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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France - from the year 1807 to the year 1814, Vol. 2 of 6 - -Author: William Patrick Francis Napier - -Release Date: March 3, 2022 [eBook #67554] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 2 OF 6 *** - - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. - - A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}, for example com^d or 12^{th}. - - Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been - placed at the end of the book. - - With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings - of names have not been changed. - - The tables in this book are best viewed using a monospace font. - - Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book. - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - WAR IN THE PENINSULA - - AND IN THE - - SOUTH OF FRANCE, - - FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. - - BY - - W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B. - - LT.-COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT. - - VOL. II. - - LONDON: - THOMAS AND WILLIAM BOONE, STRAND. - - MDCCCXXIX. - - - - -TABLE OF CONTENTS. - - - BOOK V. - - - CHAPTER I. - - Slight effect produced in England by the result of the - campaign--Debates in parliament--Treaty with Spain--Napoleon - receives addresses at Valladolid--Joseph enters Madrid--Appointed - the emperor’s lieutenant--Distribution of the French army--The - duke of Dantzig forces the bridge of Almaraz--Toledo entered - by the first corps--Infantado and Palacios ordered to advance - upon Madrid--Cuesta appointed to the command of Galluzzo’s - troops--Florida Blanca dies at Seville--Succeeded in the - presidency by the marquis of Astorga--Money arrives at Cadiz from - Mexico--Bad conduct of the central junta--State of the Spanish - army--Constancy of the soldiers--Infantado moves on Tarancon--His - advanced guard defeated there--French retire towards - Toledo--Disputes in the Spanish army--Battle of Ucles--Retreat - of Infantado--Cartoajal supersedes him, and advances to Ciudad - Real--Cuesta takes post on the Tagus, and breaks down the bridge - of Almaraz _Page_ 1 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Operations in Aragon--Confusion in Zaragoza--The third and fifth - corps invest that city--Fortification described--Monte Torrero - taken--Attack on the suburb repulsed--Mortier takes post at - Calatayud--The convent of San Joseph taken--The bridge-head - carried--Huerba passed--Device of the Spanish leaders to - encourage the besieged--Marquis of Lazan takes post on the - Sierra de Alcubierre--Lasnes arrives in the French camp--Recalls - Mortier--Lazan defeated--Gallant exploit of Mariano Galindo--The - walls of the town taken by assault--General Lacoste and colonel - San Genis slain 18 - - - CHAPTER III. - - System of terror--The convent of St. Monica taken--Spaniards - attempt to retake it, but fail--St. Augustin taken--French - change their mode of attack--Spaniards change their mode of - defence--Terrible nature of the contest--Convent of Jesus taken - on the side of the suburb--Attack on the suburb repulsed--Convent - of Francisco taken--Mine exploded under the university fails, - and the besieged are repulsed--The Cosso passed--Fresh mines - worked under the university, and in six other places--French - soldiers dispirited--Lasnes encourages them--The houses - leading down to the quay carried by storm--An enormous mine - under the university being sprung, that building is carried - by assault--The suburb is taken--Baron Versage killed, and - two thousand Spaniards surrender--Successful attack on the - right bank of the Ebro--Palafox demands terms, which are - refused--Fire resumed--Miserable condition of the city--Terrible - pestilence, and horrible sufferings of the besieged--Zaragoza - surrenders--Observations 38 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - Operations in Catalonia--St. Cyr commands the seventh - corps--Passes the frontier--State of Catalonia--Palacios fixes - his head-quarters at Villa Franca--Duhesme forces the line of - the Llobregat--Returns to Barcelona--English army from Sicily - designed to act in Catalonia--Prevented by Murat--Duhesme forages - El Vallés--Action of San Culgat--General Vives supersedes - Palacios--Spanish army augments--Blockade of Barcelona--Siege - of Rosas--Folly and negligence of the junta--Entrenchments - in the town carried by the besiegers--Marquis of Lazan, with - six thousand men, reaches Gerona--Lord Cochrane enters the - Trinity--Repulses several assaults--Citadel surrenders 5th - December--St. Cyr marches on Barcelona--Crosses the Ter--Deceives - Lazan--Turns Hostalrich--Defeats Milans at San Celoni--Battle of - Cardadeu--Caldagues retires behind the Llobregat--Negligence of - Duhesme--Battle of Molino del Rey 54 - - - CHAPTER V. - - Tumult in Tarragona--Reding proclaimed general--Reinforcements - join the Spaniards--Actions at Bruch--Lazan advances, and - fights at Castel Ampurias--He quarrels with Reding, and marches - towards Zaragoza--Reding’s plans--St. Cyr breaks Reding’s - line at Llacuna--Actions at Capelades, Igualada, and St. - Magi--French general, unable to take the abbey of Creuz, turns - it, and reaches Villaradona--Joined by Souham’s division, - takes post at Valls and Pla--Reding rallies his centre and - left wing--Endeavours to reach Taragona--Battle of Valls--Weak - condition of Tortosa--St. Cyr blockades Taragona--Sickness - in that city--St. Cyr resolves to retire--Chabran forces the - bridge of Molino del Rey--Conspiracy in Barcelona fails--Colonel - Briche arrives with a detachment from Aragon--St. Cyr retires - behind the Llobregat--Pino defeats Wimpfen at Tarrasa--Reding - dies--His character--Blake is appointed captain-general of the - _Coronilla_--Changes the line of operations to Aragon--Events - in that province--Suchet takes the command of the French at - Zaragoza--Colonels Pereña and Baget oblige eight French companies - to surrender--Blake advances--Battle of Alcanitz--Suchet falls - back--Disorder in his army--Blake neglects Catalonia--St. Cyr - marches by the valley of Congosto upon Vich--Action at the defile - of Garriga--Lecchi conducts the prisoners to the Fluvia--St. - Cyr hears of the Austrian war--Barcelona victualled by a French - squadron--Observations 78 - - - BOOK VI. - - CHAPTER I. - - Transactions in Portugal--State of that country--Neglected by - the English cabinet--Sir J. Cradock appointed to command the - British troops--Touches at Coruña--At Oporto--State of this - city--Lusitanian legion--State of Lisbon--Cradock endeavours to - reinforce Moore--Mr. Villiers arrives at Lisbon--Pikes given - to the populace--Destitute state of the army--Mr. Frere, and - others, urge Cradock to move into Spain--The reinforcements - for sir J. Moore halted at Castello Branco--General Cameron - sent to Almeida--French advanced guard reaches Merida--Cradock - relinquishes the design of reinforcing the army in Spain, - and concentrates his own troops at Saccavem--Discontents in - Lisbon--Defenceless state and danger of Portugal--Relieved by sir - J. Moore’s advance to Sahagun 112 - - - CHAPTER II. - - French retire from Merida--Send a force to Plasencia--The - direct intercourse between Portugal and sir J. Moore’s army - interrupted--Military description of Portugal--Situation of - the troops--Cradock again pressed, by Mr. Frere and others, to - move into Spain--The ministers ignorant of the real state of - affairs--Cradock hears of Moore’s advance to Sahagun--Embarks two - thousand men to reinforce him--Hears of the retreat to Coruña, - and re-lands them--Admiral Berkely arrives at Lisbon--Ministers - more anxious to get possession of Cadiz than to defend - Portugal--Five thousand men, under general Sherbrooke, embarked - at Portsmouth--Sir George Smith reaches Cadiz--State of that - city--He demands troops from Lisbon--General Mackenzie sails from - thence, with troops--Negotiations with the junta--Mr. Frere’s - weak proceedings--Tumult in Cadiz--The negotiation fails 127 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Weakness of the British army in Portugal--General Cameron - marches to Lisbon--Sir R. Wilson remains near Ciudad - Rodrigo--Sir J. Cradock prepares to take a defensive position - at Passo d’Arcos--Double dealing of the regency--The populace - murder foreigners, and insult the British troops--Anarchy in - Oporto--British government ready to abandon Portugal--Change - their intention--Military system of Portugal--the regency demand - an English general--Beresford is sent to them--Sherbrooke’s and - Mackenzie’s troops arrive at Lisbon--Beresford arrives there, and - takes the command of the native force--Change in the aspect of - affairs--Sir J. Cradock encamps at Lumiar--Relative positions of - the allied and French armies--Marshal Beresford desires sir J. - Cradock to march against Soult--Cradock refuses--Various unwise - projects broached by different persons 142 - - - BOOK VII. - - CHAPTER I. - - Coruña and Ferrol surrender to Soult--He is ordered, by the - emperor, to invade Portugal--The first corps is directed to aid - this operation--Soult goes to St. Jago--Distressed state of the - second corps--Operations of Romana and state of Gallicia--Soult - commences his march--Arrives on the Minho--Occupies Tuy, Vigo, - and Guardia--Drags large boats over land from Guardia to Campo - Saucos--Attempt to pass the Minho--Is repulsed by the Portuguese - peasantry--Importance of this repulse--Soult changes his - plan--Marches on Orense--Defeats the insurgents at Franquera, at - Ribidavia, and in the valley of the Avia--Leaves his artillery - and stores in Tuy--Defeats the Spanish insurgents in several - places, and prepares to invade Portugal--Defenceless state of - the northern provinces of that kingdom--Bernadim Friere advances - to the Cavado river--Sylveira advances to Chaves--Concerts - operations with Romana--Disputes between the Portuguese and - Spanish troops--Ignorance of the generals 162 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Soult enters Portugal--Action at Monterey--Franceschi makes - great slaughter of the Spaniards--Portuguese retreat upon - Chaves--Romana flies to Puebla Senabria--Portuguese mutiny--Three - thousand throw themselves into Chaves--Soult takes that - town--Marches upon Braga--Forces the defiles of Ruivaens and - Venda Nova--Tumults and disorders in the Portuguese camp - at Braga--Murder of general Friere and others--Battle of - Braga--Soult marches against Oporto--Disturbed state of that - town--Sylveira retakes Chaves--The French force the passage of - the Ave--The Portuguese murder general Vallonga--French appear - in front of Oporto--Negotiate with the bishop--Violence of the - people--General Foy taken--Battle of Oporto--The city stormed - with great slaughter 183 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Operations of the first and fourth corps--General state of the - French army--Description of the valley of the Tagus--Inertness - of marshal Victor--Albuquerque and Cartoajal dispute--The - latter advance in La Mancha--General Sebastiani wins the battle - of Ciudad Real--Marshal Victor forces the passage of the - Tagus, and drives Cuesta’s army from all its positions--French - cavalry checked at Miajadas--Victor crosses the Guadiana - at Medellin--Albuquerque joins Cuesta’s army--Battle of - Medellin--Spaniards totally defeated--Victor ordered, by the - king, to invade Portugal--Opens a secret communication with some - persons in Badajos--The peasants of Albuera discover the plot, - which fails--Operations of general Lapisse--He drives back sir - R. Wilson’s posts, and makes a slight attempt to take Ciudad - Rodrigo--Marches suddenly towards the Tagus, and forces the - bridge of Alcantara--Joins Victor at Merida--General insurrection - along the Portuguese frontier--The central junta remove Cartoajal - from the command, and increase Cuesta’s authority, whose army is - reinforced--Joseph discontented with Lapisse’s movement--Orders - Victor to retake the bridge of Alcantara 208 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - The bishop of Oporto flies to Lisbon, and joins the - regency--Humanity of marshal Soult--The Anti-Braganza party - revives in the north of Portugal--The leaders make proposals - to Soult--He encourages them--Error arising out of this - proceeding--Effects of Soult’s policy--Assassination of - colonel Lameth--Execution at Arifana--Distribution of the - French troops--Franceschi opposed, on the Vouga, by colonel - Trant--Loison falls back behind the Souza--Heudelet marches to - the relief of Tuy--The Spaniards, aided by some English frigates, - oblige thirteen hundred French to capitulate at Vigo--Heudelet - returns to Braga--The insurrection in the Entre Minho e Douro - ceases--Sylveira menaces Oporto--Laborde reinforces Loison, - and drives Sylveira over the Tamega--Gallant conduct and death - of colonel Patrick at Amarante--Combats at Amarante--French - repulsed--Ingenious device of captain Brochard--The bridge of - Amarante carried by storm--Loison advances to the Douro--Is - suddenly checked--Observations 231 - - - BOOK VIII. - - CHAPTER I. - - Anarchy in Portugal--Sir J. Cradock quits the command--Sir - A. Wellesley arrives at Lisbon--Happy effect of his - presence--Nominated captain-general--His military position - described--Resolves to march against Soult--Reaches - Coimbra--Conspiracy in the French army--D’Argenton’s - proceedings--Sir A. Wellesley’s situation compared with that of - Sir J. Cradock 262 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Campaign on the Douro--Relative position of the French and - English armies--Sir Arthur Wellesley marches to the Vouga--Sends - Beresford to the Douro--A division under general Hill passes - the lake of Ovar--Attempt to surprise Francheschi fails--Combat - of Grijon--The French re-cross the Douro and destroy the - bridge at Oporto--Passage of the Douro--Soult retreats upon - Amarante--Beresford reaches Amarante--Loison retreats from - that town--Sir Arthur marches upon Braga--Desperate situation - of Soult--His energy--He crosses the Sierra Catalina--Rejoins - Loison--Reaches Carvalho d’Esté--Falls back to Salamonde--Daring - action of major Dulong--The French pass the Ponte Nova - and the Saltador, and retreat by Montalegre--Soult enters - Orense--Observations 277 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Romana surprises Villa Franca--Ney advances to Lugo--Romana - retreats to the Asturias--Reforms the government there--Ney - invades the Asturias by the west--Bonnet and Kellerman enter - that province by the east and by the south--General Mahi flies - to the valley of the Syl--Romana embarks at Gihon--Ballasteros - takes St. Andero--Defeated by Bonnet--Kellerman returns to - Valladolid--Ney marches for Coruña--Carera defeats Maucune at - St. Jago Compostella--Mahi blockades Lugo--It is relieved by - Soult--Romana rejoins his army and marches to Orense--Lapisse - storms the bridge of Alcantara--Cuesta advances to the - Guadiana--Lapisse retires--Victor concentrates his army at - Torremocha--Effect of the war in Germany upon that of Spain--Sir - A. Wellesley encamps at Abrantes--The bridge of Alcantara - destroyed--Victor crosses the Tagus at Almaraz--Beresford returns - to the north of Portugal--Ney and Soult combine operations--Soult - scours the valleys of the Syl--Romana cut off from Castile and - thrown back upon Orense--Ney advances towards Vigo--Combat of - San Payo--Misunderstanding between him and Soult--Ney retreats - to Coruña--Soult marches to Zamora--Franceschi falls into the - hands of the Capuchino--His melancholy fate--Ney abandons - Gallicia--View of affairs in Aragon--Battles of Maria and - Belchite 308 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - State of the British army--Embarrassments of sir Arthur - Wellesley--State and numbers of the French armies--State and - numbers of the Spanish armies--Some account of the _partidas_, - commonly called _guerillas_--Intrigues of Mr. Frere--Conduct - of the central junta--Their inhuman treatment of the French - prisoners--Corruption and incapacity--State of the Portuguese - army--Impolicy of the British government--Expedition of - Walcheren--Expedition against Italy 334 - - - BOOK IX. - - CHAPTER I. - - Campaign of Talavera--Choice of operations--Sir Arthur Wellesley - moves into Spain--Joseph marches against Venegas--Orders Victor - to return to Talavera--Cuesta arrives at Almaraz--Sir Arthur - reaches Plasencia--Interview with Cuesta--Plan of operation - arranged--Sir Arthur, embarrassed by the want of provisions, - detaches sir Robert Wilson up the Vera de Plasencia, passes - the Tietar, and unites with Cuesta at Oropesa--Skirmish at - Talavera--Bad conduct of the Spanish troops--Victor takes post - behind the Alberche--Cuesta’s absurdity--Victor retires from the - Alberche--Sir Arthur, in want of provisions, refuses to pass that - river--Intrigues of Mr. Frere--The junta secretly orders Venegas - not to execute his part of the operation 357 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Cuesta passes the Alberche--Sir Arthur Wellesley sends two - English divisions to support him--Soult is appointed to command - the second, fifth, and sixth corps--He proposes to besiege Ciudad - Rodrigo and threaten Lisbon--He enters Salamanca, and sends - general Foy to Madrid to concert the plan of operations--The king - quits Madrid--Unites his whole army--Crosses the Guadarama river, - and attacks Cuesta--Combat of Alcabon--Spaniards fall back in - confusion to the Alberche--Cuesta refuses to pass that river--His - dangerous position--The French advance--Cuesta re-crosses the - Tietar--Sir Arthur Wellesley draws up the combined forces on the - position of Talavera--The king crosses the Tietar--Skirmish at - Casa de Salinas--Combat on the evening of the 27th--Panic in the - Spanish army--Combat on the morning of the 28th--The king holds a - council of war--Jourdan and Victor propose different plans--The - king follows that of Victor--Battle of Talavera--The French - re-cross the Alberche--General Craufurd arrives in the English - camp--His extraordinary march--Observations 377 - - - CHAPTER III. - - The king goes to Illescas with the fourth corps and - reserve--Sir R. Wilson advances to Escalona--Victor retires - to Maqueda--Conduct of the Spaniards at Talavera--Cuesta’s - cruelty--The allied generals hear of Soult’s movement upon - Baños--Bassecour’s division marches towards that point--The - pass of Baños forced--Sir A. Wellesley marches against - Soult--Proceedings of that marshal--He crosses the Bejar, and - arrives at Plasencia with three _corps d’armée_--Cuesta abandons - the British hospitals, at Talavera, to the enemy, and retreats - upon Oropesa--Dangerous position of the allies--Sir Arthur - crosses the Tagus at Arzobispo--The French arrive near that - bridge--Cuesta passes the Tagus--Combat of Arzobispo--Soult’s - plans overruled by the king--Ney defeats sir R. Wilson at Baños, - and returns to France 410 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - Venegas advances to Aranjues--Skirmishes there--Sebastiani - crosses the Tagus at Toledo--Venegas concentrates his - army--Battle of Almonacid--Sir Arthur Wellesley contemplates - passing the Tagus at the Puente de Cardinal, is prevented - by the ill-conduct of the junta--His troops distressed for - provisions--He resolves to retire into Portugal--False charge - made by Cuesta against the British army refuted--Beresford’s - proceedings--Mr. Frere superseded by lord Wellesley--The English - army abandons its position at Jaraceijo and marches towards - Portugal--Consternation of the junta--Sir A. Wellesley defends - his conduct, and refuses to remain in Spain--Takes a position - within the Portuguese frontier--Sickness in the army 429 - - - CHAPTER V. - - General observations on the campaign--Comparison between the - operations of sir John Moore and sir A. Wellesley 447 - - - - -APPENDIX. - - _Page_ - No. I. Six Sections, containing the returns of the French army 471 - - II. Three Sections; justificatory extracts from sir J. Moore’s - and sir J. Cradock’s papers, and from Parliamentary - documents, illustrating the state of Spain 475 - - III. Seven Sections; justificatory extracts from sir J. Cradock’s - papers, illustrating the state of Portugal 480 - - IV. Extracts from sir J. Cradock’s instructions 491 - - V. Ditto from sir J. Cradock’s papers relative to a deficiency - in the supply of his troops 492 - - VI. Three Sections; miscellaneous 495 - - VII. Extracts from Mr. Frere’s correspondence 497 - - VIII. Ditto from sir J. Cradock’s papers relating to Cadiz 499 - - IX. General Mackenzie’s narrative of his proceedings at Cadiz 500 - - X. Three Sections; extracts from sir J. Cradock’s papers, - shewing that Portugal was neglected by the English cabinet 506 - - XI. State and distribution of the English troops in Portugal - and Spain, January 6, April 6, April 22, May 1, June 25, - July 25, and September 25, 1809 509 - - XII. 1º. Marshal Beresford to sir J. Cradock--2º. Sir J. Cradock - to marshal Beresford 511 - - XIII. Justificatory extracts relating to the conduct of marshal - Soult 517 - - XIV. Sir A. Wellesley to sir J. Cradock 519 - - XV. Ditto to lord Castlereagh 520 - - XVI. Ditto Ditto 522 - - XVII. Ditto to the marquis of Wellesley 523 - - XVIII. 1º. General Hill to sir A. Wellesley--2º. Colonel Stopford - to general Sherbrooke 534 - - - - -LIST OF PLATES. - - - No. 1. Siege of Zaragoza _to face page_ 48 - 2. Operations in Catalonia _to face page_ 102 - 3. Operations of Cuesta and Victor on the Tagus - and Guadiana _to face page_ 226 - 4. Passage of the Douro _to face page_ 290 - 5. Operations between the Mondego and the Mincio _to face page_ 300 - 6. Operations of marshals Soult and Ney in - Gallicia _to face page_ 326 - 7. Operations of the British, French & Spanish - armies _to face page_ 409 - 8. Battle of Talavera _to face page_ 416 - - - - -NOTICE. - - -General Semelé’s journal, referred to in this volume, is only an -unattested copy; the rest of the manuscript authorities quoted or -consulted are original papers belonging to, and communications -received from, the duke of Wellington, marshal Soult, marshal -Jourdan, Mr. Stuart,[1] sir J. Cradock,[2] sir John Moore, and -other persons employed either in the British or French armies -during the Peninsular War. - -The returns of the French army are taken from the emperor -Napoleon’s original Muster Rolls. - -The letter S. marks those papers received from marshal Soult. - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - PENINSULAR WAR. - - - - -BOOK V. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -The effect produced in England by the unfortunate issue of sir John -Moore’s campaign, was not proportionable to the importance of the -subject. The people, trained to party politics, and possessing no -real power to rebuke the folly of the cabinet, regarded disasters -and triumphs with factious rather than with national feelings, -and it was alike easy to draw the public attention from affairs -of weight, and to fix it upon matters of little moment. In the -beginning of 1809, the duke of York’s conduct being impeached, -a parliamentary investigation followed; and to drag the private -frailties of that prince before the world, was thought essential to -the welfare of the country, when the incapacity which had caused -England and Spain to mourn in tears of blood, was left unprobed. -An insular people only, who are protected by their situation from -the worst evils of war, may suffer themselves to be thus deluded; -but if an unfortunate campaign were to bring a devastating enemy -into the heart of the country, the honour of a general, and the -whole military policy of the cabinet, would no longer be considered -as mere subjects for the exercise of a vile sophist’s talents for -misrepresentation. - -It is true that the ill success of the British arms was a topic, -upon which many orators in both houses of parliament expatiated -with great eloquence, but the discussions were chiefly remarkable, -as examples of acute debating without any knowledge of facts. The -opposition speakers, eager to criminate the government, exaggerated -the loss and distress of the retreat, and comprehending neither -the movements nor the motives of sir John Moore, urged several -untenable accusations against their adversaries. The ministers, -disunited by personal feelings, did not all adopt the same ground -of defence. Lord Castlereagh and lord Liverpool, passing over the -errors of the cabinet by which the general had been left only a -choice of difficulties, asserted, and truly, that the advantages -derived from the advance to Sahagun more than compensated for the -losses in the subsequent retreat. Both those statesmen paid an -honourable tribute to the merits of the commander; but Mr. Canning, -unscrupulously resolute to screen Mr. Frere, assented to all the -erroneous statements of the opposition, and endeavoured with -malignant dexterity to convert them into charges against the fallen -general. Sir John Moore was, he said, answerable for the events of -the campaign, whether the operations were glorious or distressful, -whether to be admired or deplored, they were his own, for he had -kept the ministers ignorant of his proceedings. Being pressed -closely on that point by Mr. C. Hutchinson, Mr. Canning repeated -this assertion. Not long afterwards, sir John Moore’s letters, -written almost daily and furnishing exact and copious information -of all that was passing in the Peninsula, were laid before the -house. - -The reverses experienced in Spain had somewhat damped the ardour -of the English people; but a cause so rightful in itself, was -still popular, and a treaty having been concluded with the junta, -by which the contracting powers bound themselves to make common -cause against France, and to agree to no peace except by mutual -consent, the ministers appeared resolute to support the contest. -But while professing unbounded confidence in the result of the -struggle, they already looked upon the Peninsula as a secondary -object; for the preparations of Austria, and the reputation of -the archduke Charles, whose talents were foolishly said to exceed -Napoleon’s, had awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions. It was -more agreeable to the aristocratic feelings of the English cabinet, -that the French should be defeated by a monarch in Germany, than by -a plebeian insurrection in Spain. The obscure intrigues carried on -through the princess of Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies -of Germany emanating as they did from patrician sources, engaged -all the attention of the ministers, and exciting their sympathy, -nursed those distempered feelings, which led them to see weakness -and disaffection in France when, throughout that mighty empire, few -desired and none dared openly to oppose the emperor’s wishes, when -even secret discontent was confined to some royalist chiefs and -splenetic republicans, whose influence was never felt until after -Napoleon had suffered the direst reverses. - -Unable to conceive the extent of that monarch’s views, and the -grandeur of his genius, the ministers attributed the results of -his profound calculations to a blind chance, his victories to -treason, to corruption, to any thing but that admirable skill, -with which he wielded the most powerful military force that ever -obeyed the orders of a single chief. And thus self-deluded, and -misjudging the difficulties to be encountered, they adopted every -idle project, and squandered their resources without any great -or decided effort. While negotiating with the Spanish Junta for -the occupation of Cadiz, they were also planning an expedition -against Sicily; and while loudly asserting their resolution to -defend Portugal, reserved their principal force for a blow against -Holland; their preparations for the last object being, however, -carried on with a pomp and publicity little suitable to war. With -what a mortal calamity that pageant closed, shall hereafter be -noticed; but at present it is fitting to describe the operations -that took place in Spain, coincident with and subsequent to the -retreat of sir John Moore. - -[Sidenote: Nellerto.] - -[Sidenote: Azanza and O’Farril.] - -It has been already stated, that when the capital surrendered to -the Emperor, he refused to permit Joseph to return there, unless -the public bodies and the heads of families would unite to demand -his restoration, and swear, without any mental reservation, to -be true to him. Registers had consequently been opened in the -different quarters of the city, and twenty-eight thousand six -hundred heads of families inscribed their names, and voluntarily -swore, in presence of the host, that they were sincere in their -desire to receive Joseph. After this, deputations from all the -councils, from the junta of commerce and money, the hall of the -Alcaldes, and from the corporation, waited on the emperor at -Valladolid, and being there joined by the municipality of that -town, and by deputies from Astorga, Leon, and other places, -presented the oath, and prayed that Joseph might be king. Napoleon -thus entreated, consented that his brother should return to Madrid, -and reassume his kingly functions. - -It would be idle to argue from this apparently voluntary submission -to the French emperor, that a change favourable to the usurpation -had been produced in the feelings of the Spanish people; but -it is evident that Napoleon’s victories and policy had been so -far effectual, that in the capital, and many other great towns, -the multitude as well as the notables were, either from fear or -conviction, submissive to his will; and it is but reasonable -to suppose, that if his conquests had not been interrupted by -extraneous circumstances, this example would have been generally -followed, in preference to the more glorious, but ineffectual, -resistance made by the inhabitants of those cities, whose fortitude -and whose calamities have forced from mankind a sorrowful -admiration. The cause of Spain at this moment was in truth lost; -if any cause depending upon war, which is but a succession of -violent and sudden changes, can be called so; for her armies were -dispersed, her government bewildered, and her people dismayed; the -cry of resistance had ceased, and in its stead the stern voice of -Napoleon, answered by the tread of three hundred thousand French -veterans was heard throughout the land. But the hostility of -Austria having arrested the emperor’s career in the Peninsula, the -energy of the Spaniards revived at the abrupt cessation of his -terrific warfare. - -[Sidenote: King’s correspondence captured at Vittoria, MSS.] - -Joseph, escorted by his French guards, in number between five -and six thousand, entered Madrid in state the 23d of January. -He was, however, a king without revenues, and he would have been -without even the semblance of authority, if he had not been -likewise nominated the emperor’s lieutenant in Spain, by virtue -of which title he was empowered to move the French army at his -will. This power was one extremely unacceptable to the marshals, -and he would have found it difficult to enforce it, even though -he had restrained the exercise to the limits prescribed by his -brother. But disdaining to separate the general from the monarch, -he conveyed his orders to the French army, through his Spanish -ministers, and the army in its turn disdained and resisted the -assumed authority of men, who, despised for their want of military -knowledge, were also suspected as favouring interests essentially -differing from those of the troops. - -The iron grasp that had compressed the pride and the ambitious -jealousy of the marshals being thus relaxed, the passions that -had ruined the patriots began to work among their enemies, -producing indeed less fatal effects, because their scope was more -circumscribed, but sufficiently pernicious to stop the course of -conquest. The French army, no longer a compact body, terrible -alike from its massive strength, and its flexible activity, -became a collection of independent bands, each formidable in -itself, but, from the disunion of the generals, slow to combine -for any great object; and plainly discovering, by irregularities -and insubordination, that they knew when a warrior, and when a -voluptuous monarch was at their head; but these evils were only -felt at a later period; and the distribution of the troops, when -Napoleon quitted Valladolid, still bore the impress of his genius. - -The first corps was quartered in La Mancha. - -The second corps was destined to invade Portugal. - -The third and fifth corps carried on the siege of Zaragoza. - -The fourth corps remained in the valley of the Tagus. - -The sixth corps, wanting its third division, was appointed to hold -Gallicia. - -The seventh corps continued always in Catalonia. - -The imperial guards, directed on Vittoria, contributed to the -security of the great communication with France until Zaragoza -should fall, and were yet ready to march when wanted for the -Austrian war. - -General Dessolles, with the third division of the sixth corps, -returned to Madrid. General Bonnet, with the fifth division of the -second corps, remained in the Montagna St. Andero. - -General Lapisse, with the second division of the first corps, was -sent to Salamanca, where he was joined by Maupetit’s brigade of -cavalry, which had crossed the Sierra de Bejar. - -The reserve of heavy cavalry being broken up, was distributed, by -divisions, in the following order:-- - -Latour Maubourg’s joined the first corps. Lorge’s and Lahoussaye’s -were attached to the second corps. Lassalle’s was sent to the -fourth corps. The sixth corps was reinforced with two brigades. -Milhaud’s division remained at Madrid, and Kellerman’s guarded the -lines of communication between Tudela, Burgos, and Palencia. - -Thus, Madrid being still the centre of operations, the French were -so distributed, that by a concentric movement on that capital, -they could crush every insurrection within the circle of their -positions; and the great masses, being kept upon the principal -roads diverging from Madrid to the extremities of the Peninsula, -intercepted all communication between the Provinces: while the -second corps, thrust out, as it were, beyond the circumference, -and destined, as the fourth corps had been, to sweep round from -point to point, was sure of finding a supporting army, and a good -line of retreat, at every great route leading from Madrid to the -yet unsubdued provinces of the Peninsula. The communication with -France was, at the same time, secured by the fortresses of Burgos, -Pampeluna, and St. Sebastian; and by the divisions posted at St. -Ander, Burgos, Bilbao, and Vittoria; and it was supported by a -reserve at Bayonne. - -The northern provinces were parcelled out into military governments, -the chiefs of which corresponded with each other; and, by the -means of moveable columns, repressed every petty insurrection. The -third and fifth corps, also, having their base at Pampeluna, and -their line of operations directed against Zaragoza, served as an -additional covering force to the communication with France, and were -themselves exposed to no flank attacks, except from the side of -Cuença, where the duke of Infantado commanded; but that general was -himself watched by the first corps. - -[Sidenote: Muster-rolls of the French army, MSS.] - -All the lines of correspondence, not only from France but between -the different corps, were maintained by fortified posts, having -greater or lesser garrisons, according to their importance. -Between Bayonne and Burgos there were eleven military stations. -Between Burgos and Madrid, by the road of Aranda and Somosierra, -there were eight; and eleven others protected the more circuitous -route to the capital by Valladolid, Segovia, and the Guadarama. -Between Valladolid and Zaragoza the line was secured by fifteen -intermediate points. The communication between Valladolid and St. -Ander contained eight posts; and nine others connected the former -town with Villa Franca del Bierzo, by the route of Benevente and -Astorga; finally, two were established between Benevente and Leon. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 1, section 1.] - -At this period, the force of the army, exclusive of Joseph’s French -guards, was three hundred and twenty-four thousand four hundred and -eleven men, about thirty-nine thousand being cavalry. - -Fifty-eight thousand men were in hospital. - -The depôts, governments, garrisons, posts of correspondence, -prisoners, and “_battalions of march_,” composed of stragglers, -absorbed about twenty-five thousand men. - -The remainder were under arms, with their regiments; and, -consequently, more than two hundred and forty thousand men were in -the field: while the great line of communication with France was -(and the military reader will do well to mark this, the key-stone -of Napoleon’s system) protected by above fifty thousand men, whose -positions were strengthened by three fortresses and sixty-four -posts of correspondence, each more or less fortified. - -Having thus shewn to the reader the military state of the French, -I shall now proceed with the narrative of their operations; -following, as in the first volume, a local rather than a -chronological arrangement of events. - - -OPERATIONS IN ESTREMADURA AND LA MANCHA. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, sections 2 and 3.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -The defeat of Galluzzo has been incidentally touched upon before. -The duke of Dantzic having observed that the Spanish general, with -six thousand raw levies, pretended to defend a line of forty miles, -made a feint of crossing the Tagus, at Arzobispo, and then suddenly -descending to Almaraz, forced a passage over that bridge, on the -24th of December, killed and wounded many Spaniards, and captured -four guns: and so complete was the dispersion, that for a long time -after, not a man was to be found in arms throughout Estremadura. -The French cavalry were at first placed on the tracks of the -fugitives; but intelligence of sir John Moore’s advance to Sahagun -being received, the pursuit ceased at Merida, and the fourth corps, -which had left eight hundred and thirty men in garrison at Segovia, -took post between Talavera and Placentia. The duke of Dantzic -was then recalled to France, and general Sebastiani succeeded to -the command of the fourth corps. It was at this period that the -first corps (of which the division of Lapisse only had followed -the emperor to Astorga) moved against Toledo, and that town was -occupied without opposition. The French outposts were then pushed -towards Cuença on the one side, and towards the Sierra Morena on -the other. - -Meanwhile, the central junta, changing its first design, retired -to Seville, instead of Badajos; and being continually urged, both -by Mr. Stuart and Mr. Frere, to make some effort to lighten the -pressure on the English army, ordered Palafox and the duke of -Infantado to advance; the one from Zaragoza towards Tudela, the -other from Cuença towards Madrid. The marquis of Palacios, who had -been removed from Catalonia, and was now at the head of five or -six thousand levies in the Sierra Morena, was also directed to -advance into La Mancha; and Galluzzo, deprived of his command, was -constituted a prisoner, along with Cuesta, Castaños, and a number -of other culpable or unfortunate officers, who, vainly demanding a -judgement on their cases, were dragged from place to place by the -government. - -Cuesta was, however, so popular in Estremadura, that the central -junta, although fearing and detesting him, consented to his being -placed at the head of Galluzzo’s fugitives, part of whom had, -when the pursuit ceased, rallied behind the Guadiana, and were -now, with the aid of fresh levies, again taking the form, rather -than the consistence, of an army. This appointment was an act -of deplorable weakness and incapacity. The moral effect was to -degrade the government by exposing its fears and weakness; and, in -a military view, it was destructive, because Cuesta was physically -and mentally incapable of command. Obstinate, jealous, and stricken -in years, he was heedless of time and circumstances, of disposition -and fitness. To punish with a barbarous severity, and to rush -headlong into battle, constituted, in his mind, all the functions -of a general. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, section 2d.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13. Vol. I.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, section 2.] - -The president, Florida Blanca, being eighty-one years of age, died -at Seville, and the marquis of Astorga succeeded him; but the -character of the junta was in no manner affected by the change. -Some fleeting indications of vigour had been produced by the -imminence of the danger during the flight from Aranjuez, but a -large remittance of silver, from South America, having arrived -at Cadiz, the attention of the members was so absorbed, by this -object, that the public weal was blotted from their remembrance, -and even Mr. Frere, ashamed of their conduct, appeared to acquiesce -in the justness of sir John Moore’s estimate of the value of -Spanish co-operation. - -The number of men to be enrolled for the defence of the country had -been early fixed at five hundred thousand, but scarcely one-third -had joined their colours; nevertheless, considerable bodies were -assembling at different points, because the people, especially -those of the southern provinces, although dismayed, were obedient, -and the local authorities, at a distance from the actual scene -of war, rigorously enforced the law of enrolment, and sent the -recruits to the armies, hoping thereby either to stave the war off -from their own districts, or to have the excuse of being without -fighting men, to plead for quiet submission. - -The fugitive troops also readily collected again at any given -point, partly from patriotism, partly because the French were in -possession of their native provinces, partly that they attributed -their defeats to the treachery of their generals, and partly -that, being deceived by the gross falsehoods and boasting of the -government, they, with ready vanity, imagined that the enemy had -invariably suffered enormous losses. In fine, for the reasons -mentioned in the commencement of this history, men were to be had -in abundance; but, beyond assembling them and appointing some -incapable person to command, nothing was done for defence. - -The officers who were not deceived had no confidence either in -their own troops or in the government, nor were they themselves -confided in or respected by their men. The latter were starved, -were misused, ill-handled, and they possessed neither the compact -strength of discipline nor the daring of enthusiasm. Under such -a system, it was impossible that the peasantry could be rendered -energetic soldiers; and they certainly were not active supporters -of their country’s cause; but, with a wonderful constancy, they -suffered for it, enduring fatigue and sickness, nakedness and -famine, with patience, and displaying, in all their actions and in -all their sentiments, a distinct and powerful national character. -This constancy and the iniquity of the usurpation hallowed their -efforts in despite of their ferocity, and merits respect, though -the vices and folly of the juntas and the leading men rendered the -effect of those efforts nugatory. - -Palacios, on the receipt of the orders above mentioned, advanced, -with five thousand men, to Vilharta, in La Mancha, and the duke of -Infantado, anticipating the instructions of the junta, was already -in motion from Cuença. His army, reinforced by the divisions of -Cartoajal and Lilli and by fresh levies, was about twenty thousand -men, of which two thousand were cavalry. To check the incursions -of the French horsemen, he had, a few days after the departure of -Napoleon from Madrid, detached general Senra and general Venegas -with eight thousand infantry and all the horse to scour the country -round Tarancon and Aranjuez; the former halted at Horcajada, and -the latter endeavoured to cut off a French detachment, but was -himself surprised and beaten by a very inferior force. - -Marshal Victor, however, withdrew his advanced posts, and, -concentrating Ruffin’s and Villatte’s divisions of infantry and -Latour Maubourg’s cavalry, at Villa de Alorna, in the vicinity of -Toledo, left Venegas in possession of Tarancon. But, among the -Spanish generals, mutual recriminations succeeded this failure: -the duke of Infantado possessed neither authority nor talents to -repress their disputes, and in this untoward state of affairs -receiving the orders of the junta, he immediately projected a -movement on Toledo, intending to seize that place and Aranjuez, to -break down the bridges, and to maintain the line of the Tagus. - -Quitting Cuença on the 10th, he reached Horcajada on the 12th, with -ten thousand men, the remainder of the army, commanded by Venegas, -being near Tarancon. - -The 13th, the duke having moved to Carascosa, a town somewhat in -advance of Horcajada, met a crowd of fugitives, and heard, with -equal surprise and consternation, that the corps under Venegas was -already destroyed, and the pursuers close at hand. - - -ROUT OF UCLES. - -It appeared that Victor, uneasy at the movements of the Spanish -generals, but ignorant of their situation and intentions, had -quitted Toledo also on the 10th, and marched to Ocaña, whereupon -Venegas, falling back from Tarancon, took a position at Ucles. The -12th, the French continued to advance in two columns, of which the -one, composed of Ruffin’s division and a brigade of cavalry, lost -its way, and arrived at Alcazar; but the other, commanded by Victor -himself, and composed of Villatte’s division, the remainder of the -cavalry, and the parc of artillery, took the road of Ucles, and -came upon the position of Venegas early in the morning of the 13th. - -This meeting was unexpected by either party, but the French -attacked without hesitation, and the Spaniards, flying towards -Alcazar, fell in with Ruffin’s division, and were totally -discomfitted. Several thousands laid down their arms, and many, -dispersing, fled across the fields; some, however, keeping their -ranks, made towards Ocaña, where, coming suddenly upon the French -parc of artillery, they received a heavy discharge of grape-shot, -and dispersed. Of the whole force, a small party only, under -general Giron, succeeded in forcing its way by the road of -Carascosa, and so reached the duke of Infantado, who immediately -retreated to Cuença, and without further loss, as the French -cavalry were too fatigued to pursue briskly. - -From Cuença the duke sent his artillery towards Valencia, by the -road of Tortola; but himself, with the infantry and cavalry, -marched by Chinchilla, and from thence to Tobarra, on the frontiers -of Murcia. - -At Tobarra he turned to his right, and made for Santa Cruz de -Mudela, a town situated near the entrance to the defiles of the -Sierra Morena. There he halted in the beginning of February, after -a painful and circuitous retreat of more than two hundred miles, in -a bad season. But all his artillery had been captured at Tortola, -and his forces were, by desertion and straggling, reduced to a -handful of discontented officers and a few thousand dispirited men, -worn out with fatigue and misery. - -[Sidenote: Rocca’s Memoirs.] - -Meanwhile, Victor, after scouring a part of the province of Cuença -and disposing of his prisoners, made a sudden march upon Vilharta, -intending to surprise Palacios, but that officer apprized of the -retreat of Infantado had already effected his junction with the -latter at Santa Cruz de Mudela. Whereupon the French marshal -recalling his troops, again occupied his former position at Toledo. -The prisoners taken at Ucles were marched to Madrid, those who -were weak and unable to walk were (according to Mr. Rocca) shot by -the orders of Victor, because the Spaniards had hanged some French -prisoners. If so, it was a barbarous and a shameful retaliation, -unworthy of a soldier; for what justice or honour is there in -revenging the death of one innocent person by the murder of another. - -When Victor withdrew his posts the duke of Infantado and Palacios -proceeded to re-organize their forces under the name of the -Carolina Army. The levies from Grenada and other parts were ordered -up, and the cavalry, commanded by the duke of Alburquerque, -endeavoured to surprise a French regiment of dragoons at Mora, -but the latter getting together quickly, made a bold resistance -and effected their retreat with scarcely any loss. Alburquerque -having failed in this attempt retired to Consuegra and was attacked -the next day by superior numbers, but retired fighting and got -safely off. The duke of Infantado was now displaced, and the junta -conferred the command on general Urbina Conde de Cartaojal, who -applied himself to restore discipline, and after a time finding no -enemy in front advanced to Ciudad Real, and taking post on the left -bank of the Upper Guadiana opened a communication with Cuesta. At -this period the latter’s force amounted to sixteen thousand men, of -which three thousand were cavalry; for, as the Spaniards generally -suffered more in their flights than in their battles, the horsemen -escaped with little damage and were easily rallied again in greater -relative numbers than the infantry. - -The fourth corps having withdrawn, as I have already related, to -the right bank of the Tagus, Cuesta advanced from the Guadiana and -occupied the left bank of that river, on a line extending from the -mountains in front of Arzobispo to the Puerto de Mirabete. The -French, by fortifying an old tower, held the command of the bridge -of Arzobispo, but Cuesta immediately broke down that of Almaraz, -a magnificent structure, the centre arch of which was more than a -hundred and fifty feet in height. - -In these positions the troops on either side remained tranquil both -in La Mancha and Estremadura, and so ended the exertions made to -lighten the pressure upon the English army. Two French divisions -of infantry and as many brigades of cavalry had more than sufficed -to baffle them, and hence the imminent danger that menaced the -south of Spain, when sir John Moore’s vigorous operations drew the -emperor’s forces to the north, may be justly estimated. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS IN ARAGON. - - -From the field of battle at Tudela, all the fugitives of O’Neil’s, -and a great part of those from Castaños’s army, fled to Zaragoza -and with such speed as to bring the first news of their own -disaster. With the troops, also, came an immense number of -carriages and the military chests, for the roads were wide and -excellent and the pursuit was slack. - -The citizens and the neighbouring peasantry were astounded at this -quick and unexpected calamity. They had, with a natural credulity, -relied on the vain and boasting promises of their chiefs, and being -necessarily ignorant of the true state of affairs never doubted -that their vengeance would be sated by a speedy and complete -destruction of the French. When their hopes were thus suddenly -blasted; when they beheld troops, from whom they expected nothing -but victory, come pouring into the town with all the tumult of -panic; when the peasants of all the villages through which the -fugitives passed, came rushing into the city along with the scared -multitude of flying soldiers and camp followers; every heart was -filled with consternation, and the date of Zaragoza’s glory would -have ended with the first siege, if the success at Tudela had been -followed up by the French with that celerity and vigour which the -occasion required. - -[Sidenote: Appendix Vol. I.] - -Napoleon, foreseeing that this moment of confusion and terror -would arrive, had with his usual prudence provided the means and -given directions for such an instantaneous and powerful attack -as would inevitably have overthrown the bulwark of the eastern -provinces. But the sickness of marshal Lasnes, the difficulty of -communication, the consequent false movements of Moncey and Ney, -in fine, the intervention of fortune, omnipotent as she is in war, -baffled the emperor’s long-sighted calculations, and permitted -the leaders in the city to introduce order among the multitude, -to complete the defensive works, to provide stores, and finally -by a ferocious exercise of power to insure implicit obedience to -their minutest orders. The danger of resisting the enemy appeared -light, when a suspicious word or even a discontented gesture was -instantaneously punished by a cruel death. - -[Sidenote: Muster roll of the French Army, MSS.] - -The third corps having thus missed the favourable moment for -a sudden assault, and being reduced by sickness, by losses in -battle, and by detachments to seventeen thousand four hundred men, -including the engineers and artillery, was too weak to invest -the city in form, and, therefore, remained in observation on the -Xalon river. Meanwhile, a battering train of sixty guns, with well -furnished parcs, which had been by Napoleon’s orders previously -collected in Pampeluna, were dragged by cattle to Tudela and -embarked upon the canal leading to Zaragoza. - -[Sidenote: Cavalhero. Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Marshal Mortier, with the fifth corps, was also directed to assist -in the siege, and he was in march to join Moncey, when his progress -also was arrested by sir John Moore’s advance towards Burgos. But -the utmost scope of that general’s operation being soon determined -by Napoleon’s counter-movement, Mortier resumed his march to -reinforce Moncey, and, on the 20th of December, their united corps, -forming an army of thirty-five thousand men of all arms, advanced -against Zaragoza. At this time, however, confidence had been -restored in that town, and all the preparations necessary for a -vigorous defence were completed. - -The nature of the plain in which Zaragoza is situated, the course -of the rivers, the peculiar construction of the houses, and -the multitude of convents have been already described, but the -difficulties to be encountered by the French troops were no longer -the same as in the first siege. At that time but little assistance -had been derived from science, but now, instructed by experience -and inspired as it were by the greatness of their resolution, -neither the rules of art nor the resources of genius were neglected -by the defenders. - -Zaragoza offered four irregular fronts, of which the first, -reckoning from the right of the town, extended from the Ebro to -a convent of barefooted Carmelites, and was about three hundred -yards wide. - -The second, twelve hundred yards in extent, reached from the -Carmelites to a bridge over the Huerba. - -The third, likewise of twelve hundred yards, stretched from this -bridge to an oil manufactory built beyond the walls. - -The fourth, being on an opening of four hundred yards, reached from -the oil manufactory to the Ebro. - -[Sidenote: Rogniat’s Seige of Zaragoza. Cavalhero’s Siege of -Zaragoza.] - -The first front, fortified by an ancient wall and flanked by the -guns on the Carmelite, was strengthened by some new batteries and -ramparts, and by the Castle of Aljaferia, commonly called the -Castle of the Inquisition, which stood a little in advance. This -was a fort of a square form having a bastion and tower at each -corner, and a good stone ditch, and it was connected with the body -of the place by certain walls loop-holed for musketry. - -The second front was defended by a double wall, the exterior -one being of recent erection, faced with sun-dried bricks, and -covered by a ditch with perpendicular sides fifteen feet deep -and twenty feet asunder. The flanks of this front were derived -from the convent of the Carmelites, from a large circular battery -standing in the centre of the line, from a fortified convent of -the Capuchins, called the Trinity, and from some earthen works -protecting the head of the bridge over the Huerba. - -The third front was covered by the river Huerba, the deep bed of -which was close to the foot of the ramparts. Behind this stream a -double entrenchment was carried from the bridge-head to the large -projecting convent of Santa Engracia, a distance of two hundred -yards. Santa Engracia itself was very strongly fortified and armed; -and, from thence to the oil manufactory, the line of defence was -prolonged by an ancient Moorish wall, on which several terraced -batteries were raised, to sweep all the space between the rampart -and the Huerba. These batteries, and the guns in the convent of -Santa Engracia, likewise overlooked some works raised to protect a -second bridge that crossed the river, about cannot-shot below the -first. - -Upon the right bank of the Huerba, and a little below the second -bridge, stood the convent of San Joseph, the walls of which had -been strengthened and protected by a deep ditch with a covered way -and pallisade. It was well placed to impede the enemy’s approaches, -and to facilitate sorties on the right bank of the river; and it -was, as I have said, open, in the rear, to the fire of the works at -the second bridge, and both were again overlooked by the terraced -batteries, and by the guns of Santa Engracia. - -The fourth front was protected by the Huerba, by the continuation -of the old city wall, by new batteries and entrenchments, and by -several armed convents and large houses. - -Beyond the walls the Monte Torrero, which commanded all the plain -of Zaragoza, was crowned by a large, ill-constructed fort, raised -at the distance of eighteen hundred yards from the convent of San -Joseph. This work was covered by the royal canal, the sluices of -which were defended by some field-works, open to the fire of the -fort itself. - -[Sidenote: Cavalhero.] - -On the left bank of the Ebro the suburb, built in a low marshy -plain, was protected by a chain of redoubts and fortified houses. -Finally, some gun-boats, manned by seamen from the naval arsenal -of Carthagena, completed the circuit of defence. The artillery of -the place was, however, of too small a calibre. There were only -sixty guns carrying more than twelve-pound balls; and there were -but eight large mortars. There was, however, no want of small arms, -many of which were English that had been supplied by colonel Doyle. - -These were the regular external defences of Zaragoza, most of which -were constructed at the time, according to the skill and means of -the engineers; but the experience of the former siege had taught -the people not to trust to the ordinary resources of art, and, with -equal genius and resolution, they had prepared an internal system -of defence infinitely more efficacious. - -It has been already observed that the houses of Zaragoza were -fire-proof, and, generally, of only two stories, and that, in -all the quarters of the city, the numerous massive convents and -churches rose like castles above the low buildings, and that the -greater streets, running into the broad-way called the Cosso, -divided the town into a variety of districts, unequal in size, but -each containing one or more large structures. Now, the citizens, -sacrificing all personal convenience, and resigning all idea of -private property, gave up their goods, their bodies, and their -houses to the war, and, being promiscuously mingled with the -peasantry and the regular soldiers, the whole formed one mighty -garrison, well suited to the vast fortress into which Zaragoza -was transformed: for, the doors and windows of the houses were -built up, and their fronts loop-holed; internal communications -were broken through the party-walls, and the streets were trenched -and crossed by earthen ramparts, mounted with cannon, and every -strong building was turned into a separate fortification. There -was no weak point, because there could be none in a town which -was all fortress, and where the space covered by the city was -the measurement for the thickness of the ramparts: nor in this -emergency were the leaders unmindful of moral force. - -The people were cheered by a constant reference to the former -successful resistance; their confidence was raised by the -contemplation of the vast works that had been executed; and it -was recalled to their recollection that the wet, usual at that -season of the year, would spread disease among the enemy’s ranks, -and would impair, if not entirely frustrate, his efforts. Neither -was the aid of superstition neglected: processions imposed upon -the sight, false miracles bewildered the imagination, and terrible -denunciations of the divine wrath shook the minds of men, whose -former habits and present situation rendered them peculiarly -susceptible of such impressions. Finally, the leaders were -themselves so prompt and terrible in their punishments that the -greatest cowards were likely to show the boldest bearing in their -wish to escape suspicion. - -To avoid the danger of any great explosion, the powder was made as -occasion required; and this was the more easily effected because -Zaragoza contained a royal depôt and refinery for salt-petre, and -there were powder-mills in the neighbourhood, which furnished -workmen familiar with the process of manufacturing that article. -The houses and trees beyond the walls were all demolished and cut -down, and the materials carried into the town. The public magazines -contained six months’ provisions; the convents were well stocked, -and the inhabitants had, likewise, laid up their own stores for -several months. General Doyle also sent a convoy into the town from -the side of Catalonia, and there was abundance of money, because, -in addition to the resources of the town, the military chest of -Castaños’s army, which had been supplied only the night before the -battle of Tudela, was, in the flight, carried to Zaragoza. - -[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, M.S. Cavalhero, Siege of -Zaragoza.] - -Companies of women, enrolled to attend the hospitals and to carry -provisions and ammunition to the combatants, were commanded by the -countess of Burita, a lady of an heroic disposition, who is said to -have displayed the greatest intelligence and the noblest character -during both sieges. There were thirteen engineer officers, and -eight hundred sappers and miners, composed of excavators formerly -employed on the canal, and there were from fifteen hundred to two -thousand cannoneers. - -The regular troops that fled from Tudela, being joined by two small -divisions, which retreated, at the same time, from Sanguessa and -Caparosa, formed a garrison of thirty thousand men, and, together -with the inhabitants and peasantry, presented a mass of fifty -thousand combatants, who, with passions excited almost to phrensy, -awaited an assault amidst those mighty entrenchments, where each -man’s home was a fortress and his family a garrison. To besiege, -with only thirty-five thousand men, a city so prepared was truly a -gigantic undertaking! - - -SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA. - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -The 20th of December, the two marshals, Moncey and Mortier, having -established their hospitals and magazines at Alagon on the Xalon, -advanced in three columns against Zaragoza. - -The first, composed of the infantry of the third corps, marched by -the right bank of the canal. - -The second, composed of general Suchet’s division of the fifth -corps, marched between the canal and the Ebro. - -The third, composed of general Gazan’s division of infantry, -crossed the Ebro opposite to Tauste, and from thence made an -oblique march to the Gallego river. - -The right and centre columns arrived in front of the town that -evening. The latter, after driving back the Spanish advanced -guards, halted at a distance of a league from the Capuchin convent -of the Trinity; the former took post on both sides of the Huerba, -and, having seized the aqueduct by which the canal is carried -over that river, proceeded, in pursuance of Napoleon’s orders, to -raise batteries, and to make dispositions for an immediate assault -on Monte Torrero. Meanwhile general Gazan, with the left column, -marching by Cartejon and Zuera reached Villa Nueva, on the Gallego -river, without encountering an enemy. - -[Sidenote: Cavalhero.] - -The Monte Torrero was defended by five thousand Spaniards, under -the command of general St. Marc; but, at day-break on the 21st, -the French opened their fire against the fort, and one column of -infantry having attracted the attention of the Spaniards, a second, -unseen, crossed the canal under the aqueduct, and, penetrating -between the fort and the city, entered the former by the rear, -and, at the same time, a third column stormed the works protecting -the great sluices. These sudden attacks, and the loss of the fort, -threw the Spaniards into confusion, and they hastily retired to the -town, which so enraged the plebeian leaders that the life of St. -Marc was with difficulty saved by Palafox. - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -It had been concerted among the French that general Gazan should -assault the suburb, simultaneously with the attack on the Torrero; -and that officer, having encountered a body of Spanish and Swiss -troops placed somewhat in advance, drove the former back so -quickly that the Swiss, unable to make good their retreat, were, -to the number of three or four hundred, killed or taken. But, -notwithstanding this fortunate commencement, Gazan did not attack -the suburb itself until after the affair at Monte Torrero was -over, and then only upon a single point, and without any previous -examination of the works. The Spaniards, recovering from their -first alarm, soon reinforced this point, and Gazan was forced to -desist, with the loss of four hundred men. This important failure -more than balanced the success against the Monte Torrero. It -restored the shaken confidence of the Spaniards at a most critical -moment, and checking in the French, at the outset, that impetuous -spirit, that impulse of victory, which great generals so carefully -watch and improve, threw them back upon the tedious and chilling -process of the engineer. - -The 24th of December the investment of Zaragoza was completed on -both sides of the Ebro. General Gazan occupied the bridge over -the Gallego with his left, and covered his front from sorties by -inundations and cuts that the low, marshy plain where he was posted -enabled him to make without difficulty. - -General Suchet occupied the space between the Upper Ebro and the -Huerba. - -Morlot’s division of the 3d corps encamped in the broken hollow -that formed the bed of that stream. - -General Meusnier’s division crowned the Monte Torrero, and general -Grandjean continuing the circuit to the Lower Ebro, communicated -with Gazan’s posts on the other side. Several Spanish detachments -that had been sent out to forage were thus cut off, and could never -re-enter the town; and a bridge of boats being constructed on the -Upper Ebro completed the circle of investment, and ensured a free -intercourse between the different quarters of the army. - -General Lacoste, an engineer of reputation, and aide-de-camp to -the Emperor, directed the siege. His plan was, that one false and -two real attacks should be conducted by regular approaches on the -right bank of the Ebro, and he still hoped to take the suburb by -a sudden assault. The trenches being opened on the night of the -29th of December, the 30th the place was summoned, and the terms -dictated by Napoleon when he was at Aranda de Duero, were offered. -The example of Madrid was also cited to induce a surrender. Palafox -replied, that--If Madrid had surrendered, Madrid had been sold: -Zaragoza would neither be sold nor surrender! On the receipt of -this haughty answer the attacks were commenced; the right being -directed against the convent of San Joseph; the centre against the -upper bridge over the Huerba; the left, which was the false one, -against the castle of Aljaferia. - -The 31st Palafox made sorties against all the three attacks. From -the right and centre he was beaten back with loss, and he was -likewise repulsed on the left at the trenches: but some of his -cavalry gliding between the French parallel and the Ebro surprised -and cut down a post of infantry stationed behind some ditches that -intersected the low ground on the bank of that river. This trifling -success exalted the enthusiasm of the besieged, and Palafox -gratified his personal vanity by boasting proclamations and orders -of the day, some of which bore the marks of genius, but the greater -part were ridiculous. - -The 1st of January the second parallels of the true attacks were -commenced. The next day Palafox caused the attention of the -besiegers to be occupied on the right bank of the Ebro, by slight -skirmishes, while he made a serious attack from the side of the -suburb on general Gazan’s lines of contrevallation. This sally was -repulsed with loss, but, on the right bank, the Spaniards obtained -some success. - -Marshal Moncey being called to Madrid, Junot assumed the command -of the third corps, and, about the same time, marshal Mortier was -directed to take post at Calatayud, with Suchet’s division of the -fifth corps, for the purpose of securing the communication with -Madrid. The gap in the circle of investment left by this draft of -eight thousand men, being but scantily stopped by extending general -Morlot’s division, a line of contrevallation was constructed at -that part to supply the place of numbers. - -The besieged, hoping and expecting each day that the usual falls -of rain taking place would render the besiegers’ situation -intolerable, continued their fire briskly, and worked counter -approaches on to the right of the French attacks: but the season -was unusually dry, and a thick fog rising each morning covered the -besiegers’ advances and protected their workmen, both from the fire -and from the sorties of the Spaniards. - -The 10th of January, thirty-two pieces of French artillery being -mounted and provisioned, the convent of San Joseph and the head of -the bridge over the Huerba, were battered in breach, and, at the -same time, the town was bombarded. San Joseph was so much injured -by this fire that the Spaniards, resolving to evacuate it, withdrew -their guns. Nevertheless, two hundred of their men made a vigorous -sortie at midnight, and were upon the point of entering one of the -French batteries, when they were taken in flank by two guns loaded -with grape, and were, finally, driven back, with loss of half their -number. - -The 11th, the besiegers’ batteries continued to play on San Joseph -with such success that the breach became practicable, and, at -four o’clock in the evening, some companies of infantry, with two -field-pieces, attacked by the right, and a column was kept in -readiness to assail the front, when this attack should have shaken -the defence. Two other companies of chosen men were directed to -search for an entrance by the rear, between the fort and the river. - -The defences of the convent were reduced to a ditch eighteen feet -deep, and a covered way which, falling back by both flanks to the -Huerba, was then extended along the banks of that river for some -distance. A considerable number of men still occupied this covered -way: but, when the French field-pieces on the right raked it with -a fire of grape, the Spaniards were thrown into confusion, and -crossing the bed of the river took shelter in the town. At that -moment the front of the convent was assaulted; but, while the depth -of the ditch and the Spanish fire checked the impetuosity of the -assailants at that point; the chosen companies passed round the -works, and finding a small bridge over the ditch crossed it, and -entered the convent by the rear. The front was carried by escalade, -almost at the same moment, and the few hundred Spaniards that -remained were killed or made prisoners. - -The French, who had suffered but little in this assault, -immediately lodged themselves in the convent, raised a rampart -along the edge of the Huerba, and commenced batteries against the -body of the place and against the works at the head of the upper -bridge, from whence, as well as from the town, they were incommoded -by the fire that played into the convent. - -The 15th, the bridge-head, in front of Santa Engracia, was carried -with the loss of only three men; but the Spaniards cut the bridge -itself, and sprung a mine under the works; the explosion, however, -occasioned no mischief, and the third parallels being soon -completed, and the trenches of the two attacks united, the defences -of the besieged were thus confined to the town itself. They could -no longer make sallies on the right bank of the Huerba without -overcoming the greatest difficulties. The passage of the Huerba was -then effected by the French, and breaching and counter-batteries, -mounting fifty pieces of artillery, were constructed against the -body of the place. The fire of these guns played also upon the -bridge over the Ebro, and interrupted the communication between the -suburb and the town. - -Unshaken by this aspect of affairs, the Spanish leaders, with great -readiness of mind, immediately forged intelligence of the defeat of -the emperor, and, with the sound of music, and amidst the shouts -of the populace, proclaimed the names of the marshals who had been -killed; asserting, also, that Palafox’s brother, the marquis of -Lazan, was already wasting France. This intelligence, extravagant -as it was, met with implicit credence, for such was the disposition -of the Spaniards throughout this war, that the imaginations of the -chiefs were taxed to produce absurdities proportionable to the -credulity of their followers; hence the boasting of the leaders and -the confidence of the besieged augmented as the danger increased, -and their anticipations of victory seemed realized when the -night-fires of a succouring force were discerned blazing on the -hills behind Gazan’s troops. - -The difficulties of the French were indeed fast increasing, -for while enclosing Zaragoza they were themselves encircled by -insurrections, and their supplies so straightened that famine was -felt in their camp. Disputes amongst the generals also diminished -the vigour of the operations, and the bonds of discipline being -relaxed, the military ardour of the troops naturally became -depressed. The soldiers reasoned openly upon the chances of -success, which, in times of danger, is only one degree removed from -mutiny. - -The nature of the country about Zaragoza was exceedingly favourable -to the Spaniards. The town, although situated in a plain, was -surrounded, at the distance of some miles, by strong and high -mountains, and, to the south, the fortresses of Mequinenza and -Lerida afforded a double base of operations for any forces that -might come from Catalonia and Valencia. The besiegers drew all -their supplies from Pampeluna, and consequently their long line -of operations, running through Alagon, Tudela, and Caparosa, was -difficult to defend from the insurgents, who, being gathered -in considerable numbers in the Sierra de Muela and on the side -of Epila, threatened Alagon, while others, descending from the -mountain of Soria, menaced the important point of Tudela. - -The marquis of Lazan, anxious to assist his brother, had drafted -five thousand men from the Catalonian army, and taking post in -the Sierra de Liciñena, or Alcubierre, on the left of the Ebro, -drew together all the armed peasantry of the valleys as high as -Sanguessa, and extending his line from Villa Franca on the Ebro to -Zuera on the Gallego, hemmed in the division of Gazan, and even -sent detachments as far as Caparosa to harass the French convoys -coming from Pampeluna. - -To maintain their communications and to procure provisions -the besiegers had placed between two or three thousand men in -Tudela, Caparosa, and Tafalla, and some hundreds in Alagon and at -Montalbarra. Between the latter town and the investing army six -hundred and fifty cavalry were stationed: a like number were posted -at Santa Fé, to watch the openings of the Sierra de Muela, and -sixteen hundred cavalry with twelve hundred infantry, under the -command of general Wathier, were pushed towards the south as far -as Fuentes, Wathier, falling suddenly upon an assemblage of four -or five thousand insurgents that had taken post at Belchite, broke -and dispersed them, and then pursuing his victory took the town of -Alcanitz, and established himself there in observation for the rest -of the siege. But Lazan still maintained himself in the Alcubierre. - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -In this state of affairs marshal Lasnes, having recovered from -his long sickness, arrived before Zaragoza, and took the supreme -command of both corps on the 22d of January. The influence of -his firm and vigorous character was immediately perceptible; -he recalled Suchets division from Calatayud, where it had been -lingering without necessity, and, sending it across the Ebro, -ordered Mortier to attack Lazan. At the same time a smaller -detachment was directed against the insurgents in Zuera, and, -meanwhile, Lasnes repressing all disputes, restored discipline in -the army, and pressed the siege with infinite resolution. - -The detachment sent to Zuera defeated the insurgents and took -possession of that place and of the bridge over the Gallego. -Mortier encountered the Spanish advanced guard at Perdeguera, and -pushed it back to Nuestra Señora de Vagallar, where the main body, -several thousand strong, was posted. After a short resistance, the -whole fled, and the French cavalry took four guns; Mortier then -spreading his troops in a half circle, extending from Huesca to -Pina on the Ebro, awed all the country lying between those places -and Zaragoza, and prevented any further insurrections. - -A few days before the arrival of marshal Lasnes, the besieged being -exceedingly galled by the fire from a mortar-battery, situated at -some distance behind the second parallel of the central attack, -eighty volunteers, under the command of Don Mariano Galindo, -endeavoured to silence it. They surprised and bayonetted the guard -in the nearest trenches, and passing on briskly to the battery, -entered it, and were proceeding to spike the artillery, when -unfortunately the reserve of the French arrived, and, the alarm -being given, the guards of the first trenches also assembled in -the rear of this gallant band, intercepting all retreat. Thus -surrounded, Galindo, fighting bravely, was wounded and taken, and -the greatest part of his comrades perished with as much honour as -simple soldiers can attain. - -The armed vessels in the river now made an attempt to flank the -works raised against the castle of Aljaferia, but the French -batteries forced them to drop down the stream again; and between -the nights of the 21st and the 26th of January the besiegers’ -works being carried across the Huerba, the third parallels of the -real attacks were completed. The oil manufactory and some other -advantageous posts, on the left bank of the above-named river, -were also taken possession of and included in the works, and at -the false attack a second parallel was commenced at the distance -of a hundred and fifty yards from the castle of Aljaferia; but -these advantages were not obtained without loss. The Spaniards made -sallies, in one of which they spiked two guns and burnt a French -post on the right. - -The besiegers’ batteries had, however, broken the wall of the -town in several places. Two practicable breaches were made nearly -fronting the convent of San Joseph; a third was commenced in the -convent of Saint Augustin, facing the oil manufactory. The convent -of San Engracia was laid completely open to an assault; and, on -the 29th, at twelve o’clock, the whole army being under arms, four -chosen columns rushed out of the trenches, and burst upon the -ruined works of Zaragoza. - -On the right, the assailants twice stormed an isolated stone house -that defended the breach of Saint Augustin, and twice they were -repulsed, and finally driven back with loss. - -In the centre, the attacking column, regardless of two small mines -that exploded at the foot of the walls, carried the breach fronting -the oil manufactory, and then endeavoured to break into the town; -but the Spaniards retrenched within the place, opened such a fire -of grape and musquetry that the French were content to establish -themselves on the summit of the breach, and to connect their -lodgement with the trenches by new works. - -The third column was more successful; the breach was carried, and -the neighbouring houses also, as far as the first large cross -street; beyond that, the assailants could not penetrate, but they -were enabled to establish themselves within the walls of the town, -and immediately brought forward their trenches, so as to comprehend -this lodgement within their works. - -The assault of the fourth column, which was directed against San -Engracia, was made with such rapidity and vigour that the Polish -regiment of the Vistula not only carried that convent itself, but -the one adjoining to it; and the victorious troops, unchecked -by the fire from the houses, and undaunted by the simultaneous -explosion of six small mines planted in their path, swept the -ramparts to the left as far as the bridge over the Huerba; and, at -that moment, the guards of the trenches, excited by the success of -their comrades, broke forth, without orders, mounted the walls, -pushed along the ramparts to the left, bayonetted the artillery-men -at their guns in the Capuchin convent, and, continuing their -career, endeavoured some to reach the semicircular battery and the -Misericordia, and others to break into the town. - -This wild assault was soon checked by grape from two guns planted -behind a traverse on the ramparts, and by a murderous fire from -the houses. As their ranks were thinned, the ardour of the French -sunk, and the courage of their adversaries increased. The former -were, after a little, driven back upon the Capuchins; and the -Spaniards were already breaking into that convent in pursuit, when -two battalions, detached by general Morlot from the trenches of -the false attack, arrived, and secured possession of that point, -which was moreover untenable by the Spaniards, inasmuch as the guns -of the convent of Santa Engracia saw it in reverse. The French -took, on this day, more than six hundred men. But general La -Coste immediately abandoned the false attack against the castle, -fortified the Capuchin convent and a house situated at an angle of -the wall abutting upon the bridge over the Huerba, and then joining -them by works to his trenches, the ramparts of the town became the -front line of the French. - -The walls of Zaragoza thus went to the ground, but Zaragoza herself -remained erect; and, as the broken girdle fell from the heroic -city, the besiegers started at the view of her naked strength. The -regular defences had, indeed, crumbled before the skill of the -assailants; but the popular resistance was immediately called, with -all its terrors, into action; and, as if Fortune had resolved to -mark the exact moment when the ordinary calculations of science -should cease, the chief engineers on both sides were simultaneously -slain. The French general, La Coste, a young man, intrepid, -skilful, and endowed with genius, perished like a brave soldier; -but the Spanish colonel, San Genis, died not only with the honour -of a soldier, but the glory of a patriot; falling in the noblest -cause, his blood stained the ramparts which he had himself raised -for the protection of his native place. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: Cavalhero.] - -The war being now carried into the streets of Zaragoza, the sound -of the alarm-bell was heard over all the quarters of the city; and -the people, assembling in crowds, filled the houses nearest to the -lodgements made by the French. Additional traverses and barricadoes -were constructed across the principal streets; mines were prepared -in the more open spaces; and the communications from house to house -were multiplied, until they formed a vast labyrinth, of which the -intricate windings were only to be traced by the weapons and the -dead bodies of the defenders. The members of the junta, become more -powerful from the cessation of regular warfare, with redoubled -activity and energy urged the defence, but increased the horrors of -the siege by a ferocity pushed to the very verge of phrenzy. Every -person, without regard to rank or age, who excited the suspicions -of these furious men, or of those immediately about them, was -instantly put to death; and amidst the noble bulwarks of war, a -horrid array of gibbets was to be seen, on which crowds of wretches -were suspended each night, because their courage had sunk beneath -the accumulating dangers of their situation, or because some -doubtful expression or gesture of distress had been misconstrued by -their barbarous chiefs. - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -From the heights of the walls which he had conquered, marshal -Lasnes contemplated this terrific scene; and, judging that men so -passionate, and so prepared, could not be prudently encountered -in open battle, he resolved to proceed by the slow, but certain -process of the mattock and the mine: and this was also in unison -with the emperor’s instructions. Hence from the 29th of January to -the 2d of February, the efforts of the French were directed to the -enlargement of their lodgements on the walls; and they succeeded, -after much severe fighting and several explosions, in working -forward through the nearest houses; but, at the same time, they had -to sustain many counter-assaults from the Spaniards; especially -one, exceedingly fierce, made by a friar on the Capuchins’ convent -of the Trinity. - -It has been already observed that the crossing of the large streets -divided the town into certain small districts, or islands of -houses. To gain possession of these, it was necessary not only to -mine but to fight for each house. To cross the large intersecting -streets, it was indispensable to construct traverses above or to -work by underground galleries; because a battery raked each street, -and each house was defended by a garrison that, generally speaking, -had only the option of repelling the enemy in front or dying on the -gibbet erected behind. But, as long as the convents and churches -remained in possession of the Spaniards, the progress of the French -among the islands of small houses was of little advantage to them, -because the large garrisons in the greater buildings enabled the -defenders not only to make continual and successful sallies, but -also to countermine their enemies, whose superior skill in that -kind of warfare was often frustrated by the numbers and persevering -energy of the besieged. - -To overcome these obstacles the breaching batteries opposite the -fourth front fired upon the convents of Saint Augustin and Saint -Monica, and the latter was assaulted on the 31st of January. At the -same time a part of the wall in another direction being thrown down -by a petard, a body of the besiegers poured in and taking the main -breach in rear, cleared not only the convent but several houses -around it. The Spaniards undismayed immediately opened a gallery -from St. Augustin and worked a mine under Saint Monica, but at the -moment of its being charged the French discovered and stifled the -miners. - -The 1st of February the breach in Saint Augustin, also, became -practicable, and the attention of the besieged being drawn to that -side, the French sprung a mine which they had carried under the -wall from the side of Saint Monica and immediately entered by the -opening. The Spaniards thus unexpectedly taken in the rear, were -thrown into confusion and driven out with little difficulty. They, -however, rallied in a few hours after and attempted to retake the -structure, but without success, and the besiegers animated by this -advantage broke into the neighbouring houses and, at one push, -carried so many as to arrive at the point where the street called -the Quemada joined the Cosso, or public walk. The besieged rallied, -however, at the last house of the Quemada, and renewed the combat -with so much fury that the French were beaten from the greatest -part of the houses they had taken, and suffered a loss of above a -hundred men. - -On the side of San Engracia a contest still more severe took place; -the houses in the vicinity were blown up, but the Spaniards fought -so obstinately for the ruins that the Polish troops were scarcely -able to make good their lodgement--although two successive and -powerful explosions had, with the buildings, destroyed a number of -the defenders. - -The experience of these attacks induced a change in the mode of -fighting on both sides. Hitherto the play of the French mines -had reduced the houses to ruins, and thus the soldiers were -exposed completely to the fire from the next Spanish posts. The -engineers, therefore, diminished the quantity of powder that the -interior only might fall and the outward walls stand, and this -method was found successful. Hereupon the Spaniards, with ready -ingenuity, saturated the timbers and planks of the houses with -rosin and pitch, and setting fire to those which could no longer -be maintained, interposed a burning barrier which often delayed -the assailants for two days, and always prevented them from -pushing their successes during the confusion that necessarily -followed the bursting of the mines. The fighting was, however, -incessant, a constant bombardment, the explosion of mines, the -crash of falling buildings, clamorous shouts, and the continued -echo of musquetry deafened the ear, while volumes of smoke and -dust clouded the atmosphere and lowered continually over the heads -of the combatants, as hour by hour, the French with a terrible -perseverance pushed forward their approaches to the heart of the -miserable but glorious city. - -Their efforts were chiefly directed against two points, namely -that of San Engracia, which may be denominated the left attack, -and that of Saint Augustin and Saint Monica which constituted the -right attack. At San Engracia they laboured on a line perpendicular -to the Cosso, from which they were only separated by the large -convent of the Daughters of Jerusalem, and by the hospital for -madmen, which was entrenched, although in ruins since the first -siege. The line of this attack was protected on the left by the -convent of the Capuchins, which La Coste had fortified to repel -the counter assaults of the Spaniards. The right attack was more -diffused, because the localities presented less prominent features -to determine the direction of the approaches; and the French -having mounted a number of light six-inch mortars, on peculiar -carriages, drew them from street to street, and house to house, -as occasion offered. On the other hand the Spaniards continually -plied their enemies with hand grenades, which seem to have produced -a surprising effect, and in this manner the never-ceasing combat -was prolonged until the 7th of February, when the besiegers, by -dint of alternate mines and assaults, had worked their perilous way -at either attack to the Cosso, but not without several changes of -fortune and considerable loss. They were, however, unable to obtain -a footing on that public walk, for the Spaniards still disputed -every house with undiminished resolution. - -Meanwhile, Lasnes having caused trenches to be opened on the left -bank of the Ebro, a battery of twenty guns played against an -isolated structure called the Convent of Jesus, which covered the -right of the suburb line. On the 7th of February this convent was -carried by storm, and with so little difficulty that the French, -supposing the Spaniards to be panic stricken, assailed the suburb -itself, but were quickly driven back with loss; they, however, made -good their lodgement in the convent. - -On the town side the 8th, 9th, and 10th were wasted by the -besiegers in vain attempts to pass the Cosso; they then extended -their flanks. On the right with a view to reach the quay, and so -connect this attack with that against the suburb, and on the left -to obtain possession of the large and strongly built convent of -Saint Francisco, in which after exploding an immense mine and -making two assaults they finally established themselves. - -The 11th and 12th, mines were worked under the university, a -large building on the Spanish side of the Cosso, in the line of -the right attack; but their play was insufficient to open the -walls, and the storming party was beaten, with the loss of fifty -men. Nevertheless, the besiegers continuing their labours during -the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th, passed the Cosso by means -of traverses, and prepared fresh mines under the university, but -deferred their explosion until a simultaneous effort could be -combined on the side of the suburb. - -At the left attack also, a number of houses, bordering on the -Cosso being gained, a battery was established that raked that -great thoroughfare above ground, while under it six galleries were -carried, and six mines loaded to explode at the same moment; but -the spirit of the French army was now exhausted; they had laboured -and fought without intermission for fifty days; they had crumbled -the walls with their bullets, burst the convents with their mines, -and carried the breaches with their bayonets,--fighting above and -beneath the surface of the earth, they had spared neither fire nor -the sword, their bravest men were falling in the obscurity of a -subterranean warfare; famine pinched them, and Zaragoza was still -unconquered! - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -“Before this siege,” they exclaimed, “was it ever heard of, that -twenty thousand men should besiege fifty thousand?” Scarcely a -fourth of the town was won, and they, themselves, were already -exhausted. “We must wait,” they said, “for reinforcements or we -shall all perish among their cursed ruins, which will become our -own tombs, before we can force the last of these fanatics from the -last of their dens.” - -Marshal Lasnes, unshaken by these murmurs and obstinate to conquer, -endeavoured to raise the soldiers’ hopes. He pointed out to them -that the losses of the besieged so far exceeded their own, that -the Spaniards’ strength would soon be wasted and their courage -must sink, and that the fierceness of their defence was already -abated,--but if contrary to expectation they should renew the -example of Numantia, their utter destruction must quickly ensue -from the united effects of battle, misery, and pestilence. - -These exhortations succeeded, and on the 18th, all the combinations -being complete, a general assault took place. The French at the -right attack, having opened a party-wall by the explosion of a -petard, made a sudden rush through some burning ruins, and carried, -without a check, the island of houses leading down to the quay, -with the exception of two buildings. The Spaniards were thus forced -to abandon all the external fortifications between Saint Augustin -and the Ebro, which they had preserved until that day. And while -this assault was in progress, the mines under the university -containing three thousand pounds of powder were sprung, and the -walls tumbling with a terrific crash,--a column of the besiegers -entered the place, and after one repulse secured a lodgement. -During this time fifty pieces of artillery thundered upon the -suburb and ploughed up the bridge over the Ebro, and by mid-day -opened a practicable breach in the great convent of Saint Lazar, -which was the principal defence on that side. Lasnes, observing -that the Spaniards seemed to be shaken by this overwhelming fire, -immediately ordered an assault, and Saint Lazar being carried -forthwith, all retreat to the bridge was thus intercepted, and -the besieged falling into confusion, and their commander, Baron -Versage, being killed, were all destroyed or taken, with the -exception of three hundred men, who braving the terrible fire to -which they were exposed, got back into the town. General Gazan -immediately occupied the abandoned works, and having thus cut off -above two thousand men that were stationed on the Ebro, above the -suburb, forced them also to surrender. - -This important success being followed on the 19th by another -fortunate attack on the right bank of the Ebro, and by the -devastating explosion of sixteen hundred pounds of powder, the -constancy of the besieged was at last shaken. An aide-de-camp of -Palafox came forth to demand certain terms, before offered by -the marshal, adding thereto that the garrison should be allowed -to join the Spanish armies, and that a certain number of covered -carriages should follow them. Lasnes rejected these proposals, -and the fire continued, but the hour of surrender was come! Fifty -pieces of artillery on the left bank of the Ebro, laid the houses -on the quay in ruins. The church of Our Lady of the Pillar, under -whose especial protection the city was supposed to exist, was -nearly effaced by the bombardment, and the six mines under the -Cosso loaded with many thousand pounds of powder, were ready for -a simultaneous explosion, which would have laid a quarter of the -remaining houses in the dust. In fine, war had done its work, and -the misery of Zaragoza could no longer be endured. - -The bombardment which had never ceased since the 10th of January, -had forced the women and children to take refuge in the vaults, -with which the city abounded. There the constant combustion of -oil, the closeness of the atmosphere, unusual diet, and fear and -restlessness of mind, had combined to produce a pestilence which -soon spread to the garrison. The strong and the weak, the daring -soldier and the shrinking child fell before it alike, and such -was the state of the atmosphere and the predisposition to disease -that the slightest wound gangrened and became incurable. In the -beginning of February the deaths were from four to five hundred -daily; the living were unable to bury the dead, and thousands of -carcases, scattered about the streets and court yards, or piled in -heaps at the doors of the churches, were left to dissolve in their -own corruption, or to be licked up by the flames of the burning -houses as the defence became contracted. - -[Sidenote: Cavalhero. Rogniat. Suchet.] - -The suburb, the greatest part of the walls, and one-fourth of the -houses were in the hands of the French, sixteen thousand shells -thrown during the bombardment, and the explosion of forty-five -thousand pounds of powder in the mines had shaken the city to its -foundations, and the bones of more than forty thousand persons of -every age and sex, bore dreadful testimony to the constancy of the -besieged. - -Palafox was sick, and of the plebeian chiefs, the curate of -St. Gil, the lemonade seller of the Cosso, and the Tios, Jorge, -and Marin, having been slain in battle, or swept away by the -pestilence, the obdurate violence of the remaining leaders was -so abated, that a fresh junta was formed, and after a stormy -consultation, the majority being for a surrender, a deputation -waited upon marshal Lasnes on the 20th of February, to negotiate a -capitulation. - -They proposed that the garrison should march out with the honours -of war; that the peasantry should not be considered as prisoners; -and at the particular request of the clergy, they also demanded -that the latter should have their full revenues guaranteed to them, -and punctually paid. This article was rejected with indignation, -and, according to the French writers, the place surrendered at -discretion; but the Spanish writers assert, that Lasnes granted -certain terms, drawn up by the deputation at the moment, the name -of Ferdinand the 7th being purposely omitted in the instrument, -which in substance run thus:-- - -The garrison to march out with the honours of war; to be -constituted prisoners, and marched to France; the officers to -retain their swords, baggage, and horses, the men their knapsacks; -and persons of either class, wishing to serve Joseph, to be -immediately enrolled in his ranks. The peasants to be sent to their -homes. Property and religion to be guaranteed. - -With this understanding the deputies returned to the city; but -fresh commotions had arisen during their absence. The party for -protracting the defence, although the least numerous, were the -most energetic; they had before seized all the boats on the -Ebro, fearing that Palafox and others, of whom they entertained -suspicions, would endeavour to quit the town; and they were still -so menacing and so powerful, that the deputies durst not pass -through the streets, but retired outside the walls to the castle -of Aljaferia, and from thence sent notice to the junta of their -proceedings. The dissentient party would, however, have fallen -upon the others the next day, if the junta had not taken prompt -measures to enforce the surrender. The officer in command of the -walls near the castle, by their orders, gave up his post to the -French during the night, and on the 21st of February, from twelve -to fifteen thousand sickly beings laid down those arms which they -were scarcely able to support; and this cruel and memorable siege -was finished. - - -OBSERVATIONS.--1º.--When the other events of the Spanish war shall -be lost in the obscurity of time, or only traced by disconnected -fragments, the story of Zaragoza, like some ancient triumphal -pillar standing amidst ruins, will tell a tale of past glory; and -already men point to the heroic city, and call her Spain, as if her -spirit were common to the whole nation; yet it was not so, nor was -the defence of Zaragoza itself the effect of unalloyed virtue. It -was not patriotism, nor was it courage, nor skill, nor fortitude, -nor a system of terror, but all these combined under peculiar -circumstances that upheld the defence; and this combination, and -how it was brought about, should be well considered; because it is -not so much by catching at the leading resemblances, as by studying -the differences of great affairs, that the exploits of one age can -be made to serve as models for another. - -[Illustration: _Plate 1. to face Pa. 48._ - - _Explanatory Sketch_ - of the - Seige of Zaragoza, - _1808, 1809_. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - -2º.--The defence of Zaragoza may be examined under two points of -view; as an isolated event, and as a transaction bearing on the -general struggle in the Peninsula. With respect to the latter, -it was a manifest proof, that neither the Spanish people, nor -the government, partook of the Zaragozan energy. For it would be -absurd to suppose that, in the midst of eleven millions of people, -animated by an ardent enthusiasm, fifty thousand armed men could -for two months be besieged, shut in, destroyed, they and their -works, houses, and bodies, mingled in one terrible ruin, by less -than thirty-five thousand adversaries, and that without one effort -being made to save them! - -Deprive the transaction of its dazzling colours, and the simple -outline comes to this: Thirty-five thousand French, in the midst -of insurrections, in despite of a combination of circumstances -peculiarly favourable to the defence, reduced fifty thousand of -the bravest and most energetic men in Spain. It is true, the -latter suffered nobly; but was their example imitated? Gerona, -indeed, although less celebrated, rivalled, and perhaps more than -rivalled, the glory of Zaragoza; but elsewhere her fate spoke, not -trumpet-tongued to arouse, but with a wailing voice, that carried -dismay to the heart of the nation. - -3d.--As an isolated transaction, the siege of Zaragoza is very -remarkable; but it would be a great error to suppose, that any -town, the inhabitants of which were equally resolute, might be -as well defended. Fortitude and bravery will do much; but the -combinations of science are not to be defied with impunity. There -are no miracles in war! If the houses of Zaragoza had not been -nearly incombustible, the bombardment alone would have caused the -besieged to surrender, or to perish with their flaming city. - -4th.--That the advantage offered by the peculiar structure of -the houses, and the number of the convents and churches, was -ably seized by the Spaniards, is beyond doubt. General Rogniat, -Lacoste’s successor, indeed, treats his opponents’ skill in -fortification with contempt; but colonel San Genis’ talents are -not to be judged of by the faulty construction of a few out-works, -at a time when he was under the control of a disorderly and -ferocious mob. He knew how to adapt his system of defence to the -circumstances of the moment, and no stronger proof of real genius -can be given. “Do not consult me about a capitulation,” was his -common expression. “_I shall never be of opinion that Zaragoza can -make no further defence._” But neither the talents of San Genis, -nor the construction of the houses, would have availed, if the -people within had not been of a temper adequate to the occasion; -and to trace the passions by which they were animated to their true -causes is a proper subject for historical and military research. - -5th.--That they did not possess any superior courage is evident -from the facts that the besieged, although twice the number of the -besiegers, never made any serious impression by their sallies, and -that they were unable to defend the breaches. In large masses, -the standard of courage which is established by discipline may -be often inferior to that produced by fanaticism, or any other -peculiar excitement; but the latter never lasts long, neither is -it equable, because men are of different susceptibility, following -their physical and mental conformation. Hence a system of terror -has always been the resource of those leaders who, engaged in great -undertakings, have been unable to recur to discipline. Enthusiasm -stalked in front of their bands, but punishment brought up the -rear; and Zaragoza was no exception to this practice. - -6th.--It may be said that the majority of the besieged, not being -animated by any peculiar fury, a system of terror could not be -carried to any great length; but a close examination explains this -seeming mystery. The defenders were composed of three distinct -parties,--the regular troops, the peasantry from the country, -and the citizens; but the citizens, who had most to lose, were -naturally the fiercest, and, accordingly, amongst them, the system -of terror was generated. The peasantry followed the example, as -all ignorant men, under no regular control, will do; the soldiers -meddled but little in the interior arrangements, and the division -of the town into islands of posts rendered it perfectly feasible -for violent persons, already possessed of authority, to follow -the bent of their inclinations: there was no want of men, and the -garrison of each island found it their own interest to keep those -in front of them to their posts, that the danger might be the -longer staved off from themselves. - -7th.--Palafox was only the nominal chief of Zaragoza, the laurels -gathered in both sieges should adorn plebeian brows, but those -laurels dripped with kindred as well as foreign blood. The energy -of the real chiefs, and the cause in which that energy was exerted, -may be admired; the acts perpetrated by this ruling band were, -in themselves, atrocious; and Palafox, although unable to arrest -their savage proceedings, can claim but little credit for his own -conduct. For more than a month preceeding the surrender, he never -came forth of a vaulted building, which was impervious to shells, -and in which, there is too much reason to believe, he and others, -of both sexes, lived in a state of sensuality, forming a disgusting -contrast to the wretchedness that surrounded them. - - -OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRENCH OPERATIONS. - -1º. Before the arrival of marshal Lasnes, the operations were -conducted with little vigour. The want of unity, as to time, in the -double attack of the Monte Torrero and the suburb, was a flagrant -error, that was not redeemed by any subsequent activity; but, after -the arrival of that marshal, the siege was pursued with singular -intrepidity and firmness. General Rogniat appears to disapprove of -Suchet’s division having been sent to Calatayud, yet it seems to -have been a judicious measure, inasmuch as it was necessary,-- - -1st. To protect the line of correspondence with Madrid. - -2d. To have a corps at hand, lest the duke of Infantado should quit -Cuença, and throw himself into the Guadalaxara district, a movement -that would have been extremely embarrassing to the king. Suchet’s -division, while at Calatayud, fulfilled these objects, without -losing the power of succouring Tudela, or, by a march on the side -of Daroca, of intercepting the duke of Infantado if he attempted -to raise the siege of Zaragoza; but, when the Spanish army at -Cuença was directed on Ucles, and that of the marquis of Lazan was -gathering strength on the left bank of the Ebro, it was undoubtedly -proper to recall Suchet. - -2º.--It may not be misplaced here to point out the errors of -Infantado’s operations. If, instead of bringing on a battle with -the first corps, he had marched to the Ebro, established his -depôts and places of arms at Mequinenza and Lerida, opened a -communication with Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and joined -the marquis of Lazan’s troops to his own, he might have formed an -entrenched camp in the Sierra de Alcubierre, and from thence have -carried on a methodical war with, at least, twenty-five thousand -regular troops; the insurrections on the French flanks and line of -communication with Pampeluna would then have become formidable; -and, in this situation, having the fortresses of Catalonia behind -him, with activity and prudence he might have raised the siege. - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -3º.--From a review of all the circumstances attending the siege of -Zaragoza, we may conclude that fortune was extremely favourable -to the French. They were brave, persevering, and skilful, and -they did not lose above four thousand men; but their success was -owing partly to the errors of their opponents, principally to the -destruction caused by the pestilence within the town; for, of all -that multitude said to have fallen, six thousand Spaniards only -were slain in battle. Thirteen convents and churches had been -taken; but, when the town surrendered, forty remained to be forced. - -Such are the principal circumstances of this memorable siege. I -shall now relate the contemporary operations in Catalonia. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA. - - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations.] - -It will be remembered, that when the second siege of Gerona was -raised, in August, 1808, general Duhesme returned to Barcelona, -and general Reille to Figueras; after which, the state of affairs -obliged those generals to remain on the defensive. Napoleon’s -measures to aid them were as prompt as the occasion required. While -the siege of Gerona was yet in progress, he had directed troops -to assemble at Perpignan in such numbers, as to form with those -already in Catalonia, an army of more than forty thousand men, -to be called the “_7th corps_.” Then appointing general Gouvion -St. Cyr to command it, he gave him this short but emphatic order: -“_Preserve Barcelona for me. If that place be lost, I cannot retake -it with 80,000 men._” - -The troops assembled at Perpignan were the greatest part but raw -levies; Neapolitans, Etruscans, Romans, and Swiss: there were, -however, some old regiments; but as the preparations for the grand -army under the emperor absorbed the principal attention of the -administration in France, general St. Cyr was straightened in the -means necessary to take the field; and his undisciplined troops, -suffering severe privations, were depressed in spirit, and inclined -to desert. - -The 1st of November, Napoleon, who was at Bayonne, sent orders to -the “_7th corps_” to commence its operations; and St. Cyr, having -put his divisions in motion on the 3d, crossed the frontier, and -established his head-quarters at Figueras on the 5th. - -[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence.] - -In Catalonia, as in other parts of Spain, lethargic vanity, -and abuses of the most fatal kind, had succeeded to the first -enthusiasm, and withered the energy of the people. The local junta -issued, indeed, abundance of decrees, and despatched agents to the -supreme junta, and to the English commanders in the Mediterranean, -and in Portugal, all charged with the same instructions, namely, -to demand arms, ammunition, and money. And although the central -junta treated their demands with contempt, the English authorities -answered them generously and freely. Lord Collingwood lent the -assistance of his fleet. From Malta and Sicily arms were obtained; -and sir Hew Dalrymple having completely equipped the Spanish -regiments released by the convention of Cintra, despatched them -to Catalonia in British transports. Yet it may be doubted if -the conduct of the central junta were not the wisest; for the -local government established at Tarragona had already become so -negligent, or so corrupt, that the arms thus supplied were, instead -of being used in defence of the country, sold to foreign merchants! -and such being the political state of Catalonia, it naturally -followed that the military affairs should be ill conducted. - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -The count of Caldagues, who had relieved Gerona, returned by -Hostalrich, and resumed the line of the Llobregat; and fifteen -hundred men, drawn from the garrison of Carthagena, having reached -Taragona, the marquis of Palacios, accompanied by the junta, -quitted the latter town, and fixed his head-quarters at Villa -Franca, within twenty miles of Caldagues. The latter disposed his -troops, five thousand in number, at different points between -Martorel and San Boy, covering a line of eighteen miles, along the -left bank of the river. - -General Duhesme rested a few days, and then marching from Barcelona -with six thousand men in the night, arrived the 2d of September at -day-break on the Llobregat, and immediately attacked Caldagues’ -line in several points, but principally at San Boy and Molino -del Rey. The former fort was carried, some guns and stores were -captured, and the Spaniards were pursued to Vegas, a distance -of seven or eight miles; but at Molino del Rey the French were -repulsed, and Duhesme then returned to Barcelona. - -It was the intention of the British ministers, that an auxiliary -force should have sailed from Sicily about this period, to aid -the Catalans; and doubtless it would have been a wise and timely -effort: but Napoleon’s foresight prevented the execution; for he -directed Murat to menace Sicily with a descent; and that prince, -feigning to collect forces on the coast of Calabria, spread many -reports of armaments being in preparation, and, as a preliminary -measure, attacked and carried the island of Capri; upon which -occasion sir Hudson Lowe first became known to history, by losing -in a few days a post that, without any pretensions to celebrity, -might have been defended for as many years. Murat’s demonstrations -sufficed to impose upon sir John Stuart, and from ten to twelve -thousand British troops were thus paralyzed at a most critical -period: but such will always be the result of a policy which has -no fixed and definite object in view. When statesmen cannot see -their own way clearly, the executive officers will seldom act with -vigour. - -The Spanish army was now daily increasing; the tercios of -Migueletes were augmented in number, and a regiment of hussars, -that had been most absurdly kept in Majorca ever since the -beginning of the insurrection, arrived at Taragona. - -Mariano Alvarez, the governor of Gerona, was appointed to the -command of the vanguard, composed of the garrisons of Gerona and -Rosas, and of the corps of Juan Claros, and other partizans. - -Francisco Milans and Milans de Bosch, with their Migueletes, kept -the mountains to the northward and eastward of Barcelona; and while -the latter hemmed in the French right, the former covered the -district of El Vallés, and like a bird of prey watched the French -foragers in the plain surrounding Barcelona. - -Palacios remained at Villa Franca, and the count of Caldagues -continued to guard the line of the Llobregat. - -The little port of St. Felice de Quixols, near Palamos Bay, was -filled with privateers, and the English frigates off the coast not -only aided the Spaniards in all their enterprizes, but carried on a -littoral warfare in the gulf of Lyons with great spirit and success. - -During the month of September several petty skirmishes happened -between the French marauding parties and the Migueletes about -Barcelona; but on the 10th of October, Duhesme attacked and -dislodged Francisco Milans from the mountains to the north of that -city; and designing to forage the district of El Vallés, sent on -the 11th a column of two thousand men along the sea coast towards -Mattaro, with orders to turn from thence to the left, clear the -heights beyond the Besos, of Migueletes, and push for Granollers -on the route to Vich: this column he supported by a second of -nearly equal strength, under general Millossewitz. - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -The first column reaching Granollers on the 12th, put the local -junta of that district to flight, captured some provisions and -other stores, and, finally, joined the second column, which was -posted at Mollet. Millossewitz, leaving a part of his force at the -pass of Moncada, then proceeded to San Culgat. Caldagues, hearing -of this excursion, drew together three thousand infantry, a hundred -and fifty cavalry, and six guns from his line on the Llobregat, -and was in full march by the back of the mountains for the pass -of Moncada, expecting to intercept the French in their return to -Barcelona: but, falling in with them at San Culgat, a confused -action ensued, and both sides claimed the victory; the French, -however, retreated across the mountains to Barcelona without -having foraged the district, and Caldagues returned to his former -position, justly proud of this vigorous and soldier-like movement. - -The 28th of October, Palacios quitted Catalonia to command the -levies in the Sierra Morena. General Vives succeeded him, and -the army was again reinforced by some infantry from Majorca. The -Spanish regiments, released by the convention of Cintra, also -arrived at Villa Franca, and seven or eight thousand Granadian -levies were brought up to Tarragona by general Reding, and, at -the same time, six thousand men drafted from the army of Aragon, -reached Lerida, under the command of the marquis de Lazan. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr. Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The whole force, including the garrisons of Hostalrich, Gerona, and -Rosas, was now not less than thirty-six thousand men; of which -twenty-two thousand infantry, and twelve hundred cavalry, were in -the neighbourhood of Barcelona, or in march for the Llobregat. -This force, organized in six divisions, of which the troops in the -Ampurdan formed one, took the name of the _army of the right_, and -Vives seeing himself at the head of such a power, and in possession -of all the hills and rivers encircling Barcelona, resolved to -besiege that city. - -The 3d of November, he transferred his head-quarters to Martorel; -the 8th he commenced a series of trifling skirmishes, to drive the -French posts back into the town: but they repulsed him; and, from -that time until the blockade was raised, a warfare of the most -contemptible nature was carried on by the Spaniards: the French, -who were about ten thousand strong, always maintaining their -outposts. - -[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence.] - -Notwithstanding this appearance of strength, Catalonia was a prey -to innumerable disorders. Vives, a weak, indolent man, had been a -friend of Godoy, and was not popular; he it was that, commanding -in the islands, had retained the troops in them with such tenacity -as to create doubts of his attachment to the cause; but, although -the supreme junta privately expressed their suspicions, and -requested lord Collingwood to force Vives to an avowal of his -true sentiments, they, at the same time, wrote to the latter, -publicly, in the most flattering terms, and, finally, appointed -him captain-general of Catalonia. By the people, however, both he -and others were vehemently suspected, and, as the mob governed -throughout Spain, the authorities, civil and military, were more -careful to avoid giving offence to the multitude than anxious to -molest the enemy. Catalonia was full of strong places: but they -were neither armed nor provisioned, and, like all other Spaniards, -the Catalans were confident that the French only thought of -retreating. - -[Sidenote: Muster rolls of the French army, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -Such was the state of the province and of the armies, when -Napoleon, being ready to break into the northern parts of Spain, -general St. Cyr commenced his operations. His force (including a -German division of six thousand men, not yet arrived at Perpignan) -amounted to more than thirty thousand men, ill-composed, however, -and badly provided; and St. Cyr himself was extremely discontented -with his situation. The Emperor had given him discretionary powers -to act as he judged fitting, only bearing in mind the importance of -relieving Barcelona; but marshal Berthier neglected the equipment -of the troops; and Duhesme declared that his magazines would not -hold out longer than December. - -To march directly to Barcelona was neither an easy nor an -advantageous movement. That city could only be provisioned from -France; and, until the road was cleared, by the taking of Gerona -and Hostalrich, no convoys could pass except by sea, yet, to attack -these places with prudence, it was essential to get possession of -Rosas, not only to secure an intermediate port for French vessels -passing with supplies to Barcelona, but to deprive the English of -a secure harbour, and the Spaniards of a point from whence they -could, in concert with their allies, intercept the communications -of the French army: and even blockade Figueras, which, from the -want of transport, could not be provisioned at this period. These -considerations having determined St. Cyr to commence by the siege -of Rosas, he repaired to Figueras, in person, the 6th of November; -and, on the 7th, general Reille being charged to conduct the -operation, after a sharp action, drove in the Spaniards before the -place and completed the investment. - - -SIEGE OF ROSAS. - -This town was but a narrow slip of houses built along the water’s -edge, at the head of the gulph of the same name. - -The citadel, a large irregular pentagon, stood on one side of -the town, and, on the other, the mountains that skirt the flat -and swampy plain of the Ampurdan, rose, bluff and rocky, at the -distance of half a mile. An old redoubt was built at the foot of -these hills, and, from thence to the citadel, an entrenchment had -been drawn to cover the houses. Hence, Rosas, looking towards the -land, had the citadel on the left hand, the mountains on the right, -and the front covered by this entrenchment. The roadstead permitted -ships of the line to anchor within cannon-shot of the place; and, -on the right hand coming up the gulph, a star fort, called the -Trinity, crowned a rugged hill about a mile and a quarter distant -from the citadel, the communication between it and the town being -by a narrow road carried between the foot of the hills and the -water’s edge. - -The garrison of Rosas consisted of nearly three thousand men, two -bomb-vessels, and an English seventy-four (the Excellent), were -anchored off the town, and captain West, the commodore, reinforced -the garrisons of the Trinity and the citadel with marines and -seamen from these vessels; but the damages sustained in a former -siege had been only partially repaired; both places were ill-found -in guns and stores, and the Trinity was commanded at the distance -of pistol-shot from a point of the mountains called the Puig Rom. - -The force under Reille, consisting of his own and general Pino’s -Italian division, skirmished daily with the garrison; but the rain, -which fell in torrents, having flooded the Ampurdan, the roads -became impassable for the artillery, and delayed the opening of the -trenches. Meanwhile, Souham’s division took post between the Fluvia -and Figueras, to cover the operations of the siege on the side of -Gerona, and an Italian brigade, under general Chabot, was posted at -Rabos and Espollas, to keep the Somatenes down. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -But, before Chabot’s arrival, Reille had detached a battalion to -that side; and, being uneasy for its safety, sent three more to its -assistance: this saved the battalion, which was in great danger; -and two companies were actually cut off by the Somatenes. This -loss, however, proved beneficial, as it enraged the Italians, and -checked their disposition to desert; and St. Cyr, unwilling to -pursue the system of burning villages, and yet anxious to repress -the insidious hostility of the peasants, in reprizal for the loss -of his two companies, seized an equal number of villagers, and sent -them prisoners to France. - -The inhabitants of Rosas having embarked or taken refuge in the -citadel, the houses, and the entrenchments covering them, were left -to the French; but the latter were prevented, by the fire of the -English ships, from effecting a permanent lodgement in the deserted -town; and, after a few days, a detachment from the garrison, -consisting of soldiers and townsmen, established a post there. - -[Sidenote: Captain West’s despatch.] - -The 8th captain West, in conjunction with the governor, made a -sally, but was repulsed; and, on the 9th several yards of the -citadel ramparts crumbled; but, with the assistance of the British -seamen, the breach was repaired in the night before the enemy -became aware of the accident. - -The 15th an obstinate assault made on the Trinity was repulsed, the -English seamen bearing a principal share in the success. - -The 16th the roads being passable, the French battering-train was -put in motion. The way leading up to the Puig Rom was repaired, -and two battalions were posted there, on the point commanding the -Trinity. - -The 19th three guns were mounted against the Trinity, and the -trenches were opened at the distance of four hundred yards from the -citadel. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -The 20th the fire of some French mortars obliged the vessels of -war to anchor beyond the range of the shells. During this time, -Souham was harassed by the Migueletes from the side of Gerona. The -French cavalry, unable to find forage, were sent back to France; -and Napoleon, rendered uneasy by the reports of general Duhesme, -ordered the seventh corps to advance to Barcelona, so as to arrive -there by the 26th of November; but St. Cyr refused to abandon the -siege of Rosas without a positive order. - -The assistance afforded to the besieged by captain West was -represented to the junta as an attempt of that officer to possess -himself of the place. The junta readily believed this tale, and -entered into an angry correspondence with don Pedro O’Daly, the -governor, relative to the supposed treachery; but no measures were -taken to raise the siege. During this correspondence, the Excellent -sailed from Rosas, and was succeeded by the Fame, captain Bennet. -This officer landed some men under the Trinity on the 23d, and -endeavoured, but ineffectually, to take the battery opposed to that -fort. - -[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The 27th the besiegers assaulted the Spaniards, who, to the number -of five hundred, had entrenched themselves in the deserted houses -of the town. A hundred and sixty were taken, and fifty escaped -into the citadel; the rest were slain. Breaching batteries were -immediately commenced among the ruins of the houses, and the -communication with the shipping rendered so unsafe, that Lazan, -who had come from Lerida to Gerona with six thousand men, and had -collected provisions and stores at the mouth of the Fluvia, with -the intention of supplying Rosas by sea, abandoned his design. -The ruinous condition of the front, exposed to the fire of the -besiegers, now induced Reille to summon the place a second time; -but the governor refused to surrender. - -The 30th of November, the engineers reported that the breach in -the Trinity was practicable, and an assault was ordered; although -an Italian officer, appointed to lead the storming party of fifty -men, and who had formerly served in the fort, asserted that the -breach was not a true one. The Spanish commandant thought his post -untenable; and two days before, the marines of the Fame had been -withdrawn by captain Bennet: but at this time, lord Cochrane, a -man of infinite talent in his profession, and of a courage and -enterprise that have seldom, if ever, been surpassed, arrived in -the Imperieuse frigate, and immediately threw himself, with eighty -men, into the fort. - -The Italian’s representations being unheeded, he advanced to the -assault like a man of honour, and was killed, together with all -his followers, excepting four, two of whom escaped back to their -own side, the other two being spared by the English seamen, were -drawn up with cords into the fort. The breach had, however, been -practicable at first; but it was broken in an old gallery, which -lord Cochrane immediately filled with earth and hammocks, and so -cut off the opening. In the course of a few days, a second assault -was made, but the French were again repulsed with loss. Meanwhile -the breaching batteries opened against the citadel, and a false -attack was commenced on the opposite side. - -The 4th December the garrison made a sally, in the night, from -the citadel, and with some success; but the walls were opened by -the enemy’s fire, and the next day O’Daly, hopeless of relief, -surrendered with about two thousand four hundred men, of which two -hundred were wounded. Lord Cochrane, also, blew up the magazine, -and abandoned Fort Trinity. General St. Cyr observes that the -garrison of Rosas might have been easily carried off, at night, -by the British shipping; but to embark two thousand five hundred -men, in the boats of two ships, and under a heavy fire, whether by -night or day, is not an easy operation; nevertheless, the censure -seems well founded, because sufficient preparation might have been -previously made. - -[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The defence of Rosas (with the exception of lord Cochrane’s -efforts) cannot be deemed brilliant, whether with relation to -the importance of the place, the assistance that might have been -rendered from the sea, or the number of the garrison compared with -that of the besiegers. It held out, however, thirty days, and, -if that time had been well employed by the Spaniards, the loss -of the garrison would have been amply repaid; but Vives, wholly -occupied with Barcelona, was indifferent to the fate of Rosas. A -fruitless attack on Souham’s posts, by Mariano Alvarez, was the -only effort made to interrupt the siege, or to impede the farther -progress of the enemy. Lazan, although at the head of six or seven -thousand men, could not rely upon more than three thousand; and his -applications to Vives for a reinforcement were unheeded. - -The fall of Rosas enabled St. Cyr to march to the relief of -Barcelona, and he resolved to do so: yet the project, at first -sight, would appear rather insane than hardy; for the roads, by -which Gerona and Hostalrich were to be turned, being mere paths -impervious to carriages, no artillery, and little ammunition, -could be carried, and the country was full of strong positions. -The Germans had not yet arrived at Perpignan; it was indispensable -to leave Reille in the Ampurdan, to protect Rosas and Figueras; -and, these deductions being made, less than eighteen thousand -men, including the cavalry, which had been recalled from France, -remained disposable for the operation. - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -But, on the Spanish side, Reding having come up, there were -twenty-five thousand men in the camp before Barcelona, and ten -thousand others, under Lazan and Alvarez, were at Gerona. All -these troops were, however, exceedingly ill organized. Two-thirds -of the Migueletes only carried pikes, and many were without any -arms at all. There was no sound military system; the Spanish -generals were ignorant of the French movements and strength; and -their own indolence and want of vigilance drew upon them the -contempt and suspicion of the people. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -The 8th of December St. Cyr united his army on the left bank -of the Fluvia. The 9th he passed that river, and, driving the -Spaniards over the Ter, established his head-quarters at Mediñya, -ten miles from Gerona. He wished, before pursuing his own march, -to defeat Lazan, lest the latter should harass the rear of the -army; but, finding that the marquis would not engage in a serious -affair, he made a show of sitting down before Gerona on the 10th, -hoping thereby to mislead Vives, and render him slow to break up -the blockade of Barcelona: and this succeeded; for the Spaniard -remained in his camp, irresolute and helpless, while his enemy was -rapidly passing the defiles and rivers between Gerona and the Besos. - -The nature of the country between Figueras and Barcelona has been -described in the first volume; referring to that description, -the reader will find that the only carriage-routes by which St. -Cyr could march were, one by the sea-coast, and one leading -through Gerona and Hostalrich. The first, exposed to the fire of -the English vessels, had also been broken up by lord Cochrane, -in August; and, to use the second, it was necessary to take the -fortresses, or to turn them by marching for three days through the -mountains. St. Cyr adopted the latter plan, trusting that rapidity -and superior knowledge of war would enable him to separate Lazan -and Alvarez from Vives, and so defeat them all in succession. - -The 11th, he crossed the Ter and reached La Bisbal; here he left -the last of his carriages, delivered out four days’ biscuit -and fifty rounds of ammunition to the soldiers, and with this -provision, a drove of cattle, and a reserve of ten rounds of -ammunition for each man, he commenced his hardy march the 12th -of December, making for Palamos. On the route he encountered and -beat some Migueletes that Juan Claros had brought to oppose him, -and, when near Palamos, he suffered a little from the fire of the -English ships; but he had gained a first step, and his hopes were -high. - -The 13th, he turned his back upon the coast, and, by a forced -march, reached Vidreras and Llagostera, and thus placed himself -between Vives and Lazan, for the latter had not yet passed the -heights of Casa de Selva. - -The 14th, marching by Mazanet de Selva and Martorel, he reached -the heights above Hostalrich, and encamped at Grions and Masanas. -During this day’s journey, his rear was slightly harassed by Lazan -and Claros; but he was well content to find the strong banks of -the Tordera undefended by Vives. The situation of the army was, -however, extremely critical. Lazan and Claros had, the one on the -11th, the other on the 12th, informed Vives of the movement; hence -the bulk of the Spanish force before Barcelona might be expected, -at any moment, in some of the strong positions in which the country -abounded, and the troops from Gerona were, as we have seen, close -in the rear; the Somatenes were gathering thickly on the flanks, -Hostalrich was in front, and the French soldiers had only sixty -rounds of ammunition. - -St. Cyr’s design was to turn Hostalrich, and get into the main road -again behind that fortress. The smugglers of Perpignan had affirmed -that there was no pathway, but a shepherd assured him that there -was a track by which it could be effected; and, when the efforts of -the staff-officers to trace it failed, St. Cyr himself discovered -it, but nearly fell into the hands of the Somatenes during the -search. - -The 15th, at day-break, the troops being put in motion, turned -Hostalrich and gained the main road. The garrison of that place, -endeavouring to harass their rear, were repulsed; but the Somatenes -on the flanks, emboldened because the French, to save ammunition, -did not return their fire, became exceedingly troublesome; and, -near San Celoni, the head of the column encountered some battalions -of Migueletes, which Francisco Milans had brought up from Arenas de -Mar, by the pass of Villa Gorguin. - -Milans, not being aware of St. Cyr’s approach, was soon beaten, -and his men fell back, part to Villa Gorguin, part to the heights -of Nuestra Señora de Cordera: the French thus gained the defile -of Treintapasos. But they were now so fatigued that all desired -to halt, save St. Cyr, who insisted upon the troops clearing the -defile, and reaching a plain on the other side: this was not -effected before ten o’clock. Lazan’s troops did not appear during -the day; but Vives’ army was in front, and its fires were seen on -the hills between Cardadeu and Llinas. - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, MS.] - -Information of St. Cyr’s march, as I have already observed, had -been transmitted to Vives on the 11th, and there was time for him -to have carried the bulk of his forces to the Tordera before the -French could pass that river; but intelligence of the battle of -Tudela, and of the appearance of the French near Zaragoza, arrived -at the same moment, and the Spanish general betrayed the greatest -weakness and indecision, at one moment resolving to continue before -Barcelona, at another designing to march against St. Cyr. He had, -on the 9th, sent Reding with six guns, six hundred cavalry, and one -thousand infantry, to take the command in the Ampurdan; but, the -12th, after receiving Lazan’s report, he reinforced Reding, who was -still at Granollers, and directed him upon Cardadeu. - -The 14th, he ordered Francisco Milans to march by Mattaro and -Arenas de Mar, to examine the coast road, and, if the enemy was not -in that line, to repair also to Cardadeu. - -The 15th, Milans, as we have seen, was beaten at St. Celoni; but, -in the night, he rallied his whole division on the heights of -Cordera, thus flanking the left of the French forces at Llinas. - -A council of war was held on the 13th. Caldagues advised that four -thousand Migueletes should be left to observe Duhesme, and that the -rest of the army should march at once to fight St. Cyr. Good and -soldier-like advice; but Vives was loth to abandon the siege of -Barcelona, and, adopting half-measures, left Caldagues, with the -right wing of the army, to watch Duhesme, and carried the centre -and the left, by the route of Granollers, to the heights between -Cardadeu and Llinas, where (exclusive of Milan’s division) he -united, in the night of the 15th, about eight thousand regulars, -besides several thousand Somatenes. Duhesme immediately occupied -the posts abandoned by Vives, and thus separated him from Caldagues. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -St. Cyr’s position, on the morning of the 16th, would have been -dangerous, if he had been opposed by any but Spanish generals and -Spanish troops. Vives and those about him, irresolute and weak -as they were in action, were not deficient in boasting words; -they called the French army, in derision, “_the succour_;” and, -in allusion to the battle of Baylen, announced that a second -“_bull-fight_,” in which Reding was again the “_matador_,” would be -exhibited. But Dupont and St. Cyr were men of a different stamp: -the latter justly judging that the Spaniards were not troops to -stand the shock of a good column, united his army in one solid -mass, at day-break on the 16th, and marched straight against the -centre of the enemy, giving orders that the head of the column -should go headlong on, without either firing or forming line. - - -BATTLE OF CARDADEU. - -The hills which the Spaniards occupied were high and wooded; the -right was formed by Reding’s division, the left by Vives, and -the Somatenes hung on the sides of a lofty ridge, which was only -separated from the right of the position by the little river -Mogent. The main road from Llinas led straight upon the centre, and -there was a second road conducting to Mataro, which, branching off -from the first, run between the Mogent and the right of Reding’s -ground. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -When the French commenced their march, the Somatenes galled their -left flank, and general Pino, whose division headed the column of -attack, instead of falling upon the centre, sent back for fresh -instructions, and meanwhile extended his first brigade in a line to -the left. St. Cyr, who had reiterated the order to fight in column, -was sorely troubled at Pino’s error, the ill effects of which were -instantly felt, because, Reding advancing against the front and -flank of the extended brigade, obliged it to commence a fire, which -it was impossible to sustain for want of ammunition. - -In this difficulty the French general acted with great ability and -vigour: Pino’s second brigade was directed to do that which the -first should have done. Two companies were sent to menace the left -of the Spaniards, and St. Cyr, at the same time, rapidly carried -Souham’s division, by the Mataro road, against Reding’s extreme -right. The effect was instantaneous and complete, the Spaniards -overthrown on their centre and right, and charged by the cavalry, -were beaten and dispersed in every direction, leaving all their -artillery and ammunition, and two thousand prisoners behind. - -Vives, escaping on foot across the mountain, reached Mataro, where -he was taken on board an English vessel. Reding fled on horseback -by the main road; and the next day, having rallied some of the -fugitives at Monmalo, retreated by the route of San Culgat to -Molino del Rey. The loss of the French was six hundred men; but -the battle, which lasted only one hour, was so complete, that St. -Cyr resolved to push on to Barcelona immediately, without seeking -to defeat Milans or Lazan, whom he judged too timid to venture an -action: moreover, he hoped that Duhesme, who had been informed, on -the 7th, of the intended march, and who could hear the sound of the -artillery, would intercept and turn back the flying troops. - -The French army had scarcely quitted the field of battle when -Milans arrived; but, finding how matters stood, retired to Arenas -de Mar, and gave notice to Lazan, who retreated to Gerona. St. -Cyr’s rear was thus cleared; but Duhesme, heedless of what was -passing at Cardadeu, instead of intercepting the beaten army, -sent Lecchi to attack Caldagues. The latter general, however, -concentrated his division on the evening of the 16th, repulsed -Lecchi, and retired behind the Llobregat, but left behind some -artillery and the large magazines which Vives had collected for the -siege and accumulated in his camp. - -St. Cyr reached Barcelona without encountering any of Duhesme’s -troops, and, in his Memoirs of this campaign, represents that -general as astonishingly negligent, seeking neither to molest the -enemy nor to meet the French army; treating everything belonging to -the service with indifference, making false returns, and conniving -at gross malversation in his generals. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -St. Cyr, now reflecting upon the facility with which his opponents -could be defeated, and the difficulty of pursuing them, resolved -to rest a few days at Barcelona, in hopes that the Spaniards, if -unmolested, would re-assemble in numbers behind the Llobregat, -and enable him to strike an effectual blow, for his design -was to disperse their forces so as they should not be able to -interrupt the sieges which he meditated; nor was he deceived in -his calculations. Reding joined Caldagues, and rallied from twelve -to fifteen thousand men behind the Llobregat, and Vives, having -relanded at Sitjes, sent orders to Lazan and Milans to march -likewise to that river by the district of Vallés. The arrival of -the latter was, however, so uncertain that the French general, -judging it better to attack Reding at once, united Chabran’s -division to his own, on the 20th, and advanced to St. Felieu de -Llobregat. - -The Spaniards were drawn up on the heights behind the village of -San Vincente; their position was lofty and rugged, commanding a -free view of the approaches from Barcelona. The Llobregat covered -the front, and the left flank was secure from attack, except at the -bridge of Molino del Rey, which was entrenched, guarded by a strong -detachment, and protected by heavy guns. Reding’s cavalry amounted -to one thousand, and he had fifty pieces of artillery, the greatest -part of which were in battery at the bridge of Molino del Rey; but -his right was accessible, because the river was fordable in several -places. The main road to Villa Franca led through this position, -and, at the distance of ten or twelve miles in the rear, the pass -of Ordal offered another post of great strength. - -Vives was at San Vincente on the 19th, but returned to Villa Franca -the same day; hence, when the French appeared on the 20th, the camp -was thrown into confusion. - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -A council of war being held, one party was for fighting, another -for retreating to Ordal: an officer was then sent to Vives for -orders, but he returned with a message, that Reding might retreat -if he could not defend his post. The latter, however, fearing -that he should be accused, and perhaps sacrificed for returning -without reason, resolved to fight, although he anticipated nothing -but disaster. The season was extremely severe; snow was falling, -and both armies suffered from the cold and wet. The Spanish -soldiers were dispirited by past defeats, and the despondency and -irresolution of their generals could not escape observation: but -the French and Italian troops were confident in their commander, -and flushed with success. In these dispositions the two armies -passed the night before - - -THE BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY. - -St. Cyr observing that Reding’s attention was principally directed -to the bridge of Molino, ordered Chabran’s division to that side, -with instructions to create a diversion, by opening a fire from -some artillery, and then retiring, as if his guns could not resist -the weight of the Spanish metal; in short, to persuade the enemy -that a powerful effort would be made there; but when the centre and -right of the Spaniards should be attacked, Chabran was to force -the passage of the bridge, and assail the heights beyond it. This -stratagem succeeded; Reding massed his troops on the left, and -neglected his right, which was the real point of attack. - -The 21st of December, Pino’s division crossed the Llobregat at -daylight, by a ford in front of St. Felieu, and marched against -the right of the Spanish position: Chabot’s division followed; and -Souham’s, which had passed at a ford lower down, and then ascended -by the right bank, covered Pino’s passage. The light cavalry -were held in reserve behind Chabot’s division, and a regiment of -cuirassiers was sent to support Chabran at Molino del Rey. - -The Spanish position consisted of two mountain heads, separated -by a narrow ravine and a torrent; and as the troops of the right -wing were exceedingly weakened, they were immediately chased off -their headland by the leading brigade of Pino’s division. Reding -then seeing his error, changed his front, and drew up on the other -mountain, on a new line, nearly perpendicular to the Llobregat; but -he still kept a strong detachment at the bridge of Molino, which -was thus in rear of his left. The French divisions formed rapidly -for a fresh effort. Souham on the right, Pino in the centre, Chabot -on the left. The latter gained ground in the direction of Villa -Franca, and endeavoured to turn the Spaniards’ right, and cut off -their retreat; while the light cavalry making way between the -mountain and the river, sought to connect themselves with Chabran -at Molino. - -St. Cyr’s columns, crossing the ravine that separated them from -the Spaniards, soon ascended the opposite mountain. The Catalans -had formed quickly, and opposed their enemies with an orderly, but -ill directed fire. Their front line then advanced, and offered to -charge with an appearance of great intrepidity; but their courage -sunk, and they turned as the hostile masses approached. The -reserves immediately opened a confused volley upon both parties; -and in this disorder, the road to Villa Franca being intercepted by -Chabot, the right was forced upon the centre, the centre upon the -left, and the whole pushed back in confusion upon Molino del Rey. - -Meanwhile a detachment from Chabran’s division had passed the -Llobregat above Molino, and so blocked the road to Martorel; and -in this miserable situation the Spaniards were charged by the -light cavalry, and scarcely a man would have escaped if Chabran -had obeyed his orders, and pushing across the bridge of Molino -had come upon their rear; but that general, at all times feeble in -execution, remained a tranquil spectator of the action, until the -right of Souham’s division reached the bridge; and thus the routed -troops escaped, by dispersing, and throwing away every thing that -could impede their flight across the mountains. Vives reached the -field of battle just as the route was complete, and was forced to -fly with the rest. The victorious army pursued in three columns; -Chabran’s in the direction of Igualada, Chabot’s by the road of -San Sadurni, which turned the pass of Ordal, and Souham’s by the -royal route of Villa Franca, at which place the head-quarters were -established on the 22d. The posts of Villa Nueva and Sitjes were -immediately occupied by Pino, while Souham pushed the fugitives to -the gates of Tarragona. - -The loss of the Spaniards, owing to their swiftness, was less than -might have been expected; not more than twelve hundred fell into -the hands of the French, but many superior officers were killed or -wounded; and, on the 22d, the count de Caldagues was taken, a man -apparently pedantic in military affairs, and wanting in modesty, -but evidently possessed of both courage and talent. The whole of -the artillery, and vast quantities of powder, were captured, and -with them a magazine of English muskets, quite new. Yet many of -the Migueletes were unarmed, and the junta were unceasing in their -demands for succours of this nature; but the history of any one -province was the history of all Spain. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -Barcelona was now completely relieved, and the captured magazines -supplied it for several months. There was no longer a Spanish -army in the field; and in Tarragona, where some eight or nine -thousand of the Spanish fugitives, from this and the former battle, -had taken refuge, there was terrible disorder. The people rose -tumultuously, broke open the public stores, and laying hands on -all the weapons they could find, rushed from place to place, as if -searching for something to vent their fury upon. The head of Vives -was called for; and to save his life, he was cast into prison by -Reding, who was proclaimed general-in-chief. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -The regular officers were insulted by the populace, and there was -as usual a general cry to defend the city, mixed with furious -menaces against traitors, but there were neither guns, nor -ammunition, nor provisions; and during the first moment of anarchy, -St. Cyr might certainly have rendered himself master of Tarragona -by a vigorous effort. But the opportunity soon passed away; the -French general sought only to procure subsistence, and occupied -himself in forming a train of field artillery; while Reding, who -had been almost without hope, proceeded to rally the army, and -place the town in a state of defence. - -[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The 1st of January eleven thousand infantry and eight hundred -cavalry were re-assembled at Tarragona and Reus; and a Swiss -regiment from Majorca and two Spanish regiments from Granada, -increased this force. Three thousand four hundred men arrived from -Valencia on the 5th, and from thence also five thousand muskets, -ammunition in proportion, and ten thousand pikes which had just -been landed from England, were forwarded to Tarragona. A supply -of money, obtained from the British agents at Seville, completed -the number of fortuitous and fortunate events that combined to -remedy the disaster of Molino del Rey. These circumstances, and the -inactivity of St. Cyr, who seemed suddenly paralyzed, restored the -confidence of the Catalonians, but their system remained unchanged; -for confidence among the Spaniards always led to insubordination, -but never to victory. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -Meanwhile, a part of the troops flying from Molino had taken refuge -at Bruch, and being joined by the Somatenes, chose major Green, -one of the English military agents, for their general, thinking -to hold that strong country, which was considered as impregnable -ever since the defeats of Chabran and Swartz. St. Cyr, glad of this -opportunity to retrieve the honour of the French arms, detached -Chabran himself, on the 11th of January, to take his own revenge; -but that general was still depressed by the recollection of his -former defeat. To encourage him, Chabot was directed from San -Sadurni upon Igualada, by which the defile of Bruch was turned, and -a permanent defence rendered impossible. The Spaniards, however, -made little or no resistance; and eight guns were taken, and a -considerable number of men killed. The French pursued to Igualada; -and a detachment, without orders, even assailed and took Montserrat -itself, and afterwards rejoined the main body without loss. Chabot -was then recalled to San Sadurni, and Chabran was quartered at -Martorel. - -While these events were passing beyond the Llobregat, the marquis -of Lazan was advancing, with seven or eight thousand men, towards -Castellon de Ampurias. The 1st of January he drove back a -battalion of infantry upon Rosas with considerable loss; but the -next day general Reille, having assembled about three thousand -men, intercepted Lazan’s communications, and attacked him in his -position behind the Muga. The victory seems to have been undecided; -but in the night, Lazan regained his communications, and returned -to Gerona. - -The battle of Molino del Rey checked, for a time, the ardour of -the Catalans, and Reding at first avoided serious actions, leaving -the Somatenes to harass the enemy. This plan being followed during -the months of January and February, was exceedingly troublesome to -St. Cyr, because he was obliged to send small parties continually -to seek for subsistence, and the country people, hiding their -provisions with great care, strove hard to protect their scanty -stores. But in the beginning of February the country between the -Llobregat and Tarragona was almost exhausted of food. The English -ships continued to vex the coast-line; and the French, besides -deserters, lost many men, killed and wounded, in the innumerable -petty skirmishes sustained by the marauding parties. Still St. -Cyr maintained his positions; and the country people, tired of a -warfare in which they were the chief sufferers, clamoured against -Reding, that he, with a large regular force, should look calmly -on, until the last morsel of food was discovered, and torn from -their starving families. The townspeople, also feeling the burthen -of supporting the troops, impatiently urged the general to fight; -nor was this insubordination confined to the rude multitude. - -Lazan, although at the head of nine thousand men, had remained -perfectly inactive after the skirmish at Castellon de Ampurias; but -when Reding required him to leave a suitable garrison in Gerona, -and bring the rest of his troops to Igualada, he would not obey; -and this difference was only terminated by Lazan’s marching, with -five thousand men, to the assistance of Zaragoza. The result of his -operations there has been already related in the narrative of that -siege. - -The army immediately under Reding was, however, very considerable: -the Swiss battalions were numerous and good, and some of the most -experienced of the Spanish regiments were in Catalonia. Every fifth -man of the robust population had been called out after the defeat -of Molino del Rey; and, although the people, averse to serve as -regular soldiers, did not readily answer the call, the forces under -Reding were so augmented that, in the beginning of February, it -was not less than twenty-eight thousand men. The urban guards were -also put in activity, and above fifteen thousand Somatenes assisted -the regular troops; but there was more show than real power, for -Reding was incapable of wielding the regular troops skilfully; and -the Migueletes being ill armed, without clothing and insubordinate, -devastated the country equally with the enemy. - -The Somatenes, who only took arms for local interests, would not -fight, except at the times and in the manner and place that suited -themselves; and not only neglected the advice of the regular -officers, but reviled all who would not adopt their own views; -causing many to be removed from their commands; and, with all -this, the Spanish generals never obtained good information of -the enemy’s movements, yet their own plans were immediately made -known to the French; because, at Reding’s head-quarters, as at -those of Castaños before the battle of Tudela, every project was -openly and ostentatiously discussed. Reding himself was a man of no -military talent; his activity was of body, not of mind, but he was -brave and honourable, and popular; because, being without system, -arrangement, or deep design, and easy in his nature, he thwarted no -man’s humours, and thus floated in the troubled waters until their -sudden reflux left him on the rocks. - -The Catalonian army was now divided into four distinct corps. - -Alvarez, with four thousand men, held Gerona and the Ampurdan. - -Lazan, with five thousand, was near Zaragoza. - -Don Juan Castro, an officer, accused by the Spaniards of treachery, -and who afterwards did attach himself to Joseph’s party, occupied, -with sixteen thousand men, a line extending from Olesa, on the -Upper Llobregat, to the pass of San Cristina, near Tarragona, and -this line running through Bruch, Igualada, and Llacuna, was above -sixty miles long. The remainder of the army, amounting to ten -or twelve thousand men under Reding himself, were quartered at -Tarragona, Reus, and the immediate vicinity of those places. - -The Spaniards were fed from Valencia and Aragon, (the convoys -from the former being conveyed in vessels along the coast). Their -magazines were accumulated on one or two points of the line, and -those points being chosen without judgement fettered Reding’s -movements and regulated those of the French, whose only difficulty, -in fact, was to procure food. - -[Sidenote: Appendix No. 1, section 6.] - -Early in February, St. Cyr, having exhausted the country about -him, and having his communications much vexed by the Somatenes and -by descents from the English ships, closed his posts and kept his -divisions in masses at Vendril, Villa Franca, San Sadurni, and -Martorel. The seventh corps at this period having been reinforced -by the German division, and by some conscripts, amounted to -forty-eight thousand men, of which forty-one thousand were under -arms; but the force immediately commanded by St. Cyr did not exceed -twenty-three thousand of all arms. - -The relative position of the two armies was, however, entirely in -favour of the French general, his line extending from Vendril, -by Villa Franca, to Martorel, was not more than thirty miles, -and he had a royal road by which to retreat on Barcelona. The -Spanish posts covering, as I have said, an extent of above -sixty miles, formed a half-circle round the French line, and -their communications were more rugged than those of St. Cyr. -Nevertheless, it is not to be doubted that, by avoiding any serious -action, the Catalans would have obliged the French to abandon -the country, between the Llobregat and Tarragona. Famine and -the continued drain of men, in a mountain warfare, would have -forced them away; nor could they have struck any formidable blow -to relieve themselves, seeing that all the important places were -fortified towns requiring a regular siege. The never-failing -arrogance of the Spanish character, and the unstable judgement of -Reding, induced him to forego these advantages. The closing of -the French posts and some success in a few petty skirmishes were -magnified, the last into victories and the first into a design on -the part of the enemy to fly. - -An intercourse opened with some of the inhabitants of Barcelona -likewise gave hopes of regaining that city by means of a conspiracy -within the walls. The Catalans had before made proposals to general -Lecchi to deliver up the citadel of that place, nor is there any -thing that more strongly marks the absurd self-sufficiency of the -Spaniards, during this war, than the repeated attempts they made -to corrupt the French commanders. As late as the year 1810, Martin -Carrera, being at the head of about two thousand ragged peasants, -half-armed, and only existing under the protection of the English -outposts, offered to marshal Ney, then investing Ciudad Rodrigo, -rank and honours in the Spanish army if he would desert! - -Reding, swayed by the popular clamour, resolved to attack, and in -this view he directed Castro to collect his sixteen thousand men -and fall upon the right flank and rear of St. Cyr, by the routes -of Llacuna and Igualada, and to send a detachment to seize the -pass of Ordal, and thus cut off the French line of retreat to -Barcelona. Meanwhile, advancing with eight thousand by the road -of Vendril and St. Cristina; Reding, himself, was to attack the -enemy in front. All the Migueletes and Somatenes between Gerona -and the Besos were to aid in these operations, the object being to -surround the French, a favourite project with the Spaniards at all -times; and as they publicly announced this intention, the joy was -universal, and the destruction of the hostile army was as usual -anticipated with the utmost confidence. - -The Catalans were in motion on the 14th of February, but St. Cyr -kept his army well in hand until the Spaniards being ready to -break in upon him, he judged it politic to strike first. Souham’s -division remained at Vendril, to keep Reding in check, but on the -16th St. Cyr marched from Villa Franca, with Pino’s division, and -overthrew Castro’s advanced posts which were at Lacuña and Saint -Quinti. The Spanish centre thus pierced, and their wings completely -separated, Castro’s right was thrown back upon Capellades. - -The 17th, St. Cyr, continuing his movement with Pino’s division, -reached Capellades, where he expected to unite with Chabot and -Chabran, who had orders to concentrate there,--the one from -San Sadurin, the other from Martorel. By this skilful movement -the French general avoided the pass of Bruch, and massed three -divisions on the extreme right of Castro’s left wing and close to -his magazines, which were at Igualada. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -Chabot arrived the first, and, being for a little time unsupported, -was attacked and driven back with loss, but when the other -divisions came up, the action was restored, and the Spaniards -put to flight; they rallied again at Pobla de Claramunt, between -Capellades and Igualada, a circumstance agreeable to St. Cyr, -because he had sent Mazzuchelli’s brigade from Llacuna direct upon -Igualada, and if Chabot had not been so hard pressed, the action -at Capellades was to have been delayed until Mazzuchelli had got -into the rear; but scarcely was the head of that general’s column -descried, when Castro, who was at Igualada with his reserves, -recalled the troops from Pobla de Claramunt. The French being close -at their heels, the whole passed through Igualada, fighting and in -disorder, after which, losing all courage, the Spaniards broke, -and, throwing away their arms, fled by the three routes of Cervera, -Calaf, and Manresa. They were pursued all the 17th, and the French -returned the next day, but with few prisoners, because, says St. -Cyr, “_the Catalans are endowed by nature with strong knees_.” - -Having thus broken through the centre of the Spanish line, defeated -a part of the left wing and taken the magazines, St. Cyr posted -Chabot and Chabran, at Igualada, to keep the beaten troops in -check, but himself, with Pino’s division, marched the 18th to -fall upon Reding, whose extreme left was now at St. Magi. Souham -had been instructed, when by preconcerted signals he should know -that the attack at Igualada had succeeded, to force the pass of -Cristina, and push forward to Villa Radoña, upon which town St. Cyr -was now marching. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -The position of St. Magi was attacked at four o’clock in the -evening of the 18th, and carried without difficulty, but it was -impossible to find a single peasant to guide the troops, on the -next day’s march to the abbey of Santa Creus. In this perplexity, -a wounded Spanish captain, who was prisoner, demanded to be -allowed to go to Tarragona. St. Cyr assented and offered to carry -him to the Creus, and thus the prisoner unconsciously acted as a -guide to his enemies. The march being long and difficult, it was -late ere they reached the abbey. It was a strong point, and being -occupied in force by the troops that had been beaten from San Magi -the evening before, the French, after a fruitless demonstration of -assaulting it, took a position for the night. Meanwhile, Reding -hearing of Castro’s defeat, had made a draft of men and guns from -the right wing, and marched by Pla and the pass of Cabra, intending -to rally his left. His road being just behind St. Creus, he was -passing at the moment when the French appeared before that place, -but neither general was aware of the other’s presence, and each -continued his particular movement. - -The 20th St. Cyr crossed the Gaya river under a fire from the -abbey, and continued his rapid march upon Villa Radoña, near which -place he dispersed a small corps; but finding that Souham was not -come up, he sent an officer, escorted by a battalion, to hasten -that general, whose non-arrival gave reason to believe that the -staff-officers and spies, sent with the previous instructions, had -all been intercepted. This caused the delay of a day and a half, -which would otherwise have sufficed to crush Reding’s right wing, -surprised as it would have been, without a chief, in the plain of -Tarragona. - -While St. Cyr rested at Villa Radoña, Reding pursued his march to -St. Coloma de Querault, and having rallied many of Castro’s troops, -the aspect of affairs was totally changed; for the defile of San -Cristina being forced by Souham, he reached Villa Radoña on the -21st, and, at the same time, all the weakly men, who had been left -in charge of the head-quarters at Villa Franca, also arrived. Thus -more than two-thirds of the whole French army were concentrated at -that town at the moment when the Spanish commander, being joined by -the detachment beaten from San Cristina and by the battalion at the -abbey, also rallied the greatest part of his forces, at St. Coloma -de Querault. Each general could now, by a rapid march, overwhelm -his adversary’s right wing; but the troops left by Reding, in the -plain of Tarragona, might have retired upon that fortress, while -those left by St. Cyr, at Igualada, were without support. Hence, -when the latter commander, continuing his movement on Tarragona, -reached Valls the 22d, and heard of Reding’s march, he immediately -carried Pino’s division to Pla and the pass of Cabra, resolved, if -the Spanish general should advance towards Igualada, to follow him -with a sharp spur. - -The 23d the French halted: Souham at Valls to watch the Spanish -troops in the plain of Tarragona; Pino’s division at Pla and Cabra, -sending, however, detachments to the abbey of Creus and towards -Santa Coloma to feel for Reding. In the evening these detachments -returned with some prisoners; the one from Creus reported that the -abbey was abandoned; the other that the Spanish general was making -his way back to Tarragona, by the route of Sarreal and Momblanch. -Hereupon St. Cyr, remaining in person with Pino’s division at Pla, -pushed his advanced posts on the right to the abbey of San Creus, -and in front to the defile of Cabra, designing to encounter the -Spaniards, if they returned by either of those roads. Souham’s -division took a position in front of Valls, with his left on the -Francoli river, his right towards Pla, and his advanced guard at -Pixa Moxons, watching for Reding by the road of Momblanch. - -The 24th the Spanish general, being at St. Coloma, called a -council of war, at which colonel Doyle, the British military -agent, assisted. One party was for fighting St. Cyr, another for -retreating to Lerida, a third for attacking Chabran, at Igualada, -a fourth for regaining the plain of Tarragona. There were many -opinions, but neither wisdom nor resolution; and finally, Reding, -leaving general Wimpfen, with four thousand men, at San Coloma, -decided to regain Tarragona, and took the route of Momblanch with -ten thousand of his best troops, following the Spanish accounts, -but St. Cyr says with fifteen thousand. Reding knew that Valls -was occupied, and that the line of march was intercepted, but he -imagined the French to be only five or six thousand, for the exact -situation and strength of an enemy were particulars that seldom -troubled Spanish generals. - -The 25th of February the head of Reding’s column was suddenly -fired upon, at daybreak, by Souham’s detachment, at Pixa Moxons. -The French were immediately driven back upon the main body, and, -the attack being continued, the whole division was forced to give -way. During the fight the Spanish baggage and artillery passed -the Francoli river; and the road to Tarragona being thus opened, -Reding might have effected his retreat without difficulty, but he -continued to press Souham until St. Cyr, who had received early -intelligence of the action, came down in all haste, from Pla, upon -the left flank of the Spaniards, and the latter seeing the French -dragoons, who preceded the infantry, enter in line, retired in good -order across the Francoli, and took a position behind that river. -From this ground Reding proposed to retreat in the evening; but St. -Cyr obliged him to fight there. - - -BATTLE OF VALLS. - -It was three o’clock when, Pino’s division being come up, St. Cyr’s -recommenced the action. The banks of the Francoli were steep and -rugged, and the Spanish position strong and difficult of access; -but the French general, as he himself states, wishing to increase -the moral ascendancy of his soldiers, forbad the artillery, -although excellently placed for execution, to play upon Reding’s -battalions, fearing that otherwise the latter would fly before -they could be attained by the infantry, and, under this curious -arrangement, the action was begun by the light troops. - -The French, or rather the Italians, were superior in numbers to -the Spaniards, and the columns, covered by the skirmishers, passed -the river with great alacrity, and ascended the heights under an -exceedingly regular fire, which was continued until the attacking -troops had nearly reached the summit of the position; but then both -Swiss and Catalans began to waver, and, ere the assailants could -close with them, broke, and were charged by the French cavalry. -Reding, after receiving several sabre wounds, saved himself at -Tarragona, where the greatest number of the vanquished also took -refuge, but the remainder fled in the greatest disorder on the -routes of Tortosa and Lerida. - -The count of Castel d’Orius, general of the cavalry, many superior -officers, and the whole of the artillery and baggage were taken, -and four thousand men were killed or wounded; the loss of the -French was about a thousand; and, during all these movements and -actions, Reding received no assistance from the Somatenes; nor is -this surprising, for it may be taken as an axiom in war, that armed -peasants are only formidable to stragglers. When the regular forces -engage, the peasant, sensible of his own weakness, gladly quits the -field. - -The 26th Souham’s division, descending into the plain of Tarragona, -took possession of the large and rich town of Reus, from which, -contrary to the general custom, the inhabitants had not fled. -Pino’s division occupied Pla, Alcover, and Valls; detachments were -sent to Salou and Villaseca, on the sea-coast, west of Tarragona; -and Chabot, being recalled from Igualada, was posted at the abbey -of Santa Creus, to watch the troops under Wimpfen, who was still at -St. Coloma de Querault. - -The battle of Valls finished the regular warfare in Catalonia. -Those detachments, which by the previous movements had been cut off -from the main body of the army, joined the Somatenes, and, acting -as partizan corps, troubled the communications of the French; but -St. Cyr had no longer a regular army to deal with in the field; -and Tortosa, which was in a miserably defenceless condition, and -without provisions, must have fallen, if after the battle any -attempt had been made against it. But the whole country was filled -with confusion; nor was the disorder momentary; for although Lazan, -after his defeat near Zaragoza, carried a few men to Tortosa, -he declared himself independent of Reding’s command. The fall -of Zaragoza, also, had stricken terror far and wide; and the -neighbouring provinces feared and acted each for its own safety, -without regard to any general plan. - -The fugitives from Valls, joined to the troops already in -Tarragona, crowded the latter place; and an infectious disorder -breaking out, a great mortality ensued. - -St. Cyr, satisfied that sickness should do the work of the sword, -begirt the city, and resolved to hold his positions while food -could be procured. In this policy he remained stedfast until the -middle of March, although Wimpfen attacked and drove Chabran in -succession from Igualada, Llacuna, and St. Quinti, to Villa Franca; -and although the two Milans and Claros, acting between the Besos -and the Llobregat, cut the communication with Barcelona, and in -conjunction with the English squadron, renewed the blockade of that -city. This plan was injudicious; for notwithstanding the sickness -in Tarragona, the subjugation of Catalonia was retarded by the -cessation of active hostilities. The object of the French general -should have been, while the terror of his victories was fresh, to -gain secure posts, such as Tortosa, Tarragona, Gerona, or Lerida, -from whence he could issue out, and clear the country, from time to -time, of the bands that might be assembled. His inactivity after -the battle of Molino del Rey, and at this period, enabled the -Catalonians to recover from their fears, and to put these towns in -a state of defence. - -Towards the middle of March the resources of the country being -all exhausted, St. Cyr at last determined to abandon the plains -of Tarragona, and take some position where he could feed his -troops, cover the projected seige of Gerona, and yet be at hand to -relieve Barcelona. The valleys about Vich alone offered all these -advantages; but as Claros and the Milans were in force at Molino -del Rey, he ordered Chabran to drive them from that point, that -the sick and wounded men might be first transferred from Valls to -Barcelona. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -The 10th of March, Chabran sent a battalion with one piece of -artillery on that service. The Migueletes thinking it was the -advanced guard of a greater force, abandoned the post; but being -undeceived, returned, beat the battalion, and took the gun. The -12th, Chabran having received orders to march with his whole -division, consisting of eight battalions and three squadrons, -reached the bridge, but returned without daring to attack. St. Cyr -repeated his orders, and on the 14th the troops, apparently ashamed -of their general’s irresolution, fell on vigorously, and, having -carried the bridge, established themselves on the heights on both -sides of the river. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -The communication thus opened, it was found that Duhesme, -pressed by the Migueletes without, was also extremely fearful of -conspiracies within the walls: that his fears, and the villainous -conduct of his police, had at last excited the inhabitants to -attempt that which their enemies seemed so much to dread; and -in March, an insurrection being planned in concert with the -Migueletes and with the English squadron, the latter came close in -and cannonaded the town on the 10th, expecting that Wimpfen, the -Milans, and Claros would have assaulted the gates, which was to -have been the signal for the insurrection within. - -The inhabitants were the more sanguine of success, because there -were above two thousand Spanish prisoners in the city; and -outside the walls there were two tercios secretly recruited and -maintained by the citizens: these men being without uniforms, -constantly passed in and out of the town, and Duhesme was never -able to discover or to prevent them. This curious circumstance is -illustrative of the peculiar genius of the Spaniards, which in all -matters of surprise and stratagem is unrivalled. The project was, -however, baffled by Chabran’s action at Molino del Rey, on the -14th, which dispersed the partizan corps outside the walls; and the -British squadron being exposed to a heavy gale, and disappointed in -the co-operation from the land, sailed away on the 11th. - -St. Cyr intended to commence his retrograde movement on the 18th; -but on the 17th a cannonade was heard on the side of Momblanch, -which was ascertained to proceed from a detachment of six hundred -men, with two guns, under the command of Colonel Briche. This -officer being sent by Mortier to open the communication with St. -Cyr, after the fall of Zaragoza, had forced his way through the -Spanish partizan corps. To favour his return the army halted two -days; but the enterprize, after a trial, appeared so dangerous, -that he relinquished it, and attached himself to the seventh corps. - -The inactivity that succeeded the battle of Valls, and the timidity -displayed by Chabran in the subsequent skirmishes, having depressed -the spirits of the troops, they contemplated the approaching -retreat with great uneasiness; and many officers, infected with -panic doubt, advised the general to hide his movements from the -enemy: but he, anxious to restore their confidence, took the part -of giving the Spaniards a formal notice of his intentions; and -desired of Reding that he would send proper officers to take over -the hospitals which had been fitted up at Valls, as well as some of -the French, wounded, that could not be moved. This done, the army -commencing its retreat, reached Villa Franca the 21st of March; and -the 22d passed the Llobregat, followed, but not molested, by some -feeble Spanish detachments. - -The 23d, general Pino attacked and defeated Wimpfen, who having -rallied the corps of Claros and the Milans, after the affair on -the 24th, had taken a position at Tarrasa. Pino pursued him to -the vicinity of Manresa, foraged that country, and returned with -sufficient provisions to feed the army, without drawing on the -magazines of Barcelona. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -During these proceedings, Reding died in Tarragona of his wounds. -He had been received there with great dissatisfaction after the -battle of Valls, and the interference of the British consul was -necessary to save him from the first fury of the populace, who were -always ready to attribute a defeat to the treachery of the general. -His military conduct was, by his own officers, generally and justly -condemned; but although his skill in war was slight, his courage -and honesty were unquestionable; and he was of distinguished -humanity; for, at this unhappy period, when the French prisoners -in every part of Spain were tortured with the most savage cruelty; -when to refrain from such deeds was to incur suspicion, Reding had -the manliness, not only to repress all barbarities within the range -of his command, but even to conclude a convention with St. Cyr, -under which the wounded men on both sides were to receive decent -treatment, and to be exchanged as soon as their hurts were cured. - -In his last moments Reding complained that he had been ill-served -as a general; that the Somatenes had not supported him; that his -orders were neglected; his plans disclosed to the enemy; and -that he could never get true intelligence; complaints which the -experience of Moore, Baird, Cradock, Murray, and, above all, of -Wellington, proved to be applicable to every part of Spain, and -every period of the war. - -Coupigny succeeded Reding, but he was soon superseded by general -Blake, who, for reasons hereafter to be mentioned, was appointed -captain-general of the “_Coronilla_,” or Little Crown, a title -given to the three provinces of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia, -when united; and, as the warfare in Aragon thus became immediately -connected with that in Catalonia, I shall here give a short account -of what was passing in the former province. - -When Zaragoza fell, marshal Lasnes was recalled to France; Mortier, -who succeeded him in the command, sent detachments against Jaca -and Monzon; and threatened Mequinenza and Lerida. The Fort of -Monzon, commanding a passage over the Cinca river, was abandoned -by the Spaniards, and the town and citadel of Jaca surrendered: -whereby the French opened a new and important communication with -France. But, Lerida being fruitlessly summoned, and some slight -demonstrations made against Mequinenza having failed, Mortier -cantoned his troops on both sides of the Ebro, from Barbastro to -Alcanitz, and despatched colonel Briche, as we have seen, to open -a communication with the seventh corps; but, in April, the fifth -corps marched for Castile, and general Junot was left with a part -only of the third corps to maintain Aragon. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -Many of the French artillery-men and non-commissioned officers had -been withdrawn from Spain to serve in Germany. One brigade of the -third corps also was employed to protect the communications on the -side of Navarre, and another was detached to escort the prisoners -from Zaragoza to Bayonne. These drafts, added to the loss sustained -during the siege, reduced the number of troops in Aragon to about -twelve thousand disposable men under arms. - -Junot, being sick, returned to France, and general Suchet succeeded -him. The weakness of the army gave great uneasiness to the new -general,--an uneasiness which was not allayed by finding that -men and officers were, from various causes, discontented and -dispirited. Suchet was, however, no ordinary man; and, with equal -prudence and vigour, he commenced a system of discipline in his -corps, and of order in his government, that afterwards carried -him, with scarcely a check, from one success to another, until he -obtained the rank of marshal for himself, and the honour for his -corps of being the only one in Spain that never suffered any signal -reverse. - -Suchet hoped that the battle of Valls, and other defeats sustained -by the Spaniards at this period, would give him time to re-organize -his troops in tranquillity--but this hope soon vanished. The -peasantry, observing the weakness of the third corps, only waited -for a favourable opportunity to rise, and the Migueletes and -Somatenes of the mountains about Lerida and Mequenenza were, -under the command of colonel Pereña and colonel Baget, already in -activity. - -While the duke of Abrantes yet held the command Blake’s appointment -took place; and that general drawing troops from Valencia and -Tarragona, and, being joined by Lazan, fixed his quarters at -Morella, on the frontier of Aragon. Designing to operate in that -province rather than in Catalonia, he endeavoured to re-kindle the -fire of insurrection; nor was fortune adverse to him. A part of the -garrison of Monzon having made an unsuccessful marauding excursion -beyond the Cinca, the citizens fell upon those who remained, and -obliged them to abandon that post, which was immediately occupied by -Pereña. The duke of Abrantes sent eight companies of infantry and -thirty cuirassiers to retake the place: but Baget having reinforced -Pereña, the French were repulsed, and the Cinca suddenly overflowing -behind them, cut off their retreat. The cavalry, plunging with -their horses into the river, escaped by swimming; but the infantry -finding the lower passages guarded by the garrison of Lerida, and -the upper cut off by the partizan corps, after three days’ marching -and skirmishing, surrendered to Pereña and Baget. The prisoners were -carried to Tarragona, and soon afterwards exchanged, in pursuance of -a convention made by Reding and St. Cyr. - -This little success was, as usual, sufficient to excite the most -extravagant hopes, and the garrison of Mequinenza having, about the -same time, burnt a bridge of boats which the French had thrown over -the Ebro at Caspe, Blake immediately advanced, and, driving back -the French from Beceyta and Val de Ajorfa, entered Alcanitz. The -beaten troops retired in haste and with loss to Samper and Ixar; -and it was at this moment, when the French were harassed on both -banks of the Ebro, and their wings separated by the destruction -of the bridge at Caspe, that Suchet arrived to take the command of -the third corps. Seeing his divisions disseminated over a great -tract of country, and in danger of being beaten in detail, he -immediately ordered general Habert to abandon the left bank of the -Ebro, cross that river at Fuentes, and follow in reserve upon Ixar, -where Suchet himself rallied all the rest of the troops, with the -exception of a small garrison left in Zaragoza. - - -BATTLE OF ALCANITZ. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -The French battalions were fearful and disorderly: but the general, -anxious to raise their spirits, marched towards Blake on the 23d of -May. The latter was in position in front of Alcanitz, a bridge over -the Guadalupe was immediately behind his centre, which was covered -by a hill; his left was well posted near some pools of water, but -his right was rather exposed. The French had about eight thousand -infantry and seven hundred cavalry in the field, and the Spaniards -about twelve thousand of all arms. - -Suchet, observing Blake’s dispositions, judged that if he could -carry the hill in the centre, and so separate the Spanish wings, -the latter would be cut off from the bridge of Alcanitz, and -obliged to surrender. In this design he directed a column against -each wing, to draw Blake’s attention to his flanks: but, when the -skirmishers were well engaged, three thousand men, pushing rapidly -along the main road, attacked the hillock. A brisk fire of musketry -and artillery, however, checked their progress; the Spaniards stood -firm, and the French, after a feeble effort to ascend the hill, -began to waver, and, finally, fled outright. Suchet, who was -himself slightly wounded, rallied them in the plain, and remained -there for the rest of the day, but without daring to renew the -action. In the night, he retreated; and, although not pursued, his -troops were seized with panic, and, at day-light, came pouring -into Samper with all the tumult and disorder of a rout. Blake’s -inactivity enabled Suchet to restore order; he caused the man who -first commenced the alarm to be shot; and then, encouraging the -troops that they might not seem to fly, he rested in position two -whole days, after which he retreated to Zaragoza. - -This action at Alcanitz was a subject of triumph and rejoicing -all over Spain. The supreme junta conferred an estate upon Blake; -the kingdom of Murcia was added to his command; his army rapidly -augmented; and he himself greatly elated and confirmed in a design -he had formed to retake Zaragoza, turned his whole attention to -Aragon, and totally neglected Catalonia, to which province it is -time to return. - -St. Cyr remained in Barcelona for a considerable period, during -which he endeavoured to remedy the evils of Duhesme’s government, -and to make himself acquainted with the political disposition -of the inhabitants. He filled the magazines with three months’ -provisions; and, as the prisoners within the walls were an -incumbrance, on account of their subsistence, and a source of -uneasiness from their numbers, he resolved to send them to France. -The 15th of April, having transferred his sick and weakly men -to the charge of Duhesme, and exchanged Chabran’s for Lecchi’s -division, he recommenced his march, and reached Granollers, -giving out that he was returning to the frontier of France, lest -the Catalans should remove their provisions from Vich, and thus -frustrate his principal object. - -The Migueletes, under the two Milans and Claros, were, however, on -the watch to harass the army, and had taken post beyond Garriga -on each side of a long and narrow defile in the valley of the -Congosto. This pass of surprising natural strength was barricadoed -with trees and pieces of rock, and mined in several places; and -Wimpfen also held his corps at a little distance, ready to join -Claros at the first alarm. The 16th Lecchi’s division, escorting -two thousand prisoners, appeared at the head of this defile, and -an action commenced, but in an hour the Migueletes fled on all -sides; for St. Cyr, fully aware of the strength of the position, -had secretly detached Pino to attack Wimpfen; and, while Lecchi -was engaged at the entrance, Souham and Chabot, traversing the -mountain, arrived, the one upon the flank, and the other at the -further end of this formidable pass. - -The 18th the army was established in the valley and town of Vich; -but the inhabitants, with the exception of the bishop and a few old -men, fled to the mountains with their effects, leaving, however, -their provisions behind. St. Cyr then posted Chabot’s and Pino’s -divisions at Centellas, San Martin, Tona, and Collespino, to guard -the entrance into the valley. Souham remained at Vich, his right -being at Roda and Manlieu on the Ter, and his advanced posts at -Gurp, St. Sebastian, and St. Eularia. The 24th Lecchi marched, -with the prisoners, by Filieu de Pallerols to Besalu on the -Fluvia; he was attacked several times on the route, but succeeded -in delivering his charge to general Reille, and then returned with -the first information received by St. Cyr of Napoleon’s arrival in -Paris, and the certainty of a war with Austria. To balance this, -a moveable column sent to Barcelona brought back the pleasing -intelligence that rear-admiral Comaso, with a French squadron, -having baffled the extreme vigilance of lord Collingwood, had -reached that city with ample supplies. Thus what may be called -the irregular movements in Catalonia terminated, and the more -methodical warfare of sieges commenced; but this part was committed -to other hands. General Verdier had succeeded Reille in the -Ampurdan, and marshal Augereau was on the road to supersede St. Cyr. - -[Illustration: _Plate 2. to face Pa. 102._ - - _Sketch Explanatory_ - of the - Operations in Catalonia - in - _1808 and 1809_. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - - -OBSERVATIONS.--1º. General St. Cyr’s marches were hardy, his -battles vigorous and delivered in right time and place; but his -campaign, as a whole, may be characterised as one of great efforts -without corresponding advantages. He himself attributes this to the -condition of the seventh corps, destitute and neglected, because -_the emperor disliked and wished to ruin its chief_; a strange -accusation, and unsustained by reason or facts. What! Napoleon -wilfully destroy his own armies! sacrifice forty thousand men, -that a general, who he was not obliged to employ at all, might be -disgraced! General St. Cyr acknowledges, that when he received his -instructions from the emperor, he observed the affliction of the -latter at the recent loss of Dupont’s force; yet he would have it -believed, that, in the midst of this regret, that monarch, with -a singular malice, was preparing greater disasters for himself, -merely to disgrace the general commanding the seventh corps, -and why? because the latter had formerly served with the army of -the Rhine! Yet St. Cyr met with no reverses in Catalonia, and was -afterwards made a marshal by this implacable enemy. - -2º.--That the seventh corps was not well supplied, and that its -commander was thereby placed in a difficult situation, is not to be -disputed in the face of the facts stated by general St. Cyr; but -if war were a state of ease and smoothness, the fame which attends -successful generals would be less. Napoleon selected general St. -Cyr because he thought him a capable commander; in feeble hands, -he knew the seventh corps would be weak, but, with St. Cyr at its -head, he judged it sufficient to overcome the Catalonians; nor was -he much mistaken. Barcelona, the great object of solicitude, was -saved; Rosas was taken; and if Tarragona and Tortosa did not also -fall, the one after the battle of Molino del Rey, the other after -that of Valls, it was because the French general did not choose to -attack them. Those towns were without the slightest preparation -for defence, moral or physical, and must have surrendered; nor -can the unexpected and stubborn resistance of Gerona, Zaragoza, -and Valencia be cited against this opinion. The latter cities -were previously prepared and expectant of a siege; and yet, in -every instance, except Valencia, there was a moment of dismay and -confusion, not fatal, only because the besieging generals wanted -that ready vigour which is the characteristic of great commanders. - -3º.--General St. Cyr, aware that a mere calculation of numbers -and equipment is but a poor measure of the strength of armies, -exalts the enthusiasm and the courage of the Catalans, and seems to -tremble at the danger which, owing to Napoleon’s suicidal jealousy, -menaced, at that period, not only the seventh corps but even the -south of France. In answer to this, it may be observed that M. de -St. Cyr did not hesitate, with eighteen thousand men having no -artillery, and carrying only sixty rounds of musket-ammunition, to -plunge into the midst of those terrible armies, to march through -the mountains for whole weeks, to attack the strongest positions -with the bayonet alone, nay, even to dispense with the use of his -artillery, when he did bring it into action, lest his men should -not have a sufficient contempt for their enemies. And who were -these undaunted soldiers, so high in courage, so confident, so -regardless of the great weapon of modern warfare? Not the select of -the imperial guards, the conquerors in a hundred battles, but raw -levies, the dregs and scrapings of Italy, the refuse of Naples and -of Rome, states which to name as military was to ridicule. - -4º.--With such soldiers, the battles of Cardadeu, Molino, -Igualada, and Valls, were gained; yet general St. Cyr does not -hesitate to call the Migueletes, who were beaten at those places, -the best light troops in the world. The best _light troops_ are -neither more nor less than the best troops in the world; but if, -instead of fifteen thousand Migueletes, the four thousand men -composing Wellington’s light division had been on the heights -of Cardadeu--general St. Cyr’s sixty rounds of ammunition would -scarcely have carried him to Barcelona. The injurious force with -which personal feelings act upon the judgement are well known, or -it might excite wonder that so good a writer and so able a soldier -should advance such fallacies. - -5º.--General St. Cyr’s work, admirable in many respects, bears, -nevertheless, the stamp of carelessness. Thus, he affirms that -Dupont’s march to Andalusia encouraged the tumults of Aranjues; -but the tumults of Aranjues happened in the month of March, nearly -three months previous to Dupont’s movement, which took place in -May and June. Again, he says, that, Napoleon, to make a solid -conquest in the Peninsula, should have commenced with Catalonia, -instead of over-running Spain by the northern line of operations; -an opinion quite unsustainable. The progress of the seventh corps -was impeded by the want of provisions, not by the enemy’s force. -Twenty thousand men could beat the Spaniards in the field, but they -could not subsist. What could three hundred thousand men have done? -Would it have given a just idea of Napoleon’s power to employ the -strength of his empire against the fortified towns in Catalonia? -In what would the greater solidity of this plan have consisted? -While the French were thus engaged, the patriots would have been -organizing their armies; England would have had time to bring all -her troops into line, and two hundred thousand men placed between -Zaragoza and Tortosa, or breaking into France by the western -Pyrenees, while the Austrians were advancing to the Rhine, would -have sorely shaken the solidity of general St. Cyr’s plan. - -6º.--The French emperor better understood what he was about; he -saw a nation intrinsically powerful and vehemently excited, yet -ignorant of war, and wanting the aid which England was eager to -give. All the elements of power existed in the Peninsula, and -they were fast approximating to a centre, when Napoleon burst upon -that country, and as the gathering of a water-spout is said to -be sometimes prevented by the explosion of a gun, so the rising -strength of Spain was dissipated by his sudden and dreadful -assault. If the war was not then finished, it was because his -lieutenants were tardy and jealous of each other. - -7º.--St. Cyr appears to have fallen into an error, common enough -in all times, and one very prevalent among the French generals in -Spain. He considered his task as a whole in itself, instead of a -constituent part of a greater system. He judged very well what -was wanting for the seventh corps, to subjugate Catalonia in a -solid manner, but he did not discern that it was fitting that the -seventh corps should forget Catalonia, to aid the general plan -against the Peninsula. Rosas surrendered at the very moment when -Napoleon, after the victories of Baylen, Espinosa, Tudela, and -the Somosierra, was entering Madrid as a conqueror. The battles -of Cardadeu and Molino del Rey may, therefore, be said to have -completely prostrated Spain, because the English army was isolated, -the Spanish army destroyed, and Zaragoza invested. Was that a time -to calculate the weight of powder and the number of pick-axes -required for a formal siege of Tarragona? The whole Peninsula was -shaken to the centre, the proud hearts of the Spaniards sunk with -terror, and in that great consternation, to be daring, was, on -the part of the French generals, to be prudent. St. Cyr was not -in a condition to besiege Tarragona, formally, but he might have -assaulted it with less danger than he incurred by his march to -Barcelona. The battle of Valls was another epoch of the same kind; -the English army had re-embarked, and the route of Ucles had taken -place. Portugal was invaded and Zaragoza had just fallen. That was -a time to render victory fruitful, yet no attempt was made against -Tortoza. - -8º.--St. Cyr, who justly blames Palacios and Vives for remaining -before Barcelona instead of carrying their army to the Ter and the -Fluvia, seems inclined to applaud Reding for conduct equally at -variance with the true principles of war. It was his own inactivity -after the battle of Molino that produced the army of Reding, and -the impatient folly of that army, and of the people, produced the -plan which led to the route of Igualada and the battle of Valls. -But, instead of disseminating his thirty thousand men on a line -of sixty miles, from Tarragona to the Upper Llobregat, Reding -should have put Tarragona and Tortosa into a state of defence, and, -leaving a small corps of observation near the former, have made -Lerida the base of his operations. In that position, and keeping -the bulk of his force in one mass, he might have acted on St. Cyr’s -flanks and rear effectually, by the road of Cervera--and without -danger to himself; nor could the French general have attempted -aught against Tarragona. - -But it is not with reference to the seventh corps alone that Lerida -was the proper base of the Spanish army. Let us suppose that the -supreme junta had acted for a moment upon a rational system; that -the Valencian troops, instead of remaining at Morella, had been -directed on Mequinenza and that the duke of Infantado’s force -had been carried from Cuença to the same place instead of being -routed at Ucles. Thus, in the beginning of February, more than -fifty thousand regular troops would have been assembled at Lerida, -encircled by the fortresses of Monzon, Balaguer, Mequinenza, -Tarragona, and Tortoza. Its lines of operations would have been -as numerous as the roads. The Seu d’Urgel, called the granary of -Catalonia, would have supplied corn, and the communication with -Valencia would have been direct and open. On this central and -impregnable position such a force might have held the seventh corps -in check, and also raised the siege of Zaragoza; nor could the -first corps have followed Infantado’s movements without abandoning -the whole of the emperor’s plans against Portugal and Andalusia. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -9º.--St. Cyr praises Reding’s project for surrounding the French, -and very gravely observes that the _only method_ of defeating it -was by taking the offensive himself. Nothing can be juster; but he -should have added that it was a _certain method_; and, until we -find a great commander acting upon Reding’s principles, this praise -can only be taken as an expression of civility towards a brave -adversary. St. Cyr’s own movements were very different; he disliked -Napoleon personally, but he did not dislike his manner of making -war. Buonaparte’s campaign in the Alps against Beaulieu was not an -unheeded lesson. There is, however, one proceeding of St. Cyr’s for -which there has been no precedent, and which it is unlikely will -ever be imitated, namely, the stopping of the fire of the artillery -when it was doing infinite execution, that a moral ascendancy over -the enemy might be established. It is impossible to imagine a more -cutting sarcasm on the courage of the Catalans than this fact; yet, -general St. Cyr states that his adversaries were numerous, and -fought bravely. Surely he could not have commanded so long without -knowing that _there is in all battles a decisive moment, when every -weapon, every man, every combination of force that can be brought -to bear, is necessary to gain the victory_. - -10º.--If general St. Cyr’s own marches and battles did not -sufficiently expose the fallacy of his opinions relative to the -vigour of the Catalans, lord Collingwood’s correspondence would -supply the deficiency. That able and sagacious man, writing at this -period says,-- - -“In Catalonia, every thing seems to have gone wrong since the -fall of Rosas. The Spaniards are in considerable force, yet are -dispersed and panic-struck whenever the enemy appears.”--“The -applications for supplies are unlimited; they want money, arms, -and ammunition, of which no use appears to be made when they get -them.”--“In the English papers, I see accounts of successes, and -convoys cut off, and waggons destroyed, which are not true. What -has been done in that way has been by the boats of our frigates, -which have, in two or three instances, landed men and attacked -the enemy with great gallantry. The Somatenes range the hills in -a disorderly way, and fire at a distance, but retire on being -approached.”--“The multitudes of men do not make a force.” - -Add to this the Spanish historian Cabane’s statements that the -Migueletes were always insubordinate, detested the service of the -line, and were many of them armed only with staves, and we have the -full measure of the Catalans’ resistance. - -11º.--It was not the vigour of the Catalans, but of the English, -that in this province, as in every part of the Peninsula, retarded -the progress of the French. Would St. Cyr have wasted a month -before Rosas? Would he have been hampered in his movements by his -fears for the safety of Barcelona? Would he have failed to besiege -and take Tarragona and Tortosa, if a French fleet had attended his -progress by the coast, or if it could even have made two runs in -safety? To lord Collingwood, who, like the Roman Bibulus, perished -of sickness on his decks rather than relax in his watching,--to his -keen judgement, his unceasing vigilance, the resistance made by the -Catalans was due. His fleet it was that interdicted the coast-line -to the French, protected the transport of the Spanish supplies from -Valencia, assisted in the defence of the towns, aided the retreat -of the beaten armies; in short, did that which the Spanish fleets -in Cadiz and Carthagena should have done. But the supreme junta, -equally disregarding the remonstrances of lord Collingwood, the -good of their own country, and the treaty with England, by which -they were bound to prevent their ships from falling into the hands -of the enemy, left their fleets to rot in harbour, although money -was advanced, and the assistance of the British seamen offered, to -fit them out for sea. - -Having now related the principal operations that took place in the -eastern and central provinces of Spain, which were so suddenly -overrun by the French emperor; having shown that, however restless -the Spaniards were under the yoke imposed upon them, they were -unable to throw it off; I shall turn to Portugal, where the tide of -invasion still flowing onward, although with diminished volume, was -first stayed, and finally overpowered and forced back, by a counter -flood of mightier strength. - - - - -BOOK VI. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -TRANSACTIONS IN PORTUGAL. - - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 1.] - -When sir John Moore marched from Portugal, the regency, established -by sir Hew Dalrymple, nominally governed that country; but the -weak characters of the members, the listless habits engendered -by the ancient system of misrule, the intrigues of the Oporto -faction, and the general turbulence of the people soon produced an -alarming state of anarchy. Private persons usurped the functions -of government, justice was disregarded, insubordination and murder -were hailed as indications of patriotism. War was the universal -cry, but military preparations were wholly neglected; for the -nation, in its foolish pride, believed that the French had neither -strength nor spirit for a second invasion. - -In Lisbon there was a French faction. The merchants were -apprehensive, the regency was unpopular, the public mind unsettled; -and, in Oporto, the violence of both people and soldiers was such, -that sir Harry Burrard sent two British regiments there, by sea, to -preserve tranquillity; in fine, the seeds of disorder were widely -cast and sprouting vigorously before the English cabinet thought -fit to accredit a responsible diplomatist near the government, -or to place a permanent chief at the head of the forces left by -sir John Moore. The convention of Cintra was known in England in -September. The regency was established and the frontier fortresses -occupied by British troops in the same month; yet it was not until -the middle of December that Mr. Villiers and sir John Cradock, -charged with the conduct of the political and military proceedings -in Portugal, reached Lisbon, and thus the important interval, -between the departure of Junot and their arrival, was totally -neglected by the English cabinet. - -Sir Hew Dalrymple, who had nominated the regency; sir Arthur -Wellesley, who, to local knowledge and powerful talents, added -the influence of a victorious commander; Burrard, Spencer, were -all removed from Portugal at the very moment when the presence of -persons acquainted with the real state of affairs was essential to -the well-being of the British interests in that country; and this -error was the offspring of passion and incapacity; for, if the -convention of Cintra had been rightly understood, the ministers, -appreciating the advantages of that treaty, would have resisted -the clamour of the moment, and the generals would not have been -withdrawn from the public service abroad to meet unjust and -groundless charges at home. - -It may be disputed whether Portugal was the fittest theatre for -the first operations of a British army; but, when that country was -actually freed from the presence of an enemy; when the capital -and the frontier fortresses were occupied by English troops; when -sir John Moore leaving his hospitals, baggage, and magazines -there, as in a place of arms, had marched to Spain, the question -was no longer doubtful. The ancient relations between England -and Portugal, the greatness of the port of Lisbon, the warlike -disposition of the Portuguese, and, above all, the singularly-happy -circumstance that there was neither court nor monarch to balance -the English influence, and that even the nomination of the regency -was the work of an English general, offered such great and obvious -advantages as could no where else be obtained. It was a miserable -policy that, neglecting such an occasion, retained sir Arthur -Wellesley in England, while Portugal, like a drunken man, at once -weak and turbulent, was reeling on the edge of a precipice. - -The 5th of December sir John Cradock, being on his voyage to -Lisbon, touched at Coruña. Fifteen hundred thousand dollars had -just arrived there in the Lavinia frigate; but, sir John Moore’s -intention to retreat upon Portugal being known, Cradock divided -this sum, and carried away eight hundred thousand dollars, -proposing to leave a portion at Oporto, and to take the remainder -to Lisbon, that Moore might find, on whatever line he retreated, a -supply of money. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 2.] - -From Coruña he proceeded to Oporto, and landed to gather -information of the state of affairs. Here he found that sir -Robert Wilson had succeeded in organizing, under the title of the -Lusitanian Legion, about thirteen hundred men, and that others -were on their way to reinforce him; but, this excepted, nothing at -Oporto, civil or military, bespoke either arrangement or common -sense. The bishop, still intent upon acquiring supreme rule, was -deeply engaged with secret intrigues, and, under him, a number of -factious and designing persons instigated the populace to violent -actions, with a view to profit from their excesses. - -The formation of the Lusitanian Legion was originally a project of -the chevalier da Souza, the Portuguese minister in London. Souza -was one of the bishop’s faction, and the prelate calculated upon -this force not so much to repel the enemy as to give weight to his -own party against the government. The men were promised higher pay -than any other Portuguese soldiers, to the great discontent of the -latter, and they were clad in uniforms differing in colour from -the national troops. The regency, who dreaded the machinations -of the turbulent priest, entertained the utmost jealousy of the -legion, which, in truth, was a most anomalous force, and, as might -be expected from its peculiar constitution, was productive of much -embarrassment. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 1.] - -Sir John Cradock left three hundred thousand dollars at Oporto, -and having directed the two British battalions which were in -that neighbourhood to march to Almeida, he took on board a small -detachment of German troops, and set sail for Lisbon; but, before -his departure, he strongly advised sir Robert Wilson to move -such of his legionaries as were sufficiently organized to Villa -Real, in Tras os Montes, a place appointed by the regency for the -assembly of the forces in the north. Sir Robert, tired of the folly -and disgusted with the insolence and excesses of the ruling mob, -readily adopted this advice, so far as to quit Oporto, but, having -views of his own, took the direction of Almeida instead of Villa -Real. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 5.] - -The state of the capital was little better than that of Oporto. -There was arrangement neither for present nor for future defence, -and the populace, albeit less openly encouraged to commit excesses, -were quite uncontrolled by the government. The regency had a keener -dread of domestic insurrection than of the return of the French, -whose operations they regarded with even less anxiety than the -bishop did, as being further removed than he was from the immediate -theatre of war. Their want of system and vigilance, evinced by -the following fact, was truly surprising. Sattaro and another -person, having contracted for the supply of the British troops, -demanded, in the name of the English general, all the provisions in -the public stores of Portugal, and then sold them to the English -commissaries for his own profit. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 4, section 1.] - -Sir John Cradock’s instructions directed him to reinforce sir -John Moore’s army, and, if the course of events should bring -that general back to Portugal, he was not to be interfered with. -In fact, Cradock’s operations were limited to the holding of -Elvas, Almeida, and the capital; for, although he was directed to -encourage the formation of a native army upon a good and regular -system, and even to act in concert with it on the frontier, he -was debarred from political interference; and even his relative -situation, as to rank, was left unsettled until the arrival of -Mr. Villiers, to whose direction all political and many military -arrangements were entrusted. - -It is evident that the influence of a general thus fettered, and -commanding only a small force, which was moreover much scattered, -must be feeble and insufficient to produce any real amelioration -in the military situation of the country. But the English -ministers, attentive to the false information obtained from -interested agents, still imagined that not only the Spanish, but -the Portuguese armies were numerous, and to be relied upon; and -they confidently expected, that the latter would be able to take an -active part in the Spanish campaign. - -[Sidenote: Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Cradock, feeling the danger of this illusion, made it his first -object to ascertain, and to transmit home, exact information of the -real strength and efficiency of the native regular troops. They -were nominally twenty thousand; but Miguel Percira Forjas, military -secretary to the regency, and the ablest public man Portugal -possessed, acknowledged that this force was a nullity, and that -there were not more than ten thousand stand of serviceable arms in -the kingdom, the greatest part of which were English. The troops -themselves were undisciplined and unruly; and the militia and the -“_ordenanza_,” or armed peasantry, animated rather by a spirit of -outrage than of enthusiasm, evinced no disposition to submit to -regulation, neither was there any branch of administration free -from the grossest disorder. - -The Spanish dollar had a general acceptance in Portugal. The -regency, under the pretence that a debased foreign coin would -drive the Portuguese coin out of circulation, deprived the dollar -of its current value. This regulation, true in principle, and -applicable, as far as the Portuguese gold coin (which is of -peculiar fineness) was concerned, had, however, a most injurious -effect. The Spanish dollar was in reality finer than the Portuguese -silver cruzado-nova, and would finally have maintained its value, -notwithstanding this decree. But a slur being thus thrown upon it -by the government, the money changers contrived to run its value -down for the moment, a matter of infinite importance; for the -English soldiers and sailors being all paid in these dollars, at -four shillings and sixpence, which was the true value, were thus -suddenly mulcted four-pence in each, by the artificial depreciation -of the moment. The men attributed this to fraud in the shopkeepers; -the retail trade of Lisbon was interrupted, and quarrels between -the tradesmen and the soldiers took place hourly. - -To calm this effervescence, a second decree was promulgated, -directing that the dollar should be received at the mint and in -the public offices at its real value. It then appeared that the -government could profit by coining the dollar of four shillings -and sixpence into cruzado-novas, a circumstance which gave the -whole affair the appearance of an unworthy trick to recruit the -treasury. This happened in October; and as the financial affairs -were ill managed, and the regency destitute of vigour or capacity, -the taxes were unpaid, the hard cash exhausted, and the treasury -paper at a heavy discount when Cradock arrived. Upon the scroll -thus unfolded he could only read confusion, danger, and misfortune; -for such being the fruits of victory, what could be expected from -disaster; and at this period (the middle of December) sir John -Moore was supposed to be in full retreat upon Portugal, followed by -the emperor with one French army, while another threatened Lisbon -by the line of the Tagus. The English troops in the kingdom did -not amount to ten thousand men, including the sick, and they were -ill equipped and scattered; moreover, the capital was crowded with -women and children, with baggage and non-combatants, belonging as -well to the army in Spain as to that in Portugal. - -There were in the river three Portuguese ships of the line, two -frigates, and eight other smaller vessels of war; but none were in -a state for sea, and the whole likely to fall into the hands of -the enemy: for in the midst of this confusion sir Charles Cotton -was recalled, without a successor being appointed; and although -the zeal and talents of captain Halket, the senior officer on the -station, amply compensated for the departure of the admiral, as -far as professional duties were concerned, he could not aid the -general, nor deal with the regency as vigorously as an officer of -higher rank, and formally accredited, could have done. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Papers, MSS.] - -Sir John Cradock, although fully sensible of his own difficulties, -with a very disinterested zeal, resolved to make the reinforcing of -sir John Moore’s army his first care; but his force at this time -was, as I have already said, less than ten thousand men of all -arms. It consisted of eight British and four German battalions of -infantry, four troops of dragoons, and thirty pieces of artillery, -of which, however, only six were horsed so as to take the field. -There was, also, a battalion of the 60th regiment, but it was -composed principally of Frenchmen, recruited from the prison ships, -and had been sent back from Spain, as the soldiers could not be -trusted near their countrymen. - -Of these thirteen battalions two were in Abrantes, one in Elvas, -three at Lamego on the Duero, one in Almeida, and the remaining -six at Lisbon. Three of the four battalions in the north were -immediately directed to join sir John Moore by the route of -Salamanca; and of those in the south, two, accompanied by a -demi-brigade of artillery, were sent to him from Abrantes, by the -road of Castello Branco and Ciudad Rodrigo. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The 19th of December, Mr. Villiers having arrived, sir John -Cradock forwarded to the regency a strong representation of the -dangerous state of Portugal. He observed that there was neither -activity in the government nor enthusiasm among the people; that -the army, deficient in numbers, and still more so in discipline, -was scattered and neglected; and, notwithstanding that the aspect -of affairs was so threatening, the regency were apparently without -any system, or fixed principle of action. He proposed, therefore, -that a general enrolment of all the people should take place; and -from the British stores he offered a supply of a thousand muskets -and ten thousand pikes. This giving of pikes to the people appears -to have been in compliance with Mr. Villiers’ wishes, and betrayed -more zeal than prudence; for certainly a general levy and arming -with pikes of the turbulent populace of a capital city, at such a -conjuncture, was more likely to lead to confusion and mischief than -to any effectual defence. But the main objects pressing upon the -general’s attention were sufficiently numerous and contradictory to -render it difficult for him to avoid errors. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, section 1.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 4, section 1.] - -It was a part of his instructions, and of manifest importance, to -send reinforcements to sir John Moore. But it was equally necessary -to keep a force towards the frontier on the line of the Tagus, -seeing that the fourth French corps had just passed that river at -Almaraz, had defeated Galluzzo’s army and menaced Badajos, which -was without arms, ammunition, or provisions; and, moreover, the -populace there were in commotion, and slaying the chief persons. -Now, sir John Cradock’s instructions directed him to keep his -troops in a position that would enable him to abandon Portugal, if -a very superior force should press him; but as, in such a case, -he was to carry off not only the British army, but the Portuguese -navy and stores, to destroy what he could not remove, and to -receive on board his ships all the natives who might be desirous of -escaping, it was of pressing necessity to ship the women, children, -and baggage, in fine, all the encumbrances belonging to Moore’s -army, immediately, that his own rear might be clear for a sudden -embarkation. In short, he was to send his troops to Spain, and yet -defend Portugal; to excite confidence in the Portuguese, and yet -openly to carry on the preparations for abandoning that country. - -The populace of Lisbon were, however, already uneasy at the rumours -of an embarkation, and it was doubtful if they would permit even -the British non-combatants to get on board quietly, much less -suffer the forts to be dismantled, and the ships of war to be -carried off, without a tumult, which, at such a conjuncture, would -have been fatal to all parties. Hence it was imperative to maintain -a strong garrison in Lisbon and in the forts commanding the mouth -of the river; and this draft, together with the troops absorbed by -the fortresses of Almeida and Elvas, reduced the fighting men in -the field to insignificance. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The regency, knowing the temper of the people and fearing to arm -them, were not very eager to enforce the levy; yet, anxious to hide -their weakness, they promised, at the urgent solicitations of the -English general, to send six thousand troops to Alcantara, on the -Spanish frontier, with a view to observe the march of the fourth -corps,--a promise which they never intended, and indeed were -unable, to perform. Forjas, who was supposed to be very inimical -to the British influence, frankly declared that they neither could -nor would move without an advance of money, and sir John Cradock, -although he recommended that this aid should be given, had no power -to grant it himself. - -Letters from sir John Moore, dated at Salamanca, now reached -Lisbon: they increased the anxiety to reinforce the army in Spain; -but, as they clearly showed that reverses were to be expected, -Cradock, although resolved to maintain himself in Portugal as long -as it was possible to do so without a breach of his instructions, -felt more strongly that timely preparation for an embarkation -should be made, especially as the rainy season, in which south-west -winds prevail, had set in, and rendered the departure of vessels -from the Tagus very uncertain. Meanwhile the internal state of -Portugal was in no wise amended, or likely to amend. - -The government had, indeed, issued a decree, on the 23d of -December, for organizing the population of Lisbon in sixteen -legions, but only one battalion each was to parade at the same -moment for exercise, and those only on Sundays, nor were the -legions, at any time, to assemble without the order of the general -commanding the province; and this regulation, which rendered the -whole measure absurd, was dictated by the fears of the regency. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 4.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 5.] - -A proposal to prepare the Portuguese vessels for sea was acceded -to, without any apparent dissatisfaction; but the government, -secretly jealous of their allies, fomented or encouraged discontent -and suspicion among the people. No efforts were made to improve -the regular force, none to forward the march of troops to -Alcantara; and so inactive or so callous were the regency to the -rights of humanity, that a number of French prisoners, captured -at various periods by the Portuguese, and accumulated at Lisbon, -were denied subsistence. Sir John Cradock, after many fruitless -representations, was forced to charge himself with their supply, to -avert the horrors of seeing them starved to death. The provisions -necessary for Fort La Lippe were also withheld, and general Leite, -acting upon the authority of the regency, strenuously urged that -the British troops should evacuate that fortress. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The march of the reinforcements for sir John Moore left only three -hundred dragoons and seven battalions available for the defence -of Portugal, of which four were necessarily in garrison, and the -remainder were unable to take the field, in default of mules, of -which animal the country seemed bereft; yet, at this moment, as if -in derision, Mr. Frere, the central junta, the junta of Badajos, -and the regency of Portugal, were, with common and characteristic -foolishness, pressing sir John Cradock to march into the south of -Spain, although there was scarcely a Spanish soldier there in arms -to assist him; and such a movement, if it had been either prudent -or practicable, was directly against his instructions. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Towards the end of December, the communication with sir John Moore -was suddenly interrupted, and the line of the Tagus acquired -greater importance. The troops going from Elvas to the army in -Spain were, therefore, directed to halt at Castello Branco, and -general Richard Stewart, who commanded them, being reinforced with -two hundred cavalry, was ordered, for the moment, to watch the -roads by Salvatierra and the two Idanhas, and to protect the flying -bridges at Abrantes and Vilha Velha from the enemy’s incursions. -At the same time, a promise was obtained from the regency that all -the Portuguese troops in the Alemtejo should be collected, at Campo -Mayor and Portalegre. - -Sir John Cradock fixed upon Sacavem as the position in which his -main body should be concentrated, intending to defend that point -as long as he could with so few troops; and, as he knew that -Almeida, although full of British stores, and important in every -way, was, with respect to its own defence, utterly neglected by the -regency, and that even the presence of a British force there was -viewed with jealousy, he sent brigadier-general A. Cameron, with -instructions to collect the convalescents of Moore’s army, to unite -them with the two battalions still at Almeida, and then to make his -way to the army in Spain; but if the attempt should be judged too -dangerous, Cameron was to return to Lisbon. In either case, the -stores and the sick men lying at Almeida were to be directed upon -Oporto. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The paucity of cavalry was severely felt on the frontier. It -prevented the general from ascertaining the real strength and -objects of the enemy’s parties, and the Portuguese reports -were notoriously contradictory and false. The 14th dragoons, -seven hundred strong, commanded by major-general Cotton, had -been disembarked since the 22d of December, and were destined -for the army in Spain; but such was the penury of the country, -or the difficulty of drawing forth its resources, that the -commissary-general doubted if he could forward that small body, -even by detachments. Nor is this surprising, for many of the debts -left by Moore’s army were yet unpaid, and sufficient confidence was -not established among the peasantry to induce them to bring forward -the necessary supplies upon credit. - -Rumours of reverses in Spain were now rife, and acquired -importance, when it became known that four thousand infantry, and -two thousand cavalry, the advanced guard of thirty thousand French -troops, were actually at Merida, on the road to Badajos, which -town, as I have already said, was not only in a state of anarchy, -but destitute of provisions, arms, and ammunition. If, at this -time, the Portuguese force had been assembled at Alcantara, sir -John Cradock would have supported them with the British brigades, -at Abrantes and Castello Branco; but not a man had been put in -motion, and he, feeling no confidence either in the troops or in -the promises of the regency, resolved to concentrate his own army -near Lisbon. General Stewart was, therefore, directed to destroy -the bridges of Vilha Velha and Abrantes, and to fall back to -Sacavem. - -Meanwhile, the Lisbon populace, supposing that the English general -designed to abandon them without necessity, were violently excited. -The regency, either from fear or folly, made no effort to preserve -tranquillity, and the people, feeling their own strength, proceeded -from one excess to another, until it become evident that, in a -forced embarkation, the British would have to fight their allies as -well as their enemies. At this gloomy period when ten marches would -have brought the French to Lisbon, when a stamp of Napoleon’s foot -would have extinguished that spark of war which afterwards blazed -over the Peninsula, sir John Moore made his daring movement upon -Sahagun; and Portugal, gasping as in a mortal agony, was instantly -relieved. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, sections 1 and 2.] - -It was the advanced guard of the fourth corps that had approached -Merida with the intention of proceeding to Badajos, and the emperor -was, as we have seen, preparing to follow: but, in the night of the -26th of December, an officer carrying the intelligence of Moore’s -movement, reached Merida, and, next morning, the French fell back, -and marching hastily to the Tagus, crossed it, and rejoined their -main body, from which another powerful detachment was immediately -directed upon Placentia. This retrograde movement obviated the -immediate danger; and sir John Cradock endeavoured to pacify the -people of Lisbon. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 5.] - -He ordered general Stewart’s brigade, strengthened by two German -battalions, to halt at Santarem. He explained his own motives -to the Portuguese, and urged the regency to a more frank and -vigorous system than they had hitherto followed; for, like the -Spanish juntas, they promised every thing, and performed nothing; -neither would they, although consenting, verbally, to all the -measures proposed, ever commit themselves by writing, having the -despicable intention of afterwards disclaiming that which might -prove disagreeable to the populace, or even to the French. Sir John -Cradock, however, had no power beyond his own personal influence to -enforce attention to his wishes. No successor to sir Charles Cotton -had yet arrived, and Mr. Villiers seems to have wanted the decision -and judgement required to meet such a momentous crisis. - -In the north general Cameron, having sent the sick men and part of -the stores from Almeida towards Oporto, gave up that fortress to -sir Robert Wilson; and, on the 5th of January, marched, with two -British battalions and a detachment of convalescents, by the Tras -os Montes to join the army in Spain. On the 9th, hearing of sir -John Moore’s retreat to Coruña, he would have returned to Almeida, -but Lapisse, who had taken Zamora, threatened to intercept the line -of march; wherefore, Cameron turned towards Lamego, giving notice -of his movement to sir Robert Wilson, and advising him also to -retire to the same place. Colonel Blunt, with seven companies of -the 3d regiment, escorting a convoy for sir John Moore’s army, was -likewise forced to abandon his route, and take the road to Oporto, -on which town every thing British in the north of Portugal was now -directed. - -Notwithstanding the general dismay, sir Robert Wilson rejected -Cameron’s advice, and, being reinforced by some Spanish troops, -Portuguese volunteers, and straggling convalescents, belonging to -Moore’s army, proceeded to put in practice all the arts of an able -partizan. Issuing proclamations, enticing the French to desert, -spreading false reports of his numbers, and, by petty enterprizes -and great activity, arousing a spirit of resistance throughout the -Ciudad Rodrigo country. - -The continued influx of sick and stores at Oporto, together with -the prospect of general Cameron’s arrival there, became a source -of uneasiness to sir John Cradock. Oporto, with a shifting-bar and -shoal water is the worst possible harbour for vessels to clear -out, and one of the most dangerous for vessels to lie off, at that -season of the year; hence, if the enemy advanced in force, a great -loss, both of men and stores, was to be anticipated. - -[Sidenote: Sir John Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The departure of sir Charles Cotton had diminished the naval -means at captain Halket’s disposal, and, for seventeen successive -days, such was the state of the wind that no vessel could leave -the Tagus; he, however, contrived at last to send tonnage for -two thousand persons, and undertook to keep a sloop of war off -Oporto. Sir Samuel Hood also despatched some vessels from Vigo, -but the weather continued for a long time so unfavourable that -these transports could not enter the harbour of Oporto, and the -encumbrances hourly increasing, at last produced the most serious -embarrassments. - -Sir John Moore having now relinquished his communications with -Portugal, sir John Cradock had to consider how, relying on his own -resources, he could best fulfil his instructions and maintain his -hold of that country, without risking the utter destruction of the -troops intrusted to his care. - -For an inferior army Portugal has no defensible frontier. The -rivers, generally running east and west, are fordable in most -places, subject to sudden rises and falls, offering but weak lines -of resistance; and with the exception of the Zezere, presenting no -obstacles to the advance of an enemy penetrating by the eastern -frontier. The mountains, indeed, afford many fine and some -impregnable positions, but such is the length of the frontier line -and the difficulty of lateral communications, that a general who -should attempt to defend it against superior forces would risk to -be cut off from the capital, if he concentrated his troops; and if -he extended them his line would be immediately broken. - -The possession of Lisbon constitutes, in fact, the possession of -Portugal, south of the Duero, and an inferior army can only protect -Lisbon by keeping close to that capital. Sensible of this truth, -sir John Cradock adopted the French colonel Vincente’s views for -the defence of Lisbon; and proceeded, on the 4th of January, with -seventeen hundred men to occupy the heights behind the creek of -Saccavem--leaving, however, three thousand men in the forts and -batteries at Lisbon. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -At the earnest request of the regency, who in return promised to -assemble the native troops at Thomar, Abrantes, and Vilha Velha, -general Stewart’s brigade, two thousand seven hundred strong, was -ordered to halt at Santarem. But it had been marching incessantly -for a month, and in the rain, the men’s clothes were worn out, -their accoutrements nearly destroyed, and in common with the rest -of the army, they were suffering severely from the want of shoes. - -Thus, Cameron being on the Douro, the main body between Santarem -and Lisbon, and colonel Kemmis at Elvas, with the fortieth -regiment, an army of ten thousand men--with the encumbrances of -an army of forty thousand--was placed on the three points of a -triangle, the shortest side of which was above a hundred and fifty -miles. The general commanding could not bring into the field -above five thousand men; nor could that number be assembled in a -condition for service at any one point of the frontier, under three -weeks or a month; moreover, the uncertainty of remaining in the -country at all, rendered it difficult to feed the troops, for the -commissaries being unable to make large contracts for a fixed time, -were forced to carry on, as it were, a retail system of supply. - -Mr. Frere, however, with indefatigable folly, was urging sir John -Cradock to make a diversion in Spain; and while Mr. Frere was -calling for troops in the south, Mr. Villiers was as earnest that -a force might be sent by sea to Vigo. The minister’s instructions -prescribed the preservation of Lisbon, Elvas, and Almeida; the -assembling, in concert with the Portuguese government, a combined -force on the frontier, and the sending succours of men to Moore; -but although sir John Cradock’s means were so scanty that the -fulfilment of any one of these objects was scarcely possible, -Mr. Canning writing officially to Mr. Villiers at this epoch, -as if a mighty and well supplied army was in Portugal, enforced -the “necessity of continuing to maintain possession of Portugal, -as long as could be done with the force intrusted to sir John -Cradock’s command, _remembering always that not the defence of -Portugal alone, but the employment of the enemy’s military force_, -and the diversion which would be thus created in favour of the -south of Spain, were objects not to be abandoned, except in case -of the most extreme necessity.” The enemy’s military force! It -was three hundred thousand men, and this despatch was a pompous -absurdity; but the ministers and their agents, eternally haunted by -the phantoms of Spanish and Portuguese armies, were incapable of -perceiving the palpable bulk and substance of the French hosts. The -whole system of the cabinet was one of shifts and expedients; every -week produced a fresh project,--minister and agent, alike, followed -his own views, without reference to any fixed principle: and the -generals were the only persons not empowered to arrange military -operations. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The number of officers despatched to seek information of the French -movements enabled sir John Cradock, notwithstanding the direct -communications were cut off, to obtain intelligence of Moore’s -advance towards Sahagun, and being still anxious to assist that -general, he again endeavoured to send a reinforcement into Spain, -by the route of Almeida; but the difficulty of obtaining supplies -finally induced him to accede to Mr. Villiers’ wishes, and he -shipped six hundred cavalry, and thirteen hundred infantry, on the -12th of January, meaning to send them to Vigo; the vessels were, -however, still in the river, when authentic intelligence of sir -John Moore’s retreat upon Coruña with the intention of embarking -there, was received, and rendered this project useless. - -[Sidenote: Cradock’s Paper, MSS.] - -The 14th of January the Conqueror line-of-battle-ship, having -admiral Berkeley on board, reached the Tagus, and for the first -time since sir John Cradock took the command of the troops in -Portugal, he received a communication from the ministers in England. - -It now appeared that their thoughts were less intently fixed upon -the defence of Portugal, than upon getting possession of Cadiz. -Their anxiety upon this subject had somewhat subsided after the -battle of Vimeira, but it revived with greater vigour when sir -John Moore, contemplating a movement in the south, suggested the -propriety of securing Cadiz as a place of arms; and in January an -expedition was prepared to sail for that town, with the design of -establishing a new base of operations for the English army. The -project failed, but the transaction deserves notice, as affording -proof of the perplexed and unstable policy of the day. - - -NEGOTIATION FOR THE OCCUPATION OF CADIZ. - -[Sidenote: Papers laid before Parliament, 1810.] - -While it was still unknown in England that the supreme junta had -fled from Aranjuez, sir George Smith, who had conducted Spencer’s -negotiation in 1808, was sent to Cadiz to prepare the way for the -reception of an English garrison. Four thousand men destined for -that service were soon afterwards embarked at Portsmouth, under the -command of general Sherbrooke, but this officer’s instructions were -repeatedly altered. He was first directed to touch at Lisbon in his -way to Cadiz; he was afterwards commanded to make for Coruña, to -receive orders from sir John Moore, but, on the 14th of January, -his force being increased to five thousand men, he sailed under his -first instructions; and Mr. Frere was directed to negotiate for the -admission of these troops into Cadiz, as the only condition upon -which a British army could be employed to aid the Spanish cause in -that part of the Peninsula. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.] - -When the reverses in the north of Spain became known, the -importance of Cadiz increased, and the importance of Portugal -decreased in the eyes of the English ministers. Sir John Cradock -was then made acquainted with Sherbrooke’s destination; he was -himself commanded to obey any requisition for troops that might be -made by the Spanish junta; and so independent of the real state -of affairs were the ministerial arrangements, that Cradock, whose -despatches had been one continued complaint of his inability to -procure horses for his own artillery, was directed to furnish them -for Sherbrooke’s. - -Sir George Smith, a man somewhat hasty, but of remarkable zeal and -acuteness, left England about the middle of December; and, on his -arrival at Cadiz, at once discovered that there, as in every other -part of the Peninsula, all persons being engaged in theories or -intrigues, nothing useful for defence was executed. The ramparts -of the city were in tolerable condition, but scarcely any guns -were mounted; and yet, two miles in front of the town, an outwork -had been commenced upon such a scale that it could not possibly be -finished under four months; and, after the slow mode of Spanish -proceedings, would have taken as many years to complete. - -For a solid defence of all the fortifications, sir George Smith -judged that twenty thousand good troops would be requisite, but -that ten thousand would suffice for the city. There were, however, -only five thousand militia and volunteers in the place, and not a -regular soldier under arms, neither any within reach. The number -of guns mounted and to be mounted exceeded four hundred; to serve -them, two hundred and fifty peasants and volunteers were enrolled, -and, being clothed in uniforms, were called artillery-men. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Knowing nothing of sir John Moore’s march to Sahagun, sir George -Smith naturally calculated upon the immediate approach of the -French; and seeing the helpless state of Cadiz, and being assured -that the people would willingly admit an English garrison, he -wrote to sir John Cradock for troops. The latter, little thinking -that, at such a conjuncture, the supreme junta would be more -jealous of their allies than fearful of their enemies; and judging -also, from the tenor of his latest instructions, that obedience -to this requisition would be consonant to the minister’s wishes, -immediately ordered colonel Kemmis to proceed from Elvas with -the fortieth regiment, by the route of Seville, and, at the same -time, embarked about three thousand of the best troops at Lisbon, -and sent them to Cadiz. This force, commanded by major-general -Mackenzie, sailed the 2d February, and reached their destination -the 5th of the same month. - -[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -Meanwhile, Mr. Frere, although acquainted with the sailing of -Mackenzie’s armament, was ignorant that sir George Smith had -applied to the governor of Cadiz for permission to take military -possession of that town, for Smith had no instructions to -correspond with Mr. Frere; and the latter had opened a separate -negotiation with the central junta at Seville, in which he -endeavoured to pave the way for the occupation by proposing to have -the troops admitted as guests, and he sent Mr. Stuart to arrange -this with the local authorities. - -[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -Mr. Frere had, however, meddled much with the personal intrigues of -the day: he was, moreover, of too slender a capacity to uphold the -dignity and just influence of a great power on such an occasion; -and the flimsy thread of his negotiation snapped under the hasty -touch of sir George Smith. The supreme junta, averse to every thing -that threatened to interrupt their course of sluggish indolence, -had sent the marquis de Villel, a member of their own body, to -Cadiz, avowedly to prepare the way for the admission of the troops, -but, in reality, to thwart that measure. The circumstance of -Mackenzie’s arrival, with an object different from that announced -by Mr. Frere, was instantly taken advantage of to charge England -with treachery. For the junta, knowing Mr. Frere to be their own -dupe, believed, or affected to believe, that he was also the dupe -of the English minister; and that the whole transaction was an -artifice, on the part of the latter, to get possession of the city -with a felonious intent. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -The admission of the British troops was nevertheless earnestly -desired by the inhabitants of Cadiz, and of the neighbouring towns; -and this feeling was so well understood by Mr. Stuart and sir -George Smith, that they would, notwithstanding the reluctance of -the supreme junta, have brought the affair to a good conclusion; -but, at the most critical period of the negotiation, the former was -sent on a secret mission to Vienna, by the way of Trieste, and the -latter, who was in bad health, dying about the same period, the -negotiation failed for want of a head to conduct it. - -General Mackenzie, like sir George Smith, thought that the object -might be attained: he observed, indeed, that the people, far -from suspecting any danger, were ignorant of, or incredulous of -the reverses in the north; that nothing had been done towards -equipping the fleet for sea; and that, notwithstanding the earnest -remonstrances of admiral Purvis and Mr. Stuart, the Spaniards would -neither work themselves nor permit the English sailors to work -for them. Still the general feeling was favourable to the British -army, and the good wishes of the inhabitants were openly avowed: -Mackenzie had, however, only a negative power, the affair being in -the hands of Mr. Frere. - -In the course of the negotiations carried on by that minister, the -supreme junta proposed, - -1º.--That the troops should land at Port St. Mary’s, and be -quartered there and in the neighbouring towns. - -2º.--That they should join Cuesta’s army. - -3º.--That they should go to Catalonia. - -4º.--That they should be parcelled out in small divisions, and -attached to the different Spanish armies. - -Nay, untaught by their repeated disasters, and pretending to hold -the English soldiery cheap, these self-sufficient men proposed that -the British should garrison the minor fortresses on the coast, in -order to release an equal number of Spaniards for the field. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -Mr. Frere wished to accept the first of these proposals, but -general Mackenzie, sir George Smith, and Mr. Stuart agreed that it -would be injurious for many reasons; not the least urgent of which -was, that as the troops could not have been embarked again without -some national dishonour, they must have marched towards Cuesta, -and thus have been involved in the campaign without obtaining that -which was their sole object, _the possession of Cadiz as a place of -arms_. - -Mr. Frere then suggested a modification of the second proposal, -namely, to leave a small garrison in Cadiz, and to join Cuesta with -the remainder of the troops. Sir G. Smith was dead; Mr. Stuart had -embarked for Trieste; and general Mackenzie, reluctant to oppose -Mr. Frere’s wishes, consented to march, if the necessary equipments -for his force could be procured; but he observed, that the plan -was contrary to his instructions, and to the known wishes of the -English government, and liable, in part, to the objections against -the first proposition. - -His letter was written the 18th of February, and on the 22d a -popular tumult commenced in Cadiz. - -The supreme junta, to prove that that city did not require an -English garrison, had ordered two regiments, composed of Poles, -Germans, and Swiss, prisoners or deserters from the French, to -march there. The people, aware that the junta disliked and intended -to disarm the volunteers, were offended that deserters should be -trusted in preference to themselves. They arose, and stopped the -courier, with despatches from Seville, and imprisoned the marquis -of Villel, who was obnoxious, because, while mild to persons -suspected of favouring the French, he had been harsh, or rather -brutal, in his conduct to some ladies of rank in Cadiz. - -The populace, proceeding from one violence to another, endeavoured -to kill the state prisoners; and being prevented in this bloody -object, committed several excesses, and murdered don Joseph -Heredia, the collector of the public rents. During the tumult, -which lasted two days, the disembarkation of the English troops was -repeatedly called for by the mob; and two British officers being -sent on shore as mediators, were received with enthusiasm, and -obeyed with respect, a manifest proof of the correct view taken by -sir George Smith. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -The 24th, tranquillity was restored; and the 25th, general -Mackenzie, not having received from Mr. Frere an answer to his -letter of the 18th, suggested, that of the three English battalions -then in the harbour, two should be placed in Cadiz; and that the -third, proceeding to Seville, should there unite with the 40th -regiment, and both together march to join Cuesta. - -Mr. Frere, however, instead of addressing the junta with an -authority and dignity becoming the representative of a great -nation, on whose support the independence of the whole Peninsula -rested, had been endeavouring to gain his end by subtlety. The -object was one that England had a right to seek, and the Spanish -rulers no right to refuse; for the people wished to further it, -and the threat of an appeal to them would soon have silenced the -feeble negative of such a despicable and suspected government; but -Mr. Frere, incapable of taking a single and enlarged view, was -pressing and discussing, with the secretary of the junta, a variety -of trifling points, as if to shew his epistolary dexterity; and, -finally, when his opponent had conceded the point of admitting -troops at all, broke off the negotiation, upon the question, as to -whether the number to be admitted should be one or two thousand -men, as if the way to drive a wedge was with the broad end foremost. - -[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -Self baffled in that quarter, the British plenipotentiary, turning -towards Cuesta, the avowed enemy of the junta, and one much feared -by them, sought to secure his assistance by holding out the lure -of having a British force added to his command, but the sarcastic -old general derided the diplomatist. “Although I do not,” said -he, “discover any great difficulty in the actual state of things, -which should prevent his British majesty’s troops from garrisoning -Cadiz under such terms, and for the purpose which your excellency -proposes; I am far from supposing that the supreme junta, which is -fully persuaded of the importance of our union with England, is -not grounded in its objections; and your excellency knows that it -is sufficient that they should have them, to prevent my giving any -opinion on so important a measure, _unless they should consult -me_. With regard to the 4,300 men, which your excellency is pleased -to mention, there is no doubt that I stand in need of them; but I -flatter myself, England, sensible of the importance of Estremadura, -will even lend me much greater assistance, particularly if, from -any change of circumstances, the supreme junta should no longer -manifest the repugnance we speak of.” - -This answer having frustrated the projected intrigue, Mr. Frere, -conscious perhaps of diplomatic incapacity, returned with renewed -ardour to the task of directing the military affairs, in every part -of the Peninsula. He had seen an intercepted letter of Soult’s, -addressed to the king, in which the project of penetrating into -Portugal was mentioned; and immediately concluding that general -Mackenzie’s troops would be wanted for the defence of that -kingdom, counselled him to abandon Cadiz and return to Lisbon; but -the general, who knew that, even should he return, a successful -defence of Portugal with so few troops would be impossible, and -that every precaution was already taken for an embarkation in the -last extremity, observed, that “the danger of Lisbon rendered the -occupation of Cadiz more important.” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.] - -General Mackenzie’s reply was written the 26th of February. On the -3d of March he received another despatch from Mr. Frere. Cadiz, and -the danger of Portugal, seemed to have passed from the writer’s -mind, and were unnoticed; but entering into a minutely inaccurate -statement of the situation of the French and Spanish armies, he -observed, that Soult having failed in an attempt to penetrate -Portugal by the Minho, _it was impossible, from the position -of the Spanish forces, assisted as they were by the Portuguese, -that he could persevere in his plan_. Wherefore, he proposed that -the British force then in the harbour of Cadiz should proceed -immediately to Tarragona, to aid Reding; and this wild scheme was -only frustrated by an unexpected despatch from sir John Cradock, -recalling the troops to Lisbon. - -They arrived there on the 12th of March; and thus ended a -transaction clearly indicating an unsettled policy, shallow -combinations, and a bad choice of agents on the part of the English -cabinet, and a most unwise and unworthy disposition in the supreme -junta. General Mackenzie attributed the jealousy of the latter to -French influence; Mr. Frere to the abrupt proceedings of sir George -Smith, and to fear, lest the junta of Seville, who were continually -on the watch to recover their ancient power, should represent the -admission of the British troops as a treasonable proceeding on the -part of the supreme government. It is, however, evident that the -true cause was the false position in which the English ministers -had originally placed themselves, by inundating Spain with arms -and money, without at the same time asserting a just influence, -and making their assistance the price of good order and useful -exertion. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -The effort made to secure Cadiz was an act of disinterested zeal -on the part of sir John Cradock. The absence of his best troops -exposed him to the most galling peevishness from the regency, and -to the grossest insults from the populace. With his reduced force, -he could not expect to hold even a contracted position at the -extremity of the rock of Lisbon against the weakest army likely -to invade Portugal; and, as there was neither a native force nor -a government to be depended upon, there remained for him only the -prospect of a forced and, consequently, disgraceful embarkation, -and the undeserved obloquy that never fails to follow disaster. - -In this disagreeable situation, as Elvas and Almeida no longer -contained British troops, the general’s attention was necessarily -fixed upon Lisbon and Oporto. The violence of the gales rendered -the latter a sealed port; but the hospitals and magazines of -Almeida, and even of Salamanca, being evacuated upon Lamego, that -town was crowded with fifteen hundred sick men, besides escorts, -and the hourly accumulating stores. The river had overflowed its -banks, the craft could not ply; and one large boat, attempting to -descend, was overset, and eighty persons, soldiers and others, -perished. - -General Cameron, hearing of this confusion, relinquished the idea -of embarking his detachment at Oporto, and, re-crossing the Douro, -made for Lisbon, where he arrived the beginning of February with -about two thousand men; but they were worn down by fatigue, having -marched eight hundred miles under continued rains. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, sect. 1.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, sect. 1.] - -Sir Robert Wilson sent his guns to Abrantes, by the road of -Idanha Nova; but, partly from a spirit of adventure, partly from -an erroneous idea that sir John Cradock wished him to defend the -frontier, he remained with his infantry in the neighbourhood -of Ciudad Rodrigo. His force had been increased by a Spanish -detachment under don Carlos d’España, and by some volunteers; but -it was still weak, and his operations were necessarily confined to -a few trifling skirmishes: yet, like many others, his imagination -so far outstripped his judgement that, when he had only felt the -advanced post of a single division, he expressed his conviction -that the French were going to abandon Spain altogether. - -Sir John Cradock entertained no such false expectations; he was -informed of the battle of Coruña and the death of Moore; he knew -too well the vigour and talent of that general to doubt that he -had been oppressed by an overwhelming force; he knew that Zaragoza -had fallen, and that twenty-five thousand French troops were thus -free to act in other quarters; he knew that Soult, with at least -twenty thousand men, was on the Minho; that Romana was incapable -of making any head, that Portugal was one wide scene of helpless -confusion, and that a French army was again in the neighbourhood of -Merida, threatening Lisbon by the line of the Tagus; in fine, that -his own embarrassments were hourly increasing, and that the moment -was arrived when the safety of his troops must become the chief -consideration. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 10, sect. 1.] - -The tenor of the few despatches he had received from England led -him to suppose that the ministers designed to abandon Portugal; -but, as their intentions on that head were never clearly explained, -he resolved to abide by the literal interpretation of his first -instructions, and to keep his hold of the country as long as it -was possible to do so without risking the utter destruction of his -army. To avoid that danger, he put every incumbrance at Lisbon -on board the transports in the Tagus, proceeded to dismantle the -batteries at the mouth of the river, and, in concert with the -admiral, made preparations for carrying away or destroying the -military and naval stores in the arsenal. At the same time, he -renewed his efforts to embark the sick men and stores at Oporto; -but the weather continued so unfavourable that he was finally -obliged to remove the invalids and many stores by land, yet he -could not procure carriages for the whole. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 11.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 10, sect. 2 and 3.] - -After the arrival of Cameron’s detachment, the effective British -force under arms, including convalescents and fifteen hundred -stragglers from sir John Moore’s army, was about eight thousand -men; but, when the security of the forts and magazines, and the -tranquillity of Lisbon, was provided for, only five thousand -men, and those not in the best order, could be brought into the -field. As this force was infinitely too weak to cover such a town -as Lisbon, the general judged that it would be unwise to take up -a position in advance, whence he should be obliged to retreat -through the midst of a turbulent and excited population, which -had already given too many indications of ill-temper to leave any -doubt of its hostility under such circumstances. He, therefore, -came to the resolution of withdrawing from Saccavem and Lisbon, -and concentrating his whole force on a position at Passa D’Arcos, -near the mouth of the river, where he could embark with least -danger, and where he had the best chance of defending himself, if -necessary, against superior numbers. - -This reasoning was sound, and Cradock’s intention was, undoubtedly, -not to abandon the country, unless driven from it by force, or in -pursuance of orders from England: but his arrangements seem to -have carried more the appearance of alarm than was either politic -or necessary; for the position of Passa D’Arcos might have been -prepared, and the means necessary for an embarkation secured, and -yet the bulk of the troops kept in advance until the last moment. -To display a bold and confident front in war is, of all things, the -most essential, as well to impose upon friends as upon enemies; and -sir John Cradock did not fail to experience the truth of this maxim. - -The population of Lisbon, alarmed by the reverses in Spain, and -yet, like all the people in the Peninsula, confident in their own -prowess and resolution until the very moment of attack, became -extremely exasperated; and the regency, partly from their natural -folly and insincerity, but more from the dread of the lower orders, -countenanced, if they did not instigate, the latter to commit -excesses, and to interrupt the proceedings of the British naval and -military authorities. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, sect. 5.] - -Although the measures of precaution relative to the forts had -originated with the regency, they now formally protested against -them; and, with a view to hamper the general, encouraged their -subalterns to make many false and even ridiculous charges against -the British executive officers; and it would appear that the -remonstrances of the admiral and generals were but imperfectly -supported by Mr. Villiers. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.] - -In this manner the people’s violence was nourished until the city -was filled with tumult; mobs, armed with English pikes and muskets, -collected night and day in the streets and on the high-roads, -and, under the pretext of seeking for, and killing, Frenchmen, -attacked, indiscriminately, all foreigners, even those in the -British service and wearing the British uniform. The guards, who -endeavoured to protect the victims of this ferocity, were insulted. -Couriers, passing with despatches, were intercepted and deprived -of their papers; English officers were outraged in the streets; -and such was the audacity of the people that the artillery was -placed in the squares, in expectation of an affray. In fine, the -state of Lisbon was similar to what it had been at the period of -Junot’s convention; and, if the British had abandoned the country -at this time, they would have been assailed with as much obloquy -by the Portuguese, for, such has been, and will be, the fate of -all unsuccessful auxiliaries: a reflection that should render -historians cautious of adopting accusations upon the authority of -native writers on the like occasions. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 2.] - -This spirit was not confined to Lisbon. In Oporto the disposition -to insult the British was more openly encouraged than in the -capital, and the government of the multitude was more decidedly -pronounced. From the cities it spread to the villages. The people -of the Alemtejo frontier were, indeed, remarkably apathetic; but, -from the Minho to the Tagus, the country was in horrible confusion; -the soldiers were scattered, without regard to military system, -and, being unpaid, lived at free quarters; the peasantry of the -country assembling in bands, and the populace of the towns in mobs, -intercepted the communications, appointed or displaced the generals -at their pleasure, and massacred all persons of whom they were -suspicious. The ammunition which had been supplied from England -was wasted, by constant firing in token of insubordination; and, -as if the very genius of confusion was abroad, some of the British -troops, principally _malingerers_,[3] of sir John Moore’s army, -added their quota of misconduct, to increase the general distress. - -The leading instigator of the excesses at Oporto was one Raymundo, -a coadjutor and creature of the bishop’s, a turbulent and cruel -fellow, who, by taking a share in the first insurrection against -the French, obtained a momentary influence, and has since been -elevated, by a very credulous writer, into a patriotic hero. He -was, however, a worthless coward, fitted for secret villany, but -incapable of a noble action. - -This state of affairs, productive of so much misery and danger, -continuing, without intermission, caused many of the upper classes -to despair of their country’s safety by war, and increased the -number of those who, wishing to attach themselves to the fortune -of France, were ready to accept of a foreign prince for their -sovereign, if, with him, they could obtain tranquillity and an -ameliorated constitution; and when, soon afterwards, the edge of -the enemy’s sword, falling upon the senseless multitude, filled -the streets of Oporto with blood, there was a powerful French -party already established in Portugal. The bulk of the people -were, however, stanch in their country’s cause; they were furious -and disorderly, but imbued with hatred of the French; ready at the -call of honour; and susceptible of discipline, without any loss of -energy. - -The turbulence of the citizens, the remonstrances of the regency, -and the representations of Mr. Villiers, who was in doubt for -the personal safety of the British subjects residing in Lisbon, -convinced sir John Cradock that political circumspection and -adroitness were as important as military arrangement, to prevent a -catastrophe at this critical period; and, as contrary to what might -have been expected, the enemy had not yet made any actual movement -across the frontier, he was induced to suspend his design of -falling back to Passa D’Arcos; and in this unsettled state affairs -remained until March, when intelligence arriving that the French -fleet was at sea, two of the line-of-battle ships in the Tagus were -despatched to reinforce sir Thomas Duckworth’s squadron, and the -batteries at the mouth of the river were again armed. - -Meanwhile, Soult was making progress in the north; the anarchy at -Oporto was continually increasing, and the English government had -certainly come to the resolution of abandoning Portugal if the -enemy advanced; for, although sir John Cradock was not informed -of their views, an officer in England, well acquainted with -Portuguese customs, actually received orders, and was embarking, -to aid the execution of this measure, when, suddenly, the policy -of the cabinet once more changed, and it was resolved to reinforce -the army. This resolution, which may be attributed partly to the -Austrian war, partly to the failure at Cadiz, and partly to the -necessity of satisfying public opinion in England, was accompanied -by a measure judicious in principle and of infinite importance, -inasmuch as it formed the first solid basis on which to build a -reasonable hope of success. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.] - -The Portuguese government, whether spontaneously or brought thereto -by previous negotiation, had offered the command of all the native -troops to an English general,--with power to alter and amend the -military discipline, to appoint British officers to the command -of the regiments, and to act, without control, in any manner he -should judge fitting to ameliorate the condition of the Portuguese -army; and this was the more important, because the military polity -of Portugal, although fallen into neglect, was severe, precise, -and admirably calculated to draw forth the whole strength of the -kingdom, for the regular army could be completed by coercion, and -the militia were bound to assemble in regiments, numbered, clothed, -and armed like the regulars, but only liable to serve within the -frontier. The whole of the remaining population, capable of bearing -arms, were enrolled under the name of _ordenanças_, numbered -by battalions in their different districts and obliged, under -very severe punishments, to assemble at the order of the local -magistrates either to work, to fight, or to assist the operations -of the other forces. - -The English government, accepting of this offer, agreed to supply -arms, ammunition, and other succours, granted a subsidy for the -payment of the regular forces, and thus obtained, for the first -time, a firm hold of the military resources of Portugal, and a -position in the Peninsula suitable to the dignity of England and -to the great contest in which she was engaged. - -The Portuguese government wished that sir Arthur Wellesley should -be their general; and the English cabinet offered the situation -to him, but he refused it; and it is said, that sir John Doyle, -sir John Murray, (he who afterwards failed at Tarragona,) general -Beresford, and even the marquis of Hastings, then earl of Moira, -sought for the appointment. The last was, undoubtedly, a man well -fitted by his courtly manners, his high rank, and his real talents, -both in the cabinet and in the field, for such an office; but -powerful parliamentary interest prevailing, major-general Beresford -was appointed, to the great discontent of many officers of superior -rank, who were displeased that a man, without any visible claim to -superiority, should be placed over their heads. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.] - -Information of this change was instantly conveyed to sir John -Cradock, and general Sherbrooke was ordered to put into Lisbon. -The latter was overtaken at the mouth of Cadiz harbour; and his -and general Mackenzie’s divisions arriving in the Tagus together, -on the 12th of March, gave a new turn to the affairs of Portugal. -But if Mr. Frere’s plan had been pursued--If general Sherbrooke’s -troops had not been detained by bad weather at sea--If the -first had proceeded to Tarragona, and nothing but a foul wind -prevented it--If the second sailing from port to port without -any artillery had, as was most probable, been engaged in some -other enterprise--If Victor, obeying his orders, had marched to -Abrantes--If any one of these events had happened, sir John Cradock -must have abandoned Portugal; and then how infinitely absurd these -proceedings of the English ministers would have appeared, and how -justly their puerile combinations would have been the scorn of -Europe. - -Marshal Beresford arrived at Lisbon the beginning of March; and -having received the confirmation of his power from the regency, -fixed his head-quarters at Thomar, collected the Portuguese troops -in masses, and proceeded to recast their system on the model of -the British army; commencing, with stern but wholesome rigour, a -reform that, in process of time, raised out of chaos an obedient, -well disciplined, and gallant army, worthy of a high place among -the best in Europe; for the Portuguese people, though easily misled -and excited to wrath, are of a docile and orderly disposition, and -very sensible of a just and honourable conduct in their officers. -But this reform was not effected at once, nor without many crosses -and difficulties being raised by the higher orders and by the -government--difficulties that general Beresford could never have -overcome, if he had not been directed, sustained, and shielded, by -the master spirit under whom he was destined to work. - -The plan of giving to English officers the command of the -Portuguese troops was at first proceeded on with caution; but -after a time, the ground being supposed safe, it was gradually -enlarged, until almost all the military situations of emolument and -importance were held by Englishmen; and this, combined with other -causes, gave rise to numerous intrigues, not entirely confined -to the natives, and as we shall find, in after times, seriously -threatening the power of the marshal, the existence of the British -influence, and the success of the war. - -Sir John Cradock’s situation was now materially alleviated. -The certainty of the Austrian war produced a marked change in -the disposition of the regency. The arrival of Sherbrooke’s -and Mackenzie’s divisions having increased the British force -to fourteen thousand men, the populace became more cautious of -offering insults; and, about the middle of March, two thousand men -being left to maintain tranquillity in Lisbon, the remainder of the -army was encamped at Lumiar and Saccavem; and while these things -were passing at Lisbon, the aspect of affairs changed also in other -parts of the kingdom. For, the bulk of the Portuguese regular -troops, amounting to ten or twelve thousand men, was collected by -marshal Beresford, between the Tagus and the Mondego. - -Beyond the valley of the Mondego, colonel Trant commanded a small -corps of volunteers, students from the university; and general -Vittoria was at the head of two regular battalions in Upper Beira. - -The bishop of Oporto was preparing to defend that town, with a -mixed, but ferocious and insubordinate multitude. General Sylveira, -with four or five thousand men, had taken post in the Tras os -Montes; and Romana, who had collected seven or eight thousand at -Monterey, was in communication with him. - -Sir Robert Wilson was at the head of about three thousand men; he -had withdrawn the legion from Almeida, sent a detachment to Bejar, -and remained himself on the Agueda, watching the advanced posts of -Lapisse. A few Portuguese regiments were extended from Salvatierra -and Idanha to Alcantara. There was a permanent bridge of boats over -the Tagus at Abrantes, and there were small garrisons in that town -and at Elvas. - -But all these forces united would not, with the exception of the -British, have been capable of sustaining the shock of ten thousand -French soldiers for half an hour; and the whole mass of the latter, -then hanging on the frontier of Portugal, was above fifty thousand. -Gathering like clouds on the horizon, they threatened many points, -but gave no certain indication of where the storm would break. -Soult, indeed, with about twenty thousand men, was endeavouring to -pass the Minho; but Lapisse, although constantly menacing Ciudad -Rodrigo, kept his principal masses at Salamanca and Ledesma; while -Victor had concentrated his between the Alberche and the Tietar. - -Thus Lapisse might join either Soult or Victor; and the latter -could march by Placentia against Ciudad Rodrigo, while Soult -attacked Oporto; or he might draw Lapisse to him, and penetrate -Portugal by Alcantara. He might pass the Tagus, attack Cuesta, and -pursue him to Seville; or, after defeating him, he might turn short -to the right, and enter the Alemtejo. - -In this uncertainty, sir John Cradock, keeping the British -concentrated at Lumiar and Saccavem, waited for the enemy to -develop his plans, and, in the mean time, endeavoured to procure -the necessary equipments for an active campaign. He directed -magazines to be formed at Coimbra and Abrantes; urged the regency -to exertion; took measures to raise money, and despatched officers -to Barbary to procure mules. But while thus engaged, intelligence -arrived that Victor had suddenly forced the passage of the Tagus at -Almaraz, and was in pursuit of Cuesta on the road to Merida; that -Soult, having crossed the Minho, and defeated Romana and Sylveira, -was within a few leagues of Oporto; and that Lapisse had made a -demonstration of assaulting Ciudad Rodrigo. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The junta of Oporto now vehemently demanded aid from the regency, -and the latter, although not much inclined to the bishop’s party, -proposed that sir John Cradock should unite a part of the British -forces to the Portuguese troops under marshal Beresford, and -march to the succour of Oporto. Beresford was averse to trust -the Portuguese under his immediate command, among the mutinous -multitude in that city, but he thought the whole of the British -army should move in a body to Leiria, and from thence either push -on to Oporto, or return, according to the events that might occur -in the latter town, and he endeavoured to persuade Cradock to -follow this plan. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 12, section 1.] - -It was doubtful, he said, if Victor and Soult intended to -co-operate in a single plan; but, on the supposition that it was -so, he considered it essential to drive back or to overcome one -before the other could come to his assistance. Victor was then in -pursuit of Cuesta; if he continued that pursuit, it must be to -enter Seville, or to cripple his opponent previous to the invasion -of Portugal; in either case he would be in the Sierra Morena before -he could hear of the march from Leiria, and, as Cradock had daily -intelligence of Victor’s movements, there would be full time to -relieve Oporto, and to return again to the defence of Lisbon. If, -however, Soult depended on the co-operation of Victor, he would -probably remain on the right of the Duero until the other was on -the Tagus, and Lapisse also would be contented for the present with -capturing Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 12, section 2.] - -This reasoning, so evidently unsound, did not weigh with sir John -Cradock, who resolved to preserve his central position, covering -the capital at such a distance as to preclude the danger of being -cut off from it by one army while he was engaged with another. -Lisbon and Oporto, he observed, were the enemy’s objects; the -former was of incomparably greater importance than the latter. -Portugal was in a state of anarchy equally incompatible with firm -resistance and rapid movements. The peasantry were tumultuous -and formidable to everybody but the enemy; and Beresford himself -acknowledged that the regular forces were mutinous, disregarding -their officers, choosing when and where to rest; when to fight, -and when to remain in quarters; and altogether unfit to be trusted -within the circle of the Oporto mischief. The British troops, -therefore, were the only solid resource; but they were too few to -divide, and must act in a body, or not at all. - -Was it most desirable to protect Lisbon or Oporto? The first was -near, the second two hundred miles off; and, although the utmost -exertions had been made, the army was not yet equipped for an -active campaign. The troops were ill-clothed, and wanted shoes; the -artillery was unhorsed; the commissariat possessed only a fourth -part of the transport necessary for the conveyance of provisions -and ammunition, and no activity could immediately supply these -deficiencies, inasmuch as some of the articles required were not -to be had in the country, and, to obtain others, the interference -of the regency was necessary, but hitherto all applications to -that quarter had been without any effect. Was it wise to commence -offensive operations in the north? Soult and Lapisse together were -estimated at thirty thousand men, of which above five thousand were -cavalry, and he himself could only bring fifteen guns and twelve -thousand men, of all arms, into the field; yet, if the British -army, marched with the avowed intention of relieving Oporto, it -must accomplish it, or be dishonoured! - -Was it consistent with reason to march two hundred miles in search -of a combat, which the very state of Oporto would render it almost -impossible to gain, and for an object perhaps already lost? -Suspicion was alive all over the country: if Oporto was already -taken, the army must come back; that would be the signal for fresh -tumults--for renewed cries that the country was to be abandoned; -Lisbon would instantly be in a state of insurrection, and would be -even more formidable to the British than the enemy; besides, it was -impossible to reckon upon Cuesta’s aid in keeping Victor employed. -He was personally inimical to the English, and his principal object -was to gain time for the increase and discipline of his own force. - -Victor was apparently pursuing Cuesta, but his parties had already -appeared in the neighbourhood of Badajos, and there was nothing but -a weak Portuguese garrison in Elvas to impede his march through -the Alemtejo. To cover Lisbon and the Tagus was the wisest plan: -fixed in some favourable position, at a prudent distance from that -capital, he could wait for the reinforcements he expected from -England. He invited the Portuguese troops to unite with him; a -short time would suffice to establish subordination, and then the -certainty that the capital could not be approached, except in the -face of a really-formidable army, would not only keep the enemy in -check, but, by obliging him to collect in greater numbers for the -attempt, would operate as a diversion in favour of Spain. - -The general soundness of this reasoning is apparent, and it must -not be objected to sir John Cradock that he disregarded the value -of a central position, which might enable him to be beforehand -with the enemy in covering Lisbon, if the latter should march on -his flank. The difficulty of obtaining true intelligence from the -natives and his own want of cavalry rendered it utterly unsafe -for him to divide his army, or to trust it any distance from the -capital. - -Marshal Beresford’s plan, founded on the supposition that Cradock -could engage Soult at Oporto, and yet quit him, and return at his -pleasure to Lisbon, if Victor advanced, was certainly fallacious; -the advantages rested on conjectural, the disadvantages on positive -data: it was conjectural that they could relieve Oporto; it was -positive that they would endanger Lisbon; the proposition was, -however, not made upon partial views. But, at this period, other -men, less qualified to advise, pestered sir John Cradock with -projects of a different stamp, yet deserving of notice, as showing -that the mania for grand operations, which I have before marked as -the malady of the time, was still raging. - -[Sidenote: Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -To make a suitable use of the British army was the object of all -these projectors, but there was a marvellous variety in their -plans. While the regency desired that the Portuguese and English -troops should, without unfurnishing Lisbon, co-operate for the -relief of Oporto, and while marshal Beresford recommended that the -latter only should march, the bishop was importunate to have a -detachment of the British army placed under his command, and he -recalled Sir Robert Wilson to the defence of Oporto. It appeared -reasonable that the legion should defend the city in which it was -raised; but Mr. Frere wrote from Seville that sir Robert could do -better where he was; and the latter dreading the anarchy in Oporto, -accepted Spanish rank, and refused obedience to the prelate’s -orders, yet retained his troops. The regency, however, adopted the -Lusitanian legion as a national corps, and approved of sir Robert’s -proceedings. Meanwhile Romana was earnest with sir John Cradock -for money, and that a thousand British soldiers might be sent -to aid the insurrection at Vigo; and at the same time Mr. Frere -and colonel D’Urban, a corresponding officer placed at Cuesta’s -head-quarters, proposed other plans of higher pretensions. - -[Sidenote: Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Zaragoza, said the latter, has fallen; and ten thousand French -troops being thus released, are marching towards Toledo; this is -the moment to give a fatal blow to Marshal Victor! It is one of -those critical occasions that seldom recur in war! In a day or two -sir Robert Wilson will be on the Tietar with two thousand five -hundred men; augment his force with a like number of Portuguese, -who may be drawn from Sobreira, Idanha, and Salvatierra. He shall -thus turn the right and rear of Victor’s army, and his movement -cannot be interrupted by the French force now at Salamanca and -Alva; because the communication from thence to the Tagus by the -passes of Baños and Tornevecas is sealed up; and while sir Robert -Wilson thus gets in the rear of Victor with five thousand men, -Cuesta, with twelve thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, -shall attack the latter in front, matter of easy execution; -because Cuesta can throw a pontoon bridge over the Tagus, near -Almaraz, in an hour and a half; and the Conde de Cartoajal, who -is at Manzanares in La Mancha, with ten thousand infantry and two -thousand horse, will keep Sebastiani in check. The hope is great, -the danger small; and if a few British troops can be added to the -force on the Tietar, the success will be infallible. - -There were, however, some grave objections to this infallible plan. -General Cuesta was near Almaraz; sir John Cradock was at Lisbon, -and sir Robert Wilson was at Ciudad Rodrigo. This circuitous line -of correspondence being above four hundred miles long, it is -not very clear how the combination was to be effected with that -rapidity, which was said to be essential to the success. Neither is -it very evident, that operations to be combined at such a distance, -and executed by soldiers of different nations, would have been -successful at all. On the one side, twenty thousand Portuguese and -Spanish recruits were to act on double external lines of operation; -on the other, twenty-five thousand French veterans waited in a -central position, with their front and flanks covered by the Tagus -and the Tietar. In such a contest it is possible to conceive a -different result from that anticipated by colonel D’Urban. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 7.] - -Mr. Frere’s plans were not less extensive, and he was equally -sanguine. When his project for assisting Catalonia had been -frustrated, by the recall of general Mackenzie from Cadiz, he -turned his attention to the north. Soult, he wrote to sir John -Cradock, tired of the resistance he has met with, will probably -desist from his “_unaccountable project of entering Portugal, -and occupying Gallicia at the same time_.” Let the British army, -therefore, make a push to drive the enemy out of Salamanca, -and the neighbouring towns; while the Asturians, on their side, -shall take possession of Leon and Astorga, and thus open the -communication between the northern and southern provinces. - -Fearing, however, that if this proposal should not be adopted, the -English general might be at a loss for some enterprise, Mr. Frere -also recommended that the British army should march to Alcantara; -and that the fortieth regiment, which hitherto he had retained at -Seville, contrary to sir John Cradock’s wishes, should join it at -that place; and then, the whole operating by the northern bank of -the Tagus, might, in concert with Cuesta, “_beat the French out of -Toledo, and consequently out of Madrid_.” - -[Sidenote: Muster Rolls of the French Army, MSS.] - -Now, with respect to the first of these plans, Soult never had the -intention of holding Gallicia, which was Marshal Ney’s province; -but he did propose to penetrate into Portugal, and he was not -likely to abandon his purpose; because, the only army capable of -opposing him was quitting that kingdom, and making a “_push_” of -four hundred miles to drive Lapisse out of Salamanca; moreover, the -Asturians were watched by general Bonnet’s division on one side, -and by Kellerman on the other; and the fifth corps, not ten, but -fifteen thousand strong, having quitted Zaragoza, were at this time -in the Valladolid country, and therefore close to Leon and Astorga. - -With respect to the operations by the line of the Tagus, which -were to drive Joseph out of Madrid, and consequently to attract -the attention of all the French corps, it is to be observed, that -sir John Cradock could command about twelve thousand men, Cuesta -sixteen thousand, Cartoajal twelve thousand, making a total of -forty thousand. Now, Soult had twenty-three thousand, Lapisse -nine thousand, Victor was at the head of twenty-five thousand, -Sebastiani could dispose of fifteen thousand, Mortier of a like -number, the King’s guards and the garrison of Madrid were twelve -thousand, making a total of nearly a hundred thousand men. - -But while Mr. Frere and colonel D’Urban, confiding in Soult’s -inactivity, were thus plotting the destruction of Victor and -Sebastiani, the first marshal stormed Oporto; the second, -unconscious of his danger, crossed the Tagus, and defeated Cuesta’s -army at Medellin, and at the same moment Sebastiani routed -Cartoajal’s at Ciudad Real. - - - - -BOOK VII. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -Having described the unhappy condition of Portugal and given a -general view of the transactions in Spain, I shall now resume the -narrative of Soult’s operations, thus following the main stream -of action, for the other marshals were appointed to tranquillize -the provinces already overrun by the emperor, or to war down the -remnants of the Spanish armies; but the duke of Dalmatia’s task was -to push onward in the course of conquest. Nor is it difficult to -trace him through the remainder of a campaign in which traversing -all the northern provinces, fighting in succession the armies of -three different nations, and enduring every vicissitude of war, he -left broad marks of his career and certain proofs that he was an -able commander, and of a haughty resolution in adversity. - -It has been observed, in a former part of this work, that the -inhabitants of Coruña honourably maintained their town until the -safety of the fleet which carried sir John Moore’s army from the -Spanish shores was secure; but they were less faithful to their own -cause. Coruña, although weak against a regular siege, might have -defied irregular operations, and several weeks must have elapsed -before sufficient battering train could have been brought up to -that corner of the Peninsula. Yet, a short negotiation sufficed to -put the French in possession of the place on the 19th of January, -and the means of attacking Ferrol were immediately organized from -the resources of Coruña. - -The harbour of Ferrol contained eight sail of the line, and some -smaller ships of war. The fortifications were regular, there was -an abundance of artillery and ammunition and a garrison of seven -or eight thousand men, composed of soldiers, sailors, citizens, -and armed countrymen, but their chiefs were treacherous. After -a commotion in which the admiral Obregon was arrested, his -successor Melgarejo surrendered the 26th upon somewhat better terms -than those granted to Coruña; and thus in ten days two regular -fortresses were reduced, that with more resolution might have -occupied thirty thousand men for several months. - -[Sidenote: S. MSS.] - -While yet before Ferrol the duke of Dalmatia received the following -despatch, prescribing the immediate invasion of Portugal:-- - -“Before his departure from this place, (Valladolid,) the -emperor foreseeing the embarkation of the English army, drew up -instructions for the ultimate operations of the duke of Elchingen -and yourself. He orders that when the English army shall be -embarked you will march upon Oporto with your four divisions, that -is to say, the division of Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet, -the dragoons of Lorge, and La Houssaye, and Franceschi’s light -cavalry, with the exception of two regiments that his majesty -desires you to turn over to the duke of Elchingen, in order to make -up his cavalry to four regiments.” - -“Your ‘_corps d’armée_,’ composed of seventeen regiments of -infantry and ten regiments of cavalry, is destined for the -expedition of Portugal, in combination with a movement the duke -of Belluno is going to effect. General Loison, some engineers, -staff and commissiarat officers, and thirteen Portuguese, all of -whom belonged to the army formerly in Portugal, under the duke of -Abrantes, have received instructions to join you immediately, and -you can transmit your orders for them to Lugo. This is the 21st -of January, and it is supposed you cannot be at Oporto before the -5th of February, or at Lisbon before the 16th. Thus, at that time, -namely, when you shall be near Lisbon, the ‘_corps d’armée_’ of -the duke of Belluno, composed of his own three divisions, of the -division Leval, and of ten or twelve regiments of cavalry, forming -a body of thirty thousand men, will be at Merida to make a strong -diversion in favour of your movement, and in such a mode as that he -can push the head of a column upon Lisbon, if you find any great -obstacles to your entrance, which it is, however, presumed will not -be the case.” - -“General Lapisse’s division of infantry, which is at this moment in -Salamanca, and general Maupetit’s brigade of cavalry, will, when -you shall be at Oporto, receive the duke of Istria’s orders to -march upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, where this division will -again be under the command of the duke of Belluno, who will send it -instructions to join him at Merida, and I let you know this that -you may be aware of the march of Lapisse, on your left flank, as -far as Abrantes. Such are the last orders I am charged to give you -in the name of the emperor; you will have to report to the king and -to receive his orders for your ulterior operations. The emperor has -unlimited confidence in your talents for the fine expedition that -he has charged you with.” - - ALEXANDER, - _Prince of Neufchatel, &c._ - -It was further intended, by Napoleon, that when Lisbon fell, -marshal Victor should invade Andalusia, upon the same line as -Dupont had moved the year before, and like him, also, he was to -have been assisted by a division of the second corps, which was -to cross the Guadiana and march on Seville. Meanwhile, the duke -of Elchingen, whose corps, reinforced by two regiments of cavalry -and the arrival of stragglers, amounted to near twenty thousand -men, was to maintain Gallicia, confine the Asturians within their -own frontier line, and keep open the communication with the second -corps. - -Thus, nominally, eighty thousand, and in reality sixty thousand -men, were disposed for the conquest of Lisbon, and in such a manner -that forty thousand would, after that had been accomplished, have -poured down upon Seville and Cadiz, and at a time when neither -Portugal nor Andalusia were capable of making any resistance. It -remains to shew from what causes this mighty preparation failed. - -[Sidenote: Muster-rolls of the French army, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations of the second corps, MSS.] - -The gross numbers of the second corps amounted to forty-seven -thousand, but general Bonnet’s division remained always at -St. Ander, in observation of the eastern Asturian frontier; -eight thousand were detached for the service of the general -communications, and the remainder had, since the 9th of November, -been fighting and marching incessantly among barren and snowy -mountains; hence, stragglers were numerous, and twelve thousand men -were in hospital. The force, actually under arms, did not exceed -twenty-five thousand men, worn down with fatigue, barefooted, and -without ammunition. They had outstripped their commissariat, the -military chest was not come up, the draft animals were reduced in -number, and extenuated by fatigue, the gun-carriages were shaken -by continual usage, and the artillery parc was still in the rear; -and as the sixth corps had not yet passed Lugo, two divisions of -the second were required to hold Coruña and Ferrol. Literally to -obey the emperor’s orders was consequently impossible, and Soult -fixing his head-quarters at St. Jago di Compostella, proceeded to -re-organize his army. - -Ammunition was fabricated from the loose powder found in Coruña; -shoes were obtained partly by requisition, partly from the Spanish -magazines, filled as they were with stores supplied by England. -The artillery was soon refitted, and, the greatest part of the -stragglers being rallied, in six days, the marshal thought himself -in a condition to obey his orders, and, although his troops were -still suffering from fatigue and privation, he marched, on the -1st of February, with nineteen thousand infantry, four thousand -cavalry, and fifty-eight pieces of artillery. But, before I narrate -his operations, it is necessary to give some account of the state -of Gallicia at this period, and to trace the movements of the -marquis de Romana. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.] - -When the Spanish army, on the 2d of January, crossed the -line of sir John Moore’s march, it was already in a state of -disorganization. Romana, with the cavalry, plunged at once into the -deep valleys of the Syl and the Minho; but the artillery and a part -of his infantry were overtaken and cut up by Franceschi’s cavalry. -The remainder wandered in bands from one place to another, or -dispersed to seek food and shelter among the villages in the -mountains. General Mendizabel, with a small body, halted in the -Val des Orres, and, placing guards at the Puente de Bibey, a point -of singular strength for defence, proposed to cover the approaches -to Orense on that side; but Romana himself, after wandering for a -time, collected two or three thousand men, and took post, on the -15th, at Toabado, a village about twenty miles from Lugo. - -Marshal Ney, while following the route of the 2d corps to Lugo -with the main body of his troops, detached some cavalry from Villa -Franca to scour the valleys on his left, and ordered a division of -infantry to march by the road of Orense and St. Jago to Coruña. -General Marchand, who commanded it, overthrew and dispersed -Mendizabel’s troops on the 17th, and, having halted some days -at Orense, to patrole the neighbourhood for information and to -establish an hospital, continued his march to St. Jago. - -The defeat of Mendizabel and the subsequent movements of Marchand’s -division completed the dispersion of Romana’s army; the greatest -part throwing away their arms, returned to their homes, and he -himself, with his cavalry, and the few infantry that would follow -him, crossed the Minho, passed the mountains, and, descending into -the valley of the Tamega, took refuge, on the 21st, at Oimbra, a -place on the frontier of Portugal, and close to Monterey, where -there was a small magazine, collected for the use of sir John -Moore’s army. - -In this obscure situation, unheeded by the French, he entered -into communication with the Portuguese general, Sylveira, and, -with sir John Cradock, demanding money and arms from the latter, -and endeavouring to re-assemble a respectable body of troops. But -Blake and other officers deserted him, and these events and the -general want of patriotic spirit drew from Romana the following -observation:--“I know not wherein the patriotism, so loudly -vaunted, consists; any reverse, any mishap prostrates the minds of -these people, and, thinking only of saving their own persons, they -sacrifice their country and compromise their commander.” - -The people of Gallicia, poor, scattered, living hardly, and, like -all mountaineers, very tenacious of the little property they -possess, disregarded political events which did not immediately and -visibly affect their interests, and were, with the exception of -those of the sea-port towns, but slightly moved by the aggression -of the French, as long as that aggression did not extend to their -valleys; hence, at first, they treated the English and French -armies alike. - -Sir David Baird’s division, in its advance, paid for the necessary -supplies, and it was regarded with jealousy and defrauded. Soult’s -and Moore’s armies, passing like a whirlwind, were beheld with -terror, and the people fled from both. The British and German -troops that marched to Vigo were commanded without judgement, -and licentious, and their stragglers were often murdered; their -numbers were small, and the people showed their natural hatred of -strangers without disguise. On several occasions the parties, sent -to collect cars for the conveyance of the sick, had to sustain a -skirmish before the object could be obtained, and five officers, -misled by a treacherous guide, were scarcely saved from death by -the interference of an old man, whose exertions, however, were not -successful until one of the officers had been severely wounded in -the head. On the other hand, general Marchand discovered so little -symptoms of hostility, during his march to Orense, that he left his -hospital at that town without a guard, and under the joint care -of Spanish and French surgeons, and the duties of humanity were -faithfully discharged by the former without hindrance from the -people. - -[Sidenote: Romana’s Manifesto.] - -But this quiescence did not last long: the French generals were -obliged to subsist their troops by requisitions extremely onerous -to a people whose property chiefly consisted of cattle. The many -abuses and excesses which always attend this mode of supplying -an army soon created a spirit of hatred that Romana laboured -incessantly to increase, and he was successful; for, although a bad -general, he possessed intelligence and dexterity suited to the task -of exciting a population. Moreover, the monks and friars laboured -to the same purpose; and, while Romana denounced death to those who -refused to take arms, the clergy menaced eternal perdition; and all -this was necessary, for the authority of the supreme junta was only -acknowledged as a matter of necessity--not of liking. - -Gallicia, although apparently calm, was, therefore, ripe for a -general insurrection, at the moment when the duke of Dalmatia -commenced his march from St. Jago di Compostella. - -From that town several roads lead to the Minho, the principal one -running by the coast line and crossing the Ulla, the Umia, the -Vedra, and the Octaven, passes by Pontevedra and Redondela to Tuy, -a dilapidated fortress, situated on the Spanish side of the Minho. -The second, crossing the same rivers nearer to their sources, -passes by the Monte de Tenteyros, and, entering the valley of the -Avia, follows the course of that river to Ribidavia, a considerable -town, situated at the confluence of the Avia with the Minho, and -having a stone bridge over the former, and a barque ferry on the -latter river. The third, turning the sources of the Avia, connects -St. Jago with Orense, and from Orense another road passes along -the right bank of the Minho, and connects the towns of Ribidavia, -Salvatierra, and Tuy, ending at Guardia, a small fortress at the -mouth of the Minho. - -As the shortest route to Oporto, and the only one convenient for -the artillery, was that leading by Redondela and Tuy, and from -thence by the coast, the duke of Dalmatia formed the plan of -passing the Minho between Salvatierra and Guardia. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MSS.] - -On the 1st of February Franceschi, followed by the other divisions -in succession, took the Pontevedra road. At Redondela he -encountered and defeated a small body of insurgents, and captured -four pieces of cannon; after which Vigo surrendered to one of his -detachments, while he himself marched upon Tuy, and took possession -of that town and Guardia. During these operations La Houssaye’s -dragoons, quitting Mellid, had crossed the Monte de Tenteyro, -passed through Ribidavia, and taken possession of Salvatierra, -on the Minho; and general Soult, the marshal’s brother, who had -assembled three thousand stragglers and convalescents, between -Astorga and Carrion, received orders to enter Portugal by Puebla de -Senabria, and thus join the main body. - -The rainy season was now in full torrent, and every stream and -river was overflowing its banks. The roads were deep, and the -difficulty of procuring provisions was great. These things, and the -delivering over to marshal Ney the administration of Ferrol and -Coruña, where the Spanish government and Spanish garrisons were -not only retained but paid by the French, delayed the rear of the -army so long that it was not until the 15th or 16th that the whole -of the divisions were assembled on the Minho, between Salvatierra, -Guardia, and Redondela. - -The Minho, from Melgaço to the mouth, forms the frontier of -Portugal, the banks on both sides being guarded by a number of -fortresses, originally of considerable strength, but at this -time all in a dilapidated condition. The Spanish fort of Guardia -fronted the Portuguese fort of Caminha; Tuy was opposed by Valença; -and this last was garrisoned, and the works in somewhat a better -condition than the rest; Lapella, Moncao, and Melgaço, completed -the Portuguese line. But the best defence at this moment was the -Minho itself, which, at all times a considerable river, was now a -broad and raging flood, and the Portuguese _ordenanzas_ and militia -were in arms on the other side, and had removed all the boats. - -Soult, after examining the banks with care, decided upon passing -at Campo Saucos, a little village where the ground was flatter, -more favourable, and so close to Caminha, that the army, once -across, could easily seize that place, and, the same day reach -Viana, on the Lima, from whence to Oporto was only three marches. -To attract the attention of the Portuguese; La Houssaye, who was at -Salvatierra, spread his dragoons along the Minho, and attempted to -push small parties across that river, above Melgaço, but the bulk -of the army was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Campo Saucos, -and a detachment seized the small sea-port of Bayona, in the rear. - -A division of infantry, and three hundred French marines released -at Coruña, and attached to the second corps, were then employed to -transport some large fishing boats and some heavy guns from the -harbour and fort of Guardia overland to Campo Saucos. This was -effected by the help of rollers over more than two miles of rugged -and hilly ground. It was a work of infinite labour, and, from the -11th to the 15th, the troops toiled unceasingly; the craft was, -however, at last, launched in a small lake at the confluence of the -Tamuga river with the Minho. - -The heavy guns being mounted in battery on the night of the 15th, -three hundred soldiers were embarked, and the boats, manned by -the marines, dropped silently down the Tamuga into the Minho, and -endeavoured to reach the Portuguese side of the latter river during -the darkness; but, whether from the violence of the flood, or want -of skill in the men, the landing was not effected at day-break, -and the _ordenanza_ fell with great fury upon the first who got on -shore: and now, the foremost being all slain, the others pulled -back, and regained their own side with great difficulty. This -action was infinitely creditable to the Portuguese, and it had a -surprising influence on the issue of the campaign. - -It was a gallant action, because it might reasonably have been -expected that a tumultuous assemblage of half-armed peasants, -collected on the instant, would have been dismayed at the sight of -many boats filled with soldiers some pulling across, others landing -under the protection of a heavy battery that thundered from the -midst of a multitude of troops, clustering on the heights, and -thronging to the edge of the opposite bank in eager expectation. - -It was an event of leading importance, inasmuch as it baffled an -attempt that, being successful, would have ensured the fall of -Oporto by the 21st of February, which was precisely the period when -general Mackenzie’s division being at Cadiz, sir John Cradock’s -troops were reduced to almost nothing; when the English ministers -only waited for an excuse to abandon Portugal; when the people -of that country were in the very extremity of disorder; when the -Portuguese army was a nullity; and when the regency was evidently -preparing to receive the French with submission. It was the period, -also, when Soult was expected to be at Lisbon, following the -Emperor’s orders, and, consequently, Lapisse and Victor could not -have avoided to fulfil their part of the plan for the subjugation -of Portugal. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 4.] - -The duke of Dalmatia’s situation was now, although not one of -imminent danger, extremely embarrassing, and more than ordinary -quickness and vigour were required to conduct the operations with -success. Posted in a narrow, contracted position, he was hemmed -in on the left by the Spanish insurgents, who had assembled -immediately after La Houssaye passed Orense, and who, being -possessed of a very rugged and difficult country, were, moreover, -supported by the army of Romana, which was said to be at Orense and -Ribidavia. - -In the French general’s front was the Minho, broad, raging, and at -the moment impassable, while heavy rains forbad the hope that its -waters would decrease. To collect sufficient means for forcing a -passage would have required sixteen days, and, long before that -period, the subsistence for the army would have entirely failed, -and the Portuguese, being alarmed, would have greatly augmented -their forces on the opposite bank. There remained then only to -retrace his steps to St. Jago, or break through the Spanish -insurgents, and, ascending the Minho, to open a way into Portugal -by some other route. - -The attempt to pass the river had been baffled on the 15th of -February; on the 16th the army was in full march towards Ribidavia, -upon a new line of operations, and this promptitude of decision -was supported by an equally prompt execution. La Houssaye, with -his dragoons, quitted Salvatierra, and, keeping the edge of the -Minho, was galled by the fire of the Portuguese from the opposite -bank; but, before evening, he twice broke the insurgent bands, and, -in revenge for some previous excesses of the peasantry, burnt the -villages of Morentan and Cobreira. Meanwhile the main body of the -army, passing the Tea river, at Salvatierra and Puente d’Arcos, -marched, by successive divisions, along the main road from Tuy to -Ribidavia. - -Between Franquera and Canizar the route was cut by the streams of -the Morenta and Noguera rivers; and, behind those torrents, eight -hundred Gallicians, having barricadoed the bridges and repulsed the -advanced parties of cavalry, stood upon their defence. The 17th, -at daybreak, the leading brigade of Heudelet’s division forced the -passage, and pursued the Spaniards briskly; but, when within a -short distance of Ribidavia, the latter rallied upon eight or ten -thousand insurgents, arrayed in order of battle, on a strong hill, -covering the approaches to that town. - -At this sight the advanced guard halted until the remainder of the -division and a brigade of cavalry were come up, and then, under the -personal direction of Soult, the French assailed, and drove the -Gallicians, fighting, through the town and across the Avia. The -loss of the vanquished was very considerable, and the bodies of -twenty priests were found amongst the slain; but, either from fear -or patriotism, every inhabitant had quitted Ribidavia. - -The 18th one brigade of infantry scoured the valley of the Avia, -and dispersed three or four thousand of the insurgents, who were -disposed to make a second stand on that side. A second brigade, -pushing on to Barbantes, seized a ferry-boat on the Minho, close -to that place; they were joined, the same evening, by the infantry -who had scoured the valley of the Avia the day before, and by -Franceschi’s cavalry, and, on the 19th, they entered Orense in time -to prevent the bridge over the Minho from being cut. La Houssaye’s -dragoons then took post at Maside, and the same day the remainder -of the horse and Laborde’s infantry were united at Ribidavia; -but the artillery were still between Tuy and Salvatierra, under -the protection of Merle’s and Mermet’s divisions. Thus, in three -days, the duke of Dalmatia had, with an admirable celerity and -vigour, extricated his army from a contracted unfavourable country, -strangled a formidable insurrection in its birth, and at the same -time opened a fresh line of communication with St. Jago, and an -easy passage into Portugal. - -The 20th a regiment being sent across the Minho, by the ferries -of Barbantes and Ribidavia, defeated the insurgents of the -left bank, advanced to the Arroyo river, and took post on the -heights of Merea. The army, with the exception of the division -guarding the guns, was the same day concentrated at Orense. But -the utmost efforts of the artillery-officers had been baffled -by the difficulties of the road between Tuy and Ribidavia; and -this circumstance, together with the precarious state of the -communications, the daily increasing sick-list, and the number of -petty detachments necessary to protect the rear of the army, seemed -to render the immediate invasion of Portugal hopeless. - -To men of an ordinary stamp it would have been so; but the duke of -Dalmatia, with a ready boldness, resolved to throw the greatest -part of his artillery and the whole of his other incumbrances into -Tuy, as a place of arms, and then relinquishing all communication -with Gallicia, for the moment, to march in one mass directly -upon Oporto; from whence, if successful, he proposed to re-open -his communication with Tuy, by the line of the coast, and then, -recovering his artillery and parcs, to re-establish a regular -system of operations. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -In pursuance of this resolution, sixteen of the lightest guns and -six howitzers, together with a proportion of ammunition-waggons, -were, with infinite labour and difficulty, transported to -Ribidavia, but the remaining thirty-six pieces and a vast parc -of carriages, carrying ammunition and hospital and commissariat -stores, were put into Tuy. General La Martiniere was left there -with an establishment of artillery and engineer officers, a -garrison of five hundred men fit to carry arms, and nine hundred -sick. All the stragglers, convalescents, and detachments, coming -from St. Jago, and the military chest, which was still in the -rear, guarded by six hundred infantry, were directed upon Tuy, and -the gates being then shut, La Martiniere was abandoned to his own -resources. - -The men in hospital at Ribidavia were now forwarded to Orense, and -the marshal’s quarters were established at the latter town on the -24th; but many obstacles were yet to be vanquished before the army -could commence the march into Portugal. The gun-carriages had been -so shaken in the transit from Tuy to Ribidavia that three days -were required to repair them. It was extremely difficult to obtain -provisions, and numerous bands of the peasants were still in arms; -nor were they quelled until combats had taken place at Gurzo, on -the Monte Blanco, in the Val d’Ornes, and up the valley of Avia, -by which the French wasted time, lost men, and expended ammunition -that could not be replaced. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.] - -Marshal Soult endeavoured to soften the people’s feelings by -kindness and soothing proclamations; and as he enforced a strict -discipline among his troops, his humane and politic demeanour -joined to the activity of his moveable columns, soon abated the -fierceness of the peasantry. The inhabitants of Ribidavia returned -to their houses; those of Orense had never been very violent, -and now became even friendly, and lent assistance to procure -provisions. It was not, however, an easy task to restrain the -soldiers within the bounds of humanity: the frequent combats, the -assassination and torturing of isolated men, and the privations -endured, had so exasperated the French troops, that the utmost -exertions of their general’s authority could not always control -their revenge. - -While the duke of Dalmatia was thus preparing for a formidable -inroad, his adversaries were a prey to the most horrible anarchy. -The bishop, always intent to increase his own power, had assembled -little short of fifty thousand armed persons in Oporto; and he -had also commenced a gigantic line of entrenchments on the hills -to the northward of that city. This worse than useless labour -so completely occupied all persons, that the defence of the -strong country lying between the Duero and the Minho was totally -neglected; and when the second corps appeared on the bank of the -latter river, the northern provinces were struck with terror. Then -it was that the people, for the first time, understood the extent -of their danger; and that the bishop, aroused from his intrigues, -became sensible that the French were more terrible enemies than the -regency. Once impressed with this truth, he became clamorous for -succour. He recalled sir Robert Wilson from the Agueda; he hurried -on the labours of the entrenchments; and he earnestly pressed sir -John Cradock for assistance, demanding arms, ammunition, and a -reinforcement of British soldiers. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.] - -Sir Robert Wilson, as I have already related, disregarded his -orders; and the British general refused to furnish him with troops, -but supplied him with arms, very ample stores of powder, and sent -artillery and engineer officers to superintend the construction -of the defensive works, and to aid in the arrangements for a -reasonable system of operations. The people were, however, become -too headstrong and licentious to be controlled, or even advised, -and the soldiers being drawn into the vortex of insubordination, -universal and hopeless confusion prevailed. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 1.] - -Don Bernadim Freire was the legal commander-in-chief of the -Entre Minho e Douro, but all the generals claimed an equal and -independent authority each over his own force; and this was, -perhaps, a matter of self-preservation, for general and traitor -were, at that period, almost synonymous; and to obey the orders -of a superior against the momentary wishes of the multitude was -to incur instant death: nor were there wanting men who found it -profitable to inflame the passions of the mob, and to direct -their blind vengeance against innocent persons; for the prelate’s -faction, although the most powerful, was not without opponents even -in Oporto. - -Such was the unhappy state of affairs when the undisciplined -gallantry of the peasants, baffling the efforts of the French -to cross the Minho at Campo Saucos, obliged Soult to march by -Orense. A part of the regular troops were immediately sent forward -to the Cavado river, where they were joined by the _ordenanzas_ -and the militia of the district, but all in a state of fearful -insubordination; and there were not any arrangements made for the -regular distribution of provisions, or of any one necessary supply. - -Among the troops despatched from Oporto was the second battalion -of the Lusitanian legion, nine hundred strong, well armed and well -equipped; they were commanded by baron Eben, a native of Prussia, -who, without any known services to recommend him, had suddenly -attained the rank of major in the British service. This man, -destined to act a conspicuous part in Portuguese tragedy, had been -left by sir Robert Wilson in Oporto, when that officer marched to -Almeida. Eben’s orders were to follow with the second battalion -of the legion, when the men’s clothing and equipment should be -completed; but he, retaining the troops, remained, to push his own -fortune under the prelate’s auspices. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.] - -General Freire having reached the Cavado, with a small body of -regular troops, was immediately joined by fourteen or fifteen -thousand militia and _ordenanzas_. Fixing his head-quarters at -Braga, he sent detachments to occupy the posts of Salamonde and -Ruivaens in his front; and, unfortunately for himself, endeavoured -to restrain his troops from wasting their ammunition by wanton -firing in the streets and on the roads. This exertion of command -was heinously resented; for Freire, being willing to uphold the -authority of the regency, had been for some time obnoxious to the -bishop’s faction, and already he was pointed to as a suspected -person; and the multitude were inimically disposed towards him. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 3.] - -Meanwhile, general Sylveira, assuming the command of the Tras -os Montes, advanced to Chaves, and put himself in communication -with the marquis of Romana, who, having remained tranquil at -Oimbra and Monterey since the 21st of January, had been joined by -his dispersed troops, and was again at the head of nine or ten -thousand men. Sylveira’s force consisted of about two thousand -regulars and as many militia, and his army was accompanied by many -of the _ordenanzas_; but here, as elsewhere, the Portuguese were -licentious, insubordinate, and disdainful of their general; and -the national enmity between them and the Spaniards overcoming the -sense of a common cause and common danger, the latter were evilly -entreated, both officers and men; and a deadly feud subsisted -between the two armies. - -The generals, however, agreed to act in concert, offensively and -defensively; but neither of them were the least acquainted with the -numbers, intention, or even the position of their antagonists: and -it is a proof of Romana’s unfitness for command that he, having the -whole population at his disposal, was yet ignorant of every thing -relating to his enemy that it behoved him to know. The whole of -the French force in Gallicia, at this period, was about forty-five -thousand men, Romana estimated it at twenty-one thousand. The -number under Soult was above twenty-four thousand, Romana supposed -it to be twelve thousand; and among these he included general -Marchand’s division of the sixth corps, which he always imagined to -be a part of the duke of Dalmatia’s army. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 3.] - -[Sidenote: Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The Spanish general was so elated at the spirit of the peasants -about Ribidavia, that he anticipated nothing but victory. He knew -that on the Arosa, an estuary, running up towards St. Jago de -Compostella, the inhabitants of Villa Garcia had also risen, and, -being joined by all the neighbouring districts, were preparing -to attack Vigo and Tuy; and partly from his Spanish temperament, -partly from his extreme ignorance of war, he was convinced that -the French only thought of making their escape out of Gallicia, -and that even in that they would be disappointed. But to effect -their destruction more certainly, he also, as we have seen, -pestered sir John Cradock for succours in money and ammunition, and -desired that, the insurgents on the Arosa might be assisted with -a thousand British soldiers. Cradock anxious to support the cause, -although he refused the troops, sent ammunition, and five thousand -pounds in money; but, before it arrived, Romana was beaten and in -flight. - -The combined Spanish and Portuguese forces, amounting to sixteen -thousand regulars and militia, besides _ordenanzas_, were posted -in a straggling unconnected manner along the valley of the Tamega, -and extended from Monterey, Verim, and Villaza, to near Chaves, a -distance of more than fifteen miles. This was the first line of -defence for Portugal. - -Freire and Eben, with fourteen guns and twenty-five thousand -men, were at Braga, in second line, their outposts being on the -Cavado, and at the strong passes of Ruivaens and Venda Nova: but of -these twenty-five thousand men, only six thousand were armed with -muskets; and it is to be observed that the militia and troops of -the line differed from the armed peasantry only in name, save that -their faulty discipline and mutinous disposition rendered them less -active and intelligent as skirmishers, without making them fitter -for battle. - -The bishop, with his disorderly and furious rabble, formed the -third line, occupying the entrenchments that covered Oporto. - -Such was the state of affairs, and such were the dispositions made -to resist the duke of Dalmatia; but his army, although galled and -wearied by continual toil, and when halting, disturbed and vexed by -the multitude of insurrections, was, when in motion, of a power to -overthrow and disperse these numerous bands, even as a great ship -feeling the wind, breaks through and scatters the gun-boats that -have gathered round her in the calm. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -SECOND INVASION OF PORTUGAL. - - -The Entre Minho e Douro and the Tras os Montes lying together, form -the northern part of Portugal, the extreme breadth of either, when -measured from the frontier to the Douro, does not exceed seventy -miles. - -The river Tamega, running north and south, and discharging itself -into the Douro, forms the boundary line between them; but there is, -to the west of this river, a succession of rugged mountain ridges, -which, under the names of Sierra de Gerez, Sierra de Cabrera, and -Sierra de Santa Catalina, form a second barrier, nearly parallel -to the Tamega; and across some part of these ridges any invader, -coming from the eastward, must pass to arrive at Oporto. - -Other Sierras, running also in a parallel direction with the -Tamega, cut the Tras os Montes in such a manner, that all the -considerable rivers flowing north and south tumble into the Douro. -But as the western ramifications of the Sierras de Gerez and -Cabrera shoot down towards the sea, the rivers of the Entre Douro -e Minho discharge their waters into the ocean, and consequently -flow at right angles to those of Tras os Montes. Hence it follows, -that an enemy penetrating to Oporto, from the north, would have to -pass the Lima, the Cavado, and the Ave, to reach Oporto; and, if -coming from the east, he invaded the Tras os Montes, all the rivers -and intervening ridges of that province must be crossed before the -Entre Minho e Douro could be reached. - -The duke of Dalmatia was, however, now in such a position, near -the sources of the Lima and the Tamega rivers, that he could -choose whether to penetrate by the valley of the first into the -Entre Minho e Douro, or by the valley of the second into the Tras -os Montes: and there was also a third road, leading between those -rivers through Montalegre upon Braga; but this latter route, -passing over the Sierra de Gerez, was impracticable for artillery. - -The French general had, therefore, to consider-- - -1º. If, following the course of the Lima, he should attack and -disperse the insurgents between that river and the Minho, and then -recovering his artillery from Tuy, proceed against Oporto by the -main road leading along the sea coast. - -2º. If he should descend the Tamega, take Chaves, and then decide -whether to continue his route to Villa Real, near the Douro, and so -take the defences of Tras os Montes in reverse, or, turning to his -right, and crossing the Sierra de Cabrera by the pass of Ruivaens, -enter Braga, and thus operate against Oporto. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MSS.] - -The first project was irregular and hazardous, inasmuch as Romana -and Sylveira’s troops might have fallen upon the flank and rear of -the French during their march through a difficult country; but as -the position of those generals covered the road to Chaves, to beat -them was indispensable, as a preliminary measure to either plan; -and this was immediately executed. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Papers, MSS.] - -The 4th of March the French movement commenced. The 5th, the van -being at Villa Real and Penaverde, Soult sent a flag of truce to -Romana, with a letter, in which, exposing fully the danger of the -latter’s situation, he advised him to submit: but no answer was -returned; nor would the bearer have been suffered to pass the -outposts, but that Romana himself was in the rear, for he dreaded -that such an occurrence would breed a jealousy of his conduct, and, -perhaps, cause his patriotism to be undervalued. - -This failing, three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry -marched the next morning against Monterey; while La Houssaye’s -dragoons, taking the road of Laza, covered the left flank, and -pushed parties as far La Gudina, on the route to Puebla de -Senabria. The fourth division of infantry remained at Villa del -Rey, to cover the passage of the sick and wounded men from Orense; -for the duke of Dalmatia, having no base of operations, transported -his hospitals, and other incumbrances, from place to place as the -army moved, acting in this respect after the manner of the Roman -generals, when invading a barbarous country. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MSS.] - -As the French advanced, the Spaniards abandoned their positions in -succession, spiked the guns in the dilapidated works of Monterey, -and after a slight skirmish at Verim, took the road to Puebla de -Senabria; but Franceschi followed close, and overtaking two or -three thousand as they were passing a rugged mountain, he assailed -their rear with a battalion of infantry, and at the same time -leading his horsemen round both flanks, headed the column, and -obliged it to halt. - -The Spaniards, trusting to the rough ground, drew up in one large -square and awaited the charge. Franceschi had four regiments of -cavalry; each regiment settled itself against the face of a square, -and then the whole, with loud cries, bore down swiftly upon their -opponents; the latter unsteady and dismayed, shrunk together from -the fierce assault, and were instantly trampled down in heaps. -Those who escaped the horses’ hoofs and the edge of the sword -became prisoners, but twelve hundred bodies were stretched lifeless -on the field of battle, and Franceschi continued his movements on -La Gudina. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 3.] - -Romana was at Semadems, several miles in the rear of Verim, when -his vanguard was attacked, and there was nothing to prevent him -from falling back to Chaves with his main body, according to a -plan before agreed upon between him and Sylveira, but either from -fear or indignation at the treatment his soldiers had received at -the hands of the Portuguese, he left Sylveira to his fate, and -made off with six or seven thousand men towards Bragança; from -thence passing by Puebla de Senabria, he regained the valley of the -Syl. Meanwhile, two thousand Portuguese infantry, with some guns, -issuing from the side of Villaza, cut the French line of march at -the moment when Franceschi and Heudelet having passed Monterey, -Laborde was approaching that place. In the slight combat that -ensued the Portuguese lost their guns and were driven, fighting, -down the valley of the Tamega as far as the village of Outeiro, -within their own frontier. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The defeat and flight of Romana had such an effect upon the -surrounding districts that the Spanish insurgents returned in -crowds to their habitations and delivered up their arms. Some of -the clergy, also, changing their opinions, exhorted the people to -peace, and the prisoners taken on the 6th, being dissatisfied with -Romana’s conduct, and moved by their hatred of the Portuguese, -entered the French service. These affairs occupied Soult until the -9th, during which period his outposts were pushed towards Chaves, -Montalegre, and La Gudina, but the main body remained at Verim to -cover the arrival of the sick, at Monterey. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 3.] - -Sylveira, thus beaten at Villaza, and deserted by Romana, fell back -on the 7th to a strong mountain position, one league behind Chaves, -from whence he could command a view of all the French movements -as far as Monterey. His ground was advantageous, but his military -talents were moderate, his men always insubordinate, were now -become mutinous, and many of the officers were disposed to join the -French. The general wished to abandon Chaves, the troops resolved -to defend it, and three thousand five hundred men actually did -throw themselves into that town, in defiance of Sylveira, who was -already, according to the custom of the day, pronounced a traitor -and declared worthy of that death which he would inevitably have -suffered, but that some of his troops still continued to respect -his orders. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The 10th, the convoy of French sick was close to Monterey, and -as Romana’s movement was known to be a real flight, and not -made with a design to create fresh insurrections in the rear, -the French troops were again put in motion towards Chaves; but -Merle’s division remained at Verim to protect the hospital, and -Franceschi’s took the road of La Gudina, as if he had been going -towards Salamanca. A report that he had actually entered that -town reached Lisbon, and was taken as an indication that Soult -would not pass the Portuguese frontier at Chaves, but Franceschi -quickly returned, by Osonio and Feces de Abaxo, and being assisted -by Heudelet’s division, invested Chaves on the left bank of the -Tamega, while Laborde, Mermet, La Houssaye, and Lorge, descending -the right bank, beat the Portuguese outposts, and getting -possession of a fort close under the walls of Chaves completed the -investment of that town. - -The place was immediately summoned to surrender, but no answer -was returned, and the garrison, like men bereft of their wits, -and fighting with the air, kept up a continual and heavy fire of -musketry and artillery until the 12th, when they surrendered on -receiving a second summons, more menacing than the first. The 13th -the French entered the town, and Sylveira retired to Villa Real. - -The works of Chaves were in a bad state, and few of the fifty -guns mounted on the ramparts were fit for service; but there was -a stone-bridge, and the town being in many respects more suitable -for a place of arms than Monterey, the sick were brought down -from the latter place, and an hospital was established for twelve -hundred men, the number now unfit to carry arms. The fighting men -were reduced to twenty-one thousand, and Soult, partly from the -difficulty of guarding his prisoners, partly from a desire to -abate the hostility of the Portuguese, permitted the militia and -_ordenanza_ to return to their homes, after taking an oath not -to resume their arms. To some of the poorest he gave money and -clothes, and he enrolled, at their own request, the few regular -troops taken in Chaves. - -[Sidenote: Noble’s Campaign de Galice.] - -[Sidenote: Journal of Operations MSS.] - -This wise and gentle proceeding was much blamed, by some of his -officers, especially by those who had served under Junot. They -desired that Chaves might be assaulted, and the garrison put to -the sword, for they were embued with a personal hatred of the -Portuguese, and being averse to serve in the present expedition -endeavoured, as it would appear, to thwart their general; but the -prudence of his conduct was immediately visible in the softened -feelings of the country people. The scouting parties being no -longer molested spread themselves, some on the side of Bragança and -Villa Real, others in the Entre Minho e Douro. The former reported -that there was no enemy in a condition to make head in the Tras os -Montes, but the latter fell in with the advanced guard of Freire’s -army at Ruivaens, on the road to Braga, and this determined the -further proceedings of the army. - -[Sidenote: Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The possession of Chaves enabled the duke of Dalmatia to operate -against Oporto, either by the Tras os Montes or the Entre Minho -e Douro. He decided on the latter; first, because the road, -though crossed by stronger positions, was more direct, and more -practicable for artillery, than that running through the valley -of the Tamega; secondly, because a numerous Portuguese army was -at Braga; and, thirdly, because he could the sooner remove his -communication with Tuy. - -The road from Chaves to Braga enters a deep and dangerous defile, -or rather a succession of defiles, that extend from Venda Nova to -Ruivaens, and re-commence after passing the Cavado river. Friere’s -advanced guards, composed of _ordenanza_, occupied those places; -and he had also a detachment under Eben on the road of Montalegre; -but he recalled the latter on the 14th. - -The 16th Franceschi forced the defile of Venda Nova, and the -remainder of the troops being formed in alternate masses of -cavalry and infantry, began to pass the Sierra de Cabrera. Lorge’s -dragoons, however, descending the Tamega, ordered rations for -the whole army along the road to Villa Real; and then, suddenly -retracing their steps, rejoined the main body. - -The 17th, Franceschi, being reinforced with some infantry, won the -bridge of Ruivaens, and entered Salamonde. The Portuguese, covered -by Eben’s detachment, which had arrived at St. Joa de Campo, then -fell back on the Pico de Pugalados, close to Braga; and the French -took post at Carvalho Este, two leagues in front of that city. - -Soult now expected to reach Braga without further opposition, and -caused his artillery, guarded by Laborde’s division, to enter -the pass of Venda Nova; but the _ordenanza_, reinforced by some -men from the side of Guimaraens, immediately re-assembled, and, -clustering on the mountains to the left of the column of march, -attacked it with great fierceness and subtlety. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The peasants of the northern provinces of Portugal, unlike the -squalid miserable population of Lisbon and Oporto, are robust, -handsome, and exceedingly brave. Their natural disposition is open -and obliging; and they are, when rightly handled as soldiers, -docile, intelligent, and hardy. They are, however, vehement in -their anger; and being now excited by the exhortations and personal -example of their priests, they came rushing down the sides of -the hills; and many of them, like men deprived of reason, broke -furiously into the French battalions, and were there killed. The -others, finding their efforts unavailing, fled, and were pursued a -league up the mountain by some battalions sent out against them, -but they were not yet abashed; for, making a circuit behind the -hills, they fell upon the rear of the line of march, killed fifty -of the stragglers, and plundered the baggage; and, thus galled, the -French slowly, and with much trouble, passing the long defiles of -Venda Nova, Ruivaens, and Salamonde, gathered by degrees in front -of Freire’s position. - -[Sidenote: Eben’s Report, MSS. Sir J. Cradock’s Paper.] - -That general was no more; and his troops, reeking from the -slaughter of their commander, were raging, like savage beasts, at -one moment congregating near the prisons to murder some wretch -within, at another rushing tumultuously to the outposts, with -a design to engage the enemy. The _ordenanzas_ of the distant -districts also came pouring into the camp, dragging with them -suspected persons, and adding to the general distraction. - -It appears that the unfortunate Friere, unable to establish order -in his army, had resolved to retreat; and, in pursuance of that -design, recalled Eben on the 14th, and gave directions to the -officers at the different outposts in front of Braga to retire at -the approach of the enemy. This, and his endeavour to prevent the -waste of ammunition, gave effect to a plan which had been long -prepared by the bishop’s faction for his destruction. In passing -through Braga, he was openly reviled in the streets by some of -the _ordenanzas_; and, as the latter plainly discovered their -murderous intention, he left the army; but he was seized on the -17th, at a village behind Braga, and brought back: what followed is -thus described by baron Eben, in his official report to sir John -Cradock:-- - -“I did not reach Braga until nine o’clock in the morning of the -17th. I found every thing in the greatest disorder; the houses -shut, the people flying in all directions, and part of the populace -armed with guns and pikes. Passing through the streets, I was -greeted with loud _vivas_. Though the people knew me, I could not -guess the meaning of this: at the market-place, I was detained by -the rapidly-increasing populace, who took the reins of my horse, -crying out loudly, that they were ready to do any thing to defend -the city; requesting me to assist them, and speaking in the lowest -terms of their general. I promised them to do all in my power to -aid their patriotic zeal; but said that I must first speak to him. -Upon this, they suffered me to proceed, accompanied by about a -hundred of them: but I had not got far on my way to his quarters, -when I saw him on foot, conducted by a great armed multitude, who -suffered no one to pass, and, on my attempting it, threatened to -fire. I was, therefore, obliged to turn my horse; and this the -people applauded. Two men had hold of the general’s arms, his sword -was taken from him, and the people abused him most vehemently. On -my way back to the market-place, they wanted to shoot me, taking -me for general Friere; but I was saved by a soldier of the legion, -who explained the mistake. When I reached the market-place, I -found about a thousand men drawn up: I communicated to them my -determination to assist them in their laudable endeavours to defend -themselves, provided they would first permit me to speak to the -general, for whose actions I promised to be answerable as long as -I should be with him. I had ordered a house to be got ready for my -reception, where the general arrived, accompanied as before; I -saluted him with respect, at which they plainly discovered their -disapprobation. I repeated my proposal, but they would not listen -to it. I perceived the danger of the general, and proposed to take -him to my quarters. My adjutant offered him his arm: when I spoke -to him, he only replied, ‘save me!’” - -“At the entrance of my house, I was surrounded by thousands, and -heard the loud cry of ‘kill! kill!’ I now took hold of him, and -attempted to force my way into the house, and a gentleman slightly -wounded him with the point of his sword, under my arm. He collected -all his strength, and rushed through them, and hid himself behind -the door of the house. The people surrounded me, and forced me from -the house. To draw the attention of the people from the general, I -ordered the drummers to beat the alarm, and formed the _ordenanzas_ -in ranks; but they kept a constant fire upon my house, where the -general still was. As a last attempt to save him, I now proposed -that he should be conducted to prison, in order to take a legal -trial; this was agreed to, and he was conducted there in safety. -I now hoped that I had succeeded, as the people demanded to be -led against the enemy, now rapidly advancing, in number about -two thousand. I again formed them, and advanced with them; but -soon after, I heard the firing again, and was informed that the -people had put the general to death with pikes and guns. I was now -proclaimed general.” - -[Sidenote: Eben’s Reports, MS.] - -When this murder was perpetrated, the people seemed satisfied, and -Eben announcing the approach of a British force from Oporto, sent -orders to the outposts to stand fast, as he intended to fight; -but another tumult arose, when it was discovered that an officer -of Freire’s staff, one Villaboas, was in Eben’s quarters. Several -thousand _ordenanzas_ instantly gathered about the house, and the -unhappy man was haled forth and stabbed to death at the door, the -mob all the time shouting and firing volleys in at the windows. -Yet, when their fury was somewhat abated, they obliged their new -general to come out and show that he had not been wounded, and -expressed great affection for him. - -In the course of the night the legion marched in from Pico de -Pugalados, and the following morning a reinforcement of six -thousand _ordenanzas_ came up in one mass. Fifty thousand dollars -also arrived in the camp from Oporto; for the Portuguese, like the -Spaniards, commonly reversed the order of military arrangements, -leaving their weapons in store, and bringing their encumbrances to -the field of battle. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -In the evening the corregidor and two officers of rank, together -with many persons of a meaner class, were brought to the town as -prisoners and put in jail, the armed mob being with difficulty -restrained from slaying them on the way thither; and in this -distracted manner they were proceeding when Franceschi arrived at -Carvalho on the 17th, and, surely, if that bold and enterprising -soldier could have obtained a glimpse of what was passing, or known -the real state of affairs, he would have broke into the midst -of them with his cavalry; for, of the twenty-five thousand men -composing the whole of the Portuguese force, eighteen thousand were -only armed with pikes, the remainder had wasted the greatest part -of their ammunition, and the powder in store was not made up in -cartridges. But Braga, situated in a deep hollow, was hidden from -him, and the rocky and wooded hills surrounding it were occupied by -what appeared a formidable multitude. Hence Franceschi, although -reinforced by a brigade of infantry, was satisfied by feints and -slight skirmishes to alarm his opponents, and to keep them in play -until the other divisions of the French army could arrive. - -While these events were passing at Braga, Sylveira had again -collected a considerable force of militia and _ordenanzas_ in the -Tras os Montes, and captain Arentchild, one of the officers sent by -sir John Cradock to aid the bishop, rallied a number of fugitives -at Guimaraens and Amarante. In Oporto, however, the multitude, -obeying no command, were more intent upon murder than upon defence. - -Eben’s posts extended from Falperra, on the route of Guimaraens -to the Ponte Porto, on the Cavado river; but the principal force -was stationed on a lofty ridge called the Monte Adaufé, which, at -the distance of six or seven miles from Braga, crossed the road to -Chaves. - -The left, or western, end, which overhangs the river Cavado, -covered the detachment guarding the Ponte Porto. - -The right rested on a wood and on the head of a deep ravine, and -beyond this wood the ridge, taking a curved and forward direction, -was called the Monte Vallonga, and a second mass of men was posted -there, but separated from those on the Monte Adaufé by an interval -of two miles, and by the ravine and wood before mentioned. - -A third body, being pushed still more in advance, crowned an -isolated hill, flanking the Chaves road, being prepared to take -the French in rear when the latter should attack the Monte Adaufé. - -Behind the Monte Vallonga, and separated from it by a valley three -miles wide, the ridge of Falperra was guarded by detachments sent -both from Guimaraens and from Braga. - -The road to Braga, leading directly over the centre of the Monte -Adaufé, was flanked on the left by a ridge shooting perpendicularly -out from that mountain, and ending in a lofty mass of rocks which -overhangs Carvalho Esté. The Portuguese neglected to occupy either -these rocks or the connecting ridge, and Franceschi seized the -former on the 17th. - -The 18th, Soult arrived in person, and, wishing to prevent a -battle, released twenty prisoners, and sent them in with a -proclamation couched in conciliatory language, and offering a -capitulation; but the trumpeter who accompanied them was detained, -and the prisoners were immediately slain. - -The 19th, Eben brought up all his reserves to the Adaufé, and -the Portuguese on the isolated hill in front of Monte Vallonga -took possession of Lanhoza, a village half way between that hill -and the rocky height occupied by Franceschi on the 17th. But two -divisions of French infantry being now up, Soult caused one of them -and the cavalry to attack Lanhoza, from whence the Portuguese were -immediately driven, and, being followed closely, lost their own -hill also. The other French division took post, part in Carvalho, -part on the rocky headland, and six guns were carried to the latter -during the night. In this position the French columns were close to -the centre of the Portuguese, and could, by a slight movement in -advance, separate Eben’s wings. The rest of the army was at hand, -and a general attack was arranged for the next morning. - - -BATTLE OF BRAGA. - -The 20th, at nine o’clock, the French were in motion: Franceschi -and Mermet, leaving a detachment on the hill they had carried the -night before, endeavoured to turn the right of the people on the -Monte Vallonga. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -Laborde, supported by La Houssaye’s dragoons, advanced against the -centre by the ridge connecting Carvalho with the Monte Adaufé. - -Heudelet, with a part of his division and a squadron of cavalry, -attacked the left, and made for the Ponte Porto. - -[Sidenote: Eben’s Report, MS.] - -The Portuguese immediately opened a straggling fire of musketry and -artillery in the centre; but, after a few rounds, the bursting of a -gun created some confusion, from which Laborde’s rapidly-advancing -masses gave them no time to recover; and by ten o’clock the whole -of the centre was flying in disorder down a narrow wooded valley -leading from the Adaufé to Braga. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -The French followed hard, and in the pursuit, discovering one of -their _voltigeurs_, who had been a prisoner, still alive, but -mutilated in the most horrible manner, they gave little or no -quarter. Braga was abandoned, and the victorious infantry passing -through, took post on the other side; but the cavalry continued the -havoc for some distance 011 the road to Oporto; yet, so savage was -the temper of the fugitives that, in passing through Braga, they -stopped to murder the corregidor and other prisoners in the jail, -then, casting the mangled bodies into the street, continued the -flight. Meanwhile, Heudelet, breaking over the left of the Monte -Adaufé descended upon Ponte Porto, and, after a sharp skirmish, -carried that bridge and the village on the other side of the Cavado. - -Franceschi and Mermet found considerable difficulty in ascending -the rugged sides of the Monte Vallonga, but having, at last, -attained the crest, the whole of their enemies fled. The two -generals then crossed the valley to gain the road of Guimaraens, -and cut off that line of retreat, but fell in with the three -thousand Portuguese posted above Falperra. These men, seeing the -cavalry approach, drew up with their backs to some high rocks, and -opened a fire of artillery. But Franceschi, placing his horsemen on -either flank, and a brigade of infantry against the front, as at -Verim, made all charge together, and strewed the ground with the -dead. Nevertheless, the Portuguese fought valiantly at this point, -and Franceschi acknowledged it. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s papers, MSS.] - -The vanquished lost all their artillery and above four thousand -men, of which four hundred only were made prisoners. Some of the -fugitives crossing the Cavado river, made for the Ponte de Lima, -others retired to Oporto, but the greatest number took the road of -Guimaraens, during the fight at Falperra. Eben appears, by his own -official report, to have been at Braga when the action commenced, -and to have fled among the first; for he makes no mention of the -fight at Falperra, nor of the skirmish at Ponte Porto, and his -narrative bears every mark of inaccuracy. - -When the French outposts were established in front of Braga, -general Lorge crossed the Cavado and entered Bacellos; and the -corregidor received him well, for which he was a few days after -put to death by the Portuguese general, Bonteilho, who commanded -between the Lima and the Minho. - -Braga itself had been at first abandoned by the inhabitants, but -they were induced to return the next day; and some provisions and a -large store of powder being found in the magazines, the latter was -immediately made up into cartridges, for the use of the troops. The -gun-carriages and ammunition-waggons were again repaired, and an -hospital was established for eight hundred sick and wounded: from -whence it may be judged that the loss sustained in action, since -the 15th, was not less than six hundred men. - -The French general, having thus broken through the second -Portuguese line of defence, was in a situation either to march -directly against Oporto, or to recover his communication with the -depôt at Tuy. He knew, through the medium of his spies and by -intercepted letters, that general La Martiniere, although besieged, -was in no distress; that he made successful sorties; and that his -artillery commanded that in the fortress of Valença. On the other -hand, information was received that sixty thousand troops of the -line, militia, and _ordenanza_, were assembled at the entrenched -camp covering Oporto, and the scouts reported that the Portuguese -were also in force at Guimaraens, and had cut the bridges along the -whole course of the Ave. - -Meanwhile, Sylveira struck a great blow; for, being reinforced from -the side of Beira, he remounted the Tamega, invested the French -in Chaves on the 20th, and, in eight days, obliged the garrison, -consisting of a hundred fighting men, and twelve hundred sick, -to capitulate; after which he took post at Amarante. But Soult, -ignorant of this event, left Heudelet’s division at Braga, to -protect the hospitals from Bonteilho, and then continued his own -movement against Oporto in three columns. - -The first, composed of Franceschi’s and Mermet’s divisions, marched -by the road of Guimaraens and San Justo, with orders to force the -passage of the Upper Ave, and scour the country towards Pombeiro. - -The second, which consisted of Merle’s, Laborde’s and La Houssaye’s -divisions, was commanded by Soult, in person, and moved upon Barca -de Trofa, while general Lorge, quitting Bacellos, made way by the -Ponte d’Ave. - -The passage of the Ave was fiercely disputed. The left column was -fought with in front of Guimaraens, and at Pombeiro, and again at -Puente Negrellos. The last combat was rough, and the French general -Jardon was killed. - -The march of the centre column was arrested at Barca de Trofa, by -the cutting of the bridge, and the marshal, observing the numbers -of the enemy, ascended the right bank, and forced the passage at -San Justo: but not without the help of Franceschi, who came down -the opposite side of the river, after the fight at Ponte Negrellos. - -When the left and centre had thus crossed, colonel Lallemand was -detached with a regiment of dragoons to assist Lorge, who was still -held in check at the Ponte d’Ave; Lallemand was at first beaten -back, but, being reinforced with some infantry, finally succeeded; -and the Portuguese, enraged at their defeat, brutally murdered -their commander, general Vallonga, and then dispersed. - -The whole French army was now in communication on the left bank of -the Ave; the way to Oporto was opened, and, on the 27th, the troops -were finally concentrated in front of the entrenchments covering -that city. - -The action of Monterey, the taking of Chaves, and the defeat at -Braga, had so damped the bishop’s ardour that he was, at one -time, inclined to abandon the defence of Oporto; but this idea -was relinquished when he considered the multitudes he had drawn -together, and that the English army was stronger than it had been -at any previous period since Cradock’s arrival; Beresford, also, -was at the head of a considerable native force behind the Mondego; -and, with the hope of their support, the bishop resolved to stand -the brunt. - -He had collected, in the entrenched camp, little short of forty -thousand men; and among them were many regular troops, of which two -thousand had lately arrived under the command of general Vittoria. -This general was sent by Beresford to aid Sylveira: but when Chaves -surrendered, he entered Oporto. - -The hopes of the people, also, were high, for they could not -believe that the French were a match for them; the preceding -defeats were attributed each to its particular case of treason, and -the murder of some innocent persons had followed as an expiation. -No man but the bishop durst thwart the slightest caprice of the -mob; and he was little disposed to do so, while Raymundo, and -others of his stamp, fomented their fury, and directed it to -gratify personal enmities. Thus, the defeat of Braga being known in -Oporto, caused a tumult on the 22d; and Louis D’Olivera, a man of -high rank, who had been cast into prison, was, with fourteen other -persons, haled forth, and despatched with many stabs; the bodies -were then mutilated, and dragged in triumph through the streets. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 5.] - -The entrenchments extending, as I have said, from the Douro to -the coast, were complete, and armed with two hundred guns. They -consisted of a number of forts of different sizes, placed on the -top of a succession of rounded hills; and where the hills failed, -the defences were continued by earthen ramparts, loop-holed houses, -ditches, and felled trees. Oporto itself is built in a hollow; a -bridge of boats, nearly three hundred yards in length, formed the -only communication between the city and the suburb of Villa Nova; -and this bridge was completely commanded by batteries, mounting -fifty guns, planted on the bluff and craggy heights that overhang -the river above Villa Nova, and overlooked, not only the city, but -a great part of the entrenched camp beyond it. Within the lines, -tents were pitched for even greater numbers than were assembled; -and the people ran to arms, and quickly manned their works with -great noise and tumult, when the French columns, gathering like -heavy thunder clouds, settled in front of the camp. - -The duke of Dalmatia arrived on the 27th. While at Braga he -had written to the bishop, calling on him to calm the popular -effervescence; and now, beholding the extended works in his front, -and reading their weakness even in the multitudes that guarded -them, he renewed his call upon the prelate, to spare this great -and commercial city the horrors of a storm. A prisoner, employed -to carry the summons, would have been killed, but that it was -pretended he came with an offer from Soult to surrender his army; -and notwithstanding this ingenious device, and that the bishop -commenced a negotiation, which was prolonged until evening, the -firing from the entrenchments was constant and general during the -whole of the 28th. - -The parley being finally broken off, Soult made dispositions for a -general action on the 29th. To facilitate this, he caused Merle’s -division to approach the left of the entrenchments in the evening -of the 28th, intending thereby to divert attention from the true -point of attack: a prodigious fire was immediately opened from the -works; but Merle, having pushed close up, got into some hollow -roads and enclosures, and maintained his ground. At another part -of the line, however, some of the Portuguese pretending a wish -to surrender, general Foy, with a single companion, imprudently -approached them; the latter was killed, and Foy himself made -prisoner, and carried into the town. He was mistaken for Loison, -and the people called out to kill “_Maneta_,” but with great -presence of mind he held up his hands; and the crowd, convinced of -their error, suffered him to be cast into the jail. - -The bishop, having brought affairs to this awful crisis, had not -resolution to brave the danger himself. Leaving generals Lima and -Pareiras to command the army, he, with an escort of troops, quitted -the city, and, crossing the river, took his station in Sarea, a -convent, built on the top of the rugged hill which overhangs the -suburb of Villa Nova, from whence he beheld in safety the horrors -of the next day. - -The bells in Oporto continued to ring all night; and about twelve -o’clock a violent thunder storm arising, the sound of the winds -was mistaken in the camp for the approach of enemies. At once the -whole line blazed with a fire of musketry; the roar of two hundred -pieces of artillery was heard above the noise of the tempest, -and the Portuguese calling to one another with loud cries, were -agitated at once with fury and with terror. The morning, however, -broke serenely; and a little before seven o’clock the sound of the -Frenchmen’s trumpets and drums, and the glitter of their arms, gave -notice that the whole army was in motion for the attack. - - -BATTLE AND STORMING OF OPORTO. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -The feint made the evening before against the left, which was -the weakest part of the line, had perfectly succeeded, and the -Portuguese generals placed their principal masses on that side; but -the duke of Dalmatia was intent upon the strongest points of the -works, being resolved to force his way through the town, and to -seize the bridge during the fight, that he might secure the passage -of the river. - -His army was divided into three columns; of which the first, under -Merle, attacked the left of the Portuguese centre; the second, -under Franceschi and Laborde, assailed their extreme right; the -third, composed of Mermet’s division, sustained by a brigade of -dragoons, was in the centre. General Lorge was appointed to cut off -and attack a body of ordenanza, who were posted with some guns in -front of the Portuguese left, and beyond the works on the road of -Villa de Conde. - -The battle was commenced by the wings; for Mermet’s division was -withheld, until the enemy’s generals believing the whole of the -attack was developed, had weakened their centre to strengthen -their flanks. Then the French held in reserve, rushing violently -forwards, broke through the entrenchments, and took the two -principal forts, entering by the embrasures, and killing or -dispersing all within them. Soult instantly rallied this division, -and sent two battalions to take the Portuguese left wing in the -rear; while two other battalions were ordered to march straight -into the town, and make for the bridge. - -The Portuguese army, thus cut in two, was soon beaten on all -points. Laborde carried in succession a number of forts, took fifty -pieces of artillery, and reaching the edge of the city, halted -until Franceschi, who was engaged still more to the left, could -join him. By this movement a large body of Portuguese were driven -off from the town, and forced back to the Douro, being followed -by a brigade under general Arnaud. And now Merle, seeing that the -success of the centre was complete, brought up his left flank, -and carrying all the forts to his right in succession, killed a -great number of the defenders, and drove the rest towards the sea. -These last dividing, fled for refuge, one part to the fort of St. -Joa, the other towards the mouth of the Douro; where, maddened by -terror, as the French came pouring down upon them, they strove, -some to swim across, others to get over in small boats; and when -their general, Lima, called out against this hopeless attempt, they -turned and murdered him, within musket shot of the approaching -enemy; and then renewing the attempt to cross, nearly the whole -perished. - -The victory was now certain, for Lorge had dispersed the people on -the side of Villa de Conde and general Arnaud had hemmed in those -above the town and prevented them from plunging into the river -also, as in their desperate mood they were going to do. But the -battle continued within Oporto, for the two battalions sent from -the centre having burst the barricadoes at the entrance of the -streets, had penetrated, fighting, to the bridge, and here all -the horrid circumstances of war seemed to be accumulated, and the -calamities of an age compressed into one doleful hour. - -More than four thousand persons, old and young and of both sexes, -were seen pressing forward with wild tumult, some already on the -bridge, others striving to gain it, and all in a state of phrenzy. -The batteries on the opposite bank opened their fire when the -French appeared, and at that moment a troop of Portuguese cavalry -flying from the fight came down one of the streets, and remorseless -in their fears, bore, at full gallop, into the midst of the -miserable helpless crowd, and trampled a bloody pathway to the -river. Suddenly the nearest boats, unable to sustain the increasing -weight, sunk and the foremost wretches still tumbling into the -river, as they were pressed from behind, perished, until the heaped -bodies rising above the surface of the waters, filled all the space -left by the sinking of the boats. - -The first of the French that arrived, amazed at this fearful -spectacle, forgot the battle, and hastened to save those who still -struggled for life--and while some were thus nobly employed, others -by the help of planks, getting on to the firmer parts of the -bridge, crossed the river and carried the batteries on the heights -of Villa Nova. The passage was thus secured. - -But this terrible destruction did not complete the measure of the -city’s calamities; two hundred men, who occupied the bishop’s -palace, fired from the windows and maintained that post until -the French, gathering round them in strength, burst the doors, -and put all to the sword. Every street and house now rung with -the noise of the combatants and the shrieks of distress; for the -French soldiers, exasperated by long hardships, and prone like all -soldiers to ferocity and violence during an assault, became frantic -with fury, when, in one of the principal squares, they found -several of their comrades who had been made prisoners, fastened -upright, and living, but with their eyes bursted, their tongues -torn out, and their other members mutilated and gashed. Those that -beheld the sight spared none who fell in their way. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -It was in vain that Soult strove with all his power to stop the -slaughter; it was in vain that hundreds of officers and soldiers -opposed, at the risk of their lives, the vengeance of their -comrades, and by their generous exertions rescued vast numbers that -would otherwise have fallen victims to the anger and brutality -of the moment. The frightful scene of rape, pillage, and murder, -closed not for many hours, and what with those who fell in battle, -those who were drowned, and those sacrificed to revenge, it is said -that ten thousand Portuguese died in that unhappy day! The loss of -the French did not exceed five hundred men. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -The dire slaughter at Oporto was followed up by a variety of -important operations, but before these are treated of, it is -essential to narrate the contemporaneous events on the Tagus -and the Guadiana, for the war was wide and complicated, and the -result depended more upon the general combinations than upon any -particular movements. - - -OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH CORPS. - -It has been already related that marshal Victor, after making a -futile attempt to surprize the marquis of Palacios, had retired to -his former quarters at Toledo, and that the conde de Cartoajal, -who succeeded the duke of Infantado, had advanced to Ciudad Real -with about fourteen thousand men. Cuesta, also, having rallied -the remainder of Galluzzo’s army, and reinforced it by levies -from Grenada, and regular troops from Seville, had fixed his -head-quarters at Deleytosa, broken down the bridge of Almaraz, -and with fourteen thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred -cavalry, guarded the line of the Tagus. The fourth corps remained -at Talavera and Placentia, but still holding the bridge of -Arzobispo. - -[Sidenote: Imperial Muster-rolls, MSS.] - -The reserve of heavy cavalry was now suppressed, and the regiments -were dispersed among the _corps d’armée_, but the whole army, -exclusive of the king’s guards, did not exceed two hundred and -seventy thousand men, and forty thousand horses, shewing a -decrease of sixty-five thousand men since the 15th of November. But -this number includes the imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, -and many detachments drafted from the corps;--in all forty thousand -men, who had been struck off the rolls of the army in Spain, with -a view to the war in Germany; hence the real loss of the French -by sword, sickness, and captivity, in the four months succeeding -Napoleon’s arrival in the Peninsula, was about twenty-five -thousand--a vast number, but not incredible, when it is considered -that two sieges, twelve pitched battles, and innumerable combats -had taken place during that period. - -Such was the state of affairs when the duke of Belluno, having -received orders to aid Soult in the invasion of Portugal, changed -places with the fourth corps. Sebastiani was then opposed to -Cartoajal, and Victor stood against Cuesta. The former fixed his -head-quarters at Toledo, the latter at Talavera de la Reyna, the -communication between them being kept up by Montbrun’s division -of cavalry, while the garrison of Madrid, composed of the king’s -guards, and Dessolle’s division, equally supported both. But to -understand the connection between the first, second, and fourth -corps, and Lapisse’s division, it is necessary to have a clear idea -of the nature of the country on both sides of the Tagus. - -That river, after passing Toledo, runs through a deep and long -valley, walled up on either hand by lofty mountains. Those on -the right bank are always capped with snow, and, ranging nearly -parallel with the course of the stream, divide the valley of the -Tagus from Old Castile and the Salamanca country. The highest parts -are known by the names of the Sierra de Gredos, Sierra de Bejar, -and Sierra de Gata; and in these sierras the Alberche, the Tietar, -and the Alagon, take their rise, and, ploughing the valley in a -slanting direction, fall into the Tagus. - -The principal mountain on the left bank is called the Sierra de -Guadalupe; it extends in a southward direction from the river, and -divides the upper part of La Mancha from Spanish Estremadura. The -communications leading from the Salamanca country into the valley -of the Tagus are neither many nor good; the principal passes are-- - -1st. The rout of Horcajada, an old Roman road, which, running -through Pedrahita and Villa Franca, crosses the Sierra de Gredos at -Puerto de Pico, and then descends by Montbeltran to Talavera. - -2d. The pass of Arenas, leading nearly parallel to, and at a short -distance from, the first. - -3d. The pass of Tornevecas, leading upon Placentia. - -4th. The route of Bejar, which, crossing the Sierra de Bejar at the -pass of Baños, descends likewise upon Placentia. - -5th. The route of Payo or Gata, which crosses the Sierra de Gata -by the pass of Perales, and afterwards dividing, sends one branch -to Alcantara, the other to Coria and Placentia. Of these five -passes the two last only are, generally speaking, practicable for -artillery. - -The royal roads, from Toledo and Madrid to Badajos, unite near -Talavera, and follow the course of the Tagus by the right bank as -far Naval Moral, but then, turning to the left, cross the river at -the bridge of Almaraz. Now, from Toledo, westward, to the bridge -of Almaraz, a distance of above fifty miles, the left bank of -the Tagus is so crowded by the rugged shoots of the Sierra de -Guadalupe, that it may be broadly stated as impassable for an army, -and this peculiarity of ground gives the key to the operations on -both sides. For, Cuesta and Cartoajal, by reason of this impassable -Sierra de Guadalupe, had no direct military communication: but -Victor and Sebastiani, occupying Toledo and Talavera, could, by the -royal roads above mentioned, concentrate their masses, at pleasure, -on either line of operations. - -The rallying point of the French was Madrid, and their parallel -lines of defence were the Tagus, the Alberche, and the Guadarama. - -The base of Cartoajal’s operations was the Sierra de Morena. - -Cuesta’s first line was the Tagus, and his second the Guadiana, -from whence he could retreat by a flank march to Badajos, or by a -direct one to the defiles of Monasterio in the Sierra Morena. - -The two Spanish armies, if they had been united, would have -furnished about twenty-six thousand infantry, and five thousand -cavalry, and they had no reserve. The two French corps, united, -would have exceeded thirty-five thousand fighting-men, supported -by the reserve under the king. The French, therefore, had the -advantage of numbers, position, and discipline. - -Following the orders of Napoleon, marshal Victor should have -been at Merida before the middle of February. In that position -he would have confined Cuesta to the Sierra Morena; and with his -twelve regiments of cavalry he could easily have kept all the flat -country, as far as Badajos, in subjection. That fortress itself -had no means of resistance, and, certainly, there was no Spanish -force in the field capable of impeding the full execution of the -emperor’s instructions, which were also reiterated by the king. -Nevertheless, the duke of Belluno remained inert at this critical -period, and the Spaniards, attributing his inactivity to weakness, -endeavoured to provoke the blow so unaccountably withheld; for -Cuesta was projecting offensive movements against Victor, and the -duke of Albuquerque was extremely anxious to attack Toledo from the -side of La Mancha. - -Cartoajal opposed Albuquerque’s plans, but offered him a small -force with which to act independently. The duke complained to the -junta of Cartoajal’s proceedings, and Mr. Frere, whose traces are -to be found in every intrigue, and every absurd project broached at -this period, having supported Albuquerque’s complaints, Cartoajal -was directed by the junta to follow the duke’s plans: but the -latter was himself ordered to join Cuesta, with a detachment of -four or five thousand men. - - -ROUT OF CIUDAD REAL. - -Cartoajal, in pursuance of his instructions, marched with -about twelve thousand men, and twenty guns, towards Toledo; -and his advanced guard attacked a regiment of Polish lancers, -near Consuegra: but the latter retired without loss. Hereupon, -Sebastiani, with about ten thousand men, came up against him, and -the leading divisions encountering at Yebenes, the Spaniards were -pushed back to Ciudad Real, where they halted, leaving guards on -the river in front of that town. The French, however, forced the -passage, and a tumultuary action ensuing, Cartoajal was totally -routed, with the loss of all his guns, a thousand slain, and -several thousand prisoners. The vanquished fled by Almagro; and -the French cavalry pursued even to the foot of the Sierra Morena. - -This action, fought on the 27th of March, and commonly called the -battle of Ciudad Real, was not followed up with any great profit to -the victors. Sebastiani gathered up the spoils, sent his prisoners -to the rear, and, holding his troops concentrated on the Upper -Guadiana, awaited the result of Victor’s operations: thus enabling -the Spanish fugitives to rally at Carolina, where they were -reinforced by levies from Grenada and Cordova. - -While these events were passing in La Mancha, Estremadura was also -invaded; for the king having received a despatch from Soult, dated -Orense and giving notice that the second corps would be at Oporto -about the 15th of March, had reiterated the orders that Lapisse -should move to Abrantes, and that the duke of Belluno should pass -the Tagus, and drive Cuesta beyond the Guadiana. - -Victor, who appears for some reason to have been averse to aiding -the operations of the second corps, remonstrated, and especially -urged that the order to Lapisse should be withdrawn, lest his -division should arrive too soon, and without support, at Abrantes. -This time, however, the king was firm, and, on the 14th of March, -the duke of Belluno, having collected five days’ provisions, made -the necessary dispositions to pass the Tagus. - -[Sidenote: General Semelé’s Journal of Operations, MS.] - -The amount of the Spanish force immediately on that river was -about sixteen thousand men; but Cuesta had several detachments -and irregular bands in his rear, which may be calculated at eight -thousand more. The Duke of Belluno, however, estimated the troops -in position before him at thirty thousand, a great error for so -experienced a commander to make. - -But, on the other hand, Cuesta was as ill informed; for this was -the moment when, with his approbation, colonel D’Urban proposed to -sir John Cradock, that curiously combined attack against Victor, -already noticed; in which, the Spaniards were to cross the Tagus, -and sir Robert Wilson was to come down upon the Tietar. This, also, -was the period that Mr. Frere, apparently ignorant that there -were at least twenty-five thousand fighting men in the valley of -the Tagus, without reckoning the king’s or Sebastiani’s troops, -proposed that the twelve thousand British, under sir John Cradock, -should march from Lisbon to “drive the fourth French corps from -Toledo,” and “consequently,” as he phrased it, “from Madrid.” The -first movement of marshal Victor awakened Cuesta from these dreams. - -The bridges of Talavera and Arzobispo were, as we have seen, held -by the French; and their advanced posts were pushed into the valley -of the Tagus, as far as the Barca de Bazagona. - -Cuesta’s position extended from Garbin, near the bridge of -Arzobispo, to the bridge of Almaraz. His centre being at Meza -d’Ibor, a position of surprising strength, running at right angles -from the Tagus to the Guadalupe. The head-quarters and reserves -were at Deleytosa; and a road, cut by the troops, afforded a -communication between that place and Meza d’Ibor. - -On the right bank of the Tagus there was easy access to the bridges -of Talavera, Arzobispo, and Almaraz; but on the left bank no road -existed, except from Almaraz, by which artillery could pass the -mountains, and even that was crossed by the ridge of Mirabete, -which stretching on a line parallel to the river, and at the -distance of four or five miles, affords an almost impregnable -position. - -[Sidenote: Journal of Operations of the First Corps MS.] - -The duke of Belluno’s plan was, to pass the Tagus at the bridges -of Talavera and Arzobispo, with his infantry and a part of his -cavalry, and to operate in the Sierra de Guadalupe against the -Spanish right; while the artillery and grand parc, protected by -the remainder of the cavalry, were united opposite Almaraz, having -with them a raft bridge to throw across at that point, a project -scarcely to be reconciled with the estimate made of Cuesta’s -force; for surely nothing could be more rash than to expose the -whole of the guns and field stores of the army, with no other -guard than some cavalry and one battalion of infantry, close to a -powerful enemy, who possessed a good pontoon train, and who might, -consequently, pass the river at pleasure. - -The 15th, Laval’s division of German infantry, and Lasalle’s -cavalry, crossed at Talavera, and, turning to the right, worked a -march through the rocky hills; the infantry to Aldea Nueva, on a -line somewhat short of the bridge of Arzobispo; the cavalry higher -up the mountain towards Estrella. - -The 16th, when those troops had advanced a few miles to the front, -the head-quarters, and the other divisions of infantry, passed the -bridge of Arzobispo; while the artillery and the parcs, accompanied -by a battalion of grenadiers, and the escorting cavalry, moved -to Almaraz, with orders to watch, on the 17th and 18th, for the -appearance of the army on the heights at the other side, and then -to move down to the point before indicated, for launching the raft -bridge. - -Alarmed by these movements, Cuesta hastened in person to Mirabete; -and directing general Henestrosa, with eight thousand men, to -defend the bridge of Almaraz, sent a detachment to reinforce his -right wing, which was posted behind the Ibor, a small river, but -at this season running with a full torrent from the Guadalupe to -the Tagus. - -The 17th, the Spanish advanced guards were driven, with some loss, -across the Ibor. They attempted to re-form on the high rocky banks -of that river; but, being closely followed, retreated to the camp -of Meza d’Ibor, the great natural strength of which was increased -by some field works. - -Their position could only be attacked in front; and, this being -apparent at the first glance, Laval’s division was instantly formed -in columns of attack, which pushed rapidly up the mountain; the -inequalities of ground covering them in some sort from the effects -of the enemy’s artillery. As they arrived near the summit, the -fire of musketry and grape became murderous; but, at the instant -when the Spaniards should have displayed all their vigour, they -broke and fled to Campillo, leaving behind them baggage, magazines, -seven guns, and a thousand prisoners, besides eight hundred killed -and wounded. The French had seventy killed, and near five hundred -wounded. - -While this action was taking place at Meza d’Ibor, Villatte’s -division, being higher up the Sierra, to the left, overthrew a -smaller body of Spaniards at Frenedoso, making three hundred -prisoners, and capturing a large store of arms. - -The 18th, at day-break, the duke of Belluno, who had superintended -in person the attack at Meza d’Ibor, examined from that high ground -all the remaining position of the Spaniards. Cuesta, he observed, -was in full retreat to Truxillo; but Henestrosa was still posted -in front of Almaraz. Hereupon Villatte’s division was detached -after Cuesta, to Deleytosa; but Laval’s Germans were led against -Henestrosa; and the latter, aware of his danger, and already -preparing to retire, was driven hastily over the ridge of Mirabete. - -In the course of the night, the raft bridge was thrown across the -Tagus; and the next day the dragoons passed to the left bank, the -artillery followed, and the cavalry immediately pushed forward to -Truxillo, from which town Cuesta had already fallen back to Santa -Cruz, leaving Henestrosa to cover the retreat. - -The 20th, after a slight skirmish, the latter was forced over -the Mazarna; and the whole French army, with the exception of a -regiment of dragoons (left to guard the raft bridge) was poured -along the road to Merida. - -The advanced guard, consisting of a regiment of light cavalry, -under general Bordesoult, arrived in front of Miajadas on the 21st. -Here the road dividing, sends one branch to Merida, the other to -Medellin. A party of Spanish horsemen were posted near the town; -they appeared in great alarm, and by their hesitating movements -invited a charge. The French incautiously galloped forward; and, -in a moment, twelve or fourteen hundred Spanish cavalry, placed in -ambush, came up at speed on both flanks. General Lasalle, who from -a distance had observed the movements of both sides, immediately -rode forward with a second regiment; and arrived just as Bordesoult -had extricated himself from a great peril, by his own valour, but -with the loss of seventy killed and a hundred wounded. - -[Sidenote: Journal of Operations MSS.] - -After this well-managed combat, Cuesta retired to Medellin without -being molested, and Victor spreading his cavalry posts on the -different routes to gain intelligence and to collect provisions, -established his own quarters at Truxillo, a town of some trade and -advantageously situated for a place of arms. It had been deserted -by the inhabitants and pillaged by the first French troops that -entered it, but it still offered great resources for the army, and -there was an ancient citadel, capable of being rendered defensible, -which was immediately armed with the Spanish guns, and provisioned -from the magazines taken at Meza d’Ibor. - -The flooding of the Tagus and the rocky nature of its bed had -injured the raft-bridge near Almaraz, and delayed the passage of -the artillery and stores; to remedy this inconvenience the marshal -issued directions to have a boat-bridge prepared, and caused a -field-fort to be constructed on the left bank of the Tagus, which -he armed with three guns, and garrisoned with a hundred and fifty -men to protect his bridge. These arrangements and the establishment -of an hospital for two thousand men at Truxillo, delayed the first -corps until the 24th of March. - -Meanwhile, the light cavalry reinforced by twelve hundred -_voltigeurs_ were posted at Miajadas, and having covered all -the roads branching from that central point with their scouting -parties, reported that a few of Cuesta’s people had retired to -Medellin, that from five to six thousand men were thrown into the -Sierra de Guadalupe, on the left of the French; that four thousand -infantry and two thousand cavalry were behind the river Guadiana, -in front of Medellin, but that every thing else was over the -Guadiana. - -The line of retreat chosen by Cuesta uncovered Merida, and, -consequently, the great road between Badajos and Seville was open -to the French; but Victor was not disposed to profit from this, -for he was aware that Albuquerque was coming from La Mancha to -Cuesta, and believing that he brought nine thousand infantry and -two thousand cavalry--feared that Cuesta’s intention was either -to draw him into a difficult country, by making a flank march to -join Cartoajal in La Mancha, or by crossing the Guadiana, above -Naval Villar, where the fords are always practicable, to rejoin his -detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe, and so establish a new base -of operations on the left flank of the French army. - -This reasoning was misplaced; neither Cuesta nor his army were -capable of such operations, his line of retreat was solely directed -by a desire to join Albuquerque, and to save his troops, by -taking to a rugged instead of an open country, and the duke of -Belluno lost the fruits of his previous success, by over rating -his adversary’s skill; for, instead of following Cuesta with a -resolution to break up the Spanish army, he, after leaving a -brigade at Truxillo and Almaraz, to protect the communications, was -contented to advance a few leagues on the road to Medellin with -his main body, sending his light cavalry to Merida, and pushing -on detachments towards Badajos and Seville, while other parties -explored the roads leading into the Guadalupe. - -The 27th, however, he marched in person to Medellin, at the head of -two divisions of infantry, and a brigade of heavy cavalry. Eight -hundred Spanish horse posted on the right bank of the Guadiana, -retired at his approach, and crossing that river, halted at Don -Benito, where they were reinforced by other squadrons, but no -infantry were to be discovered. The duke of Belluno then passed -the river and took post on the road leading to Mengabril and Don -Benito; hence, the situation of the French army in the evening was -as follows:-- - -The main body, consisting of two divisions of infantry, and one -incomplete brigade of heavy cavalry in position, on the road -leading from Medellin to Don Benito and Mingabril. - -The remainder of the dragoons, under Latour Maubourg, were at -Zorita, fifteen miles on the left, watching the Spaniards in the -Guadalupe. - -The light cavalry was at Merida, eighteen miles to the right, -having patrolled all that day on the roads to Badajos, Seville, and -Medellin. - -Ruffin’s division was at Miajadas eighteen miles in the rear. - -In the course of the evening Victor received intelligence, that -Albuquerque was just come up with eight thousand men, that the -combined troops, amounting to twenty-eight thousand infantry and -seven thousand cavalry, were in position on the table land of Don -Benito, and that Cuesta, aware of the scattered state of the French -army, was preparing to attack the two divisions on their march the -next day. - -Upon this, the duke of Belluno, notwithstanding the strength of -the Spanish army, resolved to fight, and immediately sent orders -to Lasalle, to Ruffin, and to Latour Maubourg, to bring their -divisions down to Medellin; but the latter was directed to leave -a detachment at Miajadas to protect the route of Merida, and a -brigade at Zorita, to observe the Spaniards in the Sierra de -Guadalupe. - -Cuesta’s numbers were, however, greatly exaggerated; that general -blaming every body but himself for his failure on the Tagus--had -fallen back to Campanarios--rallied all his scattered detachments, -and then returned to Villa Nueva de Serena, where he was joined, -on the 27th, by Albuquerque, who brought up not a great body of -infantry and cavalry as supposed, but less than three thousand -infantry and a few hundred horse. This reinforcement, added to some -battalions drawn from Andalusia, increased Cuesta’s army to about -twenty-five thousand foot, four thousand horse, and eighteen or -twenty pieces of artillery; and, with this force, he, fearing for -the safety of Badajos, retraced his steps and rushed headlong to -destruction. - -Medellin, possessing a fine stone-bridge, is situated in a hollow -on the left bank of the Guadiana, and just beyond the town is a -vast plain or table land, the edge of which, breaking abruptly -down, forms the bed of the river. The Ortigosa, a rapid torrent, -rushing perpendicularly to the Guadiana, and having steep and -rugged banks, yet in parts passable for artillery, cuts their -plain, which is also traversed by two roads, the one leading to -Mingrabil on the right, the other to Don Benito on the left, those -places being about five miles apart, and forming with Medellin an -irregular triangle. - -The French army, with the exception of the troops left to cover the -communications and those at Zorita, was concentrated in the town -at ten o’clock; and, at one, about fourteen thousand infantry, two -thousand five hundred cavalry, and forty-two pieces of artillery, -went forth to fight the - - -BATTLE OF MEDELLIN. - -The plain on the side of Don Benito was bounded by a high ridge -of land, behind which Cuesta kept the Spanish infantry concealed, -showing only his cavalry and some guns in advance. To make him -display his lines of infantry the French general sent Lasalle’s -light cavalry, with a battery of six guns and two battalions of -German infantry, towards Don Benito, while Latour Maubourg, with -five squadrons of dragoons, eight guns, and two other battalions, -keeping close to the Ortigosa, advanced towards the point of the -enemy’s ridge called the Retamosa. The rest of the army was kept in -reserve; the division of Villatte and the remainder of the Germans, -being one-half on the road of Don Benito, the other half on the -road of Mengabril. Ruffin’s division was a little way in rear of -the other, and a battalion was left to guard the baggage at the -bridge of Medellin. - -As the French squadrons advanced, the artillery on both sides -opened, and the Spanish cavalry guards in the plain retired slowly -to the higher ground. Lasalle and Latour Maubourg then pressed -forward; but as the latter, who had the shortest distance to -traverse, approached the enemy’s position, the whole Spanish line -of battle was suddenly descried in full march over the edge of the -ridge, and stretching from the Ortijos to within a mile of the -Guadiana,--a menacing but glorious apparition. - -Cuesta, Henestrosa, and the duke del Parque, with the mass of -cavalry, were on the left; Francisco Frias, with the main body of -infantry, in the centre; Equia and the marquis of Portazzo on the -right; and, from thence to the bank of the Guadiana, Albuquerque, -with some scattered squadrons, flanked the march of the whole host -as it descended, with a rapid pace, into the plain. Cuesta’s plan -was now disclosed; his line overlapped the French left, and he was -hastening to cut their army off from Medellin, but his order of -battle was on a front of three miles, and he had no reserve. - -The Duke of Belluno, seeing this, instantly brought his centre a -little forward, and then, reinforcing Latour Maubourg with ten guns -and a battalion of grenadiers, and detaching a brigade of infantry -as a support, ordered him to fall boldly in on the advancing enemy. -But at the same time Lasalle, who was giving way under the pressure -of his antagonists, was directed to retire towards Medellin, always -refusing his left. - -The Spaniards marched briskly forward into the plain, and a special -body of cavalry, with three thousand infantry, advancing from their -left, met Latour Maubourg in front, while a regiment of hussars -fell upon the French columns of grenadiers and guns in his rear. -The hussars, received with grape and a pelting fire of musketry, -and charged in flank by some dragoons, were beaten at once, but -the Spanish infantry, closely followed by the rest of their own -cavalry, came boldly up to Latour Maubourg’s horsemen, and, with a -rough discharge, forced them back in disorder. The French, however, -soon rallied, and smashing the Spanish ranks with artillery, and -fighting all together, broke in and overthrew their enemies, -man and horse. Cuesta was wounded and fell, but, being quickly -remounted, escaped. - -While this was passing on the French right, Lasalle’s cavalry, -continually refusing their left, were brought fighting close up to -the main body of the French infantry, which was now disposed on a -new front, having a reserve behind the centre. Meanwhile Latour -Maubourg’s division was being re-formed on the ridge from whence -the Spaniards had first descended, and the whole face of the battle -was changed; for the Spanish left being put to flight, the French -right wing overlapped the centre of their antagonists, and the long -attenuated line of the latter wavering, disjointed, and disclosing -wide chasms, was still advancing without an object. - -The duke of Belluno, aware that the decisive moment of the battle -had arrived, was on the point of commanding a general attack, when -his attention was arrested by the appearance of a column coming -down on the rear of his right wing from the side of Mingabril. A -brigade from the reserve, with four guns, was immediately sent to -keep this body in check, and then Lasalle’s cavalry, taking ground -to its left, unmasked the infantry in the centre, and the latter, -immediately advancing, poured a heavy fire into the Spanish ranks; -Latour Maubourg, sweeping round their left flank, fell on the rear, -and, at the same moment, Lasalle also galloped in upon the dismayed -and broken bands. A horrible carnage ensued, for the French -soldiers, while their strength would permit, continued to follow -and strike, until three-fifths of the whole Spanish army wallowed -in blood. - -Six guns and several thousand prisoners were taken. General Frias, -deeply wounded, fell into the hands of the victors; and so utter -was the discomfiture that, for several days after, Cuesta could -not rally a single battalion of infantry, and his cavalry was only -saved by the speed of the horses. - -Following general Semelé’s journal,[4] the French loss did not -exceed three hundred men, a number so utterly disproportionate to -that of the vanquished as to be scarcely credible, and, if correct, -discovering a savage rigour in the pursuit by no means commendable; -for it does not appear that any previous cruelties were perpetrated -by the Spaniards to irritate the French soldiers. The right to -slaughter an enemy in battle can neither be disputed nor limited; -but a brave soldier should always have regard to the character of -his country, and be sparing of the sword towards beaten men. - -The main body of the French army passed the night of the 28th near -the field of battle; but Latour Maubourg marched with the dragoons -by the left bank of the Guadiana to Merida, leaving a detachment at -Torre Mexia to watch the roads of Almendralego and Villa Franca, -and to give notice if the remains of Cuesta’s army should attempt -to gain Badajos, in which case the dragoons had orders to intercept -them at Loboa. - -The 29th, Villatte’s division advanced as far as Villa Nueva de -Serena, and the light cavalry were pushed on to Campanarios. But, -as all the reports agreed that Cuesta, with a few horsemen, had -taken refuge in the Sierra Morena, and that the remnants of his -army were dispersed and wandering through the fields and along the -bye-roads, without any power of re-uniting, the duke of Belluno -relinquished the pursuit. Having fixed his head-quarters at -Merida, and occupied that place and Medellin with his infantry, he -formed with his cavalry a belt extending from Loboa on the right -to Mingrabil on the left; but the people had all fled from the -country, and even the great towns were deserted. - -Merida, situated in a richly-cultivated basin, possesses a fine -bridge and many magnificent remains of antiquity, Roman and -Moorish; amongst others, a castle built on the right bank of the -river, close to the bridge, and so perfect that, in eight days, -it was rendered capable of resisting any sudden assault; and six -guns being mounted on the walls, and an hospital for a thousand men -established there, a garrison of three hundred men, with stores and -provisions for eight hundred, during two months, was put into it. - -The king now repeated his orders that the duke of Belluno should -enter Portugal, and that general Lapisse should march upon -Abrantes; but the former again remonstrated, on the ground that -he could not make such a movement and defend his communications -with Almaraz, unless the division of Lapisse was permitted to -join him by the route of Alcantara. But as Badajos, although more -capable of defence than it had been in December, when the fourth -corps was at Merida, was still far from being secure; and that -many of the richer inhabitants, disgusted and fatigued with the -violence of the mob government, were more inclined to betray the -gates to the French than to risk a siege; Victor, whose battering -train (composed of only twelve pieces, badly horsed and provided) -was still at Truxillo, opened a secret communication with the -malcontents. - -[Sidenote: Journal of Operations MS.] - -The parties met at the village of Albuera, and everything was -arranged for the surrender, when the peasants giving notice to the -junta that some treason was in progress, the latter arrested all -the persons supposed to be implicated, and the project was baffled. -The duke of Belluno then resigned all further thoughts of Badajos, -and contented himself with sending detachments to Alcantara, to get -intelligence of general Lapisse, of whose proceedings it is now -time to give some account. - -[Illustration: _Plate 3. to face Pa. 226._ - - _Sketch Explanatory_ - of - M^L. VICTOR’S OPERATIONS - AGAINST CUESTA - _in March 1809_. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - - -OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LAPISSE. - -This general, after taking Zamora in January, occupied Ledesma -and Salamanca, where he was joined by general Maupetit’s brigade -of cavalry, and as sir Robert Wilson’s legion and the feeble -garrisons in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida were the only bodies in his -front, universal terror prevailed. Yet he, although at the head -of at least ten thousand men, with a powerful artillery, remained -inactive from January to the end of March, and suffered sir Robert, -with a few hundred Portuguese, to vex his outposts, to intercept -his provisions, to restrain his patroles, and even to disturb his -infantry in their quarters. This conduct brought him into contempt, -and enabled Wilson to infuse a spirit into the people which they -were far from feeling when the enemy first appeared. - -Don Carlos d’España, with a small Spanish force, being after a -time placed under sir Robert’s command, the latter detached two -battalions to occupy the pass of Baños, and Lapisse was thus -deprived of any direct communication with Victor. In this situation -the French general remained without making any vigorous effort -either to clear his front or to get intelligence of the duke of -Dalmatia’s march upon Oporto until the beginning of April, when he -advanced towards Bejar, but, finding the passes occupied, turned -suddenly to his right, dissipated Wilson’s posts on the Ecla, -and forced the legion, then commanded by colonel Grant, to take -refuge under the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo. He summoned that town to -surrender on the 6th, and, after a slight skirmish close to the -walls, took a position between the Agueda and Ledesma. - -This event was followed by a general insurrection from Ciudad -Rodrigo to Alcantara and from Tamames to Bejar. For Lapisse, -who had been again ordered by the king to fulfil the emperor’s -instructions, and advance to Abrantes, instead of obeying, suddenly -quitted his positions on the Agueda, and, without regarding his -connexion with the second corps, abandoned Leon, and made a rapid -march, through the pass of Perales, upon Alcantara, followed -closely by sir Robert Wilson, don Carlos d’España, the two -battalions from Bejar, and a multitude of peasants, both Portuguese -and Spanish. - -At Alcantara, a corps of Spanish insurgents endeavoured to defend -the passage of the river, but the French broke through the -entrenchments on the bridge, and, with a full encounter carried the -town, and pillaged it, after which they abandoned the place, and -joined the first corps, at Merida, on the 19th of April. - -This false movement greatly injured the French cause. From that -moment the conquering impulse given by Napoleon was at an end, and -his armies, ceasing to act on the offensive, became stationary -or retrograded, and the British, Spanish, and Portuguese once -more assumed the lead. The duke of Dalmatia, abandoned to his own -resources, and in total ignorance of the situation of the corps -by which his movements should have been supported, was forced to -remain in Oporto; and at the moment, when the French combinations -were thus paralyzed, the arrival of English reinforcements at -Lisbon and the advance of sir John Cradock towards Leiria gave a -sudden and violent impetus both to the Spaniards and Portuguese -along the Beira frontier. Thus the insurrection, no longer kept -down by the presence of an intermediate French corps, connecting -Victor’s and Soult’s forces, was established in full activity from -Alcantara, on the Tagus, to Amarante, on the Tamega. - -Meanwhile Cuesta was gathering another host in the Morena; for, -although the simultaneous defeat of the armies in Estremadura and -La Mancha had at first produced the greatest dismay in Andalusia, -the Spaniards, when they found such victories as Ciudad Real and -Medellin only leading to a stagnant inactivity on the part of the -French, concluded that extreme weakness was the cause, and that the -Austrian war had or would oblige Napoleon to abandon his projects -against the Peninsula. This idea was general, and upheld not only -the people’s spirit but the central junta’s authority, which could -not otherwise have been maintained after such a succession of -follies and disasters. - -The misfortunes of the two Spanish generals had been equal; but -Cartoajal, having no popular influence, was dismissed, while Cuesta -was appointed to command what remained of both armies; and the -junta, stimulated for a moment by the imminent danger in which they -were placed, drew together all the scattered troops and levies in -Andalusia. To cover Seville, Cuesta took post in the defiles of -Monasterio, and was there joined by eight hundred horse and two -thousand three hundred infantry, drafted from the garrison of -Seville; these were followed by thirteen hundred old troops from -Cadiz; and finally, three thousand five hundred Grenadian levies, -and eight thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horsemen, -taken from the army of La Mancha, contributed to swell his numbers, -until, in the latter end of April, they amounted to twenty-five -thousand infantry, and about six thousand cavalry. General Venegas, -also, being recalled from Valencia, repaired to La Carolina, and -proceeded to organize another army of La Mancha. - -King Joseph, justly displeased at the false disposition made of -Lapisse’s division, directed that Alcantara should be immediately -re-occupied; but as this was not done without an action, which -belongs to another combination, it shall be noticed hereafter. -It is now proper to return to the operations on the Douro, so -intimately connected with those on the Guadiana, and yet so -differently conducted. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -When the bishop of Oporto beheld, from his station at Sarea, the -final overthrow of his ambitious schemes in the north of Portugal, -he fled to Lisbon. There he reconciled himself to the regency, -became a member of that body, and was soon after created patriarch; -and, as I shall have occasion to shew, used his great influence in -the most mischievous manner; discovering, on every occasion, the -untamed violence and inherent falseness of his disposition. - -Meanwhile, the fall of Oporto enabled marshal Soult to establish -a solid base of operations, and to commence a regular system of -warfare. The immediate fruit of his victory was the capture of -immense magazines of powder, and a hundred and ninety-seven pieces -of artillery, every gun of which had been used in the action. -Thirty English vessels, wind-bound in the river, and loaded with -wine and provisions for a month, also fell into his hands. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.] - -Having repressed the disorders attendant on the battle, he adopted -the same conciliatory policy which had marked his conduct at -Chaves and Braga; and endeavoured to remedy, as far as it was -possible, the deplorable results of the soldiers’ fury. Recovering -and restoring a part of the plunder, he caused the inhabitants -remaining in the town to be treated with respect; and invited, by -proclamation, all those who had fled to return. He demanded no -contribution; and, restraining with a firm hand the violence of his -men, contrived, from the captured public property, to support the -army, and even to succour the poorest and most distressed of the -population. - -Soult’s ability in the civil and political administration of -the Entre Minho e Douro produced an effect which he was not -prepared for. The prince regent’s desertion of the country was -not forgotten. The national feeling was as adverse to Portugal -being a dependency on the Brazils as it was to the usurpation of -the French, and the comparison between Soult’s government and the -horrible anarchy which preceded it was all in favour of the former. -His victories, and the evident vigour of his character, contrasted -with the apparent supineness of the English, promised permanency -for the French power; and the party, formerly noticed as being -inimical to the house of Braganza, revived. - -The leaders, thinking this a favourable opportunity to execute -their intention, waited upon the duke of Dalmatia, and expressed -their desire for a French prince and an independent government. -They even intimated their good wishes towards the duke himself, and -demanded his concurrence and protection; while, in the name of the -people, they declared that the Braganza dynasty was at an end. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.] - -Although unauthorized by the emperor to accede to this proposition, -Soult was yet unwilling to reject a plan from which he could draw -such immediate and important military advantages. Napoleon was -not a man to be lightly dealt with on such an occasion; but the -marshal, trusting that circumstances would justify him, encouraged -the design, and, appointing men to civil employments, raised -a Portuguese legion of five battalions. He acted with so much -dexterity that, in fifteen days, the cities of Oporto and Braga, -and the towns of Bacellos, Viana, Villa de Conde, Povoa de Barcim, -Feira, and Ovar, sent addresses, containing the expression of their -sentiments, and bearing the signatures of thirty thousand persons, -as well of the nobles, clergy, and merchants, as of the people. - -These addresses were burnt when the French retreated from Oporto; -but the fact that such a project was in agitation has never been -denied. The regency even caused inquest to be made on the matter; -and it was then asserted that very few persons were found to be -implicated. That many of the signatures were forged by the leaders -may readily be believed; but the policy of lessening the importance -of the affair is also evident; and the inquisitors, if willing, -could not have probed it to the bottom. - -[Sidenote: Rovigo’s Memoirs.] - -This transaction formed the ground-work of a tale generally -credited, even by his own officers, that Soult perfidiously aimed -at an independent crown; and the circumstances were certainly such -as might create suspicion. That the conclusion was false, is, -however, proved, by the mode in which Napoleon treated both the -rumour and the subject of it. Slighting the former, he yet made -known to his lieutenant that it had reached his ears, adding, “_I -remember nothing but Austerlitz_,”[5] and at the same time largely -increased the duke of Dalmatia’s command. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The policy of Soult’s conduct on this occasion, and the great -influence, if not the numbers of the Portuguese malcontents, were -abundantly proved by the ameliorated relations between the army -and the peasantry. The fierceness of the latter subsided; and even -the priests abated of their hostility in the Entre Minho e Douro. -The French soldiers were no longer assassinated in that province; -whereas, previous to this intrigue, that cruel species of warfare -had been carried on with infinite activity, and the most malignant -passions called forth on both sides. - -Among other instances of Portuguese ferocity, and of the truculent -violence of the French soldiers, the death of colonel Lameth, and -the retaliation which followed, may be cited. That young officer, -when returning from the marshal’s quarters to his own, was waylaid, -near the village of Arrifana, and murdered; his body was then -stripped, and mutilated in a shocking manner. This assassination, -committed within the French lines, and at a time when Soult -enforced the strictest discipline, was justifiable neither by the -laws of war nor by those of humanity. No general could neglect -to punish such a proceeding. The protection due to the army, and -even the welfare of the Portuguese within the French jurisdiction, -demanded a severe example, for the violence of the troops had -hitherto been with difficulty restrained by their commander; -and if, at such a moment, he had appeared indifferent to their -individual safety; his authority would have been set at naught, and -the unmeasured and indiscriminating vengeance of an insubordinate -army executed. - -Impressed with this feeling, and afflicted at the unhappy death -of a personal friend, Soult directed general Thomieres to march, -with a brigade of infantry, to Arrifana, and punish the criminals. -Thomieres was accompanied by a Portuguese civilian; and, after a -judicial inquiry, he shot five or six persons whose guilt was said -to have been proved; but it is also certain that the principal -actor, a Portuguese major of militia, and some of his accomplices, -escaped across the Vouga to colonel Trant; and the latter, -disgusted at their conduct, sent them to marshal Beresford. It -would also appear, from the statement of a peasant, that Thomieres, -or those under him, exceeded Soult’s orders; for, in that -statement, attested by oath, it is said that twenty-four innocent -persons were killed, and that the soldiers, after committing many -atrocious excesses, burnt the village. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.] - -These details have been related partly because they throw a light -upon the direful nature of this contest, but chiefly because the -transaction has been adduced by other writers as proof of cruelty -in Soult, a charge not sustained by the facts of this case, and -belied by the general tenor of his conduct, which even his enemies, -while they attributed it to an insidious policy, acknowledged, at -the time, to be mild and humane. And now, having finished this -political digression, in which the chronological order of events -has been anticipated, I shall resume the narrative of military -operations at that part where the disorders attendant on the battle -of Oporto having been repressed, a fresh series of combinations -were commenced, not less important than those which brought the -French army down to the Douro. - -The heavy blow struck on the 29th of March was followed up with -activity. The boat-bridge was restored during the night; and -the next day, the forts of Mazinho and St. Joa de Foz having -surrendered, Franceschi’s cavalry crossed the Douro, took post ten -miles in advance on the Coimbra road, and pushed patroles as far as -the Vouga river. To support this cavalry, general Mermet occupied -a position somewhat beyond the suburb of Villa Nova. Oporto itself -was held by three brigades. The dragoons of Lorge were sent to -Villa da Conde, a walled town, situated at the mouth of the Ave; -and general Caulaincourt was detached up the Douro to Penafiel, -with a brigade of cavalry, having orders to clear the valley of the -Tamega. Another brigade of cavalry was posted on the road leading -to Barca de Trofa, to protect the rear of the army; and general -Heudelet was directed to forward the hospitals from Braga to -Oporto, but to hold himself in readiness to open the communication -with Tuy. - -These dispositions made, Soult had leisure to consider his general -position. The flight of the bishop had not much abated the hostility -of the people, nor relieved the French from their difficulties. The -communication with the Minho was still intercepted; the Tras os -Montes was again in a state of insurrection; and Sylveira, with a -corps of eight thousand men, not only commanded the valley of the -Tamega, but had advanced, after re-taking Chaves, into the Entre -Minho e Douro, and was posted between the Sierra de Catalina and the -Douro. - -Lisbon, the ultimate object of the campaign, was two hundred miles -distant, and covered by a British army, whose valour was to be -dreaded, and whose numbers were daily increasing. A considerable -body of natives were with Trant upon the Vouga, and Beresford’s -force between the Tagus and the Mondego: its disorderly and weak -condition being unknown, appeared formidable at a distance. - -The day on which the second corps, following the emperor’s -instructions, should have reached Lisbon was overpassed by -six weeks; and, as the line of correspondence with Victor was -uncertain, his co-operation could scarcely be calculated upon. -Lapisse’s division was yet unfelt as an aiding force; nor was it -even known to Soult that he still remained at Salamanca: finally, -the three thousand men expected from the Astorga country, under the -conduct of the marshal’s brother, had not yet been heard of. - -On the other hand, the duke of Dalmatia had conquered a large and -rich city: he had gained the military command of a very fertile -country, from whence the principal supplies of the British army and -of Lisbon were derived: he had obtained a secure base of operations -and a prominent station in the kingdom; and if the people’s -fierceness was not yet quelled, they had learned to dread his -talents, and to be sensible of their own inferiority in battle. - -In this state of affairs, judging that the most important objects -were to relieve the garrison of Tuy and to obtain intelligence of -Lapisse’s division, Soult entrusted the first to Heudelet and the -second to Franceschi. The last-named general had occupied Feira and -Oliveira, and spread his posts along the Vouga; but the inhabitants -fled to the other side of that river, and the rich valleys beyond -were protected by colonel Trant. - -This officer, well known to the Portuguese as having commanded their -troops at Roriça and Vimiero, was at Coimbra when intelligence of -the defeat at Braga arrived, and he immediately took the command -of all the armed men in that town, among which was a small body of -volunteers, students at the university. The general dismay and -confusion being greatly increased by the subsequent catastrophe at -Oporto, the fugitives from that town and other places, accustomed -to violence, and attributing every misfortune to treachery in the -generals, flocked to Trant’s standard; and he, as a foreigner, was -enabled to assume an authority that no native of rank durst either -have accepted or refused without imminent danger. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.] - -He advanced, at first, with about eight hundred men to Sardao -and Aveiro, where he was joined by the conde Barbaceña with some -Portuguese cavalry, and by generals Victoria and Eben; but the -people regarded these officers with suspicion, and Trant continued -in the command, his force daily increasing by the arrival of -_ordenanzas_, and even by regular troops, who, quitting their -quarters, abandoned Beresford’s army to join him. - -When Franceschi advanced, Trant sent a detachment by Castanheira -to occupy the bridge of the Vouga; but the men, seized with a -panic, dispersed, and this was followed by the desertion of many -thousand _ordenanzas_,--a happy circumstance, for the numbers that -had at first collected behind the Vouga exceeded twelve thousand -men, and their extreme violence and insubordination excited the -utmost terror, and impeded the measures necessary for defence. -Trant, finally, retained about four thousand men, with which he -imposed upon the French, and preserved a fruitful country from -their incursions; but he was greatly distressed for money, because -the bishop of Oporto, in his flight, laid hands on all that was at -Coimbra and carried it to Lisbon. - -Franceschi, although reinforced with a brigade of infantry, -contented himself with chasing some insurgents that infested his -left flank, while his patroles and scouts, sent forward on the side -of Viseu, endeavoured to obtain information of Lapisse’s division; -but that general, as we have seen, was still beyond the Agueda, and -while Franceschi was thus employed in front of the French army, -Caulaincourt’s cavalry on the Tamega was pressed by the Portuguese, -and Loison marched with a brigade of infantry to his assistance on -the 9th of April. - -Sylveira, however, was too strong for both; and, on the 12th, -advancing from Canavezes, obliged Loison, after a slight action, to -take post behind the Souza. - -Meanwhile, Heudelet was hastening towards Tuy to recover the -artillery and depôts, from which the army had now been separated -forty days. - -The 6th of April, general Lorge, who had taken Villa de Conde -and cleared the coast, joined Heudelet at Bacellos. The 7th they -marched to Ponte de Lima; but the Portuguese resisted the passage -vigourously, and it was not forced until the 8th. - -The 10th the French arrived in front of Valença, on the Minho; -this fortress had been maltreated by the fire from Tuy, and the -garrison, amounting to two hundred men, having only two days’ -provisions, capitulated, on condition of being allowed to retire -to their homes; but, before the French could take possession, the -capitulating troops disbanded and the town was deserted. - -The garrison in Tuy, never having received the slightest -intelligence of the army since the separation at Ribidavia, -marvelled that the fire from Valença was discontinued; and their -surprise was extreme when they beheld the French colours flying -in that fort, and observed French videttes on the left bank of the -Minho. - -La Martiniere’s garrison, by the arrival of stragglers and a -battalion of detachments that followed the army from St. Jago, -had been increased to three thousand four hundred men; but twelve -hundred were in hospital, and two-thirds of the artillery-horses -had been eaten in default of other food. The Portuguese had passed -the Minho, and, in conjunction with the Spaniards, attacked the -place on the 15th of March; but the French general, by frequent -sallies, obliged them to keep up a distant blockade, and his fire -mastered that from Valença. - -The 22d of March, the defeat at Braga being known, the Portuguese -repassed the Minho, the Spaniards dispersed, and La Martiniere -immediately sent three hundred men to bring off the garrison of -Vigo; but it was too late, that place was taken, and the detachment -with difficulty regained Tuy. - -The peasants on the Arosa Estuary had, as I have before noticed, -risen, the 27th of February, while Soult was still at Orense; they -were headed, at first, by general Silva and by the count de Mezeda, -and, finally, a colonel Barrois, sent by the central junta, took -the command. As their numbers were very considerable, Barrois with -one part attacked Tuy; and Silva assisted by the Lively and Venus, -British frigates on that station, invested Vigo. - -The garrison of the latter place was at first small; but the -paymaster-general of the second corps, instead of proceeding to -Tuy, entered Vigo, with the military chest and an escort of eight -hundred men, and was blockaded there. After some slight attacks had -been repulsed, the French governor negotiated for a capitulation -on the 23d of March; but, distrustful of the peasantry, he was -still undecided on the 26th. Meanwhile, some of Romana’s stragglers -coming from the Val des Orres, collected between Tuy and Vigo; and -don Pablo Murillo, a regular officer, assembling fifteen hundred -retired soldiers, joined the blockading force, and, in concert with -Captain Mackinley, of the Lively, obliged the garrison to surrender -on terms. - -[Sidenote: Captain Mackinley’s Despatch.] - -The 27th, thirteen hundred men and officers, including three -hundred sick, marched out with the honours of war; and, having laid -down their arms on the glacis, were embarked for an English port, -according to the articles agreed upon. Four hundred and forty-seven -horses, sixty-two covered waggons, some stores, and the military -chest, containing five thousand pounds, fell into the victor’s -hands; and this affair being happily terminated, the Spaniards -renewed their attack on Tuy: the Portuguese once more crossed the -Minho, and the siege continued until the 10th of April, when the -place was relieved by Heudelet. The depôts and the artillery were -immediately transported across the river, and directed upon Oporto. - -The 12th, general Maucune, with a division of the sixth corps, -arrived at Tuy, with the intention of carrying off the garrison, -but seeing that the place was relieved, returned the next day. -Heudelet, having taken Viana, and the fort of Insoa, at the mouth -of the Minho, placed a small garrison in the former; and then -blowing up the works of Valença, retired to Braga and Bacellos, -sending Lorge again to Villa de Conde. - -The sick men were transported in boats along shore, from the mouth -of the Minho to Viana, Villa de Conde, and thence to Oporto; -and while these transactions were taking place on the Minho, La -Houssaye, with a brigade of dragoons and one of infantry, scoured -the country between the Lima and the Cavado, and so protected the -rear of Heudelet. - -All resistance in the Entre Minho e Douro now ceased; for, at this -period, the influence of the _Anti-Braganza_ party was exerted in -favour of the French. But on the Tras os Montes side, Sylveira -being joined by general Boteilho, from the Lima, was advancing, -and boasted that he would be in Oporto the 15th: and now, also, -intelligence of the recapture of Chaves reaching Soult, not only -explained Sylveira’s boldness, but shewed, that, while the latter -was in arms, the tranquillity of the Entre Minho e Douro could be -only momentary. Wherefore, Laborde, with a brigade of infantry, -was ordered to join Loison, and attack Amarante; while La Houssaye -pushed through Guimaraens upon the same point. - -The 15th, Laborde reached Penafiel; and Sylveira, hearing of La -Houssaye’s march, retired to Villamea. The 18th, Laborde drove back -the Portuguese without difficulty; and their retreat soon became -a flight. Sylveira himself passed the Tamega at Amarante, and was -making for the mountains, without a thought of defending that town; -but colonel Patrick, a British officer in the Portuguese service, -encouraging his battalion, faced about, and rallying the fugitives, -beat back the foremost of the enemy. This becoming act obliged -Sylveira to return; and while Patrick defended the approaches to -the bridge on the right bank with obstinate valour, the former -took a position, with five or six thousand men, on the heights -overhanging the suburb of Villa Real, on the left bank of the river. - -The 19th, La Houssaye arrived; and the French renewing their attack -on the town, Patrick again baffled their efforts; but when that -gallant man fell mortally wounded, and was carried across the -bridge, the defence slackened, and the Portuguese went over the -Tamega: the passage of the river was, however, still to be effected. - -The bridges of Mondin and Cavez above, and that of Canavezas below -Amarante, were destroyed: the Tamega was in full flood, and running -in a deep rocky bed; and the bridge in front of the French was -mined, barred with three rows of pallisades, and commanded by a -battery of ten guns. The Portuguese were in position on the heights -behind; from whence they could discern all that was passing at the -bridge, and could reinforce at will the advanced guard, which was -posted in the suburb. - - -PASSAGE OF THE TAMEGA, AT AMARANTE. - -The 20th, the first barricade was reached by the flying sap; but -the fire of the Portuguese was so deadly, that Laborde abandoned -the attack, and endeavoured to construct a bridge on tressels -half a mile below: this failed, and the efforts against the stone -bridge were of necessity renewed. The mine at the other side -was ingeniously formed; the muzzle of a loaded musket entered -the chamber, and a string being tied at one end to the trigger, -the other end was brought behind the entrenchments, so that an -explosion could be managed with the greatest precision as to time. - -[Sidenote: Noble’s Campagne de Galice.] - -The 27th, the centre barricade was burnt by captain Brochard, an -engineer officer, who devised a method of forcing the passage, so -singularly bold, that all the generals, and especially general Foy, -were opposed to it. The plan was, however, transmitted to Oporto; -and Soult sent general Hulot, his first aide-de-camp, to report if -the project was feasible. Hulot approved of Brochard’s proposal, -and the latter commenced his operations on the 2d of May. - -The troops were under arms, and disposed in the most convenient -manner, as near the head of the bridge as the necessity of keeping -them hidden would permit; and at eight o’clock, all being prepared, -and the moon shining bright, twenty men were sent a little below -the bridge, and directed to open an oblique fire of musketry -against the entrenchments. This being replied to, and the attention -of the Portuguese attracted, a sapper, dressed in dark grey, -crawled out, and pushed with his head a barrel of powder, which was -likewise enveloped in grey cloth to deaden the sound, along that -side of the bridge which was darkened by the shadow of the parapet: -when he had placed his barrel against the entrenchment covering the -Portuguese mine, he retired in the same manner. Two others followed -in succession, and retired without being discovered; but the -fourth, after placing the barrel, rose on his feet and ran back, -but was immediately shot at and wounded. - -The fire of the Portuguese was now directed on the bridge itself; -but as the barrels were not discovered, after a time it ceased; -and a fifth sapper advancing like the others, attached a sausage -seventy yards long to the barrels. At two o’clock in the morning -the whole was completed; and as the French kept very quiet, the -Portuguese remained tranquil and unsuspicious. - -Brochard had calculated that the effect of four barrels exploding -together would destroy the Portuguese entrenchments, and burn the -cord attached to their mine. The event proved that he was right; -for a thick fog arising about three o’clock, the sausage was fired, -and the explosion made a large breach. Brochard, with his sappers, -instantly jumped on to the bridge, threw water into the mine, cut -away all obstacles, and, followed by a column of grenadiers, was at -the other side before the smoke cleared away. The grenadiers being -supported by other troops, not only the suburb, but the camp on -the height behind were carried without a check, and the Portuguese -dispersing, fled over the mountains. - -The execution of captain Brochard’s bold, ingenious, and successful -project, cost only seven or eight men killed; while in the former -futile attempts above a hundred and eighty men, besides many -engineer and artillery officers, had fallen. It is, however, a -singular fact that there was a practicable ford near the bridge, -unguarded, and apparently unknown to both sides. - -A short time after the passage of the Tamega, general Heudelet, -marching from Braga by Guimaraens, entered Amarante. Laborde -occupied the position abandoned by Sylveira, and detachments were -sent up the left bank of the river to Mondin: but Loison pursued -the fugitives to the heights of Villa Real and Mezamfrio. The -Portuguese guarding the passage at Canavezas, hearing of the -action, destroyed their ammunition, and retired across the Douro -without being overtaken. - -The 6th of May, the French were near Villa Real and Mezamfrio, -but all the inhabitants had crossed the Douro. This being made -known to Soult, he reinforced Loison, and directed him to scour -the right bank of the Douro as high as Pezo de Ragoa; to complete -the destruction of Sylveira’s army, and to send patroles towards -Braganza, with the view of subduing the Tras os Montes, and of -ascertaining if any French troops had made their appearance there; -for Bessieres had been requested to make a diversion on that side. -Bessieres himself had returned to France, but the reply of his -successor Kellerman being intercepted, it appeared that he was -unable or unwilling to afford any aid. - -General Laborde was now recalled, with two regiments of infantry, -to Oporto; and the communication between that town and Amarante -was guarded by a brigade of dragoons, and a regiment of infantry. -Meanwhile, Loison felt the Portuguese at Pezo de Ragoa, on the -7th of May; but, meeting resistance, and observing a considerable -movement on the opposite bank of the Douro, he became alarmed, and -fell back the same day to Mezamfrio. The next morning he returned -to Amarante, his march being harassed by the peasantry, who came -on with a boldness shewing that some extraordinary support was at -hand; and, in truth, a new actor had appeared upon the scene; the -whole country was in commotion; and Soult, suddenly checked in his -career, was pushed backward by a strong and eager hand. - - -OBSERVATIONS.--SPANISH OPERATION. - -1º.--The great pervading error of the Spaniards in this campaign -was the notion that their armies were capable of taking the lead in -offensive movements, and fighting the French in open countries; -whereas, to avoid general actions should have been a vital -principle. - -2º.--The resolution to fight the French having, however, been -adopted, the second great error was the attaching equal importance -to the lines of operation in La Mancha and Estremadura; the one -should have been considered only as an accessory; and it is evident -that the first rank belonged to La Mancha, because it was in a more -open country; because it more immediately threatened Madrid; and -because a defeat there endangered Seville more than a defeat in -Estremadura would have done. In La Mancha the beaten army must have -fallen back upon Seville: but in Estremadura it might retire upon -Badajos. But, the latter place being to the Spaniards of infinitely -less importance than Madrid was to their opponents, the lead in the -campaign must always have belonged to the army of La Mancha, which -could, at any time, have obliged the French to fight a battle in -defence of the capital. - -The army of Estremadura might, therefore, have been safely reduced -to fifteen thousand men, provided the army of La Mancha had been -increased to forty or fifty thousand: and it would appear that, -with a very little energy, the junta could have provided a larger -force. It is true that they would have been beaten just the same: -but that is an argument against fighting great battles, which was, -certainly, the worst possible plan for the Spaniards to pursue. - -3º.--The third great error was the inertness of Valencia and -Murcia, or rather their hostility: for they were upon the verge -of civil war with the supreme junta. Those provinces, so rich -and populous, had been unmolested for eight months; they had -suffered nothing from Moncey’s irruption; and they had received -large succours from the English government. Valencia had written -her pretensions to patriotism in the bloody characters of -assassination; but, were it not for the force under Llamas which, -after the defeat of Tudela, helped to defend Zaragoza, Valencia -and Murcia might have been swallowed up by the ocean without any -sensible effect upon the general cause. Those countries were, -however, admirably situated to serve as a support to Aragon, -Catalonia, Andalusia, and La Mancha, and they could, at this time, -have paralyzed a large French force, by marching an army to San -Clemente. - -[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -It was the dread of their doing so that made the king restrain -Sebastiani from pursuing his victory at Ciudad Real; and, -assuredly, the Valencians should have moved; for, it is not so much -in their numbers as in the variety of their lines of operation that -a whole people find their advantage in opposing regular armies. -This, the observation of that profound and original writer, general -Lloyd, was confirmed by the practice of Napoleon, in Spain. - - -FRENCH OPERATIONS. - -1º.--To get possession of Seville and Cadiz was certainly as great -an object to Napoleon as to seize Lisbon: but the truth of the -maxim quoted above regulated the emperor’s proceedings. If Victor -had been directed at once upon Andalusia, the Portuguese and -Valencians could have carried their lines of operations directly -upon his flanks and rear. If Badajos and Lisbon had been the -objects of his march, the Andalusians could have fallen on his -left flank and cut his communications. But all such dangers were -avoided by the march of Soult and Lapisse; their direction was not -only concentric, but a regular prolongation of the great line of -communication with France. Ney protected the rear of one; Bessieres -the rear of the other; and those two marshals, at the same time, -separated and cut off the Asturias from the rest of Spain; thus, -all that was formidable was confined to the south of the Tagus. - -For the same reason the course of conquest was to have proceeded -from Portugal to Andalusia, which would then have been assailed -in front and flank at one moment, while the fourth corps held the -Valencians in check. By this plan the French would never have -lost their central position, nor exposed their grand line of -communication to an attack. - -2º.--That this plan, so wisely conceived in its general bearing, -should fail without any of the different corps employed having -suffered a defeat, nay, when they were victorious in all quarters -is surprising, but not inexplicable. It is clear that Napoleon’s -orders were given at a time when he did not expect that a battle -would have been fought at Coruña, or that the second corps would -have suffered so much from the severity of the weather, and the -length of the marches, neither did he anticipate the resistance -that was made by the Portuguese, between the Minho and the Douro. -The last error was a consequence of the first, for his plans were -calculated upon the supposition that the rapidity of Soult’s -movements would forestall all defence; yet the delay cannot be -charged as a fault to that marshal whose energy was conspicuous. - -3º.--Napoleon’s attention, divided between Austria and Spain, must -have been somewhat distracted by the multiplicity of his affairs. -He does not seem to have made allowance for the very rugged country -through which Soult had to march, at a time when all the rivers -and streams were overflowing, from the constant rains; and as -the combinations of war are continually changing, the delay thus -occasioned rendered Lapisse’s instructions faulty: for, although it -be true, that if the latter had marched by Guardia, upon Abrantes, -while Soult advanced to Lisbon, by Coimbra, and that Victor -entered the Alemtejo, Portugal would have been conquered without -difficulty; yet the combination was so wide, and the communications -so uncertain, that unity of action could not be insured. Soult, -weakened by the obstacles he encountered, required reinforcements -after the taking of Oporto; and Lapisse should have considered -himself as rather belonging to Soult than Victor, and have marched -upon Viseu; the duke of Dalmatia would then have been strong enough -to fight his own battle without regard to the operations in the -Alemtejo. - -4º.--The first error of the French, if the facts are correctly -shewn, must, therefore, be attributed to Napoleon, because he -overlooked the probable chances of delay, combined the operations -on too wide a scale, and gave Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, instead -of Lamego and Viseu, for the direction of Lapisse’s march. I say, -if the facts are correctly shewn, for it is scarcely discreet to -censure Napoleon’s military dispositions, however erroneous they -may _appear_ to have been, and it is certain that, in this case, -his errors, if errors they were, although sufficient to embarrass -his lieutenants, will not account for their entire failure. Above -sixty thousand men were put in motion by him, upon good general -principles, for the subjugation of Lisbon; and we must search -in the particular conduct of the generals for the reason why _a -project of Napoleon’s, to be executed by sixty thousand French -veterans, should have ended as idly and ineffectually as if it had -been concocted by the Spanish junta_. - - -OBSERVATIONS ON THE SEPARATE OPERATIONS OF LAPISSE, VICTOR, SOULT, -ROMANA, SYLVEIRA, AND CUESTA. - - -LAPISSE. - -1º.--An intercepted letter of general Maupetit, shews the small -pains taken by Lapisse to communicate with Soult. He directs that -_even so many_ as three hundred men should patrole towards Tras os -Montes, to obtain information of the second corps, at a time when -the object was so important that his whole force should have moved -in mass rather than have failed of intelligence. - -2º.--The manner in which he suffered sir Robert Wilson to gather -strength and to insult his outposts was inexcusable. He might have -marched straight upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and dispersed -every thing in his front; one of those fortresses would probably -have fallen, if not both, and from thence a strong detachment -pushed towards Lamego would not only have ascertained the situation -of the second corps, but would have greatly aided its progress by -threatening Oporto and Braga. It cannot be urged that Salamanca -required the presence of a large force, because, in that open -country, the people were at the mercy of Bessiere’s cavalry; and -so sensible were the local junta of this, that both Salamanca -and Ledesma refused assistance from Ciudad Rodrigo, when it was -offered, and preferred a quiet submission. - -3º.--When, at last, the king’s reiterated orders obliged Lapisse to -put his troops in motion, he made a demonstration against Ciudad -Rodrigo, so feeble that it scarcely called the garrison to the -ramparts, and then as if all chance of success in Portugal was at -an end, breaking through the pass of Perales, he reached Alcantara -and rejoined the first corps; a movement equally at variance with -Napoleon’s orders and with good military discretion; for the first -directed him upon Abrantes, and the second would have carried him -upon Viseu. The march to the latter place, while it insured a -junction with Soult, would not have prevented an after movement -upon Abrantes: the obstacles were by no means so great as those -which awaited him on the march to Alcantara, and the great error of -abandoning the whole country, between the Tagus and the Douro, to -the insurgents would have been avoided. - -Here then was one direct cause of failure; but the error, although -great, was not irreparable. If Soult was abandoned to his own -resources, he had also obtained a firm and important position -in the north, while Victor, reinforced by ten thousand men, -was enabled to operate against Lisbon, by the Alemtejo, more -efficaciously than before. But Victor seems to have been less -disposed than Lapisse to execute his instructions. - - -VICTOR. - -1º.--The inactivity of this marshal after the rout of Ucles has -been already mentioned. It is certain that if the fourth and first -corps had been well handled, neither Cuesta nor Cartoajal could -have ventured beyond the defiles of the Sierra Morena, much -less have bearded the French generals and established a line of -defence along the Tagus. Fifty thousand French troops should, in -two months, have done something more than maintain fifty miles of -country on one side of Madrid. - -2º.--The passage of the Tagus was successful, but can hardly be -called a skilful operation, unless the duke of Belluno calculated -upon the ignorance of his adversary. Before an able general and a -moveable army, possessing a pontoon train, it would have scarcely -answered to separate the troops in three divisions on an extent -of fifty miles, leaving the artillery and parc of ammunition, -protected only by some cavalry and one battalion of infantry, -within two hours march of the enemy, for three days. If Cuesta had -brought up all his detachments, the Meza d’Ibor might have been -effectually manned, and yet ten thousand infantry, and all the -Spanish cavalry, spared to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, on the 17th; -in this case Victor’s artillery would probably have been captured, -and his project certainly baffled. - -3º.--The passage of the Tagus being, however, effected, Victor -not only permitted Cuesta to escape, but actually lost all traces -of his army, an evident fault not to be excused by pleading -the impediments arising from the swelling of the river, the -necessity of securing the communications, &c. If Cuesta’s power -was despised before the passage of the river, when his army was -whole and his position strong, there could be no reason for such -great circumspection after his defeat, a circumspection, too, not -supported by skill, as the dispersed state of the French army, the -evening before the battle of Medellin, proves. - -4º.--That Victor was enabled to fight Cuesta, on the morning of -the 28th, with any prospect of success, must be attributed rather -to fortune than to talent. It was a fault to permit the Spaniards -to retake the offensive after the defeat on the Tagus; nor can the -first movement of the duke of Belluno in the action be praised. He -should have marched into the plain in a compact order of battle. -The danger of sending Lassalle and Latour Maubourg to such a -distance from the main body I shall have occasion to show in my -observations on Cuesta’s operations; but, the after-movements -of the French in this battle were well and rapidly combined and -vigorously executed, and the success was proportionate to the -ability displayed. - -5º.--The battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, which utterly -destroyed the Spanish armies and laid Seville and Badajos open; -those battles, in which blood was spilt like water, produced no -result to the victors, for the French generals, as if they had -struck a torpedo, never stretched forth their hands a second time. -Sebastiani, indeed, wished to penetrate the Sierra Morena; but the -king, fearful of the Valencians, restrained him. On the other hand, -Joseph urged Victor to invade the Alemtejo, yet the latter would -not obey, even when reinforced by Lapisse’s division. This was the -great and fatal error of the whole campaign, for nearly all the -disposable British and Portuguese troops were thus enabled to move -against the duke of Dalmatia, while the duke of Belluno contrived -neither to fulfil the instructions of Napoleon, nor the orders of -the king, nor yet to perform any useful achievement himself. - -He did not assist the invasion of Portugal, he did not maintain -Estremadura, he did not take Seville, nor even prevent Cuesta -from twice renewing the offensive; yet he remained in an -unhealthy situation until he lost more men, by sickness, than -would have furnished three such battles as Medellin. Two months -so unprofitably wasted by a general, at the head of thirty -thousand good troops, can scarcely be cited. The duke of Belluno’s -reputation has been too hardly earned to attribute this inactivity -to want of talent. That he was averse to aid the operations of -marshal Soult is evident, and, most happily for Portugal, it was -so; but, whether this aversion arose from personal jealousy, from -indisposition to obey the king, or from a mistaken view of affairs, -I have no means of judging. - - -CUESTA. - -Cuesta’s peculiar unfitness for the lead of an army has been -remarked more than once. It remains to show that his proceedings, -on this occasion, continued to justify those remarks. - -1º.--To defend a river, on a long line, is generally hopeless, and -especially when the defenders have not the means of passing freely, -in several places, to the opposite bank. Alexander, Hannibal, -Cæsar, Gustavus, Turenne, Napoleon, Wellington, and hundreds of -others have shown how the passage of rivers may be won. Umenes, who -prevented Antigonus from passing the Coprates, is, perhaps, the -only example of a general baffling the efforts of a skilful and -enterprising enemy in such an attempt. - -2º.--The defence of rivers having always proved fruitless, it -follows that no general should calculate upon success, and that he -should exert the greatest energy, activity, and vigilance to avoid -a heavy disaster; that all his lines of retreat should be kept -free and open, and be concentric; and that to bring his magazines -and depôts close up to the army, in such a situation, is rashness -itself. Now Cuesta was inactive, and, disregarding the maxim -which forbids the establishment of magazines in the first line of -defence, brought up the whole of his to Deleyton and Truxillo. -His combinations were ill-arranged; he abandoned Mirabete without -an effort, his depôts fell into the hands of the enemy, and his -retreat was confused and eccentric, inasmuch as part of his army -retired into the Guadalupe, while others went to Merida, and he -himself to Medellin. - -3º.--The line of retreat upon Medellin and Campanarios, instead -of Badajos, being determined by the necessity of uniting with -Albuquerque, cannot be blamed, and the immediate return to -Medellin was bold and worthy of praise, but its merit consisted in -recovering the offensive immediately after a defeat; wherefore, -Cuesta should not have halted at Medellin, thus giving the lead -again to the French general; he should have continued to advance, -and have fallen upon the scattered divisions of the French -army, endeavouring to beat them in detail, and to rally his own -detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe. The error of stopping -short at Medellin would have been apparent, if Victor, placing a -rear-guard to amuse the Spanish general, had taken the road to -Seville by Almendralejos and Zafra. - -4º. Cuesta’s general design for the battle of Medellin was well -imagined, that is, it was right to hide his army behind the ridge, -and to defer the attack until the enemy had developed his force and -order of battle in the plain, but the execution was on the lowest -scale. If, instead of advancing in one long and weak line, without -a reserve, Cuesta had held the greatest part of his troops in solid -columns, and thrust them between Lassalle and Latour Maubourg’s -divisions, which were pushed out like horns from the main body -of the French, those generals would have been cut off, and the -battle commenced by dividing the French army into three unconnected -masses, while the Spaniards would have been compact, well in hand, -and masters of the general movements. Nothing could then have saved -Victor, except hard fighting; but Cuesta’s actual dispositions -rendered it impossible for the Spaniards to win the battle by -courage, or to escape the pursuit by swiftness. - -5º. It is remarkable that the Spanish general seems never to have -thought of putting Truxillo, Guadalupe, Merida, Estrella, or -Medellin in a state of defence, although most if not all those -places had some castle or walls capable of resisting a sudden -assault. There was time to do it, for Cuesta remained unmolested, -on the Tagus, from January to the middle of March; and every -additional point of support thus obtained for an undisciplined army -would have diminished the advantages derived by the French from -their superior facility of movement. The places themselves might -have been garrisoned by the citizens and peasantry, and a week’s, -a day’s, nay, even an hour’s, delay was of importance to a force -like Cuesta’s, which, from its inexperience, must have always been -liable to confusion. - - -SOULT. - -1º. The march of this general in one column, upon Tuy, was made -under the impression that resistance would not be offered; -otherwise, it is probable that a division of infantry and a brigade -of cavalry would have been sent from St. Jago or Mellid direct upon -Orense, to insure the passage of the Minho; and it seems to have -been an error in Ney, arising, probably, from the same cause, not -to have kept Marchand’s division of the sixth corps at Orense until -the second corps had effected an entrance into Portugal. - -2º. Soult’s resolution to place the artillery and stores in Tuy, -and march into Portugal, trusting to victory for re-opening the -communication, would increase the reputation of any general. Three -times before he reached Oporto he was obliged to halt, in order to -fabricate cartridges for the infantry, from the powder taken in -battle; and his whole progress from Tuy to that city was energetic -and able in the extreme. - -3º. The military proceedings, after the taking of Oporto, do not -all bear the same stamp. The administration of the civil affairs -appears to have engrossed the marshal’s attention; and his -absence from the immediate scene of action sensibly affected the -operations. Franceschi shewed too much respect for Trant’s corps. -Loison’s movements were timid and slow; and even Laborde’s genius -seems to have been asleep. The importance of crushing Sylveira -was obvious. Now, there is nothing more necessary in war than to -strike with all the force you can at once; but here Caulaincourt -was first sent, and being too weak, Loison reinforced him, and -Laborde reinforced Loison; and all were scarcely sufficient at -last to do that which half would have done at first; but the whole -of these transactions are obscure. The great delay that took -place before the bridge of Amarante; the hesitation and frequent -recurrence for orders to the marshal, indicate want of zeal, and a -desire to procrastinate, in opposition to Soult’s wishes. Judging -from Mr. Noble’s history of the campaign, this must be traced -to a conspiracy in the French army, which shall be touched upon -hereafter. - -4º. The resistance made by the Portuguese peasantry was infinitely -creditable to their courage; but there cannot be a stronger proof -of the inefficacy of a like defence, when unsupported by good -troops. No country is more favourable to such a warfare than the -northern provinces of Portugal; the people were brave, and they -had the assistance of the organized forces under Romana, Sylveira, -Eben, and the bishop: yet we find, that Soult, in the very worst -season of the year, overcame all resistance, and penetrated to -Oporto, without an actual loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, -of more than two thousand five hundred men, including the twelve -hundred sick, captured at Chaves. - - -ROMANA. - -1º. Romana remained at Oimbra and Monterey, unmolested, from the -21st of January to the 6th of March; he had, therefore, time to -reorganise his forces, and he had, in fact, ten thousand regular -troops in tolerable order. He knew, on the 11th or 12th, that -Soult was preparing to pass the Minho, between Tuy and Guardia. -He knew, also, that the people of Ribidavia and Orense were in -arms; that those on the Arosa were preparing to rise; and that, -consequently, the French must, were it only from want of food, -break out of the contracted position they occupied, either by -Ribidavia and Orense, or by crossing the Minho, or by retreating to -St. Jago. - -With these guides, the path of the Spanish general was as plain as -the writing on the wall; he was at the head of ten thousand regular -troops; two marches would have brought him to Ribidavia, in front -of which town he might have occupied a position close on the left -flank of the French, rallied all the insurgents about him, and have -organized a formidable warfare. The French durst not have attempted -the passage of the Minho while he was in front of Ribidavia; and if -they turned against him, the place was favourable for battle, and -the retreat open by Orense and Monterey; while the difficulty of -bringing up artillery would hamper the pursuit. On the other hand, -if Soult had retreated, that alone would have been tantamount to a -victory; and Romana would have been well placed to follow upon the -rear of the French, connecting himself with the English vessels of -war upon that coast as he advanced. - -2º. So far from contemplating operations of this nature, Romana -did not even concentrate his force; but keeping it extended, in -small parties, along fifteen miles of country, indulged himself -in speculations about his enemy’s weakness, and the prospect of -their retreating altogether from the Peninsula; until he was roused -from his reveries, by finding his divisions beaten in detail, -and himself forced either to join the Portuguese with whom he -was quarrelling, or to break his promises to Sylveira and fly by -cross roads over the mountain on his right: he adopted the latter, -thus proving, that whatever might be his resources for raising an -insurrection, he could not direct one; and that he was, although -brave and active, totally destitute of military talent. At a -later period of the war, the duke of Wellington, after a long and -fruitless military discussion, drily observed, that either Romana -or himself had mistaken their profession. Time has since shewn -which. - - -SYLVEIRA. - -1º. This Portuguese general’s first operations were as ill -conducted as Romana’s; his posts were too extended; he made no -attempt to repair the works of Chaves, none to aid the important -insurrection of Ribidavia; but these errors cannot be fairly -charged upon him, as his officers were so unruly, that they held -a council of war per force, where thirty voted for fighting at -Chaves, and twenty-nine against it; the casting voice being given -by the voter calling on the troops to follow him. - -2º. The after-movement, by which Chaves was recaptured, whether -devised by Sylveira himself, or directed by marshal Beresford, -was bold and skilful; but the advance to Penafiel, while La -Houssaye and Heudelet could from Braga pass by Guimaraens, and -cut him off from Amarante, was as rash as his subsequent flight -was disgraceful. Yet, thanks to the heroic courage of colonel -Patrick, Sylveira’s reputation as a general was established among -his countrymen, by the very action which should have ruined him in -their estimation. - - - - -BOOK VIII. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.] - -It will be remembered that the narrative of sir John Cradock’s -proceedings was discontinued at the moment when that general, -nothing shaken by the importunities of the regency, the -representations of marshal Beresford, or the advice of Mr. Frere, -resolved to await at Lumiar for the arrival of the promised -reinforcements from England. While in this position, he made every -exertion to obtain transport for the supplies, remounts for the -cavalry, and draught animals for the artillery; but the Portuguese -government gave him no assistance, and an attempt to procure horses -and mules in Morocco proving unsuccessful, the army was so scantily -furnished that, other reasons failing, this alone would have -prevented any advance towards the frontier. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The singular inactivity of Victor surprised Cradock, but did -not alter his resolution; yet, being continually importuned to -advance, he, when assured that five thousand men of the promised -reinforcements were actually off the rock of Lisbon, held a council -of war. All the generals were averse to marching on Oporto, except -Beresford, and he admitted that its propriety depended on Victor’s -movements. Meanwhile, that marshal approached Badajos; Lapisse came -down upon the Agueda, and Soult, having stormed Oporto, pushed his -advanced posts to the Vouga. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 4, section 1.] - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -A cry of treason then became general in Portugal, and both the -people and the soldiers evinced a spirit truly alarming. The -latter, disregarding the authority of Beresford, and menacing their -own officers, declared that it was necessary to slay a thousand -traitors in Lisbon; and the regiments in Abrantes even abandoned -that post, and marched to join Trant upon the Vouga. But, when -these disorders were at the worst, and when a vigorous movement -of Victor and Lapisse would have produced fatal consequences, -general Hill landed with about five thousand men and three hundred -artillery horses. Cradock, then, resolved to advance, moved thereto -chiefly by the representations of Beresford, who thought such a -measure absolutely necessary to restore confidence, to ensure the -obedience of the native troops, and to enable him to take measures -for the safety of Abrantes. - -Thus, about the time that Tuy was relieved by the French, and that -Sylveira was attacked at Penafiel by Laborde, the English army was -put in motion, part upon Caldas and Obidos, part upon Rio Mayor; -and the campaign was actually commenced by Cradock, when that -general, although his measures had been all approved of by his -government, was suddenly and unexpectedly required to surrender -his command to sir Arthur Wellesley, and to proceed himself to -Gibraltar. - -[Sidenote: Lord Londonderry’s Narrative.] - -It would appear that this arrangement was adopted after a struggle -in the cabinet, and, certainly, neither the particular choice nor -the general principle of employing men of talent without regard -to seniority can be censured; nevertheless, sir John Cradock was -used unworthily. A general of his rank would never have accepted -a command on such terms; and it was neither just nor decent to -expose him to an unmerited mortification. - -Before the arrival of his successor, Cradock assembled the army at -Leiria, and established his magazines at Abrantes, Santarem, and -Peniché; but as the admiral fearing the difficult navigation at -that season, would not send victuallers to the latter place, the -magazines there were but scantily supplied. Meanwhile Lapisse made -way by Alcantara to Merida, the re-capture of Chaves became known, -and the insurrection in Beira and Tras os Montes took its full -spring. Trant’s force also increased on the Vouga, and Beresford, -who had succeeded in restoring order among the Portuguese -battalions, was more than ever urgent for an attack upon Soult; but -Cradock, unprovided with a due proportion of cavalry, unable to -procure provisions or forage, and fearful for the safety of Lisbon, -refused; and the 24th of April, hearing that his successor had -arrived, he resigned the command and repaired to Gibraltar. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 15.] - -Sir Arthur Wellesley landed the 22d of April, and, on the 24th, -signified to the British ministers that, affairs being in the -condition contemplated by them, it was his intention to assume -the command of the army; a circumstance worthy of attention, as -indicating that the defence of Portugal was even then considered a -secondary object, and of uncertain promise. The deliverance of the -Peninsula was never due to the foresight and perseverance of the -English ministers, but to the firmness and skill of the British -generals, and to the courage of troops whom no dangers could daunt -and no hardships dishearten, while they remedied the eternal errors -of the cabinet. - -The unexpected arrival of a man known only as a victorious -commander created the greatest enthusiasm in Portugal. The regency -immediately nominated him marshal-general of their troops. -The people, always fond of novelty, hailed his presence with -enthusiasm; and all those persons, whether Portuguese or British, -who had blamed sir John Cradock’s prudent caution, now anticipating -a change of system, spake largely and confidently of the future -operations: in truth, all classes were greatly excited, and an -undefined yet powerful sentiment that something great would soon be -achieved pervaded the public mind. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16.] - -Sir Arthur’s plans were, however, neither hastily adopted nor -recklessly hurried forward; like Cradock, he felt the danger -of removing far from Lisbon while Victor was on the Alemtejo -frontier, and he anxiously weighed his own resources against those -at the enemy’s disposal. Not that he wavered between offensive -and defensive movements, for a general of his discernment could -not fail to perceive that, if the French were acting upon any -concerted plan, the false march of Lapisse to Merida had marred -their combinations, by placing a whole nation, with all its -fortresses and all its forces, whether insurgents, regular troops, -or auxiliaries, between the armies of Victor and Soult, and that -neither concert nor communication could longer exist between those -marshals. - -Soult’s offensive strength, also, was evidently exhausted; he might -establish himself firmly in the provinces beyond the Douro, but -he could not, alone, force his way to Lisbon, a distance of two -hundred miles, in a season when the waters were full, and through -a country tangled with rivers, mountains, and defiles. He could -not hope, with twenty-four thousand men, to beat a whole people -in arms, assisted by an auxiliary army of as high reputation, -and nearly as numerous as his own; and, moreover, there were -discontents and conspiracy in his camp; and of this sir Arthur was -aware. - -Soult alone, then, was no longer formidable to the capital; but -that which weakened him increased the offensive power of Victor, -who was now at the head of thirty thousand men, and might march -straight upon Lisbon, and through an open country, the only barrier -being the Tagus, a river fordable in almost all seasons. Such a -movement, or even the semblance of it, must perforce draw the -British and native armies to that side; and then Soult, coming down -to the Mondego, might, from thence, connect his operations with -Victor’s by the line of the Zezere, or advance at once on Lisbon as -occasion offered. - -Now, to meet the exigencies of the campaign, the military resources -of the English general were,-- - -1º. His central position. - -2º. His own British and German troops, about twenty-six thousand in -number; of which the present under arms, including sergeants,[6] -amounted to twenty-two thousand, with three thousand seven hundred -horses and mules. - -3º. The Portuguese troops of the line; of which there might be -organised and armed about sixteen thousand. - -Nearly all these troops were already collected, or capable of -being collected in a short time, between the Tagus and Mondego; -and beyond the latter river, Trant and Sylveira commanded separate -corps; the one upon the Vouga, the other on the Tamega. - -4º. The militia and the _ordenanzas_, which may be denominated the -insurgent force. - -5º. The fortresses of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Elvas, Abrantes, -Peniché, and Badajos. - -6º. The English fleet, the Portuguese craft, and the free use of -the coast and river navigation for his supplies. - -7º. The assistance of Cuesta’s army, which amounted to thirty -thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry; of which twenty-five -thousand were actually at or in front of the defile of Monasterio, -close to Victor’s posts. Sir Arthur Wellesley’s moral resources -were the high courage of his own troops; his personal popularity; -the energy of an excited people; a favourable moment; the -presentiment of victory; and a mind equal to the occasion. - -In a strategic point of view, to fall upon Victor was best, because -he was the most dangerous neighbour to Portugal; because his defeat -would prove most detrimental to the French, most advantageous to -the Spaniards; and because the greatest body of troops could be -brought to bear against him. - -On the other hand, Soult held a rich province, from whence the -chief supply of cattle for the army was derived; he was in -possession of the second city in the kingdom, where he was forming -a French party; the feelings of the regency and the people were -greatly troubled by the loss of Oporto; and their desire to regain -it was strongly expressed. - -To attack Victor, it was indispensable to concert operations with -Cuesta; but that general was ill disposed towards the British, and -to insure his co-operation would have required time, which could be -better employed in expelling Soult. For these reasons, sir Arthur -Wellesley determined to attack the last-named marshal without -delay; intending, if successful, to establish a good system of -defence in the northern provinces: and then, in conjunction with -Cuesta, to turn his arms against Victor, hoping thus to relieve -Gallicia more effectually than by following the French into that -province. - -The security of Lisbon being the pivot of the operations against -Soult, time was the principal object to be gained. If Victor came -fiercely on, he could not be stopped, but his course might be -impeded; his path could not be blocked, but it might be planted -with thorns: and to effect this, eight or ten thousand Portuguese -troops were immediately directed upon Abrantes and Santarem, -and two British battalions and two regiments of cavalry just -disembarked, marched to the same places, where they were joined by -three other battalions drafted from the army at Leiria. - -A body of two thousand men, composed of a militia regiment and of -the Lusitanian legion, which remained near Castello Branco after -Lapisse had crossed the Tagus, were placed under the command -of colonel Mayne, and directed to take post at the bridge of -Alcantara, having orders to defend the passage of the river, and, -if necessary, to blow up the structure. At the same time, the -flying bridges at Villa Velha and Abrantes were removed, the -garrison of the latter place was reinforced, and general Mackenzie -was appointed to command all the troops, whether Portuguese or -British, thus distributed along the right bank of the Tagus. - -These precautions appeared sufficient, especially as there was a -general disposition to believe the French weaker than they really -were. Victor could not, by a mere demonstration, shake the line -of defence. If he forced the bridge of Alcantara, and penetrated -by the sterile and difficult route formerly followed by Junot, it -would bring him, without guns, upon Abrantes; but Abrantes was -already capable of a short resistance, and Mackenzie would have had -time to line the rugged banks of the Zezere. - -If, leaving Badajos and Elvas behind him, Victor should pass -through the Alemtejo, and cross the Tagus between Abrantes and -Lisbon, he was to be feared; but Cuesta had promised to follow -closely in the French general’s rear, and it was reasonable to -suppose that Mackenzie, although he might be unable to prevent the -passage of the river, would not suffer himself to be cut off from -the capital, where, having the assistance of the fleet, the aid of -the citizens, and the chance of reinforcements from England, he -might defend himself until the army could return from the Douro. -Moreover, Victor was eighteen marches from Lisbon; it was only by -accident that he and Soult could act in concert, while the allied -army, having a sure and rapid mode of correspondence with Cuesta, -was already within four marches of Oporto. - -The main body of the allies was now directed upon Coimbra; and -four of the best Portuguese battalions were incorporated in the -British brigades. Marshal Beresford retained, under his personal -command, about six thousand native troops; Trant remained stedfast -on the Vouga; Sylveira on the Tamega; and sir Robert Wilson, -quitting the command of the legion, was detached, with a small -Portuguese force, to Viseu, where, hanging upon Franceschi’s left -flank, he also communicated with Sylveira’s corps by the way of -Lamego. - -The difficulty of bringing up forage and provisions, which had -pressed so sorely on sir John Cradock, was now somewhat lessened. -The land transport was still scanty; and the admiral, dreading -the long shore navigation for large vessels, was without the -small craft necessary for victualling the troops by the coast; -but the magazines at Caldas were partly filled, and twenty large -country-boats being loaded with provisions, and the owners induced, -by premiums, to make the run, had put safely into Peniché and the -Mondego. In short, the obstacles to a forward movement, although -great, were not insurmountable. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Coimbra the 2d of May. His army was -concentrated there on the 5th, in number about twenty-five thousand -sabres and bayonets; of which nine thousand were Portuguese, three -thousand Germans, and the remainder British. The duke of Dalmatia -was ignorant that the allies were thus assembled in force upon the -Mondego, but many French officers knew it, and were silent, being -engaged in a plot of a very extraordinary nature, and which was -probably a part of the conspiracy alluded to in the first volume -of this work, as being conducted through the medium of the princess -of Tour and Taxis. - -The French soldiers were impatient and murmuring; their attachment -to Napoleon himself was deep and unshaken, but human nature shrinks -from perpetual contact with death; and they were tired of war. This -feeling induced some officers of high rank, serving in Spain, to -form a plan for changing the French government. Generally speaking, -these men were friendly to Napoleon personally; but they were -republicans in their politics, and earnest to reduce the power of -the emperor. Their project, founded upon the discontent of the -troops in the Peninsula, was to make a truce with the English -army, to elect a chief, and march into France with the resolution -to abate the pride of Napoleon, or to pull him from his throne. -The conspirators at first turned their eyes upon marshal Ney, but -finally resolved to choose Gouvion St. Cyr for their leader. Yet -it was easier to resolve than to execute. Napoleon’s ascendancy, -supported by the love and admiration of millions, was not to be -shaken by the conspiracy of a few discontented men: and, although -their hopes were not entirely relinquished until after Massena’s -retreat from Portugal in 1810, long before that period they -discovered that the soldiers, tired as they were of war, were -faithful to their great monarch, and would have slain any who -openly stirred against him. - -The foregoing facts are stated on the authority of a principal -mover of the sedition; but many minor plots had cotemporary -existence, for this was the spring time of folly. In the second -corps, the conspirators were numerous, and, by their discourses -and their slow and sullen execution of orders, had continually -thwarted the operations of marshal Soult, yet without exciting -his suspicions; but, as he penetrated into Portugal, their -counteractions increased, and, by the time he arrived at Oporto, -their design was ripe for execution. - -In the middle of April, John Viana, the son of an Oporto merchant, -appeared at marshal Beresford’s head-quarters, with proposals from -the French malcontents. The latter desired to have an English -officer sent to them, to arrange the execution of a plan, which was -to be commenced by seizing their general, and giving him over to -the British outposts: a detestable project, for it is not in the -field, and with a foreign enemy, that soldiers should concert the -overthrow of their country’s institutions, and although it would -be idle and impertinent in a foreigner to say how much and how -long men shall bear with what they deem an oppressive government, -there is a distinct and especial loyalty due from a soldier to his -general in the field; a compact of honour, which it is singularly -base to violate; and so it has in all ages been considered. When -the Argyraspides, or silver-shields of the Macedonians, delivered -their general, Eumenes, in bonds, to Antigonus, the latter, -although he had tempted them to the deed, and scrupled not to slay -the hero, reproached the treacherous soldiers for their conduct, -and, with the approbation of all men, destroyed them. Yet Antigonus -was not a foreign enemy, but of their own kin and blood. - -An English lieutenant-colonel attached to the Portuguese service -reluctantly undertook the duty of meeting the conspirators, and -penetrated, by night, but in uniform, behind the French outposts, -by the lake of Aveiro or Ovar. He had previously arranged that -one of the malcontents should meet him on the water; the boats -unknowingly passed each other in the dark, and the Englishman -returned to Aveiro; but he there found John Viana, in company with -the adjutant-major, D’Argenton. The latter confirmed what Viana -had declared at Thomar; he expressed great respect for Soult, but -dwelt upon the necessity of removing him before an appeal could be -made to the soldiers; and he readily agreed to wait, in person, -upon Beresford, saying he was himself too strongly supported in the -French army to be afraid. - -Marshal Beresford was then at Lisbon, and thither D’Argenton -followed; and, having seen him and sir Arthur Wellesley, and -remained five days in that capital, returned to Oporto. While at -Lisbon, he, in addition to his former reasons for this conspiracy, -stated that Soult wished to make himself king of Portugal; an error -into which he and many others naturally fell, from circumstances -that I have already noticed. - -When sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Coimbra, D’Argenton appeared -again at the English head-quarters; but this time, by the order -of sir Arthur, he was conducted through bye-paths, and returned -convinced, from what he had seen and heard, that although the -allies were in force on the Mondego, many days must elapse -before they could be in a condition to attack Oporto. During his -absence, D’Argenton was denounced by general Lefebre, who was -falsely imagined to be favourable to the conspiracy; passports, -signed by admiral Berkely, which this unfortunate man, contrary -to sir A. Wellesley’s urgent recommendation, had insisted upon -having, completely proved his guilt; and Soult, until that moment, -without suspicion, beheld with amazement the abyss that yawned -beneath his feet: his firmness, however, did not desert him. He -offered D’Argenton pardon, and even reward, if he would disclose -the names of the other conspirators and relate truly what he -had seen of the English and Portuguese armies. The prisoner, to -save his life, readily told all that he knew of the British, but -sir A. Wellesley’s foresight had rendered that tale useless; -and with respect to his accomplices D’Argenton was immoveable. -Exaggerating the importance of the conspiracy, he even defied the -marshal’s power, and advised him, as the safest course, to adopt -the conspirators’ sentiments; nor was this boldness fatal to him -at the moment, for Soult, anxious to ascertain the extent of the -danger, delayed executing him, and he effected his escape during -the subsequent operations. - -He was not the only person who communicated secretly with the -British general; colonel Donadieu and colonel Lafitte were engaged -in the conspiracy. The latter is said to have had an interview with -sir Arthur, between the outposts of the two armies, and from the -first the malcontents were urgent that the movements of the allied -forces should be so regulated as to favour their proceedings; but -sir Arthur Wellesley, having little dependence upon intrigue, -sternly intimated that his operations could not be regulated by -their plots, and hastened his military measures. - -Under the impression that Sylveira was successfully defending -the line of the Tamega, the British general at first resolved to -reinforce him by sending Beresford’s and sir Robert Wilson’s corps -across the Douro at Lamego, by which he hoped to cut Soult off from -Tras os Montes, intending, when their junction was effected, to -march with his own army direct upon Oporto, and to cross the Douro -near that town, by the aid of Beresford’s corps, which would then -be on the right bank. This measure, if executed, would, including -Trant’s, Wilson’s, and Sylveira’s people, have placed a mass of -thirty thousand troops, regulars and irregulars, between the Tras -os Montes and Soult, and the latter must have fought a battle under -very unfavourable circumstances, or have fallen back on the Minho, -which he could scarcely have passed at that season while pressed -by the pursuing army. But the plan was necessarily abandoned when -intelligence arrived that the bridge of Amarante was forced, and -that Sylveira, pursued by the enemy, was driven over the Douro. - -The news of this disaster only reached Coimbra the 4th of May; -on the 6th, a part of the army was already in motion to execute -a fresh project, adapted to the change of affairs; and as this -eagerness to fall on Soult may appear to justify those who censured -sir J. Cradock’s caution, it may here be well to shew how far the -circumstances were changed. - -When Cradock refused to advance, the Portuguese troops were -insubordinate and disorganized; they were now obedient and improved -in discipline. - -Sir John Cradock had scarcely any cavalry; four regiments had since -been added. - -In the middle of April, Cuesta was only gathering the wrecks of -his forces after Medellin; he was now at the head of thirty-five -thousand men. - -The intentions of the British government had been doubtful; -they were no longer so. Sir John Cradock’s influence had been -restricted; but the new general came out with enlarged powers, the -full confidence of the ministers, and with Portuguese rank. His -reputation, his popularity, and the disposition of mankind always -prone to magnify the future, whether for good or bad, combined -to give an unusual impulse to public feeling, and enabled him to -dictate at once to the regency, the diplomatists, the generals, -and the people; to disregard all petty jealousies and intrigues, -and to calculate upon resources from which his predecessor was -debarred. Sir Arthur Wellesley, habituated to the command of -armies, was moreover endowed by nature with a lofty genius, and a -mind capacious of warlike affairs. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -CAMPAIGN ON THE DOURO. - - -After the victory at Amarante, Laborde was recalled to Oporto, but -a brigade of cavalry and a regiment of infantry were left to keep -up the communication with Loison; and as the insurgent general -Bonthielo had reappeared on the Lima, general Lorge’s dragoons were -directed on that side. Mermet’s division was then pushed towards -the Vouga, and thus the French army was extended by detachments -from that river to the Tamega; and the wings separated by the Douro -and occupying two sides of a triangle, were without communication, -except by the boat-bridge of Oporto. It required three days, -therefore, to unite the army on its centre, and five days to -concentrate it on either extremity. - -The situation of the allies was very different;--sir Arthur -Wellesley having, unknown to Soult, assembled the bulk of the -troops at Coimbra, commanded the choice of two lines of operation; -the one through Viseu and Lamego, by which, in four or five -marches, he could turn the French left, and cut them off from Tras -os Montes; the other by the roads leading upon Oporto, by which, -in two marches, he could throw himself unexpectedly, and in very -superior numbers, upon the enemy’s right, with a fair prospect of -crushing it between the Vouga and the Douro. - -In taking the first of these two lines, which were separated -by the lofty ridges of the Sierra de Caramula, the march could -be covered by Wilson’s corps, at Viseu, and by Sylveira’s, near -Lamego. Along the second the movement could be screened by Trant’s -corps on the Vouga. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The duke of Dalmatia’s dispositions were made in ignorance of sir -Arthur Wellesley’s position, numbers, and intentions. He was not -even aware of the vicinity of such an antagonist, but sensible -that to advance directly upon Lisbon was beyond his own strength, -he already meditated to cross the Tamega, and then covered by that -river and the Douro, to follow the great route of Bragança, and so -enter the Salamanca country. It was in this view that Loison had -been directed to get possession of Mezamfrio and Pezo de Ragoa, -and the march of Mermet was only intended to support Franceschi’s -retreat, when the army should commence its movement towards the -Tamega. - -The 9th of May, D’Argenton was arrested; the film fell from -Soult’s eyes, and all the perils of his position broke at once -upon his view. Treason in his camp, which he could not probe, a -powerful enemy close in his front, the insurgents again active in -his rear, and the French troops scattered from the Vouga to the -Tamega, and from the Douro to the Lima, and commanded by officers, -whose fidelity was necessarily suspected, while the extent of the -conspiracy was unknown. - -Appalling as this prospect was, the duke of Dalmatia did not quail -at the view. The general officers assured him of the fidelity of -the troops; and Loison was immediately ordered to keep Mezamfrio -and Ragoa, if he could, but, under any circumstances, to hold -Amarante fast. The greatest part of the guns and stores at -Oporto were at the same time directed upon the Tamega, and the -ammunition that could not be removed was destroyed. General Lorge -was commanded to withdraw the garrison from Viana, and to proceed -likewise to Amarante, and, while D’Argenton was closely, although -vainly, pressed to discover the names of the conspirators, Soult -prepared to execute his intended movement through the Tras os -Montes. But the war was coming on with a full and swift tide; -Loison, upon whose vigour the success of the operation depended, -was already giving way; sir Arthur Wellesley was across the Vouga, -and Franceschi and Mermet were struggling in his grasp. - -The English general resolved to operate along both the routes -before spoken of, but the greater facility of supplying the troops -by the coast-line, and, above all, the exposed position of the -French right wing, so near the allies and so distant from succour, -induced him to make the principal attack by the high road leading -to Oporto. - -The army was formed in one division of cavalry and three of -infantry, exclusive of Beresford’s separate corps. - -The first division, consisting of two brigades of infantry and -twelve guns, was commanded by lieut.-general Paget. - -The second, consisting of three brigades of infantry and six guns, -by lieut.-general Sherbrooke. - -The third, consisting of two brigades of infantry and six guns, by -major-general Hill. - -The cavalry by lieut.-general Payne. - -The whole amounted to about fourteen thousand five hundred -infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and twenty-four guns, of which -six were only three-pounders. - -The 6th of May, Beresford, with six thousand Portuguese, two -British battalions, five companies of riflemen, and a squadron of -heavy cavalry, marched upon Lamego by the road of Viseu. - -The 7th, the light cavalry and Paget’s division advanced towards -the Vouga by the Oporto road, but halted, on the 8th, to give -Beresford time to reach the Upper Douro, before the attack on the -French right should commence. - -The 9th, they resumed their march for the bridge of Vouga, and, at -the same time, Hill’s division, taking the Aveiro road, the whole -reached the line of the Vouga river that evening; but Paget’s -division was not brought up until after dark, and then with -caution, to prevent the enemy’s guards from seeing the columns, the -intent being to surprise Franceschi the next morning. - -That general, with all his cavalry, a regiment of Mermet’s -division, and six guns, occupied a village, about eight miles -beyond Vouga bridge, called Albergaria Nova; the remainder of -Mermet’s infantry were at Grijon, one march in the rear, and on the -main road to Oporto. Franceschi had that day informed Soult that -the allied forces were collecting on the Mondego, and that Trant’s -posts had closed upon the Vouga; but he was far from suspecting -that the whole army was upon the last river, although, from the -imprudent conversation of an English officer, bearing a flag of -truce, he had reason to expect an attack of some kind. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley’s plan was partly arranged upon the suggestion -of the field-officer who had met D’Argenton. He had observed, -during his intercourse with the conspirators, that the lake of Ovar -was unguarded by the French, although it extended twenty miles -behind their outposts, and that all the boats were at Aveiro, which -was in possession of the allies. On his information it was decided -to turn the enemy’s right by the lake. - -Accordingly, general Hill embarked, the evening of the 9th, -with one brigade, the other being to follow him as quickly as -possible. The fishermen looked on at first with surprise; but, -soon comprehending the object, they voluntarily rushed in crowds -to the boats, and worked with such a will that the whole flotilla -arrived at Ovar precisely at sunrise on the 10th, and the troops -immediately disembarked. That day, also, marshal Beresford, having -rallied Wilson’s corps upon his own, reached Pezo de Ragoa, and he -it was that had repulsed Loison, and pursued him to Amarante. - -Both flanks of the French army were now turned, and at the same -moment sir Arthur, with the main body, fell upon Franceschi, for, -while the flotilla was navigating the lake of Ovar, the attempt -to surprise that general, at Albergaria Nova, was in progress. -Sherbrooke’s division was still in the rear; but general Cotton, -with the light cavalry, crossing the Vouga, a little after -midnight, endeavoured to turn the enemy’s left, and to get into his -rear; the head of Paget’s division, marching a little later, was to -pass through the defiles of Vouga, directly upon Albergaria, and -Trant’s corps was to make way between Paget’s division and the lake -of Aveiro. - -This enterprise, so well conceived, was baffled by petty events, -such as always abound in war. Sir Arthur Wellesley did not -perfectly know the ground beyond the Vouga; and, late in the -evening of the 9th, colonel Trant, having ascertained that an -impracticable ravine, extending from the lake to Oliveira de -Azemis, would prevent him from obeying his orders, passed the -bridge of Vouga, and carried his own guns beyond the defiles, in -order to leave the bridge clear for the British artillery and for -general Richard Stewart’s brigade. - -Stewart was charged to conduct the guns through the defile; but -the task was difficult, several carriages broke down, and Trant’s -corps thus took the lead of Paget’s column, the march of which was -impeded by the broken gun-carriages. Meanwhile the cavalry, under -Cotton, were misled by the guides, and came, in broad daylight, -upon Franceschi, who, with his flank resting upon a wood, garnished -with infantry, boldly offered a battle that Cotton durst not, under -such circumstances, accept. Thus, an hour’s delay, produced by a -few trifling accidents, marred a combination that would have shorn -Soult of a third of his infantry and all his light cavalry, for it -is not to be supposed that, when Franceschi’s horsemen were cut -off, and general Hill at Ovar, Mermet’s division could have escaped -across the Douro. - -When sir Arthur Wellesley came up to Albergaria with Paget’s -infantry, Franceschi was still in position, skirmishing with -Trant’s corps, and evidently ignorant of what a force was advancing -against him. Being immediately attacked, and his foot dislodged -from the wood, he retreated along the road to Oliveira de Azemis, -and was briskly pursued by the allied infantry; but, extricating -himself valiantly from his perilous situation, he reached Oliveira -without any serious loss; and continuing his march during the -night, by Feria, joined Mermet the next morning at Grijon. - -Franceschi, in the course of the 10th, could see the whole of the -English army, including the troops with Hill; and it may create -surprise that he should pass so near the latter general without -being attacked: but Hill was strictly obedient to his orders, which -forbade him to act on the enemy’s rear; and those orders were wise -and prudent, because the principle of operating with small bodies -on the flanks and rear of an enemy is vicious; and, while the -number of men on the left of the Douro was unknown, it would have -been rash to interpose a single brigade between the advanced-guard -and the main body of the French. General Hill was sent to Ovar, -that the line of march might be eased, and the enemy’s attention -distracted, and that a division of fresh soldiers might be at hand -to follow the pursuit, so as to arrive on the bridge of Oporto pell -mell with the flying enemy. The soldier-like retreat of Franceschi -prevented the last object from being attained. - -General Paget’s division and the cavalry halted the night of the -10th at Oliveira; Sherbrooke’s division passed the Vouga later -in the day, and remained in Albergaria. But the next morning the -pursuit was renewed, and the men, marching strongly, came up with -the enemy at Grijon, about eight o’clock in the morning. - - -COMBAT OF GRIJON. - -The French were drawn up on a range of steep hills across the -road. A wood, occupied with infantry, covered their right flank; -their front was protected by villages and broken ground, but their -left was ill placed. The British troops came on briskly in one -column, and the head was instantly and sharply engaged. The 16th -Portuguese regiment, then quitting the line of march, gallantly -drove the enemy out of the wood covering his right, and, at the -same time, the Germans, who were in the rear, bringing their left -shoulders forward, without any halt or check, turned the other -flank of the French. The latter immediately abandoned the position, -and, being pressed in the rear by two squadrons of cavalry, lost a -few killed and about a hundred prisoners. The heights of Carvalho -gave them an opportunity to turn and check the pursuing squadrons; -yet, when the British infantry, with an impetuous pace, drew near, -they again fell back; and thus, fighting and retreating, a blow and -a race, wore the day away. - -During this combat, Hill was to have marched by the coast-road -towards Oporto, to intercept the enemy’s retreat; but, by some -error in the transmission of orders, that general, taking the route -of Feria, crossed Trant’s line of march, and the time lost could -not be regained. - -The British halted at dark, but the French, continuing their -retreat, passed the Douro in the night, and at two o’clock in the -morning the bridge was destroyed. All the artillery and baggage -still in Oporto were immediately directed along the road to -Amarante, and Mermet’s division without halting at Oporto followed -the same route as far as Vallonga and Baltar, having instructions -to secure all the boats, and vigilantly to patrole the right bank -of the Douro. Loison, also, whose retreat from Pezo de Ragoa was -still unknown, once more received warning to hold on by the Tamega -without fail, as he valued the safety of the army. Meanwhile the -duke of Dalmatia commanded all the craft in the river to be -secured, and, having placed guards at the most convenient points, -proposed to remain at Oporto during the 12th, to give time for -Lorge’s dragoons and the different detachments of the army to -concentrate at Amarante. - -Soult’s personal attention was principally directed to the river -in its course _below_ the city; for the reports of his cavalry -led him to believe that Hill’s division had been disembarked at -Ovar from the ocean, and he expected that the vessels would come -round, and the passage be attempted at the mouth of the Douro. -Nevertheless, thinking that Loison still held Mesamfrio and Pezo -with six thousand men, and knowing that three brigades occupied -intermediate posts between Amarante and Oporto, he was satisfied -that his retreat was secured, and thought there was no rashness in -maintaining his position for another day. - -The conspirators, however, were also busy; his orders were -neglected, or only half obeyed, and false reports of their -execution transmitted to him; and, in this state of affairs, the -head of the British columns arrived at Villa Nova, and, before -eight o’clock in the morning of the 12th, they were concentrated in -one mass, but covered from the view of the enemy by the height on -which the convent of Sarea stands. - -The Douro rolled between the hostile forces. Soult had suffered -nothing by the previous operations, and in two days he could take -post behind the Tamega, from whence his retreat upon Bragança would -be certain, and he might, in passing, defeat Beresford, for that -general’s force was feeble as to numbers, and in infancy as to -organization; and the utmost that sir Arthur expected from it was -that, vexing the French line of march, and infesting the road of -Villa Real, it would oblige Soult to take the less accessible route -of Chaves, and so retire to Gallicia instead of Leon; but this -could not be, unless the main body of the allied troops followed -the French closely. Now, Soult, at Salamanca, would be more -formidable than Soult at Oporto, and hence the ultimate object of -the campaign, and the immediate safety of Beresford’s corps, alike -demanded that the Douro should be quickly passed. But, how force -the passage of a river, deep, swift, and more than three hundred -yards wide, while ten thousand veterans guarded the opposite bank? -Alexander the Great might have turned from it without shame! - -The height of Sarea, round which the Douro came with a sharp elbow, -prevented any view of the upper river from the town; but the duke -of Dalmatia, confident that all above the city was secure, took -his station in a house westward of Oporto, whence he could discern -the whole course of the lower river to its mouth. Meanwhile, from -the summit of Sarea, the English general, with an eagle’s glance, -searched all the opposite bank and the city and country beyond it. -He observed horses and baggage moving on the road to Vallonga, and -the dust of columns as if in retreat, and no large body of troops -was to be seen under arms near the river. The French guards were -few, and distant from each other, and the patroles were neither -many nor vigilant; but a large unfinished building standing alone, -yet with a short and easy access to it from the river, soon fixed -sir Arthur’s attention. - -This building, called the Seminary, was surrounded by a high stone -wall, which coming down to the water on either side, enclosed -an area sufficient to contain at least two battalions in order -of battle; the only egress being by an iron gate opening on the -Vallonga road. The structure itself commanded every thing in its -neighbourhood, except a mound, within cannon-shot, but too pointed -to hold a gun. There were no French posts near, and the direct -line of passage from the height of Sarea, across the river to the -building, being to the right hand, was of course hidden from the -troops in the town. Here, then, with a marvellous hardihood, sir -Arthur resolved, if he could find but one boat, to make his way, in -the face of a veteran army and a renowned general. - - -PASSAGE OF THE DOURO. - -A boat was soon obtained; for a poor barber of Oporto, evading -the French patroles, had, during the night, come over the water -in a small skiff; this being discovered by colonel Waters, a -staff officer, of a quick and daring temper, he and the barber, -and the prior of Amarante, who gallantly offered his aid, crossed -the river, and in half an hour returned, unperceived, with three -or four large barges. Meanwhile, eighteen or twenty pieces of -artillery were got up to the convent of Sarea; and major-general -John Murray, with the German brigade, some squadrons of the 14th -dragoons, and two guns, reached the Barca de Avintas, three miles -higher up the river, his orders being to search for boats, and to -effect a passage there also, if possible. - -Some of the British troops were now sent towards Avintas, to -support Murray; while others came cautiously forwards to the brink -of the river. It was ten o’clock; the enemy were tranquil and -unsuspicious; and an officer reported to sir Arthur Wellesley that -one boat was brought up to the point of passage, “_Well, let the -men cross_,” was the reply; and upon this simple order, an officer -and twenty-five soldiers, of the Buffs, entered the vessel, and in -a quarter of an hour were in the midst of the French army. - -The Seminary was thus gained without any alarm being given, and -every thing was still quiet in Oporto: not a movement was to be -seen; not a hostile sound was to be heard: a second boat followed -the first, and then a third passed a little higher up the river; -but scarcely had the men from the last landed, when a tumultuous -noise of drums and shouts arose in the city; confused masses of the -enemy were seen hurrying forth in all directions, and throwing out -clouds of skirmishers, who came furiously down upon the Seminary. -The citizens were descried gesticulating vehemently, and making -signals from their houses; and the British troops instantly crowded -to the bank of the river; Paget’s and Hill’s divisions at the point -of embarkation, and Sherbrooke’s where the old boat-bridge had been -cut away from Villa Nova. - -Paget himself passed in the third boat, and, mounting the roof of -the Seminary, was immediately struck down, severely wounded. Hill -took Paget’s place; the musketry was sharp, voluble, and increasing -every moment as the number accumulated on both sides. The enemy’s -attack was fierce and constant; his fire augmented faster than -that of the British, and his artillery, also, began to play on -the building. But the English guns, from the convent of Sarea, -commanded the whole enclosure round the Seminary, and swept the -left of the wall in such a manner as to confine the French assault -to the side of the iron gate. Murray, however, did not appear; -and the struggle was so violent, and the moment so critical, -that sir Arthur would himself have crossed, but for the earnest -representations of those about him, and the just confidence he had -in general Hill. - -Some of the citizens now pushed over to Villa Nova with several -great boats; Sherbrooke’s people begun to cross in large bodies; -and, at the same moment, a loud shout in the town, and the waving -of handkerchiefs from all the windows, gave notice that the enemy -had abandoned the lower part of the city; and now, also, Murray’s -troops were seen descending the right bank from Avintas. By this -time three battalions were in the Seminary; and Hill, advancing -to the enclosure wall, opened a destructive fire upon the French -columns as they passed, in haste and confusion, by the Vallonga -road. Five pieces of French artillery were coming out from the town -on the left; but, appalled by the line of musketry to be passed, -the drivers suddenly pulled up, and while thus hesitating, a volley -from behind stretched most of the artillery-men on the ground; the -rest, dispersing among the enclosures, left their guns on the road. -This volley was given by a part of Sherbrooke’s people, who, having -forced their way through the streets, thus came upon the rear. In -fine, the passage was won; and the allies were in considerable -force on the French side of the river. - -To the left, general Sherbrooke, with the brigade of guards, and -the 29th regiment, was in the town, and pressing the rear of -the enemy, who were quitting it. In the centre, general Hill, -holding the Seminary and the wall of the enclosure, with the -Buffs, the 48th, the 66th, the 16th Portuguese, and a battalion -of detachments, sent a damaging fire into the masses as they -passed him; and his line was prolonged on the right, although with -a considerable interval, by general Murray’s Germans, and two -squadrons of the 14th dragoons. The remainder of the army kept -passing the river at different points; and the artillery, from the -height of Sarea, still searched the enemy’s columns as they hurried -along the line of retreat. - -If general Murray had then fallen boldly in upon the disordered -crowds, their discomfiture would have been complete; but he -suffered column after column to pass him, without even a cannon -shot, and seemed fearful lest they should turn and push him into -the river. General Charles Stewart and major Hervey, however, -impatient of this inactivity, charged with the two squadrons of -dragoons, and rode over the enemy’s rear-guard, as it was pushing -through a narrow road to gain an open space beyond. Laborde was -unhorsed, Foy badly wounded; and, on the English side, major Hervey -lost an arm; and his gallant horsemen, receiving no support from -Murray, were obliged to fight their way back with loss. - -This finished the action; the French continued their retreat, and -the British remained on the ground they had gained. The latter lost -twenty killed, a general and ninety-five men wounded; the former -had about five hundred men killed and wounded, and five pieces -of artillery were taken in the fight; a considerable quantity of -ammunition, and fifty guns (of which the carriages had been burnt) -were afterwards found in the arsenal, and several hundred men were -captured in the hospitals. - -[Illustration: _Plate 4. to face Pa. 290._ - - _Sketch Explanatory_ - OF THE PASSAGE OF THE RIVER DOURO, - by - SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, - _May 12^{th}, 1809_, - AND OF THE STORMING OF OPORTO, - by - _MARSHAL SOULT_, - _March 1809_. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - -Napoleon’s veterans were so experienced, so inured to warfare -that no troops in the world could more readily recover from such a -surprise, and before they reached Vallonga their columns were again -in order, with a regular rear guard covering the retreat. A small -garrison at the mouth of the Douro was cut off, but, guided by some -friendly Portuguese, it rejoined the army in the night; and Soult, -believing that Loison was at Amarante, thought he had happily -escaped a great danger and was still formidable to his enemies. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley employed the remainder of the 12th, and the -next day, in bringing over the rear of the army, together with the -baggage, the stores, and the artillery. General Murray’s Germans, -however, pursued, on the morning of the 13th, but not further than -about two leagues on the road of Amarante. This delay has been -blamed as an error in sir Arthur; it is argued that an enemy once -surprised should never be allowed to recover, and that Soult should -have been followed up, even while a single regiment was left to -pursue. But the reasons for halting were, first, that a part of the -army was still on the left bank of the Douro;--secondly, that the -troops had out marched provisions, baggage, and ammunition, and -having passed over above eighty miles of difficult country in four -days, during three of which they were constantly fighting, both -men and animals required rest; thirdly, that nothing was known of -Beresford, whose contemporary operations it is time to relate. - -The moment of his arrival on the Douro was marked by the repulse -of Loison’s division, which immediately fell back, as I have -already related, to Mezamfrio, followed by the Portuguese patroles -only, for Beresford halted on the left bank of the river, because -the British regiments were still in the rear. This was on the -10th. Sylveira, who was at Villa Real, had orders to feel towards -Mezamfrio for the enemy, and the marshal’s force was thus, with the -assistance of the insurgents, in readiness to turn Soult from the -route of Villa Real to Bragança. - -The 11th, Loison continued his retreat, and Beresford finding him -so timid, followed, skirmishing with his rear guard, and at the -same time Sylveira advanced from Villa Real. On the 12th, the -French outposts, in front of Amarante were driven in, and the 13th -Loison abandoned that town, and took the route of Guimaraens. - -These events were unknown to sir Arthur Wellesley on the evening of -the 13th, but he heard that Soult, after destroying his artillery -and ammunition, near Penafiel, had passed over the mountain towards -Braga; and judging this to arise from Beresford’s operations on the -Tamega, he reinforced Murray with some cavalry, ordering him to -proceed by Penafiel, and if Loison still lingered near Amarante, -to open a communication with Beresford. The latter was at the same -time directed to ascend the Tamega, and intercept the enemy at -Chaves. - -Meanwhile, the main body of the army marched in two columns upon -the Minho, the one by the route of Barca de Troffa and Braga, the -other by the Ponte d’Ave and Bacellos. But, on the evening of the -14th, the movements of the enemy about Braga gave certain proofs -that not Valença and Tuy, but Chaves or Montalegre, would be the -point of his retreat. Hereupon, the left column was drawn off -from the Bacellos road and directed upon Braga, and Beresford was -instructed to move by Monterey, upon Villa del Rey, if Soult took -the line of Montalegre. - -The 15th, sir Arthur reached Braga. Murray was at Guimaraens -on his right, and Beresford, who had anticipated his orders, -was near Chaves, having sent Sylveira towards Salamonde, with -instructions to occupy the passes of Ruivaens and Melgassy. But -at this time Soult was fifteen miles in advance of Braga, having, -by a surprising effort, extricated himself from one of the -most dangerous situations that a general ever escaped from. To -understand this, it is necessary to describe the country through -which his retreat was effected. - -I have already observed that the Sierra de Cabreira and the Sierra -de Catalina line the right bank of the Tamega; but, in approaching -the Douro, the latter slants off towards Oporto, thus opening a -rough but practicable slip of land, through which the road leads -from Oporto to Amarante. Hence, the French in retreating to the -latter town had the Douro on their right hand and the Sierra de -Catalina on their left. - -Between Amarante, and Braga which is on the other side of the -Catalina, a route practicable for artillery, runs through -Guimaraens, but it is necessary to reach Amarante to fall into this -road. Thus, Soult, as he advanced along the narrow pass between -the mountains and the Douro, rested his hopes of safety entirely -upon Loison’s holding Amarante. Several days, however, had elapsed -since that general had communicated, and an aide-de-camp was sent -on the morning of the 12th to ascertain his exact position. Colonel -Tholosé, the officer employed, found Loison at Amarante, but -neither his remonstrances, nor the after coming intelligence that -Oporto was evacuated, and the army in full retreat upon the Tamega, -could induce that general to remain there, and, as we have seen, he -marched towards Guimaraens, on the 13th, abandoning the bridge of -Amarante, without a blow, and leaving his commander and two-thirds -of the army to what must have appeared inevitable destruction. - -The news of this unexpected calamity reached Soult at one o’clock -on the morning of the 13th, just as he had passed the rugged banks -of the Souza river, the weather was boisterous, the men were -fatigued, voices were heard calling for a capitulation, and the -whole army was stricken with dismay. Then it was that the duke of -Dalmatia justified, by his energy, that fortune which had raised -him to his high rank in the world. Being, by a Spanish pedlar, -informed of a path that, mounting the right bank of the Souza, led -over the Sierra de Catalina to Guimaraens, he, on the instant, -silenced the murmurs of the treacherous or fearful in the ranks, -destroyed the artillery, abandoned the military chest and baggage, -and loading the animals with sick men and musket ammunition, -repassed the Souza, and followed his Spanish guide with a hardy -resolution. - -The rain was falling in torrents, and the path was such as might -be expected in those wild regions, but the troops made good their -passage over the mountains to Pombeira, and, at Guimaraens, happily -fell in with Loison. During the night they were joined by Lorge’s -dragoons from Braga, and thus, almost beyond hope, the whole army -was concentrated. - -[Sidenote: Noble’s Campagne de Galice.] - -If Soult’s energy in command was conspicuous on this occasion, his -sagacity and judgement were not less remarkably displayed in what -followed. Most generals would have moved by the direct route upon -Guimaraens to Braga; but he, with a long reach of mind, calculated, -from the slackness of pursuit after he passed Vallonga, that the -bulk of the English army must be on the road to Braga, and would be -there before him; or that, at best, he should be obliged to retreat -fighting, and must sacrifice the guns and baggage of Loison’s and -Lorge’s corps in the face of an enemy--a circumstance that might -operate fatally on the spirit of his soldiers, and would certainly -give opportunities to the malcontents; and already one of the -generals (apparently Loison) was recommending a convention like -Cintra. - -But, with a firmness worthy of the highest admiration, Soult -destroyed all the guns and the greatest part of the baggage and -ammunition of Loison’s and Lorge’s divisions; then, leaving the -high road to Braga on his left, and once more taking to the -mountain paths, he made for the heights of Carvalho d’Este, where -he arrived late in the evening of the 14th, thus gaining a day’s -march, in point of time. The morning of the 15th he drew up his -troops in the position he had occupied just two months before at -the battle of Braga; and this spectacle, where twenty thousand men -were collected upon the theatre of a former victory, and disposed -so as to produce the greatest effect, roused all the sinking pride -of the French soldiers. It was a happy stroke of generalship, an -inspiration of real genius! - -Soult now re-organised his army; taking the command of the -rear-guard himself, and giving that of the advanced guard to -general Loison. Noble, the French historian of this campaign, says -“_the whole army was astonished_;” as if it was not a stroke of -consummate policy that the rear, which was pursued by the British, -should be under the general-in-chief, and that the front, which -was to fight its way through the native forces, should have a -commander whose very name called up all the revengeful passions -of the Portuguese. _Maneta durst not surrender_; and the duke of -Dalmatia dextrously forced those to act with most zeal who were -least inclined to serve him: and, in sooth, such was his perilous -situation, that all the resources of his mind and all the energy of -his character were needed to save the army. - -From Carvalho he retired to Salamonde, from whence there were two -lines of retreat. The one through Ruivaens and Venda Nova, by which -the army had marched when coming from Chaves two months before; -the other, shorter, although more impracticable, leading by the -Ponte Nova and Ponte Miserella into the road running from Ruivaens -to Montalegre. But the scouts brought intelligence that the bridge -of Ruivaens, on the little river of that name, was broken, and -defended by twelve hundred Portuguese, with artillery; and that -another party had been, since the morning, destroying the Ponte -Nova on the Cavado river. - -The destruction of the first bridge blocked the road to Chaves; the -second, if completed, and the passage well defended, would have -cut the French off from Montalegre. The night was setting in, the -soldiers were harassed, barefooted, and starving; the ammunition -was damp with the rain, which had never ceased since the 13th, and -which was now increasing in violence, accompanied with storms of -wind. The British army would certainly fall upon the rear in the -morning; and if the Ponte Nova, where the guard was reported to -be weak, could not be secured, the hour of surrender was surely -arrived. - -In this extremity, Soult sent for major Dulong, an officer justly -reputed for one of the most daring in the French ranks. Addressing -himself to this brave man, he said, “I have chosen you from the -whole army to seize the Ponte Nova, which has been cut by the -enemy. Do you choose a hundred grenadiers and twenty-five horsemen; -endeavour to surprise the guards, and secure the passage of the -bridge. If you succeed, say so, but send no other report; your -silence will suffice.” Thus exhorted, Dulong selected his men, and -departed. - -Favoured by the storm, he reached the bridge unperceived of the -Portuguese, killed the centinel before any alarm was given, and -then, followed by twelve grenadiers, began crawling along a narrow -slip of masonry, which was the only part of the bridge undestroyed. -The Cavado river was in full flood, and roaring in a deep channel; -one of the grenadiers fell into the gulph, but the noise of the -storm and the river was louder than his cry; Dulong, with the -eleven, still creeping onwards, reached the other side, and falling -briskly on the first posts of the peasants, killed or dispersed -the whole. At that moment, the remainder of his men advanced close -to the bridge; and some crossing, others mounting the heights, -shouting and firing, scared the Portuguese supporting-posts, who -imagined the whole army was upon them; and thus the passage was -gallantly won. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -At four o’clock, the bridge being repaired, the advanced guards -of the French commenced crossing; but as the column of march was -long, and the road narrow and rugged, the troops filed over slowly; -and beyond the Ponte Nova there was a second obstacle still more -formidable. For the pass in which the troops were moving being cut -in the side of a mountain, open on the left for several miles, at -last came upon a torrent called the Misarella, which, breaking down -a deep ravine, or rather gulph, was only to be crossed by a bridge, -constructed with a single lofty arch, called the _Saltador_, or -leaper; and so narrow that only three persons could pass abreast. -Fortunately for the French, the _Saltador_ was not cut, but -entrenched and defended by a few hundred Portuguese peasants, -who occupied the rocks on the farther side; and here the good -soldier Dulong again saved the army: for, when a first and second -attempt had been repulsed with loss, he carried the entrenchments -by a third effort; but, at the same instant, fell deeply wounded -himself. The head of the column now poured over, and it was full -time, for the English guns were thundering in the rear, and the -Ponte Nova was choked with dead. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, quitting Braga on the morning of the 16th, -had come, about four o’clock, upon Soult’s rear-guard, which -remained at Salamonde to cover the passage of the army over the -bridges. The right was strongly protected by a ravine, the left -occupied a steep hill; and a stout battle might have been made, -but men thus circumstanced, and momentarily expecting an order to -retreat, will seldom stand firmly; and, on this occasion, when some -light troops turned the left, and general Sherbrooke, with the -guards, mounting the steep hill, attacked the front, the French -made but one discharge, and fled in confusion to the Ponte Nova. As -this bridge was not on the direct line of retreat, they were for -some time unperceived, and gaining ground of their pursuers, formed -a rear-guard; but, after a time, being discovered, some guns were -brought to bear on them; and then man and horse, crushed together, -went over into the gulph; and the bridge, and the rocks, and the -defile beyond were strewed with mangled bodies. - -This was the last calamity inflicted by the sword upon the French -army in this retreat; a retreat attended by many horrid as well as -glorious events; for the peasants in their fury, with an atrocious -cruelty, tortured and mutilated every sick man and straggler that -fell into their power; and on the other hand, the soldiers, who -held together in their turn, shot the peasants; while the track -of the columns might be discovered from afar by the smoke of the -burning houses. - -The French reached Montalegre on the 17th; and an English -staff-officer, with some cavalry, being upon their rear, as far -as Villella, picked up some stragglers; but sir Arthur, with the -main body of the army, halted that day at Ruivaens. The 18th he -renewed the pursuit, and a part of his cavalry passed Montalegre, -followed by the guards; the enemy was, however, drawn up behind the -Salas in force, and no action took place. Sylveira, indeed, had -entered Montalegre, from the side of Chaves, before the British -came up from Ruivaens; but instead of pursuing, he put his men -into quarters; and a Portuguese officer of his division, who was -despatched to marshal Beresford with orders to move from Villa -Perdrices upon Villa del Rey, loitered on the road so long, that -all chance of intercepting the French line of march was at an end; -for though Beresford, on the 19th, pushed colonel Talbot with the -14th dragoons as far as Ginjo, Franceschi turned in force, and -obliged that officer to retire; and thus the pursuit terminated, -with the capture of a few stragglers on the Salas. - -Soult himself crossed the frontier by Allaritz on the 18th; and on -the 19th entered Orense, but without guns, stores, ammunition, or -baggage; his men exhausted with fatigue and misery, the greatest -part being without shoes, many without accoutrements, and in some -instances even without muskets. He had quitted Orense seventy-six -days before, with about twenty-two thousand men, and three thousand -five hundred had afterwards joined him from Tuy. He returned with -nineteen thousand five hundred, having lost by the sword and -sickness, by assassination and capture, six thousand good soldiers; -of which number above three thousand were taken in hospitals,[7] -and about a thousand were killed by the Portuguese, or had died of -sickness, previous to the retreat. The remainder were captured, or -had perished within the last eight days. He had carried fifty-eight -pieces of artillery into Portugal, and he returned without a -gun; yet was his reputation as a stout and able soldier no wise -diminished. - -[Illustration: _Plate 5. to face Pa. 300._ - - _Sketch Explanatory_ - of the - OPERATIONS - between the - MINHO & DOURO, - _1809_. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -The duke of Dalmatia’s arrangements being continually thwarted -by the conspirators, his military conduct cannot be fairly -judged of. Nevertheless, the errors of the campaign may, without -injustice, be pointed out, leaving to others the task of tracing -them to their true sources. - -1º. The disposition of the army, on both sides of the Douro, and -upon such extended lines, when no certain advice of the movements -and strength of the English force had been received, was rash. It -was, doubtless, right, that to clear the front of the army, and -to gather information, Franceschi should advance to the Vouga; -but he remained too long in the same position, and he should -have felt Trant’s force more positively. Had the latter officer -(whose boldness in maintaining the line of the Vouga was extremely -creditable) been beaten, as he easily might have been, the anarchy -in the country would have increased; and as Beresford’s troops at -Thomar wanted but an excuse to disband themselves, the Portuguese -and British preparations must have been greatly retarded. - -[Sidenote: Noble’s Campagne de Galice.] - -2º. That Soult, when he had secured, as he thought, all the boats -on an unfordable river three hundred yards wide, should think -himself safe from an attack for one day, is not wonderful. The -improbability that such a barrier could be forced in half an -hour might have rendered Fabius careless; but there were some -peculiar circumstances attending the surprise of the French army -which indicate great negligence. The commanding officer of one -regiment reported, as early as six o’clock, that the English were -crossing the river; the report was certainly premature, because -no man passed before ten o’clock; but it reached Soult, and he -sent general Quesnel, the governor of Oporto, to verify the fact. -Quesnel stated, on his return, and truly, that it was an error, -and Soult took no further precaution. The patroles were not -increased; no staff-officers appear to have been employed to watch -the river, and no signals were established; yet it was but three -days since D’Argenton’s conspiracy had been discovered, and the -extent of it was still unknown. This circumstance alone should have -induced the duke of Dalmatia to augment the number of his guards -and posts of observation, that the multiplicity of the reports -might render it impossible for the malcontents to deceive him. The -surprise at Oporto must, therefore, be considered as a fault in the -general, which could only be atoned for by the high resolution and -commanding energy with which he saved his army in the subsequent -retreat. - -3º. When general Loison suffered marshal Beresford to drive him -from Pezo de Ragoa and Mezamfrio, he committed a grave military -error; but when he abandoned Amarante, he relinquished all claim -to military reputation, as a simple statement of facts will prove. -The evening of the 12th he wrote to Soult that one regiment had -easily repulsed the whole of the enemy’s forces; yet he, although -at the head of six thousand men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, -that night and without another shot being fired, abandoned the only -passage by which, as far as he knew, the rest of the army could -escape from its perilous situation with honour. It was not general -Loison’s fault if England did not triumph a second time for the -capture of a French marshal. - - -MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH GENERAL. - -1º. If sir Arthur Wellesley’s operation be looked at as a whole, it -is impossible to deny his sagacity in planning, his decision and -celerity in execution. When he landed at Lisbon, the nation was -dismayed by previous defeats, distracted with anarchy, and menaced -on two sides by powerful armies, one of which was already in -possession of the second city in the kingdom. In twenty-eight days -he had restored public confidence; provided a defence against one -adversary; and having marched two hundred miles through a rugged -country, and forced the passage of a great river--caused his other -opponent to flee over the frontier, without artillery or baggage. - -2º.--Such being the result, it is necessary to show that the -success was due, not to the caprice of fortune, but to the talents -of the general; that he was quick to see, and active to strike; -and, first, the secresy and despatch with which the army was -collected on the Vouga belongs entirely to the man; for, there were -many obstacles to overcome; and D’Argenton, as the sequel proved, -would, by his disclosures, have ruined sir Arthur’s combinations, -if the latter had not providently given him a false view of -affairs. The subsequent march from the Vouga to the Douro was, in -itself, no mean effort, for, it must be recollected, that this -rapid advance against an eminent commander, and a veteran army of -above twenty thousand men, was made with a heterogeneous force, -of which only sixteen thousand men were approved soldiers, the -remainder being totally unformed by discipline, untried in battle, -and, only three weeks before, were in a state of open mutiny. - -3º.--The passage of the Douro, at Oporto, would, at first sight, -seem a rash undertaking; but, when examined closely, it proves to -be an example of consummate generalship, both in the conception -and the execution. The careless watch maintained by the French -may, indeed, be called fortunate, because it permitted the -English general to get a few men over unperceived; but it was not -twenty-five, nor twenty-five hundred, soldiers that could have -maintained themselves, if heedlessly cast on the other side. Sir -Arthur, when he so coolly said--“_let them pass_,” was prepared -to protect them when they had passed. He did not give that order -until he knew that Murray had found boats at Avintas, to ferry -over a considerable number of troops, and, consequently, that -that general, descending the Douro, could cover the right flank -of the Seminary, while the guns planted on the heights of Sarea -could sweep the left flank, and search all the ground enclosed by -the wall round the building. If general Murray’s troops only had -passed, they would have been compromised; if the whole army had -made the attempt at Avintas, its march would have been discovered; -but in the double passage all was secured: the men in the Seminary -by the guns, by the strength of the building, and by Murray’s -troops; the latter by the surprise on the town, which drew the -enemy’s attention away from them. Hence, it was only necessary -to throw a few brave men into the Seminary unperceived, and then -the success was almost certain; because, while that building was -maintained, the troops in the act of passing could neither be -prevented nor harmed by the enemy. To attain great objects by -simple means is the highest effort of genius! - -4º.--If general Murray had attacked vigorously, the ruin of the -French army would have ensued. It was an opportunity that would -have tempted a blind man to strike; the neglect of it argued want -of military talent and of military hardihood; and how would it -have appeared if Loison had not abandoned Amarante? If Soult, -effecting his retreat in safety, and reaching Zamora or Salamanca -in good order, had turned on Ciudad Rodrigo, he would have found -full occupation for sir Arthur Wellesley in the north; and he would -have opened a free communication with the duke of Belluno. The -latter must, then, have marched either against Seville or Lisbon; -and thus the boldness and excellent conduct of the English general, -producing no adequate results, would have been overlooked, or, -perhaps, have formed a subject for the abuse of some ignorant, -declamatory writer. - -5º.--Sir Arthur Wellesley’s reasons for halting at Oporto, the -13th, have been already noticed, but they require further remarks. -Had he followed Soult headlong, there is no doubt that the latter -would have been overtaken on the Souza river, and destroyed; -but this chance, arising from Loison’s wretched movements, -was not to be foreseen. Sir Arthur Wellesley knew nothing of -Beresford’s situation; but he naturally supposed that, following -his instructions, the latter was about Villa Real; and that, -consequently, the French would, from Amarante, either ascend the -Tamega to Chaves, or taking the road to Guimaraens and Braga, make -for the Minho. Hence, he remained where he could command the main -roads to that river, in order to intercept Soult’s retreat and -force him to a battle; whereas, if he had once entered the defile -formed by the Douro and the Sierra de Catalina, he could only have -followed his enemy in one column by a difficult route, a process -promising little advantage. Nevertheless, seeing that he detached -general Murray by that route at last, it would appear that he -should have ordered him to press the enemy closer than he did; but -there a political difficulty occurred. - -[Sidenote: King Joseph’s captured Correspondence, MS.] - -The English cabinet, although improvident in its preparations, -was very fearful of misfortune, and the general durst not risk -the safety of a single brigade, except for a great object, lest -a slight disaster should cause the army to be recalled. Thus, he -was obliged to curb his naturally enterprising disposition, and to -this burthen of ministerial incapacity, which he bore even to the -battle of Salamanca, may be traced that over-caution which has been -so often censured as a fault, not only by military writers, but by -Napoleon, who, judging from appearances, erroneously supposed it to -be a characteristic of the man, and often rebuked his generals for -not taking advantage thereof. - -6º.--The marches and encounters, from the 14th to the 17th, were -excellent on both sides. Like the wheelings and buffeting of two -vultures in the air, the generals contended, the one for safety, -the other for triumph; but there was evidently a failure in the -operations of marshal Beresford. Soult did not reach Salamonde -until the evening of the 15th, and his rear guard was still there -on the evening of the 16th. Beresford was in person at Chaves on -the 16th, and his troops reached that place early on the morning of -the 17th. Soult passed Montalegre on the 18th, but from Chaves to -that place is only one march. - -Again, marshal Beresford was in possession of Amarante on the 13th, -and as there was an excellent map of the province in existence, he -must have known the importance of Salamonde, and that there were -roads to it through Mondin and Cavez, shorter than by Guimaraens -and Chaves. It is true that Sylveira was sent to occupy Ruivaens -and Melgacy; but he executed his orders slowly, and Misarella -was neglected. Major Warre, an officer of the marshal’s staff, -endeavoured, indeed, to break down the bridges of Ponte Nova and -Ruivaens; and it was by his exertions that the peasants, surprised -at the former, had been collected; but he had only a single dragoon -with him, and was without powder to execute this important task. -The peasantry, glad to be rid of the French, were reluctant to stop -their retreat, and still more to destroy the bridge of Misarella, -which was the key of all the communications, and all the great -markets of the Entre Minho e Douro; and therefore sure to be built -up again, in which case the people knew well that their labour and -time would be called for without payment. It is undoubted that -Soult owed his safety to the failure in breaking those bridges; -and it does appear that if major Warre had been supplied with the -necessary escort and materials he would have effectually destroyed -them. - -Sylveira did not move either in the direction or with the -celerity required of him by Beresford, there seems to have been a -misunderstanding between them; but allowance must be made for the -numerous mistakes necessarily arising in the transmission of orders -by officers speaking different languages; and for the difficulty of -moving troops not accustomed, or perfectly willing to act together. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -The duke of Dalmatia halted at Orense the 20th, but on the 21st -put his troops in motion upon Lugo, where general Fournier, of the -6th corps, with three battalions of infantry and a regiment of -dragoons, was besieged by twelve or fifteen thousand Spaniards, -under the command of general Mahi. But to explain this it is -necessary to relate Romana’s operations, after his defeat at -Monterey on the 6th of March. - -Having re-assembled the fugitives at Puebla de Senabria, on the -borders of Leon, he repaired his losses by fresh levies, and was -soon after joined by three thousand men from Castile, and thus, -unknown to Ney, he had, as it were, gained the rear of the sixth -corps. Villa Franca del Bierzo was, at this time, occupied by -two weak French battalions, and their nearest support was at -Lugo: Romana resolved to surprise them, and, dividing his forces, -sent Mendizabel with one division by the valley of the Syl to -take the French in rear, and marched himself by the route of -Calcabellos. The French, thus surrounded in Villa Franca, after a -short skirmish, in which the Spaniards lost about a hundred men, -surrendered, and were sent into the Asturias. - -[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -Romana then detached a part of his forces to Orense and Ponte -Vedra, to assist Morillo and the insurrection in the western parts -of Gallicia, where, with the aid of the English ships of war, and -notwithstanding the shameful neglect of the supreme central junta, -the patriots were proceeding vigorously. The moveable columns of -the sixth corps daily lost a number of men; some in open battle, -but a still greater number by assassinations, which were rigorously -visited upon the districts where they took place; and thus, in -Gallicia, as in every other part of Spain, the war hourly assumed -a more horrid character. Referring to this period, colonel Barios -afterwards told Mr. Frere that, to repress the excesses of marshal -Ney’s troops, he, himself, had, in cold blood, caused seven hundred -French prisoners to be drowned in the Minho; an avowal recorded by -Mr. Frere, without animadversion, but which, happily for the cause -of humanity, there is good reason to believe was as false as it was -disgraceful. - -After the capture of Vigo, the Spanish force on the coast increased -rapidly. Barios returned to Seville; Martin Carrera assumed the -command of the troops near Orense, and the Conde Noroña of those -near Vigo. General Maucune returned to St. Jago from Tuy, and Ney, -apprized of the loss at Villa Franca, advanced to Lugo. Romana -immediately abandoned Gallicia, and, entering the Asturias by -the pass of Cienfuegos, marched along the line of the Gallician -frontier, until he reached Navia de Suarna. Here he left Mahi, with -the army, to observe Ney, but repaired, himself, to Oviedo, to -redress the crying wrongs of the Asturians. - -It is unnecessary to recapitulate the evil doings of the Asturian -junta, which was notoriously corrupt and incapable. Romana, after -a short inquiry, dismissed the members in virtue of his supreme -authority, and appointed new men; but this act of justice gave -great offence to Jovellanos and others. It appeared too close an -approximation to Cuesta’s manner, in Leon, the year before; and -as the central government, always selfish and jealous, abhorred -any indication of vigour or probity in a general, Romana was soon -afterwards deprived of his command. Meanwhile, he was resolutely -reforming abuses, when his proceedings were suddenly arrested by an -unexpected event. - -As soon as Ney understood that the Spanish army was posted on the -Gallician side of the Asturian frontier, and that Romana was likely -to excite the energy of the Asturian people, he planned a combined -movement, to surround and destroy, not only Romana and his army, -but also the Asturian forces, which then amounted to about fifteen -thousand men, including the _partida_ of Porlier, commonly called -the Marquisetto. This force, commanded by general Ballasteros and -general Voster, occupied Infiesta, on the eastern side of Oviedo, -and Castropol on the coast. Ney, with the consent of Joseph, -arranged that Kellerman, who was at Astorga, with six guns and -eight thousand seven hundred men, composed of detachments, drawn -together from the different corps, should penetrate the Asturias -from the south east by the pass of Pajares; that Bonnet, who always -remained at the town of St. Andero, should break in, from the north -east, by the coast road; and that the sixth corps should make an -irruption by the Concejo de Ibias, a short but difficult route -leading directly from Lugo. - -When the period for these combined movements was determined, Ney, -appointing general Marchand to command in Gallicia during his -own absence, left three battalions under Maucune at St. Jago, -three others in garrison at Coruña under general D’Armagnac, one -at Ferrol, and three with a regiment of cavalry under Fournier -at Lugo; and then marched himself, with twelve battalions of -infantry and three regiments of cavalry, against Mahi. The latter -immediately abandoned his position at Navia de Suarna, and drawing -off by his left, without giving notice to Romana, returned to -Gallicia and again entered the valley of the Syl. Ney, either -thinking that the greatest force was near Oviedo, or that it was -more important to capture Romana than to disperse Mahi’s troops, -continued his route by the valley of the Nareca, and with such -diligence that he reached Cornellana and Grado, one march from -Oviedo, before Romana knew of his approach. The Spanish general, -thus surprized, made a feeble and fruitless endeavour to check the -French at the bridge of Peñaflor, after which, sending the single -regiment he had with him to Infiesta, he embarked on board an -English vessel at Gihon, and so escaped. - -The 18th of May, Ney entered Oviedo, where he was joined by -Kellerman, and the next day pursued Romana to Gihon. Bonnet, -likewise, executed his part, but somewhat later; and thus Vorster, -being unmolested by Ney, had time to collect his corps on the -coast. Meanwhile Ballasteros, finding that Bonnet had passed -between him and Vorster, boldly marched upon St. Andero and retook -it, making the garrison and sick men (in all eleven hundred) -prisoners. The Amelia and Statira, British frigates, arrived off -the harbour at the same moment, and captured three French corvettes -and two luggers, on board of which some staff-officers were -endeavouring to escape. - -Bonnet, however, followed hard upon Ballasteros, and, the 11th of -June, routed him so completely that he, also, was forced to save -himself on board an English vessel, and the French recovered all -the prisoners, and, amongst them, the men taken at Villa Franca, by -Romana. But, before this, Ney, uneasy for his posts in Gallicia, -had returned to Coruña by the coast-road through Castropol, and -Kellerman, after several trifling skirmishes with Vorster, had also -retired to Valladolid. This expedition proved that Asturia was not -calculated for defence, although, with the aid of English ships, it -might become extremely troublesome to the French. - -While Ney was in Asturia, Carrera, advancing from the side of -Orense, appeared in front of St. Jago di Compostella at the moment -that colonel D’Esmenard, a staff-officer sent by the marshal to -give notice of his return to Coruña, arrived with an escort of -dragoons in Maucune’s camp. This escort was magnified by the -Spaniards into a reinforcement of eight hundred men; but Carrera, -who had been joined by Morillo, commanded eight thousand, and, on -the 23d, having attacked Maucune, at a place called “_Campo de -Estrella_,” totally defeated him, with a loss of six hundred men -and several guns. The Spaniards did not pursue, but the French -retreated in confusion to Coruña. Nor was this the only check -suffered by the 6th corps; for Mahi, having united a great body of -peasants to his army, drove back Fournier’s outposts, and closely -invested him in Lugo on the 19th. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -Such was the state of affairs in Gallicia when Soult arrived at -Orense; and as the inhabitants of that town, from whom he got -intelligence of these events, rather exaggerated the success of -their countrymen, the French marshal immediately sent forward an -advanced guard of his stoutest men to relieve Lugo, and followed -himself, by the route of Monforte, with as much speed as the -exhausted state of his troops would permit. The 22d, he reached -Gutin, and, the same day, his van being descried on the mountains -above Lugo, Mahi broke up his camp, and fell back to Mondenedo. - -The 23d, Soult entered Lugo, where he heard of the emperor’s -first successes in Austria, and, with renewed energy, prepared -for fresh exertions himself. The 30th, he was joined by Ney, who, -uninformed of Mahi’s position at Mondenedo, had missed a favourable -opportunity of revenging the loss at St. Jago. Meanwhile Romana, -disembarking at Ribadeo, joined Mahi at Mondenedo, and immediately -marched along the line of the Asturias frontier, until he arrived -at the sources of the Neyra, then, crossing the royal road, a -little above Lugo, plunged, once more, into the valley of the Syl; -and, having gained Orense, the 6th of June, opened a communication -with Carrera at St. Jago, and with the insurgents at Vigo. This -movement of Romana’s was able, energetic, and worthy of every -praise. - -In pursuance of an order from the emperor, Soult now sent eleven -hundred men, composed of dismounted dragoons and skeletons of -cavalry regiments, to France; and, having partially restored the -artillery and equipments of the second corps, from the arsenals -of Coruña and Ferrol, he, in concert with the duke of Elchingen, -arranged a fresh plan for the destruction of Romana, the execution -of which failed, as shall be hereafter noticed; but, at present, it -is necessary to resume the narrative of - - -VICTOR’S OPERATIONS. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.] - -After the abortive effort to gain Badajos, the duke of Belluno, in -obedience to the king’s orders, proceeded to recover Alcantara. His -rear was still within two marches of Merida when the head of his -columns, under Lapisse, drove back some cavalry posts, entered the -town of Alcantara, and the next day attempted the passage of the -bridge. - -The Portuguese force consisted of two thousand infantry, fifty -cavalry, and six guns; and some works of defence were constructed -on the right bank of the river; but, on the 14th of May, Lapisse -lining the rocks on the left bank of the river, skirmished so -sharply that the militia regiment of Idanha gave way. Colonel Mayne -then sprung a mine, but the explosion doing little injury to the -bridge, the French made good the passage. The Portuguese, who had -suffered considerably, retired to the Puente de Segura, and Lapisse -immediately sent patroles towards Castello Branco, Salvatierra, and -Idanha Nova. - -Intelligence of this attack having reached general Mackenzie, he -directed preparations to be made for destroying the boat-bridge at -Abrantes, and marched, in person, by Cortiçada to Sobreira Formosa; -this movement, and a rumour that Soult had retreated from Oporto, -afforded an excuse to Victor for again abandoning Alcantara, and -resuming his former camp. During his absence, Cuesta, true to the -promise he had given, attacked the fort of Merida; but, on the -return of the French advanced guard, re-crossed the Guadiana, and -fell back to Zafra, having first ravaged all the flat country, and -obliged the inhabitants to withdraw into the mountains. - -Some time before this, king Joseph had received a despatch from -the French minister of war, giving notice that reinforcements had -sailed from England, and warning him to lose no time in marching -against Lisbon, to create a useful diversion in favour of Soult. -It might be supposed that the original plan of the emperor would -then have been acted upon, and this was the first thought of Joseph -himself; but other circumstances created doubt and hesitation in -his councils, and, finally, induced him to abandon all thoughts of -Portugal. - -When Napoleon returned to Paris, he imagined hostilities with -Austria, although certain, would not break out so suddenly, but -that he should have time to organise a sufficient army in Germany, -without drawing his veteran troops from Spain. Hence, he still -left the imperial guards at Vittoria, and sending the prince of -Neufchatel to command the troops on the Danube, he himself remained -at Paris, to superintend the preparations for opening the campaign. -The Austrians were, however, not inattentive observers of the -perfidy which accompanied the invasion of Spain; and, aptly taking -the hint, attacked the French outposts and published their own -declaration of war at the same moment. - -Berthier, incapable of acting a principal part, was surprised, and -made a succession of false movements that would have been fatal -to the French army, if the emperor, journeying day and night, had -not arrived at the very hour when his lieutenant was on the point -of consummating the ruin of the army. Then, indeed, was seen the -supernatural force of Napoleon’s genius: in a few hours he changed -the aspect of affairs, in a few days, maugre their immense number, -his enemies, baffled and flying in all directions, proclaimed -his mastery in an art which, up to that moment, was imperfect; -for never, since troops first trod a field of battle, was such a -display of military skill made by man. - -But previous to these successes, so threatening had been the aspect -of affairs in Germany, that the imperial guards had been recalled -from Vittoria, and hurried to the Danube, the great reserve of -infantry was, as we have seen, struck off the rolls of the army in -Spain, and the skeletons of the fourth squadrons of every cavalry -regiment were ordered to return to their depôts in France. Even -the fifth corps, under Mortier, then on its way to Valladolid from -Zaragoza, was directed to halt, and hold itself in readiness to -march for Germany; and thus, while Victor was reluctant to move, -while Ney was demanding more troops to preserve Gallicia, and -while the fate of the second corps was unknown, the whole army was -actually diminished by forty thousand men, and fifteen thousand -more were paralysed with regard to offensive operations. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MS.] - -These things rendered Joseph timid. Madrid, it was argued in his -councils, was of more consequence than Lisbon. Soult might be -already at the latter place; or, if not, he might extricate himself -from his difficulties, for the capital of Spain must be covered. In -pursuance of this reasoning, Sebastiani was forbidden any forward -movement; and the duke of Belluno, whose army was daily wasting -with the Guadiana fever, took a position at Torre-Mocha, a central -point between Truxillo, Merida, and Alcantara. His cavalry posts -watched all the passages over the Guadiana and the Tagus; and his -communications with Madrid, between the Tietar and the Tagus, were -protected by twelve hundred men, detached for that purpose by the -king. - -But one timid measure in war generally produces another. The -neighbourhood of the English force at Castel Branco increased -the energy of the Spanish insurgents, who infested the valley of -the Tagus, and communicated secretly with those of the Sierra de -Guadalupe; hence, Victor, alarmed for his bridge at Almaraz, sent a -division there the 22d of May; and, as from that period until the -10th of June, he remained quiet: his campaign, which had opened -so brilliantly, was annulled. He had neither assisted Soult, nor -crushed Cuesta, nor taken Badajos nor Seville; yet he had wasted -and lost, by sickness, more men than would have sufficed to reduce -both Lisbon and Seville. The Spaniards were daily recovering -strength and confidence; and sir Arthur Wellesley, after defeating -Soult, had full leisure to return to the Tagus, and to combine his -future operations with the Spanish armies in the south. - -Information that Lapisse had forced the bridge of Alcantara reached -the English general on the night of the 17th. That part of the -army which was still behind Salamonde received immediate orders -to retrace their steps to Oporto; and when the retreat of Soult -by Orense was ascertained, the remainder of the troops, including -three Portuguese brigades under Beresford, followed the same route. -Colonel Trant was then appointed military governor of Oporto; and -it was thought sufficient to leave Sylveira with some regular -battalions and militia to defend the northern provinces; for -Soult’s army was considered a crippled force, which could not for -a long time appear again in the field; a conclusion drawn, as we -shall see, from false data, and without due allowance being made -for the energy of that chief. - -As the army proceeded southward, the contracted scope of Lapisse’s -movements was ascertained. Colonel Mayne was directed again to take -post at Alcantara; and a reinforcement of five thousand men having -landed at Lisbon, the rapidity of the march slackened. Passing by -easy journeys through Coimbra, Thomar, and Punhete, the troops -reached Abrantes the 7th of June, and encamped on the left bank -of the Tagus; but there was sickness and a great mortality in his -ranks. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -From the moment of his arrival in Portugal, sir Arthur Wellesley -had looked to the defeat of Victor as the principal, and the -operation against Soult as the secondary, object of the campaign; -and the English government, acceding to his views, now gave him a -discretionary power to enter the nearest provinces of Spain, if -Portugal should not thereby be endangered. In his correspondence -with the junta and with Cuesta, he had strongly urged the necessity -of avoiding any serious collision with the enemy until the British -troops could act in concert with the Spanish armies. This advice, -approved of by the junta, was attended to by Cuesta; insomuch -that he did not seek a battle, but he exposed his advanced posts, -as if in derision of the counsel; and, disdainful of the English -general’s abilities, expressed his belief that the latter had no -desire to act heartily, “because,” said he, “the system of the -British appears to be never to expose their troops; owing to which, -they never gain decisive actions by land.” - -Cuesta’s knowledge of the enemy’s strength and positions was always -inaccurate, and his judgement false; hence he himself not only -never gained any decisive action, but lost every army entrusted to -his command. He was discontented with the movement against Soult, -asserting that his hold of Gallicia would only be strengthened -thereby, unless that favourite folly of all Spanish generals were -adopted, namely, surrounding the enemy, without regarding whether -the troops to be surrounded were more or less numerous than the -surrounders. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, affirmed that if Soult -were first driven over the Minho, a combined attack afterwards made -upon Victor would permanently deliver Gallicia; and this plan being -followed, Gallicia was abandoned by the French, and they never -returned to that province. - -When the English army was again free to act, Cuesta was importunate -that a joint offensive operation against Victor should be -undertaken; but, obstinately attached to his own opinions, he -insisted upon tracing the whole plan of campaign. Yet his views -were so opposed to all sound military principles, that sir Arthur, -although anxious to conciliate his humour, could scarcely concede -the smallest point, lest a vital catastrophe should follow. -Valuable time was thus lost in idle discussions which might have -been employed in useful action; for the return of the British army -from the Douro had falsified Victor’s position at Torremocha. -That marshal, as late as the 10th of June, had only one division -guarding the bridge at Almaraz; and it was difficult for him -to ascertain the movements of sir Arthur Wellesley, covered, as -they were, by the Tagus, the insurgents, and Mackenzie’s corps -of observation: hence, by rapid marches, it was possible for the -English general, while Victor was still at Torremocha, to reach the -valley of the Tagus, and cutting the first corps off from Madrid, -to place it between two fires. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16.] - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.] - -This did not escape the penetration of either commander; but sir -Arthur was forced to renounce the attempt, partly because of the -sick and harassed condition of his troops, the want of shoes -and money, and the difficulty of getting supplies; but chiefly -that Cuesta’s army was scattered over the open country, between -the defiles of Monasterio and the Guadiana, and, as he refused -to concentrate or retire, Victor might have marched against and -crushed him, and yet found time to meet the British on the Tietar. -Early in June, however, marshal Beresford was, with three brigades, -directed upon Castello Branco, and the duke of Belluno, immediately -taking the alarm, and being also assured, by despatches from -Madrid, of Soult’s retreat, resolved to re-cross the Tagus. But, -previous to commencing this movement, he resolved to secure his -flank, by causing the bridge of Alcantara to be destroyed. - -Colonel Mayne, as I have already observed, had been again entrusted -with that post; but, unfortunately, his first orders to blow up -the bridge, if the enemy advanced, were not rescinded, although -the return of the army from the north rendered such a proceeding -unnecessary. Mayne did not keep his instructions secret; and -Victor, hearing of them, sent a detachment to the bridge with no -other view than to cause its destruction. He succeeded; and this -noble monument of Trajan’s genius was overturned. But such is -the nature of war that, not long afterwards, each army found its -fall injurious to their interests, and, as a matter of taste and -of military advantage, both sides alike sighed over the ruins of -Alcantara. - -Having completed this operation, Victor passed the Tagus, at -Almaraz, on the 19th, without being molested by Cuesta, and, -removing his boat-bridge, proceeded to take post at Plasencia. -Meanwhile Beresford was obliged to return to the defence of the -northern provinces of Portugal, which Soult was again menacing, -for, during the forced inactivity of the British, at Abrantes, the -cause of which I shall explain in another place, changes in the -relative positions of the hostile armies were taking place; and it -is important that these changes should be well understood, because -on them the fate of the succeeding campaign hinged. - -When Ney and Soult met at Lugo, they, although still on bad terms, -agreed, after some discussion, that the first should march from -Coruña, by the route of St. Jago and Vigo, against Carrera and the -Conde de Noroña; and that the second, entering the valley of the -Syl, should attack Romana, and drive him upon Orense, at which -place it was expected that Ney, after taking or blocking Vigo, -would be able to reach him, and thus the whole force of Gallicia -be crushed at once. Soult was then to menace the Tras os Montes, -by the side of Bragança, with the view of obliging sir Arthur -Wellesley to remain in that province, while the second corps opened -a direct communication with Madrid and with the first corps. - -Ney returned to Coruña; and, on the 1st of June, two divisions of -infantry and a brigade of dragoons, of the second corps, marched -upon Monforte: they were followed, the next day, by two other -divisions of infantry; and, at the same time, Franceschi, who was -on the Fereira river, supported by La Houssaye’s dragoons, was -directed, after scouring the road to St. Jago, to fall down the -right bank of the Tambuga, towards Orense. - -From the 2d to the 9th the main body halted at Monforte, to get -up stores from Lugo, and to scour the country on the flanks; for -Romana, in his passage, had again raised the peasantry of all the -valleys. Loison also, with a division, entered the Val des Orres, -having orders to feign a movement towards Villa Franca and Puente -Ferrada, as if for the purpose of meeting a French column in that -direction. - -The 10th, Loison passed the Syl, and took post at the Puente de -Bibey. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The 12th, Franceschi, reinforced with a division of infantry, -arrived at Monte Furada on the Syl, and, sending a detachment to -Laronco, connected his division with Loison’s. The remainder of -the infantry followed this movement, and detachments were sent up -the course of the Syl, and towards Dancos, on the road from Villa -Franca to Lugo. Loison also forced the passage of the Puente de -Bibey, and drove the insurgents to Puebla de Tribes. The French -army thus cleared all the valleys opening on the course of the -Upper Minho, and Romana was confined to the lower part of that -river. - -The 13th, Franceschi, ascending the valley of the Bibey, took post -at Bollo and the bridge of the Hermitage, and then pushed his -patroles even to Gudina and Monterey on one side, and into the -Sierra de Porto on the other, as far as the sources of the Bibey, -with a view of ascertaining, first, the exact direction which -Romana would take to avoid Loison’s column; secondly, to prevent -the Spanish general from passing the left of the French army, and -gaining the Asturias by the route of Puebla de Senabria. These -precautions occupied the duke of Dalmatia till the 19th, when, -being assured that Romana had fallen back to Monterey, he judged -that the latter would attempt the same march towards Puebla de -Senabria, by which he had escaped after the action in the month -of March. The French army was therefore directed up the valley of -the Bibey, upon Viana, where there was a bridge, and where many of -the mountain roads united. The same day Franceschi fell in with -the head of Romana’s army, and repulsed it; and the evening of the -20th the whole of the French troops were concentrated near Viana, -intending to give battle to the Spaniards the next morning; but the -latter retreated precipitately during the night, and many of the -men dispersed. - -Soult continued his movement by the left until he reached the -great road running from Castile to Orense, and from thence, having -sent Heudelet’s division to Villa Vieja to threaten the Tras os -Montes frontier, and Mermet’s division and Lorge’s dragoons towards -La Canda to observe the road of Puebla de Senabria, he marched -himself, with an advanced guard, to La Gudina, leaving Laborde and -La Houssaye in reserve between Gudina and Villa Vieja. These divers -movements, through the rugged passes of Gallicia, led to a variety -of slight skirmishes, the most important of which took place at -the Puente de Bibey, a place of such prodigious strength that it -is scarcely conceivable how men, with arms, could be brought to -abandon such a post. - -Romana’s situation was now nearly hopeless, but he was saved by -a misunderstanding between the French marshals. It appears that -Ney, having marched from Coruña, entered St. Jago with about ten -thousand men, and Carrera fell back upon Ponte Vedra, where the -Conde de Noroña joined him with some fresh troops, and, assuming -the command, continued the retreat to the Octavem river, behind -which he took post, placing his main body at the bridge of San -Payo, and sending detachments to guard some secondary points. On -the 7th of June, the French came up. The Spaniards had thirteen -thousand men, two eighteen-pounders, and nine field-pieces. Of -these forces, seven thousand men armed, three thousand unarmed, and -the whole of the artillery, were in position to defend the passage -at San Payo; the bridge was cut, and overlooked by a battery of two -eighteen-pounders. Three thousand were in reserve at Redondela; -and, at Vigo, about sixty stragglers, from sir John Moore’s army, -were landed, and, in conjunction with a detachment of seamen and -marines, occupied the forts. Some Spanish gun-boats, one of which -was manned by English seamen, under captain Winter, also proceeded -up the river to the bridge of San Payo. - -During the 7th, a desultory and useless fire took place on both -sides; but, on the 8th, the French were repulsed in some feeble -attempts made to force a passage at San Payo and at Soto Mayor, -higher up the river, the loss on either side being about a hundred -men. These attacks were merely to keep the Spaniards employed until -the reports of the officers, sent by Ney to ascertain the situation -and projects of Soult’s army, were received, and, in the evening -of the 8th, those officers returned with information, obtained from -the peasants, that the second corps was retreating upon Castile. -I have been assured by persons, then on marshal Ney’s staff, that -he, amazed at these tidings, rashly concluded that Soult, swayed -by personal feelings, wished to endanger the sixth corps, and -filled with indignation, immediately retired to Coruña; while -Soult, on the other hand, viewed this retreat as a breach of their -engagements, and an underhand policy to oblige him to remain in -Gallicia. Certain it is that by these ebullitions of temper, both -Romana and Noroña were saved; for there was nothing to prevent Ney -from sending a column against Orense, whilst he himself occupied -Noroña, on the Octavem; and, however spirited the conduct of the -Spaniards was at San Payo, it would be ridiculous to imagine that -ten thousand of the best soldiers of France, led by an officer so -quick and resolute as Ney, could have been resisted by an equal -number of raw troops and peasants, one-third of whom were without -arms. But the history of the quarrel between these marshals is -involved in mystery, the clearing of which must be left to those -who shall write the memoirs of the men. For the purposes of this -history it is sufficient to know that there was ill-blood, and that -therein the Gallicians found safety. - -Soult, informed of Ney’s retreat and of sir Arthur Wellesley’s -arrival on the Tagus, ceased to pursue Romana, and marched to -Zamora, where his sick had been before sent, and where his brother, -general Soult, had conducted three or four thousand stragglers -and convalescents. Here, also, he requested the king to send the -artillery and stores necessary to re-equip the second corps; and -here he proposed to give his harassed troops some rest, for they -had now been for eight months incessantly marching and fighting, -and men and officers were alike dispirited by the privations they -had endured, and by the terrible nature of a war in which the most -horrid scenes were daily enacted. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -To put the king in possession of his views, Soult sent general -Franceschi to Madrid; but this celebrated officer, refusing an -escort, fell into the hands of the _Capuchino_. Being transferred -to Seville, the central junta, with infamous cruelty, treated -him as if he had been a criminal instead of a brave soldier, and -confined him in a dungeon at Carthagena. The citizens there, -ashamed of their government, endeavoured to effect his escape; but -he perished at the moment when his liberation was certain. When his -young wife, a daughter of count Mathieu Dumas, heard of his fate, -she refused all nourishment; and, in a few days, by her death, -added one more to the thousand instances of the strength of woman’s -affections. - -The 25th of June, Soult reached Puebla de Senabria. - -The 28th, he marched to Mombuey. - -The 29th and 30th, he crossed the Esla, by the bridges of San -Pelayo and Castro Gonzales. - -The 2d of July, he entered Zamora, having previously rejected a -proposition of Ney’s, that the two corps should jointly maintain -Gallicia, a rejection which induced the duke of Elchingen to -evacuate that province. - -[Illustration: _Plate 6. to face Pa. 326._ - - _Sketch Explanatory of - NEY & SOULT’S_, - OPERATIONS IN GALLICIA, - in June 1809. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - -To effect this, Ney formed a camp near Betanzos; and, on the 22d -of July, withdrew his garrisons from Coruña and Ferrol, having -previously destroyed all the stores and arsenals and disabled the -land defences. Nevertheless, his influence was still so powerful -that captain Hotham, commanding the English squadron, off Coruña, -seeing the hostile attitude maintained by the inhabitants, landed -his seamen on the 24th, and spiked the guns on the sea-line; and, -in like manner, compelled a Spanish garrison, left by Ney in the -forts of Ferrol, to surrender on the 26th. The marshal, however, -marched, unmolested, by the high road to Astorga, where he arrived -on the 30th, having brought off all his own sick and those of the -second corps also, who had been left in Lugo. Thus Gallicia was -finally delivered. - -This important event has been erroneously attributed to the -exertions of the Spaniards. Those exertions were creditable to the -Gallicians, although the most powerful motive of action was to -protect their personal property; and, when the French withdrew, -this same motive led them to repair their losses by resisting the -payment of tithes and rents, a compensation by no means relished by -the proprietors or the church. But it is certain that their efforts -were only secondary causes in themselves, and chiefly supported -by the aid of England, whose ships, and arms, and stores were -constantly on the coast. - -[Sidenote: Intercepted Despatches, Parl. Pap. 1810.] - -How can the operations of the Spaniards be said to have driven the -sixth corps from Gallicia, when Ney retained every important post -in that province to the last; when single divisions of his army, -at two different periods, traversed the country, from Coruña to -Tuy, without let or hindrance; and when the Spaniards could not -prevent him from over-running the Asturias without losing his -hold of Gallicia? It is true, Soult, writing to Joseph, affirmed -that the Gallicians would wear out the strongest army; that is, if -a wrong system was pursued by the French, but he pointed out the -right method of subduing them, namely, in pursuance of Napoleon’s -views, to fortify some principal central points, from whence the -moveable columns could overrun the country; and this, he estimated, -would only require fifty thousand pounds and six weeks’ labour. -It is plain the real causes of the deliverance were--First, The -quarrels between the marshals, which saved Romana and Noroña from -destruction.--Secondly, The movements of sir Arthur Wellesley on -the Tagus; for, in an intercepted letter from Soult to Joseph, that -marshal expressly assigns the danger hanging over Madrid and the -first corps as the reason of his refusing to remain in Gallicia. -Now, although Soult’s views were undoubtedly just, and his march -provident, the latter necessarily drew after it the evacuation of -Gallicia; because, it would have been absurd to keep the sixth -corps cooped up in that corner of the Peninsula, deprived of -communication, and estranged from the general operations. - -The movement of the second corps, after quitting Monforte, -being along the edge of the Portuguese frontier, and constantly -threatening the northern provinces, drew marshal Beresford, as -I have before stated, from Castello Branco; and all the regular -Portuguese forces capable of taking the field were immediately -collected by him round Almeida. The duke del Parque was at Ciudad -Rodrigo; and as that part of Romana’s force, which had been cut off -by Soult’s movement upon Gudina, fell back upon Ciudad Rodrigo, -not less than twenty-five thousand men, Portuguese and Spaniards, -were assembled, or assembling, round those two fortresses: and -the change of situation thus brought about in the armies on the -northern line was rendered more important by the events which -were simultaneously taking place in other parts, especially in -Aragon, where general Blake, whose army had been augmented to more -than twenty thousand men, inflated with his success at Alcanitz, -advanced to Ixar and Samper. - -Suchet, himself, remained close to Zaragoza, but kept a detachment, -under general Faber, at Longares and Villa Muel, near the mountains -on the side of Daroca. Blake, hoping to cut off this detachment, -marched, himself, through Carineña, and sent general Arisaga, with -a column, to Bottorita; the latter captured a convoy of provisions -on the Huerba; but Faber retired to Plasencia, on the Xalon. - -The 14th of June, the advanced guards skirmished at Bottorita; and -Blake, endeavouring to surround the enemy, pushed a detachment to -Maria, in the plain of Zaragoza. - -The excitement produced in that city, and in Aragon generally, by -this march, was so great, that Suchet doubted if he should not -abandon Zaragoza, and return towards Navarre. The peasantry had -assembled on many points in the mountains around, and it required -great vigilance to keep down the spirit of insurrection in the city -itself. The importance of that place, however, made him resolve -to fight a battle, for which the near approach of Blake, who came -on in the full confidence that the French general would retreat, -furnished an opportunity which was not neglected. - - -BATTLE OF MARIA. - -The 14th, after some skirmishing, the Spanish army was concentrated -at Bottorita. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -The 15th, Blake slowly and unskilfully formed his troops in order -of battle, near the village of Maria, and perpendicular to the -Huerba, of which he occupied both banks. Towards two o’clock in -the day, he extended his left wing to outflank the right of the -French; but Suchet, who had just then been rejoined by Faber, and -by a brigade from Tudela, immediately stopped this evolution, -by attacking the wing with some cavalry and light troops. The -Spaniards then fell back to their line of battle; and Blake, -drawing men from his right to reinforce his centre and left, was -immediately engaged in a severe conflict. He repulsed the foremost -of the enemy’s columns; but so violent a storm arose at the moment, -that neither army could see the other, although close together, -and the action ceased for a time. Blake’s position was so ill -chosen, that he was surrounded by ravines, and had only one line -of retreat, by the bridge of Maria, which was on the extremity of -his right flank. Suchet, observing this error, when the storm had -cleared off a little, briskly engaged the centre and left of the -Spaniards, and forming his cavalry and two regiments of infantry -in column, by one vigorous effort broke quite through the Spanish -horse, and seized the bridge of Maria. Notwithstanding this, Blake, -who was at all times intrepid, collected the infantry of his centre -and left wing in a mass, and stood for the victory; but the French -troops overthrew his with a great slaughter. A general, twenty-five -guns, and many stands of colours were taken; yet few prisoners, -for the darkness enabled the dispersed Spaniards to escape by the -ravines; and Blake rallied them the next day at Bottorita. The -French lost nearly a thousand men, and general Harispé was wounded. - -During this action, a French brigade held the position of Monte -Torrero, without mixing in the fight, lest the citizens of -Zaragoza, being released from their presence, should rise against -the garrison; but after the victory, this brigade marched down the -Ebro to cut off Blake’s retreat. General Laval, who commanded it, -did not, however, execute his orders; and the Spanish army retired -on the night of the 16th. - -The 17th, the rear guard suffered some loss at Torrecilla; and on -the 18th, the two armies were again in presence at Belchite. Blake, -reinforced by some detachments, was about fourteen thousand strong; -but he had lost the greatest part of his artillery, and his men -were dispirited. Suchet, on the contrary, having by the success at -Maria awed the Aragonese, was able to bring twenty-two battalions -and seven squadrons, or about fifteen thousand men, flushed with -victory, into action. - - -BATTLE OF BELCHITE. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -[Sidenote: Blake’s Despatch.] - -The Spaniards were drawn up on a range of hills half enclosing -the town; their right, resting on a hermitage and some buildings, -was inaccessible to cavalry; the left was also well covered; and -behind the right, a hill with a building on it, overtopping all the -position and occupied by a reserve, served as a rallying point, -because there was an easy line of communication between it and the -left wing. The centre, being on rough ground containing the town of -Belchite which had a wall and gates, was also very strong; and the -whole position was so compact, that Blake, after completely filling -his line, had yet a considerable reserve in hand. His dispositions -were made to fight by his centre and right, his left being rather -in the nature of an advanced post. - -A French battalion commenced the action, by skirmishing with the -Spanish centre; but, at the same time, two columns of attack -marched, the one against the right, the other against the left. -The latter, which was the principal one, preceded by a fire of -artillery, soon closed upon the Spanish troops, and Blake’s guns -opened from his centre and right; but an ammunition-waggon blowing -up was the signal for a panic, which, commencing on the left, -reached to all parts of the line. The Spanish general then made a -charge of cavalry, to retrieve the day, but it was easily repulsed, -and the confusion that followed is thus described by himself:--“One -regiment fled without firing a shot; it was followed by another, -and a third, all flying without having discharged a gun; and, in -a few moments, the whole position was abandoned.”--“Thus we, the -generals and officers, were left alone, without being able to rally -a body which could make any opposition; and I had the mortification -to see our army dispersed, abandoning all its baggage, and throwing -away its arms, and even its clothes, before a single corps of the -enemy; nor were we able to avail ourselves of the defence of any -strong place, as it was impossible to collect two hundred men to -make head against the enemy.” - -Blake, although a bad general, was a man of real courage: stung -to the quick by this disgrace, he reproached his troops with -bitterness, demanded an inquiry into his own conduct, and, with -a strong and sincere feeling of honour, restored to the junta -the estate which had been conferred upon him for the success at -Alcanitz. - -This battle and the pursuit, in which Suchet took about four -thousand prisoners, and all the artillery, ammunition, and baggage -of the Spaniards, not only made him master of the operations in -Aragon, but also rendered the fifth corps, under Mortier, who were -now at Valladolid, completely disposable for offensive operations. -Thus, on the 1st of July, there were, exclusive of Kellerman’s and -Bonnet’s divisions, three complete _corps d’armée_, furnishing six -thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry, collected between -Astorga, Zamora, and Valladolid. The inroad on Portugal had failed, -and the loss of Gallicia followed; but Napoleon’s admirable system -of invasion was unbroken. His troops, deprived of his presiding -genius, had been stricken severely and shrunk from further -aggression; they had been too widely spread for a secure grasp, but -the reaction disclosed all the innate strength of his arrangements. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -The British army remained in the camp of Abrantes until the latter -end of June. During this period, sir Arthur Wellesley, although -burning to enter Spain, was kept back by a variety of difficulties. - -He had been reinforced with five thousand men immediately after -his return from the Douro; and, in the preceding operations, the -killed and hurt in battle did not exceed three hundred men, but the -deaths by sickness were numerous. Four thousand men in hospital, -and fifteen hundred employed in escort and depôt duties, being -deducted, the gross amount of the present under arms, as late -even as the 25th of June, did not exceed twenty-two thousand men; -and these were, at any moment, liable to be seriously diminished, -because the ministers, still intent upon Cadiz, had authorized -Mr. Frere, whenever the junta should consent to the measure, to -draw a garrison for that town from sir Arthur’s force. As an army, -therefore, it was weak in every thing but spirit. The commissariat -was without sufficient means of transport; the soldiers nearly -barefooted, and totally without pay; the military chest was empty, -and the hospitals were full. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16.] - -[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -The expense, at a low estimation, was about two hundred thousand -pounds a month, and, with the most strenuous exertions, a hundred -and sixty thousand pounds only had been procured in the two months -of May and June; and of this, thirteen thousand had been obtained -as a temporary loan in Oporto. The rate of exchange in Lisbon -was high, and, notwithstanding the increased value given to the -government paper by the successes on the Douro, this rate was daily -rising. The Spanish dollar was at five shillings, while Spanish -gold sunk so much in value that the commissary-general sent all -that he received from England, or could collect in Lisbon, to -Cadiz, and other parts, to truck for dollars; but, in all places -of commerce, the exchange was rising against England, a natural -consequence of her enormous and increasing issues of paper. Those -issues, the extravagant succours given to Spain, together with -subsidies to Austria, made it impossible to supply the army in -Portugal with specie, otherwise than by raising cash, in every -quarter of the globe, on treasury-bills, and at a most enormous -loss; an evil great in itself, opening a wide door to fraud and -villany, and rendered the war between France and England not so -much a glorious contest of arms as a struggle between public credit -and military force, in which even victory was sure to be fatal to -the former. - -The want of money, sickness, Cuesta’s impracticable temper, and -a variety of minor difficulties, too tedious to mention, kept -the army in a state of inactivity until the end of June; but, -at that period, the retreat of the first corps from Torremocha, -and the consequent advance of Cuesta, removed one obstacle to -offensive operations, and sir Arthur, having the certainty that -eight thousand additional troops were off the rock of Lisbon, then -commenced his march into Spain by the northern banks of the Tagus, -meaning to unite with Cuesta on the Tietar, and to arrange, if -possible, a plan of operations against Madrid. - -But, before I embark on the full and broad stream into which -the surges and eddies of the complicated warfare that succeeded -Napoleon’s departure from the Peninsula settled, I must give -a general view of the state of affairs, that the reader, -comprehending exactly what strength each party brought to the -encounter, may judge more truly of the result. - - -FRENCH POWER. - - Men. Horses. - The French, having received some reinforcements - of conscripts, amounted, in the beginning - of July, including the king’s guards, - to about 275,000 - In hospital 61,000 } - Stragglers and prisoners borne on } 68,000 - the states 7,000 } - ------- - Total under arms 207,000 36,000 - The military governments, lines of correspondence, - garrisons, and detachments, absorbed 32,000 3,000 - ------- ------- - _Present under arms_ with the _corps d’armée_ 175,000 33,000 - - -The actual strength and situation of each _corps d’armée_ was as -follows:-- - -[Sidenote: Muster roll of the French Army, MSS.] - - _Under the King, covering Madrid._ - - Inf. & Art. Cavalry. - First corps, in the valley of the Tagus 20,881 4,200 - Fourth corps, La Mancha 17,490 3,200 - Division of Dessolles, Madrid 6,864 - King’s French guards, Madrid, about 4,000 1,500 - ------ ------ - Total 49,235 8,900 - ------ ------ - - _In Old Castile, under Marshal Soult._ - - Inf. & Art. Cavalry. - Second corps, Zamora, Tora, and Salamanca 17,707 2,883 - Fifth corps, Valladolid 16,042 874 - Sixth corps, Astorga, and its vicinity 14,913 1,446 - ------ ------ - Total 48,662 5,203 - ------ ------ - - _In Aragon, under General Suchet._ - - Inf. & Art. Cavalry. - Third corps, Zaragoza, Alcanitz, &c. 15,226 2,604 - ------ ------ - - _In Catalonia, under Marshal Augereau._ - - Inf. & Art. Cavalry. - Seventh corps, Vich, Gerona, and Barcelona 30,593 2,500 - ------ ------ - -In addition to these corps there were twelve hundred men belonging -to the battering train, four thousand infantry under Bonnet, at St. -Andero, and two thousand two hundred cavalry under Kellerman, in -the Valladolid country. - -The fortresses and armed places in possession of the French army -were--St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, Bilbao, Santona, St. Andero, -Burgos, Leon, Astorga, on the northern line; - -Jacca, Zaragoza, Guadalaxara, Toledo, Segovia, and Zamora, on the -central line; - -Figueras, Rosas, and Barcelona, on the southern line. - -It needs but a glance at these dispositions and numbers to -understand with what a power Napoleon had fastened upon the -Peninsula, during his six weeks’ campaign. Much had been lost since -his departure, but his army still pressed the Spaniards down, and, -like a stone cast upon a brood of snakes, was immoveable to their -writhings. Nevertheless, the situation of Spain, at this epoch, was -an ameliorated one compared to that which, four months before, the -vehemence of Napoleon’s personal warfare had reduced it to. The -elements of resistance were again accumulated in masses, and the -hope, or rather confidence, of success was again in full vigour; -for, it was in the character of this people, while grovelling on -the earth, to suppose themselves standing firm; and, when creeping -in the gloom of defeat, to imagine they were soaring in the full -blaze of victory. - -The momentary cessation of offensive operations on the part of the -French, instead of being traced to its true sources, the personal -jealousies of the marshals, and the king’s want of vigour, was, -as usual, attributed, first--to fear and weakness; secondly--to -the pressure of the Austrian war. It was not considered that the -want of unity, checking the course of conquest, would cease when -the French army was driven to the defensive; neither was the might -of France duly weighed, while the strength of Austria was unduly -exalted. The disasters at Ucles, at Almaraz, at Zaragoza, Rosas, -Cardadeu, Valls, at Ciudad Real, Medellin, Braga, and Oporto, and -in the Asturias, were all forgotten. The French had been repulsed -from Portugal, and they had not taken Seville. This, to the -Spaniards, was sufficient evidence of their weakness; and, when the -French were supposed to be weak, the others, by a curious reasoning -process, always came to the conclusion that they were themselves -strong. Hence, the fore-boasting at this period was little inferior -to what it had been after the battle of Baylen; and the statement -of the relative numbers was almost as absurd. The utmost amount -of the French force was not calculated higher than a hundred and -fifteen, or a hundred and twenty, thousand men, of which about -fifty thousand were supposed to be on the French side of the Ebro, -and the whole only waiting for an excuse to abandon the Peninsula. - - -SPANISH POWER. - -The Spanish armies, on paper, were, as usual, numerous; and the -real amount of the regular force was certainly considerable, -although very inadequate to the exigencies or the resources of the -country. Before the battle of Belchite had broken Blake’s strength, -there were, organized and under arms, twelve thousand cavalry, -and about one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, exclusive -of irregular bands and armed peasantry, who were available for -particular defensive operations. After that defeat the number of -regular forces, capable of taking the field in the south-eastern -provinces, was not above twenty thousand men, of which about ten -thousand, under Coupigny, were watching Barcelona, or, again, -rallying under Blake; the remainder were in Valencia, where Caro, -Romana’s brother, had taken the command. - -In the north-western provinces there were about twenty-five -thousand men, of which fifteen thousand were in Gallicia; some -thousands in the Asturias, under Voster and Ballasteros, and the -remainder, under the duke del Parque, who was directed to organize -a new army in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. - -In Andalusia, or covering it, there were about seventy thousand -men. Of these twenty-three thousand infantry, and two thousand five -hundred cavalry, were assembled in the Morena, near St. Elena and -Carolina, under the command of general Venegas; and thirty-eight -thousand, including seven thousand cavalry, were in Estremadura, -under the orders of Cuesta, who was nominally commander-in-chief of -both armies. - -The troops, thus divided into three grand divisions, were called -the armies of _the right_, _the centre_, _the left_. The fortresses -were--Gerona, Hostalrich, Lerida, Maquinenza, Tarragona, Tortosa, -Valencia, Carthegena, and Alicant, for the army of the right; Cadiz -and Badajos for that of the centre; Ciudad Rodrigo, Coruña, and -Ferrol, for the army of the left. - -The Spanish troops were, however, far from being serviceable, in -proportion to their numbers; most of them were new levies, and -the rest were ill-trained. The generals had lost nothing of their -presumption, learnt nothing of war, and their mutual jealousies -were as strong as ever. Cuesta still hating the junta, was feared -and hated by that body in return; and Venegas was placed at the -head of the Carolina army as a counterpoise to him. Romana, also, -was obnoxious to the junta; and, in return, with more reason, the -junta was despised and disliked by him. In Valencia and Murcia -generals and juntas appeared alike indifferent to the public -welfare, and satisfied if the war was kept from their own doors. In -Catalonia there never was any unanimity. - -Blake, who had abandoned Romana in Gallicia, and who was still at -enmity with Cuesta, had been, for these very reasons, invested with -supreme power in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia; and, moreover, -there were factions and bickerings among the inferior officers -in the armies of Venegas and Cuesta. Albuquerque was ambitious -of commanding in chief, and Mr. Frere warmly intrigued in his -cause, for that gentleman still laboured under the delusion that -he was appointed to direct the military instead of conducting the -political service in the Peninsula. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.] - -In April, he had proposed to the junta that a force of five -thousand cavalry and some infantry, taken from the armies of -Cuesta and Venegas, should, under the command of the duke of -Albuquerque, commence offensive operations in La Mancha; this, he -said, would, “_if the enemy refused to take notice of it_,” become -“a very serious and perhaps a decisive movement;” and he was so -earnest that, without communicating upon the subject with sir -Arthur Wellesley, without waiting for the result of the operations -against Soult, he pretended to the junta that the co-operation of -the English army with Cuesta (that co-operation which it was sir -Arthur’s most anxious wish to bring about) could only be obtained, -as the price of the Spanish government’s acceding to his own -proposal. The plenipotentiary’s greatest efforts were, however, -directed to procure the appointment of Albuquerque to the command -of an army; but that nobleman was under the orders of Cuesta, who -was not willing to part with him, and, moreover, Frere wished to -displace Venegas, not that any fault was attributed to the latter, -but merely to make way for Albuquerque; a scheme so indecorous that -both the junta and Cuesta peremptorily rejected it. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.] - -Mr. Frere did not hesitate to attribute this rejection to a mean -jealousy of Albuquerque’s high birth and talents; but the junta had -sufficient reason for their conduct, not only on this occasion, -but afterwards, when they refused to give him any independent -command. The duke, although a brave and patriotic and even an able -soldier, was the dupe of a woman who corresponded with the French. -The junta, in the fear of offending him, forbore to punish her, at -first, yet, finally, they were obliged to shut her up, and they -could not entrust him with a command while her dangerous influence -lasted. Hence, Mr. Frere’s intrigue failed to serve Albuquerque, -and his military project for La Mancha fell to the ground, when -sir Arthur Wellesley, unable to perceive its advantages, strongly -advised the junta, not to weaken but to reinforce Cuesta’s army; -not to meddle with the French either in La Mancha or Estremadura, -but to preserve a strict defensive in all quarters. - -The _supreme junta_ was itself in fear of the old _junta of -Seville_, and the folly and arrogance of the first and its neglect -of the public weal furnished ample grounds of attack, as a slight -sketch of its administrative proceedings will suffice to prove. -The king, after the battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, had, -through the medium of don Joachim Sotelo, a Spanish minister in his -service, made an attempt to negotiate for the submission of the -junta, which was spurned at by the latter, in suitable terms, for -dignified sentiments and lofty expressions were never wanting to -the Spanish, although, taken with their deeds, they were but as a -strong wind and a few shrivelled leaves. - -The junta did not fail to make the nation observe their patriotism -upon this occasion, and, indeed, took every opportunity to praise -their own proceedings. Nevertheless, men were not wanting in Spain -most anxious, not only to check the actual abuses of power, but -to lay bare all the ancient oppressions of the country, and recur -to first principles, both for present reform and future permanent -good government; in short, to make public avowal of the misrule -which had led to their misfortunes, and, if possible, to amend -it. Knowing that although national independence may co-exist with -tyranny, it is inseparable from civil and religious freedom,--they -desired to assemble the cortez, and to give the people an earnest -that national independence was worth having; to convince them that -their sufferings and their exertions would lead to a sensible good, -instead of a mere choice between an old and a new despotism; and -this party was powerful enough to have a manifesto to their purpose -drawn up by the junta, and it would have been published, if the -English ministers had not interposed; for, as I have before said, -their object was not Spain, but Napoleon. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, printed 1810.] - -Mr. Frere vigorously opposed the promulgation of this manifesto, -and not ambiguously hinted that the displeasure of England, and -the wrath of the partizans of despotism in Spain, would be vented -on the junta, if any such approach to real liberty was made. In -his despatches to his cabinet he wrote that, from his knowledge -of the members of the junta, he felt assured they would “_shrink -from the idea of giving permanent effect to the measures which -they held out_;” and this expression he meant in their praise! but -still he thought it necessary to check the tendency to freedom in -the outset; and it would be injustice not to give his sentiments -in his own words, sentiments which were at this time perfectly -agreeable to his immediate superior, Mr. Canning, but offering a -curious contrast to the political liberality which that politician -afterwards thought it his interest to affect. - -Writing as a Spaniard, Mr. Frere thus addressed don Martin Garay:-- - -[Sidenote: Papers laid before Parliament, 1810.] - -“If we have indeed passed three centuries under an arbitrary -government, let us not forget that it is a price which we pay for -having conquered and peopled the fairest portion of the globe; -that the integrity of this immense power rests solely on these -two words, religion and the king. If the old constitution has been -lost by the conquest of America, our first object should be to -recover it, but in such a manner as not to lose what has cost us so -much in the acquisition. From this consideration, it appears to me -that we ought to avoid, as _political poison, any annunciation of -general principles, the application of which it would be impossible -to limit or qualify, even when the negroes and Indians should -quote them in favour of themselves_. But let us allow that we have -made a _bad exchange in bartering our ancient national liberty -for the glory and extension of the Spanish name_. Let us allow -that the nation has been deceived for three centuries, and that -this error should, at all hazards, be immediately done away. Even -though it were so, it does not appear _very becoming the character -of a well educated person to pass censures upon the conduct of -his forefathers_, or to complain of what he has lost by their -negligence or prodigality; and still less so, if it is done in the -face of all the world: and what shall we say of a nation who should -do this publicly, and after mature deliberation?” - -The manifesto was suppressed, a new one more consonant to Mr. -Frere’s notions was published, and a promise to convoke the cortez -given, but without naming any specific time for that event. The -junta, who, as Mr. Frere truly stated, were not at all disposed -to give any effect to free institutions, now proceeded to prop -up their own tottering power by severity: they had, previous to -the manifesto, issued a menacing proclamation, in which they -endeavoured to confound their political opponents with the spies -and tools of the French; and having before established a tribunal -of public security, they caused it to publish an edict, in which -all men, who endeavoured to raise distrust of the junta, or who -tried to overturn the government, by popular commotions, or other -means that had, by the junta, been reprobated, were declared -guilty of high treason, undeserving the name of Spaniards and -sold to Napoleon, their punishment to be death, and confiscation -of property. Any person propagating rumours, tending to weaken or -soften the hatred of the people against the French, was instantly -to be arrested and punished without remission; lastly, rewards were -offered for secret information upon these heads. - -This decree was not a dead letter. Many persons were seized, -imprisoned, and executed, without trial, or knowing their accusers. -But the deepest stain upon the Spanish character, at this period, -was the treatment experienced by prisoners of war. Thousands, and -amongst them part of Dupont’s troops, who were only prisoners by -a breach of faith, were sent to the Balearic Isles, but no order -was taken for their subsistence. When remonstrated with, the junta -cast seven thousand ashore on the little desert rock of Cabrera. -At Majorca, numbers had been massacred by the inhabitants, in the -most cowardly and brutal manner, but those left on Cabrera suffered -miseries that can scarcely be described. The supply of food, always -scanty, was often neglected altogether: there was but one spring -on the rock, which dried up in summer; clothes were never given -to them except by the English seamen, who, compassionating their -sufferings, often assisted them, in passing the island. Thus, -afflicted with hunger, thirst, and nakedness, they lived like -wild beasts while they could live, but perished in such numbers, -that less than two thousand remained to tell the tale of this -inhumanity; and surely, it was no slight disgrace that the English -government failed to interfere on such an occasion. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: General Miller’s Memoirs.] - -But what were the efforts made for the defence of the country -by this inhuman junta, which, having been originally assembled -to discuss the form of establishing a central government, had, -unlawfully, retained their delegated power, and used it so -shamefully? There was a Spanish fleet, and a sufficient number -of sailors to man it, in Carthagena. There was another fleet, -and abundance of seamen, in Cadiz. Lord Collingwood, and others, -pressed the junta, constantly and earnestly, to fit these vessels -out, and to make use of them, or at least to place them beyond the -reach of the enemy. His remonstrances were unheeded; the sailors -were rendered mutinous for want of pay, and even of subsistence, -and the government would neither fit out ships themselves, nor -suffer the English seamen to do it for them; and at the very period -when the marquis of Romana and the insurgents in Gallicia were -praying for a few stands of arms and five thousand pounds, from -sir John Cradock, the junta possessed many millions of money, and -their magazines, in Cadiz, were unable to contain the continually -increasing quantity of stores and arms arriving from England, which -were left to rot as they arrived, while, from every quarter of the -country not yet subdued, the demand for these things was incessant. - -The fleet in Cadiz harbour might have been at sea in the beginning -of February. In a week it might have been at Vigo, with money and -succours of all kinds for the insurgents in Gallicia; after which, -by skilful operations along the coast from Vigo to St. Sebastian, -it might have occupied an enormous French force on that line of -country. But instead of a fleet, the junta sent colonel Barios, an -obscure person, to steal through by-ways, and to take the command -of men who were not in want of leaders. In the same manner, the -fleet in Carthagena might have been employed on the Catalonian and -French coasts; but, far from using their means, which were really -enormous, with energy and judgement, the junta carried on the -war by encouraging virulent publications against the French, and -confined their real exertions to the assembling of the unfortunate -peasants in masses, to starve for a while, and then to be cut to -pieces by their more experienced opponents. - -The system of false reports, also, was persevered in without any -relaxation: the French were beaten on all points; the marshals -were slain or taken; their soldiers were deserting, or flying -in terror at the sight of a Spaniard; Joseph had plundered and -abandoned Madrid; and Zaragoza had not fallen. Castro, the envoy -to the Portuguese regency, so late as April, anxiously endeavoured -to persuade that government and the English general, that Zaragoza -had never been subdued, and that the story of its fall was a French -falsehood. In June, official letters were written to marshal -Beresford, from the neighbourhood of Lugo, dated the very day upon -which Soult’s army relieved that town, not to give intelligence -of the event, but to announce the utter defeat of that marshal, -and the capture of Lugo itself; the amount of the killed and -wounded, and the prisoners taken, being very exactly stated; and -this, with such an appearance of truth, as to deceive Beresford, -notwithstanding his previous experience of the people he had to -deal with. - -But the proofs of corruption and incapacity in the junta are -innumerable, and not confined to the records of events kept by -British officers. Romana, a few months later, upon the question of -appointing a regency, thus describes their conduct: “He himself,” -he said, “had doubted if the central junta was a lawful government, -and this doubt was general in the provinces through which he had -passed; yet he had, to preserve the nation from anarchy, not only -yielded obedience to it, but he had, likewise, forced the provinces -of Gallicia, Leon, and Asturias to do the same; because he thought -that an illegal government might be useful if it deserved the -confidence of the people, and that they respected its authority. -The central junta, however, was not thus situated: the people, -judging of measures by their effects, complained that the armies -were weak, the government without energy; that there were no -supplies; that the promised accounts of the public expenditure -were withheld; and yet, all the sums drawn from America, all the -succours granted by England, the rents of the crown, and the -voluntary contributions were expended. The public employments were -not given to men of merit and true lovers of their country. Some -of the members of the junta rendered their power subservient to -their own advantage; others conferred lucrative appointments on -their relations and dependents. Ecclesiastical offices had been -filled up to enable individuals to seize those rents for themselves -which ought to be appropriated for the public service. There was no -unity to be found: many of the junta cared only for the interest -of their particular province, as if they were not members of the -Spanish monarchy; confirming the appointments of the local juntas, -without regard to fitness; and even assigning recompenses to men -destitute of military knowledge, who had neither seen service nor -performed the duties assigned to them.” - -“The junta, divided into sections, undertook to manage affairs -in which they were unversed, and which were altogether foreign -to their professions. Horses, taken from their owners under -pretence of supplying the armies, were left to die of hunger -in the sea-marshes: and, finally, many important branches of -administration were in the hands of men, suspected, both from their -own conduct and from their having been creatures of that infamous -favourite who was the author of the general misery.” - -It was at this period that the celebrated _Partidas_ first -commenced the _guerilla_, or petty warfare, which has been so -lauded, as if that had been the cause of Napoleon’s discomfiture. -Those bands were infinitely numerous, because, every robber, that -feared a jail, or that could break from one; every smuggler,[8] -whose trade had been interrupted; every friar, disliking the -trammels of his convent; and every idler, that wished to avoid -the ranks of the regular army, was to be found either as chief or -associate in the _partidas_. - -The French, although harassed by the constant and cruel murders of -isolated soldiers, or followers of the army, and sometimes by the -loss of convoys, were never thwarted in any great object by these -bands; but the necessity of providing subsistence, and attaching -his followers to his fortunes, generally obliged the guerilla chief -to rob his countrymen; and, indeed, one of the principal causes -of the sudden growth of this system was the hope of intercepting -the public and private plate, which, under a decree of Joseph, was -bringing in from all parts to be coined in Madrid; for that monarch -was obliged to have recourse to forced loans, and the property of -the proscribed nobles, and suppressed convents, to maintain even -the appearance of a court. - -This description will apply to the mass of the _partidas_; but -there were certainly some who were actuated by nobler motives; -by revenge; by a gallant enterprising spirit; or, by an honest -ambition, thinking to serve their country better than by joining -the regular forces. Among the principal chiefs may be placed, -Renovales, and the two Minas, in Navarre and Arragon; Porlier -named the _marquisetto_, and Longa, in the Asturias and Biscay; -Juan Martin, or _El Empecinado_, who vexed the neighbourhood of -Madrid; Julian Sanchez, in the Gata and Salamanca country; doctor -Rovera, Pereña, and some others, in Catalonia; Juan Paladea, or -_El Medico_, between the Moreno and Toledo; the curate Merino, _El -Principe_, and Saornil, in Castile; the friar Sapia, in Soria, and -Juan Abril, near Segovia. - -But these men were of very different merit. Renovales, a regular -officer, raised the peasantry of the valleys between Pampeluna -and Zaragoza, after the fall of the latter city; but he was soon -subdued. Juan Martin, Rovera, Julian Sanchez, and the student Mina, -discovered most military talent, and Sanchez was certainly a very -bold and honest man; but Espoz y Mina, the uncle and successor of -the student, far outstripped his contemporaries in fame. He shed -the blood of his prisoners freely, but rather from false principle, -and under peculiar circumstances, than from any real ferocity, -his natural disposition being manly and generous; and, although -not possessed of any peculiar military genius, he had a sound -judgement, surprising energy, and a constant spirit. - -By birth a peasant, he despised the higher orders of his own -country, and never would suffer any _hidalgo_, or gentleman, to -join his band. From 1809, until the end of the war, he maintained -himself in the provinces bordering on the Ebro; often defeated, -and chased from place to place, he gradually increased his forces; -until, in 1812, he yet was at the head of more than ten thousand -men, whom he paid regularly, and supplied from resources chiefly -created by himself; one of which was remarkable:--He established -a treaty with the French generals, by which articles, not being -warlike stores, coming from France, had safe conduct from his -_partida_, on paying a duty, which Mina appropriated to the -subsistence of his followers. - -That the guerilla system could never seriously affect the progress -of the French, is proved by the fact, that the constant aim of the -principal chiefs was to introduce the customs of regular troops; -and their success against the enemy was proportionate to their -progress in discipline and organization. There were not less than -fifty thousand of these irregular soldiers, at one time, in Spain; -and so severely did they press upon the country that it may be -assumed as a truth that if the English army had abandoned the -contest, one of the surest means by which the French could have -gained the good will of the nation would have been the extirpating -of the _partidas_. Nevertheless, one great and unquestionable -advantage was derived by the regular armies, and especially by the -British, from the existence of these bands. The French corps could -never communicate with each other, nor combine their movements, -except by the slow method of sending officers with strong escorts; -whereas, their adversaries could correspond by post, and even by -telegraph, an advantage equal to a reinforcement of thirty thousand -men. - - -PORTUGUESE POWER. - -The Portuguese military system has been already explained. The -ranks of the regular army, and of the militia, were filling; the -arms and equipments were supplied by England; and means were taking -to give effect to the authority of the _captans mor_, or chiefs -of districts, under whom the _ordenanzas_ were to be gathered -for the defence of the country. The people having been a second -time relieved from an invasion, by the intervention of a British -army, were disposed to submit implicitly to the guidance of their -deliverers; but the effect of former misgovernment pervaded every -branch of administration, political and municipal, and impeded -the efforts made to draw forth the military resources of the -kingdom. It is a curious fact that, not only at this period, but -until the end of the war, such was the reluctance of the people to -become soldiers, that, notwithstanding their undoubted hatred of -the French, their natural docility, and the visible superiority -of the soldiers’ condition over that of the peasant or artisan, -the recruiting was always difficult; and the odious spectacle was -constantly exhibited, of men marched in chains, to reinforce -armies, which were fighting in what was a popular, and ought to -have been a sacred cause. - -The actual number of regular troops, armed and organized, was not -above fifteen thousand, and, notwithstanding the courage displayed -by those employed in the late operations, marshal Beresford -was doubtful of their military qualities, and reluctant to act -separately from the British troops. The most important fortresses -in a condition for defence were Elvas, Albuquerque, and Almeida, in -the first line; Abrantes and Peniché, in the second; the citadel, -and forts of Lisbon and Palmela, in the third. But there were many -other walled places, capable, if armed, of standing a siege, and -presenting a variety of strong points for the irregular force of -the country to assemble upon; and hence, Portugal offered, not -only great resources in men, but a base of operations solid in -itself; central with respect to the French armies, and enabling the -English general to act, without reference to the Spanish government -or Spanish commanders; an advantage more justly appreciated at -the end of the campaign than at the commencement. Such were the -relative situations of the contending hosts in the Peninsula; -yet, to take an enlarged view of affairs, it is necessary to look -beyond the actual field of battle; for the contest in Spain, no -longer isolated, was become an integral part of the great European -struggle against France. - -Napoleon, after his first successes near Ratisbon, entered Vienna, -and attempted to carry the war to the left bank of the Danube; -but a severe check, received at the battle of Esling on the 21st -of May, so shook his moral ascendancy in Europe, that he deemed -it necessary to concentrate all the disposable strength of his -empire for one gigantic effort, which should restore the terror of -his name. The appearance of inactivity assumed by him, while thus -mightily gathering his forces, deceived his enemies; and, as their -hopes rose, their boasts became extravagant, more especially in -England, where, to express a doubt of his immediate overthrow was -regarded as a heinous offence; and where the government, buoyed -up with foolish expectations, thought less of supporting a noble -and effectual warfare in Portugal than of nourishing and aiding -the secondary and rather degrading hostility of conspirators, -malcontents, and military adventurers in Germany. - -[Sidenote: Adjutant-general’s Returns.] - -While sir Arthur Wellesley was waiting impatiently on the Tagus -for the scanty reinforcements afforded him, two other armies were -simultaneously preparing to act against the extremities of the -French empire; the one, consisting of about twelve thousand men, -drawn from Sicily, was destined to invade Italy, the southern parts -of which had been denuded of troops to oppose the Austrians on -the Tagliamento. The other was assembled on the coast of England, -where above forty thousand of the finest troops the nation could -boast of, and a fleet of power to overthrow all the other navies -of the world combined, composed an armament, intended to destroy -the great marine establishment which the French emperor had so -suddenly and so portentously created at Antwerp. So vast an -expedition had never before left the British shores; neither any -one so meanly conceived, so improvidently arranged, so calamitously -conducted, for the marine and land forces, combined, numbered more -than eighty thousand fighting men, and those of the bravest; yet -the object in view was comparatively insignificant, and even that -was not obtained. Delivered over to the leading of a man, whose -military incapacity has caused the glorious title of Chatham to be -scorned, this ill-fated army, with spirit, and strength, and zeal -to have spread the fame of England to the extremities of the earth, -perished, without a blow, in the pestilent marshes of Walcheren! -And so utterly had party spirit stifled the feeling of national -honour that public men were found base enough to reprobate the -convention of Cintra, to sneer at sir John Moore’s operations, and -yet to declare the Walcheren expedition wise, profitable, and even -glorious! - -The operation against Italy was less unfortunate rather than -more ably conducted, and it was equally abortive. What with slow -preparations, the voyage, and the taking of the petty islands of -Ischia and Procida, thirteen weeks were wasted; and yet, during -that period, Murat, conscious of his inability to resist, was only -restrained from abandoning Naples by the firmness of his queen, -and the energy of Sallicetti, the minister of police. We have -seen that it was the wish of the ministers to have the troops -in Sicily employed in the south of Spain, but, yielding to the -representations of sir John Stuart, they permitted him to make -this display of military foolery: yet it is not with the bad or -good success of these expeditions that this history has to deal, -but with that palpable and direful ministerial incapacity which -suffered two men, notoriously unfitted for war, to waste and -dissipate the military strength of England on secondary objects, -while a renowned commander, placed at the most important point, was -left without an adequate force. - -For the first time since the commencement of the Peninsula war, -sixty thousand Spanish troops, well armed and clothed, were -collected in a mass, and in the right place, communicating with a -British force. For the first time since Napoleon swayed the destiny -of France, the principal army of that country had met with an -important check: the great conqueror’s fortune seemed to waver, and -the moment had arrived when the British government was called to -display all its wisdom and energy. The duke of York had performed -his duty; he had placed above ninety thousand superb soldiers, all -disposable for offensive operations, in the hands of the ministers; -but the latter knew not their value, and, instead of concentrating -them upon one, scattered them upon many points. Sir Arthur -Wellesley might have had above eighty thousand British troops on -the frontiers of Portugal, and he was a general capable of wielding -them. He was forced to commence a campaign, upon which the fate of -the Peninsula, a quick triumph or a long-protracted agony of twelve -millions of people depended, with only twenty-two thousand; while -sixty thousand fighting men, and ships numerous enough to darken -all the coasts of Spain, were waiting, in Sicily and England, for -orders which were to doom them, one part to scorn, and the other -to an inglorious and miserable fate. Shall the deliverance of the -Peninsula, then, be attributed to the firmness and long-sighted -policy of ministers who gave these glaring proofs of improvidence, -or shall the glory of that great exploit lighten round the head of -him who so manfully maintained the fierce struggle, even under the -burden of their folly? - - - - -BOOK IX. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -CAMPAIGN OF TALAVERA. - - -In the foregoing book the real state of affairs in the Peninsula -has been described; but it appeared with a somewhat different -aspect to the English general, because false informations, -egregious boasts, and hollow promises, such as had been employed to -mislead sir John Moore, were renewed at this period; and the allied -nations were influenced by a riotous rather than a reasonable -confidence of victory. The English newspapers teemed with letters, -describing the enemy’s misery and fears: nor was the camp free -from these inflated feelings. Marshal Beresford was so credulous -of French weakness as publicly to announce to the junta of Badajos -that Soult’s force, wandering and harassed by continual attacks, -was reduced to eight or ten thousand distressed soldiers. Nay, -sir Arthur Wellesley himself, swayed by the pertinacity of the -tale-makers, the unhesitating assurances of the junta, perhaps, -also, a little excited by a sense of his own great talents, was not -free from the impression that the hour of complete triumph was come. - -The Spanish government and the Spanish generals were importunate -for offensive movements, and lavish in their promises of support; -and the English general was as eager, for he was at the head of -gallant troops, his foot was on the path of victory, and he felt -that, if the duke of Belluno was not quickly disabled, the British -army, threatened on both flanks, would, as in the case of sir John -Cradock, be obliged to remain in some defensive position, near -Lisbon, until it became the scorn of the French, and an object of -suspicion and hatred to the Spanish and Portuguese people. - -There were three lines of offensive operations open:-- - -1º. _To cross the Tagus, join Cuesta’s army, and, making Elvas and -Badajos the base of movements, attack Victor in front._ This line -was circuitous. It permitted the enemy to cover his front by the -Tagus; the operations of the allies would have been cramped by the -Sierra de Guadalupe on one side, and the mountains lying between -Albuquerque and Alcantara on the other; and strong detachments must -have been left to cover the roads to Lisbon, on the right bank of -the Tagus. Finally, the communication between the duke of Belluno -and Soult being free, Beresford’s corps would have been endangered. - -2º. _To adopt Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo as the base of movements, -and to operate in conjunction with Beresford, the duke del Parque, -and Romana, by the line of Salamanca, while Cuesta and Venegas -occupied the attention of the first and fourth corps on the Tagus._ -The objections to this line were, that it separated the British -troops from the most efficient and most numerous, and obliged them -to act with the weakest and most irregular of the Spanish armies; -that it abandoned Cuesta to the ruin which his headstrong humour -would certainly provoke; and as the loss of Seville or of Lisbon -would inevitably follow; the instructions of the English ministers, -(which enjoined the defence of the latter city as paramount to -every object, save the military possession of Cadiz,) would have -been neglected. - -3º. _To march upon Plasencia and Almaraz, form a junction with -Cuesta, and advance against Madrid, while Venegas operated in the -same view, by the line of La Mancha._ The obstacles in the way of -this plan were--1º. That it exposed Cuesta to be defeated by Victor -before the junction; and that, after the junction, the combinations -would still be dependent upon the accuracy of Venegas’s movements. -2º. That sir Arthur Wellesley’s march, with reference to Soult’s -corps, would be a flank march: an unsafe operation at all times, -but, on this occasion, when the troops must move through the long -and narrow valley of the Tagus, peculiarly dangerous. Nevertheless, -this line was adopted, nor were the reasons in favour of it devoid -of force. - -The number of French immediately protecting Madrid was estimated -at fifty thousand; but confidential officers, sent to the -head-quarters of Cuesta and Venegas, had ascertained that their -strength was not overstated at thirty-eight thousand, for the -first, and twenty-five thousand for the second, all well armed -and equipped, and the last certainly the best and most efficient -army that the Spaniards had yet brought into the field. Now -the English force in Portugal amounted to thirty thousand men, -exclusive of the sick, twenty-two thousand being under arms on the -frontier, and eight thousand at Lisbon: here, then, was a mass -of ninety thousand regular troops that could be brought to bear -on fifty thousand; besides which there were sir Robert Wilson’s -legion, about a thousand strong, and the Spanish _partidas_ of the -Guadalupe and the Sierra de Bejar. - -The ridge of mountains which separate the valley of the Tagus from -Castile and Leon being, as has been already related, impracticable -for artillery, except at the passes of Baños and Perales, it was -supposed that the twenty thousand men under Beresford and the duke -del Parque would be sufficient to block those lines of march, and -that Romana, moving by the Tras os Montes, might join the duke del -Parque, and thus thirty thousand men, supported by two fortresses, -would be ready to protect the flank of the British army in its -march from Plasencia towards Madrid. A vain calculation, for Romana -remained ostentatiously idle at Coruña, and sir Arthur Wellesley, -never having seen the Spanish troops in action, thought too well of -them; and having had no experience of Spanish promises he trusted -them too far; and, at the same time, made a false judgement of the -force and position of his adversaries. The arrival of the sixth -corps at Astorga and of the fifth at Valladolid were unknown to -him: the strength of the second corps, and, perhaps, the activity -of its chief, were also underrated. Instead of fifteen or twenty -thousand harassed French troops, without artillery, there were -seventy thousand fighting-men behind the mountains! - -The 27th of June, the English army, breaking up from the camp of -Abrantes, and, being organized in the following manner, marched -into Spain:-- - -_Artillery._ - - Six brigades, 30 guns, com^d. by maj.-gen. Howorth. - -_Cavalry._ - - Three brigades, 3047 sabres, com^d. by lt.-gen. Payne. - -_Infantry._ - - 1st div. of 4 brigades, 6023 bayonets, com^d. by lt.-gen. Sherbrooke. - 2d do. 2 do. 3947 do. do. maj.-gen. Hill. - 3d do. 2 do. 3736 do. do. m.-gen. Mackenzie. - 4th do. 2 do. 2957 do. do. br.-gen. Campbell. - --- -- ----- - 5 divs. 13 brigades, 19710 sabres and bayonets. - --- -- 1287 Engineers, artillery, and waggon-train. - ----- - Grand total 20997 men, and 30 pieces of artillery. - ----- - -Besides this force, the 40th regiment, so long detained at Seville -by Mr. Frere, had arrived in Lisbon, and the troops on their march -from that city, being somewhat less than eight thousand bayonets, -were organized in three brigades, commanded by major-general -Lightfoot and brigadier-generals Robert and Catlin Craufurd. But -the leading brigade, under Robert Craufurd, only quitted Lisbon on -the 28th of June. - -The army moved by both banks of the Tagus; one column proceeding -through Sobreira Formosa, the other by Villa Velha, where a -boat-bridge was established. The 1st of July the head-quarters -were at Castello Branco, and from thence the troops continued -their route, in one column, by Moralejo and Coria; but a flanking -brigade, under general Donkin, was directed through Ceclaven and -Torijoncillos, and explored the country between Zarza Mayor and the -Tagus. The 8th, the head-quarters were established at Plasencia. -The 10th, the army arrived at that place, and was, soon after, -joined by a regiment of cavalry and two battalions of infantry from -Lisbon. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.] - -At this period Cuesta was at Almaraz, and Victor, of whose -intermediate movements it is time to take notice, was at Talavera -de la Reyna. When that marshal had retired from Torremocha, the -valley of the Tagus was exhausted by the long sojourn of the fourth -and first corps; but the valley of Plasencia was extremely fertile, -and untouched, and the duke of Belluno, whose troops, weakened -by the tertian sickness, required good nourishment, resolved to -take post there, and keep a bridge at Bazagona, on the Tietar, by -which he could, in two marches, fall upon Cuesta, if he ventured -to pass the Tagus at Almaraz. At Plasencia, also, he could open a -communication with the second and fifth corps, and observe closely -the movements of the English army on the frontier of Portugal. The -bridge at Bazagona was finished on the 21st of June, and the French -light troops were scouring the country towards Plasencia, when the -king, who had already withdrawn a division of infantry and a large -part of the cavalry of the first corps to reinforce the fourth, -ordered the duke of Belluno to retire instantly to Talavera, -leaving rear-guards on the Tietar and at Almaraz. This order, -which arrived the 22d of June, was the result of that indecision -which none but truly great men, or fools, are free from; the -first, because they can see their way clearly through the thousand -difficulties that encumber and bewilder the mind in war; the last, -because they see nothing. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -On the present occasion, general Sebastiani had reported that -Venegas was reinforced, and ready to penetrate by La Mancha; and -the king, swayed by this false information, disturbed by the march -of Cuesta, and still more by Blake’s advance against Zaragoza -(the result of which was then unknown), became so alarmed that he -commanded St. Cyr to move into Aragon, repaired himself to Toledo, -with his guards and reserve, withdrew the light cavalry and a -division of infantry from Victor, obliged that marshal to fall back -on Talavera; and even commanded Mortier to bring up the fifth corps -from Valladolid to Villa Castin, near Avila, although, following -Napoleon’s orders, it should have gone to Salamanca. - -In the hope of meeting Venegas, Joseph penetrated as far as the -Jabalon river, in La Mancha; and as the Spaniard, fearful of the -tempest approaching him, took shelter in the Morena, the king, -leaving some posts of the 4th corps at Toledo, restored the light -cavalry to the first corps, and, with his guards and reserve, -returned to Madrid. But, while he had been pursuing a shadow, -Victor was exposed to great danger; for the Jabalon is six long -marches from Madrid, and hence, for ten days, the duke of Belluno, -with only two divisions of infantry and two thousand cavalry, in -all about fourteen thousand men, had remained at Talavera without -any support, although sixty thousand men were marching against him -from different points. - -Victor did not suffer as he might have done; but his numerical -weakness was certainly the safety of Cuesta. For that general, -having followed the retreat of the first corps from Torremocha, -crossed the Tagus, at Almaraz, on the 23d of June, and pushed -an advanced guard towards Oropesa. He had thirty-eight thousand -men, yet he remained tranquil while (at a distance of only twelve -miles) fourteen thousand French made a flank movement that lasted -three days; and his careless method of acting, and his unskilful -dispositions, were so evident, that the French cavalry, far from -fearing, were preparing to punish him, when he suddenly took the -alarm, and, withdrawing to Almaraz, occupied himself in finishing -his bridges over the Tagus. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations First Corps MSS.] - -The 28th, Victor, having removed his hospitals and depôts from -Arzobispo, took a position behind the Alberche, keeping, however, -three battalions and the cavalry at Talavera, with advanced posts -at Calera and Gamonal. A small detachment, also, watched the -course of the Tagus from the mouth of the Alberche to that of the -Guadarama, and a moveable column was sent to Escalona, to observe -the Vera de Plasencia and passes leading upon Avila. In executing -this retrograde movement, Victor, having no means of transport, -burnt ten out of the fifteen pontoons supporting his bridge over -the Tietar, and, for the same reason, he threw a considerable -quantity of powder and shot into the river. His troops had been for -four days on quarter rations, and were suffering from sickness and -hunger; and the Tagus was fordable in several places. The danger -of his position is evident. The British were, however, still at -Abrantes, and Cuesta knew not how to profit by this opportunity -before the king returned from La Mancha. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, printed -in 1810.] - -Such was the position of the different armies when the British -general arrived at Plasencia. He had seen Soult’s letters, found -upon general Franceschi, and thus ascertained that the second -corps was at Zamora, and from Franceschi himself, who passed -as a prisoner, at the same time, he learned the arrival of the -fifth corps at Valladolid; but the march of Ney’s corps was not -suspected, and the tenor of Soult’s letters led to the notion that -Gallicia was to be retained. A letter of Victor’s to Joseph, dated -the 23d of June, and written in the most desponding language, -had been likewise intercepted; and, as Soult’s correspondence -also gave a strong picture of _his_ difficulties, the general -impression that the French armies were not only weak but utterly -dismayed was rather augmented than lessened by this information. -Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, could not but have some distrust, -when he knew that _two corps_ were beyond the mountains, on his -left; and, though far from suspecting the extent of his danger, he -took additional precautions to protect that flank, and renewed his -instructions to Beresford to watch the enemy’s movements, and to -look carefully to the defence of the _Puerto Perales_. But the pass -of Baños was still to be guarded, and for this purpose sir Arthur -applied to Cuesta. - -The Spanish general was at first unwilling to detach any men to -that quarter, but he finally agreed that two battalions from his -army and two others from the town of Bejar, at the other side of -the pass, should unite to defend Baños, and that the duke del -Parque should also send a detachment to the pass of Perales. -Although these measures appeared sufficient to obviate danger -from Soult’s corps, weakened as it was supposed to be, they were -evidently futile to check the real force under that marshal; and -they were rendered absolutely ridiculous by Cuesta, who sent two -weak battalions, of three hundred men each, and with only twenty -rounds of ammunition per man: and yet this was only a part of a -system which already weighed heavily on the English general. - -The 10th, sir Arthur Wellesley proceeded to Cuesta’s -head-quarters, near the Col de Mirabete, to confer with him on -their future operations. Ever since the affair of Valdez, in 1808, -the junta had been sorely afraid of Cuesta, and, suspecting that -he was meditating some signal vengeance, they endeavoured to raise -up rivals to his power. In this view they had lavished honours and -authority upon Blake; but the defeat at Belchite having crushed -their hopes in that quarter, they turned their eyes upon Venegas, -and increased his forces, taking care to give him the best troops. -Still Cuesta’s force was formidable, and to reduce it was the -object both of Mr. Frere and the junta: the motive of the first -being to elevate the duke of Albuquerque; the intention of the -others being merely to reduce the power of Cuesta. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -Whatever might have been the latter’s ultimate intention, with -respect to the junta, it is certain that his natural obstinacy -and violence were greatly increased by a knowledge of these -proceedings, and that he was ill-disposed towards the English -general, as thinking him a party concerned in these intrigues. -When, therefore, sir Arthur, at the instigation of Mr. Frere, -proposed that a draft of ten thousand Spanish troops should be -detached towards Avila and Segovia, Cuesta replied that it should -be done by the British, and absolutely refused to furnish more than -two battalions of infantry and a few cavalry to strengthen sir -Robert Wilson’s partizan corps, which was destined to act on the -enemy’s right. This determination again baffled Mr. Frere’s project -of placing the duke of Albuquerque at the head of an independent -force, and obliged the supreme junta to fall upon some other -expedient for reducing Cuesta’s power; and it was fortunate that -the old Spaniard resisted the proposal, because the ten thousand -men would have gone straight into the midst of the fifth corps, -which, in expectation of such a movement, was then at Villa Castin, -and, having been rejoined by the detachment of colonel Briche, -from Catalonia, was eighteen thousand strong, and supported by -Kellerman’s division of cavalry at Valladolid. - -The discussion between the generals lasted two days; but, with the -approbation of the supreme junta, it was finally agreed that the -British and Spanish armies, under sir Arthur and Cuesta, should -march, on the 18th, against Victor; and that Venegas, advancing, at -the same time, through La Mancha, should leave Toledo and Aranjues -to his left, and push for Fuente Duenas and Villa Maurique on the -Upper Tagus. If this movement should draw Sebastiani, with the -fourth corps, to that side, Venegas was to keep him in play while -the allied forces defeated Victor. If Sebastiani disregarded it, -Venegas was to cross the Tagus and march upon Madrid, from the -south east, while sir Robert Wilson, reinforced by some Spanish -battalions, menaced that capital from the opposite quarter. - -Previous to entering Spain, sir Arthur had ascertained that the -valleys of the Alagon and the Arago and those between Bejar and -Ciudad Rodrigo were fertile and capable of nourishing the army, and -he had sent commissaries to all these points to purchase mules, -and to arrange with the alcaldes of the different districts for -the supply of the troops. He had obtained the warmest assurances, -from the supreme junta, that every needful article should be -forthcoming, and the latter had also sent the intendant-general, -don Lonzano de Torres, to the British head-quarters, with full -powers to forward all arrangements for the supply of the English -troops. Relying upon these preparations, sir Arthur had crossed the -frontier with few means of transport and without magazines, for -Portugal could not furnish what was required, and, moreover, the -Portuguese peasants had an insuperable objection to quitting their -own country; a matter apparently of little consequence, because -Mr. Frere, writing officially at the time, described the people of -Estremadura as viewing “_the war in the light of a crusade, and -carrying it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause!_” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 17.] - -From Castello Branco to Plasencia is but seven days’ march, yet -that short time was sufficient to prove the bad faith of the junta, -and the illusion under which Mr. Frere laboured. Neither mules for -the transport of ammunition and provisions, nor the promised help -of the authorities, nor aid of any kind could be procured; and don -Lonzano de Torres, although, to sir Arthur, he freely acknowledged -the extent of the evil, the ill-will of the inhabitants, and the -shameful conduct of the supreme junta, afterwards, without shame, -asserted that the British troops had always received and consumed -double rations, and were in want of nothing; an assertion in which -he was supported by don Martin de Garay, the Spanish secretary of -state; the whole proceeding being a concerted plan, to afford the -junta a pretext for justifying their own and casting a slur upon -the English general’s conduct, if any disasters should happen. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, seriously alarmed for the subsistence of his -army, wrote, upon the 16th, to Mr. Frere and to general O’Donoghue, -the chief of Cuesta’s staff; representing to both the distress of -his army, and intimating his resolution _not to proceed beyond the -Alberche_, unless his wants were immediately supplied; faithful, -however, to his agreement with Cuesta, he prepared to put the army -in motion for that river. It was known at Plasencia, on the 15th, -that Ney had retreated from Coruña; but it was believed, that his -corps had been recalled to France; and no change took place in the -plan of campaign. It was not suspected that the sixth corps had -then been sixteen days at Astorga! - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The valley of the Tagus, into which the army was about to plunge, -is intersected by several rivers, with rugged banks and deep -channels; but their courses being very little out of the parallel -of the Tagus, the Alberche is in a manner enclosed by the Tietar. -Now, sir Robert Wilson, with four thousand Portuguese and Spanish -troops, had ascended the right bank of the latter river, and gained -possession of the passes of Arenas, which lead upon Avila, and of -the pass of San Pedro Bernardo, which leads upon Madrid. In this -position he covered the Vera de Plasencia, and threatened Victor’s -communications with the capital. The French marshal was alarmed; -and a movement of the whole army in the same direction would have -obliged him to abandon the Lower Alberche, because, two marches -from Arenas, in the direction of Escalona and Macqueda, would have -placed sir Arthur Wellesley between the first corps and Madrid. -But, on the other hand, the line of country was too rugged for -rapid movements with a large body; and it was necessary first to -secure a junction with Cuesta, because Victor, having recovered -his third division on the 7th of July, was again at the head of -twenty-five thousand men. With such a force he could not be -trusted near the Spaniards; and the British general resolved to -cross the Tietar at the Venta de Bazagona, and march by Miajadas -upon Oropesa. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of the First Corps’ Operations.] - -The 16th, two companies of the _staff corps_, with a working party -of five hundred men, marched from Plasencia to Bazagona, to throw -a bridge over the Tietar. The duke of Belluno had wasted many days -in dragging up fifteen pontoons from the Tagus, to form his bridge -at that place; and when he retired upon Talavera, he destroyed the -greatest part of the equipage; but the English officer employed -on this occasion pulled down an old house in the neighbourhood, -felled some pine trees in a wood three miles distant; and, uniting -intelligence with labour, contrived, without other aid than a few -hatchets and saws, in one day, to throw a solid bridge over the -Tietar. - -The 18th, the army crossed that river, and taking the route of -Miajadas, reached Talayuela. - -The 19th, the main body halted at Centinello and Casa de Somas. The -advanced posts at Venta de St. Juliens. - -The 20th, the troops reached Oropesa; but as their marches had been -long, and conducted through a difficult country, they halted the -21st; on which day, Cuesta, who had moved from Almaraz by Naval -Moral and Arzobispo, passed Oropesa, and united his whole force at -Velada, except a small detachment, which marched along the south -bank of the Tagus, to threaten the French by the bridge of Talavera. - -The duke of Belluno, aware of these movements, had supported his -posts at Talavera with a division of infantry, which was disposed -in successive detachments behind that town. His situation -appeared critical; because the allies, covered by the Alberche, -might still gain a march and reach Escalona before him; and from -thence either push for Madrid, by the pass of Brunete, or, taking -post at Maqueda, cut him off from the capital. But his sources -of information were sure; and he contented himself with sending -a regiment of hussars to Cazar de Escalona, to watch the Upper -Alberche, and to support the moveable column opposed to sir Robert -Wilson. - -The 21st, the allies being between Oropesa and Velada, Victor -recalled all his foraging parties, altered his line of retreat from -the Madrid to the Toledo road, removed his parc from St. Ollalla -to Cevolla, and concentrated two divisions of infantry behind the -Alberche. - -The 22d, the allies moved in two columns, to drive the French posts -from Talavera; and Cuesta, marching by the high road, came first -up with the enemy’s rear-guard, near the village of Gamonal; but -then commenced a display of ignorance, timidity, and absurdity, -that has seldom been equalled in war; the past defeats of the -Spanish army were rendered quite explicable; the little fruit -derived from them by marshal Victor quite inexplicable. General -Latour Maubourg, with two thousand dragoons, came boldly on to -the table-land of Gamonal, and sustaining a cannonade, not only -checked the head of the Spanish leading column, but actually -obliged general Zayas, who commanded it, to display his whole -line, consisting of fifteen thousand infantry and three thousand -cavalry; nor did the French horsemen give back at all, until the -appearance of the red uniforms on their right informed them that -it was time to retire. Then, and not till then, Latour Maubourg, -supported by some infantry, retreated behind the Alberche, and -without loss, although many batteries, and at least six thousand -Spanish horse, were close on his rear; but the latter could never -be induced to make even a partial charge, however favourable the -opportunity, and by two o’clock the whole French army was safely -concentrated on its position. Ruffin’s division on the left touched -the Tagus, and protected the bridge over the Alberche, which was -more immediately defended by a regiment of infantry and fourteen -pieces of artillery. Villatte’s and Lapisse’s divisions, drawn -up in successive lines, on some high ground that overlooked the -surrounding country, formed the right; the heavy cavalry were in -second line near the bridge; and in this situation Victor rested -the 22d and 23d. - -It was at all times difficult to obtain accurate information from -the Spaniards by gentle means; hence, the French were usually -better supplied with intelligence than the British; while the -native generals never knew any thing about the enemy, until they -felt the weight of his blows. Up to this period, sir Arthur’s best -sources of information had been the intercepted letters of the -French; and now, although the latter had been in the same position, -and without any change of numbers since the 7th, the inhabitants -of Talavera could not, or would not, give any information of their -strength or situation; nor could any reasonable calculation be -formed of either, until some English officers crossed the Tagus, -and, from the mountains on the left bank of that river, saw the -French position in reverse. - -The general outline of an attack was, however, agreed upon for the -next morning, but the details were unsettled; and when the English -commander came to arrange these with Cuesta, the latter was gone to -bed. The British troops were under arms at three o’clock the next -morning, but Cuesta’s staff were not aroused from slumber until -seven o’clock; and the old man finally objected to fight that day, -alleging, among other absurd reasons, that it was Sunday. But there -was something more than absurdity in these proceedings. Victor, who -was not ignorant of the weak points of his own position, remained -tranquil the 23d, being well assured that no attack would take -place, for it is certain that he had a correspondence with some of -the Spanish staff; and the secret discussions between sir Arthur -Wellesley and Cuesta, at which only one staff officer of each party -was present, became known to the enemy in twenty-four hours after; -indeed, Cuesta was himself suspected of treachery by many, yet -apparently without reason. - -In the course of the 23d, the Spanish officer commanding the -advanced posts reported that the French guns were withdrawn, and -that it was evident they meant to retreat; Cuesta then became -willing to attack, and proposed, in concert with sir Arthur -Wellesley, to examine Victor’s position; but, to the surprise of -the English commander, the Spaniard arrived in a coach, drawn by -six horses, to perform this duty; and when the inequalities of the -ground obliged him to descend from his vehicle, he cast himself -at the foot of a tree, and in a few moments went to sleep. Yet he -was always ready to censure and to thwart every proposal of his -able coadjutor. This time, however, he consented to fall upon the -enemy; and the troops were in motion early in the morning of the -24th; but the duke of Belluno was again duly informed of their -intention; and having withdrawn his moveable column from Escalona, -and relinquished the road to Madrid, retreated during the night to -Torijos. Thus, the first combination of the allies failed entirely; -and each hour the troops of the enemy were accumulating round them; -for Venegas, who should have been at Fuente Duenas, high up on the -Tagus, had not even passed Damyel; and the king was collecting his -whole strength in front, between Toledo and Talavera; while Soult -was fast gathering his more formidable power behind the mountains -of Bejar. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -The English general was indeed still ignorant of the danger which -threatened him from the Salamanca country, or he would, doubtless, -have withdrawn at once to Plasencia, and secured his communications -with Lisbon, and with Beresford’s troops; but other powerful -reasons were not wanting to prevent his further advance. Before he -quitted Plasencia he had completed contracts with the alcaldes, -in the Vera de Plasencia, for two hundred and fifty thousand -rations of forage and provisions; and this, together with what he -had before collected, would have furnished supplies for ten or -twelve days, a sufficient time to beat Victor, and carry the army -into a fresh country; but, distrustful, as he had reason to be, -of the Spaniards, he again gave notice to Cuesta and the junta, -that BEYOND THE ALBERCHE he would not move, unless his wants were -immediately supplied; for, hitherto the rations contracted for -had not been delivered; and his representations to the junta and -to Cuesta were, by both, equally disregarded; there were no means -of transport provided; the troops were already on less than half -allowance, and absolute famine approached; and when the general -demanded food for his soldiers, at the hands of those whose cause -he came to defend, he was answered with false excuses, and insulted -by false statements. Under any circumstances this would have forced -him to halt; but the advance having been made in the exercise of -his own discretion, and not at the command of his government, there -could be no room for hesitation: wherefore, remonstrating warmly, -but manfully, with the supreme junta, he announced his resolution -to go no farther, nay, even _to withdraw from Spain altogether_. - -It is evident that without these well-founded reasons for pausing, -Cuesta’s conduct, and the state of his army, offered no solid -ground for expecting success by continuing the forward movement; -but the faithless and perverse conduct of the supreme junta, -although hidden as yet from sir Arthur Wellesley, far exceeded the -measure even of Cuesta’s obdurate folly. That body, after having -agreed to the plan upon which the armies were acting, concluded, -in the fulness of their ignorance, that the combined troops in -the valley of the Tagus would be sufficient to overthrow Joseph; -and, therefore, secretly ordered Venegas not to fulfil his part, -arguing to themselves, with a cunning stupidity, that it would be -a master stroke of policy to save him from any chance of a defeat; -hoping thus to preserve a powerful force, under one of their own -creatures, to maintain their own power. This was the cause why the -army of La Mancha had failed to appear on the Tagus: and thus, the -welfare of millions was made the sport of men, who yet were never -tired of praising themselves, and have not failed to find admirers -elsewhere. - -As the Spaniards are perfect masters of the art of saying every -thing and doing nothing, sir Arthur’s remonstrances drew forth many -official statements, plausible replies, and pompous assertions, -after their manner, but produced no amelioration of the evils -complained of. Mr. Frere, also, thought it necessary to make some -apology for himself, asserting that the evil was deep rooted, and -that he had had neither time nor power to arrange any regular plan -for the subsistence of the English armies. But all the evils that -blighted the Spanish cause were deep seated; and yet Mr. Frere, who -could not arrange a plan for the subsistence of the troops, that -indispensable preliminary to military operations, and which was -really within his province, thought himself competent to direct -all the operations themselves which were in the province of the -generals. He had found leisure to meddle in all the intrigues of -the day; to aim at making and unmaking Spanish commanders; to -insult sir John Moore; to pester sir John Cradock with warlike -advice; and to arrange the plan of campaign for sir Arthur -Wellesley’s army, without that officer’s concurrence. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -The English general’s resolution to halt at Talavera made little -impression upon Cuesta. A French corps had retreated before him, -and Madrid, nay, the Pyrennees themselves, instantly rose on the -view of the sanguine Spaniard: he was resolved to be the first in -the capital, and he pushed forward in pursuit, reckless alike of -military discipline and of the friendly warnings of sir Arthur; -who vainly admonished him to open his communications as quickly as -possible with Venegas, and to beware how he let the enemy know that -the British and Spanish armies were separated. In the fulness of -his arrogant vanity, Cuesta crossed the Alberche on the 24th, and -being unable to ascertain the exact route of the French, pursued -them, by the road of Toledo, as far as Cebolla, and, by the road -of Madrid, as far as El Bravo. On the 25th, still inflated with -pride, he caused the troops at Cebolla to move on to Torrijos, and -marched himself to St. Ollalla. The 26th he discovered that he had -been pursuing a tiger. Meanwhile sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing -the consequence of this imprudence, had sent general Sherbrooke, -with two divisions of British infantry and all the cavalry, across -the Alberche, to Cazalegas, where, being centrically situated with -respect to Talavera, St. Ollalla, and Escalona, he could support -the Spaniards, and, at the same time, hold communication with sir -Robert Wilson, who had been at the latter town since the 23d. -But a great and signal crisis was at hand, the full importance -of which cannot be well understood without an exact knowledge of -the situation and proceedings of all the armies involved in this -complicated campaign. - -The 30th of June, Soult, when at Zamora, received a despatch -from the emperor, dated near Ratisbon, conferring on him the -supreme command of the second, fifth, and sixth corps, with orders -to concentrate them, and act decisively against the English. -“_Wellesley_,” said Napoleon, “_will probably advance, by the -Tagus, against Madrid: in that case, pass the mountains, fall on -his flank and rear, and crush him_;” for, at that distance, and -without other information than what his own sagacity supplied, this -allknowing soldier foresaw the leading operations even as soon and -as certainly as those who projected them. - -The duke of Dalmatia immediately imparted these instructions to -the king, and, at the same time, made known his own opinions and -designs with respect to the probable projects of the allies. He -was ignorant of the precise object and exact position of sir -Arthur Wellesley, but, judging from the cessation of hostility -in the north, that the English were in march with the design of -joining Cuesta, and acting by the line of the Tagus, he proposed to -concentrate the third corps at Salamanca, besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, -and menace Lisbon, which, he justly observed, would bring the -English army back to the northern provinces of Portugal; and if, -as some supposed, the intention of sir Arthur was to unite, at -Bragança, with Romana, and open the campaign to the north of the -Douro, the French army would still be in a suitable position to -oppose them. - -In pursuance of this opinion, Soult ordered Mortier to approach -Ciudad Rodrigo, with the double view of preparing for the siege -and covering the quarters of refreshment so much needed by the -second corps after its fatigues. Ney also was directed to march -with the sixth corps, by the left bank of the Esla, to Zamora; but -the spirit of discord was strong, and it was at this moment that -the king, alarmed by Sebastiani’s report, drew the fifth corps to -Villa Castin; while marshal Ney, holding it imprudent to uncover -Astorga and Leon, mortified, also, at being placed under the orders -of another marshal, refused to move to Zamora. Soult, crossed by -these untoward circumstances, sent the division of light cavalry, -under his brother, and one of infantry, commanded by Heudelet, from -Zamora and Toro to Salamanca, with orders to explore the course of -the Tormes, to observe Alba and Ledesma, and especially to scour -the roads leading upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Plasencia: these troops -relieved a division of dragoons belonging to Kellerman, who was -still charged with the general government of the province. - -The 10th of July, the march of the British upon Plasencia became -known, and it was manifest that sir Arthur had no design to act -north of the Douro; wherefore the duke of Dalmatia resolved to -advance, with the remainder of the second corps, to Salamanca, -and, partly by authority, partly by address, he obliged Ney to -put the sixth corps in movement for Zamora, leaving Fournier’s -dragoons to cover Astorga and Leon. Meanwhile, king Joseph, having -returned from his fruitless excursion against Venegas, was at first -incredulous of the advance of sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, but -he agreed to Soult’s project against Ciudad Rodrigo, and ordered -Mortier to return to Valladolid, where that marshal arrived, with -his first division, on the 16th of July: his second division, under -general Gazan, halted, however, at Medina del Campo and Nava del -Rey, on the route from Salamanca to Valladolid, and an advanced -guard was sent forward to Alba de Tormes. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The 13th of July, Soult, being assured that the British army -was on the eastern frontier of Portugal, and that considerable -reinforcements had been disembarked at Lisbon, became certain that -sir Arthur meant to operate by the line of the Tagus; wherefore, -he again addressed the king to move him to an immediate siege of -Ciudad Rodrigo, promising to have the three corps under his own -command in full activity in fifteen days, provided his demands -were complied with, the most important being--1º. The formation of -a battering-train;--2º. The concentration of an immense number of -detachments, which weakened the active corps;--3º. A reinforcement -of fifteen or twenty thousand conscripts, drawn from France, to -enable the old troops, employed on the line of communication, to -join the _corps d’armée_. The first corps should, he said, continue -to watch the Spanish army of Estremadura, and be prepared either -to prevent it from uniting with the English to disturb the siege, -or to join the first, second, and sixth corps, and give battle, -if that should become necessary. The siege might thus be pressed -vigourously, Ciudad would fall, Almeida be next invested, and the -communications of the English army, with Lisbon, threatened. - -The 17th, the king replied, through marshal Jourdan, that he -approved of the plan, but had not means to meet several of Soult’s -demands, and he proposed that the latter should reinforce Kellerman -and Bonnet, with ten thousand men, to enable them to seize the -Asturias, and thus strengthen the communications with France. This -drew from the duke of Dalmatia the following remonstrance:--“_Under -present circumstances we cannot avoid some sacrifice of territory. -Let us prepare, first, by concentrating, on a few points capable -of defence and covering the hospitals and depôts which may be -on the extremity of our general position. This will not be so -distressing as it may appear, because the moment we have beaten and -dispersed the enemy’s masses we shall recover all our ground._” -Then reiterating his own advice, he concluded thus:--“_I conceive -it impossible to finish this war by detachments. It is large masses -only, the strongest that you can form, that will succeed._” It is -remarkable that sir Arthur Wellesley, writing at this time, says, -“_I conceive that the French are dangerous only when in large -masses_.” - -Meanwhile, Heudelet’s division, having pushed back the advanced -guards of the duke del Parque upon Ciudad Rodrigo, ascertained that -a great movement of troops was taking place near that city, and -that sir Arthur Wellesley, advancing quicker than was expected, had -already reached Plasencia; wherefore, on the 18th, Soult directed -Mortier to march upon Salamanca with the fifth corps, and, at -the same time, reinforced Heudelet’s division with Merle’s; the -latter’s place, at Zamora, being supplied by a division of the -sixth corps, the remainder of which continued on the Esla, fronting -the Tras os Montes. Thus, not less than fifty thousand men were at -or close to Salamanca, with their cavalry-posts pointing to the -passes of Baños, on the very day that sir Arthur Wellesley crossed -the Tietar to effect his junction with Cuesta. Yet, neither through -the duke del Parque, nor Beresford, nor the guerillas, nor the -peasantry, did intelligence of this formidable fact reach him! - -Having put the three corps in motion, Soult despatched general Foy -to Madrid, with information of sir Arthur’s march, and to arrange -the future combinations of the two armies. “_It is probable_,” -he said, “_that the concentration of my army at Salamanca will -oblige the English general to change his plan; but, if he shall -already have advanced on the road to Madrid, we should assemble -all our forces, both on the Tagus and on this side, fall upon him -altogether, and crush him. Thus, his campaign will be finished, and -our operations may go on with advantage._” - -Foy arrived, the 22d, at Madrid; and, a few hours afterwards, -intelligence reached the king that the allies were at Talavera, -in front of the first corps, and that sir Robert Wilson (whose -strength was much exaggerated) was at Escalona. The die was now -cast; Joseph directed Soult to march immediately upon Plasencia, -then, leaving general Belliard, with only three thousand men, in -the Retiro, set out himself, with his guards and reserve, by the -road of Mostoles, to join Victor at Talavera. The 23d, being at -Naval-Carneiro, he received notice that the first corps would -retreat that night to Torrijos, and, in two days, would be behind -the Guadarama river; whereupon, turning to the left, Joseph -descended the Guadarama to Vargas, and effected his junction with -the duke of Belluno on the 25th. - -During this time, Sebastiani, who had been watching Venegas -near Damyel, deceived that general, and, returning to Toledo by -forced marches, left three thousand men there, with the design of -obliging him to cross the Tagus, at Aranjues. With the remainder -of the fourth corps Sebastiani joined the king: and thus nearly -fifty thousand fighting men and ninety pieces of artillery were -concentrated, on the morning of the 26th, behind the Guadarama, and -within a few miles of Cuesta’s advanced guard. But, on the side -of the allies, the main body of the Spaniards was at St. Ollalla; -Sherbrooke with two divisions and the cavalry, at Casalegas; and -the rest of the English in Talavera. So that, while the French were -concentrated and in full march to attack; the allies were separated -in four nearly equal and unconnected parts, of which three were -enclosed, as it were, in a net, between the Alberche and the Tagus! -On such an occasion Napoleon would have been swift and deadly. - -In retiring upon Toledo, instead of Madrid, the duke of Belluno -showed himself an able commander. Toledo was the strategic pivot -upon which every movement turned. It was the central point, by -holding which the army of Venegas was separated from the allies on -the Alberche. If the latter advanced, Soult’s operations rendered -every forward step a stride towards ruin. If, leaving Venegas -to his fate, they retired, it must be rapidly, or there would -be neither wisdom nor safety in the measure. The king knew that -Foy would reach Soult the 24th, and as that marshal had already -assembled his army about Salamanca, which was only four days’ march -from Plasencia, he might be in the valley of the Tagus by the 30th; -hence, to insure complete success, the royal army needed only -to keep the allies in check for four or five days. This was the -plan that Soult had recommended, that the king promised to follow, -and that marshal Jourdan strenuously supported. The unskilful -proceedings of Cuesta and Venegas, the separation of the allies, -the distressed state of the English army, actually on the verge of -famine, (a circumstance that could hardly be unknown to Victor,) -greatly facilitated the execution of this project, which did not -preclude the king from punishing the folly of the Spanish general, -whose army, scattered and without order, discipline, or plan, so -strongly invited an attack. - -I have said that Cuesta was playing with a tiger: he had some faint -perception of his danger on the 25th, and he gave orders to retreat -on the 26th; but the French, suddenly passing the Guadarama, at -two o’clock in the morning of that day, quickly drove the Spanish -cavalry out of Torrijos, and pursued them to Alcabon. Here general -Zayas had drawn up four thousand infantry, two thousand horsemen, -and eight guns, on a plain, and offered battle. - - -COMBAT OF ALCABON. - -The Spanish right rested on the road of Domingo Perez, and the left -on a chapel of the same name. The French cavalry, under Latour -Maubourg, advanced in a parallel line against the Spaniards, -and a cannonade commenced; but, at that moment, the head of the -French infantry appearing in sight, the Spaniards broke, and fled -in disorder towards St. Ollalla, followed, at full gallop, by -the horsemen, who pressed them so sorely that the panic would, -doubtless, have spread through the whole army, but for the courage -of Albuquerque, who, coming up with a division of three thousand -fresh cavalry, held the enemy in play, while Cuesta retreated, in -the greatest disorder, towards the Alberche. - -After reaching St. Ollalla, the French slackened their efforts; -the main body halted there, and the advanced guards, save a few -cavalry-posts, did not pass El Bravo, and no attempt was made -to profit from the unconnected position of the allies--a gross -and palpable error; for, either by the sword or dispersion, the -Spaniards lost, on that day, not less than four thousand men; and -such was their fear and haste that it required but a little more -perseverance in the pursuit to cause a general rout. Albuquerque, -alone, showed any front; but his efforts were unavailing, and the -disorder continued to increase until general Sherbrooke, marching -out of Cazalegas, placed his divisions between the scared troops -and the enemy. Still the danger was imminent; there was no concert -between the commanders, the ground on the left of the Alberche was -unfavourable to a retiring party, and, as yet, no position upon -which the combined forces could retire had been agreed upon! What, -then, would have been the consequence if the whole French army had -borne down, compact and strong, into the midst of the disordered -masses? - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, who, at the first alarm, had hastened to -the front, seeing the confusion beyond the Alberche, knew that a -battle was at hand; and, being persuaded that in a strong defensive -position only could the Spaniards be brought to stand a shock, -earnestly endeavoured to persuade Cuesta, while Sherbrooke’s people -could yet cover the movement, to withdraw to Talavera, where -there was ground suited for defence; but Cuesta’s uncouth nature -again broke forth; his people were beaten, dispirited, fatigued, -bewildered; clustered on a narrow slip of low, flat land, between -the Alberche, the Tagus, and the heights of Salinas; and the first -shot fired by the enemy must have been the signal of defeat; yet it -was in vain that sir Arthur Wellesley pointed out those things, and -entreated of him to avoid the fall of the rock that trembled over -his head; he replied, that his troops would be disheartened by any -further retreat, that he would fight where he stood: and in this -mood he passed the night. - -The 27th, at day-light, the British general renewed his -solicitations, at first, fruitlessly, but when the enemy’s cavalry -came in sight, and Sherbrooke prepared to retire, Cuesta sullenly -yielded, yet, turning to his staff with frantic pride, observed -that “_He had first made the Englishman go down on his knees_.” -Sir Arthur Wellesley, by virtue of his genius, now assumed the -direction of both armies. General Mackenzie’s division and a -brigade of light cavalry were left on the Alberche, to cover the -retrograde movement: but the rest of the allied troops was soon in -full march for the position, which was about six miles in the rear. -Sir Robert Wilson, who had reached Naval Carneiro on the 25th, -and opened a communication with Madrid, and who would certainly -have entered that capital but for the approaching battle, was also -recalled. He returned, on the 28th, to Escalona, and hung on the -enemy’s rear, but did not attempt to join the army. - -Between the Alberche and the town of Talavera, the country was -flat, and covered with olives and cork-trees; and, on the north, -nearly parallel to the Tagus, and at a distance of about two or -three miles, a chain of round but steep hills bounded the woody -plain. Beyond these hills, but separated from them by a deep and -rugged valley, something less than half a mile wide, was the high -mountain-ridge which divides the bed of the Alberche from that of -the Tietar. Hence, a line drawn perpendicularly from the Tagus -would cross the first chain of hills at the distance of two miles, -and at two miles and a half would fall on the mountains. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, taking the town of Talavera, which was -built close to the river, as his fixed point, placed the right -of the Spaniards there, drawing their army up in two lines, with -the left resting upon a mound, where a large field-redoubt was -constructed, and behind which a brigade of British light cavalry -was posted. The front was covered by a convent, by ditches, mud -walls, breast-works, and felled trees. The cavalry was posted -behind the infantry; and the rear was supported by a large house -in the wood, well placed, in case of defeat, to cover a retreat on -to the main roads leading from Talavera to Arzobispo and Oropesa. -In this position they could not be attacked seriously, nor their -disposition be even seen; and, thus, one-half of the line necessary -to be occupied by the allies was rendered nearly impregnable, and -yet held by the worst troops. - -The front of battle was prolonged by the British infantry. General -Campbell’s division, formed in two lines, touched the Spanish -left; general Sherbrooke’s division stood next to Campbell’s, but -arranged on one line only, because general Mackenzie’s division, -destined to form the second, was then near the Alberche. It was -intended that general Hill’s division should close the left of the -British, by taking post on the highest hill, in the chain before -mentioned, as bounding the flat and woody country; but, by some -accident, the summit of this height was not immediately occupied. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 11.] - -The whole line, thus displayed, was about two miles in length, the -left being covered by the valley between the hill and the mountain; -and from this valley a ravine, or water-course, opened, deeply, in -the front of the British left, but being gradually obliterated in -the flat ground about the centre of the line. Part of the British -cavalry was with general Mackenzie, and in the plain in front of -the left, and part behind the great redoubt, at the junction of -the allied troops. The British and Germans under arms that day -were somewhat above nineteen thousand sabres and bayonets, with -thirty guns. The Spaniards, after their previous defeat, could only -produce from thirty-three to thirty-four thousand men; but they had -seventy guns. The combined army, therefore, offered battle with -forty-four thousand infantry, nearly ten thousand cavalry, and a -hundred pieces of artillery; and the French were coming on with at -least eighty guns, and, including the king’s guards, nearly fifty -thousand men, of which above seven thousand were cavalry. But what -a difference in the quality of the troops! The French were all -hardy veterans, while the genuine soldiers of the allied army did -not exceed nineteen thousand. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The king, having passed the night of the 26th at St. Ollalla, -put his troops in motion again before day-light, on the 27th. -Latour Maubourg, with the cavalry, preceeded the column, and the -first and fourth corps, the royal guards, and reserve, followed -in succession. The appearance of the leading squadrons, near -Cazalegas, hastened, as we have seen, Cuesta’s decision, and, about -one o’clock in the afternoon, the first corps reached the heights -of Salinas, from whence the dust of the allies, as they took up -their position, could be perceived; but neither their situation nor -disposition could be made out, on account of the forest, which, -clothing the country from the Tagus nearly to the foot of the first -range of hills, masked all their evolutions. The duke of Belluno, -however, being well acquainted with the ground, instantly guessed -their true position; and, in pursuance of his advice, the king -ordered the fourth corps to march against the left of the allies; -the cavalry against the centre, and Victor himself, with the first -corps, against the right: the guards and the reserve supported the -fourth corps. - -Two good routes, suitable to artillery, led from the Alberche -to the position; the one, being the royal road to Talavera, was -followed by the fourth corps and the reserve; the other, passing -through a place called the _Casa des Salinas_, led directly upon -sir Arthur Wellesley’s extreme left, and was followed by the first -corps: but to reach this Casa, which was situated near the plain -in front of the British left wing, it was necessary to ford the -Alberche, and to march for a mile or two through the woods. A dust, -which was observed to rise near the Casa itself indicated the -presence of troops at that place; and, in fact, general Mackenzie’s -division, and a brigade of light cavalry, were there posted: the -infantry in the forest, the cavalry on the plain; but no patroles -were sent to the front; and this negligence gave rise to the - - -COMBAT OF SALINAS. - -For, about three o’clock, Lapisse and Ruffin’s division having -crossed the Alberche, marched in two columns towards the _Casa de -Salinas_, and their light infantry came so suddenly on the British -outposts that the latter were surprised, and sir Arthur Wellesley, -who was in the _Casa_, nearly fell into the enemy’s hands. The -French columns followed briskly, and charged so hotly, that the -English brigades were separated; and being composed principally -of young battalions, got into confusion, one part fired upon -another, and the whole were driven into the plain. But, in the -midst of the disorder, the forty-fifth, a stubborn old regiment, -and some companies of the fifth battalion of the sixtieth, were -seen in perfect array; and when sir Arthur rode up to the spot, -the fight was restored, and maintained so steadily, that the enemy -was checked. The infantry, supported by two brigades of cavalry, -then crossed the plain, and regained the left and centre of the -position, having lost about four hundred men. General Mackenzie, -with one brigade, immediately took post in second line behind the -guards; the other, commanded by colonel Donkin, finding the hill on -the left unoccupied, drew up there, and so completed the position. -The cavalry was formed in column behind the left of the line. - -Victor, animated by the success of this first operation, brought -up Villatte’s division, together with all the artillery and light -cavalry, to the Casa de Salinas; then, issuing from the forest, -rapidly crossed the plain; and advancing, with a fine military -display, close up to the left of the position, occupied an isolated -hill directly in front of colonel Donkin’s ground, and immediately -opened a heavy cannonade upon that officer’s brigade. Meanwhile, -the fourth corps and the reserve approaching the right more slowly, -and being unable to discover the true situation of Cuesta’s -troops, sent their light cavalry forward to make that general -shew his lines. The French horsemen rode boldly up to the front, -and commenced skirmishing with their pistols, and the Spaniards -answered them with a general discharge of small arms; but then, ten -thousand infantry, and all the artillery, breaking their ranks, -fled to the rear: the artillery-men carried off their horses; the -infantry threw away their arms, and the adjutant-general O’Donoghue -was amongst the foremost of the fugitives. Nay, Cuesta himself was -in movement towards the rear. The panic spread, and the French -would fain have charged; but sir Arthur Wellesley, who was at hand, -immediately flanked the main road with some English squadrons: the -ditches on the other side rendered the country impracticable; and -the fire of musketry being renewed by those Spaniards who remained, -the enemy lost some men, and finally retreated in disorder. - -The greatest part of Cuesta’s runaways fled as far as Oropesa, -giving out that the allies were totally defeated, and the French -army in hot pursuit; thus, the rear became a scene of incredible -disorder: the commissaries went off with their animals; the -paymasters carried away their money chests; the baggage was -scattered; and the alarm spread far and wide; nor is it to be -concealed, that some English officers disgraced their uniform on -this occasion. Cuesta, however, having recovered from his first -alarm, sent many of his cavalry regiments to head the fugitives, -and drive them back; and a part of the artillery, and some -thousands of the infantry, were thus recovered during the night; -but, in the next day’s fight, the Spanish army was less by six -thousand men than it should have been, and the great redoubt in the -centre was silent for want of guns. - - -COMBAT ON THE EVENING OF THE 27TH. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The hill on the left of the British army was the key of the whole -position. It was steep and rugged on the side towards the French, -and it was rendered more inaccessible by the ravine at the bottom; -but towards the English side it was of a smoother ascent. Victor, -however, observing that the extreme summit was unoccupied, and -that Donkin’s brigade was feeble, conceived the design of seizing -it by a sudden assault. The sun was sinking; and the twilight -and the confusion among the Spaniards on the right, appeared so -favourable to his project that, without communicating with the -king, he immediately directed Ruffin’s division to attack, Villatte -to follow in support, and Lapisse to fall on the German legion, so -as to create a diversion for Ruffin, but without engaging seriously -himself. The assault was quick and vigorous: colonel Donkin beat -back the enemy in his front, but his force was too weak to defend -every part; and many of the French turned his left, and mounted to -the summit behind him. At this moment, general Hill was ordered to -reinforce him; and it was not yet dark, when that officer, while -giving orders to the colonel of the 48th regiment, was fired at by -some troops from the highest point. Thinking they were stragglers -from his own ranks, firing at the enemy, he rode quickly up to -them, followed by his brigade-major, Fordyce; and in a moment found -himself in the midst of the French. Fordyce was killed; and Hill’s -own horse was wounded by a grenadier, who immediately seized the -bridle; but the general, spurring the animal hard, broke the man’s -hold, and galloping down the descent met the 29th regiment, and, -without an instant’s delay, led them up with such a fierce charge, -that the enemy could not sustain the shock. - -The summit was thus recovered; and the 48th regiment and the first -battalion of detachments were immediately brought forward, and, in -conjunction with the 29th and colonel Donkin’s brigade, presented a -formidable front of defence; and in good time, for the troops thus -beaten back were only a part of the 9th French regiment, forming -the advance of Ruffin’s division; but the two other regiments of -that division had lost their way in the ravine; hence the attack -had not ceased, but only subsided for a time. Lapisse was in -motion, and soon after opened his fire against the German legion; -and all the battalions of the 9th, being re-formed in one mass, -again advanced up the face of the hill with redoubled vigour. The -fighting then became vehement; and, in the darkness, the opposing -flashes of the musketry shewed with what a resolute spirit the -struggle was maintained, for the combatants were scarcely twenty -yards asunder, and for a time the event seemed doubtful; but soon -the well known shout of the British soldier was heard, rising above -the din of arms, and the enemy’s broken troops were driven once -more into the ravine below. Lapisse, who had made some impression -on the German legion, immediately abandoned his false attack, and -the fighting of the 27th ceased. The British lost about eight -hundred men, and the French about a thousand on that day. The -bivouac fires now blazed up on both sides, and the French and -British soldiers became quiet; but, about twelve o’clock, the -Spaniards on the right being alarmed at some horse in their front, -opened a prodigious peal of musketry and artillery, which continued -for twenty minutes without any object; and during the night, the -whole line was frequently disturbed by desultory firing from both -the Spanish and English troops, by which several men and officers -were unfortunately slain. - -The duke of Belluno, who had learned, from the prisoners, the -exact position of the Spaniards, until then unknown to the French -generals, now reported his own failure to the king, and proposed -that a second attempt should be made in the morning, at day-light; -but marshal Jourdan opposed this, as being a partial enterprize, -which could not lead to any great result. Victor, however, was -earnest for a trial, and, resting his representation on his -intimate knowledge of the ground, pressed the matter so home, -that he won Joseph’s assent, and immediately made dispositions -for the attack. The guns of the first corps, being formed in one -mass, on the height corresponding to that on which the English -left was posted, were enabled to command the great valley on their -own right, to range the summit of the hill in their front, and -obliquely to search the whole of the British line to the left, as -far as the great redoubt between the allied armies. - -Ruffin’s division was placed in advance, and Villatte’s in rear, of -the artillery; but the former kept one regiment close to the ravine. - -Lapisse occupied some low table-land, opposite to Sherbrooke’s -division. - -Latour Maubourg’s cavalry formed a reserve to Lapisse; and general -Beaumont’s cavalry formed a reserve to Ruffin. - -On the English side, general Hill’s division was concentrated; the -cavalry was massed behind the left, and the parc of artillery and -hospitals established under cover of the hill, between the cavalry -and Hill’s division. - - -COMBAT ON THE MORNING OF THE 28TH. - -About daybreak, Ruffin’s troops were drawn up, two regiments -abreast, supported by a third, in columns of battalions; and, in -this order, went forth against the left of the British, a part -directly against the front, and a part from the valley on the -right, thus embracing two sides of the hill. Their march was rapid -and steady; they were followed by Villatte’s division, and their -assault was preceded by a burst of artillery, that rattled round -the height, and swept away the English ranks by whole sections. The -sharp chattering of the musketry succeeded, the French guns were -then pointed towards the British centre and right, the grenadiers -instantly closed upon general Hill’s division, and the height -sparkled with fire. The inequalities of the ground broke the -compact formation of the troops on both sides, and small bodies -were seen here and there struggling for the mastery with all the -virulence of a single combat; in some places the French grenadiers -were overthrown at once, in others they would not be denied, and -reached the summit; but the reserves were always ready to vindicate -their ground, and no permanent footing was obtained. Still the -conflict was maintained with singular obstinacy; Hill himself was -wounded, and his men were falling fast; but the enemy suffered -more, and gave back, step by step at first, and slowly, to cover -the retreat of their wounded; but, finally, unable to sustain the -increasing fury of the English, and having lost above fifteen -hundred men in the space of forty minutes, the whole mass broke -away in disorder, and returned to their own position, covered by -the renewed play of their powerful artillery. - -To this destructive fire no adequate answer could be made, for the -English guns were few, and of small calibre; and when sir Arthur -Wellesley desired a reinforcement from Cuesta, the latter sent him -only two pieces; yet even those were serviceable, and the Spanish -gunners fought them gallantly. The principal line of the enemy’s -retreat was by the great valley, and a favourable opportunity for a -charge of horse occurred; but the English cavalry, having retired, -during the night, for water and forage, were yet too distant to be -of service. However, these repeated efforts of the French against -the hill, and the appearance of some of their light troops on the -mountain, beyond the left, taught the English general that he had -committed a fault in not prolonging his flank across the valley; -and he hastened to rectify it. For this purpose, he placed the -principal mass of his cavalry there, with the leading squadrons -looking into the valley, and, having obtained, from Cuesta, general -Bassecour’s division of infantry, posted it on the mountain -itself, in observation of the French light troops. Meanwhile, the -duke of Albuquerque, discontented with Cuesta’s arrangements, came, -with his division, to sir Arthur Wellesley, who placed him behind -the British, thus displaying a formidable array of horsemen, six -lines in depth. - -[Sidenote: Marshal Jourdan.] - -Immediately after the failure of Ruffin’s attack, king Joseph, -having, in person, examined the whole position of the allies, from -left to right, demanded of Jourdan and Victor if he should deliver -a general battle. The former replied that the great valley and the -mountain being unoccupied, on the 27th, sir Arthur Wellesley’s -attention should have been drawn to the right by a feint on the -Spaniards; that, during the night, the whole army should have been -silently placed in column, at the entrance of the great valley, -ready, at daybreak, to form a line of battle, on the left, to a new -front, and so have attacked the hill from whence Victor had been -twice repulsed. Such a movement, he said, would have obliged the -allies to change their front also, and, during this operation, they -might have been assailed with hopes of success. But this project -could not now be executed; the English, aware of their mistake, had -secured their left flank, by occupying the valley; and the mountain -and their front was inattackable. _Hence, the only prudent line -was to take up a position on the Alberche, and await the effect of -Soult’s operations on the English rear._ - -Marshal Victor opposed this counsel; he engaged to carry the hill -on the English left, notwithstanding his former failures, provided -the fourth corps would attack the right and centre at the same -moment; and he finished his argument by declaring that, if such a -combination failed, “_It was time to renounce making war_.” - -The king was embarrassed. His own opinion coincided with Jourdan’s; -but he feared that Victor would cause the emperor to believe a -great opportunity had been lost; and, while thus wavering, a -despatch arrived from Soult, by which it appeared that his force -could only reach Plasencia between the 3d and 5th of August. -Now, a detachment from the army of Venegas had already appeared -near Toledo, and that general’s advanced guard was approaching -Aranjuez. The king was troubled by the danger thus threatening -Madrid, because all the stores, the reserve artillery, and the -general hospitals of the whole army in Spain were deposited there; -and, moreover, the tolls received at the gates of that town formed -almost the only pecuniary resource of his court, so narrowly did -Napoleon reduce the expenditure of the war. - -These considerations overpowered his judgement, and, adopting the -worse and rejecting the better counsel, he resolved to succour the -capital; but, before separating the army, he determined to try the -chance of a battle. Indecision is a cancer in war: Joseph should -have adhered to the plan arranged with Soult; the advantages were -obvious, the ultimate success sure, and the loss of Madrid was -nothing in the scale, because it could only be temporary; but, if -the king thought otherwise, he should have decided to fight for it -at once; he should have drawn the fifth corps to him, prepared his -plan, and fallen, with the utmost rapidity, upon Cuesta, the 26th; -his advanced guard should have been on the Alberche that evening, -and, before twelve o’clock on the 27th, the English army would -have been without the aid of a single Spanish soldier. But, after -neglecting the most favourable opportunity when his army was full -of ardour, he now, with singular inconsistency, resolved to give -battle, when his enemies were completely prepared, strongly posted, -and in the pride of success, and when the confidence of his own -troops was shaken by the partial action of the morning. - -While the French generals were engaged in council, the troops on -both sides took some rest, and the English wounded were carried to -the rear; but the soldiers were suffering from hunger; the regular -service of provisions had ceased for several days, and a few ounces -of wheat, in the grain, formed the whole subsistence of men who -had fought, and who were yet to fight, so hardly. The Spanish camp -was full of confusion and distrust. Cuesta inspired terror, but no -confidence; and Albuquerque, whether from conviction or instigated -by momentary anger, just as the French were coming on to the final -attack, sent one of his staff to inform the English commander that -Cuesta was betraying him. The aide-de-camp, charged with this -message, delivered it to colonel Donkin, and that officer carried -it to sir Arthur Wellesley. The latter, seated on the summit of the -hill which had been so gallantly contested, was intently watching -the movements of the advancing enemy; he listened to this somewhat -startling message without so much as turning his head, and then -drily answering--“_Very well, you may return to your brigade_,” -continued his survey of the French. Donkin retired, filled with -admiration of the imperturbable resolution and quick penetration of -the man; and, indeed, sir Arthur’s conduct was, throughout that -day, such as became a general upon whose vigilance and intrepidity -the fate of fifty thousand men depended. - - -BATTLE OF TALAVERA. - -The dispositions of the French were soon completed. Ruffin’s -division, on the extreme right, was destined to cross the valley, -and, moving by the foot of the mountain, to turn the British left. - -Villatte’s orders were to menace the contested height with one -brigade, and to guard the valley with another, which, being -strengthened by a battalion of grenadiers, connected Ruffin’s -movement with the main attack. - -Lapisse, supported by Latour Maubourg’s dragoons, and by the king’s -reserve, was instructed to pass the ravine in front of the English -centre, and to fall, with half his infantry, upon Sherbrooke’s -division, while the other half, connecting its attack with -Villatte’s brigade, mounted the hill, and made a third effort to -master that important point. - -Milhaud’s dragoons were left on the main road, opposite Talavera, -to keep the Spaniards in check; but the rest of the heavy cavalry -was brought into the centre, behind general Sebastiani, who, with -the fourth corps, was to assail the right of the British army. A -part of the French light cavalry supported Villatte’s brigade in -the valley, and a part remained in reserve. - -A number of guns were distributed among the divisions, but the -principal mass remained on the hill, with the reserve of light -cavalry; where, also, the duke of Belluno stationed himself, to -direct the movements of the first corps. - -From nine o’clock in the morning until mid-day the field of battle -offered no appearance of hostility; the weather was intensely hot, -and the troops, on both sides, descended and mingled, without fear -or suspicion, to quench their thirst at the little brook which -divided the positions; but, at one o’clock in the afternoon, the -French soldiers were seen to gather round their eagles, and the -rolling of drums was heard along the whole line. Half an hour -later, the king’s guards, the reserve, and the fourth corps were -descried, near the centre of the enemy’s position, marching to -join the first corps; and, at two o’clock, the table-land and -the height on the French right, even to the valley, were covered -with the dark and lowering masses. At this moment some hundreds -of English soldiers, employed to carry the wounded to the rear, -returned in one body, and were, by the French, supposed to be sir -Robert Wilson’s corps joining the army; nevertheless, the duke of -Belluno, whose arrangements were now completed, gave the signal for -battle: and eighty pieces of artillery immediately sent a tempest -of bullets before the light troops, who, coming on swiftly and with -the violence of a hail-storm, were closely followed by the broad, -black columns, in all the majesty of war. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, from the summit of the hill, had a clear -view of the whole field of battle; and first he saw the fourth -corps rush forwards, with the usual impetuosity of French soldiers, -and clearing the intersected ground in their front, fall upon -Campbell’s division with infinite fury; but that general, assisted -by Mackenzie’s brigade, and by two Spanish battalions, withstood -their utmost efforts. The English regiments, putting the French -skirmishers aside, met the advancing columns with loud shouts, and, -breaking in on their front, and lapping their flanks with fire, -and giving no respite, pushed them back with a terrible carnage. -Ten guns were taken; but, as general Campbell prudently forbore -pursuit, the French rallied on their supports, and made a show of -attacking again: vain attempt! The British artillery and musketry -played too vehemently upon their masses, and a Spanish regiment of -cavalry charging on their flank at the same time, the whole retired -in disorder, and the victory was secured in that quarter. - -But, while this was passing on the right, Villatte’s division, -preceded by the grenadiers, and supported by two regiments of light -cavalry, was seen advancing up the great valley against the left, -and, beyond Villatte’s, Ruffin was discovered marching towards the -mountain. Sir Arthur Wellesley immediately ordered Anson’s brigade -of cavalry, composed of the twenty-third light dragoons and the -first German hussars, to charge the head of these columns; and this -brigade, coming on at a canter, and increasing its speed as it -advanced, rode headlong against the enemy, but, in a few moments, -came upon the brink of a hollow cleft, which was not perceptible at -a distance. The French, throwing themselves into squares, opened -their fire; and colonel Arenstchild, commanding the hussars, an -officer whom forty years’ experience had made a master in his art, -promptly reined up at the brink, exclaiming, in his broken phrase, -“_I will not kill my young mens!_” - -The English blood was hotter! The twenty-third, under colonel -Seymour, rode wildly down into the hollow, and men and horses -fell over each other in dreadful confusion. The survivors, still -untamed, mounted the opposite bank by two’s and three’s; Seymour -was wounded; but major Frederick Ponsonby, a hardy soldier, -rallying all who came up, passed through the midst of Villatte’s -columns, and, reckless of the musketry, from each side, fell, with -inexpressible violence, upon a brigade of French _chasseurs_ in -the rear. The combat was fierce but short; Victor had perceived -the first advance of the English, and detached his Polish lancers, -and Westphalian light-horse, to the support of Villatte; and these -fresh troops coming up when the twenty-third, already overmatched, -could scarcely hold up against the chasseurs, entirely broke them. -Those who were not killed or taken made for Bassecour’s Spanish -division, and so escaped, leaving behind two hundred and seven men -and officers, or about half the number that went into action. - -During this time the hill, the key of the position, was again -attacked, and Lapisse, crossing the ravine, pressed hard upon the -English centre; his own artillery, aided by the great battery on -his right, opened large gaps in Sherbrooke’s ranks, and the French -columns came close up to the British line in the resolution to win; -but they were received with a general discharge of all arms, and -so vigorously encountered, that they gave back in disorder; and, -in the excitement of the moment, the brigade of English guards, -quitting the line, followed up their success with inconsiderate -ardour. The enemy’s supporting columns and dragoons advanced, the -men who had been repulsed turned again, and the French batteries -pounded the flank and front of the guards. - -Thus maltreated, the latter drew back, and, at the same moment, the -German legion, being sorely pressed, got into confusion. Hill’s -and Campbell’s divisions, on the extremities of the line, still -held fast; but the centre of the British was absolutely broken, -and the fate of the day seemed to incline in favour of the French, -when, suddenly, colonel Donellan, with the forty-eighth regiment, -was seen advancing through the midst of the disordered masses. At -first, it seemed as if this regiment must be carried away by the -retiring crowds, but, wheeling back by companies, it let them pass -through the intervals, and then, resuming its proud and beautiful -line, marched against the right of the pursuing columns, and plied -them with such a destructive musketry, and closed upon them with -such a firm and regular pace, that the forward movement of the -French was checked. The guards and the Germans immediately rallied; -a brigade of light cavalry came up from the second line at a trot; -the artillery battered the enemy’s flanks without intermission, and -the French, beginning to waver, soon lost their advantage, and the -battle was restored. - -In all actions there is one critical and decisive moment which will -give the victory to the general who knows how to seize it. When -the guards first made their rash charge, sir Arthur Wellesley, -foreseeing the issue of it, had ordered the forty-eighth down from -the hill, although a rough battle was going on there; and, at the -same time, he directed Cotton’s light cavalry to advance. These -dispositions gained the day. The French relaxed their efforts by -degrees; the fire of the English grew hotter; and their loud and -confident shouts--sure augury of success--were heard along the -whole line. - -In the hands of a great general, Joseph’s guards and the reserve, -which were yet entire, might have restored the combat: but -all combination was at an end on the French side. The fourth -corps, beaten back on the left with the loss of ten guns, was in -confusion; the troops in the great valley on the right, amazed -at the furious charge of the twenty-third, and awed by the sight -of four distinct lines of cavalry, still in reserve, remained -stationary. No impression had been made on the hill; Lapisse -himself was mortally wounded, and, at last, his division giving -way, the whole army retired to its position, from whence it had -descended to the attack. This retrograde movement was covered by -skirmishers and an increasing fire of artillery; and the British, -reduced to less than fourteen thousand sabres and bayonets, and -exhausted by toil, and the want of food, could not pursue. The -Spanish army was incapable of any evolution, and about six o’clock -all hostility ceased, each army holding the position of the -morning. But the battle was scarcely over when, the dry grass and -shrubs taking fire, a volume of flames passed with inconceivable -rapidity across a part of the field, scorching, in its course, both -the dead and the wounded. - -On the British side two generals (Mackenzie and Langworth), -thirty-one officers of inferior rank, and seven hundred and -sixty-seven serjeants and soldiers were killed upon the spot; and -three generals, a hundred and ninety-two officers, three thousand -seven hundred and eighteen serjeants and privates wounded. Nine -officers, six hundred and forty-three serjeants and soldiers were -missing; thus making a total loss of six thousand two hundred and -sixty-eight, in the two days’ fighting, of which five thousand four -hundred and twenty-two fell on the 28th. - -[Sidenote: Marshal Jourdan, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations of the First Corps, MSS.] - -The French suffered more severely. Two generals and nine hundred -and forty-four killed; six thousand two hundred and ninety-four -wounded, and a hundred and fifty-six prisoners; furnishing a total -of seven thousand three hundred and eighty-nine men and officers, -of which four thousand were of the first corps. Of seventeen guns -captured, ten were taken by general Campbell’s division, and seven -were left in the woods by the French. - -The Spaniards returned above twelve hundred men, killed and -wounded, but the correctness of the report was very much doubted at -the time. - -The 29th, at day-break, the French army quitted its position, -and, before six o’clock, was in order of battle on the heights -of Salinas, behind the Alberche. That day, also, general Robert -Craufurd reached the English camp, with the forty-third, -fifty-second, and ninety-fifth or rifle regiment, and immediately -took charge of the outposts. These troops, after a march of -twenty miles, were in bivouac near Malpartida de Plasencia, when -the alarm, caused by the fugitive Spanish, spread to that part. -Craufurd allowed the men to rest for a few hours, and then, -withdrawing about fifty of the weakest from the ranks, commenced -his march with the resolution not to halt until he reached the -field of battle. As the brigade advanced, crowds of the runaways -were met with; and those not all Spaniards, propagating the vilest -falsehoods: “_the army was defeated_,”--“_Sir Arthur Wellesley was -killed_,”--“_the French were only a few miles distant_;” and some, -blinded by their fears, affected even to point out the enemy’s -advanced posts on the nearest hills. Indignant at this shameful -scene, the troops hastened, rather than slackened, the impetuosity -of their pace; and, leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in -twenty-six hours they had crossed the field of battle in a close -and compact body, having, in that time, passed over sixty-two -English miles, and in the hottest season of the year, each man -carrying from fifty to sixty pounds weight upon his shoulders. Had -the historian Gibbon known of such a march, he would have spared -his sneer about the “delicacy of modern soldiers!” - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. The moral courage evinced by sir Arthur Wellesley, when, with -such a coadjutor as Cuesta, he accepted battle, was not less -remarkable than the judicious disposition which, finally, rendered -him master of the field. Yet it is doubtful if he could have -maintained his position had the French been well managed, and their -strength reserved for the proper moment, instead of being wasted on -isolated attacks during the night of the 27th, and the morning of -the 28th. A pitched battle is a great affair. A good general will -endeavour to bring all the moral, as well as the physical, force of -his army into play at the same time, if he means to win, and all -may be too little. - -Marshal Jourdan’s project was conceived in this spirit, and worthy -of his reputation; and it is possible, that he might have placed -his army, unperceived, on the flank of the English, and by a sudden -and general attack have carried the key of the position, and so -commenced his battle well: but sir Arthur Wellesley’s resources -would not then have been exhausted. He had foreseen such a -movement, and was prepared, by a change of front, to keep the enemy -in check with his left wing and cavalry; while the right, marching -upon the position abandoned by the French, should cut the latter -off from the Alberche. In this movement the allies would have been -reinforced by Wilson’s corps, which was near Cazalegas, and the -contending armies would then have exchanged lines of operation. -The French could, however, have gained nothing, unless they won a -complete victory; but the allies would, even though defeated, have -ensured their junction with Venegas. Madrid and Toledo would have -fallen; and before Soult could unite with Joseph, a new line of -operations, through the fertile country of La Mancha, would have -been obtained. But these matters are only speculative. - -2º. The distribution of the French troops for the great attack -cannot be praised. The attempt to turn the English left with a -single division was puerile. The allied cavalry was plainly to be -seen in the valley; how, then, could a single division hope to -develop its attack upon the hill, when five thousand horsemen were -hanging upon its flank? and, in fact, the whole of Ruffin’s, and -the half of Villatte’s division, were paralyzed by the charge of -a single regiment. To have rendered this movement formidable, the -principal part of the French cavalry should have preceded the march -of the infantry; but the great error was fighting at all, before -Soult reached Plasencia. - -3º. It has been said, that to complete the victory sir Arthur -Wellesley should have caused the Spaniards to advance; but this -would, more probably, have led to a defeat. Neither Cuesta, nor -his troops, were capable of an orderly movement. The infantry of -the first and the fourth corps were still above twenty thousand -strong; and, although a repulsed, by no means a discomfited -force. The cavalry, the king’s guards, and Dessolle’s division, -had not been engaged at all, and were alone sufficient to beat -the Spaniards. A second panic, such as that of the 27th, would -have led to the most deplorable consequences, as those, who know -with what facility French soldiers recover from a repulse, will -readily acknowledge. This battle was one of hard honest fighting, -and the exceeding gallantry of the troops honoured the nations -to which they belonged. The English owed much to the general’s -dispositions and something to fortune. The French owed nothing to -their commander; but when it is considered that only the reserve -of their infantry were withheld from the great attack on the 28th, -and that, consequently, above thirty thousand men were closely -and unsuccessfully engaged for three hours with sixteen thousand -British, it must be confessed that the latter proved themselves -to be truly formidable soldiers; yet the greatest part were raw -men, so lately drafted from the militia regiments that many of -them still bore the number of their former regiments on their -accoutrements. - -[Illustration: _Plate 7. to face Pa. 409_ - - Operations of the - BRITISH, FRENCH & SPANISH ARMIES, - in July & August 1809. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -The French rested the 29th at Salinas; but, in the night, the king -marched with the 4th corps and the reserve to St. Ollalla, from -whence he sent a division to relieve Toledo. The 31st, he halted. -The 1st of August he marched to Illescas, a central position, from -whence he could interpose between Venegas and the capital. The -duke of Belluno, with the first corps, remained on the Alberche, -having orders to fall upon the rear-guard of the allies, when -the latter should be forced to retire, in consequence of Soult’s -operations. Meantime, sir Robert Wilson, who, during the action -was near Cazalegas, returned to Escalona; and Victor, displaying -an unaccountable dread of this small body, which he supposed to be -the precursor of the allied army, immediately retired, first to -Maqueda, then to Santa Cruz del Retamar, and was even proceeding to -Mostoles, when a retrograde movement of the allies recalled him to -the Alberche. - -The British army was so weak, and had suffered so much, that the -29th and 30th were passed, by sir Arthur, in establishing his -hospitals at Talavera, and in fruitless endeavours to procure -provisions, and the necessary assistance to prevent the wounded men -from perishing. Neither Cuesta nor the inhabitants of Talavera, -although possessing ample means, would render the slightest aid, -nor would they even assist to bury the dead. The corn secreted in -Talavera was alone sufficient to support the army for a month; -but the troops were starving, although the inhabitants, who had -fled across the Tagus with their portable effects at the beginning -of the battle, had now returned. It is not surprising that, in -such circumstances, men should endeavour to save their property, -especially provisions; yet the apathy with which they beheld the -wounded men dying for want of aid, and those who were found sinking -from hunger, did in no wise answer Mr. Frere’s description of them, -as men who “_looked upon the war in the light of a crusade, and -carried it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause_.” - -This conduct left an indelible impression on the minds of the -English soldiers. From that period to the end of the war their -contempt and dislike of the Spaniards were never effaced; and long -afterwards, Badajos and St. Sebastian suffered for the churlish -behaviour of the people of Talavera. The principal motive of action -with the Spaniards was always personal rancour: hence, those troops -who had behaved so ill in action, and the inhabitants, who withheld -alike their sympathy and their aid from the English soldiers to -whose bravery they owed the existence of their town, were busily -engaged after the battle, in beating out the brains of the wounded -French as they lay upon the field; and they were only checked -by the English soldiers, who, in some instances, fired upon the -perpetrators of this horrible iniquity. - -Cuesta also gave proofs of his ferocious character; he, who had -shown himself alike devoid of talent and real patriotism, whose -indolence and ignorance of his profession had banished all order -and discipline from his army, and whose stupid pride had all -but caused its destruction, now assumed the Roman general, and -proceeded to decimate the regiments that had fled in the panic -on the 27th. Above fifty men he slew in this manner; and if his -cruelty, so contrary to reason and the morals of the age, had not -been mitigated by the earnest intercession of sir Arthur Wellesley, -more men would have been destroyed in cold blood, by this savage -old man, than had fallen in the battle. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -Hitherto the allied generals had thought little of the duke of -Dalmatia’s movements, and their eyes were still fixed on Madrid; -but, the 30th, information was received at Talavera, that twelve -thousand rations had been ordered, for the 28th, at Fuente Dueña -by that marshal, and twenty-four thousand at Los Santos, a town -situated between Alba de Tormes and the pass of Baños. Cuesta, -conscious of the defenceless state of the latter post, suggested -that sir Robert Wilson should be sent there; but sir Arthur -Wellesley wished Wilson to remain at Escalona, to renew his -intercourse with Madrid, and proposed that a Spanish corps should -go. Indeed, he still slighted the idea of danger from that quarter, -and hoped that the result of the battle would suffice to check -Soult’s march. Cuesta rejected this proposal at the moment, and -again, on the 31st, when sir Arthur renewed his application; but, -on the 1st of August, it was known that Soult had entered Bejar; -and then, on the 2d, general Bassecour was detached by Cuesta to -defend the Puerto de Baños, from which he was absent four long -marches, while the enemy had been, on the 31st, within one march. - -The day that Bassecour marched, intelligence arrived that Soult had -entered Plasencia. Baños had been abandoned to the enemy without -a shot; for the battalions from Bejar had dispersed, and those -sent by Cuesta had been withdrawn to Almaraz by their general the -marquis de la Reyna, who also proclaimed that he would destroy the -boat-bridge at that place. This news roused Cuesta; he proposed -that half the allied army should march to the rear, and attack -Soult. Sir Arthur Wellesley refused to divide the English army, but -offered to go or stay with the whole; and, when the other desired -him to choose, he answered that he would go, and Cuesta appeared -satisfied. - -On the night of the 2d August, letters were received from Wilson, -announcing the appearance of the French near Nombella, whither he, -unconscious of the effect produced by his presence at Escalona, -had retreated with his infantry, sending his artillery to St. -Roman, near Talavera. As sir Arthur Wellesley could not suppose -that sir Robert Wilson’s corps alone would cause the first corps to -retire, he naturally concluded that Victor’s design was to cross -the Alberche at Escalona, crush Wilson, and operate a communication -with Soult by the valley of the Tietar. As such a movement, if -persisted in, would necessarily dislodge Cuesta from Talavera, -sir Arthur, before he commenced his march, obtained the Spanish -general’s promise that he would collect cars, for the purpose of -transporting as many of the English wounded as were in a condition -to be moved, from Talavera, to some more suitable place. This -promise, like all the others, was shamefully violated; but the -British general had not yet learned the full extent of Cuesta’s bad -faith, and thinking that a few days would suffice to drive back -Soult, marched, on the 3d of August, with seventeen thousand men, -to Oropesa, intending to unite with Bassecour’s division, and to -fight Soult, whose force he estimated at fifteen thousand. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations 2d corps, MS.] - -Meanwhile, Soult being, by the return of general Foy, on the -24th of July, assured of the king’s concurrence in the combined -movements to be executed, ordered Laborde, Merle, and La Houssaye -to march from Zamora and Toro upon Salamanca and Ledesma, and to -scour the banks of the Tormes. The sixth corps was also directed -upon the same place; and, the 25th, Soult repaired to Salamanca -in person, intending to unite the three corps there. Hearing, -however, of Victor’s retrograde movement from the Alberche to the -Guadarama, he desired marshal Mortier to march, on the 28th, to -Plasencia, by Fuente Roble and Bejar, and he placed La Houssaye’s -and Lorge’s dragoons under his command: the remainder of the second -corps and the light cavalry were to follow when the sixth corps -should be in motion. This done, Soult wrote to the king, saying, -“_My urgent desire is that your majesty may not fight a general -battle before you are certain of the concentration of all my forces -near Plasencia. The most important results will be obtained if -your majesty will abstain from attacking until the moment when a -knowledge of my march causes the enemy to retrace his steps, which -he must do, or he is lost._” - -The 29th, the fifth corps was at Fuente Roble; but information -being received that Beresford, with an army, had reached Almeida -on the 27th, the march was covered by strong detachments on the -side of Ciudad Rodrigo. The long-expected convoy of artillery and -ammunition for the second corps had, however, arrived in Salamanca -the 29th; and Ney wrote, from Toro, that he also would be there -the 31st. - -The 30th, the fifth corps drove the marquis de la Reyna from the -pass of Baños, and took post at Aldea Neuva del Camina and Herbas; -and the second corps, quitting Salamanca, arrived, the same day, at -Siete Carrera. - -The 31st, the fifth corps entered Plasencia; the second corps -reached Fuente la Casa, Fuente Roble, San Estevan, and Los Santos. - -Plasencia was full of convalescents, detachments, and -non-combatants; and when the French arrived, about two thousand -men, including five hundred of the Lusitanian legion, evacuated the -town, taking the road to Moraleja and Zarza Mayor; but four hundred -sick men, following the enemy’s accounts, were captured, together -with a few stores. During these rapid marches, the French were -daily harassed by the Spanish peasantry: the villages were also -deserted; the cavalry wandered far and near to procure subsistence; -and several slight skirmishes and some pillage took place. - -The 1st of August, the second corps passed the Col de Baños, and -the head of the column entered Plasencia, which was, like other -places, deserted by the greatest part of the inhabitants. Vague -reports that a battle had been fought between the 26th and 29th was -the only intelligence that could be procured of the situation of -the allies; and, on the 2d, the advanced guard of the army marched -to the Venta de Bazagona, while scouting parties were, at the same -time, directed towards Coria, to acquire news of marshal Beresford, -who was now said to be moving along the Portuguese frontier. - -The 3d of August, the fifth corps and the dragoons, passing the -Tietar, reached Toril, the outposts were pushed to Cazatejada and -Sierra de Requemada; but the second corps remained at Plasencia, -awaiting the arrival of the sixth corps, the head of which was now -at Baños. Hence, on the 3d of August, the king and Sebastiani being -at Illescas and Valdemoro, Victor at Maqueda, Cuesta at Talavera, -sir Arthur Wellesley at Oropesa, and Soult on the Tietar; the -narrow valley of the Tagus was crowded in its whole length by the -contending troops. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 1, section 4.] - -The allies held the centre, being only one day’s march asunder; -but their force, when concentrated, was not more than forty-seven -thousand men. The French could not unite in under three days, -but their combined forces exceeded ninety thousand men, of which -fifty-three thousand were under Soult; and this singular situation -was rendered more remarkable by the ignorance in which all parties -were as to the strength and movements of their adversaries. Victor -and the king, frightened by Wilson’s partizan corps of four -thousand men, were preparing to unite at Mostoles, while Cuesta, -equally alarmed at Victor, was retiring from Talavera. Sir Arthur -Wellesley was supposed, by Joseph, to be at the head of twenty-five -thousand British; and the former, calculating on Soult’s weakness, -was marching, with twenty-three thousand Spanish and English, -to engage fifty-three thousand French; while Soult, unable to -ascertain the exact situation of either friends or enemies, little -suspected that the prey was rushing into his jaws. At this moment -the fate of the Peninsula hung by a thread, which could not bear -the weight for twenty-four hours; yet fortune so ordained that no -irreparable disaster ensued. - -[Illustration: _Plate 8._ - - _The Battle of_ - TALAVERA, - _at the period of the final Attack_ - on the 28^{th} July 1809. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - -At five o’clock in the evening of the third, it was known at the -English head-quarters that the French were near Naval Moral, and, -consequently, between the allies and the bridge of Almaraz. - -At six o’clock, letters from Cuesta advised sir Arthur that the -king was again advancing, and that, from intercepted despatches -addressed to Soult, it appeared that the latter must be stronger -than was supposed; hence, Cuesta said that, wishing to aid the -English, he would quit Talavera that evening: in other words, -abandon the British hospitals! - -To this unexpected communication sir Arthur replied that the king -was still some marches off, and that Venegas should be directed -to occupy him on the Upper Tagus; that Soult’s strength was -exceedingly overrated, and Victor’s movements not decided enough to -oblige the Spanish army to quit Talavera. Hence he required that -Cuesta should at least wait until the next morning, to cover the -evacuation of the English hospitals. But, before this communication -reached Cuesta, the latter was in full march; and, at day-break on -the 4th, the Spanish army was descried moving, in several columns, -down the valley towards Oropesa, where Bassecour’s division soon -after joined it from Centinello, and, at the same time, the cavalry -patroles found the French near Naval Moral. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley having, by this time, seen the intercepted -letters himself, became convinced that Soult’s force was not -overrated at thirty thousand; and the duke of Dalmatia, who had -also intercepted some English letters, learned that, on the first -of August, the allies were still at Talavera, and ill-informed of -his march. Thus, the one general perceived his danger and the -other his advantage at the same moment. - -Mortier was immediately ordered, by the duke of Dalmatia, to -take a position with the fifth corps at Cazatejada, to seize the -boat-bridge at Almaraz, if it was not destroyed, and to patrole -towards Arzobispo. The second corps was, likewise, directed upon -the same place; and the head of the sixth entered Plasencia. The -further progress of the allies was thus barred in front; the Tagus -was on their left; impassable mountains on their right; and it was -certain that Cuesta’s retreat would immediately bring the king -and Victor down upon their rear. The peril of this situation was -apparent to every soldier in the British ranks, and produced a -general inquietude. No man felt the slightest confidence in the -Spaniards, and the recollection of the stern conflict at Talavera, -aided by a sense of exhaustion from long abstinence, depressed the -spirits of men and officers. The army was, indeed, ready to fight, -but all persons felt that it must be for safety, not for glory. - -In this trying moment, sir Arthur Wellesley abated nothing of his -usual calmness and fortitude. He knew not the full extent of the -danger; but, assuming the enemy in his front to be thirty thousand -men, and Victor to have twenty-five thousand others in his rear, -he judged that to continue the offensive would be rash, because -he must fight and beat those two marshals separately within three -days, which, with starving and tired troops, inferior in number, -was scarcely to be accomplished. But, to remain where he was on the -defensive was equally unpromising, because the road from Talavera -to Arzobispo led through Calera, in the rear of Oropesa; and thus -Victor could intercept the only line of retreat, and a battle must -then be fought, in an unfavourable position, against the united -forces of the enemy, estimated, as we have seen, to be above -fifty thousand men. One resource remained: to pass the bridge of -Arzobispo immediately, and take up a line of defence behind that -river, before the French could seize the Col de Mirabete, and so -cut off the road to Truxillo and Merida--a hard alternative; but -the long-cherished error relative to Soult’s weakness had dried -up the springs of success, and left the campaign, like a withered -stem, without fruit or foliage. - -Cuesta doggedly opposed this project; asserting that Oropesa was -a position suitable for a battle, and that he would fight there. -Further concession to his humours would have been folly, and sir -Arthur sternly declared that he would move forthwith, leaving the -Spanish general to do that which should seem meet to him; and, -assuredly, this decided conduct saved the Peninsula, for not fifty, -but ninety thousand enemies were at hand. - -It was now six o’clock in the morning, the baggage and ammunition -were already in motion for the bridge of Arzobispo; but the army, -which had been reinforced by a troop of horse-artillery, and some -convalescents that escaped from Plasencia, remained in position for -several hours, to cover the passage of the stores and the wounded -men from Talavera; the latter having just arrived at Calera in -the most pitiable condition. About noon, the road being clear, -the columns marched to the bridge; and, at two o’clock, the whole -army was in position at the other side, the present danger was -averted, and the combinations of the enemy were baffled. During the -passage, several herds of swine, which, following the custom of the -country, were feeding in the woods, under charge of the swineherds, -were fallen in with; and the soldiers, instigated by hunger, broke -their ranks, and ran in upon the animals as in a charge, shooting, -stabbing, and, like men possessed, cutting off the flesh while the -beasts were yet alive; nor can this conduct be much censured under -the circumstances of the moment; yet it was a severe misfortune to -the poor peasants, whose property was thus destroyed. - -From Arzobispo, the army moved towards Deleytoza; but general -Craufurd’s brigade, with six pieces of artillery, was directed -to gain the bridge of Almaraz by a forced march, lest the enemy, -discovering the ford below that place, should cross the river, -and seize the Puerto de Mirabete. The roads were exceedingly -rugged, and the guns could only be dragged up the Meza d’Ibor by -the force of men. Nevertheless, Craufurd reached his destination -on the evening of the 5th, and the head-quarters were established -at Deleytoza, on the 7th, the artillery being at Campillo, the -rear guard occupying the Meza d’Ibor. The sick and wounded were -then forwarded to Merida; but the paucity of transport was such, -that sir Arthur Wellesley was obliged to unload both ammunition -and treasure carts for the conveyance of these unfortunate men. -Meanwhile Soult, little thinking that his object was already -frustrated, continued his march on the 5th, and Mortier took post -at Naval Moral; the advanced guard entered Puebla de Naciada, and -the patroles, scouring the roads to Oropesa and the bridge of -Arzobispo, fell in with and were chased by the Spanish cavalry -from Arzobispo; for Cuesta would not retire on the 4th, and was in -the act of passing the bridge when the French came in view. The -movements were now hurried on both sides; before dark, the Spanish -army was across the Tagus, with the exception of a rear guard, -which remained on the right bank that evening, but it was driven -across the river, on the morning of the 6th, by the fifth corps, -which afterwards took post at Valdeveja and Puebla de Naciada. Ney -also reached Naval Moral, and the second corps entered Gordo. - -The 7th, Mortier examined the Spanish position, and reported that -Cuesta, having thrown up entrenchments, and placed twenty guns in -battery, to rake the bridge, which was also barricadoed, had left -two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to hold the post, and -withdrawn the rest of his army towards Meza d’Ibor. Hereupon, Soult -detached his light cavalry towards Talavera, to communicate with -the king, and brought up the second corps to Arzobispo. Meanwhile, -the duke of Belluno having, on the 5th, ascertained the retreat -of the allies from Talavera, retraced his steps, and entered that -town on the 6th. Thus the English wounded, left there, fell into -his hands, and their treatment was such as might be expected from -a gallant and courteous nation, for, between the British soldiers -and the French, there was no rancour, and the generous usages of a -civilized and honourable warfare were cherished. - -The 7th, Victor crossed the Tagus, at the bridge of Talavera, and -pushed his advanced guard to Aldea Nueva de Balbaroya, on the left -bank, within a few leagues of the Spanish position, which Soult -was preparing to attack in front, for he had observed that, at a -certain point, the Spanish horses, when brought to drink, came far -into the stream, and, the place being sounded in the night of the -7th, a deep but practicable ford was discovered, about half a mile -above the bridge. - -The fifth and second corps and a division of the sixth were -concentrated to force this passage, early on the morning of the -8th; but Soult being just then informed of Victor’s movement, and -perceiving that Albuquerque had withdrawn the Spanish cavalry, -leaving only a rear guard in the works, judged that the allies -were retreating; wherefore, without relinquishing the attack at -Arzobispo, he immediately sent the division of the sixth corps -back to Naval Moral, and, at the same time, transmitted a plan of -the ford below Almaraz, directed Ney to cross the Tagus there, -seize the Puerto de Mirabete, and be in readiness to fall upon the -allies, as they came out from the defiles between Deleytoza and -Truxillo. - -Meanwhile, the heat of the day had induced Albuquerque to seek -shelter for his horsemen in a wood, near Azutan, a village about -five miles from the bridge; and the Spanish infantry, keeping a bad -guard, were sleeping or loitering about without care or thought, -when Mortier, who was charged with the direction of the attack, -taking advantage of their want of vigilance, commenced the passage -of the river. - - -COMBAT OF ARZOBISPO. - -The French cavalry, about six thousand in number, were secretly -assembled near the ford, and, about two o’clock in the day, general -Caulaincourt’s brigade suddenly entered the stream. The Spaniards, -running to their arms, manned the batteries, and opened upon the -leading squadrons; but Mortier, with a powerful concentric fire -of artillery, immediately overwhelmed the Spanish gunners; and -Caulaincourt, having reached the other side of the river, turned -to his right, and, taking the batteries in reverse, cut down the -artillerymen, and dispersed the infantry who attempted to form. The -duke of Albuquerque, who had mounted at the first alarm, now came -down with all his horsemen in one mass, but without order, upon -Caulaincourt, and the latter was, for a few moments, in imminent -danger; but the rest of the French cavalry, passing rapidly, soon -joined in the combat; one brigade of infantry followed at the ford, -another burst the barriers on the bridge itself, and, by this time, -the Spanish foot were flying to the mountains. Albuquerque’s effort -was thus frustrated, a general route ensued, and five guns and -about four hundred prisoners were taken. - -Soult’s intention being to follow up this success, he directed -that the first corps should move, in two columns, upon Guadalupe -and Deleytoza, intending to support it with the second and fifth, -while the sixth corps crossed at Almaraz, and seized the pass of -Mirabete. This would undoubtedly have completed the ruin of the -Spanish army, and forced sir Arthur to make a rapid and disastrous -retreat; for so complete was the surprise and so sudden the -overthrow that some of the English foragers also fell into the -hands of the enemy; and that Cuesta’s army was in no condition to -have made any resistance, if the pursuit had been continued with -vigour, is clear, from the following facts:-- - -1º. When he withdrew his main body from the bridge of Arzobispo to -Peralada de Garbin, on the 7th, he left fifteen pieces of artillery -by the road-side, without a guard. The defeat of Albuquerque placed -these guns at the mercy of the enemy, who were, however, ignorant -of their situation, until a trumpeter attending an English flag -of truce, either treacherously or foolishly, mentioned it in the -French camp, from whence a detachment of cavalry was sent to fetch -them off. 2º. The British military agent, placed at the Spanish -head-quarters, was kept in ignorance of the action; and it was -only by the arrival of the duke of Albuquerque, at Deleytoza, on -the evening of the 9th, that sir Arthur Wellesley knew the bridge -was lost. He had before advised Cuesta to withdraw behind the Ibor -river, and even now contemplated a partial attack to keep the enemy -in check; but when he repaired in person to that general’s quarter, -on the 10th, he found the country covered with fugitives and -stragglers, and Cuesta as helpless and yet as haughty as ever. All -his ammunition and guns (forty pieces) were at the right bank of -the Ibor, and, of course, at the foot of the Meza, and within sight -and cannon-shot of the enemy, on the right bank of the Tagus. They -would have been taken by the first French patroles that approached, -but that sir Arthur Wellesley persuaded the Spanish staff-officers -to have them dragged up the hill, in the course of the 10th, -without Cuesta’s knowledge. - -In this state of affairs, the impending fate of the Peninsula was -again averted by the king, who recalled the first corps to the -support of the fourth, then opposed to Venegas. Marshal Ney, also, -was unable to discover the ford below the bridge of Almaraz; and, -by the 11th, the allies had re-established their line of defence. -The head-quarters of the British were at Jaraicejo, and those -of the Spaniards at Deleytoza: the former, guarding the ford of -Almaraz, formed the left; the latter, occupying the Meza d’Ibor -and Campillo, were on the right. The 12th, Cuesta having resigned, -general Equia succeeded to the command, and gave hopes of a better -co-operation; but the evil was in the character of the people. -The position of the allies was, however, compact and central; the -reserves could easily support the advanced posts; the communication -to the rear was open; and, if defended with courage, the Meza -d’Ibor is impregnable. To pass the Tagus at Almaraz, in itself a -difficult operation, would be of no avail to the enemy, while the -Mirabete and Meza d’Ibor were occupied, because his troops would be -enclosed in the narrow space between those ridges and the river. - -The duke of Dalmatia, thus thwarted, conceived that sir Arthur -Wellesley would endeavour to re-pass the Tagus by Alcantara, and -so rejoin Beresford and the five thousand British troops under -Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn, which were, by this time, near the -frontier of Portugal. To prevent this he resolved to march at once -upon Coria, with the second, fifth, and sixth corps, to menace -the communications both of sir Arthur and Beresford with Lisbon, -and, at the same time, prepare for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; -but marshal Ney absolutely refused to concur in this operation: -he observed that sir Arthur Wellesley was not yet in march for -Alcantara; that it was exceedingly dangerous to invade Portugal in -a hasty manner; and that the army could not be fed between Coria, -Plasencia, and the Tagus; finally, that Salamanca, being again in -possession of the Spaniards, it was more fitting that the sixth -corps should retake that town, and occupy the line of the Tormes to -cover Castile. - -This reasoning was approved by Joseph; he dreaded the further -fatigue and privations that would attend a continuance of the -operations during the excessive heats, and in a wasted country; and -he was strengthened in his opinion by the receipt of a despatch -from the emperor, dated Schoenbrun, the 29th of July, in which any -further offensive operations were forbad, until the reinforcements -which the recent victory of Wagram enabled him to send should -arrive in Spain. The second corps was, consequently, directed to -take post at Plasencia. The fifth corps relieved the first at -Talavera; and the English wounded being, by Victor, given over to -marshal Mortier, the latter, with a chivalrous sense of honour, -would not permit his own soldiers, although suffering severe -privations themselves, to receive rations until the hospitals were -first supplied. The sixth corps was now directed upon Valladolid, -for Joseph was alarmed lest fresh insurrection, excited and -supported by the duke del Parque, should spread over the whole of -Leon and Castile. Ney marched, on the 11th, from Plasencia; but, -to his surprise, found that sir Robert Wilson, with about four -thousand men, part Spaniards, part Portuguese, was in possession of -the pass of Baños. To explain this, it must be observed, that when -the British army marched from Talavera, on the 3d, Wilson, being -at Nombella, was put in communication with Cuesta. He had sent his -artillery to the army on the 3d, and on the 4th, finding that the -Spaniards had abandoned Talavera, he fell back with his infantry -to Vellada, a few miles north of Talavera. He was then twenty-four -miles from Arzobispo; and, as Cuesta did not quit Oropesa until the -5th, a junction with sir Arthur Wellesley might have been effected: -but it was impossible to know this at the time; and Wilson, very -prudently, crossing the Tietar, made for the mountains, trusting to -his activity and local knowledge to escape the enemy. Villatte’s -division pursued him, on the 5th, to Nombella; a detachment from -the garrison of Avila was watching for him in the passes of Arenas -and Monbeltran, and general Foy waited for him in the Vera de -Plasencia. Nevertheless, he baffled his opponents, broke through -their circle at Viandar, passed the Gredos at a ridge called the -Sierra de Lanes, and, getting into the valley of the Tormes, -reached Bejar: from thence, thinking to recover his communications -with the army, he marched towards Plasencia, by the pass of Baños, -and thus, on the morning of the 12th, met with Ney, returning to -the Salamanca country. - -The dust of the French column being seen from afar, and a retreat -to Ciudad Rodrigo open, it is not easy to comprehend why sir Robert -Wilson should have given battle to the sixth corps. His position, -although difficult of approach, and strengthened by the piling of -large stones in the narrowest parts, was not one in which he could -hope to stop a whole army; and, accordingly, when the French, -overcoming the local obstacles, got close upon his left, the fight -was at an end. The first charge broke both the legion and the -Spanish auxiliaries, and the whole dispersed. Ney then continued -his march, and, having recovered the line of the Tormes, resigned -the command of the sixth corps to general Marchand, and returned to -France. But, while these things happened in Estremadura, La Mancha -was the theatre of more important operations. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -When the duke of Belluno retired from Salinas to Maqueda, the -king, fearing that the allies were moving up the right bank of the -Alberche, carried his reserve, in the night of the 3d, to Mostoles; -but the fourth corps remained at Illescas, and sent strong patroles -to Valdemoro. Wilson, however, retired, as we have seen, from -Nombella on the 4th; and the king, no longer expecting the allies -in that quarter, marched in the night to Valdemoro, where he was -joined by the fourth corps from Illescas. - -The 5th, the duke of Belluno returned to St. Ollalla; and the king -marched against general Venegas, who, in pursuance of the secret -orders of the junta, before mentioned, had loitered about Daymiel -and Tembleque until the 27th of July. The 29th, however, Venegas -reached Ocaña, his advanced posts being at Aranjuez, his rear-guard -at Yepes, and one division, under Lacy, in front of Toledo. The -same day, one of the _partidas_, attending the army, surprised -a small French post on the other side of the Tagus; and Lacy’s -division skirmished with the garrison of Toledo. - -The 30th, Venegas heard of the battle of Talavera; and at the same -time Lacy reported that the head of the enemy’s columns were to be -seen on the road beyond Toledo. Hereupon, the Spanish commander -reinforced Lacy, and gave him Mora as a point of retreat; but, on -the 2d of August, being falsely informed by Cuesta that the allied -troops would immediately march upon Madrid, Venegas recalled -his divisions from Toledo, pretending to concentrate his army at -Aranjuez, in order to march also upon the capital; but he had no -intention of doing so; for the junta did not desire to see Cuesta, -at the head of sixty thousand men, in that city; and, previous to -the battle of Talavera, had not only forbidden him to enter Madrid, -but appointed another man governor. This prohibition would, no -doubt, have been disregarded by Cuesta; but Venegas was obedient -to their secret instructions, and under pretence of danger to his -flanks, if he marched on the capital, remained at Aranjuez, where -his flank being equally exposed to an enemy coming from Toledo, he -yet performed no service to the general cause. - -The 3d, he pushed an advanced guard to Puente Largo; and leaving -six hundred infantry, and some cavalry, near Toledo, concentrated -his army between Aranjuez and Ocaña; and in this position he -remained until the 5th, when his advanced guard was driven from -the Puente Largo, and across the Tagus. His line of posts on that -river was then attacked by the French skirmishers, and, under -cover of a heavy cannonade, his position was examined by the -enemy’s generals; but when the latter found that all the bridges -above and below Aranjuez were broken down, they resolved to pass -the Tagus at Toledo. With this intent, the French army re-crossed -the Xarama river, and marched in the direction of that city; but -Venegas still keeping his posts at Aranjuez, foolishly dispersed -his other divisions at Tembleque, Ocaña, and Guardia. He himself -was desirous of defending La Mancha. The central junta, with more -prudence, wished him to retreat into the Sierra Morena; but Mr. -Frere proposed that his army should be divided; one part to enter -the Morena, and the other to march by Cuença, upon Aragon, and so -to menace the communications with France! The admirable absurdity -of this proposal would probably have caused it to be adopted, if -Sebastiani’s movements had not put an end to the discussion. That -general, crossing the Tagus at Toledo, and at a ford higher up, -drove the Spaniards’ left back upon the Guazalate. This was on the -9th of August; on the 10th, Venegas concentrated his whole army -at Almonacid, and, holding a council of war, resolved to attack -the French on the 12th; but the time was miscalculated. Sebastiani -advanced on the 11th, and commenced - - -THE BATTLE OF ALMONACID. - -The army of Venegas, including two thousand cavalry, was somewhat -more than twenty-five thousand strong, with forty pieces of -artillery. It was the most efficient Spanish force that had yet -taken the field; it was composed of the best regiments in Spain, -well armed and clothed; and the generals of division were neither -incapacitated by age, nor destitute of experience, most of them -having been employed in the previous campaign. The village of -Almonacid was in the centre of the Spanish position; and, together -with some table-land in front of it, was occupied by two divisions -of infantry under general Castejon. The left wing, under general -Lacy, rested on a hill which covered the main road to Consuegra. -The right wing, commanded by general Vigodet, was drawn up on some -rising ground covering the road to Tembleque. A reserve, under -general Giron, and the greatest part of the artillery, were posted -behind the centre, on a rugged hill, crowned by an old castle. The -cavalry were placed at the extremity of each wing. - -General Dessolles, with the French reserve, was still some hours’ -march behind, but Sebastiani, after observing the dispositions -made by Venegas, resolved to attack him with the fourth corps -only. The Polish division immediately marched against the front; -Leval’s Germans turned the flank of the hill, on which the Spanish -left was posted; and two French brigades were directed upon the -centre. After a sharp fight, the Spanish left was put to flight; -but Venegas, outflanking the victorious troops with his cavalry, -charged and threw them into disorder. At this moment, the head of -Dessolles’s column arrived, and enabled Sabastiani’s reserves to -restore the combat; and then the Spanish cavalry, shattered by -musketry, and by the fire of four pieces of artillery, was, in -turn, charged by a French regiment of horse, and broken. Venegas -rallied his troops again on the castle-hill, behind the village; -but the king came up with the remainder of the reserve, and the -attack was renewed. The Poles and Germans continued their march -against the left flank of the Spaniards; nine fresh battalions fell -upon their centre, and a column of six battalions forced the right. -The height and the castle were thus carried at the first effort. -Venegas attempted to cover his retreat, by making a stand in the -plain behind; but two divisions of dragoons charged his troops -before they could re-form, and the disorder became irremediable. -The Spaniards, throwing away their arms, dispersed in every -direction, and were pursued and slaughtered by the horsemen for -several hours. - -Following the French account, three thousand of the vanquished -were slain, and four thousand taken prisoners; and all the -guns, baggage, ammunition, and carriages fell into the hands of -the victors, whose loss did not exceed fifteen hundred men. The -remnants of the defeated army took shelter in the Sierra Morena. -The head-quarters of the fourth corps were then established at -Aranjuez; those of the first at Toledo; and the king returned in -triumph to the capital. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.] - -The allied troops, however, still held their position at -Deleytosa and Jaraicejo, and sir Arthur Wellesley was not, at -the first, without hopes to maintain himself there, or even to -resume offensive operations; for he knew that Ney had returned -to Salamanca, and he erroneously believed that Mortier commanded -only a part of the first corps, and that the remainder were at -Toledo. On the other hand, his own strength was about seventeen -thousand men; Beresford had reached Moraleja, with from twelve to -fourteen thousand Portuguese; and between the frontier of Portugal -and Lisbon there were at least five thousand British troops, -composing the brigades of Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn. If Soult -invaded Portugal, the intention of the English general was to have -followed him. If the French remained in their present position, he -meant to re-cross the Tagus, and, in conjunction with Beresford’s -troops, to fall upon their right at Plasencia. For his own front -he had no fear; and he was taking measures to restore the broken -arch of the Cardinal’s bridge over the Tagus, with a view to his -operation against Plasencia, when the misconduct of the Spanish -government and its generals again obliged him to look solely to the -preservation of his own army. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 7.] - -From the 23d of July, when the bad faith of the junta, the apathy -of the people in Estremadura, and the wayward folly of Cuesta, had -checked the forward movements of the British, the privations of the -latter, which had commenced at Plasencia, daily increased. It was -in vain that sir Arthur, remonstrating with Cuesta and the junta, -had warned them of the consequences; it was in vain that he refused -to pass the Alberche until the necessary supplies were secured. His -reasonings, his representations, and even the fact of his having -halted at Talavera, were alike disregarded by men who, judging -from their own habits, concluded that his actions would also be at -variance with his professions. - -If he demanded food for his troops, he was answered by false -statements of what had been supplied, and falser promises of what -would be done; and the glorious services rendered at Talavera, far -from exciting the gratitude or calling forth the activity of the -Spanish authorities, seemed only to render them the more perverse. -The soldiers in the ranks were weakened by hunger, the sick were -dying for want of necessary succours, the commissaries were without -the means of transport; and when sir Arthur Wellesley applied for -only ninety artillery horses to supply the place of those killed -in the action, Cuesta, on the very field of battle, and with the -steam of the English blood still reeking in his nostrils, refused -this request, and, two days after, abandoned the wounded men to an -enemy that he and his countrymen were hourly describing as the most -ferocious and dishonourable of mankind. - -The retreat of the allies across the Tagus increased the sufferings -of the troops, and the warmth of their general’s remonstrances -rose in proportion to the ill-treatment they experienced; but -the replies, nothing abating in falseness as to fact, now became -insulting both to the general and his army: “_The British were -not only well but over supplied_:”--“_they robbed the peasantry, -pillaged the villages, intercepted the Spanish convoys, and openly -sold the provisions thus shamefully acquired_:”--“_the retreat of -the army across the Tagus was unnecessary; Soult ought to have been -destroyed; and the English general must have secret motives for his -conduct, which he dare not avouch_:”--and other calumnies of the -like nature. - -Now, from the 20th of July to the 20th of August, although the -Spaniards were generally well fed, the English soldiers had not -received ten full rations. Half a pound of wheat in the grain, and, -twice a week, a few ounces of flour, with a quarter of a pound of -goat’s flesh, formed the sole subsistence of men and officers; and -this scanty supply was procured with much labour, for the goats -were to be caught and killed by the troops; and it was, perhaps, -upon this additional hardship that the accusation of selling -provisions was founded, for, in such cases, it is in all armies the -custom that the offal belongs to the men who slaughter the animals. -But the famine in the camp was plainly proved by this very fact; -for a goat’s offal sold, at this time, for three and even four -dollars, or about double the usual price of the whole animal; and -men and officers strove to outbid each other for the wretched food. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 18.] - -It has been said that the British soldiers are less intelligent -in providing for themselves, and less able to sustain privations -of food than the soldiers of any other nation. This is one of -many vulgar errors which have been promulgated respecting them. -How they should be constantly victorious, and yet inferior to all -other nations in military qualification, does not, at first sight, -appear a very logical conclusion; but the truth is, that, with the -exception of the Spanish and Portuguese, who are, undoubtedly, more -sober, the English soldiers possess all the most valuable military -qualities in as high, and many in a much higher degree than any -other nation. They are as rapid and as intelligent as the French, -as obedient as the German, as enduring as the Russian, and more -robust than any; and, with respect to food, this is sure, that no -man, of any nation, with less than two pounds of solid food of some -kind daily, can do his work well for any length of time. A general -charge of pillaging is easily made and hard to be disproved; but -it is certain that the Spanish troops themselves did not only -pillage, but wantonly devastate the country, and that without any -excuse; for, with the exception of the three days succeeding the -defeat of Arzobispo, their rations were regular and sufficient: -and, with respect to the interruption of their convoys, by the -British soldiers, the reverse was the fact. _The Spanish cavalry -intercepted the provisions and forage destined for the English -army, and fired upon the foragers, as if they had been enemies._ - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.] - -Before the middle of August there were, in the six regiments of -English cavalry, a thousand men completely dismounted, and the -horses of seven hundred others were unserviceable. The baggage -animals died in greater numbers; the artillery cattle were scarcely -able to drag the guns; and one-third of the reserve ammunition was -given over to the Spaniards, because the ammunition carts were -required for the conveyance of sick men, of which the number daily -increased. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 17.] - -Marshal Beresford experienced the same difficulties in the -neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. The numerous desertions that took -place in the Portuguese army, when it became known that the troops -were to enter Spain, prevented him from taking the field so soon -as he had expected; but, in the last days of July, being prepared -to act, he crossed the Portuguese frontier, and, from that moment, -the usual vexatious system of the Spaniards commenced. Romana -still continued at Coruña; but the duke del Parque was full of -mighty projects, and indignant that Beresford would not blindly -adopt his recommendations. Both generals were ignorant of the -real strength of the French; but the Spaniard was confident, and -insisted upon offensive movements, while Beresford, a general by -no means of an enterprising disposition when in the sole command -of an army, contented himself with taking up a defensive line -behind the Agueda. In this, however, he was justified; first, by -his instructions, which obliged him to look to the pass of Perales -and the defence of the frontier line; secondly, by the state of -his army, which was not half organized, and without horsemen or -artillery; and, thirdly, by the conduct of the Spanish authorities. - -The Portuguese troops were not only refused provisions, but -those which had been collected by sir Arthur Wellesley, and put -into the magazines at Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view to operate in -that quarter, were seized by the cabildo, as security for a debt -pretended to be due for the supply of sir John Moore’s army. The -claim itself was of doubtful character, for Cradock had before -offered to pay it if the cabildo would produce the voucher for its -being due, a preliminary which had not been complied with. There -was also an English commissary at Ciudad Rodrigo, empowered to -liquidate that and any other just claim upon the British military -chest; but the cabildo, like all Spaniards, mistaking violence for -energy, preferred this display of petty power to the interests of -the common cause. Meanwhile, Soult having passed the Sierra de -Gredos, by the Baños, Beresford, moving in a parallel direction, -crossed the Sierra de Gata, at Perales; reached Moraleja about the -12th of August, and having rallied the troops and convalescents cut -off from Talavera, marched to Salvatierra, where he arrived the -17th, and took post behind the Elga, covering the road to Abrantes. - -The supreme junta now offered sir Arthur Wellesley the rank of -captain-general, and sent him a present of horses; and when he, -accepting the rank, refused the pay, as he had before refused that -of the Portuguese government, they pressed him to renew offensive -operations; but, acting as if they thought the honours conferred -upon the general would amply compensate for the sufferings of -the troops, the junta made no change in their system. These -things convinced sir Arthur Wellesley that Spain was no longer -the place for a British army, and he relinquished the idea of -further operations in that country. Sending his cavalry to the -neighbourhood of Caceres, he broke down another arch of the -Cardinal’s bridge, to prevent the enemy from troubling him, and, -through the British ambassador, informed the junta that he would -immediately retire into Portugal. - -This information created the wildest consternation; for, in -their swollen self-sufficiency, the members of the government had -hitherto disregarded all warnings upon this subject, and now acting -as, in the like case, they had acted, the year before, with sir -John Moore, they endeavoured to avert the consequences of their -own evil doings, by vehement remonstrances and the most absurd -statements:--“_The French were weak and the moment most propitious -for driving them beyond the Pyrenees_:” “THE UNCALLED-FOR RETREAT -OF THE ENGLISH WOULD RUIN THE CAUSE:” and so forth. But they had to -deal with a general as firm as sir John Moore; and, in the British -ambassador, they no longer found an instrument suited to their -purposes. - -Lord Wellesley, a man with too many weaknesses to be called -great, but of an expanded capacity, and a genius at once subtle -and imperious, had come out on a special mission,--and Mr. Frere, -whose last communication with the junta had been to recommend -another military project, was happily displaced; yet, even in his -private capacity, he made an effort to have some of the generals -superseded; and the junta, with a refined irony, truly Spanish, -created him _marquis of_ UNION. - -At Cadiz, the honours paid to lord Wellesley were extravagant and -unbecoming, and his journey from thence to Seville was a scene -of triumph; but these outward demonstrations of feeling did not -impose upon him beyond the moment. His brother’s correspondence and -his own penetration soon enabled him to make a just estimate of -the junta’s protestations. Disdaining their intrigues, and fully -appreciating a general’s right to direct the operations of his own -army, he seconded sir Arthur’s remonstrances with firmness, and -wisely taking the latter’s statements as a guide and basis for his -own views, urged them upon the Spanish government with becoming -dignity. - -The junta, on their part, always protesting that the welfare of -the British army was the principal object of their care, did not -fail to prove, very clearly upon paper, that the troops, ever -since their entry into Spain, had been amply supplied: and that -no measure might be wanting to satisfy the English general, they -invested don Lorenzo Calvo, a member of their body, with full -powers to draw forth and apply all the resources of the country -to the nourishment of both armies. This gentleman’s promises and -assurances, relative to the supply, were more full and formal than -M. de Garay’s, and equally false. He declared that provisions and -forage, in vast quantities, were actually being delivered into -the magazines at Truxillo, when, in fact, there was not even an -effort making to collect any. He promised that the British should -be served, although the Spanish troops should thereby suffer; and, -at the very time of making this promise, he obliged the alcaldes -of a distant town to send, into the Spanish camp, provisions which -had been already purchased by an English commissary. In fine, lord -Wellesley had arrived too late; all the mischief that petulance, -folly, bad faith, violence, and ignorance united, could inflict, -was already accomplished, and, while he was vainly urging a vile, -if not a treacherous government, to provide sustenance for the -soldiers, sir Arthur withdrew the latter from a post where the -vultures, in their prescience of death, were already congregating. - -The 20th, the main body of the British army quitted Jaraicejo, -and marched by Truxillo upon Merida. The light brigade, under -Craufurd, being relieved at Almaraz by the Spaniards, took the -road of Caceres to Valencia de Alcantara. But the pass of Mirabete -bore ample testimony to the previous sufferings of the troops; -Craufurd’s brigade, which, only three weeks before, had traversed -sixty miles in a single march, were now with difficulty, and after -many halts, able to reach the summit of the Mirabete, although -only four miles from their camp; and the side of that mountain was -covered with baggage, and the carcases of many hundred animals that -died in the ascent. - -The retreat being thus commenced, the junta, with the malevolence -of anger engendered by fear, calumniated the man to whom, only ten -days before, they had addressed the most fulsome compliments, and -to whose courage and skill they owed their own existence. “_It was -not the want of provisions_,” they said, “_but some other motive -that caused the English general to retreat_.” This was openly and -insultingly stated by Garray, by Eguia, and by Calvo, in their -correspondence with lord Wellesley and sir Arthur; and at the same -time the junta industriously spread a report that the true reason -was their own firm resistance to the ungenerous demands of the -English ministers, who had required the cession of Cadiz and the -island of Cuba, as the price of furthur assistance. - -At Talavera, sir Arthur Wellesley had been forced to give over -to the Spaniards the artillery taken from the enemy. At Meza -d’Ibor, he had sacrificed a part of his ammunition, to obtain -conveyance for the wounded men, and to effect the present movement -from Jaraicejo, without leaving his sick behind, he was obliged -to abandon all his parc of ammunition, and stores, and then the -Spanish generals, who had refused the slightest aid to convey the -sick and wounded men, immediately found ample means to carry off -all these stores to their own magazines. In this manner, almost -bereft of baggage and ammunition, those soldiers, who had withstood -the fiercest efforts of the enemy, were driven, as it were, -ignominiously from the country they had protected to their loss. - -The 24th, the head-quarters being at Merida, a despatch from lord -Wellesley was received. He painted in strong colours the terror -of the junta, the distraction of the people, and the universal -confusion; and with a natural anxiety to mitigate their distress, -he proposed that the British army should, notwithstanding the -past, endeavour to cover Andalusia, by taking, in conjunction with -the Spanish army, a defensive post behind the Guadiana, in such -manner that the left should rest on the frontier of Portugal: to -facilitate this he had, he said, presented a plan to the junta for -the future supply of provisions, and the vicinity of the frontier -and of Seville would, he hoped, obviate any difficulty on that -point. But he rested his project entirely upon political grounds; -and it is worthy of observation that he who, for many years had, -with despotic power, controlled the movements of immense armies -in India, carefully avoided any appearance of meddling with the -general’s province. “I am,” said he, “fully sensible not only of -the _indelicacy_, but of the inutility of attempting to offer to -you any opinion of mine in a situation where your own judgement -must be your best guide.”--“Viewing, however, so nearly, the -painful consequences of your immediate retreat into Portugal, I -have deemed it to be my duty to submit it to your consideration the -possibility of adopting an intermediate plan.” - -On the receipt of this despatch, sir Arthur Wellesley halted -at Merida for some days. He was able in that country to obtain -provisions, and he wished, if possible, to allay the excitement -occasioned by his retreat; but he refused to co-operate again with -the Spaniards. Want, he said, had driven him to separate from -them, but their shameful flight at Arzobispo would alone have -justified him for doing so. To take up a defensive position behind -the Guadiana would be useless, because that river was fordable, -and the ground behind it weak. The line of the Tagus, occupied at -the moment by Eguia, was so strong, that if the Spaniards could -defend any thing they might defend that. His advice then was that -they should send the pontoon-bridge to Badajos, and remain on the -defensive at Deleytoza and Almaraz. But, it might be asked, was -there no chance of renewing the offensive? To what purpose? The -French were as numerous, if not more so, than the allies; and, with -respect to the Spaniards at least, superior in discipline and every -military quality. To advance again was only to play the same losing -game as before. Baños and Perales must be guarded, or the bands in -Castile would again pour through upon the rear of the allied army; -but who was to guard these passes? The British were too few to -detach, and the Spaniards could not be trusted; and if they could, -Avila and the Guadarama passes remained, by which the enemy could -reinforce the army in front,--for there were no Spanish troops in -the north of Spain capable of making a diversion. - -“But there was a more serious consideration, namely, the constant -and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the -enemy. We, in England,” said sir Arthur, “never hear of their -defeats and flights, but I have heard Spanish officers telling -of nineteen or twenty actions of the description of that at the -bridge of Arzobispo, accounts of which, I believe, have never -been published.” “In the battle of Talavera,” he continued, “in -which the Spanish army, with very trifling exception, was not -engaged,--whole corps threw away their arms, and run off, when they -were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack. When these -dastardly soldiers run away they plunder every thing they meet. -In their flight from Talavera they plundered the baggage of the -British army, which was, at that moment, bravely engaged in their -cause.” - -For these reasons he would not, he said, again co-operate with the -Spaniards; yet, by taking post on the Portuguese frontier, he would -hang upon the enemy’s flank, and thus, unless the latter came with -very great forces, prevent him from crossing the Guadiana. This -reasoning was conclusive; but, ere it reached lord Wellesley, the -latter found that so far from his plans, relative to the supply, -having been adopted, he could not even get an answer from the -junta; and that miserable body, at one moment stupified with fear, -at the next bursting with folly, now talked of the enemy’s being -about to retire to the Pyrenees, or even to the interior of France: -and assuming the right to dispose of the Portuguese army as well -as of their own, importunately pressed for an immediate, combined, -offensive operation, by the troops of the three nations, to harass -the enemy in his retreat; but, at the same time, they ordered Eguia -to withdraw from Deleytoza, behind the Guadiana. - -The 31st, Eguia reached La Serena; and Venegas having rallied his -fugitives in the Morena, and being reinforced from the depôts -in Andalusia, the two armies amounted to about fifty thousand -men, of which eight or ten thousand were horse: for, as I have -before observed, the Spanish cavalry seldom suffered much. But -the tide of popular discontent was now setting full against the -central government. The members of the ancient junta of Seville -worked incessantly for their overthrow. Romana, Castaños, Cuesta, -Albuquerque, all, and they were many, who had suffered dishonour at -their hands, were against them; and the local junta of Estremadura -insisted that Albuquerque should command in that province. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 17.] - -Thus pressed, the supreme junta, considering Venegas as a man -devoted to their wishes, resolved to increase his forces. For this -purpose they gave Albuquerque the command in Estremadura, but -furnished him with only twelve thousand men, sending the remainder -of Eguia’s army to Venegas; and, at the same time, making a last -effort to engage the British general in their proceedings, they -offered to place Albuquerque under his orders, provided he would -undertake an offensive movement. By these means, they maintained -their tottering power: but their plans, being founded upon vile -political intrigues, could in no wise alter sir Arthur Wellesley’s -determination, which was the result of enlarged military views. He -refused their offers; and, the 4th of September, his head-quarters -were established at Badajos. Meanwhile, Romana delivered over his -army to the duke del Parque, and repaired to Seville. Venegas again -advanced into La Mancha, but at the approach of a very inferior -force of the enemy, retired, with all the haste and confusion of a -rout, to the Morena. The English troops were then distributed in -Badajos, Elvas, Campo Mayor, and other places, on both banks of the -Guadiana. The brigades already in Portugal were brought up to the -army, and the lost ammunition and equipments were replaced from the -magazines at Lisbon, Abrantes, and Santarem. Beresford, leaving -some light troops and militia on the frontier, retired to Thomar, -and this eventful campaign, of two months, terminated. - -The loss of the army was considerable; above three thousand five -hundred men had been killed, or had died of sickness, or fallen -into the enemy’s hands. Fifteen hundred horses had perished from -want of food, exclusive of those lost in battle; the spirits of -the soldiers were depressed; and a heart-burning hatred of the -Spaniards was engendered by the treatment endured. To fill the cup, -the pestilent fever of the Guadiana, assailing bodies which fatigue -and bad nourishment had already predisposed to disease, made -frightful ravages. Dysentry, that scourge of armies, raged; and, in -a short time, above five thousand men died in the hospitals. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -During this short, but important campaign, the armies on both sides -acted in violation of that maxim which condemns “_double external -lines of operation_,” but the results vindicated the soundness of -the rule. Nothing permanent or great, nothing proportionate to -the number of the troops, the vastness of the combinations, or -the reputation of the commanders, was achieved; yet, neither sir -Arthur Wellesley nor the duke of Dalmatia can be justly censured, -seeing that the last was controlled by the king, and the first by -circumstances of a peculiar nature. The French marshal was thwarted -by superior authority; and the English general, commanding an -auxiliary force, was obliged to regulate his movements, not by -his own military views, but by the actual state of the Spaniards’ -operations, and with reference to the politics and temper of that -people. - -La Mancha was the true line by which to act against Madrid, but -the British army was on the frontier of Portugal. The junta -refused Cadiz as a place of arms; and without Cadiz, or some other -fortified sea-port, neither prudence, nor his instructions, would -permit sir Arthur to hazard a great operation on that side. Hence -he adopted, not what was most fitting, in a military sense, but -what was least objectionable among the few plans that could be -concerted at all with the Spanish generals and government. Now, -the latter being resolved to act with strong armies, both in -Estremadura and La Mancha, the English general had but to remain on -a miserable defensive system in Portugal, or to unite with Cuesta -in the valley of the Tagus. His territorial line of operations was -therefore a matter of necessity, and any fair criticism must be -founded on the management of his masses after it was chosen. That -he did not greatly err in his conception of the campaign, is to be -inferred from the fact, that Napoleon, Soult, Victor, and Jourdan, -simultaneously expected him upon the very line he followed. He was -thwarted by Cuesta at every step, Venegas failed to aid him, and -the fatal error relative to Soult’s forces, under which he laboured -throughout, vitiated all his operations; yet he shook the intrusive -monarch roughly, in the midst of fifty thousand men. - -Let the project be judged, not by what did happen, but by what -would have happened, if Cuesta had been active, and if Venegas had -performed his part loyally. The junction of the British and Spanish -forces was made at Naval Moral, on the 22d of July. The duke of -Belluno, with twenty-one thousand men, was then in position behind -the Alberche, the fourth corps near Madrilejos in La Mancha, and -Joseph at Madrid, where general Foy had just arrived, to concert -Soult’s movement upon Plasencia. - -It is evident that the king and Sebastiani could not reach the -scene of action before the 25th or 26th of July, nor could Soult -influence the operations before the 1st or 2d of August. If then, -the allied army, being sixty thousand strong, with a hundred -pieces of artillery, had attacked Victor on the morning of the -23d, it is to be presumed that the latter would have been beaten, -and obliged to retreat, either upon Madrid or Toledo; but the -country immediately in his rear was open, and ten thousand horsemen -could have been launched in the pursuit. Sir Robert Wilson, also, -would have been on Victor’s flank, if, neglecting a junction with -the fourth corps, that marshal had taken the road to Madrid; and -if that of Toledo, the first and fourth corps would have been -separated from the king, who did not reach Vargas until the evening -of the 25th, but who would not, in this case, have been able to -advance at all beyond Naval Carneiro. - -Now, admitting that, by superior discipline and experience, the -French troops had effected their retreat on either line without any -serious calamity, what would have followed? - -1º. If Victor joined the king, the latter could only have retired, -by Guadalaxara, upon the third corps, or have gone by the Guadarama -towards Soult. - -2º. If Victor joined Sebastiani, the two corps must have retreated -to Guadalaxara, and the king would have joined them there, or, as -before said, have pushed for the Guadarama to join Soult. - -No doubt, that marshal, having so powerful an army, would, in -either case, have restored Joseph to his capital, and have cut -off sir Arthur’s communication with Portugal by the valley of the -Tagus. Nevertheless, a great moral impression would have been -produced by the temporary loss of Madrid, which was, moreover, the -general depôt of all the French armies; and, meanwhile, Venegas, -Cuesta, and sir Arthur Wellesley would have been united, and on -one line of operations (that of La Mancha), which, under such -circumstances, would have forced the junta to consent to the -occupation of Cadiz. In this view it must be admitted that the -plan was conceived with genius. - -Victor’s position on the Alberche was, however, strong; he -commanded twenty-five thousand veterans; and, as the Spaniards -were very incapable in the field, it may be argued that a general -movement of the whole army to Escalona, and from thence to Maqueda, -would have been preferable to a direct attack at Salinas; because -the allies, if thus suddenly placed in the midst of the French -corps, might have beaten them in detail, and would certainly have -cut the king off from the Guadarama, and forced him back upon -the Guadalaxara. But, with Cuesta for a colleague, how could a -general undertake an operation requiring celerity and the nicest -calculation? - -The false dealing of the junta no prudence could guard against; -but experience proves that, without extraordinary good fortune, -some accident will always happen to mar the combinations of armies -acting upon “_double external lines_.” And so it was with respect -to Venegas; for that general, with a force of twenty-six thousand -men, suffered himself to be held in check for five days by three -thousand French, and at the battle of Almonacid shewed that he knew -neither when to advance nor when to retreat. - -The patience with which sir Arthur Wellesley bore the foolish -insults of Cuesta, and the undaunted firmness with which he fought -to protect the Spanish army, require no illustration. When the -latter fell back from St. Ollalla on the 26th, it was impossible -for the British to retreat with honour; and there is nothing more -memorable in the history of this war, nothing more creditable to -the personal character of the English chief, than the battle of -Talavera, considered as an isolated event. Nevertheless, that -contest proved that the allies were unable to attain their object; -for, notwithstanding Victor’s ill-judged partial attacks on the -night of the 27th and morning of the 28th, and notwithstanding the -final repulse of the French, all the advantages of the movements, -as a whole, were with the latter. They were, on the 31st of July, -including the garrison of Toledo, still above forty thousand men; -and they maintained their central position, although it was not -until the 1st of August that Soult’s approach caused any change -in the views of the allied generals; and this brings us to the -fundamental error of sir Arthur Wellesley’s operations. - -That so able a commander should engage himself in the narrow valley -of the Tagus with twenty thousand British and forty thousand -Spanish troops, when fifty thousand French were waiting for him at -the further end, and above fifty thousand more were hanging on his -flank and rear, shews that the greatest masters of the art may err. -He who wars walks in a mist through which the keenest eyes cannot -always discern the right path. “_Speak to me of a general who has -made no mistakes in war_,” said Turenne, “_and you speak of one who -has seldom made war_.” - -Sir Arthur Wellesley thus excused his error:--“When I entered Spain -I had reason to believe that I should be joined by a Spanish army -in such a respectable state of discipline and efficiency, as that -it had kept in check, during nearly three months after a defeat, a -French army, at one time superior, and at no time much inferior.” - -“I had likewise reason to believe that the French corps, in the -north of Spain, were fully employed; and although I had heard of -the arrival of marshal Soult at Zamora, on the 29th of June, with a -view to equip the remains of his corps, I did not think it possible -that three French corps, consisting of thirty-four thousand men, -under three marshals, could have been assembled at Salamanca -without the knowledge of the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, or of the -junta of Castile; that these corps could have been moved from their -stations in Gallicia, the Asturias, and Biscay, without setting -free, for general operations, any Spanish troops which had been -opposed to them, or without any other inconvenience to the enemy -than that of protracting, to a later period, the settlement of his -government in those provinces;--and that they could have penetrated -into Estremadura, without a shot being fired at them by the troops -deemed sufficient to defend the passes by the Spanish generals.” -But thus it was that, like the figures in a phantasmagoria, the -military preparations of Spain, however menacing in appearance, -were invariably found to be vain and illusory. - -That sir Arthur Wellesley’s error was not fatal is to be attributed -to three causes:-- - -1º. The reluctance of marshal Ney to quit Astorga;--2º. The march -of the fifth corps upon Villa Castin instead of Salamanca;--3º. -The vehemence with which Victor advised the battle of Talavera: in -short, jealousy among the marshals, and the undecided temper of the -king. - -If Soult had not been thwarted, he would have concentrated the -three corps near Salamanca before the 20th, and he would have -reached Plasencia before the 28th of July. The allies must then -have forced their way into La Mancha, or been crushed; but could -they have done the former without another battle? without the -loss of all the wounded men? could they have done it at all? The -British, including Robert Craufurd’s brigade, were seventeen -thousand fighting men on the 29th, but wasted with fatigue and -hunger. The Spaniards were above thirty thousand: but in them no -trust could be placed for an effort requiring fine discipline and -courage of the highest order. The intrusive king was at the head of -forty thousand good troops. Venegas, at once ignorant and hampered -by the intrigues of the junta, was as nought in the operations; -but Soult’s step, stealthy while the situation of affairs was -obscure, would have been impetuous when a light broke on the field -of battle; and it is scarcely possible to conceive that the allies -could have forced their way in front before that marshal would have -fallen on their rear. - - -FRENCH OPERATIONS. - -The intrusive monarch was finally successful; yet it may be safely -affirmed that, with the exception of uniting his three corps behind -the Guadarama, on the evening of the 25th, his proceedings were an -uninterrupted series of errors. First, he would not suffer Soult -to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo with seventy thousand men, in the end -of July. To protect Madrid from the army of Venegas overbalanced, -in his mind, the advantages of this bold and grand project, -which would inevitably have drawn sir Arthur Wellesley from the -Tagus, and which, interrupting all military communication between -the northern and southern provinces, and ensuring possession of -Castile and Leon, would, by its success, have opened a broad way -to Lisbon. But Cuesta and Venegas, meanwhile, would have marched -against Madrid! Cuesta and Venegas, acting on external lines, and -whose united force did not exceed sixty-five thousand men! And -the king, holding a central position, with fifty thousand French -veterans, was alarmed at this prospect, and, rejecting Soult’s -plan, drew Mortier, with the fifth corps, to Villa Castin. Truly, -this was to neglect the bearing fruit-tree from fear of the nettle -at its stem! - -Sir Arthur Wellesley’s advance to Talavera was the result of this -great error; but he having thus incautiously afforded Soult an -opportunity of striking a fatal blow, a fresh combination was -concerted. The king, with equal judgement and activity, then united -all his own forces near Toledo, separated Venegas from Cuesta, -pushed back the latter upon the English army, and obliged both to -stand on the defensive, with eyes attentively directed to their -front, when the real point of danger was in the rear. This was -skilful; but the battle of Talavera which followed was a palpable, -an enormous, fault. The allies could neither move forward nor -backward, without being infinitely worse situated for success than -in that strong position, which seemed marked out by fortune herself -for their security. Until the 31st, the operations of Venegas were -not even felt; hence, till the 31st, the position on the Alberche -might have been maintained without danger; and, on the first of -August, the head of Soult’s column was at Plasencia. - -Let us suppose that the French had merely made demonstrations on -the 28th, and had retired behind the Alberche the 29th, would the -allies have dared to attack them in that position? The conduct -of the Spaniards, on the evening of the 27th, answers the -question; and, moreover, Joseph, with an army compact, active, -and experienced, could, with ease, have baffled any efforts of -the combined forces to bring him to action; he might have covered -himself by the Guadarama and by the Tagus, in succession, and the -farther he led his opponents from Talavera, without uncovering -the line of La Mancha, the more certain the effect of Soult’s -operation: but here we have another proof that double external -lines are essentially vicious. - -The combined movement of the French was desirable, from the -greatness of the object to be gained, and safe, from the powerful -force on each point. The occasion was so favourable that, -notwithstanding the imprudent heat of Victor, the reluctance of -Ney, and the unsteady temper of the king, the fate of the allies -was, up to the evening of the 3d, heavy in the scale. Nevertheless, -as the central position held by the allies, cut the line of -correspondence between Joseph and Soult, the king’s despatches -were intercepted, and the whole operation, even at the last hour, -was baffled. The first element of success in war is, that every -thing should emanate from a single head; and it would have been -preferable that the king, drawing the second and fifth corps to him -by the pass of the Guadarama, or by that of Avila, should, with the -eighty thousand men thus united, have fallen upon the allies in -front. Such a combination, although of less brilliant promise than -the one adopted, would have been more sure; and the less a general -trusts to fortune the better:--she is capricious! - -When one Spanish army was surprised at Arzobispo, another -completely beaten at Almonacid, and when Wilson’s Portuguese corps -was dispersed at Baños, the junta had just completed the measure -of their folly by quarrelling with the only force left that could -protect them. The French were, in truth, therefore, the masters of -the Peninsula; but they terminated their operations at the very -moment when they should have pursued them with redoubled activity; -for the general aspect of affairs and the particular circumstances -of the campaign were alike favourable. - -Napoleon was victorious in Germany; and of the British expeditions -against Italy and Holland, the former had scarcely struggled into -life,--the latter was already corrupting in death. Hence, Joseph -might have been assured that he would receive reinforcements, but -that none, of any consequence, could reach his adversaries; and, in -the Peninsula, there was nothing to oppose him. Navarre, Biscay, -Aragon, and the Castiles were subdued; Gerona closely beleaguered; -and the rest of Catalonia, if not quiescent, totally unable to -succour that noble city. Valencia was inert; the Asturias still -trembling; and in Gallicia there was nothing but confusion. Romana, -commanding fifteen thousand infantry, but neither cavalry nor -artillery, was still at Coruña, and durst not quit the mountains. -The duke del Parque held Ciudad Rodrigo, but was in no condition -to make head against more than a French division. The battle -of Almonacid had cleared La Mancha of troops. Estremadura and -Andalusia were, as we have seen, weak, distracted, and incapable of -solid resistance. There remained only the English and Portuguese -armies, the one being at Jaraceijo, the other at Moraleja. - -The line of resistance may, therefore, be said to have extended -from the Sierra Morena to Coruña--weak from its length; weaker, -that the allied corps, being separated by mountains, by rivers, -and by vast tracts of country, and having different bases of -operation, such as Lisbon, Seville, and Ciudad Rodrigo, could not -act in concert, except offensively; and with how little effect in -that way the campaign of Talavera had proved. But the French were -concentrated in a narrow space, and, having only Madrid to cover, -were advantageously situated for offensive or defensive movements. - -The allied forces were, for the most part, imperfectly organized, -and would not, altogether, have amounted to ninety thousand -fighting men. The French were above one hundred thousand, dangerous -from their discipline and experience, more dangerous that they held -a central position, and that their numbers were unknown to their -opponents; and, moreover, having, in four days, gained one general -and two minor battles, their courage was high and eager. - -[Sidenote: See Calvo Garray and Lord Wellesley’s Correspondence, -Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -At this period, by the acknowledgement of the Spaniards themselves, -the fate of the country depended entirely upon the British troops, -and, doubtless, the latter were soldiers of no ordinary stamp; -but there is a limit to human power, in war as well as in other -matters. Sir Arthur Wellesley was at the head of some seventeen -thousand men, of all arms, and about five thousand were somewhere -between Lisbon and Alcantara: but the whole French army could, in -two days, have been concentrated in the valley of the Tagus. Soult, -alone, of all the associated generals, appears to have viewed this -crisis with the eye of a great commander. Had he been permitted -to follow up the attack at Arzobispo, on the 8th of August, what -could the seventeen thousand starving British troops, encumbered -with the terror-stricken Spaniards, have effected against the -seventy thousand French that would have stormed their positions on -three sides at once? The hardy, enduring English infantry might, -indeed, have held their ground in one battle, but could they -have fought a second? Would not a movement of the first corps by -Guadalupe, would not famine alone, have forced the ten or twelve -thousand men remaining (if, indeed, so many were left) to abandon -the banks of the Tagus, to abandon, also, their parcs of ammunition -and their wounded men, and to retreat towards Portugal; and to -retreat, also, with little hope, harassed, as they would have been, -by six thousand horsemen, for Soult had eighteen regiments of -cavalry? - -[Sidenote: Parl. Pap. 1810.] - -Let it be supposed, however, that the strength of the Meza d’Ibor -and the Mirabete had baffled all the enemy’s efforts, and that, -seeing the allies fixed in those positions, the sixth corps, in -pursuance of Soult’s second proposal, had crossed the frontier -of Portugal. Sir Arthur Wellesley, contemplating such an event, -affirmed that he meant to follow them in any movement they might -make against Lisbon; but there were two ways of following, the one -by the south and the other by the north bank of the Tagus. Now, if -he designed to cross the Tagus at the Cardinal’s bridge, and so, -connecting his right with Beresford, to hang on the enemy’s rear, -it could only have been while he was ignorant of Venegas’ defeat, -and when he imagined the French to have but thirty thousand men in -the valley of the Tagus; but they had above seventy thousand; and, -without endangering Madrid, they could have invaded Portugal with, -at least, fifty thousand men under arms. - -If, on the other hand, he designed to move by the south side of -the Tagus, the French line of march upon Abrantes and Lisbon was -shorter than his; and Beresford, who only reached Moraleja on the -12th, would have been cut off, and thrown back upon Almeida. It -is true that marshal Ney alleged the difficulty of feeding the -troops in the country about Plasencia and Coria, and the prudence -of Soult’s project might, in that respect, have been somewhat -questionable. But the duke of Elchingen was averse to _any_ -invasion of Portugal; and, to an unwilling mind, difficulties -are enlarged beyond their due proportion. Moreover, his talents -were more remarkable in a battle than in the dispositions for a -campaign; and Soult’s opinion must, on this occasion, be allowed -greater weight, because the Vera de Plasencia and the valleys -of the Bejar and the Gata mountains were certainly exceedingly -fertile, they had been little injured, and the object was, not to -fix a base of operations, but to obtain a momentary subsistence -until a richer country could be opened. - -Admitting, however, that a march on Lisbon was not feasible at that -moment, there could have been no well-founded objection to the -siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which Soult again proposed. The emperor’s -instructions were indeed pleaded; but those were general, founded -upon the past errors of the campaign, which made him doubtful of -the future; they were not applicable to the peculiar circumstances -of the moment, and would have been disregarded by a general with a -tithe of his own genius. Fortunately for Spain, the intrusive king -was not a great commander. When he might have entered the temple of -victory with banners flying, he stretched himself at the threshold -and slept. - -The departure of the English army was a remarkable epoch in the -Peninsular war. The policy of combining operations with the Spanish -armies, and of striking directly at the great masses of the French, -had been fairly acted upon, and had failed; and the long-cherished -delusion, relative to Spanish enthusiasm and Spanish efficiency, -was at last dissipated. The transactions of the campaign of 1809 -form a series of practical comments upon the campaign of 1808. All -the objections which had been made to sir John Moore’s conduct, -being put to the test of experience, proved illusory, while -the soundness of that general’s views were confirmed in every -particular. The leading events of the two campaigns bear a striking -resemblance to each other. - -Both sir Arthur Wellesley and sir John Moore advanced from -Portugal to _aid the Spanish armies_. The first general commanded -twenty-five thousand, the last twenty thousand men; but there was -this difference: that, in 1808, Portugal was so disorganised as to -require a British force to keep down anarchy; whereas, in 1809, -Portugal formed a good base of operations, and a Portuguese army -was acting in conjunction with the British. - -Sir John Moore was joined by six thousand men, under Romana, and -there was no other Spanish army in existence to aid him. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley was joined by thirty-eight thousand Spaniards, -under Cuesta, and he calculated upon twenty-six thousand, under -Venegas; while from twenty to twenty-five thousand others were -acting in Gallicia and Leon. - -Sir John Moore was urged to throw himself into the heart of Spain, -to aid a people represented as abounding in courage and every other -military virtue. Judging of what he could not see by that which was -within his view, he doubted the truth of these representations, and -thinking that a powerful army, commanded by a man of the greatest -military genius, was likely to prove formidable, he was unwilling -to commit his own small force in an unequal contest. Nevertheless, -feeling that some practicable demonstration of the difficulties to -be encountered was required by the temper of the times, he made a -movement, too delicate and dangerous to be adopted, unless for a -great political as well as military purpose. - -To relieve the southern provinces, and to convince the English -government and the English public that they had taken a false view -of affairs, were the objects of his advance to the Carrion river; -but, although he carried his army forward with a boldness that -marked the consciousness of superior talents, he never lost sight -of the danger he was incurring by exposing his flank to the French -emperor. To obviate this danger as much as possible, he established -a second line of retreat upon Gallicia, and he kept a watchful eye -upon the cloud gathering at Madrid. Arrived in front of Soult’s -corps, and being upon the point of attacking him, the expected -storm burst, but, by a rapid march to Benevente, Moore saved -himself from being taken in flank and rear and destroyed. Benevente -was, however, untenable against the forces brought up by Napoleon, -and, the retreat being continued to Coruña, the army, after a -battle, embarked. - -It was objected--1º. That Moore should have gone to Madrid;--2º. -That he should have fought at Astorga, at Villa Franca, and at -Lugo, instead of at Coruña;--3º. That he overrated the strength -of the enemy, and undervalued the strength and enthusiasm of the -Spaniards; and that, being of a desponding temper, he lost the -opportunity of driving the French beyond the Ebro, for, that a -battle gained (and it was assumed that a battle must have been -gained had he attacked) would have assuredly broken the enemy’s -power, and called forth all the energies of Spain. - -Sir John Moore reasoned that the Spanish enthusiasm was not great, -that it evaporated in boasting and promises, which could not be -relied upon; that the British army was sent as an auxiliary, not as -a principal force; and that the native armies being all dispersed -before he could come to their assistance, the enemy was far too -strong to contend with single handed; wherefore, it was prudent -to re-embark, and to choose some other base of operations, to be -conducted upon sounder views of the actual state of affairs, or to -give up the contest altogether; for that little or no hope of final -success could be entertained, unless the councils and dispositions -of the Spaniards changed for the better. He died; and the English -ministers, adopting the reasoning of his detractors, once more sent -an auxiliary army to Spain; although the system still existed which -he had denounced as incompatible with success. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, a general of their own choice, and assuredly -a better could not have been made, was placed at the head of this -army; and, after giving Soult a heavy blow on the Douro, he also -advanced to deliver Spain. Like sir John Moore, he was cramped for -want of money; and, like sir John Moore, he was pestered with -false representations, and a variety of plans, founded upon short -sighted views, and displaying great ignorance of the art of war; -but, finally, he adopted, and, as far as the inveterate nature of -the people he had to deal with would permit, executed a project, -which, like sir John Moore’s, had for its object to overpower the -French in his front, and, by forcing them to concentrate, relieve -the distant provinces; and give full play to the enthusiasm of the -Spaniards. - -When sir John Moore advanced, there were no Spanish armies to -assist him; the French were above three hundred and twenty thousand -strong, and of these two hundred and fifty thousand were disposable -to move against any point; moreover, they were commanded in person -by Napoleon, of whom it has been said by the duke of Wellington, -that his presence, alone, was equal to forty thousand good troops. - -When sir Arthur Wellesley advanced, the French forces in the -Peninsula did not exceed two hundred and sixty thousand men, of -which only one hundred thousand could be brought to bear on his -operations; and he was assisted by sixty thousand Spaniards, well -armed, and tolerably disciplined. His plans were certainly laid -with great ability upon the data furnished to him; but he trusted -to Spanish promises and to Spanish energy, and he did not fail to -repent his credulity; nevertheless, he delivered and gained that -battle which sir John Moore had been reproached for not essaying; -but it was found that a veteran French army, even of inferior -numbers, was not to be destroyed, or even much dispirited, by one -defeat; and while this battle was fighting, Soult, with fifty -thousand men, came down upon the flank and rear of the English, a -movement precisely similar to that which Napoleon had made from -Madrid upon the flank and rear of sir John Moore. This last general -saved himself by crossing the Esla, in the presence of the French -patroles; and in like manner, sir Arthur evaded destruction by -crossing the Tagus, within view of the enemy’s scouts, so closely -timed was the escape of both. - -When sir John Moore retreated, the Spanish government, reproaching -him, asserted that the French were on the point of ruin, and -Romana, even at Astorga, continued to urge offensive operations. - -When sir Arthur Wellesley retired from Jaraceijo, the junta in -the same manner asserted that the French were upon the point -of retiring from Spain, and general Equia proposed offensive -operations. In explaining his motives, and discussing the treatment -he had met with, sir John Moore wrote thus to his own government: -“_The British were sent to aid the Spanish armies, but they are not -equal to encounter the French, who have at least eighty thousand -men_, and we have nothing to expect from the Spaniards, who are not -to be trusted; they are apathetic, lethargic, quick to promise, -backward to act, improvident, insensible to the shame of flying -before the enemy, they refuse all assistance, and I am obliged to -leave ammunition, stores, and money, behind. The Spanish armies -have shewn no resolution, the people no enthusiasm nor daring -spirit, and that which has not been shown hitherto, I know not why -it should be expected to be displayed hereafter.” Such were his -expressions. - -When sir Arthur Wellesley had proved the Spaniards, he, also, -writing to his government, says:--“We are here worse off than in -a hostile country;--never was an army so ill used;--the Spaniards -have made all sorts of promises;--we had absolutely no assistance -from the Spanish army; on the contrary, we were obliged to lay -down our ammunition, to unload the treasure, and to employ the -cars in the removal of our sick and wounded. The common dictates -of humanity have been disregarded by them, and I have been obliged -to leave ammunition, stores, and money behind. _Whatever is to -be done must be done by the British army, but that is certainly -not capable, singly, to resist a French army of at least seventy -thousand men._” - -The last advice given to the government, by sir John Moore, was -against sending an auxiliary force to Spain. Sir Arthur Wellesley, -in the same spirit, withdrew his troops; and, from that moment, -to the end of the struggle, he warred, indeed, for Spain, and -in Spain, but never with Spain. “I have fished in many troubled -waters, but Spanish troubled waters I will never try again,” was -his expression, when speaking of this campaign; and he kept his -word. That country became, indeed, a field, on which the French and -English armies contended for the destiny of Europe; but the defeats -or victories, the promises or the performances of the Spaniards -scarcely influenced the movements. Spain, being left to her own -devices, was beaten in every encounter, foiled in every project, -yet made no change in her policy; and while Portugal endeavoured to -raise her energy on a level with that of her ally, Spain sought to -drag down England to the depth of folly and weakness, in which she -herself was plunged. The one would not sacrifice an atom of false -pride to obtain the greatest benefits; the other submitted, not -with abject dependence, but with a magnanimous humility, to every -mortification, rather than be conquered; and the effects of their -different modes were such as might be expected. Portugal, although -assaulted by an infinitely greater number of enemies, in proportion -to her strength, overthrew the oppressors the moment they set foot -upon her soil; while in Spain, town after town was taken, army -after army dispersed, every battle a defeat, and every defeat -sensibly diminished the heat of resistance. Napoleon once declared -that a nation resolved to be free could not be conquered; and the -Spaniards re-echoed the sentiment in their manifestos, as if to say -it was all that was necessary. But Napoleon contemplated a nation, -like the Portuguese, making use of every means of defence, whether -derived from themselves or their alliances; not a people puffed -with conceit, and lavish of sounding-phrases, such as “perishing -under the ruins of the last wall,” yet beaten with a facility that -rendered them the derision of the world; a people unable to guide -themselves yet arrogantly refusing all advice. Such a nation is -ripe for destruction, and such a nation was Spain. - -The campaign of 1809 finished the third epoch of the war, and it -was prolific of instruction. The jealousy of the French marshals, -the evils of disunion, the folly of the Spanish government, and -the absurdity of the Spanish character, with respect to public -affairs, were placed in the strongest light; while the vast -combinations, the sanguinary battles, the singular changes of -fortune, the result so little suitable to the greatness of the -efforts, amply demonstrated the difficulty and the uncertainty of -military affairs. It was a campaign replete with interest; a great -lesson from which a great commander profited. Sir Arthur Wellesley -had now experienced the weakness of his friends and the strength -of his enemies, and he felt all the emptiness of public boasting. -Foreseeing that if the contest was to be carried on, it must be in -Portugal, and that unless he himself could support the cause of -the Peninsula, it must fall, his manner of making war changed. His -caution increased tenfold; yet, abating nothing of his boldness, -he met and baffled the best of the French legions in the fulness -of their strength. He was alike unmoved by the intrigues of the -Portuguese regency, and by the undisguised hatred of the Spanish -government; and when some of his own generals, and one of them on -his personal staff, denouncing his rashness and predicting the ruin -of the army, caused the puny energy of the English ministers to -quail as the crisis approached, he, with gigantic vigour, pushed -aside these impediments, and, steadily holding on his own course, -proved himself a sufficient man, whether to uphold or to conquer -kingdoms. - - - - -APPENDIX. - - - - -APPENDIX. - - -No. I. - -SECTION I.--GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, EXTRACTED -FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS, SIGNED BY THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL. - -Commanded by the Emperor Napoleon, in person, 15th Jan. 1809. - - Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Prisoners. Total. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Horses. - 241,010 48,821 24,549 3,521 58,026 826 324,411 52,342 - -King Joseph, commanding--15th Feb. 1809. - - Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Prisoners. Total Effective. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Horses. - 193,416 3,339 36,326 9,523 56,404 1,843 288,219 43,704 - -_Note._--The imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, and several -thousand non-commissioned officers and old soldiers, wanted for the -war in Austria, in all above 40,000 men, were struck off the rolls -since the last returns. - -1st July, 1809. - - Prisoners - Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. and Total Effective. - Stragglers. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Horses. - 24,082 31,537 19,596 4,513 60,785 7,301 288,766 36,050 - Deduct detached men comprised in governments 19,596 4,513 - -------- ------ - Real total 269,170 31,537 - -------- ------ - -15th July, 1809. - - 196,144 31,131 19,122 4,608 58,230 8,089 281,585 35,739 - Deduct detached in governments 19,122 4,608 - -------- ------ - Real total 262,463 31,131 - -------- ------ - -15th August, 1809. - - 187,560 30,319 12,697 3,930 58,588 7,403 266,248 34,880 - Deduct for governments 12,697 3,930 - -------- ------ - Real total 253,551 30,950 - -------- ------ - - -SECTION II.--RETURN OF THE FRENCH ARMY BY CORPS. - - Troops immediately under the king--1st June, 1809. - The king’s guards, about 5000 men, of all arms, - are never borne on the rolls. - First corps, marshal Victor commanding. - Head-quarters, Torremocha. - - Present under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 4 divisions of infantry 41 battalions 21,268 32,819 - 2 ditto cavalry 27 squadrons 5,232 7,344 - Artillery and equipage 40 companies 2,984 3,610 - Number of guns, 48 ------ ------ - Total present under arms 29,484 Grand total 43,773 - ------ ------ - -First Corps--21st June, 1809. Head-quarters, Almaraz. - - Present under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 3 divisions of infantry 33 battalions 18,367 25,633 - 2 ditto cavalry 20 squadrons 4,259 5,762 - Artillery and equipage ” 2,535 2,860 - ------ ------ - Total present under arms 25,161 Grand total 34,255 - ------ ------ - -First Corps--15th July, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Cazalegas. - - 3 divisions of infantry 33 battalions 18,890 26,373 - 2 ditto cavalry 18 squadrons 3,781 5,080 - Artillery and equipage ” 2,586 3,005 - ------ ------ - Total present under arms 25,257 Grand total 34,458 - ------ ------ - -First Corps--1st August, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Maqueda. - - 3 divisions of infantry 33 battalions 15,066 25,068 - 2 ditto cavalry 18 squadrons 4,987 4,983 - Artillery and equipage ” 2,362 2,873 - ------ ------ - Total present under arms 22,415 Grand total 32,924 - ------ ------ - -Fourth Corps, General Sebastiani--10th July, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Alcala. - - Present under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 3 divisions of infantry 27 battalions 17,100 25,960 - 2 ditto cavalry 25 squadrons 3,670 5,859 - Number of artillerymen omitted in - the returns ” ” - 30 guns ------ ------ - Total present under arms 20,770 Grand total 31,819 - ------ ------ - -15th August, 1809. - - 3 divisions of infantry 27 battalions 14,259 25,801 - 2 ditto cavalry 25 squadrons 3,420 5,801 - ------ ------ - Total present under arms 17,679 Grand total 31,602 - ------ ------ - -Division of Reserve, General Dessolles--15th July, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Madrid. - - Present under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 1 division of infantry 10 battalions 7,681 10,254 - Number of guns unknown. - -Kellerman’s division--21st April, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Astorga. - - Men. Horses. Guns. - Total, composed of detachments 8,753 805 8 - -10th June, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Oviedo. - - Under arms. Total. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. - Total, composed of detachments 7,423 2,549 7,681 2,690 - -15th July, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Valladolid. - - 8 squadrons 2,291 2,360 2,469 2,393 - 6 guns - - -SECTION III. - -1st February, 1809. - - Under arms. - Men. - Division Lapisse infantry 12 battalions 7,692 - Brigade Maupetit cavalry 6 squadrons 910 - ------ - Total under general Lapisse at Salamanca 8,602 sabres and bayonets. - Number of guns and artillerymen unknown. - - -SECTION IV.--RETURN OF TROOPS UNDER THE IMMEDIATE COMMAND OF -MARSHAL SOULT. - -Second Corps, Soult--15th July, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Toro. - - Present under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 4 divisions of infantry 47 battalions 16,626 35,188 - 3 ditto cavalry 19 squadrons 2,883 4,540 - Artillery ” 1,081 1,620 - 40 guns ------ ------ - Total present under arms 20,590 Grand total 41,348 - ------ ------ - -Fifth Corps, Mortier. - -Head-quarters, Valladolid. - - 2 divisions of infantry 24 battalions 15,036 19,541 - 1 brigade of cavalry 6 squadrons 896 1,491 - Artillery ” 648 803 - 30 guns ------ ------ - Total present under arms 16,580 Grand total 21,835 - ------ ------ - -Sixth Corps, Ney. - -Head-quarters, Benevente. - - Present under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 2 divisions of infantry 24 battalions 13,700 17,587 - 1 ditto cavalry 10 squadrons 1,446 2,092 - Artillery ” 1,113 1,293 - 37 guns ----- ------ - Total present under arms 16,259 Grand total 20,972 - ------ ------ - -General total under Soult, 15th July, 1809. - - Under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 95 battalions--35 squadrons 53,529 84,155 - 107 guns - - -SECTION V.--TROOPS EMPLOYED IN THE SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA, UNDER MARSHAL -LASNES. - -15th January, 1809. - - Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Total effective. - Men. Men. Men. Men. - Third corps 17,406 5,789 13,668 36,863 - Fifth corps 18,284 ” 4,189 22,473 - ------ ----- ------ ------ - Total 35,690 5,789 17,857 59,336 - ------ ----- ------ ------ - -15th February, 1809. - - Third corps 16,035 5,891 13,259 35,269 - Fifth corps 17,933 1,735 3,859 23,626 - ------ ----- ------ ------ - Total 33,968 7,526 17,118 58,895 - ------ ----- ------ ------ - - -SECTION VI.--RETURN OF THE SEVENTH CORPS, GENERAL ST. CYR. - -15th January, 1809. - - Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Prisoners. Total. - Men. Men. Men. Men. Men. Horses. - 41,386 ” 6,589 543 48,518 5,403 - -15th May, 1809. - - 42,246 2,341 10,243 435 55,265 5,537 - -15th June, 1809. - - 42,146 1,699 10,222 406 54,473 5,365 - - * * * * * - - -No. II. - - -SECTION I.--STATE OF SPAIN. - -_Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, December 17, 1808._ - -“In consequence of the unfavourable news from Spain, yesterday, the -populace, in Badajos, murdered a Spanish colonel, and one or two -more of note.” - - -_Lieutenant Ellis (an officer employed to gain intelligence) to -colonel Kemmis, Loboa, December 27._ - -“The French entered Truxillo, yesterday, at eleven o’clock; and, -from the circumstance of their having reconnoitred the intermediate -villages, might be expected to arrive at Merida in two hours after -we left it.” - - -_Colonel Kemmis to sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 28._ - -“Badajos cannot make resistance in any degree, either to check or -to stop the progress of the enemy. From the statement made to me, -last night, by the governor, they want _arms_, _ammunition_, and -_provisions_.”--“The enemy marched into Truxillo, on the 26th, at -half-past twelve o’clock in the day; but, at two, on the following -morning, a French officer arrived there, and they fell back four -leagues.” - - -_Lieutenant Ellis to colonel Kemmis, December 28._ - -“I proceeded cautiously to Truxillo. The main body of the enemy, -six thousand in number, had retired across the bridge of Almaraz, -and had not taken the road to Madrid, but had proceeded to -Plasencia, leaving behind more than half the requisition for money -which had been imposed on the town of Truxillo.” - - -_Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Seville, January 2, 1809._ - -“The corps of four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, -which had marched from Talavera, and had actually passed the bridge -of Almaraz, has fallen back, and is already near Plasencia, on its -way northward.”--“The extreme attention of Buonaparte being at -this moment directed to the English army, everything which can be -collected is opposed to you alone.” - - -SECTION II. - -_Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, December 27, 1808._ - -“You will receive, together with this, several letters from Doyle, -which describe events in Catalonia _no way differing from what -we have witnessed in other parts of Spain_!”--“The junta have -established themselves here, and, whatever may have been the -expectation which their alarm on the road may have induced Mr. -Frere to form of their future proceedings, _a culpable relapse -into their former apathy_ seems susceptible of no other remedies -but such as will be much stronger than any Spaniard is likely to -adopt.”--“Although Caro promised to write every particular of his -conversation with you to the junta, I have hitherto been unable -to see his letter. I therefore thought it expedient to put the -whole to writing, and, at _the same time, to express my conviction -both of the justice and propriety of your whole conduct during the -late events, when it was impossible, under any circumstances, to -have adopted other determination consistently with the safety of -the army committed to your charge_. Though I doubt if this will -stop the clamour which has been raised on the subject; and, though -events have probably since taken place, which may materially change -the state of affairs, it may be satisfactory to tell you that Mr. -Frere _appears_ to enter into the reasons alleged by you, and to -feel, in their full force, the motives which induced you to act so -cautiously, and to ground no operation on the hope of any effectual -support from the Spaniards.” - - -_Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, Seville, January 2._ - -“The president, Florida Blanca, died two days since, and I was in -hopes that the junta would have availed themselves of this event -to make some change in their government.”--“I see, however, little -but good disposition, and _am still to look for that_ energy in -rewarding service and punishing treachery which can alone mend -matters.” - - -_Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, Seville, January 10._ - -“Reding is at _Tarragona_, expecting to be attacked, and possessing -a force composed chiefly of peasantry, but of which he certainly -cannot command above ten thousand men in a situation to face -his opponents at any given point.”--“Whittingham arrived here -yesterday, last from the duke of Infantados’ head-quarters. He -assures me the duke had already twenty thousand men when he _left -Cuença_.”--“_On the side of Estremadura_, matters are not going on -well: Galluzzo, who allowed the enemy to pass the bridges, is here -prisoner, and his corps is placed under the command of Cuesta. I -cannot say, however, that I see much activity since the change; -parties of the enemy cover the country between Madrid and Almaraz, -while the corps of six thousand men, which had been pushed forward -from Madrid, have, I understand, already passed Plasencia, and -probably are on the other side of the Puerto, for the purpose of -falling on the Salamanca country, and, if possible, cutting off -your communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.” - - -SECTION III. - -_Mr. Frere to Mr. Canning, Seville, May 8._ - -“Besides the advantages which may be looked for from placing -so extensive a command under a person of such tried abilities -as general Blake, it is to be hoped that it will put an end to -the distractions arising from the contracted views of those who -directed the provincial junta, particularly that of Valencia, which -have been so embarrassing to his predecessors.” - - -_Mr. Frere to Mr. Canning, Seville, July 10, 1809._ - -“As the devastations which have been committed have, in many -instances, deprived the peasants of the means of paying what is -due to the proprietors and to the church, a general spirit of -resistance to all claims of this kind has begun to show itself.” - - -_Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808._ - -“I much fear that alarm and despondency has gained ground about -Badajos and that part of Spain, and that there is so little -co-operation in the acts of their several juntas, and such a want -of subordination and common consent among the armed bodies, to -which the defence of the country is entrusted, against such an -united force as that of the French, that extreme confusion prevails -everywhere.” - - -_Colonel Kemmis to sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 30._ - -“He (lieutenant Ellis) has been living with general Cuesta for the -last two days,”--“who has assured him that the Spanish troops, in -Madrid, forced their way through the French army; and he expressed -great sorrow in adding that, though a Spanish force is often -collected, the smallest check disperses them; that in few instances -depôts were provided, and those ill supplied,” &c.--“that, such was -the dispersion and flight of the Spanish armies, between Badajos -and Madrid, there did not remain a single man.” - - -_Colonel Kemmis to lieut.-colonel Reynel, military secretary to sir -John Cradock, Seville, February 7, 1809._ - -“In passing through the Sierra Morena mountains, where Nature has -done much for the defence of this province, it was painful to -observe the pitiful works they were about to throw up. In this -whole direction there is but one body that has anything like the -appearance of a soldier, viz. dismounted cavalry.” - - -_General Mackenzie to sir John Cradock, Cadiz, February 9, 1809._ - -“The Spaniards here seem lulled in the most fatal security. They -are ignorant of the events in the north of Spain, or will not give -credit when they do hear them. Vague reports of the emperor of -Austria’s having declared war, and Buonaparte’s return to France -gains unlimited credit.”--“The equipment of the fleet goes on very -slowly, though there is no want of exertion now on the part of -admiral Purvis or Mr. Stuart; offers of every assistance are daily -made, but they will neither work themselves nor permit our people -to work for them. The preparations of the ships for carrying off -the French prisoners goes on equally ill.” - - -_Duc de Albuquerque to Mr. Frere, Talavera, July 31, 1809._ - -“During our marches we stop to repose, like flocks of sheep, -without taking up any position, so that, if the enemy knew the -condition we were in, they would defeat us wherever they attacked -us. If, in the evening of the 26th, I had not gone out directly -with my division, and succeeded in checking the enemy, the whole -army would have dispersed, and all the artillery and baggage, -which were in the streets of St. Ollalla, would have been lost; -and as a proof of what would have happened, had not the enemy, who -was within musket-shot, been checked, for many had already thrown -away their arms, &c. the commissaries abandoning more than fifteen -hundred rations of bread, the carts occupying and blocking up the -streets of the town; and to this, I repeat, we are daily exposed, -as we march, as if it were on a pilgrimage, without any regard to -distance, order, or method, and with the whole parc of artillery, -which ought always to remain at the distance of two, three, or more -leagues.” - - -_Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Wellesley, Merida, September 1, 1809._ - -“I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings of the -central junta, that, in the distribution of their forces, they do -not consider military defence and military operations so much as -they do political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political -objects.” - - -_Lord Wellesley to Mr. Canning, Seville, September 2, 1809._ - -“While the intelligence received from sir Arthur Wellesley, to -the date of the 24th instant, continued to furnish irresistible -proofs of the failure of every promise or effort made by this -government for the immediate relief of our troops, no satisfaction -was afforded to me respecting any permanent plan for their future -supply.”--“The troops of Portugal, which entered Spain, under -general Beresford, suffered similar distress, and experienced -similar ill-treatment; although the efforts of Portugal, in the -cause of Spain, have been as gratuitous as those of Great Britain; -and although Spain possesses no claim, of any description, to the -aid of a Portuguese army.”--“In this calamity, the people of Spain -cannot fail to acknowledge the natural consequences of their own -weakness, nor to discover the urgent necessity of enforcing a more -steady, pure, and vigorous system, both of council and action. A -relaxed state of domestic government and an indolent reliance on -the activity of foreign assistance have endangered all the high and -virtuous objects for which Spain has armed and bled. It must now -be evident that no alliance can protect her from the inevitable -result of internal disorder and national infirmity. She must amend -and strengthen her government; she must improve the administration -of her resources, and the structure and discipline of her armies, -before she can become capable of deriving benefit from foreign -aid. Spain has proved untrue to our alliance, because she is not -true to herself.”--“Until some great change shall be effected in -the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of -her armies, no British army can safely attempt to co-operate with -the Spanish troops in the territory of Spain.” - - * * * * * - - -No. III. - - -JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK’s CORRESPONDENCE, MSS. - -SECTION I.--STATE OF PORTUGAL. - -_Sir J. Cradock to sir R. Wilson, Oporto, December 8, 1808._ - -“I press this measure” (to move the legion from Oporto to Villa -Real) “upon your adoption, for many reasons, &c. &c.; but the more -especially that it will give an impulse to military preparation -in general, and tend to eradicate _the notion that, since the -evacuation of Portugal by the French, the prospect of a future war -is at an end_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to sir John Moore, December 9, 1808._ - -“I have pressed the adoption of such measures as appeared most -likely _to revive some notion of danger_, and the necessity of -activity and energy.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 14, 1808, Lisbon._ - -“The inaction of the regency was apparent at Oporto to a lamentable -degree; and, though I saw general Bernadim Friere, I could not -gain from him any information as to the state or numbers of the -Portuguese troops, where they were stationed, or who commanded -them. I apprehend, from his conversation, that the general officers -are all of equal authority; and that even seniority had not its -usual effect. He concluded his observations to me with the strong -expression, ‘_That, from the evacuation of Portugal by the French, -the nation had thought all war at an end_.’” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to sir J. Moore, December 28, 1808._ - -“Mr. Villiers and myself have both concurred upon the _absolute -necessity to arouse and animate the Portuguese to some sense of -their situation_.” - - -_Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 30, 1808._ - -“_The apathy of the Portuguese is not to be expressed._ Their -general, Leite, is a most excellent character: a theorist, and, -like his countrymen, _supine_.” - - -_Extract from the Report of lieutenant Brotherton, (an officer -employed to obtain intelligence in the north of Portugal,) February -11, 1809. Head-quarters of Romana’s army._ - -“From the totally defenceless state in which the two northern -provinces are left, it will require at least eight days (I speak -from authority) to prepare any thing like adequate means of -defence.” - - -SECTION II.--LUSITANIAN LEGION. - -_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, November 27, 1808._ - -“Its formation was proposed by the chevalier de Souza.”--“The pay, -allowances, and clothing were settled by the chevalier de Souza. -The former regulated, as I understood, upon the scale _of increased -pay, which the provisional government of Oporto had adopted for all -the troops they were in progress of levying_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808._ - -“I have considerable doubt if ever they” (the legion) “can be -incorporated, with effect and conciliation, with the body of the -Portuguese army.”--“They are viewed with _extreme jealousy by the -regency_; and the _commanding officers of the Portuguese battalion -resisted, universally, the allowing of volunteers from their -regiments to enter into the legion_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, January 19, 1809._ - -“The Lusitanian legion continues to give considerable uneasiness, -from its peculiar state, under present circumstances.” - - -_Captain Morgan (Lusitanian legion) to sir J. Cradock, January 19, -1809._ - -“Should a retreat be adopted, sir Robert would not retire to -Oporto. _It is the government of a mob, of which he has had too -much experience._” - - -SECTION III.--PORTUGUESE ARMY. - -_Sir J. Cradock to sir J. Moore, December 9, 1808._ - -“I am sorry to state that I find, as far as my limited observation -reaches, the Portuguese army, and every other military concern, _in -the worst possible state_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, December 18, 1809._ - -“I am sure that the state of the Portuguese army is quite -misunderstood in England; _and that a reliance is placed upon -it for the defence of the country that is entirely without -foundation_. Their” (Portuguese) “ministers will avow this to you -after ten minutes’ conversation.”--“Even of the reduced numbers -of their men enrolled, (not amounting to twenty thousand, at the -very highest computation,) to make any thing out of them, it is -necessary to recur to first principles, and give them _officers_, -_arms_, _clothing_, _accoutrements_, _horses_, &c.; and I need -not say that money is wanting to effect this: and the ministers -positively declare that they have none; and that no collection of -their forces can take place, much less a movement to the frontier, -without a supply.”--“M. Forjas, secretary to the government, in -answer to a strong question from me, stated that _their army have -not in possession ten thousand firelocks fit for use_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808._ - -“I am exerting myself to bring to account ‘the _supposed_ -Portuguese army.’”--“Your lordship will perceive that _I talk -of the regulars as if it were a regular force_; but I should be -guilty of a deceit, that might lead to bad consequences, if I did -not fairly state that _I conceive them to be of no moment at this -time_.” - - -Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 8, 1809. - -“I am ready to go to the utmost verge of prudence; but _Mr. Frere, -when he talks of Portuguese troops and arrangements, really_ (as I -believe you will allow) _fait bâtir les châteaux_.” - - -_Major-general Cotton to sir J. Cradock, April 7, 1809._ - -“I yesterday inspected the Portuguese cavalry.”--“This cavalry is -unformed, and totally unfit for any sort of service.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, February 12._ - -“It appears that a report has reached your lordship that a -conscription for horses in this country had been attended with -great effect, and that above three thousand had been collected. -It is, indeed, a matter of serious concern that such _serious -misrepresentations_ should be transmitted; for it is a well-known -fact that many of the Portuguese regiments of cavalry _are without -horses_; and, if I am to pursue the subject, their _battalions of -infantry are one-half without arms or clothing_! But the total want -of all means of regulations for subsistence from so deplorable a -view, in the event of co-operation, that the result, in my opinion, -cannot be attended with success. _It is, however, but justice to -say, that the disposition of the Portuguese seems well-inclined and -faithful to the common cause; and that a very efficient soldiery -may be formed under more favourable circumstances._” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, February 27, 1809._ - -“I fear that your excellency is led to entertain a more favourable -notion of the efficacy of the Portuguese army than, in any shape, -it is entitled. In short, my opinion is that they want every thing -that constitutes a respectable force, except about ten thousand -English arms. I believe they have no others. Many of their _cavalry -regiments are without horses, without swords, pistols, &c. Their -battalions are not clothed; and, as to subsistence, they live at -free quarters upon the villages where they are stationed._ To take -the field with effect, or an assurance of food, seems to me out of -the question. Since the first moment of my arrival, I wished to -procure the advance of a small Portuguese force to Alcantara; but -it has been impossible. It is a matter of serious lamentation that -such mis-representations of the Portuguese force should go home, or -reach your excellency.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 3._ - -“No reliance whatever can be placed upon the Portuguese troops -in their present state. _If I said that the whole were ready to -mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak general Beresford’s sentiments. -They will not be commanded by their own officers and they do just -as they please._” - - -SECTION IV.--CONDUCT OF THE REGENCY--TREATMENT OF FRENCH PRISONERS. - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 26, 1809._ - -“I have hitherto directed that these prisoners should be subsisted -at our charge, but I have no authority in this measure; they are -_in a most deplorable state_, and really are _a disgrace to all -concerned_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 5, 1809._ - -“It is absolutely necessary that the regency should give in an -answer about the French prisoners. The whole is an unauthorised -heavy charge, for which I give my warrant; and I see no end to the -case: and, added to this, _their situation is a reflection upon -humanity_.” - - -SECTION V.--NEGLECT, DUPLICITY, AND TIMIDITY. - -_Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 17._ - -“Lalippe, on which the very existence of Elvas depends, has not -been supplied with provisions as I have been taught to expect.” - - -_Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 25._ - -“The great importance of this fort” (Lalippe) “is well known to the -Portuguese; and, therefore, they are jealous, notwithstanding the -miserable condition of their troops, and total incapacity to defend -the fort, if attacked.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, December 26, 1808._ - -“_The promises and apparently satisfactory language of the -Portuguese government_ are, in my opinion, by no means sufficient -to meet the case. _I want to see_ some steps actually taken before -my mind is decided that the nation will defend itself.”--“Indeed, -I am told, on good authority, that _the government are afraid to -allow the people to arm_.”--“The moment I see any materials to -work upon, it will be my most anxious duty to give every effect, -&c.”--“But, under the present _inactivity and indifference_, it is, -&c.” - - -_Reports of colonel Donkin (quarter-master-general) to Sir J. -Cradock, March 21._ - -“I cannot, however, order officers of my department to check this -irregularity” (forcing quarters) “_when it originates solely in the -neglect of the Portuguese civil magistrates_; for troops will not -obey orders, which expose them wantonly to great privations.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, March 25._ - -“I have repeately urged this subject” (quarters of troops) “to the -regency, in the strongest manner, but, as you perceive, without -effect.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 17._ - -“Whatever suits the momentary purpose, upon the most superficial -view, seems to be the guide in the Portuguese councils. Ultimate -objects, which, in the course of things, must arrive, are never -brought into the calculation.” - - -_Cradock to Berkely, January 17._ - -“The regency seem to decline giving any specific directions -relative to the guns in fort St. Julian and the river batteries, -and, _above all, not to write any thing_; but they are very willing -to acquiesce in any thing we shall do, only anxious that, on a -future day, it _shall appear to be our act, not theirs_.” - - -_Admiral Berkely to sir J. Cradock, February 19, 1809._ - -“I imagine Mr. Villiers has transmitted a copy of the extraordinary -note sent him by the regency; in which they complain of the conduct -of the artillery-officer who dismantled the Bugio fort, and -intimate their intention of sending for all the guns and powder -from fort St. Julian; and add many particulars, as novel as they -are suspicious.”--“Whether the language of this note arises from -duplicity, or any other cause, it is equally to be resisted; and, -therefore, stated some facts which may be retorted upon them, and -which will not place their conduct in the _most favourable point of -view towards either their own sovereign or Great Britain_.” - - -_Extract from an official note, drawn up by sir John Cradock, -Lisbon, February 20, 1809._ - -“It was told me, two or three times, by Mr. Villiers, that M. -Forjas, or some other member of the regency, had expressed extreme -solicitude about the forts on the Tagus, &c.”--“I always urged Mr. -Villiers to get from M. Forjas, or any other member, a declaration -of what they wished, that we might exactly conform to it; for -they seemed to be anxious to go beyond what we should venture to -propose. Mr. Villiers, after some time, told me that the Portuguese -government were _unwilling to put down any thing upon paper_, or -give any specific instruction; but they would willingly leave -all the arrangement to us.”--“After the above statement, which I -declare, upon my honour, to be the accurate description of what has -passed, I must express my surprise, and even indignation, at the -protest now made by the regency; and when it is considered that the -Bugio fort is often inaccessible for a week together, this part of -their complaint is shameful to the highest degree. _Their general -object is, however, to be distinguished._” - - -SECTION VI.--ANARCHY IN PORTUGAL. - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, February 20, 1809._ - -“_Northern parts._--It may be difficult to manage any -money-transactions in Oporto, for the populace in that town have -been suffered to become the masters; and it was by an exchange of -public and private property that the commissariat money has been -lately secured.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February, 1809._ - -“To gratify a mob, the other day, at Oporto, a guard of the -sixtieth regiment was given up, and disarmed by baron Eben.” - - -_Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, March 17, 1809, Lamego._ - -“Considering the tumults, and the state of effervescence of the -public mind, and the blind fury of the populace--it will neither be -useful nor safe to remain amongst them.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26, 1809._ - -“The disposition is good, but the proceedings are those of an -ungovernable mob, _exposed to the evil effects of designing -persons_.”--“I confine myself to the north of Portugal and Oporto, -for the same excesses have not taken place at this side the Douro; -but the principles of insubordination, I should fear, would -prevail.”--“If the confusion and anarchy that prevail at Oporto -will permit a defence some exertion may be expected.”--“Ammunition -has been abundantly supplied, _but no quantity would meet the -consumption expended in the manner it has been in the Tras os -Montes_; an attempt to save which was, I believe, the occasion of -Bernadim Friere’s death.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 30, 1809._ - -“The anarchy that prevails at Oporto must, I fear, render every -exertion unavailable for defence; and such is the ungovernable -spirit of the populace, _that it is very difficult to say what part -they might take if the proceedings of the British did not suit -their views_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29._ - -“Oporto and all its concerns, with the bishop, nominally, at its -head, is in the hands of a wild ungovernable populace, _that has -already committed the most cruel excesses_. I fear the same spirit -exists in what is called the Portuguese army.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 29, Lisbon._ - -“Without a British force in Lisbon, the authority of the regency -would pass away, and the scenes of Oporto would take place here.” - - -_Report of captain Lawson, January 30, Lisbon._ - -“Last night, my servant returning from the post-office was -attacked by a party of Portuguese pike-men, headed by one of their -own officers, who severely wounded the horse in two places, and -slightly in several places, and obliged him, the servant, to put -himself under the protection of the guard at the town-major’s -office, to save his own life: the outrage was committed without the -slightest provocation.” - - -_General Langwerth to sir J. Cradock, February 1, Lisbon._ - -“The orderly, with the general orders, on his way to St. Julian’s, -was stopped by a Portuguese sergeant and twenty men with pikes; the -sergeant forced the orderly to deliver the letter containing the -orders, broke it open, read the contents, and returned the enclosed -receipt; the same guard stopped captain Clives, Royal Grenadier -army, and lieutenants Beurman and Liners; these officers were in -full uniform.” - - -_General Sontag’s Official Report, February 3._ - -“Mr. Usher, deputy purveyor, and Mr. M’Carty, interpreter, both -British subjects, arrived this day from Oporto, went to Moore’s -Hotel, where they were arrested and brought to the minister of -police. Mr. Usher was in his British uniform.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, January 30._ - -“Some unpleasant incidents have lately occurred on the part -of the Portuguese armed inhabitants of Lisbon towards British -individuals, but I cannot persuade myself that they have proceeded -from any fixed evil disposition.”--“The British army has not, -in any instance, departed from the most regular discipline, and -continues to manifest the greatest temper and moderation.”--“The -excesses on the part of the Portuguese commence by an _uncontrolled -pursuit, without any authority from the police, after all persons -whom they please to call Frenchmen_, and, in their indiscriminate -career, they _often attack every foreigner, and will not even -abstain from_ those in our service. Those _persons seek refuge in -our guard-room_, and though the guards and patroles have positive -orders not to interfere under any pretext with the police, yet it -is very difficult to smother the feelings of humanity when the -wretched persons are flying from a furious and unauthorised rabble. -_Mr. Villiers has exerted himself much with the Regency to check -this disorder, and prevent the assembly of armed persons in the -streets at night, who beat drums and discharge their pieces at -all hours; but as yet his remonstrances have not had the desired -effect._” - - -_Mr. Villiers to sir J. Cradock, January 30._ - -“Finding the people beat to arms, and paraded about the streets -after dark, _on the very evening after the regency had settled -that these irregularities should be restrained_, I addressed the -ministers of the home department upon the subject; and as other -excesses came to my knowledge, I followed up my complaint.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 30._ - -“I have, this morning, been taking such steps as appear necessary -to secure our general situation from insult; and, at the same -time, if practicable, not to manifest a distrust in the Portuguese -nation, which, if sanctioned from head-quarters, would destroy any -reason for our being here. I can assure you, every officer and -soldier has received impressions that it is most difficult to act -against, but I am determined to persevere in keeping the army from -aggression to the last moment.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February._ - -“When I reflect upon the frequent declarations of individual -members of the regency, that they cannot control the populace; -that there are at least seventy thousand armed inhabitants in -Lisbon; that the regency dare not let them parade (their exercise -has been at an end for some time, and the regency, at this moment, -say they cannot look upon themselves as responsible,) it appears -impossible that I should depart from the reasoning of my own mind, -to meet a sensation of _I do not know whom_, and lessen the proper -military appearance of our only guard. We are now beyond the power -of surprise or insult, and I cannot, as my own individual act, -alter the state of things. However, I never am devoted to my own -way of thinking, and if you recommend the measure (the political -reasoning, when the enemy is at a distance, may always be weighed -against military regulation), or see any good consequences, I will -immediately _order back the guns_ to their former station in the -artillery barracks.” - - -_Marshal Beresford to sir J. Cradock, April 7, Santarem._ - -“I, this morning, met no less than _three expresses_, communicating -to me the _horrible state of mutiny, for I can call it no less, -in which the troops every where are, and the inhabitants are in -equal insubordination, and they encourage each other. I find two -or three regiments have marched away (to what they call to oppose -the enemy)_ where they pleased, in despite of their officers and -generals, who are entirely commanded by them. This you will say is -a pleasing state to be in; however, we must face it, and I hope for -the best result, and I am sanguine enough to look for such. Colonel -Trant will shortly have a pretty strong corps, if the regiments -continue thus to volunteer for him.” - - -_Mr. Villiers to sir J. Cradock, February 15._ - -“I should almost doubt whether the British subjects _could be left -in safety in Lisbon_.” - - -SECTION VII.--FALSE INTELLIGENCE. - -_Sir J. Cradock to colonel Donkin._ - -“I believe it is certain that we cannot depend upon the activity of -the Portuguese government upon this head,” (intelligence,) “either -as to promptitude or security.” - - -_Colonel Donkin to sir J. Cradock, January 1, Lisbon._ - -“Experience has _shewn how utterly impossible it is to get correct -intelligence here_; an enemy may be within four or five days march -of this city before it is known, unless he attacks on the very line -our troops occupy.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29._ - -“It is singular how imperfectly all intelligence, though of such -important events, reaches this, and we have not had, for two days, -any account from Oporto.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26._ - -“Yesterday the chevalier de Castro stated, from authority, a -movement on the part of the French, quite different from a _direct -report_ from the junta of Badajos.” - - * * * * * - - -No. IV. - - -SECTION I.--EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN CRADOCK’S INSTRUCTIONS. - -_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, December 24, 1808._ - -“Upon the actual approach of the enemy towards Lisbon, in such -strength as may render further resistance ineffectual, you will -take care that measures be taken, in due time, for withdrawing -both the British army and _such Portuguese as may be desirous of -accompanying it_.”--“The British admiral will be directed to take -effectual measures, with your assistance, for depriving the enemy -of all the resources, more especially those of a naval description, -which the Tagus contains. Every thing of a naval and military -description, that cannot be brought away, must, in the last -extremity, be destroyed.” - - -_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, November 25, 1808._ - -“I am to signify his majesty’s pleasure that, in the event of any -application being made to you from the regency of Portugal, on the -subject of the occupation of the fortresses with his majesty’s -troops, you do _refer the subject to Mr. Villiers_, who has -received instruction, &c. and you will not make any alteration as -to the mode prescribed for garrisoning the fortresses _without -directions from Mr. Villiers_.” - - -_Lord Castlereagh to general Sherbrooke, January 12, 1809._ - -“Sir J. Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition you -may make _for horses for your guns_, or any other species of supply -the service may require.” - - -_Extracts from certain queries put to lord Castlereagh by sir J. -Cradock, with the answers thereto._ - - QUERY. ANSWER. - - “What may be the situation “The relations with the government - of my command?” of Portugal will be arranged when - Mr. Villiers arrives.” - - “In what light is the force “Ditto.” - under my command to be - considered?” &c. &c. - - “May any Portuguese battalions “The taking of Portuguese battalions - be levied for English pay?” into English pay will, if adopted, - be managed _through Mr. Villiers_.” - - “If any want of provisions “The general measures of supplying - should appear in Portugal, may Portugal with provisions will be - I be allowed to adopt measures, _referred to Mr. Villiers_.” - in conjunction with the regency, - for obtaining a supply?” - - “If any Portuguese corps can “_Mr. Villiers will be authorised_ - be got into such forwardness to enter upon the discussion of this - as to be fit to enter Spain, and subject with the regency, availing - they should be willing to join himself of your assistance,” &c. - sir J. Moore, are they to be put - on British pay?” - - * * * * * - - -No. V. - - -JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK’S PAPERS. - -WANT OF SUPPLIES. - -_Commissary Rawlings, deputy-commissary-general, to Cradock, -December 22._ - -“Your excellency is aware of the exhausted state of this country. -The difficulties encountered by sir J. Moore were of the most -serious nature, even before the sources of supply were so much -drained as they now are.” - - -WANT OF TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES. - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, 17th March._ - -“I have been obliged to send officers of the artillery and -commissariat department to Gibraltar to attempt the supply of -horses from the Barbary coast; and, such is our actual want, -that the proper movement of even the force we have is nearly -impracticable.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26._ - -“The means of transport are so confined that I must not expose -any thing to loss; and the artillery must be preserved with the -greatest care, for I cannot equip more than two brigades of -six-pounders, and one light brigade of three-pounders, the latter -being of a very inferior description.” - - -_Commissary Rawlings to sir John Cradock, March._ - -“The precarious tenure of this country by British troops has -hitherto precluded the possibility of establishing such an -advantageous contract for the public as, in more permanent cases, -might necessarily be expected: we have literally been supplied from -hand to mouth.” - - -_Colonel Robe to sir J. Cradock, March 20_. - -“It is necessary for me to add that every exertion has been -made to supply the artillery with horses and mules by the -deputy-commissary-general, but, from the exhausted state of the -country, and the demands upon it for the Portuguese army, no more -than two brigades have been furnished with those animals, and these -are much too slight for the general service of the artillery.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, March 20._ - -“From the first moment of my arrival in this country, unceasing -exertion has been employed to purchase and procure them” (horses -and mules) “at any price or by any means, but the adequate supply -for even the former small number of the British army could not be -obtained. I have also made repeated representations to England.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29._ - -“I want eight hundred horses and mules for the common conveyance of -provision and the equipment of the artillery.” - - -_Commissary Rawlings to sir J. Cradock, April 9._ - -“Some of the persons employed to provide cattle for the troops have -returned without effecting their mission. This disappointment must -be attributed to the movements of the enemy in the north, from -whence our supply has hitherto been obtained.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to marshal Beresford, Caldas, April 18._ - -“You can form no adequate idea of the difficulty to procure -supplies. The subject of forage for the cavalry keeps me in alarm -without intermission, and there is no certainty for a single -day. The country appears to be without the ability to furnish -straw.”--“In short, the supply is just for the day, and barely -sufficient.”--“I have begged of Mr. Villiers to desire the regency -would send a person, in special authority, to this district to -furnish supplies, if they are to be found. I shall act like the -French, and make requisition, with this difference, that we are -ready to pay for every thing to the utmost.” - - -_Cradock to Berkely, Caldas, April 17._ - -“Such is the dearth of supply in this part of the country, and -even in advance as far as we could go, that, unless victuallers -are sent (or some other arrangement to the same effect) to Peniché -and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot maintain our position. We cannot -advance, for all our means of transport are gone back to Lisbon; -and even in a retreat the cavalry could not be fed.”--“If there -is insurmountable risk in sending the victuallers to Peniché, -I request your declaration to this effect; for I must, in that -case, retire the army to a station close to Lisbon, to fed be from -thence.” - - -_Cradock to Villiers, April 17._ - -“This letter is plainly to state that, unless some victuallers are -sent, even at risk, to Peniché and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot -maintain our position, and must retreat.”--“If the articles are in -the country we must have them, and all ceremony must be dispensed -with. The enemy would have them without paying for them: we must -equally exact and pay.” - - -_Cradock to Beresford, April 20._ - -“All the recommendation you point out upon the assistance to be -derived from the coast have been long since acted upon to the -utmost of my exertions; but the difficulties started by the admiral -and the commissary were so great, that I cannot say I have much -dependence upon immediate aid.” - - -_General Cotton to Cradock, April 21._ - -“I wish I could once see the cavalry together; but I much fear that -before that happens they will be very much out of condition. The -fourteenth have already fallen off very much, owing to the frequent -want of straw and their being supplied with Indian corn, which they -will not eat: added to these circumstances, the commissary obliges -the cavalry to carry (on the horses) three days’ forage.” - - -_G. Harrison to Mr. Rawlings, Treasury-chambers, February 25._ - -“It having been represented to the lords commissioners of his -majesty’s treasury that the troops at Lisbon are experiencing the -greatest hardships from the want of shoes, I have received their -lordships commands,” &c. &c. - - -_Sir J. Cradock to colonel Willoughby Gordon, military secretary, -February 11._ - -“I trust that the importance of the subject will plead my excuse -for thus repeating my representations of the wretched state of the -clothing and the great coats in particular of his majesty’s troops -serving in this country.” - - -_Lord Castlereagh to general Sherbrooke, January 12._ - -“Sir John Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition -you make for horses for your guns, or any other species of supply -the service may, from time to time, require.” - - * * * * * - - -No. VI. - - -SECTION I.--MISCELLANEOUS. - -_Captain Morgan, Lusitanian Legion, to sir J. Cradock, Lisbon, -January 19, 1809._ - -“I left sir R. Wilson very critically situated, occupying a pass -on the Agueda. Sir Robert is wholly unsupported; he has been -advised by colonel Guard to fall back; and, from his information, -he imagines that sir John Moore is withdrawing his troops through -Gallicia. On the other hand, he has received _positive orders from -you_[9] _to defend the frontiers_, and pressing letters to that -effect from the bishop of Oporto.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, 30th January._ - -“The regency and the bishop of Oporto are not pleased at his” (sir -R. Wilson) “quitting the bounds of Portugal.” - - -_Ditto to Ditto, 6th March._ - -“I had a letter from sir R. Wilson, from Ciudad Rodrigo (24th -February), wherein he says, that many French prisoners state their -expectations that the French army will retire behind the Ebro. Sir -Robert’s own persuasion is _that the French will retire altogether -from Spain_.” - - -SECTION II. - -_General Cameron to sir J. Cradock, Lamego, January 16._ - -“I have collected several detachments of recovered men belonging -to sir J. Moore’s army, whom I found scattered in all directions, -without necessaries, and some of them committing every possible -excess that could render the name of a British soldier odious to -the nation.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely, March 16._ - -“There are about one hundred and twenty persons confined on board -the _Rosina_, whose conduct has rendered them a disgrace to the -army.” - - -SECTION III. - -_Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, Oimbra, Head-Quarters of -Romana, February 21._ - -“The marquis of Romana seems to think that the serious _intention -of the enemy is to retreat from Gallicia_ altogether; and even -that he will find much difficulty _in extricating himself_. I must -confess that _I am not so sanguine_; and I judge that the present -retrograde movement from the Minho is more with an intent to -advance from Orense on Montalegre, and in this direction.” - - -_Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, March._ - -“I still believe Romana had intention to fall back on Chaves, and -join himself to the Portuguese army. _His troops had been much -vexed by the unfriendly conduct of the Portuguese_, and a cordial -co-operation was not to be expected; but that he should separate -altogether is what I neither could expect nor conceive. He -suddenly informed me of his resolution to retreat to Bragança. He -had just received a letter from Sylveira, which he also answered -to that effect, and which created no small surprise, as a plan of -operations had already been settled between them.” - - -_Major Victor Arentchild to sir J. Cradock, Oporto, March 16._ - -“General Sylveira has only one regiment with him; and his conduct -has been such, that the people have lost all confidence in him, and -consider him a traitor. I merely mention this to your excellency -as the opinion of the public.... The marquis of Romana’s army is -retreating to Orres, in Gallicia, and is, I fear, in a wretched -condition. The opinion entertained of him is far from good.” - - -_Mr. commissary Boys to Mr. commissary Rawlings, Almeida, January -13._ - -“Sir John Moore, with his army, was retreating, and ten thousand -men had deserted from the marquis of Romana, and were pillaging the -country.” - - -_Lord Castlereagh to marshal Beresford, February 15._ - -“The Portuguese government having solicited that a British general -officer should be appointed to command and organize their army, -his majesty has been graciously pleased to select you for this -important trust.” - - -_Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere, January 23._ - -“No effort appears to have been made by the Spaniards, either to -second the British operations, or even to defend Ferrol, or save -the naval means (whatever they may be) in that harbour.” - - * * * * * - - -No. VII. - - -EXTRACTS FROM MR FRERE’S CORRESPONDENCE. - - (N. B. The Italics are not in the original.) - - -_Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, Seville, March 14._ - -“Our hope of offensive operations in Aragon is so much diminished -by the defeat of general Reding, that I should much doubt whether -any reinforcements, such as we could now send there, would enable -us to attempt them with the prospect of a degree of success, such -as might compensate for the inconvenience liable to arise from -the derangement of calculations which may have been formed at -home.”--“On the other hand, there seems reason to _apprehend_, -that general Soult may at last, in consequence of the resistance -he has experienced, _desist from his unaccountable project, of -entering Portugal and occupying Gallicia_. His return would, of -course, add largely to the disposable and moveable force of the -enemy, while it would not increase ours by any force of that -description.”--“In this view of the subject there are two points -for the employment of a British force; one, _by making a push -to drive the enemy from Salamanca, and the neighbouring towns_, -while the Asturians should make an effort on their side to occupy -Leon and Astorga, thus re-establishing the communications between -the northern and southern provinces. The other, by moving from -the bridge of Alcantara along the northern bank of the Tagus, in -concert with general Cuesta, to attack and _drive the enemy from -Toledo, and consequently from Madrid_. In the latter alternative, -the British could have the advantage of acting in concert with a -disciplined army. They would, likewise, have immediately the start -of any reinforcement from the army of general Soult, supposing him -to abandon Gallicia for the sake of moving southward; and these -movements would not tend in the same degree to draw him from his -present position, in which, for so many reasons, _it is desirable -he should continue_. It would, I should imagine, at the same time, -cover Andalusia, and the points of the greatest interest and -importance in this province, more effectually than the same force -employed in any other manner.” - - -_Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, March 22._ - -“The fortieth remains here: under the present circumstances I could -not think of their removal, unless to meet a British force from -Elvas.” - - -_Mr. Frere to sir A. Wellesley, Seville, May 4._ - - Extracted from Parliamentary Papers, 1810. - -“As it was my object to obtain _a diversion in La Mancha as the -price of co-operation_ on your part, and the impression which they -(the junta) received from colonel Alava’s report was, that your -intention was, after defeating or driving Soult into Gallicia, to -come down upon Estremadura to attack general Victor, I was under -some disadvantage, inasmuch as they imagined, that the point which -I wanted to make a condition was already conceded.” - - * * * * * - - -No. VIII. - - -EXTRACTS RELATIVE TO CADIZ. - -_Sir John Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 16._ - -“The troops from England for Cadiz may or may not arrive, at -least we may expect delay; but I think the subject of sending a -force from this requires immediate deliberation and settlement. I -am prepared to appropriate for this service any number that may -be deemed proper under existing circumstances. It is only upon -the political part of the subject I can have any hesitation, and -whether the Spaniards will receive the force as they ought. The -orders from England are to send it if the supreme junta shall make -the requisition. The question is, whether we shall anticipate the -demand or not?” - - -_Sir John Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 29._ - -“This measure (sending troops to Cadiz) is certainly one of -considerable responsibility to those concerned; but upon its -adoption, Mr. Villiers, Admiral Berkely, and myself, could not -well hesitate, after the despatches that were communicated to us, -as addressed to you, as well as those directed to ourselves, which -placed Cadiz in so prominent a point of view, upon the unfavourable -termination of the campaign in the north of Spain.”--“The force in -Portugal is weakened to a degree, especially in British regiments, -that reduces it to almost nothing; but I may look to the arrival -of the force of five thousand men, announced to be on their way; -and if it is intended to maintain Portugal, it will be but fair to -replace the present detachment from them.” - - -_Sir John Cradock to general Mackenzie, March 9._ - -“I yesterday received orders from his majesty’s government to -press, in the most expeditious manner, the immediate return of the -forces under your command to the Tagus.” - - -_Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 9._ - -“Your lordship will find, by the present communication, that -major-general Mackenzie, at the express desire and advice of -Mr. Frere, has actually left Cadiz with his whole force, (the -fortieth regiment, from Seville, will be united,) and proceeded -to Tarragona, unless your lordship’s orders may have overtaken -major-general Sherbrooke, who passed this port four days ago -(without any communication). It may be presumed that he will follow -the same course, upon the same motives that influenced general -Mackenzie; and at present a new scene of operations is entered upon -in that part of Spain.” - - * * * * * - - -No. IX. - - -NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF MAJOR-GENERAL MACKENZIE’S -DETACHMENT FROM LISBON TO CADIZ. - -“The detachment sailed from Lisbon on the 2d February, 1809, and -arrived in Cadiz harbour on the 5th, at night. I immediately -waited on rear-admiral Purvis, and from him I learnt there are -some difficulties started by the marquis Villel (the commissioner -from the central junta, as well as a member of it) to our landing -and occupying Cadiz. I then waited on sir George Smith, on shore, -where this intelligence was, in some degree, confirmed; but sir -George still expressed an expectation that the objections would be -got over. These objections had been, it seems, but lately started. -Next morning I saw Mr. Charles Stuart, who was acting under a -diplomatic authority from Mr. Frere, and had a conference with -him and sir G. Smith, when I explained the nature of my orders, -and it was determined to wait on the marquis Villel. Mr. Stuart -explained to the marquis that the object of my coming was to offer -our assistance in the occupation and defence of Cadiz, and in -making the necessary preparations for such an event; that we were -only the advance of a larger corps coming from England, to act -from this side against the common enemy. The marquis hesitated, -and, after some speeches of compliment, said his authority did not -extend so far; that he must wait for instructions from the central -government; and, in the mean time, said he could permit our landing -at Port St. Mary’s. This I declined, as an unnecessary loss of -time, and contrary to my orders; and it was then agreed to wait for -the decision of the central junta from Seville. I thereupon wrote -to Mr. Frere, and sent him a copy of my instructions from sir J. -Cradock. - -The decision of the junta was received on the 8th; and I received -a letter from Mr. Frere, which put an end, for the moment, to our -hope of occupying Cadiz. The reason assigned by the junta was of -the most flimsy nature, viz. “That they had ordered two of their -own battalions to occupy Cadiz;” a measure which was evidently the -thought of the moment, and a mere pretext. - -Although I cannot presume to judge of the evil political -consequences which might arise from such a measure, as alluded -to in Mr. Frere’s, yet I had every reason to believe, as well -from the opinion of sir G. Smith, as of all others conversant -in the sentiments of the people of Cadiz, that our landing and -occupying the place would be a very popular measure. Mr. Frere’s -letter expressed a great desire that we should not appear to have -made an offer that was refused; and was desirous that we should -not immediately depart, but that we should land and occupy the -cantonments offered to us. On consulting with sir G. Smith and Mr. -Stuart, this appeared to be contrary to the grounds on which we had -set out; but as we were equally desirous not to appear at variance -with the Spanish government, we agreed to submit to Mr. Frere, -whether it would not be better for the troops to remain for the -present in their transports, as we had already stated that we were -in expectation of being immediately joined by a force from England, -the scene of whose operations was uncertain; and our remaining in -the harbour under this idea would answer every purpose Mr. Frere -proposed by a landing. - -I had, besides, some military objections to a landing; for, without -reckoning the uncertainty of an embarkation from Port St. Mary’s, -I knew how dilatory all proceedings are in Spain. That if we were -once placed in the scattered cantonments proposed, and we had a -sudden call for embarkation, above a week would have been lost in -effecting it; and from former experience, the effects of a certain -disorder would, probably, have thrown a large number of our men -into the hospitals. It is further evident that the detachment -could not have been re-embarked without some stain on the national -honour. It must have very soon marched into the interior of Spain, -and thus have involved our country in its support, without having -obtained the object for which it was detached,--the possession of -Cadiz. On all these considerations I thought it right to defer -landing, until we should hear further from Mr. Frere, to whom both -Mr. Stuart and myself wrote, and I presume he was satisfied with -the reasons given. In all these proceedings I had the cordial -approbation of sir G. Smith, who, notwithstanding unfavourable -appearances, seemed sanguine to the last that the point would -be carried. I therefore wrote to sir J. Cradock, by the Hope -brig, on the 9th, stating what had been done, and that we should -remain in Cadiz harbour (with Mr. Frere’s approbation) until we -received orders from him or from England. And I wrote, by the same -conveyance, to the same purport, to Lord Castlereagh. - -On the 15th, we had the misfortune to lose sir G. Smith, who died -that morning; and on the 18th, I received a letter from Mr. Frere, -in which he seemed to have altered his opinion as to the propriety -of our occupying Cadiz, and stating that the only mode which -appeared to him likely to succeed in obtaining the possession was -my leaving a small part of my detachment there, and proceeding with -the rest to join Cuesta’s army; that, as a force was expected from -England for the same purpose for which my detachment came, what I -left behind might follow me on their arrival. - -I confess I was much disappointed at this proposal, the whole of -my detachment not appearing more than equal to the charge of the -place; but as it had not been laid before the junta, I considered -it my duty to state the objections to it, as they arose out of -my instructions. Such a measure would have completely committed -our country, in a particular point, in the interior, with a very -small detachment, a thing which I was instructed his majesty’s -ministers wished to avoid; whilst the admittance of a handful of -men could not be considered as any possession of the place, where -there were about four thousand volunteers well drilled. I therefore -submitted to Mr. Frere, to defer the proposition of this measure -until the arrival of troops from England, which might be looked -for, according to his statement, every hour. We should be, then, in -a condition to take possession of Cadiz effectually, and advance, -in some point, respectably, towards the enemy. If, however, Mr. -Frere should determine to bring forward the measure immediately, -I further informed him, that I was ready to move on, as soon as we -could obtain the necessary equipments. - -Mr. Stuart embarked on the 21st, on board the Ambuscade, on a -secret mission. On the 22d, and before I received any further -communication from Mr. Frere, a popular commotion broke out -suddenly at Cadiz, in consequence of the measure which the junta -had adopted, of marching some of their own troops into the town, -as the reason (or rather pretext) for declining to receive us. The -regiment now on its march in, was composed of Poles, Swiss, and -other foreigners, deserters from the French army, whose entrance -the people were determined to resist. The utmost care was taken to -prevent our officers or soldiers from taking any part whatever on -this occasion; and, except in some cases where I was applied to -by the governor, for the interference of some British officers as -mediators, we steered perfectly clear. It was now evident that the -people were favourable to our landing and occupying the town, for -it was frequently called for during the tumult. - -As soon as I could safely send an account of this commotion to -Mr. Frere, I despatched an officer (captain Kelly, assistant -quarter-master-general) with a detail. The Fisguard sailed on the -24th, for Lisbon and England, by which ship I informed sir J. -Cradock, as well as lord Castlereagh, of all that had passed since -my last; and just at that time colonel Roche arrived from Seville. -He was sent down, by Mr. Frere, to Cadiz, in consequence of Mr. -Stuart’s mission. I had till now expected Mr. Frere’s decision, -on the subject of the proposition in his letter of the 18th; but -as so much time had elapsed, I conjectured he might have dropped -it for the present; and conceiving that something favourable to -the object of my mission might be drawn from the present state -of things, I had a full conversation with colonel Roche on the -subject. He told me the junta were dissatisfied with our not having -accepted the cantonments offered to us; but he did not seem to -think our views unattainable, particularly at the present moment. -I asked his opinion as to the practicability of general Stuart’s -being admitted, with two of my three battalions, into Cadiz, if I -advanced with the third to Seville to join the fortieth regiment, -thus making an equal division of my force. Colonel Roche was of -opinion that this would be acceded to; and I, therefore, despatched -him, as soon as possible, with a proposal to this effect to Mr. -Frere. Though two battalions could not be considered a sufficient -garrison, yet, from the evident popularity of our troops, and -the speedy expectation of a reinforcement from England, I thought -it would be extremely proper to make the trial. It also appeared -to me that by advancing to Seville I should not run much risk of -involving those two battalions in any operations before the arrival -of general Sherbrooke, which could embarrass him in the execution -of the orders he might bring from home. - -This proposition certainly exceeded any thing authorised by my -instructions, but, I trust, the circumstances will be found to -warrant it. - -After colonel Roche’s departure for Seville, captain Kelly returned -from thence, on the 26th, with a verbal confidential message from -Mr. Frere, stating that marshal Soult was marching from Gallicia -into Portugal, in three columns, and that Mr. Frere would write -to me by express, or by next post. On the 27th, I received this -promised letter, enclosing the copy of an intercepted letter from -Soult to Joseph Buonaparte; and Mr. Frere expresses his opinion -that my detachment may now be more useful in Portugal than at Cadiz. - -Knowing, as I did before I left Lisbon, that every proper step was -taking for evacuating Portugal, in case of necessity, and that -nothing else than succours from home could enable sir John Cradock -to hold his ground there, it became more than ever necessary to -ascertain whether his army will be received into Cadiz, in case -of the evacuation of Portugal. In case the present negotiation -succeeded, I had arranged with admiral Purvis to send a frigate -with the intelligence to Lisbon immediately. If it failed, every -thing was in readiness to sail with the detachment thither; for, -although the assistance I should bring might not be sufficient of -itself to make any alteration in the resolutions already taken, -yet, if reinforcements arrived from England, we should be a welcome -addition. - -On the morning of the 2d of March I received a letter from colonel -Roche, dated February 28, stating that my proposition had not yet -been decided on, but that it would be taken into consideration -that day. He expressed much apprehension of a party in the French -interest. - -The morning of the 3d having passed without any letter from Mr. -Frere or colonel Roche, as I had been assured by the latter -I should receive, at furthest by the post of that morning, I -despatched another courier, dreading some accident. In the -afternoon, however, I received a long and important letter from -Mr. Frere, from which I concluded the negotiation had failed -(although he did not say so in terms); and a letter I received -shortly afterwards from colonel Roche confirmed this failure. -Mr. Frere’s letter entered very minutely into the state of the -Spanish and French armies; mentioned the failure of Soult’s attempt -to penetrate into Portugal by the Minho, and the improbability -of his persisting in it, from the position of the Spanish army, -assisted by the Portuguese. He then points out, in strong terms, -the essential use my detachment could be of at Tarragona, in giving -spirit and vigour to the cause in that country, where it is most in -need of support. - -As the return of my detachment to Portugal, except in the case -of resisting the enemy, would not have a favourable appearance; -and the proceeding to Tarragona would so evidently shew our -determination to support the general cause, and leave the Spanish -government without an excuse afterwards for refusing to admit our -troops into Cadiz, it was my intention to have complied with Mr. -Frere’s solicitations, as the employment of my detachment on the -sea-coast would easily admit of its being afterwards withdrawn, -without committing any other British force for its support; and the -motives urged by Mr. Frere were so strong, that I scarcely thought -myself vindicable in hesitating to comply. - -I accordingly wrote on the night of the 3d March to this effect -to Mr. Frere, sir J. Cradock, and lord Castlereagh. But on the -4th, in the evening, captain Cooke, of the Coldstream guards, -arrived from England with despatches for general Sherbrooke, who -had not yet arrived. Captain Cooke came in the Eclair brig of war, -and had stopped at Lisbon, which he left again on the evening of -the 2d, and brought me a message to the following purport from -sir J. Cradock, viz. ‘That he was determined to defend Portugal -to the utmost of his power; that in this situation he considered -my detachment as the choice part of his little army; that the -enemy were actually on the borders, though there was not yet any -intelligence of their having entered Portugal; and that unless -some extraordinary circumstance, of which he could form no idea, -prevented it, he should look for my immediate return to Lisbon.’ - -This order, of course, put an end to all further deliberation. The -idea of proceeding to Tarragona was abandoned. I wrote to this -effect to Mr. Frere, and embarked at midnight on the 4th. Contrary -winds detained in Cadiz harbour the whole of the 5th, but on the -6th the fleet sailed, and arrived in the Tagus on the 12th. - -I trust, in the whole of these proceedings, in a very intricate -and delicate situation, an honest and anxious desire has been -evinced on my part, to accomplish the object of my mission; the -failure of which, I am persuaded, will be found to arise from the -apprehensions and disunion of the central junta, and not from the -inclinations of the people of Cadiz. - - (Signed) J. R. MACKENZIE, - _Major-general._ - _Lisbon, March 13, 1809._” - - * * * * * - - -No. X. - - -COMMUNICATIONS WITH MINISTERS--NEGLECT OF PORTUGAL. - -SECTION I. - -_Mr. Canning to Mr. Villiers, January 24, 1809._ - -“You are aware, by my despatch, No. 4, of the 24th of December, -enclosing copies, &c. &c. _that, in the event of the evacuation of -Portugal, by the force under sir J. Cradock’s command, an event -rendered the more probable by the transactions in Gallicia_.” - - -_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, February 6._ - -“_Should you be compelled to evacuate Portugal_,” _&c._ - - -_Admiral Berkely to sir J. Cradock, February 6._ - -“The period of the British army’s stay in this place _appearing to -draw near to its conclusion_.” - - -SECTION II. - -_Sir J. Cradock to colonel Guard, January 3._ - -“The garrisons of Elvas and Almeida have engaged my most serious -thoughts.”--“But, as they were occupied by the command of his -majesty’s ministers, and _we remain without any fresh instructions -under the present critical circumstances_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to general Richard Stewart, January 10._ - -“I feel what a risk I run in thus leaving Lisbon defenceless, but -_I obey the original orders of government_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to general Richard Stewart, January 12._ - -“_We are still without any instructions whatever from England._” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to captain Halket, January 13._ - -“Though we cannot say _when_ it may take place, and it shall be -deferred to the last moment, _in hopes of hearing from England_, -yet I believe it to be our duty to prepare every thing for the -event of an embarkation.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely, January 17._ - -“I lament to say that there appears nothing before us but the -resolution _to remain in Portugal to the last proper moment, -awaiting orders from England_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 19._ - -“With our force inferior and ill-composed, as it is, _we are -determined to remain to the last proper moment, in the hopes of -receiving orders from England_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely_, _February 9_. - -“The orders we daily expect may be either for _immediate -embarkation, or to maintain Portugal_.”--“I am pursuaded we have -but this one wish, which is to act for the credit of our country, -and endeavour, under the _want of all information, to discover what -may be the object of the government we serve_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to general Mackenzie, February 26._ - -“Since the 14th of January _we are without instructions from -England_.” - - -SECTION III. - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 15._ - -“What appears to be my duty is to keep the fixed idea that the -_army in Portugal should remain to the last moment_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 15._ - -“I am just favoured with your communication about the dangerous -effects likely to be produced by the measure of withdrawing the -troops from Lisbon to occupy the military position of Oyeras, -Passo d’Arcos, &c. I fear (though the contrary was intended to be -expressly stated) that you are led into the idea that the position -in question was solely intended for embarkation. My avowed design -was to await (in a military post suited to our force) orders -from England, or to defend ourselves with reasonable prospect of -success against any attempt from the enemy, or even from thence -to make a forward movement, should future events lead to such -a proceeding.”--“What I must object to is to take up a false -position, say Alcantara, or other heights about the town, which -would only defend a certain position and leave the remainder to -the power of the enemy, one which we must leave upon his approach -and seek another bearing the appearance of flight and yet not -securing our retreat. The whole having announced the intention to -defend Lisbon, but giving up that idea upon the appearance of the -enemy: for positions liable to be turned on every side cannot be -persevered in by an inferior force.”--“My political reasoning upon -this subject was contained in the letter I wrote the admiral, and, -I must repeat, it continues unweakened,” &c.--“After your strong -representations of this morning, I shall certainly not persevere; -and, as there is no instant necessity for the measure, will await -the progress of events.” - - * * * * * - - -No. XI. - - -STATE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORCE UNDER SIR J. CRADDOCK, JANUARY -6, 1809, EXTRACTED FROM THE HEAD-QUARTER STATES. - -Disposable for the Field. - - Garrisons. Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. - Men. Men. Men. - Santarem 68 190 2,492 General Richard Stewart. - Saccavem 97 169 1,450 General M’Kenzie. - Lisbon .. 519 .... General Cotton. - .. .. 236 attached to different - --- --- ----- battalions. - 165 879 4,178 - --- --- ----- - Total 5,222 - - Garrisons. Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. - Men. Men. Men. - Almeida 38 .. 1,440 - Elvas 33 .. 679 - Oporto .. .. 379 - Lisbon and Forts 315 .. 2,682 - --- -- ----- - Total 486 .. 5,170 - ----- - General total 10,392 - ------ - - Note.--Every man capable of bearing arms is included in this - state. - - -ORDER OF BATTLE, APRIL 6, 1809, CALDAS. - -Sir J. Cradock, commander-in-chief. - -Major-general Sherbrooke, second in command. - - Artillery.--Major-general Howarth. Cavalry.--Major-general Cotton. - - Under arms. - Men. - First line, five brigades 10,418 - Second line, three brigades 3,810 - Reserve, one brigade 1,858 - Cavalry 800 - ------ - Total 16,886 - ------ - - -STATE OF THE ARMY UNDER SIR A. WELLESLEY, APRIL 22. - -Head-quarters, Leyria. - - Under arms. Sick. Command. Effective. - Men. Men. Men. Men. - Artillery 441 88 408 937 - Cavalry 1,439 13 418 1,870 - Infantry 16,539 1,937 314 18,790 - ------ ----- ----- ------ - Total 18,419 2,038 1,140 21,597 - ------ ----- ----- ------ - - 6lb. 3lb. Howitzers. - Number of guns 20 6 4 - - Total 30 - - -STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, MAY 1, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Coimbra. - - Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file. - Men. Men. Men. Men. Men. - 1,413 3,074 19,510 230 24,227 - Deduct { Hospital 2,357 - { Absent 1,217 - ------ - Total present under arms 20,653 - ------ - - -STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, JUNE 25, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Abrantes. - - Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file. - Men. Men. Men. Men. Men. - 1,586 3,736 21,267 406 26,995 - Deduct { Hospital 3,246 - { Commands 1,396 - 30 Pieces of artillery. ------ - Total present under arms 22,353 - ------ - - -STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, JULY 25, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Talavera. - - Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file. - Men. Men. Men. Men. Men. - 1,584 3,734 29,694 398 35,410 - Deduct { Hospital 4,827 - { Commands 1,596 - ------ - Total present under arms 28,987 - Deduct regiments on march 9,141 - 30 Pieces of artillery. ------ - Real present under arms 19,846 - ------ - - -STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Badajos. - - Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file. - Men. Men. Men. Men. Men. - 1,947 4,273 28,409 389 35,018 - - In Hospital 8,827 } - Command and missing 2,526 } Total absent 11,353 - ------ - Total present under arms 23,765 - ------ - - * * * * * - - -No. XII. - - -SECTION I. - -MARSHAL BERESFORD TO SIR J. CRADOCK. - - _March 29, 1809._ - - SIR, - -I have the honour to annex your excellency a copy of requisitions, -from their excellencies the government of this kingdom, for the -speedy succouring of Oporto, which your excellency is informed is -so immediately in danger, from the approach of the French army, -whose advance posts are now within four leagues of that town. - -I annex, for the information of your excellency, the instructions -which, under the existing circumstances, I had issued to the -general, commanding beyond the Douro; but the object of which has -been frustrated by events, at once unfortunate and melancholy. - -The corps of brigadier-general Victoria, consisting of two -battalions of the line, which, on the appearance of the urgent -danger in the north, I had directed to cross the Douro, are now -in Oporto, as is the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, -part of the regiment of Valença, and some regiments of militia; -but I cannot get any return of the troops there, though, I -understand, the number is considerable; and to this must be added -a considerable number of ordenanza from without, and the armed -population which will, I understand, amount to eight or ten -thousand men, and of the arms come from England, three thousand -stand that were sent to the army north of the Douro, are probably -now in Oporto, with a proportion of ammunition. I have thought -it right to give this statement of the actual state of things at -Oporto, as far as I can get information of, that your excellency -may be aware of it; and it is with regret that I farther add -that there prevails, in the town, the greatest anarchy and -insubordination,--and that, in short, by the latest accounts, the -populace entirely govern the law, civil and military. - -Upon the subject of marching a British force to Oporto under -the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the -various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we -had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary -for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me -to submit to your excellency’s consideration the propriety of -advancing the British force to Leyria, to be then pushed on to -Oporto, or otherwise, as the information from different parts -may render expedient. But my principal reason was that, as there -appeared an intention of co-operation (of which, however, there is -no certainty) between the marshals Victor and Soult, it would be -most desirable, by either driving back or overcoming one before the -other could give his co-operating aid to defeat their plan, and if -we should, or not, be able. To do this would be merely a matter -of calculation of time, as, supposing, on our arrival at Leyria, -Oporto offered a prospect of holding out till we could reach it, -and that Victor continued his southern pursuit of Cuesta, he would -get so distant from us, as to permit the army, pushing from Leyria -to Oporto, without apprehension from the army of Victor, who, by -the time he could possibly hear of our movement, would be in the -Sierra Morena, which would clearly show that his principle object, -and from which he did not seem willing to be diverted, was either -the destruction of Cuesta’s army, to enter more securely into -Portugal, or to push to Seville; but, at all events, he would be -too distant to give us apprehensions of any surprise upon this -capital, as we have daily information of his movements, and which -would enable us, wherever we were in Portugal, even to reach it -before him. If, however, the final co-operation of these two -armies is intended for the conquest of this kingdom, and that -Soult does not think that of his army from Gallicia and that from -Salamanca sufficient, then he will satisfy himself, until Victor -is ready to act with him, in the possession of the country beyond -the Douro, where he will refresh and rest his troops, re-equip -them, and otherwise provide them, to be ready for the projected -co-operation,--whilst the army from Salamanca will, probably, -satisfy itself with the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and -act and wait in conjunction with Soult, both waiting till Victor -has settled his present objects, and then all co-operating. - -It is for your excellency to judge, under the actual circumstances, -of the propriety of this movement towards Oporto, not only for -the British troops, but, also, of those of the allies, as, by my -instructions, I must consider you as commanding the allied armies; -and the time is now certainly arrived, for what efforts they can -make being combined: undoubtedly, their being employed in separate -projects will cause each falling separately, and without advantage -to the common cause. - -I would, however, certainly, under present circumstances, be -unwilling to send the few troops I could spare from the army, -between the Tagus and the Mondego, to Oporto, as, unsupported by -British, I fear it would be losing so many men, that on a future -occasion, with such support, may weigh in the scale; and indeed, -the very insubordinate state of the troops, of which I have just -received a second report and complaint, from general Miranda, would -render it highly unwise to send them to a town in the state that -Oporto now is, where the best disposed troops, except a great body -went there, if they were not debauched to insubordination, would be -borne down by the multitude; and it is to be feared that whatever -Portuguese troops enter the town will fall with it, as the temper -of the people prevents the possibility of even any preparations for -retreat, in case of misfortune, to the outward and very extended -lines of defence. Having stated so much, I must leave the question -to your excellency, &c. - - I have the honour, &c. - - W. C. BERESFORD. - - -SIR J. CRADOCK TO MARSHAL BERESFORD. - - _Lisbon, March 29, 1809._ - - DEAR SIR, - -I have the honour to acknowledge, at the earliest moment, your -excellency’s letter of this evening, conveying a copy of the -request from the regency, &c. that I should move the British troops -to the succour of Oporto, at this moment menaced, &c. - -Upon a subject of such importance, I experience considerable -relief, that the general view of approaching circumstances has -been, for a length of time, within my reflection, and that all -my reasoning (whatever it may be) has been transmitted to the -government in England, and the part I am now called upon to act -is simply but the execution of those measures I have long thought -it prudent to pursue, and which the present critical and involved -state of affairs seem to confirm and give no reason to alter in any -part. - -It has always appeared, to my judgement, that the enemy has but -two objects to attain in this kingdom. The possession of Lisbon -and Oporto, I believe it to be universally admitted, and I need -not point out to your discrimination the infinitely superior -value of the former above the latter. There are such positive -local disadvantages attached to Oporto, independent of its remote -position, that no military disposition, in which a small English -army is to bear part, can apply. It pains me, therefore, to decline -obedience to an application from so high an authority as the -governors of the kingdom. It may be their duty to make the request, -though I much doubt if their judgement goes along with it; but it -appears to be mine not to transfer the small British force, under -my command, (totally inadequate to separate objects,) from the -defence of this part of the kingdom to the very doubtful succour of -a place two hundred miles distant, and by a movement to the north -with this professed view, feel myself engaged in a war that leaves -Lisbon and the Tagus defenceless and unprotected from the inroads -of other bodies of the enemy that may be prepared to combine in a -general invasion. - -I shall hasten, therefore, from all general observation, to the -exact case before us, and state, in a concise manner, our actual -situation, leaving to your judgement, how far it may be necessary -to communicate some particulars that relate to the British army, -and lay before the governors and your excellency the best ideas -I can form for the employment of the British auxiliary force, in -conjunction with the Portuguese, for the ultimate protection of -Portugal under the pressure of all existing circumstances. - -It may be granted that the enemy, with a force from seventeen -to twenty thousand, a considerable portion of which (it is said -five thousand) is cavalry, is directly menacing Oporto, there is -reason to believe that the division at Salamanca, estimated from -nine to twelve thousand, with a powerful force of artillery, is -moving to Ciudad Rodrigo, either for the investment of that place, -or to act in conjunction with general Soult, by an advance into -the Upper Beira. In the present view it is necessary to state, -with the weight it so well deserves, that the united forces of -generals Victor and Sebastiani are, apparently, pursuing general -Cuesta, just retiring before them; but it appears that a part -of the enemies had diverged to Merida, and had spread alarm and -dismay, even to the town of Badajos, on the frontiers of Portugal, -from whence, to the heights of Almeida, or the opposite of Lisbon, -through the whole of the Alemtejo: except the weak garrison of -Elvas, there is nothing to interrupt the immediate passage. - -Against such an attempt from the enemy I derive no security from -the contiguity of general Cuesta’s army; for, besides the general -disinclination he has so strongly marked to the British character, -he has other objects to pursue, and his principal wish is to gain -time for the organization of his own force. To a person so well -acquainted with Portugal, and the circumstances of the present -hour, as your excellency is, it is quite superfluous to enter upon -further details, &c. It is only required to lay before you, in -confidence, the exact amount of the British forces, as the real -point upon which the whole subject depends: I may state it at -twelve thousand effective men, to take the field, if the necessary -garrison to maintain Lisbon in some tranquillity, and retain -possession of the maritime forts is left. It may be increased to -fourteen thousand, if these points are risked; but even to gain -the advantage of numbers to so limited a force, I cannot recommend -the measure, for the anarchy that prevails at Oporto, and would -be, perhaps, worse at Lisbon, is more to be dreaded than the -presence of an enemy, and may render all exertion useless. The -necessary means of transport for our army, notwithstanding every -effort, from the earliest moment, are quite inadequate, and not -more than two and a half brigades of artillery (fifteen guns) can -be equipped. To adventure upon an advance to Oporto, two hundred -miles from Lisbon, when the very object is, perhaps, at this -moment lost, seems to be a point only to gratify the good feelings -of every soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the -understanding, and the ultimate view of things. If the British -army sets out with the declared object to succour Oporto, or expel -the enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same; nothing -but the accomplishment will suit the English character; and I -confess that the best reasoning of my judgement, upon every public -and private principle, for the credit of the British army, and the -hope of any effectual assistance from the Portuguese nation is, -that the British troops should never make one retrograde step: -from that moment I will date the extinction of all Portuguese aid, -military as well as civil. The British army, from its description, -may disregard this common occurrence in war, but I am persuaded, in -the present state of the Portuguese army, and with the sentiments -of suspicion now alive, all explanation would be vain, and that it -would be left to the small body of English, alone, to sustain the -whole future conflict. - -I have now only to state what my inferior judgement points out; -and as the arduous situation of command is allotted to me, I must -try to execute to the best of my power. I shall remain faithful -to my first principles, and persevere in the defence of Lisbon -and the Tagus. I invite the co-operation of the Portuguese force, -and, under your guidance and auspicious control, I look to a very -powerful accession of strength. I am convinced nothing will be -done by them in detached parties or in any isolated situation. -They will acquire confidence by number, and emulation will arise, -a rapid discipline will ensue from their connection with us, and -the whole, animated by your presence, will give the best promise of -success. Until we have consulted again I shall not say whether our -general position should be at Lumiar, extending the whole right to -Saccavem, or any other station more in advance. At this moment I -have only to express the indispensable circumstance of some fixed -basis, upon which the allied army will act, and by our united -strength try to counteract the peculiar disadvantages that attends -the defence of Portugal from positions that cannot be properly -embraced, and always leave some part exposed. - -Allow me to conclude, with the solemn expression of my own -conviction, that nothing will give so much chance of a prosperous -result to the arduous scene in which we are engaged (either as -to reality or view) as the knowledge to the enemy, that, before -he conquers Portugal, he must defeat an army of some magnitude, -determined to fight him, and awaiting his approach, unbroken and -not exposed to the danger of a false movement. Such a conquest -cannot be an easy one, and must prove, if he pursue it, a powerful -diversion in favour of Spain. - -It will gain me the sincerest pleasure, &c. - - JOHN CRADOCK. - - * * * * * - - -No. XIII. - - -JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF MARSHAL SOULT. - -_Captain Brotherton to colonel Donkin, (quarter-master-general,) -Lamego, March 17, 1809._ - -“The enemy has, however, on this occasion, practised those arts -which Frenchmen are so expert in--circulating proclamations and -insidiously abandoning, for a moment, their usual system of terror, -plunder, and desolation, _treating the inhabitants with feigned -moderation and kindness_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 20, 1809, Caldas._ - -“It also appears to be the object of the enemy to ingratiate -himself with the populace of Oporto, _by even feeding them_ and -granting other indulgences.”--“It is also said that a Portuguese -legion, to consist of _six thousand_ men, has been instituted.” - - -_Extract from Soult’s Official Report of the expedition to -Portugal._ - -“Dans, quinze jours. Les villes de _Braga_, _Oporto_, _Bacellos_, -_Viana_, _Villa de Conde_, _Povoa de Barcim_, _Feira_, et -_Ovar_, eurent exprimé leurs vœux, des nombreuses deputations -se rendirent à Oporto pour les remettre au marechal Soult et -le prier de le faire parvenir à l’empereur. Des adresses qui -renfermaient l’expression de ce vœu étaient couverts de plus de -trente mille signatures du clergé, de la noblesse, des négocians, -et du peuple.”--“Pendant son séjour à Oporto. Le M. Soult fit des -proclamations et rendit divers arrêtés sur l’administration et la -police de la province _Entre Minho e Douro_. Il nomma au nom de -l’empereur aux emplois qui étaient vacans et apres avoir reçu la -manifestation politique des habitants il organiza la garde national -ainsi qu’une légion de cinq bataillons.”--“_Aucume contribution ne -fût frappé_ les fonds trouvés dans les caisses royales suffirent -pour fournir aux besoins des troupes, _et même pour donner de -secours aux Portugais_.” - - -_Intercepted letter of the duke of Dalmatia’s to general La -Martiniere, Orense, March 2, 1809._ - -“J’ai reçu vôtre lettre du 27 Jan. j’éprouve toutes les -dispositions que vous avez faites je vous ai deja dit que vous -pouviez disposer pour le service des fonds qui sont dans la caisse -royale de Tuy. Faites entrer en ville le plus de subsistance que -vous pourriez. Si de valence on vous tire de coups de canon envoyez -leurs des bombes. Bientôt vous pourrez mettre les chevaux au vert, -mais faites les garder. Dans les equipages qui sont à Tuy. Il y’a -douze cent pair de souliers, de cuir pour un égal nombre et un -peu de drap, vous pouvez en disposer pour vôtre troupe. Ralliez -au depôt général tout ce qui appartient au corps d’armée et qui -étoit resté en arrière, ainsi vous auriez bientôt une petite armée -qui se soutiendra d’elle même et faire la police dans le province -dont vous devez tirer de quoi vivre, soignez bien les hospitaux et -n’envoiez personne sur Ribidavia. J’espère que sous peu je vous -aurai ouvert une autre communication, le province d’Orence est en -très grande partie pacifié, je marche sur les débris du corps de -Romana pour en finir avec eux, ils sont du côté de Monterey. Si -apres cet expédition il y avoit encore en Gallice des troubles, -je reviendrai avec toute mon armée pour les appaiser et alors -malheur à ceux qui les auroient occasionné: _je veux la paix et -la tranquilité, que les habitans se livrent aux travaux de la -campagne, qu’ils soient protegés et que la troupe se conduise bien. -Les mutins et les malintentionés François et Espagnols, doivent -être sevèrement punies._ Il faut de tems en tems des examples. Je -crois que vous pourriez correspondre avec moi par des gens du pays. -Mais il faut bien leur payer ou leur promettre, qu’en arrivant -pres de moi ils le seront généreusement et prendre de gages pour -repondre de leur fidelité, donnez de vos nouvelles au général -Marchand. Pour le même moyen dite au colonel l’Abbeville de bien -mettre en état son artillerie. - - “MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.” - - * * * * * - - -No. XIV. - - -SIR A. WELLESLEY TO SIR J. CRADOCK. - - _Lisbon, April 23._ - -Mr. Villiers will have informed you of my arrival here yesterday, -and of the concurrence of my opinion with that which you appear to -entertain in respect to the further movements to the northward. I -conclude that you will have determined to halt the army at Leyria. -I think that, before any further steps are taken in respect to -Soult, it would be desirable to consider the situation of Victor; -how far he is enabled to make an attack upon Portugal, and the -means of defence of the east of Portugal while the British will be -to the northward, and, eventually, the means of defence of Lisbon -and the Tagus, in case this attack should be made upon the country. - -All these subjects must have been considered by you; and, I fear, -in no very satisfactory light, as you appear to have moved to the -northward unwillingly: and I should be glad to talk them over with -you. - -In order to consider of some of them, and to make various -arrangements, which can be made only here, I have requested -marshal Beresford to come here, if he should not deem his absence -from the Portuguese troops, in the present state, likely to be -disadvantageous to the public service; and I have directed him to -let you know whether he will come or not. - -It might, probably, also be more agreeable and convenient to you -to see me here than with the army; and if this should be the case, -it would be a most convenient arrangement to me to meet you here. -I beg, however, that you will consider this proposition only in a -view to your own convenience and wishes. If you should, however, -choose to come, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will -bring with you the adjutant-general and quarter-master-general, the -chief engineer and the commanding officer of the artillery, and the -commissary. - - Ever yours, &c. - ARTHUR WELLESLEY. - -N.B. Some paragraphs of a private nature are omitted. - - * * * * * - - -No. XV. - - -_Extracts of a Letter from Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord -Castlereagh, Lisbon, April 24, 1809._ - -“I arrived here on Saturday, and found that sir John Cradock and -general Beresford had moved up the country, to the northward, -with the troops under their command respectively; the former to -Leyria, and the latter to Thomar. Sir John Cradock, however, does -not appear to have entertained any decided intention of moving -forward; on the contrary, indeed, he appears, by his letters to -Mr. Villiers, to have intended to go no further till he should -hear that Victor’s movements were decided, and, therefore, I -consider affairs in this country to be exactly in the state in -which, if I found them, it was the intention of the king’s minister -that I should assume the command; and, accordingly, I propose to -assume it as soon as I shall communicate with sir John Cradock. -I have written to him, and to general Beresford, to apprize him -that I conceive advantage will result from our meeting here, and -I expect them both here as soon as possible. In respect to the -enemy, Soult is still at Oporto, and he has not pushed his posts -to the southward further than the river Vouga. He has nothing in -Tras os Montes since the loss of Chaves, of which you have been -most probably apprized; but he has some posts on the river Tamega, -which divides that province from Minho, and it is supposed that -he wishes to reserve for himself the option of retreating through -Tras os Montes into Spain, if he should find it necessary. General -Sylveira, with a Portuguese corps, is in Tras os Montes, but I -am not acquainted with its strength or its composition. General -Lapisse, who commands the French corps which, it was supposed, -when I left England, was marching from Salamanca into Portugal, -has turned off to his left, and has marched along the Portuguese -frontier to Alcantara, where he crossed the Tagus, and thence he -went to Merida, on the Guadiana, where he is in communication with, -indeed I may say, part of the army of Victor; he has an advanced -post at Montejo, nearer to the Portuguese frontier than Merida. -Victor has continued at Medellin since the action with Cuesta; he -is either fortifying that post, or making an entrenched camp there. -Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which, it is -said, will soon be twenty-five thousand infantry and six thousand -cavalry, a part of them good troops; I know nothing of the marquis -de la Romana, or of anything to the northward of Portugal. I intend -to move upon Soult, as soon as I can make some arrangements upon -which I can depend for the defence of the Tagus, either to impede -or delay Victor’s progress, in case he should come in while I am -absent. I should prefer an attack upon Victor, in concert with -Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of a fertile province of -this kingdom and of the favourite town of Oporto, of which it is -most desirable to deprive him; and if any operation upon Victor, -connected with Cuesta’s movements, did not require time to concert -it, which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult from the -north of Portugal. If Soult should go, I think it most advisable, -for many reasons, in which I need not enter at present, to act upon -the defensive in the north of Portugal, and to bring the British -army to the eastern frontier. If the light brigade should not have -left England, when you receive this letter, I trust that you will -send them off without loss of time; and I request you to desire -the officer commanding them to endeavour to get intelligence, as -he will go along the coast, particularly at Aveiro and the mouth -of the Mondego; and I wish that he should stop at the latter place -for orders, if he should find that the British army is engaged in -operations to the northward, and if he should not already have -received orders at Aveiro. The twenty-third dragoons might also -receive directions to a similar purport. The hussars, I conclude, -have sailed before this time. We are much in want of craft here; -now that we are going to carry on an operation to the northward -constant convoys will be necessary, and the admiral does not appear -to have the means in his power of supplying all that is required of -him. The twenty-fourth regiment arrived this day, &c. &c. - - (Signed) “ARTHUR WELLESLEY.” - - * * * * * - - -No. XVI. - - -LETTER FROM SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO LORD CASTLEREAGH. - - _Abrantes, June 22, 1809._ - - MY LORD, - -When I wrote to you last I was in hopes that I should have marched -before this time, but the money is not yet arrived. Things are -in their progress as they were when I wrote on the 17th. The -French are continuing their retreat. Sebastiani has also fallen -back towards Toledo, and Venegas has advanced, and Cuesta had his -head-quarters at Truxillo, on the 19th. I am apprehensive that -you will think I have delayed my march unnecessarily since my -arrival upon the Tagus. But it was, and is, quite impossible to -move without money. Not only were the officers and soldiers in the -greatest distress, and the want of money the cause of many of the -disorders of which I have had occasion to complain; but we can no -longer obtain the supplies of the country, or command its resources -for the transport of our own supplies either by land or by water. -Besides this, the army required rest, after their expedition to -the frontiers of Gallicia, and shoes, and to be furbished up in -different ways; and I was well aware that, if necessity had not -obliged me to halt at the present moment, I should have been -compelled to make a longer halt some time hence. To all this add, -that, for some time after I came here, I believed that the French -were retiring, (as appears by my letters to your lordship,) and -that I should have no opportunity of striking a blow against them, -even if I could have marched. I hope that you will attend to my -requisitions for money; not only am I in want, but the Portuguese -government, to whom Mr. Villiers says that we owe £125,000. I -repeat, that we must have £200,000 a month, from England, till -I write you that I can do without it; in which sum I include -£40,000 a month for the Portuguese government, to pay for twenty -thousand men. If the Portuguese government are to receive a larger -sum from Great Britain, the sum to be sent to Portugal must be -proportionably increased. Besides this, money must be sent to pay -the Portuguese debt and our debts in Portugal. There are, besides, -debts of sir John Moore’s army still due in Spain, which I am -called upon to pay. In short, we must have £125,000, and £200,000 a -month, reckoning from the beginning of May, &c. &c. - - (Signed) “ARTHUR WELLESLEY.” - - * * * * * - - -No. XVII. - - -LETTER FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY. - - _Badajos, October 30, 1809._ - - MY LORD, - -I have had the honour of receiving your excellency’s despatch, -(marked 1.) of the 17th instant, containing a copy of your note to -M. de Garay, of the 8th of September, and a copy of his note, in -answer to your excellency, of the 3d of October. - -I am not surprised that M. de Garay should endeavour to attribute -to the irregularities of the English commissariat the deficiencies -of supplies and means of transport experienced by the British army -in its late service in Spain; I am not disposed to justify the -English commissariat where they deserve blame; but I must think it -but justice to them to declare that the British army is indebted to -their exertions for the scanty supplies it received. - -From some of the statements contained in M. de Garay’s note it -would appear that the British army had suffered no distress during -the late service; others have a tendency to prove that great -distress was suffered, at a very early period, by both armies; -particularly the quotation of a letter from general Cuesta, of -the 1st of August, in answer to a complaint which I am supposed -to have made, that the Spanish troops and _their prisoners_ were -better supplied than the British army. The answer to all these -statements is a reference to the fact that the army suffered great -distress for want of provisions, forage, and means of equipment; -and, although that distress might have been aggravated, it could -not have been occasioned by the inexperience or irregularity of the -English commissariat. - -I know nothing of the orders which M. de Garay states were sent -by the government to the different provincial juntas, to provide -provisions and means of transport for the British army on its -passage through the different towns in the provinces. If such -orders were sent, it was obvious that the central junta, as a -government, have no power or influence over the provincial juntas -and magistrates, to whom their orders were addressed, as they -produced no effect; and the supplies, such as they were, were -procured only by the requisitions and exertions of the English -commissaries. But it is obvious, from M. de Garay’s account of -these orders, that the central junta had taken a very erroneous -view of the operations to be carried on by the army, and of -the provision to be made for the troops while engaged in those -operations. The government provided, by their orders, for the -troops only while on their passage through the towns; relying upon -their immediate success, and making no provision for the collection -of one body, of not less than fifty thousand men, even for one -day. At the same time that they were guilty of this unpardonable -omission, which paralyzed all our efforts, they rendered that -success doubtful, by countermanding the orders given to general -Venegas by general Cuesta, and thus exposing the combined armies to -a general action with the enemy’s concentrated force. The effect of -their orders will appear more fully in the following detail:-- - -As soon as the line of my operations in Spain was decided, I sent -a commissary to Ciudad Rodrigo, to endeavour to procure mules to -attend the army, in concert with don Lozano des Torres, that city -and its neighbourhood being the places in which the army commanded -by the late sir John Moore had been most largely supplied. M. -de Garay expresses the astonishment of the government that the -British army should have entered Spain unprovided with the means -of transport, notwithstanding that a few paragraphs preceding -this expression of astonishment, he informs your excellency, in -the name of the government, that they had given orders to the -provincial juntas of Badajos and Castile (at Ciudad Rodrigo) and -the magistrates, to provide and supply us with the means which, of -course, they must have been aware that we should require. No army -can carry on its operations if unprovided with means of transport; -and the British army was, from circumstances, particularly in want -at that moment. - -The means of transport, commonly used in Portugal, are carts, drawn -by bullocks, which are unable, without great distress, to move -more than twelve miles in a day, a distance much shorter than that -which the state of the country in which the army was to carry on -operations in Spain, and the nature of the country, would oblige -the army to march. The number of carts which we had been able to -bring from Portugal was not sufficient to draw our ammunition, and -there were none to carry provisions. - -Having failed in procuring, at Ciudad Rodrigo and in the -neighbourhood, the means of transport which I required, I wrote to -general O’Donaghue, on the 16th of July, a letter, in which, after -stating our wants and the failure of the country in supplying them, -I gave notice that if they were not supplied I should discontinue -my co-operation with general Cuesta, after I should have performed -my part in the first operation which we had concerted, viz. the -removal of the enemy from the Alberche; and, if not supplied as I -required, I should eventually withdraw from Spain altogether. From -this letter of the 16th July, it will appear that I called for -the supplies, and gave notice that I should withdraw from Spain -if they were not furnished, not only long previous to the retreat -across the Tagus of the 4th of August, but even previous to the -commencement of the operations of the campaign. - -Notwithstanding that this letter of the 16th of July was -communicated to the central junta, both by Mr. Frere and general -Cuesta, the British army has, to this day, received no assistance -of this description from Spain, excepting twenty carts, which -joined at Merida, ten on the 30th of August, and ten on the 2d of -September; and about three hundred mules of about five hundred -which were hired at Bejar, and joined at a subsequent period. None -of the mules stated to have been hired and despatched to the army -from Seville, or by Igea or Cevallos, or the two brigades of forty -each, or the horses, have ever joined the British army; and I -conclude that they are with the Spanish army of Estremadura, as are -the remainder of the (one hundred) ten brigades of carts which were -intended and are marked for the British army. But none of these -mules or carts, supposing them to have been sent from Seville for -our use, reached Estremadura till after the 21st of August, the day -on which, after five weeks’ notice, I was obliged to separate from -the Spanish army. - -It is not true, therefore, that my resolution to withdraw from -Spain, as then carried into execution, was “sudden,” or ought to -have surprised the government: nor does it appear to have been -perilous from what has since appeared in this part of Spain. - -I ought, probably, on the 16th of July, to have determined to -suspend all operations till the army should be supplied with the -means required; but having, on the 11th of July, settled with -general Cuesta a plan of operations to be carried into execution by -the armies under the command of general Venegas, general Cuesta, -and myself, respectively, I did not think it proper to disappoint -general Cuesta. I believed that general Venegas would have carried -into execution that part of the plan of operations allotted to his -army, although I was afterwards disappointed in that expectation; -and I preferred that the British army should suffer inconvenience -than that general Venegas’s corps should be exposed alone to the -attack of the enemy; and, above all, I was induced to hope that I -should be supplied. - -Accordingly, I marched, on the 18th of July, from Plasencia, the -soldiers carrying on their backs their provisions to the 21st, on -which day a junction was formed with general Cuesta’s army; and, -from that day to the 24th of August, the troops or their horses did -not receive one regular ration. The irregularity and deficiency, -both in quality and quantity, were so great that I considered it -a matter of justice to the troops to remit to them, during that -period, half of the sum usually stopped from their pay for rations. - -The forage for the horses was picked up for them by their riders -wherever they could find it, and was generally wheat or rye, which -are considered unwholesome food; and the consequence was that, -exclusive of the loss by engaging with the enemy, the army lost, -in the short period of five weeks, not less than one thousand five -hundred horses. - -I have no knowledge of what passed between general Cuesta and don -Lozano des Torres and the intendant of provisions of the Spanish -army. I never saw the latter gentleman excepting twice; the first -time on the 22d of July, when he waited upon me to claim, for the -Spanish army, sixteen thousand rations of bread which had been -brought into Talavera, and had been sent to my quarters, and which -were delivered over to him, notwithstanding that the British troops -were in want; and the second time, on the 25th of July, when he -waited upon me, also at Talavera, to desire that the ovens of that -town might be delivered over for the use of the Spanish army, they -having moved to St. Ollalla, and the British army being still at -Talavera. This request, which was not complied with, is an example -of the preference which was given to the British troops while they -were in Spain. - -The orders stated to have been given by the central to the -provincial juntas and magistrates, were not more effectual in -procuring provisions than in procuring means of transport. In -the interval between the 15th and 21st of July, the British -commissaries had made contracts with the magistrates in the -different villages of the Vera de Plasencia, a country abounding in -resources of every description, for the delivery at Talavera, on -different days before the 24th of July, of two hundred and fifty -thousand rations of provisions. These contracts were not performed; -the British army was consequently unable to move in pursuit of the -enemy when he retired on that day; and, I conclude, that the French -army have since subsisted on these resources. - -The British army never received any salt meat, nor any of the rice -or other articles stated to have been sent from Seville for their -use, excepting to make up the miserable ration by which the men -were only prevented from starving during the period to which I have -adverted; nor was it attended by the troop of biscuit bakers, nor -did it enjoy any of the advantages of their labours, nor was the -supposed magazine of four hundred thousand pounds of biscuit ever -performed. These are notorious facts, which cannot be disputed, -of the truth of which every officer and soldier in the army can -bear testimony. I assure your excellency, that not only have the -supplies furnished to the army under my command been paid for -whenever the bills for them could be got in, but the old debts due -to the inhabitants for supplies furnished to the army, under the -command of the late sir John Moore, have been discharged; and I -have repeatedly desired the Spanish agents, and others acting with -the army, and the different juntas with which I have communicated, -to let the people know that all demands upon the British -government, which could be substantiated, would be discharged. - -I beg to refer your excellency to my despatches of the 21st of -August, No. 12, for an account of the state of the magazine at -Truxillo, on the 20th of August. Of the state of supplies and -provisions at that period, lieutenant-colonel Walters had, by -my desire, made an arrangement with the Spanish commissariat -for the division of the magazine at Truxillo between the two -armies; and he as well as I was satisfied with the principle and -detail of that arrangement. But if the British army received only -one-third of a ration on the 18th of August, and only one-half of -a ration on the 19th, not of bread, but of flour; if the horses -of the army received nothing; and if the state of the magazine -at Truxillo was such, at that time, as to hold out no hope, not -of improvement, (for it was too late to wait for improvement,) -but of a full and regular supply of provisions and forage of all -descriptions, I was justified in withdrawing from Spain. In point -of fact, the magazine at Truxillo, which, under the arrangement -made by lieutenant-colonel Waters was to be the sole source of the -supply to both armies, did not contain, on the 20th of August, a -sufficiency to supply one day’s demand upon it. - -But it is said that M. de Calvo promised and engaged to supply the -British army; upon which I have only to observe that I had trusted -too long to the promises of the Spanish agents, and that I had -particular reason for want of confidence in M. de Calvo; as, at -the moment he was assuring me that the British army should have -all the provisions the country could afford, in preference to, and -to the exclusion of the Spanish army, I had in my possession an -order from him, (of which your excellency has a copy,) addressed -to the magistrates of Guadalupe, directing him to send to the -head-quarters of the Spanish army provisions which a British -commissary had ordered to be prepared and sent to the magazines -at Truxillo, to be divided between both armies, in conformity -to the agreement entered into with the Spanish commissaries by -lieutenant-colonel Waters. - -As the state of the magazine at Truxillo was the immediate cause -(as far as the want of provisions went) of my withdrawing from -Spain, I beg to observe to your excellency that I was not mistaken -in my opinion of its insufficiency; as, if I am not misinformed, -general Equia’s army suffered the greatest distress in the -neighbourhood of Truxillo, even after that part of the country and -the magazines had been relieved from the burthen of supporting the -British army. - -In respect to the conduct of the operations in Spain by the Spanish -general officers, many things were done of which I did not approve; -some contrary to my expectations, and some contrary to positive -agreements. - -M. de Garay has stated that the orders of the marquis de Romana -were framed in conformity with suggestions from marshal Beresford; -and thence he infers that the operations of that corps were -approved of by me. - -The marquis de Romana was still at Coruña on the 5th, and I believe -as late as the 9th of August; and the armies of Estramadura retired -across the Tagus on the 4th of August. This reference to dates -shews that there was, and could have been no connexion in the -operations of those different armies. In fact, I knew nothing of -the marquis of Romana’s operations; and till I heard, on the 3d of -August, that marshal Ney’s corps had passed through the mountains -of Estramadura at Baños, and was at Naval Moral, I did not believe -that that part of the enemy’s army had quitted Astorga, or that the -marquis was at liberty, or had it in his power to quit Gallicia. - -Marshal Beresford’s corps was collected upon the frontiers of -Portugal in the end of July, principally for the purpose of forming -the troops; and it was hoped he would keep in check the enemy’s -corps under Soult, which was at Zamora, and threatened Portugal; -that he would act as a corps of observation in that quarter, and on -the left of the British army; and I particularly requested marshal -Beresford to attend to the Puerto de Perales. But I never intended, -and never held out any hope to the Spanish officers that the corps -under marshal Beresford could effect any operation at that period -of the campaign, and never was a party to any arrangement of an -operation in which that corps was to be concerned. - -In the cases in which measures were carried on in a manner of which -I did not approve, or which I did not expect, or contrary to the -positive agreement, those who acted contrary to my opinion may have -been right; but still they acted in a manner of which they were -aware I did not approve: and the assertion in the note, that the -operations were carried on with my concurrence, is unfounded. - -I expected, from the communications I had with general Cuesta, -through sir Robert Wilson and colonel Roche, that the Puerto de -Baños would have been effectually occupied and secured; and, at all -events, that the troops appointed to guard that point, upon which I -was aware that all the operations, nay, the security, of the army -depended, would not have retired without firing a shot. - -It was agreed, between general Cuesta and me, on the 11th of July, -that general Venegas, who was under his command, should march -by Trembleque, Ocaña, Puerte Dueños, to Arganda, near Madrid; -where he was to be on the 22d and 23d of July, when the combined -armies should be at Talavera and Escola. This agreement was not -performed, and the consequence of its non-performance (which had -been foreseen) occurred; viz. that the combined armies were engaged -with the enemy’s concentrated force. I have heard that the cause of -the non-performance of this agreement was that the central junta -had countermanded the orders which general Venegas had received -from general Cuesta; of which countermand they gave us no notice. I -shall make no observation upon this proceeding, excepting that the -plan of operations, as agreed upon with me, was not carried into -execution, by general Venegas, in this instance. - -It was agreed, by general Cuesta, on the 2d of August, that when I -marched against Soult on the 3d, he would remain at Talavera. That -agreement was broken when he withdrew from Talavera, in my opinion, -without sufficient cause. And it is also my opinion that he ought -not to have withdrawn, particularly considering that he had the -charge of my hospital, without my consent. I do not conceive that -if general Cuesta had remained at Talavera, it would have made -any difference in the result of the campaign. When Soult added -thirty-four thousand to the numbers already opposed to the combined -armies in Estremadura, the enemy was too strong for us; and it was -necessary that we should retire across the Tagus. But if general -Cuesta had held the post of Talavera, according to agreement, I -should have been able to remove my hospital, or, at least, to know -the exact situation of every individual left there; and I think -that other disadvantages might have been avoided in the retreat. - -When adverting to this part of the subject, I cannot avoid to -observe upon the ambiguity of language used in the note respecting -the assistance afforded by general Cuesta to remove the hospital -from Talavera. That assistance amounted to four carts on the 4th of -August, at Oropesa. In the subsequent removal of the wounded, and -of the men subsequently taken sick, we had absolutely no assistance -from the Spanish army or the country. We were obliged to lay down -our ammunition, which was delivered over to the Spanish army, -and to unload the treasure, and employ the carts in the removal -of the wounded and sick. At Truxillo, in particular, assistance -which could have been afforded was withheld, on the 22d and 23d of -August, M. de Calvo and don Lozano des Torres being in the town. - -In respect to the refusal to make movements recommended by me, I -am of opinion that if general Bassecourt had been detached towards -Plasencia on the 30th of July, when I recommended that movement, -and if the troops had done their duty, Soult would have been -stopped at the Tietar, at least for a sufficient length of time to -enable me to secure the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz; and here -again the hospital would have been saved. - -He was not detached, however, till the 2d; and then I understood, -from M. de Garay’s note, that it was general Cuesta’s opinion that -the movement was useless. - -It could not have been considered as useless by general Cuesta on -the 30th, because the proposition for making a detachment from the -combined armies originated with himself on that day; and it could -not have been considered as useless even on the morning of the 2d, -as, till the evening of that day, we did not receive intelligence -of the arrival of Soult at Plasencia. A reference to the date of -the period at which the general considered this detachment as -useless would have been desirable. - -I cannot account for the surprise stated to have been felt by -general Cuesta upon finding the British army at Oropesa on the -morning of the 4th of August. The army had left Talavera on the -morning of the 3d, and had marched to Oropesa, six leagues, or -twenty-four miles, on that day; which I conceive a sufficient -distance for a body of men which had been starving for many days -before. The accounts received, on the evening of the 3d, of -the enemy’s position at Naval Moral, and of his strength, and -of general Cuesta’s intended march on that evening, leaving my -hospital to its fate, were sufficient to induce me to pause and -consider our situation, and, at least, not to move before daylight -on the 4th; shortly after which time, general Cuesta arrived at -Oropesa. - -Upon considering our situation at that time, it was evident to me -that the combined armies must retire across the Tagus, and that -every moment’s delay must expose them to the risk of being cut -off from their only remaining point of retreat. A battle, even if -it had been successful, could not have improved our situation; -two battles, or probably three, must have been fought and gained -before our difficulties, resulting from the increased strength of -the enemy in Estremadura, could be removed. I did not consider the -British army, at least, equal to such an exertion at that moment. -It is unnecessary to make any observation upon the Spanish army; -but the occurrences at Arzobispo, a few days afterwards, shewed -that they were not equal to any great contest. - -M. de Garay complains of the alteration in the line of our -operations, and of the sudden changes in the direction of our -marches, to which he attributes the deficiency of our supplies, -which, in this part of the note, he is disposed to admit that the -British army experienced. I know of but one alteration in the -plan of operations and in the direction of the march, which was -occasioned by the circumstances to which I have just referred. - -When intelligence was first received of the arrival of the enemy -at Plasencia, and of the retreat, without resistance, of the corps -appointed to guard the Puerto de Baños, my intention was to move -towards Plasencia, to attack the enemy’s corps which had passed -through the Puerto. That intention was altered, only when I heard -of the numbers of which that corps consisted; and when I found -that, by general Cuesta’s movement from Talavera, the rear of the -army was not secure, that the only retreat was liable to be cut -off, and that the enemy had it in their power, and at their option, -to join or to attack us in separate bodies. - -It could not be attributed to me, that this large reinforcement -was allowed to enter Estremadura, or that we had not earlier -intelligence of their approach. - -The Puerto de Baños was abandoned, without firing a shot, by the -Spanish troops sent there to guard it; and the junta of Castile, -if they knew of the collection of the enemy’s troops at Salamanca, -sent no notice of it; and no notice was in fact received, till the -accounts arrived that the enemy had ordered rations at Fuente Noble -and Los Santos; and they arrived on the following day. But when the -enemy arrived at Naval Moral, in Estremadura, in such strength, and -the post of Talavera was abandoned, the central junta will find it -difficult to convince this country and the world that it was not -expedient to alter the plan of our operations and the direction of -our march. - -But this alteration, instead of aggravating the deficiency of -our supplies, ought to have alleviated our distresses, if any -measures had been adopted at Seville to supply the British army, -in consequence of my letter of the 16th July. The alteration was -from the offensive to the defensive; the march was retrograde; and -if any supplies had been prepared and sent, the army must have met -them on the road, and must have received them sooner. Accordingly, -we did meet supplies on the road, but they were for the Spanish -army; and although our troops were starving at the time, they were -forwarded, untouched, to their destination. - -I have sent to marshal Beresford a copy of that part of M. de -Garay’s note which refers to the supplies for the Portuguese army -under his command, upon which he will make his observations, which -I propose to forward to your excellency. I shall here, therefore, -only repeat that the want of magazines, and the apathy and -disinclination of the magistrates and people in Spain to furnish -supplies for the armies, even for payment, were the causes that -the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, suffered great -distress from want, while within the Spanish frontier. - -Till the evils, of which I think I have reason to complain, are -remedied, till I shall see magazines established for the supply of -the armies, and a regular system adopted for keeping them filled, -and an army, upon whose exertions I can depend, commanded by -officers capable and willing to carry into execution the operations -which may have been planned by mutual agreement, I cannot enter -upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish armies. I do not -think it necessary now to enter into any calculations to shew the -fallacy of M. de Garay’s calculations of the relative numerical -strength of the allies, and of the enemy, in the Peninsula; if the -fallacy was not so great, as I am certain it is, I should be of the -same opinion, respecting the expediency of co-operating with the -Spanish troops. But if the British and the Portuguese armies should -not actively co-operate with them, they will at least do them no -injury; and if M. de Garay is not mistaken, as I believe he is, -in his calculations of numbers; and if the Spanish armies are in -the state of efficiency in which they are represented to be, and -which they ought to be, to invite our co-operation, the deficiency -of thirty-six thousand men, which the British and Portuguese -armies might add to their numbers, can be no objection to their -undertaking, immediately, the operations which M. de Garay is of -opinion would give to his countrymen the early possession of those -blessings for which they are contending. - -I have the honour to be, &c. - - (Signed) WELLINGTON. - - * * * * * - - -No. XVIII. - - -COPY OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL HILL TO SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY. - - _Camp, August 17, 1809._ - - SIR, - -I beg leave to report to you that the parties sent out by the -officers of my division, yesterday, to procure forage, were, in -more instances than one, opposed by the Spaniards. The following -circumstances have been made known to me, and I take the liberty of -repeating them for your excellency’s information. - -My servants were sent about three leagues on the Truxillo road, in -order to get forage for me; and after gathering three mule loads, -a party of Spanish soldiers, consisting of five or six, came up to -them with their swords drawn, and obliged them to leave the corn -they had collected. My servants told me, that the same party fired -two shots towards other British men employed in getting forage. The -assistant-commissary of my division, likewise, states to me, that -the men he sent out for forage were fired at by the Spaniards. - -I have the honour to be, &c. - - (Signed) R. HILL, major-general. - - -COPY OF A LETTER FROM COLONEL STOPFORD TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL -SHERBROOKE. - - _Jaraceijo, August 16, 1809._ - - SIR, - -I beg leave to inform you that I have just received intimations of -some Spaniards having fired at some of the guards, for taking some -forage. As there is no forage given us by the commissary, I wish to -know what I am to do, in order to get some for the horses. - - (Signed) E. STOPFORD, second brigade of guards. - - -END OF VOL. II. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] Now lord Stuart de Rothesay. - -[2] Now lord Howden. - -[3] An appellation given among soldiers to men who, under pretence -of sickness, shrink from the performance of their duties in the -field. - -[4] It is necessary again to remark that I possess only an -unauthenticated copy of general Semelé’s Journal. - -[5] Soult distinguished himself in that battle. - -[6] In the British army, when speaking of the number present -under arms, the corporals and privates only are understood. In -the French army, the present under arms includes every military -person, whether officers, non-commissioned officers, or soldiers; a -distinction which should be borne in mind. - -[7] Viz. 1800 left in Viana and Braga. - 500 including the wounded taken in Oporto. - 1300 taken at Chaves, by Sylveira. - -[8] The bands formed of smugglers were called Quadrillas. - -[9] Note by sir J. Cradock. This is not a correct statement, but -quite the contrary; it must have been the bishop. - - * * * * * - - -_Published and sold by_ T. & W. BOONE, 480, _Strand, near -Charing-Cross._ - - -TRACTS ON VAULTS AND BRIDGES; containing Observations on the -various Forms of Vaults; on the Taking Down and Rebuilding LONDON -BRIDGE; and on the PRINCIPLES OF ARCHES: illustrated by extensive -Tables of Bridges. Also, containing the Principles of PENDANT -BRIDGES, with reference to the Properties of the Catenary, applied -to the Menai Bridge. And a Theoretical Investigation of the -Catenary. By SAMUEL WARE. 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Battle of Talavera ... 406’ replaced by - ‘7. Operations of the British, French & Spanish armies ... 409’. - Pg xi: ‘8. Operations in the valley of the Tagus ... 416’ replaced by - ‘8. Battle of Talavera ... 416’. - - Main text: - Pg 22: ‘eighteen hunded yards’ replaced by ‘eighteen hundred yards’. - Pg 28: ‘aid-de-camp to the’ replaced by ‘aide-de-camp to the’. - Pg 45: ‘An aid-de-camp of’ replaced by ‘An aide-de-camp of’. - Pg 60: ‘not be be provisioned’ replaced by ‘not be provisioned’. - Pg 63: ‘on the the 9th’ replaced by ‘on the 9th’. - Pg 83: ‘their cummunications’ replaced by ‘their communications’. - Pg 144: ‘literal interpetation’ replaced by ‘literal interpretation’. - Pg 146: ‘unsuccessful auxilliaries’ replaced by - ‘unsuccessful auxiliaries’. - Pg 152: ‘Silviera’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’. - Pg 153: ‘develope his plans’ replaced by ‘develop his plans’. - Pg 154: ‘Silveira’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’. - Pg 159: ‘recal of general’ replaced by ‘recall of general’. - Pg 167: ‘Silveira’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’. - Pg 170: ‘river to Ribadavia’ replaced by ‘river to Ribidavia’. - Pg 179: ‘the inflame the’ replaced by ‘to inflame the’. - Pg 189: ‘the Cabado river’ replaced by ‘the Cavado river’. - Pg 200: ‘at the Ponte Ave’ replaced by ‘at the Ponte d’Ave’. - Pg 211: ‘and the Guadaramo’ replaced by ‘and the Guadarama’. - Pg 211: ‘second the Guardiana’ replaced by ‘second the Guadiana’. - Pg 218: ‘the river Garganza’ replaced by ‘the river Guadiana’. - Pg 226: (in caption) ‘AGAINST GUESTA’ replaced by ‘AGAINST CUESTA’. - Pg 229: ‘were thus paralized’ replaced by ‘were thus paralyzed’. - Pg 235: ‘charge not be sustained’ replaced by ‘charge not sustained’. - Pg 240: ‘The garison of the’ replaced by ‘The garrison of the’. - Pg 244: ‘and run back’ replaced by ‘and ran back’. - Pg 248: ‘paralized a large’ replaced by ‘paralyzed a large’. - Pg 250: ‘marched by Guarda’ replaced by ‘marched by Guardia’. - Pg 263: (in Sidenote) ‘Lord LonLondonderry’ replaced by - ‘Lord Londonderry’. - Pg 266: ‘The Portugese troops’ replaced by ‘The Portuguese troops’. - Pg 282: ‘Olivera de Azemiz’ replaced by ‘Oliveira de Azemis’. - Pg 308: ‘CHAP. III’ replaced by ‘CHAPTER III’. - Pg 309: ‘every other other part’ replaced by ‘every other part’. - Pg 369: ‘Porguese and Spanish’ replaced by ‘Portuguese and Spanish’. - Pg 408: ‘develope its attack’ replaced by ‘develop its attack’. - Pg 409: (in caption) ‘Plate 7. to face Pa.’ replaced by - ‘Plate 7. to face Pa. 409’. - Pg 416: ‘unite under three’ replaced by ‘unite in under three’. - Pg 427: ‘and strenghened by’ replaced by ‘and strengthened by’. - Pg 427: ‘Spanish auxilliaries’ replaced by ‘Spanish auxiliaries’. - Pg 453: ‘Crauford’s brigade’ replaced by ‘Craufurd’s brigade’. - Pg 456: ‘by quarelling with’ replaced by ‘by quarrelling with’. - - Appendix: - Pg 471: some numbers in these tables are clearly incorrect (eg 3,339 - and 24,082) but none have been changed. - Pg 482: ‘bâtir les chateux’ replaced by ‘bâtir les châteaux’. - Pg 486: ‘I always nrged’ replaced by ‘I always urged’. - Pg 486: ‘of effervenscence of’ replaced by ‘of effervescence of’. - Pg 491: ‘The taking Portuguese’ replaced by ‘The taking of Portuguese’. - Pg 492: ‘proper movoment of’ replaced by ‘proper movement of’. - Pg 495: ‘to Mr. Rawlins’ replaced by ‘to Mr. Rawlings’. - Pg 527: ‘pounds of buiscuit’ replaced by ‘pounds of biscuit’. - Pg 527: ‘ever officer’ replaced by ‘every officer’. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 2 OF 6 *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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*/ - position: absolute; - color: #A9A9A9; - right: 92%; - font-size: 80%; - text-align: right; - font-style: normal; - font-weight: normal; - font-variant: normal; - text-indent: .5em; -} - - -/* sidenotes */ -.sidenote { - float: right; - clear: right; - width: 18%; - margin: .5em .3em 0 .5em; - padding: .2em; - text-align: left; - text-indent: 0em; - font-size: 60%; - color: black; - background: #eeeeee; - border: dashed thin; - font-style: normal; - font-weight: normal;} - -.x-ebookmaker .sidenote { - float: right; - clear: right; - width: 18%;} - - -/* general placement and presentation */ -.center {text-align: center; text-indent: 0em;} - -.right {text-align: right; margin-right: 1em;} - -.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} -.allsmcap {font-variant: small-caps; text-transform: lowercase;} - -sup {font-size: 60%;} -sub {font-size: 60%;} - -.lsp {letter-spacing: 0.1em;} -.lsp2 {letter-spacing: 0.2em;} -.lht {line-height: 2em;} - -.caption {font-weight: normal; font-size: 70%; - padding-bottom: 0.50em;} - - -/* Images */ - -img { - border: none; - max-width: 100%; - height: auto; -} - -img.w100 {width: 100%;} - - -.figcenter { - margin: auto; - text-align: center; - page-break-inside: avoid; - max-width: 100%;} - - -/* Footnotes */ -.footnotes {border: dashed 1px; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 3em; - padding-bottom: 1em;} - -.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 90%;} -.footnote p {text-indent: 0em;} -.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} - -.fnanchor { - vertical-align: super; - font-size: .8em; - text-decoration: none; -} - - -/* Transcriber's notes */ -.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; - color: black; - font-size:smaller; - padding:0.5em; - margin-bottom:5em; - font-family:sans-serif, serif; } - -.transnote p {text-indent: 0em;} - - -/* custom cover (cover.jpg) */ -.customcover {visibility: hidden; display: none;} -.x-ebookmaker .customcover {visibility: visible; display: block;} - - -/* Illustration classes */ -.illowp70 {width: 70%;} -.x-ebookmaker .illowp70 {width: 65%;} - - </style> - </head> - -<body> -<p style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, Vol. 2 of 6, by William Patrick Francis Napier</p> -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, Vol. 2 of 6</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: William Patrick Francis Napier</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: March 3, 2022 [eBook #67554]</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</p> - <p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em; text-align:left'>Produced by: Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)</p> -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814, VOL. 2 OF 6 ***</div> - - -<div class="transnote"> -<p><strong>TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE</strong></p> - -<p>Footnote anchors are denoted by <span class="fnanchor">[number]</span>, and the footnotes have been -placed at the end of the book.</p> - -<p>With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings -of names have not been changed.</p> - -<p class="customcover">The cover image was created by the transcriber -and is placed in the public domain.</p> - -<p>Some minor changes to the text are noted at the <a href="#TN">end of the book.</a> -<span class="screenonly">These are indicated by a <ins class="corr">dotted gray</ins> underline.</span></p> -</div> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> - -<h1> -<span class="lsp2 bold">HISTORY</span><br /> -<span class="fs50">OF THE</span><br /> -<span class="fs120">WAR IN THE PENINSULA</span></h1> -</div> - -<p class="p2 pfs80">AND IN THE</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs135">SOUTH OF FRANCE,</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs100">FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.</p> - -<p class="p3 pfs70">BY</p> - -<p class="pfs135">W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.</p> - -<p class="pfs70">LT. COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT.</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs120">VOL. II.</p> - -<p class="p3 pfs120">LONDON:</p> -<p class="pfs100">THOMAS AND WILLIAM BOONE, STRAND.</p> - -<hr class="r10a" /> - -<p class="pfs70 lsp">MDCCCXXIX.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_v"></a>[Pg v]</span><br /></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="TABLE_OF_CONTENTS">TABLE OF CONTENTS.</h2> -</div> - -<hr class="r20" /> - -<table class="autotable fs70" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs150" colspan="2">BOOK V.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER I.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Slight effect produced in England by the result of the campaign—Debates - in parliament—Treaty with Spain—Napoleon receives addresses at Valladolid—Joseph - enters Madrid—Appointed the emperor’s lieutenant—Distribution of the French army—The - duke of Dantzig forces the bridge of Almaraz—Toledo entered by the first corps—Infantado - and Palacios ordered to advance upon Madrid—Cuesta appointed to the command of Galluzzo’s - troops—Florida Blanca dies at Seville—Succeeded in the presidency by the marquis of - Astorga—Money arrives at Cadiz from Mexico—Bad conduct of the central junta—State - of the Spanish army—Constancy of the soldiers—Infantado moves on Tarancon—His - advanced guard defeated there—French retire towards Toledo—Disputes in the Spanish - army—Battle of Ucles—Retreat of Infantado—Cartoajal supersedes him, and advances - to Ciudad Real—Cuesta takes post on the Tagus, and breaks down the bridge of Almaraz</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_1"><em>Page</em> 1</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER II.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Operations in Aragon—Confusion in Zaragoza—The third and fifth corps invest - that city—Fortification described—Monte Torrero taken—Attack on the suburb - repulsed—Mortier takes post at Calatayud—The convent of San Joseph taken—The - bridge-head carried—Huerba passed—Device of the Spanish leaders to encourage the - besieged—Marquis of Lazan takes post on the Sierra de Alcubierre—Lasnes arrives in the - French camp—<ins class="corr" id="tn-v" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Recals Mortier'">Recalls - Mortier</ins>—Lazan defeated—Gallant exploit of Mariano Galindo—The - walls of the town taken by assault—General Lacoste and colonel San Genis slain</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_18">18</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER III.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">System of terror—The convent of St. Monica taken—Spaniards attempt to retake it, - but fail—St. Augustin taken—French change their mode of attack—Spaniards change their - mode of defence—Terrible nature of the contest—Convent of Jesus taken on the side of the - suburb—Attack on the suburb repulsed—Convent of Francisco taken—Mine exploded under - the university fails, and the besieged are repulsed—The Cosso passed—Fresh mines worked under - the university, and in six other places—French soldiers dispirited—Lasnes encourages - them—The houses leading down to the quay carried by storm—An enormous mine under the - university being sprung, that building is carried by assault—The suburb is taken—Baron - Versage killed, and two thousand Spaniards surrender—Successful attack on the right bank of the - Ebro—Palafox demands terms, which are refused—Fire resumed—Miserable condition of the - city—Terrible pestilence, and horrible sufferings of the besieged—Zaragoza - surrenders—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_38">38</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER IV. <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vi"></a>[vi]</span></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Operations in Catalonia—St. Cyr commands the seventh corps—Passes the - frontier—State of Catalonia—Palacios fixes his head-quarters at Villa Franca—Duhesme - forces the line of the Llobregat—Returns to Barcelona—English army from Sicily designed to - act in Catalonia—Prevented by Murat—Duhesme forages El Vallés—Action of San - Culgat—General Vives supersedes Palacios—Spanish army augments—Blockade of - Barcelona—Siege of Rosas—Folly and negligence of the junta—Entrenchments in the town - carried by the besiegers—Marquis of Lazan, with six thousand men, reaches Gerona—Lord - Cochrane enters the Trinity—Repulses several assaults—Citadel surrenders 5th December—St. - Cyr marches on Barcelona—Crosses the Ter—Deceives Lazan—Turns Hostalrich—Defeats - Milans at San Celoni—Battle of Cardadeu—Caldagues retires behind the Llobregat—Negligence - of Duhesme—Battle of Molino del Rey</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_54">54</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER V.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Tumult in Tarragona—Reding proclaimed general—Reinforcements join the - Spaniards—Actions at Bruch—Lazan advances, and fights at Castel Ampurias—He quarrels - with Reding, and marches towards Zaragoza—Reding’s plans—St. Cyr breaks Reding’s line at - Llacuna—Actions at Capelades, Igualada, and St. Magi—French general, unable to take the abbey - of Creuz, turns it, and reaches Villaradona—Joined by Souham’s division, takes post at Valls and - Pla—Reding rallies his centre and left wing—Endeavours to reach Taragona—Battle of - Valls—Weak condition of Tortosa—St. Cyr blockades Taragona—Sickness in that city—St. - Cyr resolves to retire—Chabran forces the bridge of Molino del Rey—Conspiracy in Barcelona - fails—Colonel Briche arrives with a detachment from Aragon—St. Cyr retires behind the - Llobregat—Pino defeats Wimpfen at Tarrasa—Reding dies—His character—Blake is - appointed captain-general of the <em>Coronilla</em>—Changes the line of operations to Aragon—Events - in that province—Suchet takes the command of the French at Zaragoza—Colonels Pereña and Baget - oblige eight French companies to surrender—Blake advances—Battle of Alcanitz—Suchet falls - back—Disorder in his army—Blake neglects Catalonia—St. Cyr marches by the valley of - Congosto upon Vich—Action at the defile of Garriga—Lecchi conducts the prisoners to the - Fluvia—St. Cyr hears of the Austrian war—Barcelona victualled by a French squadron—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_78">78</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs150" colspan="2">BOOK VI.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER I.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Transactions in Portugal—State of that country—Neglected by the English - cabinet—Sir J. Cradock appointed to command the British troops—Touches at Coruña—At - Oporto—State of this city—Lusitanian legion—State of Lisbon—Cradock endeavours - to reinforce Moore—Mr. Villiers arrives at Lisbon—Pikes given to the populace—Destitute - state of the army—Mr. Frere, and others, urge Cradock to move into Spain—The reinforcements for - sir J. Moore halted at Castello Branco—General Cameron sent to Almeida—French advanced guard - reaches Merida—Cradock relinquishes the design of reinforcing the army in Spain, and concentrates his - own troops at Saccavem—Discontents in Lisbon—Defenceless state and danger of Portugal—Relieved - by sir J. Moore’s advance to Sahagun</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_112">112</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER II. <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vii"></a>[vii]</span></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">French retire from Merida—Send a force to Plasencia—The direct intercourse between - Portugal and sir J. Moore’s army interrupted—Military description of Portugal—Situation of the - troops—Cradock again pressed, by Mr. Frere and others, to move into Spain—The ministers ignorant - of the real state of affairs—Cradock hears of Moore’s advance to Sahagun—Embarks two thousand men - to reinforce him—Hears of the retreat to Coruña, and re-lands them—Admiral Berkely arrives at - Lisbon—Ministers more anxious to get possession of Cadiz than to defend Portugal—Five thousand - men, under general Sherbrooke, embarked at Portsmouth—Sir George Smith reaches Cadiz—State of - that city—He demands troops from Lisbon—General Mackenzie sails from thence, with - troops—Negotiations with the junta—Mr. Frere’s weak proceedings—Tumult in Cadiz—The - negotiation fails</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_127">127</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER III.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Weakness of the British army in Portugal—General Cameron marches to Lisbon—Sir R. - Wilson remains near Ciudad Rodrigo—Sir J. Cradock prepares to take a defensive position at Passo - d’Arcos—Double dealing of the regency—The populace murder foreigners, and insult the British - troops—Anarchy in Oporto—British government ready to abandon Portugal—Change their - intention—Military system of Portugal—the regency demand an English general—Beresford is - sent to them—Sherbrooke’s and Mackenzie’s troops arrive at Lisbon—Beresford arrives there, and - takes the command of the native force—Change in the aspect of affairs—Sir J. Cradock encamps at - Lumiar—Relative positions of the allied and French armies—Marshal Beresford desires sir J. - Cradock to march against Soult—Cradock refuses—Various unwise projects broached by different persons</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_142">142</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs150" colspan="2">BOOK VII.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER I.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Coruña and Ferrol surrender to Soult—He is ordered, by the emperor, to invade - Portugal—The first corps is directed to aid this operation—Soult goes to St. Jago—Distressed - state of the second corps—Operations of Romana and state of Gallicia—Soult commences his - march—Arrives on the Minho—Occupies Tuy, Vigo, and Guardia—Drags large boats over land - from Guardia to Campo Saucos—Attempt to pass the Minho—Is repulsed by the Portuguese - peasantry—Importance of this repulse—Soult changes his plan—Marches on Orense—Defeats - the insurgents at Franquera, at Ribidavia, and in the valley of the Avia—Leaves his artillery and stores - in Tuy—Defeats the Spanish insurgents in several places, and prepares to invade Portugal—Defenceless - state of the northern provinces of that kingdom—Bernadim Friere advances to the Cavado - river—Sylveira advances to Chaves—Concerts operations with Romana—Disputes between the - Portuguese and Spanish troops—Ignorance of the generals</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_162">162</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER II.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Soult enters Portugal—Action at Monterey—Franceschi makes great slaughter of the - Spaniards—Portuguese retreat upon Chaves—Romana flies to Puebla Senabria—Portuguese - mutiny—Three thousand throw themselves into Chaves—Soult takes that town—Marches upon - Braga—Forces the defiles of Ruivaens and Venda Nova—Tumults and disorders in the Portuguese - camp at Braga—Murder of general Friere and others—Battle of Braga—Soult marches -<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_viii"></a>[viii]</span> - against Oporto—Disturbed state of that town—Sylveira retakes Chaves—The French force the - passage of the Ave—The Portuguese murder general Vallonga—French appear in front of - Oporto—Negotiate with the bishop—Violence of the people—General Foy taken—Battle - of Oporto—The city stormed with great slaughter</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_183">183</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER III.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Operations of the first and fourth corps—General state of the French army—Description - of the valley of the Tagus—Inertness of marshal Victor—Albuquerque and Cartoajal dispute—The - latter advance in La Mancha—General Sebastiani wins the battle of Ciudad Real—Marshal Victor forces - the passage of the Tagus, and drives Cuesta’s army from all its positions—French cavalry checked at - Miajadas—Victor crosses the Guadiana at Medellin—Albuquerque joins Cuesta’s army—Battle of - Medellin—Spaniards totally defeated—Victor ordered, by the king, to invade Portugal—Opens - a secret communication with some persons in Badajos—The peasants of Albuera discover the plot, which - fails—Operations of general Lapisse—He drives back sir R. Wilson’s posts, and makes a slight - attempt to take Ciudad Rodrigo—Marches suddenly towards the Tagus, and forces the bridge of - Alcantara—Joins Victor at Merida—General insurrection along the Portuguese frontier—The - central junta remove Cartoajal from the command, and increase Cuesta’s authority, whose army is - reinforced—Joseph discontented with Lapisse’s movement—Orders Victor to retake the bridge of Alcantara</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_208">208</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER IV.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">The bishop of Oporto flies to Lisbon, and joins the regency—Humanity of marshal - Soult—The Anti-Braganza party revives in the north of Portugal—The leaders make proposals to - Soult—He encourages them—Error arising out of this proceeding—Effects of Soult’s - policy—Assassination of colonel Lameth—Execution at Arifana—Distribution of the French - troops—Franceschi opposed, on the Vouga, by colonel Trant—Loison falls back behind the - Souza—Heudelet marches to the relief of Tuy—The Spaniards, aided by some English frigates, - oblige thirteen hundred French to capitulate at Vigo—Heudelet returns to Braga—The insurrection - in the Entre Minho e Douro ceases—Sylveira menaces Oporto—Laborde reinforces Loison, and drives - Sylveira over the Tamega—Gallant conduct and death of colonel Patrick at Amarante—Combats at - Amarante—French repulsed—Ingenious device of captain Brochard—The bridge of Amarante carried - by storm—Loison advances to the Douro—Is suddenly checked—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_231">231</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs150" colspan="2">BOOK VIII.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER I.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Anarchy in Portugal—Sir J. Cradock quits the command—Sir A. Wellesley arrives at - Lisbon—Happy effect of his presence—Nominated captain-general—His military position - described—Resolves to march against Soult—Reaches Coimbra—Conspiracy in the French - army—D’Argenton’s proceedings—Sir A. Wellesley’s situation compared with that of Sir J. Cradock</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_262">262</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER II. <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ix"></a>[ix]</span></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Campaign on the Douro—Relative position of the French and English armies—Sir Arthur - Wellesley marches to the Vouga—Sends Beresford to the Douro—A division under general Hill passes - the lake of Ovar—Attempt to surprise Francheschi fails—Combat of Grijon—The French re-cross - the Douro and destroy the bridge at Oporto—Passage of the Douro—Soult retreats upon - Amarante—<ins class="corr" id="tn-ix" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Berresford reaches'">Beresford - reaches</ins> Amarante—Loison retreats from that town—Sir Arthur marches upon - Braga—Desperate situation of Soult—His energy—He crosses the Sierra Catalina—Rejoins - Loison—Reaches Carvalho d’Esté—Falls back to Salamonde—Daring action of major Dulong—The - French pass the Ponte Nova and the Saltador, and retreat by Montalegre—Soult enters - Orense—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_277">277</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER III.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Romana surprises Villa Franca—Ney advances to Lugo—Romana retreats to the - Asturias—Reforms the government there—Ney invades the Asturias by the west—Bonnet and - Kellerman enter that province by the east and by the south—General Mahi flies to the valley of the - Syl—Romana embarks at Gihon—Ballasteros takes St. Andero—Defeated by Bonnet—Kellerman - returns to Valladolid—Ney marches for Coruña—Carera defeats Maucune at St. Jago - Compostella—Mahi blockades Lugo—It is relieved by Soult—Romana rejoins his army and marches - to Orense—Lapisse storms the bridge of Alcantara—Cuesta advances to the Guadiana—Lapisse - retires—Victor concentrates his army at Torremocha—Effect of the war in Germany upon that of - Spain—Sir A. Wellesley encamps at Abrantes—The bridge of Alcantara destroyed—Victor crosses - the Tagus at Almaraz—Beresford returns to the north of Portugal—Ney and Soult combine - operations—Soult scours the valleys of the Syl—Romana cut off from Castile and thrown back upon - Orense—Ney advances towards Vigo—Combat of San Payo—Misunderstanding between him and - Soult—Ney retreats to Coruña—Soult marches to Zamora—Franceschi falls into the hands of the - Capuchino—His melancholy fate—<ins class="corr" id="tn-ixa" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Ney abandous Gallicia'">Ney - abandons Gallicia</ins>—View of affairs in Aragon—Battles - of Maria and Belchite</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_308">308</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER IV.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">State of the British army—Embarrassments of sir Arthur Wellesley—State and numbers - of the French armies—State and numbers of the Spanish armies—Some account of the <em>partidas</em>, - commonly called <em>guerillas</em>—Intrigues of Mr. Frere—Conduct of the central junta—Their - inhuman treatment of the French prisoners—Corruption and incapacity—State of the Portuguese - army—Impolicy of the British government—Expedition of Walcheren—Expedition against Italy</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_334">334</a></td> -</tr> - -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs150" colspan="2">BOOK IX.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER I.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Campaign of Talavera—Choice of operations—Sir Arthur Wellesley moves into - Spain—Joseph marches against Venegas—Orders Victor to return to Talavera—Cuesta arrives at - Almaraz—Sir Arthur reaches Plasencia—Interview with Cuesta—Plan of operation - arranged—Sir Arthur, embarrassed by the want of provisions, detaches sir Robert Wilson up the -<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_x"></a>[x]</span> - Vera de Plasencia, passes the Tietar, and unites with Cuesta at Oropesa—Skirmish at Talavera—Bad - conduct of the Spanish troops—Victor takes post behind the Alberche—Cuesta’s absurdity—Victor - retires from the Alberche—Sir Arthur, in want of provisions, refuses to pass that river—Intrigues - of Mr. Frere—The junta secretly orders Venegas not to execute his part of the operation</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_357">357</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER II.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Cuesta passes the Alberche—Sir Arthur Wellesley sends two English divisions to support - him—Soult is appointed to command the second, fifth, and sixth corps—He proposes to besiege Ciudad - Rodrigo and threaten Lisbon—He enters Salamanca, and sends general Foy to Madrid to concert the plan of - operations—The king quits Madrid—Unites his whole army—Crosses the Guadarama river, and - attacks Cuesta—Combat of Alcabon—Spaniards fall back in confusion to the Alberche—Cuesta - refuses to pass that river—His dangerous position—The French advance—Cuesta re-crosses the - Tietar—Sir Arthur Wellesley draws up the combined forces on the position of Talavera—The king - crosses the Tietar—Skirmish at Casa de Salinas—Combat on the evening of the 27th—Panic in - the Spanish army—Combat on the morning of the 28th—The king holds a council of war—Jourdan - and Victor propose different plans—The king follows that of Victor—Battle of Talavera—The - French re-cross the Alberche—General Craufurd arrives in the English camp—His extraordinary - march—Observations</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_377">377</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER III.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">The king goes to Illescas with the fourth corps and reserve—Sir R. Wilson advances to - Escalona—Victor retires to Maqueda—Conduct of the Spaniards at Talavera—Cuesta’s - cruelty—The allied generals hear of Soult’s movement upon Baños—Bassecour’s division marches - towards that point—The pass of Baños forced—Sir A. Wellesley marches against Soult—Proceedings - of that marshal—He crosses the Bejar, and arrives at Plasencia with three <em>corps d’armée</em>—Cuesta - abandons the British hospitals, at Talavera, to the enemy, and retreats upon Oropesa—Dangerous position - of the allies—Sir Arthur crosses the Tagus at Arzobispo—The French arrive near that - bridge—Cuesta passes the Tagus—Combat of Arzobispo—Soult’s plans overruled by the - king—Ney defeats sir R. Wilson at Baños, and returns to France</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_410">410</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER IV.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">Venegas advances to Aranjues—Skirmishes there—Sebastiani crosses the Tagus at - Toledo—Venegas concentrates his army—Battle of Almonacid—Sir Arthur Wellesley contemplates - passing the Tagus at the Puente de Cardinal, is prevented by the ill-conduct of the junta—His troops - distressed for provisions—He resolves to retire into Portugal—False charge made by Cuesta against - the British army refuted—Beresford’s proceedings—Mr. Frere superseded by lord Wellesley—The - English army abandons its position at Jaraceijo and marches towards Portugal—Consternation of the - junta—Sir A. Wellesley defends his conduct, and refuses to remain in Spain—Takes a position - within the Portuguese frontier—Sickness in the army</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_429">429</a></td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs135" colspan="2">CHAPTER V.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx">General observations on the campaign—Comparison between the operations of sir John Moore - and sir A. Wellesley</td> -<td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_447">447</a></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xi"></a>[xi]</span><br /></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPX">APPENDIX.</h2> -</div> - -<table class="autotable fs70" summary=""> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td></td> -<td class="tdrb"><em>Page</em></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_I">No. I.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Six Sections, containing the returns of the French army</td> -<td class="tdrb">471</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_II">II.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Three Sections; justificatory extracts from sir J. Moore’s and sir J. Cradock’s papers, and from Parliamentary documents, illustrating the state of Spain</td> -<td class="tdrb">475</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_III">III.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Seven Sections; justificatory extracts from sir J. Cradock’s papers, illustrating the state of Portugal</td> -<td class="tdrb">480</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_IV">IV.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Extracts from sir J. Cradock’s instructions</td> -<td class="tdrb">491</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_V">V.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Ditto from sir J. Cradock’s papers relative to a deficiency in the supply of his troops</td> -<td class="tdrb">492</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_VI">VI.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Three Sections; miscellaneous</td> -<td class="tdrb">495</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_VII">VII.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Extracts from Mr. Frere’s correspondence</td> -<td class="tdrb">497</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_VIII">VIII.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Ditto from sir J. Cradock’s papers relating to Cadiz</td> -<td class="tdrb">499</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_IX">IX.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">General Mackenzie’s narrative of his proceedings at Cadiz</td> -<td class="tdrb">500</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_X">X.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Three Sections; extracts from sir J. Cradock’s papers, shewing that Portugal was neglected by the English cabinet</td> -<td class="tdrb">506</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_XI">XI.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">State and distribution of the English troops in Portugal and Spain, January 6, April 6, April 22, May 1, June 25, July 25, and September 25, 1809</td> -<td class="tdrb">509</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_XII">XII.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">1º. Marshal Beresford to sir J. Cradock—2º. Sir J. Cradock to marshal Beresford</td> -<td class="tdrb">511</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_XIII">XIII.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Justificatory extracts relating to the conduct of marshal Soult</td> -<td class="tdrb">517</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_XIV">XIV.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Sir A. Wellesley to sir J. Cradock</td> -<td class="tdrb">519</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_XV">XV.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Ditto to lord Castlereagh</td> -<td class="tdrb">520</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_XVI">XVI.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Ditto Ditto</td> -<td class="tdrb">522</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_XVII">XVII.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Ditto to the marquis of Wellesley</td> -<td class="tdrb">523</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#No_XVIII">XVIII.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">1º. General Hill to sir A. Wellesley—2º. Colonel Stopford to general Sherbrooke</td> -<td class="tdrb">534</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak" id="LIST_OF_PLATES">LIST OF PLATES.</h2> -</div> - -<table class="autotable fs70" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_048fp">No. 1.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Siege of Zaragoza</td> -<td class="tdrb"><em>to face page</em></td> -<td class="tdrb"> 48</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_102fp">2.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Operations in Catalonia</td> -<td class="tdrb"><em>to face page</em></td> -<td class="tdrb">102</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_226fp">3.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Operations of Cuesta and Victor on the Tagus and Guadiana</td> -<td class="tdrb"><em>to face page</em></td> -<td class="tdrb">226</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_290fp">4.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Passage of the Douro</td> -<td class="tdrb"><em>to face page</em></td> -<td class="tdrb">290</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_300fp">5.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Operations between the Mondego and the Mincio</td> -<td class="tdrb"><em>to face page</em></td> -<td class="tdrb">300</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_326fp">6.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx">Operations of marshals Soult and Ney in Gallicia</td> -<td class="tdrb"><em>to face page</em></td> -<td class="tdrb">326</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_408fp">7.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx"><ins class="corr" id="tn-xi" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Battle of Talavera'"> -Operations of the British, French & Spanish armies</ins></td> -<td class="tdrb"><em>to face page</em></td> -<td class="tdrb">409</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrt"><a href="#i_b_416fp">8.</a></td> -<td class="tdlx"><ins class="corr" id="tn-xia" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Operations in the valley of the Tagus'"> -Battle of Talavera</ins></td> -<td class="tdrb"><em>to face page</em></td> -<td class="tdrb">416</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> - -<h2 class="p4 nobreak" id="NOTICE">NOTICE.</h2> -</div> - -<p>General Semelé’s journal, referred to in this volume, is -only an unattested copy; the rest of the manuscript authorities -quoted or consulted are original papers belonging to, and communications -received from, the duke of Wellington, marshal -Soult, marshal Jourdan, Mr. Stuart,<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> sir J. Cradock,<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> sir John -Moore, and other persons employed either in the British or -French armies during the Peninsular War.</p> - -<p>The returns of the French army are taken from the emperor -Napoleon’s original Muster Rolls.</p> - -<p>The letter S. marks those papers received from marshal Soult.</p> - - -<hr class="p4 chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1"></a>[Pg 1]</span><br /></p> - -<p class="pfs135 lsp2">HISTORY</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs70">OF THE</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs150 lsp2">PENINSULAR WAR.</p> - -<hr class="r20" /> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_V">BOOK V.</h2> - -<h3 id="CHAPTER_BV_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - -<p>The effect produced in England by the unfortunate -issue of sir John Moore’s campaign, was not -proportionable to the importance of the subject. -The people, trained to party politics, and possessing -no real power to rebuke the folly of the cabinet, -regarded disasters and triumphs with factious rather -than with national feelings, and it was alike easy -to draw the public attention from affairs of weight, -and to fix it upon matters of little moment. In the -beginning of 1809, the duke of York’s conduct -being impeached, a parliamentary investigation -followed; and to drag the private frailties of that -prince before the world, was thought essential to -the welfare of the country, when the incapacity -which had caused England and Spain to mourn in -tears of blood, was left unprobed. An insular -people only, who are protected by their situation -from the worst evils of war, may suffer themselves -to be thus deluded; but if an unfortunate campaign -were to bring a devastating enemy into the heart of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_2"></a>[2]</span> -the country, the honour of a general, and the whole -military policy of the cabinet, would no longer be -considered as mere subjects for the exercise of a -vile sophist’s talents for misrepresentation.</p> - -<p>It is true that the ill success of the British arms -was a topic, upon which many orators in both -houses of parliament expatiated with great eloquence, -but the discussions were chiefly remarkable, as examples -of acute debating without any knowledge of -facts. The opposition speakers, eager to criminate -the government, exaggerated the loss and distress -of the retreat, and comprehending neither the movements -nor the motives of sir John Moore, urged -several untenable accusations against their adversaries. -The ministers, disunited by personal feelings, -did not all adopt the same ground of defence. Lord -Castlereagh and lord Liverpool, passing over the -errors of the cabinet by which the general had been -left only a choice of difficulties, asserted, and truly, -that the advantages derived from the advance to -Sahagun more than compensated for the losses in -the subsequent retreat. Both those statesmen paid -an honourable tribute to the merits of the commander; -but Mr. Canning, unscrupulously resolute -to screen Mr. Frere, assented to all the erroneous -statements of the opposition, and endeavoured with -malignant dexterity to convert them into charges -against the fallen general. Sir John Moore was, -he said, answerable for the events of the campaign, -whether the operations were glorious or distressful, -whether to be admired or deplored, they were his -own, for he had kept the ministers ignorant of his -proceedings. Being pressed closely on that point -by Mr. C. Hutchinson, Mr. Canning repeated this -assertion. Not long afterwards, sir John Moore’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_3"></a>[3]</span> -letters, written almost daily and furnishing exact -and copious information of all that was passing in -the Peninsula, were laid before the house.</p> - -<p>The reverses experienced in Spain had somewhat -damped the ardour of the English people; but a -cause so rightful in itself, was still popular, and a -treaty having been concluded with the junta, by -which the contracting powers bound themselves to -make common cause against France, and to agree -to no peace except by mutual consent, the ministers -appeared resolute to support the contest. But while -professing unbounded confidence in the result of -the struggle, they already looked upon the Peninsula -as a secondary object; for the preparations of -Austria, and the reputation of the archduke -Charles, whose talents were foolishly said to exceed -Napoleon’s, had awakened the dormant spirit of -coalitions. It was more agreeable to the aristocratic -feelings of the English cabinet, that the French -should be defeated by a monarch in Germany, -than by a plebeian insurrection in Spain. The obscure -intrigues carried on through the princess of -Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies of Germany -emanating as they did from patrician sources, engaged -all the attention of the ministers, and exciting -their sympathy, nursed those distempered feelings, -which led them to see weakness and disaffection in -France when, throughout that mighty empire, few -desired and none dared openly to oppose the emperor’s -wishes, when even secret discontent was -confined to some royalist chiefs and splenetic republicans, -whose influence was never felt until after -Napoleon had suffered the direst reverses.</p> - -<p>Unable to conceive the extent of that monarch’s -views, and the grandeur of his genius, the ministers<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_4"></a>[4]</span> -attributed the results of his profound calculations to -a blind chance, his victories to treason, to corruption, -to any thing but that admirable skill, with -which he wielded the most powerful military force -that ever obeyed the orders of a single chief. And -thus self-deluded, and misjudging the difficulties to -be encountered, they adopted every idle project, -and squandered their resources without any great or -decided effort. While negotiating with the Spanish -Junta for the occupation of Cadiz, they were also -planning an expedition against Sicily; and while -loudly asserting their resolution to defend Portugal, -reserved their principal force for a blow against -Holland; their preparations for the last object being, -however, carried on with a pomp and publicity little -suitable to war. With what a mortal calamity that -pageant closed, shall hereafter be noticed; but at -present it is fitting to describe the operations that -took place in Spain, coincident with and subsequent -to the retreat of sir John Moore.</p> - -<p>It has been already stated, that when the capital -surrendered to the Emperor, he refused to permit -Joseph to return there, unless the public bodies and -the heads of families would unite to demand his -restoration, and swear, without any mental reservation, -to be true to him. Registers had consequently -<span class="sidenote">Nellerto.</span> -been opened in the different quarters of the city, -and twenty-eight thousand six hundred heads of -families inscribed their names, and voluntarily -swore, in presence of the host, that they were -<span class="sidenote">Azanza and O’Farril.</span> -sincere in their desire to receive Joseph. After -this, deputations from all the councils, from the -junta of commerce and money, the hall of the -Alcaldes, and from the corporation, waited on the -emperor at Valladolid, and being there joined by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5"></a>[5]</span> -the municipality of that town, and by deputies from -Astorga, Leon, and other places, presented the oath, -and prayed that Joseph might be king. Napoleon -thus entreated, consented that his brother should -return to Madrid, and reassume his kingly functions.</p> - -<p>It would be idle to argue from this apparently -voluntary submission to the French emperor, that a -change favourable to the usurpation had been produced -in the feelings of the Spanish people; but it -is evident that Napoleon’s victories and policy had -been so far effectual, that in the capital, and many -other great towns, the multitude as well as the -notables were, either from fear or conviction, submissive -to his will; and it is but reasonable to suppose, -that if his conquests had not been interrupted -by extraneous circumstances, this example would -have been generally followed, in preference to the -more glorious, but ineffectual, resistance made by -the inhabitants of those cities, whose fortitude and -whose calamities have forced from mankind a sorrowful -admiration. The cause of Spain at this -moment was in truth lost; if any cause depending -upon war, which is but a succession of violent and -sudden changes, can be called so; for her armies -were dispersed, her government bewildered, and her -people dismayed; the cry of resistance had ceased, -and in its stead the stern voice of Napoleon, answered -by the tread of three hundred thousand -French veterans was heard throughout the land. -But the hostility of Austria having arrested the -emperor’s career in the Peninsula, the energy of the -Spaniards revived at the abrupt cessation of his -terrific warfare.</p> - -<p>Joseph, escorted by his French guards, in number -between five and six thousand, entered Madrid<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6"></a>[6]</span> -in state the 23d of January. He was, however, a -king without revenues, and he would have been -without even the semblance of authority, if he had -not been likewise nominated the emperor’s lieutenant -in Spain, by virtue of which title he was -empowered to move the French army at his will. -This power was one extremely unacceptable to the -marshals, and he would have found it difficult to -enforce it, even though he had restrained the exercise -to the limits prescribed by his brother. But -disdaining to separate the general from the monarch, -<span class="sidenote">King’s correspondence captured at Vittoria, MSS.</span> -he conveyed his orders to the French army, through -his Spanish ministers, and the army in its turn disdained -and resisted the assumed authority of men, -who, despised for their want of military knowledge, -were also suspected as favouring interests essentially -differing from those of the troops.</p> - -<p>The iron grasp that had compressed the pride -and the ambitious jealousy of the marshals being -thus relaxed, the passions that had ruined the -patriots began to work among their enemies, producing -indeed less fatal effects, because their scope -was more circumscribed, but sufficiently pernicious -to stop the course of conquest. The French army, -no longer a compact body, terrible alike from its -massive strength, and its flexible activity, became -a collection of independent bands, each formidable -in itself, but, from the disunion of the generals, slow -to combine for any great object; and plainly discovering, -by irregularities and insubordination, that -they knew when a warrior, and when a voluptuous -monarch was at their head; but these evils were -only felt at a later period; and the distribution of -the troops, when Napoleon quitted Valladolid, still -bore the impress of his genius.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7"></a>[7]</span></p> - -<p>The first corps was quartered in La Mancha.</p> - -<p>The second corps was destined to invade Portugal.</p> - -<p>The third and fifth corps carried on the siege of -Zaragoza.</p> - -<p>The fourth corps remained in the valley of the -Tagus.</p> - -<p>The sixth corps, wanting its third division, was -appointed to hold Gallicia.</p> - -<p>The seventh corps continued always in Catalonia.</p> - -<p>The imperial guards, directed on Vittoria, contributed -to the security of the great communication -with France until Zaragoza should fall, and were -yet ready to march when wanted for the Austrian -war.</p> - -<p>General Dessolles, with the third division of the -sixth corps, returned to Madrid. General Bonnet, -with the fifth division of the second corps, remained -in the Montagna St. Andero.</p> - -<p>General Lapisse, with the second division of -the first corps, was sent to Salamanca, where he -was joined by Maupetit’s brigade of cavalry, which -had crossed the Sierra de Bejar.</p> - -<p>The reserve of heavy cavalry being broken up, -was distributed, by divisions, in the following -order:—</p> - -<p>Latour Maubourg’s joined the first corps. Lorge’s -and Lahoussaye’s were attached to the second -corps. Lassalle’s was sent to the fourth corps. -The sixth corps was reinforced with two brigades. -Milhaud’s division remained at Madrid, and Kellerman’s -guarded the lines of communication between -Tudela, Burgos, and Palencia.</p> - -<p>Thus, Madrid being still the centre of operations, -the French were so distributed, that by a -concentric movement on that capital, they could -crush every insurrection within the circle of their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_8"></a>[8]</span> -positions; and the great masses, being kept upon -the principal roads diverging from Madrid to the -extremities of the Peninsula, intercepted all communication -between the Provinces: while the second -corps, thrust out, as it were, beyond the circumference, -and destined, as the fourth corps had been, -to sweep round from point to point, was sure of -finding a supporting army, and a good line of -retreat, at every great route leading from Madrid -to the yet unsubdued provinces of the Peninsula. -The communication with France was, at the same -time, secured by the fortresses of Burgos, Pampeluna, -and St. Sebastian; and by the divisions -posted at St. Ander, Burgos, Bilbao, and Vittoria; -and it was supported by a reserve at Bayonne.</p> - -<p>The northern provinces were parcelled out into -military governments, the chiefs of which corresponded -with each other; and, by the means of -moveable columns, repressed every petty insurrection. -The third and fifth corps, also, having their base at -Pampeluna, and their line of operations directed -against Zaragoza, served as an additional covering -force to the communication with France, and were -themselves exposed to no flank attacks, except -from the side of Cuença, where the duke of -Infantado commanded; but that general was -himself watched by the first corps.</p> - -<p>All the lines of correspondence, not only from France -but between the different corps, were maintained -by fortified posts, having greater or lesser garrisons, -according to their importance. Between Bayonne -and Burgos there were eleven military stations. -Between Burgos and Madrid, by the road of -<span class="sidenote">Muster-rolls of the French army, MSS.</span> -Aranda and Somosierra, there were eight; and -eleven others protected the more circuitous route -to the capital by Valladolid, Segovia, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9"></a>[9]</span> -Guadarama. Between Valladolid and Zaragoza -the line was secured by fifteen intermediate points. -The communication between Valladolid and St. -Ander contained eight posts; and nine others connected -the former town with Villa Franca del -Bierzo, by the route of Benevente and Astorga; -finally, two were established between Benevente -and Leon.</p> - -<p>At this period, the force of the army, exclusive -of Joseph’s French guards, was three hundred -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_I">Appendix, No. 1</a>, section 1.</span> -and twenty-four thousand four hundred and eleven -men, about thirty-nine thousand being cavalry.</p> - -<p>Fifty-eight thousand men were in hospital.</p> - -<p>The depôts, governments, garrisons, posts of -correspondence, prisoners, and “<em>battalions of march</em>,” -composed of stragglers, absorbed about twenty-five -thousand men.</p> - -<p>The remainder were under arms, with their -regiments; and, consequently, more than two -hundred and forty thousand men were in the field: -while the great line of communication with France -was (and the military reader will do well to mark -this, the key-stone of Napoleon’s system) protected -by above fifty thousand men, whose positions were -strengthened by three fortresses and sixty-four posts -of correspondence, each more or less fortified.</p> - -<p>Having thus shewn to the reader the military -state of the French, I shall now proceed with the -narrative of their operations; following, as in the -first volume, a local rather than a chronological -arrangement of events.</p> - - -<h4>OPERATIONS IN ESTREMADURA AND LA MANCHA.</h4> - -<p>The defeat of Galluzzo has been incidentally -touched upon before. The duke of Dantzic having<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10"></a>[10]</span> -observed that the Spanish general, with six -thousand raw levies, pretended to defend a line of -forty miles, made a feint of crossing the Tagus, at -Arzobispo, and then suddenly descending to Almaraz, -forced a passage over that bridge, on the -24th of December, killed and wounded many -Spaniards, and captured four guns: and so complete -was the dispersion, that for a long time after, not -a man was to be found in arms throughout Estremadura. -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_II">Appendix, No. 2</a>, sections 2 and 3.</span> -The French cavalry were at first placed -on the tracks of the fugitives; but intelligence of -sir John Moore’s advance to Sahagun being received, -<span class="sidenote">Ibid.</span> -the pursuit ceased at Merida, and the -fourth corps, which had left eight hundred and -thirty men in garrison at Segovia, took post -between Talavera and Placentia. The duke of -Dantzic was then recalled to France, and general -Sebastiani succeeded to the command of the fourth -corps. It was at this period that the first corps -(of which the division of Lapisse only had followed -the emperor to Astorga) moved against Toledo, -and that town was occupied without opposition. -The French outposts were then pushed towards -Cuença on the one side, and towards the Sierra -Morena on the other.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the central junta, changing its first -design, retired to Seville, instead of Badajos; and -being continually urged, both by Mr. Stuart and -Mr. Frere, to make some effort to lighten the -pressure on the English army, ordered Palafox and -the duke of Infantado to advance; the one from -Zaragoza towards Tudela, the other from Cuença -towards Madrid. The marquis of Palacios, who -had been removed from Catalonia, and was now -at the head of five or six thousand levies in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11"></a>[11]</span> -Sierra Morena, was also directed to advance into -La Mancha; and Galluzzo, deprived of his -command, was constituted a prisoner, along with -Cuesta, Castaños, and a number of other culpable -or unfortunate officers, who, vainly demanding a -judgement on their cases, were dragged from place -to place by the government.</p> - -<p>Cuesta was, however, so popular in Estremadura, -that the central junta, although fearing and detesting -him, consented to his being placed at the -head of Galluzzo’s fugitives, part of whom had, -when the pursuit ceased, rallied behind the -Guadiana, and were now, with the aid of fresh -levies, again taking the form, rather than the -consistence, of an army. This appointment was an -act of deplorable weakness and incapacity. The -moral effect was to degrade the government by -exposing its fears and weakness; and, in a -military view, it was destructive, because Cuesta -was physically and mentally incapable of command. -Obstinate, jealous, and stricken in years, he was -heedless of time and circumstances, of disposition -and fitness. To punish with a barbarous severity, -and to rush headlong into battle, constituted, in -his mind, all the functions of a general.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><a href="#No_II">Appendix, -No. 2</a>, -section 2d.</div> - -<p>The president, Florida Blanca, being eighty-one -years of age, died at Seville, and the marquis of -Astorga succeeded him; but the character of the -junta was in no manner affected by the change. -Some fleeting indications of vigour had been produced -by the imminence of the danger during the -flight from Aranjuez, but a large remittance of -silver, from South America, having arrived at Cadiz, -<span class="sidenote">Appendix, No. 13. Vol. I.</span> -the attention of the members was so absorbed, by -this object, that the public weal was blotted from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12"></a>[12]</span> -their remembrance, and even Mr. Frere, ashamed -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_II">Appendix, No. 2</a>, section 2.</span> -of their conduct, appeared to acquiesce in the justness -of sir John Moore’s estimate of the value of -Spanish co-operation.</p> - -<p>The number of men to be enrolled for the defence -of the country had been early fixed at five hundred -thousand, but scarcely one-third had joined their -colours; nevertheless, considerable bodies were assembling -at different points, because the people, -especially those of the southern provinces, although -dismayed, were obedient, and the local authorities, -at a distance from the actual scene of war, rigorously -enforced the law of enrolment, and sent the recruits -to the armies, hoping thereby either to stave the -war off from their own districts, or to have the -excuse of being without fighting men, to plead for -quiet submission.</p> - -<p>The fugitive troops also readily collected again -at any given point, partly from patriotism, partly -because the French were in possession of their -native provinces, partly that they attributed their -defeats to the treachery of their generals, and -partly that, being deceived by the gross falsehoods -and boasting of the government, they, with ready -vanity, imagined that the enemy had invariably -suffered enormous losses. In fine, for the reasons -mentioned in the commencement of this history, -men were to be had in abundance; but, beyond -assembling them and appointing some incapable -person to command, nothing was done for defence.</p> - -<p>The officers who were not deceived had no confidence -either in their own troops or in the government, -nor were they themselves confided in or respected -by their men. The latter were starved, were misused, -ill-handled, and they possessed neither the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13"></a>[13]</span> -compact strength of discipline nor the daring of -enthusiasm. Under such a system, it was impossible -that the peasantry could be rendered energetic -soldiers; and they certainly were not active supporters -of their country’s cause; but, with a wonderful -constancy, they suffered for it, enduring -fatigue and sickness, nakedness and famine, with -patience, and displaying, in all their actions and -in all their sentiments, a distinct and powerful -national character. This constancy and the iniquity -of the usurpation hallowed their efforts in despite -of their ferocity, and merits respect, though the -vices and folly of the juntas and the leading men -rendered the effect of those efforts nugatory.</p> - -<p>Palacios, on the receipt of the orders above -mentioned, advanced, with five thousand men, to -Vilharta, in La Mancha, and the duke of Infantado, -anticipating the instructions of the junta, was -already in motion from Cuença. His army, reinforced -by the divisions of Cartoajal and Lilli and -by fresh levies, was about twenty thousand men, of -which two thousand were cavalry. To check the -incursions of the French horsemen, he had, a few -days after the departure of Napoleon from Madrid, -detached general Senra and general Venegas with -eight thousand infantry and all the horse to scour -the country round Tarancon and Aranjuez; the -former halted at Horcajada, and the latter endeavoured -to cut off a French detachment, but was -himself surprised and beaten by a very inferior -force.</p> - -<p>Marshal Victor, however, withdrew his advanced -posts, and, concentrating Ruffin’s and Villatte’s divisions -of infantry and Latour Maubourg’s cavalry, -at Villa de Alorna, in the vicinity of Toledo, left<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14"></a>[14]</span> -Venegas in possession of Tarancon. But, among -the Spanish generals, mutual recriminations succeeded -this failure: the duke of Infantado possessed -neither authority nor talents to repress their disputes, -and in this untoward state of affairs receiving the -orders of the junta, he immediately projected a -movement on Toledo, intending to seize that place -and Aranjuez, to break down the bridges, and to -maintain the line of the Tagus.</p> - -<p>Quitting Cuença on the 10th, he reached Horcajada -on the 12th, with ten thousand men, the -remainder of the army, commanded by Venegas, -being near Tarancon.</p> - -<p>The 13th, the duke having moved to Carascosa, -a town somewhat in advance of Horcajada, met -a crowd of fugitives, and heard, with equal surprise -and consternation, that the corps under Venegas -was already destroyed, and the pursuers close at -hand.</p> - - -<h4>ROUT OF UCLES.</h4> - -<p>It appeared that Victor, uneasy at the movements -of the Spanish generals, but ignorant of their -situation and intentions, had quitted Toledo also -on the 10th, and marched to Ocaña, whereupon -Venegas, falling back from Tarancon, took a position -at Ucles. The 12th, the French continued -to advance in two columns, of which the one, composed -of Ruffin’s division and a brigade of cavalry, -lost its way, and arrived at Alcazar; but the other, -commanded by Victor himself, and composed of -Villatte’s division, the remainder of the cavalry, -and the parc of artillery, took the road of Ucles, -and came upon the position of Venegas early in the -morning of the 13th.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15"></a>[15]</span></p> - -<p>This meeting was unexpected by either party, -but the French attacked without hesitation, and the -Spaniards, flying towards Alcazar, fell in with -Ruffin’s division, and were totally discomfitted. -Several thousands laid down their arms, and many, -dispersing, fled across the fields; some, however, -keeping their ranks, made towards Ocaña, where, -coming suddenly upon the French parc of artillery, -they received a heavy discharge of grape-shot, and -dispersed. Of the whole force, a small party only, -under general Giron, succeeded in forcing its way -by the road of Carascosa, and so reached the duke -of Infantado, who immediately retreated to Cuença, -and without further loss, as the French cavalry -were too fatigued to pursue briskly.</p> - -<p>From Cuença the duke sent his artillery towards -Valencia, by the road of Tortola; but himself, with -the infantry and cavalry, marched by Chinchilla, -and from thence to Tobarra, on the frontiers of -Murcia.</p> - -<p>At Tobarra he turned to his right, and made for -Santa Cruz de Mudela, a town situated near the -entrance to the defiles of the Sierra Morena. There -he halted in the beginning of February, after a -painful and circuitous retreat of more than two -hundred miles, in a bad season. But all his artillery -had been captured at Tortola, and his forces were, -by desertion and straggling, reduced to a handful -of discontented officers and a few thousand dispirited -men, worn out with fatigue and misery.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Victor, after scouring a part of the -province of Cuença and disposing of his prisoners, -made a sudden march upon Vilharta, intending to -surprise Palacios, but that officer apprized of the -retreat of Infantado had already effected his junction<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16"></a>[16]</span> -with the latter at Santa Cruz de Mudela. -Whereupon the French marshal recalling his troops, -again occupied his former position at Toledo. The -prisoners taken at Ucles were marched to Madrid, -those who were weak and unable to walk were -<span class="sidenote">Rocca’s Memoirs.</span> -(according to Mr. Rocca) shot by the orders of -Victor, because the Spaniards had hanged some -French prisoners. If so, it was a barbarous and a -shameful retaliation, unworthy of a soldier; for -what justice or honour is there in revenging the -death of one innocent person by the murder of -another.</p> - -<p>When Victor withdrew his posts the duke of -Infantado and Palacios proceeded to re-organize -their forces under the name of the Carolina Army. -The levies from Grenada and other parts were -ordered up, and the cavalry, commanded by the -duke of Alburquerque, endeavoured to surprise a -French regiment of dragoons at Mora, but the -latter getting together quickly, made a bold resistance -and effected their retreat with scarcely any -loss. Alburquerque having failed in this attempt -retired to Consuegra and was attacked the next day -by superior numbers, but retired fighting and got -safely off. The duke of Infantado was now displaced, -and the junta conferred the command on -general Urbina Conde de Cartaojal, who applied -himself to restore discipline, and after a time -finding no enemy in front advanced to Ciudad -Real, and taking post on the left bank of the Upper -Guadiana opened a communication with Cuesta. -At this period the latter’s force amounted to sixteen -thousand men, of which three thousand were -cavalry; for, as the Spaniards generally suffered -more in their flights than in their battles, the horsemen<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17"></a>[17]</span> -escaped with little damage and were easily -rallied again in greater relative numbers than the -infantry.</p> - -<p>The fourth corps having withdrawn, as I have -already related, to the right bank of the Tagus, -Cuesta advanced from the Guadiana and occupied -the left bank of that river, on a line extending from -the mountains in front of Arzobispo to the Puerto -de Mirabete. The French, by fortifying an old -tower, held the command of the bridge of Arzobispo, -but Cuesta immediately broke down that of -Almaraz, a magnificent structure, the centre arch -of which was more than a hundred and fifty feet -in height.</p> - -<p>In these positions the troops on either side remained -tranquil both in La Mancha and Estremadura, -and so ended the exertions made to lighten -the pressure upon the English army. Two French -divisions of infantry and as many brigades of -cavalry had more than sufficed to baffle them, and -hence the imminent danger that menaced the south -of Spain, when sir John Moore’s vigorous operations -drew the emperor’s forces to the north, may -be justly estimated.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18"></a>[18]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BV_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS IN ARAGON.</h4> - -<p>From the field of battle at Tudela, all the fugitives -of O’Neil’s, and a great part of those from -Castaños’s army, fled to Zaragoza and with such -speed as to bring the first news of their own disaster. -With the troops, also, came an immense number of -carriages and the military chests, for the roads were -wide and excellent and the pursuit was slack.</p> - -<p>The citizens and the neighbouring peasantry -were astounded at this quick and unexpected -calamity. They had, with a natural credulity, -relied on the vain and boasting promises of their -chiefs, and being necessarily ignorant of the true -state of affairs never doubted that their vengeance -would be sated by a speedy and complete destruction -of the French. When their hopes were thus -suddenly blasted; when they beheld troops, from -whom they expected nothing but victory, come -pouring into the town with all the tumult of panic; -when the peasants of all the villages through which -the fugitives passed, came rushing into the city -along with the scared multitude of flying soldiers -and camp followers; every heart was filled with -consternation, and the date of Zaragoza’s glory -would have ended with the first siege, if the success -at Tudela had been followed up by the French -with that celerity and vigour which the occasion -required.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19"></a>[19]</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote">Appendix -Vol. I.</div> - -<p>Napoleon, foreseeing that this moment of confusion -and terror would arrive, had with his usual -prudence provided the means and given directions -for such an instantaneous and powerful attack as -would inevitably have overthrown the bulwark of -the eastern provinces. But the sickness of marshal -Lasnes, the difficulty of communication, the consequent -false movements of Moncey and Ney, in fine, -the intervention of fortune, omnipotent as she is in -war, baffled the emperor’s long-sighted calculations, -and permitted the leaders in the city to introduce -order among the multitude, to complete the defensive -works, to provide stores, and finally by a -ferocious exercise of power to insure implicit obedience -to their minutest orders. The danger of -resisting the enemy appeared light, when a suspicious -word or even a discontented gesture was -instantaneously punished by a cruel death.</p> - -<p>The third corps having thus missed the favourable -moment for a sudden assault, and being -reduced by sickness, by losses in battle, and by -<span class="sidenote">Muster roll of the French Army, MSS.</span> -detachments to seventeen thousand four hundred -men, including the engineers and artillery, was too -weak to invest the city in form, and, therefore, -remained in observation on the Xalon river. -Meanwhile, a battering train of sixty guns, with -well furnished parcs, which had been by Napoleon’s -orders previously collected in Pampeluna, were -dragged by cattle to Tudela and embarked upon -the canal leading to Zaragoza.</p> - -<p>Marshal Mortier, with the fifth corps, was also -directed to assist in the siege, and he was in -march to join Moncey, when his progress also was -arrested by sir John Moore’s advance towards<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20"></a>[20]</span> -Burgos. But the utmost scope of that general’s -operation being soon determined by Napoleon’s -counter-movement, Mortier resumed his march to -reinforce Moncey, and, on the 20th of December, -their united corps, forming an army of thirty-five -thousand men of all arms, advanced against Zaragoza. -<span class="sidenote">Cavalhero.<br />Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -At this time, however, confidence had been -restored in that town, and all the preparations -necessary for a vigorous defence were completed.</p> - -<p>The nature of the plain in which Zaragoza is -situated, the course of the rivers, the peculiar -construction of the houses, and the multitude of -convents have been already described, but the -difficulties to be encountered by the French troops -were no longer the same as in the first siege. At -that time but little assistance had been derived -from science, but now, instructed by experience -and inspired as it were by the greatness of their -resolution, neither the rules of art nor the resources -of genius were neglected by the defenders.</p> - -<p>Zaragoza offered four irregular fronts, of which -the first, reckoning from the right of the town, -extended from the Ebro to a convent of barefooted -Carmelites, and was about three hundred -yards wide.</p> - -<p>The second, twelve hundred yards in extent, -reached from the Carmelites to a bridge over the -Huerba.</p> - -<p>The third, likewise of twelve hundred yards, -stretched from this bridge to an oil manufactory -built beyond the walls.</p> - -<p>The fourth, being on an opening of four hundred -yards, reached from the oil manufactory to the -Ebro.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21"></a>[21]</span></p> - -<p>The first front, fortified by an ancient wall and -flanked by the guns on the Carmelite, was strengthened -<span class="sidenote">Rogniat’s Seige of Zaragoza.<br />Cavalhero’s Siege of Zaragoza.</span> -by some new batteries and ramparts, and by -the Castle of Aljaferia, commonly called the Castle -of the Inquisition, which stood a little in advance. -This was a fort of a square form having a bastion -and tower at each corner, and a good stone ditch, and -it was connected with the body of the place by -certain walls loop-holed for musketry.</p> - -<p>The second front was defended by a double wall, -the exterior one being of recent erection, faced -with sun-dried bricks, and covered by a ditch with -perpendicular sides fifteen feet deep and twenty -feet asunder. The flanks of this front were derived -from the convent of the Carmelites, from a large -circular battery standing in the centre of the line, -from a fortified convent of the Capuchins, called -the Trinity, and from some earthen works protecting -the head of the bridge over the Huerba.</p> - -<p>The third front was covered by the river Huerba, -the deep bed of which was close to the foot of the -ramparts. Behind this stream a double entrenchment -was carried from the bridge-head to the large -projecting convent of Santa Engracia, a distance of -two hundred yards. Santa Engracia itself was very -strongly fortified and armed; and, from thence to -the oil manufactory, the line of defence was prolonged -by an ancient Moorish wall, on which several -terraced batteries were raised, to sweep all the space -between the rampart and the Huerba. These -batteries, and the guns in the convent of Santa -Engracia, likewise overlooked some works raised to -protect a second bridge that crossed the river, -about cannot-shot below the first.</p> - -<p>Upon the right bank of the Huerba, and a little<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22"></a>[22]</span> -below the second bridge, stood the convent of San -Joseph, the walls of which had been strengthened -and protected by a deep ditch with a covered way -and pallisade. It was well placed to impede the -enemy’s approaches, and to facilitate sorties on the -right bank of the river; and it was, as I have said, -open, in the rear, to the fire of the works at the -second bridge, and both were again overlooked by -the terraced batteries, and by the guns of Santa -Engracia.</p> - -<p>The fourth front was protected by the Huerba, by -the continuation of the old city wall, by new batteries -and entrenchments, and by several armed -convents and large houses.</p> - -<p>Beyond the walls the Monte Torrero, which commanded -all the plain of Zaragoza, was crowned by a -large, ill-constructed fort, raised at the distance of -<ins class="corr" id="tn-22" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'eighteen hunded yards'"> -eighteen hundred yards</ins> from the convent of San -Joseph. This work was covered by the royal canal, -the sluices of which were defended by some field-works, -open to the fire of the fort itself.</p> - -<p>On the left bank of the Ebro the suburb, built in -a low marshy plain, was protected by a chain of -redoubts and fortified houses. Finally, some gun-boats, -manned by seamen from the naval arsenal -of Carthagena, completed the circuit of defence. The -artillery of the place was, however, of too small a -<span class="sidenote">Cavalhero.</span> -calibre. There were only sixty guns carrying more -than twelve-pound balls; and there were but eight -large mortars. There was, however, no want of -small arms, many of which were English that had -been supplied by colonel Doyle.</p> - -<p>These were the regular external defences of -Zaragoza, most of which were constructed at the -time, according to the skill and means of the engineers;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23"></a>[23]</span> -but the experience of the former siege -had taught the people not to trust to the ordinary -resources of art, and, with equal genius and resolution, -they had prepared an internal system of -defence infinitely more efficacious.</p> - -<p>It has been already observed that the houses of -Zaragoza were fire-proof, and, generally, of only -two stories, and that, in all the quarters of the city, -the numerous massive convents and churches rose -like castles above the low buildings, and that the -greater streets, running into the broad-way called -the Cosso, divided the town into a variety of districts, -unequal in size, but each containing one or -more large structures. Now, the citizens, sacrificing -all personal convenience, and resigning all -idea of private property, gave up their goods, -their bodies, and their houses to the war, and, -being promiscuously mingled with the peasantry -and the regular soldiers, the whole formed one -mighty garrison, well suited to the vast fortress -into which Zaragoza was transformed: for, the -doors and windows of the houses were built up, -and their fronts loop-holed; internal communications -were broken through the party-walls, and the -streets were trenched and crossed by earthen ramparts, -mounted with cannon, and every strong -building was turned into a separate fortification. -There was no weak point, because there could be -none in a town which was all fortress, and where -the space covered by the city was the measurement -for the thickness of the ramparts: nor in this emergency -were the leaders unmindful of moral force.</p> - -<p>The people were cheered by a constant reference -to the former successful resistance; their confidence -was raised by the contemplation of the vast works<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24"></a>[24]</span> -that had been executed; and it was recalled to -their recollection that the wet, usual at that season -of the year, would spread disease among the enemy’s -ranks, and would impair, if not entirely frustrate, -his efforts. Neither was the aid of superstition -neglected: processions imposed upon the sight, -false miracles bewildered the imagination, and terrible -denunciations of the divine wrath shook the -minds of men, whose former habits and present -situation rendered them peculiarly susceptible of -such impressions. Finally, the leaders were themselves -so prompt and terrible in their punishments -that the greatest cowards were likely to show the -boldest bearing in their wish to escape suspicion.</p> - -<p>To avoid the danger of any great explosion, the -powder was made as occasion required; and this -was the more easily effected because Zaragoza contained -a royal depôt and refinery for salt-petre, and -there were powder-mills in the neighbourhood, -which furnished workmen familiar with the process -of manufacturing that article. The houses and -trees beyond the walls were all demolished and cut -down, and the materials carried into the town. The -public magazines contained six months’ provisions; -the convents were well stocked, and the inhabitants -had, likewise, laid up their own stores for several -months. General Doyle also sent a convoy into the -town from the side of Catalonia, and there was -abundance of money, because, in addition to the -resources of the town, the military chest of Castaños’s -army, which had been supplied only the -night before the battle of Tudela, was, in the flight, -carried to Zaragoza.</p> - -<p>Companies of women, enrolled to attend the -hospitals and to carry provisions and ammunition<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25"></a>[25]</span> -to the combatants, were commanded by the countess -<span class="sidenote">Doyle’s Correspondence, M.S.<br />Cavalhero, Siege of Zaragoza.</span> -of Burita, a lady of an heroic disposition, who -is said to have displayed the greatest intelligence -and the noblest character during both sieges. -There were thirteen engineer officers, and eight -hundred sappers and miners, composed of excavators -formerly employed on the canal, and there were -from fifteen hundred to two thousand cannoneers.</p> - -<p>The regular troops that fled from Tudela, being -joined by two small divisions, which retreated, at -the same time, from Sanguessa and Caparosa, -formed a garrison of thirty thousand men, and, -together with the inhabitants and peasantry, presented -a mass of fifty thousand combatants, who, -with passions excited almost to phrensy, awaited an -assault amidst those mighty entrenchments, where -each man’s home was a fortress and his family a -garrison. To besiege, with only thirty-five thousand -men, a city so prepared was truly a gigantic -undertaking!</p> - - -<h4>SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.</h4> - -<p>The 20th of December, the two marshals, Moncey -and Mortier, having established their hospitals and -<span class="sidenote">Rogniat.</span> -magazines at Alagon on the Xalon, advanced in -three columns against Zaragoza.</p> - -<p>The first, composed of the infantry of the third -corps, marched by the right bank of the canal.</p> - -<p>The second, composed of general Suchet’s division -of the fifth corps, marched between the canal -and the Ebro.</p> - -<p>The third, composed of general Gazan’s division -of infantry, crossed the Ebro opposite to Tauste, -and from thence made an oblique march to the -Gallego river.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26"></a>[26]</span></p> - -<p>The right and centre columns arrived in front of -the town that evening. The latter, after driving -back the Spanish advanced guards, halted at a distance -of a league from the Capuchin convent of the -Trinity; the former took post on both sides of the -Huerba, and, having seized the aqueduct by which -the canal is carried over that river, proceeded, in -pursuance of Napoleon’s orders, to raise batteries, -and to make dispositions for an immediate assault -on Monte Torrero. Meanwhile general Gazan, -with the left column, marching by Cartejon and -Zuera reached Villa Nueva, on the Gallego river, -without encountering an enemy.</p> - -<p>The Monte Torrero was defended by five thousand -Spaniards, under the command of general -St. Marc; but, at day-break on the 21st, the French -opened their fire against the fort, and one column -of infantry having attracted the attention of the -Spaniards, a second, unseen, crossed the canal -under the aqueduct, and, penetrating between the -fort and the city, entered the former by the rear, -and, at the same time, a third column stormed the -works protecting the great sluices. These sudden -attacks, and the loss of the fort, threw the -<span class="sidenote">Cavalhero.</span> -Spaniards into confusion, and they hastily retired -to the town, which so enraged the plebeian leaders -that the life of St. Marc was with difficulty saved -by Palafox.</p> - -<p>It had been concerted among the French that -general Gazan should assault the suburb, simultaneously -with the attack on the Torrero; and that -officer, having encountered a body of Spanish and -Swiss troops placed somewhat in advance, drove -the former back so quickly that the Swiss, unable -to make good their retreat, were, to the number of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27"></a>[27]</span> -three or four hundred, killed or taken. But, notwithstanding -<span class="sidenote">Rogniat.</span> -this fortunate commencement, Gazan -did not attack the suburb itself until after the affair -at Monte Torrero was over, and then only upon a -single point, and without any previous examination -of the works. The Spaniards, recovering from their -first alarm, soon reinforced this point, and Gazan -was forced to desist, with the loss of four hundred -men. This important failure more than balanced -the success against the Monte Torrero. It restored -the shaken confidence of the Spaniards at a most -critical moment, and checking in the French, at the -outset, that impetuous spirit, that impulse of victory, -which great generals so carefully watch and improve, -threw them back upon the tedious and chilling -process of the engineer.</p> - -<p>The 24th of December the investment of Zaragoza -was completed on both sides of the Ebro. -General Gazan occupied the bridge over the Gallego -with his left, and covered his front from sorties by -inundations and cuts that the low, marshy plain -where he was posted enabled him to make without -difficulty.</p> - -<p>General Suchet occupied the space between the -Upper Ebro and the Huerba.</p> - -<p>Morlot’s division of the 3d corps encamped in -the broken hollow that formed the bed of that -stream.</p> - -<p>General Meusnier’s division crowned the Monte -Torrero, and general Grandjean continuing the -circuit to the Lower Ebro, communicated with -Gazan’s posts on the other side. Several Spanish -detachments that had been sent out to forage were -thus cut off, and could never re-enter the town; -and a bridge of boats being constructed on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28"></a>[28]</span> -Upper Ebro completed the circle of investment, -and ensured a free intercourse between the different -quarters of the army.</p> - -<p>General Lacoste, an engineer of reputation, and -<ins class="corr" id="tn-28" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'aid-de-camp'"> -aide-de-camp</ins> to the Emperor, directed the siege. -His plan was, that one false and two real attacks -should be conducted by regular approaches on the -right bank of the Ebro, and he still hoped to take -the suburb by a sudden assault. The trenches -being opened on the night of the 29th of December, -the 30th the place was summoned, and the terms -dictated by Napoleon when he was at Aranda de -Duero, were offered. The example of Madrid was -also cited to induce a surrender. Palafox replied, -that—If Madrid had surrendered, Madrid had been -sold: Zaragoza would neither be sold nor surrender! -On the receipt of this haughty answer the attacks -were commenced; the right being directed against -the convent of San Joseph; the centre against the -upper bridge over the Huerba; the left, which was -the false one, against the castle of Aljaferia.</p> - -<p>The 31st Palafox made sorties against all the -three attacks. From the right and centre he was -beaten back with loss, and he was likewise repulsed -on the left at the trenches: but some of his cavalry -gliding between the French parallel and the Ebro -surprised and cut down a post of infantry stationed -behind some ditches that intersected the low ground -on the bank of that river. This trifling success -exalted the enthusiasm of the besieged, and Palafox -gratified his personal vanity by boasting proclamations -and orders of the day, some of which bore the -marks of genius, but the greater part were ridiculous.</p> - -<p>The 1st of January the second parallels of the -true attacks were commenced. The next day Palafox<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29"></a>[29]</span> -caused the attention of the besiegers to be -occupied on the right bank of the Ebro, by slight -skirmishes, while he made a serious attack from the -side of the suburb on general Gazan’s lines of contrevallation. -This sally was repulsed with loss, -but, on the right bank, the Spaniards obtained -some success.</p> - -<p>Marshal Moncey being called to Madrid, Junot -assumed the command of the third corps, and, -about the same time, marshal Mortier was directed -to take post at Calatayud, with Suchet’s division of -the fifth corps, for the purpose of securing the -communication with Madrid. The gap in the -circle of investment left by this draft of eight thousand -men, being but scantily stopped by extending -general Morlot’s division, a line of contrevallation -was constructed at that part to supply the place of -numbers.</p> - -<p>The besieged, hoping and expecting each day -that the usual falls of rain taking place would -render the besiegers’ situation intolerable, continued -their fire briskly, and worked counter approaches -on to the right of the French attacks: but the -season was unusually dry, and a thick fog rising -each morning covered the besiegers’ advances and -protected their workmen, both from the fire and -from the sorties of the Spaniards.</p> - -<p>The 10th of January, thirty-two pieces of French -artillery being mounted and provisioned, the convent -of San Joseph and the head of the bridge over -the Huerba, were battered in breach, and, at the -same time, the town was bombarded. San Joseph -was so much injured by this fire that the Spaniards, -resolving to evacuate it, withdrew their guns. -Nevertheless, two hundred of their men made a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30"></a>[30]</span> -vigorous sortie at midnight, and were upon the -point of entering one of the French batteries, when -they were taken in flank by two guns loaded with -grape, and were, finally, driven back, with loss of -half their number.</p> - -<p>The 11th, the besiegers’ batteries continued to -play on San Joseph with such success that the -breach became practicable, and, at four o’clock in -the evening, some companies of infantry, with two -field-pieces, attacked by the right, and a column -was kept in readiness to assail the front, when this -attack should have shaken the defence. Two other -companies of chosen men were directed to search -for an entrance by the rear, between the fort and -the river.</p> - -<p>The defences of the convent were reduced to a -ditch eighteen feet deep, and a covered way which, -falling back by both flanks to the Huerba, was then -extended along the banks of that river for some -distance. A considerable number of men still -occupied this covered way: but, when the French -field-pieces on the right raked it with a fire of -grape, the Spaniards were thrown into confusion, -and crossing the bed of the river took shelter in the -town. At that moment the front of the convent -was assaulted; but, while the depth of the ditch -and the Spanish fire checked the impetuosity of the -assailants at that point; the chosen companies -passed round the works, and finding a small bridge -over the ditch crossed it, and entered the convent -by the rear. The front was carried by escalade, -almost at the same moment, and the few hundred -Spaniards that remained were killed or made -prisoners.</p> - -<p>The French, who had suffered but little in this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31"></a>[31]</span> -assault, immediately lodged themselves in the -convent, raised a rampart along the edge of the -Huerba, and commenced batteries against the body -of the place and against the works at the head of -the upper bridge, from whence, as well as from the -town, they were incommoded by the fire that played -into the convent.</p> - -<p>The 15th, the bridge-head, in front of Santa -Engracia, was carried with the loss of only three -men; but the Spaniards cut the bridge itself, and -sprung a mine under the works; the explosion, -however, occasioned no mischief, and the third parallels -being soon completed, and the trenches of the -two attacks united, the defences of the besieged -were thus confined to the town itself. They could -no longer make sallies on the right bank of the -Huerba without overcoming the greatest difficulties. -The passage of the Huerba was then effected by -the French, and breaching and counter-batteries, -mounting fifty pieces of artillery, were constructed -against the body of the place. The fire of these -guns played also upon the bridge over the Ebro, -and interrupted the communication between the -suburb and the town.</p> - -<p>Unshaken by this aspect of affairs, the Spanish -leaders, with great readiness of mind, immediately -forged intelligence of the defeat of the emperor, -and, with the sound of music, and amidst the shouts -of the populace, proclaimed the names of the marshals -who had been killed; asserting, also, that -Palafox’s brother, the marquis of Lazan, was already -wasting France. This intelligence, extravagant as -it was, met with implicit credence, for such was -the disposition of the Spaniards throughout this war, -that the imaginations of the chiefs were taxed to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32"></a>[32]</span> -produce absurdities proportionable to the credulity -of their followers; hence the boasting of the leaders -and the confidence of the besieged augmented as -the danger increased, and their anticipations of victory -seemed realized when the night-fires of a succouring -force were discerned blazing on the hills -behind Gazan’s troops.</p> - -<p>The difficulties of the French were indeed fast -increasing, for while enclosing Zaragoza they were -themselves encircled by insurrections, and their supplies -so straightened that famine was felt in their -camp. Disputes amongst the generals also diminished -the vigour of the operations, and the bonds -of discipline being relaxed, the military ardour of -the troops naturally became depressed. The soldiers -reasoned openly upon the chances of success, which, -in times of danger, is only one degree removed from -mutiny.</p> - -<p>The nature of the country about Zaragoza was -exceedingly favourable to the Spaniards. The town, -although situated in a plain, was surrounded, at the -distance of some miles, by strong and high mountains, -and, to the south, the fortresses of Mequinenza -and Lerida afforded a double base of operations for -any forces that might come from Catalonia and -Valencia. The besiegers drew all their supplies -from Pampeluna, and consequently their long line -of operations, running through Alagon, Tudela, and -Caparosa, was difficult to defend from the insurgents, -who, being gathered in considerable numbers -in the Sierra de Muela and on the side of Epila, -threatened Alagon, while others, descending from -the mountain of Soria, menaced the important point -of Tudela.</p> - -<p>The marquis of Lazan, anxious to assist his brother,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33"></a>[33]</span> -had drafted five thousand men from the -Catalonian army, and taking post in the Sierra de -Liciñena, or Alcubierre, on the left of the Ebro, -drew together all the armed peasantry of the valleys -as high as Sanguessa, and extending his line from -Villa Franca on the Ebro to Zuera on the Gallego, -hemmed in the division of Gazan, and even sent -detachments as far as Caparosa to harass the French -convoys coming from Pampeluna.</p> - -<p>To maintain their communications and to procure -provisions the besiegers had placed between two -or three thousand men in Tudela, Caparosa, and -Tafalla, and some hundreds in Alagon and at Montalbarra. -Between the latter town and the investing -army six hundred and fifty cavalry were stationed: -a like number were posted at Santa Fé, to watch -the openings of the Sierra de Muela, and sixteen -hundred cavalry with twelve hundred infantry, -under the command of general Wathier, were -pushed towards the south as far as Fuentes, -Wathier, falling suddenly upon an assemblage of -four or five thousand insurgents that had taken post -at Belchite, broke and dispersed them, and then -pursuing his victory took the town of Alcanitz, and -established himself there in observation for the rest -of the siege. But Lazan still maintained himself -in the Alcubierre.</p> - -<p>In this state of affairs marshal Lasnes, having -recovered from his long sickness, arrived before -Zaragoza, and took the supreme command of both -corps on the 22d of January. The influence of his -firm and vigorous character was immediately perceptible; -he recalled Suchets division from Calatayud, -where it had been lingering without necessity, -<span class="sidenote">Rogniat.</span> -and, sending it across the Ebro, ordered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34"></a>[34]</span> -Mortier to attack Lazan. At the same time a -smaller detachment was directed against the insurgents -in Zuera, and, meanwhile, Lasnes repressing -all disputes, restored discipline in the army, and -pressed the siege with infinite resolution.</p> - -<p>The detachment sent to Zuera defeated the insurgents -and took possession of that place and of the -bridge over the Gallego. Mortier encountered the -Spanish advanced guard at Perdeguera, and pushed -it back to Nuestra Señora de Vagallar, where the -main body, several thousand strong, was posted. -After a short resistance, the whole fled, and the -French cavalry took four guns; Mortier then spreading -his troops in a half circle, extending from -Huesca to Pina on the Ebro, awed all the country -lying between those places and Zaragoza, and prevented -any further insurrections.</p> - -<p>A few days before the arrival of marshal Lasnes, -the besieged being exceedingly galled by the fire -from a mortar-battery, situated at some distance -behind the second parallel of the central attack, -eighty volunteers, under the command of Don -Mariano Galindo, endeavoured to silence it. They -surprised and bayonetted the guard in the nearest -trenches, and passing on briskly to the battery, -entered it, and were proceeding to spike the artillery, -when unfortunately the reserve of the French arrived, -and, the alarm being given, the guards of -the first trenches also assembled in the rear of this -gallant band, intercepting all retreat. Thus surrounded, -Galindo, fighting bravely, was wounded -and taken, and the greatest part of his comrades -perished with as much honour as simple soldiers -can attain.</p> - -<p>The armed vessels in the river now made an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35"></a>[35]</span> -attempt to flank the works raised against the castle -of Aljaferia, but the French batteries forced them -to drop down the stream again; and between the -nights of the 21st and the 26th of January the -besiegers’ works being carried across the Huerba, -the third parallels of the real attacks were -completed. The oil manufactory and some other -advantageous posts, on the left bank of the above-named -river, were also taken possession of and included -in the works, and at the false attack a second -parallel was commenced at the distance of a hundred -and fifty yards from the castle of Aljaferia; but -these advantages were not obtained without loss. -The Spaniards made sallies, in one of which they -spiked two guns and burnt a French post on the -right.</p> - -<p>The besiegers’ batteries had, however, broken -the wall of the town in several places. Two -practicable breaches were made nearly fronting the -convent of San Joseph; a third was commenced in -the convent of Saint Augustin, facing the oil manufactory. -The convent of San Engracia was laid -completely open to an assault; and, on the 29th, -at twelve o’clock, the whole army being under -arms, four chosen columns rushed out of the -trenches, and burst upon the ruined works of -Zaragoza.</p> - -<p>On the right, the assailants twice stormed an -isolated stone house that defended the breach of -Saint Augustin, and twice they were repulsed, and -finally driven back with loss.</p> - -<p>In the centre, the attacking column, regardless -of two small mines that exploded at the foot of the -walls, carried the breach fronting the oil manufactory, -and then endeavoured to break into the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36"></a>[36]</span> -town; but the Spaniards retrenched within the -place, opened such a fire of grape and musquetry -that the French were content to establish themselves -on the summit of the breach, and to connect their -lodgement with the trenches by new works.</p> - -<p>The third column was more successful; the -breach was carried, and the neighbouring houses -also, as far as the first large cross street; beyond -that, the assailants could not penetrate, but they -were enabled to establish themselves within the -walls of the town, and immediately brought forward -their trenches, so as to comprehend this lodgement -within their works.</p> - -<p>The assault of the fourth column, which was -directed against San Engracia, was made with -such rapidity and vigour that the Polish regiment -of the Vistula not only carried that convent itself, -but the one adjoining to it; and the victorious -troops, unchecked by the fire from the houses, and -undaunted by the simultaneous explosion of six -small mines planted in their path, swept the ramparts -to the left as far as the bridge over the -Huerba; and, at that moment, the guards of the -trenches, excited by the success of their comrades, -broke forth, without orders, mounted the walls, -pushed along the ramparts to the left, bayonetted -the artillery-men at their guns in the Capuchin -convent, and, continuing their career, endeavoured -some to reach the semicircular battery and the -Misericordia, and others to break into the town.</p> - -<p>This wild assault was soon checked by grape -from two guns planted behind a traverse on the -ramparts, and by a murderous fire from the houses. -As their ranks were thinned, the ardour of the -French sunk, and the courage of their adversaries<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37"></a>[37]</span> -increased. The former were, after a little, driven -back upon the Capuchins; and the Spaniards were -already breaking into that convent in pursuit, when -two battalions, detached by general Morlot from -the trenches of the false attack, arrived, and -secured possession of that point, which was moreover -untenable by the Spaniards, inasmuch as the -guns of the convent of Santa Engracia saw it in -reverse. The French took, on this day, more than -six hundred men. But general La Coste immediately -abandoned the false attack against the -castle, fortified the Capuchin convent and a house -situated at an angle of the wall abutting upon the -bridge over the Huerba, and then joining them by -works to his trenches, the ramparts of the town -became the front line of the French.</p> - -<p>The walls of Zaragoza thus went to the ground, -but Zaragoza herself remained erect; and, as the -broken girdle fell from the heroic city, the besiegers -started at the view of her naked strength. The -regular defences had, indeed, crumbled before the -skill of the assailants; but the popular resistance -was immediately called, with all its terrors, into -action; and, as if Fortune had resolved to mark -the exact moment when the ordinary calculations -of science should cease, the chief engineers on -both sides were simultaneously slain. The French -general, La Coste, a young man, intrepid, skilful, -and endowed with genius, perished like a brave -soldier; but the Spanish colonel, San Genis, died -not only with the honour of a soldier, but the glory -of a patriot; falling in the noblest cause, his blood -stained the ramparts which he had himself raised -for the protection of his native place.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38"></a>[38]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BV_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - -<p>The war being now carried into the streets of -Zaragoza, the sound of the alarm-bell was heard -over all the quarters of the city; and the people, -assembling in crowds, filled the houses nearest to -the lodgements made by the French. Additional -traverses and barricadoes were constructed across -the principal streets; mines were prepared in the -more open spaces; and the communications from -house to house were multiplied, until they formed -a vast labyrinth, of which the intricate windings -were only to be traced by the weapons and the -dead bodies of the defenders. The members of -the junta, become more powerful from the cessation -of regular warfare, with redoubled activity -and energy urged the defence, but increased -the horrors of the siege by a ferocity pushed -to the very verge of phrenzy. Every person, -without regard to rank or age, who excited the -suspicions of these furious men, or of those immediately -about them, was instantly put to death; -and amidst the noble bulwarks of war, a horrid -<span class="sidenote">Cavalhero.</span> -array of gibbets was to be seen, on which crowds -of wretches were suspended each night, because -their courage had sunk beneath the accumulating -dangers of their situation, or because some doubtful -expression or gesture of distress had been misconstrued -by their barbarous chiefs.</p> - -<p>From the heights of the walls which he had -conquered, marshal Lasnes contemplated this terrific -<span class="sidenote">Rogniat.</span> -scene; and, judging that men so passionate, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39"></a>[39]</span> -so prepared, could not be prudently encountered in -open battle, he resolved to proceed by the slow, -but certain process of the mattock and the mine: -and this was also in unison with the emperor’s -instructions. Hence from the 29th of January to -the 2d of February, the efforts of the French were -directed to the enlargement of their lodgements on -the walls; and they succeeded, after much severe -fighting and several explosions, in working forward -through the nearest houses; but, at the same time, -they had to sustain many counter-assaults from the -Spaniards; especially one, exceedingly fierce, made -by a friar on the Capuchins’ convent of the Trinity.</p> - -<p>It has been already observed that the crossing -of the large streets divided the town into certain -small districts, or islands of houses. To gain -possession of these, it was necessary not only to -mine but to fight for each house. To cross the -large intersecting streets, it was indispensable to -construct traverses above or to work by underground -galleries; because a battery raked each -street, and each house was defended by a garrison -that, generally speaking, had only the option of -repelling the enemy in front or dying on the gibbet -erected behind. But, as long as the convents -and churches remained in possession of the Spaniards, -the progress of the French among the islands of -small houses was of little advantage to them, because -the large garrisons in the greater buildings -enabled the defenders not only to make continual -and successful sallies, but also to countermine their -enemies, whose superior skill in that kind of warfare -was often frustrated by the numbers and persevering -energy of the besieged.</p> - -<p>To overcome these obstacles the breaching batteries<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40"></a>[40]</span> -opposite the fourth front fired upon the -convents of Saint Augustin and Saint Monica, and -the latter was assaulted on the 31st of January. -At the same time a part of the wall in another -direction being thrown down by a petard, a body of -the besiegers poured in and taking the main breach -in rear, cleared not only the convent but several -houses around it. The Spaniards undismayed immediately -opened a gallery from St. Augustin and -worked a mine under Saint Monica, but at the -moment of its being charged the French discovered -and stifled the miners.</p> - -<p>The 1st of February the breach in Saint Augustin, -also, became practicable, and the attention of the -besieged being drawn to that side, the French -sprung a mine which they had carried under the -wall from the side of Saint Monica and immediately -entered by the opening. The Spaniards thus unexpectedly -taken in the rear, were thrown into confusion -and driven out with little difficulty. They, -however, rallied in a few hours after and attempted -to retake the structure, but without success, and the -besiegers animated by this advantage broke into -the neighbouring houses and, at one push, carried -so many as to arrive at the point where the street -called the Quemada joined the Cosso, or public -walk. The besieged rallied, however, at the last -house of the Quemada, and renewed the combat -with so much fury that the French were beaten -from the greatest part of the houses they had taken, -and suffered a loss of above a hundred men.</p> - -<p>On the side of San Engracia a contest still more -severe took place; the houses in the vicinity were -blown up, but the Spaniards fought so obstinately -for the ruins that the Polish troops were scarcely<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41"></a>[41]</span> -able to make good their lodgement—although two -successive and powerful explosions had, with the -buildings, destroyed a number of the defenders.</p> - -<p>The experience of these attacks induced a change -in the mode of fighting on both sides. Hitherto -the play of the French mines had reduced the -houses to ruins, and thus the soldiers were exposed -completely to the fire from the next Spanish posts. -The engineers, therefore, diminished the quantity -of powder that the interior only might fall and the -outward walls stand, and this method was found -successful. Hereupon the Spaniards, with ready -ingenuity, saturated the timbers and planks of the -houses with rosin and pitch, and setting fire to -those which could no longer be maintained, interposed -a burning barrier which often delayed the -assailants for two days, and always prevented them -from pushing their successes during the confusion -that necessarily followed the bursting of the mines. -The fighting was, however, incessant, a constant -bombardment, the explosion of mines, the crash of -falling buildings, clamorous shouts, and the continued -echo of musquetry deafened the ear, while -volumes of smoke and dust clouded the atmosphere -and lowered continually over the heads of the combatants, -as hour by hour, the French with a terrible -perseverance pushed forward their approaches to -the heart of the miserable but glorious city.</p> - -<p>Their efforts were chiefly directed against two -points, namely that of San Engracia, which may -be denominated the left attack, and that of Saint -Augustin and Saint Monica which constituted the -right attack. At San Engracia they laboured on a -line perpendicular to the Cosso, from which they -were only separated by the large convent of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42"></a>[42]</span> -Daughters of Jerusalem, and by the hospital for -madmen, which was entrenched, although in ruins -since the first siege. The line of this attack was -protected on the left by the convent of the Capuchins, -which La Coste had fortified to repel the -counter assaults of the Spaniards. The right attack -was more diffused, because the localities presented -less prominent features to determine the direction -of the approaches; and the French having mounted -a number of light six-inch mortars, on peculiar -carriages, drew them from street to street, and -house to house, as occasion offered. On the other -hand the Spaniards continually plied their enemies -with hand grenades, which seem to have produced -a surprising effect, and in this manner the never-ceasing -combat was prolonged until the 7th of -February, when the besiegers, by dint of alternate -mines and assaults, had worked their perilous way -at either attack to the Cosso, but not without -several changes of fortune and considerable loss. -They were, however, unable to obtain a footing on -that public walk, for the Spaniards still disputed -every house with undiminished resolution.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Lasnes having caused trenches to be -opened on the left bank of the Ebro, a battery of -twenty guns played against an isolated structure -called the Convent of Jesus, which covered the -right of the suburb line. On the 7th of February -this convent was carried by storm, and with so little -difficulty that the French, supposing the Spaniards -to be panic stricken, assailed the suburb itself, but -were quickly driven back with loss; they, however, -made good their lodgement in the convent.</p> - -<p>On the town side the 8th, 9th, and 10th were -wasted by the besiegers in vain attempts to pass<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43"></a>[43]</span> -the Cosso; they then extended their flanks. On the -right with a view to reach the quay, and so connect -this attack with that against the suburb, and on the -left to obtain possession of the large and strongly -built convent of Saint Francisco, in which after exploding -an immense mine and making two assaults -they finally established themselves.</p> - -<p>The 11th and 12th, mines were worked under -the university, a large building on the Spanish side -of the Cosso, in the line of the right attack; but -their play was insufficient to open the walls, and -the storming party was beaten, with the loss of fifty -men. Nevertheless, the besiegers continuing their -labours during the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th, -passed the Cosso by means of traverses, and prepared -fresh mines under the university, but deferred -their explosion until a simultaneous effort -could be combined on the side of the suburb.</p> - -<p>At the left attack also, a number of houses, -bordering on the Cosso being gained, a battery was -established that raked that great thoroughfare above -ground, while under it six galleries were carried, -and six mines loaded to explode at the same -moment; but the spirit of the French army was -now exhausted; they had laboured and fought -without intermission for fifty days; they had -crumbled the walls with their bullets, burst the -convents with their mines, and carried the breaches -with their bayonets,—fighting above and beneath -the surface of the earth, they had spared neither -fire nor the sword, their bravest men were falling -in the obscurity of a subterranean warfare; famine -pinched them, and Zaragoza was still unconquered!</p> - - -<p>“Before this siege,” they exclaimed, “was it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44"></a>[44]</span> -ever heard of, that twenty thousand men should -besiege fifty thousand?” Scarcely a fourth of the -<span class="sidenote">Rogniat.</span> -town was won, and they, themselves, were already -exhausted. “We must wait,” they said, “for reinforcements -or we shall all perish among their -cursed ruins, which will become our own tombs, -before we can force the last of these fanatics from -the last of their dens.”</p> - -<p>Marshal Lasnes, unshaken by these murmurs and -obstinate to conquer, endeavoured to raise the -soldiers’ hopes. He pointed out to them that the -losses of the besieged so far exceeded their own, -that the Spaniards’ strength would soon be wasted -and their courage must sink, and that the fierceness -of their defence was already abated,—but if contrary -to expectation they should renew the example -of Numantia, their utter destruction must quickly -ensue from the united effects of battle, misery, and -pestilence.</p> - -<p>These exhortations succeeded, and on the 18th, all -the combinations being complete, a general assault -took place. The French at the right attack, having -opened a party-wall by the explosion of a petard, -made a sudden rush through some burning ruins, -and carried, without a check, the island of houses -leading down to the quay, with the exception of -two buildings. The Spaniards were thus forced to -abandon all the external fortifications between -Saint Augustin and the Ebro, which they had preserved -until that day. And while this assault was -in progress, the mines under the university containing -three thousand pounds of powder were sprung, and -the walls tumbling with a terrific crash,—a column of -the besiegers entered the place, and after one repulse -secured a lodgement. During this time fifty pieces<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45"></a>[45]</span> -of artillery thundered upon the suburb and ploughed -up the bridge over the Ebro, and by mid-day opened a -practicable breach in the great convent of Saint -Lazar, which was the principal defence on that -side. Lasnes, observing that the Spaniards seemed -to be shaken by this overwhelming fire, immediately -ordered an assault, and Saint Lazar being carried -forthwith, all retreat to the bridge was thus intercepted, -and the besieged falling into confusion, and -their commander, Baron Versage, being killed, were -all destroyed or taken, with the exception of three -hundred men, who braving the terrible fire to which -they were exposed, got back into the town. -General Gazan immediately occupied the abandoned -works, and having thus cut off above two thousand -men that were stationed on the Ebro, above the -suburb, forced them also to surrender.</p> - -<p>This important success being followed on the 19th -by another fortunate attack on the right bank of -the Ebro, and by the devastating explosion of sixteen -hundred pounds of powder, the constancy -of the besieged was at last shaken. <ins class="corr" id="tn-45" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'An aid-de-camp of'"> -An aide-de-camp of</ins> Palafox came forth to demand certain -terms, before offered by the marshal, adding thereto -that the garrison should be allowed to join the -Spanish armies, and that a certain number of -covered carriages should follow them. Lasnes rejected -these proposals, and the fire continued, but -the hour of surrender was come! Fifty pieces of -artillery on the left bank of the Ebro, laid the houses -on the quay in ruins. The church of Our Lady of -the Pillar, under whose especial protection the -city was supposed to exist, was nearly effaced by -the bombardment, and the six mines under the -Cosso loaded with many thousand pounds of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46"></a>[46]</span> -powder, were ready for a simultaneous explosion, -which would have laid a quarter of the remaining -houses in the dust. In fine, war had done its -work, and the misery of Zaragoza could no longer -be endured.</p> - -<p>The bombardment which had never ceased since -the 10th of January, had forced the women and -children to take refuge in the vaults, with which -the city abounded. There the constant combustion -of oil, the closeness of the atmosphere, unusual diet, -and fear and restlessness of mind, had combined to -produce a pestilence which soon spread to the garrison. -The strong and the weak, the daring soldier -and the shrinking child fell before it alike, and -such was the state of the atmosphere and the predisposition -to disease that the slightest wound -gangrened and became incurable. In the beginning -of February the deaths were from four to five -hundred daily; the living were unable to bury the -dead, and thousands of carcases, scattered about the -streets and court yards, or piled in heaps at the -doors of the churches, were left to dissolve in their -own corruption, or to be licked up by the flames -of the burning houses as the defence became contracted.</p> - -<p>The suburb, the greatest part of the walls, and -one-fourth of the houses were in the hands of the -French, sixteen thousand shells thrown during the -bombardment, and the explosion of forty-five thousand -pounds of powder in the mines had shaken the -<span class="sidenote">Cavalhero. Rogniat. Suchet.</span> -city to its foundations, and the bones of more than -forty thousand persons of every age and sex, bore -dreadful testimony to the constancy of the besieged.</p> - -<p>Palafox was sick, and of the plebeian chiefs, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47"></a>[47]</span> -curate of St. Gil, the lemonade seller of the Cosso, -and the Tios, Jorge, and Marin, having been slain in -battle, or swept away by the pestilence, the obdurate -violence of the remaining leaders was so abated, -that a fresh junta was formed, and after a stormy -consultation, the majority being for a surrender, a -deputation waited upon marshal Lasnes on the 20th -of February, to negotiate a capitulation.</p> - -<p>They proposed that the garrison should march -out with the honours of war; that the peasantry -should not be considered as prisoners; and at the -particular request of the clergy, they also demanded -that the latter should have their full revenues guaranteed -to them, and punctually paid. This article -was rejected with indignation, and, according to the -French writers, the place surrendered at discretion; -but the Spanish writers assert, that Lasnes granted -certain terms, drawn up by the deputation at the -moment, the name of Ferdinand the 7th being purposely -omitted in the instrument, which in substance -run thus:—</p> - -<p>The garrison to march out with the honours of -war; to be constituted prisoners, and marched to -France; the officers to retain their swords, baggage, -and horses, the men their knapsacks; and persons -of either class, wishing to serve Joseph, to be immediately -enrolled in his ranks. The peasants to -be sent to their homes. Property and religion to -be guaranteed.</p> - -<p>With this understanding the deputies returned to -the city; but fresh commotions had arisen during -their absence. The party for protracting the defence, -although the least numerous, were the most energetic; -they had before seized all the boats on the -Ebro, fearing that Palafox and others, of whom they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48"></a>[48]</span> -entertained suspicions, would endeavour to quit the -town; and they were still so menacing and so powerful, -that the deputies durst not pass through the -streets, but retired outside the walls to the castle of -Aljaferia, and from thence sent notice to the junta -of their proceedings. The dissentient party would, -however, have fallen upon the others the next day, -if the junta had not taken prompt measures to enforce -the surrender. The officer in command of the walls -near the castle, by their orders, gave up his post to -the French during the night, and on the 21st of -February, from twelve to fifteen thousand sickly -beings laid down those arms which they were -scarcely able to support; and this cruel and memorable -siege was finished.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Observations.</span>—1º.—When the other events of -the Spanish war shall be lost in the obscurity of -time, or only traced by disconnected fragments, the -story of Zaragoza, like some ancient triumphal pillar -standing amidst ruins, will tell a tale of past glory; -and already men point to the heroic city, and call -her Spain, as if her spirit were common to the whole -nation; yet it was not so, nor was the defence of -Zaragoza itself the effect of unalloyed virtue. It -was not patriotism, nor was it courage, nor skill, nor -fortitude, nor a system of terror, but all these combined -under peculiar circumstances that upheld the -defence; and this combination, and how it was -brought about, should be well considered; because -it is not so much by catching at the leading resemblances, -as by studying the differences of great -affairs, that the exploits of one age can be made to -serve as models for another.</p> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_048fp" style="max-width: 30em;"> - <p class="fs70"><em>Plate 1. to face Pa. 48.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_048fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_048fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"> -<em>Explanatory Sketch</em> of the<br /> -SEIGE OF ZARAGOZA,<br /> -<em>1808, 1809</em>.<br /> -<p><em>London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>2º.—The defence of Zaragoza may be examined -under two points of view; as an isolated event, and -as a transaction bearing on the general struggle in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49"></a>[49]</span> -the Peninsula. With respect to the latter, it was -a manifest proof, that neither the Spanish people, -nor the government, partook of the Zaragozan energy. -For it would be absurd to suppose that, in the midst -of eleven millions of people, animated by an ardent -enthusiasm, fifty thousand armed men could for two -months be besieged, shut in, destroyed, they and -their works, houses, and bodies, mingled in one -terrible ruin, by less than thirty-five thousand adversaries, -and that without one effort being made to -save them!</p> - -<p>Deprive the transaction of its dazzling colours, -and the simple outline comes to this: Thirty-five -thousand French, in the midst of insurrections, in -despite of a combination of circumstances peculiarly -favourable to the defence, reduced fifty thousand of -the bravest and most energetic men in Spain. It is -true, the latter suffered nobly; but was their example -imitated? Gerona, indeed, although less celebrated, -rivalled, and perhaps more than rivalled, -the glory of Zaragoza; but elsewhere her fate spoke, -not trumpet-tongued to arouse, but with a wailing -voice, that carried dismay to the heart of the nation.</p> - -<p>3d.—As an isolated transaction, the siege of Zaragoza -is very remarkable; but it would be a great -error to suppose, that any town, the inhabitants of -which were equally resolute, might be as well defended. -Fortitude and bravery will do much; but -the combinations of science are not to be defied with -impunity. There are no miracles in war! If the -houses of Zaragoza had not been nearly incombustible, -the bombardment alone would have caused -the besieged to surrender, or to perish with their -flaming city.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50"></a>[50]</span></p> - -<p>4th.—That the advantage offered by the peculiar -structure of the houses, and the number of the convents -and churches, was ably seized by the Spaniards, -is beyond doubt. General Rogniat, Lacoste’s successor, -indeed, treats his opponents’ skill in fortification -with contempt; but colonel San Genis’ talents are -not to be judged of by the faulty construction of a few -out-works, at a time when he was under the control -of a disorderly and ferocious mob. He knew how to -adapt his system of defence to the circumstances of -the moment, and no stronger proof of real genius -can be given. “Do not consult me about a capitulation,” -was his common expression. “<em>I shall -never be of opinion that Zaragoza can make no -further defence.</em>” But neither the talents of San -Genis, nor the construction of the houses, would -have availed, if the people within had not been of -a temper adequate to the occasion; and to trace the -passions by which they were animated to their true -causes is a proper subject for historical and military -research.</p> - -<p>5th.—That they did not possess any superior -courage is evident from the facts that the -besieged, although twice the number of the besiegers, -never made any serious impression by -their sallies, and that they were unable to defend -the breaches. In large masses, the standard of -courage which is established by discipline may be -often inferior to that produced by fanaticism, or -any other peculiar excitement; but the latter never -lasts long, neither is it equable, because men are -of different susceptibility, following their physical -and mental conformation. Hence a system of terror -has always been the resource of those leaders who, -engaged in great undertakings, have been unable to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51"></a>[51]</span> -recur to discipline. Enthusiasm stalked in front of -their bands, but punishment brought up the rear; -and Zaragoza was no exception to this practice.</p> - -<p>6th.—It may be said that the majority of the besieged, -not being animated by any peculiar fury, a -system of terror could not be carried to any great -length; but a close examination explains this seeming -mystery. The defenders were composed of three -distinct parties,—the regular troops, the peasantry -from the country, and the citizens; but the citizens, -who had most to lose, were naturally the fiercest, -and, accordingly, amongst them, the system of terror -was generated. The peasantry followed the example, -as all ignorant men, under no regular control, -will do; the soldiers meddled but little in the -interior arrangements, and the division of the town -into islands of posts rendered it perfectly feasible -for violent persons, already possessed of authority, -to follow the bent of their inclinations: there was -no want of men, and the garrison of each island -found it their own interest to keep those in front of -them to their posts, that the danger might be the -longer staved off from themselves.</p> - -<p>7th.—Palafox was only the nominal chief of Zaragoza, -the laurels gathered in both sieges should -adorn plebeian brows, but those laurels dripped -with kindred as well as foreign blood. The energy -of the real chiefs, and the cause in which that -energy was exerted, may be admired; the acts perpetrated -by this ruling band were, in themselves, -atrocious; and Palafox, although unable to arrest -their savage proceedings, can claim but little credit -for his own conduct. For more than a month preceeding -the surrender, he never came forth of a -vaulted building, which was impervious to shells,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52"></a>[52]</span> -and in which, there is too much reason to believe, -he and others, of both sexes, lived in a state of -sensuality, forming a disgusting contrast to the -wretchedness that surrounded them.</p> - - -<p>OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRENCH OPERATIONS.</p> - -<p>1º. Before the arrival of marshal Lasnes, the -operations were conducted with little vigour. The -want of unity, as to time, in the double attack of -the Monte Torrero and the suburb, was a flagrant -error, that was not redeemed by any subsequent -activity; but, after the arrival of that marshal, the -siege was pursued with singular intrepidity and -firmness. General Rogniat appears to disapprove -of Suchet’s division having been sent to Calatayud, -yet it seems to have been a judicious measure, inasmuch -as it was necessary,—</p> - -<p>1st. To protect the line of correspondence with -Madrid.</p> - -<p>2d. To have a corps at hand, lest the duke of -Infantado should quit Cuença, and throw himself -into the Guadalaxara district, a movement that -would have been extremely embarrassing to the -king. Suchet’s division, while at Calatayud, fulfilled -these objects, without losing the power of succouring -Tudela, or, by a march on the side of Daroca, -of intercepting the duke of Infantado if he attempted -to raise the siege of Zaragoza; but, when -the Spanish army at Cuença was directed on Ucles, -and that of the marquis of Lazan was gathering -strength on the left bank of the Ebro, it was undoubtedly -proper to recall Suchet.</p> - -<p>2º.—It may not be misplaced here to point out -the errors of Infantado’s operations. If, instead of -bringing on a battle with the first corps, he had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53"></a>[53]</span> -marched to the Ebro, established his depôts and -places of arms at Mequinenza and Lerida, opened -a communication with Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, -and joined the marquis of Lazan’s troops to -his own, he might have formed an entrenched -camp in the Sierra de Alcubierre, and from thence -have carried on a methodical war with, at least, -twenty-five thousand regular troops; the insurrections -on the French flanks and line of communication -with Pampeluna would then have become -formidable; and, in this situation, having the fortresses -of Catalonia behind him, with activity and -prudence he might have raised the siege.</p> - -<p>3º.—From a review of all the circumstances -attending the siege of Zaragoza, we may conclude -that fortune was extremely favourable to the French. -They were brave, persevering, and skilful, and they -did not lose above four thousand men; but their -success was owing partly to the errors of their opponents, -principally to the destruction caused by -<span class="sidenote">Rogniat.</span> -the pestilence within the town; for, of all that -multitude said to have fallen, six thousand Spaniards -only were slain in battle. Thirteen convents -and churches had been taken; but, when the town -surrendered, forty remained to be forced.</p> - -<p>Such are the principal circumstances of this memorable -siege. I shall now relate the contemporary -operations in Catalonia.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54"></a>[54]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BV_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.</h4> - -<p>It will be remembered, that when the second -siege of Gerona was raised, in August, 1808, general -Duhesme returned to Barcelona, and general -Reille to Figueras; after which, the state of affairs -obliged those generals to remain on the defensive. -Napoleon’s measures to aid them were as prompt as -the occasion required. While the siege of Gerona -was yet in progress, he had directed troops to assemble -at Perpignan in such numbers, as to form with -those already in Catalonia, an army of more than -forty thousand men, to be called the “<em>7th corps</em>.” -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations.</span> -Then appointing general Gouvion St. Cyr to command -it, he gave him this short but emphatic order: -“<em>Preserve Barcelona for me. If that place be lost, -I cannot retake it with 80,000 men.</em>”</p> - -<p>The troops assembled at Perpignan were the -greatest part but raw levies; Neapolitans, Etruscans, -Romans, and Swiss: there were, however, some old -regiments; but as the preparations for the grand -army under the emperor absorbed the principal attention -of the administration in France, general St. -Cyr was straightened in the means necessary to take -the field; and his undisciplined troops, suffering -severe privations, were depressed in spirit, and inclined -to desert.</p> - -<p>The 1st of November, Napoleon, who was at -Bayonne, sent orders to the “<em>7th corps</em>” to commence -its operations; and St. Cyr, having put his -divisions in motion on the 3d, crossed the frontier,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55"></a>[55]</span> -and established his head-quarters at Figueras on -the 5th.</p> - -<p>In Catalonia, as in other parts of Spain, lethargic -vanity, and abuses of the most fatal kind, had succeeded -to the first enthusiasm, and withered the -energy of the people. The local junta issued, -indeed, abundance of decrees, and despatched agents -to the supreme junta, and to the English commanders -in the Mediterranean, and in Portugal, all -charged with the same instructions, namely, to demand -arms, ammunition, and money. And although -the central junta treated their demands with contempt, -the English authorities answered them generously -and freely. Lord Collingwood lent the -assistance of his fleet. From Malta and Sicily arms -were obtained; and sir Hew Dalrymple having -completely equipped the Spanish regiments released -by the convention of Cintra, despatched them to -Catalonia in British transports. Yet it may be -doubted if the conduct of the central junta were not -the wisest; for the local government established at -Tarragona had already become so negligent, or so -corrupt, that the arms thus supplied were, instead -<span class="sidenote">Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence.</span> -of being used in defence of the country, sold to -foreign merchants! and such being the political state -of Catalonia, it naturally followed that the military -affairs should be ill conducted.</p> - -<p>The count of Caldagues, who had relieved Gerona, -returned by Hostalrich, and resumed the line of the -Llobregat; and fifteen hundred men, drawn from -<span class="sidenote">Cabanes.</span> -the garrison of Carthagena, having reached Taragona, -the marquis of Palacios, accompanied by the -junta, quitted the latter town, and fixed his head-quarters -at Villa Franca, within twenty miles of -Caldagues. The latter disposed his troops, five thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56"></a>[56]</span> -in number, at different points between Martorel -and San Boy, covering a line of eighteen miles, -along the left bank of the river.</p> - -<p>General Duhesme rested a few days, and then -marching from Barcelona with six thousand men in -the night, arrived the 2d of September at day-break -on the Llobregat, and immediately attacked Caldagues’ -line in several points, but principally at San -Boy and Molino del Rey. The former fort was -carried, some guns and stores were captured, and -the Spaniards were pursued to Vegas, a distance of -seven or eight miles; but at Molino del Rey the -French were repulsed, and Duhesme then returned -to Barcelona.</p> - -<p>It was the intention of the British ministers, that -an auxiliary force should have sailed from Sicily -about this period, to aid the Catalans; and doubtless -it would have been a wise and timely effort: but -Napoleon’s foresight prevented the execution; for -he directed Murat to menace Sicily with a descent; -and that prince, feigning to collect forces on the -coast of Calabria, spread many reports of armaments -being in preparation, and, as a preliminary measure, -attacked and carried the island of Capri; upon -which occasion sir Hudson Lowe first became known -to history, by losing in a few days a post that, -without any pretensions to celebrity, might have -been defended for as many years. Murat’s demonstrations -sufficed to impose upon sir John Stuart, -and from ten to twelve thousand British troops were -thus paralyzed at a most critical period: but such -will always be the result of a policy which has no -fixed and definite object in view. When statesmen -cannot see their own way clearly, the executive -officers will seldom act with vigour.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57"></a>[57]</span></p> - -<p>The Spanish army was now daily increasing; the -tercios of Migueletes were augmented in number, -and a regiment of hussars, that had been most absurdly -kept in Majorca ever since the beginning of -the insurrection, arrived at Taragona.</p> - -<p>Mariano Alvarez, the governor of Gerona, was -appointed to the command of the vanguard, composed -of the garrisons of Gerona and Rosas, and of -the corps of Juan Claros, and other partizans.</p> - -<p>Francisco Milans and Milans de Bosch, with -their Migueletes, kept the mountains to the northward -and eastward of Barcelona; and while the -latter hemmed in the French right, the former -covered the district of El Vallés, and like a bird of -prey watched the French foragers in the plain surrounding -Barcelona.</p> - -<p>Palacios remained at Villa Franca, and the count -of Caldagues continued to guard the line of the -Llobregat.</p> - -<p>The little port of St. Felice de Quixols, near Palamos -Bay, was filled with privateers, and the -English frigates off the coast not only aided the -Spaniards in all their enterprizes, but carried on a -littoral warfare in the gulf of Lyons with great -spirit and success.</p> - -<p>During the month of September several petty -skirmishes happened between the French marauding -parties and the Migueletes about Barcelona; but on -the 10th of October, Duhesme attacked and dislodged -Francisco Milans from the mountains to the -north of that city; and designing to forage the district -of El Vallés, sent on the 11th a column of two -thousand men along the sea coast towards Mattaro, -with orders to turn from thence to the left, clear the -heights beyond the Besos, of Migueletes, and push<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58"></a>[58]</span> -for Granollers on the route to Vich: this column he -supported by a second of nearly equal strength, -under general Millossewitz.</p> - -<p>The first column reaching Granollers on the -12th, put the local junta of that district to flight, -captured some provisions and other stores, and, -finally, joined the second column, which was posted -at Mollet. Millossewitz, leaving a part of his -force at the pass of Moncada, then proceeded to -San Culgat. Caldagues, hearing of this excursion, -drew together three thousand infantry, a hundred -and fifty cavalry, and six guns from his line on the -Llobregat, and was in full march by the back of -the mountains for the pass of Moncada, expecting -to intercept the French in their return to Barcelona: -<span class="sidenote">Cabanes.</span> -but, falling in with them at San Culgat, a confused -action ensued, and both sides claimed the victory; -the French, however, retreated across the mountains -to Barcelona without having foraged the district, -and Caldagues returned to his former position, -justly proud of this vigorous and soldier-like movement.</p> - -<p>The 28th of October, Palacios quitted Catalonia -to command the levies in the Sierra Morena. -General Vives succeeded him, and the army was -again reinforced by some infantry from Majorca. -The Spanish regiments, released by the convention -of Cintra, also arrived at Villa Franca, and seven -or eight thousand Granadian levies were brought up -to Tarragona by general Reding, and, at the same -time, six thousand men drafted from the army of -Aragon, reached Lerida, under the command of the -marquis de Lazan.</p> - -<p>The whole force, including the garrisons of Hostalrich, -Gerona, and Rosas, was now not less than<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59"></a>[59]</span> -thirty-six thousand men; of which twenty-two -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.<br />Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -thousand infantry, and twelve hundred cavalry, -were in the neighbourhood of Barcelona, or in march -for the Llobregat. This force, organized in six -divisions, of which the troops in the Ampurdan -formed one, took the name of the <em>army of the right</em>, -and Vives seeing himself at the head of such a -power, and in possession of all the hills and rivers -encircling Barcelona, resolved to besiege that city.</p> - -<p>The 3d of November, he transferred his head-quarters -to Martorel; the 8th he commenced a -series of trifling skirmishes, to drive the French -posts back into the town: but they repulsed him; -and, from that time until the blockade was raised, -a warfare of the most contemptible nature was -carried on by the Spaniards: the French, who were -about ten thousand strong, always maintaining their -outposts.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding this appearance of strength, -Catalonia was a prey to innumerable disorders. -Vives, a weak, indolent man, had been a friend of -Godoy, and was not popular; he it was that, commanding -in the islands, had retained the troops in -them with such tenacity as to create doubts of his -attachment to the cause; but, although the supreme -junta privately expressed their suspicions, and -<span class="sidenote">Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence.</span> -requested lord Collingwood to force Vives to an -avowal of his true sentiments, they, at the same -time, wrote to the latter, publicly, in the most -flattering terms, and, finally, appointed him captain-general -of Catalonia. By the people, however, -both he and others were vehemently suspected, and, -as the mob governed throughout Spain, the authorities, -civil and military, were more careful to avoid -giving offence to the multitude than anxious to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60"></a>[60]</span> -molest the enemy. Catalonia was full of strong -places: but they were neither armed nor provisioned, -and, like all other Spaniards, the Catalans -were confident that the French only thought of -retreating.</p> - -<p>Such was the state of the province and of the -armies, when Napoleon, being ready to break into -the northern parts of Spain, general St. Cyr commenced -his operations. His force (including a -<span class="sidenote">Muster rolls of the French army, MSS.</span> -German division of six thousand men, not yet -arrived at Perpignan) amounted to more than thirty -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -thousand men, ill-composed, however, and badly -provided; and St. Cyr himself was extremely discontented -with his situation. The Emperor had given -him discretionary powers to act as he judged fitting, -only bearing in mind the importance of relieving -Barcelona; but marshal Berthier neglected the -equipment of the troops; and Duhesme declared -that his magazines would not hold out longer than -December.</p> - -<p>To march directly to Barcelona was neither -an easy nor an advantageous movement. That city -could only be provisioned from France; and, until -the road was cleared, by the taking of Gerona and -Hostalrich, no convoys could pass except by sea, -yet, to attack these places with prudence, it was -essential to get possession of Rosas, not only to -secure an intermediate port for French vessels -passing with supplies to Barcelona, but to deprive -the English of a secure harbour, and the Spaniards -of a point from whence they could, in concert with -their allies, intercept the communications of the -French army: and even blockade Figueras, -which, from the want of transport, could <ins class="corr" id="tn-60" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'not be be provisioned'"> -not be provisioned</ins> at this period. These considerations<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61"></a>[61]</span> -having determined St. Cyr to commence by the -siege of Rosas, he repaired to Figueras, in person, -the 6th of November; and, on the 7th, general -Reille being charged to conduct the operation, after -a sharp action, drove in the Spaniards before the -place and completed the investment.</p> - - -<h4>SIEGE OF ROSAS.</h4> - -<p>This town was but a narrow slip of houses built -along the water’s edge, at the head of the gulph of -the same name.</p> - -<p>The citadel, a large irregular pentagon, stood on -one side of the town, and, on the other, the mountains -that skirt the flat and swampy plain of the -Ampurdan, rose, bluff and rocky, at the distance of -half a mile. An old redoubt was built at the foot -of these hills, and, from thence to the citadel, an -entrenchment had been drawn to cover the houses. -Hence, Rosas, looking towards the land, had the -citadel on the left hand, the mountains on the right, -and the front covered by this entrenchment. The -roadstead permitted ships of the line to anchor -within cannon-shot of the place; and, on the right -hand coming up the gulph, a star fort, called the -Trinity, crowned a rugged hill about a mile and a -quarter distant from the citadel, the communication -between it and the town being by a narrow road -carried between the foot of the hills and the water’s -edge.</p> - -<p>The garrison of Rosas consisted of nearly three -thousand men, two bomb-vessels, and an English -seventy-four (the Excellent), were anchored off the -town, and captain West, the commodore, reinforced -the garrisons of the Trinity and the citadel with -marines and seamen from these vessels; but the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62"></a>[62]</span> -damages sustained in a former siege had been only -partially repaired; both places were ill-found in -guns and stores, and the Trinity was commanded -at the distance of pistol-shot from a point of the -mountains called the Puig Rom.</p> - -<p>The force under Reille, consisting of his own -and general Pino’s Italian division, skirmished daily -with the garrison; but the rain, which fell in -torrents, having flooded the Ampurdan, the roads -became impassable for the artillery, and delayed -the opening of the trenches. Meanwhile, Souham’s -division took post between the Fluvia and Figueras, -to cover the operations of the siege on the side of -Gerona, and an Italian brigade, under general Chabot, -was posted at Rabos and Espollas, to keep the -Somatenes down.</p> - -<p>But, before Chabot’s arrival, Reille had detached -a battalion to that side; and, being uneasy for its -safety, sent three more to its assistance: this saved -the battalion, which was in great danger; and two -companies were actually cut off by the Somatenes. -This loss, however, proved beneficial, as it enraged -the Italians, and checked their disposition to desert; -and St. Cyr, unwilling to pursue the system of -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -burning villages, and yet anxious to repress the -insidious hostility of the peasants, in reprizal for -the loss of his two companies, seized an equal -number of villagers, and sent them prisoners to -France.</p> - -<p>The inhabitants of Rosas having embarked or -taken refuge in the citadel, the houses, and the -entrenchments covering them, were left to the -French; but the latter were prevented, by the fire -of the English ships, from effecting a permanent -lodgement in the deserted town; and, after a few<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63"></a>[63]</span> -days, a detachment from the garrison, consisting -of soldiers and townsmen, established a post -there.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Captain -West’s despatch.</div> - -<p>The 8th captain West, in conjunction with the -governor, made a sally, but was repulsed; and, <ins class="corr" id="tn-63" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'on the the 9th'"> -on the 9th</ins> several yards of the citadel ramparts -crumbled; but, with the assistance of the British -seamen, the breach was repaired in the night -before the enemy became aware of the accident.</p> - -<p>The 15th an obstinate assault made on the Trinity -was repulsed, the English seamen bearing a principal -share in the success.</p> - -<p>The 16th the roads being passable, the French -battering-train was put in motion. The way leading -up to the Puig Rom was repaired, and two battalions -were posted there, on the point commanding -the Trinity.</p> - -<p>The 19th three guns were mounted against the -Trinity, and the trenches were opened at the -distance of four hundred yards from the citadel.</p> - -<p>The 20th the fire of some French mortars obliged -the vessels of war to anchor beyond the range of -the shells. During this time, Souham was harassed -by the Migueletes from the side of Gerona. -The French cavalry, unable to find forage, were -sent back to France; and Napoleon, rendered uneasy -by the reports of general Duhesme, ordered the -seventh corps to advance to Barcelona, so as to -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -arrive there by the 26th of November; but St. Cyr -refused to abandon the siege of Rosas without a -positive order.</p> - -<p>The assistance afforded to the besieged by captain -West was represented to the junta as an attempt -of that officer to possess himself of the place. -The junta readily believed this tale, and entered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64"></a>[64]</span> -into an angry correspondence with don Pedro -O’Daly, the governor, relative to the supposed -treachery; but no measures were taken to raise the -siege. During this correspondence, the Excellent -sailed from Rosas, and was succeeded by the Fame, -captain Bennet. This officer landed some men -under the Trinity on the 23d, and endeavoured, -but ineffectually, to take the battery opposed to -that fort.</p> - -<p>The 27th the besiegers assaulted the Spaniards, -who, to the number of five hundred, had entrenched -themselves in the deserted houses of the -town. A hundred and sixty were taken, and fifty -escaped into the citadel; the rest were slain. -Breaching batteries were immediately commenced -among the ruins of the houses, and the communication -with the shipping rendered so unsafe, that -Lazan, who had come from Lerida to Gerona with -six thousand men, and had collected provisions and -<span class="sidenote">Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -stores at the mouth of the Fluvia, with the intention of -supplying Rosas by sea, abandoned his design. -The ruinous condition of the front, exposed to -the fire of the besiegers, now induced Reille to -summon the place a second time; but the governor -refused to surrender.</p> - -<p>The 30th of November, the engineers reported -that the breach in the Trinity was practicable, and -an assault was ordered; although an Italian officer, -appointed to lead the storming party of fifty men, -and who had formerly served in the fort, asserted -that the breach was not a true one. The Spanish -commandant thought his post untenable; and two -days before, the marines of the Fame had been -withdrawn by captain Bennet: but at this time, -lord Cochrane, a man of infinite talent in his profession,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65"></a>[65]</span> -and of a courage and enterprise that have -seldom, if ever, been surpassed, arrived in the Imperieuse -frigate, and immediately threw himself, -with eighty men, into the fort.</p> - -<p>The Italian’s representations being unheeded, he -advanced to the assault like a man of honour, and -was killed, together with all his followers, excepting -four, two of whom escaped back to their own -side, the other two being spared by the English -seamen, were drawn up with cords into the fort. -The breach had, however, been practicable at first; -but it was broken in an old gallery, which lord -Cochrane immediately filled with earth and hammocks, -and so cut off the opening. In the course -of a few days, a second assault was made, but the -French were again repulsed with loss. Meanwhile -the breaching batteries opened against the citadel, -and a false attack was commenced on the opposite -side.</p> - -<p>The 4th December the garrison made a sally, in -the night, from the citadel, and with some success; -but the walls were opened by the enemy’s fire, -and the next day O’Daly, hopeless of relief, surrendered -with about two thousand four hundred -men, of which two hundred were wounded. Lord -Cochrane, also, blew up the magazine, and abandoned -Fort Trinity. General St. Cyr observes that -the garrison of Rosas might have been easily carried -off, at night, by the British shipping; but to -embark two thousand five hundred men, in the -boats of two ships, and under a heavy fire, whether -by night or day, is not an easy operation; -nevertheless, the censure seems well founded, because -sufficient preparation might have been previously -made.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66"></a>[66]</span></p> - -<p>The defence of Rosas (with the exception of lord -Cochrane’s efforts) cannot be deemed brilliant, -whether with relation to the importance of the -place, the assistance that might have been rendered -from the sea, or the number of the garrison -compared with that of the besiegers. It held out, -however, thirty days, and, if that time had been -well employed by the Spaniards, the loss of the -garrison would have been amply repaid; but Vives, -wholly occupied with Barcelona, was indifferent to -the fate of Rosas. A fruitless attack on Souham’s -posts, by Mariano Alvarez, was the only effort made -to interrupt the siege, or to impede the farther progress -<span class="sidenote">Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -of the enemy. Lazan, although at the head -of six or seven thousand men, could not rely upon -more than three thousand; and his applications to -Vives for a reinforcement were unheeded.</p> - -<p>The fall of Rosas enabled St. Cyr to march to -the relief of Barcelona, and he resolved to do so: -yet the project, at first sight, would appear rather -insane than hardy; for the roads, by which Gerona -and Hostalrich were to be turned, being mere paths -impervious to carriages, no artillery, and little ammunition, -could be carried, and the country was -full of strong positions. The Germans had not yet -arrived at Perpignan; it was indispensable to leave -Reille in the Ampurdan, to protect Rosas and -Figueras; and, these deductions being made, less -than eighteen thousand men, including the cavalry, -which had been recalled from France, remained -disposable for the operation.</p> - -<p>But, on the Spanish side, Reding having come -up, there were twenty-five thousand men in the -camp before Barcelona, and ten thousand others, -under Lazan and Alvarez, were at Gerona. All<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67"></a>[67]</span> -these troops were, however, exceedingly ill organized. -<span class="sidenote">Cabanes.</span> -Two-thirds of the Migueletes only carried -pikes, and many were without any arms at all. -There was no sound military system; the Spanish -generals were ignorant of the French movements -and strength; and their own indolence and want of -vigilance drew upon them the contempt and suspicion -of the people.</p> - -<p>The 8th of December St. Cyr united his army -on the left bank of the Fluvia. The 9th he passed -that river, and, driving the Spaniards over the Ter, -established his head-quarters at Mediñya, ten miles -from Gerona. He wished, before pursuing his own -march, to defeat Lazan, lest the latter should harass -the rear of the army; but, finding that the marquis -would not engage in a serious affair, he made a -show of sitting down before Gerona on the 10th, -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -hoping thereby to mislead Vives, and render him -slow to break up the blockade of Barcelona: and -<span class="sidenote">Cabanes.</span> -this succeeded; for the Spaniard remained in his -camp, irresolute and helpless, while his enemy was -rapidly passing the defiles and rivers between Gerona -and the Besos.</p> - -<p>The nature of the country between Figueras and -Barcelona has been described in the first volume; -referring to that description, the reader will find -that the only carriage-routes by which St. Cyr -could march were, one by the sea-coast, and one -leading through Gerona and Hostalrich. The first, -exposed to the fire of the English vessels, had -also been broken up by lord Cochrane, in August; -and, to use the second, it was necessary to take -the fortresses, or to turn them by marching for three -days through the mountains. St. Cyr adopted the -latter plan, trusting that rapidity and superior knowledge<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68"></a>[68]</span> -of war would enable him to separate Lazan -and Alvarez from Vives, and so defeat them all in -succession.</p> - -<p>The 11th, he crossed the Ter and reached La -Bisbal; here he left the last of his carriages, delivered -out four days’ biscuit and fifty rounds of -ammunition to the soldiers, and with this provision, -a drove of cattle, and a reserve of ten rounds of -ammunition for each man, he commenced his hardy -march the 12th of December, making for Palamos. -On the route he encountered and beat some Migueletes -that Juan Claros had brought to oppose him, -and, when near Palamos, he suffered a little from -the fire of the English ships; but he had gained a -first step, and his hopes were high.</p> - -<p>The 13th, he turned his back upon the coast, -and, by a forced march, reached Vidreras and -Llagostera, and thus placed himself between Vives -and Lazan, for the latter had not yet passed the -heights of Casa de Selva.</p> - -<p>The 14th, marching by Mazanet de Selva and -Martorel, he reached the heights above Hostalrich, -and encamped at Grions and Masanas. During -this day’s journey, his rear was slightly harassed -by Lazan and Claros; but he was well content to -find the strong banks of the Tordera undefended by -Vives. The situation of the army was, however, -extremely critical. Lazan and Claros had, the one -on the 11th, the other on the 12th, informed Vives -of the movement; hence the bulk of the Spanish -force before Barcelona might be expected, at any -moment, in some of the strong positions in which -the country abounded, and the troops from Gerona -were, as we have seen, close in the rear; the Somatenes -were gathering thickly on the flanks, Hostalrich<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69"></a>[69]</span> -was in front, and the French soldiers had -only sixty rounds of ammunition.</p> - -<p>St. Cyr’s design was to turn Hostalrich, and get -into the main road again behind that fortress. The -smugglers of Perpignan had affirmed that there was -no pathway, but a shepherd assured him that there -was a track by which it could be effected; and, -when the efforts of the staff-officers to trace it -failed, St. Cyr himself discovered it, but nearly fell -into the hands of the Somatenes during the search.</p> - -<p>The 15th, at day-break, the troops being put in -motion, turned Hostalrich and gained the main -road. The garrison of that place, endeavouring -to harass their rear, were repulsed; but the -Somatenes on the flanks, emboldened because the -French, to save ammunition, did not return their -fire, became exceedingly troublesome; and, near -San Celoni, the head of the column encountered -some battalions of Migueletes, which Francisco -Milans had brought up from Arenas de Mar, by the -pass of Villa Gorguin.</p> - -<p>Milans, not being aware of St. Cyr’s approach, -was soon beaten, and his men fell back, part to -Villa Gorguin, part to the heights of Nuestra Señora -de Cordera: the French thus gained the defile -of Treintapasos. But they were now so fatigued -that all desired to halt, save St. Cyr, who insisted -upon the troops clearing the defile, and reaching a -plain on the other side: this was not effected before -ten o’clock. Lazan’s troops did not appear -during the day; but Vives’ army was in front, -and its fires were seen on the hills between Cardadeu -and Llinas.</p> - -<p>Information of St. Cyr’s march, as I have already -observed, had been transmitted to Vives on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70"></a>[70]</span> -11th, and there was time for him to have carried -the bulk of his forces to the Tordera before the -French could pass that river; but intelligence of -the battle of Tudela, and of the appearance of the -French near Zaragoza, arrived at the same moment, -<span class="sidenote">Cabanes.</span> -and the Spanish general betrayed the -greatest weakness and indecision, at one moment -resolving to continue before Barcelona, at another -designing to march against St. Cyr. He had, on -<span class="sidenote">Doyle’s Correspondence, MS.</span> -the 9th, sent Reding with six guns, six hundred -cavalry, and one thousand infantry, to take the -command in the Ampurdan; but, the 12th, after -receiving Lazan’s report, he reinforced Reding, who -was still at Granollers, and directed him upon Cardadeu.</p> - -<p>The 14th, he ordered Francisco Milans to march -by Mattaro and Arenas de Mar, to examine the -coast road, and, if the enemy was not in that line, -to repair also to Cardadeu.</p> - -<p>The 15th, Milans, as we have seen, was beaten -at St. Celoni; but, in the night, he rallied his -whole division on the heights of Cordera, thus -flanking the left of the French forces at Llinas.</p> - -<p>A council of war was held on the 13th. Caldagues -advised that four thousand Migueletes should -be left to observe Duhesme, and that the rest of -the army should march at once to fight St. Cyr. -Good and soldier-like advice; but Vives was loth -to abandon the siege of Barcelona, and, adopting -half-measures, left Caldagues, with the right wing -of the army, to watch Duhesme, and carried the -centre and the left, by the route of Granollers, to -the heights between Cardadeu and Llinas, where -(exclusive of Milan’s division) he united, in the -night of the 15th, about eight thousand regulars,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71"></a>[71]</span> -besides several thousand Somatenes. Duhesme immediately -occupied the posts abandoned by Vives, -and thus separated him from Caldagues.</p> - -<p>St. Cyr’s position, on the morning of the 16th, -would have been dangerous, if he had been opposed -by any but Spanish generals and Spanish troops. -Vives and those about him, irresolute and weak as -they were in action, were not deficient in boasting -words; they called the French army, in derision, -“<em>the succour</em>;” and, in allusion to the battle of -Baylen, announced that a second “<em>bull-fight</em>,” in -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -which Reding was again the “<em>matador</em>,” would be -exhibited. But Dupont and St. Cyr were men of a -different stamp: the latter justly judging that the -Spaniards were not troops to stand the shock of a -good column, united his army in one solid mass, -at day-break on the 16th, and marched straight -against the centre of the enemy, giving orders that -the head of the column should go headlong on, -without either firing or forming line.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF CARDADEU.</h4> - -<p>The hills which the Spaniards occupied were -high and wooded; the right was formed by Reding’s -division, the left by Vives, and the Somatenes hung -on the sides of a lofty ridge, which was only separated -from the right of the position by the little -river Mogent. The main road from Llinas led -straight upon the centre, and there was a second -road conducting to Mataro, which, branching off -from the first, run between the Mogent and the -right of Reding’s ground.</p> - -<p>When the French commenced their march, the -Somatenes galled their left flank, and general Pino,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72"></a>[72]</span> -whose division headed the column of attack, instead -of falling upon the centre, sent back for fresh instructions, -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -and meanwhile extended his first brigade -in a line to the left. St. Cyr, who had reiterated -the order to fight in column, was sorely -troubled at Pino’s error, the ill effects of which -were instantly felt, because, Reding advancing -against the front and flank of the extended brigade, -obliged it to commence a fire, which it was impossible -to sustain for want of ammunition.</p> - -<p>In this difficulty the French general acted with -great ability and vigour: Pino’s second brigade was -directed to do that which the first should have done. -Two companies were sent to menace the left of the -Spaniards, and St. Cyr, at the same time, rapidly -carried Souham’s division, by the Mataro road, -against Reding’s extreme right. The effect was -instantaneous and complete, the Spaniards overthrown -on their centre and right, and charged by -the cavalry, were beaten and dispersed in every -direction, leaving all their artillery and ammunition, -and two thousand prisoners behind.</p> - -<p>Vives, escaping on foot across the mountain, -reached Mataro, where he was taken on board an -English vessel. Reding fled on horseback by the -main road; and the next day, having rallied some -of the fugitives at Monmalo, retreated by the route -of San Culgat to Molino del Rey. The loss of the -French was six hundred men; but the battle, which -lasted only one hour, was so complete, that St. Cyr -resolved to push on to Barcelona immediately, without -seeking to defeat Milans or Lazan, whom he -judged too timid to venture an action: moreover, he -hoped that Duhesme, who had been informed, on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73"></a>[73]</span> -the 7th, of the intended march, and who could -hear the sound of the artillery, would intercept and -turn back the flying troops.</p> - -<p>The French army had scarcely quitted the field -of battle when Milans arrived; but, finding how -matters stood, retired to Arenas de Mar, and gave -notice to Lazan, who retreated to Gerona. St. Cyr’s -rear was thus cleared; but Duhesme, heedless of -what was passing at Cardadeu, instead of intercepting -the beaten army, sent Lecchi to attack Caldagues. -The latter general, however, concentrated -his division on the evening of the 16th, repulsed -Lecchi, and retired behind the Llobregat, but left -behind some artillery and the large magazines which -Vives had collected for the siege and accumulated -in his camp.</p> - -<p>St. Cyr reached Barcelona without encountering -any of Duhesme’s troops, and, in his Memoirs of -this campaign, represents that general as astonishingly -negligent, seeking neither to molest the enemy -nor to meet the French army; treating everything -belonging to the service with indifference, making -false returns, and conniving at gross malversation -in his generals.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</div> - -<p>St. Cyr, now reflecting upon the facility with -which his opponents could be defeated, and the -difficulty of pursuing them, resolved to rest a few -days at Barcelona, in hopes that the Spaniards, if -unmolested, would re-assemble in numbers behind -the Llobregat, and enable him to strike an effectual -blow, for his design was to disperse their forces so -as they should not be able to interrupt the sieges -which he meditated; nor was he deceived in his -calculations. Reding joined Caldagues, and rallied -from twelve to fifteen thousand men behind the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74"></a>[74]</span> -Llobregat, and Vives, having relanded at Sitjes, -sent orders to Lazan and Milans to march likewise -to that river by the district of Vallés. The arrival -of the latter was, however, so uncertain that the -French general, judging it better to attack Reding -at once, united Chabran’s division to his own, on -the 20th, and advanced to St. Felieu de Llobregat.</p> - -<p>The Spaniards were drawn up on the heights -behind the village of San Vincente; their position -was lofty and rugged, commanding a free view of -the approaches from Barcelona. The Llobregat -covered the front, and the left flank was secure -from attack, except at the bridge of Molino del Rey, -which was entrenched, guarded by a strong detachment, -and protected by heavy guns. Reding’s cavalry -amounted to one thousand, and he had fifty -pieces of artillery, the greatest part of which were -in battery at the bridge of Molino del Rey; but -his right was accessible, because the river was -fordable in several places. The main road to Villa -Franca led through this position, and, at the distance -of ten or twelve miles in the rear, the pass of Ordal -offered another post of great strength.</p> - -<p>Vives was at San Vincente on the 19th, but returned -to Villa Franca the same day; hence, when the -French appeared on the 20th, the camp was thrown -into confusion.</p> - -<p>A council of war being held, one party was for -fighting, another for retreating to Ordal: an officer -<span class="sidenote">Cabanes.</span> -was then sent to Vives for orders, but he returned -with a message, that Reding might retreat if he -could not defend his post. The latter, however, -fearing that he should be accused, and perhaps sacrificed -for returning without reason, resolved to -fight, although he anticipated nothing but disaster.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75"></a>[75]</span> -The season was extremely severe; snow was falling, -and both armies suffered from the cold and wet. -The Spanish soldiers were dispirited by past defeats, -and the despondency and irresolution of their generals -could not escape observation: but the French -and Italian troops were confident in their commander, -and flushed with success. In these dispositions the -two armies passed the night before</p> - - -<h4>THE BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY.</h4> - -<p>St. Cyr observing that Reding’s attention was -principally directed to the bridge of Molino, ordered -Chabran’s division to that side, with instructions to -create a diversion, by opening a fire from some artillery, -and then retiring, as if his guns could not -resist the weight of the Spanish metal; in short, to -persuade the enemy that a powerful effort would be -made there; but when the centre and right of the -Spaniards should be attacked, Chabran was to force -the passage of the bridge, and assail the heights -beyond it. This stratagem succeeded; Reding -massed his troops on the left, and neglected his -right, which was the real point of attack.</p> - -<p>The 21st of December, Pino’s division crossed the -Llobregat at daylight, by a ford in front of St. Felieu, -and marched against the right of the Spanish -position: Chabot’s division followed; and Souham’s, -which had passed at a ford lower down, and then -ascended by the right bank, covered Pino’s passage. -The light cavalry were held in reserve behind Chabot’s -division, and a regiment of cuirassiers was sent -to support Chabran at Molino del Rey.</p> - -<p>The Spanish position consisted of two mountain -heads, separated by a narrow ravine and a torrent; -and as the troops of the right wing were exceedingly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76"></a>[76]</span> -weakened, they were immediately chased off their -headland by the leading brigade of Pino’s division. -Reding then seeing his error, changed his front, -and drew up on the other mountain, on a new line, -nearly perpendicular to the Llobregat; but he still -kept a strong detachment at the bridge of Molino, -which was thus in rear of his left. The French -divisions formed rapidly for a fresh effort. Souham -on the right, Pino in the centre, Chabot on the left. -The latter gained ground in the direction of Villa -Franca, and endeavoured to turn the Spaniards’ -right, and cut off their retreat; while the light -cavalry making way between the mountain and the -river, sought to connect themselves with Chabran -at Molino.</p> - -<p>St. Cyr’s columns, crossing the ravine that separated -them from the Spaniards, soon ascended the -opposite mountain. The Catalans had formed -quickly, and opposed their enemies with an orderly, -but ill directed fire. Their front line then advanced, -and offered to charge with an appearance of great -intrepidity; but their courage sunk, and they turned -as the hostile masses approached. The reserves -immediately opened a confused volley upon both -parties; and in this disorder, the road to Villa -Franca being intercepted by Chabot, the right was -forced upon the centre, the centre upon the left, and -the whole pushed back in confusion upon Molino -del Rey.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile a detachment from Chabran’s division -had passed the Llobregat above Molino, and so -blocked the road to Martorel; and in this miserable -situation the Spaniards were charged by the light -cavalry, and scarcely a man would have escaped if -Chabran had obeyed his orders, and pushing across<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77"></a>[77]</span> -the bridge of Molino had come upon their rear; but -that general, at all times feeble in execution, remained -a tranquil spectator of the action, until the -right of Souham’s division reached the bridge; and -thus the routed troops escaped, by dispersing, and -throwing away every thing that could impede their -flight across the mountains. Vives reached the field -of battle just as the route was complete, and was -forced to fly with the rest. The victorious army -pursued in three columns; Chabran’s in the direction -of Igualada, Chabot’s by the road of San Sadurni, -which turned the pass of Ordal, and Souham’s -by the royal route of Villa Franca, at which place -the head-quarters were established on the 22d. The -posts of Villa Nueva and Sitjes were immediately -occupied by Pino, while Souham pushed the fugitives -to the gates of Tarragona.</p> - -<p>The loss of the Spaniards, owing to their swiftness, -was less than might have been expected; not -more than twelve hundred fell into the hands of the -French, but many superior officers were killed or -wounded; and, on the 22d, the count de Caldagues -was taken, a man apparently pedantic in military -affairs, and wanting in modesty, but evidently possessed -of both courage and talent. The whole of -the artillery, and vast quantities of powder, were -captured, and with them a magazine of English -muskets, quite new. Yet many of the Migueletes -were unarmed, and the junta were unceasing in their -demands for succours of this nature; but the history -of any one province was the history of all Spain.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78"></a>[78]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BV_V">CHAPTER V.</h3> -</div> - -<p>Barcelona was now completely relieved, and -the captured magazines supplied it for several months. -There was no longer a Spanish army in the field; -and in Tarragona, where some eight or nine thousand -of the Spanish fugitives, from this and the former -battle, had taken refuge, there was terrible disorder. -<span class="sidenote">Cabanes.</span> -The people rose tumultuously, broke open the public -stores, and laying hands on all the weapons they -could find, rushed from place to place, as if searching -for something to vent their fury upon. The -head of Vives was called for; and to save his life, -he was cast into prison by Reding, who was proclaimed -general-in-chief.</p> - -<p>The regular officers were insulted by the populace, -and there was as usual a general cry to defend -the city, mixed with furious menaces against traitors, -but there were neither guns, nor ammunition, nor -provisions; and during the first moment of anarchy, -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -St. Cyr might certainly have rendered himself master -of Tarragona by a vigorous effort. But the -opportunity soon passed away; the French general -sought only to procure subsistence, and occupied -himself in forming a train of field artillery; while -Reding, who had been almost without hope, proceeded -to rally the army, and place the town in a -state of defence.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Doyle’s -Correspondence, -MSS.</div> - -<p>The 1st of January eleven thousand infantry and -eight hundred cavalry were re-assembled at Tarragona -and Reus; and a Swiss regiment from Majorca -and two Spanish regiments from Granada, increased<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79"></a>[79]</span> -this force. Three thousand four hundred men -arrived from Valencia on the 5th, and from thence -also five thousand muskets, ammunition in proportion, -and ten thousand pikes which had just been -landed from England, were forwarded to Tarragona. -A supply of money, obtained from the British -agents at Seville, completed the number of fortuitous -and fortunate events that combined to -remedy the disaster of Molino del Rey. These -circumstances, and the inactivity of St. Cyr, who -seemed suddenly paralyzed, restored the confidence -of the Catalonians, but their system remained unchanged; -for confidence among the Spaniards always -led to insubordination, but never to victory.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, a part of the troops flying from -Molino had taken refuge at Bruch, and being -joined by the Somatenes, chose major Green, one -of the English military agents, for their general, -thinking to hold that strong country, which was -considered as impregnable ever since the defeats of -Chabran and Swartz. St. Cyr, glad of this opportunity -to retrieve the honour of the French arms, -detached Chabran himself, on the 11th of January, -to take his own revenge; but that general was still -depressed by the recollection of his former defeat. -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -To encourage him, Chabot was directed from San -Sadurni upon Igualada, by which the defile of -Bruch was turned, and a permanent defence rendered -impossible. The Spaniards, however, made -little or no resistance; and eight guns were taken, -and a considerable number of men killed. The -French pursued to Igualada; and a detachment, -without orders, even assailed and took Montserrat -itself, and afterwards rejoined the main body<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80"></a>[80]</span> -without loss. Chabot was then recalled to San -Sadurni, and Chabran was quartered at Martorel.</p> - -<p>While these events were passing beyond the -Llobregat, the marquis of Lazan was advancing, -with seven or eight thousand men, towards Castellon -de Ampurias. The 1st of January he drove back -a battalion of infantry upon Rosas with considerable -loss; but the next day general Reille, having assembled -about three thousand men, intercepted -Lazan’s communications, and attacked him in his -position behind the Muga. The victory seems to -have been undecided; but in the night, Lazan -regained his communications, and returned to -Gerona.</p> - -<p>The battle of Molino del Rey checked, for a -time, the ardour of the Catalans, and Reding at -first avoided serious actions, leaving the Somatenes -to harass the enemy. This plan being followed -during the months of January and February, was -exceedingly troublesome to St. Cyr, because he -was obliged to send small parties continually to -seek for subsistence, and the country people, hiding -their provisions with great care, strove hard to -protect their scanty stores. But in the beginning -of February the country between the Llobregat and -Tarragona was almost exhausted of food. The -English ships continued to vex the coast-line; and -the French, besides deserters, lost many men, -killed and wounded, in the innumerable petty -skirmishes sustained by the marauding parties. -Still St. Cyr maintained his positions; and the -country people, tired of a warfare in which they -were the chief sufferers, clamoured against Reding, -that he, with a large regular force, should look calmly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81"></a>[81]</span> -on, until the last morsel of food was discovered, and -torn from their starving families. The townspeople, -also feeling the burthen of supporting the -troops, impatiently urged the general to fight; nor -was this insubordination confined to the rude -multitude.</p> - -<p>Lazan, although at the head of nine thousand -men, had remained perfectly inactive after the -skirmish at Castellon de Ampurias; but when -Reding required him to leave a suitable garrison -in Gerona, and bring the rest of his troops to -Igualada, he would not obey; and this difference -was only terminated by Lazan’s marching, with -five thousand men, to the assistance of Zaragoza. -The result of his operations there has been already -related in the narrative of that siege.</p> - -<p>The army immediately under Reding was, -however, very considerable: the Swiss battalions -were numerous and good, and some of the most -experienced of the Spanish regiments were in -Catalonia. Every fifth man of the robust population -had been called out after the defeat of Molino -del Rey; and, although the people, averse to serve -as regular soldiers, did not readily answer the call, -the forces under Reding were so augmented that, -in the beginning of February, it was not less than -twenty-eight thousand men. The urban guards -were also put in activity, and above fifteen thousand -Somatenes assisted the regular troops; but -there was more show than real power, for Reding -was incapable of wielding the regular troops skilfully; -and the Migueletes being ill armed, without -clothing and insubordinate, devastated the country -equally with the enemy.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82"></a>[82]</span></p> - -<p>The Somatenes, who only took arms for local -interests, would not fight, except at the times and -in the manner and place that suited themselves; -and not only neglected the advice of the regular -officers, but reviled all who would not adopt their -own views; causing many to be removed from -their commands; and, with all this, the Spanish -generals never obtained good information of the -enemy’s movements, yet their own plans were -immediately made known to the French; because, -at Reding’s head-quarters, as at those of Castaños -before the battle of Tudela, every project was -openly and ostentatiously discussed. Reding himself -was a man of no military talent; his activity -was of body, not of mind, but he was brave and -honourable, and popular; because, being without -system, arrangement, or deep design, and easy in -his nature, he thwarted no man’s humours, and -thus floated in the troubled waters until their -sudden reflux left him on the rocks.</p> - -<p>The Catalonian army was now divided into four -distinct corps.</p> - -<p>Alvarez, with four thousand men, held Gerona -and the Ampurdan.</p> - -<p>Lazan, with five thousand, was near Zaragoza.</p> - -<p>Don Juan Castro, an officer, accused by the -Spaniards of treachery, and who afterwards did -attach himself to Joseph’s party, occupied, with sixteen -thousand men, a line extending from Olesa, on -the Upper Llobregat, to the pass of San Cristina, -near Tarragona, and this line running through -Bruch, Igualada, and Llacuna, was above sixty -miles long. The remainder of the army, amounting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83"></a>[83]</span> -to ten or twelve thousand men under Reding himself, -were quartered at Tarragona, Reus, and the -immediate vicinity of those places.</p> - -<p>The Spaniards were fed from Valencia and -Aragon, (the convoys from the former being conveyed -in vessels along the coast). Their magazines -were accumulated on one or two points of the -line, and those points being chosen without judgement -fettered Reding’s movements and regulated -those of the French, whose only difficulty, in fact, -was to procure food.</p> - -<p>Early in February, St. Cyr, having exhausted -the country about him, and having his communications -much vexed by the Somatenes and by descents -from the English ships, closed his posts and -kept his divisions in masses at Vendril, Villa -Franca, San Sadurni, and Martorel. The seventh -corps at this period having been reinforced by the -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_I">Appendix No. 1</a>, section 6.</span> -German division, and by some conscripts, amounted -to forty-eight thousand men, of which forty-one -thousand were under arms; but the force immediately -commanded by St. Cyr did not exceed -twenty-three thousand of all arms.</p> - -<p>The relative position of the two armies was, however, -entirely in favour of the French general, his line -extending from Vendril, by Villa Franca, to Martorel, -was not more than thirty miles, and he had a royal -road by which to retreat on Barcelona. The Spanish -posts covering, as I have said, an extent of above -sixty miles, formed a half-circle round the French -line, and <ins class="corr" id="tn-83" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'their cummunications'"> -their communications</ins> were more rugged -than those of St. Cyr. Nevertheless, it is not to be -doubted that, by avoiding any serious action, the -Catalans would have obliged the French to abandon -the country, between the Llobregat and Tarragona.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84"></a>[84]</span> -Famine and the continued drain of men, in a -mountain warfare, would have forced them away; -nor could they have struck any formidable blow to -relieve themselves, seeing that all the important -places were fortified towns requiring a regular -siege. The never-failing arrogance of the Spanish -character, and the unstable judgement of Reding, -induced him to forego these advantages. The -closing of the French posts and some success in a -few petty skirmishes were magnified, the last into -victories and the first into a design on the part of -the enemy to fly.</p> - -<p>An intercourse opened with some of the inhabitants -of Barcelona likewise gave hopes of regaining -that city by means of a conspiracy within the -walls. The Catalans had before made proposals to -general Lecchi to deliver up the citadel of that -place, nor is there any thing that more strongly -marks the absurd self-sufficiency of the Spaniards, -during this war, than the repeated attempts they -made to corrupt the French commanders. As late -as the year 1810, Martin Carrera, being at the head -of about two thousand ragged peasants, half-armed, -and only existing under the protection of the English -outposts, offered to marshal Ney, then investing -Ciudad Rodrigo, rank and honours in the -Spanish army if he would desert!</p> - -<p>Reding, swayed by the popular clamour, resolved -to attack, and in this view he directed Castro to -collect his sixteen thousand men and fall upon the -right flank and rear of St. Cyr, by the routes of -Llacuna and Igualada, and to send a detachment to -seize the pass of Ordal, and thus cut off the French -line of retreat to Barcelona. Meanwhile, advancing -with eight thousand by the road of Vendril and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85"></a>[85]</span> -St. Cristina; Reding, himself, was to attack the -enemy in front. All the Migueletes and Somatenes -between Gerona and the Besos were to aid in these -operations, the object being to surround the French, -a favourite project with the Spaniards at all times; -and as they publicly announced this intention, the -joy was universal, and the destruction of the hostile -army was as usual anticipated with the utmost confidence.</p> - -<p>The Catalans were in motion on the 14th of -February, but St. Cyr kept his army well in hand -until the Spaniards being ready to break in upon -him, he judged it politic to strike first. Souham’s -division remained at Vendril, to keep Reding in -check, but on the 16th St. Cyr marched from -Villa Franca, with Pino’s division, and overthrew -Castro’s advanced posts which were at Lacuña and -Saint Quinti. The Spanish centre thus pierced, -and their wings completely separated, Castro’s -right was thrown back upon Capellades.</p> - -<p>The 17th, St. Cyr, continuing his movement -with Pino’s division, reached Capellades, where he -expected to unite with Chabot and Chabran, who -had orders to concentrate there,—the one from San -Sadurin, the other from Martorel. By this skilful -movement the French general avoided the pass of -Bruch, and massed three divisions on the extreme -right of Castro’s left wing and close to his magazines, -which were at Igualada.</p> - -<p>Chabot arrived the first, and, being for a little -time unsupported, was attacked and driven back -with loss, but when the other divisions came up, -the action was restored, and the Spaniards put to -flight; they rallied again at Pobla de Claramunt, -between Capellades and Igualada, a circumstance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86"></a>[86]</span> -agreeable to St. Cyr, because he had sent Mazzuchelli’s -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -brigade from Llacuna direct upon Igualada, -and if Chabot had not been so hard pressed, -the action at Capellades was to have been delayed -until Mazzuchelli had got into the rear; but -scarcely was the head of that general’s column -descried, when Castro, who was at Igualada with -his reserves, recalled the troops from Pobla de -Claramunt. The French being close at their heels, -the whole passed through Igualada, fighting and -in disorder, after which, losing all courage, the -Spaniards broke, and, throwing away their arms, -fled by the three routes of Cervera, Calaf, and Manresa. -They were pursued all the 17th, and the -French returned the next day, but with few prisoners, -because, says St. Cyr, “<em>the Catalans are -endowed by nature with strong knees</em>.”</p> - -<p>Having thus broken through the centre of the -Spanish line, defeated a part of the left wing and -taken the magazines, St. Cyr posted Chabot and -Chabran, at Igualada, to keep the beaten troops in -check, but himself, with Pino’s division, marched -the 18th to fall upon Reding, whose extreme left -was now at St. Magi. Souham had been instructed, -when by preconcerted signals he should -know that the attack at Igualada had succeeded, to -force the pass of Cristina, and push forward to -Villa Radoña, upon which town St. Cyr was now -marching.</p> - -<p>The position of St. Magi was attacked at four -o’clock in the evening of the 18th, and carried without -difficulty, but it was impossible to find a -single peasant to guide the troops, on the next -day’s march to the abbey of Santa Creus. In -this perplexity, a wounded Spanish captain, who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87"></a>[87]</span> -was prisoner, demanded to be allowed to go to Tarragona. -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -St. Cyr assented and offered to carry him -to the Creus, and thus the prisoner unconsciously -acted as a guide to his enemies. The march being -long and difficult, it was late ere they reached the -abbey. It was a strong point, and being occupied -in force by the troops that had been beaten -from San Magi the evening before, the French, -after a fruitless demonstration of assaulting it, took -a position for the night. Meanwhile, Reding hearing -of Castro’s defeat, had made a draft of men and -guns from the right wing, and marched by Pla and -the pass of Cabra, intending to rally his left. His -road being just behind St. Creus, he was passing -at the moment when the French appeared before -that place, but neither general was aware of the -other’s presence, and each continued his particular -movement.</p> - -<p>The 20th St. Cyr crossed the Gaya river under -a fire from the abbey, and continued his rapid -march upon Villa Radoña, near which place he -dispersed a small corps; but finding that Souham -was not come up, he sent an officer, escorted by a -battalion, to hasten that general, whose non-arrival -gave reason to believe that the staff-officers and -spies, sent with the previous instructions, had all -been intercepted. This caused the delay of a day -and a half, which would otherwise have sufficed to -crush Reding’s right wing, surprised as it would -have been, without a chief, in the plain of Tarragona.</p> - -<p>While St. Cyr rested at Villa Radoña, Reding -pursued his march to St. Coloma de Querault, and -having rallied many of Castro’s troops, the aspect -of affairs was totally changed; for the defile of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88"></a>[88]</span> -San Cristina being forced by Souham, he reached -Villa Radoña on the 21st, and, at the same time, -all the weakly men, who had been left in charge of -the head-quarters at Villa Franca, also arrived. -Thus more than two-thirds of the whole French -army were concentrated at that town at the moment -when the Spanish commander, being joined by the -detachment beaten from San Cristina and by the -battalion at the abbey, also rallied the greatest -part of his forces, at St. Coloma de Querault. Each -general could now, by a rapid march, overwhelm -his adversary’s right wing; but the troops left by -Reding, in the plain of Tarragona, might have -retired upon that fortress, while those left by St. -Cyr, at Igualada, were without support. Hence, -when the latter commander, continuing his movement -on Tarragona, reached Valls the 22d, and -heard of Reding’s march, he immediately carried -Pino’s division to Pla and the pass of Cabra, resolved, -if the Spanish general should advance towards -Igualada, to follow him with a sharp spur.</p> - -<p>The 23d the French halted: Souham at Valls to -watch the Spanish troops in the plain of Tarragona; -Pino’s division at Pla and Cabra, sending, -however, detachments to the abbey of Creus and -towards Santa Coloma to feel for Reding. In the -evening these detachments returned with some prisoners; -the one from Creus reported that the abbey -was abandoned; the other that the Spanish general -was making his way back to Tarragona, by the -route of Sarreal and Momblanch. Hereupon St. -Cyr, remaining in person with Pino’s division at -Pla, pushed his advanced posts on the right to the -abbey of San Creus, and in front to the defile of -Cabra, designing to encounter the Spaniards, if<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89"></a>[89]</span> -they returned by either of those roads. Souham’s -division took a position in front of Valls, with his -left on the Francoli river, his right towards Pla, -and his advanced guard at Pixa Moxons, watching -for Reding by the road of Momblanch.</p> - -<p>The 24th the Spanish general, being at St. -Coloma, called a council of war, at which colonel -Doyle, the British military agent, assisted. One -party was for fighting St. Cyr, another for retreating -to Lerida, a third for attacking Chabran, at Igualada, -a fourth for regaining the plain of Tarragona. -There were many opinions, but neither wisdom nor -resolution; and finally, Reding, leaving general -Wimpfen, with four thousand men, at San Coloma, -decided to regain Tarragona, and took the route of -Momblanch with ten thousand of his best troops, -following the Spanish accounts, but St. Cyr says -with fifteen thousand. Reding knew that Valls -was occupied, and that the line of march was intercepted, -but he imagined the French to be only -five or six thousand, for the exact situation and -strength of an enemy were particulars that seldom -troubled Spanish generals.</p> - -<p>The 25th of February the head of Reding’s column -was suddenly fired upon, at daybreak, by -Souham’s detachment, at Pixa Moxons. The French -were immediately driven back upon the main body, -and, the attack being continued, the whole division -was forced to give way. During the fight the -Spanish baggage and artillery passed the Francoli -river; and the road to Tarragona being thus opened, -Reding might have effected his retreat without -difficulty, but he continued to press Souham until -St. Cyr, who had received early intelligence of the -action, came down in all haste, from Pla, upon the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90"></a>[90]</span> -left flank of the Spaniards, and the latter seeing -the French dragoons, who preceded the infantry, -enter in line, retired in good order across the Francoli, -and took a position behind that river. From -this ground Reding proposed to retreat in the -evening; but St. Cyr obliged him to fight there.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF VALLS.</h4> - -<p>It was three o’clock when, Pino’s division being -come up, St. Cyr’s recommenced the action. The -banks of the Francoli were steep and rugged, and -the Spanish position strong and difficult of access; -but the French general, as he himself states, wishing -to increase the moral ascendancy of his soldiers, -forbad the artillery, although excellently placed for -execution, to play upon Reding’s battalions, fearing -that otherwise the latter would fly before they -could be attained by the infantry, and, under this -curious arrangement, the action was begun by the -light troops.</p> - -<p>The French, or rather the Italians, were superior -in numbers to the Spaniards, and the columns, -covered by the skirmishers, passed the river with -great alacrity, and ascended the heights under an -exceedingly regular fire, which was continued until -the attacking troops had nearly reached the summit -of the position; but then both Swiss and Catalans -began to waver, and, ere the assailants could close -with them, broke, and were charged by the French -cavalry. Reding, after receiving several sabre -wounds, saved himself at Tarragona, where the -greatest number of the vanquished also took refuge, -but the remainder fled in the greatest disorder on -the routes of Tortosa and Lerida.</p> - -<p>The count of Castel d’Orius, general of the cavalry,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91"></a>[91]</span> -many superior officers, and the whole of the artillery -and baggage were taken, and four thousand men -were killed or wounded; the loss of the French was -about a thousand; and, during all these movements -and actions, Reding received no assistance from -the Somatenes; nor is this surprising, for it may -be taken as an axiom in war, that armed peasants -are only formidable to stragglers. When the regular -forces engage, the peasant, sensible of his -own weakness, gladly quits the field.</p> - -<p>The 26th Souham’s division, descending into the -plain of Tarragona, took possession of the large -and rich town of Reus, from which, contrary to -the general custom, the inhabitants had not fled. -Pino’s division occupied Pla, Alcover, and Valls; -detachments were sent to Salou and Villaseca, on -the sea-coast, west of Tarragona; and Chabot, being -recalled from Igualada, was posted at the abbey of -Santa Creus, to watch the troops under Wimpfen, -who was still at St. Coloma de Querault.</p> - -<p>The battle of Valls finished the regular warfare -in Catalonia. Those detachments, which by the -previous movements had been cut off from the main -body of the army, joined the Somatenes, and, acting -as partizan corps, troubled the communications of -the French; but St. Cyr had no longer a regular -army to deal with in the field; and Tortosa, which -was in a miserably defenceless condition, and without -provisions, must have fallen, if after the battle -any attempt had been made against it. But the -whole country was filled with confusion; nor was -the disorder momentary; for although Lazan, after -his defeat near Zaragoza, carried a few men to -Tortosa, he declared himself independent of Reding’s -command. The fall of Zaragoza, also, had stricken<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92"></a>[92]</span> -terror far and wide; and the neighbouring provinces -feared and acted each for its own safety, without -regard to any general plan.</p> - -<p>The fugitives from Valls, joined to the troops -already in Tarragona, crowded the latter place; and -an infectious disorder breaking out, a great mortality -ensued.</p> - -<p>St. Cyr, satisfied that sickness should do the work -of the sword, begirt the city, and resolved to hold -his positions while food could be procured. In this -policy he remained stedfast until the middle of -March, although Wimpfen attacked and drove Chabran -in succession from Igualada, Llacuna, and St. -Quinti, to Villa Franca; and although the two -Milans and Claros, acting between the Besos and -the Llobregat, cut the communication with Barcelona, -and in conjunction with the English squadron, -renewed the blockade of that city. This plan was -injudicious; for notwithstanding the sickness in Tarragona, -the subjugation of Catalonia was retarded -by the cessation of active hostilities. The object of -the French general should have been, while the -terror of his victories was fresh, to gain secure posts, -such as Tortosa, Tarragona, Gerona, or Lerida, -from whence he could issue out, and clear the -country, from time to time, of the bands that might -be assembled. His inactivity after the battle of -Molino del Rey, and at this period, enabled the -Catalonians to recover from their fears, and to put -these towns in a state of defence.</p> - -<p>Towards the middle of March the resources of the -country being all exhausted, St. Cyr at last determined -to abandon the plains of Tarragona, and take -some position where he could feed his troops, cover -the projected seige of Gerona, and yet be at hand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93"></a>[93]</span> -to relieve Barcelona. The valleys about Vich alone -offered all these advantages; but as Claros and the -Milans were in force at Molino del Rey, he ordered -Chabran to drive them from that point, that the -sick and wounded men might be first transferred -from Valls to Barcelona.</p> - -<p>The 10th of March, Chabran sent a battalion with -one piece of artillery on that service. The Migueletes -thinking it was the advanced guard of a -greater force, abandoned the post; but being undeceived, -returned, beat the battalion, and took the -gun. The 12th, Chabran having received orders -to march with his whole division, consisting of eight -battalions and three squadrons, reached the bridge, -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -but returned without daring to attack. St. Cyr repeated -his orders, and on the 14th the troops, apparently -ashamed of their general’s irresolution, fell -on vigorously, and, having carried the bridge, -established themselves on the heights on both sides -of the river.</p> - -<p>The communication thus opened, it was found -that Duhesme, pressed by the Migueletes without, -was also extremely fearful of conspiracies within the -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -walls: that his fears, and the villainous conduct of -his police, had at last excited the inhabitants to -attempt that which their enemies seemed so much -to dread; and in March, an insurrection being -planned in concert with the Migueletes and with -the English squadron, the latter came close in and -cannonaded the town on the 10th, expecting that -Wimpfen, the Milans, and Claros would have -assaulted the gates, which was to have been the -signal for the insurrection within.</p> - -<p>The inhabitants were the more sanguine of success, -because there were above two thousand Spanish<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94"></a>[94]</span> -prisoners in the city; and outside the walls -there were two tercios secretly recruited and maintained -by the citizens: these men being without -uniforms, constantly passed in and out of the town, -and Duhesme was never able to discover or to -prevent them. This curious circumstance is illustrative -of the peculiar genius of the Spaniards, which -in all matters of surprise and stratagem is unrivalled. -The project was, however, baffled by Chabran’s -action at Molino del Rey, on the 14th, which dispersed -the partizan corps outside the walls; and the -British squadron being exposed to a heavy gale, -and disappointed in the co-operation from the land, -sailed away on the 11th.</p> - -<p>St. Cyr intended to commence his retrograde -movement on the 18th; but on the 17th a cannonade -was heard on the side of Momblanch, which was -ascertained to proceed from a detachment of six -hundred men, with two guns, under the command of -Colonel Briche. This officer being sent by Mortier -to open the communication with St. Cyr, after the -fall of Zaragoza, had forced his way through the -Spanish partizan corps. To favour his return the -army halted two days; but the enterprize, after a -trial, appeared so dangerous, that he relinquished -it, and attached himself to the seventh corps.</p> - -<p>The inactivity that succeeded the battle of Valls, -and the timidity displayed by Chabran in the subsequent -skirmishes, having depressed the spirits of -the troops, they contemplated the approaching retreat -with great uneasiness; and many officers, infected -with panic doubt, advised the general to hide his -movements from the enemy: but he, anxious to -restore their confidence, took the part of giving the -Spaniards a formal notice of his intentions; and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95"></a>[95]</span> -desired of Reding that he would send proper officers -to take over the hospitals which had been fitted up -at Valls, as well as some of the French, wounded, -that could not be moved. This done, the army -commencing its retreat, reached Villa Franca the -21st of March; and the 22d passed the Llobregat, -followed, but not molested, by some feeble Spanish -detachments.</p> - -<p>The 23d, general Pino attacked and defeated -Wimpfen, who having rallied the corps of Claros -and the Milans, after the affair on the 24th, had -taken a position at Tarrasa. Pino pursued him to -the vicinity of Manresa, foraged that country, and -returned with sufficient provisions to feed the army, -without drawing on the magazines of Barcelona.</p> - -<p>During these proceedings, Reding died in Tarragona -of his wounds. He had been received there -with great dissatisfaction after the battle of Valls, -and the interference of the British consul was necessary -to save him from the first fury of the populace, -who were always ready to attribute a defeat to the -treachery of the general. His military conduct was, -by his own officers, generally and justly condemned; -but although his skill in war was slight, his courage -and honesty were unquestionable; and he was of -distinguished humanity; for, at this unhappy period, -when the French prisoners in every part of Spain -were tortured with the most savage cruelty; when -to refrain from such deeds was to incur suspicion, -Reding had the manliness, not only to repress all -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -barbarities within the range of his command, but -even to conclude a convention with St. Cyr, under -which the wounded men on both sides were to receive -decent treatment, and to be exchanged as soon as -their hurts were cured.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96"></a>[96]</span></p> - -<p>In his last moments Reding complained that he -had been ill-served as a general; that the Somatenes -had not supported him; that his orders were -neglected; his plans disclosed to the enemy; and -that he could never get true intelligence; complaints -which the experience of Moore, Baird, -Cradock, Murray, and, above all, of Wellington, -proved to be applicable to every part of Spain, and -every period of the war.</p> - -<p>Coupigny succeeded Reding, but he was soon -superseded by general Blake, who, for reasons -hereafter to be mentioned, was appointed captain-general -of the “<i lang="es" xml:lang="es">Coronilla</i>,” or Little Crown, a title -given to the three provinces of Valencia, Aragon, -and Catalonia, when united; and, as the warfare in -Aragon thus became immediately connected with -that in Catalonia, I shall here give a short account -of what was passing in the former province.</p> - -<p>When Zaragoza fell, marshal Lasnes was recalled -to France; Mortier, who succeeded him in the -command, sent detachments against Jaca and Monzon; -and threatened Mequinenza and Lerida. The -Fort of Monzon, commanding a passage over the -Cinca river, was abandoned by the Spaniards, and -the town and citadel of Jaca surrendered: whereby -the French opened a new and important communication -with France. But, Lerida being fruitlessly -summoned, and some slight demonstrations made -against Mequinenza having failed, Mortier cantoned -his troops on both sides of the Ebro, from Barbastro -to Alcanitz, and despatched colonel Briche, as we -have seen, to open a communication with the -seventh corps; but, in April, the fifth corps marched -for Castile, and general Junot was left with a part -only of the third corps to maintain Aragon.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97"></a>[97]</span></p> - -<p>Many of the French artillery-men and non-commissioned -<span class="sidenote">Suchet’s Memoirs.</span> -officers had been withdrawn from Spain -to serve in Germany. One brigade of the third corps -also was employed to protect the communications -on the side of Navarre, and another was detached -to escort the prisoners from Zaragoza to Bayonne. -These drafts, added to the loss sustained during -the siege, reduced the number of troops in Aragon -to about twelve thousand disposable men under -arms.</p> - -<p>Junot, being sick, returned to France, and general -Suchet succeeded him. The weakness of the army -gave great uneasiness to the new general,—an uneasiness -which was not allayed by finding that men -and officers were, from various causes, discontented -and dispirited. Suchet was, however, no ordinary -man; and, with equal prudence and vigour, he -commenced a system of discipline in his corps, and -of order in his government, that afterwards carried -him, with scarcely a check, from one success to -another, until he obtained the rank of marshal for -himself, and the honour for his corps of being the -only one in Spain that never suffered any signal -reverse.</p> - -<p>Suchet hoped that the battle of Valls, and other -defeats sustained by the Spaniards at this period, -would give him time to re-organize his troops in -tranquillity—but this hope soon vanished. The -peasantry, observing the weakness of the third -corps, only waited for a favourable opportunity to -rise, and the Migueletes and Somatenes of the -mountains about Lerida and Mequenenza were, -under the command of colonel Pereña and colonel -Baget, already in activity.</p> - -<p>While the duke of Abrantes yet held the command<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98"></a>[98]</span> -Blake’s appointment took place; and that -general drawing troops from Valencia and Tarragona, -and, being joined by Lazan, fixed his quarters -at Morella, on the frontier of Aragon. Designing -to operate in that province rather than in Catalonia, -he endeavoured to re-kindle the fire of insurrection; -nor was fortune adverse to him. A part of the -garrison of Monzon having made an unsuccessful -marauding excursion beyond the Cinca, the -citizens fell upon those who remained, and obliged -them to abandon that post, which was immediately -occupied by Pereña. The duke of Abrantes sent -eight companies of infantry and thirty cuirassiers -to retake the place: but Baget having reinforced -Pereña, the French were repulsed, and the -Cinca suddenly overflowing behind them, cut off -their retreat. The cavalry, plunging with their -horses into the river, escaped by swimming; but -the infantry finding the lower passages guarded by -the garrison of Lerida, and the upper cut off by the -partizan corps, after three days’ marching and -skirmishing, surrendered to Pereña and Baget. The -prisoners were carried to Tarragona, and soon -afterwards exchanged, in pursuance of a convention -made by Reding and St. Cyr.</p> - -<p>This little success was, as usual, sufficient to -excite the most extravagant hopes, and the garrison -of Mequinenza having, about the same time, burnt -a bridge of boats which the French had thrown -over the Ebro at Caspe, Blake immediately advanced, -and, driving back the French from Beceyta -and Val de Ajorfa, entered Alcanitz. The beaten -troops retired in haste and with loss to Samper and -Ixar; and it was at this moment, when the French -were harassed on both banks of the Ebro, and their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99"></a>[99]</span> -wings separated by the destruction of the bridge at -Caspe, that Suchet arrived to take the command of -the third corps. Seeing his divisions disseminated -over a great tract of country, and in danger of -being beaten in detail, he immediately ordered -general Habert to abandon the left bank of the -Ebro, cross that river at Fuentes, and follow in -reserve upon Ixar, where Suchet himself rallied all -the rest of the troops, with the exception of a small -garrison left in Zaragoza.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF ALCANITZ.</h4> - -<p>The French battalions were fearful and disorderly: -but the general, anxious to raise their spirits, -marched towards Blake on the 23d of May. The -<span class="sidenote">Suchet’s Memoirs.</span> -latter was in position in front of Alcanitz, a bridge -over the Guadalupe was immediately behind his -centre, which was covered by a hill; his left was -well posted near some pools of water, but his right -was rather exposed. The French had about eight -thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry in the -field, and the Spaniards about twelve thousand of -all arms.</p> - -<p>Suchet, observing Blake’s dispositions, judged -that if he could carry the hill in the centre, and so -separate the Spanish wings, the latter would be cut -off from the bridge of Alcanitz, and obliged to surrender. -In this design he directed a column against -each wing, to draw Blake’s attention to his flanks: -but, when the skirmishers were well engaged, three -thousand men, pushing rapidly along the main -road, attacked the hillock. A brisk fire of musketry -and artillery, however, checked their progress; the -Spaniards stood firm, and the French, after a feeble -effort to ascend the hill, began to waver, and,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100"></a>[100]</span> -finally, fled outright. Suchet, who was himself -slightly wounded, rallied them in the plain, and -remained there for the rest of the day, but without -daring to renew the action. In the night, he -retreated; and, although not pursued, his troops -were seized with panic, and, at day-light, came -pouring into Samper with all the tumult and disorder -of a rout. Blake’s inactivity enabled Suchet -to restore order; he caused the man who first commenced -the alarm to be shot; and then, encouraging -the troops that they might not seem to fly, he rested -in position two whole days, after which he retreated -to Zaragoza.</p> - -<p>This action at Alcanitz was a subject of triumph -and rejoicing all over Spain. The supreme junta -conferred an estate upon Blake; the kingdom of -Murcia was added to his command; his army -rapidly augmented; and he himself greatly elated -and confirmed in a design he had formed to retake -Zaragoza, turned his whole attention to Aragon, -and totally neglected Catalonia, to which province -it is time to return.</p> - -<p>St. Cyr remained in Barcelona for a considerable -period, during which he endeavoured to remedy -the evils of Duhesme’s government, and to make -himself acquainted with the political disposition of -the inhabitants. He filled the magazines with three -months’ provisions; and, as the prisoners within -the walls were an incumbrance, on account of their -subsistence, and a source of uneasiness from their -numbers, he resolved to send them to France. The -15th of April, having transferred his sick and -weakly men to the charge of Duhesme, and exchanged -Chabran’s for Lecchi’s division, he recommenced -his march, and reached Granollers,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101"></a>[101]</span> -giving out that he was returning to the frontier of -France, lest the Catalans should remove their provisions -from Vich, and thus frustrate his principal -object.</p> - -<p>The Migueletes, under the two Milans and -Claros, were, however, on the watch to harass -the army, and had taken post beyond Garriga -on each side of a long and narrow defile in the valley -of the Congosto. This pass of surprising natural -strength was barricadoed with trees and pieces -of rock, and mined in several places; and Wimpfen -also held his corps at a little distance, ready to -join Claros at the first alarm. The 16th Lecchi’s -division, escorting two thousand prisoners, appeared -at the head of this defile, and an action commenced, -but in an hour the Migueletes fled on all sides; -for St. Cyr, fully aware of the strength of the -position, had secretly detached Pino to attack -Wimpfen; and, while Lecchi was engaged at -the entrance, Souham and Chabot, traversing -the mountain, arrived, the one upon the flank, and -the other at the further end of this formidable -pass.</p> - -<p>The 18th the army was established in the valley -and town of Vich; but the inhabitants, with the -exception of the bishop and a few old men, fled to -the mountains with their effects, leaving, however, -their provisions behind. St. Cyr then posted -Chabot’s and Pino’s divisions at Centellas, San -Martin, Tona, and Collespino, to guard the entrance -into the valley. Souham remained at Vich, his -right being at Roda and Manlieu on the Ter, and -his advanced posts at Gurp, St. Sebastian, and -St. Eularia. The 24th Lecchi marched, with the -prisoners, by Filieu de Pallerols to Besalu on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102"></a>[102]</span> -Fluvia; he was attacked several times on the route, -but succeeded in delivering his charge to general -Reille, and then returned with the first information -received by St. Cyr of Napoleon’s arrival in Paris, -and the certainty of a war with Austria. To -balance this, a moveable column sent to Barcelona -brought back the pleasing intelligence that rear-admiral -Comaso, with a French squadron, having -baffled the extreme vigilance of lord Collingwood, -had reached that city with ample supplies. Thus -what may be called the irregular movements in -Catalonia terminated, and the more methodical -warfare of sieges commenced; but this part was -committed to other hands. General Verdier had -succeeded Reille in the Ampurdan, and marshal -Augereau was on the road to supersede St. Cyr.</p> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_102fp" style="max-width: 30em;"> - <p class="fs70"><em>Plate 2. to face Pa. 102.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_102fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_102fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"> -<em>Sketch Explanatory</em> of the<br /> -OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA<br /> -<em>in 1808 and 1809</em>.<br /> -<p><em>London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="smcap">Observations.</span>—1º. General St. Cyr’s marches -were hardy, his battles vigorous and delivered in -right time and place; but his campaign, as a whole, -may be characterised as one of great efforts without -corresponding advantages. He himself attributes -this to the condition of the seventh corps, destitute -and neglected, because <em>the emperor disliked and -wished to ruin its chief</em>; a strange accusation, and -unsustained by reason or facts. What! Napoleon -wilfully destroy his own armies! sacrifice forty -thousand men, that a general, who he was not -obliged to employ at all, might be disgraced! -General St. Cyr acknowledges, that when he received -his instructions from the emperor, he observed -the affliction of the latter at the recent loss of -Dupont’s force; yet he would have it believed, that, -in the midst of this regret, that monarch, with a -singular malice, was preparing greater disasters for -himself, merely to disgrace the general commanding -the seventh corps, and why? because the latter<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103"></a>[103]</span> -had formerly served with the army of the Rhine! -Yet St. Cyr met with no reverses in Catalonia, and -was afterwards made a marshal by this implacable -enemy.</p> - -<p>2º.—That the seventh corps was not well supplied, -and that its commander was thereby placed in a -difficult situation, is not to be disputed in the face -of the facts stated by general St. Cyr; but if war -were a state of ease and smoothness, the fame -which attends successful generals would be less. -Napoleon selected general St. Cyr because he -thought him a capable commander; in feeble hands, -he knew the seventh corps would be weak, but, -with St. Cyr at its head, he judged it sufficient to -overcome the Catalonians; nor was he much mistaken. -Barcelona, the great object of solicitude, -was saved; Rosas was taken; and if Tarragona -and Tortosa did not also fall, the one after the -battle of Molino del Rey, the other after that of -Valls, it was because the French general did not -choose to attack them. Those towns were without -the slightest preparation for defence, moral or -physical, and must have surrendered; nor can the -unexpected and stubborn resistance of Gerona, -Zaragoza, and Valencia be cited against this -opinion. The latter cities were previously prepared -and expectant of a siege; and yet, in every instance, -except Valencia, there was a moment of dismay -and confusion, not fatal, only because the besieging -generals wanted that ready vigour which is the -characteristic of great commanders.</p> - -<p>3º.—General St. Cyr, aware that a mere calculation -of numbers and equipment is but a poor<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104"></a>[104]</span> -measure of the strength of armies, exalts the enthusiasm -and the courage of the Catalans, and seems -to tremble at the danger which, owing to Napoleon’s -suicidal jealousy, menaced, at that period, not -only the seventh corps but even the south of France. -In answer to this, it may be observed that M. de -St. Cyr did not hesitate, with eighteen thousand -men having no artillery, and carrying only sixty -rounds of musket-ammunition, to plunge into the -midst of those terrible armies, to march through -the mountains for whole weeks, to attack the strongest -positions with the bayonet alone, nay, even to -dispense with the use of his artillery, when he did -bring it into action, lest his men should not have -a sufficient contempt for their enemies. And who -were these undaunted soldiers, so high in courage, -so confident, so regardless of the great weapon of -modern warfare? Not the select of the imperial -guards, the conquerors in a hundred battles, but -raw levies, the dregs and scrapings of Italy, the -refuse of Naples and of Rome, states which to -name as military was to ridicule.</p> - -<p>4º.—With such soldiers, the battles of Cardadeu, -Molino, Igualada, and Valls, were gained; yet -general St. Cyr does not hesitate to call the -Migueletes, who were beaten at those places, the -best light troops in the world. The best <em>light -troops</em> are neither more nor less than the best troops -in the world; but if, instead of fifteen thousand -Migueletes, the four thousand men composing Wellington’s -light division had been on the heights of -Cardadeu—general St. Cyr’s sixty rounds of ammunition -would scarcely have carried him to Barcelona. -The injurious force with which personal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105"></a>[105]</span> -feelings act upon the judgement are well known, or it -might excite wonder that so good a writer and so -able a soldier should advance such fallacies.</p> - -<p>5º.—General St. Cyr’s work, admirable in many -respects, bears, nevertheless, the stamp of carelessness. -Thus, he affirms that Dupont’s march to -Andalusia encouraged the tumults of Aranjues; but -the tumults of Aranjues happened in the month of -March, nearly three months previous to Dupont’s -movement, which took place in May and June. -Again, he says, that, Napoleon, to make a solid -conquest in the Peninsula, should have commenced -with Catalonia, instead of over-running Spain by the -northern line of operations; an opinion quite unsustainable. -The progress of the seventh corps was -impeded by the want of provisions, not by the -enemy’s force. Twenty thousand men could beat -the Spaniards in the field, but they could not subsist. -What could three hundred thousand men have done? -Would it have given a just idea of Napoleon’s -power to employ the strength of his empire against -the fortified towns in Catalonia? In what would -the greater solidity of this plan have consisted? -While the French were thus engaged, the patriots -would have been organizing their armies; England -would have had time to bring all her troops into -line, and two hundred thousand men placed between -Zaragoza and Tortosa, or breaking into France by -the western Pyrenees, while the Austrians were -advancing to the Rhine, would have sorely shaken -the solidity of general St. Cyr’s plan.</p> - -<p>6º.—The French emperor better understood what -he was about; he saw a nation intrinsically powerful -and vehemently excited, yet ignorant of war, and -wanting the aid which England was eager to give.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106"></a>[106]</span> -All the elements of power existed in the Peninsula, -and they were fast approximating to a centre, when -Napoleon burst upon that country, and as the -gathering of a water-spout is said to be sometimes -prevented by the explosion of a gun, so the rising -strength of Spain was dissipated by his sudden and -dreadful assault. If the war was not then finished, -it was because his lieutenants were tardy and -jealous of each other.</p> - -<p>7º.—St. Cyr appears to have fallen into an -error, common enough in all times, and one very -prevalent among the French generals in Spain. -He considered his task as a whole in itself, instead -of a constituent part of a greater system. He -judged very well what was wanting for the seventh -corps, to subjugate Catalonia in a solid manner, but -he did not discern that it was fitting that the -seventh corps should forget Catalonia, to aid the general -plan against the Peninsula. Rosas surrendered -at the very moment when Napoleon, after the -victories of Baylen, Espinosa, Tudela, and the Somosierra, -was entering Madrid as a conqueror. The -battles of Cardadeu and Molino del Rey may, -therefore, be said to have completely prostrated -Spain, because the English army was isolated, the -Spanish army destroyed, and Zaragoza invested. -Was that a time to calculate the weight of powder -and the number of pick-axes required for a formal -siege of Tarragona? The whole Peninsula was -shaken to the centre, the proud hearts of the Spaniards -sunk with terror, and in that great consternation, -to be daring, was, on the part of the -French generals, to be prudent. St. Cyr was -not in a condition to besiege Tarragona, formally, -but he might have assaulted it with less danger<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107"></a>[107]</span> -than he incurred by his march to Barcelona. The -battle of Valls was another epoch of the same -kind; the English army had re-embarked, and the -route of Ucles had taken place. Portugal was invaded -and Zaragoza had just fallen. That was a -time to render victory fruitful, yet no attempt was -made against Tortoza.</p> - -<p>8º.—St. Cyr, who justly blames Palacios and -Vives for remaining before Barcelona instead of -carrying their army to the Ter and the Fluvia, -seems inclined to applaud Reding for conduct -equally at variance with the true principles of war. -It was his own inactivity after the battle of Molino -that produced the army of Reding, and the impatient -folly of that army, and of the people, produced -the plan which led to the route of Igualada and -the battle of Valls. But, instead of disseminating -his thirty thousand men on a line of sixty miles, -from Tarragona to the Upper Llobregat, Reding -should have put Tarragona and Tortosa into a state -of defence, and, leaving a small corps of observation -near the former, have made Lerida the base of his -operations. In that position, and keeping the bulk -of his force in one mass, he might have acted on -St. Cyr’s flanks and rear effectually, by the road -of Cervera—and without danger to himself; nor -could the French general have attempted aught -against Tarragona.</p> - -<p>But it is not with reference to the seventh corps -alone that Lerida was the proper base of the -Spanish army. Let us suppose that the supreme -junta had acted for a moment upon a rational -system; that the Valencian troops, instead of remaining -at Morella, had been directed on Mequinenza<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108"></a>[108]</span> -and that the duke of Infantado’s force had -been carried from Cuença to the same place instead -of being routed at Ucles. Thus, in the beginning -of February, more than fifty thousand regular troops -would have been assembled at Lerida, encircled by -the fortresses of Monzon, Balaguer, Mequinenza, -Tarragona, and Tortoza. Its lines of operations -would have been as numerous as the roads. -The Seu d’Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia, -would have supplied corn, and the communication -with Valencia would have been direct and open. -On this central and impregnable position such a -force might have held the seventh corps in check, -and also raised the siege of Zaragoza; nor could the -first corps have followed Infantado’s movements -without abandoning the whole of the emperor’s -plans against Portugal and Andalusia.</p> - -<p>9º.—St. Cyr praises Reding’s project for surrounding -the French, and very gravely observes -that the <em>only method</em> of defeating it was by taking -the offensive himself. Nothing can be juster; but -he should have added that it was a <em>certain method</em>; -and, until we find a great commander acting upon -Reding’s principles, this praise can only be taken -as an expression of civility towards a brave adversary. -St. Cyr’s own movements were very different; -he disliked Napoleon personally, but he did not -dislike his manner of making war. Buonaparte’s -campaign in the Alps against Beaulieu was not an -unheeded lesson. There is, however, one proceeding -of St. Cyr’s for which there has been no precedent, -and which it is unlikely will ever be imitated, -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -namely, the stopping of the fire of the artillery -when it was doing infinite execution, that a moral<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109"></a>[109]</span> -ascendancy over the enemy might be established. -It is impossible to imagine a more cutting sarcasm -on the courage of the Catalans than this fact; -yet, general St. Cyr states that his adversaries -were numerous, and fought bravely. Surely he -could not have commanded so long without knowing -that <em>there is in all battles a decisive moment, -when every weapon, every man, every combination of -force that can be brought to bear, is necessary to -gain the victory</em>.</p> - -<p>10º.—If general St. Cyr’s own marches and battles -did not sufficiently expose the fallacy of his -opinions relative to the vigour of the Catalans, lord -Collingwood’s correspondence would supply the -deficiency. That able and sagacious man, writing -at this period says,—</p> - -<p>“In Catalonia, every thing seems to have gone -wrong since the fall of Rosas. The Spaniards are -in considerable force, yet are dispersed and panic-struck -whenever the enemy appears.”—“The applications -for supplies are unlimited; they want -money, arms, and ammunition, of which no use -appears to be made when they get them.”—“In -the English papers, I see accounts of successes, and -convoys cut off, and waggons destroyed, which are -not true. What has been done in that way has -been by the boats of our frigates, which have, in -two or three instances, landed men and attacked the -enemy with great gallantry. The Somatenes range -the hills in a disorderly way, and fire at a distance, -but retire on being approached.”—“The multitudes -of men do not make a force.”</p> - -<p>Add to this the Spanish historian Cabane’s statements -that the Migueletes were always insubordinate,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110"></a>[110]</span> -detested the service of the line, and were -many of them armed only with staves, and we -have the full measure of the Catalans’ resistance.</p> - -<p>11º.—It was not the vigour of the Catalans, but -of the English, that in this province, as in every -part of the Peninsula, retarded the progress of the -French. Would St. Cyr have wasted a month before -Rosas? Would he have been hampered in his -movements by his fears for the safety of Barcelona? -Would he have failed to besiege and take Tarragona -and Tortosa, if a French fleet had attended -his progress by the coast, or if it could even have -made two runs in safety? To lord Collingwood, -who, like the Roman Bibulus, perished of sickness -on his decks rather than relax in his watching,—to -his keen judgement, his unceasing vigilance, the resistance -made by the Catalans was due. His fleet -it was that interdicted the coast-line to the French, -protected the transport of the Spanish supplies from -Valencia, assisted in the defence of the towns, aided -the retreat of the beaten armies; in short, did that -which the Spanish fleets in Cadiz and Carthagena -should have done. But the supreme junta, equally -disregarding the remonstrances of lord Collingwood, -the good of their own country, and the treaty with -England, by which they were bound to prevent -their ships from falling into the hands of the enemy, -left their fleets to rot in harbour, although money -was advanced, and the assistance of the British -seamen offered, to fit them out for sea.</p> - -<p>Having now related the principal operations that -took place in the eastern and central provinces of -Spain, which were so suddenly overrun by the -French emperor; having shown that, however restless<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111"></a>[111]</span> -the Spaniards were under the yoke imposed -upon them, they were unable to throw it off; I -shall turn to Portugal, where the tide of invasion -still flowing onward, although with diminished -volume, was first stayed, and finally overpowered -and forced back, by a counter flood of mightier -strength.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112"></a>[112]</span><br /></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_VI">BOOK VI.</h2> -</div> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BVI_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - -<h4>TRANSACTIONS IN PORTUGAL.</h4> - -<p>When sir John Moore marched from Portugal, -the regency, established by sir Hew Dalrymple, -nominally governed that country; but the weak -characters of the members, the listless habits engendered -by the ancient system of misrule, the -intrigues of the Oporto faction, and the general -turbulence of the people soon produced an alarming -state of anarchy. Private persons usurped the -functions of government, justice was disregarded, -insubordination and murder were hailed as indications -of patriotism. War was the universal cry, -but military preparations were wholly neglected; -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, section 1.</span> -for the nation, in its foolish pride, believed that the -French had neither strength nor spirit for a second -invasion.</p> - -<p>In Lisbon there was a French faction. The merchants -were apprehensive, the regency was unpopular, -the public mind unsettled; and, in Oporto, -the violence of both people and soldiers was such, -that sir Harry Burrard sent two British regiments -there, by sea, to preserve tranquillity; in fine, the -seeds of disorder were widely cast and sprouting -vigorously before the English cabinet thought fit -to accredit a responsible diplomatist near the government,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113"></a>[113]</span> -or to place a permanent chief at the head of -the forces left by sir John Moore. The convention -of Cintra was known in England in September. -The regency was established and the frontier fortresses -occupied by British troops in the same -month; yet it was not until the middle of December -that Mr. Villiers and sir John Cradock, charged -with the conduct of the political and military proceedings -in Portugal, reached Lisbon, and thus the -important interval, between the departure of Junot -and their arrival, was totally neglected by the -English cabinet.</p> - -<p>Sir Hew Dalrymple, who had nominated the -regency; sir Arthur Wellesley, who, to local knowledge -and powerful talents, added the influence of -a victorious commander; Burrard, Spencer, were -all removed from Portugal at the very moment -when the presence of persons acquainted with the -real state of affairs was essential to the well-being -of the British interests in that country; and this -error was the offspring of passion and incapacity; -for, if the convention of Cintra had been rightly -understood, the ministers, appreciating the advantages -of that treaty, would have resisted the clamour -of the moment, and the generals would not have -been withdrawn from the public service abroad -to meet unjust and groundless charges at home.</p> - -<p>It may be disputed whether Portugal was the -fittest theatre for the first operations of a British -army; but, when that country was actually freed -from the presence of an enemy; when the capital -and the frontier fortresses were occupied by English -troops; when sir John Moore leaving his hospitals, -baggage, and magazines there, as in a place of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114"></a>[114]</span> -arms, had marched to Spain, the question was no -longer doubtful. The ancient relations between -England and Portugal, the greatness of the port of -Lisbon, the warlike disposition of the Portuguese, -and, above all, the singularly-happy circumstance -that there was neither court nor monarch to balance -the English influence, and that even the nomination -of the regency was the work of an English general, -offered such great and obvious advantages as could -no where else be obtained. It was a miserable -policy that, neglecting such an occasion, retained -sir Arthur Wellesley in England, while Portugal, -like a drunken man, at once weak and turbulent, -was reeling on the edge of a precipice.</p> - -<p>The 5th of December sir John Cradock, being -on his voyage to Lisbon, touched at Coruña. Fifteen -hundred thousand dollars had just arrived -there in the Lavinia frigate; but, sir John Moore’s -intention to retreat upon Portugal being known, -Cradock divided this sum, and carried away eight -hundred thousand dollars, proposing to leave a -portion at Oporto, and to take the remainder to -Lisbon, that Moore might find, on whatever line he -retreated, a supply of money.</p> - -<p>From Coruña he proceeded to Oporto, and landed -to gather information of the state of affairs. Here -he found that sir Robert Wilson had succeeded in -organizing, under the title of the Lusitanian Legion, -about thirteen hundred men, and that others were -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, section 2.</span> -on their way to reinforce him; but, this excepted, -nothing at Oporto, civil or military, bespoke either -arrangement or common sense. The bishop, still -intent upon acquiring supreme rule, was deeply -engaged with secret intrigues, and, under him, a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115"></a>[115]</span> -number of factious and designing persons instigated -the populace to violent actions, with a view to profit -from their excesses.</p> - -<p>The formation of the Lusitanian Legion was -originally a project of the chevalier da Souza, the -Portuguese minister in London. Souza was one of -the bishop’s faction, and the prelate calculated upon -this force not so much to repel the enemy as to give -weight to his own party against the government. -The men were promised higher pay than any other -Portuguese soldiers, to the great discontent of the -latter, and they were clad in uniforms differing in -colour from the national troops. The regency, who -dreaded the machinations of the turbulent priest, -entertained the utmost jealousy of the legion, which, -in truth, was a most anomalous force, and, as might -be expected from its peculiar constitution, was productive -of much embarrassment.</p> - -<p>Sir John Cradock left three hundred thousand -dollars at Oporto, and having directed the two -British battalions which were in that neighbourhood -to march to Almeida, he took on board a small detachment -of German troops, and set sail for Lisbon; -but, before his departure, he strongly advised sir -Robert Wilson to move such of his legionaries as -were sufficiently organized to Villa Real, in Tras os -Montes, a place appointed by the regency for the -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6</a>, section 1.</span> -assembly of the forces in the north. Sir Robert, -tired of the folly and disgusted with the insolence -and excesses of the ruling mob, readily adopted -this advice, so far as to quit Oporto, but, having -views of his own, took the direction of Almeida -instead of Villa Real.</p> - -<p>The state of the capital was little better than -that of Oporto. There was arrangement neither<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116"></a>[116]</span> -for present nor for future defence, and the populace, -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, section 5.</span> -albeit less openly encouraged to commit excesses, -were quite uncontrolled by the government. The -regency had a keener dread of domestic insurrection -than of the return of the French, whose operations -they regarded with even less anxiety than the bishop -did, as being further removed than he was from -the immediate theatre of war. Their want of system -and vigilance, evinced by the following fact, -was truly surprising. Sattaro and another person, -having contracted for the supply of the British -troops, demanded, in the name of the English -general, all the provisions in the public stores of -Portugal, and then sold them to the English commissaries -for his own profit.</p> - -<p>Sir John Cradock’s instructions directed him to -reinforce sir John Moore’s army, and, if the course -of events should bring that general back to Portugal, -he was not to be interfered with. In fact, -Cradock’s operations were limited to the holding of -Elvas, Almeida, and the capital; for, although he -was directed to encourage the formation of a native -army upon a good and regular system, and even to -act in concert with it on the frontier, he was -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_IV">Appendix, No. 4</a>, section 1.</span> -debarred from political interference; and even his -relative situation, as to rank, was left unsettled -until the arrival of Mr. Villiers, to whose direction -all political and many military arrangements were -entrusted.</p> - -<p>It is evident that the influence of a general thus -fettered, and commanding only a small force, which -was moreover much scattered, must be feeble and -insufficient to produce any real amelioration in the -military situation of the country. But the English -ministers, attentive to the false information obtained<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117"></a>[117]</span> -from interested agents, still imagined that not only -the Spanish, but the Portuguese armies were numerous, -and to be relied upon; and they confidently -expected, that the latter would be able to take an -active part in the Spanish campaign.</p> - -<p>Cradock, feeling the danger of this illusion, made -it his first object to ascertain, and to transmit home, -exact information of the real strength and efficiency -of the native regular troops. They were nominally -twenty thousand; but Miguel Percira Forjas, military -secretary to the regency, and the ablest public -man Portugal possessed, acknowledged that this -force was a nullity, and that there were not more -<span class="sidenote">Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -than ten thousand stand of serviceable arms in the -kingdom, the greatest part of which were English. -The troops themselves were undisciplined and unruly; -and the militia and the “<i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanza</i>,” or armed peasantry, -animated rather by a spirit of outrage than -of enthusiasm, evinced no disposition to submit to -regulation, neither was there any branch of administration -free from the grossest disorder.</p> - -<p>The Spanish dollar had a general acceptance in -Portugal. The regency, under the pretence that a -debased foreign coin would drive the Portuguese -coin out of circulation, deprived the dollar of its -current value. This regulation, true in principle, -and applicable, as far as the Portuguese gold coin -(which is of peculiar fineness) was concerned, had, -however, a most injurious effect. The Spanish -dollar was in reality finer than the Portuguese silver -cruzado-nova, and would finally have maintained -its value, notwithstanding this decree. But a slur -being thus thrown upon it by the government, the -money changers contrived to run its value down for -the moment, a matter of infinite importance; for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118"></a>[118]</span> -the English soldiers and sailors being all paid in -these dollars, at four shillings and sixpence, which -was the true value, were thus suddenly mulcted four-pence -in each, by the artificial depreciation of the -moment. The men attributed this to fraud in the -shopkeepers; the retail trade of Lisbon was interrupted, -and quarrels between the tradesmen and the -soldiers took place hourly.</p> - -<p>To calm this effervescence, a second decree was -promulgated, directing that the dollar should be -received at the mint and in the public offices at its -real value. It then appeared that the government -could profit by coining the dollar of four shillings -and sixpence into cruzado-novas, a circumstance -which gave the whole affair the appearance of an -unworthy trick to recruit the treasury. This happened -in October; and as the financial affairs were -ill managed, and the regency destitute of vigour or -capacity, the taxes were unpaid, the hard cash -exhausted, and the treasury paper at a heavy discount -when Cradock arrived. Upon the scroll thus -unfolded he could only read confusion, danger, and -misfortune; for such being the fruits of victory, -what could be expected from disaster; and at this -period (the middle of December) sir John Moore -was supposed to be in full retreat upon Portugal, -followed by the emperor with one French army, while -another threatened Lisbon by the line of the Tagus. -The English troops in the kingdom did not amount -to ten thousand men, including the sick, and they -were ill equipped and scattered; moreover, the capital -was crowded with women and children, with -baggage and non-combatants, belonging as well to -the army in Spain as to that in Portugal.</p> - -<p>There were in the river three Portuguese ships of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119"></a>[119]</span> -the line, two frigates, and eight other smaller vessels -of war; but none were in a state for sea, and the -whole likely to fall into the hands of the enemy: for -in the midst of this confusion sir Charles Cotton was -recalled, without a successor being appointed; and -although the zeal and talents of captain Halket, the -senior officer on the station, amply compensated for -the departure of the admiral, as far as professional -duties were concerned, he could not aid the general, -nor deal with the regency as vigorously as an officer -of higher rank, and formally accredited, could have -done.</p> - -<p>Sir John Cradock, although fully sensible of his -own difficulties, with a very disinterested zeal, resolved -to make the reinforcing of sir John Moore’s -army his first care; but his force at this time was, -as I have already said, less than ten thousand men -of all arms. It consisted of eight British and four -German battalions of infantry, four troops of dragoons, -and thirty pieces of artillery, of which, however, only -<span class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s Papers, MSS.</span> -six were horsed so as to take the field. There was, -also, a battalion of the 60th regiment, but it was -composed principally of Frenchmen, recruited from -the prison ships, and had been sent back from Spain, -as the soldiers could not be trusted near their countrymen.</p> - -<p>Of these thirteen battalions two were in Abrantes, -one in Elvas, three at Lamego on the Duero, one in -Almeida, and the remaining six at Lisbon. Three -of the four battalions in the north were immediately -directed to join sir John Moore by the route of Salamanca; -and of those in the south, two, accompanied -by a demi-brigade of artillery, were sent to him from -Abrantes, by the road of Castello Branco and Ciudad -Rodrigo.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120"></a>[120]</span></p> - -<p>The 19th of December, Mr. Villiers having arrived, -sir John Cradock forwarded to the regency a strong -representation of the dangerous state of Portugal. -He observed that there was neither activity in the -government nor enthusiasm among the people; that -the army, deficient in numbers, and still more so in -discipline, was scattered and neglected; and, notwithstanding -that the aspect of affairs was so threatening, -the regency were apparently without any -<span class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -system, or fixed principle of action. He proposed, -therefore, that a general enrolment of all the people -should take place; and from the British stores he -offered a supply of a thousand muskets and ten -thousand pikes. This giving of pikes to the people -appears to have been in compliance with Mr. Villiers’ -wishes, and betrayed more zeal than prudence; for -certainly a general levy and arming with pikes of -the turbulent populace of a capital city, at such a -conjuncture, was more likely to lead to confusion -and mischief than to any effectual defence. But -the main objects pressing upon the general’s attention -were sufficiently numerous and contradictory -to render it difficult for him to avoid errors.</p> - -<p>It was a part of his instructions, and of manifest -importance, to send reinforcements to sir John -Moore. But it was equally necessary to keep a -force towards the frontier on the line of the Tagus, -seeing that the fourth French corps had just passed -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_II">Appendix, No. 2</a>, section 1.</span> -that river at Almaraz, had defeated Galluzzo’s army -and menaced Badajos, which was without arms, -ammunition, or provisions; and, moreover, the -populace there were in commotion, and slaying the -chief persons. Now, sir John Cradock’s instructions -directed him to keep his troops in a position that -would enable him to abandon Portugal, if a very<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121"></a>[121]</span> -superior force should press him; but as, in such a -case, he was to carry off not only the British army, -but the Portuguese navy and stores, to destroy what -he could not remove, and to receive on board his -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_IV">Appendix, No. 4</a>, section 1.</span> -ships all the natives who might be desirous of -escaping, it was of pressing necessity to ship the -women, children, and baggage, in fine, all the -encumbrances belonging to Moore’s army, immediately, -that his own rear might be clear for a -sudden embarkation. In short, he was to send his -troops to Spain, and yet defend Portugal; to excite -confidence in the Portuguese, and yet openly to -carry on the preparations for abandoning that -country.</p> - -<p>The populace of Lisbon were, however, already -uneasy at the rumours of an embarkation, and it -was doubtful if they would permit even the British -non-combatants to get on board quietly, much less -suffer the forts to be dismantled, and the ships of -war to be carried off, without a tumult, which, at -such a conjuncture, would have been fatal to all -parties. Hence it was imperative to maintain a -strong garrison in Lisbon and in the forts commanding -the mouth of the river; and this draft, together -with the troops absorbed by the fortresses of Almeida -and Elvas, reduced the fighting men in the field to -insignificance.</p> - -<p>The regency, knowing the temper of the people -and fearing to arm them, were not very eager to -enforce the levy; yet, anxious to hide their weakness, -they promised, at the urgent solicitations of -the English general, to send six thousand troops to -Alcantara, on the Spanish frontier, with a view to -observe the march of the fourth corps,—a promise<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122"></a>[122]</span> -which they never intended, and indeed were unable, -to perform. Forjas, who was supposed to be -very inimical to the British influence, frankly declared -<span class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -that they neither could nor would move -without an advance of money, and sir John Cradock, -although he recommended that this aid should -be given, had no power to grant it himself.</p> - -<p>Letters from sir John Moore, dated at Salamanca, -now reached Lisbon: they increased the anxiety to -reinforce the army in Spain; but, as they clearly -showed that reverses were to be expected, Cradock, -although resolved to maintain himself in Portugal -as long as it was possible to do so without a breach -of his instructions, felt more strongly that timely -preparation for an embarkation should be made, -especially as the rainy season, in which south-west -winds prevail, had set in, and rendered the departure -of vessels from the Tagus very uncertain. -Meanwhile the internal state of Portugal was in -no wise amended, or likely to amend.</p> - -<p>The government had, indeed, issued a decree, on -the 23d of December, for organizing the population -of Lisbon in sixteen legions, but only one battalion -each was to parade at the same moment for exercise, -and those only on Sundays, nor were the legions, -at any time, to assemble without the order of the -general commanding the province; and this regulation, -which rendered the whole measure absurd, was -dictated by the fears of the regency.</p> - -<p>A proposal to prepare the Portuguese vessels for -sea was acceded to, without any apparent dissatisfaction; -but the government, secretly jealous of -their allies, fomented or encouraged discontent and -suspicion among the people. No efforts were made<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123"></a>[123]</span> -to improve the regular force, none to forward the -march of troops to Alcantara; and so inactive or -so callous were the regency to the rights of humanity, -that a number of French prisoners, captured -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, section 4.</span> -at various periods by the Portuguese, and accumulated -at Lisbon, were denied subsistence. Sir John -Cradock, after many fruitless representations, was -forced to charge himself with their supply, to avert -the horrors of seeing them starved to death. The -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, section 5.</span> -provisions necessary for Fort La Lippe were also -withheld, and general Leite, acting upon the authority -of the regency, strenuously urged that the -British troops should evacuate that fortress.</p> - -<p>The march of the reinforcements for sir John -Moore left only three hundred dragoons and seven -battalions available for the defence of Portugal, of -which four were necessarily in garrison, and the -remainder were unable to take the field, in default -of mules, of which animal the country seemed -bereft; yet, at this moment, as if in derision, Mr. -Frere, the central junta, the junta of Badajos, and -the regency of Portugal, were, with common and -<span class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -characteristic foolishness, pressing sir John Cradock -to march into the south of Spain, although there -was scarcely a Spanish soldier there in arms to -assist him; and such a movement, if it had been -either prudent or practicable, was directly against -his instructions.</p> - -<p>Towards the end of December, the communication -with sir John Moore was suddenly interrupted, -and the line of the Tagus acquired greater importance. -The troops going from Elvas to the army in -Spain were, therefore, directed to halt at Castello -Branco, and general Richard Stewart, who commanded -them, being reinforced with two hundred<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124"></a>[124]</span> -cavalry, was ordered, for the moment, to watch the -<span class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -roads by Salvatierra and the two Idanhas, and to -protect the flying bridges at Abrantes and Vilha -Velha from the enemy’s incursions. At the same -time, a promise was obtained from the regency that -all the Portuguese troops in the Alemtejo should -be collected, at Campo Mayor and Portalegre.</p> - -<p>Sir John Cradock fixed upon Sacavem as the -position in which his main body should be concentrated, -intending to defend that point as long as he -could with so few troops; and, as he knew that -Almeida, although full of British stores, and important -in every way, was, with respect to its own -defence, utterly neglected by the regency, and -that even the presence of a British force there -was viewed with jealousy, he sent brigadier-general -A. Cameron, with instructions to collect -the convalescents of Moore’s army, to unite -them with the two battalions still at Almeida, and -then to make his way to the army in Spain; but if -the attempt should be judged too dangerous, Cameron -was to return to Lisbon. In either case, the -stores and the sick men lying at Almeida were to -be directed upon Oporto.</p> - -<p>The paucity of cavalry was severely felt on -the frontier. It prevented the general from ascertaining -the real strength and objects of the enemy’s -parties, and the Portuguese reports were notoriously -contradictory and false. The 14th dragoons, seven -hundred strong, commanded by major-general Cotton, -had been disembarked since the 22d of December, -<span class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -and were destined for the army in Spain; but -such was the penury of the country, or the difficulty -of drawing forth its resources, that the commissary-general -doubted if he could forward that small<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125"></a>[125]</span> -body, even by detachments. Nor is this surprising, -for many of the debts left by Moore’s -army were yet unpaid, and sufficient confidence was -not established among the peasantry to induce -them to bring forward the necessary supplies upon -credit.</p> - -<p>Rumours of reverses in Spain were now rife, and -acquired importance, when it became known that -four thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry, -the advanced guard of thirty thousand French -troops, were actually at Merida, on the road to -Badajos, which town, as I have already said, was -not only in a state of anarchy, but destitute of provisions, -arms, and ammunition. If, at this time, -the Portuguese force had been assembled at Alcantara, -sir John Cradock would have supported them -with the British brigades, at Abrantes and Castello -Branco; but not a man had been put in motion, -and he, feeling no confidence either in the troops -or in the promises of the regency, resolved to concentrate -his own army near Lisbon. General Stewart -was, therefore, directed to destroy the bridges of -Vilha Velha and Abrantes, and to fall back to -Sacavem.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the Lisbon populace, supposing that -the English general designed to abandon them -without necessity, were violently excited. The -regency, either from fear or folly, made no effort -to preserve tranquillity, and the people, feeling -their own strength, proceeded from one excess to -another, until it become evident that, in a forced -embarkation, the British would have to fight their -allies as well as their enemies. At this gloomy -period when ten marches would have brought<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126"></a>[126]</span> -the French to Lisbon, when a stamp of Napoleon’s -foot would have extinguished that spark of war -which afterwards blazed over the Peninsula, sir -John Moore made his daring movement upon -Sahagun; and Portugal, gasping as in a mortal -agony, was instantly relieved.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127"></a>[127]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BVI_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - -<p>It was the advanced guard of the fourth corps -that had approached Merida with the intention of -proceeding to Badajos, and the emperor was, as -we have seen, preparing to follow: but, in the -night of the 26th of December, an officer carrying -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_II">Appendix, No. 2</a>, sections 1 and 2.</span> -the intelligence of Moore’s movement, reached -Merida, and, next morning, the French fell back, -and marching hastily to the Tagus, crossed it, and -rejoined their main body, from which another -powerful detachment was immediately directed -upon Placentia. This retrograde movement obviated -the immediate danger; and sir John Cradock -endeavoured to pacify the people of Lisbon.</p> - -<p>He ordered general Stewart’s brigade, strengthened -by two German battalions, to halt at Santarem. He -explained his own motives to the Portuguese, and -urged the regency to a more frank and vigorous -system than they had hitherto followed; for, like -the Spanish juntas, they promised every thing, and -performed nothing; neither would they, although -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, section 5.</span> -consenting, verbally, to all the measures proposed, -ever commit themselves by writing, having the -despicable intention of afterwards disclaiming that -which might prove disagreeable to the populace, or -even to the French. Sir John Cradock, however, -had no power beyond his own personal influence to -enforce attention to his wishes. No successor to -sir Charles Cotton had yet arrived, and Mr. Villiers -seems to have wanted the decision and judgement -required to meet such a momentous crisis.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128"></a>[128]</span></p> - -<p>In the north general Cameron, having sent the -sick men and part of the stores from Almeida towards -Oporto, gave up that fortress to sir Robert -Wilson; and, on the 5th of January, marched, with -two British battalions and a detachment of convalescents, -by the Tras os Montes to join the army in -Spain. On the 9th, hearing of sir John Moore’s -retreat to Coruña, he would have returned to Almeida, -but Lapisse, who had taken Zamora, threatened -to intercept the line of march; wherefore, -Cameron turned towards Lamego, giving notice of -his movement to sir Robert Wilson, and advising -him also to retire to the same place. Colonel -Blunt, with seven companies of the 3d regiment, -escorting a convoy for sir John Moore’s army, was -likewise forced to abandon his route, and take the -road to Oporto, on which town every thing British -in the north of Portugal was now directed.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding the general dismay, sir Robert -Wilson rejected Cameron’s advice, and, being reinforced -by some Spanish troops, Portuguese volunteers, -and straggling convalescents, belonging to -Moore’s army, proceeded to put in practice all the -arts of an able partizan. Issuing proclamations, -enticing the French to desert, spreading false -reports of his numbers, and, by petty enterprizes -and great activity, arousing a spirit of resistance -throughout the Ciudad Rodrigo country.</p> - -<p>The continued influx of sick and stores at Oporto, -together with the prospect of general Cameron’s -arrival there, became a source of uneasiness to sir -John Cradock. Oporto, with a shifting-bar and -shoal water is the worst possible harbour for vessels -to clear out, and one of the most dangerous for -vessels to lie off, at that season of the year; hence,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129"></a>[129]</span> -if the enemy advanced in force, a great loss, both -of men and stores, was to be anticipated.</p> - -<p>The departure of sir Charles Cotton had diminished -the naval means at captain Halket’s disposal, and, -for seventeen successive days, such was the state of -<span class="sidenote">Sir John Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -the wind that no vessel could leave the Tagus; he, -however, contrived at last to send tonnage for two -thousand persons, and undertook to keep a sloop of -war off Oporto. Sir Samuel Hood also despatched -some vessels from Vigo, but the weather continued -for a long time so unfavourable that these transports -could not enter the harbour of Oporto, and the -encumbrances hourly increasing, at last produced -the most serious embarrassments.</p> - -<p>Sir John Moore having now relinquished his -communications with Portugal, sir John Cradock -had to consider how, relying on his own resources, -he could best fulfil his instructions and maintain his -hold of that country, without risking the utter -destruction of the troops intrusted to his care.</p> - -<p>For an inferior army Portugal has no defensible -frontier. The rivers, generally running east and -west, are fordable in most places, subject to sudden -rises and falls, offering but weak lines of resistance; -and with the exception of the Zezere, presenting -no obstacles to the advance of an enemy penetrating -by the eastern frontier. The mountains, indeed, -afford many fine and some impregnable positions, but -such is the length of the frontier line and the difficulty -of lateral communications, that a general -who should attempt to defend it against superior -forces would risk to be cut off from the capital, if -he concentrated his troops; and if he extended -them his line would be immediately broken.</p> - -<p>The possession of Lisbon constitutes, in fact, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130"></a>[130]</span> -possession of Portugal, south of the Duero, and an -inferior army can only protect Lisbon by keeping -close to that capital. Sensible of this truth, sir -John Cradock adopted the French colonel Vincente’s -views for the defence of Lisbon; and -proceeded, on the 4th of January, with seventeen -hundred men to occupy the heights behind the -creek of Saccavem—leaving, however, three thousand -men in the forts and batteries at Lisbon.</p> - -<p>At the earnest request of the regency, who in -return promised to assemble the native troops at -Thomar, Abrantes, and Vilha Velha, general Stewart’s -brigade, two thousand seven hundred strong, -<span class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -was ordered to halt at Santarem. But it had been -marching incessantly for a month, and in the rain, -the men’s clothes were worn out, their accoutrements -nearly destroyed, and in common with the -rest of the army, they were suffering severely from -the want of shoes.</p> - -<p>Thus, Cameron being on the Douro, the main -body between Santarem and Lisbon, and colonel -Kemmis at Elvas, with the fortieth regiment, -an army of ten thousand men—with the encumbrances -of an army of forty thousand—was placed -on the three points of a triangle, the shortest -side of which was above a hundred and fifty -miles. The general commanding could not bring -into the field above five thousand men; nor could -that number be assembled in a condition for service -at any one point of the frontier, under three weeks -or a month; moreover, the uncertainty of remaining -in the country at all, rendered it difficult to feed the -troops, for the commissaries being unable to make -large contracts for a fixed time, were forced to carry -on, as it were, a retail system of supply.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131"></a>[131]</span></p> - -<p>Mr. Frere, however, with indefatigable folly, was -urging sir John Cradock to make a diversion in -Spain; and while Mr. Frere was calling for troops -in the south, Mr. Villiers was as earnest that a force -might be sent by sea to Vigo. The minister’s instructions -prescribed the preservation of Lisbon, -Elvas, and Almeida; the assembling, in concert with -the Portuguese government, a combined force on -the frontier, and the sending succours of men to -Moore; but although sir John Cradock’s means -were so scanty that the fulfilment of any one of -these objects was scarcely possible, Mr. Canning -writing officially to Mr. Villiers at this epoch, as if -a mighty and well supplied army was in Portugal, -enforced the “necessity of continuing to maintain -possession of Portugal, as long as could be done -with the force intrusted to sir John Cradock’s command, -<em>remembering always that not the defence of -Portugal alone, but the employment of the enemy’s -military force</em>, and the diversion which would be -thus created in favour of the south of Spain, were -objects not to be abandoned, except in case of the -most extreme necessity.” The enemy’s military -force! It was three hundred thousand men, and -this despatch was a pompous absurdity; but the -ministers and their agents, eternally haunted by the -phantoms of Spanish and Portuguese armies, were -incapable of perceiving the palpable bulk and substance -of the French hosts. The whole system of the -cabinet was one of shifts and expedients; every week -produced a fresh project,—minister and agent, -alike, followed his own views, without reference to -any fixed principle: and the generals were the only -persons not empowered to arrange military operations.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132"></a>[132]</span></p> - -<p>The number of officers despatched to seek information -of the French movements enabled sir John -Cradock, notwithstanding the direct communications -were cut off, to obtain intelligence of Moore’s -advance towards Sahagun, and being still anxious -to assist that general, he again endeavoured to send -a reinforcement into Spain, by the route of Almeida; -but the difficulty of obtaining supplies -finally induced him to accede to Mr. Villiers’ -wishes, and he shipped six hundred cavalry, and -<span class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -thirteen hundred infantry, on the 12th of January, -meaning to send them to Vigo; the vessels were, -however, still in the river, when authentic intelligence -of sir John Moore’s retreat upon Coruña with -the intention of embarking there, was received, and -rendered this project useless.</p> - -<p>The 14th of January the Conqueror line-of-battle-ship, -having admiral Berkeley on board, reached -the Tagus, and for the first time since sir John -<span class="sidenote">Cradock’s Paper, MSS.</span> -Cradock took the command of the troops in Portugal, -he received a communication from the ministers -in England.</p> - -<p>It now appeared that their thoughts were less -intently fixed upon the defence of Portugal, than -upon getting possession of Cadiz. Their anxiety -upon this subject had somewhat subsided after the -battle of Vimeira, but it revived with greater vigour -when sir John Moore, contemplating a movement -in the south, suggested the propriety of securing -Cadiz as a place of arms; and in January an expedition -was prepared to sail for that town, with the -design of establishing a new base of operations for -the English army. The project failed, but the -transaction deserves notice, as affording proof of the -perplexed and unstable policy of the day.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133"></a>[133]</span></p> - - -<h4>NEGOTIATION FOR THE OCCUPATION OF CADIZ.</h4> - -<div class="sidenote">Papers laid before Parliament, 1810.</div> - -<p>While it was still unknown in England that the -supreme junta had fled from Aranjuez, sir George -Smith, who had conducted Spencer’s negotiation -in 1808, was sent to Cadiz to prepare the -way for the reception of an English garrison. Four -thousand men destined for that service were soon -afterwards embarked at Portsmouth, under the -command of general Sherbrooke, but this officer’s -instructions were repeatedly altered. He was first -directed to touch at Lisbon in his way to Cadiz; -he was afterwards commanded to make for Coruña, -to receive orders from sir John Moore, but, on the -14th of January, his force being increased to five -thousand men, he sailed under his first instructions; -and Mr. Frere was directed to negotiate for the admission -of these troops into Cadiz, as the only condition -upon which a British army could be employed to aid -the Spanish cause in that part of the Peninsula.</p> - -<p>When the reverses in the north of Spain became -known, the importance of Cadiz increased, and -the importance of Portugal decreased in the eyes -of the English ministers. Sir John Cradock was -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VIII">Appendix, No. 8</a>.</span> -then made acquainted with Sherbrooke’s destination; -he was himself commanded to obey any -requisition for troops that might be made by the -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_V">Appendix, No. 5</a>.</span> -Spanish junta; and so independent of the real -state of affairs were the ministerial arrangements, -that Cradock, whose despatches had been one continued -complaint of his inability to procure horses -for his own artillery, was directed to furnish them -for Sherbrooke’s.</p> - -<p>Sir George Smith, a man somewhat hasty, but -of remarkable zeal and acuteness, left England<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134"></a>[134]</span> -about the middle of December; and, on his arrival -at Cadiz, at once discovered that there, as in every -other part of the Peninsula, all persons being -engaged in theories or intrigues, nothing useful for -defence was executed. The ramparts of the city -were in tolerable condition, but scarcely any guns -were mounted; and yet, two miles in front of the -town, an outwork had been commenced upon such -a scale that it could not possibly be finished under -four months; and, after the slow mode of Spanish -proceedings, would have taken as many years to -complete.</p> - -<p>For a solid defence of all the fortifications, sir -George Smith judged that twenty thousand good -troops would be requisite, but that ten thousand -would suffice for the city. There were, however, -only five thousand militia and volunteers in the -place, and not a regular soldier under arms, neither -any within reach. The number of guns mounted -and to be mounted exceeded four hundred; to serve -them, two hundred and fifty peasants and volunteers -were enrolled, and, being clothed in uniforms, were -called artillery-men.</p> - -<p>Knowing nothing of sir John Moore’s march to -Sahagun, sir George Smith naturally calculated -upon the immediate approach of the French; and -seeing the helpless state of Cadiz, and being -assured that the people would willingly admit an -English garrison, he wrote to sir John Cradock for -troops. The latter, little thinking that, at such -a conjuncture, the supreme junta would be more -<span class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -jealous of their allies than fearful of their enemies; -and judging also, from the tenor of his latest instructions, -that obedience to this requisition would -be consonant to the minister’s wishes, immediately<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135"></a>[135]</span> -ordered colonel Kemmis to proceed from Elvas -with the fortieth regiment, by the route of Seville, -and, at the same time, embarked about three -thousand of the best troops at Lisbon, and sent -them to Cadiz. This force, commanded by major-general -Mackenzie, sailed the 2d February, and -reached their destination the 5th of the same -month.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Parl. Papers, 1810.</div> - -<p>Meanwhile, Mr. Frere, although acquainted with -the sailing of Mackenzie’s armament, was ignorant -that sir George Smith had applied to the governor -of Cadiz for permission to take military possession -of that town, for Smith had no instructions to -correspond with Mr. Frere; and the latter had -opened a separate negotiation with the central -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_IX">Appendix, No. 9</a>.</span> -junta at Seville, in which he endeavoured to pave -the way for the occupation by proposing to have -the troops admitted as guests, and he sent Mr. Stuart -to arrange this with the local authorities.</p> - -<p>Mr. Frere had, however, meddled much with the -personal intrigues of the day: he was, moreover, -of too slender a capacity to uphold the dignity and -just influence of a great power on such an occasion; -and the flimsy thread of his negotiation snapped -under the hasty touch of sir George Smith. The -supreme junta, averse to every thing that threatened -to interrupt their course of sluggish indolence, had -sent the marquis de Villel, a member of their own -body, to Cadiz, avowedly to prepare the way for -the admission of the troops, but, in reality, to -thwart that measure. The circumstance of Mackenzie’s -arrival, with an object different from that -announced by Mr. Frere, was instantly taken advantage -of to charge England with treachery. For<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136"></a>[136]</span> -the junta, knowing Mr. Frere to be their own dupe, -<span class="sidenote">Parl. Papers, 1810.</span> -believed, or affected to believe, that he was also -the dupe of the English minister; and that the -whole transaction was an artifice, on the part of -the latter, to get possession of the city with a -felonious intent.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><a href="#No_IX">Appendix, No. 9</a>.</div> - -<p>The admission of the British troops was nevertheless -earnestly desired by the inhabitants of Cadiz, -and of the neighbouring towns; and this feeling -was so well understood by Mr. Stuart and sir George -Smith, that they would, notwithstanding the reluctance -of the supreme junta, have brought the -affair to a good conclusion; but, at the most -critical period of the negotiation, the former was -sent on a secret mission to Vienna, by the way of -Trieste, and the latter, who was in bad health, -dying about the same period, the negotiation failed -for want of a head to conduct it.</p> - -<p>General Mackenzie, like sir George Smith, -thought that the object might be attained: he -observed, indeed, that the people, far from suspecting -any danger, were ignorant of, or incredulous -of the reverses in the north; that nothing had been -done towards equipping the fleet for sea; and that, -notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of admiral -Purvis and Mr. Stuart, the Spaniards would -neither work themselves nor permit the English -sailors to work for them. Still the general feeling -was favourable to the British army, and the good -wishes of the inhabitants were openly avowed: -Mackenzie had, however, only a negative power, -the affair being in the hands of Mr. Frere.</p> - -<p>In the course of the negotiations carried on by -that minister, the supreme junta proposed,</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137"></a>[137]</span></p> - -<p>1º.—That the troops should land at Port St. -Mary’s, and be quartered there and in the neighbouring -towns.</p> - -<p>2º.—That they should join Cuesta’s army.</p> - -<p>3º.—That they should go to Catalonia.</p> - -<p>4º.—That they should be parcelled out in small -divisions, and attached to the different Spanish -armies.</p> - -<p>Nay, untaught by their repeated disasters, and -pretending to hold the English soldiery cheap, these -self-sufficient men proposed that the British should -garrison the minor fortresses on the coast, in order -to release an equal number of Spaniards for the -field.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><a href="#No_IX">Appendix, No. 9</a>.</div> - -<p>Mr. Frere wished to accept the first of these -proposals, but general Mackenzie, sir George Smith, -and Mr. Stuart agreed that it would be injurious -for many reasons; not the least urgent of which -was, that as the troops could not have been embarked -again without some national dishonour, they must -have marched towards Cuesta, and thus have been -involved in the campaign without obtaining that -which was their sole object, <em>the possession of Cadiz -as a place of arms</em>.</p> - -<p>Mr. Frere then suggested a modification of the -second proposal, namely, to leave a small garrison -in Cadiz, and to join Cuesta with the remainder of -the troops. Sir G. Smith was dead; Mr. Stuart had -embarked for Trieste; and general Mackenzie, reluctant -to oppose Mr. Frere’s wishes, consented to -march, if the necessary equipments for his force -could be procured; but he observed, that the plan -was contrary to his instructions, and to the known -wishes of the English government, and liable, in part, -to the objections against the first proposition.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138"></a>[138]</span></p> - -<p>His letter was written the 18th of February, and -on the 22d a popular tumult commenced in Cadiz.</p> - -<p>The supreme junta, to prove that that city did -not require an English garrison, had ordered two -regiments, composed of Poles, Germans, and Swiss, -prisoners or deserters from the French, to march -there. The people, aware that the junta disliked -and intended to disarm the volunteers, were offended -that deserters should be trusted in preference to -themselves. They arose, and stopped the courier, -with despatches from Seville, and imprisoned the -marquis of Villel, who was obnoxious, because, -while mild to persons suspected of favouring the -French, he had been harsh, or rather brutal, in his -conduct to some ladies of rank in Cadiz.</p> - -<p>The populace, proceeding from one violence to -another, endeavoured to kill the state prisoners; -and being prevented in this bloody object, committed -several excesses, and murdered don Joseph Heredia, -the collector of the public rents. During the tumult, -which lasted two days, the disembarkation of the -English troops was repeatedly called for by the -mob; and two British officers being sent on shore as -mediators, were received with enthusiasm, and -obeyed with respect, a manifest proof of the correct -view taken by sir George Smith.</p> - -<p>The 24th, tranquillity was restored; and the 25th, -general Mackenzie, not having received from Mr. -Frere an answer to his letter of the 18th, suggested, -that of the three English battalions then in the harbour, -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_IX">Appendix, No. 9</a>.</span> -two should be placed in Cadiz; and that the -third, proceeding to Seville, should there unite with -the 40th regiment, and both together march to join -Cuesta.</p> - -<p>Mr. Frere, however, instead of addressing the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139"></a>[139]</span> -junta with an authority and dignity becoming the -representative of a great nation, on whose support -the independence of the whole Peninsula rested, -had been endeavouring to gain his end by subtlety. -The object was one that England had a right to -seek, and the Spanish rulers no right to refuse; for -the people wished to further it, and the threat of an -appeal to them would soon have silenced the feeble -negative of such a despicable and suspected government; -but Mr. Frere, incapable of taking a single -and enlarged view, was pressing and discussing, -with the secretary of the junta, a variety of trifling -points, as if to shew his epistolary dexterity; and, -finally, when his opponent had conceded the point -of admitting troops at all, broke off the negotiation, -upon the question, as to whether the number to be -admitted should be one or two thousand men, as if -the way to drive a wedge was with the broad end -foremost.</p> - -<p>Self baffled in that quarter, the British plenipotentiary, -turning towards Cuesta, the avowed enemy -of the junta, and one much feared by them, sought -to secure his assistance by holding out the lure of -having a British force added to his command, but -the sarcastic old general derided the diplomatist. -“Although I do not,” said he, “discover any great -difficulty in the actual state of things, which should -<span class="sidenote">Parl. Papers, 1810.</span> -prevent his British majesty’s troops from garrisoning -Cadiz under such terms, and for the purpose which -your excellency proposes; I am far from supposing -that the supreme junta, which is fully persuaded of -the importance of our union with England, is not -grounded in its objections; and your excellency -knows that it is sufficient that they should have -them, to prevent my giving any opinion on so important<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140"></a>[140]</span> -a measure, <em>unless they should consult me</em>. -With regard to the 4,300 men, which your excellency -is pleased to mention, there is no doubt that -I stand in need of them; but I flatter myself, England, -sensible of the importance of Estremadura, -will even lend me much greater assistance, particularly -if, from any change of circumstances, the -supreme junta should no longer manifest the repugnance -we speak of.”</p> - -<p>This answer having frustrated the projected intrigue, -Mr. Frere, conscious perhaps of diplomatic -incapacity, returned with renewed ardour to the task -of directing the military affairs, in every part of the -Peninsula. He had seen an intercepted letter of -Soult’s, addressed to the king, in which the project -of penetrating into Portugal was mentioned; and -immediately concluding that general Mackenzie’s -troops would be wanted for the defence of that kingdom, -counselled him to abandon Cadiz and return to -Lisbon; but the general, who knew that, even should -he return, a successful defence of Portugal with so -few troops would be impossible, and that every precaution -was already taken for an embarkation in the -last extremity, observed, that “the danger of Lisbon -rendered the occupation of Cadiz more important.”</p> - -<p>General Mackenzie’s reply was written the 26th -of February. On the 3d of March he received -another despatch from Mr. Frere. Cadiz, and the -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_IX">Appendix, No. 9</a>.</span> -danger of Portugal, seemed to have passed from the -writer’s mind, and were unnoticed; but entering -into a minutely inaccurate statement of the situation -of the French and Spanish armies, he observed, that -Soult having failed in an attempt to penetrate Portugal -by the Minho, <em>it was impossible, from the position<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141"></a>[141]</span> -of the Spanish forces, assisted as they were by the -Portuguese, that he could persevere in his plan</em>. -Wherefore, he proposed that the British force then -in the harbour of Cadiz should proceed immediately -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VIII">Appendix, No. 8</a>.</span> -to Tarragona, to aid Reding; and this wild scheme -was only frustrated by an unexpected despatch from -sir John Cradock, recalling the troops to Lisbon.</p> - -<p>They arrived there on the 12th of March; and -thus ended a transaction clearly indicating an unsettled -policy, shallow combinations, and a bad -choice of agents on the part of the English cabinet, -and a most unwise and unworthy disposition in the -supreme junta. General Mackenzie attributed the -jealousy of the latter to French influence; Mr. Frere -to the abrupt proceedings of sir George Smith, and -to fear, lest the junta of Seville, who were continually -on the watch to recover their ancient power, -should represent the admission of the British troops -as a treasonable proceeding on the part of the supreme -government. It is, however, evident that -the true cause was the false position in which the -English ministers had originally placed themselves, -by inundating Spain with arms and money, without -at the same time asserting a just influence, and -making their assistance the price of good order and -useful exertion.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142"></a>[142]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BVI_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - -<p>The effort made to secure Cadiz was an act of -disinterested zeal on the part of sir John Cradock. -The absence of his best troops exposed him to the -most galling peevishness from the regency, and to -the grossest insults from the populace. With his -reduced force, he could not expect to hold even a -contracted position at the extremity of the rock of -Lisbon against the weakest army likely to invade -Portugal; and, as there was neither a native force -nor a government to be depended upon, there remained -for him only the prospect of a forced and, -consequently, disgraceful embarkation, and the undeserved -obloquy that never fails to follow disaster.</p> - -<p>In this disagreeable situation, as Elvas and Almeida -no longer contained British troops, the general’s -attention was necessarily fixed upon Lisbon -and Oporto. The violence of the gales rendered -the latter a sealed port; but the hospitals and magazines -of Almeida, and even of Salamanca, being evacuated -upon Lamego, that town was crowded -with fifteen hundred sick men, besides escorts, and -the hourly accumulating stores. The river had -overflowed its banks, the craft could not ply; -and one large boat, attempting to descend, was -overset, and eighty persons, soldiers and others, -perished.</p> - -<p>General Cameron, hearing of this confusion, relinquished -the idea of embarking his detachment at -Oporto, and, re-crossing the Douro, made for Lisbon, -where he arrived the beginning of February with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143"></a>[143]</span> -about two thousand men; but they were worn down -by fatigue, having marched eight hundred miles -under continued rains.</p> - -<p>Sir Robert Wilson sent his guns to Abrantes, by -the road of Idanha Nova; but, partly from a spirit -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6</a>, sect. 1.</span> -of adventure, partly from an erroneous idea that sir -John Cradock wished him to defend the frontier, he -remained with his infantry in the neighbourhood of -Ciudad Rodrigo. His force had been increased by -a Spanish detachment under don Carlos d’España, -and by some volunteers; but it was still weak, and -his operations were necessarily confined to a few -trifling skirmishes: yet, like many others, his imagination -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6</a>, sect. 1.</span> -so far outstripped his judgement that, when -he had only felt the advanced post of a single division, -he expressed his conviction that the French -were going to abandon Spain altogether.</p> - -<p>Sir John Cradock entertained no such false expectations; -he was informed of the battle of Coruña -and the death of Moore; he knew too well -the vigour and talent of that general to doubt that -he had been oppressed by an overwhelming force; -he knew that Zaragoza had fallen, and that twenty-five -thousand French troops were thus free to act in -other quarters; he knew that Soult, with at least -twenty thousand men, was on the Minho; that Romana -was incapable of making any head, that Portugal -was one wide scene of helpless confusion, -and that a French army was again in the neighbourhood -of Merida, threatening Lisbon by the line -of the Tagus; in fine, that his own embarrassments -were hourly increasing, and that the moment was -arrived when the safety of his troops must become -the chief consideration.</p> - -<p>The tenor of the few despatches he had received<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144"></a>[144]</span> -from England led him to suppose that the ministers -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_X">Appendix, No. 10</a>, sect. 1.</span> -designed to abandon Portugal; but, as their intentions -on that head were never clearly explained, he -resolved to abide by the <ins class="corr" id="tn-144" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'literal interpetation'"> -literal interpretation</ins> of his -first instructions, and to keep his hold of the country -as long as it was possible to do so without risking -the utter destruction of his army. To avoid -that danger, he put every incumbrance at Lisbon on -board the transports in the Tagus, proceeded to -dismantle the batteries at the mouth of the river, -and, in concert with the admiral, made preparations -for carrying away or destroying the military and -naval stores in the arsenal. At the same time, he -renewed his efforts to embark the sick men and -stores at Oporto; but the weather continued so unfavourable -that he was finally obliged to remove -the invalids and many stores by land, yet he could -not procure carriages for the whole.</p> - -<p>After the arrival of Cameron’s detachment, the -effective British force under arms, including convalescents -and fifteen hundred stragglers from sir John -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XI">Appendix, No. 11</a>.</span> -Moore’s army, was about eight thousand men; but, -when the security of the forts and magazines, and the -tranquillity of Lisbon, was provided for, only five -thousand men, and those not in the best order, -could be brought into the field. As this force was -infinitely too weak to cover such a town as Lisbon, -the general judged that it would be unwise to take up -a position in advance, whence he should be obliged -to retreat through the midst of a turbulent and excited -population, which had already given too many indications -of ill-temper to leave any doubt of its hostility -under such circumstances. He, therefore, came -to the resolution of withdrawing from Saccavem and -Lisbon, and concentrating his whole force on a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145"></a>[145]</span> -position at Passa D’Arcos, near the mouth of the -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_X">Appendix, No. 10</a>, sect. 2 and 3.</span> -river, where he could embark with least danger, -and where he had the best chance of defending -himself, if necessary, against superior numbers.</p> - -<p>This reasoning was sound, and Cradock’s intention -was, undoubtedly, not to abandon the country, -unless driven from it by force, or in pursuance of -orders from England: but his arrangements seem to -have carried more the appearance of alarm than -was either politic or necessary; for the position of -Passa D’Arcos might have been prepared, and the -means necessary for an embarkation secured, and -yet the bulk of the troops kept in advance until the -last moment. To display a bold and confident front -in war is, of all things, the most essential, as well -to impose upon friends as upon enemies; and sir -John Cradock did not fail to experience the truth of -this maxim.</p> - -<p>The population of Lisbon, alarmed by the reverses -in Spain, and yet, like all the people in the -Peninsula, confident in their own prowess and resolution -until the very moment of attack, became -extremely exasperated; and the regency, partly -from their natural folly and insincerity, but more -from the dread of the lower orders, countenanced, -if they did not instigate, the latter to commit excesses, -and to interrupt the proceedings of the -British naval and military authorities.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, sect. 5.</div> - -<p>Although the measures of precaution relative to -the forts had originated with the regency, they now -formally protested against them; and, with a view -to hamper the general, encouraged their subalterns -to make many false and even ridiculous charges -against the British executive officers; and it would -appear that the remonstrances of the admiral and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146"></a>[146]</span> -generals were but imperfectly supported by Mr. -Villiers.</p> - -<p>In this manner the people’s violence was nourished -until the city was filled with tumult; mobs, armed -with English pikes and muskets, collected night and -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, section 6.</span> -day in the streets and on the high-roads, and, under -the pretext of seeking for, and killing, Frenchmen, -attacked, indiscriminately, all foreigners, even those -in the British service and wearing the British uniform. -The guards, who endeavoured to protect the -victims of this ferocity, were insulted. Couriers, -passing with despatches, were intercepted and -deprived of their papers; English officers were -outraged in the streets; and such was the audacity -of the people that the artillery was placed in the -squares, in expectation of an affray. In fine, the -state of Lisbon was similar to what it had been at -the period of Junot’s convention; and, if the British -had abandoned the country at this time, they would -have been assailed with as much obloquy by the -Portuguese, for, such has been, and will be, the -fate of all <ins class="corr" id="tn-146" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'unsuccessful auxilliaries'"> -unsuccessful auxiliaries</ins>: a reflection -that should render historians cautious of adopting -accusations upon the authority of native writers on -the like occasions.</p> - -<p>This spirit was not confined to Lisbon. In -Oporto the disposition to insult the British was -more openly encouraged than in the capital, and -the government of the multitude was more decidedly -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, section 6.</span> -pronounced. From the cities it spread to the villages. -The people of the Alemtejo frontier were, -indeed, remarkably apathetic; but, from the Minho -to the Tagus, the country was in horrible confusion; -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, section 6.</span> -the soldiers were scattered, without regard to military -system, and, being unpaid, lived at free<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147"></a>[147]</span> -quarters; the peasantry of the country assembling -in bands, and the populace of the towns in mobs, -intercepted the communications, appointed or displaced -the generals at their pleasure, and massacred -all persons of whom they were suspicious. The -ammunition which had been supplied from England -was wasted, by constant firing in token of -insubordination; and, as if the very genius of -confusion was abroad, some of the British troops, -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6</a>, section 2.</span> -principally <em>malingerers</em>,<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> of sir John Moore’s army, -added their quota of misconduct, to increase the -general distress.</p> - -<p>The leading instigator of the excesses at Oporto -was one Raymundo, a coadjutor and creature of -the bishop’s, a turbulent and cruel fellow, who, by -taking a share in the first insurrection against the -French, obtained a momentary influence, and has -since been elevated, by a very credulous writer, into -a patriotic hero. He was, however, a worthless -coward, fitted for secret villany, but incapable of -a noble action.</p> - -<p>This state of affairs, productive of so much -misery and danger, continuing, without intermission, -caused many of the upper classes to despair -of their country’s safety by war, and increased -the number of those who, wishing to attach -themselves to the fortune of France, were ready to -accept of a foreign prince for their sovereign, if, -with him, they could obtain tranquillity and an -ameliorated constitution; and when, soon afterwards, -the edge of the enemy’s sword, falling upon -the senseless multitude, filled the streets of Oporto -with blood, there was a powerful French party<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148"></a>[148]</span> -already established in Portugal. The bulk of the -people were, however, stanch in their country’s -cause; they were furious and disorderly, but imbued -with hatred of the French; ready at the call -of honour; and susceptible of discipline, without any -loss of energy.</p> - -<p>The turbulence of the citizens, the remonstrances -of the regency, and the representations of Mr. -Villiers, who was in doubt for the personal safety -of the British subjects residing in Lisbon, convinced -sir John Cradock that political circumspection and -adroitness were as important as military arrangement, -to prevent a catastrophe at this critical -period; and, as contrary to what might have been -expected, the enemy had not yet made any actual -movement across the frontier, he was induced to -suspend his design of falling back to Passa D’Arcos; -and in this unsettled state affairs remained until -March, when intelligence arriving that the French -fleet was at sea, two of the line-of-battle ships in -the Tagus were despatched to reinforce sir Thomas -Duckworth’s squadron, and the batteries at the -mouth of the river were again armed.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Soult was making progress in the -north; the anarchy at Oporto was continually increasing, -and the English government had certainly -come to the resolution of abandoning Portugal if -the enemy advanced; for, although sir John Cradock -was not informed of their views, an officer in England, -well acquainted with Portuguese customs, actually -received orders, and was embarking, to aid the -execution of this measure, when, suddenly, the -policy of the cabinet once more changed, and it was -resolved to reinforce the army. This resolution, -which may be attributed partly to the Austrian war,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149"></a>[149]</span> -partly to the failure at Cadiz, and partly to the necessity -of satisfying public opinion in England, was -accompanied by a measure judicious in principle and -of infinite importance, inasmuch as it formed the first -solid basis on which to build a reasonable hope of -success.</p> - -<p>The Portuguese government, whether spontaneously -or brought thereto by previous negotiation, -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6</a>.</span> -had offered the command of all the native troops to -an English general,—with power to alter and amend -the military discipline, to appoint British officers to -the command of the regiments, and to act, without -control, in any manner he should judge fitting to -ameliorate the condition of the Portuguese army; -and this was the more important, because the military -polity of Portugal, although fallen into neglect, -was severe, precise, and admirably calculated to -draw forth the whole strength of the kingdom, for -the regular army could be completed by coercion, -and the militia were bound to assemble in regiments, -numbered, clothed, and armed like the regulars, -but only liable to serve within the frontier. The -whole of the remaining population, capable of -bearing arms, were enrolled under the name of -<i lang="es" xml:lang="es">ordenanças</i>, numbered by battalions in their different -districts and obliged, under very severe -punishments, to assemble at the order of the local -magistrates either to work, to fight, or to assist the -operations of the other forces.</p> - -<p>The English government, accepting of this offer, -agreed to supply arms, ammunition, and other succours, -granted a subsidy for the payment of the -regular forces, and thus obtained, for the first time, -a firm hold of the military resources of Portugal, -and a position in the Peninsula suitable to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150"></a>[150]</span> -dignity of England and to the great contest in -which she was engaged.</p> - -<p>The Portuguese government wished that sir Arthur -Wellesley should be their general; and the English -cabinet offered the situation to him, but he refused -it; and it is said, that sir John Doyle, sir John -Murray, (he who afterwards failed at Tarragona,) -general Beresford, and even the marquis of Hastings, -then earl of Moira, sought for the appointment. -The last was, undoubtedly, a man well fitted by his -courtly manners, his high rank, and his real talents, -both in the cabinet and in the field, for such an -office; but powerful parliamentary interest prevailing, -major-general Beresford was appointed, to the -great discontent of many officers of superior rank, -who were displeased that a man, without any visible -claim to superiority, should be placed over their -heads.</p> - -<p>Information of this change was instantly conveyed -to sir John Cradock, and general Sherbrooke was -ordered to put into Lisbon. The latter was overtaken -at the mouth of Cadiz harbour; and his and general -Mackenzie’s divisions arriving in the Tagus together, -on the 12th of March, gave a new turn to the affairs -of Portugal. But if Mr. Frere’s plan had been -pursued—If general Sherbrooke’s troops had not -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VIII">Appendix, No. 8</a>.</span> -been detained by bad weather at sea—If the first -had proceeded to Tarragona, and nothing but a foul -wind prevented it—If the second sailing from port -to port without any artillery had, as was most probable, -been engaged in some other enterprise—If -Victor, obeying his orders, had marched to Abrantes—If -any one of these events had happened, sir John -Cradock must have abandoned Portugal; and then -how infinitely absurd these proceedings of the English<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151"></a>[151]</span> -ministers would have appeared, and how justly -their puerile combinations would have been the -scorn of Europe.</p> - -<p>Marshal Beresford arrived at Lisbon the beginning -of March; and having received the confirmation of -his power from the regency, fixed his head-quarters -at Thomar, collected the Portuguese troops in masses, -and proceeded to recast their system on the model -of the British army; commencing, with stern but -wholesome rigour, a reform that, in process of time, -raised out of chaos an obedient, well disciplined, -and gallant army, worthy of a high place among the -best in Europe; for the Portuguese people, though -easily misled and excited to wrath, are of a docile -and orderly disposition, and very sensible of a just -and honourable conduct in their officers. But this -reform was not effected at once, nor without many -crosses and difficulties being raised by the higher -orders and by the government—difficulties that general -Beresford could never have overcome, if he -had not been directed, sustained, and shielded, by -the master spirit under whom he was destined to -work.</p> - -<p>The plan of giving to English officers the command -of the Portuguese troops was at first proceeded -on with caution; but after a time, the ground being -supposed safe, it was gradually enlarged, until -almost all the military situations of emolument and -importance were held by Englishmen; and this, -combined with other causes, gave rise to numerous -intrigues, not entirely confined to the natives, and -as we shall find, in after times, seriously threatening -the power of the marshal, the existence of the British -influence, and the success of the war.</p> - -<p>Sir John Cradock’s situation was now materially<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152"></a>[152]</span> -alleviated. The certainty of the Austrian war produced -a marked change in the disposition of the -regency. The arrival of Sherbrooke’s and Mackenzie’s -divisions having increased the British force to -fourteen thousand men, the populace became more -cautious of offering insults; and, about the middle -of March, two thousand men being left to maintain -tranquillity in Lisbon, the remainder of the army -was encamped at Lumiar and Saccavem; and while -these things were passing at Lisbon, the aspect of -affairs changed also in other parts of the kingdom. -For, the bulk of the Portuguese regular troops, -amounting to ten or twelve thousand men, was -collected by marshal Beresford, between the Tagus -and the Mondego.</p> - -<p>Beyond the valley of the Mondego, colonel Trant -commanded a small corps of volunteers, students from -the university; and general Vittoria was at the head -of two regular battalions in Upper Beira.</p> - -<p>The bishop of Oporto was preparing to defend -that town, with a mixed, but ferocious and insubordinate -multitude. General <ins class="corr" id="tn-152" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Silviera'"> -Sylveira</ins>, with four or -five thousand men, had taken post in the Tras os -Montes; and Romana, who had collected seven or -eight thousand at Monterey, was in communication -with him.</p> - -<p>Sir Robert Wilson was at the head of about three -thousand men; he had withdrawn the legion from -Almeida, sent a detachment to Bejar, and remained -himself on the Agueda, watching the advanced posts -of Lapisse. A few Portuguese regiments were extended -from Salvatierra and Idanha to Alcantara. -There was a permanent bridge of boats over the -Tagus at Abrantes, and there were small garrisons -in that town and at Elvas.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153"></a>[153]</span></p> - -<p>But all these forces united would not, with the -exception of the British, have been capable of sustaining -the shock of ten thousand French soldiers -for half an hour; and the whole mass of the latter, -then hanging on the frontier of Portugal, was above -fifty thousand. Gathering like clouds on the horizon, -they threatened many points, but gave no certain -indication of where the storm would break. Soult, -indeed, with about twenty thousand men, was endeavouring -to pass the Minho; but Lapisse, although -constantly menacing Ciudad Rodrigo, kept his -principal masses at Salamanca and Ledesma; while -Victor had concentrated his between the Alberche -and the Tietar.</p> - -<p>Thus Lapisse might join either Soult or Victor; -and the latter could march by Placentia against -Ciudad Rodrigo, while Soult attacked Oporto; or -he might draw Lapisse to him, and penetrate Portugal -by Alcantara. He might pass the Tagus, -attack Cuesta, and pursue him to Seville; or, after -defeating him, he might turn short to the right, and -enter the Alemtejo.</p> - -<p>In this uncertainty, sir John Cradock, keeping the -British concentrated at Lumiar and Saccavem, -waited for the enemy to <ins class="corr" id="tn-153" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'develope his plans'"> -develop his plans</ins>, and, in -the mean time, endeavoured to procure the necessary -equipments for an active campaign. He directed -magazines to be formed at Coimbra and Abrantes; -urged the regency to exertion; took measures to -raise money, and despatched officers to Barbary to -procure mules. But while thus engaged, intelligence -arrived that Victor had suddenly forced the -passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and was in pursuit -of Cuesta on the road to Merida; that Soult, -having crossed the Minho, and defeated Romana<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154"></a>[154]</span> -and <ins class="corr" id="tn-154" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Silveira'"> -Sylveira</ins>, was within a few leagues of Oporto; -and that Lapisse had made a demonstration of -assaulting Ciudad Rodrigo.</p> - -<p>The junta of Oporto now vehemently demanded -aid from the regency, and the latter, although not -much inclined to the bishop’s party, proposed that -sir John Cradock should unite a part of the British -<span class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -forces to the Portuguese troops under marshal -Beresford, and march to the succour of Oporto. -Beresford was averse to trust the Portuguese under -his immediate command, among the mutinous multitude -in that city, but he thought the whole of the -British army should move in a body to Leiria, and -from thence either push on to Oporto, or return, -according to the events that might occur in the -latter town, and he endeavoured to persuade Cradock -to follow this plan.</p> - -<p>It was doubtful, he said, if Victor and Soult intended -to co-operate in a single plan; but, on the -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XII">Appendix, No. 12</a>, section 1.</span> -supposition that it was so, he considered it essential -to drive back or to overcome one before the other -could come to his assistance. Victor was then in -pursuit of Cuesta; if he continued that pursuit, it -must be to enter Seville, or to cripple his opponent -previous to the invasion of Portugal; in either case -he would be in the Sierra Morena before he could -hear of the march from Leiria, and, as Cradock -had daily intelligence of Victor’s movements, there -would be full time to relieve Oporto, and to return -again to the defence of Lisbon. If, however, Soult -depended on the co-operation of Victor, he would -probably remain on the right of the Duero until the -other was on the Tagus, and Lapisse also would be -contented for the present with capturing Ciudad -Rodrigo and Almeida.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155"></a>[155]</span></p> - -<p>This reasoning, so evidently unsound, did not -weigh with sir John Cradock, who resolved to preserve -his central position, covering the capital at -such a distance as to preclude the danger of being -cut off from it by one army while he was engaged -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XII">Appendix, No. 12</a>, section 2.</span> -with another. Lisbon and Oporto, he observed, -were the enemy’s objects; the former was of incomparably -greater importance than the latter. Portugal -was in a state of anarchy equally incompatible -with firm resistance and rapid movements. The -peasantry were tumultuous and formidable to everybody -but the enemy; and Beresford himself acknowledged -that the regular forces were mutinous, disregarding -their officers, choosing when and where -to rest; when to fight, and when to remain in quarters; -and altogether unfit to be trusted within the -circle of the Oporto mischief. The British troops, -therefore, were the only solid resource; but they -were too few to divide, and must act in a body, or -not at all.</p> - -<p>Was it most desirable to protect Lisbon or Oporto? -The first was near, the second two hundred miles -off; and, although the utmost exertions had been -made, the army was not yet equipped for an active -campaign. The troops were ill-clothed, and wanted -shoes; the artillery was unhorsed; the commissariat -possessed only a fourth part of the transport necessary -for the conveyance of provisions and ammunition, -and no activity could immediately supply -these deficiencies, inasmuch as some of the articles -required were not to be had in the country, and, to -obtain others, the interference of the regency was -necessary, but hitherto all applications to that quarter -had been without any effect. Was it wise to commence -offensive operations in the north? Soult and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156"></a>[156]</span> -Lapisse together were estimated at thirty thousand -men, of which above five thousand were cavalry, -and he himself could only bring fifteen guns and -twelve thousand men, of all arms, into the field; -yet, if the British army, marched with the avowed -intention of relieving Oporto, it must accomplish -it, or be dishonoured!</p> - -<p>Was it consistent with reason to march two hundred -miles in search of a combat, which the very -state of Oporto would render it almost impossible -to gain, and for an object perhaps already lost? -Suspicion was alive all over the country: if Oporto -was already taken, the army must come back; that -would be the signal for fresh tumults—for renewed -cries that the country was to be abandoned; Lisbon -would instantly be in a state of insurrection, and -would be even more formidable to the British than -the enemy; besides, it was impossible to reckon -upon Cuesta’s aid in keeping Victor employed. He -was personally inimical to the English, and his -principal object was to gain time for the increase -and discipline of his own force.</p> - -<p>Victor was apparently pursuing Cuesta, but his -parties had already appeared in the neighbourhood -of Badajos, and there was nothing but a weak Portuguese -garrison in Elvas to impede his march -through the Alemtejo. To cover Lisbon and the -Tagus was the wisest plan: fixed in some favourable -position, at a prudent distance from that capital, -he could wait for the reinforcements he expected -from England. He invited the Portuguese troops -to unite with him; a short time would suffice to -establish subordination, and then the certainty that -the capital could not be approached, except in the -face of a really-formidable army, would not only<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157"></a>[157]</span> -keep the enemy in check, but, by obliging him to -collect in greater numbers for the attempt, would -operate as a diversion in favour of Spain.</p> - -<p>The general soundness of this reasoning is apparent, -and it must not be objected to sir John Cradock -that he disregarded the value of a central position, -which might enable him to be beforehand with the -enemy in covering Lisbon, if the latter should march -on his flank. The difficulty of obtaining true intelligence -from the natives and his own want of cavalry -rendered it utterly unsafe for him to divide his -army, or to trust it any distance from the capital.</p> - -<p>Marshal Beresford’s plan, founded on the supposition -that Cradock could engage Soult at Oporto, -and yet quit him, and return at his pleasure to -Lisbon, if Victor advanced, was certainly fallacious; -the advantages rested on conjectural, the disadvantages -on positive data: it was conjectural that -they could relieve Oporto; it was positive that they -would endanger Lisbon; the proposition was, however, -not made upon partial views. But, at this -period, other men, less qualified to advise, pestered -sir John Cradock with projects of a different stamp, -yet deserving of notice, as showing that the mania -for grand operations, which I have before marked -as the malady of the time, was still raging.</p> - -<p>To make a suitable use of the British army was -the object of all these projectors, but there was a -marvellous variety in their plans. While the regency -desired that the Portuguese and English -troops should, without unfurnishing Lisbon, co-operate -for the relief of Oporto, and while marshal -Beresford recommended that the latter only should -march, the bishop was importunate to have a detachment -of the British army placed under his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158"></a>[158]</span> -command, and he recalled Sir Robert Wilson to -the defence of Oporto. It appeared reasonable that -the legion should defend the city in which it was -raised; but Mr. Frere wrote from Seville that sir -Robert could do better where he was; and the latter -dreading the anarchy in Oporto, accepted Spanish -rank, and refused obedience to the prelate’s orders, -yet retained his troops. The regency, however, -adopted the Lusitanian legion as a national corps, -<span class="sidenote">Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -and approved of sir Robert’s proceedings. Meanwhile -Romana was earnest with sir John Cradock -for money, and that a thousand British soldiers might -be sent to aid the insurrection at Vigo; and at the -same time Mr. Frere and colonel D’Urban, a corresponding -officer placed at Cuesta’s head-quarters, -proposed other plans of higher pretensions.</p> - -<p>Zaragoza, said the latter, has fallen; and ten -thousand French troops being thus released, are -marching towards Toledo; this is the moment to -give a fatal blow to Marshal Victor! It is one of -those critical occasions that seldom recur in war! -<span class="sidenote">Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -In a day or two sir Robert Wilson will be on the -Tietar with two thousand five hundred men; augment -his force with a like number of Portuguese, -who may be drawn from Sobreira, Idanha, and Salvatierra. -He shall thus turn the right and rear of -Victor’s army, and his movement cannot be interrupted -by the French force now at Salamanca and -Alva; because the communication from thence to -the Tagus by the passes of Baños and Tornevecas -is sealed up; and while sir Robert Wilson thus gets -in the rear of Victor with five thousand men, Cuesta, -with twelve thousand infantry and two thousand -cavalry, shall attack the latter in front, matter of -easy execution; because Cuesta can throw a pontoon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159"></a>[159]</span> -bridge over the Tagus, near Almaraz, in an hour -and a half; and the Conde de Cartoajal, who is at -Manzanares in La Mancha, with ten thousand infantry -and two thousand horse, will keep Sebastiani in -check. The hope is great, the danger small; and -if a few British troops can be added to the force on -the Tietar, the success will be infallible.</p> - -<p>There were, however, some grave objections to -this infallible plan. General Cuesta was near Almaraz; -sir John Cradock was at Lisbon, and sir -Robert Wilson was at Ciudad Rodrigo. This circuitous -line of correspondence being above four -hundred miles long, it is not very clear how the -combination was to be effected with that rapidity, -which was said to be essential to the success. -Neither is it very evident, that operations to be -combined at such a distance, and executed by soldiers -of different nations, would have been successful -at all. On the one side, twenty thousand Portuguese -and Spanish recruits were to act on double external -lines of operation; on the other, twenty-five thousand -French veterans waited in a central position, -with their front and flanks covered by the Tagus and -the Tietar. In such a contest it is possible to conceive -a different result from that anticipated by -colonel D’Urban.</p> - -<p>Mr. Frere’s plans were not less extensive, and he -was equally sanguine. When his project for assisting -Catalonia had been frustrated, by the <ins class="corr" id="tn-159" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'recal of general'"> -recall of general</ins> Mackenzie from Cadiz, he turned his attention -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix, No. 7</a>.</span> -to the north. Soult, he wrote to sir John -Cradock, tired of the resistance he has met with, -will probably desist from his “<em>unaccountable project -of entering Portugal, and occupying Gallicia -at the same time</em>.” Let the British army, therefore,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160"></a>[160]</span> -make a push to drive the enemy out of Salamanca, -and the neighbouring towns; while the Asturians, -on their side, shall take possession of Leon and -Astorga, and thus open the communication between -the northern and southern provinces.</p> - -<p>Fearing, however, that if this proposal should -not be adopted, the English general might be at a -loss for some enterprise, Mr. Frere also recommended -that the British army should march to Alcantara; -and that the fortieth regiment, which hitherto he had -retained at Seville, contrary to sir John Cradock’s -wishes, should join it at that place; and then, the -whole operating by the northern bank of the Tagus, -might, in concert with Cuesta, “<em>beat the French -out of Toledo, and consequently out of Madrid</em>.”</p> - -<p>Now, with respect to the first of these plans, -Soult never had the intention of holding Gallicia, -which was Marshal Ney’s province; but he did -propose to penetrate into Portugal, and he was not -likely to abandon his purpose; because, the only -army capable of opposing him was quitting that -kingdom, and making a “<em>push</em>” of four hundred -miles to drive Lapisse out of Salamanca; moreover, -<span class="sidenote">Muster Rolls of the French Army, MSS.</span> -the Asturians were watched by general Bonnet’s -division on one side, and by Kellerman on the other; -and the fifth corps, not ten, but fifteen thousand -strong, having quitted Zaragoza, were at this time -in the Valladolid country, and therefore close to -Leon and Astorga.</p> - -<p>With respect to the operations by the line of the -Tagus, which were to drive Joseph out of Madrid, -and consequently to attract the attention of all the -French corps, it is to be observed, that sir John -Cradock could command about twelve thousand men, -Cuesta sixteen thousand, Cartoajal twelve thousand,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161"></a>[161]</span> -making a total of forty thousand. Now, Soult had -twenty-three thousand, Lapisse nine thousand, Victor -was at the head of twenty-five thousand, Sebastiani -could dispose of fifteen thousand, Mortier of a -like number, the King’s guards and the garrison of -Madrid were twelve thousand, making a total of -nearly a hundred thousand men.</p> - -<p>But while Mr. Frere and colonel D’Urban, confiding -in Soult’s inactivity, were thus plotting the -destruction of Victor and Sebastiani, the first marshal -stormed Oporto; the second, unconscious of his -danger, crossed the Tagus, and defeated Cuesta’s -army at Medellin, and at the same moment Sebastiani -routed Cartoajal’s at Ciudad Real.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162"></a>[162]</span><br /></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_VII">BOOK VII.</h2> -</div> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BVII_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - -<p>Having described the unhappy condition of -Portugal and given a general view of the transactions -in Spain, I shall now resume the narrative of -Soult’s operations, thus following the main stream -of action, for the other marshals were appointed to -tranquillize the provinces already overrun by the -emperor, or to war down the remnants of the -Spanish armies; but the duke of Dalmatia’s task -was to push onward in the course of conquest. -Nor is it difficult to trace him through the remainder -of a campaign in which traversing all the -northern provinces, fighting in succession the armies -of three different nations, and enduring every vicissitude -of war, he left broad marks of his career and -certain proofs that he was an able commander, and -of a haughty resolution in adversity.</p> - -<p>It has been observed, in a former part of -this work, that the inhabitants of Coruña honourably -maintained their town until the safety of -the fleet which carried sir John Moore’s army -from the Spanish shores was secure; but they -were less faithful to their own cause. Coruña, -although weak against a regular siege, might have -defied irregular operations, and several weeks must -have elapsed before sufficient battering train could -have been brought up to that corner of the Peninsula. -Yet, a short negotiation sufficed to put the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_163"></a>[163]</span> -French in possession of the place on the 19th of -January, and the means of attacking Ferrol were -immediately organized from the resources of -Coruña.</p> - -<p>The harbour of Ferrol contained eight sail of the -line, and some smaller ships of war. The fortifications -were regular, there was an abundance of artillery -and ammunition and a garrison of seven or -eight thousand men, composed of soldiers, sailors, -citizens, and armed countrymen, but their chiefs -were treacherous. After a commotion in which the -admiral Obregon was arrested, his successor Melgarejo -surrendered the 26th upon somewhat better -terms than those granted to Coruña; and thus in -ten days two regular fortresses were reduced, that -with more resolution might have occupied thirty -thousand men for several months.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">S.<br />MSS.</div> - -<p>While yet before Ferrol the duke of Dalmatia received -the following despatch, prescribing the immediate -invasion of Portugal:—</p> - -<p>“Before his departure from this place, (Valladolid,) -the emperor foreseeing the embarkation of the -English army, drew up instructions for the ultimate -operations of the duke of Elchingen and yourself. -He orders that when the English army shall be -embarked you will march upon Oporto with -your four divisions, that is to say, the division -of Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet, the -dragoons of Lorge, and La Houssaye, and Franceschi’s -light cavalry, with the exception of two regiments -that his majesty desires you to turn over to -the duke of Elchingen, in order to make up his -cavalry to four regiments.”</p> - -<p>“Your ‘<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">corps d’armée</i>,’ composed of seventeen -regiments of infantry and ten regiments of cavalry,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_164"></a>[164]</span> -is destined for the expedition of Portugal, in combination -with a movement the duke of Belluno is -going to effect. General Loison, some engineers, -staff and commissiarat officers, and thirteen Portuguese, -all of whom belonged to the army formerly -in Portugal, under the duke of Abrantes, have received -instructions to join you immediately, and -you can transmit your orders for them to Lugo. -This is the 21st of January, and it is supposed you -cannot be at Oporto before the 5th of February, or -at Lisbon before the 16th. Thus, at that time, -namely, when you shall be near Lisbon, the ‘<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">corps -d’armée</i>’ of the duke of Belluno, composed of his -own three divisions, of the division Leval, and of -ten or twelve regiments of cavalry, forming a body -of thirty thousand men, will be at Merida to make a -strong diversion in favour of your movement, and in -such a mode as that he can push the head of a -column upon Lisbon, if you find any great obstacles -to your entrance, which it is, however, presumed -will not be the case.”</p> - -<p>“General Lapisse’s division of infantry, which -is at this moment in Salamanca, and general Maupetit’s -brigade of cavalry, will, when you shall be -at Oporto, receive the duke of Istria’s orders to -march upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, where -this division will again be under the command of -the duke of Belluno, who will send it instructions to -join him at Merida, and I let you know this that -you may be aware of the march of Lapisse, on your -left flank, as far as Abrantes. Such are the last -orders I am charged to give you in the name of the -emperor; you will have to report to the king and -to receive his orders for your ulterior operations. -The emperor has unlimited confidence in your<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165"></a>[165]</span> -talents for the fine expedition that he has charged -you with.”</p> - -<p class="right">ALEXANDER, <br /> -<em>Prince of Neufchatel, &c.</em></p> - -<p class="p1">It was further intended, by Napoleon, that -when Lisbon fell, marshal Victor should invade Andalusia, -upon the same line as Dupont had moved -the year before, and like him, also, he was to have -been assisted by a division of the second corps, -which was to cross the Guadiana and march on -Seville. Meanwhile, the duke of Elchingen, whose -corps, reinforced by two regiments of cavalry and -the arrival of stragglers, amounted to near twenty -thousand men, was to maintain Gallicia, confine the -Asturians within their own frontier line, and keep -open the communication with the second corps.</p> - -<p>Thus, nominally, eighty thousand, and in reality -sixty thousand men, were disposed for the conquest -of Lisbon, and in such a manner that forty thousand -would, after that had been accomplished, have -poured down upon Seville and Cadiz, and at a time -when neither Portugal nor Andalusia were capable -of making any resistance. It remains to shew from -what causes this mighty preparation failed.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Muster-rolls -of the -French army, -MSS.</div> - -<p>The gross numbers of the second corps amounted -to forty-seven thousand, but general Bonnet’s division -remained always at St. Ander, in observation -of the eastern Asturian frontier; eight thousand -were detached for the service of the general communications, -and the remainder had, since the 9th -of November, been fighting and marching incessantly -among barren and snowy mountains; hence, -stragglers were numerous, and twelve thousand men -were in hospital. The force, actually under arms,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166"></a>[166]</span> -did not exceed twenty-five thousand men, worn -<span class="sidenote">S.<br />Journal of Operations of the second corps, MSS.</span> -down with fatigue, barefooted, and without ammunition. -They had outstripped their commissariat, -the military chest was not come up, the draft animals -were reduced in number, and extenuated by -fatigue, the gun-carriages were shaken by continual -usage, and the artillery parc was still in the -rear; and as the sixth corps had not yet passed -Lugo, two divisions of the second were required -to hold Coruña and Ferrol. Literally to obey the -emperor’s orders was consequently impossible, and -Soult fixing his head-quarters at St. Jago di Compostella, -proceeded to re-organize his army.</p> - -<p>Ammunition was fabricated from the loose powder -found in Coruña; shoes were obtained partly by -requisition, partly from the Spanish magazines, -filled as they were with stores supplied by England. -The artillery was soon refitted, and, the greatest -part of the stragglers being rallied, in six days, the -marshal thought himself in a condition to obey his -orders, and, although his troops were still suffering -from fatigue and privation, he marched, on the 1st -of February, with nineteen thousand infantry, four -thousand cavalry, and fifty-eight pieces of artillery. -But, before I narrate his operations, it is necessary -to give some account of the state of Gallicia at this -period, and to trace the movements of the marquis -de Romana.</p> - -<p>When the Spanish army, on the 2d of January, -crossed the line of sir John Moore’s march, it was -already in a state of disorganization. Romana, with -the cavalry, plunged at once into the deep valleys -of the Syl and the Minho; but the artillery and a -part of his infantry were overtaken and cut up by -Franceschi’s cavalry. The remainder wandered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167"></a>[167]</span> -in bands from one place to another, or dispersed to -seek food and shelter among the villages in the -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6</a>.</span> -mountains. General Mendizabel, with a small -body, halted in the Val des Orres, and, placing -guards at the Puente de Bibey, a point of singular -strength for defence, proposed to cover the approaches -to Orense on that side; but Romana himself, -after wandering for a time, collected two or -three thousand men, and took post, on the 15th, at -Toabado, a village about twenty miles from Lugo.</p> - -<p>Marshal Ney, while following the route of the -2d corps to Lugo with the main body of his troops, -detached some cavalry from Villa Franca to scour -the valleys on his left, and ordered a division of -infantry to march by the road of Orense and St. -Jago to Coruña. General Marchand, who commanded -it, overthrew and dispersed Mendizabel’s -troops on the 17th, and, having halted some days -at Orense, to patrole the neighbourhood for information -and to establish an hospital, continued his -march to St. Jago.</p> - -<p>The defeat of Mendizabel and the subsequent -movements of Marchand’s division completed the -dispersion of Romana’s army; the greatest part -throwing away their arms, returned to their homes, -and he himself, with his cavalry, and the few infantry -that would follow him, crossed the Minho, -passed the mountains, and, descending into the -valley of the Tamega, took refuge, on the 21st, at -Oimbra, a place on the frontier of Portugal, and close -to Monterey, where there was a small magazine, -collected for the use of sir John Moore’s army.</p> - -<p>In this obscure situation, unheeded by the French, -he entered into communication with the Portuguese -general, <ins class="corr" id="tn-167" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Silveira'"> -Sylveira</ins>, and, with sir John Cradock, demanding<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168"></a>[168]</span> -money and arms from the latter, and -endeavouring to re-assemble a respectable body of -troops. But Blake and other officers deserted him, -and these events and the general want of patriotic -spirit drew from Romana the following observation:—“I -know not wherein the patriotism, so -loudly vaunted, consists; any reverse, any mishap -prostrates the minds of these people, and, thinking -only of saving their own persons, they sacrifice -their country and compromise their commander.”</p> - -<p>The people of Gallicia, poor, scattered, living -hardly, and, like all mountaineers, very tenacious -of the little property they possess, disregarded political -events which did not immediately and visibly -affect their interests, and were, with the exception -of those of the sea-port towns, but slightly moved -by the aggression of the French, as long as that -aggression did not extend to their valleys; hence, -at first, they treated the English and French armies -alike.</p> - -<p>Sir David Baird’s division, in its advance, paid -for the necessary supplies, and it was regarded with -jealousy and defrauded. Soult’s and Moore’s armies, -passing like a whirlwind, were beheld with terror, -and the people fled from both. The British and -German troops that marched to Vigo were commanded -without judgement, and licentious, and their -stragglers were often murdered; their numbers were -small, and the people showed their natural hatred -of strangers without disguise. On several occasions -the parties, sent to collect cars for the conveyance -of the sick, had to sustain a skirmish before the -object could be obtained, and five officers, misled -by a treacherous guide, were scarcely saved from -death by the interference of an old man, whose<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169"></a>[169]</span> -exertions, however, were not successful until one -of the officers had been severely wounded in the -head. On the other hand, general Marchand discovered -so little symptoms of hostility, during his -march to Orense, that he left his hospital at that -town without a guard, and under the joint care of -Spanish and French surgeons, and the duties of -humanity were faithfully discharged by the former -without hindrance from the people.</p> - -<p>But this quiescence did not last long: the French -generals were obliged to subsist their troops by -requisitions extremely onerous to a people whose -property chiefly consisted of cattle. The many -abuses and excesses which always attend this mode -of supplying an army soon created a spirit of -hatred that Romana laboured incessantly to increase, -and he was successful; for, although a bad general, -he possessed intelligence and dexterity suited to the -task of exciting a population. Moreover, the monks -<span class="sidenote">Romana’s Manifesto.</span> -and friars laboured to the same purpose; and, while -Romana denounced death to those who refused to -take arms, the clergy menaced eternal perdition; -and all this was necessary, for the authority of the -supreme junta was only acknowledged as a matter -of necessity—not of liking.</p> - -<p>Gallicia, although apparently calm, was, therefore, -ripe for a general insurrection, at the moment -when the duke of Dalmatia commenced his march -from St. Jago di Compostella.</p> - -<p>From that town several roads lead to the Minho, the -principal one running by the coast line and crossing -the Ulla, the Umia, the Vedra, and the Octaven, -passes by Pontevedra and Redondela to Tuy, a -dilapidated fortress, situated on the Spanish side -of the Minho. The second, crossing the same rivers<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170"></a>[170]</span> -nearer to their sources, passes by the Monte de -Tenteyros, and, entering the valley of the Avia, -follows the course of that <ins class="corr" id="tn-170" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'river to Ribadavia'"> -river to Ribidavia</ins>, a considerable town, situated at the confluence of the -Avia with the Minho, and having a stone bridge -over the former, and a barque ferry on the latter -river. The third, turning the sources of the Avia, -connects St. Jago with Orense, and from Orense -another road passes along the right bank of the -Minho, and connects the towns of Ribidavia, Salvatierra, -and Tuy, ending at Guardia, a small -fortress at the mouth of the Minho.</p> - -<p>As the shortest route to Oporto, and the only one -convenient for the artillery, was that leading by -Redondela and Tuy, and from thence by the coast, -the duke of Dalmatia formed the plan of passing -the Minho between Salvatierra and Guardia.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">S.<br /> -Journal of Operations, MSS.</div> - -<p>On the 1st of February Franceschi, followed by -the other divisions in succession, took the Pontevedra -road. At Redondela he encountered and defeated -a small body of insurgents, and captured four pieces -of cannon; after which Vigo surrendered to one of -his detachments, while he himself marched upon -Tuy, and took possession of that town and Guardia. -During these operations La Houssaye’s dragoons, -quitting Mellid, had crossed the Monte de Tenteyro, -passed through Ribidavia, and taken possession -of Salvatierra, on the Minho; and general -Soult, the marshal’s brother, who had assembled -three thousand stragglers and convalescents, between -Astorga and Carrion, received orders to enter -Portugal by Puebla de Senabria, and thus join the -main body.</p> - -<p>The rainy season was now in full torrent, and -every stream and river was overflowing its banks.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171"></a>[171]</span> -The roads were deep, and the difficulty of procuring -provisions was great. These things, and the delivering -over to marshal Ney the administration of -Ferrol and Coruña, where the Spanish government -and Spanish garrisons were not only retained but -paid by the French, delayed the rear of the army -so long that it was not until the 15th or 16th that -the whole of the divisions were assembled on the -Minho, between Salvatierra, Guardia, and Redondela.</p> - -<p>The Minho, from Melgaço to the mouth, forms -the frontier of Portugal, the banks on both sides -being guarded by a number of fortresses, originally -of considerable strength, but at this time all in a -dilapidated condition. The Spanish fort of Guardia -fronted the Portuguese fort of Caminha; Tuy was -opposed by Valença; and this last was garrisoned, -and the works in somewhat a better condition than -the rest; Lapella, Moncao, and Melgaço, completed -the Portuguese line. But the best defence at this -moment was the Minho itself, which, at all times a -considerable river, was now a broad and raging -flood, and the Portuguese <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i> and militia -were in arms on the other side, and had removed -all the boats.</p> - -<p>Soult, after examining the banks with care, -decided upon passing at Campo Saucos, a little -village where the ground was flatter, more favourable, -and so close to Caminha, that the army, once -across, could easily seize that place, and, the same -day reach Viana, on the Lima, from whence to Oporto -was only three marches. To attract the attention -of the Portuguese; La Houssaye, who was at Salvatierra, -spread his dragoons along the Minho, and -attempted to push small parties across that river,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172"></a>[172]</span> -above Melgaço, but the bulk of the army was concentrated -in the neighbourhood of Campo Saucos, -and a detachment seized the small sea-port of -Bayona, in the rear.</p> - -<p>A division of infantry, and three hundred French -marines released at Coruña, and attached to the -second corps, were then employed to transport some -large fishing boats and some heavy guns from the harbour -and fort of Guardia overland to Campo Saucos. -This was effected by the help of rollers over more -than two miles of rugged and hilly ground. It was a -work of infinite labour, and, from the 11th to the 15th, -the troops toiled unceasingly; the craft was, however, -at last, launched in a small lake at the confluence -of the Tamuga river with the Minho.</p> - -<p>The heavy guns being mounted in battery on the -night of the 15th, three hundred soldiers were -embarked, and the boats, manned by the marines, -dropped silently down the Tamuga into the Minho, -and endeavoured to reach the Portuguese side of the -latter river during the darkness; but, whether from -the violence of the flood, or want of skill in the -men, the landing was not effected at day-break, and -the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanza</i> fell with great fury upon the first -who got on shore: and now, the foremost being all -slain, the others pulled back, and regained their -own side with great difficulty. This action was -infinitely creditable to the Portuguese, and it had -a surprising influence on the issue of the campaign.</p> - -<p>It was a gallant action, because it might reasonably -have been expected that a tumultuous -assemblage of half-armed peasants, collected on -the instant, would have been dismayed at the sight -of many boats filled with soldiers some pulling across, -others landing under the protection of a heavy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173"></a>[173]</span> -battery that thundered from the midst of a multitude -of troops, clustering on the heights, and thronging -to the edge of the opposite bank in eager expectation.</p> - -<p>It was an event of leading importance, inasmuch -as it baffled an attempt that, being successful, would -have ensured the fall of Oporto by the 21st of -February, which was precisely the period when -general Mackenzie’s division being at Cadiz, sir -John Cradock’s troops were reduced to almost -nothing; when the English ministers only waited -for an excuse to abandon Portugal; when the -people of that country were in the very extremity -of disorder; when the Portuguese army was a -nullity; and when the regency was evidently preparing -to receive the French with submission. It -was the period, also, when Soult was expected to -be at Lisbon, following the Emperor’s orders, and, -consequently, Lapisse and Victor could not have -avoided to fulfil their part of the plan for the -subjugation of Portugal.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">See <a href="#i_b_290fp">Plan 4</a>.</div> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia’s situation was now, -although not one of imminent danger, extremely -embarrassing, and more than ordinary quickness -and vigour were required to conduct the operations -with success. Posted in a narrow, contracted position, -he was hemmed in on the left by the Spanish -insurgents, who had assembled immediately after -La Houssaye passed Orense, and who, being possessed -of a very rugged and difficult country, were, -moreover, supported by the army of Romana, which -was said to be at Orense and Ribidavia.</p> - -<p>In the French general’s front was the Minho, -broad, raging, and at the moment impassable, -while heavy rains forbad the hope that its waters<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174"></a>[174]</span> -would decrease. To collect sufficient means for -forcing a passage would have required sixteen days, -and, long before that period, the subsistence for the -army would have entirely failed, and the Portuguese, -being alarmed, would have greatly augmented their -forces on the opposite bank. There remained then -only to retrace his steps to St. Jago, or break -through the Spanish insurgents, and, ascending the -Minho, to open a way into Portugal by some other -route.</p> - -<p>The attempt to pass the river had been baffled on -the 15th of February; on the 16th the army was -in full march towards Ribidavia, upon a new line -of operations, and this promptitude of decision was -supported by an equally prompt execution. La -Houssaye, with his dragoons, quitted Salvatierra, -and, keeping the edge of the Minho, was galled by -the fire of the Portuguese from the opposite bank; -but, before evening, he twice broke the insurgent -bands, and, in revenge for some previous excesses -of the peasantry, burnt the villages of Morentan -and Cobreira. Meanwhile the main body of the -army, passing the Tea river, at Salvatierra and -Puente d’Arcos, marched, by successive divisions, -along the main road from Tuy to Ribidavia.</p> - -<p>Between Franquera and Canizar the route was -cut by the streams of the Morenta and Noguera -rivers; and, behind those torrents, eight hundred -Gallicians, having barricadoed the bridges and repulsed -the advanced parties of cavalry, stood upon -their defence. The 17th, at daybreak, the leading -brigade of Heudelet’s division forced the passage, -and pursued the Spaniards briskly; but, when within -a short distance of Ribidavia, the latter rallied upon -eight or ten thousand insurgents, arrayed in order<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175"></a>[175]</span> -of battle, on a strong hill, covering the approaches -to that town.</p> - -<p>At this sight the advanced guard halted until -the remainder of the division and a brigade of cavalry -were come up, and then, under the personal -direction of Soult, the French assailed, and drove -the Gallicians, fighting, through the town and -across the Avia. The loss of the vanquished was -very considerable, and the bodies of twenty priests -were found amongst the slain; but, either from -fear or patriotism, every inhabitant had quitted -Ribidavia.</p> - -<p>The 18th one brigade of infantry scoured the -valley of the Avia, and dispersed three or four -thousand of the insurgents, who were disposed to -make a second stand on that side. A second brigade, -pushing on to Barbantes, seized a ferry-boat -on the Minho, close to that place; they were joined, -the same evening, by the infantry who had scoured -the valley of the Avia the day before, and by Franceschi’s -cavalry, and, on the 19th, they entered -Orense in time to prevent the bridge over the Minho -from being cut. La Houssaye’s dragoons then took -post at Maside, and the same day the remainder of -the horse and Laborde’s infantry were united at -Ribidavia; but the artillery were still between Tuy -and Salvatierra, under the protection of Merle’s and -Mermet’s divisions. Thus, in three days, the duke -of Dalmatia had, with an admirable celerity and -vigour, extricated his army from a contracted unfavourable -country, strangled a formidable insurrection -in its birth, and at the same time opened a -fresh line of communication with St. Jago, and an -easy passage into Portugal.</p> - -<p>The 20th a regiment being sent across the Minho,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176"></a>[176]</span> -by the ferries of Barbantes and Ribidavia, defeated -the insurgents of the left bank, advanced to the -Arroyo river, and took post on the heights of -Merea. The army, with the exception of the division -guarding the guns, was the same day concentrated -at Orense. But the utmost efforts of the -artillery-officers had been baffled by the difficulties -of the road between Tuy and Ribidavia; and this -circumstance, together with the precarious state of -the communications, the daily increasing sick-list, -and the number of petty detachments necessary to -protect the rear of the army, seemed to render the -immediate invasion of Portugal hopeless.</p> - -<p>To men of an ordinary stamp it would have been -so; but the duke of Dalmatia, with a ready boldness, -resolved to throw the greatest part of his artillery -and the whole of his other incumbrances into Tuy, -as a place of arms, and then relinquishing all communication -with Gallicia, for the moment, to march -in one mass directly upon Oporto; from whence, if -successful, he proposed to re-open his communication -with Tuy, by the line of the coast, and then, -recovering his artillery and parcs, to re-establish a -regular system of operations.</p> - -<p>In pursuance of this resolution, sixteen of the -lightest guns and six howitzers, together with a -proportion of ammunition-waggons, were, with infinite -labour and difficulty, transported to Ribidavia, -but the remaining thirty-six pieces and a vast parc -of carriages, carrying ammunition and hospital and -<span class="sidenote">S.<br /> Journal of Operations MSS.</span> -commissariat stores, were put into Tuy. General -La Martiniere was left there with an establishment -of artillery and engineer officers, a garrison of five -hundred men fit to carry arms, and nine hundred -sick. All the stragglers, convalescents, and detachments,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177"></a>[177]</span> -coming from St. Jago, and the military chest, -which was still in the rear, guarded by six hundred -infantry, were directed upon Tuy, and the gates -being then shut, La Martiniere was abandoned to -his own resources.</p> - -<p>The men in hospital at Ribidavia were now forwarded -to Orense, and the marshal’s quarters were -established at the latter town on the 24th; but many -obstacles were yet to be vanquished before the army -could commence the march into Portugal. The -gun-carriages had been so shaken in the transit -from Tuy to Ribidavia that three days were required -to repair them. It was extremely difficult to -obtain provisions, and numerous bands of the peasants -were still in arms; nor were they quelled -until combats had taken place at Gurzo, on the -Monte Blanco, in the Val d’Ornes, and up the -valley of Avia, by which the French wasted time, -lost men, and expended ammunition that could not -be replaced.</p> - -<p>Marshal Soult endeavoured to soften the people’s -feelings by kindness and soothing proclamations; -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XIII">Appendix, No. 13</a>.</span> -and as he enforced a strict discipline among his -troops, his humane and politic demeanour joined -to the activity of his moveable columns, soon -abated the fierceness of the peasantry. The inhabitants -of Ribidavia returned to their houses; -those of Orense had never been very violent, and -now became even friendly, and lent assistance to -procure provisions. It was not, however, an -easy task to restrain the soldiers within the bounds -of humanity: the frequent combats, the assassination -and torturing of isolated men, and the privations -endured, had so exasperated the French -troops, that the utmost exertions of their general’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178"></a>[178]</span> -authority could not always control their -revenge.</p> - -<p>While the duke of Dalmatia was thus preparing -for a formidable inroad, his adversaries were a prey -to the most horrible anarchy. The bishop, always -intent to increase his own power, had assembled -little short of fifty thousand armed persons in -Oporto; and he had also commenced a gigantic -line of entrenchments on the hills to the northward -of that city. This worse than useless labour so -completely occupied all persons, that the defence -of the strong country lying between the Duero and -the Minho was totally neglected; and when the -second corps appeared on the bank of the latter -river, the northern provinces were struck with -terror. Then it was that the people, for the first -time, understood the extent of their danger; and -that the bishop, aroused from his intrigues, became -sensible that the French were more terrible enemies -than the regency. Once impressed with this truth, -he became clamorous for succour. He recalled sir -Robert Wilson from the Agueda; he hurried on -the labours of the entrenchments; and he earnestly -pressed sir John Cradock for assistance, demanding -arms, ammunition, and a reinforcement of British -soldiers.</p> - -<p>Sir Robert Wilson, as I have already related, -disregarded his orders; and the British general -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, section 6.</span> -refused to furnish him with troops, but supplied -him with arms, very ample stores of powder, and -sent artillery and engineer officers to superintend -the construction of the defensive works, and to aid -in the arrangements for a reasonable system of -operations. The people were, however, become -too headstrong and licentious to be controlled, or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179"></a>[179]</span> -even advised, and the soldiers being drawn into -the vortex of insubordination, universal and hopeless -confusion prevailed.</p> - - -<p>Don Bernadim Freire was the legal commander-in-chief -of the Entre Minho e Douro, but all the -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, section 1.</span> -generals claimed an equal and independent authority -each over his own force; and this was, perhaps, -a matter of self-preservation, for general and traitor -were, at that period, almost synonymous; and to -obey the orders of a superior against the momentary -wishes of the multitude was to incur instant death: -nor were there wanting men who found it profitable -<ins class="corr" id="tn-179" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the inflame the'"> -to inflame the</ins> passions of the mob, and to direct -their blind vengeance against innocent persons; -for the prelate’s faction, although the most powerful, -was not without opponents even in Oporto.</p> - -<p>Such was the unhappy state of affairs when the -undisciplined gallantry of the peasants, baffling -the efforts of the French to cross the Minho -at Campo Saucos, obliged Soult to march by -Orense. A part of the regular troops were immediately -sent forward to the Cavado river, where -they were joined by the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i> and the -militia of the district, but all in a state of fearful -insubordination; and there were not any arrangements -made for the regular distribution of provisions, -or of any one necessary supply.</p> - -<p>Among the troops despatched from Oporto was -the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, nine -hundred strong, well armed and well equipped; -they were commanded by baron Eben, a native of -Prussia, who, without any known services to recommend -him, had suddenly attained the rank of -major in the British service. This man, destined -to act a conspicuous part in Portuguese tragedy,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_180"></a>[180]</span> -had been left by sir Robert Wilson in Oporto, when -that officer marched to Almeida. Eben’s orders -were to follow with the second battalion of the -legion, when the men’s clothing and equipment -should be completed; but he, retaining the troops, -remained, to push his own fortune under the -prelate’s auspices.</p> - -<p>General Freire having reached the Cavado, with -a small body of regular troops, was immediately -joined by fourteen or fifteen thousand militia and -<i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i>. Fixing his head-quarters at Braga, -he sent detachments to occupy the posts of Salamonde -and Ruivaens in his front; and, unfortunately -for himself, endeavoured to restrain his -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, section 6.</span> -troops from wasting their ammunition by wanton -firing in the streets and on the roads. This exertion -of command was heinously resented; for Freire, -being willing to uphold the authority of the regency, -had been for some time obnoxious to the bishop’s -faction, and already he was pointed to as a suspected -person; and the multitude were inimically -disposed towards him.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, general Sylveira, assuming the command -of the Tras os Montes, advanced to Chaves, -and put himself in communication with the marquis -of Romana, who, having remained tranquil at -Oimbra and Monterey since the 21st of January, -had been joined by his dispersed troops, and was -again at the head of nine or ten thousand men. -Sylveira’s force consisted of about two thousand -regulars and as many militia, and his army was -accompanied by many of the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i>; but -here, as elsewhere, the Portuguese were licentious, -insubordinate, and disdainful of their general; and -the national enmity between them and the Spaniards<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181"></a>[181]</span> -overcoming the sense of a common cause and -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6</a>, section 3.</span> -common danger, the latter were evilly entreated, -both officers and men; and a deadly feud subsisted -between the two armies.</p> - -<p>The generals, however, agreed to act in concert, -offensively and defensively; but neither of them -were the least acquainted with the numbers, intention, -or even the position of their antagonists: and -it is a proof of Romana’s unfitness for command -that he, having the whole population at his disposal, -was yet ignorant of every thing relating to his enemy -that it behoved him to know. The whole of the -French force in Gallicia, at this period, was about -forty-five thousand men, Romana estimated it at -twenty-one thousand. The number under Soult -was above twenty-four thousand, Romana supposed -it to be twelve thousand; and among these he -included general Marchand’s division of the sixth -corps, which he always imagined to be a part of the -duke of Dalmatia’s army.</p> - -<p>The Spanish general was so elated at the spirit of -the peasants about Ribidavia, that he anticipated -nothing but victory. He knew that on the Arosa, an -estuary, running up towards St. Jago de Compostella, -the inhabitants of Villa Garcia had also risen, and, -being joined by all the neighbouring districts, were -preparing to attack Vigo and Tuy; and partly from -his Spanish temperament, partly from his extreme -ignorance of war, he was convinced that the French -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6</a>, section 3.</span> -only thought of making their escape out of Gallicia, -and that even in that they would be disappointed. -But to effect their destruction more certainly, he also, -<span class="sidenote">Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -as we have seen, pestered sir John Cradock for succours -in money and ammunition, and desired that, -the insurgents on the Arosa might be assisted with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_182"></a>[182]</span> -a thousand British soldiers. Cradock anxious to -support the cause, although he refused the troops, -sent ammunition, and five thousand pounds in money; -but, before it arrived, Romana was beaten and in -flight.</p> - -<p>The combined Spanish and Portuguese forces, -amounting to sixteen thousand regulars and militia, -besides <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i>, were posted in a straggling -unconnected manner along the valley of the Tamega, -and extended from Monterey, Verim, and Villaza, -to near Chaves, a distance of more than fifteen miles. -This was the first line of defence for Portugal.</p> - -<p>Freire and Eben, with fourteen guns and twenty-five -thousand men, were at Braga, in second line, -their outposts being on the Cavado, and at the strong -passes of Ruivaens and Venda Nova: but of these -twenty-five thousand men, only six thousand were -armed with muskets; and it is to be observed that -the militia and troops of the line differed from the -armed peasantry only in name, save that their faulty -discipline and mutinous disposition rendered them -less active and intelligent as skirmishers, without -making them fitter for battle.</p> - -<p>The bishop, with his disorderly and furious rabble, -formed the third line, occupying the entrenchments -that covered Oporto.</p> - -<p>Such was the state of affairs, and such were the -dispositions made to resist the duke of Dalmatia; -but his army, although galled and wearied by continual -toil, and when halting, disturbed and vexed -by the multitude of insurrections, was, when in -motion, of a power to overthrow and disperse these -numerous bands, even as a great ship feeling the -wind, breaks through and scatters the gun-boats -that have gathered round her in the calm.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183"></a>[183]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BVII_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>SECOND INVASION OF PORTUGAL.</h4> - -<p>The Entre Minho e Douro and the Tras os Montes -lying together, form the northern part of Portugal, -the extreme breadth of either, when measured from -the frontier to the Douro, does not exceed seventy -miles.</p> - -<p>The river Tamega, running north and south, and -discharging itself into the Douro, forms the boundary -line between them; but there is, to the west of this -river, a succession of rugged mountain ridges, which, -under the names of Sierra de Gerez, Sierra de Cabrera, -and Sierra de Santa Catalina, form a second -barrier, nearly parallel to the Tamega; and across -some part of these ridges any invader, coming from -the eastward, must pass to arrive at Oporto.</p> - -<p>Other Sierras, running also in a parallel direction -with the Tamega, cut the Tras os Montes in such a -manner, that all the considerable rivers flowing north -and south tumble into the Douro. But as the western -ramifications of the Sierras de Gerez and Cabrera -shoot down towards the sea, the rivers of the Entre -Douro e Minho discharge their waters into the ocean, -and consequently flow at right angles to those of -Tras os Montes. Hence it follows, that an enemy -penetrating to Oporto, from the north, would have -to pass the Lima, the Cavado, and the Ave, to reach -Oporto; and, if coming from the east, he invaded -the Tras os Montes, all the rivers and intervening -ridges of that province must be crossed before the -Entre Minho e Douro could be reached.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184"></a>[184]</span></p> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia was, however, now in such -a position, near the sources of the Lima and the -Tamega rivers, that he could choose whether to -penetrate by the valley of the first into the Entre -Minho e Douro, or by the valley of the second into -the Tras os Montes: and there was also a third -road, leading between those rivers through Montalegre -upon Braga; but this latter route, passing over -the Sierra de Gerez, was impracticable for artillery.</p> - -<p>The French general had, therefore, to consider—</p> - -<p>1º. If, following the course of the Lima, he should -attack and disperse the insurgents between that river -and the Minho, and then recovering his artillery -from Tuy, proceed against Oporto by the main road -leading along the sea coast.</p> - -<p>2º. If he should descend the Tamega, take Chaves, -and then decide whether to continue his route to -Villa Real, near the Douro, and so take the defences -of Tras os Montes in reverse, or, turning to his right, -and crossing the Sierra de Cabrera by the pass of -Ruivaens, enter Braga, and thus operate against -Oporto.</p> - -<p>The first project was irregular and hazardous, -inasmuch as Romana and Sylveira’s troops might -have fallen upon the flank and rear of the French -during their march through a difficult country; but -<span class="sidenote">S.<br />Journal of Operations, MSS.</span> -as the position of those generals covered the road to -Chaves, to beat them was indispensable, as a preliminary -measure to either plan; and this was immediately -executed.</p> - -<p>The 4th of March the French movement commenced. -The 5th, the van being at Villa Real and -Penaverde, Soult sent a flag of truce to Romana, -with a letter, in which, exposing fully the danger -of the latter’s situation, he advised him to submit:<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185"></a>[185]</span> -but no answer was returned; nor would the bearer -<span class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s Papers, MSS.</span> -have been suffered to pass the outposts, but that -Romana himself was in the rear, for he dreaded -that such an occurrence would breed a jealousy of -his conduct, and, perhaps, cause his patriotism to -be undervalued.</p> - -<p>This failing, three divisions of infantry and one -of cavalry marched the next morning against Monterey; -while La Houssaye’s dragoons, taking the -road of Laza, covered the left flank, and pushed -parties as far La Gudina, on the route to Puebla de -Senabria. The fourth division of infantry remained -at Villa del Rey, to cover the passage of the sick -and wounded men from Orense; for the duke of -Dalmatia, having no base of operations, transported -his hospitals, and other incumbrances, from place to -place as the army moved, acting in this respect after -the manner of the Roman generals, when invading -a barbarous country.</p> - -<p>As the French advanced, the Spaniards abandoned -their positions in succession, spiked the guns in the -<span class="sidenote">S.<br />Journal of Operations, MSS.</span> -dilapidated works of Monterey, and after a slight -skirmish at Verim, took the road to Puebla de Senabria; -but Franceschi followed close, and overtaking -two or three thousand as they were passing a -rugged mountain, he assailed their rear with a -battalion of infantry, and at the same time leading -his horsemen round both flanks, headed the column, -and obliged it to halt.</p> - -<p>The Spaniards, trusting to the rough ground, -drew up in one large square and awaited the charge. -Franceschi had four regiments of cavalry; each regiment -settled itself against the face of a square, -and then the whole, with loud cries, bore down -swiftly upon their opponents; the latter unsteady<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186"></a>[186]</span> -and dismayed, shrunk together from the fierce -assault, and were instantly trampled down in heaps. -Those who escaped the horses’ hoofs and the edge -of the sword became prisoners, but twelve hundred -bodies were stretched lifeless on the field of battle, -and Franceschi continued his movements on La -Gudina.</p> - -<p>Romana was at Semadems, several miles in the -rear of Verim, when his vanguard was attacked, and -there was nothing to prevent him from falling back -to Chaves with his main body, according to a plan -before agreed upon between him and Sylveira, but -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6</a>, section 3.</span> -either from fear or indignation at the treatment his -soldiers had received at the hands of the Portuguese, -he left Sylveira to his fate, and made off with -six or seven thousand men towards Bragança; -from thence passing by Puebla de Senabria, he regained -the valley of the Syl. Meanwhile, two -thousand Portuguese infantry, with some guns, -issuing from the side of Villaza, cut the French -line of march at the moment when Franceschi and -Heudelet having passed Monterey, Laborde was -approaching that place. In the slight combat that -ensued the Portuguese lost their guns and were -driven, fighting, down the valley of the Tamega as -far as the village of Outeiro, within their own -frontier.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">S.<br /> -Journal of -Operations -MSS.</div> - -<p>The defeat and flight of Romana had such an -effect upon the surrounding districts that the Spanish -insurgents returned in crowds to their habitations -and delivered up their arms. Some of the -clergy, also, changing their opinions, exhorted the -people to peace, and the prisoners taken on the 6th, -being dissatisfied with Romana’s conduct, and -moved by their hatred of the Portuguese, entered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_187"></a>[187]</span> -the French service. These affairs occupied Soult -until the 9th, during which period his outposts -were pushed towards Chaves, Montalegre, and La -Gudina, but the main body remained at Verim to -cover the arrival of the sick, at Monterey.</p> - -<p>Sylveira, thus beaten at Villaza, and deserted by -Romana, fell back on the 7th to a strong mountain -position, one league behind Chaves, from whence he -could command a view of all the French movements -as far as Monterey. His ground was advantageous, -but his military talents were moderate, his men -always insubordinate, were now become mutinous, -and many of the officers were disposed to join the -French. The general wished to abandon Chaves, -the troops resolved to defend it, and three thousand -five hundred men actually did throw themselves -into that town, in defiance of Sylveira, who was -already, according to the custom of the day, pronounced -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VI">Appendix, No. 6</a>, section 3.</span> -a traitor and declared worthy of that death -which he would inevitably have suffered, but that -some of his troops still continued to respect his -orders.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">S.<br /> -Journal of -Operations -MSS.</div> - -<p>The 10th, the convoy of French sick was close to -Monterey, and as Romana’s movement was known to -be a real flight, and not made with a design to create -fresh insurrections in the rear, the French troops -were again put in motion towards Chaves; but -Merle’s division remained at Verim to protect the -hospital, and Franceschi’s took the road of La -Gudina, as if he had been going towards Salamanca. -A report that he had actually entered that town -reached Lisbon, and was taken as an indication that -Soult would not pass the Portuguese frontier at -Chaves, but Franceschi quickly returned, by Osonio -and Feces de Abaxo, and being assisted by Heudelet’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188"></a>[188]</span> -division, invested Chaves on the left bank of -the Tamega, while Laborde, Mermet, La Houssaye, -and Lorge, descending the right bank, beat the -Portuguese outposts, and getting possession of a -fort close under the walls of Chaves completed the -investment of that town.</p> - -<p>The place was immediately summoned to surrender, -but no answer was returned, and the garrison, -like men bereft of their wits, and fighting -with the air, kept up a continual and heavy fire of -musketry and artillery until the 12th, when they -surrendered on receiving a second summons, more -menacing than the first. The 13th the French -entered the town, and Sylveira retired to Villa -Real.</p> - -<p>The works of Chaves were in a bad state, and -few of the fifty guns mounted on the ramparts were -fit for service; but there was a stone-bridge, and -the town being in many respects more suitable for -a place of arms than Monterey, the sick were -brought down from the latter place, and an hospital -was established for twelve hundred men, the number -now unfit to carry arms. The fighting men -were reduced to twenty-one thousand, and Soult, -partly from the difficulty of guarding his prisoners, -partly from a desire to abate the hostility of the -Portuguese, permitted the militia and <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanza</i> to -return to their homes, after taking an oath not to -resume their arms. To some of the poorest he -gave money and clothes, and he enrolled, at their -own request, the few regular troops taken in -Chaves.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Noble’s -Campaign -de Galice.</div> - -<p>This wise and gentle proceeding was much -blamed, by some of his officers, especially by -those who had served under Junot. They desired<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189"></a>[189]</span> -that Chaves might be assaulted, and the garrison -put to the sword, for they were embued with a -personal hatred of the Portuguese, and being averse -to serve in the present expedition endeavoured, as -it would appear, to thwart their general; but the -prudence of his conduct was immediately visible -in the softened feelings of the country people. -The scouting parties being no longer molested -spread themselves, some on the side of Bragança -<span class="sidenote">Journal of Operations MSS.</span> -and Villa Real, others in the Entre Minho e Douro. -The former reported that there was no enemy in a -condition to make head in the Tras os Montes, but -the latter fell in with the advanced guard of Freire’s -army at Ruivaens, on the road to Braga, and this -determined the further proceedings of the army.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Journal of -Operations -MSS.</div> - -<p>The possession of Chaves enabled the duke of -Dalmatia to operate against Oporto, either by the -Tras os Montes or the Entre Minho e Douro. He -decided on the latter; first, because the road, -though crossed by stronger positions, was more -direct, and more practicable for artillery, than that -running through the valley of the Tamega; secondly, -because a numerous Portuguese army was at Braga; -and, thirdly, because he could the sooner remove his -communication with Tuy.</p> - -<p>The road from Chaves to Braga enters a deep -and dangerous defile, or rather a succession of -defiles, that extend from Venda Nova to Ruivaens, -and re-commence after passing <ins class="corr" id="tn-189" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the Cabado river'"> -the Cavado river</ins>. Friere’s advanced guards, composed of <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanza</i>, -occupied those places; and he had also a detachment -under Eben on the road of Montalegre; but -he recalled the latter on the 14th.</p> - -<p>The 16th Franceschi forced the defile of Venda -Nova, and the remainder of the troops being formed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190"></a>[190]</span> -in alternate masses of cavalry and infantry, began -to pass the Sierra de Cabrera. Lorge’s dragoons, -however, descending the Tamega, ordered rations -for the whole army along the road to Villa Real; -and then, suddenly retracing their steps, rejoined -the main body.</p> - -<p>The 17th, Franceschi, being reinforced with some -infantry, won the bridge of Ruivaens, and entered -Salamonde. The Portuguese, covered by Eben’s detachment, -which had arrived at St. Joa de Campo, -then fell back on the Pico de Pugalados, close to -Braga; and the French took post at Carvalho Este, -two leagues in front of that city.</p> - -<p>Soult now expected to reach Braga without -further opposition, and caused his artillery, guarded -by Laborde’s division, to enter the pass of Venda -Nova; but the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanza</i>, reinforced by some -men from the side of Guimaraens, immediately -re-assembled, and, clustering on the mountains to -the left of the column of march, attacked it with -great fierceness and subtlety.</p> - -<p>The peasants of the northern provinces of -Portugal, unlike the squalid miserable population -of Lisbon and Oporto, are robust, handsome, and -exceedingly brave. Their natural disposition is -open and obliging; and they are, when rightly -handled as soldiers, docile, intelligent, and hardy. -They are, however, vehement in their anger; and -being now excited by the exhortations and personal -example of their priests, they came rushing down -the sides of the hills; and many of them, like men -deprived of reason, broke furiously into the French -battalions, and were there killed. The others, -finding their efforts unavailing, fled, and were -pursued a league up the mountain by some battalions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191"></a>[191]</span> -sent out against them, but they were not yet -<span class="sidenote">S.<br />Journal of Operations MSS.</span> -abashed; for, making a circuit behind the hills, -they fell upon the rear of the line of march, -killed fifty of the stragglers, and plundered the -baggage; and, thus galled, the French slowly, -and with much trouble, passing the long defiles of -Venda Nova, Ruivaens, and Salamonde, gathered -by degrees in front of Freire’s position.</p> - -<p>That general was no more; and his troops, -reeking from the slaughter of their commander, -were raging, like savage beasts, at one moment -congregating near the prisons to murder some -wretch within, at another rushing tumultuously to -<span class="sidenote">Eben’s Report, MSS.<br />Sir J. Cradock’s Paper.</span> -the outposts, with a design to engage the enemy. -The <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i> of the distant districts also came -pouring into the camp, dragging with them suspected -persons, and adding to the general distraction.</p> - -<p>It appears that the unfortunate Friere, unable to -establish order in his army, had resolved to retreat; -and, in pursuance of that design, recalled Eben -on the 14th, and gave directions to the officers at -the different outposts in front of Braga to retire at -the approach of the enemy. This, and his endeavour -to prevent the waste of ammunition, gave -effect to a plan which had been long prepared by -the bishop’s faction for his destruction. In passing -through Braga, he was openly reviled in the streets -by some of the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i>; and, as the latter -plainly discovered their murderous intention, he -left the army; but he was seized on the 17th, at a -village behind Braga, and brought back: what -followed is thus described by baron Eben, in his -official report to sir John Cradock:—</p> - -<p>“I did not reach Braga until nine o’clock in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192"></a>[192]</span> -morning of the 17th. I found every thing in the -greatest disorder; the houses shut, the people flying -in all directions, and part of the populace armed -with guns and pikes. Passing through the streets, I -was greeted with loud <em>vivas</em>. Though the people -knew me, I could not guess the meaning of this: -at the market-place, I was detained by the rapidly-increasing -populace, who took the reins of my -horse, crying out loudly, that they were ready to -do any thing to defend the city; requesting me -to assist them, and speaking in the lowest terms of -their general. I promised them to do all in my -power to aid their patriotic zeal; but said that I -must first speak to him. Upon this, they suffered -me to proceed, accompanied by about a hundred -of them: but I had not got far on my way to his -quarters, when I saw him on foot, conducted by a -great armed multitude, who suffered no one to pass, -and, on my attempting it, threatened to fire. I -was, therefore, obliged to turn my horse; and this -the people applauded. Two men had hold of the -general’s arms, his sword was taken from him, and -the people abused him most vehemently. On my -way back to the market-place, they wanted to shoot -me, taking me for general Friere; but I was saved -by a soldier of the legion, who explained the -mistake. When I reached the market-place, I -found about a thousand men drawn up: I communicated -to them my determination to assist them in -their laudable endeavours to defend themselves, -provided they would first permit me to speak to the -general, for whose actions I promised to be answerable -as long as I should be with him. I had -ordered a house to be got ready for my reception, -where the general arrived, accompanied as before;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_193"></a>[193]</span> -I saluted him with respect, at which they plainly -discovered their disapprobation. I repeated my -proposal, but they would not listen to it. I perceived -the danger of the general, and proposed to -take him to my quarters. My adjutant offered him -his arm: when I spoke to him, he only replied, -‘save me!’”</p> - -<p>“At the entrance of my house, I was surrounded -by thousands, and heard the loud cry of ‘kill! kill!’ -I now took hold of him, and attempted to force -my way into the house, and a gentleman slightly -wounded him with the point of his sword, under -my arm. He collected all his strength, and rushed -through them, and hid himself behind the door of -the house. The people surrounded me, and forced -me from the house. To draw the attention of the -people from the general, I ordered the drummers -to beat the alarm, and formed the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i> in -ranks; but they kept a constant fire upon my house, -where the general still was. As a last attempt to -save him, I now proposed that he should be conducted -to prison, in order to take a legal trial; -this was agreed to, and he was conducted there in -safety. I now hoped that I had succeeded, as the -people demanded to be led against the enemy, now -rapidly advancing, in number about two thousand. -I again formed them, and advanced with them; -but soon after, I heard the firing again, and was -informed that the people had put the general to -death with pikes and guns. I was now proclaimed -general.”</p> - -<p>When this murder was perpetrated, the people -seemed satisfied, and Eben announcing the approach -of a British force from Oporto, sent orders to the -outposts to stand fast, as he intended to fight; but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_194"></a>[194]</span> -another tumult arose, when it was discovered that -<span class="sidenote">Eben’s Reports, MS.</span> -an officer of Freire’s staff, one Villaboas, was in -Eben’s quarters. Several thousand <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i> instantly -gathered about the house, and the unhappy -man was haled forth and stabbed to death at the -door, the mob all the time shouting and firing volleys -in at the windows. Yet, when their fury was somewhat -abated, they obliged their new general to -come out and show that he had not been wounded, -and expressed great affection for him.</p> - -<p>In the course of the night the legion marched in -from Pico de Pugalados, and the following morning -a reinforcement of six thousand <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i> came up -in one mass. Fifty thousand dollars also arrived in -the camp from Oporto; for the Portuguese, like -the Spaniards, commonly reversed the order of military -arrangements, leaving their weapons in store, -and bringing their encumbrances to the field of -battle.</p> - -<p>In the evening the corregidor and two officers of -rank, together with many persons of a meaner class, -were brought to the town as prisoners and put in -jail, the armed mob being with difficulty restrained -from slaying them on the way thither; and in this -distracted manner they were proceeding when Franceschi -arrived at Carvalho on the 17th, and, surely, -if that bold and enterprising soldier could have -obtained a glimpse of what was passing, or known -the real state of affairs, he would have broke into -the midst of them with his cavalry; for, of the -twenty-five thousand men composing the whole of -the Portuguese force, eighteen thousand were only -<span class="sidenote">S.<br />Journal of Operations MS.</span> -armed with pikes, the remainder had wasted the -greatest part of their ammunition, and the powder -in store was not made up in cartridges. But<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_195"></a>[195]</span> -Braga, situated in a deep hollow, was hidden from -him, and the rocky and wooded hills surrounding -it were occupied by what appeared a formidable -multitude. Hence Franceschi, although reinforced -by a brigade of infantry, was satisfied by feints and -slight skirmishes to alarm his opponents, and to -keep them in play until the other divisions of the -French army could arrive.</p> - -<p>While these events were passing at Braga, Sylveira -had again collected a considerable force of -militia and <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i> in the Tras os Montes, and -captain Arentchild, one of the officers sent by sir -John Cradock to aid the bishop, rallied a number -of fugitives at Guimaraens and Amarante. In -Oporto, however, the multitude, obeying no command, -were more intent upon murder than upon -defence.</p> - -<p>Eben’s posts extended from Falperra, on the route -of Guimaraens to the Ponte Porto, on the Cavado -river; but the principal force was stationed on a -lofty ridge called the Monte Adaufé, which, at the -distance of six or seven miles from Braga, crossed -the road to Chaves.</p> - -<p>The left, or western, end, which overhangs the -river Cavado, covered the detachment guarding the -Ponte Porto.</p> - -<p>The right rested on a wood and on the head of a -deep ravine, and beyond this wood the ridge, taking -a curved and forward direction, was called the -Monte Vallonga, and a second mass of men was -posted there, but separated from those on the -Monte Adaufé by an interval of two miles, and by -the ravine and wood before mentioned.</p> - -<p>A third body, being pushed still more in advance, -crowned an isolated hill, flanking the Chaves road,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_196"></a>[196]</span> -being prepared to take the French in rear when the -latter should attack the Monte Adaufé.</p> - -<p>Behind the Monte Vallonga, and separated from -it by a valley three miles wide, the ridge of Falperra -was guarded by detachments sent both from -Guimaraens and from Braga.</p> - -<p>The road to Braga, leading directly over the -centre of the Monte Adaufé, was flanked on the -left by a ridge shooting perpendicularly out from -that mountain, and ending in a lofty mass of rocks -which overhangs Carvalho Esté. The Portuguese -neglected to occupy either these rocks or the connecting -ridge, and Franceschi seized the former on -the 17th.</p> - -<p>The 18th, Soult arrived in person, and, wishing -to prevent a battle, released twenty prisoners, and -sent them in with a proclamation couched in conciliatory -language, and offering a capitulation; but -the trumpeter who accompanied them was detained, -and the prisoners were immediately slain.</p> - -<p>The 19th, Eben brought up all his reserves to the -Adaufé, and the Portuguese on the isolated hill in -front of Monte Vallonga took possession of Lanhoza, -a village half way between that hill and the -rocky height occupied by Franceschi on the 17th. -But two divisions of French infantry being now up, -Soult caused one of them and the cavalry to attack -Lanhoza, from whence the Portuguese were immediately -driven, and, being followed closely, lost their -own hill also. The other French division took post, -part in Carvalho, part on the rocky headland, and -six guns were carried to the latter during the night. -In this position the French columns were close to -the centre of the Portuguese, and could, by a slight -movement in advance, separate Eben’s wings. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_197"></a>[197]</span> -rest of the army was at hand, and a general attack -was arranged for the next morning.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF BRAGA.</h4> - -<p>The 20th, at nine o’clock, the French were in -motion: Franceschi and Mermet, leaving a detachment -on the hill they had carried the night before, -endeavoured to turn the right of the people on the -Monte Vallonga.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">S.<br />Journal of Operations MSS.</div> - -<p>Laborde, supported by La Houssaye’s dragoons, -advanced against the centre by the ridge connecting -Carvalho with the Monte Adaufé.</p> - -<p>Heudelet, with a part of his division and a squadron -of cavalry, attacked the left, and made for the -Ponte Porto.</p> - -<p>The Portuguese immediately opened a straggling -fire of musketry and artillery in the centre; but, -after a few rounds, the bursting of a gun created -some confusion, from which Laborde’s rapidly-advancing -masses gave them no time to recover; and -<span class="sidenote">Eben’s Report, MS.</span> -by ten o’clock the whole of the centre was flying -in disorder down a narrow wooded valley leading -from the Adaufé to Braga.</p> - -<p>The French followed hard, and in the pursuit, -discovering one of their <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">voltigeurs</i>, who had been -a prisoner, still alive, but mutilated in the most -<span class="sidenote">S.<br />Journal of Operations MS.</span> -horrible manner, they gave little or no quarter. -Braga was abandoned, and the victorious infantry -passing through, took post on the other side; but -the cavalry continued the havoc for some distance -011 the road to Oporto; yet, so savage was the -temper of the fugitives that, in passing through -Braga, they stopped to murder the corregidor and -other prisoners in the jail, then, casting the mangled -bodies into the street, continued the flight.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_198"></a>[198]</span> -Meanwhile, Heudelet, breaking over the left of the -Monte Adaufé descended upon Ponte Porto, and, -after a sharp skirmish, carried that bridge and the -village on the other side of the Cavado.</p> - -<p>Franceschi and Mermet found considerable difficulty -in ascending the rugged sides of the Monte -Vallonga, but having, at last, attained the crest, -the whole of their enemies fled. The two generals -then crossed the valley to gain the road of Guimaraens, -and cut off that line of retreat, but fell in -with the three thousand Portuguese posted above -Falperra. These men, seeing the cavalry approach, -drew up with their backs to some high rocks, and -opened a fire of artillery. But Franceschi, placing -his horsemen on either flank, and a brigade of -infantry against the front, as at Verim, made all -charge together, and strewed the ground with the -dead. Nevertheless, the Portuguese fought valiantly -at this point, and Franceschi acknowledged it.</p> - -<p>The vanquished lost all their artillery and above -four thousand men, of which four hundred only -were made prisoners. Some of the fugitives crossing -the Cavado river, made for the Ponte de Lima, -others retired to Oporto, but the greatest number -took the road of Guimaraens, during the fight at -<span class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s papers, MSS.</span> -Falperra. Eben appears, by his own official report, -to have been at Braga when the action commenced, -and to have fled among the first; for he makes no -mention of the fight at Falperra, nor of the skirmish -at Ponte Porto, and his narrative bears every mark -of inaccuracy.</p> - -<p>When the French outposts were established -in front of Braga, general Lorge crossed the Cavado -and entered Bacellos; and the corregidor -received him well, for which he was a few days<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_199"></a>[199]</span> -after put to death by the Portuguese general, Bonteilho, -who commanded between the Lima and the -Minho.</p> - -<p>Braga itself had been at first abandoned by the -inhabitants, but they were induced to return the -next day; and some provisions and a large store of -powder being found in the magazines, the latter -was immediately made up into cartridges, for the -use of the troops. The gun-carriages and ammunition-waggons -were again repaired, and an hospital -was established for eight hundred sick and wounded: -from whence it may be judged that the loss sustained -in action, since the 15th, was not less than six -hundred men.</p> - -<p>The French general, having thus broken through -the second Portuguese line of defence, was in a -situation either to march directly against Oporto, -or to recover his communication with the depôt at -Tuy. He knew, through the medium of his spies -and by intercepted letters, that general La Martiniere, -although besieged, was in no distress; that -he made successful sorties; and that his artillery -commanded that in the fortress of Valença. On -the other hand, information was received that sixty -thousand troops of the line, militia, and <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanza</i>, -were assembled at the entrenched camp covering -Oporto, and the scouts reported that the Portuguese -were also in force at Guimaraens, and had cut the -bridges along the whole course of the Ave.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Sylveira struck a great blow; for, -being reinforced from the side of Beira, he remounted -the Tamega, invested the French in Chaves on the -20th, and, in eight days, obliged the garrison, -consisting of a hundred fighting men, and twelve -hundred sick, to capitulate; after which he took<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_200"></a>[200]</span> -post at Amarante. But Soult, ignorant of this -event, left Heudelet’s division at Braga, to protect -the hospitals from Bonteilho, and then continued -his own movement against Oporto in three columns.</p> - -<p>The first, composed of Franceschi’s and Mermet’s -divisions, marched by the road of Guimaraens and -San Justo, with orders to force the passage of the -Upper Ave, and scour the country towards Pombeiro.</p> - -<p>The second, which consisted of Merle’s, Laborde’s -and La Houssaye’s divisions, was commanded by -Soult, in person, and moved upon Barca de Trofa, -while general Lorge, quitting Bacellos, made way -by the Ponte d’Ave.</p> - -<p>The passage of the Ave was fiercely disputed. -The left column was fought with in front of Guimaraens, -and at Pombeiro, and again at Puente -Negrellos. The last combat was rough, and the -French general Jardon was killed.</p> - -<p>The march of the centre column was arrested at -Barca de Trofa, by the cutting of the bridge, and -the marshal, observing the numbers of the enemy, -ascended the right bank, and forced the passage at -San Justo: but not without the help of Franceschi, -who came down the opposite side of the river, after -the fight at Ponte Negrellos.</p> - -<p>When the left and centre had thus crossed, colonel -Lallemand was detached with a regiment of dragoons -to assist Lorge, who was still held in check -<ins class="corr" id="tn-200" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'at the Ponte Ave'"> -at the Ponte d’Ave</ins>; Lallemand was at first beaten -back, but, being reinforced with some infantry, -finally succeeded; and the Portuguese, enraged at -their defeat, brutally murdered their commander, -general Vallonga, and then dispersed.</p> - -<p>The whole French army was now in communication<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_201"></a>[201]</span> -on the left bank of the Ave; the way to -Oporto was opened, and, on the 27th, the troops -were finally concentrated in front of the entrenchments -covering that city.</p> - -<p>The action of Monterey, the taking of Chaves, -and the defeat at Braga, had so damped the bishop’s -ardour that he was, at one time, inclined to abandon -the defence of Oporto; but this idea was relinquished -when he considered the multitudes he had -drawn together, and that the English army was -stronger than it had been at any previous period -since Cradock’s arrival; Beresford, also, was at -the head of a considerable native force behind the -Mondego; and, with the hope of their support, the -bishop resolved to stand the brunt.</p> - -<p>He had collected, in the entrenched camp, little -short of forty thousand men; and among them were -many regular troops, of which two thousand had -lately arrived under the command of general Vittoria. -This general was sent by Beresford to aid Sylveira: -but when Chaves surrendered, he entered Oporto.</p> - -<p>The hopes of the people, also, were high, for they -could not believe that the French were a match for -them; the preceding defeats were attributed each to -its particular case of treason, and the murder of some -innocent persons had followed as an expiation. No -man but the bishop durst thwart the slightest caprice -of the mob; and he was little disposed to do so, -while Raymundo, and others of his stamp, fomented -their fury, and directed it to gratify personal enmities. -Thus, the defeat of Braga being known in -Oporto, caused a tumult on the 22d; and Louis -D’Olivera, a man of high rank, who had been cast -into prison, was, with fourteen other persons, haled -forth, and despatched with many stabs; the bodies<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_202"></a>[202]</span> -were then mutilated, and dragged in triumph through -the streets.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">See <a href="#i_b_300fp">Plan 5</a>.</div> - -<p>The entrenchments extending, as I have said, from -the Douro to the coast, were complete, and armed -with two hundred guns. They consisted of a number -of forts of different sizes, placed on the top of -a succession of rounded hills; and where the hills -failed, the defences were continued by earthen -ramparts, loop-holed houses, ditches, and felled trees. -Oporto itself is built in a hollow; a bridge of boats, -nearly three hundred yards in length, formed the -only communication between the city and the suburb -of Villa Nova; and this bridge was completely commanded -by batteries, mounting fifty guns, planted -on the bluff and craggy heights that overhang -the river above Villa Nova, and overlooked, not -only the city, but a great part of the entrenched -camp beyond it. Within the lines, tents were -pitched for even greater numbers than were assembled; -and the people ran to arms, and quickly -manned their works with great noise and tumult, -when the French columns, gathering like heavy -thunder clouds, settled in front of the camp.</p> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia arrived on the 27th. While -at Braga he had written to the bishop, calling on -him to calm the popular effervescence; and now, -beholding the extended works in his front, and -reading their weakness even in the multitudes that -guarded them, he renewed his call upon the prelate, -to spare this great and commercial city the horrors -of a storm. A prisoner, employed to carry the -summons, would have been killed, but that it was -pretended he came with an offer from Soult to surrender -his army; and notwithstanding this ingenious -device, and that the bishop commenced a negotiation,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_203"></a>[203]</span> -which was prolonged until evening, the firing -from the entrenchments was constant and general -during the whole of the 28th.</p> - -<p>The parley being finally broken off, Soult made -dispositions for a general action on the 29th. To -facilitate this, he caused Merle’s division to approach -the left of the entrenchments in the evening of the -28th, intending thereby to divert attention from the -true point of attack: a prodigious fire was immediately -opened from the works; but Merle, having -pushed close up, got into some hollow roads and -enclosures, and maintained his ground. At another -part of the line, however, some of the Portuguese -pretending a wish to surrender, general Foy, with a -single companion, imprudently approached them; -the latter was killed, and Foy himself made prisoner, -and carried into the town. He was mistaken for -Loison, and the people called out to kill “<em>Maneta</em>,” -but with great presence of mind he held up his -hands; and the crowd, convinced of their error, -suffered him to be cast into the jail.</p> - -<p>The bishop, having brought affairs to this awful -crisis, had not resolution to brave the danger himself. -Leaving generals Lima and Pareiras to command -the army, he, with an escort of troops, quitted -the city, and, crossing the river, took his station in -Sarea, a convent, built on the top of the rugged hill -which overhangs the suburb of Villa Nova, from -whence he beheld in safety the horrors of the next -day.</p> - -<p>The bells in Oporto continued to ring all night; -and about twelve o’clock a violent thunder storm -arising, the sound of the winds was mistaken in the -camp for the approach of enemies. At once the -whole line blazed with a fire of musketry; the roar<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_204"></a>[204]</span> -of two hundred pieces of artillery was heard above -the noise of the tempest, and the Portuguese calling -to one another with loud cries, were agitated at -once with fury and with terror. The morning, however, -broke serenely; and a little before seven o’clock -the sound of the Frenchmen’s trumpets and drums, -and the glitter of their arms, gave notice that the -whole army was in motion for the attack.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE AND STORMING OF OPORTO.</h4> - -<div class="sidenote">S.<br /> -Journal of Operations MS.</div> - -<p>The feint made the evening before against the -left, which was the weakest part of the line, had -perfectly succeeded, and the Portuguese generals -placed their principal masses on that side; but the -duke of Dalmatia was intent upon the strongest -points of the works, being resolved to force his way -through the town, and to seize the bridge during -the fight, that he might secure the passage of the -river.</p> - -<p>His army was divided into three columns; of which -the first, under Merle, attacked the left of the Portuguese -centre; the second, under Franceschi and -Laborde, assailed their extreme right; the third, -composed of Mermet’s division, sustained by a brigade -of dragoons, was in the centre. General Lorge -was appointed to cut off and attack a body of ordenanza, -who were posted with some guns in front of -the Portuguese left, and beyond the works on the -road of Villa de Conde.</p> - -<p>The battle was commenced by the wings; for -Mermet’s division was withheld, until the enemy’s -generals believing the whole of the attack was -developed, had weakened their centre to strengthen -their flanks. Then the French held in reserve, -rushing violently forwards, broke through the entrenchments,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_205"></a>[205]</span> -and took the two principal forts, entering -by the embrasures, and killing or dispersing all -within them. Soult instantly rallied this division, -and sent two battalions to take the Portuguese left -wing in the rear; while two other battalions were -ordered to march straight into the town, and make -for the bridge.</p> - -<p>The Portuguese army, thus cut in two, was soon -beaten on all points. Laborde carried in succession -a number of forts, took fifty pieces of artillery, and -reaching the edge of the city, halted until Franceschi, -who was engaged still more to the left, could -join him. By this movement a large body of Portuguese -were driven off from the town, and forced -back to the Douro, being followed by a brigade -under general Arnaud. And now Merle, seeing that -the success of the centre was complete, brought up -his left flank, and carrying all the forts to his right -in succession, killed a great number of the defenders, -and drove the rest towards the sea. These last -dividing, fled for refuge, one part to the fort of St. -Joa, the other towards the mouth of the Douro; -where, maddened by terror, as the French came -pouring down upon them, they strove, some to swim -across, others to get over in small boats; and when -their general, Lima, called out against this hopeless -attempt, they turned and murdered him, within -musket shot of the approaching enemy; and then -renewing the attempt to cross, nearly the whole -perished.</p> - -<p>The victory was now certain, for Lorge had dispersed -the people on the side of Villa de Conde -and general Arnaud had hemmed in those above -the town and prevented them from plunging into -the river also, as in their desperate mood they were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_206"></a>[206]</span> -going to do. But the battle continued within -Oporto, for the two battalions sent from the centre -having burst the barricadoes at the entrance of the -streets, had penetrated, fighting, to the bridge, and -here all the horrid circumstances of war seemed to -be accumulated, and the calamities of an age compressed -into one doleful hour.</p> - -<p>More than four thousand persons, old and young -and of both sexes, were seen pressing forward with -wild tumult, some already on the bridge, others -striving to gain it, and all in a state of phrenzy. -The batteries on the opposite bank opened their fire -when the French appeared, and at that moment a -troop of Portuguese cavalry flying from the fight -came down one of the streets, and remorseless in -their fears, bore, at full gallop, into the midst of the -miserable helpless crowd, and trampled a bloody -pathway to the river. Suddenly the nearest boats, -unable to sustain the increasing weight, sunk and -the foremost wretches still tumbling into the river, -as they were pressed from behind, perished, until -the heaped bodies rising above the surface of the -waters, filled all the space left by the sinking of the -boats.</p> - -<p>The first of the French that arrived, amazed at -this fearful spectacle, forgot the battle, and hastened -to save those who still struggled for life—and -while some were thus nobly employed, others by -the help of planks, getting on to the firmer parts of -the bridge, crossed the river and carried the batteries -on the heights of Villa Nova. The passage -was thus secured.</p> - -<p>But this terrible destruction did not complete the -measure of the city’s calamities; two hundred men, -who occupied the bishop’s palace, fired from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_207"></a>[207]</span> -windows and maintained that post until the French, -gathering round them in strength, burst the doors, -and put all to the sword. Every street and house -now rung with the noise of the combatants and the -shrieks of distress; for the French soldiers, exasperated -by long hardships, and prone like all -soldiers to ferocity and violence during an assault, -became frantic with fury, when, in one of the principal -squares, they found several of their comrades -who had been made prisoners, fastened upright, and -living, but with their eyes bursted, their tongues -torn out, and their other members mutilated and -gashed. Those that beheld the sight spared none -who fell in their way.</p> - -<p>It was in vain that Soult strove with all his power -to stop the slaughter; it was in vain that hundreds -of officers and soldiers opposed, at the risk of their -lives, the vengeance of their comrades, and by their -generous exertions rescued vast numbers that would -otherwise have fallen victims to the anger and -brutality of the moment. The frightful scene of -rape, pillage, and murder, closed not for many -<span class="sidenote">S.<br />Journal of Operations MS.</span> -hours, and what with those who fell in battle, those -who were drowned, and those sacrificed to revenge, -it is said that ten thousand Portuguese died in that -unhappy day! The loss of the French did not exceed -five hundred men.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_208"></a>[208]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BVII_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - -<p class="noindent">The dire slaughter at Oporto was followed up by a -variety of important operations, but before these are -treated of, it is essential to narrate the contemporaneous -events on the Tagus and the Guadiana, for -the war was wide and complicated, and the result -depended more upon the general combinations than -upon any particular movements.</p> - - -<h4>OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH CORPS.</h4> - -<p>It has been already related that marshal Victor, -after making a futile attempt to surprize the marquis -of Palacios, had retired to his former quarters -at Toledo, and that the conde de Cartoajal, who -succeeded the duke of Infantado, had advanced to -Ciudad Real with about fourteen thousand men. -Cuesta, also, having rallied the remainder of Galluzzo’s -army, and reinforced it by levies from Grenada, -and regular troops from Seville, had fixed his -head-quarters at Deleytosa, broken down the bridge -of Almaraz, and with fourteen thousand infantry and -two thousand five hundred cavalry, guarded the line -of the Tagus. The fourth corps remained at Talavera -and Placentia, but still holding the bridge of -Arzobispo.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Imperial -Muster-rolls, -MSS.</div> - -<p>The reserve of heavy cavalry was now suppressed, -and the regiments were dispersed among the <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">corps -d’armée</i>, but the whole army, exclusive of the king’s -guards, did not exceed two hundred and seventy -thousand men, and forty thousand horses, shewing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_209"></a>[209]</span> -a decrease of sixty-five thousand men since the 15th -of November. But this number includes the imperial -guards, the reserve of infantry, and many detachments -drafted from the corps;—in all forty -thousand men, who had been struck off the rolls of -the army in Spain, with a view to the war in -Germany; hence the real loss of the French by -sword, sickness, and captivity, in the four months -succeeding Napoleon’s arrival in the Peninsula, was -about twenty-five thousand—a vast number, but -not incredible, when it is considered that two -sieges, twelve pitched battles, and innumerable -combats had taken place during that period.</p> - -<p>Such was the state of affairs when the duke of -Belluno, having received orders to aid Soult in the -invasion of Portugal, changed places with the fourth -corps. Sebastiani was then opposed to Cartoajal, -and Victor stood against Cuesta. The former fixed -his head-quarters at Toledo, the latter at Talavera -de la Reyna, the communication between them being -kept up by Montbrun’s division of cavalry, while -the garrison of Madrid, composed of the king’s -guards, and Dessolle’s division, equally supported -both. But to understand the connection between -the first, second, and fourth corps, and Lapisse’s division, -it is necessary to have a clear idea of the -nature of the country on both sides of the Tagus.</p> - -<p>That river, after passing Toledo, runs through a -deep and long valley, walled up on either hand by -lofty mountains. Those on the right bank are always -capped with snow, and, ranging nearly parallel -with the course of the stream, divide the valley of -the Tagus from Old Castile and the Salamanca -country. The highest parts are known by the -names of the Sierra de Gredos, Sierra de Bejar, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_210"></a>[210]</span> -Sierra de Gata; and in these sierras the Alberche, -the Tietar, and the Alagon, take their rise, and, -ploughing the valley in a slanting direction, fall -into the Tagus.</p> - -<p>The principal mountain on the left bank is called -the Sierra de Guadalupe; it extends in a southward -direction from the river, and divides the -upper part of La Mancha from Spanish Estremadura. -The communications leading from the -Salamanca country into the valley of the Tagus are -neither many nor good; the principal passes are—</p> - -<p>1st. The rout of Horcajada, an old Roman road, -which, running through Pedrahita and Villa Franca, -crosses the Sierra de Gredos at Puerto de Pico, and -then descends by Montbeltran to Talavera.</p> - -<p>2d. The pass of Arenas, leading nearly parallel -to, and at a short distance from, the first.</p> - -<p>3d. The pass of Tornevecas, leading upon -Placentia.</p> - -<p>4th. The route of Bejar, which, crossing the -Sierra de Bejar at the pass of Baños, descends -likewise upon Placentia.</p> - -<p>5th. The route of Payo or Gata, which crosses -the Sierra de Gata by the pass of Perales, and -afterwards dividing, sends one branch to Alcantara, -the other to Coria and Placentia. Of these five -passes the two last only are, generally speaking, -practicable for artillery.</p> - -<p>The royal roads, from Toledo and Madrid to Badajos, -unite near Talavera, and follow the course of -the Tagus by the right bank as far Naval Moral, but -then, turning to the left, cross the river at the bridge -of Almaraz. Now, from Toledo, westward, to the -bridge of Almaraz, a distance of above fifty miles, -the left bank of the Tagus is so crowded by the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_211"></a>[211]</span> -rugged shoots of the Sierra de Guadalupe, that it -may be broadly stated as impassable for an army, and -this peculiarity of ground gives the key to the operations -on both sides. For, Cuesta and Cartoajal, by -reason of this impassable Sierra de Guadalupe, had -no direct military communication: but Victor and -Sebastiani, occupying Toledo and Talavera, could, -by the royal roads above mentioned, concentrate their -masses, at pleasure, on either line of operations.</p> - -<p>The rallying point of the French was Madrid, -and their parallel lines of defence were the Tagus, -the Alberche, <ins class="corr" id="tn-211" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'and the Guadaramo'"> -and the Guadarama</ins>.</p> - -<p>The base of Cartoajal’s operations was the Sierra -de Morena.</p> - -<p>Cuesta’s first line was the Tagus, and his -<ins class="corr" id="tn-211a" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'second the Guardiana'"> -second the Guadiana</ins>, from whence he could retreat by a -flank march to Badajos, or by a direct one to the -defiles of Monasterio in the Sierra Morena.</p> - -<p>The two Spanish armies, if they had been united, -would have furnished about twenty-six thousand -infantry, and five thousand cavalry, and they had -no reserve. The two French corps, united, would -have exceeded thirty-five thousand fighting-men, -supported by the reserve under the king. The -French, therefore, had the advantage of numbers, -position, and discipline.</p> - -<p>Following the orders of Napoleon, marshal Victor -should have been at Merida before the middle of -February. In that position he would have confined -Cuesta to the Sierra Morena; and with his twelve -regiments of cavalry he could easily have kept all -the flat country, as far as Badajos, in subjection. -That fortress itself had no means of resistance, and, -certainly, there was no Spanish force in the field -capable of impeding the full execution of the emperor’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_212"></a>[212]</span> -instructions, which were also reiterated by the -king. Nevertheless, the duke of Belluno remained -inert at this critical period, and the Spaniards, attributing -his inactivity to weakness, endeavoured -to provoke the blow so unaccountably withheld; -for Cuesta was projecting offensive movements -against Victor, and the duke of Albuquerque was -extremely anxious to attack Toledo from the side of -La Mancha.</p> - -<p>Cartoajal opposed Albuquerque’s plans, but -offered him a small force with which to act independently. -The duke complained to the junta of -Cartoajal’s proceedings, and Mr. Frere, whose -traces are to be found in every intrigue, and every -absurd project broached at this period, having -supported Albuquerque’s complaints, Cartoajal was -directed by the junta to follow the duke’s plans: -but the latter was himself ordered to join Cuesta, -with a detachment of four or five thousand men.</p> - - -<h4>ROUT OF CIUDAD REAL.</h4> - -<p>Cartoajal, in pursuance of his instructions, -marched with about twelve thousand men, and -twenty guns, towards Toledo; and his advanced -guard attacked a regiment of Polish lancers, near -Consuegra: but the latter retired without loss. -Hereupon, Sebastiani, with about ten thousand -men, came up against him, and the leading divisions -encountering at Yebenes, the Spaniards were -pushed back to Ciudad Real, where they halted, -leaving guards on the river in front of that town. -The French, however, forced the passage, and a -tumultuary action ensuing, Cartoajal was totally -routed, with the loss of all his guns, a thousand -slain, and several thousand prisoners. The vanquished<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_213"></a>[213]</span> -fled by Almagro; and the French cavalry -pursued even to the foot of the Sierra Morena.</p> - -<p>This action, fought on the 27th of March, and -commonly called the battle of Ciudad Real, was not -followed up with any great profit to the victors. -Sebastiani gathered up the spoils, sent his prisoners -to the rear, and, holding his troops concentrated -on the Upper Guadiana, awaited the result of -Victor’s operations: thus enabling the Spanish -fugitives to rally at Carolina, where they were -reinforced by levies from Grenada and Cordova.</p> - -<p>While these events were passing in La Mancha, -Estremadura was also invaded; for the king having -received a despatch from Soult, dated Orense and -giving notice that the second corps would be at -Oporto about the 15th of March, had reiterated -the orders that Lapisse should move to Abrantes, -and that the duke of Belluno should pass the -Tagus, and drive Cuesta beyond the Guadiana.</p> - -<p>Victor, who appears for some reason to have been -averse to aiding the operations of the second corps, -remonstrated, and especially urged that the order -to Lapisse should be withdrawn, lest his division -should arrive too soon, and without support, at -Abrantes. This time, however, the king was firm, -and, on the 14th of March, the duke of Belluno, -having collected five days’ provisions, made the -necessary dispositions to pass the Tagus.</p> - -<p>The amount of the Spanish force immediately on -that river was about sixteen thousand men; but -Cuesta had several detachments and irregular bands -<span class="sidenote">General Semelé’s Journal of Operations, MS.</span> -in his rear, which may be calculated at eight thousand -more. The Duke of Belluno, however, estimated -the troops in position before him at thirty -thousand, a great error for so experienced a commander -to make.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_214"></a>[214]</span></p> - -<p>But, on the other hand, Cuesta was as ill informed; -for this was the moment when, with his approbation, -colonel D’Urban proposed to sir John Cradock, that -curiously combined attack against Victor, already -noticed; in which, the Spaniards were to cross the -Tagus, and sir Robert Wilson was to come down -upon the Tietar. This, also, was the period that -Mr. Frere, apparently ignorant that there were at -least twenty-five thousand fighting men in the valley -of the Tagus, without reckoning the king’s or Sebastiani’s -troops, proposed that the twelve thousand -British, under sir John Cradock, should march from -Lisbon to “drive the fourth French corps from Toledo,” -and “consequently,” as he phrased it, “from -Madrid.” The first movement of marshal Victor -awakened Cuesta from these dreams.</p> - -<p>The bridges of Talavera and Arzobispo were, as -we have seen, held by the French; and their advanced -posts were pushed into the valley of the -Tagus, as far as the Barca de Bazagona.</p> - -<p>Cuesta’s position extended from Garbin, near the -bridge of Arzobispo, to the bridge of Almaraz. His -centre being at Meza d’Ibor, a position of surprising -strength, running at right angles from the Tagus to -the Guadalupe. The head-quarters and reserves -were at Deleytosa; and a road, cut by the troops, -afforded a communication between that place and -Meza d’Ibor.</p> - -<p>On the right bank of the Tagus there was easy -access to the bridges of Talavera, Arzobispo, and -Almaraz; but on the left bank no road existed, -except from Almaraz, by which artillery could pass -the mountains, and even that was crossed by the -ridge of Mirabete, which stretching on a line parallel -to the river, and at the distance of four or five miles, -affords an almost impregnable position.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_215"></a>[215]</span></p> - -<p>The duke of Belluno’s plan was, to pass the Tagus -at the bridges of Talavera and Arzobispo, with his -infantry and a part of his cavalry, and to operate -in the Sierra de Guadalupe against the Spanish -right; while the artillery and grand parc, protected -<span class="sidenote">Journal of Operations of the First Corps MS.</span> -by the remainder of the cavalry, were united opposite -Almaraz, having with them a raft bridge to -throw across at that point, a project scarcely to be -reconciled with the estimate made of Cuesta’s force; -for surely nothing could be more rash than to expose -the whole of the guns and field stores of the army, -with no other guard than some cavalry and one -battalion of infantry, close to a powerful enemy, -who possessed a good pontoon train, and who might, -consequently, pass the river at pleasure.</p> - -<p>The 15th, Laval’s division of German infantry, -and Lasalle’s cavalry, crossed at Talavera, and, -turning to the right, worked a march through the -rocky hills; the infantry to Aldea Nueva, on a line -somewhat short of the bridge of Arzobispo; the -cavalry higher up the mountain towards Estrella.</p> - -<p>The 16th, when those troops had advanced a few -miles to the front, the head-quarters, and the other -divisions of infantry, passed the bridge of Arzobispo; -while the artillery and the parcs, accompanied by a -battalion of grenadiers, and the escorting cavalry, -moved to Almaraz, with orders to watch, on the 17th -and 18th, for the appearance of the army on the -heights at the other side, and then to move down -to the point before indicated, for launching the raft -bridge.</p> - -<p>Alarmed by these movements, Cuesta hastened -in person to Mirabete; and directing general Henestrosa, -with eight thousand men, to defend the bridge -of Almaraz, sent a detachment to reinforce his right<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_216"></a>[216]</span> -wing, which was posted behind the Ibor, a small -river, but at this season running with a full torrent -from the Guadalupe to the Tagus.</p> - -<p>The 17th, the Spanish advanced guards were -driven, with some loss, across the Ibor. They attempted -to re-form on the high rocky banks of that -river; but, being closely followed, retreated to the -camp of Meza d’Ibor, the great natural strength of -which was increased by some field works.</p> - -<p>Their position could only be attacked in front; and, -this being apparent at the first glance, Laval’s division -was instantly formed in columns of attack, -which pushed rapidly up the mountain; the inequalities -of ground covering them in some sort from the -effects of the enemy’s artillery. As they arrived -near the summit, the fire of musketry and grape -became murderous; but, at the instant when the -Spaniards should have displayed all their vigour, -they broke and fled to Campillo, leaving behind -them baggage, magazines, seven guns, and a thousand -prisoners, besides eight hundred killed and -wounded. The French had seventy killed, and near -five hundred wounded.</p> - -<p>While this action was taking place at Meza -d’Ibor, Villatte’s division, being higher up the Sierra, -to the left, overthrew a smaller body of Spaniards -at Frenedoso, making three hundred prisoners, and -capturing a large store of arms.</p> - -<p>The 18th, at day-break, the duke of Belluno, who -had superintended in person the attack at Meza -d’Ibor, examined from that high ground all the remaining -position of the Spaniards. Cuesta, he -observed, was in full retreat to Truxillo; but -Henestrosa was still posted in front of Almaraz. -Hereupon Villatte’s division was detached after<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_217"></a>[217]</span> -Cuesta, to Deleytosa; but Laval’s Germans were -led against Henestrosa; and the latter, aware of his -danger, and already preparing to retire, was driven -hastily over the ridge of Mirabete.</p> - -<p>In the course of the night, the raft bridge was -thrown across the Tagus; and the next day the -dragoons passed to the left bank, the artillery followed, -and the cavalry immediately pushed forward -to Truxillo, from which town Cuesta had already -fallen back to Santa Cruz, leaving Henestrosa to -cover the retreat.</p> - -<p>The 20th, after a slight skirmish, the latter was -forced over the Mazarna; and the whole French -army, with the exception of a regiment of dragoons -(left to guard the raft bridge) was poured along the -road to Merida.</p> - -<p>The advanced guard, consisting of a regiment of -light cavalry, under general Bordesoult, arrived in -front of Miajadas on the 21st. Here the road -dividing, sends one branch to Merida, the other to -Medellin. A party of Spanish horsemen were posted -near the town; they appeared in great alarm, and -by their hesitating movements invited a charge. -The French incautiously galloped forward; and, in -a moment, twelve or fourteen hundred Spanish -cavalry, placed in ambush, came up at speed on -both flanks. General Lasalle, who from a distance -had observed the movements of both sides, immediately -rode forward with a second regiment; and -arrived just as Bordesoult had extricated himself -from a great peril, by his own valour, but with the -loss of seventy killed and a hundred wounded.</p> - -<p>After this well-managed combat, Cuesta retired -to Medellin without being molested, and Victor -spreading his cavalry posts on the different routes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_218"></a>[218]</span> -to gain intelligence and to collect provisions, established -<span class="sidenote">Journal of Operations MSS.</span> -his own quarters at Truxillo, a town of -some trade and advantageously situated for a place -of arms. It had been deserted by the inhabitants -and pillaged by the first French troops that entered -it, but it still offered great resources for the army, -and there was an ancient citadel, capable of being -rendered defensible, which was immediately armed -with the Spanish guns, and provisioned from the -magazines taken at Meza d’Ibor.</p> - -<p>The flooding of the Tagus and the rocky nature -of its bed had injured the raft-bridge near Almaraz, -and delayed the passage of the artillery and stores; -to remedy this inconvenience the marshal issued -directions to have a boat-bridge prepared, and -caused a field-fort to be constructed on the left -bank of the Tagus, which he armed with three -guns, and garrisoned with a hundred and fifty men -to protect his bridge. These arrangements and the -establishment of an hospital for two thousand men -at Truxillo, delayed the first corps until the 24th -of March.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the light cavalry reinforced by -twelve hundred <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">voltigeurs</i> were posted at Miajadas, -and having covered all the roads branching -from that central point with their scouting parties, -reported that a few of Cuesta’s people had retired -to Medellin, that from five to six thousand men -were thrown into the Sierra de Guadalupe, on the -left of the French; that four thousand infantry and -two thousand cavalry were behind <ins class="corr" id="tn-218" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'the river Garganza'"> -the river Guadiana</ins>, -in front of Medellin, but that every thing -else was over the Guadiana.</p> - -<p>The line of retreat chosen by Cuesta uncovered -Merida, and, consequently, the great road between<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_219"></a>[219]</span> -Badajos and Seville was open to the French; but -Victor was not disposed to profit from this, for he -was aware that Albuquerque was coming from La -Mancha to Cuesta, and believing that he brought -nine thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry—feared -that Cuesta’s intention was either to draw -him into a difficult country, by making a flank -march to join Cartoajal in La Mancha, or by crossing -the Guadiana, above Naval Villar, where the -fords are always practicable, to rejoin his detachments -in the Sierra de Guadalupe, and so establish -a new base of operations on the left flank of the -French army.</p> - -<p>This reasoning was misplaced; neither Cuesta -nor his army were capable of such operations, his -line of retreat was solely directed by a desire to -join Albuquerque, and to save his troops, by taking -to a rugged instead of an open country, and the -duke of Belluno lost the fruits of his previous -success, by over rating his adversary’s skill; for, -instead of following Cuesta with a resolution to -break up the Spanish army, he, after leaving a brigade -at Truxillo and Almaraz, to protect the communications, -was contented to advance a few -leagues on the road to Medellin with his main body, -sending his light cavalry to Merida, and pushing -on detachments towards Badajos and Seville, while -other parties explored the roads leading into the -Guadalupe.</p> - -<p>The 27th, however, he marched in person to Medellin, -at the head of two divisions of infantry, and -a brigade of heavy cavalry. Eight hundred Spanish -horse posted on the right bank of the Guadiana, -retired at his approach, and crossing that river, -halted at Don Benito, where they were reinforced<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_220"></a>[220]</span> -by other squadrons, but no infantry were to be discovered. -The duke of Belluno then passed the -river and took post on the road leading to Mengabril -and Don Benito; hence, the situation of the -French army in the evening was as follows:—</p> - -<p>The main body, consisting of two divisions of infantry, -and one incomplete brigade of heavy cavalry -in position, on the road leading from Medellin to -Don Benito and Mingabril.</p> - -<p>The remainder of the dragoons, under Latour -Maubourg, were at Zorita, fifteen miles on the left, -watching the Spaniards in the Guadalupe.</p> - -<p>The light cavalry was at Merida, eighteen miles -to the right, having patrolled all that day on the -roads to Badajos, Seville, and Medellin.</p> - -<p>Ruffin’s division was at Miajadas eighteen miles -in the rear.</p> - -<p>In the course of the evening Victor received intelligence, -that Albuquerque was just come up with -eight thousand men, that the combined troops, -amounting to twenty-eight thousand infantry and -seven thousand cavalry, were in position on the -table land of Don Benito, and that Cuesta, aware of -the scattered state of the French army, was preparing -to attack the two divisions on their march the next -day.</p> - -<p>Upon this, the duke of Belluno, notwithstanding -the strength of the Spanish army, resolved to fight, -and immediately sent orders to Lasalle, to Ruffin, -and to Latour Maubourg, to bring their divisions -down to Medellin; but the latter was directed to -leave a detachment at Miajadas to protect the -route of Merida, and a brigade at Zorita, to observe -the Spaniards in the Sierra de Guadalupe.</p> - -<p>Cuesta’s numbers were, however, greatly exaggerated;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_221"></a>[221]</span> -that general blaming every body but himself -for his failure on the Tagus—had fallen back -to Campanarios—rallied all his scattered detachments, -and then returned to Villa Nueva de Serena, -where he was joined, on the 27th, by Albuquerque, -who brought up not a great body of infantry and -cavalry as supposed, but less than three thousand -infantry and a few hundred horse. This reinforcement, -added to some battalions drawn from Andalusia, -increased Cuesta’s army to about twenty-five -thousand foot, four thousand horse, and eighteen or -twenty pieces of artillery; and, with this force, he, -fearing for the safety of Badajos, retraced his steps -and rushed headlong to destruction.</p> - -<p>Medellin, possessing a fine stone-bridge, is situated -in a hollow on the left bank of the Guadiana, -and just beyond the town is a vast plain or table -land, the edge of which, breaking abruptly down, -forms the bed of the river. The Ortigosa, a rapid -torrent, rushing perpendicularly to the Guadiana, -and having steep and rugged banks, yet in parts -passable for artillery, cuts their plain, which is also -traversed by two roads, the one leading to Mingrabil -on the right, the other to Don Benito on the -left, those places being about five miles apart, and -forming with Medellin an irregular triangle.</p> - -<p>The French army, with the exception of the -troops left to cover the communications and those at -Zorita, was concentrated in the town at ten o’clock; -and, at one, about fourteen thousand infantry, two -thousand five hundred cavalry, and forty-two pieces -of artillery, went forth to fight the</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF MEDELLIN.</h4> - -<p>The plain on the side of Don Benito was bounded<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_222"></a>[222]</span> -by a high ridge of land, behind which Cuesta kept -the Spanish infantry concealed, showing only his -cavalry and some guns in advance. To make him -display his lines of infantry the French general -sent Lasalle’s light cavalry, with a battery of six -guns and two battalions of German infantry, towards -Don Benito, while Latour Maubourg, with five -squadrons of dragoons, eight guns, and two other -battalions, keeping close to the Ortigosa, advanced -towards the point of the enemy’s ridge called the -Retamosa. The rest of the army was kept in reserve; -the division of Villatte and the remainder of -the Germans, being one-half on the road of Don -Benito, the other half on the road of Mengabril. -Ruffin’s division was a little way in rear of the -other, and a battalion was left to guard the baggage -at the bridge of Medellin.</p> - -<p>As the French squadrons advanced, the artillery -on both sides opened, and the Spanish cavalry -guards in the plain retired slowly to the higher -ground. Lasalle and Latour Maubourg then pressed -forward; but as the latter, who had the shortest -distance to traverse, approached the enemy’s position, -the whole Spanish line of battle was suddenly -descried in full march over the edge of the ridge, -and stretching from the Ortijos to within a mile of -the Guadiana,—a menacing but glorious apparition.</p> - -<p>Cuesta, Henestrosa, and the duke del Parque, -with the mass of cavalry, were on the left; Francisco -Frias, with the main body of infantry, in the -centre; Equia and the marquis of Portazzo on the -right; and, from thence to the bank of the Guadiana, -Albuquerque, with some scattered squadrons, -flanked the march of the whole host as it descended, -with a rapid pace, into the plain. Cuesta’s plan<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_223"></a>[223]</span> -was now disclosed; his line overlapped the French -left, and he was hastening to cut their army off -from Medellin, but his order of battle was on a -front of three miles, and he had no reserve.</p> - -<p>The Duke of Belluno, seeing this, instantly -brought his centre a little forward, and then, reinforcing -Latour Maubourg with ten guns and a battalion -of grenadiers, and detaching a brigade of -infantry as a support, ordered him to fall boldly in -on the advancing enemy. But at the same time -Lasalle, who was giving way under the pressure of -his antagonists, was directed to retire towards Medellin, -always refusing his left.</p> - -<p>The Spaniards marched briskly forward into the -plain, and a special body of cavalry, with three -thousand infantry, advancing from their left, met -Latour Maubourg in front, while a regiment of hussars -fell upon the French columns of grenadiers -and guns in his rear. The hussars, received with -grape and a pelting fire of musketry, and charged -in flank by some dragoons, were beaten at once, -but the Spanish infantry, closely followed by the -rest of their own cavalry, came boldly up to Latour -Maubourg’s horsemen, and, with a rough discharge, -forced them back in disorder. The French, however, -soon rallied, and smashing the Spanish ranks -with artillery, and fighting all together, broke in -and overthrew their enemies, man and horse. Cuesta -was wounded and fell, but, being quickly remounted, -escaped.</p> - -<p>While this was passing on the French right, Lasalle’s -cavalry, continually refusing their left, were -brought fighting close up to the main body of the -French infantry, which was now disposed on a new<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_224"></a>[224]</span> -front, having a reserve behind the centre. Meanwhile -Latour Maubourg’s division was being re-formed -on the ridge from whence the Spaniards had -first descended, and the whole face of the battle -was changed; for the Spanish left being put to -flight, the French right wing overlapped the centre -of their antagonists, and the long attenuated line -of the latter wavering, disjointed, and disclosing -wide chasms, was still advancing without an -object.</p> - -<p>The duke of Belluno, aware that the decisive -moment of the battle had arrived, was on the point -of commanding a general attack, when his attention -was arrested by the appearance of a column coming -down on the rear of his right wing from the side of -Mingabril. A brigade from the reserve, with four -guns, was immediately sent to keep this body in -check, and then Lasalle’s cavalry, taking ground to -its left, unmasked the infantry in the centre, and -the latter, immediately advancing, poured a heavy -fire into the Spanish ranks; Latour Maubourg, -sweeping round their left flank, fell on the rear, -and, at the same moment, Lasalle also galloped in -upon the dismayed and broken bands. A horrible -carnage ensued, for the French soldiers, while their -strength would permit, continued to follow and -strike, until three-fifths of the whole Spanish army -wallowed in blood.</p> - -<p>Six guns and several thousand prisoners were -taken. General Frias, deeply wounded, fell into -the hands of the victors; and so utter was the discomfiture -that, for several days after, Cuesta could -not rally a single battalion of infantry, and his -cavalry was only saved by the speed of the horses.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_225"></a>[225]</span></p> - -<p>Following general Semelé’s journal,<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> the French -loss did not exceed three hundred men, a number -so utterly disproportionate to that of the vanquished -as to be scarcely credible, and, if correct, discovering -a savage rigour in the pursuit by no means -commendable; for it does not appear that any previous -cruelties were perpetrated by the Spaniards -to irritate the French soldiers. The right to slaughter -an enemy in battle can neither be disputed nor -limited; but a brave soldier should always have -regard to the character of his country, and be -sparing of the sword towards beaten men.</p> - -<p>The main body of the French army passed the -night of the 28th near the field of battle; but Latour -Maubourg marched with the dragoons by the -left bank of the Guadiana to Merida, leaving a -detachment at Torre Mexia to watch the roads of -Almendralego and Villa Franca, and to give notice -if the remains of Cuesta’s army should attempt to -gain Badajos, in which case the dragoons had orders -to intercept them at Loboa.</p> - -<p>The 29th, Villatte’s division advanced as far as -Villa Nueva de Serena, and the light cavalry were -pushed on to Campanarios. But, as all the reports -agreed that Cuesta, with a few horsemen, had -taken refuge in the Sierra Morena, and that the -remnants of his army were dispersed and wandering -through the fields and along the bye-roads, without -any power of re-uniting, the duke of Belluno relinquished -the pursuit. Having fixed his head-quarters -at Merida, and occupied that place and Medellin -with his infantry, he formed with his cavalry -a belt extending from Loboa on the right to Mingrabil<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_226"></a>[226]</span> -on the left; but the people had all fled from -the country, and even the great towns were deserted.</p> - -<p>Merida, situated in a richly-cultivated basin, possesses -a fine bridge and many magnificent remains -of antiquity, Roman and Moorish; amongst others, -a castle built on the right bank of the river, close -to the bridge, and so perfect that, in eight days, it -was rendered capable of resisting any sudden -assault; and six guns being mounted on the walls, -and an hospital for a thousand men established -there, a garrison of three hundred men, with stores -and provisions for eight hundred, during two -months, was put into it.</p> - -<p>The king now repeated his orders that the duke -of Belluno should enter Portugal, and that general -Lapisse should march upon Abrantes; but the -former again remonstrated, on the ground that he -could not make such a movement and defend his -communications with Almaraz, unless the division -of Lapisse was permitted to join him by the route -of Alcantara. But as Badajos, although more -capable of defence than it had been in December, -when the fourth corps was at Merida, was still far -from being secure; and that many of the richer -inhabitants, disgusted and fatigued with the violence -of the mob government, were more inclined to betray -the gates to the French than to risk a siege; -Victor, whose battering train (composed of only -twelve pieces, badly horsed and provided) was still -at Truxillo, opened a secret communication with -the malcontents.</p> - -<p>The parties met at the village of Albuera, and -everything was arranged for the surrender, when -the peasants giving notice to the junta that some<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_227"></a>[227]</span> -treason was in progress, the latter arrested all the -<span class="sidenote">Journal of Operations MS.</span> -persons supposed to be implicated, and the project -was baffled. The duke of Belluno then resigned -all further thoughts of Badajos, and contented himself -with sending detachments to Alcantara, to get -intelligence of general Lapisse, of whose proceedings -it is now time to give some account.</p> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_226fp" style="max-width: 30em;"> - <p class="fs70"><em>Plate 3. to face Pa. 226.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_226fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_226fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"> -<em>Sketch Explanatory</em> of<br /> -M<sup>L</sup>. VICTOR’S OPERATIONS<br /> -<ins class="corr" id="tn-226" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'AGAINST GUESTA'"> -AGAINST CUESTA</ins><br /> -<em>in March 1809</em>.<br /> -<p><em>London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.</em></p></div> -</div> - - -<h4>OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LAPISSE.</h4> - -<p>This general, after taking Zamora in January, -occupied Ledesma and Salamanca, where he was -joined by general Maupetit’s brigade of cavalry, and -as sir Robert Wilson’s legion and the feeble garrisons -in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida were the -only bodies in his front, universal terror prevailed. -Yet he, although at the head of at least ten thousand -men, with a powerful artillery, remained inactive -from January to the end of March, and suffered sir -Robert, with a few hundred Portuguese, to vex his -outposts, to intercept his provisions, to restrain his -patroles, and even to disturb his infantry in their -quarters. This conduct brought him into contempt, -and enabled Wilson to infuse a spirit into the people -which they were far from feeling when the enemy -first appeared.</p> - -<p>Don Carlos d’España, with a small Spanish force, -being after a time placed under sir Robert’s command, -the latter detached two battalions to occupy -the pass of Baños, and Lapisse was thus deprived -of any direct communication with Victor. In this -situation the French general remained without -making any vigorous effort either to clear his front -or to get intelligence of the duke of Dalmatia’s -march upon Oporto until the beginning of April, -when he advanced towards Bejar, but, finding the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_228"></a>[228]</span> -passes occupied, turned suddenly to his right, dissipated -Wilson’s posts on the Ecla, and forced -the legion, then commanded by colonel Grant, to -take refuge under the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo. -He summoned that town to surrender on the 6th, -and, after a slight skirmish close to the walls, took -a position between the Agueda and Ledesma.</p> - -<p>This event was followed by a general insurrection -from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara and from Tamames -to Bejar. For Lapisse, who had been again -ordered by the king to fulfil the emperor’s instructions, -and advance to Abrantes, instead of obeying, -suddenly quitted his positions on the Agueda, and, -without regarding his connexion with the second -corps, abandoned Leon, and made a rapid march, -through the pass of Perales, upon Alcantara, followed -closely by sir Robert Wilson, don Carlos -d’España, the two battalions from Bejar, and a -multitude of peasants, both Portuguese and Spanish.</p> - -<p>At Alcantara, a corps of Spanish insurgents endeavoured -to defend the passage of the river, but -the French broke through the entrenchments on -the bridge, and, with a full encounter carried the -town, and pillaged it, after which they abandoned -the place, and joined the first corps, at Merida, on -the 19th of April.</p> - -<p>This false movement greatly injured the French -cause. From that moment the conquering impulse -given by Napoleon was at an end, and his armies, -ceasing to act on the offensive, became stationary -or retrograded, and the British, Spanish, and Portuguese -once more assumed the lead. The duke of -Dalmatia, abandoned to his own resources, and in -total ignorance of the situation of the corps by -which his movements should have been supported,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_229"></a>[229]</span> -was forced to remain in Oporto; and at the moment, -when the French combinations <ins class="corr" id="tn-229" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'were thus paralized'"> -were thus paralyzed</ins>, the arrival of English reinforcements at Lisbon and -the advance of sir John Cradock towards Leiria -gave a sudden and violent impetus both to the -Spaniards and Portuguese along the Beira frontier. -Thus the insurrection, no longer kept down by -the presence of an intermediate French corps, connecting -Victor’s and Soult’s forces, was established -in full activity from Alcantara, on the Tagus, to -Amarante, on the Tamega.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Cuesta was gathering another host in -the Morena; for, although the simultaneous defeat -of the armies in Estremadura and La Mancha had -at first produced the greatest dismay in Andalusia, -the Spaniards, when they found such victories as -Ciudad Real and Medellin only leading to a stagnant -inactivity on the part of the French, concluded that -extreme weakness was the cause, and that the Austrian -war had or would oblige Napoleon to abandon -his projects against the Peninsula. This idea was -general, and upheld not only the people’s spirit but -the central junta’s authority, which could not otherwise -have been maintained after such a succession -of follies and disasters.</p> - -<p>The misfortunes of the two Spanish generals had -been equal; but Cartoajal, having no popular influence, -was dismissed, while Cuesta was appointed to -command what remained of both armies; and the -junta, stimulated for a moment by the imminent -danger in which they were placed, drew together -all the scattered troops and levies in Andalusia. -To cover Seville, Cuesta took post in the defiles -of Monasterio, and was there joined by eight hundred -horse and two thousand three hundred infantry,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_230"></a>[230]</span> -drafted from the garrison of Seville; these were -followed by thirteen hundred old troops from Cadiz; -and finally, three thousand five hundred Grenadian -levies, and eight thousand foot, and two thousand -five hundred horsemen, taken from the army of La -Mancha, contributed to swell his numbers, until, in -the latter end of April, they amounted to twenty-five -thousand infantry, and about six thousand cavalry. -General Venegas, also, being recalled from Valencia, -repaired to La Carolina, and proceeded to organize -another army of La Mancha.</p> - -<p>King Joseph, justly displeased at the false disposition -made of Lapisse’s division, directed that -Alcantara should be immediately re-occupied; but -as this was not done without an action, which -belongs to another combination, it shall be noticed -hereafter. It is now proper to return to the operations -on the Douro, so intimately connected with -those on the Guadiana, and yet so differently conducted.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_231"></a>[231]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BVII_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - -<p>When the bishop of Oporto beheld, from his -station at Sarea, the final overthrow of his ambitious -schemes in the north of Portugal, he fled to Lisbon. -There he reconciled himself to the regency, became -a member of that body, and was soon after -created patriarch; and, as I shall have occasion to -shew, used his great influence in the most mischievous -manner; discovering, on every occasion, the untamed -violence and inherent falseness of his disposition.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the fall of Oporto enabled marshal -Soult to establish a solid base of operations, and to -commence a regular system of warfare. The immediate -fruit of his victory was the capture of immense -magazines of powder, and a hundred and ninety-seven -pieces of artillery, every gun of which had -been used in the action. Thirty English vessels, -wind-bound in the river, and loaded with wine and -provisions for a month, also fell into his hands.</p> - -<p>Having repressed the disorders attendant on the -battle, he adopted the same conciliatory policy -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XIII">Appendix, No. 13</a>.</span> -which had marked his conduct at Chaves and Braga; -and endeavoured to remedy, as far as it was possible, -the deplorable results of the soldiers’ fury. Recovering -and restoring a part of the plunder, he caused -the inhabitants remaining in the town to be treated -with respect; and invited, by proclamation, all those -who had fled to return. He demanded no contribution; -and, restraining with a firm hand the violence -of his men, contrived, from the captured public<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_232"></a>[232]</span> -property, to support the army, and even to succour -the poorest and most distressed of the population.</p> - -<p>Soult’s ability in the civil and political administration -of the Entre Minho e Douro produced an -effect which he was not prepared for. The prince -regent’s desertion of the country was not forgotten. -The national feeling was as adverse to Portugal being -a dependency on the Brazils as it was to the usurpation -of the French, and the comparison between -Soult’s government and the horrible anarchy which -preceded it was all in favour of the former. His -victories, and the evident vigour of his character, -contrasted with the apparent supineness of the -English, promised permanency for the French power; -and the party, formerly noticed as being inimical to -the house of Braganza, revived.</p> - -<p>The leaders, thinking this a favourable opportunity -to execute their intention, waited upon the duke -of Dalmatia, and expressed their desire for a French -prince and an independent government. They even -intimated their good wishes towards the duke himself, -and demanded his concurrence and protection; -while, in the name of the people, they declared that -the Braganza dynasty was at an end.</p> - -<p>Although unauthorized by the emperor to accede -to this proposition, Soult was yet unwilling to reject -a plan from which he could draw such immediate -and important military advantages. Napoleon was not -a man to be lightly dealt with on such an occasion; -but the marshal, trusting that circumstances would -justify him, encouraged the design, and, appointing -men to civil employments, raised a Portuguese legion -of five battalions. He acted with so much dexterity -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XIII">Appendix, No. 13</a>.</span> -that, in fifteen days, the cities of Oporto and Braga, -and the towns of Bacellos, Viana, Villa de Conde,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_233"></a>[233]</span> -Povoa de Barcim, Feira, and Ovar, sent addresses, -containing the expression of their sentiments, and -bearing the signatures of thirty thousand persons, -as well of the nobles, clergy, and merchants, as of -the people.</p> - -<p>These addresses were burnt when the French retreated -from Oporto; but the fact that such a project -was in agitation has never been denied. The regency -even caused inquest to be made on the matter; and -it was then asserted that very few persons were -found to be implicated. That many of the signatures -were forged by the leaders may readily be believed; -but the policy of lessening the importance of the -affair is also evident; and the inquisitors, if willing, -could not have probed it to the bottom.</p> - -<p>This transaction formed the ground-work of a -tale generally credited, even by his own officers, -that Soult perfidiously aimed at an independent -crown; and the circumstances were certainly such -as might create suspicion. That the conclusion was -false, is, however, proved, by the mode in which -Napoleon treated both the rumour and the subject -<span class="sidenote">Rovigo’s Memoirs.</span> -of it. Slighting the former, he yet made known to -his lieutenant that it had reached his ears, adding, -“<em>I remember nothing but Austerlitz</em>,”<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> and at the -same time largely increased the duke of Dalmatia’s -command.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">S.<br /> -Journal of -Operations -MSS.</div> - -<p>The policy of Soult’s conduct on this occasion, -and the great influence, if not the numbers of the -Portuguese malcontents, were abundantly proved -by the ameliorated relations between the army and -the peasantry. The fierceness of the latter subsided; -and even the priests abated of their hostility<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_234"></a>[234]</span> -in the Entre Minho e Douro. The French soldiers -were no longer assassinated in that province; -whereas, previous to this intrigue, that cruel -species of warfare had been carried on with infinite -activity, and the most malignant passions called -forth on both sides.</p> - -<p>Among other instances of Portuguese ferocity, -and of the truculent violence of the French soldiers, -the death of colonel Lameth, and the retaliation -which followed, may be cited. That young officer, -when returning from the marshal’s quarters to his -own, was waylaid, near the village of Arrifana, and -murdered; his body was then stripped, and mutilated -in a shocking manner. This assassination, -committed within the French lines, and at a time -when Soult enforced the strictest discipline, was -justifiable neither by the laws of war nor by those -of humanity. No general could neglect to punish -such a proceeding. The protection due to the -army, and even the welfare of the Portuguese -within the French jurisdiction, demanded a severe -example, for the violence of the troops had hitherto -been with difficulty restrained by their commander; -and if, at such a moment, he had appeared indifferent -to their individual safety; his authority -would have been set at naught, and the unmeasured -and indiscriminating vengeance of an insubordinate -army executed.</p> - -<p>Impressed with this feeling, and afflicted at the -unhappy death of a personal friend, Soult directed -general Thomieres to march, with a brigade of -infantry, to Arrifana, and punish the criminals. -Thomieres was accompanied by a Portuguese -civilian; and, after a judicial inquiry, he shot five -or six persons whose guilt was said to have been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_235"></a>[235]</span> -proved; but it is also certain that the principal -actor, a Portuguese major of militia, and some of -his accomplices, escaped across the Vouga to -colonel Trant; and the latter, disgusted at their -conduct, sent them to marshal Beresford. It would -also appear, from the statement of a peasant, that -Thomieres, or those under him, exceeded Soult’s -orders; for, in that statement, attested by oath, -it is said that twenty-four innocent persons were -killed, and that the soldiers, after committing many -atrocious excesses, burnt the village.</p> - -<p>These details have been related partly because -they throw a light upon the direful nature of this -contest, but chiefly because the transaction has -been adduced by other writers as proof of cruelty -in Soult, a <ins class="corr" id="tn-235" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'charge not be sustained'"> -charge not sustained</ins> by the facts of -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XIII">Appendix, No. 13</a>.</span> -this case, and belied by the general tenor of his -conduct, which even his enemies, while they attributed -it to an insidious policy, acknowledged, at -the time, to be mild and humane. And now, -having finished this political digression, in which -the chronological order of events has been anticipated, -I shall resume the narrative of military -operations at that part where the disorders attendant -on the battle of Oporto having been repressed, a -fresh series of combinations were commenced, not -less important than those which brought the French -army down to the Douro.</p> - -<p>The heavy blow struck on the 29th of March -was followed up with activity. The boat-bridge -was restored during the night; and the next day, -the forts of Mazinho and St. Joa de Foz having -surrendered, Franceschi’s cavalry crossed the Douro, -took post ten miles in advance on the Coimbra -road, and pushed patroles as far as the Vouga<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_236"></a>[236]</span> -river. To support this cavalry, general Mermet -occupied a position somewhat beyond the suburb of -Villa Nova. Oporto itself was held by three -brigades. The dragoons of Lorge were sent to -Villa da Conde, a walled town, situated at the -mouth of the Ave; and general Caulaincourt was -detached up the Douro to Penafiel, with a brigade of -cavalry, having orders to clear the valley of the Tamega. -Another brigade of cavalry was posted on -the road leading to Barca de Trofa, to protect the rear -of the army; and general Heudelet was directed to -forward the hospitals from Braga to Oporto, but to -hold himself in readiness to open the communication -with Tuy.</p> - -<p>These dispositions made, Soult had leisure to -consider his general position. The flight of the -bishop had not much abated the hostility of the -people, nor relieved the French from their difficulties. -The communication with the Minho was -still intercepted; the Tras os Montes was again in -a state of insurrection; and Sylveira, with a corps of -eight thousand men, not only commanded the valley -of the Tamega, but had advanced, after re-taking -Chaves, into the Entre Minho e Douro, and was -posted between the Sierra de Catalina and the Douro.</p> - -<p>Lisbon, the ultimate object of the campaign, -was two hundred miles distant, and covered by a -British army, whose valour was to be dreaded, and -whose numbers were daily increasing. A considerable -body of natives were with Trant upon the -Vouga, and Beresford’s force between the Tagus -and the Mondego: its disorderly and weak condition -being unknown, appeared formidable at a -distance.</p> - -<p>The day on which the second corps, following<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_237"></a>[237]</span> -the emperor’s instructions, should have reached -Lisbon was overpassed by six weeks; and, as the -line of correspondence with Victor was uncertain, -his co-operation could scarcely be calculated upon. -Lapisse’s division was yet unfelt as an aiding force; -nor was it even known to Soult that he still remained -at Salamanca: finally, the three thousand men -expected from the Astorga country, under the -conduct of the marshal’s brother, had not yet been -heard of.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the duke of Dalmatia had -conquered a large and rich city: he had gained -the military command of a very fertile country, -from whence the principal supplies of the British -army and of Lisbon were derived: he had obtained -a secure base of operations and a prominent station -in the kingdom; and if the people’s fierceness was -not yet quelled, they had learned to dread his -talents, and to be sensible of their own inferiority -in battle.</p> - -<p>In this state of affairs, judging that the most -important objects were to relieve the garrison of -Tuy and to obtain intelligence of Lapisse’s division, -Soult entrusted the first to Heudelet and the second -to Franceschi. The last-named general had occupied -Feira and Oliveira, and spread his posts along -the Vouga; but the inhabitants fled to the other -side of that river, and the rich valleys beyond were -protected by colonel Trant.</p> - -<p>This officer, well known to the Portuguese as -having commanded their troops at Roriça and -Vimiero, was at Coimbra when intelligence of the -defeat at Braga arrived, and he immediately took -the command of all the armed men in that town, -among which was a small body of volunteers, students<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_238"></a>[238]</span> -at the university. The general dismay and -confusion being greatly increased by the subsequent -catastrophe at Oporto, the fugitives from that town -and other places, accustomed to violence, and attributing -every misfortune to treachery in the generals, -flocked to Trant’s standard; and he, as a -foreigner, was enabled to assume an authority that -no native of rank durst either have accepted or -refused without imminent danger.</p> - -<p>He advanced, at first, with about eight hundred -men to Sardao and Aveiro, where he was joined by -the conde Barbaceña with some Portuguese cavalry, -and by generals Victoria and Eben; but the people -regarded these officers with suspicion, and Trant -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_III">Appendix, No. 3</a>, section 6.</span> -continued in the command, his force daily increasing -by the arrival of <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i>, and even by -regular troops, who, quitting their quarters, abandoned -Beresford’s army to join him.</p> - -<p>When Franceschi advanced, Trant sent a detachment -by Castanheira to occupy the bridge of the -Vouga; but the men, seized with a panic, dispersed, -and this was followed by the desertion of many -thousand <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i>,—a happy circumstance, for -the numbers that had at first collected behind the -Vouga exceeded twelve thousand men, and their -extreme violence and insubordination excited the -utmost terror, and impeded the measures necessary -for defence. Trant, finally, retained about four -thousand men, with which he imposed upon the -French, and preserved a fruitful country from their -incursions; but he was greatly distressed for money, -because the bishop of Oporto, in his flight, laid -hands on all that was at Coimbra and carried it to -Lisbon.</p> - -<p>Franceschi, although reinforced with a brigade<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_239"></a>[239]</span> -of infantry, contented himself with chasing some -insurgents that infested his left flank, while his -patroles and scouts, sent forward on the side of -Viseu, endeavoured to obtain information of Lapisse’s -division; but that general, as we have seen, -was still beyond the Agueda, and while Franceschi -was thus employed in front of the French army, -Caulaincourt’s cavalry on the Tamega was pressed -by the Portuguese, and Loison marched with a -brigade of infantry to his assistance on the 9th of -April.</p> - -<p>Sylveira, however, was too strong for both; and, on -the 12th, advancing from Canavezes, obliged Loison, -after a slight action, to take post behind the Souza.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Heudelet was hastening towards Tuy -to recover the artillery and depôts, from which the -army had now been separated forty days.</p> - -<p>The 6th of April, general Lorge, who had taken -Villa de Conde and cleared the coast, joined Heudelet -at Bacellos. The 7th they marched to Ponte -de Lima; but the Portuguese resisted the passage -vigourously, and it was not forced until the 8th.</p> - -<p>The 10th the French arrived in front of Valença, -on the Minho; this fortress had been maltreated by -the fire from Tuy, and the garrison, amounting to -two hundred men, having only two days’ provisions, -capitulated, on condition of being allowed to retire -to their homes; but, before the French could take -possession, the capitulating troops disbanded and -the town was deserted.</p> - -<p>The garrison in Tuy, never having received the -slightest intelligence of the army since the separation -at Ribidavia, marvelled that the fire from -Valença was discontinued; and their surprise was -extreme when they beheld the French colours flying<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_240"></a>[240]</span> -in that fort, and observed French videttes on the -left bank of the Minho.</p> - -<p>La Martiniere’s garrison, by the arrival of stragglers -and a battalion of detachments that followed -the army from St. Jago, had been increased to three -thousand four hundred men; but twelve hundred -were in hospital, and two-thirds of the artillery-horses -had been eaten in default of other food. -The Portuguese had passed the Minho, and, in -conjunction with the Spaniards, attacked the place -on the 15th of March; but the French general, by -frequent sallies, obliged them to keep up a distant -blockade, and his fire mastered that from Valença.</p> - -<p>The 22d of March, the defeat at Braga being -known, the Portuguese repassed the Minho, the -Spaniards dispersed, and La Martiniere immediately -sent three hundred men to bring off the garrison -of Vigo; but it was too late, that place was taken, -and the detachment with difficulty regained Tuy.</p> - -<p>The peasants on the Arosa Estuary had, as I -have before noticed, risen, the 27th of February, -while Soult was still at Orense; they were headed, -at first, by general Silva and by the count de Mezeda, -and, finally, a colonel Barrois, sent by the -central junta, took the command. As their numbers -were very considerable, Barrois with one part -attacked Tuy; and Silva assisted by the Lively and -Venus, British frigates on that station, invested -Vigo.</p> - -<p><ins class="corr" id="tn-240" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'The garison of the'"> -The garrison of the</ins> latter place was at first small; -but the paymaster-general of the second corps, instead -of proceeding to Tuy, entered Vigo, with the military -chest and an escort of eight hundred men, and -was blockaded there. After some slight attacks had -been repulsed, the French governor negotiated for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_241"></a>[241]</span> -a capitulation on the 23d of March; but, distrustful -of the peasantry, he was still undecided on the -26th. Meanwhile, some of Romana’s stragglers -coming from the Val des Orres, collected between -Tuy and Vigo; and don Pablo Murillo, a regular -officer, assembling fifteen hundred retired soldiers, -joined the blockading force, and, in concert with -Captain Mackinley, of the Lively, obliged the -garrison to surrender on terms.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Captain -Mackinley’s -Despatch.</div> - -<p>The 27th, thirteen hundred men and officers, including -three hundred sick, marched out with the -honours of war; and, having laid down their arms -on the glacis, were embarked for an English port, -according to the articles agreed upon. Four hundred -and forty-seven horses, sixty-two covered waggons, -some stores, and the military chest, containing -five thousand pounds, fell into the victor’s hands; -and this affair being happily terminated, the Spaniards -renewed their attack on Tuy: the Portuguese -once more crossed the Minho, and the siege continued -until the 10th of April, when the place was -relieved by Heudelet. The depôts and the artillery -were immediately transported across the river, and -directed upon Oporto.</p> - -<p>The 12th, general Maucune, with a division of -the sixth corps, arrived at Tuy, with the intention -of carrying off the garrison, but seeing that the -place was relieved, returned the next day. Heudelet, -having taken Viana, and the fort of Insoa, at -the mouth of the Minho, placed a small garrison in -the former; and then blowing up the works of -Valença, retired to Braga and Bacellos, sending -Lorge again to Villa de Conde.</p> - -<p>The sick men were transported in boats along -shore, from the mouth of the Minho to Viana, Villa<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_242"></a>[242]</span> -de Conde, and thence to Oporto; and while these -transactions were taking place on the Minho, La -Houssaye, with a brigade of dragoons and one -of infantry, scoured the country between the -Lima and the Cavado, and so protected the rear of -Heudelet.</p> - -<p>All resistance in the Entre Minho e Douro now -ceased; for, at this period, the influence of the -<em>Anti-Braganza</em> party was exerted in favour of the -French. But on the Tras os Montes side, Sylveira -being joined by general Boteilho, from the Lima, -was advancing, and boasted that he would be in -Oporto the 15th: and now, also, intelligence of the -recapture of Chaves reaching Soult, not only explained -Sylveira’s boldness, but shewed, that, while -the latter was in arms, the tranquillity of the Entre -Minho e Douro could be only momentary. Wherefore, -Laborde, with a brigade of infantry, was ordered -to join Loison, and attack Amarante; while La -Houssaye pushed through Guimaraens upon the -same point.</p> - -<p>The 15th, Laborde reached Penafiel; and Sylveira, -hearing of La Houssaye’s march, retired to -Villamea. The 18th, Laborde drove back the Portuguese -without difficulty; and their retreat soon -became a flight. Sylveira himself passed the Tamega -at Amarante, and was making for the mountains, -without a thought of defending that town; but -colonel Patrick, a British officer in the Portuguese -service, encouraging his battalion, faced about, and -rallying the fugitives, beat back the foremost of the -enemy. This becoming act obliged Sylveira to -return; and while Patrick defended the approaches -to the bridge on the right bank with obstinate valour, -the former took a position, with five or six thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_243"></a>[243]</span> -men, on the heights overhanging the suburb of Villa -Real, on the left bank of the river.</p> - -<p>The 19th, La Houssaye arrived; and the French -renewing their attack on the town, Patrick again -baffled their efforts; but when that gallant man fell -mortally wounded, and was carried across the bridge, -the defence slackened, and the Portuguese went over -the Tamega: the passage of the river was, however, -still to be effected.</p> - -<p>The bridges of Mondin and Cavez above, and -that of Canavezas below Amarante, were destroyed: -the Tamega was in full flood, and running in a deep -rocky bed; and the bridge in front of the French -was mined, barred with three rows of pallisades, and -commanded by a battery of ten guns. The Portuguese -were in position on the heights behind; from -whence they could discern all that was passing at -the bridge, and could reinforce at will the advanced -guard, which was posted in the suburb.</p> - - -<h4>PASSAGE OF THE TAMEGA, AT AMARANTE.</h4> - -<p>The 20th, the first barricade was reached by the -flying sap; but the fire of the Portuguese was so -deadly, that Laborde abandoned the attack, and -endeavoured to construct a bridge on tressels half a -mile below: this failed, and the efforts against the -stone bridge were of necessity renewed. The mine -at the other side was ingeniously formed; the muzzle -of a loaded musket entered the chamber, and a string -being tied at one end to the trigger, the other end -was brought behind the entrenchments, so that an -explosion could be managed with the greatest precision -as to time.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Noble’s -Campagne -de Galice.</div> - -<p>The 27th, the centre barricade was burnt by -captain Brochard, an engineer officer, who devised<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_244"></a>[244]</span> -a method of forcing the passage, so singularly bold, -that all the generals, and especially general Foy, -were opposed to it. The plan was, however, transmitted -to Oporto; and Soult sent general Hulot, his -first aide-de-camp, to report if the project was feasible. -Hulot approved of Brochard’s proposal, and the -latter commenced his operations on the 2d of May.</p> - -<p>The troops were under arms, and disposed in the -most convenient manner, as near the head of the -bridge as the necessity of keeping them hidden -would permit; and at eight o’clock, all being prepared, -and the moon shining bright, twenty men -were sent a little below the bridge, and directed to -open an oblique fire of musketry against the entrenchments. -This being replied to, and the attention -of the Portuguese attracted, a sapper, dressed -in dark grey, crawled out, and pushed with his head -a barrel of powder, which was likewise enveloped -in grey cloth to deaden the sound, along that side -of the bridge which was darkened by the shadow of -the parapet: when he had placed his barrel against -the entrenchment covering the Portuguese mine, he -retired in the same manner. Two others followed -in succession, and retired without being discovered; -but the fourth, after placing the barrel, rose on his -feet <ins class="corr" id="tn-244" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'and run back'"> -and ran back</ins>, but was immediately shot at and -wounded.</p> - -<p>The fire of the Portuguese was now directed on -the bridge itself; but as the barrels were not discovered, -after a time it ceased; and a fifth sapper -advancing like the others, attached a sausage seventy -yards long to the barrels. At two o’clock in the -morning the whole was completed; and as the French -kept very quiet, the Portuguese remained tranquil -and unsuspicious.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_245"></a>[245]</span></p> - -<p>Brochard had calculated that the effect of four -barrels exploding together would destroy the Portuguese -entrenchments, and burn the cord attached to -their mine. The event proved that he was right; -for a thick fog arising about three o’clock, the sausage -was fired, and the explosion made a large -breach. Brochard, with his sappers, instantly jumped -on to the bridge, threw water into the mine, cut -away all obstacles, and, followed by a column of -grenadiers, was at the other side before the smoke -cleared away. The grenadiers being supported by -other troops, not only the suburb, but the camp on -the height behind were carried without a check, -and the Portuguese dispersing, fled over the mountains.</p> - -<p>The execution of captain Brochard’s bold, ingenious, -and successful project, cost only seven or -eight men killed; while in the former futile attempts -above a hundred and eighty men, besides many -engineer and artillery officers, had fallen. It is, -however, a singular fact that there was a practicable -ford near the bridge, unguarded, and apparently -unknown to both sides.</p> - -<p>A short time after the passage of the Tamega, -general Heudelet, marching from Braga by Guimaraens, -entered Amarante. Laborde occupied the -position abandoned by Sylveira, and detachments -were sent up the left bank of the river to Mondin: -but Loison pursued the fugitives to the heights of -Villa Real and Mezamfrio. The Portuguese -guarding the passage at Canavezas, hearing of the -action, destroyed their ammunition, and retired -across the Douro without being overtaken.</p> - -<p>The 6th of May, the French were near Villa Real -and Mezamfrio, but all the inhabitants had crossed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_246"></a>[246]</span> -the Douro. This being made known to Soult, he -reinforced Loison, and directed him to scour the right -bank of the Douro as high as Pezo de Ragoa; to -complete the destruction of Sylveira’s army, and -to send patroles towards Braganza, with the view of -subduing the Tras os Montes, and of ascertaining if -any French troops had made their appearance there; -for Bessieres had been requested to make a diversion -on that side. Bessieres himself had returned to -France, but the reply of his successor Kellerman -being intercepted, it appeared that he was unable -or unwilling to afford any aid.</p> - -<p>General Laborde was now recalled, with two -regiments of infantry, to Oporto; and the communication -between that town and Amarante was -guarded by a brigade of dragoons, and a regiment -of infantry. Meanwhile, Loison felt the Portuguese -at Pezo de Ragoa, on the 7th of May; but, meeting -resistance, and observing a considerable movement -on the opposite bank of the Douro, he became -alarmed, and fell back the same day to Mezamfrio. -The next morning he returned to Amarante, his -march being harassed by the peasantry, who came -on with a boldness shewing that some extraordinary -support was at hand; and, in truth, a new actor -had appeared upon the scene; the whole country -was in commotion; and Soult, suddenly checked -in his career, was pushed backward by a strong -and eager hand.</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.—SPANISH OPERATION.</h4> - -<p>1º.—The great pervading error of the Spaniards -in this campaign was the notion that their armies -were capable of taking the lead in offensive movements, -and fighting the French in open countries;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_247"></a>[247]</span> -whereas, to avoid general actions should have been -a vital principle.</p> - -<p>2º.—The resolution to fight the French having, -however, been adopted, the second great error was -the attaching equal importance to the lines of operation -in La Mancha and Estremadura; the one -should have been considered only as an accessory; -and it is evident that the first rank belonged to -La Mancha, because it was in a more open country; -because it more immediately threatened Madrid; -and because a defeat there endangered Seville more -than a defeat in Estremadura would have done. In -La Mancha the beaten army must have fallen back -upon Seville: but in Estremadura it might retire -upon Badajos. But, the latter place being to the -Spaniards of infinitely less importance than Madrid -was to their opponents, the lead in the campaign -must always have belonged to the army of La -Mancha, which could, at any time, have obliged the -French to fight a battle in defence of the capital.</p> - -<p>The army of Estremadura might, therefore, have -been safely reduced to fifteen thousand men, provided -the army of La Mancha had been increased -to forty or fifty thousand: and it would appear that, -with a very little energy, the junta could have -provided a larger force. It is true that they would -have been beaten just the same: but that is an -argument against fighting great battles, which was, -certainly, the worst possible plan for the Spaniards -to pursue.</p> - -<p>3º.—The third great error was the inertness of -Valencia and Murcia, or rather their hostility: for -they were upon the verge of civil war with the -supreme junta. Those provinces, so rich and -populous, had been unmolested for eight months;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_248"></a>[248]</span> -they had suffered nothing from Moncey’s irruption; -and they had received large succours from the -English government. Valencia had written her -pretensions to patriotism in the bloody characters -of assassination; but, were it not for the force under -Llamas which, after the defeat of Tudela, helped -to defend Zaragoza, Valencia and Murcia might -have been swallowed up by the ocean without any -sensible effect upon the general cause. Those countries -were, however, admirably situated to serve as -a support to Aragon, Catalonia, Andalusia, and -La Mancha, and they could, at this time, have -<ins class="corr" id="tn-248" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'paralized a large'"> -paralyzed a large</ins> French force, by marching an -army to San Clemente.</p> - -<p>It was the dread of their doing so that made the -king restrain Sebastiani from pursuing his victory -<span class="sidenote">Parl. Papers, 1810.</span> -at Ciudad Real; and, assuredly, the Valencians -should have moved; for, it is not so much in their -numbers as in the variety of their lines of operation -that a whole people find their advantage in opposing -regular armies. This, the observation of that -profound and original writer, general Lloyd, was -confirmed by the practice of Napoleon, in Spain.</p> - - -<h4>FRENCH OPERATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º.—To get possession of Seville and Cadiz was -certainly as great an object to Napoleon as to seize -Lisbon: but the truth of the maxim quoted above -regulated the emperor’s proceedings. If Victor -had been directed at once upon Andalusia, the -Portuguese and Valencians could have carried their -lines of operations directly upon his flanks and -rear. If Badajos and Lisbon had been the objects -of his march, the Andalusians could have fallen on -his left flank and cut his communications. But all<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_249"></a>[249]</span> -such dangers were avoided by the march of Soult -and Lapisse; their direction was not only concentric, -but a regular prolongation of the great line of communication -with France. Ney protected the rear -of one; Bessieres the rear of the other; and those -two marshals, at the same time, separated and cut -off the Asturias from the rest of Spain; thus, all -that was formidable was confined to the south of -the Tagus.</p> - -<p>For the same reason the course of conquest was -to have proceeded from Portugal to Andalusia, -which would then have been assailed in front and -flank at one moment, while the fourth corps held -the Valencians in check. By this plan the French -would never have lost their central position, nor -exposed their grand line of communication to an -attack.</p> - -<p>2º.—That this plan, so wisely conceived in its -general bearing, should fail without any of the different -corps employed having suffered a defeat, nay, -when they were victorious in all quarters is surprising, -but not inexplicable. It is clear that Napoleon’s -orders were given at a time when he did not -expect that a battle would have been fought at -Coruña, or that the second corps would have suffered -so much from the severity of the weather, -and the length of the marches, neither did he anticipate -the resistance that was made by the Portuguese, -between the Minho and the Douro. The last -error was a consequence of the first, for his plans -were calculated upon the supposition that the rapidity -of Soult’s movements would forestall all defence; -yet the delay cannot be charged as a fault -to that marshal whose energy was conspicuous.</p> - -<p>3º.—Napoleon’s attention, divided between Austria<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_250"></a>[250]</span> -and Spain, must have been somewhat distracted -by the multiplicity of his affairs. He does not seem -to have made allowance for the very rugged country -through which Soult had to march, at a time when -all the rivers and streams were overflowing, from the -constant rains; and as the combinations of war are -continually changing, the delay thus occasioned -rendered Lapisse’s instructions faulty: for, although -it be true, that if the latter had <ins class="corr" id="tn-250" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'marched by Guarda'"> -marched by Guardia</ins>, upon Abrantes, while Soult advanced to Lisbon, by -Coimbra, and that Victor entered the Alemtejo, Portugal -would have been conquered without difficulty; -yet the combination was so wide, and the communications -so uncertain, that unity of action could not -be insured. Soult, weakened by the obstacles -he encountered, required reinforcements after the -taking of Oporto; and Lapisse should have considered -himself as rather belonging to Soult than -Victor, and have marched upon Viseu; the duke -of Dalmatia would then have been strong enough to -fight his own battle without regard to the operations -in the Alemtejo.</p> - -<p>4º.—The first error of the French, if the facts are -correctly shewn, must, therefore, be attributed to -Napoleon, because he overlooked the probable -chances of delay, combined the operations on too -wide a scale, and gave Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, -instead of Lamego and Viseu, for the direction -of Lapisse’s march. I say, if the facts are correctly -shewn, for it is scarcely discreet to censure -Napoleon’s military dispositions, however erroneous -they may <em>appear</em> to have been, and it is certain that, -in this case, his errors, if errors they were, although -sufficient to embarrass his lieutenants, will not account -for their entire failure. Above sixty thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_251"></a>[251]</span> -men were put in motion by him, upon good general -principles, for the subjugation of Lisbon; and we -must search in the particular conduct of the generals -for the reason why <em>a project of Napoleon’s, to be -executed by sixty thousand French veterans, should -have ended as idly and ineffectually as if it had been -concocted by the Spanish junta</em>.</p> - - -<h4 class="lht lsp2">OBSERVATIONS ON THE SEPARATE OPERATIONS -OF LAPISSE, VICTOR, SOULT, ROMANA, SYLVEIRA, -AND CUESTA.</h4> - - -<h4>LAPISSE.</h4> - -<p>1º.—An intercepted letter of general Maupetit, -shews the small pains taken by Lapisse to communicate -with Soult. He directs that <em>even so many</em> as -three hundred men should patrole towards Tras os -Montes, to obtain information of the second corps, -at a time when the object was so important that -his whole force should have moved in mass rather -than have failed of intelligence.</p> - -<p>2º.—The manner in which he suffered sir Robert -Wilson to gather strength and to insult his -outposts was inexcusable. He might have marched -straight upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and -dispersed every thing in his front; one of those fortresses -would probably have fallen, if not both, and -from thence a strong detachment pushed towards -Lamego would not only have ascertained the situation -of the second corps, but would have greatly -aided its progress by threatening Oporto and Braga. -It cannot be urged that Salamanca required the -presence of a large force, because, in that open -country, the people were at the mercy of Bessiere’s -cavalry; and so sensible were the local junta of this, -that both Salamanca and Ledesma refused assistance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_252"></a>[252]</span> -from Ciudad Rodrigo, when it was offered, and -preferred a quiet submission.</p> - -<p>3º.—When, at last, the king’s reiterated orders -obliged Lapisse to put his troops in motion, he made -a demonstration against Ciudad Rodrigo, so feeble -that it scarcely called the garrison to the ramparts, -and then as if all chance of success in Portugal was -at an end, breaking through the pass of Perales, he -reached Alcantara and rejoined the first corps; a -movement equally at variance with Napoleon’s -orders and with good military discretion; for the -first directed him upon Abrantes, and the second -would have carried him upon Viseu. The march -to the latter place, while it insured a junction with -Soult, would not have prevented an after movement -upon Abrantes: the obstacles were by no means -so great as those which awaited him on the march -to Alcantara, and the great error of abandoning the -whole country, between the Tagus and the Douro, -to the insurgents would have been avoided.</p> - -<p>Here then was one direct cause of failure; but -the error, although great, was not irreparable. If -Soult was abandoned to his own resources, he had -also obtained a firm and important position in the -north, while Victor, reinforced by ten thousand -men, was enabled to operate against Lisbon, by the -Alemtejo, more efficaciously than before. But -Victor seems to have been less disposed than -Lapisse to execute his instructions.</p> - - -<h4>VICTOR.</h4> - -<p>1º.—The inactivity of this marshal after the rout -of Ucles has been already mentioned. It is certain -that if the fourth and first corps had been well -handled, neither Cuesta nor Cartoajal could have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_253"></a>[253]</span> -ventured beyond the defiles of the Sierra Morena, -much less have bearded the French generals and -established a line of defence along the Tagus. -Fifty thousand French troops should, in two months, -have done something more than maintain fifty miles -of country on one side of Madrid.</p> - -<p>2º.—The passage of the Tagus was successful, -but can hardly be called a skilful operation, unless -the duke of Belluno calculated upon the ignorance -of his adversary. Before an able general and a -moveable army, possessing a pontoon train, it -would have scarcely answered to separate the troops -in three divisions on an extent of fifty miles, leaving -the artillery and parc of ammunition, protected only -by some cavalry and one battalion of infantry, -within two hours march of the enemy, for three -days. If Cuesta had brought up all his detachments, -the Meza d’Ibor might have been effectually -manned, and yet ten thousand infantry, and all the -Spanish cavalry, spared to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, -on the 17th; in this case Victor’s artillery -would probably have been captured, and his project -certainly baffled.</p> - -<p>3º.—The passage of the Tagus being, however, -effected, Victor not only permitted Cuesta to escape, -but actually lost all traces of his army, an evident -fault not to be excused by pleading the impediments -arising from the swelling of the river, the necessity -of securing the communications, &c. If Cuesta’s -power was despised before the passage of the river, -when his army was whole and his position strong, -there could be no reason for such great circumspection -after his defeat, a circumspection, too, not -supported by skill, as the dispersed state of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_254"></a>[254]</span> -French army, the evening before the battle of -Medellin, proves.</p> - -<p>4º.—That Victor was enabled to fight Cuesta, on -the morning of the 28th, with any prospect of -success, must be attributed rather to fortune than -to talent. It was a fault to permit the Spaniards to -retake the offensive after the defeat on the Tagus; -nor can the first movement of the duke of Belluno -in the action be praised. He should have marched -into the plain in a compact order of battle. The -danger of sending Lassalle and Latour Maubourg -to such a distance from the main body I shall have -occasion to show in my observations on Cuesta’s -operations; but, the after-movements of the French -in this battle were well and rapidly combined and -vigorously executed, and the success was proportionate -to the ability displayed.</p> - -<p>5º.—The battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, -which utterly destroyed the Spanish armies and -laid Seville and Badajos open; those battles, in -which blood was spilt like water, produced no result -to the victors, for the French generals, as if -they had struck a torpedo, never stretched forth -their hands a second time. Sebastiani, indeed, -wished to penetrate the Sierra Morena; but the -king, fearful of the Valencians, restrained him. -On the other hand, Joseph urged Victor to invade -the Alemtejo, yet the latter would not obey, even -when reinforced by Lapisse’s division. This was -the great and fatal error of the whole campaign, -for nearly all the disposable British and Portuguese -troops were thus enabled to move against the duke -of Dalmatia, while the duke of Belluno contrived -neither to fulfil the instructions of Napoleon, nor the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_255"></a>[255]</span> -orders of the king, nor yet to perform any useful -achievement himself.</p> - -<p>He did not assist the invasion of Portugal, he -did not maintain Estremadura, he did not take -Seville, nor even prevent Cuesta from twice renewing -the offensive; yet he remained in an unhealthy -situation until he lost more men, by sickness, than -would have furnished three such battles as Medellin. -Two months so unprofitably wasted by a -general, at the head of thirty thousand good troops, -can scarcely be cited. The duke of Belluno’s reputation -has been too hardly earned to attribute -this inactivity to want of talent. That he was -averse to aid the operations of marshal Soult is -evident, and, most happily for Portugal, it was so; -but, whether this aversion arose from personal jealousy, -from indisposition to obey the king, or from -a mistaken view of affairs, I have no means of -judging.</p> - - -<h4>CUESTA.</h4> - -<p>Cuesta’s peculiar unfitness for the lead of an -army has been remarked more than once. It remains -to show that his proceedings, on this occasion, -continued to justify those remarks.</p> - -<p>1º.—To defend a river, on a long line, is generally -hopeless, and especially when the defenders -have not the means of passing freely, in several -places, to the opposite bank. Alexander, Hannibal, -Cæsar, Gustavus, Turenne, Napoleon, Wellington, -and hundreds of others have shown how the passage -of rivers may be won. Umenes, who prevented -Antigonus from passing the Coprates, is, perhaps, -the only example of a general baffling the efforts<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_256"></a>[256]</span> -of a skilful and enterprising enemy in such an -attempt.</p> - -<p>2º.—The defence of rivers having always proved -fruitless, it follows that no general should calculate -upon success, and that he should exert the greatest -energy, activity, and vigilance to avoid a heavy -disaster; that all his lines of retreat should be kept -free and open, and be concentric; and that to bring -his magazines and depôts close up to the army, in -such a situation, is rashness itself. Now Cuesta -was inactive, and, disregarding the maxim which -forbids the establishment of magazines in the first -line of defence, brought up the whole of his to -Deleyton and Truxillo. His combinations were ill-arranged; -he abandoned Mirabete without an effort, -his depôts fell into the hands of the enemy, and his -retreat was confused and eccentric, inasmuch as -part of his army retired into the Guadalupe, while -others went to Merida, and he himself to Medellin.</p> - -<p>3º.—The line of retreat upon Medellin and Campanarios, -instead of Badajos, being determined by -the necessity of uniting with Albuquerque, cannot -be blamed, and the immediate return to Medellin -was bold and worthy of praise, but its merit consisted -in recovering the offensive immediately after -a defeat; wherefore, Cuesta should not have halted -at Medellin, thus giving the lead again to the -French general; he should have continued to advance, -and have fallen upon the scattered divisions -of the French army, endeavouring to beat them in -detail, and to rally his own detachments in the -Sierra de Guadalupe. The error of stopping short -at Medellin would have been apparent, if Victor, -placing a rear-guard to amuse the Spanish general,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_257"></a>[257]</span> -had taken the road to Seville by Almendralejos and -Zafra.</p> - -<p>4º. Cuesta’s general design for the battle of -Medellin was well imagined, that is, it was right -to hide his army behind the ridge, and to defer the -attack until the enemy had developed his force and -order of battle in the plain, but the execution was -on the lowest scale. If, instead of advancing in -one long and weak line, without a reserve, Cuesta -had held the greatest part of his troops in solid -columns, and thrust them between Lassalle and -Latour Maubourg’s divisions, which were pushed -out like horns from the main body of the French, -those generals would have been cut off, and the -battle commenced by dividing the French army -into three unconnected masses, while the Spaniards -would have been compact, well in hand, and masters -of the general movements. Nothing could then -have saved Victor, except hard fighting; but Cuesta’s -actual dispositions rendered it impossible for the -Spaniards to win the battle by courage, or to escape -the pursuit by swiftness.</p> - -<p>5º. It is remarkable that the Spanish general -seems never to have thought of putting Truxillo, -Guadalupe, Merida, Estrella, or Medellin in a state -of defence, although most if not all those places -had some castle or walls capable of resisting a -sudden assault. There was time to do it, for Cuesta -remained unmolested, on the Tagus, from January -to the middle of March; and every additional point -of support thus obtained for an undisciplined army -would have diminished the advantages derived by -the French from their superior facility of movement. -The places themselves might have been garrisoned -by the citizens and peasantry, and a week’s, a day’s,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_258"></a>[258]</span> -nay, even an hour’s, delay was of importance to a -force like Cuesta’s, which, from its inexperience, -must have always been liable to confusion.</p> - - -<h4>SOULT.</h4> - -<p>1º. The march of this general in one column, upon -Tuy, was made under the impression that resistance -would not be offered; otherwise, it is probable that -a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry would -have been sent from St. Jago or Mellid direct upon -Orense, to insure the passage of the Minho; and it -seems to have been an error in Ney, arising, probably, -from the same cause, not to have kept Marchand’s -division of the sixth corps at Orense until -the second corps had effected an entrance into -Portugal.</p> - -<p>2º. Soult’s resolution to place the artillery and -stores in Tuy, and march into Portugal, trusting to -victory for re-opening the communication, would -increase the reputation of any general. Three times -before he reached Oporto he was obliged to halt, -in order to fabricate cartridges for the infantry, from -the powder taken in battle; and his whole progress -from Tuy to that city was energetic and able in the -extreme.</p> - -<p>3º. The military proceedings, after the taking of -Oporto, do not all bear the same stamp. The -administration of the civil affairs appears to have -engrossed the marshal’s attention; and his absence -from the immediate scene of action sensibly affected -the operations. Franceschi shewed too much respect -for Trant’s corps. Loison’s movements were timid -and slow; and even Laborde’s genius seems to have -been asleep. The importance of crushing Sylveira -was obvious. Now, there is nothing more necessary<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_259"></a>[259]</span> -in war than to strike with all the force you can at -once; but here Caulaincourt was first sent, and -being too weak, Loison reinforced him, and Laborde -reinforced Loison; and all were scarcely sufficient -at last to do that which half would have done at -first; but the whole of these transactions are obscure. -The great delay that took place before the bridge of -Amarante; the hesitation and frequent recurrence -for orders to the marshal, indicate want of zeal, -and a desire to procrastinate, in opposition to Soult’s -wishes. Judging from Mr. Noble’s history of the -campaign, this must be traced to a conspiracy in -the French army, which shall be touched upon -hereafter.</p> - -<p>4º. The resistance made by the Portuguese peasantry -was infinitely creditable to their courage; but -there cannot be a stronger proof of the inefficacy of -a like defence, when unsupported by good troops. -No country is more favourable to such a warfare -than the northern provinces of Portugal; the people -were brave, and they had the assistance of the organized -forces under Romana, Sylveira, Eben, and -the bishop: yet we find, that Soult, in the very -worst season of the year, overcame all resistance, -and penetrated to Oporto, without an actual loss, in -killed, wounded, and prisoners, of more than two -thousand five hundred men, including the twelve -hundred sick, captured at Chaves.</p> - - -<h4>ROMANA.</h4> - -<p>1º. Romana remained at Oimbra and Monterey, -unmolested, from the 21st of January to the 6th of -March; he had, therefore, time to reorganise his -forces, and he had, in fact, ten thousand regular -troops in tolerable order. He knew, on the 11th or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_260"></a>[260]</span> -12th, that Soult was preparing to pass the Minho, -between Tuy and Guardia. He knew, also, that the -people of Ribidavia and Orense were in arms; that -those on the Arosa were preparing to rise; and that, -consequently, the French must, were it only from -want of food, break out of the contracted position -they occupied, either by Ribidavia and Orense, or -by crossing the Minho, or by retreating to St. Jago.</p> - -<p>With these guides, the path of the Spanish general -was as plain as the writing on the wall; he was at -the head of ten thousand regular troops; two -marches would have brought him to Ribidavia, in -front of which town he might have occupied a position -close on the left flank of the French, rallied all -the insurgents about him, and have organized a -formidable warfare. The French durst not have -attempted the passage of the Minho while he was -in front of Ribidavia; and if they turned against -him, the place was favourable for battle, and the -retreat open by Orense and Monterey; while the -difficulty of bringing up artillery would hamper the -pursuit. On the other hand, if Soult had retreated, -that alone would have been tantamount to a victory; -and Romana would have been well placed to follow -upon the rear of the French, connecting himself -with the English vessels of war upon that coast as -he advanced.</p> - -<p>2º. So far from contemplating operations of this -nature, Romana did not even concentrate his force; -but keeping it extended, in small parties, along -fifteen miles of country, indulged himself in speculations -about his enemy’s weakness, and the prospect -of their retreating altogether from the Peninsula; -until he was roused from his reveries, by finding his -divisions beaten in detail, and himself forced either<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_261"></a>[261]</span> -to join the Portuguese with whom he was quarrelling, -or to break his promises to Sylveira and fly by -cross roads over the mountain on his right: he -adopted the latter, thus proving, that whatever -might be his resources for raising an insurrection, -he could not direct one; and that he was, although -brave and active, totally destitute of military talent. -At a later period of the war, the duke of Wellington, -after a long and fruitless military discussion, -drily observed, that either Romana or himself had -mistaken their profession. Time has since shewn -which.</p> - - -<h4>SYLVEIRA.</h4> - -<p>1º. This Portuguese general’s first operations were -as ill conducted as Romana’s; his posts were too -extended; he made no attempt to repair the works -of Chaves, none to aid the important insurrection of -Ribidavia; but these errors cannot be fairly charged -upon him, as his officers were so unruly, that they -held a council of war per force, where thirty voted -for fighting at Chaves, and twenty-nine against it; -the casting voice being given by the voter calling -on the troops to follow him.</p> - -<p>2º. The after-movement, by which Chaves was -recaptured, whether devised by Sylveira himself, -or directed by marshal Beresford, was bold and -skilful; but the advance to Penafiel, while La -Houssaye and Heudelet could from Braga pass by -Guimaraens, and cut him off from Amarante, was -as rash as his subsequent flight was disgraceful. -Yet, thanks to the heroic courage of colonel Patrick, -Sylveira’s reputation as a general was established -among his countrymen, by the very action which -should have ruined him in their estimation.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_262"></a>[262]</span><br /></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_VIII">BOOK VIII.</h2> -</div> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BVIII_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - -<p>It will be remembered that the narrative of sir -John Cradock’s proceedings was discontinued at -the moment when that general, nothing shaken by -the importunities of the regency, the representations -of marshal Beresford, or the advice of Mr. Frere, -resolved to await at Lumiar for the arrival of the -promised reinforcements from England. While in -this position, he made every exertion to obtain -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_V">Appendix, No. 5</a>.</span> -transport for the supplies, remounts for the cavalry, -and draught animals for the artillery; but the Portuguese -government gave him no assistance, and an -attempt to procure horses and mules in Morocco -proving unsuccessful, the army was so scantily furnished -that, other reasons failing, this alone would -have prevented any advance towards the frontier.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s -Correspondence, -MSS.</div> - -<p>The singular inactivity of Victor surprised Cradock, -but did not alter his resolution; yet, being -continually importuned to advance, he, when assured -that five thousand men of the promised reinforcements -were actually off the rock of Lisbon, -held a council of war. All the generals were averse -to marching on Oporto, except Beresford, and he -admitted that its propriety depended on Victor’s -movements. Meanwhile, that marshal approached -Badajos; Lapisse came down upon the Agueda, and -Soult, having stormed Oporto, pushed his advanced -posts to the Vouga.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_263"></a>[263]</span></p> - -<div class="sidenote"><a href="#No_IV">Appendix, -No. 4</a>, section -1.</div> - -<p>A cry of treason then became general in Portugal, -and both the people and the soldiers evinced -a spirit truly alarming. The latter, disregarding the -authority of Beresford, and menacing their own -officers, declared that it was necessary to slay a -thousand traitors in Lisbon; and the regiments in -Abrantes even abandoned that post, and marched to -join Trant upon the Vouga. But, when these disorders -were at the worst, and when a vigorous -movement of Victor and Lapisse would have produced -fatal consequences, general Hill landed with -about five thousand men and three hundred artillery -horses. Cradock, then, resolved to advance, -moved thereto chiefly by the representations of -<span class="sidenote">Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.</span> -Beresford, who thought such a measure absolutely -necessary to restore confidence, to ensure the obedience -of the native troops, and to enable him to -take measures for the safety of Abrantes.</p> - -<p>Thus, about the time that Tuy was relieved by -the French, and that Sylveira was attacked at Penafiel -by Laborde, the English army was put in motion, -part upon Caldas and Obidos, part upon Rio -Mayor; and the campaign was actually commenced -by Cradock, when that general, although his measures -had been all approved of by his government, -was suddenly and unexpectedly required to surrender -his command to sir Arthur Wellesley, and to -proceed himself to Gibraltar.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><ins class="corr" id="tn-263" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Lord LonLondonderry'"> -Lord Londonderry</ins>’s Narrative.</div> - -<p>It would appear that this arrangement was adopted -after a struggle in the cabinet, and, certainly, neither -the particular choice nor the general principle -of employing men of talent without regard to seniority -can be censured; nevertheless, sir John -Cradock was used unworthily. A general of his -rank would never have accepted a command on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_264"></a>[264]</span> -such terms; and it was neither just nor decent to -expose him to an unmerited mortification.</p> - -<p>Before the arrival of his successor, Cradock assembled -the army at Leiria, and established his -magazines at Abrantes, Santarem, and Peniché; -but as the admiral fearing the difficult navigation -at that season, would not send victuallers to the -latter place, the magazines there were but scantily -supplied. Meanwhile Lapisse made way by Alcantara -to Merida, the re-capture of Chaves became -known, and the insurrection in Beira and Tras os -Montes took its full spring. Trant’s force also -increased on the Vouga, and Beresford, who had -succeeded in restoring order among the Portuguese -battalions, was more than ever urgent for an attack -upon Soult; but Cradock, unprovided with a due -proportion of cavalry, unable to procure provisions -or forage, and fearful for the safety of Lisbon, refused; -and the 24th of April, hearing that his successor -had arrived, he resigned the command and -repaired to Gibraltar.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley landed the 22d of April, -and, on the 24th, signified to the British ministers -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XV">Appendix, No. 15</a>.</span> -that, affairs being in the condition contemplated by -them, it was his intention to assume the command -of the army; a circumstance worthy of attention, -as indicating that the defence of Portugal was even -then considered a secondary object, and of uncertain -promise. The deliverance of the Peninsula -was never due to the foresight and perseverance of -the English ministers, but to the firmness and skill -of the British generals, and to the courage of troops -whom no dangers could daunt and no hardships -dishearten, while they remedied the eternal errors -of the cabinet.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_265"></a>[265]</span></p> - -<p>The unexpected arrival of a man known only as -a victorious commander created the greatest enthusiasm -in Portugal. The regency immediately nominated -him marshal-general of their troops. The -people, always fond of novelty, hailed his presence -with enthusiasm; and all those persons, whether -Portuguese or British, who had blamed sir John -Cradock’s prudent caution, now anticipating a change -of system, spake largely and confidently of the -future operations: in truth, all classes were greatly -excited, and an undefined yet powerful sentiment -that something great would soon be achieved pervaded -the public mind.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XVI">Appendix, -No. 16</a>.</div> - -<p>Sir Arthur’s plans were, however, neither hastily -adopted nor recklessly hurried forward; like Cradock, -he felt the danger of removing far from -Lisbon while Victor was on the Alemtejo frontier, -and he anxiously weighed his own resources against -those at the enemy’s disposal. Not that he wavered -between offensive and defensive movements, for a -general of his discernment could not fail to perceive -that, if the French were acting upon any concerted -plan, the false march of Lapisse to Merida had -marred their combinations, by placing a whole -nation, with all its fortresses and all its forces, -whether insurgents, regular troops, or auxiliaries, -between the armies of Victor and Soult, and that -neither concert nor communication could longer -exist between those marshals.</p> - -<p>Soult’s offensive strength, also, was evidently exhausted; -he might establish himself firmly in the -provinces beyond the Douro, but he could not, -alone, force his way to Lisbon, a distance of two -hundred miles, in a season when the waters were -full, and through a country tangled with rivers,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_266"></a>[266]</span> -mountains, and defiles. He could not hope, with -twenty-four thousand men, to beat a whole people -in arms, assisted by an auxiliary army of as high -reputation, and nearly as numerous as his own; -and, moreover, there were discontents and conspiracy -in his camp; and of this sir Arthur -was aware.</p> - -<p>Soult alone, then, was no longer formidable to -the capital; but that which weakened him increased -the offensive power of Victor, who was now at the -head of thirty thousand men, and might march -straight upon Lisbon, and through an open country, -the only barrier being the Tagus, a river fordable -in almost all seasons. Such a movement, or even -the semblance of it, must perforce draw the British -and native armies to that side; and then Soult, -coming down to the Mondego, might, from thence, -connect his operations with Victor’s by the line of -the Zezere, or advance at once on Lisbon as occasion -offered.</p> - -<p>Now, to meet the exigencies of the campaign, the -military resources of the English general were,—</p> - -<p>1º. His central position.</p> - -<p>2º. His own British and German troops, about -twenty-six thousand in number; of which the -present under arms, including sergeants,<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> amounted -to twenty-two thousand, with three thousand seven -hundred horses and mules.</p> - -<p>3º. <ins class="corr" id="tn-266" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'The Portugese troops'"> -The Portuguese troops</ins> of the line; of which -there might be organised and armed about sixteen -thousand.</p> - -<p>Nearly all these troops were already collected, or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_267"></a>[267]</span> -capable of being collected in a short time, between -the Tagus and Mondego; and beyond the latter -river, Trant and Sylveira commanded separate -corps; the one upon the Vouga, the other on the -Tamega.</p> - -<p>4º. The militia and the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i>, which may -be denominated the insurgent force.</p> - -<p>5º. The fortresses of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, -Elvas, Abrantes, Peniché, and Badajos.</p> - -<p>6º. The English fleet, the Portuguese craft, and -the free use of the coast and river navigation for -his supplies.</p> - -<p>7º. The assistance of Cuesta’s army, which -amounted to thirty thousand infantry and six -thousand cavalry; of which twenty-five thousand -were actually at or in front of the defile of Monasterio, -close to Victor’s posts. Sir Arthur -Wellesley’s moral resources were the high courage -of his own troops; his personal popularity; the -energy of an excited people; a favourable moment; -the presentiment of victory; and a mind equal to -the occasion.</p> - -<p>In a strategic point of view, to fall upon Victor -was best, because he was the most dangerous -neighbour to Portugal; because his defeat would -prove most detrimental to the French, most advantageous -to the Spaniards; and because the greatest -body of troops could be brought to bear against -him.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, Soult held a rich province, -from whence the chief supply of cattle for the -army was derived; he was in possession of the -second city in the kingdom, where he was forming -a French party; the feelings of the regency and -the people were greatly troubled by the loss of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_268"></a>[268]</span> -Oporto; and their desire to regain it was strongly -expressed.</p> - -<p>To attack Victor, it was indispensable to concert -operations with Cuesta; but that general was ill -disposed towards the British, and to insure his -co-operation would have required time, which could -be better employed in expelling Soult. For these -reasons, sir Arthur Wellesley determined to attack -the last-named marshal without delay; intending, -if successful, to establish a good system of defence -in the northern provinces: and then, in conjunction -with Cuesta, to turn his arms against Victor, hoping -thus to relieve Gallicia more effectually than by -following the French into that province.</p> - -<p>The security of Lisbon being the pivot of the -operations against Soult, time was the principal -object to be gained. If Victor came fiercely on, -he could not be stopped, but his course might be -impeded; his path could not be blocked, but it -might be planted with thorns: and to effect this, -eight or ten thousand Portuguese troops were immediately -directed upon Abrantes and Santarem, -and two British battalions and two regiments of -cavalry just disembarked, marched to the same -places, where they were joined by three other -battalions drafted from the army at Leiria.</p> - -<p>A body of two thousand men, composed of a -militia regiment and of the Lusitanian legion, -which remained near Castello Branco after Lapisse -had crossed the Tagus, were placed under the -command of colonel Mayne, and directed to take -post at the bridge of Alcantara, having orders -to defend the passage of the river, and, if necessary, -to blow up the structure. At the same time, -the flying bridges at Villa Velha and Abrantes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_269"></a>[269]</span> -were removed, the garrison of the latter place -was reinforced, and general Mackenzie was appointed -to command all the troops, whether Portuguese -or British, thus distributed along the right -bank of the Tagus.</p> - -<p>These precautions appeared sufficient, especially -as there was a general disposition to believe the -French weaker than they really were. Victor -could not, by a mere demonstration, shake the -line of defence. If he forced the bridge of -Alcantara, and penetrated by the sterile and difficult -route formerly followed by Junot, it would -bring him, without guns, upon Abrantes; but -Abrantes was already capable of a short resistance, -and Mackenzie would have had time to line the -rugged banks of the Zezere.</p> - -<p>If, leaving Badajos and Elvas behind him, Victor -should pass through the Alemtejo, and cross the -Tagus between Abrantes and Lisbon, he was to be -feared; but Cuesta had promised to follow closely -in the French general’s rear, and it was reasonable -to suppose that Mackenzie, although he might be -unable to prevent the passage of the river, would -not suffer himself to be cut off from the capital, -where, having the assistance of the fleet, the aid -of the citizens, and the chance of reinforcements -from England, he might defend himself until the -army could return from the Douro. Moreover, Victor -was eighteen marches from Lisbon; it was only by -accident that he and Soult could act in concert, -while the allied army, having a sure and rapid -mode of correspondence with Cuesta, was already -within four marches of Oporto.</p> - -<p>The main body of the allies was now directed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_270"></a>[270]</span> -upon Coimbra; and four of the best Portuguese -battalions were incorporated in the British brigades. -Marshal Beresford retained, under his personal -command, about six thousand native troops; Trant -remained stedfast on the Vouga; Sylveira on the -Tamega; and sir Robert Wilson, quitting the command -of the legion, was detached, with a small -Portuguese force, to Viseu, where, hanging upon -Franceschi’s left flank, he also communicated with -Sylveira’s corps by the way of Lamego.</p> - -<p>The difficulty of bringing up forage and provisions, -which had pressed so sorely on sir John -Cradock, was now somewhat lessened. The land -transport was still scanty; and the admiral, dreading -the long shore navigation for large vessels, was -without the small craft necessary for victualling -the troops by the coast; but the magazines at -Caldas were partly filled, and twenty large country-boats -being loaded with provisions, and the owners -induced, by premiums, to make the run, had put -safely into Peniché and the Mondego. In short, -the obstacles to a forward movement, although -great, were not insurmountable.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Coimbra the 2d of -May. His army was concentrated there on the -5th, in number about twenty-five thousand sabres -and bayonets; of which nine thousand were Portuguese, -three thousand Germans, and the remainder -British. The duke of Dalmatia was ignorant that -the allies were thus assembled in force upon -the Mondego, but many French officers knew it, -and were silent, being engaged in a plot of a -very extraordinary nature, and which was probably -a part of the conspiracy alluded to in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_271"></a>[271]</span> -first volume of this work, as being conducted -through the medium of the princess of Tour and -Taxis.</p> - -<p>The French soldiers were impatient and murmuring; -their attachment to Napoleon himself was -deep and unshaken, but human nature shrinks from -perpetual contact with death; and they were tired -of war. This feeling induced some officers of high -rank, serving in Spain, to form a plan for changing -the French government. Generally speaking, these -men were friendly to Napoleon personally; but they -were republicans in their politics, and earnest to reduce -the power of the emperor. Their project, -founded upon the discontent of the troops in the -Peninsula, was to make a truce with the English -army, to elect a chief, and march into -France with the resolution to abate the pride of -Napoleon, or to pull him from his throne. The -conspirators at first turned their eyes upon marshal -Ney, but finally resolved to choose Gouvion -St. Cyr for their leader. Yet it was easier to -resolve than to execute. Napoleon’s ascendancy, -supported by the love and admiration of millions, -was not to be shaken by the conspiracy of a few -discontented men: and, although their hopes were -not entirely relinquished until after Massena’s -retreat from Portugal in 1810, long before that -period they discovered that the soldiers, tired as -they were of war, were faithful to their great -monarch, and would have slain any who openly -stirred against him.</p> - -<p>The foregoing facts are stated on the authority -of a principal mover of the sedition; but many -minor plots had cotemporary existence, for this was -the spring time of folly. In the second corps,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_272"></a>[272]</span> -the conspirators were numerous, and, by their -discourses and their slow and sullen execution -of orders, had continually thwarted the operations -of marshal Soult, yet without exciting his suspicions; -but, as he penetrated into Portugal, their -counteractions increased, and, by the time he arrived -at Oporto, their design was ripe for execution.</p> - -<p>In the middle of April, John Viana, the son of -an Oporto merchant, appeared at marshal Beresford’s -head-quarters, with proposals from the French -malcontents. The latter desired to have an English -officer sent to them, to arrange the execution of a -plan, which was to be commenced by seizing their -general, and giving him over to the British outposts: -a detestable project, for it is not in the field, -and with a foreign enemy, that soldiers should -concert the overthrow of their country’s institutions, -and although it would be idle and impertinent -in a foreigner to say how much and how long -men shall bear with what they deem an oppressive -government, there is a distinct and especial -loyalty due from a soldier to his general in the -field; a compact of honour, which it is singularly -base to violate; and so it has in all ages been -considered. When the Argyraspides, or silver-shields -of the Macedonians, delivered their general, -Eumenes, in bonds, to Antigonus, the latter, although -he had tempted them to the deed, and -scrupled not to slay the hero, reproached the -treacherous soldiers for their conduct, and, with -the approbation of all men, destroyed them. Yet -Antigonus was not a foreign enemy, but of their -own kin and blood.</p> - -<p>An English lieutenant-colonel attached to the -Portuguese service reluctantly undertook the duty<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_273"></a>[273]</span> -of meeting the conspirators, and penetrated, by -night, but in uniform, behind the French outposts, -by the lake of Aveiro or Ovar. He had -previously arranged that one of the malcontents -should meet him on the water; the boats unknowingly -passed each other in the dark, and the -Englishman returned to Aveiro; but he there found -John Viana, in company with the adjutant-major, -D’Argenton. The latter confirmed what Viana -had declared at Thomar; he expressed great respect -for Soult, but dwelt upon the necessity of -removing him before an appeal could be made to -the soldiers; and he readily agreed to wait, in -person, upon Beresford, saying he was himself -too strongly supported in the French army to be -afraid.</p> - -<p>Marshal Beresford was then at Lisbon, and -thither D’Argenton followed; and, having seen -him and sir Arthur Wellesley, and remained -five days in that capital, returned to Oporto. -While at Lisbon, he, in addition to his former -reasons for this conspiracy, stated that Soult wished -to make himself king of Portugal; an error into -which he and many others naturally fell, from -circumstances that I have already noticed.</p> - -<p>When sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Coimbra, -D’Argenton appeared again at the English head-quarters; -but this time, by the order of sir Arthur, -he was conducted through bye-paths, and returned -convinced, from what he had seen and heard, that -although the allies were in force on the Mondego, -many days must elapse before they could be in a -condition to attack Oporto. During his absence, -D’Argenton was denounced by general Lefebre, -who was falsely imagined to be favourable to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_274"></a>[274]</span> -the conspiracy; passports, signed by admiral -Berkely, which this unfortunate man, contrary -to sir A. Wellesley’s urgent recommendation, had -insisted upon having, completely proved his guilt; -and Soult, until that moment, without suspicion, -beheld with amazement the abyss that yawned -beneath his feet: his firmness, however, did not -desert him. He offered D’Argenton pardon, and -even reward, if he would disclose the names -of the other conspirators and relate truly what he -had seen of the English and Portuguese armies. -The prisoner, to save his life, readily told all that -he knew of the British, but sir A. Wellesley’s foresight -had rendered that tale useless; and with -respect to his accomplices D’Argenton was immoveable. -Exaggerating the importance of the conspiracy, -he even defied the marshal’s power, and advised -him, as the safest course, to adopt the conspirators’ -sentiments; nor was this boldness fatal to -him at the moment, for Soult, anxious to ascertain -the extent of the danger, delayed executing him, -and he effected his escape during the subsequent -operations.</p> - -<p>He was not the only person who communicated -secretly with the British general; colonel Donadieu -and colonel Lafitte were engaged in the conspiracy. -The latter is said to have had an interview with -sir Arthur, between the outposts of the two armies, -and from the first the malcontents were urgent that -the movements of the allied forces should be so -regulated as to favour their proceedings; but sir -Arthur Wellesley, having little dependence upon -intrigue, sternly intimated that his operations could -not be regulated by their plots, and hastened his -military measures.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_275"></a>[275]</span></p> - -<p>Under the impression that Sylveira was successfully -defending the line of the Tamega, the British -general at first resolved to reinforce him by sending -Beresford’s and sir Robert Wilson’s corps across -the Douro at Lamego, by which he hoped to cut -Soult off from Tras os Montes, intending, when -their junction was effected, to march with his own -army direct upon Oporto, and to cross the Douro -near that town, by the aid of Beresford’s corps, -which would then be on the right bank. This -measure, if executed, would, including Trant’s, -Wilson’s, and Sylveira’s people, have placed -a mass of thirty thousand troops, regulars and -irregulars, between the Tras os Montes and -Soult, and the latter must have fought a battle -under very unfavourable circumstances, or have -fallen back on the Minho, which he could scarcely -have passed at that season while pressed by the -pursuing army. But the plan was necessarily -abandoned when intelligence arrived that the -bridge of Amarante was forced, and that Sylveira, -pursued by the enemy, was driven over the -Douro.</p> - -<p>The news of this disaster only reached Coimbra -the 4th of May; on the 6th, a part of the army -was already in motion to execute a fresh project, -adapted to the change of affairs; and as this -eagerness to fall on Soult may appear to justify -those who censured sir J. Cradock’s caution, it may -here be well to shew how far the circumstances -were changed.</p> - -<p>When Cradock refused to advance, the Portuguese -troops were insubordinate and disorganized; -they were now obedient and improved in discipline.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_276"></a>[276]</span></p> - -<p>Sir John Cradock had scarcely any cavalry; -four regiments had since been added.</p> - -<p>In the middle of April, Cuesta was only gathering -the wrecks of his forces after Medellin; he was -now at the head of thirty-five thousand men.</p> - -<p>The intentions of the British government had been -doubtful; they were no longer so. Sir John Cradock’s -influence had been restricted; but the new general -came out with enlarged powers, the full confidence -of the ministers, and with Portuguese rank. His -reputation, his popularity, and the disposition of -mankind always prone to magnify the future, whether -for good or bad, combined to give an unusual impulse -to public feeling, and enabled him to dictate at -once to the regency, the diplomatists, the generals, -and the people; to disregard all petty jealousies and -intrigues, and to calculate upon resources from -which his predecessor was debarred. Sir Arthur -Wellesley, habituated to the command of armies, was -moreover endowed by nature with a lofty genius, -and a mind capacious of warlike affairs.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_277"></a>[277]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BVIII_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>CAMPAIGN ON THE DOURO.</h4> - -<p>After the victory at Amarante, Laborde was recalled -to Oporto, but a brigade of cavalry and a -regiment of infantry were left to keep up the communication -with Loison; and as the insurgent -general Bonthielo had reappeared on the Lima, -general Lorge’s dragoons were directed on that -side. Mermet’s division was then pushed towards -the Vouga, and thus the French army was extended -by detachments from that river to the Tamega; and -the wings separated by the Douro and occupying -two sides of a triangle, were without communication, -except by the boat-bridge of Oporto. It required -three days, therefore, to unite the army on its centre, -and five days to concentrate it on either extremity.</p> - -<p>The situation of the allies was very different;—sir -Arthur Wellesley having, unknown to Soult, -assembled the bulk of the troops at Coimbra, commanded -the choice of two lines of operation; the -one through Viseu and Lamego, by which, in four -or five marches, he could turn the French left, and -cut them off from Tras os Montes; the other by the -roads leading upon Oporto, by which, in two -marches, he could throw himself unexpectedly, and -in very superior numbers, upon the enemy’s right, -with a fair prospect of crushing it between the -Vouga and the Douro.</p> - -<p>In taking the first of these two lines, which were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_278"></a>[278]</span> -separated by the lofty ridges of the Sierra de Caramula, -the march could be covered by Wilson’s corps, -at Viseu, and by Sylveira’s, near Lamego. Along -the second the movement could be screened by -Trant’s corps on the Vouga.</p> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia’s dispositions were made -in ignorance of sir Arthur Wellesley’s position, -numbers, and intentions. He was not even aware -of the vicinity of such an antagonist, but sensible -that to advance directly upon Lisbon was beyond -his own strength, he already meditated to cross the -<span class="sidenote">S.<br />Journal of Operations MSS.</span> -Tamega, and then covered by that river and the -Douro, to follow the great route of Bragança, and so -enter the Salamanca country. It was in this view -that Loison had been directed to get possession of -Mezamfrio and Pezo de Ragoa, and the march of -Mermet was only intended to support Franceschi’s -retreat, when the army should commence its movement -towards the Tamega.</p> - -<p>The 9th of May, D’Argenton was arrested; the -film fell from Soult’s eyes, and all the perils of his -position broke at once upon his view. Treason in -his camp, which he could not probe, a powerful -enemy close in his front, the insurgents again active -in his rear, and the French troops scattered from the -Vouga to the Tamega, and from the Douro to the -Lima, and commanded by officers, whose fidelity -was necessarily suspected, while the extent of the -conspiracy was unknown.</p> - -<p>Appalling as this prospect was, the duke of -Dalmatia did not quail at the view. The general -officers assured him of the fidelity of the troops; -and Loison was immediately ordered to keep Mezamfrio -and Ragoa, if he could, but, under any -circumstances, to hold Amarante fast. The greatest<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_279"></a>[279]</span> -part of the guns and stores at Oporto were at the -same time directed upon the Tamega, and the -ammunition that could not be removed was destroyed. -General Lorge was commanded to withdraw -the garrison from Viana, and to proceed -likewise to Amarante, and, while D’Argenton was -closely, although vainly, pressed to discover the -names of the conspirators, Soult prepared to execute -his intended movement through the Tras os Montes. -But the war was coming on with a full and swift -tide; Loison, upon whose vigour the success of the -operation depended, was already giving way; sir -Arthur Wellesley was across the Vouga, and Franceschi -and Mermet were struggling in his grasp.</p> - -<p>The English general resolved to operate along -both the routes before spoken of, but the greater -facility of supplying the troops by the coast-line, -and, above all, the exposed position of the French -right wing, so near the allies and so distant from -succour, induced him to make the principal attack -by the high road leading to Oporto.</p> - -<p>The army was formed in one division of cavalry -and three of infantry, exclusive of Beresford’s separate -corps.</p> - -<p>The first division, consisting of two brigades of -infantry and twelve guns, was commanded by lieut.-general -Paget.</p> - -<p>The second, consisting of three brigades of infantry -and six guns, by lieut.-general Sherbrooke.</p> - -<p>The third, consisting of two brigades of infantry -and six guns, by major-general Hill.</p> - -<p>The cavalry by lieut.-general Payne.</p> - -<p>The whole amounted to about fourteen thousand five -hundred infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and twenty-four -guns, of which six were only three-pounders.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_280"></a>[280]</span></p> - -<p>The 6th of May, Beresford, with six thousand -Portuguese, two British battalions, five companies -of riflemen, and a squadron of heavy cavalry, -marched upon Lamego by the road of Viseu.</p> - -<p>The 7th, the light cavalry and Paget’s division -advanced towards the Vouga by the Oporto road, -but halted, on the 8th, to give Beresford time to reach -the Upper Douro, before the attack on the French -right should commence.</p> - -<p>The 9th, they resumed their march for the bridge -of Vouga, and, at the same time, Hill’s division, -taking the Aveiro road, the whole reached the line -of the Vouga river that evening; but Paget’s division -was not brought up until after dark, and then -with caution, to prevent the enemy’s guards from -seeing the columns, the intent being to surprise -Franceschi the next morning.</p> - -<p>That general, with all his cavalry, a regiment of -Mermet’s division, and six guns, occupied a village, -about eight miles beyond Vouga bridge, called -Albergaria Nova; the remainder of Mermet’s infantry -were at Grijon, one march in the rear, and -on the main road to Oporto. Franceschi had that -day informed Soult that the allied forces were collecting -on the Mondego, and that Trant’s posts had -closed upon the Vouga; but he was far from suspecting -that the whole army was upon the last -river, although, from the imprudent conversation of -an English officer, bearing a flag of truce, he had -reason to expect an attack of some kind.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley’s plan was partly arranged -upon the suggestion of the field-officer who had -met D’Argenton. He had observed, during his intercourse -with the conspirators, that the lake of -Ovar was unguarded by the French, although it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_281"></a>[281]</span> -extended twenty miles behind their outposts, and -that all the boats were at Aveiro, which was in -possession of the allies. On his information it was -decided to turn the enemy’s right by the lake.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, general Hill embarked, the evening -of the 9th, with one brigade, the other being to -follow him as quickly as possible. The fishermen -looked on at first with surprise; but, soon comprehending -the object, they voluntarily rushed in -crowds to the boats, and worked with such a will -that the whole flotilla arrived at Ovar precisely at -sunrise on the 10th, and the troops immediately -disembarked. That day, also, marshal Beresford, -having rallied Wilson’s corps upon his own, -reached Pezo de Ragoa, and he it was that had repulsed -Loison, and pursued him to Amarante.</p> - -<p>Both flanks of the French army were now turned, -and at the same moment sir Arthur, with the main -body, fell upon Franceschi, for, while the flotilla -was navigating the lake of Ovar, the attempt to -surprise that general, at Albergaria Nova, was in -progress. Sherbrooke’s division was still in the -rear; but general Cotton, with the light cavalry, -crossing the Vouga, a little after midnight, endeavoured -to turn the enemy’s left, and to get into his -rear; the head of Paget’s division, marching a little -later, was to pass through the defiles of Vouga, -directly upon Albergaria, and Trant’s corps was to -make way between Paget’s division and the lake of -Aveiro.</p> - -<p>This enterprise, so well conceived, was baffled by -petty events, such as always abound in war. Sir -Arthur Wellesley did not perfectly know the ground -beyond the Vouga; and, late in the evening of the -9th, colonel Trant, having ascertained that an impracticable<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_282"></a>[282]</span> -ravine, extending from the lake to <ins class="corr" id="tn-282" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Olivera de Azemiz'"> -Oliveira de Azemis</ins>, would prevent him from obeying -his orders, passed the bridge of Vouga, and carried -his own guns beyond the defiles, in order to leave -the bridge clear for the British artillery and for -general Richard Stewart’s brigade.</p> - -<p>Stewart was charged to conduct the guns through -the defile; but the task was difficult, several carriages -broke down, and Trant’s corps thus took the -lead of Paget’s column, the march of which was -impeded by the broken gun-carriages. Meanwhile -the cavalry, under Cotton, were misled by the -guides, and came, in broad daylight, upon Franceschi, -who, with his flank resting upon a wood, -garnished with infantry, boldly offered a battle that -Cotton durst not, under such circumstances, accept. -Thus, an hour’s delay, produced by a few trifling -accidents, marred a combination that would have -shorn Soult of a third of his infantry and all his -light cavalry, for it is not to be supposed that, -when Franceschi’s horsemen were cut off, and general -Hill at Ovar, Mermet’s division could have -escaped across the Douro.</p> - -<p>When sir Arthur Wellesley came up to Albergaria -with Paget’s infantry, Franceschi was still in -position, skirmishing with Trant’s corps, and evidently -ignorant of what a force was advancing -against him. Being immediately attacked, and his -foot dislodged from the wood, he retreated along -the road to Oliveira de Azemis, and was briskly -pursued by the allied infantry; but, extricating -himself valiantly from his perilous situation, he -reached Oliveira without any serious loss; and continuing -his march during the night, by Feria, -joined Mermet the next morning at Grijon.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_283"></a>[283]</span></p> - -<p>Franceschi, in the course of the 10th, could see -the whole of the English army, including the troops -with Hill; and it may create surprise that he should -pass so near the latter general without being attacked: -but Hill was strictly obedient to his orders, -which forbade him to act on the enemy’s rear; and -those orders were wise and prudent, because the -principle of operating with small bodies on the -flanks and rear of an enemy is vicious; and, while -the number of men on the left of the Douro was -unknown, it would have been rash to interpose -a single brigade between the advanced-guard and -the main body of the French. General Hill was -sent to Ovar, that the line of march might be eased, -and the enemy’s attention distracted, and that a -division of fresh soldiers might be at hand to follow -the pursuit, so as to arrive on the bridge of Oporto -pell mell with the flying enemy. The soldier-like -retreat of Franceschi prevented the last object from -being attained.</p> - -<p>General Paget’s division and the cavalry halted -the night of the 10th at Oliveira; Sherbrooke’s -division passed the Vouga later in the day, and -remained in Albergaria. But the next morning the -pursuit was renewed, and the men, marching -strongly, came up with the enemy at Grijon, about -eight o’clock in the morning.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF GRIJON.</h4> - -<p>The French were drawn up on a range of steep -hills across the road. A wood, occupied with infantry, -covered their right flank; their front was -protected by villages and broken ground, but their -left was ill placed. The British troops came on -briskly in one column, and the head was instantly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_284"></a>[284]</span> -and sharply engaged. The 16th Portuguese regiment, -then quitting the line of march, gallantly -drove the enemy out of the wood covering his right, -and, at the same time, the Germans, who were in -the rear, bringing their left shoulders forward, without -any halt or check, turned the other flank of the -French. The latter immediately abandoned the -position, and, being pressed in the rear by two -squadrons of cavalry, lost a few killed and about -a hundred prisoners. The heights of Carvalho -gave them an opportunity to turn and check the -pursuing squadrons; yet, when the British infantry, -with an impetuous pace, drew near, they again -fell back; and thus, fighting and retreating, a blow -and a race, wore the day away.</p> - -<p>During this combat, Hill was to have marched by -the coast-road towards Oporto, to intercept the -enemy’s retreat; but, by some error in the transmission -of orders, that general, taking the route of -Feria, crossed Trant’s line of march, and the time -lost could not be regained.</p> - -<p>The British halted at dark, but the French, continuing -their retreat, passed the Douro in the night, -and at two o’clock in the morning the bridge was -destroyed. All the artillery and baggage still in -Oporto were immediately directed along the road -to Amarante, and Mermet’s division without halting -at Oporto followed the same route as far as -Vallonga and Baltar, having instructions to secure -all the boats, and vigilantly to patrole the right -bank of the Douro. Loison, also, whose retreat -from Pezo de Ragoa was still unknown, once more -received warning to hold on by the Tamega without -fail, as he valued the safety of the army. Meanwhile -the duke of Dalmatia commanded all the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_285"></a>[285]</span> -craft in the river to be secured, and, having placed -guards at the most convenient points, proposed to -remain at Oporto during the 12th, to give time for -Lorge’s dragoons and the different detachments of -the army to concentrate at Amarante.</p> - -<p>Soult’s personal attention was principally directed -to the river in its course <em>below</em> the city; for the -reports of his cavalry led him to believe that Hill’s -division had been disembarked at Ovar from the -ocean, and he expected that the vessels would come -round, and the passage be attempted at the mouth -of the Douro. Nevertheless, thinking that Loison -still held Mesamfrio and Pezo with six thousand -men, and knowing that three brigades occupied -intermediate posts between Amarante and Oporto, -he was satisfied that his retreat was secured, and -thought there was no rashness in maintaining his -position for another day.</p> - -<p>The conspirators, however, were also busy; his -orders were neglected, or only half obeyed, and -false reports of their execution transmitted to him; -and, in this state of affairs, the head of the British -columns arrived at Villa Nova, and, before eight -o’clock in the morning of the 12th, they were concentrated -in one mass, but covered from the view of -the enemy by the height on which the convent of -Sarea stands.</p> - -<p>The Douro rolled between the hostile forces. -Soult had suffered nothing by the previous operations, -and in two days he could take post behind -the Tamega, from whence his retreat upon Bragança -would be certain, and he might, in passing, defeat -Beresford, for that general’s force was feeble as to -numbers, and in infancy as to organization; and the -utmost that sir Arthur expected from it was that,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_286"></a>[286]</span> -vexing the French line of march, and infesting the -road of Villa Real, it would oblige Soult to take -the less accessible route of Chaves, and so retire to -Gallicia instead of Leon; but this could not be, -unless the main body of the allied troops followed -the French closely. Now, Soult, at Salamanca, -would be more formidable than Soult at Oporto, -and hence the ultimate object of the campaign, and -the immediate safety of Beresford’s corps, alike -demanded that the Douro should be quickly passed. -But, how force the passage of a river, deep, swift, -and more than three hundred yards wide, while ten -thousand veterans guarded the opposite bank? -Alexander the Great might have turned from it -without shame!</p> - -<p>The height of Sarea, round which the Douro -came with a sharp elbow, prevented any view of -the upper river from the town; but the duke of -Dalmatia, confident that all above the city was -secure, took his station in a house westward of -Oporto, whence he could discern the whole course -of the lower river to its mouth. Meanwhile, from -the summit of Sarea, the English general, with an -eagle’s glance, searched all the opposite bank and -the city and country beyond it. He observed horses -and baggage moving on the road to Vallonga, and the -dust of columns as if in retreat, and no large body -of troops was to be seen under arms near the river. -The French guards were few, and distant from -each other, and the patroles were neither many nor -vigilant; but a large unfinished building standing -alone, yet with a short and easy access to it from -the river, soon fixed sir Arthur’s attention.</p> - -<p>This building, called the Seminary, was surrounded -by a high stone wall, which coming down<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_287"></a>[287]</span> -to the water on either side, enclosed an area -sufficient to contain at least two battalions in order -of battle; the only egress being by an iron gate -opening on the Vallonga road. The structure itself -commanded every thing in its neighbourhood, except -a mound, within cannon-shot, but too pointed to -hold a gun. There were no French posts near, -and the direct line of passage from the height -of Sarea, across the river to the building, being -to the right hand, was of course hidden from -the troops in the town. Here, then, with a -marvellous hardihood, sir Arthur resolved, if he -could find but one boat, to make his way, -in the face of a veteran army and a renowned -general.</p> - - -<h4>PASSAGE OF THE DOURO.</h4> - -<p>A boat was soon obtained; for a poor barber of -Oporto, evading the French patroles, had, during -the night, come over the water in a small skiff; -this being discovered by colonel Waters, a staff -officer, of a quick and daring temper, he and the -barber, and the prior of Amarante, who gallantly -offered his aid, crossed the river, and in half an -hour returned, unperceived, with three or four large -barges. Meanwhile, eighteen or twenty pieces of -artillery were got up to the convent of Sarea; and -major-general John Murray, with the German brigade, -some squadrons of the 14th dragoons, and -two guns, reached the Barca de Avintas, three miles -higher up the river, his orders being to search for -boats, and to effect a passage there also, if possible.</p> - -<p>Some of the British troops were now sent towards -Avintas, to support Murray; while others came -cautiously forwards to the brink of the river. It<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_288"></a>[288]</span> -was ten o’clock; the enemy were tranquil and unsuspicious; -and an officer reported to sir Arthur -Wellesley that one boat was brought up to the point -of passage, “<em>Well, let the men cross</em>,” was the -reply; and upon this simple order, an officer and -twenty-five soldiers, of the Buffs, entered the vessel, -and in a quarter of an hour were in the midst of the -French army.</p> - -<p>The Seminary was thus gained without any alarm -being given, and every thing was still quiet in -Oporto: not a movement was to be seen; not a -hostile sound was to be heard: a second boat followed -the first, and then a third passed a little -higher up the river; but scarcely had the men from -the last landed, when a tumultuous noise of drums -and shouts arose in the city; confused masses of the -enemy were seen hurrying forth in all directions, -and throwing out clouds of skirmishers, who came -furiously down upon the Seminary. The citizens -were descried gesticulating vehemently, and making -signals from their houses; and the British troops -instantly crowded to the bank of the river; Paget’s -and Hill’s divisions at the point of embarkation, and -Sherbrooke’s where the old boat-bridge had been -cut away from Villa Nova.</p> - -<p>Paget himself passed in the third boat, and, -mounting the roof of the Seminary, was immediately -struck down, severely wounded. Hill took Paget’s -place; the musketry was sharp, voluble, and increasing -every moment as the number accumulated -on both sides. The enemy’s attack was fierce -and constant; his fire augmented faster than that of -the British, and his artillery, also, began to play on -the building. But the English guns, from the convent -of Sarea, commanded the whole enclosure<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_289"></a>[289]</span> -round the Seminary, and swept the left of the wall in -such a manner as to confine the French assault to the -side of the iron gate. Murray, however, did not appear; -and the struggle was so violent, and the moment -so critical, that sir Arthur would himself have crossed, -but for the earnest representations of those about him, -and the just confidence he had in general Hill.</p> - -<p>Some of the citizens now pushed over to Villa Nova -with several great boats; Sherbrooke’s people begun -to cross in large bodies; and, at the same moment, -a loud shout in the town, and the waving of handkerchiefs -from all the windows, gave notice that the -enemy had abandoned the lower part of the city; -and now, also, Murray’s troops were seen descending -the right bank from Avintas. By this time three -battalions were in the Seminary; and Hill, advancing -to the enclosure wall, opened a destructive fire upon -the French columns as they passed, in haste and -confusion, by the Vallonga road. Five pieces of -French artillery were coming out from the town on -the left; but, appalled by the line of musketry to -be passed, the drivers suddenly pulled up, and -while thus hesitating, a volley from behind stretched -most of the artillery-men on the ground; the rest, -dispersing among the enclosures, left their guns on -the road. This volley was given by a part of Sherbrooke’s -people, who, having forced their way through -the streets, thus came upon the rear. In fine, the -passage was won; and the allies were in considerable -force on the French side of the river.</p> - -<p>To the left, general Sherbrooke, with the brigade -of guards, and the 29th regiment, was in the town, -and pressing the rear of the enemy, who were quitting -it. In the centre, general Hill, holding the Seminary -and the wall of the enclosure, with the Buffs,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_290"></a>[290]</span> -the 48th, the 66th, the 16th Portuguese, and a -battalion of detachments, sent a damaging fire into -the masses as they passed him; and his line was -prolonged on the right, although with a considerable -interval, by general Murray’s Germans, and -two squadrons of the 14th dragoons. The remainder -of the army kept passing the river at different points; -and the artillery, from the height of Sarea, still -searched the enemy’s columns as they hurried along -the line of retreat.</p> - -<p>If general Murray had then fallen boldly in upon -the disordered crowds, their discomfiture would have -been complete; but he suffered column after column -to pass him, without even a cannon shot, and seemed -fearful lest they should turn and push him into the -river. General Charles Stewart and major Hervey, -however, impatient of this inactivity, charged with -the two squadrons of dragoons, and rode over the -enemy’s rear-guard, as it was pushing through a -narrow road to gain an open space beyond. Laborde -was unhorsed, Foy badly wounded; and, on the -English side, major Hervey lost an arm; and his -gallant horsemen, receiving no support from Murray, -were obliged to fight their way back with loss.</p> - -<p>This finished the action; the French continued -their retreat, and the British remained on the ground -they had gained. The latter lost twenty killed, a -general and ninety-five men wounded; the former -had about five hundred men killed and wounded, -and five pieces of artillery were taken in the fight; -a considerable quantity of ammunition, and fifty -guns (of which the carriages had been burnt) were -afterwards found in the arsenal, and several hundred -men were captured in the hospitals.</p> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_290fp" style="max-width: 30em;"> -<p class="fs70"><em>Plate 4. to face Pa. 290.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_290fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_290fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"><em>Sketch Explanatory</em><br /> -OF THE PASSAGE OF THE RIVER DOURO,<br /> -by SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY,<br /> -<em>May 12<sup>th</sup>, 1809</em>,<br /> -AND OF THE STORMING OF OPORTO,<br /> -by <em>MARSHAL SOULT</em>,<br /> -<em>March 1809</em>.<br /> -<p><em>London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>Napoleon’s veterans were so experienced, so -inured to warfare that no troops in the world could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_291"></a>[291]</span> -more readily recover from such a surprise, and -before they reached Vallonga their columns were -again in order, with a regular rear guard covering -the retreat. A small garrison at the mouth of the -Douro was cut off, but, guided by some friendly -Portuguese, it rejoined the army in the night; and -Soult, believing that Loison was at Amarante, -thought he had happily escaped a great danger and -was still formidable to his enemies.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley employed the remainder of -the 12th, and the next day, in bringing over the rear -of the army, together with the baggage, the stores, -and the artillery. General Murray’s Germans, however, -pursued, on the morning of the 13th, but not -further than about two leagues on the road of Amarante. -This delay has been blamed as an error in -sir Arthur; it is argued that an enemy once surprised -should never be allowed to recover, and that -Soult should have been followed up, even while a -single regiment was left to pursue. But the reasons -for halting were, first, that a part of the army was -still on the left bank of the Douro;—secondly, that -the troops had out marched provisions, baggage, -and ammunition, and having passed over above -eighty miles of difficult country in four days, -during three of which they were constantly fighting, -both men and animals required rest; thirdly, that -nothing was known of Beresford, whose contemporary -operations it is time to relate.</p> - -<p>The moment of his arrival on the Douro was -marked by the repulse of Loison’s division, which -immediately fell back, as I have already related, to -Mezamfrio, followed by the Portuguese patroles -only, for Beresford halted on the left bank of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_292"></a>[292]</span> -river, because the British regiments were still in -the rear. This was on the 10th. Sylveira, who was -at Villa Real, had orders to feel towards Mezamfrio -for the enemy, and the marshal’s force was -thus, with the assistance of the insurgents, in readiness -to turn Soult from the route of Villa Real to -Bragança.</p> - -<p>The 11th, Loison continued his retreat, and Beresford -finding him so timid, followed, skirmishing -with his rear guard, and at the same time Sylveira -advanced from Villa Real. On the 12th, the French -outposts, in front of Amarante were driven in, and -the 13th Loison abandoned that town, and took the -route of Guimaraens.</p> - -<p>These events were unknown to sir Arthur Wellesley -on the evening of the 13th, but he heard -that Soult, after destroying his artillery and ammunition, -near Penafiel, had passed over the mountain -towards Braga; and judging this to arise from -Beresford’s operations on the Tamega, he reinforced -Murray with some cavalry, ordering him to proceed -by Penafiel, and if Loison still lingered near Amarante, -to open a communication with Beresford. The -latter was at the same time directed to ascend the -Tamega, and intercept the enemy at Chaves.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the main body of the army marched -in two columns upon the Minho, the one by the route -of Barca de Troffa and Braga, the other by the -Ponte d’Ave and Bacellos. But, on the evening -of the 14th, the movements of the enemy about -Braga gave certain proofs that not Valença and Tuy, -but Chaves or Montalegre, would be the point of -his retreat. Hereupon, the left column was drawn -off from the Bacellos road and directed upon Braga, -and Beresford was instructed to move by Monterey,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_293"></a>[293]</span> -upon Villa del Rey, if Soult took the line of -Montalegre.</p> - -<p>The 15th, sir Arthur reached Braga. Murray -was at Guimaraens on his right, and Beresford, who -had anticipated his orders, was near Chaves, -having sent Sylveira towards Salamonde, with instructions -to occupy the passes of Ruivaens and -Melgassy. But at this time Soult was fifteen miles -in advance of Braga, having, by a surprising effort, -extricated himself from one of the most dangerous -situations that a general ever escaped from. To -understand this, it is necessary to describe the -country through which his retreat was effected.</p> - -<p>I have already observed that the Sierra de -Cabreira and the Sierra de Catalina line the right -bank of the Tamega; but, in approaching the Douro, -the latter slants off towards Oporto, thus opening a -rough but practicable slip of land, through which -the road leads from Oporto to Amarante. Hence, -the French in retreating to the latter town had the -Douro on their right hand and the Sierra de Catalina -on their left.</p> - -<p>Between Amarante, and Braga which is on the -other side of the Catalina, a route practicable -for artillery, runs through Guimaraens, but it is -necessary to reach Amarante to fall into this -road. Thus, Soult, as he advanced along the narrow -pass between the mountains and the Douro, -rested his hopes of safety entirely upon Loison’s -holding Amarante. Several days, however, had -elapsed since that general had communicated, and -an aide-de-camp was sent on the morning of the -12th to ascertain his exact position. Colonel -Tholosé, the officer employed, found Loison at -Amarante, but neither his remonstrances, nor the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_294"></a>[294]</span> -after coming intelligence that Oporto was evacuated, -and the army in full retreat upon the Tamega, could -induce that general to remain there, and, as we have -seen, he marched towards Guimaraens, on the 13th, -abandoning the bridge of Amarante, without a blow, -and leaving his commander and two-thirds of the -army to what must have appeared inevitable destruction.</p> - -<p>The news of this unexpected calamity reached -Soult at one o’clock on the morning of the 13th, -just as he had passed the rugged banks of the -Souza river, the weather was boisterous, the men -were fatigued, voices were heard calling for a capitulation, -and the whole army was stricken with dismay. -Then it was that the duke of Dalmatia justified, -by his energy, that fortune which had raised -him to his high rank in the world. Being, by a -Spanish pedlar, informed of a path that, mounting -the right bank of the Souza, led over the Sierra de -Catalina to Guimaraens, he, on the instant, silenced -the murmurs of the treacherous or fearful in the -ranks, destroyed the artillery, abandoned the military -chest and baggage, and loading the animals with sick -men and musket ammunition, repassed the Souza, -and followed his Spanish guide with a hardy resolution.</p> - -<p>The rain was falling in torrents, and the path -was such as might be expected in those wild regions, -but the troops made good their passage over -the mountains to Pombeira, and, at Guimaraens, -happily fell in with Loison. During the night -they were joined by Lorge’s dragoons from Braga, -and thus, almost beyond hope, the whole army was -concentrated.</p> - -<p>If Soult’s energy in command was conspicuous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_295"></a>[295]</span> -on this occasion, his sagacity and judgement were -not less remarkably displayed in what followed. -Most generals would have moved by the direct -route upon Guimaraens to Braga; but he, with a -long reach of mind, calculated, from the slackness -of pursuit after he passed Vallonga, that the -bulk of the English army must be on the road to -Braga, and would be there before him; or that, at -best, he should be obliged to retreat fighting, and -must sacrifice the guns and baggage of Loison’s -and Lorge’s corps in the face of an enemy—a -circumstance that might operate fatally on the -spirit of his soldiers, and would certainly give -<span class="sidenote">Noble’s Campagne de Galice.</span> -opportunities to the malcontents; and already one -of the generals (apparently Loison) was recommending -a convention like Cintra.</p> - -<p>But, with a firmness worthy of the highest admiration, -Soult destroyed all the guns and the greatest -part of the baggage and ammunition of Loison’s -and Lorge’s divisions; then, leaving the high road -to Braga on his left, and once more taking to the -mountain paths, he made for the heights of Carvalho -d’Este, where he arrived late in the evening -of the 14th, thus gaining a day’s march, in point -of time. The morning of the 15th he drew up -his troops in the position he had occupied just two -months before at the battle of Braga; and this -spectacle, where twenty thousand men were collected -upon the theatre of a former victory, and -disposed so as to produce the greatest effect, roused -all the sinking pride of the French soldiers. It -was a happy stroke of generalship, an inspiration -of real genius!</p> - -<p>Soult now re-organised his army; taking the -command of the rear-guard himself, and giving<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_296"></a>[296]</span> -that of the advanced guard to general Loison. -Noble, the French historian of this campaign, says -“<em>the whole army was astonished</em>;” as if it was not -a stroke of consummate policy that the rear, which -was pursued by the British, should be under the -general-in-chief, and that the front, which was to -fight its way through the native forces, should -have a commander whose very name called up -all the revengeful passions of the Portuguese. -<em>Maneta durst not surrender</em>; and the duke of -Dalmatia dextrously forced those to act with most zeal -who were least inclined to serve him: and, in sooth, -such was his perilous situation, that all the resources -of his mind and all the energy of his -character were needed to save the army.</p> - -<p>From Carvalho he retired to Salamonde, from -whence there were two lines of retreat. The one -through Ruivaens and Venda Nova, by which the -army had marched when coming from Chaves two -months before; the other, shorter, although more impracticable, -leading by the Ponte Nova and Ponte -Miserella into the road running from Ruivaens to -Montalegre. But the scouts brought intelligence -that the bridge of Ruivaens, on the little river of -that name, was broken, and defended by twelve -hundred Portuguese, with artillery; and that -another party had been, since the morning, destroying -the Ponte Nova on the Cavado river.</p> - -<p>The destruction of the first bridge blocked the -road to Chaves; the second, if completed, and -the passage well defended, would have cut the -French off from Montalegre. The night was setting -in, the soldiers were harassed, barefooted, and -starving; the ammunition was damp with the rain, -which had never ceased since the 13th, and which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_297"></a>[297]</span> -was now increasing in violence, accompanied with -storms of wind. The British army would certainly -fall upon the rear in the morning; and if the Ponte -Nova, where the guard was reported to be weak, -could not be secured, the hour of surrender was -surely arrived.</p> - -<p>In this extremity, Soult sent for major Dulong, -an officer justly reputed for one of the most daring -in the French ranks. Addressing himself to this -brave man, he said, “I have chosen you from the -whole army to seize the Ponte Nova, which has been cut -by the enemy. Do you choose a hundred grenadiers -and twenty-five horsemen; endeavour to surprise -the guards, and secure the passage of the bridge. -If you succeed, say so, but send no other report; -your silence will suffice.” Thus exhorted, Dulong -selected his men, and departed.</p> - -<p>Favoured by the storm, he reached the bridge -unperceived of the Portuguese, killed the centinel -before any alarm was given, and then, followed by -twelve grenadiers, began crawling along a narrow -slip of masonry, which was the only part of the -bridge undestroyed. The Cavado river was in full -flood, and roaring in a deep channel; one of the -grenadiers fell into the gulph, but the noise of -the storm and the river was louder than his cry; -Dulong, with the eleven, still creeping onwards, -reached the other side, and falling briskly on the -first posts of the peasants, killed or dispersed the -whole. At that moment, the remainder of his men -advanced close to the bridge; and some crossing, -others mounting the heights, shouting and firing, -scared the Portuguese supporting-posts, who -imagined the whole army was upon them; and -thus the passage was gallantly won.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_298"></a>[298]</span></p> - -<p>At four o’clock, the bridge being repaired, -the advanced guards of the French commenced -crossing; but as the column of march was long, -and the road narrow and rugged, the troops filed -over slowly; and beyond the Ponte Nova there -was a second obstacle still more formidable. For the -pass in which the troops were moving being cut in -the side of a mountain, open on the left for several -miles, at last came upon a torrent called the -Misarella, which, breaking down a deep ravine, -or rather gulph, was only to be crossed by a bridge, -constructed with a single lofty arch, called the -<i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">Saltador</i>, or leaper; and so narrow that only -three persons could pass abreast. Fortunately -for the French, the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">Saltador</i> was not cut, but -entrenched and defended by a few hundred Portuguese -peasants, who occupied the rocks on the -<span class="sidenote">S.<br />Journal of Operations MS.</span> -farther side; and here the good soldier Dulong -again saved the army: for, when a first and second -attempt had been repulsed with loss, he carried -the entrenchments by a third effort; but, at the -same instant, fell deeply wounded himself. The -head of the column now poured over, and it was -full time, for the English guns were thundering in -the rear, and the Ponte Nova was choked with dead.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley, quitting Braga on the -morning of the 16th, had come, about four o’clock, -upon Soult’s rear-guard, which remained at Salamonde -to cover the passage of the army over the -bridges. The right was strongly protected by a -ravine, the left occupied a steep hill; and a stout -battle might have been made, but men thus circumstanced, -and momentarily expecting an order -to retreat, will seldom stand firmly; and, on this -occasion, when some light troops turned the left,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_299"></a>[299]</span> -and general Sherbrooke, with the guards, mounting -the steep hill, attacked the front, the French made -but one discharge, and fled in confusion to the -Ponte Nova. As this bridge was not on the direct -line of retreat, they were for some time unperceived, -and gaining ground of their pursuers, -formed a rear-guard; but, after a time, being discovered, -some guns were brought to bear on them; -and then man and horse, crushed together, went -over into the gulph; and the bridge, and the -rocks, and the defile beyond were strewed with -mangled bodies.</p> - -<p>This was the last calamity inflicted by the sword -upon the French army in this retreat; a retreat -attended by many horrid as well as glorious events; -for the peasants in their fury, with an atrocious -cruelty, tortured and mutilated every sick man and -straggler that fell into their power; and on the other -hand, the soldiers, who held together in their turn, -shot the peasants; while the track of the columns -might be discovered from afar by the smoke of the -burning houses.</p> - -<p>The French reached Montalegre on the 17th; -and an English staff-officer, with some cavalry, -being upon their rear, as far as Villella, picked -up some stragglers; but sir Arthur, with the main -body of the army, halted that day at Ruivaens. -The 18th he renewed the pursuit, and a part of his -cavalry passed Montalegre, followed by the guards; -the enemy was, however, drawn up behind the Salas -in force, and no action took place. Sylveira, indeed, -had entered Montalegre, from the side of Chaves, -before the British came up from Ruivaens; but -instead of pursuing, he put his men into quarters; -and a Portuguese officer of his division, who was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_300"></a>[300]</span> -despatched to marshal Beresford with orders to move -from Villa Perdrices upon Villa del Rey, loitered on -the road so long, that all chance of intercepting the -French line of march was at an end; for though -Beresford, on the 19th, pushed colonel Talbot with -the 14th dragoons as far as Ginjo, Franceschi turned -in force, and obliged that officer to retire; and thus -the pursuit terminated, with the capture of a few -stragglers on the Salas.</p> - -<p>Soult himself crossed the frontier by Allaritz on -the 18th; and on the 19th entered Orense, but -without guns, stores, ammunition, or baggage; his -men exhausted with fatigue and misery, the greatest -part being without shoes, many without accoutrements, -and in some instances even without muskets. -He had quitted Orense seventy-six days before, with -about twenty-two thousand men, and three thousand -five hundred had afterwards joined him from Tuy. -He returned with nineteen thousand five hundred, -having lost by the sword and sickness, by assassination -and capture, six thousand good soldiers; of -which number above three thousand were taken in -hospitals,<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> and about a thousand were killed by the -Portuguese, or had died of sickness, previous to the -retreat. The remainder were captured, or had -perished within the last eight days. He had carried -fifty-eight pieces of artillery into Portugal, and he -returned without a gun; yet was his reputation as -a stout and able soldier no wise diminished.</p> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_300fp" style="max-width: 30em;"> -<p class="fs70"><em>Plate 5. to face Pa. 300.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_300fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_300fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"><em>Sketch Explanatory</em> of the<br /> -OPERATIONS<br /> -between the<br /> -MINHO & DOURO,<br /> -<em>1809</em>.<br /> -<p><em>London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.</em></p></div> -</div> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia’s arrangements being continually -thwarted by the conspirators, his military -conduct cannot be fairly judged of. Nevertheless,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_301"></a>[301]</span> -the errors of the campaign may, without injustice, -be pointed out, leaving to others the task of tracing -them to their true sources.</p> - -<p>1º. The disposition of the army, on both sides of -the Douro, and upon such extended lines, when no -certain advice of the movements and strength of the -English force had been received, was rash. It was, -doubtless, right, that to clear the front of the army, -and to gather information, Franceschi should advance -to the Vouga; but he remained too long in the same -position, and he should have felt Trant’s force more -positively. Had the latter officer (whose boldness -in maintaining the line of the Vouga was extremely -creditable) been beaten, as he easily might have -been, the anarchy in the country would have increased; -and as Beresford’s troops at Thomar wanted -but an excuse to disband themselves, the Portuguese -and British preparations must have been greatly -retarded.</p> - -<p>2º. That Soult, when he had secured, as he -thought, all the boats on an unfordable river three -hundred yards wide, should think himself safe from -an attack for one day, is not wonderful. The improbability -that such a barrier could be forced in -half an hour might have rendered Fabius careless; -but there were some peculiar circumstances attending -the surprise of the French army which indicate -<span class="sidenote">Noble’s Campagne de Galice.</span> -great negligence. The commanding officer of one -regiment reported, as early as six o’clock, that the -English were crossing the river; the report was -certainly premature, because no man passed before -ten o’clock; but it reached Soult, and he sent general -Quesnel, the governor of Oporto, to verify the -fact. Quesnel stated, on his return, and truly, that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_302"></a>[302]</span> -it was an error, and Soult took no further precaution. -The patroles were not increased; no staff-officers -appear to have been employed to watch the river, -and no signals were established; yet it was but -three days since D’Argenton’s conspiracy had been -discovered, and the extent of it was still unknown. -This circumstance alone should have induced the -duke of Dalmatia to augment the number of his -guards and posts of observation, that the multiplicity -of the reports might render it impossible for the -malcontents to deceive him. The surprise at Oporto -must, therefore, be considered as a fault in the -general, which could only be atoned for by the -high resolution and commanding energy with which -he saved his army in the subsequent retreat.</p> - -<p>3º. When general Loison suffered marshal Beresford -to drive him from Pezo de Ragoa and Mezamfrio, -he committed a grave military error; but when -he abandoned Amarante, he relinquished all claim -to military reputation, as a simple statement of facts -will prove. The evening of the 12th he wrote to -Soult that one regiment had easily repulsed the -whole of the enemy’s forces; yet he, although at -the head of six thousand men, cavalry, infantry, and -artillery, that night and without another shot being -fired, abandoned the only passage by which, as far -as he knew, the rest of the army could escape from -its perilous situation with honour. It was not general -Loison’s fault if England did not triumph a -second time for the capture of a French marshal.</p> - - -<h4>MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH GENERAL.</h4> - -<p>1º. If sir Arthur Wellesley’s operation be looked -at as a whole, it is impossible to deny his sagacity -in planning, his decision and celerity in execution.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_303"></a>[303]</span> -When he landed at Lisbon, the nation was dismayed -by previous defeats, distracted with anarchy, and -menaced on two sides by powerful armies, one of -which was already in possession of the second city -in the kingdom. In twenty-eight days he had restored -public confidence; provided a defence against -one adversary; and having marched two hundred -miles through a rugged country, and forced the -passage of a great river—caused his other opponent -to flee over the frontier, without artillery or baggage.</p> - -<p>2º.—Such being the result, it is necessary to -show that the success was due, not to the caprice -of fortune, but to the talents of the general; that -he was quick to see, and active to strike; and, first, -the secresy and despatch with which the army was -collected on the Vouga belongs entirely to the man; -for, there were many obstacles to overcome; and -D’Argenton, as the sequel proved, would, by his -disclosures, have ruined sir Arthur’s combinations, -if the latter had not providently given him a false -view of affairs. The subsequent march from the -Vouga to the Douro was, in itself, no mean effort, -for, it must be recollected, that this rapid advance -against an eminent commander, and a veteran army -of above twenty thousand men, was made with -a heterogeneous force, of which only sixteen -thousand men were approved soldiers, the remainder -being totally unformed by discipline, -untried in battle, and, only three weeks before, -were in a state of open mutiny.</p> - -<p>3º.—The passage of the Douro, at Oporto, -would, at first sight, seem a rash undertaking; but, -when examined closely, it proves to be an example -of consummate generalship, both in the conception -and the execution. The careless watch maintained<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_304"></a>[304]</span> -by the French may, indeed, be called fortunate, -because it permitted the English general to get a -few men over unperceived; but it was not twenty-five, -nor twenty-five hundred, soldiers that could -have maintained themselves, if heedlessly cast on -the other side. Sir Arthur, when he so coolly -said—“<em>let them pass</em>,” was prepared to protect them -when they had passed. He did not give that order -until he knew that Murray had found boats at -Avintas, to ferry over a considerable number of -troops, and, consequently, that that general, descending -the Douro, could cover the right flank of -the Seminary, while the guns planted on the heights -of Sarea could sweep the left flank, and search all -the ground enclosed by the wall round the building. -If general Murray’s troops only had passed, they -would have been compromised; if the whole army -had made the attempt at Avintas, its march would -have been discovered; but in the double passage -all was secured: the men in the Seminary by the -guns, by the strength of the building, and by -Murray’s troops; the latter by the surprise on the -town, which drew the enemy’s attention away from -them. Hence, it was only necessary to throw a -few brave men into the Seminary unperceived, and -then the success was almost certain; because, while -that building was maintained, the troops in the -act of passing could neither be prevented nor -harmed by the enemy. To attain great objects by -simple means is the highest effort of genius!</p> - -<p>4º.—If general Murray had attacked vigorously, -the ruin of the French army would have ensued. -It was an opportunity that would have tempted a -blind man to strike; the neglect of it argued want -of military talent and of military hardihood; and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_305"></a>[305]</span> -how would it have appeared if Loison had not -abandoned Amarante? If Soult, effecting his -retreat in safety, and reaching Zamora or Salamanca -in good order, had turned on Ciudad -Rodrigo, he would have found full occupation -for sir Arthur Wellesley in the north; and he -would have opened a free communication with the -duke of Belluno. The latter must, then, have -marched either against Seville or Lisbon; and thus -the boldness and excellent conduct of the English -general, producing no adequate results, would have -been overlooked, or, perhaps, have formed a -subject for the abuse of some ignorant, declamatory -writer.</p> - -<p>5º.—Sir Arthur Wellesley’s reasons for halting -at Oporto, the 13th, have been already noticed, but -they require further remarks. Had he followed -Soult headlong, there is no doubt that the latter -would have been overtaken on the Souza river, and -destroyed; but this chance, arising from Loison’s -wretched movements, was not to be foreseen. Sir -Arthur Wellesley knew nothing of Beresford’s -situation; but he naturally supposed that, following -his instructions, the latter was about Villa Real; -and that, consequently, the French would, from -Amarante, either ascend the Tamega to Chaves, -or taking the road to Guimaraens and Braga, make -for the Minho. Hence, he remained where he -could command the main roads to that river, in -order to intercept Soult’s retreat and force him to -a battle; whereas, if he had once entered the defile -formed by the Douro and the Sierra de Catalina, -he could only have followed his enemy in one column -by a difficult route, a process promising little -advantage. Nevertheless, seeing that he detached<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_306"></a>[306]</span> -general Murray by that route at last, it would -appear that he should have ordered him to press -the enemy closer than he did; but there a political -difficulty occurred.</p> - -<p>The English cabinet, although improvident in -its preparations, was very fearful of misfortune, -and the general durst not risk the safety of a single -brigade, except for a great object, lest a slight -disaster should cause the army to be recalled. Thus, -he was obliged to curb his naturally enterprising -disposition, and to this burthen of ministerial incapacity, -which he bore even to the battle of Salamanca, -may be traced that over-caution which has -been so often censured as a fault, not only by military -<span class="sidenote">King Joseph’s captured Correspondence, MS.</span> -writers, but by Napoleon, who, judging from -appearances, erroneously supposed it to be a characteristic -of the man, and often rebuked his -generals for not taking advantage thereof.</p> - -<p>6º.—The marches and encounters, from the 14th -to the 17th, were excellent on both sides. Like -the wheelings and buffeting of two vultures in the -air, the generals contended, the one for safety, the -other for triumph; but there was evidently a failure -in the operations of marshal Beresford. Soult did -not reach Salamonde until the evening of the 15th, -and his rear guard was still there on the evening -of the 16th. Beresford was in person at Chaves -on the 16th, and his troops reached that place early -on the morning of the 17th. Soult passed Montalegre -on the 18th, but from Chaves to that place -is only one march.</p> - -<p>Again, marshal Beresford was in possession of -Amarante on the 13th, and as there was an excellent -map of the province in existence, he must have -known the importance of Salamonde, and that there<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_307"></a>[307]</span> -were roads to it through Mondin and Cavez, shorter -than by Guimaraens and Chaves. It is true that -Sylveira was sent to occupy Ruivaens and Melgacy; -but he executed his orders slowly, and Misarella -was neglected. Major Warre, an officer of the -marshal’s staff, endeavoured, indeed, to break down -the bridges of Ponte Nova and Ruivaens; and it -was by his exertions that the peasants, surprised at -the former, had been collected; but he had only a -single dragoon with him, and was without powder -to execute this important task. The peasantry, -glad to be rid of the French, were reluctant -to stop their retreat, and still more to destroy the -bridge of Misarella, which was the key of all the -communications, and all the great markets of the -Entre Minho e Douro; and therefore sure to -be built up again, in which case the people knew -well that their labour and time would be called for -without payment. It is undoubted that Soult owed -his safety to the failure in breaking those bridges; -and it does appear that if major Warre had been -supplied with the necessary escort and materials -he would have effectually destroyed them.</p> - -<p>Sylveira did not move either in the direction or -with the celerity required of him by Beresford, -there seems to have been a misunderstanding -between them; but allowance must be made for -the numerous mistakes necessarily arising in the -transmission of orders by officers speaking different -languages; and for the difficulty of moving troops -not accustomed, or perfectly willing to act together.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_308"></a>[308]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BVIII_III"> -<ins class="corr" id="tn-308" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'CHAP. III'"> -CHAPTER III</ins>.</h3> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote">S.<br /> -Journal of -Operations -MS.</div> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia halted at Orense the 20th, -but on the 21st put his troops in motion upon -Lugo, where general Fournier, of the 6th corps, -with three battalions of infantry and a regiment of -dragoons, was besieged by twelve or fifteen thousand -Spaniards, under the command of general -Mahi. But to explain this it is necessary to relate -Romana’s operations, after his defeat at Monterey -on the 6th of March.</p> - -<p>Having re-assembled the fugitives at Puebla de -Senabria, on the borders of Leon, he repaired -his losses by fresh levies, and was soon after joined -by three thousand men from Castile, and thus, unknown -to Ney, he had, as it were, gained the rear -of the sixth corps. Villa Franca del Bierzo was, at -this time, occupied by two weak French battalions, -and their nearest support was at Lugo: Romana resolved -to surprise them, and, dividing his forces, -sent Mendizabel with one division by the valley of -the Syl to take the French in rear, and marched -himself by the route of Calcabellos. The French, thus -surrounded in Villa Franca, after a short skirmish, -in which the Spaniards lost about a hundred men, -surrendered, and were sent into the Asturias.</p> - -<p>Romana then detached a part of his forces to -Orense and Ponte Vedra, to assist Morillo and the -insurrection in the western parts of Gallicia, -where, with the aid of the English ships of war, -and notwithstanding the shameful neglect of the -supreme central junta, the patriots were proceeding<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_309"></a>[309]</span> -vigorously. The moveable columns of the sixth -corps daily lost a number of men; some in open -battle, but a still greater number by assassinations, -which were rigorously visited upon the districts -where they took place; and thus, in Gallicia, as in -<ins class="corr" id="tn-309" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'every other other part'"> -every other part</ins> of Spain, the war hourly assumed -a more horrid character. Referring to this -period, colonel Barios afterwards told Mr. Frere -that, to repress the excesses of marshal Ney’s troops, -<span class="sidenote">Parl. Papers, 1810.</span> -he, himself, had, in cold blood, caused seven hundred -French prisoners to be drowned in the Minho; an -avowal recorded by Mr. Frere, without animadversion, -but which, happily for the cause of humanity, -there is good reason to believe was as false as it was -disgraceful.</p> - -<p>After the capture of Vigo, the Spanish force on -the coast increased rapidly. Barios returned to -Seville; Martin Carrera assumed the command of -the troops near Orense, and the Conde Noroña of -those near Vigo. General Maucune returned to -St. Jago from Tuy, and Ney, apprized of the loss -at Villa Franca, advanced to Lugo. Romana immediately -abandoned Gallicia, and, entering the -Asturias by the pass of Cienfuegos, marched along -the line of the Gallician frontier, until he reached -Navia de Suarna. Here he left Mahi, with the army, -to observe Ney, but repaired, himself, to Oviedo, -to redress the crying wrongs of the Asturians.</p> - -<p>It is unnecessary to recapitulate the evil doings -of the Asturian junta, which was notoriously corrupt -and incapable. Romana, after a short inquiry, -dismissed the members in virtue of his supreme -authority, and appointed new men; but this act of -justice gave great offence to Jovellanos and others. -It appeared too close an approximation to Cuesta’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_310"></a>[310]</span> -manner, in Leon, the year before; and as the central -government, always selfish and jealous, abhorred -any indication of vigour or probity in a general, -Romana was soon afterwards deprived of his command. -Meanwhile, he was resolutely reforming -abuses, when his proceedings were suddenly arrested -by an unexpected event.</p> - -<p>As soon as Ney understood that the Spanish -army was posted on the Gallician side of the -Asturian frontier, and that Romana was likely to -excite the energy of the Asturian people, he planned -a combined movement, to surround and destroy, not -only Romana and his army, but also the Asturian -forces, which then amounted to about fifteen thousand -men, including the <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">partida</i> of Porlier, commonly -called the Marquisetto. This force, commanded -by general Ballasteros and general Voster, -occupied Infiesta, on the eastern side of Oviedo, -and Castropol on the coast. Ney, with the consent -of Joseph, arranged that Kellerman, who was at -Astorga, with six guns and eight thousand seven -hundred men, composed of detachments, drawn -together from the different corps, should penetrate -the Asturias from the south east by the pass of -Pajares; that Bonnet, who always remained at the -town of St. Andero, should break in, from the north -east, by the coast road; and that the sixth corps -should make an irruption by the Concejo de Ibias, a -short but difficult route leading directly from Lugo.</p> - -<p>When the period for these combined movements -was determined, Ney, appointing general Marchand -to command in Gallicia during his own -absence, left three battalions under Maucune at St. -Jago, three others in garrison at Coruña under -general D’Armagnac, one at Ferrol, and three with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_311"></a>[311]</span> -a regiment of cavalry under Fournier at Lugo; and -then marched himself, with twelve battalions of infantry -and three regiments of cavalry, against Mahi. -The latter immediately abandoned his position -at Navia de Suarna, and drawing off by his left, -without giving notice to Romana, returned to -Gallicia and again entered the valley of the Syl. -Ney, either thinking that the greatest force was -near Oviedo, or that it was more important to -capture Romana than to disperse Mahi’s troops, continued -his route by the valley of the Nareca, and -with such diligence that he reached Cornellana and -Grado, one march from Oviedo, before Romana -knew of his approach. The Spanish general, thus -surprized, made a feeble and fruitless endeavour -to check the French at the bridge of Peñaflor, after -which, sending the single regiment he had with -him to Infiesta, he embarked on board an English -vessel at Gihon, and so escaped.</p> - -<p>The 18th of May, Ney entered Oviedo, where he -was joined by Kellerman, and the next day pursued -Romana to Gihon. Bonnet, likewise, executed his -part, but somewhat later; and thus Vorster, being -unmolested by Ney, had time to collect his corps -on the coast. Meanwhile Ballasteros, finding that -Bonnet had passed between him and Vorster, boldly -marched upon St. Andero and retook it, making -the garrison and sick men (in all eleven hundred) -prisoners. The Amelia and Statira, British frigates, -arrived off the harbour at the same moment, and -captured three French corvettes and two luggers, -on board of which some staff-officers were endeavouring -to escape.</p> - -<p>Bonnet, however, followed hard upon Ballasteros, -and, the 11th of June, routed him so completely<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_312"></a>[312]</span> -that he, also, was forced to save himself on -board an English vessel, and the French recovered -all the prisoners, and, amongst them, the men taken -at Villa Franca, by Romana. But, before this, Ney, -uneasy for his posts in Gallicia, had returned to -Coruña by the coast-road through Castropol, and -Kellerman, after several trifling skirmishes with -Vorster, had also retired to Valladolid. This expedition -proved that Asturia was not calculated for -defence, although, with the aid of English ships, it -might become extremely troublesome to the French.</p> - -<p>While Ney was in Asturia, Carrera, advancing -from the side of Orense, appeared in front of -St. Jago di Compostella at the moment that colonel -D’Esmenard, a staff-officer sent by the marshal to -give notice of his return to Coruña, arrived with an -escort of dragoons in Maucune’s camp. This escort -was magnified by the Spaniards into a reinforcement -of eight hundred men; but Carrera, who had -been joined by Morillo, commanded eight thousand, -and, on the 23d, having attacked Maucune, at a -place called “<em>Campo de Estrella</em>,” totally defeated -him, with a loss of six hundred men and several -guns. The Spaniards did not pursue, but the -French retreated in confusion to Coruña. Nor was -this the only check suffered by the 6th corps; for -Mahi, having united a great body of peasants to -his army, drove back Fournier’s outposts, and -closely invested him in Lugo on the 19th.</p> - -<p>Such was the state of affairs in Gallicia when -Soult arrived at Orense; and as the inhabitants of -that town, from whom he got intelligence of these -<span class="sidenote">S.<br />Journal of Operations MS.</span> -events, rather exaggerated the success of their -countrymen, the French marshal immediately sent -forward an advanced guard of his stoutest men to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_313"></a>[313]</span> -relieve Lugo, and followed himself, by the route of -Monforte, with as much speed as the exhausted -state of his troops would permit. The 22d, he -reached Gutin, and, the same day, his van being -descried on the mountains above Lugo, Mahi broke -up his camp, and fell back to Mondenedo.</p> - -<p>The 23d, Soult entered Lugo, where he heard of -the emperor’s first successes in Austria, and, with -renewed energy, prepared for fresh exertions himself. -The 30th, he was joined by Ney, who, uninformed -of Mahi’s position at Mondenedo, had -missed a favourable opportunity of revenging the -loss at St. Jago. Meanwhile Romana, disembarking -at Ribadeo, joined Mahi at Mondenedo, and immediately -marched along the line of the Asturias -frontier, until he arrived at the sources of the -Neyra, then, crossing the royal road, a little above -Lugo, plunged, once more, into the valley of the -Syl; and, having gained Orense, the 6th of June, -opened a communication with Carrera at St. Jago, -and with the insurgents at Vigo. This movement -of Romana’s was able, energetic, and worthy of -every praise.</p> - -<p>In pursuance of an order from the emperor, Soult -now sent eleven hundred men, composed of -dismounted dragoons and skeletons of cavalry -regiments, to France; and, having partially restored -the artillery and equipments of the second -corps, from the arsenals of Coruña and Ferrol, he, -in concert with the duke of Elchingen, arranged -a fresh plan for the destruction of Romana, the -execution of which failed, as shall be hereafter -noticed; but, at present, it is necessary to resume -the narrative of</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_314"></a>[314]</span></p> - - -<h4>VICTOR’S OPERATIONS.</h4> - -<p>After the abortive effort to gain Badajos, the duke -of Belluno, in obedience to the king’s orders, proceeded -<span class="sidenote">Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.</span> -to recover Alcantara. His rear was still -within two marches of Merida when the head of -his columns, under Lapisse, drove back some cavalry -posts, entered the town of Alcantara, and the next -day attempted the passage of the bridge.</p> - -<p>The Portuguese force consisted of two thousand -infantry, fifty cavalry, and six guns; and some works -of defence were constructed on the right bank of -the river; but, on the 14th of May, Lapisse lining -the rocks on the left bank of the river, skirmished -so sharply that the militia regiment of -Idanha gave way. Colonel Mayne then sprung a -mine, but the explosion doing little injury to -the bridge, the French made good the passage. -The Portuguese, who had suffered considerably, -retired to the Puente de Segura, and Lapisse immediately -sent patroles towards Castello Branco, -Salvatierra, and Idanha Nova.</p> - -<p>Intelligence of this attack having reached general -Mackenzie, he directed preparations to be made -for destroying the boat-bridge at Abrantes, and -marched, in person, by Cortiçada to Sobreira Formosa; -this movement, and a rumour that Soult -had retreated from Oporto, afforded an excuse to -Victor for again abandoning Alcantara, and resuming -his former camp. During his absence, Cuesta, true -to the promise he had given, attacked the fort of -Merida; but, on the return of the French advanced -guard, re-crossed the Guadiana, and fell back to -Zafra, having first ravaged all the flat country, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_315"></a>[315]</span> -obliged the inhabitants to withdraw into the mountains.</p> - -<p>Some time before this, king Joseph had received -a despatch from the French minister of war, giving -notice that reinforcements had sailed from England, -and warning him to lose no time in marching against -Lisbon, to create a useful diversion in favour of -Soult. It might be supposed that the original plan -of the emperor would then have been acted upon, -and this was the first thought of Joseph himself; -but other circumstances created doubt and hesitation -in his councils, and, finally, induced him to -abandon all thoughts of Portugal.</p> - -<p>When Napoleon returned to Paris, he imagined -hostilities with Austria, although certain, would -not break out so suddenly, but that he should -have time to organise a sufficient army in Germany, -without drawing his veteran troops from Spain. -Hence, he still left the imperial guards at Vittoria, -and sending the prince of Neufchatel to command -the troops on the Danube, he himself remained at -Paris, to superintend the preparations for opening -the campaign. The Austrians were, however, not -inattentive observers of the perfidy which accompanied -the invasion of Spain; and, aptly taking the -hint, attacked the French outposts and published -their own declaration of war at the same moment.</p> - -<p>Berthier, incapable of acting a principal part, -was surprised, and made a succession of false -movements that would have been fatal to the -French army, if the emperor, journeying day and -night, had not arrived at the very hour when his -lieutenant was on the point of consummating the -ruin of the army. Then, indeed, was seen the -supernatural force of Napoleon’s genius: in a few<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_316"></a>[316]</span> -hours he changed the aspect of affairs, in a -few days, maugre their immense number, his -enemies, baffled and flying in all directions, proclaimed -his mastery in an art which, up to that -moment, was imperfect; for never, since troops -first trod a field of battle, was such a display of -military skill made by man.</p> - -<p>But previous to these successes, so threatening -had been the aspect of affairs in Germany, that the -imperial guards had been recalled from Vittoria, -and hurried to the Danube, the great reserve of -infantry was, as we have seen, struck off the rolls -of the army in Spain, and the skeletons of the -fourth squadrons of every cavalry regiment were -ordered to return to their depôts in France. Even -the fifth corps, under Mortier, then on its way -to Valladolid from Zaragoza, was directed to -halt, and hold itself in readiness to march for -Germany; and thus, while Victor was reluctant to -move, while Ney was demanding more troops to -preserve Gallicia, and while the fate of the second -corps was unknown, the whole army was actually -diminished by forty thousand men, and fifteen -thousand more were paralysed with regard to -offensive operations.</p> - -<p>These things rendered Joseph timid. Madrid, -it was argued in his councils, was of more consequence -than Lisbon. Soult might be already at -the latter place; or, if not, he might extricate -himself from his difficulties, for the capital of -Spain must be covered. In pursuance of this -reasoning, Sebastiani was forbidden any forward -movement; and the duke of Belluno, whose army -was daily wasting with the Guadiana fever, took -a position at Torre-Mocha, a central point between<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_317"></a>[317]</span> -Truxillo, Merida, and Alcantara. His cavalry -<span class="sidenote">Semelé’s Journal of Operations MS.</span> -posts watched all the passages over the Guadiana -and the Tagus; and his communications with -Madrid, between the Tietar and the Tagus, were -protected by twelve hundred men, detached for -that purpose by the king.</p> - -<p>But one timid measure in war generally produces -another. The neighbourhood of the English force -at Castel Branco increased the energy of the Spanish -insurgents, who infested the valley of the Tagus, -and communicated secretly with those of the Sierra -de Guadalupe; hence, Victor, alarmed for his -bridge at Almaraz, sent a division there the 22d of -May; and, as from that period until the 10th of -June, he remained quiet: his campaign, which had -opened so brilliantly, was annulled. He had -neither assisted Soult, nor crushed Cuesta, nor -taken Badajos nor Seville; yet he had wasted and -lost, by sickness, more men than would have sufficed -to reduce both Lisbon and Seville. The Spaniards -were daily recovering strength and confidence; and -sir Arthur Wellesley, after defeating Soult, had full -leisure to return to the Tagus, and to combine -his future operations with the Spanish armies in -the south.</p> - -<p>Information that Lapisse had forced the bridge -of Alcantara reached the English general on the -night of the 17th. That part of the army which -was still behind Salamonde received immediate -orders to retrace their steps to Oporto; and when -the retreat of Soult by Orense was ascertained, -the remainder of the troops, including three Portuguese -brigades under Beresford, followed the -same route. Colonel Trant was then appointed -military governor of Oporto; and it was thought<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_318"></a>[318]</span> -sufficient to leave Sylveira with some regular -battalions and militia to defend the northern provinces; -for Soult’s army was considered a crippled -force, which could not for a long time appear again -in the field; a conclusion drawn, as we shall see, -from false data, and without due allowance being -made for the energy of that chief.</p> - -<p>As the army proceeded southward, the contracted -scope of Lapisse’s movements was ascertained. -Colonel Mayne was directed again to take post at -Alcantara; and a reinforcement of five thousand -men having landed at Lisbon, the rapidity of the -march slackened. Passing by easy journeys through -Coimbra, Thomar, and Punhete, the troops reached -Abrantes the 7th of June, and encamped on the -left bank of the Tagus; but there was sickness and -a great mortality in his ranks.</p> - -<p>From the moment of his arrival in Portugal, -sir Arthur Wellesley had looked to the defeat of -Victor as the principal, and the operation against -<span class="sidenote">Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence,<br />Parl. Papers, 1810.</span> -Soult as the secondary, object of the campaign; -and the English government, acceding to his -views, now gave him a discretionary power to -enter the nearest provinces of Spain, if Portugal -should not thereby be endangered. In his correspondence -with the junta and with Cuesta, he -had strongly urged the necessity of avoiding any -serious collision with the enemy until the British -troops could act in concert with the Spanish armies. -This advice, approved of by the junta, was -attended to by Cuesta; insomuch that he did not -seek a battle, but he exposed his advanced posts, -as if in derision of the counsel; and, disdainful -of the English general’s abilities, expressed his -belief that the latter had no desire to act heartily,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_319"></a>[319]</span> -“because,” said he, “the system of the British -appears to be never to expose their troops; owing -to which, they never gain decisive actions by land.”</p> - -<p>Cuesta’s knowledge of the enemy’s strength and -positions was always inaccurate, and his judgement -false; hence he himself not only never gained any -decisive action, but lost every army entrusted to his -command. He was discontented with the movement -against Soult, asserting that his hold of Gallicia -would only be strengthened thereby, unless that -favourite folly of all Spanish generals were adopted, -namely, surrounding the enemy, without regarding -whether the troops to be surrounded were more or -less numerous than the surrounders. Sir Arthur -Wellesley, however, affirmed that if Soult were -first driven over the Minho, a combined attack -afterwards made upon Victor would permanently -deliver Gallicia; and this plan being followed, -Gallicia was abandoned by the French, and they -never returned to that province.</p> - -<p>When the English army was again free to act, -Cuesta was importunate that a joint offensive operation -against Victor should be undertaken; but, -obstinately attached to his own opinions, he insisted -upon tracing the whole plan of campaign. Yet -his views were so opposed to all sound military -principles, that sir Arthur, although anxious to -conciliate his humour, could scarcely concede the -smallest point, lest a vital catastrophe should follow. -Valuable time was thus lost in idle discussions -which might have been employed in useful action; -for the return of the British army from the Douro -had falsified Victor’s position at Torremocha. That -marshal, as late as the 10th of June, had only one -division guarding the bridge at Almaraz; and it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_320"></a>[320]</span> -was difficult for him to ascertain the movements of -sir Arthur Wellesley, covered, as they were, by -the Tagus, the insurgents, and Mackenzie’s corps -of observation: hence, by rapid marches, it was -possible for the English general, while Victor was -still at Torremocha, to reach the valley of the -Tagus, and cutting the first corps off from Madrid, -to place it between two fires.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Semelé’s -Journal of Operations -MS.</div> - -<p>This did not escape the penetration of either -commander; but sir Arthur was forced to renounce -the attempt, partly because of the sick and harassed -condition of his troops, the want of shoes and -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XVI">Appendix, No. 16</a>.</span> -money, and the difficulty of getting supplies; but -chiefly that Cuesta’s army was scattered over the -open country, between the defiles of Monasterio -and the Guadiana, and, as he refused to concentrate -<span class="sidenote">Parliamentary Papers, 1810.</span> -or retire, Victor might have marched against and -crushed him, and yet found time to meet the British -on the Tietar. Early in June, however, marshal -Beresford was, with three brigades, directed upon -Castello Branco, and the duke of Belluno, immediately -taking the alarm, and being also assured, by -despatches from Madrid, of Soult’s retreat, resolved -to re-cross the Tagus. But, previous to commencing -this movement, he resolved to secure his flank, by -causing the bridge of Alcantara to be destroyed.</p> - -<p>Colonel Mayne, as I have already observed, had -been again entrusted with that post; but, unfortunately, -his first orders to blow up the bridge, if the -enemy advanced, were not rescinded, although the -return of the army from the north rendered such a -proceeding unnecessary. Mayne did not keep his -instructions secret; and Victor, hearing of them, -sent a detachment to the bridge with no other view -than to cause its destruction. He succeeded; and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_321"></a>[321]</span> -this noble monument of Trajan’s genius was overturned. -But such is the nature of war that, not -long afterwards, each army found its fall injurious -to their interests, and, as a matter of taste and of -military advantage, both sides alike sighed over the -ruins of Alcantara.</p> - -<p>Having completed this operation, Victor passed -the Tagus, at Almaraz, on the 19th, without being -molested by Cuesta, and, removing his boat-bridge, -proceeded to take post at Plasencia. Meanwhile -Beresford was obliged to return to the defence of -the northern provinces of Portugal, which Soult -was again menacing, for, during the forced inactivity -of the British, at Abrantes, the cause of which I -shall explain in another place, changes in the relative -positions of the hostile armies were taking -place; and it is important that these changes should -be well understood, because on them the fate of the -succeeding campaign hinged.</p> - -<p>When Ney and Soult met at Lugo, they, although -still on bad terms, agreed, after some discussion, -that the first should march from Coruña, by the -route of St. Jago and Vigo, against Carrera and the -Conde de Noroña; and that the second, entering -the valley of the Syl, should attack Romana, and -drive him upon Orense, at which place it was expected -that Ney, after taking or blocking Vigo, -would be able to reach him, and thus the whole -force of Gallicia be crushed at once. Soult was -then to menace the Tras os Montes, by the side of -Bragança, with the view of obliging sir Arthur -Wellesley to remain in that province, while the -second corps opened a direct communication with -Madrid and with the first corps.</p> - -<p>Ney returned to Coruña; and, on the 1st of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_322"></a>[322]</span> -June, two divisions of infantry and a brigade of -dragoons, of the second corps, marched upon Monforte: -they were followed, the next day, by two -other divisions of infantry; and, at the same time, -Franceschi, who was on the Fereira river, supported -by La Houssaye’s dragoons, was directed, -after scouring the road to St. Jago, to fall down the -right bank of the Tambuga, towards Orense.</p> - -<p>From the 2d to the 9th the main body halted at -Monforte, to get up stores from Lugo, and to scour -the country on the flanks; for Romana, in his passage, -had again raised the peasantry of all the -valleys. Loison also, with a division, entered the -Val des Orres, having orders to feign a movement -towards Villa Franca and Puente Ferrada, as if for -the purpose of meeting a French column in that -direction.</p> - -<p>The 10th, Loison passed the Syl, and took post -at the Puente de Bibey.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">S.<br /> -Journal of -Operations -MSS.</div> - -<p>The 12th, Franceschi, reinforced with a division -of infantry, arrived at Monte Furada on the Syl, -and, sending a detachment to Laronco, connected -his division with Loison’s. The remainder of the -infantry followed this movement, and detachments -were sent up the course of the Syl, and towards -Dancos, on the road from Villa Franca to Lugo. -Loison also forced the passage of the Puente de -Bibey, and drove the insurgents to Puebla de Tribes. -The French army thus cleared all the valleys opening -on the course of the Upper Minho, and Romana -was confined to the lower part of that river.</p> - -<p>The 13th, Franceschi, ascending the valley of the -Bibey, took post at Bollo and the bridge of the -Hermitage, and then pushed his patroles even to -Gudina and Monterey on one side, and into the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_323"></a>[323]</span> -Sierra de Porto on the other, as far as the sources -of the Bibey, with a view of ascertaining, first, the -exact direction which Romana would take to avoid -Loison’s column; secondly, to prevent the Spanish -general from passing the left of the French army, -and gaining the Asturias by the route of Puebla de -Senabria. These precautions occupied the duke -of Dalmatia till the 19th, when, being assured -that Romana had fallen back to Monterey, he -judged that the latter would attempt the same -march towards Puebla de Senabria, by which -he had escaped after the action in the month of -March. The French army was therefore directed -up the valley of the Bibey, upon Viana, where -there was a bridge, and where many of the mountain -roads united. The same day Franceschi fell in with -the head of Romana’s army, and repulsed it; and -the evening of the 20th the whole of the French -troops were concentrated near Viana, intending to -give battle to the Spaniards the next morning; but -the latter retreated precipitately during the night, -and many of the men dispersed.</p> - -<p>Soult continued his movement by the left until -he reached the great road running from Castile to -Orense, and from thence, having sent Heudelet’s -division to Villa Vieja to threaten the Tras os Montes -frontier, and Mermet’s division and Lorge’s dragoons -towards La Canda to observe the road of Puebla de -Senabria, he marched himself, with an advanced -guard, to La Gudina, leaving Laborde and La Houssaye -in reserve between Gudina and Villa Vieja. -These divers movements, through the rugged passes -of Gallicia, led to a variety of slight skirmishes, -the most important of which took place at the Puente -de Bibey, a place of such prodigious strength that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_324"></a>[324]</span> -it is scarcely conceivable how men, with arms, could -be brought to abandon such a post.</p> - -<p>Romana’s situation was now nearly hopeless, but -he was saved by a misunderstanding between the -French marshals. It appears that Ney, having -marched from Coruña, entered St. Jago with about -ten thousand men, and Carrera fell back upon -Ponte Vedra, where the Conde de Noroña joined -him with some fresh troops, and, assuming the -command, continued the retreat to the Octavem -river, behind which he took post, placing his main -body at the bridge of San Payo, and sending detachments -to guard some secondary points. On the -7th of June, the French came up. The Spaniards -had thirteen thousand men, two eighteen-pounders, -and nine field-pieces. Of these forces, seven thousand -men armed, three thousand unarmed, and the -whole of the artillery, were in position to defend -the passage at San Payo; the bridge was cut, and -overlooked by a battery of two eighteen-pounders. -Three thousand were in reserve at Redondela; and, -at Vigo, about sixty stragglers, from sir John Moore’s -army, were landed, and, in conjunction with a detachment -of seamen and marines, occupied the forts. -Some Spanish gun-boats, one of which was manned -by English seamen, under captain Winter, also -proceeded up the river to the bridge of San Payo.</p> - -<p>During the 7th, a desultory and useless fire took -place on both sides; but, on the 8th, the French -were repulsed in some feeble attempts made to force -a passage at San Payo and at Soto Mayor, higher -up the river, the loss on either side being about a -hundred men. These attacks were merely to keep -the Spaniards employed until the reports of the -officers, sent by Ney to ascertain the situation and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_325"></a>[325]</span> -projects of Soult’s army, were received, and, in -the evening of the 8th, those officers returned with -information, obtained from the peasants, that the -second corps was retreating upon Castile. I have -been assured by persons, then on marshal Ney’s -staff, that he, amazed at these tidings, rashly concluded -that Soult, swayed by personal feelings, -wished to endanger the sixth corps, and filled with -indignation, immediately retired to Coruña; while -Soult, on the other hand, viewed this retreat as a -breach of their engagements, and an underhand policy -to oblige him to remain in Gallicia. Certain it -is that by these ebullitions of temper, both Romana -and Noroña were saved; for there was nothing to -prevent Ney from sending a column against Orense, -whilst he himself occupied Noroña, on the Octavem; -and, however spirited the conduct of the -Spaniards was at San Payo, it would be ridiculous -to imagine that ten thousand of the best soldiers of -France, led by an officer so quick and resolute as -Ney, could have been resisted by an equal number -of raw troops and peasants, one-third of whom -were without arms. But the history of the quarrel -between these marshals is involved in mystery, the -clearing of which must be left to those who shall -write the memoirs of the men. For the purposes -of this history it is sufficient to know that there -was ill-blood, and that therein the Gallicians found -safety.</p> - -<p>Soult, informed of Ney’s retreat and of sir Arthur -Wellesley’s arrival on the Tagus, ceased to pursue -Romana, and marched to Zamora, where his sick -had been before sent, and where his brother, general -Soult, had conducted three or four thousand stragglers -and convalescents. Here, also, he requested<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_326"></a>[326]</span> -the king to send the artillery and stores necessary -to re-equip the second corps; and here he proposed -to give his harassed troops some rest, for they had -now been for eight months incessantly marching -and fighting, and men and officers were alike dispirited -by the privations they had endured, and by -the terrible nature of a war in which the most -horrid scenes were daily enacted.</p> - -<p>To put the king in possession of his views, Soult -sent general Franceschi to Madrid; but this celebrated -officer, refusing an escort, fell into the hands -<span class="sidenote">S.<br />Journal of Operations MSS.</span> -of the <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">Capuchino</i>. Being transferred to Seville, -the central junta, with infamous cruelty, treated -him as if he had been a criminal instead of a brave -soldier, and confined him in a dungeon at Carthagena. -The citizens there, ashamed of their government, -endeavoured to effect his escape; but he perished -at the moment when his liberation was certain. -When his young wife, a daughter of count Mathieu -Dumas, heard of his fate, she refused all nourishment; -and, in a few days, by her death, added one -more to the thousand instances of the strength of -woman’s affections.</p> - -<p>The 25th of June, Soult reached Puebla de Senabria.</p> - -<p>The 28th, he marched to Mombuey.</p> - -<p>The 29th and 30th, he crossed the Esla, by the -bridges of San Pelayo and Castro Gonzales.</p> - -<p>The 2d of July, he entered Zamora, having previously -rejected a proposition of Ney’s, that the -two corps should jointly maintain Gallicia, a rejection -which induced the duke of Elchingen to -evacuate that province.</p> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_326fp" style="max-width: 30em;"> -<p class="fs70"><em>Plate 6. to face Pa. 326.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_326fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_326fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"><em>Sketch Explanatory of<br /> -NEY & SOULT’S</em>,<br /> -OPERATIONS IN GALLICIA,<br /> -in June 1809.<br /> -<p><em>London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p>To effect this, Ney formed a camp near Betanzos; -and, on the 22d of July, withdrew his garrisons -from Coruña and Ferrol, having previously destroyed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_327"></a>[327]</span> -all the stores and arsenals and disabled the land -defences. Nevertheless, his influence was still so -powerful that captain Hotham, commanding the -English squadron, off Coruña, seeing the hostile -attitude maintained by the inhabitants, landed his -seamen on the 24th, and spiked the guns on the -sea-line; and, in like manner, compelled a Spanish -garrison, left by Ney in the forts of Ferrol, to -surrender on the 26th. The marshal, however, -marched, unmolested, by the high road to Astorga, -where he arrived on the 30th, having brought off -all his own sick and those of the second corps also, -who had been left in Lugo. Thus Gallicia was -finally delivered.</p> - -<p>This important event has been erroneously attributed -to the exertions of the Spaniards. Those exertions -were creditable to the Gallicians, although -the most powerful motive of action was to protect -their personal property; and, when the French -withdrew, this same motive led them to repair their -losses by resisting the payment of tithes and rents, -a compensation by no means relished by the proprietors -or the church. But it is certain that their -efforts were only secondary causes in themselves, -and chiefly supported by the aid of England, whose -ships, and arms, and stores were constantly on the -coast.</p> - -<p>How can the operations of the Spaniards be said -to have driven the sixth corps from Gallicia, when -Ney retained every important post in that province -to the last; when single divisions of his army, at -two different periods, traversed the country, from -Coruña to Tuy, without let or hindrance; and when -the Spaniards could not prevent him from over-running<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_328"></a>[328]</span> -the Asturias without losing his hold of Gallicia? -It is true, Soult, writing to Joseph, affirmed -that the Gallicians would wear out the strongest -army; that is, if a wrong system was pursued by -the French, but he pointed out the right method of -<span class="sidenote">Intercepted Despatches, Parl. Pap. 1810.</span> -subduing them, namely, in pursuance of Napoleon’s -views, to fortify some principal central points, from -whence the moveable columns could overrun the -country; and this, he estimated, would only require -fifty thousand pounds and six weeks’ labour. It is -plain the real causes of the deliverance were—First, -The quarrels between the marshals, which saved -Romana and Noroña from destruction.—Secondly, -The movements of sir Arthur Wellesley on the Tagus; -for, in an intercepted letter from Soult to -Joseph, that marshal expressly assigns the danger -hanging over Madrid and the first corps as the -reason of his refusing to remain in Gallicia. Now, -although Soult’s views were undoubtedly just, and -his march provident, the latter necessarily drew after -it the evacuation of Gallicia; because, it would -have been absurd to keep the sixth corps cooped up -in that corner of the Peninsula, deprived of communication, -and estranged from the general operations.</p> - -<p>The movement of the second corps, after quitting -Monforte, being along the edge of the Portuguese -frontier, and constantly threatening the northern -provinces, drew marshal Beresford, as I have before -stated, from Castello Branco; and all the regular -Portuguese forces capable of taking the field were -immediately collected by him round Almeida. The -duke del Parque was at Ciudad Rodrigo; and as -that part of Romana’s force, which had been cut -off by Soult’s movement upon Gudina, fell back upon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_329"></a>[329]</span> -Ciudad Rodrigo, not less than twenty-five thousand -men, Portuguese and Spaniards, were assembled, or -assembling, round those two fortresses: and the -change of situation thus brought about in the armies -on the northern line was rendered more important -by the events which were simultaneously taking -place in other parts, especially in Aragon, where -general Blake, whose army had been augmented to -more than twenty thousand men, inflated with his -success at Alcanitz, advanced to Ixar and Samper.</p> - -<p>Suchet, himself, remained close to Zaragoza, but -kept a detachment, under general Faber, at Longares -and Villa Muel, near the mountains on the -side of Daroca. Blake, hoping to cut off this detachment, -marched, himself, through Carineña, and sent -general Arisaga, with a column, to Bottorita; the -latter captured a convoy of provisions on the Huerba; -but Faber retired to Plasencia, on the Xalon.</p> - -<p>The 14th of June, the advanced guards skirmished -at Bottorita; and Blake, endeavouring to surround -the enemy, pushed a detachment to Maria, in the -plain of Zaragoza.</p> - -<p>The excitement produced in that city, and in -Aragon generally, by this march, was so great, that -Suchet doubted if he should not abandon Zaragoza, -and return towards Navarre. The peasantry had -assembled on many points in the mountains around, -and it required great vigilance to keep down the -spirit of insurrection in the city itself. The importance -of that place, however, made him resolve -to fight a battle, for which the near approach of -Blake, who came on in the full confidence that -the French general would retreat, furnished an opportunity -which was not neglected.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_330"></a>[330]</span></p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF MARIA.</h4> - -<p>The 14th, after some skirmishing, the Spanish -army was concentrated at Bottorita.</p> - -<p>The 15th, Blake slowly and unskilfully formed -his troops in order of battle, near the village of -Maria, and perpendicular to the Huerba, of which -he occupied both banks. Towards two o’clock in -the day, he extended his left wing to outflank the -right of the French; but Suchet, who had just then -been rejoined by Faber, and by a brigade from -Tudela, immediately stopped this evolution, by attacking -the wing with some cavalry and light troops. -The Spaniards then fell back to their line of battle; -and Blake, drawing men from his right to reinforce his -centre and left, was immediately engaged in a severe -conflict. He repulsed the foremost of the enemy’s -columns; but so violent a storm arose at the moment, -that neither army could see the other, although -close together, and the action ceased for a time. -Blake’s position was so ill chosen, that he was surrounded -by ravines, and had only one line of retreat, -by the bridge of Maria, which was on the extremity -<span class="sidenote">Suchet’s Memoirs.</span> -of his right flank. Suchet, observing this error, when -the storm had cleared off a little, briskly engaged the -centre and left of the Spaniards, and forming his -cavalry and two regiments of infantry in column, by -one vigorous effort broke quite through the Spanish -horse, and seized the bridge of Maria. Notwithstanding -this, Blake, who was at all times intrepid, -collected the infantry of his centre and left wing in -a mass, and stood for the victory; but the French -troops overthrew his with a great slaughter. A -general, twenty-five guns, and many stands of colours -were taken; yet few prisoners, for the darkness<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_331"></a>[331]</span> -enabled the dispersed Spaniards to escape by the -ravines; and Blake rallied them the next day at -Bottorita. The French lost nearly a thousand men, -and general Harispé was wounded.</p> - -<p>During this action, a French brigade held the -position of Monte Torrero, without mixing in the -fight, lest the citizens of Zaragoza, being released -from their presence, should rise against the garrison; -but after the victory, this brigade marched down -the Ebro to cut off Blake’s retreat. General Laval, -who commanded it, did not, however, execute his -orders; and the Spanish army retired on the night -of the 16th.</p> - -<p>The 17th, the rear guard suffered some loss at -Torrecilla; and on the 18th, the two armies were -again in presence at Belchite. Blake, reinforced -by some detachments, was about fourteen thousand -strong; but he had lost the greatest part of his -artillery, and his men were dispirited. Suchet, on -the contrary, having by the success at Maria awed -the Aragonese, was able to bring twenty-two battalions -and seven squadrons, or about fifteen thousand -men, flushed with victory, into action.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF BELCHITE.</h4> - -<div class="sidenote">Suchet’s -Memoirs.</div> - -<p>The Spaniards were drawn up on a range of hills -half enclosing the town; their right, resting on a -hermitage and some buildings, was inaccessible to -cavalry; the left was also well covered; and behind -the right, a hill with a building on it, overtopping -all the position and occupied by a reserve, served -<span class="sidenote">Blake’s Despatch.</span> -as a rallying point, because there was an easy line -of communication between it and the left wing. -The centre, being on rough ground containing the -town of Belchite which had a wall and gates, was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_332"></a>[332]</span> -also very strong; and the whole position was so -compact, that Blake, after completely filling his line, -had yet a considerable reserve in hand. His dispositions -were made to fight by his centre and right, -his left being rather in the nature of an advanced -post.</p> - -<p>A French battalion commenced the action, by -skirmishing with the Spanish centre; but, at the -same time, two columns of attack marched, the one -against the right, the other against the left. The -latter, which was the principal one, preceded by a -fire of artillery, soon closed upon the Spanish troops, -and Blake’s guns opened from his centre and right; -but an ammunition-waggon blowing up was the -signal for a panic, which, commencing on the left, -reached to all parts of the line. The Spanish -general then made a charge of cavalry, to retrieve -the day, but it was easily repulsed, and the confusion -that followed is thus described by himself:—“One -regiment fled without firing a shot; it was -followed by another, and a third, all flying without -having discharged a gun; and, in a few moments, -the whole position was abandoned.”—“Thus we, -the generals and officers, were left alone, without -being able to rally a body which could make any -opposition; and I had the mortification to see our -army dispersed, abandoning all its baggage, and -throwing away its arms, and even its clothes, before -a single corps of the enemy; nor were we able to -avail ourselves of the defence of any strong place, -as it was impossible to collect two hundred men to -make head against the enemy.”</p> - -<p>Blake, although a bad general, was a man of real -courage: stung to the quick by this disgrace, he -reproached his troops with bitterness, demanded an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_333"></a>[333]</span> -inquiry into his own conduct, and, with a strong -and sincere feeling of honour, restored to the junta -the estate which had been conferred upon him for -the success at Alcanitz.</p> - -<p>This battle and the pursuit, in which Suchet -took about four thousand prisoners, and all the -artillery, ammunition, and baggage of the Spaniards, -not only made him master of the operations in -Aragon, but also rendered the fifth corps, under -Mortier, who were now at Valladolid, completely -disposable for offensive operations. Thus, on the -1st of July, there were, exclusive of Kellerman’s -and Bonnet’s divisions, three complete <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">corps d’armée</i>, -furnishing six thousand cavalry and fifty thousand -infantry, collected between Astorga, Zamora, -and Valladolid. The inroad on Portugal had failed, -and the loss of Gallicia followed; but Napoleon’s -admirable system of invasion was unbroken. His -troops, deprived of his presiding genius, had been -stricken severely and shrunk from further aggression; -they had been too widely spread for a secure -grasp, but the reaction disclosed all the innate -strength of his arrangements.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_334"></a>[334]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BVIII_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - -<p>The British army remained in the camp of -Abrantes until the latter end of June. During this -period, sir Arthur Wellesley, although burning to -enter Spain, was kept back by a variety of difficulties.</p> - -<p>He had been reinforced with five thousand men -immediately after his return from the Douro; and, -in the preceding operations, the killed and hurt in -battle did not exceed three hundred men, but the -deaths by sickness were numerous. Four thousand -men in hospital, and fifteen hundred employed in -escort and depôt duties, being deducted, the gross -amount of the present under arms, as late even as -the 25th of June, did not exceed twenty-two thousand -men; and these were, at any moment, liable -to be seriously diminished, because the ministers, -still intent upon Cadiz, had authorized Mr. Frere, -whenever the junta should consent to the measure, -to draw a garrison for that town from sir Arthur’s -force. As an army, therefore, it was weak in every -thing but spirit. The commissariat was without -sufficient means of transport; the soldiers nearly -barefooted, and totally without pay; the military -chest was empty, and the hospitals were full.</p> - -<div class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XVI">Appendix, -No. 16</a>.</div> - -<p>The expense, at a low estimation, was about two -hundred thousand pounds a month, and, with the -most strenuous exertions, a hundred and sixty thousand -pounds only had been procured in the two -months of May and June; and of this, thirteen -thousand had been obtained as a temporary loan in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_335"></a>[335]</span> -Oporto. The rate of exchange in Lisbon was high, -and, notwithstanding the increased value given to -the government paper by the successes on the Douro, -<span class="sidenote">Parl. Papers, 1810.</span> -this rate was daily rising. The Spanish dollar was -at five shillings, while Spanish gold sunk so much -in value that the commissary-general sent all that -he received from England, or could collect in Lisbon, -to Cadiz, and other parts, to truck for dollars; -but, in all places of commerce, the exchange -was rising against England, a natural consequence -of her enormous and increasing issues of paper. -Those issues, the extravagant succours given to -Spain, together with subsidies to Austria, made it -impossible to supply the army in Portugal with -specie, otherwise than by raising cash, in every -quarter of the globe, on treasury-bills, and at a -most enormous loss; an evil great in itself, opening -a wide door to fraud and villany, and rendered the -war between France and England not so much a -glorious contest of arms as a struggle between public -credit and military force, in which even victory -was sure to be fatal to the former.</p> - -<p>The want of money, sickness, Cuesta’s impracticable -temper, and a variety of minor difficulties, -too tedious to mention, kept the army in a state of -inactivity until the end of June; but, at that period, -the retreat of the first corps from Torremocha, and -the consequent advance of Cuesta, removed one -obstacle to offensive operations, and sir Arthur, -having the certainty that eight thousand additional -troops were off the rock of Lisbon, then commenced -his march into Spain by the northern banks of the -Tagus, meaning to unite with Cuesta on the Tietar, -and to arrange, if possible, a plan of operations -against Madrid.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_336"></a>[336]</span></p> - -<p>But, before I embark on the full and broad stream -into which the surges and eddies of the complicated -warfare that succeeded Napoleon’s departure from -the Peninsula settled, I must give a general view of -the state of affairs, that the reader, comprehending -exactly what strength each party brought to the -encounter, may judge more truly of the result.</p> - - -<h4>FRENCH POWER.</h4> - -<table class="autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men. </td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3">The French, having received some reinforcements of conscripts, amounted, - in the beginning of July, including the king’s guards, to about</td> -<td class="tdrb">275,000</td> -<td class="tdrb"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">In hospital</td> -<td class="tdr">61,000</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -<td class="tdr" rowspan="2">68,000</td> -<td class="tdr" rowspan="2"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Stragglers and prisoners borne on the states</td> -<td class="tdr">7,000</td> -<td class="tdl">}</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad6">Total under arms</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">207,000</td> -<td class="tdr">36,000</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3">The military governments, lines of correspondence, garrisons, and detachments, absorbed</td> -<td class="tdrb">32,000</td> -<td class="tdrb">3,000</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"><em>Present under arms</em> with the <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">corps d’armée</i></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdrb">175,000</td> -<td class="tdrb">33,000</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -</table> - - -<div class="sidenote">Muster -roll of the -French -Army, -MSS.</div> - -<p>The actual strength and situation of each <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">corps -d’armée</i> was as follows:—</p> - -<table class="p2 autotable fs80" width="100%" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3"><em>Under the King, covering Madrid.</em></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Inf. & Art.</td> -<td class="tdr">Cavalry.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">First corps, in the valley of the Tagus</td> -<td class="tdr">20,881</td> -<td class="tdr">4,200</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Fourth corps, La Mancha</td> -<td class="tdr">17,490</td> -<td class="tdr">3,200</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Division of Dessolles, Madrid</td> -<td class="tdr">6,864</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">King’s French guards, Madrid, about</td> -<td class="tdr">4,000</td> -<td class="tdr">1,500</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr padr2">Total</td> -<td class="tdr">49,235</td> -<td class="tdr">8,900</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="3"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3"><em>In Old Castile, under Marshal Soult.</em></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Inf. & Art.</td> -<td class="tdr">Cavalry.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Second corps, Zamora, Tora, and Salamanca</td> -<td class="tdr">17,707</td> -<td class="tdr">2,883</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Fifth corps, Valladolid</td> -<td class="tdr">16,042</td> -<td class="tdr">874</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Sixth corps, Astorga, and its vicinity</td> -<td class="tdr">14,913</td> -<td class="tdr">1,446</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr padr2">Total</td> -<td class="tdr">48,662</td> -<td class="tdr">5,203</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="3"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3"><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_337"></a>[337]</span> - <em>In Aragon, under General Suchet.</em></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Inf. & Art.</td> -<td class="tdr">Cavalry.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Third corps, Zaragoza, Alcanitz, &c.</td> -<td class="tdr">15,226</td> -<td class="tdr">2,604</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="3"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3"><em>In Catalonia, under Marshal Augereau.</em></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Inf. & Art.</td> -<td class="tdr">Cavalry.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Seventh corps, Vich, Gerona, and Barcelona</td> -<td class="tdr">30,593</td> -<td class="tdr">2,500</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p>In addition to these corps there were twelve hundred -men belonging to the battering train, four -thousand infantry under Bonnet, at St. Andero, and -two thousand two hundred cavalry under Kellerman, -in the Valladolid country.</p> - -<p>The fortresses and armed places in possession of -the French army were—St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, -Bilbao, Santona, St. Andero, Burgos, Leon, Astorga, -on the northern line;</p> - -<p>Jacca, Zaragoza, Guadalaxara, Toledo, Segovia, -and Zamora, on the central line;</p> - -<p>Figueras, Rosas, and Barcelona, on the southern -line.</p> - -<p>It needs but a glance at these dispositions and -numbers to understand with what a power Napoleon -had fastened upon the Peninsula, during his six -weeks’ campaign. Much had been lost since his -departure, but his army still pressed the Spaniards -down, and, like a stone cast upon a brood of snakes, -was immoveable to their writhings. Nevertheless, -the situation of Spain, at this epoch, was an ameliorated -one compared to that which, four months -before, the vehemence of Napoleon’s personal warfare -had reduced it to. The elements of resistance -were again accumulated in masses, and the hope, -or rather confidence, of success was again in full -vigour; for, it was in the character of this people, -while grovelling on the earth, to suppose themselves -standing firm; and, when creeping in the gloom of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_338"></a>[338]</span> -defeat, to imagine they were soaring in the full -blaze of victory.</p> - -<p>The momentary cessation of offensive operations -on the part of the French, instead of being traced -to its true sources, the personal jealousies of the -marshals, and the king’s want of vigour, was, as -usual, attributed, first—to fear and weakness; secondly—to -the pressure of the Austrian war. It -was not considered that the want of unity, checking -the course of conquest, would cease when the -French army was driven to the defensive; neither -was the might of France duly weighed, while -the strength of Austria was unduly exalted. -The disasters at Ucles, at Almaraz, at Zaragoza, -Rosas, Cardadeu, Valls, at Ciudad Real, Medellin, -Braga, and Oporto, and in the Asturias, were all -forgotten. The French had been repulsed from -Portugal, and they had not taken Seville. This, -to the Spaniards, was sufficient evidence of their -weakness; and, when the French were supposed -to be weak, the others, by a curious reasoning -process, always came to the conclusion that they -were themselves strong. Hence, the fore-boasting -at this period was little inferior to what it had -been after the battle of Baylen; and the statement -of the relative numbers was almost as absurd. The -utmost amount of the French force was not calculated -higher than a hundred and fifteen, or a hundred -and twenty, thousand men, of which about -fifty thousand were supposed to be on the French -side of the Ebro, and the whole only waiting for -an excuse to abandon the Peninsula.</p> - - -<h4>SPANISH POWER.</h4> - -<p>The Spanish armies, on paper, were, as usual,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_339"></a>[339]</span> -numerous; and the real amount of the regular force -was certainly considerable, although very inadequate -to the exigencies or the resources of the country. -Before the battle of Belchite had broken Blake’s -strength, there were, organized and under arms, -twelve thousand cavalry, and about one hundred and -twenty thousand infantry, exclusive of irregular bands -and armed peasantry, who were available for particular -defensive operations. After that defeat the -number of regular forces, capable of taking the field -in the south-eastern provinces, was not above twenty -thousand men, of which about ten thousand, under -Coupigny, were watching Barcelona, or, again, -rallying under Blake; the remainder were in Valencia, -where Caro, Romana’s brother, had taken -the command.</p> - -<p>In the north-western provinces there were about -twenty-five thousand men, of which fifteen thousand -were in Gallicia; some thousands in the Asturias, -under Voster and Ballasteros, and the remainder, under -the duke del Parque, who was directed to organize a -new army in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo.</p> - -<p>In Andalusia, or covering it, there were about seventy -thousand men. Of these twenty-three thousand -infantry, and two thousand five hundred cavalry, -were assembled in the Morena, near St. Elena and -Carolina, under the command of general Venegas; -and thirty-eight thousand, including seven thousand -cavalry, were in Estremadura, under the orders of -Cuesta, who was nominally commander-in-chief of -both armies.</p> - -<p>The troops, thus divided into three grand divisions, -were called the armies of <em>the right</em>, <em>the centre</em>, -<em>the left</em>. The fortresses were—Gerona, Hostalrich, -Lerida, Maquinenza, Tarragona, Tortosa,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_340"></a>[340]</span> -Valencia, Carthegena, and Alicant, for the army of -the right; Cadiz and Badajos for that of the centre; -Ciudad Rodrigo, Coruña, and Ferrol, for the army -of the left.</p> - -<p>The Spanish troops were, however, far from -being serviceable, in proportion to their numbers; -most of them were new levies, and the rest were -ill-trained. The generals had lost nothing of their -presumption, learnt nothing of war, and their -mutual jealousies were as strong as ever. Cuesta -still hating the junta, was feared and hated by that -body in return; and Venegas was placed at the -head of the Carolina army as a counterpoise to him. -Romana, also, was obnoxious to the junta; and, in -return, with more reason, the junta was despised -and disliked by him. In Valencia and Murcia -generals and juntas appeared alike indifferent to -the public welfare, and satisfied if the war was -kept from their own doors. In Catalonia there -never was any unanimity.</p> - -<p>Blake, who had abandoned Romana in Gallicia, -and who was still at enmity with Cuesta, had been, -for these very reasons, invested with supreme -power in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia; and, -moreover, there were factions and bickerings among -the inferior officers in the armies of Venegas and -Cuesta. Albuquerque was ambitious of commanding -in chief, and Mr. Frere warmly intrigued in his -cause, for that gentleman still laboured under the -delusion that he was appointed to direct the military -instead of conducting the political service in the -Peninsula.</p> - -<p>In April, he had proposed to the junta that a -force of five thousand cavalry and some infantry, -taken from the armies of Cuesta and Venegas,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_341"></a>[341]</span> -should, under the command of the duke of Albuquerque, -commence offensive operations in La -<span class="sidenote">Parliamentary Papers, 1810.</span> -Mancha; this, he said, would, “<em>if the enemy refused -to take notice of it</em>,” become “a very serious -and perhaps a decisive movement;” and he was so -earnest that, without communicating upon the -subject with sir Arthur Wellesley, without waiting -for the result of the operations against Soult, he -pretended to the junta that the co-operation of the -English army with Cuesta (that co-operation which -it was sir Arthur’s most anxious wish to bring -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VIII">Appendix, No. 8</a>.</span> -about) could only be obtained, as the price of the -Spanish government’s acceding to his own proposal. -The plenipotentiary’s greatest efforts were, -however, directed to procure the appointment of -Albuquerque to the command of an army; but -that nobleman was under the orders of Cuesta, -who was not willing to part with him, and, -moreover, Frere wished to displace Venegas, not -that any fault was attributed to the latter, but -merely to make way for Albuquerque; a scheme so -indecorous that both the junta and Cuesta peremptorily -rejected it.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Parliamentary -Papers, -1810.</div> - -<p>Mr. Frere did not hesitate to attribute this rejection -to a mean jealousy of Albuquerque’s high birth -and talents; but the junta had sufficient reason for -their conduct, not only on this occasion, but afterwards, -when they refused to give him any independent -command. The duke, although a brave -and patriotic and even an able soldier, was the -dupe of a woman who corresponded with the -French. The junta, in the fear of offending him, -forbore to punish her, at first, yet, finally, they were -obliged to shut her up, and they could not entrust -him with a command while her dangerous influence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_342"></a>[342]</span> -lasted. Hence, Mr. Frere’s intrigue failed to serve -Albuquerque, and his military project for La -Mancha fell to the ground, when sir Arthur -Wellesley, unable to perceive its advantages, strongly -advised the junta, not to weaken but to reinforce -Cuesta’s army; not to meddle with the French -either in La Mancha or Estremadura, but to preserve -a strict defensive in all quarters.</p> - -<p>The <em>supreme junta</em> was itself in fear of the old -<em>junta of Seville</em>, and the folly and arrogance of the -first and its neglect of the public weal furnished -ample grounds of attack, as a slight sketch of its -administrative proceedings will suffice to prove. -The king, after the battles of Medellin and Ciudad -Real, had, through the medium of don Joachim -Sotelo, a Spanish minister in his service, made an -attempt to negotiate for the submission of the junta, -which was spurned at by the latter, in suitable -terms, for dignified sentiments and lofty expressions -were never wanting to the Spanish, although, taken -with their deeds, they were but as a strong wind -and a few shrivelled leaves.</p> - -<p>The junta did not fail to make the nation observe -their patriotism upon this occasion, and, indeed, -took every opportunity to praise their own proceedings. -Nevertheless, men were not wanting in -Spain most anxious, not only to check the actual -abuses of power, but to lay bare all the ancient oppressions -of the country, and recur to first principles, -both for present reform and future permanent -good government; in short, to make public -avowal of the misrule which had led to their misfortunes, -and, if possible, to amend it. Knowing -that although national independence may co-exist -with tyranny, it is inseparable from civil and religious<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_343"></a>[343]</span> -freedom,—they desired to assemble the -cortez, and to give the people an earnest that national -independence was worth having; to convince -them that their sufferings and their exertions -would lead to a sensible good, instead of a mere -choice between an old and a new despotism; and this -party was powerful enough to have a manifesto to -their purpose drawn up by the junta, and it would -have been published, if the English ministers had -not interposed; for, as I have before said, their -object was not Spain, but Napoleon.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Parliamentary -Papers, -printed -1810.</div> - -<p>Mr. Frere vigorously opposed the promulgation -of this manifesto, and not ambiguously hinted that -the displeasure of England, and the wrath of the -partizans of despotism in Spain, would be vented -on the junta, if any such approach to real liberty -was made. In his despatches to his cabinet he -wrote that, from his knowledge of the members of -the junta, he felt assured they would “<em>shrink from -the idea of giving permanent effect to the measures -which they held out</em>;” and this expression he meant -in their praise! but still he thought it necessary to -check the tendency to freedom in the outset; and it -would be injustice not to give his sentiments in his -own words, sentiments which were at this time -perfectly agreeable to his immediate superior, Mr. -Canning, but offering a curious contrast to the -political liberality which that politician afterwards -thought it his interest to affect.</p> - -<p>Writing as a Spaniard, Mr. Frere thus addressed -don Martin Garay:—</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Papers -laid before -Parliament, -1810.</div> - -<p>“If we have indeed passed three centuries under -an arbitrary government, let us not forget that it is -a price which we pay for having conquered and -peopled the fairest portion of the globe; that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_344"></a>[344]</span> -integrity of this immense power rests solely on -these two words, religion and the king. If the old -constitution has been lost by the conquest of America, -our first object should be to recover it, but in -such a manner as not to lose what has cost us so -much in the acquisition. From this consideration, -it appears to me that we ought to avoid, as <em>political -poison, any annunciation of general principles, the -application of which it would be impossible to limit or -qualify, even when the negroes and Indians should -quote them in favour of themselves</em>. But let us -allow that we have made a <em>bad exchange in bartering -our ancient national liberty for the glory and extension -of the Spanish name</em>. Let us allow that the -nation has been deceived for three centuries, and -that this error should, at all hazards, be immediately -done away. Even though it were so, it does -not appear <em>very becoming the character of a well -educated person to pass censures upon the conduct of -his forefathers</em>, or to complain of what he has lost -by their negligence or prodigality; and still less so, -if it is done in the face of all the world: and what -shall we say of a nation who should do this publicly, -and after mature deliberation?”</p> - -<p>The manifesto was suppressed, a new one more -consonant to Mr. Frere’s notions was published, and -a promise to convoke the cortez given, but without -naming any specific time for that event. The junta, -who, as Mr. Frere truly stated, were not at all -disposed to give any effect to free institutions, now -proceeded to prop up their own tottering power by -severity: they had, previous to the manifesto, -issued a menacing proclamation, in which they -endeavoured to confound their political opponents -with the spies and tools of the French; and having<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_345"></a>[345]</span> -before established a tribunal of public security, they -caused it to publish an edict, in which all men, who -endeavoured to raise distrust of the junta, or who -tried to overturn the government, by popular commotions, -or other means that had, by the junta, -been reprobated, were declared guilty of high -treason, undeserving the name of Spaniards and -sold to Napoleon, their punishment to be death, and -confiscation of property. Any person propagating -rumours, tending to weaken or soften the hatred of -the people against the French, was instantly to be -arrested and punished without remission; lastly, -rewards were offered for secret information upon -these heads.</p> - -<p>This decree was not a dead letter. Many persons -were seized, imprisoned, and executed, without trial, -or knowing their accusers. But the deepest stain -upon the Spanish character, at this period, was the -treatment experienced by prisoners of war. Thousands, -and amongst them part of Dupont’s troops, -who were only prisoners by a breach of faith, were -sent to the Balearic Isles, but no order was taken -for their subsistence. When remonstrated with, -the junta cast seven thousand ashore on the little -desert rock of Cabrera. At Majorca, numbers had -been massacred by the inhabitants, in the most -cowardly and brutal manner, but those left on -Cabrera suffered miseries that can scarcely be -described. The supply of food, always scanty, was -often neglected altogether: there was but one spring -on the rock, which dried up in summer; clothes were -never given to them except by the English seamen, -who, compassionating their sufferings, often assisted -them, in passing the island. Thus, afflicted with -hunger, thirst, and nakedness, they lived like wild<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_346"></a>[346]</span> -beasts while they could live, but perished in such -numbers, that less than two thousand remained to tell -the tale of this inhumanity; and surely, it was no -slight disgrace that the English government failed -to interfere on such an occasion.</p> - -<p>But what were the efforts made for the defence -of the country by this inhuman junta, which, having -been originally assembled to discuss the form of -establishing a central government, had, unlawfully, -retained their delegated power, and used it so -shamefully? There was a Spanish fleet, and a sufficient -number of sailors to man it, in Carthagena. -There was another fleet, and abundance of seamen, -in Cadiz. Lord Collingwood, and others, pressed -the junta, constantly and earnestly, to fit these -vessels out, and to make use of them, or at least to -place them beyond the reach of the enemy. His -remonstrances were unheeded; the sailors were rendered -mutinous for want of pay, and even of subsistence, -and the government would neither fit out -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_IX">Appendix, No. 9</a>.</span> -ships themselves, nor suffer the English seamen to -do it for them; and at the very period when the -marquis of Romana and the insurgents in Gallicia -were praying for a few stands of arms and five -<span class="sidenote">Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence.</span> -thousand pounds, from sir John Cradock, the junta -possessed many millions of money, and their magazines, -<span class="sidenote">General Miller’s Memoirs.</span> -in Cadiz, were unable to contain the continually -increasing quantity of stores and arms arriving -from England, which were left to rot as they -arrived, while, from every quarter of the country -not yet subdued, the demand for these things was -incessant.</p> - -<p>The fleet in Cadiz harbour might have been at -sea in the beginning of February. In a week it -might have been at Vigo, with money and succours<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_347"></a>[347]</span> -of all kinds for the insurgents in Gallicia; after -which, by skilful operations along the coast from -Vigo to St. Sebastian, it might have occupied an -enormous French force on that line of country. But -instead of a fleet, the junta sent colonel Barios, an -obscure person, to steal through by-ways, and to -take the command of men who were not in want of -leaders. In the same manner, the fleet in Carthagena -might have been employed on the Catalonian -and French coasts; but, far from using their -means, which were really enormous, with energy -and judgement, the junta carried on the war by encouraging -virulent publications against the French, -and confined their real exertions to the assembling -of the unfortunate peasants in masses, to starve for -a while, and then to be cut to pieces by their more -experienced opponents.</p> - -<p>The system of false reports, also, was persevered -in without any relaxation: the French were beaten -on all points; the marshals were slain or taken; -their soldiers were deserting, or flying in terror at -the sight of a Spaniard; Joseph had plundered and -abandoned Madrid; and Zaragoza had not fallen. -Castro, the envoy to the Portuguese regency, so -late as April, anxiously endeavoured to persuade -that government and the English general, that -Zaragoza had never been subdued, and that the story -of its fall was a French falsehood. In June, official -letters were written to marshal Beresford, from the -neighbourhood of Lugo, dated the very day upon -which Soult’s army relieved that town, not to give -intelligence of the event, but to announce the utter -defeat of that marshal, and the capture of Lugo -itself; the amount of the killed and wounded, and -the prisoners taken, being very exactly stated; and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_348"></a>[348]</span> -this, with such an appearance of truth, as to deceive -Beresford, notwithstanding his previous experience -of the people he had to deal with.</p> - -<p>But the proofs of corruption and incapacity in the -junta are innumerable, and not confined to the -records of events kept by British officers. Romana, -a few months later, upon the question of appointing -a regency, thus describes their conduct: “He -himself,” he said, “had doubted if the central -junta was a lawful government, and this doubt was -general in the provinces through which he had -passed; yet he had, to preserve the nation from -anarchy, not only yielded obedience to it, but he -had, likewise, forced the provinces of Gallicia, Leon, -and Asturias to do the same; because he thought -that an illegal government might be useful if it -deserved the confidence of the people, and that they -respected its authority. The central junta, however, -was not thus situated: the people, judging of measures -by their effects, complained that the armies -were weak, the government without energy; that -there were no supplies; that the promised accounts -of the public expenditure were withheld; and yet, -all the sums drawn from America, all the succours -granted by England, the rents of the crown, and -the voluntary contributions were expended. The -public employments were not given to men of merit -and true lovers of their country. Some of the -members of the junta rendered their power subservient -to their own advantage; others conferred lucrative -appointments on their relations and dependents. -Ecclesiastical offices had been filled up to -enable individuals to seize those rents for themselves -which ought to be appropriated for the public -service. There was no unity to be found: many of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_349"></a>[349]</span> -the junta cared only for the interest of their particular -province, as if they were not members of the -Spanish monarchy; confirming the appointments of -the local juntas, without regard to fitness; and even -assigning recompenses to men destitute of military -knowledge, who had neither seen service nor performed -the duties assigned to them.”</p> - -<p>“The junta, divided into sections, undertook to -manage affairs in which they were unversed, and -which were altogether foreign to their professions. -Horses, taken from their owners under pretence of -supplying the armies, were left to die of hunger in -the sea-marshes: and, finally, many important -branches of administration were in the hands of -men, suspected, both from their own conduct and -from their having been creatures of that infamous -favourite who was the author of the general misery.”</p> - -<p>It was at this period that the celebrated <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">Partidas</i> -first commenced the <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">guerilla</i>, or petty warfare, -which has been so lauded, as if that had been the -cause of Napoleon’s discomfiture. Those bands were -infinitely numerous, because, every robber, that feared -a jail, or that could break from one; every smuggler,<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> -whose trade had been interrupted; every friar, -disliking the trammels of his convent; and every -idler, that wished to avoid the ranks of the regular -army, was to be found either as chief or associate -in the <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">partidas</i>.</p> - -<p>The French, although harassed by the constant -and cruel murders of isolated soldiers, or followers -of the army, and sometimes by the loss of convoys, -were never thwarted in any great object by these -bands; but the necessity of providing subsistence,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_350"></a>[350]</span> -and attaching his followers to his fortunes, generally -obliged the guerilla chief to rob his countrymen; -and, indeed, one of the principal causes of the sudden -growth of this system was the hope of intercepting -the public and private plate, which, under -a decree of Joseph, was bringing in from all parts -to be coined in Madrid; for that monarch was -obliged to have recourse to forced loans, and the -property of the proscribed nobles, and suppressed -convents, to maintain even the appearance of a -court.</p> - -<p>This description will apply to the mass of the -<i lang="es" xml:lang="es">partidas</i>; but there were certainly some who -were actuated by nobler motives; by revenge; by -a gallant enterprising spirit; or, by an honest ambition, -thinking to serve their country better than -by joining the regular forces. Among the principal -chiefs may be placed, Renovales, and the two Minas, -in Navarre and Arragon; Porlier named the <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">marquisetto</i>, -and Longa, in the Asturias and Biscay; -Juan Martin, or <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">El Empecinado</i>, who vexed the -neighbourhood of Madrid; Julian Sanchez, in the -Gata and Salamanca country; doctor Rovera, Pereña, -and some others, in Catalonia; Juan Paladea, -or <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">El Medico</i>, between the Moreno and Toledo; -the curate Merino, <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">El Principe</i>, and Saornil, in -Castile; the friar Sapia, in Soria, and Juan Abril, -near Segovia.</p> - -<p>But these men were of very different merit. Renovales, -a regular officer, raised the peasantry of -the valleys between Pampeluna and Zaragoza, after -the fall of the latter city; but he was soon subdued. -Juan Martin, Rovera, Julian Sanchez, and the student -Mina, discovered most military talent, and -Sanchez was certainly a very bold and honest man;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_351"></a>[351]</span> -but Espoz y Mina, the uncle and successor of the -student, far outstripped his contemporaries in fame. -He shed the blood of his prisoners freely, but rather -from false principle, and under peculiar circumstances, -than from any real ferocity, his natural -disposition being manly and generous; and, although -not possessed of any peculiar military genius, he -had a sound judgement, surprising energy, and a -constant spirit.</p> - -<p>By birth a peasant, he despised the higher orders -of his own country, and never would suffer any -<i lang="es" xml:lang="es">hidalgo</i>, or gentleman, to join his band. From -1809, until the end of the war, he maintained himself -in the provinces bordering on the Ebro; often -defeated, and chased from place to place, he gradually -increased his forces; until, in 1812, he yet was -at the head of more than ten thousand men, whom -he paid regularly, and supplied from resources -chiefly created by himself; one of which was remarkable:—He -established a treaty with the French -generals, by which articles, not being warlike stores, -coming from France, had safe conduct from his -<i lang="es" xml:lang="es">partida</i>, on paying a duty, which Mina appropriated -to the subsistence of his followers.</p> - -<p>That the guerilla system could never seriously -affect the progress of the French, is proved by the -fact, that the constant aim of the principal chiefs -was to introduce the customs of regular troops; and -their success against the enemy was proportionate -to their progress in discipline and organization. -There were not less than fifty thousand of these -irregular soldiers, at one time, in Spain; and so -severely did they press upon the country that it -may be assumed as a truth that if the English -army had abandoned the contest, one of the surest<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_352"></a>[352]</span> -means by which the French could have gained the -good will of the nation would have been the extirpating -of the <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">partidas</i>. Nevertheless, one great and -unquestionable advantage was derived by the regular -armies, and especially by the British, from the existence -of these bands. The French corps could never -communicate with each other, nor combine their movements, -except by the slow method of sending officers -with strong escorts; whereas, their adversaries could -correspond by post, and even by telegraph, an advantage -equal to a reinforcement of thirty thousand men.</p> - - -<h4>PORTUGUESE POWER.</h4> - -<p>The Portuguese military system has been already -explained. The ranks of the regular army, and of -the militia, were filling; the arms and equipments -were supplied by England; and means were taking -to give effect to the authority of the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">captans mor</i>, -or chiefs of districts, under whom the <i lang="pt" xml:lang="pt">ordenanzas</i> -were to be gathered for the defence of the country. -The people having been a second time relieved from -an invasion, by the intervention of a British army, -were disposed to submit implicitly to the guidance -of their deliverers; but the effect of former misgovernment -pervaded every branch of administration, -political and municipal, and impeded the efforts -made to draw forth the military resources of the kingdom. -It is a curious fact that, not only at this period, -but until the end of the war, such was the reluctance -of the people to become soldiers, that, notwithstanding -their undoubted hatred of the French, -their natural docility, and the visible superiority of -the soldiers’ condition over that of the peasant or -artisan, the recruiting was always difficult; and the -odious spectacle was constantly exhibited, of men<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_353"></a>[353]</span> -marched in chains, to reinforce armies, which were -fighting in what was a popular, and ought to have -been a sacred cause.</p> - -<p>The actual number of regular troops, armed and -organized, was not above fifteen thousand, and, notwithstanding -the courage displayed by those employed -in the late operations, marshal Beresford was -doubtful of their military qualities, and reluctant to -act separately from the British troops. The most -important fortresses in a condition for defence were -Elvas, Albuquerque, and Almeida, in the first line; -Abrantes and Peniché, in the second; the citadel, -and forts of Lisbon and Palmela, in the third. But -there were many other walled places, capable, if -armed, of standing a siege, and presenting a variety -of strong points for the irregular force of the country -to assemble upon; and hence, Portugal offered, -not only great resources in men, but a base of operations -solid in itself; central with respect to the -French armies, and enabling the English general to -act, without reference to the Spanish government -or Spanish commanders; an advantage more justly -appreciated at the end of the campaign than at the -commencement. Such were the relative situations -of the contending hosts in the Peninsula; yet, to -take an enlarged view of affairs, it is necessary to -look beyond the actual field of battle; for the contest -in Spain, no longer isolated, was become an -integral part of the great European struggle against -France.</p> - -<p>Napoleon, after his first successes near Ratisbon, -entered Vienna, and attempted to carry the war to -the left bank of the Danube; but a severe check, -received at the battle of Esling on the 21st of May, -so shook his moral ascendancy in Europe, that he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_354"></a>[354]</span> -deemed it necessary to concentrate all the disposable -strength of his empire for one gigantic effort, -which should restore the terror of his name. The -appearance of inactivity assumed by him, while -thus mightily gathering his forces, deceived his -enemies; and, as their hopes rose, their boasts -became extravagant, more especially in England, -where, to express a doubt of his immediate overthrow -was regarded as a heinous offence; and -where the government, buoyed up with foolish -expectations, thought less of supporting a noble -and effectual warfare in Portugal than of nourishing -and aiding the secondary and rather degrading -hostility of conspirators, malcontents, and military -adventurers in Germany.</p> - -<p>While sir Arthur Wellesley was waiting impatiently -on the Tagus for the scanty reinforcements -afforded him, two other armies were simultaneously -preparing to act against the extremities of the -French empire; the one, consisting of about twelve -thousand men, drawn from Sicily, was destined to -invade Italy, the southern parts of which had been -denuded of troops to oppose the Austrians on the -<span class="sidenote">Adjutant-general’s Returns.</span> -Tagliamento. The other was assembled on the -coast of England, where above forty thousand of -the finest troops the nation could boast of, and a -fleet of power to overthrow all the other navies of -the world combined, composed an armament, intended -to destroy the great marine establishment -which the French emperor had so suddenly and -so portentously created at Antwerp. So vast an -expedition had never before left the British shores; -neither any one so meanly conceived, so improvidently -arranged, so calamitously conducted, for -the marine and land forces, combined, numbered -more than eighty thousand fighting men, and those<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_355"></a>[355]</span> -of the bravest; yet the object in view was comparatively -insignificant, and even that was not obtained. -Delivered over to the leading of a man, whose -military incapacity has caused the glorious title of -Chatham to be scorned, this ill-fated army, with -spirit, and strength, and zeal to have spread the -fame of England to the extremities of the earth, -perished, without a blow, in the pestilent marshes -of Walcheren! And so utterly had party spirit -stifled the feeling of national honour that public -men were found base enough to reprobate the convention -of Cintra, to sneer at sir John Moore’s operations, -and yet to declare the Walcheren expedition -wise, profitable, and even glorious!</p> - -<p>The operation against Italy was less unfortunate -rather than more ably conducted, and it was equally -abortive. What with slow preparations, the voyage, -and the taking of the petty islands of Ischia and -Procida, thirteen weeks were wasted; and yet, -during that period, Murat, conscious of his inability -to resist, was only restrained from abandoning Naples -by the firmness of his queen, and the energy -of Sallicetti, the minister of police. We have seen -that it was the wish of the ministers to have the -troops in Sicily employed in the south of Spain, -but, yielding to the representations of sir John -Stuart, they permitted him to make this display of -military foolery: yet it is not with the bad or good -success of these expeditions that this history has to -deal, but with that palpable and direful ministerial -incapacity which suffered two men, notoriously unfitted -for war, to waste and dissipate the military -strength of England on secondary objects, while a -renowned commander, placed at the most important -point, was left without an adequate force.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_356"></a>[356]</span></p> - -<p>For the first time since the commencement of the -Peninsula war, sixty thousand Spanish troops, well -armed and clothed, were collected in a mass, and in -the right place, communicating with a British force. -For the first time since Napoleon swayed the destiny -of France, the principal army of that country had -met with an important check: the great conqueror’s -fortune seemed to waver, and the moment had arrived -when the British government was called to -display all its wisdom and energy. The duke of -York had performed his duty; he had placed above -ninety thousand superb soldiers, all disposable for -offensive operations, in the hands of the ministers; -but the latter knew not their value, and, instead of -concentrating them upon one, scattered them upon -many points. Sir Arthur Wellesley might have had -above eighty thousand British troops on the frontiers -of Portugal, and he was a general capable of -wielding them. He was forced to commence a -campaign, upon which the fate of the Peninsula, a -quick triumph or a long-protracted agony of twelve -millions of people depended, with only twenty-two -thousand; while sixty thousand fighting men, and -ships numerous enough to darken all the coasts of -Spain, were waiting, in Sicily and England, for -orders which were to doom them, one part to scorn, -and the other to an inglorious and miserable fate. -Shall the deliverance of the Peninsula, then, be -attributed to the firmness and long-sighted policy -of ministers who gave these glaring proofs of improvidence, -or shall the glory of that great exploit -lighten round the head of him who so manfully -maintained the fierce struggle, even under the burden -of their folly?</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_357"></a>[357]</span><br /></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="BOOK_IX">BOOK IX.</h2> -</div> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BIX_I">CHAPTER I.</h3> - -<h4>CAMPAIGN OF TALAVERA.</h4> - -<p>In the foregoing book the real state of affairs in -the Peninsula has been described; but it appeared -with a somewhat different aspect to the English -general, because false informations, egregious -boasts, and hollow promises, such as had been -employed to mislead sir John Moore, were renewed -at this period; and the allied nations were influenced -by a riotous rather than a reasonable -confidence of victory. The English newspapers -teemed with letters, describing the enemy’s misery -and fears: nor was the camp free from these -inflated feelings. Marshal Beresford was so credulous -of French weakness as publicly to announce -to the junta of Badajos that Soult’s force, wandering -and harassed by continual attacks, was -reduced to eight or ten thousand distressed soldiers. -Nay, sir Arthur Wellesley himself, swayed by the -pertinacity of the tale-makers, the unhesitating -assurances of the junta, perhaps, also, a little excited -by a sense of his own great talents, was not free -from the impression that the hour of complete -triumph was come.</p> - -<p>The Spanish government and the Spanish generals -were importunate for offensive movements,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_358"></a>[358]</span> -and lavish in their promises of support; and the -English general was as eager, for he was at the -head of gallant troops, his foot was on the path of -victory, and he felt that, if the duke of Belluno -was not quickly disabled, the British army, threatened -on both flanks, would, as in the case of sir -John Cradock, be obliged to remain in some defensive -position, near Lisbon, until it became the -scorn of the French, and an object of suspicion -and hatred to the Spanish and Portuguese people.</p> - -<p>There were three lines of offensive operations -open:—</p> - -<p>1º. <em>To cross the Tagus, join Cuesta’s army, and, -making Elvas and Badajos the base of movements, -attack Victor in front.</em> This line was circuitous. -It permitted the enemy to cover his front by the -Tagus; the operations of the allies would have -been cramped by the Sierra de Guadalupe on one -side, and the mountains lying between Albuquerque -and Alcantara on the other; and strong -detachments must have been left to cover the roads -to Lisbon, on the right bank of the Tagus. Finally, -the communication between the duke of Belluno -and Soult being free, Beresford’s corps would have -been endangered.</p> - -<p>2º. <em>To adopt Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo as the -base of movements, and to operate in conjunction with -Beresford, the duke del Parque, and Romana, by -the line of Salamanca, while Cuesta and Venegas -occupied the attention of the first and fourth corps -on the Tagus.</em> The objections to this line were, -that it separated the British troops from the most -efficient and most numerous, and obliged them to -act with the weakest and most irregular of the -Spanish armies; that it abandoned Cuesta to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_359"></a>[359]</span> -ruin which his headstrong humour would certainly -provoke; and as the loss of Seville or of Lisbon would -inevitably follow; the instructions of the English -ministers, (which enjoined the defence of the latter -city as paramount to every object, save the military -possession of Cadiz,) would have been neglected.</p> - -<p>3º. <em>To march upon Plasencia and Almaraz, form -a junction with Cuesta, and advance against Madrid, -while Venegas operated in the same view, by the line -of La Mancha.</em> The obstacles in the way of this -plan were—1º. That it exposed Cuesta to be defeated -by Victor before the junction; and that, -after the junction, the combinations would still be -dependent upon the accuracy of Venegas’s movements. -2º. That sir Arthur Wellesley’s march, -with reference to Soult’s corps, would be a flank -march: an unsafe operation at all times, but, on -this occasion, when the troops must move through -the long and narrow valley of the Tagus, peculiarly -dangerous. Nevertheless, this line was adopted, -nor were the reasons in favour of it devoid of force.</p> - -<p>The number of French immediately protecting -Madrid was estimated at fifty thousand; but confidential -officers, sent to the head-quarters of Cuesta -and Venegas, had ascertained that their strength -was not overstated at thirty-eight thousand, for the -first, and twenty-five thousand for the second, all -well armed and equipped, and the last certainly -the best and most efficient army that the Spaniards -had yet brought into the field. Now the English -force in Portugal amounted to thirty thousand -men, exclusive of the sick, twenty-two thousand -being under arms on the frontier, and eight thousand -at Lisbon: here, then, was a mass of ninety thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_360"></a>[360]</span> -regular troops that could be brought to bear on fifty -thousand; besides which there were sir Robert -Wilson’s legion, about a thousand strong, and the -Spanish <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">partidas</i> of the Guadalupe and the Sierra -de Bejar.</p> - -<p>The ridge of mountains which separate the -valley of the Tagus from Castile and Leon being, -as has been already related, impracticable for artillery, -except at the passes of Baños and Perales, it -was supposed that the twenty thousand men under -Beresford and the duke del Parque would be sufficient -to block those lines of march, and that -Romana, moving by the Tras os Montes, might join -the duke del Parque, and thus thirty thousand men, -supported by two fortresses, would be ready to -protect the flank of the British army in its march -from Plasencia towards Madrid. A vain calculation, -for Romana remained ostentatiously idle at -Coruña, and sir Arthur Wellesley, never having seen -the Spanish troops in action, thought too well of -them; and having had no experience of Spanish -promises he trusted them too far; and, at the same -time, made a false judgement of the force and position -of his adversaries. The arrival of the sixth corps -at Astorga and of the fifth at Valladolid were unknown -to him: the strength of the second corps, -and, perhaps, the activity of its chief, were also -underrated. Instead of fifteen or twenty thousand -harassed French troops, without artillery, there -were seventy thousand fighting-men behind the -mountains!</p> - -<p>The 27th of June, the English army, breaking up -from the camp of Abrantes, and, being organized in -the following manner, marched into Spain:—</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_361"></a>[361]</span></p> - -<table class="autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5"><em>Artillery.</em></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Six brigades,</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">30</td> -<td class="tdl">guns,</td> -<td class="tdl">comd. by maj.-gen. Howorth.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="5"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5"><em>Cavalry.</em></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Three brigades,</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">3047</td> -<td class="tdl">sabres,</td> -<td class="tdl">comd. by lt.-gen. Payne.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td colspan="5"> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5"><em>Infantry.</em></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">1st div. of</td> -<td class="tdl">4 brigades,</td> -<td class="tdr">6023</td> -<td class="tdl">bayonets,</td> -<td class="tdl">comd. by lt.-gen. Sherbrooke.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2d do.</td> -<td class="tdl">2 do.</td> -<td class="tdr">3947</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">do.</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">do. maj.-gen. Hill.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">3d do.</td> -<td class="tdl">2 do.</td> -<td class="tdr">3736</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">do.</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">do. m.-gen. Mackenzie.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">4th do.</td> -<td class="tdl">2 do.</td> -<td class="tdr">2957</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">do.</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">do. br.-gen. Campbell.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">—</td> -<td class="tdl">—</td> -<td class="tdr">——–</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">5 divs.</td> -<td class="tdl">13 brigades,</td> -<td class="tdr">19710</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">sabres and bayonets.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">—</td> -<td class="tdl">—</td> -<td class="tdr">1287</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Engineers, artillery, and waggon-train.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">——–</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad6" colspan="2">Grand total</td> -<td class="tdr">20997</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">men, and 30 pieces of artillery.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">——–</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p>Besides this force, the 40th regiment, so long -detained at Seville by Mr. Frere, had arrived in -Lisbon, and the troops on their march from that city, -being somewhat less than eight thousand bayonets, -were organized in three brigades, commanded by -major-general Lightfoot and brigadier-generals Robert -and Catlin Craufurd. But the leading brigade, -under Robert Craufurd, only quitted Lisbon on the -28th of June.</p> - -<p>The army moved by both banks of the Tagus; -one column proceeding through Sobreira Formosa, -the other by Villa Velha, where a boat-bridge was -established. The 1st of July the head-quarters were -at Castello Branco, and from thence the troops continued -their route, in one column, by Moralejo and -Coria; but a flanking brigade, under general Donkin, -was directed through Ceclaven and Torijoncillos, -and explored the country between Zarza -Mayor and the Tagus. The 8th, the head-quarters -were established at Plasencia. The 10th, the army -arrived at that place, and was, soon after, joined by -a regiment of cavalry and two battalions of infantry -from Lisbon.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_362"></a>[362]</span></p> - -<p>At this period Cuesta was at Almaraz, and Victor, -of whose intermediate movements it is time to -take notice, was at Talavera de la Reyna. When -that marshal had retired from Torremocha, the valley -<span class="sidenote">Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.</span> -of the Tagus was exhausted by the long sojourn of -the fourth and first corps; but the valley of Plasencia -was extremely fertile, and untouched, and -the duke of Belluno, whose troops, weakened by -the tertian sickness, required good nourishment, -resolved to take post there, and keep a bridge at -Bazagona, on the Tietar, by which he could, in -two marches, fall upon Cuesta, if he ventured to -pass the Tagus at Almaraz. At Plasencia, also, he -could open a communication with the second and -fifth corps, and observe closely the movements of -the English army on the frontier of Portugal. The -bridge at Bazagona was finished on the 21st of -June, and the French light troops were scouring the -country towards Plasencia, when the king, who had -already withdrawn a division of infantry and a large -part of the cavalry of the first corps to reinforce the -fourth, ordered the duke of Belluno to retire instantly -to Talavera, leaving rear-guards on the Tietar and at -Almaraz. This order, which arrived the 22d of -June, was the result of that indecision which none -but truly great men, or fools, are free from; the -first, because they can see their way clearly through -the thousand difficulties that encumber and bewilder -the mind in war; the last, because they see -nothing.</p> - -<p>On the present occasion, general Sebastiani had -reported that Venegas was reinforced, and ready to -penetrate by La Mancha; and the king, swayed by -this false information, disturbed by the march of -Cuesta, and still more by Blake’s advance against<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_363"></a>[363]</span> -Zaragoza (the result of which was then unknown), -<span class="sidenote">St. Cyr.</span> -became so alarmed that he commanded St. Cyr to -move into Aragon, repaired himself to Toledo, -with his guards and reserve, withdrew the light -cavalry and a division of infantry from Victor, -obliged that marshal to fall back on Talavera; and -even commanded Mortier to bring up the fifth corps -from Valladolid to Villa Castin, near Avila, although, -following Napoleon’s orders, it should have -gone to Salamanca.</p> - -<p>In the hope of meeting Venegas, Joseph penetrated -as far as the Jabalon river, in La Mancha; -and as the Spaniard, fearful of the tempest approaching -him, took shelter in the Morena, the king, -leaving some posts of the 4th corps at Toledo, restored -the light cavalry to the first corps, and, -with his guards and reserve, returned to Madrid. -But, while he had been pursuing a shadow, Victor -was exposed to great danger; for the Jabalon is six -long marches from Madrid, and hence, for ten -days, the duke of Belluno, with only two divisions -of infantry and two thousand cavalry, in all about -fourteen thousand men, had remained at Talavera -without any support, although sixty thousand men -were marching against him from different points.</p> - -<p>Victor did not suffer as he might have done; but -his numerical weakness was certainly the safety of -Cuesta. For that general, having followed the retreat -of the first corps from Torremocha, crossed -the Tagus, at Almaraz, on the 23d of June, and -pushed an advanced guard towards Oropesa. He -had thirty-eight thousand men, yet he remained -tranquil while (at a distance of only twelve miles) -fourteen thousand French made a flank movement -that lasted three days; and his careless method of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_364"></a>[364]</span> -acting, and his unskilful dispositions, were so evident, -that the French cavalry, far from fearing, were -preparing to punish him, when he suddenly took -the alarm, and, withdrawing to Almaraz, occupied -himself in finishing his bridges over the Tagus.</p> - -<p>The 28th, Victor, having removed his hospitals -and depôts from Arzobispo, took a position behind -the Alberche, keeping, however, three battalions -and the cavalry at Talavera, with advanced posts at -Calera and Gamonal. A small detachment, also, -watched the course of the Tagus from the mouth of -the Alberche to that of the Guadarama, and a -moveable column was sent to Escalona, to observe -the Vera de Plasencia and passes leading upon -Avila. In executing this retrograde movement, Victor, -having no means of transport, burnt ten out of -<span class="sidenote">Semelé’s Journal of Operations First Corps MSS.</span> -the fifteen pontoons supporting his bridge over the -Tietar, and, for the same reason, he threw a considerable -quantity of powder and shot into the river. -His troops had been for four days on quarter rations, -and were suffering from sickness and hunger; -and the Tagus was fordable in several places. The -danger of his position is evident. The British -were, however, still at Abrantes, and Cuesta knew -not how to profit by this opportunity before the -king returned from La Mancha.</p> - -<p>Such was the position of the different armies -when the British general arrived at Plasencia. He -had seen Soult’s letters, found upon general Franceschi, -and thus ascertained that the second corps -was at Zamora, and from Franceschi himself, who -passed as a prisoner, at the same time, he learned -the arrival of the fifth corps at Valladolid; but the -march of Ney’s corps was not suspected, and the -tenor of Soult’s letters led to the notion that Gallicia<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_365"></a>[365]</span> -was to be retained. A letter of Victor’s to -Joseph, dated the 23d of June, and written in the -most desponding language, had been likewise intercepted; -and, as Soult’s correspondence also gave -a strong picture of <em>his</em> difficulties, the general -impression that the French armies were not only -weak but utterly dismayed was rather augmented -than lessened by this information. Sir Arthur -Wellesley, however, could not but have some -distrust, when he knew that <em>two corps</em> were beyond -the mountains, on his left; and, though far -from suspecting the extent of his danger, he took -<span class="sidenote">Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, printed in 1810.</span> -additional precautions to protect that flank, and -renewed his instructions to Beresford to watch the -enemy’s movements, and to look carefully to the -defence of the <em>Puerto Perales</em>. But the pass of -Baños was still to be guarded, and for this purpose -sir Arthur applied to Cuesta.</p> - -<p>The Spanish general was at first unwilling to -detach any men to that quarter, but he finally -agreed that two battalions from his army and two -others from the town of Bejar, at the other side of -the pass, should unite to defend Baños, and that -the duke del Parque should also send a detachment -to the pass of Perales. Although these measures -appeared sufficient to obviate danger from Soult’s -corps, weakened as it was supposed to be, they -were evidently futile to check the real force under -that marshal; and they were rendered absolutely -ridiculous by Cuesta, who sent two weak battalions, -of three hundred men each, and with only twenty -rounds of ammunition per man: and yet this was -only a part of a system which already weighed -heavily on the English general.</p> - -<p>The 10th, sir Arthur Wellesley proceeded to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_366"></a>[366]</span> -Cuesta’s head-quarters, near the Col de Mirabete, -to confer with him on their future operations. Ever -since the affair of Valdez, in 1808, the junta had -been sorely afraid of Cuesta, and, suspecting that -he was meditating some signal vengeance, they -endeavoured to raise up rivals to his power. In -this view they had lavished honours and authority -upon Blake; but the defeat at Belchite having -crushed their hopes in that quarter, they turned -their eyes upon Venegas, and increased his forces, -taking care to give him the best troops. Still -Cuesta’s force was formidable, and to reduce it was -the object both of Mr. Frere and the junta: the -motive of the first being to elevate the duke of -Albuquerque; the intention of the others being -merely to reduce the power of Cuesta.</p> - -<p>Whatever might have been the latter’s ultimate -intention, with respect to the junta, it is certain -that his natural obstinacy and violence were greatly -increased by a knowledge of these proceedings, and -that he was ill-disposed towards the English general, -as thinking him a party concerned in these intrigues. -When, therefore, sir Arthur, at the instigation of -Mr. Frere, proposed that a draft of ten thousand -<span class="sidenote">Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.</span> -Spanish troops should be detached towards Avila -and Segovia, Cuesta replied that it should be done -by the British, and absolutely refused to furnish -more than two battalions of infantry and a few -cavalry to strengthen sir Robert Wilson’s partizan -corps, which was destined to act on the enemy’s right. -This determination again baffled Mr. Frere’s project -of placing the duke of Albuquerque at the -head of an independent force, and obliged the -supreme junta to fall upon some other expedient -for reducing Cuesta’s power; and it was fortunate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_367"></a>[367]</span> -that the old Spaniard resisted the proposal, because -the ten thousand men would have gone straight -into the midst of the fifth corps, which, in expectation -of such a movement, was then at Villa -Castin, and, having been rejoined by the detachment -of colonel Briche, from Catalonia, was eighteen -thousand strong, and supported by Kellerman’s -division of cavalry at Valladolid.</p> - -<p>The discussion between the generals lasted two -days; but, with the approbation of the supreme -junta, it was finally agreed that the British and -Spanish armies, under sir Arthur and Cuesta, should -march, on the 18th, against Victor; and that -Venegas, advancing, at the same time, through La -Mancha, should leave Toledo and Aranjues to his -left, and push for Fuente Duenas and Villa Maurique -on the Upper Tagus. If this movement should -draw Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, to that side, -Venegas was to keep him in play while the allied -forces defeated Victor. If Sebastiani disregarded -it, Venegas was to cross the Tagus and march upon -Madrid, from the south east, while sir Robert -Wilson, reinforced by some Spanish battalions, -menaced that capital from the opposite quarter.</p> - -<p>Previous to entering Spain, sir Arthur had ascertained -that the valleys of the Alagon and the Arago -and those between Bejar and Ciudad Rodrigo were -fertile and capable of nourishing the army, and he -had sent commissaries to all these points to purchase -mules, and to arrange with the alcaldes of the different -districts for the supply of the troops. He -had obtained the warmest assurances, from the supreme -junta, that every needful article should be -forthcoming, and the latter had also sent the intendant-general, -don Lonzano de Torres, to the British<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_368"></a>[368]</span> -head-quarters, with full powers to forward all arrangements -for the supply of the English troops. -Relying upon these preparations, sir Arthur had -crossed the frontier with few means of transport and -without magazines, for Portugal could not furnish -what was required, and, moreover, the Portuguese -peasants had an insuperable objection to quitting -their own country; a matter apparently of little -consequence, because Mr. Frere, writing officially -at the time, described the people of Estremadura -as viewing “<em>the war in the light of a crusade, and -carrying it on with all the enthusiasm of such a -cause!</em>”</p> - -<p>From Castello Branco to Plasencia is but seven -days’ march, yet that short time was sufficient to -prove the bad faith of the junta, and the illusion -under which Mr. Frere laboured. Neither mules -for the transport of ammunition and provisions, nor -the promised help of the authorities, nor aid of -any kind could be procured; and don Lonzano de -Torres, although, to sir Arthur, he freely acknowledged -the extent of the evil, the ill-will of the -inhabitants, and the shameful conduct of the supreme -junta, afterwards, without shame, asserted that the -British troops had always received and consumed -double rations, and were in want of nothing; an -assertion in which he was supported by don Martin -de Garay, the Spanish secretary of state; the whole -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XVII">Appendix, No. 17</a>.</span> -proceeding being a concerted plan, to afford the -junta a pretext for justifying their own and casting -a slur upon the English general’s conduct, if any -disasters should happen.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley, seriously alarmed for the -subsistence of his army, wrote, upon the 16th, to -Mr. Frere and to general O’Donoghue, the chief of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_369"></a>[369]</span> -Cuesta’s staff; representing to both the distress of -his army, and intimating his resolution <em>not to proceed -beyond the Alberche</em>, unless his wants were immediately -supplied; faithful, however, to his agreement -with Cuesta, he prepared to put the army in -motion for that river. It was known at Plasencia, -on the 15th, that Ney had retreated from Coruña; -but it was believed, that his corps had been recalled -to France; and no change took place in the plan of -campaign. It was not suspected that the sixth corps -had then been sixteen days at Astorga!</p> - -<p>The valley of the Tagus, into which the army was -about to plunge, is intersected by several rivers, with -rugged banks and deep channels; but their courses -being very little out of the parallel of the Tagus, -the Alberche is in a manner enclosed by the Tietar. -Now, sir Robert Wilson, with four thousand <ins class="corr" id="tn-369" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Porguese and Spanish'"> -Portuguese and Spanish</ins> troops, had ascended the -right bank of the latter river, and gained possession -of the passes of Arenas, which lead upon Avila, -and of the pass of San Pedro Bernardo, which leads -upon Madrid. In this position he covered the Vera -<span class="sidenote">Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.</span> -de Plasencia, and threatened Victor’s communications -with the capital. The French marshal was alarmed; -and a movement of the whole army in the same -direction would have obliged him to abandon -the Lower Alberche, because, two marches from -Arenas, in the direction of Escalona and Macqueda, -would have placed sir Arthur Wellesley between -the first corps and Madrid. But, on the other hand, -the line of country was too rugged for rapid movements -with a large body; and it was necessary first -to secure a junction with Cuesta, because Victor, -having recovered his third division on the 7th of -July, was again at the head of twenty-five thousand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_370"></a>[370]</span> -men. With such a force he could not be trusted -near the Spaniards; and the British general resolved -to cross the Tietar at the Venta de Bazagona, and -march by Miajadas upon Oropesa.</p> - -<p>The 16th, two companies of the <em>staff corps</em>, with -a working party of five hundred men, marched from -Plasencia to Bazagona, to throw a bridge over the -<span class="sidenote">Semelé’s Journal of the First Corps’ Operations.</span> -Tietar. The duke of Belluno had wasted many days -in dragging up fifteen pontoons from the Tagus, to -form his bridge at that place; and when he retired -upon Talavera, he destroyed the greatest part of the -equipage; but the English officer employed on -this occasion pulled down an old house in the -neighbourhood, felled some pine trees in a wood -three miles distant; and, uniting intelligence with -labour, contrived, without other aid than a few -hatchets and saws, in one day, to throw a solid -bridge over the Tietar.</p> - -<p>The 18th, the army crossed that river, and taking -the route of Miajadas, reached Talayuela.</p> - -<p>The 19th, the main body halted at Centinello -and Casa de Somas. The advanced posts at Venta -de St. Juliens.</p> - -<p>The 20th, the troops reached Oropesa; but as -their marches had been long, and conducted through -a difficult country, they halted the 21st; on which -day, Cuesta, who had moved from Almaraz by -Naval Moral and Arzobispo, passed Oropesa, and -united his whole force at Velada, except a small -detachment, which marched along the south bank -of the Tagus, to threaten the French by the bridge -of Talavera.</p> - -<p>The duke of Belluno, aware of these movements, -had supported his posts at Talavera with a division -of infantry, which was disposed in successive detachments<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_371"></a>[371]</span> -behind that town. His situation appeared -critical; because the allies, covered by the Alberche, -might still gain a march and reach Escalona before -him; and from thence either push for Madrid, by -the pass of Brunete, or, taking post at Maqueda, -cut him off from the capital. But his sources of -information were sure; and he contented himself -with sending a regiment of hussars to Cazar de -Escalona, to watch the Upper Alberche, and to -support the moveable column opposed to sir Robert -Wilson.</p> - -<p>The 21st, the allies being between Oropesa and -Velada, Victor recalled all his foraging parties, -altered his line of retreat from the Madrid to the -Toledo road, removed his parc from St. Ollalla to -Cevolla, and concentrated two divisions of infantry -behind the Alberche.</p> - -<p>The 22d, the allies moved in two columns, to -drive the French posts from Talavera; and Cuesta, -marching by the high road, came first up with the -enemy’s rear-guard, near the village of Gamonal; -but then commenced a display of ignorance, timidity, -and absurdity, that has seldom been equalled in war; -the past defeats of the Spanish army were rendered -quite explicable; the little fruit derived from them -by marshal Victor quite inexplicable. General -Latour Maubourg, with two thousand dragoons, -came boldly on to the table-land of Gamonal, -and sustaining a cannonade, not only checked the -head of the Spanish leading column, but actually -obliged general Zayas, who commanded it, to display -his whole line, consisting of fifteen thousand -infantry and three thousand cavalry; nor did the -French horsemen give back at all, until the appearance -of the red uniforms on their right informed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_372"></a>[372]</span> -them that it was time to retire. Then, and not till -then, Latour Maubourg, supported by some infantry, -retreated behind the Alberche, and without loss, -although many batteries, and at least six thousand -Spanish horse, were close on his rear; but the -latter could never be induced to make even a partial -charge, however favourable the opportunity, and by -two o’clock the whole French army was safely concentrated -on its position. Ruffin’s division on the -left touched the Tagus, and protected the bridge -over the Alberche, which was more immediately -defended by a regiment of infantry and fourteen -pieces of artillery. Villatte’s and Lapisse’s divisions, -drawn up in successive lines, on some high ground -that overlooked the surrounding country, formed -the right; the heavy cavalry were in second line -near the bridge; and in this situation Victor rested -the 22d and 23d.</p> - -<p>It was at all times difficult to obtain accurate information -from the Spaniards by gentle means; -hence, the French were usually better supplied with -intelligence than the British; while the native -generals never knew any thing about the enemy, -until they felt the weight of his blows. Up to this -period, sir Arthur’s best sources of information had -been the intercepted letters of the French; and now, -although the latter had been in the same position, -and without any change of numbers since the 7th, -the inhabitants of Talavera could not, or would not, -give any information of their strength or situation; -nor could any reasonable calculation be formed of -either, until some English officers crossed the Tagus, -and, from the mountains on the left bank of that -river, saw the French position in reverse.</p> - -<p>The general outline of an attack was, however,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_373"></a>[373]</span> -agreed upon for the next morning, but the details -were unsettled; and when the English commander -came to arrange these with Cuesta, the latter was gone -to bed. The British troops were under arms at three -o’clock the next morning, but Cuesta’s staff were not -aroused from slumber until seven o’clock; and the -old man finally objected to fight that day, alleging, -among other absurd reasons, that it was Sunday. -But there was something more than absurdity in -these proceedings. Victor, who was not ignorant -of the weak points of his own position, remained -tranquil the 23d, being well assured that no attack -would take place, for it is certain that he had a -correspondence with some of the Spanish staff; and -the secret discussions between sir Arthur Wellesley -and Cuesta, at which only one staff officer of each -party was present, became known to the enemy in -twenty-four hours after; indeed, Cuesta was himself -suspected of treachery by many, yet apparently -without reason.</p> - -<p>In the course of the 23d, the Spanish officer -commanding the advanced posts reported that the -French guns were withdrawn, and that it was evident -they meant to retreat; Cuesta then became -willing to attack, and proposed, in concert with -sir Arthur Wellesley, to examine Victor’s position; -but, to the surprise of the English commander, the -Spaniard arrived in a coach, drawn by six horses, to -perform this duty; and when the inequalities of the -ground obliged him to descend from his vehicle, he -cast himself at the foot of a tree, and in a few moments -went to sleep. Yet he was always ready to -censure and to thwart every proposal of his able -coadjutor. This time, however, he consented to -fall upon the enemy; and the troops were in motion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_374"></a>[374]</span> -early in the morning of the 24th; but the duke -of Belluno was again duly informed of their intention; -and having withdrawn his moveable column -from Escalona, and relinquished the road to -Madrid, retreated during the night to Torijos. -Thus, the first combination of the allies failed -entirely; and each hour the troops of the enemy -were accumulating round them; for Venegas, who -should have been at Fuente Duenas, high up on the -Tagus, had not even passed Damyel; and the king -was collecting his whole strength in front, between Toledo -and Talavera; while Soult was fast gathering his -more formidable power behind the mountains of Bejar.</p> - -<p>The English general was indeed still ignorant -of the danger which threatened him from the Salamanca -country, or he would, doubtless, have -withdrawn at once to Plasencia, and secured his -communications with Lisbon, and with Beresford’s -troops; but other powerful reasons were not wanting -to prevent his further advance. Before he quitted -Plasencia he had completed contracts with the alcaldes, -in the Vera de Plasencia, for two hundred -and fifty thousand rations of forage and provisions; -and this, together with what he had before collected, -would have furnished supplies for ten or twelve -days, a sufficient time to beat Victor, and carry the -army into a fresh country; but, distrustful, as he -had reason to be, of the Spaniards, he again gave -notice to Cuesta and the junta, that <span class="smcap">beyond the -Alberche</span> he would not move, unless his wants -were immediately supplied; for, hitherto the rations -contracted for had not been delivered; and -his representations to the junta and to Cuesta were, -by both, equally disregarded; there were no means -of transport provided; the troops were already on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_375"></a>[375]</span> -less than half allowance, and absolute famine approached; -and when the general demanded food for -his soldiers, at the hands of those whose cause he -came to defend, he was answered with false excuses, -and insulted by false statements. Under any circumstances -this would have forced him to halt; but -the advance having been made in the exercise of -his own discretion, and not at the command of his -<span class="sidenote">Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.</span> -government, there could be no room for hesitation: -wherefore, remonstrating warmly, but manfully, -with the supreme junta, he announced his resolution -to go no farther, nay, even <em>to withdraw from Spain -altogether</em>.</p> - -<p>It is evident that without these well-founded -reasons for pausing, Cuesta’s conduct, and the state -of his army, offered no solid ground for expecting -success by continuing the forward movement; but -the faithless and perverse conduct of the supreme -junta, although hidden as yet from sir Arthur Wellesley, -far exceeded the measure even of Cuesta’s -obdurate folly. That body, after having agreed to -the plan upon which the armies were acting, concluded, -in the fulness of their ignorance, that the -combined troops in the valley of the Tagus would -be sufficient to overthrow Joseph; and, therefore, -secretly ordered Venegas not to fulfil his part, -arguing to themselves, with a cunning stupidity, -that it would be a master stroke of policy to save -him from any chance of a defeat; hoping thus -to preserve a powerful force, under one of their own -creatures, to maintain their own power. This was -the cause why the army of La Mancha had failed to -appear on the Tagus: and thus, the welfare of -millions was made the sport of men, who yet were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_376"></a>[376]</span> -never tired of praising themselves, and have not -failed to find admirers elsewhere.</p> - -<p>As the Spaniards are perfect masters of the art of -saying every thing and doing nothing, sir Arthur’s -remonstrances drew forth many official statements, -plausible replies, and pompous assertions, after their -manner, but produced no amelioration of the evils -complained of. Mr. Frere, also, thought it necessary -to make some apology for himself, asserting -that the evil was deep rooted, and that he had had -neither time nor power to arrange any regular plan -for the subsistence of the English armies. But all -the evils that blighted the Spanish cause were deep -seated; and yet Mr. Frere, who could not arrange -a plan for the subsistence of the troops, that indispensable -preliminary to military operations, and -which was really within his province, thought himself -competent to direct all the operations themselves -which were in the province of the generals. He -had found leisure to meddle in all the intrigues of -the day; to aim at making and unmaking Spanish -commanders; to insult sir John Moore; to pester -sir John Cradock with warlike advice; and to arrange -the plan of campaign for sir Arthur Wellesley’s -army, without that officer’s concurrence.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_377"></a>[377]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BIX_II">CHAPTER II.</h3> -</div> - -<p>The English general’s resolution to halt at Talavera -made little impression upon Cuesta. A French -corps had retreated before him, and Madrid, nay, -the Pyrennees themselves, instantly rose on the -view of the sanguine Spaniard: he was resolved to -be the first in the capital, and he pushed forward -in pursuit, reckless alike of military discipline and -of the friendly warnings of sir Arthur; who vainly -admonished him to open his communications as -quickly as possible with Venegas, and to beware -how he let the enemy know that the British and -Spanish armies were separated. In the fulness of -his arrogant vanity, Cuesta crossed the Alberche on -the 24th, and being unable to ascertain the exact -route of the French, pursued them, by the road of -Toledo, as far as Cebolla, and, by the road of Madrid, -as far as El Bravo. On the 25th, still inflated -with pride, he caused the troops at Cebolla to move -on to Torrijos, and marched himself to St. Ollalla. -The 26th he discovered that he had been pursuing a -tiger. Meanwhile sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing -the consequence of this imprudence, had sent general -Sherbrooke, with two divisions of British infantry -and all the cavalry, across the Alberche, to Cazalegas, -where, being centrically situated with respect to -Talavera, St. Ollalla, and Escalona, he could support -the Spaniards, and, at the same time, hold communication -with sir Robert Wilson, who had been at the -latter town since the 23d. But a great and signal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_378"></a>[378]</span> -crisis was at hand, the full importance of which -cannot be well understood without an exact knowledge -of the situation and proceedings of all the -armies involved in this complicated campaign.</p> - -<p>The 30th of June, Soult, when at Zamora, received -a despatch from the emperor, dated near -Ratisbon, conferring on him the supreme command -of the second, fifth, and sixth corps, with orders -to concentrate them, and act decisively against the -English. “<em>Wellesley</em>,” said Napoleon, “<em>will probably -advance, by the Tagus, against Madrid: in -that case, pass the mountains, fall on his flank -and rear, and crush him</em>;” for, at that distance, -and without other information than what his own -sagacity supplied, this allknowing soldier foresaw -the leading operations even as soon and as certainly -as those who projected them.</p> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia immediately imparted these -instructions to the king, and, at the same time, -made known his own opinions and designs with respect -to the probable projects of the allies. He -was ignorant of the precise object and exact position -of sir Arthur Wellesley, but, judging from the cessation -of hostility in the north, that the English -were in march with the design of joining Cuesta, -and acting by the line of the Tagus, he proposed -to concentrate the third corps at Salamanca, besiege -Ciudad Rodrigo, and menace Lisbon, which, he -justly observed, would bring the English army back -to the northern provinces of Portugal; and if, as -some supposed, the intention of sir Arthur was to -unite, at Bragança, with Romana, and open the -campaign to the north of the Douro, the French -army would still be in a suitable position to oppose -them.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_379"></a>[379]</span></p> - -<p>In pursuance of this opinion, Soult ordered Mortier -to approach Ciudad Rodrigo, with the double -view of preparing for the siege and covering the -quarters of refreshment so much needed by the -second corps after its fatigues. Ney also was -directed to march with the sixth corps, by the left -bank of the Esla, to Zamora; but the spirit of -discord was strong, and it was at this moment that -the king, alarmed by Sebastiani’s report, drew the -fifth corps to Villa Castin; while marshal Ney, -holding it imprudent to uncover Astorga and Leon, -mortified, also, at being placed under the orders -of another marshal, refused to move to Zamora. -Soult, crossed by these untoward circumstances, -sent the division of light cavalry, under his brother, -and one of infantry, commanded by Heudelet, from -Zamora and Toro to Salamanca, with orders to -explore the course of the Tormes, to observe Alba -and Ledesma, and especially to scour the roads -leading upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Plasencia: these -troops relieved a division of dragoons belonging to -Kellerman, who was still charged with the general -government of the province.</p> - -<p>The 10th of July, the march of the British upon -Plasencia became known, and it was manifest that sir -Arthur had no design to act north of the Douro; -wherefore the duke of Dalmatia resolved to advance, -with the remainder of the second corps, to Salamanca, -and, partly by authority, partly by address, -he obliged Ney to put the sixth corps in movement -for Zamora, leaving Fournier’s dragoons to cover -Astorga and Leon. Meanwhile, king Joseph, having -returned from his fruitless excursion against Venegas, -was at first incredulous of the advance of sir Arthur -Wellesley and Cuesta, but he agreed to Soult’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_380"></a>[380]</span> -project against Ciudad Rodrigo, and ordered Mortier -to return to Valladolid, where that marshal arrived, -with his first division, on the 16th of July: his -second division, under general Gazan, halted, however, -at Medina del Campo and Nava del Rey, on -the route from Salamanca to Valladolid, and an -advanced guard was sent forward to Alba de Tormes.</p> - -<p>The 13th of July, Soult, being assured that the -British army was on the eastern frontier of Portugal, -and that considerable reinforcements had been disembarked -at Lisbon, became certain that sir Arthur -meant to operate by the line of the Tagus; wherefore, -he again addressed the king to move him to -an immediate siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, promising -to have the three corps under his own command in -full activity in fifteen days, provided his demands -were complied with, the most important being—1º. -The formation of a battering-train;—2º. The -concentration of an immense number of detachments, -which weakened the active corps;—3º. A -reinforcement of fifteen or twenty thousand conscripts, -drawn from France, to enable the old troops, -employed on the line of communication, to join the -<i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">corps d’armée</i>. The first corps should, he said, -continue to watch the Spanish army of Estremadura, -<span class="sidenote">S.<br />Journal of Operations MSS.</span> -and be prepared either to prevent it from -uniting with the English to disturb the siege, or to -join the first, second, and sixth corps, and give -battle, if that should become necessary. The siege -might thus be pressed vigourously, Ciudad would -fall, Almeida be next invested, and the communications -of the English army, with Lisbon, threatened.</p> - -<p>The 17th, the king replied, through marshal -Jourdan, that he approved of the plan, but had not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_381"></a>[381]</span> -means to meet several of Soult’s demands, and he -proposed that the latter should reinforce Kellerman -and Bonnet, with ten thousand men, to enable them -to seize the Asturias, and thus strengthen the communications -with France. This drew from the duke -of Dalmatia the following remonstrance:—“<em>Under -present circumstances we cannot avoid some sacrifice -of territory. Let us prepare, first, by concentrating, -on a few points capable of defence and covering the -hospitals and depôts which may be on the extremity -of our general position. This will not be so distressing -as it may appear, because the moment we have -beaten and dispersed the enemy’s masses we shall -recover all our ground.</em>” Then reiterating his own -advice, he concluded thus:—“<em>I conceive it impossible -to finish this war by detachments. It is large -masses only, the strongest that you can form, that -will succeed.</em>” It is remarkable that sir Arthur -Wellesley, writing at this time, says, “<em>I conceive -that the French are dangerous only when in large -masses</em>.”</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Heudelet’s division, having pushed -back the advanced guards of the duke del Parque -upon Ciudad Rodrigo, ascertained that a great -movement of troops was taking place near that city, -and that sir Arthur Wellesley, advancing quicker -than was expected, had already reached Plasencia; -wherefore, on the 18th, Soult directed Mortier to -march upon Salamanca with the fifth corps, and, at -the same time, reinforced Heudelet’s division with -Merle’s; the latter’s place, at Zamora, being supplied -by a division of the sixth corps, the remainder -of which continued on the Esla, fronting the Tras -os Montes. Thus, not less than fifty thousand men -were at or close to Salamanca, with their cavalry-posts<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_382"></a>[382]</span> -pointing to the passes of Baños, on the very -day that sir Arthur Wellesley crossed the Tietar -to effect his junction with Cuesta. Yet, neither -through the duke del Parque, nor Beresford, nor -the guerillas, nor the peasantry, did intelligence of -this formidable fact reach him!</p> - -<p>Having put the three corps in motion, Soult despatched -general Foy to Madrid, with information -of sir Arthur’s march, and to arrange the future -combinations of the two armies. “<em>It is probable</em>,” -he said, “<em>that the concentration of my army at Salamanca -will oblige the English general to change his -plan; but, if he shall already have advanced on the -road to Madrid, we should assemble all our forces, -both on the Tagus and on this side, fall upon him -altogether, and crush him. Thus, his campaign will -be finished, and our operations may go on with advantage.</em>”</p> - -<p>Foy arrived, the 22d, at Madrid; and, a few -hours afterwards, intelligence reached the king that -the allies were at Talavera, in front of the first -corps, and that sir Robert Wilson (whose strength -was much exaggerated) was at Escalona. The die -was now cast; Joseph directed Soult to march immediately -upon Plasencia, then, leaving general -Belliard, with only three thousand men, in the -Retiro, set out himself, with his guards and reserve, -by the road of Mostoles, to join Victor at Talavera. -The 23d, being at Naval-Carneiro, he received -notice that the first corps would retreat that night -to Torrijos, and, in two days, would be behind the -Guadarama river; whereupon, turning to the left, -Joseph descended the Guadarama to Vargas, and -effected his junction with the duke of Belluno on -the 25th.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_383"></a>[383]</span></p> - -<p>During this time, Sebastiani, who had been -watching Venegas near Damyel, deceived that general, -and, returning to Toledo by forced marches, left -three thousand men there, with the design of obliging -him to cross the Tagus, at Aranjues. With the remainder -of the fourth corps Sebastiani joined the -king: and thus nearly fifty thousand fighting men -and ninety pieces of artillery were concentrated, on -the morning of the 26th, behind the Guadarama, -and within a few miles of Cuesta’s advanced guard. -But, on the side of the allies, the main body of the -Spaniards was at St. Ollalla; Sherbrooke with -two divisions and the cavalry, at Casalegas; and -the rest of the English in Talavera. So that, -while the French were concentrated and in full -march to attack; the allies were separated in -four nearly equal and unconnected parts, of which -three were enclosed, as it were, in a net, between -the Alberche and the Tagus! On such an occasion -Napoleon would have been swift and deadly.</p> - -<p>In retiring upon Toledo, instead of Madrid, the -duke of Belluno showed himself an able commander. -Toledo was the strategic pivot upon which -every movement turned. It was the central point, -by holding which the army of Venegas was separated -from the allies on the Alberche. If the latter -advanced, Soult’s operations rendered every forward -step a stride towards ruin. If, leaving Venegas to -his fate, they retired, it must be rapidly, or there -would be neither wisdom nor safety in the measure. -The king knew that Foy would reach Soult the -24th, and as that marshal had already assembled -his army about Salamanca, which was only four -days’ march from Plasencia, he might be in the -valley of the Tagus by the 30th; hence, to insure<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_384"></a>[384]</span> -complete success, the royal army needed only to -keep the allies in check for four or five days. -This was the plan that Soult had recommended, -that the king promised to follow, and that marshal -Jourdan strenuously supported. The unskilful -proceedings of Cuesta and Venegas, the -separation of the allies, the distressed state of the -English army, actually on the verge of famine, (a -circumstance that could hardly be unknown to Victor,) -greatly facilitated the execution of this project, -which did not preclude the king from punishing -the folly of the Spanish general, whose army, scattered -and without order, discipline, or plan, so -strongly invited an attack.</p> - -<p>I have said that Cuesta was playing with a tiger: -he had some faint perception of his danger on the -25th, and he gave orders to retreat on the 26th; -but the French, suddenly passing the Guadarama, at -two o’clock in the morning of that day, quickly -drove the Spanish cavalry out of Torrijos, and pursued -them to Alcabon. Here general Zayas had -drawn up four thousand infantry, two thousand -horsemen, and eight guns, on a plain, and offered -battle.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF ALCABON.</h4> - -<p>The Spanish right rested on the road of Domingo -Perez, and the left on a chapel of the same name. The -French cavalry, under Latour Maubourg, advanced in -a parallel line against the Spaniards, and a cannonade -commenced; but, at that moment, the head of the -French infantry appearing in sight, the Spaniards -broke, and fled in disorder towards St. Ollalla, followed, -at full gallop, by the horsemen, who pressed -them so sorely that the panic would, doubtless, have -spread through the whole army, but for the courage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_385"></a>[385]</span> -of Albuquerque, who, coming up with a division of -three thousand fresh cavalry, held the enemy in -play, while Cuesta retreated, in the greatest disorder, -towards the Alberche.</p> - -<p>After reaching St. Ollalla, the French slackened -their efforts; the main body halted there, and the -advanced guards, save a few cavalry-posts, did not -pass El Bravo, and no attempt was made to profit -from the unconnected position of the allies—a gross -and palpable error; for, either by the sword or dispersion, -the Spaniards lost, on that day, not less -than four thousand men; and such was their fear -and haste that it required but a little more perseverance -in the pursuit to cause a general rout. Albuquerque, -alone, showed any front; but his efforts -were unavailing, and the disorder continued to -increase until general Sherbrooke, marching out of -Cazalegas, placed his divisions between the scared -troops and the enemy. Still the danger was imminent; -there was no concert between the commanders, -the ground on the left of the Alberche was -unfavourable to a retiring party, and, as yet, no -position upon which the combined forces could -retire had been agreed upon! What, then, would -have been the consequence if the whole French -army had borne down, compact and strong, into -the midst of the disordered masses?</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley, who, at the first alarm, -had hastened to the front, seeing the confusion -beyond the Alberche, knew that a battle was at -hand; and, being persuaded that in a strong -defensive position only could the Spaniards be -brought to stand a shock, earnestly endeavoured to -persuade Cuesta, while Sherbrooke’s people could -yet cover the movement, to withdraw to Talavera,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_386"></a>[386]</span> -where there was ground suited for defence; but -Cuesta’s uncouth nature again broke forth; his -people were beaten, dispirited, fatigued, bewildered; -clustered on a narrow slip of low, flat land, -between the Alberche, the Tagus, and the heights -of Salinas; and the first shot fired by the enemy -must have been the signal of defeat; yet it was in -vain that sir Arthur Wellesley pointed out those -things, and entreated of him to avoid the fall of the -rock that trembled over his head; he replied, that -his troops would be disheartened by any further -retreat, that he would fight where he stood: and -in this mood he passed the night.</p> - -<p>The 27th, at day-light, the British general -renewed his solicitations, at first, fruitlessly, but -when the enemy’s cavalry came in sight, and Sherbrooke -prepared to retire, Cuesta sullenly yielded, -yet, turning to his staff with frantic pride, observed -that “<em>He had first made the Englishman go down -on his knees</em>.” Sir Arthur Wellesley, by virtue of -his genius, now assumed the direction of both armies. -General Mackenzie’s division and a brigade of light -cavalry were left on the Alberche, to cover the retrograde -movement: but the rest of the allied troops -was soon in full march for the position, which was -about six miles in the rear. Sir Robert Wilson, -who had reached Naval Carneiro on the 25th, and -opened a communication with Madrid, and who -would certainly have entered that capital but for -the approaching battle, was also recalled. He -returned, on the 28th, to Escalona, and hung on the -enemy’s rear, but did not attempt to join the army.</p> - -<p>Between the Alberche and the town of Talavera, -the country was flat, and covered with olives and -cork-trees; and, on the north, nearly parallel to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_387"></a>[387]</span> -the Tagus, and at a distance of about two or three -miles, a chain of round but steep hills bounded the -woody plain. Beyond these hills, but separated -from them by a deep and rugged valley, something -less than half a mile wide, was the high mountain-ridge -which divides the bed of the Alberche from -that of the Tietar. Hence, a line drawn perpendicularly -from the Tagus would cross the first chain -of hills at the distance of two miles, and at two -miles and a half would fall on the mountains.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley, taking the town of Talavera, -which was built close to the river, as his -fixed point, placed the right of the Spaniards there, -drawing their army up in two lines, with the left -resting upon a mound, where a large field-redoubt -was constructed, and behind which a brigade of -British light cavalry was posted. The front was -covered by a convent, by ditches, mud walls, breast-works, -and felled trees. The cavalry was posted -behind the infantry; and the rear was supported by -a large house in the wood, well placed, in case of -defeat, to cover a retreat on to the main roads -leading from Talavera to Arzobispo and Oropesa. -In this position they could not be attacked seriously, -nor their disposition be even seen; and, thus, one-half -of the line necessary to be occupied by the -allies was rendered nearly impregnable, and yet -held by the worst troops.</p> - -<p>The front of battle was prolonged by the -British infantry. General Campbell’s division, -formed in two lines, touched the Spanish left; -general Sherbrooke’s division stood next to Campbell’s, -but arranged on one line only, because -general Mackenzie’s division, destined to form the -second, was then near the Alberche. It was intended<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_388"></a>[388]</span> -that general Hill’s division should close the -left of the British, by taking post on the highest -hill, in the chain before mentioned, as bounding -the flat and woody country; but, by some accident, -the summit of this height was not immediately -occupied.</p> - -<p>The whole line, thus displayed, was about two -miles in length, the left being covered by the valley -between the hill and the mountain; and from this -valley a ravine, or water-course, opened, deeply, in -the front of the British left, but being gradually -obliterated in the flat ground about the centre of -the line. Part of the British cavalry was with -general Mackenzie, and in the plain in front of the -left, and part behind the great redoubt, at the -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XI">Appendix, No. 11</a>.</span> -junction of the allied troops. The British and -Germans under arms that day were somewhat -above nineteen thousand sabres and bayonets, with -thirty guns. The Spaniards, after their previous -defeat, could only produce from thirty-three to -thirty-four thousand men; but they had seventy -guns. The combined army, therefore, offered -battle with forty-four thousand infantry, nearly ten -thousand cavalry, and a hundred pieces of artillery; -and the French were coming on with at -least eighty guns, and, including the king’s guards, -nearly fifty thousand men, of which above seven -thousand were cavalry. But what a difference -in the quality of the troops! The French were -all hardy veterans, while the genuine soldiers -of the allied army did not exceed nineteen thousand.</p> - -<p>The king, having passed the night of the 26th at -St. Ollalla, put his troops in motion again before -day-light, on the 27th. Latour Maubourg, with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_389"></a>[389]</span> -the cavalry, preceeded the column, and the first -and fourth corps, the royal guards, and reserve, -followed in succession. The appearance of the -leading squadrons, near Cazalegas, hastened, as we -have seen, Cuesta’s decision, and, about one o’clock -in the afternoon, the first corps reached the heights -of Salinas, from whence the dust of the allies, as -they took up their position, could be perceived; -but neither their situation nor disposition could -be made out, on account of the forest, which, -clothing the country from the Tagus nearly to the -foot of the first range of hills, masked all their -<span class="sidenote">Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.</span> -evolutions. The duke of Belluno, however, being -well acquainted with the ground, instantly guessed -their true position; and, in pursuance of his advice, -the king ordered the fourth corps to march -against the left of the allies; the cavalry against -the centre, and Victor himself, with the first corps, -against the right: the guards and the reserve supported -the fourth corps.</p> - -<p>Two good routes, suitable to artillery, led from the -Alberche to the position; the one, being the royal -road to Talavera, was followed by the fourth corps -and the reserve; the other, passing through a place -called the <em>Casa des Salinas</em>, led directly upon sir -Arthur Wellesley’s extreme left, and was followed -by the first corps: but to reach this Casa, which -was situated near the plain in front of the British -left wing, it was necessary to ford the Alberche, -and to march for a mile or two through the woods. -A dust, which was observed to rise near the Casa -itself indicated the presence of troops at that -place; and, in fact, general Mackenzie’s division, -and a brigade of light cavalry, were there posted: -the infantry in the forest, the cavalry on the plain;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_390"></a>[390]</span> -but no patroles were sent to the front; and this -negligence gave rise to the</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF SALINAS.</h4> - -<p>For, about three o’clock, Lapisse and Ruffin’s -division having crossed the Alberche, marched in -two columns towards the <em>Casa de Salinas</em>, and -their light infantry came so suddenly on the British -outposts that the latter were surprised, and sir Arthur -Wellesley, who was in the <em>Casa</em>, nearly fell into -the enemy’s hands. The French columns followed -briskly, and charged so hotly, that the English brigades -were separated; and being composed principally -of young battalions, got into confusion, one -part fired upon another, and the whole were driven -into the plain. But, in the midst of the disorder, the -forty-fifth, a stubborn old regiment, and some companies -of the fifth battalion of the sixtieth, were seen in -perfect array; and when sir Arthur rode up to the spot, -the fight was restored, and maintained so steadily, -that the enemy was checked. The infantry, supported -by two brigades of cavalry, then crossed the -plain, and regained the left and centre of the position, -having lost about four hundred men. General -Mackenzie, with one brigade, immediately took post -in second line behind the guards; the other, commanded -by colonel Donkin, finding the hill on the -left unoccupied, drew up there, and so completed -the position. The cavalry was formed in column -behind the left of the line.</p> - -<p>Victor, animated by the success of this first operation, -brought up Villatte’s division, together with -all the artillery and light cavalry, to the Casa de -Salinas; then, issuing from the forest, rapidly -crossed the plain; and advancing, with a fine military<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_391"></a>[391]</span> -display, close up to the left of the position, -occupied an isolated hill directly in front of colonel -Donkin’s ground, and immediately opened a heavy -cannonade upon that officer’s brigade. Meanwhile, -the fourth corps and the reserve approaching the -right more slowly, and being unable to discover the -true situation of Cuesta’s troops, sent their light -cavalry forward to make that general shew his -lines. The French horsemen rode boldly up to -the front, and commenced skirmishing with their -pistols, and the Spaniards answered them with a -general discharge of small arms; but then, ten -thousand infantry, and all the artillery, breaking -their ranks, fled to the rear: the artillery-men carried -off their horses; the infantry threw away their -arms, and the adjutant-general O’Donoghue was -amongst the foremost of the fugitives. Nay, Cuesta -himself was in movement towards the rear. The -panic spread, and the French would fain have -charged; but sir Arthur Wellesley, who was at -hand, immediately flanked the main road with some -English squadrons: the ditches on the other side -rendered the country impracticable; and the fire of -musketry being renewed by those Spaniards who -remained, the enemy lost some men, and finally -retreated in disorder.</p> - -<p>The greatest part of Cuesta’s runaways fled as far -as Oropesa, giving out that the allies were totally -defeated, and the French army in hot pursuit; -thus, the rear became a scene of incredible disorder: -the commissaries went off with their animals; the -paymasters carried away their money chests; the -baggage was scattered; and the alarm spread far -and wide; nor is it to be concealed, that some -English officers disgraced their uniform on this occasion.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_392"></a>[392]</span> -Cuesta, however, having recovered from his -first alarm, sent many of his cavalry regiments to -head the fugitives, and drive them back; and a part -of the artillery, and some thousands of the infantry, -were thus recovered during the night; but, in the -next day’s fight, the Spanish army was less by six -thousand men than it should have been, and the -great redoubt in the centre was silent for want of -guns.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT ON THE EVENING OF THE 27TH.</h4> - -<p>The hill on the left of the British army was the -key of the whole position. It was steep and rugged -on the side towards the French, and it was rendered -more inaccessible by the ravine at the bottom; but -towards the English side it was of a smoother ascent. -<span class="sidenote">Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.</span> -Victor, however, observing that the extreme summit -was unoccupied, and that Donkin’s brigade was -feeble, conceived the design of seizing it by a sudden -assault. The sun was sinking; and the twilight -and the confusion among the Spaniards on the -right, appeared so favourable to his project that, -without communicating with the king, he immediately -directed Ruffin’s division to attack, Villatte -to follow in support, and Lapisse to fall on the -German legion, so as to create a diversion for -Ruffin, but without engaging seriously himself. -The assault was quick and vigorous: colonel -Donkin beat back the enemy in his front, but his -force was too weak to defend every part; and many -of the French turned his left, and mounted to the -summit behind him. At this moment, general Hill -was ordered to reinforce him; and it was not yet -dark, when that officer, while giving orders to -the colonel of the 48th regiment, was fired at by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_393"></a>[393]</span> -some troops from the highest point. Thinking they -were stragglers from his own ranks, firing at the -enemy, he rode quickly up to them, followed by -his brigade-major, Fordyce; and in a moment found -himself in the midst of the French. Fordyce was -killed; and Hill’s own horse was wounded by a -grenadier, who immediately seized the bridle; but -the general, spurring the animal hard, broke the -man’s hold, and galloping down the descent met -the 29th regiment, and, without an instant’s delay, -led them up with such a fierce charge, that the -enemy could not sustain the shock.</p> - -<p>The summit was thus recovered; and the 48th -regiment and the first battalion of detachments were -immediately brought forward, and, in conjunction -with the 29th and colonel Donkin’s brigade, presented -a formidable front of defence; and in good -time, for the troops thus beaten back were only a -part of the 9th French regiment, forming the advance -of Ruffin’s division; but the two other regiments of -that division had lost their way in the ravine; hence -the attack had not ceased, but only subsided for a -time. Lapisse was in motion, and soon after opened -his fire against the German legion; and all the battalions -of the 9th, being re-formed in one mass, again -advanced up the face of the hill with redoubled -vigour. The fighting then became vehement; and, -in the darkness, the opposing flashes of the musketry -shewed with what a resolute spirit the struggle was -maintained, for the combatants were scarcely twenty -yards asunder, and for a time the event seemed -doubtful; but soon the well known shout of the -British soldier was heard, rising above the din of -arms, and the enemy’s broken troops were driven<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_394"></a>[394]</span> -once more into the ravine below. Lapisse, who had -made some impression on the German legion, immediately -abandoned his false attack, and the fighting of -the 27th ceased. The British lost about eight hundred -men, and the French about a thousand on that -day. The bivouac fires now blazed up on both sides, -and the French and British soldiers became quiet; -but, about twelve o’clock, the Spaniards on the right -being alarmed at some horse in their front, opened -a prodigious peal of musketry and artillery, which -continued for twenty minutes without any object; -and during the night, the whole line was frequently -disturbed by desultory firing from both the Spanish -and English troops, by which several men and officers -were unfortunately slain.</p> - -<p>The duke of Belluno, who had learned, from the -prisoners, the exact position of the Spaniards, until -then unknown to the French generals, now reported -his own failure to the king, and proposed that a second -attempt should be made in the morning, at day-light; -but marshal Jourdan opposed this, as being -a partial enterprize, which could not lead to any -great result. Victor, however, was earnest for a -trial, and, resting his representation on his intimate -knowledge of the ground, pressed the matter so -home, that he won Joseph’s assent, and immediately -made dispositions for the attack. The guns of the -first corps, being formed in one mass, on the height -corresponding to that on which the English left was -posted, were enabled to command the great valley -on their own right, to range the summit of the hill -in their front, and obliquely to search the whole of -the British line to the left, as far as the great redoubt -between the allied armies.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_395"></a>[395]</span></p> - -<p>Ruffin’s division was placed in advance, and -Villatte’s in rear, of the artillery; but the former -kept one regiment close to the ravine.</p> - -<p>Lapisse occupied some low table-land, opposite -to Sherbrooke’s division.</p> - -<p>Latour Maubourg’s cavalry formed a reserve to -Lapisse; and general Beaumont’s cavalry formed a -reserve to Ruffin.</p> - -<p>On the English side, general Hill’s division was -concentrated; the cavalry was massed behind the -left, and the parc of artillery and hospitals established -under cover of the hill, between the cavalry -and Hill’s division.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT ON THE MORNING OF THE 28TH.</h4> - -<p>About daybreak, Ruffin’s troops were drawn -up, two regiments abreast, supported by a third, -in columns of battalions; and, in this order, went -forth against the left of the British, a part directly -against the front, and a part from the valley on the -right, thus embracing two sides of the hill. Their -march was rapid and steady; they were followed -by Villatte’s division, and their assault was preceded -by a burst of artillery, that rattled round -the height, and swept away the English ranks by -whole sections. The sharp chattering of the musketry -succeeded, the French guns were then -pointed towards the British centre and right, the -grenadiers instantly closed upon general Hill’s -division, and the height sparkled with fire. The -inequalities of the ground broke the compact -formation of the troops on both sides, and small -bodies were seen here and there struggling for the -mastery with all the virulence of a single combat; -in some places the French grenadiers were overthrown<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_396"></a>[396]</span> -at once, in others they would not be denied, -and reached the summit; but the reserves were -always ready to vindicate their ground, and no -permanent footing was obtained. Still the conflict -was maintained with singular obstinacy; Hill himself -was wounded, and his men were falling fast; -but the enemy suffered more, and gave back, step -by step at first, and slowly, to cover the retreat of -their wounded; but, finally, unable to sustain the -increasing fury of the English, and having lost -above fifteen hundred men in the space of forty -minutes, the whole mass broke away in disorder, -and returned to their own position, covered by the -renewed play of their powerful artillery.</p> - -<p>To this destructive fire no adequate answer could -be made, for the English guns were few, and of -small calibre; and when sir Arthur Wellesley desired -a reinforcement from Cuesta, the latter sent him -only two pieces; yet even those were serviceable, -and the Spanish gunners fought them gallantly. -The principal line of the enemy’s retreat was by the -great valley, and a favourable opportunity for a -charge of horse occurred; but the English cavalry, -having retired, during the night, for water and -forage, were yet too distant to be of service. However, -these repeated efforts of the French against -the hill, and the appearance of some of their light -troops on the mountain, beyond the left, taught the -English general that he had committed a fault in -not prolonging his flank across the valley; and he -hastened to rectify it. For this purpose, he placed -the principal mass of his cavalry there, with the -leading squadrons looking into the valley, and, -having obtained, from Cuesta, general Bassecour’s -division of infantry, posted it on the mountain itself,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_397"></a>[397]</span> -in observation of the French light troops. -Meanwhile, the duke of Albuquerque, discontented -with Cuesta’s arrangements, came, with his division, -to sir Arthur Wellesley, who placed him behind the -British, thus displaying a formidable array of horsemen, -six lines in depth.</p> - -<p>Immediately after the failure of Ruffin’s attack, -king Joseph, having, in person, examined the whole -position of the allies, from left to right, demanded -of Jourdan and Victor if he should deliver a general -battle. The former replied that the great valley -and the mountain being unoccupied, on the 27th, -<span class="sidenote">Marshal Jourdan.</span> -sir Arthur Wellesley’s attention should have been -drawn to the right by a feint on the Spaniards; -that, during the night, the whole army should have -been silently placed in column, at the entrance of -the great valley, ready, at daybreak, to form a line -of battle, on the left, to a new front, and so have -attacked the hill from whence Victor had been twice -repulsed. Such a movement, he said, would have -obliged the allies to change their front also, and, -during this operation, they might have been assailed -with hopes of success. But this project could not -now be executed; the English, aware of their mistake, -had secured their left flank, by occupying the -valley; and the mountain and their front was inattackable. -<em>Hence, the only prudent line was to take -up a position on the Alberche, and await the effect of -Soult’s operations on the English rear.</em></p> - -<p>Marshal Victor opposed this counsel; he engaged -to carry the hill on the English left, notwithstanding -his former failures, provided the fourth corps would -attack the right and centre at the same moment; -and he finished his argument by declaring that, if<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_398"></a>[398]</span> -such a combination failed, “<em>It was time to renounce -making war</em>.”</p> - -<p>The king was embarrassed. His own opinion -coincided with Jourdan’s; but he feared that Victor -would cause the emperor to believe a great opportunity -had been lost; and, while thus wavering, a -despatch arrived from Soult, by which it appeared -that his force could only reach Plasencia between -the 3d and 5th of August. Now, a detachment -from the army of Venegas had already appeared -near Toledo, and that general’s advanced guard -was approaching Aranjuez. The king was troubled -by the danger thus threatening Madrid, because all -the stores, the reserve artillery, and the general -hospitals of the whole army in Spain were deposited -there; and, moreover, the tolls received at the -gates of that town formed almost the only pecuniary -resource of his court, so narrowly did Napoleon -reduce the expenditure of the war.</p> - -<p>These considerations overpowered his judgement, -and, adopting the worse and rejecting the better -counsel, he resolved to succour the capital; but, -before separating the army, he determined to try -the chance of a battle. Indecision is a cancer in -war: Joseph should have adhered to the plan arranged -with Soult; the advantages were obvious, -the ultimate success sure, and the loss of Madrid -was nothing in the scale, because it could only be -temporary; but, if the king thought otherwise, he -should have decided to fight for it at once; he -should have drawn the fifth corps to him, prepared -his plan, and fallen, with the utmost rapidity, upon -Cuesta, the 26th; his advanced guard should have -been on the Alberche that evening, and, before<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_399"></a>[399]</span> -twelve o’clock on the 27th, the English army would -have been without the aid of a single Spanish soldier. -But, after neglecting the most favourable -opportunity when his army was full of ardour, he -now, with singular inconsistency, resolved to give -battle, when his enemies were completely prepared, -strongly posted, and in the pride of success, and -when the confidence of his own troops was shaken -by the partial action of the morning.</p> - -<p>While the French generals were engaged in -council, the troops on both sides took some rest, -and the English wounded were carried to the rear; -but the soldiers were suffering from hunger; the -regular service of provisions had ceased for several -days, and a few ounces of wheat, in the grain, -formed the whole subsistence of men who had -fought, and who were yet to fight, so hardly. The -Spanish camp was full of confusion and distrust. -Cuesta inspired terror, but no confidence; and Albuquerque, -whether from conviction or instigated -by momentary anger, just as the French were -coming on to the final attack, sent one of his staff -to inform the English commander that Cuesta was -betraying him. The aide-de-camp, charged with -this message, delivered it to colonel Donkin, and -that officer carried it to sir Arthur Wellesley. The -latter, seated on the summit of the hill which had -been so gallantly contested, was intently watching -the movements of the advancing enemy; he listened -to this somewhat startling message without so much -as turning his head, and then drily answering—“<em>Very -well, you may return to your brigade</em>,” continued -his survey of the French. Donkin retired, -filled with admiration of the imperturbable resolution -and quick penetration of the man; and, indeed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_400"></a>[400]</span> -sir Arthur’s conduct was, throughout that day, -such as became a general upon whose vigilance -and intrepidity the fate of fifty thousand men depended.</p> - - -<h4>BATTLE OF TALAVERA.</h4> - -<p>The dispositions of the French were soon completed. -Ruffin’s division, on the extreme right, -was destined to cross the valley, and, moving by -the foot of the mountain, to turn the British left.</p> - -<p>Villatte’s orders were to menace the contested -height with one brigade, and to guard the valley -with another, which, being strengthened by a battalion -of grenadiers, connected Ruffin’s movement -with the main attack.</p> - -<p>Lapisse, supported by Latour Maubourg’s dragoons, -and by the king’s reserve, was instructed to -pass the ravine in front of the English centre, and -to fall, with half his infantry, upon Sherbrooke’s -division, while the other half, connecting its attack -with Villatte’s brigade, mounted the hill, and made -a third effort to master that important point.</p> - -<p>Milhaud’s dragoons were left on the main road, -opposite Talavera, to keep the Spaniards in check; -but the rest of the heavy cavalry was brought into -the centre, behind general Sebastiani, who, with the -fourth corps, was to assail the right of the British -army. A part of the French light cavalry supported -Villatte’s brigade in the valley, and a part remained -in reserve.</p> - -<p>A number of guns were distributed among the -divisions, but the principal mass remained on the -hill, with the reserve of light cavalry; where, also, -the duke of Belluno stationed himself, to direct the -movements of the first corps.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_401"></a>[401]</span></p> - -<p>From nine o’clock in the morning until mid-day -the field of battle offered no appearance of hostility; -the weather was intensely hot, and the troops, on -both sides, descended and mingled, without fear or -suspicion, to quench their thirst at the little brook -which divided the positions; but, at one o’clock in -the afternoon, the French soldiers were seen to -gather round their eagles, and the rolling of drums -was heard along the whole line. Half an hour -later, the king’s guards, the reserve, and the fourth -corps were descried, near the centre of the enemy’s -position, marching to join the first corps; and, at -two o’clock, the table-land and the height on the -French right, even to the valley, were covered with -the dark and lowering masses. At this moment -some hundreds of English soldiers, employed to -carry the wounded to the rear, returned in one -body, and were, by the French, supposed to be sir -Robert Wilson’s corps joining the army; nevertheless, -the duke of Belluno, whose arrangements -were now completed, gave the signal for battle: -and eighty pieces of artillery immediately sent a -tempest of bullets before the light troops, who, -coming on swiftly and with the violence of a hail-storm, -were closely followed by the broad, black -columns, in all the majesty of war.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley, from the summit of the -hill, had a clear view of the whole field of battle; -and first he saw the fourth corps rush forwards, -with the usual impetuosity of French soldiers, and -clearing the intersected ground in their front, fall -upon Campbell’s division with infinite fury; but -that general, assisted by Mackenzie’s brigade, and -by two Spanish battalions, withstood their utmost -efforts. The English regiments, putting the French<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_402"></a>[402]</span> -skirmishers aside, met the advancing columns with -loud shouts, and, breaking in on their front, and -lapping their flanks with fire, and giving no respite, -pushed them back with a terrible carnage. Ten -guns were taken; but, as general Campbell prudently -forbore pursuit, the French rallied on their -supports, and made a show of attacking again: vain -attempt! The British artillery and musketry -played too vehemently upon their masses, and a -Spanish regiment of cavalry charging on their -flank at the same time, the whole retired in disorder, -and the victory was secured in that quarter.</p> - -<p>But, while this was passing on the right, Villatte’s -division, preceded by the grenadiers, and supported -by two regiments of light cavalry, was seen advancing -up the great valley against the left, and, -beyond Villatte’s, Ruffin was discovered marching -towards the mountain. Sir Arthur Wellesley immediately -ordered Anson’s brigade of cavalry, composed -of the twenty-third light dragoons and the first -German hussars, to charge the head of these columns; -and this brigade, coming on at a canter, and increasing -its speed as it advanced, rode headlong -against the enemy, but, in a few moments, came -upon the brink of a hollow cleft, which was not -perceptible at a distance. The French, throwing -themselves into squares, opened their fire; and -colonel Arenstchild, commanding the hussars, an -officer whom forty years’ experience had made a -master in his art, promptly reined up at the brink, -exclaiming, in his broken phrase, “<em>I will not kill -my young mens!</em>”</p> - -<p>The English blood was hotter! The twenty-third, -under colonel Seymour, rode wildly down -into the hollow, and men and horses fell over each<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_403"></a>[403]</span> -other in dreadful confusion. The survivors, still -untamed, mounted the opposite bank by two’s and -three’s; Seymour was wounded; but major Frederick -Ponsonby, a hardy soldier, rallying all who came -up, passed through the midst of Villatte’s columns, -and, reckless of the musketry, from each side, -fell, with inexpressible violence, upon a brigade of -French <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">chasseurs</i> in the rear. The combat was -fierce but short; Victor had perceived the first -advance of the English, and detached his Polish -lancers, and Westphalian light-horse, to the support -of Villatte; and these fresh troops coming up -when the twenty-third, already overmatched, could -scarcely hold up against the chasseurs, entirely -broke them. Those who were not killed or taken -made for Bassecour’s Spanish division, and so -escaped, leaving behind two hundred and seven -men and officers, or about half the number that -went into action.</p> - -<p>During this time the hill, the key of the position, -was again attacked, and Lapisse, crossing the ravine, -pressed hard upon the English centre; his own -artillery, aided by the great battery on his right, -opened large gaps in Sherbrooke’s ranks, and the -French columns came close up to the British line -in the resolution to win; but they were received -with a general discharge of all arms, and so vigorously -encountered, that they gave back in disorder; -and, in the excitement of the moment, the brigade -of English guards, quitting the line, followed up -their success with inconsiderate ardour. The enemy’s -supporting columns and dragoons advanced, -the men who had been repulsed turned again, -and the French batteries pounded the flank and -front of the guards.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_404"></a>[404]</span></p> - -<p>Thus maltreated, the latter drew back, and, at -the same moment, the German legion, being sorely -pressed, got into confusion. Hill’s and Campbell’s -divisions, on the extremities of the line, still held -fast; but the centre of the British was absolutely -broken, and the fate of the day seemed to incline -in favour of the French, when, suddenly, colonel -Donellan, with the forty-eighth regiment, was seen -advancing through the midst of the disordered -masses. At first, it seemed as if this regiment -must be carried away by the retiring crowds, but, -wheeling back by companies, it let them pass -through the intervals, and then, resuming its proud -and beautiful line, marched against the right of -the pursuing columns, and plied them with such a -destructive musketry, and closed upon them with -such a firm and regular pace, that the forward -movement of the French was checked. The guards -and the Germans immediately rallied; a brigade -of light cavalry came up from the second line at a -trot; the artillery battered the enemy’s flanks without -intermission, and the French, beginning to -waver, soon lost their advantage, and the battle -was restored.</p> - -<p>In all actions there is one critical and decisive -moment which will give the victory to the general -who knows how to seize it. When the guards first -made their rash charge, sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing -the issue of it, had ordered the forty-eighth -down from the hill, although a rough battle -was going on there; and, at the same time, he -directed Cotton’s light cavalry to advance. These -dispositions gained the day. The French relaxed -their efforts by degrees; the fire of the English -grew hotter; and their loud and confident shouts—sure<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_405"></a>[405]</span> -augury of success—were heard along the whole -line.</p> - -<p>In the hands of a great general, Joseph’s guards -and the reserve, which were yet entire, might have -restored the combat: but all combination was at an -end on the French side. The fourth corps, beaten -back on the left with the loss of ten guns, was in -confusion; the troops in the great valley on the -right, amazed at the furious charge of the twenty-third, -and awed by the sight of four distinct lines -of cavalry, still in reserve, remained stationary. -No impression had been made on the hill; Lapisse -himself was mortally wounded, and, at last, his -division giving way, the whole army retired to its -position, from whence it had descended to the -attack. This retrograde movement was covered by -skirmishers and an increasing fire of artillery; and -the British, reduced to less than fourteen thousand -sabres and bayonets, and exhausted by toil, and -the want of food, could not pursue. The Spanish -army was incapable of any evolution, and about -six o’clock all hostility ceased, each army holding -the position of the morning. But the battle was -scarcely over when, the dry grass and shrubs taking -fire, a volume of flames passed with inconceivable -rapidity across a part of the field, scorching, in -its course, both the dead and the wounded.</p> - -<p>On the British side two generals (Mackenzie and -Langworth), thirty-one officers of inferior rank, -and seven hundred and sixty-seven serjeants and -soldiers were killed upon the spot; and three -generals, a hundred and ninety-two officers, three -thousand seven hundred and eighteen serjeants -and privates wounded. Nine officers, six hundred -and forty-three serjeants and soldiers were missing;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_406"></a>[406]</span> -thus making a total loss of six thousand two hundred -and sixty-eight, in the two days’ fighting, of -which five thousand four hundred and twenty-two -fell on the 28th.</p> - -<p>The French suffered more severely. Two generals -and nine hundred and forty-four killed; -<span class="sidenote">Marshal Jourdan, MSS.</span> -six thousand two hundred and ninety-four wounded, -and a hundred and fifty-six prisoners; furnishing a -<span class="sidenote">Semelé’s Journal of Operations of the First Corps, MSS.</span> -total of seven thousand three hundred and eighty-nine -men and officers, of which four thousand were -of the first corps. Of seventeen guns captured, ten -were taken by general Campbell’s division, and -seven were left in the woods by the French.</p> - -<p>The Spaniards returned above twelve hundred -men, killed and wounded, but the correctness of -the report was very much doubted at the time.</p> - -<p>The 29th, at day-break, the French army quitted -its position, and, before six o’clock, was in order -of battle on the heights of Salinas, behind the -Alberche. That day, also, general Robert Craufurd -reached the English camp, with the forty-third, fifty-second, -and ninety-fifth or rifle regiment, and immediately -took charge of the outposts. These troops, -after a march of twenty miles, were in bivouac near -Malpartida de Plasencia, when the alarm, caused -by the fugitive Spanish, spread to that part. -Craufurd allowed the men to rest for a few hours, -and then, withdrawing about fifty of the weakest -from the ranks, commenced his march with the -resolution not to halt until he reached the field of -battle. As the brigade advanced, crowds of the -runaways were met with; and those not all -Spaniards, propagating the vilest falsehoods: “<em>the -army was defeated</em>,”—“<em>Sir Arthur Wellesley was -killed</em>,”—“<em>the French were only a few miles distant</em>;”<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_407"></a>[407]</span> -and some, blinded by their fears, affected even to -point out the enemy’s advanced posts on the nearest -hills. Indignant at this shameful scene, the troops -hastened, rather than slackened, the impetuosity of -their pace; and, leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, -in twenty-six hours they had crossed the field -of battle in a close and compact body, having, in -that time, passed over sixty-two English miles, and -in the hottest season of the year, each man carrying -from fifty to sixty pounds weight upon his shoulders. -Had the historian Gibbon known of such a -march, he would have spared his sneer about the -“delicacy of modern soldiers!”</p> - - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>1º. The moral courage evinced by sir Arthur -Wellesley, when, with such a coadjutor as Cuesta, -he accepted battle, was not less remarkable than -the judicious disposition which, finally, rendered -him master of the field. Yet it is doubtful if he -could have maintained his position had the French -been well managed, and their strength reserved for -the proper moment, instead of being wasted on -isolated attacks during the night of the 27th, and -the morning of the 28th. A pitched battle is a -great affair. A good general will endeavour to bring -all the moral, as well as the physical, force of his army -into play at the same time, if he means to win, and -all may be too little.</p> - -<p>Marshal Jourdan’s project was conceived in -this spirit, and worthy of his reputation; and it is -possible, that he might have placed his army, unperceived, -on the flank of the English, and by a -sudden and general attack have carried the key of -the position, and so commenced his battle well: but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_408"></a>[408]</span> -sir Arthur Wellesley’s resources would not then have -been exhausted. He had foreseen such a movement, -and was prepared, by a change of front, to keep the -enemy in check with his left wing and cavalry; -while the right, marching upon the position abandoned -by the French, should cut the latter off from -the Alberche. In this movement the allies would -have been reinforced by Wilson’s corps, which was -near Cazalegas, and the contending armies would -then have exchanged lines of operation. The French -could, however, have gained nothing, unless they -won a complete victory; but the allies would, even -though defeated, have ensured their junction with -Venegas. Madrid and Toledo would have fallen; -and before Soult could unite with Joseph, a new -line of operations, through the fertile country of -La Mancha, would have been obtained. But these -matters are only speculative.</p> - -<p>2º. The distribution of the French troops for the -great attack cannot be praised. The attempt to turn -the English left with a single division was puerile. -The allied cavalry was plainly to be seen in the -valley; how, then, could a single division hope to -<ins class="corr" id="tn-408" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'develope its attack'"> -develop its attack</ins> upon the hill, when five thousand -horsemen were hanging upon its flank? and, in fact, -the whole of Ruffin’s, and the half of Villatte’s division, -were paralyzed by the charge of a single -regiment. To have rendered this movement formidable, -the principal part of the French cavalry -should have preceded the march of the infantry; -but the great error was fighting at all, before Soult -reached Plasencia.</p> - -<p>3º. It has been said, that to complete the victory -sir Arthur Wellesley should have caused the Spaniards -to advance; but this would, more probably,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_409"></a>[409]</span> -have led to a defeat. Neither Cuesta, nor his troops, -were capable of an orderly movement. The infantry -of the first and the fourth corps were still above -twenty thousand strong; and, although a repulsed, -by no means a discomfited force. The cavalry, the -king’s guards, and Dessolle’s division, had not been -engaged at all, and were alone sufficient to beat the -Spaniards. A second panic, such as that of the -27th, would have led to the most deplorable consequences, -as those, who know with what facility -French soldiers recover from a repulse, will readily -acknowledge. This battle was one of hard honest -fighting, and the exceeding gallantry of the troops -honoured the nations to which they belonged. The -English owed much to the general’s dispositions and -something to fortune. The French owed nothing to -their commander; but when it is considered that -only the reserve of their infantry were withheld -from the great attack on the 28th, and that, consequently, -above thirty thousand men were closely and -unsuccessfully engaged for three hours with sixteen -thousand British, it must be confessed that the -latter proved themselves to be truly formidable -soldiers; yet the greatest part were raw men, so -lately drafted from the militia regiments that many -of them still bore the number of their former regiments -on their accoutrements.</p> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_408fp" style="max-width: 30em;"> -<p class="fs70"><em><ins class="corr" id="tn-409" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Plate 7. to face Pa.'"> -Plate 7. to face Pa. 409</ins></em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_408fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_408fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption">Operations of the<br /> -BRITISH, FRENCH & SPANISH ARMIES,<br /> -in July & August 1809.<br /> -<p><em>London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.</em></p></div> -</div> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_410"></a>[410]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BIX_III">CHAPTER III.</h3> -</div> - -<p>The French rested the 29th at Salinas; but, in -the night, the king marched with the 4th corps and -the reserve to St. Ollalla, from whence he sent a -division to relieve Toledo. The 31st, he halted. -The 1st of August he marched to Illescas, a central -position, from whence he could interpose between -Venegas and the capital. The duke of Belluno, -with the first corps, remained on the Alberche, -having orders to fall upon the rear-guard of the -allies, when the latter should be forced to retire, -in consequence of Soult’s operations. Meantime, -sir Robert Wilson, who, during the action -was near Cazalegas, returned to Escalona; and -Victor, displaying an unaccountable dread of this -small body, which he supposed to be the precursor -of the allied army, immediately retired, first -to Maqueda, then to Santa Cruz del Retamar, and -was even proceeding to Mostoles, when a retrograde -movement of the allies recalled him to the Alberche.</p> - -<p>The British army was so weak, and had suffered -so much, that the 29th and 30th were passed, by sir -Arthur, in establishing his hospitals at Talavera, and -in fruitless endeavours to procure provisions, and the -necessary assistance to prevent the wounded men from -perishing. Neither Cuesta nor the inhabitants of -Talavera, although possessing ample means, would -render the slightest aid, nor would they even assist -to bury the dead. The corn secreted in Talavera -was alone sufficient to support the army for a month; -but the troops were starving, although the inhabitants,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_411"></a>[411]</span> -who had fled across the Tagus with their -portable effects at the beginning of the battle, had -now returned. It is not surprising that, in such -circumstances, men should endeavour to save their -property, especially provisions; yet the apathy -with which they beheld the wounded men dying -for want of aid, and those who were found sinking -from hunger, did in no wise answer Mr. Frere’s -description of them, as men who “<em>looked upon -the war in the light of a crusade, and carried it on -with all the enthusiasm of such a cause</em>.”</p> - -<p>This conduct left an indelible impression on the -minds of the English soldiers. From that period to -the end of the war their contempt and dislike of -the Spaniards were never effaced; and long afterwards, -Badajos and St. Sebastian suffered for the -churlish behaviour of the people of Talavera. The -principal motive of action with the Spaniards was -always personal rancour: hence, those troops who -had behaved so ill in action, and the inhabitants, -who withheld alike their sympathy and their aid -from the English soldiers to whose bravery they owed -the existence of their town, were busily engaged -after the battle, in beating out the brains of the -wounded French as they lay upon the field; and -they were only checked by the English soldiers, who, -in some instances, fired upon the perpetrators of this -horrible iniquity.</p> - -<p>Cuesta also gave proofs of his ferocious character; -he, who had shown himself alike devoid -of talent and real patriotism, whose indolence and -ignorance of his profession had banished all order -and discipline from his army, and whose stupid -pride had all but caused its destruction, now assumed -the Roman general, and proceeded to decimate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_412"></a>[412]</span> -the regiments that had fled in the panic on -the 27th. Above fifty men he slew in this manner; -and if his cruelty, so contrary to reason and the -morals of the age, had not been mitigated by -the earnest intercession of sir Arthur Wellesley, -more men would have been destroyed in cold blood, -by this savage old man, than had fallen in the -battle.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">Sir A. Wellesley’s -Correspondence, -Parl. Papers, -1810.</div> - -<p>Hitherto the allied generals had thought little of -the duke of Dalmatia’s movements, and their eyes -were still fixed on Madrid; but, the 30th, information -was received at Talavera, that twelve thousand -rations had been ordered, for the 28th, at Fuente -Dueña by that marshal, and twenty-four thousand -at Los Santos, a town situated between Alba de -Tormes and the pass of Baños. Cuesta, conscious -of the defenceless state of the latter post, suggested -that sir Robert Wilson should be sent there; but -sir Arthur Wellesley wished Wilson to remain at -Escalona, to renew his intercourse with Madrid, -and proposed that a Spanish corps should go. -Indeed, he still slighted the idea of danger from -that quarter, and hoped that the result of the -battle would suffice to check Soult’s march. Cuesta -rejected this proposal at the moment, and again, on -the 31st, when sir Arthur renewed his application; -but, on the 1st of August, it was known that Soult -had entered Bejar; and then, on the 2d, general -Bassecour was detached by Cuesta to defend the -Puerto de Baños, from which he was absent four -long marches, while the enemy had been, on the -31st, within one march.</p> - -<p>The day that Bassecour marched, intelligence -arrived that Soult had entered Plasencia. Baños -had been abandoned to the enemy without a shot;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_413"></a>[413]</span> -for the battalions from Bejar had dispersed, and -those sent by Cuesta had been withdrawn to -Almaraz by their general the marquis de la Reyna, -who also proclaimed that he would destroy the -boat-bridge at that place. This news roused Cuesta; -he proposed that half the allied army should march -to the rear, and attack Soult. Sir Arthur Wellesley -refused to divide the English army, but offered to -go or stay with the whole; and, when the other -desired him to choose, he answered that he would -go, and Cuesta appeared satisfied.</p> - -<p>On the night of the 2d August, letters were -received from Wilson, announcing the appearance -of the French near Nombella, whither he, unconscious -of the effect produced by his presence at -Escalona, had retreated with his infantry, sending -his artillery to St. Roman, near Talavera. As sir -Arthur Wellesley could not suppose that sir Robert -Wilson’s corps alone would cause the first corps -to retire, he naturally concluded that Victor’s -design was to cross the Alberche at Escalona, crush -Wilson, and operate a communication with Soult -by the valley of the Tietar. As such a movement, -if persisted in, would necessarily dislodge -Cuesta from Talavera, sir Arthur, before he commenced -his march, obtained the Spanish general’s -promise that he would collect cars, for the purpose -of transporting as many of the English wounded -as were in a condition to be moved, from Talavera, -to some more suitable place. This promise, like -all the others, was shamefully violated; but the -British general had not yet learned the full extent -of Cuesta’s bad faith, and thinking that a few days -would suffice to drive back Soult, marched, on the -3d of August, with seventeen thousand men, to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_414"></a>[414]</span> -Oropesa, intending to unite with Bassecour’s division, -and to fight Soult, whose force he estimated -at fifteen thousand.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">S.<br /> -Journal of -Operations -2d corps, -MS.</div> - -<p>Meanwhile, Soult being, by the return of general -Foy, on the 24th of July, assured of the king’s -concurrence in the combined movements to be -executed, ordered Laborde, Merle, and La Houssaye -to march from Zamora and Toro upon Salamanca -and Ledesma, and to scour the banks of the Tormes. -The sixth corps was also directed upon the same -place; and, the 25th, Soult repaired to Salamanca -in person, intending to unite the three corps there. -Hearing, however, of Victor’s retrograde movement -from the Alberche to the Guadarama, he -desired marshal Mortier to march, on the 28th, to -Plasencia, by Fuente Roble and Bejar, and he placed -La Houssaye’s and Lorge’s dragoons under his -command: the remainder of the second corps and -the light cavalry were to follow when the sixth -corps should be in motion. This done, Soult -wrote to the king, saying, “<em>My urgent desire is -that your majesty may not fight a general battle -before you are certain of the concentration of all my -forces near Plasencia. The most important results -will be obtained if your majesty will abstain from -attacking until the moment when a knowledge of my -march causes the enemy to retrace his steps, which -he must do, or he is lost.</em>”</p> - -<p>The 29th, the fifth corps was at Fuente Roble; -but information being received that Beresford, with -an army, had reached Almeida on the 27th, the march -was covered by strong detachments on the side of -Ciudad Rodrigo. The long-expected convoy of -artillery and ammunition for the second corps had, -however, arrived in Salamanca the 29th; and Ney<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_415"></a>[415]</span> -wrote, from Toro, that he also would be there -the 31st.</p> - -<p>The 30th, the fifth corps drove the marquis de la -Reyna from the pass of Baños, and took post at -Aldea Neuva del Camina and Herbas; and the -second corps, quitting Salamanca, arrived, the same -day, at Siete Carrera.</p> - -<p>The 31st, the fifth corps entered Plasencia; the -second corps reached Fuente la Casa, Fuente -Roble, San Estevan, and Los Santos.</p> - -<p>Plasencia was full of convalescents, detachments, -and non-combatants; and when the French arrived, -about two thousand men, including five hundred of -the Lusitanian legion, evacuated the town, taking -the road to Moraleja and Zarza Mayor; but four -hundred sick men, following the enemy’s accounts, -were captured, together with a few stores. During -these rapid marches, the French were daily harassed -by the Spanish peasantry: the villages were also -deserted; the cavalry wandered far and near to -procure subsistence; and several slight skirmishes -and some pillage took place.</p> - -<p>The 1st of August, the second corps passed the Col -de Baños, and the head of the column entered Plasencia, -which was, like other places, deserted by -the greatest part of the inhabitants. Vague reports -that a battle had been fought between the 26th and -29th was the only intelligence that could be procured -of the situation of the allies; and, on the -2d, the advanced guard of the army marched to the -Venta de Bazagona, while scouting parties were, at -the same time, directed towards Coria, to acquire -news of marshal Beresford, who was now said to be -moving along the Portuguese frontier.</p> - -<p>The 3d of August, the fifth corps and the dragoons,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_416"></a>[416]</span> -passing the Tietar, reached Toril, the outposts -were pushed to Cazatejada and Sierra de -Requemada; but the second corps remained at -Plasencia, awaiting the arrival of the sixth corps, -the head of which was now at Baños. Hence, on the -3d of August, the king and Sebastiani being at -Illescas and Valdemoro, Victor at Maqueda, Cuesta -at Talavera, sir Arthur Wellesley at Oropesa, and -Soult on the Tietar; the narrow valley of the Tagus was -crowded in its whole length by the contending troops.</p> - -<p>The allies held the centre, being only one day’s -march asunder; but their force, when concentrated, -was not more than forty-seven thousand men. -The French could not <ins class="corr" id="tn-416" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'unite under three'"> -unite in under three</ins> days, but their combined forces exceeded ninety thousand -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_I">Appendix, No. 1</a>, section 4.</span> -men, of which fifty-three thousand were under -Soult; and this singular situation was rendered -more remarkable by the ignorance in which all -parties were as to the strength and movements of -their adversaries. Victor and the king, frightened -by Wilson’s partizan corps of four thousand men, -were preparing to unite at Mostoles, while Cuesta, -equally alarmed at Victor, was retiring from Talavera. -Sir Arthur Wellesley was supposed, by -Joseph, to be at the head of twenty-five thousand -British; and the former, calculating on Soult’s -weakness, was marching, with twenty-three thousand -Spanish and English, to engage fifty-three -thousand French; while Soult, unable to ascertain the -exact situation of either friends or enemies, little -suspected that the prey was rushing into his jaws. -At this moment the fate of the Peninsula hung by -a thread, which could not bear the weight for -twenty-four hours; yet fortune so ordained that no -irreparable disaster ensued.</p> - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<div class="figcenter illowp70" id="i_b_416fp" style="max-width: 30em;"> -<p class="fs70"><em>Plate 8.</em></p> - <img class="w100" src="images/i_b_416fp.jpg" alt="" /> - <a rel="nofollow" href="images/i_b_416fp-large.jpg"> - <span class="screenonly fs60 center">click here for larger image.</span></a> - <div class="caption"><em>The Battle of</em><br /> -TALAVERA,<br /> -<em>at the period of the final Attack</em><br /> -on the 28<sup>th</sup> July 1809.<br /> -<p><em>London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.</em></p></div> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_417"></a>[417]</span></p> - -<p>At five o’clock in the evening of the third, it was -known at the English head-quarters that the French -were near Naval Moral, and, consequently, between -the allies and the bridge of Almaraz.</p> - -<p>At six o’clock, letters from Cuesta advised sir -Arthur that the king was again advancing, and that, -from intercepted despatches addressed to Soult, it -appeared that the latter must be stronger than was -supposed; hence, Cuesta said that, wishing to aid -the English, he would quit Talavera that evening: -in other words, abandon the British hospitals!</p> - -<p>To this unexpected communication sir Arthur replied -that the king was still some marches off, and -that Venegas should be directed to occupy him on -the Upper Tagus; that Soult’s strength was exceedingly -overrated, and Victor’s movements not -decided enough to oblige the Spanish army to quit -Talavera. Hence he required that Cuesta should at -least wait until the next morning, to cover the evacuation -of the English hospitals. But, before this communication -reached Cuesta, the latter was in full -march; and, at day-break on the 4th, the Spanish -army was descried moving, in several columns, -down the valley towards Oropesa, where Bassecour’s -division soon after joined it from Centinello, and, -at the same time, the cavalry patroles found the -French near Naval Moral.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley having, by this time, seen -the intercepted letters himself, became convinced -that Soult’s force was not overrated at thirty thousand; -and the duke of Dalmatia, who had also -intercepted some English letters, learned that, on -the first of August, the allies were still at Talavera, -and ill-informed of his march. Thus, the one general<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_418"></a>[418]</span> -perceived his danger and the other his advantage -at the same moment.</p> - -<p>Mortier was immediately ordered, by the duke -of Dalmatia, to take a position with the fifth corps -at Cazatejada, to seize the boat-bridge at Almaraz, -if it was not destroyed, and to patrole towards Arzobispo. -The second corps was, likewise, directed -upon the same place; and the head of the sixth -entered Plasencia. The further progress of the -allies was thus barred in front; the Tagus was on -their left; impassable mountains on their right; and -it was certain that Cuesta’s retreat would immediately -bring the king and Victor down upon their -rear. The peril of this situation was apparent to -every soldier in the British ranks, and produced a -general inquietude. No man felt the slightest confidence -in the Spaniards, and the recollection of -the stern conflict at Talavera, aided by a sense of -exhaustion from long abstinence, depressed the -spirits of men and officers. The army was, indeed, -ready to fight, but all persons felt that it must be -for safety, not for glory.</p> - -<p>In this trying moment, sir Arthur Wellesley -abated nothing of his usual calmness and fortitude. -He knew not the full extent of the danger; but, -assuming the enemy in his front to be thirty thousand -men, and Victor to have twenty-five thousand -others in his rear, he judged that to continue the -offensive would be rash, because he must fight and -beat those two marshals separately within three -days, which, with starving and tired troops, inferior -in number, was scarcely to be accomplished. But, -to remain where he was on the defensive was equally -unpromising, because the road from Talavera to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_419"></a>[419]</span> -Arzobispo led through Calera, in the rear of Oropesa; -and thus Victor could intercept the only line of -retreat, and a battle must then be fought, in an -unfavourable position, against the united forces of -the enemy, estimated, as we have seen, to be above -fifty thousand men. One resource remained: to -pass the bridge of Arzobispo immediately, and take -up a line of defence behind that river, before the -French could seize the Col de Mirabete, and so -cut off the road to Truxillo and Merida—a hard -alternative; but the long-cherished error relative -to Soult’s weakness had dried up the springs of -success, and left the campaign, like a withered -stem, without fruit or foliage.</p> - -<p>Cuesta doggedly opposed this project; asserting -that Oropesa was a position suitable for a battle, -and that he would fight there. Further concession -to his humours would have been folly, and sir -Arthur sternly declared that he would move forthwith, -leaving the Spanish general to do that which -should seem meet to him; and, assuredly, this decided -conduct saved the Peninsula, for not fifty, but -ninety thousand enemies were at hand.</p> - -<p>It was now six o’clock in the morning, the baggage -and ammunition were already in motion for -the bridge of Arzobispo; but the army, which had -been reinforced by a troop of horse-artillery, and -some convalescents that escaped from Plasencia, -remained in position for several hours, to cover the -passage of the stores and the wounded men from -Talavera; the latter having just arrived at Calera -in the most pitiable condition. About noon, the -road being clear, the columns marched to the bridge; -and, at two o’clock, the whole army was in position<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_420"></a>[420]</span> -at the other side, the present danger was averted, -and the combinations of the enemy were baffled. -During the passage, several herds of swine, which, -following the custom of the country, were feeding -in the woods, under charge of the swineherds, -were fallen in with; and the soldiers, instigated -by hunger, broke their ranks, and ran in upon the -animals as in a charge, shooting, stabbing, and, -like men possessed, cutting off the flesh while the -beasts were yet alive; nor can this conduct be much -censured under the circumstances of the moment; -yet it was a severe misfortune to the poor peasants, -whose property was thus destroyed.</p> - -<p>From Arzobispo, the army moved towards Deleytoza; -but general Craufurd’s brigade, with six pieces -of artillery, was directed to gain the bridge of -Almaraz by a forced march, lest the enemy, discovering -the ford below that place, should cross the -river, and seize the Puerto de Mirabete. The roads -were exceedingly rugged, and the guns could only -be dragged up the Meza d’Ibor by the force of men. -Nevertheless, Craufurd reached his destination on -the evening of the 5th, and the head-quarters were -established at Deleytoza, on the 7th, the artillery -being at Campillo, the rear guard occupying the -Meza d’Ibor. The sick and wounded were then -forwarded to Merida; but the paucity of transport -was such, that sir Arthur Wellesley was obliged to -unload both ammunition and treasure carts for the -conveyance of these unfortunate men. Meanwhile -Soult, little thinking that his object was already -frustrated, continued his march on the 5th, and -Mortier took post at Naval Moral; the advanced -guard entered Puebla de Naciada, and the patroles, -scouring the roads to Oropesa and the bridge of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_421"></a>[421]</span> -Arzobispo, fell in with and were chased by the -Spanish cavalry from Arzobispo; for Cuesta would -not retire on the 4th, and was in the act of passing -the bridge when the French came in view. The -movements were now hurried on both sides; before -dark, the Spanish army was across the Tagus, with -the exception of a rear guard, which remained on -the right bank that evening, but it was driven -across the river, on the morning of the 6th, by the -fifth corps, which afterwards took post at Valdeveja -and Puebla de Naciada. Ney also reached Naval -Moral, and the second corps entered Gordo.</p> - -<p>The 7th, Mortier examined the Spanish position, -and reported that Cuesta, having thrown up entrenchments, -and placed twenty guns in battery, to -rake the bridge, which was also barricadoed, had -left two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to -hold the post, and withdrawn the rest of his army -towards Meza d’Ibor. Hereupon, Soult detached -his light cavalry towards Talavera, to communicate -with the king, and brought up the second corps to -Arzobispo. Meanwhile, the duke of Belluno having, -on the 5th, ascertained the retreat of the allies from -Talavera, retraced his steps, and entered that town -on the 6th. Thus the English wounded, left there, -fell into his hands, and their treatment was such as -might be expected from a gallant and courteous -nation, for, between the British soldiers and the -French, there was no rancour, and the generous -usages of a civilized and honourable warfare were -cherished.</p> - -<p>The 7th, Victor crossed the Tagus, at the bridge -of Talavera, and pushed his advanced guard to -Aldea Nueva de Balbaroya, on the left bank, within -a few leagues of the Spanish position, which Soult<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_422"></a>[422]</span> -was preparing to attack in front, for he had observed -that, at a certain point, the Spanish horses, when -brought to drink, came far into the stream, and, -the place being sounded in the night of the 7th, -a deep but practicable ford was discovered, about -half a mile above the bridge.</p> - -<p>The fifth and second corps and a division of the -sixth were concentrated to force this passage, early -on the morning of the 8th; but Soult being just -then informed of Victor’s movement, and perceiving -that Albuquerque had withdrawn the Spanish cavalry, -leaving only a rear guard in the works, -judged that the allies were retreating; wherefore, -without relinquishing the attack at Arzobispo, he -immediately sent the division of the sixth corps -back to Naval Moral, and, at the same time, transmitted -a plan of the ford below Almaraz, directed -Ney to cross the Tagus there, seize the Puerto de -Mirabete, and be in readiness to fall upon the -allies, as they came out from the defiles between -Deleytoza and Truxillo.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the heat of the day had induced -Albuquerque to seek shelter for his horsemen in a -wood, near Azutan, a village about five miles from -the bridge; and the Spanish infantry, keeping a -bad guard, were sleeping or loitering about without -care or thought, when Mortier, who was charged -with the direction of the attack, taking advantage -of their want of vigilance, commenced the passage -of the river.</p> - - -<h4>COMBAT OF ARZOBISPO.</h4> - -<p>The French cavalry, about six thousand in number, -were secretly assembled near the ford, and, -about two o’clock in the day, general Caulaincourt’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_423"></a>[423]</span> -brigade suddenly entered the stream. The Spaniards, -running to their arms, manned the batteries, -and opened upon the leading squadrons; but Mortier, -with a powerful concentric fire of artillery, -immediately overwhelmed the Spanish gunners; and -Caulaincourt, having reached the other side of the -river, turned to his right, and, taking the batteries -in reverse, cut down the artillerymen, and dispersed -the infantry who attempted to form. The duke of -Albuquerque, who had mounted at the first alarm, -now came down with all his horsemen in one mass, -but without order, upon Caulaincourt, and the latter -was, for a few moments, in imminent danger; but -the rest of the French cavalry, passing rapidly, soon -joined in the combat; one brigade of infantry followed -at the ford, another burst the barriers on the -bridge itself, and, by this time, the Spanish foot -were flying to the mountains. Albuquerque’s effort -was thus frustrated, a general route ensued, and -five guns and about four hundred prisoners were -taken.</p> - -<p>Soult’s intention being to follow up this success, -he directed that the first corps should move, in two -columns, upon Guadalupe and Deleytoza, intending -to support it with the second and fifth, while the -sixth corps crossed at Almaraz, and seized the pass -of Mirabete. This would undoubtedly have completed -the ruin of the Spanish army, and forced sir -Arthur to make a rapid and disastrous retreat; for -so complete was the surprise and so sudden the -overthrow that some of the English foragers also -fell into the hands of the enemy; and that Cuesta’s -army was in no condition to have made any resistance, -if the pursuit had been continued with vigour, -is clear, from the following facts:—</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_424"></a>[424]</span></p> - -<p>1º. When he withdrew his main body from the -bridge of Arzobispo to Peralada de Garbin, on the -7th, he left fifteen pieces of artillery by the road-side, -without a guard. The defeat of Albuquerque -placed these guns at the mercy of the enemy, who -were, however, ignorant of their situation, until a -trumpeter attending an English flag of truce, either -treacherously or foolishly, mentioned it in the -French camp, from whence a detachment of cavalry -was sent to fetch them off. 2º. The British -military agent, placed at the Spanish head-quarters, -was kept in ignorance of the action; and it was -only by the arrival of the duke of Albuquerque, at -Deleytoza, on the evening of the 9th, that sir -Arthur Wellesley knew the bridge was lost. He -had before advised Cuesta to withdraw behind the -Ibor river, and even now contemplated a partial attack -to keep the enemy in check; but when he repaired -in person to that general’s quarter, on the 10th, -he found the country covered with fugitives and -stragglers, and Cuesta as helpless and yet as -haughty as ever. All his ammunition and guns -(forty pieces) were at the right bank of the Ibor, -and, of course, at the foot of the Meza, and within -sight and cannon-shot of the enemy, on the right -bank of the Tagus. They would have been taken -by the first French patroles that approached, but -that sir Arthur Wellesley persuaded the Spanish -staff-officers to have them dragged up the hill, in -the course of the 10th, without Cuesta’s knowledge.</p> - -<p>In this state of affairs, the impending fate of the -Peninsula was again averted by the king, who recalled -the first corps to the support of the fourth, -then opposed to Venegas. Marshal Ney, also, was -unable to discover the ford below the bridge of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_425"></a>[425]</span> -Almaraz; and, by the 11th, the allies had re-established -their line of defence. The head-quarters -of the British were at Jaraicejo, and those of the -Spaniards at Deleytoza: the former, guarding the -ford of Almaraz, formed the left; the latter, occupying -the Meza d’Ibor and Campillo, were on -the right. The 12th, Cuesta having resigned, general -Equia succeeded to the command, and gave -hopes of a better co-operation; but the evil was in -the character of the people. The position of the -allies was, however, compact and central; the reserves -could easily support the advanced posts; -the communication to the rear was open; and, if -defended with courage, the Meza d’Ibor is impregnable. -To pass the Tagus at Almaraz, in itself -a difficult operation, would be of no avail to the -enemy, while the Mirabete and Meza d’Ibor were -occupied, because his troops would be enclosed in -the narrow space between those ridges and the river.</p> - -<p>The duke of Dalmatia, thus thwarted, conceived -that sir Arthur Wellesley would endeavour to -re-pass the Tagus by Alcantara, and so rejoin -Beresford and the five thousand British troops -under Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn, which were, -by this time, near the frontier of Portugal. To -prevent this he resolved to march at once upon -Coria, with the second, fifth, and sixth corps, to -menace the communications both of sir Arthur and -Beresford with Lisbon, and, at the same time, prepare -for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; but marshal -Ney absolutely refused to concur in this operation: -he observed that sir Arthur Wellesley was not yet -in march for Alcantara; that it was exceedingly -dangerous to invade Portugal in a hasty manner; -and that the army could not be fed between Coria,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_426"></a>[426]</span> -Plasencia, and the Tagus; finally, that Salamanca, -being again in possession of the Spaniards, it was -more fitting that the sixth corps should retake that -town, and occupy the line of the Tormes to cover -Castile.</p> - -<p>This reasoning was approved by Joseph; he -dreaded the further fatigue and privations that -would attend a continuance of the operations during -the excessive heats, and in a wasted country; and -he was strengthened in his opinion by the receipt -of a despatch from the emperor, dated Schoenbrun, -the 29th of July, in which any further offensive -operations were forbad, until the reinforcements -which the recent victory of Wagram enabled him -to send should arrive in Spain. The second corps -was, consequently, directed to take post at Plasencia. -The fifth corps relieved the first at Talavera; and -the English wounded being, by Victor, given over -to marshal Mortier, the latter, with a chivalrous -sense of honour, would not permit his own soldiers, -although suffering severe privations themselves, to -receive rations until the hospitals were first supplied. -The sixth corps was now directed upon Valladolid, -for Joseph was alarmed lest fresh insurrection, -excited and supported by the duke del Parque, -should spread over the whole of Leon and Castile. -Ney marched, on the 11th, from Plasencia; but, to -his surprise, found that sir Robert Wilson, with -about four thousand men, part Spaniards, part Portuguese, -was in possession of the pass of Baños. -To explain this, it must be observed, that when the -British army marched from Talavera, on the 3d, -Wilson, being at Nombella, was put in communication -with Cuesta. He had sent his artillery to the -army on the 3d, and on the 4th, finding that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_427"></a>[427]</span> -Spaniards had abandoned Talavera, he fell back -with his infantry to Vellada, a few miles north -of Talavera. He was then twenty-four miles from -Arzobispo; and, as Cuesta did not quit Oropesa -until the 5th, a junction with sir Arthur Wellesley -might have been effected: but it was impossible to -know this at the time; and Wilson, very prudently, -crossing the Tietar, made for the mountains, trusting -to his activity and local knowledge to escape the -enemy. Villatte’s division pursued him, on the 5th, -to Nombella; a detachment from the garrison of -Avila was watching for him in the passes of Arenas -and Monbeltran, and general Foy waited for him -in the Vera de Plasencia. Nevertheless, he baffled -his opponents, broke through their circle at Viandar, -passed the Gredos at a ridge called the Sierra de -Lanes, and, getting into the valley of the Tormes, -reached Bejar: from thence, thinking to recover -his communications with the army, he marched -towards Plasencia, by the pass of Baños, and thus, -on the morning of the 12th, met with Ney, returning -to the Salamanca country.</p> - -<p>The dust of the French column being seen from -afar, and a retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo open, it is -not easy to comprehend why sir Robert Wilson -should have given battle to the sixth corps. His -position, although difficult of approach, <ins class="corr" id="tn-427" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'and strenghened by'"> -and strengthened by</ins> the piling of large stones in the -narrowest parts, was not one in which he could -hope to stop a whole army; and, accordingly, when -the French, overcoming the local obstacles, got -close upon his left, the fight was at an end. The -first charge broke both the legion and the <ins class="corr" id="tn-427a" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Spanish auxilliaries'"> -Spanish auxiliaries</ins>, and the whole dispersed. Ney then<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_428"></a>[428]</span> -continued his march, and, having recovered the line -of the Tormes, resigned the command of the sixth -corps to general Marchand, and returned to France. -But, while these things happened in Estremadura, -La Mancha was the theatre of more important -operations.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_429"></a>[429]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BIX_IV">CHAPTER IV.</h3> -</div> - -<p>When the duke of Belluno retired from Salinas -to Maqueda, the king, fearing that the allies were -moving up the right bank of the Alberche, carried -his reserve, in the night of the 3d, to Mostoles; but -the fourth corps remained at Illescas, and sent strong -patroles to Valdemoro. Wilson, however, retired, -as we have seen, from Nombella on the 4th; and -the king, no longer expecting the allies in that -quarter, marched in the night to Valdemoro, where -he was joined by the fourth corps from Illescas.</p> - -<p>The 5th, the duke of Belluno returned to St. -Ollalla; and the king marched against general -Venegas, who, in pursuance of the secret orders of -the junta, before mentioned, had loitered about -Daymiel and Tembleque until the 27th of July. -The 29th, however, Venegas reached Ocaña, his -advanced posts being at Aranjuez, his rear-guard -at Yepes, and one division, under Lacy, in front -of Toledo. The same day, one of the <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">partidas</i>, -attending the army, surprised a small French post -on the other side of the Tagus; and Lacy’s division -skirmished with the garrison of Toledo.</p> - -<p>The 30th, Venegas heard of the battle of Talavera; -and at the same time Lacy reported that the -head of the enemy’s columns were to be seen on the -road beyond Toledo. Hereupon, the Spanish commander -reinforced Lacy, and gave him Mora as -a point of retreat; but, on the 2d of August, being -falsely informed by Cuesta that the allied troops -would immediately march upon Madrid, Venegas<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_430"></a>[430]</span> -recalled his divisions from Toledo, pretending to -concentrate his army at Aranjuez, in order to -march also upon the capital; but he had no intention -of doing so; for the junta did not desire to see -Cuesta, at the head of sixty thousand men, in that -city; and, previous to the battle of Talavera, had -not only forbidden him to enter Madrid, but appointed -another man governor. This prohibition -would, no doubt, have been disregarded by Cuesta; -but Venegas was obedient to their secret instructions, -and under pretence of danger to his flanks, if he -marched on the capital, remained at Aranjuez, where -his flank being equally exposed to an enemy coming -from Toledo, he yet performed no service to the -general cause.</p> - -<p>The 3d, he pushed an advanced guard to Puente -Largo; and leaving six hundred infantry, and some -cavalry, near Toledo, concentrated his army between -Aranjuez and Ocaña; and in this position he remained -until the 5th, when his advanced guard was -driven from the Puente Largo, and across the Tagus. -His line of posts on that river was then attacked by -the French skirmishers, and, under cover of a heavy -cannonade, his position was examined by the enemy’s -generals; but when the latter found that all -the bridges above and below Aranjuez were broken -down, they resolved to pass the Tagus at Toledo. -With this intent, the French army re-crossed the -Xarama river, and marched in the direction of that -city; but Venegas still keeping his posts at Aranjuez, -foolishly dispersed his other divisions at -Tembleque, Ocaña, and Guardia. He himself was -desirous of defending La Mancha. The central junta, -with more prudence, wished him to retreat into -the Sierra Morena; but Mr. Frere proposed that his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_431"></a>[431]</span> -army should be divided; one part to enter the -Morena, and the other to march by Cuença, upon -Aragon, and so to menace the communications with -France! The admirable absurdity of this proposal -would probably have caused it to be adopted, if -Sebastiani’s movements had not put an end to the -discussion. That general, crossing the Tagus at -Toledo, and at a ford higher up, drove the Spaniards’ -left back upon the Guazalate. This was on -the 9th of August; on the 10th, Venegas concentrated -his whole army at Almonacid, and, holding a -council of war, resolved to attack the French on the -12th; but the time was miscalculated. Sebastiani -advanced on the 11th, and commenced</p> - - -<h4>THE BATTLE OF ALMONACID.</h4> - -<p>The army of Venegas, including two thousand -cavalry, was somewhat more than twenty-five thousand -strong, with forty pieces of artillery. It was -the most efficient Spanish force that had yet taken -the field; it was composed of the best regiments in -Spain, well armed and clothed; and the generals of -division were neither incapacitated by age, nor -destitute of experience, most of them having been -employed in the previous campaign. The village -of Almonacid was in the centre of the Spanish position; -and, together with some table-land in front of -it, was occupied by two divisions of infantry under -general Castejon. The left wing, under general -Lacy, rested on a hill which covered the main road -to Consuegra. The right wing, commanded by -general Vigodet, was drawn up on some rising -ground covering the road to Tembleque. A reserve, -under general Giron, and the greatest part of the -artillery, were posted behind the centre, on a rugged<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_432"></a>[432]</span> -hill, crowned by an old castle. The cavalry were -placed at the extremity of each wing.</p> - -<p>General Dessolles, with the French reserve, was -still some hours’ march behind, but Sebastiani, -after observing the dispositions made by Venegas, -resolved to attack him with the fourth corps only. -The Polish division immediately marched against -the front; Leval’s Germans turned the flank of the -hill, on which the Spanish left was posted; and -two French brigades were directed upon the centre. -After a sharp fight, the Spanish left was put to -flight; but Venegas, outflanking the victorious -troops with his cavalry, charged and threw them -into disorder. At this moment, the head of Dessolles’s -column arrived, and enabled Sabastiani’s -reserves to restore the combat; and then the -Spanish cavalry, shattered by musketry, and by -the fire of four pieces of artillery, was, in turn, -charged by a French regiment of horse, and broken. -Venegas rallied his troops again on the castle-hill, -behind the village; but the king came up -with the remainder of the reserve, and the attack -was renewed. The Poles and Germans continued -their march against the left flank of the Spaniards; -nine fresh battalions fell upon their centre, and a -column of six battalions forced the right. The -height and the castle were thus carried at the first -effort. Venegas attempted to cover his retreat, by -making a stand in the plain behind; but two divisions -of dragoons charged his troops before they -could re-form, and the disorder became irremediable. -The Spaniards, throwing away their arms, dispersed -in every direction, and were pursued and slaughtered -by the horsemen for several hours.</p> - -<p>Following the French account, three thousand of -the vanquished were slain, and four thousand taken<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_433"></a>[433]</span> -prisoners; and all the guns, baggage, ammunition, -and carriages fell into the hands of the victors, -whose loss did not exceed fifteen hundred men. -The remnants of the defeated army took shelter in -the Sierra Morena. The head-quarters of the fourth -corps were then established at Aranjuez; those of -the first at Toledo; and the king returned in triumph -to the capital.</p> - -<p>The allied troops, however, still held their position -at Deleytosa and Jaraicejo, and sir Arthur -<span class="sidenote">Parliamentary Papers, 1810.</span> -Wellesley was not, at the first, without hopes to -maintain himself there, or even to resume offensive -operations; for he knew that Ney had returned -to Salamanca, and he erroneously believed that -Mortier commanded only a part of the first corps, -and that the remainder were at Toledo. On the -other hand, his own strength was about seventeen -thousand men; Beresford had reached Moraleja, -with from twelve to fourteen thousand Portuguese; -and between the frontier of Portugal and Lisbon there -were at least five thousand British troops, composing -the brigades of Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn. -If Soult invaded Portugal, the intention of the -English general was to have followed him. If the -French remained in their present position, he meant to -re-cross the Tagus, and, in conjunction with Beresford’s -troops, to fall upon their right at Plasencia. -For his own front he had no fear; and he was -taking measures to restore the broken arch of the -Cardinal’s bridge over the Tagus, with a view to -his operation against Plasencia, when the misconduct -of the Spanish government and its generals -again obliged him to look solely to the preservation -of his own army.</p> - -<p>From the 23d of July, when the bad faith of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_434"></a>[434]</span> -junta, the apathy of the people in Estremadura, -and the wayward folly of Cuesta, had checked the -forward movements of the British, the privations of -the latter, which had commenced at Plasencia, daily -increased. It was in vain that sir Arthur, remonstrating -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_VII">Appendix, No. 7</a>.</span> -with Cuesta and the junta, had warned -them of the consequences; it was in vain that he -refused to pass the Alberche until the necessary -supplies were secured. His reasonings, his representations, -and even the fact of his having halted -at Talavera, were alike disregarded by men who, -judging from their own habits, concluded that his -actions would also be at variance with his professions.</p> - -<p>If he demanded food for his troops, he was -answered by false statements of what had been -supplied, and falser promises of what would be -done; and the glorious services rendered at Talavera, -far from exciting the gratitude or calling forth -the activity of the Spanish authorities, seemed only -to render them the more perverse. The soldiers in -the ranks were weakened by hunger, the sick were -dying for want of necessary succours, the commissaries -were without the means of transport; and -when sir Arthur Wellesley applied for only ninety -artillery horses to supply the place of those killed -in the action, Cuesta, on the very field of battle, -and with the steam of the English blood still reeking -in his nostrils, refused this request, and, two -days after, abandoned the wounded men to an -enemy that he and his countrymen were hourly describing -as the most ferocious and dishonourable of -mankind.</p> - -<p>The retreat of the allies across the Tagus increased -the sufferings of the troops, and the warmth<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_435"></a>[435]</span> -of their general’s remonstrances rose in proportion to -the ill-treatment they experienced; but the replies, -nothing abating in falseness as to fact, now became -insulting both to the general and his army: “<em>The -British were not only well but over supplied</em>:”—“<em>they -robbed the peasantry, pillaged the villages, -intercepted the Spanish convoys, and openly sold the -provisions thus shamefully acquired</em>:”—“<em>the retreat -of the army across the Tagus was unnecessary; -Soult ought to have been destroyed; and the English -general must have secret motives for his conduct, -which he dare not avouch</em>:”—and other calumnies of -the like nature.</p> - -<p>Now, from the 20th of July to the 20th of August, -although the Spaniards were generally well -fed, the English soldiers had not received ten full -rations. Half a pound of wheat in the grain, and, -twice a week, a few ounces of flour, with a quarter -of a pound of goat’s flesh, formed the sole subsistence -of men and officers; and this scanty supply -was procured with much labour, for the goats were -to be caught and killed by the troops; and it was, -perhaps, upon this additional hardship that the accusation -of selling provisions was founded, for, in -such cases, it is in all armies the custom that the -offal belongs to the men who slaughter the animals. -But the famine in the camp was plainly proved by -this very fact; for a goat’s offal sold, at this time, -for three and even four dollars, or about double the -usual price of the whole animal; and men and officers -strove to outbid each other for the wretched -food.</p> - -<p>It has been said that the British soldiers are less -intelligent in providing for themselves, and less -able to sustain privations of food than the soldiers<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_436"></a>[436]</span> -of any other nation. This is one of many vulgar -errors which have been promulgated respecting them. -How they should be constantly victorious, and yet -inferior to all other nations in military qualification, -does not, at first sight, appear a very logical conclusion; -but the truth is, that, with the exception -of the Spanish and Portuguese, who are, undoubtedly, -more sober, the English soldiers possess all the -most valuable military qualities in as high, and many -in a much higher degree than any other nation. They -are as rapid and as intelligent as the French, as -obedient as the German, as enduring as the Russian, -and more robust than any; and, with respect to -food, this is sure, that no man, of any nation, with -less than two pounds of solid food of some kind -daily, can do his work well for any length of time. -A general charge of pillaging is easily made and -hard to be disproved; but it is certain that the -Spanish troops themselves did not only pillage, but -wantonly devastate the country, and that without -any excuse; for, with the exception of the three -days succeeding the defeat of Arzobispo, their rations -were regular and sufficient: and, with respect -to the interruption of their convoys, by the British -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XVIII">Appendix, No. 18</a>.</span> -soldiers, the reverse was the fact. <em>The Spanish -cavalry intercepted the provisions and forage destined -for the English army, and fired upon the foragers, -as if they had been enemies.</em></p> - -<div class="sidenote">Parliamentary -Papers, -1810.</div> - -<p>Before the middle of August there were, in the -six regiments of English cavalry, a thousand men -completely dismounted, and the horses of seven -hundred others were unserviceable. The baggage -animals died in greater numbers; the artillery cattle -were scarcely able to drag the guns; and one-third -of the reserve ammunition was given over<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_437"></a>[437]</span> -to the Spaniards, because the ammunition carts were -required for the conveyance of sick men, of which -the number daily increased.</p> - -<p>Marshal Beresford experienced the same difficulties -in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. The -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XVII">Appendix, No. 17</a>.</span> -numerous desertions that took place in the Portuguese -army, when it became known that the troops -were to enter Spain, prevented him from taking the -field so soon as he had expected; but, in the last -days of July, being prepared to act, he crossed the -Portuguese frontier, and, from that moment, the -usual vexatious system of the Spaniards commenced. -Romana still continued at Coruña; but the duke -del Parque was full of mighty projects, and indignant -that Beresford would not blindly adopt his -recommendations. Both generals were ignorant of -the real strength of the French; but the Spaniard -was confident, and insisted upon offensive movements, -while Beresford, a general by no means of an -enterprising disposition when in the sole command -of an army, contented himself with taking up a -defensive line behind the Agueda. In this, however, -he was justified; first, by his instructions, -which obliged him to look to the pass of Perales -and the defence of the frontier line; secondly, by -the state of his army, which was not half organized, -and without horsemen or artillery; and, thirdly, by -the conduct of the Spanish authorities.</p> - -<p>The Portuguese troops were not only refused -provisions, but those which had been collected by -sir Arthur Wellesley, and put into the magazines -at Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view to operate in that -quarter, were seized by the cabildo, as security for -a debt pretended to be due for the supply of sir -John Moore’s army. The claim itself was of doubtful -character, for Cradock had before offered to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_438"></a>[438]</span> -pay it if the cabildo would produce the voucher -for its being due, a preliminary which had not -been complied with. There was also an English -commissary at Ciudad Rodrigo, empowered to -liquidate that and any other just claim upon the -British military chest; but the cabildo, like all -Spaniards, mistaking violence for energy, preferred -this display of petty power to the interests of the -common cause. Meanwhile, Soult having passed -the Sierra de Gredos, by the Baños, Beresford, -moving in a parallel direction, crossed the Sierra -de Gata, at Perales; reached Moraleja about the -12th of August, and having rallied the troops -and convalescents cut off from Talavera, marched -to Salvatierra, where he arrived the 17th, and -took post behind the Elga, covering the road to -Abrantes.</p> - -<p>The supreme junta now offered sir Arthur Wellesley -the rank of captain-general, and sent him a -present of horses; and when he, accepting the -rank, refused the pay, as he had before refused -that of the Portuguese government, they pressed -him to renew offensive operations; but, acting as if -they thought the honours conferred upon the general -would amply compensate for the sufferings -of the troops, the junta made no change in their -system. These things convinced sir Arthur Wellesley -that Spain was no longer the place for a -British army, and he relinquished the idea of further -operations in that country. Sending his cavalry -to the neighbourhood of Caceres, he broke down -another arch of the Cardinal’s bridge, to prevent the -enemy from troubling him, and, through the British -ambassador, informed the junta that he would -immediately retire into Portugal.</p> - -<p>This information created the wildest consternation;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_439"></a>[439]</span> -for, in their swollen self-sufficiency, the members of -the government had hitherto disregarded all warnings -upon this subject, and now acting as, in the -like case, they had acted, the year before, with sir -John Moore, they endeavoured to avert the consequences -of their own evil doings, by vehement -remonstrances and the most absurd statements:—“<em>The -French were weak and the moment most propitious -for driving them beyond the Pyrenees</em>:” “<span class="smcap">the -uncalled-for retreat of the English would ruin the -cause</span>:” and so forth. But they had to deal with a -general as firm as sir John Moore; and, in the -British ambassador, they no longer found an instrument -suited to their purposes.</p> - -<p>Lord Wellesley, a man with too many weaknesses -to be called great, but of an expanded capacity, -and a genius at once subtle and imperious, -had come out on a special mission,—and Mr. Frere, -whose last communication with the junta had been -to recommend another military project, was happily -displaced; yet, even in his private capacity, -he made an effort to have some of the generals -superseded; and the junta, with a refined irony, -truly Spanish, created him <em>marquis of</em> <span class="smcap">Union</span>.</p> - -<p>At Cadiz, the honours paid to lord Wellesley -were extravagant and unbecoming, and his journey -from thence to Seville was a scene of triumph; but -these outward demonstrations of feeling did not -impose upon him beyond the moment. His brother’s -correspondence and his own penetration soon -enabled him to make a just estimate of the junta’s -protestations. Disdaining their intrigues, and fully -appreciating a general’s right to direct the operations -of his own army, he seconded sir Arthur’s remonstrances -with firmness, and wisely taking the latter’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_440"></a>[440]</span> -statements as a guide and basis for his own views, -urged them upon the Spanish government with -becoming dignity.</p> - -<p>The junta, on their part, always protesting that -the welfare of the British army was the principal -object of their care, did not fail to prove, very -clearly upon paper, that the troops, ever since their -entry into Spain, had been amply supplied: and that -no measure might be wanting to satisfy the English -general, they invested don Lorenzo Calvo, a member -of their body, with full powers to draw -forth and apply all the resources of the country -to the nourishment of both armies. This -gentleman’s promises and assurances, relative to -the supply, were more full and formal than M. -de Garay’s, and equally false. He declared that -provisions and forage, in vast quantities, were actually -being delivered into the magazines at Truxillo, -when, in fact, there was not even an effort making -to collect any. He promised that the British should -be served, although the Spanish troops should -thereby suffer; and, at the very time of making -this promise, he obliged the alcaldes of a distant -town to send, into the Spanish camp, provisions -which had been already purchased by an English -commissary. In fine, lord Wellesley had arrived -too late; all the mischief that petulance, folly, bad -faith, violence, and ignorance united, could inflict, -was already accomplished, and, while he was vainly -urging a vile, if not a treacherous government, to -provide sustenance for the soldiers, sir Arthur withdrew -the latter from a post where the vultures, in -their prescience of death, were already congregating.</p> - -<p>The 20th, the main body of the British army -quitted Jaraicejo, and marched by Truxillo upon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_441"></a>[441]</span> -Merida. The light brigade, under Craufurd, being -relieved at Almaraz by the Spaniards, took the road -of Caceres to Valencia de Alcantara. But the -pass of Mirabete bore ample testimony to the previous -sufferings of the troops; Craufurd’s brigade, -which, only three weeks before, had traversed sixty -miles in a single march, were now with difficulty, -and after many halts, able to reach the summit of -the Mirabete, although only four miles from their -camp; and the side of that mountain was covered -with baggage, and the carcases of many hundred -animals that died in the ascent.</p> - -<p>The retreat being thus commenced, the junta, -with the malevolence of anger engendered by fear, -calumniated the man to whom, only ten days before, -they had addressed the most fulsome compliments, -and to whose courage and skill they owed their own -existence. “<em>It was not the want of provisions</em>,” they -said, “<em>but some other motive that caused the English -general to retreat</em>.” This was openly and -insultingly stated by Garray, by Eguia, and by -Calvo, in their correspondence with lord Wellesley -and sir Arthur; and at the same time the junta -industriously spread a report that the true reason -was their own firm resistance to the ungenerous -demands of the English ministers, who had required -the cession of Cadiz and the island of Cuba, -as the price of furthur assistance.</p> - -<p>At Talavera, sir Arthur Wellesley had been forced -to give over to the Spaniards the artillery taken -from the enemy. At Meza d’Ibor, he had sacrificed -a part of his ammunition, to obtain conveyance -for the wounded men, and to effect the present movement -from Jaraicejo, without leaving his sick behind, -he was obliged to abandon all his parc of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_442"></a>[442]</span> -ammunition, and stores, and then the Spanish -generals, who had refused the slightest aid to -convey the sick and wounded men, immediately -found ample means to carry off all these stores to -their own magazines. In this manner, almost -bereft of baggage and ammunition, those soldiers, -who had withstood the fiercest efforts of the enemy, -were driven, as it were, ignominiously from the -country they had protected to their loss.</p> - -<p>The 24th, the head-quarters being at Merida, a -despatch from lord Wellesley was received. He -painted in strong colours the terror of the junta, -the distraction of the people, and the universal -confusion; and with a natural anxiety to mitigate -their distress, he proposed that the British army -should, notwithstanding the past, endeavour to -cover Andalusia, by taking, in conjunction with the -Spanish army, a defensive post behind the Guadiana, -in such manner that the left should rest on the -frontier of Portugal: to facilitate this he had, he said, -presented a plan to the junta for the future supply -of provisions, and the vicinity of the frontier and -of Seville would, he hoped, obviate any difficulty -on that point. But he rested his project -entirely upon political grounds; and it is worthy -of observation that he who, for many years had, -with despotic power, controlled the movements of -immense armies in India, carefully avoided any appearance -of meddling with the general’s province. -“I am,” said he, “fully sensible not only of the -<em>indelicacy</em>, but of the inutility of attempting to offer -to you any opinion of mine in a situation where -your own judgement must be your best guide.”—“Viewing, -however, so nearly, the painful consequences -of your immediate retreat into Portugal,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_443"></a>[443]</span> -I have deemed it to be my duty to submit it to -your consideration the possibility of adopting an -intermediate plan.”</p> - -<p>On the receipt of this despatch, sir Arthur -Wellesley halted at Merida for some days. He -was able in that country to obtain provisions, and -he wished, if possible, to allay the excitement occasioned -by his retreat; but he refused to co-operate -again with the Spaniards. Want, he said, had -driven him to separate from them, but their shameful -flight at Arzobispo would alone have justified -him for doing so. To take up a defensive position -behind the Guadiana would be useless, because -that river was fordable, and the ground behind it -weak. The line of the Tagus, occupied at the -moment by Eguia, was so strong, that if the -Spaniards could defend any thing they might -defend that. His advice then was that they -should send the pontoon-bridge to Badajos, and -remain on the defensive at Deleytoza and Almaraz. -But, it might be asked, was there no chance of -renewing the offensive? To what purpose? The -French were as numerous, if not more so, than -the allies; and, with respect to the Spaniards at -least, superior in discipline and every military -quality. To advance again was only to play the -same losing game as before. Baños and Perales must -be guarded, or the bands in Castile would again -pour through upon the rear of the allied army; -but who was to guard these passes? The British -were too few to detach, and the Spaniards could not -be trusted; and if they could, Avila and the Guadarama -passes remained, by which the enemy could -reinforce the army in front,—for there were no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_444"></a>[444]</span> -Spanish troops in the north of Spain capable of -making a diversion.</p> - -<p>“But there was a more serious consideration, -namely, the constant and shameful misbehaviour -of the Spanish troops before the enemy. We, -in England,” said sir Arthur, “never hear of their -defeats and flights, but I have heard Spanish officers -telling of nineteen or twenty actions of the description -of that at the bridge of Arzobispo, accounts of -which, I believe, have never been published.” -“In the battle of Talavera,” he continued, “in -which the Spanish army, with very trifling exception, -was not engaged,—whole corps threw away -their arms, and run off, when they were neither -attacked nor threatened with an attack. When -these dastardly soldiers run away they plunder -every thing they meet. In their flight from -Talavera they plundered the baggage of the -British army, which was, at that moment, bravely -engaged in their cause.”</p> - -<p>For these reasons he would not, he said, again -co-operate with the Spaniards; yet, by taking post -on the Portuguese frontier, he would hang upon -the enemy’s flank, and thus, unless the latter came -with very great forces, prevent him from crossing -the Guadiana. This reasoning was conclusive; but, -ere it reached lord Wellesley, the latter found -that so far from his plans, relative to the supply, -having been adopted, he could not even get -an answer from the junta; and that miserable -body, at one moment stupified with fear, at the -next bursting with folly, now talked of the enemy’s -being about to retire to the Pyrenees, or even to -the interior of France: and assuming the right to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_445"></a>[445]</span> -dispose of the Portuguese army as well as of their -own, importunately pressed for an immediate, -combined, offensive operation, by the troops of -the three nations, to harass the enemy in his retreat; -but, at the same time, they ordered Eguia to -withdraw from Deleytoza, behind the Guadiana.</p> - -<p>The 31st, Eguia reached La Serena; and Venegas -having rallied his fugitives in the Morena, and -being reinforced from the depôts in Andalusia, the -two armies amounted to about fifty thousand men, -of which eight or ten thousand were horse: for, as -I have before observed, the Spanish cavalry seldom -suffered much. But the tide of popular discontent -was now setting full against the central government. -The members of the ancient junta of Seville worked -incessantly for their overthrow. Romana, Castaños, -Cuesta, Albuquerque, all, and they were many, -who had suffered dishonour at their hands, were -against them; and the local junta of Estremadura -insisted that Albuquerque should command in that -province.</p> - -<p>Thus pressed, the supreme junta, considering -Venegas as a man devoted to their wishes, resolved -to increase his forces. For this purpose they gave -Albuquerque the command in Estremadura, but -furnished him with only twelve thousand men, -sending the remainder of Eguia’s army to Venegas; -and, at the same time, making a last effort to engage -the British general in their proceedings, they -offered to place Albuquerque under his orders, -provided he would undertake an offensive movement. -<span class="sidenote"><a href="#No_XVII">Appendix, No. 17</a>.</span> -By these means, they maintained their -tottering power: but their plans, being founded -upon vile political intrigues, could in no wise alter -sir Arthur Wellesley’s determination, which was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_446"></a>[446]</span> -the result of enlarged military views. He refused -their offers; and, the 4th of September, his head-quarters -were established at Badajos. Meanwhile, -Romana delivered over his army to the duke del -Parque, and repaired to Seville. Venegas again -advanced into La Mancha, but at the approach -of a very inferior force of the enemy, retired, with -all the haste and confusion of a rout, to the Morena. -The English troops were then distributed in Badajos, -Elvas, Campo Mayor, and other places, on both -banks of the Guadiana. The brigades already in -Portugal were brought up to the army, and the -lost ammunition and equipments were replaced -from the magazines at Lisbon, Abrantes, and Santarem. -Beresford, leaving some light troops and -militia on the frontier, retired to Thomar, and this -eventful campaign, of two months, terminated.</p> - -<p>The loss of the army was considerable; above -three thousand five hundred men had been killed, -or had died of sickness, or fallen into the enemy’s -hands. Fifteen hundred horses had perished from -want of food, exclusive of those lost in battle; the -spirits of the soldiers were depressed; and a heart-burning -hatred of the Spaniards was engendered by -the treatment endured. To fill the cup, the pestilent -fever of the Guadiana, assailing bodies which -fatigue and bad nourishment had already predisposed -to disease, made frightful ravages. Dysentry, -that scourge of armies, raged; and, in a short time, -above five thousand men died in the hospitals.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_447"></a>[447]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_BIX_V">CHAPTER V.</h3> -</div> - -<h4>OBSERVATIONS.</h4> - -<p>During this short, but important campaign, the -armies on both sides acted in violation of that maxim -which condemns “<em>double external lines of operation</em>,” -but the results vindicated the soundness of the rule. -Nothing permanent or great, nothing proportionate -to the number of the troops, the vastness of the -combinations, or the reputation of the commanders, -was achieved; yet, neither sir Arthur Wellesley -nor the duke of Dalmatia can be justly censured, -seeing that the last was controlled by the king, -and the first by circumstances of a peculiar nature. -The French marshal was thwarted by superior authority; -and the English general, commanding an -auxiliary force, was obliged to regulate his movements, -not by his own military views, but by the -actual state of the Spaniards’ operations, and with -reference to the politics and temper of that people.</p> - -<p>La Mancha was the true line by which to act -against Madrid, but the British army was on the -frontier of Portugal. The junta refused Cadiz as a -place of arms; and without Cadiz, or some other -fortified sea-port, neither prudence, nor his instructions, -would permit sir Arthur to hazard a great -operation on that side. Hence he adopted, not what -was most fitting, in a military sense, but what was -least objectionable among the few plans that could -be concerted at all with the Spanish generals and -government. Now, the latter being resolved to act<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_448"></a>[448]</span> -with strong armies, both in Estremadura and La -Mancha, the English general had but to remain on -a miserable defensive system in Portugal, or to unite -with Cuesta in the valley of the Tagus. His territorial -line of operations was therefore a matter of -necessity, and any fair criticism must be founded on -the management of his masses after it was chosen. -That he did not greatly err in his conception of -the campaign, is to be inferred from the fact, that -Napoleon, Soult, Victor, and Jourdan, simultaneously -expected him upon the very line he followed. -He was thwarted by Cuesta at every step, Venegas -failed to aid him, and the fatal error relative to -Soult’s forces, under which he laboured throughout, -vitiated all his operations; yet he shook the intrusive -monarch roughly, in the midst of fifty thousand -men.</p> - -<p>Let the project be judged, not by what did happen, -but by what would have happened, if Cuesta had -been active, and if Venegas had performed his part -loyally. The junction of the British and Spanish -forces was made at Naval Moral, on the 22d of -July. The duke of Belluno, with twenty-one thousand -men, was then in position behind the Alberche, -the fourth corps near Madrilejos in La Mancha, -and Joseph at Madrid, where general Foy had just -arrived, to concert Soult’s movement upon Plasencia.</p> - -<p>It is evident that the king and Sebastiani could -not reach the scene of action before the 25th or 26th -of July, nor could Soult influence the operations -before the 1st or 2d of August. If then, the allied -army, being sixty thousand strong, with a hundred -pieces of artillery, had attacked Victor on the morning -of the 23d, it is to be presumed that the latter -would have been beaten, and obliged to retreat,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_449"></a>[449]</span> -either upon Madrid or Toledo; but the country immediately -in his rear was open, and ten thousand -horsemen could have been launched in the pursuit. -Sir Robert Wilson, also, would have been -on Victor’s flank, if, neglecting a junction with the -fourth corps, that marshal had taken the road to -Madrid; and if that of Toledo, the first and fourth -corps would have been separated from the king, who -did not reach Vargas until the evening of the 25th, -but who would not, in this case, have been able to -advance at all beyond Naval Carneiro.</p> - -<p>Now, admitting that, by superior discipline and -experience, the French troops had effected their -retreat on either line without any serious calamity, -what would have followed?</p> - -<p>1º. If Victor joined the king, the latter could -only have retired, by Guadalaxara, upon the third -corps, or have gone by the Guadarama towards -Soult.</p> - -<p>2º. If Victor joined Sebastiani, the two corps -must have retreated to Guadalaxara, and the king -would have joined them there, or, as before said, -have pushed for the Guadarama to join Soult.</p> - -<p>No doubt, that marshal, having so powerful an -army, would, in either case, have restored Joseph -to his capital, and have cut off sir Arthur’s communication -with Portugal by the valley of the Tagus. -Nevertheless, a great moral impression would have -been produced by the temporary loss of Madrid, -which was, moreover, the general depôt of all the -French armies; and, meanwhile, Venegas, Cuesta, -and sir Arthur Wellesley would have been united, -and on one line of operations (that of La Mancha), -which, under such circumstances, would have forced -the junta to consent to the occupation of Cadiz. In<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_450"></a>[450]</span> -this view it must be admitted that the plan was -conceived with genius.</p> - -<p>Victor’s position on the Alberche was, however, -strong; he commanded twenty-five thousand veterans; -and, as the Spaniards were very incapable -in the field, it may be argued that a general movement -of the whole army to Escalona, and from thence -to Maqueda, would have been preferable to a direct -attack at Salinas; because the allies, if thus suddenly -placed in the midst of the French corps, -might have beaten them in detail, and would certainly -have cut the king off from the Guadarama, -and forced him back upon the Guadalaxara. But, -with Cuesta for a colleague, how could a general -undertake an operation requiring celerity and -the nicest calculation?</p> - -<p>The false dealing of the junta no prudence could -guard against; but experience proves that, without -extraordinary good fortune, some accident will always -happen to mar the combinations of armies acting -upon “<em>double external lines</em>.” And so it was with -respect to Venegas; for that general, with a force -of twenty-six thousand men, suffered himself to be -held in check for five days by three thousand French, -and at the battle of Almonacid shewed that he -knew neither when to advance nor when to retreat.</p> - -<p>The patience with which sir Arthur Wellesley -bore the foolish insults of Cuesta, and the undaunted -firmness with which he fought to protect -the Spanish army, require no illustration. -When the latter fell back from St. Ollalla on the -26th, it was impossible for the British to retreat -with honour; and there is nothing more memorable -in the history of this war, nothing more creditable -to the personal character of the English chief, than<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_451"></a>[451]</span> -the battle of Talavera, considered as an isolated -event. Nevertheless, that contest proved that the -allies were unable to attain their object; for, notwithstanding -Victor’s ill-judged partial attacks on -the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th, and -notwithstanding the final repulse of the French, all -the advantages of the movements, as a whole, were -with the latter. They were, on the 31st of July, -including the garrison of Toledo, still above forty -thousand men; and they maintained their central -position, although it was not until the 1st of August -that Soult’s approach caused any change in the -views of the allied generals; and this brings us to -the fundamental error of sir Arthur Wellesley’s operations.</p> - -<p>That so able a commander should engage himself -in the narrow valley of the Tagus with twenty -thousand British and forty thousand Spanish troops, -when fifty thousand French were waiting for him -at the further end, and above fifty thousand more -were hanging on his flank and rear, shews that the -greatest masters of the art may err. He who wars -walks in a mist through which the keenest eyes -cannot always discern the right path. “<em>Speak to -me of a general who has made no mistakes in war</em>,” -said Turenne, “<em>and you speak of one who has seldom -made war</em>.”</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley thus excused his error:—“When -I entered Spain I had reason to believe -that I should be joined by a Spanish army in such -a respectable state of discipline and efficiency, as -that it had kept in check, during nearly three -months after a defeat, a French army, at one time -superior, and at no time much inferior.”</p> - -<p>“I had likewise reason to believe that the French<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_452"></a>[452]</span> -corps, in the north of Spain, were fully employed; and -although I had heard of the arrival of marshal Soult -at Zamora, on the 29th of June, with a view to equip -the remains of his corps, I did not think it possible that -three French corps, consisting of thirty-four thousand -men, under three marshals, could have been assembled -at Salamanca without the knowledge of the governor -of Ciudad Rodrigo, or of the junta of Castile; -that these corps could have been moved from their -stations in Gallicia, the Asturias, and Biscay, without -setting free, for general operations, any Spanish -troops which had been opposed to them, or without -any other inconvenience to the enemy than that of -protracting, to a later period, the settlement of his -government in those provinces;—and that they -could have penetrated into Estremadura, without -a shot being fired at them by the troops deemed -sufficient to defend the passes by the Spanish generals.” -But thus it was that, like the figures in -a phantasmagoria, the military preparations of -Spain, however menacing in appearance, were invariably -found to be vain and illusory.</p> - -<p>That sir Arthur Wellesley’s error was not fatal -is to be attributed to three causes:—</p> - -<p>1º. The reluctance of marshal Ney to quit Astorga;—2º. -The march of the fifth corps upon -Villa Castin instead of Salamanca;—3º. The vehemence -with which Victor advised the battle of -Talavera: in short, jealousy among the marshals, -and the undecided temper of the king.</p> - -<p>If Soult had not been thwarted, he would have -concentrated the three corps near Salamanca before -the 20th, and he would have reached Plasencia -before the 28th of July. The allies must then -have forced their way into La Mancha, or been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_453"></a>[453]</span> -crushed; but could they have done the former -without another battle? without the loss of all -the wounded men? could they have done it at all? -The British, including Robert <ins class="corr" id="tn-453" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'Crauford’s brigade'"> -Craufurd’s brigade</ins>, were seventeen thousand fighting men on the 29th, -but wasted with fatigue and hunger. The Spaniards -were above thirty thousand: but in them no trust could -be placed for an effort requiring fine discipline and -courage of the highest order. The intrusive king -was at the head of forty thousand good troops. -Venegas, at once ignorant and hampered by the -intrigues of the junta, was as nought in the operations; -but Soult’s step, stealthy while the situation -of affairs was obscure, would have been impetuous -when a light broke on the field of battle; and it is -scarcely possible to conceive that the allies could -have forced their way in front before that marshal -would have fallen on their rear.</p> - - -<h4>FRENCH OPERATIONS.</h4> - -<p>The intrusive monarch was finally successful; -yet it may be safely affirmed that, with the exception -of uniting his three corps behind the Guadarama, -on the evening of the 25th, his proceedings -were an uninterrupted series of errors. First, he -would not suffer Soult to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo -with seventy thousand men, in the end of July. -To protect Madrid from the army of Venegas -overbalanced, in his mind, the advantages of this -bold and grand project, which would inevitably -have drawn sir Arthur Wellesley from the Tagus, -and which, interrupting all military communication -between the northern and southern provinces, and -ensuring possession of Castile and Leon, would, by -its success, have opened a broad way to Lisbon.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_454"></a>[454]</span> -But Cuesta and Venegas, meanwhile, would have -marched against Madrid! Cuesta and Venegas, -acting on external lines, and whose united force -did not exceed sixty-five thousand men! And the -king, holding a central position, with fifty thousand -French veterans, was alarmed at this prospect, and, -rejecting Soult’s plan, drew Mortier, with the fifth -corps, to Villa Castin. Truly, this was to neglect -the bearing fruit-tree from fear of the nettle at its -stem!</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley’s advance to Talavera was -the result of this great error; but he having thus -incautiously afforded Soult an opportunity of striking -a fatal blow, a fresh combination was concerted. -The king, with equal judgement and activity, then -united all his own forces near Toledo, separated -Venegas from Cuesta, pushed back the latter upon -the English army, and obliged both to stand on the -defensive, with eyes attentively directed to their -front, when the real point of danger was in the -rear. This was skilful; but the battle of Talavera -which followed was a palpable, an enormous, fault. -The allies could neither move forward nor backward, -without being infinitely worse situated for success -than in that strong position, which seemed marked -out by fortune herself for their security. Until the -31st, the operations of Venegas were not even felt; -hence, till the 31st, the position on the Alberche -might have been maintained without danger; and, -on the first of August, the head of Soult’s column -was at Plasencia.</p> - -<p>Let us suppose that the French had merely made -demonstrations on the 28th, and had retired behind -the Alberche the 29th, would the allies have dared -to attack them in that position? The conduct of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_455"></a>[455]</span> -the Spaniards, on the evening of the 27th, answers -the question; and, moreover, Joseph, with an army -compact, active, and experienced, could, with ease, -have baffled any efforts of the combined forces to -bring him to action; he might have covered himself -by the Guadarama and by the Tagus, in succession, -and the farther he led his opponents from -Talavera, without uncovering the line of La Mancha, -the more certain the effect of Soult’s operation: but -here we have another proof that double external -lines are essentially vicious.</p> - -<p>The combined movement of the French was desirable, -from the greatness of the object to be gained, -and safe, from the powerful force on each point. -The occasion was so favourable that, notwithstanding -the imprudent heat of Victor, the reluctance of -Ney, and the unsteady temper of the king, the fate -of the allies was, up to the evening of the 3d, -heavy in the scale. Nevertheless, as the central -position held by the allies, cut the line of correspondence -between Joseph and Soult, the king’s -despatches were intercepted, and the whole operation, -even at the last hour, was baffled. The -first element of success in war is, that every -thing should emanate from a single head; and it -would have been preferable that the king, drawing -the second and fifth corps to him by the pass of the -Guadarama, or by that of Avila, should, with the -eighty thousand men thus united, have fallen upon -the allies in front. Such a combination, although -of less brilliant promise than the one adopted, -would have been more sure; and the less a general -trusts to fortune the better:—she is capricious!</p> - -<p>When one Spanish army was surprised at Arzobispo, -another completely beaten at Almonacid, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_456"></a>[456]</span> -when Wilson’s Portuguese corps was dispersed at -Baños, the junta had just completed the measure of -their folly <ins class="corr" id="tn-456" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'by quarelling with'"> -by quarrelling with</ins> the only force left -that could protect them. The French were, in -truth, therefore, the masters of the Peninsula; but -they terminated their operations at the very moment -when they should have pursued them with redoubled -activity; for the general aspect of affairs -and the particular circumstances of the campaign -were alike favourable.</p> - -<p>Napoleon was victorious in Germany; and of the -British expeditions against Italy and Holland, the -former had scarcely struggled into life,—the latter -was already corrupting in death. Hence, Joseph -might have been assured that he would receive -reinforcements, but that none, of any consequence, -could reach his adversaries; and, in the Peninsula, -there was nothing to oppose him. Navarre, Biscay, -Aragon, and the Castiles were subdued; Gerona -closely beleaguered; and the rest of Catalonia, if -not quiescent, totally unable to succour that noble -city. Valencia was inert; the Asturias still trembling; -and in Gallicia there was nothing but confusion. -Romana, commanding fifteen thousand infantry, but -neither cavalry nor artillery, was still at Coruña, -and durst not quit the mountains. The duke del -Parque held Ciudad Rodrigo, but was in no condition -to make head against more than a French -division. The battle of Almonacid had cleared La -Mancha of troops. Estremadura and Andalusia were, -as we have seen, weak, distracted, and incapable of -solid resistance. There remained only the English -and Portuguese armies, the one being at Jaraceijo, -the other at Moraleja.</p> - -<p>The line of resistance may, therefore, be said to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_457"></a>[457]</span> -have extended from the Sierra Morena to Coruña—weak -from its length; weaker, that the allied corps, -being separated by mountains, by rivers, and by -vast tracts of country, and having different bases of -operation, such as Lisbon, Seville, and Ciudad -Rodrigo, could not act in concert, except offensively; -and with how little effect in that way the -campaign of Talavera had proved. But the French -were concentrated in a narrow space, and, having -only Madrid to cover, were advantageously situated -for offensive or defensive movements.</p> - -<p>The allied forces were, for the most part, imperfectly -organized, and would not, altogether, have -amounted to ninety thousand fighting men. The -French were above one hundred thousand, dangerous -from their discipline and experience, more -dangerous that they held a central position, and -that their numbers were unknown to their opponents; -and, moreover, having, in four days, gained -one general and two minor battles, their courage -was high and eager.</p> - -<div class="sidenote">See Calvo -Garray and -Lord Wellesley’s -Correspondence, -Parl. Papers, -1810.</div> - -<p>At this period, by the acknowledgement of the -Spaniards themselves, the fate of the country depended -entirely upon the British troops, and, doubtless, -the latter were soldiers of no ordinary stamp; -but there is a limit to human power, in war as well -as in other matters. Sir Arthur Wellesley was at -the head of some seventeen thousand men, of all -arms, and about five thousand were somewhere between -Lisbon and Alcantara: but the whole French -army could, in two days, have been concentrated in -the valley of the Tagus. Soult, alone, of all the -associated generals, appears to have viewed this -crisis with the eye of a great commander. Had he -been permitted to follow up the attack at Arzobispo,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_458"></a>[458]</span> -on the 8th of August, what could the seventeen -thousand starving British troops, encumbered with -the terror-stricken Spaniards, have effected against -the seventy thousand French that would have -stormed their positions on three sides at once? -The hardy, enduring English infantry might, indeed, -have held their ground in one battle, but -could they have fought a second? Would not a -movement of the first corps by Guadalupe, would -not famine alone, have forced the ten or twelve -thousand men remaining (if, indeed, so many were -left) to abandon the banks of the Tagus, to abandon, -also, their parcs of ammunition and their -wounded men, and to retreat towards Portugal; -and to retreat, also, with little hope, harassed, as -they would have been, by six thousand horsemen, -for Soult had eighteen regiments of cavalry?</p> - -<p>Let it be supposed, however, that the strength of -the Meza d’Ibor and the Mirabete had baffled all -the enemy’s efforts, and that, seeing the allies fixed -in those positions, the sixth corps, in pursuance of -Soult’s second proposal, had crossed the frontier of -<span class="sidenote">Parl. Pap. 1810.</span> -Portugal. Sir Arthur Wellesley, contemplating -such an event, affirmed that he meant to follow -them in any movement they might make against -Lisbon; but there were two ways of following, the -one by the south and the other by the north bank -of the Tagus. Now, if he designed to cross the -Tagus at the Cardinal’s bridge, and so, connecting -his right with Beresford, to hang on the enemy’s -rear, it could only have been while he was ignorant -of Venegas’ defeat, and when he imagined -the French to have but thirty thousand men in the -valley of the Tagus; but they had above seventy -thousand; and, without endangering Madrid, they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_459"></a>[459]</span> -could have invaded Portugal with, at least, fifty -thousand men under arms.</p> - -<p>If, on the other hand, he designed to move by -the south side of the Tagus, the French line of -march upon Abrantes and Lisbon was shorter than -his; and Beresford, who only reached Moraleja on -the 12th, would have been cut off, and thrown -back upon Almeida. It is true that marshal Ney -alleged the difficulty of feeding the troops in the -country about Plasencia and Coria, and the prudence -of Soult’s project might, in that respect, -have been somewhat questionable. But the duke -of Elchingen was averse to <em>any</em> invasion of Portugal; -and, to an unwilling mind, difficulties are -enlarged beyond their due proportion. Moreover, -his talents were more remarkable in a battle than -in the dispositions for a campaign; and Soult’s -opinion must, on this occasion, be allowed greater -weight, because the Vera de Plasencia and the -valleys of the Bejar and the Gata mountains were -certainly exceedingly fertile, they had been little -injured, and the object was, not to fix a base of -operations, but to obtain a momentary subsistence -until a richer country could be opened.</p> - -<p>Admitting, however, that a march on Lisbon -was not feasible at that moment, there could have -been no well-founded objection to the siege of -Ciudad Rodrigo, which Soult again proposed. The -emperor’s instructions were indeed pleaded; but -those were general, founded upon the past errors of -the campaign, which made him doubtful of the -future; they were not applicable to the peculiar -circumstances of the moment, and would have been -disregarded by a general with a tithe of his own -genius. Fortunately for Spain, the intrusive king<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_460"></a>[460]</span> -was not a great commander. When he might have -entered the temple of victory with banners flying, -he stretched himself at the threshold and slept.</p> - -<p>The departure of the English army was a remarkable -epoch in the Peninsular war. The policy of -combining operations with the Spanish armies, and -of striking directly at the great masses of the -French, had been fairly acted upon, and had failed; -and the long-cherished delusion, relative to Spanish -enthusiasm and Spanish efficiency, was at last dissipated. -The transactions of the campaign of 1809 -form a series of practical comments upon the campaign -of 1808. All the objections which had been -made to sir John Moore’s conduct, being put to the -test of experience, proved illusory, while the soundness -of that general’s views were confirmed in every -particular. The leading events of the two campaigns -bear a striking resemblance to each other.</p> - -<p>Both sir Arthur Wellesley and sir John Moore -advanced from Portugal to <em>aid the Spanish armies</em>. -The first general commanded twenty-five thousand, -the last twenty thousand men; but there was this -difference: that, in 1808, Portugal was so disorganised -as to require a British force to keep down -anarchy; whereas, in 1809, Portugal formed a good -base of operations, and a Portuguese army was -acting in conjunction with the British.</p> - -<p>Sir John Moore was joined by six thousand men, -under Romana, and there was no other Spanish -army in existence to aid him.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley was joined by thirty-eight -thousand Spaniards, under Cuesta, and he calculated -upon twenty-six thousand, under Venegas; -while from twenty to twenty-five thousand others -were acting in Gallicia and Leon.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_461"></a>[461]</span></p> - -<p>Sir John Moore was urged to throw himself into -the heart of Spain, to aid a people represented as -abounding in courage and every other military -virtue. Judging of what he could not see by that -which was within his view, he doubted the truth of -these representations, and thinking that a powerful -army, commanded by a man of the greatest military -genius, was likely to prove formidable, he was unwilling -to commit his own small force in an unequal -contest. Nevertheless, feeling that some practicable -demonstration of the difficulties to be encountered -was required by the temper of the times, he made -a movement, too delicate and dangerous to be -adopted, unless for a great political as well as -military purpose.</p> - -<p>To relieve the southern provinces, and to convince -the English government and the English -public that they had taken a false view of affairs, -were the objects of his advance to the Carrion river; -but, although he carried his army forward with a -boldness that marked the consciousness of superior -talents, he never lost sight of the danger he was -incurring by exposing his flank to the French emperor. -To obviate this danger as much as possible, -he established a second line of retreat upon Gallicia, -and he kept a watchful eye upon the cloud gathering -at Madrid. Arrived in front of Soult’s corps, -and being upon the point of attacking him, the -expected storm burst, but, by a rapid march to -Benevente, Moore saved himself from being taken -in flank and rear and destroyed. Benevente was, -however, untenable against the forces brought up -by Napoleon, and, the retreat being continued to -Coruña, the army, after a battle, embarked.</p> - -<p>It was objected—1º. That Moore should have<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_462"></a>[462]</span> -gone to Madrid;—2º. That he should have fought -at Astorga, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo, instead -of at Coruña;—3º. That he overrated the strength -of the enemy, and undervalued the strength and -enthusiasm of the Spaniards; and that, being of a -desponding temper, he lost the opportunity of -driving the French beyond the Ebro, for, that a -battle gained (and it was assumed that a battle -must have been gained had he attacked) would have -assuredly broken the enemy’s power, and called -forth all the energies of Spain.</p> - -<p>Sir John Moore reasoned that the Spanish enthusiasm -was not great, that it evaporated in -boasting and promises, which could not be relied -upon; that the British army was sent as an auxiliary, -not as a principal force; and that the native armies -being all dispersed before he could come to their -assistance, the enemy was far too strong to contend -with single handed; wherefore, it was prudent to re-embark, -and to choose some other base of operations, -to be conducted upon sounder views of the actual -state of affairs, or to give up the contest altogether; -for that little or no hope of final success could be -entertained, unless the councils and dispositions of -the Spaniards changed for the better. He died; -and the English ministers, adopting the reasoning -of his detractors, once more sent an auxiliary army -to Spain; although the system still existed which -he had denounced as incompatible with success.</p> - -<p>Sir Arthur Wellesley, a general of their own -choice, and assuredly a better could not have been -made, was placed at the head of this army; and, -after giving Soult a heavy blow on the Douro, he -also advanced to deliver Spain. Like sir John -Moore, he was cramped for want of money; and,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_463"></a>[463]</span> -like sir John Moore, he was pestered with false -representations, and a variety of plans, founded -upon short sighted views, and displaying great -ignorance of the art of war; but, finally, he adopted, -and, as far as the inveterate nature of the people he -had to deal with would permit, executed a project, -which, like sir John Moore’s, had for its object to -overpower the French in his front, and, by forcing -them to concentrate, relieve the distant provinces; -and give full play to the enthusiasm of the -Spaniards.</p> - -<p>When sir John Moore advanced, there were no -Spanish armies to assist him; the French were -above three hundred and twenty thousand strong, -and of these two hundred and fifty thousand were -disposable to move against any point; moreover, -they were commanded in person by Napoleon, of -whom it has been said by the duke of Wellington, -that his presence, alone, was equal to forty thousand -good troops.</p> - -<p>When sir Arthur Wellesley advanced, the French -forces in the Peninsula did not exceed two hundred -and sixty thousand men, of which only one hundred -thousand could be brought to bear on his -operations; and he was assisted by sixty thousand -Spaniards, well armed, and tolerably disciplined. -His plans were certainly laid with great ability upon -the data furnished to him; but he trusted to -Spanish promises and to Spanish energy, and he -did not fail to repent his credulity; nevertheless, -he delivered and gained that battle which sir John -Moore had been reproached for not essaying; but -it was found that a veteran French army, even of -inferior numbers, was not to be destroyed, or even -much dispirited, by one defeat; and while this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_464"></a>[464]</span> -battle was fighting, Soult, with fifty thousand men, -came down upon the flank and rear of the English, -a movement precisely similar to that which Napoleon -had made from Madrid upon the flank and -rear of sir John Moore. This last general saved -himself by crossing the Esla, in the presence of the -French patroles; and in like manner, sir Arthur -evaded destruction by crossing the Tagus, within -view of the enemy’s scouts, so closely timed was -the escape of both.</p> - -<p>When sir John Moore retreated, the Spanish -government, reproaching him, asserted that the -French were on the point of ruin, and Romana, -even at Astorga, continued to urge offensive operations.</p> - -<p>When sir Arthur Wellesley retired from Jaraceijo, -the junta in the same manner asserted that -the French were upon the point of retiring from -Spain, and general Equia proposed offensive operations. -In explaining his motives, and discussing -the treatment he had met with, sir John Moore -wrote thus to his own government: “<em>The British -were sent to aid the Spanish armies, but they are not -equal to encounter the French, who have at least -eighty thousand men</em>, and we have nothing to expect -from the Spaniards, who are not to be trusted; they -are apathetic, lethargic, quick to promise, backward -to act, improvident, insensible to the shame of -flying before the enemy, they refuse all assistance, -and I am obliged to leave ammunition, stores, and -money, behind. The Spanish armies have shewn -no resolution, the people no enthusiasm nor daring -spirit, and that which has not been shown hitherto, -I know not why it should be expected to be displayed -hereafter.” Such were his expressions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_465"></a>[465]</span></p> - -<p>When sir Arthur Wellesley had proved the -Spaniards, he, also, writing to his government, -says:—“We are here worse off than in a hostile -country;—never was an army so ill used;—the Spaniards -have made all sorts of promises;—we had -absolutely no assistance from the Spanish army; on -the contrary, we were obliged to lay down our ammunition, -to unload the treasure, and to employ the -cars in the removal of our sick and wounded. The -common dictates of humanity have been disregarded -by them, and I have been obliged to leave ammunition, -stores, and money behind. <em>Whatever is to be -done must be done by the British army, but that is -certainly not capable, singly, to resist a French army -of at least seventy thousand men.</em>”</p> - -<p>The last advice given to the government, by sir -John Moore, was against sending an auxiliary force -to Spain. Sir Arthur Wellesley, in the same spirit, -withdrew his troops; and, from that moment, to the -end of the struggle, he warred, indeed, for Spain, -and in Spain, but never with Spain. “I have -fished in many troubled waters, but Spanish -troubled waters I will never try again,” was his -expression, when speaking of this campaign; and -he kept his word. That country became, indeed, -a field, on which the French and English armies -contended for the destiny of Europe; but the defeats -or victories, the promises or the performances -of the Spaniards scarcely influenced the movements. -Spain, being left to her own devices, was -beaten in every encounter, foiled in every project, -yet made no change in her policy; and while -Portugal endeavoured to raise her energy on a -level with that of her ally, Spain sought to drag -down England to the depth of folly and weakness,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_466"></a>[466]</span> -in which she herself was plunged. The one would -not sacrifice an atom of false pride to obtain the -greatest benefits; the other submitted, not with -abject dependence, but with a magnanimous humility, -to every mortification, rather than be conquered; -and the effects of their different modes -were such as might be expected. Portugal, although -assaulted by an infinitely greater number of -enemies, in proportion to her strength, overthrew -the oppressors the moment they set foot upon her -soil; while in Spain, town after town was taken, -army after army dispersed, every battle a defeat, -and every defeat sensibly diminished the heat of -resistance. Napoleon once declared that a nation -resolved to be free could not be conquered; and -the Spaniards re-echoed the sentiment in their manifestos, -as if to say it was all that was necessary. -But Napoleon contemplated a nation, like the Portuguese, -making use of every means of defence, -whether derived from themselves or their alliances; -not a people puffed with conceit, and lavish of -sounding-phrases, such as “perishing under the -ruins of the last wall,” yet beaten with a facility -that rendered them the derision of the world; a -people unable to guide themselves yet arrogantly -refusing all advice. Such a nation is ripe for destruction, -and such a nation was Spain.</p> - -<p>The campaign of 1809 finished the third epoch -of the war, and it was prolific of instruction. The -jealousy of the French marshals, the evils of disunion, -the folly of the Spanish government, and the -absurdity of the Spanish character, with respect to -public affairs, were placed in the strongest light; -while the vast combinations, the sanguinary battles, -the singular changes of fortune, the result so little<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_467"></a>[467]</span> -suitable to the greatness of the efforts, amply demonstrated -the difficulty and the uncertainty of -military affairs. It was a campaign replete with -interest; a great lesson from which a great commander -profited. Sir Arthur Wellesley had now -experienced the weakness of his friends and the -strength of his enemies, and he felt all the emptiness -of public boasting. Foreseeing that if the contest -was to be carried on, it must be in Portugal, and -that unless he himself could support the cause of -the Peninsula, it must fall, his manner of making -war changed. His caution increased tenfold; yet, -abating nothing of his boldness, he met and baffled -the best of the French legions in the fulness of their -strength. He was alike unmoved by the intrigues -of the Portuguese regency, and by the undisguised -hatred of the Spanish government; and when some -of his own generals, and one of them on his personal -staff, denouncing his rashness and predicting the -ruin of the army, caused the puny energy of the -English ministers to quail as the crisis approached, -he, with gigantic vigour, pushed aside these impediments, -and, steadily holding on his own course, -proved himself a sufficient man, whether to uphold -or to conquer kingdoms.</p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_468"></a>[468]</span><br /> - <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_469"></a>[469]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak fs180">APPENDIX.</h2> -</div> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_470"></a>[470]</span><br /> - <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_471"></a>[471]</span></p> - -<p class="pfs150" id="APPENDIX">APPENDIX.</p> -</div> - -<hr class="r10" /> - -<h3 id="No_I">No. I.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp2"><ins class="corr" id="tn-471" title="Transcriber’s Note—(Some numbers in these tables are clearly incorrect)"> -SECTION I.—</ins>GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH -ARMY IN SPAIN, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL -MUSTER-ROLLS, SIGNED BY THE PRINCE -OF NEUFCHATEL.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="8">Commanded by the Emperor Napoleon, in person, 15th Jan. 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdr">Hospital.</td> -<td class="tdr">Prisoners.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdrq">Men.</td> -<td class="tdrq">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">241,010</td> -<td class="tdr">48,821</td> -<td class="tdr">24,549</td> -<td class="tdr">3,521</td> -<td class="tdrq">58,026</td> -<td class="tdrq">826</td> -<td class="tdr">324,411</td> -<td class="tdr">52,342</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="8">King Joseph, commanding—15th Feb. 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdr">Hospital.</td> -<td class="tdr">Prisoners.</td> -<td class="tdrq" colspan="2">Total Effective.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdrq">Men.</td> -<td class="tdrq">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">193,416</td> -<td class="tdr">3,339</td> -<td class="tdr">36,326</td> -<td class="tdr">9,523</td> -<td class="tdrq">56,404</td> -<td class="tdrq">1,843</td> -<td class="tdr">288,219</td> -<td class="tdr">43,704</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="8"><p><em>Note.</em>—The imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, and several thousand -non-commissioned officers and old soldiers, wanted for the war in -Austria, in all above 40,000 men, were struck off the rolls since the last returns.</p></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="8">1st July, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdrq" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdr">Hospital.</td> -<td class="tdc">Prisoners<br />and<br />Stragglers.</td> -<td class="tdrq" colspan="2">Total Effective.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdrq">Men.</td> -<td class="tdrq">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">24,082</td> -<td class="tdr">31,537</td> -<td class="tdr">19,596</td> -<td class="tdr">4,513</td> -<td class="tdrq">60,785</td> -<td class="tdrq">7,301</td> -<td class="tdr">288,766</td> -<td class="tdr">36,050</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6">Deduct detached men comprised in governments</td> -<td class="tdr">19,596</td> -<td class="tdr">4,513</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr">————</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="4"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Real total</td> -<td class="tdr">269,170</td> -<td class="tdr">31,537</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr">————</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="8">15th July, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">196,144</td> -<td class="tdr">31,131</td> -<td class="tdr">19,122</td> -<td class="tdr">4,608</td> -<td class="tdrq">58,230</td> -<td class="tdrq">8,089</td> -<td class="tdr">281,585</td> -<td class="tdr">35,739</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6">Deduct detached in governments</td> -<td class="tdr">19,122</td> -<td class="tdr">4,608</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr">————</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="4"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Real total</td> -<td class="tdr">262,463</td> -<td class="tdr">31,131</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr">————</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="8">15th August, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">187,560</td> -<td class="tdr">30,319</td> -<td class="tdr">12,697</td> -<td class="tdr">3,930</td> -<td class="tdrq">58,588</td> -<td class="tdrq">7,403</td> -<td class="tdr">266,248</td> -<td class="tdr">34,880</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6">Deduct for governments</td> -<td class="tdr">12,697</td> -<td class="tdr">3,930</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr">————</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="4"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Real total</td> -<td class="tdr">253,551</td> -<td class="tdr">30,950</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="6"></td> -<td class="tdr">————</td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_472"></a>[472]</span><br /></p> - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION II.—RETURN OF THE FRENCH ARMY BY CORPS.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Troops immediately under the king—1st June, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">The king’s guards, about 5000 men, of all arms, are never borne on the rolls.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">First corps, marshal Victor commanding.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Head-quarters, Torremocha.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdr">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr pad3">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men. </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">4 divisions of infantry</td> -<td class="tdl">41 battalions</td> -<td class="tdr">21,268</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">32,819</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2 ditto cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl">27 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdr">5,232</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">7,344</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery and equipage</td> -<td class="tdl">40 companies</td> -<td class="tdr">2,984</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">3,610</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Number of guns, 48</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total present under arms</td> -<td class="tdr">29,484</td> -<td class="tdl">Grand total</td> -<td class="tdr">43,773</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">First Corps—21st June, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Head-quarters, Almaraz.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdr">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men. </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">3 divisions of infantry</td> -<td class="tdl">33 battalions</td> -<td class="tdr">18,367</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">25,633</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2 ditto cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl">20 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdr">4,259</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">5,762</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery and equipage</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdr">2,535</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">2,860</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total present under arms</td> -<td class="tdr">25,161</td> -<td class="tdl">Grand total</td> -<td class="tdr">34,255</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">First Corps—15th July, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Head-quarters, Cazalegas.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">3 divisions of infantry</td> -<td class="tdl">33 battalions</td> -<td class="tdr">18,890</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">26,373</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2 ditto cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl">18 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdr">3,781</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">5,080</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery and equipage</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdr">2,586</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">3,005</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total present under arms</td> -<td class="tdr">25,257</td> -<td class="tdl">Grand total</td> -<td class="tdr">34,458</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">First Corps—1st August, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Head-quarters, Maqueda.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">3 divisions of infantry</td> -<td class="tdl">33 battalions</td> -<td class="tdr">15,066</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">25,068</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2 ditto cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl">18 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdr">4,987</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">4,983</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery and equipage</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdr">2,362</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">2,873</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total present under arms</td> -<td class="tdr">22,415</td> -<td class="tdl">Grand total</td> -<td class="tdr">32,924</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Fourth Corps, General Sebastiani—10th July, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Head-quarters, Alcala.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdr">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men. </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">3 divisions of infantry</td> -<td class="tdl">27 battalions</td> -<td class="tdr">17,100</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">25,960</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2 ditto cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl">25 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdr">3,670</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">5,859</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Number of artillerymen omitted in the returns</td> -<td class="tdr">”</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">”</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">30 guns</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total present under arms</td> -<td class="tdr">20,770</td> -<td class="tdl">Grand total</td> -<td class="tdr">31,819</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">15th August, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">3 divisions of infantry</td> -<td class="tdl">27 battalions</td> -<td class="tdr">14,259</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">25,801</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2 ditto cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl">25 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdr">3,420</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">5,801</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total present under arms</td> -<td class="tdr">17,679</td> -<td class="tdl">Grand total</td> -<td class="tdr">31,602</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5"><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_473"></a>[473]</span> - Division of Reserve, General Dessolles—15th July, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Head-quarters, Madrid.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdr">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">1 division of infantry</td> -<td class="tdl">10 battalions</td> -<td class="tdr">7,681</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">10,254</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Number of guns unknown.</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Kellerman’s division—21st April, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Head-quarters, Astorga.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Guns.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total, composed of detachments</td> -<td class="tdc">8,753</td> -<td class="tdrq">805</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">8</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">10th June, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Head-quarters, Oviedo.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Horses.</td> -<td class="tdr"> Men.</td> -<td class="tdr"> Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Total, composed of detachments</td> -<td class="tdc">7,423</td> -<td class="tdr">2,549</td> -<td class="tdr">7,681</td> -<td class="tdr">2,690</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">15th July, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Head-quarters, Valladolid.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad8">8 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdc">2,291</td> -<td class="tdr">2,360</td> -<td class="tdr">2,469</td> -<td class="tdr">2,393</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl pad8">6 guns</td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION III.</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs80">1st February, 1809.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Under arms.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdc pad2">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Division Lapisse</td> -<td class="tdl">infantry</td> -<td class="tdl">12 battalions</td> -<td class="tdc pad2">7,692</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Brigade Maupetit</td> -<td class="tdl">cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl"> 6 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdc pad2"> 910</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3"></td> -<td class="tdc pad2">——</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="3">Total under general Lapisse at Salamanca</td> -<td class="tdc pad2">8,602</td> -<td class="tdl">sabres and bayonets.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Number of guns and artillerymen unknown.</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">SECTION IV.—RETURN OF TROOPS UNDER THE -IMMEDIATE COMMAND OF MARSHAL SOULT.</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs80">Second Corps, Soult—15th July, 1809.</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs80">Head-quarters, Toro.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdr">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdc pad3">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">4 divisions of infantry</td> -<td class="tdl">47 battalions</td> -<td class="tdc pad3">16,626</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">35,188</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">3 ditto cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl">19 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdc pad3"> 2,883</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">4,540</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdc pad3"> 1,081</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">1,620</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">40 guns</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc pad3">–——</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">–——</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total present under arms</td> -<td class="tdc pad3">20,590</td> -<td class="tdl">Grand total</td> -<td class="tdr">41,348</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc pad3">–——</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">–——</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p class="p1 pfs80">Fifth Corps, Mortier.</p> - -<p class="pfs80">Head-quarters, Valladolid.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2 divisions of infantry</td> -<td class="tdl">24 battalions</td> -<td class="tdr pad3">15,036</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">19,541</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">1 brigade of cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl"> 6 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdr pad3">896</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">1,491</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdr pad3">648</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">803</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">30 guns</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr pad3">–——</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">–——</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Total present under arms</td> -<td class="tdr pad3">16,580</td> -<td class="tdl">Grand total</td> -<td class="tdr">21,835</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr pad3">–——</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">–——</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_474"></a>[474]</span></p> - -<p class="p1 pfs80">Sixth Corps, Ney.</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs80">Head-quarters, Benevente.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdr">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2"></td> -<td class="tdc pad3">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">2 divisions of infantry</td> -<td class="tdl">24 battalions</td> -<td class="tdc pad3">13,700</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">17,587</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">1 ditto cavalry</td> -<td class="tdl">10 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdc pad3"> 1,446</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">2,092</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdc pad3"> 1,113</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">1,293</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">37 guns</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc pad3">–——</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">–——</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Total present under arms</td> -<td class="tdc pad3">16,259</td> -<td class="tdl">Grand total</td> -<td class="tdr">20,972</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc pad3">–——</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">–——</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p class="p1 pfs80">General total under Soult, 15th July, 1809.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80" width="70%" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdr">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdr">Men. </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"> 95 battalions—35 squadrons</td> -<td class="tdc">53,529</td> -<td class="tdr">84,155</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">107 guns</td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdr"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">SECTION V.—TROOPS EMPLOYED IN THE SIEGE -OF ZARAGOZA, UNDER MARSHAL LASNES.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">15th January, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdc">Hospital.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total effective.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Third corps</td> -<td class="tdc">17,406</td> -<td class="tdc">5,789</td> -<td class="tdc">13,668</td> -<td class="tdc">36,863</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Fifth corps</td> -<td class="tdc">18,284</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdc">4,189</td> -<td class="tdc">22,473</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -<td class="tdc">–——</td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">Total</td> -<td class="tdc">35,690</td> -<td class="tdc">5,789</td> -<td class="tdc">17,857</td> -<td class="tdc">59,336</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -<td class="tdc">–——</td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">15th February, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Third corps</td> -<td class="tdc">16,035</td> -<td class="tdc">5,891</td> -<td class="tdc">13,259</td> -<td class="tdc">35,269</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Fifth corps</td> -<td class="tdc">17,933</td> -<td class="tdc">1,735</td> -<td class="tdc">3,859</td> -<td class="tdc">23,626</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -<td class="tdc">–——</td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdr">Total</td> -<td class="tdc">33,968</td> -<td class="tdc">7,526</td> -<td class="tdc">17,118</td> -<td class="tdc">58,895</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -<td class="tdc">–——</td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">SECTION VI.—RETURN OF THE SEVENTH CORPS,<br /> -GENERAL ST. CYR.</p> - -<table class="autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="6">15th January, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Present under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc">Detached.</td> -<td class="tdc">Hospital.</td> -<td class="tdc">Prisoners.</td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Horses.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">41,386</td> -<td class="tdc">”</td> -<td class="tdc">6,589</td> -<td class="tdc">543</td> -<td class="tdc">48,518</td> -<td class="tdc">5,403</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="6">15th May, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">42,246</td> -<td class="tdc">2,341</td> -<td class="tdc">10,243</td> -<td class="tdc">435</td> -<td class="tdc">55,265</td> -<td class="tdc">5,537</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="6">15th June, 1809.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">42,146</td> -<td class="tdc">1,699</td> -<td class="tdc">10,222</td> -<td class="tdc">406</td> -<td class="tdc">54,473</td> -<td class="tdc">5,365</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_475"></a>[475]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_II">No. II.</h3> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION I.—STATE OF SPAIN.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, December 17, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“In consequence of the unfavourable news from Spain, yesterday, -the populace, in Badajos, murdered a Spanish colonel, -and one or two more of note.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Lieutenant Ellis (an officer employed to gain intelligence) to -colonel Kemmis, Loboa, December 27.</em></p> - -<p>“The French entered Truxillo, yesterday, at eleven o’clock; -and, from the circumstance of their having reconnoitred the intermediate -villages, might be expected to arrive at Merida in two -hours after we left it.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Colonel Kemmis to sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 28.</em></p> - -<p>“Badajos cannot make resistance in any degree, either to -check or to stop the progress of the enemy. From the statement -made to me, last night, by the governor, they want <em>arms</em>, <em>ammunition</em>, -and <em>provisions</em>.”—“The enemy marched into Truxillo, -on the 26th, at half-past twelve o’clock in the day; but, at two, -on the following morning, a French officer arrived there, and -they fell back four leagues.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Lieutenant Ellis to colonel Kemmis, December 28.</em></p> - -<p>“I proceeded cautiously to Truxillo. The main body of the -enemy, six thousand in number, had retired across the bridge of -Almaraz, and had not taken the road to Madrid, but had proceeded -to Plasencia, leaving behind more than half the requisition for -money which had been imposed on the town of Truxillo.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Seville, January 2, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“The corps of four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, -which had marched from Talavera, and had actually passed the -bridge of Almaraz, has fallen back, and is already near Plasencia, -on its way northward.”—“The extreme attention of Buonaparte -being at this moment directed to the English army, everything -which can be collected is opposed to you alone.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_476"></a>[476]</span><br /></p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION II.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, December 27, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“You will receive, together with this, several letters from -Doyle, which describe events in Catalonia <em>no way differing from -what we have witnessed in other parts of Spain</em>!”—“The -junta have established themselves here, and, whatever may have -been the expectation which their alarm on the road may have -induced Mr. Frere to form of their future proceedings, <em>a culpable -relapse into their former apathy</em> seems susceptible of no other -remedies but such as will be much stronger than any Spaniard is -likely to adopt.”—“Although Caro promised to write every -particular of his conversation with you to the junta, I have -hitherto been unable to see his letter. I therefore thought it -expedient to put the whole to writing, and, at <em>the same time, -to express my conviction both of the justice and propriety of -your whole conduct during the late events, when it was impossible, -under any circumstances, to have adopted other determination -consistently with the safety of the army committed -to your charge</em>. Though I doubt if this will stop the clamour -which has been raised on the subject; and, though events have -probably since taken place, which may materially change the state -of affairs, it may be satisfactory to tell you that Mr. Frere <em>appears</em> -to enter into the reasons alleged by you, and to feel, in their full -force, the motives which induced you to act so cautiously, and to -ground no operation on the hope of any effectual support from the -Spaniards.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, Seville, January 2.</em></p> - -<p>“The president, Florida Blanca, died two days since, and I -was in hopes that the junta would have availed themselves of this -event to make some change in their government.”—“I see, however, -little but good disposition, and <em>am still to look for that</em> -energy in rewarding service and punishing treachery which can -alone mend matters.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, Seville, January 10.</em></p> - -<p>“Reding is at <em>Tarragona</em>, expecting to be attacked, and possessing -a force composed chiefly of peasantry, but of which he -certainly cannot command above ten thousand men in a situation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_477"></a>[477]</span> -to face his opponents at any given point.”—“Whittingham -arrived here yesterday, last from the duke of Infantados’ head-quarters. -He assures me the duke had already twenty thousand -men when he <em>left Cuença</em>.”—“<em>On the side of Estremadura</em>, -matters are not going on well: Galluzzo, who allowed the enemy -to pass the bridges, is here prisoner, and his corps is placed under -the command of Cuesta. I cannot say, however, that I see much -activity since the change; parties of the enemy cover the country -between Madrid and Almaraz, while the corps of six thousand -men, which had been pushed forward from Madrid, have, I understand, -already passed Plasencia, and probably are on the other -side of the Puerto, for the purpose of falling on the Salamanca -country, and, if possible, cutting off your communication with -Ciudad Rodrigo.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION III.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Frere to Mr. Canning, Seville, May 8.</em></p> - -<p>“Besides the advantages which may be looked for from -placing so extensive a command under a person of such tried -abilities as general Blake, it is to be hoped that it will put an end -to the distractions arising from the contracted views of those who -directed the provincial junta, particularly that of Valencia, which -have been so embarrassing to his predecessors.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Frere to Mr. Canning, Seville, July 10, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“As the devastations which have been committed have, in -many instances, deprived the peasants of the means of paying -what is due to the proprietors and to the church, a general spirit -of resistance to all claims of this kind has begun to show itself.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“I much fear that alarm and despondency has gained ground -about Badajos and that part of Spain, and that there is so little -co-operation in the acts of their several juntas, and such a want -of subordination and common consent among the armed bodies, to -which the defence of the country is entrusted, against such an -united force as that of the French, that extreme confusion prevails -everywhere.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_478"></a>[478]</span></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Colonel Kemmis to sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 30.</em></p> - -<p>“He (lieutenant Ellis) has been living with general Cuesta for -the last two days,”—“who has assured him that the Spanish -troops, in Madrid, forced their way through the French army; -and he expressed great sorrow in adding that, though a Spanish -force is often collected, the smallest check disperses them; -that in few instances depôts were provided, and those ill supplied,” -&c.—“that, such was the dispersion and flight of the -Spanish armies, between Badajos and Madrid, there did not -remain a single man.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Colonel Kemmis to lieut.-colonel Reynel, military secretary -to sir John Cradock, Seville, February 7, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“In passing through the Sierra Morena mountains, where -Nature has done much for the defence of this province, it was -painful to observe the pitiful works they were about to throw up. -In this whole direction there is but one body that has anything -like the appearance of a soldier, viz. dismounted cavalry.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>General Mackenzie to sir John Cradock, Cadiz, February 9, -1809.</em></p> - -<p>“The Spaniards here seem lulled in the most fatal security. -They are ignorant of the events in the north of Spain, or will -not give credit when they do hear them. Vague reports of the -emperor of Austria’s having declared war, and Buonaparte’s return -to France gains unlimited credit.”—“The equipment of the fleet -goes on very slowly, though there is no want of exertion now on -the part of admiral Purvis or Mr. Stuart; offers of every assistance -are daily made, but they will neither work themselves nor -permit our people to work for them. The preparations of the -ships for carrying off the French prisoners goes on equally ill.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Duc de Albuquerque to Mr. Frere, Talavera, July 31, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“During our marches we stop to repose, like flocks of sheep, -without taking up any position, so that, if the enemy knew the -condition we were in, they would defeat us wherever they attacked -us. If, in the evening of the 26th, I had not gone out directly -with my division, and succeeded in checking the enemy, the -whole army would have dispersed, and all the artillery and -baggage, which were in the streets of St. Ollalla, would have been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_479"></a>[479]</span> -lost; and as a proof of what would have happened, had not the -enemy, who was within musket-shot, been checked, for many -had already thrown away their arms, &c. the commissaries abandoning -more than fifteen hundred rations of bread, the carts -occupying and blocking up the streets of the town; and to this, -I repeat, we are daily exposed, as we march, as if it were on a -pilgrimage, without any regard to distance, order, or method, and -with the whole parc of artillery, which ought always to remain at -the distance of two, three, or more leagues.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Wellesley, Merida, September 1, -1809.</em></p> - -<p>“I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings -of the central junta, that, in the distribution of their forces, they -do not consider military defence and military operations so much -as they do political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political -objects.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Lord Wellesley to Mr. Canning, Seville, September 2, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“While the intelligence received from sir Arthur Wellesley, to -the date of the 24th instant, continued to furnish irresistible proofs -of the failure of every promise or effort made by this government -for the immediate relief of our troops, no satisfaction was afforded -to me respecting any permanent plan for their future supply.”—“The -troops of Portugal, which entered Spain, under general -Beresford, suffered similar distress, and experienced similar ill-treatment; -although the efforts of Portugal, in the cause of Spain, -have been as gratuitous as those of Great Britain; and although -Spain possesses no claim, of any description, to the aid of a -Portuguese army.”—“In this calamity, the people of Spain cannot -fail to acknowledge the natural consequences of their own -weakness, nor to discover the urgent necessity of enforcing a more -steady, pure, and vigorous system, both of council and action. A -relaxed state of domestic government and an indolent reliance on -the activity of foreign assistance have endangered all the high -and virtuous objects for which Spain has armed and bled. It -must now be evident that no alliance can protect her from the -inevitable result of internal disorder and national infirmity. She -must amend and strengthen her government; she must improve -the administration of her resources, and the structure and discipline -of her armies, before she can become capable of deriving<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_480"></a>[480]</span> -benefit from foreign aid. Spain has proved untrue to our alliance, -because she is not true to herself.”—“Until some great change -shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, -and in the state of her armies, no British army can safely attempt -to co-operate with the Spanish troops in the territory of Spain.”</p> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_III">No. III.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht">JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK’s -CORRESPONDENCE, MSS.</p> - - -<p class="p1 pfs70 lht">SECTION I.—STATE OF PORTUGAL.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to sir R. Wilson, Oporto, December 8, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“I press this measure” (to move the legion from Oporto to -Villa Real) “upon your adoption, for many reasons, &c. &c.; -but the more especially that it will give an impulse to military -preparation in general, and tend to eradicate <em>the notion that, -since the evacuation of Portugal by the French, the prospect -of a future war is at an end</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to sir John Moore, December 9, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“I have pressed the adoption of such measures as appeared -most likely <em>to revive some notion of danger</em>, and the necessity -of activity and energy.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 14, 1808, Lisbon.</em></p> - -<p>“The inaction of the regency was apparent at Oporto to a -lamentable degree; and, though I saw general Bernadim Friere, -I could not gain from him any information as to the state or -numbers of the Portuguese troops, where they were stationed, -or who commanded them. I apprehend, from his conversation, -that the general officers are all of equal authority; and that even -seniority had not its usual effect. He concluded his observations -to me with the strong expression, ‘<em>That, from the evacuation -of Portugal by the French, the nation had thought all war -at an end</em>.’”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to sir J. Moore, December 28, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“Mr. Villiers and myself have both concurred upon the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_481"></a>[481]</span> -<em>absolute necessity to arouse and animate the Portuguese to -some sense of their situation</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 30, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“<em>The apathy of the Portuguese is not to be expressed.</em> -Their general, Leite, is a most excellent character: a theorist, -and, like his countrymen, <em>supine</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 negin1"><em>Extract from the Report of lieutenant Brotherton, (an -officer employed to obtain intelligence in the north of -Portugal,) February 11, 1809. Head-quarters of Romana’s -army.</em></p> - -<p>“From the totally defenceless state in which the two northern -provinces are left, it will require at least eight days (I speak from -authority) to prepare any thing like adequate means of defence.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION II.—LUSITANIAN LEGION.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, November 27, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“Its formation was proposed by the chevalier de Souza.”—“The -pay, allowances, and clothing were settled by the chevalier -de Souza. The former regulated, as I understood, upon the -scale <em>of increased pay, which the provisional government of -Oporto had adopted for all the troops they were in progress -of levying</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“I have considerable doubt if ever they” (the legion) “can -be incorporated, with effect and conciliation, with the body of the -Portuguese army.”—“They are viewed with <em>extreme jealousy -by the regency</em>; and the <em>commanding officers of the Portuguese -battalion resisted, universally, the allowing of volunteers -from their regiments to enter into the legion</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, January 19, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“The Lusitanian legion continues to give considerable uneasiness, -from its peculiar state, under present circumstances.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Captain Morgan (Lusitanian legion) to sir J. Cradock, -January 19, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“Should a retreat be adopted, sir Robert would not retire to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_482"></a>[482]</span> -Oporto. <em>It is the government of a mob, of which he has had -too much experience.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION III.—PORTUGUESE ARMY.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to sir J. Moore, December 9, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“I am sorry to state that I find, as far as my limited observation -reaches, the Portuguese army, and every other military -concern, <em>in the worst possible state</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, December 18, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“I am sure that the state of the Portuguese army is quite -misunderstood in England; <em>and that a reliance is placed upon it -for the defence of the country that is entirely without -foundation</em>. Their” (Portuguese) “ministers will avow this to -you after ten minutes’ conversation.”—“Even of the reduced -numbers of their men enrolled, (not amounting to twenty -thousand, at the very highest computation,) to make any thing -out of them, it is necessary to recur to first principles, and give -them <em>officers</em>, <em>arms</em>, <em>clothing</em>, <em>accoutrements</em>, <em>horses</em>, &c.; and -I need not say that money is wanting to effect this: and the -ministers positively declare that they have none; and that no -collection of their forces can take place, much less a movement -to the frontier, without a supply.”—“M. Forjas, secretary to -the government, in answer to a strong question from me, stated -that <em>their army have not in possession ten thousand firelocks -fit for use</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“I am exerting myself to bring to account ‘the <em>supposed</em> -Portuguese army.’”—“Your lordship will perceive that <em>I talk -of the regulars as if it were a regular force</em>; but I should -be guilty of a deceit, that might lead to bad consequences, if I -did not fairly state that <em>I conceive them to be of no moment at -this time</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center">Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 8, 1809.</p> - -<p>“I am ready to go to the utmost verge of prudence; but -<em>Mr. Frere, when he talks of Portuguese troops and arrangements, -really</em> (as I believe you will allow) <i lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">fait -<ins class="corr" id="tn-482" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'bâtir les chateux'"> -bâtir les châteaux</ins></i>.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_483"></a>[483]</span></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Major-general Cotton to sir J. Cradock, April 7, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“I yesterday inspected the Portuguese cavalry.”—“This -cavalry is unformed, and totally unfit for any sort of service.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, February 12.</em></p> - -<p>“It appears that a report has reached your lordship that a -conscription for horses in this country had been attended with -great effect, and that above three thousand had been collected. -It is, indeed, a matter of serious concern that such <em>serious -misrepresentations</em> should be transmitted; for it is a well-known -fact that many of the Portuguese regiments of cavalry <em>are -without horses</em>; and, if I am to pursue the subject, their <em>battalions -of infantry are one-half without arms or clothing</em>! But -the total want of all means of regulations for subsistence from so -deplorable a view, in the event of co-operation, that the result, -in my opinion, cannot be attended with success. <em>It is, however, -but justice to say, that the disposition of the Portuguese -seems well-inclined and faithful to the common cause; -and that a very efficient soldiery may be formed under more -favourable circumstances.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, February 27, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“I fear that your excellency is led to entertain a more favourable -notion of the efficacy of the Portuguese army than, in -any shape, it is entitled. In short, my opinion is that they -want every thing that constitutes a respectable force, except -about ten thousand English arms. I believe they have no others. -Many of their <em>cavalry regiments are without horses, without -swords, pistols, &c. Their battalions are not clothed; and, -as to subsistence, they live at free quarters upon the villages -where they are stationed.</em> To take the field with effect, or an -assurance of food, seems to me out of the question. Since the -first moment of my arrival, I wished to procure the advance of -a small Portuguese force to Alcantara; but it has been impossible. -It is a matter of serious lamentation that such mis-representations -of the Portuguese force should go home, or reach your excellency.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 3.</em></p> - -<p>“No reliance whatever can be placed upon the Portuguese -troops in their present state. <em>If I said that the whole were ready<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_484"></a>[484]</span> -to mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak general Beresford’s -sentiments. They will not be commanded by their own officers -and they do just as they please.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht">SECTION IV.—CONDUCT OF THE REGENCY—TREATMENT OF -FRENCH PRISONERS.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 26, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“I have hitherto directed that these prisoners should be -subsisted at our charge, but I have no authority in this measure; -they are <em>in a most deplorable state</em>, and really are <em>a disgrace to -all concerned</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 5, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“It is absolutely necessary that the regency should give in an -answer about the French prisoners. The whole is an unauthorised -heavy charge, for which I give my warrant; and I see no end -to the case: and, added to this, <em>their situation is a reflection -upon humanity</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION V.—NEGLECT, DUPLICITY, AND TIMIDITY.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 17.</em></p> - -<p>“Lalippe, on which the very existence of Elvas depends, has -not been supplied with provisions as I have been taught to -expect.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 25.</em></p> - -<p>“The great importance of this fort” (Lalippe) “is well known -to the Portuguese; and, therefore, they are jealous, notwithstanding -the miserable condition of their troops, and total incapacity -to defend the fort, if attacked.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, December 26, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“<em>The promises and apparently satisfactory language of -the Portuguese government</em> are, in my opinion, by no means -sufficient to meet the case. <em>I want to see</em> some steps actually -taken before my mind is decided that the nation will defend -itself.”—“Indeed, I am told, on good authority, that <em>the government<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_485"></a>[485]</span> -are afraid to allow the people to arm</em>.”—“The -moment I see any materials to work upon, it will be my most -anxious duty to give every effect, &c.”—“But, under the present -<em>inactivity and indifference</em>, it is, &c.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Reports of colonel Donkin (quarter-master-general) to Sir -J. Cradock, March 21.</em></p> - -<p>“I cannot, however, order officers of my department to check -this irregularity” (forcing quarters) “<em>when it originates solely -in the neglect of the Portuguese civil magistrates</em>; for troops -will not obey orders, which expose them wantonly to great -privations.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, March 25.</em></p> - -<p>“I have repeately urged this subject” (quarters of troops) -“to the regency, in the strongest manner, but, as you perceive, -without effect.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 17.</em></p> - -<p>“Whatever suits the momentary purpose, upon the most -superficial view, seems to be the guide in the Portuguese -councils. Ultimate objects, which, in the course of things, must -arrive, are never brought into the calculation.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Cradock to Berkely, January 17.</em></p> - -<p>“The regency seem to decline giving any specific directions -relative to the guns in fort St. Julian and the river batteries, and, -<em>above all, not to write any thing</em>; but they are very willing to -acquiesce in any thing we shall do, only anxious that, on a future -day, it <em>shall appear to be our act, not theirs</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Admiral Berkely to sir J. Cradock, February 19, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“I imagine Mr. Villiers has transmitted a copy of the extraordinary -note sent him by the regency; in which they complain -of the conduct of the artillery-officer who dismantled the Bugio -fort, and intimate their intention of sending for all the guns -and powder from fort St. Julian; and add many particulars, as -novel as they are suspicious.”—“Whether the language of this -note arises from duplicity, or any other cause, it is equally to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_486"></a>[486]</span> -resisted; and, therefore, stated some facts which may be retorted -upon them, and which will not place their conduct in the <em>most -favourable point of view towards either their own sovereign -or Great Britain</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from an official note, drawn up by sir John Cradock, -Lisbon, February 20, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“It was told me, two or three times, by Mr. Villiers, that -M. Forjas, or some other member of the regency, had expressed -extreme solicitude about the forts on the Tagus, -&c.”—“<ins class="corr" id="tn-486" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'I always nrged'"> -I always urged</ins> Mr. Villiers to get from M. Forjas, or any other member, -a declaration of what they wished, that we might exactly conform -to it; for they seemed to be anxious to go beyond what we should -venture to propose. Mr. Villiers, after some time, told me that -the Portuguese government were <em>unwilling to put down any -thing upon paper</em>, or give any specific instruction; but they -would willingly leave all the arrangement to us.”—“After the -above statement, which I declare, upon my honour, to be the -accurate description of what has passed, I must express my -surprise, and even indignation, at the protest now made by the -regency; and when it is considered that the Bugio fort is often -inaccessible for a week together, this part of their complaint is -shameful to the highest degree. <em>Their general object is, however, -to be distinguished.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION VI.—ANARCHY IN PORTUGAL.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, February 20, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“<em>Northern parts.</em>—It may be difficult to manage any money-transactions -in Oporto, for the populace in that town have been -suffered to become the masters; and it was by an exchange of -public and private property that the commissariat money has been -lately secured.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“To gratify a mob, the other day, at Oporto, a guard of the -sixtieth regiment was given up, and disarmed by baron Eben.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, March 17, 1809, -Lamego.</em></p> - -<p>“Considering the tumults, and the state <ins class="corr" id="tn-486a" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'of effervenscence of'"> -of effervescence of</ins><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_487"></a>[487]</span> -the public mind, and the blind fury of the populace—it will -neither be useful nor safe to remain amongst them.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“The disposition is good, but the proceedings are those of an -ungovernable mob, <em>exposed to the evil effects of designing persons</em>.”—“I -confine myself to the north of Portugal and Oporto, -for the same excesses have not taken place at this side the -Douro; but the principles of insubordination, I should fear, would -prevail.”—“If the confusion and anarchy that prevail at Oporto -will permit a defence some exertion may be expected.”—“Ammunition -has been abundantly supplied, <em>but no quantity would -meet the consumption expended in the manner it has been in the -Tras os Montes</em>; an attempt to save which was, I believe, the -occasion of Bernadim Friere’s death.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 30, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“The anarchy that prevails at Oporto must, I fear, render -every exertion unavailable for defence; and such is the ungovernable -spirit of the populace, <em>that it is very difficult to say what -part they might take if the proceedings of the British did -not suit their views</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29.</em></p> - -<p>“Oporto and all its concerns, with the bishop, nominally, at -its head, is in the hands of a wild ungovernable populace, <em>that -has already committed the most cruel excesses</em>. I fear the -same spirit exists in what is called the Portuguese army.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 29, Lisbon.</em></p> - -<p>“Without a British force in Lisbon, the authority of the -regency would pass away, and the scenes of Oporto would take -place here.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Report of captain Lawson, January 30, Lisbon.</em></p> - -<p>“Last night, my servant returning from the post-office was -attacked by a party of Portuguese pike-men, headed by one of -their own officers, who severely wounded the horse in two places, -and slightly in several places, and obliged him, the servant, to -put himself under the protection of the guard at the town-major’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_488"></a>[488]</span> -office, to save his own life: the outrage was committed without the -slightest provocation.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>General Langwerth to sir J. Cradock, February 1, Lisbon.</em></p> - -<p>“The orderly, with the general orders, on his way to St. -Julian’s, was stopped by a Portuguese sergeant and twenty men -with pikes; the sergeant forced the orderly to deliver the letter -containing the orders, broke it open, read the contents, and returned -the enclosed receipt; the same guard stopped captain -Clives, Royal Grenadier army, and lieutenants Beurman and -Liners; these officers were in full uniform.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>General Sontag’s Official Report, February 3.</em></p> - -<p>“Mr. Usher, deputy purveyor, and Mr. M’Carty, interpreter, -both British subjects, arrived this day from Oporto, went to -Moore’s Hotel, where they were arrested and brought to the -minister of police. Mr. Usher was in his British uniform.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, January 30.</em></p> - -<p>“Some unpleasant incidents have lately occurred on the part -of the Portuguese armed inhabitants of Lisbon towards British -individuals, but I cannot persuade myself that they have proceeded -from any fixed evil disposition.”—“The British army has -not, in any instance, departed from the most regular discipline, -and continues to manifest the greatest temper and moderation.”—“The -excesses on the part of the Portuguese commence by an -<em>uncontrolled pursuit, without any authority from the police, -after all persons whom they please to call Frenchmen</em>, and, in -their indiscriminate career, they <em>often attack every foreigner, -and will not even abstain from</em> those in our service. Those <em>persons -seek refuge in our guard-room</em>, and though the guards and -patroles have positive orders not to interfere under any pretext -with the police, yet it is very difficult to smother the feelings of -humanity when the wretched persons are flying from a furious -and unauthorised rabble. <em>Mr. Villiers has exerted himself -much with the Regency to check this disorder, and prevent -the assembly of armed persons in the streets at night, -who beat drums and discharge their pieces at all hours; but as -yet his remonstrances have not had the desired effect.</em>”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_489"></a>[489]</span></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Villiers to sir J. Cradock, January 30.</em></p> - -<p>“Finding the people beat to arms, and paraded about the -streets after dark, <em>on the very evening after the regency had -settled that these irregularities should be restrained</em>, I addressed -the ministers of the home department upon the subject; -and as other excesses came to my knowledge, I followed up my -complaint.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 30.</em></p> - -<p>“I have, this morning, been taking such steps as appear -necessary to secure our general situation from insult; and, at the -same time, if practicable, not to manifest a distrust in the Portuguese -nation, which, if sanctioned from head-quarters, would -destroy any reason for our being here. I can assure you, every -officer and soldier has received impressions that it is most difficult -to act against, but I am determined to persevere in keeping the -army from aggression to the last moment.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February.</em></p> - -<p>“When I reflect upon the frequent declarations of individual -members of the regency, that they cannot control the populace; -that there are at least seventy thousand armed inhabitants in -Lisbon; that the regency dare not let them parade (their exercise -has been at an end for some time, and the regency, at this -moment, say they cannot look upon themselves as responsible,) -it appears impossible that I should depart from the reasoning of -my own mind, to meet a sensation of <em>I do not know whom</em>, and -lessen the proper military appearance of our only guard. We -are now beyond the power of surprise or insult, and I cannot, as -my own individual act, alter the state of things. However, I -never am devoted to my own way of thinking, and if you recommend -the measure (the political reasoning, when the enemy is -at a distance, may always be weighed against military regulation), -or see any good consequences, I will immediately <em>order back the -guns</em> to their former station in the artillery barracks.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Marshal Beresford to sir J. Cradock, April 7, Santarem.</em></p> - -<p>“I, this morning, met no less than <em>three expresses</em>, communicating -to me the <em>horrible state of mutiny, for I can call it -no less, in which the troops every where are, and the inhabitants<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_490"></a>[490]</span> -are in equal insubordination, and they encourage each -other. I find two or three regiments have marched away (to what -they call to oppose the enemy)</em> where they pleased, in despite of -their officers and generals, who are entirely commanded by them. -This you will say is a pleasing state to be in; however, we must -face it, and I hope for the best result, and I am sanguine enough -to look for such. Colonel Trant will shortly have a pretty strong -corps, if the regiments continue thus to volunteer for him.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Villiers to sir J. Cradock, February 15.</em></p> - -<p>“I should almost doubt whether the British subjects <em>could be -left in safety in Lisbon</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION VII.—FALSE INTELLIGENCE.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to colonel Donkin.</em></p> - -<p>“I believe it is certain that we cannot depend upon the -activity of the Portuguese government upon this head,” (intelligence,) -“either as to promptitude or security.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Colonel Donkin to sir J. Cradock, January 1, Lisbon.</em></p> - -<p>“Experience has <em>shewn how utterly impossible it is to get -correct intelligence here</em>; an enemy may be within four or five -days march of this city before it is known, unless he attacks on -the very line our troops occupy.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29.</em></p> - -<p>“It is singular how imperfectly all intelligence, though of -such important events, reaches this, and we have not had, for two -days, any account from Oporto.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26.</em></p> - -<p>“Yesterday the chevalier de Castro stated, from authority, a -movement on the part of the French, quite different from a <em>direct -report</em> from the junta of Badajos.”</p> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_491"></a>[491]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_IV">No. IV.</h3> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">SECTION I.—EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN CRADOCK’S -INSTRUCTIONS.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, December 24, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“Upon the actual approach of the enemy towards Lisbon, in -such strength as may render further resistance ineffectual, you -will take care that measures be taken, in due time, for withdrawing -both the British army and <em>such Portuguese as may be desirous -of accompanying it</em>.”—“The British admiral will be directed -to take effectual measures, with your assistance, for depriving the -enemy of all the resources, more especially those of a naval -description, which the Tagus contains. Every thing of a naval -and military description, that cannot be brought away, must, in -the last extremity, be destroyed.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, November 25, 1808.</em></p> - -<p>“I am to signify his majesty’s pleasure that, in the event of any -application being made to you from the regency of Portugal, on -the subject of the occupation of the fortresses with his majesty’s -troops, you do <em>refer the subject to Mr. Villiers</em>, who has received -instruction, &c. and you will not make any alteration as to -the mode prescribed for garrisoning the fortresses <em>without directions -from Mr. Villiers</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Lord Castlereagh to general Sherbrooke, January 12, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“Sir J. Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition -you may make <em>for horses for your guns</em>, or any other -species of supply the service may require.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts from certain queries put to lord Castlereagh by sir -J. Cradock, with the answers thereto.</em></p> - -<table class="autotable fs90" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc fs80">QUERY.</td> -<td class="tdc fs80">ANSWER.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx"><p>“What may be the situation of my command?”</p></td> -<td class="tdlx"><p>“The relations with the government of Portugal will be arranged when Mr. Villiers arrives.”</p></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx"><p>“In what light is the force under my command to be considered?” &c. &c.</p></td> -<td class="tdlx"><p>“Ditto.”</p></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx"><p>“May any Portuguese battalions be levied for English pay?”</p></td> -<td class="tdlx"><p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_492"></a>[492]</span> - “<ins class="corr" id="tn-491" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'The taking Portuguese'"> - The taking of Portuguese</ins> battalions into English pay will, if adopted, be managed <em>through Mr. Villiers</em>.”</p></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx"><p>“If any want of provisions should appear in Portugal, may I be allowed to adopt measures, in conjunction with the regency, for obtaining a supply?”</p></td> -<td class="tdlx"><p>“The general measures of supplying Portugal with provisions will be <em>referred to Mr. Villiers</em>.”</p></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdlx"><p>“If any Portuguese corps can be got into such forwardness as to be fit to enter Spain, and they should be willing to join sir J. Moore, are they to be put on British pay?”</p></td> -<td class="tdlx"><p>“<em>Mr. Villiers will be authorised</em> to enter upon the discussion of this subject with the regency, availing himself of your assistance,” &c.</p></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_V">No. V.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. -CRADOCK’S PAPERS.</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs60">WANT OF SUPPLIES.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Commissary Rawlings, deputy-commissary-general, to -Cradock, December 22.</em></p> - -<p>“Your excellency is aware of the exhausted state of this country. -The difficulties encountered by sir J. Moore were of the most -serious nature, even before the sources of supply were so much -drained as they now are.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs60">WANT OF TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES.</p> - -<p class="center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, 17th March.</em></p> - -<p>“I have been obliged to send officers of the artillery and commissariat -department to Gibraltar to attempt the supply of horses -from the Barbary coast; and, such is our actual want, that the -<ins class="corr" id="tn-492" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'proper movoment of'"> -proper movement of</ins> even the force we have is nearly impracticable.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26.</em></p> - -<p>“The means of transport are so confined that I must not -expose any thing to loss; and the artillery must be preserved with -the greatest care, for I cannot equip more than two brigades of -six-pounders, and one light brigade of three-pounders, the latter -being of a very inferior description.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_493"></a>[493]</span></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Commissary Rawlings to sir John Cradock, March.</em></p> - -<p>“The precarious tenure of this country by British troops has -hitherto precluded the possibility of establishing such an advantageous -contract for the public as, in more permanent cases, might -necessarily be expected: we have literally been supplied from hand -to mouth.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Colonel Robe to sir J. Cradock, March 20</em>.</p> - -<p>“It is necessary for me to add that every exertion has been -made to supply the artillery with horses and mules by the deputy-commissary-general, -but, from the exhausted state of the country, -and the demands upon it for the Portuguese army, no more than -two brigades have been furnished with those animals, and these -are much too slight for the general service of the artillery.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, March 20.</em></p> - -<p>“From the first moment of my arrival in this country, unceasing -exertion has been employed to purchase and procure them” (horses -and mules) “at any price or by any means, but the adequate -supply for even the former small number of the British army -could not be obtained. I have also made repeated representations -to England.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29.</em></p> - -<p>“I want eight hundred horses and mules for the common -conveyance of provision and the equipment of the artillery.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Commissary Rawlings to sir J. Cradock, April 9.</em></p> - -<p>“Some of the persons employed to provide cattle for the troops -have returned without effecting their mission. This disappointment -must be attributed to the movements of the enemy in the -north, from whence our supply has hitherto been obtained.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to marshal Beresford, Caldas, April 18.</em></p> - -<p>“You can form no adequate idea of the difficulty to procure -supplies. The subject of forage for the cavalry keeps me in alarm -without intermission, and there is no certainty for a single day. -The country appears to be without the ability to furnish straw.”—“In -short, the supply is just for the day, and barely sufficient.”—“I -have begged of Mr. Villiers to desire the regency would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_494"></a>[494]</span> -send a person, in special authority, to this district to furnish supplies, -if they are to be found. I shall act like the French, and -make requisition, with this difference, that we are ready to pay -for every thing to the utmost.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Cradock to Berkely, Caldas, April 17.</em></p> - -<p>“Such is the dearth of supply in this part of the country, and -even in advance as far as we could go, that, unless victuallers are -sent (or some other arrangement to the same effect) to Peniché -and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot maintain our position. We -cannot advance, for all our means of transport are gone back to -Lisbon; and even in a retreat the cavalry could not be fed.”—“If -there is insurmountable risk in sending the victuallers to -Peniché, I request your declaration to this effect; for I must, in -that case, retire the army to a station close to Lisbon, to fed be from -thence.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Cradock to Villiers, April 17.</em></p> - -<p>“This letter is plainly to state that, unless some victuallers are -sent, even at risk, to Peniché and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot -maintain our position, and must retreat.”—“If the articles are -in the country we must have them, and all ceremony must be -dispensed with. The enemy would have them without paying for -them: we must equally exact and pay.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Cradock to Beresford, April 20.</em></p> - -<p>“All the recommendation you point out upon the assistance to -be derived from the coast have been long since acted upon to the -utmost of my exertions; but the difficulties started by the admiral -and the commissary were so great, that I cannot say I have much -dependence upon immediate aid.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>General Cotton to Cradock, April 21.</em></p> - -<p>“I wish I could once see the cavalry together; but I much -fear that before that happens they will be very much out of condition. -The fourteenth have already fallen off very much, owing -to the frequent want of straw and their being supplied with Indian -corn, which they will not eat: added to these circumstances, the -commissary obliges the cavalry to carry (on the horses) three -days’ forage.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_495"></a>[495]</span></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>G. Harrison <ins class="corr" id="tn-495" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'to Mr. Rawlins'"> -to Mr. Rawlings</ins>, Treasury-chambers, -February 25.</em></p> - -<p>“It having been represented to the lords commissioners of his -majesty’s treasury that the troops at Lisbon are experiencing the -greatest hardships from the want of shoes, I have received their -lordships commands,” &c. &c.</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to colonel Willoughby Gordon, military -secretary, February 11.</em></p> - -<p>“I trust that the importance of the subject will plead my excuse -for thus repeating my representations of the wretched state -of the clothing and the great coats in particular of his majesty’s -troops serving in this country.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Lord Castlereagh to general Sherbrooke, January 12.</em></p> - -<p>“Sir John Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition -you make for horses for your guns, or any other species -of supply the service may, from time to time, require.”</p> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_VI">No. VI.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION I.—MISCELLANEOUS.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Captain Morgan, Lusitanian Legion, to sir J. Cradock, -Lisbon, January 19, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“I left sir R. Wilson very critically situated, occupying a pass -on the Agueda. Sir Robert is wholly unsupported; he has been -advised by colonel Guard to fall back; and, from his information, -he imagines that sir John Moore is withdrawing his troops -through Gallicia. On the other hand, he has received <em>positive -orders from you</em><a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> <em>to defend the frontiers</em>, and pressing letters -to that effect from the bishop of Oporto.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, 30th January.</em></p> - -<p>“The regency and the bishop of Oporto are not pleased at his” -(sir R. Wilson) “quitting the bounds of Portugal.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_496"></a>[496]</span></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Ditto to Ditto, 6th March.</em></p> - -<p>“I had a letter from sir R. Wilson, from Ciudad Rodrigo -(24th February), wherein he says, that many French prisoners -state their expectations that the French army will retire behind -the Ebro. Sir Robert’s own persuasion is <em>that the French will -retire altogether from Spain</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION II.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>General Cameron to sir J. Cradock, Lamego, January 16.</em></p> - -<p>“I have collected several detachments of recovered men belonging -to sir J. Moore’s army, whom I found scattered in all -directions, without necessaries, and some of them committing -every possible excess that could render the name of a British -soldier odious to the nation.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely, March 16.</em></p> - -<p>“There are about one hundred and twenty persons confined on -board the <i>Rosina</i>, whose conduct has rendered them a disgrace to -the army.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION III.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, Oimbra, Head-Quarters -of Romana, February 21.</em></p> - -<p>“The marquis of Romana seems to think that the serious <em>intention -of the enemy is to retreat from Gallicia</em> altogether; and -even that he will find much difficulty <em>in extricating himself</em>. I -must confess that <em>I am not so sanguine</em>; and I judge that the -present retrograde movement from the Minho is more with an -intent to advance from Orense on Montalegre, and in this direction.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, March.</em></p> - -<p>“I still believe Romana had intention to fall back on Chaves, and -join himself to the Portuguese army. <em>His troops had been much -vexed by the unfriendly conduct of the Portuguese</em>, and a cordial -co-operation was not to be expected; but that he should -separate altogether is what I neither could expect nor conceive.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_497"></a>[497]</span> -He suddenly informed me of his resolution to retreat to Bragança. -He had just received a letter from Sylveira, which he also answered -to that effect, and which created no small surprise, as a -plan of operations had already been settled between them.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Major Victor Arentchild to sir J. Cradock, Oporto, March 16.</em></p> - -<p>“General Sylveira has only one regiment with him; and his -conduct has been such, that the people have lost all confidence in -him, and consider him a traitor. I merely mention this to your -excellency as the opinion of the public.... The marquis of -Romana’s army is retreating to Orres, in Gallicia, and is, I fear, -in a wretched condition. The opinion entertained of him is far -from good.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. commissary Boys to Mr. commissary Rawlings, Almeida, -January 13.</em></p> - -<p>“Sir John Moore, with his army, was retreating, and ten -thousand men had deserted from the marquis of Romana, and -were pillaging the country.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Lord Castlereagh to marshal Beresford, February 15.</em></p> - -<p>“The Portuguese government having solicited that a British -general officer should be appointed to command and organize their -army, his majesty has been graciously pleased to select you for -this important trust.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere, January 23.</em></p> - -<p>“No effort appears to have been made by the Spaniards, either -to second the British operations, or even to defend Ferrol, or save -the naval means (whatever they may be) in that harbour.”</p> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_VII">No. VII.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70">EXTRACTS FROM MR FRERE’S CORRESPONDENCE.</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs60">(N. B. The Italics are not in the original.)</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, Seville, March 14.</em></p> - -<p>“Our hope of offensive operations in Aragon is so much diminished -by the defeat of general Reding, that I should much doubt<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_498"></a>[498]</span> -whether any reinforcements, such as we could now send there, -would enable us to attempt them with the prospect of a degree of -success, such as might compensate for the inconvenience liable to -arise from the derangement of calculations which may have been -formed at home.”—“On the other hand, there seems reason -to <em>apprehend</em>, that general Soult may at last, in consequence of -the resistance he has experienced, <em>desist from his unaccountable -project, of entering Portugal and occupying Gallicia</em>. His -return would, of course, add largely to the disposable and moveable -force of the enemy, while it would not increase ours by any -force of that description.”—“In this view of the subject there -are two points for the employment of a British force; one, <em>by -making a push to drive the enemy from Salamanca, and the -neighbouring towns</em>, while the Asturians should make an effort on -their side to occupy Leon and Astorga, thus re-establishing the communications -between the northern and southern provinces. The -other, by moving from the bridge of Alcantara along the northern -bank of the Tagus, in concert with general Cuesta, to attack and -<em>drive the enemy from Toledo, and consequently from Madrid</em>. -In the latter alternative, the British could have the advantage of -acting in concert with a disciplined army. They would, likewise, -have immediately the start of any reinforcement from the army of -general Soult, supposing him to abandon Gallicia for the sake of -moving southward; and these movements would not tend in the -same degree to draw him from his present position, in which, for -so many reasons, <em>it is desirable he should continue</em>. It would, -I should imagine, at the same time, cover Andalusia, and the -points of the greatest interest and importance in this province, -more effectually than the same force employed in any other -manner.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, March 22.</em></p> - -<p>“The fortieth remains here: under the present circumstances -I could not think of their removal, unless to meet a British force -from Elvas.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Frere to sir A. Wellesley, Seville, May 4.</em></p> - -<p class="p1 pfs60">Extracted from Parliamentary Papers, 1810.</p> - -<p>“As it was my object to obtain <em>a diversion in La Mancha -as the price of co-operation</em> on your part, and the impression -which they (the junta) received from colonel Alava’s report was,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_499"></a>[499]</span> -that your intention was, after defeating or driving Soult into Gallicia, -to come down upon Estremadura to attack general Victor, I was -under some disadvantage, inasmuch as they imagined, that the -point which I wanted to make a condition was already conceded.”</p> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_VIII">No. VIII.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70">EXTRACTS RELATIVE TO CADIZ.</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs60"><em>Sir John Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 16.</em></p> - -<p>“The troops from England for Cadiz may or may not arrive, -at least we may expect delay; but I think the subject of sending -a force from this requires immediate deliberation and settlement. -I am prepared to appropriate for this service any number that -may be deemed proper under existing circumstances. It is only -upon the political part of the subject I can have any hesitation, -and whether the Spaniards will receive the force as they ought. -The orders from England are to send it if the supreme junta shall -make the requisition. The question is, whether we shall anticipate -the demand or not?”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir John Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 29.</em></p> - -<p>“This measure (sending troops to Cadiz) is certainly one of -considerable responsibility to those concerned; but upon its adoption, -Mr. Villiers, Admiral Berkely, and myself, could not well -hesitate, after the despatches that were communicated to us, as -addressed to you, as well as those directed to ourselves, which -placed Cadiz in so prominent a point of view, upon the unfavourable -termination of the campaign in the north of Spain.”—“The -force in Portugal is weakened to a degree, especially in British -regiments, that reduces it to almost nothing; but I may look to -the arrival of the force of five thousand men, announced to be on -their way; and if it is intended to maintain Portugal, it will be -but fair to replace the present detachment from them.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir John Cradock to general Mackenzie, March 9.</em></p> - -<p>“I yesterday received orders from his majesty’s government to -press, in the most expeditious manner, the immediate return of -the forces under your command to the Tagus.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_500"></a>[500]</span></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 9.</em></p> - -<p>“Your lordship will find, by the present communication, that -major-general Mackenzie, at the express desire and advice of Mr. -Frere, has actually left Cadiz with his whole force, (the fortieth -regiment, from Seville, will be united,) and proceeded to Tarragona, -unless your lordship’s orders may have overtaken major-general -Sherbrooke, who passed this port four days ago (without any -communication). It may be presumed that he will follow the -same course, upon the same motives that influenced general -Mackenzie; and at present a new scene of operations is entered -upon in that part of Spain.”</p> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_IX">No. IX.</h3> -</div> - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF MAJOR-GENERAL -MACKENZIE’S DETACHMENT FROM -LISBON TO CADIZ.</p> - -<p>“The detachment sailed from Lisbon on the 2d February, -1809, and arrived in Cadiz harbour on the 5th, at night. I immediately -waited on rear-admiral Purvis, and from him I learnt -there are some difficulties started by the marquis Villel (the commissioner -from the central junta, as well as a member of it) to -our landing and occupying Cadiz. I then waited on sir George -Smith, on shore, where this intelligence was, in some degree, -confirmed; but sir George still expressed an expectation that the -objections would be got over. These objections had been, it seems, -but lately started. Next morning I saw Mr. Charles Stuart, who -was acting under a diplomatic authority from Mr. Frere, and had -a conference with him and sir G. Smith, when I explained the -nature of my orders, and it was determined to wait on the marquis -Villel. Mr. Stuart explained to the marquis that the object of -my coming was to offer our assistance in the occupation and defence -of Cadiz, and in making the necessary preparations for such -an event; that we were only the advance of a larger corps coming -from England, to act from this side against the common enemy. -The marquis hesitated, and, after some speeches of compliment, -said his authority did not extend so far; that he must wait for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_501"></a>[501]</span> -instructions from the central government; and, in the mean time, -said he could permit our landing at Port St. Mary’s. This I -declined, as an unnecessary loss of time, and contrary to my -orders; and it was then agreed to wait for the decision of the -central junta from Seville. I thereupon wrote to Mr. Frere, and -sent him a copy of my instructions from sir J. Cradock.</p> - -<p>The decision of the junta was received on the 8th; and I received -a letter from Mr. Frere, which put an end, for the moment, -to our hope of occupying Cadiz. The reason assigned by the -junta was of the most flimsy nature, viz. “That they had ordered -two of their own battalions to occupy Cadiz;” a measure which -was evidently the thought of the moment, and a mere pretext.</p> - -<p>Although I cannot presume to judge of the evil political consequences -which might arise from such a measure, as alluded to in -Mr. Frere’s, yet I had every reason to believe, as well from the -opinion of sir G. Smith, as of all others conversant in the sentiments -of the people of Cadiz, that our landing and occupying the -place would be a very popular measure. Mr. Frere’s letter expressed -a great desire that we should not appear to have made an -offer that was refused; and was desirous that we should not immediately -depart, but that we should land and occupy the cantonments -offered to us. On consulting with sir G. Smith and Mr. -Stuart, this appeared to be contrary to the grounds on which we -had set out; but as we were equally desirous not to appear at -variance with the Spanish government, we agreed to submit to -Mr. Frere, whether it would not be better for the troops to remain -for the present in their transports, as we had already stated that -we were in expectation of being immediately joined by a force -from England, the scene of whose operations was uncertain; and -our remaining in the harbour under this idea would answer every -purpose Mr. Frere proposed by a landing.</p> - -<p>I had, besides, some military objections to a landing; for, -without reckoning the uncertainty of an embarkation from Port -St. Mary’s, I knew how dilatory all proceedings are in Spain. -That if we were once placed in the scattered cantonments proposed, -and we had a sudden call for embarkation, above a week would -have been lost in effecting it; and from former experience, the -effects of a certain disorder would, probably, have thrown a large -number of our men into the hospitals. It is further evident that -the detachment could not have been re-embarked without some -stain on the national honour. It must have very soon marched<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_502"></a>[502]</span> -into the interior of Spain, and thus have involved our country in -its support, without having obtained the object for which it was -detached,—the possession of Cadiz. On all these considerations I -thought it right to defer landing, until we should hear further -from Mr. Frere, to whom both Mr. Stuart and myself wrote, and -I presume he was satisfied with the reasons given. In all these -proceedings I had the cordial approbation of sir G. Smith, who, -notwithstanding unfavourable appearances, seemed sanguine to the -last that the point would be carried. I therefore wrote to sir J. -Cradock, by the Hope brig, on the 9th, stating what had been -done, and that we should remain in Cadiz harbour (with Mr. -Frere’s approbation) until we received orders from him or from -England. And I wrote, by the same conveyance, to the same -purport, to Lord Castlereagh.</p> - -<p>On the 15th, we had the misfortune to lose sir G. Smith, who -died that morning; and on the 18th, I received a letter from Mr. -Frere, in which he seemed to have altered his opinion as to the -propriety of our occupying Cadiz, and stating that the only mode -which appeared to him likely to succeed in obtaining the possession -was my leaving a small part of my detachment there, and -proceeding with the rest to join Cuesta’s army; that, as a force -was expected from England for the same purpose for which my -detachment came, what I left behind might follow me on their -arrival.</p> - -<p>I confess I was much disappointed at this proposal, the whole -of my detachment not appearing more than equal to the charge of -the place; but as it had not been laid before the junta, I considered -it my duty to state the objections to it, as they arose out of my -instructions. Such a measure would have completely committed -our country, in a particular point, in the interior, with a very -small detachment, a thing which I was instructed his majesty’s -ministers wished to avoid; whilst the admittance of a handful of -men could not be considered as any possession of the place, where -there were about four thousand volunteers well drilled. I therefore -submitted to Mr. Frere, to defer the proposition of this -measure until the arrival of troops from England, which might be -looked for, according to his statement, every hour. We should -be, then, in a condition to take possession of Cadiz effectually, and -advance, in some point, respectably, towards the enemy. If, however, -Mr. Frere should determine to bring forward the measure<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_503"></a>[503]</span> -immediately, I further informed him, that I was ready to move -on, as soon as we could obtain the necessary equipments.</p> - -<p>Mr. Stuart embarked on the 21st, on board the Ambuscade, on -a secret mission. On the 22d, and before I received any further -communication from Mr. Frere, a popular commotion broke out -suddenly at Cadiz, in consequence of the measure which the junta -had adopted, of marching some of their own troops into the town, -as the reason (or rather pretext) for declining to receive us. The -regiment now on its march in, was composed of Poles, Swiss, and -other foreigners, deserters from the French army, whose entrance -the people were determined to resist. The utmost care was taken -to prevent our officers or soldiers from taking any part whatever -on this occasion; and, except in some cases where I was applied -to by the governor, for the interference of some British officers as -mediators, we steered perfectly clear. It was now evident that -the people were favourable to our landing and occupying the town, -for it was frequently called for during the tumult.</p> - -<p>As soon as I could safely send an account of this commotion to -Mr. Frere, I despatched an officer (captain Kelly, assistant quarter-master-general) -with a detail. The Fisguard sailed on the -24th, for Lisbon and England, by which ship I informed sir J. -Cradock, as well as lord Castlereagh, of all that had passed since -my last; and just at that time colonel Roche arrived from Seville. -He was sent down, by Mr. Frere, to Cadiz, in consequence of -Mr. Stuart’s mission. I had till now expected Mr. Frere’s decision, -on the subject of the proposition in his letter of the 18th; -but as so much time had elapsed, I conjectured he might have -dropped it for the present; and conceiving that something favourable -to the object of my mission might be drawn from the present -state of things, I had a full conversation with colonel Roche on -the subject. He told me the junta were dissatisfied with our not -having accepted the cantonments offered to us; but he did not -seem to think our views unattainable, particularly at the present -moment. I asked his opinion as to the practicability of general -Stuart’s being admitted, with two of my three battalions, into Cadiz, -if I advanced with the third to Seville to join the fortieth regiment, -thus making an equal division of my force. Colonel Roche -was of opinion that this would be acceded to; and I, therefore, -despatched him, as soon as possible, with a proposal to this effect to -Mr. Frere. Though two battalions could not be considered a -sufficient garrison, yet, from the evident popularity of our troops,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_504"></a>[504]</span> -and the speedy expectation of a reinforcement from England, I -thought it would be extremely proper to make the trial. It also -appeared to me that by advancing to Seville I should not run -much risk of involving those two battalions in any operations before -the arrival of general Sherbrooke, which could embarrass him in -the execution of the orders he might bring from home.</p> - -<p>This proposition certainly exceeded any thing authorised by my -instructions, but, I trust, the circumstances will be found to warrant -it.</p> - -<p>After colonel Roche’s departure for Seville, captain Kelly returned -from thence, on the 26th, with a verbal confidential message -from Mr. Frere, stating that marshal Soult was marching from -Gallicia into Portugal, in three columns, and that Mr. Frere -would write to me by express, or by next post. On the 27th, I -received this promised letter, enclosing the copy of an intercepted -letter from Soult to Joseph Buonaparte; and Mr. Frere expresses -his opinion that my detachment may now be more useful in Portugal -than at Cadiz.</p> - -<p>Knowing, as I did before I left Lisbon, that every proper step -was taking for evacuating Portugal, in case of necessity, and that -nothing else than succours from home could enable sir John Cradock -to hold his ground there, it became more than ever necessary -to ascertain whether his army will be received into Cadiz, in case -of the evacuation of Portugal. In case the present negotiation -succeeded, I had arranged with admiral Purvis to send a frigate -with the intelligence to Lisbon immediately. If it failed, every -thing was in readiness to sail with the detachment thither; for, -although the assistance I should bring might not be sufficient of -itself to make any alteration in the resolutions already taken, yet, -if reinforcements arrived from England, we should be a welcome -addition.</p> - -<p>On the morning of the 2d of March I received a letter from -colonel Roche, dated February 28, stating that my proposition -had not yet been decided on, but that it would be taken into consideration -that day. He expressed much apprehension of a party -in the French interest.</p> - -<p>The morning of the 3d having passed without any letter from -Mr. Frere or colonel Roche, as I had been assured by the latter -I should receive, at furthest by the post of that morning, I despatched -another courier, dreading some accident. In the afternoon, -however, I received a long and important letter from Mr.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_505"></a>[505]</span> -Frere, from which I concluded the negotiation had failed (although -he did not say so in terms); and a letter I received shortly afterwards -from colonel Roche confirmed this failure. Mr. Frere’s -letter entered very minutely into the state of the Spanish and -French armies; mentioned the failure of Soult’s attempt to penetrate -into Portugal by the Minho, and the improbability of his -persisting in it, from the position of the Spanish army, assisted by -the Portuguese. He then points out, in strong terms, the essential -use my detachment could be of at Tarragona, in giving spirit -and vigour to the cause in that country, where it is most in need -of support.</p> - -<p>As the return of my detachment to Portugal, except in the case -of resisting the enemy, would not have a favourable appearance; -and the proceeding to Tarragona would so evidently shew our determination -to support the general cause, and leave the Spanish -government without an excuse afterwards for refusing to admit -our troops into Cadiz, it was my intention to have complied with -Mr. Frere’s solicitations, as the employment of my detachment on -the sea-coast would easily admit of its being afterwards withdrawn, -without committing any other British force for its support; and -the motives urged by Mr. Frere were so strong, that I scarcely -thought myself vindicable in hesitating to comply.</p> - -<p>I accordingly wrote on the night of the 3d March to this effect -to Mr. Frere, sir J. Cradock, and lord Castlereagh. But on the -4th, in the evening, captain Cooke, of the Coldstream guards, -arrived from England with despatches for general Sherbrooke, -who had not yet arrived. Captain Cooke came in the Eclair brig -of war, and had stopped at Lisbon, which he left again on the -evening of the 2d, and brought me a message to the following -purport from sir J. Cradock, viz. ‘That he was determined to -defend Portugal to the utmost of his power; that in this situation -he considered my detachment as the choice part of his little army; -that the enemy were actually on the borders, though there was -not yet any intelligence of their having entered Portugal; and -that unless some extraordinary circumstance, of which he could -form no idea, prevented it, he should look for my immediate return -to Lisbon.’</p> - -<p>This order, of course, put an end to all further deliberation. -The idea of proceeding to Tarragona was abandoned. I wrote to -this effect to Mr. Frere, and embarked at midnight on the 4th. -Contrary winds detained in Cadiz harbour the whole of the 5th,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_506"></a>[506]</span> -but on the 6th the fleet sailed, and arrived in the Tagus on -the 12th.</p> - -<p>I trust, in the whole of these proceedings, in a very intricate -and delicate situation, an honest and anxious desire has been -evinced on my part, to accomplish the object of my mission; the -failure of which, I am persuaded, will be found to arise from the -apprehensions and disunion of the central junta, and not from the -inclinations of the people of Cadiz.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signed) <span class="pad4"><span class="smcap">J. R. Mackenzie</span>,</span><br /> -<span class="padr2"><em>Major-general.</em></span></p> - -<p><em>Lisbon, March 13, 1809.</em>”</p> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_X">No. X.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">COMMUNICATIONS WITH MINISTERS—NEGLECT -OF PORTUGAL.</p> - - -<p class="p1 pfs60">SECTION I.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Mr. Canning to Mr. Villiers, January 24, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“You are aware, by my despatch, No. 4, of the 24th of December, -enclosing copies, &c. &c. <em>that, in the event of the -evacuation of Portugal, by the force under sir J. Cradock’s -command, an event rendered the more probable by the transactions -in Gallicia</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, February 6.</em></p> - -<p>“<em>Should you be compelled to evacuate Portugal</em>,” <em>&c.</em></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Admiral Berkely to sir J. Cradock, February 6.</em></p> - -<p>“The period of the British army’s stay in this place <em>appearing -to draw near to its conclusion</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION II.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to colonel Guard, January 3.</em></p> - -<p>“The garrisons of Elvas and Almeida have engaged my most -serious thoughts.”—“But, as they were occupied by the command<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_507"></a>[507]</span> -of his majesty’s ministers, and <em>we remain without any -fresh instructions under the present critical circumstances</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to general Richard Stewart, January 10.</em></p> - -<p>“I feel what a risk I run in thus leaving Lisbon defenceless, -but <em>I obey the original orders of government</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to general Richard Stewart, January 12.</em></p> - -<p>“<em>We are still without any instructions whatever from -England.</em>”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to captain Halket, January 13.</em></p> - -<p>“Though we cannot say <em>when</em> it may take place, and it shall -be deferred to the last moment, <em>in hopes of hearing from -England</em>, yet I believe it to be our duty to prepare every thing -for the event of an embarkation.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely, January 17.</em></p> - -<p>“I lament to say that there appears nothing before us but the -resolution <em>to remain in Portugal to the last proper moment, -awaiting orders from England</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 19.</em></p> - -<p>“With our force inferior and ill-composed, as it is, <em>we are -determined to remain to the last proper moment, in the hopes -of receiving orders from England</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely</em>, <em>February 9</em>.</p> - -<p>“The orders we daily expect may be either for <em>immediate -embarkation, or to maintain Portugal</em>.”—“I am pursuaded -we have but this one wish, which is to act for the credit of our -country, and endeavour, under the <em>want of all information, to -discover what may be the object of the government we serve</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to general Mackenzie, February 26.</em></p> - -<p>“Since the 14th of January <em>we are without instructions from -England</em>.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_508"></a>[508]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION III.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 15.</em></p> - -<p>“What appears to be my duty is to keep the fixed idea that the -<em>army in Portugal should remain to the last moment</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 15.</em></p> - -<p>“I am just favoured with your communication about the dangerous -effects likely to be produced by the measure of withdrawing -the troops from Lisbon to occupy the military position of Oyeras, -Passo d’Arcos, &c. I fear (though the contrary was intended to be -expressly stated) that you are led into the idea that the position in -question was solely intended for embarkation. My avowed design -was to await (in a military post suited to our force) orders from -England, or to defend ourselves with reasonable prospect of -success against any attempt from the enemy, or even from thence -to make a forward movement, should future events lead to such a -proceeding.”—“What I must object to is to take up a false -position, say Alcantara, or other heights about the town, which -would only defend a certain position and leave the remainder to -the power of the enemy, one which we must leave upon his approach -and seek another bearing the appearance of flight and yet -not securing our retreat. The whole having announced the -intention to defend Lisbon, but giving up that idea upon the -appearance of the enemy: for positions liable to be turned on -every side cannot be persevered in by an inferior force.”—“My -political reasoning upon this subject was contained in the letter I -wrote the admiral, and, I must repeat, it continues unweakened,” -&c.—“After your strong representations of this morning, I shall -certainly not persevere; and, as there is no instant necessity for -the measure, will await the progress of events.”</p> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_509"></a>[509]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_XI">No. XI.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp2">STATE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORCE UNDER -SIR J. CRADDOCK, JANUARY 6, 1809, EXTRACTED -FROM THE HEAD-QUARTER STATES.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Disposable for the Field.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Garrisons.</td> -<td class="tdc">Artillery.</td> -<td class="tdc">Cavalry.</td> -<td class="tdc">Infantry.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Santarem</td> -<td class="tdc">68</td> -<td class="tdc">190</td> -<td class="tdc">2,492</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">General Richard Stewart.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Saccavem</td> -<td class="tdc">97</td> -<td class="tdc">169</td> -<td class="tdc">1,450</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">General M’Kenzie.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Lisbon</td> -<td class="tdc">..</td> -<td class="tdc">519</td> -<td class="tdc">....</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">General Cotton.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">..</td> -<td class="tdc">..</td> -<td class="tdc"> 236</td> -<td class="tdl">attached to different battalions.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">–—</td> -<td class="tdc">–—</td> -<td class="tdc">–——</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">165</td> -<td class="tdc">879</td> -<td class="tdc">4,178</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">–—</td> -<td class="tdc">–—</td> -<td class="tdc">–——</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total</td> -<td class="tdl pad3"> 5,222</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Garrisons.</td> -<td class="tdc">Artillery.</td> -<td class="tdc">Cavalry.</td> -<td class="tdc">Infantry.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Almeida</td> -<td class="tdc"> 38</td> -<td class="tdc">..</td> -<td class="tdc">1,440</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Elvas</td> -<td class="tdc"> 33</td> -<td class="tdc">..</td> -<td class="tdc"> 679</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Oporto</td> -<td class="tdc">..</td> -<td class="tdc">..</td> -<td class="tdc"> 379</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Lisbon and Forts</td> -<td class="tdc">315</td> -<td class="tdc">..</td> -<td class="tdc">2,682</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">–—</td> -<td class="tdc">–—</td> -<td class="tdc">–——</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Total</td> -<td class="tdc">486</td> -<td class="tdc">..</td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl pad3"> 5,170</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl pad3">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">General total</td> -<td class="tdl pad3">10,392</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl pad3">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Note.—Every man capable of bearing arms is included in this state.</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp2">ORDER OF BATTLE, APRIL 6, 1809, CALDAS.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Sir J. Cradock, commander-in-chief.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Major-general Sherbrooke, second in command.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Artillery.— Major-general Howarth.</td> -<td class="tdl">Cavalry.— Major-general Cotton.</td> -</tr> -<tr><td></td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Under arms.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">First line, five brigades</td> -<td class="tdc">10,418</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Second line, three brigades</td> -<td class="tdc"> 3,810</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Reserve, one brigade</td> -<td class="tdc"> 1,858</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl">Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdc"> 800</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Total</td> -<td class="tdc">16,886</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_510"></a>[510]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">STATE OF THE ARMY UNDER SIR A. WELLESLEY, APRIL 22.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Head-quarters, Leyria.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Under arms.</td> -<td class="tdc">Sick.</td> -<td class="tdc">Command.</td> -<td class="tdc">Effective.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Artillery</td> -<td class="tdc"> 441</td> -<td class="tdc"> 88</td> -<td class="tdc"> 408</td> -<td class="tdc"> 937</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Cavalry</td> -<td class="tdc">1,439</td> -<td class="tdc"> 13</td> -<td class="tdc"> 418</td> -<td class="tdc">1,870</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Infantry</td> -<td class="tdc">16,539</td> -<td class="tdc">1,937</td> -<td class="tdc"> 314</td> -<td class="tdc">18,790</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -<td class="tdc">–——</td> -<td class="tdc">–——</td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Total</td> -<td class="tdc">18,419</td> -<td class="tdc">2,038</td> -<td class="tdc">1,140</td> -<td class="tdc">21,597</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -<td class="tdc">–——</td> -<td class="tdc">–——</td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -<tr><td> </td></tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdr">6lb.</td> -<td class="tdr">3lb.</td> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2">Howitzers.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl">Number of guns</td> -<td class="tdrq">20</td> -<td class="tdrq">6</td> -<td class="tdc">4</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Total 30</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, MAY 1, 1809.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="6">Head-quarters, Coimbra.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Artillery.</td> -<td class="tdc">Cavalry.</td> -<td class="tdc">Infantry.</td> -<td class="tdc">Waggon</td> -<td class="tdl">train.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total rank and file.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">1,413</td> -<td class="tdc">3,074</td> -<td class="tdc">19,510</td> -<td class="tdc">230</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">24,227</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl" rowspan="2">Deduct</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Hospital</td> -<td class="tdc"> 2,357</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Absent</td> -<td class="tdc"> 1,217</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">–——</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Total present under arms</td> -<td class="tdc">20,653</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">–——</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, JUNE 25, 1809.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="6">Head-quarters, Abrantes.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Artillery.</td> -<td class="tdc">Cavalry.</td> -<td class="tdc">Infantry.</td> -<td class="tdc">Waggon</td> -<td class="tdl">train.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total rank and file.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">1,586</td> -<td class="tdc">3,736</td> -<td class="tdc">21,267</td> -<td class="tdc">406</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">26,995</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc" rowspan="2">Deduct</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Hospital</td> -<td class="tdc"> 3,246</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Commands</td> -<td class="tdc"> 1,396</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">30 Pieces of artillery.</td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Total present under arms</td> -<td class="tdc">22,353</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<p class="p1 pfs70 lht lsp">STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, JULY 25, 1809.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="6">Head-quarters, Talavera.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Artillery.</td> -<td class="tdc">Cavalry.</td> -<td class="tdc">Infantry.</td> -<td class="tdc">Waggon</td> -<td class="tdl">train.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total rank and file.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">1,584</td> -<td class="tdc">3,734</td> -<td class="tdc">29,694</td> -<td class="tdc">398</td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">35,410</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc" rowspan="2">Deduct</td> -<td class="tdl">{ Hospital</td> -<td class="tdc"> 4,827</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl">{ Commands</td> -<td class="tdc"> 1,596</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Total present under arms</td> -<td class="tdc">28,987</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Deduct regiments on march</td> -<td class="tdc"> 9,141</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">30 Pieces of artillery.</td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="3">Real present under arms</td> -<td class="tdc">19,846</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdl"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_511"></a>[511]</span></p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1809.</p> - -<table class="p1 autotable fs80" summary=""> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5">Head-quarters, Badajos.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Artillery.</td> -<td class="tdc">Cavalry.</td> -<td class="tdc">Infantry.</td> -<td class="tdc">Waggon train.</td> -<td class="tdc">Total rank and file.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -<td class="tdc">Men.</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">1,947</td> -<td class="tdc">4,273</td> -<td class="tdc">28,409</td> -<td class="tdc">389</td> -<td class="tdc">35,018</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc">In Hospital</td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc">8,827 }</td> -<td class="tdc" rowspan="2">Total absent</td> -<td class="tdc" rowspan="2">11,353</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Command and missing</td> -<td class="tdc">2,526 }</td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2">Total present under arms</td> -<td class="tdc">23,765</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc"></td> -<td class="tdc">———</td> -</tr> -</table> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_XII">No. XII.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70">SECTION I.</p> - -<p class="p1 pfs90">MARSHAL BERESFORD TO SIR J. CRADOCK.</p> - -<p class="right"><em>March 29, 1809.</em></p> - -<p class="allsmcap pad2">SIR,</p> - -<p>I have the honour to annex your excellency a copy of requisitions, -from their excellencies the government of this kingdom, -for the speedy succouring of Oporto, which your excellency is -informed is so immediately in danger, from the approach of the -French army, whose advance posts are now within four leagues -of that town.</p> - -<p>I annex, for the information of your excellency, the instructions -which, under the existing circumstances, I had issued to -the general, commanding beyond the Douro; but the object of -which has been frustrated by events, at once unfortunate and -melancholy.</p> - -<p>The corps of brigadier-general Victoria, consisting of two -battalions of the line, which, on the appearance of the urgent -danger in the north, I had directed to cross the Douro, are now -in Oporto, as is the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, part -of the regiment of Valença, and some regiments of militia; but I -cannot get any return of the troops there, though, I understand, -the number is considerable; and to this must be added a considerable -number of ordenanza from without, and the armed population -which will, I understand, amount to eight or ten thousand -men, and of the arms come from England, three thousand stand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_512"></a>[512]</span> -that were sent to the army north of the Douro, are probably now -in Oporto, with a proportion of ammunition. I have thought it -right to give this statement of the actual state of things at Oporto, -as far as I can get information of, that your excellency may be -aware of it; and it is with regret that I farther add that there -prevails, in the town, the greatest anarchy and insubordination,—and -that, in short, by the latest accounts, the populace entirely -govern the law, civil and military.</p> - -<p>Upon the subject of marching a British force to Oporto under -the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the -various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we -had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary -for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me -to submit to your excellency’s consideration the propriety of advancing -the British force to Leyria, to be then pushed on to -Oporto, or otherwise, as the information from different parts may -render expedient. But my principal reason was that, as there -appeared an intention of co-operation (of which, however, there -is no certainty) between the marshals Victor and Soult, it would -be most desirable, by either driving back or overcoming one -before the other could give his co-operating aid to defeat their -plan, and if we should, or not, be able. To do this would be -merely a matter of calculation of time, as, supposing, on our -arrival at Leyria, Oporto offered a prospect of holding out till -we could reach it, and that Victor continued his southern pursuit -of Cuesta, he would get so distant from us, as to permit the army, -pushing from Leyria to Oporto, without apprehension from the -army of Victor, who, by the time he could possibly hear of our -movement, would be in the Sierra Morena, which would clearly -show that his principle object, and from which he did not seem -willing to be diverted, was either the destruction of Cuesta’s army, -to enter more securely into Portugal, or to push to Seville; but, at -all events, he would be too distant to give us apprehensions of -any surprise upon this capital, as we have daily information of his -movements, and which would enable us, wherever we were in -Portugal, even to reach it before him. If, however, the final co-operation -of these two armies is intended for the conquest of this -kingdom, and that Soult does not think that of his army from -Gallicia and that from Salamanca sufficient, then he will -satisfy himself, until Victor is ready to act with him, in the possession -of the country beyond the Douro, where he will refresh<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_513"></a>[513]</span> -and rest his troops, re-equip them, and otherwise provide them, to -be ready for the projected co-operation,—whilst the army from -Salamanca will, probably, satisfy itself with the capture of Ciudad -Rodrigo and Almeida, and act and wait in conjunction with -Soult, both waiting till Victor has settled his present objects, and -then all co-operating.</p> - -<p>It is for your excellency to judge, under the actual circumstances, -of the propriety of this movement towards Oporto, not -only for the British troops, but, also, of those of the allies, as, by -my instructions, I must consider you as commanding the allied -armies; and the time is now certainly arrived, for what efforts -they can make being combined: undoubtedly, their being employed -in separate projects will cause each falling separately, and without -advantage to the common cause.</p> - -<p>I would, however, certainly, under present circumstances, be -unwilling to send the few troops I could spare from the army, -between the Tagus and the Mondego, to Oporto, as, unsupported -by British, I fear it would be losing so many men, that on a -future occasion, with such support, may weigh in the scale; and -indeed, the very insubordinate state of the troops, of which I -have just received a second report and complaint, from general -Miranda, would render it highly unwise to send them to a town -in the state that Oporto now is, where the best disposed -troops, except a great body went there, if they were not debauched -to insubordination, would be borne down by the multitude; and it -is to be feared that whatever Portuguese troops enter the town -will fall with it, as the temper of the people prevents the possibility -of even any preparations for retreat, in case of misfortune, -to the outward and very extended lines of defence. Having -stated so much, I must leave the question to your excellency, &c.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr4">I have the honour, &c.</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">W. C. Beresford</span>.</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs90">SIR J. CRADOCK TO MARSHAL BERESFORD.</p> - -<p class="right"><em>Lisbon, March 29, 1809.</em></p> - -<p class="allsmcap pad2">DEAR SIR,</p> - -<p>I have the honour to acknowledge, at the earliest moment, -your excellency’s letter of this evening, conveying a copy of the -request from the regency, &c. that I should move the British -troops to the succour of Oporto, at this moment menaced, &c.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_514"></a>[514]</span></p> - -<p>Upon a subject of such importance, I experience considerable -relief, that the general view of approaching circumstances has -been, for a length of time, within my reflection, and that all my -reasoning (whatever it may be) has been transmitted to the government -in England, and the part I am now called upon to act -is simply but the execution of those measures I have long thought -it prudent to pursue, and which the present critical and involved -state of affairs seem to confirm and give no reason to alter -in any part.</p> - -<p>It has always appeared, to my judgement, that the enemy has but -two objects to attain in this kingdom. The possession of Lisbon -and Oporto, I believe it to be universally admitted, and I need -not point out to your discrimination the infinitely superior value -of the former above the latter. There are such positive local disadvantages -attached to Oporto, independent of its remote position, -that no military disposition, in which a small English army is to -bear part, can apply. It pains me, therefore, to decline obedience -to an application from so high an authority as the governors of -the kingdom. It may be their duty to make the request, though -I much doubt if their judgement goes along with it; but it appears -to be mine not to transfer the small British force, under my command, -(totally inadequate to separate objects,) from the defence of -this part of the kingdom to the very doubtful succour of a place -two hundred miles distant, and by a movement to the north with -this professed view, feel myself engaged in a war that leaves -Lisbon and the Tagus defenceless and unprotected from the inroads -of other bodies of the enemy that may be prepared to combine -in a general invasion.</p> - -<p>I shall hasten, therefore, from all general observation, to the -exact case before us, and state, in a concise manner, our actual -situation, leaving to your judgement, how far it may be necessary -to communicate some particulars that relate to the British army, -and lay before the governors and your excellency the best ideas -I can form for the employment of the British auxiliary force, in -conjunction with the Portuguese, for the ultimate protection of -Portugal under the pressure of all existing circumstances.</p> - -<p>It may be granted that the enemy, with a force from seventeen -to twenty thousand, a considerable portion of which (it is said -five thousand) is cavalry, is directly menacing Oporto, there is -reason to believe that the division at Salamanca, estimated from -nine to twelve thousand, with a powerful force of artillery, is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_515"></a>[515]</span> -moving to Ciudad Rodrigo, either for the investment of that -place, or to act in conjunction with general Soult, by an advance -into the Upper Beira. In the present view it is necessary to -state, with the weight it so well deserves, that the united forces -of generals Victor and Sebastiani are, apparently, pursuing -general Cuesta, just retiring before them; but it appears that a -part of the enemies had diverged to Merida, and had spread alarm -and dismay, even to the town of Badajos, on the frontiers of -Portugal, from whence, to the heights of Almeida, or the opposite -of Lisbon, through the whole of the Alemtejo: except the weak -garrison of Elvas, there is nothing to interrupt the immediate -passage.</p> - -<p>Against such an attempt from the enemy I derive no security -from the contiguity of general Cuesta’s army; for, besides the -general disinclination he has so strongly marked to the British -character, he has other objects to pursue, and his principal wish -is to gain time for the organization of his own force. To a person -so well acquainted with Portugal, and the circumstances of the -present hour, as your excellency is, it is quite superfluous to enter -upon further details, &c. It is only required to lay before you, in -confidence, the exact amount of the British forces, as the real point -upon which the whole subject depends: I may state it at twelve -thousand effective men, to take the field, if the necessary garrison -to maintain Lisbon in some tranquillity, and retain possession of the -maritime forts is left. It may be increased to fourteen thousand, -if these points are risked; but even to gain the advantage of numbers -to so limited a force, I cannot recommend the measure, for -the anarchy that prevails at Oporto, and would be, perhaps, worse -at Lisbon, is more to be dreaded than the presence of an enemy, -and may render all exertion useless. The necessary means of -transport for our army, notwithstanding every effort, from the -earliest moment, are quite inadequate, and not more than two and -a half brigades of artillery (fifteen guns) can be equipped. To adventure -upon an advance to Oporto, two hundred miles from -Lisbon, when the very object is, perhaps, at this moment lost, -seems to be a point only to gratify the good feelings of every -soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the understanding, -and the ultimate view of things. If the British army -sets out with the declared object to succour Oporto, or expel the -enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same; nothing -but the accomplishment will suit the English character; and I<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_516"></a>[516]</span> -confess that the best reasoning of my judgement, upon every -public and private principle, for the credit of the British army, -and the hope of any effectual assistance from the Portuguese -nation is, that the British troops should never make one retrograde -step: from that moment I will date the extinction of all Portuguese -aid, military as well as civil. The British army, from its -description, may disregard this common occurrence in war, but I -am persuaded, in the present state of the Portuguese army, and -with the sentiments of suspicion now alive, all explanation would -be vain, and that it would be left to the small body of English, -alone, to sustain the whole future conflict.</p> - -<p>I have now only to state what my inferior judgement points out; -and as the arduous situation of command is allotted to me, I must -try to execute to the best of my power. I shall remain faithful -to my first principles, and persevere in the defence of Lisbon and -the Tagus. I invite the co-operation of the Portuguese force, -and, under your guidance and auspicious control, I look to a very -powerful accession of strength. I am convinced nothing will be -done by them in detached parties or in any isolated situation. -They will acquire confidence by number, and emulation will arise, -a rapid discipline will ensue from their connection with us, and -the whole, animated by your presence, will give the best promise of -success. Until we have consulted again I shall not say whether -our general position should be at Lumiar, extending the whole -right to Saccavem, or any other station more in advance. At this -moment I have only to express the indispensable circumstance of -some fixed basis, upon which the allied army will act, and by our -united strength try to counteract the peculiar disadvantages that -attends the defence of Portugal from positions that cannot be -properly embraced, and always leave some part exposed.</p> - -<p>Allow me to conclude, with the solemn expression of my own -conviction, that nothing will give so much chance of a prosperous -result to the arduous scene in which we are engaged (either as to -reality or view) as the knowledge to the enemy, that, before he -conquers Portugal, he must defeat an army of some magnitude, -determined to fight him, and awaiting his approach, unbroken and -not exposed to the danger of a false movement. Such a conquest -cannot be an easy one, and must prove, if he pursue it, a -powerful diversion in favour of Spain.</p> - -<p>It will gain me the sincerest pleasure, &c.</p> - -<p class="smcap right">John Cradock.</p> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_517"></a>[517]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_XIII">No. XIII.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS RELATING TO THE -CONDUCT OF MARSHAL SOULT.</p> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Captain Brotherton to colonel Donkin, (quarter-master-general,) -Lamego, March 17, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“The enemy has, however, on this occasion, practised those -arts which Frenchmen are so expert in—circulating proclamations -and insidiously abandoning, for a moment, their usual system of -terror, plunder, and desolation, <em>treating the inhabitants with -feigned moderation and kindness</em>.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 20, 1809, Caldas.</em></p> - -<p>“It also appears to be the object of the enemy to ingratiate -himself with the populace of Oporto, <em>by even feeding them</em> -and granting other indulgences.”—“It is also said that a -Portuguese legion, to consist of <em>six thousand</em> men, has been -instituted.”</p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extract from Soult’s Official Report of the expedition to -Portugal.</em></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p>“Dans, quinze jours. Les villes de <em>Braga</em>, <em>Oporto</em>, <em>Bacellos</em>, -<em>Viana</em>, <em>Villa de Conde</em>, <em>Povoa de Barcim</em>, <em>Feira</em>, et <em>Ovar</em>, -eurent exprimé leurs vœux, des nombreuses deputations se rendirent -à Oporto pour les remettre au marechal Soult et le prier -de le faire parvenir à l’empereur. Des adresses qui renfermaient -l’expression de ce vœu étaient couverts de plus de trente -mille signatures du clergé, de la noblesse, des négocians, et du -peuple.”—“Pendant son séjour à Oporto. Le M. Soult fit des -proclamations et rendit divers arrêtés sur l’administration et la -police de la province <i lang="es" xml:lang="es">Entre Minho e Douro</i>. Il nomma au nom -de l’empereur aux emplois qui étaient vacans et apres avoir reçu -la manifestation politique des habitants il organiza la garde -national ainsi qu’une légion de cinq bataillons.”—“<em>Aucume contribution -ne fût frappé</em> les fonds trouvés dans les caisses royales -suffirent pour fournir aux besoins des troupes, <em>et même pour -donner de secours aux Portugais</em>.”</p> - </div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_518"></a>[518]</span></p> - - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Intercepted letter of the duke of Dalmatia’s to general La -Martiniere, Orense, March 2, 1809.</em></p> - - <div lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"> -<p>“J’ai reçu vôtre lettre du 27 Jan. j’éprouve toutes les dispositions -que vous avez faites je vous ai deja dit que vous pouviez disposer -pour le service des fonds qui sont dans la caisse royale de Tuy. -Faites entrer en ville le plus de subsistance que vous pourriez. Si -de valence on vous tire de coups de canon envoyez leurs des -bombes. Bientôt vous pourrez mettre les chevaux au vert, mais -faites les garder. Dans les equipages qui sont à Tuy. Il y’a douze -cent pair de souliers, de cuir pour un égal nombre et un peu de -drap, vous pouvez en disposer pour vôtre troupe. Ralliez au depôt -général tout ce qui appartient au corps d’armée et qui étoit resté -en arrière, ainsi vous auriez bientôt une petite armée qui se -soutiendra d’elle même et faire la police dans le province dont vous -devez tirer de quoi vivre, soignez bien les hospitaux et n’envoiez -personne sur Ribidavia. J’espère que sous peu je vous aurai ouvert -une autre communication, le province d’Orence est en très grande -partie pacifié, je marche sur les débris du corps de Romana pour -en finir avec eux, ils sont du côté de Monterey. Si apres cet -expédition il y avoit encore en Gallice des troubles, je reviendrai -avec toute mon armée pour les appaiser et alors malheur à ceux -qui les auroient occasionné: <em>je veux la paix et la tranquilité, -que les habitans se livrent aux travaux de la campagne, qu’ils -soient protegés et que la troupe se conduise bien. Les mutins -et les malintentionés François et Espagnols, doivent être sevèrement -punies.</em> Il faut de tems en tems des examples. Je crois -que vous pourriez correspondre avec moi par des gens du pays. -Mais il faut bien leur payer ou leur promettre, qu’en arrivant -pres de moi ils le seront généreusement et prendre de gages -pour repondre de leur fidelité, donnez de vos nouvelles au général -Marchand. Pour le même moyen dite au colonel l’Abbeville de -bien mettre en état son artillerie.</p> - -<p class="smcap right lsp">“Marechal duc de Dalmatie.”</p> - </div> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_519"></a>[519]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_XIV">No. XIV.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">SIR A. WELLESLEY TO SIR J. CRADOCK.</p> - -<p class="right"><em>Lisbon, April 23.</em></p> - -<p>Mr. Villiers will have informed you of my arrival here -yesterday, and of the concurrence of my opinion with that which -you appear to entertain in respect to the further movements to the -northward. I conclude that you will have determined to halt the -army at Leyria. I think that, before any further steps are taken -in respect to Soult, it would be desirable to consider the situation -of Victor; how far he is enabled to make an attack upon Portugal, -and the means of defence of the east of Portugal while -the British will be to the northward, and, eventually, the means -of defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, in case this attack should -be made upon the country.</p> - -<p>All these subjects must have been considered by you; and, I -fear, in no very satisfactory light, as you appear to have moved -to the northward unwillingly: and I should be glad to talk them -over with you.</p> - -<p>In order to consider of some of them, and to make various -arrangements, which can be made only here, I have requested -marshal Beresford to come here, if he should not deem his absence -from the Portuguese troops, in the present state, likely to be -disadvantageous to the public service; and I have directed him -to let you know whether he will come or not.</p> - -<p>It might, probably, also be more agreeable and convenient to -you to see me here than with the army; and if this should be -the case, it would be a most convenient arrangement to me to meet -you here. I beg, however, that you will consider this proposition -only in a view to your own convenience and wishes. If you -should, however, choose to come, I shall be very much obliged -to you if you will bring with you the adjutant-general and -quarter-master-general, the chief engineer and the commanding -officer of the artillery, and the commissary.</p> - -<p class="right"> -<span class="padr4">Ever yours, &c.</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Arthur Wellesley</span>.</p> - -<p>N.B. Some paragraphs of a private nature are omitted.</p> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_520"></a>[520]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_XV">No. XV.</h3> - -<p class="p1 center"><em>Extracts of a Letter from Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord -Castlereagh, Lisbon, April 24, 1809.</em></p> - -<p>“I arrived here on Saturday, and found that sir John Cradock -and general Beresford had moved up the country, to the northward, -with the troops under their command respectively; the -former to Leyria, and the latter to Thomar. Sir John Cradock, -however, does not appear to have entertained any decided intention -of moving forward; on the contrary, indeed, he appears, by -his letters to Mr. Villiers, to have intended to go no further till -he should hear that Victor’s movements were decided, and, therefore, -I consider affairs in this country to be exactly in the state -in which, if I found them, it was the intention of the king’s -minister that I should assume the command; and, accordingly, I -propose to assume it as soon as I shall communicate with sir John -Cradock. I have written to him, and to general Beresford, to -apprize him that I conceive advantage will result from our meeting -here, and I expect them both here as soon as possible. In respect -to the enemy, Soult is still at Oporto, and he has not pushed his -posts to the southward further than the river Vouga. He has -nothing in Tras os Montes since the loss of Chaves, of which -you have been most probably apprized; but he has some posts on -the river Tamega, which divides that province from Minho, and -it is supposed that he wishes to reserve for himself the option of -retreating through Tras os Montes into Spain, if he should find -it necessary. General Sylveira, with a Portuguese corps, is in -Tras os Montes, but I am not acquainted with its strength or -its composition. General Lapisse, who commands the French -corps which, it was supposed, when I left England, was marching -from Salamanca into Portugal, has turned off to his left, and has -marched along the Portuguese frontier to Alcantara, where he -crossed the Tagus, and thence he went to Merida, on the Guadiana, -where he is in communication with, indeed I may say, part -of the army of Victor; he has an advanced post at Montejo, -nearer to the Portuguese frontier than Merida. Victor has continued -at Medellin since the action with Cuesta; he is either fortifying -that post, or making an entrenched camp there. Cuesta<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_521"></a>[521]</span> -is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which, it is said, will soon -be twenty-five thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, a -part of them good troops; I know nothing of the marquis de la -Romana, or of anything to the northward of Portugal. I intend -to move upon Soult, as soon as I can make some arrangements -upon which I can depend for the defence of the Tagus, either to -impede or delay Victor’s progress, in case he should come in while -I am absent. I should prefer an attack upon Victor, in concert -with Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of a fertile province -of this kingdom and of the favourite town of Oporto, of which -it is most desirable to deprive him; and if any operation upon -Victor, connected with Cuesta’s movements, did not require time -to concert it, which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult -from the north of Portugal. If Soult should go, I think it most -advisable, for many reasons, in which I need not enter at present, -to act upon the defensive in the north of Portugal, and to bring -the British army to the eastern frontier. If the light brigade -should not have left England, when you receive this letter, I trust -that you will send them off without loss of time; and I request -you to desire the officer commanding them to endeavour to get -intelligence, as he will go along the coast, particularly at Aveiro -and the mouth of the Mondego; and I wish that he should stop -at the latter place for orders, if he should find that the British -army is engaged in operations to the northward, and if he should -not already have received orders at Aveiro. The twenty-third -dragoons might also receive directions to a similar purport. The -hussars, I conclude, have sailed before this time. We are much -in want of craft here; now that we are going to carry on an -operation to the northward constant convoys will be necessary, -and the admiral does not appear to have the means in his power -of supplying all that is required of him. The twenty-fourth -regiment arrived this day, &c. &c.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signed) <span class="pad2">“<span class="smcap">Arthur Wellesley.</span>”</span></p> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_522"></a>[522]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_XVI">No. XVI.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">LETTER FROM SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO LORD CASTLEREAGH.</p> - -<p class="right"><em>Abrantes, June 22, 1809.</em></p> - -<p class="allsmcap pad2">MY LORD,</p> - -<p>When I wrote to you last I was in hopes that I should have -marched before this time, but the money is not yet arrived. -Things are in their progress as they were when I wrote on the -17th. The French are continuing their retreat. Sebastiani has -also fallen back towards Toledo, and Venegas has advanced, and -Cuesta had his head-quarters at Truxillo, on the 19th. I am -apprehensive that you will think I have delayed my march unnecessarily -since my arrival upon the Tagus. But it was, and is, -quite impossible to move without money. Not only were the -officers and soldiers in the greatest distress, and the want of -money the cause of many of the disorders of which I have had -occasion to complain; but we can no longer obtain the supplies of -the country, or command its resources for the transport of our -own supplies either by land or by water. Besides this, the army -required rest, after their expedition to the frontiers of Gallicia, -and shoes, and to be furbished up in different ways; and I was -well aware that, if necessity had not obliged me to halt at the -present moment, I should have been compelled to make a longer -halt some time hence. To all this add, that, for some time after -I came here, I believed that the French were retiring, (as appears -by my letters to your lordship,) and that I should have no opportunity -of striking a blow against them, even if I could have -marched. I hope that you will attend to my requisitions for -money; not only am I in want, but the Portuguese government, -to whom Mr. Villiers says that we owe £125,000. I repeat, that -we must have £200,000 a month, from England, till I write you -that I can do without it; in which sum I include £40,000 a -month for the Portuguese government, to pay for twenty thousand -men. If the Portuguese government are to receive a larger sum -from Great Britain, the sum to be sent to Portugal must be -proportionably increased. Besides this, money must be sent to -pay the Portuguese debt and our debts in Portugal. There are,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_523"></a>[523]</span> -besides, debts of sir John Moore’s army still due in Spain, which -I am called upon to pay. In short, we must have £125,000, and -£200,000 a month, reckoning from the beginning of May, &c. -&c.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signed) <span class="pad3">“<span class="smcap">Arthur Wellesley.</span>”</span></p> - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_XVII">No. XVII.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">LETTER FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY.</p> - -<p class="right"><em>Badajos, October 30, 1809.</em></p> - -<p class="allsmcap pad2">MY LORD,</p> - -<p>I have had the honour of receiving your excellency’s despatch, -(marked 1.) of the 17th instant, containing a copy of your note -to M. de Garay, of the 8th of September, and a copy of his note, -in answer to your excellency, of the 3d of October.</p> - -<p>I am not surprised that M. de Garay should endeavour to -attribute to the irregularities of the English commissariat the -deficiencies of supplies and means of transport experienced by the -British army in its late service in Spain; I am not disposed to -justify the English commissariat where they deserve blame; but -I must think it but justice to them to declare that the British -army is indebted to their exertions for the scanty supplies it -received.</p> - -<p>From some of the statements contained in M. de Garay’s note -it would appear that the British army had suffered no distress -during the late service; others have a tendency to prove that great -distress was suffered, at a very early period, by both armies; -particularly the quotation of a letter from general Cuesta, of the -1st of August, in answer to a complaint which I am supposed to -have made, that the Spanish troops and <em>their prisoners</em> were -better supplied than the British army. The answer to all these -statements is a reference to the fact that the army suffered great -distress for want of provisions, forage, and means of equipment; -and, although that distress might have been aggravated, it could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_524"></a>[524]</span> -not have been occasioned by the inexperience or irregularity of -the English commissariat.</p> - -<p>I know nothing of the orders which M. de Garay states were -sent by the government to the different provincial juntas, to -provide provisions and means of transport for the British army -on its passage through the different towns in the provinces. If -such orders were sent, it was obvious that the central junta, as a -government, have no power or influence over the provincial juntas -and magistrates, to whom their orders were addressed, as they -produced no effect; and the supplies, such as they were, were -procured only by the requisitions and exertions of the English -commissaries. But it is obvious, from M. de Garay’s account of -these orders, that the central junta had taken a very erroneous -view of the operations to be carried on by the army, and of the -provision to be made for the troops while engaged in those -operations. The government provided, by their orders, for the -troops only while on their passage through the towns; relying -upon their immediate success, and making no provision for the -collection of one body, of not less than fifty thousand men, even -for one day. At the same time that they were guilty of this unpardonable -omission, which paralyzed all our efforts, they rendered -that success doubtful, by countermanding the orders given to -general Venegas by general Cuesta, and thus exposing the combined -armies to a general action with the enemy’s concentrated -force. The effect of their orders will appear more fully in the -following detail:—</p> - -<p>As soon as the line of my operations in Spain was decided, I -sent a commissary to Ciudad Rodrigo, to endeavour to procure -mules to attend the army, in concert with don Lozano des Torres, -that city and its neighbourhood being the places in which the army -commanded by the late sir John Moore had been most largely -supplied. M. de Garay expresses the astonishment of the government -that the British army should have entered Spain unprovided -with the means of transport, notwithstanding that a few paragraphs -preceding this expression of astonishment, he informs your -excellency, in the name of the government, that they had given -orders to the provincial juntas of Badajos and Castile (at Ciudad -Rodrigo) and the magistrates, to provide and supply us with the -means which, of course, they must have been aware that we -should require. No army can carry on its operations if unprovided<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_525"></a>[525]</span> -with means of transport; and the British army was, from circumstances, -particularly in want at that moment.</p> - -<p>The means of transport, commonly used in Portugal, are carts, -drawn by bullocks, which are unable, without great distress, to -move more than twelve miles in a day, a distance much shorter -than that which the state of the country in which the army was -to carry on operations in Spain, and the nature of the country, -would oblige the army to march. The number of carts which we -had been able to bring from Portugal was not sufficient to draw -our ammunition, and there were none to carry provisions.</p> - -<p>Having failed in procuring, at Ciudad Rodrigo and in the -neighbourhood, the means of transport which I required, I wrote -to general O’Donaghue, on the 16th of July, a letter, in which, -after stating our wants and the failure of the country in supplying -them, I gave notice that if they were not supplied I should discontinue -my co-operation with general Cuesta, after I should have -performed my part in the first operation which we had concerted, viz. -the removal of the enemy from the Alberche; and, if not supplied -as I required, I should eventually withdraw from Spain altogether. -From this letter of the 16th July, it will appear that I called for -the supplies, and gave notice that I should withdraw from Spain -if they were not furnished, not only long previous to the retreat -across the Tagus of the 4th of August, but even previous to the -commencement of the operations of the campaign.</p> - -<p>Notwithstanding that this letter of the 16th of July was communicated -to the central junta, both by Mr. Frere and general -Cuesta, the British army has, to this day, received no assistance of -this description from Spain, excepting twenty carts, which joined -at Merida, ten on the 30th of August, and ten on the 2d of -September; and about three hundred mules of about five hundred -which were hired at Bejar, and joined at a subsequent period. -None of the mules stated to have been hired and despatched to -the army from Seville, or by Igea or Cevallos, or the two brigades -of forty each, or the horses, have ever joined the British army; -and I conclude that they are with the Spanish army of Estremadura, -as are the remainder of the (one hundred) ten brigades -of carts which were intended and are marked for the British -army. But none of these mules or carts, supposing them to have -been sent from Seville for our use, reached Estremadura till after -the 21st of August, the day on which, after five weeks’ notice, I -was obliged to separate from the Spanish army.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_526"></a>[526]</span></p> - -<p>It is not true, therefore, that my resolution to withdraw from -Spain, as then carried into execution, was “sudden,” or ought -to have surprised the government: nor does it appear to have been -perilous from what has since appeared in this part of Spain.</p> - -<p>I ought, probably, on the 16th of July, to have determined to -suspend all operations till the army should be supplied with the -means required; but having, on the 11th of July, settled with -general Cuesta a plan of operations to be carried into execution by -the armies under the command of general Venegas, general Cuesta, -and myself, respectively, I did not think it proper to disappoint -general Cuesta. I believed that general Venegas would have carried -into execution that part of the plan of operations allotted to his -army, although I was afterwards disappointed in that expectation; -and I preferred that the British army should suffer inconvenience -than that general Venegas’s corps should be exposed alone to -the attack of the enemy; and, above all, I was induced to hope -that I should be supplied.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, I marched, on the 18th of July, from Plasencia, -the soldiers carrying on their backs their provisions to the 21st, -on which day a junction was formed with general Cuesta’s army; -and, from that day to the 24th of August, the troops or their -horses did not receive one regular ration. The irregularity and -deficiency, both in quality and quantity, were so great that I considered -it a matter of justice to the troops to remit to them, during -that period, half of the sum usually stopped from their pay for -rations.</p> - -<p>The forage for the horses was picked up for them by their riders -wherever they could find it, and was generally wheat or rye, -which are considered unwholesome food; and the consequence was -that, exclusive of the loss by engaging with the enemy, the army -lost, in the short period of five weeks, not less than one thousand -five hundred horses.</p> - -<p>I have no knowledge of what passed between general Cuesta -and don Lozano des Torres and the intendant of provisions of the -Spanish army. I never saw the latter gentleman excepting twice; -the first time on the 22d of July, when he waited upon me to claim, -for the Spanish army, sixteen thousand rations of bread which -had been brought into Talavera, and had been sent to my quarters, -and which were delivered over to him, notwithstanding that -the British troops were in want; and the second time, on the 25th -of July, when he waited upon me, also at Talavera, to desire that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_527"></a>[527]</span> -the ovens of that town might be delivered over for the use of the -Spanish army, they having moved to St. Ollalla, and the British -army being still at Talavera. This request, which was not complied -with, is an example of the preference which was given to -the British troops while they were in Spain.</p> - -<p>The orders stated to have been given by the central to the -provincial juntas and magistrates, were not more effectual in -procuring provisions than in procuring means of transport. In -the interval between the 15th and 21st of July, the British commissaries -had made contracts with the magistrates in the different -villages of the Vera de Plasencia, a country abounding in resources -of every description, for the delivery at Talavera, on different -days before the 24th of July, of two hundred and fifty thousand -rations of provisions. These contracts were not performed; the -British army was consequently unable to move in pursuit of the -enemy when he retired on that day; and, I conclude, that the -French army have since subsisted on these resources.</p> - -<p>The British army never received any salt meat, nor any of the -rice or other articles stated to have been sent from Seville for -their use, excepting to make up the miserable ration by which -the men were only prevented from starving during the period to -which I have adverted; nor was it attended by the troop of biscuit -bakers, nor did it enjoy any of the advantages of their labours, -nor was the supposed magazine of four hundred thousand -<ins class="corr" id="tn-527" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'pounds of buiscuit'"> -pounds of biscuit</ins> ever performed. These are notorious facts, which -cannot be disputed, of the truth of which <ins class="corr" id="tn-527a" title="Transcriber’s Note—Original text: 'ever officer'"> -every officer</ins> and soldier in the army can bear testimony. I assure your excellency, that -not only have the supplies furnished to the army under my command -been paid for whenever the bills for them could be got in, -but the old debts due to the inhabitants for supplies furnished to -the army, under the command of the late sir John Moore, have -been discharged; and I have repeatedly desired the Spanish -agents, and others acting with the army, and the different juntas -with which I have communicated, to let the people know that all -demands upon the British government, which could be substantiated, -would be discharged.</p> - -<p>I beg to refer your excellency to my despatches of the 21st of -August, No. 12, for an account of the state of the magazine at -Truxillo, on the 20th of August. Of the state of supplies and -provisions at that period, lieutenant-colonel Walters had, by my -desire, made an arrangement with the Spanish commissariat for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_528"></a>[528]</span> -the division of the magazine at Truxillo between the two armies; -and he as well as I was satisfied with the principle and detail of -that arrangement. But if the British army received only one-third -of a ration on the 18th of August, and only one-half of a -ration on the 19th, not of bread, but of flour; if the horses of the -army received nothing; and if the state of the magazine at -Truxillo was such, at that time, as to hold out no hope, not of -improvement, (for it was too late to wait for improvement,) but -of a full and regular supply of provisions and forage of all descriptions, -I was justified in withdrawing from Spain. In point of -fact, the magazine at Truxillo, which, under the arrangement -made by lieutenant-colonel Waters was to be the sole source of -the supply to both armies, did not contain, on the 20th of August, -a sufficiency to supply one day’s demand upon it.</p> - -<p>But it is said that M. de Calvo promised and engaged to supply -the British army; upon which I have only to observe that I had -trusted too long to the promises of the Spanish agents, and that -I had particular reason for want of confidence in M. de Calvo; -as, at the moment he was assuring me that the British army -should have all the provisions the country could afford, in preference -to, and to the exclusion of the Spanish army, I had in -my possession an order from him, (of which your excellency has -a copy,) addressed to the magistrates of Guadalupe, directing -him to send to the head-quarters of the Spanish army provisions -which a British commissary had ordered to be prepared and sent -to the magazines at Truxillo, to be divided between both armies, -in conformity to the agreement entered into with the Spanish -commissaries by lieutenant-colonel Waters.</p> - -<p>As the state of the magazine at Truxillo was the immediate -cause (as far as the want of provisions went) of my withdrawing -from Spain, I beg to observe to your excellency that I was not -mistaken in my opinion of its insufficiency; as, if I am not -misinformed, general Equia’s army suffered the greatest distress -in the neighbourhood of Truxillo, even after that part of the -country and the magazines had been relieved from the burthen of -supporting the British army.</p> - -<p>In respect to the conduct of the operations in Spain by the -Spanish general officers, many things were done of which I did -not approve; some contrary to my expectations, and some contrary -to positive agreements.</p> - -<p>M. de Garay has stated that the orders of the marquis de<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_529"></a>[529]</span> -Romana were framed in conformity with suggestions from marshal -Beresford; and thence he infers that the operations of that corps -were approved of by me.</p> - -<p>The marquis de Romana was still at Coruña on the 5th, and I -believe as late as the 9th of August; and the armies of Estramadura -retired across the Tagus on the 4th of August. This -reference to dates shews that there was, and could have been no -connexion in the operations of those different armies. In fact, I -knew nothing of the marquis of Romana’s operations; and till -I heard, on the 3d of August, that marshal Ney’s corps had -passed through the mountains of Estramadura at Baños, and was -at Naval Moral, I did not believe that that part of the enemy’s -army had quitted Astorga, or that the marquis was at liberty, or -had it in his power to quit Gallicia.</p> - -<p>Marshal Beresford’s corps was collected upon the frontiers of -Portugal in the end of July, principally for the purpose of forming -the troops; and it was hoped he would keep in check the enemy’s -corps under Soult, which was at Zamora, and threatened -Portugal; that he would act as a corps of observation in that -quarter, and on the left of the British army; and I particularly -requested marshal Beresford to attend to the Puerto de Perales. -But I never intended, and never held out any hope to the Spanish -officers that the corps under marshal Beresford could effect any -operation at that period of the campaign, and never was a party -to any arrangement of an operation in which that corps was to be -concerned.</p> - -<p>In the cases in which measures were carried on in a manner of -which I did not approve, or which I did not expect, or contrary -to the positive agreement, those who acted contrary to my opinion -may have been right; but still they acted in a manner of which -they were aware I did not approve: and the assertion in the note, -that the operations were carried on with my concurrence, is -unfounded.</p> - -<p>I expected, from the communications I had with general -Cuesta, through sir Robert Wilson and colonel Roche, that the -Puerto de Baños would have been effectually occupied and secured; -and, at all events, that the troops appointed to guard that point, -upon which I was aware that all the operations, nay, the security, -of the army depended, would not have retired without firing -a shot.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_530"></a>[530]</span></p> - -<p>It was agreed, between general Cuesta and me, on the 11th of -July, that general Venegas, who was under his command, should -march by Trembleque, Ocaña, Puerte Dueños, to Arganda, near -Madrid; where he was to be on the 22d and 23d of July, when -the combined armies should be at Talavera and Escola. This -agreement was not performed, and the consequence of its non-performance -(which had been foreseen) occurred; viz. that the -combined armies were engaged with the enemy’s concentrated -force. I have heard that the cause of the non-performance of -this agreement was that the central junta had countermanded the -orders which general Venegas had received from general Cuesta; -of which countermand they gave us no notice. I shall make no -observation upon this proceeding, excepting that the plan of -operations, as agreed upon with me, was not carried into execution, -by general Venegas, in this instance.</p> - -<p>It was agreed, by general Cuesta, on the 2d of August, that -when I marched against Soult on the 3d, he would remain at -Talavera. That agreement was broken when he withdrew from -Talavera, in my opinion, without sufficient cause. And it is also -my opinion that he ought not to have withdrawn, particularly -considering that he had the charge of my hospital, without my -consent. I do not conceive that if general Cuesta had remained -at Talavera, it would have made any difference in the result of -the campaign. When Soult added thirty-four thousand to the -numbers already opposed to the combined armies in Estremadura, -the enemy was too strong for us; and it was necessary that we -should retire across the Tagus. But if general Cuesta had held -the post of Talavera, according to agreement, I should have been -able to remove my hospital, or, at least, to know the exact -situation of every individual left there; and I think that other -disadvantages might have been avoided in the retreat.</p> - -<p>When adverting to this part of the subject, I cannot avoid to -observe upon the ambiguity of language used in the note respecting -the assistance afforded by general Cuesta to remove the -hospital from Talavera. That assistance amounted to four carts -on the 4th of August, at Oropesa. In the subsequent removal -of the wounded, and of the men subsequently taken sick, we -had absolutely no assistance from the Spanish army or the -country. We were obliged to lay down our ammunition, which -was delivered over to the Spanish army, and to unload the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_531"></a>[531]</span> -treasure, and employ the carts in the removal of the wounded -and sick. At Truxillo, in particular, assistance which could have -been afforded was withheld, on the 22d and 23d of August, -M. de Calvo and don Lozano des Torres being in the town.</p> - -<p>In respect to the refusal to make movements recommended by -me, I am of opinion that if general Bassecourt had been detached -towards Plasencia on the 30th of July, when I recommended -that movement, and if the troops had done their duty, Soult -would have been stopped at the Tietar, at least for a sufficient -length of time to enable me to secure the passage of the Tagus -at Almaraz; and here again the hospital would have been saved.</p> - -<p>He was not detached, however, till the 2d; and then I understood, -from M. de Garay’s note, that it was general Cuesta’s -opinion that the movement was useless.</p> - -<p>It could not have been considered as useless by general Cuesta -on the 30th, because the proposition for making a detachment -from the combined armies originated with himself on that day; -and it could not have been considered as useless even on the -morning of the 2d, as, till the evening of that day, we did not -receive intelligence of the arrival of Soult at Plasencia. A -reference to the date of the period at which the general considered -this detachment as useless would have been desirable.</p> - -<p>I cannot account for the surprise stated to have been felt by -general Cuesta upon finding the British army at Oropesa on the -morning of the 4th of August. The army had left Talavera on -the morning of the 3d, and had marched to Oropesa, six leagues, -or twenty-four miles, on that day; which I conceive a sufficient -distance for a body of men which had been starving for many -days before. The accounts received, on the evening of the 3d, -of the enemy’s position at Naval Moral, and of his strength, and -of general Cuesta’s intended march on that evening, leaving my -hospital to its fate, were sufficient to induce me to pause and -consider our situation, and, at least, not to move before daylight -on the 4th; shortly after which time, general Cuesta arrived at -Oropesa.</p> - -<p>Upon considering our situation at that time, it was evident to -me that the combined armies must retire across the Tagus, and -that every moment’s delay must expose them to the risk of being -cut off from their only remaining point of retreat. A battle, even -if it had been successful, could not have improved our situation; -two battles, or probably three, must have been fought and gained<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_532"></a>[532]</span> -before our difficulties, resulting from the increased strength of the -enemy in Estremadura, could be removed. I did not consider -the British army, at least, equal to such an exertion at that -moment. It is unnecessary to make any observation upon the -Spanish army; but the occurrences at Arzobispo, a few days -afterwards, shewed that they were not equal to any great contest.</p> - -<p>M. de Garay complains of the alteration in the line of our -operations, and of the sudden changes in the direction of our -marches, to which he attributes the deficiency of our supplies, -which, in this part of the note, he is disposed to admit that the -British army experienced. I know of but one alteration in the -plan of operations and in the direction of the march, which was -occasioned by the circumstances to which I have just referred.</p> - -<p>When intelligence was first received of the arrival of the enemy -at Plasencia, and of the retreat, without resistance, of the corps -appointed to guard the Puerto de Baños, my intention was to -move towards Plasencia, to attack the enemy’s corps which had -passed through the Puerto. That intention was altered, only -when I heard of the numbers of which that corps consisted; and -when I found that, by general Cuesta’s movement from Talavera, -the rear of the army was not secure, that the only retreat was -liable to be cut off, and that the enemy had it in their power, and -at their option, to join or to attack us in separate bodies.</p> - -<p>It could not be attributed to me, that this large reinforcement -was allowed to enter Estremadura, or that we had not earlier -intelligence of their approach.</p> - -<p>The Puerto de Baños was abandoned, without firing a shot, by -the Spanish troops sent there to guard it; and the junta of Castile, -if they knew of the collection of the enemy’s troops at Salamanca, -sent no notice of it; and no notice was in fact received, till the -accounts arrived that the enemy had ordered rations at Fuente -Noble and Los Santos; and they arrived on the following day. -But when the enemy arrived at Naval Moral, in Estremadura, in -such strength, and the post of Talavera was abandoned, the central -junta will find it difficult to convince this country and the -world that it was not expedient to alter the plan of our operations -and the direction of our march.</p> - -<p>But this alteration, instead of aggravating the deficiency of our -supplies, ought to have alleviated our distresses, if any measures -had been adopted at Seville to supply the British army, in consequence -of my letter of the 16th July. The alteration was from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_533"></a>[533]</span> -the offensive to the defensive; the march was retrograde; and if -any supplies had been prepared and sent, the army must have -met them on the road, and must have received them sooner. -Accordingly, we did meet supplies on the road, but they were for -the Spanish army; and although our troops were starving at the -time, they were forwarded, untouched, to their destination.</p> - -<p>I have sent to marshal Beresford a copy of that part of M. de -Garay’s note which refers to the supplies for the Portuguese army -under his command, upon which he will make his observations, -which I propose to forward to your excellency. I shall here, -therefore, only repeat that the want of magazines, and the apathy -and disinclination of the magistrates and people in Spain to furnish -supplies for the armies, even for payment, were the causes that -the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, suffered great -distress from want, while within the Spanish frontier.</p> - -<p>Till the evils, of which I think I have reason to complain, are -remedied, till I shall see magazines established for the supply of -the armies, and a regular system adopted for keeping them filled, -and an army, upon whose exertions I can depend, commanded by -officers capable and willing to carry into execution the operations -which may have been planned by mutual agreement, I cannot -enter upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish armies. -I do not think it necessary now to enter into any calculations to -shew the fallacy of M. de Garay’s calculations of the relative numerical -strength of the allies, and of the enemy, in the Peninsula; -if the fallacy was not so great, as I am certain it is, I should be -of the same opinion, respecting the expediency of co-operating -with the Spanish troops. But if the British and the Portuguese -armies should not actively co-operate with them, they will at least -do them no injury; and if M. de Garay is not mistaken, as I -believe he is, in his calculations of numbers; and if the Spanish -armies are in the state of efficiency in which they are represented -to be, and which they ought to be, to invite our co-operation, the -deficiency of thirty-six thousand men, which the British and Portuguese -armies might add to their numbers, can be no objection to -their undertaking, immediately, the operations which M. de Garay -is of opinion would give to his countrymen the early possession of -those blessings for which they are contending.</p> - -<p>I have the honour to be, &c.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signed) <span class="smcap pad4">Wellington.</span></p> - - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> -<div class="chapter"></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_534"></a>[534]</span><br /></p> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="No_XVIII">No. XVIII.</h3> - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">COPY OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL HILL TO SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.</p> - -<p class="right"><em>Camp, August 17, 1809.</em></p> - -<p class="allsmcap pad2">SIR,</p> - -<p>I beg leave to report to you that the parties sent out by the officers -of my division, yesterday, to procure forage, were, in more instances -than one, opposed by the Spaniards. The following circumstances -have been made known to me, and I take the liberty -of repeating them for your excellency’s information.</p> - -<p>My servants were sent about three leagues on the Truxillo road, -in order to get forage for me; and after gathering three mule -loads, a party of Spanish soldiers, consisting of five or six, came -up to them with their swords drawn, and obliged them to leave -the corn they had collected. My servants told me, that the same -party fired two shots towards other British men employed in getting -forage. The assistant-commissary of my division, likewise, states -to me, that the men he sent out for forage were fired at by the -Spaniards.</p> - -<p>I have the honour to be, &c.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signed) <span class="smcap pad3">R. Hill</span>, major-general.</p> - - -<p class="p2 pfs70 lht lsp">COPY OF A LETTER FROM COLONEL STOPFORD TO -LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SHERBROOKE.</p> - -<p class="right"><em>Jaraceijo, August 16, 1809.</em></p> - -<p class="allsmcap pad2">SIR,</p> - -<p>I beg leave to inform you that I have just received intimations -of some Spaniards having fired at some of the guards, for taking -some forage. As there is no forage given us by the commissary, -I wish to know what I am to do, in order to get some for the -horses.</p> - -<p class="right"> -(Signed) <span class="smcap pad2">E. Stopford</span>, second brigade of guards.</p> - -<p class="p2 pfs70">END OF VOL. II.</p> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<div class="footnotes"><h2 class="nobreak">FOOTNOTES:</h2> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> Now lord Stuart de Rothesay.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[2]</a> Now lord Howden.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">[3]</a> An appellation given among soldiers to men who, under pretence of sickness, -shrink from the performance of their duties in the field.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">[4]</a> It is necessary again to remark that I possess only an unauthenticated copy -of general Semelé’s Journal.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">[5]</a> Soult distinguished himself in that battle.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">[6]</a> In the British army, when speaking of the number present under arms, the -corporals and privates only are understood. In the French army, the present -under arms includes every military person, whether officers, non-commissioned -officers, or soldiers; a distinction which should be borne in mind.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">[7]</a></p> - -<p> -Viz. 1800 left in Viana and Braga.<br /> -<span class="pad2h">500 including the wounded taken in Oporto.</span><br /> -<span class="pad2">1300 taken at Chaves, by Sylveira.</span><br /> -</p> - - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">[8]</a> The bands formed of smugglers were called Quadrillas.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">[9]</a> Note by sir J. Cradock. This is not a correct statement, but quite the contrary; -it must have been the bishop.</p> - -</div> -</div> - - -<div class="chapter"></div> -<hr class="fulla" /> -<p class="pfs70"><em>Published and sold by</em> T. & W. BOONE, 480, <em>Strand, near Charing-Cross.</em></p> -<hr class="full" /> - - <div class="fs60"> - -<p><span class="smcap">TRACTS on VAULTS and BRIDGES</span>; containing Observations on the various Forms -of Vaults; on the Taking Down and Rebuilding <span class="smcap">London Bridge</span>; and on the <span class="smcap">Principles -of Arches</span>: illustrated by extensive Tables of Bridges. Also, containing the Principles of -<span class="smcap">Pendant Bridges</span>, with reference to the Properties of the Catenary, applied to the Menai -Bridge. And a Theoretical Investigation of the Catenary. By SAMUEL WARE. With -20 copper-plates and 10 wood-cuts, royal 8vo. price 20<em>s.</em> boards.</p> - -<p>This Book will be found of the highest importance to Military as well as Civil Engineers, -being the only practical work on the subject of Suspension Bridges.</p> - - -<p class="center">BY THE SAME AUTHOR.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">A DESIGN for a TUNNEL under the THAMES</span>, from Horselydown to St. -Katharine’s, with Letter-press Description. Price 3<em>s.</em></p> - -<p class="center">ALSO, BY THE SAME AUTHOR.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">REMARKS on THEATRES</span>; and on the Propriety of <em>Vaulting them with Brick and -Stone</em>: with Observations on the <span class="smcap">Construction of Domes</span>; and the Vaults of the Free and -Accepted Masons. 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I have limited my endeavours to the most necessary -instructions, classing them as much as the subject enabled me, under separate heads, to -facilitate their being rightly comprehended and easily remembered. For the greater encouragement -of the learner, I have studied brevity; but not in a degree to have prevented -my endeavouring more to make the principles of the game, and the rationality of them, intelligible, -than to furnish a young player with a set of rules to get by rote, that he might go -blindly right.”</p> - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p><span class="smcap">TRANSACTIONS of the MEDICO-BOTANICAL SOCIETY OF LONDON</span>; containing, -with other Papers, an Account of the <span class="smcap">Angustura Bark Tree</span>. Vol. I. Part I. -8vo. plates, price 6<em>s.</em></p> - -<hr class="r20a" /> - -<p>Part I. and II. 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Should the final purpose be accomplished, -which the present Volume contributes but partially to establish, and the plan of the -Author receive a perfect developement, he is sanguine enough to hope that his Work will not -be found undeserving of the title under which he purposes the detached parts of it should be -combined:—“<span class="smcap">The Divine Vocation of Abraham</span> <em>demonstrated, from the Expectation, -formed by all Nations, that a</em> <span class="smcap">Great Deliverer</span> <em>would appear about the time of</em> <span class="smcap">our Lord’s</span> -<em>Advent</em>.”</p> - -<p>As an explanation of the views and objects of the Author, the sources of his information, -and the modes of his investigation, cannot be effected without entering fully into details, he -is obliged to defer the undertaking to the appearance of a Preliminary Dissertation, by which -he purposes his Work shall be preceded. Of the feasibility of his plan, a perfect estimate -may be formed from the experiment which is made in the Volume now submitted to the -Public; the remote antiquity of the period to which his researches were confined, and the -paucity of the materials which are supplied by history or tradition, having thrown obstacles -in the way of inquiry which must proportionably disappear as the subject is deduced from -times more recent and more perfectly known.</p> - -<p>It is necessary to add, that the subject of <span class="smcap">the Divine Vocation of Abraham</span> has been -treated, in a general and succinct form, in the Course of <span class="smcap">Lectures</span>, delivered by the Author, -on the foundation of the Hon. Robert Boyle. In one of those discourses, the argument, -deduced from prophecy, in the Volume now submitted to the Public, was originally -produced. Since that time, the Author having noted down, in the course of his reading, -which has been various and extensive, whatever appeared to bear upon his subject; the -leisure and retirement which he has long enjoyed have enabled him to work it up in its -present form, in which the formality of the discourse is abandoned for a more free mode of -discussion.</p> - -<p class="center">WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR.</p> - -<p>An <span class="smcap">INQUIRY into the INTEGRITY of the GREEK VULGATE</span>, or Received -Text of the New Testament; in which the Greek Manuscripts are newly classed, the Integrity -of the Received Text vindicated, and the Various Readings traced to their Origin. 8vo. -price 16<em>s.</em></p> - -<p>The <span class="smcap">OPERATIONS of the HOLY GHOST</span> illustrated and confirmed by Scriptural -Authorities; in a Series of Sermons evincing the Wisdom and Consistency of the Economy -of Grace: with Notes and Illustrations, exhibiting the Evidences of the Truth and Authority -of the Doctrine, from the Primitive Church and the Church of England. 8vo. price 12<em>s.</em></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">VINDICATION of a REVIEW</span> of the Bampton Lectures for 1815, inserted in the -British Critic, in a Letter addressed to the Rev. Reginald Heber, A.M. &c.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">OBJECTIONS of a CHURCHMAN to uniting with the BIBLE SOCIETY</span>, including -a Reply to the Arguments in favour of that Association.</p> - -<p>A KEY to M. Volney’s Ruins, or the Revolutions of Empires; by a Reformer. -Price 3<em>s.</em></p> - -<p>REMARKS on a passage in Eusebius’s History, communicated by M. Calbo to the Rev. -F. Nolan, with a POSTSCRIPT in Reply to the Rev. T. Falconer’s Case of Eusebius -examined.</p> - -<p>REMARKS on a LETTER of Constantine the Great, to Eusebius of Cæsarea, on the -Instauration of the Scriptures; and on the First IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION, in favour -of Christianity, issued from Milan; with—</p> - -<p>A PENNY POSTSCRIPT, exhibiting the competence and honesty displayed by Dr. -Falconer in a recent Tract, entitled “The Absurd Hypothesis,” that Eusebius of Cæsarea, -Bishop and Historian, was an Editor or Corrupter of the Holy Scripture exposed.</p> - -<p>A HARMONICAL GRAMMAR of the Latin Language. 8vo. price 4<em>s.</em></p> - -<p class="noindent pad2"> -Ditto of the French. 8vo. price 4<em>s.</em><br /> -Ditto of the Italian. 8vo. price 4<em>s.</em><br /> -Ditto of the Spanish. 8vo. price 4<em>s.</em></p> - - -<p class="center"><em>In the Press.</em>—ALSO BY THE SAME AUTHOR.</p> - -<p>HARMONICAL GRAMMARS of the Principal Ancient and Modern Languages, viz. the -Greek, Hebrew, Chaldee, Syriac, and Samaritan, Portuguese, German, and Modern Greek. 8vo.</p> - -<p>OCCASIONAL TRACTS, in Vindication of the Truth, Integrity, and Higher Doctrines -of the Sacred Writings; in Refutation of the Cavils of Infidels and Objectors. 3 vols. 8vo.</p> - -<p>The EXPECTATIONS formed by the PERSIANS, that a GREAT DELIVERER -would appear about the time of our Lord’s Advent, demonstrated.</p> - -<p>The EXPECTATIONS formed by the ROMANS, on the same subject, will follow in -continuation; and it is the Author’s intention to extend his inquiry to the GREEKS, -EGYPTIANS, and other great Nations.</p> - -<p>The Author is engaged in printing a uniform edition of his works, in ten volumes; the -several parts of which will appear <i lang="la" xml:lang="la">seriatim</i>. Separate titles will be, however, furnished to -the different volumes, for the convenience of those readers who may feel disposed to purchase -only a part of the collection.</p> - - </div> - -<hr class="fulla" /> - -<div class="chapter"></div> - -<div class="p4 transnote"> -<a name="TN" id="TN"></a> -<p><strong>TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE</strong></p> - -<p>Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been -corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within -the text and consultation of external sources.</p> - -<p>Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added, -when a predominant preference was found in the original book.</p> - -<p>Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, -and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.</p> - -<p> -Table of Contents:<br /> -<a href="#tn-v">Pg v</a>: ‘Recals Mortier’ replaced by ‘Recalls Mortier’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-ix">Pg ix</a>: ‘Berresford reaches’ replaced by ‘Beresford reaches’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-ixa">Pg ix</a>: ‘Ney abandous Gallicia’ replaced by ‘Ney abandons Gallicia’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-xi">Pg xi</a>: ‘7. Battle of Talavera ... 406’ replaced by ‘7. Operations of the British, French & Spanish armies ... 409’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-xia">Pg xi</a>: ‘8. Operations in the valley of the Tagus ... 416’ replaced by ‘8. Battle of Talavera ... 416’.<br /> -<br /> -Main text:<br /> -<a href="#tn-22">Pg 22</a>: ‘eighteen hunded yards’ replaced by ‘eighteen hundred yards’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-28">Pg 28</a>: ‘aid-de-camp to the’ replaced by ‘aide-de-camp to the’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-45">Pg 45</a>: ‘An aid-de-camp of’ replaced by ‘An aide-de-camp of’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-60">Pg 60</a>: ‘not be be provisioned’ replaced by ‘not be provisioned’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-63">Pg 63</a>: ‘on the the 9th’ replaced by ‘on the 9th’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-83">Pg 83</a>: ‘their cummunications’ replaced by ‘their communications’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-144">Pg 144</a>: ‘literal interpetation’ replaced by ‘literal interpretation’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-146">Pg 146</a>: ‘unsuccessful auxilliaries’ replaced by ‘unsuccessful auxiliaries’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-152">Pg 152</a>: ‘Silviera’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-153">Pg 153</a>: ‘develope his plans’ replaced by ‘develop his plans’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-154">Pg 154</a>: ‘Silveira’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-159">Pg 159</a>: ‘recal of general’ replaced by ‘recall of general’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-167">Pg 167</a>: ‘Silveira’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-170">Pg 170</a>: ‘river to Ribadavia’ replaced by ‘river to Ribidavia’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-179">Pg 179</a>: ‘the inflame the’ replaced by ‘to inflame the’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-189">Pg 189</a>: ‘the Cabado river’ replaced by ‘the Cavado river’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-200">Pg 200</a>: ‘at the Ponte Ave’ replaced by ‘at the Ponte d’Ave’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-211">Pg 211</a>: ‘and the Guadaramo’ replaced by ‘and the Guadarama’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-211a">Pg 211</a>: ‘second the Guardiana’ replaced by ‘second the Guadiana’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-218">Pg 218</a>: ‘the river Garganza’ replaced by ‘the river Guadiana’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-226">Pg 226</a>: (in caption) ‘AGAINST GUESTA’ replaced by ‘AGAINST CUESTA’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-229">Pg 229</a>: ‘were thus paralized’ replaced by ‘were thus paralyzed’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-235">Pg 235</a>: ‘charge not be sustained’ replaced by ‘charge not sustained’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-240">Pg 240</a>: ‘The garison of the’ replaced by ‘The garrison of the’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-244">Pg 244</a>: ‘and run back’ replaced by ‘and ran back’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-248">Pg 248</a>: ‘paralized a large’ replaced by ‘paralyzed a large’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-250">Pg 250</a>: ‘marched by Guarda’ replaced by ‘marched by Guardia’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-263">Pg 263</a>: (in Sidenote) ‘Lord LonLondonderry’ replaced by ‘Lord Londonderry’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-266">Pg 266</a>: ‘The Portugese troops’ replaced by ‘The Portuguese troops’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-282">Pg 282</a>: ‘Olivera de Azemiz’ replaced by ‘Oliveira de Azemis’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-308">Pg 308</a>: ‘CHAP. III’ replaced by ‘CHAPTER III’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-309">Pg 309</a>: ‘every other other part’ replaced by ‘every other part’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-369">Pg 369</a>: ‘Porguese and Spanish’ replaced by ‘Portuguese and Spanish’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-408">Pg 408</a>: ‘develope its attack’ replaced by ‘develop its attack’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-409">Pg 409</a>: (in caption) ‘Plate 7. to face Pa.’ replaced by ‘Plate 7. to face Pa. 409’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-416">Pg 416</a>: ‘unite under three’ replaced by ‘unite in under three’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-427">Pg 427</a>: ‘and strenghened by’ replaced by ‘and strengthened by’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-427a">Pg 427</a>: ‘Spanish auxilliaries’ replaced by ‘Spanish auxiliaries’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-453">Pg 453</a>: ‘Crauford’s brigade’ replaced by ‘Craufurd’s brigade’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-456">Pg 456</a>: ‘by quarelling with’ replaced by ‘by quarrelling with’.<br /> -<br /> -Appendix:<br /> -<a href="#tn-471">Pg 471</a>: some numbers in these tables are clearly incorrect (eg 3,339 and -24,082) but none have been changed.<br /> -<a href="#tn-482">Pg 482</a>: ‘bâtir les chateux’ replaced by ‘bâtir les châteaux’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-486">Pg 486</a>: ‘I always nrged’ replaced by ‘I always urged’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-486a">Pg 486</a>: ‘of effervenscence of’ replaced by ‘of effervescence of’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-491">Pg 491</a>: ‘The taking Portuguese’ replaced by ‘The taking of Portuguese’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-492">Pg 492</a>: ‘proper movoment of’ replaced by ‘proper movement of’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-495">Pg 495</a>: ‘to Mr. Rawlins’ replaced by ‘to Mr. Rawlings’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-527">Pg 527</a>: ‘pounds of buiscuit’ replaced by ‘pounds of biscuit’.<br /> -<a href="#tn-527a">Pg 527</a>: ‘ever officer’ replaced by ‘every officer’.<br /> -</p> -</div> - - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814, VOL. 2 OF 6 ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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