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diff --git a/old/67554-0.txt b/old/67554-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index ffd9bce..0000000 --- a/old/67554-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18462 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of the War in the Peninsula -and in the South of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, Vol. 2 -of 6, by William Patrick Francis Napier - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France - from the year 1807 to the year 1814, Vol. 2 of 6 - -Author: William Patrick Francis Napier - -Release Date: March 3, 2022 [eBook #67554] - -Language: English - -Produced by: Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 2 OF 6 *** - - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. - - A superscript is denoted by ^x or ^{xx}, for example com^d or 12^{th}. - - Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been - placed at the end of the book. - - With a few exceptions noted at the end of the book, variant spellings - of names have not been changed. - - The tables in this book are best viewed using a monospace font. - - Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book. - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - WAR IN THE PENINSULA - - AND IN THE - - SOUTH OF FRANCE, - - FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814. - - BY - - W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B. - - LT.-COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT. - - VOL. II. - - LONDON: - THOMAS AND WILLIAM BOONE, STRAND. - - MDCCCXXIX. - - - - -TABLE OF CONTENTS. - - - BOOK V. - - - CHAPTER I. - - Slight effect produced in England by the result of the - campaign--Debates in parliament--Treaty with Spain--Napoleon - receives addresses at Valladolid--Joseph enters Madrid--Appointed - the emperor’s lieutenant--Distribution of the French army--The - duke of Dantzig forces the bridge of Almaraz--Toledo entered - by the first corps--Infantado and Palacios ordered to advance - upon Madrid--Cuesta appointed to the command of Galluzzo’s - troops--Florida Blanca dies at Seville--Succeeded in the - presidency by the marquis of Astorga--Money arrives at Cadiz from - Mexico--Bad conduct of the central junta--State of the Spanish - army--Constancy of the soldiers--Infantado moves on Tarancon--His - advanced guard defeated there--French retire towards - Toledo--Disputes in the Spanish army--Battle of Ucles--Retreat - of Infantado--Cartoajal supersedes him, and advances to Ciudad - Real--Cuesta takes post on the Tagus, and breaks down the bridge - of Almaraz _Page_ 1 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Operations in Aragon--Confusion in Zaragoza--The third and fifth - corps invest that city--Fortification described--Monte Torrero - taken--Attack on the suburb repulsed--Mortier takes post at - Calatayud--The convent of San Joseph taken--The bridge-head - carried--Huerba passed--Device of the Spanish leaders to - encourage the besieged--Marquis of Lazan takes post on the - Sierra de Alcubierre--Lasnes arrives in the French camp--Recalls - Mortier--Lazan defeated--Gallant exploit of Mariano Galindo--The - walls of the town taken by assault--General Lacoste and colonel - San Genis slain 18 - - - CHAPTER III. - - System of terror--The convent of St. Monica taken--Spaniards - attempt to retake it, but fail--St. Augustin taken--French - change their mode of attack--Spaniards change their mode of - defence--Terrible nature of the contest--Convent of Jesus taken - on the side of the suburb--Attack on the suburb repulsed--Convent - of Francisco taken--Mine exploded under the university fails, - and the besieged are repulsed--The Cosso passed--Fresh mines - worked under the university, and in six other places--French - soldiers dispirited--Lasnes encourages them--The houses - leading down to the quay carried by storm--An enormous mine - under the university being sprung, that building is carried - by assault--The suburb is taken--Baron Versage killed, and - two thousand Spaniards surrender--Successful attack on the - right bank of the Ebro--Palafox demands terms, which are - refused--Fire resumed--Miserable condition of the city--Terrible - pestilence, and horrible sufferings of the besieged--Zaragoza - surrenders--Observations 38 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - Operations in Catalonia--St. Cyr commands the seventh - corps--Passes the frontier--State of Catalonia--Palacios fixes - his head-quarters at Villa Franca--Duhesme forces the line of - the Llobregat--Returns to Barcelona--English army from Sicily - designed to act in Catalonia--Prevented by Murat--Duhesme forages - El Vallés--Action of San Culgat--General Vives supersedes - Palacios--Spanish army augments--Blockade of Barcelona--Siege - of Rosas--Folly and negligence of the junta--Entrenchments - in the town carried by the besiegers--Marquis of Lazan, with - six thousand men, reaches Gerona--Lord Cochrane enters the - Trinity--Repulses several assaults--Citadel surrenders 5th - December--St. Cyr marches on Barcelona--Crosses the Ter--Deceives - Lazan--Turns Hostalrich--Defeats Milans at San Celoni--Battle of - Cardadeu--Caldagues retires behind the Llobregat--Negligence of - Duhesme--Battle of Molino del Rey 54 - - - CHAPTER V. - - Tumult in Tarragona--Reding proclaimed general--Reinforcements - join the Spaniards--Actions at Bruch--Lazan advances, and - fights at Castel Ampurias--He quarrels with Reding, and marches - towards Zaragoza--Reding’s plans--St. Cyr breaks Reding’s - line at Llacuna--Actions at Capelades, Igualada, and St. - Magi--French general, unable to take the abbey of Creuz, turns - it, and reaches Villaradona--Joined by Souham’s division, - takes post at Valls and Pla--Reding rallies his centre and - left wing--Endeavours to reach Taragona--Battle of Valls--Weak - condition of Tortosa--St. Cyr blockades Taragona--Sickness - in that city--St. Cyr resolves to retire--Chabran forces the - bridge of Molino del Rey--Conspiracy in Barcelona fails--Colonel - Briche arrives with a detachment from Aragon--St. Cyr retires - behind the Llobregat--Pino defeats Wimpfen at Tarrasa--Reding - dies--His character--Blake is appointed captain-general of the - _Coronilla_--Changes the line of operations to Aragon--Events - in that province--Suchet takes the command of the French at - Zaragoza--Colonels Pereña and Baget oblige eight French companies - to surrender--Blake advances--Battle of Alcanitz--Suchet falls - back--Disorder in his army--Blake neglects Catalonia--St. Cyr - marches by the valley of Congosto upon Vich--Action at the defile - of Garriga--Lecchi conducts the prisoners to the Fluvia--St. - Cyr hears of the Austrian war--Barcelona victualled by a French - squadron--Observations 78 - - - BOOK VI. - - CHAPTER I. - - Transactions in Portugal--State of that country--Neglected by - the English cabinet--Sir J. Cradock appointed to command the - British troops--Touches at Coruña--At Oporto--State of this - city--Lusitanian legion--State of Lisbon--Cradock endeavours to - reinforce Moore--Mr. Villiers arrives at Lisbon--Pikes given - to the populace--Destitute state of the army--Mr. Frere, and - others, urge Cradock to move into Spain--The reinforcements - for sir J. Moore halted at Castello Branco--General Cameron - sent to Almeida--French advanced guard reaches Merida--Cradock - relinquishes the design of reinforcing the army in Spain, - and concentrates his own troops at Saccavem--Discontents in - Lisbon--Defenceless state and danger of Portugal--Relieved by sir - J. Moore’s advance to Sahagun 112 - - - CHAPTER II. - - French retire from Merida--Send a force to Plasencia--The - direct intercourse between Portugal and sir J. Moore’s army - interrupted--Military description of Portugal--Situation of - the troops--Cradock again pressed, by Mr. Frere and others, to - move into Spain--The ministers ignorant of the real state of - affairs--Cradock hears of Moore’s advance to Sahagun--Embarks two - thousand men to reinforce him--Hears of the retreat to Coruña, - and re-lands them--Admiral Berkely arrives at Lisbon--Ministers - more anxious to get possession of Cadiz than to defend - Portugal--Five thousand men, under general Sherbrooke, embarked - at Portsmouth--Sir George Smith reaches Cadiz--State of that - city--He demands troops from Lisbon--General Mackenzie sails from - thence, with troops--Negotiations with the junta--Mr. Frere’s - weak proceedings--Tumult in Cadiz--The negotiation fails 127 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Weakness of the British army in Portugal--General Cameron - marches to Lisbon--Sir R. Wilson remains near Ciudad - Rodrigo--Sir J. Cradock prepares to take a defensive position - at Passo d’Arcos--Double dealing of the regency--The populace - murder foreigners, and insult the British troops--Anarchy in - Oporto--British government ready to abandon Portugal--Change - their intention--Military system of Portugal--the regency demand - an English general--Beresford is sent to them--Sherbrooke’s and - Mackenzie’s troops arrive at Lisbon--Beresford arrives there, and - takes the command of the native force--Change in the aspect of - affairs--Sir J. Cradock encamps at Lumiar--Relative positions of - the allied and French armies--Marshal Beresford desires sir J. - Cradock to march against Soult--Cradock refuses--Various unwise - projects broached by different persons 142 - - - BOOK VII. - - CHAPTER I. - - Coruña and Ferrol surrender to Soult--He is ordered, by the - emperor, to invade Portugal--The first corps is directed to aid - this operation--Soult goes to St. Jago--Distressed state of the - second corps--Operations of Romana and state of Gallicia--Soult - commences his march--Arrives on the Minho--Occupies Tuy, Vigo, - and Guardia--Drags large boats over land from Guardia to Campo - Saucos--Attempt to pass the Minho--Is repulsed by the Portuguese - peasantry--Importance of this repulse--Soult changes his - plan--Marches on Orense--Defeats the insurgents at Franquera, at - Ribidavia, and in the valley of the Avia--Leaves his artillery - and stores in Tuy--Defeats the Spanish insurgents in several - places, and prepares to invade Portugal--Defenceless state of - the northern provinces of that kingdom--Bernadim Friere advances - to the Cavado river--Sylveira advances to Chaves--Concerts - operations with Romana--Disputes between the Portuguese and - Spanish troops--Ignorance of the generals 162 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Soult enters Portugal--Action at Monterey--Franceschi makes - great slaughter of the Spaniards--Portuguese retreat upon - Chaves--Romana flies to Puebla Senabria--Portuguese mutiny--Three - thousand throw themselves into Chaves--Soult takes that - town--Marches upon Braga--Forces the defiles of Ruivaens and - Venda Nova--Tumults and disorders in the Portuguese camp - at Braga--Murder of general Friere and others--Battle of - Braga--Soult marches against Oporto--Disturbed state of that - town--Sylveira retakes Chaves--The French force the passage of - the Ave--The Portuguese murder general Vallonga--French appear - in front of Oporto--Negotiate with the bishop--Violence of the - people--General Foy taken--Battle of Oporto--The city stormed - with great slaughter 183 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Operations of the first and fourth corps--General state of the - French army--Description of the valley of the Tagus--Inertness - of marshal Victor--Albuquerque and Cartoajal dispute--The - latter advance in La Mancha--General Sebastiani wins the battle - of Ciudad Real--Marshal Victor forces the passage of the - Tagus, and drives Cuesta’s army from all its positions--French - cavalry checked at Miajadas--Victor crosses the Guadiana - at Medellin--Albuquerque joins Cuesta’s army--Battle of - Medellin--Spaniards totally defeated--Victor ordered, by the - king, to invade Portugal--Opens a secret communication with some - persons in Badajos--The peasants of Albuera discover the plot, - which fails--Operations of general Lapisse--He drives back sir - R. Wilson’s posts, and makes a slight attempt to take Ciudad - Rodrigo--Marches suddenly towards the Tagus, and forces the - bridge of Alcantara--Joins Victor at Merida--General insurrection - along the Portuguese frontier--The central junta remove Cartoajal - from the command, and increase Cuesta’s authority, whose army is - reinforced--Joseph discontented with Lapisse’s movement--Orders - Victor to retake the bridge of Alcantara 208 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - The bishop of Oporto flies to Lisbon, and joins the - regency--Humanity of marshal Soult--The Anti-Braganza party - revives in the north of Portugal--The leaders make proposals - to Soult--He encourages them--Error arising out of this - proceeding--Effects of Soult’s policy--Assassination of - colonel Lameth--Execution at Arifana--Distribution of the - French troops--Franceschi opposed, on the Vouga, by colonel - Trant--Loison falls back behind the Souza--Heudelet marches to - the relief of Tuy--The Spaniards, aided by some English frigates, - oblige thirteen hundred French to capitulate at Vigo--Heudelet - returns to Braga--The insurrection in the Entre Minho e Douro - ceases--Sylveira menaces Oporto--Laborde reinforces Loison, - and drives Sylveira over the Tamega--Gallant conduct and death - of colonel Patrick at Amarante--Combats at Amarante--French - repulsed--Ingenious device of captain Brochard--The bridge of - Amarante carried by storm--Loison advances to the Douro--Is - suddenly checked--Observations 231 - - - BOOK VIII. - - CHAPTER I. - - Anarchy in Portugal--Sir J. Cradock quits the command--Sir - A. Wellesley arrives at Lisbon--Happy effect of his - presence--Nominated captain-general--His military position - described--Resolves to march against Soult--Reaches - Coimbra--Conspiracy in the French army--D’Argenton’s - proceedings--Sir A. Wellesley’s situation compared with that of - Sir J. Cradock 262 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Campaign on the Douro--Relative position of the French and - English armies--Sir Arthur Wellesley marches to the Vouga--Sends - Beresford to the Douro--A division under general Hill passes - the lake of Ovar--Attempt to surprise Francheschi fails--Combat - of Grijon--The French re-cross the Douro and destroy the - bridge at Oporto--Passage of the Douro--Soult retreats upon - Amarante--Beresford reaches Amarante--Loison retreats from - that town--Sir Arthur marches upon Braga--Desperate situation - of Soult--His energy--He crosses the Sierra Catalina--Rejoins - Loison--Reaches Carvalho d’Esté--Falls back to Salamonde--Daring - action of major Dulong--The French pass the Ponte Nova - and the Saltador, and retreat by Montalegre--Soult enters - Orense--Observations 277 - - - CHAPTER III. - - Romana surprises Villa Franca--Ney advances to Lugo--Romana - retreats to the Asturias--Reforms the government there--Ney - invades the Asturias by the west--Bonnet and Kellerman enter - that province by the east and by the south--General Mahi flies - to the valley of the Syl--Romana embarks at Gihon--Ballasteros - takes St. Andero--Defeated by Bonnet--Kellerman returns to - Valladolid--Ney marches for Coruña--Carera defeats Maucune at - St. Jago Compostella--Mahi blockades Lugo--It is relieved by - Soult--Romana rejoins his army and marches to Orense--Lapisse - storms the bridge of Alcantara--Cuesta advances to the - Guadiana--Lapisse retires--Victor concentrates his army at - Torremocha--Effect of the war in Germany upon that of Spain--Sir - A. Wellesley encamps at Abrantes--The bridge of Alcantara - destroyed--Victor crosses the Tagus at Almaraz--Beresford returns - to the north of Portugal--Ney and Soult combine operations--Soult - scours the valleys of the Syl--Romana cut off from Castile and - thrown back upon Orense--Ney advances towards Vigo--Combat of - San Payo--Misunderstanding between him and Soult--Ney retreats - to Coruña--Soult marches to Zamora--Franceschi falls into the - hands of the Capuchino--His melancholy fate--Ney abandons - Gallicia--View of affairs in Aragon--Battles of Maria and - Belchite 308 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - State of the British army--Embarrassments of sir Arthur - Wellesley--State and numbers of the French armies--State and - numbers of the Spanish armies--Some account of the _partidas_, - commonly called _guerillas_--Intrigues of Mr. Frere--Conduct - of the central junta--Their inhuman treatment of the French - prisoners--Corruption and incapacity--State of the Portuguese - army--Impolicy of the British government--Expedition of - Walcheren--Expedition against Italy 334 - - - BOOK IX. - - CHAPTER I. - - Campaign of Talavera--Choice of operations--Sir Arthur Wellesley - moves into Spain--Joseph marches against Venegas--Orders Victor - to return to Talavera--Cuesta arrives at Almaraz--Sir Arthur - reaches Plasencia--Interview with Cuesta--Plan of operation - arranged--Sir Arthur, embarrassed by the want of provisions, - detaches sir Robert Wilson up the Vera de Plasencia, passes - the Tietar, and unites with Cuesta at Oropesa--Skirmish at - Talavera--Bad conduct of the Spanish troops--Victor takes post - behind the Alberche--Cuesta’s absurdity--Victor retires from the - Alberche--Sir Arthur, in want of provisions, refuses to pass that - river--Intrigues of Mr. Frere--The junta secretly orders Venegas - not to execute his part of the operation 357 - - - CHAPTER II. - - Cuesta passes the Alberche--Sir Arthur Wellesley sends two - English divisions to support him--Soult is appointed to command - the second, fifth, and sixth corps--He proposes to besiege Ciudad - Rodrigo and threaten Lisbon--He enters Salamanca, and sends - general Foy to Madrid to concert the plan of operations--The king - quits Madrid--Unites his whole army--Crosses the Guadarama river, - and attacks Cuesta--Combat of Alcabon--Spaniards fall back in - confusion to the Alberche--Cuesta refuses to pass that river--His - dangerous position--The French advance--Cuesta re-crosses the - Tietar--Sir Arthur Wellesley draws up the combined forces on the - position of Talavera--The king crosses the Tietar--Skirmish at - Casa de Salinas--Combat on the evening of the 27th--Panic in the - Spanish army--Combat on the morning of the 28th--The king holds a - council of war--Jourdan and Victor propose different plans--The - king follows that of Victor--Battle of Talavera--The French - re-cross the Alberche--General Craufurd arrives in the English - camp--His extraordinary march--Observations 377 - - - CHAPTER III. - - The king goes to Illescas with the fourth corps and - reserve--Sir R. Wilson advances to Escalona--Victor retires - to Maqueda--Conduct of the Spaniards at Talavera--Cuesta’s - cruelty--The allied generals hear of Soult’s movement upon - Baños--Bassecour’s division marches towards that point--The - pass of Baños forced--Sir A. Wellesley marches against - Soult--Proceedings of that marshal--He crosses the Bejar, and - arrives at Plasencia with three _corps d’armée_--Cuesta abandons - the British hospitals, at Talavera, to the enemy, and retreats - upon Oropesa--Dangerous position of the allies--Sir Arthur - crosses the Tagus at Arzobispo--The French arrive near that - bridge--Cuesta passes the Tagus--Combat of Arzobispo--Soult’s - plans overruled by the king--Ney defeats sir R. Wilson at Baños, - and returns to France 410 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - Venegas advances to Aranjues--Skirmishes there--Sebastiani - crosses the Tagus at Toledo--Venegas concentrates his - army--Battle of Almonacid--Sir Arthur Wellesley contemplates - passing the Tagus at the Puente de Cardinal, is prevented - by the ill-conduct of the junta--His troops distressed for - provisions--He resolves to retire into Portugal--False charge - made by Cuesta against the British army refuted--Beresford’s - proceedings--Mr. Frere superseded by lord Wellesley--The English - army abandons its position at Jaraceijo and marches towards - Portugal--Consternation of the junta--Sir A. Wellesley defends - his conduct, and refuses to remain in Spain--Takes a position - within the Portuguese frontier--Sickness in the army 429 - - - CHAPTER V. - - General observations on the campaign--Comparison between the - operations of sir John Moore and sir A. Wellesley 447 - - - - -APPENDIX. - - _Page_ - No. I. Six Sections, containing the returns of the French army 471 - - II. Three Sections; justificatory extracts from sir J. Moore’s - and sir J. Cradock’s papers, and from Parliamentary - documents, illustrating the state of Spain 475 - - III. Seven Sections; justificatory extracts from sir J. Cradock’s - papers, illustrating the state of Portugal 480 - - IV. Extracts from sir J. Cradock’s instructions 491 - - V. Ditto from sir J. Cradock’s papers relative to a deficiency - in the supply of his troops 492 - - VI. Three Sections; miscellaneous 495 - - VII. Extracts from Mr. Frere’s correspondence 497 - - VIII. Ditto from sir J. Cradock’s papers relating to Cadiz 499 - - IX. General Mackenzie’s narrative of his proceedings at Cadiz 500 - - X. Three Sections; extracts from sir J. Cradock’s papers, - shewing that Portugal was neglected by the English cabinet 506 - - XI. State and distribution of the English troops in Portugal - and Spain, January 6, April 6, April 22, May 1, June 25, - July 25, and September 25, 1809 509 - - XII. 1º. Marshal Beresford to sir J. Cradock--2º. Sir J. Cradock - to marshal Beresford 511 - - XIII. Justificatory extracts relating to the conduct of marshal - Soult 517 - - XIV. Sir A. Wellesley to sir J. Cradock 519 - - XV. Ditto to lord Castlereagh 520 - - XVI. Ditto Ditto 522 - - XVII. Ditto to the marquis of Wellesley 523 - - XVIII. 1º. General Hill to sir A. Wellesley--2º. Colonel Stopford - to general Sherbrooke 534 - - - - -LIST OF PLATES. - - - No. 1. Siege of Zaragoza _to face page_ 48 - 2. Operations in Catalonia _to face page_ 102 - 3. Operations of Cuesta and Victor on the Tagus - and Guadiana _to face page_ 226 - 4. Passage of the Douro _to face page_ 290 - 5. Operations between the Mondego and the Mincio _to face page_ 300 - 6. Operations of marshals Soult and Ney in - Gallicia _to face page_ 326 - 7. Operations of the British, French & Spanish - armies _to face page_ 409 - 8. Battle of Talavera _to face page_ 416 - - - - -NOTICE. - - -General Semelé’s journal, referred to in this volume, is only an -unattested copy; the rest of the manuscript authorities quoted or -consulted are original papers belonging to, and communications -received from, the duke of Wellington, marshal Soult, marshal -Jourdan, Mr. Stuart,[1] sir J. Cradock,[2] sir John Moore, and -other persons employed either in the British or French armies -during the Peninsular War. - -The returns of the French army are taken from the emperor -Napoleon’s original Muster Rolls. - -The letter S. marks those papers received from marshal Soult. - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - PENINSULAR WAR. - - - - -BOOK V. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -The effect produced in England by the unfortunate issue of sir John -Moore’s campaign, was not proportionable to the importance of the -subject. The people, trained to party politics, and possessing no -real power to rebuke the folly of the cabinet, regarded disasters -and triumphs with factious rather than with national feelings, -and it was alike easy to draw the public attention from affairs -of weight, and to fix it upon matters of little moment. In the -beginning of 1809, the duke of York’s conduct being impeached, -a parliamentary investigation followed; and to drag the private -frailties of that prince before the world, was thought essential to -the welfare of the country, when the incapacity which had caused -England and Spain to mourn in tears of blood, was left unprobed. -An insular people only, who are protected by their situation from -the worst evils of war, may suffer themselves to be thus deluded; -but if an unfortunate campaign were to bring a devastating enemy -into the heart of the country, the honour of a general, and the -whole military policy of the cabinet, would no longer be considered -as mere subjects for the exercise of a vile sophist’s talents for -misrepresentation. - -It is true that the ill success of the British arms was a topic, -upon which many orators in both houses of parliament expatiated -with great eloquence, but the discussions were chiefly remarkable, -as examples of acute debating without any knowledge of facts. The -opposition speakers, eager to criminate the government, exaggerated -the loss and distress of the retreat, and comprehending neither -the movements nor the motives of sir John Moore, urged several -untenable accusations against their adversaries. The ministers, -disunited by personal feelings, did not all adopt the same ground -of defence. Lord Castlereagh and lord Liverpool, passing over the -errors of the cabinet by which the general had been left only a -choice of difficulties, asserted, and truly, that the advantages -derived from the advance to Sahagun more than compensated for the -losses in the subsequent retreat. Both those statesmen paid an -honourable tribute to the merits of the commander; but Mr. Canning, -unscrupulously resolute to screen Mr. Frere, assented to all the -erroneous statements of the opposition, and endeavoured with -malignant dexterity to convert them into charges against the fallen -general. Sir John Moore was, he said, answerable for the events of -the campaign, whether the operations were glorious or distressful, -whether to be admired or deplored, they were his own, for he had -kept the ministers ignorant of his proceedings. Being pressed -closely on that point by Mr. C. Hutchinson, Mr. Canning repeated -this assertion. Not long afterwards, sir John Moore’s letters, -written almost daily and furnishing exact and copious information -of all that was passing in the Peninsula, were laid before the -house. - -The reverses experienced in Spain had somewhat damped the ardour -of the English people; but a cause so rightful in itself, was -still popular, and a treaty having been concluded with the junta, -by which the contracting powers bound themselves to make common -cause against France, and to agree to no peace except by mutual -consent, the ministers appeared resolute to support the contest. -But while professing unbounded confidence in the result of the -struggle, they already looked upon the Peninsula as a secondary -object; for the preparations of Austria, and the reputation of -the archduke Charles, whose talents were foolishly said to exceed -Napoleon’s, had awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions. It was -more agreeable to the aristocratic feelings of the English cabinet, -that the French should be defeated by a monarch in Germany, than by -a plebeian insurrection in Spain. The obscure intrigues carried on -through the princess of Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies -of Germany emanating as they did from patrician sources, engaged -all the attention of the ministers, and exciting their sympathy, -nursed those distempered feelings, which led them to see weakness -and disaffection in France when, throughout that mighty empire, few -desired and none dared openly to oppose the emperor’s wishes, when -even secret discontent was confined to some royalist chiefs and -splenetic republicans, whose influence was never felt until after -Napoleon had suffered the direst reverses. - -Unable to conceive the extent of that monarch’s views, and the -grandeur of his genius, the ministers attributed the results of -his profound calculations to a blind chance, his victories to -treason, to corruption, to any thing but that admirable skill, -with which he wielded the most powerful military force that ever -obeyed the orders of a single chief. And thus self-deluded, and -misjudging the difficulties to be encountered, they adopted every -idle project, and squandered their resources without any great -or decided effort. While negotiating with the Spanish Junta for -the occupation of Cadiz, they were also planning an expedition -against Sicily; and while loudly asserting their resolution to -defend Portugal, reserved their principal force for a blow against -Holland; their preparations for the last object being, however, -carried on with a pomp and publicity little suitable to war. With -what a mortal calamity that pageant closed, shall hereafter be -noticed; but at present it is fitting to describe the operations -that took place in Spain, coincident with and subsequent to the -retreat of sir John Moore. - -[Sidenote: Nellerto.] - -[Sidenote: Azanza and O’Farril.] - -It has been already stated, that when the capital surrendered to -the Emperor, he refused to permit Joseph to return there, unless -the public bodies and the heads of families would unite to demand -his restoration, and swear, without any mental reservation, to -be true to him. Registers had consequently been opened in the -different quarters of the city, and twenty-eight thousand six -hundred heads of families inscribed their names, and voluntarily -swore, in presence of the host, that they were sincere in their -desire to receive Joseph. After this, deputations from all the -councils, from the junta of commerce and money, the hall of the -Alcaldes, and from the corporation, waited on the emperor at -Valladolid, and being there joined by the municipality of that -town, and by deputies from Astorga, Leon, and other places, -presented the oath, and prayed that Joseph might be king. Napoleon -thus entreated, consented that his brother should return to Madrid, -and reassume his kingly functions. - -It would be idle to argue from this apparently voluntary submission -to the French emperor, that a change favourable to the usurpation -had been produced in the feelings of the Spanish people; but -it is evident that Napoleon’s victories and policy had been so -far effectual, that in the capital, and many other great towns, -the multitude as well as the notables were, either from fear or -conviction, submissive to his will; and it is but reasonable -to suppose, that if his conquests had not been interrupted by -extraneous circumstances, this example would have been generally -followed, in preference to the more glorious, but ineffectual, -resistance made by the inhabitants of those cities, whose fortitude -and whose calamities have forced from mankind a sorrowful -admiration. The cause of Spain at this moment was in truth lost; -if any cause depending upon war, which is but a succession of -violent and sudden changes, can be called so; for her armies were -dispersed, her government bewildered, and her people dismayed; the -cry of resistance had ceased, and in its stead the stern voice of -Napoleon, answered by the tread of three hundred thousand French -veterans was heard throughout the land. But the hostility of -Austria having arrested the emperor’s career in the Peninsula, the -energy of the Spaniards revived at the abrupt cessation of his -terrific warfare. - -[Sidenote: King’s correspondence captured at Vittoria, MSS.] - -Joseph, escorted by his French guards, in number between five -and six thousand, entered Madrid in state the 23d of January. -He was, however, a king without revenues, and he would have been -without even the semblance of authority, if he had not been -likewise nominated the emperor’s lieutenant in Spain, by virtue -of which title he was empowered to move the French army at his -will. This power was one extremely unacceptable to the marshals, -and he would have found it difficult to enforce it, even though -he had restrained the exercise to the limits prescribed by his -brother. But disdaining to separate the general from the monarch, -he conveyed his orders to the French army, through his Spanish -ministers, and the army in its turn disdained and resisted the -assumed authority of men, who, despised for their want of military -knowledge, were also suspected as favouring interests essentially -differing from those of the troops. - -The iron grasp that had compressed the pride and the ambitious -jealousy of the marshals being thus relaxed, the passions that -had ruined the patriots began to work among their enemies, -producing indeed less fatal effects, because their scope was more -circumscribed, but sufficiently pernicious to stop the course of -conquest. The French army, no longer a compact body, terrible -alike from its massive strength, and its flexible activity, -became a collection of independent bands, each formidable in -itself, but, from the disunion of the generals, slow to combine -for any great object; and plainly discovering, by irregularities -and insubordination, that they knew when a warrior, and when a -voluptuous monarch was at their head; but these evils were only -felt at a later period; and the distribution of the troops, when -Napoleon quitted Valladolid, still bore the impress of his genius. - -The first corps was quartered in La Mancha. - -The second corps was destined to invade Portugal. - -The third and fifth corps carried on the siege of Zaragoza. - -The fourth corps remained in the valley of the Tagus. - -The sixth corps, wanting its third division, was appointed to hold -Gallicia. - -The seventh corps continued always in Catalonia. - -The imperial guards, directed on Vittoria, contributed to the -security of the great communication with France until Zaragoza -should fall, and were yet ready to march when wanted for the -Austrian war. - -General Dessolles, with the third division of the sixth corps, -returned to Madrid. General Bonnet, with the fifth division of the -second corps, remained in the Montagna St. Andero. - -General Lapisse, with the second division of the first corps, was -sent to Salamanca, where he was joined by Maupetit’s brigade of -cavalry, which had crossed the Sierra de Bejar. - -The reserve of heavy cavalry being broken up, was distributed, by -divisions, in the following order:-- - -Latour Maubourg’s joined the first corps. Lorge’s and Lahoussaye’s -were attached to the second corps. Lassalle’s was sent to the -fourth corps. The sixth corps was reinforced with two brigades. -Milhaud’s division remained at Madrid, and Kellerman’s guarded the -lines of communication between Tudela, Burgos, and Palencia. - -Thus, Madrid being still the centre of operations, the French were -so distributed, that by a concentric movement on that capital, -they could crush every insurrection within the circle of their -positions; and the great masses, being kept upon the principal -roads diverging from Madrid to the extremities of the Peninsula, -intercepted all communication between the Provinces: while the -second corps, thrust out, as it were, beyond the circumference, -and destined, as the fourth corps had been, to sweep round from -point to point, was sure of finding a supporting army, and a good -line of retreat, at every great route leading from Madrid to the -yet unsubdued provinces of the Peninsula. The communication with -France was, at the same time, secured by the fortresses of Burgos, -Pampeluna, and St. Sebastian; and by the divisions posted at St. -Ander, Burgos, Bilbao, and Vittoria; and it was supported by a -reserve at Bayonne. - -The northern provinces were parcelled out into military governments, -the chiefs of which corresponded with each other; and, by the -means of moveable columns, repressed every petty insurrection. The -third and fifth corps, also, having their base at Pampeluna, and -their line of operations directed against Zaragoza, served as an -additional covering force to the communication with France, and were -themselves exposed to no flank attacks, except from the side of -Cuença, where the duke of Infantado commanded; but that general was -himself watched by the first corps. - -[Sidenote: Muster-rolls of the French army, MSS.] - -All the lines of correspondence, not only from France but between -the different corps, were maintained by fortified posts, having -greater or lesser garrisons, according to their importance. -Between Bayonne and Burgos there were eleven military stations. -Between Burgos and Madrid, by the road of Aranda and Somosierra, -there were eight; and eleven others protected the more circuitous -route to the capital by Valladolid, Segovia, and the Guadarama. -Between Valladolid and Zaragoza the line was secured by fifteen -intermediate points. The communication between Valladolid and St. -Ander contained eight posts; and nine others connected the former -town with Villa Franca del Bierzo, by the route of Benevente and -Astorga; finally, two were established between Benevente and Leon. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 1, section 1.] - -At this period, the force of the army, exclusive of Joseph’s French -guards, was three hundred and twenty-four thousand four hundred and -eleven men, about thirty-nine thousand being cavalry. - -Fifty-eight thousand men were in hospital. - -The depôts, governments, garrisons, posts of correspondence, -prisoners, and “_battalions of march_,” composed of stragglers, -absorbed about twenty-five thousand men. - -The remainder were under arms, with their regiments; and, -consequently, more than two hundred and forty thousand men were in -the field: while the great line of communication with France was -(and the military reader will do well to mark this, the key-stone -of Napoleon’s system) protected by above fifty thousand men, whose -positions were strengthened by three fortresses and sixty-four -posts of correspondence, each more or less fortified. - -Having thus shewn to the reader the military state of the French, -I shall now proceed with the narrative of their operations; -following, as in the first volume, a local rather than a -chronological arrangement of events. - - -OPERATIONS IN ESTREMADURA AND LA MANCHA. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, sections 2 and 3.] - -[Sidenote: Ibid.] - -The defeat of Galluzzo has been incidentally touched upon before. -The duke of Dantzic having observed that the Spanish general, with -six thousand raw levies, pretended to defend a line of forty miles, -made a feint of crossing the Tagus, at Arzobispo, and then suddenly -descending to Almaraz, forced a passage over that bridge, on the -24th of December, killed and wounded many Spaniards, and captured -four guns: and so complete was the dispersion, that for a long time -after, not a man was to be found in arms throughout Estremadura. -The French cavalry were at first placed on the tracks of the -fugitives; but intelligence of sir John Moore’s advance to Sahagun -being received, the pursuit ceased at Merida, and the fourth corps, -which had left eight hundred and thirty men in garrison at Segovia, -took post between Talavera and Placentia. The duke of Dantzic -was then recalled to France, and general Sebastiani succeeded to -the command of the fourth corps. It was at this period that the -first corps (of which the division of Lapisse only had followed -the emperor to Astorga) moved against Toledo, and that town was -occupied without opposition. The French outposts were then pushed -towards Cuença on the one side, and towards the Sierra Morena on -the other. - -Meanwhile, the central junta, changing its first design, retired -to Seville, instead of Badajos; and being continually urged, both -by Mr. Stuart and Mr. Frere, to make some effort to lighten the -pressure on the English army, ordered Palafox and the duke of -Infantado to advance; the one from Zaragoza towards Tudela, the -other from Cuença towards Madrid. The marquis of Palacios, who had -been removed from Catalonia, and was now at the head of five or -six thousand levies in the Sierra Morena, was also directed to -advance into La Mancha; and Galluzzo, deprived of his command, was -constituted a prisoner, along with Cuesta, Castaños, and a number -of other culpable or unfortunate officers, who, vainly demanding a -judgement on their cases, were dragged from place to place by the -government. - -Cuesta was, however, so popular in Estremadura, that the central -junta, although fearing and detesting him, consented to his being -placed at the head of Galluzzo’s fugitives, part of whom had, -when the pursuit ceased, rallied behind the Guadiana, and were -now, with the aid of fresh levies, again taking the form, rather -than the consistence, of an army. This appointment was an act -of deplorable weakness and incapacity. The moral effect was to -degrade the government by exposing its fears and weakness; and, in -a military view, it was destructive, because Cuesta was physically -and mentally incapable of command. Obstinate, jealous, and stricken -in years, he was heedless of time and circumstances, of disposition -and fitness. To punish with a barbarous severity, and to rush -headlong into battle, constituted, in his mind, all the functions -of a general. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, section 2d.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13. Vol. I.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, section 2.] - -The president, Florida Blanca, being eighty-one years of age, died -at Seville, and the marquis of Astorga succeeded him; but the -character of the junta was in no manner affected by the change. -Some fleeting indications of vigour had been produced by the -imminence of the danger during the flight from Aranjuez, but a -large remittance of silver, from South America, having arrived -at Cadiz, the attention of the members was so absorbed, by this -object, that the public weal was blotted from their remembrance, -and even Mr. Frere, ashamed of their conduct, appeared to acquiesce -in the justness of sir John Moore’s estimate of the value of -Spanish co-operation. - -The number of men to be enrolled for the defence of the country had -been early fixed at five hundred thousand, but scarcely one-third -had joined their colours; nevertheless, considerable bodies were -assembling at different points, because the people, especially -those of the southern provinces, although dismayed, were obedient, -and the local authorities, at a distance from the actual scene -of war, rigorously enforced the law of enrolment, and sent the -recruits to the armies, hoping thereby either to stave the war off -from their own districts, or to have the excuse of being without -fighting men, to plead for quiet submission. - -The fugitive troops also readily collected again at any given -point, partly from patriotism, partly because the French were in -possession of their native provinces, partly that they attributed -their defeats to the treachery of their generals, and partly -that, being deceived by the gross falsehoods and boasting of the -government, they, with ready vanity, imagined that the enemy had -invariably suffered enormous losses. In fine, for the reasons -mentioned in the commencement of this history, men were to be had -in abundance; but, beyond assembling them and appointing some -incapable person to command, nothing was done for defence. - -The officers who were not deceived had no confidence either in -their own troops or in the government, nor were they themselves -confided in or respected by their men. The latter were starved, -were misused, ill-handled, and they possessed neither the compact -strength of discipline nor the daring of enthusiasm. Under such -a system, it was impossible that the peasantry could be rendered -energetic soldiers; and they certainly were not active supporters -of their country’s cause; but, with a wonderful constancy, they -suffered for it, enduring fatigue and sickness, nakedness and -famine, with patience, and displaying, in all their actions and in -all their sentiments, a distinct and powerful national character. -This constancy and the iniquity of the usurpation hallowed their -efforts in despite of their ferocity, and merits respect, though -the vices and folly of the juntas and the leading men rendered the -effect of those efforts nugatory. - -Palacios, on the receipt of the orders above mentioned, advanced, -with five thousand men, to Vilharta, in La Mancha, and the duke of -Infantado, anticipating the instructions of the junta, was already -in motion from Cuença. His army, reinforced by the divisions of -Cartoajal and Lilli and by fresh levies, was about twenty thousand -men, of which two thousand were cavalry. To check the incursions -of the French horsemen, he had, a few days after the departure of -Napoleon from Madrid, detached general Senra and general Venegas -with eight thousand infantry and all the horse to scour the country -round Tarancon and Aranjuez; the former halted at Horcajada, and -the latter endeavoured to cut off a French detachment, but was -himself surprised and beaten by a very inferior force. - -Marshal Victor, however, withdrew his advanced posts, and, -concentrating Ruffin’s and Villatte’s divisions of infantry and -Latour Maubourg’s cavalry, at Villa de Alorna, in the vicinity of -Toledo, left Venegas in possession of Tarancon. But, among the -Spanish generals, mutual recriminations succeeded this failure: -the duke of Infantado possessed neither authority nor talents to -repress their disputes, and in this untoward state of affairs -receiving the orders of the junta, he immediately projected a -movement on Toledo, intending to seize that place and Aranjuez, to -break down the bridges, and to maintain the line of the Tagus. - -Quitting Cuença on the 10th, he reached Horcajada on the 12th, with -ten thousand men, the remainder of the army, commanded by Venegas, -being near Tarancon. - -The 13th, the duke having moved to Carascosa, a town somewhat in -advance of Horcajada, met a crowd of fugitives, and heard, with -equal surprise and consternation, that the corps under Venegas was -already destroyed, and the pursuers close at hand. - - -ROUT OF UCLES. - -It appeared that Victor, uneasy at the movements of the Spanish -generals, but ignorant of their situation and intentions, had -quitted Toledo also on the 10th, and marched to Ocaña, whereupon -Venegas, falling back from Tarancon, took a position at Ucles. The -12th, the French continued to advance in two columns, of which the -one, composed of Ruffin’s division and a brigade of cavalry, lost -its way, and arrived at Alcazar; but the other, commanded by Victor -himself, and composed of Villatte’s division, the remainder of the -cavalry, and the parc of artillery, took the road of Ucles, and -came upon the position of Venegas early in the morning of the 13th. - -This meeting was unexpected by either party, but the French -attacked without hesitation, and the Spaniards, flying towards -Alcazar, fell in with Ruffin’s division, and were totally -discomfitted. Several thousands laid down their arms, and many, -dispersing, fled across the fields; some, however, keeping their -ranks, made towards Ocaña, where, coming suddenly upon the French -parc of artillery, they received a heavy discharge of grape-shot, -and dispersed. Of the whole force, a small party only, under -general Giron, succeeded in forcing its way by the road of -Carascosa, and so reached the duke of Infantado, who immediately -retreated to Cuença, and without further loss, as the French -cavalry were too fatigued to pursue briskly. - -From Cuença the duke sent his artillery towards Valencia, by the -road of Tortola; but himself, with the infantry and cavalry, -marched by Chinchilla, and from thence to Tobarra, on the frontiers -of Murcia. - -At Tobarra he turned to his right, and made for Santa Cruz de -Mudela, a town situated near the entrance to the defiles of the -Sierra Morena. There he halted in the beginning of February, after -a painful and circuitous retreat of more than two hundred miles, in -a bad season. But all his artillery had been captured at Tortola, -and his forces were, by desertion and straggling, reduced to a -handful of discontented officers and a few thousand dispirited men, -worn out with fatigue and misery. - -[Sidenote: Rocca’s Memoirs.] - -Meanwhile, Victor, after scouring a part of the province of Cuença -and disposing of his prisoners, made a sudden march upon Vilharta, -intending to surprise Palacios, but that officer apprized of the -retreat of Infantado had already effected his junction with the -latter at Santa Cruz de Mudela. Whereupon the French marshal -recalling his troops, again occupied his former position at Toledo. -The prisoners taken at Ucles were marched to Madrid, those who -were weak and unable to walk were (according to Mr. Rocca) shot by -the orders of Victor, because the Spaniards had hanged some French -prisoners. If so, it was a barbarous and a shameful retaliation, -unworthy of a soldier; for what justice or honour is there in -revenging the death of one innocent person by the murder of another. - -When Victor withdrew his posts the duke of Infantado and Palacios -proceeded to re-organize their forces under the name of the -Carolina Army. The levies from Grenada and other parts were ordered -up, and the cavalry, commanded by the duke of Alburquerque, -endeavoured to surprise a French regiment of dragoons at Mora, -but the latter getting together quickly, made a bold resistance -and effected their retreat with scarcely any loss. Alburquerque -having failed in this attempt retired to Consuegra and was attacked -the next day by superior numbers, but retired fighting and got -safely off. The duke of Infantado was now displaced, and the junta -conferred the command on general Urbina Conde de Cartaojal, who -applied himself to restore discipline, and after a time finding no -enemy in front advanced to Ciudad Real, and taking post on the left -bank of the Upper Guadiana opened a communication with Cuesta. At -this period the latter’s force amounted to sixteen thousand men, of -which three thousand were cavalry; for, as the Spaniards generally -suffered more in their flights than in their battles, the horsemen -escaped with little damage and were easily rallied again in greater -relative numbers than the infantry. - -The fourth corps having withdrawn, as I have already related, to -the right bank of the Tagus, Cuesta advanced from the Guadiana and -occupied the left bank of that river, on a line extending from the -mountains in front of Arzobispo to the Puerto de Mirabete. The -French, by fortifying an old tower, held the command of the bridge -of Arzobispo, but Cuesta immediately broke down that of Almaraz, -a magnificent structure, the centre arch of which was more than a -hundred and fifty feet in height. - -In these positions the troops on either side remained tranquil both -in La Mancha and Estremadura, and so ended the exertions made to -lighten the pressure upon the English army. Two French divisions -of infantry and as many brigades of cavalry had more than sufficed -to baffle them, and hence the imminent danger that menaced the -south of Spain, when sir John Moore’s vigorous operations drew the -emperor’s forces to the north, may be justly estimated. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS IN ARAGON. - - -From the field of battle at Tudela, all the fugitives of O’Neil’s, -and a great part of those from Castaños’s army, fled to Zaragoza -and with such speed as to bring the first news of their own -disaster. With the troops, also, came an immense number of -carriages and the military chests, for the roads were wide and -excellent and the pursuit was slack. - -The citizens and the neighbouring peasantry were astounded at this -quick and unexpected calamity. They had, with a natural credulity, -relied on the vain and boasting promises of their chiefs, and being -necessarily ignorant of the true state of affairs never doubted -that their vengeance would be sated by a speedy and complete -destruction of the French. When their hopes were thus suddenly -blasted; when they beheld troops, from whom they expected nothing -but victory, come pouring into the town with all the tumult of -panic; when the peasants of all the villages through which the -fugitives passed, came rushing into the city along with the scared -multitude of flying soldiers and camp followers; every heart was -filled with consternation, and the date of Zaragoza’s glory would -have ended with the first siege, if the success at Tudela had been -followed up by the French with that celerity and vigour which the -occasion required. - -[Sidenote: Appendix Vol. I.] - -Napoleon, foreseeing that this moment of confusion and terror -would arrive, had with his usual prudence provided the means and -given directions for such an instantaneous and powerful attack -as would inevitably have overthrown the bulwark of the eastern -provinces. But the sickness of marshal Lasnes, the difficulty of -communication, the consequent false movements of Moncey and Ney, -in fine, the intervention of fortune, omnipotent as she is in war, -baffled the emperor’s long-sighted calculations, and permitted -the leaders in the city to introduce order among the multitude, -to complete the defensive works, to provide stores, and finally -by a ferocious exercise of power to insure implicit obedience to -their minutest orders. The danger of resisting the enemy appeared -light, when a suspicious word or even a discontented gesture was -instantaneously punished by a cruel death. - -[Sidenote: Muster roll of the French Army, MSS.] - -The third corps having thus missed the favourable moment for -a sudden assault, and being reduced by sickness, by losses in -battle, and by detachments to seventeen thousand four hundred men, -including the engineers and artillery, was too weak to invest -the city in form, and, therefore, remained in observation on the -Xalon river. Meanwhile, a battering train of sixty guns, with well -furnished parcs, which had been by Napoleon’s orders previously -collected in Pampeluna, were dragged by cattle to Tudela and -embarked upon the canal leading to Zaragoza. - -[Sidenote: Cavalhero. Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Marshal Mortier, with the fifth corps, was also directed to assist -in the siege, and he was in march to join Moncey, when his progress -also was arrested by sir John Moore’s advance towards Burgos. But -the utmost scope of that general’s operation being soon determined -by Napoleon’s counter-movement, Mortier resumed his march to -reinforce Moncey, and, on the 20th of December, their united corps, -forming an army of thirty-five thousand men of all arms, advanced -against Zaragoza. At this time, however, confidence had been -restored in that town, and all the preparations necessary for a -vigorous defence were completed. - -The nature of the plain in which Zaragoza is situated, the course -of the rivers, the peculiar construction of the houses, and -the multitude of convents have been already described, but the -difficulties to be encountered by the French troops were no longer -the same as in the first siege. At that time but little assistance -had been derived from science, but now, instructed by experience -and inspired as it were by the greatness of their resolution, -neither the rules of art nor the resources of genius were neglected -by the defenders. - -Zaragoza offered four irregular fronts, of which the first, -reckoning from the right of the town, extended from the Ebro to -a convent of barefooted Carmelites, and was about three hundred -yards wide. - -The second, twelve hundred yards in extent, reached from the -Carmelites to a bridge over the Huerba. - -The third, likewise of twelve hundred yards, stretched from this -bridge to an oil manufactory built beyond the walls. - -The fourth, being on an opening of four hundred yards, reached from -the oil manufactory to the Ebro. - -[Sidenote: Rogniat’s Seige of Zaragoza. Cavalhero’s Siege of -Zaragoza.] - -The first front, fortified by an ancient wall and flanked by the -guns on the Carmelite, was strengthened by some new batteries and -ramparts, and by the Castle of Aljaferia, commonly called the -Castle of the Inquisition, which stood a little in advance. This -was a fort of a square form having a bastion and tower at each -corner, and a good stone ditch, and it was connected with the body -of the place by certain walls loop-holed for musketry. - -The second front was defended by a double wall, the exterior -one being of recent erection, faced with sun-dried bricks, and -covered by a ditch with perpendicular sides fifteen feet deep -and twenty feet asunder. The flanks of this front were derived -from the convent of the Carmelites, from a large circular battery -standing in the centre of the line, from a fortified convent of -the Capuchins, called the Trinity, and from some earthen works -protecting the head of the bridge over the Huerba. - -The third front was covered by the river Huerba, the deep bed of -which was close to the foot of the ramparts. Behind this stream a -double entrenchment was carried from the bridge-head to the large -projecting convent of Santa Engracia, a distance of two hundred -yards. Santa Engracia itself was very strongly fortified and armed; -and, from thence to the oil manufactory, the line of defence was -prolonged by an ancient Moorish wall, on which several terraced -batteries were raised, to sweep all the space between the rampart -and the Huerba. These batteries, and the guns in the convent of -Santa Engracia, likewise overlooked some works raised to protect a -second bridge that crossed the river, about cannot-shot below the -first. - -Upon the right bank of the Huerba, and a little below the second -bridge, stood the convent of San Joseph, the walls of which had -been strengthened and protected by a deep ditch with a covered way -and pallisade. It was well placed to impede the enemy’s approaches, -and to facilitate sorties on the right bank of the river; and it -was, as I have said, open, in the rear, to the fire of the works at -the second bridge, and both were again overlooked by the terraced -batteries, and by the guns of Santa Engracia. - -The fourth front was protected by the Huerba, by the continuation -of the old city wall, by new batteries and entrenchments, and by -several armed convents and large houses. - -Beyond the walls the Monte Torrero, which commanded all the plain -of Zaragoza, was crowned by a large, ill-constructed fort, raised -at the distance of eighteen hundred yards from the convent of San -Joseph. This work was covered by the royal canal, the sluices of -which were defended by some field-works, open to the fire of the -fort itself. - -[Sidenote: Cavalhero.] - -On the left bank of the Ebro the suburb, built in a low marshy -plain, was protected by a chain of redoubts and fortified houses. -Finally, some gun-boats, manned by seamen from the naval arsenal -of Carthagena, completed the circuit of defence. The artillery of -the place was, however, of too small a calibre. There were only -sixty guns carrying more than twelve-pound balls; and there were -but eight large mortars. There was, however, no want of small arms, -many of which were English that had been supplied by colonel Doyle. - -These were the regular external defences of Zaragoza, most of which -were constructed at the time, according to the skill and means of -the engineers; but the experience of the former siege had taught -the people not to trust to the ordinary resources of art, and, with -equal genius and resolution, they had prepared an internal system -of defence infinitely more efficacious. - -It has been already observed that the houses of Zaragoza were -fire-proof, and, generally, of only two stories, and that, in -all the quarters of the city, the numerous massive convents and -churches rose like castles above the low buildings, and that the -greater streets, running into the broad-way called the Cosso, -divided the town into a variety of districts, unequal in size, but -each containing one or more large structures. Now, the citizens, -sacrificing all personal convenience, and resigning all idea of -private property, gave up their goods, their bodies, and their -houses to the war, and, being promiscuously mingled with the -peasantry and the regular soldiers, the whole formed one mighty -garrison, well suited to the vast fortress into which Zaragoza -was transformed: for, the doors and windows of the houses were -built up, and their fronts loop-holed; internal communications -were broken through the party-walls, and the streets were trenched -and crossed by earthen ramparts, mounted with cannon, and every -strong building was turned into a separate fortification. There -was no weak point, because there could be none in a town which -was all fortress, and where the space covered by the city was -the measurement for the thickness of the ramparts: nor in this -emergency were the leaders unmindful of moral force. - -The people were cheered by a constant reference to the former -successful resistance; their confidence was raised by the -contemplation of the vast works that had been executed; and it -was recalled to their recollection that the wet, usual at that -season of the year, would spread disease among the enemy’s ranks, -and would impair, if not entirely frustrate, his efforts. Neither -was the aid of superstition neglected: processions imposed upon -the sight, false miracles bewildered the imagination, and terrible -denunciations of the divine wrath shook the minds of men, whose -former habits and present situation rendered them peculiarly -susceptible of such impressions. Finally, the leaders were -themselves so prompt and terrible in their punishments that the -greatest cowards were likely to show the boldest bearing in their -wish to escape suspicion. - -To avoid the danger of any great explosion, the powder was made as -occasion required; and this was the more easily effected because -Zaragoza contained a royal depôt and refinery for salt-petre, and -there were powder-mills in the neighbourhood, which furnished -workmen familiar with the process of manufacturing that article. -The houses and trees beyond the walls were all demolished and cut -down, and the materials carried into the town. The public magazines -contained six months’ provisions; the convents were well stocked, -and the inhabitants had, likewise, laid up their own stores for -several months. General Doyle also sent a convoy into the town from -the side of Catalonia, and there was abundance of money, because, -in addition to the resources of the town, the military chest of -Castaños’s army, which had been supplied only the night before the -battle of Tudela, was, in the flight, carried to Zaragoza. - -[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, M.S. Cavalhero, Siege of -Zaragoza.] - -Companies of women, enrolled to attend the hospitals and to carry -provisions and ammunition to the combatants, were commanded by the -countess of Burita, a lady of an heroic disposition, who is said to -have displayed the greatest intelligence and the noblest character -during both sieges. There were thirteen engineer officers, and -eight hundred sappers and miners, composed of excavators formerly -employed on the canal, and there were from fifteen hundred to two -thousand cannoneers. - -The regular troops that fled from Tudela, being joined by two small -divisions, which retreated, at the same time, from Sanguessa and -Caparosa, formed a garrison of thirty thousand men, and, together -with the inhabitants and peasantry, presented a mass of fifty -thousand combatants, who, with passions excited almost to phrensy, -awaited an assault amidst those mighty entrenchments, where each -man’s home was a fortress and his family a garrison. To besiege, -with only thirty-five thousand men, a city so prepared was truly a -gigantic undertaking! - - -SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA. - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -The 20th of December, the two marshals, Moncey and Mortier, having -established their hospitals and magazines at Alagon on the Xalon, -advanced in three columns against Zaragoza. - -The first, composed of the infantry of the third corps, marched by -the right bank of the canal. - -The second, composed of general Suchet’s division of the fifth -corps, marched between the canal and the Ebro. - -The third, composed of general Gazan’s division of infantry, -crossed the Ebro opposite to Tauste, and from thence made an -oblique march to the Gallego river. - -The right and centre columns arrived in front of the town that -evening. The latter, after driving back the Spanish advanced -guards, halted at a distance of a league from the Capuchin convent -of the Trinity; the former took post on both sides of the Huerba, -and, having seized the aqueduct by which the canal is carried -over that river, proceeded, in pursuance of Napoleon’s orders, to -raise batteries, and to make dispositions for an immediate assault -on Monte Torrero. Meanwhile general Gazan, with the left column, -marching by Cartejon and Zuera reached Villa Nueva, on the Gallego -river, without encountering an enemy. - -[Sidenote: Cavalhero.] - -The Monte Torrero was defended by five thousand Spaniards, under -the command of general St. Marc; but, at day-break on the 21st, -the French opened their fire against the fort, and one column of -infantry having attracted the attention of the Spaniards, a second, -unseen, crossed the canal under the aqueduct, and, penetrating -between the fort and the city, entered the former by the rear, -and, at the same time, a third column stormed the works protecting -the great sluices. These sudden attacks, and the loss of the fort, -threw the Spaniards into confusion, and they hastily retired to the -town, which so enraged the plebeian leaders that the life of St. -Marc was with difficulty saved by Palafox. - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -It had been concerted among the French that general Gazan should -assault the suburb, simultaneously with the attack on the Torrero; -and that officer, having encountered a body of Spanish and Swiss -troops placed somewhat in advance, drove the former back so -quickly that the Swiss, unable to make good their retreat, were, -to the number of three or four hundred, killed or taken. But, -notwithstanding this fortunate commencement, Gazan did not attack -the suburb itself until after the affair at Monte Torrero was -over, and then only upon a single point, and without any previous -examination of the works. The Spaniards, recovering from their -first alarm, soon reinforced this point, and Gazan was forced to -desist, with the loss of four hundred men. This important failure -more than balanced the success against the Monte Torrero. It -restored the shaken confidence of the Spaniards at a most critical -moment, and checking in the French, at the outset, that impetuous -spirit, that impulse of victory, which great generals so carefully -watch and improve, threw them back upon the tedious and chilling -process of the engineer. - -The 24th of December the investment of Zaragoza was completed on -both sides of the Ebro. General Gazan occupied the bridge over -the Gallego with his left, and covered his front from sorties by -inundations and cuts that the low, marshy plain where he was posted -enabled him to make without difficulty. - -General Suchet occupied the space between the Upper Ebro and the -Huerba. - -Morlot’s division of the 3d corps encamped in the broken hollow -that formed the bed of that stream. - -General Meusnier’s division crowned the Monte Torrero, and general -Grandjean continuing the circuit to the Lower Ebro, communicated -with Gazan’s posts on the other side. Several Spanish detachments -that had been sent out to forage were thus cut off, and could never -re-enter the town; and a bridge of boats being constructed on the -Upper Ebro completed the circle of investment, and ensured a free -intercourse between the different quarters of the army. - -General Lacoste, an engineer of reputation, and aide-de-camp to -the Emperor, directed the siege. His plan was, that one false and -two real attacks should be conducted by regular approaches on the -right bank of the Ebro, and he still hoped to take the suburb by -a sudden assault. The trenches being opened on the night of the -29th of December, the 30th the place was summoned, and the terms -dictated by Napoleon when he was at Aranda de Duero, were offered. -The example of Madrid was also cited to induce a surrender. Palafox -replied, that--If Madrid had surrendered, Madrid had been sold: -Zaragoza would neither be sold nor surrender! On the receipt of -this haughty answer the attacks were commenced; the right being -directed against the convent of San Joseph; the centre against the -upper bridge over the Huerba; the left, which was the false one, -against the castle of Aljaferia. - -The 31st Palafox made sorties against all the three attacks. From -the right and centre he was beaten back with loss, and he was -likewise repulsed on the left at the trenches: but some of his -cavalry gliding between the French parallel and the Ebro surprised -and cut down a post of infantry stationed behind some ditches that -intersected the low ground on the bank of that river. This trifling -success exalted the enthusiasm of the besieged, and Palafox -gratified his personal vanity by boasting proclamations and orders -of the day, some of which bore the marks of genius, but the greater -part were ridiculous. - -The 1st of January the second parallels of the true attacks were -commenced. The next day Palafox caused the attention of the -besiegers to be occupied on the right bank of the Ebro, by slight -skirmishes, while he made a serious attack from the side of the -suburb on general Gazan’s lines of contrevallation. This sally was -repulsed with loss, but, on the right bank, the Spaniards obtained -some success. - -Marshal Moncey being called to Madrid, Junot assumed the command -of the third corps, and, about the same time, marshal Mortier was -directed to take post at Calatayud, with Suchet’s division of the -fifth corps, for the purpose of securing the communication with -Madrid. The gap in the circle of investment left by this draft of -eight thousand men, being but scantily stopped by extending general -Morlot’s division, a line of contrevallation was constructed at -that part to supply the place of numbers. - -The besieged, hoping and expecting each day that the usual falls -of rain taking place would render the besiegers’ situation -intolerable, continued their fire briskly, and worked counter -approaches on to the right of the French attacks: but the season -was unusually dry, and a thick fog rising each morning covered the -besiegers’ advances and protected their workmen, both from the fire -and from the sorties of the Spaniards. - -The 10th of January, thirty-two pieces of French artillery being -mounted and provisioned, the convent of San Joseph and the head of -the bridge over the Huerba, were battered in breach, and, at the -same time, the town was bombarded. San Joseph was so much injured -by this fire that the Spaniards, resolving to evacuate it, withdrew -their guns. Nevertheless, two hundred of their men made a vigorous -sortie at midnight, and were upon the point of entering one of the -French batteries, when they were taken in flank by two guns loaded -with grape, and were, finally, driven back, with loss of half their -number. - -The 11th, the besiegers’ batteries continued to play on San Joseph -with such success that the breach became practicable, and, at -four o’clock in the evening, some companies of infantry, with two -field-pieces, attacked by the right, and a column was kept in -readiness to assail the front, when this attack should have shaken -the defence. Two other companies of chosen men were directed to -search for an entrance by the rear, between the fort and the river. - -The defences of the convent were reduced to a ditch eighteen feet -deep, and a covered way which, falling back by both flanks to the -Huerba, was then extended along the banks of that river for some -distance. A considerable number of men still occupied this covered -way: but, when the French field-pieces on the right raked it with -a fire of grape, the Spaniards were thrown into confusion, and -crossing the bed of the river took shelter in the town. At that -moment the front of the convent was assaulted; but, while the depth -of the ditch and the Spanish fire checked the impetuosity of the -assailants at that point; the chosen companies passed round the -works, and finding a small bridge over the ditch crossed it, and -entered the convent by the rear. The front was carried by escalade, -almost at the same moment, and the few hundred Spaniards that -remained were killed or made prisoners. - -The French, who had suffered but little in this assault, -immediately lodged themselves in the convent, raised a rampart -along the edge of the Huerba, and commenced batteries against the -body of the place and against the works at the head of the upper -bridge, from whence, as well as from the town, they were incommoded -by the fire that played into the convent. - -The 15th, the bridge-head, in front of Santa Engracia, was carried -with the loss of only three men; but the Spaniards cut the bridge -itself, and sprung a mine under the works; the explosion, however, -occasioned no mischief, and the third parallels being soon -completed, and the trenches of the two attacks united, the defences -of the besieged were thus confined to the town itself. They could -no longer make sallies on the right bank of the Huerba without -overcoming the greatest difficulties. The passage of the Huerba was -then effected by the French, and breaching and counter-batteries, -mounting fifty pieces of artillery, were constructed against the -body of the place. The fire of these guns played also upon the -bridge over the Ebro, and interrupted the communication between the -suburb and the town. - -Unshaken by this aspect of affairs, the Spanish leaders, with great -readiness of mind, immediately forged intelligence of the defeat of -the emperor, and, with the sound of music, and amidst the shouts -of the populace, proclaimed the names of the marshals who had been -killed; asserting, also, that Palafox’s brother, the marquis of -Lazan, was already wasting France. This intelligence, extravagant -as it was, met with implicit credence, for such was the disposition -of the Spaniards throughout this war, that the imaginations of the -chiefs were taxed to produce absurdities proportionable to the -credulity of their followers; hence the boasting of the leaders and -the confidence of the besieged augmented as the danger increased, -and their anticipations of victory seemed realized when the -night-fires of a succouring force were discerned blazing on the -hills behind Gazan’s troops. - -The difficulties of the French were indeed fast increasing, -for while enclosing Zaragoza they were themselves encircled by -insurrections, and their supplies so straightened that famine was -felt in their camp. Disputes amongst the generals also diminished -the vigour of the operations, and the bonds of discipline being -relaxed, the military ardour of the troops naturally became -depressed. The soldiers reasoned openly upon the chances of -success, which, in times of danger, is only one degree removed from -mutiny. - -The nature of the country about Zaragoza was exceedingly favourable -to the Spaniards. The town, although situated in a plain, was -surrounded, at the distance of some miles, by strong and high -mountains, and, to the south, the fortresses of Mequinenza and -Lerida afforded a double base of operations for any forces that -might come from Catalonia and Valencia. The besiegers drew all -their supplies from Pampeluna, and consequently their long line -of operations, running through Alagon, Tudela, and Caparosa, was -difficult to defend from the insurgents, who, being gathered -in considerable numbers in the Sierra de Muela and on the side -of Epila, threatened Alagon, while others, descending from the -mountain of Soria, menaced the important point of Tudela. - -The marquis of Lazan, anxious to assist his brother, had drafted -five thousand men from the Catalonian army, and taking post in -the Sierra de Liciñena, or Alcubierre, on the left of the Ebro, -drew together all the armed peasantry of the valleys as high as -Sanguessa, and extending his line from Villa Franca on the Ebro to -Zuera on the Gallego, hemmed in the division of Gazan, and even -sent detachments as far as Caparosa to harass the French convoys -coming from Pampeluna. - -To maintain their communications and to procure provisions -the besiegers had placed between two or three thousand men in -Tudela, Caparosa, and Tafalla, and some hundreds in Alagon and at -Montalbarra. Between the latter town and the investing army six -hundred and fifty cavalry were stationed: a like number were posted -at Santa Fé, to watch the openings of the Sierra de Muela, and -sixteen hundred cavalry with twelve hundred infantry, under the -command of general Wathier, were pushed towards the south as far -as Fuentes, Wathier, falling suddenly upon an assemblage of four -or five thousand insurgents that had taken post at Belchite, broke -and dispersed them, and then pursuing his victory took the town of -Alcanitz, and established himself there in observation for the rest -of the siege. But Lazan still maintained himself in the Alcubierre. - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -In this state of affairs marshal Lasnes, having recovered from -his long sickness, arrived before Zaragoza, and took the supreme -command of both corps on the 22d of January. The influence of -his firm and vigorous character was immediately perceptible; -he recalled Suchets division from Calatayud, where it had been -lingering without necessity, and, sending it across the Ebro, -ordered Mortier to attack Lazan. At the same time a smaller -detachment was directed against the insurgents in Zuera, and, -meanwhile, Lasnes repressing all disputes, restored discipline in -the army, and pressed the siege with infinite resolution. - -The detachment sent to Zuera defeated the insurgents and took -possession of that place and of the bridge over the Gallego. -Mortier encountered the Spanish advanced guard at Perdeguera, and -pushed it back to Nuestra Señora de Vagallar, where the main body, -several thousand strong, was posted. After a short resistance, the -whole fled, and the French cavalry took four guns; Mortier then -spreading his troops in a half circle, extending from Huesca to -Pina on the Ebro, awed all the country lying between those places -and Zaragoza, and prevented any further insurrections. - -A few days before the arrival of marshal Lasnes, the besieged being -exceedingly galled by the fire from a mortar-battery, situated at -some distance behind the second parallel of the central attack, -eighty volunteers, under the command of Don Mariano Galindo, -endeavoured to silence it. They surprised and bayonetted the guard -in the nearest trenches, and passing on briskly to the battery, -entered it, and were proceeding to spike the artillery, when -unfortunately the reserve of the French arrived, and, the alarm -being given, the guards of the first trenches also assembled in -the rear of this gallant band, intercepting all retreat. Thus -surrounded, Galindo, fighting bravely, was wounded and taken, and -the greatest part of his comrades perished with as much honour as -simple soldiers can attain. - -The armed vessels in the river now made an attempt to flank the -works raised against the castle of Aljaferia, but the French -batteries forced them to drop down the stream again; and between -the nights of the 21st and the 26th of January the besiegers’ -works being carried across the Huerba, the third parallels of the -real attacks were completed. The oil manufactory and some other -advantageous posts, on the left bank of the above-named river, -were also taken possession of and included in the works, and at -the false attack a second parallel was commenced at the distance -of a hundred and fifty yards from the castle of Aljaferia; but -these advantages were not obtained without loss. The Spaniards made -sallies, in one of which they spiked two guns and burnt a French -post on the right. - -The besiegers’ batteries had, however, broken the wall of the -town in several places. Two practicable breaches were made nearly -fronting the convent of San Joseph; a third was commenced in the -convent of Saint Augustin, facing the oil manufactory. The convent -of San Engracia was laid completely open to an assault; and, on -the 29th, at twelve o’clock, the whole army being under arms, four -chosen columns rushed out of the trenches, and burst upon the -ruined works of Zaragoza. - -On the right, the assailants twice stormed an isolated stone house -that defended the breach of Saint Augustin, and twice they were -repulsed, and finally driven back with loss. - -In the centre, the attacking column, regardless of two small mines -that exploded at the foot of the walls, carried the breach fronting -the oil manufactory, and then endeavoured to break into the town; -but the Spaniards retrenched within the place, opened such a fire -of grape and musquetry that the French were content to establish -themselves on the summit of the breach, and to connect their -lodgement with the trenches by new works. - -The third column was more successful; the breach was carried, and -the neighbouring houses also, as far as the first large cross -street; beyond that, the assailants could not penetrate, but they -were enabled to establish themselves within the walls of the town, -and immediately brought forward their trenches, so as to comprehend -this lodgement within their works. - -The assault of the fourth column, which was directed against San -Engracia, was made with such rapidity and vigour that the Polish -regiment of the Vistula not only carried that convent itself, but -the one adjoining to it; and the victorious troops, unchecked -by the fire from the houses, and undaunted by the simultaneous -explosion of six small mines planted in their path, swept the -ramparts to the left as far as the bridge over the Huerba; and, at -that moment, the guards of the trenches, excited by the success of -their comrades, broke forth, without orders, mounted the walls, -pushed along the ramparts to the left, bayonetted the artillery-men -at their guns in the Capuchin convent, and, continuing their -career, endeavoured some to reach the semicircular battery and the -Misericordia, and others to break into the town. - -This wild assault was soon checked by grape from two guns planted -behind a traverse on the ramparts, and by a murderous fire from -the houses. As their ranks were thinned, the ardour of the French -sunk, and the courage of their adversaries increased. The former -were, after a little, driven back upon the Capuchins; and the -Spaniards were already breaking into that convent in pursuit, when -two battalions, detached by general Morlot from the trenches of -the false attack, arrived, and secured possession of that point, -which was moreover untenable by the Spaniards, inasmuch as the guns -of the convent of Santa Engracia saw it in reverse. The French -took, on this day, more than six hundred men. But general La -Coste immediately abandoned the false attack against the castle, -fortified the Capuchin convent and a house situated at an angle of -the wall abutting upon the bridge over the Huerba, and then joining -them by works to his trenches, the ramparts of the town became the -front line of the French. - -The walls of Zaragoza thus went to the ground, but Zaragoza herself -remained erect; and, as the broken girdle fell from the heroic -city, the besiegers started at the view of her naked strength. The -regular defences had, indeed, crumbled before the skill of the -assailants; but the popular resistance was immediately called, with -all its terrors, into action; and, as if Fortune had resolved to -mark the exact moment when the ordinary calculations of science -should cease, the chief engineers on both sides were simultaneously -slain. The French general, La Coste, a young man, intrepid, -skilful, and endowed with genius, perished like a brave soldier; -but the Spanish colonel, San Genis, died not only with the honour -of a soldier, but the glory of a patriot; falling in the noblest -cause, his blood stained the ramparts which he had himself raised -for the protection of his native place. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: Cavalhero.] - -The war being now carried into the streets of Zaragoza, the sound -of the alarm-bell was heard over all the quarters of the city; and -the people, assembling in crowds, filled the houses nearest to the -lodgements made by the French. Additional traverses and barricadoes -were constructed across the principal streets; mines were prepared -in the more open spaces; and the communications from house to house -were multiplied, until they formed a vast labyrinth, of which the -intricate windings were only to be traced by the weapons and the -dead bodies of the defenders. The members of the junta, become more -powerful from the cessation of regular warfare, with redoubled -activity and energy urged the defence, but increased the horrors of -the siege by a ferocity pushed to the very verge of phrenzy. Every -person, without regard to rank or age, who excited the suspicions -of these furious men, or of those immediately about them, was -instantly put to death; and amidst the noble bulwarks of war, a -horrid array of gibbets was to be seen, on which crowds of wretches -were suspended each night, because their courage had sunk beneath -the accumulating dangers of their situation, or because some -doubtful expression or gesture of distress had been misconstrued by -their barbarous chiefs. - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -From the heights of the walls which he had conquered, marshal -Lasnes contemplated this terrific scene; and, judging that men so -passionate, and so prepared, could not be prudently encountered -in open battle, he resolved to proceed by the slow, but certain -process of the mattock and the mine: and this was also in unison -with the emperor’s instructions. Hence from the 29th of January to -the 2d of February, the efforts of the French were directed to the -enlargement of their lodgements on the walls; and they succeeded, -after much severe fighting and several explosions, in working -forward through the nearest houses; but, at the same time, they had -to sustain many counter-assaults from the Spaniards; especially -one, exceedingly fierce, made by a friar on the Capuchins’ convent -of the Trinity. - -It has been already observed that the crossing of the large streets -divided the town into certain small districts, or islands of -houses. To gain possession of these, it was necessary not only to -mine but to fight for each house. To cross the large intersecting -streets, it was indispensable to construct traverses above or to -work by underground galleries; because a battery raked each street, -and each house was defended by a garrison that, generally speaking, -had only the option of repelling the enemy in front or dying on the -gibbet erected behind. But, as long as the convents and churches -remained in possession of the Spaniards, the progress of the French -among the islands of small houses was of little advantage to them, -because the large garrisons in the greater buildings enabled the -defenders not only to make continual and successful sallies, but -also to countermine their enemies, whose superior skill in that -kind of warfare was often frustrated by the numbers and persevering -energy of the besieged. - -To overcome these obstacles the breaching batteries opposite the -fourth front fired upon the convents of Saint Augustin and Saint -Monica, and the latter was assaulted on the 31st of January. At the -same time a part of the wall in another direction being thrown down -by a petard, a body of the besiegers poured in and taking the main -breach in rear, cleared not only the convent but several houses -around it. The Spaniards undismayed immediately opened a gallery -from St. Augustin and worked a mine under Saint Monica, but at the -moment of its being charged the French discovered and stifled the -miners. - -The 1st of February the breach in Saint Augustin, also, became -practicable, and the attention of the besieged being drawn to that -side, the French sprung a mine which they had carried under the -wall from the side of Saint Monica and immediately entered by the -opening. The Spaniards thus unexpectedly taken in the rear, were -thrown into confusion and driven out with little difficulty. They, -however, rallied in a few hours after and attempted to retake the -structure, but without success, and the besiegers animated by this -advantage broke into the neighbouring houses and, at one push, -carried so many as to arrive at the point where the street called -the Quemada joined the Cosso, or public walk. The besieged rallied, -however, at the last house of the Quemada, and renewed the combat -with so much fury that the French were beaten from the greatest -part of the houses they had taken, and suffered a loss of above a -hundred men. - -On the side of San Engracia a contest still more severe took place; -the houses in the vicinity were blown up, but the Spaniards fought -so obstinately for the ruins that the Polish troops were scarcely -able to make good their lodgement--although two successive and -powerful explosions had, with the buildings, destroyed a number of -the defenders. - -The experience of these attacks induced a change in the mode of -fighting on both sides. Hitherto the play of the French mines -had reduced the houses to ruins, and thus the soldiers were -exposed completely to the fire from the next Spanish posts. The -engineers, therefore, diminished the quantity of powder that the -interior only might fall and the outward walls stand, and this -method was found successful. Hereupon the Spaniards, with ready -ingenuity, saturated the timbers and planks of the houses with -rosin and pitch, and setting fire to those which could no longer -be maintained, interposed a burning barrier which often delayed -the assailants for two days, and always prevented them from -pushing their successes during the confusion that necessarily -followed the bursting of the mines. The fighting was, however, -incessant, a constant bombardment, the explosion of mines, the -crash of falling buildings, clamorous shouts, and the continued -echo of musquetry deafened the ear, while volumes of smoke and -dust clouded the atmosphere and lowered continually over the heads -of the combatants, as hour by hour, the French with a terrible -perseverance pushed forward their approaches to the heart of the -miserable but glorious city. - -Their efforts were chiefly directed against two points, namely -that of San Engracia, which may be denominated the left attack, -and that of Saint Augustin and Saint Monica which constituted the -right attack. At San Engracia they laboured on a line perpendicular -to the Cosso, from which they were only separated by the large -convent of the Daughters of Jerusalem, and by the hospital for -madmen, which was entrenched, although in ruins since the first -siege. The line of this attack was protected on the left by the -convent of the Capuchins, which La Coste had fortified to repel -the counter assaults of the Spaniards. The right attack was more -diffused, because the localities presented less prominent features -to determine the direction of the approaches; and the French -having mounted a number of light six-inch mortars, on peculiar -carriages, drew them from street to street, and house to house, -as occasion offered. On the other hand the Spaniards continually -plied their enemies with hand grenades, which seem to have produced -a surprising effect, and in this manner the never-ceasing combat -was prolonged until the 7th of February, when the besiegers, by -dint of alternate mines and assaults, had worked their perilous way -at either attack to the Cosso, but not without several changes of -fortune and considerable loss. They were, however, unable to obtain -a footing on that public walk, for the Spaniards still disputed -every house with undiminished resolution. - -Meanwhile, Lasnes having caused trenches to be opened on the left -bank of the Ebro, a battery of twenty guns played against an -isolated structure called the Convent of Jesus, which covered the -right of the suburb line. On the 7th of February this convent was -carried by storm, and with so little difficulty that the French, -supposing the Spaniards to be panic stricken, assailed the suburb -itself, but were quickly driven back with loss; they, however, made -good their lodgement in the convent. - -On the town side the 8th, 9th, and 10th were wasted by the -besiegers in vain attempts to pass the Cosso; they then extended -their flanks. On the right with a view to reach the quay, and so -connect this attack with that against the suburb, and on the left -to obtain possession of the large and strongly built convent of -Saint Francisco, in which after exploding an immense mine and -making two assaults they finally established themselves. - -The 11th and 12th, mines were worked under the university, a -large building on the Spanish side of the Cosso, in the line of -the right attack; but their play was insufficient to open the -walls, and the storming party was beaten, with the loss of fifty -men. Nevertheless, the besiegers continuing their labours during -the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th, passed the Cosso by means -of traverses, and prepared fresh mines under the university, but -deferred their explosion until a simultaneous effort could be -combined on the side of the suburb. - -At the left attack also, a number of houses, bordering on the -Cosso being gained, a battery was established that raked that -great thoroughfare above ground, while under it six galleries were -carried, and six mines loaded to explode at the same moment; but -the spirit of the French army was now exhausted; they had laboured -and fought without intermission for fifty days; they had crumbled -the walls with their bullets, burst the convents with their mines, -and carried the breaches with their bayonets,--fighting above and -beneath the surface of the earth, they had spared neither fire nor -the sword, their bravest men were falling in the obscurity of a -subterranean warfare; famine pinched them, and Zaragoza was still -unconquered! - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -“Before this siege,” they exclaimed, “was it ever heard of, that -twenty thousand men should besiege fifty thousand?” Scarcely a -fourth of the town was won, and they, themselves, were already -exhausted. “We must wait,” they said, “for reinforcements or we -shall all perish among their cursed ruins, which will become our -own tombs, before we can force the last of these fanatics from the -last of their dens.” - -Marshal Lasnes, unshaken by these murmurs and obstinate to conquer, -endeavoured to raise the soldiers’ hopes. He pointed out to them -that the losses of the besieged so far exceeded their own, that -the Spaniards’ strength would soon be wasted and their courage -must sink, and that the fierceness of their defence was already -abated,--but if contrary to expectation they should renew the -example of Numantia, their utter destruction must quickly ensue -from the united effects of battle, misery, and pestilence. - -These exhortations succeeded, and on the 18th, all the combinations -being complete, a general assault took place. The French at the -right attack, having opened a party-wall by the explosion of a -petard, made a sudden rush through some burning ruins, and carried, -without a check, the island of houses leading down to the quay, -with the exception of two buildings. The Spaniards were thus forced -to abandon all the external fortifications between Saint Augustin -and the Ebro, which they had preserved until that day. And while -this assault was in progress, the mines under the university -containing three thousand pounds of powder were sprung, and the -walls tumbling with a terrific crash,--a column of the besiegers -entered the place, and after one repulse secured a lodgement. -During this time fifty pieces of artillery thundered upon the -suburb and ploughed up the bridge over the Ebro, and by mid-day -opened a practicable breach in the great convent of Saint Lazar, -which was the principal defence on that side. Lasnes, observing -that the Spaniards seemed to be shaken by this overwhelming fire, -immediately ordered an assault, and Saint Lazar being carried -forthwith, all retreat to the bridge was thus intercepted, and -the besieged falling into confusion, and their commander, Baron -Versage, being killed, were all destroyed or taken, with the -exception of three hundred men, who braving the terrible fire to -which they were exposed, got back into the town. General Gazan -immediately occupied the abandoned works, and having thus cut off -above two thousand men that were stationed on the Ebro, above the -suburb, forced them also to surrender. - -This important success being followed on the 19th by another -fortunate attack on the right bank of the Ebro, and by the -devastating explosion of sixteen hundred pounds of powder, the -constancy of the besieged was at last shaken. An aide-de-camp of -Palafox came forth to demand certain terms, before offered by -the marshal, adding thereto that the garrison should be allowed -to join the Spanish armies, and that a certain number of covered -carriages should follow them. Lasnes rejected these proposals, -and the fire continued, but the hour of surrender was come! Fifty -pieces of artillery on the left bank of the Ebro, laid the houses -on the quay in ruins. The church of Our Lady of the Pillar, under -whose especial protection the city was supposed to exist, was -nearly effaced by the bombardment, and the six mines under the -Cosso loaded with many thousand pounds of powder, were ready for -a simultaneous explosion, which would have laid a quarter of the -remaining houses in the dust. In fine, war had done its work, and -the misery of Zaragoza could no longer be endured. - -The bombardment which had never ceased since the 10th of January, -had forced the women and children to take refuge in the vaults, -with which the city abounded. There the constant combustion of -oil, the closeness of the atmosphere, unusual diet, and fear and -restlessness of mind, had combined to produce a pestilence which -soon spread to the garrison. The strong and the weak, the daring -soldier and the shrinking child fell before it alike, and such -was the state of the atmosphere and the predisposition to disease -that the slightest wound gangrened and became incurable. In the -beginning of February the deaths were from four to five hundred -daily; the living were unable to bury the dead, and thousands of -carcases, scattered about the streets and court yards, or piled in -heaps at the doors of the churches, were left to dissolve in their -own corruption, or to be licked up by the flames of the burning -houses as the defence became contracted. - -[Sidenote: Cavalhero. Rogniat. Suchet.] - -The suburb, the greatest part of the walls, and one-fourth of the -houses were in the hands of the French, sixteen thousand shells -thrown during the bombardment, and the explosion of forty-five -thousand pounds of powder in the mines had shaken the city to its -foundations, and the bones of more than forty thousand persons of -every age and sex, bore dreadful testimony to the constancy of the -besieged. - -Palafox was sick, and of the plebeian chiefs, the curate of -St. Gil, the lemonade seller of the Cosso, and the Tios, Jorge, -and Marin, having been slain in battle, or swept away by the -pestilence, the obdurate violence of the remaining leaders was -so abated, that a fresh junta was formed, and after a stormy -consultation, the majority being for a surrender, a deputation -waited upon marshal Lasnes on the 20th of February, to negotiate a -capitulation. - -They proposed that the garrison should march out with the honours -of war; that the peasantry should not be considered as prisoners; -and at the particular request of the clergy, they also demanded -that the latter should have their full revenues guaranteed to them, -and punctually paid. This article was rejected with indignation, -and, according to the French writers, the place surrendered at -discretion; but the Spanish writers assert, that Lasnes granted -certain terms, drawn up by the deputation at the moment, the name -of Ferdinand the 7th being purposely omitted in the instrument, -which in substance run thus:-- - -The garrison to march out with the honours of war; to be -constituted prisoners, and marched to France; the officers to -retain their swords, baggage, and horses, the men their knapsacks; -and persons of either class, wishing to serve Joseph, to be -immediately enrolled in his ranks. The peasants to be sent to their -homes. Property and religion to be guaranteed. - -With this understanding the deputies returned to the city; but -fresh commotions had arisen during their absence. The party for -protracting the defence, although the least numerous, were the -most energetic; they had before seized all the boats on the -Ebro, fearing that Palafox and others, of whom they entertained -suspicions, would endeavour to quit the town; and they were still -so menacing and so powerful, that the deputies durst not pass -through the streets, but retired outside the walls to the castle -of Aljaferia, and from thence sent notice to the junta of their -proceedings. The dissentient party would, however, have fallen -upon the others the next day, if the junta had not taken prompt -measures to enforce the surrender. The officer in command of the -walls near the castle, by their orders, gave up his post to the -French during the night, and on the 21st of February, from twelve -to fifteen thousand sickly beings laid down those arms which they -were scarcely able to support; and this cruel and memorable siege -was finished. - - -OBSERVATIONS.--1º.--When the other events of the Spanish war shall -be lost in the obscurity of time, or only traced by disconnected -fragments, the story of Zaragoza, like some ancient triumphal -pillar standing amidst ruins, will tell a tale of past glory; and -already men point to the heroic city, and call her Spain, as if her -spirit were common to the whole nation; yet it was not so, nor was -the defence of Zaragoza itself the effect of unalloyed virtue. It -was not patriotism, nor was it courage, nor skill, nor fortitude, -nor a system of terror, but all these combined under peculiar -circumstances that upheld the defence; and this combination, and -how it was brought about, should be well considered; because it is -not so much by catching at the leading resemblances, as by studying -the differences of great affairs, that the exploits of one age can -be made to serve as models for another. - -[Illustration: _Plate 1. to face Pa. 48._ - - _Explanatory Sketch_ - of the - Seige of Zaragoza, - _1808, 1809_. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - -2º.--The defence of Zaragoza may be examined under two points of -view; as an isolated event, and as a transaction bearing on the -general struggle in the Peninsula. With respect to the latter, -it was a manifest proof, that neither the Spanish people, nor -the government, partook of the Zaragozan energy. For it would be -absurd to suppose that, in the midst of eleven millions of people, -animated by an ardent enthusiasm, fifty thousand armed men could -for two months be besieged, shut in, destroyed, they and their -works, houses, and bodies, mingled in one terrible ruin, by less -than thirty-five thousand adversaries, and that without one effort -being made to save them! - -Deprive the transaction of its dazzling colours, and the simple -outline comes to this: Thirty-five thousand French, in the midst -of insurrections, in despite of a combination of circumstances -peculiarly favourable to the defence, reduced fifty thousand of -the bravest and most energetic men in Spain. It is true, the -latter suffered nobly; but was their example imitated? Gerona, -indeed, although less celebrated, rivalled, and perhaps more than -rivalled, the glory of Zaragoza; but elsewhere her fate spoke, not -trumpet-tongued to arouse, but with a wailing voice, that carried -dismay to the heart of the nation. - -3d.--As an isolated transaction, the siege of Zaragoza is very -remarkable; but it would be a great error to suppose, that any -town, the inhabitants of which were equally resolute, might be -as well defended. Fortitude and bravery will do much; but the -combinations of science are not to be defied with impunity. There -are no miracles in war! If the houses of Zaragoza had not been -nearly incombustible, the bombardment alone would have caused the -besieged to surrender, or to perish with their flaming city. - -4th.--That the advantage offered by the peculiar structure of -the houses, and the number of the convents and churches, was -ably seized by the Spaniards, is beyond doubt. General Rogniat, -Lacoste’s successor, indeed, treats his opponents’ skill in -fortification with contempt; but colonel San Genis’ talents are -not to be judged of by the faulty construction of a few out-works, -at a time when he was under the control of a disorderly and -ferocious mob. He knew how to adapt his system of defence to the -circumstances of the moment, and no stronger proof of real genius -can be given. “Do not consult me about a capitulation,” was his -common expression. “_I shall never be of opinion that Zaragoza can -make no further defence._” But neither the talents of San Genis, -nor the construction of the houses, would have availed, if the -people within had not been of a temper adequate to the occasion; -and to trace the passions by which they were animated to their true -causes is a proper subject for historical and military research. - -5th.--That they did not possess any superior courage is evident -from the facts that the besieged, although twice the number of the -besiegers, never made any serious impression by their sallies, and -that they were unable to defend the breaches. In large masses, -the standard of courage which is established by discipline may -be often inferior to that produced by fanaticism, or any other -peculiar excitement; but the latter never lasts long, neither is -it equable, because men are of different susceptibility, following -their physical and mental conformation. Hence a system of terror -has always been the resource of those leaders who, engaged in great -undertakings, have been unable to recur to discipline. Enthusiasm -stalked in front of their bands, but punishment brought up the -rear; and Zaragoza was no exception to this practice. - -6th.--It may be said that the majority of the besieged, not being -animated by any peculiar fury, a system of terror could not be -carried to any great length; but a close examination explains this -seeming mystery. The defenders were composed of three distinct -parties,--the regular troops, the peasantry from the country, -and the citizens; but the citizens, who had most to lose, were -naturally the fiercest, and, accordingly, amongst them, the system -of terror was generated. The peasantry followed the example, as -all ignorant men, under no regular control, will do; the soldiers -meddled but little in the interior arrangements, and the division -of the town into islands of posts rendered it perfectly feasible -for violent persons, already possessed of authority, to follow -the bent of their inclinations: there was no want of men, and the -garrison of each island found it their own interest to keep those -in front of them to their posts, that the danger might be the -longer staved off from themselves. - -7th.--Palafox was only the nominal chief of Zaragoza, the laurels -gathered in both sieges should adorn plebeian brows, but those -laurels dripped with kindred as well as foreign blood. The energy -of the real chiefs, and the cause in which that energy was exerted, -may be admired; the acts perpetrated by this ruling band were, -in themselves, atrocious; and Palafox, although unable to arrest -their savage proceedings, can claim but little credit for his own -conduct. For more than a month preceeding the surrender, he never -came forth of a vaulted building, which was impervious to shells, -and in which, there is too much reason to believe, he and others, -of both sexes, lived in a state of sensuality, forming a disgusting -contrast to the wretchedness that surrounded them. - - -OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRENCH OPERATIONS. - -1º. Before the arrival of marshal Lasnes, the operations were -conducted with little vigour. The want of unity, as to time, in the -double attack of the Monte Torrero and the suburb, was a flagrant -error, that was not redeemed by any subsequent activity; but, after -the arrival of that marshal, the siege was pursued with singular -intrepidity and firmness. General Rogniat appears to disapprove of -Suchet’s division having been sent to Calatayud, yet it seems to -have been a judicious measure, inasmuch as it was necessary,-- - -1st. To protect the line of correspondence with Madrid. - -2d. To have a corps at hand, lest the duke of Infantado should quit -Cuença, and throw himself into the Guadalaxara district, a movement -that would have been extremely embarrassing to the king. Suchet’s -division, while at Calatayud, fulfilled these objects, without -losing the power of succouring Tudela, or, by a march on the side -of Daroca, of intercepting the duke of Infantado if he attempted -to raise the siege of Zaragoza; but, when the Spanish army at -Cuença was directed on Ucles, and that of the marquis of Lazan was -gathering strength on the left bank of the Ebro, it was undoubtedly -proper to recall Suchet. - -2º.--It may not be misplaced here to point out the errors of -Infantado’s operations. If, instead of bringing on a battle with -the first corps, he had marched to the Ebro, established his -depôts and places of arms at Mequinenza and Lerida, opened a -communication with Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and joined -the marquis of Lazan’s troops to his own, he might have formed an -entrenched camp in the Sierra de Alcubierre, and from thence have -carried on a methodical war with, at least, twenty-five thousand -regular troops; the insurrections on the French flanks and line of -communication with Pampeluna would then have become formidable; -and, in this situation, having the fortresses of Catalonia behind -him, with activity and prudence he might have raised the siege. - -[Sidenote: Rogniat.] - -3º.--From a review of all the circumstances attending the siege of -Zaragoza, we may conclude that fortune was extremely favourable -to the French. They were brave, persevering, and skilful, and -they did not lose above four thousand men; but their success was -owing partly to the errors of their opponents, principally to the -destruction caused by the pestilence within the town; for, of all -that multitude said to have fallen, six thousand Spaniards only -were slain in battle. Thirteen convents and churches had been -taken; but, when the town surrendered, forty remained to be forced. - -Such are the principal circumstances of this memorable siege. I -shall now relate the contemporary operations in Catalonia. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA. - - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations.] - -It will be remembered, that when the second siege of Gerona was -raised, in August, 1808, general Duhesme returned to Barcelona, -and general Reille to Figueras; after which, the state of affairs -obliged those generals to remain on the defensive. Napoleon’s -measures to aid them were as prompt as the occasion required. While -the siege of Gerona was yet in progress, he had directed troops -to assemble at Perpignan in such numbers, as to form with those -already in Catalonia, an army of more than forty thousand men, -to be called the “_7th corps_.” Then appointing general Gouvion -St. Cyr to command it, he gave him this short but emphatic order: -“_Preserve Barcelona for me. If that place be lost, I cannot retake -it with 80,000 men._” - -The troops assembled at Perpignan were the greatest part but raw -levies; Neapolitans, Etruscans, Romans, and Swiss: there were, -however, some old regiments; but as the preparations for the grand -army under the emperor absorbed the principal attention of the -administration in France, general St. Cyr was straightened in the -means necessary to take the field; and his undisciplined troops, -suffering severe privations, were depressed in spirit, and inclined -to desert. - -The 1st of November, Napoleon, who was at Bayonne, sent orders to -the “_7th corps_” to commence its operations; and St. Cyr, having -put his divisions in motion on the 3d, crossed the frontier, and -established his head-quarters at Figueras on the 5th. - -[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence.] - -In Catalonia, as in other parts of Spain, lethargic vanity, -and abuses of the most fatal kind, had succeeded to the first -enthusiasm, and withered the energy of the people. The local junta -issued, indeed, abundance of decrees, and despatched agents to the -supreme junta, and to the English commanders in the Mediterranean, -and in Portugal, all charged with the same instructions, namely, -to demand arms, ammunition, and money. And although the central -junta treated their demands with contempt, the English authorities -answered them generously and freely. Lord Collingwood lent the -assistance of his fleet. From Malta and Sicily arms were obtained; -and sir Hew Dalrymple having completely equipped the Spanish -regiments released by the convention of Cintra, despatched them -to Catalonia in British transports. Yet it may be doubted if -the conduct of the central junta were not the wisest; for the -local government established at Tarragona had already become so -negligent, or so corrupt, that the arms thus supplied were, instead -of being used in defence of the country, sold to foreign merchants! -and such being the political state of Catalonia, it naturally -followed that the military affairs should be ill conducted. - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -The count of Caldagues, who had relieved Gerona, returned by -Hostalrich, and resumed the line of the Llobregat; and fifteen -hundred men, drawn from the garrison of Carthagena, having reached -Taragona, the marquis of Palacios, accompanied by the junta, -quitted the latter town, and fixed his head-quarters at Villa -Franca, within twenty miles of Caldagues. The latter disposed his -troops, five thousand in number, at different points between -Martorel and San Boy, covering a line of eighteen miles, along the -left bank of the river. - -General Duhesme rested a few days, and then marching from Barcelona -with six thousand men in the night, arrived the 2d of September at -day-break on the Llobregat, and immediately attacked Caldagues’ -line in several points, but principally at San Boy and Molino -del Rey. The former fort was carried, some guns and stores were -captured, and the Spaniards were pursued to Vegas, a distance -of seven or eight miles; but at Molino del Rey the French were -repulsed, and Duhesme then returned to Barcelona. - -It was the intention of the British ministers, that an auxiliary -force should have sailed from Sicily about this period, to aid -the Catalans; and doubtless it would have been a wise and timely -effort: but Napoleon’s foresight prevented the execution; for he -directed Murat to menace Sicily with a descent; and that prince, -feigning to collect forces on the coast of Calabria, spread many -reports of armaments being in preparation, and, as a preliminary -measure, attacked and carried the island of Capri; upon which -occasion sir Hudson Lowe first became known to history, by losing -in a few days a post that, without any pretensions to celebrity, -might have been defended for as many years. Murat’s demonstrations -sufficed to impose upon sir John Stuart, and from ten to twelve -thousand British troops were thus paralyzed at a most critical -period: but such will always be the result of a policy which has -no fixed and definite object in view. When statesmen cannot see -their own way clearly, the executive officers will seldom act with -vigour. - -The Spanish army was now daily increasing; the tercios of -Migueletes were augmented in number, and a regiment of hussars, -that had been most absurdly kept in Majorca ever since the -beginning of the insurrection, arrived at Taragona. - -Mariano Alvarez, the governor of Gerona, was appointed to the -command of the vanguard, composed of the garrisons of Gerona and -Rosas, and of the corps of Juan Claros, and other partizans. - -Francisco Milans and Milans de Bosch, with their Migueletes, kept -the mountains to the northward and eastward of Barcelona; and while -the latter hemmed in the French right, the former covered the -district of El Vallés, and like a bird of prey watched the French -foragers in the plain surrounding Barcelona. - -Palacios remained at Villa Franca, and the count of Caldagues -continued to guard the line of the Llobregat. - -The little port of St. Felice de Quixols, near Palamos Bay, was -filled with privateers, and the English frigates off the coast not -only aided the Spaniards in all their enterprizes, but carried on a -littoral warfare in the gulf of Lyons with great spirit and success. - -During the month of September several petty skirmishes happened -between the French marauding parties and the Migueletes about -Barcelona; but on the 10th of October, Duhesme attacked and -dislodged Francisco Milans from the mountains to the north of that -city; and designing to forage the district of El Vallés, sent on -the 11th a column of two thousand men along the sea coast towards -Mattaro, with orders to turn from thence to the left, clear the -heights beyond the Besos, of Migueletes, and push for Granollers -on the route to Vich: this column he supported by a second of -nearly equal strength, under general Millossewitz. - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -The first column reaching Granollers on the 12th, put the local -junta of that district to flight, captured some provisions and -other stores, and, finally, joined the second column, which was -posted at Mollet. Millossewitz, leaving a part of his force at the -pass of Moncada, then proceeded to San Culgat. Caldagues, hearing -of this excursion, drew together three thousand infantry, a hundred -and fifty cavalry, and six guns from his line on the Llobregat, -and was in full march by the back of the mountains for the pass -of Moncada, expecting to intercept the French in their return to -Barcelona: but, falling in with them at San Culgat, a confused -action ensued, and both sides claimed the victory; the French, -however, retreated across the mountains to Barcelona without -having foraged the district, and Caldagues returned to his former -position, justly proud of this vigorous and soldier-like movement. - -The 28th of October, Palacios quitted Catalonia to command the -levies in the Sierra Morena. General Vives succeeded him, and -the army was again reinforced by some infantry from Majorca. The -Spanish regiments, released by the convention of Cintra, also -arrived at Villa Franca, and seven or eight thousand Granadian -levies were brought up to Tarragona by general Reding, and, at -the same time, six thousand men drafted from the army of Aragon, -reached Lerida, under the command of the marquis de Lazan. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr. Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The whole force, including the garrisons of Hostalrich, Gerona, and -Rosas, was now not less than thirty-six thousand men; of which -twenty-two thousand infantry, and twelve hundred cavalry, were in -the neighbourhood of Barcelona, or in march for the Llobregat. -This force, organized in six divisions, of which the troops in the -Ampurdan formed one, took the name of the _army of the right_, and -Vives seeing himself at the head of such a power, and in possession -of all the hills and rivers encircling Barcelona, resolved to -besiege that city. - -The 3d of November, he transferred his head-quarters to Martorel; -the 8th he commenced a series of trifling skirmishes, to drive the -French posts back into the town: but they repulsed him; and, from -that time until the blockade was raised, a warfare of the most -contemptible nature was carried on by the Spaniards: the French, -who were about ten thousand strong, always maintaining their -outposts. - -[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence.] - -Notwithstanding this appearance of strength, Catalonia was a prey -to innumerable disorders. Vives, a weak, indolent man, had been a -friend of Godoy, and was not popular; he it was that, commanding -in the islands, had retained the troops in them with such tenacity -as to create doubts of his attachment to the cause; but, although -the supreme junta privately expressed their suspicions, and -requested lord Collingwood to force Vives to an avowal of his -true sentiments, they, at the same time, wrote to the latter, -publicly, in the most flattering terms, and, finally, appointed -him captain-general of Catalonia. By the people, however, both he -and others were vehemently suspected, and, as the mob governed -throughout Spain, the authorities, civil and military, were more -careful to avoid giving offence to the multitude than anxious to -molest the enemy. Catalonia was full of strong places: but they -were neither armed nor provisioned, and, like all other Spaniards, -the Catalans were confident that the French only thought of -retreating. - -[Sidenote: Muster rolls of the French army, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -Such was the state of the province and of the armies, when -Napoleon, being ready to break into the northern parts of Spain, -general St. Cyr commenced his operations. His force (including a -German division of six thousand men, not yet arrived at Perpignan) -amounted to more than thirty thousand men, ill-composed, however, -and badly provided; and St. Cyr himself was extremely discontented -with his situation. The Emperor had given him discretionary powers -to act as he judged fitting, only bearing in mind the importance of -relieving Barcelona; but marshal Berthier neglected the equipment -of the troops; and Duhesme declared that his magazines would not -hold out longer than December. - -To march directly to Barcelona was neither an easy nor an -advantageous movement. That city could only be provisioned from -France; and, until the road was cleared, by the taking of Gerona -and Hostalrich, no convoys could pass except by sea, yet, to attack -these places with prudence, it was essential to get possession of -Rosas, not only to secure an intermediate port for French vessels -passing with supplies to Barcelona, but to deprive the English of -a secure harbour, and the Spaniards of a point from whence they -could, in concert with their allies, intercept the communications -of the French army: and even blockade Figueras, which, from the -want of transport, could not be provisioned at this period. These -considerations having determined St. Cyr to commence by the siege -of Rosas, he repaired to Figueras, in person, the 6th of November; -and, on the 7th, general Reille being charged to conduct the -operation, after a sharp action, drove in the Spaniards before the -place and completed the investment. - - -SIEGE OF ROSAS. - -This town was but a narrow slip of houses built along the water’s -edge, at the head of the gulph of the same name. - -The citadel, a large irregular pentagon, stood on one side of -the town, and, on the other, the mountains that skirt the flat -and swampy plain of the Ampurdan, rose, bluff and rocky, at the -distance of half a mile. An old redoubt was built at the foot of -these hills, and, from thence to the citadel, an entrenchment had -been drawn to cover the houses. Hence, Rosas, looking towards the -land, had the citadel on the left hand, the mountains on the right, -and the front covered by this entrenchment. The roadstead permitted -ships of the line to anchor within cannon-shot of the place; and, -on the right hand coming up the gulph, a star fort, called the -Trinity, crowned a rugged hill about a mile and a quarter distant -from the citadel, the communication between it and the town being -by a narrow road carried between the foot of the hills and the -water’s edge. - -The garrison of Rosas consisted of nearly three thousand men, two -bomb-vessels, and an English seventy-four (the Excellent), were -anchored off the town, and captain West, the commodore, reinforced -the garrisons of the Trinity and the citadel with marines and -seamen from these vessels; but the damages sustained in a former -siege had been only partially repaired; both places were ill-found -in guns and stores, and the Trinity was commanded at the distance -of pistol-shot from a point of the mountains called the Puig Rom. - -The force under Reille, consisting of his own and general Pino’s -Italian division, skirmished daily with the garrison; but the rain, -which fell in torrents, having flooded the Ampurdan, the roads -became impassable for the artillery, and delayed the opening of the -trenches. Meanwhile, Souham’s division took post between the Fluvia -and Figueras, to cover the operations of the siege on the side of -Gerona, and an Italian brigade, under general Chabot, was posted at -Rabos and Espollas, to keep the Somatenes down. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -But, before Chabot’s arrival, Reille had detached a battalion to -that side; and, being uneasy for its safety, sent three more to its -assistance: this saved the battalion, which was in great danger; -and two companies were actually cut off by the Somatenes. This -loss, however, proved beneficial, as it enraged the Italians, and -checked their disposition to desert; and St. Cyr, unwilling to -pursue the system of burning villages, and yet anxious to repress -the insidious hostility of the peasants, in reprizal for the loss -of his two companies, seized an equal number of villagers, and sent -them prisoners to France. - -The inhabitants of Rosas having embarked or taken refuge in the -citadel, the houses, and the entrenchments covering them, were left -to the French; but the latter were prevented, by the fire of the -English ships, from effecting a permanent lodgement in the deserted -town; and, after a few days, a detachment from the garrison, -consisting of soldiers and townsmen, established a post there. - -[Sidenote: Captain West’s despatch.] - -The 8th captain West, in conjunction with the governor, made a -sally, but was repulsed; and, on the 9th several yards of the -citadel ramparts crumbled; but, with the assistance of the British -seamen, the breach was repaired in the night before the enemy -became aware of the accident. - -The 15th an obstinate assault made on the Trinity was repulsed, the -English seamen bearing a principal share in the success. - -The 16th the roads being passable, the French battering-train was -put in motion. The way leading up to the Puig Rom was repaired, -and two battalions were posted there, on the point commanding the -Trinity. - -The 19th three guns were mounted against the Trinity, and the -trenches were opened at the distance of four hundred yards from the -citadel. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -The 20th the fire of some French mortars obliged the vessels of -war to anchor beyond the range of the shells. During this time, -Souham was harassed by the Migueletes from the side of Gerona. The -French cavalry, unable to find forage, were sent back to France; -and Napoleon, rendered uneasy by the reports of general Duhesme, -ordered the seventh corps to advance to Barcelona, so as to arrive -there by the 26th of November; but St. Cyr refused to abandon the -siege of Rosas without a positive order. - -The assistance afforded to the besieged by captain West was -represented to the junta as an attempt of that officer to possess -himself of the place. The junta readily believed this tale, and -entered into an angry correspondence with don Pedro O’Daly, the -governor, relative to the supposed treachery; but no measures were -taken to raise the siege. During this correspondence, the Excellent -sailed from Rosas, and was succeeded by the Fame, captain Bennet. -This officer landed some men under the Trinity on the 23d, and -endeavoured, but ineffectually, to take the battery opposed to that -fort. - -[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The 27th the besiegers assaulted the Spaniards, who, to the number -of five hundred, had entrenched themselves in the deserted houses -of the town. A hundred and sixty were taken, and fifty escaped -into the citadel; the rest were slain. Breaching batteries were -immediately commenced among the ruins of the houses, and the -communication with the shipping rendered so unsafe, that Lazan, -who had come from Lerida to Gerona with six thousand men, and had -collected provisions and stores at the mouth of the Fluvia, with -the intention of supplying Rosas by sea, abandoned his design. -The ruinous condition of the front, exposed to the fire of the -besiegers, now induced Reille to summon the place a second time; -but the governor refused to surrender. - -The 30th of November, the engineers reported that the breach in -the Trinity was practicable, and an assault was ordered; although -an Italian officer, appointed to lead the storming party of fifty -men, and who had formerly served in the fort, asserted that the -breach was not a true one. The Spanish commandant thought his post -untenable; and two days before, the marines of the Fame had been -withdrawn by captain Bennet: but at this time, lord Cochrane, a -man of infinite talent in his profession, and of a courage and -enterprise that have seldom, if ever, been surpassed, arrived in -the Imperieuse frigate, and immediately threw himself, with eighty -men, into the fort. - -The Italian’s representations being unheeded, he advanced to the -assault like a man of honour, and was killed, together with all -his followers, excepting four, two of whom escaped back to their -own side, the other two being spared by the English seamen, were -drawn up with cords into the fort. The breach had, however, been -practicable at first; but it was broken in an old gallery, which -lord Cochrane immediately filled with earth and hammocks, and so -cut off the opening. In the course of a few days, a second assault -was made, but the French were again repulsed with loss. Meanwhile -the breaching batteries opened against the citadel, and a false -attack was commenced on the opposite side. - -The 4th December the garrison made a sally, in the night, from -the citadel, and with some success; but the walls were opened by -the enemy’s fire, and the next day O’Daly, hopeless of relief, -surrendered with about two thousand four hundred men, of which two -hundred were wounded. Lord Cochrane, also, blew up the magazine, -and abandoned Fort Trinity. General St. Cyr observes that the -garrison of Rosas might have been easily carried off, at night, -by the British shipping; but to embark two thousand five hundred -men, in the boats of two ships, and under a heavy fire, whether by -night or day, is not an easy operation; nevertheless, the censure -seems well founded, because sufficient preparation might have been -previously made. - -[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The defence of Rosas (with the exception of lord Cochrane’s -efforts) cannot be deemed brilliant, whether with relation to -the importance of the place, the assistance that might have been -rendered from the sea, or the number of the garrison compared with -that of the besiegers. It held out, however, thirty days, and, -if that time had been well employed by the Spaniards, the loss -of the garrison would have been amply repaid; but Vives, wholly -occupied with Barcelona, was indifferent to the fate of Rosas. A -fruitless attack on Souham’s posts, by Mariano Alvarez, was the -only effort made to interrupt the siege, or to impede the farther -progress of the enemy. Lazan, although at the head of six or seven -thousand men, could not rely upon more than three thousand; and his -applications to Vives for a reinforcement were unheeded. - -The fall of Rosas enabled St. Cyr to march to the relief of -Barcelona, and he resolved to do so: yet the project, at first -sight, would appear rather insane than hardy; for the roads, by -which Gerona and Hostalrich were to be turned, being mere paths -impervious to carriages, no artillery, and little ammunition, -could be carried, and the country was full of strong positions. -The Germans had not yet arrived at Perpignan; it was indispensable -to leave Reille in the Ampurdan, to protect Rosas and Figueras; -and, these deductions being made, less than eighteen thousand -men, including the cavalry, which had been recalled from France, -remained disposable for the operation. - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -But, on the Spanish side, Reding having come up, there were -twenty-five thousand men in the camp before Barcelona, and ten -thousand others, under Lazan and Alvarez, were at Gerona. All -these troops were, however, exceedingly ill organized. Two-thirds -of the Migueletes only carried pikes, and many were without any -arms at all. There was no sound military system; the Spanish -generals were ignorant of the French movements and strength; and -their own indolence and want of vigilance drew upon them the -contempt and suspicion of the people. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -The 8th of December St. Cyr united his army on the left bank -of the Fluvia. The 9th he passed that river, and, driving the -Spaniards over the Ter, established his head-quarters at Mediñya, -ten miles from Gerona. He wished, before pursuing his own march, -to defeat Lazan, lest the latter should harass the rear of the -army; but, finding that the marquis would not engage in a serious -affair, he made a show of sitting down before Gerona on the 10th, -hoping thereby to mislead Vives, and render him slow to break up -the blockade of Barcelona: and this succeeded; for the Spaniard -remained in his camp, irresolute and helpless, while his enemy was -rapidly passing the defiles and rivers between Gerona and the Besos. - -The nature of the country between Figueras and Barcelona has been -described in the first volume; referring to that description, -the reader will find that the only carriage-routes by which St. -Cyr could march were, one by the sea-coast, and one leading -through Gerona and Hostalrich. The first, exposed to the fire of -the English vessels, had also been broken up by lord Cochrane, -in August; and, to use the second, it was necessary to take the -fortresses, or to turn them by marching for three days through the -mountains. St. Cyr adopted the latter plan, trusting that rapidity -and superior knowledge of war would enable him to separate Lazan -and Alvarez from Vives, and so defeat them all in succession. - -The 11th, he crossed the Ter and reached La Bisbal; here he left -the last of his carriages, delivered out four days’ biscuit -and fifty rounds of ammunition to the soldiers, and with this -provision, a drove of cattle, and a reserve of ten rounds of -ammunition for each man, he commenced his hardy march the 12th -of December, making for Palamos. On the route he encountered and -beat some Migueletes that Juan Claros had brought to oppose him, -and, when near Palamos, he suffered a little from the fire of the -English ships; but he had gained a first step, and his hopes were -high. - -The 13th, he turned his back upon the coast, and, by a forced -march, reached Vidreras and Llagostera, and thus placed himself -between Vives and Lazan, for the latter had not yet passed the -heights of Casa de Selva. - -The 14th, marching by Mazanet de Selva and Martorel, he reached -the heights above Hostalrich, and encamped at Grions and Masanas. -During this day’s journey, his rear was slightly harassed by Lazan -and Claros; but he was well content to find the strong banks of -the Tordera undefended by Vives. The situation of the army was, -however, extremely critical. Lazan and Claros had, the one on the -11th, the other on the 12th, informed Vives of the movement; hence -the bulk of the Spanish force before Barcelona might be expected, -at any moment, in some of the strong positions in which the country -abounded, and the troops from Gerona were, as we have seen, close -in the rear; the Somatenes were gathering thickly on the flanks, -Hostalrich was in front, and the French soldiers had only sixty -rounds of ammunition. - -St. Cyr’s design was to turn Hostalrich, and get into the main road -again behind that fortress. The smugglers of Perpignan had affirmed -that there was no pathway, but a shepherd assured him that there -was a track by which it could be effected; and, when the efforts of -the staff-officers to trace it failed, St. Cyr himself discovered -it, but nearly fell into the hands of the Somatenes during the -search. - -The 15th, at day-break, the troops being put in motion, turned -Hostalrich and gained the main road. The garrison of that place, -endeavouring to harass their rear, were repulsed; but the Somatenes -on the flanks, emboldened because the French, to save ammunition, -did not return their fire, became exceedingly troublesome; and, -near San Celoni, the head of the column encountered some battalions -of Migueletes, which Francisco Milans had brought up from Arenas de -Mar, by the pass of Villa Gorguin. - -Milans, not being aware of St. Cyr’s approach, was soon beaten, -and his men fell back, part to Villa Gorguin, part to the heights -of Nuestra Señora de Cordera: the French thus gained the defile -of Treintapasos. But they were now so fatigued that all desired -to halt, save St. Cyr, who insisted upon the troops clearing the -defile, and reaching a plain on the other side: this was not -effected before ten o’clock. Lazan’s troops did not appear during -the day; but Vives’ army was in front, and its fires were seen on -the hills between Cardadeu and Llinas. - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, MS.] - -Information of St. Cyr’s march, as I have already observed, had -been transmitted to Vives on the 11th, and there was time for him -to have carried the bulk of his forces to the Tordera before the -French could pass that river; but intelligence of the battle of -Tudela, and of the appearance of the French near Zaragoza, arrived -at the same moment, and the Spanish general betrayed the greatest -weakness and indecision, at one moment resolving to continue before -Barcelona, at another designing to march against St. Cyr. He had, -on the 9th, sent Reding with six guns, six hundred cavalry, and one -thousand infantry, to take the command in the Ampurdan; but, the -12th, after receiving Lazan’s report, he reinforced Reding, who was -still at Granollers, and directed him upon Cardadeu. - -The 14th, he ordered Francisco Milans to march by Mattaro and -Arenas de Mar, to examine the coast road, and, if the enemy was not -in that line, to repair also to Cardadeu. - -The 15th, Milans, as we have seen, was beaten at St. Celoni; but, -in the night, he rallied his whole division on the heights of -Cordera, thus flanking the left of the French forces at Llinas. - -A council of war was held on the 13th. Caldagues advised that four -thousand Migueletes should be left to observe Duhesme, and that the -rest of the army should march at once to fight St. Cyr. Good and -soldier-like advice; but Vives was loth to abandon the siege of -Barcelona, and, adopting half-measures, left Caldagues, with the -right wing of the army, to watch Duhesme, and carried the centre -and the left, by the route of Granollers, to the heights between -Cardadeu and Llinas, where (exclusive of Milan’s division) he -united, in the night of the 15th, about eight thousand regulars, -besides several thousand Somatenes. Duhesme immediately occupied -the posts abandoned by Vives, and thus separated him from Caldagues. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -St. Cyr’s position, on the morning of the 16th, would have been -dangerous, if he had been opposed by any but Spanish generals and -Spanish troops. Vives and those about him, irresolute and weak -as they were in action, were not deficient in boasting words; -they called the French army, in derision, “_the succour_;” and, -in allusion to the battle of Baylen, announced that a second -“_bull-fight_,” in which Reding was again the “_matador_,” would be -exhibited. But Dupont and St. Cyr were men of a different stamp: -the latter justly judging that the Spaniards were not troops to -stand the shock of a good column, united his army in one solid -mass, at day-break on the 16th, and marched straight against the -centre of the enemy, giving orders that the head of the column -should go headlong on, without either firing or forming line. - - -BATTLE OF CARDADEU. - -The hills which the Spaniards occupied were high and wooded; the -right was formed by Reding’s division, the left by Vives, and -the Somatenes hung on the sides of a lofty ridge, which was only -separated from the right of the position by the little river -Mogent. The main road from Llinas led straight upon the centre, and -there was a second road conducting to Mataro, which, branching off -from the first, run between the Mogent and the right of Reding’s -ground. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -When the French commenced their march, the Somatenes galled their -left flank, and general Pino, whose division headed the column of -attack, instead of falling upon the centre, sent back for fresh -instructions, and meanwhile extended his first brigade in a line to -the left. St. Cyr, who had reiterated the order to fight in column, -was sorely troubled at Pino’s error, the ill effects of which were -instantly felt, because, Reding advancing against the front and -flank of the extended brigade, obliged it to commence a fire, which -it was impossible to sustain for want of ammunition. - -In this difficulty the French general acted with great ability and -vigour: Pino’s second brigade was directed to do that which the -first should have done. Two companies were sent to menace the left -of the Spaniards, and St. Cyr, at the same time, rapidly carried -Souham’s division, by the Mataro road, against Reding’s extreme -right. The effect was instantaneous and complete, the Spaniards -overthrown on their centre and right, and charged by the cavalry, -were beaten and dispersed in every direction, leaving all their -artillery and ammunition, and two thousand prisoners behind. - -Vives, escaping on foot across the mountain, reached Mataro, where -he was taken on board an English vessel. Reding fled on horseback -by the main road; and the next day, having rallied some of the -fugitives at Monmalo, retreated by the route of San Culgat to -Molino del Rey. The loss of the French was six hundred men; but -the battle, which lasted only one hour, was so complete, that St. -Cyr resolved to push on to Barcelona immediately, without seeking -to defeat Milans or Lazan, whom he judged too timid to venture an -action: moreover, he hoped that Duhesme, who had been informed, on -the 7th, of the intended march, and who could hear the sound of the -artillery, would intercept and turn back the flying troops. - -The French army had scarcely quitted the field of battle when -Milans arrived; but, finding how matters stood, retired to Arenas -de Mar, and gave notice to Lazan, who retreated to Gerona. St. -Cyr’s rear was thus cleared; but Duhesme, heedless of what was -passing at Cardadeu, instead of intercepting the beaten army, -sent Lecchi to attack Caldagues. The latter general, however, -concentrated his division on the evening of the 16th, repulsed -Lecchi, and retired behind the Llobregat, but left behind some -artillery and the large magazines which Vives had collected for the -siege and accumulated in his camp. - -St. Cyr reached Barcelona without encountering any of Duhesme’s -troops, and, in his Memoirs of this campaign, represents that -general as astonishingly negligent, seeking neither to molest the -enemy nor to meet the French army; treating everything belonging to -the service with indifference, making false returns, and conniving -at gross malversation in his generals. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -St. Cyr, now reflecting upon the facility with which his opponents -could be defeated, and the difficulty of pursuing them, resolved -to rest a few days at Barcelona, in hopes that the Spaniards, if -unmolested, would re-assemble in numbers behind the Llobregat, -and enable him to strike an effectual blow, for his design -was to disperse their forces so as they should not be able to -interrupt the sieges which he meditated; nor was he deceived in -his calculations. Reding joined Caldagues, and rallied from twelve -to fifteen thousand men behind the Llobregat, and Vives, having -relanded at Sitjes, sent orders to Lazan and Milans to march -likewise to that river by the district of Vallés. The arrival of -the latter was, however, so uncertain that the French general, -judging it better to attack Reding at once, united Chabran’s -division to his own, on the 20th, and advanced to St. Felieu de -Llobregat. - -The Spaniards were drawn up on the heights behind the village of -San Vincente; their position was lofty and rugged, commanding a -free view of the approaches from Barcelona. The Llobregat covered -the front, and the left flank was secure from attack, except at the -bridge of Molino del Rey, which was entrenched, guarded by a strong -detachment, and protected by heavy guns. Reding’s cavalry amounted -to one thousand, and he had fifty pieces of artillery, the greatest -part of which were in battery at the bridge of Molino del Rey; but -his right was accessible, because the river was fordable in several -places. The main road to Villa Franca led through this position, -and, at the distance of ten or twelve miles in the rear, the pass -of Ordal offered another post of great strength. - -Vives was at San Vincente on the 19th, but returned to Villa Franca -the same day; hence, when the French appeared on the 20th, the camp -was thrown into confusion. - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -A council of war being held, one party was for fighting, another -for retreating to Ordal: an officer was then sent to Vives for -orders, but he returned with a message, that Reding might retreat -if he could not defend his post. The latter, however, fearing -that he should be accused, and perhaps sacrificed for returning -without reason, resolved to fight, although he anticipated nothing -but disaster. The season was extremely severe; snow was falling, -and both armies suffered from the cold and wet. The Spanish -soldiers were dispirited by past defeats, and the despondency and -irresolution of their generals could not escape observation: but -the French and Italian troops were confident in their commander, -and flushed with success. In these dispositions the two armies -passed the night before - - -THE BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY. - -St. Cyr observing that Reding’s attention was principally directed -to the bridge of Molino, ordered Chabran’s division to that side, -with instructions to create a diversion, by opening a fire from -some artillery, and then retiring, as if his guns could not resist -the weight of the Spanish metal; in short, to persuade the enemy -that a powerful effort would be made there; but when the centre and -right of the Spaniards should be attacked, Chabran was to force -the passage of the bridge, and assail the heights beyond it. This -stratagem succeeded; Reding massed his troops on the left, and -neglected his right, which was the real point of attack. - -The 21st of December, Pino’s division crossed the Llobregat at -daylight, by a ford in front of St. Felieu, and marched against -the right of the Spanish position: Chabot’s division followed; and -Souham’s, which had passed at a ford lower down, and then ascended -by the right bank, covered Pino’s passage. The light cavalry -were held in reserve behind Chabot’s division, and a regiment of -cuirassiers was sent to support Chabran at Molino del Rey. - -The Spanish position consisted of two mountain heads, separated -by a narrow ravine and a torrent; and as the troops of the right -wing were exceedingly weakened, they were immediately chased off -their headland by the leading brigade of Pino’s division. Reding -then seeing his error, changed his front, and drew up on the other -mountain, on a new line, nearly perpendicular to the Llobregat; but -he still kept a strong detachment at the bridge of Molino, which -was thus in rear of his left. The French divisions formed rapidly -for a fresh effort. Souham on the right, Pino in the centre, Chabot -on the left. The latter gained ground in the direction of Villa -Franca, and endeavoured to turn the Spaniards’ right, and cut off -their retreat; while the light cavalry making way between the -mountain and the river, sought to connect themselves with Chabran -at Molino. - -St. Cyr’s columns, crossing the ravine that separated them from -the Spaniards, soon ascended the opposite mountain. The Catalans -had formed quickly, and opposed their enemies with an orderly, but -ill directed fire. Their front line then advanced, and offered to -charge with an appearance of great intrepidity; but their courage -sunk, and they turned as the hostile masses approached. The -reserves immediately opened a confused volley upon both parties; -and in this disorder, the road to Villa Franca being intercepted by -Chabot, the right was forced upon the centre, the centre upon the -left, and the whole pushed back in confusion upon Molino del Rey. - -Meanwhile a detachment from Chabran’s division had passed the -Llobregat above Molino, and so blocked the road to Martorel; and -in this miserable situation the Spaniards were charged by the -light cavalry, and scarcely a man would have escaped if Chabran -had obeyed his orders, and pushing across the bridge of Molino -had come upon their rear; but that general, at all times feeble in -execution, remained a tranquil spectator of the action, until the -right of Souham’s division reached the bridge; and thus the routed -troops escaped, by dispersing, and throwing away every thing that -could impede their flight across the mountains. Vives reached the -field of battle just as the route was complete, and was forced to -fly with the rest. The victorious army pursued in three columns; -Chabran’s in the direction of Igualada, Chabot’s by the road of -San Sadurni, which turned the pass of Ordal, and Souham’s by the -royal route of Villa Franca, at which place the head-quarters were -established on the 22d. The posts of Villa Nueva and Sitjes were -immediately occupied by Pino, while Souham pushed the fugitives to -the gates of Tarragona. - -The loss of the Spaniards, owing to their swiftness, was less than -might have been expected; not more than twelve hundred fell into -the hands of the French, but many superior officers were killed or -wounded; and, on the 22d, the count de Caldagues was taken, a man -apparently pedantic in military affairs, and wanting in modesty, -but evidently possessed of both courage and talent. The whole of -the artillery, and vast quantities of powder, were captured, and -with them a magazine of English muskets, quite new. Yet many of -the Migueletes were unarmed, and the junta were unceasing in their -demands for succours of this nature; but the history of any one -province was the history of all Spain. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -[Sidenote: Cabanes.] - -Barcelona was now completely relieved, and the captured magazines -supplied it for several months. There was no longer a Spanish -army in the field; and in Tarragona, where some eight or nine -thousand of the Spanish fugitives, from this and the former battle, -had taken refuge, there was terrible disorder. The people rose -tumultuously, broke open the public stores, and laying hands on -all the weapons they could find, rushed from place to place, as if -searching for something to vent their fury upon. The head of Vives -was called for; and to save his life, he was cast into prison by -Reding, who was proclaimed general-in-chief. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -The regular officers were insulted by the populace, and there was -as usual a general cry to defend the city, mixed with furious -menaces against traitors, but there were neither guns, nor -ammunition, nor provisions; and during the first moment of anarchy, -St. Cyr might certainly have rendered himself master of Tarragona -by a vigorous effort. But the opportunity soon passed away; the -French general sought only to procure subsistence, and occupied -himself in forming a train of field artillery; while Reding, who -had been almost without hope, proceeded to rally the army, and -place the town in a state of defence. - -[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The 1st of January eleven thousand infantry and eight hundred -cavalry were re-assembled at Tarragona and Reus; and a Swiss -regiment from Majorca and two Spanish regiments from Granada, -increased this force. Three thousand four hundred men arrived from -Valencia on the 5th, and from thence also five thousand muskets, -ammunition in proportion, and ten thousand pikes which had just -been landed from England, were forwarded to Tarragona. A supply -of money, obtained from the British agents at Seville, completed -the number of fortuitous and fortunate events that combined to -remedy the disaster of Molino del Rey. These circumstances, and the -inactivity of St. Cyr, who seemed suddenly paralyzed, restored the -confidence of the Catalonians, but their system remained unchanged; -for confidence among the Spaniards always led to insubordination, -but never to victory. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -Meanwhile, a part of the troops flying from Molino had taken refuge -at Bruch, and being joined by the Somatenes, chose major Green, -one of the English military agents, for their general, thinking -to hold that strong country, which was considered as impregnable -ever since the defeats of Chabran and Swartz. St. Cyr, glad of this -opportunity to retrieve the honour of the French arms, detached -Chabran himself, on the 11th of January, to take his own revenge; -but that general was still depressed by the recollection of his -former defeat. To encourage him, Chabot was directed from San -Sadurni upon Igualada, by which the defile of Bruch was turned, and -a permanent defence rendered impossible. The Spaniards, however, -made little or no resistance; and eight guns were taken, and a -considerable number of men killed. The French pursued to Igualada; -and a detachment, without orders, even assailed and took Montserrat -itself, and afterwards rejoined the main body without loss. Chabot -was then recalled to San Sadurni, and Chabran was quartered at -Martorel. - -While these events were passing beyond the Llobregat, the marquis -of Lazan was advancing, with seven or eight thousand men, towards -Castellon de Ampurias. The 1st of January he drove back a -battalion of infantry upon Rosas with considerable loss; but the -next day general Reille, having assembled about three thousand -men, intercepted Lazan’s communications, and attacked him in his -position behind the Muga. The victory seems to have been undecided; -but in the night, Lazan regained his communications, and returned -to Gerona. - -The battle of Molino del Rey checked, for a time, the ardour of -the Catalans, and Reding at first avoided serious actions, leaving -the Somatenes to harass the enemy. This plan being followed during -the months of January and February, was exceedingly troublesome to -St. Cyr, because he was obliged to send small parties continually -to seek for subsistence, and the country people, hiding their -provisions with great care, strove hard to protect their scanty -stores. But in the beginning of February the country between the -Llobregat and Tarragona was almost exhausted of food. The English -ships continued to vex the coast-line; and the French, besides -deserters, lost many men, killed and wounded, in the innumerable -petty skirmishes sustained by the marauding parties. Still St. -Cyr maintained his positions; and the country people, tired of a -warfare in which they were the chief sufferers, clamoured against -Reding, that he, with a large regular force, should look calmly -on, until the last morsel of food was discovered, and torn from -their starving families. The townspeople, also feeling the burthen -of supporting the troops, impatiently urged the general to fight; -nor was this insubordination confined to the rude multitude. - -Lazan, although at the head of nine thousand men, had remained -perfectly inactive after the skirmish at Castellon de Ampurias; but -when Reding required him to leave a suitable garrison in Gerona, -and bring the rest of his troops to Igualada, he would not obey; -and this difference was only terminated by Lazan’s marching, with -five thousand men, to the assistance of Zaragoza. The result of his -operations there has been already related in the narrative of that -siege. - -The army immediately under Reding was, however, very considerable: -the Swiss battalions were numerous and good, and some of the most -experienced of the Spanish regiments were in Catalonia. Every fifth -man of the robust population had been called out after the defeat -of Molino del Rey; and, although the people, averse to serve as -regular soldiers, did not readily answer the call, the forces under -Reding were so augmented that, in the beginning of February, it -was not less than twenty-eight thousand men. The urban guards were -also put in activity, and above fifteen thousand Somatenes assisted -the regular troops; but there was more show than real power, for -Reding was incapable of wielding the regular troops skilfully; and -the Migueletes being ill armed, without clothing and insubordinate, -devastated the country equally with the enemy. - -The Somatenes, who only took arms for local interests, would not -fight, except at the times and in the manner and place that suited -themselves; and not only neglected the advice of the regular -officers, but reviled all who would not adopt their own views; -causing many to be removed from their commands; and, with all -this, the Spanish generals never obtained good information of -the enemy’s movements, yet their own plans were immediately made -known to the French; because, at Reding’s head-quarters, as at -those of Castaños before the battle of Tudela, every project was -openly and ostentatiously discussed. Reding himself was a man of no -military talent; his activity was of body, not of mind, but he was -brave and honourable, and popular; because, being without system, -arrangement, or deep design, and easy in his nature, he thwarted no -man’s humours, and thus floated in the troubled waters until their -sudden reflux left him on the rocks. - -The Catalonian army was now divided into four distinct corps. - -Alvarez, with four thousand men, held Gerona and the Ampurdan. - -Lazan, with five thousand, was near Zaragoza. - -Don Juan Castro, an officer, accused by the Spaniards of treachery, -and who afterwards did attach himself to Joseph’s party, occupied, -with sixteen thousand men, a line extending from Olesa, on the -Upper Llobregat, to the pass of San Cristina, near Tarragona, and -this line running through Bruch, Igualada, and Llacuna, was above -sixty miles long. The remainder of the army, amounting to ten -or twelve thousand men under Reding himself, were quartered at -Tarragona, Reus, and the immediate vicinity of those places. - -The Spaniards were fed from Valencia and Aragon, (the convoys -from the former being conveyed in vessels along the coast). Their -magazines were accumulated on one or two points of the line, and -those points being chosen without judgement fettered Reding’s -movements and regulated those of the French, whose only difficulty, -in fact, was to procure food. - -[Sidenote: Appendix No. 1, section 6.] - -Early in February, St. Cyr, having exhausted the country about -him, and having his communications much vexed by the Somatenes and -by descents from the English ships, closed his posts and kept his -divisions in masses at Vendril, Villa Franca, San Sadurni, and -Martorel. The seventh corps at this period having been reinforced -by the German division, and by some conscripts, amounted to -forty-eight thousand men, of which forty-one thousand were under -arms; but the force immediately commanded by St. Cyr did not exceed -twenty-three thousand of all arms. - -The relative position of the two armies was, however, entirely in -favour of the French general, his line extending from Vendril, -by Villa Franca, to Martorel, was not more than thirty miles, -and he had a royal road by which to retreat on Barcelona. The -Spanish posts covering, as I have said, an extent of above -sixty miles, formed a half-circle round the French line, and -their communications were more rugged than those of St. Cyr. -Nevertheless, it is not to be doubted that, by avoiding any serious -action, the Catalans would have obliged the French to abandon -the country, between the Llobregat and Tarragona. Famine and -the continued drain of men, in a mountain warfare, would have -forced them away; nor could they have struck any formidable blow -to relieve themselves, seeing that all the important places were -fortified towns requiring a regular siege. The never-failing -arrogance of the Spanish character, and the unstable judgement of -Reding, induced him to forego these advantages. The closing of -the French posts and some success in a few petty skirmishes were -magnified, the last into victories and the first into a design on -the part of the enemy to fly. - -An intercourse opened with some of the inhabitants of Barcelona -likewise gave hopes of regaining that city by means of a conspiracy -within the walls. The Catalans had before made proposals to general -Lecchi to deliver up the citadel of that place, nor is there any -thing that more strongly marks the absurd self-sufficiency of the -Spaniards, during this war, than the repeated attempts they made -to corrupt the French commanders. As late as the year 1810, Martin -Carrera, being at the head of about two thousand ragged peasants, -half-armed, and only existing under the protection of the English -outposts, offered to marshal Ney, then investing Ciudad Rodrigo, -rank and honours in the Spanish army if he would desert! - -Reding, swayed by the popular clamour, resolved to attack, and in -this view he directed Castro to collect his sixteen thousand men -and fall upon the right flank and rear of St. Cyr, by the routes -of Llacuna and Igualada, and to send a detachment to seize the -pass of Ordal, and thus cut off the French line of retreat to -Barcelona. Meanwhile, advancing with eight thousand by the road -of Vendril and St. Cristina; Reding, himself, was to attack the -enemy in front. All the Migueletes and Somatenes between Gerona -and the Besos were to aid in these operations, the object being to -surround the French, a favourite project with the Spaniards at all -times; and as they publicly announced this intention, the joy was -universal, and the destruction of the hostile army was as usual -anticipated with the utmost confidence. - -The Catalans were in motion on the 14th of February, but St. Cyr -kept his army well in hand until the Spaniards being ready to -break in upon him, he judged it politic to strike first. Souham’s -division remained at Vendril, to keep Reding in check, but on the -16th St. Cyr marched from Villa Franca, with Pino’s division, and -overthrew Castro’s advanced posts which were at Lacuña and Saint -Quinti. The Spanish centre thus pierced, and their wings completely -separated, Castro’s right was thrown back upon Capellades. - -The 17th, St. Cyr, continuing his movement with Pino’s division, -reached Capellades, where he expected to unite with Chabot and -Chabran, who had orders to concentrate there,--the one from -San Sadurin, the other from Martorel. By this skilful movement -the French general avoided the pass of Bruch, and massed three -divisions on the extreme right of Castro’s left wing and close to -his magazines, which were at Igualada. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -Chabot arrived the first, and, being for a little time unsupported, -was attacked and driven back with loss, but when the other -divisions came up, the action was restored, and the Spaniards -put to flight; they rallied again at Pobla de Claramunt, between -Capellades and Igualada, a circumstance agreeable to St. Cyr, -because he had sent Mazzuchelli’s brigade from Llacuna direct upon -Igualada, and if Chabot had not been so hard pressed, the action -at Capellades was to have been delayed until Mazzuchelli had got -into the rear; but scarcely was the head of that general’s column -descried, when Castro, who was at Igualada with his reserves, -recalled the troops from Pobla de Claramunt. The French being close -at their heels, the whole passed through Igualada, fighting and in -disorder, after which, losing all courage, the Spaniards broke, -and, throwing away their arms, fled by the three routes of Cervera, -Calaf, and Manresa. They were pursued all the 17th, and the French -returned the next day, but with few prisoners, because, says St. -Cyr, “_the Catalans are endowed by nature with strong knees_.” - -Having thus broken through the centre of the Spanish line, defeated -a part of the left wing and taken the magazines, St. Cyr posted -Chabot and Chabran, at Igualada, to keep the beaten troops in -check, but himself, with Pino’s division, marched the 18th to -fall upon Reding, whose extreme left was now at St. Magi. Souham -had been instructed, when by preconcerted signals he should know -that the attack at Igualada had succeeded, to force the pass of -Cristina, and push forward to Villa Radoña, upon which town St. Cyr -was now marching. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -The position of St. Magi was attacked at four o’clock in the -evening of the 18th, and carried without difficulty, but it was -impossible to find a single peasant to guide the troops, on the -next day’s march to the abbey of Santa Creus. In this perplexity, -a wounded Spanish captain, who was prisoner, demanded to be -allowed to go to Tarragona. St. Cyr assented and offered to carry -him to the Creus, and thus the prisoner unconsciously acted as a -guide to his enemies. The march being long and difficult, it was -late ere they reached the abbey. It was a strong point, and being -occupied in force by the troops that had been beaten from San Magi -the evening before, the French, after a fruitless demonstration of -assaulting it, took a position for the night. Meanwhile, Reding -hearing of Castro’s defeat, had made a draft of men and guns from -the right wing, and marched by Pla and the pass of Cabra, intending -to rally his left. His road being just behind St. Creus, he was -passing at the moment when the French appeared before that place, -but neither general was aware of the other’s presence, and each -continued his particular movement. - -The 20th St. Cyr crossed the Gaya river under a fire from the -abbey, and continued his rapid march upon Villa Radoña, near which -place he dispersed a small corps; but finding that Souham was not -come up, he sent an officer, escorted by a battalion, to hasten -that general, whose non-arrival gave reason to believe that the -staff-officers and spies, sent with the previous instructions, had -all been intercepted. This caused the delay of a day and a half, -which would otherwise have sufficed to crush Reding’s right wing, -surprised as it would have been, without a chief, in the plain of -Tarragona. - -While St. Cyr rested at Villa Radoña, Reding pursued his march to -St. Coloma de Querault, and having rallied many of Castro’s troops, -the aspect of affairs was totally changed; for the defile of San -Cristina being forced by Souham, he reached Villa Radoña on the -21st, and, at the same time, all the weakly men, who had been left -in charge of the head-quarters at Villa Franca, also arrived. Thus -more than two-thirds of the whole French army were concentrated at -that town at the moment when the Spanish commander, being joined by -the detachment beaten from San Cristina and by the battalion at the -abbey, also rallied the greatest part of his forces, at St. Coloma -de Querault. Each general could now, by a rapid march, overwhelm -his adversary’s right wing; but the troops left by Reding, in the -plain of Tarragona, might have retired upon that fortress, while -those left by St. Cyr, at Igualada, were without support. Hence, -when the latter commander, continuing his movement on Tarragona, -reached Valls the 22d, and heard of Reding’s march, he immediately -carried Pino’s division to Pla and the pass of Cabra, resolved, if -the Spanish general should advance towards Igualada, to follow him -with a sharp spur. - -The 23d the French halted: Souham at Valls to watch the Spanish -troops in the plain of Tarragona; Pino’s division at Pla and Cabra, -sending, however, detachments to the abbey of Creus and towards -Santa Coloma to feel for Reding. In the evening these detachments -returned with some prisoners; the one from Creus reported that the -abbey was abandoned; the other that the Spanish general was making -his way back to Tarragona, by the route of Sarreal and Momblanch. -Hereupon St. Cyr, remaining in person with Pino’s division at Pla, -pushed his advanced posts on the right to the abbey of San Creus, -and in front to the defile of Cabra, designing to encounter the -Spaniards, if they returned by either of those roads. Souham’s -division took a position in front of Valls, with his left on the -Francoli river, his right towards Pla, and his advanced guard at -Pixa Moxons, watching for Reding by the road of Momblanch. - -The 24th the Spanish general, being at St. Coloma, called a -council of war, at which colonel Doyle, the British military -agent, assisted. One party was for fighting St. Cyr, another for -retreating to Lerida, a third for attacking Chabran, at Igualada, -a fourth for regaining the plain of Tarragona. There were many -opinions, but neither wisdom nor resolution; and finally, Reding, -leaving general Wimpfen, with four thousand men, at San Coloma, -decided to regain Tarragona, and took the route of Momblanch with -ten thousand of his best troops, following the Spanish accounts, -but St. Cyr says with fifteen thousand. Reding knew that Valls -was occupied, and that the line of march was intercepted, but he -imagined the French to be only five or six thousand, for the exact -situation and strength of an enemy were particulars that seldom -troubled Spanish generals. - -The 25th of February the head of Reding’s column was suddenly -fired upon, at daybreak, by Souham’s detachment, at Pixa Moxons. -The French were immediately driven back upon the main body, and, -the attack being continued, the whole division was forced to give -way. During the fight the Spanish baggage and artillery passed -the Francoli river; and the road to Tarragona being thus opened, -Reding might have effected his retreat without difficulty, but he -continued to press Souham until St. Cyr, who had received early -intelligence of the action, came down in all haste, from Pla, upon -the left flank of the Spaniards, and the latter seeing the French -dragoons, who preceded the infantry, enter in line, retired in good -order across the Francoli, and took a position behind that river. -From this ground Reding proposed to retreat in the evening; but St. -Cyr obliged him to fight there. - - -BATTLE OF VALLS. - -It was three o’clock when, Pino’s division being come up, St. Cyr’s -recommenced the action. The banks of the Francoli were steep and -rugged, and the Spanish position strong and difficult of access; -but the French general, as he himself states, wishing to increase -the moral ascendancy of his soldiers, forbad the artillery, -although excellently placed for execution, to play upon Reding’s -battalions, fearing that otherwise the latter would fly before -they could be attained by the infantry, and, under this curious -arrangement, the action was begun by the light troops. - -The French, or rather the Italians, were superior in numbers to -the Spaniards, and the columns, covered by the skirmishers, passed -the river with great alacrity, and ascended the heights under an -exceedingly regular fire, which was continued until the attacking -troops had nearly reached the summit of the position; but then both -Swiss and Catalans began to waver, and, ere the assailants could -close with them, broke, and were charged by the French cavalry. -Reding, after receiving several sabre wounds, saved himself at -Tarragona, where the greatest number of the vanquished also took -refuge, but the remainder fled in the greatest disorder on the -routes of Tortosa and Lerida. - -The count of Castel d’Orius, general of the cavalry, many superior -officers, and the whole of the artillery and baggage were taken, -and four thousand men were killed or wounded; the loss of the -French was about a thousand; and, during all these movements and -actions, Reding received no assistance from the Somatenes; nor is -this surprising, for it may be taken as an axiom in war, that armed -peasants are only formidable to stragglers. When the regular forces -engage, the peasant, sensible of his own weakness, gladly quits the -field. - -The 26th Souham’s division, descending into the plain of Tarragona, -took possession of the large and rich town of Reus, from which, -contrary to the general custom, the inhabitants had not fled. -Pino’s division occupied Pla, Alcover, and Valls; detachments were -sent to Salou and Villaseca, on the sea-coast, west of Tarragona; -and Chabot, being recalled from Igualada, was posted at the abbey -of Santa Creus, to watch the troops under Wimpfen, who was still at -St. Coloma de Querault. - -The battle of Valls finished the regular warfare in Catalonia. -Those detachments, which by the previous movements had been cut off -from the main body of the army, joined the Somatenes, and, acting -as partizan corps, troubled the communications of the French; but -St. Cyr had no longer a regular army to deal with in the field; -and Tortosa, which was in a miserably defenceless condition, and -without provisions, must have fallen, if after the battle any -attempt had been made against it. But the whole country was filled -with confusion; nor was the disorder momentary; for although Lazan, -after his defeat near Zaragoza, carried a few men to Tortosa, -he declared himself independent of Reding’s command. The fall -of Zaragoza, also, had stricken terror far and wide; and the -neighbouring provinces feared and acted each for its own safety, -without regard to any general plan. - -The fugitives from Valls, joined to the troops already in -Tarragona, crowded the latter place; and an infectious disorder -breaking out, a great mortality ensued. - -St. Cyr, satisfied that sickness should do the work of the sword, -begirt the city, and resolved to hold his positions while food -could be procured. In this policy he remained stedfast until the -middle of March, although Wimpfen attacked and drove Chabran in -succession from Igualada, Llacuna, and St. Quinti, to Villa Franca; -and although the two Milans and Claros, acting between the Besos -and the Llobregat, cut the communication with Barcelona, and in -conjunction with the English squadron, renewed the blockade of that -city. This plan was injudicious; for notwithstanding the sickness -in Tarragona, the subjugation of Catalonia was retarded by the -cessation of active hostilities. The object of the French general -should have been, while the terror of his victories was fresh, to -gain secure posts, such as Tortosa, Tarragona, Gerona, or Lerida, -from whence he could issue out, and clear the country, from time to -time, of the bands that might be assembled. His inactivity after -the battle of Molino del Rey, and at this period, enabled the -Catalonians to recover from their fears, and to put these towns in -a state of defence. - -Towards the middle of March the resources of the country being -all exhausted, St. Cyr at last determined to abandon the plains -of Tarragona, and take some position where he could feed his -troops, cover the projected seige of Gerona, and yet be at hand to -relieve Barcelona. The valleys about Vich alone offered all these -advantages; but as Claros and the Milans were in force at Molino -del Rey, he ordered Chabran to drive them from that point, that -the sick and wounded men might be first transferred from Valls to -Barcelona. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -The 10th of March, Chabran sent a battalion with one piece of -artillery on that service. The Migueletes thinking it was the -advanced guard of a greater force, abandoned the post; but being -undeceived, returned, beat the battalion, and took the gun. The -12th, Chabran having received orders to march with his whole -division, consisting of eight battalions and three squadrons, -reached the bridge, but returned without daring to attack. St. Cyr -repeated his orders, and on the 14th the troops, apparently ashamed -of their general’s irresolution, fell on vigorously, and, having -carried the bridge, established themselves on the heights on both -sides of the river. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -The communication thus opened, it was found that Duhesme, -pressed by the Migueletes without, was also extremely fearful of -conspiracies within the walls: that his fears, and the villainous -conduct of his police, had at last excited the inhabitants to -attempt that which their enemies seemed so much to dread; and -in March, an insurrection being planned in concert with the -Migueletes and with the English squadron, the latter came close in -and cannonaded the town on the 10th, expecting that Wimpfen, the -Milans, and Claros would have assaulted the gates, which was to -have been the signal for the insurrection within. - -The inhabitants were the more sanguine of success, because there -were above two thousand Spanish prisoners in the city; and -outside the walls there were two tercios secretly recruited and -maintained by the citizens: these men being without uniforms, -constantly passed in and out of the town, and Duhesme was never -able to discover or to prevent them. This curious circumstance is -illustrative of the peculiar genius of the Spaniards, which in all -matters of surprise and stratagem is unrivalled. The project was, -however, baffled by Chabran’s action at Molino del Rey, on the -14th, which dispersed the partizan corps outside the walls; and the -British squadron being exposed to a heavy gale, and disappointed in -the co-operation from the land, sailed away on the 11th. - -St. Cyr intended to commence his retrograde movement on the 18th; -but on the 17th a cannonade was heard on the side of Momblanch, -which was ascertained to proceed from a detachment of six hundred -men, with two guns, under the command of Colonel Briche. This -officer being sent by Mortier to open the communication with St. -Cyr, after the fall of Zaragoza, had forced his way through the -Spanish partizan corps. To favour his return the army halted two -days; but the enterprize, after a trial, appeared so dangerous, -that he relinquished it, and attached himself to the seventh corps. - -The inactivity that succeeded the battle of Valls, and the timidity -displayed by Chabran in the subsequent skirmishes, having depressed -the spirits of the troops, they contemplated the approaching -retreat with great uneasiness; and many officers, infected with -panic doubt, advised the general to hide his movements from the -enemy: but he, anxious to restore their confidence, took the part -of giving the Spaniards a formal notice of his intentions; and -desired of Reding that he would send proper officers to take over -the hospitals which had been fitted up at Valls, as well as some of -the French, wounded, that could not be moved. This done, the army -commencing its retreat, reached Villa Franca the 21st of March; and -the 22d passed the Llobregat, followed, but not molested, by some -feeble Spanish detachments. - -The 23d, general Pino attacked and defeated Wimpfen, who having -rallied the corps of Claros and the Milans, after the affair on -the 24th, had taken a position at Tarrasa. Pino pursued him to -the vicinity of Manresa, foraged that country, and returned with -sufficient provisions to feed the army, without drawing on the -magazines of Barcelona. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -During these proceedings, Reding died in Tarragona of his wounds. -He had been received there with great dissatisfaction after the -battle of Valls, and the interference of the British consul was -necessary to save him from the first fury of the populace, who were -always ready to attribute a defeat to the treachery of the general. -His military conduct was, by his own officers, generally and justly -condemned; but although his skill in war was slight, his courage -and honesty were unquestionable; and he was of distinguished -humanity; for, at this unhappy period, when the French prisoners -in every part of Spain were tortured with the most savage cruelty; -when to refrain from such deeds was to incur suspicion, Reding had -the manliness, not only to repress all barbarities within the range -of his command, but even to conclude a convention with St. Cyr, -under which the wounded men on both sides were to receive decent -treatment, and to be exchanged as soon as their hurts were cured. - -In his last moments Reding complained that he had been ill-served -as a general; that the Somatenes had not supported him; that his -orders were neglected; his plans disclosed to the enemy; and -that he could never get true intelligence; complaints which the -experience of Moore, Baird, Cradock, Murray, and, above all, of -Wellington, proved to be applicable to every part of Spain, and -every period of the war. - -Coupigny succeeded Reding, but he was soon superseded by general -Blake, who, for reasons hereafter to be mentioned, was appointed -captain-general of the “_Coronilla_,” or Little Crown, a title -given to the three provinces of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia, -when united; and, as the warfare in Aragon thus became immediately -connected with that in Catalonia, I shall here give a short account -of what was passing in the former province. - -When Zaragoza fell, marshal Lasnes was recalled to France; Mortier, -who succeeded him in the command, sent detachments against Jaca -and Monzon; and threatened Mequinenza and Lerida. The Fort of -Monzon, commanding a passage over the Cinca river, was abandoned -by the Spaniards, and the town and citadel of Jaca surrendered: -whereby the French opened a new and important communication with -France. But, Lerida being fruitlessly summoned, and some slight -demonstrations made against Mequinenza having failed, Mortier -cantoned his troops on both sides of the Ebro, from Barbastro to -Alcanitz, and despatched colonel Briche, as we have seen, to open -a communication with the seventh corps; but, in April, the fifth -corps marched for Castile, and general Junot was left with a part -only of the third corps to maintain Aragon. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -Many of the French artillery-men and non-commissioned officers had -been withdrawn from Spain to serve in Germany. One brigade of the -third corps also was employed to protect the communications on the -side of Navarre, and another was detached to escort the prisoners -from Zaragoza to Bayonne. These drafts, added to the loss sustained -during the siege, reduced the number of troops in Aragon to about -twelve thousand disposable men under arms. - -Junot, being sick, returned to France, and general Suchet succeeded -him. The weakness of the army gave great uneasiness to the new -general,--an uneasiness which was not allayed by finding that -men and officers were, from various causes, discontented and -dispirited. Suchet was, however, no ordinary man; and, with equal -prudence and vigour, he commenced a system of discipline in his -corps, and of order in his government, that afterwards carried -him, with scarcely a check, from one success to another, until he -obtained the rank of marshal for himself, and the honour for his -corps of being the only one in Spain that never suffered any signal -reverse. - -Suchet hoped that the battle of Valls, and other defeats sustained -by the Spaniards at this period, would give him time to re-organize -his troops in tranquillity--but this hope soon vanished. The -peasantry, observing the weakness of the third corps, only waited -for a favourable opportunity to rise, and the Migueletes and -Somatenes of the mountains about Lerida and Mequenenza were, -under the command of colonel Pereña and colonel Baget, already in -activity. - -While the duke of Abrantes yet held the command Blake’s appointment -took place; and that general drawing troops from Valencia and -Tarragona, and, being joined by Lazan, fixed his quarters at -Morella, on the frontier of Aragon. Designing to operate in that -province rather than in Catalonia, he endeavoured to re-kindle the -fire of insurrection; nor was fortune adverse to him. A part of the -garrison of Monzon having made an unsuccessful marauding excursion -beyond the Cinca, the citizens fell upon those who remained, and -obliged them to abandon that post, which was immediately occupied by -Pereña. The duke of Abrantes sent eight companies of infantry and -thirty cuirassiers to retake the place: but Baget having reinforced -Pereña, the French were repulsed, and the Cinca suddenly overflowing -behind them, cut off their retreat. The cavalry, plunging with -their horses into the river, escaped by swimming; but the infantry -finding the lower passages guarded by the garrison of Lerida, and -the upper cut off by the partizan corps, after three days’ marching -and skirmishing, surrendered to Pereña and Baget. The prisoners were -carried to Tarragona, and soon afterwards exchanged, in pursuance of -a convention made by Reding and St. Cyr. - -This little success was, as usual, sufficient to excite the most -extravagant hopes, and the garrison of Mequinenza having, about the -same time, burnt a bridge of boats which the French had thrown over -the Ebro at Caspe, Blake immediately advanced, and, driving back -the French from Beceyta and Val de Ajorfa, entered Alcanitz. The -beaten troops retired in haste and with loss to Samper and Ixar; -and it was at this moment, when the French were harassed on both -banks of the Ebro, and their wings separated by the destruction -of the bridge at Caspe, that Suchet arrived to take the command of -the third corps. Seeing his divisions disseminated over a great -tract of country, and in danger of being beaten in detail, he -immediately ordered general Habert to abandon the left bank of the -Ebro, cross that river at Fuentes, and follow in reserve upon Ixar, -where Suchet himself rallied all the rest of the troops, with the -exception of a small garrison left in Zaragoza. - - -BATTLE OF ALCANITZ. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -The French battalions were fearful and disorderly: but the general, -anxious to raise their spirits, marched towards Blake on the 23d of -May. The latter was in position in front of Alcanitz, a bridge over -the Guadalupe was immediately behind his centre, which was covered -by a hill; his left was well posted near some pools of water, but -his right was rather exposed. The French had about eight thousand -infantry and seven hundred cavalry in the field, and the Spaniards -about twelve thousand of all arms. - -Suchet, observing Blake’s dispositions, judged that if he could -carry the hill in the centre, and so separate the Spanish wings, -the latter would be cut off from the bridge of Alcanitz, and -obliged to surrender. In this design he directed a column against -each wing, to draw Blake’s attention to his flanks: but, when the -skirmishers were well engaged, three thousand men, pushing rapidly -along the main road, attacked the hillock. A brisk fire of musketry -and artillery, however, checked their progress; the Spaniards stood -firm, and the French, after a feeble effort to ascend the hill, -began to waver, and, finally, fled outright. Suchet, who was -himself slightly wounded, rallied them in the plain, and remained -there for the rest of the day, but without daring to renew the -action. In the night, he retreated; and, although not pursued, his -troops were seized with panic, and, at day-light, came pouring -into Samper with all the tumult and disorder of a rout. Blake’s -inactivity enabled Suchet to restore order; he caused the man who -first commenced the alarm to be shot; and then, encouraging the -troops that they might not seem to fly, he rested in position two -whole days, after which he retreated to Zaragoza. - -This action at Alcanitz was a subject of triumph and rejoicing -all over Spain. The supreme junta conferred an estate upon Blake; -the kingdom of Murcia was added to his command; his army rapidly -augmented; and he himself greatly elated and confirmed in a design -he had formed to retake Zaragoza, turned his whole attention to -Aragon, and totally neglected Catalonia, to which province it is -time to return. - -St. Cyr remained in Barcelona for a considerable period, during -which he endeavoured to remedy the evils of Duhesme’s government, -and to make himself acquainted with the political disposition -of the inhabitants. He filled the magazines with three months’ -provisions; and, as the prisoners within the walls were an -incumbrance, on account of their subsistence, and a source of -uneasiness from their numbers, he resolved to send them to France. -The 15th of April, having transferred his sick and weakly men -to the charge of Duhesme, and exchanged Chabran’s for Lecchi’s -division, he recommenced his march, and reached Granollers, -giving out that he was returning to the frontier of France, lest -the Catalans should remove their provisions from Vich, and thus -frustrate his principal object. - -The Migueletes, under the two Milans and Claros, were, however, on -the watch to harass the army, and had taken post beyond Garriga -on each side of a long and narrow defile in the valley of the -Congosto. This pass of surprising natural strength was barricadoed -with trees and pieces of rock, and mined in several places; and -Wimpfen also held his corps at a little distance, ready to join -Claros at the first alarm. The 16th Lecchi’s division, escorting -two thousand prisoners, appeared at the head of this defile, and -an action commenced, but in an hour the Migueletes fled on all -sides; for St. Cyr, fully aware of the strength of the position, -had secretly detached Pino to attack Wimpfen; and, while Lecchi -was engaged at the entrance, Souham and Chabot, traversing the -mountain, arrived, the one upon the flank, and the other at the -further end of this formidable pass. - -The 18th the army was established in the valley and town of Vich; -but the inhabitants, with the exception of the bishop and a few old -men, fled to the mountains with their effects, leaving, however, -their provisions behind. St. Cyr then posted Chabot’s and Pino’s -divisions at Centellas, San Martin, Tona, and Collespino, to guard -the entrance into the valley. Souham remained at Vich, his right -being at Roda and Manlieu on the Ter, and his advanced posts at -Gurp, St. Sebastian, and St. Eularia. The 24th Lecchi marched, -with the prisoners, by Filieu de Pallerols to Besalu on the -Fluvia; he was attacked several times on the route, but succeeded -in delivering his charge to general Reille, and then returned with -the first information received by St. Cyr of Napoleon’s arrival in -Paris, and the certainty of a war with Austria. To balance this, -a moveable column sent to Barcelona brought back the pleasing -intelligence that rear-admiral Comaso, with a French squadron, -having baffled the extreme vigilance of lord Collingwood, had -reached that city with ample supplies. Thus what may be called -the irregular movements in Catalonia terminated, and the more -methodical warfare of sieges commenced; but this part was committed -to other hands. General Verdier had succeeded Reille in the -Ampurdan, and marshal Augereau was on the road to supersede St. Cyr. - -[Illustration: _Plate 2. to face Pa. 102._ - - _Sketch Explanatory_ - of the - Operations in Catalonia - in - _1808 and 1809_. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - - -OBSERVATIONS.--1º. General St. Cyr’s marches were hardy, his -battles vigorous and delivered in right time and place; but his -campaign, as a whole, may be characterised as one of great efforts -without corresponding advantages. He himself attributes this to the -condition of the seventh corps, destitute and neglected, because -_the emperor disliked and wished to ruin its chief_; a strange -accusation, and unsustained by reason or facts. What! Napoleon -wilfully destroy his own armies! sacrifice forty thousand men, -that a general, who he was not obliged to employ at all, might be -disgraced! General St. Cyr acknowledges, that when he received his -instructions from the emperor, he observed the affliction of the -latter at the recent loss of Dupont’s force; yet he would have it -believed, that, in the midst of this regret, that monarch, with -a singular malice, was preparing greater disasters for himself, -merely to disgrace the general commanding the seventh corps, -and why? because the latter had formerly served with the army of -the Rhine! Yet St. Cyr met with no reverses in Catalonia, and was -afterwards made a marshal by this implacable enemy. - -2º.--That the seventh corps was not well supplied, and that its -commander was thereby placed in a difficult situation, is not to be -disputed in the face of the facts stated by general St. Cyr; but -if war were a state of ease and smoothness, the fame which attends -successful generals would be less. Napoleon selected general St. -Cyr because he thought him a capable commander; in feeble hands, -he knew the seventh corps would be weak, but, with St. Cyr at its -head, he judged it sufficient to overcome the Catalonians; nor was -he much mistaken. Barcelona, the great object of solicitude, was -saved; Rosas was taken; and if Tarragona and Tortosa did not also -fall, the one after the battle of Molino del Rey, the other after -that of Valls, it was because the French general did not choose to -attack them. Those towns were without the slightest preparation -for defence, moral or physical, and must have surrendered; nor -can the unexpected and stubborn resistance of Gerona, Zaragoza, -and Valencia be cited against this opinion. The latter cities -were previously prepared and expectant of a siege; and yet, in -every instance, except Valencia, there was a moment of dismay and -confusion, not fatal, only because the besieging generals wanted -that ready vigour which is the characteristic of great commanders. - -3º.--General St. Cyr, aware that a mere calculation of numbers -and equipment is but a poor measure of the strength of armies, -exalts the enthusiasm and the courage of the Catalans, and seems to -tremble at the danger which, owing to Napoleon’s suicidal jealousy, -menaced, at that period, not only the seventh corps but even the -south of France. In answer to this, it may be observed that M. de -St. Cyr did not hesitate, with eighteen thousand men having no -artillery, and carrying only sixty rounds of musket-ammunition, to -plunge into the midst of those terrible armies, to march through -the mountains for whole weeks, to attack the strongest positions -with the bayonet alone, nay, even to dispense with the use of his -artillery, when he did bring it into action, lest his men should -not have a sufficient contempt for their enemies. And who were -these undaunted soldiers, so high in courage, so confident, so -regardless of the great weapon of modern warfare? Not the select of -the imperial guards, the conquerors in a hundred battles, but raw -levies, the dregs and scrapings of Italy, the refuse of Naples and -of Rome, states which to name as military was to ridicule. - -4º.--With such soldiers, the battles of Cardadeu, Molino, -Igualada, and Valls, were gained; yet general St. Cyr does not -hesitate to call the Migueletes, who were beaten at those places, -the best light troops in the world. The best _light troops_ are -neither more nor less than the best troops in the world; but if, -instead of fifteen thousand Migueletes, the four thousand men -composing Wellington’s light division had been on the heights -of Cardadeu--general St. Cyr’s sixty rounds of ammunition would -scarcely have carried him to Barcelona. The injurious force with -which personal feelings act upon the judgement are well known, or -it might excite wonder that so good a writer and so able a soldier -should advance such fallacies. - -5º.--General St. Cyr’s work, admirable in many respects, bears, -nevertheless, the stamp of carelessness. Thus, he affirms that -Dupont’s march to Andalusia encouraged the tumults of Aranjues; -but the tumults of Aranjues happened in the month of March, nearly -three months previous to Dupont’s movement, which took place in -May and June. Again, he says, that, Napoleon, to make a solid -conquest in the Peninsula, should have commenced with Catalonia, -instead of over-running Spain by the northern line of operations; -an opinion quite unsustainable. The progress of the seventh corps -was impeded by the want of provisions, not by the enemy’s force. -Twenty thousand men could beat the Spaniards in the field, but they -could not subsist. What could three hundred thousand men have done? -Would it have given a just idea of Napoleon’s power to employ the -strength of his empire against the fortified towns in Catalonia? -In what would the greater solidity of this plan have consisted? -While the French were thus engaged, the patriots would have been -organizing their armies; England would have had time to bring all -her troops into line, and two hundred thousand men placed between -Zaragoza and Tortosa, or breaking into France by the western -Pyrenees, while the Austrians were advancing to the Rhine, would -have sorely shaken the solidity of general St. Cyr’s plan. - -6º.--The French emperor better understood what he was about; he -saw a nation intrinsically powerful and vehemently excited, yet -ignorant of war, and wanting the aid which England was eager to -give. All the elements of power existed in the Peninsula, and -they were fast approximating to a centre, when Napoleon burst upon -that country, and as the gathering of a water-spout is said to -be sometimes prevented by the explosion of a gun, so the rising -strength of Spain was dissipated by his sudden and dreadful -assault. If the war was not then finished, it was because his -lieutenants were tardy and jealous of each other. - -7º.--St. Cyr appears to have fallen into an error, common enough -in all times, and one very prevalent among the French generals in -Spain. He considered his task as a whole in itself, instead of a -constituent part of a greater system. He judged very well what -was wanting for the seventh corps, to subjugate Catalonia in a -solid manner, but he did not discern that it was fitting that the -seventh corps should forget Catalonia, to aid the general plan -against the Peninsula. Rosas surrendered at the very moment when -Napoleon, after the victories of Baylen, Espinosa, Tudela, and -the Somosierra, was entering Madrid as a conqueror. The battles -of Cardadeu and Molino del Rey may, therefore, be said to have -completely prostrated Spain, because the English army was isolated, -the Spanish army destroyed, and Zaragoza invested. Was that a time -to calculate the weight of powder and the number of pick-axes -required for a formal siege of Tarragona? The whole Peninsula was -shaken to the centre, the proud hearts of the Spaniards sunk with -terror, and in that great consternation, to be daring, was, on -the part of the French generals, to be prudent. St. Cyr was not -in a condition to besiege Tarragona, formally, but he might have -assaulted it with less danger than he incurred by his march to -Barcelona. The battle of Valls was another epoch of the same kind; -the English army had re-embarked, and the route of Ucles had taken -place. Portugal was invaded and Zaragoza had just fallen. That was -a time to render victory fruitful, yet no attempt was made against -Tortoza. - -8º.--St. Cyr, who justly blames Palacios and Vives for remaining -before Barcelona instead of carrying their army to the Ter and the -Fluvia, seems inclined to applaud Reding for conduct equally at -variance with the true principles of war. It was his own inactivity -after the battle of Molino that produced the army of Reding, and -the impatient folly of that army, and of the people, produced the -plan which led to the route of Igualada and the battle of Valls. -But, instead of disseminating his thirty thousand men on a line -of sixty miles, from Tarragona to the Upper Llobregat, Reding -should have put Tarragona and Tortosa into a state of defence, and, -leaving a small corps of observation near the former, have made -Lerida the base of his operations. In that position, and keeping -the bulk of his force in one mass, he might have acted on St. Cyr’s -flanks and rear effectually, by the road of Cervera--and without -danger to himself; nor could the French general have attempted -aught against Tarragona. - -But it is not with reference to the seventh corps alone that Lerida -was the proper base of the Spanish army. Let us suppose that the -supreme junta had acted for a moment upon a rational system; that -the Valencian troops, instead of remaining at Morella, had been -directed on Mequinenza and that the duke of Infantado’s force -had been carried from Cuença to the same place instead of being -routed at Ucles. Thus, in the beginning of February, more than -fifty thousand regular troops would have been assembled at Lerida, -encircled by the fortresses of Monzon, Balaguer, Mequinenza, -Tarragona, and Tortoza. Its lines of operations would have been -as numerous as the roads. The Seu d’Urgel, called the granary of -Catalonia, would have supplied corn, and the communication with -Valencia would have been direct and open. On this central and -impregnable position such a force might have held the seventh corps -in check, and also raised the siege of Zaragoza; nor could the -first corps have followed Infantado’s movements without abandoning -the whole of the emperor’s plans against Portugal and Andalusia. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -9º.--St. Cyr praises Reding’s project for surrounding the French, -and very gravely observes that the _only method_ of defeating it -was by taking the offensive himself. Nothing can be juster; but he -should have added that it was a _certain method_; and, until we -find a great commander acting upon Reding’s principles, this praise -can only be taken as an expression of civility towards a brave -adversary. St. Cyr’s own movements were very different; he disliked -Napoleon personally, but he did not dislike his manner of making -war. Buonaparte’s campaign in the Alps against Beaulieu was not an -unheeded lesson. There is, however, one proceeding of St. Cyr’s for -which there has been no precedent, and which it is unlikely will -ever be imitated, namely, the stopping of the fire of the artillery -when it was doing infinite execution, that a moral ascendancy over -the enemy might be established. It is impossible to imagine a more -cutting sarcasm on the courage of the Catalans than this fact; yet, -general St. Cyr states that his adversaries were numerous, and -fought bravely. Surely he could not have commanded so long without -knowing that _there is in all battles a decisive moment, when every -weapon, every man, every combination of force that can be brought -to bear, is necessary to gain the victory_. - -10º.--If general St. Cyr’s own marches and battles did not -sufficiently expose the fallacy of his opinions relative to the -vigour of the Catalans, lord Collingwood’s correspondence would -supply the deficiency. That able and sagacious man, writing at this -period says,-- - -“In Catalonia, every thing seems to have gone wrong since the -fall of Rosas. The Spaniards are in considerable force, yet are -dispersed and panic-struck whenever the enemy appears.”--“The -applications for supplies are unlimited; they want money, arms, -and ammunition, of which no use appears to be made when they get -them.”--“In the English papers, I see accounts of successes, and -convoys cut off, and waggons destroyed, which are not true. What -has been done in that way has been by the boats of our frigates, -which have, in two or three instances, landed men and attacked -the enemy with great gallantry. The Somatenes range the hills in -a disorderly way, and fire at a distance, but retire on being -approached.”--“The multitudes of men do not make a force.” - -Add to this the Spanish historian Cabane’s statements that the -Migueletes were always insubordinate, detested the service of the -line, and were many of them armed only with staves, and we have the -full measure of the Catalans’ resistance. - -11º.--It was not the vigour of the Catalans, but of the English, -that in this province, as in every part of the Peninsula, retarded -the progress of the French. Would St. Cyr have wasted a month -before Rosas? Would he have been hampered in his movements by his -fears for the safety of Barcelona? Would he have failed to besiege -and take Tarragona and Tortosa, if a French fleet had attended his -progress by the coast, or if it could even have made two runs in -safety? To lord Collingwood, who, like the Roman Bibulus, perished -of sickness on his decks rather than relax in his watching,--to his -keen judgement, his unceasing vigilance, the resistance made by the -Catalans was due. His fleet it was that interdicted the coast-line -to the French, protected the transport of the Spanish supplies from -Valencia, assisted in the defence of the towns, aided the retreat -of the beaten armies; in short, did that which the Spanish fleets -in Cadiz and Carthagena should have done. But the supreme junta, -equally disregarding the remonstrances of lord Collingwood, the -good of their own country, and the treaty with England, by which -they were bound to prevent their ships from falling into the hands -of the enemy, left their fleets to rot in harbour, although money -was advanced, and the assistance of the British seamen offered, to -fit them out for sea. - -Having now related the principal operations that took place in the -eastern and central provinces of Spain, which were so suddenly -overrun by the French emperor; having shown that, however restless -the Spaniards were under the yoke imposed upon them, they were -unable to throw it off; I shall turn to Portugal, where the tide of -invasion still flowing onward, although with diminished volume, was -first stayed, and finally overpowered and forced back, by a counter -flood of mightier strength. - - - - -BOOK VI. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -TRANSACTIONS IN PORTUGAL. - - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 1.] - -When sir John Moore marched from Portugal, the regency, established -by sir Hew Dalrymple, nominally governed that country; but the -weak characters of the members, the listless habits engendered -by the ancient system of misrule, the intrigues of the Oporto -faction, and the general turbulence of the people soon produced an -alarming state of anarchy. Private persons usurped the functions -of government, justice was disregarded, insubordination and murder -were hailed as indications of patriotism. War was the universal -cry, but military preparations were wholly neglected; for the -nation, in its foolish pride, believed that the French had neither -strength nor spirit for a second invasion. - -In Lisbon there was a French faction. The merchants were -apprehensive, the regency was unpopular, the public mind unsettled; -and, in Oporto, the violence of both people and soldiers was such, -that sir Harry Burrard sent two British regiments there, by sea, to -preserve tranquillity; in fine, the seeds of disorder were widely -cast and sprouting vigorously before the English cabinet thought -fit to accredit a responsible diplomatist near the government, -or to place a permanent chief at the head of the forces left by -sir John Moore. The convention of Cintra was known in England in -September. The regency was established and the frontier fortresses -occupied by British troops in the same month; yet it was not until -the middle of December that Mr. Villiers and sir John Cradock, -charged with the conduct of the political and military proceedings -in Portugal, reached Lisbon, and thus the important interval, -between the departure of Junot and their arrival, was totally -neglected by the English cabinet. - -Sir Hew Dalrymple, who had nominated the regency; sir Arthur -Wellesley, who, to local knowledge and powerful talents, added -the influence of a victorious commander; Burrard, Spencer, were -all removed from Portugal at the very moment when the presence of -persons acquainted with the real state of affairs was essential to -the well-being of the British interests in that country; and this -error was the offspring of passion and incapacity; for, if the -convention of Cintra had been rightly understood, the ministers, -appreciating the advantages of that treaty, would have resisted -the clamour of the moment, and the generals would not have been -withdrawn from the public service abroad to meet unjust and -groundless charges at home. - -It may be disputed whether Portugal was the fittest theatre for -the first operations of a British army; but, when that country was -actually freed from the presence of an enemy; when the capital -and the frontier fortresses were occupied by English troops; when -sir John Moore leaving his hospitals, baggage, and magazines -there, as in a place of arms, had marched to Spain, the question -was no longer doubtful. The ancient relations between England -and Portugal, the greatness of the port of Lisbon, the warlike -disposition of the Portuguese, and, above all, the singularly-happy -circumstance that there was neither court nor monarch to balance -the English influence, and that even the nomination of the regency -was the work of an English general, offered such great and obvious -advantages as could no where else be obtained. It was a miserable -policy that, neglecting such an occasion, retained sir Arthur -Wellesley in England, while Portugal, like a drunken man, at once -weak and turbulent, was reeling on the edge of a precipice. - -The 5th of December sir John Cradock, being on his voyage to -Lisbon, touched at Coruña. Fifteen hundred thousand dollars had -just arrived there in the Lavinia frigate; but, sir John Moore’s -intention to retreat upon Portugal being known, Cradock divided -this sum, and carried away eight hundred thousand dollars, -proposing to leave a portion at Oporto, and to take the remainder -to Lisbon, that Moore might find, on whatever line he retreated, a -supply of money. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 2.] - -From Coruña he proceeded to Oporto, and landed to gather -information of the state of affairs. Here he found that sir -Robert Wilson had succeeded in organizing, under the title of the -Lusitanian Legion, about thirteen hundred men, and that others -were on their way to reinforce him; but, this excepted, nothing at -Oporto, civil or military, bespoke either arrangement or common -sense. The bishop, still intent upon acquiring supreme rule, was -deeply engaged with secret intrigues, and, under him, a number of -factious and designing persons instigated the populace to violent -actions, with a view to profit from their excesses. - -The formation of the Lusitanian Legion was originally a project of -the chevalier da Souza, the Portuguese minister in London. Souza -was one of the bishop’s faction, and the prelate calculated upon -this force not so much to repel the enemy as to give weight to his -own party against the government. The men were promised higher pay -than any other Portuguese soldiers, to the great discontent of the -latter, and they were clad in uniforms differing in colour from -the national troops. The regency, who dreaded the machinations -of the turbulent priest, entertained the utmost jealousy of the -legion, which, in truth, was a most anomalous force, and, as might -be expected from its peculiar constitution, was productive of much -embarrassment. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 1.] - -Sir John Cradock left three hundred thousand dollars at Oporto, -and having directed the two British battalions which were in -that neighbourhood to march to Almeida, he took on board a small -detachment of German troops, and set sail for Lisbon; but, before -his departure, he strongly advised sir Robert Wilson to move -such of his legionaries as were sufficiently organized to Villa -Real, in Tras os Montes, a place appointed by the regency for the -assembly of the forces in the north. Sir Robert, tired of the folly -and disgusted with the insolence and excesses of the ruling mob, -readily adopted this advice, so far as to quit Oporto, but, having -views of his own, took the direction of Almeida instead of Villa -Real. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 5.] - -The state of the capital was little better than that of Oporto. -There was arrangement neither for present nor for future defence, -and the populace, albeit less openly encouraged to commit excesses, -were quite uncontrolled by the government. The regency had a keener -dread of domestic insurrection than of the return of the French, -whose operations they regarded with even less anxiety than the -bishop did, as being further removed than he was from the immediate -theatre of war. Their want of system and vigilance, evinced by -the following fact, was truly surprising. Sattaro and another -person, having contracted for the supply of the British troops, -demanded, in the name of the English general, all the provisions in -the public stores of Portugal, and then sold them to the English -commissaries for his own profit. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 4, section 1.] - -Sir John Cradock’s instructions directed him to reinforce sir -John Moore’s army, and, if the course of events should bring -that general back to Portugal, he was not to be interfered with. -In fact, Cradock’s operations were limited to the holding of -Elvas, Almeida, and the capital; for, although he was directed to -encourage the formation of a native army upon a good and regular -system, and even to act in concert with it on the frontier, he -was debarred from political interference; and even his relative -situation, as to rank, was left unsettled until the arrival of -Mr. Villiers, to whose direction all political and many military -arrangements were entrusted. - -It is evident that the influence of a general thus fettered, and -commanding only a small force, which was moreover much scattered, -must be feeble and insufficient to produce any real amelioration -in the military situation of the country. But the English -ministers, attentive to the false information obtained from -interested agents, still imagined that not only the Spanish, but -the Portuguese armies were numerous, and to be relied upon; and -they confidently expected, that the latter would be able to take an -active part in the Spanish campaign. - -[Sidenote: Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Cradock, feeling the danger of this illusion, made it his first -object to ascertain, and to transmit home, exact information of the -real strength and efficiency of the native regular troops. They -were nominally twenty thousand; but Miguel Percira Forjas, military -secretary to the regency, and the ablest public man Portugal -possessed, acknowledged that this force was a nullity, and that -there were not more than ten thousand stand of serviceable arms in -the kingdom, the greatest part of which were English. The troops -themselves were undisciplined and unruly; and the militia and the -“_ordenanza_,” or armed peasantry, animated rather by a spirit of -outrage than of enthusiasm, evinced no disposition to submit to -regulation, neither was there any branch of administration free -from the grossest disorder. - -The Spanish dollar had a general acceptance in Portugal. The -regency, under the pretence that a debased foreign coin would -drive the Portuguese coin out of circulation, deprived the dollar -of its current value. This regulation, true in principle, and -applicable, as far as the Portuguese gold coin (which is of -peculiar fineness) was concerned, had, however, a most injurious -effect. The Spanish dollar was in reality finer than the Portuguese -silver cruzado-nova, and would finally have maintained its value, -notwithstanding this decree. But a slur being thus thrown upon it -by the government, the money changers contrived to run its value -down for the moment, a matter of infinite importance; for the -English soldiers and sailors being all paid in these dollars, at -four shillings and sixpence, which was the true value, were thus -suddenly mulcted four-pence in each, by the artificial depreciation -of the moment. The men attributed this to fraud in the shopkeepers; -the retail trade of Lisbon was interrupted, and quarrels between -the tradesmen and the soldiers took place hourly. - -To calm this effervescence, a second decree was promulgated, -directing that the dollar should be received at the mint and in -the public offices at its real value. It then appeared that the -government could profit by coining the dollar of four shillings -and sixpence into cruzado-novas, a circumstance which gave the -whole affair the appearance of an unworthy trick to recruit the -treasury. This happened in October; and as the financial affairs -were ill managed, and the regency destitute of vigour or capacity, -the taxes were unpaid, the hard cash exhausted, and the treasury -paper at a heavy discount when Cradock arrived. Upon the scroll -thus unfolded he could only read confusion, danger, and misfortune; -for such being the fruits of victory, what could be expected from -disaster; and at this period (the middle of December) sir John -Moore was supposed to be in full retreat upon Portugal, followed by -the emperor with one French army, while another threatened Lisbon -by the line of the Tagus. The English troops in the kingdom did -not amount to ten thousand men, including the sick, and they were -ill equipped and scattered; moreover, the capital was crowded with -women and children, with baggage and non-combatants, belonging as -well to the army in Spain as to that in Portugal. - -There were in the river three Portuguese ships of the line, two -frigates, and eight other smaller vessels of war; but none were in -a state for sea, and the whole likely to fall into the hands of -the enemy: for in the midst of this confusion sir Charles Cotton -was recalled, without a successor being appointed; and although -the zeal and talents of captain Halket, the senior officer on the -station, amply compensated for the departure of the admiral, as -far as professional duties were concerned, he could not aid the -general, nor deal with the regency as vigorously as an officer of -higher rank, and formally accredited, could have done. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Papers, MSS.] - -Sir John Cradock, although fully sensible of his own difficulties, -with a very disinterested zeal, resolved to make the reinforcing of -sir John Moore’s army his first care; but his force at this time -was, as I have already said, less than ten thousand men of all -arms. It consisted of eight British and four German battalions of -infantry, four troops of dragoons, and thirty pieces of artillery, -of which, however, only six were horsed so as to take the field. -There was, also, a battalion of the 60th regiment, but it was -composed principally of Frenchmen, recruited from the prison ships, -and had been sent back from Spain, as the soldiers could not be -trusted near their countrymen. - -Of these thirteen battalions two were in Abrantes, one in Elvas, -three at Lamego on the Duero, one in Almeida, and the remaining -six at Lisbon. Three of the four battalions in the north were -immediately directed to join sir John Moore by the route of -Salamanca; and of those in the south, two, accompanied by a -demi-brigade of artillery, were sent to him from Abrantes, by the -road of Castello Branco and Ciudad Rodrigo. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The 19th of December, Mr. Villiers having arrived, sir John -Cradock forwarded to the regency a strong representation of the -dangerous state of Portugal. He observed that there was neither -activity in the government nor enthusiasm among the people; that -the army, deficient in numbers, and still more so in discipline, -was scattered and neglected; and, notwithstanding that the aspect -of affairs was so threatening, the regency were apparently without -any system, or fixed principle of action. He proposed, therefore, -that a general enrolment of all the people should take place; and -from the British stores he offered a supply of a thousand muskets -and ten thousand pikes. This giving of pikes to the people appears -to have been in compliance with Mr. Villiers’ wishes, and betrayed -more zeal than prudence; for certainly a general levy and arming -with pikes of the turbulent populace of a capital city, at such a -conjuncture, was more likely to lead to confusion and mischief than -to any effectual defence. But the main objects pressing upon the -general’s attention were sufficiently numerous and contradictory to -render it difficult for him to avoid errors. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, section 1.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 4, section 1.] - -It was a part of his instructions, and of manifest importance, to -send reinforcements to sir John Moore. But it was equally necessary -to keep a force towards the frontier on the line of the Tagus, -seeing that the fourth French corps had just passed that river at -Almaraz, had defeated Galluzzo’s army and menaced Badajos, which -was without arms, ammunition, or provisions; and, moreover, the -populace there were in commotion, and slaying the chief persons. -Now, sir John Cradock’s instructions directed him to keep his -troops in a position that would enable him to abandon Portugal, if -a very superior force should press him; but as, in such a case, -he was to carry off not only the British army, but the Portuguese -navy and stores, to destroy what he could not remove, and to -receive on board his ships all the natives who might be desirous of -escaping, it was of pressing necessity to ship the women, children, -and baggage, in fine, all the encumbrances belonging to Moore’s -army, immediately, that his own rear might be clear for a sudden -embarkation. In short, he was to send his troops to Spain, and yet -defend Portugal; to excite confidence in the Portuguese, and yet -openly to carry on the preparations for abandoning that country. - -The populace of Lisbon were, however, already uneasy at the rumours -of an embarkation, and it was doubtful if they would permit even -the British non-combatants to get on board quietly, much less -suffer the forts to be dismantled, and the ships of war to be -carried off, without a tumult, which, at such a conjuncture, would -have been fatal to all parties. Hence it was imperative to maintain -a strong garrison in Lisbon and in the forts commanding the mouth -of the river; and this draft, together with the troops absorbed by -the fortresses of Almeida and Elvas, reduced the fighting men in -the field to insignificance. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The regency, knowing the temper of the people and fearing to arm -them, were not very eager to enforce the levy; yet, anxious to hide -their weakness, they promised, at the urgent solicitations of the -English general, to send six thousand troops to Alcantara, on the -Spanish frontier, with a view to observe the march of the fourth -corps,--a promise which they never intended, and indeed were -unable, to perform. Forjas, who was supposed to be very inimical -to the British influence, frankly declared that they neither could -nor would move without an advance of money, and sir John Cradock, -although he recommended that this aid should be given, had no power -to grant it himself. - -Letters from sir John Moore, dated at Salamanca, now reached -Lisbon: they increased the anxiety to reinforce the army in Spain; -but, as they clearly showed that reverses were to be expected, -Cradock, although resolved to maintain himself in Portugal as long -as it was possible to do so without a breach of his instructions, -felt more strongly that timely preparation for an embarkation -should be made, especially as the rainy season, in which south-west -winds prevail, had set in, and rendered the departure of vessels -from the Tagus very uncertain. Meanwhile the internal state of -Portugal was in no wise amended, or likely to amend. - -The government had, indeed, issued a decree, on the 23d of -December, for organizing the population of Lisbon in sixteen -legions, but only one battalion each was to parade at the same -moment for exercise, and those only on Sundays, nor were the -legions, at any time, to assemble without the order of the general -commanding the province; and this regulation, which rendered the -whole measure absurd, was dictated by the fears of the regency. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 4.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 5.] - -A proposal to prepare the Portuguese vessels for sea was acceded -to, without any apparent dissatisfaction; but the government, -secretly jealous of their allies, fomented or encouraged discontent -and suspicion among the people. No efforts were made to improve -the regular force, none to forward the march of troops to -Alcantara; and so inactive or so callous were the regency to the -rights of humanity, that a number of French prisoners, captured -at various periods by the Portuguese, and accumulated at Lisbon, -were denied subsistence. Sir John Cradock, after many fruitless -representations, was forced to charge himself with their supply, to -avert the horrors of seeing them starved to death. The provisions -necessary for Fort La Lippe were also withheld, and general Leite, -acting upon the authority of the regency, strenuously urged that -the British troops should evacuate that fortress. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The march of the reinforcements for sir John Moore left only three -hundred dragoons and seven battalions available for the defence -of Portugal, of which four were necessarily in garrison, and the -remainder were unable to take the field, in default of mules, of -which animal the country seemed bereft; yet, at this moment, as if -in derision, Mr. Frere, the central junta, the junta of Badajos, -and the regency of Portugal, were, with common and characteristic -foolishness, pressing sir John Cradock to march into the south of -Spain, although there was scarcely a Spanish soldier there in arms -to assist him; and such a movement, if it had been either prudent -or practicable, was directly against his instructions. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Towards the end of December, the communication with sir John Moore -was suddenly interrupted, and the line of the Tagus acquired -greater importance. The troops going from Elvas to the army in -Spain were, therefore, directed to halt at Castello Branco, and -general Richard Stewart, who commanded them, being reinforced with -two hundred cavalry, was ordered, for the moment, to watch the -roads by Salvatierra and the two Idanhas, and to protect the flying -bridges at Abrantes and Vilha Velha from the enemy’s incursions. -At the same time, a promise was obtained from the regency that all -the Portuguese troops in the Alemtejo should be collected, at Campo -Mayor and Portalegre. - -Sir John Cradock fixed upon Sacavem as the position in which his -main body should be concentrated, intending to defend that point -as long as he could with so few troops; and, as he knew that -Almeida, although full of British stores, and important in every -way, was, with respect to its own defence, utterly neglected by the -regency, and that even the presence of a British force there was -viewed with jealousy, he sent brigadier-general A. Cameron, with -instructions to collect the convalescents of Moore’s army, to unite -them with the two battalions still at Almeida, and then to make his -way to the army in Spain; but if the attempt should be judged too -dangerous, Cameron was to return to Lisbon. In either case, the -stores and the sick men lying at Almeida were to be directed upon -Oporto. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The paucity of cavalry was severely felt on the frontier. It -prevented the general from ascertaining the real strength and -objects of the enemy’s parties, and the Portuguese reports -were notoriously contradictory and false. The 14th dragoons, -seven hundred strong, commanded by major-general Cotton, had -been disembarked since the 22d of December, and were destined -for the army in Spain; but such was the penury of the country, -or the difficulty of drawing forth its resources, that the -commissary-general doubted if he could forward that small body, -even by detachments. Nor is this surprising, for many of the debts -left by Moore’s army were yet unpaid, and sufficient confidence was -not established among the peasantry to induce them to bring forward -the necessary supplies upon credit. - -Rumours of reverses in Spain were now rife, and acquired -importance, when it became known that four thousand infantry, and -two thousand cavalry, the advanced guard of thirty thousand French -troops, were actually at Merida, on the road to Badajos, which -town, as I have already said, was not only in a state of anarchy, -but destitute of provisions, arms, and ammunition. If, at this -time, the Portuguese force had been assembled at Alcantara, sir -John Cradock would have supported them with the British brigades, -at Abrantes and Castello Branco; but not a man had been put in -motion, and he, feeling no confidence either in the troops or in -the promises of the regency, resolved to concentrate his own army -near Lisbon. General Stewart was, therefore, directed to destroy -the bridges of Vilha Velha and Abrantes, and to fall back to -Sacavem. - -Meanwhile, the Lisbon populace, supposing that the English general -designed to abandon them without necessity, were violently excited. -The regency, either from fear or folly, made no effort to preserve -tranquillity, and the people, feeling their own strength, proceeded -from one excess to another, until it become evident that, in a -forced embarkation, the British would have to fight their allies as -well as their enemies. At this gloomy period when ten marches would -have brought the French to Lisbon, when a stamp of Napoleon’s foot -would have extinguished that spark of war which afterwards blazed -over the Peninsula, sir John Moore made his daring movement upon -Sahagun; and Portugal, gasping as in a mortal agony, was instantly -relieved. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 2, sections 1 and 2.] - -It was the advanced guard of the fourth corps that had approached -Merida with the intention of proceeding to Badajos, and the emperor -was, as we have seen, preparing to follow: but, in the night of the -26th of December, an officer carrying the intelligence of Moore’s -movement, reached Merida, and, next morning, the French fell back, -and marching hastily to the Tagus, crossed it, and rejoined their -main body, from which another powerful detachment was immediately -directed upon Placentia. This retrograde movement obviated the -immediate danger; and sir John Cradock endeavoured to pacify the -people of Lisbon. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 5.] - -He ordered general Stewart’s brigade, strengthened by two German -battalions, to halt at Santarem. He explained his own motives -to the Portuguese, and urged the regency to a more frank and -vigorous system than they had hitherto followed; for, like the -Spanish juntas, they promised every thing, and performed nothing; -neither would they, although consenting, verbally, to all the -measures proposed, ever commit themselves by writing, having the -despicable intention of afterwards disclaiming that which might -prove disagreeable to the populace, or even to the French. Sir John -Cradock, however, had no power beyond his own personal influence to -enforce attention to his wishes. No successor to sir Charles Cotton -had yet arrived, and Mr. Villiers seems to have wanted the decision -and judgement required to meet such a momentous crisis. - -In the north general Cameron, having sent the sick men and part of -the stores from Almeida towards Oporto, gave up that fortress to -sir Robert Wilson; and, on the 5th of January, marched, with two -British battalions and a detachment of convalescents, by the Tras -os Montes to join the army in Spain. On the 9th, hearing of sir -John Moore’s retreat to Coruña, he would have returned to Almeida, -but Lapisse, who had taken Zamora, threatened to intercept the line -of march; wherefore, Cameron turned towards Lamego, giving notice -of his movement to sir Robert Wilson, and advising him also to -retire to the same place. Colonel Blunt, with seven companies of -the 3d regiment, escorting a convoy for sir John Moore’s army, was -likewise forced to abandon his route, and take the road to Oporto, -on which town every thing British in the north of Portugal was now -directed. - -Notwithstanding the general dismay, sir Robert Wilson rejected -Cameron’s advice, and, being reinforced by some Spanish troops, -Portuguese volunteers, and straggling convalescents, belonging to -Moore’s army, proceeded to put in practice all the arts of an able -partizan. Issuing proclamations, enticing the French to desert, -spreading false reports of his numbers, and, by petty enterprizes -and great activity, arousing a spirit of resistance throughout the -Ciudad Rodrigo country. - -The continued influx of sick and stores at Oporto, together with -the prospect of general Cameron’s arrival there, became a source -of uneasiness to sir John Cradock. Oporto, with a shifting-bar and -shoal water is the worst possible harbour for vessels to clear -out, and one of the most dangerous for vessels to lie off, at that -season of the year; hence, if the enemy advanced in force, a great -loss, both of men and stores, was to be anticipated. - -[Sidenote: Sir John Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The departure of sir Charles Cotton had diminished the naval -means at captain Halket’s disposal, and, for seventeen successive -days, such was the state of the wind that no vessel could leave -the Tagus; he, however, contrived at last to send tonnage for -two thousand persons, and undertook to keep a sloop of war off -Oporto. Sir Samuel Hood also despatched some vessels from Vigo, -but the weather continued for a long time so unfavourable that -these transports could not enter the harbour of Oporto, and the -encumbrances hourly increasing, at last produced the most serious -embarrassments. - -Sir John Moore having now relinquished his communications with -Portugal, sir John Cradock had to consider how, relying on his own -resources, he could best fulfil his instructions and maintain his -hold of that country, without risking the utter destruction of the -troops intrusted to his care. - -For an inferior army Portugal has no defensible frontier. The -rivers, generally running east and west, are fordable in most -places, subject to sudden rises and falls, offering but weak lines -of resistance; and with the exception of the Zezere, presenting no -obstacles to the advance of an enemy penetrating by the eastern -frontier. The mountains, indeed, afford many fine and some -impregnable positions, but such is the length of the frontier line -and the difficulty of lateral communications, that a general who -should attempt to defend it against superior forces would risk to -be cut off from the capital, if he concentrated his troops; and if -he extended them his line would be immediately broken. - -The possession of Lisbon constitutes, in fact, the possession of -Portugal, south of the Duero, and an inferior army can only protect -Lisbon by keeping close to that capital. Sensible of this truth, -sir John Cradock adopted the French colonel Vincente’s views for -the defence of Lisbon; and proceeded, on the 4th of January, with -seventeen hundred men to occupy the heights behind the creek of -Saccavem--leaving, however, three thousand men in the forts and -batteries at Lisbon. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -At the earnest request of the regency, who in return promised to -assemble the native troops at Thomar, Abrantes, and Vilha Velha, -general Stewart’s brigade, two thousand seven hundred strong, was -ordered to halt at Santarem. But it had been marching incessantly -for a month, and in the rain, the men’s clothes were worn out, -their accoutrements nearly destroyed, and in common with the rest -of the army, they were suffering severely from the want of shoes. - -Thus, Cameron being on the Douro, the main body between Santarem -and Lisbon, and colonel Kemmis at Elvas, with the fortieth -regiment, an army of ten thousand men--with the encumbrances of -an army of forty thousand--was placed on the three points of a -triangle, the shortest side of which was above a hundred and fifty -miles. The general commanding could not bring into the field -above five thousand men; nor could that number be assembled in a -condition for service at any one point of the frontier, under three -weeks or a month; moreover, the uncertainty of remaining in the -country at all, rendered it difficult to feed the troops, for the -commissaries being unable to make large contracts for a fixed time, -were forced to carry on, as it were, a retail system of supply. - -Mr. Frere, however, with indefatigable folly, was urging sir John -Cradock to make a diversion in Spain; and while Mr. Frere was -calling for troops in the south, Mr. Villiers was as earnest that -a force might be sent by sea to Vigo. The minister’s instructions -prescribed the preservation of Lisbon, Elvas, and Almeida; the -assembling, in concert with the Portuguese government, a combined -force on the frontier, and the sending succours of men to Moore; -but although sir John Cradock’s means were so scanty that the -fulfilment of any one of these objects was scarcely possible, -Mr. Canning writing officially to Mr. Villiers at this epoch, -as if a mighty and well supplied army was in Portugal, enforced -the “necessity of continuing to maintain possession of Portugal, -as long as could be done with the force intrusted to sir John -Cradock’s command, _remembering always that not the defence of -Portugal alone, but the employment of the enemy’s military force_, -and the diversion which would be thus created in favour of the -south of Spain, were objects not to be abandoned, except in case -of the most extreme necessity.” The enemy’s military force! It -was three hundred thousand men, and this despatch was a pompous -absurdity; but the ministers and their agents, eternally haunted by -the phantoms of Spanish and Portuguese armies, were incapable of -perceiving the palpable bulk and substance of the French hosts. The -whole system of the cabinet was one of shifts and expedients; every -week produced a fresh project,--minister and agent, alike, followed -his own views, without reference to any fixed principle: and the -generals were the only persons not empowered to arrange military -operations. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The number of officers despatched to seek information of the French -movements enabled sir John Cradock, notwithstanding the direct -communications were cut off, to obtain intelligence of Moore’s -advance towards Sahagun, and being still anxious to assist that -general, he again endeavoured to send a reinforcement into Spain, -by the route of Almeida; but the difficulty of obtaining supplies -finally induced him to accede to Mr. Villiers’ wishes, and he -shipped six hundred cavalry, and thirteen hundred infantry, on the -12th of January, meaning to send them to Vigo; the vessels were, -however, still in the river, when authentic intelligence of sir -John Moore’s retreat upon Coruña with the intention of embarking -there, was received, and rendered this project useless. - -[Sidenote: Cradock’s Paper, MSS.] - -The 14th of January the Conqueror line-of-battle-ship, having -admiral Berkeley on board, reached the Tagus, and for the first -time since sir John Cradock took the command of the troops in -Portugal, he received a communication from the ministers in England. - -It now appeared that their thoughts were less intently fixed upon -the defence of Portugal, than upon getting possession of Cadiz. -Their anxiety upon this subject had somewhat subsided after the -battle of Vimeira, but it revived with greater vigour when sir -John Moore, contemplating a movement in the south, suggested the -propriety of securing Cadiz as a place of arms; and in January an -expedition was prepared to sail for that town, with the design of -establishing a new base of operations for the English army. The -project failed, but the transaction deserves notice, as affording -proof of the perplexed and unstable policy of the day. - - -NEGOTIATION FOR THE OCCUPATION OF CADIZ. - -[Sidenote: Papers laid before Parliament, 1810.] - -While it was still unknown in England that the supreme junta had -fled from Aranjuez, sir George Smith, who had conducted Spencer’s -negotiation in 1808, was sent to Cadiz to prepare the way for the -reception of an English garrison. Four thousand men destined for -that service were soon afterwards embarked at Portsmouth, under the -command of general Sherbrooke, but this officer’s instructions were -repeatedly altered. He was first directed to touch at Lisbon in his -way to Cadiz; he was afterwards commanded to make for Coruña, to -receive orders from sir John Moore, but, on the 14th of January, -his force being increased to five thousand men, he sailed under his -first instructions; and Mr. Frere was directed to negotiate for the -admission of these troops into Cadiz, as the only condition upon -which a British army could be employed to aid the Spanish cause in -that part of the Peninsula. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.] - -When the reverses in the north of Spain became known, the -importance of Cadiz increased, and the importance of Portugal -decreased in the eyes of the English ministers. Sir John Cradock -was then made acquainted with Sherbrooke’s destination; he was -himself commanded to obey any requisition for troops that might be -made by the Spanish junta; and so independent of the real state -of affairs were the ministerial arrangements, that Cradock, whose -despatches had been one continued complaint of his inability to -procure horses for his own artillery, was directed to furnish them -for Sherbrooke’s. - -Sir George Smith, a man somewhat hasty, but of remarkable zeal and -acuteness, left England about the middle of December; and, on his -arrival at Cadiz, at once discovered that there, as in every other -part of the Peninsula, all persons being engaged in theories or -intrigues, nothing useful for defence was executed. The ramparts -of the city were in tolerable condition, but scarcely any guns -were mounted; and yet, two miles in front of the town, an outwork -had been commenced upon such a scale that it could not possibly be -finished under four months; and, after the slow mode of Spanish -proceedings, would have taken as many years to complete. - -For a solid defence of all the fortifications, sir George Smith -judged that twenty thousand good troops would be requisite, but -that ten thousand would suffice for the city. There were, however, -only five thousand militia and volunteers in the place, and not a -regular soldier under arms, neither any within reach. The number -of guns mounted and to be mounted exceeded four hundred; to serve -them, two hundred and fifty peasants and volunteers were enrolled, -and, being clothed in uniforms, were called artillery-men. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Knowing nothing of sir John Moore’s march to Sahagun, sir George -Smith naturally calculated upon the immediate approach of the -French; and seeing the helpless state of Cadiz, and being assured -that the people would willingly admit an English garrison, he -wrote to sir John Cradock for troops. The latter, little thinking -that, at such a conjuncture, the supreme junta would be more -jealous of their allies than fearful of their enemies; and judging -also, from the tenor of his latest instructions, that obedience -to this requisition would be consonant to the minister’s wishes, -immediately ordered colonel Kemmis to proceed from Elvas with -the fortieth regiment, by the route of Seville, and, at the same -time, embarked about three thousand of the best troops at Lisbon, -and sent them to Cadiz. This force, commanded by major-general -Mackenzie, sailed the 2d February, and reached their destination -the 5th of the same month. - -[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -Meanwhile, Mr. Frere, although acquainted with the sailing of -Mackenzie’s armament, was ignorant that sir George Smith had -applied to the governor of Cadiz for permission to take military -possession of that town, for Smith had no instructions to -correspond with Mr. Frere; and the latter had opened a separate -negotiation with the central junta at Seville, in which he -endeavoured to pave the way for the occupation by proposing to have -the troops admitted as guests, and he sent Mr. Stuart to arrange -this with the local authorities. - -[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -Mr. Frere had, however, meddled much with the personal intrigues of -the day: he was, moreover, of too slender a capacity to uphold the -dignity and just influence of a great power on such an occasion; -and the flimsy thread of his negotiation snapped under the hasty -touch of sir George Smith. The supreme junta, averse to every thing -that threatened to interrupt their course of sluggish indolence, -had sent the marquis de Villel, a member of their own body, to -Cadiz, avowedly to prepare the way for the admission of the troops, -but, in reality, to thwart that measure. The circumstance of -Mackenzie’s arrival, with an object different from that announced -by Mr. Frere, was instantly taken advantage of to charge England -with treachery. For the junta, knowing Mr. Frere to be their own -dupe, believed, or affected to believe, that he was also the dupe -of the English minister; and that the whole transaction was an -artifice, on the part of the latter, to get possession of the city -with a felonious intent. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -The admission of the British troops was nevertheless earnestly -desired by the inhabitants of Cadiz, and of the neighbouring towns; -and this feeling was so well understood by Mr. Stuart and sir -George Smith, that they would, notwithstanding the reluctance of -the supreme junta, have brought the affair to a good conclusion; -but, at the most critical period of the negotiation, the former was -sent on a secret mission to Vienna, by the way of Trieste, and the -latter, who was in bad health, dying about the same period, the -negotiation failed for want of a head to conduct it. - -General Mackenzie, like sir George Smith, thought that the object -might be attained: he observed, indeed, that the people, far -from suspecting any danger, were ignorant of, or incredulous of -the reverses in the north; that nothing had been done towards -equipping the fleet for sea; and that, notwithstanding the earnest -remonstrances of admiral Purvis and Mr. Stuart, the Spaniards would -neither work themselves nor permit the English sailors to work -for them. Still the general feeling was favourable to the British -army, and the good wishes of the inhabitants were openly avowed: -Mackenzie had, however, only a negative power, the affair being in -the hands of Mr. Frere. - -In the course of the negotiations carried on by that minister, the -supreme junta proposed, - -1º.--That the troops should land at Port St. Mary’s, and be -quartered there and in the neighbouring towns. - -2º.--That they should join Cuesta’s army. - -3º.--That they should go to Catalonia. - -4º.--That they should be parcelled out in small divisions, and -attached to the different Spanish armies. - -Nay, untaught by their repeated disasters, and pretending to hold -the English soldiery cheap, these self-sufficient men proposed that -the British should garrison the minor fortresses on the coast, in -order to release an equal number of Spaniards for the field. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -Mr. Frere wished to accept the first of these proposals, but -general Mackenzie, sir George Smith, and Mr. Stuart agreed that it -would be injurious for many reasons; not the least urgent of which -was, that as the troops could not have been embarked again without -some national dishonour, they must have marched towards Cuesta, -and thus have been involved in the campaign without obtaining that -which was their sole object, _the possession of Cadiz as a place of -arms_. - -Mr. Frere then suggested a modification of the second proposal, -namely, to leave a small garrison in Cadiz, and to join Cuesta with -the remainder of the troops. Sir G. Smith was dead; Mr. Stuart had -embarked for Trieste; and general Mackenzie, reluctant to oppose -Mr. Frere’s wishes, consented to march, if the necessary equipments -for his force could be procured; but he observed, that the plan -was contrary to his instructions, and to the known wishes of the -English government, and liable, in part, to the objections against -the first proposition. - -His letter was written the 18th of February, and on the 22d a -popular tumult commenced in Cadiz. - -The supreme junta, to prove that that city did not require an -English garrison, had ordered two regiments, composed of Poles, -Germans, and Swiss, prisoners or deserters from the French, to -march there. The people, aware that the junta disliked and intended -to disarm the volunteers, were offended that deserters should be -trusted in preference to themselves. They arose, and stopped the -courier, with despatches from Seville, and imprisoned the marquis -of Villel, who was obnoxious, because, while mild to persons -suspected of favouring the French, he had been harsh, or rather -brutal, in his conduct to some ladies of rank in Cadiz. - -The populace, proceeding from one violence to another, endeavoured -to kill the state prisoners; and being prevented in this bloody -object, committed several excesses, and murdered don Joseph -Heredia, the collector of the public rents. During the tumult, -which lasted two days, the disembarkation of the English troops was -repeatedly called for by the mob; and two British officers being -sent on shore as mediators, were received with enthusiasm, and -obeyed with respect, a manifest proof of the correct view taken by -sir George Smith. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -The 24th, tranquillity was restored; and the 25th, general -Mackenzie, not having received from Mr. Frere an answer to his -letter of the 18th, suggested, that of the three English battalions -then in the harbour, two should be placed in Cadiz; and that the -third, proceeding to Seville, should there unite with the 40th -regiment, and both together march to join Cuesta. - -Mr. Frere, however, instead of addressing the junta with an -authority and dignity becoming the representative of a great -nation, on whose support the independence of the whole Peninsula -rested, had been endeavouring to gain his end by subtlety. The -object was one that England had a right to seek, and the Spanish -rulers no right to refuse; for the people wished to further it, -and the threat of an appeal to them would soon have silenced the -feeble negative of such a despicable and suspected government; but -Mr. Frere, incapable of taking a single and enlarged view, was -pressing and discussing, with the secretary of the junta, a variety -of trifling points, as if to shew his epistolary dexterity; and, -finally, when his opponent had conceded the point of admitting -troops at all, broke off the negotiation, upon the question, as to -whether the number to be admitted should be one or two thousand -men, as if the way to drive a wedge was with the broad end foremost. - -[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -Self baffled in that quarter, the British plenipotentiary, turning -towards Cuesta, the avowed enemy of the junta, and one much feared -by them, sought to secure his assistance by holding out the lure -of having a British force added to his command, but the sarcastic -old general derided the diplomatist. “Although I do not,” said -he, “discover any great difficulty in the actual state of things, -which should prevent his British majesty’s troops from garrisoning -Cadiz under such terms, and for the purpose which your excellency -proposes; I am far from supposing that the supreme junta, which is -fully persuaded of the importance of our union with England, is -not grounded in its objections; and your excellency knows that it -is sufficient that they should have them, to prevent my giving any -opinion on so important a measure, _unless they should consult -me_. With regard to the 4,300 men, which your excellency is pleased -to mention, there is no doubt that I stand in need of them; but I -flatter myself, England, sensible of the importance of Estremadura, -will even lend me much greater assistance, particularly if, from -any change of circumstances, the supreme junta should no longer -manifest the repugnance we speak of.” - -This answer having frustrated the projected intrigue, Mr. Frere, -conscious perhaps of diplomatic incapacity, returned with renewed -ardour to the task of directing the military affairs, in every part -of the Peninsula. He had seen an intercepted letter of Soult’s, -addressed to the king, in which the project of penetrating into -Portugal was mentioned; and immediately concluding that general -Mackenzie’s troops would be wanted for the defence of that -kingdom, counselled him to abandon Cadiz and return to Lisbon; but -the general, who knew that, even should he return, a successful -defence of Portugal with so few troops would be impossible, and -that every precaution was already taken for an embarkation in the -last extremity, observed, that “the danger of Lisbon rendered the -occupation of Cadiz more important.” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.] - -General Mackenzie’s reply was written the 26th of February. On the -3d of March he received another despatch from Mr. Frere. Cadiz, and -the danger of Portugal, seemed to have passed from the writer’s -mind, and were unnoticed; but entering into a minutely inaccurate -statement of the situation of the French and Spanish armies, he -observed, that Soult having failed in an attempt to penetrate -Portugal by the Minho, _it was impossible, from the position -of the Spanish forces, assisted as they were by the Portuguese, -that he could persevere in his plan_. Wherefore, he proposed that -the British force then in the harbour of Cadiz should proceed -immediately to Tarragona, to aid Reding; and this wild scheme was -only frustrated by an unexpected despatch from sir John Cradock, -recalling the troops to Lisbon. - -They arrived there on the 12th of March; and thus ended a -transaction clearly indicating an unsettled policy, shallow -combinations, and a bad choice of agents on the part of the English -cabinet, and a most unwise and unworthy disposition in the supreme -junta. General Mackenzie attributed the jealousy of the latter to -French influence; Mr. Frere to the abrupt proceedings of sir George -Smith, and to fear, lest the junta of Seville, who were continually -on the watch to recover their ancient power, should represent the -admission of the British troops as a treasonable proceeding on the -part of the supreme government. It is, however, evident that the -true cause was the false position in which the English ministers -had originally placed themselves, by inundating Spain with arms -and money, without at the same time asserting a just influence, -and making their assistance the price of good order and useful -exertion. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -The effort made to secure Cadiz was an act of disinterested zeal -on the part of sir John Cradock. The absence of his best troops -exposed him to the most galling peevishness from the regency, and -to the grossest insults from the populace. With his reduced force, -he could not expect to hold even a contracted position at the -extremity of the rock of Lisbon against the weakest army likely -to invade Portugal; and, as there was neither a native force nor -a government to be depended upon, there remained for him only the -prospect of a forced and, consequently, disgraceful embarkation, -and the undeserved obloquy that never fails to follow disaster. - -In this disagreeable situation, as Elvas and Almeida no longer -contained British troops, the general’s attention was necessarily -fixed upon Lisbon and Oporto. The violence of the gales rendered -the latter a sealed port; but the hospitals and magazines of -Almeida, and even of Salamanca, being evacuated upon Lamego, that -town was crowded with fifteen hundred sick men, besides escorts, -and the hourly accumulating stores. The river had overflowed its -banks, the craft could not ply; and one large boat, attempting to -descend, was overset, and eighty persons, soldiers and others, -perished. - -General Cameron, hearing of this confusion, relinquished the idea -of embarking his detachment at Oporto, and, re-crossing the Douro, -made for Lisbon, where he arrived the beginning of February with -about two thousand men; but they were worn down by fatigue, having -marched eight hundred miles under continued rains. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, sect. 1.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, sect. 1.] - -Sir Robert Wilson sent his guns to Abrantes, by the road of -Idanha Nova; but, partly from a spirit of adventure, partly from -an erroneous idea that sir John Cradock wished him to defend the -frontier, he remained with his infantry in the neighbourhood -of Ciudad Rodrigo. His force had been increased by a Spanish -detachment under don Carlos d’España, and by some volunteers; but -it was still weak, and his operations were necessarily confined to -a few trifling skirmishes: yet, like many others, his imagination -so far outstripped his judgement that, when he had only felt the -advanced post of a single division, he expressed his conviction -that the French were going to abandon Spain altogether. - -Sir John Cradock entertained no such false expectations; he was -informed of the battle of Coruña and the death of Moore; he knew -too well the vigour and talent of that general to doubt that he -had been oppressed by an overwhelming force; he knew that Zaragoza -had fallen, and that twenty-five thousand French troops were thus -free to act in other quarters; he knew that Soult, with at least -twenty thousand men, was on the Minho; that Romana was incapable -of making any head, that Portugal was one wide scene of helpless -confusion, and that a French army was again in the neighbourhood of -Merida, threatening Lisbon by the line of the Tagus; in fine, that -his own embarrassments were hourly increasing, and that the moment -was arrived when the safety of his troops must become the chief -consideration. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 10, sect. 1.] - -The tenor of the few despatches he had received from England led -him to suppose that the ministers designed to abandon Portugal; -but, as their intentions on that head were never clearly explained, -he resolved to abide by the literal interpretation of his first -instructions, and to keep his hold of the country as long as it -was possible to do so without risking the utter destruction of his -army. To avoid that danger, he put every incumbrance at Lisbon -on board the transports in the Tagus, proceeded to dismantle the -batteries at the mouth of the river, and, in concert with the -admiral, made preparations for carrying away or destroying the -military and naval stores in the arsenal. At the same time, he -renewed his efforts to embark the sick men and stores at Oporto; -but the weather continued so unfavourable that he was finally -obliged to remove the invalids and many stores by land, yet he -could not procure carriages for the whole. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 11.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 10, sect. 2 and 3.] - -After the arrival of Cameron’s detachment, the effective British -force under arms, including convalescents and fifteen hundred -stragglers from sir John Moore’s army, was about eight thousand -men; but, when the security of the forts and magazines, and the -tranquillity of Lisbon, was provided for, only five thousand -men, and those not in the best order, could be brought into the -field. As this force was infinitely too weak to cover such a town -as Lisbon, the general judged that it would be unwise to take up -a position in advance, whence he should be obliged to retreat -through the midst of a turbulent and excited population, which -had already given too many indications of ill-temper to leave any -doubt of its hostility under such circumstances. He, therefore, -came to the resolution of withdrawing from Saccavem and Lisbon, -and concentrating his whole force on a position at Passa D’Arcos, -near the mouth of the river, where he could embark with least -danger, and where he had the best chance of defending himself, if -necessary, against superior numbers. - -This reasoning was sound, and Cradock’s intention was, undoubtedly, -not to abandon the country, unless driven from it by force, or in -pursuance of orders from England: but his arrangements seem to -have carried more the appearance of alarm than was either politic -or necessary; for the position of Passa D’Arcos might have been -prepared, and the means necessary for an embarkation secured, and -yet the bulk of the troops kept in advance until the last moment. -To display a bold and confident front in war is, of all things, the -most essential, as well to impose upon friends as upon enemies; and -sir John Cradock did not fail to experience the truth of this maxim. - -The population of Lisbon, alarmed by the reverses in Spain, and -yet, like all the people in the Peninsula, confident in their own -prowess and resolution until the very moment of attack, became -extremely exasperated; and the regency, partly from their natural -folly and insincerity, but more from the dread of the lower orders, -countenanced, if they did not instigate, the latter to commit -excesses, and to interrupt the proceedings of the British naval and -military authorities. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, sect. 5.] - -Although the measures of precaution relative to the forts had -originated with the regency, they now formally protested against -them; and, with a view to hamper the general, encouraged their -subalterns to make many false and even ridiculous charges against -the British executive officers; and it would appear that the -remonstrances of the admiral and generals were but imperfectly -supported by Mr. Villiers. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.] - -In this manner the people’s violence was nourished until the city -was filled with tumult; mobs, armed with English pikes and muskets, -collected night and day in the streets and on the high-roads, -and, under the pretext of seeking for, and killing, Frenchmen, -attacked, indiscriminately, all foreigners, even those in the -British service and wearing the British uniform. The guards, who -endeavoured to protect the victims of this ferocity, were insulted. -Couriers, passing with despatches, were intercepted and deprived -of their papers; English officers were outraged in the streets; -and such was the audacity of the people that the artillery was -placed in the squares, in expectation of an affray. In fine, the -state of Lisbon was similar to what it had been at the period of -Junot’s convention; and, if the British had abandoned the country -at this time, they would have been assailed with as much obloquy -by the Portuguese, for, such has been, and will be, the fate of -all unsuccessful auxiliaries: a reflection that should render -historians cautious of adopting accusations upon the authority of -native writers on the like occasions. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 2.] - -This spirit was not confined to Lisbon. In Oporto the disposition -to insult the British was more openly encouraged than in the -capital, and the government of the multitude was more decidedly -pronounced. From the cities it spread to the villages. The people -of the Alemtejo frontier were, indeed, remarkably apathetic; but, -from the Minho to the Tagus, the country was in horrible confusion; -the soldiers were scattered, without regard to military system, -and, being unpaid, lived at free quarters; the peasantry of the -country assembling in bands, and the populace of the towns in mobs, -intercepted the communications, appointed or displaced the generals -at their pleasure, and massacred all persons of whom they were -suspicious. The ammunition which had been supplied from England -was wasted, by constant firing in token of insubordination; and, -as if the very genius of confusion was abroad, some of the British -troops, principally _malingerers_,[3] of sir John Moore’s army, -added their quota of misconduct, to increase the general distress. - -The leading instigator of the excesses at Oporto was one Raymundo, -a coadjutor and creature of the bishop’s, a turbulent and cruel -fellow, who, by taking a share in the first insurrection against -the French, obtained a momentary influence, and has since been -elevated, by a very credulous writer, into a patriotic hero. He -was, however, a worthless coward, fitted for secret villany, but -incapable of a noble action. - -This state of affairs, productive of so much misery and danger, -continuing, without intermission, caused many of the upper classes -to despair of their country’s safety by war, and increased the -number of those who, wishing to attach themselves to the fortune -of France, were ready to accept of a foreign prince for their -sovereign, if, with him, they could obtain tranquillity and an -ameliorated constitution; and when, soon afterwards, the edge of -the enemy’s sword, falling upon the senseless multitude, filled -the streets of Oporto with blood, there was a powerful French -party already established in Portugal. The bulk of the people -were, however, stanch in their country’s cause; they were furious -and disorderly, but imbued with hatred of the French; ready at the -call of honour; and susceptible of discipline, without any loss of -energy. - -The turbulence of the citizens, the remonstrances of the regency, -and the representations of Mr. Villiers, who was in doubt for -the personal safety of the British subjects residing in Lisbon, -convinced sir John Cradock that political circumspection and -adroitness were as important as military arrangement, to prevent a -catastrophe at this critical period; and, as contrary to what might -have been expected, the enemy had not yet made any actual movement -across the frontier, he was induced to suspend his design of -falling back to Passa D’Arcos; and in this unsettled state affairs -remained until March, when intelligence arriving that the French -fleet was at sea, two of the line-of-battle ships in the Tagus were -despatched to reinforce sir Thomas Duckworth’s squadron, and the -batteries at the mouth of the river were again armed. - -Meanwhile, Soult was making progress in the north; the anarchy at -Oporto was continually increasing, and the English government had -certainly come to the resolution of abandoning Portugal if the -enemy advanced; for, although sir John Cradock was not informed -of their views, an officer in England, well acquainted with -Portuguese customs, actually received orders, and was embarking, -to aid the execution of this measure, when, suddenly, the policy -of the cabinet once more changed, and it was resolved to reinforce -the army. This resolution, which may be attributed partly to the -Austrian war, partly to the failure at Cadiz, and partly to the -necessity of satisfying public opinion in England, was accompanied -by a measure judicious in principle and of infinite importance, -inasmuch as it formed the first solid basis on which to build a -reasonable hope of success. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.] - -The Portuguese government, whether spontaneously or brought thereto -by previous negotiation, had offered the command of all the native -troops to an English general,--with power to alter and amend the -military discipline, to appoint British officers to the command -of the regiments, and to act, without control, in any manner he -should judge fitting to ameliorate the condition of the Portuguese -army; and this was the more important, because the military polity -of Portugal, although fallen into neglect, was severe, precise, -and admirably calculated to draw forth the whole strength of the -kingdom, for the regular army could be completed by coercion, and -the militia were bound to assemble in regiments, numbered, clothed, -and armed like the regulars, but only liable to serve within the -frontier. The whole of the remaining population, capable of bearing -arms, were enrolled under the name of _ordenanças_, numbered -by battalions in their different districts and obliged, under -very severe punishments, to assemble at the order of the local -magistrates either to work, to fight, or to assist the operations -of the other forces. - -The English government, accepting of this offer, agreed to supply -arms, ammunition, and other succours, granted a subsidy for the -payment of the regular forces, and thus obtained, for the first -time, a firm hold of the military resources of Portugal, and a -position in the Peninsula suitable to the dignity of England and -to the great contest in which she was engaged. - -The Portuguese government wished that sir Arthur Wellesley should -be their general; and the English cabinet offered the situation -to him, but he refused it; and it is said, that sir John Doyle, -sir John Murray, (he who afterwards failed at Tarragona,) general -Beresford, and even the marquis of Hastings, then earl of Moira, -sought for the appointment. The last was, undoubtedly, a man well -fitted by his courtly manners, his high rank, and his real talents, -both in the cabinet and in the field, for such an office; but -powerful parliamentary interest prevailing, major-general Beresford -was appointed, to the great discontent of many officers of superior -rank, who were displeased that a man, without any visible claim to -superiority, should be placed over their heads. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.] - -Information of this change was instantly conveyed to sir John -Cradock, and general Sherbrooke was ordered to put into Lisbon. -The latter was overtaken at the mouth of Cadiz harbour; and his -and general Mackenzie’s divisions arriving in the Tagus together, -on the 12th of March, gave a new turn to the affairs of Portugal. -But if Mr. Frere’s plan had been pursued--If general Sherbrooke’s -troops had not been detained by bad weather at sea--If the -first had proceeded to Tarragona, and nothing but a foul wind -prevented it--If the second sailing from port to port without -any artillery had, as was most probable, been engaged in some -other enterprise--If Victor, obeying his orders, had marched to -Abrantes--If any one of these events had happened, sir John Cradock -must have abandoned Portugal; and then how infinitely absurd these -proceedings of the English ministers would have appeared, and how -justly their puerile combinations would have been the scorn of -Europe. - -Marshal Beresford arrived at Lisbon the beginning of March; and -having received the confirmation of his power from the regency, -fixed his head-quarters at Thomar, collected the Portuguese troops -in masses, and proceeded to recast their system on the model of -the British army; commencing, with stern but wholesome rigour, a -reform that, in process of time, raised out of chaos an obedient, -well disciplined, and gallant army, worthy of a high place among -the best in Europe; for the Portuguese people, though easily misled -and excited to wrath, are of a docile and orderly disposition, and -very sensible of a just and honourable conduct in their officers. -But this reform was not effected at once, nor without many crosses -and difficulties being raised by the higher orders and by the -government--difficulties that general Beresford could never have -overcome, if he had not been directed, sustained, and shielded, by -the master spirit under whom he was destined to work. - -The plan of giving to English officers the command of the -Portuguese troops was at first proceeded on with caution; but -after a time, the ground being supposed safe, it was gradually -enlarged, until almost all the military situations of emolument and -importance were held by Englishmen; and this, combined with other -causes, gave rise to numerous intrigues, not entirely confined -to the natives, and as we shall find, in after times, seriously -threatening the power of the marshal, the existence of the British -influence, and the success of the war. - -Sir John Cradock’s situation was now materially alleviated. -The certainty of the Austrian war produced a marked change in -the disposition of the regency. The arrival of Sherbrooke’s -and Mackenzie’s divisions having increased the British force -to fourteen thousand men, the populace became more cautious of -offering insults; and, about the middle of March, two thousand men -being left to maintain tranquillity in Lisbon, the remainder of the -army was encamped at Lumiar and Saccavem; and while these things -were passing at Lisbon, the aspect of affairs changed also in other -parts of the kingdom. For, the bulk of the Portuguese regular -troops, amounting to ten or twelve thousand men, was collected by -marshal Beresford, between the Tagus and the Mondego. - -Beyond the valley of the Mondego, colonel Trant commanded a small -corps of volunteers, students from the university; and general -Vittoria was at the head of two regular battalions in Upper Beira. - -The bishop of Oporto was preparing to defend that town, with a -mixed, but ferocious and insubordinate multitude. General Sylveira, -with four or five thousand men, had taken post in the Tras os -Montes; and Romana, who had collected seven or eight thousand at -Monterey, was in communication with him. - -Sir Robert Wilson was at the head of about three thousand men; he -had withdrawn the legion from Almeida, sent a detachment to Bejar, -and remained himself on the Agueda, watching the advanced posts of -Lapisse. A few Portuguese regiments were extended from Salvatierra -and Idanha to Alcantara. There was a permanent bridge of boats over -the Tagus at Abrantes, and there were small garrisons in that town -and at Elvas. - -But all these forces united would not, with the exception of the -British, have been capable of sustaining the shock of ten thousand -French soldiers for half an hour; and the whole mass of the latter, -then hanging on the frontier of Portugal, was above fifty thousand. -Gathering like clouds on the horizon, they threatened many points, -but gave no certain indication of where the storm would break. -Soult, indeed, with about twenty thousand men, was endeavouring to -pass the Minho; but Lapisse, although constantly menacing Ciudad -Rodrigo, kept his principal masses at Salamanca and Ledesma; while -Victor had concentrated his between the Alberche and the Tietar. - -Thus Lapisse might join either Soult or Victor; and the latter -could march by Placentia against Ciudad Rodrigo, while Soult -attacked Oporto; or he might draw Lapisse to him, and penetrate -Portugal by Alcantara. He might pass the Tagus, attack Cuesta, and -pursue him to Seville; or, after defeating him, he might turn short -to the right, and enter the Alemtejo. - -In this uncertainty, sir John Cradock, keeping the British -concentrated at Lumiar and Saccavem, waited for the enemy to -develop his plans, and, in the mean time, endeavoured to procure -the necessary equipments for an active campaign. He directed -magazines to be formed at Coimbra and Abrantes; urged the regency -to exertion; took measures to raise money, and despatched officers -to Barbary to procure mules. But while thus engaged, intelligence -arrived that Victor had suddenly forced the passage of the Tagus at -Almaraz, and was in pursuit of Cuesta on the road to Merida; that -Soult, having crossed the Minho, and defeated Romana and Sylveira, -was within a few leagues of Oporto; and that Lapisse had made a -demonstration of assaulting Ciudad Rodrigo. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The junta of Oporto now vehemently demanded aid from the regency, -and the latter, although not much inclined to the bishop’s party, -proposed that sir John Cradock should unite a part of the British -forces to the Portuguese troops under marshal Beresford, and -march to the succour of Oporto. Beresford was averse to trust -the Portuguese under his immediate command, among the mutinous -multitude in that city, but he thought the whole of the British -army should move in a body to Leiria, and from thence either push -on to Oporto, or return, according to the events that might occur -in the latter town, and he endeavoured to persuade Cradock to -follow this plan. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 12, section 1.] - -It was doubtful, he said, if Victor and Soult intended to -co-operate in a single plan; but, on the supposition that it was -so, he considered it essential to drive back or to overcome one -before the other could come to his assistance. Victor was then in -pursuit of Cuesta; if he continued that pursuit, it must be to -enter Seville, or to cripple his opponent previous to the invasion -of Portugal; in either case he would be in the Sierra Morena before -he could hear of the march from Leiria, and, as Cradock had daily -intelligence of Victor’s movements, there would be full time to -relieve Oporto, and to return again to the defence of Lisbon. If, -however, Soult depended on the co-operation of Victor, he would -probably remain on the right of the Duero until the other was on -the Tagus, and Lapisse also would be contented for the present with -capturing Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 12, section 2.] - -This reasoning, so evidently unsound, did not weigh with sir John -Cradock, who resolved to preserve his central position, covering -the capital at such a distance as to preclude the danger of being -cut off from it by one army while he was engaged with another. -Lisbon and Oporto, he observed, were the enemy’s objects; the -former was of incomparably greater importance than the latter. -Portugal was in a state of anarchy equally incompatible with firm -resistance and rapid movements. The peasantry were tumultuous -and formidable to everybody but the enemy; and Beresford himself -acknowledged that the regular forces were mutinous, disregarding -their officers, choosing when and where to rest; when to fight, -and when to remain in quarters; and altogether unfit to be trusted -within the circle of the Oporto mischief. The British troops, -therefore, were the only solid resource; but they were too few to -divide, and must act in a body, or not at all. - -Was it most desirable to protect Lisbon or Oporto? The first was -near, the second two hundred miles off; and, although the utmost -exertions had been made, the army was not yet equipped for an -active campaign. The troops were ill-clothed, and wanted shoes; the -artillery was unhorsed; the commissariat possessed only a fourth -part of the transport necessary for the conveyance of provisions -and ammunition, and no activity could immediately supply these -deficiencies, inasmuch as some of the articles required were not -to be had in the country, and, to obtain others, the interference -of the regency was necessary, but hitherto all applications to -that quarter had been without any effect. Was it wise to commence -offensive operations in the north? Soult and Lapisse together were -estimated at thirty thousand men, of which above five thousand were -cavalry, and he himself could only bring fifteen guns and twelve -thousand men, of all arms, into the field; yet, if the British -army, marched with the avowed intention of relieving Oporto, it -must accomplish it, or be dishonoured! - -Was it consistent with reason to march two hundred miles in search -of a combat, which the very state of Oporto would render it almost -impossible to gain, and for an object perhaps already lost? -Suspicion was alive all over the country: if Oporto was already -taken, the army must come back; that would be the signal for fresh -tumults--for renewed cries that the country was to be abandoned; -Lisbon would instantly be in a state of insurrection, and would be -even more formidable to the British than the enemy; besides, it was -impossible to reckon upon Cuesta’s aid in keeping Victor employed. -He was personally inimical to the English, and his principal object -was to gain time for the increase and discipline of his own force. - -Victor was apparently pursuing Cuesta, but his parties had already -appeared in the neighbourhood of Badajos, and there was nothing but -a weak Portuguese garrison in Elvas to impede his march through -the Alemtejo. To cover Lisbon and the Tagus was the wisest plan: -fixed in some favourable position, at a prudent distance from that -capital, he could wait for the reinforcements he expected from -England. He invited the Portuguese troops to unite with him; a -short time would suffice to establish subordination, and then the -certainty that the capital could not be approached, except in the -face of a really-formidable army, would not only keep the enemy in -check, but, by obliging him to collect in greater numbers for the -attempt, would operate as a diversion in favour of Spain. - -The general soundness of this reasoning is apparent, and it must -not be objected to sir John Cradock that he disregarded the value -of a central position, which might enable him to be beforehand -with the enemy in covering Lisbon, if the latter should march on -his flank. The difficulty of obtaining true intelligence from the -natives and his own want of cavalry rendered it utterly unsafe -for him to divide his army, or to trust it any distance from the -capital. - -Marshal Beresford’s plan, founded on the supposition that Cradock -could engage Soult at Oporto, and yet quit him, and return at his -pleasure to Lisbon, if Victor advanced, was certainly fallacious; -the advantages rested on conjectural, the disadvantages on positive -data: it was conjectural that they could relieve Oporto; it was -positive that they would endanger Lisbon; the proposition was, -however, not made upon partial views. But, at this period, other -men, less qualified to advise, pestered sir John Cradock with -projects of a different stamp, yet deserving of notice, as showing -that the mania for grand operations, which I have before marked as -the malady of the time, was still raging. - -[Sidenote: Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -To make a suitable use of the British army was the object of all -these projectors, but there was a marvellous variety in their -plans. While the regency desired that the Portuguese and English -troops should, without unfurnishing Lisbon, co-operate for the -relief of Oporto, and while marshal Beresford recommended that the -latter only should march, the bishop was importunate to have a -detachment of the British army placed under his command, and he -recalled Sir Robert Wilson to the defence of Oporto. It appeared -reasonable that the legion should defend the city in which it was -raised; but Mr. Frere wrote from Seville that sir Robert could do -better where he was; and the latter dreading the anarchy in Oporto, -accepted Spanish rank, and refused obedience to the prelate’s -orders, yet retained his troops. The regency, however, adopted the -Lusitanian legion as a national corps, and approved of sir Robert’s -proceedings. Meanwhile Romana was earnest with sir John Cradock -for money, and that a thousand British soldiers might be sent -to aid the insurrection at Vigo; and at the same time Mr. Frere -and colonel D’Urban, a corresponding officer placed at Cuesta’s -head-quarters, proposed other plans of higher pretensions. - -[Sidenote: Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -Zaragoza, said the latter, has fallen; and ten thousand French -troops being thus released, are marching towards Toledo; this is -the moment to give a fatal blow to Marshal Victor! It is one of -those critical occasions that seldom recur in war! In a day or two -sir Robert Wilson will be on the Tietar with two thousand five -hundred men; augment his force with a like number of Portuguese, -who may be drawn from Sobreira, Idanha, and Salvatierra. He shall -thus turn the right and rear of Victor’s army, and his movement -cannot be interrupted by the French force now at Salamanca and -Alva; because the communication from thence to the Tagus by the -passes of Baños and Tornevecas is sealed up; and while sir Robert -Wilson thus gets in the rear of Victor with five thousand men, -Cuesta, with twelve thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, -shall attack the latter in front, matter of easy execution; -because Cuesta can throw a pontoon bridge over the Tagus, near -Almaraz, in an hour and a half; and the Conde de Cartoajal, who -is at Manzanares in La Mancha, with ten thousand infantry and two -thousand horse, will keep Sebastiani in check. The hope is great, -the danger small; and if a few British troops can be added to the -force on the Tietar, the success will be infallible. - -There were, however, some grave objections to this infallible plan. -General Cuesta was near Almaraz; sir John Cradock was at Lisbon, -and sir Robert Wilson was at Ciudad Rodrigo. This circuitous line -of correspondence being above four hundred miles long, it is -not very clear how the combination was to be effected with that -rapidity, which was said to be essential to the success. Neither is -it very evident, that operations to be combined at such a distance, -and executed by soldiers of different nations, would have been -successful at all. On the one side, twenty thousand Portuguese and -Spanish recruits were to act on double external lines of operation; -on the other, twenty-five thousand French veterans waited in a -central position, with their front and flanks covered by the Tagus -and the Tietar. In such a contest it is possible to conceive a -different result from that anticipated by colonel D’Urban. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 7.] - -Mr. Frere’s plans were not less extensive, and he was equally -sanguine. When his project for assisting Catalonia had been -frustrated, by the recall of general Mackenzie from Cadiz, he -turned his attention to the north. Soult, he wrote to sir John -Cradock, tired of the resistance he has met with, will probably -desist from his “_unaccountable project of entering Portugal, -and occupying Gallicia at the same time_.” Let the British army, -therefore, make a push to drive the enemy out of Salamanca, -and the neighbouring towns; while the Asturians, on their side, -shall take possession of Leon and Astorga, and thus open the -communication between the northern and southern provinces. - -Fearing, however, that if this proposal should not be adopted, the -English general might be at a loss for some enterprise, Mr. Frere -also recommended that the British army should march to Alcantara; -and that the fortieth regiment, which hitherto he had retained at -Seville, contrary to sir John Cradock’s wishes, should join it at -that place; and then, the whole operating by the northern bank of -the Tagus, might, in concert with Cuesta, “_beat the French out of -Toledo, and consequently out of Madrid_.” - -[Sidenote: Muster Rolls of the French Army, MSS.] - -Now, with respect to the first of these plans, Soult never had the -intention of holding Gallicia, which was Marshal Ney’s province; -but he did propose to penetrate into Portugal, and he was not -likely to abandon his purpose; because, the only army capable of -opposing him was quitting that kingdom, and making a “_push_” of -four hundred miles to drive Lapisse out of Salamanca; moreover, the -Asturians were watched by general Bonnet’s division on one side, -and by Kellerman on the other; and the fifth corps, not ten, but -fifteen thousand strong, having quitted Zaragoza, were at this time -in the Valladolid country, and therefore close to Leon and Astorga. - -With respect to the operations by the line of the Tagus, which -were to drive Joseph out of Madrid, and consequently to attract -the attention of all the French corps, it is to be observed, that -sir John Cradock could command about twelve thousand men, Cuesta -sixteen thousand, Cartoajal twelve thousand, making a total of -forty thousand. Now, Soult had twenty-three thousand, Lapisse -nine thousand, Victor was at the head of twenty-five thousand, -Sebastiani could dispose of fifteen thousand, Mortier of a like -number, the King’s guards and the garrison of Madrid were twelve -thousand, making a total of nearly a hundred thousand men. - -But while Mr. Frere and colonel D’Urban, confiding in Soult’s -inactivity, were thus plotting the destruction of Victor and -Sebastiani, the first marshal stormed Oporto; the second, -unconscious of his danger, crossed the Tagus, and defeated Cuesta’s -army at Medellin, and at the same moment Sebastiani routed -Cartoajal’s at Ciudad Real. - - - - -BOOK VII. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -Having described the unhappy condition of Portugal and given a -general view of the transactions in Spain, I shall now resume the -narrative of Soult’s operations, thus following the main stream -of action, for the other marshals were appointed to tranquillize -the provinces already overrun by the emperor, or to war down the -remnants of the Spanish armies; but the duke of Dalmatia’s task was -to push onward in the course of conquest. Nor is it difficult to -trace him through the remainder of a campaign in which traversing -all the northern provinces, fighting in succession the armies of -three different nations, and enduring every vicissitude of war, he -left broad marks of his career and certain proofs that he was an -able commander, and of a haughty resolution in adversity. - -It has been observed, in a former part of this work, that the -inhabitants of Coruña honourably maintained their town until the -safety of the fleet which carried sir John Moore’s army from the -Spanish shores was secure; but they were less faithful to their own -cause. Coruña, although weak against a regular siege, might have -defied irregular operations, and several weeks must have elapsed -before sufficient battering train could have been brought up to -that corner of the Peninsula. Yet, a short negotiation sufficed to -put the French in possession of the place on the 19th of January, -and the means of attacking Ferrol were immediately organized from -the resources of Coruña. - -The harbour of Ferrol contained eight sail of the line, and some -smaller ships of war. The fortifications were regular, there was -an abundance of artillery and ammunition and a garrison of seven -or eight thousand men, composed of soldiers, sailors, citizens, -and armed countrymen, but their chiefs were treacherous. After -a commotion in which the admiral Obregon was arrested, his -successor Melgarejo surrendered the 26th upon somewhat better terms -than those granted to Coruña; and thus in ten days two regular -fortresses were reduced, that with more resolution might have -occupied thirty thousand men for several months. - -[Sidenote: S. MSS.] - -While yet before Ferrol the duke of Dalmatia received the following -despatch, prescribing the immediate invasion of Portugal:-- - -“Before his departure from this place, (Valladolid,) the -emperor foreseeing the embarkation of the English army, drew up -instructions for the ultimate operations of the duke of Elchingen -and yourself. He orders that when the English army shall be -embarked you will march upon Oporto with your four divisions, that -is to say, the division of Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet, -the dragoons of Lorge, and La Houssaye, and Franceschi’s light -cavalry, with the exception of two regiments that his majesty -desires you to turn over to the duke of Elchingen, in order to make -up his cavalry to four regiments.” - -“Your ‘_corps d’armée_,’ composed of seventeen regiments of -infantry and ten regiments of cavalry, is destined for the -expedition of Portugal, in combination with a movement the duke -of Belluno is going to effect. General Loison, some engineers, -staff and commissiarat officers, and thirteen Portuguese, all of -whom belonged to the army formerly in Portugal, under the duke of -Abrantes, have received instructions to join you immediately, and -you can transmit your orders for them to Lugo. This is the 21st -of January, and it is supposed you cannot be at Oporto before the -5th of February, or at Lisbon before the 16th. Thus, at that time, -namely, when you shall be near Lisbon, the ‘_corps d’armée_’ of -the duke of Belluno, composed of his own three divisions, of the -division Leval, and of ten or twelve regiments of cavalry, forming -a body of thirty thousand men, will be at Merida to make a strong -diversion in favour of your movement, and in such a mode as that he -can push the head of a column upon Lisbon, if you find any great -obstacles to your entrance, which it is, however, presumed will not -be the case.” - -“General Lapisse’s division of infantry, which is at this moment in -Salamanca, and general Maupetit’s brigade of cavalry, will, when -you shall be at Oporto, receive the duke of Istria’s orders to -march upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, where this division will -again be under the command of the duke of Belluno, who will send it -instructions to join him at Merida, and I let you know this that -you may be aware of the march of Lapisse, on your left flank, as -far as Abrantes. Such are the last orders I am charged to give you -in the name of the emperor; you will have to report to the king and -to receive his orders for your ulterior operations. The emperor has -unlimited confidence in your talents for the fine expedition that -he has charged you with.” - - ALEXANDER, - _Prince of Neufchatel, &c._ - -It was further intended, by Napoleon, that when Lisbon fell, -marshal Victor should invade Andalusia, upon the same line as -Dupont had moved the year before, and like him, also, he was to -have been assisted by a division of the second corps, which was -to cross the Guadiana and march on Seville. Meanwhile, the duke -of Elchingen, whose corps, reinforced by two regiments of cavalry -and the arrival of stragglers, amounted to near twenty thousand -men, was to maintain Gallicia, confine the Asturians within their -own frontier line, and keep open the communication with the second -corps. - -Thus, nominally, eighty thousand, and in reality sixty thousand -men, were disposed for the conquest of Lisbon, and in such a manner -that forty thousand would, after that had been accomplished, have -poured down upon Seville and Cadiz, and at a time when neither -Portugal nor Andalusia were capable of making any resistance. It -remains to shew from what causes this mighty preparation failed. - -[Sidenote: Muster-rolls of the French army, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations of the second corps, MSS.] - -The gross numbers of the second corps amounted to forty-seven -thousand, but general Bonnet’s division remained always at -St. Ander, in observation of the eastern Asturian frontier; -eight thousand were detached for the service of the general -communications, and the remainder had, since the 9th of November, -been fighting and marching incessantly among barren and snowy -mountains; hence, stragglers were numerous, and twelve thousand men -were in hospital. The force, actually under arms, did not exceed -twenty-five thousand men, worn down with fatigue, barefooted, and -without ammunition. They had outstripped their commissariat, the -military chest was not come up, the draft animals were reduced in -number, and extenuated by fatigue, the gun-carriages were shaken -by continual usage, and the artillery parc was still in the rear; -and as the sixth corps had not yet passed Lugo, two divisions of -the second were required to hold Coruña and Ferrol. Literally to -obey the emperor’s orders was consequently impossible, and Soult -fixing his head-quarters at St. Jago di Compostella, proceeded to -re-organize his army. - -Ammunition was fabricated from the loose powder found in Coruña; -shoes were obtained partly by requisition, partly from the Spanish -magazines, filled as they were with stores supplied by England. -The artillery was soon refitted, and, the greatest part of the -stragglers being rallied, in six days, the marshal thought himself -in a condition to obey his orders, and, although his troops were -still suffering from fatigue and privation, he marched, on the -1st of February, with nineteen thousand infantry, four thousand -cavalry, and fifty-eight pieces of artillery. But, before I narrate -his operations, it is necessary to give some account of the state -of Gallicia at this period, and to trace the movements of the -marquis de Romana. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.] - -When the Spanish army, on the 2d of January, crossed the -line of sir John Moore’s march, it was already in a state of -disorganization. Romana, with the cavalry, plunged at once into the -deep valleys of the Syl and the Minho; but the artillery and a part -of his infantry were overtaken and cut up by Franceschi’s cavalry. -The remainder wandered in bands from one place to another, or -dispersed to seek food and shelter among the villages in the -mountains. General Mendizabel, with a small body, halted in the -Val des Orres, and, placing guards at the Puente de Bibey, a point -of singular strength for defence, proposed to cover the approaches -to Orense on that side; but Romana himself, after wandering for a -time, collected two or three thousand men, and took post, on the -15th, at Toabado, a village about twenty miles from Lugo. - -Marshal Ney, while following the route of the 2d corps to Lugo -with the main body of his troops, detached some cavalry from Villa -Franca to scour the valleys on his left, and ordered a division of -infantry to march by the road of Orense and St. Jago to Coruña. -General Marchand, who commanded it, overthrew and dispersed -Mendizabel’s troops on the 17th, and, having halted some days -at Orense, to patrole the neighbourhood for information and to -establish an hospital, continued his march to St. Jago. - -The defeat of Mendizabel and the subsequent movements of Marchand’s -division completed the dispersion of Romana’s army; the greatest -part throwing away their arms, returned to their homes, and he -himself, with his cavalry, and the few infantry that would follow -him, crossed the Minho, passed the mountains, and, descending into -the valley of the Tamega, took refuge, on the 21st, at Oimbra, a -place on the frontier of Portugal, and close to Monterey, where -there was a small magazine, collected for the use of sir John -Moore’s army. - -In this obscure situation, unheeded by the French, he entered -into communication with the Portuguese general, Sylveira, and, -with sir John Cradock, demanding money and arms from the latter, -and endeavouring to re-assemble a respectable body of troops. But -Blake and other officers deserted him, and these events and the -general want of patriotic spirit drew from Romana the following -observation:--“I know not wherein the patriotism, so loudly -vaunted, consists; any reverse, any mishap prostrates the minds of -these people, and, thinking only of saving their own persons, they -sacrifice their country and compromise their commander.” - -The people of Gallicia, poor, scattered, living hardly, and, like -all mountaineers, very tenacious of the little property they -possess, disregarded political events which did not immediately and -visibly affect their interests, and were, with the exception of -those of the sea-port towns, but slightly moved by the aggression -of the French, as long as that aggression did not extend to their -valleys; hence, at first, they treated the English and French -armies alike. - -Sir David Baird’s division, in its advance, paid for the necessary -supplies, and it was regarded with jealousy and defrauded. Soult’s -and Moore’s armies, passing like a whirlwind, were beheld with -terror, and the people fled from both. The British and German -troops that marched to Vigo were commanded without judgement, -and licentious, and their stragglers were often murdered; their -numbers were small, and the people showed their natural hatred of -strangers without disguise. On several occasions the parties, sent -to collect cars for the conveyance of the sick, had to sustain a -skirmish before the object could be obtained, and five officers, -misled by a treacherous guide, were scarcely saved from death by -the interference of an old man, whose exertions, however, were not -successful until one of the officers had been severely wounded in -the head. On the other hand, general Marchand discovered so little -symptoms of hostility, during his march to Orense, that he left his -hospital at that town without a guard, and under the joint care -of Spanish and French surgeons, and the duties of humanity were -faithfully discharged by the former without hindrance from the -people. - -[Sidenote: Romana’s Manifesto.] - -But this quiescence did not last long: the French generals were -obliged to subsist their troops by requisitions extremely onerous -to a people whose property chiefly consisted of cattle. The many -abuses and excesses which always attend this mode of supplying -an army soon created a spirit of hatred that Romana laboured -incessantly to increase, and he was successful; for, although a bad -general, he possessed intelligence and dexterity suited to the task -of exciting a population. Moreover, the monks and friars laboured -to the same purpose; and, while Romana denounced death to those who -refused to take arms, the clergy menaced eternal perdition; and all -this was necessary, for the authority of the supreme junta was only -acknowledged as a matter of necessity--not of liking. - -Gallicia, although apparently calm, was, therefore, ripe for a -general insurrection, at the moment when the duke of Dalmatia -commenced his march from St. Jago di Compostella. - -From that town several roads lead to the Minho, the principal one -running by the coast line and crossing the Ulla, the Umia, the -Vedra, and the Octaven, passes by Pontevedra and Redondela to Tuy, -a dilapidated fortress, situated on the Spanish side of the Minho. -The second, crossing the same rivers nearer to their sources, -passes by the Monte de Tenteyros, and, entering the valley of the -Avia, follows the course of that river to Ribidavia, a considerable -town, situated at the confluence of the Avia with the Minho, and -having a stone bridge over the former, and a barque ferry on the -latter river. The third, turning the sources of the Avia, connects -St. Jago with Orense, and from Orense another road passes along -the right bank of the Minho, and connects the towns of Ribidavia, -Salvatierra, and Tuy, ending at Guardia, a small fortress at the -mouth of the Minho. - -As the shortest route to Oporto, and the only one convenient for -the artillery, was that leading by Redondela and Tuy, and from -thence by the coast, the duke of Dalmatia formed the plan of -passing the Minho between Salvatierra and Guardia. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MSS.] - -On the 1st of February Franceschi, followed by the other divisions -in succession, took the Pontevedra road. At Redondela he -encountered and defeated a small body of insurgents, and captured -four pieces of cannon; after which Vigo surrendered to one of his -detachments, while he himself marched upon Tuy, and took possession -of that town and Guardia. During these operations La Houssaye’s -dragoons, quitting Mellid, had crossed the Monte de Tenteyro, -passed through Ribidavia, and taken possession of Salvatierra, -on the Minho; and general Soult, the marshal’s brother, who had -assembled three thousand stragglers and convalescents, between -Astorga and Carrion, received orders to enter Portugal by Puebla de -Senabria, and thus join the main body. - -The rainy season was now in full torrent, and every stream and -river was overflowing its banks. The roads were deep, and the -difficulty of procuring provisions was great. These things, and the -delivering over to marshal Ney the administration of Ferrol and -Coruña, where the Spanish government and Spanish garrisons were -not only retained but paid by the French, delayed the rear of the -army so long that it was not until the 15th or 16th that the whole -of the divisions were assembled on the Minho, between Salvatierra, -Guardia, and Redondela. - -The Minho, from Melgaço to the mouth, forms the frontier of -Portugal, the banks on both sides being guarded by a number of -fortresses, originally of considerable strength, but at this -time all in a dilapidated condition. The Spanish fort of Guardia -fronted the Portuguese fort of Caminha; Tuy was opposed by Valença; -and this last was garrisoned, and the works in somewhat a better -condition than the rest; Lapella, Moncao, and Melgaço, completed -the Portuguese line. But the best defence at this moment was the -Minho itself, which, at all times a considerable river, was now a -broad and raging flood, and the Portuguese _ordenanzas_ and militia -were in arms on the other side, and had removed all the boats. - -Soult, after examining the banks with care, decided upon passing -at Campo Saucos, a little village where the ground was flatter, -more favourable, and so close to Caminha, that the army, once -across, could easily seize that place, and, the same day reach -Viana, on the Lima, from whence to Oporto was only three marches. -To attract the attention of the Portuguese; La Houssaye, who was at -Salvatierra, spread his dragoons along the Minho, and attempted to -push small parties across that river, above Melgaço, but the bulk -of the army was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Campo Saucos, -and a detachment seized the small sea-port of Bayona, in the rear. - -A division of infantry, and three hundred French marines released -at Coruña, and attached to the second corps, were then employed to -transport some large fishing boats and some heavy guns from the -harbour and fort of Guardia overland to Campo Saucos. This was -effected by the help of rollers over more than two miles of rugged -and hilly ground. It was a work of infinite labour, and, from the -11th to the 15th, the troops toiled unceasingly; the craft was, -however, at last, launched in a small lake at the confluence of the -Tamuga river with the Minho. - -The heavy guns being mounted in battery on the night of the 15th, -three hundred soldiers were embarked, and the boats, manned by -the marines, dropped silently down the Tamuga into the Minho, and -endeavoured to reach the Portuguese side of the latter river during -the darkness; but, whether from the violence of the flood, or want -of skill in the men, the landing was not effected at day-break, -and the _ordenanza_ fell with great fury upon the first who got on -shore: and now, the foremost being all slain, the others pulled -back, and regained their own side with great difficulty. This -action was infinitely creditable to the Portuguese, and it had a -surprising influence on the issue of the campaign. - -It was a gallant action, because it might reasonably have been -expected that a tumultuous assemblage of half-armed peasants, -collected on the instant, would have been dismayed at the sight of -many boats filled with soldiers some pulling across, others landing -under the protection of a heavy battery that thundered from the -midst of a multitude of troops, clustering on the heights, and -thronging to the edge of the opposite bank in eager expectation. - -It was an event of leading importance, inasmuch as it baffled an -attempt that, being successful, would have ensured the fall of -Oporto by the 21st of February, which was precisely the period when -general Mackenzie’s division being at Cadiz, sir John Cradock’s -troops were reduced to almost nothing; when the English ministers -only waited for an excuse to abandon Portugal; when the people -of that country were in the very extremity of disorder; when the -Portuguese army was a nullity; and when the regency was evidently -preparing to receive the French with submission. It was the period, -also, when Soult was expected to be at Lisbon, following the -Emperor’s orders, and, consequently, Lapisse and Victor could not -have avoided to fulfil their part of the plan for the subjugation -of Portugal. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 4.] - -The duke of Dalmatia’s situation was now, although not one of -imminent danger, extremely embarrassing, and more than ordinary -quickness and vigour were required to conduct the operations with -success. Posted in a narrow, contracted position, he was hemmed -in on the left by the Spanish insurgents, who had assembled -immediately after La Houssaye passed Orense, and who, being -possessed of a very rugged and difficult country, were, moreover, -supported by the army of Romana, which was said to be at Orense and -Ribidavia. - -In the French general’s front was the Minho, broad, raging, and at -the moment impassable, while heavy rains forbad the hope that its -waters would decrease. To collect sufficient means for forcing a -passage would have required sixteen days, and, long before that -period, the subsistence for the army would have entirely failed, -and the Portuguese, being alarmed, would have greatly augmented -their forces on the opposite bank. There remained then only to -retrace his steps to St. Jago, or break through the Spanish -insurgents, and, ascending the Minho, to open a way into Portugal -by some other route. - -The attempt to pass the river had been baffled on the 15th of -February; on the 16th the army was in full march towards Ribidavia, -upon a new line of operations, and this promptitude of decision -was supported by an equally prompt execution. La Houssaye, with -his dragoons, quitted Salvatierra, and, keeping the edge of the -Minho, was galled by the fire of the Portuguese from the opposite -bank; but, before evening, he twice broke the insurgent bands, and, -in revenge for some previous excesses of the peasantry, burnt the -villages of Morentan and Cobreira. Meanwhile the main body of the -army, passing the Tea river, at Salvatierra and Puente d’Arcos, -marched, by successive divisions, along the main road from Tuy to -Ribidavia. - -Between Franquera and Canizar the route was cut by the streams of -the Morenta and Noguera rivers; and, behind those torrents, eight -hundred Gallicians, having barricadoed the bridges and repulsed the -advanced parties of cavalry, stood upon their defence. The 17th, -at daybreak, the leading brigade of Heudelet’s division forced the -passage, and pursued the Spaniards briskly; but, when within a -short distance of Ribidavia, the latter rallied upon eight or ten -thousand insurgents, arrayed in order of battle, on a strong hill, -covering the approaches to that town. - -At this sight the advanced guard halted until the remainder of the -division and a brigade of cavalry were come up, and then, under the -personal direction of Soult, the French assailed, and drove the -Gallicians, fighting, through the town and across the Avia. The -loss of the vanquished was very considerable, and the bodies of -twenty priests were found amongst the slain; but, either from fear -or patriotism, every inhabitant had quitted Ribidavia. - -The 18th one brigade of infantry scoured the valley of the Avia, -and dispersed three or four thousand of the insurgents, who were -disposed to make a second stand on that side. A second brigade, -pushing on to Barbantes, seized a ferry-boat on the Minho, close -to that place; they were joined, the same evening, by the infantry -who had scoured the valley of the Avia the day before, and by -Franceschi’s cavalry, and, on the 19th, they entered Orense in time -to prevent the bridge over the Minho from being cut. La Houssaye’s -dragoons then took post at Maside, and the same day the remainder -of the horse and Laborde’s infantry were united at Ribidavia; -but the artillery were still between Tuy and Salvatierra, under -the protection of Merle’s and Mermet’s divisions. Thus, in three -days, the duke of Dalmatia had, with an admirable celerity and -vigour, extricated his army from a contracted unfavourable country, -strangled a formidable insurrection in its birth, and at the same -time opened a fresh line of communication with St. Jago, and an -easy passage into Portugal. - -The 20th a regiment being sent across the Minho, by the ferries -of Barbantes and Ribidavia, defeated the insurgents of the -left bank, advanced to the Arroyo river, and took post on the -heights of Merea. The army, with the exception of the division -guarding the guns, was the same day concentrated at Orense. But -the utmost efforts of the artillery-officers had been baffled -by the difficulties of the road between Tuy and Ribidavia; and -this circumstance, together with the precarious state of the -communications, the daily increasing sick-list, and the number of -petty detachments necessary to protect the rear of the army, seemed -to render the immediate invasion of Portugal hopeless. - -To men of an ordinary stamp it would have been so; but the duke of -Dalmatia, with a ready boldness, resolved to throw the greatest -part of his artillery and the whole of his other incumbrances into -Tuy, as a place of arms, and then relinquishing all communication -with Gallicia, for the moment, to march in one mass directly -upon Oporto; from whence, if successful, he proposed to re-open -his communication with Tuy, by the line of the coast, and then, -recovering his artillery and parcs, to re-establish a regular -system of operations. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -In pursuance of this resolution, sixteen of the lightest guns and -six howitzers, together with a proportion of ammunition-waggons, -were, with infinite labour and difficulty, transported to -Ribidavia, but the remaining thirty-six pieces and a vast parc -of carriages, carrying ammunition and hospital and commissariat -stores, were put into Tuy. General La Martiniere was left there -with an establishment of artillery and engineer officers, a -garrison of five hundred men fit to carry arms, and nine hundred -sick. All the stragglers, convalescents, and detachments, coming -from St. Jago, and the military chest, which was still in the -rear, guarded by six hundred infantry, were directed upon Tuy, and -the gates being then shut, La Martiniere was abandoned to his own -resources. - -The men in hospital at Ribidavia were now forwarded to Orense, and -the marshal’s quarters were established at the latter town on the -24th; but many obstacles were yet to be vanquished before the army -could commence the march into Portugal. The gun-carriages had been -so shaken in the transit from Tuy to Ribidavia that three days -were required to repair them. It was extremely difficult to obtain -provisions, and numerous bands of the peasants were still in arms; -nor were they quelled until combats had taken place at Gurzo, on -the Monte Blanco, in the Val d’Ornes, and up the valley of Avia, -by which the French wasted time, lost men, and expended ammunition -that could not be replaced. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.] - -Marshal Soult endeavoured to soften the people’s feelings by -kindness and soothing proclamations; and as he enforced a strict -discipline among his troops, his humane and politic demeanour -joined to the activity of his moveable columns, soon abated the -fierceness of the peasantry. The inhabitants of Ribidavia returned -to their houses; those of Orense had never been very violent, -and now became even friendly, and lent assistance to procure -provisions. It was not, however, an easy task to restrain the -soldiers within the bounds of humanity: the frequent combats, the -assassination and torturing of isolated men, and the privations -endured, had so exasperated the French troops, that the utmost -exertions of their general’s authority could not always control -their revenge. - -While the duke of Dalmatia was thus preparing for a formidable -inroad, his adversaries were a prey to the most horrible anarchy. -The bishop, always intent to increase his own power, had assembled -little short of fifty thousand armed persons in Oporto; and he -had also commenced a gigantic line of entrenchments on the hills -to the northward of that city. This worse than useless labour -so completely occupied all persons, that the defence of the -strong country lying between the Duero and the Minho was totally -neglected; and when the second corps appeared on the bank of the -latter river, the northern provinces were struck with terror. Then -it was that the people, for the first time, understood the extent -of their danger; and that the bishop, aroused from his intrigues, -became sensible that the French were more terrible enemies than the -regency. Once impressed with this truth, he became clamorous for -succour. He recalled sir Robert Wilson from the Agueda; he hurried -on the labours of the entrenchments; and he earnestly pressed sir -John Cradock for assistance, demanding arms, ammunition, and a -reinforcement of British soldiers. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.] - -Sir Robert Wilson, as I have already related, disregarded his -orders; and the British general refused to furnish him with troops, -but supplied him with arms, very ample stores of powder, and sent -artillery and engineer officers to superintend the construction -of the defensive works, and to aid in the arrangements for a -reasonable system of operations. The people were, however, become -too headstrong and licentious to be controlled, or even advised, -and the soldiers being drawn into the vortex of insubordination, -universal and hopeless confusion prevailed. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 1.] - -Don Bernadim Freire was the legal commander-in-chief of the -Entre Minho e Douro, but all the generals claimed an equal and -independent authority each over his own force; and this was, -perhaps, a matter of self-preservation, for general and traitor -were, at that period, almost synonymous; and to obey the orders -of a superior against the momentary wishes of the multitude was -to incur instant death: nor were there wanting men who found it -profitable to inflame the passions of the mob, and to direct -their blind vengeance against innocent persons; for the prelate’s -faction, although the most powerful, was not without opponents even -in Oporto. - -Such was the unhappy state of affairs when the undisciplined -gallantry of the peasants, baffling the efforts of the French -to cross the Minho at Campo Saucos, obliged Soult to march by -Orense. A part of the regular troops were immediately sent forward -to the Cavado river, where they were joined by the _ordenanzas_ -and the militia of the district, but all in a state of fearful -insubordination; and there were not any arrangements made for the -regular distribution of provisions, or of any one necessary supply. - -Among the troops despatched from Oporto was the second battalion -of the Lusitanian legion, nine hundred strong, well armed and well -equipped; they were commanded by baron Eben, a native of Prussia, -who, without any known services to recommend him, had suddenly -attained the rank of major in the British service. This man, -destined to act a conspicuous part in Portuguese tragedy, had been -left by sir Robert Wilson in Oporto, when that officer marched to -Almeida. Eben’s orders were to follow with the second battalion -of the legion, when the men’s clothing and equipment should be -completed; but he, retaining the troops, remained, to push his own -fortune under the prelate’s auspices. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.] - -General Freire having reached the Cavado, with a small body of -regular troops, was immediately joined by fourteen or fifteen -thousand militia and _ordenanzas_. Fixing his head-quarters at -Braga, he sent detachments to occupy the posts of Salamonde and -Ruivaens in his front; and, unfortunately for himself, endeavoured -to restrain his troops from wasting their ammunition by wanton -firing in the streets and on the roads. This exertion of command -was heinously resented; for Freire, being willing to uphold the -authority of the regency, had been for some time obnoxious to the -bishop’s faction, and already he was pointed to as a suspected -person; and the multitude were inimically disposed towards him. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 3.] - -Meanwhile, general Sylveira, assuming the command of the Tras -os Montes, advanced to Chaves, and put himself in communication -with the marquis of Romana, who, having remained tranquil at -Oimbra and Monterey since the 21st of January, had been joined by -his dispersed troops, and was again at the head of nine or ten -thousand men. Sylveira’s force consisted of about two thousand -regulars and as many militia, and his army was accompanied by many -of the _ordenanzas_; but here, as elsewhere, the Portuguese were -licentious, insubordinate, and disdainful of their general; and -the national enmity between them and the Spaniards overcoming the -sense of a common cause and common danger, the latter were evilly -entreated, both officers and men; and a deadly feud subsisted -between the two armies. - -The generals, however, agreed to act in concert, offensively and -defensively; but neither of them were the least acquainted with the -numbers, intention, or even the position of their antagonists: and -it is a proof of Romana’s unfitness for command that he, having the -whole population at his disposal, was yet ignorant of every thing -relating to his enemy that it behoved him to know. The whole of -the French force in Gallicia, at this period, was about forty-five -thousand men, Romana estimated it at twenty-one thousand. The -number under Soult was above twenty-four thousand, Romana supposed -it to be twelve thousand; and among these he included general -Marchand’s division of the sixth corps, which he always imagined to -be a part of the duke of Dalmatia’s army. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 3.] - -[Sidenote: Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The Spanish general was so elated at the spirit of the peasants -about Ribidavia, that he anticipated nothing but victory. He knew -that on the Arosa, an estuary, running up towards St. Jago de -Compostella, the inhabitants of Villa Garcia had also risen, and, -being joined by all the neighbouring districts, were preparing -to attack Vigo and Tuy; and partly from his Spanish temperament, -partly from his extreme ignorance of war, he was convinced that -the French only thought of making their escape out of Gallicia, -and that even in that they would be disappointed. But to effect -their destruction more certainly, he also, as we have seen, -pestered sir John Cradock for succours in money and ammunition, and -desired that, the insurgents on the Arosa might be assisted with -a thousand British soldiers. Cradock anxious to support the cause, -although he refused the troops, sent ammunition, and five thousand -pounds in money; but, before it arrived, Romana was beaten and in -flight. - -The combined Spanish and Portuguese forces, amounting to sixteen -thousand regulars and militia, besides _ordenanzas_, were posted -in a straggling unconnected manner along the valley of the Tamega, -and extended from Monterey, Verim, and Villaza, to near Chaves, a -distance of more than fifteen miles. This was the first line of -defence for Portugal. - -Freire and Eben, with fourteen guns and twenty-five thousand -men, were at Braga, in second line, their outposts being on the -Cavado, and at the strong passes of Ruivaens and Venda Nova: but of -these twenty-five thousand men, only six thousand were armed with -muskets; and it is to be observed that the militia and troops of -the line differed from the armed peasantry only in name, save that -their faulty discipline and mutinous disposition rendered them less -active and intelligent as skirmishers, without making them fitter -for battle. - -The bishop, with his disorderly and furious rabble, formed the -third line, occupying the entrenchments that covered Oporto. - -Such was the state of affairs, and such were the dispositions made -to resist the duke of Dalmatia; but his army, although galled and -wearied by continual toil, and when halting, disturbed and vexed by -the multitude of insurrections, was, when in motion, of a power to -overthrow and disperse these numerous bands, even as a great ship -feeling the wind, breaks through and scatters the gun-boats that -have gathered round her in the calm. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -SECOND INVASION OF PORTUGAL. - - -The Entre Minho e Douro and the Tras os Montes lying together, form -the northern part of Portugal, the extreme breadth of either, when -measured from the frontier to the Douro, does not exceed seventy -miles. - -The river Tamega, running north and south, and discharging itself -into the Douro, forms the boundary line between them; but there is, -to the west of this river, a succession of rugged mountain ridges, -which, under the names of Sierra de Gerez, Sierra de Cabrera, and -Sierra de Santa Catalina, form a second barrier, nearly parallel -to the Tamega; and across some part of these ridges any invader, -coming from the eastward, must pass to arrive at Oporto. - -Other Sierras, running also in a parallel direction with the -Tamega, cut the Tras os Montes in such a manner, that all the -considerable rivers flowing north and south tumble into the Douro. -But as the western ramifications of the Sierras de Gerez and -Cabrera shoot down towards the sea, the rivers of the Entre Douro -e Minho discharge their waters into the ocean, and consequently -flow at right angles to those of Tras os Montes. Hence it follows, -that an enemy penetrating to Oporto, from the north, would have to -pass the Lima, the Cavado, and the Ave, to reach Oporto; and, if -coming from the east, he invaded the Tras os Montes, all the rivers -and intervening ridges of that province must be crossed before the -Entre Minho e Douro could be reached. - -The duke of Dalmatia was, however, now in such a position, near -the sources of the Lima and the Tamega rivers, that he could -choose whether to penetrate by the valley of the first into the -Entre Minho e Douro, or by the valley of the second into the Tras -os Montes: and there was also a third road, leading between those -rivers through Montalegre upon Braga; but this latter route, -passing over the Sierra de Gerez, was impracticable for artillery. - -The French general had, therefore, to consider-- - -1º. If, following the course of the Lima, he should attack and -disperse the insurgents between that river and the Minho, and then -recovering his artillery from Tuy, proceed against Oporto by the -main road leading along the sea coast. - -2º. If he should descend the Tamega, take Chaves, and then decide -whether to continue his route to Villa Real, near the Douro, and so -take the defences of Tras os Montes in reverse, or, turning to his -right, and crossing the Sierra de Cabrera by the pass of Ruivaens, -enter Braga, and thus operate against Oporto. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MSS.] - -The first project was irregular and hazardous, inasmuch as Romana -and Sylveira’s troops might have fallen upon the flank and rear of -the French during their march through a difficult country; but as -the position of those generals covered the road to Chaves, to beat -them was indispensable, as a preliminary measure to either plan; -and this was immediately executed. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Papers, MSS.] - -The 4th of March the French movement commenced. The 5th, the van -being at Villa Real and Penaverde, Soult sent a flag of truce to -Romana, with a letter, in which, exposing fully the danger of the -latter’s situation, he advised him to submit: but no answer was -returned; nor would the bearer have been suffered to pass the -outposts, but that Romana himself was in the rear, for he dreaded -that such an occurrence would breed a jealousy of his conduct, and, -perhaps, cause his patriotism to be undervalued. - -This failing, three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry -marched the next morning against Monterey; while La Houssaye’s -dragoons, taking the road of Laza, covered the left flank, and -pushed parties as far La Gudina, on the route to Puebla de -Senabria. The fourth division of infantry remained at Villa del -Rey, to cover the passage of the sick and wounded men from Orense; -for the duke of Dalmatia, having no base of operations, transported -his hospitals, and other incumbrances, from place to place as the -army moved, acting in this respect after the manner of the Roman -generals, when invading a barbarous country. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MSS.] - -As the French advanced, the Spaniards abandoned their positions in -succession, spiked the guns in the dilapidated works of Monterey, -and after a slight skirmish at Verim, took the road to Puebla de -Senabria; but Franceschi followed close, and overtaking two or -three thousand as they were passing a rugged mountain, he assailed -their rear with a battalion of infantry, and at the same time -leading his horsemen round both flanks, headed the column, and -obliged it to halt. - -The Spaniards, trusting to the rough ground, drew up in one large -square and awaited the charge. Franceschi had four regiments of -cavalry; each regiment settled itself against the face of a square, -and then the whole, with loud cries, bore down swiftly upon their -opponents; the latter unsteady and dismayed, shrunk together from -the fierce assault, and were instantly trampled down in heaps. -Those who escaped the horses’ hoofs and the edge of the sword -became prisoners, but twelve hundred bodies were stretched lifeless -on the field of battle, and Franceschi continued his movements on -La Gudina. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 3.] - -Romana was at Semadems, several miles in the rear of Verim, when -his vanguard was attacked, and there was nothing to prevent him -from falling back to Chaves with his main body, according to a -plan before agreed upon between him and Sylveira, but either from -fear or indignation at the treatment his soldiers had received at -the hands of the Portuguese, he left Sylveira to his fate, and -made off with six or seven thousand men towards Bragança; from -thence passing by Puebla de Senabria, he regained the valley of the -Syl. Meanwhile, two thousand Portuguese infantry, with some guns, -issuing from the side of Villaza, cut the French line of march at -the moment when Franceschi and Heudelet having passed Monterey, -Laborde was approaching that place. In the slight combat that -ensued the Portuguese lost their guns and were driven, fighting, -down the valley of the Tamega as far as the village of Outeiro, -within their own frontier. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The defeat and flight of Romana had such an effect upon the -surrounding districts that the Spanish insurgents returned in -crowds to their habitations and delivered up their arms. Some of -the clergy, also, changing their opinions, exhorted the people to -peace, and the prisoners taken on the 6th, being dissatisfied with -Romana’s conduct, and moved by their hatred of the Portuguese, -entered the French service. These affairs occupied Soult until the -9th, during which period his outposts were pushed towards Chaves, -Montalegre, and La Gudina, but the main body remained at Verim to -cover the arrival of the sick, at Monterey. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6, section 3.] - -Sylveira, thus beaten at Villaza, and deserted by Romana, fell back -on the 7th to a strong mountain position, one league behind Chaves, -from whence he could command a view of all the French movements -as far as Monterey. His ground was advantageous, but his military -talents were moderate, his men always insubordinate, were now -become mutinous, and many of the officers were disposed to join the -French. The general wished to abandon Chaves, the troops resolved -to defend it, and three thousand five hundred men actually did -throw themselves into that town, in defiance of Sylveira, who was -already, according to the custom of the day, pronounced a traitor -and declared worthy of that death which he would inevitably have -suffered, but that some of his troops still continued to respect -his orders. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The 10th, the convoy of French sick was close to Monterey, and -as Romana’s movement was known to be a real flight, and not -made with a design to create fresh insurrections in the rear, -the French troops were again put in motion towards Chaves; but -Merle’s division remained at Verim to protect the hospital, and -Franceschi’s took the road of La Gudina, as if he had been going -towards Salamanca. A report that he had actually entered that -town reached Lisbon, and was taken as an indication that Soult -would not pass the Portuguese frontier at Chaves, but Franceschi -quickly returned, by Osonio and Feces de Abaxo, and being assisted -by Heudelet’s division, invested Chaves on the left bank of the -Tamega, while Laborde, Mermet, La Houssaye, and Lorge, descending -the right bank, beat the Portuguese outposts, and getting -possession of a fort close under the walls of Chaves completed the -investment of that town. - -The place was immediately summoned to surrender, but no answer -was returned, and the garrison, like men bereft of their wits, -and fighting with the air, kept up a continual and heavy fire of -musketry and artillery until the 12th, when they surrendered on -receiving a second summons, more menacing than the first. The 13th -the French entered the town, and Sylveira retired to Villa Real. - -The works of Chaves were in a bad state, and few of the fifty -guns mounted on the ramparts were fit for service; but there was -a stone-bridge, and the town being in many respects more suitable -for a place of arms than Monterey, the sick were brought down -from the latter place, and an hospital was established for twelve -hundred men, the number now unfit to carry arms. The fighting men -were reduced to twenty-one thousand, and Soult, partly from the -difficulty of guarding his prisoners, partly from a desire to -abate the hostility of the Portuguese, permitted the militia and -_ordenanza_ to return to their homes, after taking an oath not -to resume their arms. To some of the poorest he gave money and -clothes, and he enrolled, at their own request, the few regular -troops taken in Chaves. - -[Sidenote: Noble’s Campaign de Galice.] - -[Sidenote: Journal of Operations MSS.] - -This wise and gentle proceeding was much blamed, by some of his -officers, especially by those who had served under Junot. They -desired that Chaves might be assaulted, and the garrison put to -the sword, for they were embued with a personal hatred of the -Portuguese, and being averse to serve in the present expedition -endeavoured, as it would appear, to thwart their general; but the -prudence of his conduct was immediately visible in the softened -feelings of the country people. The scouting parties being no -longer molested spread themselves, some on the side of Bragança and -Villa Real, others in the Entre Minho e Douro. The former reported -that there was no enemy in a condition to make head in the Tras os -Montes, but the latter fell in with the advanced guard of Freire’s -army at Ruivaens, on the road to Braga, and this determined the -further proceedings of the army. - -[Sidenote: Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The possession of Chaves enabled the duke of Dalmatia to operate -against Oporto, either by the Tras os Montes or the Entre Minho -e Douro. He decided on the latter; first, because the road, -though crossed by stronger positions, was more direct, and more -practicable for artillery, than that running through the valley -of the Tamega; secondly, because a numerous Portuguese army was -at Braga; and, thirdly, because he could the sooner remove his -communication with Tuy. - -The road from Chaves to Braga enters a deep and dangerous defile, -or rather a succession of defiles, that extend from Venda Nova to -Ruivaens, and re-commence after passing the Cavado river. Friere’s -advanced guards, composed of _ordenanza_, occupied those places; -and he had also a detachment under Eben on the road of Montalegre; -but he recalled the latter on the 14th. - -The 16th Franceschi forced the defile of Venda Nova, and the -remainder of the troops being formed in alternate masses of -cavalry and infantry, began to pass the Sierra de Cabrera. Lorge’s -dragoons, however, descending the Tamega, ordered rations for -the whole army along the road to Villa Real; and then, suddenly -retracing their steps, rejoined the main body. - -The 17th, Franceschi, being reinforced with some infantry, won the -bridge of Ruivaens, and entered Salamonde. The Portuguese, covered -by Eben’s detachment, which had arrived at St. Joa de Campo, then -fell back on the Pico de Pugalados, close to Braga; and the French -took post at Carvalho Este, two leagues in front of that city. - -Soult now expected to reach Braga without further opposition, and -caused his artillery, guarded by Laborde’s division, to enter -the pass of Venda Nova; but the _ordenanza_, reinforced by some -men from the side of Guimaraens, immediately re-assembled, and, -clustering on the mountains to the left of the column of march, -attacked it with great fierceness and subtlety. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The peasants of the northern provinces of Portugal, unlike the -squalid miserable population of Lisbon and Oporto, are robust, -handsome, and exceedingly brave. Their natural disposition is open -and obliging; and they are, when rightly handled as soldiers, -docile, intelligent, and hardy. They are, however, vehement in -their anger; and being now excited by the exhortations and personal -example of their priests, they came rushing down the sides of -the hills; and many of them, like men deprived of reason, broke -furiously into the French battalions, and were there killed. The -others, finding their efforts unavailing, fled, and were pursued a -league up the mountain by some battalions sent out against them, -but they were not yet abashed; for, making a circuit behind the -hills, they fell upon the rear of the line of march, killed fifty -of the stragglers, and plundered the baggage; and, thus galled, the -French slowly, and with much trouble, passing the long defiles of -Venda Nova, Ruivaens, and Salamonde, gathered by degrees in front -of Freire’s position. - -[Sidenote: Eben’s Report, MSS. Sir J. Cradock’s Paper.] - -That general was no more; and his troops, reeking from the -slaughter of their commander, were raging, like savage beasts, at -one moment congregating near the prisons to murder some wretch -within, at another rushing tumultuously to the outposts, with -a design to engage the enemy. The _ordenanzas_ of the distant -districts also came pouring into the camp, dragging with them -suspected persons, and adding to the general distraction. - -It appears that the unfortunate Friere, unable to establish order -in his army, had resolved to retreat; and, in pursuance of that -design, recalled Eben on the 14th, and gave directions to the -officers at the different outposts in front of Braga to retire at -the approach of the enemy. This, and his endeavour to prevent the -waste of ammunition, gave effect to a plan which had been long -prepared by the bishop’s faction for his destruction. In passing -through Braga, he was openly reviled in the streets by some of -the _ordenanzas_; and, as the latter plainly discovered their -murderous intention, he left the army; but he was seized on the -17th, at a village behind Braga, and brought back: what followed is -thus described by baron Eben, in his official report to sir John -Cradock:-- - -“I did not reach Braga until nine o’clock in the morning of the -17th. I found every thing in the greatest disorder; the houses -shut, the people flying in all directions, and part of the populace -armed with guns and pikes. Passing through the streets, I was -greeted with loud _vivas_. Though the people knew me, I could not -guess the meaning of this: at the market-place, I was detained by -the rapidly-increasing populace, who took the reins of my horse, -crying out loudly, that they were ready to do any thing to defend -the city; requesting me to assist them, and speaking in the lowest -terms of their general. I promised them to do all in my power to -aid their patriotic zeal; but said that I must first speak to him. -Upon this, they suffered me to proceed, accompanied by about a -hundred of them: but I had not got far on my way to his quarters, -when I saw him on foot, conducted by a great armed multitude, who -suffered no one to pass, and, on my attempting it, threatened to -fire. I was, therefore, obliged to turn my horse; and this the -people applauded. Two men had hold of the general’s arms, his sword -was taken from him, and the people abused him most vehemently. On -my way back to the market-place, they wanted to shoot me, taking -me for general Friere; but I was saved by a soldier of the legion, -who explained the mistake. When I reached the market-place, I -found about a thousand men drawn up: I communicated to them my -determination to assist them in their laudable endeavours to defend -themselves, provided they would first permit me to speak to the -general, for whose actions I promised to be answerable as long as -I should be with him. I had ordered a house to be got ready for my -reception, where the general arrived, accompanied as before; I -saluted him with respect, at which they plainly discovered their -disapprobation. I repeated my proposal, but they would not listen -to it. I perceived the danger of the general, and proposed to take -him to my quarters. My adjutant offered him his arm: when I spoke -to him, he only replied, ‘save me!’” - -“At the entrance of my house, I was surrounded by thousands, and -heard the loud cry of ‘kill! kill!’ I now took hold of him, and -attempted to force my way into the house, and a gentleman slightly -wounded him with the point of his sword, under my arm. He collected -all his strength, and rushed through them, and hid himself behind -the door of the house. The people surrounded me, and forced me from -the house. To draw the attention of the people from the general, I -ordered the drummers to beat the alarm, and formed the _ordenanzas_ -in ranks; but they kept a constant fire upon my house, where the -general still was. As a last attempt to save him, I now proposed -that he should be conducted to prison, in order to take a legal -trial; this was agreed to, and he was conducted there in safety. -I now hoped that I had succeeded, as the people demanded to be -led against the enemy, now rapidly advancing, in number about -two thousand. I again formed them, and advanced with them; but -soon after, I heard the firing again, and was informed that the -people had put the general to death with pikes and guns. I was now -proclaimed general.” - -[Sidenote: Eben’s Reports, MS.] - -When this murder was perpetrated, the people seemed satisfied, and -Eben announcing the approach of a British force from Oporto, sent -orders to the outposts to stand fast, as he intended to fight; -but another tumult arose, when it was discovered that an officer -of Freire’s staff, one Villaboas, was in Eben’s quarters. Several -thousand _ordenanzas_ instantly gathered about the house, and the -unhappy man was haled forth and stabbed to death at the door, the -mob all the time shouting and firing volleys in at the windows. -Yet, when their fury was somewhat abated, they obliged their new -general to come out and show that he had not been wounded, and -expressed great affection for him. - -In the course of the night the legion marched in from Pico de -Pugalados, and the following morning a reinforcement of six -thousand _ordenanzas_ came up in one mass. Fifty thousand dollars -also arrived in the camp from Oporto; for the Portuguese, like the -Spaniards, commonly reversed the order of military arrangements, -leaving their weapons in store, and bringing their encumbrances to -the field of battle. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -In the evening the corregidor and two officers of rank, together -with many persons of a meaner class, were brought to the town as -prisoners and put in jail, the armed mob being with difficulty -restrained from slaying them on the way thither; and in this -distracted manner they were proceeding when Franceschi arrived at -Carvalho on the 17th, and, surely, if that bold and enterprising -soldier could have obtained a glimpse of what was passing, or known -the real state of affairs, he would have broke into the midst -of them with his cavalry; for, of the twenty-five thousand men -composing the whole of the Portuguese force, eighteen thousand were -only armed with pikes, the remainder had wasted the greatest part -of their ammunition, and the powder in store was not made up in -cartridges. But Braga, situated in a deep hollow, was hidden from -him, and the rocky and wooded hills surrounding it were occupied by -what appeared a formidable multitude. Hence Franceschi, although -reinforced by a brigade of infantry, was satisfied by feints and -slight skirmishes to alarm his opponents, and to keep them in play -until the other divisions of the French army could arrive. - -While these events were passing at Braga, Sylveira had again -collected a considerable force of militia and _ordenanzas_ in the -Tras os Montes, and captain Arentchild, one of the officers sent by -sir John Cradock to aid the bishop, rallied a number of fugitives -at Guimaraens and Amarante. In Oporto, however, the multitude, -obeying no command, were more intent upon murder than upon defence. - -Eben’s posts extended from Falperra, on the route of Guimaraens -to the Ponte Porto, on the Cavado river; but the principal force -was stationed on a lofty ridge called the Monte Adaufé, which, at -the distance of six or seven miles from Braga, crossed the road to -Chaves. - -The left, or western, end, which overhangs the river Cavado, -covered the detachment guarding the Ponte Porto. - -The right rested on a wood and on the head of a deep ravine, and -beyond this wood the ridge, taking a curved and forward direction, -was called the Monte Vallonga, and a second mass of men was posted -there, but separated from those on the Monte Adaufé by an interval -of two miles, and by the ravine and wood before mentioned. - -A third body, being pushed still more in advance, crowned an -isolated hill, flanking the Chaves road, being prepared to take -the French in rear when the latter should attack the Monte Adaufé. - -Behind the Monte Vallonga, and separated from it by a valley three -miles wide, the ridge of Falperra was guarded by detachments sent -both from Guimaraens and from Braga. - -The road to Braga, leading directly over the centre of the Monte -Adaufé, was flanked on the left by a ridge shooting perpendicularly -out from that mountain, and ending in a lofty mass of rocks which -overhangs Carvalho Esté. The Portuguese neglected to occupy either -these rocks or the connecting ridge, and Franceschi seized the -former on the 17th. - -The 18th, Soult arrived in person, and, wishing to prevent a -battle, released twenty prisoners, and sent them in with a -proclamation couched in conciliatory language, and offering a -capitulation; but the trumpeter who accompanied them was detained, -and the prisoners were immediately slain. - -The 19th, Eben brought up all his reserves to the Adaufé, and -the Portuguese on the isolated hill in front of Monte Vallonga -took possession of Lanhoza, a village half way between that hill -and the rocky height occupied by Franceschi on the 17th. But two -divisions of French infantry being now up, Soult caused one of them -and the cavalry to attack Lanhoza, from whence the Portuguese were -immediately driven, and, being followed closely, lost their own -hill also. The other French division took post, part in Carvalho, -part on the rocky headland, and six guns were carried to the latter -during the night. In this position the French columns were close to -the centre of the Portuguese, and could, by a slight movement in -advance, separate Eben’s wings. The rest of the army was at hand, -and a general attack was arranged for the next morning. - - -BATTLE OF BRAGA. - -The 20th, at nine o’clock, the French were in motion: Franceschi -and Mermet, leaving a detachment on the hill they had carried the -night before, endeavoured to turn the right of the people on the -Monte Vallonga. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -Laborde, supported by La Houssaye’s dragoons, advanced against the -centre by the ridge connecting Carvalho with the Monte Adaufé. - -Heudelet, with a part of his division and a squadron of cavalry, -attacked the left, and made for the Ponte Porto. - -[Sidenote: Eben’s Report, MS.] - -The Portuguese immediately opened a straggling fire of musketry and -artillery in the centre; but, after a few rounds, the bursting of a -gun created some confusion, from which Laborde’s rapidly-advancing -masses gave them no time to recover; and by ten o’clock the whole -of the centre was flying in disorder down a narrow wooded valley -leading from the Adaufé to Braga. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -The French followed hard, and in the pursuit, discovering one of -their _voltigeurs_, who had been a prisoner, still alive, but -mutilated in the most horrible manner, they gave little or no -quarter. Braga was abandoned, and the victorious infantry passing -through, took post on the other side; but the cavalry continued the -havoc for some distance 011 the road to Oporto; yet, so savage was -the temper of the fugitives that, in passing through Braga, they -stopped to murder the corregidor and other prisoners in the jail, -then, casting the mangled bodies into the street, continued the -flight. Meanwhile, Heudelet, breaking over the left of the Monte -Adaufé descended upon Ponte Porto, and, after a sharp skirmish, -carried that bridge and the village on the other side of the Cavado. - -Franceschi and Mermet found considerable difficulty in ascending -the rugged sides of the Monte Vallonga, but having, at last, -attained the crest, the whole of their enemies fled. The two -generals then crossed the valley to gain the road of Guimaraens, -and cut off that line of retreat, but fell in with the three -thousand Portuguese posted above Falperra. These men, seeing the -cavalry approach, drew up with their backs to some high rocks, and -opened a fire of artillery. But Franceschi, placing his horsemen on -either flank, and a brigade of infantry against the front, as at -Verim, made all charge together, and strewed the ground with the -dead. Nevertheless, the Portuguese fought valiantly at this point, -and Franceschi acknowledged it. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s papers, MSS.] - -The vanquished lost all their artillery and above four thousand -men, of which four hundred only were made prisoners. Some of the -fugitives crossing the Cavado river, made for the Ponte de Lima, -others retired to Oporto, but the greatest number took the road of -Guimaraens, during the fight at Falperra. Eben appears, by his own -official report, to have been at Braga when the action commenced, -and to have fled among the first; for he makes no mention of the -fight at Falperra, nor of the skirmish at Ponte Porto, and his -narrative bears every mark of inaccuracy. - -When the French outposts were established in front of Braga, -general Lorge crossed the Cavado and entered Bacellos; and the -corregidor received him well, for which he was a few days after -put to death by the Portuguese general, Bonteilho, who commanded -between the Lima and the Minho. - -Braga itself had been at first abandoned by the inhabitants, but -they were induced to return the next day; and some provisions and a -large store of powder being found in the magazines, the latter was -immediately made up into cartridges, for the use of the troops. The -gun-carriages and ammunition-waggons were again repaired, and an -hospital was established for eight hundred sick and wounded: from -whence it may be judged that the loss sustained in action, since -the 15th, was not less than six hundred men. - -The French general, having thus broken through the second -Portuguese line of defence, was in a situation either to march -directly against Oporto, or to recover his communication with the -depôt at Tuy. He knew, through the medium of his spies and by -intercepted letters, that general La Martiniere, although besieged, -was in no distress; that he made successful sorties; and that his -artillery commanded that in the fortress of Valença. On the other -hand, information was received that sixty thousand troops of the -line, militia, and _ordenanza_, were assembled at the entrenched -camp covering Oporto, and the scouts reported that the Portuguese -were also in force at Guimaraens, and had cut the bridges along the -whole course of the Ave. - -Meanwhile, Sylveira struck a great blow; for, being reinforced from -the side of Beira, he remounted the Tamega, invested the French -in Chaves on the 20th, and, in eight days, obliged the garrison, -consisting of a hundred fighting men, and twelve hundred sick, -to capitulate; after which he took post at Amarante. But Soult, -ignorant of this event, left Heudelet’s division at Braga, to -protect the hospitals from Bonteilho, and then continued his own -movement against Oporto in three columns. - -The first, composed of Franceschi’s and Mermet’s divisions, marched -by the road of Guimaraens and San Justo, with orders to force the -passage of the Upper Ave, and scour the country towards Pombeiro. - -The second, which consisted of Merle’s, Laborde’s and La Houssaye’s -divisions, was commanded by Soult, in person, and moved upon Barca -de Trofa, while general Lorge, quitting Bacellos, made way by the -Ponte d’Ave. - -The passage of the Ave was fiercely disputed. The left column was -fought with in front of Guimaraens, and at Pombeiro, and again at -Puente Negrellos. The last combat was rough, and the French general -Jardon was killed. - -The march of the centre column was arrested at Barca de Trofa, by -the cutting of the bridge, and the marshal, observing the numbers -of the enemy, ascended the right bank, and forced the passage at -San Justo: but not without the help of Franceschi, who came down -the opposite side of the river, after the fight at Ponte Negrellos. - -When the left and centre had thus crossed, colonel Lallemand was -detached with a regiment of dragoons to assist Lorge, who was still -held in check at the Ponte d’Ave; Lallemand was at first beaten -back, but, being reinforced with some infantry, finally succeeded; -and the Portuguese, enraged at their defeat, brutally murdered -their commander, general Vallonga, and then dispersed. - -The whole French army was now in communication on the left bank of -the Ave; the way to Oporto was opened, and, on the 27th, the troops -were finally concentrated in front of the entrenchments covering -that city. - -The action of Monterey, the taking of Chaves, and the defeat at -Braga, had so damped the bishop’s ardour that he was, at one -time, inclined to abandon the defence of Oporto; but this idea -was relinquished when he considered the multitudes he had drawn -together, and that the English army was stronger than it had been -at any previous period since Cradock’s arrival; Beresford, also, -was at the head of a considerable native force behind the Mondego; -and, with the hope of their support, the bishop resolved to stand -the brunt. - -He had collected, in the entrenched camp, little short of forty -thousand men; and among them were many regular troops, of which two -thousand had lately arrived under the command of general Vittoria. -This general was sent by Beresford to aid Sylveira: but when Chaves -surrendered, he entered Oporto. - -The hopes of the people, also, were high, for they could not -believe that the French were a match for them; the preceding -defeats were attributed each to its particular case of treason, and -the murder of some innocent persons had followed as an expiation. -No man but the bishop durst thwart the slightest caprice of the -mob; and he was little disposed to do so, while Raymundo, and -others of his stamp, fomented their fury, and directed it to -gratify personal enmities. Thus, the defeat of Braga being known in -Oporto, caused a tumult on the 22d; and Louis D’Olivera, a man of -high rank, who had been cast into prison, was, with fourteen other -persons, haled forth, and despatched with many stabs; the bodies -were then mutilated, and dragged in triumph through the streets. - -[Sidenote: See Plan 5.] - -The entrenchments extending, as I have said, from the Douro to -the coast, were complete, and armed with two hundred guns. They -consisted of a number of forts of different sizes, placed on the -top of a succession of rounded hills; and where the hills failed, -the defences were continued by earthen ramparts, loop-holed houses, -ditches, and felled trees. Oporto itself is built in a hollow; a -bridge of boats, nearly three hundred yards in length, formed the -only communication between the city and the suburb of Villa Nova; -and this bridge was completely commanded by batteries, mounting -fifty guns, planted on the bluff and craggy heights that overhang -the river above Villa Nova, and overlooked, not only the city, but -a great part of the entrenched camp beyond it. Within the lines, -tents were pitched for even greater numbers than were assembled; -and the people ran to arms, and quickly manned their works with -great noise and tumult, when the French columns, gathering like -heavy thunder clouds, settled in front of the camp. - -The duke of Dalmatia arrived on the 27th. While at Braga he -had written to the bishop, calling on him to calm the popular -effervescence; and now, beholding the extended works in his front, -and reading their weakness even in the multitudes that guarded -them, he renewed his call upon the prelate, to spare this great -and commercial city the horrors of a storm. A prisoner, employed -to carry the summons, would have been killed, but that it was -pretended he came with an offer from Soult to surrender his army; -and notwithstanding this ingenious device, and that the bishop -commenced a negotiation, which was prolonged until evening, the -firing from the entrenchments was constant and general during the -whole of the 28th. - -The parley being finally broken off, Soult made dispositions for a -general action on the 29th. To facilitate this, he caused Merle’s -division to approach the left of the entrenchments in the evening -of the 28th, intending thereby to divert attention from the true -point of attack: a prodigious fire was immediately opened from the -works; but Merle, having pushed close up, got into some hollow -roads and enclosures, and maintained his ground. At another part -of the line, however, some of the Portuguese pretending a wish -to surrender, general Foy, with a single companion, imprudently -approached them; the latter was killed, and Foy himself made -prisoner, and carried into the town. He was mistaken for Loison, -and the people called out to kill “_Maneta_,” but with great -presence of mind he held up his hands; and the crowd, convinced of -their error, suffered him to be cast into the jail. - -The bishop, having brought affairs to this awful crisis, had not -resolution to brave the danger himself. Leaving generals Lima and -Pareiras to command the army, he, with an escort of troops, quitted -the city, and, crossing the river, took his station in Sarea, a -convent, built on the top of the rugged hill which overhangs the -suburb of Villa Nova, from whence he beheld in safety the horrors -of the next day. - -The bells in Oporto continued to ring all night; and about twelve -o’clock a violent thunder storm arising, the sound of the winds -was mistaken in the camp for the approach of enemies. At once the -whole line blazed with a fire of musketry; the roar of two hundred -pieces of artillery was heard above the noise of the tempest, -and the Portuguese calling to one another with loud cries, were -agitated at once with fury and with terror. The morning, however, -broke serenely; and a little before seven o’clock the sound of the -Frenchmen’s trumpets and drums, and the glitter of their arms, gave -notice that the whole army was in motion for the attack. - - -BATTLE AND STORMING OF OPORTO. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -The feint made the evening before against the left, which was -the weakest part of the line, had perfectly succeeded, and the -Portuguese generals placed their principal masses on that side; but -the duke of Dalmatia was intent upon the strongest points of the -works, being resolved to force his way through the town, and to -seize the bridge during the fight, that he might secure the passage -of the river. - -His army was divided into three columns; of which the first, under -Merle, attacked the left of the Portuguese centre; the second, -under Franceschi and Laborde, assailed their extreme right; the -third, composed of Mermet’s division, sustained by a brigade of -dragoons, was in the centre. General Lorge was appointed to cut off -and attack a body of ordenanza, who were posted with some guns in -front of the Portuguese left, and beyond the works on the road of -Villa de Conde. - -The battle was commenced by the wings; for Mermet’s division was -withheld, until the enemy’s generals believing the whole of the -attack was developed, had weakened their centre to strengthen -their flanks. Then the French held in reserve, rushing violently -forwards, broke through the entrenchments, and took the two -principal forts, entering by the embrasures, and killing or -dispersing all within them. Soult instantly rallied this division, -and sent two battalions to take the Portuguese left wing in the -rear; while two other battalions were ordered to march straight -into the town, and make for the bridge. - -The Portuguese army, thus cut in two, was soon beaten on all -points. Laborde carried in succession a number of forts, took fifty -pieces of artillery, and reaching the edge of the city, halted -until Franceschi, who was engaged still more to the left, could -join him. By this movement a large body of Portuguese were driven -off from the town, and forced back to the Douro, being followed -by a brigade under general Arnaud. And now Merle, seeing that the -success of the centre was complete, brought up his left flank, -and carrying all the forts to his right in succession, killed a -great number of the defenders, and drove the rest towards the sea. -These last dividing, fled for refuge, one part to the fort of St. -Joa, the other towards the mouth of the Douro; where, maddened by -terror, as the French came pouring down upon them, they strove, -some to swim across, others to get over in small boats; and when -their general, Lima, called out against this hopeless attempt, they -turned and murdered him, within musket shot of the approaching -enemy; and then renewing the attempt to cross, nearly the whole -perished. - -The victory was now certain, for Lorge had dispersed the people on -the side of Villa de Conde and general Arnaud had hemmed in those -above the town and prevented them from plunging into the river -also, as in their desperate mood they were going to do. But the -battle continued within Oporto, for the two battalions sent from -the centre having burst the barricadoes at the entrance of the -streets, had penetrated, fighting, to the bridge, and here all -the horrid circumstances of war seemed to be accumulated, and the -calamities of an age compressed into one doleful hour. - -More than four thousand persons, old and young and of both sexes, -were seen pressing forward with wild tumult, some already on the -bridge, others striving to gain it, and all in a state of phrenzy. -The batteries on the opposite bank opened their fire when the -French appeared, and at that moment a troop of Portuguese cavalry -flying from the fight came down one of the streets, and remorseless -in their fears, bore, at full gallop, into the midst of the -miserable helpless crowd, and trampled a bloody pathway to the -river. Suddenly the nearest boats, unable to sustain the increasing -weight, sunk and the foremost wretches still tumbling into the -river, as they were pressed from behind, perished, until the heaped -bodies rising above the surface of the waters, filled all the space -left by the sinking of the boats. - -The first of the French that arrived, amazed at this fearful -spectacle, forgot the battle, and hastened to save those who still -struggled for life--and while some were thus nobly employed, others -by the help of planks, getting on to the firmer parts of the -bridge, crossed the river and carried the batteries on the heights -of Villa Nova. The passage was thus secured. - -But this terrible destruction did not complete the measure of the -city’s calamities; two hundred men, who occupied the bishop’s -palace, fired from the windows and maintained that post until -the French, gathering round them in strength, burst the doors, -and put all to the sword. Every street and house now rung with -the noise of the combatants and the shrieks of distress; for the -French soldiers, exasperated by long hardships, and prone like all -soldiers to ferocity and violence during an assault, became frantic -with fury, when, in one of the principal squares, they found -several of their comrades who had been made prisoners, fastened -upright, and living, but with their eyes bursted, their tongues -torn out, and their other members mutilated and gashed. Those that -beheld the sight spared none who fell in their way. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -It was in vain that Soult strove with all his power to stop the -slaughter; it was in vain that hundreds of officers and soldiers -opposed, at the risk of their lives, the vengeance of their -comrades, and by their generous exertions rescued vast numbers that -would otherwise have fallen victims to the anger and brutality -of the moment. The frightful scene of rape, pillage, and murder, -closed not for many hours, and what with those who fell in battle, -those who were drowned, and those sacrificed to revenge, it is said -that ten thousand Portuguese died in that unhappy day! The loss of -the French did not exceed five hundred men. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -The dire slaughter at Oporto was followed up by a variety of -important operations, but before these are treated of, it is -essential to narrate the contemporaneous events on the Tagus -and the Guadiana, for the war was wide and complicated, and the -result depended more upon the general combinations than upon any -particular movements. - - -OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH CORPS. - -It has been already related that marshal Victor, after making a -futile attempt to surprize the marquis of Palacios, had retired to -his former quarters at Toledo, and that the conde de Cartoajal, -who succeeded the duke of Infantado, had advanced to Ciudad Real -with about fourteen thousand men. Cuesta, also, having rallied -the remainder of Galluzzo’s army, and reinforced it by levies -from Grenada, and regular troops from Seville, had fixed his -head-quarters at Deleytosa, broken down the bridge of Almaraz, -and with fourteen thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred -cavalry, guarded the line of the Tagus. The fourth corps remained -at Talavera and Placentia, but still holding the bridge of -Arzobispo. - -[Sidenote: Imperial Muster-rolls, MSS.] - -The reserve of heavy cavalry was now suppressed, and the regiments -were dispersed among the _corps d’armée_, but the whole army, -exclusive of the king’s guards, did not exceed two hundred and -seventy thousand men, and forty thousand horses, shewing a -decrease of sixty-five thousand men since the 15th of November. But -this number includes the imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, -and many detachments drafted from the corps;--in all forty thousand -men, who had been struck off the rolls of the army in Spain, with -a view to the war in Germany; hence the real loss of the French -by sword, sickness, and captivity, in the four months succeeding -Napoleon’s arrival in the Peninsula, was about twenty-five -thousand--a vast number, but not incredible, when it is considered -that two sieges, twelve pitched battles, and innumerable combats -had taken place during that period. - -Such was the state of affairs when the duke of Belluno, having -received orders to aid Soult in the invasion of Portugal, changed -places with the fourth corps. Sebastiani was then opposed to -Cartoajal, and Victor stood against Cuesta. The former fixed his -head-quarters at Toledo, the latter at Talavera de la Reyna, the -communication between them being kept up by Montbrun’s division -of cavalry, while the garrison of Madrid, composed of the king’s -guards, and Dessolle’s division, equally supported both. But to -understand the connection between the first, second, and fourth -corps, and Lapisse’s division, it is necessary to have a clear idea -of the nature of the country on both sides of the Tagus. - -That river, after passing Toledo, runs through a deep and long -valley, walled up on either hand by lofty mountains. Those on -the right bank are always capped with snow, and, ranging nearly -parallel with the course of the stream, divide the valley of the -Tagus from Old Castile and the Salamanca country. The highest parts -are known by the names of the Sierra de Gredos, Sierra de Bejar, -and Sierra de Gata; and in these sierras the Alberche, the Tietar, -and the Alagon, take their rise, and, ploughing the valley in a -slanting direction, fall into the Tagus. - -The principal mountain on the left bank is called the Sierra de -Guadalupe; it extends in a southward direction from the river, and -divides the upper part of La Mancha from Spanish Estremadura. The -communications leading from the Salamanca country into the valley -of the Tagus are neither many nor good; the principal passes are-- - -1st. The rout of Horcajada, an old Roman road, which, running -through Pedrahita and Villa Franca, crosses the Sierra de Gredos at -Puerto de Pico, and then descends by Montbeltran to Talavera. - -2d. The pass of Arenas, leading nearly parallel to, and at a short -distance from, the first. - -3d. The pass of Tornevecas, leading upon Placentia. - -4th. The route of Bejar, which, crossing the Sierra de Bejar at the -pass of Baños, descends likewise upon Placentia. - -5th. The route of Payo or Gata, which crosses the Sierra de Gata -by the pass of Perales, and afterwards dividing, sends one branch -to Alcantara, the other to Coria and Placentia. Of these five -passes the two last only are, generally speaking, practicable for -artillery. - -The royal roads, from Toledo and Madrid to Badajos, unite near -Talavera, and follow the course of the Tagus by the right bank as -far Naval Moral, but then, turning to the left, cross the river at -the bridge of Almaraz. Now, from Toledo, westward, to the bridge -of Almaraz, a distance of above fifty miles, the left bank of -the Tagus is so crowded by the rugged shoots of the Sierra de -Guadalupe, that it may be broadly stated as impassable for an army, -and this peculiarity of ground gives the key to the operations on -both sides. For, Cuesta and Cartoajal, by reason of this impassable -Sierra de Guadalupe, had no direct military communication: but -Victor and Sebastiani, occupying Toledo and Talavera, could, by the -royal roads above mentioned, concentrate their masses, at pleasure, -on either line of operations. - -The rallying point of the French was Madrid, and their parallel -lines of defence were the Tagus, the Alberche, and the Guadarama. - -The base of Cartoajal’s operations was the Sierra de Morena. - -Cuesta’s first line was the Tagus, and his second the Guadiana, -from whence he could retreat by a flank march to Badajos, or by a -direct one to the defiles of Monasterio in the Sierra Morena. - -The two Spanish armies, if they had been united, would have -furnished about twenty-six thousand infantry, and five thousand -cavalry, and they had no reserve. The two French corps, united, -would have exceeded thirty-five thousand fighting-men, supported -by the reserve under the king. The French, therefore, had the -advantage of numbers, position, and discipline. - -Following the orders of Napoleon, marshal Victor should have -been at Merida before the middle of February. In that position -he would have confined Cuesta to the Sierra Morena; and with his -twelve regiments of cavalry he could easily have kept all the flat -country, as far as Badajos, in subjection. That fortress itself -had no means of resistance, and, certainly, there was no Spanish -force in the field capable of impeding the full execution of the -emperor’s instructions, which were also reiterated by the king. -Nevertheless, the duke of Belluno remained inert at this critical -period, and the Spaniards, attributing his inactivity to weakness, -endeavoured to provoke the blow so unaccountably withheld; for -Cuesta was projecting offensive movements against Victor, and the -duke of Albuquerque was extremely anxious to attack Toledo from the -side of La Mancha. - -Cartoajal opposed Albuquerque’s plans, but offered him a small -force with which to act independently. The duke complained to the -junta of Cartoajal’s proceedings, and Mr. Frere, whose traces are -to be found in every intrigue, and every absurd project broached at -this period, having supported Albuquerque’s complaints, Cartoajal -was directed by the junta to follow the duke’s plans: but the -latter was himself ordered to join Cuesta, with a detachment of -four or five thousand men. - - -ROUT OF CIUDAD REAL. - -Cartoajal, in pursuance of his instructions, marched with -about twelve thousand men, and twenty guns, towards Toledo; -and his advanced guard attacked a regiment of Polish lancers, -near Consuegra: but the latter retired without loss. Hereupon, -Sebastiani, with about ten thousand men, came up against him, and -the leading divisions encountering at Yebenes, the Spaniards were -pushed back to Ciudad Real, where they halted, leaving guards on -the river in front of that town. The French, however, forced the -passage, and a tumultuary action ensuing, Cartoajal was totally -routed, with the loss of all his guns, a thousand slain, and -several thousand prisoners. The vanquished fled by Almagro; and -the French cavalry pursued even to the foot of the Sierra Morena. - -This action, fought on the 27th of March, and commonly called the -battle of Ciudad Real, was not followed up with any great profit to -the victors. Sebastiani gathered up the spoils, sent his prisoners -to the rear, and, holding his troops concentrated on the Upper -Guadiana, awaited the result of Victor’s operations: thus enabling -the Spanish fugitives to rally at Carolina, where they were -reinforced by levies from Grenada and Cordova. - -While these events were passing in La Mancha, Estremadura was also -invaded; for the king having received a despatch from Soult, dated -Orense and giving notice that the second corps would be at Oporto -about the 15th of March, had reiterated the orders that Lapisse -should move to Abrantes, and that the duke of Belluno should pass -the Tagus, and drive Cuesta beyond the Guadiana. - -Victor, who appears for some reason to have been averse to aiding -the operations of the second corps, remonstrated, and especially -urged that the order to Lapisse should be withdrawn, lest his -division should arrive too soon, and without support, at Abrantes. -This time, however, the king was firm, and, on the 14th of March, -the duke of Belluno, having collected five days’ provisions, made -the necessary dispositions to pass the Tagus. - -[Sidenote: General Semelé’s Journal of Operations, MS.] - -The amount of the Spanish force immediately on that river was -about sixteen thousand men; but Cuesta had several detachments -and irregular bands in his rear, which may be calculated at eight -thousand more. The Duke of Belluno, however, estimated the troops -in position before him at thirty thousand, a great error for so -experienced a commander to make. - -But, on the other hand, Cuesta was as ill informed; for this was -the moment when, with his approbation, colonel D’Urban proposed to -sir John Cradock, that curiously combined attack against Victor, -already noticed; in which, the Spaniards were to cross the Tagus, -and sir Robert Wilson was to come down upon the Tietar. This, also, -was the period that Mr. Frere, apparently ignorant that there -were at least twenty-five thousand fighting men in the valley of -the Tagus, without reckoning the king’s or Sebastiani’s troops, -proposed that the twelve thousand British, under sir John Cradock, -should march from Lisbon to “drive the fourth French corps from -Toledo,” and “consequently,” as he phrased it, “from Madrid.” The -first movement of marshal Victor awakened Cuesta from these dreams. - -The bridges of Talavera and Arzobispo were, as we have seen, held -by the French; and their advanced posts were pushed into the valley -of the Tagus, as far as the Barca de Bazagona. - -Cuesta’s position extended from Garbin, near the bridge of -Arzobispo, to the bridge of Almaraz. His centre being at Meza -d’Ibor, a position of surprising strength, running at right angles -from the Tagus to the Guadalupe. The head-quarters and reserves -were at Deleytosa; and a road, cut by the troops, afforded a -communication between that place and Meza d’Ibor. - -On the right bank of the Tagus there was easy access to the bridges -of Talavera, Arzobispo, and Almaraz; but on the left bank no road -existed, except from Almaraz, by which artillery could pass the -mountains, and even that was crossed by the ridge of Mirabete, -which stretching on a line parallel to the river, and at the -distance of four or five miles, affords an almost impregnable -position. - -[Sidenote: Journal of Operations of the First Corps MS.] - -The duke of Belluno’s plan was, to pass the Tagus at the bridges -of Talavera and Arzobispo, with his infantry and a part of his -cavalry, and to operate in the Sierra de Guadalupe against the -Spanish right; while the artillery and grand parc, protected by -the remainder of the cavalry, were united opposite Almaraz, having -with them a raft bridge to throw across at that point, a project -scarcely to be reconciled with the estimate made of Cuesta’s -force; for surely nothing could be more rash than to expose the -whole of the guns and field stores of the army, with no other -guard than some cavalry and one battalion of infantry, close to a -powerful enemy, who possessed a good pontoon train, and who might, -consequently, pass the river at pleasure. - -The 15th, Laval’s division of German infantry, and Lasalle’s -cavalry, crossed at Talavera, and, turning to the right, worked a -march through the rocky hills; the infantry to Aldea Nueva, on a -line somewhat short of the bridge of Arzobispo; the cavalry higher -up the mountain towards Estrella. - -The 16th, when those troops had advanced a few miles to the front, -the head-quarters, and the other divisions of infantry, passed the -bridge of Arzobispo; while the artillery and the parcs, accompanied -by a battalion of grenadiers, and the escorting cavalry, moved -to Almaraz, with orders to watch, on the 17th and 18th, for the -appearance of the army on the heights at the other side, and then -to move down to the point before indicated, for launching the raft -bridge. - -Alarmed by these movements, Cuesta hastened in person to Mirabete; -and directing general Henestrosa, with eight thousand men, to -defend the bridge of Almaraz, sent a detachment to reinforce his -right wing, which was posted behind the Ibor, a small river, but -at this season running with a full torrent from the Guadalupe to -the Tagus. - -The 17th, the Spanish advanced guards were driven, with some loss, -across the Ibor. They attempted to re-form on the high rocky banks -of that river; but, being closely followed, retreated to the camp -of Meza d’Ibor, the great natural strength of which was increased -by some field works. - -Their position could only be attacked in front; and, this being -apparent at the first glance, Laval’s division was instantly formed -in columns of attack, which pushed rapidly up the mountain; the -inequalities of ground covering them in some sort from the effects -of the enemy’s artillery. As they arrived near the summit, the -fire of musketry and grape became murderous; but, at the instant -when the Spaniards should have displayed all their vigour, they -broke and fled to Campillo, leaving behind them baggage, magazines, -seven guns, and a thousand prisoners, besides eight hundred killed -and wounded. The French had seventy killed, and near five hundred -wounded. - -While this action was taking place at Meza d’Ibor, Villatte’s -division, being higher up the Sierra, to the left, overthrew a -smaller body of Spaniards at Frenedoso, making three hundred -prisoners, and capturing a large store of arms. - -The 18th, at day-break, the duke of Belluno, who had superintended -in person the attack at Meza d’Ibor, examined from that high ground -all the remaining position of the Spaniards. Cuesta, he observed, -was in full retreat to Truxillo; but Henestrosa was still posted -in front of Almaraz. Hereupon Villatte’s division was detached -after Cuesta, to Deleytosa; but Laval’s Germans were led against -Henestrosa; and the latter, aware of his danger, and already -preparing to retire, was driven hastily over the ridge of Mirabete. - -In the course of the night, the raft bridge was thrown across the -Tagus; and the next day the dragoons passed to the left bank, the -artillery followed, and the cavalry immediately pushed forward to -Truxillo, from which town Cuesta had already fallen back to Santa -Cruz, leaving Henestrosa to cover the retreat. - -The 20th, after a slight skirmish, the latter was forced over -the Mazarna; and the whole French army, with the exception of a -regiment of dragoons (left to guard the raft bridge) was poured -along the road to Merida. - -The advanced guard, consisting of a regiment of light cavalry, -under general Bordesoult, arrived in front of Miajadas on the 21st. -Here the road dividing, sends one branch to Merida, the other to -Medellin. A party of Spanish horsemen were posted near the town; -they appeared in great alarm, and by their hesitating movements -invited a charge. The French incautiously galloped forward; and, -in a moment, twelve or fourteen hundred Spanish cavalry, placed in -ambush, came up at speed on both flanks. General Lasalle, who from -a distance had observed the movements of both sides, immediately -rode forward with a second regiment; and arrived just as Bordesoult -had extricated himself from a great peril, by his own valour, but -with the loss of seventy killed and a hundred wounded. - -[Sidenote: Journal of Operations MSS.] - -After this well-managed combat, Cuesta retired to Medellin without -being molested, and Victor spreading his cavalry posts on the -different routes to gain intelligence and to collect provisions, -established his own quarters at Truxillo, a town of some trade and -advantageously situated for a place of arms. It had been deserted -by the inhabitants and pillaged by the first French troops that -entered it, but it still offered great resources for the army, and -there was an ancient citadel, capable of being rendered defensible, -which was immediately armed with the Spanish guns, and provisioned -from the magazines taken at Meza d’Ibor. - -The flooding of the Tagus and the rocky nature of its bed had -injured the raft-bridge near Almaraz, and delayed the passage of -the artillery and stores; to remedy this inconvenience the marshal -issued directions to have a boat-bridge prepared, and caused a -field-fort to be constructed on the left bank of the Tagus, which -he armed with three guns, and garrisoned with a hundred and fifty -men to protect his bridge. These arrangements and the establishment -of an hospital for two thousand men at Truxillo, delayed the first -corps until the 24th of March. - -Meanwhile, the light cavalry reinforced by twelve hundred -_voltigeurs_ were posted at Miajadas, and having covered all -the roads branching from that central point with their scouting -parties, reported that a few of Cuesta’s people had retired to -Medellin, that from five to six thousand men were thrown into the -Sierra de Guadalupe, on the left of the French; that four thousand -infantry and two thousand cavalry were behind the river Guadiana, -in front of Medellin, but that every thing else was over the -Guadiana. - -The line of retreat chosen by Cuesta uncovered Merida, and, -consequently, the great road between Badajos and Seville was open -to the French; but Victor was not disposed to profit from this, -for he was aware that Albuquerque was coming from La Mancha to -Cuesta, and believing that he brought nine thousand infantry and -two thousand cavalry--feared that Cuesta’s intention was either -to draw him into a difficult country, by making a flank march to -join Cartoajal in La Mancha, or by crossing the Guadiana, above -Naval Villar, where the fords are always practicable, to rejoin his -detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe, and so establish a new base -of operations on the left flank of the French army. - -This reasoning was misplaced; neither Cuesta nor his army were -capable of such operations, his line of retreat was solely directed -by a desire to join Albuquerque, and to save his troops, by -taking to a rugged instead of an open country, and the duke of -Belluno lost the fruits of his previous success, by over rating -his adversary’s skill; for, instead of following Cuesta with a -resolution to break up the Spanish army, he, after leaving a -brigade at Truxillo and Almaraz, to protect the communications, was -contented to advance a few leagues on the road to Medellin with -his main body, sending his light cavalry to Merida, and pushing -on detachments towards Badajos and Seville, while other parties -explored the roads leading into the Guadalupe. - -The 27th, however, he marched in person to Medellin, at the head of -two divisions of infantry, and a brigade of heavy cavalry. Eight -hundred Spanish horse posted on the right bank of the Guadiana, -retired at his approach, and crossing that river, halted at Don -Benito, where they were reinforced by other squadrons, but no -infantry were to be discovered. The duke of Belluno then passed -the river and took post on the road leading to Mengabril and Don -Benito; hence, the situation of the French army in the evening was -as follows:-- - -The main body, consisting of two divisions of infantry, and one -incomplete brigade of heavy cavalry in position, on the road -leading from Medellin to Don Benito and Mingabril. - -The remainder of the dragoons, under Latour Maubourg, were at -Zorita, fifteen miles on the left, watching the Spaniards in the -Guadalupe. - -The light cavalry was at Merida, eighteen miles to the right, -having patrolled all that day on the roads to Badajos, Seville, and -Medellin. - -Ruffin’s division was at Miajadas eighteen miles in the rear. - -In the course of the evening Victor received intelligence, that -Albuquerque was just come up with eight thousand men, that the -combined troops, amounting to twenty-eight thousand infantry and -seven thousand cavalry, were in position on the table land of Don -Benito, and that Cuesta, aware of the scattered state of the French -army, was preparing to attack the two divisions on their march the -next day. - -Upon this, the duke of Belluno, notwithstanding the strength of -the Spanish army, resolved to fight, and immediately sent orders -to Lasalle, to Ruffin, and to Latour Maubourg, to bring their -divisions down to Medellin; but the latter was directed to leave -a detachment at Miajadas to protect the route of Merida, and a -brigade at Zorita, to observe the Spaniards in the Sierra de -Guadalupe. - -Cuesta’s numbers were, however, greatly exaggerated; that general -blaming every body but himself for his failure on the Tagus--had -fallen back to Campanarios--rallied all his scattered detachments, -and then returned to Villa Nueva de Serena, where he was joined, -on the 27th, by Albuquerque, who brought up not a great body of -infantry and cavalry as supposed, but less than three thousand -infantry and a few hundred horse. This reinforcement, added to some -battalions drawn from Andalusia, increased Cuesta’s army to about -twenty-five thousand foot, four thousand horse, and eighteen or -twenty pieces of artillery; and, with this force, he, fearing for -the safety of Badajos, retraced his steps and rushed headlong to -destruction. - -Medellin, possessing a fine stone-bridge, is situated in a hollow -on the left bank of the Guadiana, and just beyond the town is a -vast plain or table land, the edge of which, breaking abruptly -down, forms the bed of the river. The Ortigosa, a rapid torrent, -rushing perpendicularly to the Guadiana, and having steep and -rugged banks, yet in parts passable for artillery, cuts their -plain, which is also traversed by two roads, the one leading to -Mingrabil on the right, the other to Don Benito on the left, those -places being about five miles apart, and forming with Medellin an -irregular triangle. - -The French army, with the exception of the troops left to cover the -communications and those at Zorita, was concentrated in the town -at ten o’clock; and, at one, about fourteen thousand infantry, two -thousand five hundred cavalry, and forty-two pieces of artillery, -went forth to fight the - - -BATTLE OF MEDELLIN. - -The plain on the side of Don Benito was bounded by a high ridge -of land, behind which Cuesta kept the Spanish infantry concealed, -showing only his cavalry and some guns in advance. To make him -display his lines of infantry the French general sent Lasalle’s -light cavalry, with a battery of six guns and two battalions of -German infantry, towards Don Benito, while Latour Maubourg, with -five squadrons of dragoons, eight guns, and two other battalions, -keeping close to the Ortigosa, advanced towards the point of the -enemy’s ridge called the Retamosa. The rest of the army was kept in -reserve; the division of Villatte and the remainder of the Germans, -being one-half on the road of Don Benito, the other half on the -road of Mengabril. Ruffin’s division was a little way in rear of -the other, and a battalion was left to guard the baggage at the -bridge of Medellin. - -As the French squadrons advanced, the artillery on both sides -opened, and the Spanish cavalry guards in the plain retired slowly -to the higher ground. Lasalle and Latour Maubourg then pressed -forward; but as the latter, who had the shortest distance to -traverse, approached the enemy’s position, the whole Spanish line -of battle was suddenly descried in full march over the edge of the -ridge, and stretching from the Ortijos to within a mile of the -Guadiana,--a menacing but glorious apparition. - -Cuesta, Henestrosa, and the duke del Parque, with the mass of -cavalry, were on the left; Francisco Frias, with the main body of -infantry, in the centre; Equia and the marquis of Portazzo on the -right; and, from thence to the bank of the Guadiana, Albuquerque, -with some scattered squadrons, flanked the march of the whole host -as it descended, with a rapid pace, into the plain. Cuesta’s plan -was now disclosed; his line overlapped the French left, and he was -hastening to cut their army off from Medellin, but his order of -battle was on a front of three miles, and he had no reserve. - -The Duke of Belluno, seeing this, instantly brought his centre a -little forward, and then, reinforcing Latour Maubourg with ten guns -and a battalion of grenadiers, and detaching a brigade of infantry -as a support, ordered him to fall boldly in on the advancing enemy. -But at the same time Lasalle, who was giving way under the pressure -of his antagonists, was directed to retire towards Medellin, always -refusing his left. - -The Spaniards marched briskly forward into the plain, and a special -body of cavalry, with three thousand infantry, advancing from their -left, met Latour Maubourg in front, while a regiment of hussars -fell upon the French columns of grenadiers and guns in his rear. -The hussars, received with grape and a pelting fire of musketry, -and charged in flank by some dragoons, were beaten at once, but -the Spanish infantry, closely followed by the rest of their own -cavalry, came boldly up to Latour Maubourg’s horsemen, and, with a -rough discharge, forced them back in disorder. The French, however, -soon rallied, and smashing the Spanish ranks with artillery, and -fighting all together, broke in and overthrew their enemies, -man and horse. Cuesta was wounded and fell, but, being quickly -remounted, escaped. - -While this was passing on the French right, Lasalle’s cavalry, -continually refusing their left, were brought fighting close up to -the main body of the French infantry, which was now disposed on a -new front, having a reserve behind the centre. Meanwhile Latour -Maubourg’s division was being re-formed on the ridge from whence -the Spaniards had first descended, and the whole face of the battle -was changed; for the Spanish left being put to flight, the French -right wing overlapped the centre of their antagonists, and the long -attenuated line of the latter wavering, disjointed, and disclosing -wide chasms, was still advancing without an object. - -The duke of Belluno, aware that the decisive moment of the battle -had arrived, was on the point of commanding a general attack, when -his attention was arrested by the appearance of a column coming -down on the rear of his right wing from the side of Mingabril. A -brigade from the reserve, with four guns, was immediately sent to -keep this body in check, and then Lasalle’s cavalry, taking ground -to its left, unmasked the infantry in the centre, and the latter, -immediately advancing, poured a heavy fire into the Spanish ranks; -Latour Maubourg, sweeping round their left flank, fell on the rear, -and, at the same moment, Lasalle also galloped in upon the dismayed -and broken bands. A horrible carnage ensued, for the French -soldiers, while their strength would permit, continued to follow -and strike, until three-fifths of the whole Spanish army wallowed -in blood. - -Six guns and several thousand prisoners were taken. General Frias, -deeply wounded, fell into the hands of the victors; and so utter -was the discomfiture that, for several days after, Cuesta could -not rally a single battalion of infantry, and his cavalry was only -saved by the speed of the horses. - -Following general Semelé’s journal,[4] the French loss did not -exceed three hundred men, a number so utterly disproportionate to -that of the vanquished as to be scarcely credible, and, if correct, -discovering a savage rigour in the pursuit by no means commendable; -for it does not appear that any previous cruelties were perpetrated -by the Spaniards to irritate the French soldiers. The right to -slaughter an enemy in battle can neither be disputed nor limited; -but a brave soldier should always have regard to the character of -his country, and be sparing of the sword towards beaten men. - -The main body of the French army passed the night of the 28th near -the field of battle; but Latour Maubourg marched with the dragoons -by the left bank of the Guadiana to Merida, leaving a detachment at -Torre Mexia to watch the roads of Almendralego and Villa Franca, -and to give notice if the remains of Cuesta’s army should attempt -to gain Badajos, in which case the dragoons had orders to intercept -them at Loboa. - -The 29th, Villatte’s division advanced as far as Villa Nueva de -Serena, and the light cavalry were pushed on to Campanarios. But, -as all the reports agreed that Cuesta, with a few horsemen, had -taken refuge in the Sierra Morena, and that the remnants of his -army were dispersed and wandering through the fields and along the -bye-roads, without any power of re-uniting, the duke of Belluno -relinquished the pursuit. Having fixed his head-quarters at -Merida, and occupied that place and Medellin with his infantry, he -formed with his cavalry a belt extending from Loboa on the right -to Mingrabil on the left; but the people had all fled from the -country, and even the great towns were deserted. - -Merida, situated in a richly-cultivated basin, possesses a fine -bridge and many magnificent remains of antiquity, Roman and -Moorish; amongst others, a castle built on the right bank of the -river, close to the bridge, and so perfect that, in eight days, -it was rendered capable of resisting any sudden assault; and six -guns being mounted on the walls, and an hospital for a thousand men -established there, a garrison of three hundred men, with stores and -provisions for eight hundred, during two months, was put into it. - -The king now repeated his orders that the duke of Belluno should -enter Portugal, and that general Lapisse should march upon -Abrantes; but the former again remonstrated, on the ground that -he could not make such a movement and defend his communications -with Almaraz, unless the division of Lapisse was permitted to -join him by the route of Alcantara. But as Badajos, although more -capable of defence than it had been in December, when the fourth -corps was at Merida, was still far from being secure; and that -many of the richer inhabitants, disgusted and fatigued with the -violence of the mob government, were more inclined to betray the -gates to the French than to risk a siege; Victor, whose battering -train (composed of only twelve pieces, badly horsed and provided) -was still at Truxillo, opened a secret communication with the -malcontents. - -[Sidenote: Journal of Operations MS.] - -The parties met at the village of Albuera, and everything was -arranged for the surrender, when the peasants giving notice to the -junta that some treason was in progress, the latter arrested all -the persons supposed to be implicated, and the project was baffled. -The duke of Belluno then resigned all further thoughts of Badajos, -and contented himself with sending detachments to Alcantara, to get -intelligence of general Lapisse, of whose proceedings it is now -time to give some account. - -[Illustration: _Plate 3. to face Pa. 226._ - - _Sketch Explanatory_ - of - M^L. VICTOR’S OPERATIONS - AGAINST CUESTA - _in March 1809_. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - - -OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LAPISSE. - -This general, after taking Zamora in January, occupied Ledesma -and Salamanca, where he was joined by general Maupetit’s brigade -of cavalry, and as sir Robert Wilson’s legion and the feeble -garrisons in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida were the only bodies in his -front, universal terror prevailed. Yet he, although at the head -of at least ten thousand men, with a powerful artillery, remained -inactive from January to the end of March, and suffered sir Robert, -with a few hundred Portuguese, to vex his outposts, to intercept -his provisions, to restrain his patroles, and even to disturb his -infantry in their quarters. This conduct brought him into contempt, -and enabled Wilson to infuse a spirit into the people which they -were far from feeling when the enemy first appeared. - -Don Carlos d’España, with a small Spanish force, being after a -time placed under sir Robert’s command, the latter detached two -battalions to occupy the pass of Baños, and Lapisse was thus -deprived of any direct communication with Victor. In this situation -the French general remained without making any vigorous effort -either to clear his front or to get intelligence of the duke of -Dalmatia’s march upon Oporto until the beginning of April, when he -advanced towards Bejar, but, finding the passes occupied, turned -suddenly to his right, dissipated Wilson’s posts on the Ecla, -and forced the legion, then commanded by colonel Grant, to take -refuge under the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo. He summoned that town to -surrender on the 6th, and, after a slight skirmish close to the -walls, took a position between the Agueda and Ledesma. - -This event was followed by a general insurrection from Ciudad -Rodrigo to Alcantara and from Tamames to Bejar. For Lapisse, -who had been again ordered by the king to fulfil the emperor’s -instructions, and advance to Abrantes, instead of obeying, suddenly -quitted his positions on the Agueda, and, without regarding his -connexion with the second corps, abandoned Leon, and made a rapid -march, through the pass of Perales, upon Alcantara, followed -closely by sir Robert Wilson, don Carlos d’España, the two -battalions from Bejar, and a multitude of peasants, both Portuguese -and Spanish. - -At Alcantara, a corps of Spanish insurgents endeavoured to defend -the passage of the river, but the French broke through the -entrenchments on the bridge, and, with a full encounter carried the -town, and pillaged it, after which they abandoned the place, and -joined the first corps, at Merida, on the 19th of April. - -This false movement greatly injured the French cause. From that -moment the conquering impulse given by Napoleon was at an end, and -his armies, ceasing to act on the offensive, became stationary -or retrograded, and the British, Spanish, and Portuguese once -more assumed the lead. The duke of Dalmatia, abandoned to his own -resources, and in total ignorance of the situation of the corps -by which his movements should have been supported, was forced to -remain in Oporto; and at the moment, when the French combinations -were thus paralyzed, the arrival of English reinforcements at -Lisbon and the advance of sir John Cradock towards Leiria gave a -sudden and violent impetus both to the Spaniards and Portuguese -along the Beira frontier. Thus the insurrection, no longer kept -down by the presence of an intermediate French corps, connecting -Victor’s and Soult’s forces, was established in full activity from -Alcantara, on the Tagus, to Amarante, on the Tamega. - -Meanwhile Cuesta was gathering another host in the Morena; for, -although the simultaneous defeat of the armies in Estremadura and -La Mancha had at first produced the greatest dismay in Andalusia, -the Spaniards, when they found such victories as Ciudad Real and -Medellin only leading to a stagnant inactivity on the part of the -French, concluded that extreme weakness was the cause, and that the -Austrian war had or would oblige Napoleon to abandon his projects -against the Peninsula. This idea was general, and upheld not only -the people’s spirit but the central junta’s authority, which could -not otherwise have been maintained after such a succession of -follies and disasters. - -The misfortunes of the two Spanish generals had been equal; but -Cartoajal, having no popular influence, was dismissed, while Cuesta -was appointed to command what remained of both armies; and the -junta, stimulated for a moment by the imminent danger in which they -were placed, drew together all the scattered troops and levies in -Andalusia. To cover Seville, Cuesta took post in the defiles of -Monasterio, and was there joined by eight hundred horse and two -thousand three hundred infantry, drafted from the garrison of -Seville; these were followed by thirteen hundred old troops from -Cadiz; and finally, three thousand five hundred Grenadian levies, -and eight thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horsemen, -taken from the army of La Mancha, contributed to swell his numbers, -until, in the latter end of April, they amounted to twenty-five -thousand infantry, and about six thousand cavalry. General Venegas, -also, being recalled from Valencia, repaired to La Carolina, and -proceeded to organize another army of La Mancha. - -King Joseph, justly displeased at the false disposition made of -Lapisse’s division, directed that Alcantara should be immediately -re-occupied; but as this was not done without an action, which -belongs to another combination, it shall be noticed hereafter. -It is now proper to return to the operations on the Douro, so -intimately connected with those on the Guadiana, and yet so -differently conducted. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -When the bishop of Oporto beheld, from his station at Sarea, the -final overthrow of his ambitious schemes in the north of Portugal, -he fled to Lisbon. There he reconciled himself to the regency, -became a member of that body, and was soon after created patriarch; -and, as I shall have occasion to shew, used his great influence in -the most mischievous manner; discovering, on every occasion, the -untamed violence and inherent falseness of his disposition. - -Meanwhile, the fall of Oporto enabled marshal Soult to establish -a solid base of operations, and to commence a regular system of -warfare. The immediate fruit of his victory was the capture of -immense magazines of powder, and a hundred and ninety-seven pieces -of artillery, every gun of which had been used in the action. -Thirty English vessels, wind-bound in the river, and loaded with -wine and provisions for a month, also fell into his hands. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.] - -Having repressed the disorders attendant on the battle, he adopted -the same conciliatory policy which had marked his conduct at -Chaves and Braga; and endeavoured to remedy, as far as it was -possible, the deplorable results of the soldiers’ fury. Recovering -and restoring a part of the plunder, he caused the inhabitants -remaining in the town to be treated with respect; and invited, by -proclamation, all those who had fled to return. He demanded no -contribution; and, restraining with a firm hand the violence of his -men, contrived, from the captured public property, to support the -army, and even to succour the poorest and most distressed of the -population. - -Soult’s ability in the civil and political administration of -the Entre Minho e Douro produced an effect which he was not -prepared for. The prince regent’s desertion of the country was -not forgotten. The national feeling was as adverse to Portugal -being a dependency on the Brazils as it was to the usurpation of -the French, and the comparison between Soult’s government and the -horrible anarchy which preceded it was all in favour of the former. -His victories, and the evident vigour of his character, contrasted -with the apparent supineness of the English, promised permanency -for the French power; and the party, formerly noticed as being -inimical to the house of Braganza, revived. - -The leaders, thinking this a favourable opportunity to execute -their intention, waited upon the duke of Dalmatia, and expressed -their desire for a French prince and an independent government. -They even intimated their good wishes towards the duke himself, and -demanded his concurrence and protection; while, in the name of the -people, they declared that the Braganza dynasty was at an end. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.] - -Although unauthorized by the emperor to accede to this proposition, -Soult was yet unwilling to reject a plan from which he could draw -such immediate and important military advantages. Napoleon was -not a man to be lightly dealt with on such an occasion; but the -marshal, trusting that circumstances would justify him, encouraged -the design, and, appointing men to civil employments, raised -a Portuguese legion of five battalions. He acted with so much -dexterity that, in fifteen days, the cities of Oporto and Braga, -and the towns of Bacellos, Viana, Villa de Conde, Povoa de Barcim, -Feira, and Ovar, sent addresses, containing the expression of their -sentiments, and bearing the signatures of thirty thousand persons, -as well of the nobles, clergy, and merchants, as of the people. - -These addresses were burnt when the French retreated from Oporto; -but the fact that such a project was in agitation has never been -denied. The regency even caused inquest to be made on the matter; -and it was then asserted that very few persons were found to be -implicated. That many of the signatures were forged by the leaders -may readily be believed; but the policy of lessening the importance -of the affair is also evident; and the inquisitors, if willing, -could not have probed it to the bottom. - -[Sidenote: Rovigo’s Memoirs.] - -This transaction formed the ground-work of a tale generally -credited, even by his own officers, that Soult perfidiously aimed -at an independent crown; and the circumstances were certainly such -as might create suspicion. That the conclusion was false, is, -however, proved, by the mode in which Napoleon treated both the -rumour and the subject of it. Slighting the former, he yet made -known to his lieutenant that it had reached his ears, adding, “_I -remember nothing but Austerlitz_,”[5] and at the same time largely -increased the duke of Dalmatia’s command. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The policy of Soult’s conduct on this occasion, and the great -influence, if not the numbers of the Portuguese malcontents, were -abundantly proved by the ameliorated relations between the army -and the peasantry. The fierceness of the latter subsided; and even -the priests abated of their hostility in the Entre Minho e Douro. -The French soldiers were no longer assassinated in that province; -whereas, previous to this intrigue, that cruel species of warfare -had been carried on with infinite activity, and the most malignant -passions called forth on both sides. - -Among other instances of Portuguese ferocity, and of the truculent -violence of the French soldiers, the death of colonel Lameth, and -the retaliation which followed, may be cited. That young officer, -when returning from the marshal’s quarters to his own, was waylaid, -near the village of Arrifana, and murdered; his body was then -stripped, and mutilated in a shocking manner. This assassination, -committed within the French lines, and at a time when Soult -enforced the strictest discipline, was justifiable neither by the -laws of war nor by those of humanity. No general could neglect -to punish such a proceeding. The protection due to the army, and -even the welfare of the Portuguese within the French jurisdiction, -demanded a severe example, for the violence of the troops had -hitherto been with difficulty restrained by their commander; -and if, at such a moment, he had appeared indifferent to their -individual safety; his authority would have been set at naught, and -the unmeasured and indiscriminating vengeance of an insubordinate -army executed. - -Impressed with this feeling, and afflicted at the unhappy death -of a personal friend, Soult directed general Thomieres to march, -with a brigade of infantry, to Arrifana, and punish the criminals. -Thomieres was accompanied by a Portuguese civilian; and, after a -judicial inquiry, he shot five or six persons whose guilt was said -to have been proved; but it is also certain that the principal -actor, a Portuguese major of militia, and some of his accomplices, -escaped across the Vouga to colonel Trant; and the latter, -disgusted at their conduct, sent them to marshal Beresford. It -would also appear, from the statement of a peasant, that Thomieres, -or those under him, exceeded Soult’s orders; for, in that -statement, attested by oath, it is said that twenty-four innocent -persons were killed, and that the soldiers, after committing many -atrocious excesses, burnt the village. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13.] - -These details have been related partly because they throw a light -upon the direful nature of this contest, but chiefly because the -transaction has been adduced by other writers as proof of cruelty -in Soult, a charge not sustained by the facts of this case, and -belied by the general tenor of his conduct, which even his enemies, -while they attributed it to an insidious policy, acknowledged, at -the time, to be mild and humane. And now, having finished this -political digression, in which the chronological order of events -has been anticipated, I shall resume the narrative of military -operations at that part where the disorders attendant on the battle -of Oporto having been repressed, a fresh series of combinations -were commenced, not less important than those which brought the -French army down to the Douro. - -The heavy blow struck on the 29th of March was followed up with -activity. The boat-bridge was restored during the night; and -the next day, the forts of Mazinho and St. Joa de Foz having -surrendered, Franceschi’s cavalry crossed the Douro, took post ten -miles in advance on the Coimbra road, and pushed patroles as far as -the Vouga river. To support this cavalry, general Mermet occupied -a position somewhat beyond the suburb of Villa Nova. Oporto itself -was held by three brigades. The dragoons of Lorge were sent to -Villa da Conde, a walled town, situated at the mouth of the Ave; -and general Caulaincourt was detached up the Douro to Penafiel, -with a brigade of cavalry, having orders to clear the valley of the -Tamega. Another brigade of cavalry was posted on the road leading -to Barca de Trofa, to protect the rear of the army; and general -Heudelet was directed to forward the hospitals from Braga to -Oporto, but to hold himself in readiness to open the communication -with Tuy. - -These dispositions made, Soult had leisure to consider his general -position. The flight of the bishop had not much abated the hostility -of the people, nor relieved the French from their difficulties. The -communication with the Minho was still intercepted; the Tras os -Montes was again in a state of insurrection; and Sylveira, with a -corps of eight thousand men, not only commanded the valley of the -Tamega, but had advanced, after re-taking Chaves, into the Entre -Minho e Douro, and was posted between the Sierra de Catalina and the -Douro. - -Lisbon, the ultimate object of the campaign, was two hundred miles -distant, and covered by a British army, whose valour was to be -dreaded, and whose numbers were daily increasing. A considerable -body of natives were with Trant upon the Vouga, and Beresford’s -force between the Tagus and the Mondego: its disorderly and weak -condition being unknown, appeared formidable at a distance. - -The day on which the second corps, following the emperor’s -instructions, should have reached Lisbon was overpassed by -six weeks; and, as the line of correspondence with Victor was -uncertain, his co-operation could scarcely be calculated upon. -Lapisse’s division was yet unfelt as an aiding force; nor was it -even known to Soult that he still remained at Salamanca: finally, -the three thousand men expected from the Astorga country, under the -conduct of the marshal’s brother, had not yet been heard of. - -On the other hand, the duke of Dalmatia had conquered a large and -rich city: he had gained the military command of a very fertile -country, from whence the principal supplies of the British army and -of Lisbon were derived: he had obtained a secure base of operations -and a prominent station in the kingdom; and if the people’s -fierceness was not yet quelled, they had learned to dread his -talents, and to be sensible of their own inferiority in battle. - -In this state of affairs, judging that the most important objects -were to relieve the garrison of Tuy and to obtain intelligence of -Lapisse’s division, Soult entrusted the first to Heudelet and the -second to Franceschi. The last-named general had occupied Feira and -Oliveira, and spread his posts along the Vouga; but the inhabitants -fled to the other side of that river, and the rich valleys beyond -were protected by colonel Trant. - -This officer, well known to the Portuguese as having commanded their -troops at Roriça and Vimiero, was at Coimbra when intelligence of -the defeat at Braga arrived, and he immediately took the command -of all the armed men in that town, among which was a small body of -volunteers, students at the university. The general dismay and -confusion being greatly increased by the subsequent catastrophe at -Oporto, the fugitives from that town and other places, accustomed -to violence, and attributing every misfortune to treachery in the -generals, flocked to Trant’s standard; and he, as a foreigner, was -enabled to assume an authority that no native of rank durst either -have accepted or refused without imminent danger. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, section 6.] - -He advanced, at first, with about eight hundred men to Sardao -and Aveiro, where he was joined by the conde Barbaceña with some -Portuguese cavalry, and by generals Victoria and Eben; but the -people regarded these officers with suspicion, and Trant continued -in the command, his force daily increasing by the arrival of -_ordenanzas_, and even by regular troops, who, quitting their -quarters, abandoned Beresford’s army to join him. - -When Franceschi advanced, Trant sent a detachment by Castanheira -to occupy the bridge of the Vouga; but the men, seized with a -panic, dispersed, and this was followed by the desertion of many -thousand _ordenanzas_,--a happy circumstance, for the numbers that -had at first collected behind the Vouga exceeded twelve thousand -men, and their extreme violence and insubordination excited the -utmost terror, and impeded the measures necessary for defence. -Trant, finally, retained about four thousand men, with which he -imposed upon the French, and preserved a fruitful country from -their incursions; but he was greatly distressed for money, because -the bishop of Oporto, in his flight, laid hands on all that was at -Coimbra and carried it to Lisbon. - -Franceschi, although reinforced with a brigade of infantry, -contented himself with chasing some insurgents that infested his -left flank, while his patroles and scouts, sent forward on the side -of Viseu, endeavoured to obtain information of Lapisse’s division; -but that general, as we have seen, was still beyond the Agueda, and -while Franceschi was thus employed in front of the French army, -Caulaincourt’s cavalry on the Tamega was pressed by the Portuguese, -and Loison marched with a brigade of infantry to his assistance on -the 9th of April. - -Sylveira, however, was too strong for both; and, on the 12th, -advancing from Canavezes, obliged Loison, after a slight action, to -take post behind the Souza. - -Meanwhile, Heudelet was hastening towards Tuy to recover the -artillery and depôts, from which the army had now been separated -forty days. - -The 6th of April, general Lorge, who had taken Villa de Conde -and cleared the coast, joined Heudelet at Bacellos. The 7th they -marched to Ponte de Lima; but the Portuguese resisted the passage -vigourously, and it was not forced until the 8th. - -The 10th the French arrived in front of Valença, on the Minho; -this fortress had been maltreated by the fire from Tuy, and the -garrison, amounting to two hundred men, having only two days’ -provisions, capitulated, on condition of being allowed to retire -to their homes; but, before the French could take possession, the -capitulating troops disbanded and the town was deserted. - -The garrison in Tuy, never having received the slightest -intelligence of the army since the separation at Ribidavia, -marvelled that the fire from Valença was discontinued; and their -surprise was extreme when they beheld the French colours flying -in that fort, and observed French videttes on the left bank of the -Minho. - -La Martiniere’s garrison, by the arrival of stragglers and a -battalion of detachments that followed the army from St. Jago, -had been increased to three thousand four hundred men; but twelve -hundred were in hospital, and two-thirds of the artillery-horses -had been eaten in default of other food. The Portuguese had passed -the Minho, and, in conjunction with the Spaniards, attacked the -place on the 15th of March; but the French general, by frequent -sallies, obliged them to keep up a distant blockade, and his fire -mastered that from Valença. - -The 22d of March, the defeat at Braga being known, the Portuguese -repassed the Minho, the Spaniards dispersed, and La Martiniere -immediately sent three hundred men to bring off the garrison of -Vigo; but it was too late, that place was taken, and the detachment -with difficulty regained Tuy. - -The peasants on the Arosa Estuary had, as I have before noticed, -risen, the 27th of February, while Soult was still at Orense; they -were headed, at first, by general Silva and by the count de Mezeda, -and, finally, a colonel Barrois, sent by the central junta, took -the command. As their numbers were very considerable, Barrois with -one part attacked Tuy; and Silva assisted by the Lively and Venus, -British frigates on that station, invested Vigo. - -The garrison of the latter place was at first small; but the -paymaster-general of the second corps, instead of proceeding to -Tuy, entered Vigo, with the military chest and an escort of eight -hundred men, and was blockaded there. After some slight attacks had -been repulsed, the French governor negotiated for a capitulation -on the 23d of March; but, distrustful of the peasantry, he was -still undecided on the 26th. Meanwhile, some of Romana’s stragglers -coming from the Val des Orres, collected between Tuy and Vigo; and -don Pablo Murillo, a regular officer, assembling fifteen hundred -retired soldiers, joined the blockading force, and, in concert with -Captain Mackinley, of the Lively, obliged the garrison to surrender -on terms. - -[Sidenote: Captain Mackinley’s Despatch.] - -The 27th, thirteen hundred men and officers, including three -hundred sick, marched out with the honours of war; and, having laid -down their arms on the glacis, were embarked for an English port, -according to the articles agreed upon. Four hundred and forty-seven -horses, sixty-two covered waggons, some stores, and the military -chest, containing five thousand pounds, fell into the victor’s -hands; and this affair being happily terminated, the Spaniards -renewed their attack on Tuy: the Portuguese once more crossed the -Minho, and the siege continued until the 10th of April, when the -place was relieved by Heudelet. The depôts and the artillery were -immediately transported across the river, and directed upon Oporto. - -The 12th, general Maucune, with a division of the sixth corps, -arrived at Tuy, with the intention of carrying off the garrison, -but seeing that the place was relieved, returned the next day. -Heudelet, having taken Viana, and the fort of Insoa, at the mouth -of the Minho, placed a small garrison in the former; and then -blowing up the works of Valença, retired to Braga and Bacellos, -sending Lorge again to Villa de Conde. - -The sick men were transported in boats along shore, from the mouth -of the Minho to Viana, Villa de Conde, and thence to Oporto; -and while these transactions were taking place on the Minho, La -Houssaye, with a brigade of dragoons and one of infantry, scoured -the country between the Lima and the Cavado, and so protected the -rear of Heudelet. - -All resistance in the Entre Minho e Douro now ceased; for, at this -period, the influence of the _Anti-Braganza_ party was exerted in -favour of the French. But on the Tras os Montes side, Sylveira -being joined by general Boteilho, from the Lima, was advancing, -and boasted that he would be in Oporto the 15th: and now, also, -intelligence of the recapture of Chaves reaching Soult, not only -explained Sylveira’s boldness, but shewed, that, while the latter -was in arms, the tranquillity of the Entre Minho e Douro could be -only momentary. Wherefore, Laborde, with a brigade of infantry, -was ordered to join Loison, and attack Amarante; while La Houssaye -pushed through Guimaraens upon the same point. - -The 15th, Laborde reached Penafiel; and Sylveira, hearing of La -Houssaye’s march, retired to Villamea. The 18th, Laborde drove back -the Portuguese without difficulty; and their retreat soon became -a flight. Sylveira himself passed the Tamega at Amarante, and was -making for the mountains, without a thought of defending that town; -but colonel Patrick, a British officer in the Portuguese service, -encouraging his battalion, faced about, and rallying the fugitives, -beat back the foremost of the enemy. This becoming act obliged -Sylveira to return; and while Patrick defended the approaches to -the bridge on the right bank with obstinate valour, the former -took a position, with five or six thousand men, on the heights -overhanging the suburb of Villa Real, on the left bank of the river. - -The 19th, La Houssaye arrived; and the French renewing their attack -on the town, Patrick again baffled their efforts; but when that -gallant man fell mortally wounded, and was carried across the -bridge, the defence slackened, and the Portuguese went over the -Tamega: the passage of the river was, however, still to be effected. - -The bridges of Mondin and Cavez above, and that of Canavezas below -Amarante, were destroyed: the Tamega was in full flood, and running -in a deep rocky bed; and the bridge in front of the French was -mined, barred with three rows of pallisades, and commanded by a -battery of ten guns. The Portuguese were in position on the heights -behind; from whence they could discern all that was passing at the -bridge, and could reinforce at will the advanced guard, which was -posted in the suburb. - - -PASSAGE OF THE TAMEGA, AT AMARANTE. - -The 20th, the first barricade was reached by the flying sap; but -the fire of the Portuguese was so deadly, that Laborde abandoned -the attack, and endeavoured to construct a bridge on tressels -half a mile below: this failed, and the efforts against the stone -bridge were of necessity renewed. The mine at the other side -was ingeniously formed; the muzzle of a loaded musket entered -the chamber, and a string being tied at one end to the trigger, -the other end was brought behind the entrenchments, so that an -explosion could be managed with the greatest precision as to time. - -[Sidenote: Noble’s Campagne de Galice.] - -The 27th, the centre barricade was burnt by captain Brochard, an -engineer officer, who devised a method of forcing the passage, so -singularly bold, that all the generals, and especially general Foy, -were opposed to it. The plan was, however, transmitted to Oporto; -and Soult sent general Hulot, his first aide-de-camp, to report if -the project was feasible. Hulot approved of Brochard’s proposal, -and the latter commenced his operations on the 2d of May. - -The troops were under arms, and disposed in the most convenient -manner, as near the head of the bridge as the necessity of keeping -them hidden would permit; and at eight o’clock, all being prepared, -and the moon shining bright, twenty men were sent a little below -the bridge, and directed to open an oblique fire of musketry -against the entrenchments. This being replied to, and the attention -of the Portuguese attracted, a sapper, dressed in dark grey, -crawled out, and pushed with his head a barrel of powder, which was -likewise enveloped in grey cloth to deaden the sound, along that -side of the bridge which was darkened by the shadow of the parapet: -when he had placed his barrel against the entrenchment covering the -Portuguese mine, he retired in the same manner. Two others followed -in succession, and retired without being discovered; but the -fourth, after placing the barrel, rose on his feet and ran back, -but was immediately shot at and wounded. - -The fire of the Portuguese was now directed on the bridge itself; -but as the barrels were not discovered, after a time it ceased; -and a fifth sapper advancing like the others, attached a sausage -seventy yards long to the barrels. At two o’clock in the morning -the whole was completed; and as the French kept very quiet, the -Portuguese remained tranquil and unsuspicious. - -Brochard had calculated that the effect of four barrels exploding -together would destroy the Portuguese entrenchments, and burn the -cord attached to their mine. The event proved that he was right; -for a thick fog arising about three o’clock, the sausage was fired, -and the explosion made a large breach. Brochard, with his sappers, -instantly jumped on to the bridge, threw water into the mine, cut -away all obstacles, and, followed by a column of grenadiers, was at -the other side before the smoke cleared away. The grenadiers being -supported by other troops, not only the suburb, but the camp on -the height behind were carried without a check, and the Portuguese -dispersing, fled over the mountains. - -The execution of captain Brochard’s bold, ingenious, and successful -project, cost only seven or eight men killed; while in the former -futile attempts above a hundred and eighty men, besides many -engineer and artillery officers, had fallen. It is, however, a -singular fact that there was a practicable ford near the bridge, -unguarded, and apparently unknown to both sides. - -A short time after the passage of the Tamega, general Heudelet, -marching from Braga by Guimaraens, entered Amarante. Laborde -occupied the position abandoned by Sylveira, and detachments were -sent up the left bank of the river to Mondin: but Loison pursued -the fugitives to the heights of Villa Real and Mezamfrio. The -Portuguese guarding the passage at Canavezas, hearing of the -action, destroyed their ammunition, and retired across the Douro -without being overtaken. - -The 6th of May, the French were near Villa Real and Mezamfrio, -but all the inhabitants had crossed the Douro. This being made -known to Soult, he reinforced Loison, and directed him to scour -the right bank of the Douro as high as Pezo de Ragoa; to complete -the destruction of Sylveira’s army, and to send patroles towards -Braganza, with the view of subduing the Tras os Montes, and of -ascertaining if any French troops had made their appearance there; -for Bessieres had been requested to make a diversion on that side. -Bessieres himself had returned to France, but the reply of his -successor Kellerman being intercepted, it appeared that he was -unable or unwilling to afford any aid. - -General Laborde was now recalled, with two regiments of infantry, -to Oporto; and the communication between that town and Amarante -was guarded by a brigade of dragoons, and a regiment of infantry. -Meanwhile, Loison felt the Portuguese at Pezo de Ragoa, on the -7th of May; but, meeting resistance, and observing a considerable -movement on the opposite bank of the Douro, he became alarmed, and -fell back the same day to Mezamfrio. The next morning he returned -to Amarante, his march being harassed by the peasantry, who came -on with a boldness shewing that some extraordinary support was at -hand; and, in truth, a new actor had appeared upon the scene; the -whole country was in commotion; and Soult, suddenly checked in his -career, was pushed backward by a strong and eager hand. - - -OBSERVATIONS.--SPANISH OPERATION. - -1º.--The great pervading error of the Spaniards in this campaign -was the notion that their armies were capable of taking the lead in -offensive movements, and fighting the French in open countries; -whereas, to avoid general actions should have been a vital -principle. - -2º.--The resolution to fight the French having, however, been -adopted, the second great error was the attaching equal importance -to the lines of operation in La Mancha and Estremadura; the one -should have been considered only as an accessory; and it is evident -that the first rank belonged to La Mancha, because it was in a more -open country; because it more immediately threatened Madrid; and -because a defeat there endangered Seville more than a defeat in -Estremadura would have done. In La Mancha the beaten army must have -fallen back upon Seville: but in Estremadura it might retire upon -Badajos. But, the latter place being to the Spaniards of infinitely -less importance than Madrid was to their opponents, the lead in the -campaign must always have belonged to the army of La Mancha, which -could, at any time, have obliged the French to fight a battle in -defence of the capital. - -The army of Estremadura might, therefore, have been safely reduced -to fifteen thousand men, provided the army of La Mancha had been -increased to forty or fifty thousand: and it would appear that, -with a very little energy, the junta could have provided a larger -force. It is true that they would have been beaten just the same: -but that is an argument against fighting great battles, which was, -certainly, the worst possible plan for the Spaniards to pursue. - -3º.--The third great error was the inertness of Valencia and -Murcia, or rather their hostility: for they were upon the verge -of civil war with the supreme junta. Those provinces, so rich -and populous, had been unmolested for eight months; they had -suffered nothing from Moncey’s irruption; and they had received -large succours from the English government. Valencia had written -her pretensions to patriotism in the bloody characters of -assassination; but, were it not for the force under Llamas which, -after the defeat of Tudela, helped to defend Zaragoza, Valencia -and Murcia might have been swallowed up by the ocean without any -sensible effect upon the general cause. Those countries were, -however, admirably situated to serve as a support to Aragon, -Catalonia, Andalusia, and La Mancha, and they could, at this time, -have paralyzed a large French force, by marching an army to San -Clemente. - -[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -It was the dread of their doing so that made the king restrain -Sebastiani from pursuing his victory at Ciudad Real; and, -assuredly, the Valencians should have moved; for, it is not so much -in their numbers as in the variety of their lines of operation that -a whole people find their advantage in opposing regular armies. -This, the observation of that profound and original writer, general -Lloyd, was confirmed by the practice of Napoleon, in Spain. - - -FRENCH OPERATIONS. - -1º.--To get possession of Seville and Cadiz was certainly as great -an object to Napoleon as to seize Lisbon: but the truth of the -maxim quoted above regulated the emperor’s proceedings. If Victor -had been directed at once upon Andalusia, the Portuguese and -Valencians could have carried their lines of operations directly -upon his flanks and rear. If Badajos and Lisbon had been the -objects of his march, the Andalusians could have fallen on his -left flank and cut his communications. But all such dangers were -avoided by the march of Soult and Lapisse; their direction was not -only concentric, but a regular prolongation of the great line of -communication with France. Ney protected the rear of one; Bessieres -the rear of the other; and those two marshals, at the same time, -separated and cut off the Asturias from the rest of Spain; thus, -all that was formidable was confined to the south of the Tagus. - -For the same reason the course of conquest was to have proceeded -from Portugal to Andalusia, which would then have been assailed -in front and flank at one moment, while the fourth corps held the -Valencians in check. By this plan the French would never have -lost their central position, nor exposed their grand line of -communication to an attack. - -2º.--That this plan, so wisely conceived in its general bearing, -should fail without any of the different corps employed having -suffered a defeat, nay, when they were victorious in all quarters -is surprising, but not inexplicable. It is clear that Napoleon’s -orders were given at a time when he did not expect that a battle -would have been fought at Coruña, or that the second corps would -have suffered so much from the severity of the weather, and the -length of the marches, neither did he anticipate the resistance -that was made by the Portuguese, between the Minho and the Douro. -The last error was a consequence of the first, for his plans were -calculated upon the supposition that the rapidity of Soult’s -movements would forestall all defence; yet the delay cannot be -charged as a fault to that marshal whose energy was conspicuous. - -3º.--Napoleon’s attention, divided between Austria and Spain, must -have been somewhat distracted by the multiplicity of his affairs. -He does not seem to have made allowance for the very rugged country -through which Soult had to march, at a time when all the rivers -and streams were overflowing, from the constant rains; and as -the combinations of war are continually changing, the delay thus -occasioned rendered Lapisse’s instructions faulty: for, although it -be true, that if the latter had marched by Guardia, upon Abrantes, -while Soult advanced to Lisbon, by Coimbra, and that Victor -entered the Alemtejo, Portugal would have been conquered without -difficulty; yet the combination was so wide, and the communications -so uncertain, that unity of action could not be insured. Soult, -weakened by the obstacles he encountered, required reinforcements -after the taking of Oporto; and Lapisse should have considered -himself as rather belonging to Soult than Victor, and have marched -upon Viseu; the duke of Dalmatia would then have been strong enough -to fight his own battle without regard to the operations in the -Alemtejo. - -4º.--The first error of the French, if the facts are correctly -shewn, must, therefore, be attributed to Napoleon, because he -overlooked the probable chances of delay, combined the operations -on too wide a scale, and gave Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, instead -of Lamego and Viseu, for the direction of Lapisse’s march. I say, -if the facts are correctly shewn, for it is scarcely discreet to -censure Napoleon’s military dispositions, however erroneous they -may _appear_ to have been, and it is certain that, in this case, -his errors, if errors they were, although sufficient to embarrass -his lieutenants, will not account for their entire failure. Above -sixty thousand men were put in motion by him, upon good general -principles, for the subjugation of Lisbon; and we must search -in the particular conduct of the generals for the reason why _a -project of Napoleon’s, to be executed by sixty thousand French -veterans, should have ended as idly and ineffectually as if it had -been concocted by the Spanish junta_. - - -OBSERVATIONS ON THE SEPARATE OPERATIONS OF LAPISSE, VICTOR, SOULT, -ROMANA, SYLVEIRA, AND CUESTA. - - -LAPISSE. - -1º.--An intercepted letter of general Maupetit, shews the small -pains taken by Lapisse to communicate with Soult. He directs that -_even so many_ as three hundred men should patrole towards Tras os -Montes, to obtain information of the second corps, at a time when -the object was so important that his whole force should have moved -in mass rather than have failed of intelligence. - -2º.--The manner in which he suffered sir Robert Wilson to gather -strength and to insult his outposts was inexcusable. He might have -marched straight upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and dispersed -every thing in his front; one of those fortresses would probably -have fallen, if not both, and from thence a strong detachment -pushed towards Lamego would not only have ascertained the situation -of the second corps, but would have greatly aided its progress by -threatening Oporto and Braga. It cannot be urged that Salamanca -required the presence of a large force, because, in that open -country, the people were at the mercy of Bessiere’s cavalry; and -so sensible were the local junta of this, that both Salamanca -and Ledesma refused assistance from Ciudad Rodrigo, when it was -offered, and preferred a quiet submission. - -3º.--When, at last, the king’s reiterated orders obliged Lapisse to -put his troops in motion, he made a demonstration against Ciudad -Rodrigo, so feeble that it scarcely called the garrison to the -ramparts, and then as if all chance of success in Portugal was at -an end, breaking through the pass of Perales, he reached Alcantara -and rejoined the first corps; a movement equally at variance with -Napoleon’s orders and with good military discretion; for the first -directed him upon Abrantes, and the second would have carried him -upon Viseu. The march to the latter place, while it insured a -junction with Soult, would not have prevented an after movement -upon Abrantes: the obstacles were by no means so great as those -which awaited him on the march to Alcantara, and the great error of -abandoning the whole country, between the Tagus and the Douro, to -the insurgents would have been avoided. - -Here then was one direct cause of failure; but the error, although -great, was not irreparable. If Soult was abandoned to his own -resources, he had also obtained a firm and important position -in the north, while Victor, reinforced by ten thousand men, -was enabled to operate against Lisbon, by the Alemtejo, more -efficaciously than before. But Victor seems to have been less -disposed than Lapisse to execute his instructions. - - -VICTOR. - -1º.--The inactivity of this marshal after the rout of Ucles has -been already mentioned. It is certain that if the fourth and first -corps had been well handled, neither Cuesta nor Cartoajal could -have ventured beyond the defiles of the Sierra Morena, much -less have bearded the French generals and established a line of -defence along the Tagus. Fifty thousand French troops should, in -two months, have done something more than maintain fifty miles of -country on one side of Madrid. - -2º.--The passage of the Tagus was successful, but can hardly be -called a skilful operation, unless the duke of Belluno calculated -upon the ignorance of his adversary. Before an able general and a -moveable army, possessing a pontoon train, it would have scarcely -answered to separate the troops in three divisions on an extent -of fifty miles, leaving the artillery and parc of ammunition, -protected only by some cavalry and one battalion of infantry, -within two hours march of the enemy, for three days. If Cuesta had -brought up all his detachments, the Meza d’Ibor might have been -effectually manned, and yet ten thousand infantry, and all the -Spanish cavalry, spared to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, on the 17th; -in this case Victor’s artillery would probably have been captured, -and his project certainly baffled. - -3º.--The passage of the Tagus being, however, effected, Victor -not only permitted Cuesta to escape, but actually lost all traces -of his army, an evident fault not to be excused by pleading -the impediments arising from the swelling of the river, the -necessity of securing the communications, &c. If Cuesta’s power -was despised before the passage of the river, when his army was -whole and his position strong, there could be no reason for such -great circumspection after his defeat, a circumspection, too, not -supported by skill, as the dispersed state of the French army, the -evening before the battle of Medellin, proves. - -4º.--That Victor was enabled to fight Cuesta, on the morning of -the 28th, with any prospect of success, must be attributed rather -to fortune than to talent. It was a fault to permit the Spaniards -to retake the offensive after the defeat on the Tagus; nor can the -first movement of the duke of Belluno in the action be praised. He -should have marched into the plain in a compact order of battle. -The danger of sending Lassalle and Latour Maubourg to such a -distance from the main body I shall have occasion to show in my -observations on Cuesta’s operations; but, the after-movements -of the French in this battle were well and rapidly combined and -vigorously executed, and the success was proportionate to the -ability displayed. - -5º.--The battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, which utterly -destroyed the Spanish armies and laid Seville and Badajos open; -those battles, in which blood was spilt like water, produced no -result to the victors, for the French generals, as if they had -struck a torpedo, never stretched forth their hands a second time. -Sebastiani, indeed, wished to penetrate the Sierra Morena; but the -king, fearful of the Valencians, restrained him. On the other hand, -Joseph urged Victor to invade the Alemtejo, yet the latter would -not obey, even when reinforced by Lapisse’s division. This was the -great and fatal error of the whole campaign, for nearly all the -disposable British and Portuguese troops were thus enabled to move -against the duke of Dalmatia, while the duke of Belluno contrived -neither to fulfil the instructions of Napoleon, nor the orders of -the king, nor yet to perform any useful achievement himself. - -He did not assist the invasion of Portugal, he did not maintain -Estremadura, he did not take Seville, nor even prevent Cuesta -from twice renewing the offensive; yet he remained in an -unhealthy situation until he lost more men, by sickness, than -would have furnished three such battles as Medellin. Two months -so unprofitably wasted by a general, at the head of thirty -thousand good troops, can scarcely be cited. The duke of Belluno’s -reputation has been too hardly earned to attribute this inactivity -to want of talent. That he was averse to aid the operations of -marshal Soult is evident, and, most happily for Portugal, it was -so; but, whether this aversion arose from personal jealousy, from -indisposition to obey the king, or from a mistaken view of affairs, -I have no means of judging. - - -CUESTA. - -Cuesta’s peculiar unfitness for the lead of an army has been -remarked more than once. It remains to show that his proceedings, -on this occasion, continued to justify those remarks. - -1º.--To defend a river, on a long line, is generally hopeless, and -especially when the defenders have not the means of passing freely, -in several places, to the opposite bank. Alexander, Hannibal, -Cæsar, Gustavus, Turenne, Napoleon, Wellington, and hundreds of -others have shown how the passage of rivers may be won. Umenes, who -prevented Antigonus from passing the Coprates, is, perhaps, the -only example of a general baffling the efforts of a skilful and -enterprising enemy in such an attempt. - -2º.--The defence of rivers having always proved fruitless, it -follows that no general should calculate upon success, and that he -should exert the greatest energy, activity, and vigilance to avoid -a heavy disaster; that all his lines of retreat should be kept -free and open, and be concentric; and that to bring his magazines -and depôts close up to the army, in such a situation, is rashness -itself. Now Cuesta was inactive, and, disregarding the maxim -which forbids the establishment of magazines in the first line of -defence, brought up the whole of his to Deleyton and Truxillo. -His combinations were ill-arranged; he abandoned Mirabete without -an effort, his depôts fell into the hands of the enemy, and his -retreat was confused and eccentric, inasmuch as part of his army -retired into the Guadalupe, while others went to Merida, and he -himself to Medellin. - -3º.--The line of retreat upon Medellin and Campanarios, instead -of Badajos, being determined by the necessity of uniting with -Albuquerque, cannot be blamed, and the immediate return to -Medellin was bold and worthy of praise, but its merit consisted in -recovering the offensive immediately after a defeat; wherefore, -Cuesta should not have halted at Medellin, thus giving the lead -again to the French general; he should have continued to advance, -and have fallen upon the scattered divisions of the French -army, endeavouring to beat them in detail, and to rally his own -detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe. The error of stopping -short at Medellin would have been apparent, if Victor, placing a -rear-guard to amuse the Spanish general, had taken the road to -Seville by Almendralejos and Zafra. - -4º. Cuesta’s general design for the battle of Medellin was well -imagined, that is, it was right to hide his army behind the ridge, -and to defer the attack until the enemy had developed his force and -order of battle in the plain, but the execution was on the lowest -scale. If, instead of advancing in one long and weak line, without -a reserve, Cuesta had held the greatest part of his troops in solid -columns, and thrust them between Lassalle and Latour Maubourg’s -divisions, which were pushed out like horns from the main body -of the French, those generals would have been cut off, and the -battle commenced by dividing the French army into three unconnected -masses, while the Spaniards would have been compact, well in hand, -and masters of the general movements. Nothing could then have saved -Victor, except hard fighting; but Cuesta’s actual dispositions -rendered it impossible for the Spaniards to win the battle by -courage, or to escape the pursuit by swiftness. - -5º. It is remarkable that the Spanish general seems never to have -thought of putting Truxillo, Guadalupe, Merida, Estrella, or -Medellin in a state of defence, although most if not all those -places had some castle or walls capable of resisting a sudden -assault. There was time to do it, for Cuesta remained unmolested, -on the Tagus, from January to the middle of March; and every -additional point of support thus obtained for an undisciplined army -would have diminished the advantages derived by the French from -their superior facility of movement. The places themselves might -have been garrisoned by the citizens and peasantry, and a week’s, -a day’s, nay, even an hour’s, delay was of importance to a force -like Cuesta’s, which, from its inexperience, must have always been -liable to confusion. - - -SOULT. - -1º. The march of this general in one column, upon Tuy, was made -under the impression that resistance would not be offered; -otherwise, it is probable that a division of infantry and a brigade -of cavalry would have been sent from St. Jago or Mellid direct upon -Orense, to insure the passage of the Minho; and it seems to have -been an error in Ney, arising, probably, from the same cause, not -to have kept Marchand’s division of the sixth corps at Orense until -the second corps had effected an entrance into Portugal. - -2º. Soult’s resolution to place the artillery and stores in Tuy, -and march into Portugal, trusting to victory for re-opening the -communication, would increase the reputation of any general. Three -times before he reached Oporto he was obliged to halt, in order to -fabricate cartridges for the infantry, from the powder taken in -battle; and his whole progress from Tuy to that city was energetic -and able in the extreme. - -3º. The military proceedings, after the taking of Oporto, do not -all bear the same stamp. The administration of the civil affairs -appears to have engrossed the marshal’s attention; and his -absence from the immediate scene of action sensibly affected the -operations. Franceschi shewed too much respect for Trant’s corps. -Loison’s movements were timid and slow; and even Laborde’s genius -seems to have been asleep. The importance of crushing Sylveira -was obvious. Now, there is nothing more necessary in war than to -strike with all the force you can at once; but here Caulaincourt -was first sent, and being too weak, Loison reinforced him, and -Laborde reinforced Loison; and all were scarcely sufficient at -last to do that which half would have done at first; but the whole -of these transactions are obscure. The great delay that took -place before the bridge of Amarante; the hesitation and frequent -recurrence for orders to the marshal, indicate want of zeal, and a -desire to procrastinate, in opposition to Soult’s wishes. Judging -from Mr. Noble’s history of the campaign, this must be traced -to a conspiracy in the French army, which shall be touched upon -hereafter. - -4º. The resistance made by the Portuguese peasantry was infinitely -creditable to their courage; but there cannot be a stronger proof -of the inefficacy of a like defence, when unsupported by good -troops. No country is more favourable to such a warfare than the -northern provinces of Portugal; the people were brave, and they -had the assistance of the organized forces under Romana, Sylveira, -Eben, and the bishop: yet we find, that Soult, in the very worst -season of the year, overcame all resistance, and penetrated to -Oporto, without an actual loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, -of more than two thousand five hundred men, including the twelve -hundred sick, captured at Chaves. - - -ROMANA. - -1º. Romana remained at Oimbra and Monterey, unmolested, from the -21st of January to the 6th of March; he had, therefore, time to -reorganise his forces, and he had, in fact, ten thousand regular -troops in tolerable order. He knew, on the 11th or 12th, that -Soult was preparing to pass the Minho, between Tuy and Guardia. -He knew, also, that the people of Ribidavia and Orense were in -arms; that those on the Arosa were preparing to rise; and that, -consequently, the French must, were it only from want of food, -break out of the contracted position they occupied, either by -Ribidavia and Orense, or by crossing the Minho, or by retreating to -St. Jago. - -With these guides, the path of the Spanish general was as plain as -the writing on the wall; he was at the head of ten thousand regular -troops; two marches would have brought him to Ribidavia, in front -of which town he might have occupied a position close on the left -flank of the French, rallied all the insurgents about him, and have -organized a formidable warfare. The French durst not have attempted -the passage of the Minho while he was in front of Ribidavia; and if -they turned against him, the place was favourable for battle, and -the retreat open by Orense and Monterey; while the difficulty of -bringing up artillery would hamper the pursuit. On the other hand, -if Soult had retreated, that alone would have been tantamount to a -victory; and Romana would have been well placed to follow upon the -rear of the French, connecting himself with the English vessels of -war upon that coast as he advanced. - -2º. So far from contemplating operations of this nature, Romana -did not even concentrate his force; but keeping it extended, in -small parties, along fifteen miles of country, indulged himself -in speculations about his enemy’s weakness, and the prospect of -their retreating altogether from the Peninsula; until he was roused -from his reveries, by finding his divisions beaten in detail, -and himself forced either to join the Portuguese with whom he -was quarrelling, or to break his promises to Sylveira and fly by -cross roads over the mountain on his right: he adopted the latter, -thus proving, that whatever might be his resources for raising an -insurrection, he could not direct one; and that he was, although -brave and active, totally destitute of military talent. At a -later period of the war, the duke of Wellington, after a long and -fruitless military discussion, drily observed, that either Romana -or himself had mistaken their profession. Time has since shewn -which. - - -SYLVEIRA. - -1º. This Portuguese general’s first operations were as ill -conducted as Romana’s; his posts were too extended; he made no -attempt to repair the works of Chaves, none to aid the important -insurrection of Ribidavia; but these errors cannot be fairly -charged upon him, as his officers were so unruly, that they held -a council of war per force, where thirty voted for fighting at -Chaves, and twenty-nine against it; the casting voice being given -by the voter calling on the troops to follow him. - -2º. The after-movement, by which Chaves was recaptured, whether -devised by Sylveira himself, or directed by marshal Beresford, -was bold and skilful; but the advance to Penafiel, while La -Houssaye and Heudelet could from Braga pass by Guimaraens, and -cut him off from Amarante, was as rash as his subsequent flight -was disgraceful. Yet, thanks to the heroic courage of colonel -Patrick, Sylveira’s reputation as a general was established among -his countrymen, by the very action which should have ruined him in -their estimation. - - - - -BOOK VIII. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.] - -It will be remembered that the narrative of sir John Cradock’s -proceedings was discontinued at the moment when that general, -nothing shaken by the importunities of the regency, the -representations of marshal Beresford, or the advice of Mr. Frere, -resolved to await at Lumiar for the arrival of the promised -reinforcements from England. While in this position, he made every -exertion to obtain transport for the supplies, remounts for the -cavalry, and draught animals for the artillery; but the Portuguese -government gave him no assistance, and an attempt to procure horses -and mules in Morocco proving unsuccessful, the army was so scantily -furnished that, other reasons failing, this alone would have -prevented any advance towards the frontier. - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -The singular inactivity of Victor surprised Cradock, but did -not alter his resolution; yet, being continually importuned to -advance, he, when assured that five thousand men of the promised -reinforcements were actually off the rock of Lisbon, held a council -of war. All the generals were averse to marching on Oporto, except -Beresford, and he admitted that its propriety depended on Victor’s -movements. Meanwhile, that marshal approached Badajos; Lapisse came -down upon the Agueda, and Soult, having stormed Oporto, pushed his -advanced posts to the Vouga. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 4, section 1.] - -[Sidenote: Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.] - -A cry of treason then became general in Portugal, and both the -people and the soldiers evinced a spirit truly alarming. The -latter, disregarding the authority of Beresford, and menacing their -own officers, declared that it was necessary to slay a thousand -traitors in Lisbon; and the regiments in Abrantes even abandoned -that post, and marched to join Trant upon the Vouga. But, when -these disorders were at the worst, and when a vigorous movement -of Victor and Lapisse would have produced fatal consequences, -general Hill landed with about five thousand men and three hundred -artillery horses. Cradock, then, resolved to advance, moved thereto -chiefly by the representations of Beresford, who thought such a -measure absolutely necessary to restore confidence, to ensure the -obedience of the native troops, and to enable him to take measures -for the safety of Abrantes. - -Thus, about the time that Tuy was relieved by the French, and that -Sylveira was attacked at Penafiel by Laborde, the English army was -put in motion, part upon Caldas and Obidos, part upon Rio Mayor; -and the campaign was actually commenced by Cradock, when that -general, although his measures had been all approved of by his -government, was suddenly and unexpectedly required to surrender -his command to sir Arthur Wellesley, and to proceed himself to -Gibraltar. - -[Sidenote: Lord Londonderry’s Narrative.] - -It would appear that this arrangement was adopted after a struggle -in the cabinet, and, certainly, neither the particular choice nor -the general principle of employing men of talent without regard -to seniority can be censured; nevertheless, sir John Cradock was -used unworthily. A general of his rank would never have accepted -a command on such terms; and it was neither just nor decent to -expose him to an unmerited mortification. - -Before the arrival of his successor, Cradock assembled the army at -Leiria, and established his magazines at Abrantes, Santarem, and -Peniché; but as the admiral fearing the difficult navigation at -that season, would not send victuallers to the latter place, the -magazines there were but scantily supplied. Meanwhile Lapisse made -way by Alcantara to Merida, the re-capture of Chaves became known, -and the insurrection in Beira and Tras os Montes took its full -spring. Trant’s force also increased on the Vouga, and Beresford, -who had succeeded in restoring order among the Portuguese -battalions, was more than ever urgent for an attack upon Soult; but -Cradock, unprovided with a due proportion of cavalry, unable to -procure provisions or forage, and fearful for the safety of Lisbon, -refused; and the 24th of April, hearing that his successor had -arrived, he resigned the command and repaired to Gibraltar. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 15.] - -Sir Arthur Wellesley landed the 22d of April, and, on the 24th, -signified to the British ministers that, affairs being in the -condition contemplated by them, it was his intention to assume -the command of the army; a circumstance worthy of attention, as -indicating that the defence of Portugal was even then considered a -secondary object, and of uncertain promise. The deliverance of the -Peninsula was never due to the foresight and perseverance of the -English ministers, but to the firmness and skill of the British -generals, and to the courage of troops whom no dangers could daunt -and no hardships dishearten, while they remedied the eternal errors -of the cabinet. - -The unexpected arrival of a man known only as a victorious -commander created the greatest enthusiasm in Portugal. The regency -immediately nominated him marshal-general of their troops. -The people, always fond of novelty, hailed his presence with -enthusiasm; and all those persons, whether Portuguese or British, -who had blamed sir John Cradock’s prudent caution, now anticipating -a change of system, spake largely and confidently of the future -operations: in truth, all classes were greatly excited, and an -undefined yet powerful sentiment that something great would soon be -achieved pervaded the public mind. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16.] - -Sir Arthur’s plans were, however, neither hastily adopted nor -recklessly hurried forward; like Cradock, he felt the danger -of removing far from Lisbon while Victor was on the Alemtejo -frontier, and he anxiously weighed his own resources against those -at the enemy’s disposal. Not that he wavered between offensive -and defensive movements, for a general of his discernment could -not fail to perceive that, if the French were acting upon any -concerted plan, the false march of Lapisse to Merida had marred -their combinations, by placing a whole nation, with all its -fortresses and all its forces, whether insurgents, regular troops, -or auxiliaries, between the armies of Victor and Soult, and that -neither concert nor communication could longer exist between those -marshals. - -Soult’s offensive strength, also, was evidently exhausted; he might -establish himself firmly in the provinces beyond the Douro, but -he could not, alone, force his way to Lisbon, a distance of two -hundred miles, in a season when the waters were full, and through -a country tangled with rivers, mountains, and defiles. He could -not hope, with twenty-four thousand men, to beat a whole people -in arms, assisted by an auxiliary army of as high reputation, -and nearly as numerous as his own; and, moreover, there were -discontents and conspiracy in his camp; and of this sir Arthur was -aware. - -Soult alone, then, was no longer formidable to the capital; but -that which weakened him increased the offensive power of Victor, -who was now at the head of thirty thousand men, and might march -straight upon Lisbon, and through an open country, the only barrier -being the Tagus, a river fordable in almost all seasons. Such a -movement, or even the semblance of it, must perforce draw the -British and native armies to that side; and then Soult, coming down -to the Mondego, might, from thence, connect his operations with -Victor’s by the line of the Zezere, or advance at once on Lisbon as -occasion offered. - -Now, to meet the exigencies of the campaign, the military resources -of the English general were,-- - -1º. His central position. - -2º. His own British and German troops, about twenty-six thousand in -number; of which the present under arms, including sergeants,[6] -amounted to twenty-two thousand, with three thousand seven hundred -horses and mules. - -3º. The Portuguese troops of the line; of which there might be -organised and armed about sixteen thousand. - -Nearly all these troops were already collected, or capable of -being collected in a short time, between the Tagus and Mondego; -and beyond the latter river, Trant and Sylveira commanded separate -corps; the one upon the Vouga, the other on the Tamega. - -4º. The militia and the _ordenanzas_, which may be denominated the -insurgent force. - -5º. The fortresses of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Elvas, Abrantes, -Peniché, and Badajos. - -6º. The English fleet, the Portuguese craft, and the free use of -the coast and river navigation for his supplies. - -7º. The assistance of Cuesta’s army, which amounted to thirty -thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry; of which twenty-five -thousand were actually at or in front of the defile of Monasterio, -close to Victor’s posts. Sir Arthur Wellesley’s moral resources -were the high courage of his own troops; his personal popularity; -the energy of an excited people; a favourable moment; the -presentiment of victory; and a mind equal to the occasion. - -In a strategic point of view, to fall upon Victor was best, because -he was the most dangerous neighbour to Portugal; because his defeat -would prove most detrimental to the French, most advantageous to -the Spaniards; and because the greatest body of troops could be -brought to bear against him. - -On the other hand, Soult held a rich province, from whence the -chief supply of cattle for the army was derived; he was in -possession of the second city in the kingdom, where he was forming -a French party; the feelings of the regency and the people were -greatly troubled by the loss of Oporto; and their desire to regain -it was strongly expressed. - -To attack Victor, it was indispensable to concert operations with -Cuesta; but that general was ill disposed towards the British, and -to insure his co-operation would have required time, which could be -better employed in expelling Soult. For these reasons, sir Arthur -Wellesley determined to attack the last-named marshal without -delay; intending, if successful, to establish a good system of -defence in the northern provinces: and then, in conjunction with -Cuesta, to turn his arms against Victor, hoping thus to relieve -Gallicia more effectually than by following the French into that -province. - -The security of Lisbon being the pivot of the operations against -Soult, time was the principal object to be gained. If Victor came -fiercely on, he could not be stopped, but his course might be -impeded; his path could not be blocked, but it might be planted -with thorns: and to effect this, eight or ten thousand Portuguese -troops were immediately directed upon Abrantes and Santarem, -and two British battalions and two regiments of cavalry just -disembarked, marched to the same places, where they were joined by -three other battalions drafted from the army at Leiria. - -A body of two thousand men, composed of a militia regiment and of -the Lusitanian legion, which remained near Castello Branco after -Lapisse had crossed the Tagus, were placed under the command -of colonel Mayne, and directed to take post at the bridge of -Alcantara, having orders to defend the passage of the river, and, -if necessary, to blow up the structure. At the same time, the -flying bridges at Villa Velha and Abrantes were removed, the -garrison of the latter place was reinforced, and general Mackenzie -was appointed to command all the troops, whether Portuguese or -British, thus distributed along the right bank of the Tagus. - -These precautions appeared sufficient, especially as there was a -general disposition to believe the French weaker than they really -were. Victor could not, by a mere demonstration, shake the line -of defence. If he forced the bridge of Alcantara, and penetrated -by the sterile and difficult route formerly followed by Junot, it -would bring him, without guns, upon Abrantes; but Abrantes was -already capable of a short resistance, and Mackenzie would have had -time to line the rugged banks of the Zezere. - -If, leaving Badajos and Elvas behind him, Victor should pass -through the Alemtejo, and cross the Tagus between Abrantes and -Lisbon, he was to be feared; but Cuesta had promised to follow -closely in the French general’s rear, and it was reasonable to -suppose that Mackenzie, although he might be unable to prevent the -passage of the river, would not suffer himself to be cut off from -the capital, where, having the assistance of the fleet, the aid of -the citizens, and the chance of reinforcements from England, he -might defend himself until the army could return from the Douro. -Moreover, Victor was eighteen marches from Lisbon; it was only by -accident that he and Soult could act in concert, while the allied -army, having a sure and rapid mode of correspondence with Cuesta, -was already within four marches of Oporto. - -The main body of the allies was now directed upon Coimbra; and -four of the best Portuguese battalions were incorporated in the -British brigades. Marshal Beresford retained, under his personal -command, about six thousand native troops; Trant remained stedfast -on the Vouga; Sylveira on the Tamega; and sir Robert Wilson, -quitting the command of the legion, was detached, with a small -Portuguese force, to Viseu, where, hanging upon Franceschi’s left -flank, he also communicated with Sylveira’s corps by the way of -Lamego. - -The difficulty of bringing up forage and provisions, which had -pressed so sorely on sir John Cradock, was now somewhat lessened. -The land transport was still scanty; and the admiral, dreading -the long shore navigation for large vessels, was without the -small craft necessary for victualling the troops by the coast; -but the magazines at Caldas were partly filled, and twenty large -country-boats being loaded with provisions, and the owners induced, -by premiums, to make the run, had put safely into Peniché and the -Mondego. In short, the obstacles to a forward movement, although -great, were not insurmountable. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Coimbra the 2d of May. His army was -concentrated there on the 5th, in number about twenty-five thousand -sabres and bayonets; of which nine thousand were Portuguese, three -thousand Germans, and the remainder British. The duke of Dalmatia -was ignorant that the allies were thus assembled in force upon the -Mondego, but many French officers knew it, and were silent, being -engaged in a plot of a very extraordinary nature, and which was -probably a part of the conspiracy alluded to in the first volume -of this work, as being conducted through the medium of the princess -of Tour and Taxis. - -The French soldiers were impatient and murmuring; their attachment -to Napoleon himself was deep and unshaken, but human nature shrinks -from perpetual contact with death; and they were tired of war. This -feeling induced some officers of high rank, serving in Spain, to -form a plan for changing the French government. Generally speaking, -these men were friendly to Napoleon personally; but they were -republicans in their politics, and earnest to reduce the power of -the emperor. Their project, founded upon the discontent of the -troops in the Peninsula, was to make a truce with the English -army, to elect a chief, and march into France with the resolution -to abate the pride of Napoleon, or to pull him from his throne. -The conspirators at first turned their eyes upon marshal Ney, but -finally resolved to choose Gouvion St. Cyr for their leader. Yet -it was easier to resolve than to execute. Napoleon’s ascendancy, -supported by the love and admiration of millions, was not to be -shaken by the conspiracy of a few discontented men: and, although -their hopes were not entirely relinquished until after Massena’s -retreat from Portugal in 1810, long before that period they -discovered that the soldiers, tired as they were of war, were -faithful to their great monarch, and would have slain any who -openly stirred against him. - -The foregoing facts are stated on the authority of a principal -mover of the sedition; but many minor plots had cotemporary -existence, for this was the spring time of folly. In the second -corps, the conspirators were numerous, and, by their discourses -and their slow and sullen execution of orders, had continually -thwarted the operations of marshal Soult, yet without exciting -his suspicions; but, as he penetrated into Portugal, their -counteractions increased, and, by the time he arrived at Oporto, -their design was ripe for execution. - -In the middle of April, John Viana, the son of an Oporto merchant, -appeared at marshal Beresford’s head-quarters, with proposals from -the French malcontents. The latter desired to have an English -officer sent to them, to arrange the execution of a plan, which was -to be commenced by seizing their general, and giving him over to -the British outposts: a detestable project, for it is not in the -field, and with a foreign enemy, that soldiers should concert the -overthrow of their country’s institutions, and although it would -be idle and impertinent in a foreigner to say how much and how -long men shall bear with what they deem an oppressive government, -there is a distinct and especial loyalty due from a soldier to his -general in the field; a compact of honour, which it is singularly -base to violate; and so it has in all ages been considered. When -the Argyraspides, or silver-shields of the Macedonians, delivered -their general, Eumenes, in bonds, to Antigonus, the latter, -although he had tempted them to the deed, and scrupled not to slay -the hero, reproached the treacherous soldiers for their conduct, -and, with the approbation of all men, destroyed them. Yet Antigonus -was not a foreign enemy, but of their own kin and blood. - -An English lieutenant-colonel attached to the Portuguese service -reluctantly undertook the duty of meeting the conspirators, and -penetrated, by night, but in uniform, behind the French outposts, -by the lake of Aveiro or Ovar. He had previously arranged that -one of the malcontents should meet him on the water; the boats -unknowingly passed each other in the dark, and the Englishman -returned to Aveiro; but he there found John Viana, in company with -the adjutant-major, D’Argenton. The latter confirmed what Viana -had declared at Thomar; he expressed great respect for Soult, but -dwelt upon the necessity of removing him before an appeal could be -made to the soldiers; and he readily agreed to wait, in person, -upon Beresford, saying he was himself too strongly supported in the -French army to be afraid. - -Marshal Beresford was then at Lisbon, and thither D’Argenton -followed; and, having seen him and sir Arthur Wellesley, and -remained five days in that capital, returned to Oporto. While at -Lisbon, he, in addition to his former reasons for this conspiracy, -stated that Soult wished to make himself king of Portugal; an error -into which he and many others naturally fell, from circumstances -that I have already noticed. - -When sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Coimbra, D’Argenton appeared -again at the English head-quarters; but this time, by the order -of sir Arthur, he was conducted through bye-paths, and returned -convinced, from what he had seen and heard, that although the -allies were in force on the Mondego, many days must elapse -before they could be in a condition to attack Oporto. During his -absence, D’Argenton was denounced by general Lefebre, who was -falsely imagined to be favourable to the conspiracy; passports, -signed by admiral Berkely, which this unfortunate man, contrary -to sir A. Wellesley’s urgent recommendation, had insisted upon -having, completely proved his guilt; and Soult, until that moment, -without suspicion, beheld with amazement the abyss that yawned -beneath his feet: his firmness, however, did not desert him. He -offered D’Argenton pardon, and even reward, if he would disclose -the names of the other conspirators and relate truly what he -had seen of the English and Portuguese armies. The prisoner, to -save his life, readily told all that he knew of the British, but -sir A. Wellesley’s foresight had rendered that tale useless; -and with respect to his accomplices D’Argenton was immoveable. -Exaggerating the importance of the conspiracy, he even defied the -marshal’s power, and advised him, as the safest course, to adopt -the conspirators’ sentiments; nor was this boldness fatal to him -at the moment, for Soult, anxious to ascertain the extent of the -danger, delayed executing him, and he effected his escape during -the subsequent operations. - -He was not the only person who communicated secretly with the -British general; colonel Donadieu and colonel Lafitte were engaged -in the conspiracy. The latter is said to have had an interview with -sir Arthur, between the outposts of the two armies, and from the -first the malcontents were urgent that the movements of the allied -forces should be so regulated as to favour their proceedings; but -sir Arthur Wellesley, having little dependence upon intrigue, -sternly intimated that his operations could not be regulated by -their plots, and hastened his military measures. - -Under the impression that Sylveira was successfully defending -the line of the Tamega, the British general at first resolved to -reinforce him by sending Beresford’s and sir Robert Wilson’s corps -across the Douro at Lamego, by which he hoped to cut Soult off from -Tras os Montes, intending, when their junction was effected, to -march with his own army direct upon Oporto, and to cross the Douro -near that town, by the aid of Beresford’s corps, which would then -be on the right bank. This measure, if executed, would, including -Trant’s, Wilson’s, and Sylveira’s people, have placed a mass of -thirty thousand troops, regulars and irregulars, between the Tras -os Montes and Soult, and the latter must have fought a battle under -very unfavourable circumstances, or have fallen back on the Minho, -which he could scarcely have passed at that season while pressed -by the pursuing army. But the plan was necessarily abandoned when -intelligence arrived that the bridge of Amarante was forced, and -that Sylveira, pursued by the enemy, was driven over the Douro. - -The news of this disaster only reached Coimbra the 4th of May; -on the 6th, a part of the army was already in motion to execute -a fresh project, adapted to the change of affairs; and as this -eagerness to fall on Soult may appear to justify those who censured -sir J. Cradock’s caution, it may here be well to shew how far the -circumstances were changed. - -When Cradock refused to advance, the Portuguese troops were -insubordinate and disorganized; they were now obedient and improved -in discipline. - -Sir John Cradock had scarcely any cavalry; four regiments had since -been added. - -In the middle of April, Cuesta was only gathering the wrecks of -his forces after Medellin; he was now at the head of thirty-five -thousand men. - -The intentions of the British government had been doubtful; -they were no longer so. Sir John Cradock’s influence had been -restricted; but the new general came out with enlarged powers, the -full confidence of the ministers, and with Portuguese rank. His -reputation, his popularity, and the disposition of mankind always -prone to magnify the future, whether for good or bad, combined -to give an unusual impulse to public feeling, and enabled him to -dictate at once to the regency, the diplomatists, the generals, -and the people; to disregard all petty jealousies and intrigues, -and to calculate upon resources from which his predecessor was -debarred. Sir Arthur Wellesley, habituated to the command of -armies, was moreover endowed by nature with a lofty genius, and a -mind capacious of warlike affairs. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -CAMPAIGN ON THE DOURO. - - -After the victory at Amarante, Laborde was recalled to Oporto, but -a brigade of cavalry and a regiment of infantry were left to keep -up the communication with Loison; and as the insurgent general -Bonthielo had reappeared on the Lima, general Lorge’s dragoons were -directed on that side. Mermet’s division was then pushed towards -the Vouga, and thus the French army was extended by detachments -from that river to the Tamega; and the wings separated by the Douro -and occupying two sides of a triangle, were without communication, -except by the boat-bridge of Oporto. It required three days, -therefore, to unite the army on its centre, and five days to -concentrate it on either extremity. - -The situation of the allies was very different;--sir Arthur -Wellesley having, unknown to Soult, assembled the bulk of the -troops at Coimbra, commanded the choice of two lines of operation; -the one through Viseu and Lamego, by which, in four or five -marches, he could turn the French left, and cut them off from Tras -os Montes; the other by the roads leading upon Oporto, by which, -in two marches, he could throw himself unexpectedly, and in very -superior numbers, upon the enemy’s right, with a fair prospect of -crushing it between the Vouga and the Douro. - -In taking the first of these two lines, which were separated -by the lofty ridges of the Sierra de Caramula, the march could -be covered by Wilson’s corps, at Viseu, and by Sylveira’s, near -Lamego. Along the second the movement could be screened by Trant’s -corps on the Vouga. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The duke of Dalmatia’s dispositions were made in ignorance of sir -Arthur Wellesley’s position, numbers, and intentions. He was not -even aware of the vicinity of such an antagonist, but sensible -that to advance directly upon Lisbon was beyond his own strength, -he already meditated to cross the Tamega, and then covered by that -river and the Douro, to follow the great route of Bragança, and so -enter the Salamanca country. It was in this view that Loison had -been directed to get possession of Mezamfrio and Pezo de Ragoa, -and the march of Mermet was only intended to support Franceschi’s -retreat, when the army should commence its movement towards the -Tamega. - -The 9th of May, D’Argenton was arrested; the film fell from -Soult’s eyes, and all the perils of his position broke at once -upon his view. Treason in his camp, which he could not probe, a -powerful enemy close in his front, the insurgents again active in -his rear, and the French troops scattered from the Vouga to the -Tamega, and from the Douro to the Lima, and commanded by officers, -whose fidelity was necessarily suspected, while the extent of the -conspiracy was unknown. - -Appalling as this prospect was, the duke of Dalmatia did not quail -at the view. The general officers assured him of the fidelity of -the troops; and Loison was immediately ordered to keep Mezamfrio -and Ragoa, if he could, but, under any circumstances, to hold -Amarante fast. The greatest part of the guns and stores at -Oporto were at the same time directed upon the Tamega, and the -ammunition that could not be removed was destroyed. General Lorge -was commanded to withdraw the garrison from Viana, and to proceed -likewise to Amarante, and, while D’Argenton was closely, although -vainly, pressed to discover the names of the conspirators, Soult -prepared to execute his intended movement through the Tras os -Montes. But the war was coming on with a full and swift tide; -Loison, upon whose vigour the success of the operation depended, -was already giving way; sir Arthur Wellesley was across the Vouga, -and Franceschi and Mermet were struggling in his grasp. - -The English general resolved to operate along both the routes -before spoken of, but the greater facility of supplying the troops -by the coast-line, and, above all, the exposed position of the -French right wing, so near the allies and so distant from succour, -induced him to make the principal attack by the high road leading -to Oporto. - -The army was formed in one division of cavalry and three of -infantry, exclusive of Beresford’s separate corps. - -The first division, consisting of two brigades of infantry and -twelve guns, was commanded by lieut.-general Paget. - -The second, consisting of three brigades of infantry and six guns, -by lieut.-general Sherbrooke. - -The third, consisting of two brigades of infantry and six guns, by -major-general Hill. - -The cavalry by lieut.-general Payne. - -The whole amounted to about fourteen thousand five hundred -infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and twenty-four guns, of which -six were only three-pounders. - -The 6th of May, Beresford, with six thousand Portuguese, two -British battalions, five companies of riflemen, and a squadron of -heavy cavalry, marched upon Lamego by the road of Viseu. - -The 7th, the light cavalry and Paget’s division advanced towards -the Vouga by the Oporto road, but halted, on the 8th, to give -Beresford time to reach the Upper Douro, before the attack on the -French right should commence. - -The 9th, they resumed their march for the bridge of Vouga, and, at -the same time, Hill’s division, taking the Aveiro road, the whole -reached the line of the Vouga river that evening; but Paget’s -division was not brought up until after dark, and then with -caution, to prevent the enemy’s guards from seeing the columns, the -intent being to surprise Franceschi the next morning. - -That general, with all his cavalry, a regiment of Mermet’s -division, and six guns, occupied a village, about eight miles -beyond Vouga bridge, called Albergaria Nova; the remainder of -Mermet’s infantry were at Grijon, one march in the rear, and on the -main road to Oporto. Franceschi had that day informed Soult that -the allied forces were collecting on the Mondego, and that Trant’s -posts had closed upon the Vouga; but he was far from suspecting -that the whole army was upon the last river, although, from the -imprudent conversation of an English officer, bearing a flag of -truce, he had reason to expect an attack of some kind. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley’s plan was partly arranged upon the suggestion -of the field-officer who had met D’Argenton. He had observed, -during his intercourse with the conspirators, that the lake of Ovar -was unguarded by the French, although it extended twenty miles -behind their outposts, and that all the boats were at Aveiro, which -was in possession of the allies. On his information it was decided -to turn the enemy’s right by the lake. - -Accordingly, general Hill embarked, the evening of the 9th, -with one brigade, the other being to follow him as quickly as -possible. The fishermen looked on at first with surprise; but, -soon comprehending the object, they voluntarily rushed in crowds -to the boats, and worked with such a will that the whole flotilla -arrived at Ovar precisely at sunrise on the 10th, and the troops -immediately disembarked. That day, also, marshal Beresford, having -rallied Wilson’s corps upon his own, reached Pezo de Ragoa, and he -it was that had repulsed Loison, and pursued him to Amarante. - -Both flanks of the French army were now turned, and at the same -moment sir Arthur, with the main body, fell upon Franceschi, for, -while the flotilla was navigating the lake of Ovar, the attempt -to surprise that general, at Albergaria Nova, was in progress. -Sherbrooke’s division was still in the rear; but general Cotton, -with the light cavalry, crossing the Vouga, a little after -midnight, endeavoured to turn the enemy’s left, and to get into his -rear; the head of Paget’s division, marching a little later, was to -pass through the defiles of Vouga, directly upon Albergaria, and -Trant’s corps was to make way between Paget’s division and the lake -of Aveiro. - -This enterprise, so well conceived, was baffled by petty events, -such as always abound in war. Sir Arthur Wellesley did not -perfectly know the ground beyond the Vouga; and, late in the -evening of the 9th, colonel Trant, having ascertained that an -impracticable ravine, extending from the lake to Oliveira de -Azemis, would prevent him from obeying his orders, passed the -bridge of Vouga, and carried his own guns beyond the defiles, in -order to leave the bridge clear for the British artillery and for -general Richard Stewart’s brigade. - -Stewart was charged to conduct the guns through the defile; but -the task was difficult, several carriages broke down, and Trant’s -corps thus took the lead of Paget’s column, the march of which was -impeded by the broken gun-carriages. Meanwhile the cavalry, under -Cotton, were misled by the guides, and came, in broad daylight, -upon Franceschi, who, with his flank resting upon a wood, garnished -with infantry, boldly offered a battle that Cotton durst not, under -such circumstances, accept. Thus, an hour’s delay, produced by a -few trifling accidents, marred a combination that would have shorn -Soult of a third of his infantry and all his light cavalry, for it -is not to be supposed that, when Franceschi’s horsemen were cut -off, and general Hill at Ovar, Mermet’s division could have escaped -across the Douro. - -When sir Arthur Wellesley came up to Albergaria with Paget’s -infantry, Franceschi was still in position, skirmishing with -Trant’s corps, and evidently ignorant of what a force was advancing -against him. Being immediately attacked, and his foot dislodged -from the wood, he retreated along the road to Oliveira de Azemis, -and was briskly pursued by the allied infantry; but, extricating -himself valiantly from his perilous situation, he reached Oliveira -without any serious loss; and continuing his march during the -night, by Feria, joined Mermet the next morning at Grijon. - -Franceschi, in the course of the 10th, could see the whole of the -English army, including the troops with Hill; and it may create -surprise that he should pass so near the latter general without -being attacked: but Hill was strictly obedient to his orders, which -forbade him to act on the enemy’s rear; and those orders were wise -and prudent, because the principle of operating with small bodies -on the flanks and rear of an enemy is vicious; and, while the -number of men on the left of the Douro was unknown, it would have -been rash to interpose a single brigade between the advanced-guard -and the main body of the French. General Hill was sent to Ovar, -that the line of march might be eased, and the enemy’s attention -distracted, and that a division of fresh soldiers might be at hand -to follow the pursuit, so as to arrive on the bridge of Oporto pell -mell with the flying enemy. The soldier-like retreat of Franceschi -prevented the last object from being attained. - -General Paget’s division and the cavalry halted the night of the -10th at Oliveira; Sherbrooke’s division passed the Vouga later -in the day, and remained in Albergaria. But the next morning the -pursuit was renewed, and the men, marching strongly, came up with -the enemy at Grijon, about eight o’clock in the morning. - - -COMBAT OF GRIJON. - -The French were drawn up on a range of steep hills across the -road. A wood, occupied with infantry, covered their right flank; -their front was protected by villages and broken ground, but their -left was ill placed. The British troops came on briskly in one -column, and the head was instantly and sharply engaged. The 16th -Portuguese regiment, then quitting the line of march, gallantly -drove the enemy out of the wood covering his right, and, at the -same time, the Germans, who were in the rear, bringing their left -shoulders forward, without any halt or check, turned the other -flank of the French. The latter immediately abandoned the position, -and, being pressed in the rear by two squadrons of cavalry, lost a -few killed and about a hundred prisoners. The heights of Carvalho -gave them an opportunity to turn and check the pursuing squadrons; -yet, when the British infantry, with an impetuous pace, drew near, -they again fell back; and thus, fighting and retreating, a blow and -a race, wore the day away. - -During this combat, Hill was to have marched by the coast-road -towards Oporto, to intercept the enemy’s retreat; but, by some -error in the transmission of orders, that general, taking the route -of Feria, crossed Trant’s line of march, and the time lost could -not be regained. - -The British halted at dark, but the French, continuing their -retreat, passed the Douro in the night, and at two o’clock in the -morning the bridge was destroyed. All the artillery and baggage -still in Oporto were immediately directed along the road to -Amarante, and Mermet’s division without halting at Oporto followed -the same route as far as Vallonga and Baltar, having instructions -to secure all the boats, and vigilantly to patrole the right bank -of the Douro. Loison, also, whose retreat from Pezo de Ragoa was -still unknown, once more received warning to hold on by the Tamega -without fail, as he valued the safety of the army. Meanwhile the -duke of Dalmatia commanded all the craft in the river to be -secured, and, having placed guards at the most convenient points, -proposed to remain at Oporto during the 12th, to give time for -Lorge’s dragoons and the different detachments of the army to -concentrate at Amarante. - -Soult’s personal attention was principally directed to the river -in its course _below_ the city; for the reports of his cavalry -led him to believe that Hill’s division had been disembarked at -Ovar from the ocean, and he expected that the vessels would come -round, and the passage be attempted at the mouth of the Douro. -Nevertheless, thinking that Loison still held Mesamfrio and Pezo -with six thousand men, and knowing that three brigades occupied -intermediate posts between Amarante and Oporto, he was satisfied -that his retreat was secured, and thought there was no rashness in -maintaining his position for another day. - -The conspirators, however, were also busy; his orders were -neglected, or only half obeyed, and false reports of their -execution transmitted to him; and, in this state of affairs, the -head of the British columns arrived at Villa Nova, and, before -eight o’clock in the morning of the 12th, they were concentrated in -one mass, but covered from the view of the enemy by the height on -which the convent of Sarea stands. - -The Douro rolled between the hostile forces. Soult had suffered -nothing by the previous operations, and in two days he could take -post behind the Tamega, from whence his retreat upon Bragança would -be certain, and he might, in passing, defeat Beresford, for that -general’s force was feeble as to numbers, and in infancy as to -organization; and the utmost that sir Arthur expected from it was -that, vexing the French line of march, and infesting the road of -Villa Real, it would oblige Soult to take the less accessible route -of Chaves, and so retire to Gallicia instead of Leon; but this -could not be, unless the main body of the allied troops followed -the French closely. Now, Soult, at Salamanca, would be more -formidable than Soult at Oporto, and hence the ultimate object of -the campaign, and the immediate safety of Beresford’s corps, alike -demanded that the Douro should be quickly passed. But, how force -the passage of a river, deep, swift, and more than three hundred -yards wide, while ten thousand veterans guarded the opposite bank? -Alexander the Great might have turned from it without shame! - -The height of Sarea, round which the Douro came with a sharp elbow, -prevented any view of the upper river from the town; but the duke -of Dalmatia, confident that all above the city was secure, took -his station in a house westward of Oporto, whence he could discern -the whole course of the lower river to its mouth. Meanwhile, from -the summit of Sarea, the English general, with an eagle’s glance, -searched all the opposite bank and the city and country beyond it. -He observed horses and baggage moving on the road to Vallonga, and -the dust of columns as if in retreat, and no large body of troops -was to be seen under arms near the river. The French guards were -few, and distant from each other, and the patroles were neither -many nor vigilant; but a large unfinished building standing alone, -yet with a short and easy access to it from the river, soon fixed -sir Arthur’s attention. - -This building, called the Seminary, was surrounded by a high stone -wall, which coming down to the water on either side, enclosed -an area sufficient to contain at least two battalions in order -of battle; the only egress being by an iron gate opening on the -Vallonga road. The structure itself commanded every thing in its -neighbourhood, except a mound, within cannon-shot, but too pointed -to hold a gun. There were no French posts near, and the direct -line of passage from the height of Sarea, across the river to the -building, being to the right hand, was of course hidden from the -troops in the town. Here, then, with a marvellous hardihood, sir -Arthur resolved, if he could find but one boat, to make his way, in -the face of a veteran army and a renowned general. - - -PASSAGE OF THE DOURO. - -A boat was soon obtained; for a poor barber of Oporto, evading -the French patroles, had, during the night, come over the water -in a small skiff; this being discovered by colonel Waters, a -staff officer, of a quick and daring temper, he and the barber, -and the prior of Amarante, who gallantly offered his aid, crossed -the river, and in half an hour returned, unperceived, with three -or four large barges. Meanwhile, eighteen or twenty pieces of -artillery were got up to the convent of Sarea; and major-general -John Murray, with the German brigade, some squadrons of the 14th -dragoons, and two guns, reached the Barca de Avintas, three miles -higher up the river, his orders being to search for boats, and to -effect a passage there also, if possible. - -Some of the British troops were now sent towards Avintas, to -support Murray; while others came cautiously forwards to the brink -of the river. It was ten o’clock; the enemy were tranquil and -unsuspicious; and an officer reported to sir Arthur Wellesley that -one boat was brought up to the point of passage, “_Well, let the -men cross_,” was the reply; and upon this simple order, an officer -and twenty-five soldiers, of the Buffs, entered the vessel, and in -a quarter of an hour were in the midst of the French army. - -The Seminary was thus gained without any alarm being given, and -every thing was still quiet in Oporto: not a movement was to be -seen; not a hostile sound was to be heard: a second boat followed -the first, and then a third passed a little higher up the river; -but scarcely had the men from the last landed, when a tumultuous -noise of drums and shouts arose in the city; confused masses of the -enemy were seen hurrying forth in all directions, and throwing out -clouds of skirmishers, who came furiously down upon the Seminary. -The citizens were descried gesticulating vehemently, and making -signals from their houses; and the British troops instantly crowded -to the bank of the river; Paget’s and Hill’s divisions at the point -of embarkation, and Sherbrooke’s where the old boat-bridge had been -cut away from Villa Nova. - -Paget himself passed in the third boat, and, mounting the roof of -the Seminary, was immediately struck down, severely wounded. Hill -took Paget’s place; the musketry was sharp, voluble, and increasing -every moment as the number accumulated on both sides. The enemy’s -attack was fierce and constant; his fire augmented faster than -that of the British, and his artillery, also, began to play on -the building. But the English guns, from the convent of Sarea, -commanded the whole enclosure round the Seminary, and swept the -left of the wall in such a manner as to confine the French assault -to the side of the iron gate. Murray, however, did not appear; -and the struggle was so violent, and the moment so critical, -that sir Arthur would himself have crossed, but for the earnest -representations of those about him, and the just confidence he had -in general Hill. - -Some of the citizens now pushed over to Villa Nova with several -great boats; Sherbrooke’s people begun to cross in large bodies; -and, at the same moment, a loud shout in the town, and the waving -of handkerchiefs from all the windows, gave notice that the enemy -had abandoned the lower part of the city; and now, also, Murray’s -troops were seen descending the right bank from Avintas. By this -time three battalions were in the Seminary; and Hill, advancing -to the enclosure wall, opened a destructive fire upon the French -columns as they passed, in haste and confusion, by the Vallonga -road. Five pieces of French artillery were coming out from the town -on the left; but, appalled by the line of musketry to be passed, -the drivers suddenly pulled up, and while thus hesitating, a volley -from behind stretched most of the artillery-men on the ground; the -rest, dispersing among the enclosures, left their guns on the road. -This volley was given by a part of Sherbrooke’s people, who, having -forced their way through the streets, thus came upon the rear. In -fine, the passage was won; and the allies were in considerable -force on the French side of the river. - -To the left, general Sherbrooke, with the brigade of guards, and -the 29th regiment, was in the town, and pressing the rear of -the enemy, who were quitting it. In the centre, general Hill, -holding the Seminary and the wall of the enclosure, with the -Buffs, the 48th, the 66th, the 16th Portuguese, and a battalion -of detachments, sent a damaging fire into the masses as they -passed him; and his line was prolonged on the right, although with -a considerable interval, by general Murray’s Germans, and two -squadrons of the 14th dragoons. The remainder of the army kept -passing the river at different points; and the artillery, from the -height of Sarea, still searched the enemy’s columns as they hurried -along the line of retreat. - -If general Murray had then fallen boldly in upon the disordered -crowds, their discomfiture would have been complete; but he -suffered column after column to pass him, without even a cannon -shot, and seemed fearful lest they should turn and push him into -the river. General Charles Stewart and major Hervey, however, -impatient of this inactivity, charged with the two squadrons of -dragoons, and rode over the enemy’s rear-guard, as it was pushing -through a narrow road to gain an open space beyond. Laborde was -unhorsed, Foy badly wounded; and, on the English side, major Hervey -lost an arm; and his gallant horsemen, receiving no support from -Murray, were obliged to fight their way back with loss. - -This finished the action; the French continued their retreat, and -the British remained on the ground they had gained. The latter lost -twenty killed, a general and ninety-five men wounded; the former -had about five hundred men killed and wounded, and five pieces -of artillery were taken in the fight; a considerable quantity of -ammunition, and fifty guns (of which the carriages had been burnt) -were afterwards found in the arsenal, and several hundred men were -captured in the hospitals. - -[Illustration: _Plate 4. to face Pa. 290._ - - _Sketch Explanatory_ - OF THE PASSAGE OF THE RIVER DOURO, - by - SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, - _May 12^{th}, 1809_, - AND OF THE STORMING OF OPORTO, - by - _MARSHAL SOULT_, - _March 1809_. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - -Napoleon’s veterans were so experienced, so inured to warfare -that no troops in the world could more readily recover from such a -surprise, and before they reached Vallonga their columns were again -in order, with a regular rear guard covering the retreat. A small -garrison at the mouth of the Douro was cut off, but, guided by some -friendly Portuguese, it rejoined the army in the night; and Soult, -believing that Loison was at Amarante, thought he had happily -escaped a great danger and was still formidable to his enemies. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley employed the remainder of the 12th, and the -next day, in bringing over the rear of the army, together with the -baggage, the stores, and the artillery. General Murray’s Germans, -however, pursued, on the morning of the 13th, but not further than -about two leagues on the road of Amarante. This delay has been -blamed as an error in sir Arthur; it is argued that an enemy once -surprised should never be allowed to recover, and that Soult should -have been followed up, even while a single regiment was left to -pursue. But the reasons for halting were, first, that a part of the -army was still on the left bank of the Douro;--secondly, that the -troops had out marched provisions, baggage, and ammunition, and -having passed over above eighty miles of difficult country in four -days, during three of which they were constantly fighting, both -men and animals required rest; thirdly, that nothing was known of -Beresford, whose contemporary operations it is time to relate. - -The moment of his arrival on the Douro was marked by the repulse -of Loison’s division, which immediately fell back, as I have -already related, to Mezamfrio, followed by the Portuguese patroles -only, for Beresford halted on the left bank of the river, because -the British regiments were still in the rear. This was on the -10th. Sylveira, who was at Villa Real, had orders to feel towards -Mezamfrio for the enemy, and the marshal’s force was thus, with the -assistance of the insurgents, in readiness to turn Soult from the -route of Villa Real to Bragança. - -The 11th, Loison continued his retreat, and Beresford finding him -so timid, followed, skirmishing with his rear guard, and at the -same time Sylveira advanced from Villa Real. On the 12th, the -French outposts, in front of Amarante were driven in, and the 13th -Loison abandoned that town, and took the route of Guimaraens. - -These events were unknown to sir Arthur Wellesley on the evening of -the 13th, but he heard that Soult, after destroying his artillery -and ammunition, near Penafiel, had passed over the mountain towards -Braga; and judging this to arise from Beresford’s operations on the -Tamega, he reinforced Murray with some cavalry, ordering him to -proceed by Penafiel, and if Loison still lingered near Amarante, -to open a communication with Beresford. The latter was at the same -time directed to ascend the Tamega, and intercept the enemy at -Chaves. - -Meanwhile, the main body of the army marched in two columns upon -the Minho, the one by the route of Barca de Troffa and Braga, the -other by the Ponte d’Ave and Bacellos. But, on the evening of the -14th, the movements of the enemy about Braga gave certain proofs -that not Valença and Tuy, but Chaves or Montalegre, would be the -point of his retreat. Hereupon, the left column was drawn off -from the Bacellos road and directed upon Braga, and Beresford was -instructed to move by Monterey, upon Villa del Rey, if Soult took -the line of Montalegre. - -The 15th, sir Arthur reached Braga. Murray was at Guimaraens -on his right, and Beresford, who had anticipated his orders, -was near Chaves, having sent Sylveira towards Salamonde, with -instructions to occupy the passes of Ruivaens and Melgassy. But -at this time Soult was fifteen miles in advance of Braga, having, -by a surprising effort, extricated himself from one of the -most dangerous situations that a general ever escaped from. To -understand this, it is necessary to describe the country through -which his retreat was effected. - -I have already observed that the Sierra de Cabreira and the Sierra -de Catalina line the right bank of the Tamega; but, in approaching -the Douro, the latter slants off towards Oporto, thus opening a -rough but practicable slip of land, through which the road leads -from Oporto to Amarante. Hence, the French in retreating to the -latter town had the Douro on their right hand and the Sierra de -Catalina on their left. - -Between Amarante, and Braga which is on the other side of the -Catalina, a route practicable for artillery, runs through -Guimaraens, but it is necessary to reach Amarante to fall into this -road. Thus, Soult, as he advanced along the narrow pass between -the mountains and the Douro, rested his hopes of safety entirely -upon Loison’s holding Amarante. Several days, however, had elapsed -since that general had communicated, and an aide-de-camp was sent -on the morning of the 12th to ascertain his exact position. Colonel -Tholosé, the officer employed, found Loison at Amarante, but -neither his remonstrances, nor the after coming intelligence that -Oporto was evacuated, and the army in full retreat upon the Tamega, -could induce that general to remain there, and, as we have seen, he -marched towards Guimaraens, on the 13th, abandoning the bridge of -Amarante, without a blow, and leaving his commander and two-thirds -of the army to what must have appeared inevitable destruction. - -The news of this unexpected calamity reached Soult at one o’clock -on the morning of the 13th, just as he had passed the rugged banks -of the Souza river, the weather was boisterous, the men were -fatigued, voices were heard calling for a capitulation, and the -whole army was stricken with dismay. Then it was that the duke of -Dalmatia justified, by his energy, that fortune which had raised -him to his high rank in the world. Being, by a Spanish pedlar, -informed of a path that, mounting the right bank of the Souza, led -over the Sierra de Catalina to Guimaraens, he, on the instant, -silenced the murmurs of the treacherous or fearful in the ranks, -destroyed the artillery, abandoned the military chest and baggage, -and loading the animals with sick men and musket ammunition, -repassed the Souza, and followed his Spanish guide with a hardy -resolution. - -The rain was falling in torrents, and the path was such as might -be expected in those wild regions, but the troops made good their -passage over the mountains to Pombeira, and, at Guimaraens, happily -fell in with Loison. During the night they were joined by Lorge’s -dragoons from Braga, and thus, almost beyond hope, the whole army -was concentrated. - -[Sidenote: Noble’s Campagne de Galice.] - -If Soult’s energy in command was conspicuous on this occasion, his -sagacity and judgement were not less remarkably displayed in what -followed. Most generals would have moved by the direct route upon -Guimaraens to Braga; but he, with a long reach of mind, calculated, -from the slackness of pursuit after he passed Vallonga, that the -bulk of the English army must be on the road to Braga, and would be -there before him; or that, at best, he should be obliged to retreat -fighting, and must sacrifice the guns and baggage of Loison’s and -Lorge’s corps in the face of an enemy--a circumstance that might -operate fatally on the spirit of his soldiers, and would certainly -give opportunities to the malcontents; and already one of the -generals (apparently Loison) was recommending a convention like -Cintra. - -But, with a firmness worthy of the highest admiration, Soult -destroyed all the guns and the greatest part of the baggage and -ammunition of Loison’s and Lorge’s divisions; then, leaving the -high road to Braga on his left, and once more taking to the -mountain paths, he made for the heights of Carvalho d’Este, where -he arrived late in the evening of the 14th, thus gaining a day’s -march, in point of time. The morning of the 15th he drew up his -troops in the position he had occupied just two months before at -the battle of Braga; and this spectacle, where twenty thousand men -were collected upon the theatre of a former victory, and disposed -so as to produce the greatest effect, roused all the sinking pride -of the French soldiers. It was a happy stroke of generalship, an -inspiration of real genius! - -Soult now re-organised his army; taking the command of the -rear-guard himself, and giving that of the advanced guard to -general Loison. Noble, the French historian of this campaign, says -“_the whole army was astonished_;” as if it was not a stroke of -consummate policy that the rear, which was pursued by the British, -should be under the general-in-chief, and that the front, which -was to fight its way through the native forces, should have a -commander whose very name called up all the revengeful passions -of the Portuguese. _Maneta durst not surrender_; and the duke of -Dalmatia dextrously forced those to act with most zeal who were -least inclined to serve him: and, in sooth, such was his perilous -situation, that all the resources of his mind and all the energy of -his character were needed to save the army. - -From Carvalho he retired to Salamonde, from whence there were two -lines of retreat. The one through Ruivaens and Venda Nova, by which -the army had marched when coming from Chaves two months before; -the other, shorter, although more impracticable, leading by the -Ponte Nova and Ponte Miserella into the road running from Ruivaens -to Montalegre. But the scouts brought intelligence that the bridge -of Ruivaens, on the little river of that name, was broken, and -defended by twelve hundred Portuguese, with artillery; and that -another party had been, since the morning, destroying the Ponte -Nova on the Cavado river. - -The destruction of the first bridge blocked the road to Chaves; the -second, if completed, and the passage well defended, would have -cut the French off from Montalegre. The night was setting in, the -soldiers were harassed, barefooted, and starving; the ammunition -was damp with the rain, which had never ceased since the 13th, and -which was now increasing in violence, accompanied with storms of -wind. The British army would certainly fall upon the rear in the -morning; and if the Ponte Nova, where the guard was reported to -be weak, could not be secured, the hour of surrender was surely -arrived. - -In this extremity, Soult sent for major Dulong, an officer justly -reputed for one of the most daring in the French ranks. Addressing -himself to this brave man, he said, “I have chosen you from the -whole army to seize the Ponte Nova, which has been cut by the -enemy. Do you choose a hundred grenadiers and twenty-five horsemen; -endeavour to surprise the guards, and secure the passage of the -bridge. If you succeed, say so, but send no other report; your -silence will suffice.” Thus exhorted, Dulong selected his men, and -departed. - -Favoured by the storm, he reached the bridge unperceived of the -Portuguese, killed the centinel before any alarm was given, and -then, followed by twelve grenadiers, began crawling along a narrow -slip of masonry, which was the only part of the bridge undestroyed. -The Cavado river was in full flood, and roaring in a deep channel; -one of the grenadiers fell into the gulph, but the noise of the -storm and the river was louder than his cry; Dulong, with the -eleven, still creeping onwards, reached the other side, and falling -briskly on the first posts of the peasants, killed or dispersed -the whole. At that moment, the remainder of his men advanced close -to the bridge; and some crossing, others mounting the heights, -shouting and firing, scared the Portuguese supporting-posts, who -imagined the whole army was upon them; and thus the passage was -gallantly won. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -At four o’clock, the bridge being repaired, the advanced guards -of the French commenced crossing; but as the column of march was -long, and the road narrow and rugged, the troops filed over slowly; -and beyond the Ponte Nova there was a second obstacle still more -formidable. For the pass in which the troops were moving being cut -in the side of a mountain, open on the left for several miles, at -last came upon a torrent called the Misarella, which, breaking down -a deep ravine, or rather gulph, was only to be crossed by a bridge, -constructed with a single lofty arch, called the _Saltador_, or -leaper; and so narrow that only three persons could pass abreast. -Fortunately for the French, the _Saltador_ was not cut, but -entrenched and defended by a few hundred Portuguese peasants, -who occupied the rocks on the farther side; and here the good -soldier Dulong again saved the army: for, when a first and second -attempt had been repulsed with loss, he carried the entrenchments -by a third effort; but, at the same instant, fell deeply wounded -himself. The head of the column now poured over, and it was full -time, for the English guns were thundering in the rear, and the -Ponte Nova was choked with dead. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, quitting Braga on the morning of the 16th, -had come, about four o’clock, upon Soult’s rear-guard, which -remained at Salamonde to cover the passage of the army over the -bridges. The right was strongly protected by a ravine, the left -occupied a steep hill; and a stout battle might have been made, -but men thus circumstanced, and momentarily expecting an order to -retreat, will seldom stand firmly; and, on this occasion, when some -light troops turned the left, and general Sherbrooke, with the -guards, mounting the steep hill, attacked the front, the French -made but one discharge, and fled in confusion to the Ponte Nova. As -this bridge was not on the direct line of retreat, they were for -some time unperceived, and gaining ground of their pursuers, formed -a rear-guard; but, after a time, being discovered, some guns were -brought to bear on them; and then man and horse, crushed together, -went over into the gulph; and the bridge, and the rocks, and the -defile beyond were strewed with mangled bodies. - -This was the last calamity inflicted by the sword upon the French -army in this retreat; a retreat attended by many horrid as well as -glorious events; for the peasants in their fury, with an atrocious -cruelty, tortured and mutilated every sick man and straggler that -fell into their power; and on the other hand, the soldiers, who -held together in their turn, shot the peasants; while the track -of the columns might be discovered from afar by the smoke of the -burning houses. - -The French reached Montalegre on the 17th; and an English -staff-officer, with some cavalry, being upon their rear, as far -as Villella, picked up some stragglers; but sir Arthur, with the -main body of the army, halted that day at Ruivaens. The 18th he -renewed the pursuit, and a part of his cavalry passed Montalegre, -followed by the guards; the enemy was, however, drawn up behind the -Salas in force, and no action took place. Sylveira, indeed, had -entered Montalegre, from the side of Chaves, before the British -came up from Ruivaens; but instead of pursuing, he put his men -into quarters; and a Portuguese officer of his division, who was -despatched to marshal Beresford with orders to move from Villa -Perdrices upon Villa del Rey, loitered on the road so long, that -all chance of intercepting the French line of march was at an end; -for though Beresford, on the 19th, pushed colonel Talbot with the -14th dragoons as far as Ginjo, Franceschi turned in force, and -obliged that officer to retire; and thus the pursuit terminated, -with the capture of a few stragglers on the Salas. - -Soult himself crossed the frontier by Allaritz on the 18th; and on -the 19th entered Orense, but without guns, stores, ammunition, or -baggage; his men exhausted with fatigue and misery, the greatest -part being without shoes, many without accoutrements, and in some -instances even without muskets. He had quitted Orense seventy-six -days before, with about twenty-two thousand men, and three thousand -five hundred had afterwards joined him from Tuy. He returned with -nineteen thousand five hundred, having lost by the sword and -sickness, by assassination and capture, six thousand good soldiers; -of which number above three thousand were taken in hospitals,[7] -and about a thousand were killed by the Portuguese, or had died of -sickness, previous to the retreat. The remainder were captured, or -had perished within the last eight days. He had carried fifty-eight -pieces of artillery into Portugal, and he returned without a -gun; yet was his reputation as a stout and able soldier no wise -diminished. - -[Illustration: _Plate 5. to face Pa. 300._ - - _Sketch Explanatory_ - of the - OPERATIONS - between the - MINHO & DOURO, - _1809_. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -The duke of Dalmatia’s arrangements being continually thwarted -by the conspirators, his military conduct cannot be fairly -judged of. Nevertheless, the errors of the campaign may, without -injustice, be pointed out, leaving to others the task of tracing -them to their true sources. - -1º. The disposition of the army, on both sides of the Douro, and -upon such extended lines, when no certain advice of the movements -and strength of the English force had been received, was rash. It -was, doubtless, right, that to clear the front of the army, and -to gather information, Franceschi should advance to the Vouga; -but he remained too long in the same position, and he should -have felt Trant’s force more positively. Had the latter officer -(whose boldness in maintaining the line of the Vouga was extremely -creditable) been beaten, as he easily might have been, the anarchy -in the country would have increased; and as Beresford’s troops at -Thomar wanted but an excuse to disband themselves, the Portuguese -and British preparations must have been greatly retarded. - -[Sidenote: Noble’s Campagne de Galice.] - -2º. That Soult, when he had secured, as he thought, all the boats -on an unfordable river three hundred yards wide, should think -himself safe from an attack for one day, is not wonderful. The -improbability that such a barrier could be forced in half an -hour might have rendered Fabius careless; but there were some -peculiar circumstances attending the surprise of the French army -which indicate great negligence. The commanding officer of one -regiment reported, as early as six o’clock, that the English were -crossing the river; the report was certainly premature, because -no man passed before ten o’clock; but it reached Soult, and he -sent general Quesnel, the governor of Oporto, to verify the fact. -Quesnel stated, on his return, and truly, that it was an error, -and Soult took no further precaution. The patroles were not -increased; no staff-officers appear to have been employed to watch -the river, and no signals were established; yet it was but three -days since D’Argenton’s conspiracy had been discovered, and the -extent of it was still unknown. This circumstance alone should have -induced the duke of Dalmatia to augment the number of his guards -and posts of observation, that the multiplicity of the reports -might render it impossible for the malcontents to deceive him. The -surprise at Oporto must, therefore, be considered as a fault in the -general, which could only be atoned for by the high resolution and -commanding energy with which he saved his army in the subsequent -retreat. - -3º. When general Loison suffered marshal Beresford to drive him -from Pezo de Ragoa and Mezamfrio, he committed a grave military -error; but when he abandoned Amarante, he relinquished all claim -to military reputation, as a simple statement of facts will prove. -The evening of the 12th he wrote to Soult that one regiment had -easily repulsed the whole of the enemy’s forces; yet he, although -at the head of six thousand men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, -that night and without another shot being fired, abandoned the only -passage by which, as far as he knew, the rest of the army could -escape from its perilous situation with honour. It was not general -Loison’s fault if England did not triumph a second time for the -capture of a French marshal. - - -MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH GENERAL. - -1º. If sir Arthur Wellesley’s operation be looked at as a whole, it -is impossible to deny his sagacity in planning, his decision and -celerity in execution. When he landed at Lisbon, the nation was -dismayed by previous defeats, distracted with anarchy, and menaced -on two sides by powerful armies, one of which was already in -possession of the second city in the kingdom. In twenty-eight days -he had restored public confidence; provided a defence against one -adversary; and having marched two hundred miles through a rugged -country, and forced the passage of a great river--caused his other -opponent to flee over the frontier, without artillery or baggage. - -2º.--Such being the result, it is necessary to show that the -success was due, not to the caprice of fortune, but to the talents -of the general; that he was quick to see, and active to strike; -and, first, the secresy and despatch with which the army was -collected on the Vouga belongs entirely to the man; for, there were -many obstacles to overcome; and D’Argenton, as the sequel proved, -would, by his disclosures, have ruined sir Arthur’s combinations, -if the latter had not providently given him a false view of -affairs. The subsequent march from the Vouga to the Douro was, in -itself, no mean effort, for, it must be recollected, that this -rapid advance against an eminent commander, and a veteran army of -above twenty thousand men, was made with a heterogeneous force, -of which only sixteen thousand men were approved soldiers, the -remainder being totally unformed by discipline, untried in battle, -and, only three weeks before, were in a state of open mutiny. - -3º.--The passage of the Douro, at Oporto, would, at first sight, -seem a rash undertaking; but, when examined closely, it proves to -be an example of consummate generalship, both in the conception -and the execution. The careless watch maintained by the French -may, indeed, be called fortunate, because it permitted the -English general to get a few men over unperceived; but it was not -twenty-five, nor twenty-five hundred, soldiers that could have -maintained themselves, if heedlessly cast on the other side. Sir -Arthur, when he so coolly said--“_let them pass_,” was prepared -to protect them when they had passed. He did not give that order -until he knew that Murray had found boats at Avintas, to ferry -over a considerable number of troops, and, consequently, that -that general, descending the Douro, could cover the right flank -of the Seminary, while the guns planted on the heights of Sarea -could sweep the left flank, and search all the ground enclosed by -the wall round the building. If general Murray’s troops only had -passed, they would have been compromised; if the whole army had -made the attempt at Avintas, its march would have been discovered; -but in the double passage all was secured: the men in the Seminary -by the guns, by the strength of the building, and by Murray’s -troops; the latter by the surprise on the town, which drew the -enemy’s attention away from them. Hence, it was only necessary -to throw a few brave men into the Seminary unperceived, and then -the success was almost certain; because, while that building was -maintained, the troops in the act of passing could neither be -prevented nor harmed by the enemy. To attain great objects by -simple means is the highest effort of genius! - -4º.--If general Murray had attacked vigorously, the ruin of the -French army would have ensued. It was an opportunity that would -have tempted a blind man to strike; the neglect of it argued want -of military talent and of military hardihood; and how would it -have appeared if Loison had not abandoned Amarante? If Soult, -effecting his retreat in safety, and reaching Zamora or Salamanca -in good order, had turned on Ciudad Rodrigo, he would have found -full occupation for sir Arthur Wellesley in the north; and he would -have opened a free communication with the duke of Belluno. The -latter must, then, have marched either against Seville or Lisbon; -and thus the boldness and excellent conduct of the English general, -producing no adequate results, would have been overlooked, or, -perhaps, have formed a subject for the abuse of some ignorant, -declamatory writer. - -5º.--Sir Arthur Wellesley’s reasons for halting at Oporto, the -13th, have been already noticed, but they require further remarks. -Had he followed Soult headlong, there is no doubt that the latter -would have been overtaken on the Souza river, and destroyed; -but this chance, arising from Loison’s wretched movements, -was not to be foreseen. Sir Arthur Wellesley knew nothing of -Beresford’s situation; but he naturally supposed that, following -his instructions, the latter was about Villa Real; and that, -consequently, the French would, from Amarante, either ascend the -Tamega to Chaves, or taking the road to Guimaraens and Braga, make -for the Minho. Hence, he remained where he could command the main -roads to that river, in order to intercept Soult’s retreat and -force him to a battle; whereas, if he had once entered the defile -formed by the Douro and the Sierra de Catalina, he could only have -followed his enemy in one column by a difficult route, a process -promising little advantage. Nevertheless, seeing that he detached -general Murray by that route at last, it would appear that he -should have ordered him to press the enemy closer than he did; but -there a political difficulty occurred. - -[Sidenote: King Joseph’s captured Correspondence, MS.] - -The English cabinet, although improvident in its preparations, -was very fearful of misfortune, and the general durst not risk -the safety of a single brigade, except for a great object, lest -a slight disaster should cause the army to be recalled. Thus, he -was obliged to curb his naturally enterprising disposition, and to -this burthen of ministerial incapacity, which he bore even to the -battle of Salamanca, may be traced that over-caution which has been -so often censured as a fault, not only by military writers, but by -Napoleon, who, judging from appearances, erroneously supposed it to -be a characteristic of the man, and often rebuked his generals for -not taking advantage thereof. - -6º.--The marches and encounters, from the 14th to the 17th, were -excellent on both sides. Like the wheelings and buffeting of two -vultures in the air, the generals contended, the one for safety, -the other for triumph; but there was evidently a failure in the -operations of marshal Beresford. Soult did not reach Salamonde -until the evening of the 15th, and his rear guard was still there -on the evening of the 16th. Beresford was in person at Chaves on -the 16th, and his troops reached that place early on the morning of -the 17th. Soult passed Montalegre on the 18th, but from Chaves to -that place is only one march. - -Again, marshal Beresford was in possession of Amarante on the 13th, -and as there was an excellent map of the province in existence, he -must have known the importance of Salamonde, and that there were -roads to it through Mondin and Cavez, shorter than by Guimaraens -and Chaves. It is true that Sylveira was sent to occupy Ruivaens -and Melgacy; but he executed his orders slowly, and Misarella -was neglected. Major Warre, an officer of the marshal’s staff, -endeavoured, indeed, to break down the bridges of Ponte Nova and -Ruivaens; and it was by his exertions that the peasants, surprised -at the former, had been collected; but he had only a single dragoon -with him, and was without powder to execute this important task. -The peasantry, glad to be rid of the French, were reluctant to stop -their retreat, and still more to destroy the bridge of Misarella, -which was the key of all the communications, and all the great -markets of the Entre Minho e Douro; and therefore sure to be built -up again, in which case the people knew well that their labour and -time would be called for without payment. It is undoubted that -Soult owed his safety to the failure in breaking those bridges; -and it does appear that if major Warre had been supplied with the -necessary escort and materials he would have effectually destroyed -them. - -Sylveira did not move either in the direction or with the -celerity required of him by Beresford, there seems to have been a -misunderstanding between them; but allowance must be made for the -numerous mistakes necessarily arising in the transmission of orders -by officers speaking different languages; and for the difficulty of -moving troops not accustomed, or perfectly willing to act together. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -The duke of Dalmatia halted at Orense the 20th, but on the 21st -put his troops in motion upon Lugo, where general Fournier, of the -6th corps, with three battalions of infantry and a regiment of -dragoons, was besieged by twelve or fifteen thousand Spaniards, -under the command of general Mahi. But to explain this it is -necessary to relate Romana’s operations, after his defeat at -Monterey on the 6th of March. - -Having re-assembled the fugitives at Puebla de Senabria, on the -borders of Leon, he repaired his losses by fresh levies, and was -soon after joined by three thousand men from Castile, and thus, -unknown to Ney, he had, as it were, gained the rear of the sixth -corps. Villa Franca del Bierzo was, at this time, occupied by -two weak French battalions, and their nearest support was at -Lugo: Romana resolved to surprise them, and, dividing his forces, -sent Mendizabel with one division by the valley of the Syl to -take the French in rear, and marched himself by the route of -Calcabellos. The French, thus surrounded in Villa Franca, after a -short skirmish, in which the Spaniards lost about a hundred men, -surrendered, and were sent into the Asturias. - -[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -Romana then detached a part of his forces to Orense and Ponte -Vedra, to assist Morillo and the insurrection in the western parts -of Gallicia, where, with the aid of the English ships of war, and -notwithstanding the shameful neglect of the supreme central junta, -the patriots were proceeding vigorously. The moveable columns of -the sixth corps daily lost a number of men; some in open battle, -but a still greater number by assassinations, which were rigorously -visited upon the districts where they took place; and thus, in -Gallicia, as in every other part of Spain, the war hourly assumed -a more horrid character. Referring to this period, colonel Barios -afterwards told Mr. Frere that, to repress the excesses of marshal -Ney’s troops, he, himself, had, in cold blood, caused seven hundred -French prisoners to be drowned in the Minho; an avowal recorded by -Mr. Frere, without animadversion, but which, happily for the cause -of humanity, there is good reason to believe was as false as it was -disgraceful. - -After the capture of Vigo, the Spanish force on the coast increased -rapidly. Barios returned to Seville; Martin Carrera assumed the -command of the troops near Orense, and the Conde Noroña of those -near Vigo. General Maucune returned to St. Jago from Tuy, and Ney, -apprized of the loss at Villa Franca, advanced to Lugo. Romana -immediately abandoned Gallicia, and, entering the Asturias by -the pass of Cienfuegos, marched along the line of the Gallician -frontier, until he reached Navia de Suarna. Here he left Mahi, with -the army, to observe Ney, but repaired, himself, to Oviedo, to -redress the crying wrongs of the Asturians. - -It is unnecessary to recapitulate the evil doings of the Asturian -junta, which was notoriously corrupt and incapable. Romana, after -a short inquiry, dismissed the members in virtue of his supreme -authority, and appointed new men; but this act of justice gave -great offence to Jovellanos and others. It appeared too close an -approximation to Cuesta’s manner, in Leon, the year before; and -as the central government, always selfish and jealous, abhorred -any indication of vigour or probity in a general, Romana was soon -afterwards deprived of his command. Meanwhile, he was resolutely -reforming abuses, when his proceedings were suddenly arrested by an -unexpected event. - -As soon as Ney understood that the Spanish army was posted on the -Gallician side of the Asturian frontier, and that Romana was likely -to excite the energy of the Asturian people, he planned a combined -movement, to surround and destroy, not only Romana and his army, -but also the Asturian forces, which then amounted to about fifteen -thousand men, including the _partida_ of Porlier, commonly called -the Marquisetto. This force, commanded by general Ballasteros and -general Voster, occupied Infiesta, on the eastern side of Oviedo, -and Castropol on the coast. Ney, with the consent of Joseph, -arranged that Kellerman, who was at Astorga, with six guns and -eight thousand seven hundred men, composed of detachments, drawn -together from the different corps, should penetrate the Asturias -from the south east by the pass of Pajares; that Bonnet, who always -remained at the town of St. Andero, should break in, from the north -east, by the coast road; and that the sixth corps should make an -irruption by the Concejo de Ibias, a short but difficult route -leading directly from Lugo. - -When the period for these combined movements was determined, Ney, -appointing general Marchand to command in Gallicia during his -own absence, left three battalions under Maucune at St. Jago, -three others in garrison at Coruña under general D’Armagnac, one -at Ferrol, and three with a regiment of cavalry under Fournier -at Lugo; and then marched himself, with twelve battalions of -infantry and three regiments of cavalry, against Mahi. The latter -immediately abandoned his position at Navia de Suarna, and drawing -off by his left, without giving notice to Romana, returned to -Gallicia and again entered the valley of the Syl. Ney, either -thinking that the greatest force was near Oviedo, or that it was -more important to capture Romana than to disperse Mahi’s troops, -continued his route by the valley of the Nareca, and with such -diligence that he reached Cornellana and Grado, one march from -Oviedo, before Romana knew of his approach. The Spanish general, -thus surprized, made a feeble and fruitless endeavour to check the -French at the bridge of Peñaflor, after which, sending the single -regiment he had with him to Infiesta, he embarked on board an -English vessel at Gihon, and so escaped. - -The 18th of May, Ney entered Oviedo, where he was joined by -Kellerman, and the next day pursued Romana to Gihon. Bonnet, -likewise, executed his part, but somewhat later; and thus Vorster, -being unmolested by Ney, had time to collect his corps on the -coast. Meanwhile Ballasteros, finding that Bonnet had passed -between him and Vorster, boldly marched upon St. Andero and retook -it, making the garrison and sick men (in all eleven hundred) -prisoners. The Amelia and Statira, British frigates, arrived off -the harbour at the same moment, and captured three French corvettes -and two luggers, on board of which some staff-officers were -endeavouring to escape. - -Bonnet, however, followed hard upon Ballasteros, and, the 11th of -June, routed him so completely that he, also, was forced to save -himself on board an English vessel, and the French recovered all -the prisoners, and, amongst them, the men taken at Villa Franca, by -Romana. But, before this, Ney, uneasy for his posts in Gallicia, -had returned to Coruña by the coast-road through Castropol, and -Kellerman, after several trifling skirmishes with Vorster, had also -retired to Valladolid. This expedition proved that Asturia was not -calculated for defence, although, with the aid of English ships, it -might become extremely troublesome to the French. - -While Ney was in Asturia, Carrera, advancing from the side of -Orense, appeared in front of St. Jago di Compostella at the moment -that colonel D’Esmenard, a staff-officer sent by the marshal to -give notice of his return to Coruña, arrived with an escort of -dragoons in Maucune’s camp. This escort was magnified by the -Spaniards into a reinforcement of eight hundred men; but Carrera, -who had been joined by Morillo, commanded eight thousand, and, on -the 23d, having attacked Maucune, at a place called “_Campo de -Estrella_,” totally defeated him, with a loss of six hundred men -and several guns. The Spaniards did not pursue, but the French -retreated in confusion to Coruña. Nor was this the only check -suffered by the 6th corps; for Mahi, having united a great body of -peasants to his army, drove back Fournier’s outposts, and closely -invested him in Lugo on the 19th. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.] - -Such was the state of affairs in Gallicia when Soult arrived at -Orense; and as the inhabitants of that town, from whom he got -intelligence of these events, rather exaggerated the success of -their countrymen, the French marshal immediately sent forward an -advanced guard of his stoutest men to relieve Lugo, and followed -himself, by the route of Monforte, with as much speed as the -exhausted state of his troops would permit. The 22d, he reached -Gutin, and, the same day, his van being descried on the mountains -above Lugo, Mahi broke up his camp, and fell back to Mondenedo. - -The 23d, Soult entered Lugo, where he heard of the emperor’s -first successes in Austria, and, with renewed energy, prepared -for fresh exertions himself. The 30th, he was joined by Ney, who, -uninformed of Mahi’s position at Mondenedo, had missed a favourable -opportunity of revenging the loss at St. Jago. Meanwhile Romana, -disembarking at Ribadeo, joined Mahi at Mondenedo, and immediately -marched along the line of the Asturias frontier, until he arrived -at the sources of the Neyra, then, crossing the royal road, a -little above Lugo, plunged, once more, into the valley of the Syl; -and, having gained Orense, the 6th of June, opened a communication -with Carrera at St. Jago, and with the insurgents at Vigo. This -movement of Romana’s was able, energetic, and worthy of every -praise. - -In pursuance of an order from the emperor, Soult now sent eleven -hundred men, composed of dismounted dragoons and skeletons of -cavalry regiments, to France; and, having partially restored the -artillery and equipments of the second corps, from the arsenals -of Coruña and Ferrol, he, in concert with the duke of Elchingen, -arranged a fresh plan for the destruction of Romana, the execution -of which failed, as shall be hereafter noticed; but, at present, it -is necessary to resume the narrative of - - -VICTOR’S OPERATIONS. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.] - -After the abortive effort to gain Badajos, the duke of Belluno, in -obedience to the king’s orders, proceeded to recover Alcantara. His -rear was still within two marches of Merida when the head of his -columns, under Lapisse, drove back some cavalry posts, entered the -town of Alcantara, and the next day attempted the passage of the -bridge. - -The Portuguese force consisted of two thousand infantry, fifty -cavalry, and six guns; and some works of defence were constructed -on the right bank of the river; but, on the 14th of May, Lapisse -lining the rocks on the left bank of the river, skirmished so -sharply that the militia regiment of Idanha gave way. Colonel Mayne -then sprung a mine, but the explosion doing little injury to the -bridge, the French made good the passage. The Portuguese, who had -suffered considerably, retired to the Puente de Segura, and Lapisse -immediately sent patroles towards Castello Branco, Salvatierra, and -Idanha Nova. - -Intelligence of this attack having reached general Mackenzie, he -directed preparations to be made for destroying the boat-bridge at -Abrantes, and marched, in person, by Cortiçada to Sobreira Formosa; -this movement, and a rumour that Soult had retreated from Oporto, -afforded an excuse to Victor for again abandoning Alcantara, and -resuming his former camp. During his absence, Cuesta, true to the -promise he had given, attacked the fort of Merida; but, on the -return of the French advanced guard, re-crossed the Guadiana, and -fell back to Zafra, having first ravaged all the flat country, and -obliged the inhabitants to withdraw into the mountains. - -Some time before this, king Joseph had received a despatch from -the French minister of war, giving notice that reinforcements had -sailed from England, and warning him to lose no time in marching -against Lisbon, to create a useful diversion in favour of Soult. -It might be supposed that the original plan of the emperor would -then have been acted upon, and this was the first thought of Joseph -himself; but other circumstances created doubt and hesitation in -his councils, and, finally, induced him to abandon all thoughts of -Portugal. - -When Napoleon returned to Paris, he imagined hostilities with -Austria, although certain, would not break out so suddenly, but -that he should have time to organise a sufficient army in Germany, -without drawing his veteran troops from Spain. Hence, he still -left the imperial guards at Vittoria, and sending the prince of -Neufchatel to command the troops on the Danube, he himself remained -at Paris, to superintend the preparations for opening the campaign. -The Austrians were, however, not inattentive observers of the -perfidy which accompanied the invasion of Spain; and, aptly taking -the hint, attacked the French outposts and published their own -declaration of war at the same moment. - -Berthier, incapable of acting a principal part, was surprised, and -made a succession of false movements that would have been fatal -to the French army, if the emperor, journeying day and night, had -not arrived at the very hour when his lieutenant was on the point -of consummating the ruin of the army. Then, indeed, was seen the -supernatural force of Napoleon’s genius: in a few hours he changed -the aspect of affairs, in a few days, maugre their immense number, -his enemies, baffled and flying in all directions, proclaimed -his mastery in an art which, up to that moment, was imperfect; -for never, since troops first trod a field of battle, was such a -display of military skill made by man. - -But previous to these successes, so threatening had been the aspect -of affairs in Germany, that the imperial guards had been recalled -from Vittoria, and hurried to the Danube, the great reserve of -infantry was, as we have seen, struck off the rolls of the army in -Spain, and the skeletons of the fourth squadrons of every cavalry -regiment were ordered to return to their depôts in France. Even -the fifth corps, under Mortier, then on its way to Valladolid from -Zaragoza, was directed to halt, and hold itself in readiness to -march for Germany; and thus, while Victor was reluctant to move, -while Ney was demanding more troops to preserve Gallicia, and -while the fate of the second corps was unknown, the whole army was -actually diminished by forty thousand men, and fifteen thousand -more were paralysed with regard to offensive operations. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MS.] - -These things rendered Joseph timid. Madrid, it was argued in his -councils, was of more consequence than Lisbon. Soult might be -already at the latter place; or, if not, he might extricate himself -from his difficulties, for the capital of Spain must be covered. In -pursuance of this reasoning, Sebastiani was forbidden any forward -movement; and the duke of Belluno, whose army was daily wasting -with the Guadiana fever, took a position at Torre-Mocha, a central -point between Truxillo, Merida, and Alcantara. His cavalry posts -watched all the passages over the Guadiana and the Tagus; and his -communications with Madrid, between the Tietar and the Tagus, were -protected by twelve hundred men, detached for that purpose by the -king. - -But one timid measure in war generally produces another. The -neighbourhood of the English force at Castel Branco increased -the energy of the Spanish insurgents, who infested the valley of -the Tagus, and communicated secretly with those of the Sierra de -Guadalupe; hence, Victor, alarmed for his bridge at Almaraz, sent a -division there the 22d of May; and, as from that period until the -10th of June, he remained quiet: his campaign, which had opened -so brilliantly, was annulled. He had neither assisted Soult, nor -crushed Cuesta, nor taken Badajos nor Seville; yet he had wasted -and lost, by sickness, more men than would have sufficed to reduce -both Lisbon and Seville. The Spaniards were daily recovering -strength and confidence; and sir Arthur Wellesley, after defeating -Soult, had full leisure to return to the Tagus, and to combine his -future operations with the Spanish armies in the south. - -Information that Lapisse had forced the bridge of Alcantara reached -the English general on the night of the 17th. That part of the -army which was still behind Salamonde received immediate orders -to retrace their steps to Oporto; and when the retreat of Soult -by Orense was ascertained, the remainder of the troops, including -three Portuguese brigades under Beresford, followed the same route. -Colonel Trant was then appointed military governor of Oporto; and -it was thought sufficient to leave Sylveira with some regular -battalions and militia to defend the northern provinces; for -Soult’s army was considered a crippled force, which could not for -a long time appear again in the field; a conclusion drawn, as we -shall see, from false data, and without due allowance being made -for the energy of that chief. - -As the army proceeded southward, the contracted scope of Lapisse’s -movements was ascertained. Colonel Mayne was directed again to take -post at Alcantara; and a reinforcement of five thousand men having -landed at Lisbon, the rapidity of the march slackened. Passing by -easy journeys through Coimbra, Thomar, and Punhete, the troops -reached Abrantes the 7th of June, and encamped on the left bank -of the Tagus; but there was sickness and a great mortality in his -ranks. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -From the moment of his arrival in Portugal, sir Arthur Wellesley -had looked to the defeat of Victor as the principal, and the -operation against Soult as the secondary, object of the campaign; -and the English government, acceding to his views, now gave him a -discretionary power to enter the nearest provinces of Spain, if -Portugal should not thereby be endangered. In his correspondence -with the junta and with Cuesta, he had strongly urged the necessity -of avoiding any serious collision with the enemy until the British -troops could act in concert with the Spanish armies. This advice, -approved of by the junta, was attended to by Cuesta; insomuch -that he did not seek a battle, but he exposed his advanced posts, -as if in derision of the counsel; and, disdainful of the English -general’s abilities, expressed his belief that the latter had no -desire to act heartily, “because,” said he, “the system of the -British appears to be never to expose their troops; owing to which, -they never gain decisive actions by land.” - -Cuesta’s knowledge of the enemy’s strength and positions was always -inaccurate, and his judgement false; hence he himself not only -never gained any decisive action, but lost every army entrusted to -his command. He was discontented with the movement against Soult, -asserting that his hold of Gallicia would only be strengthened -thereby, unless that favourite folly of all Spanish generals were -adopted, namely, surrounding the enemy, without regarding whether -the troops to be surrounded were more or less numerous than the -surrounders. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, affirmed that if Soult -were first driven over the Minho, a combined attack afterwards made -upon Victor would permanently deliver Gallicia; and this plan being -followed, Gallicia was abandoned by the French, and they never -returned to that province. - -When the English army was again free to act, Cuesta was importunate -that a joint offensive operation against Victor should be -undertaken; but, obstinately attached to his own opinions, he -insisted upon tracing the whole plan of campaign. Yet his views -were so opposed to all sound military principles, that sir Arthur, -although anxious to conciliate his humour, could scarcely concede -the smallest point, lest a vital catastrophe should follow. -Valuable time was thus lost in idle discussions which might have -been employed in useful action; for the return of the British army -from the Douro had falsified Victor’s position at Torremocha. -That marshal, as late as the 10th of June, had only one division -guarding the bridge at Almaraz; and it was difficult for him -to ascertain the movements of sir Arthur Wellesley, covered, as -they were, by the Tagus, the insurgents, and Mackenzie’s corps -of observation: hence, by rapid marches, it was possible for the -English general, while Victor was still at Torremocha, to reach the -valley of the Tagus, and cutting the first corps off from Madrid, -to place it between two fires. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MS.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16.] - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.] - -This did not escape the penetration of either commander; but sir -Arthur was forced to renounce the attempt, partly because of the -sick and harassed condition of his troops, the want of shoes -and money, and the difficulty of getting supplies; but chiefly -that Cuesta’s army was scattered over the open country, between -the defiles of Monasterio and the Guadiana, and, as he refused -to concentrate or retire, Victor might have marched against and -crushed him, and yet found time to meet the British on the Tietar. -Early in June, however, marshal Beresford was, with three brigades, -directed upon Castello Branco, and the duke of Belluno, immediately -taking the alarm, and being also assured, by despatches from -Madrid, of Soult’s retreat, resolved to re-cross the Tagus. But, -previous to commencing this movement, he resolved to secure his -flank, by causing the bridge of Alcantara to be destroyed. - -Colonel Mayne, as I have already observed, had been again entrusted -with that post; but, unfortunately, his first orders to blow up -the bridge, if the enemy advanced, were not rescinded, although -the return of the army from the north rendered such a proceeding -unnecessary. Mayne did not keep his instructions secret; and -Victor, hearing of them, sent a detachment to the bridge with no -other view than to cause its destruction. He succeeded; and this -noble monument of Trajan’s genius was overturned. But such is -the nature of war that, not long afterwards, each army found its -fall injurious to their interests, and, as a matter of taste and -of military advantage, both sides alike sighed over the ruins of -Alcantara. - -Having completed this operation, Victor passed the Tagus, at -Almaraz, on the 19th, without being molested by Cuesta, and, -removing his boat-bridge, proceeded to take post at Plasencia. -Meanwhile Beresford was obliged to return to the defence of the -northern provinces of Portugal, which Soult was again menacing, -for, during the forced inactivity of the British, at Abrantes, the -cause of which I shall explain in another place, changes in the -relative positions of the hostile armies were taking place; and it -is important that these changes should be well understood, because -on them the fate of the succeeding campaign hinged. - -When Ney and Soult met at Lugo, they, although still on bad terms, -agreed, after some discussion, that the first should march from -Coruña, by the route of St. Jago and Vigo, against Carrera and the -Conde de Noroña; and that the second, entering the valley of the -Syl, should attack Romana, and drive him upon Orense, at which -place it was expected that Ney, after taking or blocking Vigo, -would be able to reach him, and thus the whole force of Gallicia -be crushed at once. Soult was then to menace the Tras os Montes, -by the side of Bragança, with the view of obliging sir Arthur -Wellesley to remain in that province, while the second corps opened -a direct communication with Madrid and with the first corps. - -Ney returned to Coruña; and, on the 1st of June, two divisions of -infantry and a brigade of dragoons, of the second corps, marched -upon Monforte: they were followed, the next day, by two other -divisions of infantry; and, at the same time, Franceschi, who was -on the Fereira river, supported by La Houssaye’s dragoons, was -directed, after scouring the road to St. Jago, to fall down the -right bank of the Tambuga, towards Orense. - -From the 2d to the 9th the main body halted at Monforte, to get -up stores from Lugo, and to scour the country on the flanks; for -Romana, in his passage, had again raised the peasantry of all the -valleys. Loison also, with a division, entered the Val des Orres, -having orders to feign a movement towards Villa Franca and Puente -Ferrada, as if for the purpose of meeting a French column in that -direction. - -The 10th, Loison passed the Syl, and took post at the Puente de -Bibey. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The 12th, Franceschi, reinforced with a division of infantry, -arrived at Monte Furada on the Syl, and, sending a detachment to -Laronco, connected his division with Loison’s. The remainder of -the infantry followed this movement, and detachments were sent up -the course of the Syl, and towards Dancos, on the road from Villa -Franca to Lugo. Loison also forced the passage of the Puente de -Bibey, and drove the insurgents to Puebla de Tribes. The French -army thus cleared all the valleys opening on the course of the -Upper Minho, and Romana was confined to the lower part of that -river. - -The 13th, Franceschi, ascending the valley of the Bibey, took post -at Bollo and the bridge of the Hermitage, and then pushed his -patroles even to Gudina and Monterey on one side, and into the -Sierra de Porto on the other, as far as the sources of the Bibey, -with a view of ascertaining, first, the exact direction which -Romana would take to avoid Loison’s column; secondly, to prevent -the Spanish general from passing the left of the French army, and -gaining the Asturias by the route of Puebla de Senabria. These -precautions occupied the duke of Dalmatia till the 19th, when, -being assured that Romana had fallen back to Monterey, he judged -that the latter would attempt the same march towards Puebla de -Senabria, by which he had escaped after the action in the month -of March. The French army was therefore directed up the valley of -the Bibey, upon Viana, where there was a bridge, and where many of -the mountain roads united. The same day Franceschi fell in with -the head of Romana’s army, and repulsed it; and the evening of the -20th the whole of the French troops were concentrated near Viana, -intending to give battle to the Spaniards the next morning; but the -latter retreated precipitately during the night, and many of the -men dispersed. - -Soult continued his movement by the left until he reached the -great road running from Castile to Orense, and from thence, having -sent Heudelet’s division to Villa Vieja to threaten the Tras os -Montes frontier, and Mermet’s division and Lorge’s dragoons towards -La Canda to observe the road of Puebla de Senabria, he marched -himself, with an advanced guard, to La Gudina, leaving Laborde and -La Houssaye in reserve between Gudina and Villa Vieja. These divers -movements, through the rugged passes of Gallicia, led to a variety -of slight skirmishes, the most important of which took place at -the Puente de Bibey, a place of such prodigious strength that it -is scarcely conceivable how men, with arms, could be brought to -abandon such a post. - -Romana’s situation was now nearly hopeless, but he was saved by -a misunderstanding between the French marshals. It appears that -Ney, having marched from Coruña, entered St. Jago with about ten -thousand men, and Carrera fell back upon Ponte Vedra, where the -Conde de Noroña joined him with some fresh troops, and, assuming -the command, continued the retreat to the Octavem river, behind -which he took post, placing his main body at the bridge of San -Payo, and sending detachments to guard some secondary points. On -the 7th of June, the French came up. The Spaniards had thirteen -thousand men, two eighteen-pounders, and nine field-pieces. Of -these forces, seven thousand men armed, three thousand unarmed, and -the whole of the artillery, were in position to defend the passage -at San Payo; the bridge was cut, and overlooked by a battery of two -eighteen-pounders. Three thousand were in reserve at Redondela; -and, at Vigo, about sixty stragglers, from sir John Moore’s army, -were landed, and, in conjunction with a detachment of seamen and -marines, occupied the forts. Some Spanish gun-boats, one of which -was manned by English seamen, under captain Winter, also proceeded -up the river to the bridge of San Payo. - -During the 7th, a desultory and useless fire took place on both -sides; but, on the 8th, the French were repulsed in some feeble -attempts made to force a passage at San Payo and at Soto Mayor, -higher up the river, the loss on either side being about a hundred -men. These attacks were merely to keep the Spaniards employed until -the reports of the officers, sent by Ney to ascertain the situation -and projects of Soult’s army, were received, and, in the evening -of the 8th, those officers returned with information, obtained from -the peasants, that the second corps was retreating upon Castile. -I have been assured by persons, then on marshal Ney’s staff, that -he, amazed at these tidings, rashly concluded that Soult, swayed -by personal feelings, wished to endanger the sixth corps, and -filled with indignation, immediately retired to Coruña; while -Soult, on the other hand, viewed this retreat as a breach of their -engagements, and an underhand policy to oblige him to remain in -Gallicia. Certain it is that by these ebullitions of temper, both -Romana and Noroña were saved; for there was nothing to prevent Ney -from sending a column against Orense, whilst he himself occupied -Noroña, on the Octavem; and, however spirited the conduct of the -Spaniards was at San Payo, it would be ridiculous to imagine that -ten thousand of the best soldiers of France, led by an officer so -quick and resolute as Ney, could have been resisted by an equal -number of raw troops and peasants, one-third of whom were without -arms. But the history of the quarrel between these marshals is -involved in mystery, the clearing of which must be left to those -who shall write the memoirs of the men. For the purposes of this -history it is sufficient to know that there was ill-blood, and that -therein the Gallicians found safety. - -Soult, informed of Ney’s retreat and of sir Arthur Wellesley’s -arrival on the Tagus, ceased to pursue Romana, and marched to -Zamora, where his sick had been before sent, and where his brother, -general Soult, had conducted three or four thousand stragglers -and convalescents. Here, also, he requested the king to send the -artillery and stores necessary to re-equip the second corps; and -here he proposed to give his harassed troops some rest, for they -had now been for eight months incessantly marching and fighting, -and men and officers were alike dispirited by the privations they -had endured, and by the terrible nature of a war in which the most -horrid scenes were daily enacted. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -To put the king in possession of his views, Soult sent general -Franceschi to Madrid; but this celebrated officer, refusing an -escort, fell into the hands of the _Capuchino_. Being transferred -to Seville, the central junta, with infamous cruelty, treated -him as if he had been a criminal instead of a brave soldier, and -confined him in a dungeon at Carthagena. The citizens there, -ashamed of their government, endeavoured to effect his escape; but -he perished at the moment when his liberation was certain. When his -young wife, a daughter of count Mathieu Dumas, heard of his fate, -she refused all nourishment; and, in a few days, by her death, -added one more to the thousand instances of the strength of woman’s -affections. - -The 25th of June, Soult reached Puebla de Senabria. - -The 28th, he marched to Mombuey. - -The 29th and 30th, he crossed the Esla, by the bridges of San -Pelayo and Castro Gonzales. - -The 2d of July, he entered Zamora, having previously rejected a -proposition of Ney’s, that the two corps should jointly maintain -Gallicia, a rejection which induced the duke of Elchingen to -evacuate that province. - -[Illustration: _Plate 6. to face Pa. 326._ - - _Sketch Explanatory of - NEY & SOULT’S_, - OPERATIONS IN GALLICIA, - in June 1809. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - -To effect this, Ney formed a camp near Betanzos; and, on the 22d -of July, withdrew his garrisons from Coruña and Ferrol, having -previously destroyed all the stores and arsenals and disabled the -land defences. Nevertheless, his influence was still so powerful -that captain Hotham, commanding the English squadron, off Coruña, -seeing the hostile attitude maintained by the inhabitants, landed -his seamen on the 24th, and spiked the guns on the sea-line; and, -in like manner, compelled a Spanish garrison, left by Ney in the -forts of Ferrol, to surrender on the 26th. The marshal, however, -marched, unmolested, by the high road to Astorga, where he arrived -on the 30th, having brought off all his own sick and those of the -second corps also, who had been left in Lugo. Thus Gallicia was -finally delivered. - -This important event has been erroneously attributed to the -exertions of the Spaniards. Those exertions were creditable to the -Gallicians, although the most powerful motive of action was to -protect their personal property; and, when the French withdrew, -this same motive led them to repair their losses by resisting the -payment of tithes and rents, a compensation by no means relished by -the proprietors or the church. But it is certain that their efforts -were only secondary causes in themselves, and chiefly supported -by the aid of England, whose ships, and arms, and stores were -constantly on the coast. - -[Sidenote: Intercepted Despatches, Parl. Pap. 1810.] - -How can the operations of the Spaniards be said to have driven the -sixth corps from Gallicia, when Ney retained every important post -in that province to the last; when single divisions of his army, -at two different periods, traversed the country, from Coruña to -Tuy, without let or hindrance; and when the Spaniards could not -prevent him from over-running the Asturias without losing his -hold of Gallicia? It is true, Soult, writing to Joseph, affirmed -that the Gallicians would wear out the strongest army; that is, if -a wrong system was pursued by the French, but he pointed out the -right method of subduing them, namely, in pursuance of Napoleon’s -views, to fortify some principal central points, from whence the -moveable columns could overrun the country; and this, he estimated, -would only require fifty thousand pounds and six weeks’ labour. -It is plain the real causes of the deliverance were--First, The -quarrels between the marshals, which saved Romana and Noroña from -destruction.--Secondly, The movements of sir Arthur Wellesley on -the Tagus; for, in an intercepted letter from Soult to Joseph, that -marshal expressly assigns the danger hanging over Madrid and the -first corps as the reason of his refusing to remain in Gallicia. -Now, although Soult’s views were undoubtedly just, and his march -provident, the latter necessarily drew after it the evacuation of -Gallicia; because, it would have been absurd to keep the sixth -corps cooped up in that corner of the Peninsula, deprived of -communication, and estranged from the general operations. - -The movement of the second corps, after quitting Monforte, -being along the edge of the Portuguese frontier, and constantly -threatening the northern provinces, drew marshal Beresford, as -I have before stated, from Castello Branco; and all the regular -Portuguese forces capable of taking the field were immediately -collected by him round Almeida. The duke del Parque was at Ciudad -Rodrigo; and as that part of Romana’s force, which had been cut off -by Soult’s movement upon Gudina, fell back upon Ciudad Rodrigo, -not less than twenty-five thousand men, Portuguese and Spaniards, -were assembled, or assembling, round those two fortresses: and -the change of situation thus brought about in the armies on the -northern line was rendered more important by the events which -were simultaneously taking place in other parts, especially in -Aragon, where general Blake, whose army had been augmented to more -than twenty thousand men, inflated with his success at Alcanitz, -advanced to Ixar and Samper. - -Suchet, himself, remained close to Zaragoza, but kept a detachment, -under general Faber, at Longares and Villa Muel, near the mountains -on the side of Daroca. Blake, hoping to cut off this detachment, -marched, himself, through Carineña, and sent general Arisaga, with -a column, to Bottorita; the latter captured a convoy of provisions -on the Huerba; but Faber retired to Plasencia, on the Xalon. - -The 14th of June, the advanced guards skirmished at Bottorita; and -Blake, endeavouring to surround the enemy, pushed a detachment to -Maria, in the plain of Zaragoza. - -The excitement produced in that city, and in Aragon generally, by -this march, was so great, that Suchet doubted if he should not -abandon Zaragoza, and return towards Navarre. The peasantry had -assembled on many points in the mountains around, and it required -great vigilance to keep down the spirit of insurrection in the city -itself. The importance of that place, however, made him resolve -to fight a battle, for which the near approach of Blake, who came -on in the full confidence that the French general would retreat, -furnished an opportunity which was not neglected. - - -BATTLE OF MARIA. - -The 14th, after some skirmishing, the Spanish army was concentrated -at Bottorita. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -The 15th, Blake slowly and unskilfully formed his troops in order -of battle, near the village of Maria, and perpendicular to the -Huerba, of which he occupied both banks. Towards two o’clock in -the day, he extended his left wing to outflank the right of the -French; but Suchet, who had just then been rejoined by Faber, and -by a brigade from Tudela, immediately stopped this evolution, -by attacking the wing with some cavalry and light troops. The -Spaniards then fell back to their line of battle; and Blake, -drawing men from his right to reinforce his centre and left, was -immediately engaged in a severe conflict. He repulsed the foremost -of the enemy’s columns; but so violent a storm arose at the moment, -that neither army could see the other, although close together, -and the action ceased for a time. Blake’s position was so ill -chosen, that he was surrounded by ravines, and had only one line -of retreat, by the bridge of Maria, which was on the extremity of -his right flank. Suchet, observing this error, when the storm had -cleared off a little, briskly engaged the centre and left of the -Spaniards, and forming his cavalry and two regiments of infantry -in column, by one vigorous effort broke quite through the Spanish -horse, and seized the bridge of Maria. Notwithstanding this, Blake, -who was at all times intrepid, collected the infantry of his centre -and left wing in a mass, and stood for the victory; but the French -troops overthrew his with a great slaughter. A general, twenty-five -guns, and many stands of colours were taken; yet few prisoners, -for the darkness enabled the dispersed Spaniards to escape by the -ravines; and Blake rallied them the next day at Bottorita. The -French lost nearly a thousand men, and general Harispé was wounded. - -During this action, a French brigade held the position of Monte -Torrero, without mixing in the fight, lest the citizens of -Zaragoza, being released from their presence, should rise against -the garrison; but after the victory, this brigade marched down the -Ebro to cut off Blake’s retreat. General Laval, who commanded it, -did not, however, execute his orders; and the Spanish army retired -on the night of the 16th. - -The 17th, the rear guard suffered some loss at Torrecilla; and on -the 18th, the two armies were again in presence at Belchite. Blake, -reinforced by some detachments, was about fourteen thousand strong; -but he had lost the greatest part of his artillery, and his men -were dispirited. Suchet, on the contrary, having by the success at -Maria awed the Aragonese, was able to bring twenty-two battalions -and seven squadrons, or about fifteen thousand men, flushed with -victory, into action. - - -BATTLE OF BELCHITE. - -[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.] - -[Sidenote: Blake’s Despatch.] - -The Spaniards were drawn up on a range of hills half enclosing -the town; their right, resting on a hermitage and some buildings, -was inaccessible to cavalry; the left was also well covered; and -behind the right, a hill with a building on it, overtopping all the -position and occupied by a reserve, served as a rallying point, -because there was an easy line of communication between it and the -left wing. The centre, being on rough ground containing the town of -Belchite which had a wall and gates, was also very strong; and the -whole position was so compact, that Blake, after completely filling -his line, had yet a considerable reserve in hand. His dispositions -were made to fight by his centre and right, his left being rather -in the nature of an advanced post. - -A French battalion commenced the action, by skirmishing with the -Spanish centre; but, at the same time, two columns of attack -marched, the one against the right, the other against the left. -The latter, which was the principal one, preceded by a fire of -artillery, soon closed upon the Spanish troops, and Blake’s guns -opened from his centre and right; but an ammunition-waggon blowing -up was the signal for a panic, which, commencing on the left, -reached to all parts of the line. The Spanish general then made a -charge of cavalry, to retrieve the day, but it was easily repulsed, -and the confusion that followed is thus described by himself:--“One -regiment fled without firing a shot; it was followed by another, -and a third, all flying without having discharged a gun; and, in -a few moments, the whole position was abandoned.”--“Thus we, the -generals and officers, were left alone, without being able to rally -a body which could make any opposition; and I had the mortification -to see our army dispersed, abandoning all its baggage, and throwing -away its arms, and even its clothes, before a single corps of the -enemy; nor were we able to avail ourselves of the defence of any -strong place, as it was impossible to collect two hundred men to -make head against the enemy.” - -Blake, although a bad general, was a man of real courage: stung -to the quick by this disgrace, he reproached his troops with -bitterness, demanded an inquiry into his own conduct, and, with -a strong and sincere feeling of honour, restored to the junta -the estate which had been conferred upon him for the success at -Alcanitz. - -This battle and the pursuit, in which Suchet took about four -thousand prisoners, and all the artillery, ammunition, and baggage -of the Spaniards, not only made him master of the operations in -Aragon, but also rendered the fifth corps, under Mortier, who were -now at Valladolid, completely disposable for offensive operations. -Thus, on the 1st of July, there were, exclusive of Kellerman’s and -Bonnet’s divisions, three complete _corps d’armée_, furnishing six -thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry, collected between -Astorga, Zamora, and Valladolid. The inroad on Portugal had failed, -and the loss of Gallicia followed; but Napoleon’s admirable system -of invasion was unbroken. His troops, deprived of his presiding -genius, had been stricken severely and shrunk from further -aggression; they had been too widely spread for a secure grasp, but -the reaction disclosed all the innate strength of his arrangements. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -The British army remained in the camp of Abrantes until the latter -end of June. During this period, sir Arthur Wellesley, although -burning to enter Spain, was kept back by a variety of difficulties. - -He had been reinforced with five thousand men immediately after -his return from the Douro; and, in the preceding operations, the -killed and hurt in battle did not exceed three hundred men, but the -deaths by sickness were numerous. Four thousand men in hospital, -and fifteen hundred employed in escort and depôt duties, being -deducted, the gross amount of the present under arms, as late -even as the 25th of June, did not exceed twenty-two thousand men; -and these were, at any moment, liable to be seriously diminished, -because the ministers, still intent upon Cadiz, had authorized -Mr. Frere, whenever the junta should consent to the measure, to -draw a garrison for that town from sir Arthur’s force. As an army, -therefore, it was weak in every thing but spirit. The commissariat -was without sufficient means of transport; the soldiers nearly -barefooted, and totally without pay; the military chest was empty, -and the hospitals were full. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16.] - -[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -The expense, at a low estimation, was about two hundred thousand -pounds a month, and, with the most strenuous exertions, a hundred -and sixty thousand pounds only had been procured in the two months -of May and June; and of this, thirteen thousand had been obtained -as a temporary loan in Oporto. The rate of exchange in Lisbon -was high, and, notwithstanding the increased value given to the -government paper by the successes on the Douro, this rate was daily -rising. The Spanish dollar was at five shillings, while Spanish -gold sunk so much in value that the commissary-general sent all -that he received from England, or could collect in Lisbon, to -Cadiz, and other parts, to truck for dollars; but, in all places -of commerce, the exchange was rising against England, a natural -consequence of her enormous and increasing issues of paper. Those -issues, the extravagant succours given to Spain, together with -subsidies to Austria, made it impossible to supply the army in -Portugal with specie, otherwise than by raising cash, in every -quarter of the globe, on treasury-bills, and at a most enormous -loss; an evil great in itself, opening a wide door to fraud and -villany, and rendered the war between France and England not so -much a glorious contest of arms as a struggle between public credit -and military force, in which even victory was sure to be fatal to -the former. - -The want of money, sickness, Cuesta’s impracticable temper, and -a variety of minor difficulties, too tedious to mention, kept -the army in a state of inactivity until the end of June; but, -at that period, the retreat of the first corps from Torremocha, -and the consequent advance of Cuesta, removed one obstacle to -offensive operations, and sir Arthur, having the certainty that -eight thousand additional troops were off the rock of Lisbon, then -commenced his march into Spain by the northern banks of the Tagus, -meaning to unite with Cuesta on the Tietar, and to arrange, if -possible, a plan of operations against Madrid. - -But, before I embark on the full and broad stream into which -the surges and eddies of the complicated warfare that succeeded -Napoleon’s departure from the Peninsula settled, I must give -a general view of the state of affairs, that the reader, -comprehending exactly what strength each party brought to the -encounter, may judge more truly of the result. - - -FRENCH POWER. - - Men. Horses. - The French, having received some reinforcements - of conscripts, amounted, in the beginning - of July, including the king’s guards, - to about 275,000 - In hospital 61,000 } - Stragglers and prisoners borne on } 68,000 - the states 7,000 } - ------- - Total under arms 207,000 36,000 - The military governments, lines of correspondence, - garrisons, and detachments, absorbed 32,000 3,000 - ------- ------- - _Present under arms_ with the _corps d’armée_ 175,000 33,000 - - -The actual strength and situation of each _corps d’armée_ was as -follows:-- - -[Sidenote: Muster roll of the French Army, MSS.] - - _Under the King, covering Madrid._ - - Inf. & Art. Cavalry. - First corps, in the valley of the Tagus 20,881 4,200 - Fourth corps, La Mancha 17,490 3,200 - Division of Dessolles, Madrid 6,864 - King’s French guards, Madrid, about 4,000 1,500 - ------ ------ - Total 49,235 8,900 - ------ ------ - - _In Old Castile, under Marshal Soult._ - - Inf. & Art. Cavalry. - Second corps, Zamora, Tora, and Salamanca 17,707 2,883 - Fifth corps, Valladolid 16,042 874 - Sixth corps, Astorga, and its vicinity 14,913 1,446 - ------ ------ - Total 48,662 5,203 - ------ ------ - - _In Aragon, under General Suchet._ - - Inf. & Art. Cavalry. - Third corps, Zaragoza, Alcanitz, &c. 15,226 2,604 - ------ ------ - - _In Catalonia, under Marshal Augereau._ - - Inf. & Art. Cavalry. - Seventh corps, Vich, Gerona, and Barcelona 30,593 2,500 - ------ ------ - -In addition to these corps there were twelve hundred men belonging -to the battering train, four thousand infantry under Bonnet, at St. -Andero, and two thousand two hundred cavalry under Kellerman, in -the Valladolid country. - -The fortresses and armed places in possession of the French army -were--St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, Bilbao, Santona, St. Andero, -Burgos, Leon, Astorga, on the northern line; - -Jacca, Zaragoza, Guadalaxara, Toledo, Segovia, and Zamora, on the -central line; - -Figueras, Rosas, and Barcelona, on the southern line. - -It needs but a glance at these dispositions and numbers to -understand with what a power Napoleon had fastened upon the -Peninsula, during his six weeks’ campaign. Much had been lost since -his departure, but his army still pressed the Spaniards down, and, -like a stone cast upon a brood of snakes, was immoveable to their -writhings. Nevertheless, the situation of Spain, at this epoch, was -an ameliorated one compared to that which, four months before, the -vehemence of Napoleon’s personal warfare had reduced it to. The -elements of resistance were again accumulated in masses, and the -hope, or rather confidence, of success was again in full vigour; -for, it was in the character of this people, while grovelling on -the earth, to suppose themselves standing firm; and, when creeping -in the gloom of defeat, to imagine they were soaring in the full -blaze of victory. - -The momentary cessation of offensive operations on the part of the -French, instead of being traced to its true sources, the personal -jealousies of the marshals, and the king’s want of vigour, was, -as usual, attributed, first--to fear and weakness; secondly--to -the pressure of the Austrian war. It was not considered that the -want of unity, checking the course of conquest, would cease when -the French army was driven to the defensive; neither was the might -of France duly weighed, while the strength of Austria was unduly -exalted. The disasters at Ucles, at Almaraz, at Zaragoza, Rosas, -Cardadeu, Valls, at Ciudad Real, Medellin, Braga, and Oporto, and -in the Asturias, were all forgotten. The French had been repulsed -from Portugal, and they had not taken Seville. This, to the -Spaniards, was sufficient evidence of their weakness; and, when the -French were supposed to be weak, the others, by a curious reasoning -process, always came to the conclusion that they were themselves -strong. Hence, the fore-boasting at this period was little inferior -to what it had been after the battle of Baylen; and the statement -of the relative numbers was almost as absurd. The utmost amount -of the French force was not calculated higher than a hundred and -fifteen, or a hundred and twenty, thousand men, of which about -fifty thousand were supposed to be on the French side of the Ebro, -and the whole only waiting for an excuse to abandon the Peninsula. - - -SPANISH POWER. - -The Spanish armies, on paper, were, as usual, numerous; and the -real amount of the regular force was certainly considerable, -although very inadequate to the exigencies or the resources of the -country. Before the battle of Belchite had broken Blake’s strength, -there were, organized and under arms, twelve thousand cavalry, -and about one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, exclusive -of irregular bands and armed peasantry, who were available for -particular defensive operations. After that defeat the number of -regular forces, capable of taking the field in the south-eastern -provinces, was not above twenty thousand men, of which about ten -thousand, under Coupigny, were watching Barcelona, or, again, -rallying under Blake; the remainder were in Valencia, where Caro, -Romana’s brother, had taken the command. - -In the north-western provinces there were about twenty-five -thousand men, of which fifteen thousand were in Gallicia; some -thousands in the Asturias, under Voster and Ballasteros, and the -remainder, under the duke del Parque, who was directed to organize -a new army in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. - -In Andalusia, or covering it, there were about seventy thousand -men. Of these twenty-three thousand infantry, and two thousand five -hundred cavalry, were assembled in the Morena, near St. Elena and -Carolina, under the command of general Venegas; and thirty-eight -thousand, including seven thousand cavalry, were in Estremadura, -under the orders of Cuesta, who was nominally commander-in-chief of -both armies. - -The troops, thus divided into three grand divisions, were called -the armies of _the right_, _the centre_, _the left_. The fortresses -were--Gerona, Hostalrich, Lerida, Maquinenza, Tarragona, Tortosa, -Valencia, Carthegena, and Alicant, for the army of the right; Cadiz -and Badajos for that of the centre; Ciudad Rodrigo, Coruña, and -Ferrol, for the army of the left. - -The Spanish troops were, however, far from being serviceable, in -proportion to their numbers; most of them were new levies, and -the rest were ill-trained. The generals had lost nothing of their -presumption, learnt nothing of war, and their mutual jealousies -were as strong as ever. Cuesta still hating the junta, was feared -and hated by that body in return; and Venegas was placed at the -head of the Carolina army as a counterpoise to him. Romana, also, -was obnoxious to the junta; and, in return, with more reason, the -junta was despised and disliked by him. In Valencia and Murcia -generals and juntas appeared alike indifferent to the public -welfare, and satisfied if the war was kept from their own doors. In -Catalonia there never was any unanimity. - -Blake, who had abandoned Romana in Gallicia, and who was still at -enmity with Cuesta, had been, for these very reasons, invested with -supreme power in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia; and, moreover, -there were factions and bickerings among the inferior officers -in the armies of Venegas and Cuesta. Albuquerque was ambitious -of commanding in chief, and Mr. Frere warmly intrigued in his -cause, for that gentleman still laboured under the delusion that -he was appointed to direct the military instead of conducting the -political service in the Peninsula. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.] - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 8.] - -In April, he had proposed to the junta that a force of five -thousand cavalry and some infantry, taken from the armies of -Cuesta and Venegas, should, under the command of the duke of -Albuquerque, commence offensive operations in La Mancha; this, he -said, would, “_if the enemy refused to take notice of it_,” become -“a very serious and perhaps a decisive movement;” and he was so -earnest that, without communicating upon the subject with sir -Arthur Wellesley, without waiting for the result of the operations -against Soult, he pretended to the junta that the co-operation of -the English army with Cuesta (that co-operation which it was sir -Arthur’s most anxious wish to bring about) could only be obtained, -as the price of the Spanish government’s acceding to his own -proposal. The plenipotentiary’s greatest efforts were, however, -directed to procure the appointment of Albuquerque to the command -of an army; but that nobleman was under the orders of Cuesta, who -was not willing to part with him, and, moreover, Frere wished to -displace Venegas, not that any fault was attributed to the latter, -but merely to make way for Albuquerque; a scheme so indecorous that -both the junta and Cuesta peremptorily rejected it. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.] - -Mr. Frere did not hesitate to attribute this rejection to a mean -jealousy of Albuquerque’s high birth and talents; but the junta had -sufficient reason for their conduct, not only on this occasion, -but afterwards, when they refused to give him any independent -command. The duke, although a brave and patriotic and even an able -soldier, was the dupe of a woman who corresponded with the French. -The junta, in the fear of offending him, forbore to punish her, at -first, yet, finally, they were obliged to shut her up, and they -could not entrust him with a command while her dangerous influence -lasted. Hence, Mr. Frere’s intrigue failed to serve Albuquerque, -and his military project for La Mancha fell to the ground, when -sir Arthur Wellesley, unable to perceive its advantages, strongly -advised the junta, not to weaken but to reinforce Cuesta’s army; -not to meddle with the French either in La Mancha or Estremadura, -but to preserve a strict defensive in all quarters. - -The _supreme junta_ was itself in fear of the old _junta of -Seville_, and the folly and arrogance of the first and its neglect -of the public weal furnished ample grounds of attack, as a slight -sketch of its administrative proceedings will suffice to prove. -The king, after the battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, had, -through the medium of don Joachim Sotelo, a Spanish minister in his -service, made an attempt to negotiate for the submission of the -junta, which was spurned at by the latter, in suitable terms, for -dignified sentiments and lofty expressions were never wanting to -the Spanish, although, taken with their deeds, they were but as a -strong wind and a few shrivelled leaves. - -The junta did not fail to make the nation observe their patriotism -upon this occasion, and, indeed, took every opportunity to praise -their own proceedings. Nevertheless, men were not wanting in Spain -most anxious, not only to check the actual abuses of power, but -to lay bare all the ancient oppressions of the country, and recur -to first principles, both for present reform and future permanent -good government; in short, to make public avowal of the misrule -which had led to their misfortunes, and, if possible, to amend -it. Knowing that although national independence may co-exist with -tyranny, it is inseparable from civil and religious freedom,--they -desired to assemble the cortez, and to give the people an earnest -that national independence was worth having; to convince them that -their sufferings and their exertions would lead to a sensible good, -instead of a mere choice between an old and a new despotism; and -this party was powerful enough to have a manifesto to their purpose -drawn up by the junta, and it would have been published, if the -English ministers had not interposed; for, as I have before said, -their object was not Spain, but Napoleon. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, printed 1810.] - -Mr. Frere vigorously opposed the promulgation of this manifesto, -and not ambiguously hinted that the displeasure of England, and -the wrath of the partizans of despotism in Spain, would be vented -on the junta, if any such approach to real liberty was made. In -his despatches to his cabinet he wrote that, from his knowledge -of the members of the junta, he felt assured they would “_shrink -from the idea of giving permanent effect to the measures which -they held out_;” and this expression he meant in their praise! but -still he thought it necessary to check the tendency to freedom in -the outset; and it would be injustice not to give his sentiments -in his own words, sentiments which were at this time perfectly -agreeable to his immediate superior, Mr. Canning, but offering a -curious contrast to the political liberality which that politician -afterwards thought it his interest to affect. - -Writing as a Spaniard, Mr. Frere thus addressed don Martin Garay:-- - -[Sidenote: Papers laid before Parliament, 1810.] - -“If we have indeed passed three centuries under an arbitrary -government, let us not forget that it is a price which we pay for -having conquered and peopled the fairest portion of the globe; -that the integrity of this immense power rests solely on these -two words, religion and the king. If the old constitution has been -lost by the conquest of America, our first object should be to -recover it, but in such a manner as not to lose what has cost us so -much in the acquisition. From this consideration, it appears to me -that we ought to avoid, as _political poison, any annunciation of -general principles, the application of which it would be impossible -to limit or qualify, even when the negroes and Indians should -quote them in favour of themselves_. But let us allow that we have -made a _bad exchange in bartering our ancient national liberty -for the glory and extension of the Spanish name_. Let us allow -that the nation has been deceived for three centuries, and that -this error should, at all hazards, be immediately done away. Even -though it were so, it does not appear _very becoming the character -of a well educated person to pass censures upon the conduct of -his forefathers_, or to complain of what he has lost by their -negligence or prodigality; and still less so, if it is done in the -face of all the world: and what shall we say of a nation who should -do this publicly, and after mature deliberation?” - -The manifesto was suppressed, a new one more consonant to Mr. -Frere’s notions was published, and a promise to convoke the cortez -given, but without naming any specific time for that event. The -junta, who, as Mr. Frere truly stated, were not at all disposed -to give any effect to free institutions, now proceeded to prop -up their own tottering power by severity: they had, previous to -the manifesto, issued a menacing proclamation, in which they -endeavoured to confound their political opponents with the spies -and tools of the French; and having before established a tribunal -of public security, they caused it to publish an edict, in which -all men, who endeavoured to raise distrust of the junta, or who -tried to overturn the government, by popular commotions, or other -means that had, by the junta, been reprobated, were declared -guilty of high treason, undeserving the name of Spaniards and -sold to Napoleon, their punishment to be death, and confiscation -of property. Any person propagating rumours, tending to weaken or -soften the hatred of the people against the French, was instantly -to be arrested and punished without remission; lastly, rewards were -offered for secret information upon these heads. - -This decree was not a dead letter. Many persons were seized, -imprisoned, and executed, without trial, or knowing their accusers. -But the deepest stain upon the Spanish character, at this period, -was the treatment experienced by prisoners of war. Thousands, and -amongst them part of Dupont’s troops, who were only prisoners by -a breach of faith, were sent to the Balearic Isles, but no order -was taken for their subsistence. When remonstrated with, the junta -cast seven thousand ashore on the little desert rock of Cabrera. -At Majorca, numbers had been massacred by the inhabitants, in the -most cowardly and brutal manner, but those left on Cabrera suffered -miseries that can scarcely be described. The supply of food, always -scanty, was often neglected altogether: there was but one spring -on the rock, which dried up in summer; clothes were never given -to them except by the English seamen, who, compassionating their -sufferings, often assisted them, in passing the island. Thus, -afflicted with hunger, thirst, and nakedness, they lived like -wild beasts while they could live, but perished in such numbers, -that less than two thousand remained to tell the tale of this -inhumanity; and surely, it was no slight disgrace that the English -government failed to interfere on such an occasion. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] - -[Sidenote: Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence.] - -[Sidenote: General Miller’s Memoirs.] - -But what were the efforts made for the defence of the country -by this inhuman junta, which, having been originally assembled -to discuss the form of establishing a central government, had, -unlawfully, retained their delegated power, and used it so -shamefully? There was a Spanish fleet, and a sufficient number -of sailors to man it, in Carthagena. There was another fleet, -and abundance of seamen, in Cadiz. Lord Collingwood, and others, -pressed the junta, constantly and earnestly, to fit these vessels -out, and to make use of them, or at least to place them beyond the -reach of the enemy. His remonstrances were unheeded; the sailors -were rendered mutinous for want of pay, and even of subsistence, -and the government would neither fit out ships themselves, nor -suffer the English seamen to do it for them; and at the very period -when the marquis of Romana and the insurgents in Gallicia were -praying for a few stands of arms and five thousand pounds, from -sir John Cradock, the junta possessed many millions of money, and -their magazines, in Cadiz, were unable to contain the continually -increasing quantity of stores and arms arriving from England, which -were left to rot as they arrived, while, from every quarter of the -country not yet subdued, the demand for these things was incessant. - -The fleet in Cadiz harbour might have been at sea in the beginning -of February. In a week it might have been at Vigo, with money and -succours of all kinds for the insurgents in Gallicia; after which, -by skilful operations along the coast from Vigo to St. Sebastian, -it might have occupied an enormous French force on that line of -country. But instead of a fleet, the junta sent colonel Barios, an -obscure person, to steal through by-ways, and to take the command -of men who were not in want of leaders. In the same manner, the -fleet in Carthagena might have been employed on the Catalonian and -French coasts; but, far from using their means, which were really -enormous, with energy and judgement, the junta carried on the -war by encouraging virulent publications against the French, and -confined their real exertions to the assembling of the unfortunate -peasants in masses, to starve for a while, and then to be cut to -pieces by their more experienced opponents. - -The system of false reports, also, was persevered in without any -relaxation: the French were beaten on all points; the marshals -were slain or taken; their soldiers were deserting, or flying -in terror at the sight of a Spaniard; Joseph had plundered and -abandoned Madrid; and Zaragoza had not fallen. Castro, the envoy -to the Portuguese regency, so late as April, anxiously endeavoured -to persuade that government and the English general, that Zaragoza -had never been subdued, and that the story of its fall was a French -falsehood. In June, official letters were written to marshal -Beresford, from the neighbourhood of Lugo, dated the very day upon -which Soult’s army relieved that town, not to give intelligence -of the event, but to announce the utter defeat of that marshal, -and the capture of Lugo itself; the amount of the killed and -wounded, and the prisoners taken, being very exactly stated; and -this, with such an appearance of truth, as to deceive Beresford, -notwithstanding his previous experience of the people he had to -deal with. - -But the proofs of corruption and incapacity in the junta are -innumerable, and not confined to the records of events kept by -British officers. Romana, a few months later, upon the question of -appointing a regency, thus describes their conduct: “He himself,” -he said, “had doubted if the central junta was a lawful government, -and this doubt was general in the provinces through which he had -passed; yet he had, to preserve the nation from anarchy, not only -yielded obedience to it, but he had, likewise, forced the provinces -of Gallicia, Leon, and Asturias to do the same; because he thought -that an illegal government might be useful if it deserved the -confidence of the people, and that they respected its authority. -The central junta, however, was not thus situated: the people, -judging of measures by their effects, complained that the armies -were weak, the government without energy; that there were no -supplies; that the promised accounts of the public expenditure -were withheld; and yet, all the sums drawn from America, all the -succours granted by England, the rents of the crown, and the -voluntary contributions were expended. The public employments were -not given to men of merit and true lovers of their country. Some -of the members of the junta rendered their power subservient to -their own advantage; others conferred lucrative appointments on -their relations and dependents. Ecclesiastical offices had been -filled up to enable individuals to seize those rents for themselves -which ought to be appropriated for the public service. There was no -unity to be found: many of the junta cared only for the interest -of their particular province, as if they were not members of the -Spanish monarchy; confirming the appointments of the local juntas, -without regard to fitness; and even assigning recompenses to men -destitute of military knowledge, who had neither seen service nor -performed the duties assigned to them.” - -“The junta, divided into sections, undertook to manage affairs -in which they were unversed, and which were altogether foreign -to their professions. Horses, taken from their owners under -pretence of supplying the armies, were left to die of hunger -in the sea-marshes: and, finally, many important branches of -administration were in the hands of men, suspected, both from their -own conduct and from their having been creatures of that infamous -favourite who was the author of the general misery.” - -It was at this period that the celebrated _Partidas_ first -commenced the _guerilla_, or petty warfare, which has been so -lauded, as if that had been the cause of Napoleon’s discomfiture. -Those bands were infinitely numerous, because, every robber, that -feared a jail, or that could break from one; every smuggler,[8] -whose trade had been interrupted; every friar, disliking the -trammels of his convent; and every idler, that wished to avoid -the ranks of the regular army, was to be found either as chief or -associate in the _partidas_. - -The French, although harassed by the constant and cruel murders of -isolated soldiers, or followers of the army, and sometimes by the -loss of convoys, were never thwarted in any great object by these -bands; but the necessity of providing subsistence, and attaching -his followers to his fortunes, generally obliged the guerilla chief -to rob his countrymen; and, indeed, one of the principal causes -of the sudden growth of this system was the hope of intercepting -the public and private plate, which, under a decree of Joseph, was -bringing in from all parts to be coined in Madrid; for that monarch -was obliged to have recourse to forced loans, and the property of -the proscribed nobles, and suppressed convents, to maintain even -the appearance of a court. - -This description will apply to the mass of the _partidas_; but -there were certainly some who were actuated by nobler motives; -by revenge; by a gallant enterprising spirit; or, by an honest -ambition, thinking to serve their country better than by joining -the regular forces. Among the principal chiefs may be placed, -Renovales, and the two Minas, in Navarre and Arragon; Porlier -named the _marquisetto_, and Longa, in the Asturias and Biscay; -Juan Martin, or _El Empecinado_, who vexed the neighbourhood of -Madrid; Julian Sanchez, in the Gata and Salamanca country; doctor -Rovera, Pereña, and some others, in Catalonia; Juan Paladea, or -_El Medico_, between the Moreno and Toledo; the curate Merino, _El -Principe_, and Saornil, in Castile; the friar Sapia, in Soria, and -Juan Abril, near Segovia. - -But these men were of very different merit. Renovales, a regular -officer, raised the peasantry of the valleys between Pampeluna -and Zaragoza, after the fall of the latter city; but he was soon -subdued. Juan Martin, Rovera, Julian Sanchez, and the student Mina, -discovered most military talent, and Sanchez was certainly a very -bold and honest man; but Espoz y Mina, the uncle and successor of -the student, far outstripped his contemporaries in fame. He shed -the blood of his prisoners freely, but rather from false principle, -and under peculiar circumstances, than from any real ferocity, -his natural disposition being manly and generous; and, although -not possessed of any peculiar military genius, he had a sound -judgement, surprising energy, and a constant spirit. - -By birth a peasant, he despised the higher orders of his own -country, and never would suffer any _hidalgo_, or gentleman, to -join his band. From 1809, until the end of the war, he maintained -himself in the provinces bordering on the Ebro; often defeated, -and chased from place to place, he gradually increased his forces; -until, in 1812, he yet was at the head of more than ten thousand -men, whom he paid regularly, and supplied from resources chiefly -created by himself; one of which was remarkable:--He established -a treaty with the French generals, by which articles, not being -warlike stores, coming from France, had safe conduct from his -_partida_, on paying a duty, which Mina appropriated to the -subsistence of his followers. - -That the guerilla system could never seriously affect the progress -of the French, is proved by the fact, that the constant aim of the -principal chiefs was to introduce the customs of regular troops; -and their success against the enemy was proportionate to their -progress in discipline and organization. There were not less than -fifty thousand of these irregular soldiers, at one time, in Spain; -and so severely did they press upon the country that it may be -assumed as a truth that if the English army had abandoned the -contest, one of the surest means by which the French could have -gained the good will of the nation would have been the extirpating -of the _partidas_. Nevertheless, one great and unquestionable -advantage was derived by the regular armies, and especially by the -British, from the existence of these bands. The French corps could -never communicate with each other, nor combine their movements, -except by the slow method of sending officers with strong escorts; -whereas, their adversaries could correspond by post, and even by -telegraph, an advantage equal to a reinforcement of thirty thousand -men. - - -PORTUGUESE POWER. - -The Portuguese military system has been already explained. The -ranks of the regular army, and of the militia, were filling; the -arms and equipments were supplied by England; and means were taking -to give effect to the authority of the _captans mor_, or chiefs -of districts, under whom the _ordenanzas_ were to be gathered -for the defence of the country. The people having been a second -time relieved from an invasion, by the intervention of a British -army, were disposed to submit implicitly to the guidance of their -deliverers; but the effect of former misgovernment pervaded every -branch of administration, political and municipal, and impeded -the efforts made to draw forth the military resources of the -kingdom. It is a curious fact that, not only at this period, but -until the end of the war, such was the reluctance of the people to -become soldiers, that, notwithstanding their undoubted hatred of -the French, their natural docility, and the visible superiority -of the soldiers’ condition over that of the peasant or artisan, -the recruiting was always difficult; and the odious spectacle was -constantly exhibited, of men marched in chains, to reinforce -armies, which were fighting in what was a popular, and ought to -have been a sacred cause. - -The actual number of regular troops, armed and organized, was not -above fifteen thousand, and, notwithstanding the courage displayed -by those employed in the late operations, marshal Beresford -was doubtful of their military qualities, and reluctant to act -separately from the British troops. The most important fortresses -in a condition for defence were Elvas, Albuquerque, and Almeida, in -the first line; Abrantes and Peniché, in the second; the citadel, -and forts of Lisbon and Palmela, in the third. But there were many -other walled places, capable, if armed, of standing a siege, and -presenting a variety of strong points for the irregular force of -the country to assemble upon; and hence, Portugal offered, not -only great resources in men, but a base of operations solid in -itself; central with respect to the French armies, and enabling the -English general to act, without reference to the Spanish government -or Spanish commanders; an advantage more justly appreciated at -the end of the campaign than at the commencement. Such were the -relative situations of the contending hosts in the Peninsula; -yet, to take an enlarged view of affairs, it is necessary to look -beyond the actual field of battle; for the contest in Spain, no -longer isolated, was become an integral part of the great European -struggle against France. - -Napoleon, after his first successes near Ratisbon, entered Vienna, -and attempted to carry the war to the left bank of the Danube; -but a severe check, received at the battle of Esling on the 21st -of May, so shook his moral ascendancy in Europe, that he deemed -it necessary to concentrate all the disposable strength of his -empire for one gigantic effort, which should restore the terror of -his name. The appearance of inactivity assumed by him, while thus -mightily gathering his forces, deceived his enemies; and, as their -hopes rose, their boasts became extravagant, more especially in -England, where, to express a doubt of his immediate overthrow was -regarded as a heinous offence; and where the government, buoyed -up with foolish expectations, thought less of supporting a noble -and effectual warfare in Portugal than of nourishing and aiding -the secondary and rather degrading hostility of conspirators, -malcontents, and military adventurers in Germany. - -[Sidenote: Adjutant-general’s Returns.] - -While sir Arthur Wellesley was waiting impatiently on the Tagus -for the scanty reinforcements afforded him, two other armies were -simultaneously preparing to act against the extremities of the -French empire; the one, consisting of about twelve thousand men, -drawn from Sicily, was destined to invade Italy, the southern parts -of which had been denuded of troops to oppose the Austrians on -the Tagliamento. The other was assembled on the coast of England, -where above forty thousand of the finest troops the nation could -boast of, and a fleet of power to overthrow all the other navies -of the world combined, composed an armament, intended to destroy -the great marine establishment which the French emperor had so -suddenly and so portentously created at Antwerp. So vast an -expedition had never before left the British shores; neither any -one so meanly conceived, so improvidently arranged, so calamitously -conducted, for the marine and land forces, combined, numbered more -than eighty thousand fighting men, and those of the bravest; yet -the object in view was comparatively insignificant, and even that -was not obtained. Delivered over to the leading of a man, whose -military incapacity has caused the glorious title of Chatham to be -scorned, this ill-fated army, with spirit, and strength, and zeal -to have spread the fame of England to the extremities of the earth, -perished, without a blow, in the pestilent marshes of Walcheren! -And so utterly had party spirit stifled the feeling of national -honour that public men were found base enough to reprobate the -convention of Cintra, to sneer at sir John Moore’s operations, and -yet to declare the Walcheren expedition wise, profitable, and even -glorious! - -The operation against Italy was less unfortunate rather than -more ably conducted, and it was equally abortive. What with slow -preparations, the voyage, and the taking of the petty islands of -Ischia and Procida, thirteen weeks were wasted; and yet, during -that period, Murat, conscious of his inability to resist, was only -restrained from abandoning Naples by the firmness of his queen, -and the energy of Sallicetti, the minister of police. We have -seen that it was the wish of the ministers to have the troops -in Sicily employed in the south of Spain, but, yielding to the -representations of sir John Stuart, they permitted him to make -this display of military foolery: yet it is not with the bad or -good success of these expeditions that this history has to deal, -but with that palpable and direful ministerial incapacity which -suffered two men, notoriously unfitted for war, to waste and -dissipate the military strength of England on secondary objects, -while a renowned commander, placed at the most important point, was -left without an adequate force. - -For the first time since the commencement of the Peninsula war, -sixty thousand Spanish troops, well armed and clothed, were -collected in a mass, and in the right place, communicating with a -British force. For the first time since Napoleon swayed the destiny -of France, the principal army of that country had met with an -important check: the great conqueror’s fortune seemed to waver, and -the moment had arrived when the British government was called to -display all its wisdom and energy. The duke of York had performed -his duty; he had placed above ninety thousand superb soldiers, all -disposable for offensive operations, in the hands of the ministers; -but the latter knew not their value, and, instead of concentrating -them upon one, scattered them upon many points. Sir Arthur -Wellesley might have had above eighty thousand British troops on -the frontiers of Portugal, and he was a general capable of wielding -them. He was forced to commence a campaign, upon which the fate of -the Peninsula, a quick triumph or a long-protracted agony of twelve -millions of people depended, with only twenty-two thousand; while -sixty thousand fighting men, and ships numerous enough to darken -all the coasts of Spain, were waiting, in Sicily and England, for -orders which were to doom them, one part to scorn, and the other -to an inglorious and miserable fate. Shall the deliverance of the -Peninsula, then, be attributed to the firmness and long-sighted -policy of ministers who gave these glaring proofs of improvidence, -or shall the glory of that great exploit lighten round the head of -him who so manfully maintained the fierce struggle, even under the -burden of their folly? - - - - -BOOK IX. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -CAMPAIGN OF TALAVERA. - - -In the foregoing book the real state of affairs in the Peninsula -has been described; but it appeared with a somewhat different -aspect to the English general, because false informations, -egregious boasts, and hollow promises, such as had been employed to -mislead sir John Moore, were renewed at this period; and the allied -nations were influenced by a riotous rather than a reasonable -confidence of victory. The English newspapers teemed with letters, -describing the enemy’s misery and fears: nor was the camp free -from these inflated feelings. Marshal Beresford was so credulous -of French weakness as publicly to announce to the junta of Badajos -that Soult’s force, wandering and harassed by continual attacks, -was reduced to eight or ten thousand distressed soldiers. Nay, -sir Arthur Wellesley himself, swayed by the pertinacity of the -tale-makers, the unhesitating assurances of the junta, perhaps, -also, a little excited by a sense of his own great talents, was not -free from the impression that the hour of complete triumph was come. - -The Spanish government and the Spanish generals were importunate -for offensive movements, and lavish in their promises of support; -and the English general was as eager, for he was at the head of -gallant troops, his foot was on the path of victory, and he felt -that, if the duke of Belluno was not quickly disabled, the British -army, threatened on both flanks, would, as in the case of sir John -Cradock, be obliged to remain in some defensive position, near -Lisbon, until it became the scorn of the French, and an object of -suspicion and hatred to the Spanish and Portuguese people. - -There were three lines of offensive operations open:-- - -1º. _To cross the Tagus, join Cuesta’s army, and, making Elvas and -Badajos the base of movements, attack Victor in front._ This line -was circuitous. It permitted the enemy to cover his front by the -Tagus; the operations of the allies would have been cramped by the -Sierra de Guadalupe on one side, and the mountains lying between -Albuquerque and Alcantara on the other; and strong detachments must -have been left to cover the roads to Lisbon, on the right bank of -the Tagus. Finally, the communication between the duke of Belluno -and Soult being free, Beresford’s corps would have been endangered. - -2º. _To adopt Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo as the base of movements, -and to operate in conjunction with Beresford, the duke del Parque, -and Romana, by the line of Salamanca, while Cuesta and Venegas -occupied the attention of the first and fourth corps on the Tagus._ -The objections to this line were, that it separated the British -troops from the most efficient and most numerous, and obliged them -to act with the weakest and most irregular of the Spanish armies; -that it abandoned Cuesta to the ruin which his headstrong humour -would certainly provoke; and as the loss of Seville or of Lisbon -would inevitably follow; the instructions of the English ministers, -(which enjoined the defence of the latter city as paramount to -every object, save the military possession of Cadiz,) would have -been neglected. - -3º. _To march upon Plasencia and Almaraz, form a junction with -Cuesta, and advance against Madrid, while Venegas operated in the -same view, by the line of La Mancha._ The obstacles in the way of -this plan were--1º. That it exposed Cuesta to be defeated by Victor -before the junction; and that, after the junction, the combinations -would still be dependent upon the accuracy of Venegas’s movements. -2º. That sir Arthur Wellesley’s march, with reference to Soult’s -corps, would be a flank march: an unsafe operation at all times, -but, on this occasion, when the troops must move through the long -and narrow valley of the Tagus, peculiarly dangerous. Nevertheless, -this line was adopted, nor were the reasons in favour of it devoid -of force. - -The number of French immediately protecting Madrid was estimated -at fifty thousand; but confidential officers, sent to the -head-quarters of Cuesta and Venegas, had ascertained that their -strength was not overstated at thirty-eight thousand, for the -first, and twenty-five thousand for the second, all well armed -and equipped, and the last certainly the best and most efficient -army that the Spaniards had yet brought into the field. Now -the English force in Portugal amounted to thirty thousand men, -exclusive of the sick, twenty-two thousand being under arms on the -frontier, and eight thousand at Lisbon: here, then, was a mass -of ninety thousand regular troops that could be brought to bear -on fifty thousand; besides which there were sir Robert Wilson’s -legion, about a thousand strong, and the Spanish _partidas_ of the -Guadalupe and the Sierra de Bejar. - -The ridge of mountains which separate the valley of the Tagus from -Castile and Leon being, as has been already related, impracticable -for artillery, except at the passes of Baños and Perales, it was -supposed that the twenty thousand men under Beresford and the duke -del Parque would be sufficient to block those lines of march, and -that Romana, moving by the Tras os Montes, might join the duke del -Parque, and thus thirty thousand men, supported by two fortresses, -would be ready to protect the flank of the British army in its -march from Plasencia towards Madrid. A vain calculation, for Romana -remained ostentatiously idle at Coruña, and sir Arthur Wellesley, -never having seen the Spanish troops in action, thought too well of -them; and having had no experience of Spanish promises he trusted -them too far; and, at the same time, made a false judgement of the -force and position of his adversaries. The arrival of the sixth -corps at Astorga and of the fifth at Valladolid were unknown to -him: the strength of the second corps, and, perhaps, the activity -of its chief, were also underrated. Instead of fifteen or twenty -thousand harassed French troops, without artillery, there were -seventy thousand fighting-men behind the mountains! - -The 27th of June, the English army, breaking up from the camp of -Abrantes, and, being organized in the following manner, marched -into Spain:-- - -_Artillery._ - - Six brigades, 30 guns, com^d. by maj.-gen. Howorth. - -_Cavalry._ - - Three brigades, 3047 sabres, com^d. by lt.-gen. Payne. - -_Infantry._ - - 1st div. of 4 brigades, 6023 bayonets, com^d. by lt.-gen. Sherbrooke. - 2d do. 2 do. 3947 do. do. maj.-gen. Hill. - 3d do. 2 do. 3736 do. do. m.-gen. Mackenzie. - 4th do. 2 do. 2957 do. do. br.-gen. Campbell. - --- -- ----- - 5 divs. 13 brigades, 19710 sabres and bayonets. - --- -- 1287 Engineers, artillery, and waggon-train. - ----- - Grand total 20997 men, and 30 pieces of artillery. - ----- - -Besides this force, the 40th regiment, so long detained at Seville -by Mr. Frere, had arrived in Lisbon, and the troops on their march -from that city, being somewhat less than eight thousand bayonets, -were organized in three brigades, commanded by major-general -Lightfoot and brigadier-generals Robert and Catlin Craufurd. But -the leading brigade, under Robert Craufurd, only quitted Lisbon on -the 28th of June. - -The army moved by both banks of the Tagus; one column proceeding -through Sobreira Formosa, the other by Villa Velha, where a -boat-bridge was established. The 1st of July the head-quarters -were at Castello Branco, and from thence the troops continued -their route, in one column, by Moralejo and Coria; but a flanking -brigade, under general Donkin, was directed through Ceclaven and -Torijoncillos, and explored the country between Zarza Mayor and the -Tagus. The 8th, the head-quarters were established at Plasencia. -The 10th, the army arrived at that place, and was, soon after, -joined by a regiment of cavalry and two battalions of infantry from -Lisbon. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.] - -At this period Cuesta was at Almaraz, and Victor, of whose -intermediate movements it is time to take notice, was at Talavera -de la Reyna. When that marshal had retired from Torremocha, the -valley of the Tagus was exhausted by the long sojourn of the fourth -and first corps; but the valley of Plasencia was extremely fertile, -and untouched, and the duke of Belluno, whose troops, weakened -by the tertian sickness, required good nourishment, resolved to -take post there, and keep a bridge at Bazagona, on the Tietar, by -which he could, in two marches, fall upon Cuesta, if he ventured -to pass the Tagus at Almaraz. At Plasencia, also, he could open a -communication with the second and fifth corps, and observe closely -the movements of the English army on the frontier of Portugal. The -bridge at Bazagona was finished on the 21st of June, and the French -light troops were scouring the country towards Plasencia, when the -king, who had already withdrawn a division of infantry and a large -part of the cavalry of the first corps to reinforce the fourth, -ordered the duke of Belluno to retire instantly to Talavera, -leaving rear-guards on the Tietar and at Almaraz. This order, -which arrived the 22d of June, was the result of that indecision -which none but truly great men, or fools, are free from; the -first, because they can see their way clearly through the thousand -difficulties that encumber and bewilder the mind in war; the last, -because they see nothing. - -[Sidenote: St. Cyr.] - -On the present occasion, general Sebastiani had reported that -Venegas was reinforced, and ready to penetrate by La Mancha; and -the king, swayed by this false information, disturbed by the march -of Cuesta, and still more by Blake’s advance against Zaragoza -(the result of which was then unknown), became so alarmed that he -commanded St. Cyr to move into Aragon, repaired himself to Toledo, -with his guards and reserve, withdrew the light cavalry and a -division of infantry from Victor, obliged that marshal to fall back -on Talavera; and even commanded Mortier to bring up the fifth corps -from Valladolid to Villa Castin, near Avila, although, following -Napoleon’s orders, it should have gone to Salamanca. - -In the hope of meeting Venegas, Joseph penetrated as far as the -Jabalon river, in La Mancha; and as the Spaniard, fearful of the -tempest approaching him, took shelter in the Morena, the king, -leaving some posts of the 4th corps at Toledo, restored the light -cavalry to the first corps, and, with his guards and reserve, -returned to Madrid. But, while he had been pursuing a shadow, -Victor was exposed to great danger; for the Jabalon is six long -marches from Madrid, and hence, for ten days, the duke of Belluno, -with only two divisions of infantry and two thousand cavalry, in -all about fourteen thousand men, had remained at Talavera without -any support, although sixty thousand men were marching against him -from different points. - -Victor did not suffer as he might have done; but his numerical -weakness was certainly the safety of Cuesta. For that general, -having followed the retreat of the first corps from Torremocha, -crossed the Tagus, at Almaraz, on the 23d of June, and pushed -an advanced guard towards Oropesa. He had thirty-eight thousand -men, yet he remained tranquil while (at a distance of only twelve -miles) fourteen thousand French made a flank movement that lasted -three days; and his careless method of acting, and his unskilful -dispositions, were so evident, that the French cavalry, far from -fearing, were preparing to punish him, when he suddenly took the -alarm, and, withdrawing to Almaraz, occupied himself in finishing -his bridges over the Tagus. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations First Corps MSS.] - -The 28th, Victor, having removed his hospitals and depôts from -Arzobispo, took a position behind the Alberche, keeping, however, -three battalions and the cavalry at Talavera, with advanced posts -at Calera and Gamonal. A small detachment, also, watched the -course of the Tagus from the mouth of the Alberche to that of the -Guadarama, and a moveable column was sent to Escalona, to observe -the Vera de Plasencia and passes leading upon Avila. In executing -this retrograde movement, Victor, having no means of transport, -burnt ten out of the fifteen pontoons supporting his bridge over -the Tietar, and, for the same reason, he threw a considerable -quantity of powder and shot into the river. His troops had been for -four days on quarter rations, and were suffering from sickness and -hunger; and the Tagus was fordable in several places. The danger -of his position is evident. The British were, however, still at -Abrantes, and Cuesta knew not how to profit by this opportunity -before the king returned from La Mancha. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, printed -in 1810.] - -Such was the position of the different armies when the British -general arrived at Plasencia. He had seen Soult’s letters, found -upon general Franceschi, and thus ascertained that the second -corps was at Zamora, and from Franceschi himself, who passed -as a prisoner, at the same time, he learned the arrival of the -fifth corps at Valladolid; but the march of Ney’s corps was not -suspected, and the tenor of Soult’s letters led to the notion that -Gallicia was to be retained. A letter of Victor’s to Joseph, dated -the 23d of June, and written in the most desponding language, -had been likewise intercepted; and, as Soult’s correspondence -also gave a strong picture of _his_ difficulties, the general -impression that the French armies were not only weak but utterly -dismayed was rather augmented than lessened by this information. -Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, could not but have some distrust, -when he knew that _two corps_ were beyond the mountains, on his -left; and, though far from suspecting the extent of his danger, he -took additional precautions to protect that flank, and renewed his -instructions to Beresford to watch the enemy’s movements, and to -look carefully to the defence of the _Puerto Perales_. But the pass -of Baños was still to be guarded, and for this purpose sir Arthur -applied to Cuesta. - -The Spanish general was at first unwilling to detach any men to -that quarter, but he finally agreed that two battalions from his -army and two others from the town of Bejar, at the other side of -the pass, should unite to defend Baños, and that the duke del -Parque should also send a detachment to the pass of Perales. -Although these measures appeared sufficient to obviate danger -from Soult’s corps, weakened as it was supposed to be, they were -evidently futile to check the real force under that marshal; and -they were rendered absolutely ridiculous by Cuesta, who sent two -weak battalions, of three hundred men each, and with only twenty -rounds of ammunition per man: and yet this was only a part of a -system which already weighed heavily on the English general. - -The 10th, sir Arthur Wellesley proceeded to Cuesta’s -head-quarters, near the Col de Mirabete, to confer with him on -their future operations. Ever since the affair of Valdez, in 1808, -the junta had been sorely afraid of Cuesta, and, suspecting that -he was meditating some signal vengeance, they endeavoured to raise -up rivals to his power. In this view they had lavished honours and -authority upon Blake; but the defeat at Belchite having crushed -their hopes in that quarter, they turned their eyes upon Venegas, -and increased his forces, taking care to give him the best troops. -Still Cuesta’s force was formidable, and to reduce it was the -object both of Mr. Frere and the junta: the motive of the first -being to elevate the duke of Albuquerque; the intention of the -others being merely to reduce the power of Cuesta. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -Whatever might have been the latter’s ultimate intention, with -respect to the junta, it is certain that his natural obstinacy -and violence were greatly increased by a knowledge of these -proceedings, and that he was ill-disposed towards the English -general, as thinking him a party concerned in these intrigues. -When, therefore, sir Arthur, at the instigation of Mr. Frere, -proposed that a draft of ten thousand Spanish troops should be -detached towards Avila and Segovia, Cuesta replied that it should -be done by the British, and absolutely refused to furnish more than -two battalions of infantry and a few cavalry to strengthen sir -Robert Wilson’s partizan corps, which was destined to act on the -enemy’s right. This determination again baffled Mr. Frere’s project -of placing the duke of Albuquerque at the head of an independent -force, and obliged the supreme junta to fall upon some other -expedient for reducing Cuesta’s power; and it was fortunate that -the old Spaniard resisted the proposal, because the ten thousand -men would have gone straight into the midst of the fifth corps, -which, in expectation of such a movement, was then at Villa Castin, -and, having been rejoined by the detachment of colonel Briche, -from Catalonia, was eighteen thousand strong, and supported by -Kellerman’s division of cavalry at Valladolid. - -The discussion between the generals lasted two days; but, with the -approbation of the supreme junta, it was finally agreed that the -British and Spanish armies, under sir Arthur and Cuesta, should -march, on the 18th, against Victor; and that Venegas, advancing, at -the same time, through La Mancha, should leave Toledo and Aranjues -to his left, and push for Fuente Duenas and Villa Maurique on the -Upper Tagus. If this movement should draw Sebastiani, with the -fourth corps, to that side, Venegas was to keep him in play while -the allied forces defeated Victor. If Sebastiani disregarded it, -Venegas was to cross the Tagus and march upon Madrid, from the -south east, while sir Robert Wilson, reinforced by some Spanish -battalions, menaced that capital from the opposite quarter. - -Previous to entering Spain, sir Arthur had ascertained that the -valleys of the Alagon and the Arago and those between Bejar and -Ciudad Rodrigo were fertile and capable of nourishing the army, and -he had sent commissaries to all these points to purchase mules, -and to arrange with the alcaldes of the different districts for -the supply of the troops. He had obtained the warmest assurances, -from the supreme junta, that every needful article should be -forthcoming, and the latter had also sent the intendant-general, -don Lonzano de Torres, to the British head-quarters, with full -powers to forward all arrangements for the supply of the English -troops. Relying upon these preparations, sir Arthur had crossed the -frontier with few means of transport and without magazines, for -Portugal could not furnish what was required, and, moreover, the -Portuguese peasants had an insuperable objection to quitting their -own country; a matter apparently of little consequence, because -Mr. Frere, writing officially at the time, described the people of -Estremadura as viewing “_the war in the light of a crusade, and -carrying it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause!_” - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 17.] - -From Castello Branco to Plasencia is but seven days’ march, yet -that short time was sufficient to prove the bad faith of the junta, -and the illusion under which Mr. Frere laboured. Neither mules for -the transport of ammunition and provisions, nor the promised help -of the authorities, nor aid of any kind could be procured; and don -Lonzano de Torres, although, to sir Arthur, he freely acknowledged -the extent of the evil, the ill-will of the inhabitants, and the -shameful conduct of the supreme junta, afterwards, without shame, -asserted that the British troops had always received and consumed -double rations, and were in want of nothing; an assertion in which -he was supported by don Martin de Garay, the Spanish secretary of -state; the whole proceeding being a concerted plan, to afford the -junta a pretext for justifying their own and casting a slur upon -the English general’s conduct, if any disasters should happen. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, seriously alarmed for the subsistence of his -army, wrote, upon the 16th, to Mr. Frere and to general O’Donoghue, -the chief of Cuesta’s staff; representing to both the distress of -his army, and intimating his resolution _not to proceed beyond the -Alberche_, unless his wants were immediately supplied; faithful, -however, to his agreement with Cuesta, he prepared to put the army -in motion for that river. It was known at Plasencia, on the 15th, -that Ney had retreated from Coruña; but it was believed, that his -corps had been recalled to France; and no change took place in the -plan of campaign. It was not suspected that the sixth corps had -then been sixteen days at Astorga! - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The valley of the Tagus, into which the army was about to plunge, -is intersected by several rivers, with rugged banks and deep -channels; but their courses being very little out of the parallel -of the Tagus, the Alberche is in a manner enclosed by the Tietar. -Now, sir Robert Wilson, with four thousand Portuguese and Spanish -troops, had ascended the right bank of the latter river, and gained -possession of the passes of Arenas, which lead upon Avila, and of -the pass of San Pedro Bernardo, which leads upon Madrid. In this -position he covered the Vera de Plasencia, and threatened Victor’s -communications with the capital. The French marshal was alarmed; -and a movement of the whole army in the same direction would have -obliged him to abandon the Lower Alberche, because, two marches -from Arenas, in the direction of Escalona and Macqueda, would have -placed sir Arthur Wellesley between the first corps and Madrid. -But, on the other hand, the line of country was too rugged for -rapid movements with a large body; and it was necessary first to -secure a junction with Cuesta, because Victor, having recovered -his third division on the 7th of July, was again at the head of -twenty-five thousand men. With such a force he could not be -trusted near the Spaniards; and the British general resolved to -cross the Tietar at the Venta de Bazagona, and march by Miajadas -upon Oropesa. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of the First Corps’ Operations.] - -The 16th, two companies of the _staff corps_, with a working party -of five hundred men, marched from Plasencia to Bazagona, to throw -a bridge over the Tietar. The duke of Belluno had wasted many days -in dragging up fifteen pontoons from the Tagus, to form his bridge -at that place; and when he retired upon Talavera, he destroyed the -greatest part of the equipage; but the English officer employed -on this occasion pulled down an old house in the neighbourhood, -felled some pine trees in a wood three miles distant; and, uniting -intelligence with labour, contrived, without other aid than a few -hatchets and saws, in one day, to throw a solid bridge over the -Tietar. - -The 18th, the army crossed that river, and taking the route of -Miajadas, reached Talayuela. - -The 19th, the main body halted at Centinello and Casa de Somas. The -advanced posts at Venta de St. Juliens. - -The 20th, the troops reached Oropesa; but as their marches had been -long, and conducted through a difficult country, they halted the -21st; on which day, Cuesta, who had moved from Almaraz by Naval -Moral and Arzobispo, passed Oropesa, and united his whole force at -Velada, except a small detachment, which marched along the south -bank of the Tagus, to threaten the French by the bridge of Talavera. - -The duke of Belluno, aware of these movements, had supported his -posts at Talavera with a division of infantry, which was disposed -in successive detachments behind that town. His situation -appeared critical; because the allies, covered by the Alberche, -might still gain a march and reach Escalona before him; and from -thence either push for Madrid, by the pass of Brunete, or, taking -post at Maqueda, cut him off from the capital. But his sources -of information were sure; and he contented himself with sending -a regiment of hussars to Cazar de Escalona, to watch the Upper -Alberche, and to support the moveable column opposed to sir Robert -Wilson. - -The 21st, the allies being between Oropesa and Velada, Victor -recalled all his foraging parties, altered his line of retreat from -the Madrid to the Toledo road, removed his parc from St. Ollalla -to Cevolla, and concentrated two divisions of infantry behind the -Alberche. - -The 22d, the allies moved in two columns, to drive the French posts -from Talavera; and Cuesta, marching by the high road, came first -up with the enemy’s rear-guard, near the village of Gamonal; but -then commenced a display of ignorance, timidity, and absurdity, -that has seldom been equalled in war; the past defeats of the -Spanish army were rendered quite explicable; the little fruit -derived from them by marshal Victor quite inexplicable. General -Latour Maubourg, with two thousand dragoons, came boldly on to -the table-land of Gamonal, and sustaining a cannonade, not only -checked the head of the Spanish leading column, but actually -obliged general Zayas, who commanded it, to display his whole -line, consisting of fifteen thousand infantry and three thousand -cavalry; nor did the French horsemen give back at all, until the -appearance of the red uniforms on their right informed them that -it was time to retire. Then, and not till then, Latour Maubourg, -supported by some infantry, retreated behind the Alberche, and -without loss, although many batteries, and at least six thousand -Spanish horse, were close on his rear; but the latter could never -be induced to make even a partial charge, however favourable the -opportunity, and by two o’clock the whole French army was safely -concentrated on its position. Ruffin’s division on the left touched -the Tagus, and protected the bridge over the Alberche, which was -more immediately defended by a regiment of infantry and fourteen -pieces of artillery. Villatte’s and Lapisse’s divisions, drawn -up in successive lines, on some high ground that overlooked the -surrounding country, formed the right; the heavy cavalry were in -second line near the bridge; and in this situation Victor rested -the 22d and 23d. - -It was at all times difficult to obtain accurate information from -the Spaniards by gentle means; hence, the French were usually -better supplied with intelligence than the British; while the -native generals never knew any thing about the enemy, until they -felt the weight of his blows. Up to this period, sir Arthur’s best -sources of information had been the intercepted letters of the -French; and now, although the latter had been in the same position, -and without any change of numbers since the 7th, the inhabitants -of Talavera could not, or would not, give any information of their -strength or situation; nor could any reasonable calculation be -formed of either, until some English officers crossed the Tagus, -and, from the mountains on the left bank of that river, saw the -French position in reverse. - -The general outline of an attack was, however, agreed upon for the -next morning, but the details were unsettled; and when the English -commander came to arrange these with Cuesta, the latter was gone to -bed. The British troops were under arms at three o’clock the next -morning, but Cuesta’s staff were not aroused from slumber until -seven o’clock; and the old man finally objected to fight that day, -alleging, among other absurd reasons, that it was Sunday. But there -was something more than absurdity in these proceedings. Victor, who -was not ignorant of the weak points of his own position, remained -tranquil the 23d, being well assured that no attack would take -place, for it is certain that he had a correspondence with some of -the Spanish staff; and the secret discussions between sir Arthur -Wellesley and Cuesta, at which only one staff officer of each party -was present, became known to the enemy in twenty-four hours after; -indeed, Cuesta was himself suspected of treachery by many, yet -apparently without reason. - -In the course of the 23d, the Spanish officer commanding the -advanced posts reported that the French guns were withdrawn, and -that it was evident they meant to retreat; Cuesta then became -willing to attack, and proposed, in concert with sir Arthur -Wellesley, to examine Victor’s position; but, to the surprise of -the English commander, the Spaniard arrived in a coach, drawn by -six horses, to perform this duty; and when the inequalities of the -ground obliged him to descend from his vehicle, he cast himself -at the foot of a tree, and in a few moments went to sleep. Yet he -was always ready to censure and to thwart every proposal of his -able coadjutor. This time, however, he consented to fall upon the -enemy; and the troops were in motion early in the morning of the -24th; but the duke of Belluno was again duly informed of their -intention; and having withdrawn his moveable column from Escalona, -and relinquished the road to Madrid, retreated during the night to -Torijos. Thus, the first combination of the allies failed entirely; -and each hour the troops of the enemy were accumulating round them; -for Venegas, who should have been at Fuente Duenas, high up on the -Tagus, had not even passed Damyel; and the king was collecting his -whole strength in front, between Toledo and Talavera; while Soult -was fast gathering his more formidable power behind the mountains -of Bejar. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -The English general was indeed still ignorant of the danger which -threatened him from the Salamanca country, or he would, doubtless, -have withdrawn at once to Plasencia, and secured his communications -with Lisbon, and with Beresford’s troops; but other powerful -reasons were not wanting to prevent his further advance. Before he -quitted Plasencia he had completed contracts with the alcaldes, -in the Vera de Plasencia, for two hundred and fifty thousand -rations of forage and provisions; and this, together with what he -had before collected, would have furnished supplies for ten or -twelve days, a sufficient time to beat Victor, and carry the army -into a fresh country; but, distrustful, as he had reason to be, -of the Spaniards, he again gave notice to Cuesta and the junta, -that BEYOND THE ALBERCHE he would not move, unless his wants were -immediately supplied; for, hitherto the rations contracted for -had not been delivered; and his representations to the junta and -to Cuesta were, by both, equally disregarded; there were no means -of transport provided; the troops were already on less than half -allowance, and absolute famine approached; and when the general -demanded food for his soldiers, at the hands of those whose cause -he came to defend, he was answered with false excuses, and insulted -by false statements. Under any circumstances this would have forced -him to halt; but the advance having been made in the exercise of -his own discretion, and not at the command of his government, there -could be no room for hesitation: wherefore, remonstrating warmly, -but manfully, with the supreme junta, he announced his resolution -to go no farther, nay, even _to withdraw from Spain altogether_. - -It is evident that without these well-founded reasons for pausing, -Cuesta’s conduct, and the state of his army, offered no solid -ground for expecting success by continuing the forward movement; -but the faithless and perverse conduct of the supreme junta, -although hidden as yet from sir Arthur Wellesley, far exceeded the -measure even of Cuesta’s obdurate folly. That body, after having -agreed to the plan upon which the armies were acting, concluded, -in the fulness of their ignorance, that the combined troops in -the valley of the Tagus would be sufficient to overthrow Joseph; -and, therefore, secretly ordered Venegas not to fulfil his part, -arguing to themselves, with a cunning stupidity, that it would be -a master stroke of policy to save him from any chance of a defeat; -hoping thus to preserve a powerful force, under one of their own -creatures, to maintain their own power. This was the cause why the -army of La Mancha had failed to appear on the Tagus: and thus, the -welfare of millions was made the sport of men, who yet were never -tired of praising themselves, and have not failed to find admirers -elsewhere. - -As the Spaniards are perfect masters of the art of saying every -thing and doing nothing, sir Arthur’s remonstrances drew forth many -official statements, plausible replies, and pompous assertions, -after their manner, but produced no amelioration of the evils -complained of. Mr. Frere, also, thought it necessary to make some -apology for himself, asserting that the evil was deep rooted, and -that he had had neither time nor power to arrange any regular plan -for the subsistence of the English armies. But all the evils that -blighted the Spanish cause were deep seated; and yet Mr. Frere, who -could not arrange a plan for the subsistence of the troops, that -indispensable preliminary to military operations, and which was -really within his province, thought himself competent to direct -all the operations themselves which were in the province of the -generals. He had found leisure to meddle in all the intrigues of -the day; to aim at making and unmaking Spanish commanders; to -insult sir John Moore; to pester sir John Cradock with warlike -advice; and to arrange the plan of campaign for sir Arthur -Wellesley’s army, without that officer’s concurrence. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -The English general’s resolution to halt at Talavera made little -impression upon Cuesta. A French corps had retreated before him, -and Madrid, nay, the Pyrennees themselves, instantly rose on the -view of the sanguine Spaniard: he was resolved to be the first in -the capital, and he pushed forward in pursuit, reckless alike of -military discipline and of the friendly warnings of sir Arthur; -who vainly admonished him to open his communications as quickly as -possible with Venegas, and to beware how he let the enemy know that -the British and Spanish armies were separated. In the fulness of -his arrogant vanity, Cuesta crossed the Alberche on the 24th, and -being unable to ascertain the exact route of the French, pursued -them, by the road of Toledo, as far as Cebolla, and, by the road -of Madrid, as far as El Bravo. On the 25th, still inflated with -pride, he caused the troops at Cebolla to move on to Torrijos, and -marched himself to St. Ollalla. The 26th he discovered that he had -been pursuing a tiger. Meanwhile sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing -the consequence of this imprudence, had sent general Sherbrooke, -with two divisions of British infantry and all the cavalry, across -the Alberche, to Cazalegas, where, being centrically situated with -respect to Talavera, St. Ollalla, and Escalona, he could support -the Spaniards, and, at the same time, hold communication with sir -Robert Wilson, who had been at the latter town since the 23d. -But a great and signal crisis was at hand, the full importance -of which cannot be well understood without an exact knowledge of -the situation and proceedings of all the armies involved in this -complicated campaign. - -The 30th of June, Soult, when at Zamora, received a despatch -from the emperor, dated near Ratisbon, conferring on him the -supreme command of the second, fifth, and sixth corps, with orders -to concentrate them, and act decisively against the English. -“_Wellesley_,” said Napoleon, “_will probably advance, by the -Tagus, against Madrid: in that case, pass the mountains, fall on -his flank and rear, and crush him_;” for, at that distance, and -without other information than what his own sagacity supplied, this -allknowing soldier foresaw the leading operations even as soon and -as certainly as those who projected them. - -The duke of Dalmatia immediately imparted these instructions to -the king, and, at the same time, made known his own opinions and -designs with respect to the probable projects of the allies. He -was ignorant of the precise object and exact position of sir -Arthur Wellesley, but, judging from the cessation of hostility -in the north, that the English were in march with the design of -joining Cuesta, and acting by the line of the Tagus, he proposed to -concentrate the third corps at Salamanca, besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, -and menace Lisbon, which, he justly observed, would bring the -English army back to the northern provinces of Portugal; and if, -as some supposed, the intention of sir Arthur was to unite, at -Bragança, with Romana, and open the campaign to the north of the -Douro, the French army would still be in a suitable position to -oppose them. - -In pursuance of this opinion, Soult ordered Mortier to approach -Ciudad Rodrigo, with the double view of preparing for the siege -and covering the quarters of refreshment so much needed by the -second corps after its fatigues. Ney also was directed to march -with the sixth corps, by the left bank of the Esla, to Zamora; but -the spirit of discord was strong, and it was at this moment that -the king, alarmed by Sebastiani’s report, drew the fifth corps to -Villa Castin; while marshal Ney, holding it imprudent to uncover -Astorga and Leon, mortified, also, at being placed under the orders -of another marshal, refused to move to Zamora. Soult, crossed by -these untoward circumstances, sent the division of light cavalry, -under his brother, and one of infantry, commanded by Heudelet, from -Zamora and Toro to Salamanca, with orders to explore the course of -the Tormes, to observe Alba and Ledesma, and especially to scour -the roads leading upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Plasencia: these troops -relieved a division of dragoons belonging to Kellerman, who was -still charged with the general government of the province. - -The 10th of July, the march of the British upon Plasencia became -known, and it was manifest that sir Arthur had no design to act -north of the Douro; wherefore the duke of Dalmatia resolved to -advance, with the remainder of the second corps, to Salamanca, -and, partly by authority, partly by address, he obliged Ney to -put the sixth corps in movement for Zamora, leaving Fournier’s -dragoons to cover Astorga and Leon. Meanwhile, king Joseph, having -returned from his fruitless excursion against Venegas, was at first -incredulous of the advance of sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, but -he agreed to Soult’s project against Ciudad Rodrigo, and ordered -Mortier to return to Valladolid, where that marshal arrived, with -his first division, on the 16th of July: his second division, under -general Gazan, halted, however, at Medina del Campo and Nava del -Rey, on the route from Salamanca to Valladolid, and an advanced -guard was sent forward to Alba de Tormes. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The 13th of July, Soult, being assured that the British army -was on the eastern frontier of Portugal, and that considerable -reinforcements had been disembarked at Lisbon, became certain that -sir Arthur meant to operate by the line of the Tagus; wherefore, -he again addressed the king to move him to an immediate siege of -Ciudad Rodrigo, promising to have the three corps under his own -command in full activity in fifteen days, provided his demands -were complied with, the most important being--1º. The formation of -a battering-train;--2º. The concentration of an immense number of -detachments, which weakened the active corps;--3º. A reinforcement -of fifteen or twenty thousand conscripts, drawn from France, to -enable the old troops, employed on the line of communication, to -join the _corps d’armée_. The first corps should, he said, continue -to watch the Spanish army of Estremadura, and be prepared either -to prevent it from uniting with the English to disturb the siege, -or to join the first, second, and sixth corps, and give battle, -if that should become necessary. The siege might thus be pressed -vigourously, Ciudad would fall, Almeida be next invested, and the -communications of the English army, with Lisbon, threatened. - -The 17th, the king replied, through marshal Jourdan, that he -approved of the plan, but had not means to meet several of Soult’s -demands, and he proposed that the latter should reinforce Kellerman -and Bonnet, with ten thousand men, to enable them to seize the -Asturias, and thus strengthen the communications with France. This -drew from the duke of Dalmatia the following remonstrance:--“_Under -present circumstances we cannot avoid some sacrifice of territory. -Let us prepare, first, by concentrating, on a few points capable -of defence and covering the hospitals and depôts which may be -on the extremity of our general position. This will not be so -distressing as it may appear, because the moment we have beaten and -dispersed the enemy’s masses we shall recover all our ground._” -Then reiterating his own advice, he concluded thus:--“_I conceive -it impossible to finish this war by detachments. It is large masses -only, the strongest that you can form, that will succeed._” It is -remarkable that sir Arthur Wellesley, writing at this time, says, -“_I conceive that the French are dangerous only when in large -masses_.” - -Meanwhile, Heudelet’s division, having pushed back the advanced -guards of the duke del Parque upon Ciudad Rodrigo, ascertained that -a great movement of troops was taking place near that city, and -that sir Arthur Wellesley, advancing quicker than was expected, had -already reached Plasencia; wherefore, on the 18th, Soult directed -Mortier to march upon Salamanca with the fifth corps, and, at -the same time, reinforced Heudelet’s division with Merle’s; the -latter’s place, at Zamora, being supplied by a division of the -sixth corps, the remainder of which continued on the Esla, fronting -the Tras os Montes. Thus, not less than fifty thousand men were at -or close to Salamanca, with their cavalry-posts pointing to the -passes of Baños, on the very day that sir Arthur Wellesley crossed -the Tietar to effect his junction with Cuesta. Yet, neither through -the duke del Parque, nor Beresford, nor the guerillas, nor the -peasantry, did intelligence of this formidable fact reach him! - -Having put the three corps in motion, Soult despatched general Foy -to Madrid, with information of sir Arthur’s march, and to arrange -the future combinations of the two armies. “_It is probable_,” -he said, “_that the concentration of my army at Salamanca will -oblige the English general to change his plan; but, if he shall -already have advanced on the road to Madrid, we should assemble -all our forces, both on the Tagus and on this side, fall upon him -altogether, and crush him. Thus, his campaign will be finished, and -our operations may go on with advantage._” - -Foy arrived, the 22d, at Madrid; and, a few hours afterwards, -intelligence reached the king that the allies were at Talavera, -in front of the first corps, and that sir Robert Wilson (whose -strength was much exaggerated) was at Escalona. The die was now -cast; Joseph directed Soult to march immediately upon Plasencia, -then, leaving general Belliard, with only three thousand men, in -the Retiro, set out himself, with his guards and reserve, by the -road of Mostoles, to join Victor at Talavera. The 23d, being at -Naval-Carneiro, he received notice that the first corps would -retreat that night to Torrijos, and, in two days, would be behind -the Guadarama river; whereupon, turning to the left, Joseph -descended the Guadarama to Vargas, and effected his junction with -the duke of Belluno on the 25th. - -During this time, Sebastiani, who had been watching Venegas -near Damyel, deceived that general, and, returning to Toledo by -forced marches, left three thousand men there, with the design of -obliging him to cross the Tagus, at Aranjues. With the remainder -of the fourth corps Sebastiani joined the king: and thus nearly -fifty thousand fighting men and ninety pieces of artillery were -concentrated, on the morning of the 26th, behind the Guadarama, and -within a few miles of Cuesta’s advanced guard. But, on the side -of the allies, the main body of the Spaniards was at St. Ollalla; -Sherbrooke with two divisions and the cavalry, at Casalegas; and -the rest of the English in Talavera. So that, while the French were -concentrated and in full march to attack; the allies were separated -in four nearly equal and unconnected parts, of which three were -enclosed, as it were, in a net, between the Alberche and the Tagus! -On such an occasion Napoleon would have been swift and deadly. - -In retiring upon Toledo, instead of Madrid, the duke of Belluno -showed himself an able commander. Toledo was the strategic pivot -upon which every movement turned. It was the central point, by -holding which the army of Venegas was separated from the allies on -the Alberche. If the latter advanced, Soult’s operations rendered -every forward step a stride towards ruin. If, leaving Venegas -to his fate, they retired, it must be rapidly, or there would -be neither wisdom nor safety in the measure. The king knew that -Foy would reach Soult the 24th, and as that marshal had already -assembled his army about Salamanca, which was only four days’ march -from Plasencia, he might be in the valley of the Tagus by the 30th; -hence, to insure complete success, the royal army needed only -to keep the allies in check for four or five days. This was the -plan that Soult had recommended, that the king promised to follow, -and that marshal Jourdan strenuously supported. The unskilful -proceedings of Cuesta and Venegas, the separation of the allies, -the distressed state of the English army, actually on the verge of -famine, (a circumstance that could hardly be unknown to Victor,) -greatly facilitated the execution of this project, which did not -preclude the king from punishing the folly of the Spanish general, -whose army, scattered and without order, discipline, or plan, so -strongly invited an attack. - -I have said that Cuesta was playing with a tiger: he had some faint -perception of his danger on the 25th, and he gave orders to retreat -on the 26th; but the French, suddenly passing the Guadarama, at -two o’clock in the morning of that day, quickly drove the Spanish -cavalry out of Torrijos, and pursued them to Alcabon. Here general -Zayas had drawn up four thousand infantry, two thousand horsemen, -and eight guns, on a plain, and offered battle. - - -COMBAT OF ALCABON. - -The Spanish right rested on the road of Domingo Perez, and the left -on a chapel of the same name. The French cavalry, under Latour -Maubourg, advanced in a parallel line against the Spaniards, -and a cannonade commenced; but, at that moment, the head of the -French infantry appearing in sight, the Spaniards broke, and fled -in disorder towards St. Ollalla, followed, at full gallop, by -the horsemen, who pressed them so sorely that the panic would, -doubtless, have spread through the whole army, but for the courage -of Albuquerque, who, coming up with a division of three thousand -fresh cavalry, held the enemy in play, while Cuesta retreated, in -the greatest disorder, towards the Alberche. - -After reaching St. Ollalla, the French slackened their efforts; -the main body halted there, and the advanced guards, save a few -cavalry-posts, did not pass El Bravo, and no attempt was made -to profit from the unconnected position of the allies--a gross -and palpable error; for, either by the sword or dispersion, the -Spaniards lost, on that day, not less than four thousand men; and -such was their fear and haste that it required but a little more -perseverance in the pursuit to cause a general rout. Albuquerque, -alone, showed any front; but his efforts were unavailing, and the -disorder continued to increase until general Sherbrooke, marching -out of Cazalegas, placed his divisions between the scared troops -and the enemy. Still the danger was imminent; there was no concert -between the commanders, the ground on the left of the Alberche was -unfavourable to a retiring party, and, as yet, no position upon -which the combined forces could retire had been agreed upon! What, -then, would have been the consequence if the whole French army had -borne down, compact and strong, into the midst of the disordered -masses? - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, who, at the first alarm, had hastened to -the front, seeing the confusion beyond the Alberche, knew that a -battle was at hand; and, being persuaded that in a strong defensive -position only could the Spaniards be brought to stand a shock, -earnestly endeavoured to persuade Cuesta, while Sherbrooke’s people -could yet cover the movement, to withdraw to Talavera, where -there was ground suited for defence; but Cuesta’s uncouth nature -again broke forth; his people were beaten, dispirited, fatigued, -bewildered; clustered on a narrow slip of low, flat land, between -the Alberche, the Tagus, and the heights of Salinas; and the first -shot fired by the enemy must have been the signal of defeat; yet it -was in vain that sir Arthur Wellesley pointed out those things, and -entreated of him to avoid the fall of the rock that trembled over -his head; he replied, that his troops would be disheartened by any -further retreat, that he would fight where he stood: and in this -mood he passed the night. - -The 27th, at day-light, the British general renewed his -solicitations, at first, fruitlessly, but when the enemy’s cavalry -came in sight, and Sherbrooke prepared to retire, Cuesta sullenly -yielded, yet, turning to his staff with frantic pride, observed -that “_He had first made the Englishman go down on his knees_.” -Sir Arthur Wellesley, by virtue of his genius, now assumed the -direction of both armies. General Mackenzie’s division and a -brigade of light cavalry were left on the Alberche, to cover the -retrograde movement: but the rest of the allied troops was soon in -full march for the position, which was about six miles in the rear. -Sir Robert Wilson, who had reached Naval Carneiro on the 25th, -and opened a communication with Madrid, and who would certainly -have entered that capital but for the approaching battle, was also -recalled. He returned, on the 28th, to Escalona, and hung on the -enemy’s rear, but did not attempt to join the army. - -Between the Alberche and the town of Talavera, the country was -flat, and covered with olives and cork-trees; and, on the north, -nearly parallel to the Tagus, and at a distance of about two or -three miles, a chain of round but steep hills bounded the woody -plain. Beyond these hills, but separated from them by a deep and -rugged valley, something less than half a mile wide, was the high -mountain-ridge which divides the bed of the Alberche from that of -the Tietar. Hence, a line drawn perpendicularly from the Tagus -would cross the first chain of hills at the distance of two miles, -and at two miles and a half would fall on the mountains. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, taking the town of Talavera, which was -built close to the river, as his fixed point, placed the right -of the Spaniards there, drawing their army up in two lines, with -the left resting upon a mound, where a large field-redoubt was -constructed, and behind which a brigade of British light cavalry -was posted. The front was covered by a convent, by ditches, mud -walls, breast-works, and felled trees. The cavalry was posted -behind the infantry; and the rear was supported by a large house -in the wood, well placed, in case of defeat, to cover a retreat on -to the main roads leading from Talavera to Arzobispo and Oropesa. -In this position they could not be attacked seriously, nor their -disposition be even seen; and, thus, one-half of the line necessary -to be occupied by the allies was rendered nearly impregnable, and -yet held by the worst troops. - -The front of battle was prolonged by the British infantry. General -Campbell’s division, formed in two lines, touched the Spanish -left; general Sherbrooke’s division stood next to Campbell’s, but -arranged on one line only, because general Mackenzie’s division, -destined to form the second, was then near the Alberche. It was -intended that general Hill’s division should close the left of the -British, by taking post on the highest hill, in the chain before -mentioned, as bounding the flat and woody country; but, by some -accident, the summit of this height was not immediately occupied. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 11.] - -The whole line, thus displayed, was about two miles in length, the -left being covered by the valley between the hill and the mountain; -and from this valley a ravine, or water-course, opened, deeply, in -the front of the British left, but being gradually obliterated in -the flat ground about the centre of the line. Part of the British -cavalry was with general Mackenzie, and in the plain in front of -the left, and part behind the great redoubt, at the junction of -the allied troops. The British and Germans under arms that day -were somewhat above nineteen thousand sabres and bayonets, with -thirty guns. The Spaniards, after their previous defeat, could only -produce from thirty-three to thirty-four thousand men; but they had -seventy guns. The combined army, therefore, offered battle with -forty-four thousand infantry, nearly ten thousand cavalry, and a -hundred pieces of artillery; and the French were coming on with at -least eighty guns, and, including the king’s guards, nearly fifty -thousand men, of which above seven thousand were cavalry. But what -a difference in the quality of the troops! The French were all -hardy veterans, while the genuine soldiers of the allied army did -not exceed nineteen thousand. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The king, having passed the night of the 26th at St. Ollalla, -put his troops in motion again before day-light, on the 27th. -Latour Maubourg, with the cavalry, preceeded the column, and the -first and fourth corps, the royal guards, and reserve, followed -in succession. The appearance of the leading squadrons, near -Cazalegas, hastened, as we have seen, Cuesta’s decision, and, about -one o’clock in the afternoon, the first corps reached the heights -of Salinas, from whence the dust of the allies, as they took up -their position, could be perceived; but neither their situation nor -disposition could be made out, on account of the forest, which, -clothing the country from the Tagus nearly to the foot of the first -range of hills, masked all their evolutions. The duke of Belluno, -however, being well acquainted with the ground, instantly guessed -their true position; and, in pursuance of his advice, the king -ordered the fourth corps to march against the left of the allies; -the cavalry against the centre, and Victor himself, with the first -corps, against the right: the guards and the reserve supported the -fourth corps. - -Two good routes, suitable to artillery, led from the Alberche -to the position; the one, being the royal road to Talavera, was -followed by the fourth corps and the reserve; the other, passing -through a place called the _Casa des Salinas_, led directly upon -sir Arthur Wellesley’s extreme left, and was followed by the first -corps: but to reach this Casa, which was situated near the plain -in front of the British left wing, it was necessary to ford the -Alberche, and to march for a mile or two through the woods. A dust, -which was observed to rise near the Casa itself indicated the -presence of troops at that place; and, in fact, general Mackenzie’s -division, and a brigade of light cavalry, were there posted: the -infantry in the forest, the cavalry on the plain; but no patroles -were sent to the front; and this negligence gave rise to the - - -COMBAT OF SALINAS. - -For, about three o’clock, Lapisse and Ruffin’s division having -crossed the Alberche, marched in two columns towards the _Casa de -Salinas_, and their light infantry came so suddenly on the British -outposts that the latter were surprised, and sir Arthur Wellesley, -who was in the _Casa_, nearly fell into the enemy’s hands. The -French columns followed briskly, and charged so hotly, that the -English brigades were separated; and being composed principally -of young battalions, got into confusion, one part fired upon -another, and the whole were driven into the plain. But, in the -midst of the disorder, the forty-fifth, a stubborn old regiment, -and some companies of the fifth battalion of the sixtieth, were -seen in perfect array; and when sir Arthur rode up to the spot, -the fight was restored, and maintained so steadily, that the enemy -was checked. The infantry, supported by two brigades of cavalry, -then crossed the plain, and regained the left and centre of the -position, having lost about four hundred men. General Mackenzie, -with one brigade, immediately took post in second line behind the -guards; the other, commanded by colonel Donkin, finding the hill on -the left unoccupied, drew up there, and so completed the position. -The cavalry was formed in column behind the left of the line. - -Victor, animated by the success of this first operation, brought -up Villatte’s division, together with all the artillery and light -cavalry, to the Casa de Salinas; then, issuing from the forest, -rapidly crossed the plain; and advancing, with a fine military -display, close up to the left of the position, occupied an isolated -hill directly in front of colonel Donkin’s ground, and immediately -opened a heavy cannonade upon that officer’s brigade. Meanwhile, -the fourth corps and the reserve approaching the right more slowly, -and being unable to discover the true situation of Cuesta’s -troops, sent their light cavalry forward to make that general -shew his lines. The French horsemen rode boldly up to the front, -and commenced skirmishing with their pistols, and the Spaniards -answered them with a general discharge of small arms; but then, ten -thousand infantry, and all the artillery, breaking their ranks, -fled to the rear: the artillery-men carried off their horses; the -infantry threw away their arms, and the adjutant-general O’Donoghue -was amongst the foremost of the fugitives. Nay, Cuesta himself was -in movement towards the rear. The panic spread, and the French -would fain have charged; but sir Arthur Wellesley, who was at hand, -immediately flanked the main road with some English squadrons: the -ditches on the other side rendered the country impracticable; and -the fire of musketry being renewed by those Spaniards who remained, -the enemy lost some men, and finally retreated in disorder. - -The greatest part of Cuesta’s runaways fled as far as Oropesa, -giving out that the allies were totally defeated, and the French -army in hot pursuit; thus, the rear became a scene of incredible -disorder: the commissaries went off with their animals; the -paymasters carried away their money chests; the baggage was -scattered; and the alarm spread far and wide; nor is it to be -concealed, that some English officers disgraced their uniform on -this occasion. Cuesta, however, having recovered from his first -alarm, sent many of his cavalry regiments to head the fugitives, -and drive them back; and a part of the artillery, and some -thousands of the infantry, were thus recovered during the night; -but, in the next day’s fight, the Spanish army was less by six -thousand men than it should have been, and the great redoubt in the -centre was silent for want of guns. - - -COMBAT ON THE EVENING OF THE 27TH. - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.] - -The hill on the left of the British army was the key of the whole -position. It was steep and rugged on the side towards the French, -and it was rendered more inaccessible by the ravine at the bottom; -but towards the English side it was of a smoother ascent. Victor, -however, observing that the extreme summit was unoccupied, and -that Donkin’s brigade was feeble, conceived the design of seizing -it by a sudden assault. The sun was sinking; and the twilight -and the confusion among the Spaniards on the right, appeared so -favourable to his project that, without communicating with the -king, he immediately directed Ruffin’s division to attack, Villatte -to follow in support, and Lapisse to fall on the German legion, so -as to create a diversion for Ruffin, but without engaging seriously -himself. The assault was quick and vigorous: colonel Donkin beat -back the enemy in his front, but his force was too weak to defend -every part; and many of the French turned his left, and mounted to -the summit behind him. At this moment, general Hill was ordered to -reinforce him; and it was not yet dark, when that officer, while -giving orders to the colonel of the 48th regiment, was fired at by -some troops from the highest point. Thinking they were stragglers -from his own ranks, firing at the enemy, he rode quickly up to -them, followed by his brigade-major, Fordyce; and in a moment found -himself in the midst of the French. Fordyce was killed; and Hill’s -own horse was wounded by a grenadier, who immediately seized the -bridle; but the general, spurring the animal hard, broke the man’s -hold, and galloping down the descent met the 29th regiment, and, -without an instant’s delay, led them up with such a fierce charge, -that the enemy could not sustain the shock. - -The summit was thus recovered; and the 48th regiment and the first -battalion of detachments were immediately brought forward, and, in -conjunction with the 29th and colonel Donkin’s brigade, presented a -formidable front of defence; and in good time, for the troops thus -beaten back were only a part of the 9th French regiment, forming -the advance of Ruffin’s division; but the two other regiments of -that division had lost their way in the ravine; hence the attack -had not ceased, but only subsided for a time. Lapisse was in -motion, and soon after opened his fire against the German legion; -and all the battalions of the 9th, being re-formed in one mass, -again advanced up the face of the hill with redoubled vigour. The -fighting then became vehement; and, in the darkness, the opposing -flashes of the musketry shewed with what a resolute spirit the -struggle was maintained, for the combatants were scarcely twenty -yards asunder, and for a time the event seemed doubtful; but soon -the well known shout of the British soldier was heard, rising above -the din of arms, and the enemy’s broken troops were driven once -more into the ravine below. Lapisse, who had made some impression -on the German legion, immediately abandoned his false attack, and -the fighting of the 27th ceased. The British lost about eight -hundred men, and the French about a thousand on that day. The -bivouac fires now blazed up on both sides, and the French and -British soldiers became quiet; but, about twelve o’clock, the -Spaniards on the right being alarmed at some horse in their front, -opened a prodigious peal of musketry and artillery, which continued -for twenty minutes without any object; and during the night, the -whole line was frequently disturbed by desultory firing from both -the Spanish and English troops, by which several men and officers -were unfortunately slain. - -The duke of Belluno, who had learned, from the prisoners, the -exact position of the Spaniards, until then unknown to the French -generals, now reported his own failure to the king, and proposed -that a second attempt should be made in the morning, at day-light; -but marshal Jourdan opposed this, as being a partial enterprize, -which could not lead to any great result. Victor, however, was -earnest for a trial, and, resting his representation on his -intimate knowledge of the ground, pressed the matter so home, -that he won Joseph’s assent, and immediately made dispositions -for the attack. The guns of the first corps, being formed in one -mass, on the height corresponding to that on which the English -left was posted, were enabled to command the great valley on their -own right, to range the summit of the hill in their front, and -obliquely to search the whole of the British line to the left, as -far as the great redoubt between the allied armies. - -Ruffin’s division was placed in advance, and Villatte’s in rear, of -the artillery; but the former kept one regiment close to the ravine. - -Lapisse occupied some low table-land, opposite to Sherbrooke’s -division. - -Latour Maubourg’s cavalry formed a reserve to Lapisse; and general -Beaumont’s cavalry formed a reserve to Ruffin. - -On the English side, general Hill’s division was concentrated; the -cavalry was massed behind the left, and the parc of artillery and -hospitals established under cover of the hill, between the cavalry -and Hill’s division. - - -COMBAT ON THE MORNING OF THE 28TH. - -About daybreak, Ruffin’s troops were drawn up, two regiments -abreast, supported by a third, in columns of battalions; and, in -this order, went forth against the left of the British, a part -directly against the front, and a part from the valley on the -right, thus embracing two sides of the hill. Their march was rapid -and steady; they were followed by Villatte’s division, and their -assault was preceded by a burst of artillery, that rattled round -the height, and swept away the English ranks by whole sections. The -sharp chattering of the musketry succeeded, the French guns were -then pointed towards the British centre and right, the grenadiers -instantly closed upon general Hill’s division, and the height -sparkled with fire. The inequalities of the ground broke the -compact formation of the troops on both sides, and small bodies -were seen here and there struggling for the mastery with all the -virulence of a single combat; in some places the French grenadiers -were overthrown at once, in others they would not be denied, and -reached the summit; but the reserves were always ready to vindicate -their ground, and no permanent footing was obtained. Still the -conflict was maintained with singular obstinacy; Hill himself was -wounded, and his men were falling fast; but the enemy suffered -more, and gave back, step by step at first, and slowly, to cover -the retreat of their wounded; but, finally, unable to sustain the -increasing fury of the English, and having lost above fifteen -hundred men in the space of forty minutes, the whole mass broke -away in disorder, and returned to their own position, covered by -the renewed play of their powerful artillery. - -To this destructive fire no adequate answer could be made, for the -English guns were few, and of small calibre; and when sir Arthur -Wellesley desired a reinforcement from Cuesta, the latter sent him -only two pieces; yet even those were serviceable, and the Spanish -gunners fought them gallantly. The principal line of the enemy’s -retreat was by the great valley, and a favourable opportunity for a -charge of horse occurred; but the English cavalry, having retired, -during the night, for water and forage, were yet too distant to be -of service. However, these repeated efforts of the French against -the hill, and the appearance of some of their light troops on the -mountain, beyond the left, taught the English general that he had -committed a fault in not prolonging his flank across the valley; -and he hastened to rectify it. For this purpose, he placed the -principal mass of his cavalry there, with the leading squadrons -looking into the valley, and, having obtained, from Cuesta, general -Bassecour’s division of infantry, posted it on the mountain -itself, in observation of the French light troops. Meanwhile, the -duke of Albuquerque, discontented with Cuesta’s arrangements, came, -with his division, to sir Arthur Wellesley, who placed him behind -the British, thus displaying a formidable array of horsemen, six -lines in depth. - -[Sidenote: Marshal Jourdan.] - -Immediately after the failure of Ruffin’s attack, king Joseph, -having, in person, examined the whole position of the allies, from -left to right, demanded of Jourdan and Victor if he should deliver -a general battle. The former replied that the great valley and the -mountain being unoccupied, on the 27th, sir Arthur Wellesley’s -attention should have been drawn to the right by a feint on the -Spaniards; that, during the night, the whole army should have been -silently placed in column, at the entrance of the great valley, -ready, at daybreak, to form a line of battle, on the left, to a new -front, and so have attacked the hill from whence Victor had been -twice repulsed. Such a movement, he said, would have obliged the -allies to change their front also, and, during this operation, they -might have been assailed with hopes of success. But this project -could not now be executed; the English, aware of their mistake, had -secured their left flank, by occupying the valley; and the mountain -and their front was inattackable. _Hence, the only prudent line -was to take up a position on the Alberche, and await the effect of -Soult’s operations on the English rear._ - -Marshal Victor opposed this counsel; he engaged to carry the hill -on the English left, notwithstanding his former failures, provided -the fourth corps would attack the right and centre at the same -moment; and he finished his argument by declaring that, if such a -combination failed, “_It was time to renounce making war_.” - -The king was embarrassed. His own opinion coincided with Jourdan’s; -but he feared that Victor would cause the emperor to believe a -great opportunity had been lost; and, while thus wavering, a -despatch arrived from Soult, by which it appeared that his force -could only reach Plasencia between the 3d and 5th of August. -Now, a detachment from the army of Venegas had already appeared -near Toledo, and that general’s advanced guard was approaching -Aranjuez. The king was troubled by the danger thus threatening -Madrid, because all the stores, the reserve artillery, and the -general hospitals of the whole army in Spain were deposited there; -and, moreover, the tolls received at the gates of that town formed -almost the only pecuniary resource of his court, so narrowly did -Napoleon reduce the expenditure of the war. - -These considerations overpowered his judgement, and, adopting the -worse and rejecting the better counsel, he resolved to succour the -capital; but, before separating the army, he determined to try the -chance of a battle. Indecision is a cancer in war: Joseph should -have adhered to the plan arranged with Soult; the advantages were -obvious, the ultimate success sure, and the loss of Madrid was -nothing in the scale, because it could only be temporary; but, if -the king thought otherwise, he should have decided to fight for it -at once; he should have drawn the fifth corps to him, prepared his -plan, and fallen, with the utmost rapidity, upon Cuesta, the 26th; -his advanced guard should have been on the Alberche that evening, -and, before twelve o’clock on the 27th, the English army would -have been without the aid of a single Spanish soldier. But, after -neglecting the most favourable opportunity when his army was full -of ardour, he now, with singular inconsistency, resolved to give -battle, when his enemies were completely prepared, strongly posted, -and in the pride of success, and when the confidence of his own -troops was shaken by the partial action of the morning. - -While the French generals were engaged in council, the troops on -both sides took some rest, and the English wounded were carried to -the rear; but the soldiers were suffering from hunger; the regular -service of provisions had ceased for several days, and a few ounces -of wheat, in the grain, formed the whole subsistence of men who -had fought, and who were yet to fight, so hardly. The Spanish camp -was full of confusion and distrust. Cuesta inspired terror, but no -confidence; and Albuquerque, whether from conviction or instigated -by momentary anger, just as the French were coming on to the final -attack, sent one of his staff to inform the English commander that -Cuesta was betraying him. The aide-de-camp, charged with this -message, delivered it to colonel Donkin, and that officer carried -it to sir Arthur Wellesley. The latter, seated on the summit of the -hill which had been so gallantly contested, was intently watching -the movements of the advancing enemy; he listened to this somewhat -startling message without so much as turning his head, and then -drily answering--“_Very well, you may return to your brigade_,” -continued his survey of the French. Donkin retired, filled with -admiration of the imperturbable resolution and quick penetration of -the man; and, indeed, sir Arthur’s conduct was, throughout that -day, such as became a general upon whose vigilance and intrepidity -the fate of fifty thousand men depended. - - -BATTLE OF TALAVERA. - -The dispositions of the French were soon completed. Ruffin’s -division, on the extreme right, was destined to cross the valley, -and, moving by the foot of the mountain, to turn the British left. - -Villatte’s orders were to menace the contested height with one -brigade, and to guard the valley with another, which, being -strengthened by a battalion of grenadiers, connected Ruffin’s -movement with the main attack. - -Lapisse, supported by Latour Maubourg’s dragoons, and by the king’s -reserve, was instructed to pass the ravine in front of the English -centre, and to fall, with half his infantry, upon Sherbrooke’s -division, while the other half, connecting its attack with -Villatte’s brigade, mounted the hill, and made a third effort to -master that important point. - -Milhaud’s dragoons were left on the main road, opposite Talavera, -to keep the Spaniards in check; but the rest of the heavy cavalry -was brought into the centre, behind general Sebastiani, who, with -the fourth corps, was to assail the right of the British army. A -part of the French light cavalry supported Villatte’s brigade in -the valley, and a part remained in reserve. - -A number of guns were distributed among the divisions, but the -principal mass remained on the hill, with the reserve of light -cavalry; where, also, the duke of Belluno stationed himself, to -direct the movements of the first corps. - -From nine o’clock in the morning until mid-day the field of battle -offered no appearance of hostility; the weather was intensely hot, -and the troops, on both sides, descended and mingled, without fear -or suspicion, to quench their thirst at the little brook which -divided the positions; but, at one o’clock in the afternoon, the -French soldiers were seen to gather round their eagles, and the -rolling of drums was heard along the whole line. Half an hour -later, the king’s guards, the reserve, and the fourth corps were -descried, near the centre of the enemy’s position, marching to -join the first corps; and, at two o’clock, the table-land and -the height on the French right, even to the valley, were covered -with the dark and lowering masses. At this moment some hundreds -of English soldiers, employed to carry the wounded to the rear, -returned in one body, and were, by the French, supposed to be sir -Robert Wilson’s corps joining the army; nevertheless, the duke of -Belluno, whose arrangements were now completed, gave the signal for -battle: and eighty pieces of artillery immediately sent a tempest -of bullets before the light troops, who, coming on swiftly and with -the violence of a hail-storm, were closely followed by the broad, -black columns, in all the majesty of war. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, from the summit of the hill, had a clear -view of the whole field of battle; and first he saw the fourth -corps rush forwards, with the usual impetuosity of French soldiers, -and clearing the intersected ground in their front, fall upon -Campbell’s division with infinite fury; but that general, assisted -by Mackenzie’s brigade, and by two Spanish battalions, withstood -their utmost efforts. The English regiments, putting the French -skirmishers aside, met the advancing columns with loud shouts, and, -breaking in on their front, and lapping their flanks with fire, -and giving no respite, pushed them back with a terrible carnage. -Ten guns were taken; but, as general Campbell prudently forbore -pursuit, the French rallied on their supports, and made a show of -attacking again: vain attempt! The British artillery and musketry -played too vehemently upon their masses, and a Spanish regiment of -cavalry charging on their flank at the same time, the whole retired -in disorder, and the victory was secured in that quarter. - -But, while this was passing on the right, Villatte’s division, -preceded by the grenadiers, and supported by two regiments of light -cavalry, was seen advancing up the great valley against the left, -and, beyond Villatte’s, Ruffin was discovered marching towards the -mountain. Sir Arthur Wellesley immediately ordered Anson’s brigade -of cavalry, composed of the twenty-third light dragoons and the -first German hussars, to charge the head of these columns; and this -brigade, coming on at a canter, and increasing its speed as it -advanced, rode headlong against the enemy, but, in a few moments, -came upon the brink of a hollow cleft, which was not perceptible at -a distance. The French, throwing themselves into squares, opened -their fire; and colonel Arenstchild, commanding the hussars, an -officer whom forty years’ experience had made a master in his art, -promptly reined up at the brink, exclaiming, in his broken phrase, -“_I will not kill my young mens!_” - -The English blood was hotter! The twenty-third, under colonel -Seymour, rode wildly down into the hollow, and men and horses -fell over each other in dreadful confusion. The survivors, still -untamed, mounted the opposite bank by two’s and three’s; Seymour -was wounded; but major Frederick Ponsonby, a hardy soldier, -rallying all who came up, passed through the midst of Villatte’s -columns, and, reckless of the musketry, from each side, fell, with -inexpressible violence, upon a brigade of French _chasseurs_ in -the rear. The combat was fierce but short; Victor had perceived -the first advance of the English, and detached his Polish lancers, -and Westphalian light-horse, to the support of Villatte; and these -fresh troops coming up when the twenty-third, already overmatched, -could scarcely hold up against the chasseurs, entirely broke them. -Those who were not killed or taken made for Bassecour’s Spanish -division, and so escaped, leaving behind two hundred and seven men -and officers, or about half the number that went into action. - -During this time the hill, the key of the position, was again -attacked, and Lapisse, crossing the ravine, pressed hard upon the -English centre; his own artillery, aided by the great battery on -his right, opened large gaps in Sherbrooke’s ranks, and the French -columns came close up to the British line in the resolution to win; -but they were received with a general discharge of all arms, and -so vigorously encountered, that they gave back in disorder; and, -in the excitement of the moment, the brigade of English guards, -quitting the line, followed up their success with inconsiderate -ardour. The enemy’s supporting columns and dragoons advanced, the -men who had been repulsed turned again, and the French batteries -pounded the flank and front of the guards. - -Thus maltreated, the latter drew back, and, at the same moment, the -German legion, being sorely pressed, got into confusion. Hill’s -and Campbell’s divisions, on the extremities of the line, still -held fast; but the centre of the British was absolutely broken, -and the fate of the day seemed to incline in favour of the French, -when, suddenly, colonel Donellan, with the forty-eighth regiment, -was seen advancing through the midst of the disordered masses. At -first, it seemed as if this regiment must be carried away by the -retiring crowds, but, wheeling back by companies, it let them pass -through the intervals, and then, resuming its proud and beautiful -line, marched against the right of the pursuing columns, and plied -them with such a destructive musketry, and closed upon them with -such a firm and regular pace, that the forward movement of the -French was checked. The guards and the Germans immediately rallied; -a brigade of light cavalry came up from the second line at a trot; -the artillery battered the enemy’s flanks without intermission, and -the French, beginning to waver, soon lost their advantage, and the -battle was restored. - -In all actions there is one critical and decisive moment which will -give the victory to the general who knows how to seize it. When -the guards first made their rash charge, sir Arthur Wellesley, -foreseeing the issue of it, had ordered the forty-eighth down from -the hill, although a rough battle was going on there; and, at the -same time, he directed Cotton’s light cavalry to advance. These -dispositions gained the day. The French relaxed their efforts by -degrees; the fire of the English grew hotter; and their loud and -confident shouts--sure augury of success--were heard along the -whole line. - -In the hands of a great general, Joseph’s guards and the reserve, -which were yet entire, might have restored the combat: but -all combination was at an end on the French side. The fourth -corps, beaten back on the left with the loss of ten guns, was in -confusion; the troops in the great valley on the right, amazed -at the furious charge of the twenty-third, and awed by the sight -of four distinct lines of cavalry, still in reserve, remained -stationary. No impression had been made on the hill; Lapisse -himself was mortally wounded, and, at last, his division giving -way, the whole army retired to its position, from whence it had -descended to the attack. This retrograde movement was covered by -skirmishers and an increasing fire of artillery; and the British, -reduced to less than fourteen thousand sabres and bayonets, and -exhausted by toil, and the want of food, could not pursue. The -Spanish army was incapable of any evolution, and about six o’clock -all hostility ceased, each army holding the position of the -morning. But the battle was scarcely over when, the dry grass and -shrubs taking fire, a volume of flames passed with inconceivable -rapidity across a part of the field, scorching, in its course, both -the dead and the wounded. - -On the British side two generals (Mackenzie and Langworth), -thirty-one officers of inferior rank, and seven hundred and -sixty-seven serjeants and soldiers were killed upon the spot; and -three generals, a hundred and ninety-two officers, three thousand -seven hundred and eighteen serjeants and privates wounded. Nine -officers, six hundred and forty-three serjeants and soldiers were -missing; thus making a total loss of six thousand two hundred and -sixty-eight, in the two days’ fighting, of which five thousand four -hundred and twenty-two fell on the 28th. - -[Sidenote: Marshal Jourdan, MSS.] - -[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations of the First Corps, MSS.] - -The French suffered more severely. Two generals and nine hundred -and forty-four killed; six thousand two hundred and ninety-four -wounded, and a hundred and fifty-six prisoners; furnishing a total -of seven thousand three hundred and eighty-nine men and officers, -of which four thousand were of the first corps. Of seventeen guns -captured, ten were taken by general Campbell’s division, and seven -were left in the woods by the French. - -The Spaniards returned above twelve hundred men, killed and -wounded, but the correctness of the report was very much doubted at -the time. - -The 29th, at day-break, the French army quitted its position, -and, before six o’clock, was in order of battle on the heights -of Salinas, behind the Alberche. That day, also, general Robert -Craufurd reached the English camp, with the forty-third, -fifty-second, and ninety-fifth or rifle regiment, and immediately -took charge of the outposts. These troops, after a march of -twenty miles, were in bivouac near Malpartida de Plasencia, when -the alarm, caused by the fugitive Spanish, spread to that part. -Craufurd allowed the men to rest for a few hours, and then, -withdrawing about fifty of the weakest from the ranks, commenced -his march with the resolution not to halt until he reached the -field of battle. As the brigade advanced, crowds of the runaways -were met with; and those not all Spaniards, propagating the vilest -falsehoods: “_the army was defeated_,”--“_Sir Arthur Wellesley was -killed_,”--“_the French were only a few miles distant_;” and some, -blinded by their fears, affected even to point out the enemy’s -advanced posts on the nearest hills. Indignant at this shameful -scene, the troops hastened, rather than slackened, the impetuosity -of their pace; and, leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in -twenty-six hours they had crossed the field of battle in a close -and compact body, having, in that time, passed over sixty-two -English miles, and in the hottest season of the year, each man -carrying from fifty to sixty pounds weight upon his shoulders. Had -the historian Gibbon known of such a march, he would have spared -his sneer about the “delicacy of modern soldiers!” - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -1º. The moral courage evinced by sir Arthur Wellesley, when, with -such a coadjutor as Cuesta, he accepted battle, was not less -remarkable than the judicious disposition which, finally, rendered -him master of the field. Yet it is doubtful if he could have -maintained his position had the French been well managed, and their -strength reserved for the proper moment, instead of being wasted on -isolated attacks during the night of the 27th, and the morning of -the 28th. A pitched battle is a great affair. A good general will -endeavour to bring all the moral, as well as the physical, force of -his army into play at the same time, if he means to win, and all -may be too little. - -Marshal Jourdan’s project was conceived in this spirit, and worthy -of his reputation; and it is possible, that he might have placed -his army, unperceived, on the flank of the English, and by a sudden -and general attack have carried the key of the position, and so -commenced his battle well: but sir Arthur Wellesley’s resources -would not then have been exhausted. He had foreseen such a -movement, and was prepared, by a change of front, to keep the enemy -in check with his left wing and cavalry; while the right, marching -upon the position abandoned by the French, should cut the latter -off from the Alberche. In this movement the allies would have been -reinforced by Wilson’s corps, which was near Cazalegas, and the -contending armies would then have exchanged lines of operation. -The French could, however, have gained nothing, unless they won a -complete victory; but the allies would, even though defeated, have -ensured their junction with Venegas. Madrid and Toledo would have -fallen; and before Soult could unite with Joseph, a new line of -operations, through the fertile country of La Mancha, would have -been obtained. But these matters are only speculative. - -2º. The distribution of the French troops for the great attack -cannot be praised. The attempt to turn the English left with a -single division was puerile. The allied cavalry was plainly to be -seen in the valley; how, then, could a single division hope to -develop its attack upon the hill, when five thousand horsemen were -hanging upon its flank? and, in fact, the whole of Ruffin’s, and -the half of Villatte’s division, were paralyzed by the charge of -a single regiment. To have rendered this movement formidable, the -principal part of the French cavalry should have preceded the march -of the infantry; but the great error was fighting at all, before -Soult reached Plasencia. - -3º. It has been said, that to complete the victory sir Arthur -Wellesley should have caused the Spaniards to advance; but this -would, more probably, have led to a defeat. Neither Cuesta, nor -his troops, were capable of an orderly movement. The infantry of -the first and the fourth corps were still above twenty thousand -strong; and, although a repulsed, by no means a discomfited -force. The cavalry, the king’s guards, and Dessolle’s division, -had not been engaged at all, and were alone sufficient to beat -the Spaniards. A second panic, such as that of the 27th, would -have led to the most deplorable consequences, as those, who know -with what facility French soldiers recover from a repulse, will -readily acknowledge. This battle was one of hard honest fighting, -and the exceeding gallantry of the troops honoured the nations -to which they belonged. The English owed much to the general’s -dispositions and something to fortune. The French owed nothing to -their commander; but when it is considered that only the reserve -of their infantry were withheld from the great attack on the 28th, -and that, consequently, above thirty thousand men were closely -and unsuccessfully engaged for three hours with sixteen thousand -British, it must be confessed that the latter proved themselves -to be truly formidable soldiers; yet the greatest part were raw -men, so lately drafted from the militia regiments that many of -them still bore the number of their former regiments on their -accoutrements. - -[Illustration: _Plate 7. to face Pa. 409_ - - Operations of the - BRITISH, FRENCH & SPANISH ARMIES, - in July & August 1809. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -The French rested the 29th at Salinas; but, in the night, the king -marched with the 4th corps and the reserve to St. Ollalla, from -whence he sent a division to relieve Toledo. The 31st, he halted. -The 1st of August he marched to Illescas, a central position, from -whence he could interpose between Venegas and the capital. The -duke of Belluno, with the first corps, remained on the Alberche, -having orders to fall upon the rear-guard of the allies, when -the latter should be forced to retire, in consequence of Soult’s -operations. Meantime, sir Robert Wilson, who, during the action -was near Cazalegas, returned to Escalona; and Victor, displaying -an unaccountable dread of this small body, which he supposed to be -the precursor of the allied army, immediately retired, first to -Maqueda, then to Santa Cruz del Retamar, and was even proceeding to -Mostoles, when a retrograde movement of the allies recalled him to -the Alberche. - -The British army was so weak, and had suffered so much, that the -29th and 30th were passed, by sir Arthur, in establishing his -hospitals at Talavera, and in fruitless endeavours to procure -provisions, and the necessary assistance to prevent the wounded men -from perishing. Neither Cuesta nor the inhabitants of Talavera, -although possessing ample means, would render the slightest aid, -nor would they even assist to bury the dead. The corn secreted in -Talavera was alone sufficient to support the army for a month; -but the troops were starving, although the inhabitants, who had -fled across the Tagus with their portable effects at the beginning -of the battle, had now returned. It is not surprising that, in -such circumstances, men should endeavour to save their property, -especially provisions; yet the apathy with which they beheld the -wounded men dying for want of aid, and those who were found sinking -from hunger, did in no wise answer Mr. Frere’s description of them, -as men who “_looked upon the war in the light of a crusade, and -carried it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause_.” - -This conduct left an indelible impression on the minds of the -English soldiers. From that period to the end of the war their -contempt and dislike of the Spaniards were never effaced; and long -afterwards, Badajos and St. Sebastian suffered for the churlish -behaviour of the people of Talavera. The principal motive of action -with the Spaniards was always personal rancour: hence, those troops -who had behaved so ill in action, and the inhabitants, who withheld -alike their sympathy and their aid from the English soldiers to -whose bravery they owed the existence of their town, were busily -engaged after the battle, in beating out the brains of the wounded -French as they lay upon the field; and they were only checked -by the English soldiers, who, in some instances, fired upon the -perpetrators of this horrible iniquity. - -Cuesta also gave proofs of his ferocious character; he, who had -shown himself alike devoid of talent and real patriotism, whose -indolence and ignorance of his profession had banished all order -and discipline from his army, and whose stupid pride had all -but caused its destruction, now assumed the Roman general, and -proceeded to decimate the regiments that had fled in the panic -on the 27th. Above fifty men he slew in this manner; and if his -cruelty, so contrary to reason and the morals of the age, had not -been mitigated by the earnest intercession of sir Arthur Wellesley, -more men would have been destroyed in cold blood, by this savage -old man, than had fallen in the battle. - -[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -Hitherto the allied generals had thought little of the duke of -Dalmatia’s movements, and their eyes were still fixed on Madrid; -but, the 30th, information was received at Talavera, that twelve -thousand rations had been ordered, for the 28th, at Fuente Dueña -by that marshal, and twenty-four thousand at Los Santos, a town -situated between Alba de Tormes and the pass of Baños. Cuesta, -conscious of the defenceless state of the latter post, suggested -that sir Robert Wilson should be sent there; but sir Arthur -Wellesley wished Wilson to remain at Escalona, to renew his -intercourse with Madrid, and proposed that a Spanish corps should -go. Indeed, he still slighted the idea of danger from that quarter, -and hoped that the result of the battle would suffice to check -Soult’s march. Cuesta rejected this proposal at the moment, and -again, on the 31st, when sir Arthur renewed his application; but, -on the 1st of August, it was known that Soult had entered Bejar; -and then, on the 2d, general Bassecour was detached by Cuesta to -defend the Puerto de Baños, from which he was absent four long -marches, while the enemy had been, on the 31st, within one march. - -The day that Bassecour marched, intelligence arrived that Soult had -entered Plasencia. Baños had been abandoned to the enemy without -a shot; for the battalions from Bejar had dispersed, and those -sent by Cuesta had been withdrawn to Almaraz by their general the -marquis de la Reyna, who also proclaimed that he would destroy the -boat-bridge at that place. This news roused Cuesta; he proposed -that half the allied army should march to the rear, and attack -Soult. Sir Arthur Wellesley refused to divide the English army, but -offered to go or stay with the whole; and, when the other desired -him to choose, he answered that he would go, and Cuesta appeared -satisfied. - -On the night of the 2d August, letters were received from Wilson, -announcing the appearance of the French near Nombella, whither he, -unconscious of the effect produced by his presence at Escalona, -had retreated with his infantry, sending his artillery to St. -Roman, near Talavera. As sir Arthur Wellesley could not suppose -that sir Robert Wilson’s corps alone would cause the first corps to -retire, he naturally concluded that Victor’s design was to cross -the Alberche at Escalona, crush Wilson, and operate a communication -with Soult by the valley of the Tietar. As such a movement, if -persisted in, would necessarily dislodge Cuesta from Talavera, -sir Arthur, before he commenced his march, obtained the Spanish -general’s promise that he would collect cars, for the purpose of -transporting as many of the English wounded as were in a condition -to be moved, from Talavera, to some more suitable place. This -promise, like all the others, was shamefully violated; but the -British general had not yet learned the full extent of Cuesta’s bad -faith, and thinking that a few days would suffice to drive back -Soult, marched, on the 3d of August, with seventeen thousand men, -to Oropesa, intending to unite with Bassecour’s division, and to -fight Soult, whose force he estimated at fifteen thousand. - -[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations 2d corps, MS.] - -Meanwhile, Soult being, by the return of general Foy, on the -24th of July, assured of the king’s concurrence in the combined -movements to be executed, ordered Laborde, Merle, and La Houssaye -to march from Zamora and Toro upon Salamanca and Ledesma, and to -scour the banks of the Tormes. The sixth corps was also directed -upon the same place; and, the 25th, Soult repaired to Salamanca -in person, intending to unite the three corps there. Hearing, -however, of Victor’s retrograde movement from the Alberche to the -Guadarama, he desired marshal Mortier to march, on the 28th, to -Plasencia, by Fuente Roble and Bejar, and he placed La Houssaye’s -and Lorge’s dragoons under his command: the remainder of the second -corps and the light cavalry were to follow when the sixth corps -should be in motion. This done, Soult wrote to the king, saying, -“_My urgent desire is that your majesty may not fight a general -battle before you are certain of the concentration of all my forces -near Plasencia. The most important results will be obtained if -your majesty will abstain from attacking until the moment when a -knowledge of my march causes the enemy to retrace his steps, which -he must do, or he is lost._” - -The 29th, the fifth corps was at Fuente Roble; but information -being received that Beresford, with an army, had reached Almeida -on the 27th, the march was covered by strong detachments on the -side of Ciudad Rodrigo. The long-expected convoy of artillery and -ammunition for the second corps had, however, arrived in Salamanca -the 29th; and Ney wrote, from Toro, that he also would be there -the 31st. - -The 30th, the fifth corps drove the marquis de la Reyna from the -pass of Baños, and took post at Aldea Neuva del Camina and Herbas; -and the second corps, quitting Salamanca, arrived, the same day, at -Siete Carrera. - -The 31st, the fifth corps entered Plasencia; the second corps -reached Fuente la Casa, Fuente Roble, San Estevan, and Los Santos. - -Plasencia was full of convalescents, detachments, and -non-combatants; and when the French arrived, about two thousand -men, including five hundred of the Lusitanian legion, evacuated the -town, taking the road to Moraleja and Zarza Mayor; but four hundred -sick men, following the enemy’s accounts, were captured, together -with a few stores. During these rapid marches, the French were -daily harassed by the Spanish peasantry: the villages were also -deserted; the cavalry wandered far and near to procure subsistence; -and several slight skirmishes and some pillage took place. - -The 1st of August, the second corps passed the Col de Baños, and -the head of the column entered Plasencia, which was, like other -places, deserted by the greatest part of the inhabitants. Vague -reports that a battle had been fought between the 26th and 29th was -the only intelligence that could be procured of the situation of -the allies; and, on the 2d, the advanced guard of the army marched -to the Venta de Bazagona, while scouting parties were, at the same -time, directed towards Coria, to acquire news of marshal Beresford, -who was now said to be moving along the Portuguese frontier. - -The 3d of August, the fifth corps and the dragoons, passing the -Tietar, reached Toril, the outposts were pushed to Cazatejada and -Sierra de Requemada; but the second corps remained at Plasencia, -awaiting the arrival of the sixth corps, the head of which was now -at Baños. Hence, on the 3d of August, the king and Sebastiani being -at Illescas and Valdemoro, Victor at Maqueda, Cuesta at Talavera, -sir Arthur Wellesley at Oropesa, and Soult on the Tietar; the -narrow valley of the Tagus was crowded in its whole length by the -contending troops. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 1, section 4.] - -The allies held the centre, being only one day’s march asunder; -but their force, when concentrated, was not more than forty-seven -thousand men. The French could not unite in under three days, -but their combined forces exceeded ninety thousand men, of which -fifty-three thousand were under Soult; and this singular situation -was rendered more remarkable by the ignorance in which all parties -were as to the strength and movements of their adversaries. Victor -and the king, frightened by Wilson’s partizan corps of four -thousand men, were preparing to unite at Mostoles, while Cuesta, -equally alarmed at Victor, was retiring from Talavera. Sir Arthur -Wellesley was supposed, by Joseph, to be at the head of twenty-five -thousand British; and the former, calculating on Soult’s weakness, -was marching, with twenty-three thousand Spanish and English, -to engage fifty-three thousand French; while Soult, unable to -ascertain the exact situation of either friends or enemies, little -suspected that the prey was rushing into his jaws. At this moment -the fate of the Peninsula hung by a thread, which could not bear -the weight for twenty-four hours; yet fortune so ordained that no -irreparable disaster ensued. - -[Illustration: _Plate 8._ - - _The Battle of_ - TALAVERA, - _at the period of the final Attack_ - on the 28^{th} July 1809. - -_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._] - -At five o’clock in the evening of the third, it was known at the -English head-quarters that the French were near Naval Moral, and, -consequently, between the allies and the bridge of Almaraz. - -At six o’clock, letters from Cuesta advised sir Arthur that the -king was again advancing, and that, from intercepted despatches -addressed to Soult, it appeared that the latter must be stronger -than was supposed; hence, Cuesta said that, wishing to aid the -English, he would quit Talavera that evening: in other words, -abandon the British hospitals! - -To this unexpected communication sir Arthur replied that the king -was still some marches off, and that Venegas should be directed -to occupy him on the Upper Tagus; that Soult’s strength was -exceedingly overrated, and Victor’s movements not decided enough to -oblige the Spanish army to quit Talavera. Hence he required that -Cuesta should at least wait until the next morning, to cover the -evacuation of the English hospitals. But, before this communication -reached Cuesta, the latter was in full march; and, at day-break on -the 4th, the Spanish army was descried moving, in several columns, -down the valley towards Oropesa, where Bassecour’s division soon -after joined it from Centinello, and, at the same time, the cavalry -patroles found the French near Naval Moral. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley having, by this time, seen the intercepted -letters himself, became convinced that Soult’s force was not -overrated at thirty thousand; and the duke of Dalmatia, who had -also intercepted some English letters, learned that, on the first -of August, the allies were still at Talavera, and ill-informed of -his march. Thus, the one general perceived his danger and the -other his advantage at the same moment. - -Mortier was immediately ordered, by the duke of Dalmatia, to -take a position with the fifth corps at Cazatejada, to seize the -boat-bridge at Almaraz, if it was not destroyed, and to patrole -towards Arzobispo. The second corps was, likewise, directed upon -the same place; and the head of the sixth entered Plasencia. The -further progress of the allies was thus barred in front; the Tagus -was on their left; impassable mountains on their right; and it was -certain that Cuesta’s retreat would immediately bring the king -and Victor down upon their rear. The peril of this situation was -apparent to every soldier in the British ranks, and produced a -general inquietude. No man felt the slightest confidence in the -Spaniards, and the recollection of the stern conflict at Talavera, -aided by a sense of exhaustion from long abstinence, depressed the -spirits of men and officers. The army was, indeed, ready to fight, -but all persons felt that it must be for safety, not for glory. - -In this trying moment, sir Arthur Wellesley abated nothing of his -usual calmness and fortitude. He knew not the full extent of the -danger; but, assuming the enemy in his front to be thirty thousand -men, and Victor to have twenty-five thousand others in his rear, -he judged that to continue the offensive would be rash, because -he must fight and beat those two marshals separately within three -days, which, with starving and tired troops, inferior in number, -was scarcely to be accomplished. But, to remain where he was on the -defensive was equally unpromising, because the road from Talavera -to Arzobispo led through Calera, in the rear of Oropesa; and thus -Victor could intercept the only line of retreat, and a battle must -then be fought, in an unfavourable position, against the united -forces of the enemy, estimated, as we have seen, to be above -fifty thousand men. One resource remained: to pass the bridge of -Arzobispo immediately, and take up a line of defence behind that -river, before the French could seize the Col de Mirabete, and so -cut off the road to Truxillo and Merida--a hard alternative; but -the long-cherished error relative to Soult’s weakness had dried -up the springs of success, and left the campaign, like a withered -stem, without fruit or foliage. - -Cuesta doggedly opposed this project; asserting that Oropesa was -a position suitable for a battle, and that he would fight there. -Further concession to his humours would have been folly, and sir -Arthur sternly declared that he would move forthwith, leaving the -Spanish general to do that which should seem meet to him; and, -assuredly, this decided conduct saved the Peninsula, for not fifty, -but ninety thousand enemies were at hand. - -It was now six o’clock in the morning, the baggage and ammunition -were already in motion for the bridge of Arzobispo; but the army, -which had been reinforced by a troop of horse-artillery, and some -convalescents that escaped from Plasencia, remained in position for -several hours, to cover the passage of the stores and the wounded -men from Talavera; the latter having just arrived at Calera in -the most pitiable condition. About noon, the road being clear, -the columns marched to the bridge; and, at two o’clock, the whole -army was in position at the other side, the present danger was -averted, and the combinations of the enemy were baffled. During the -passage, several herds of swine, which, following the custom of the -country, were feeding in the woods, under charge of the swineherds, -were fallen in with; and the soldiers, instigated by hunger, broke -their ranks, and ran in upon the animals as in a charge, shooting, -stabbing, and, like men possessed, cutting off the flesh while the -beasts were yet alive; nor can this conduct be much censured under -the circumstances of the moment; yet it was a severe misfortune to -the poor peasants, whose property was thus destroyed. - -From Arzobispo, the army moved towards Deleytoza; but general -Craufurd’s brigade, with six pieces of artillery, was directed -to gain the bridge of Almaraz by a forced march, lest the enemy, -discovering the ford below that place, should cross the river, -and seize the Puerto de Mirabete. The roads were exceedingly -rugged, and the guns could only be dragged up the Meza d’Ibor by -the force of men. Nevertheless, Craufurd reached his destination -on the evening of the 5th, and the head-quarters were established -at Deleytoza, on the 7th, the artillery being at Campillo, the -rear guard occupying the Meza d’Ibor. The sick and wounded were -then forwarded to Merida; but the paucity of transport was such, -that sir Arthur Wellesley was obliged to unload both ammunition -and treasure carts for the conveyance of these unfortunate men. -Meanwhile Soult, little thinking that his object was already -frustrated, continued his march on the 5th, and Mortier took post -at Naval Moral; the advanced guard entered Puebla de Naciada, and -the patroles, scouring the roads to Oropesa and the bridge of -Arzobispo, fell in with and were chased by the Spanish cavalry -from Arzobispo; for Cuesta would not retire on the 4th, and was in -the act of passing the bridge when the French came in view. The -movements were now hurried on both sides; before dark, the Spanish -army was across the Tagus, with the exception of a rear guard, -which remained on the right bank that evening, but it was driven -across the river, on the morning of the 6th, by the fifth corps, -which afterwards took post at Valdeveja and Puebla de Naciada. Ney -also reached Naval Moral, and the second corps entered Gordo. - -The 7th, Mortier examined the Spanish position, and reported that -Cuesta, having thrown up entrenchments, and placed twenty guns in -battery, to rake the bridge, which was also barricadoed, had left -two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to hold the post, and -withdrawn the rest of his army towards Meza d’Ibor. Hereupon, Soult -detached his light cavalry towards Talavera, to communicate with -the king, and brought up the second corps to Arzobispo. Meanwhile, -the duke of Belluno having, on the 5th, ascertained the retreat -of the allies from Talavera, retraced his steps, and entered that -town on the 6th. Thus the English wounded, left there, fell into -his hands, and their treatment was such as might be expected from -a gallant and courteous nation, for, between the British soldiers -and the French, there was no rancour, and the generous usages of a -civilized and honourable warfare were cherished. - -The 7th, Victor crossed the Tagus, at the bridge of Talavera, and -pushed his advanced guard to Aldea Nueva de Balbaroya, on the left -bank, within a few leagues of the Spanish position, which Soult -was preparing to attack in front, for he had observed that, at a -certain point, the Spanish horses, when brought to drink, came far -into the stream, and, the place being sounded in the night of the -7th, a deep but practicable ford was discovered, about half a mile -above the bridge. - -The fifth and second corps and a division of the sixth were -concentrated to force this passage, early on the morning of the -8th; but Soult being just then informed of Victor’s movement, and -perceiving that Albuquerque had withdrawn the Spanish cavalry, -leaving only a rear guard in the works, judged that the allies -were retreating; wherefore, without relinquishing the attack at -Arzobispo, he immediately sent the division of the sixth corps -back to Naval Moral, and, at the same time, transmitted a plan of -the ford below Almaraz, directed Ney to cross the Tagus there, -seize the Puerto de Mirabete, and be in readiness to fall upon the -allies, as they came out from the defiles between Deleytoza and -Truxillo. - -Meanwhile, the heat of the day had induced Albuquerque to seek -shelter for his horsemen in a wood, near Azutan, a village about -five miles from the bridge; and the Spanish infantry, keeping a bad -guard, were sleeping or loitering about without care or thought, -when Mortier, who was charged with the direction of the attack, -taking advantage of their want of vigilance, commenced the passage -of the river. - - -COMBAT OF ARZOBISPO. - -The French cavalry, about six thousand in number, were secretly -assembled near the ford, and, about two o’clock in the day, general -Caulaincourt’s brigade suddenly entered the stream. The Spaniards, -running to their arms, manned the batteries, and opened upon the -leading squadrons; but Mortier, with a powerful concentric fire -of artillery, immediately overwhelmed the Spanish gunners; and -Caulaincourt, having reached the other side of the river, turned -to his right, and, taking the batteries in reverse, cut down the -artillerymen, and dispersed the infantry who attempted to form. The -duke of Albuquerque, who had mounted at the first alarm, now came -down with all his horsemen in one mass, but without order, upon -Caulaincourt, and the latter was, for a few moments, in imminent -danger; but the rest of the French cavalry, passing rapidly, soon -joined in the combat; one brigade of infantry followed at the ford, -another burst the barriers on the bridge itself, and, by this time, -the Spanish foot were flying to the mountains. Albuquerque’s effort -was thus frustrated, a general route ensued, and five guns and -about four hundred prisoners were taken. - -Soult’s intention being to follow up this success, he directed -that the first corps should move, in two columns, upon Guadalupe -and Deleytoza, intending to support it with the second and fifth, -while the sixth corps crossed at Almaraz, and seized the pass of -Mirabete. This would undoubtedly have completed the ruin of the -Spanish army, and forced sir Arthur to make a rapid and disastrous -retreat; for so complete was the surprise and so sudden the -overthrow that some of the English foragers also fell into the -hands of the enemy; and that Cuesta’s army was in no condition to -have made any resistance, if the pursuit had been continued with -vigour, is clear, from the following facts:-- - -1º. When he withdrew his main body from the bridge of Arzobispo to -Peralada de Garbin, on the 7th, he left fifteen pieces of artillery -by the road-side, without a guard. The defeat of Albuquerque placed -these guns at the mercy of the enemy, who were, however, ignorant -of their situation, until a trumpeter attending an English flag -of truce, either treacherously or foolishly, mentioned it in the -French camp, from whence a detachment of cavalry was sent to fetch -them off. 2º. The British military agent, placed at the Spanish -head-quarters, was kept in ignorance of the action; and it was -only by the arrival of the duke of Albuquerque, at Deleytoza, on -the evening of the 9th, that sir Arthur Wellesley knew the bridge -was lost. He had before advised Cuesta to withdraw behind the Ibor -river, and even now contemplated a partial attack to keep the enemy -in check; but when he repaired in person to that general’s quarter, -on the 10th, he found the country covered with fugitives and -stragglers, and Cuesta as helpless and yet as haughty as ever. All -his ammunition and guns (forty pieces) were at the right bank of -the Ibor, and, of course, at the foot of the Meza, and within sight -and cannon-shot of the enemy, on the right bank of the Tagus. They -would have been taken by the first French patroles that approached, -but that sir Arthur Wellesley persuaded the Spanish staff-officers -to have them dragged up the hill, in the course of the 10th, -without Cuesta’s knowledge. - -In this state of affairs, the impending fate of the Peninsula was -again averted by the king, who recalled the first corps to the -support of the fourth, then opposed to Venegas. Marshal Ney, also, -was unable to discover the ford below the bridge of Almaraz; and, -by the 11th, the allies had re-established their line of defence. -The head-quarters of the British were at Jaraicejo, and those -of the Spaniards at Deleytoza: the former, guarding the ford of -Almaraz, formed the left; the latter, occupying the Meza d’Ibor -and Campillo, were on the right. The 12th, Cuesta having resigned, -general Equia succeeded to the command, and gave hopes of a better -co-operation; but the evil was in the character of the people. -The position of the allies was, however, compact and central; the -reserves could easily support the advanced posts; the communication -to the rear was open; and, if defended with courage, the Meza -d’Ibor is impregnable. To pass the Tagus at Almaraz, in itself a -difficult operation, would be of no avail to the enemy, while the -Mirabete and Meza d’Ibor were occupied, because his troops would be -enclosed in the narrow space between those ridges and the river. - -The duke of Dalmatia, thus thwarted, conceived that sir Arthur -Wellesley would endeavour to re-pass the Tagus by Alcantara, and -so rejoin Beresford and the five thousand British troops under -Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn, which were, by this time, near the -frontier of Portugal. To prevent this he resolved to march at once -upon Coria, with the second, fifth, and sixth corps, to menace -the communications both of sir Arthur and Beresford with Lisbon, -and, at the same time, prepare for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; -but marshal Ney absolutely refused to concur in this operation: -he observed that sir Arthur Wellesley was not yet in march for -Alcantara; that it was exceedingly dangerous to invade Portugal in -a hasty manner; and that the army could not be fed between Coria, -Plasencia, and the Tagus; finally, that Salamanca, being again in -possession of the Spaniards, it was more fitting that the sixth -corps should retake that town, and occupy the line of the Tormes to -cover Castile. - -This reasoning was approved by Joseph; he dreaded the further -fatigue and privations that would attend a continuance of the -operations during the excessive heats, and in a wasted country; and -he was strengthened in his opinion by the receipt of a despatch -from the emperor, dated Schoenbrun, the 29th of July, in which any -further offensive operations were forbad, until the reinforcements -which the recent victory of Wagram enabled him to send should -arrive in Spain. The second corps was, consequently, directed to -take post at Plasencia. The fifth corps relieved the first at -Talavera; and the English wounded being, by Victor, given over to -marshal Mortier, the latter, with a chivalrous sense of honour, -would not permit his own soldiers, although suffering severe -privations themselves, to receive rations until the hospitals were -first supplied. The sixth corps was now directed upon Valladolid, -for Joseph was alarmed lest fresh insurrection, excited and -supported by the duke del Parque, should spread over the whole of -Leon and Castile. Ney marched, on the 11th, from Plasencia; but, -to his surprise, found that sir Robert Wilson, with about four -thousand men, part Spaniards, part Portuguese, was in possession of -the pass of Baños. To explain this, it must be observed, that when -the British army marched from Talavera, on the 3d, Wilson, being -at Nombella, was put in communication with Cuesta. He had sent his -artillery to the army on the 3d, and on the 4th, finding that the -Spaniards had abandoned Talavera, he fell back with his infantry -to Vellada, a few miles north of Talavera. He was then twenty-four -miles from Arzobispo; and, as Cuesta did not quit Oropesa until the -5th, a junction with sir Arthur Wellesley might have been effected: -but it was impossible to know this at the time; and Wilson, very -prudently, crossing the Tietar, made for the mountains, trusting to -his activity and local knowledge to escape the enemy. Villatte’s -division pursued him, on the 5th, to Nombella; a detachment from -the garrison of Avila was watching for him in the passes of Arenas -and Monbeltran, and general Foy waited for him in the Vera de -Plasencia. Nevertheless, he baffled his opponents, broke through -their circle at Viandar, passed the Gredos at a ridge called the -Sierra de Lanes, and, getting into the valley of the Tormes, -reached Bejar: from thence, thinking to recover his communications -with the army, he marched towards Plasencia, by the pass of Baños, -and thus, on the morning of the 12th, met with Ney, returning to -the Salamanca country. - -The dust of the French column being seen from afar, and a retreat -to Ciudad Rodrigo open, it is not easy to comprehend why sir Robert -Wilson should have given battle to the sixth corps. His position, -although difficult of approach, and strengthened by the piling of -large stones in the narrowest parts, was not one in which he could -hope to stop a whole army; and, accordingly, when the French, -overcoming the local obstacles, got close upon his left, the fight -was at an end. The first charge broke both the legion and the -Spanish auxiliaries, and the whole dispersed. Ney then continued -his march, and, having recovered the line of the Tormes, resigned -the command of the sixth corps to general Marchand, and returned to -France. But, while these things happened in Estremadura, La Mancha -was the theatre of more important operations. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -When the duke of Belluno retired from Salinas to Maqueda, the -king, fearing that the allies were moving up the right bank of the -Alberche, carried his reserve, in the night of the 3d, to Mostoles; -but the fourth corps remained at Illescas, and sent strong patroles -to Valdemoro. Wilson, however, retired, as we have seen, from -Nombella on the 4th; and the king, no longer expecting the allies -in that quarter, marched in the night to Valdemoro, where he was -joined by the fourth corps from Illescas. - -The 5th, the duke of Belluno returned to St. Ollalla; and the king -marched against general Venegas, who, in pursuance of the secret -orders of the junta, before mentioned, had loitered about Daymiel -and Tembleque until the 27th of July. The 29th, however, Venegas -reached Ocaña, his advanced posts being at Aranjuez, his rear-guard -at Yepes, and one division, under Lacy, in front of Toledo. The -same day, one of the _partidas_, attending the army, surprised -a small French post on the other side of the Tagus; and Lacy’s -division skirmished with the garrison of Toledo. - -The 30th, Venegas heard of the battle of Talavera; and at the same -time Lacy reported that the head of the enemy’s columns were to be -seen on the road beyond Toledo. Hereupon, the Spanish commander -reinforced Lacy, and gave him Mora as a point of retreat; but, on -the 2d of August, being falsely informed by Cuesta that the allied -troops would immediately march upon Madrid, Venegas recalled -his divisions from Toledo, pretending to concentrate his army at -Aranjuez, in order to march also upon the capital; but he had no -intention of doing so; for the junta did not desire to see Cuesta, -at the head of sixty thousand men, in that city; and, previous to -the battle of Talavera, had not only forbidden him to enter Madrid, -but appointed another man governor. This prohibition would, no -doubt, have been disregarded by Cuesta; but Venegas was obedient -to their secret instructions, and under pretence of danger to his -flanks, if he marched on the capital, remained at Aranjuez, where -his flank being equally exposed to an enemy coming from Toledo, he -yet performed no service to the general cause. - -The 3d, he pushed an advanced guard to Puente Largo; and leaving -six hundred infantry, and some cavalry, near Toledo, concentrated -his army between Aranjuez and Ocaña; and in this position he -remained until the 5th, when his advanced guard was driven from -the Puente Largo, and across the Tagus. His line of posts on that -river was then attacked by the French skirmishers, and, under -cover of a heavy cannonade, his position was examined by the -enemy’s generals; but when the latter found that all the bridges -above and below Aranjuez were broken down, they resolved to pass -the Tagus at Toledo. With this intent, the French army re-crossed -the Xarama river, and marched in the direction of that city; but -Venegas still keeping his posts at Aranjuez, foolishly dispersed -his other divisions at Tembleque, Ocaña, and Guardia. He himself -was desirous of defending La Mancha. The central junta, with more -prudence, wished him to retreat into the Sierra Morena; but Mr. -Frere proposed that his army should be divided; one part to enter -the Morena, and the other to march by Cuença, upon Aragon, and so -to menace the communications with France! The admirable absurdity -of this proposal would probably have caused it to be adopted, if -Sebastiani’s movements had not put an end to the discussion. That -general, crossing the Tagus at Toledo, and at a ford higher up, -drove the Spaniards’ left back upon the Guazalate. This was on the -9th of August; on the 10th, Venegas concentrated his whole army -at Almonacid, and, holding a council of war, resolved to attack -the French on the 12th; but the time was miscalculated. Sebastiani -advanced on the 11th, and commenced - - -THE BATTLE OF ALMONACID. - -The army of Venegas, including two thousand cavalry, was somewhat -more than twenty-five thousand strong, with forty pieces of -artillery. It was the most efficient Spanish force that had yet -taken the field; it was composed of the best regiments in Spain, -well armed and clothed; and the generals of division were neither -incapacitated by age, nor destitute of experience, most of them -having been employed in the previous campaign. The village of -Almonacid was in the centre of the Spanish position; and, together -with some table-land in front of it, was occupied by two divisions -of infantry under general Castejon. The left wing, under general -Lacy, rested on a hill which covered the main road to Consuegra. -The right wing, commanded by general Vigodet, was drawn up on some -rising ground covering the road to Tembleque. A reserve, under -general Giron, and the greatest part of the artillery, were posted -behind the centre, on a rugged hill, crowned by an old castle. The -cavalry were placed at the extremity of each wing. - -General Dessolles, with the French reserve, was still some hours’ -march behind, but Sebastiani, after observing the dispositions -made by Venegas, resolved to attack him with the fourth corps -only. The Polish division immediately marched against the front; -Leval’s Germans turned the flank of the hill, on which the Spanish -left was posted; and two French brigades were directed upon the -centre. After a sharp fight, the Spanish left was put to flight; -but Venegas, outflanking the victorious troops with his cavalry, -charged and threw them into disorder. At this moment, the head of -Dessolles’s column arrived, and enabled Sabastiani’s reserves to -restore the combat; and then the Spanish cavalry, shattered by -musketry, and by the fire of four pieces of artillery, was, in -turn, charged by a French regiment of horse, and broken. Venegas -rallied his troops again on the castle-hill, behind the village; -but the king came up with the remainder of the reserve, and the -attack was renewed. The Poles and Germans continued their march -against the left flank of the Spaniards; nine fresh battalions fell -upon their centre, and a column of six battalions forced the right. -The height and the castle were thus carried at the first effort. -Venegas attempted to cover his retreat, by making a stand in the -plain behind; but two divisions of dragoons charged his troops -before they could re-form, and the disorder became irremediable. -The Spaniards, throwing away their arms, dispersed in every -direction, and were pursued and slaughtered by the horsemen for -several hours. - -Following the French account, three thousand of the vanquished -were slain, and four thousand taken prisoners; and all the -guns, baggage, ammunition, and carriages fell into the hands of -the victors, whose loss did not exceed fifteen hundred men. The -remnants of the defeated army took shelter in the Sierra Morena. -The head-quarters of the fourth corps were then established at -Aranjuez; those of the first at Toledo; and the king returned in -triumph to the capital. - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.] - -The allied troops, however, still held their position at -Deleytosa and Jaraicejo, and sir Arthur Wellesley was not, at -the first, without hopes to maintain himself there, or even to -resume offensive operations; for he knew that Ney had returned -to Salamanca, and he erroneously believed that Mortier commanded -only a part of the first corps, and that the remainder were at -Toledo. On the other hand, his own strength was about seventeen -thousand men; Beresford had reached Moraleja, with from twelve to -fourteen thousand Portuguese; and between the frontier of Portugal -and Lisbon there were at least five thousand British troops, -composing the brigades of Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn. If Soult -invaded Portugal, the intention of the English general was to have -followed him. If the French remained in their present position, he -meant to re-cross the Tagus, and, in conjunction with Beresford’s -troops, to fall upon their right at Plasencia. For his own front -he had no fear; and he was taking measures to restore the broken -arch of the Cardinal’s bridge over the Tagus, with a view to his -operation against Plasencia, when the misconduct of the Spanish -government and its generals again obliged him to look solely to the -preservation of his own army. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 7.] - -From the 23d of July, when the bad faith of the junta, the apathy -of the people in Estremadura, and the wayward folly of Cuesta, had -checked the forward movements of the British, the privations of the -latter, which had commenced at Plasencia, daily increased. It was -in vain that sir Arthur, remonstrating with Cuesta and the junta, -had warned them of the consequences; it was in vain that he refused -to pass the Alberche until the necessary supplies were secured. His -reasonings, his representations, and even the fact of his having -halted at Talavera, were alike disregarded by men who, judging -from their own habits, concluded that his actions would also be at -variance with his professions. - -If he demanded food for his troops, he was answered by false -statements of what had been supplied, and falser promises of what -would be done; and the glorious services rendered at Talavera, far -from exciting the gratitude or calling forth the activity of the -Spanish authorities, seemed only to render them the more perverse. -The soldiers in the ranks were weakened by hunger, the sick were -dying for want of necessary succours, the commissaries were without -the means of transport; and when sir Arthur Wellesley applied for -only ninety artillery horses to supply the place of those killed -in the action, Cuesta, on the very field of battle, and with the -steam of the English blood still reeking in his nostrils, refused -this request, and, two days after, abandoned the wounded men to an -enemy that he and his countrymen were hourly describing as the most -ferocious and dishonourable of mankind. - -The retreat of the allies across the Tagus increased the sufferings -of the troops, and the warmth of their general’s remonstrances -rose in proportion to the ill-treatment they experienced; but -the replies, nothing abating in falseness as to fact, now became -insulting both to the general and his army: “_The British were -not only well but over supplied_:”--“_they robbed the peasantry, -pillaged the villages, intercepted the Spanish convoys, and openly -sold the provisions thus shamefully acquired_:”--“_the retreat of -the army across the Tagus was unnecessary; Soult ought to have been -destroyed; and the English general must have secret motives for his -conduct, which he dare not avouch_:”--and other calumnies of the -like nature. - -Now, from the 20th of July to the 20th of August, although the -Spaniards were generally well fed, the English soldiers had not -received ten full rations. Half a pound of wheat in the grain, and, -twice a week, a few ounces of flour, with a quarter of a pound of -goat’s flesh, formed the sole subsistence of men and officers; and -this scanty supply was procured with much labour, for the goats -were to be caught and killed by the troops; and it was, perhaps, -upon this additional hardship that the accusation of selling -provisions was founded, for, in such cases, it is in all armies the -custom that the offal belongs to the men who slaughter the animals. -But the famine in the camp was plainly proved by this very fact; -for a goat’s offal sold, at this time, for three and even four -dollars, or about double the usual price of the whole animal; and -men and officers strove to outbid each other for the wretched food. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 18.] - -It has been said that the British soldiers are less intelligent -in providing for themselves, and less able to sustain privations -of food than the soldiers of any other nation. This is one of -many vulgar errors which have been promulgated respecting them. -How they should be constantly victorious, and yet inferior to all -other nations in military qualification, does not, at first sight, -appear a very logical conclusion; but the truth is, that, with the -exception of the Spanish and Portuguese, who are, undoubtedly, more -sober, the English soldiers possess all the most valuable military -qualities in as high, and many in a much higher degree than any -other nation. They are as rapid and as intelligent as the French, -as obedient as the German, as enduring as the Russian, and more -robust than any; and, with respect to food, this is sure, that no -man, of any nation, with less than two pounds of solid food of some -kind daily, can do his work well for any length of time. A general -charge of pillaging is easily made and hard to be disproved; but -it is certain that the Spanish troops themselves did not only -pillage, but wantonly devastate the country, and that without any -excuse; for, with the exception of the three days succeeding the -defeat of Arzobispo, their rations were regular and sufficient: -and, with respect to the interruption of their convoys, by the -British soldiers, the reverse was the fact. _The Spanish cavalry -intercepted the provisions and forage destined for the English -army, and fired upon the foragers, as if they had been enemies._ - -[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.] - -Before the middle of August there were, in the six regiments of -English cavalry, a thousand men completely dismounted, and the -horses of seven hundred others were unserviceable. The baggage -animals died in greater numbers; the artillery cattle were scarcely -able to drag the guns; and one-third of the reserve ammunition was -given over to the Spaniards, because the ammunition carts were -required for the conveyance of sick men, of which the number daily -increased. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 17.] - -Marshal Beresford experienced the same difficulties in the -neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. The numerous desertions that took -place in the Portuguese army, when it became known that the troops -were to enter Spain, prevented him from taking the field so soon -as he had expected; but, in the last days of July, being prepared -to act, he crossed the Portuguese frontier, and, from that moment, -the usual vexatious system of the Spaniards commenced. Romana -still continued at Coruña; but the duke del Parque was full of -mighty projects, and indignant that Beresford would not blindly -adopt his recommendations. Both generals were ignorant of the -real strength of the French; but the Spaniard was confident, and -insisted upon offensive movements, while Beresford, a general by -no means of an enterprising disposition when in the sole command -of an army, contented himself with taking up a defensive line -behind the Agueda. In this, however, he was justified; first, by -his instructions, which obliged him to look to the pass of Perales -and the defence of the frontier line; secondly, by the state of -his army, which was not half organized, and without horsemen or -artillery; and, thirdly, by the conduct of the Spanish authorities. - -The Portuguese troops were not only refused provisions, but -those which had been collected by sir Arthur Wellesley, and put -into the magazines at Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view to operate in -that quarter, were seized by the cabildo, as security for a debt -pretended to be due for the supply of sir John Moore’s army. The -claim itself was of doubtful character, for Cradock had before -offered to pay it if the cabildo would produce the voucher for its -being due, a preliminary which had not been complied with. There -was also an English commissary at Ciudad Rodrigo, empowered to -liquidate that and any other just claim upon the British military -chest; but the cabildo, like all Spaniards, mistaking violence for -energy, preferred this display of petty power to the interests of -the common cause. Meanwhile, Soult having passed the Sierra de -Gredos, by the Baños, Beresford, moving in a parallel direction, -crossed the Sierra de Gata, at Perales; reached Moraleja about the -12th of August, and having rallied the troops and convalescents cut -off from Talavera, marched to Salvatierra, where he arrived the -17th, and took post behind the Elga, covering the road to Abrantes. - -The supreme junta now offered sir Arthur Wellesley the rank of -captain-general, and sent him a present of horses; and when he, -accepting the rank, refused the pay, as he had before refused that -of the Portuguese government, they pressed him to renew offensive -operations; but, acting as if they thought the honours conferred -upon the general would amply compensate for the sufferings of -the troops, the junta made no change in their system. These -things convinced sir Arthur Wellesley that Spain was no longer -the place for a British army, and he relinquished the idea of -further operations in that country. Sending his cavalry to the -neighbourhood of Caceres, he broke down another arch of the -Cardinal’s bridge, to prevent the enemy from troubling him, and, -through the British ambassador, informed the junta that he would -immediately retire into Portugal. - -This information created the wildest consternation; for, in -their swollen self-sufficiency, the members of the government had -hitherto disregarded all warnings upon this subject, and now acting -as, in the like case, they had acted, the year before, with sir -John Moore, they endeavoured to avert the consequences of their -own evil doings, by vehement remonstrances and the most absurd -statements:--“_The French were weak and the moment most propitious -for driving them beyond the Pyrenees_:” “THE UNCALLED-FOR RETREAT -OF THE ENGLISH WOULD RUIN THE CAUSE:” and so forth. But they had to -deal with a general as firm as sir John Moore; and, in the British -ambassador, they no longer found an instrument suited to their -purposes. - -Lord Wellesley, a man with too many weaknesses to be called -great, but of an expanded capacity, and a genius at once subtle -and imperious, had come out on a special mission,--and Mr. Frere, -whose last communication with the junta had been to recommend -another military project, was happily displaced; yet, even in his -private capacity, he made an effort to have some of the generals -superseded; and the junta, with a refined irony, truly Spanish, -created him _marquis of_ UNION. - -At Cadiz, the honours paid to lord Wellesley were extravagant and -unbecoming, and his journey from thence to Seville was a scene -of triumph; but these outward demonstrations of feeling did not -impose upon him beyond the moment. His brother’s correspondence and -his own penetration soon enabled him to make a just estimate of -the junta’s protestations. Disdaining their intrigues, and fully -appreciating a general’s right to direct the operations of his own -army, he seconded sir Arthur’s remonstrances with firmness, and -wisely taking the latter’s statements as a guide and basis for his -own views, urged them upon the Spanish government with becoming -dignity. - -The junta, on their part, always protesting that the welfare of -the British army was the principal object of their care, did not -fail to prove, very clearly upon paper, that the troops, ever -since their entry into Spain, had been amply supplied: and that -no measure might be wanting to satisfy the English general, they -invested don Lorenzo Calvo, a member of their body, with full -powers to draw forth and apply all the resources of the country -to the nourishment of both armies. This gentleman’s promises and -assurances, relative to the supply, were more full and formal than -M. de Garay’s, and equally false. He declared that provisions and -forage, in vast quantities, were actually being delivered into -the magazines at Truxillo, when, in fact, there was not even an -effort making to collect any. He promised that the British should -be served, although the Spanish troops should thereby suffer; and, -at the very time of making this promise, he obliged the alcaldes -of a distant town to send, into the Spanish camp, provisions which -had been already purchased by an English commissary. In fine, lord -Wellesley had arrived too late; all the mischief that petulance, -folly, bad faith, violence, and ignorance united, could inflict, -was already accomplished, and, while he was vainly urging a vile, -if not a treacherous government, to provide sustenance for the -soldiers, sir Arthur withdrew the latter from a post where the -vultures, in their prescience of death, were already congregating. - -The 20th, the main body of the British army quitted Jaraicejo, -and marched by Truxillo upon Merida. The light brigade, under -Craufurd, being relieved at Almaraz by the Spaniards, took the -road of Caceres to Valencia de Alcantara. But the pass of Mirabete -bore ample testimony to the previous sufferings of the troops; -Craufurd’s brigade, which, only three weeks before, had traversed -sixty miles in a single march, were now with difficulty, and after -many halts, able to reach the summit of the Mirabete, although -only four miles from their camp; and the side of that mountain was -covered with baggage, and the carcases of many hundred animals that -died in the ascent. - -The retreat being thus commenced, the junta, with the malevolence -of anger engendered by fear, calumniated the man to whom, only ten -days before, they had addressed the most fulsome compliments, and -to whose courage and skill they owed their own existence. “_It was -not the want of provisions_,” they said, “_but some other motive -that caused the English general to retreat_.” This was openly and -insultingly stated by Garray, by Eguia, and by Calvo, in their -correspondence with lord Wellesley and sir Arthur; and at the same -time the junta industriously spread a report that the true reason -was their own firm resistance to the ungenerous demands of the -English ministers, who had required the cession of Cadiz and the -island of Cuba, as the price of furthur assistance. - -At Talavera, sir Arthur Wellesley had been forced to give over -to the Spaniards the artillery taken from the enemy. At Meza -d’Ibor, he had sacrificed a part of his ammunition, to obtain -conveyance for the wounded men, and to effect the present movement -from Jaraicejo, without leaving his sick behind, he was obliged -to abandon all his parc of ammunition, and stores, and then the -Spanish generals, who had refused the slightest aid to convey the -sick and wounded men, immediately found ample means to carry off -all these stores to their own magazines. In this manner, almost -bereft of baggage and ammunition, those soldiers, who had withstood -the fiercest efforts of the enemy, were driven, as it were, -ignominiously from the country they had protected to their loss. - -The 24th, the head-quarters being at Merida, a despatch from lord -Wellesley was received. He painted in strong colours the terror -of the junta, the distraction of the people, and the universal -confusion; and with a natural anxiety to mitigate their distress, -he proposed that the British army should, notwithstanding the -past, endeavour to cover Andalusia, by taking, in conjunction with -the Spanish army, a defensive post behind the Guadiana, in such -manner that the left should rest on the frontier of Portugal: to -facilitate this he had, he said, presented a plan to the junta for -the future supply of provisions, and the vicinity of the frontier -and of Seville would, he hoped, obviate any difficulty on that -point. But he rested his project entirely upon political grounds; -and it is worthy of observation that he who, for many years had, -with despotic power, controlled the movements of immense armies -in India, carefully avoided any appearance of meddling with the -general’s province. “I am,” said he, “fully sensible not only of -the _indelicacy_, but of the inutility of attempting to offer to -you any opinion of mine in a situation where your own judgement -must be your best guide.”--“Viewing, however, so nearly, the -painful consequences of your immediate retreat into Portugal, I -have deemed it to be my duty to submit it to your consideration the -possibility of adopting an intermediate plan.” - -On the receipt of this despatch, sir Arthur Wellesley halted -at Merida for some days. He was able in that country to obtain -provisions, and he wished, if possible, to allay the excitement -occasioned by his retreat; but he refused to co-operate again with -the Spaniards. Want, he said, had driven him to separate from -them, but their shameful flight at Arzobispo would alone have -justified him for doing so. To take up a defensive position behind -the Guadiana would be useless, because that river was fordable, -and the ground behind it weak. The line of the Tagus, occupied at -the moment by Eguia, was so strong, that if the Spaniards could -defend any thing they might defend that. His advice then was that -they should send the pontoon-bridge to Badajos, and remain on the -defensive at Deleytoza and Almaraz. But, it might be asked, was -there no chance of renewing the offensive? To what purpose? The -French were as numerous, if not more so, than the allies; and, with -respect to the Spaniards at least, superior in discipline and every -military quality. To advance again was only to play the same losing -game as before. Baños and Perales must be guarded, or the bands in -Castile would again pour through upon the rear of the allied army; -but who was to guard these passes? The British were too few to -detach, and the Spaniards could not be trusted; and if they could, -Avila and the Guadarama passes remained, by which the enemy could -reinforce the army in front,--for there were no Spanish troops in -the north of Spain capable of making a diversion. - -“But there was a more serious consideration, namely, the constant -and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the -enemy. We, in England,” said sir Arthur, “never hear of their -defeats and flights, but I have heard Spanish officers telling -of nineteen or twenty actions of the description of that at the -bridge of Arzobispo, accounts of which, I believe, have never -been published.” “In the battle of Talavera,” he continued, “in -which the Spanish army, with very trifling exception, was not -engaged,--whole corps threw away their arms, and run off, when they -were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack. When these -dastardly soldiers run away they plunder every thing they meet. -In their flight from Talavera they plundered the baggage of the -British army, which was, at that moment, bravely engaged in their -cause.” - -For these reasons he would not, he said, again co-operate with the -Spaniards; yet, by taking post on the Portuguese frontier, he would -hang upon the enemy’s flank, and thus, unless the latter came with -very great forces, prevent him from crossing the Guadiana. This -reasoning was conclusive; but, ere it reached lord Wellesley, the -latter found that so far from his plans, relative to the supply, -having been adopted, he could not even get an answer from the -junta; and that miserable body, at one moment stupified with fear, -at the next bursting with folly, now talked of the enemy’s being -about to retire to the Pyrenees, or even to the interior of France: -and assuming the right to dispose of the Portuguese army as well -as of their own, importunately pressed for an immediate, combined, -offensive operation, by the troops of the three nations, to harass -the enemy in his retreat; but, at the same time, they ordered Eguia -to withdraw from Deleytoza, behind the Guadiana. - -The 31st, Eguia reached La Serena; and Venegas having rallied his -fugitives in the Morena, and being reinforced from the depôts -in Andalusia, the two armies amounted to about fifty thousand -men, of which eight or ten thousand were horse: for, as I have -before observed, the Spanish cavalry seldom suffered much. But -the tide of popular discontent was now setting full against the -central government. The members of the ancient junta of Seville -worked incessantly for their overthrow. Romana, Castaños, Cuesta, -Albuquerque, all, and they were many, who had suffered dishonour at -their hands, were against them; and the local junta of Estremadura -insisted that Albuquerque should command in that province. - -[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 17.] - -Thus pressed, the supreme junta, considering Venegas as a man -devoted to their wishes, resolved to increase his forces. For this -purpose they gave Albuquerque the command in Estremadura, but -furnished him with only twelve thousand men, sending the remainder -of Eguia’s army to Venegas; and, at the same time, making a last -effort to engage the British general in their proceedings, they -offered to place Albuquerque under his orders, provided he would -undertake an offensive movement. By these means, they maintained -their tottering power: but their plans, being founded upon vile -political intrigues, could in no wise alter sir Arthur Wellesley’s -determination, which was the result of enlarged military views. He -refused their offers; and, the 4th of September, his head-quarters -were established at Badajos. Meanwhile, Romana delivered over his -army to the duke del Parque, and repaired to Seville. Venegas again -advanced into La Mancha, but at the approach of a very inferior -force of the enemy, retired, with all the haste and confusion of a -rout, to the Morena. The English troops were then distributed in -Badajos, Elvas, Campo Mayor, and other places, on both banks of the -Guadiana. The brigades already in Portugal were brought up to the -army, and the lost ammunition and equipments were replaced from the -magazines at Lisbon, Abrantes, and Santarem. Beresford, leaving -some light troops and militia on the frontier, retired to Thomar, -and this eventful campaign, of two months, terminated. - -The loss of the army was considerable; above three thousand five -hundred men had been killed, or had died of sickness, or fallen -into the enemy’s hands. Fifteen hundred horses had perished from -want of food, exclusive of those lost in battle; the spirits of -the soldiers were depressed; and a heart-burning hatred of the -Spaniards was engendered by the treatment endured. To fill the cup, -the pestilent fever of the Guadiana, assailing bodies which fatigue -and bad nourishment had already predisposed to disease, made -frightful ravages. Dysentry, that scourge of armies, raged; and, in -a short time, above five thousand men died in the hospitals. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -OBSERVATIONS. - -During this short, but important campaign, the armies on both sides -acted in violation of that maxim which condemns “_double external -lines of operation_,” but the results vindicated the soundness of -the rule. Nothing permanent or great, nothing proportionate to -the number of the troops, the vastness of the combinations, or -the reputation of the commanders, was achieved; yet, neither sir -Arthur Wellesley nor the duke of Dalmatia can be justly censured, -seeing that the last was controlled by the king, and the first by -circumstances of a peculiar nature. The French marshal was thwarted -by superior authority; and the English general, commanding an -auxiliary force, was obliged to regulate his movements, not by -his own military views, but by the actual state of the Spaniards’ -operations, and with reference to the politics and temper of that -people. - -La Mancha was the true line by which to act against Madrid, but -the British army was on the frontier of Portugal. The junta -refused Cadiz as a place of arms; and without Cadiz, or some other -fortified sea-port, neither prudence, nor his instructions, would -permit sir Arthur to hazard a great operation on that side. Hence -he adopted, not what was most fitting, in a military sense, but -what was least objectionable among the few plans that could be -concerted at all with the Spanish generals and government. Now, -the latter being resolved to act with strong armies, both in -Estremadura and La Mancha, the English general had but to remain on -a miserable defensive system in Portugal, or to unite with Cuesta -in the valley of the Tagus. His territorial line of operations was -therefore a matter of necessity, and any fair criticism must be -founded on the management of his masses after it was chosen. That -he did not greatly err in his conception of the campaign, is to be -inferred from the fact, that Napoleon, Soult, Victor, and Jourdan, -simultaneously expected him upon the very line he followed. He was -thwarted by Cuesta at every step, Venegas failed to aid him, and -the fatal error relative to Soult’s forces, under which he laboured -throughout, vitiated all his operations; yet he shook the intrusive -monarch roughly, in the midst of fifty thousand men. - -Let the project be judged, not by what did happen, but by what -would have happened, if Cuesta had been active, and if Venegas had -performed his part loyally. The junction of the British and Spanish -forces was made at Naval Moral, on the 22d of July. The duke of -Belluno, with twenty-one thousand men, was then in position behind -the Alberche, the fourth corps near Madrilejos in La Mancha, and -Joseph at Madrid, where general Foy had just arrived, to concert -Soult’s movement upon Plasencia. - -It is evident that the king and Sebastiani could not reach the -scene of action before the 25th or 26th of July, nor could Soult -influence the operations before the 1st or 2d of August. If then, -the allied army, being sixty thousand strong, with a hundred -pieces of artillery, had attacked Victor on the morning of the -23d, it is to be presumed that the latter would have been beaten, -and obliged to retreat, either upon Madrid or Toledo; but the -country immediately in his rear was open, and ten thousand horsemen -could have been launched in the pursuit. Sir Robert Wilson, also, -would have been on Victor’s flank, if, neglecting a junction with -the fourth corps, that marshal had taken the road to Madrid; and -if that of Toledo, the first and fourth corps would have been -separated from the king, who did not reach Vargas until the evening -of the 25th, but who would not, in this case, have been able to -advance at all beyond Naval Carneiro. - -Now, admitting that, by superior discipline and experience, the -French troops had effected their retreat on either line without any -serious calamity, what would have followed? - -1º. If Victor joined the king, the latter could only have retired, -by Guadalaxara, upon the third corps, or have gone by the Guadarama -towards Soult. - -2º. If Victor joined Sebastiani, the two corps must have retreated -to Guadalaxara, and the king would have joined them there, or, as -before said, have pushed for the Guadarama to join Soult. - -No doubt, that marshal, having so powerful an army, would, in -either case, have restored Joseph to his capital, and have cut -off sir Arthur’s communication with Portugal by the valley of the -Tagus. Nevertheless, a great moral impression would have been -produced by the temporary loss of Madrid, which was, moreover, the -general depôt of all the French armies; and, meanwhile, Venegas, -Cuesta, and sir Arthur Wellesley would have been united, and on -one line of operations (that of La Mancha), which, under such -circumstances, would have forced the junta to consent to the -occupation of Cadiz. In this view it must be admitted that the -plan was conceived with genius. - -Victor’s position on the Alberche was, however, strong; he -commanded twenty-five thousand veterans; and, as the Spaniards -were very incapable in the field, it may be argued that a general -movement of the whole army to Escalona, and from thence to Maqueda, -would have been preferable to a direct attack at Salinas; because -the allies, if thus suddenly placed in the midst of the French -corps, might have beaten them in detail, and would certainly have -cut the king off from the Guadarama, and forced him back upon -the Guadalaxara. But, with Cuesta for a colleague, how could a -general undertake an operation requiring celerity and the nicest -calculation? - -The false dealing of the junta no prudence could guard against; -but experience proves that, without extraordinary good fortune, -some accident will always happen to mar the combinations of armies -acting upon “_double external lines_.” And so it was with respect -to Venegas; for that general, with a force of twenty-six thousand -men, suffered himself to be held in check for five days by three -thousand French, and at the battle of Almonacid shewed that he knew -neither when to advance nor when to retreat. - -The patience with which sir Arthur Wellesley bore the foolish -insults of Cuesta, and the undaunted firmness with which he fought -to protect the Spanish army, require no illustration. When the -latter fell back from St. Ollalla on the 26th, it was impossible -for the British to retreat with honour; and there is nothing more -memorable in the history of this war, nothing more creditable to -the personal character of the English chief, than the battle of -Talavera, considered as an isolated event. Nevertheless, that -contest proved that the allies were unable to attain their object; -for, notwithstanding Victor’s ill-judged partial attacks on the -night of the 27th and morning of the 28th, and notwithstanding the -final repulse of the French, all the advantages of the movements, -as a whole, were with the latter. They were, on the 31st of July, -including the garrison of Toledo, still above forty thousand men; -and they maintained their central position, although it was not -until the 1st of August that Soult’s approach caused any change -in the views of the allied generals; and this brings us to the -fundamental error of sir Arthur Wellesley’s operations. - -That so able a commander should engage himself in the narrow valley -of the Tagus with twenty thousand British and forty thousand -Spanish troops, when fifty thousand French were waiting for him at -the further end, and above fifty thousand more were hanging on his -flank and rear, shews that the greatest masters of the art may err. -He who wars walks in a mist through which the keenest eyes cannot -always discern the right path. “_Speak to me of a general who has -made no mistakes in war_,” said Turenne, “_and you speak of one who -has seldom made war_.” - -Sir Arthur Wellesley thus excused his error:--“When I entered Spain -I had reason to believe that I should be joined by a Spanish army -in such a respectable state of discipline and efficiency, as that -it had kept in check, during nearly three months after a defeat, a -French army, at one time superior, and at no time much inferior.” - -“I had likewise reason to believe that the French corps, in the -north of Spain, were fully employed; and although I had heard of -the arrival of marshal Soult at Zamora, on the 29th of June, with a -view to equip the remains of his corps, I did not think it possible -that three French corps, consisting of thirty-four thousand men, -under three marshals, could have been assembled at Salamanca -without the knowledge of the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, or of the -junta of Castile; that these corps could have been moved from their -stations in Gallicia, the Asturias, and Biscay, without setting -free, for general operations, any Spanish troops which had been -opposed to them, or without any other inconvenience to the enemy -than that of protracting, to a later period, the settlement of his -government in those provinces;--and that they could have penetrated -into Estremadura, without a shot being fired at them by the troops -deemed sufficient to defend the passes by the Spanish generals.” -But thus it was that, like the figures in a phantasmagoria, the -military preparations of Spain, however menacing in appearance, -were invariably found to be vain and illusory. - -That sir Arthur Wellesley’s error was not fatal is to be attributed -to three causes:-- - -1º. The reluctance of marshal Ney to quit Astorga;--2º. The march -of the fifth corps upon Villa Castin instead of Salamanca;--3º. -The vehemence with which Victor advised the battle of Talavera: in -short, jealousy among the marshals, and the undecided temper of the -king. - -If Soult had not been thwarted, he would have concentrated the -three corps near Salamanca before the 20th, and he would have -reached Plasencia before the 28th of July. The allies must then -have forced their way into La Mancha, or been crushed; but could -they have done the former without another battle? without the -loss of all the wounded men? could they have done it at all? The -British, including Robert Craufurd’s brigade, were seventeen -thousand fighting men on the 29th, but wasted with fatigue and -hunger. The Spaniards were above thirty thousand: but in them no -trust could be placed for an effort requiring fine discipline and -courage of the highest order. The intrusive king was at the head of -forty thousand good troops. Venegas, at once ignorant and hampered -by the intrigues of the junta, was as nought in the operations; -but Soult’s step, stealthy while the situation of affairs was -obscure, would have been impetuous when a light broke on the field -of battle; and it is scarcely possible to conceive that the allies -could have forced their way in front before that marshal would have -fallen on their rear. - - -FRENCH OPERATIONS. - -The intrusive monarch was finally successful; yet it may be safely -affirmed that, with the exception of uniting his three corps behind -the Guadarama, on the evening of the 25th, his proceedings were an -uninterrupted series of errors. First, he would not suffer Soult -to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo with seventy thousand men, in the end -of July. To protect Madrid from the army of Venegas overbalanced, -in his mind, the advantages of this bold and grand project, -which would inevitably have drawn sir Arthur Wellesley from the -Tagus, and which, interrupting all military communication between -the northern and southern provinces, and ensuring possession of -Castile and Leon, would, by its success, have opened a broad way -to Lisbon. But Cuesta and Venegas, meanwhile, would have marched -against Madrid! Cuesta and Venegas, acting on external lines, and -whose united force did not exceed sixty-five thousand men! And -the king, holding a central position, with fifty thousand French -veterans, was alarmed at this prospect, and, rejecting Soult’s -plan, drew Mortier, with the fifth corps, to Villa Castin. Truly, -this was to neglect the bearing fruit-tree from fear of the nettle -at its stem! - -Sir Arthur Wellesley’s advance to Talavera was the result of this -great error; but he having thus incautiously afforded Soult an -opportunity of striking a fatal blow, a fresh combination was -concerted. The king, with equal judgement and activity, then united -all his own forces near Toledo, separated Venegas from Cuesta, -pushed back the latter upon the English army, and obliged both to -stand on the defensive, with eyes attentively directed to their -front, when the real point of danger was in the rear. This was -skilful; but the battle of Talavera which followed was a palpable, -an enormous, fault. The allies could neither move forward nor -backward, without being infinitely worse situated for success than -in that strong position, which seemed marked out by fortune herself -for their security. Until the 31st, the operations of Venegas were -not even felt; hence, till the 31st, the position on the Alberche -might have been maintained without danger; and, on the first of -August, the head of Soult’s column was at Plasencia. - -Let us suppose that the French had merely made demonstrations on -the 28th, and had retired behind the Alberche the 29th, would the -allies have dared to attack them in that position? The conduct -of the Spaniards, on the evening of the 27th, answers the -question; and, moreover, Joseph, with an army compact, active, -and experienced, could, with ease, have baffled any efforts of -the combined forces to bring him to action; he might have covered -himself by the Guadarama and by the Tagus, in succession, and the -farther he led his opponents from Talavera, without uncovering -the line of La Mancha, the more certain the effect of Soult’s -operation: but here we have another proof that double external -lines are essentially vicious. - -The combined movement of the French was desirable, from the -greatness of the object to be gained, and safe, from the powerful -force on each point. The occasion was so favourable that, -notwithstanding the imprudent heat of Victor, the reluctance of -Ney, and the unsteady temper of the king, the fate of the allies -was, up to the evening of the 3d, heavy in the scale. Nevertheless, -as the central position held by the allies, cut the line of -correspondence between Joseph and Soult, the king’s despatches -were intercepted, and the whole operation, even at the last hour, -was baffled. The first element of success in war is, that every -thing should emanate from a single head; and it would have been -preferable that the king, drawing the second and fifth corps to him -by the pass of the Guadarama, or by that of Avila, should, with the -eighty thousand men thus united, have fallen upon the allies in -front. Such a combination, although of less brilliant promise than -the one adopted, would have been more sure; and the less a general -trusts to fortune the better:--she is capricious! - -When one Spanish army was surprised at Arzobispo, another -completely beaten at Almonacid, and when Wilson’s Portuguese corps -was dispersed at Baños, the junta had just completed the measure -of their folly by quarrelling with the only force left that could -protect them. The French were, in truth, therefore, the masters of -the Peninsula; but they terminated their operations at the very -moment when they should have pursued them with redoubled activity; -for the general aspect of affairs and the particular circumstances -of the campaign were alike favourable. - -Napoleon was victorious in Germany; and of the British expeditions -against Italy and Holland, the former had scarcely struggled into -life,--the latter was already corrupting in death. Hence, Joseph -might have been assured that he would receive reinforcements, but -that none, of any consequence, could reach his adversaries; and, in -the Peninsula, there was nothing to oppose him. Navarre, Biscay, -Aragon, and the Castiles were subdued; Gerona closely beleaguered; -and the rest of Catalonia, if not quiescent, totally unable to -succour that noble city. Valencia was inert; the Asturias still -trembling; and in Gallicia there was nothing but confusion. Romana, -commanding fifteen thousand infantry, but neither cavalry nor -artillery, was still at Coruña, and durst not quit the mountains. -The duke del Parque held Ciudad Rodrigo, but was in no condition -to make head against more than a French division. The battle -of Almonacid had cleared La Mancha of troops. Estremadura and -Andalusia were, as we have seen, weak, distracted, and incapable of -solid resistance. There remained only the English and Portuguese -armies, the one being at Jaraceijo, the other at Moraleja. - -The line of resistance may, therefore, be said to have extended -from the Sierra Morena to Coruña--weak from its length; weaker, -that the allied corps, being separated by mountains, by rivers, -and by vast tracts of country, and having different bases of -operation, such as Lisbon, Seville, and Ciudad Rodrigo, could not -act in concert, except offensively; and with how little effect in -that way the campaign of Talavera had proved. But the French were -concentrated in a narrow space, and, having only Madrid to cover, -were advantageously situated for offensive or defensive movements. - -The allied forces were, for the most part, imperfectly organized, -and would not, altogether, have amounted to ninety thousand -fighting men. The French were above one hundred thousand, dangerous -from their discipline and experience, more dangerous that they held -a central position, and that their numbers were unknown to their -opponents; and, moreover, having, in four days, gained one general -and two minor battles, their courage was high and eager. - -[Sidenote: See Calvo Garray and Lord Wellesley’s Correspondence, -Parl. Papers, 1810.] - -At this period, by the acknowledgement of the Spaniards themselves, -the fate of the country depended entirely upon the British troops, -and, doubtless, the latter were soldiers of no ordinary stamp; -but there is a limit to human power, in war as well as in other -matters. Sir Arthur Wellesley was at the head of some seventeen -thousand men, of all arms, and about five thousand were somewhere -between Lisbon and Alcantara: but the whole French army could, in -two days, have been concentrated in the valley of the Tagus. Soult, -alone, of all the associated generals, appears to have viewed this -crisis with the eye of a great commander. Had he been permitted -to follow up the attack at Arzobispo, on the 8th of August, what -could the seventeen thousand starving British troops, encumbered -with the terror-stricken Spaniards, have effected against the -seventy thousand French that would have stormed their positions on -three sides at once? The hardy, enduring English infantry might, -indeed, have held their ground in one battle, but could they -have fought a second? Would not a movement of the first corps by -Guadalupe, would not famine alone, have forced the ten or twelve -thousand men remaining (if, indeed, so many were left) to abandon -the banks of the Tagus, to abandon, also, their parcs of ammunition -and their wounded men, and to retreat towards Portugal; and to -retreat, also, with little hope, harassed, as they would have been, -by six thousand horsemen, for Soult had eighteen regiments of -cavalry? - -[Sidenote: Parl. Pap. 1810.] - -Let it be supposed, however, that the strength of the Meza d’Ibor -and the Mirabete had baffled all the enemy’s efforts, and that, -seeing the allies fixed in those positions, the sixth corps, in -pursuance of Soult’s second proposal, had crossed the frontier -of Portugal. Sir Arthur Wellesley, contemplating such an event, -affirmed that he meant to follow them in any movement they might -make against Lisbon; but there were two ways of following, the one -by the south and the other by the north bank of the Tagus. Now, if -he designed to cross the Tagus at the Cardinal’s bridge, and so, -connecting his right with Beresford, to hang on the enemy’s rear, -it could only have been while he was ignorant of Venegas’ defeat, -and when he imagined the French to have but thirty thousand men in -the valley of the Tagus; but they had above seventy thousand; and, -without endangering Madrid, they could have invaded Portugal with, -at least, fifty thousand men under arms. - -If, on the other hand, he designed to move by the south side of -the Tagus, the French line of march upon Abrantes and Lisbon was -shorter than his; and Beresford, who only reached Moraleja on the -12th, would have been cut off, and thrown back upon Almeida. It -is true that marshal Ney alleged the difficulty of feeding the -troops in the country about Plasencia and Coria, and the prudence -of Soult’s project might, in that respect, have been somewhat -questionable. But the duke of Elchingen was averse to _any_ -invasion of Portugal; and, to an unwilling mind, difficulties -are enlarged beyond their due proportion. Moreover, his talents -were more remarkable in a battle than in the dispositions for a -campaign; and Soult’s opinion must, on this occasion, be allowed -greater weight, because the Vera de Plasencia and the valleys -of the Bejar and the Gata mountains were certainly exceedingly -fertile, they had been little injured, and the object was, not to -fix a base of operations, but to obtain a momentary subsistence -until a richer country could be opened. - -Admitting, however, that a march on Lisbon was not feasible at that -moment, there could have been no well-founded objection to the -siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which Soult again proposed. The emperor’s -instructions were indeed pleaded; but those were general, founded -upon the past errors of the campaign, which made him doubtful of -the future; they were not applicable to the peculiar circumstances -of the moment, and would have been disregarded by a general with a -tithe of his own genius. Fortunately for Spain, the intrusive king -was not a great commander. When he might have entered the temple of -victory with banners flying, he stretched himself at the threshold -and slept. - -The departure of the English army was a remarkable epoch in the -Peninsular war. The policy of combining operations with the Spanish -armies, and of striking directly at the great masses of the French, -had been fairly acted upon, and had failed; and the long-cherished -delusion, relative to Spanish enthusiasm and Spanish efficiency, -was at last dissipated. The transactions of the campaign of 1809 -form a series of practical comments upon the campaign of 1808. All -the objections which had been made to sir John Moore’s conduct, -being put to the test of experience, proved illusory, while -the soundness of that general’s views were confirmed in every -particular. The leading events of the two campaigns bear a striking -resemblance to each other. - -Both sir Arthur Wellesley and sir John Moore advanced from -Portugal to _aid the Spanish armies_. The first general commanded -twenty-five thousand, the last twenty thousand men; but there was -this difference: that, in 1808, Portugal was so disorganised as to -require a British force to keep down anarchy; whereas, in 1809, -Portugal formed a good base of operations, and a Portuguese army -was acting in conjunction with the British. - -Sir John Moore was joined by six thousand men, under Romana, and -there was no other Spanish army in existence to aid him. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley was joined by thirty-eight thousand Spaniards, -under Cuesta, and he calculated upon twenty-six thousand, under -Venegas; while from twenty to twenty-five thousand others were -acting in Gallicia and Leon. - -Sir John Moore was urged to throw himself into the heart of Spain, -to aid a people represented as abounding in courage and every other -military virtue. Judging of what he could not see by that which was -within his view, he doubted the truth of these representations, and -thinking that a powerful army, commanded by a man of the greatest -military genius, was likely to prove formidable, he was unwilling -to commit his own small force in an unequal contest. Nevertheless, -feeling that some practicable demonstration of the difficulties to -be encountered was required by the temper of the times, he made a -movement, too delicate and dangerous to be adopted, unless for a -great political as well as military purpose. - -To relieve the southern provinces, and to convince the English -government and the English public that they had taken a false view -of affairs, were the objects of his advance to the Carrion river; -but, although he carried his army forward with a boldness that -marked the consciousness of superior talents, he never lost sight -of the danger he was incurring by exposing his flank to the French -emperor. To obviate this danger as much as possible, he established -a second line of retreat upon Gallicia, and he kept a watchful eye -upon the cloud gathering at Madrid. Arrived in front of Soult’s -corps, and being upon the point of attacking him, the expected -storm burst, but, by a rapid march to Benevente, Moore saved -himself from being taken in flank and rear and destroyed. Benevente -was, however, untenable against the forces brought up by Napoleon, -and, the retreat being continued to Coruña, the army, after a -battle, embarked. - -It was objected--1º. That Moore should have gone to Madrid;--2º. -That he should have fought at Astorga, at Villa Franca, and at -Lugo, instead of at Coruña;--3º. That he overrated the strength -of the enemy, and undervalued the strength and enthusiasm of the -Spaniards; and that, being of a desponding temper, he lost the -opportunity of driving the French beyond the Ebro, for, that a -battle gained (and it was assumed that a battle must have been -gained had he attacked) would have assuredly broken the enemy’s -power, and called forth all the energies of Spain. - -Sir John Moore reasoned that the Spanish enthusiasm was not great, -that it evaporated in boasting and promises, which could not be -relied upon; that the British army was sent as an auxiliary, not as -a principal force; and that the native armies being all dispersed -before he could come to their assistance, the enemy was far too -strong to contend with single handed; wherefore, it was prudent -to re-embark, and to choose some other base of operations, to be -conducted upon sounder views of the actual state of affairs, or to -give up the contest altogether; for that little or no hope of final -success could be entertained, unless the councils and dispositions -of the Spaniards changed for the better. He died; and the English -ministers, adopting the reasoning of his detractors, once more sent -an auxiliary army to Spain; although the system still existed which -he had denounced as incompatible with success. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley, a general of their own choice, and assuredly -a better could not have been made, was placed at the head of this -army; and, after giving Soult a heavy blow on the Douro, he also -advanced to deliver Spain. Like sir John Moore, he was cramped for -want of money; and, like sir John Moore, he was pestered with -false representations, and a variety of plans, founded upon short -sighted views, and displaying great ignorance of the art of war; -but, finally, he adopted, and, as far as the inveterate nature of -the people he had to deal with would permit, executed a project, -which, like sir John Moore’s, had for its object to overpower the -French in his front, and, by forcing them to concentrate, relieve -the distant provinces; and give full play to the enthusiasm of the -Spaniards. - -When sir John Moore advanced, there were no Spanish armies to -assist him; the French were above three hundred and twenty thousand -strong, and of these two hundred and fifty thousand were disposable -to move against any point; moreover, they were commanded in person -by Napoleon, of whom it has been said by the duke of Wellington, -that his presence, alone, was equal to forty thousand good troops. - -When sir Arthur Wellesley advanced, the French forces in the -Peninsula did not exceed two hundred and sixty thousand men, of -which only one hundred thousand could be brought to bear on his -operations; and he was assisted by sixty thousand Spaniards, well -armed, and tolerably disciplined. His plans were certainly laid -with great ability upon the data furnished to him; but he trusted -to Spanish promises and to Spanish energy, and he did not fail to -repent his credulity; nevertheless, he delivered and gained that -battle which sir John Moore had been reproached for not essaying; -but it was found that a veteran French army, even of inferior -numbers, was not to be destroyed, or even much dispirited, by one -defeat; and while this battle was fighting, Soult, with fifty -thousand men, came down upon the flank and rear of the English, a -movement precisely similar to that which Napoleon had made from -Madrid upon the flank and rear of sir John Moore. This last general -saved himself by crossing the Esla, in the presence of the French -patroles; and in like manner, sir Arthur evaded destruction by -crossing the Tagus, within view of the enemy’s scouts, so closely -timed was the escape of both. - -When sir John Moore retreated, the Spanish government, reproaching -him, asserted that the French were on the point of ruin, and -Romana, even at Astorga, continued to urge offensive operations. - -When sir Arthur Wellesley retired from Jaraceijo, the junta in -the same manner asserted that the French were upon the point -of retiring from Spain, and general Equia proposed offensive -operations. In explaining his motives, and discussing the treatment -he had met with, sir John Moore wrote thus to his own government: -“_The British were sent to aid the Spanish armies, but they are not -equal to encounter the French, who have at least eighty thousand -men_, and we have nothing to expect from the Spaniards, who are not -to be trusted; they are apathetic, lethargic, quick to promise, -backward to act, improvident, insensible to the shame of flying -before the enemy, they refuse all assistance, and I am obliged to -leave ammunition, stores, and money, behind. The Spanish armies -have shewn no resolution, the people no enthusiasm nor daring -spirit, and that which has not been shown hitherto, I know not why -it should be expected to be displayed hereafter.” Such were his -expressions. - -When sir Arthur Wellesley had proved the Spaniards, he, also, -writing to his government, says:--“We are here worse off than in -a hostile country;--never was an army so ill used;--the Spaniards -have made all sorts of promises;--we had absolutely no assistance -from the Spanish army; on the contrary, we were obliged to lay -down our ammunition, to unload the treasure, and to employ the -cars in the removal of our sick and wounded. The common dictates -of humanity have been disregarded by them, and I have been obliged -to leave ammunition, stores, and money behind. _Whatever is to -be done must be done by the British army, but that is certainly -not capable, singly, to resist a French army of at least seventy -thousand men._” - -The last advice given to the government, by sir John Moore, was -against sending an auxiliary force to Spain. Sir Arthur Wellesley, -in the same spirit, withdrew his troops; and, from that moment, -to the end of the struggle, he warred, indeed, for Spain, and -in Spain, but never with Spain. “I have fished in many troubled -waters, but Spanish troubled waters I will never try again,” was -his expression, when speaking of this campaign; and he kept his -word. That country became, indeed, a field, on which the French and -English armies contended for the destiny of Europe; but the defeats -or victories, the promises or the performances of the Spaniards -scarcely influenced the movements. Spain, being left to her own -devices, was beaten in every encounter, foiled in every project, -yet made no change in her policy; and while Portugal endeavoured to -raise her energy on a level with that of her ally, Spain sought to -drag down England to the depth of folly and weakness, in which she -herself was plunged. The one would not sacrifice an atom of false -pride to obtain the greatest benefits; the other submitted, not -with abject dependence, but with a magnanimous humility, to every -mortification, rather than be conquered; and the effects of their -different modes were such as might be expected. Portugal, although -assaulted by an infinitely greater number of enemies, in proportion -to her strength, overthrew the oppressors the moment they set foot -upon her soil; while in Spain, town after town was taken, army -after army dispersed, every battle a defeat, and every defeat -sensibly diminished the heat of resistance. Napoleon once declared -that a nation resolved to be free could not be conquered; and the -Spaniards re-echoed the sentiment in their manifestos, as if to say -it was all that was necessary. But Napoleon contemplated a nation, -like the Portuguese, making use of every means of defence, whether -derived from themselves or their alliances; not a people puffed -with conceit, and lavish of sounding-phrases, such as “perishing -under the ruins of the last wall,” yet beaten with a facility that -rendered them the derision of the world; a people unable to guide -themselves yet arrogantly refusing all advice. Such a nation is -ripe for destruction, and such a nation was Spain. - -The campaign of 1809 finished the third epoch of the war, and it -was prolific of instruction. The jealousy of the French marshals, -the evils of disunion, the folly of the Spanish government, and -the absurdity of the Spanish character, with respect to public -affairs, were placed in the strongest light; while the vast -combinations, the sanguinary battles, the singular changes of -fortune, the result so little suitable to the greatness of the -efforts, amply demonstrated the difficulty and the uncertainty of -military affairs. It was a campaign replete with interest; a great -lesson from which a great commander profited. Sir Arthur Wellesley -had now experienced the weakness of his friends and the strength -of his enemies, and he felt all the emptiness of public boasting. -Foreseeing that if the contest was to be carried on, it must be in -Portugal, and that unless he himself could support the cause of -the Peninsula, it must fall, his manner of making war changed. His -caution increased tenfold; yet, abating nothing of his boldness, -he met and baffled the best of the French legions in the fulness -of their strength. He was alike unmoved by the intrigues of the -Portuguese regency, and by the undisguised hatred of the Spanish -government; and when some of his own generals, and one of them on -his personal staff, denouncing his rashness and predicting the ruin -of the army, caused the puny energy of the English ministers to -quail as the crisis approached, he, with gigantic vigour, pushed -aside these impediments, and, steadily holding on his own course, -proved himself a sufficient man, whether to uphold or to conquer -kingdoms. - - - - -APPENDIX. - - - - -APPENDIX. - - -No. I. - -SECTION I.--GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, EXTRACTED -FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS, SIGNED BY THE PRINCE OF NEUFCHATEL. - -Commanded by the Emperor Napoleon, in person, 15th Jan. 1809. - - Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Prisoners. Total. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Horses. - 241,010 48,821 24,549 3,521 58,026 826 324,411 52,342 - -King Joseph, commanding--15th Feb. 1809. - - Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Prisoners. Total Effective. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Horses. - 193,416 3,339 36,326 9,523 56,404 1,843 288,219 43,704 - -_Note._--The imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, and several -thousand non-commissioned officers and old soldiers, wanted for the -war in Austria, in all above 40,000 men, were struck off the rolls -since the last returns. - -1st July, 1809. - - Prisoners - Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. and Total Effective. - Stragglers. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Horses. - 24,082 31,537 19,596 4,513 60,785 7,301 288,766 36,050 - Deduct detached men comprised in governments 19,596 4,513 - -------- ------ - Real total 269,170 31,537 - -------- ------ - -15th July, 1809. - - 196,144 31,131 19,122 4,608 58,230 8,089 281,585 35,739 - Deduct detached in governments 19,122 4,608 - -------- ------ - Real total 262,463 31,131 - -------- ------ - -15th August, 1809. - - 187,560 30,319 12,697 3,930 58,588 7,403 266,248 34,880 - Deduct for governments 12,697 3,930 - -------- ------ - Real total 253,551 30,950 - -------- ------ - - -SECTION II.--RETURN OF THE FRENCH ARMY BY CORPS. - - Troops immediately under the king--1st June, 1809. - The king’s guards, about 5000 men, of all arms, - are never borne on the rolls. - First corps, marshal Victor commanding. - Head-quarters, Torremocha. - - Present under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 4 divisions of infantry 41 battalions 21,268 32,819 - 2 ditto cavalry 27 squadrons 5,232 7,344 - Artillery and equipage 40 companies 2,984 3,610 - Number of guns, 48 ------ ------ - Total present under arms 29,484 Grand total 43,773 - ------ ------ - -First Corps--21st June, 1809. Head-quarters, Almaraz. - - Present under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 3 divisions of infantry 33 battalions 18,367 25,633 - 2 ditto cavalry 20 squadrons 4,259 5,762 - Artillery and equipage ” 2,535 2,860 - ------ ------ - Total present under arms 25,161 Grand total 34,255 - ------ ------ - -First Corps--15th July, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Cazalegas. - - 3 divisions of infantry 33 battalions 18,890 26,373 - 2 ditto cavalry 18 squadrons 3,781 5,080 - Artillery and equipage ” 2,586 3,005 - ------ ------ - Total present under arms 25,257 Grand total 34,458 - ------ ------ - -First Corps--1st August, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Maqueda. - - 3 divisions of infantry 33 battalions 15,066 25,068 - 2 ditto cavalry 18 squadrons 4,987 4,983 - Artillery and equipage ” 2,362 2,873 - ------ ------ - Total present under arms 22,415 Grand total 32,924 - ------ ------ - -Fourth Corps, General Sebastiani--10th July, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Alcala. - - Present under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 3 divisions of infantry 27 battalions 17,100 25,960 - 2 ditto cavalry 25 squadrons 3,670 5,859 - Number of artillerymen omitted in - the returns ” ” - 30 guns ------ ------ - Total present under arms 20,770 Grand total 31,819 - ------ ------ - -15th August, 1809. - - 3 divisions of infantry 27 battalions 14,259 25,801 - 2 ditto cavalry 25 squadrons 3,420 5,801 - ------ ------ - Total present under arms 17,679 Grand total 31,602 - ------ ------ - -Division of Reserve, General Dessolles--15th July, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Madrid. - - Present under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 1 division of infantry 10 battalions 7,681 10,254 - Number of guns unknown. - -Kellerman’s division--21st April, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Astorga. - - Men. Horses. Guns. - Total, composed of detachments 8,753 805 8 - -10th June, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Oviedo. - - Under arms. Total. - Men. Horses. Men. Horses. - Total, composed of detachments 7,423 2,549 7,681 2,690 - -15th July, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Valladolid. - - 8 squadrons 2,291 2,360 2,469 2,393 - 6 guns - - -SECTION III. - -1st February, 1809. - - Under arms. - Men. - Division Lapisse infantry 12 battalions 7,692 - Brigade Maupetit cavalry 6 squadrons 910 - ------ - Total under general Lapisse at Salamanca 8,602 sabres and bayonets. - Number of guns and artillerymen unknown. - - -SECTION IV.--RETURN OF TROOPS UNDER THE IMMEDIATE COMMAND OF -MARSHAL SOULT. - -Second Corps, Soult--15th July, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Toro. - - Present under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 4 divisions of infantry 47 battalions 16,626 35,188 - 3 ditto cavalry 19 squadrons 2,883 4,540 - Artillery ” 1,081 1,620 - 40 guns ------ ------ - Total present under arms 20,590 Grand total 41,348 - ------ ------ - -Fifth Corps, Mortier. - -Head-quarters, Valladolid. - - 2 divisions of infantry 24 battalions 15,036 19,541 - 1 brigade of cavalry 6 squadrons 896 1,491 - Artillery ” 648 803 - 30 guns ------ ------ - Total present under arms 16,580 Grand total 21,835 - ------ ------ - -Sixth Corps, Ney. - -Head-quarters, Benevente. - - Present under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 2 divisions of infantry 24 battalions 13,700 17,587 - 1 ditto cavalry 10 squadrons 1,446 2,092 - Artillery ” 1,113 1,293 - 37 guns ----- ------ - Total present under arms 16,259 Grand total 20,972 - ------ ------ - -General total under Soult, 15th July, 1809. - - Under arms. Total. - Men. Men. - 95 battalions--35 squadrons 53,529 84,155 - 107 guns - - -SECTION V.--TROOPS EMPLOYED IN THE SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA, UNDER MARSHAL -LASNES. - -15th January, 1809. - - Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Total effective. - Men. Men. Men. Men. - Third corps 17,406 5,789 13,668 36,863 - Fifth corps 18,284 ” 4,189 22,473 - ------ ----- ------ ------ - Total 35,690 5,789 17,857 59,336 - ------ ----- ------ ------ - -15th February, 1809. - - Third corps 16,035 5,891 13,259 35,269 - Fifth corps 17,933 1,735 3,859 23,626 - ------ ----- ------ ------ - Total 33,968 7,526 17,118 58,895 - ------ ----- ------ ------ - - -SECTION VI.--RETURN OF THE SEVENTH CORPS, GENERAL ST. CYR. - -15th January, 1809. - - Present under arms. Detached. Hospital. Prisoners. Total. - Men. Men. Men. Men. Men. Horses. - 41,386 ” 6,589 543 48,518 5,403 - -15th May, 1809. - - 42,246 2,341 10,243 435 55,265 5,537 - -15th June, 1809. - - 42,146 1,699 10,222 406 54,473 5,365 - - * * * * * - - -No. II. - - -SECTION I.--STATE OF SPAIN. - -_Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, December 17, 1808._ - -“In consequence of the unfavourable news from Spain, yesterday, the -populace, in Badajos, murdered a Spanish colonel, and one or two -more of note.” - - -_Lieutenant Ellis (an officer employed to gain intelligence) to -colonel Kemmis, Loboa, December 27._ - -“The French entered Truxillo, yesterday, at eleven o’clock; and, -from the circumstance of their having reconnoitred the intermediate -villages, might be expected to arrive at Merida in two hours after -we left it.” - - -_Colonel Kemmis to sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 28._ - -“Badajos cannot make resistance in any degree, either to check or -to stop the progress of the enemy. From the statement made to me, -last night, by the governor, they want _arms_, _ammunition_, and -_provisions_.”--“The enemy marched into Truxillo, on the 26th, at -half-past twelve o’clock in the day; but, at two, on the following -morning, a French officer arrived there, and they fell back four -leagues.” - - -_Lieutenant Ellis to colonel Kemmis, December 28._ - -“I proceeded cautiously to Truxillo. The main body of the enemy, -six thousand in number, had retired across the bridge of Almaraz, -and had not taken the road to Madrid, but had proceeded to -Plasencia, leaving behind more than half the requisition for money -which had been imposed on the town of Truxillo.” - - -_Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Seville, January 2, 1809._ - -“The corps of four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, -which had marched from Talavera, and had actually passed the bridge -of Almaraz, has fallen back, and is already near Plasencia, on its -way northward.”--“The extreme attention of Buonaparte being at -this moment directed to the English army, everything which can be -collected is opposed to you alone.” - - -SECTION II. - -_Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, December 27, 1808._ - -“You will receive, together with this, several letters from Doyle, -which describe events in Catalonia _no way differing from what -we have witnessed in other parts of Spain_!”--“The junta have -established themselves here, and, whatever may have been the -expectation which their alarm on the road may have induced Mr. -Frere to form of their future proceedings, _a culpable relapse -into their former apathy_ seems susceptible of no other remedies -but such as will be much stronger than any Spaniard is likely to -adopt.”--“Although Caro promised to write every particular of his -conversation with you to the junta, I have hitherto been unable -to see his letter. I therefore thought it expedient to put the -whole to writing, and, at _the same time, to express my conviction -both of the justice and propriety of your whole conduct during the -late events, when it was impossible, under any circumstances, to -have adopted other determination consistently with the safety of -the army committed to your charge_. Though I doubt if this will -stop the clamour which has been raised on the subject; and, though -events have probably since taken place, which may materially change -the state of affairs, it may be satisfactory to tell you that Mr. -Frere _appears_ to enter into the reasons alleged by you, and to -feel, in their full force, the motives which induced you to act so -cautiously, and to ground no operation on the hope of any effectual -support from the Spaniards.” - - -_Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, Seville, January 2._ - -“The president, Florida Blanca, died two days since, and I was in -hopes that the junta would have availed themselves of this event -to make some change in their government.”--“I see, however, little -but good disposition, and _am still to look for that_ energy in -rewarding service and punishing treachery which can alone mend -matters.” - - -_Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, Seville, January 10._ - -“Reding is at _Tarragona_, expecting to be attacked, and possessing -a force composed chiefly of peasantry, but of which he certainly -cannot command above ten thousand men in a situation to face -his opponents at any given point.”--“Whittingham arrived here -yesterday, last from the duke of Infantados’ head-quarters. He -assures me the duke had already twenty thousand men when he _left -Cuença_.”--“_On the side of Estremadura_, matters are not going on -well: Galluzzo, who allowed the enemy to pass the bridges, is here -prisoner, and his corps is placed under the command of Cuesta. I -cannot say, however, that I see much activity since the change; -parties of the enemy cover the country between Madrid and Almaraz, -while the corps of six thousand men, which had been pushed forward -from Madrid, have, I understand, already passed Plasencia, and -probably are on the other side of the Puerto, for the purpose of -falling on the Salamanca country, and, if possible, cutting off -your communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.” - - -SECTION III. - -_Mr. Frere to Mr. Canning, Seville, May 8._ - -“Besides the advantages which may be looked for from placing -so extensive a command under a person of such tried abilities -as general Blake, it is to be hoped that it will put an end to -the distractions arising from the contracted views of those who -directed the provincial junta, particularly that of Valencia, which -have been so embarrassing to his predecessors.” - - -_Mr. Frere to Mr. Canning, Seville, July 10, 1809._ - -“As the devastations which have been committed have, in many -instances, deprived the peasants of the means of paying what is -due to the proprietors and to the church, a general spirit of -resistance to all claims of this kind has begun to show itself.” - - -_Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808._ - -“I much fear that alarm and despondency has gained ground about -Badajos and that part of Spain, and that there is so little -co-operation in the acts of their several juntas, and such a want -of subordination and common consent among the armed bodies, to -which the defence of the country is entrusted, against such an -united force as that of the French, that extreme confusion prevails -everywhere.” - - -_Colonel Kemmis to sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 30._ - -“He (lieutenant Ellis) has been living with general Cuesta for the -last two days,”--“who has assured him that the Spanish troops, in -Madrid, forced their way through the French army; and he expressed -great sorrow in adding that, though a Spanish force is often -collected, the smallest check disperses them; that in few instances -depôts were provided, and those ill supplied,” &c.--“that, such was -the dispersion and flight of the Spanish armies, between Badajos -and Madrid, there did not remain a single man.” - - -_Colonel Kemmis to lieut.-colonel Reynel, military secretary to sir -John Cradock, Seville, February 7, 1809._ - -“In passing through the Sierra Morena mountains, where Nature has -done much for the defence of this province, it was painful to -observe the pitiful works they were about to throw up. In this -whole direction there is but one body that has anything like the -appearance of a soldier, viz. dismounted cavalry.” - - -_General Mackenzie to sir John Cradock, Cadiz, February 9, 1809._ - -“The Spaniards here seem lulled in the most fatal security. They -are ignorant of the events in the north of Spain, or will not give -credit when they do hear them. Vague reports of the emperor of -Austria’s having declared war, and Buonaparte’s return to France -gains unlimited credit.”--“The equipment of the fleet goes on very -slowly, though there is no want of exertion now on the part of -admiral Purvis or Mr. Stuart; offers of every assistance are daily -made, but they will neither work themselves nor permit our people -to work for them. The preparations of the ships for carrying off -the French prisoners goes on equally ill.” - - -_Duc de Albuquerque to Mr. Frere, Talavera, July 31, 1809._ - -“During our marches we stop to repose, like flocks of sheep, -without taking up any position, so that, if the enemy knew the -condition we were in, they would defeat us wherever they attacked -us. If, in the evening of the 26th, I had not gone out directly -with my division, and succeeded in checking the enemy, the whole -army would have dispersed, and all the artillery and baggage, -which were in the streets of St. Ollalla, would have been lost; -and as a proof of what would have happened, had not the enemy, who -was within musket-shot, been checked, for many had already thrown -away their arms, &c. the commissaries abandoning more than fifteen -hundred rations of bread, the carts occupying and blocking up the -streets of the town; and to this, I repeat, we are daily exposed, -as we march, as if it were on a pilgrimage, without any regard to -distance, order, or method, and with the whole parc of artillery, -which ought always to remain at the distance of two, three, or more -leagues.” - - -_Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Wellesley, Merida, September 1, 1809._ - -“I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings of the -central junta, that, in the distribution of their forces, they do -not consider military defence and military operations so much as -they do political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political -objects.” - - -_Lord Wellesley to Mr. Canning, Seville, September 2, 1809._ - -“While the intelligence received from sir Arthur Wellesley, to -the date of the 24th instant, continued to furnish irresistible -proofs of the failure of every promise or effort made by this -government for the immediate relief of our troops, no satisfaction -was afforded to me respecting any permanent plan for their future -supply.”--“The troops of Portugal, which entered Spain, under -general Beresford, suffered similar distress, and experienced -similar ill-treatment; although the efforts of Portugal, in the -cause of Spain, have been as gratuitous as those of Great Britain; -and although Spain possesses no claim, of any description, to the -aid of a Portuguese army.”--“In this calamity, the people of Spain -cannot fail to acknowledge the natural consequences of their own -weakness, nor to discover the urgent necessity of enforcing a more -steady, pure, and vigorous system, both of council and action. A -relaxed state of domestic government and an indolent reliance on -the activity of foreign assistance have endangered all the high and -virtuous objects for which Spain has armed and bled. It must now -be evident that no alliance can protect her from the inevitable -result of internal disorder and national infirmity. She must amend -and strengthen her government; she must improve the administration -of her resources, and the structure and discipline of her armies, -before she can become capable of deriving benefit from foreign -aid. Spain has proved untrue to our alliance, because she is not -true to herself.”--“Until some great change shall be effected in -the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of -her armies, no British army can safely attempt to co-operate with -the Spanish troops in the territory of Spain.” - - * * * * * - - -No. III. - - -JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK’s CORRESPONDENCE, MSS. - -SECTION I.--STATE OF PORTUGAL. - -_Sir J. Cradock to sir R. Wilson, Oporto, December 8, 1808._ - -“I press this measure” (to move the legion from Oporto to Villa -Real) “upon your adoption, for many reasons, &c. &c.; but the more -especially that it will give an impulse to military preparation -in general, and tend to eradicate _the notion that, since the -evacuation of Portugal by the French, the prospect of a future war -is at an end_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to sir John Moore, December 9, 1808._ - -“I have pressed the adoption of such measures as appeared most -likely _to revive some notion of danger_, and the necessity of -activity and energy.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 14, 1808, Lisbon._ - -“The inaction of the regency was apparent at Oporto to a lamentable -degree; and, though I saw general Bernadim Friere, I could not -gain from him any information as to the state or numbers of the -Portuguese troops, where they were stationed, or who commanded -them. I apprehend, from his conversation, that the general officers -are all of equal authority; and that even seniority had not its -usual effect. He concluded his observations to me with the strong -expression, ‘_That, from the evacuation of Portugal by the French, -the nation had thought all war at an end_.’” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to sir J. Moore, December 28, 1808._ - -“Mr. Villiers and myself have both concurred upon the _absolute -necessity to arouse and animate the Portuguese to some sense of -their situation_.” - - -_Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 30, 1808._ - -“_The apathy of the Portuguese is not to be expressed._ Their -general, Leite, is a most excellent character: a theorist, and, -like his countrymen, _supine_.” - - -_Extract from the Report of lieutenant Brotherton, (an officer -employed to obtain intelligence in the north of Portugal,) February -11, 1809. Head-quarters of Romana’s army._ - -“From the totally defenceless state in which the two northern -provinces are left, it will require at least eight days (I speak -from authority) to prepare any thing like adequate means of -defence.” - - -SECTION II.--LUSITANIAN LEGION. - -_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, November 27, 1808._ - -“Its formation was proposed by the chevalier de Souza.”--“The pay, -allowances, and clothing were settled by the chevalier de Souza. -The former regulated, as I understood, upon the scale _of increased -pay, which the provisional government of Oporto had adopted for all -the troops they were in progress of levying_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808._ - -“I have considerable doubt if ever they” (the legion) “can be -incorporated, with effect and conciliation, with the body of the -Portuguese army.”--“They are viewed with _extreme jealousy by the -regency_; and the _commanding officers of the Portuguese battalion -resisted, universally, the allowing of volunteers from their -regiments to enter into the legion_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, January 19, 1809._ - -“The Lusitanian legion continues to give considerable uneasiness, -from its peculiar state, under present circumstances.” - - -_Captain Morgan (Lusitanian legion) to sir J. Cradock, January 19, -1809._ - -“Should a retreat be adopted, sir Robert would not retire to -Oporto. _It is the government of a mob, of which he has had too -much experience._” - - -SECTION III.--PORTUGUESE ARMY. - -_Sir J. Cradock to sir J. Moore, December 9, 1808._ - -“I am sorry to state that I find, as far as my limited observation -reaches, the Portuguese army, and every other military concern, _in -the worst possible state_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, December 18, 1809._ - -“I am sure that the state of the Portuguese army is quite -misunderstood in England; _and that a reliance is placed upon -it for the defence of the country that is entirely without -foundation_. Their” (Portuguese) “ministers will avow this to you -after ten minutes’ conversation.”--“Even of the reduced numbers -of their men enrolled, (not amounting to twenty thousand, at the -very highest computation,) to make any thing out of them, it is -necessary to recur to first principles, and give them _officers_, -_arms_, _clothing_, _accoutrements_, _horses_, &c.; and I need -not say that money is wanting to effect this: and the ministers -positively declare that they have none; and that no collection of -their forces can take place, much less a movement to the frontier, -without a supply.”--“M. Forjas, secretary to the government, in -answer to a strong question from me, stated that _their army have -not in possession ten thousand firelocks fit for use_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808._ - -“I am exerting myself to bring to account ‘the _supposed_ -Portuguese army.’”--“Your lordship will perceive that _I talk -of the regulars as if it were a regular force_; but I should be -guilty of a deceit, that might lead to bad consequences, if I did -not fairly state that _I conceive them to be of no moment at this -time_.” - - -Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 8, 1809. - -“I am ready to go to the utmost verge of prudence; but _Mr. Frere, -when he talks of Portuguese troops and arrangements, really_ (as I -believe you will allow) _fait bâtir les châteaux_.” - - -_Major-general Cotton to sir J. Cradock, April 7, 1809._ - -“I yesterday inspected the Portuguese cavalry.”--“This cavalry is -unformed, and totally unfit for any sort of service.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, February 12._ - -“It appears that a report has reached your lordship that a -conscription for horses in this country had been attended with -great effect, and that above three thousand had been collected. -It is, indeed, a matter of serious concern that such _serious -misrepresentations_ should be transmitted; for it is a well-known -fact that many of the Portuguese regiments of cavalry _are without -horses_; and, if I am to pursue the subject, their _battalions of -infantry are one-half without arms or clothing_! But the total want -of all means of regulations for subsistence from so deplorable a -view, in the event of co-operation, that the result, in my opinion, -cannot be attended with success. _It is, however, but justice to -say, that the disposition of the Portuguese seems well-inclined and -faithful to the common cause; and that a very efficient soldiery -may be formed under more favourable circumstances._” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, February 27, 1809._ - -“I fear that your excellency is led to entertain a more favourable -notion of the efficacy of the Portuguese army than, in any shape, -it is entitled. In short, my opinion is that they want every thing -that constitutes a respectable force, except about ten thousand -English arms. I believe they have no others. Many of their _cavalry -regiments are without horses, without swords, pistols, &c. Their -battalions are not clothed; and, as to subsistence, they live at -free quarters upon the villages where they are stationed._ To take -the field with effect, or an assurance of food, seems to me out of -the question. Since the first moment of my arrival, I wished to -procure the advance of a small Portuguese force to Alcantara; but -it has been impossible. It is a matter of serious lamentation that -such mis-representations of the Portuguese force should go home, or -reach your excellency.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 3._ - -“No reliance whatever can be placed upon the Portuguese troops -in their present state. _If I said that the whole were ready to -mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak general Beresford’s sentiments. -They will not be commanded by their own officers and they do just -as they please._” - - -SECTION IV.--CONDUCT OF THE REGENCY--TREATMENT OF FRENCH PRISONERS. - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 26, 1809._ - -“I have hitherto directed that these prisoners should be subsisted -at our charge, but I have no authority in this measure; they are -_in a most deplorable state_, and really are _a disgrace to all -concerned_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 5, 1809._ - -“It is absolutely necessary that the regency should give in an -answer about the French prisoners. The whole is an unauthorised -heavy charge, for which I give my warrant; and I see no end to the -case: and, added to this, _their situation is a reflection upon -humanity_.” - - -SECTION V.--NEGLECT, DUPLICITY, AND TIMIDITY. - -_Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 17._ - -“Lalippe, on which the very existence of Elvas depends, has not -been supplied with provisions as I have been taught to expect.” - - -_Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 25._ - -“The great importance of this fort” (Lalippe) “is well known to the -Portuguese; and, therefore, they are jealous, notwithstanding the -miserable condition of their troops, and total incapacity to defend -the fort, if attacked.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, December 26, 1808._ - -“_The promises and apparently satisfactory language of the -Portuguese government_ are, in my opinion, by no means sufficient -to meet the case. _I want to see_ some steps actually taken before -my mind is decided that the nation will defend itself.”--“Indeed, -I am told, on good authority, that _the government are afraid to -allow the people to arm_.”--“The moment I see any materials to -work upon, it will be my most anxious duty to give every effect, -&c.”--“But, under the present _inactivity and indifference_, it is, -&c.” - - -_Reports of colonel Donkin (quarter-master-general) to Sir J. -Cradock, March 21._ - -“I cannot, however, order officers of my department to check this -irregularity” (forcing quarters) “_when it originates solely in the -neglect of the Portuguese civil magistrates_; for troops will not -obey orders, which expose them wantonly to great privations.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, March 25._ - -“I have repeately urged this subject” (quarters of troops) “to the -regency, in the strongest manner, but, as you perceive, without -effect.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 17._ - -“Whatever suits the momentary purpose, upon the most superficial -view, seems to be the guide in the Portuguese councils. Ultimate -objects, which, in the course of things, must arrive, are never -brought into the calculation.” - - -_Cradock to Berkely, January 17._ - -“The regency seem to decline giving any specific directions -relative to the guns in fort St. Julian and the river batteries, -and, _above all, not to write any thing_; but they are very willing -to acquiesce in any thing we shall do, only anxious that, on a -future day, it _shall appear to be our act, not theirs_.” - - -_Admiral Berkely to sir J. Cradock, February 19, 1809._ - -“I imagine Mr. Villiers has transmitted a copy of the extraordinary -note sent him by the regency; in which they complain of the conduct -of the artillery-officer who dismantled the Bugio fort, and -intimate their intention of sending for all the guns and powder -from fort St. Julian; and add many particulars, as novel as they -are suspicious.”--“Whether the language of this note arises from -duplicity, or any other cause, it is equally to be resisted; and, -therefore, stated some facts which may be retorted upon them, and -which will not place their conduct in the _most favourable point of -view towards either their own sovereign or Great Britain_.” - - -_Extract from an official note, drawn up by sir John Cradock, -Lisbon, February 20, 1809._ - -“It was told me, two or three times, by Mr. Villiers, that M. -Forjas, or some other member of the regency, had expressed extreme -solicitude about the forts on the Tagus, &c.”--“I always urged Mr. -Villiers to get from M. Forjas, or any other member, a declaration -of what they wished, that we might exactly conform to it; for -they seemed to be anxious to go beyond what we should venture to -propose. Mr. Villiers, after some time, told me that the Portuguese -government were _unwilling to put down any thing upon paper_, or -give any specific instruction; but they would willingly leave -all the arrangement to us.”--“After the above statement, which I -declare, upon my honour, to be the accurate description of what has -passed, I must express my surprise, and even indignation, at the -protest now made by the regency; and when it is considered that the -Bugio fort is often inaccessible for a week together, this part of -their complaint is shameful to the highest degree. _Their general -object is, however, to be distinguished._” - - -SECTION VI.--ANARCHY IN PORTUGAL. - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, February 20, 1809._ - -“_Northern parts._--It may be difficult to manage any -money-transactions in Oporto, for the populace in that town have -been suffered to become the masters; and it was by an exchange of -public and private property that the commissariat money has been -lately secured.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February, 1809._ - -“To gratify a mob, the other day, at Oporto, a guard of the -sixtieth regiment was given up, and disarmed by baron Eben.” - - -_Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, March 17, 1809, Lamego._ - -“Considering the tumults, and the state of effervescence of the -public mind, and the blind fury of the populace--it will neither be -useful nor safe to remain amongst them.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26, 1809._ - -“The disposition is good, but the proceedings are those of an -ungovernable mob, _exposed to the evil effects of designing -persons_.”--“I confine myself to the north of Portugal and Oporto, -for the same excesses have not taken place at this side the Douro; -but the principles of insubordination, I should fear, would -prevail.”--“If the confusion and anarchy that prevail at Oporto -will permit a defence some exertion may be expected.”--“Ammunition -has been abundantly supplied, _but no quantity would meet the -consumption expended in the manner it has been in the Tras os -Montes_; an attempt to save which was, I believe, the occasion of -Bernadim Friere’s death.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 30, 1809._ - -“The anarchy that prevails at Oporto must, I fear, render every -exertion unavailable for defence; and such is the ungovernable -spirit of the populace, _that it is very difficult to say what part -they might take if the proceedings of the British did not suit -their views_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29._ - -“Oporto and all its concerns, with the bishop, nominally, at its -head, is in the hands of a wild ungovernable populace, _that has -already committed the most cruel excesses_. I fear the same spirit -exists in what is called the Portuguese army.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 29, Lisbon._ - -“Without a British force in Lisbon, the authority of the regency -would pass away, and the scenes of Oporto would take place here.” - - -_Report of captain Lawson, January 30, Lisbon._ - -“Last night, my servant returning from the post-office was -attacked by a party of Portuguese pike-men, headed by one of their -own officers, who severely wounded the horse in two places, and -slightly in several places, and obliged him, the servant, to put -himself under the protection of the guard at the town-major’s -office, to save his own life: the outrage was committed without the -slightest provocation.” - - -_General Langwerth to sir J. Cradock, February 1, Lisbon._ - -“The orderly, with the general orders, on his way to St. Julian’s, -was stopped by a Portuguese sergeant and twenty men with pikes; the -sergeant forced the orderly to deliver the letter containing the -orders, broke it open, read the contents, and returned the enclosed -receipt; the same guard stopped captain Clives, Royal Grenadier -army, and lieutenants Beurman and Liners; these officers were in -full uniform.” - - -_General Sontag’s Official Report, February 3._ - -“Mr. Usher, deputy purveyor, and Mr. M’Carty, interpreter, both -British subjects, arrived this day from Oporto, went to Moore’s -Hotel, where they were arrested and brought to the minister of -police. Mr. Usher was in his British uniform.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, January 30._ - -“Some unpleasant incidents have lately occurred on the part -of the Portuguese armed inhabitants of Lisbon towards British -individuals, but I cannot persuade myself that they have proceeded -from any fixed evil disposition.”--“The British army has not, -in any instance, departed from the most regular discipline, and -continues to manifest the greatest temper and moderation.”--“The -excesses on the part of the Portuguese commence by an _uncontrolled -pursuit, without any authority from the police, after all persons -whom they please to call Frenchmen_, and, in their indiscriminate -career, they _often attack every foreigner, and will not even -abstain from_ those in our service. Those _persons seek refuge in -our guard-room_, and though the guards and patroles have positive -orders not to interfere under any pretext with the police, yet it -is very difficult to smother the feelings of humanity when the -wretched persons are flying from a furious and unauthorised rabble. -_Mr. Villiers has exerted himself much with the Regency to check -this disorder, and prevent the assembly of armed persons in the -streets at night, who beat drums and discharge their pieces at -all hours; but as yet his remonstrances have not had the desired -effect._” - - -_Mr. Villiers to sir J. Cradock, January 30._ - -“Finding the people beat to arms, and paraded about the streets -after dark, _on the very evening after the regency had settled -that these irregularities should be restrained_, I addressed the -ministers of the home department upon the subject; and as other -excesses came to my knowledge, I followed up my complaint.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 30._ - -“I have, this morning, been taking such steps as appear necessary -to secure our general situation from insult; and, at the same -time, if practicable, not to manifest a distrust in the Portuguese -nation, which, if sanctioned from head-quarters, would destroy any -reason for our being here. I can assure you, every officer and -soldier has received impressions that it is most difficult to act -against, but I am determined to persevere in keeping the army from -aggression to the last moment.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February._ - -“When I reflect upon the frequent declarations of individual -members of the regency, that they cannot control the populace; -that there are at least seventy thousand armed inhabitants in -Lisbon; that the regency dare not let them parade (their exercise -has been at an end for some time, and the regency, at this moment, -say they cannot look upon themselves as responsible,) it appears -impossible that I should depart from the reasoning of my own mind, -to meet a sensation of _I do not know whom_, and lessen the proper -military appearance of our only guard. We are now beyond the power -of surprise or insult, and I cannot, as my own individual act, -alter the state of things. However, I never am devoted to my own -way of thinking, and if you recommend the measure (the political -reasoning, when the enemy is at a distance, may always be weighed -against military regulation), or see any good consequences, I will -immediately _order back the guns_ to their former station in the -artillery barracks.” - - -_Marshal Beresford to sir J. Cradock, April 7, Santarem._ - -“I, this morning, met no less than _three expresses_, communicating -to me the _horrible state of mutiny, for I can call it no less, -in which the troops every where are, and the inhabitants are in -equal insubordination, and they encourage each other. I find two -or three regiments have marched away (to what they call to oppose -the enemy)_ where they pleased, in despite of their officers and -generals, who are entirely commanded by them. This you will say is -a pleasing state to be in; however, we must face it, and I hope for -the best result, and I am sanguine enough to look for such. Colonel -Trant will shortly have a pretty strong corps, if the regiments -continue thus to volunteer for him.” - - -_Mr. Villiers to sir J. Cradock, February 15._ - -“I should almost doubt whether the British subjects _could be left -in safety in Lisbon_.” - - -SECTION VII.--FALSE INTELLIGENCE. - -_Sir J. Cradock to colonel Donkin._ - -“I believe it is certain that we cannot depend upon the activity of -the Portuguese government upon this head,” (intelligence,) “either -as to promptitude or security.” - - -_Colonel Donkin to sir J. Cradock, January 1, Lisbon._ - -“Experience has _shewn how utterly impossible it is to get correct -intelligence here_; an enemy may be within four or five days march -of this city before it is known, unless he attacks on the very line -our troops occupy.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29._ - -“It is singular how imperfectly all intelligence, though of such -important events, reaches this, and we have not had, for two days, -any account from Oporto.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26._ - -“Yesterday the chevalier de Castro stated, from authority, a -movement on the part of the French, quite different from a _direct -report_ from the junta of Badajos.” - - * * * * * - - -No. IV. - - -SECTION I.--EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN CRADOCK’S INSTRUCTIONS. - -_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, December 24, 1808._ - -“Upon the actual approach of the enemy towards Lisbon, in such -strength as may render further resistance ineffectual, you will -take care that measures be taken, in due time, for withdrawing -both the British army and _such Portuguese as may be desirous of -accompanying it_.”--“The British admiral will be directed to take -effectual measures, with your assistance, for depriving the enemy -of all the resources, more especially those of a naval description, -which the Tagus contains. Every thing of a naval and military -description, that cannot be brought away, must, in the last -extremity, be destroyed.” - - -_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, November 25, 1808._ - -“I am to signify his majesty’s pleasure that, in the event of any -application being made to you from the regency of Portugal, on the -subject of the occupation of the fortresses with his majesty’s -troops, you do _refer the subject to Mr. Villiers_, who has -received instruction, &c. and you will not make any alteration as -to the mode prescribed for garrisoning the fortresses _without -directions from Mr. Villiers_.” - - -_Lord Castlereagh to general Sherbrooke, January 12, 1809._ - -“Sir J. Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition you -may make _for horses for your guns_, or any other species of supply -the service may require.” - - -_Extracts from certain queries put to lord Castlereagh by sir J. -Cradock, with the answers thereto._ - - QUERY. ANSWER. - - “What may be the situation “The relations with the government - of my command?” of Portugal will be arranged when - Mr. Villiers arrives.” - - “In what light is the force “Ditto.” - under my command to be - considered?” &c. &c. - - “May any Portuguese battalions “The taking of Portuguese battalions - be levied for English pay?” into English pay will, if adopted, - be managed _through Mr. Villiers_.” - - “If any want of provisions “The general measures of supplying - should appear in Portugal, may Portugal with provisions will be - I be allowed to adopt measures, _referred to Mr. Villiers_.” - in conjunction with the regency, - for obtaining a supply?” - - “If any Portuguese corps can “_Mr. Villiers will be authorised_ - be got into such forwardness to enter upon the discussion of this - as to be fit to enter Spain, and subject with the regency, availing - they should be willing to join himself of your assistance,” &c. - sir J. Moore, are they to be put - on British pay?” - - * * * * * - - -No. V. - - -JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK’S PAPERS. - -WANT OF SUPPLIES. - -_Commissary Rawlings, deputy-commissary-general, to Cradock, -December 22._ - -“Your excellency is aware of the exhausted state of this country. -The difficulties encountered by sir J. Moore were of the most -serious nature, even before the sources of supply were so much -drained as they now are.” - - -WANT OF TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES. - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, 17th March._ - -“I have been obliged to send officers of the artillery and -commissariat department to Gibraltar to attempt the supply of -horses from the Barbary coast; and, such is our actual want, -that the proper movement of even the force we have is nearly -impracticable.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26._ - -“The means of transport are so confined that I must not expose -any thing to loss; and the artillery must be preserved with the -greatest care, for I cannot equip more than two brigades of -six-pounders, and one light brigade of three-pounders, the latter -being of a very inferior description.” - - -_Commissary Rawlings to sir John Cradock, March._ - -“The precarious tenure of this country by British troops has -hitherto precluded the possibility of establishing such an -advantageous contract for the public as, in more permanent cases, -might necessarily be expected: we have literally been supplied from -hand to mouth.” - - -_Colonel Robe to sir J. Cradock, March 20_. - -“It is necessary for me to add that every exertion has been -made to supply the artillery with horses and mules by the -deputy-commissary-general, but, from the exhausted state of the -country, and the demands upon it for the Portuguese army, no more -than two brigades have been furnished with those animals, and these -are much too slight for the general service of the artillery.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, March 20._ - -“From the first moment of my arrival in this country, unceasing -exertion has been employed to purchase and procure them” (horses -and mules) “at any price or by any means, but the adequate supply -for even the former small number of the British army could not be -obtained. I have also made repeated representations to England.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29._ - -“I want eight hundred horses and mules for the common conveyance of -provision and the equipment of the artillery.” - - -_Commissary Rawlings to sir J. Cradock, April 9._ - -“Some of the persons employed to provide cattle for the troops have -returned without effecting their mission. This disappointment must -be attributed to the movements of the enemy in the north, from -whence our supply has hitherto been obtained.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to marshal Beresford, Caldas, April 18._ - -“You can form no adequate idea of the difficulty to procure -supplies. The subject of forage for the cavalry keeps me in alarm -without intermission, and there is no certainty for a single -day. The country appears to be without the ability to furnish -straw.”--“In short, the supply is just for the day, and barely -sufficient.”--“I have begged of Mr. Villiers to desire the regency -would send a person, in special authority, to this district to -furnish supplies, if they are to be found. I shall act like the -French, and make requisition, with this difference, that we are -ready to pay for every thing to the utmost.” - - -_Cradock to Berkely, Caldas, April 17._ - -“Such is the dearth of supply in this part of the country, and -even in advance as far as we could go, that, unless victuallers -are sent (or some other arrangement to the same effect) to Peniché -and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot maintain our position. We cannot -advance, for all our means of transport are gone back to Lisbon; -and even in a retreat the cavalry could not be fed.”--“If there -is insurmountable risk in sending the victuallers to Peniché, -I request your declaration to this effect; for I must, in that -case, retire the army to a station close to Lisbon, to fed be from -thence.” - - -_Cradock to Villiers, April 17._ - -“This letter is plainly to state that, unless some victuallers are -sent, even at risk, to Peniché and St. Martinho Bay, we cannot -maintain our position, and must retreat.”--“If the articles are in -the country we must have them, and all ceremony must be dispensed -with. The enemy would have them without paying for them: we must -equally exact and pay.” - - -_Cradock to Beresford, April 20._ - -“All the recommendation you point out upon the assistance to be -derived from the coast have been long since acted upon to the -utmost of my exertions; but the difficulties started by the admiral -and the commissary were so great, that I cannot say I have much -dependence upon immediate aid.” - - -_General Cotton to Cradock, April 21._ - -“I wish I could once see the cavalry together; but I much fear that -before that happens they will be very much out of condition. The -fourteenth have already fallen off very much, owing to the frequent -want of straw and their being supplied with Indian corn, which they -will not eat: added to these circumstances, the commissary obliges -the cavalry to carry (on the horses) three days’ forage.” - - -_G. Harrison to Mr. Rawlings, Treasury-chambers, February 25._ - -“It having been represented to the lords commissioners of his -majesty’s treasury that the troops at Lisbon are experiencing the -greatest hardships from the want of shoes, I have received their -lordships commands,” &c. &c. - - -_Sir J. Cradock to colonel Willoughby Gordon, military secretary, -February 11._ - -“I trust that the importance of the subject will plead my excuse -for thus repeating my representations of the wretched state of the -clothing and the great coats in particular of his majesty’s troops -serving in this country.” - - -_Lord Castlereagh to general Sherbrooke, January 12._ - -“Sir John Cradock will be directed to comply with any requisition -you make for horses for your guns, or any other species of supply -the service may, from time to time, require.” - - * * * * * - - -No. VI. - - -SECTION I.--MISCELLANEOUS. - -_Captain Morgan, Lusitanian Legion, to sir J. Cradock, Lisbon, -January 19, 1809._ - -“I left sir R. Wilson very critically situated, occupying a pass -on the Agueda. Sir Robert is wholly unsupported; he has been -advised by colonel Guard to fall back; and, from his information, -he imagines that sir John Moore is withdrawing his troops through -Gallicia. On the other hand, he has received _positive orders from -you_[9] _to defend the frontiers_, and pressing letters to that -effect from the bishop of Oporto.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, 30th January._ - -“The regency and the bishop of Oporto are not pleased at his” (sir -R. Wilson) “quitting the bounds of Portugal.” - - -_Ditto to Ditto, 6th March._ - -“I had a letter from sir R. Wilson, from Ciudad Rodrigo (24th -February), wherein he says, that many French prisoners state their -expectations that the French army will retire behind the Ebro. Sir -Robert’s own persuasion is _that the French will retire altogether -from Spain_.” - - -SECTION II. - -_General Cameron to sir J. Cradock, Lamego, January 16._ - -“I have collected several detachments of recovered men belonging -to sir J. Moore’s army, whom I found scattered in all directions, -without necessaries, and some of them committing every possible -excess that could render the name of a British soldier odious to -the nation.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely, March 16._ - -“There are about one hundred and twenty persons confined on board -the _Rosina_, whose conduct has rendered them a disgrace to the -army.” - - -SECTION III. - -_Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, Oimbra, Head-Quarters of -Romana, February 21._ - -“The marquis of Romana seems to think that the serious _intention -of the enemy is to retreat from Gallicia_ altogether; and even -that he will find much difficulty _in extricating himself_. I must -confess that _I am not so sanguine_; and I judge that the present -retrograde movement from the Minho is more with an intent to -advance from Orense on Montalegre, and in this direction.” - - -_Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, March._ - -“I still believe Romana had intention to fall back on Chaves, and -join himself to the Portuguese army. _His troops had been much -vexed by the unfriendly conduct of the Portuguese_, and a cordial -co-operation was not to be expected; but that he should separate -altogether is what I neither could expect nor conceive. He -suddenly informed me of his resolution to retreat to Bragança. He -had just received a letter from Sylveira, which he also answered -to that effect, and which created no small surprise, as a plan of -operations had already been settled between them.” - - -_Major Victor Arentchild to sir J. Cradock, Oporto, March 16._ - -“General Sylveira has only one regiment with him; and his conduct -has been such, that the people have lost all confidence in him, and -consider him a traitor. I merely mention this to your excellency -as the opinion of the public.... The marquis of Romana’s army is -retreating to Orres, in Gallicia, and is, I fear, in a wretched -condition. The opinion entertained of him is far from good.” - - -_Mr. commissary Boys to Mr. commissary Rawlings, Almeida, January -13._ - -“Sir John Moore, with his army, was retreating, and ten thousand -men had deserted from the marquis of Romana, and were pillaging the -country.” - - -_Lord Castlereagh to marshal Beresford, February 15._ - -“The Portuguese government having solicited that a British general -officer should be appointed to command and organize their army, -his majesty has been graciously pleased to select you for this -important trust.” - - -_Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere, January 23._ - -“No effort appears to have been made by the Spaniards, either to -second the British operations, or even to defend Ferrol, or save -the naval means (whatever they may be) in that harbour.” - - * * * * * - - -No. VII. - - -EXTRACTS FROM MR FRERE’S CORRESPONDENCE. - - (N. B. The Italics are not in the original.) - - -_Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, Seville, March 14._ - -“Our hope of offensive operations in Aragon is so much diminished -by the defeat of general Reding, that I should much doubt whether -any reinforcements, such as we could now send there, would enable -us to attempt them with the prospect of a degree of success, such -as might compensate for the inconvenience liable to arise from -the derangement of calculations which may have been formed at -home.”--“On the other hand, there seems reason to _apprehend_, -that general Soult may at last, in consequence of the resistance -he has experienced, _desist from his unaccountable project, of -entering Portugal and occupying Gallicia_. His return would, of -course, add largely to the disposable and moveable force of the -enemy, while it would not increase ours by any force of that -description.”--“In this view of the subject there are two points -for the employment of a British force; one, _by making a push -to drive the enemy from Salamanca, and the neighbouring towns_, -while the Asturians should make an effort on their side to occupy -Leon and Astorga, thus re-establishing the communications between -the northern and southern provinces. The other, by moving from -the bridge of Alcantara along the northern bank of the Tagus, in -concert with general Cuesta, to attack and _drive the enemy from -Toledo, and consequently from Madrid_. In the latter alternative, -the British could have the advantage of acting in concert with a -disciplined army. They would, likewise, have immediately the start -of any reinforcement from the army of general Soult, supposing him -to abandon Gallicia for the sake of moving southward; and these -movements would not tend in the same degree to draw him from his -present position, in which, for so many reasons, _it is desirable -he should continue_. It would, I should imagine, at the same time, -cover Andalusia, and the points of the greatest interest and -importance in this province, more effectually than the same force -employed in any other manner.” - - -_Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, March 22._ - -“The fortieth remains here: under the present circumstances I could -not think of their removal, unless to meet a British force from -Elvas.” - - -_Mr. Frere to sir A. Wellesley, Seville, May 4._ - - Extracted from Parliamentary Papers, 1810. - -“As it was my object to obtain _a diversion in La Mancha as the -price of co-operation_ on your part, and the impression which they -(the junta) received from colonel Alava’s report was, that your -intention was, after defeating or driving Soult into Gallicia, to -come down upon Estremadura to attack general Victor, I was under -some disadvantage, inasmuch as they imagined, that the point which -I wanted to make a condition was already conceded.” - - * * * * * - - -No. VIII. - - -EXTRACTS RELATIVE TO CADIZ. - -_Sir John Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 16._ - -“The troops from England for Cadiz may or may not arrive, at -least we may expect delay; but I think the subject of sending a -force from this requires immediate deliberation and settlement. I -am prepared to appropriate for this service any number that may -be deemed proper under existing circumstances. It is only upon -the political part of the subject I can have any hesitation, and -whether the Spaniards will receive the force as they ought. The -orders from England are to send it if the supreme junta shall make -the requisition. The question is, whether we shall anticipate the -demand or not?” - - -_Sir John Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 29._ - -“This measure (sending troops to Cadiz) is certainly one of -considerable responsibility to those concerned; but upon its -adoption, Mr. Villiers, Admiral Berkely, and myself, could not -well hesitate, after the despatches that were communicated to us, -as addressed to you, as well as those directed to ourselves, which -placed Cadiz in so prominent a point of view, upon the unfavourable -termination of the campaign in the north of Spain.”--“The force in -Portugal is weakened to a degree, especially in British regiments, -that reduces it to almost nothing; but I may look to the arrival -of the force of five thousand men, announced to be on their way; -and if it is intended to maintain Portugal, it will be but fair to -replace the present detachment from them.” - - -_Sir John Cradock to general Mackenzie, March 9._ - -“I yesterday received orders from his majesty’s government to -press, in the most expeditious manner, the immediate return of the -forces under your command to the Tagus.” - - -_Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 9._ - -“Your lordship will find, by the present communication, that -major-general Mackenzie, at the express desire and advice of -Mr. Frere, has actually left Cadiz with his whole force, (the -fortieth regiment, from Seville, will be united,) and proceeded -to Tarragona, unless your lordship’s orders may have overtaken -major-general Sherbrooke, who passed this port four days ago -(without any communication). It may be presumed that he will follow -the same course, upon the same motives that influenced general -Mackenzie; and at present a new scene of operations is entered upon -in that part of Spain.” - - * * * * * - - -No. IX. - - -NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF MAJOR-GENERAL MACKENZIE’S -DETACHMENT FROM LISBON TO CADIZ. - -“The detachment sailed from Lisbon on the 2d February, 1809, and -arrived in Cadiz harbour on the 5th, at night. I immediately -waited on rear-admiral Purvis, and from him I learnt there are -some difficulties started by the marquis Villel (the commissioner -from the central junta, as well as a member of it) to our landing -and occupying Cadiz. I then waited on sir George Smith, on shore, -where this intelligence was, in some degree, confirmed; but sir -George still expressed an expectation that the objections would be -got over. These objections had been, it seems, but lately started. -Next morning I saw Mr. Charles Stuart, who was acting under a -diplomatic authority from Mr. Frere, and had a conference with -him and sir G. Smith, when I explained the nature of my orders, -and it was determined to wait on the marquis Villel. Mr. Stuart -explained to the marquis that the object of my coming was to offer -our assistance in the occupation and defence of Cadiz, and in -making the necessary preparations for such an event; that we were -only the advance of a larger corps coming from England, to act -from this side against the common enemy. The marquis hesitated, -and, after some speeches of compliment, said his authority did not -extend so far; that he must wait for instructions from the central -government; and, in the mean time, said he could permit our landing -at Port St. Mary’s. This I declined, as an unnecessary loss of -time, and contrary to my orders; and it was then agreed to wait for -the decision of the central junta from Seville. I thereupon wrote -to Mr. Frere, and sent him a copy of my instructions from sir J. -Cradock. - -The decision of the junta was received on the 8th; and I received -a letter from Mr. Frere, which put an end, for the moment, to our -hope of occupying Cadiz. The reason assigned by the junta was of -the most flimsy nature, viz. “That they had ordered two of their -own battalions to occupy Cadiz;” a measure which was evidently the -thought of the moment, and a mere pretext. - -Although I cannot presume to judge of the evil political -consequences which might arise from such a measure, as alluded -to in Mr. Frere’s, yet I had every reason to believe, as well -from the opinion of sir G. Smith, as of all others conversant -in the sentiments of the people of Cadiz, that our landing and -occupying the place would be a very popular measure. Mr. Frere’s -letter expressed a great desire that we should not appear to have -made an offer that was refused; and was desirous that we should -not immediately depart, but that we should land and occupy the -cantonments offered to us. On consulting with sir G. Smith and Mr. -Stuart, this appeared to be contrary to the grounds on which we had -set out; but as we were equally desirous not to appear at variance -with the Spanish government, we agreed to submit to Mr. Frere, -whether it would not be better for the troops to remain for the -present in their transports, as we had already stated that we were -in expectation of being immediately joined by a force from England, -the scene of whose operations was uncertain; and our remaining in -the harbour under this idea would answer every purpose Mr. Frere -proposed by a landing. - -I had, besides, some military objections to a landing; for, without -reckoning the uncertainty of an embarkation from Port St. Mary’s, -I knew how dilatory all proceedings are in Spain. That if we were -once placed in the scattered cantonments proposed, and we had a -sudden call for embarkation, above a week would have been lost in -effecting it; and from former experience, the effects of a certain -disorder would, probably, have thrown a large number of our men -into the hospitals. It is further evident that the detachment -could not have been re-embarked without some stain on the national -honour. It must have very soon marched into the interior of Spain, -and thus have involved our country in its support, without having -obtained the object for which it was detached,--the possession of -Cadiz. On all these considerations I thought it right to defer -landing, until we should hear further from Mr. Frere, to whom both -Mr. Stuart and myself wrote, and I presume he was satisfied with -the reasons given. In all these proceedings I had the cordial -approbation of sir G. Smith, who, notwithstanding unfavourable -appearances, seemed sanguine to the last that the point would -be carried. I therefore wrote to sir J. Cradock, by the Hope -brig, on the 9th, stating what had been done, and that we should -remain in Cadiz harbour (with Mr. Frere’s approbation) until we -received orders from him or from England. And I wrote, by the same -conveyance, to the same purport, to Lord Castlereagh. - -On the 15th, we had the misfortune to lose sir G. Smith, who died -that morning; and on the 18th, I received a letter from Mr. Frere, -in which he seemed to have altered his opinion as to the propriety -of our occupying Cadiz, and stating that the only mode which -appeared to him likely to succeed in obtaining the possession was -my leaving a small part of my detachment there, and proceeding with -the rest to join Cuesta’s army; that, as a force was expected from -England for the same purpose for which my detachment came, what I -left behind might follow me on their arrival. - -I confess I was much disappointed at this proposal, the whole of -my detachment not appearing more than equal to the charge of the -place; but as it had not been laid before the junta, I considered -it my duty to state the objections to it, as they arose out of -my instructions. Such a measure would have completely committed -our country, in a particular point, in the interior, with a very -small detachment, a thing which I was instructed his majesty’s -ministers wished to avoid; whilst the admittance of a handful of -men could not be considered as any possession of the place, where -there were about four thousand volunteers well drilled. I therefore -submitted to Mr. Frere, to defer the proposition of this measure -until the arrival of troops from England, which might be looked -for, according to his statement, every hour. We should be, then, in -a condition to take possession of Cadiz effectually, and advance, -in some point, respectably, towards the enemy. If, however, Mr. -Frere should determine to bring forward the measure immediately, -I further informed him, that I was ready to move on, as soon as we -could obtain the necessary equipments. - -Mr. Stuart embarked on the 21st, on board the Ambuscade, on a -secret mission. On the 22d, and before I received any further -communication from Mr. Frere, a popular commotion broke out -suddenly at Cadiz, in consequence of the measure which the junta -had adopted, of marching some of their own troops into the town, -as the reason (or rather pretext) for declining to receive us. The -regiment now on its march in, was composed of Poles, Swiss, and -other foreigners, deserters from the French army, whose entrance -the people were determined to resist. The utmost care was taken to -prevent our officers or soldiers from taking any part whatever on -this occasion; and, except in some cases where I was applied to -by the governor, for the interference of some British officers as -mediators, we steered perfectly clear. It was now evident that the -people were favourable to our landing and occupying the town, for -it was frequently called for during the tumult. - -As soon as I could safely send an account of this commotion to -Mr. Frere, I despatched an officer (captain Kelly, assistant -quarter-master-general) with a detail. The Fisguard sailed on the -24th, for Lisbon and England, by which ship I informed sir J. -Cradock, as well as lord Castlereagh, of all that had passed since -my last; and just at that time colonel Roche arrived from Seville. -He was sent down, by Mr. Frere, to Cadiz, in consequence of Mr. -Stuart’s mission. I had till now expected Mr. Frere’s decision, -on the subject of the proposition in his letter of the 18th; but -as so much time had elapsed, I conjectured he might have dropped -it for the present; and conceiving that something favourable to -the object of my mission might be drawn from the present state -of things, I had a full conversation with colonel Roche on the -subject. He told me the junta were dissatisfied with our not having -accepted the cantonments offered to us; but he did not seem to -think our views unattainable, particularly at the present moment. -I asked his opinion as to the practicability of general Stuart’s -being admitted, with two of my three battalions, into Cadiz, if I -advanced with the third to Seville to join the fortieth regiment, -thus making an equal division of my force. Colonel Roche was of -opinion that this would be acceded to; and I, therefore, despatched -him, as soon as possible, with a proposal to this effect to Mr. -Frere. Though two battalions could not be considered a sufficient -garrison, yet, from the evident popularity of our troops, and -the speedy expectation of a reinforcement from England, I thought -it would be extremely proper to make the trial. It also appeared -to me that by advancing to Seville I should not run much risk of -involving those two battalions in any operations before the arrival -of general Sherbrooke, which could embarrass him in the execution -of the orders he might bring from home. - -This proposition certainly exceeded any thing authorised by my -instructions, but, I trust, the circumstances will be found to -warrant it. - -After colonel Roche’s departure for Seville, captain Kelly returned -from thence, on the 26th, with a verbal confidential message from -Mr. Frere, stating that marshal Soult was marching from Gallicia -into Portugal, in three columns, and that Mr. Frere would write -to me by express, or by next post. On the 27th, I received this -promised letter, enclosing the copy of an intercepted letter from -Soult to Joseph Buonaparte; and Mr. Frere expresses his opinion -that my detachment may now be more useful in Portugal than at Cadiz. - -Knowing, as I did before I left Lisbon, that every proper step was -taking for evacuating Portugal, in case of necessity, and that -nothing else than succours from home could enable sir John Cradock -to hold his ground there, it became more than ever necessary to -ascertain whether his army will be received into Cadiz, in case -of the evacuation of Portugal. In case the present negotiation -succeeded, I had arranged with admiral Purvis to send a frigate -with the intelligence to Lisbon immediately. If it failed, every -thing was in readiness to sail with the detachment thither; for, -although the assistance I should bring might not be sufficient of -itself to make any alteration in the resolutions already taken, -yet, if reinforcements arrived from England, we should be a welcome -addition. - -On the morning of the 2d of March I received a letter from colonel -Roche, dated February 28, stating that my proposition had not yet -been decided on, but that it would be taken into consideration -that day. He expressed much apprehension of a party in the French -interest. - -The morning of the 3d having passed without any letter from Mr. -Frere or colonel Roche, as I had been assured by the latter -I should receive, at furthest by the post of that morning, I -despatched another courier, dreading some accident. In the -afternoon, however, I received a long and important letter from -Mr. Frere, from which I concluded the negotiation had failed -(although he did not say so in terms); and a letter I received -shortly afterwards from colonel Roche confirmed this failure. -Mr. Frere’s letter entered very minutely into the state of the -Spanish and French armies; mentioned the failure of Soult’s attempt -to penetrate into Portugal by the Minho, and the improbability -of his persisting in it, from the position of the Spanish army, -assisted by the Portuguese. He then points out, in strong terms, -the essential use my detachment could be of at Tarragona, in giving -spirit and vigour to the cause in that country, where it is most in -need of support. - -As the return of my detachment to Portugal, except in the case -of resisting the enemy, would not have a favourable appearance; -and the proceeding to Tarragona would so evidently shew our -determination to support the general cause, and leave the Spanish -government without an excuse afterwards for refusing to admit our -troops into Cadiz, it was my intention to have complied with Mr. -Frere’s solicitations, as the employment of my detachment on the -sea-coast would easily admit of its being afterwards withdrawn, -without committing any other British force for its support; and the -motives urged by Mr. Frere were so strong, that I scarcely thought -myself vindicable in hesitating to comply. - -I accordingly wrote on the night of the 3d March to this effect -to Mr. Frere, sir J. Cradock, and lord Castlereagh. But on the -4th, in the evening, captain Cooke, of the Coldstream guards, -arrived from England with despatches for general Sherbrooke, who -had not yet arrived. Captain Cooke came in the Eclair brig of war, -and had stopped at Lisbon, which he left again on the evening of -the 2d, and brought me a message to the following purport from -sir J. Cradock, viz. ‘That he was determined to defend Portugal -to the utmost of his power; that in this situation he considered -my detachment as the choice part of his little army; that the -enemy were actually on the borders, though there was not yet any -intelligence of their having entered Portugal; and that unless -some extraordinary circumstance, of which he could form no idea, -prevented it, he should look for my immediate return to Lisbon.’ - -This order, of course, put an end to all further deliberation. The -idea of proceeding to Tarragona was abandoned. I wrote to this -effect to Mr. Frere, and embarked at midnight on the 4th. Contrary -winds detained in Cadiz harbour the whole of the 5th, but on the -6th the fleet sailed, and arrived in the Tagus on the 12th. - -I trust, in the whole of these proceedings, in a very intricate -and delicate situation, an honest and anxious desire has been -evinced on my part, to accomplish the object of my mission; the -failure of which, I am persuaded, will be found to arise from the -apprehensions and disunion of the central junta, and not from the -inclinations of the people of Cadiz. - - (Signed) J. R. MACKENZIE, - _Major-general._ - _Lisbon, March 13, 1809._” - - * * * * * - - -No. X. - - -COMMUNICATIONS WITH MINISTERS--NEGLECT OF PORTUGAL. - -SECTION I. - -_Mr. Canning to Mr. Villiers, January 24, 1809._ - -“You are aware, by my despatch, No. 4, of the 24th of December, -enclosing copies, &c. &c. _that, in the event of the evacuation of -Portugal, by the force under sir J. Cradock’s command, an event -rendered the more probable by the transactions in Gallicia_.” - - -_Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, February 6._ - -“_Should you be compelled to evacuate Portugal_,” _&c._ - - -_Admiral Berkely to sir J. Cradock, February 6._ - -“The period of the British army’s stay in this place _appearing to -draw near to its conclusion_.” - - -SECTION II. - -_Sir J. Cradock to colonel Guard, January 3._ - -“The garrisons of Elvas and Almeida have engaged my most serious -thoughts.”--“But, as they were occupied by the command of his -majesty’s ministers, and _we remain without any fresh instructions -under the present critical circumstances_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to general Richard Stewart, January 10._ - -“I feel what a risk I run in thus leaving Lisbon defenceless, but -_I obey the original orders of government_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to general Richard Stewart, January 12._ - -“_We are still without any instructions whatever from England._” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to captain Halket, January 13._ - -“Though we cannot say _when_ it may take place, and it shall be -deferred to the last moment, _in hopes of hearing from England_, -yet I believe it to be our duty to prepare every thing for the -event of an embarkation.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely, January 17._ - -“I lament to say that there appears nothing before us but the -resolution _to remain in Portugal to the last proper moment, -awaiting orders from England_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 19._ - -“With our force inferior and ill-composed, as it is, _we are -determined to remain to the last proper moment, in the hopes of -receiving orders from England_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to admiral Berkely_, _February 9_. - -“The orders we daily expect may be either for _immediate -embarkation, or to maintain Portugal_.”--“I am pursuaded we have -but this one wish, which is to act for the credit of our country, -and endeavour, under the _want of all information, to discover what -may be the object of the government we serve_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to general Mackenzie, February 26._ - -“Since the 14th of January _we are without instructions from -England_.” - - -SECTION III. - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 15._ - -“What appears to be my duty is to keep the fixed idea that the -_army in Portugal should remain to the last moment_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 15._ - -“I am just favoured with your communication about the dangerous -effects likely to be produced by the measure of withdrawing the -troops from Lisbon to occupy the military position of Oyeras, -Passo d’Arcos, &c. I fear (though the contrary was intended to be -expressly stated) that you are led into the idea that the position -in question was solely intended for embarkation. My avowed design -was to await (in a military post suited to our force) orders -from England, or to defend ourselves with reasonable prospect of -success against any attempt from the enemy, or even from thence -to make a forward movement, should future events lead to such -a proceeding.”--“What I must object to is to take up a false -position, say Alcantara, or other heights about the town, which -would only defend a certain position and leave the remainder to -the power of the enemy, one which we must leave upon his approach -and seek another bearing the appearance of flight and yet not -securing our retreat. The whole having announced the intention to -defend Lisbon, but giving up that idea upon the appearance of the -enemy: for positions liable to be turned on every side cannot be -persevered in by an inferior force.”--“My political reasoning upon -this subject was contained in the letter I wrote the admiral, and, -I must repeat, it continues unweakened,” &c.--“After your strong -representations of this morning, I shall certainly not persevere; -and, as there is no instant necessity for the measure, will await -the progress of events.” - - * * * * * - - -No. XI. - - -STATE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORCE UNDER SIR J. CRADDOCK, JANUARY -6, 1809, EXTRACTED FROM THE HEAD-QUARTER STATES. - -Disposable for the Field. - - Garrisons. Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. - Men. Men. Men. - Santarem 68 190 2,492 General Richard Stewart. - Saccavem 97 169 1,450 General M’Kenzie. - Lisbon .. 519 .... General Cotton. - .. .. 236 attached to different - --- --- ----- battalions. - 165 879 4,178 - --- --- ----- - Total 5,222 - - Garrisons. Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. - Men. Men. Men. - Almeida 38 .. 1,440 - Elvas 33 .. 679 - Oporto .. .. 379 - Lisbon and Forts 315 .. 2,682 - --- -- ----- - Total 486 .. 5,170 - ----- - General total 10,392 - ------ - - Note.--Every man capable of bearing arms is included in this - state. - - -ORDER OF BATTLE, APRIL 6, 1809, CALDAS. - -Sir J. Cradock, commander-in-chief. - -Major-general Sherbrooke, second in command. - - Artillery.--Major-general Howarth. Cavalry.--Major-general Cotton. - - Under arms. - Men. - First line, five brigades 10,418 - Second line, three brigades 3,810 - Reserve, one brigade 1,858 - Cavalry 800 - ------ - Total 16,886 - ------ - - -STATE OF THE ARMY UNDER SIR A. WELLESLEY, APRIL 22. - -Head-quarters, Leyria. - - Under arms. Sick. Command. Effective. - Men. Men. Men. Men. - Artillery 441 88 408 937 - Cavalry 1,439 13 418 1,870 - Infantry 16,539 1,937 314 18,790 - ------ ----- ----- ------ - Total 18,419 2,038 1,140 21,597 - ------ ----- ----- ------ - - 6lb. 3lb. Howitzers. - Number of guns 20 6 4 - - Total 30 - - -STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, MAY 1, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Coimbra. - - Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file. - Men. Men. Men. Men. Men. - 1,413 3,074 19,510 230 24,227 - Deduct { Hospital 2,357 - { Absent 1,217 - ------ - Total present under arms 20,653 - ------ - - -STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, JUNE 25, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Abrantes. - - Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file. - Men. Men. Men. Men. Men. - 1,586 3,736 21,267 406 26,995 - Deduct { Hospital 3,246 - { Commands 1,396 - 30 Pieces of artillery. ------ - Total present under arms 22,353 - ------ - - -STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, JULY 25, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Talavera. - - Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file. - Men. Men. Men. Men. Men. - 1,584 3,734 29,694 398 35,410 - Deduct { Hospital 4,827 - { Commands 1,596 - ------ - Total present under arms 28,987 - Deduct regiments on march 9,141 - 30 Pieces of artillery. ------ - Real present under arms 19,846 - ------ - - -STATE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY’S ARMY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1809. - -Head-quarters, Badajos. - - Artillery. Cavalry. Infantry. Waggon train. Total rank and file. - Men. Men. Men. Men. Men. - 1,947 4,273 28,409 389 35,018 - - In Hospital 8,827 } - Command and missing 2,526 } Total absent 11,353 - ------ - Total present under arms 23,765 - ------ - - * * * * * - - -No. XII. - - -SECTION I. - -MARSHAL BERESFORD TO SIR J. CRADOCK. - - _March 29, 1809._ - - SIR, - -I have the honour to annex your excellency a copy of requisitions, -from their excellencies the government of this kingdom, for the -speedy succouring of Oporto, which your excellency is informed is -so immediately in danger, from the approach of the French army, -whose advance posts are now within four leagues of that town. - -I annex, for the information of your excellency, the instructions -which, under the existing circumstances, I had issued to the -general, commanding beyond the Douro; but the object of which has -been frustrated by events, at once unfortunate and melancholy. - -The corps of brigadier-general Victoria, consisting of two -battalions of the line, which, on the appearance of the urgent -danger in the north, I had directed to cross the Douro, are now -in Oporto, as is the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, -part of the regiment of Valença, and some regiments of militia; -but I cannot get any return of the troops there, though, I -understand, the number is considerable; and to this must be added -a considerable number of ordenanza from without, and the armed -population which will, I understand, amount to eight or ten -thousand men, and of the arms come from England, three thousand -stand that were sent to the army north of the Douro, are probably -now in Oporto, with a proportion of ammunition. I have thought -it right to give this statement of the actual state of things at -Oporto, as far as I can get information of, that your excellency -may be aware of it; and it is with regret that I farther add -that there prevails, in the town, the greatest anarchy and -insubordination,--and that, in short, by the latest accounts, the -populace entirely govern the law, civil and military. - -Upon the subject of marching a British force to Oporto under -the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the -various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we -had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary -for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me -to submit to your excellency’s consideration the propriety of -advancing the British force to Leyria, to be then pushed on to -Oporto, or otherwise, as the information from different parts -may render expedient. But my principal reason was that, as there -appeared an intention of co-operation (of which, however, there is -no certainty) between the marshals Victor and Soult, it would be -most desirable, by either driving back or overcoming one before the -other could give his co-operating aid to defeat their plan, and if -we should, or not, be able. To do this would be merely a matter -of calculation of time, as, supposing, on our arrival at Leyria, -Oporto offered a prospect of holding out till we could reach it, -and that Victor continued his southern pursuit of Cuesta, he would -get so distant from us, as to permit the army, pushing from Leyria -to Oporto, without apprehension from the army of Victor, who, by -the time he could possibly hear of our movement, would be in the -Sierra Morena, which would clearly show that his principle object, -and from which he did not seem willing to be diverted, was either -the destruction of Cuesta’s army, to enter more securely into -Portugal, or to push to Seville; but, at all events, he would be -too distant to give us apprehensions of any surprise upon this -capital, as we have daily information of his movements, and which -would enable us, wherever we were in Portugal, even to reach it -before him. If, however, the final co-operation of these two -armies is intended for the conquest of this kingdom, and that -Soult does not think that of his army from Gallicia and that from -Salamanca sufficient, then he will satisfy himself, until Victor -is ready to act with him, in the possession of the country beyond -the Douro, where he will refresh and rest his troops, re-equip -them, and otherwise provide them, to be ready for the projected -co-operation,--whilst the army from Salamanca will, probably, -satisfy itself with the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and -act and wait in conjunction with Soult, both waiting till Victor -has settled his present objects, and then all co-operating. - -It is for your excellency to judge, under the actual circumstances, -of the propriety of this movement towards Oporto, not only for -the British troops, but, also, of those of the allies, as, by my -instructions, I must consider you as commanding the allied armies; -and the time is now certainly arrived, for what efforts they can -make being combined: undoubtedly, their being employed in separate -projects will cause each falling separately, and without advantage -to the common cause. - -I would, however, certainly, under present circumstances, be -unwilling to send the few troops I could spare from the army, -between the Tagus and the Mondego, to Oporto, as, unsupported by -British, I fear it would be losing so many men, that on a future -occasion, with such support, may weigh in the scale; and indeed, -the very insubordinate state of the troops, of which I have just -received a second report and complaint, from general Miranda, would -render it highly unwise to send them to a town in the state that -Oporto now is, where the best disposed troops, except a great body -went there, if they were not debauched to insubordination, would be -borne down by the multitude; and it is to be feared that whatever -Portuguese troops enter the town will fall with it, as the temper -of the people prevents the possibility of even any preparations for -retreat, in case of misfortune, to the outward and very extended -lines of defence. Having stated so much, I must leave the question -to your excellency, &c. - - I have the honour, &c. - - W. C. BERESFORD. - - -SIR J. CRADOCK TO MARSHAL BERESFORD. - - _Lisbon, March 29, 1809._ - - DEAR SIR, - -I have the honour to acknowledge, at the earliest moment, your -excellency’s letter of this evening, conveying a copy of the -request from the regency, &c. that I should move the British troops -to the succour of Oporto, at this moment menaced, &c. - -Upon a subject of such importance, I experience considerable -relief, that the general view of approaching circumstances has -been, for a length of time, within my reflection, and that all -my reasoning (whatever it may be) has been transmitted to the -government in England, and the part I am now called upon to act -is simply but the execution of those measures I have long thought -it prudent to pursue, and which the present critical and involved -state of affairs seem to confirm and give no reason to alter in any -part. - -It has always appeared, to my judgement, that the enemy has but -two objects to attain in this kingdom. The possession of Lisbon -and Oporto, I believe it to be universally admitted, and I need -not point out to your discrimination the infinitely superior -value of the former above the latter. There are such positive -local disadvantages attached to Oporto, independent of its remote -position, that no military disposition, in which a small English -army is to bear part, can apply. It pains me, therefore, to decline -obedience to an application from so high an authority as the -governors of the kingdom. It may be their duty to make the request, -though I much doubt if their judgement goes along with it; but it -appears to be mine not to transfer the small British force, under -my command, (totally inadequate to separate objects,) from the -defence of this part of the kingdom to the very doubtful succour of -a place two hundred miles distant, and by a movement to the north -with this professed view, feel myself engaged in a war that leaves -Lisbon and the Tagus defenceless and unprotected from the inroads -of other bodies of the enemy that may be prepared to combine in a -general invasion. - -I shall hasten, therefore, from all general observation, to the -exact case before us, and state, in a concise manner, our actual -situation, leaving to your judgement, how far it may be necessary -to communicate some particulars that relate to the British army, -and lay before the governors and your excellency the best ideas -I can form for the employment of the British auxiliary force, in -conjunction with the Portuguese, for the ultimate protection of -Portugal under the pressure of all existing circumstances. - -It may be granted that the enemy, with a force from seventeen -to twenty thousand, a considerable portion of which (it is said -five thousand) is cavalry, is directly menacing Oporto, there is -reason to believe that the division at Salamanca, estimated from -nine to twelve thousand, with a powerful force of artillery, is -moving to Ciudad Rodrigo, either for the investment of that place, -or to act in conjunction with general Soult, by an advance into -the Upper Beira. In the present view it is necessary to state, -with the weight it so well deserves, that the united forces of -generals Victor and Sebastiani are, apparently, pursuing general -Cuesta, just retiring before them; but it appears that a part -of the enemies had diverged to Merida, and had spread alarm and -dismay, even to the town of Badajos, on the frontiers of Portugal, -from whence, to the heights of Almeida, or the opposite of Lisbon, -through the whole of the Alemtejo: except the weak garrison of -Elvas, there is nothing to interrupt the immediate passage. - -Against such an attempt from the enemy I derive no security from -the contiguity of general Cuesta’s army; for, besides the general -disinclination he has so strongly marked to the British character, -he has other objects to pursue, and his principal wish is to gain -time for the organization of his own force. To a person so well -acquainted with Portugal, and the circumstances of the present -hour, as your excellency is, it is quite superfluous to enter upon -further details, &c. It is only required to lay before you, in -confidence, the exact amount of the British forces, as the real -point upon which the whole subject depends: I may state it at -twelve thousand effective men, to take the field, if the necessary -garrison to maintain Lisbon in some tranquillity, and retain -possession of the maritime forts is left. It may be increased to -fourteen thousand, if these points are risked; but even to gain -the advantage of numbers to so limited a force, I cannot recommend -the measure, for the anarchy that prevails at Oporto, and would -be, perhaps, worse at Lisbon, is more to be dreaded than the -presence of an enemy, and may render all exertion useless. The -necessary means of transport for our army, notwithstanding every -effort, from the earliest moment, are quite inadequate, and not -more than two and a half brigades of artillery (fifteen guns) can -be equipped. To adventure upon an advance to Oporto, two hundred -miles from Lisbon, when the very object is, perhaps, at this -moment lost, seems to be a point only to gratify the good feelings -of every soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the -understanding, and the ultimate view of things. If the British -army sets out with the declared object to succour Oporto, or expel -the enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same; nothing -but the accomplishment will suit the English character; and I -confess that the best reasoning of my judgement, upon every public -and private principle, for the credit of the British army, and the -hope of any effectual assistance from the Portuguese nation is, -that the British troops should never make one retrograde step: -from that moment I will date the extinction of all Portuguese aid, -military as well as civil. The British army, from its description, -may disregard this common occurrence in war, but I am persuaded, in -the present state of the Portuguese army, and with the sentiments -of suspicion now alive, all explanation would be vain, and that it -would be left to the small body of English, alone, to sustain the -whole future conflict. - -I have now only to state what my inferior judgement points out; -and as the arduous situation of command is allotted to me, I must -try to execute to the best of my power. I shall remain faithful -to my first principles, and persevere in the defence of Lisbon -and the Tagus. I invite the co-operation of the Portuguese force, -and, under your guidance and auspicious control, I look to a very -powerful accession of strength. I am convinced nothing will be -done by them in detached parties or in any isolated situation. -They will acquire confidence by number, and emulation will arise, -a rapid discipline will ensue from their connection with us, and -the whole, animated by your presence, will give the best promise of -success. Until we have consulted again I shall not say whether our -general position should be at Lumiar, extending the whole right to -Saccavem, or any other station more in advance. At this moment I -have only to express the indispensable circumstance of some fixed -basis, upon which the allied army will act, and by our united -strength try to counteract the peculiar disadvantages that attends -the defence of Portugal from positions that cannot be properly -embraced, and always leave some part exposed. - -Allow me to conclude, with the solemn expression of my own -conviction, that nothing will give so much chance of a prosperous -result to the arduous scene in which we are engaged (either as -to reality or view) as the knowledge to the enemy, that, before -he conquers Portugal, he must defeat an army of some magnitude, -determined to fight him, and awaiting his approach, unbroken and -not exposed to the danger of a false movement. Such a conquest -cannot be an easy one, and must prove, if he pursue it, a powerful -diversion in favour of Spain. - -It will gain me the sincerest pleasure, &c. - - JOHN CRADOCK. - - * * * * * - - -No. XIII. - - -JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF MARSHAL SOULT. - -_Captain Brotherton to colonel Donkin, (quarter-master-general,) -Lamego, March 17, 1809._ - -“The enemy has, however, on this occasion, practised those arts -which Frenchmen are so expert in--circulating proclamations and -insidiously abandoning, for a moment, their usual system of terror, -plunder, and desolation, _treating the inhabitants with feigned -moderation and kindness_.” - - -_Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 20, 1809, Caldas._ - -“It also appears to be the object of the enemy to ingratiate -himself with the populace of Oporto, _by even feeding them_ and -granting other indulgences.”--“It is also said that a Portuguese -legion, to consist of _six thousand_ men, has been instituted.” - - -_Extract from Soult’s Official Report of the expedition to -Portugal._ - -“Dans, quinze jours. Les villes de _Braga_, _Oporto_, _Bacellos_, -_Viana_, _Villa de Conde_, _Povoa de Barcim_, _Feira_, et -_Ovar_, eurent exprimé leurs vœux, des nombreuses deputations -se rendirent à Oporto pour les remettre au marechal Soult et -le prier de le faire parvenir à l’empereur. Des adresses qui -renfermaient l’expression de ce vœu étaient couverts de plus de -trente mille signatures du clergé, de la noblesse, des négocians, -et du peuple.”--“Pendant son séjour à Oporto. Le M. Soult fit des -proclamations et rendit divers arrêtés sur l’administration et la -police de la province _Entre Minho e Douro_. Il nomma au nom de -l’empereur aux emplois qui étaient vacans et apres avoir reçu la -manifestation politique des habitants il organiza la garde national -ainsi qu’une légion de cinq bataillons.”--“_Aucume contribution ne -fût frappé_ les fonds trouvés dans les caisses royales suffirent -pour fournir aux besoins des troupes, _et même pour donner de -secours aux Portugais_.” - - -_Intercepted letter of the duke of Dalmatia’s to general La -Martiniere, Orense, March 2, 1809._ - -“J’ai reçu vôtre lettre du 27 Jan. j’éprouve toutes les -dispositions que vous avez faites je vous ai deja dit que vous -pouviez disposer pour le service des fonds qui sont dans la caisse -royale de Tuy. Faites entrer en ville le plus de subsistance que -vous pourriez. Si de valence on vous tire de coups de canon envoyez -leurs des bombes. Bientôt vous pourrez mettre les chevaux au vert, -mais faites les garder. Dans les equipages qui sont à Tuy. Il y’a -douze cent pair de souliers, de cuir pour un égal nombre et un -peu de drap, vous pouvez en disposer pour vôtre troupe. Ralliez -au depôt général tout ce qui appartient au corps d’armée et qui -étoit resté en arrière, ainsi vous auriez bientôt une petite armée -qui se soutiendra d’elle même et faire la police dans le province -dont vous devez tirer de quoi vivre, soignez bien les hospitaux et -n’envoiez personne sur Ribidavia. J’espère que sous peu je vous -aurai ouvert une autre communication, le province d’Orence est en -très grande partie pacifié, je marche sur les débris du corps de -Romana pour en finir avec eux, ils sont du côté de Monterey. Si -apres cet expédition il y avoit encore en Gallice des troubles, -je reviendrai avec toute mon armée pour les appaiser et alors -malheur à ceux qui les auroient occasionné: _je veux la paix et -la tranquilité, que les habitans se livrent aux travaux de la -campagne, qu’ils soient protegés et que la troupe se conduise bien. -Les mutins et les malintentionés François et Espagnols, doivent -être sevèrement punies._ Il faut de tems en tems des examples. Je -crois que vous pourriez correspondre avec moi par des gens du pays. -Mais il faut bien leur payer ou leur promettre, qu’en arrivant -pres de moi ils le seront généreusement et prendre de gages pour -repondre de leur fidelité, donnez de vos nouvelles au général -Marchand. Pour le même moyen dite au colonel l’Abbeville de bien -mettre en état son artillerie. - - “MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.” - - * * * * * - - -No. XIV. - - -SIR A. WELLESLEY TO SIR J. CRADOCK. - - _Lisbon, April 23._ - -Mr. Villiers will have informed you of my arrival here yesterday, -and of the concurrence of my opinion with that which you appear to -entertain in respect to the further movements to the northward. I -conclude that you will have determined to halt the army at Leyria. -I think that, before any further steps are taken in respect to -Soult, it would be desirable to consider the situation of Victor; -how far he is enabled to make an attack upon Portugal, and the -means of defence of the east of Portugal while the British will be -to the northward, and, eventually, the means of defence of Lisbon -and the Tagus, in case this attack should be made upon the country. - -All these subjects must have been considered by you; and, I fear, -in no very satisfactory light, as you appear to have moved to the -northward unwillingly: and I should be glad to talk them over with -you. - -In order to consider of some of them, and to make various -arrangements, which can be made only here, I have requested -marshal Beresford to come here, if he should not deem his absence -from the Portuguese troops, in the present state, likely to be -disadvantageous to the public service; and I have directed him to -let you know whether he will come or not. - -It might, probably, also be more agreeable and convenient to you -to see me here than with the army; and if this should be the case, -it would be a most convenient arrangement to me to meet you here. -I beg, however, that you will consider this proposition only in a -view to your own convenience and wishes. If you should, however, -choose to come, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will -bring with you the adjutant-general and quarter-master-general, the -chief engineer and the commanding officer of the artillery, and the -commissary. - - Ever yours, &c. - ARTHUR WELLESLEY. - -N.B. Some paragraphs of a private nature are omitted. - - * * * * * - - -No. XV. - - -_Extracts of a Letter from Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord -Castlereagh, Lisbon, April 24, 1809._ - -“I arrived here on Saturday, and found that sir John Cradock and -general Beresford had moved up the country, to the northward, -with the troops under their command respectively; the former to -Leyria, and the latter to Thomar. Sir John Cradock, however, does -not appear to have entertained any decided intention of moving -forward; on the contrary, indeed, he appears, by his letters to -Mr. Villiers, to have intended to go no further till he should -hear that Victor’s movements were decided, and, therefore, I -consider affairs in this country to be exactly in the state in -which, if I found them, it was the intention of the king’s minister -that I should assume the command; and, accordingly, I propose to -assume it as soon as I shall communicate with sir John Cradock. -I have written to him, and to general Beresford, to apprize him -that I conceive advantage will result from our meeting here, and -I expect them both here as soon as possible. In respect to the -enemy, Soult is still at Oporto, and he has not pushed his posts -to the southward further than the river Vouga. He has nothing in -Tras os Montes since the loss of Chaves, of which you have been -most probably apprized; but he has some posts on the river Tamega, -which divides that province from Minho, and it is supposed that -he wishes to reserve for himself the option of retreating through -Tras os Montes into Spain, if he should find it necessary. General -Sylveira, with a Portuguese corps, is in Tras os Montes, but I -am not acquainted with its strength or its composition. General -Lapisse, who commands the French corps which, it was supposed, -when I left England, was marching from Salamanca into Portugal, -has turned off to his left, and has marched along the Portuguese -frontier to Alcantara, where he crossed the Tagus, and thence he -went to Merida, on the Guadiana, where he is in communication with, -indeed I may say, part of the army of Victor; he has an advanced -post at Montejo, nearer to the Portuguese frontier than Merida. -Victor has continued at Medellin since the action with Cuesta; he -is either fortifying that post, or making an entrenched camp there. -Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which, it is -said, will soon be twenty-five thousand infantry and six thousand -cavalry, a part of them good troops; I know nothing of the marquis -de la Romana, or of anything to the northward of Portugal. I intend -to move upon Soult, as soon as I can make some arrangements upon -which I can depend for the defence of the Tagus, either to impede -or delay Victor’s progress, in case he should come in while I am -absent. I should prefer an attack upon Victor, in concert with -Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of a fertile province of -this kingdom and of the favourite town of Oporto, of which it is -most desirable to deprive him; and if any operation upon Victor, -connected with Cuesta’s movements, did not require time to concert -it, which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult from the -north of Portugal. If Soult should go, I think it most advisable, -for many reasons, in which I need not enter at present, to act upon -the defensive in the north of Portugal, and to bring the British -army to the eastern frontier. If the light brigade should not have -left England, when you receive this letter, I trust that you will -send them off without loss of time; and I request you to desire -the officer commanding them to endeavour to get intelligence, as -he will go along the coast, particularly at Aveiro and the mouth -of the Mondego; and I wish that he should stop at the latter place -for orders, if he should find that the British army is engaged in -operations to the northward, and if he should not already have -received orders at Aveiro. The twenty-third dragoons might also -receive directions to a similar purport. The hussars, I conclude, -have sailed before this time. We are much in want of craft here; -now that we are going to carry on an operation to the northward -constant convoys will be necessary, and the admiral does not appear -to have the means in his power of supplying all that is required of -him. The twenty-fourth regiment arrived this day, &c. &c. - - (Signed) “ARTHUR WELLESLEY.” - - * * * * * - - -No. XVI. - - -LETTER FROM SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO LORD CASTLEREAGH. - - _Abrantes, June 22, 1809._ - - MY LORD, - -When I wrote to you last I was in hopes that I should have marched -before this time, but the money is not yet arrived. Things are -in their progress as they were when I wrote on the 17th. The -French are continuing their retreat. Sebastiani has also fallen -back towards Toledo, and Venegas has advanced, and Cuesta had his -head-quarters at Truxillo, on the 19th. I am apprehensive that -you will think I have delayed my march unnecessarily since my -arrival upon the Tagus. But it was, and is, quite impossible to -move without money. Not only were the officers and soldiers in the -greatest distress, and the want of money the cause of many of the -disorders of which I have had occasion to complain; but we can no -longer obtain the supplies of the country, or command its resources -for the transport of our own supplies either by land or by water. -Besides this, the army required rest, after their expedition to -the frontiers of Gallicia, and shoes, and to be furbished up in -different ways; and I was well aware that, if necessity had not -obliged me to halt at the present moment, I should have been -compelled to make a longer halt some time hence. To all this add, -that, for some time after I came here, I believed that the French -were retiring, (as appears by my letters to your lordship,) and -that I should have no opportunity of striking a blow against them, -even if I could have marched. I hope that you will attend to my -requisitions for money; not only am I in want, but the Portuguese -government, to whom Mr. Villiers says that we owe £125,000. I -repeat, that we must have £200,000 a month, from England, till -I write you that I can do without it; in which sum I include -£40,000 a month for the Portuguese government, to pay for twenty -thousand men. If the Portuguese government are to receive a larger -sum from Great Britain, the sum to be sent to Portugal must be -proportionably increased. Besides this, money must be sent to pay -the Portuguese debt and our debts in Portugal. There are, besides, -debts of sir John Moore’s army still due in Spain, which I am -called upon to pay. In short, we must have £125,000, and £200,000 a -month, reckoning from the beginning of May, &c. &c. - - (Signed) “ARTHUR WELLESLEY.” - - * * * * * - - -No. XVII. - - -LETTER FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY. - - _Badajos, October 30, 1809._ - - MY LORD, - -I have had the honour of receiving your excellency’s despatch, -(marked 1.) of the 17th instant, containing a copy of your note to -M. de Garay, of the 8th of September, and a copy of his note, in -answer to your excellency, of the 3d of October. - -I am not surprised that M. de Garay should endeavour to attribute -to the irregularities of the English commissariat the deficiencies -of supplies and means of transport experienced by the British army -in its late service in Spain; I am not disposed to justify the -English commissariat where they deserve blame; but I must think it -but justice to them to declare that the British army is indebted to -their exertions for the scanty supplies it received. - -From some of the statements contained in M. de Garay’s note it -would appear that the British army had suffered no distress during -the late service; others have a tendency to prove that great -distress was suffered, at a very early period, by both armies; -particularly the quotation of a letter from general Cuesta, of -the 1st of August, in answer to a complaint which I am supposed -to have made, that the Spanish troops and _their prisoners_ were -better supplied than the British army. The answer to all these -statements is a reference to the fact that the army suffered great -distress for want of provisions, forage, and means of equipment; -and, although that distress might have been aggravated, it could -not have been occasioned by the inexperience or irregularity of the -English commissariat. - -I know nothing of the orders which M. de Garay states were sent -by the government to the different provincial juntas, to provide -provisions and means of transport for the British army on its -passage through the different towns in the provinces. If such -orders were sent, it was obvious that the central junta, as a -government, have no power or influence over the provincial juntas -and magistrates, to whom their orders were addressed, as they -produced no effect; and the supplies, such as they were, were -procured only by the requisitions and exertions of the English -commissaries. But it is obvious, from M. de Garay’s account of -these orders, that the central junta had taken a very erroneous -view of the operations to be carried on by the army, and of -the provision to be made for the troops while engaged in those -operations. The government provided, by their orders, for the -troops only while on their passage through the towns; relying upon -their immediate success, and making no provision for the collection -of one body, of not less than fifty thousand men, even for one -day. At the same time that they were guilty of this unpardonable -omission, which paralyzed all our efforts, they rendered that -success doubtful, by countermanding the orders given to general -Venegas by general Cuesta, and thus exposing the combined armies to -a general action with the enemy’s concentrated force. The effect of -their orders will appear more fully in the following detail:-- - -As soon as the line of my operations in Spain was decided, I sent -a commissary to Ciudad Rodrigo, to endeavour to procure mules to -attend the army, in concert with don Lozano des Torres, that city -and its neighbourhood being the places in which the army commanded -by the late sir John Moore had been most largely supplied. M. -de Garay expresses the astonishment of the government that the -British army should have entered Spain unprovided with the means -of transport, notwithstanding that a few paragraphs preceding -this expression of astonishment, he informs your excellency, in -the name of the government, that they had given orders to the -provincial juntas of Badajos and Castile (at Ciudad Rodrigo) and -the magistrates, to provide and supply us with the means which, of -course, they must have been aware that we should require. No army -can carry on its operations if unprovided with means of transport; -and the British army was, from circumstances, particularly in want -at that moment. - -The means of transport, commonly used in Portugal, are carts, drawn -by bullocks, which are unable, without great distress, to move -more than twelve miles in a day, a distance much shorter than that -which the state of the country in which the army was to carry on -operations in Spain, and the nature of the country, would oblige -the army to march. The number of carts which we had been able to -bring from Portugal was not sufficient to draw our ammunition, and -there were none to carry provisions. - -Having failed in procuring, at Ciudad Rodrigo and in the -neighbourhood, the means of transport which I required, I wrote to -general O’Donaghue, on the 16th of July, a letter, in which, after -stating our wants and the failure of the country in supplying them, -I gave notice that if they were not supplied I should discontinue -my co-operation with general Cuesta, after I should have performed -my part in the first operation which we had concerted, viz. the -removal of the enemy from the Alberche; and, if not supplied as I -required, I should eventually withdraw from Spain altogether. From -this letter of the 16th July, it will appear that I called for -the supplies, and gave notice that I should withdraw from Spain -if they were not furnished, not only long previous to the retreat -across the Tagus of the 4th of August, but even previous to the -commencement of the operations of the campaign. - -Notwithstanding that this letter of the 16th of July was -communicated to the central junta, both by Mr. Frere and general -Cuesta, the British army has, to this day, received no assistance -of this description from Spain, excepting twenty carts, which -joined at Merida, ten on the 30th of August, and ten on the 2d of -September; and about three hundred mules of about five hundred -which were hired at Bejar, and joined at a subsequent period. None -of the mules stated to have been hired and despatched to the army -from Seville, or by Igea or Cevallos, or the two brigades of forty -each, or the horses, have ever joined the British army; and I -conclude that they are with the Spanish army of Estremadura, as are -the remainder of the (one hundred) ten brigades of carts which were -intended and are marked for the British army. But none of these -mules or carts, supposing them to have been sent from Seville for -our use, reached Estremadura till after the 21st of August, the day -on which, after five weeks’ notice, I was obliged to separate from -the Spanish army. - -It is not true, therefore, that my resolution to withdraw from -Spain, as then carried into execution, was “sudden,” or ought to -have surprised the government: nor does it appear to have been -perilous from what has since appeared in this part of Spain. - -I ought, probably, on the 16th of July, to have determined to -suspend all operations till the army should be supplied with the -means required; but having, on the 11th of July, settled with -general Cuesta a plan of operations to be carried into execution by -the armies under the command of general Venegas, general Cuesta, -and myself, respectively, I did not think it proper to disappoint -general Cuesta. I believed that general Venegas would have carried -into execution that part of the plan of operations allotted to his -army, although I was afterwards disappointed in that expectation; -and I preferred that the British army should suffer inconvenience -than that general Venegas’s corps should be exposed alone to the -attack of the enemy; and, above all, I was induced to hope that I -should be supplied. - -Accordingly, I marched, on the 18th of July, from Plasencia, the -soldiers carrying on their backs their provisions to the 21st, on -which day a junction was formed with general Cuesta’s army; and, -from that day to the 24th of August, the troops or their horses did -not receive one regular ration. The irregularity and deficiency, -both in quality and quantity, were so great that I considered it -a matter of justice to the troops to remit to them, during that -period, half of the sum usually stopped from their pay for rations. - -The forage for the horses was picked up for them by their riders -wherever they could find it, and was generally wheat or rye, which -are considered unwholesome food; and the consequence was that, -exclusive of the loss by engaging with the enemy, the army lost, -in the short period of five weeks, not less than one thousand five -hundred horses. - -I have no knowledge of what passed between general Cuesta and don -Lozano des Torres and the intendant of provisions of the Spanish -army. I never saw the latter gentleman excepting twice; the first -time on the 22d of July, when he waited upon me to claim, for the -Spanish army, sixteen thousand rations of bread which had been -brought into Talavera, and had been sent to my quarters, and which -were delivered over to him, notwithstanding that the British troops -were in want; and the second time, on the 25th of July, when he -waited upon me, also at Talavera, to desire that the ovens of that -town might be delivered over for the use of the Spanish army, they -having moved to St. Ollalla, and the British army being still at -Talavera. This request, which was not complied with, is an example -of the preference which was given to the British troops while they -were in Spain. - -The orders stated to have been given by the central to the -provincial juntas and magistrates, were not more effectual in -procuring provisions than in procuring means of transport. In -the interval between the 15th and 21st of July, the British -commissaries had made contracts with the magistrates in the -different villages of the Vera de Plasencia, a country abounding in -resources of every description, for the delivery at Talavera, on -different days before the 24th of July, of two hundred and fifty -thousand rations of provisions. These contracts were not performed; -the British army was consequently unable to move in pursuit of the -enemy when he retired on that day; and, I conclude, that the French -army have since subsisted on these resources. - -The British army never received any salt meat, nor any of the rice -or other articles stated to have been sent from Seville for their -use, excepting to make up the miserable ration by which the men -were only prevented from starving during the period to which I have -adverted; nor was it attended by the troop of biscuit bakers, nor -did it enjoy any of the advantages of their labours, nor was the -supposed magazine of four hundred thousand pounds of biscuit ever -performed. These are notorious facts, which cannot be disputed, -of the truth of which every officer and soldier in the army can -bear testimony. I assure your excellency, that not only have the -supplies furnished to the army under my command been paid for -whenever the bills for them could be got in, but the old debts due -to the inhabitants for supplies furnished to the army, under the -command of the late sir John Moore, have been discharged; and I -have repeatedly desired the Spanish agents, and others acting with -the army, and the different juntas with which I have communicated, -to let the people know that all demands upon the British -government, which could be substantiated, would be discharged. - -I beg to refer your excellency to my despatches of the 21st of -August, No. 12, for an account of the state of the magazine at -Truxillo, on the 20th of August. Of the state of supplies and -provisions at that period, lieutenant-colonel Walters had, by -my desire, made an arrangement with the Spanish commissariat -for the division of the magazine at Truxillo between the two -armies; and he as well as I was satisfied with the principle and -detail of that arrangement. But if the British army received only -one-third of a ration on the 18th of August, and only one-half of -a ration on the 19th, not of bread, but of flour; if the horses -of the army received nothing; and if the state of the magazine -at Truxillo was such, at that time, as to hold out no hope, not -of improvement, (for it was too late to wait for improvement,) -but of a full and regular supply of provisions and forage of all -descriptions, I was justified in withdrawing from Spain. In point -of fact, the magazine at Truxillo, which, under the arrangement -made by lieutenant-colonel Waters was to be the sole source of the -supply to both armies, did not contain, on the 20th of August, a -sufficiency to supply one day’s demand upon it. - -But it is said that M. de Calvo promised and engaged to supply the -British army; upon which I have only to observe that I had trusted -too long to the promises of the Spanish agents, and that I had -particular reason for want of confidence in M. de Calvo; as, at -the moment he was assuring me that the British army should have -all the provisions the country could afford, in preference to, and -to the exclusion of the Spanish army, I had in my possession an -order from him, (of which your excellency has a copy,) addressed -to the magistrates of Guadalupe, directing him to send to the -head-quarters of the Spanish army provisions which a British -commissary had ordered to be prepared and sent to the magazines -at Truxillo, to be divided between both armies, in conformity -to the agreement entered into with the Spanish commissaries by -lieutenant-colonel Waters. - -As the state of the magazine at Truxillo was the immediate cause -(as far as the want of provisions went) of my withdrawing from -Spain, I beg to observe to your excellency that I was not mistaken -in my opinion of its insufficiency; as, if I am not misinformed, -general Equia’s army suffered the greatest distress in the -neighbourhood of Truxillo, even after that part of the country and -the magazines had been relieved from the burthen of supporting the -British army. - -In respect to the conduct of the operations in Spain by the Spanish -general officers, many things were done of which I did not approve; -some contrary to my expectations, and some contrary to positive -agreements. - -M. de Garay has stated that the orders of the marquis de Romana -were framed in conformity with suggestions from marshal Beresford; -and thence he infers that the operations of that corps were -approved of by me. - -The marquis de Romana was still at Coruña on the 5th, and I believe -as late as the 9th of August; and the armies of Estramadura retired -across the Tagus on the 4th of August. This reference to dates -shews that there was, and could have been no connexion in the -operations of those different armies. In fact, I knew nothing of -the marquis of Romana’s operations; and till I heard, on the 3d of -August, that marshal Ney’s corps had passed through the mountains -of Estramadura at Baños, and was at Naval Moral, I did not believe -that that part of the enemy’s army had quitted Astorga, or that the -marquis was at liberty, or had it in his power to quit Gallicia. - -Marshal Beresford’s corps was collected upon the frontiers of -Portugal in the end of July, principally for the purpose of forming -the troops; and it was hoped he would keep in check the enemy’s -corps under Soult, which was at Zamora, and threatened Portugal; -that he would act as a corps of observation in that quarter, and on -the left of the British army; and I particularly requested marshal -Beresford to attend to the Puerto de Perales. But I never intended, -and never held out any hope to the Spanish officers that the corps -under marshal Beresford could effect any operation at that period -of the campaign, and never was a party to any arrangement of an -operation in which that corps was to be concerned. - -In the cases in which measures were carried on in a manner of which -I did not approve, or which I did not expect, or contrary to the -positive agreement, those who acted contrary to my opinion may have -been right; but still they acted in a manner of which they were -aware I did not approve: and the assertion in the note, that the -operations were carried on with my concurrence, is unfounded. - -I expected, from the communications I had with general Cuesta, -through sir Robert Wilson and colonel Roche, that the Puerto de -Baños would have been effectually occupied and secured; and, at all -events, that the troops appointed to guard that point, upon which I -was aware that all the operations, nay, the security, of the army -depended, would not have retired without firing a shot. - -It was agreed, between general Cuesta and me, on the 11th of July, -that general Venegas, who was under his command, should march -by Trembleque, Ocaña, Puerte Dueños, to Arganda, near Madrid; -where he was to be on the 22d and 23d of July, when the combined -armies should be at Talavera and Escola. This agreement was not -performed, and the consequence of its non-performance (which had -been foreseen) occurred; viz. that the combined armies were engaged -with the enemy’s concentrated force. I have heard that the cause of -the non-performance of this agreement was that the central junta -had countermanded the orders which general Venegas had received -from general Cuesta; of which countermand they gave us no notice. I -shall make no observation upon this proceeding, excepting that the -plan of operations, as agreed upon with me, was not carried into -execution, by general Venegas, in this instance. - -It was agreed, by general Cuesta, on the 2d of August, that when I -marched against Soult on the 3d, he would remain at Talavera. That -agreement was broken when he withdrew from Talavera, in my opinion, -without sufficient cause. And it is also my opinion that he ought -not to have withdrawn, particularly considering that he had the -charge of my hospital, without my consent. I do not conceive that -if general Cuesta had remained at Talavera, it would have made -any difference in the result of the campaign. When Soult added -thirty-four thousand to the numbers already opposed to the combined -armies in Estremadura, the enemy was too strong for us; and it was -necessary that we should retire across the Tagus. But if general -Cuesta had held the post of Talavera, according to agreement, I -should have been able to remove my hospital, or, at least, to know -the exact situation of every individual left there; and I think -that other disadvantages might have been avoided in the retreat. - -When adverting to this part of the subject, I cannot avoid to -observe upon the ambiguity of language used in the note respecting -the assistance afforded by general Cuesta to remove the hospital -from Talavera. That assistance amounted to four carts on the 4th of -August, at Oropesa. In the subsequent removal of the wounded, and -of the men subsequently taken sick, we had absolutely no assistance -from the Spanish army or the country. We were obliged to lay down -our ammunition, which was delivered over to the Spanish army, -and to unload the treasure, and employ the carts in the removal -of the wounded and sick. At Truxillo, in particular, assistance -which could have been afforded was withheld, on the 22d and 23d of -August, M. de Calvo and don Lozano des Torres being in the town. - -In respect to the refusal to make movements recommended by me, I -am of opinion that if general Bassecourt had been detached towards -Plasencia on the 30th of July, when I recommended that movement, -and if the troops had done their duty, Soult would have been -stopped at the Tietar, at least for a sufficient length of time to -enable me to secure the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz; and here -again the hospital would have been saved. - -He was not detached, however, till the 2d; and then I understood, -from M. de Garay’s note, that it was general Cuesta’s opinion that -the movement was useless. - -It could not have been considered as useless by general Cuesta on -the 30th, because the proposition for making a detachment from the -combined armies originated with himself on that day; and it could -not have been considered as useless even on the morning of the 2d, -as, till the evening of that day, we did not receive intelligence -of the arrival of Soult at Plasencia. A reference to the date of -the period at which the general considered this detachment as -useless would have been desirable. - -I cannot account for the surprise stated to have been felt by -general Cuesta upon finding the British army at Oropesa on the -morning of the 4th of August. The army had left Talavera on the -morning of the 3d, and had marched to Oropesa, six leagues, or -twenty-four miles, on that day; which I conceive a sufficient -distance for a body of men which had been starving for many days -before. The accounts received, on the evening of the 3d, of -the enemy’s position at Naval Moral, and of his strength, and -of general Cuesta’s intended march on that evening, leaving my -hospital to its fate, were sufficient to induce me to pause and -consider our situation, and, at least, not to move before daylight -on the 4th; shortly after which time, general Cuesta arrived at -Oropesa. - -Upon considering our situation at that time, it was evident to me -that the combined armies must retire across the Tagus, and that -every moment’s delay must expose them to the risk of being cut -off from their only remaining point of retreat. A battle, even if -it had been successful, could not have improved our situation; -two battles, or probably three, must have been fought and gained -before our difficulties, resulting from the increased strength of -the enemy in Estremadura, could be removed. I did not consider the -British army, at least, equal to such an exertion at that moment. -It is unnecessary to make any observation upon the Spanish army; -but the occurrences at Arzobispo, a few days afterwards, shewed -that they were not equal to any great contest. - -M. de Garay complains of the alteration in the line of our -operations, and of the sudden changes in the direction of our -marches, to which he attributes the deficiency of our supplies, -which, in this part of the note, he is disposed to admit that the -British army experienced. I know of but one alteration in the -plan of operations and in the direction of the march, which was -occasioned by the circumstances to which I have just referred. - -When intelligence was first received of the arrival of the enemy -at Plasencia, and of the retreat, without resistance, of the corps -appointed to guard the Puerto de Baños, my intention was to move -towards Plasencia, to attack the enemy’s corps which had passed -through the Puerto. That intention was altered, only when I heard -of the numbers of which that corps consisted; and when I found -that, by general Cuesta’s movement from Talavera, the rear of the -army was not secure, that the only retreat was liable to be cut -off, and that the enemy had it in their power, and at their option, -to join or to attack us in separate bodies. - -It could not be attributed to me, that this large reinforcement -was allowed to enter Estremadura, or that we had not earlier -intelligence of their approach. - -The Puerto de Baños was abandoned, without firing a shot, by the -Spanish troops sent there to guard it; and the junta of Castile, -if they knew of the collection of the enemy’s troops at Salamanca, -sent no notice of it; and no notice was in fact received, till the -accounts arrived that the enemy had ordered rations at Fuente Noble -and Los Santos; and they arrived on the following day. But when the -enemy arrived at Naval Moral, in Estremadura, in such strength, and -the post of Talavera was abandoned, the central junta will find it -difficult to convince this country and the world that it was not -expedient to alter the plan of our operations and the direction of -our march. - -But this alteration, instead of aggravating the deficiency of -our supplies, ought to have alleviated our distresses, if any -measures had been adopted at Seville to supply the British army, -in consequence of my letter of the 16th July. The alteration was -from the offensive to the defensive; the march was retrograde; and -if any supplies had been prepared and sent, the army must have met -them on the road, and must have received them sooner. Accordingly, -we did meet supplies on the road, but they were for the Spanish -army; and although our troops were starving at the time, they were -forwarded, untouched, to their destination. - -I have sent to marshal Beresford a copy of that part of M. de -Garay’s note which refers to the supplies for the Portuguese army -under his command, upon which he will make his observations, which -I propose to forward to your excellency. I shall here, therefore, -only repeat that the want of magazines, and the apathy and -disinclination of the magistrates and people in Spain to furnish -supplies for the armies, even for payment, were the causes that -the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, suffered great -distress from want, while within the Spanish frontier. - -Till the evils, of which I think I have reason to complain, are -remedied, till I shall see magazines established for the supply of -the armies, and a regular system adopted for keeping them filled, -and an army, upon whose exertions I can depend, commanded by -officers capable and willing to carry into execution the operations -which may have been planned by mutual agreement, I cannot enter -upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish armies. I do not -think it necessary now to enter into any calculations to shew the -fallacy of M. de Garay’s calculations of the relative numerical -strength of the allies, and of the enemy, in the Peninsula; if the -fallacy was not so great, as I am certain it is, I should be of the -same opinion, respecting the expediency of co-operating with the -Spanish troops. But if the British and the Portuguese armies should -not actively co-operate with them, they will at least do them no -injury; and if M. de Garay is not mistaken, as I believe he is, -in his calculations of numbers; and if the Spanish armies are in -the state of efficiency in which they are represented to be, and -which they ought to be, to invite our co-operation, the deficiency -of thirty-six thousand men, which the British and Portuguese -armies might add to their numbers, can be no objection to their -undertaking, immediately, the operations which M. de Garay is of -opinion would give to his countrymen the early possession of those -blessings for which they are contending. - -I have the honour to be, &c. - - (Signed) WELLINGTON. - - * * * * * - - -No. XVIII. - - -COPY OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL HILL TO SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY. - - _Camp, August 17, 1809._ - - SIR, - -I beg leave to report to you that the parties sent out by the -officers of my division, yesterday, to procure forage, were, in -more instances than one, opposed by the Spaniards. The following -circumstances have been made known to me, and I take the liberty of -repeating them for your excellency’s information. - -My servants were sent about three leagues on the Truxillo road, in -order to get forage for me; and after gathering three mule loads, -a party of Spanish soldiers, consisting of five or six, came up to -them with their swords drawn, and obliged them to leave the corn -they had collected. My servants told me, that the same party fired -two shots towards other British men employed in getting forage. The -assistant-commissary of my division, likewise, states to me, that -the men he sent out for forage were fired at by the Spaniards. - -I have the honour to be, &c. - - (Signed) R. HILL, major-general. - - -COPY OF A LETTER FROM COLONEL STOPFORD TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL -SHERBROOKE. - - _Jaraceijo, August 16, 1809._ - - SIR, - -I beg leave to inform you that I have just received intimations of -some Spaniards having fired at some of the guards, for taking some -forage. As there is no forage given us by the commissary, I wish to -know what I am to do, in order to get some for the horses. - - (Signed) E. STOPFORD, second brigade of guards. - - -END OF VOL. II. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] Now lord Stuart de Rothesay. - -[2] Now lord Howden. - -[3] An appellation given among soldiers to men who, under pretence -of sickness, shrink from the performance of their duties in the -field. - -[4] It is necessary again to remark that I possess only an -unauthenticated copy of general Semelé’s Journal. - -[5] Soult distinguished himself in that battle. - -[6] In the British army, when speaking of the number present -under arms, the corporals and privates only are understood. In -the French army, the present under arms includes every military -person, whether officers, non-commissioned officers, or soldiers; a -distinction which should be borne in mind. - -[7] Viz. 1800 left in Viana and Braga. - 500 including the wounded taken in Oporto. - 1300 taken at Chaves, by Sylveira. - -[8] The bands formed of smugglers were called Quadrillas. - -[9] Note by sir J. Cradock. This is not a correct statement, but -quite the contrary; it must have been the bishop. - - * * * * * - - -_Published and sold by_ T. & W. BOONE, 480, _Strand, near -Charing-Cross._ - - -TRACTS ON VAULTS AND BRIDGES; containing Observations on the -various Forms of Vaults; on the Taking Down and Rebuilding LONDON -BRIDGE; and on the PRINCIPLES OF ARCHES: illustrated by extensive -Tables of Bridges. Also, containing the Principles of PENDANT -BRIDGES, with reference to the Properties of the Catenary, applied -to the Menai Bridge. And a Theoretical Investigation of the -Catenary. By SAMUEL WARE. 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Battle of Talavera ... 406’ replaced by - ‘7. Operations of the British, French & Spanish armies ... 409’. - Pg xi: ‘8. Operations in the valley of the Tagus ... 416’ replaced by - ‘8. Battle of Talavera ... 416’. - - Main text: - Pg 22: ‘eighteen hunded yards’ replaced by ‘eighteen hundred yards’. - Pg 28: ‘aid-de-camp to the’ replaced by ‘aide-de-camp to the’. - Pg 45: ‘An aid-de-camp of’ replaced by ‘An aide-de-camp of’. - Pg 60: ‘not be be provisioned’ replaced by ‘not be provisioned’. - Pg 63: ‘on the the 9th’ replaced by ‘on the 9th’. - Pg 83: ‘their cummunications’ replaced by ‘their communications’. - Pg 144: ‘literal interpetation’ replaced by ‘literal interpretation’. - Pg 146: ‘unsuccessful auxilliaries’ replaced by - ‘unsuccessful auxiliaries’. - Pg 152: ‘Silviera’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’. - Pg 153: ‘develope his plans’ replaced by ‘develop his plans’. - Pg 154: ‘Silveira’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’. - Pg 159: ‘recal of general’ replaced by ‘recall of general’. - Pg 167: ‘Silveira’ replaced by ‘Sylveira’. - Pg 170: ‘river to Ribadavia’ replaced by ‘river to Ribidavia’. - Pg 179: ‘the inflame the’ replaced by ‘to inflame the’. - Pg 189: ‘the Cabado river’ replaced by ‘the Cavado river’. - Pg 200: ‘at the Ponte Ave’ replaced by ‘at the Ponte d’Ave’. - Pg 211: ‘and the Guadaramo’ replaced by ‘and the Guadarama’. - Pg 211: ‘second the Guardiana’ replaced by ‘second the Guadiana’. - Pg 218: ‘the river Garganza’ replaced by ‘the river Guadiana’. - Pg 226: (in caption) ‘AGAINST GUESTA’ replaced by ‘AGAINST CUESTA’. - Pg 229: ‘were thus paralized’ replaced by ‘were thus paralyzed’. - Pg 235: ‘charge not be sustained’ replaced by ‘charge not sustained’. - Pg 240: ‘The garison of the’ replaced by ‘The garrison of the’. - Pg 244: ‘and run back’ replaced by ‘and ran back’. - Pg 248: ‘paralized a large’ replaced by ‘paralyzed a large’. - Pg 250: ‘marched by Guarda’ replaced by ‘marched by Guardia’. - Pg 263: (in Sidenote) ‘Lord LonLondonderry’ replaced by - ‘Lord Londonderry’. - Pg 266: ‘The Portugese troops’ replaced by ‘The Portuguese troops’. - Pg 282: ‘Olivera de Azemiz’ replaced by ‘Oliveira de Azemis’. - Pg 308: ‘CHAP. III’ replaced by ‘CHAPTER III’. - Pg 309: ‘every other other part’ replaced by ‘every other part’. - Pg 369: ‘Porguese and Spanish’ replaced by ‘Portuguese and Spanish’. - Pg 408: ‘develope its attack’ replaced by ‘develop its attack’. - Pg 409: (in caption) ‘Plate 7. to face Pa.’ replaced by - ‘Plate 7. to face Pa. 409’. - Pg 416: ‘unite under three’ replaced by ‘unite in under three’. - Pg 427: ‘and strenghened by’ replaced by ‘and strengthened by’. - Pg 427: ‘Spanish auxilliaries’ replaced by ‘Spanish auxiliaries’. - Pg 453: ‘Crauford’s brigade’ replaced by ‘Craufurd’s brigade’. - Pg 456: ‘by quarelling with’ replaced by ‘by quarrelling with’. - - Appendix: - Pg 471: some numbers in these tables are clearly incorrect (eg 3,339 - and 24,082) but none have been changed. - Pg 482: ‘bâtir les chateux’ replaced by ‘bâtir les châteaux’. - Pg 486: ‘I always nrged’ replaced by ‘I always urged’. - Pg 486: ‘of effervenscence of’ replaced by ‘of effervescence of’. - Pg 491: ‘The taking Portuguese’ replaced by ‘The taking of Portuguese’. - Pg 492: ‘proper movoment of’ replaced by ‘proper movement of’. - Pg 495: ‘to Mr. Rawlins’ replaced by ‘to Mr. Rawlings’. - Pg 527: ‘pounds of buiscuit’ replaced by ‘pounds of biscuit’. - Pg 527: ‘ever officer’ replaced by ‘every officer’. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE -PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR -1814, VOL. 2 OF 6 *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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