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diff --git a/7142-h/7142-h.htm b/7142-h/7142-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..306ff02 --- /dev/null +++ b/7142-h/7142-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,19800 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The History of the Peloponnesian War, by Thucydides</title> + +<style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + +body { margin-left: 20%; + margin-right: 20%; + text-align: justify; } + +h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 {text-align: center; font-style: normal; font-weight: +normal; line-height: 1.5; margin-top: .5em; margin-bottom: .5em;} + +h1 {font-size: 300%; + margin-top: 0.6em; + margin-bottom: 0.6em; + letter-spacing: 0.12em; + word-spacing: 0.2em; + text-indent: 0em;} +h2 {font-size: 150%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 1em;} +h3 {font-size: 130%; margin-top: 1em;} +h4 {font-size: 120%;} +h5 {font-size: 110%;} + +.no-break {page-break-before: avoid;} /* for epubs */ + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always; margin-top: 4em;} + +hr {width: 80%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} + +p {text-indent: 1em; + margin-top: 0.25em; + margin-bottom: 0.25em; } + +p.poem {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-size: 90%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.letter {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.noindent {text-indent: 0% } + +p.center {text-align: center; + text-indent: 0em; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +a:link {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:visited {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:hover {color:red} + +</style> + </head> + <body> + +<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The History of the Peloponnesian War, by Thucydides</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: The History of the Peloponnesian War</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Thucydides</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Translator: Richard Crawley</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: March 15, 2003 [eBook #7142]<br /> +[Most recently updated: September 7, 2021]</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Albert Imrie and David Widger</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ***</div> + +<h1>THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR</h1> + +<h2 class="no-break">By Thucydides 431 BC</h2> + +<h3> Translated by Richard Crawley </h3> + +<p class="center"> +With Permission<br/> +to<br/> +CONNOP THIRLWALL<br/> +Historian of Greece<br/> +This Translation of the Work of His<br/> +Great Predecessor<br/> +is Respectfully Inscribed<br/> +by<br/> +—The Translator— +</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2>CONTENTS</h2> + +<table summary="" style=""> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2H_4_0001"><b>BOOK I</b></a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0001">CHAPTER I</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0002">CHAPTER II</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0003">CHAPTER III</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0004">CHAPTER IV</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0005">CHAPTER V</a><br/> <br/> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2H_4_0007"><b>BOOK II</b></a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0006">CHAPTER VI</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0007">CHAPTER VII</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0008">CHAPTER VIII</a><br/> <br/> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2H_4_0011"><b>BOOK III</b></a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0009">CHAPTER IX</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0010">CHAPTER X</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0011">CHAPTER XI</a><br/> <br/> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2H_4_0015"><b>BOOK IV</b></a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0012">CHAPTER XII</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0013">CHAPTER XIII</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0014">CHAPTER XIV</a><br/> <br/> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2H_4_0019"><b>BOOK V</b></a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0015">CHAPTER XV</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0016">CHAPTER XVI</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0017">CHAPTER XVII</a><br/> <br/> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2H_4_0023"><b>BOOK VI</b></a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0018">CHAPTER XVIII</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0019">CHAPTER XIX</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0020">CHAPTER XX</a><br/> <br/> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2H_4_0027"><b>BOOK VII</b></a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0021">CHAPTER XXI</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0022">CHAPTER XXII</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0023">CHAPTER XXIII</a><br/> <br/> </td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2H_4_0031"><b>BOOK VIII</b></a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0024">CHAPTER XXIV</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0025">CHAPTER XXV</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#link2HCH0026">CHAPTER XXVI</a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<hr /> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2H_4_0001" id="link2H_4_0001"></a> +BOOK I </h2> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0001" id="link2HCH0001"></a> +CHAPTER I </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the Commencement of the +Peloponnesian War +</p> + +<p> +Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the +Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning at the moment that it broke out, +and believing that it would be a great war and more worthy of relation than any +that had preceded it. This belief was not without its grounds. The preparations +of both the combatants were in every department in the last state of +perfection; and he could see the rest of the Hellenic race taking sides in the +quarrel; those who delayed doing so at once having it in contemplation. Indeed +this was the greatest movement yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes, +but of a large part of the barbarian world—I had almost said of mankind. +For though the events of remote antiquity, and even those that more immediately +preceded the war, could not from lapse of time be clearly ascertained, yet the +evidences which an inquiry carried as far back as was practicable leads me to +trust, all point to the conclusion that there was nothing on a great scale, +either in war or in other matters. +</p> + +<p> +For instance, it is evident that the country now called Hellas had in ancient +times no settled population; on the contrary, migrations were of frequent +occurrence, the several tribes readily abandoning their homes under the +pressure of superior numbers. Without commerce, without freedom of +communication either by land or sea, cultivating no more of their territory +than the exigencies of life required, destitute of capital, never planting +their land (for they could not tell when an invader might not come and take it +all away, and when he did come they had no walls to stop him), thinking that +the necessities of daily sustenance could be supplied at one place as well as +another, they cared little for shifting their habitation, and consequently +neither built large cities nor attained to any other form of greatness. The +richest soils were always most subject to this change of masters; such as the +district now called Thessaly, Boeotia, most of the Peloponnese, Arcadia +excepted, and the most fertile parts of the rest of Hellas. The goodness of the +land favoured the aggrandizement of particular individuals, and thus created +faction which proved a fertile source of ruin. It also invited invasion. +Accordingly Attica, from the poverty of its soil enjoying from a very remote +period freedom from faction, never changed its inhabitants. And here is no +inconsiderable exemplification of my assertion that the migrations were the +cause of there being no correspondent growth in other parts. The most powerful +victims of war or faction from the rest of Hellas took refuge with the +Athenians as a safe retreat; and at an early period, becoming naturalized, +swelled the already large population of the city to such a height that Attica +became at last too small to hold them, and they had to send out colonies to +Ionia. +</p> + +<p> +There is also another circumstance that contributes not a little to my +conviction of the weakness of ancient times. Before the Trojan war there is no +indication of any common action in Hellas, nor indeed of the universal +prevalence of the name; on the contrary, before the time of Hellen, son of +Deucalion, no such appellation existed, but the country went by the names of +the different tribes, in particular of the Pelasgian. It was not till Hellen +and his sons grew strong in Phthiotis, and were invited as allies into the +other cities, that one by one they gradually acquired from the connection the +name of Hellenes; though a long time elapsed before that name could fasten +itself upon all. The best proof of this is furnished by Homer. Born long after +the Trojan War, he nowhere calls all of them by that name, nor indeed any of +them except the followers of Achilles from Phthiotis, who were the original +Hellenes: in his poems they are called Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. He does +not even use the term barbarian, probably because the Hellenes had not yet been +marked off from the rest of the world by one distinctive appellation. It +appears therefore that the several Hellenic communities, comprising not only +those who first acquired the name, city by city, as they came to understand +each other, but also those who assumed it afterwards as the name of the whole +people, were before the Trojan war prevented by their want of strength and the +absence of mutual intercourse from displaying any collective action. +</p> + +<p> +Indeed, they could not unite for this expedition till they had gained increased +familiarity with the sea. And the first person known to us by tradition as +having established a navy is Minos. He made himself master of what is now +called the Hellenic sea, and ruled over the Cyclades, into most of which he +sent the first colonies, expelling the Carians and appointing his own sons +governors; and thus did his best to put down piracy in those waters, a +necessary step to secure the revenues for his own use. +</p> + +<p> +For in early times the Hellenes and the barbarians of the coast and islands, as +communication by sea became more common, were tempted to turn pirates, under +the conduct of their most powerful men; the motives being to serve their own +cupidity and to support the needy. They would fall upon a town unprotected by +walls, and consisting of a mere collection of villages, and would plunder it; +indeed, this came to be the main source of their livelihood, no disgrace being +yet attached to such an achievement, but even some glory. An illustration of +this is furnished by the honour with which some of the inhabitants of the +continent still regard a successful marauder, and by the question we find the +old poets everywhere representing the people as asking of +voyagers—“Are they pirates?”—as if those who are asked +the question would have no idea of disclaiming the imputation, or their +interrogators of reproaching them for it. The same rapine prevailed also by +land. +</p> + +<p> +And even at the present day many of Hellas still follow the old fashion, the +Ozolian Locrians for instance, the Aetolians, the Acarnanians, and that region +of the continent; and the custom of carrying arms is still kept up among these +continentals, from the old piratical habits. The whole of Hellas used once to +carry arms, their habitations being unprotected and their communication with +each other unsafe; indeed, to wear arms was as much a part of everyday life +with them as with the barbarians. And the fact that the people in these parts +of Hellas are still living in the old way points to a time when the same mode +of life was once equally common to all. The Athenians were the first to lay +aside their weapons, and to adopt an easier and more luxurious mode of life; +indeed, it is only lately that their rich old men left off the luxury of +wearing undergarments of linen, and fastening a knot of their hair with a tie +of golden grasshoppers, a fashion which spread to their Ionian kindred and long +prevailed among the old men there. On the contrary, a modest style of dressing, +more in conformity with modern ideas, was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians, +the rich doing their best to assimilate their way of life to that of the common +people. They also set the example of contending naked, publicly stripping and +anointing themselves with oil in their gymnastic exercises. Formerly, even in +the Olympic contests, the athletes who contended wore belts across their +middles; and it is but a few years since that the practice ceased. To this day +among some of the barbarians, especially in Asia, when prizes for boxing and +wrestling are offered, belts are worn by the combatants. And there are many +other points in which a likeness might be shown between the life of the +Hellenic world of old and the barbarian of to-day. +</p> + +<p> +With respect to their towns, later on, at an era of increased facilities of +navigation and a greater supply of capital, we find the shores becoming the +site of walled towns, and the isthmuses being occupied for the purposes of +commerce and defence against a neighbour. But the old towns, on account of the +great prevalence of piracy, were built away from the sea, whether on the +islands or the continent, and still remain in their old sites. For the pirates +used to plunder one another, and indeed all coast populations, whether +seafaring or not. +</p> + +<p> +The islanders, too, were great pirates. These islanders were Carians and +Phoenicians, by whom most of the islands were colonized, as was proved by the +following fact. During the purification of Delos by Athens in this war all the +graves in the island were taken up, and it was found that above half their +inmates were Carians: they were identified by the fashion of the arms buried +with them, and by the method of interment, which was the same as the Carians +still follow. But as soon as Minos had formed his navy, communication by sea +became easier, as he colonized most of the islands, and thus expelled the +malefactors. The coast population now began to apply themselves more closely to +the acquisition of wealth, and their life became more settled; some even began +to build themselves walls on the strength of their newly acquired riches. For +the love of gain would reconcile the weaker to the dominion of the stronger, +and the possession of capital enabled the more powerful to reduce the smaller +towns to subjection. And it was at a somewhat later stage of this development +that they went on the expedition against Troy. +</p> + +<p> +What enabled Agamemnon to raise the armament was more, in my opinion, his +superiority in strength, than the oaths of Tyndareus, which bound the suitors +to follow him. Indeed, the account given by those Peloponnesians who have been +the recipients of the most credible tradition is this. First of all Pelops, +arriving among a needy population from Asia with vast wealth, acquired such +power that, stranger though he was, the country was called after him; and this +power fortune saw fit materially to increase in the hands of his descendants. +Eurystheus had been killed in Attica by the Heraclids. Atreus was his +mother’s brother; and to the hands of his relation, who had left his +father on account of the death of Chrysippus, Eurystheus, when he set out on +his expedition, had committed Mycenæ and the government. As time went on and +Eurystheus did not return, Atreus complied with the wishes of the Mycenæans, +who were influenced by fear of the Heraclids—besides, his power seemed +considerable, and he had not neglected to court the favour of the +populace—and assumed the sceptre of Mycenæ and the rest of the dominions +of Eurystheus. And so the power of the descendants of Pelops came to be greater +than that of the descendants of Perseus. To all this Agamemnon succeeded. He +had also a navy far stronger than his contemporaries, so that, in my opinion, +fear was quite as strong an element as love in the formation of the confederate +expedition. The strength of his navy is shown by the fact that his own was the +largest contingent, and that of the Arcadians was furnished by him; this at +least is what Homer says, if his testimony is deemed sufficient. Besides, in +his account of the transmission of the sceptre, he calls him +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +Of many an isle, and of all Argos king. +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +Now Agamemnon’s was a continental power; and he could not have been +master of any except the adjacent islands (and these would not be many), but +through the possession of a fleet. +</p> + +<p> +And from this expedition we may infer the character of earlier enterprises. Now +Mycenæ may have been a small place, and many of the towns of that age may +appear comparatively insignificant, but no exact observer would therefore feel +justified in rejecting the estimate given by the poets and by tradition of the +magnitude of the armament. For I suppose if Lacedaemon were to become desolate, +and the temples and the foundations of the public buildings were left, that as +time went on there would be a strong disposition with posterity to refuse to +accept her fame as a true exponent of her power. And yet they occupy two-fifths +of Peloponnese and lead the whole, not to speak of their numerous allies +without. Still, as the city is neither built in a compact form nor adorned with +magnificent temples and public edifices, but composed of villages after the old +fashion of Hellas, there would be an impression of inadequacy. Whereas, if +Athens were to suffer the same misfortune, I suppose that any inference from +the appearance presented to the eye would make her power to have been twice as +great as it is. We have therefore no right to be sceptical, nor to content +ourselves with an inspection of a town to the exclusion of a consideration of +its power; but we may safely conclude that the armament in question surpassed +all before it, as it fell short of modern efforts; if we can here also accept +the testimony of Homer’s poems, in which, without allowing for the +exaggeration which a poet would feel himself licensed to employ, we can see +that it was far from equalling ours. He has represented it as consisting of +twelve hundred vessels; the Boeotian complement of each ship being a hundred +and twenty men, that of the ships of Philoctetes fifty. By this, I conceive, he +meant to convey the maximum and the minimum complement: at any rate, he does +not specify the amount of any others in his catalogue of the ships. That they +were all rowers as well as warriors we see from his account of the ships of +Philoctetes, in which all the men at the oar are bowmen. Now it is improbable +that many supernumeraries sailed, if we except the kings and high officers; +especially as they had to cross the open sea with munitions of war, in ships, +moreover, that had no decks, but were equipped in the old piratical fashion. So +that if we strike the average of the largest and smallest ships, the number of +those who sailed will appear inconsiderable, representing, as they did, the +whole force of Hellas. And this was due not so much to scarcity of men as of +money. Difficulty of subsistence made the invaders reduce the numbers of the +army to a point at which it might live on the country during the prosecution of +the war. Even after the victory they obtained on their arrival—and a +victory there must have been, or the fortifications of the naval camp could +never have been built—there is no indication of their whole force having +been employed; on the contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation of the +Chersonese and to piracy from want of supplies. This was what really enabled +the Trojans to keep the field for ten years against them; the dispersion of the +enemy making them always a match for the detachment left behind. If they had +brought plenty of supplies with them, and had persevered in the war without +scattering for piracy and agriculture, they would have easily defeated the +Trojans in the field, since they could hold their own against them with the +division on service. In short, if they had stuck to the siege, the capture of +Troy would have cost them less time and less trouble. But as want of money +proved the weakness of earlier expeditions, so from the same cause even the one +in question, more famous than its predecessors, may be pronounced on the +evidence of what it effected to have been inferior to its renown and to the +current opinion about it formed under the tuition of the poets. +</p> + +<p> +Even after the Trojan War, Hellas was still engaged in removing and settling, +and thus could not attain to the quiet which must precede growth. The late +return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many revolutions, and factions ensued +almost everywhere; and it was the citizens thus driven into exile who founded +the cities. Sixty years after the capture of Ilium, the modern Boeotians were +driven out of Arne by the Thessalians, and settled in the present Boeotia, the +former Cadmeis; though there was a division of them there before, some of whom +joined the expedition to Ilium. Twenty years later, the Dorians and the +Heraclids became masters of Peloponnese; so that much had to be done and many +years had to elapse before Hellas could attain to a durable tranquillity +undisturbed by removals, and could begin to send out colonies, as Athens did to +Ionia and most of the islands, and the Peloponnesians to most of Italy and +Sicily and some places in the rest of Hellas. All these places were founded +subsequently to the war with Troy. +</p> + +<p> +But as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth became more an +object, the revenues of the states increasing, tyrannies were by their means +established almost everywhere—the old form of government being hereditary +monarchy with definite prerogatives—and Hellas began to fit out fleets +and apply herself more closely to the sea. It is said that the Corinthians were +the first to approach the modern style of naval architecture, and that Corinth +was the first place in Hellas where galleys were built; and we have Ameinocles, +a Corinthian shipwright, making four ships for the Samians. Dating from the end +of this war, it is nearly three hundred years ago that Ameinocles went to +Samos. Again, the earliest sea-fight in history was between the Corinthians and +Corcyraeans; this was about two hundred and sixty years ago, dating from the +same time. Planted on an isthmus, Corinth had from time out of mind been a +commercial emporium; as formerly almost all communication between the Hellenes +within and without Peloponnese was carried on overland, and the Corinthian +territory was the highway through which it travelled. She had consequently +great money resources, as is shown by the epithet “wealthy” +bestowed by the old poets on the place, and this enabled her, when traffic by +sea became more common, to procure her navy and put down piracy; and as she +could offer a mart for both branches of the trade, she acquired for herself all +the power which a large revenue affords. Subsequently the Ionians attained to +great naval strength in the reign of Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and +of his son Cambyses, and while they were at war with the former commanded for a +while the Ionian sea. Polycrates also, the tyrant of Samos, had a powerful navy +in the reign of Cambyses, with which he reduced many of the islands, and among +them Rhenea, which he consecrated to the Delian Apollo. About this time also +the Phocaeans, while they were founding Marseilles, defeated the Carthaginians +in a sea-fight. These were the most powerful navies. And even these, although +so many generations had elapsed since the Trojan war, seem to have been +principally composed of the old fifty-oars and long-boats, and to have counted +few galleys among their ranks. Indeed it was only shortly the Persian war, and +the death of Darius the successor of Cambyses, that the Sicilian tyrants and +the Corcyraeans acquired any large number of galleys. For after these there +were no navies of any account in Hellas till the expedition of Xerxes; Aegina, +Athens, and others may have possessed a few vessels, but they were principally +fifty-oars. It was quite at the end of this period that the war with Aegina and +the prospect of the barbarian invasion enabled Themistocles to persuade the +Athenians to build the fleet with which they fought at Salamis; and even these +vessels had not complete decks. +</p> + +<p> +The navies, then, of the Hellenes during the period we have traversed were what +I have described. All their insignificance did not prevent their being an +element of the greatest power to those who cultivated them, alike in revenue +and in dominion. They were the means by which the islands were reached and +reduced, those of the smallest area falling the easiest prey. Wars by land +there were none, none at least by which power was acquired; we have the usual +border contests, but of distant expeditions with conquest for object we hear +nothing among the Hellenes. There was no union of subject cities round a great +state, no spontaneous combination of equals for confederate expeditions; what +fighting there was consisted merely of local warfare between rival neighbours. +The nearest approach to a coalition took place in the old war between Chalcis +and Eretria; this was a quarrel in which the rest of the Hellenic name did to +some extent take sides. +</p> + +<p> +Various, too, were the obstacles which the national growth encountered in +various localities. The power of the Ionians was advancing with rapid strides, +when it came into collision with Persia, under King Cyrus, who, after having +dethroned Croesus and overrun everything between the Halys and the sea, stopped +not till he had reduced the cities of the coast; the islands being only left to +be subdued by Darius and the Phoenician navy. +</p> + +<p> +Again, wherever there were tyrants, their habit of providing simply for +themselves, of looking solely to their personal comfort and family +aggrandizement, made safety the great aim of their policy, and prevented +anything great proceeding from them; though they would each have their affairs +with their immediate neighbours. All this is only true of the mother country, +for in Sicily they attained to very great power. Thus for a long time +everywhere in Hellas do we find causes which make the states alike incapable of +combination for great and national ends, or of any vigorous action of their +own. +</p> + +<p> +But at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the far older tyrannies +of the rest of Hellas were, with the exception of those in Sicily, once and for +all put down by Lacedaemon; for this city, though after the settlement of the +Dorians, its present inhabitants, it suffered from factions for an unparalleled +length of time, still at a very early period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a +freedom from tyrants which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of +government for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late +war, and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of the other +states. Not many years after the deposition of the tyrants, the battle of +Marathon was fought between the Medes and the Athenians. Ten years afterwards, +the barbarian returned with the armada for the subjugation of Hellas. In the +face of this great danger, the command of the confederate Hellenes was assumed +by the Lacedaemonians in virtue of their superior power; and the Athenians, +having made up their minds to abandon their city, broke up their homes, threw +themselves into their ships, and became a naval people. This coalition, after +repulsing the barbarian, soon afterwards split into two sections, which +included the Hellenes who had revolted from the King, as well as those who had +aided him in the war. At the end of the one stood Athens, at the head of the +other Lacedaemon, one the first naval, the other the first military power in +Hellas. For a short time the league held together, till the Lacedaemonians and +Athenians quarrelled and made war upon each other with their allies, a duel +into which all the Hellenes sooner or later were drawn, though some might at +first remain neutral. So that the whole period from the Median war to this, +with some peaceful intervals, was spent by each power in war, either with its +rival, or with its own revolted allies, and consequently afforded them constant +practice in military matters, and that experience which is learnt in the school +of danger. +</p> + +<p> +The policy of Lacedaemon was not to exact tribute from her allies, but merely +to secure their subservience to her interests by establishing oligarchies among +them; Athens, on the contrary, had by degrees deprived hers of their ships, and +imposed instead contributions in money on all except Chios and Lesbos. Both +found their resources for this war separately to exceed the sum of their +strength when the alliance flourished intact. +</p> + +<p> +Having now given the result of my inquiries into early times, I grant that +there will be a difficulty in believing every particular detail. The way that +most men deal with traditions, even traditions of their own country, is to +receive them all alike as they are delivered, without applying any critical +test whatever. The general Athenian public fancy that Hipparchus was tyrant +when he fell by the hands of Harmodius and Aristogiton, not knowing that +Hippias, the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus, was really supreme, and that +Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers; and that Harmodius and Aristogiton +suspecting, on the very day, nay at the very moment fixed on for the deed, that +information had been conveyed to Hippias by their accomplices, concluded that +he had been warned, and did not attack him, yet, not liking to be apprehended +and risk their lives for nothing, fell upon Hipparchus near the temple of the +daughters of Leos, and slew him as he was arranging the Panathenaic procession. +</p> + +<p> +There are many other unfounded ideas current among the rest of the Hellenes, +even on matters of contemporary history, which have not been obscured by time. +For instance, there is the notion that the Lacedaemonian kings have two votes +each, the fact being that they have only one; and that there is a company of +Pitane, there being simply no such thing. So little pains do the vulgar take in +the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to +hand. On the whole, however, the conclusions I have drawn from the proofs +quoted may, I believe, safely be relied on. Assuredly they will not be +disturbed either by the lays of a poet displaying the exaggeration of his +craft, or by the compositions of the chroniclers that are attractive at +truth’s expense; the subjects they treat of being out of the reach of +evidence, and time having robbed most of them of historical value by enthroning +them in the region of legend. Turning from these, we can rest satisfied with +having proceeded upon the clearest data, and having arrived at conclusions as +exact as can be expected in matters of such antiquity. To come to this war: +despite the known disposition of the actors in a struggle to overrate its +importance, and when it is over to return to their admiration of earlier +events, yet an examination of the facts will show that it was much greater than +the wars which preceded it. +</p> + +<p> +With reference to the speeches in this history, some were delivered before the +war began, others while it was going on; some I heard myself, others I got from +various quarters; it was in all cases difficult to carry them word for word in +one’s memory, so my habit has been to make the speakers say what was in +my opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as +closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said. And with +reference to the narrative of events, far from permitting myself to derive it +from the first source that came to hand, I did not even trust my own +impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what others +saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe +and detailed tests possible. My conclusions have cost me some labour from the +want of coincidence between accounts of the same occurrences by different +eye-witnesses, arising sometimes from imperfect memory, sometimes from undue +partiality for one side or the other. The absence of romance in my history +will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by +those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the +interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble +if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, +not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession +for all time. +</p> + +<p> +The Median War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a speedy +decision in two actions by sea and two by land. The Peloponnesian War was +prolonged to an immense length, and, long as it was, it was short without +parallel for the misfortunes that it brought upon Hellas. Never had so many +cities been taken and laid desolate, here by the barbarians, here by the +parties contending (the old inhabitants being sometimes removed to make room +for others); never was there so much banishing and blood-shedding, now on the +field of battle, now in the strife of faction. Old stories of occurrences +handed down by tradition, but scantily confirmed by experience, suddenly ceased +to be incredible; there were earthquakes of unparalleled extent and violence; +eclipses of the sun occurred with a frequency unrecorded in previous history; +there were great droughts in sundry places and consequent famines, and that +most calamitous and awfully fatal visitation, the plague. All this came upon +them with the late war, which was begun by the Athenians and Peloponnesians by +the dissolution of the thirty years’ truce made after the conquest of +Euboea. To the question why they broke the treaty, I answer by placing first an +account of their grounds of complaint and points of difference, that no one may +ever have to ask the immediate cause which plunged the Hellenes into a war of +such magnitude. The real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most +kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this +inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable. Still it is well to give the +grounds alleged by either side which led to the dissolution of the treaty and +the breaking out of the war. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0002" id="link2HCH0002"></a> +CHAPTER II </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Causes of the War—The Affair of Epidamnus—The Affair of Potidæa +</p> + +<p> +The city of Epidamnus stands on the right of the entrance of the Ionic Gulf. +Its vicinity is inhabited by the Taulantians, an Illyrian people. The place is +a colony from Corcyra, founded by Phalius, son of Eratocleides, of the family +of the Heraclids, who had according to ancient usage been summoned for the +purpose from Corinth, the mother country. The colonists were joined by some +Corinthians, and others of the Dorian race. Now, as time went on, the city of +Epidamnus became great and populous; but falling a prey to factions arising, it +is said, from a war with her neighbours the barbarians, she became much +enfeebled, and lost a considerable amount of her power. The last act before the +war was the expulsion of the nobles by the people. The exiled party joined the +barbarians, and proceeded to plunder those in the city by sea and land; and the +Epidamnians, finding themselves hard pressed, sent ambassadors to Corcyra +beseeching their mother country not to allow them to perish, but to make up +matters between them and the exiles, and to rid them of the war with the +barbarians. The ambassadors seated themselves in the temple of Hera as +suppliants, and made the above requests to the Corcyraeans. But the Corcyraeans +refused to accept their supplication, and they were dismissed without having +effected anything. +</p> + +<p> +When the Epidamnians found that no help could be expected from Corcyra, they +were in a strait what to do next. So they sent to Delphi and inquired of the +God whether they should deliver their city to the Corinthians and endeavour to +obtain some assistance from their founders. The answer he gave them was to +deliver the city and place themselves under Corinthian protection. So the +Epidamnians went to Corinth and delivered over the colony in obedience to the +commands of the oracle. They showed that their founder came from Corinth, and +revealed the answer of the god; and they begged them not to allow them to +perish, but to assist them. This the Corinthians consented to do. Believing the +colony to belong as much to themselves as to the Corcyraeans, they felt it to +be a kind of duty to undertake their protection. Besides, they hated the +Corcyraeans for their contempt of the mother country. Instead of meeting with +the usual honours accorded to the parent city by every other colony at public +assemblies, such as precedence at sacrifices, Corinth found herself treated +with contempt by a power which in point of wealth could stand comparison with +any even of the richest communities in Hellas, which possessed great military +strength, and which sometimes could not repress a pride in the high naval +position of an island whose nautical renown dated from the days of its old +inhabitants, the Phaeacians. This was one reason of the care that they lavished +on their fleet, which became very efficient; indeed they began the war with a +force of a hundred and twenty galleys. +</p> + +<p> +All these grievances made Corinth eager to send the promised aid to Epidamnus. +Advertisement was made for volunteer settlers, and a force of Ambraciots, +Leucadians, and Corinthians was dispatched. They marched by land to Apollonia, +a Corinthian colony, the route by sea being avoided from fear of Corcyraean +interruption. When the Corcyraeans heard of the arrival of the settlers and +troops in Epidamnus, and the surrender of the colony to Corinth, they took +fire. Instantly putting to sea with five-and-twenty ships, which were quickly +followed by others, they insolently commanded the Epidamnians to receive back +the banished nobles—(it must be premised that the Epidamnian exiles had +come to Corcyra and, pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors, had +appealed to their kindred to restore them)—and to dismiss the Corinthian +garrison and settlers. But to all this the Epidamnians turned a deaf ear. Upon +this the Corcyraeans commenced operations against them with a fleet of forty +sail. They took with them the exiles, with a view to their restoration, and +also secured the services of the Illyrians. Sitting down before the city, they +issued a proclamation to the effect that any of the natives that chose, and the +foreigners, might depart unharmed, with the alternative of being treated as +enemies. On their refusal the Corcyraeans proceeded to besiege the city, which +stands on an isthmus; and the Corinthians, receiving intelligence of the +investment of Epidamnus, got together an armament and proclaimed a colony to +Epidamnus, perfect political equality being guaranteed to all who chose to go. +Any who were not prepared to sail at once might, by paying down the sum of +fifty Corinthian drachmae, have a share in the colony without leaving Corinth. +Great numbers took advantage of this proclamation, some being ready to start +directly, others paying the requisite forfeit. In case of their passage being +disputed by the Corcyraeans, several cities were asked to lend them a convoy. +Megara prepared to accompany them with eight ships, Pale in Cephallonia with +four; Epidaurus furnished five, Hermione one, Troezen two, Leucas ten, and +Ambracia eight. The Thebans and Phliasians were asked for money, the Eleans for +hulls as well; while Corinth herself furnished thirty ships and three thousand +heavy infantry. +</p> + +<p> +When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they came to Corinth with +envoys from Lacedaemon and Sicyon, whom they persuaded to accompany them, and +bade her recall the garrison and settlers, as she had nothing to do with +Epidamnus. If, however, she had any claims to make, they were willing to submit +the matter to the arbitration of such of the cities in Peloponnese as should be +chosen by mutual agreement, and that the colony should remain with the city to +whom the arbitrators might assign it. They were also willing to refer the +matter to the oracle at Delphi. If, in defiance of their protestations, war was +appealed to, they should be themselves compelled by this violence to seek +friends in quarters where they had no desire to seek them, and to make even old +ties give way to the necessity of assistance. The answer they got from Corinth +was that, if they would withdraw their fleet and the barbarians from Epidamnus, +negotiation might be possible; but, while the town was still being besieged, +going before arbitrators was out of the question. The Corcyraeans retorted that +if Corinth would withdraw her troops from Epidamnus they would withdraw theirs, +or they were ready to let both parties remain in statu quo, an armistice being +concluded till judgment could be given. +</p> + +<p> +Turning a deaf ear to all these proposals, when their ships were manned and +their allies had come in, the Corinthians sent a herald before them to declare +war and, getting under way with seventy-five ships and two thousand heavy +infantry, sailed for Epidamnus to give battle to the Corcyraeans. The fleet was +under the command of Aristeus, son of Pellichas, Callicrates, son of Callias, +and Timanor, son of Timanthes; the troops under that of Archetimus, son of +Eurytimus, and Isarchidas, son of Isarchus. When they had reached Actium in the +territory of Anactorium, at the mouth of the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, +where the temple of Apollo stands, the Corcyraeans sent on a herald in a light +boat to warn them not to sail against them. Meanwhile they proceeded to man +their ships, all of which had been equipped for action, the old vessels being +undergirded to make them seaworthy. On the return of the herald without any +peaceful answer from the Corinthians, their ships being now manned, they put +out to sea to meet the enemy with a fleet of eighty sail (forty were engaged in +the siege of Epidamnus), formed line, and went into action, and gained a +decisive victory, and destroyed fifteen of the Corinthian vessels. The same day +had seen Epidamnus compelled by its besiegers to capitulate; the conditions +being that the foreigners should be sold, and the Corinthians kept as prisoners +of war, till their fate should be otherwise decided. +</p> + +<p> +After the engagement the Corcyraeans set up a trophy on Leukimme, a headland of +Corcyra, and slew all their captives except the Corinthians, whom they kept as +prisoners of war. Defeated at sea, the Corinthians and their allies repaired +home, and left the Corcyraeans masters of all the sea about those parts. +Sailing to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, they ravaged their territory, and burnt +Cyllene, the harbour of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money +to Corinth. For almost the whole of the period that followed the battle they +remained masters of the sea, and the allies of Corinth were harassed by +Corcyraean cruisers. At last Corinth, roused by the sufferings of her allies, +sent out ships and troops in the fall of the summer, who formed an encampment +at Actium and about Chimerium, in Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and +the rest of the friendly cities. The Corcyraeans on their part formed a similar +station on Leukimme. Neither party made any movement, but they remained +confronting each other till the end of the summer, and winter was at hand +before either of them returned home. +</p> + +<p> +Corinth, exasperated by the war with the Corcyraeans, spent the whole of the +year after the engagement and that succeeding it in building ships, and in +straining every nerve to form an efficient fleet; rowers being drawn from +Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas by the inducement of large bounties. The +Corcyraeans, alarmed at the news of their preparations, being without a single +ally in Hellas (for they had not enrolled themselves either in the Athenian or +in the Lacedaemonian confederacy), decided to repair to Athens in order to +enter into alliance and to endeavour to procure support from her. Corinth also, +hearing of their intentions, sent an embassy to Athens to prevent the +Corcyraean navy being joined by the Athenian, and her prospect of ordering the +war according to her wishes being thus impeded. An assembly was convoked, and +the rival advocates appeared: the Corcyraeans spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Athenians! when a people that have not rendered any important service or +support to their neighbours in times past, for which they might claim to be +repaid, appear before them as we now appear before you to solicit their +assistance, they may fairly be required to satisfy certain preliminary +conditions. They should show, first, that it is expedient or at least safe to +grant their request; next, that they will retain a lasting sense of the +kindness. But if they cannot clearly establish any of these points, they must +not be annoyed if they meet with a rebuff. Now the Corcyraeans believe that +with their petition for assistance they can also give you a satisfactory answer +on these points, and they have therefore dispatched us hither. It has so +happened that our policy as regards you with respect to this request, turns out +to be inconsistent, and as regards our interests, to be at the present crisis +inexpedient. We say inconsistent, because a power which has never in the whole +of her past history been willing to ally herself with any of her neighbours, is +now found asking them to ally themselves with her. And we say inexpedient, +because in our present war with Corinth it has left us in a position of entire +isolation, and what once seemed the wise precaution of refusing to involve +ourselves in alliances with other powers, lest we should also involve ourselves +in risks of their choosing, has now proved to be folly and weakness. It is true +that in the late naval engagement we drove back the Corinthians from our shores +single-handed. But they have now got together a still larger armament from +Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas; and we, seeing our utter inability to cope +with them without foreign aid, and the magnitude of the danger which subjection +to them implies, find it necessary to ask help from you and from every other +power. And we hope to be excused if we forswear our old principle of complete +political isolation, a principle which was not adopted with any sinister +intention, but was rather the consequence of an error in judgment. +</p> + +<p> +“Now there are many reasons why in the event of your compliance you will +congratulate yourselves on this request having been made to you. First, because +your assistance will be rendered to a power which, herself inoffensive, is a +victim to the injustice of others. Secondly, because all that we most value is +at stake in the present contest, and your welcome of us under these +circumstances will be a proof of goodwill which will ever keep alive the +gratitude you will lay up in our hearts. Thirdly, yourselves excepted, we are +the greatest naval power in Hellas. Moreover, can you conceive a stroke of good +fortune more rare in itself, or more disheartening to your enemies, than that +the power whose adhesion you would have valued above much material and moral +strength should present herself self-invited, should deliver herself into your +hands without danger and without expense, and should lastly put you in the way +of gaining a high character in the eyes of the world, the gratitude of those +whom you shall assist, and a great accession of strength for yourselves? You +may search all history without finding many instances of a people gaining all +these advantages at once, or many instances of a power that comes in quest of +assistance being in a position to give to the people whose alliance she +solicits as much safety and honour as she will receive. But it will be urged +that it is only in the case of a war that we shall be found useful. To this we +answer that if any of you imagine that that war is far off, he is grievously +mistaken, and is blind to the fact that Lacedaemon regards you with jealousy +and desires war, and that Corinth is powerful there—the same, remember, +that is your enemy, and is even now trying to subdue us as a preliminary to +attacking you. And this she does to prevent our becoming united by a common +enmity, and her having us both on her hands, and also to ensure getting the +start of you in one of two ways, either by crippling our power or by making its +strength her own. Now it is our policy to be beforehand with her—that is, +for Corcyra to make an offer of alliance and for you to accept it; in fact, we +ought to form plans against her instead of waiting to defeat the plans she +forms against us. +</p> + +<p> +“If she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers into alliance is +not right, let her know that every colony that is well treated honours its +parent state, but becomes estranged from it by injustice. For colonists are not +sent forth on the understanding that they are to be the slaves of those that +remain behind, but that they are to be their equals. And that Corinth was +injuring us is clear. Invited to refer the dispute about Epidamnus to +arbitration, they chose to prosecute their complaints war rather than by a fair +trial. And let their conduct towards us who are their kindred be a warning to +you not to be misled by their deceit, nor to yield to their direct requests; +concessions to adversaries only end in self-reproach, and the more strictly +they are avoided the greater will be the chance of security. +</p> + +<p> +“If it be urged that your reception of us will be a breach of the treaty +existing between you and Lacedaemon, the answer is that we are a neutral state, +and that one of the express provisions of that treaty is that it shall be +competent for any Hellenic state that is neutral to join whichever side it +pleases. And it is intolerable for Corinth to be allowed to obtain men for her +navy not only from her allies, but also from the rest of Hellas, no small +number being furnished by your own subjects; while we are to be excluded both +from the alliance left open to us by treaty, and from any assistance that we +might get from other quarters, and you are to be accused of political +immorality if you comply with our request. On the other hand, we shall have +much greater cause to complain of you, if you do not comply with it; if we, who +are in peril and are no enemies of yours, meet with a repulse at your hands, +while Corinth, who is the aggressor and your enemy, not only meets with no +hindrance from you, but is even allowed to draw material for war from your +dependencies. This ought not to be, but you should either forbid her enlisting +men in your dominions, or you should lend us too what help you may think +advisable. +</p> + +<p> +“But your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and support. The +advantages of this course, as we premised in the beginning of our speech, are +many. We mention one that is perhaps the chief. Could there be a clearer +guarantee of our good faith than is offered by the fact that the power which is +at enmity with you is also at enmity with us, and that that power is fully able +to punish defection? And there is a wide difference between declining the +alliance of an inland and of a maritime power. For your first endeavour should +be to prevent, if possible, the existence of any naval power except your own; +failing this, to secure the friendship of the strongest that does exist. And if +any of you believe that what we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon this +belief, lest it should lead to a breach of the treaty, you must remember that +on the one hand, whatever your fears, your strength will be formidable to your +antagonists; on the other, whatever the confidence you derive from refusing to +receive us, your weakness will have no terrors for a strong enemy. You must +also remember that your decision is for Athens no less than Corcyra, and that +you are not making the best provision for her interests, if at a time when you +are anxiously scanning the horizon that you may be in readiness for the +breaking out of the war which is all but upon you, you hesitate to attach to +your side a place whose adhesion or estrangement is alike pregnant with the +most vital consequences. For it lies conveniently for the coast-navigation in +the direction of Italy and Sicily, being able to bar the passage of naval +reinforcements from thence to Peloponnese, and from Peloponnese thither; and it +is in other respects a most desirable station. To sum up as shortly as +possible, embracing both general and particular considerations, let this show +you the folly of sacrificing us. Remember that there are but three considerable +naval powers in Hellas—Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth—and that if you +allow two of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for herself, +you will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of Corcyra and +Peloponnese. But if you receive us, you will have our ships to reinforce you in +the struggle.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of the Corcyraeans. After they had finished, the +Corinthians spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“These Corcyraeans in the speech we have just heard do not confine +themselves to the question of their reception into your alliance. They also +talk of our being guilty of injustice, and their being the victims of an +unjustifiable war. It becomes necessary for us to touch upon both these points +before we proceed to the rest of what we have to say, that you may have a more +correct idea of the grounds of our claim, and have good cause to reject their +petition. According to them, their old policy of refusing all offers of +alliance was a policy of moderation. It was in fact adopted for bad ends, not +for good; indeed their conduct is such as to make them by no means desirous of +having allies present to witness it, or of having the shame of asking their +concurrence. Besides, their geographical situation makes them independent of +others, and consequently the decision in cases where they injure any lies not +with judges appointed by mutual agreement, but with themselves, because, while +they seldom make voyages to their neighbours, they are constantly being visited +by foreign vessels which are compelled to put in to Corcyra. In short, the +object that they propose to themselves, in their specious policy of complete +isolation, is not to avoid sharing in the crimes of others, but to secure +monopoly of crime to themselves—the licence of outrage wherever they can +compel, of fraud wherever they can elude, and the enjoyment of their gains +without shame. And yet if they were the honest men they pretend to be, the less +hold that others had upon them, the stronger would be the light in which they +might have put their honesty by giving and taking what was just. +</p> + +<p> +“But such has not been their conduct either towards others or towards us. +The attitude of our colony towards us has always been one of estrangement and +is now one of hostility; for, say they: ‘We were not sent out to be +ill-treated.’ We rejoin that we did not found the colony to be insulted +by them, but to be their head and to be regarded with a proper respect. At any +rate our other colonies honour us, and we are much beloved by our colonists; +and clearly, if the majority are satisfied with us, these can have no good +reason for a dissatisfaction in which they stand alone, and we are not acting +improperly in making war against them, nor are we making war against them +without having received signal provocation. Besides, if we were in the wrong, +it would be honourable in them to give way to our wishes, and disgraceful for +us to trample on their moderation; but in the pride and licence of wealth they +have sinned again and again against us, and never more deeply than when +Epidamnus, our dependency, which they took no steps to claim in its distress +upon our coming to relieve it, was by them seized, and is now held by force of +arms. +</p> + +<p> +“As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first +submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from the party +who is safe in a commanding position cannot gain the credit due only to him +who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well as words, places himself on a +level with his adversary. In their case, it was not before they laid siege to +the place, but after they at length understood that we should not tamely suffer +it, that they thought of the specious word arbitration. And not satisfied with +their own misconduct there, they appear here now requiring you to join with +them not in alliance but in crime, and to receive them in spite of their being +at enmity with us. But it was when they stood firmest that they should have +made overtures to you, and not at a time when we have been wronged and they are +in peril; nor yet at a time when you will be admitting to a share in your +protection those who never admitted you to a share in their power, and will be +incurring an equal amount of blame from us with those in whose offences you had +no hand. No, they should have shared their power with you before they asked you +to share your fortunes with them. +</p> + +<p> +“So then the reality of the grievances we come to complain of, and the +violence and rapacity of our opponents, have both been proved. But that you +cannot equitably receive them, this you have still to learn. It may be true +that one of the provisions of the treaty is that it shall be competent for any +state, whose name was not down on the list, to join whichever side it pleases. +But this agreement is not meant for those whose object in joining is the injury +of other powers, but for those whose need of support does not arise from the +fact of defection, and whose adhesion will not bring to the power that is mad +enough to receive them war instead of peace; which will be the case with you, +if you refuse to listen to us. For you cannot become their auxiliary and remain +our friend; if you join in their attack, you must share the punishment which +the defenders inflict on them. And yet you have the best possible right to be +neutral, or, failing this, you should on the contrary join us against them. +Corinth is at least in treaty with you; with Corcyra you were never even in +truce. But do not lay down the principle that defection is to be patronized. +Did we on the defection of the Samians record our vote against you, when the +rest of the Peloponnesian powers were equally divided on the question whether +they should assist them? No, we told them to their face that every power has a +right to punish its own allies. Why, if you make it your policy to receive and +assist all offenders, you will find that just as many of your dependencies will +come over to us, and the principle that you establish will press less heavily +on us than on yourselves. +</p> + +<p> +“This then is what Hellenic law entitles us to demand as a right. But we +have also advice to offer and claims on your gratitude, which, since there is +no danger of our injuring you, as we are not enemies, and since our friendship +does not amount to very frequent intercourse, we say ought to be liquidated at +the present juncture. When you were in want of ships of war for the war against +the Aeginetans, before the Persian invasion, Corinth supplied you with twenty +vessels. That good turn, and the line we took on the Samian question, when we +were the cause of the Peloponnesians refusing to assist them, enabled you to +conquer Aegina and to punish Samos. And we acted thus at crises when, if ever, +men are wont in their efforts against their enemies to forget everything for +the sake of victory, regarding him who assists them then as a friend, even if +thus far he has been a foe, and him who opposes them then as a foe, even if he +has thus far been a friend; indeed they allow their real interests to suffer +from their absorbing preoccupation in the struggle. +</p> + +<p> +“Weigh well these considerations, and let your youth learn what they are +from their elders, and let them determine to do unto us as we have done unto +you. And let them not acknowledge the justice of what we say, but dispute its +wisdom in the contingency of war. Not only is the straightest path generally +speaking the wisest; but the coming of the war, which the Corcyraeans have used +as a bugbear to persuade you to do wrong, is still uncertain, and it is not +worth while to be carried away by it into gaining the instant and declared +enmity of Corinth. It were, rather, wise to try and counteract the unfavourable +impression which your conduct to Megara has created. For kindness opportunely +shown has a greater power of removing old grievances than the facts of the case +may warrant. And do not be seduced by the prospect of a great naval alliance. +Abstinence from all injustice to other first-rate powers is a greater tower of +strength than anything that can be gained by the sacrifice of permanent +tranquillity for an apparent temporary advantage. It is now our turn to benefit +by the principle that we laid down at Lacedaemon, that every power has a right +to punish her own allies. We now claim to receive the same from you, and +protest against your rewarding us for benefiting you by our vote by injuring us +by yours. On the contrary, return us like for like, remembering that this is +that very crisis in which he who lends aid is most a friend, and he who opposes +is most a foe. And for these Corcyraeans—neither receive them into +alliance in our despite, nor be their abettors in crime. So do, and you will +act as we have a right to expect of you, and at the same time best consult your +own interests.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of the Corinthians. +</p> + +<p> +When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held. In the first +there was a manifest disposition to listen to the representations of Corinth; +in the second, public feeling had changed and an alliance with Corcyra was +decided on, with certain reservations. It was to be a defensive, not an +offensive alliance. It did not involve a breach of the treaty with Peloponnese: +Athens could not be required to join Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth. But +each of the contracting parties had a right to the other’s assistance +against invasion, whether of his own territory or that of an ally. For it began +now to be felt that the coming of the Peloponnesian war was only a question of +time, and no one was willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra +sacrificed to Corinth; though if they could let them weaken each other by +mutual conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the struggle which Athens +might one day have to wage with Corinth and the other naval powers. At the same +time the island seemed to lie conveniently on the coasting passage to Italy and +Sicily. With these views, Athens received Corcyra into alliance and, on the +departure of the Corinthians not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their +assistance. They were commanded by Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus, +the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their instructions +were to avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet except under certain +circumstances. If it sailed to Corcyra and threatened a landing on her coast, +or in any of her possessions, they were to do their utmost to prevent it. These +instructions were prompted by an anxiety to avoid a breach of the treaty. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Corinthians completed their preparations, and sailed for Corcyra +with a hundred and fifty ships. Of these Elis furnished ten, Megara twelve, +Leucas ten, Ambracia twenty-seven, Anactorium one, and Corinth herself ninety. +Each of these contingents had its own admiral, the Corinthian being under the +command of Xenoclides, son of Euthycles, with four colleagues. Sailing from +Leucas, they made land at the part of the continent opposite Corcyra. They +anchored in the harbour of Chimerium, in the territory of Thesprotis, above +which, at some distance from the sea, lies the city of Ephyre, in the Elean +district. By this city the Acherusian lake pours its waters into the sea. It +gets its name from the river Acheron, which flows through Thesprotis and falls +into the lake. There also the river Thyamis flows, forming the boundary between +Thesprotis and Kestrine; and between these rivers rises the point of Chimerium. +In this part of the continent the Corinthians now came to anchor, and formed an +encampment. When the Corcyraeans saw them coming, they manned a hundred and ten +ships, commanded by Meikiades, Aisimides, and Eurybatus, and stationed +themselves at one of the Sybota isles; the ten Athenian ships being present. On +Point Leukimme they posted their land forces, and a thousand heavy infantry who +had come from Zacynthus to their assistance. Nor were the Corinthians on the +mainland without their allies. The barbarians flocked in large numbers to their +assistance, the inhabitants of this part of the continent being old allies of +theirs. +</p> + +<p> +When the Corinthian preparations were completed, they took three days’ +provisions and put out from Chimerium by night, ready for action. Sailing with +the dawn, they sighted the Corcyraean fleet out at sea and coming towards them. +When they perceived each other, both sides formed in order of battle. On the +Corcyraean right wing lay the Athenian ships, the rest of the line being +occupied by their own vessels formed in three squadrons, each of which was +commanded by one of the three admirals. Such was the Corcyraean formation. The +Corinthian was as follows: on the right wing lay the Megarian and Ambraciot +ships, in the centre the rest of the allies in order. But the left was composed +of the best sailers in the Corinthian navy, to encounter the Athenians and the +right wing of the Corcyraeans. As soon as the signals were raised on either +side, they joined battle. Both sides had a large number of heavy infantry on +their decks, and a large number of archers and darters, the old imperfect +armament still prevailing. The sea-fight was an obstinate one, though not +remarkable for its science; indeed it was more like a battle by land. Whenever +they charged each other, the multitude and crush of the vessels made it by no +means easy to get loose; besides, their hopes of victory lay principally in the +heavy infantry on the decks, who stood and fought in order, the ships remaining +stationary. The manoeuvre of breaking the line was not tried; in short, +strength and pluck had more share in the fight than science. Everywhere tumult +reigned, the battle being one scene of confusion; meanwhile the Athenian ships, +by coming up to the Corcyraeans whenever they were pressed, served to alarm the +enemy, though their commanders could not join in the battle from fear of their +instructions. The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most. The Corcyraeans +routed it, and chased them in disorder to the continent with twenty ships, +sailed up to their camp, and burnt the tents which they found empty, and +plundered the stuff. So in this quarter the Corinthians and their allies were +defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. But where the Corinthians +themselves were, on the left, they gained a decided success; the scanty forces +of the Corcyraeans being further weakened by the want of the twenty ships +absent on the pursuit. Seeing the Corcyraeans hard pressed, the Athenians began +at length to assist them more unequivocally. At first, it is true, they +refrained from charging any ships; but when the rout was becoming patent, and +the Corinthians were pressing on, the time at last came when every one set to, +and all distinction was laid aside, and it came to this point, that the +Corinthians and Athenians raised their hands against each other. +</p> + +<p> +After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves in lashing +fast and hauling after them the hulls of the vessels which they had disabled, +turned their attention to the men, whom they butchered as they sailed through, +not caring so much to make prisoners. Some even of their own friends were slain +by them, by mistake, in their ignorance of the defeat of the right wing For the +number of the ships on both sides, and the distance to which they covered the +sea, made it difficult, after they had once joined, to distinguish between the +conquering and the conquered; this battle proving far greater than any before +it, any at least between Hellenes, for the number of vessels engaged. After the +Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the wrecks +and their dead, most of whom they succeeded in getting hold of and conveying to +Sybota, the rendezvous of the land forces furnished by their barbarian allies. +Sybota, it must be known, is a desert harbour of Thesprotis. This task over, +they mustered anew, and sailed against the Corcyraeans, who on their part +advanced to meet them with all their ships that were fit for service and +remaining to them, accompanied by the Athenian vessels, fearing that they might +attempt a landing in their territory. It was by this time getting late, and the +paean had been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back +water. They had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing up, which had been sent +out afterwards to reinforce the ten vessels by the Athenians, who feared, as it +turned out justly, the defeat of the Corcyraeans and the inability of their +handful of ships to protect them. These ships were thus seen by the Corinthians +first. They suspected that they were from Athens, and that those which they saw +were not all, but that there were more behind; they accordingly began to +retire. The Corcyraeans meanwhile had not sighted them, as they were advancing +from a point which they could not so well see, and were wondering why the +Corinthians were backing water, when some caught sight of them, and cried out +that there were ships in sight ahead. Upon this they also retired; for it was +now getting dark, and the retreat of the Corinthians had suspended hostilities. +Thus they parted from each other, and the battle ceased with night. The +Corcyraeans were in their camp at Leukimme, when these twenty ships from +Athens, under the command of Glaucon, the son of Leagrus, and Andocides, son of +Leogoras, bore on through the corpses and the wrecks, and sailed up to the +camp, not long after they were sighted. It was now night, and the Corcyraeans +feared that they might be hostile vessels; but they soon knew them, and the +ships came to anchor. +</p> + +<p> +The next day the thirty Athenian vessels put out to sea, accompanied by all the +Corcyraean ships that were seaworthy, and sailed to the harbour at Sybota, +where the Corinthians lay, to see if they would engage. The Corinthians put out +from the land and formed a line in the open sea, but beyond this made no +further movement, having no intention of assuming the offensive. For they saw +reinforcements arrived fresh from Athens, and themselves confronted by numerous +difficulties, such as the necessity of guarding the prisoners whom they had on +board and the want of all means of refitting their ships in a desert place. +What they were thinking more about was how their voyage home was to be +effected; they feared that the Athenians might consider that the treaty was +dissolved by the collision which had occurred, and forbid their departure. +</p> + +<p> +Accordingly they resolved to put some men on board a boat, and send them +without a herald’s wand to the Athenians, as an experiment. Having done +so, they spoke as follows: “You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war and +break the treaty. Engaged in chastising our enemies, we find you placing +yourselves in our path in arms against us. Now if your intentions are to +prevent us sailing to Corcyra, or anywhere else that we may wish, and if you +are for breaking the treaty, first take us that are here and treat us as +enemies.” Such was what they said, and all the Corcyraean armament that +were within hearing immediately called out to take them and kill them. But the +Athenians answered as follows: “Neither are we beginning war, +Peloponnesians, nor are we breaking the treaty; but these Corcyraeans are our +allies, and we are come to help them. So if you want to sail anywhere else, we +place no obstacle in your way; but if you are going to sail against Corcyra, or +any of her possessions, we shall do our best to stop you.” +</p> + +<p> +Receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians commenced +preparations for their voyage home, and set up a trophy in Sybota, on the +continent; while the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead that had been +carried out to them by the current, and by a wind which rose in the night and +scattered them in all directions, and set up their trophy in Sybota, on the +island, as victors. The reasons each side had for claiming the victory were +these. The Corinthians had been victorious in the sea-fight until night; and +having thus been enabled to carry off most wrecks and dead, they were in +possession of no fewer than a thousand prisoners of war, and had sunk close +upon seventy vessels. The Corcyraeans had destroyed about thirty ships, and +after the arrival of the Athenians had taken up the wrecks and dead on their +side; they had besides seen the Corinthians retire before them, backing water +on sight of the Athenian vessels, and upon the arrival of the Athenians refuse +to sail out against them from Sybota. Thus both sides claimed the victory. +</p> + +<p> +The Corinthians on the voyage home took Anactorium, which stands at the mouth +of the Ambracian gulf. The place was taken by treachery, being common ground to +the Corcyraeans and Corinthians. After establishing Corinthian settlers there, +they retired home. Eight hundred of the Corcyraeans were slaves; these they +sold; two hundred and fifty they retained in captivity, and treated with great +attention, in the hope that they might bring over their country to Corinth on +their return; most of them being, as it happened, men of very high position in +Corcyra. In this way Corcyra maintained her political existence in the war with +Corinth, and the Athenian vessels left the island. This was the first cause of +the war that Corinth had against the Athenians, viz., that they had fought +against them with the Corcyraeans in time of treaty. +</p> + +<p> +Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose between the Athenians +and Peloponnesians, and contributed their share to the war. Corinth was forming +schemes for retaliation, and Athens suspected her hostility. The Potidæans, who +inhabit the isthmus of Pallene, being a Corinthian colony, but tributary allies +of Athens, were ordered to raze the wall looking towards Pallene, to give +hostages, to dismiss the Corinthian magistrates, and in future not to receive +the persons sent from Corinth annually to succeed them. It was feared that they +might be persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians to revolt, and might draw +the rest of the allies in the direction of Thrace to revolt with them. These +precautions against the Potidæans were taken by the Athenians immediately after +the battle at Corcyra. Not only was Corinth at length openly hostile, but +Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had from an old friend +and ally been made an enemy. He had been made an enemy by the Athenians +entering into alliance with his brother Philip and Derdas, who were in league +against him. In his alarm he had sent to Lacedaemon to try and involve the +Athenians in a war with the Peloponnesians, and was endeavouring to win over +Corinth in order to bring about the revolt of Potidæa. He also made overtures +to the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace, and to the Bottiaeans, to +persuade them to join in the revolt; for he thought that if these places on the +border could be made his allies, it would be easier to carry on the war with +their co-operation. Alive to all this, and wishing to anticipate the revolt of +the cities, the Athenians acted as follows. They were just then sending off +thirty ships and a thousand heavy infantry for his country under the command of +Archestratus, son of Lycomedes, with four colleagues. They instructed the +captains to take hostages of the Potidæans, to raze the wall, and to be on +their guard against the revolt of the neighbouring cities. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Potidæans sent envoys to Athens on the chance of persuading them +to take no new steps in their matters; they also went to Lacedaemon with the +Corinthians to secure support in case of need. Failing after prolonged +negotiation to obtain anything satisfactory from the Athenians; being unable, +for all they could say, to prevent the vessels that were destined for Macedonia +from also sailing against them; and receiving from the Lacedaemonian government +a promise to invade Attica, if the Athenians should attack Potidæa, the +Potidæans, thus favoured by the moment, at last entered into league with the +Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and revolted. And Perdiccas induced the Chalcidians +to abandon and demolish their towns on the seaboard and, settling inland at +Olynthus, to make that one city a strong place: meanwhile to those who followed +his advice he gave a part of his territory in Mygdonia round Lake Bolbe as a +place of abode while the war against the Athenians should last. They +accordingly demolished their towns, removed inland and prepared for war. The +thirty ships of the Athenians, arriving before the Thracian places, found +Potidæa and the rest in revolt. Their commanders, considering it to be quite +impossible with their present force to carry on war with Perdiccas and with the +confederate towns as well turned to Macedonia, their original destination, and, +having established themselves there, carried on war in co-operation with +Philip, and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded the country from the +interior. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Corinthians, with Potidæa in revolt and the Athenian ships on the +coast of Macedonia, alarmed for the safety of the place and thinking its danger +theirs, sent volunteers from Corinth, and mercenaries from the rest of +Peloponnese, to the number of sixteen hundred heavy infantry in all, and four +hundred light troops. Aristeus, son of Adimantus, who was always a steady +friend to the Potidæans, took command of the expedition, and it was principally +for love of him that most of the men from Corinth volunteered. They arrived in +Thrace forty days after the revolt of Potidæa. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians also immediately received the news of the revolt of the cities. +On being informed that Aristeus and his reinforcements were on their way, they +sent two thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens and forty ships against +the places in revolt, under the command of Callias, son of Calliades, and four +colleagues. They arrived in Macedonia first, and found the force of a thousand +men that had been first sent out, just become masters of Therme and besieging +Pydna. Accordingly they also joined in the investment, and besieged Pydna for a +while. Subsequently they came to terms and concluded a forced alliance with +Perdiccas, hastened by the calls of Potidæa and by the arrival of Aristeus at +that place. They withdrew from Macedonia, going to Beroea and thence to +Strepsa, and, after a futile attempt on the latter place, they pursued by land +their march to Potidæa with three thousand heavy infantry of their own +citizens, besides a number of their allies, and six hundred Macedonian +horsemen, the followers of Philip and Pausanias. With these sailed seventy +ships along the coast. Advancing by short marches, on the third day they +arrived at Gigonus, where they encamped. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Potidæans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus were encamped on +the side looking towards Olynthus on the isthmus, in expectation of the +Athenians, and had established their market outside the city. The allies had +chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry; while the command of the cavalry +was given to Perdiccas, who had at once left the alliance of the Athenians and +gone back to that of the Potidæans, having deputed Iolaus as his general: The +plan of Aristeus was to keep his own force on the isthmus, and await the attack +of the Athenians; leaving the Chalcidians and the allies outside the isthmus, +and the two hundred cavalry from Perdiccas in Olynthus to act upon the Athenian +rear, on the occasion of their advancing against him; and thus to place the +enemy between two fires. While Callias the Athenian general and his colleagues +dispatched the Macedonian horse and a few of the allies to Olynthus, to prevent +any movement being made from that quarter, the Athenians themselves broke up +their camp and marched against Potidæa. After they had arrived at the isthmus, +and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they formed against him, and soon +afterwards engaged. The wing of Aristeus, with the Corinthians and other picked +troops round him, routed the wing opposed to it, and followed for a +considerable distance in pursuit. But the rest of the army of the Potidæans and +of the Peloponnesians was defeated by the Athenians, and took refuge within the +fortifications. Returning from the pursuit, Aristeus perceived the defeat of +the rest of the army. Being at a loss which of the two risks to choose, whether +to go to Olynthus or to Potidæa, he at last determined to draw his men into as +small a space as possible, and force his way with a run into Potidæa. Not +without difficulty, through a storm of missiles, he passed along by the +breakwater through the sea, and brought off most of his men safe, though a few +were lost. Meanwhile the auxiliaries of the Potidæans from Olynthus, which is +about seven miles off and in sight of Potidæa, when the battle began and the +signals were raised, advanced a little way to render assistance; and the +Macedonian horse formed against them to prevent it. But on victory speedily +declaring for the Athenians and the signals being taken down, they retired back +within the wall; and the Macedonians returned to the Athenians. Thus there were +no cavalry present on either side. After the battle the Athenians set up a +trophy, and gave back their dead to the Potidæans under truce. The Potidæans +and their allies had close upon three hundred killed; the Athenians a hundred +and fifty of their own citizens, and Callias their general. +</p> + +<p> +The wall on the side of the isthmus had now works at once raised against it, +and manned by the Athenians. That on the side of Pallene had no works raised +against it. They did not think themselves strong enough at once to keep a +garrison in the isthmus and to cross over to Pallene and raise works there; +they were afraid that the Potidæans and their allies might take advantage of +their division to attack them. Meanwhile the Athenians at home learning that +there were no works at Pallene, some time afterwards sent off sixteen hundred +heavy infantry of their own citizens under the command of Phormio, son of +Asopius. Arrived at Pallene, he fixed his headquarters at Aphytis, and led his +army against Potidæa by short marches, ravaging the country as he advanced. No +one venturing to meet him in the field, he raised works against the wall on the +side of Pallene. So at length Potidæa was strongly invested on either side, and +from the sea by the ships co-operating in the blockade. Aristeus, seeing its +investment complete, and having no hope of its salvation, except in the event +of some movement from the Peloponnese, or of some other improbable contingency, +advised all except five hundred to watch for a wind and sail out of the place, +in order that their provisions might last the longer. He was willing to be +himself one of those who remained. Unable to persuade them, and desirous of +acting on the next alternative, and of having things outside in the best +posture possible, he eluded the guardships of the Athenians and sailed out. +Remaining among the Chalcidians, he continued to carry on the war; in +particular he laid an ambuscade near the city of the Sermylians, and cut off +many of them; he also communicated with Peloponnese, and tried to contrive some +method by which help might be brought. Meanwhile, after the completion of the +investment of Potidæa, Phormio next employed his sixteen hundred men in +ravaging Chalcidice and Bottica: some of the towns also were taken by him. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0003" id="link2HCH0003"></a> +CHAPTER III </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Lacedaemon +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians and Peloponnesians had these antecedent grounds of complaint +against each other: the complaint of Corinth was that her colony of Potidæa, +and Corinthian and Peloponnesian citizens within it, were being besieged; that +of Athens against the Peloponnesians that they had incited a town of hers, a +member of her alliance and a contributor to her revenue, to revolt, and had +come and were openly fighting against her on the side of the Potidæans. For all +this, war had not yet broken out: there was still truce for a while; for this +was a private enterprise on the part of Corinth. +</p> + +<p> +But the siege of Potidæa put an end to her inaction; she had men inside it: +besides, she feared for the place. Immediately summoning the allies to +Lacedaemon, she came and loudly accused Athens of breach of the treaty and +aggression on the rights of Peloponnese. With her, the Aeginetans, formally +unrepresented from fear of Athens, in secret proved not the least urgent of the +advocates for war, asserting that they had not the independence guaranteed to +them by the treaty. After extending the summons to any of their allies and +others who might have complaints to make of Athenian aggression, the +Lacedaemonians held their ordinary assembly, and invited them to speak. There +were many who came forward and made their several accusations; among them the +Megarians, in a long list of grievances, called special attention to the fact +of their exclusion from the ports of the Athenian empire and the market of +Athens, in defiance of the treaty. Last of all the Corinthians came forward, +and having let those who preceded them inflame the Lacedaemonians, now followed +with a speech to this effect: +</p> + +<p> +“Lacedaemonians! the confidence which you feel in your constitution and +social order, inclines you to receive any reflections of ours on other powers +with a certain scepticism. Hence springs your moderation, but hence also the +rather limited knowledge which you betray in dealing with foreign politics. +Time after time was our voice raised to warn you of the blows about to be dealt +us by Athens, and time after time, instead of taking the trouble to ascertain +the worth of our communications, you contented yourselves with suspecting the +speakers of being inspired by private interest. And so, instead of calling +these allies together before the blow fell, you have delayed to do so till we +are smarting under it; allies among whom we have not the worst title to speak, +as having the greatest complaints to make, complaints of Athenian outrage and +Lacedaemonian neglect. Now if these assaults on the rights of Hellas had been +made in the dark, you might be unacquainted with the facts, and it would be our +duty to enlighten you. As it is, long speeches are not needed where you see +servitude accomplished for some of us, meditated for others—in particular +for our allies—and prolonged preparations in the aggressor against the +hour of war. Or what, pray, is the meaning of their reception of Corcyra by +fraud, and their holding it against us by force? what of the siege of +Potidæa?—places one of which lies most conveniently for any action +against the Thracian towns; while the other would have contributed a very large +navy to the Peloponnesians? +</p> + +<p> +“For all this you are responsible. You it was who first allowed them to +fortify their city after the Median war, and afterwards to erect the long +walls—you who, then and now, are always depriving of freedom not only +those whom they have enslaved, but also those who have as yet been your allies. +For the true author of the subjugation of a people is not so much the immediate +agent, as the power which permits it having the means to prevent it; +particularly if that power aspires to the glory of being the liberator of +Hellas. We are at last assembled. It has not been easy to assemble, nor even +now are our objects defined. We ought not to be still inquiring into the fact +of our wrongs, but into the means of our defence. For the aggressors with +matured plans to oppose to our indecision have cast threats aside and betaken +themselves to action. And we know what are the paths by which Athenian +aggression travels, and how insidious is its progress. A degree of confidence +she may feel from the idea that your bluntness of perception prevents your +noticing her; but it is nothing to the impulse which her advance will receive +from the knowledge that you see, but do not care to interfere. You, +Lacedaemonians, of all the Hellenes are alone inactive, and defend yourselves +not by doing anything but by looking as if you would do something; you alone +wait till the power of an enemy is becoming twice its original size, instead of +crushing it in its infancy. And yet the world used to say that you were to be +depended upon; but in your case, we fear, it said more than the truth. The +Mede, we ourselves know, had time to come from the ends of the earth to +Peloponnese, without any force of yours worthy of the name advancing to meet +him. But this was a distant enemy. Well, Athens at all events is a near +neighbour, and yet Athens you utterly disregard; against Athens you prefer to +act on the defensive instead of on the offensive, and to make it an affair of +chances by deferring the struggle till she has grown far stronger than at +first. And yet you know that on the whole the rock on which the barbarian was +wrecked was himself, and that if our present enemy Athens has not again and +again annihilated us, we owe it more to her blunders than to your protection; +Indeed, expectations from you have before now been the ruin of some, whose +faith induced them to omit preparation. +</p> + +<p> +“We hope that none of you will consider these words of remonstrance to be +rather words of hostility; men remonstrate with friends who are in error, +accusations they reserve for enemies who have wronged them. Besides, we +consider that we have as good a right as any one to point out a +neighbour’s faults, particularly when we contemplate the great contrast +between the two national characters; a contrast of which, as far as we can see, +you have little perception, having never yet considered what sort of +antagonists you will encounter in the Athenians, how widely, how absolutely +different from yourselves. The Athenians are addicted to innovation, and their +designs are characterized by swiftness alike in conception and execution; you +have a genius for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total want of +invention, and when forced to act you never go far enough. Again, they are +adventurous beyond their power, and daring beyond their judgment, and in danger +they are sanguine; your wont is to attempt less than is justified by your +power, to mistrust even what is sanctioned by your judgment, and to fancy that +from danger there is no release. Further, there is promptitude on their side +against procrastination on yours; they are never at home, you are never from +it: for they hope by their absence to extend their acquisitions, you fear by +your advance to endanger what you have left behind. They are swift to follow up +a success, and slow to recoil from a reverse. Their bodies they spend +ungrudgingly in their country’s cause; their intellect they jealously +husband to be employed in her service. A scheme unexecuted is with them a +positive loss, a successful enterprise a comparative failure. The deficiency +created by the miscarriage of an undertaking is soon filled up by fresh hopes; +for they alone are enabled to call a thing hoped for a thing got, by the speed +with which they act upon their resolutions. Thus they toil on in trouble and +danger all the days of their life, with little opportunity for enjoying, being +ever engaged in getting: their only idea of a holiday is to do what the +occasion demands, and to them laborious occupation is less of a misfortune than +the peace of a quiet life. To describe their character in a word, one might +truly say that they were born into the world to take no rest themselves and to +give none to others. +</p> + +<p> +“Such is Athens, your antagonist. And yet, Lacedaemonians, you still +delay, and fail to see that peace stays longest with those, who are not more +careful to use their power justly than to show their determination not to +submit to injustice. On the contrary, your ideal of fair dealing is based on +the principle that, if you do not injure others, you need not risk your own +fortunes in preventing others from injuring you. Now you could scarcely have +succeeded in such a policy even with a neighbour like yourselves; but in the +present instance, as we have just shown, your habits are old-fashioned as +compared with theirs. It is the law as in art, so in politics, that +improvements ever prevail; and though fixed usages may be best for undisturbed +communities, constant necessities of action must be accompanied by the constant +improvement of methods. Thus it happens that the vast experience of Athens has +carried her further than you on the path of innovation. +</p> + +<p> +“Here, at least, let your procrastination end. For the present, assist +your allies and Potidæa in particular, as you promised, by a speedy invasion of +Attica, and do not sacrifice friends and kindred to their bitterest enemies, +and drive the rest of us in despair to some other alliance. Such a step would +not be condemned either by the Gods who received our oaths, or by the men who +witnessed them. The breach of a treaty cannot be laid to the people whom +desertion compels to seek new relations, but to the power that fails to assist +its confederate. But if you will only act, we will stand by you; it would be +unnatural for us to change, and never should we meet with such a congenial +ally. For these reasons choose the right course, and endeavour not to let +Peloponnese under your supremacy degenerate from the prestige that it enjoyed +under that of your ancestors.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of the Corinthians. There happened to be Athenian envoys +present at Lacedaemon on other business. On hearing the speeches they thought +themselves called upon to come before the Lacedaemonians. Their intention was +not to offer a defence on any of the charges which the cities brought against +them, but to show on a comprehensive view that it was not a matter to be +hastily decided on, but one that demanded further consideration. There was also +a wish to call attention to the great power of Athens, and to refresh the +memory of the old and enlighten the ignorance of the young, from a notion that +their words might have the effect of inducing them to prefer tranquillity to +war. So they came to the Lacedaemonians and said that they too, if there was no +objection, wished to speak to their assembly. They replied by inviting them to +come forward. The Athenians advanced, and spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“The object of our mission here was not to argue with your allies, but to +attend to the matters on which our state dispatched us. However, the vehemence +of the outcry that we hear against us has prevailed on us to come forward. It +is not to combat the accusations of the cities (indeed you are not the judges +before whom either we or they can plead), but to prevent your taking the wrong +course on matters of great importance by yielding too readily to the +persuasions of your allies. We also wish to show on a review of the whole +indictment that we have a fair title to our possessions, and that our country +has claims to consideration. We need not refer to remote antiquity: there we +could appeal to the voice of tradition, but not to the experience of our +audience. But to the Median War and contemporary history we must refer, +although we are rather tired of continually bringing this subject forward. In +our action during that war we ran great risk to obtain certain advantages: you +had your share in the solid results, do not try to rob us of all share in the +good that the glory may do us. However, the story shall be told not so much to +deprecate hostility as to testify against it, and to show, if you are so ill +advised as to enter into a struggle with Athens, what sort of an antagonist she +is likely to prove. We assert that at Marathon we were at the front, and faced +the barbarian single-handed. That when he came the second time, unable to cope +with him by land we went on board our ships with all our people, and joined in +the action at Salamis. This prevented his taking the Peloponnesian states in +detail, and ravaging them with his fleet; when the multitude of his vessels +would have made any combination for self-defence impossible. The best proof of +this was furnished by the invader himself. Defeated at sea, he considered his +power to be no longer what it had been, and retired as speedily as possible +with the greater part of his army. +</p> + +<p> +“Such, then, was the result of the matter, and it was clearly proved that +it was on the fleet of Hellas that her cause depended. Well, to this result we +contributed three very useful elements, viz., the largest number of ships, the +ablest commander, and the most unhesitating patriotism. Our contingent of ships +was little less than two-thirds of the whole four hundred; the commander was +Themistocles, through whom chiefly it was that the battle took place in the +straits, the acknowledged salvation of our cause. Indeed, this was the reason +of your receiving him with honours such as had never been accorded to any +foreign visitor. While for daring patriotism we had no competitors. Receiving +no reinforcements from behind, seeing everything in front of us already +subjugated, we had the spirit, after abandoning our city, after sacrificing our +property (instead of deserting the remainder of the league or depriving them of +our services by dispersing), to throw ourselves into our ships and meet the +danger, without a thought of resenting your neglect to assist us. We assert, +therefore, that we conferred on you quite as much as we received. For you had a +stake to fight for; the cities which you had left were still filled with your +homes, and you had the prospect of enjoying them again; and your coming was +prompted quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us; at all events, you +never appeared till we had nothing left to lose. But we left behind us a city +that was a city no longer, and staked our lives for a city that had an +existence only in desperate hope, and so bore our full share in your +deliverance and in ours. But if we had copied others, and allowed fears for our +territory to make us give in our adhesion to the Mede before you came, or if we +had suffered our ruin to break our spirit and prevent us embarking in our +ships, your naval inferiority would have made a sea-fight unnecessary, and his +objects would have been peaceably attained. +</p> + +<p> +“Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed at +that crisis, nor by the wisdom of our counsels, do we merit our extreme +unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our empire. That +empire we acquired by no violent means, but because you were unwilling to +prosecute to its conclusion the war against the barbarian, and because the +allies attached themselves to us and spontaneously asked us to assume the +command. And the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to +its present height; fear being our principal motive, though honour and interest +afterwards came in. And at last, when almost all hated us, when some had +already revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be the friends +that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it +appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all who left us +would fall to you. And no one can quarrel with a people for making, in matters +of tremendous risk, the best provision that it can for its interest. +</p> + +<p> +“You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to settle +the states in Peloponnese as is agreeable to you. And if at the period of which +we were speaking you had persevered to the end of the matter, and had incurred +hatred in your command, we are sure that you would have made yourselves just as +galling to the allies, and would have been forced to choose between a strong +government and danger to yourselves. It follows that it was not a very +wonderful action, or contrary to the common practice of mankind, if we did +accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up under the +pressure of three of the strongest motives, fear, honour, and interest. And it +was not we who set the example, for it has always been law that the weaker +should be subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed ourselves to be worthy +of our position, and so you thought us till now, when calculations of interest +have made you take up the cry of justice—a consideration which no one +ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had a chance of gaining +anything by might. And praise is due to all who, if not so superior to human +nature as to refuse dominion, yet respect justice more than their position +compels them to do. +</p> + +<p> +“We imagine that our moderation would be best demonstrated by the conduct +of others who should be placed in our position; but even our equity has very +unreasonably subjected us to condemnation instead of approval. Our abatement of +our rights in the contract trials with our allies, and our causing them to be +decided by impartial laws at Athens, have gained us the character of being +litigious. And none care to inquire why this reproach is not brought against +other imperial powers, who treat their subjects with less moderation than we +do; the secret being that where force can be used, law is not needed. But our +subjects are so habituated to associate with us as equals that any defeat +whatever that clashes with their notions of justice, whether it proceeds from a +legal judgment or from the power which our empire gives us, makes them forget +to be grateful for being allowed to retain most of their possessions, and more +vexed at a part being taken, than if we had from the first cast law aside and +openly gratified our covetousness. If we had done so, not even would they have +disputed that the weaker must give way to the stronger. Men’s +indignation, it seems, is more excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong; +the first looks like being cheated by an equal, the second like being compelled +by a superior. At all events they contrived to put up with much worse treatment +than this from the Mede, yet they think our rule severe, and this is to be +expected, for the present always weighs heavy on the conquered. This at least +is certain. If you were to succeed in overthrowing us and in taking our place, +you would speedily lose the popularity with which fear of us has invested you, +if your policy of to-day is at all to tally with the sample that you gave of it +during the brief period of your command against the Mede. Not only is your life +at home regulated by rules and institutions incompatible with those of others, +but your citizens abroad act neither on these rules nor on those which are +recognized by the rest of Hellas. +</p> + +<p> +“Take time then in forming your resolution, as the matter is of great +importance; and do not be persuaded by the opinions and complaints of others to +bring trouble on yourselves, but consider the vast influence of accident in +war, before you are engaged in it. As it continues, it generally becomes an +affair of chances, chances from which neither of us is exempt, and whose event +we must risk in the dark. It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at +the wrong end, to act first, and wait for disaster to discuss the matter. But +we are not yet by any means so misguided, nor, so far as we can see, are you; +accordingly, while it is still open to us both to choose aright, we bid you not +to dissolve the treaty, or to break your oaths, but to have our differences +settled by arbitration according to our agreement. Or else we take the gods who +heard the oaths to witness, and if you begin hostilities, whatever line of +action you choose, we will try not to be behindhand in repelling you.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard the +complaints of the allies against the Athenians, and the observations of the +latter, they made all withdraw, and consulted by themselves on the question +before them. The opinions of the majority all led to the same conclusion; the +Athenians were open aggressors, and war must be declared at once. But +Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, came forward, who had the reputation of +being at once a wise and a moderate man, and made the following speech: +</p> + +<p> +“I have not lived so long, Lacedaemonians, without having had the +experience of many wars, and I see those among you of the same age as myself, +who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing for war from +inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its safety. This, the war on +which you are now debating, would be one of the greatest magnitude, on a sober +consideration of the matter. In a struggle with Peloponnesians and neighbours +our strength is of the same character, and it is possible to move swiftly on +the different points. But a struggle with a people who live in a distant land, +who have also an extraordinary familiarity with the sea, and who are in the +highest state of preparation in every other department; with wealth private and +public, with ships, and horses, and heavy infantry, and a population such as no +one other Hellenic place can equal, and lastly a number of tributary +allies—what can justify us in rashly beginning such a struggle? wherein +is our trust that we should rush on it unprepared? Is it in our ships? There we +are inferior; while if we are to practise and become a match for them, time +must intervene. Is it in our money? There we have a far greater deficiency. We +neither have it in our treasury, nor are we ready to contribute it from our +private funds. Confidence might possibly be felt in our superiority in heavy +infantry and population, which will enable us to invade and devastate their +lands. But the Athenians have plenty of other land in their empire, and can +import what they want by sea. Again, if we are to attempt an insurrection of +their allies, these will have to be supported with a fleet, most of them being +islanders. What then is to be our war? For unless we can either beat them at +sea, or deprive them of the revenues which feed their navy, we shall meet with +little but disaster. Meanwhile our honour will be pledged to keeping on, +particularly if it be the opinion that we began the quarrel. For let us never +be elated by the fatal hope of the war being quickly ended by the devastation +of their lands. I fear rather that we may leave it as a legacy to our children; +so improbable is it that the Athenian spirit will be the slave of their land, +or Athenian experience be cowed by war. +</p> + +<p> +“Not that I would bid you be so unfeeling as to suffer them to injure +your allies, and to refrain from unmasking their intrigues; but I do bid you +not to take up arms at once, but to send and remonstrate with them in a tone +not too suggestive of war, nor again too suggestive of submission, and to +employ the interval in perfecting our own preparations. The means will be, +first, the acquisition of allies, Hellenic or barbarian it matters not, so long +as they are an accession to our strength naval or pecuniary—I say +Hellenic or barbarian, because the odium of such an accession to all who like +us are the objects of the designs of the Athenians is taken away by the law of +self-preservation—and secondly the development of our home resources. If +they listen to our embassy, so much the better; but if not, after the lapse of +two or three years our position will have become materially strengthened, and +we can then attack them if we think proper. Perhaps by that time the sight of +our preparations, backed by language equally significant, will have disposed +them to submission, while their land is still untouched, and while their +counsels may be directed to the retention of advantages as yet undestroyed. For +the only light in which you can view their land is that of a hostage in your +hands, a hostage the more valuable the better it is cultivated. This you ought +to spare as long as possible, and not make them desperate, and so increase the +difficulty of dealing with them. For if while still unprepared, hurried away by +the complaints of our allies, we are induced to lay it waste, have a care that +we do not bring deep disgrace and deep perplexity upon Peloponnese. Complaints, +whether of communities or individuals, it is possible to adjust; but war +undertaken by a coalition for sectional interests, whose progress there is no +means of foreseeing, does not easily admit of creditable settlement. +</p> + +<p> +“And none need think it cowardice for a number of confederates to pause +before they attack a single city. The Athenians have allies as numerous as our +own, and allies that pay tribute, and war is a matter not so much of arms as of +money, which makes arms of use. And this is more than ever true in a struggle +between a continental and a maritime power. First, then, let us provide money, +and not allow ourselves to be carried away by the talk of our allies before we +have done so: as we shall have the largest share of responsibility for the +consequences be they good or bad, we have also a right to a tranquil inquiry +respecting them. +</p> + +<p> +“And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of our character that +are most assailed by their criticism, need not make you blush. If we undertake +the war without preparation, we should by hastening its commencement only delay +its conclusion: further, a free and a famous city has through all time been +ours. The quality which they condemn is really nothing but a wise moderation; +thanks to its possession, we alone do not become insolent in success and give +way less than others in misfortune; we are not carried away by the pleasure of +hearing ourselves cheered on to risks which our judgment condemns; nor, if +annoyed, are we any the more convinced by attempts to exasperate us by +accusation. We are both warlike and wise, and it is our sense of order that +makes us so. We are warlike, because self-control contains honour as a chief +constituent, and honour bravery. And we are wise, because we are educated with +too little learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to +disobey them, and are brought up not to be too knowing in useless +matters—such as the knowledge which can give a specious criticism of an +enemy’s plans in theory, but fails to assail them with equal success in +practice—but are taught to consider that the schemes of our enemies are +not dissimilar to our own, and that the freaks of chance are not determinable +by calculation. In practice we always base our preparations against an enemy on +the assumption that his plans are good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes +not on a belief in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Nor +ought we to believe that there is much difference between man and man, but to +think that the superiority lies with him who is reared in the severest school. +These practices, then, which our ancestors have delivered to us, and by whose +maintenance we have always profited, must not be given up. And we must not be +hurried into deciding in a day’s brief space a question which concerns +many lives and fortunes and many cities, and in which honour is deeply +involved—but we must decide calmly. This our strength peculiarly enables +us to do. As for the Athenians, send to them on the matter of Potidæa, send on +the matter of the alleged wrongs of the allies, particularly as they are +prepared with legal satisfaction; and to proceed against one who offers +arbitration as against a wrongdoer, law forbids. Meanwhile do not omit +preparation for war. This decision will be the best for yourselves, the most +terrible to your opponents.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of Archidamus. Last came forward Sthenelaidas, one of the +ephors for that year, and spoke to the Lacedaemonians as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“The long speech of the Athenians I do not pretend to understand. They +said a good deal in praise of themselves, but nowhere denied that they are +injuring our allies and Peloponnese. And yet if they behaved well against the +Mede then, but ill towards us now, they deserve double punishment for having +ceased to be good and for having become bad. We meanwhile are the same then and +now, and shall not, if we are wise, disregard the wrongs of our allies, or put +off till to-morrow the duty of assisting those who must suffer to-day. Others +have much money and ships and horses, but we have good allies whom we must not +give up to the Athenians, nor by lawsuits and words decide the matter, as it is +anything but in word that we are harmed, but render instant and powerful help. +And let us not be told that it is fitting for us to deliberate under injustice; +long deliberation is rather fitting for those who have injustice in +contemplation. Vote therefore, Lacedaemonians, for war, as the honour of Sparta +demands, and neither allow the further aggrandizement of Athens, nor betray our +allies to ruin, but with the gods let us advance against the aggressors.” +</p> + +<p> +With these words he, as ephor, himself put the question to the assembly of the +Lacedaemonians. He said that he could not determine which was the loudest +acclamation (their mode of decision is by acclamation not by voting); the fact +being that he wished to make them declare their opinion openly and thus to +increase their ardour for war. Accordingly he said: “All Lacedaemonians +who are of opinion that the treaty has been broken, and that Athens is guilty, +leave your seats and go there,” pointing out a certain place; “all +who are of the opposite opinion, there.” They accordingly stood up and +divided; and those who held that the treaty had been broken were in a decided +majority. Summoning the allies, they told them that their opinion was that +Athens had been guilty of injustice, but that they wished to convoke all the +allies and put it to the vote; in order that they might make war, if they +decided to do so, on a common resolution. Having thus gained their point, the +delegates returned home at once; the Athenian envoys a little later, when they +had dispatched the objects of their mission. This decision of the assembly, +judging that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of the +thirty years’ truce, which was entered into after the affair of Euboea. +</p> + +<p> +The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that the war must +be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by the arguments of the +allies, as because they feared the growth of the power of the Athenians, seeing +most of Hellas already subject to them. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0004" id="link2HCH0004"></a> +CHAPTER IV </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +From the end of the Persian to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War—The +Progress from Supremacy to Empire +</p> + +<p> +The way in which Athens came to be placed in the circumstances under which her +power grew was this. After the Medes had returned from Europe, defeated by sea +and land by the Hellenes, and after those of them who had fled with their ships +to Mycale had been destroyed, Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, the +commander of the Hellenes at Mycale, departed home with the allies from +Peloponnese. But the Athenians and the allies from Ionia and Hellespont, who +had now revolted from the King, remained and laid siege to Sestos, which was +still held by the Medes. After wintering before it, they became masters of the +place on its evacuation by the barbarians; and after this they sailed away from +Hellespont to their respective cities. Meanwhile the Athenian people, after the +departure of the barbarian from their country, at once proceeded to carry over +their children and wives, and such property as they had left, from the places +where they had deposited them, and prepared to rebuild their city and their +walls. For only isolated portions of the circumference had been left standing, +and most of the houses were in ruins; though a few remained, in which the +Persian grandees had taken up their quarters. +</p> + +<p> +Perceiving what they were going to do, the Lacedaemonians sent an embassy to +Athens. They would have themselves preferred to see neither her nor any other +city in possession of a wall; though here they acted principally at the +instigation of their allies, who were alarmed at the strength of her newly +acquired navy and the valour which she had displayed in the war with the Medes. +They begged her not only to abstain from building walls for herself, but also +to join them in throwing down the walls that still held together of the +ultra-Peloponnesian cities. The real meaning of their advice, the suspicion +that it contained against the Athenians, was not proclaimed; it was urged that +so the barbarian, in the event of a third invasion, would not have any strong +place, such as he now had in Thebes, for his base of operations; and that +Peloponnese would suffice for all as a base both for retreat and offence. After +the Lacedaemonians had thus spoken, they were, on the advice of Themistocles, +immediately dismissed by the Athenians, with the answer that ambassadors should +be sent to Sparta to discuss the question. Themistocles told the Athenians to +send him off with all speed to Lacedaemon, but not to dispatch his colleagues +as soon as they had selected them, but to wait until they had raised their wall +to the height from which defence was possible. Meanwhile the whole population +in the city was to labour at the wall, the Athenians, their wives, and their +children, sparing no edifice, private or public, which might be of any use to +the work, but throwing all down. After giving these instructions, and adding +that he would be responsible for all other matters there, he departed. Arrived +at Lacedaemon he did not seek an audience with the authorities, but tried to +gain time and made excuses. When any of the government asked him why he did not +appear in the assembly, he would say that he was waiting for his colleagues, +who had been detained in Athens by some engagement; however, that he expected +their speedy arrival, and wondered that they were not yet there. At first the +Lacedaemonians trusted the words of Themistocles, through their friendship for +him; but when others arrived, all distinctly declaring that the work was going +on and already attaining some elevation, they did not know how to disbelieve +it. Aware of this, he told them that rumours are deceptive, and should not be +trusted; they should send some reputable persons from Sparta to inspect, whose +report might be trusted. They dispatched them accordingly. Concerning these +Themistocles secretly sent word to the Athenians to detain them as far as +possible without putting them under open constraint, and not to let them go +until they had themselves returned. For his colleagues had now joined him, +Abronichus, son of Lysicles, and Aristides, son of Lysimachus, with the news +that the wall was sufficiently advanced; and he feared that when the +Lacedaemonians heard the facts, they might refuse to let them go. So the +Athenians detained the envoys according to his message, and Themistocles had an +audience with the Lacedaemonians, and at last openly told them that Athens was +now fortified sufficiently to protect its inhabitants; that any embassy which +the Lacedaemonians or their allies might wish to send to them should in future +proceed on the assumption that the people to whom they were going was able to +distinguish both its own and the general interests. That when the Athenians +thought fit to abandon their city and to embark in their ships, they ventured +on that perilous step without consulting them; and that on the other hand, +wherever they had deliberated with the Lacedaemonians, they had proved +themselves to be in judgment second to none. That they now thought it fit that +their city should have a wall, and that this would be more for the advantage of +both the citizens of Athens and the Hellenic confederacy; for without equal +military strength it was impossible to contribute equal or fair counsel to the +common interest. It followed, he observed, either that all the members of the +confederacy should be without walls, or that the present step should be +considered a right one. +</p> + +<p> +The Lacedaemonians did not betray any open signs of anger against the Athenians +at what they heard. The embassy, it seems, was prompted not by a desire to +obstruct, but to guide the counsels of their government: besides, Spartan +feeling was at that time very friendly towards Athens on account of the +patriotism which she had displayed in the struggle with the Mede. Still the +defeat of their wishes could not but cause them secret annoyance. The envoys of +each state departed home without complaint. +</p> + +<p> +In this way the Athenians walled their city in a little while. To this day the +building shows signs of the haste of its execution; the foundations are laid of +stones of all kinds, and in some places not wrought or fitted, but placed just +in the order in which they were brought by the different hands; and many +columns, too, from tombs, and sculptured stones were put in with the rest. For +the bounds of the city were extended at every point of the circumference; and +so they laid hands on everything without exception in their haste. Themistocles +also persuaded them to finish the walls of Piraeus, which had been begun +before, in his year of office as archon; being influenced alike by the fineness +of a locality that has three natural harbours, and by the great start which the +Athenians would gain in the acquisition of power by becoming a naval people. +For he first ventured to tell them to stick to the sea and forthwith began to +lay the foundations of the empire. It was by his advice, too, that they built +the walls of that thickness which can still be discerned round Piraeus, the +stones being brought up by two wagons meeting each other. Between the walls +thus formed there was neither rubble nor mortar, but great stones hewn square +and fitted together, cramped to each other on the outside with iron and lead. +About half the height that he intended was finished. His idea was by their size +and thickness to keep off the attacks of an enemy; he thought that they might +be adequately defended by a small garrison of invalids, and the rest be freed +for service in the fleet. For the fleet claimed most of his attention. He saw, +as I think, that the approach by sea was easier for the king’s army than +that by land: he also thought Piraeus more valuable than the upper city; +indeed, he was always advising the Athenians, if a day should come when they +were hard pressed by land, to go down into Piraeus, and defy the world with +their fleet. Thus, therefore, the Athenians completed their wall, and commenced +their other buildings immediately after the retreat of the Mede. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, was sent out from Lacedaemon as +commander-in-chief of the Hellenes, with twenty ships from Peloponnese. With +him sailed the Athenians with thirty ships, and a number of the other allies. +They made an expedition against Cyprus and subdued most of the island, and +afterwards against Byzantium, which was in the hands of the Medes, and +compelled it to surrender. This event took place while the Spartans were still +supreme. But the violence of Pausanias had already begun to be disagreeable to +the Hellenes, particularly to the Ionians and the newly liberated populations. +These resorted to the Athenians and requested them as their kinsmen to become +their leaders, and to stop any attempt at violence on the part of Pausanias. +The Athenians accepted their overtures, and determined to put down any attempt +of the kind and to settle everything else as their interests might seem to +demand. In the meantime the Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias for an +investigation of the reports which had reached them. Manifold and grave +accusations had been brought against him by Hellenes arriving in Sparta; and, +to all appearance, there had been in him more of the mimicry of a despot than +of the attitude of a general. As it happened, his recall came just at the time +when the hatred which he had inspired had induced the allies to desert him, the +soldiers from Peloponnese excepted, and to range themselves by the side of the +Athenians. On his arrival at Lacedaemon, he was censured for his private acts +of oppression, but was acquitted on the heaviest counts and pronounced not +guilty; it must be known that the charge of Medism formed one of the principal, +and to all appearance one of the best founded, articles against him. The +Lacedaemonians did not, however, restore him to his command, but sent out +Dorkis and certain others with a small force; who found the allies no longer +inclined to concede to them the supremacy. Perceiving this they departed, and +the Lacedaemonians did not send out any to succeed them. They feared for those +who went out a deterioration similar to that observable in Pausanias; besides, +they desired to be rid of the Median War, and were satisfied of the competency +of the Athenians for the position, and of their friendship at the time towards +themselves. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians, having thus succeeded to the supremacy by the voluntary act of +the allies through their hatred of Pausanias, fixed which cities were to +contribute money against the barbarian, which ships; their professed object +being to retaliate for their sufferings by ravaging the King’s country. +Now was the time that the office of “Treasurers for Hellas” was +first instituted by the Athenians. These officers received the tribute, as the +money contributed was called. The tribute was first fixed at four hundred and +sixty talents. The common treasury was at Delos, and the congresses were held +in the temple. Their supremacy commenced with independent allies who acted on +the resolutions of a common congress. It was marked by the following +undertakings in war and in administration during the interval between the +Median and the present war, against the barbarian, against their own rebel +allies, and against the Peloponnesian powers which would come in contact with +them on various occasions. My excuse for relating these events, and for +venturing on this digression, is that this passage of history has been omitted +by all my predecessors, who have confined themselves either to Hellenic history +before the Median War, or the Median War itself. Hellanicus, it is true, did +touch on these events in his Athenian history; but he is somewhat concise and +not accurate in his dates. Besides, the history of these events contains an +explanation of the growth of the Athenian empire. +</p> + +<p> +First the Athenians besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon from the Medes, +and made slaves of the inhabitants, being under the command of Cimon, son of +Miltiades. Next they enslaved Scyros, the island in the Aegean, containing a +Dolopian population, and colonized it themselves. This was followed by a war +against Carystus, in which the rest of Euboea remained neutral, and which was +ended by surrender on conditions. After this Naxos left the confederacy, and a +war ensued, and she had to return after a siege; this was the first instance of +the engagement being broken by the subjugation of an allied city, a precedent +which was followed by that of the rest in the order which circumstances +prescribed. Of all the causes of defection, that connected with arrears of +tribute and vessels, and with failure of service, was the chief; for the +Athenians were very severe and exacting, and made themselves offensive by +applying the screw of necessity to men who were not used to and in fact not +disposed for any continuous labour. In some other respects the Athenians were +not the old popular rulers they had been at first; and if they had more than +their fair share of service, it was correspondingly easy for them to reduce any +that tried to leave the confederacy. For this the allies had themselves to +blame; the wish to get off service making most of them arrange to pay their +share of the expense in money instead of in ships, and so to avoid having to +leave their homes. Thus while Athens was increasing her navy with the funds +which they contributed, a revolt always found them without resources or +experience for war. +</p> + +<p> +Next we come to the actions by land and by sea at the river Eurymedon, between +the Athenians with their allies, and the Medes, when the Athenians won both +battles on the same day under the conduct of Cimon, son of Miltiades, and +captured and destroyed the whole Phoenician fleet, consisting of two hundred +vessels. Some time afterwards occurred the defection of the Thasians, caused by +disagreements about the marts on the opposite coast of Thrace, and about the +mine in their possession. Sailing with a fleet to Thasos, the Athenians +defeated them at sea and effected a landing on the island. About the same time +they sent ten thousand settlers of their own citizens and the allies to settle +the place then called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways, now Amphipolis. They succeeded +in gaining possession of Ennea Hodoi from the Edonians, but on advancing into +the interior of Thrace were cut off in Drabescus, a town of the Edonians, by +the assembled Thracians, who regarded the settlement of the place Ennea Hodoi +as an act of hostility. Meanwhile the Thasians being defeated in the field and +suffering siege, appealed to Lacedaemon, and desired her to assist them by an +invasion of Attica. Without informing Athens, she promised and intended to do +so, but was prevented by the occurrence of the earthquake, accompanied by the +secession of the Helots and the Thuriats and Aethaeans of the Perioeci to +Ithome. Most of the Helots were the descendants of the old Messenians that were +enslaved in the famous war; and so all of them came to be called Messenians. So +the Lacedaemonians being engaged in a war with the rebels in Ithome, the +Thasians in the third year of the siege obtained terms from the Athenians by +razing their walls, delivering up their ships, and arranging to pay the moneys +demanded at once, and tribute in future; giving up their possessions on the +continent together with the mine. +</p> + +<p> +The Lacedaemonians, meanwhile, finding the war against the rebels in Ithome +likely to last, invoked the aid of their allies, and especially of the +Athenians, who came in some force under the command of Cimon. The reason for +this pressing summons lay in their reputed skill in siege operations; a long +siege had taught the Lacedaemonians their own deficiency in this art, else they +would have taken the place by assault. The first open quarrel between the +Lacedaemonians and Athenians arose out of this expedition. The Lacedaemonians, +when assault failed to take the place, apprehensive of the enterprising and +revolutionary character of the Athenians, and further looking upon them as of +alien extraction, began to fear that, if they remained, they might be tempted +by the besieged in Ithome to attempt some political changes. They accordingly +dismissed them alone of the allies, without declaring their suspicions, but +merely saying that they had now no need of them. But the Athenians, aware that +their dismissal did not proceed from the more honourable reason of the two, but +from suspicions which had been conceived, went away deeply offended, and +conscious of having done nothing to merit such treatment from the +Lacedaemonians; and the instant that they returned home they broke off the +alliance which had been made against the Mede, and allied themselves with +Sparta’s enemy Argos; each of the contracting parties taking the same +oaths and making the same alliance with the Thessalians. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the rebels in Ithome, unable to prolong further a ten years’ +resistance, surrendered to Lacedaemon; the conditions being that they should +depart from Peloponnese under safe conduct, and should never set foot in it +again: any one who might hereafter be found there was to be the slave of his +captor. It must be known that the Lacedaemonians had an old oracle from Delphi, +to the effect that they should let go the suppliant of Zeus at Ithome. So they +went forth with their children and their wives, and being received by Athens +from the hatred that she now felt for the Lacedaemonians, were located at +Naupactus, which she had lately taken from the Ozolian Locrians. The Athenians +received another addition to their confederacy in the Megarians; who left the +Lacedaemonian alliance, annoyed by a war about boundaries forced on them by +Corinth. The Athenians occupied Megara and Pegae, and built the Megarians their +long walls from the city to Nisaea, in which they placed an Athenian garrison. +This was the principal cause of the Corinthians conceiving such a deadly hatred +against Athens. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan king of the Libyans on the +Egyptian border, having his headquarters at Marea, the town above Pharos, +caused a revolt of almost the whole of Egypt from King Artaxerxes and, placing +himself at its head, invited the Athenians to his assistance. Abandoning a +Cyprian expedition upon which they happened to be engaged with two hundred +ships of their own and their allies, they arrived in Egypt and sailed from the +sea into the Nile, and making themselves masters of the river and two-thirds of +Memphis, addressed themselves to the attack of the remaining third, which is +called White Castle. Within it were Persians and Medes who had taken refuge +there, and Egyptians who had not joined the rebellion. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Athenians, making a descent from their fleet upon Haliae, were +engaged by a force of Corinthians and Epidaurians; and the Corinthians were +victorious. Afterwards the Athenians engaged the Peloponnesian fleet off +Cecruphalia; and the Athenians were victorious. Subsequently war broke out +between Aegina and Athens, and there was a great battle at sea off Aegina +between the Athenians and Aeginetans, each being aided by their allies; in +which victory remained with the Athenians, who took seventy of the +enemy’s ships, and landed in the country and commenced a siege under the +command of Leocrates, son of Stroebus. Upon this the Peloponnesians, desirous +of aiding the Aeginetans, threw into Aegina a force of three hundred heavy +infantry, who had before been serving with the Corinthians and Epidaurians. +Meanwhile the Corinthians and their allies occupied the heights of Geraneia, +and marched down into the Megarid, in the belief that, with a large force +absent in Aegina and Egypt, Athens would be unable to help the Megarians +without raising the siege of Aegina. But the Athenians, instead of moving the +army of Aegina, raised a force of the old and young men that had been left in +the city, and marched into the Megarid under the command of Myronides. After a +drawn battle with the Corinthians, the rival hosts parted, each with the +impression that they had gained the victory. The Athenians, however, if +anything, had rather the advantage, and on the departure of the Corinthians set +up a trophy. Urged by the taunts of the elders in their city, the Corinthians +made their preparations, and about twelve days afterwards came and set up their +trophy as victors. Sallying out from Megara, the Athenians cut off the party +that was employed in erecting the trophy, and engaged and defeated the rest. In +the retreat of the vanquished army, a considerable division, pressed by the +pursuers and mistaking the road, dashed into a field on some private property, +with a deep trench all round it, and no way out. Being acquainted with the +place, the Athenians hemmed their front with heavy infantry and, placing the +light troops round in a circle, stoned all who had gone in. Corinth here +suffered a severe blow. The bulk of her army continued its retreat home. +</p> + +<p> +About this time the Athenians began to build the long walls to the sea, that +towards Phalerum and that towards Piraeus. Meanwhile the Phocians made an +expedition against Doris, the old home of the Lacedaemonians, containing the +towns of Boeum, Kitinium, and Erineum. They had taken one of these towns, when +the Lacedaemonians under Nicomedes, son of Cleombrotus, commanding for King +Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, who was still a minor, came to the aid of the +Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy infantry of their own, and ten thousand of +their allies. After compelling the Phocians to restore the town on conditions, +they began their retreat. The route by sea, across the Crissaean Gulf, exposed +them to the risk of being stopped by the Athenian fleet; that across Geraneia +seemed scarcely safe, the Athenians holding Megara and Pegae. For the pass was +a difficult one, and was always guarded by the Athenians; and, in the present +instance, the Lacedaemonians had information that they meant to dispute their +passage. So they resolved to remain in Boeotia, and to consider which would be +the safest line of march. They had also another reason for this resolve. Secret +encouragement had been given them by a party in Athens, who hoped to put an end +to the reign of democracy and the building of the Long Walls. Meanwhile the +Athenians marched against them with their whole levy and a thousand Argives and +the respective contingents of the rest of their allies. Altogether they were +fourteen thousand strong. The march was prompted by the notion that the +Lacedaemonians were at a loss how to effect their passage, and also by +suspicions of an attempt to overthrow the democracy. Some cavalry also joined +the Athenians from their Thessalian allies; but these went over to the +Lacedaemonians during the battle. +</p> + +<p> +The battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia. After heavy loss on both sides, +victory declared for the Lacedaemonians and their allies. After entering the +Megarid and cutting down the fruit trees, the Lacedaemonians returned home +across Geraneia and the isthmus. Sixty-two days after the battle the Athenians +marched into Boeotia under the command of Myronides, defeated the Boeotians in +battle at Oenophyta, and became masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They dismantled +the walls of the Tanagraeans, took a hundred of the richest men of the Opuntian +Locrians as hostages, and finished their own long walls. This was followed by +the surrender of the Aeginetans to Athens on conditions; they pulled down their +walls, gave up their ships, and agreed to pay tribute in future. The Athenians +sailed round Peloponnese under Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus, burnt the arsenal of +Lacedaemon, took Chalcis, a town of the Corinthians, and in a descent upon +Sicyon defeated the Sicyonians in battle. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Athenians in Egypt and their allies were still there, and +encountered all the vicissitudes of war. First the Athenians were masters of +Egypt, and the King sent Megabazus a Persian to Lacedaemon with money to bribe +the Peloponnesians to invade Attica and so draw off the Athenians from Egypt. +Finding that the matter made no progress, and that the money was only being +wasted, he recalled Megabazus with the remainder of the money, and sent +Megabuzus, son of Zopyrus, a Persian, with a large army to Egypt. Arriving by +land he defeated the Egyptians and their allies in a battle, and drove the +Hellenes out of Memphis, and at length shut them up in the island of +Prosopitis, where he besieged them for a year and six months. At last, draining +the canal of its waters, which he diverted into another channel, he left their +ships high and dry and joined most of the island to the mainland, and then +marched over on foot and captured it. Thus the enterprise of the Hellenes came +to ruin after six years of war. Of all that large host a few travelling through +Libya reached Cyrene in safety, but most of them perished. And thus Egypt +returned to its subjection to the King, except Amyrtaeus, the king in the +marshes, whom they were unable to capture from the extent of the marsh; the +marshmen being also the most warlike of the Egyptians. Inaros, the Libyan king, +the sole author of the Egyptian revolt, was betrayed, taken, and crucified. +Meanwhile a relieving squadron of fifty vessels had sailed from Athens and the +rest of the confederacy for Egypt. They put in to shore at the Mendesian mouth +of the Nile, in total ignorance of what had occurred. Attacked on the land side +by the troops, and from the sea by the Phoenician navy, most of the ships were +destroyed; the few remaining being saved by retreat. Such was the end of the +great expedition of the Athenians and their allies to Egypt. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Orestes, son of Echecratidas, the Thessalian king, being an exile +from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. Taking with them the +Boeotians and Phocians their allies, the Athenians marched to Pharsalus in +Thessaly. They became masters of the country, though only in the immediate +vicinity of the camp; beyond which they could not go for fear of the Thessalian +cavalry. But they failed to take the city or to attain any of the other objects +of their expedition, and returned home with Orestes without having effected +anything. Not long after this a thousand of the Athenians embarked in the +vessels that were at Pegae (Pegae, it must be remembered, was now theirs), and +sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of Pericles, son of +Xanthippus. Landing in Sicyon and defeating the Sicyonians who engaged them, +they immediately took with them the Achaeans and, sailing across, marched +against and laid siege to Oeniadae in Acarnania. Failing however to take it, +they returned home. +</p> + +<p> +Three years afterwards a truce was made between the Peloponnesians and +Athenians for five years. Released from Hellenic war, the Athenians made an +expedition to Cyprus with two hundred vessels of their own and their allies, +under the command of Cimon. Sixty of these were detached to Egypt at the +instance of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes; the rest laid siege to Kitium, +from which, however, they were compelled to retire by the death of Cimon and by +scarcity of provisions. Sailing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought with the +Phoenicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians by land and sea, and, being victorious on +both elements departed home, and with them the returned squadron from Egypt. +After this the Lacedaemonians marched out on a sacred war, and, becoming +masters of the temple at Delphi, it in the hands of the Delphians. Immediately +after their retreat, the Athenians marched out, became masters of the temple, +and placed it in the hands of the Phocians. +</p> + +<p> +Some time after this, Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and some other places in Boeotia +being in the hands of the Boeotian exiles, the Athenians marched against the +above-mentioned hostile places with a thousand Athenian heavy infantry and the +allied contingents, under the command of Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus. They took +Chaeronea, and made slaves of the inhabitants, and, leaving a garrison, +commenced their return. On their road they were attacked at Coronea by the +Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, with some Locrians and Euboean exiles, and +others who were of the same way of thinking, were defeated in battle, and some +killed, others taken captive. The Athenians evacuated all Boeotia by a treaty +providing for the recovery of the men; and the exiled Boeotians returned, and +with all the rest regained their independence. +</p> + +<p> +This was soon afterwards followed by the revolt of Euboea from Athens. Pericles +had already crossed over with an army of Athenians to the island, when news was +brought to him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were on the +point of invading Attica, and that the Athenian garrison had been cut off by +the Megarians, with the exception of a few who had taken refuge in Nisaea. The +Megarians had introduced the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the +town before they revolted. Meanwhile Pericles brought his army back in all +haste from Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians marched into Attica as far as +Eleusis and Thrius, ravaging the country under the conduct of King Pleistoanax, +the son of Pausanias, and without advancing further returned home. The +Athenians then crossed over again to Euboea under the command of Pericles, and +subdued the whole of the island: all but Histiaea was settled by convention; +the Histiaeans they expelled from their homes, and occupied their territory +themselves. +</p> + +<p> +Not long after their return from Euboea, they made a truce with the +Lacedaemonians and their allies for thirty years, giving up the posts which +they occupied in Peloponnese—Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia. In the +sixth year of the truce, war broke out between the Samians and Milesians about +Priene. Worsted in the war, the Milesians came to Athens with loud complaints +against the Samians. In this they were joined by certain private persons from +Samos itself, who wished to revolutionize the government. Accordingly the +Athenians sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy; took +hostages from the Samians, fifty boys and as many men, lodged them in Lemnos, +and after leaving a garrison in the island returned home. But some of the +Samians had not remained in the island, but had fled to the continent. Making +an agreement with the most powerful of those in the city, and an alliance with +Pissuthnes, son of Hystaspes, the then satrap of Sardis, they got together a +force of seven hundred mercenaries, and under cover of night crossed over to +Samos. Their first step was to rise on the commons, most of whom they secured; +their next to steal their hostages from Lemnos; after which they revolted, gave +up the Athenian garrison left with them and its commanders to Pissuthnes, and +instantly prepared for an expedition against Miletus. The Byzantines also +revolted with them. +</p> + +<p> +As soon as the Athenians heard the news, they sailed with sixty ships against +Samos. Sixteen of these went to Caria to look out for the Phoenician fleet, and +to Chios and Lesbos carrying round orders for reinforcements, and so never +engaged; but forty-four ships under the command of Pericles with nine +colleagues gave battle, off the island of Tragia, to seventy Samian vessels, of +which twenty were transports, as they were sailing from Miletus. Victory +remained with the Athenians. Reinforced afterwards by forty ships from Athens, +and twenty-five Chian and Lesbian vessels, the Athenians landed, and having the +superiority by land invested the city with three walls; it was also invested +from the sea. Meanwhile Pericles took sixty ships from the blockading squadron, +and departed in haste for Caunus and Caria, intelligence having been brought in +of the approach of the Phoenician fleet to the aid of the Samians; indeed +Stesagoras and others had left the island with five ships to bring them. But in +the meantime the Samians made a sudden sally, and fell on the camp, which they +found unfortified. Destroying the look-out vessels, and engaging and defeating +such as were being launched to meet them, they remained masters of their own +seas for fourteen days, and carried in and carried out what they pleased. But +on the arrival of Pericles, they were once more shut up. Fresh reinforcements +afterwards arrived—forty ships from Athens with Thucydides, Hagnon, and +Phormio; twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty vessels from Chios and +Lesbos. After a brief attempt at fighting, the Samians, unable to hold out, +were reduced after a nine months’ siege and surrendered on conditions; +they razed their walls, gave hostages, delivered up their ships, and arranged +to pay the expenses of the war by instalments. The Byzantines also agreed to be +subject as before. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0005" id="link2HCH0005"></a> +CHAPTER V </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Second Congress at Lacedaemon—Preparations for War and Diplomatic +Skirmishes—Cylon—Pausanias—Themistocles +</p> + +<p> +After this, though not many years later, we at length come to what has been +already related, the affairs of Corcyra and Potidæa, and the events that served +as a pretext for the present war. All these actions of the Hellenes against +each other and the barbarian occurred in the fifty years’ interval +between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of the present war. During this +interval the Athenians succeeded in placing their empire on a firmer basis, and +advanced their own home power to a very great height. The Lacedaemonians, +though fully aware of it, opposed it only for a little while, but remained +inactive during most of the period, being of old slow to go to war except under +the pressure of necessity, and in the present instance being hampered by wars +at home; until the growth of the Athenian power could be no longer ignored, and +their own confederacy became the object of its encroachments. They then felt +that they could endure it no longer, but that the time had come for them to +throw themselves heart and soul upon the hostile power, and break it, if they +could, by commencing the present war. And though the Lacedaemonians had made up +their own minds on the fact of the breach of the treaty and the guilt of the +Athenians, yet they sent to Delphi and inquired of the God whether it would be +well with them if they went to war; and, as it is reported, received from him +the answer that if they put their whole strength into the war, victory would be +theirs, and the promise that he himself would be with them, whether invoked or +uninvoked. Still they wished to summon their allies again, and to take their +vote on the propriety of making war. After the ambassadors from the +confederates had arrived and a congress had been convened, they all spoke their +minds, most of them denouncing the Athenians and demanding that the war should +begin. In particular the Corinthians. They had before on their own account +canvassed the cities in detail to induce them to vote for the war, in the fear +that it might come too late to save Potidæa; they were present also on this +occasion, and came forward the last, and made the following speech: +</p> + +<p> +“Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians of having +failed in their duty: they have not only voted for war themselves, but have +assembled us here for that purpose. We say their duty, for supremacy has its +duties. Besides equitably administering private interests, leaders are required +to show a special care for the common welfare in return for the special honours +accorded to them by all in other ways. For ourselves, all who have already had +dealings with the Athenians require no warning to be on their guard against +them. The states more inland and out of the highway of communication should +understand that, if they omit to support the coast powers, the result will be +to injure the transit of their produce for exportation and the reception in +exchange of their imports from the sea; and they must not be careless judges of +what is now said, as if it had nothing to do with them, but must expect that +the sacrifice of the powers on the coast will one day be followed by the +extension of the danger to the interior, and must recognize that their own +interests are deeply involved in this discussion. For these reasons they should +not hesitate to exchange peace for war. If wise men remain quiet, while they +are not injured, brave men abandon peace for war when they are injured, +returning to an understanding on a favourable opportunity: in fact, they are +neither intoxicated by their success in war, nor disposed to take an injury for +the sake of the delightful tranquillity of peace. Indeed, to falter for the +sake of such delights is, if you remain inactive, the quickest way of losing +the sweets of repose to which you cling; while to conceive extravagant +pretensions from success in war is to forget how hollow is the confidence by +which you are elated. For if many ill-conceived plans have succeeded through +the still greater fatuity of an opponent, many more, apparently well laid, have +on the contrary ended in disgrace. The confidence with which we form our +schemes is never completely justified in their execution; speculation is +carried on in safety, but, when it comes to action, fear causes failure. +</p> + +<p> +“To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling war it is +under the pressure of injury, with adequate grounds of complaint; and after we +have chastised the Athenians we will in season desist. We have many reasons to +expect success—first, superiority in numbers and in military experience, +and secondly our general and unvarying obedience in the execution of orders. +The naval strength which they possess shall be raised by us from our respective +antecedent resources, and from the moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from +these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. +For the power of Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be +exposed to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money. A +single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their ruin: should they hold out, in +that case there will be the more time for us to exercise ourselves in naval +matters; and as soon as we have arrived at an equality in science, we need +scarcely ask whether we shall be their superiors in courage. For the advantages +that we have by nature they cannot acquire by education; while their +superiority in science must be removed by our practice. The money required for +these objects shall be provided by our contributions: nothing indeed could be +more monstrous than the suggestion that, while their allies never tire of +contributing for their own servitude, we should refuse to spend for vengeance +and self-preservation the treasure which by such refusal we shall forfeit to +Athenian rapacity and see employed for our own ruin. +</p> + +<p> +“We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of their +allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues, which are the +source of their strength, and establishment of fortified positions in their +country, and various operations which cannot be foreseen at present. For war of +all things proceeds least upon definite rules, but draws principally upon +itself for contrivances to meet an emergency; and in such cases the party who +faces the struggle and keeps his temper best meets with most security, and he +who loses his temper about it with correspondent disaster. Let us also reflect +that if it was merely a number of disputes of territory between rival +neighbours, it might be borne; but here we have an enemy in Athens that is a +match for our whole coalition, and more than a match for any of its members; so +that unless as a body and as individual nationalities and individual cities we +make an unanimous stand against her, she will easily conquer us divided and in +detail. That conquest, terrible as it may sound, would, it must be known, have +no other end than slavery pure and simple; a word which Peloponnese cannot even +hear whispered without disgrace, or without disgrace see so many states abused +by one. Meanwhile the opinion would be either that we were justly so used, or +that we put up with it from cowardice, and were proving degenerate sons in not +even securing for ourselves the freedom which our fathers gave to Hellas; and +in allowing the establishment in Hellas of a tyrant state, though in individual +states we think it our duty to put down sole rulers. And we do not know how +this conduct can be held free from three of the gravest failings, want of +sense, of courage, or of vigilance. For we do not suppose that you have taken +refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so fatal in so many +instances—a feeling which from the numbers that it has ruined has come to +be called not contemptuous but contemptible. +</p> + +<p> +“There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past further than +may be of service to the present. For the future we must provide by maintaining +what the present gives us and redoubling our efforts; it is hereditary to us to +win virtue as the fruit of labour, and you must not change the habit, even +though you should have a slight advantage in wealth and resources; for it is +not right that what was won in want should be lost in plenty; no, we must +boldly advance to the war for many reasons; the god has commanded it and +promised to be with us, and the rest of Hellas will all join in the struggle, +part from fear, part from interest. You will be the first to break a treaty +which the god, in advising us to go to war, judges to be violated already, but +rather to support a treaty that has been outraged: indeed, treaties are broken +not by resistance but by aggression. +</p> + +<p> +“Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it, will +amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend in the interests +of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest is the surest of bonds, +whether between states or individuals. Delay not, therefore, to assist Potidæa, +a Dorian city besieged by Ionians, which is quite a reversal of the order of +things; nor to assert the freedom of the rest. It is impossible for us to wait +any longer when waiting can only mean immediate disaster for some of us, and, +if it comes to be known that we have conferred but do not venture to protect +ourselves, like disaster in the near future for the rest. Delay not, fellow +allies, but, convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the wisdom of this +counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by its immediate terrors, but looking +beyond to the lasting peace by which it will be succeeded. Out of war peace +gains fresh stability, but to refuse to abandon repose for war is not so sure a +method of avoiding danger. We must believe that the tyrant city that has been +established in Hellas has been established against all alike, with a programme +of universal empire, part fulfilled, part in contemplation; let us then attack +and reduce it, and win future security for ourselves and freedom for the +Hellenes who are now enslaved.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of the Corinthians. The Lacedaemonians, having now heard +all, give their opinion, took the vote of all the allied states present in +order, great and small alike; and the majority voted for war. This decided, it +was still impossible for them to commence at once, from their want of +preparation; but it was resolved that the means requisite were to be procured +by the different states, and that there was to be no delay. And indeed, in +spite of the time occupied with the necessary arrangements, less than a year +elapsed before Attica was invaded, and the war openly begun. +</p> + +<p> +This interval was spent in sending embassies to Athens charged with complaints, +in order to obtain as good a pretext for war as possible, in the event of her +paying no attention to them. The first Lacedaemonian embassy was to order the +Athenians to drive out the curse of the goddess; the history of which is as +follows. In former generations there was an Athenian of the name of Cylon, a +victor at the Olympic games, of good birth and powerful position, who had +married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, at that time tyrant of Megara. Now +this Cylon was inquiring at Delphi; when he was told by the god to seize the +Acropolis of Athens on the grand festival of Zeus. Accordingly, procuring a +force from Theagenes and persuading his friends to join him, when the Olympic +festival in Peloponnese came, he seized the Acropolis, with the intention of +making himself tyrant, thinking that this was the grand festival of Zeus, and +also an occasion appropriate for a victor at the Olympic games. Whether the +grand festival that was meant was in Attica or elsewhere was a question which +he never thought of, and which the oracle did not offer to solve. For the +Athenians also have a festival which is called the grand festival of Zeus +Meilichios or Gracious, viz., the Diasia. It is celebrated outside the city, +and the whole people sacrifice not real victims but a number of bloodless +offerings peculiar to the country. However, fancying he had chosen the right +time, he made the attempt. As soon as the Athenians perceived it, they flocked +in, one and all, from the country, and sat down, and laid siege to the citadel. +But as time went on, weary of the labour of blockade, most of them departed; +the responsibility of keeping guard being left to the nine archons, with +plenary powers to arrange everything according to their good judgment. It must +be known that at that time most political functions were discharged by the nine +archons. Meanwhile Cylon and his besieged companions were distressed for want +of food and water. Accordingly Cylon and his brother made their escape; but the +rest being hard pressed, and some even dying of famine, seated themselves as +suppliants at the altar in the Acropolis. The Athenians who were charged with +the duty of keeping guard, when they saw them at the point of death in the +temple, raised them up on the understanding that no harm should be done to +them, led them out, and slew them. Some who as they passed by took refuge at +the altars of the awful goddesses were dispatched on the spot. From this deed +the men who killed them were called accursed and guilty against the goddess, +they and their descendants. Accordingly these cursed ones were driven out by +the Athenians, driven out again by Cleomenes of Lacedaemon and an Athenian +faction; the living were driven out, and the bones of the dead were taken up; +thus they were cast out. For all that, they came back afterwards, and their +descendants are still in the city. +</p> + +<p> +This, then was the curse that the Lacedaemonians ordered them to drive out. +They were actuated primarily, as they pretended, by a care for the honour of +the gods; but they also know that Pericles, son of Xanthippus, was connected +with the curse on his mother’s side, and they thought that his banishment +would materially advance their designs on Athens. Not that they really hoped to +succeed in procuring this; they rather thought to create a prejudice against +him in the eyes of his countrymen from the feeling that the war would be partly +caused by his misfortune. For being the most powerful man of his time, and the +leading Athenian statesman, he opposed the Lacedaemonians in everything, and +would have no concessions, but ever urged the Athenians on to war. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians retorted by ordering the Lacedaemonians to drive out the curse of +Taenarus. The Lacedaemonians had once raised up some Helot suppliants from the +temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, led them away and slain them; for which they +believe the great earthquake at Sparta to have been a retribution. The +Athenians also ordered them to drive out the curse of the goddess of the Brazen +House; the history of which is as follows. After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian +had been recalled by the Spartans from his command in the Hellespont (this is +his first recall), and had been tried by them and acquitted, not being again +sent out in a public capacity, he took a galley of Hermione on his own +responsibility, without the authority of the Lacedaemonians, and arrived as a +private person in the Hellespont. He came ostensibly for the Hellenic war, +really to carry on his intrigues with the King, which he had begun before his +recall, being ambitious of reigning over Hellas. The circumstance which first +enabled him to lay the King under an obligation, and to make a beginning of the +whole design, was this. Some connections and kinsmen of the King had been taken +in Byzantium, on its capture from the Medes, when he was first there, after the +return from Cyprus. These captives he sent off to the King without the +knowledge of the rest of the allies, the account being that they had escaped +from him. He managed this with the help of Gongylus, an Eretrian, whom he had +placed in charge of Byzantium and the prisoners. He also gave Gongylus a letter +for the King, the contents of which were as follows, as was afterwards +discovered: “Pausanias, the general of Sparta, anxious to do you a +favour, sends you these his prisoners of war. I propose also, with your +approval, to marry your daughter, and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas +subject to you. I may say that I think I am able to do this, with your +co-operation. Accordingly if any of this please you, send a safe man to the sea +through whom we may in future conduct our correspondence.” +</p> + +<p> +This was all that was revealed in the writing, and Xerxes was pleased with the +letter. He sent off Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, to the sea with orders to +supersede Megabates, the previous governor in the satrapy of Daskylion, and to +send over as quickly as possible to Pausanias at Byzantium a letter which he +entrusted to him; to show him the royal signet, and to execute any commission +which he might receive from Pausanias on the King’s matters with all care +and fidelity. Artabazus on his arrival carried the King’s orders into +effect, and sent over the letter, which contained the following answer: +“Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom you have saved for +me across sea from Byzantium, an obligation is laid up for you in our house, +recorded for ever; and with your proposals I am well pleased. Let neither night +nor day stop you from diligently performing any of your promises to me; neither +for cost of gold nor of silver let them be hindered, nor yet for number of +troops, wherever it may be that their presence is needed; but with Artabazus, +an honourable man whom I send you, boldly advance my objects and yours, as may +be most for the honour and interest of us both.” +</p> + +<p> +Before held in high honour by the Hellenes as the hero of Plataea, Pausanias, +after the receipt of this letter, became prouder than ever, and could no longer +live in the usual style, but went out of Byzantium in a Median dress, was +attended on his march through Thrace by a bodyguard of Medes and Egyptians, +kept a Persian table, and was quite unable to contain his intentions, but +betrayed by his conduct in trifles what his ambition looked one day to enact on +a grander scale. He also made himself difficult of access, and displayed so +violent a temper to every one without exception that no one could come near +him. Indeed, this was the principal reason why the confederacy went over to the +Athenians. +</p> + +<p> +The above-mentioned conduct, coming to the ears of the Lacedaemonians, +occasioned his first recall. And after his second voyage out in the ship of +Hermione, without their orders, he gave proofs of similar behaviour. Besieged +and expelled from Byzantium by the Athenians, he did not return to Sparta; but +news came that he had settled at Colonae in the Troad, and was intriguing with +the barbarians, and that his stay there was for no good purpose; and the +ephors, now no longer hesitating, sent him a herald and a scytale with orders +to accompany the herald or be declared a public enemy. Anxious above everything +to avoid suspicion, and confident that he could quash the charge by means of +money, he returned a second time to Sparta. At first thrown into prison by the +ephors (whose powers enable them to do this to the King), soon compromised the +matter and came out again, and offered himself for trial to any who wished to +institute an inquiry concerning him. +</p> + +<p> +Now the Spartans had no tangible proof against him—neither his enemies +nor the nation—of that indubitable kind required for the punishment of a +member of the royal family, and at that moment in high office; he being regent +for his first cousin King Pleistarchus, Leonidas’s son, who was still a +minor. But by his contempt of the laws and imitation of the barbarians, he gave +grounds for much suspicion of his being discontented with things established; +all the occasions on which he had in any way departed from the regular customs +were passed in review, and it was remembered that he had taken upon himself to +have inscribed on the tripod at Delphi, which was dedicated by the Hellenes as +the first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, the following couplet: +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised<br/> +This monument, that Phœbus might be praised. +</p> + +<p> +At the time the Lacedaemonians had at once erased the couplet, and inscribed +the names of the cities that had aided in the overthrow of the barbarian and +dedicated the offering. Yet it was considered that Pausanias had here been +guilty of a grave offence, which, interpreted by the light of the attitude +which he had since assumed, gained a new significance, and seemed to be quite +in keeping with his present schemes. Besides, they were informed that he was +even intriguing with the Helots; and such indeed was the fact, for he promised +them freedom and citizenship if they would join him in insurrection and would +help him to carry out his plans to the end. Even now, mistrusting the evidence +even of the Helots themselves, the ephors would not consent to take any decided +step against him; in accordance with their regular custom towards themselves, +namely, to be slow in taking any irrevocable resolve in the matter of a Spartan +citizen without indisputable proof. At last, it is said, the person who was +going to carry to Artabazus the last letter for the King, a man of Argilus, +once the favourite and most trusty servant of Pausanias, turned informer. +Alarmed by the reflection that none of the previous messengers had ever +returned, having counterfeited the seal, in order that, if he found himself +mistaken in his surmises, or if Pausanias should ask to make some correction, +he might not be discovered, he undid the letter, and found the postscript that +he had suspected, viz. an order to put him to death. +</p> + +<p> +On being shown the letter, the ephors now felt more certain. Still, they wished +to hear Pausanias commit himself with their own ears. Accordingly the man went +by appointment to Taenarus as a suppliant, and there built himself a hut +divided into two by a partition; within which he concealed some of the ephors +and let them hear the whole matter plainly. For Pausanias came to him and asked +him the reason of his suppliant position; and the man reproached him with the +order that he had written concerning him, and one by one declared all the rest +of the circumstances, how he who had never yet brought him into any danger, +while employed as agent between him and the King, was yet just like the mass of +his servants to be rewarded with death. Admitting all this, and telling him not +to be angry about the matter, Pausanias gave him the pledge of raising him up +from the temple, and begged him to set off as quickly as possible, and not to +hinder the business in hand. +</p> + +<p> +The ephors listened carefully, and then departed, taking no action for the +moment, but, having at last attained to certainty, were preparing to arrest him +in the city. It is reported that, as he was about to be arrested in the street, +he saw from the face of one of the ephors what he was coming for; another, too, +made him a secret signal, and betrayed it to him from kindness. Setting off +with a run for the temple of the goddess of the Brazen House, the enclosure of +which was near at hand, he succeeded in taking sanctuary before they took him, +and entering into a small chamber, which formed part of the temple, to avoid +being exposed to the weather, lay still there. The ephors, for the moment +distanced in the pursuit, afterwards took off the roof of the chamber, and +having made sure that he was inside, shut him in, barricaded the doors, and +staying before the place, reduced him by starvation. When they found that he +was on the point of expiring, just as he was, in the chamber, they brought him +out of the temple, while the breath was still in him, and as soon as he was +brought out he died. They were going to throw him into the Kaiadas, where they +cast criminals, but finally decided to inter him somewhere near. But the god at +Delphi afterwards ordered the Lacedaemonians to remove the tomb to the place of +his death—where he now lies in the consecrated ground, as an inscription +on a monument declares—and, as what had been done was a curse to them, to +give back two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen House. So they +had two brazen statues made, and dedicated them as a substitute for Pausanias. +The Athenians retorted by telling the Lacedaemonians to drive out what the god +himself had pronounced to be a curse. +</p> + +<p> +To return to the Medism of Pausanias. Matter was found in the course of the +inquiry to implicate Themistocles; and the Lacedaemonians accordingly sent +envoys to the Athenians and required them to punish him as they had punished +Pausanias. The Athenians consented to do so. But he had, as it happened, been +ostracized, and, with a residence at Argos, was in the habit of visiting other +parts of Peloponnese. So they sent with the Lacedaemonians, who were ready to +join in the pursuit, persons with instructions to take him wherever they found +him. But Themistocles got scent of their intentions, and fled from Peloponnese +to Corcyra, which was under obligations towards him. But the Corcyraeans +alleged that they could not venture to shelter him at the cost of offending +Athens and Lacedaemon, and they conveyed him over to the continent opposite. +Pursued by the officers who hung on the report of his movements, at a loss +where to turn, he was compelled to stop at the house of Admetus, the Molossian +king, though they were not on friendly terms. Admetus happened not to be +indoors, but his wife, to whom he made himself a suppliant, instructed him to +take their child in his arms and sit down by the hearth. Soon afterwards +Admetus came in, and Themistocles told him who he was, and begged him not to +revenge on Themistocles in exile any opposition which his requests might have +experienced from Themistocles at Athens. Indeed, he was now far too low for his +revenge; retaliation was only honourable between equals. Besides, his +opposition to the king had only affected the success of a request, not the +safety of his person; if the king were to give him up to the pursuers that he +mentioned, and the fate which they intended for him, he would just be +consigning him to certain death. +</p> + +<p> +The King listened to him and raised him up with his son, as he was sitting with +him in his arms after the most effectual method of supplication, and on the +arrival of the Lacedaemonians not long afterwards, refused to give him up for +anything they could say, but sent him off by land to the other sea to Pydna in +Alexander’s dominions, as he wished to go to the Persian king. There he +met with a merchantman on the point of starting for Ionia. Going on board, he +was carried by a storm to the Athenian squadron which was blockading Naxos. In +his alarm—he was luckily unknown to the people in the vessel—he +told the master who he was and what he was flying for, and said that, if he +refused to save him, he would declare that he was taking him for a bribe. +Meanwhile their safety consisted in letting no one leave the ship until a +favourable time for sailing should arise. If he complied with his wishes, he +promised him a proper recompense. The master acted as he desired, and, after +lying to for a day and a night out of reach of the squadron, at length arrived +at Ephesus. +</p> + +<p> +After having rewarded him with a present of money, as soon as he received some +from his friends at Athens and from his secret hoards at Argos, Themistocles +started inland with one of the coast Persians, and sent a letter to King +Artaxerxes, Xerxes’s son, who had just come to the throne. Its contents +were as follows: “I, Themistocles, am come to you, who did your house +more harm than any of the Hellenes, when I was compelled to defend myself +against your father’s invasion—harm, however, far surpassed by the +good that I did him during his retreat, which brought no danger for me but much +for him. For the past, you are a good turn in my debt”—here he +mentioned the warning sent to Xerxes from Salamis to retreat, as well as his +finding the bridges unbroken, which, as he falsely pretended, was due to +him—“for the present, able to do you great service, I am here, +pursued by the Hellenes for my friendship for you. However, I desire a +year’s grace, when I shall be able to declare in person the objects of my +coming.” +</p> + +<p> +It is said that the King approved his intention, and told him to do as he said. +He employed the interval in making what progress he could in the study of the +Persian tongue, and of the customs of the country. Arrived at court at the end +of the year, he attained to very high consideration there, such as no Hellene +has ever possessed before or since; partly from his splendid antecedents, +partly from the hopes which he held out of effecting for him the subjugation of +Hellas, but principally by the proof which experience daily gave of his +capacity. For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most indubitable signs +of genius; indeed, in this particular he has a claim on our admiration quite +extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own native capacity, alike unformed and +unsupplemented by study, he was at once the best judge in those sudden crises +which admit of little or of no deliberation, and the best prophet of the +future, even to its most distant possibilities. An able theoretical expositor +of all that came within the sphere of his practice, he was not without the +power of passing an adequate judgment in matters in which he had no experience. +He could also excellently divine the good and evil which lay hid in the unseen +future. In fine, whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the +slightness of his application, this extraordinary man must be allowed to have +surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency. +Disease was the real cause of his death; though there is a story of his having +ended his life by poison, on finding himself unable to fulfil his promises to +the king. However this may be, there is a monument to him in the marketplace of +Asiatic Magnesia. He was governor of the district, the King having given him +Magnesia, which brought in fifty talents a year, for bread, Lampsacus, which +was considered to be the richest wine country, for wine, and Myos for other +provisions. His bones, it is said, were conveyed home by his relatives in +accordance with his wishes, and interred in Attic ground. This was done without +the knowledge of the Athenians; as it is against the law to bury in Attica an +outlaw for treason. So ends the history of Pausanias and Themistocles, the +Lacedaemonian and the Athenian, the most famous men of their time in Hellas. +</p> + +<p> +To return to the Lacedaemonians. The history of their first embassy, the +injunctions which it conveyed, and the rejoinder which it provoked, concerning +the expulsion of the accursed persons, have been related already. It was +followed by a second, which ordered Athens to raise the siege of Potidæa, and +to respect the independence of Aegina. Above all, it gave her most distinctly +to understand that war might be prevented by the revocation of the Megara +decree, excluding the Megarians from the use of Athenian harbours and of the +market of Athens. But Athens was not inclined either to revoke the decree, or +to entertain their other proposals; she accused the Megarians of pushing their +cultivation into the consecrated ground and the unenclosed land on the border, +and of harbouring her runaway slaves. At last an embassy arrived with the +Lacedaemonian ultimatum. The ambassadors were Ramphias, Melesippus, and +Agesander. Not a word was said on any of the old subjects; there was simply +this: “Lacedaemon wishes the peace to continue, and there is no reason +why it should not, if you would leave the Hellenes independent.” Upon +this the Athenians held an assembly, and laid the matter before their +consideration. It was resolved to deliberate once for all on all their demands, +and to give them an answer. There were many speakers who came forward and gave +their support to one side or the other, urging the necessity of war, or the +revocation of the decree and the folly of allowing it to stand in the way of +peace. Among them came forward Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man of +his time at Athens, ablest alike in counsel and in action, and gave the +following advice: +</p> + +<p> +“There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through everything, +and that is the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians. I know that +the spirit which inspires men while they are being persuaded to make war is not +always retained in action; that as circumstances change, resolutions change. +Yet I see that now as before the same, almost literally the same, counsel is +demanded of me; and I put it to those of you who are allowing yourselves to be +persuaded, to support the national resolves even in the case of reverses, or to +forfeit all credit for their wisdom in the event of success. For sometimes the +course of things is as arbitrary as the plans of man; indeed this is why we +usually blame chance for whatever does not happen as we expected. Now it was +clear before that Lacedaemon entertained designs against us; it is still more +clear now. The treaty provides that we shall mutually submit our differences to +legal settlement, and that we shall meanwhile each keep what we have. Yet the +Lacedaemonians never yet made us any such offer, never yet would accept from us +any such offer; on the contrary, they wish complaints to be settled by war +instead of by negotiation; and in the end we find them here dropping the tone +of expostulation and adopting that of command. They order us to raise the siege +of Potidæa, to let Aegina be independent, to revoke the Megara decree; and they +conclude with an ultimatum warning us to leave the Hellenes independent. I hope +that you will none of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifle if +we refuse to revoke the Megara decree, which appears in front of their +complaints, and the revocation of which is to save us from war, or let any +feeling of self-reproach linger in your minds, as if you went to war for slight +cause. Why, this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your resolution. +If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand, as having +been frightened into obedience in the first instance; while a firm refusal will +make them clearly understand that they must treat you more as equals. Make your +decision therefore at once, either to submit before you are harmed, or if we +are to go to war, as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether +the ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making concessions or +consenting to a precarious tenure of our possessions. For all claims from an +equal, urged upon a neighbour as commands before any attempt at legal +settlement, be they great or be they small, have only one meaning, and that is +slavery. +</p> + +<p> +“As to the war and the resources of either party, a detailed comparison +will not show you the inferiority of Athens. Personally engaged in the +cultivation of their land, without funds either private or public, the +Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars across sea, from the +strict limit which poverty imposes on their attacks upon each other. Powers of +this description are quite incapable of often manning a fleet or often sending +out an army: they cannot afford the absence from their homes, the expenditure +from their own funds; and besides, they have not command of the sea. Capital, +it must be remembered, maintains a war more than forced contributions. Farmers +are a class of men that are always more ready to serve in person than in purse. +Confident that the former will survive the dangers, they are by no means so +sure that the latter will not be prematurely exhausted, especially if the war +last longer than they expect, which it very likely will. In a single battle the +Peloponnesians and their allies may be able to defy all Hellas, but they are +incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power different in character +from their own, by the want of the single council-chamber requisite to prompt +and vigorous action, and the substitution of a diet composed of various races, +in which every state possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own ends, a +condition of things which generally results in no action at all. The great wish +of some is to avenge themselves on some particular enemy, the great wish of +others to save their own pocket. Slow in assembling, they devote a very small +fraction of the time to the consideration of any public object, most of it to +the prosecution of their own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will +come of his neglect, that it is the business of somebody else to look after +this or that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all +separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays. +</p> + +<p> +“But the principal point is the hindrance that they will experience from +want of money. The slowness with which it comes in will cause delay; but the +opportunities of war wait for no man. Again, we need not be alarmed either at +the possibility of their raising fortifications in Attica, or at their navy. It +would be difficult for any system of fortifications to establish a rival city, +even in time of peace, much more, surely, in an enemy’s country, with +Athens just as much fortified against it as it against Athens; while a mere +post might be able to do some harm to the country by incursions and by the +facilities which it would afford for desertion, but can never prevent our +sailing into their country and raising fortifications there, and making +reprisals with our powerful fleet. For our naval skill is of more use to us for +service on land, than their military skill for service at sea. Familiarity with +the sea they will not find an easy acquisition. If you who have been practising +at it ever since the Median invasion have not yet brought it to perfection, is +there any chance of anything considerable being effected by an agricultural, +unseafaring population, who will besides be prevented from practising by the +constant presence of strong squadrons of observation from Athens? With a small +squadron they might hazard an engagement, encouraging their ignorance by +numbers; but the restraint of a strong force will prevent their moving, and +through want of practice they will grow more clumsy, and consequently more +timid. It must be kept in mind that seamanship, just like anything else, is a +matter of art, and will not admit of being taken up occasionally as an +occupation for times of leisure; on the contrary, it is so exacting as to leave +leisure for nothing else. +</p> + +<p> +“Even if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia or Delphi, and try to +seduce our foreign sailors by the temptation of higher pay, that would only be +a serious danger if we could not still be a match for them by embarking our own +citizens and the aliens resident among us. But in fact by this means we are +always a match for them; and, best of all, we have a larger and higher class of +native coxswains and sailors among our own citizens than all the rest of +Hellas. And to say nothing of the danger of such a step, none of our foreign +sailors would consent to become an outlaw from his country, and to take service +with them and their hopes, for the sake of a few days’ high pay. +</p> + +<p> +“This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the position of the +Peloponnesians; that of Athens is free from the defects that I have criticized +in them, and has other advantages of its own, which they can show nothing to +equal. If they march against our country we will sail against theirs, and it +will then be found that the desolation of the whole of Attica is not the same +as that of even a fraction of Peloponnese; for they will not be able to supply +the deficiency except by a battle, while we have plenty of land both on the +islands and the continent. The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter. +Consider for a moment. Suppose that we were islanders; can you conceive a more +impregnable position? Well, this in future should, as far as possible, be our +conception of our position. Dismissing all thought of our land and houses, we +must vigilantly guard the sea and the city. No irritation that we may feel for +the former must provoke us to a battle with the numerical superiority of the +Peloponnesians. A victory would only be succeeded by another battle against the +same superiority: a reverse involves the loss of our allies, the source of our +strength, who will not remain quiet a day after we become unable to march +against them. We must cry not over the loss of houses and land but of +men’s lives; since houses and land do not gain men, but men them. And if +I had thought that I could persuade you, I would have bid you go out and lay +them waste with your own hands, and show the Peloponnesians that this at any +rate will not make you submit. +</p> + +<p> +“I have many other reasons to hope for a favourable issue, if you can +consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the conduct of the war, +and will abstain from wilfully involving yourselves in other dangers; indeed, I +am more afraid of our own blunders than of the enemy’s devices. But these +matters shall be explained in another speech, as events require; for the +present dismiss these men with the answer that we will allow Megara the use of +our market and harbours, when the Lacedaemonians suspend their alien acts in +favour of us and our allies, there being nothing in the treaty to prevent +either one or the other: that we will leave the cities independent, if +independent we found them when we made the treaty, and when the Lacedaemonians +grant to their cities an independence not involving subservience to +Lacedaemonian interests, but such as each severally may desire: that we are +willing to give the legal satisfaction which our agreements specify, and that +we shall not commence hostilities, but shall resist those who do commence them. +This is an answer agreeable at once to the rights and the dignity of Athens. It +must be thoroughly understood that war is a necessity; but that the more +readily we accept it, the less will be the ardour of our opponents, and that +out of the greatest dangers communities and individuals acquire the greatest +glory. Did not our fathers resist the Medes not only with resources far +different from ours, but even when those resources had been abandoned; and more +by wisdom than by fortune, more by daring than by strength, did not they beat +off the barbarian and advance their affairs to their present height? We must +not fall behind them, but must resist our enemies in any way and in every way, +and attempt to hand down our power to our posterity unimpaired.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, persuaded of the wisdom of his +advice, voted as he desired, and answered the Lacedaemonians as he recommended, +both on the separate points and in the general; they would do nothing on +dictation, but were ready to have the complaints settled in a fair and +impartial manner by the legal method, which the terms of the truce prescribed. +So the envoys departed home and did not return again. +</p> + +<p> +These were the charges and differences existing between the rival powers before +the war, arising immediately from the affair at Epidamnus and Corcyra. Still +intercourse continued in spite of them, and mutual communication. It was +carried on without heralds, but not without suspicion, as events were occurring +which were equivalent to a breach of the treaty and matter for war. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2H_4_0007" id="link2H_4_0007"></a> +BOOK II </h2> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0006" id="link2HCH0006"></a> +CHAPTER VI </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Beginning of the Peloponnesian War—First Invasion of Attica—Funeral +Oration of Pericles +</p> + +<p> +The war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies on either side +now really begins. For now all intercourse except through the medium of heralds +ceased, and hostilities were commenced and prosecuted without intermission. The +history follows the chronological order of events by summers and winters. +</p> + +<p> +The thirty years’ truce which was entered into after the conquest of +Euboea lasted fourteen years. In the fifteenth, in the forty-eighth year of the +priestess-ship of Chrysis at Argos, in the ephorate of Aenesias at Sparta, in +the last month but two of the archonship of Pythodorus at Athens, and six +months after the battle of Potidæa, just at the beginning of spring, a Theban +force a little over three hundred strong, under the command of their +Boeotarchs, Pythangelus, son of Phyleides, and Diemporus, son of Onetorides, +about the first watch of the night, made an armed entry into Plataea, a town of +Boeotia in alliance with Athens. The gates were opened to them by a Plataean +called Naucleides, who, with his party, had invited them in, meaning to put to +death the citizens of the opposite party, bring over the city to Thebes, and +thus obtain power for themselves. This was arranged through Eurymachus, son of +Leontiades, a person of great influence at Thebes. For Plataea had always been +at variance with Thebes; and the latter, foreseeing that war was at hand, +wished to surprise her old enemy in time of peace, before hostilities had +actually broken out. Indeed this was how they got in so easily without being +observed, as no guard had been posted. After the soldiers had grounded arms in +the market-place, those who had invited them in wished them to set to work at +once and go to their enemies’ houses. This, however, the Thebans refused +to do, but determined to make a conciliatory proclamation, and if possible to +come to a friendly understanding with the citizens. Their herald accordingly +invited any who wished to resume their old place in the confederacy of their +countrymen to ground arms with them, for they thought that in this way the city +would readily join them. +</p> + +<p> +On becoming aware of the presence of the Thebans within their gates, and of the +sudden occupation of the town, the Plataeans concluded in their alarm that more +had entered than was really the case, the night preventing their seeing them. +They accordingly came to terms and, accepting the proposal, made no movement; +especially as the Thebans offered none of them any violence. But somehow or +other, during the negotiations, they discovered the scanty numbers of the +Thebans, and decided that they could easily attack and overpower them; the mass +of the Plataeans being averse to revolting from Athens. At all events they +resolved to attempt it. Digging through the party walls of the houses, they +thus managed to join each other without being seen going through the streets, +in which they placed wagons without the beasts in them, to serve as a +barricade, and arranged everything else as seemed convenient for the occasion. +When everything had been done that circumstances permitted, they watched their +opportunity and went out of their houses against the enemy. It was still night, +though daybreak was at hand: in daylight it was thought that their attack would +be met by men full of courage and on equal terms with their assailants, while +in darkness it would fall upon panic-stricken troops, who would also be at a +disadvantage from their enemy’s knowledge of the locality. So they made +their assault at once, and came to close quarters as quickly as they could. +</p> + +<p> +The Thebans, finding themselves outwitted, immediately closed up to repel all +attacks made upon them. Twice or thrice they beat back their assailants. But +the men shouted and charged them, the women and slaves screamed and yelled from +the houses and pelted them with stones and tiles; besides, it had been raining +hard all night; and so at last their courage gave way, and they turned and fled +through the town. Most of the fugitives were quite ignorant of the right ways +out, and this, with the mud, and the darkness caused by the moon being in her +last quarter, and the fact that their pursuers knew their way about and could +easily stop their escape, proved fatal to many. The only gate open was the one +by which they had entered, and this was shut by one of the Plataeans driving +the spike of a javelin into the bar instead of the bolt; so that even here +there was no longer any means of exit. They were now chased all over the town. +Some got on the wall and threw themselves over, in most cases with a fatal +result. One party managed to find a deserted gate, and obtaining an axe from a +woman, cut through the bar; but as they were soon observed only a few succeeded +in getting out. Others were cut off in detail in different parts of the city. +The most numerous and compact body rushed into a large building next to the +city wall: the doors on the side of the street happened to be open, and the +Thebans fancied that they were the gates of the town, and that there was a +passage right through to the outside. The Plataeans, seeing their enemies in a +trap, now consulted whether they should set fire to the building and burn them +just as they were, or whether there was anything else that they could do with +them; until at length these and the rest of the Theban survivors found +wandering about the town agreed to an unconditional surrender of themselves and +their arms to the Plataeans. +</p> + +<p> +While such was the fate of the party in Plataea, the rest of the Thebans who +were to have joined them with all their forces before daybreak, in case of +anything miscarrying with the body that had entered, received the news of the +affair on the road, and pressed forward to their succour. Now Plataea is nearly +eight miles from Thebes, and their march delayed by the rain that had fallen in +the night, for the river Asopus had risen and was not easy of passage; and so, +having to march in the rain, and being hindered in crossing the river, they +arrived too late, and found the whole party either slain or captive. When they +learned what had happened, they at once formed a design against the Plataeans +outside the city. As the attack had been made in time of peace, and was +perfectly unexpected, there were of course men and stock in the fields; and the +Thebans wished if possible to have some prisoners to exchange against their +countrymen in the town, should any chance to have been taken alive. Such was +their plan. But the Plataeans suspected their intention almost before it was +formed, and becoming alarmed for their fellow citizens outside the town, sent a +herald to the Thebans, reproaching them for their unscrupulous attempt to seize +their city in time of peace, and warning them against any outrage on those +outside. Should the warning be disregarded, they threatened to put to death the +men they had in their hands, but added that, on the Thebans retiring from their +territory, they would surrender the prisoners to their friends. This is the +Theban account of the matter, and they say that they had an oath given them. +The Plataeans, on the other hand, do not admit any promise of an immediate +surrender, but make it contingent upon subsequent negotiation: the oath they +deny altogether. Be this as it may, upon the Thebans retiring from their +territory without committing any injury, the Plataeans hastily got in whatever +they had in the country and immediately put the men to death. The prisoners +were a hundred and eighty in number; Eurymachus, the person with whom the +traitors had negotiated, being one. +</p> + +<p> +This done, the Plataeans sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the dead to the +Thebans under a truce, and arranged things in the city as seemed best to meet +the present emergency. The Athenians meanwhile, having had word of the affair +sent them immediately after its occurrence, had instantly seized all the +Boeotians in Attica, and sent a herald to the Plataeans to forbid their +proceeding to extremities with their Theban prisoners without instructions from +Athens. The news of the men’s death had of course not arrived; the first +messenger having left Plataea just when the Thebans entered it, the second just +after their defeat and capture; so there was no later news. Thus the Athenians +sent orders in ignorance of the facts; and the herald on his arrival found the +men slain. After this the Athenians marched to Plataea and brought in +provisions, and left a garrison in the place, also taking away the women and +children and such of the men as were least efficient. +</p> + +<p> +After the affair at Plataea, the treaty had been broken by an overt act, and +Athens at once prepared for war, as did also Lacedaemon and her allies. They +resolved to send embassies to the King and to such other of the barbarian +powers as either party could look to for assistance, and tried to ally +themselves with the independent states at home. Lacedaemon, in addition to the +existing marine, gave orders to the states that had declared for her in Italy +and Sicily to build vessels up to a grand total of five hundred, the quota of +each city being determined by its size, and also to provide a specified sum of +money. Till these were ready they were to remain neutral and to admit single +Athenian ships into their harbours. Athens on her part reviewed her existing +confederacy, and sent embassies to the places more immediately round +Peloponnese—Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and +Zacynthus—perceiving that if these could be relied on she could carry the +war all round Peloponnese. +</p> + +<p> +And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put forth their utmost +strength for the war, this was only natural. Zeal is always at its height at +the commencement of an undertaking; and on this particular occasion Peloponnese +and Athens were both full of young men whose inexperience made them eager to +take up arms, while the rest of Hellas stood straining with excitement at the +conflict of its leading cities. Everywhere predictions were being recited and +oracles being chanted by such persons as collect them, and this not only in the +contending cities. Further, some while before this, there was an earthquake at +Delos, for the first time in the memory of the Hellenes. This was said and +thought to be ominous of the events impending; indeed, nothing of the kind that +happened was allowed to pass without remark. The good wishes of men made +greatly for the Lacedaemonians, especially as they proclaimed themselves the +liberators of Hellas. No private or public effort that could help them in +speech or action was omitted; each thinking that the cause suffered wherever he +could not himself see to it. So general was the indignation felt against +Athens, whether by those who wished to escape from her empire, or were +apprehensive of being absorbed by it. Such were the preparations and such the +feelings with which the contest opened. +</p> + +<p> +The allies of the two belligerents were the following. These were the allies of +Lacedaemon: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus except the Argives and +Achaeans, who were neutral; Pellene being the only Achaean city that first +joined in the war, though her example was afterwards followed by the rest. +Outside Peloponnese the Megarians, Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, +Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of these, ships were furnished by the Corinthians, +Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians; and +cavalry by the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The other states sent +infantry. This was the Lacedaemonian confederacy. That of Athens comprised the +Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in Naupactus, most of the +Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, Zacynthians, and some tributary cities in the +following countries, viz., Caria upon the sea with her Dorian neighbours, +Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian towns, the islands lying between +Peloponnese and Crete towards the east, and all the Cyclades except Melos and +Thera. Of these, ships were furnished by Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, infantry +and money by the rest. Such were the allies of either party and their resources +for the war. +</p> + +<p> +Immediately after the affair at Plataea, Lacedaemon sent round orders to the +cities in Peloponnese and the rest of her confederacy to prepare troops and the +provisions requisite for a foreign campaign, in order to invade Attica. The +several states were ready at the time appointed and assembled at the Isthmus: +the contingent of each city being two-thirds of its whole force. After the +whole army had mustered, the Lacedaemonian king, Archidamus, the leader of the +expedition, called together the generals of all the states and the principal +persons and officers, and exhorted them as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both within +and without Peloponnese, and the elder men among us here are not without +experience in war. Yet we have never set out with a larger force than the +present; and if our numbers and efficiency are remarkable, so also is the power +of the state against which we march. We ought not then to show ourselves +inferior to our ancestors, or unequal to our own reputation. For the hopes and +attention of all Hellas are bent upon the present effort, and its sympathy is +with the enemy of the hated Athens. Therefore, numerous as the invading army +may appear to be, and certain as some may think it that our adversary will not +meet us in the field, this is no sort of justification for the least negligence +upon the march; but the officers and men of each particular city should always +be prepared for the advent of danger in their own quarters. The course of war +cannot be foreseen, and its attacks are generally dictated by the impulse of +the moment; and where overweening self-confidence has despised preparation, a +wise apprehension often been able to make head against superior numbers. Not +that confidence is out of place in an army of invasion, but in an enemy’s +country it should also be accompanied by the precautions of apprehension: +troops will by this combination be best inspired for dealing a blow, and best +secured against receiving one. In the present instance, the city against which +we are going, far from being so impotent for defence, is on the contrary most +excellently equipped at all points; so that we have every reason to expect that +they will take the field against us, and that if they have not set out already +before we are there, they will certainly do so when they see us in their +territory wasting and destroying their property. For men are always exasperated +at suffering injuries to which they are not accustomed, and on seeing them +inflicted before their very eyes; and where least inclined for reflection, rush +with the greatest heat to action. The Athenians are the very people of all +others to do this, as they aspire to rule the rest of the world, and are more +in the habit of invading and ravaging their neighbours’ territory, than +of seeing their own treated in the like fashion. Considering, therefore, the +power of the state against which we are marching, and the greatness of the +reputation which, according to the event, we shall win or lose for our +ancestors and ourselves, remember as you follow where you may be led to regard +discipline and vigilance as of the first importance, and to obey with alacrity +the orders transmitted to you; as nothing contributes so much to the credit and +safety of an army as the union of large bodies by a single discipline.” +</p> + +<p> +With this brief speech dismissing the assembly, Archidamus first sent off +Melesippus, son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in case she should be more +inclined to submit on seeing the Peloponnesians actually on the march. But the +Athenians did not admit into the city or to their assembly, Pericles having +already carried a motion against admitting either herald or embassy from the +Lacedaemonians after they had once marched out. +</p> + +<p> +The herald was accordingly sent away without an audience, and ordered to be +beyond the frontier that same day; in future, if those who sent him had a +proposition to make, they must retire to their own territory before they +dispatched embassies to Athens. An escort was sent with Melesippus to prevent +his holding communication with any one. When he reached the frontier and was +just going to be dismissed, he departed with these words: “This day will +be the beginning of great misfortunes to the Hellenes.” As soon as he +arrived at the camp, and Archidamus learnt that the Athenians had still no +thoughts of submitting, he at length began his march, and advanced with his +army into their territory. Meanwhile the Boeotians, sending their contingent +and cavalry to join the Peloponnesian expedition, went to Plataea with the +remainder and laid waste the country. +</p> + +<p> +While the Peloponnesians were still mustering at the Isthmus, or on the march +before they invaded Attica, Pericles, son of Xanthippus, one of the ten +generals of the Athenians, finding that the invasion was to take place, +conceived the idea that Archidamus, who happened to be his friend, might +possibly pass by his estate without ravaging it. This he might do, either from +a personal wish to oblige him, or acting under instructions from Lacedaemon for +the purpose of creating a prejudice against him, as had been before attempted +in the demand for the expulsion of the accursed family. He accordingly took the +precaution of announcing to the Athenians in the assembly that, although +Archidamus was his friend, yet this friendship should not extend to the +detriment of the state, and that in case the enemy should make his houses and +lands an exception to the rest and not pillage them, he at once gave them up to +be public property, so that they should not bring him into suspicion. He also +gave the citizens some advice on their present affairs in the same strain as +before. They were to prepare for the war, and to carry in their property from +the country. They were not to go out to battle, but to come into the city and +guard it, and get ready their fleet, in which their real strength lay. They +were also to keep a tight rein on their allies—the strength of Athens +being derived from the money brought in by their payments, and success in war +depending principally upon conduct and capital, had no reason to despond. Apart +from other sources of income, an average revenue of six hundred talents of +silver was drawn from the tribute of the allies; and there were still six +thousand talents of coined silver in the Acropolis, out of nine thousand seven +hundred that had once been there, from which the money had been taken for the +porch of the Acropolis, the other public buildings, and for Potidæa. This did +not include the uncoined gold and silver in public and private offerings, the +sacred vessels for the processions and games, the Median spoils, and similar +resources to the amount of five hundred talents. To this he added the treasures +of the other temples. These were by no means inconsiderable, and might fairly +be used. Nay, if they were ever absolutely driven to it, they might take even +the gold ornaments of Athene herself; for the statue contained forty talents of +pure gold and it was all removable. This might be used for self-preservation, +and must every penny of it be restored. Such was their financial +position—surely a satisfactory one. Then they had an army of thirteen +thousand heavy infantry, besides sixteen thousand more in the garrisons and on +home duty at Athens. This was at first the number of men on guard in the event +of an invasion: it was composed of the oldest and youngest levies and the +resident aliens who had heavy armour. The Phaleric wall ran for four miles, +before it joined that round the city; and of this last nearly five had a guard, +although part of it was left without one, viz., that between the Long Wall and +the Phaleric. Then there were the Long Walls to Piraeus, a distance of some +four miles and a half, the outer of which was manned. Lastly, the circumference +of Piraeus with Munychia was nearly seven miles and a half; only half of this, +however, was guarded. Pericles also showed them that they had twelve hundred +horse including mounted archers, with sixteen hundred archers unmounted, and +three hundred galleys fit for service. Such were the resources of Athens in the +different departments when the Peloponnesian invasion was impending and +hostilities were being commenced. Pericles also urged his usual arguments for +expecting a favourable issue to the war. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians listened to his advice, and began to carry in their wives and +children from the country, and all their household furniture, even to the +woodwork of their houses which they took down. Their sheep and cattle they sent +over to Euboea and the adjacent islands. But they found it hard to move, as +most of them had been always used to live in the country. +</p> + +<p> +From very early times this had been more the case with the Athenians than with +others. Under Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign of Theseus, Attica +had always consisted of a number of independent townships, each with its own +town hall and magistrates. Except in times of danger the king at Athens was not +consulted; in ordinary seasons they carried on their government and settled +their affairs without his interference; sometimes even they waged war against +him, as in the case of the Eleusinians with Eumolpus against Erechtheus. In +Theseus, however, they had a king of equal intelligence and power; and one of +the chief features in his organization of the country was to abolish the +council-chambers and magistrates of the petty cities, and to merge them in the +single council-chamber and town hall of the present capital. Individuals might +still enjoy their private property just as before, but they were henceforth +compelled to have only one political centre, viz., Athens; which thus counted +all the inhabitants of Attica among her citizens, so that when Theseus died he +left a great state behind him. Indeed, from him dates the Synoecia, or Feast of +Union; which is paid for by the state, and which the Athenians still keep in +honour of the goddess. Before this the city consisted of the present citadel +and the district beneath it looking rather towards the south. This is shown by +the fact that the temples of the other deities, besides that of Athene, are in +the citadel; and even those that are outside it are mostly situated in this +quarter of the city, as that of the Olympian Zeus, of the Pythian Apollo, of +Earth, and of Dionysus in the Marshes, the same in whose honour the older +Dionysia are to this day celebrated in the month of Anthesterion not only by +the Athenians but also by their Ionian descendants. There are also other +ancient temples in this quarter. The fountain too, which, since the alteration +made by the tyrants, has been called Enneacrounos, or Nine Pipes, but which, +when the spring was open, went by the name of Callirhoe, or Fairwater, was in +those days, from being so near, used for the most important offices. Indeed, +the old fashion of using the water before marriage and for other sacred +purposes is still kept up. Again, from their old residence in that quarter, the +citadel is still known among Athenians as the city. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians thus long lived scattered over Attica in independent townships. +Even after the centralization of Theseus, old habit still prevailed; and from +the early times down to the present war most Athenians still lived in the +country with their families and households, and were consequently not at all +inclined to move now, especially as they had only just restored their +establishments after the Median invasion. Deep was their trouble and discontent +at abandoning their houses and the hereditary temples of the ancient +constitution, and at having to change their habits of life and to bid farewell +to what each regarded as his native city. +</p> + +<p> +When they arrived at Athens, though a few had houses of their own to go to, or +could find an asylum with friends or relatives, by far the greater number had +to take up their dwelling in the parts of the city that were not built over and +in the temples and chapels of the heroes, except the Acropolis and the temple +of the Eleusinian Demeter and such other Places as were always kept closed. The +occupation of the plot of ground lying below the citadel called the Pelasgian +had been forbidden by a curse; and there was also an ominous fragment of a +Pythian oracle which said: +</p> + +<p> +Leave the Pelasgian parcel desolate, Woe worth the day that men inhabit it! +</p> + +<p> +Yet this too was now built over in the necessity of the moment. And in my +opinion, if the oracle proved true, it was in the opposite sense to what was +expected. For the misfortunes of the state did not arise from the unlawful +occupation, but the necessity of the occupation from the war; and though the +god did not mention this, he foresaw that it would be an evil day for Athens in +which the plot came to be inhabited. Many also took up their quarters in the +towers of the walls or wherever else they could. For when they were all come +in, the city proved too small to hold them; though afterwards they divided the +Long Walls and a great part of Piraeus into lots and settled there. All this +while great attention was being given to the war; the allies were being +mustered, and an armament of a hundred ships equipped for Peloponnese. Such was +the state of preparation at Athens. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing. The first town they +came to in Attica was Oenoe, where they to enter the country. Sitting down +before it, they prepared to assault the wall with engines and otherwise. Oenoe, +standing upon the Athenian and Boeotian border, was of course a walled town, +and was used as a fortress by the Athenians in time of war. So the +Peloponnesians prepared for their assault, and wasted some valuable time before +the place. This delay brought the gravest censure upon Archidamus. Even during +the levying of the war he had credit for weakness and Athenian sympathies by +the half measures he had advocated; and after the army had assembled he had +further injured himself in public estimation by his loitering at the Isthmus +and the slowness with which the rest of the march had been conducted. But all +this was as nothing to the delay at Oenoe. During this interval the Athenians +were carrying in their property; and it was the belief of the Peloponnesians +that a quick advance would have found everything still out, had it not been for +his procrastination. Such was the feeling of the army towards Archidamus during +the siege. But he, it is said, expected that the Athenians would shrink from +letting their land be wasted, and would make their submission while it was +still uninjured; and this was why he waited. +</p> + +<p> +But after he had assaulted Oenoe, and every possible attempt to take it had +failed, as no herald came from Athens, he at last broke up his camp and invaded +Attica. This was about eighty days after the Theban attempt upon Plataea, just +in the middle of summer, when the corn was ripe, and Archidamus, son of Zeuxis, +king of Lacedaemon, was in command. Encamping in Eleusis and the Thriasian +plain, they began their ravages, and putting to flight some Athenian horse at a +place called Rheiti, or the Brooks, they then advanced, keeping Mount Aegaleus +on their right, through Cropia, until they reached Acharnae, the largest of the +Athenian demes or townships. Sitting down before it, they formed a camp there, +and continued their ravages for a long while. +</p> + +<p> +The reason why Archidamus remained in order of battle at Acharnae during this +incursion, instead of descending into the plain, is said to have been this. He +hoped that the Athenians might possibly be tempted by the multitude of their +youth and the unprecedented efficiency of their service to come out to battle +and attempt to stop the devastation of their lands. Accordingly, as they had +met him at Eleusis or the Thriasian plain, he tried if they could be provoked +to a sally by the spectacle of a camp at Acharnae. He thought the place itself +a good position for encamping; and it seemed likely that such an important part +of the state as the three thousand heavy infantry of the Acharnians would +refuse to submit to the ruin of their property, and would force a battle on the +rest of the citizens. On the other hand, should the Athenians not take the +field during this incursion, he could then fearlessly ravage the plain in +future invasions, and extend his advance up to the very walls of Athens. After +the Acharnians had lost their own property they would be less willing to risk +themselves for that of their neighbours; and so there would be division in the +Athenian counsels. These were the motives of Archidamus for remaining at +Acharnae. +</p> + +<p> +In the meanwhile, as long as the army was at Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, +hopes were still entertained of its not advancing any nearer. It was remembered +that Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, had invaded Attica with +a Peloponnesian army fourteen years before, but had retreated without advancing +farther than Eleusis and Thria, which indeed proved the cause of his exile from +Sparta, as it was thought he had been bribed to retreat. But when they saw the +army at Acharnae, barely seven miles from Athens, they lost all patience. The +territory of Athens was being ravaged before the very eyes of the Athenians, a +sight which the young men had never seen before and the old only in the Median +wars; and it was naturally thought a grievous insult, and the determination was +universal, especially among the young men, to sally forth and stop it. Knots +were formed in the streets and engaged in hot discussion; for if the proposed +sally was warmly recommended, it was also in some cases opposed. Oracles of the +most various import were recited by the collectors, and found eager listeners +in one or other of the disputants. Foremost in pressing for the sally were the +Acharnians, as constituting no small part of the army of the state, and as it +was their land that was being ravaged. In short, the whole city was in a most +excited state; Pericles was the object of general indignation; his previous +counsels were totally forgotten; he was abused for not leading out the army +which he commanded, and was made responsible for the whole of the public +suffering. +</p> + +<p> +He, meanwhile, seeing anger and infatuation just now in the ascendant, and of +his wisdom in refusing a sally, would not call either assembly or meeting of +the people, fearing the fatal results of a debate inspired by passion and not +by prudence. Accordingly he addressed himself to the defence of the city, and +kept it as quiet as possible, though he constantly sent out cavalry to prevent +raids on the lands near the city from flying parties of the enemy. There was a +trifling affair at Phrygia between a squadron of the Athenian horse with the +Thessalians and the Boeotian cavalry; in which the former had rather the best +of it, until the heavy infantry advanced to the support of the Boeotians, when +the Thessalians and Athenians were routed and lost a few men, whose bodies, +however, were recovered the same day without a truce. The next day the +Peloponnesians set up a trophy. Ancient alliance brought the Thessalians to the +aid of Athens; those who came being the Larisaeans, Pharsalians, Cranonians, +Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. The Larisaean commanders were Polymedes +and Aristonus, two party leaders in Larisa; the Pharsalian general was Menon; +each of the other cities had also its own commander. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime the Peloponnesians, as the Athenians did not come out to engage +them, broke up from Acharnae and ravaged some of the demes between Mount Parnes +and Brilessus. While they were in Attica the Athenians sent off the hundred +ships which they had been preparing round Peloponnese, with a thousand heavy +infantry and four hundred archers on board, under the command of Carcinus, son +of Xenotimus, Proteas, son of Epicles, and Socrates, son of Antigenes. This +armament weighed anchor and started on its cruise, and the Peloponnesians, +after remaining in Attica as long as their provisions lasted, retired through +Boeotia by a different road to that by which they had entered. As they passed +Oropus they ravaged the territory of Graea, which is held by the Oropians from +Athens, and reaching Peloponnese broke up to their respective cities. +</p> + +<p> +After they had retired the Athenians set guards by land and sea at the points +at which they intended to have regular stations during the war. They also +resolved to set apart a special fund of a thousand talents from the moneys in +the Acropolis. This was not to be spent, but the current expenses of the war +were to be otherwise provided for. If any one should move or put to the vote a +proposition for using the money for any purpose whatever except that of +defending the city in the event of the enemy bringing a fleet to make an attack +by sea, it should be a capital offence. With this sum of money they also set +aside a special fleet of one hundred galleys, the best ships of each year, with +their captains. None of these were to be used except with the money and against +the same peril, should such peril arise. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships round Peloponnese, reinforced by a +Corcyraean squadron of fifty vessels and some others of the allies in those +parts, cruised about the coasts and ravaged the country. Among other places +they landed in Laconia and made an assault upon Methone; there being no +garrison in the place, and the wall being weak. But it so happened that +Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan, was in command of a guard for the defence +of the district. Hearing of the attack, he hurried with a hundred heavy +infantry to the assistance of the besieged, and dashing through the army of the +Athenians, which was scattered over the country and had its attention turned to +the wall, threw himself into Methone. He lost a few men in making good his +entrance, but saved the place and won the thanks of Sparta by his exploit, +being thus the first officer who obtained this notice during the war. The +Athenians at once weighed anchor and continued their cruise. Touching at Pheia +in Elis, they ravaged the country for two days and defeated a picked force of +three hundred men that had come from the vale of Elis and the immediate +neighbourhood to the rescue. But a stiff squall came down upon them, and, not +liking to face it in a place where there was no harbour, most of them got on +board their ships, and doubling Point Ichthys sailed into the port of Pheia. In +the meantime the Messenians, and some others who could not get on board, +marched over by land and took Pheia. The fleet afterwards sailed round and +picked them up and then put to sea; Pheia being evacuated, as the main army of +the Eleans had now come up. The Athenians continued their cruise, and ravaged +other places on the coast. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships to cruise round Locris and +also to guard Euboea; Cleopompus, son of Clinias, being in command. Making +descents from the fleet he ravaged certain places on the sea-coast, and +captured Thronium and took hostages from it. He also defeated at Alope the +Locrians that had assembled to resist him. +</p> + +<p> +During the summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans with their wives +and children from Aegina, on the ground of their having been the chief agents +in bringing the war upon them. Besides, Aegina lies so near Peloponnese that it +seemed safer to send colonists of their own to hold it, and shortly afterwards +the settlers were sent out. The banished Aeginetans found an asylum in Thyrea, +which was given to them by Lacedaemon, not only on account of her quarrel with +Athens, but also because the Aeginetans had laid her under obligations at the +time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. The territory of Thyrea is +on the frontier of Argolis and Laconia, reaching down to the sea. Those of the +Aeginetans who did not settle here were scattered over the rest of Hellas. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar month, the only time by the +way at which it appears possible, the sun was eclipsed after noon. After it had +assumed the form of a crescent and some of the stars had come out, it returned +to its natural shape. +</p> + +<p> +During the same summer Nymphodorus, son of Pythes, an Abderite, whose sister +Sitalces had married, was made their proxenus by the Athenians and sent for to +Athens. They had hitherto considered him their enemy; but he had great +influence with Sitalces, and they wished this prince to become their ally. +Sitalces was the son of Teres and King of the Thracians. Teres, the father of +Sitalces, was the first to establish the great kingdom of the Odrysians on a +scale quite unknown to the rest of Thrace, a large portion of the Thracians +being independent. This Teres is in no way related to Tereus who married +Pandion’s daughter Procne from Athens; nor indeed did they belong to the +same part of Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulis, part of what is now called Phocis, +but which at that time was inhabited by Thracians. It was in this land that the +women perpetrated the outrage upon Itys; and many of the poets when they +mention the nightingale call it the Daulian bird. Besides, Pandion in +contracting an alliance for his daughter would consider the advantages of +mutual assistance, and would naturally prefer a match at the above moderate +distance to the journey of many days which separates Athens from the Odrysians. +Again the names are different; and this Teres was king of the Odrysians, the +first by the way who attained to any power. Sitalces, his son, was now sought +as an ally by the Athenians, who desired his aid in the reduction of the +Thracian towns and of Perdiccas. Coming to Athens, Nymphodorus concluded the +alliance with Sitalces and made his son Sadocus an Athenian citizen, and +promised to finish the war in Thrace by persuading Sitalces to send the +Athenians a force of Thracian horse and targeteers. He also reconciled them +with Perdiccas, and induced them to restore Therme to him; upon which Perdiccas +at once joined the Athenians and Phormio in an expedition against the +Chalcidians. Thus Sitalces, son of Teres, King of the Thracians, and Perdiccas, +son of Alexander, King of the Macedonians, became allies of Athens. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred vessels were still cruising round +Peloponnese. After taking Sollium, a town belonging to Corinth, and presenting +the city and territory to the Acarnanians of Palaira, they stormed Astacus, +expelled its tyrant Evarchus, and gained the place for their confederacy. Next +they sailed to the island of Cephallenia and brought it over without using +force. Cephallenia lies off Acarnania and Leucas, and consists of four states, +the Paleans, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronaeans. Not long afterwards the fleet +returned to Athens. Towards the autumn of this year the Athenians invaded the +Megarid with their whole levy, resident aliens included, under the command of +Pericles, son of Xanthippus. The Athenians in the hundred ships round +Peloponnese on their journey home had just reached Aegina, and hearing that the +citizens at home were in full force at Megara, now sailed over and joined them. +This was without doubt the largest army of Athenians ever assembled, the state +being still in the flower of her strength and yet unvisited by the plague. Full +ten thousand heavy infantry were in the field, all Athenian citizens, besides +the three thousand before Potidæa. Then the resident aliens who joined in the +incursion were at least three thousand strong; besides which there was a +multitude of light troops. They ravaged the greater part of the territory, and +then retired. Other incursions into the Megarid were afterwards made by the +Athenians annually during the war, sometimes only with cavalry, sometimes with +all their forces. This went on until the capture of Nisaea. Atalanta also, the +desert island off the Opuntian coast, was towards the end of this summer +converted into a fortified post by the Athenians, in order to prevent +privateers issuing from Opus and the rest of Locris and plundering Euboea. Such +were the events of this summer after the return of the Peloponnesians from +Attica. +</p> + +<p> +In the ensuing winter the Acarnanian Evarchus, wishing to return to Astacus, +persuaded the Corinthians to sail over with forty ships and fifteen hundred +heavy infantry and restore him; himself also hiring some mercenaries. In +command of the force were Euphamidas, son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus, son of +Timocrates, and Eumachus, son of Chrysis, who sailed over and restored him and, +after failing in an attempt on some places on the Acarnanian coast which they +were desirous of gaining, began their voyage home. Coasting along shore they +touched at Cephallenia and made a descent on the Cranian territory, and losing +some men by the treachery of the Cranians, who fell suddenly upon them after +having agreed to treat, put to sea somewhat hurriedly and returned home. +</p> + +<p> +In the same winter the Athenians gave a funeral at the public cost to those who +had first fallen in this war. It was a custom of their ancestors, and the +manner of it is as follows. Three days before the ceremony, the bones of the +dead are laid out in a tent which has been erected; and their friends bring to +their relatives such offerings as they please. In the funeral procession +cypress coffins are borne in cars, one for each tribe; the bones of the +deceased being placed in the coffin of their tribe. Among these is carried one +empty bier decked for the missing, that is, for those whose bodies could not be +recovered. Any citizen or stranger who pleases, joins in the procession: and +the female relatives are there to wail at the burial. The dead are laid in the +public sepulchre in the Beautiful suburb of the city, in which those who fall +in war are always buried; with the exception of those slain at Marathon, who +for their singular and extraordinary valour were interred on the spot where +they fell. After the bodies have been laid in the earth, a man chosen by the +state, of approved wisdom and eminent reputation, pronounces over them an +appropriate panegyric; after which all retire. Such is the manner of the +burying; and throughout the whole of the war, whenever the occasion arose, the +established custom was observed. Meanwhile these were the first that had +fallen, and Pericles, son of Xanthippus, was chosen to pronounce their +eulogium. When the proper time arrived, he advanced from the sepulchre to an +elevated platform in order to be heard by as many of the crowd as possible, and +spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Most of my predecessors in this place have commended him who made this +speech part of the law, telling us that it is well that it should be delivered +at the burial of those who fall in battle. For myself, I should have thought +that the worth which had displayed itself in deeds would be sufficiently +rewarded by honours also shown by deeds; such as you now see in this funeral +prepared at the people’s cost. And I could have wished that the +reputations of many brave men were not to be imperilled in the mouth of a +single individual, to stand or fall according as he spoke well or ill. For it +is hard to speak properly upon a subject where it is even difficult to convince +your hearers that you are speaking the truth. On the one hand, the friend who +is familiar with every fact of the story may think that some point has not been +set forth with that fullness which he wishes and knows it to deserve; on the +other, he who is a stranger to the matter may be led by envy to suspect +exaggeration if he hears anything above his own nature. For men can endure to +hear others praised only so long as they can severally persuade themselves of +their own ability to equal the actions recounted: when this point is passed, +envy comes in and with it incredulity. However, since our ancestors have +stamped this custom with their approval, it becomes my duty to obey the law and +to try to satisfy your several wishes and opinions as best I may. +</p> + +<p> +“I shall begin with our ancestors: it is both just and proper that they +should have the honour of the first mention on an occasion like the present. +They dwelt in the country without break in the succession from generation to +generation, and handed it down free to the present time by their valour. And if +our more remote ancestors deserve praise, much more do our own fathers, who +added to their inheritance the empire which we now possess, and spared no pains +to be able to leave their acquisitions to us of the present generation. Lastly, +there are few parts of our dominions that have not been augmented by those of +us here, who are still more or less in the vigour of life; while the mother +country has been furnished by us with everything that can enable her to depend +on her own resources whether for war or for peace. That part of our history +which tells of the military achievements which gave us our several possessions, +or of the ready valour with which either we or our fathers stemmed the tide of +Hellenic or foreign aggression, is a theme too familiar to my hearers for me to +dilate on, and I shall therefore pass it by. But what was the road by which we +reached our position, what the form of government under which our greatness +grew, what the national habits out of which it sprang; these are questions +which I may try to solve before I proceed to my panegyric upon these men; since +I think this to be a subject upon which on the present occasion a speaker may +properly dwell, and to which the whole assemblage, whether citizens or +foreigners, may listen with advantage. +</p> + +<p> +“Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states; we are +rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration favours +the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look +to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if +no social standing, advancement in public life falls to reputation for +capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor +again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not +hindered by the obscurity of his condition. The freedom which we enjoy in our +government extends also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a +jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry +with our neighbour for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those +injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no +positive penalty. But all this ease in our private relations does not make us +lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to +obey the magistrates and the laws, particularly such as regard the protection +of the injured, whether they are actually on the statute book, or belong to +that code which, although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged +disgrace. +</p> + +<p> +“Further, we provide plenty of means for the mind to refresh itself from +business. We celebrate games and sacrifices all the year round, and the +elegance of our private establishments forms a daily source of pleasure and +helps to banish the spleen; while the magnitude of our city draws the produce +of the world into our harbour, so that to the Athenian the fruits of other +countries are as familiar a luxury as those of his own. +</p> + +<p> +“If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from our +antagonists. We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien acts +exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing, although the +eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality; trusting less in +system and policy than to the native spirit of our citizens; while in +education, where our rivals from their very cradles by a painful discipline +seek after manliness, at Athens we live exactly as we please, and yet are just +as ready to encounter every legitimate danger. In proof of this it may be +noticed that the Lacedaemonians do not invade our country alone, but bring with +them all their confederates; while we Athenians advance unsupported into the +territory of a neighbour, and fighting upon a foreign soil usually vanquish +with ease men who are defending their homes. Our united force was never yet +encountered by any enemy, because we have at once to attend to our marine and +to dispatch our citizens by land upon a hundred different services; so that, +wherever they engage with some such fraction of our strength, a success against +a detachment is magnified into a victory over the nation, and a defeat into a +reverse suffered at the hands of our entire people. And yet if with habits not +of labour but of ease, and courage not of art but of nature, we are still +willing to encounter danger, we have the double advantage of escaping the +experience of hardships in anticipation and of facing them in the hour of need +as fearlessly as those who are never free from them. +</p> + +<p> +“Nor are these the only points in which our city is worthy of admiration. +We cultivate refinement without extravagance and knowledge without effeminacy; +wealth we employ more for use than for show, and place the real disgrace of +poverty not in owning to the fact but in declining the struggle against it. Our +public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our +ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still +fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, regarding him who +takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, we Athenians +are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate, and, instead of looking +on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an +indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all. Again, in our enterprises +we present the singular spectacle of daring and deliberation, each carried to +its highest point, and both united in the same persons; although usually +decision is the fruit of ignorance, hesitation of reflection. But the palm of +courage will surely be adjudged most justly to those, who best know the +difference between hardship and pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink +from danger. In generosity we are equally singular, acquiring our friends by +conferring, not by receiving, favours. Yet, of course, the doer of the favour +is the firmer friend of the two, in order by continued kindness to keep the +recipient in his debt; while the debtor feels less keenly from the very +consciousness that the return he makes will be a payment, not a free gift. And +it is only the Athenians, who, fearless of consequences, confer their benefits +not from calculations of expediency, but in the confidence of liberality. +</p> + +<p> +“In short, I say that as a city we are the school of Hellas, while I +doubt if the world can produce a man who, where he has only himself to depend +upon, is equal to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy a versatility, as +the Athenian. And that this is no mere boast thrown out for the occasion, but +plain matter of fact, the power of the state acquired by these habits proves. +For Athens alone of her contemporaries is found when tested to be greater than +her reputation, and alone gives no occasion to her assailants to blush at the +antagonist by whom they have been worsted, or to her subjects to question her +title by merit to rule. Rather, the admiration of the present and succeeding +ages will be ours, since we have not left our power without witness, but have +shown it by mighty proofs; and far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist, or +other of his craft whose verses might charm for the moment only for the +impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have forced every +sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere, whether for evil +or for good, have left imperishable monuments behind us. Such is the Athens for +which these men, in the assertion of their resolve not to lose her, nobly +fought and died; and well may every one of their survivors be ready to suffer +in her cause. +</p> + +<p> +“Indeed if I have dwelt at some length upon the character of our country, +it has been to show that our stake in the struggle is not the same as theirs +who have no such blessings to lose, and also that the panegyric of the men over +whom I am now speaking might be by definite proofs established. That panegyric +is now in a great measure complete; for the Athens that I have celebrated is +only what the heroism of these and their like have made her, men whose fame, +unlike that of most Hellenes, will be found to be only commensurate with their +deserts. And if a test of worth be wanted, it is to be found in their closing +scene, and this not only in cases in which it set the final seal upon their +merit, but also in those in which it gave the first intimation of their having +any. For there is justice in the claim that steadfastness in his +country’s battles should be as a cloak to cover a man’s other +imperfections; since the good action has blotted out the bad, and his merit as +a citizen more than outweighed his demerits as an individual. But none of these +allowed either wealth with its prospect of future enjoyment to unnerve his +spirit, or poverty with its hope of a day of freedom and riches to tempt him to +shrink from danger. No, holding that vengeance upon their enemies was more to +be desired than any personal blessings, and reckoning this to be the most +glorious of hazards, they joyfully determined to accept the risk, to make sure +of their vengeance, and to let their wishes wait; and while committing to hope +the uncertainty of final success, in the business before them they thought fit +to act boldly and trust in themselves. Thus choosing to die resisting, rather +than to live submitting, they fled only from dishonour, but met danger face to +face, and after one brief moment, while at the summit of their fortune, +escaped, not from their fear, but from their glory. +</p> + +<p> +“So died these men as became Athenians. You, their survivors, must +determine to have as unfaltering a resolution in the field, though you may pray +that it may have a happier issue. And not contented with ideas derived only +from words of the advantages which are bound up with the defence of your +country, though these would furnish a valuable text to a speaker even before an +audience so alive to them as the present, you must yourselves realize the power +of Athens, and feed your eyes upon her from day to day, till love of her fills +your hearts; and then, when all her greatness shall break upon you, you must +reflect that it was by courage, sense of duty, and a keen feeling of honour in +action that men were enabled to win all this, and that no personal failure in +an enterprise could make them consent to deprive their country of their valour, +but they laid it at her feet as the most glorious contribution that they could +offer. For this offering of their lives made in common by them all they each of +them individually received that renown which never grows old, and for a +sepulchre, not so much that in which their bones have been deposited, but that +noblest of shrines wherein their glory is laid up to be eternally remembered +upon every occasion on which deed or story shall call for its commemoration. +For heroes have the whole earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their +own, where the column with its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every +breast a record unwritten with no tablet to preserve it, except that of the +heart. These take as your model and, judging happiness to be the fruit of +freedom and freedom of valour, never decline the dangers of war. For it is not +the miserable that would most justly be unsparing of their lives; these have +nothing to hope for: it is rather they to whom continued life may bring +reverses as yet unknown, and to whom a fall, if it came, would be most +tremendous in its consequences. And surely, to a man of spirit, the degradation +of cowardice must be immeasurably more grievous than the unfelt death which +strikes him in the midst of his strength and patriotism! +</p> + +<p> +“Comfort, therefore, not condolence, is what I have to offer to the +parents of the dead who may be here. Numberless are the chances to which, as +they know, the life of man is subject; but fortunate indeed are they who draw +for their lot a death so glorious as that which has caused your mourning, and +to whom life has been so exactly measured as to terminate in the happiness in +which it has been passed. Still I know that this is a hard saying, especially +when those are in question of whom you will constantly be reminded by seeing in +the homes of others blessings of which once you also boasted: for grief is felt +not so much for the want of what we have never known, as for the loss of that +to which we have been long accustomed. Yet you who are still of an age to beget +children must bear up in the hope of having others in their stead; not only +will they help you to forget those whom you have lost, but will be to the state +at once a reinforcement and a security; for never can a fair or just policy be +expected of the citizen who does not, like his fellows, bring to the decision +the interests and apprehensions of a father. While those of you who have passed +your prime must congratulate yourselves with the thought that the best part of +your life was fortunate, and that the brief span that remains will be cheered +by the fame of the departed. For it is only the love of honour that never grows +old; and honour it is, not gain, as some would have it, that rejoices the heart +of age and helplessness. +</p> + +<p> +“Turning to the sons or brothers of the dead, I see an arduous struggle +before you. When a man is gone, all are wont to praise him, and should your +merit be ever so transcendent, you will still find it difficult not merely to +overtake, but even to approach their renown. The living have envy to contend +with, while those who are no longer in our path are honoured with a goodwill +into which rivalry does not enter. On the other hand, if I must say anything on +the subject of female excellence to those of you who will now be in widowhood, +it will be all comprised in this brief exhortation. Great will be your glory in +not falling short of your natural character; and greatest will be hers who is +least talked of among the men, whether for good or for bad. +</p> + +<p> +“My task is now finished. I have performed it to the best of my ability, +and in word, at least, the requirements of the law are now satisfied. If deeds +be in question, those who are here interred have received part of their honours +already, and for the rest, their children will be brought up till manhood at +the public expense: the state thus offers a valuable prize, as the garland of +victory in this race of valour, for the reward both of those who have fallen +and their survivors. And where the rewards for merit are greatest, there are +found the best citizens. +</p> + +<p> +“And now that you have brought to a close your lamentations for your +relatives, you may depart.” +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0007" id="link2HCH0007"></a> +CHAPTER VII </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Second Year of the War—The Plague of Athens—Position and Policy of +Pericles—Fall of Potidæa +</p> + +<p> +Such was the funeral that took place during this winter, with which the first +year of the war came to an end. In the first days of summer the Lacedaemonians +and their allies, with two-thirds of their forces as before, invaded Attica, +under the command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, King of Lacedaemon, and sat +down and laid waste the country. Not many days after their arrival in Attica +the plague first began to show itself among the Athenians. It was said that it +had broken out in many places previously in the neighbourhood of Lemnos and +elsewhere; but a pestilence of such extent and mortality was nowhere +remembered. Neither were the physicians at first of any service, ignorant as +they were of the proper way to treat it, but they died themselves the most +thickly, as they visited the sick most often; nor did any human art succeed any +better. Supplications in the temples, divinations, and so forth were found +equally futile, till the overwhelming nature of the disaster at last put a stop +to them altogether. +</p> + +<p> +It first began, it is said, in the parts of Ethiopia above Egypt, and thence +descended into Egypt and Libya and into most of the King’s country. +Suddenly falling upon Athens, it first attacked the population in +Piraeus—which was the occasion of their saying that the Peloponnesians +had poisoned the reservoirs, there being as yet no wells there—and +afterwards appeared in the upper city, when the deaths became much more +frequent. All speculation as to its origin and its causes, if causes can be +found adequate to produce so great a disturbance, I leave to other writers, +whether lay or professional; for myself, I shall simply set down its nature, +and explain the symptoms by which perhaps it may be recognized by the student, +if it should ever break out again. This I can the better do, as I had the +disease myself, and watched its operation in the case of others. +</p> + +<p> +That year then is admitted to have been otherwise unprecedentedly free from +sickness; and such few cases as occurred all determined in this. As a rule, +however, there was no ostensible cause; but people in good health were all of a +sudden attacked by violent heats in the head, and redness and inflammation in +the eyes, the inward parts, such as the throat or tongue, becoming bloody and +emitting an unnatural and fetid breath. These symptoms were followed by +sneezing and hoarseness, after which the pain soon reached the chest, and +produced a hard cough. When it fixed in the stomach, it upset it; and +discharges of bile of every kind named by physicians ensued, accompanied by +very great distress. In most cases also an ineffectual retching followed, +producing violent spasms, which in some cases ceased soon after, in others much +later. Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor pale in its +appearance, but reddish, livid, and breaking out into small pustules and +ulcers. But internally it burned so that the patient could not bear to have on +him clothing or linen even of the very lightest description; or indeed to be +otherwise than stark naked. What they would have liked best would have been to +throw themselves into cold water; as indeed was done by some of the neglected +sick, who plunged into the rain-tanks in their agonies of unquenchable thirst; +though it made no difference whether they drank little or much. Besides this, +the miserable feeling of not being able to rest or sleep never ceased to +torment them. The body meanwhile did not waste away so long as the distemper +was at its height, but held out to a marvel against its ravages; so that when +they succumbed, as in most cases, on the seventh or eighth day to the internal +inflammation, they had still some strength in them. But if they passed this +stage, and the disease descended further into the bowels, inducing a violent +ulceration there accompanied by severe diarrhoea, this brought on a weakness +which was generally fatal. For the disorder first settled in the head, ran its +course from thence through the whole of the body, and, even where it did not +prove mortal, it still left its mark on the extremities; for it settled in the +privy parts, the fingers and the toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, +some too with that of their eyes. Others again were seized with an entire loss +of memory on their first recovery, and did not know either themselves or their +friends. +</p> + +<p> +But while the nature of the distemper was such as to baffle all description, +and its attacks almost too grievous for human nature to endure, it was still in +the following circumstance that its difference from all ordinary disorders was +most clearly shown. All the birds and beasts that prey upon human bodies, +either abstained from touching them (though there were many lying unburied), or +died after tasting them. In proof of this, it was noticed that birds of this +kind actually disappeared; they were not about the bodies, or indeed to be seen +at all. But of course the effects which I have mentioned could best be studied +in a domestic animal like the dog. +</p> + +<p> +Such then, if we pass over the varieties of particular cases which were many +and peculiar, were the general features of the distemper. Meanwhile the town +enjoyed an immunity from all the ordinary disorders; or if any case occurred, +it ended in this. Some died in neglect, others in the midst of every attention. +No remedy was found that could be used as a specific; for what did good in one +case, did harm in another. Strong and weak constitutions proved equally +incapable of resistance, all alike being swept away, although dieted with the +utmost precaution. By far the most terrible feature in the malady was the +dejection which ensued when any one felt himself sickening, for the despair +into which they instantly fell took away their power of resistance, and left +them a much easier prey to the disorder; besides which, there was the awful +spectacle of men dying like sheep, through having caught the infection in +nursing each other. This caused the greatest mortality. On the one hand, if +they were afraid to visit each other, they perished from neglect; indeed many +houses were emptied of their inmates for want of a nurse: on the other, if they +ventured to do so, death was the consequence. This was especially the case with +such as made any pretensions to goodness: honour made them unsparing of +themselves in their attendance in their friends’ houses, where even the +members of the family were at last worn out by the moans of the dying, and +succumbed to the force of the disaster. Yet it was with those who had recovered +from the disease that the sick and the dying found most compassion. These knew +what it was from experience, and had now no fear for themselves; for the same +man was never attacked twice—never at least fatally. And such persons not +only received the congratulations of others, but themselves also, in the +elation of the moment, half entertained the vain hope that they were for the +future safe from any disease whatsoever. +</p> + +<p> +An aggravation of the existing calamity was the influx from the country into +the city, and this was especially felt by the new arrivals. As there were no +houses to receive them, they had to be lodged at the hot season of the year in +stifling cabins, where the mortality raged without restraint. The bodies of +dying men lay one upon another, and half-dead creatures reeled about the +streets and gathered round all the fountains in their longing for water. The +sacred places also in which they had quartered themselves were full of corpses +of persons that had died there, just as they were; for as the disaster passed +all bounds, men, not knowing what was to become of them, became utterly +careless of everything, whether sacred or profane. All the burial rites before +in use were entirely upset, and they buried the bodies as best they could. Many +from want of the proper appliances, through so many of their friends having +died already, had recourse to the most shameless sepultures: sometimes getting +the start of those who had raised a pile, they threw their own dead body upon +the stranger’s pyre and ignited it; sometimes they tossed the corpse +which they were carrying on the top of another that was burning, and so went +off. +</p> + +<p> +Nor was this the only form of lawless extravagance which owed its origin to the +plague. Men now coolly ventured on what they had formerly done in a corner, and +not just as they pleased, seeing the rapid transitions produced by persons in +prosperity suddenly dying and those who before had nothing succeeding to their +property. So they resolved to spend quickly and enjoy themselves, regarding +their lives and riches as alike things of a day. Perseverance in what men +called honour was popular with none, it was so uncertain whether they would be +spared to attain the object; but it was settled that present enjoyment, and all +that contributed to it, was both honourable and useful. Fear of gods or law of +man there was none to restrain them. As for the first, they judged it to be +just the same whether they worshipped them or not, as they saw all alike +perishing; and for the last, no one expected to live to be brought to trial for +his offences, but each felt that a far severer sentence had been already passed +upon them all and hung ever over their heads, and before this fell it was only +reasonable to enjoy life a little. +</p> + +<p> +Such was the nature of the calamity, and heavily did it weigh on the Athenians; +death raging within the city and devastation without. Among other things which +they remembered in their distress was, very naturally, the following verse +which the old men said had long ago been uttered: +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +A Dorian war shall come and with it death. +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +So a dispute arose as to whether dearth and not death had not been the word in +the verse; but at the present juncture, it was of course decided in favour of +the latter; for the people made their recollection fit in with their +sufferings. I fancy, however, that if another Dorian war should ever afterwards +come upon us, and a dearth should happen to accompany it, the verse will +probably be read accordingly. The oracle also which had been given to the +Lacedaemonians was now remembered by those who knew of it. When the god was +asked whether they should go to war, he answered that if they put their might +into it, victory would be theirs, and that he would himself be with them. With +this oracle events were supposed to tally. For the plague broke out as soon as +the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, and never entering Peloponnese (not at least +to an extent worth noticing), committed its worst ravages at Athens, and next +to Athens, at the most populous of the other towns. Such was the history of the +plague. +</p> + +<p> +After ravaging the plain, the Peloponnesians advanced into the Paralian region +as far as Laurium, where the Athenian silver mines are, and first laid waste +the side looking towards Peloponnese, next that which faces Euboea and Andros. +But Pericles, who was still general, held the same opinion as in the former +invasion, and would not let the Athenians march out against them. +</p> + +<p> +However, while they were still in the plain, and had not yet entered the +Paralian land, he had prepared an armament of a hundred ships for Peloponnese, +and when all was ready put out to sea. On board the ships he took four thousand +Athenian heavy infantry, and three hundred cavalry in horse transports, and +then for the first time made out of old galleys; fifty Chian and Lesbian +vessels also joining in the expedition. When this Athenian armament put out to +sea, they left the Peloponnesians in Attica in the Paralian region. Arriving at +Epidaurus in Peloponnese they ravaged most of the territory, and even had hopes +of taking the town by an assault: in this however they were not successful. +Putting out from Epidaurus, they laid waste the territory of Troezen, Halieis, +and Hermione, all towns on the coast of Peloponnese, and thence sailing to +Prasiai, a maritime town in Laconia, ravaged part of its territory, and took +and sacked the place itself; after which they returned home, but found the +Peloponnesians gone and no longer in Attica. +</p> + +<p> +During the whole time that the Peloponnesians were in Attica and the Athenians +on the expedition in their ships, men kept dying of the plague both in the +armament and in Athens. Indeed it was actually asserted that the departure of +the Peloponnesians was hastened by fear of the disorder; as they heard from +deserters that it was in the city, and also could see the burials going on. Yet +in this invasion they remained longer than in any other, and ravaged the whole +country, for they were about forty days in Attica. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer Hagnon, son of Nicias, and Cleopompus, son of Clinias, the +colleagues of Pericles, took the armament of which he had lately made use, and +went off upon an expedition against the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace +and Potidæa, which was still under siege. As soon as they arrived, they brought +up their engines against Potidæa and tried every means of taking it, but did +not succeed either in capturing the city or in doing anything else worthy of +their preparations. For the plague attacked them here also, and committed such +havoc as to cripple them completely, even the previously healthy soldiers of +the former expedition catching the infection from Hagnon’s troops; while +Phormio and the sixteen hundred men whom he commanded only escaped by being no +longer in the neighbourhood of the Chalcidians. The end of it was that Hagnon +returned with his ships to Athens, having lost one thousand and fifty out of +four thousand heavy infantry in about forty days; though the soldiers stationed +there before remained in the country and carried on the siege of Potidæa. +</p> + +<p> +After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians a change came over the spirit +of the Athenians. Their land had now been twice laid waste; and war and +pestilence at once pressed heavy upon them. They began to find fault with +Pericles, as the author of the war and the cause of all their misfortunes, and +became eager to come to terms with Lacedaemon, and actually sent ambassadors +thither, who did not however succeed in their mission. Their despair was now +complete and all vented itself upon Pericles. When he saw them exasperated at +the present turn of affairs and acting exactly as he had anticipated, he called +an assembly, being (it must be remembered) still general, with the double +object of restoring confidence and of leading them from these angry feelings to +a calmer and more hopeful state of mind. He accordingly came forward and spoke +as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“I was not unprepared for the indignation of which I have been the +object, as I know its causes; and I have called an assembly for the purpose of +reminding you upon certain points, and of protesting against your being +unreasonably irritated with me, or cowed by your sufferings. I am of opinion +that national greatness is more for the advantage of private citizens, than any +individual well-being coupled with public humiliation. A man may be personally +ever so well off, and yet if his country be ruined he must be ruined with it; +whereas a flourishing commonwealth always affords chances of salvation to +unfortunate individuals. Since then a state can support the misfortunes of +private citizens, while they cannot support hers, it is surely the duty of +every one to be forward in her defence, and not like you to be so confounded +with your domestic afflictions as to give up all thoughts of the common safety, +and to blame me for having counselled war and yourselves for having voted it. +And yet if you are angry with me, it is with one who, as I believe, is second +to no man either in knowledge of the proper policy, or in the ability to +expound it, and who is moreover not only a patriot but an honest one. A man +possessing that knowledge without that faculty of exposition might as well have +no idea at all on the matter: if he had both these gifts, but no love for his +country, he would be but a cold advocate for her interests; while were his +patriotism not proof against bribery, everything would go for a price. So that +if you thought that I was even moderately distinguished for these qualities +when you took my advice and went to war, there is certainly no reason now why I +should be charged with having done wrong. +</p> + +<p> +“For those of course who have a free choice in the matter and whose +fortunes are not at stake, war is the greatest of follies. But if the only +choice was between submission with loss of independence, and danger with the +hope of preserving that independence, in such a case it is he who will not +accept the risk that deserves blame, not he who will. I am the same man and do +not alter, it is you who change, since in fact you took my advice while unhurt, +and waited for misfortune to repent of it; and the apparent error of my policy +lies in the infirmity of your resolution, since the suffering that it entails +is being felt by every one among you, while its advantage is still remote and +obscure to all, and a great and sudden reverse having befallen you, your mind +is too much depressed to persevere in your resolves. For before what is sudden, +unexpected, and least within calculation, the spirit quails; and putting all +else aside, the plague has certainly been an emergency of this kind. Born, +however, as you are, citizens of a great state, and brought up, as you have +been, with habits equal to your birth, you should be ready to face the greatest +disasters and still to keep unimpaired the lustre of your name. For the +judgment of mankind is as relentless to the weakness that falls short of a +recognized renown, as it is jealous of the arrogance that aspires higher than +its due. Cease then to grieve for your private afflictions, and address +yourselves instead to the safety of the commonwealth. +</p> + +<p> +“If you shrink before the exertions which the war makes necessary, and +fear that after all they may not have a happy result, you know the reasons by +which I have often demonstrated to you the groundlessness of your +apprehensions. If those are not enough, I will now reveal an advantage arising +from the greatness of your dominion, which I think has never yet suggested +itself to you, which I never mentioned in my previous speeches, and which has +so bold a sound that I should scarce adventure it now, were it not for the +unnatural depression which I see around me. You perhaps think that your empire +extends only over your allies; I will declare to you the truth. The visible +field of action has two parts, land and sea. In the whole of one of these you +are completely supreme, not merely as far as you use it at present, but also to +what further extent you may think fit: in fine, your naval resources are such +that your vessels may go where they please, without the King or any other +nation on earth being able to stop them. So that although you may think it a +great privation to lose the use of your land and houses, still you must see +that this power is something widely different; and instead of fretting on their +account, you should really regard them in the light of the gardens and other +accessories that embellish a great fortune, and as, in comparison, of little +moment. You should know too that liberty preserved by your efforts will easily +recover for us what we have lost, while, the knee once bowed, even what you +have will pass from you. Your fathers receiving these possessions not from +others, but from themselves, did not let slip what their labour had acquired, +but delivered them safe to you; and in this respect at least you must prove +yourselves their equals, remembering that to lose what one has got is more +disgraceful than to be balked in getting, and you must confront your enemies +not merely with spirit but with disdain. Confidence indeed a blissful ignorance +can impart, ay, even to a coward’s breast, but disdain is the privilege +of those who, like us, have been assured by reflection of their superiority to +their adversary. And where the chances are the same, knowledge fortifies +courage by the contempt which is its consequence, its trust being placed, not +in hope, which is the prop of the desperate, but in a judgment grounded upon +existing resources, whose anticipations are more to be depended upon. +</p> + +<p> +“Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining the +glories of her position. These are a common source of pride to you all, and you +cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect to share its honours. You +should remember also that what you are fighting against is not merely slavery +as an exchange for independence, but also loss of empire and danger from the +animosities incurred in its exercise. Besides, to recede is no longer possible, +if indeed any of you in the alarm of the moment has become enamoured of the +honesty of such an unambitious part. For what you hold is, to speak somewhat +plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe. +And men of these retiring views, making converts of others, would quickly ruin +a state; indeed the result would be the same if they could live independent by +themselves; for the retiring and unambitious are never secure without vigorous +protectors at their side; in fine, such qualities are useless to an imperial +city, though they may help a dependency to an unmolested servitude. +</p> + +<p> +“But you must not be seduced by citizens like these or angry with +me—who, if I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves—in spite +of the enemy having invaded your country and done what you could be certain +that he would do, if you refused to comply with his demands; and although +besides what we counted for, the plague has come upon us—the only point +indeed at which our calculation has been at fault. It is this, I know, that has +had a large share in making me more unpopular than I should otherwise have +been—quite undeservedly, unless you are also prepared to give me the +credit of any success with which chance may present you. Besides, the hand of +heaven must be borne with resignation, that of the enemy with fortitude; this +was the old way at Athens, and do not you prevent it being so still. Remember, +too, that if your country has the greatest name in all the world, it is because +she never bent before disaster; because she has expended more life and effort +in war than any other city, and has won for herself a power greater than any +hitherto known, the memory of which will descend to the latest posterity; even +if now, in obedience to the general law of decay, we should ever be forced to +yield, still it will be remembered that we held rule over more Hellenes than +any other Hellenic state, that we sustained the greatest wars against their +united or separate powers, and inhabited a city unrivalled by any other in +resources or magnitude. These glories may incur the censure of the slow and +unambitious; but in the breast of energy they will awake emulation, and in +those who must remain without them an envious regret. Hatred and unpopularity +at the moment have fallen to the lot of all who have aspired to rule others; +but where odium must be incurred, true wisdom incurs it for the highest +objects. Hatred also is short-lived; but that which makes the splendour of the +present and the glory of the future remains for ever unforgotten. Make your +decision, therefore, for glory then and honour now, and attain both objects by +instant and zealous effort: do not send heralds to Lacedaemon, and do not +betray any sign of being oppressed by your present sufferings, since they whose +minds are least sensitive to calamity, and whose hands are most quick to meet +it, are the greatest men and the greatest communities.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the arguments by which Pericles tried to cure the Athenians of their +anger against him and to divert their thoughts from their immediate +afflictions. As a community he succeeded in convincing them; they not only gave +up all idea of sending to Lacedaemon, but applied themselves with increased +energy to the war; still as private individuals they could not help smarting +under their sufferings, the common people having been deprived of the little +that they were possessed, while the higher orders had lost fine properties with +costly establishments and buildings in the country, and, worst of all, had war +instead of peace. In fact, the public feeling against him did not subside until +he had been fined. Not long afterwards, however, according to the way of the +multitude, they again elected him general and committed all their affairs to +his hands, having now become less sensitive to their private and domestic +afflictions, and understanding that he was the best man of all for the public +necessities. For as long as he was at the head of the state during the peace, +he pursued a moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness +was at its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly +gauged the power of his country. He outlived its commencement two years and six +months, and the correctness of his previsions respecting it became better known +by his death. He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, +to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the +war, and doing this, promised them a favourable result. What they did was the +very contrary, allowing private ambitions and private interests, in matters +apparently quite foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to +themselves and to their allies—projects whose success would only conduce +to the honour and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed +certain disaster on the country in the war. The causes of this are not far to +seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled +to exercise an independent control over the multitude—in short, to lead +them instead of being led by them; for as he never sought power by improper +means, he was never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so +high an estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction. +Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with a word +reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he +could at once restore them to confidence. In short, what was nominally a +democracy became in his hands government by the first citizen. With his +successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each +grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state +affairs to the whims of the multitude. This, as might have been expected in a +great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the +Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much through a miscalculation of +the power of those against whom it was sent, as through a fault in the senders +in not taking the best measures afterwards to assist those who had gone out, +but choosing rather to occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership +of the commons, by which they not only paralysed operations in the field, but +also first introduced civil discord at home. Yet after losing most of their +fleet besides other forces in Sicily, and with faction already dominant in the +city, they could still for three years make head against their original +adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians, but also by their own allies +nearly all in revolt, and at last by the King’s son, Cyrus, who furnished +the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till they +fell the victims of their own intestine disorders. So superfluously abundant +were the resources from which the genius of Pericles foresaw an easy triumph in +the war over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians. +</p> + +<p> +During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies made an expedition +with a hundred ships against Zacynthus, an island lying off the coast of Elis, +peopled by a colony of Achaeans from Peloponnese, and in alliance with Athens. +There were a thousand Lacedaemonian heavy infantry on board, and Cnemus, a +Spartan, as admiral. They made a descent from their ships, and ravaged most of +the country; but as the inhabitants would not submit, they sailed back home. +</p> + +<p> +At the end of the same summer the Corinthian Aristeus, Aneristus, Nicolaus, and +Stratodemus, envoys from Lacedaemon, Timagoras, a Tegean, and a private +individual named Pollis from Argos, on their way to Asia to persuade the King +to supply funds and join in the war, came to Sitalces, son of Teres in Thrace, +with the idea of inducing him, if possible, to forsake the alliance of Athens +and to march on Potidæa then besieged by an Athenian force, and also of getting +conveyed by his means to their destination across the Hellespont to +Pharnabazus, who was to send them up the country to the King. But there chanced +to be with Sitalces some Athenian ambassadors—Learchus, son of +Callimachus, and Ameiniades, son of Philemon—who persuaded +Sitalces’ son, Sadocus, the new Athenian citizen, to put the men into +their hands and thus prevent their crossing over to the King and doing their +part to injure the country of his choice. He accordingly had them seized, as +they were travelling through Thrace to the vessel in which they were to cross +the Hellespont, by a party whom he had sent on with Learchus and Ameiniades, +and gave orders for their delivery to the Athenian ambassadors, by whom they +were brought to Athens. On their arrival, the Athenians, afraid that Aristeus, +who had been notably the prime mover in the previous affairs of Potidæa and +their Thracian possessions, might live to do them still more mischief if he +escaped, slew them all the same day, without giving them a trial or hearing the +defence which they wished to offer, and cast their bodies into a pit; thinking +themselves justified in using in retaliation the same mode of warfare which the +Lacedaemonians had begun, when they slew and cast into pits all the Athenian +and allied traders whom they caught on board the merchantmen round Peloponnese. +Indeed, at the outset of the war, the Lacedaemonians butchered as enemies all +whom they took on the sea, whether allies of Athens or neutrals. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time towards the close of the summer, the Ambraciot forces, with +a number of barbarians that they had raised, marched against the Amphilochian +Argos and the rest of that country. The origin of their enmity against the +Argives was this. This Argos and the rest of Amphilochia were colonized by +Amphilochus, son of Amphiaraus. Dissatisfied with the state of affairs at home +on his return thither after the Trojan War, he built this city in the Ambracian +Gulf, and named it Argos after his own country. This was the largest town in +Amphilochia, and its inhabitants the most powerful. Under the pressure of +misfortune many generations afterwards, they called in the Ambraciots, their +neighbours on the Amphilochian border, to join their colony; and it was by this +union with the Ambraciots that they learnt their present Hellenic speech, the +rest of the Amphilochians being barbarians. After a time the Ambraciots +expelled the Argives and held the city themselves. Upon this the Amphilochians +gave themselves over to the Acarnanians; and the two together called the +Athenians, who sent them Phormio as general and thirty ships; upon whose +arrival they took Argos by storm, and made slaves of the Ambraciots; and the +Amphilochians and Acarnanians inhabited the town in common. After this began +the alliance between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The enmity of the +Ambraciots against the Argives thus commenced with the enslavement of their +citizens; and afterwards during the war they collected this armament among +themselves and the Chaonians, and other of the neighbouring barbarians. Arrived +before Argos, they became masters of the country; but not being successful in +their attacks upon the town, returned home and dispersed among their different +peoples. +</p> + +<p> +Such were the events of the summer. The ensuing winter the Athenians sent +twenty ships round Peloponnese, under the command of Phormio, who stationed +himself at Naupactus and kept watch against any one sailing in or out of +Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf. Six others went to Caria and Lycia under +Melesander, to collect tribute in those parts, and also to prevent the +Peloponnesian privateers from taking up their station in those waters and +molesting the passage of the merchantmen from Phaselis and Phoenicia and the +adjoining continent. However, Melesander, going up the country into Lycia with +a force of Athenians from the ships and the allies, was defeated and killed in +battle, with the loss of a number of his troops. +</p> + +<p> +The same winter the Potidæans at length found themselves no longer able to hold +out against their besiegers. The inroads of the Peloponnesians into Attica had +not had the desired effect of making the Athenians raise the siege. Provisions +there were none left; and so far had distress for food gone in Potidæa that, +besides a number of other horrors, instances had even occurred of the people +having eaten one another. In this extremity they at last made proposals for +capitulating to the Athenian generals in command against them—Xenophon, +son of Euripides, Hestiodorus, son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus, son of +Callimachus. The generals accepted their proposals, seeing the sufferings of +the army in so exposed a position; besides which the state had already spent +two thousand talents upon the siege. The terms of the capitulation were as +follows: a free passage out for themselves, their children, wives and +auxiliaries, with one garment apiece, the women with two, and a fixed sum of +money for their journey. Under this treaty they went out to Chalcidice and +other places, according as was their power. The Athenians, however, blamed the +generals for granting terms without instructions from home, being of opinion +that the place would have had to surrender at discretion. They afterwards sent +settlers of their own to Potidæa, and colonized it. Such were the events of the +winter, and so ended the second year of this war of which Thucydides was the +historian. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0008" id="link2HCH0008"></a> +CHAPTER VIII </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Third Year of the War—Investment of Plataea—Naval Victories of +Phormio—Thracian Irruption into Macedonia under Sitalces +</p> + +<p> +The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, instead of invading +Attica, marched against Plataea, under the command of Archidamus, son of +Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. He had encamped his army and was about +to lay waste the country, when the Plataeans hastened to send envoys to him, +and spoke as follows: “Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, in invading the +Plataean territory, you do what is wrong in itself, and worthy neither of +yourselves nor of the fathers who begot you. Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, +your countryman, after freeing Hellas from the Medes with the help of those +Hellenes who were willing to undertake the risk of the battle fought near our +city, offered sacrifice to Zeus the Liberator in the marketplace of Plataea, +and calling all the allies together restored to the Plataeans their city and +territory, and declared it independent and inviolate against aggression or +conquest. Should any such be attempted, the allies present were to help +according to their power. Your fathers rewarded us thus for the courage and +patriotism that we displayed at that perilous epoch; but you do just the +contrary, coming with our bitterest enemies, the Thebans, to enslave us. We +appeal, therefore, to the gods to whom the oaths were then made, to the gods of +your ancestors, and lastly to those of our country, and call upon you to +refrain from violating our territory or transgressing the oaths, and to let us +live independent, as Pausanias decreed.” +</p> + +<p> +The Plataeans had got thus far when they were cut short by Archidamus saying: +“There is justice, Plataeans, in what you say, if you act up to your +words. According, to the grant of Pausanias, continue to be independent +yourselves, and join in freeing those of your fellow countrymen who, after +sharing in the perils of that period, joined in the oaths to you, and are now +subject to the Athenians; for it is to free them and the rest that all this +provision and war has been made. I could wish that you would share our labours +and abide by the oaths yourselves; if this is impossible, do what we have +already required of you—remain neutral, enjoying your own; join neither +side, but receive both as friends, neither as allies for the war. With this we +shall be satisfied.” Such were the words of Archidamus. The Plataeans, +after hearing what he had to say, went into the city and acquainted the people +with what had passed, and presently returned for answer that it was impossible +for them to do what he proposed without consulting the Athenians, with whom +their children and wives now were; besides which they had their fears for the +town. After his departure, what was to prevent the Athenians from coming and +taking it out of their hands, or the Thebans, who would be included in the +oaths, from taking advantage of the proposed neutrality to make a second +attempt to seize the city? Upon these points he tried to reassure them by +saying: “You have only to deliver over the city and houses to us +Lacedaemonians, to point out the boundaries of your land, the number of your +fruit-trees, and whatever else can be numerically stated, and yourselves to +withdraw wherever you like as long as the war shall last. When it is over we +will restore to you whatever we received, and in the interim hold it in trust +and keep it in cultivation, paying you a sufficient allowance.” +</p> + +<p> +When they had heard what he had to say, they re-entered the city, and after +consulting with the people said that they wished first to acquaint the +Athenians with this proposal, and in the event of their approving to accede to +it; in the meantime they asked him to grant them a truce and not to lay waste +their territory. He accordingly granted a truce for the number of days +requisite for the journey, and meanwhile abstained from ravaging their +territory. The Plataean envoys went to Athens, and consulted with the +Athenians, and returned with the following message to those in the city: +“The Athenians say, Plataeans, that they never hitherto, since we became +their allies, on any occasion abandoned us to an enemy, nor will they now +neglect us, but will help us according to their ability; and they adjure you by +the oaths which your fathers swore, to keep the alliance unaltered.” +</p> + +<p> +On the delivery of this message by the envoys, the Plataeans resolved not to be +unfaithful to the Athenians but to endure, if it must be, seeing their lands +laid waste and any other trials that might come to them, and not to send out +again, but to answer from the wall that it was impossible for them to do as the +Lacedaemonians proposed. As soon as he had received this answer, King +Archidamus proceeded first to make a solemn appeal to the gods and heroes of +the country in words following: “Ye gods and heroes of the Plataean +territory, be my witnesses that not as aggressors originally, nor until these +had first departed from the common oath, did we invade this land, in which our +fathers offered you their prayers before defeating the Medes, and which you +made auspicious to the Hellenic arms; nor shall we be aggressors in the +measures to which we may now resort, since we have made many fair proposals but +have not been successful. Graciously accord that those who were the first to +offend may be punished for it, and that vengeance may be attained by those who +would righteously inflict it.” +</p> + +<p> +After this appeal to the gods Archidamus put his army in motion. First he +enclosed the town with a palisade formed of the fruit-trees which they cut +down, to prevent further egress from Plataea; next they threw up a mound +against the city, hoping that the largeness of the force employed would ensure +the speedy reduction of the place. They accordingly cut down timber from +Cithaeron, and built it up on either side, laying it like lattice-work to serve +as a wall to keep the mound from spreading abroad, and carried to it wood and +stones and earth and whatever other material might help to complete it. They +continued to work at the mound for seventy days and nights without +intermission, being divided into relief parties to allow of some being employed +in carrying while others took sleep and refreshment; the Lacedaemonian officer +attached to each contingent keeping the men to the work. But the Plataeans, +observing the progress of the mound, constructed a wall of wood and fixed it +upon that part of the city wall against which the mound was being erected, and +built up bricks inside it which they took from the neighbouring houses. The +timbers served to bind the building together, and to prevent its becoming weak +as it advanced in height; it had also a covering of skins and hides, which +protected the woodwork against the attacks of burning missiles and allowed the +men to work in safety. Thus the wall was raised to a great height, and the +mound opposite made no less rapid progress. The Plataeans also thought of +another expedient; they pulled out part of the wall upon which the mound +abutted, and carried the earth into the city. +</p> + +<p> +Discovering this the Peloponnesians twisted up clay in wattles of reed and +threw it into the breach formed in the mound, in order to give it consistency +and prevent its being carried away like the soil. Stopped in this way the +Plataeans changed their mode of operation, and digging a mine from the town +calculated their way under the mound, and began to carry off its material as +before. This went on for a long while without the enemy outside finding it out, +so that for all they threw on the top their mound made no progress in +proportion, being carried away from beneath and constantly settling down in the +vacuum. But the Plataeans, fearing that even thus they might not be able to +hold out against the superior numbers of the enemy, had yet another invention. +They stopped working at the large building in front of the mound, and starting +at either end of it inside from the old low wall, built a new one in the form +of a crescent running in towards the town; in order that in the event of the +great wall being taken this might remain, and the enemy have to throw up a +fresh mound against it, and as they advanced within might not only have their +trouble over again, but also be exposed to missiles on their flanks. While +raising the mound the Peloponnesians also brought up engines against the city, +one of which was brought up upon the mound against the great building and shook +down a good piece of it, to the no small alarm of the Plataeans. Others were +advanced against different parts of the wall but were lassoed and broken by the +Plataeans; who also hung up great beams by long iron chains from either +extremity of two poles laid on the wall and projecting over it, and drew them +up at an angle whenever any point was threatened by the engine, and loosing +their hold let the beam go with its chains slack, so that it fell with a run +and snapped off the nose of the battering ram. +</p> + +<p> +After this the Peloponnesians, finding that their engines effected nothing, and +that their mound was met by the counterwork, concluded that their present means +of offence were unequal to the taking of the city, and prepared for its +circumvallation. First, however, they determined to try the effects of fire and +see whether they could not, with the help of a wind, burn the town, as it was +not a large one; indeed they thought of every possible expedient by which the +place might be reduced without the expense of a blockade. They accordingly +brought faggots of brushwood and threw them from the mound, first into the +space between it and the wall; and this soon becoming full from the number of +hands at work, they next heaped the faggots up as far into the town as they +could reach from the top, and then lighted the wood by setting fire to it with +sulphur and pitch. The consequence was a fire greater than any one had ever yet +seen produced by human agency, though it could not of course be compared to the +spontaneous conflagrations sometimes known to occur through the wind rubbing +the branches of a mountain forest together. And this fire was not only +remarkable for its magnitude, but was also, at the end of so many perils, +within an ace of proving fatal to the Plataeans; a great part of the town +became entirely inaccessible, and had a wind blown upon it, in accordance with +the hopes of the enemy, nothing could have saved them. As it was, there is also +a story of heavy rain and thunder having come on by which the fire was put out +and the danger averted. +</p> + +<p> +Failing in this last attempt the Peloponnesians left a portion of their forces +on the spot, dismissing the rest, and built a wall of circumvallation round the +town, dividing the ground among the various cities present; a ditch being made +within and without the lines, from which they got their bricks. All being +finished by about the rising of Arcturus, they left men enough to man half the +wall, the rest being manned by the Boeotians, and drawing off their army +dispersed to their several cities. The Plataeans had before sent off their +wives and children and oldest men and the mass of the non-combatants to Athens; +so that the number of the besieged left in the place comprised four hundred of +their own citizens, eighty Athenians, and a hundred and ten women to bake their +bread. This was the sum total at the commencement of the siege, and there was +no one else within the walls, bond or free. Such were the arrangements made for +the blockade of Plataea. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer and simultaneously with the expedition against Plataea, the +Athenians marched with two thousand heavy infantry and two hundred horse +against the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace and the Bottiaeans, just as +the corn was getting ripe, under the command of Xenophon, son of Euripides, +with two colleagues. Arriving before Spartolus in Bottiaea, they destroyed the +corn and had some hopes of the city coming over through the intrigues of a +faction within. But those of a different way of thinking had sent to Olynthus; +and a garrison of heavy infantry and other troops arrived accordingly. These +issuing from Spartolus were engaged by the Athenians in front of the town: the +Chalcidian heavy infantry, and some auxiliaries with them, were beaten and +retreated into Spartolus; but the Chalcidian horse and light troops defeated +the horse and light troops of the Athenians. The Chalcidians had already a few +targeteers from Crusis, and presently after the battle were joined by some +others from Olynthus; upon seeing whom the light troops from Spartolus, +emboldened by this accession and by their previous success, with the help of +the Chalcidian horse and the reinforcement just arrived again attacked the +Athenians, who retired upon the two divisions which they had left with their +baggage. Whenever the Athenians advanced, their adversary gave way, pressing +them with missiles the instant they began to retire. The Chalcidian horse also, +riding up and charging them just as they pleased, at last caused a panic +amongst them and routed and pursued them to a great distance. The Athenians +took refuge in Potidæa, and afterwards recovered their dead under truce, and +returned to Athens with the remnant of their army; four hundred and thirty men +and all the generals having fallen. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans set up a +trophy, took up their dead, and dispersed to their several cities. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer, not long after this, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, being +desirous of reducing the whole of Acarnania and detaching it from Athens, +persuaded the Lacedaemonians to equip a fleet from their confederacy and send a +thousand heavy infantry to Acarnania, representing that, if a combined movement +were made by land and sea, the coast Acarnanians would be unable to march, and +the conquest of Zacynthus and Cephallenia easily following on the possession of +Acarnania, the cruise round Peloponnese would be no longer so convenient for +the Athenians. Besides which there was a hope of taking Naupactus. The +Lacedaemonians accordingly at once sent off a few vessels with Cnemus, who was +still high admiral, and the heavy infantry on board; and sent round orders for +the fleet to equip as quickly as possible and sail to Leucas. The Corinthians +were the most forward in the business; the Ambraciots being a colony of theirs. +While the ships from Corinth, Sicyon, and the neighbourhood were getting ready, +and those from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia, which had arrived before, were +waiting for them at Leucas, Cnemus and his thousand heavy infantry had run into +the gulf, giving the slip to Phormio, the commander of the Athenian squadron +stationed off Naupactus, and began at once to prepare for the land expedition. +The Hellenic troops with him consisted of the Ambraciots, Leucadians, and +Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians with whom he came; the barbarian +of a thousand Chaonians, who, belonging to a nation that has no king, were led +by Photys and Nicanor, the two members of the royal family to whom the +chieftainship for that year had been confided. With the Chaonians came also +some Thesprotians, like them without a king, some Molossians and Atintanians +led by Sabylinthus, the guardian of King Tharyps who was still a minor, and +some Paravaeans, under their king Oroedus, accompanied by a thousand Orestians, +subjects of King Antichus and placed by him under the command of Oroedus. There +were also a thousand Macedonians sent by Perdiccas without the knowledge of the +Athenians, but they arrived too late. With this force Cnemus set out, without +waiting for the fleet from Corinth. Passing through the territory of +Amphilochian Argos, and sacking the open village of Limnaea, they advanced to +Stratus the Acarnanian capital; this once taken, the rest of the country, they +felt convinced, would speedily follow. +</p> + +<p> +The Acarnanians, finding themselves invaded by a large army by land, and from +the sea threatened by a hostile fleet, made no combined attempt at resistance, +but remained to defend their homes, and sent for help to Phormio, who replied +that, when a fleet was on the point of sailing from Corinth, it was impossible +for him to leave Naupactus unprotected. The Peloponnesians meanwhile and their +allies advanced upon Stratus in three divisions, with the intention of +encamping near it and attempting the wall by force if they failed to succeed by +negotiation. The order of march was as follows: the centre was occupied by the +Chaonians and the rest of the barbarians, with the Leucadians and Anactorians +and their followers on the right, and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and +Ambraciots on the left; each division being a long way off from, and sometimes +even out of sight of, the others. The Hellenes advanced in good order, keeping +a look-out till they encamped in a good position; but the Chaonians, filled +with self-confidence, and having the highest character for courage among the +tribes of that part of the continent, without waiting to occupy their camp, +rushed on with the rest of the barbarians, in the idea that they should take +the town by assault and obtain the sole glory of the enterprise. While they +were coming on, the Stratians, becoming aware how things stood, and thinking +that the defeat of this division would considerably dishearten the Hellenes +behind it, occupied the environs of the town with ambuscades, and as soon as +they approached engaged them at close quarters from the city and the +ambuscades. A panic seizing the Chaonians, great numbers of them were slain; +and as soon as they were seen to give way the rest of the barbarians turned and +fled. Owing to the distance by which their allies had preceded them, neither of +the Hellenic divisions knew anything of the battle, but fancied they were +hastening on to encamp. However, when the flying barbarians broke in upon them, +they opened their ranks to receive them, brought their divisions together, and +stopped quiet where they were for the day; the Stratians not offering to engage +them, as the rest of the Acarnanians had not yet arrived, but contenting +themselves with slinging at them from a distance, which distressed them +greatly, as there was no stirring without their armour. The Acarnanians would +seem to excel in this mode of warfare. +</p> + +<p> +As soon as night fell, Cnemus hastily drew off his army to the river Anapus, +about nine miles from Stratus, recovering his dead next day under truce, and +being there joined by the friendly Oeniadae, fell back upon their city before +the enemy’s reinforcements came up. From hence each returned home; and +the Stratians set up a trophy for the battle with the barbarians. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates in the +Crissaean Gulf, which was to have co-operated with Cnemus and prevented the +coast Acarnanians from joining their countrymen in the interior, was disabled +from doing so by being compelled about the same time as the battle at Stratus +to fight with Phormio and the twenty Athenian vessels stationed at Naupactus. +For they were watched, as they coasted along out of the gulf, by Phormio, who +wished to attack in the open sea. But the Corinthians and allies had started +for Acarnania without any idea of fighting at sea, and with vessels more like +transports for carrying soldiers; besides which, they never dreamed of the +twenty Athenian ships venturing to engage their forty-seven. However, while +they were coasting along their own shore, there were the Athenians sailing +along in line with them; and when they tried to cross over from Patrae in +Achaea to the mainland on the other side, on their way to Acarnania, they saw +them again coming out from Chalcis and the river Evenus to meet them. They +slipped from their moorings in the night, but were observed, and were at length +compelled to fight in mid passage. Each state that contributed to the armament +had its own general; the Corinthian commanders were Machaon, Isocrates, and +Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians ranged their vessels in as large a circle as +possible without leaving an opening, with the prows outside and the sterns in; +and placed within all the small craft in company, and their five best sailers +to issue out at a moment’s notice and strengthen any point threatened by +the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians, formed in line, sailed round and round them, and forced them to +contract their circle, by continually brushing past and making as though they +would attack at once, having been previously cautioned by Phormio not to do so +till he gave the signal. His hope was that the Peloponnesians would not retain +their order like a force on shore, but that the ships would fall foul of one +another and the small craft cause confusion; and if the wind should blow from +the gulf (in expectation of which he kept sailing round them, and which usually +rose towards morning), they would not, he felt sure, remain steady an instant. +He also thought that it rested with him to attack when he pleased, as his ships +were better sailers, and that an attack timed by the coming of the wind would +tell best. When the wind came down, the enemy’s ships were now in a +narrow space, and what with the wind and the small craft dashing against them, +at once fell into confusion: ship fell foul of ship, while the crews were +pushing them off with poles, and by their shouting, swearing, and struggling +with one another, made captains’ orders and boatswains’ cries alike +inaudible, and through being unable for want of practice to clear their oars in +the rough water, prevented the vessels from obeying their helmsmen properly. At +this moment Phormio gave the signal, and the Athenians attacked. Sinking first +one of the admirals, they then disabled all they came across, so that no one +thought of resistance for the confusion, but fled for Patrae and Dyme in +Achaea. The Athenians gave chase and captured twelve ships, and taking most of +the men out of them sailed to Molycrium, and after setting up a trophy on the +promontory of Rhium and dedicating a ship to Poseidon, returned to Naupactus. +As for the Peloponnesians, they at once sailed with their remaining ships along +the coast from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene, the Eleian arsenal; where Cnemus, +and the ships from Leucas that were to have joined them, also arrived after the +battle at Stratus. +</p> + +<p> +The Lacedaemonians now sent to the fleet to Cnemus three +commissioners—Timocrates, Bradidas, and Lycophron—with orders to +prepare to engage again with better fortune, and not to be driven from the sea +by a few vessels; for they could not at all account for their discomfiture, the +less so as it was their first attempt at sea; and they fancied that it was not +that their marine was so inferior, but that there had been misconduct +somewhere, not considering the long experience of the Athenians as compared +with the little practice which they had had themselves. The commissioners were +accordingly sent in anger. As soon as they arrived they set to work with Cnemus +to order ships from the different states, and to put those which they already +had in fighting order. Meanwhile Phormio sent word to Athens of their +preparations and his own victory, and desired as many ships as possible to be +speedily sent to him, as he stood in daily expectation of a battle. Twenty were +accordingly sent, but instructions were given to their commander to go first to +Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was proxenus of the Athenians, had +persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, promising to procure the reduction of +that hostile town; his real wish being to oblige the Polichnitans, neighbours +of the Cydonians. He accordingly went with the ships to Crete, and, accompanied +by the Polichnitans, laid waste the lands of the Cydonians; and, what with +adverse winds and stress of weather wasted no little time there. +</p> + +<p> +While the Athenians were thus detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians in Cyllene +got ready for battle, and coasted along to Panormus in Achaea, where their land +army had come to support them. Phormio also coasted along to Molycrian Rhium, +and anchored outside it with twenty ships, the same as he had fought with +before. This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians. The other, in Peloponnese, +lies opposite to it; the sea between them is about three-quarters of a mile +broad, and forms the mouth of the Crissaean gulf. At this, the Achaean Rhium, +not far off Panormus, where their army lay, the Peloponnesians now cast anchor +with seventy-seven ships, when they saw the Athenians do so. For six or seven +days they remained opposite each other, practising and preparing for the +battle; the one resolved not to sail out of the Rhia into the open sea, for +fear of the disaster which had already happened to them, the other not to sail +into the straits, thinking it advantageous to the enemy, to fight in the +narrows. At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the Peloponnesian +commanders, being desirous of bringing on a battle as soon as possible, before +reinforcements should arrive from Athens, and noticing that the men were most +of them cowed by the previous defeat and out of heart for the business, first +called them together and encouraged them as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Peloponnesians, the late engagement, which may have made some of you +afraid of the one now in prospect, really gives no just ground for +apprehension. Preparation for it, as you know, there was little enough; and the +object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as an expedition by land. +Besides this, the chances of war were largely against us; and perhaps also +inexperience had something to do with our failure in our first naval action. It +was not, therefore, cowardice that produced our defeat, nor ought the +determination which force has not quelled, but which still has a word to say +with its adversary, to lose its edge from the result of an accident; but +admitting the possibility of a chance miscarriage, we should know that brave +hearts must be always brave, and while they remain so can never put forward +inexperience as an excuse for misconduct. Nor are you so behind the enemy in +experience as you are ahead of him in courage; and although the science of your +opponents would, if valour accompanied it, have also the presence of mind to +carry out at in emergency the lesson it has learnt, yet a faint heart will make +all art powerless in the face of danger. For fear takes away presence of mind, +and without valour art is useless. Against their superior experience set your +superior daring, and against the fear induced by defeat the fact of your having +been then unprepared; remember, too, that you have always the advantage of +superior numbers, and of engaging off your own coast, supported by your heavy +infantry; and as a rule, numbers and equipment give victory. At no point, +therefore, is defeat likely; and as for our previous mistakes, the very fact of +their occurrence will teach us better for the future. Steersmen and sailors +may, therefore, confidently attend to their several duties, none quitting the +station assigned to them: as for ourselves, we promise to prepare for the +engagement at least as well as your previous commanders, and to give no excuse +for any one misconducting himself. Should any insist on doing so, he shall meet +with the punishment he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured with the +appropriate rewards of valour.” +</p> + +<p> +The Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men after this fashion. Phormio, +meanwhile, being himself not without fears for the courage of his men, and +noticing that they were forming in groups among themselves and were alarmed at +the odds against them, desired to call them together and give them confidence +and counsel in the present emergency. He had before continually told them, and +had accustomed their minds to the idea, that there was no numerical superiority +that they could not face; and the men themselves had long been persuaded that +Athenians need never retire before any quantity of Peloponnesian vessels. At +the moment, however, he saw that they were dispirited by the sight before them, +and wishing to refresh their confidence, called them together and spoke as +follows: +</p> + +<p> +“I see, my men, that you are frightened by the number of the enemy, and I +have accordingly called you together, not liking you to be afraid of what is +not really terrible. In the first place, the Peloponnesians, already defeated, +and not even themselves thinking that they are a match for us, have not +ventured to meet us on equal terms, but have equipped this multitude of ships +against us. Next, as to that upon which they most rely, the courage which they +suppose constitutional to them, their confidence here only arises from the +success which their experience in land service usually gives them, and which +they fancy will do the same for them at sea. But this advantage will in all +justice belong to us on this element, if to them on that; as they are not +superior to us in courage, but we are each of us more confident, according to +our experience in our particular department. Besides, as the Lacedaemonians use +their supremacy over their allies to promote their own glory, they are most of +them being brought into danger against their will, or they would never, after +such a decided defeat, have ventured upon a fresh engagement. You need not, +therefore, be afraid of their dash. You, on the contrary, inspire a much +greater and better founded alarm, both because of your late victory and also of +their belief that we should not face them unless about to do something worthy +of a success so signal. An adversary numerically superior, like the one before +us, comes into action trusting more to strength than to resolution; while he +who voluntarily confronts tremendous odds must have very great internal +resources to draw upon. For these reasons the Peloponnesians fear our +irrational audacity more than they would ever have done a more commensurate +preparation. Besides, many armaments have before now succumbed to an inferior +through want of skill or sometimes of courage; neither of which defects +certainly are ours. As to the battle, it shall not be, if I can help it, in the +strait, nor will I sail in there at all; seeing that in a contest between a +number of clumsily managed vessels and a small, fast, well-handled squadron, +want of sea room is an undoubted disadvantage. One cannot run down an enemy +properly without having a sight of him a good way off, nor can one retire at +need when pressed; one can neither break the line nor return upon his rear, the +proper tactics for a fast sailer; but the naval action necessarily becomes a +land one, in which numbers must decide the matter. For all this I will provide +as far as can be. Do you stay at your posts by your ships, and be sharp at +catching the word of command, the more so as we are observing one another from +so short a distance; and in action think order and silence +all-important—qualities useful in war generally, and in naval engagements +in particular; and behave before the enemy in a manner worthy of your past +exploits. The issues you will fight for are great—to destroy the naval +hopes of the Peloponnesians or to bring nearer to the Athenians their fears for +the sea. And I may once more remind you that you have defeated most of them +already; and beaten men do not face a danger twice with the same +determination.” +</p> + +<p> +Such was the exhortation of Phormio. The Peloponnesians finding that the +Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows, in order to lead them in +whether they wished it or not, put out at dawn, and forming four abreast, +sailed inside the gulf in the direction of their own country, the right wing +leading as they had lain at anchor. In this wing were placed twenty of their +best sailers; so that in the event of Phormio thinking that their object was +Naupactus, and coasting along thither to save the place, the Athenians might +not be able to escape their onset by getting outside their wing, but might be +cut off by the vessels in question. As they expected, Phormio, in alarm for the +place at that moment emptied of its garrison, as soon as he saw them put out, +reluctantly and hurriedly embarked and sailed along shore; the Messenian land +forces moving along also to support him. The Peloponnesians seeing him coasting +along with his ships in single file, and by this inside the gulf and close +inshore as they so much wished, at one signal tacked suddenly and bore down in +line at their best speed on the Athenians, hoping to cut off the whole +squadron. The eleven leading vessels, however, escaped the Peloponnesian wing +and its sudden movement, and reached the more open water; but the rest were +overtaken as they tried to run through, driven ashore and disabled; such of the +crews being slain as had not swum out of them. Some of the ships the +Peloponnesians lashed to their own, and towed off empty; one they took with the +men in it; others were just being towed off, when they were saved by the +Messenians dashing into the sea with their armour and fighting from the decks +that they had boarded. +</p> + +<p> +Thus far victory was with the Peloponnesians, and the Athenian fleet destroyed; +the twenty ships in the right wing being meanwhile in chase of the eleven +Athenian vessels that had escaped their sudden movement and reached the more +open water. These, with the exception of one ship, all outsailed them and got +safe into Naupactus, and forming close inshore opposite the temple of Apollo, +with their prows facing the enemy, prepared to defend themselves in case the +Peloponnesians should sail inshore against them. After a while the +Peloponnesians came up, chanting the paean for their victory as they sailed on; +the single Athenian ship remaining being chased by a Leucadian far ahead of the +rest. But there happened to be a merchantman lying at anchor in the roadstead, +which the Athenian ship found time to sail round, and struck the Leucadian in +chase amidships and sank her. An exploit so sudden and unexpected produced a +panic among the Peloponnesians; and having fallen out of order in the +excitement of victory, some of them dropped their oars and stopped their way in +order to let the main body come up—an unsafe thing to do considering how +near they were to the enemy’s prows; while others ran aground in the +shallows, in their ignorance of the localities. +</p> + +<p> +Elated at this incident, the Athenians at one word gave a cheer, and dashed at +the enemy, who, embarrassed by his mistakes and the disorder in which he found +himself, only stood for an instant, and then fled for Panormus, whence he had +put out. The Athenians following on his heels took the six vessels nearest +them, and recovered those of their own which had been disabled close inshore +and taken in tow at the beginning of the action; they killed some of the crews +and took some prisoners. On board the Leucadian which went down off the +merchantman, was the Lacedaemonian Timocrates, who killed himself when the ship +was sunk, and was cast up in the harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians on their +return set up a trophy on the spot from which they had put out and turned the +day, and picking up the wrecks and dead that were on their shore, gave back to +the enemy their dead under truce. The Peloponnesians also set up a trophy as +victors for the defeat inflicted upon the ships they had disabled in shore, and +dedicated the vessel which they had taken at Achaean Rhium, side by side with +the trophy. After this, apprehensive of the reinforcement expected from Athens, +all except the Leucadians sailed into the Crissaean Gulf for Corinth. Not long +after their retreat, the twenty Athenian ships, which were to have joined +Phormio before the battle, arrived at Naupactus. +</p> + +<p> +Thus the summer ended. Winter was now at hand; but dispersing the fleet, which +had retired to Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other +Peloponnesian captains allowed themselves to be persuaded by the Megarians to +make an attempt upon Piraeus, the port of Athens, which from her decided +superiority at sea had been naturally left unguarded and open. Their plan was +as follows: The men were each to take their oar, cushion, and rowlock thong, +and, going overland from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side, to get to +Megara as quickly as they could, and launching forty vessels, which happened to +be in the docks at Nisaea, to sail at once to Piraeus. There was no fleet on +the look-out in the harbour, and no one had the least idea of the enemy +attempting a surprise; while an open attack would, it was thought, never be +deliberately ventured on, or, if in contemplation, would be speedily known at +Athens. Their plan formed, the next step was to put it in execution. Arriving +by night and launching the vessels from Nisaea, they sailed, not to Piraeus as +they had originally intended, being afraid of the risk, besides which there was +some talk of a wind having stopped them, but to the point of Salamis that looks +towards Megara; where there was a fort and a squadron of three ships to prevent +anything sailing in or out of Megara. This fort they assaulted, and towed off +the galleys empty, and surprising the inhabitants began to lay waste the rest +of the island. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile fire signals were raised to alarm Athens, and a panic ensued there as +serious as any that occurred during the war. The idea in the city was that the +enemy had already sailed into Piraeus: in Piraeus it was thought that they had +taken Salamis and might at any moment arrive in the port; as indeed might +easily have been done if their hearts had been a little firmer: certainly no +wind would have prevented them. As soon as day broke, the Athenians assembled +in full force, launched their ships, and embarking in haste and uproar went +with the fleet to Salamis, while their soldiery mounted guard in Piraeus. The +Peloponnesians, on becoming aware of the coming relief, after they had overrun +most of Salamis, hastily sailed off with their plunder and captives and the +three ships from Fort Budorum to Nisaea; the state of their ships also causing +them some anxiety, as it was a long while since they had been launched, and +they were not water-tight. Arrived at Megara, they returned back on foot to +Corinth. The Athenians finding them no longer at Salamis, sailed back +themselves; and after this made arrangements for guarding Piraeus more +diligently in future, by closing the harbours, and by other suitable +precautions. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time, at the beginning of this winter, Sitalces, son of Teres, +the Odrysian king of Thrace, made an expedition against Perdiccas, son of +Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the Chalcidians in the neighbourhood of +Thrace; his object being to enforce one promise and fulfil another. On the one +hand Perdiccas had made him a promise, when hard pressed at the commencement of +the war, upon condition that Sitalces should reconcile the Athenians to him and +not attempt to restore his brother and enemy, the pretender Philip, but had not +offered to fulfil his engagement; on the other he, Sitalces, on entering into +alliance with the Athenians, had agreed to put an end to the Chalcidian war in +Thrace. These were the two objects of his invasion. With him he brought +Amyntas, the son of Philip, whom he destined for the throne of Macedonia, and +some Athenian envoys then at his court on this business, and Hagnon as general; +for the Athenians were to join him against the Chalcidians with a fleet and as +many soldiers as they could get together. +</p> + +<p> +Beginning with the Odrysians, he first called out the Thracian tribes subject +to him between Mounts Haemus and Rhodope and the Euxine and Hellespont; next +the Getae beyond Haemus, and the other hordes settled south of the Danube in +the neighbourhood of the Euxine, who, like the Getae, border on the Scythians +and are armed in the same manner, being all mounted archers. Besides these he +summoned many of the hill Thracian independent swordsmen, called Dii and mostly +inhabiting Mount Rhodope, some of whom came as mercenaries, others as +volunteers; also the Agrianes and Laeaeans, and the rest of the Paeonian tribes +in his empire, at the confines of which these lay, extending up to the Laeaean +Paeonians and the river Strymon, which flows from Mount Scombrus through the +country of the Agrianes and Laeaeans; there the empire of Sitalces ends and the +territory of the independent Paeonians begins. Bordering on the Triballi, also +independent, were the Treres and Tilataeans, who dwell to the north of Mount +Scombrus and extend towards the setting sun as far as the river Oskius. This +river rises in the same mountains as the Nestus and Hebrus, a wild and +extensive range connected with Rhodope. +</p> + +<p> +The empire of the Odrysians extended along the seaboard from Abdera to the +mouth of the Danube in the Euxine. The navigation of this coast by the shortest +route takes a merchantman four days and four nights with a wind astern the +whole way: by land an active man, travelling by the shortest road, can get from +Abdera to the Danube in eleven days. Such was the length of its coast line. +Inland from Byzantium to the Laeaeans and the Strymon, the farthest limit of +its extension into the interior, it is a journey of thirteen days for an active +man. The tribute from all the barbarian districts and the Hellenic cities, +taking what they brought in under Seuthes, the successor of Sitalces, who +raised it to its greatest height, amounted to about four hundred talents in +gold and silver. There were also presents in gold and silver to a no less +amount, besides stuff, plain and embroidered, and other articles, made not only +for the king, but also for the Odrysian lords and nobles. For there was here +established a custom opposite to that prevailing in the Persian kingdom, +namely, of taking rather than giving; more disgrace being attached to not +giving when asked than to asking and being refused; and although this prevailed +elsewhere in Thrace, it was practised most extensively among the powerful +Odrysians, it being impossible to get anything done without a present. It was +thus a very powerful kingdom; in revenue and general prosperity surpassing all +in Europe between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine, and in numbers and military +resources coming decidedly next to the Scythians, with whom indeed no people in +Europe can bear comparison, there not being even in Asia any nation singly a +match for them if unanimous, though of course they are not on a level with +other races in general intelligence and the arts of civilized life. +</p> + +<p> +It was the master of this empire that now prepared to take the field. When +everything was ready, he set out on his march for Macedonia, first through his +own dominions, next over the desolate range of Cercine that divides the +Sintians and Paeonians, crossing by a road which he had made by felling the +timber on a former campaign against the latter people. Passing over these +mountains, with the Paeonians on his right and the Sintians and Maedians on the +left, he finally arrived at Doberus, in Paeonia, losing none of his army on the +march, except perhaps by sickness, but receiving some augmentations, many of +the independent Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope of plunder; so +that the whole is said to have formed a grand total of a hundred and fifty +thousand. Most of this was infantry, though there was about a third cavalry, +furnished principally by the Odrysians themselves and next to them by the +Getae. The most warlike of the infantry were the independent swordsmen who came +down from Rhodope; the rest of the mixed multitude that followed him being +chiefly formidable by their numbers. +</p> + +<p> +Assembling in Doberus, they prepared for descending from the heights upon Lower +Macedonia, where the dominions of Perdiccas lay; for the Lyncestae, Elimiots, +and other tribes more inland, though Macedonians by blood, and allies and +dependants of their kindred, still have their own separate governments. The +country on the sea coast, now called Macedonia, was first acquired by +Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors, originally Temenids from +Argos. This was effected by the expulsion from Pieria of the Pierians, who +afterwards inhabited Phagres and other places under Mount Pangaeus, beyond the +Strymon (indeed the country between Pangaeus and the sea is still called the +Pierian Gulf); of the Bottiaeans, at present neighbours of the Chalcidians, +from Bottia, and by the acquisition in Paeonia of a narrow strip along the +river Axius extending to Pella and the sea; the district of Mygdonia, between +the Axius and the Strymon, being also added by the expulsion of the Edonians. +From Eordia also were driven the Eordians, most of whom perished, though a few +of them still live round Physca, and the Almopians from Almopia. These +Macedonians also conquered places belonging to the other tribes, which are +still theirs—Anthemus, Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of Macedonia proper. +The whole is now called Macedonia, and at the time of the invasion of Sitalces, +Perdiccas, Alexander’s son, was the reigning king. +</p> + +<p> +These Macedonians, unable to take the field against so numerous an invader, +shut themselves up in such strong places and fortresses as the country +possessed. Of these there was no great number, most of those now found in the +country having been erected subsequently by Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, on +his accession, who also cut straight roads, and otherwise put the kingdom on a +better footing as regards horses, heavy infantry, and other war material than +had been done by all the eight kings that preceded him. Advancing from Doberus, +the Thracian host first invaded what had been once Philip’s government, +and took Idomene by assault, Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places by +negotiation, these last coming over for love of Philip’s son, Amyntas, +then with Sitalces. Laying siege to Europus, and failing to take it, he next +advanced into the rest of Macedonia to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus, not +proceeding beyond this into Bottiaea and Pieria, but staying to lay waste +Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus. +</p> + +<p> +The Macedonians never even thought of meeting him with infantry; but the +Thracian host was, as opportunity offered, attacked by handfuls of their horse, +which had been reinforced from their allies in the interior. Armed with +cuirasses, and excellent horsemen, wherever these charged they overthrew all +before them, but ran considerable risk in entangling themselves in the masses +of the enemy, and so finally desisted from these efforts, deciding that they +were not strong enough to venture against numbers so superior. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Sitalces opened negotiations with Perdiccas on the objects of his +expedition; and finding that the Athenians, not believing that he would come, +did not appear with their fleet, though they sent presents and envoys, +dispatched a large part of his army against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and +shutting them up inside their walls laid waste their country. While he remained +in these parts, the people farther south, such as the Thessalians, Magnetes, +and the other tribes subject to the Thessalians, and the Hellenes as far as +Thermopylae, all feared that the army might advance against them, and prepared +accordingly. These fears were shared by the Thracians beyond the Strymon to the +north, who inhabited the plains, such as the Panaeans, the Odomanti, the Droi, +and the Dersaeans, all of whom are independent. It was even matter of +conversation among the Hellenes who were enemies of Athens whether he might not +be invited by his ally to advance also against them. Meanwhile he held +Chalcidice and Bottice and Macedonia, and was ravaging them all; but finding +that he was not succeeding in any of the objects of his invasion, and that his +army was without provisions and was suffering from the severity of the season, +he listened to the advice of Seuthes, son of Spardacus, his nephew and highest +officer, and decided to retreat without delay. This Seuthes had been secretly +gained by Perdiccas by the promise of his sister in marriage with a rich dowry. +In accordance with this advice, and after a stay of thirty days in all, eight +of which were spent in Chalcidice, he retired home as quickly as he could; and +Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. +Such was the history of the expedition of Sitalces. +</p> + +<p> +In the course of this winter, after the dispersion of the Peloponnesian fleet, +the Athenians in Naupactus, under Phormio, coasted along to Astacus and +disembarked, and marched into the interior of Acarnania with four hundred +Athenian heavy infantry and four hundred Messenians. After expelling some +suspected persons from Stratus, Coronta, and other places, and restoring Cynes, +son of Theolytus, to Coronta, they returned to their ships, deciding that it +was impossible in the winter season to march against Oeniadae, a place which, +unlike the rest of Acarnania, had been always hostile to them; for the river +Achelous flowing from Mount Pindus through Dolopia and the country of the +Agraeans and Amphilochians and the plain of Acarnania, past the town of Stratus +in the upper part of its course, forms lakes where it falls into the sea round +Oeniadae, and thus makes it impracticable for an army in winter by reason of +the water. Opposite to Oeniadae lie most of the islands called Echinades, so +close to the mouths of the Achelous that that powerful stream is constantly +forming deposits against them, and has already joined some of the islands to +the continent, and seems likely in no long while to do the same with the rest. +For the current is strong, deep, and turbid, and the islands are so thick +together that they serve to imprison the alluvial deposit and prevent its +dispersing, lying, as they do, not in one line, but irregularly, so as to leave +no direct passage for the water into the open sea. The islands in question are +uninhabited and of no great size. There is also a story that Alcmaeon, son of +Amphiraus, during his wanderings after the murder of his mother was bidden by +Apollo to inhabit this spot, through an oracle which intimated that he would +have no release from his terrors until he should find a country to dwell in +which had not been seen by the sun, or existed as land at the time he slew his +mother; all else being to him polluted ground. Perplexed at this, the story +goes on to say, he at last observed this deposit of the Achelous, and +considered that a place sufficient to support life upon, might have been thrown +up during the long interval that had elapsed since the death of his mother and +the beginning of his wanderings. Settling, therefore, in the district round +Oeniadae, he founded a dominion, and left the country its name from his son +Acarnan. Such is the story we have received concerning Alcmaeon. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians and Phormio putting back from Acarnania and arriving at +Naupactus, sailed home to Athens in the spring, taking with them the ships that +they had captured, and such of the prisoners made in the late actions as were +freemen; who were exchanged, man for man. And so ended this winter, and the +third year of this war, of which Thucydides was the historian. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2H_4_0011" id="link2H_4_0011"></a> +BOOK III </h2> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0009" id="link2HCH0009"></a> +CHAPTER IX </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Fourth and Fifth Years of the War—Revolt of Mitylene +</p> + +<p> +The next summer, just as the corn was getting ripe, the Peloponnesians and +their allies invaded Attica under the command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, +king of the Lacedaemonians, and sat down and ravaged the land; the Athenian +horse as usual attacking them, wherever it was practicable, and preventing the +mass of the light troops from advancing from their camp and wasting the parts +near the city. After staying the time for which they had taken provisions, the +invaders retired and dispersed to their several cities. +</p> + +<p> +Immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians all Lesbos, except +Methymna, revolted from the Athenians. The Lesbians had wished to revolt even +before the war, but the Lacedaemonians would not receive them; and yet now when +they did revolt, they were compelled to do so sooner than they had intended. +While they were waiting until the moles for their harbours and the ships and +walls that they had in building should be finished, and for the arrival of +archers and corn and other things that they were engaged in fetching from the +Pontus, the Tenedians, with whom they were at enmity, and the Methymnians, and +some factious persons in Mitylene itself, who were proxeni of Athens, informed +the Athenians that the Mitylenians were forcibly uniting the island under their +sovereignty, and that the preparations about which they were so active, were +all concerted with the Boeotians their kindred and the Lacedaemonians with a +view to a revolt, and that, unless they were immediately prevented, Athens +would lose Lesbos. +</p> + +<p> +However, the Athenians, distressed by the plague, and by the war that had +recently broken out and was now raging, thought it a serious matter to add +Lesbos with its fleet and untouched resources to the list of their enemies; and +at first would not believe the charge, giving too much weight to their wish +that it might not be true. But when an embassy which they sent had failed to +persuade the Mitylenians to give up the union and preparations complained of, +they became alarmed, and resolved to strike the first blow. They accordingly +suddenly sent off forty ships that had been got ready to sail round +Peloponnese, under the command of Cleippides, son of Deinias, and two others; +word having been brought them of a festival in honour of the Malean Apollo +outside the town, which is kept by the whole people of Mitylene, and at which, +if haste were made, they might hope to take them by surprise. If this plan +succeeded, well and good; if not, they were to order the Mitylenians to deliver +up their ships and to pull down their walls, and if they did not obey, to +declare war. The ships accordingly set out; the ten galleys, forming the +contingent of the Mitylenians present with the fleet according to the terms of +the alliance, being detained by the Athenians, and their crews placed in +custody. However, the Mitylenians were informed of the expedition by a man who +crossed from Athens to Euboea, and going overland to Geraestus, sailed from +thence by a merchantman which he found on the point of putting to sea, and so +arrived at Mitylene the third day after leaving Athens. The Mitylenians +accordingly refrained from going out to the temple at Malea, and moreover +barricaded and kept guard round the half-finished parts of their walls and +harbours. +</p> + +<p> +When the Athenians sailed in not long after and saw how things stood, the +generals delivered their orders, and upon the Mitylenians refusing to obey, +commenced hostilities. The Mitylenians, thus compelled to go to war without +notice and unprepared, at first sailed out with their fleet and made some show +of fighting, a little in front of the harbour; but being driven back by the +Athenian ships, immediately offered to treat with the commanders, wishing, if +possible, to get the ships away for the present upon any tolerable terms. The +Athenian commanders accepted their offers, being themselves fearful that they +might not be able to cope with the whole of Lesbos; and an armistice having +been concluded, the Mitylenians sent to Athens one of the informers, already +repentant of his conduct, and others with him, to try to persuade the Athenians +of the innocence of their intentions and to get the fleet recalled. In the +meantime, having no great hope of a favourable answer from Athens, they also +sent off a galley with envoys to Lacedaemon, unobserved by the Athenian fleet +which was anchored at Malea to the north of the town. +</p> + +<p> +While these envoys, reaching Lacedaemon after a difficult journey across the +open sea, were negotiating for succours being sent them, the ambassadors from +Athens returned without having effected anything; and hostilities were at once +begun by the Mitylenians and the rest of Lesbos, with the exception of the +Methymnians, who came to the aid of the Athenians with the Imbrians and +Lemnians and some few of the other allies. The Mitylenians made a sortie with +all their forces against the Athenian camp; and a battle ensued, in which they +gained some slight advantage, but retired notwithstanding, not feeling +sufficient confidence in themselves to spend the night upon the field. After +this they kept quiet, wishing to wait for the chance of reinforcements arriving +from Peloponnese before making a second venture, being encouraged by the +arrival of Meleas, a Laconian, and Hermaeondas, a Theban, who had been sent off +before the insurrection but had been unable to reach Lesbos before the Athenian +expedition, and who now stole in in a galley after the battle, and advised them +to send another galley and envoys back with them, which the Mitylenians +accordingly did. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Athenians, greatly encouraged by the inaction of the Mitylenians, +summoned allies to their aid, who came in all the quicker from seeing so little +vigour displayed by the Lesbians, and bringing round their ships to a new +station to the south of the town, fortified two camps, one on each side of the +city, and instituted a blockade of both the harbours. The sea was thus closed +against the Mitylenians, who, however, commanded the whole country, with the +rest of the Lesbians who had now joined them; the Athenians only holding a +limited area round their camps, and using Malea more as the station for their +ships and their market. +</p> + +<p> +While the war went on in this way at Mitylene, the Athenians, about the same +time in this summer, also sent thirty ships to Peloponnese under Asopius, son +of Phormio; the Acarnanians insisting that the commander sent should be some +son or relative of Phormio. As the ships coasted along shore they ravaged the +seaboard of Laconia; after which Asopius sent most of the fleet home, and +himself went on with twelve vessels to Naupactus, and afterwards raising the +whole Acarnanian population made an expedition against Oeniadae, the fleet +sailing along the Achelous, while the army laid waste the country. The +inhabitants, however, showing no signs of submitting, he dismissed the land +forces and himself sailed to Leucas, and making a descent upon Nericus was cut +off during his retreat, and most of his troops with him, by the people in those +parts aided by some coastguards; after which the Athenians sailed away, +recovering their dead from the Leucadians under truce. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the envoys of the Mitylenians sent out in the first ship were told by +the Lacedaemonians to come to Olympia, in order that the rest of the allies +might hear them and decide upon their matter, and so they journeyed thither. It +was the Olympiad in which the Rhodian Dorieus gained his second victory, and +the envoys having been introduced to make their speech after the festival, +spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Lacedaemonians and allies, the rule established among the Hellenes is +not unknown to us. Those who revolt in war and forsake their former confederacy +are favourably regarded by those who receive them, in so far as they are of use +to them, but otherwise are thought less well of, through being considered +traitors to their former friends. Nor is this an unfair way of judging, where +the rebels and the power from whom they secede are at one in policy and +sympathy, and a match for each other in resources and power, and where no +reasonable ground exists for the rebellion. But with us and the Athenians this +was not the case; and no one need think the worse of us for revolting from them +in danger, after having been honoured by them in time of peace. +</p> + +<p> +“Justice and honesty will be the first topics of our speech, especially +as we are asking for alliance; because we know that there can never be any +solid friendship between individuals, or union between communities that is +worth the name, unless the parties be persuaded of each other’s honesty, +and be generally congenial the one to the other; since from difference in +feeling springs also difference in conduct. Between ourselves and the Athenians +alliance began, when you withdrew from the Median War and they remained to +finish the business. But we did not become allies of the Athenians for the +subjugation of the Hellenes, but allies of the Hellenes for their liberation +from the Mede; and as long as the Athenians led us fairly we followed them +loyally; but when we saw them relax their hostility to the Mede, to try to +compass the subjection of the allies, then our apprehensions began. Unable, +however, to unite and defend themselves, on account of the number of +confederates that had votes, all the allies were enslaved, except ourselves and +the Chians, who continued to send our contingents as independent and nominally +free. Trust in Athens as a leader, however, we could no longer feel, judging by +the examples already given; it being unlikely that she would reduce our fellow +confederates, and not do the same by us who were left, if ever she had the +power. +</p> + +<p> +“Had we all been still independent, we could have had more faith in their +not attempting any change; but the greater number being their subjects, while +they were treating us as equals, they would naturally chafe under this solitary +instance of independence as contrasted with the submission of the majority; +particularly as they daily grew more powerful, and we more destitute. Now the +only sure basis of an alliance is for each party to be equally afraid of the +other; he who would like to encroach is then deterred by the reflection that he +will not have odds in his favour. Again, if we were left independent, it was +only because they thought they saw their way to empire more clearly by specious +language and by the paths of policy than by those of force. Not only were we +useful as evidence that powers who had votes, like themselves, would not, +surely, join them in their expeditions, against their will, without the party +attacked being in the wrong; but the same system also enabled them to lead the +stronger states against the weaker first, and so to leave the former to the +last, stripped of their natural allies, and less capable of resistance. But if +they had begun with us, while all the states still had their resources under +their own control, and there was a centre to rally round, the work of +subjugation would have been found less easy. Besides this, our navy gave them +some apprehension: it was always possible that it might unite with you or with +some other power, and become dangerous to Athens. The court which we paid to +their commons and its leaders for the time being also helped us to maintain our +independence. However, we did not expect to be able to do so much longer, if +this war had not broken out, from the examples that we had had of their conduct +to the rest. +</p> + +<p> +“How then could we put our trust in such friendship or freedom as we had +here? We accepted each other against our inclination; fear made them court us +in war, and us them in peace; sympathy, the ordinary basis of confidence, had +its place supplied by terror, fear having more share than friendship in +detaining us in the alliance; and the first party that should be encouraged by +the hope of impunity was certain to break faith with the other. So that to +condemn us for being the first to break off, because they delay the blow that +we dread, instead of ourselves delaying to know for certain whether it will be +dealt or not, is to take a false view of the case. For if we were equally able +with them to meet their plots and imitate their delay, we should be their +equals and should be under no necessity of being their subjects; but the +liberty of offence being always theirs, that of defence ought clearly to be +ours. +</p> + +<p> +“Such, Lacedaemonians and allies, are the grounds and the reasons of our +revolt; clear enough to convince our hearers of the fairness of our conduct, +and sufficient to alarm ourselves, and to make us turn to some means of safety. +This we wished to do long ago, when we sent to you on the subject while the +peace yet lasted, but were balked by your refusing to receive us; and now, upon +the Boeotians inviting us, we at once responded to the call, and decided upon a +twofold revolt, from the Hellenes and from the Athenians, not to aid the latter +in harming the former, but to join in their liberation, and not to allow the +Athenians in the end to destroy us, but to act in time against them. Our +revolt, however, has taken place prematurely and without preparation—a +fact which makes it all the more incumbent on you to receive us into alliance +and to send us speedy relief, in order to show that you support your friends, +and at the same time do harm to your enemies. You have an opportunity such as +you never had before. Disease and expenditure have wasted the Athenians: their +ships are either cruising round your coasts, or engaged in blockading us; and +it is not probable that they will have any to spare, if you invade them a +second time this summer by sea and land; but they will either offer no +resistance to your vessels, or withdraw from both our shores. Nor must it be +thought that this is a case of putting yourselves into danger for a country +which is not yours. Lesbos may appear far off, but when help is wanted she will +be found near enough. It is not in Attica that the war will be decided, as some +imagine, but in the countries by which Attica is supported; and the Athenian +revenue is drawn from the allies, and will become still larger if they reduce +us; as not only will no other state revolt, but our resources will be added to +theirs, and we shall be treated worse than those that were enslaved before. But +if you will frankly support us, you will add to your side a state that has a +large navy, which is your great want; you will smooth the way to the overthrow +of the Athenians by depriving them of their allies, who will be greatly +encouraged to come over; and you will free yourselves from the imputation made +against you, of not supporting insurrection. In short, only show yourselves as +liberators, and you may count upon having the advantage in the war. +</p> + +<p> +“Respect, therefore, the hopes placed in you by the Hellenes, and that +Olympian Zeus, in whose temple we stand as very suppliants; become the allies +and defenders of the Mitylenians, and do not sacrifice us, who put our lives +upon the hazard, in a cause in which general good will result to all from our +success, and still more general harm if we fail through your refusing to help +us; but be the men that the Hellenes think you, and our fears desire.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of the Mitylenians. After hearing them out, the +Lacedaemonians and confederates granted what they urged, and took the Lesbians +into alliance, and deciding in favour of the invasion of Attica, told the +allies present to march as quickly as possible to the Isthmus with two-thirds +of their forces; and arriving there first themselves, got ready hauling +machines to carry their ships across from Corinth to the sea on the side of +Athens, in order to make their attack by sea and land at once. However, the +zeal which they displayed was not imitated by the rest of the confederates, who +came in but slowly, being engaged in harvesting their corn and sick of making +expeditions. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Athenians, aware that the preparations of the enemy were due to +his conviction of their weakness, and wishing to show him that he was mistaken, +and that they were able, without moving the Lesbian fleet, to repel with ease +that with which they were menaced from Peloponnese, manned a hundred ships by +embarking the citizens of Athens, except the knights and Pentacosiomedimni, and +the resident aliens; and putting out to the Isthmus, displayed their power, and +made descents upon Peloponnese wherever they pleased. A disappointment so +signal made the Lacedaemonians think that the Lesbians had not spoken the +truth; and embarrassed by the non-appearance of the confederates, coupled with +the news that the thirty ships round Peloponnese were ravaging the lands near +Sparta, they went back home. Afterwards, however, they got ready a fleet to +send to Lesbos, and ordering a total of forty ships from the different cities +in the league, appointed Alcidas to command the expedition in his capacity of +high admiral. Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships, upon seeing the +Lacedaemonians go home, went home likewise. +</p> + +<p> +If, at the time that this fleet was at sea, Athens had almost the largest +number of first-rate ships in commission that she ever possessed at any one +moment, she had as many or even more when the war began. At that time one +hundred guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis; a hundred more were cruising round +Peloponnese, besides those employed at Potidæa and in other places; making a +grand total of two hundred and fifty vessels employed on active service in a +single summer. It was this, with Potidæa, that most exhausted her +revenues—Potidæa being blockaded by a force of heavy infantry (each +drawing two drachmae a day, one for himself and another for his servant), which +amounted to three thousand at first, and was kept at this number down to the +end of the siege; besides sixteen hundred with Phormio who went away before it +was over; and the ships being all paid at the same rate. In this way her money +was wasted at first; and this was the largest number of ships ever manned by +her. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time that the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the +Mitylenians marched by land with their mercenaries against Methymna, which they +thought to gain by treachery. After assaulting the town, and not meeting with +the success that they anticipated, they withdrew to Antissa, Pyrrha, and +Eresus; and taking measures for the better security of these towns and +strengthening their walls, hastily returned home. After their departure the +Methymnians marched against Antissa, but were defeated in a sortie by the +Antissians and their mercenaries, and retreated in haste after losing many of +their number. Word of this reaching Athens, and the Athenians learning that the +Mitylenians were masters of the country and their own soldiers unable to hold +them in check, they sent out about the beginning of autumn Paches, son of +Epicurus, to take the command, and a thousand Athenian heavy infantry; who +worked their own passage and, arriving at Mitylene, built a single wall all +round it, forts being erected at some of the strongest points. Mitylene was +thus blockaded strictly on both sides, by land and by sea; and winter now drew +near. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians needing money for the siege, although they had for the first time +raised a contribution of two hundred talents from their own citizens, now sent +out twelve ships to levy subsidies from their allies, with Lysicles and four +others in command. After cruising to different places and laying them under +contribution, Lysicles went up the country from Myus, in Caria, across the +plain of the Meander, as far as the hill of Sandius; and being attacked by the +Carians and the people of Anaia, was slain with many of his soldiers. +</p> + +<p> +The same winter the Plataeans, who were still being besieged by the +Peloponnesians and Boeotians, distressed by the failure of their provisions, +and seeing no hope of relief from Athens, nor any other means of safety, formed +a scheme with the Athenians besieged with them for escaping, if possible, by +forcing their way over the enemy’s walls; the attempt having been +suggested by Theaenetus, son of Tolmides, a soothsayer, and Eupompides, son of +Daimachus, one of their generals. At first all were to join: afterwards, half +hung back, thinking the risk great; about two hundred and twenty, however, +voluntarily persevered in the attempt, which was carried out in the following +way. Ladders were made to match the height of the enemy’s wall, which +they measured by the layers of bricks, the side turned towards them not being +thoroughly whitewashed. These were counted by many persons at once; and though +some might miss the right calculation, most would hit upon it, particularly as +they counted over and over again, and were no great way from the wall, but +could see it easily enough for their purpose. The length required for the +ladders was thus obtained, being calculated from the breadth of the brick. +</p> + +<p> +Now the wall of the Peloponnesians was constructed as follows. It consisted of +two lines drawn round the place, one against the Plataeans, the other against +any attack on the outside from Athens, about sixteen feet apart. The +intermediate space of sixteen feet was occupied by huts portioned out among the +soldiers on guard, and built in one block, so as to give the appearance of a +single thick wall with battlements on either side. At intervals of every ten +battlements were towers of considerable size, and the same breadth as the wall, +reaching right across from its inner to its outer face, with no means of +passing except through the middle. Accordingly on stormy and wet nights the +battlements were deserted, and guard kept from the towers, which were not far +apart and roofed in above. +</p> + +<p> +Such being the structure of the wall by which the Plataeans were blockaded, +when their preparations were completed, they waited for a stormy night of wind +and rain and without any moon, and then set out, guided by the authors of the +enterprise. Crossing first the ditch that ran round the town, they next gained +the wall of the enemy unperceived by the sentinels, who did not see them in the +darkness, or hear them, as the wind drowned with its roar the noise of their +approach; besides which they kept a good way off from each other, that they +might not be betrayed by the clash of their weapons. They were also lightly +equipped, and had only the left foot shod to preserve them from slipping in the +mire. They came up to the battlements at one of the intermediate spaces where +they knew them to be unguarded: those who carried the ladders went first and +planted them; next twelve light-armed soldiers with only a dagger and a +breastplate mounted, led by Ammias, son of Coroebus, who was the first on the +wall; his followers getting up after him and going six to each of the towers. +After these came another party of light troops armed with spears, whose +shields, that they might advance the easier, were carried by men behind, who +were to hand them to them when they found themselves in presence of the enemy. +After a good many had mounted they were discovered by the sentinels in the +towers, by the noise made by a tile which was knocked down by one of the +Plataeans as he was laying hold of the battlements. The alarm was instantly +given, and the troops rushed to the wall, not knowing the nature of the danger, +owing to the dark night and stormy weather; the Plataeans in the town having +also chosen that moment to make a sortie against the wall of the Peloponnesians +upon the side opposite to that on which their men were getting over, in order +to divert the attention of the besiegers. Accordingly they remained distracted +at their several posts, without any venturing to stir to give help from his own +station, and at a loss to guess what was going on. Meanwhile the three hundred +set aside for service on emergencies went outside the wall in the direction of +the alarm. Fire-signals of an attack were also raised towards Thebes; but the +Plataeans in the town at once displayed a number of others, prepared beforehand +for this very purpose, in order to render the enemy’s signals +unintelligible, and to prevent his friends getting a true idea of what was +passing and coming to his aid before their comrades who had gone out should +have made good their escape and be in safety. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the first of the scaling party that had got up, after carrying both +the towers and putting the sentinels to the sword, posted themselves inside to +prevent any one coming through against them; and rearing ladders from the wall, +sent several men up on the towers, and from their summit and base kept in check +all of the enemy that came up, with their missiles, while their main body +planted a number of ladders against the wall, and knocking down the +battlements, passed over between the towers; each as soon as he had got over +taking up his station at the edge of the ditch, and plying from thence with +arrows and darts any who came along the wall to stop the passage of his +comrades. When all were over, the party on the towers came down, the last of +them not without difficulty, and proceeded to the ditch, just as the three +hundred came up carrying torches. The Plataeans, standing on the edge of the +ditch in the dark, had a good view of their opponents, and discharged their +arrows and darts upon the unarmed parts of their bodies, while they themselves +could not be so well seen in the obscurity for the torches; and thus even the +last of them got over the ditch, though not without effort and difficulty; as +ice had formed in it, not strong enough to walk upon, but of that watery kind +which generally comes with a wind more east than north, and the snow which this +wind had caused to fall during the night had made the water in the ditch rise, +so that they could scarcely breast it as they crossed. However, it was mainly +the violence of the storm that enabled them to effect their escape at all. +</p> + +<p> +Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans went all together along the road leading +to Thebes, keeping the chapel of the hero Androcrates upon their right; +considering that the last road which the Peloponnesians would suspect them of +having taken would be that towards their enemies’ country. Indeed they +could see them pursuing with torches upon the Athens road towards Cithaeron and +Druoskephalai or Oakheads. After going for rather more than half a mile upon +the road to Thebes, the Plataeans turned off and took that leading to the +mountain, to Erythrae and Hysiae, and reaching the hills, made good their +escape to Athens, two hundred and twelve men in all; some of their number +having turned back into the town before getting over the wall, and one archer +having been taken prisoner at the outer ditch. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians +gave up the pursuit and returned to their posts; and the Plataeans in the town, +knowing nothing of what had passed, and informed by those who had turned back +that not a man had escaped, sent out a herald as soon as it was day to make a +truce for the recovery of the dead bodies, and then, learning the truth, +desisted. In this way the Plataean party got over and were saved. +</p> + +<p> +Towards the close of the same winter, Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian, was sent out +in a galley from Lacedaemon to Mitylene. Going by sea to Pyrrha, and from +thence overland, he passed along the bed of a torrent, where the line of +circumvallation was passable, and thus entering unperceived into Mitylene told +the magistrates that Attica would certainly be invaded, and the forty ships +destined to relieve them arrive, and that he had been sent on to announce this +and to superintend matters generally. The Mitylenians upon this took courage, +and laid aside the idea of treating with the Athenians; and now this winter +ended, and with it ended the fourth year of the war of which Thucydides was the +historian. +</p> + +<p> +The next summer the Peloponnesians sent off the forty-two ships for Mitylene, +under Alcidas, their high admiral, and themselves and their allies invaded +Attica, their object being to distract the Athenians by a double movement, and +thus to make it less easy for them to act against the fleet sailing to +Mitylene. The commander in this invasion was Cleomenes, in the place of King +Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, his nephew, who was still a minor. Not content +with laying waste whatever had shot up in the parts which they had before +devastated, the invaders now extended their ravages to lands passed over in +their previous incursions; so that this invasion was more severely felt by the +Athenians than any except the second; the enemy staying on and on until they +had overrun most of the country, in the expectation of hearing from Lesbos of +something having been achieved by their fleet, which they thought must now have +got over. However, as they did not obtain any of the results expected, and +their provisions began to run short, they retreated and dispersed to their +different cities. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime the Mitylenians, finding their provisions failing, while the +fleet from Peloponnese was loitering on the way instead of appearing at +Mitylene, were compelled to come to terms with the Athenians in the following +manner. Salaethus having himself ceased to expect the fleet to arrive, now +armed the commons with heavy armour, which they had not before possessed, with +the intention of making a sortie against the Athenians. The commons, however, +no sooner found themselves possessed of arms than they refused any longer to +obey their officers; and forming in knots together, told the authorities to +bring out in public the provisions and divide them amongst them all, or they +would themselves come to terms with the Athenians and deliver up the city. +</p> + +<p> +The government, aware of their inability to prevent this, and of the danger +they would be in, if left out of the capitulation, publicly agreed with Paches +and the army to surrender Mitylene at discretion and to admit the troops into +the town; upon the understanding that the Mitylenians should be allowed to send +an embassy to Athens to plead their cause, and that Paches should not imprison, +make slaves of, or put to death any of the citizens until its return. Such were +the terms of the capitulation; in spite of which the chief authors of the +negotiation with Lacedaemon were so completely overcome by terror when the army +entered that they went and seated themselves by the altars, from which they +were raised up by Paches under promise that he would do them no wrong, and +lodged by him in Tenedos, until he should learn the pleasure of the Athenians +concerning them. Paches also sent some galleys and seized Antissa, and took +such other military measures as he thought advisable. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the forty ships, who ought to have made all +haste to relieve Mitylene, lost time in coming round Peloponnese itself, and +proceeding leisurely on the remainder of the voyage, made Delos without having +been seen by the Athenians at Athens, and from thence arriving at Icarus and +Myconus, there first heard of the fall of Mitylene. Wishing to know the truth, +they put into Embatum, in the Erythraeid, about seven days after the capture of +the town. Here they learned the truth, and began to consider what they were to +do; and Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Alcidas and Peloponnesians who share with me the command of this +armament, my advice is to sail just as we are to Mitylene, before we have been +heard of. We may expect to find the Athenians as much off their guard as men +generally are who have just taken a city: this will certainly be so by sea, +where they have no idea of any enemy attacking them, and where our strength, as +it happens, mainly lies; while even their land forces are probably scattered +about the houses in the carelessness of victory. If therefore we were to fall +upon them suddenly and in the night, I have hopes, with the help of the +well-wishers that we may have left inside the town, that we shall become +masters of the place. Let us not shrink from the risk, but let us remember that +this is just the occasion for one of the baseless panics common in war: and +that to be able to guard against these in one’s own case, and to detect +the moment when an attack will find an enemy at this disadvantage, is what +makes a successful general.” +</p> + +<p> +These words of Teutiaplus failing to move Alcidas, some of the Ionian exiles +and the Lesbians with the expedition began to urge him, since this seemed too +dangerous, to seize one of the Ionian cities or the Aeolic town of Cyme, to use +as a base for effecting the revolt of Ionia. This was by no means a hopeless +enterprise, as their coming was welcome everywhere; their object would be by +this move to deprive Athens of her chief source of revenue, and at the same +time to saddle her with expense, if she chose to blockade them; and they would +probably induce Pissuthnes to join them in the war. However, Alcidas gave this +proposal as bad a reception as the other, being eager, since he had come too +late for Mitylene, to find himself back in Peloponnese as soon as possible. +</p> + +<p> +Accordingly he put out from Embatum and proceeded along shore; and touching at +the Teian town, Myonnesus, there butchered most of the prisoners that he had +taken on his passage. Upon his coming to anchor at Ephesus, envoys came to him +from the Samians at Anaia, and told him that he was not going the right way to +free Hellas in massacring men who had never raised a hand against him, and who +were not enemies of his, but allies of Athens against their will, and that if +he did not stop he would turn many more friends into enemies than enemies into +friends. Alcidas agreed to this, and let go all the Chians still in his hands +and some of the others that he had taken; the inhabitants, instead of flying at +the sight of his vessels, rather coming up to them, taking them for Athenian, +having no sort of expectation that while the Athenians commanded the sea +Peloponnesian ships would venture over to Ionia. +</p> + +<p> +From Ephesus Alcidas set sail in haste and fled. He had been seen by the +Salaminian and Paralian galleys, which happened to be sailing from Athens, +while still at anchor off Clarus; and fearing pursuit he now made across the +open sea, fully determined to touch nowhere, if he could help it, until he got +to Peloponnese. Meanwhile news of him had come in to Paches from the +Erythraeid, and indeed from all quarters. As Ionia was unfortified, great fears +were felt that the Peloponnesians coasting along shore, even if they did not +intend to stay, might make descents in passing and plunder the towns; and now +the Paralian and Salaminian, having seen him at Clarus, themselves brought +intelligence of the fact. Paches accordingly gave hot chase, and continued the +pursuit as far as the isle of Patmos, and then finding that Alcidas had got on +too far to be overtaken, came back again. Meanwhile he thought it fortunate +that, as he had not fallen in with them out at sea, he had not overtaken them +anywhere where they would have been forced to encamp, and so give him the +trouble of blockading them. +</p> + +<p> +On his return along shore he touched, among other places, at Notium, the port +of Colophon, where the Colophonians had settled after the capture of the upper +town by Itamenes and the barbarians, who had been called in by certain +individuals in a party quarrel. The capture of the town took place about the +time of the second Peloponnesian invasion of Attica. However, the refugees, +after settling at Notium, again split up into factions, one of which called in +Arcadian and barbarian mercenaries from Pissuthnes and, entrenching these in a +quarter apart, formed a new community with the Median party of the Colophonians +who joined them from the upper town. Their opponents had retired into exile, +and now called in Paches, who invited Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians +in the fortified quarter, to a parley, upon condition that, if they could not +agree, he was to be put back safe and sound in the fortification. However, upon +his coming out to him, he put him into custody, though not in chains, and +attacked suddenly and took by surprise the fortification, and putting the +Arcadians and the barbarians found in it to the sword, afterwards took Hippias +into it as he had promised, and, as soon as he was inside, seized him and shot +him down. Paches then gave up Notium to the Colophonians not of the Median +party; and settlers were afterwards sent out from Athens, and the place +colonized according to Athenian laws, after collecting all the Colophonians +found in any of the cities. +</p> + +<p> +Arrived at Mitylene, Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus; and finding the +Lacedaemonian, Salaethus, in hiding in the town, sent him off to Athens, +together with the Mitylenians that he had placed in Tenedos, and any other +persons that he thought concerned in the revolt. He also sent back the greater +part of his forces, remaining with the rest to settle Mitylene and the rest of +Lesbos as he thought best. +</p> + +<p> +Upon the arrival of the prisoners with Salaethus, the Athenians at once put the +latter to death, although he offered, among other things, to procure the +withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Plataea, which was still under siege; and +after deliberating as to what they should do with the former, in the fury of +the moment determined to put to death not only the prisoners at Athens, but the +whole adult male population of Mitylene, and to make slaves of the women and +children. It was remarked that Mitylene had revolted without being, like the +rest, subjected to the empire; and what above all swelled the wrath of the +Athenians was the fact of the Peloponnesian fleet having ventured over to Ionia +to her support, a fact which was held to argue a long meditated rebellion. They +accordingly sent a galley to communicate the decree to Paches, commanding him +to lose no time in dispatching the Mitylenians. The morrow brought repentance +with it and reflection on the horrid cruelty of a decree, which condemned a +whole city to the fate merited only by the guilty. This was no sooner perceived +by the Mitylenian ambassadors at Athens and their Athenian supporters, than +they moved the authorities to put the question again to the vote; which they +the more easily consented to do, as they themselves plainly saw that most of +the citizens wished some one to give them an opportunity for reconsidering the +matter. An assembly was therefore at once called, and after much expression of +opinion upon both sides, Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, the same who had carried the +former motion of putting the Mitylenians to death, the most violent man at +Athens, and at that time by far the most powerful with the commons, came +forward again and spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“I have often before now been convinced that a democracy is incapable of +empire, and never more so than by your present change of mind in the matter of +Mitylene. Fears or plots being unknown to you in your daily relations with each +other, you feel just the same with regard to your allies, and never reflect +that the mistakes into which you may be led by listening to their appeals, or +by giving way to your own compassion, are full of danger to yourselves, and +bring you no thanks for your weakness from your allies; entirely forgetting +that your empire is a despotism and your subjects disaffected conspirators, +whose obedience is ensured not by your suicidal concessions, but by the +superiority given you by your own strength and not their loyalty. The most +alarming feature in the case is the constant change of measures with which we +appear to be threatened, and our seeming ignorance of the fact that bad laws +which are never changed are better for a city than good ones that have no +authority; that unlearned loyalty is more serviceable than quick-witted +insubordination; and that ordinary men usually manage public affairs better +than their more gifted fellows. The latter are always wanting to appear wiser +than the laws, and to overrule every proposition brought forward, thinking that +they cannot show their wit in more important matters, and by such behaviour too +often ruin their country; while those who mistrust their own cleverness are +content to be less learned than the laws, and less able to pick holes in the +speech of a good speaker; and being fair judges rather than rival athletes, +generally conduct affairs successfully. These we ought to imitate, instead of +being led on by cleverness and intellectual rivalry to advise your people +against our real opinions. +</p> + +<p> +“For myself, I adhere to my former opinion, and wonder at those who have +proposed to reopen the case of the Mitylenians, and who are thus causing a +delay which is all in favour of the guilty, by making the sufferer proceed +against the offender with the edge of his anger blunted; although where +vengeance follows most closely upon the wrong, it best equals it and most amply +requites it. I wonder also who will be the man who will maintain the contrary, +and will pretend to show that the crimes of the Mitylenians are of service to +us, and our misfortunes injurious to the allies. Such a man must plainly either +have such confidence in his rhetoric as to adventure to prove that what has +been once for all decided is still undetermined, or be bribed to try to delude +us by elaborate sophisms. In such contests the state gives the rewards to +others, and takes the dangers for herself. The persons to blame are you who are +so foolish as to institute these contests; who go to see an oration as you +would to see a sight, take your facts on hearsay, judge of the practicability +of a project by the wit of its advocates, and trust for the truth as to past +events not to the fact which you saw more than to the clever strictures which +you heard; the easy victims of new-fangled arguments, unwilling to follow +received conclusions; slaves to every new paradox, despisers of the +commonplace; the first wish of every man being that he could speak himself, the +next to rival those who can speak by seeming to be quite up with their ideas by +applauding every hit almost before it is made, and by being as quick in +catching an argument as you are slow in foreseeing its consequences; asking, if +I may so say, for something different from the conditions under which we live, +and yet comprehending inadequately those very conditions; very slaves to the +pleasure of the ear, and more like the audience of a rhetorician than the +council of a city. +</p> + +<p> +“In order to keep you from this, I proceed to show that no one state has +ever injured you as much as Mitylene. I can make allowance for those who revolt +because they cannot bear our empire, or who have been forced to do so by the +enemy. But for those who possessed an island with fortifications; who could +fear our enemies only by sea, and there had their own force of galleys to +protect them; who were independent and held in the highest honour by +you—to act as these have done, this is not revolt—revolt implies +oppression; it is deliberate and wanton aggression; an attempt to ruin us by +siding with our bitterest enemies; a worse offence than a war undertaken on +their own account in the acquisition of power. The fate of those of their +neighbours who had already rebelled and had been subdued was no lesson to them; +their own prosperity could not dissuade them from affronting danger; but +blindly confident in the future, and full of hopes beyond their power though +not beyond their ambition, they declared war and made their decision to prefer +might to right, their attack being determined not by provocation but by the +moment which seemed propitious. The truth is that great good fortune coming +suddenly and unexpectedly tends to make a people insolent; in most cases it is +safer for mankind to have success in reason than out of reason; and it is +easier for them, one may say, to stave off adversity than to preserve +prosperity. Our mistake has been to distinguish the Mitylenians as we have +done: had they been long ago treated like the rest, they never would have so +far forgotten themselves, human nature being as surely made arrogant by +consideration as it is awed by firmness. Let them now therefore be punished as +their crime requires, and do not, while you condemn the aristocracy, absolve +the people. This is certain, that all attacked you without distinction, +although they might have come over to us and been now again in possession of +their city. But no, they thought it safer to throw in their lot with the +aristocracy and so joined their rebellion! Consider therefore: if you subject +to the same punishment the ally who is forced to rebel by the enemy, and him +who does so by his own free choice, which of them, think you, is there that +will not rebel upon the slightest pretext; when the reward of success is +freedom, and the penalty of failure nothing so very terrible? We meanwhile +shall have to risk our money and our lives against one state after another; and +if successful, shall receive a ruined town from which we can no longer draw the +revenue upon which our strength depends; while if unsuccessful, we shall have +an enemy the more upon our hands, and shall spend the time that might be +employed in combating our existing foes in warring with our own allies. +</p> + +<p> +“No hope, therefore, that rhetoric may instil or money purchase, of the +mercy due to human infirmity must be held out to the Mitylenians. Their offence +was not involuntary, but of malice and deliberate; and mercy is only for +unwilling offenders. I therefore, now as before, persist against your reversing +your first decision, or giving way to the three failings most fatal to +empire—pity, sentiment, and indulgence. Compassion is due to those who +can reciprocate the feeling, not to those who will never pity us in return, but +are our natural and necessary foes: the orators who charm us with sentiment may +find other less important arenas for their talents, in the place of one where +the city pays a heavy penalty for a momentary pleasure, themselves receiving +fine acknowledgments for their fine phrases; while indulgence should be shown +towards those who will be our friends in future, instead of towards men who +will remain just what they were, and as much our enemies as before. To sum up +shortly, I say that if you follow my advice you will do what is just towards +the Mitylenians, and at the same time expedient; while by a different decision +you will not oblige them so much as pass sentence upon yourselves. For if they +were right in rebelling, you must be wrong in ruling. However, if, right or +wrong, you determine to rule, you must carry out your principle and punish the +Mitylenians as your interest requires; or else you must give up your empire and +cultivate honesty without danger. Make up your minds, therefore, to give them +like for like; and do not let the victims who escaped the plot be more +insensible than the conspirators who hatched it; but reflect what they would +have done if victorious over you, especially they were the aggressors. It is +they who wrong their neighbour without a cause, that pursue their victim to the +death, on account of the danger which they foresee in letting their enemy +survive; since the object of a wanton wrong is more dangerous, if he escape, +than an enemy who has not this to complain of. Do not, therefore, be traitors +to yourselves, but recall as nearly as possible the moment of suffering and the +supreme importance which you then attached to their reduction; and now pay them +back in their turn, without yielding to present weakness or forgetting the +peril that once hung over you. Punish them as they deserve, and teach your +other allies by a striking example that the penalty of rebellion is death. Let +them once understand this and you will not have so often to neglect your +enemies while you are fighting with your own confederates.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of Cleon. After him Diodotus, son of Eucrates, who had also +in the previous assembly spoken most strongly against putting the Mitylenians +to death, came forward and spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the +Mitylenians, nor do I approve the protests which we have heard against +important questions being frequently debated. I think the two things most +opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste usually goes hand in hand +with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of mind. As for the argument +that speech ought not to be the exponent of action, the man who uses it must be +either senseless or interested: senseless if he believes it possible to treat +of the uncertain future through any other medium; interested if, wishing to +carry a disgraceful measure and doubting his ability to speak well in a bad +cause, he thinks to frighten opponents and hearers by well-aimed calumny. What +is still more intolerable is to accuse a speaker of making a display in order +to be paid for it. If ignorance only were imputed, an unsuccessful speaker +might retire with a reputation for honesty, if not for wisdom; while the charge +of dishonesty makes him suspected, if successful, and thought, if defeated, not +only a fool but a rogue. The city is no gainer by such a system, since fear +deprives it of its advisers; although in truth, if our speakers are to make +such assertions, it would be better for the country if they could not speak at +all, as we should then make fewer blunders. The good citizen ought to triumph +not by frightening his opponents but by beating them fairly in argument; and a +wise city, without over-distinguishing its best advisers, will nevertheless not +deprive them of their due, and, far from punishing an unlucky counsellor, will +not even regard him as disgraced. In this way successful orators would be least +tempted to sacrifice their convictions to popularity, in the hope of still +higher honours, and unsuccessful speakers to resort to the same popular arts in +order to win over the multitude. +</p> + +<p> +“This is not our way; and, besides, the moment that a man is suspected of +giving advice, however good, from corrupt motives, we feel such a grudge +against him for the gain which after all we are not certain he will receive, +that we deprive the city of its certain benefit. Plain good advice has thus +come to be no less suspected than bad; and the advocate of the most monstrous +measures is not more obliged to use deceit to gain the people, than the best +counsellor is to lie in order to be believed. The city and the city only, owing +to these refinements, can never be served openly and without disguise; he who +does serve it openly being always suspected of serving himself in some secret +way in return. Still, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, and +the position of affairs, we orators must make it our business to look a little +farther than you who judge offhand; especially as we, your advisers, are +responsible, while you, our audience, are not so. For if those who gave the +advice, and those who took it, suffered equally, you would judge more calmly; +as it is, you visit the disasters into which the whim of the moment may have +led you upon the single person of your adviser, not upon yourselves, his +numerous companions in error. +</p> + +<p> +“However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in the +matter of Mitylene; indeed, the question before us as sensible men is not their +guilt, but our interests. Though I prove them ever so guilty, I shall not, +therefore, advise their death, unless it be expedient; nor though they should +have claims to indulgence, shall I recommend it, unless it be dearly for the +good of the country. I consider that we are deliberating for the future more +than for the present; and where Cleon is so positive as to the useful deterrent +effects that will follow from making rebellion capital, I, who consider the +interests of the future quite as much as he, as positively maintain the +contrary. And I require you not to reject my useful considerations for his +specious ones: his speech may have the attraction of seeming the more just in +your present temper against Mitylene; but we are not in a court of justice, but +in a political assembly; and the question is not justice, but how to make the +Mitylenians useful to Athens. +</p> + +<p> +“Now of course communities have enacted the penalty of death for many +offences far lighter than this: still hope leads men to venture, and no one +ever yet put himself in peril without the inward conviction that he would +succeed in his design. Again, was there ever city rebelling that did not +believe that it possessed either in itself or in its alliances resources +adequate to the enterprise? All, states and individuals, are alike prone to +err, and there is no law that will prevent them; or why should men have +exhausted the list of punishments in search of enactments to protect them from +evildoers? It is probable that in early times the penalties for the greatest +offences were less severe, and that, as these were disregarded, the penalty of +death has been by degrees in most cases arrived at, which is itself disregarded +in like manner. Either then some means of terror more terrible than this must +be discovered, or it must be owned that this restraint is useless; and that as +long as poverty gives men the courage of necessity, or plenty fills them with +the ambition which belongs to insolence and pride, and the other conditions of +life remain each under the thraldom of some fatal and master passion, so long +will the impulse never be wanting to drive men into danger. Hope also and +cupidity, the one leading and the other following, the one conceiving the +attempt, the other suggesting the facility of succeeding, cause the widest +ruin, and, although invisible agents, are far stronger than the dangers that +are seen. Fortune, too, powerfully helps the delusion and, by the unexpected +aid that she sometimes lends, tempts men to venture with inferior means; and +this is especially the case with communities, because the stakes played for are +the highest, freedom or empire, and, when all are acting together, each man +irrationally magnifies his own capacity. In fine, it is impossible to prevent, +and only great simplicity can hope to prevent, human nature doing what it has +once set its mind upon, by force of law or by any other deterrent force +whatsoever. +</p> + +<p> +“We must not, therefore, commit ourselves to a false policy through a +belief in the efficacy of the punishment of death, or exclude rebels from the +hope of repentance and an early atonement of their error. Consider a moment. At +present, if a city that has already revolted perceive that it cannot succeed, +it will come to terms while it is still able to refund expenses, and pay +tribute afterwards. In the other case, what city, think you, would not prepare +better than is now done, and hold out to the last against its besiegers, if it +is all one whether it surrender late or soon? And how can it be otherwise than +hurtful to us to be put to the expense of a siege, because surrender is out of +the question; and if we take the city, to receive a ruined town from which we +can no longer draw the revenue which forms our real strength against the enemy? +We must not, therefore, sit as strict judges of the offenders to our own +prejudice, but rather see how by moderate chastisements we may be enabled to +benefit in future by the revenue-producing powers of our dependencies; and we +must make up our minds to look for our protection not to legal terrors but to +careful administration. At present we do exactly the opposite. When a free +community, held in subjection by force, rises, as is only natural, and asserts +its independence, it is no sooner reduced than we fancy ourselves obliged to +punish it severely; although the right course with freemen is not to chastise +them rigorously when they do rise, but rigorously to watch them before they +rise, and to prevent their ever entertaining the idea, and, the insurrection +suppressed, to make as few responsible for it as possible. +</p> + +<p> +“Only consider what a blunder you would commit in doing as Cleon +recommends. As things are at present, in all the cities the people is your +friend, and either does not revolt with the oligarchy, or, if forced to do so, +becomes at once the enemy of the insurgents; so that in the war with the +hostile city you have the masses on your side. But if you butcher the people of +Mitylene, who had nothing to do with the revolt, and who, as soon as they got +arms, of their own motion surrendered the town, first you will commit the crime +of killing your benefactors; and next you will play directly into the hands of +the higher classes, who when they induce their cities to rise, will immediately +have the people on their side, through your having announced in advance the +same punishment for those who are guilty and for those who are not. On the +contrary, even if they were guilty, you ought to seem not to notice it, in +order to avoid alienating the only class still friendly to us. In short, I +consider it far more useful for the preservation of our empire voluntarily to +put up with injustice, than to put to death, however justly, those whom it is +our interest to keep alive. As for Cleon’s idea that in punishment the +claims of justice and expediency can both be satisfied, facts do not confirm +the possibility of such a combination. +</p> + +<p> +“Confess, therefore, that this is the wisest course, and without +conceding too much either to pity or to indulgence, by neither of which motives +do I any more than Cleon wish you to be influenced, upon the plain merits of +the case before you, be persuaded by me to try calmly those of the Mitylenians +whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to leave the rest undisturbed. This is at +once best for the future, and most terrible to your enemies at the present +moment; inasmuch as good policy against an adversary is superior to the blind +attacks of brute force.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of Diodotus. The two opinions thus expressed were the ones +that most directly contradicted each other; and the Athenians, notwithstanding +their change of feeling, now proceeded to a division, in which the show of +hands was almost equal, although the motion of Diodotus carried the day. +Another galley was at once sent off in haste, for fear that the first might +reach Lesbos in the interval, and the city be found destroyed; the first ship +having about a day and a night’s start. Wine and barley-cakes were +provided for the vessel by the Mitylenian ambassadors, and great promises made +if they arrived in time; which caused the men to use such diligence upon the +voyage that they took their meals of barley-cakes kneaded with oil and wine as +they rowed, and only slept by turns while the others were at the oar. Luckily +they met with no contrary wind, and the first ship making no haste upon so +horrid an errand, while the second pressed on in the manner described, the +first arrived so little before them, that Paches had only just had time to read +the decree, and to prepare to execute the sentence, when the second put into +port and prevented the massacre. The danger of Mitylene had indeed been great. +</p> + +<p> +The other party whom Paches had sent off as the prime movers in the rebellion, +were upon Cleon’s motion put to death by the Athenians, the number being +rather more than a thousand. The Athenians also demolished the walls of the +Mitylenians, and took possession of their ships. Afterwards tribute was not +imposed upon the Lesbians; but all their land, except that of the Methymnians, +was divided into three thousand allotments, three hundred of which were +reserved as sacred for the gods, and the rest assigned by lot to Athenian +shareholders, who were sent out to the island. With these the Lesbians agreed +to pay a rent of two minae a year for each allotment, and cultivated the land +themselves. The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the continent +belonging to the Mitylenians, which thus became for the future subject to +Athens. Such were the events that took place at Lesbos. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0010" id="link2HCH0010"></a> +CHAPTER X </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Fifth Year of the War—Trial and Execution of the Plataeans— +Corcyraean Revolution +</p> + +<p> +During the same summer, after the reduction of Lesbos, the Athenians under +Nicias, son of Niceratus, made an expedition against the island of Minoa, which +lies off Megara and was used as a fortified post by the Megarians, who had +built a tower upon it. Nicias wished to enable the Athenians to maintain their +blockade from this nearer station instead of from Budorum and Salamis; to stop +the Peloponnesian galleys and privateers sailing out unobserved from the +island, as they had been in the habit of doing; and at the same time prevent +anything from coming into Megara. Accordingly, after taking two towers +projecting on the side of Nisaea, by engines from the sea, and clearing the +entrance into the channel between the island and the shore, he next proceeded +to cut off all communication by building a wall on the mainland at the point +where a bridge across a morass enabled succours to be thrown into the island, +which was not far off from the continent. A few days sufficing to accomplish +this, he afterwards raised some works in the island also, and leaving a +garrison there, departed with his forces. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time in this summer, the Plataeans, being now without provisions +and unable to support the siege, surrendered to the Peloponnesians in the +following manner. An assault had been made upon the wall, which the Plataeans +were unable to repel. The Lacedaemonian commander, perceiving their weakness, +wished to avoid taking the place by storm; his instructions from Lacedaemon +having been so conceived, in order that if at any future time peace should be +made with Athens, and they should agree each to restore the places that they +had taken in the war, Plataea might be held to have come over voluntarily, and +not be included in the list. He accordingly sent a herald to them to ask if +they were willing voluntarily to surrender the town to the Lacedaemonians, and +accept them as their judges, upon the understanding that the guilty should be +punished, but no one without form of law. The Plataeans were now in the last +state of weakness, and the herald had no sooner delivered his message than they +surrendered the town. The Peloponnesians fed them for some days until the +judges from Lacedaemon, who were five in number, arrived. Upon their arrival no +charge was preferred; they simply called up the Plataeans, and asked them +whether they had done the Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the war then +raging. The Plataeans asked leave to speak at greater length, and deputed two +of their number to represent them: Astymachus, son of Asopolaus, and Lacon, son +of Aeimnestus, proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, who came forward and spoke as +follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Lacedaemonians, when we surrendered our city we trusted in you, and +looked forward to a trial more agreeable to the forms of law than the present, +to which we had no idea of being subjected; the judges also in whose hands we +consented to place ourselves were you, and you only (from whom we thought we +were most likely to obtain justice), and not other persons, as is now the case. +As matters stand, we are afraid that we have been doubly deceived. We have good +reason to suspect, not only that the issue to be tried is the most terrible of +all, but that you will not prove impartial; if we may argue from the fact that +no accusation was first brought forward for us to answer, but we had ourselves +to ask leave to speak, and from the question being put so shortly, that a true +answer to it tells against us, while a false one can be contradicted. In this +dilemma, our safest, and indeed our only course, seems to be to say something +at all risks: placed as we are, we could scarcely be silent without being +tormented by the damning thought that speaking might have saved us. Another +difficulty that we have to encounter is the difficulty of convincing you. Were +we unknown to each other we might profit by bringing forward new matter with +which you were unacquainted: as it is, we can tell you nothing that you do not +know already, and we fear, not that you have condemned us in your own minds of +having failed in our duty towards you, and make this our crime, but that to +please a third party we have to submit to a trial the result of which is +already decided. Nevertheless, we will place before you what we can justly +urge, not only on the question of the quarrel which the Thebans have against +us, but also as addressing you and the rest of the Hellenes; and we will remind +you of our good services, and endeavour to prevail with you. +</p> + +<p> +“To your short question, whether we have done the Lacedaemonians and +allies any service in this war, we say, if you ask us as enemies, that to +refrain from serving you was not to do you injury; if as friends, that you are +more in fault for having marched against us. During the peace, and against the +Mede, we acted well: we have not now been the first to break the peace, and we +were the only Boeotians who then joined in defending against the Mede the +liberty of Hellas. Although an inland people, we were present at the action at +Artemisium; in the battle that took place in our territory we fought by the +side of yourselves and Pausanias; and in all the other Hellenic exploits of the +time we took a part quite out of proportion to our strength. Besides, you, as +Lacedaemonians, ought not to forget that at the time of the great panic at +Sparta, after the earthquake, caused by the secession of the Helots to Ithome, +we sent the third part of our citizens to assist you. +</p> + +<p> +“On these great and historical occasions such was the part that we chose, +although afterwards we became your enemies. For this you were to blame. When we +asked for your alliance against our Theban oppressors, you rejected our +petition, and told us to go to the Athenians who were our neighbours, as you +lived too far off. In the war we never have done to you, and never should have +done to you, anything unreasonable. If we refused to desert the Athenians when +you asked us, we did no wrong; they had helped us against the Thebans when you +drew back, and we could no longer give them up with honour; especially as we +had obtained their alliance and had been admitted to their citizenship at our +own request, and after receiving benefits at their hands; but it was plainly +our duty loyally to obey their orders. Besides, the faults that either of you +may commit in your supremacy must be laid, not upon the followers, but on the +chiefs that lead them astray. +</p> + +<p> +“With regard to the Thebans, they have wronged us repeatedly, and their +last aggression, which has been the means of bringing us into our present +position, is within your own knowledge. In seizing our city in time of peace, +and what is more at a holy time in the month, they justly encountered our +vengeance, in accordance with the universal law which sanctions resistance to +an invader; and it cannot now be right that we should suffer on their account. +By taking your own immediate interest and their animosity as the test of +justice, you will prove yourselves to be rather waiters on expediency than +judges of right; although if they seem useful to you now, we and the rest of +the Hellenes gave you much more valuable help at a time of greater need. Now +you are the assailants, and others fear you; but at the crisis to which we +allude, when the barbarian threatened all with slavery, the Thebans were on his +side. It is just, therefore, to put our patriotism then against our error now, +if error there has been; and you will find the merit outweighing the fault, and +displayed at a juncture when there were few Hellenes who would set their valour +against the strength of Xerxes, and when greater praise was theirs who +preferred the dangerous path of honour to the safe course of consulting their +own interest with respect to the invasion. To these few we belonged, and highly +were we honoured for it; and yet we now fear to perish by having again acted on +the same principles, and chosen to act well with Athens sooner than wisely with +Sparta. Yet in justice the same cases should be decided in the same way, and +policy should not mean anything else than lasting gratitude for the service of +good ally combined with a proper attention to one’s own immediate +interest. +</p> + +<p> +“Consider also that at present the Hellenes generally regard you as a +pattern of worth and honour; and if you pass an unjust sentence upon us in this +which is no obscure cause, but one in which you, the judges, are as illustrious +as we, the prisoners, are blameless, take care that displeasure be not felt at +an unworthy decision in the matter of honourable men made by men yet more +honourable than they, and at the consecration in the national temples of spoils +taken from the Plataeans, the benefactors of Hellas. Shocking indeed will it +seem for Lacedaemonians to destroy Plataea, and for the city whose name your +fathers inscribed upon the tripod at Delphi for its good service, to be by you +blotted out from the map of Hellas, to please the Thebans. To such a depth of +misfortune have we fallen that, while the Medes’ success had been our +ruin, Thebans now supplant us in your once fond regards; and we have been +subjected to two dangers, the greatest of any—that of dying of starvation +then, if we had not surrendered our town, and now of being tried for our lives. +So that we Plataeans, after exertions beyond our power in the cause of the +Hellenes, are rejected by all, forsaken and unassisted; helped by none of our +allies, and reduced to doubt the stability of our only hope, yourselves. +</p> + +<p> +“Still, in the name of the gods who once presided over our confederacy, +and of our own good service in the Hellenic cause, we adjure you to relent; to +recall the decision which we fear that the Thebans may have obtained from you; +to ask back the gift that you have given them, that they disgrace not you by +slaying us; to gain a pure instead of a guilty gratitude, and not to gratify +others to be yourselves rewarded with shame. Our lives may be quickly taken, +but it will be a heavy task to wipe away the infamy of the deed; as we are no +enemies whom you might justly punish, but friends forced into taking arms +against you. To grant us our lives would be, therefore, a righteous judgment; +if you consider also that we are prisoners who surrendered of their own accord, +stretching out our hands for quarter, whose slaughter Hellenic law forbids, and +who besides were always your benefactors. Look at the sepulchres of your +fathers, slain by the Medes and buried in our country, whom year by year we +honoured with garments and all other dues, and the first-fruits of all that our +land produced in their season, as friends from a friendly country and allies to +our old companions in arms. Should you not decide aright, your conduct would be +the very opposite to ours. Consider only: Pausanias buried them thinking that +he was laying them in friendly ground and among men as friendly; but you, if +you kill us and make the Plataean territory Theban, will leave your fathers and +kinsmen in a hostile soil and among their murderers, deprived of the honours +which they now enjoy. What is more, you will enslave the land in which the +freedom of the Hellenes was won, make desolate the temples of the gods to whom +they prayed before they overcame the Medes, and take away your ancestral +sacrifices from those who founded and instituted them. +</p> + +<p> +“It were not to your glory, Lacedaemonians, either to offend in this way +against the common law of the Hellenes and against your own ancestors, or to +kill us your benefactors to gratify another’s hatred without having been +wronged yourselves: it were more so to spare us and to yield to the impressions +of a reasonable compassion; reflecting not merely on the awful fate in store +for us, but also on the character of the sufferers, and on the impossibility of +predicting how soon misfortune may fall even upon those who deserve it not. We, +as we have a right to do and as our need impels us, entreat you, calling aloud +upon the gods at whose common altar all the Hellenes worship, to hear our +request, to be not unmindful of the oaths which your fathers swore, and which +we now plead—we supplicate you by the tombs of your fathers, and appeal +to those that are gone to save us from falling into the hands of the Thebans +and their dearest friends from being given up to their most detested foes. We +also remind you of that day on which we did the most glorious deeds, by your +fathers’ sides, we who now on this are like to suffer the most dreadful +fate. Finally, to do what is necessary and yet most difficult for men in our +situation—that is, to make an end of speaking, since with that ending the +peril of our lives draws near—in conclusion we say that we did not +surrender our city to the Thebans (to that we would have preferred inglorious +starvation), but trusted in and capitulated to you; and it would be just, if we +fail to persuade you, to put us back in the same position and let us take the +chance that falls to us. And at the same time we adjure you not to give us +up—your suppliants, Lacedaemonians, out of your hands and faith, +Plataeans foremost of the Hellenic patriots, to Thebans, our most hated +enemies—but to be our saviours, and not, while you free the rest of the +Hellenes, to bring us to destruction.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of the Plataeans. The Thebans, afraid that the +Lacedaemonians might be moved by what they had heard, came forward and said +that they too desired to address them, since the Plataeans had, against their +wish, been allowed to speak at length instead of being confined to a simple +answer to the question. Leave being granted, the Thebans spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“We should never have asked to make this speech if the Plataeans on their +side had contented themselves with shortly answering the question, and had not +turned round and made charges against us, coupled with a long defence of +themselves upon matters outside the present inquiry and not even the subject of +accusation, and with praise of what no one finds fault with. However, since +they have done so, we must answer their charges and refute their self-praise, +in order that neither our bad name nor their good may help them, but that you +may hear the real truth on both points, and so decide. +</p> + +<p> +“The origin of our quarrel was this. We settled Plataea some time after +the rest of Boeotia, together with other places out of which we had driven the +mixed population. The Plataeans not choosing to recognize our supremacy, as had +been first arranged, but separating themselves from the rest of the Boeotians, +and proving traitors to their nationality, we used compulsion; upon which they +went over to the Athenians, and with them did as much harm, for which we +retaliated. +</p> + +<p> +“Next, when the barbarian invaded Hellas, they say that they were the +only Boeotians who did not Medize; and this is where they most glorify +themselves and abuse us. We say that if they did not Medize, it was because the +Athenians did not do so either; just as afterwards when the Athenians attacked +the Hellenes they, the Plataeans, were again the only Boeotians who Atticized. +And yet consider the forms of our respective governments when we so acted. Our +city at that juncture had neither an oligarchical constitution in which all the +nobles enjoyed equal rights, nor a democracy, but that which is most opposed to +law and good government and nearest a tyranny—the rule of a close cabal. +These, hoping to strengthen their individual power by the success of the Mede, +kept down by force the people, and brought him into the town. The city as a +whole was not its own mistress when it so acted, and ought not to be reproached +for the errors that it committed while deprived of its constitution. Examine +only how we acted after the departure of the Mede and the recovery of the +constitution; when the Athenians attacked the rest of Hellas and endeavoured to +subjugate our country, of the greater part of which faction had already made +them masters. Did not we fight and conquer at Coronea and liberate Boeotia, and +do we not now actively contribute to the liberation of the rest, providing +horses to the cause and a force unequalled by that of any other state in the +confederacy? +</p> + +<p> +“Let this suffice to excuse us for our Medism. We will now endeavour to +show that you have injured the Hellenes more than we, and are more deserving of +condign punishment. It was in defence against us, say you, that you became +allies and citizens of Athens. If so, you ought only to have called in the +Athenians against us, instead of joining them in attacking others: it was open +to you to do this if you ever felt that they were leading you where you did not +wish to follow, as Lacedaemon was already your ally against the Mede, as you so +much insist; and this was surely sufficient to keep us off, and above all to +allow you to deliberate in security. Nevertheless, of your own choice and +without compulsion you chose to throw your lot in with Athens. And you say that +it had been base for you to betray your benefactors; but it was surely far +baser and more iniquitous to sacrifice the whole body of the Hellenes, your +fellow confederates, who were liberating Hellas, than the Athenians only, who +were enslaving it. The return that you made them was therefore neither equal +nor honourable, since you called them in, as you say, because you were being +oppressed yourselves, and then became their accomplices in oppressing others; +although baseness rather consists in not returning like for like than in not +returning what is justly due but must be unjustly paid. +</p> + +<p> +“Meanwhile, after thus plainly showing that it was not for the sake of +the Hellenes that you alone then did not Medize, but because the Athenians did +not do so either, and you wished to side with them and to be against the rest; +you now claim the benefit of good deeds done to please your neighbours. This +cannot be admitted: you chose the Athenians, and with them you must stand or +fall. Nor can you plead the league then made and claim that it should now +protect you. You abandoned that league, and offended against it by helping +instead of hindering the subjugation of the Aeginetans and others of its +members, and that not under compulsion, but while in enjoyment of the same +institutions that you enjoy to the present hour, and no one forcing you as in +our case. Lastly, an invitation was addressed to you before you were blockaded +to be neutral and join neither party: this you did not accept. Who then merit +the detestation of the Hellenes more justly than you, you who sought their ruin +under the mask of honour? The former virtues that you allege you now show not +to be proper to your character; the real bent of your nature has been at length +damningly proved: when the Athenians took the path of injustice you followed +them. +</p> + +<p> +“Of our unwilling Medism and your wilful Atticizing this then is our +explanation. The last wrong wrong of which you complain consists in our having, +as you say, lawlessly invaded your town in time of peace and festival. Here +again we cannot think that we were more in fault than yourselves. If of our own +proper motion we made an armed attack upon your city and ravaged your +territory, we are guilty; but if the first men among you in estate and family, +wishing to put an end to the foreign connection and to restore you to the +common Boeotian country, of their own free will invited us, wherein is our +crime? Where wrong is done, those who lead, as you say, are more to blame than +those who follow. Not that, in our judgment, wrong was done either by them or +by us. Citizens like yourselves, and with more at stake than you, they opened +their own walls and introduced us into their own city, not as foes but as +friends, to prevent the bad among you from becoming worse; to give honest men +their due; to reform principles without attacking persons, since you were not +to be banished from your city, but brought home to your kindred, nor to be made +enemies to any, but friends alike to all. +</p> + +<p> +“That our intention was not hostile is proved by our behaviour. We did no +harm to any one, but publicly invited those who wished to live under a +national, Boeotian government to come over to us; which as first you gladly +did, and made an agreement with us and remained tranquil, until you became +aware of the smallness of our numbers. Now it is possible that there may have +been something not quite fair in our entering without the consent of your +commons. At any rate you did not repay us in kind. Instead of refraining, as we +had done, from violence, and inducing us to retire by negotiation, you fell +upon us in violation of your agreement, and slew some of us in fight, of which +we do not so much complain, for in that there was a certain justice; but others +who held out their hands and received quarter, and whose lives you subsequently +promised us, you lawlessly butchered. If this was not abominable, what is? And +after these three crimes committed one after the other—the violation of +your agreement, the murder of the men afterwards, and the lying breach of your +promise not to kill them, if we refrained from injuring your property in the +country—you still affirm that we are the criminals and yourselves pretend +to escape justice. Not so, if these your judges decide aright, but you will be +punished for all together. +</p> + +<p> +“Such, Lacedaemonians, are the facts. We have gone into them at some +length both on your account and on our own, that you may fed that you will +justly condemn the prisoners, and we, that we have given an additional sanction +to our vengeance. We would also prevent you from being melted by hearing of +their past virtues, if any such they had: these may be fairly appealed to by +the victims of injustice, but only aggravate the guilt of criminals, since they +offend against their better nature. Nor let them gain anything by crying and +wailing, by calling upon your fathers’ tombs and their own desolate +condition. Against this we point to the far more dreadful fate of our youth, +butchered at their hands; the fathers of whom either fell at Coronea, bringing +Boeotia over to you, or seated, forlorn old men by desolate hearths, with far +more reason implore your justice upon the prisoners. The pity which they appeal +to is rather due to men who suffer unworthily; those who suffer justly as they +do are on the contrary subjects for triumph. For their present desolate +condition they have themselves to blame, since they wilfully rejected the +better alliance. Their lawless act was not provoked by any action of ours: +hate, not justice, inspired their decision; and even now the satisfaction which +they afford us is not adequate; they will suffer by a legal sentence, not as +they pretend as suppliants asking for quarter in battle, but as prisoners who +have surrendered upon agreement to take their trial. Vindicate, therefore, +Lacedaemonians, the Hellenic law which they have broken; and to us, the victims +of its violation, grant the reward merited by our zeal. Nor let us be +supplanted in your favour by their harangues, but offer an example to the +Hellenes, that the contests to which you invite them are of deeds, not words: +good deeds can be shortly stated, but where wrong is done a wealth of language +is needed to veil its deformity. However, if leading powers were to do what you +are now doing, and putting one short question to all alike were to decide +accordingly, men would be less tempted to seek fine phrases to cover bad +actions.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of the Thebans. The Lacedaemonian judges decided that the +question whether they had received any service from the Plataeans in the war, +was a fair one for them to put; as they had always invited them to be neutral, +agreeably to the original covenant of Pausanias after the defeat of the Mede, +and had again definitely offered them the same conditions before the blockade. +This offer having been refused, they were now, they conceived, by the loyalty +of their intention released from their covenant; and having, as they +considered, suffered evil at the hands of the Plataeans, they brought them in +again one by one and asked each of them the same question, that is to say, +whether they had done the Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the war; and +upon their saying that they had not, took them out and slew them, all without +exception. The number of Plataeans thus massacred was not less than two +hundred, with twenty-five Athenians who had shared in the siege. The women were +taken as slaves. The city the Thebans gave for about a year to some political +emigrants from Megara and to the surviving Plataeans of their own party to +inhabit, and afterwards razed it to the ground from the very foundations, and +built on to the precinct of Hera an inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all +round above and below, making use for this purpose of the roofs and doors of +the Plataeans: of the rest of the materials in the wall, the brass and the +iron, they made couches which they dedicated to Hera, for whom they also built +a stone chapel of a hundred feet square. The land they confiscated and let out +on a ten years’ lease to Theban occupiers. The adverse attitude of the +Lacedaemonians in the whole Plataean affair was mainly adopted to please the +Thebans, who were thought to be useful in the war at that moment raging. Such +was the end of Plataea, in the ninety-third year after she became the ally of +Athens. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile, the forty ships of the Peloponnesians that had gone to the relief of +the Lesbians, and which we left flying across the open sea, pursued by the +Athenians, were caught in a storm off Crete, and scattering from thence made +their way to Peloponnese, where they found at Cyllene thirteen Leucadian and +Ambraciot galleys, with Brasidas, son of Tellis, lately arrived as counsellor +to Alcidas; the Lacedaemonians, upon the failure of the Lesbian expedition, +having resolved to strengthen their fleet and sail to Corcyra, where a +revolution had broken out, so as to arrive there before the twelve Athenian +ships at Naupactus could be reinforced from Athens. Brasidas and Alcidas began +to prepare accordingly. +</p> + +<p> +The Corcyraean revolution began with the return of the prisoners taken in the +sea-fights off Epidamnus. These the Corinthians had released, nominally upon +the security of eight hundred talents given by their proxeni, but in reality +upon their engagement to bring over Corcyra to Corinth. These men proceeded to +canvass each of the citizens, and to intrigue with the view of detaching the +city from Athens. Upon the arrival of an Athenian and a Corinthian vessel, with +envoys on board, a conference was held in which the Corcyraeans voted to remain +allies of the Athenians according to their agreement, but to be friends of the +Peloponnesians as they had been formerly. Meanwhile, the returned prisoners +brought Peithias, a volunteer proxenus of the Athenians and leader of the +commons, to trial, upon the charge of enslaving Corcyra to Athens. He, being +acquitted, retorted by accusing five of the richest of their number of cutting +stakes in the ground sacred to Zeus and Alcinous; the legal penalty being a +stater for each stake. Upon their conviction, the amount of the penalty being +very large, they seated themselves as suppliants in the temples to be allowed +to pay it by instalments; but Peithias, who was one of the senate, prevailed +upon that body to enforce the law; upon which the accused, rendered desperate +by the law, and also learning that Peithias had the intention, while still a +member of the senate, to persuade the people to conclude a defensive and +offensive alliance with Athens, banded together armed with daggers, and +suddenly bursting into the senate killed Peithias and sixty others, senators +and private persons; some few only of the party of Peithias taking refuge in +the Athenian galley, which had not yet departed. +</p> + +<p> +After this outrage, the conspirators summoned the Corcyraeans to an assembly, +and said that this would turn out for the best, and would save them from being +enslaved by Athens: for the future, they moved to receive neither party unless +they came peacefully in a single ship, treating any larger number as enemies. +This motion made, they compelled it to be adopted, and instantly sent off +envoys to Athens to justify what had been done and to dissuade the refugees +there from any hostile proceedings which might lead to a reaction. +</p> + +<p> +Upon the arrival of the embassy, the Athenians arrested the envoys and all who +listened to them, as revolutionists, and lodged them in Aegina. Meanwhile a +Corinthian galley arriving in the island with Lacedaemonian envoys, the +dominant Corcyraean party attacked the commons and defeated them in battle. +Night coming on, the commons took refuge in the Acropolis and the higher parts +of the city, and concentrated themselves there, having also possession of the +Hyllaic harbour; their adversaries occupying the market-place, where most of +them lived, and the harbour adjoining, looking towards the mainland. +</p> + +<p> +The next day passed in skirmishes of little importance, each party sending into +the country to offer freedom to the slaves and to invite them to join them. The +mass of the slaves answered the appeal of the commons; their antagonists being +reinforced by eight hundred mercenaries from the continent. +</p> + +<p> +After a day’s interval hostilities recommenced, victory remaining with +the commons, who had the advantage in numbers and position, the women also +valiantly assisting them, pelting with tiles from the houses, and supporting +the melee with a fortitude beyond their sex. Towards dusk, the oligarchs in +full rout, fearing that the victorious commons might assault and carry the +arsenal and put them to the sword, fired the houses round the marketplace and +the lodging-houses, in order to bar their advance; sparing neither their own, +nor those of their neighbours; by which much stuff of the merchants was +consumed and the city risked total destruction, if a wind had come to help the +flame by blowing on it. Hostilities now ceasing, both sides kept quiet, passing +the night on guard, while the Corinthian ship stole out to sea upon the victory +of the commons, and most of the mercenaries passed over secretly to the +continent. +</p> + +<p> +The next day the Athenian general, Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes, came up from +Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian heavy infantry. He at +once endeavoured to bring about a settlement, and persuaded the two parties to +agree together to bring to trial ten of the ringleaders, who presently fled, +while the rest were to live in peace, making terms with each other, and +entering into a defensive and offensive alliance with the Athenians. This +arranged, he was about to sail away, when the leaders of the commons induced +him to leave them five of his ships to make their adversaries less disposed to +move, while they manned and sent with him an equal number of their own. He had +no sooner consented, than they began to enroll their enemies for the ships; and +these, fearing that they might be sent off to Athens, seated themselves as +suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri. An attempt on the part of Nicostratus +to reassure them and to persuade them to rise proving unsuccessful, the commons +armed upon this pretext, alleging the refusal of their adversaries to sail with +them as a proof of the hollowness of their intentions, and took their arms out +of their houses, and would have dispatched some whom they fell in with, if +Nicostratus had not prevented it. The rest of the party, seeing what was going +on, seated themselves as suppliants in the temple of Hera, being not less than +four hundred in number; until the commons, fearing that they might adopt some +desperate resolution, induced them to rise, and conveyed them over to the +island in front of the temple, where provisions were sent across to them. +</p> + +<p> +At this stage in the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day after the removal +of the men to the island, the Peloponnesian ships arrived from Cyllene where +they had been stationed since their return from Ionia, fifty-three in number, +still under the command of Alcidas, but with Brasidas also on board as his +adviser; and dropping anchor at Sybota, a harbour on the mainland, at daybreak +made sail for Corcyra. +</p> + +<p> +The Corcyraeans in great confusion and alarm at the state of things in the city +and at the approach of the invader, at once proceeded to equip sixty vessels, +which they sent out, as fast as they were manned, against the enemy, in spite +of the Athenians recommending them to let them sail out first, and to follow +themselves afterwards with all their ships together. Upon their vessels coming +up to the enemy in this straggling fashion, two immediately deserted: in others +the crews were fighting among themselves, and there was no order in anything +that was done; so that the Peloponnesians, seeing their confusion, placed +twenty ships to oppose the Corcyraeans, and ranged the rest against the twelve +Athenian ships, amongst which were the two vessels Salaminia and Paralus. +</p> + +<p> +While the Corcyraeans, attacking without judgment and in small detachments, +were already crippled by their own misconduct, the Athenians, afraid of the +numbers of the enemy and of being surrounded, did not venture to attack the +main body or even the centre of the division opposed to them, but fell upon its +wing and sank one vessel; after which the Peloponnesians formed in a circle, +and the Athenians rowed round them and tried to throw them into disorder. +Perceiving this, the division opposed to the Corcyraeans, fearing a repetition +of the disaster of Naupactus, came to support their friends, and the whole +fleet now bore down, united, upon the Athenians, who retired before it, backing +water, retiring as leisurely as possible in order to give the Corcyraeans time +to escape, while the enemy was thus kept occupied. Such was the character of +this sea-fight, which lasted until sunset. +</p> + +<p> +The Corcyraeans now feared that the enemy would follow up their victory and +sail against the town and rescue the men in the island, or strike some other +blow equally decisive, and accordingly carried the men over again to the temple +of Hera, and kept guard over the city. The Peloponnesians, however, although +victorious in the sea-fight, did not venture to attack the town, but took the +thirteen Corcyraean vessels which they had captured, and with them sailed back +to the continent from whence they had put out. The next day equally they +refrained from attacking the city, although the disorder and panic were at +their height, and though Brasidas, it is said, urged Alcidas, his superior +officer, to do so, but they landed upon the promontory of Leukimme and laid +waste the country. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the commons in Corcyra, being still in great fear of the fleet +attacking them, came to a parley with the suppliants and their friends, in +order to save the town; and prevailed upon some of them to go on board the +ships, of which they still manned thirty, against the expected attack. But the +Peloponnesians after ravaging the country until midday sailed away, and towards +nightfall were informed by beacon signals of the approach of sixty Athenian +vessels from Leucas, under the command of Eurymedon, son of Thucles; which had +been sent off by the Athenians upon the news of the revolution and of the fleet +with Alcidas being about to sail for Corcyra. +</p> + +<p> +The Peloponnesians accordingly at once set off in haste by night for home, +coasting along shore; and hauling their ships across the Isthmus of Leucas, in +order not to be seen doubling it, so departed. The Corcyraeans, made aware of +the approach of the Athenian fleet and of the departure of the enemy, brought +the Messenians from outside the walls into the town, and ordered the fleet +which they had manned to sail round into the Hyllaic harbour; and while it was +so doing, slew such of their enemies as they laid hands on, dispatching +afterwards, as they landed them, those whom they had persuaded to go on board +the ships. Next they went to the sanctuary of Hera and persuaded about fifty +men to take their trial, and condemned them all to death. The mass of the +suppliants who had refused to do so, on seeing what was taking place, slew each +other there in the consecrated ground; while some hanged themselves upon the +trees, and others destroyed themselves as they were severally able. During +seven days that Eurymedon stayed with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans were +engaged in butchering those of their fellow citizens whom they regarded as +their enemies: and although the crime imputed was that of attempting to put +down the democracy, some were slain also for private hatred, others by their +debtors because of the moneys owed to them. Death thus raged in every shape; +and, as usually happens at such times, there was no length to which violence +did not go; sons were killed by their fathers, and suppliants dragged from the +altar or slain upon it; while some were even walled up in the temple of +Dionysus and died there. +</p> + +<p> +So bloody was the march of the revolution, and the impression which it made was +the greater as it was one of the first to occur. Later on, one may say, the +whole Hellenic world was convulsed; struggles being every, where made by the +popular chiefs to bring in the Athenians, and by the oligarchs to introduce the +Lacedaemonians. In peace there would have been neither the pretext nor the wish +to make such an invitation; but in war, with an alliance always at the command +of either faction for the hurt of their adversaries and their own corresponding +advantage, opportunities for bringing in the foreigner were never wanting to +the revolutionary parties. The sufferings which revolution entailed upon the +cities were many and terrible, such as have occurred and always will occur, as +long as the nature of mankind remains the same; though in a severer or milder +form, and varying in their symptoms, according to the variety of the particular +cases. In peace and prosperity, states and individuals have better sentiments, +because they do not find themselves suddenly confronted with imperious +necessities; but war takes away the easy supply of daily wants, and so proves a +rough master, that brings most men’s characters to a level with their +fortunes. Revolution thus ran its course from city to city, and the places +which it arrived at last, from having heard what had been done before, carried +to a still greater excess the refinement of their inventions, as manifested in +the cunning of their enterprises and the atrocity of their reprisals. Words had +to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given them. +Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent +hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for +unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question, inaptness to act on any. +Frantic violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a +justifiable means of self-defence. The advocate of extreme measures was always +trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected. To succeed in a plot was to +have a shrewd head, to divine a plot a still shrewder; but to try to provide +against having to do either was to break up your party and to be afraid of your +adversaries. In fine, to forestall an intending criminal, or to suggest the +idea of a crime where it was wanting, was equally commended until even blood +became a weaker tie than party, from the superior readiness of those united by +the latter to dare everything without reserve; for such associations had not in +view the blessings derivable from established institutions but were formed by +ambition for their overthrow; and the confidence of their members in each other +rested less on any religious sanction than upon complicity in crime. The fair +proposals of an adversary were met with jealous precautions by the stronger of +the two, and not with a generous confidence. Revenge also was held of more +account than self-preservation. Oaths of reconciliation, being only proffered +on either side to meet an immediate difficulty, only held good so long as no +other weapon was at hand; but when opportunity offered, he who first ventured +to seize it and to take his enemy off his guard, thought this perfidious +vengeance sweeter than an open one, since, considerations of safety apart, +success by treachery won him the palm of superior intelligence. Indeed it is +generally the case that men are readier to call rogues clever than simpletons +honest, and are as ashamed of being the second as they are proud of being the +first. The cause of all these evils was the lust for power arising from greed +and ambition; and from these passions proceeded the violence of parties once +engaged in contention. The leaders in the cities, each provided with the +fairest professions, on the one side with the cry of political equality of the +people, on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought prizes for themselves in +those public interests which they pretended to cherish, and, recoiling from no +means in their struggles for ascendancy engaged in the direst excesses; in +their acts of vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not stopping at what +justice or the good of the state demanded, but making the party caprice of the +moment their only standard, and invoking with equal readiness the condemnation +of an unjust verdict or the authority of the strong arm to glut the animosities +of the hour. Thus religion was in honour with neither party; but the use of +fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation. Meanwhile the +moderate part of the citizens perished between the two, either for not joining +in the quarrel, or because envy would not suffer them to escape. +</p> + +<p> +Thus every form of iniquity took root in the Hellenic countries by reason of +the troubles. The ancient simplicity into which honour so largely entered was +laughed down and disappeared; and society became divided into camps in which no +man trusted his fellow. To put an end to this, there was neither promise to be +depended upon, nor oath that could command respect; but all parties dwelling +rather in their calculation upon the hopelessness of a permanent state of +things, were more intent upon self-defence than capable of confidence. In this +contest the blunter wits were most successful. Apprehensive of their own +deficiencies and of the cleverness of their antagonists, they feared to be +worsted in debate and to be surprised by the combinations of their more +versatile opponents, and so at once boldly had recourse to action: while their +adversaries, arrogantly thinking that they should know in time, and that it was +unnecessary to secure by action what policy afforded, often fell victims to +their want of precaution. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Corcyra gave the first example of most of the crimes alluded to; of +the reprisals exacted by the governed who had never experienced equitable +treatment or indeed aught but insolence from their rulers—when their hour +came; of the iniquitous resolves of those who desired to get rid of their +accustomed poverty, and ardently coveted their neighbours’ goods; and +lastly, of the savage and pitiless excesses into which men who had begun the +struggle, not in a class but in a party spirit, were hurried by their +ungovernable passions. In the confusion into which life was now thrown in the +cities, human nature, always rebelling against the law and now its master, +gladly showed itself ungoverned in passion, above respect for justice, and the +enemy of all superiority; since revenge would not have been set above religion, +and gain above justice, had it not been for the fatal power of envy. Indeed men +too often take upon themselves in the prosecution of their revenge to set the +example of doing away with those general laws to which all alike can look for +salvation in adversity, instead of allowing them to subsist against the day of +danger when their aid may be required. +</p> + +<p> +While the revolutionary passions thus for the first time displayed themselves +in the factions of Corcyra, Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet sailed away; after +which some five hundred Corcyraean exiles who had succeeded in escaping, took +some forts on the mainland, and becoming masters of the Corcyraean territory +over the water, made this their base to Plunder their countrymen in the island, +and did so much damage as to cause a severe famine in the town. They also sent +envoys to Lacedaemon and Corinth to negotiate their restoration; but meeting +with no success, afterwards got together boats and mercenaries and crossed over +to the island, being about six hundred in all; and burning their boats so as to +have no hope except in becoming masters of the country, went up to Mount +Istone, and fortifying themselves there, began to annoy those in the city and +obtained command of the country. +</p> + +<p> +At the close of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships under the +command of Laches, son of Melanopus, and Charoeades, son of Euphiletus, to +Sicily, where the Syracusans and Leontines were at war. The Syracusans had for +allies all the Dorian cities except Camarina—these had been included in +the Lacedaemonian confederacy from the commencement of the war, though they had +not taken any active part in it—the Leontines had Camarina and the +Chalcidian cities. In Italy the Locrians were for the Syracusans, the Rhegians +for their Leontine kinsmen. The allies of the Leontines now sent to Athens and +appealed to their ancient alliance and to their Ionian origin, to persuade the +Athenians to send them a fleet, as the Syracusans were blockading them by land +and sea. The Athenians sent it upon the plea of their common descent, but in +reality to prevent the exportation of Sicilian corn to Peloponnese and to test +the possibility of bringing Sicily into subjection. Accordingly they +established themselves at Rhegium in Italy, and from thence carried on the war +in concert with their allies. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0011" id="link2HCH0011"></a> +CHAPTER XI </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Year of the War—Campaigns of Demosthenes in Western Greece—Ruin of +Ambracia +</p> + +<p> +Summer was now over. The winter following, the plague a second time attacked +the Athenians; for although it had never entirely left them, still there had +been a notable abatement in its ravages. The second visit lasted no less than a +year, the first having lasted two; and nothing distressed the Athenians and +reduced their power more than this. No less than four thousand four hundred +heavy infantry in the ranks died of it and three hundred cavalry, besides a +number of the multitude that was never ascertained. At the same time took place +the numerous earthquakes in Athens, Euboea, and Boeotia, particularly at +Orchomenus in the last-named country. +</p> + +<p> +The same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians, with thirty ships, +made an expedition against the islands of Aeolus; it being impossible to invade +them in summer, owing to the want of water. These islands are occupied by the +Liparaeans, a Cnidian colony, who live in one of them of no great size called +Lipara; and from this as their headquarters cultivate the rest, Didyme, +Strongyle, and Hiera. In Hiera the people in those parts believe that +Hephaestus has his forge, from the quantity of flame which they see it send out +by night, and of smoke by day. These islands lie off the coast of the Sicels +and Messinese, and were allies of the Syracusans. The Athenians laid waste +their land, and as the inhabitants did not submit, sailed back to Rhegium. Thus +the winter ended, and with it ended the fifth year of this war, of which +Thucydides was the historian. +</p> + +<p> +The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies set out to invade Attica +under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, and went as far as the Isthmus, +but numerous earthquakes occurring, turned back again without the invasion +taking place. About the same time that these earthquakes were so common, the +sea at Orobiae, in Euboea, retiring from the then line of coast, returned in a +huge wave and invaded a great part of the town, and retreated leaving some of +it still under water; so that what was once land is now sea; such of the +inhabitants perishing as could not run up to the higher ground in time. A +similar inundation also occurred at Atalanta, the island off the Opuntian +Locrian coast, carrying away part of the Athenian fort and wrecking one of two +ships which were drawn up on the beach. At Peparethus also the sea retreated a +little, without however any inundation following; and an earthquake threw down +part of the wall, the town hall, and a few other buildings. The cause, in my +opinion, of this phenomenon must be sought in the earthquake. At the point +where its shock has been the most violent, the sea is driven back and, suddenly +recoiling with redoubled force, causes the inundation. Without an earthquake I +do not see how such an accident could happen. +</p> + +<p> +During the same summer different operations were carried on by the different +belligerents in Sicily; by the Siceliots themselves against each other, and by +the Athenians and their allies: I shall however confine myself to the actions +in which the Athenians took part, choosing the most important. The death of the +Athenian general Charoeades, killed by the Syracusans in battle, left Laches in +the sole command of the fleet, which he now directed in concert with the allies +against Mylae, a place belonging to the Messinese. Two Messinese battalions in +garrison at Mylae laid an ambush for the party landing from the ships, but were +routed with great slaughter by the Athenians and their allies, who thereupon +assaulted the fortification and compelled them to surrender the Acropolis and +to march with them upon Messina. This town afterwards also submitted upon the +approach of the Athenians and their allies, and gave hostages and all other +securities required. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round Peloponnese under +Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and Procles, son of Theodorus, and sixty +others, with two thousand heavy infantry, against Melos, under Nicias, son of +Niceratus; wishing to reduce the Melians, who, although islanders, refused to +be subjects of Athens or even to join her confederacy. The devastation of their +land not procuring their submission, the fleet, weighing from Melos, sailed to +Oropus in the territory of Graea, and landing at nightfall, the heavy infantry +started at once from the ships by land for Tanagra in Boeotia, where they were +met by the whole levy from Athens, agreeably to a concerted signal, under the +command of Hipponicus, son of Callias, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles. They +encamped, and passing that day in ravaging the Tanagraean territory, remained +there for the night; and next day, after defeating those of the Tanagraeans who +sailed out against them and some Thebans who had come up to help the +Tanagraeans, took some arms, set up a trophy, and retired, the troops to the +city and the others to the ships. Nicias with his sixty ships coasted +alongshore and ravaged the Locrian seaboard, and so returned home. +</p> + +<p> +About this time the Lacedaemonians founded their colony of Heraclea in Trachis, +their object being the following: the Malians form in all three tribes, the +Paralians, the Hiereans, and the Trachinians. The last of these having suffered +severely in a war with their neighbours the Oetaeans, at first intended to give +themselves up to Athens; but afterwards fearing not to find in her the security +that they sought, sent to Lacedaemon, having chosen Tisamenus for their +ambassador. In this embassy joined also the Dorians from the mother country of +the Lacedaemonians, with the same request, as they themselves also suffered +from the same enemy. After hearing them, the Lacedaemonians determined to send +out the colony, wishing to assist the Trachinians and Dorians, and also because +they thought that the proposed town would lie conveniently for the purposes of +the war against the Athenians. A fleet might be got ready there against Euboea, +with the advantage of a short passage to the island; and the town would also be +useful as a station on the road to Thrace. In short, everything made the +Lacedaemonians eager to found the place. After first consulting the god at +Delphi and receiving a favourable answer, they sent off the colonists, +Spartans, and Perioeci, inviting also any of the rest of the Hellenes who might +wish to accompany them, except Ionians, Achaeans, and certain other +nationalities; three Lacedaemonians leading as founders of the colony, Leon, +Alcidas, and Damagon. The settlement effected, they fortified anew the city, +now called Heraclea, distant about four miles and a half from Thermopylae and +two miles and a quarter from the sea, and commenced building docks, closing the +side towards Thermopylae just by the pass itself, in order that they might be +easily defended. +</p> + +<p> +The foundation of this town, evidently meant to annoy Euboea (the passage +across to Cenaeum in that island being a short one), at first caused some alarm +at Athens, which the event however did nothing to justify, the town never +giving them any trouble. The reason of this was as follows. The Thessalians, +who were sovereign in those parts, and whose territory was menaced by its +foundation, were afraid that it might prove a very powerful neighbour, and +accordingly continually harassed and made war upon the new settlers, until they +at last wore them out in spite of their originally considerable numbers, people +flocking from all quarters to a place founded by the Lacedaemonians, and thus +thought secure of prosperity. On the other hand the Lacedaemonians themselves, +in the persons of their governors, did their full share towards ruining its +prosperity and reducing its population, as they frightened away the greater +part of the inhabitants by governing harshly and in some cases not fairly, and +thus made it easier for their neighbours to prevail against them. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer, about the same time that the Athenians were detained at Melos, +their fellow citizens in the thirty ships cruising round Peloponnese, after +cutting off some guards in an ambush at Ellomenus in Leucadia, subsequently +went against Leucas itself with a large armament, having been reinforced by the +whole levy of the Acarnanians except Oeniadae, and by the Zacynthians and +Cephallenians and fifteen ships from Corcyra. While the Leucadians witnessed +the devastation of their land, without and within the isthmus upon which the +town of Leucas and the temple of Apollo stand, without making any movement on +account of the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, the Acarnanians urged +Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to build a wall so as to cut off the town +from the continent, a measure which they were convinced would secure its +capture and rid them once and for all of a most troublesome enemy. +</p> + +<p> +Demosthenes however had in the meanwhile been persuaded by the Messenians that +it was a fine opportunity for him, having so large an army assembled, to attack +the Aetolians, who were not only the enemies of Naupactus, but whose reduction +would further make it easy to gain the rest of that part of the continent for +the Athenians. The Aetolian nation, although numerous and warlike, yet dwelt in +unwalled villages scattered far apart, and had nothing but light armour, and +might, according to the Messenians, be subdued without much difficulty before +succours could arrive. The plan which they recommended was to attack first the +Apodotians, next the Ophionians, and after these the Eurytanians, who are the +largest tribe in Aetolia, and speak, as is said, a language exceedingly +difficult to understand, and eat their flesh raw. These once subdued, the rest +would easily come in. +</p> + +<p> +To this plan Demosthenes consented, not only to please the Messenians, but also +in the belief that by adding the Aetolians to his other continental allies he +would be able, without aid from home, to march against the Boeotians by way of +Ozolian Locris to Kytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right until he +descended to the Phocians, whom he could force to join him if their ancient +friendship for Athens did not, as he anticipated, at once decide them to do so. +Arrived in Phocis he was already upon the frontier of Boeotia. He accordingly +weighed from Leucas, against the wish of the Acarnanians, and with his whole +armament sailed along the coast to Sollium, where he communicated to them his +intention; and upon their refusing to agree to it on account of the +non-investment of Leucas, himself with the rest of the forces, the +Cephallenians, the Messenians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenian +marines from his own ships (the fifteen Corcyraean vessels having departed), +started on his expedition against the Aetolians. His base he established at +Oeneon in Locris, as the Ozolian Locrians were allies of Athens and were to +meet him with all their forces in the interior. Being neighbours of the +Aetolians and armed in the same way, it was thought that they would be of great +service upon the expedition, from their acquaintance with the localities and +the warfare of the inhabitants. +</p> + +<p> +After bivouacking with the army in the precinct of Nemean Zeus, in which the +poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by the people of the country, according +to an oracle which had foretold that he should die in Nemea, Demosthenes set +out at daybreak to invade Aetolia. The first day he took Potidania, the next +Krokyle, and the third Tichium, where he halted and sent back the booty to +Eupalium in Locris, having determined to pursue his conquests as far as the +Ophionians, and, in the event of their refusing to submit, to return to +Naupactus and make them the objects of a second expedition. Meanwhile the +Aetolians had been aware of his design from the moment of its formation, and as +soon as the army invaded their country came up in great force with all their +tribes; even the most remote Ophionians, the Bomiensians, and Calliensians, who +extend towards the Malian Gulf, being among the number. +</p> + +<p> +The Messenians, however, adhered to their original advice. Assuring Demosthenes +that the Aetolians were an easy conquest, they urged him to push on as rapidly +as possible, and to try to take the villages as fast as he came up to them, +without waiting until the whole nation should be in arms against him. Led on by +his advisers and trusting in his fortune, as he had met with no opposition, +without waiting for his Locrian reinforcements, who were to have supplied him +with the light-armed darters in which he was most deficient, he advanced and +stormed Aegitium, the inhabitants flying before him and posting themselves upon +the hills above the town, which stood on high ground about nine miles from the +sea. Meanwhile the Aetolians had gathered to the rescue, and now attacked the +Athenians and their allies, running down from the hills on every side and +darting their javelins, falling back when the Athenian army advanced, and +coming on as it retired; and for a long while the battle was of this character, +alternate advance and retreat, in both which operations the Athenians had the +worst. +</p> + +<p> +Still as long as their archers had arrows left and were able to use them, they +held out, the light-armed Aetolians retiring before the arrows; but after the +captain of the archers had been killed and his men scattered, the soldiers, +wearied out with the constant repetition of the same exertions and hard pressed +by the Aetolians with their javelins, at last turned and fled, and falling into +pathless gullies and places that they were unacquainted with, thus perished, +the Messenian Chromon, their guide, having also unfortunately been killed. A +great many were overtaken in the pursuit by the swift-footed and light-armed +Aetolians, and fell beneath their javelins; the greater number however missed +their road and rushed into the wood, which had no ways out, and which was soon +fired and burnt round them by the enemy. Indeed the Athenian army fell victims +to death in every form, and suffered all the vicissitudes of flight; the +survivors escaped with difficulty to the sea and Oeneon in Locris, whence they +had set out. Many of the allies were killed, and about one hundred and twenty +Athenian heavy infantry, not a man less, and all in the prime of life. These +were by far the best men in the city of Athens that fell during this war. Among +the slain was also Procles, the colleague of Demosthenes. Meanwhile the +Athenians took up their dead under truce from the Aetolians, and retired to +Naupactus, and from thence went in their ships to Athens; Demosthenes staying +behind in Naupactus and in the neighbourhood, being afraid to face the +Athenians after the disaster. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time the Athenians on the coast of Sicily sailed to Locris, and +in a descent which they made from the ships defeated the Locrians who came +against them, and took a fort upon the river Halex. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer the Aetolians, who before the Athenian expedition had sent an +embassy to Corinth and Lacedaemon, composed of Tolophus, an Ophionian, +Boriades, an Eurytanian, and Tisander, an Apodotian, obtained that an army +should be sent them against Naupactus, which had invited the Athenian invasion. +The Lacedaemonians accordingly sent off towards autumn three thousand heavy +infantry of the allies, five hundred of whom were from Heraclea, the newly +founded city in Trachis, under the command of Eurylochus, a Spartan, +accompanied by Macarius and Menedaius, also Spartans. +</p> + +<p> +The army having assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Ozolian +Locrians; the road to Naupactus lying through their territory, and he having +besides conceived the idea of detaching them from Athens. His chief abettors in +Locris were the Amphissians, who were alarmed at the hostility of the Phocians. +These first gave hostages themselves, and induced the rest to do the same for +fear of the invading army; first, their neighbours the Myonians, who held the +most difficult of the passes, and after them the Ipnians, Messapians, +Tritaeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeanthians, all of whom +joined in the expedition; the Olpaeans contenting themselves with giving +hostages, without accompanying the invasion; and the Hyaeans refusing to do +either, until the capture of Polis, one of their villages. +</p> + +<p> +His preparations completed, Eurylochus lodged the hostages in Kytinium, in +Doris, and advanced upon Naupactus through the country of the Locrians, taking +upon his way Oeneon and Eupalium, two of their towns that refused to join him. +Arrived in the Naupactian territory, and having been now joined by the +Aetolians, the army laid waste the land and took the suburb of the town, which +was unfortified; and after this Molycrium also, a Corinthian colony subject to +Athens. Meanwhile the Athenian Demosthenes, who since the affair in Aetolia had +remained near Naupactus, having had notice of the army and fearing for the +town, went and persuaded the Acarnanians, although not without difficulty +because of his departure from Leucas, to go to the relief of Naupactus. They +accordingly sent with him on board his ships a thousand heavy infantry, who +threw themselves into the place and saved it; the extent of its wall and the +small number of its defenders otherwise placing it in the greatest danger. +Meanwhile Eurylochus and his companions, finding that this force had entered +and that it was impossible to storm the town, withdrew, not to Peloponnese, but +to the country once called Aeolis, and now Calydon and Pleuron, and to the +places in that neighbourhood, and Proschium in Aetolia; the Ambraciots having +come and urged them to combine with them in attacking Amphilochian Argos and +the rest of Amphilochia and Acarnania; affirming that the conquest of these +countries would bring all the continent into alliance with Lacedaemon. To this +Eurylochus consented, and dismissing the Aetolians, now remained quiet with his +army in those parts, until the time should come for the Ambraciots to take the +field, and for him to join them before Argos. +</p> + +<p> +Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the Athenians in Sicily with their +Hellenic allies, and such of the Sicel subjects or allies of Syracuse as had +revolted from her and joined their army, marched against the Sicel town Inessa, +the acropolis of which was held by the Syracusans, and after attacking it +without being able to take it, retired. In the retreat, the allies retreating +after the Athenians were attacked by the Syracusans from the fort, and a large +part of their army routed with great slaughter. After this, Laches and the +Athenians from the ships made some descents in Locris, and defeating the +Locrians, who came against them with Proxenus, son of Capaton, upon the river +Caicinus, took some arms and departed. +</p> + +<p> +The same winter the Athenians purified Delos, in compliance, it appears, with a +certain oracle. It had been purified before by Pisistratus the tyrant; not +indeed the whole island, but as much of it as could be seen from the temple. +All of it was, however, now purified in the following way. All the sepulchres +of those that had died in Delos were taken up, and for the future it was +commanded that no one should be allowed either to die or to give birth to a +child in the island; but that they should be carried over to Rhenea, which is +so near to Delos that Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, having added Rhenea to his +other island conquests during his period of naval ascendancy, dedicated it to +the Delian Apollo by binding it to Delos with a chain. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians, after the purification, celebrated, for the first time, the +quinquennial festival of the Delian games. Once upon a time, indeed, there was +a great assemblage of the Ionians and the neighbouring islanders at Delos, who +used to come to the festival, as the Ionians now do to that of Ephesus, and +athletic and poetical contests took place there, and the cities brought choirs +of dancers. Nothing can be clearer on this point than the following verses of +Homer, taken from a hymn to Apollo: +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +Phœbus, wherever thou strayest, far or near,<br/> +Delos was still of all thy haunts most dear.<br/> +Thither the robed Ionians take their way<br/> +With wife and child to keep thy holiday,<br/> +Invoke thy favour on each manly game,<br/> +And dance and sing in honour of thy name. +</p> + +<p> +That there was also a poetical contest in which the Ionians went to contend, +again is shown by the following, taken from the same hymn. After celebrating +the Delian dance of the women, he ends his song of praise with these verses, in +which he also alludes to himself: +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +Well, may Apollo keep you all! and so,<br/> +Sweethearts, good-bye—yet tell me not I go<br/> +Out from your hearts; and if in after hours<br/> +Some other wanderer in this world of ours<br/> +Touch at your shores, and ask your maidens here<br/> +Who sings the songs the sweetest to your ear,<br/> +Think of me then, and answer with a smile,<br/> +‘A blind old man of Scio’s rocky isle.’ +</p> + +<p> +Homer thus attests that there was anciently a great assembly and festival at +Delos. In later times, although the islanders and the Athenians continued to +send the choirs of dancers with sacrifices, the contests and most of the +ceremonies were abolished, probably through adversity, until the Athenians +celebrated the games upon this occasion with the novelty of horse-races. +</p> + +<p> +The same winter the Ambraciots, as they had promised Eurylochus when they +retained his army, marched out against Amphilochian Argos with three thousand +heavy infantry, and invading the Argive territory occupied Olpae, a stronghold +on a hill near the sea, which had been formerly fortified by the Acarnanians +and used as the place of assizes for their nation, and which is about two miles +and three-quarters from the city of Argos upon the sea-coast. Meanwhile the +Acarnanians went with a part of their forces to the relief of Argos, and with +the rest encamped in Amphilochia at the place called Crenae, or the Wells, to +watch for Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians, and to prevent their passing +through and effecting their junction with the Ambraciots; while they also sent +for Demosthenes, the commander of the Aetolian expedition, to be their leader, +and for the twenty Athenian ships that were cruising off Peloponnese under the +command of Aristotle, son of Timocrates, and Hierophon, son of Antimnestus. On +their part, the Ambraciots at Olpae sent a messenger to their own city, to beg +them to come with their whole levy to their assistance, fearing that the army +of Eurylochus might not be able to pass through the Acarnanians, and that they +might themselves be obliged to fight single-handed, or be unable to retreat, if +they wished it, without danger. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians, learning that the Ambraciots at +Olpae had arrived, set out from Proschium with all haste to join them, and +crossing the Achelous advanced through Acarnania, which they found deserted by +its population, who had gone to the relief of Argos; keeping on their right the +city of the Stratians and its garrison, and on their left the rest of +Acarnania. Traversing the territory of the Stratians, they advanced through +Phytia, next, skirting Medeon, through Limnaea; after which they left Acarnania +behind them and entered a friendly country, that of the Agraeans. From thence +they reached and crossed Mount Thymaus, which belongs to the Agraeans, and +descended into the Argive territory after nightfall, and passing between the +city of Argos and the Acarnanian posts at Crenae, joined the Ambraciots at +Olpae. +</p> + +<p> +Uniting here at daybreak, they sat down at the place called Metropolis, and +encamped. Not long afterwards the Athenians in the twenty ships came into the +Ambracian Gulf to support the Argives, with Demosthenes and two hundred +Messenian heavy infantry, and sixty Athenian archers. While the fleet off Olpae +blockaded the hill from the sea, the Acarnanians and a few of the +Amphilochians, most of whom were kept back by force by the Ambraciots, had +already arrived at Argos, and were preparing to give battle to the enemy, +having chosen Demosthenes to command the whole of the allied army in concert +with their own generals. Demosthenes led them near to Olpae and encamped, a +great ravine separating the two armies. During five days they remained +inactive; on the sixth both sides formed in order of battle. The army of the +Peloponnesians was the largest and outflanked their opponents; and Demosthenes +fearing that his right might be surrounded, placed in ambush in a hollow way +overgrown with bushes some four hundred heavy infantry and light troops, who +were to rise up at the moment of the onset behind the projecting left wing of +the enemy, and to take them in the rear. When both sides were ready they joined +battle; Demosthenes being on the right wing with the Messenians and a few +Athenians, while the rest of the line was made up of the different divisions of +the Acarnanians, and of the Amphilochian carters. The Peloponnesians and +Ambraciots were drawn up pell-mell together, with the exception of the +Mantineans, who were massed on the left, without however reaching to the +extremity of the wing, where Eurylochus and his men confronted the Messenians +and Demosthenes. +</p> + +<p> +The Peloponnesians were now well engaged and with their outflanking wing were +upon the point of turning their enemy’s right; when the Acarnanians from +the ambuscade set upon them from behind, and broke them at the first attack, +without their staying to resist; while the panic into which they fell caused +the flight of most of their army, terrified beyond measure at seeing the +division of Eurylochus and their best troops cut to pieces. Most of the work +was done by Demosthenes and his Messenians, who were posted in this part of the +field. Meanwhile the Ambraciots (who are the best soldiers in those countries) +and the troops upon the right wing, defeated the division opposed to them and +pursued it to Argos. Returning from the pursuit, they found their main body +defeated; and hard pressed by the Acarnanians, with difficulty made good their +passage to Olpae, suffering heavy loss on the way, as they dashed on without +discipline or order, the Mantineans excepted, who kept their ranks best of any +in the army during the retreat. +</p> + +<p> +The battle did not end until the evening. The next day Menedaius, who on the +death of Eurylochus and Macarius had succeeded to the sole command, being at a +loss after so signal a defeat how to stay and sustain a siege, cut off as he +was by land and by the Athenian fleet by sea, and equally so how to retreat in +safety, opened a parley with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian generals for a +truce and permission to retreat, and at the same time for the recovery of the +dead. The dead they gave back to him, and setting up a trophy took up their own +also to the number of about three hundred. The retreat demanded they refused +publicly to the army; but permission to depart without delay was secretly +granted to the Mantineans and to Menedaius and the other commanders and +principal men of the Peloponnesians by Demosthenes and his Acarnanian +colleagues; who desired to strip the Ambraciots and the mercenary host of +foreigners of their supporters; and, above all, to discredit the Lacedaemonians +and Peloponnesians with the Hellenes in those parts, as traitors and +self-seekers. +</p> + +<p> +While the enemy was taking up his dead and hastily burying them as he could, +and those who obtained permission were secretly planning their retreat, word +was brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians that the Ambraciots from the +city, in compliance with the first message from Olpae, were on the march with +their whole levy through Amphilochia to join their countrymen at Olpae, knowing +nothing of what had occurred. Demosthenes prepared to march with his army +against them, and meanwhile sent on at once a strong division to beset the +roads and occupy the strong positions. In the meantime the Mantineans and +others included in the agreement went out under the pretence of gathering herbs +and firewood, and stole off by twos and threes, picking on the way the things +which they professed to have come out for, until they had gone some distance +from Olpae, when they quickened their pace. The Ambraciots and such of the rest +as had accompanied them in larger parties, seeing them going on, pushed on in +their turn, and began running in order to catch them up. The Acarnanians at +first thought that all alike were departing without permission, and began to +pursue the Peloponnesians; and believing that they were being betrayed, even +threw a dart or two at some of their generals who tried to stop them and told +them that leave had been given. Eventually, however, they let pass the +Mantineans and Peloponnesians, and slew only the Ambraciots, there being much +dispute and difficulty in distinguishing whether a man was an Ambraciot or a +Peloponnesian. The number thus slain was about two hundred; the rest escaped +into the bordering territory of Agraea, and found refuge with Salynthius, the +friendly king of the Agraeans. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Ambraciots from the city arrived at Idomene. Idomene consists of +two lofty hills, the higher of which the troops sent on by Demosthenes +succeeded in occupying after nightfall, unobserved by the Ambraciots, who had +meanwhile ascended the smaller and bivouacked under it. After supper +Demosthenes set out with the rest of the army, as soon as it was evening; +himself with half his force making for the pass, and the remainder going by the +Amphilochian hills. At dawn he fell upon the Ambraciots while they were still +abed, ignorant of what had passed, and fully thinking that it was their own +countrymen—Demosthenes having purposely put the Messenians in front with +orders to address them in the Doric dialect, and thus to inspire confidence in +the sentinels, who would not be able to see them as it was still night. In this +way he routed their army as soon as he attacked it, slaying most of them where +they were, the rest breaking away in flight over the hills. The roads, however, +were already occupied, and while the Amphilochians knew their own country, the +Ambraciots were ignorant of it and could not tell which way to turn, and had +also heavy armour as against a light-armed enemy, and so fell into ravines and +into the ambushes which had been set for them, and perished there. In their +manifold efforts to escape some even turned to the sea, which was not far off, +and seeing the Athenian ships coasting alongshore just while the action was +going on, swam off to them, thinking it better in the panic they were in, to +perish, if perish they must, by the hands of the Athenians, than by those of +the barbarous and detested Amphilochians. Of the large Ambraciot force +destroyed in this manner, a few only reached the city in safety; while the +Acarnanians, after stripping the dead and setting up a trophy, returned to +Argos. +</p> + +<p> +The next day arrived a herald from the Ambraciots who had fled from Olpae to +the Agraeans, to ask leave to take up the dead that had fallen after the first +engagement, when they left the camp with the Mantineans and their companions, +without, like them, having had permission to do so. At the sight of the arms of +the Ambraciots from the city, the herald was astonished at their number, +knowing nothing of the disaster and fancying that they were those of their own +party. Some one asked him what he was so astonished at, and how many of them +had been killed, fancying in his turn that this was the herald from the troops +at Idomene. He replied: “About two hundred”; upon which his +interrogator took him up, saying: “Why, the arms you see here are of more +than a thousand.” The herald replied: “Then they are not the arms +of those who fought with us?” The other answered: “Yes, they are, +if at least you fought at Idomene yesterday.” “But we fought with +no one yesterday; but the day before in the retreat.” “However that +may be, we fought yesterday with those who came to reinforce you from the city +of the Ambraciots.” When the herald heard this and knew that the +reinforcement from the city had been destroyed, he broke into wailing and, +stunned at the magnitude of the present evils, went away at once without having +performed his errand, or again asking for the dead bodies. Indeed, this was by +far the greatest disaster that befell any one Hellenic city in an equal number +of days during this war; and I have not set down the number of the dead, +because the amount stated seems so out of proportion to the size of the city as +to be incredible. In any case I know that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians +had wished to take Ambracia as the Athenians and Demosthenes advised, they +would have done so without a blow; as it was, they feared that if the Athenians +had it they would be worse neighbours to them than the present. +</p> + +<p> +After this the Acarnanians allotted a third of the spoils to the Athenians, and +divided the rest among their own different towns. The share of the Athenians +was captured on the voyage home; the arms now deposited in the Attic temples +are three hundred panoplies, which the Acarnanians set apart for Demosthenes, +and which he brought to Athens in person, his return to his country after the +Aetolian disaster being rendered less hazardous by this exploit. The Athenians +in the twenty ships also went off to Naupactus. The Acarnanians and +Amphilochians, after the departure of Demosthenes and the Athenians, granted +the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refuge with Salynthius and the +Agraeans a free retreat from Oeniadae, to which place they had removed from the +country of Salynthius, and for the future concluded with the Ambraciots a +treaty and alliance for one hundred years, upon the terms following. It was to +be a defensive, not an offensive alliance; the Ambraciots could not be required +to march with the Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians +with the Ambraciots against the Athenians; for the rest the Ambraciots were to +give up the places and hostages that they held of the Amphilochians, and not to +give help to Anactorium, which was at enmity with the Acarnanians. With this +arrangement they put an end to the war. After this the Corinthians sent a +garrison of their own citizens to Ambracia, composed of three hundred heavy +infantry, under the command of Xenocleides, son of Euthycles, who reached their +destination after a difficult journey across the continent. Such was the +history of the affair of Ambracia. +</p> + +<p> +The same winter the Athenians in Sicily made a descent from their ships upon +the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels, who had invaded its +borders from the interior, and also sailed to the islands of Aeolus. Upon their +return to Rhegium they found the Athenian general, Pythodorus, son of +Isolochus, come to supersede Laches in the command of the fleet. The allies in +Sicily had sailed to Athens and induced the Athenians to send out more vessels +to their assistance, pointing out that the Syracusans who already commanded +their land were making efforts to get together a navy, to avoid being any +longer excluded from the sea by a few vessels. The Athenians proceeded to man +forty ships to send to them, thinking that the war in Sicily would thus be the +sooner ended, and also wishing to exercise their navy. One of the generals, +Pythodorus, was accordingly sent out with a few ships; Sophocles, son of +Sostratides, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles, being destined to follow with the +main body. Meanwhile Pythodorus had taken the command of Laches’ ships, +and towards the end of winter sailed against the Locrian fort, which Laches had +formerly taken, and returned after being defeated in battle by the Locrians. +</p> + +<p> +In the first days of this spring, the stream of fire issued from Etna, as on +former occasions, and destroyed some land of the Catanians, who live upon Mount +Etna, which is the largest mountain in Sicily. Fifty years, it is said, had +elapsed since the last eruption, there having been three in all since the +Hellenes have inhabited Sicily. Such were the events of this winter; and with +it ended the sixth year of this war, of which Thucydides was the historian. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2H_4_0015" id="link2H_4_0015"></a> +BOOK IV </h2> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0012" id="link2HCH0012"></a> +CHAPTER XII </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Seventh Year of the War—Occupation of Pylos—Surrender of the +Spartan Army in Sphacteria +</p> + +<p> +Next summer, about the time of the corn’s coming into ear, ten Syracusan +and as many Locrian vessels sailed to Messina, in Sicily, and occupied the town +upon the invitation of the inhabitants; and Messina revolted from the +Athenians. The Syracusans contrived this chiefly because they saw that the +place afforded an approach to Sicily, and feared that the Athenians might +hereafter use it as a base for attacking them with a larger force; the Locrians +because they wished to carry on hostilities from both sides of the strait and +to reduce their enemies, the people of Rhegium. Meanwhile, the Locrians had +invaded the Rhegian territory with all their forces, to prevent their +succouring Messina, and also at the instance of some exiles from Rhegium who +were with them; the long factions by which that town had been torn rendering it +for the moment incapable of resistance, and thus furnishing an additional +temptation to the invaders. After devastating the country the Locrian land +forces retired, their ships remaining to guard Messina, while others were being +manned for the same destination to carry on the war from thence. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time in the spring, before the corn was ripe, the Peloponnesians +and their allies invaded Attica under Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the +Lacedaemonians, and sat down and laid waste the country. Meanwhile the +Athenians sent off the forty ships which they had been preparing to Sicily, +with the remaining generals Eurymedon and Sophocles; their colleague Pythodorus +having already preceded them thither. These had also instructions as they +sailed by to look to the Corcyraeans in the town, who were being plundered by +the exiles in the mountain. To support these exiles sixty Peloponnesian vessels +had lately sailed, it being thought that the famine raging in the city would +make it easy for them to reduce it. Demosthenes also, who had remained without +employment since his return from Acarnania, applied and obtained permission to +use the fleet, if he wished it, upon the coast of Peloponnese. +</p> + +<p> +Off Laconia they heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra, +upon which Eurymedon and Sophocles wished to hasten to the island, but +Demosthenes required them first to touch at Pylos and do what was wanted there, +before continuing their voyage. While they were making objections, a squall +chanced to come on and carried the fleet into Pylos. Demosthenes at once urged +them to fortify the place, it being for this that he had come on the voyage, +and made them observe there was plenty of stone and timber on the spot, and +that the place was strong by nature, and together with much of the country +round unoccupied; Pylos, or Coryphasium, as the Lacedaemonians call it, being +about forty-five miles distant from Sparta, and situated in the old country of +the Messenians. The commanders told him that there was no lack of desert +headlands in Peloponnese if he wished to put the city to expense by occupying +them. He, however, thought that this place was distinguished from others of the +kind by having a harbour close by; while the Messenians, the old natives of the +country, speaking the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians, could do them the +greatest mischief by their incursions from it, and would at the same time be a +trusty garrison. +</p> + +<p> +After speaking to the captains of companies on the subject, and failing to +persuade either the generals or the soldiers, he remained inactive with the +rest from stress of weather; until the soldiers themselves wanting occupation +were seized with a sudden impulse to go round and fortify the place. +Accordingly they set to work in earnest, and having no iron tools, picked up +stones, and put them together as they happened to fit, and where mortar was +needed, carried it on their backs for want of hods, stooping down to make it +stay on, and clasping their hands together behind to prevent it falling off; +sparing no effort to be able to complete the most vulnerable points before the +arrival of the Lacedaemonians, most of the place being sufficiently strong by +nature without further fortifications. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians were celebrating a festival, and also at first +made light of the news, in the idea that whenever they chose to take the field +the place would be immediately evacuated by the enemy or easily taken by force; +the absence of their army before Athens having also something to do with their +delay. The Athenians fortified the place on the land side, and where it most +required it, in six days, and leaving Demosthenes with five ships to garrison +it, with the main body of the fleet hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and +Sicily. +</p> + +<p> +As soon as the Peloponnesians in Attica heard of the occupation of Pylos, they +hurried back home; the Lacedaemonians and their king Agis thinking that the +matter touched them nearly. Besides having made their invasion early in the +season, and while the corn was still green, most of their troops were short of +provisions: the weather also was unusually bad for the time of year, and +greatly distressed their army. Many reasons thus combined to hasten their +departure and to make this invasion a very short one; indeed they only stayed +fifteen days in Attica. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time the Athenian general Simonides getting together a few +Athenians from the garrisons, and a number of the allies in those parts, took +Eion in Thrace, a Mendaean colony and hostile to Athens, by treachery, but had +no sooner done so than the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans came up and beat him out +of it, with the loss of many of his soldiers. +</p> + +<p> +On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans themselves and +the nearest of the Perioeci at once set out for Pylos, the other Lacedaemonians +following more slowly, as they had just come in from another campaign. Word was +also sent round Peloponnese to come up as quickly as possible to Pylos; while +the sixty Peloponnesian ships were sent for from Corcyra, and being dragged by +their crews across the isthmus of Leucas, passed unperceived by the Athenian +squadron at Zacynthus, and reached Pylos, where the land forces had arrived +before them. Before the Peloponnesian fleet sailed in, Demosthenes found time +to send out unobserved two ships to inform Eurymedon and the Athenians on board +the fleet at Zacynthus of the danger of Pylos and to summon them to his +assistance. While the ships hastened on their voyage in obedience to the orders +of Demosthenes, the Lacedaemonians prepared to assault the fort by land and +sea, hoping to capture with ease a work constructed in haste, and held by a +feeble garrison. Meanwhile, as they expected the Athenian ships to arrive from +Zacynthus, they intended, if they failed to take the place before, to block up +the entrances of the harbour to prevent their being able to anchor inside it. +For the island of Sphacteria, stretching along in a line close in front of the +harbour, at once makes it safe and narrows its entrances, leaving a passage for +two ships on the side nearest Pylos and the Athenian fortifications, and for +eight or nine on that next the rest of the mainland: for the rest, the island +was entirely covered with wood, and without paths through not being inhabited, +and about one mile and five furlongs in length. The inlets the Lacedaemonians +meant to close with a line of ships placed close together, with their prows +turned towards the sea, and, meanwhile, fearing that the enemy might make use +of the island to operate against them, carried over some heavy infantry +thither, stationing others along the coast. By this means the island and the +continent would be alike hostile to the Athenians, as they would be unable to +land on either; and the shore of Pylos itself outside the inlet towards the +open sea having no harbour, and, therefore, presenting no point which they +could use as a base to relieve their countrymen, they, the Lacedaemonians, +without sea-fight or risk would in all probability become masters of the place, +occupied as it had been on the spur of the moment, and unfurnished with +provisions. This being determined, they carried over to the island the heavy +infantry, drafted by lot from all the companies. Some others had crossed over +before in relief parties, but these last who were left there were four hundred +and twenty in number, with their Helot attendants, commanded by Epitadas, son +of Molobrus. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedaemonians about to attack him by sea and +land at once, himself was not idle. He drew up under the fortification and +enclosed in a stockade the galleys remaining to him of those which had been +left him, arming the sailors taken out of them with poor shields made most of +them of osier, it being impossible to procure arms in such a desert place, and +even these having been obtained from a thirty-oared Messenian privateer and a +boat belonging to some Messenians who happened to have come to them. Among +these Messenians were forty heavy infantry, whom he made use of with the rest. +Posting most of his men, unarmed and armed, upon the best fortified and strong +points of the place towards the interior, with orders to repel any attack of +the land forces, he picked sixty heavy infantry and a few archers from his +whole force, and with these went outside the wall down to the sea, where he +thought that the enemy would most likely attempt to land. Although the ground +was difficult and rocky, looking towards the open sea, the fact that this was +the weakest part of the wall would, he thought, encourage their ardour, as the +Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, had here paid little attention +to their defences, and the enemy if he could force a landing might feel secure +of taking the place. At this point, accordingly, going down to the +water’s edge, he posted his heavy infantry to prevent, if possible, a +landing, and encouraged them in the following terms: +</p> + +<p> +“Soldiers and comrades in this adventure, I hope that none of you in our +present strait will think to show his wit by exactly calculating all the perils +that encompass us, but that you will rather hasten to close with the enemy, +without staying to count the odds, seeing in this your best chance of safety. +In emergencies like ours calculation is out of place; the sooner the danger is +faced the better. To my mind also most of the chances are for us, if we will +only stand fast and not throw away our advantages, overawed by the numbers of +the enemy. One of the points in our favour is the awkwardness of the landing. +This, however, only helps us if we stand our ground. If we give way it will be +practicable enough, in spite of its natural difficulty, without a defender; and +the enemy will instantly become more formidable from the difficulty he will +have in retreating, supposing that we succeed in repulsing him, which we shall +find it easier to do, while he is on board his ships, than after he has landed +and meets us on equal terms. As to his numbers, these need not too much alarm +you. Large as they may be he can only engage in small detachments, from the +impossibility of bringing to. Besides, the numerical superiority that we have +to meet is not that of an army on land with everything else equal, but of +troops on board ship, upon an element where many favourable accidents are +required to act with effect. I therefore consider that his difficulties may be +fairly set against our numerical deficiencies, and at the same time I charge +you, as Athenians who know by experience what landing from ships on a hostile +territory means, and how impossible it is to drive back an enemy determined +enough to stand his ground and not to be frightened away by the surf and the +terrors of the ships sailing in, to stand fast in the present emergency, beat +back the enemy at the water’s edge, and save yourselves and the +place.” +</p> + +<p> +Thus encouraged by Demosthenes, the Athenians felt more confident, and went +down to meet the enemy, posting themselves along the edge of the sea. The +Lacedaemonians now put themselves in movement and simultaneously assaulted the +fortification with their land forces and with their ships, forty-three in +number, under their admiral, Thrasymelidas, son of Cratesicles, a Spartan, who +made his attack just where Demosthenes expected. The Athenians had thus to +defend themselves on both sides, from the land and from the sea; the enemy +rowing up in small detachments, the one relieving the other—it being +impossible for many to bring to at once—and showing great ardour and +cheering each other on, in the endeavour to force a passage and to take the +fortification. He who most distinguished himself was Brasidas. Captain of a +galley, and seeing that the captains and steersmen, impressed by the difficulty +of the position, hung back even where a landing might have seemed possible, for +fear of wrecking their vessels, he shouted out to them, that they must never +allow the enemy to fortify himself in their country for the sake of saving +timber, but must shiver their vessels and force a landing; and bade the allies, +instead of hesitating in such a moment to sacrifice their ships for Lacedaemon +in return for her many benefits, to run them boldly aground, land in one way or +another, and make themselves masters of the place and its garrison. +</p> + +<p> +Not content with this exhortation, he forced his own steersman to run his ship +ashore, and stepping on to the gangway, was endeavouring to land, when he was +cut down by the Athenians, and after receiving many wounds fainted away. +Falling into the bows, his shield slipped off his arm into the sea, and being +thrown ashore was picked up by the Athenians, and afterwards used for the +trophy which they set up for this attack. The rest also did their best, but +were not able to land, owing to the difficulty of the ground and the +unflinching tenacity of the Athenians. It was a strange reversal of the order +of things for Athenians to be fighting from the land, and from Laconian land +too, against Lacedaemonians coming from the sea; while Lacedaemonians were +trying to land from shipboard in their own country, now become hostile, to +attack Athenians, although the former were chiefly famous at the time as an +inland people and superior by land, the latter as a maritime people with a navy +that had no equal. +</p> + +<p> +After continuing their attacks during that day and most of the next, the +Peloponnesians desisted, and the day after sent some of their ships to Asine +for timber to make engines, hoping to take by their aid, in spite of its +height, the wall opposite the harbour, where the landing was easiest. At this +moment the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus arrived, now numbering fifty sail, +having been reinforced by some of the ships on guard at Naupactus and by four +Chian vessels. Seeing the coast and the island both crowded with heavy +infantry, and the hostile ships in harbour showing no signs of sailing out, at +a loss where to anchor, they sailed for the moment to the desert island of +Prote, not far off, where they passed the night. The next day they got under +way in readiness to engage in the open sea if the enemy chose to put out to +meet them, being determined in the event of his not doing so to sail in and +attack him. The Lacedaemonians did not put out to sea, and having omitted to +close the inlets as they had intended, remained quiet on shore, engaged in +manning their ships and getting ready, in the case of any one sailing in, to +fight in the harbour, which is a fairly large one. +</p> + +<p> +Perceiving this, the Athenians advanced against them by each inlet, and falling +on the enemy’s fleet, most of which was by this time afloat and in line, +at once put it to flight, and giving chase as far as the short distance +allowed, disabled a good many vessels and took five, one with its crew on +board; dashing in at the rest that had taken refuge on shore, and battering +some that were still being manned, before they could put out, and lashing on to +their own ships and towing off empty others whose crews had fled. At this sight +the Lacedaemonians, maddened by a disaster which cut off their men on the +island, rushed to the rescue, and going into the sea with their heavy armour, +laid hold of the ships and tried to drag them back, each man thinking that +success depended on his individual exertions. Great was the melee, and quite in +contradiction to the naval tactics usual to the two combatants; the +Lacedaemonians in their excitement and dismay being actually engaged in a +sea-fight on land, while the victorious Athenians, in their eagerness to push +their success as far as possible, were carrying on a land-fight from their +ships. After great exertions and numerous wounds on both sides they separated, +the Lacedaemonians saving their empty ships, except those first taken; and both +parties returning to their camp, the Athenians set up a trophy, gave back the +dead, secured the wrecks, and at once began to cruise round and jealously watch +the island, with its intercepted garrison, while the Peloponnesians on the +mainland, whose contingents had now all come up, stayed where they were before +Pylos. +</p> + +<p> +When the news of what had happened at Pylos reached Sparta, the disaster was +thought so serious that the Lacedaemonians resolved that the authorities should +go down to the camp, and decide on the spot what was best to be done. There, +seeing that it was impossible to help their men, and not wishing to risk their +being reduced by hunger or overpowered by numbers, they determined, with the +consent of the Athenian generals, to conclude an armistice at Pylos and send +envoys to Athens to obtain a convention, and to endeavour to get back their men +as quickly as possible. +</p> + +<p> +The generals accepting their offers, an armistice was concluded upon the terms +following: +</p> + +<p> +That the Lacedaemonians should bring to Pylos and deliver up to the Athenians +the ships that had fought in the late engagement, and all in Laconia that were +vessels of war, and should make no attack on the fortification either by land +or by sea. +</p> + +<p> +That the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send to +the men in the island a certain fixed quantity of corn ready kneaded, that is +to say, two quarts of barley meal, one pint of wine, and a piece of meat for +each man, and half the same quantity for a servant. +</p> + +<p> +That this allowance should be sent in under the eyes of the Athenians, and that +no boat should sail to the island except openly. +</p> + +<p> +That the Athenians should continue to the island same as before, without +however landing upon it, and should refrain from attacking the Peloponnesian +troops either by land or by sea. +</p> + +<p> +That if either party should infringe any of these terms in the slightest +particular, the armistice should be at once void. +</p> + +<p> +That the armistice should hold good until the return of the Lacedaemonian +envoys from Athens—the Athenians sending them thither in a galley and +bringing them back again—and upon the arrival of the envoys should be at +an end, and the ships be restored by the Athenians in the same state as they +received them. +</p> + +<p> +Such were the terms of the armistice, and the ships were delivered over to the +number of sixty, and the envoys sent off accordingly. Arrived at Athens they +spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Athenians, the Lacedaemonians sent us to try to find some way of +settling the affair of our men on the island, that shall be at once +satisfactory to our interests, and as consistent with our dignity in our +misfortune as circumstances permit. We can venture to speak at some length +without any departure from the habit of our country. Men of few words where +many are not wanted, we can be less brief when there is a matter of importance +to be illustrated and an end to be served by its illustration. Meanwhile we beg +you to take what we may say, not in a hostile spirit, nor as if we thought you +ignorant and wished to lecture you, but rather as a suggestion on the best +course to be taken, addressed to intelligent judges. You can now, if you +choose, employ your present success to advantage, so as to keep what you have +got and gain honour and reputation besides, and you can avoid the mistake of +those who meet with an extraordinary piece of good fortune, and are led on by +hope to grasp continually at something further, through having already +succeeded without expecting it. While those who have known most vicissitudes of +good and bad, have also justly least faith in their prosperity; and to teach +your city and ours this lesson experience has not been wanting. +</p> + +<p> +“To be convinced of this you have only to look at our present misfortune. +What power in Hellas stood higher than we did? and yet we are come to you, +although we formerly thought ourselves more able to grant what we are now here +to ask. Nevertheless, we have not been brought to this by any decay in our +power, or through having our heads turned by aggrandizement; no, our resources +are what they have always been, and our error has been an error of judgment, to +which all are equally liable. Accordingly, the prosperity which your city now +enjoys, and the accession that it has lately received, must not make you fancy +that fortune will be always with you. Indeed sensible men are prudent enough to +treat their gains as precarious, just as they would also keep a clear head in +adversity, and think that war, so far from staying within the limit to which a +combatant may wish to confine it, will run the course that its chances +prescribe; and thus, not being puffed up by confidence in military success, +they are less likely to come to grief, and most ready to make peace, if they +can, while their fortune lasts. This, Athenians, you have a good opportunity to +do now with us, and thus to escape the possible disasters which may follow upon +your refusal, and the consequent imputation of having owed to accident even +your present advantages, when you might have left behind you a reputation for +power and wisdom which nothing could endanger. +</p> + +<p> +“The Lacedaemonians accordingly invite you to make a treaty and to end +the war, and offer peace and alliance and the most friendly and intimate +relations in every way and on every occasion between us; and in return ask for +the men on the island, thinking it better for both parties not to stand out to +the end, on the chance of some favourable accident enabling the men to force +their way out, or of their being compelled to succumb under the pressure of +blockade. Indeed if great enmities are ever to be really settled, we think it +will be, not by the system of revenge and military success, and by forcing an +opponent to swear to a treaty to his disadvantage, but when the more fortunate +combatant waives these his privileges, to be guided by gentler feelings +conquers his rival in generosity, and accords peace on more moderate conditions +than he expected. From that moment, instead of the debt of revenge which +violence must entail, his adversary owes a debt of generosity to be paid in +kind, and is inclined by honour to stand to his agreement. And men oftener act +in this manner towards their greatest enemies than where the quarrel is of less +importance; they are also by nature as glad to give way to those who first +yield to them, as they are apt to be provoked by arrogance to risks condemned +by their own judgment. +</p> + +<p> +“To apply this to ourselves: if peace was ever desirable for both +parties, it is surely so at the present moment, before anything irremediable +befall us and force us to hate you eternally, personally as well as +politically, and you to miss the advantages that we now offer you. While the +issue is still in doubt, and you have reputation and our friendship in +prospect, and we the compromise of our misfortune before anything fatal occur, +let us be reconciled, and for ourselves choose peace instead of war, and grant +to the rest of the Hellenes a remission from their sufferings, for which be +sure they will think they have chiefly you to thank. The war that they labour +under they know not which began, but the peace that concludes it, as it depends +on your decision, will by their gratitude be laid to your door. By such a +decision you can become firm friends with the Lacedaemonians at their own +invitation, which you do not force from them, but oblige them by accepting. And +from this friendship consider the advantages that are likely to follow: when +Attica and Sparta are at one, the rest of Hellas, be sure, will remain in +respectful inferiority before its heads.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of the Lacedaemonians, their idea being that the Athenians, +already desirous of a truce and only kept back by their opposition, would +joyfully accept a peace freely offered, and give back the men. The Athenians, +however, having the men on the island, thought that the treaty would be ready +for them whenever they chose to make it, and grasped at something further. +Foremost to encourage them in this policy was Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, a +popular leader of the time and very powerful with the multitude, who persuaded +them to answer as follows: First, the men in the island must surrender +themselves and their arms and be brought to Athens. Next, the Lacedaemonians +must restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia, all places acquired not by +arms, but by the previous convention, under which they had been ceded by Athens +herself at a moment of disaster, when a truce was more necessary to her than at +present. This done they might take back their men, and make a truce for as long +as both parties might agree. +</p> + +<p> +To this answer the envoys made no reply, but asked that commissioners might be +chosen with whom they might confer on each point, and quietly talk the matter +over and try to come to some agreement. Hereupon Cleon violently assailed them, +saying that he knew from the first that they had no right intentions, and that +it was clear enough now by their refusing to speak before the people, and +wanting to confer in secret with a committee of two or three. No, if they meant +anything honest let them say it out before all. The Lacedaemonians, however, +seeing that whatever concessions they might be prepared to make in their +misfortune, it was impossible for them to speak before the multitude and lose +credit with their allies for a negotiation which might after all miscarry, and +on the other hand, that the Athenians would never grant what they asked upon +moderate terms, returned from Athens without having effected anything. +</p> + +<p> +Their arrival at once put an end to the armistice at Pylos, and the +Lacedaemonians asked back their ships according to the convention. The +Athenians, however, alleged an attack on the fort in contravention of the +truce, and other grievances seemingly not worth mentioning, and refused to give +them back, insisting upon the clause by which the slightest infringement made +the armistice void. The Lacedaemonians, after denying the contravention and +protesting against their bad faith in the matter of the ships, went away and +earnestly addressed themselves to the war. Hostilities were now carried on at +Pylos upon both sides with vigour. The Athenians cruised round the island all +day with two ships going different ways; and by night, except on the seaward +side in windy weather, anchored round it with their whole fleet, which, having +been reinforced by twenty ships from Athens come to aid in the blockade, now +numbered seventy sail; while the Peloponnesians remained encamped on the +continent, making attacks on the fort, and on the look-out for any opportunity +which might offer itself for the deliverance of their men. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily had brought up to the +squadron guarding Messina the reinforcement which we left them preparing, and +carried on the war from thence, incited chiefly by the Locrians from hatred of +the Rhegians, whose territory they had invaded with all their forces. The +Syracusans also wished to try their fortune at sea, seeing that the Athenians +had only a few ships actually at Rhegium, and hearing that the main fleet +destined to join them was engaged in blockading the island. A naval victory, +they thought, would enable them to blockade Rhegium by sea and land, and easily +to reduce it; a success which would at once place their affairs upon a solid +basis, the promontory of Rhegium in Italy and Messina in Sicily being so near +each other that it would be impossible for the Athenians to cruise against them +and command the strait. The strait in question consists of the sea between +Rhegium and Messina, at the point where Sicily approaches nearest to the +continent, and is the Charybdis through which the story makes Ulysses sail; and +the narrowness of the passage and the strength of the current that pours in +from the vast Tyrrhenian and Sicilian mains, have rightly given it a bad +reputation. +</p> + +<p> +In this strait the Syracusans and their allies were compelled to fight, late in +the day, about the passage of a boat, putting out with rather more than thirty +ships against sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian vessels. Defeated by the +Athenians they hastily set off, each for himself, to their own stations at +Messina and Rhegium, with the loss of one ship; night coming on before the +battle was finished. After this the Locrians retired from the Rhegian +territory, and the ships of the Syracusans and their allies united and came to +anchor at Cape Pelorus, in the territory of Messina, where their land forces +joined them. Here the Athenians and Rhegians sailed up, and seeing the ships +unmanned, made an attack, in which they in their turn lost one vessel, which +was caught by a grappling iron, the crew saving themselves by swimming. After +this the Syracusans got on board their ships, and while they were being towed +alongshore to Messina, were again attacked by the Athenians, but suddenly got +out to sea and became the assailants, and caused them to lose another vessel. +After thus holding their own in the voyage alongshore and in the engagement as +above described, the Syracusans sailed on into the harbour of Messina. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Athenians, having received warning that Camarina was about to be +betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, sailed thither; and the +Messinese took this opportunity to attack by sea and land with all their forces +their Chalcidian neighbour, Naxos. The first day they forced the Naxians to +keep their walls, and laid waste their country; the next they sailed round with +their ships, and laid waste their land on the river Akesines, while their land +forces menaced the city. Meanwhile the Sicels came down from the high country +in great numbers, to aid against the Messinese; and the Naxians, elated at the +sight, and animated by a belief that the Leontines and their other Hellenic +allies were coming to their support, suddenly sallied out from the town, and +attacked and routed the Messinese, killing more than a thousand of them; while +the remainder suffered severely in their retreat home, being attacked by the +barbarians on the road, and most of them cut off. The ships put in to Messina, +and afterwards dispersed for their different homes. The Leontines and their +allies, with the Athenians, upon this at once turned their arms against the now +weakened Messina, and attacked, the Athenians with their ships on the side of +the harbour, and the land forces on that of the town. The Messinese, however, +sallying out with Demoteles and some Locrians who had been left to garrison the +city after the disaster, suddenly attacked and routed most of the Leontine +army, killing a great number; upon seeing which the Athenians landed from their +ships, and falling on the Messinese in disorder chased them back into the town, +and setting up a trophy retired to Rhegium. After this the Hellenes in Sicily +continued to make war on each other by land, without the Athenians. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos were still besieging the Lacedaemonians in the +island, the Peloponnesian forces on the continent remaining where they were. +The blockade was very laborious for the Athenians from want of food and water; +there was no spring except one in the citadel of Pylos itself, and that not a +large one, and most of them were obliged to grub up the shingle on the sea +beach and drink such water as they could find. They also suffered from want of +room, being encamped in a narrow space; and as there was no anchorage for the +ships, some took their meals on shore in their turn, while the others were +anchored out at sea. But their greatest discouragement arose from the +unexpectedly long time which it took to reduce a body of men shut up in a +desert island, with only brackish water to drink, a matter which they had +imagined would take them only a few days. The fact was that the Lacedaemonians +had made advertisement for volunteers to carry into the island ground corn, +wine, cheese, and any other food useful in a siege; high prices being offered, +and freedom promised to any of the Helots who should succeed in doing so. The +Helots accordingly were most forward to engage in this risky traffic, putting +off from this or that part of Peloponnese, and running in by night on the +seaward side of the island. They were best pleased, however, when they could +catch a wind to carry them in. It was more easy to elude the look-out of the +galleys, when it blew from the seaward, as it became impossible for them to +anchor round the island; while the Helots had their boats rated at their value +in money, and ran them ashore, without caring how they landed, being sure to +find the soldiers waiting for them at the landing-places. But all who risked it +in fair weather were taken. Divers also swam in under water from the harbour, +dragging by a cord in skins poppyseed mixed with honey, and bruised linseed; +these at first escaped notice, but afterwards a look-out was kept for them. In +short, both sides tried every possible contrivance, the one to throw in +provisions, and the other to prevent their introduction. +</p> + +<p> +At Athens, meanwhile, the news that the army was in great distress, and that +corn found its way in to the men in the island, caused no small perplexity; and +the Athenians began to fear that winter might come on and find them still +engaged in the blockade. They saw that the convoying of provisions round +Peloponnese would be then impossible. The country offered no resources in +itself, and even in summer they could not send round enough. The blockade of a +place without harbours could no longer be kept up; and the men would either +escape by the siege being abandoned, or would watch for bad weather and sail +out in the boats that brought in their corn. What caused still more alarm was +the attitude of the Lacedaemonians, who must, it was thought by the Athenians, +feel themselves on strong ground not to send them any more envoys; and they +began to repent having rejected the treaty. Cleon, perceiving the disfavour +with which he was regarded for having stood in the way of the convention, now +said that their informants did not speak the truth; and upon the messengers +recommending them, if they did not believe them, to send some commissioners to +see, Cleon himself and Theagenes were chosen by the Athenians as commissioners. +Aware that he would now be obliged either to say what had been already said by +the men whom he was slandering, or be proved a liar if he said the contrary, he +told the Athenians, whom he saw to be not altogether disinclined for a fresh +expedition, that instead of sending and wasting their time and opportunities, +if they believed what was told them, they ought to sail against the men. And +pointing at Nicias, son of Niceratus, then general, whom he hated, he +tauntingly said that it would be easy, if they had men for generals, to sail +with a force and take those in the island, and that if he had himself been in +command, he would have done it. +</p> + +<p> +Nicias, seeing the Athenians murmuring against Cleon for not sailing now if it +seemed to him so easy, and further seeing himself the object of attack, told +him that for all that the generals cared, he might take what force he chose and +make the attempt. At first Cleon fancied that this resignation was merely a +figure of speech, and was ready to go, but finding that it was seriously meant, +he drew back, and said that Nicias, not he, was general, being now frightened, +and having never supposed that Nicias would go so far as to retire in his +favour. Nicias, however, repeated his offer, and resigned the command against +Pylos, and called the Athenians to witness that he did so. And as the multitude +is wont to do, the more Cleon shrank from the expedition and tried to back out +of what he had said, the more they encouraged Nicias to hand over his command, +and clamoured at Cleon to go. At last, not knowing how to get out of his words, +he undertook the expedition, and came forward and said that he was not afraid +of the Lacedaemonians, but would sail without taking any one from the city with +him, except the Lemnians and Imbrians that were at Athens, with some targeteers +that had come up from Aenus, and four hundred archers from other quarters. With +these and the soldiers at Pylos, he would within twenty days either bring the +Lacedaemonians alive, or kill them on the spot. The Athenians could not help +laughing at his fatuity, while sensible men comforted themselves with the +reflection that they must gain in either circumstance; either they would be rid +of Cleon, which they rather hoped, or if disappointed in this expectation, +would reduce the Lacedaemonians. +</p> + +<p> +After he had settled everything in the assembly, and the Athenians had voted +him the command of the expedition, he chose as his colleague Demosthenes, one +of the generals at Pylos, and pushed forward the preparations for his voyage. +His choice fell upon Demosthenes because he heard that he was contemplating a +descent on the island; the soldiers distressed by the difficulties of the +position, and rather besieged than besiegers, being eager to fight it out, +while the firing of the island had increased the confidence of the general. He +had been at first afraid, because the island having never been inhabited was +almost entirely covered with wood and without paths, thinking this to be in the +enemy’s favour, as he might land with a large force, and yet might suffer +loss by an attack from an unseen position. The mistakes and forces of the enemy +the wood would in a great measure conceal from him, while every blunder of his +own troops would be at once detected, and they would be thus able to fall upon +him unexpectedly just where they pleased, the attack being always in their +power. If, on the other hand, he should force them to engage in the thicket, +the smaller number who knew the country would, he thought, have the advantage +over the larger who were ignorant of it, while his own army might be cut off +imperceptibly, in spite of its numbers, as the men would not be able to see +where to succour each other. +</p> + +<p> +The Aetolian disaster, which had been mainly caused by the wood, had not a +little to do with these reflections. Meanwhile, one of the soldiers who were +compelled by want of room to land on the extremities of the island and take +their dinners, with outposts fixed to prevent a surprise, set fire to a little +of the wood without meaning to do so; and as it came on to blow soon +afterwards, almost the whole was consumed before they were aware of it. +Demosthenes was now able for the first time to see how numerous the +Lacedaemonians really were, having up to this moment been under the impression +that they took in provisions for a smaller number; he also saw that the +Athenians thought success important and were anxious about it, and that it was +now easier to land on the island, and accordingly got ready for the attempt, +sent for troops from the allies in the neighbourhood, and pushed forward his +other preparations. At this moment Cleon arrived at Pylos with the troops which +he had asked for, having sent on word to say that he was coming. The first step +taken by the two generals after their meeting was to send a herald to the camp +on the mainland, to ask if they were disposed to avoid all risk and to order +the men on the island to surrender themselves and their arms, to be kept in +gentle custody until some general convention should be concluded. +</p> + +<p> +On the rejection of this proposition the generals let one day pass, and the +next, embarking all their heavy infantry on board a few ships, put out by +night, and a little before dawn landed on both sides of the island from the +open sea and from the harbour, being about eight hundred strong, and advanced +with a run against the first post in the island. +</p> + +<p> +The enemy had distributed his force as follows: In this first post there were +about thirty heavy infantry; the centre and most level part, where the water +was, was held by the main body, and by Epitadas their commander; while a small +party guarded the very end of the island, towards Pylos, which was precipitous +on the sea-side and very difficult to attack from the land, and where there was +also a sort of old fort of stones rudely put together, which they thought might +be useful to them, in case they should be forced to retreat. Such was their +disposition. +</p> + +<p> +The advanced post thus attacked by the Athenians was at once put to the sword, +the men being scarcely out of bed and still arming, the landing having taken +them by surprise, as they fancied the ships were only sailing as usual to their +stations for the night. As soon as day broke, the rest of the army landed, that +is to say, all the crews of rather more than seventy ships, except the lowest +rank of oars, with the arms they carried, eight hundred archers, and as many +targeteers, the Messenian reinforcements, and all the other troops on duty +round Pylos, except the garrison on the fort. The tactics of Demosthenes had +divided them into companies of two hundred, more or less, and made them occupy +the highest points in order to paralyse the enemy by surrounding him on every +side and thus leaving him without any tangible adversary, exposed to the +cross-fire of their host; plied by those in his rear if he attacked in front, +and by those on one flank if he moved against those on the other. In short, +wherever he went he would have the assailants behind him, and these light-armed +assailants, the most awkward of all; arrows, darts, stones, and slings making +them formidable at a distance, and there being no means of getting at them at +close quarters, as they could conquer flying, and the moment their pursuer +turned they were upon him. Such was the idea that inspired Demosthenes in his +conception of the descent, and presided over its execution. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the main body of the troops in the island (that under Epitadas), +seeing their outpost cut off and an army advancing against them, serried their +ranks and pressed forward to close with the Athenian heavy infantry in front of +them, the light troops being upon their flanks and rear. However, they were not +able to engage or to profit by their superior skill, the light troops keeping +them in check on either side with their missiles, and the heavy infantry +remaining stationary instead of advancing to meet them; and although they +routed the light troops wherever they ran up and approached too closely, yet +they retreated fighting, being lightly equipped, and easily getting the start +in their flight, from the difficult and rugged nature of the ground, in an +island hitherto desert, over which the Lacedaemonians could not pursue them +with their heavy armour. +</p> + +<p> +After this skirmishing had lasted some little while, the Lacedaemonians became +unable to dash out with the same rapidity as before upon the points attacked, +and the light troops finding that they now fought with less vigour, became more +confident. They could see with their own eyes that they were many times more +numerous than the enemy; they were now more familiar with his aspect and found +him less terrible, the result not having justified the apprehensions which they +had suffered, when they first landed in slavish dismay at the idea of attacking +Lacedaemonians; and accordingly their fear changing to disdain, they now rushed +all together with loud shouts upon them, and pelted them with stones, darts, +and arrows, whichever came first to hand. The shouting accompanying their onset +confounded the Lacedaemonians, unaccustomed to this mode of fighting; dust rose +from the newly burnt wood, and it was impossible to see in front of one with +the arrows and stones flying through clouds of dust from the hands of numerous +assailants. The Lacedaemonians had now to sustain a rude conflict; their caps +would not keep out the arrows, darts had broken off in the armour of the +wounded, while they themselves were helpless for offence, being prevented from +using their eyes to see what was before them, and unable to hear the words of +command for the hubbub raised by the enemy; danger encompassed them on every +side, and there was no hope of any means of defence or safety. +</p> + +<p> +At last, after many had been already wounded in the confined space in which +they were fighting, they formed in close order and retired on the fort at the +end of the island, which was not far off, and to their friends who held it. The +moment they gave way, the light troops became bolder and pressed upon them, +shouting louder than ever, and killed as many as they came up with in their +retreat, but most of the Lacedaemonians made good their escape to the fort, and +with the garrison in it ranged themselves all along its whole extent to repulse +the enemy wherever it was assailable. The Athenians pursuing, unable to +surround and hem them in, owing to the strength of the ground, attacked them in +front and tried to storm the position. For a long time, indeed for most of the +day, both sides held out against all the torments of the battle, thirst, and +sun, the one endeavouring to drive the enemy from the high ground, the other to +maintain himself upon it, it being now more easy for the Lacedaemonians to +defend themselves than before, as they could not be surrounded on the flanks. +</p> + +<p> +The struggle began to seem endless, when the commander of the Messenians came +to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were losing their labour: but +if they would give him some archers and light troops to go round on the +enemy’s rear by a way he would undertake to find, he thought he could +force the approach. Upon receiving what he asked for, he started from a point +out of sight in order not to be seen by the enemy, and creeping on wherever the +precipices of the island permitted, and where the Lacedaemonians, trusting to +the strength of the ground, kept no guard, succeeded after the greatest +difficulty in getting round without their seeing him, and suddenly appeared on +the high ground in their rear, to the dismay of the surprised enemy and the +still greater joy of his expectant friends. The Lacedaemonians thus placed +between two fires, and in the same dilemma, to compare small things with great, +as at Thermopylae, where the defenders were cut off through the Persians +getting round by the path, being now attacked in front and behind, began to +give way, and overcome by the odds against them and exhausted from want of +food, retreated. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians were already masters of the approaches when Cleon and Demosthenes +perceiving that, if the enemy gave way a single step further, they would be +destroyed by their soldiery, put a stop to the battle and held their men back; +wishing to take the Lacedaemonians alive to Athens, and hoping that their +stubbornness might relax on hearing the offer of terms, and that they might +surrender and yield to the present overwhelming danger. Proclamation was +accordingly made, to know if they would surrender themselves and their arms to +the Athenians to be dealt at their discretion. +</p> + +<p> +The Lacedaemonians hearing this offer, most of them lowered their shields and +waved their hands to show that they accepted it. Hostilities now ceased, and a +parley was held between Cleon and Demosthenes and Styphon, son of Pharax, on +the other side; since Epitadas, the first of the previous commanders, had been +killed, and Hippagretas, the next in command, left for dead among the slain, +though still alive, and thus the command had devolved upon Styphon according to +the law, in case of anything happening to his superiors. Styphon and his +companions said they wished to send a herald to the Lacedaemonians on the +mainland, to know what they were to do. The Athenians would not let any of them +go, but themselves called for heralds from the mainland, and after questions +had been carried backwards and forwards two or three times, the last man that +passed over from the Lacedaemonians on the continent brought this message: +“The Lacedaemonians bid you to decide for yourselves so long as you do +nothing dishonourable”; upon which after consulting together they +surrendered themselves and their arms. The Athenians, after guarding them that +day and night, the next morning set up a trophy in the island, and got ready to +sail, giving their prisoners in batches to be guarded by the captains of the +galleys; and the Lacedaemonians sent a herald and took up their dead. The +number of the killed and prisoners taken in the island was as follows: four +hundred and twenty heavy infantry had passed over; three hundred all but eight +were taken alive to Athens; the rest were killed. About a hundred and twenty of +the prisoners were Spartans. The Athenian loss was small, the battle not having +been fought at close quarters. +</p> + +<p> +The blockade in all, counting from the fight at sea to the battle in the +island, had lasted seventy-two days. For twenty of these, during the absence of +the envoys sent to treat for peace, the men had provisions given them, for the +rest they were fed by the smugglers. Corn and other victual was found in the +island; the commander Epitadas having kept the men upon half rations. The +Athenians and Peloponnesians now each withdrew their forces from Pylos, and +went home, and crazy as Cleon’s promise was, he fulfilled it, by bringing +the men to Athens within the twenty days as he had pledged himself to do. +</p> + +<p> +Nothing that happened in the war surprised the Hellenes so much as this. It was +the opinion that no force or famine could make the Lacedaemonians give up their +arms, but that they would fight on as they could, and die with them in their +hands: indeed people could scarcely believe that those who had surrendered were +of the same stuff as the fallen; and an Athenian ally, who some time after +insultingly asked one of the prisoners from the island if those that had fallen +were men of honour, received for answer that the atraktos—that is, the +arrow—would be worth a great deal if it could tell men of honour from the +rest; in allusion to the fact that the killed were those whom the stones and +the arrows happened to hit. +</p> + +<p> +Upon the arrival of the men the Athenians determined to keep them in prison +until the peace, and if the Peloponnesians invaded their country in the +interval, to bring them out and put them to death. Meanwhile the defence of +Pylos was not forgotten; the Messenians from Naupactus sent to their old +country, to which Pylos formerly belonged, some of the likeliest of their +number, and began a series of incursions into Laconia, which their common +dialect rendered most destructive. The Lacedaemonians, hitherto without +experience of incursions or a warfare of the kind, finding the Helots +deserting, and fearing the march of revolution in their country, began to be +seriously uneasy, and in spite of their unwillingness to betray this to the +Athenians began to send envoys to Athens, and tried to recover Pylos and the +prisoners. The Athenians, however, kept grasping at more, and dismissed envoy +after envoy without their having effected anything. Such was the history of the +affair of Pylos. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0013" id="link2HCH0013"></a> +CHAPTER XIII </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Seventh and Eighth Years of the War—End of Corcyraean Revolution— +Peace of Gela—Capture of Nisaea +</p> + +<p> +The same summer, directly after these events, the Athenians made an expedition +against the territory of Corinth with eighty ships and two thousand Athenian +heavy infantry, and two hundred cavalry on board horse transports, accompanied +by the Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians from the allies, under the command +of Nicias, son of Niceratus, with two colleagues. Putting out to sea they made +land at daybreak between Chersonese and Rheitus, at the beach of the country +underneath the Solygian hill, upon which the Dorians in old times established +themselves and carried on war against the Aeolian inhabitants of Corinth, and +where a village now stands called Solygia. The beach where the fleet came to is +about a mile and a half from the village, seven miles from Corinth, and two and +a quarter from the Isthmus. The Corinthians had heard from Argos of the coming +of the Athenian armament, and had all come up to the Isthmus long before, with +the exception of those who lived beyond it, and also of five hundred who were +away in garrison in Ambracia and Leucadia; and they were there in full force +watching for the Athenians to land. These last, however, gave them the slip by +coming in the dark; and being informed by signals of the fact the Corinthians +left half their number at Cenchreae, in case the Athenians should go against +Crommyon, and marched in all haste to the rescue. +</p> + +<p> +Battus, one of the two generals present at the action, went with a company to +defend the village of Solygia, which was unfortified; Lycophron remaining to +give battle with the rest. The Corinthians first attacked the right wing of the +Athenians, which had just landed in front of Chersonese, and afterwards the +rest of the army. The battle was an obstinate one, and fought throughout hand +to hand. The right wing of the Athenians and Carystians, who had been placed at +the end of the line, received and with some difficulty repulsed the +Corinthians, who thereupon retreated to a wall upon the rising ground behind, +and throwing down the stones upon them, came on again singing the paean, and +being received by the Athenians, were again engaged at close quarters. At this +moment a Corinthian company having come to the relief of the left wing, routed +and pursued the Athenian right to the sea, whence they were in their turn +driven back by the Athenians and Carystians from the ships. Meanwhile the rest +of the army on either side fought on tenaciously, especially the right wing of +the Corinthians, where Lycophron sustained the attack of the Athenian left, +which it was feared might attempt the village of Solygia. +</p> + +<p> +After holding on for a long while without either giving way, the Athenians +aided by their horse, of which the enemy had none, at length routed the +Corinthians, who retired to the hill and, halting, remained quiet there, +without coming down again. It was in this rout of the right wing that they had +the most killed, Lycophron their general being among the number. The rest of +the army, broken and put to flight in this way without being seriously pursued +or hurried, retired to the high ground and there took up its position. The +Athenians, finding that the enemy no longer offered to engage them, stripped +his dead and took up their own and immediately set up a trophy. Meanwhile, the +half of the Corinthians left at Cenchreae to guard against the Athenians +sailing on Crommyon, although unable to see the battle for Mount Oneion, found +out what was going on by the dust, and hurried up to the rescue; as did also +the older Corinthians from the town, upon discovering what had occurred. The +Athenians seeing them all coming against them, and thinking that they were +reinforcements arriving from the neighbouring Peloponnesians, withdrew in haste +to their ships with their spoils and their own dead, except two that they left +behind, not being able to find them, and going on board crossed over to the +islands opposite, and from thence sent a herald, and took up under truce the +bodies which they had left behind. Two hundred and twelve Corinthians fell in +the battle, and rather less than fifty Athenians. +</p> + +<p> +Weighing from the islands, the Athenians sailed the same day to Crommyon in the +Corinthian territory, about thirteen miles from the city, and coming to anchor +laid waste the country, and passed the night there. The next day, after first +coasting along to the territory of Epidaurus and making a descent there, they +came to Methana between Epidaurus and Troezen, and drew a wall across and +fortified the isthmus of the peninsula, and left a post there from which +incursions were henceforth made upon the country of Troezen, Haliae, and +Epidaurus. After walling off this spot, the fleet sailed off home. +</p> + +<p> +While these events were going on, Eurymedon and Sophocles had put to sea with +the Athenian fleet from Pylos on their way to Sicily and, arriving at Corcyra, +joined the townsmen in an expedition against the party established on Mount +Istone, who had crossed over, as I have mentioned, after the revolution and +become masters of the country, to the great hurt of the inhabitants. Their +stronghold having been taken by an attack, the garrison took refuge in a body +upon some high ground and there capitulated, agreeing to give up their +mercenary auxiliaries, lay down their arms, and commit themselves to the +discretion of the Athenian people. The generals carried them across under truce +to the island of Ptychia, to be kept in custody until they could be sent to +Athens, upon the understanding that, if any were caught running away, all would +lose the benefit of the treaty. Meanwhile the leaders of the Corcyraean +commons, afraid that the Athenians might spare the lives of the prisoners, had +recourse to the following stratagem. They gained over some few men on the +island by secretly sending friends with instructions to provide them with a +boat, and to tell them, as if for their own sakes, that they had best escape as +quickly as possible, as the Athenian generals were going to give them up to the +Corcyraean people. +</p> + +<p> +These representations succeeding, it was so arranged that the men were caught +sailing out in the boat that was provided, and the treaty became void +accordingly, and the whole body were given up to the Corcyraeans. For this +result the Athenian generals were in a great measure responsible; their evident +disinclination to sail for Sicily, and thus to leave to others the honour of +conducting the men to Athens, encouraged the intriguers in their design and +seemed to affirm the truth of their representations. The prisoners thus handed +over were shut up by the Corcyraeans in a large building, and afterwards taken +out by twenties and led past two lines of heavy infantry, one on each side, +being bound together, and beaten and stabbed by the men in the lines whenever +any saw pass a personal enemy; while men carrying whips went by their side and +hastened on the road those that walked too slowly. +</p> + +<p> +As many as sixty men were taken out and killed in this way without the +knowledge of their friends in the building, who fancied they were merely being +moved from one prison to another. At last, however, someone opened their eyes +to the truth, upon which they called upon the Athenians to kill them +themselves, if such was their pleasure, and refused any longer to go out of the +building, and said they would do all they could to prevent any one coming in. +The Corcyraeans, not liking themselves to force a passage by the doors, got up +on the top of the building, and breaking through the roof, threw down the tiles +and let fly arrows at them, from which the prisoners sheltered themselves as +well as they could. Most of their number, meanwhile, were engaged in +dispatching themselves by thrusting into their throats the arrows shot by the +enemy, and hanging themselves with the cords taken from some beds that happened +to be there, and with strips made from their clothing; adopting, in short, +every possible means of self-destruction, and also falling victims to the +missiles of their enemies on the roof. Night came on while these horrors were +enacting, and most of it had passed before they were concluded. When it was day +the Corcyraeans threw them in layers upon wagons and carried them out of the +city. All the women taken in the stronghold were sold as slaves. In this way +the Corcyraeans of the mountain were destroyed by the commons; and so after +terrible excesses the party strife came to an end, at least as far as the +period of this war is concerned, for of one party there was practically nothing +left. Meanwhile the Athenians sailed off to Sicily, their primary destination, +and carried on the war with their allies there. +</p> + +<p> +At the close of the summer, the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians made +an expedition against Anactorium, the Corinthian town lying at the mouth of the +Ambracian Gulf, and took it by treachery; and the Acarnanians themselves, +sending settlers from all parts of Acarnania, occupied the place. +</p> + +<p> +Summer was now over. During the winter ensuing, Aristides, son of Archippus, +one of the commanders of the Athenian ships sent to collect money from the +allies, arrested at Eion, on the Strymon, Artaphernes, a Persian, on his way +from the King to Lacedaemon. He was conducted to Athens, where the Athenians +got his dispatches translated from the Assyrian character and read them. With +numerous references to other subjects, they in substance told the +Lacedaemonians that the King did not know what they wanted, as of the many +ambassadors they had sent him no two ever told the same story; if however they +were prepared to speak plainly they might send him some envoys with this +Persian. The Athenians afterwards sent back Artaphernes in a galley to Ephesus, +and ambassadors with him, who heard there of the death of King Artaxerxes, son +of Xerxes, which took place about that time, and so returned home. +</p> + +<p> +The same winter the Chians pulled down their new wall at the command of the +Athenians, who suspected them of meditating an insurrection, after first +however obtaining pledges from the Athenians, and security as far as this was +possible for their continuing to treat them as before. Thus the winter ended, +and with it ended the seventh year of this war of which Thucydides is the +historian. +</p> + +<p> +In first days of the next summer there was an eclipse of the sun at the time of +new moon, and in the early part of the same month an earthquake. Meanwhile, the +Mitylenian and other Lesbian exiles set out, for the most part from the +continent, with mercenaries hired in Peloponnese, and others levied on the +spot, and took Rhoeteum, but restored it without injury on the receipt of two +thousand Phocaean staters. After this they marched against Antandrus and took +the town by treachery, their plan being to free Antandrus and the rest of the +Actaean towns, formerly owned by Mitylene but now held by the Athenians. Once +fortified there, they would have every facility for ship-building from the +vicinity of Ida and the consequent abundance of timber, and plenty of other +supplies, and might from this base easily ravage Lesbos, which was not far off, +and make themselves masters of the Aeolian towns on the continent. +</p> + +<p> +While these were the schemes of the exiles, the Athenians in the same summer +made an expedition with sixty ships, two thousand heavy infantry, a few +cavalry, and some allied troops from Miletus and other parts, against Cythera, +under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, Nicostratus, son of Diotrephes, +and Autocles, son of Tolmaeus. Cythera is an island lying off Laconia, opposite +Malea; the inhabitants are Lacedaemonians of the class of the Perioeci; and an +officer called the judge of Cythera went over to the place annually from +Sparta. A garrison of heavy infantry was also regularly sent there, and great +attention paid to the island, as it was the landing-place for the merchantmen +from Egypt and Libya, and at the same time secured Laconia from the attacks of +privateers from the sea, at the only point where it is assailable, as the whole +coast rises abruptly towards the Sicilian and Cretan seas. +</p> + +<p> +Coming to land here with their armament, the Athenians with ten ships and two +thousand Milesian heavy infantry took the town of Scandea, on the sea; and with +the rest of their forces landing on the side of the island looking towards +Malea, went against the lower town of Cythera, where they found all the +inhabitants encamped. A battle ensuing, the Cytherians held their ground for +some little while, and then turned and fled into the upper town, where they +soon afterwards capitulated to Nicias and his colleagues, agreeing to leave +their fate to the decision of the Athenians, their lives only being safe. A +correspondence had previously been going on between Nicias and certain of the +inhabitants, which caused the surrender to be effected more speedily, and upon +terms more advantageous, present and future, for the Cytherians; who would +otherwise have been expelled by the Athenians on account of their being +Lacedaemonians and their island being so near to Laconia. After the +capitulation, the Athenians occupied the town of Scandea near the harbour, and +appointing a garrison for Cythera, sailed to Asine, Helus, and most of the +places on the sea, and making descents and passing the night on shore at such +spots as were convenient, continued ravaging the country for about seven days. +</p> + +<p> +The Lacedaemonians seeing the Athenians masters of Cythera, and expecting +descents of the kind upon their coasts, nowhere opposed them in force, but sent +garrisons here and there through the country, consisting of as many heavy +infantry as the points menaced seemed to require, and generally stood very much +upon the defensive. After the severe and unexpected blow that had befallen them +in the island, the occupation of Pylos and Cythera, and the apparition on every +side of a war whose rapidity defied precaution, they lived in constant fear of +internal revolution, and now took the unusual step of raising four hundred +horse and a force of archers, and became more timid than ever in military +matters, finding themselves involved in a maritime struggle, which their +organization had never contemplated, and that against Athenians, with whom an +enterprise unattempted was always looked upon as a success sacrificed. Besides +this, their late numerous reverses of fortune, coming close one upon another +without any reason, had thoroughly unnerved them, and they were always afraid +of a second disaster like that on the island, and thus scarcely dared to take +the field, but fancied that they could not stir without a blunder, for being +new to the experience of adversity they had lost all confidence in themselves. +</p> + +<p> +Accordingly they now allowed the Athenians to ravage their seaboard, without +making any movement, the garrisons in whose neighbourhood the descents were +made always thinking their numbers insufficient, and sharing the general +feeling. A single garrison which ventured to resist, near Cotyrta and +Aphrodisia, struck terror by its charge into the scattered mob of light troops, +but retreated, upon being received by the heavy infantry, with the loss of a +few men and some arms, for which the Athenians set up a trophy, and then sailed +off to Cythera. From thence they sailed round to Epidaurus Limera, ravaged part +of the country, and so came to Thyrea in the Cynurian territory, upon the +Argive and Laconian border. This district had been given by its Lacedaemonian +owners to the expelled Aeginetans to inhabit, in return for their good offices +at the time of the earthquake and the rising of the Helots; and also because, +although subjects of Athens, they had always sided with Lacedaemon. +</p> + +<p> +While the Athenians were still at sea, the Aeginetans evacuated a fort which +they were building upon the coast, and retreated into the upper town where they +lived, rather more than a mile from the sea. One of the Lacedaemonian district +garrisons which was helping them in the work, refused to enter here with them +at their entreaty, thinking it dangerous to shut themselves up within the wall, +and retiring to the high ground remained quiet, not considering themselves a +match for the enemy. Meanwhile the Athenians landed, and instantly advanced +with all their forces and took Thyrea. The town they burnt, pillaging what was +in it; the Aeginetans who were not slain in action they took with them to +Athens, with Tantalus, son of Patrocles, their Lacedaemonian commander, who had +been wounded and taken prisoner. They also took with them a few men from +Cythera whom they thought it safest to remove. These the Athenians determined +to lodge in the islands: the rest of the Cytherians were to retain their lands +and pay four talents tribute; the Aeginetans captured to be all put to death, +on account of the old inveterate feud; and Tantalus to share the imprisonment +of the Lacedaemonians taken on the island. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer, the inhabitants of Camarina and Gela in Sicily first made an +armistice with each other, after which embassies from all the other Sicilian +cities assembled at Gela to try to bring about a pacification. After many +expressions of opinion on one side and the other, according to the griefs and +pretensions of the different parties complaining, Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a +Syracusan, the most influential man among them, addressed the following words +to the assembly: +</p> + +<p> +“If I now address you, Sicilians, it is not because my city is the least +in Sicily or the greatest sufferer by the war, but in order to state publicly +what appears to me to be the best policy for the whole island. That war is an +evil is a proposition so familiar to every one that it would be tedious to +develop it. No one is forced to engage in it by ignorance, or kept out of it by +fear, if he fancies there is anything to be gained by it. To the former the +gain appears greater than the danger, while the latter would rather stand the +risk than put up with any immediate sacrifice. But if both should happen to +have chosen the wrong moment for acting in this way, advice to make peace would +not be unserviceable; and this, if we did but see it, is just what we stand +most in need of at the present juncture. +</p> + +<p> +“I suppose that no one will dispute that we went to war at first in order +to serve our own several interests, that we are now, in view of the same +interests, debating how we can make peace; and that if we separate without +having as we think our rights, we shall go to war again. And yet, as men of +sense, we ought to see that our separate interests are not alone at stake in +the present congress: there is also the question whether we have still time to +save Sicily, the whole of which in my opinion is menaced by Athenian ambition; +and we ought to find in the name of that people more imperious arguments for +peace than any which I can advance, when we see the first power in Hellas +watching our mistakes with the few ships that she has at present in our waters, +and under the fair name of alliance speciously seeking to turn to account the +natural hostility that exists between us. If we go to war, and call in to help +us a people that are ready enough to carry their arms even where they are not +invited; and if we injure ourselves at our own expense, and at the same time +serve as the pioneers of their dominion, we may expect, when they see us worn +out, that they will one day come with a larger armament, and seek to bring all +of us into subjection. +</p> + +<p> +“And yet as sensible men, if we call in allies and court danger, it +should be in order to enrich our different countries with new acquisitions, and +not to ruin what they possess already; and we should understand that the +intestine discords which are so fatal to communities generally, will be equally +so to Sicily, if we, its inhabitants, absorbed in our local quarrels, neglect +the common enemy. These considerations should reconcile individual with +individual, and city with city, and unite us in a common effort to save the +whole of Sicily. Nor should any one imagine that the Dorians only are enemies +of Athens, while the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian blood; the attack +in question is not inspired by hatred of one of two nationalities, but by a +desire for the good things in Sicily, the common property of us all. This is +proved by the Athenian reception of the Chalcidian invitation: an ally who has +never given them any assistance whatever, at once receives from them almost +more than the treaty entitles him to. That the Athenians should cherish this +ambition and practise this policy is very excusable; and I do not blame those +who wish to rule, but those who are over-ready to serve. It is just as much in +men’s nature to rule those who submit to them, as it is to resist those +who molest them; one is not less invariable than the other. Meanwhile all who +see these dangers and refuse to provide for them properly, or who have come +here without having made up their minds that our first duty is to unite to get +rid of the common peril, are mistaken. The quickest way to be rid of it is to +make peace with each other; since the Athenians menace us not from their own +country, but from that of those who invited them here. In this way instead of +war issuing in war, peace quietly ends our quarrels; and the guests who come +hither under fair pretences for bad ends, will have good reason for going away +without having attained them. +</p> + +<p> +“So far as regards the Athenians, such are the great advantages proved +inherent in a wise policy. Independently of this, in the face of the universal +consent, that peace is the first of blessings, how can we refuse to make it +amongst ourselves; or do you not think that the good which you have, and the +ills that you complain of, would be better preserved and cured by quiet than by +war; that peace has its honours and splendours of a less perilous kind, not to +mention the numerous other blessings that one might dilate on, with the not +less numerous miseries of war? These considerations should teach you not to +disregard my words, but rather to look in them every one for his own safety. If +there be any here who feels certain either by right or might to effect his +object, let not this surprise be to him too severe a disappointment. Let him +remember that many before now have tried to chastise a wrongdoer, and failing +to punish their enemy have not even saved themselves; while many who have +trusted in force to gain an advantage, instead of gaining anything more, have +been doomed to lose what they had. Vengeance is not necessarily successful +because wrong has been done, or strength sure because it is confident; but the +incalculable element in the future exercises the widest influence, and is the +most treacherous, and yet in fact the most useful of all things, as it +frightens us all equally, and thus makes us consider before attacking each +other. +</p> + +<p> +“Let us therefore now allow the undefined fear of this unknown future, +and the immediate terror of the Athenians’ presence, to produce their +natural impression, and let us consider any failure to carry out the programmes +that we may each have sketched out for ourselves as sufficiently accounted for +by these obstacles, and send away the intruder from the country; and if +everlasting peace be impossible between us, let us at all events make a treaty +for as long a term as possible, and put off our private differences to another +day. In fine, let us recognize that the adoption of my advice will leave us +each citizens of a free state, and as such arbiters of our own destiny, able to +return good or bad offices with equal effect; while its rejection will make us +dependent on others, and thus not only impotent to repel an insult, but on the +most favourable supposition, friends to our direst enemies, and at feud with +our natural friends. +</p> + +<p> +“For myself, though, as I said at first, the representative of a great +city, and able to think less of defending myself than of attacking others, I am +prepared to concede something in prevision of these dangers. I am not inclined +to ruin myself for the sake of hurting my enemies, or so blinded by animosity +as to think myself equally master of my own plans and of fortune which I cannot +command; but I am ready to give up anything in reason. I call upon the rest of +you to imitate my conduct of your own free will, without being forced to do so +by the enemy. There is no disgrace in connections giving way to one another, a +Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to his brethren; above and beyond this we +are neighbours, live in the same country, are girt by the same sea, and go by +the same name of Sicilians. We shall go to war again, I suppose, when the time +comes, and again make peace among ourselves by means of future congresses; but +the foreign invader, if we are wise, will always find us united against him, +since the hurt of one is the danger of all; and we shall never, in future, +invite into the island either allies or mediators. By so acting we shall at the +present moment do for Sicily a double service, ridding her at once of the +Athenians, and of civil war, and in future shall live in freedom at home, and +be less menaced from abroad.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of Hermocrates. The Sicilians took his advice, and came to +an understanding among themselves to end the war, each keeping what they +had—the Camarinaeans taking Morgantina at a price fixed to be paid to the +Syracusans—and the allies of the Athenians called the officers in +command, and told them that they were going to make peace and that they would +be included in the treaty. The generals assenting, the peace was concluded, and +the Athenian fleet afterwards sailed away from Sicily. Upon their arrival at +Athens, the Athenians banished Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined Eurymedon +for having taken bribes to depart when they might have subdued Sicily. So +thoroughly had the present prosperity persuaded the citizens that nothing could +withstand them, and that they could achieve what was possible and impracticable +alike, with means ample or inadequate it mattered not. The secret of this was +their general extraordinary success, which made them confuse their strength +with their hopes. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer the Megarians in the city, pressed by the hostilities of the +Athenians, who invaded their country twice every year with all their forces, +and harassed by the incursions of their own exiles at Pegae, who had been +expelled in a revolution by the popular party, began to ask each other whether +it would not be better to receive back their exiles, and free the town from one +of its two scourges. The friends of the emigrants, perceiving the agitation, +now more openly than before demanded the adoption of this proposition; and the +leaders of the commons, seeing that the sufferings of the times had tired out +the constancy of their supporters, entered in their alarm into correspondence +with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates, son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes, son +of Alcisthenes, and resolved to betray the town, thinking this less dangerous +to themselves than the return of the party which they had banished. It was +accordingly arranged that the Athenians should first take the long walls +extending for nearly a mile from the city to the port of Nisaea, to prevent the +Peloponnesians coming to the rescue from that place, where they formed the sole +garrison to secure the fidelity of Megara; and that after this the attempt +should be made to put into their hands the upper town, which it was thought +would then come over with less difficulty. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians, after plans had been arranged between themselves and their +correspondents both as to words and actions, sailed by night to Minoa, the +island off Megara, with six hundred heavy infantry under the command of +Hippocrates, and took post in a quarry not far off, out of which bricks used to +be taken for the walls; while Demosthenes, the other commander, with a +detachment of Plataean light troops and another of Peripoli, placed himself in +ambush in the precinct of Enyalius, which was still nearer. No one knew of it, +except those whose business it was to know that night. A little before +daybreak, the traitors in Megara began to act. Every night for a long time +back, under pretence of marauding, in order to have a means of opening the +gates, they had been used, with the consent of the officer in command, to carry +by night a sculling boat upon a cart along the ditch to the sea, and so to sail +out, bringing it back again before day upon the cart, and taking it within the +wall through the gates, in order, as they pretended, to baffle the Athenian +blockade at Minoa, there being no boat to be seen in the harbour. On the +present occasion the cart was already at the gates, which had been opened in +the usual way for the boat, when the Athenians, with whom this had been +concerted, saw it, and ran at the top of their speed from the ambush in order +to reach the gates before they were shut again, and while the cart was still +there to prevent their being closed; their Megarian accomplices at the same +moment killing the guard at the gates. The first to run in was Demosthenes with +his Plataeans and Peripoli, just where the trophy now stands; and he was no +sooner within the gates than the Plataeans engaged and defeated the nearest +party of Peloponnesians who had taken the alarm and come to the rescue, and +secured the gates for the approaching Athenian heavy infantry. +</p> + +<p> +After this, each of the Athenians as fast as they entered went against the +wall. A few of the Peloponnesian garrison stood their ground at first, and +tried to repel the assault, and some of them were killed; but the main body +took fright and fled; the night attack and the sight of the Megarian traitors +in arms against them making them think that all Megara had gone over to the +enemy. It so happened also that the Athenian herald of his own idea called out +and invited any of the Megarians that wished, to join the Athenian ranks; and +this was no sooner heard by the garrison than they gave way, and, convinced +that they were the victims of a concerted attack, took refuge in Nisaea. By +daybreak, the walls being now taken and the Megarians in the city in great +agitation, the persons who had negotiated with the Athenians, supported by the +rest of the popular party which was privy to the plot, said that they ought to +open the gates and march out to battle. It had been concerted between them that +the Athenians should rush in, the moment that the gates were opened, while the +conspirators were to be distinguished from the rest by being anointed with oil, +and so to avoid being hurt. They could open the gates with more security, as +four thousand Athenian heavy infantry from Eleusis, and six hundred horse, had +marched all night, according to agreement, and were now close at hand. The +conspirators were all ready anointed and at their posts by the gates, when one +of their accomplices denounced the plot to the opposite party, who gathered +together and came in a body, and roundly said that they must not march +out—a thing they had never yet ventured on even when in greater force +than at present—or wantonly compromise the safety of the town, and that +if what they said was not attended to, the battle would have to be fought in +Megara. For the rest, they gave no signs of their knowledge of the intrigue, +but stoutly maintained that their advice was the best, and meanwhile kept close +by and watched the gates, making it impossible for the conspirators to effect +their purpose. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenian generals seeing that some obstacle had arisen, and that the +capture of the town by force was no longer practicable, at once proceeded to +invest Nisaea, thinking that, if they could take it before relief arrived, the +surrender of Megara would soon follow. Iron, stone-masons, and everything else +required quickly coming up from Athens, the Athenians started from the wall +which they occupied, and from this point built a cross wall looking towards +Megara down to the sea on either side of Nisaea; the ditch and the walls being +divided among the army, stones and bricks taken from the suburb, and the +fruit-trees and timber cut down to make a palisade wherever this seemed +necessary; the houses also in the suburb with the addition of battlements +sometimes entering into the fortification. The whole of this day the work +continued, and by the afternoon of the next the wall was all but completed, +when the garrison in Nisaea, alarmed by the absolute want of provisions, which +they used to take in for the day from the upper town, not anticipating any +speedy relief from the Peloponnesians, and supposing Megara to be hostile, +capitulated to the Athenians on condition that they should give up their arms, +and should each be ransomed for a stipulated sum; their Lacedaemonian +commander, and any others of his countrymen in the place, being left to the +discretion of the Athenians. On these conditions they surrendered and came out, +and the Athenians broke down the long walls at their point of junction with +Megara, took possession of Nisaea, and went on with their other preparations. +</p> + +<p> +Just at this time the Lacedaemonian Brasidas, son of Tellis, happened to be in +the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, getting ready an army for Thrace. As +soon as he heard of the capture of the walls, fearing for the Peloponnesians in +Nisaea and the safety of Megara, he sent to the Boeotians to meet him as +quickly as possible at Tripodiscus, a village so called of the Megarid, under +Mount Geraneia, and went himself, with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian +heavy infantry, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and such +troops of his own as he had already levied, expecting to find Nisaea not yet +taken. Hearing of its fall (he had marched out by night to Tripodiscus), he +took three hundred picked men from the army, without waiting till his coming +should be known, and came up to Megara unobserved by the Athenians, who were +down by the sea, ostensibly, and really if possible, to attempt Nisaea, but +above all to get into Megara and secure the town. He accordingly invited the +townspeople to admit his party, saying that he had hopes of recovering Nisaea. +</p> + +<p> +However, one of the Megarian factions feared that he might expel them and +restore the exiles; the other that the commons, apprehensive of this very +danger, might set upon them, and the city be thus destroyed by a battle within +its gates under the eyes of the ambushed Athenians. He was accordingly refused +admittance, both parties electing to remain quiet and await the event; each +expecting a battle between the Athenians and the relieving army, and thinking +it safer to see their friends victorious before declaring in their favour. +</p> + +<p> +Unable to carry his point, Brasidas went back to the rest of the army. At +daybreak the Boeotians joined him. Having determined to relieve Megara, whose +danger they considered their own, even before hearing from Brasidas, they were +already in full force at Plataea, when his messenger arrived to add spurs to +their resolution; and they at once sent on to him two thousand two hundred +heavy infantry, and six hundred horse, returning home with the main body. The +whole army thus assembled numbered six thousand heavy infantry. The Athenian +heavy infantry were drawn up by Nisaea and the sea; but the light troops being +scattered over the plain were attacked by the Boeotian horse and driven to the +sea, being taken entirely by surprise, as on previous occasions no relief had +ever come to the Megarians from any quarter. Here the Boeotians were in their +turn charged and engaged by the Athenian horse, and a cavalry action ensued +which lasted a long time, and in which both parties claimed the victory. The +Athenians killed and stripped the leader of the Boeotian horse and some few of +his comrades who had charged right up to Nisaea, and remaining masters of the +bodies gave them back under truce, and set up a trophy; but regarding the +action as a whole the forces separated without either side having gained a +decisive advantage, the Boeotians returning to their army and the Athenians to +Nisaea. +</p> + +<p> +After this Brasidas and the army came nearer to the sea and to Megara, and +taking up a convenient position, remained quiet in order of battle, expecting +to be attacked by the Athenians and knowing that the Megarians were waiting to +see which would be the victor. This attitude seemed to present two advantages. +Without taking the offensive or willingly provoking the hazards of a battle, +they openly showed their readiness to fight, and thus without bearing the +burden of the day would fairly reap its honours; while at the same time they +effectually served their interests at Megara. For if they had failed to show +themselves they would not have had a chance, but would have certainly been +considered vanquished, and have lost the town. As it was, the Athenians might +possibly not be inclined to accept their challenge, and their object would be +attained without fighting. And so it turned out. The Athenians formed outside +the long walls and, the enemy not attacking, there remained motionless; their +generals having decided that the risk was too unequal. In fact most of their +objects had been already attained; and they would have to begin a battle +against superior numbers, and if victorious could only gain Megara, while a +defeat would destroy the flower of their heavy soldiery. For the enemy it was +different; as even the states actually represented in his army risked each only +a part of its entire force, he might well be more audacious. Accordingly, after +waiting for some time without either side attacking, the Athenians withdrew to +Nisaea, and the Peloponnesians after them to the point from which they had set +out. The friends of the Megarian exiles now threw aside their hesitation, and +opened the gates to Brasidas and the commanders from the different +states—looking upon him as the victor and upon the Athenians as having +declined the battle—and receiving them into the town proceeded to discuss +matters with them; the party in correspondence with the Athenians being +paralysed by the turn things had taken. +</p> + +<p> +Afterwards Brasidas let the allies go home, and himself went back to Corinth, +to prepare for his expedition to Thrace, his original destination. The +Athenians also returning home, the Megarians in the city most implicated in the +Athenian negotiation, knowing that they had been detected, presently +disappeared; while the rest conferred with the friends of the exiles, and +restored the party at Pegae, after binding them under solemn oaths to take no +vengeance for the past, and only to consult the real interests of the town. +However, as soon as they were in office, they held a review of the heavy +infantry, and separating the battalions, picked out about a hundred of their +enemies, and of those who were thought to be most involved in the +correspondence with the Athenians, brought them before the people, and +compelling the vote to be given openly, had them condemned and executed, and +established a close oligarchy in the town—a revolution which lasted a +very long while, although effected by a very few partisans. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0014" id="link2HCH0014"></a> +CHAPTER XIV </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Eighth and Ninth Years of the War—Invasion of Boeotia—Fall of +Amphipolis—Brilliant Successes of Brasidas +</p> + +<p> +The same summer the Mitylenians were about to fortify Antandrus, as they had +intended, when Demodocus and Aristides, the commanders of the Athenian squadron +engaged in levying subsidies, heard on the Hellespont of what was being done to +the place (Lamachus their colleague having sailed with ten ships into the +Pontus) and conceived fears of its becoming a second Anaia-the place in which +the Samian exiles had established themselves to annoy Samos, helping the +Peloponnesians by sending pilots to their navy, and keeping the city in +agitation and receiving all its outlaws. They accordingly got together a force +from the allies and set sail, defeated in battle the troops that met them from +Antandrus, and retook the place. Not long after, Lamachus, who had sailed into +the Pontus, lost his ships at anchor in the river Calex, in the territory of +Heraclea, rain having fallen in the interior and the flood coming suddenly down +upon them; and himself and his troops passed by land through the Bithynian +Thracians on the Asiatic side, and arrived at Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at +the mouth of the Pontus. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer the Athenian general, Demosthenes, arrived at Naupactus with +forty ships immediately after the return from the Megarid. Hippocrates and +himself had had overtures made to them by certain men in the cities in Boeotia, +who wished to change the constitution and introduce a democracy as at Athens; +Ptoeodorus, a Theban exile, being the chief mover in this intrigue. The seaport +town of Siphae, in the bay of Crisae, in the Thespian territory, was to be +betrayed to them by one party; Chaeronea (a dependency of what was formerly +called the Minyan, now the Boeotian, Orchomenus) to be put into their hands by +another from that town, whose exiles were very active in the business, hiring +men in Peloponnese. Some Phocians also were in the plot, Chaeronea being the +frontier town of Boeotia and close to Phanotis in Phocia. Meanwhile the +Athenians were to seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the territory of +Tanagra looking towards Euboea; and all these events were to take place +simultaneously upon a day appointed, in order that the Boeotians might be +unable to unite to oppose them at Delium, being everywhere detained by +disturbances at home. Should the enterprise succeed, and Delium be fortified, +its authors confidently expected that even if no revolution should immediately +follow in Boeotia, yet with these places in their hands, and the country being +harassed by incursions, and a refuge in each instance near for the partisans +engaged in them, things would not remain as they were, but that the rebels +being supported by the Athenians and the forces of the oligarchs divided, it +would be possible after a while to settle matters according to their wishes. +</p> + +<p> +Such was the plot in contemplation. Hippocrates with a force raised at home +awaited the proper moment to take the field against the Boeotians; while he +sent on Demosthenes with the forty ships above mentioned to Naupactus, to raise +in those parts an army of Acarnanians and of the other allies, and sail and +receive Siphae from the conspirators; a day having been agreed on for the +simultaneous execution of both these operations. Demosthenes on his arrival +found Oeniadae already compelled by the united Acarnanians to join the Athenian +confederacy, and himself raising all the allies in those countries marched +against and subdued Salynthius and the Agraeans; after which he devoted himself +to the preparations necessary to enable him to be at Siphae by the time +appointed. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time in the summer, Brasidas set out on his march for the +Thracian places with seventeen hundred heavy infantry, and arriving at Heraclea +in Trachis, from thence sent on a messenger to his friends at Pharsalus, to ask +them to conduct himself and his army through the country. Accordingly there +came to Melitia in Achaia Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and +Strophacus, the Chalcidian proxenus, under whose escort he resumed his march, +being accompanied also by other Thessalians, among whom was Niconidas from +Larissa, a friend of Perdiccas. It was never very easy to traverse Thessaly +without an escort; and throughout all Hellas for an armed force to pass without +leave through a neighbour’s country was a delicate step to take. Besides +this the Thessalian people had always sympathized with the Athenians. Indeed if +instead of the customary close oligarchy there had been a constitutional +government in Thessaly, he would never have been able to proceed; since even as +it was, he was met on his march at the river Enipeus by certain of the opposite +party who forbade his further progress, and complained of his making the +attempt without the consent of the nation. To this his escort answered that +they had no intention of taking him through against their will; they were only +friends in attendance on an unexpected visitor. Brasidas himself added that he +came as a friend to Thessaly and its inhabitants, his arms not being directed +against them but against the Athenians, with whom he was at war, and that +although he knew of no quarrel between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians to +prevent the two nations having access to each other’s territory, he +neither would nor could proceed against their wishes; he could only beg them +not to stop him. With this answer they went away, and he took the advice of his +escort, and pushed on without halting, before a greater force might gather to +prevent him. Thus in the day that he set out from Melitia he performed the +whole distance to Pharsalus, and encamped on the river Apidanus; and so to +Phacium and from thence to Perrhaebia. Here his Thessalian escort went back, +and the Perrhaebians, who are subjects of Thessaly, set him down at Dium in the +dominions of Perdiccas, a Macedonian town under Mount Olympus, looking towards +Thessaly. +</p> + +<p> +In this way Brasidas hurried through Thessaly before any one could be got ready +to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice. The departure of the army +from Peloponnese had been procured by the Thracian towns in revolt against +Athens and by Perdiccas, alarmed at the successes of the Athenians. The +Chalcidians thought that they would be the first objects of an Athenian +expedition, not that the neighbouring towns which had not yet revolted did not +also secretly join in the invitation; and Perdiccas also had his apprehensions +on account of his old quarrels with the Athenians, although not openly at war +with them, and above all wished to reduce Arrhabaeus, king of the Lyncestians. +It had been less difficult for them to get an army to leave Peloponnese, +because of the ill fortune of the Lacedaemonians at the present moment. The +attacks of the Athenians upon Peloponnese, and in particular upon Laconia, +might, it was hoped, be diverted most effectually by annoying them in return, +and by sending an army to their allies, especially as they were willing to +maintain it and asked for it to aid them in revolting. The Lacedaemonians were +also glad to have an excuse for sending some of the Helots out of the country, +for fear that the present aspect of affairs and the occupation of Pylos might +encourage them to move. Indeed fear of their numbers and obstinacy even +persuaded the Lacedaemonians to the action which I shall now relate, their +policy at all times having been governed by the necessity of taking precautions +against them. The Helots were invited by a proclamation to pick out those of +their number who claimed to have most distinguished themselves against the +enemy, in order that they might receive their freedom; the object being to test +them, as it was thought that the first to claim their freedom would be the most +high-spirited and the most apt to rebel. As many as two thousand were selected +accordingly, who crowned themselves and went round the temples, rejoicing in +their new freedom. The Spartans, however, soon afterwards did away with them, +and no one ever knew how each of them perished. The Spartans now therefore +gladly sent seven hundred as heavy infantry with Brasidas, who recruited the +rest of his force by means of money in Peloponnese. +</p> + +<p> +Brasidas himself was sent out by the Lacedaemonians mainly at his own desire, +although the Chalcidians also were eager to have a man so thorough as he had +shown himself whenever there was anything to be done at Sparta, and whose +after-service abroad proved of the utmost use to his country. At the present +moment his just and moderate conduct towards the towns generally succeeded in +procuring their revolt, besides the places which he managed to take by +treachery; and thus when the Lacedaemonians desired to treat, as they +ultimately did, they had places to offer in exchange, and the burden of war +meanwhile shifted from Peloponnese. Later on in the war, after the events in +Sicily, the present valour and conduct of Brasidas, known by experience to +some, by hearsay to others, was what mainly created in the allies of Athens a +feeling for the Lacedaemonians. He was the first who went out and showed +himself so good a man at all points as to leave behind him the conviction that +the rest were like him. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile his arrival in the Thracian country no sooner became known to the +Athenians than they declared war against Perdiccas, whom they regarded as the +author of the expedition, and kept a closer watch on their allies in that +quarter. +</p> + +<p> +Upon the arrival of Brasidas and his army, Perdiccas immediately started with +them and with his own forces against Arrhabaeus, son of Bromerus, king of the +Lyncestian Macedonians, his neighbour, with whom he had a quarrel and whom he +wished to subdue. However, when he arrived with his army and Brasidas at the +pass leading into Lyncus, Brasidas told him that before commencing hostilities +he wished to go and try to persuade Arrhabaeus to become the ally of +Lacedaemon, this latter having already made overtures intimating his +willingness to make Brasidas arbitrator between them, and the Chalcidian envoys +accompanying him having warned him not to remove the apprehensions of +Perdiccas, in order to ensure his greater zeal in their cause. Besides, the +envoys of Perdiccas had talked at Lacedaemon about his bringing many of the +places round him into alliance with them; and thus Brasidas thought he might +take a larger view of the question of Arrhabaeus. Perdiccas however retorted +that he had not brought him with him to arbitrate in their quarrel, but to put +down the enemies whom he might point out to him; and that while he, Perdiccas, +maintained half his army it was a breach of faith for Brasidas to parley with +Arrhabaeus. Nevertheless Brasidas disregarded the wishes of Perdiccas and held +the parley in spite of him, and suffered himself to be persuaded to lead off +the army without invading the country of Arrhabaeus; after which Perdiccas, +holding that faith had not been kept with him, contributed only a third instead +of half of the support of the army. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer, without loss of time, Brasidas marched with the Chalcidians +against Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians, a little before vintage. The +inhabitants were divided into two parties on the question of receiving him; +those who had joined the Chalcidians in inviting him, and the popular party. +However, fear for their fruit, which was still out, enabled Brasidas to +persuade the multitude to admit him alone, and to hear what he had to say +before making a decision; and he was admitted accordingly and appeared before +the people, and not being a bad speaker for a Lacedaemonian, addressed them as +follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Acanthians, the Lacedaemonians have sent out me and my army to make good +the reason that we gave for the war when we began it, viz., that we were going +to war with the Athenians in order to free Hellas. Our delay in coming has been +caused by mistaken expectations as to the war at home, which led us to hope, by +our own unassisted efforts and without your risking anything, to effect the +speedy downfall of the Athenians; and you must not blame us for this, as we are +now come the moment that we were able, prepared with your aid to do our best to +subdue them. Meanwhile I am astonished at finding your gates shut against me, +and at not meeting with a better welcome. We Lacedaemonians thought of you as +allies eager to have us, to whom we should come in spirit even before we were +with you in body; and in this expectation undertook all the risks of a march of +many days through a strange country, so far did our zeal carry us. It will be a +terrible thing if after this you have other intentions, and mean to stand in +the way of your own and Hellenic freedom. It is not merely that you oppose me +yourselves; but wherever I may go people will be less inclined to join me, on +the score that you, to whom I first came—an important town like Acanthus, +and prudent men like the Acanthians—refused to admit me. I shall have +nothing to prove that the reason which I advance is the true one; it will be +said either that there is something unfair in the freedom which I offer, or +that I am in insufficient force and unable to protect you against an attack +from Athens. Yet when I went with the army which I now have to the relief of +Nisaea, the Athenians did not venture to engage me although in greater force +than I; and it is not likely they will ever send across sea against you an army +as numerous as they had at Nisaea. And for myself, I have come here not to hurt +but to free the Hellenes, witness the solemn oaths by which I have bound my +government that the allies that I may bring over shall be independent; and +besides my object in coming is not by force or fraud to obtain your alliance, +but to offer you mine to help you against your Athenian masters. I protest, +therefore, against any suspicions of my intentions after the guarantees which I +offer, and equally so against doubts of my ability to protect you, and I invite +you to join me without hesitation. +</p> + +<p> +“Some of you may hang back because they have private enemies, and fear +that I may put the city into the hands of a party: none need be more tranquil +than they. I am not come here to help this party or that; and I do not consider +that I should be bringing you freedom in any real sense, if I should disregard +your constitution, and enslave the many to the few or the few to the many. This +would be heavier than a foreign yoke; and we Lacedaemonians, instead of being +thanked for our pains, should get neither honour nor glory, but, contrariwise, +reproaches. The charges which strengthen our hands in the war against the +Athenians would on our own showing be merited by ourselves, and more hateful in +us than in those who make no pretensions to honesty; as it is more disgraceful +for persons of character to take what they covet by fair-seeming fraud than by +open force; the one aggression having for its justification the might which +fortune gives, the other being simply a piece of clever roguery. A matter which +concerns us thus nearly we naturally look to most jealously; and over and above +the oaths that I have mentioned, what stronger assurance can you have, when you +see that our words, compared with the actual facts, produce the necessary +conviction that it is our interest to act as we say? +</p> + +<p> +“If to these considerations of mine you put in the plea of inability, and +claim that your friendly feeling should save you from being hurt by your +refusal; if you say that freedom, in your opinion, is not without its dangers, +and that it is right to offer it to those who can accept it, but not to force +it on any against their will, then I shall take the gods and heroes of your +country to witness that I came for your good and was rejected, and shall do my +best to compel you by laying waste your land. I shall do so without scruple, +being justified by the necessity which constrains me, first, to prevent the +Lacedaemonians from being damaged by you, their friends, in the event of your +nonadhesion, through the moneys that you pay to the Athenians; and secondly, to +prevent the Hellenes from being hindered by you in shaking off their servitude. +Otherwise indeed we should have no right to act as we propose; except in the +name of some public interest, what call should we Lacedaemonians have to free +those who do not wish it? Empire we do not aspire to: it is what we are +labouring to put down; and we should wrong the greater number if we allowed you +to stand in the way of the independence that we offer to all. Endeavour, +therefore, to decide wisely, and strive to begin the work of liberation for the +Hellenes, and lay up for yourselves endless renown, while you escape private +loss, and cover your commonwealth with glory.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been said on +both sides of the question, gave their votes in secret, and the majority, +influenced by the seductive arguments of Brasidas and by fear for their fruit, +decided to revolt from Athens; not however admitting the army until they had +taken his personal security for the oaths sworn by his government before they +sent him out, assuring the independence of the allies whom he might bring over. +Not long after, Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, followed their example and +revolted. +</p> + +<p> +Such were the events of this summer. It was in the first days of the winter +following that the places in Boeotia were to be put into the hands of the +Athenian generals, Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the latter of whom was to go +with his ships to Siphae, the former to Delium. A mistake, however, was made in +the days on which they were each to start; and Demosthenes, sailing first to +Siphae, with the Acarnanians and many of the allies from those parts on board, +failed to effect anything, through the plot having been betrayed by Nicomachus, +a Phocian from Phanotis, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians. +Succours accordingly flocked in from all parts of Boeotia, Hippocrates not +being yet there to make his diversion, and Siphae and Chaeronea were promptly +secured, and the conspirators, informed of the mistake, did not venture on any +movement in the towns. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Hippocrates made a levy in mass of the citizens, resident aliens, and +foreigners in Athens, and arrived at his destination after the Boeotians had +already come back from Siphae, and encamping his army began to fortify Delium, +the sanctuary of Apollo, in the following manner. A trench was dug all round +the temple and the consecrated ground, and the earth thrown up from the +excavation was made to do duty as a wall, in which stakes were also planted, +the vines round the sanctuary being cut down and thrown in, together with +stones and bricks pulled down from the houses near; every means, in short, +being used to run up the rampart. Wooden towers were also erected where they +were wanted, and where there was no part of the temple buildings left standing, +as on the side where the gallery once existing had fallen in. The work was +begun on the third day after leaving home, and continued during the fourth, and +till dinnertime on the fifth, when most of it being now finished the army +removed from Delium about a mile and a quarter on its way home. From this point +most of the light troops went straight on, while the heavy infantry halted and +remained where they were; Hippocrates having stayed behind at Delium to arrange +the posts, and to give directions for the completion of such part of the +outworks as had been left unfinished. +</p> + +<p> +During the days thus employed the Boeotians were mustering at Tanagra, and by +the time that they had come in from all the towns, found the Athenians already +on their way home. The rest of the eleven Boeotarchs were against giving +battle, as the enemy was no longer in Boeotia, the Athenians being just over +the Oropian border, when they halted; but Pagondas, son of Aeolidas, one of the +Boeotarchs of Thebes (Arianthides, son of Lysimachidas, being the other), and +then commander-in-chief, thought it best to hazard a battle. He accordingly +called the men to him, company after company, to prevent their all leaving +their arms at once, and urged them to attack the Athenians, and stand the issue +of a battle, speaking as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Boeotians, the idea that we ought not to give battle to the Athenians, +unless we came up with them in Boeotia, is one which should never have entered +into the head of any of us, your generals. It was to annoy Boeotia that they +crossed the frontier and built a fort in our country; and they are therefore, I +imagine, our enemies wherever we may come up with them, and from wheresoever +they may have come to act as enemies do. And if any one has taken up with the +idea in question for reasons of safety, it is high time for him to change his +mind. The party attacked, whose own country is in danger, can scarcely discuss +what is prudent with the calmness of men who are in full enjoyment of what they +have got, and are thinking of attacking a neighbour in order to get more. It is +your national habit, in your country or out of it, to oppose the same +resistance to a foreign invader; and when that invader is Athenian, and lives +upon your frontier besides, it is doubly imperative to do so. As between +neighbours generally, freedom means simply a determination to hold one’s +own; and with neighbours like these, who are trying to enslave near and far +alike, there is nothing for it but to fight it out to the last. Look at the +condition of the Euboeans and of most of the rest of Hellas, and be convinced +that others have to fight with their neighbours for this frontier or that, but +that for us conquest means one frontier for the whole country, about which no +dispute can be made, for they will simply come and take by force what we have. +So much more have we to fear from this neighbour than from another. Besides, +people who, like the Athenians in the present instance, are tempted by pride of +strength to attack their neighbours, usually march most confidently against +those who keep still, and only defend themselves in their own country, but +think twice before they grapple with those who meet them outside their frontier +and strike the first blow if opportunity offers. The Athenians have shown us +this themselves; the defeat which we inflicted upon them at Coronea, at the +time when our quarrels had allowed them to occupy the country, has given great +security to Boeotia until the present day. Remembering this, the old must equal +their ancient exploits, and the young, the sons of the heroes of that time, +must endeavour not to disgrace their native valour; and trusting in the help of +the god whose temple has been sacrilegiously fortified, and in the victims +which in our sacrifices have proved propitious, we must march against the +enemy, and teach him that he must go and get what he wants by attacking someone +who will not resist him, but that men whose glory it is to be always ready to +give battle for the liberty of their own country, and never unjustly to enslave +that of others, will not let him go without a struggle.” +</p> + +<p> +By these arguments Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to attack the Athenians, +and quickly breaking up his camp led his army forward, it being now late in the +day. On nearing the enemy, he halted in a position where a hill intervening +prevented the two armies from seeing each other, and then formed and prepared +for action. Meanwhile Hippocrates at Delium, informed of the approach of the +Boeotians, sent orders to his troops to throw themselves into line, and himself +joined them not long afterwards, leaving about three hundred horse behind him +at Delium, at once to guard the place in case of attack, and to watch their +opportunity and fall upon the Boeotians during the battle. The Boeotians placed +a detachment to deal with these, and when everything was arranged to their +satisfaction appeared over the hill, and halted in the order which they had +determined on, to the number of seven thousand heavy infantry, more than ten +thousand light troops, one thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers. On +their right were the Thebans and those of their province, in the centre the +Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the other people around the lake, and on +the left the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians, the cavalry and the +light troops being at the extremity of each wing. The Thebans formed +twenty-five shields deep, the rest as they pleased. Such was the strength and +disposition of the Boeotian army. +</p> + +<p> +On the side of the Athenians, the heavy infantry throughout the whole army +formed eight deep, being in numbers equal to the enemy, with the cavalry upon +the two wings. Light troops regularly armed there were none in the army, nor +had there ever been any at Athens. Those who had joined in the invasion, though +many times more numerous than those of the enemy, had mostly followed unarmed, +as part of the levy in mass of the citizens and foreigners at Athens, and +having started first on their way home were not present in any number. The +armies being now in line and upon the point of engaging, Hippocrates, the +general, passed along the Athenian ranks, and encouraged them as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Athenians, I shall only say a few words to you, but brave men require no +more, and they are addressed more to your understanding than to your courage. +None of you must fancy that we are going out of our way to run this risk in the +country of another. Fought in their territory the battle will be for ours: if +we conquer, the Peloponnesians will never invade your country without the +Boeotian horse, and in one battle you will win Boeotia and in a manner free +Attica. Advance to meet them then like citizens of a country in which you all +glory as the first in Hellas, and like sons of the fathers who beat them at +Oenophyta with Myronides and thus gained possession of Boeotia.” +</p> + +<p> +Hippocrates had got half through the army with his exhortation, when the +Boeotians, after a few more hasty words from Pagondas, struck up the paean, and +came against them from the hill; the Athenians advancing to meet them, and +closing at a run. The extreme wing of neither army came into action, one like +the other being stopped by the water-courses in the way; the rest engaged with +the utmost obstinacy, shield against shield. The Boeotian left, as far as the +centre, was worsted by the Athenians. The Thespians in that part of the field +suffered most severely. The troops alongside them having given way, they were +surrounded in a narrow space and cut down fighting hand to hand; some of the +Athenians also fell into confusion in surrounding the enemy and mistook and so +killed each other. In this part of the field the Boeotians were beaten, and +retreated upon the troops still fighting; but the right, where the Thebans +were, got the better of the Athenians and shoved them further and further back, +though gradually at first. It so happened also that Pagondas, seeing the +distress of his left, had sent two squadrons of horse, where they could not be +seen, round the hill, and their sudden appearance struck a panic into the +victorious wing of the Athenians, who thought that it was another army coming +against them. At length in both parts of the field, disturbed by this panic, +and with their line broken by the advancing Thebans, the whole Athenian army +took to flight. Some made for Delium and the sea, some for Oropus, others for +Mount Parnes, or wherever they had hopes of safety, pursued and cut down by the +Boeotians, and in particular by the cavalry, composed partly of Boeotians and +partly of Locrians, who had come up just as the rout began. Night however +coming on to interrupt the pursuit, the mass of the fugitives escaped more +easily than they would otherwise have done. The next day the troops at Oropus +and Delium returned home by sea, after leaving a garrison in the latter place, +which they continued to hold notwithstanding the defeat. +</p> + +<p> +The Boeotians set up a trophy, took up their own dead, and stripped those of +the enemy, and leaving a guard over them retired to Tanagra, there to take +measures for attacking Delium. Meanwhile a herald came from the Athenians to +ask for the dead, but was met and turned back by a Boeotian herald, who told +him that he would effect nothing until the return of himself the Boeotian +herald, and who then went on to the Athenians, and told them on the part of the +Boeotians that they had done wrong in transgressing the law of the Hellenes. Of +what use was the universal custom protecting the temples in an invaded country, +if the Athenians were to fortify Delium and live there, acting exactly as if +they were on unconsecrated ground, and drawing and using for their purposes the +water which they, the Boeotians, never touched except for sacred uses? +Accordingly for the god as well as for themselves, in the name of the deities +concerned, and of Apollo, the Boeotians invited them first to evacuate the +temple, if they wished to take up the dead that belonged to them. +</p> + +<p> +After these words from the herald, the Athenians sent their own herald to the +Boeotians to say that they had not done any wrong to the temple, and for the +future would do it no more harm than they could help; not having occupied it +originally in any such design, but to defend themselves from it against those +who were really wronging them. The law of the Hellenes was that conquest of a +country, whether more or less extensive, carried with it possession of the +temples in that country, with the obligation to keep up the usual ceremonies, +at least as far as possible. The Boeotians and most other people who had turned +out the owners of a country, and put themselves in their places by force, now +held as of right the temples which they originally entered as usurpers. If the +Athenians could have conquered more of Boeotia this would have been the case +with them: as things stood, the piece of it which they had got they should +treat as their own, and not quit unless obliged. The water they had disturbed +under the impulsion of a necessity which they had not wantonly incurred, having +been forced to use it in defending themselves against the Boeotians who first +invaded Attica. Besides, anything done under the pressure of war and danger +might reasonably claim indulgence even in the eye of the god; or why, pray, +were the altars the asylum for involuntary offences? Transgression also was a +term applied to presumptuous offenders, not to the victims of adverse +circumstances. In short, which were most impious—the Boeotians who wished +to barter dead bodies for holy places, or the Athenians who refused to give up +holy places to obtain what was theirs by right? The condition of evacuating +Boeotia must therefore be withdrawn. They were no longer in Boeotia. They stood +where they stood by the right of the sword. All that the Boeotians had to do +was to tell them to take up their dead under a truce according to the national +custom. +</p> + +<p> +The Boeotians replied that if they were in Boeotia, they must evacuate that +country before taking up their dead; if they were in their own territory, they +could do as they pleased: for they knew that, although the Oropid where the +bodies as it chanced were lying (the battle having been fought on the borders) +was subject to Athens, yet the Athenians could not get them without their +leave. Besides, why should they grant a truce for Athenian ground? And what +could be fairer than to tell them to evacuate Boeotia if they wished to get +what they asked? The Athenian herald accordingly returned with this answer, +without having accomplished his object. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Boeotians at once sent for darters and slingers from the Malian +Gulf, and with two thousand Corinthian heavy infantry who had joined them after +the battle, the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisaea, and some +Megarians with them, marched against Delium, and attacked the fort, and after +divers efforts finally succeeded in taking it by an engine of the following +description. They sawed in two and scooped out a great beam from end to end, +and fitting it nicely together again like a pipe, hung by chains a cauldron at +one extremity, with which communicated an iron tube projecting from the beam, +which was itself in great part plated with iron. This they brought up from a +distance upon carts to the part of the wall principally composed of vines and +timber, and when it was near, inserted huge bellows into their end of the beam +and blew with them. The blast passing closely confined into the cauldron, which +was filled with lighted coals, sulphur and pitch, made a great blaze, and set +fire to the wall, which soon became untenable for its defenders, who left it +and fled; and in this way the fort was taken. Of the garrison some were killed +and two hundred made prisoners; most of the rest got on board their ships and +returned home. +</p> + +<p> +Soon after the fall of Delium, which took place seventeen days after the +battle, the Athenian herald, without knowing what had happened, came again for +the dead, which were now restored by the Boeotians, who no longer answered as +at first. Not quite five hundred Boeotians fell in the battle, and nearly one +thousand Athenians, including Hippocrates the general, besides a great number +of light troops and camp followers. +</p> + +<p> +Soon after this battle Demosthenes, after the failure of his voyage to Siphae +and of the plot on the town, availed himself of the Acarnanian and Agraean +troops and of the four hundred Athenian heavy infantry which he had on board, +to make a descent on the Sicyonian coast. Before however all his ships had come +to shore, the Sicyonians came up and routed and chased to their ships those +that had landed, killing some and taking others prisoners; after which they set +up a trophy, and gave back the dead under truce. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time with the affair of Delium took place the death of Sitalces, +king of the Odrysians, who was defeated in battle, in a campaign against the +Triballi; Seuthes, son of Sparadocus, his nephew, succeeding to the kingdom of +the Odrysians, and of the rest of Thrace ruled by Sitalces. +</p> + +<p> +The same winter Brasidas, with his allies in the Thracian places, marched +against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon. A settlement upon +the spot on which the city now stands was before attempted by Aristagoras, the +Milesian (when he fled from King Darius), who was however dislodged by the +Edonians; and thirty-two years later by the Athenians, who sent thither ten +thousand settlers of their own citizens, and whoever else chose to go. These +were cut off at Drabescus by the Thracians. Twenty-nine years after, the +Athenians returned (Hagnon, son of Nicias, being sent out as leader of the +colony) and drove out the Edonians, and founded a town on the spot, formerly +called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways. The base from which they started was Eion, +their commercial seaport at the mouth of the river, not more than three miles +from the present town, which Hagnon named Amphipolis, because the Strymon flows +round it on two sides, and he built it so as to be conspicuous from the sea and +land alike, running a long wall across from river to river, to complete the +circumference. +</p> + +<p> +Brasidas now marched against this town, starting from Arne in Chalcidice. +Arriving about dusk at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake of Bolbe runs into +the sea, he supped there, and went on during the night. The weather was stormy +and it was snowing a little, which encouraged him to hurry on, in order, if +possible, to take every one at Amphipolis by surprise, except the party who +were to betray it. The plot was carried on by some natives of Argilus, an +Andrian colony, residing in Amphipolis, where they had also other accomplices +gained over by Perdiccas or the Chalcidians. But the most active in the matter +were the inhabitants of Argilus itself, which is close by, who had always been +suspected by the Athenians, and had had designs on the place. These men now saw +their opportunity arrive with Brasidas, and having for some time been in +correspondence with their countrymen in Amphipolis for the betrayal of the +town, at once received him into Argilus, and revolted from the Athenians, and +that same night took him on to the bridge over the river; where he found only a +small guard to oppose him, the town being at some distance from the passage, +and the walls not reaching down to it as at present. This guard he easily drove +in, partly through there being treason in their ranks, partly from the stormy +state of the weather and the suddenness of his attack, and so got across the +bridge, and immediately became master of all the property outside; the +Amphipolitans having houses all over the quarter. +</p> + +<p> +The passage of Brasidas was a complete surprise to the people in the town; and +the capture of many of those outside, and the flight of the rest within the +wall, combined to produce great confusion among the citizens; especially as +they did not trust one another. It is even said that if Brasidas, instead of +stopping to pillage, had advanced straight against the town, he would probably +have taken it. In fact, however, he established himself where he was and +overran the country outside, and for the present remained inactive, vainly +awaiting a demonstration on the part of his friends within. Meanwhile the party +opposed to the traitors proved numerous enough to prevent the gates being +immediately thrown open, and in concert with Eucles, the general, who had come +from Athens to defend the place, sent to the other commander in Thrace, +Thucydides, son of Olorus, the author of this history, who was at the isle of +Thasos, a Parian colony, half a day’s sail from Amphipolis, to tell him +to come to their relief. On receipt of this message he at once set sail with +seven ships which he had with him, in order, if possible, to reach Amphipolis +in time to prevent its capitulation, or in any case to save Eion. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Brasidas, afraid of succours arriving by sea from Thasos, and +learning that Thucydides possessed the right of working the gold mines in that +part of Thrace, and had thus great influence with the inhabitants of the +continent, hastened to gain the town, if possible, before the people of +Amphipolis should be encouraged by his arrival to hope that he could save them +by getting together a force of allies from the sea and from Thrace, and so +refuse to surrender. He accordingly offered moderate terms, proclaiming that +any of the Amphipolitans and Athenians who chose, might continue to enjoy their +property with full rights of citizenship; while those who did not wish to stay +had five days to depart, taking their property with them. +</p> + +<p> +The bulk of the inhabitants, upon hearing this, began to change their minds, +especially as only a small number of the citizens were Athenians, the majority +having come from different quarters, and many of the prisoners outside had +relations within the walls. They found the proclamation a fair one in +comparison of what their fear had suggested; the Athenians being glad to go +out, as they thought they ran more risk than the rest, and further, did not +expect any speedy relief, and the multitude generally being content at being +left in possession of their civic rights, and at such an unexpected reprieve +from danger. The partisans of Brasidas now openly advocated this course, seeing +that the feeling of the people had changed, and that they no longer gave ear to +the Athenian general present; and thus the surrender was made and Brasidas was +admitted by them on the terms of his proclamation. In this way they gave up the +city, and late in the same day Thucydides and his ships entered the harbour of +Eion, Brasidas having just got hold of Amphipolis, and having been within a +night of taking Eion: had the ships been less prompt in relieving it, in the +morning it would have been his. +</p> + +<p> +After this Thucydides put all in order at Eion to secure it against any present +or future attack of Brasidas, and received such as had elected to come there +from the interior according to the terms agreed on. Meanwhile Brasidas suddenly +sailed with a number of boats down the river to Eion to see if he could not +seize the point running out from the wall, and so command the entrance; at the +same time he attempted it by land, but was beaten off on both sides and had to +content himself with arranging matters at Amphipolis and in the neighbourhood. +Myrcinus, an Edonian town, also came over to him; the Edonian king Pittacus +having been killed by the sons of Goaxis and his own wife Brauro; and Galepsus +and Oesime, which are Thasian colonies, not long after followed its example. +Perdiccas too came up immediately after the capture and joined in these +arrangements. +</p> + +<p> +The news that Amphipolis was in the hands of the enemy caused great alarm at +Athens. Not only was the town valuable for the timber it afforded for +shipbuilding, and the money that it brought in; but also, although the escort +of the Thessalians gave the Lacedaemonians a means of reaching the allies of +Athens as far as the Strymon, yet as long as they were not masters of the +bridge but were watched on the side of Eion by the Athenian galleys, and on the +land side impeded by a large and extensive lake formed by the waters of the +river, it was impossible for them to go any further. Now, on the contrary, the +path seemed open. There was also the fear of the allies revolting, owing to the +moderation displayed by Brasidas in all his conduct, and to the declarations +which he was everywhere making that he sent out to free Hellas. The towns +subject to the Athenians, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and of the terms +accorded to it, and of the gentleness of Brasidas, felt most strongly +encouraged to change their condition, and sent secret messages to him, begging +him to come on to them; each wishing to be the first to revolt. Indeed there +seemed to be no danger in so doing; their mistake in their estimate of the +Athenian power was as great as that power afterwards turned out to be, and +their judgment was based more upon blind wishing than upon any sound prevision; +for it is a habit of mankind to entrust to careless hope what they long for, +and to use sovereign reason to thrust aside what they do not fancy. Besides the +late severe blow which the Athenians had met with in Boeotia, joined to the +seductive, though untrue, statements of Brasidas, about the Athenians not +having ventured to engage his single army at Nisaea, made the allies confident, +and caused them to believe that no Athenian force would be sent against them. +Above all the wish to do what was agreeable at the moment, and the likelihood +that they should find the Lacedaemonians full of zeal at starting, made them +eager to venture. Observing this, the Athenians sent garrisons to the different +towns, as far as was possible at such short notice and in winter; while +Brasidas sent dispatches to Lacedaemon asking for reinforcements, and himself +made preparations for building galleys in the Strymon. The Lacedaemonians +however did not send him any, partly through envy on the part of their chief +men, partly because they were more bent on recovering the prisoners of the +island and ending the war. +</p> + +<p> +The same winter the Megarians took and razed to the foundations the long walls +which had been occupied by the Athenians; and Brasidas after the capture of +Amphipolis marched with his allies against Acte, a promontory running out from +the King’s dike with an inward curve, and ending in Athos, a lofty +mountain looking towards the Aegean Sea. In it are various towns, Sane, an +Andrian colony, close to the canal, and facing the sea in the direction of +Euboea; the others being Thyssus, Cleone, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium, +inhabited by mixed barbarian races speaking the two languages. There is also a +small Chalcidian element; but the greater number are Tyrrheno-Pelasgians once +settled in Lemnos and Athens, and Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians; the +towns being all small ones. Most of these came over to Brasidas; but Sane and +Dium held out and saw their land ravaged by him and his army. +</p> + +<p> +Upon their not submitting, he at once marched against Torone in Chalcidice, +which was held by an Athenian garrison, having been invited by a few persons +who were prepared to hand over the town. Arriving in the dark a little before +daybreak, he sat down with his army near the temple of the Dioscuri, rather +more than a quarter of a mile from the city. The rest of the town of Torone and +the Athenians in garrison did not perceive his approach; but his partisans +knowing that he was coming (a few of them had secretly gone out to meet him) +were on the watch for his arrival, and were no sooner aware of it than they +took it to them seven light-armed men with daggers, who alone of twenty men +ordered on this service dared to enter, commanded by Lysistratus an Olynthian. +These passed through the sea wall, and without being seen went up and put to +the sword the garrison of the highest post in the town, which stands on a hill, +and broke open the postern on the side of Canastraeum. +</p> + +<p> +Brasidas meanwhile came a little nearer and then halted with his main body, +sending on one hundred targeteers to be ready to rush in first, the moment that +a gate should be thrown open and the beacon lighted as agreed. After some time +passed in waiting and wondering at the delay, the targeteers by degrees got up +close to the town. The Toronaeans inside at work with the party that had +entered had by this time broken down the postern and opened the gates leading +to the market-place by cutting through the bar, and first brought some men +round and let them in by the postern, in order to strike a panic into the +surprised townsmen by suddenly attacking them from behind and on both sides at +once; after which they raised the fire-signal as had been agreed, and took in +by the market gates the rest of the targeteers. +</p> + +<p> +Brasidas seeing the signal told the troops to rise, and dashed forward amid the +loud hurrahs of his men, which carried dismay among the astonished townspeople. +Some burst in straight by the gate, others over some square pieces of timber +placed against the wall (which has fallen down and was being rebuilt) to draw +up stones; Brasidas and the greater number making straight uphill for the +higher part of the town, in order to take it from top to bottom, and once for +all, while the rest of the multitude spread in all directions. +</p> + +<p> +The capture of the town was effected before the great body of the Toronaeans +had recovered from their surprise and confusion; but the conspirators and the +citizens of their party at once joined the invaders. About fifty of the +Athenian heavy infantry happened to be sleeping in the market-place when the +alarm reached them. A few of these were killed fighting; the rest escaped, some +by land, others to the two ships on the station, and took refuge in Lecythus, a +fort garrisoned by their own men in the corner of the town running out into the +sea and cut off by a narrow isthmus; where they were joined by the Toronaeans +of their party. +</p> + +<p> +Day now arrived, and the town being secured, Brasidas made a proclamation to +the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the Athenians, to come out, as many as +chose, to their homes without fearing for their rights or persons, and sent a +herald to invite the Athenians to accept a truce, and to evacuate Lecythus with +their property, as being Chalcidian ground. The Athenians refused this offer, +but asked for a truce for a day to take up their dead. Brasidas granted it for +two days, which he employed in fortifying the houses near, and the Athenians in +doing the same to their positions. Meanwhile he called a meeting of the +Toronaeans, and said very much what he had said at Acanthus, namely, that they +must not look upon those who had negotiated with him for the capture of the +town as bad men or as traitors, as they had not acted as they had done from +corrupt motives or in order to enslave the city, but for the good and freedom +of Torone; nor again must those who had not shared in the enterprise fancy that +they would not equally reap its fruits, as he had not come to destroy either +city or individual. This was the reason of his proclamation to those that had +fled for refuge to the Athenians: he thought none the worse of them for their +friendship for the Athenians; he believed that they had only to make trial of +the Lacedaemonians to like them as well, or even much better, as acting much +more justly: it was for want of such a trial that they were now afraid of them. +Meanwhile he warned all of them to prepare to be staunch allies, and for being +held responsible for all faults in future: for the past, they had not wronged +the Lacedaemonians but had been wronged by others who were too strong for them, +and any opposition that they might have offered him could be excused. +</p> + +<p> +Having encouraged them with this address, as soon as the truce expired he made +his attack upon Lecythus; the Athenians defending themselves from a poor wall +and from some houses with parapets. One day they beat him off; the next the +enemy were preparing to bring up an engine against them from which they meant +to throw fire upon the wooden defences, and the troops were already coming up +to the point where they fancied they could best bring up the engine, and where +place was most assailable; meanwhile the Athenians put a wooden tower upon a +house opposite, and carried up a quantity of jars and casks of water and big +stones, and a large number of men also climbed up. The house thus laden too +heavily suddenly broke down with a loud crash; at which the men who were near +and saw it were more vexed than frightened; but those not so near, and still +more those furthest off, thought that the place was already taken at that +point, and fled in haste to the sea and the ships. +</p> + +<p> +Brasidas, perceiving that they were deserting the parapet, and seeing what was +going on, dashed forward with his troops, and immediately took the fort, and +put to the sword all whom he found in it. In this way the place was evacuated +by the Athenians, who went across in their boats and ships to Pallene. Now +there is a temple of Athene in Lecythus, and Brasidas had proclaimed in the +moment of making the assault that he would give thirty silver minae to the man +first on the wall. Being now of opinion that the capture was scarcely due to +human means, he gave the thirty minae to the goddess for her temple, and razed +and cleared Lecythus, and made the whole of it consecrated ground. The rest of +the winter he spent in settling the places in his hands, and in making designs +upon the rest; and with the expiration of the winter the eighth year of this +war ended. +</p> + +<p> +In the spring of the summer following, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians made an +armistice for a year; the Athenians thinking that they would thus have full +leisure to take their precautions before Brasidas could procure the revolt of +any more of their towns, and might also, if it suited them, conclude a general +peace; the Lacedaemonians divining the actual fears of the Athenians, and +thinking that after once tasting a respite from trouble and misery they would +be more disposed to consent to a reconciliation, and to give back the +prisoners, and make a treaty for the longer period. The great idea of the +Lacedaemonians was to get back their men while Brasidas’s good fortune +lasted: further successes might make the struggle a less unequal one in +Chalcidice, but would leave them still deprived of their men, and even in +Chalcidice not more than a match for the Athenians and by no means certain of +victory. An armistice was accordingly concluded by Lacedaemon and her allies +upon the terms following: +</p> + +<p> +1. As to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, we are agreed that +whosoever will shall have access to it, without fraud or fear, according to the +usages of his forefathers. The Lacedaemonians and the allies present agree to +this, and promise to send heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians, and to do +their best to persuade them to agree likewise. +</p> + +<p> +2. As to the treasure of the god, we agree to exert ourselves to detect all +malversators, truly and honestly following the customs of our forefathers, we +and you and all others willing to do so, all following the customs of our +forefathers. As to these points the Lacedaemonians and the other allies are +agreed as has been said. +</p> + +<p> +3. As to what follows, the Lacedaemonians and the other allies agree, if the +Athenians conclude a treaty, to remain, each of us in our own territory, +retaining our respective acquisitions: the garrison in Coryphasium keeping +within Buphras and Tomeus: that in Cythera attempting no communication with the +Peloponnesian confederacy, neither we with them, nor they with us: that in +Nisaea and Minoa not crossing the road leading from the gates of the temple of +Nisus to that of Poseidon and from thence straight to the bridge at Minoa: the +Megarians and the allies being equally bound not to cross this road, and the +Athenians retaining the island they have taken, without any communication on +either side: as to Troezen, each side retaining what it has, and as was +arranged with the Athenians. +</p> + +<p> +4. As to the use of the sea, so far as refers to their own coast and to that of +their confederacy, that the Lacedaemonians and their allies may voyage upon it +in any vessel rowed by oars and of not more than five hundred talents tonnage, +not a vessel of war. +</p> + +<p> +5. That all heralds and embassies, with as many attendants as they please, for +concluding the war and adjusting claims, shall have free passage, going and +coming, to Peloponnese or Athens by land and by sea. +</p> + +<p> +6. That during the truce, deserters whether bond or free shall be received +neither by you, nor by us. +</p> + +<p> +7. Further, that satisfaction shall be given by you to us and by us to you +according to the public law of our several countries, all disputes being +settled by law without recourse to hostilities. +</p> + +<p> +The Lacedaemonians and allies agree to these articles; but if you have anything +fairer or juster to suggest, come to Lacedaemon and let us know: whatever shall +be just will meet with no objection either from the Lacedaemonians or from the +allies. Only let those who come come with full powers, as you desire us. The +truce shall be for one year. +</p> + +<p> +Approved by the people. +</p> + +<p> +The tribe of Acamantis had the prytany, Phoenippus was secretary, Niciades +chairman. Laches moved, in the name of the good luck of the Athenians, that +they should conclude the armistice upon the terms agreed upon by the +Lacedaemonians and the allies. It was agreed accordingly in the popular +assembly that the armistice should be for one year, beginning that very day, +the fourteenth of the month of Elaphebolion; during which time ambassadors and +heralds should go and come between the two countries to discuss the bases of a +pacification. That the generals and prytanes should call an assembly of the +people, in which the Athenians should first consult on the peace, and on the +mode in which the embassy for putting an end to the war should be admitted. +That the embassy now present should at once take the engagement before the +people to keep well and truly this truce for one year. +</p> + +<p> +On these terms the Lacedaemonians concluded with the Athenians and their allies +on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius; the allies also taking the +oaths. Those who concluded and poured the libation were Taurus, son of +Echetimides, Athenaeus, son of Pericleidas, and Philocharidas, son of +Eryxidaidas, Lacedaemonians; Aeneas, son of Ocytus, and Euphamidas, son of +Aristonymus, Corinthians; Damotimus, son of Naucrates, and Onasimus, son of +Megacles, Sicyonians; Nicasus, son of Cecalus, and Menecrates, son of +Amphidorus, Megarians; and Amphias, son of Eupaidas, an Epidaurian; and the +Athenian generals Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and +Autocles, son of Tolmaeus. Such was the armistice, and during the whole of it +conferences went on on the subject of a pacification. +</p> + +<p> +In the days in which they were going backwards and forwards to these +conferences, Scione, a town in Pallene, revolted from Athens, and went over to +Brasidas. The Scionaeans say that they are Pallenians from Peloponnese, and +that their first founders on their voyage from Troy were carried in to this +spot by the storm which the Achaeans were caught in, and there settled. The +Scionaeans had no sooner revolted than Brasidas crossed over by night to +Scione, with a friendly galley ahead and himself in a small boat some way +behind; his idea being that if he fell in with a vessel larger than the boat he +would have the galley to defend him, while a ship that was a match for the +galley would probably neglect the small vessel to attack the large one, and +thus leave him time to escape. His passage effected, he called a meeting of the +Scionaeans and spoke to the same effect as at Acanthus and Torone, adding that +they merited the utmost commendation, in that, in spite of Pallene within the +isthmus being cut off by the Athenian occupation of Potidæa and of their own +practically insular position, they had of their own free will gone forward to +meet their liberty instead of timorously waiting until they had been by force +compelled to their own manifest good. This was a sign that they would valiantly +undergo any trial, however great; and if he should order affairs as he +intended, he should count them among the truest and sincerest friends of the +Lacedaemonians, and would in every other way honour them. +</p> + +<p> +The Scionaeans were elated by his language, and even those who had at first +disapproved of what was being done catching the general confidence, they +determined on a vigorous conduct of the war, and welcomed Brasidas with all +possible honours, publicly crowning him with a crown of gold as the liberator +of Hellas; while private persons crowded round him and decked him with garlands +as though he had been an athlete. Meanwhile Brasidas left them a small garrison +for the present and crossed back again, and not long afterwards sent over a +larger force, intending with the help of the Scionaeans to attempt Mende and +Potidæa before the Athenians should arrive; Scione, he felt, being too like an +island for them not to relieve it. He had besides intelligence in the above +towns about their betrayal. +</p> + +<p> +In the midst of his designs upon the towns in question, a galley arrived with +the commissioners carrying round the news of the armistice, Aristonymus for the +Athenians and Athenaeus for the Lacedaemonians. The troops now crossed back to +Torone, and the commissioners gave Brasidas notice of the convention. All the +Lacedaemonian allies in Thrace accepted what had been done; and Aristonymus +made no difficulty about the rest, but finding, on counting the days, that the +Scionaeans had revolted after the date of the convention, refused to include +them in it. To this Brasidas earnestly objected, asserting that the revolt took +place before, and would not give up the town. Upon Aristonymus reporting the +case to Athens, the people at once prepared to send an expedition to Scione. +Upon this, envoys arrived from Lacedaemon, alleging that this would be a breach +of the truce, and laying claim to the town upon the faith of the assertion of +Brasidas, and meanwhile offering to submit the question to arbitration. +Arbitration, however, was what the Athenians did not choose to risk; being +determined to send troops at once to the place, and furious at the idea of even +the islanders now daring to revolt, in a vain reliance upon the power of the +Lacedaemonians by land. Besides the facts of the revolt were rather as the +Athenians contended, the Scionaeans having revolted two days after the +convention. Cleon accordingly succeeded in carrying a decree to reduce and put +to death the Scionaeans; and the Athenians employed the leisure which they now +enjoyed in preparing for the expedition. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Mende revolted, a town in Pallene and a colony of the Eretrians, and +was received without scruple by Brasidas, in spite of its having evidently come +over during the armistice, on account of certain infringements of the truce +alleged by him against the Athenians. This audacity of Mende was partly caused +by seeing Brasidas forward in the matter and by the conclusions drawn from his +refusal to betray Scione; and besides, the conspirators in Mende were few, and, +as I have already intimated, had carried on their practices too long not to +fear detection for themselves, and not to wish to force the inclination of the +multitude. This news made the Athenians more furious than ever, and they at +once prepared against both towns. Brasidas, expecting their arrival, conveyed +away to Olynthus in Chalcidice the women and children of the Scionaeans and +Mendaeans, and sent over to them five hundred Peloponnesian heavy infantry and +three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, all under the command of Polydamidas. +</p> + +<p> +Leaving these two towns to prepare together against the speedy arrival of the +Athenians, Brasidas and Perdiccas started on a second joint expedition into +Lyncus against Arrhabaeus; the latter with the forces of his Macedonian +subjects, and a corps of heavy infantry composed of Hellenes domiciled in the +country; the former with the Peloponnesians whom he still had with him and the +Chalcidians, Acanthians, and the rest in such force as they were able. In all +there were about three thousand Hellenic heavy infantry, accompanied by all the +Macedonian cavalry with the Chalcidians, near one thousand strong, besides an +immense crowd of barbarians. On entering the country of Arrhabaeus, they found +the Lyncestians encamped awaiting them, and themselves took up a position +opposite. The infantry on either side were upon a hill, with a plain between +them, into which the horse of both armies first galloped down and engaged a +cavalry action. After this the Lyncestian heavy infantry advanced from their +hill to join their cavalry and offered battle; upon which Brasidas and +Perdiccas also came down to meet them, and engaged and routed them with heavy +loss; the survivors taking refuge upon the heights and there remaining +inactive. The victors now set up a trophy and waited two or three days for the +Illyrian mercenaries who were to join Perdiccas. Perdiccas then wished to go on +and attack the villages of Arrhabaeus, and to sit still no longer; but +Brasidas, afraid that the Athenians might sail up during his absence, and of +something happening to Mende, and seeing besides that the Illyrians did not +appear, far from seconding this wish was anxious to return. +</p> + +<p> +While they were thus disputing, the news arrived that the Illyrians had +actually betrayed Perdiccas and had joined Arrhabaeus; and the fear inspired by +their warlike character made both parties now think it best to retreat. +However, owing to the dispute, nothing had been settled as to when they should +start; and night coming on, the Macedonians and the barbarian crowd took fright +in a moment in one of those mysterious panics to which great armies are liable; +and persuaded that an army many times more numerous than that which had really +arrived was advancing and all but upon them, suddenly broke and fled in the +direction of home, and thus compelled Perdiccas, who at first did not perceive +what had occurred, to depart without seeing Brasidas, the two armies being +encamped at a considerable distance from each other. At daybreak Brasidas, +perceiving that the Macedonians had gone on, and that the Illyrians and +Arrhabaeus were on the point of attacking him, formed his heavy infantry into a +square, with the light troops in the centre, and himself also prepared to +retreat. Posting his youngest soldiers to dash out wherever the enemy should +attack them, he himself with three hundred picked men in the rear intended to +face about during the retreat and beat off the most forward of their +assailants, Meanwhile, before the enemy approached, he sought to sustain the +courage of his soldiers with the following hasty exhortation: +</p> + +<p> +“Peloponnesians, if I did not suspect you of being dismayed at being left +alone to sustain the attack of a numerous and barbarian enemy, I should just +have said a few words to you as usual without further explanation. As it is, in +the face of the desertion of our friends and the numbers of the enemy, I have +some advice and information to offer, which, brief as they must be, will, I +hope, suffice for the more important points. The bravery that you habitually +display in war does not depend on your having allies at your side in this or +that encounter, but on your native courage; nor have numbers any terrors for +citizens of states like yours, in which the many do not rule the few, but +rather the few the many, owing their position to nothing else than to +superiority in the field. Inexperience now makes you afraid of barbarians; and +yet the trial of strength which you had with the Macedonians among them, and my +own judgment, confirmed by what I hear from others, should be enough to satisfy +you that they will not prove formidable. Where an enemy seems strong but is +really weak, a true knowledge of the facts makes his adversary the bolder, just +as a serious antagonist is encountered most confidently by those who do not +know him. Thus the present enemy might terrify an inexperienced imagination; +they are formidable in outward bulk, their loud yelling is unbearable, and the +brandishing of their weapons in the air has a threatening appearance. But when +it comes to real fighting with an opponent who stands his ground, they are not +what they seemed; they have no regular order that they should be ashamed of +deserting their positions when hard pressed; flight and attack are with them +equally honourable, and afford no test of courage; their independent mode of +fighting never leaving any one who wants to run away without a fair excuse for +so doing. In short, they think frightening you at a secure distance a surer +game than meeting you hand to hand; otherwise they would have done the one and +not the other. You can thus plainly see that the terrors with which they were +at first invested are in fact trifling enough, though to the eye and ear very +prominent. Stand your ground therefore when they advance, and again wait your +opportunity to retire in good order, and you will reach a place of safety all +the sooner, and will know for ever afterwards that rabble such as these, to +those who sustain their first attack, do but show off their courage by threats +of the terrible things that they are going to do, at a distance, but with those +who give way to them are quick enough to display their heroism in pursuit when +they can do so without danger.” +</p> + +<p> +With this brief address Brasidas began to lead off his army. Seeing this, the +barbarians came on with much shouting and hubbub, thinking that he was flying +and that they would overtake him and cut him off. But wherever they charged +they found the young men ready to dash out against them, while Brasidas with +his picked company sustained their onset. Thus the Peloponnesians withstood the +first attack, to the surprise of the enemy, and afterwards received and +repulsed them as fast as they came on, retiring as soon as their opponents +became quiet. The main body of the barbarians ceased therefore to molest the +Hellenes with Brasidas in the open country, and leaving behind a certain number +to harass their march, the rest went on after the flying Macedonians, slaying +those with whom they came up, and so arrived in time to occupy the narrow pass +between two hills that leads into the country of Arrhabaeus. They knew that +this was the only way by which Brasidas could retreat, and now proceeded to +surround him just as he entered the most impracticable part of the road, in +order to cut him off. +</p> + +<p> +Brasidas, perceiving their intention, told his three hundred to run on without +order, each as quickly as he could, to the hill which seemed easiest to take, +and to try to dislodge the barbarians already there, before they should be +joined by the main body closing round him. These attacked and overpowered the +party upon the hill, and the main army of the Hellenes now advanced with less +difficulty towards it—the barbarians being terrified at seeing their men +on that side driven from the height and no longer following the main body, who, +they considered, had gained the frontier and made good their escape. The +heights once gained, Brasidas now proceeded more securely, and the same day +arrived at Arnisa, the first town in the dominions of Perdiccas. The soldiers, +enraged at the desertion of the Macedonians, vented their rage on all their +yokes of oxen which they found on the road, and on any baggage which had +tumbled off (as might easily happen in the panic of a night retreat), by +unyoking and cutting down the cattle and taking the baggage for themselves. +From this moment Perdiccas began to regard Brasidas as an enemy and to feel +against the Peloponnesians a hatred which could not be congenial to the +adversary of the Athenians. However, he departed from his natural interests and +made it his endeavour to come to terms with the latter and to get rid of the +former. +</p> + +<p> +On his return from Macedonia to Torone, Brasidas found the Athenians already +masters of Mende, and remained quiet where he was, thinking it now out of his +power to cross over into Pallene and assist the Mendaeans, but he kept good +watch over Torone. For about the same time as the campaign in Lyncus, the +Athenians sailed upon the expedition which we left them preparing against Mende +and Scione, with fifty ships, ten of which were Chians, one thousand Athenian +heavy infantry and six hundred archers, one hundred Thracian mercenaries and +some targeteers drawn from their allies in the neighbourhood, under the command +of Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes. Weighing from +Potidæa, the fleet came to land opposite the temple of Poseidon, and proceeded +against Mende; the men of which town, reinforced by three hundred Scionaeans, +with their Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred heavy infantry in all, +under Polydamidas, they found encamped upon a strong hill outside the city. +These Nicias, with one hundred and twenty light-armed Methonaeans, sixty picked +men from the Athenian heavy infantry, and all the archers, tried to reach by a +path running up the hill, but received a wound and found himself unable to +force the position; while Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army, advancing +upon the hill, which was naturally difficult, by a different approach further +off, was thrown into utter disorder; and the whole Athenian army narrowly +escaped being defeated. For that day, as the Mendaeans and their allies showed +no signs of yielding, the Athenians retreated and encamped, and the Mendaeans +at nightfall returned into the town. +</p> + +<p> +The next day the Athenians sailed round to the Scione side, and took the +suburb, and all day plundered the country, without any one coming out against +them, partly because of intestine disturbances in the town; and the following +night the three hundred Scionaeans returned home. On the morrow Nicias advanced +with half the army to the frontier of Scione and laid waste the country; while +Nicostratus with the remainder sat down before the town near the upper gate on +the road to Potidæa. The arms of the Mendaeans and of their Peloponnesian +auxiliaries within the wall happened to be piled in that quarter, where +Polydamidas accordingly began to draw them up for battle, encouraging the +Mendaeans to make a sortie. At this moment one of the popular party answered +him factiously that they would not go out and did not want a war, and for thus +answering was dragged by the arm and knocked about by Polydamidas. Hereupon the +infuriated commons at once seized their arms and rushed at the Peloponnesians +and at their allies of the opposite faction. The troops thus assaulted were at +once routed, partly from the suddenness of the conflict and partly through fear +of the gates being opened to the Athenians, with whom they imagined that the +attack had been concerted. As many as were not killed on the spot took refuge +in the citadel, which they had held from the first; and the whole, Athenian +army, Nicias having by this time returned and being close to the city, now +burst into Mende, which had opened its gates without any convention, and sacked +it just as if they had taken it by storm, the generals even finding some +difficulty in restraining them from also massacring the inhabitants. After this +the Athenians told the Mendaeans that they might retain their civil rights, and +themselves judge the supposed authors of the revolt; and cut off the party in +the citadel by a wall built down to the sea on either side, appointing troops +to maintain the blockade. Having thus secured Mende, they proceeded against +Scione. +</p> + +<p> +The Scionaeans and Peloponnesians marched out against them, occupying a strong +hill in front of the town, which had to be captured by the enemy before they +could invest the place. The Athenians stormed the hill, defeated and dislodged +its occupants, and, having encamped and set up a trophy, prepared for the work +of circumvallation. Not long after they had begun their operations, the +auxiliaries besieged in the citadel of Mende forced the guard by the sea-side +and arrived by night at Scione, into which most of them succeeded in entering, +passing through the besieging army. +</p> + +<p> +While the investment of Scione was in progress, Perdiccas sent a herald to the +Athenian generals and made peace with the Athenians, through spite against +Brasidas for the retreat from Lyncus, from which moment indeed he had begun to +negotiate. The Lacedaemonian Ischagoras was just then upon the point of +starting with an army overland to join Brasidas; and Perdiccas, being now +required by Nicias to give some proof of the sincerity of his reconciliation to +the Athenians, and being himself no longer disposed to let the Peloponnesians +into his country, put in motion his friends in Thessaly, with whose chief men +he always took care to have relations, and so effectually stopped the army and +its preparation that they did not even try the Thessalians. Ischagoras himself, +however, with Ameinias and Aristeus, succeeded in reaching Brasidas; they had +been commissioned by the Lacedaemonians to inspect the state of affairs, and +brought out from Sparta (in violation of all precedent) some of their young men +to put in command of the towns, to guard against their being entrusted to the +persons upon the spot. Brasidas accordingly placed Clearidas, son of Cleonymus, +in Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas, son of Hegesander, in Torone. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians on the charge +of Atticism, having always wished to do so, and now finding it an easy matter, +as the flower of the Thespian youth had perished in the battle with the +Athenians. The same summer also the temple of Hera at Argos was burnt down, +through Chrysis, the priestess, placing a lighted torch near the garlands and +then falling asleep, so that they all caught fire and were in a blaze before +she observed it. Chrysis that very night fled to Phlius for fear of the +Argives, who, agreeably to the law in such a case, appointed another priestess +named Phaeinis. Chrysis at the time of her flight had been priestess for eight +years of the present war and half the ninth. At the close of the summer the +investment of Scione was completed, and the Athenians, leaving a detachment to +maintain the blockade, returned with the rest of their army. +</p> + +<p> +During the winter following, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were kept quiet +by the armistice; but the Mantineans and Tegeans, and their respective allies, +fought a battle at Laodicium, in the Oresthid. The victory remained doubtful, +as each side routed one of the wings opposed to them, and both set up trophies +and sent spoils to Delphi. After heavy loss on both sides the battle was +undecided, and night interrupted the action; yet the Tegeans passed the night +on the field and set up a trophy at once, while the Mantineans withdrew to +Bucolion and set up theirs afterwards. +</p> + +<p> +At the close of the same winter, in fact almost in spring, Brasidas made an +attempt upon Potidæa. He arrived by night, and succeeded in planting a ladder +against the wall without being discovered, the ladder being planted just in the +interval between the passing round of the bell and the return of the man who +brought it back. Upon the garrison, however, taking the alarm immediately +afterwards, before his men came up, he quickly led off his troops, without +waiting until it was day. So ended the winter and the ninth year of this war of +which Thucydides is the historian. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2H_4_0019" id="link2H_4_0019"></a> +BOOK V </h2> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0015" id="link2HCH0015"></a> +CHAPTER XV </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Tenth Year of the War—Death of Cleon and Brasidas—Peace of Nicias +</p> + +<p> +The next summer the truce for a year ended, after lasting until the Pythian +games. During the armistice the Athenians expelled the Delians from Delos, +concluding that they must have been polluted by some old offence at the time of +their consecration, and that this had been the omission in the previous +purification of the island, which, as I have related, had been thought to have +been duly accomplished by the removal of the graves of the dead. The Delians +had Atramyttium in Asia given them by Pharnaces, and settled there as they +removed from Delos. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Cleon prevailed on the Athenians to let him set sail at the +expiration of the armistice for the towns in the direction of Thrace with +twelve hundred heavy infantry and three hundred horse from Athens, a large +force of the allies, and thirty ships. First touching at the still besieged +Scione, and taking some heavy infantry from the army there, he next sailed into +Cophos, a harbour in the territory of Torone, which is not far from the town. +From thence, having learnt from deserters that Brasidas was not in Torone, and +that its garrison was not strong enough to give him battle, he advanced with +his army against the town, sending ten ships to sail round into the harbour. He +first came to the fortification lately thrown up in front of the town by +Brasidas in order to take in the suburb, to do which he had pulled down part of +the original wall and made it all one city. To this point Pasitelidas, the +Lacedaemonian commander, with such garrison as there was in the place, hurried +to repel the Athenian assault; but finding himself hard pressed, and seeing the +ships that had been sent round sailing into the harbour, Pasitelidas began to +be afraid that they might get up to the city before its defenders were there +and, the fortification being also carried, he might be taken prisoner, and so +abandoned the outwork and ran into the town. But the Athenians from the ships +had already taken Torone, and their land forces following at his heels burst in +with him with a rush over the part of the old wall that had been pulled down, +killing some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans in the melee, and making +prisoners of the rest, and Pasitelidas their commander amongst them. Brasidas +meanwhile had advanced to relieve Torone, and had only about four miles more to +go when he heard of its fall on the road, and turned back again. Cleon and the +Athenians set up two trophies, one by the harbour, the other by the +fortification and, making slaves of the wives and children of the Toronaeans, +sent the men with the Peloponnesians and any Chalcidians that were there, to +the number of seven hundred, to Athens; whence, however, they all came home +afterwards, the Peloponnesians on the conclusion of peace, and the rest by +being exchanged against other prisoners with the Olynthians. About the same +time Panactum, a fortress on the Athenian border, was taken by treachery by the +Boeotians. Meanwhile Cleon, after placing a garrison in Torone, weighed anchor +and sailed around Athos on his way to Amphipolis. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time Phaeax, son of Erasistratus, set sail with two colleagues +as ambassador from Athens to Italy and Sicily. The Leontines, upon the +departure of the Athenians from Sicily after the pacification, had placed a +number of new citizens upon the roll, and the commons had a design for +redividing the land; but the upper classes, aware of their intention, called in +the Syracusans and expelled the commons. These last were scattered in various +directions; but the upper classes came to an agreement with the Syracusans, +abandoned and laid waste their city, and went and lived at Syracuse, where they +were made citizens. Afterwards some of them were dissatisfied, and leaving +Syracuse occupied Phocaeae, a quarter of the town of Leontini, and Bricinniae, +a strong place in the Leontine country, and being there joined by most of the +exiled commons carried on war from the fortifications. The Athenians hearing +this, sent Phaeax to see if they could not by some means so convince their +allies there and the rest of the Sicilians of the ambitious designs of Syracuse +as to induce them to form a general coalition against her, and thus save the +commons of Leontini. Arrived in Sicily, Phaeax succeeded at Camarina and +Agrigentum, but meeting with a repulse at Gela did not go on to the rest, as he +saw that he should not succeed with them, but returned through the country of +the Sicels to Catana, and after visiting Bricinniae as he passed, and +encouraging its inhabitants, sailed back to Athens. +</p> + +<p> +During his voyage along the coast to and from Sicily, he treated with some +cities in Italy on the subject of friendship with Athens, and also fell in with +some Locrian settlers exiled from Messina, who had been sent thither when the +Locrians were called in by one of the factions that divided Messina after the +pacification of Sicily, and Messina came for a time into the hands of the +Locrians. These being met by Phaeax on their return home received no injury at +his hands, as the Locrians had agreed with him for a treaty with Athens. They +were the only people of the allies who, when the reconciliation between the +Sicilians took place, had not made peace with her; nor indeed would they have +done so now, if they had not been pressed by a war with the Hipponians and +Medmaeans who lived on their border, and were colonists of theirs. Phaeax +meanwhile proceeded on his voyage, and at length arrived at Athens. +</p> + +<p> +Cleon, whom we left on his voyage from Torone to Amphipolis, made Eion his +base, and after an unsuccessful assault upon the Andrian colony of Stagirus, +took Galepsus, a colony of Thasos, by storm. He now sent envoys to Perdiccas to +command his attendance with an army, as provided by the alliance; and others to +Thrace, to Polles, king of the Odomantians, who was to bring as many Thracian +mercenaries as possible; and himself remained inactive in Eion, awaiting their +arrival. Informed of this, Brasidas on his part took up a position of +observation upon Cerdylium, a place situated in the Argilian country on high +ground across the river, not far from Amphipolis, and commanding a view on all +sides, and thus made it impossible for Cleon’s army to move without his +seeing it; for he fully expected that Cleon, despising the scanty numbers of +his opponent, would march against Amphipolis with the force that he had got +with him. At the same time Brasidas made his preparations, calling to his +standard fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries and all the Edonians, horse and +targeteers; he also had a thousand Myrcinian and Chalcidian targeteers, besides +those in Amphipolis, and a force of heavy infantry numbering altogether about +two thousand, and three hundred Hellenic horse. Fifteen hundred of these he had +with him upon Cerdylium; the rest were stationed with Clearidas in Amphipolis. +</p> + +<p> +After remaining quiet for some time, Cleon was at length obliged to do as +Brasidas expected. His soldiers, tired of their inactivity, began also +seriously to reflect on the weakness and incompetence of their commander, and +the skill and valour that would be opposed to him, and on their own original +unwillingness to accompany him. These murmurs coming to the ears of Cleon, he +resolved not to disgust the army by keeping it in the same place, and broke up +his camp and advanced. The temper of the general was what it had been at Pylos, +his success on that occasion having given him confidence in his capacity. He +never dreamed of any one coming out to fight him, but said that he was rather +going up to view the place; and if he waited for his reinforcements, it was not +in order to make victory secure in case he should be compelled to engage, but +to be enabled to surround and storm the city. He accordingly came and posted +his army upon a strong hill in front of Amphipolis, and proceeded to examine +the lake formed by the Strymon, and how the town lay on the side of Thrace. He +thought to retire at pleasure without fighting, as there was no one to be seen +upon the wall or coming out of the gates, all of which were shut. Indeed, it +seemed a mistake not to have brought down engines with him; he could then have +taken the town, there being no one to defend it. +</p> + +<p> +As soon as Brasidas saw the Athenians in motion he descended himself from +Cerdylium and entered Amphipolis. He did not venture to go out in regular order +against the Athenians: he mistrusted his strength, and thought it inadequate to +the attempt; not in numbers—these were not so unequal—but in +quality, the flower of the Athenian army being in the field, with the best of +the Lemnians and Imbrians. He therefore prepared to assail them by stratagem. +By showing the enemy the number of his troops, and the shifts which he had been +put to to to arm them, he thought that he should have less chance of beating +him than by not letting him have a sight of them, and thus learn how good a +right he had to despise them. He accordingly picked out a hundred and fifty +heavy infantry and, putting the rest under Clearidas, determined to attack +suddenly before the Athenians retired; thinking that he should not have again +such a chance of catching them alone, if their reinforcements were once allowed +to come up; and so calling all his soldiers together in order to encourage them +and explain his intention, spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Peloponnesians, the character of the country from which we have come, +one which has always owed its freedom to valour, and the fact that you are +Dorians and the enemy you are about to fight Ionians, whom you are accustomed +to beat, are things that do not need further comment. But the plan of attack +that I propose to pursue, this it is as well to explain, in order that the fact +of our adventuring with a part instead of with the whole of our forces may not +damp your courage by the apparent disadvantage at which it places you. I +imagine it is the poor opinion that he has of us, and the fact that he has no +idea of any one coming out to engage him, that has made the enemy march up to +the place and carelessly look about him as he is doing, without noticing us. +But the most successful soldier will always be the man who most happily detects +a blunder like this, and who carefully consulting his own means makes his +attack not so much by open and regular approaches, as by seizing the +opportunity of the moment; and these stratagems, which do the greatest service +to our friends by most completely deceiving our enemies, have the most +brilliant name in war. Therefore, while their careless confidence continues, +and they are still thinking, as in my judgment they are now doing, more of +retreat than of maintaining their position, while their spirit is slack and not +high-strung with expectation, I with the men under my command will, if +possible, take them by surprise and fall with a run upon their centre; and do +you, Clearidas, afterwards, when you see me already upon them, and, as is +likely, dealing terror among them, take with you the Amphipolitans, and the +rest of the allies, and suddenly open the gates and dash at them, and hasten to +engage as quickly as you can. That is our best chance of establishing a panic +among them, as a fresh assailant has always more terrors for an enemy than the +one he is immediately engaged with. Show yourself a brave man, as a Spartan +should; and do you, allies, follow him like men, and remember that zeal, +honour, and obedience mark the good soldier, and that this day will make you +either free men and allies of Lacedaemon, or slaves of Athens; even if you +escape without personal loss of liberty or life, your bondage will be on +harsher terms than before, and you will also hinder the liberation of the rest +of the Hellenes. No cowardice then on your part, seeing the greatness of the +issues at stake, and I will show that what I preach to others I can practise +myself.” +</p> + +<p> +After this brief speech Brasidas himself prepared for the sally, and placed the +rest with Clearidas at the Thracian gates to support him as had been agreed. +Meanwhile he had been seen coming down from Cerdylium and then in the city, +which is overlooked from the outside, sacrificing near the temple of Athene; in +short, all his movements had been observed, and word was brought to Cleon, who +had at the moment gone on to look about him, that the whole of the +enemy’s force could be seen in the town, and that the feet of horses and +men in great numbers were visible under the gates, as if a sally were intended. +Upon hearing this he went up to look, and having done so, being unwilling to +venture upon the decisive step of a battle before his reinforcements came up, +and fancying that he would have time to retire, bid the retreat be sounded and +sent orders to the men to effect it by moving on the left wing in the direction +of Eion, which was indeed the only way practicable. This however not being +quick enough for him, he joined the retreat in person and made the right wing +wheel round, thus turning its unarmed side to the enemy. It was then that +Brasidas, seeing the Athenian force in motion and his opportunity come, said to +the men with him and the rest: “Those fellows will never stand before us, +one can see that by the way their spears and heads are going. Troops which do +as they do seldom stand a charge. Quick, someone, and open the gates I spoke +of, and let us be out and at them with no fears for the result.” +Accordingly issuing out by the palisade gate and by the first in the long wall +then existing, he ran at the top of his speed along the straight road, where +the trophy now stands as you go by the steepest part of the hill, and fell upon +and routed the centre of the Athenians, panic-stricken by their own disorder +and astounded at his audacity. At the same moment Clearidas in execution of his +orders issued out from the Thracian gates to support him, and also attacked the +enemy. The result was that the Athenians, suddenly and unexpectedly attacked on +both sides, fell into confusion; and their left towards Eion, which had already +got on some distance, at once broke and fled. Just as it was in full retreat +and Brasidas was passing on to attack the right, he received a wound; but his +fall was not perceived by the Athenians, as he was taken up by those near him +and carried off the field. The Athenian right made a better stand, and though +Cleon, who from the first had no thought of fighting, at once fled and was +overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian targeteer, his infantry forming in close +order upon the hill twice or thrice repulsed the attacks of Clearidas, and did +not finally give way until they were surrounded and routed by the missiles of +the Myrcinian and Chalcidian horse and the targeteers. Thus the Athenian army +was all now in flight; and such as escaped being killed in the battle, or by +the Chalcidian horse and the targeteers, dispersed among the hills, and with +difficulty made their way to Eion. The men who had taken up and rescued +Brasidas, brought him into the town with the breath still in him: he lived to +hear of the victory of his troops, and not long after expired. The rest of the +army returning with Clearidas from the pursuit stripped the dead and set up a +trophy. +</p> + +<p> +After this all the allies attended in arms and buried Brasidas at the public +expense in the city, in front of what is now the marketplace, and the +Amphipolitans, having enclosed his tomb, ever afterwards sacrifice to him as a +hero and have given to him the honour of games and annual offerings. They +constituted him the founder of their colony, and pulled down the Hagnonic +erections, and obliterated everything that could be interpreted as a memorial +of his having founded the place; for they considered that Brasidas had been +their preserver, and courting as they did the alliance of Lacedaemon for fear +of Athens, in their present hostile relations with the latter they could no +longer with the same advantage or satisfaction pay Hagnon his honours. They +also gave the Athenians back their dead. About six hundred of the latter had +fallen and only seven of the enemy, owing to there having been no regular +engagement, but the affair of accident and panic that I have described. After +taking up their dead the Athenians sailed off home, while Clearidas and his +troops remained to arrange matters at Amphipolis. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time three Lacedaemonians—Ramphias, Autocharidas, and +Epicydidas—led a reinforcement of nine hundred heavy infantry to the +towns in the direction of Thrace, and arriving at Heraclea in Trachis reformed +matters there as seemed good to them. While they delayed there, this battle +took place and so the summer ended. +</p> + +<p> +With the beginning of the winter following, Ramphias and his companions +penetrated as far as Pierium in Thessaly; but as the Thessalians opposed their +further advance, and Brasidas whom they came to reinforce was dead, they turned +back home, thinking that the moment had gone by, the Athenians being defeated +and gone, and themselves not equal to the execution of Brasidas’s +designs. The main cause however of their return was because they knew that when +they set out Lacedaemonian opinion was really in favour of peace. +</p> + +<p> +Indeed it so happened that directly after the battle of Amphipolis and the +retreat of Ramphias from Thessaly, both sides ceased to prosecute the war and +turned their attention to peace. Athens had suffered severely at Delium, and +again shortly afterwards at Amphipolis, and had no longer that confidence in +her strength which had made her before refuse to treat, in the belief of +ultimate victory which her success at the moment had inspired; besides, she was +afraid of her allies being tempted by her reverses to rebel more generally, and +repented having let go the splendid opportunity for peace which the affair of +Pylos had offered. Lacedaemon, on the other hand, found the event of the war to +falsify her notion that a few years would suffice for the overthrow of the +power of the Athenians by the devastation of their land. She had suffered on +the island a disaster hitherto unknown at Sparta; she saw her country plundered +from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were deserting, and she was in constant +apprehension that those who remained in Peloponnese would rely upon those +outside and take advantage of the situation to renew their old attempts at +revolution. Besides this, as chance would have it, her thirty years’ +truce with the Argives was upon the point of expiring; and they refused to +renew it unless Cynuria were restored to them; so that it seemed impossible to +fight Argos and Athens at once. She also suspected some of the cities in +Peloponnese of intending to go over to the enemy and that was indeed the case. +</p> + +<p> +These considerations made both sides disposed for an accommodation; the +Lacedaemonians being probably the most eager, as they ardently desired to +recover the men taken upon the island, the Spartans among whom belonged to the +first families and were accordingly related to the governing body in +Lacedaemon. Negotiations had been begun directly after their capture, but the +Athenians in their hour of triumph would not consent to any reasonable terms; +though after their defeat at Delium, Lacedaemon, knowing that they would be now +more inclined to listen, at once concluded the armistice for a year, during +which they were to confer together and see if a longer period could not be +agreed upon. +</p> + +<p> +Now, however, after the Athenian defeat at Amphipolis, and the death of Cleon +and Brasidas, who had been the two principal opponents of peace on either +side—the latter from the success and honour which war gave him, the +former because he thought that, if tranquillity were restored, his crimes would +be more open to detection and his slanders less credited—the foremost +candidates for power in either city, Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of +Lacedaemon, and Nicias, son of Niceratus, the most fortunate general of his +time, each desired peace more ardently than ever. Nicias, while still happy and +honoured, wished to secure his good fortune, to obtain a present release from +trouble for himself and his countrymen, and hand down to posterity a name as an +ever-successful statesman, and thought the way to do this was to keep out of +danger and commit himself as little as possible to fortune, and that peace +alone made this keeping out of danger possible. Pleistoanax, again, was +assailed by his enemies for his restoration, and regularly held up by them to +the prejudice of his countrymen, upon every reverse that befell them, as though +his unjust restoration were the cause; the accusation being that he and his +brother Aristocles had bribed the prophetess of Delphi to tell the +Lacedaemonian deputations which successively arrived at the temple to bring +home the seed of the demigod son of Zeus from abroad, else they would have to +plough with a silver share. In this way, it was insisted, in time he had +induced the Lacedaemonians in the nineteenth year of his exile to Lycaeum +(whither he had gone when banished on suspicion of having been bribed to +retreat from Attica, and had built half his house within the consecrated +precinct of Zeus for fear of the Lacedaemonians), to restore him with the same +dances and sacrifices with which they had instituted their kings upon the first +settlement of Lacedaemon. The smart of this accusation, and the reflection that +in peace no disaster could occur, and that when Lacedaemon had recovered her +men there would be nothing for his enemies to take hold of (whereas, while war +lasted, the highest station must always bear the scandal of everything that +went wrong), made him ardently desire a settlement. Accordingly this winter was +employed in conferences; and as spring rapidly approached, the Lacedaemonians +sent round orders to the cities to prepare for a fortified occupation of +Attica, and held this as a sword over the heads of the Athenians to induce them +to listen to their overtures; and at last, after many claims had been urged on +either side at the conferences a peace was agreed on upon the following basis. +Each party was to restore its conquests, but Athens was to keep Nisaea; her +demand for Plataea being met by the Thebans asserting that they had acquired +the place not by force or treachery, but by the voluntary adhesion upon +agreement of its citizens; and the same, according to the Athenian account, +being the history of her acquisition of Nisaea. This arranged, the +Lacedaemonians summoned their allies, and all voting for peace except the +Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians, who did not approve of these +proceedings, they concluded the treaty and made peace, each of the contracting +parties swearing to the following articles: +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians and Lacedaemonians and their allies made a treaty, and swore to +it, city by city, as follows; +</p> + +<p> +1. Touching the national temples, there shall be a free passage by land and by +sea to all who wish it, to sacrifice, travel, consult, and attend the oracle or +games, according to the customs of their countries. +</p> + +<p> +2. The temple and shrine of Apollo at Delphi and the Delphians shall be +governed by their own laws, taxed by their own state, and judged by their own +judges, the land and the people, according to the custom of their country. +</p> + +<p> +3. The treaty shall be binding for fifty years upon the Athenians and the +allies of the Athenians, and upon the Lacedaemonians and the allies of the +Lacedaemonians, without fraud or hurt by land or by sea. +</p> + +<p> +4. It shall not be lawful to take up arms, with intent to do hurt, either for +the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies, or +for the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedaemonians and their allies, +in any way or means whatsoever. But should any difference arise between them +they are to have recourse to law and oaths, according as may be agreed between +the parties. +</p> + +<p> +5. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall give back Amphipolis to the +Athenians. Nevertheless, in the case of cities given up by the Lacedaemonians +to the Athenians, the inhabitants shall be allowed to go where they please and +to take their property with them: and the cities shall be independent, paying +only the tribute of Aristides. And it shall not be lawful for the Athenians or +their allies to carry on war against them after the treaty has been concluded, +so long as the tribute is paid. The cities referred to are Argilus, Stagirus, +Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. These cities shall be neutral, +allies neither of the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians: but if the cities +consent, it shall be lawful for the Athenians to make them their allies, +provided always that the cities wish it. The Mecybernaeans, Sanaeans, and +Singaeans shall inhabit their own cities, as also the Olynthians and +Acanthians: but the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall give back Panactum to +the Athenians. +</p> + +<p> +6. The Athenians shall give back Coryphasium, Cythera, Methana, Lacedaemonians +that are in the prison at Athens or elsewhere in the Athenian dominions, and +shall let go the Peloponnesians besieged in Scione, and all others in Scione +that are allies of the Lacedaemonians, and all whom Brasidas sent in there, and +any others of the allies of the Lacedaemonians that may be in the prison at +Athens or elsewhere in the Athenian dominions. +</p> + +<p> +7. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall in like manner give back any of +the Athenians or their allies that they may have in their hands. +</p> + +<p> +8. In the case of Scione, Torone, and Sermylium, and any other cities that the +Athenians may have, the Athenians may adopt such measures as they please. +</p> + +<p> +9. The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, +city by city. Every man shall swear by the most binding oath of his country, +seventeen from each city. The oath shall be as follows; “I will abide by +this agreement and treaty honestly and without deceit.” In the same way +an oath shall be taken by the Lacedaemonians and their allies to the Athenians: +and the oath shall be renewed annually by both parties. Pillars shall be +erected at Olympia, Pythia, the Isthmus, at Athens in the Acropolis, and at +Lacedaemon in the temple at Amyclae. +</p> + +<p> +10. If anything be forgotten, whatever it be, and on whatever point, it shall +be consistent with their oath for both parties, the Athenians and +Lacedaemonians, to alter it, according to their discretion. +</p> + +<p> +The treaty begins from the ephoralty of Pleistolas in Lacedaemon, on the 27th +day of the month of Artemisium, and from the archonship, of Alcaeus at Athens, +on the 25th day of the month of Elaphebolion. Those who took the oath and +poured the libations for the Lacedaemonians were Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, +Damagetis, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, +Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinadas, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus: for the +Athenians, Lampon, Isthmonicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, +Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, +Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes. +</p> + +<p> +This treaty was made in the spring, just at the end of winter, directly after +the city festival of Dionysus, just ten years, with the difference of a few +days, from the first invasion of Attica and the commencement of this war. This +must be calculated by the seasons rather than by trusting to the enumeration of +the names of the several magistrates or offices of honour that are used to mark +past events. Accuracy is impossible where an event may have occurred in the +beginning, or middle, or at any period in their tenure of office. But by +computing by summers and winters, the method adopted in this history, it will +be found that, each of these amounting to half a year, there were ten summers +and as many winters contained in this first war. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, to whose lot it fell to begin the work of +restitution, immediately set free all the prisoners of war in their possession, +and sent Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas as envoys to the towns in the +direction of Thrace, to order Clearidas to hand over Amphipolis to the +Athenians, and the rest of their allies each to accept the treaty as it +affected them. They, however, did not like its terms, and refused to accept it; +Clearidas also, willing to oblige the Chalcidians, would not hand over the +town, averring his inability to do so against their will. Meanwhile he hastened +in person to Lacedaemon with envoys from the place, to defend his disobedience +against the possible accusations of Ischagoras and his companions, and also to +see whether it was too late for the agreement to be altered; and on finding the +Lacedaemonians were bound, quickly set out back again with instructions from +them to hand over the place, if possible, or at all events to bring out the +Peloponnesians that were in it. +</p> + +<p> +The allies happened to be present in person at Lacedaemon, and those who had +not accepted the treaty were now asked by the Lacedaemonians to adopt it. This, +however, they refused to do, for the same reasons as before, unless a fairer +one than the present were agreed upon; and remaining firm in their +determination were dismissed by the Lacedaemonians, who now decided on forming +an alliance with the Athenians, thinking that Argos, who had refused the +application of Ampelidas and Lichas for a renewal of the treaty, would without +Athens be no longer formidable, and that the rest of the Peloponnese would be +most likely to keep quiet, if the coveted alliance of Athens were shut against +them. Accordingly, after conference with the Athenian ambassadors, an alliance +was agreed upon and oaths were exchanged, upon the terms following: +</p> + +<p> +1. The Lacedaemonians shall be allies of the Athenians for fifty years. +</p> + +<p> +2. Should any enemy invade the territory of Lacedaemon and injure the +Lacedaemonians, the Athenians shall help in such way as they most effectively +can, according to their power. But if the invader be gone after plundering the +country, that city shall be the enemy of Lacedaemon and Athens, and shall be +chastised by both, and one shall not make peace without the other. This to be +honestly, loyally, and without fraud. +</p> + +<p> +3. Should any enemy invade the territory of Athens and injure the Athenians, +the Lacedaemonians shall help them in such way as they most effectively can, +according to their power. But if the invader be gone after plundering the +country, that city shall be the enemy of Lacedaemon and Athens, and shall be +chastised by both, and one shall not make peace without the other. This to be +honestly, loyally, and without fraud. +</p> + +<p> +4. Should the slave population rise, the Athenians shall help the +Lacedaemonians with all their might, according to their power. +</p> + +<p> +5. This treaty shall be sworn to by the same persons on either side that swore +to the other. It shall be renewed annually by the Lacedaemonians going to +Athens for the Dionysia, and the Athenians to Lacedaemon for the Hyacinthia, +and a pillar shall be set up by either party: at Lacedaemon near the statue of +Apollo at Amyclae, and at Athens on the Acropolis near the statue of Athene. +Should the Lacedaemonians and Athenians see to add to or take away from the +alliance in any particular, it shall be consistent with their oaths for both +parties to do so, according to their discretion. +</p> + +<p> +Those who took the oath for the Lacedaemonians were Pleistoanax, Agis, +Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, +Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, and +Laphilus; for the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, +Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, +Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes. +</p> + +<p> +This alliance was made not long after the treaty; and the Athenians gave back +the men from the island to the Lacedaemonians, and the summer of the eleventh +year began. This completes the history of the first war, which occupied the +whole of the ten years previously. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0016" id="link2HCH0016"></a> +CHAPTER XVI </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Feeling against Sparta in Peloponnese—League of the Mantineans, Eleans, +Argives, and Athenians—Battle of Mantinea and breaking up of the League +</p> + +<p> +After the treaty and the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, +concluded after the ten years’ war, in the ephorate of Pleistolas at +Lacedaemon, and the archonship of Alcaeus at Athens, the states which had +accepted them were at peace; but the Corinthians and some of the cities in +Peloponnese trying to disturb the settlement, a fresh agitation was instantly +commenced by the allies against Lacedaemon. Further, the Lacedaemonians, as +time went on, became suspected by the Athenians through their not performing +some of the provisions in the treaty; and though for six years and ten months +they abstained from invasion of each other’s territory, yet abroad an +unstable armistice did not prevent either party doing the other the most +effectual injury, until they were finally obliged to break the treaty made +after the ten years’ war and to have recourse to open hostilities. +</p> + +<p> +The history of this period has been also written by the same Thucydides, an +Athenian, in the chronological order of events by summers and winters, to the +time when the Lacedaemonians and their allies put an end to the Athenian +empire, and took the Long Walls and Piraeus. The war had then lasted for +twenty-seven years in all. Only a mistaken judgment can object to including the +interval of treaty in the war. Looked at by the light of facts it cannot, it +will be found, be rationally considered a state of peace, where neither party +either gave or got back all that they had agreed, apart from the violations of +it which occurred on both sides in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and other +instances, and the fact that the allies in the direction of Thrace were in as +open hostility as ever, while the Boeotians had only a truce renewed every ten +days. So that the first ten years’ war, the treacherous armistice that +followed it, and the subsequent war will, calculating by the seasons, be found +to make up the number of years which I have mentioned, with the difference of a +few days, and to afford an instance of faith in oracles being for once +justified by the event. I certainly all along remember from the beginning to +the end of the war its being commonly declared that it would last thrice nine +years. I lived through the whole of it, being of an age to comprehend events, +and giving my attention to them in order to know the exact truth about them. It +was also my fate to be an exile from my country for twenty years after my +command at Amphipolis; and being present with both parties, and more especially +with the Peloponnesians by reason of my exile, I had leisure to observe affairs +somewhat particularly. I will accordingly now relate the differences that arose +after the ten years’ war, the breach of the treaty, and the hostilities +that followed. +</p> + +<p> +After the conclusion of the fifty years’ truce and of the subsequent +alliance, the embassies from Peloponnese which had been summoned for this +business returned from Lacedaemon. The rest went straight home, but the +Corinthians first turned aside to Argos and opened negotiations with some of +the men in office there, pointing out that Lacedaemon could have no good end in +view, but only the subjugation of Peloponnese, or she would never have entered +into treaty and alliance with the once detested Athenians, and that the duty of +consulting for the safety of Peloponnese had now fallen upon Argos, who should +immediately pass a decree inviting any Hellenic state that chose, such state +being independent and accustomed to meet fellow powers upon the fair and equal +ground of law and justice, to make a defensive alliance with the Argives; +appointing a few individuals with plenipotentiary powers, instead of making the +people the medium of negotiation, in order that, in the case of an applicant +being rejected, the fact of his overtures might not be made public. They said +that many would come over from hatred of the Lacedaemonians. After this +explanation of their views, the Corinthians returned home. +</p> + +<p> +The persons with whom they had communicated reported the proposal to their +government and people, and the Argives passed the decree and chose twelve men +to negotiate an alliance for any Hellenic state that wished it, except Athens +and Lacedaemon, neither of which should be able to join without reference to +the Argive people. Argos came into the plan the more readily because she saw +that war with Lacedaemon was inevitable, the truce being on the point of +expiring; and also because she hoped to gain the supremacy of Peloponnese. For +at this time Lacedaemon had sunk very low in public estimation because of her +disasters, while the Argives were in a most flourishing condition, having taken +no part in the Attic war, but having on the contrary profited largely by their +neutrality. The Argives accordingly prepared to receive into alliance any of +the Hellenes that desired it. +</p> + +<p> +The Mantineans and their allies were the first to come over through fear of the +Lacedaemonians. Having taken advantage of the war against Athens to reduce a +large part of Arcadia into subjection, they thought that Lacedaemon would not +leave them undisturbed in their conquests, now that she had leisure to +interfere, and consequently gladly turned to a powerful city like Argos, the +historical enemy of the Lacedaemonians, and a sister democracy. Upon the +defection of Mantinea, the rest of Peloponnese at once began to agitate the +propriety of following her example, conceiving that the Mantineans not have +changed sides without good reason; besides which they were angry with +Lacedaemon among other reasons for having inserted in the treaty with Athens +that it should be consistent with their oaths for both parties, Lacedaemonians +and Athenians, to add to or take away from it according to their discretion. It +was this clause that was the real origin of the panic in Peloponnese, by +exciting suspicions of a Lacedaemonian and Athenian combination against their +liberties: any alteration should properly have been made conditional upon the +consent of the whole body of the allies. With these apprehensions there was a +very general desire in each state to place itself in alliance with Argos. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime the Lacedaemonians perceiving the agitation going on in +Peloponnese, and that Corinth was the author of it and was herself about to +enter into alliance with the Argives, sent ambassadors thither in the hope of +preventing what was in contemplation. They accused her of having brought it all +about, and told her that she could not desert Lacedaemon and become the ally of +Argos, without adding violation of her oaths to the crime which she had already +committed in not accepting the treaty with Athens, when it had been expressly +agreed that the decision of the majority of the allies should be binding, +unless the gods or heroes stood in the way. Corinth in her answer, delivered +before those of her allies who had like her refused to accept the treaty, and +whom she had previously invited to attend, refrained from openly stating the +injuries she complained of, such as the non-recovery of Sollium or Anactorium +from the Athenians, or any other point in which she thought she had been +prejudiced, but took shelter under the pretext that she could not give up her +Thracian allies, to whom her separate individual security had been given, when +they first rebelled with Potidæa, as well as upon subsequent occasions. She +denied, therefore, that she committed any violation of her oaths to the allies +in not entering into the treaty with Athens; having sworn upon the faith of the +gods to her Thracian friends, she could not honestly give them up. Besides, the +expression was, “unless the gods or heroes stand in the way.” Now +here, as it appeared to her, the gods stood in the way. This was what she said +on the subject of her former oaths. As to the Argive alliance, she would confer +with her friends and do whatever was right. The Lacedaemonian envoys returning +home, some Argive ambassadors who happened to be in Corinth pressed her to +conclude the alliance without further delay, but were told to attend at the +next congress to be held at Corinth. +</p> + +<p> +Immediately afterwards an Elean embassy arrived, and first making an alliance +with Corinth went on from thence to Argos, according to their instructions, and +became allies of the Argives, their country being just then at enmity with +Lacedaemon and Lepreum. Some time back there had been a war between the +Lepreans and some of the Arcadians; and the Eleans being called in by the +former with the offer of half their lands, had put an end to the war, and +leaving the land in the hands of its Leprean occupiers had imposed upon them +the tribute of a talent to the Olympian Zeus. Till the Attic war this tribute +was paid by the Lepreans, who then took the war as an excuse for no longer +doing so, and upon the Eleans using force appealed to Lacedaemon. The case was +thus submitted to her arbitrament; but the Eleans, suspecting the fairness of +the tribunal, renounced the reference and laid waste the Leprean territory. The +Lacedaemonians nevertheless decided that the Lepreans were independent and the +Eleans aggressors, and as the latter did not abide by the arbitration, sent a +garrison of heavy infantry into Lepreum. Upon this the Eleans, holding that +Lacedaemon had received one of their rebel subjects, put forward the convention +providing that each confederate should come out of the Attic war in possession +of what he had when he went into it, and considering that justice had not been +done them went over to the Argives, and now made the alliance through their +ambassadors, who had been instructed for that purpose. Immediately after them +the Corinthians and the Thracian Chalcidians became allies of Argos. Meanwhile +the Boeotians and Megarians, who acted together, remained quiet, being left to +do as they pleased by Lacedaemon, and thinking that the Argive democracy would +not suit so well with their aristocratic government as the Lacedaemonian +constitution. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time in this summer Athens succeeded in reducing Scione, put the +adult males to death, and, making slaves of the women and children, gave the +land for the Plataeans to live in. She also brought back the Delians to Delos, +moved by her misfortunes in the field and by the commands of the god at Delphi. +Meanwhile the Phocians and Locrians commenced hostilities. The Corinthians and +Argives, being now in alliance, went to Tegea to bring about its defection from +Lacedaemon, seeing that, if so considerable a state could be persuaded to join, +all Peloponnese would be with them. But when the Tegeans said that they would +do nothing against Lacedaemon, the hitherto zealous Corinthians relaxed their +activity, and began to fear that none of the rest would now come over. Still +they went to the Boeotians and tried to persuade them to alliance and a common +action generally with Argos and themselves, and also begged them to go with +them to Athens and obtain for them a ten days’ truce similar to that made +between the Athenians and Boeotians not long after the fifty years’ +treaty, and, in the event of the Athenians refusing, to throw up the armistice, +and not make any truce in future without Corinth. These were the requests of +the Corinthians. The Boeotians stopped them on the subject of the Argive +alliance, but went with them to Athens, where however they failed to obtain the +ten days’ truce; the Athenian answer being that the Corinthians had truce +already, as being allies of Lacedaemon. Nevertheless the Boeotians did not +throw up their ten days’ truce, in spite of the prayers and reproaches of +the Corinthians for their breach of faith; and these last had to content +themselves with a de facto armistice with Athens. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer the Lacedaemonians marched into Arcadia with their whole levy +under Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, against the +Parrhasians, who were subjects of Mantinea, and a faction of whom had invited +their aid. They also meant to demolish, if possible, the fort of Cypsela which +the Mantineans had built and garrisoned in the Parrhasian territory, to annoy +the district of Sciritis in Laconia. The Lacedaemonians accordingly laid waste +the Parrhasian country, and the Mantineans, placing their town in the hands of +an Argive garrison, addressed themselves to the defence of their confederacy, +but being unable to save Cypsela or the Parrhasian towns went back to Mantinea. +Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians made the Parrhasians independent, razed the +fortress, and returned home. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer the soldiers from Thrace who had gone out with Brasidas came +back, having been brought from thence after the treaty by Clearidas; and the +Lacedaemonians decreed that the Helots who had fought with Brasidas should be +free and allowed to live where they liked, and not long afterwards settled them +with the Neodamodes at Lepreum, which is situated on the Laconian and Elean +border; Lacedaemon being at this time at enmity with Elis. Those however of the +Spartans who had been taken prisoners on the island and had surrendered their +arms might, it was feared, suppose that they were to be subjected to some +degradation in consequence of their misfortune, and so make some attempt at +revolution, if left in possession of their franchise. These were therefore at +once disfranchised, although some of them were in office at the time, and thus +placed under a disability to take office, or buy and sell anything. After some +time, however, the franchise was restored to them. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer the Dians took Thyssus, a town on Acte by Athos in alliance +with Athens. During the whole of this summer intercourse between the Athenians +and Peloponnesians continued, although each party began to suspect the other +directly after the treaty, because of the places specified in it not being +restored. Lacedaemon, to whose lot it had fallen to begin by restoring +Amphipolis and the other towns, had not done so. She had equally failed to get +the treaty accepted by her Thracian allies, or by the Boeotians or the +Corinthians; although she was continually promising to unite with Athens in +compelling their compliance, if it were longer refused. She also kept fixing a +time at which those who still refused to come in were to be declared enemies to +both parties, but took care not to bind herself by any written agreement. +Meanwhile the Athenians, seeing none of these professions performed in fact, +began to suspect the honesty of her intentions, and consequently not only +refused to comply with her demands for Pylos, but also repented having given up +the prisoners from the island, and kept tight hold of the other places, until +Lacedaemon’s part of the treaty should be fulfilled. Lacedaemon, on the +other hand, said she had done what she could, having given up the Athenian +prisoners of war in her possession, evacuated Thrace, and performed everything +else in her power. Amphipolis it was out of her ability to restore; but she +would endeavour to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians into the treaty, to +recover Panactum, and send home all the Athenian prisoners of war in Boeotia. +Meanwhile she required that Pylos should be restored, or at all events that the +Messenians and Helots should be withdrawn, as her troops had been from Thrace, +and the place garrisoned, if necessary, by the Athenians themselves. After a +number of different conferences held during the summer, she succeeded in +persuading Athens to withdraw from Pylos the Messenians and the rest of the +Helots and deserters from Laconia, who were accordingly settled by her at +Cranii in Cephallenia. Thus during this summer there was peace and intercourse +between the two peoples. +</p> + +<p> +Next winter, however, the ephors under whom the treaty had been made were no +longer in office, and some of their successors were directly opposed to it. +Embassies now arrived from the Lacedaemonian confederacy, and the Athenians, +Boeotians, and Corinthians also presented themselves at Lacedaemon, and after +much discussion and no agreement between them, separated for their several +homes; when Cleobulus and Xenares, the two ephors who were the most anxious to +break off the treaty, took advantage of this opportunity to communicate +privately with the Boeotians and Corinthians, and, advising them to act as much +as possible together, instructed the former first to enter into alliance with +Argos, and then try and bring themselves and the Argives into alliance with +Lacedaemon. The Boeotians would so be least likely to be compelled to come into +the Attic treaty; and the Lacedaemonians would prefer gaining the friendship +and alliance of Argos even at the price of the hostility of Athens and the +rupture of the treaty. The Boeotians knew that an honourable friendship with +Argos had been long the desire of Lacedaemon; for the Lacedaemonians believed +that this would considerably facilitate the conduct of the war outside +Peloponnese. Meanwhile they begged the Boeotians to place Panactum in her hands +in order that she might, if possible, obtain Pylos in exchange for it, and so +be more in a position to resume hostilities with Athens. +</p> + +<p> +After receiving these instructions for their governments from Xenares and +Cleobulus and their friends at Lacedaemon, the Boeotians and Corinthians +departed. On their way home they were joined by two persons high in office at +Argos, who had waited for them on the road, and who now sounded them upon the +possibility of the Boeotians joining the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans in +becoming the allies of Argos, in the idea that if this could be effected they +would be able, thus united, to make peace or war as they pleased either against +Lacedaemon or any other power. The Boeotian envoys were were pleased at thus +hearing themselves accidentally asked to do what their friends at Lacedaemon +had told them; and the two Argives perceiving that their proposal was +agreeable, departed with a promise to send ambassadors to the Boeotians. On +their arrival the Boeotians reported to the Boeotarchs what had been said to +them at Lacedaemon and also by the Argives who had met them, and the +Boeotarchs, pleased with the idea, embraced it with the more eagerness from the +lucky coincidence of Argos soliciting the very thing wanted by their friends at +Lacedaemon. Shortly afterwards ambassadors appeared from Argos with the +proposals indicated; and the Boeotarchs approved of the terms and dismissed the +ambassadors with a promise to send envoys to Argos to negotiate the alliance. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime it was decided by the Boeotarchs, the Corinthians, the +Megarians, and the envoys from Thrace first to interchange oaths together to +give help to each other whenever it was required and not to make war or peace +except in common; after which the Boeotians and Megarians, who acted together, +should make the alliance with Argos. But before the oaths were taken the +Boeotarchs communicated these proposals to the four councils of the Boeotians, +in whom the supreme power resides, and advised them to interchange oaths with +all such cities as should be willing to enter into a defensive league with the +Boeotians. But the members of the Boeotian councils refused their assent to the +proposal, being afraid of offending Lacedaemon by entering into a league with +the deserter Corinth; the Boeotarchs not having acquainted them with what had +passed at Lacedaemon and with the advice given by Cleobulus and Xenares and the +Boeotian partisans there, namely, that they should become allies of Corinth and +Argos as a preliminary to a junction with Lacedaemon; fancying that, even if +they should say nothing about this, the councils would not vote against what +had been decided and advised by the Boeotarchs. This difficulty arising, the +Corinthians and the envoys from Thrace departed without anything having been +concluded; and the Boeotarchs, who had previously intended after carrying this +to try and effect the alliance with Argos, now omitted to bring the Argive +question before the councils, or to send to Argos the envoys whom they had +promised; and a general coldness and delay ensued in the matter. +</p> + +<p> +In this same winter Mecyberna was assaulted and taken by the Olynthians, having +an Athenian garrison inside it. +</p> + +<p> +All this while negotiations had been going on between the Athenians and +Lacedaemonians about the conquests still retained by each, and Lacedaemon, +hoping that if Athens were to get back Panactum from the Boeotians she might +herself recover Pylos, now sent an embassy to the Boeotians, and begged them to +place Panactum and their Athenian prisoners in her hands, in order that she +might exchange them for Pylos. This the Boeotians refused to do, unless +Lacedaemon made a separate alliance with them as she had done with Athens. +Lacedaemon knew that this would be a breach of faith to Athens, as it had been +agreed that neither of them should make peace or war without the other; yet +wishing to obtain Panactum which she hoped to exchange for Pylos, and the party +who pressed for the dissolution of the treaty strongly affecting the Boeotian +connection, she at length concluded the alliance just as winter gave way to +spring; and Panactum was instantly razed. And so the eleventh year of the war +ended. +</p> + +<p> +In the first days of the summer following, the Argives, seeing that the +promised ambassadors from Boeotia did not arrive, and that Panactum was being +demolished, and that a separate alliance had been concluded between the +Boeotians and Lacedaemonians, began to be afraid that Argos might be left +alone, and all the confederacy go over to Lacedaemon. They fancied that the +Boeotians had been persuaded by the Lacedaemonians to raze Panactum and to +enter into the treaty with the Athenians, and that Athens was privy to this +arrangement, and even her alliance, therefore, no longer open to them—a +resource which they had always counted upon, by reason of the dissensions +existing, in the event of the noncontinuance of their treaty with Lacedaemon. +In this strait the Argives, afraid that, as the result of refusing to renew the +treaty with Lacedaemon and of aspiring to the supremacy in Peloponnese, they +would have the Lacedaemonians, Tegeans, Boeotians, and Athenians on their hands +all at once, now hastily sent off Eustrophus and Aeson, who seemed the persons +most likely to be acceptable, as envoys to Lacedaemon, with the view of making +as good a treaty as they could with the Lacedaemonians, upon such terms as +could be got, and being left in peace. +</p> + +<p> +Having reached Lacedaemon, their ambassadors proceeded to negotiate the terms +of the proposed treaty. What the Argives first demanded was that they might be +allowed to refer to the arbitration of some state or private person the +question of the Cynurian land, a piece of frontier territory about which they +have always been disputing, and which contains the towns of Thyrea and Anthene, +and is occupied by the Lacedaemonians. The Lacedaemonians at first said that +they could not allow this point to be discussed, but were ready to conclude +upon the old terms. Eventually, however, the Argive ambassadors succeeded in +obtaining from them this concession: For the present there was to be a truce +for fifty years, but it should be competent for either party, there being +neither plague nor war in Lacedaemon or Argos, to give a formal challenge and +decide the question of this territory by battle, as on a former occasion, when +both sides claimed the victory; pursuit not being allowed beyond the frontier +of Argos or Lacedaemon. The Lacedaemonians at first thought this mere folly; +but at last, anxious at any cost to have the friendship of Argos they agreed to +the terms demanded, and reduced them to writing. However, before any of this +should become binding, the ambassadors were to return to Argos and communicate +with their people and, in the event of their approval, to come at the feast of +the Hyacinthia and take the oaths. +</p> + +<p> +The envoys returned accordingly. In the meantime, while the Argives were +engaged in these negotiations, the Lacedaemonian ambassadors—Andromedes, +Phaedimus, and Antimenidas—who were to receive the prisoners from the +Boeotians and restore them and Panactum to the Athenians, found that the +Boeotians had themselves razed Panactum, upon the plea that oaths had been +anciently exchanged between their people and the Athenians, after a dispute on +the subject to the effect that neither should inhabit the place, but that they +should graze it in common. As for the Athenian prisoners of war in the hands of +the Boeotians, these were delivered over to Andromedes and his colleagues, and +by them conveyed to Athens and given back. The envoys at the same time +announced the razing of Panactum, which to them seemed as good as its +restitution, as it would no longer lodge an enemy of Athens. This announcement +was received with great indignation by the Athenians, who thought that the +Lacedaemonians had played them false, both in the matter of the demolition of +Panactum, which ought to have been restored to them standing, and in having, as +they now heard, made a separate alliance with the Boeotians, in spite of their +previous promise to join Athens in compelling the adhesion of those who refused +to accede to the treaty. The Athenians also considered the other points in +which Lacedaemon had failed in her compact, and thinking that they had been +overreached, gave an angry answer to the ambassadors and sent them away. +</p> + +<p> +The breach between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians having gone thus far, the +party at Athens, also, who wished to cancel the treaty, immediately put +themselves in motion. Foremost amongst these was Alcibiades, son of Clinias, a +man yet young in years for any other Hellenic city, but distinguished by the +splendour of his ancestry. Alcibiades thought the Argive alliance really +preferable, not that personal pique had not also a great deal to do with his +opposition; he being offended with the Lacedaemonians for having negotiated the +treaty through Nicias and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his +youth, and also for not having shown him the respect due to the ancient +connection of his family with them as their proxeni, which, renounced by his +grandfather, he had lately himself thought to renew by his attentions to their +prisoners taken in the island. Being thus, as he thought, slighted on all +hands, he had in the first instance spoken against the treaty, saying that the +Lacedaemonians were not to be trusted, but that they only treated, in order to +be enabled by this means to crush Argos, and afterwards to attack Athens alone; +and now, immediately upon the above occurring, he sent privately to the +Argives, telling them to come as quickly as possible to Athens, accompanied by +the Mantineans and Eleans, with proposals of alliance; as the moment was +propitious and he himself would do all he could to help them. +</p> + +<p> +Upon receiving this message and discovering that the Athenians, far from being +privy to the Boeotian alliance, were involved in a serious quarrel with the +Lacedaemonians, the Argives paid no further attention to the embassy which they +had just sent to Lacedaemon on the subject of the treaty, and began to incline +rather towards the Athenians, reflecting that, in the event of war, they would +thus have on their side a city that was not only an ancient ally of Argos, but +a sister democracy and very powerful at sea. They accordingly at once sent +ambassadors to Athens to treat for an alliance, accompanied by others from Elis +and Mantinea. +</p> + +<p> +At the same time arrived in haste from Lacedaemon an embassy consisting of +persons reputed well disposed towards the Athenians—Philocharidas, Leon, +and Endius—for fear that the Athenians in their irritation might conclude +alliance with the Argives, and also to ask back Pylos in exchange for Panactum, +and in defence of the alliance with the Boeotians to plead that it had not been +made to hurt the Athenians. Upon the envoys speaking in the senate upon these +points, and stating that they had come with full powers to settle all others at +issue between them, Alcibiades became afraid that, if they were to repeat these +statements to the popular assembly, they might gain the multitude, and the +Argive alliance might be rejected, and accordingly had recourse to the +following stratagem. He persuaded the Lacedaemonians by a solemn assurance that +if they would say nothing of their full powers in the assembly, he would give +back Pylos to them (himself, the present opponent of its restitution, engaging +to obtain this from the Athenians), and would settle the other points at issue. +His plan was to detach them from Nicias and to disgrace them before the people, +as being without sincerity in their intentions, or even common consistency in +their language, and so to get the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans taken into +alliance. This plan proved successful. When the envoys appeared before the +people, and upon the question being put to them, did not say as they had said +in the senate, that they had come with full powers, the Athenians lost all +patience, and carried away by Alcibiades, who thundered more loudly than ever +against the Lacedaemonians, were ready instantly to introduce the Argives and +their companions and to take them into alliance. An earthquake, however, +occurring, before anything definite had been done, this assembly was adjourned. +</p> + +<p> +In the assembly held the next day, Nicias, in spite of the Lacedaemonians +having been deceived themselves, and having allowed him to be deceived also in +not admitting that they had come with full powers, still maintained that it was +best to be friends with the Lacedaemonians, and, letting the Argive proposals +stand over, to send once more to Lacedaemon and learn her intentions. The +adjournment of the war could only increase their own prestige and injure that +of their rivals; the excellent state of their affairs making it their interest +to preserve this prosperity as long as possible, while those of Lacedaemon were +so desperate that the sooner she could try her fortune again the better. He +succeeded accordingly in persuading them to send ambassadors, himself being +among the number, to invite the Lacedaemonians, if they were really sincere, to +restore Panactum intact with Amphipolis, and to abandon their alliance with the +Boeotians (unless they consented to accede to the treaty), agreeably to the +stipulation which forbade either to treat without the other. The ambassadors +were also directed to say that the Athenians, had they wished to play false, +might already have made alliance with the Argives, who were indeed come to +Athens for that very purpose, and went off furnished with instructions as to +any other complaints that the Athenians had to make. Having reached Lacedaemon, +they communicated their instructions, and concluded by telling the +Lacedaemonians that unless they gave up their alliance with the Boeotians, in +the event of their not acceding to the treaty, the Athenians for their part +would ally themselves with the Argives and their friends. The Lacedaemonians, +however, refused to give up the Boeotian alliance—the party of Xenares +the ephor, and such as shared their view, carrying the day upon this +point—but renewed the oaths at the request of Nicias, who feared to +return without having accomplished anything and to be disgraced; as was indeed +his fate, he being held the author of the treaty with Lacedaemon. When he +returned, and the Athenians heard that nothing had been done at Lacedaemon, +they flew into a passion, and deciding that faith had not been kept with them, +took advantage of the presence of the Argives and their allies, who had been +introduced by Alcibiades, and made a treaty and alliance with them upon the +terms following: +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, acting for themselves and the +allies in their respective empires, made a treaty for a hundred years, to be +without fraud or hurt by land and by sea. +</p> + +<p> +1. It shall not be lawful to carry on war, either for the Argives, Eleans, +Mantineans, and their allies, against the Athenians, or the allies in the +Athenian empire: or for the Athenians and their allies against the Argives, +Eleans, Mantineans, or their allies, in any way or means whatsoever. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall be allies for a hundred +years upon the terms following: +</p> + +<p> +2. If an enemy invade the country of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans, and +Mantineans shall go to the relief of Athens, according as the Athenians may +require by message, in such way as they most effectually can, to the best of +their power. But if the invader be gone after plundering the territory, the +offending state shall be the enemy of the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and +Athenians, and war shall be made against it by all these cities: and no one of +the cities shall be able to make peace with that state, except all the above +cities agree to do so. +</p> + +<p> +3. Likewise the Athenians shall go to the relief of Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, +if an enemy invade the country of Elis, Mantinea, or Argos, according as the +above cities may require by message, in such way as they most effectually can, +to the best of their power. But if the invader be gone after plundering the +territory, the state offending shall be the enemy of the Athenians, Argives, +Mantineans, and Eleans, and war shall be made against it by all these cities, +and peace may not be made with that state except all the above cities agree to +it. +</p> + +<p> +4. No armed force shall be allowed to pass for hostile purposes through the +country of the powers contracting, or of the allies in their respective +empires, or to go by sea, except all the cities—that is to say, Athens, +Argos, Mantinea, and Elis—vote for such passage. +</p> + +<p> +5. The relieving troops shall be maintained by the city sending them for thirty +days from their arrival in the city that has required them, and upon their +return in the same way: if their services be desired for a longer period, the +city that sent for them shall maintain them, at the rate of three Aeginetan +obols per day for a heavy-armed soldier, archer, or light soldier, and an +Aeginetan drachma for a trooper. +</p> + +<p> +6. The city sending for the troops shall have the command when the war is in +its own country: but in case of the cities resolving upon a joint expedition +the command shall be equally divided among all the cities. +</p> + +<p> +7. The treaty shall be sworn to by the Athenians for themselves and their +allies, by the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and their allies, by each state +individually. Each shall swear the oath most binding in his country over +full-grown victims: the oath being as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“I STAND BY THE ALLIANCE AND ITS ARTICLES, JUSTLY, INNOCENTLY, AND +SINCERELY, AND I WILL NOT TRANSGRESS THE SAME IN ANY WAY OR MEANS +WHATSOEVER.” +</p> + +<p> +The oath shall be taken at Athens by the Senate and the magistrates, the +Prytanes administering it: at Argos by the Senate, the Eighty, and the Artynae, +the Eighty administering it: at Mantinea by the Demiurgi, the Senate, and the +other magistrates, the Theori and Polemarchs administering it: at Elis by the +Demiurgi, the magistrates, and the Six Hundred, the Demiurgi and the +Thesmophylaces administering it. The oaths shall be renewed by the Athenians +going to Elis, Mantinea, and Argos thirty days before the Olympic games: by the +Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans going to Athens ten days before the great feast +of the Panathenaea. The articles of the treaty, the oaths, and the alliance +shall be inscribed on a stone pillar by the Athenians in the citadel, by the +Argives in the market-place, in the temple of Apollo: by the Mantineans in the +temple of Zeus, in the market-place: and a brazen pillar shall be erected +jointly by them at the Olympic games now at hand. Should the above cities see +good to make any addition in these articles, whatever all the above cities +shall agree upon, after consulting together, shall be binding. +</p> + +<p> +Although the treaty and alliances were thus concluded, still the treaty between +the Lacedaemonians and Athenians was not renounced by either party. Meanwhile +Corinth, although the ally of the Argives, did not accede to the new treaty, +any more than she had done to the alliance, defensive and offensive, formed +before this between the Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans, when she declared +herself content with the first alliance, which was defensive only, and which +bound them to help each other, but not to join in attacking any. The +Corinthians thus stood aloof from their allies, and again turned their thoughts +towards Lacedaemon. +</p> + +<p> +At the Olympic games which were held this summer, and in which the Arcadian +Androsthenes was victor the first time in the wrestling and boxing, the +Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple by the Eleans, and thus prevented +from sacrificing or contending, for having refused to pay the fine specified in +the Olympic law imposed upon them by the Eleans, who alleged that they had +attacked Fort Phyrcus, and sent heavy infantry of theirs into Lepreum during +the Olympic truce. The amount of the fine was two thousand minae, two for each +heavy-armed soldier, as the law prescribes. The Lacedaemonians sent envoys, and +pleaded that the imposition was unjust; saying that the truce had not yet been +proclaimed at Lacedaemon when the heavy infantry were sent off. But the Eleans +affirmed that the armistice with them had already begun (they proclaim it first +among themselves), and that the aggression of the Lacedaemonians had taken them +by surprise while they were living quietly as in time of peace, and not +expecting anything. Upon this the Lacedaemonians submitted, that if the Eleans +really believed that they had committed an aggression, it was useless after +that to proclaim the truce at Lacedaemon; but they had proclaimed it +notwithstanding, as believing nothing of the kind, and from that moment the +Lacedaemonians had made no attack upon their country. Nevertheless the Eleans +adhered to what they had said, that nothing would persuade them that an +aggression had not been committed; if, however, the Lacedaemonians would +restore Lepreum, they would give up their own share of the money and pay that +of the god for them. +</p> + +<p> +As this proposal was not accepted, the Eleans tried a second. Instead of +restoring Lepreum, if this was objected to, the Lacedaemonians should ascend +the altar of the Olympian Zeus, as they were so anxious to have access to the +temple, and swear before the Hellenes that they would surely pay the fine at a +later day. This being also refused, the Lacedaemonians were excluded from the +temple, the sacrifice, and the games, and sacrificed at home; the Lepreans +being the only other Hellenes who did not attend. Still the Eleans were afraid +of the Lacedaemonians sacrificing by force, and kept guard with a heavy-armed +company of their young men; being also joined by a thousand Argives, the same +number of Mantineans, and by some Athenian cavalry who stayed at Harpina during +the feast. Great fears were felt in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians coming +in arms, especially after Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, had been +scourged on the course by the umpires; because, upon his horses being the +winners, and the Boeotian people being proclaimed the victor on account of his +having no right to enter, he came forward on the course and crowned the +charioteer, in order to show that the chariot was his. After this incident all +were more afraid than ever, and firmly looked for a disturbance: the +Lacedaemonians, however, kept quiet, and let the feast pass by, as we have +seen. After the Olympic games, the Argives and the allies repaired to Corinth +to invite her to come over to them. There they found some Lacedaemonian envoys; +and a long discussion ensued, which after all ended in nothing, as an +earthquake occurred, and they dispersed to their different homes. +</p> + +<p> +Summer was now over. The winter following a battle took place between the +Heracleots in Trachinia and the Aenianians, Dolopians, Malians, and certain of +the Thessalians, all tribes bordering on and hostile to the town, which +directly menaced their country. Accordingly, after having opposed and harassed +it from its very foundation by every means in their power, they now in this +battle defeated the Heracleots, Xenares, son of Cnidis, their Lacedaemonian +commander, being among the slain. Thus the winter ended and the twelfth year of +this war ended also. After the battle, Heraclea was so terribly reduced that in +the first days of the summer following the Boeotians occupied the place and +sent away the Lacedaemonian Agesippidas for misgovernment, fearing that the +town might be taken by the Athenians while the Lacedaemonians were distracted +with the affairs of Peloponnese. The Lacedaemonians, nevertheless, were +offended with them for what they had done. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer Alcibiades, son of Clinias, now one of the generals at Athens, +in concert with the Argives and the allies, went into Peloponnese with a few +Athenian heavy infantry and archers and some of the allies in those parts whom +he took up as he passed, and with this army marched here and there through +Peloponnese, and settled various matters connected with the alliance, and among +other things induced the Patrians to carry their walls down to the sea, +intending himself also to build a fort near the Achaean Rhium. However, the +Corinthians and Sicyonians, and all others who would have suffered by its being +built, came up and hindered him. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer war broke out between the Epidaurians and Argives. The pretext +was that the Epidaurians did not send an offering for their pasture-land to +Apollo Pythaeus, as they were bound to do, the Argives having the chief +management of the temple; but, apart from this pretext, Alcibiades and the +Argives were determined, if possible, to gain possession of Epidaurus, and thus +to ensure the neutrality of Corinth and give the Athenians a shorter passage +for their reinforcements from Aegina than if they had to sail round Scyllaeum. +The Argives accordingly prepared to invade Epidaurus by themselves, to exact +the offering. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time the Lacedaemonians marched out with all their people to +Leuctra upon their frontier, opposite to Mount Lycaeum, under the command of +Agis, son of Archidamus, without any one knowing their destination, not even +the cities that sent the contingents. The sacrifices, however, for crossing the +frontier not proving propitious, the Lacedaemonians returned home themselves, +and sent word to the allies to be ready to march after the month ensuing, which +happened to be the month of Carneus, a holy time for the Dorians. Upon the +retreat of the Lacedaemonians the Argives marched out on the last day but three +of the month before Carneus, and keeping this as the day during the whole time +that they were out, invaded and plundered Epidaurus. The Epidaurians summoned +their allies to their aid, some of whom pleaded the month as an excuse; others +came as far as the frontier of Epidaurus and there remained inactive. +</p> + +<p> +While the Argives were in Epidaurus embassies from the cities assembled at +Mantinea, upon the invitation of the Athenians. The conference having begun, +the Corinthian Euphamidas said that their actions did not agree with their +words; while they were sitting deliberating about peace, the Epidaurians and +their allies and the Argives were arrayed against each other in arms; deputies +from each party should first go and separate the armies, and then the talk +about peace might be resumed. In compliance with this suggestion, they went and +brought back the Argives from Epidaurus, and afterwards reassembled, but +without succeeding any better in coming to a conclusion; and the Argives a +second time invaded Epidaurus and plundered the country. The Lacedaemonians +also marched out to Caryae; but the frontier sacrifices again proving +unfavourable, they went back again, and the Argives, after ravaging about a +third of the Epidaurian territory, returned home. Meanwhile a thousand Athenian +heavy infantry had come to their aid under the command of Alcibiades, but +finding that the Lacedaemonian expedition was at an end, and that they were no +longer wanted, went back again. +</p> + +<p> +So passed the summer. The next winter the Lacedaemonians managed to elude the +vigilance of the Athenians, and sent in a garrison of three hundred men to +Epidaurus, under the command of Agesippidas. Upon this the Argives went to the +Athenians and complained of their having allowed an enemy to pass by sea, in +spite of the clause in the treaty by which the allies were not to allow an +enemy to pass through their country. Unless, therefore, they now put the +Messenians and Helots in Pylos to annoy the Lacedaemonians, they, the Argives, +should consider that faith had not been kept with them. The Athenians were +persuaded by Alcibiades to inscribe at the bottom of the Laconian pillar that +the Lacedaemonians had not kept their oaths, and to convey the Helots at Cranii +to Pylos to plunder the country; but for the rest they remained quiet as +before. During this winter hostilities went on between the Argives and +Epidaurians, without any pitched battle taking place, but only forays and +ambuscades, in which the losses were small and fell now on one side and now on +the other. At the close of the winter, towards the beginning of spring, the +Argives went with scaling ladders to Epidaurus, expecting to find it left +unguarded on account of the war and to be able to take it by assault, but +returned unsuccessful. And the winter ended, and with it the thirteenth year of +the war ended also. +</p> + +<p> +In the middle of the next summer the Lacedaemonians, seeing the Epidaurians, +their allies, in distress, and the rest of Peloponnese either in revolt or +disaffected, concluded that it was high time for them to interfere if they +wished to stop the progress of the evil, and accordingly with their full force, +the Helots included, took the field against Argos, under the command of Agis, +son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. The Tegeans and the other +Arcadian allies of Lacedaemon joined in the expedition. The allies from the +rest of Peloponnese and from outside mustered at Phlius; the Boeotians with +five thousand heavy infantry and as many light troops, and five hundred horse +and the same number of dismounted troopers; the Corinthians with two thousand +heavy infantry; the rest more or less as might happen; and the Phliasians with +all their forces, the army being in their country. +</p> + +<p> +The preparations of the Lacedaemonians from the first had been known to the +Argives, who did not, however, take the field until the enemy was on his road +to join the rest at Phlius. Reinforced by the Mantineans with their allies, and +by three thousand Elean heavy infantry, they advanced and fell in with the +Lacedaemonians at Methydrium in Arcadia. Each party took up its position upon a +hill, and the Argives prepared to engage the Lacedaemonians while they were +alone; but Agis eluded them by breaking up his camp in the night, and proceeded +to join the rest of the allies at Phlius. The Argives discovering this at +daybreak, marched first to Argos and then to the Nemean road, by which they +expected the Lacedaemonians and their allies would come down. However, Agis, +instead of taking this road as they expected, gave the Lacedaemonians, +Arcadians, and Epidaurians their orders, and went along another difficult road, +and descended into the plain of Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and +Phliasians marched by another steep road; while the Boeotians, Megarians, and +Sicyonians had instructions to come down by the Nemean road where the Argives +were posted, in order that, if the enemy advanced into the plain against the +troops of Agis, they might fall upon his rear with their cavalry. These +dispositions concluded, Agis invaded the plain and began to ravage Saminthus +and other places. +</p> + +<p> +Discovering this, the Argives came up from Nemea, day having now dawned. On +their way they fell in with the troops of the Phliasians and Corinthians, and +killed a few of the Phliasians and had perhaps a few more of their own men +killed by the Corinthians. Meanwhile the Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians, +advancing upon Nemea according to their instructions, found the Argives no +longer there, as they had gone down on seeing their property ravaged, and were +now forming for battle, the Lacedaemonians imitating their example. The Argives +were now completely surrounded; from the plain the Lacedaemonians and their +allies shut them off from their city; above them were the Corinthians, +Phliasians, and Pellenians; and on the side of Nemea the Boeotians, Sicyonians, +and Megarians. Meanwhile their army was without cavalry, the Athenians alone +among the allies not having yet arrived. Now the bulk of the Argives and their +allies did not see the danger of their position, but thought that they could +not have a fairer field, having intercepted the Lacedaemonians in their own +country and close to the city. Two men, however, in the Argive army, Thrasylus, +one of the five generals, and Alciphron, the Lacedaemonian proxenus, just as +the armies were upon the point of engaging, went and held a parley with Agis +and urged him not to bring on a battle, as the Argives were ready to refer to +fair and equal arbitration whatever complaints the Lacedaemonians might have +against them, and to make a treaty and live in peace in future. +</p> + +<p> +The Argives who made these statements did so upon their own authority, not by +order of the people, and Agis on his accepted their proposals, and without +himself either consulting the majority, simply communicated the matter to a +single individual, one of the high officers accompanying the expedition, and +granted the Argives a truce for four months, in which to fulfil their promises; +after which he immediately led off the army without giving any explanation to +any of the other allies. The Lacedaemonians and allies followed their general +out of respect for the law, but amongst themselves loudly blamed Agis for going +away from so fair a field (the enemy being hemmed in on every side by infantry +and cavalry) without having done anything worthy of their strength. Indeed this +was by far the finest Hellenic army ever yet brought together; and it should +have been seen while it was still united at Nemea, with the Lacedaemonians in +full force, the Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, +Phliasians and Megarians, and all these the flower of their respective +populations, thinking themselves a match not merely for the Argive confederacy, +but for another such added to it. The army thus retired blaming Agis, and +returned every man to his home. The Argives however blamed still more loudly +the persons who had concluded the truce without consulting the people, +themselves thinking that they had let escape with the Lacedaemonians an +opportunity such as they should never see again; as the struggle would have +been under the walls of their city, and by the side of many and brave allies. +On their return accordingly they began to stone Thrasylus in the bed of the +Charadrus, where they try all military causes before entering the city. +Thrasylus fled to the altar, and so saved his life; his property however they +confiscated. +</p> + +<p> +After this arrived a thousand Athenian heavy infantry and three hundred horse, +under the command of Laches and Nicostratus; whom the Argives, being +nevertheless loath to break the truce with the Lacedaemonians, begged to +depart, and refused to bring before the people, to whom they had a +communication to make, until compelled to do so by the entreaties of the +Mantineans and Eleans, who were still at Argos. The Athenians, by the mouth of +Alcibiades their ambassador there present, told the Argives and the allies that +they had no right to make a truce at all without the consent of their fellow +confederates, and now that the Athenians had arrived so opportunely the war +ought to be resumed. These arguments proving successful with the allies, they +immediately marched upon Orchomenos, all except the Argives, who, although they +had consented like the rest, stayed behind at first, but eventually joined the +others. They now all sat down and besieged Orchomenos, and made assaults upon +it; one of their reasons for desiring to gain this place being that hostages +from Arcadia had been lodged there by the Lacedaemonians. The Orchomenians, +alarmed at the weakness of their wall and the numbers of the enemy, and at the +risk they ran of perishing before relief arrived, capitulated upon condition of +joining the league, of giving hostages of their own to the Mantineans, and +giving up those lodged with them by the Lacedaemonians. Orchomenos thus +secured, the allies now consulted as to which of the remaining places they +should attack next. The Eleans were urgent for Lepreum; the Mantineans for +Tegea; and the Argives and Athenians giving their support to the Mantineans, +the Eleans went home in a rage at their not having voted for Lepreum; while the +rest of the allies made ready at Mantinea for going against Tegea, which a +party inside had arranged to put into their hands. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, upon their return from Argos after concluding the +four months’ truce, vehemently blamed Agis for not having subdued Argos, +after an opportunity such as they thought they had never had before; for it was +no easy matter to bring so many and so good allies together. But when the news +arrived of the capture of Orchomenos, they became more angry than ever, and, +departing from all precedent, in the heat of the moment had almost decided to +raze his house, and to fine him ten thousand drachmae. Agis however entreated +them to do none of these things, promising to atone for his fault by good +service in the field, failing which they might then do to him whatever they +pleased; and they accordingly abstained from razing his house or fining him as +they had threatened to do, and now made a law, hitherto unknown at Lacedaemon, +attaching to him ten Spartans as counsellors, without whose consent he should +have no power to lead an army out of the city. +</p> + +<p> +At this juncture arrived word from their friends in Tegea that, unless they +speedily appeared, Tegea would go over from them to the Argives and their +allies, if it had not gone over already. Upon this news a force marched out +from Lacedaemon, of the Spartans and Helots and all their people, and that +instantly and upon a scale never before witnessed. Advancing to Orestheum in +Maenalia, they directed the Arcadians in their league to follow close after +them to Tegea, and, going on themselves as far as Orestheum, from thence sent +back the sixth part of the Spartans, consisting of the oldest and youngest men, +to guard their homes, and with the rest of their army arrived at Tegea; where +their Arcadian allies soon after joined them. Meanwhile they sent to Corinth, +to the Boeotians, the Phocians, and Locrians, with orders to come up as quickly +as possible to Mantinea. These had but short notice; and it was not easy except +all together, and after waiting for each other, to pass through the +enemy’s country, which lay right across and blocked up the line of +communication. Nevertheless they made what haste they could. Meanwhile the +Lacedaemonians with the Arcadian allies that had joined them, entered the +territory of Mantinea, and encamping near the temple of Heracles began to +plunder the country. +</p> + +<p> +Here they were seen by the Argives and their allies, who immediately took up a +strong and difficult position, and formed in order of battle. The +Lacedaemonians at once advanced against them, and came on within a +stone’s throw or javelin’s cast, when one of the older men, seeing +the enemy’s position to be a strong one, hallooed to Agis that he was +minded to cure one evil with another; meaning that he wished to make amends for +his retreat, which had been so much blamed, from Argos, by his present untimely +precipitation. Meanwhile Agis, whether in consequence of this halloo or of some +sudden new idea of his own, quickly led back his army without engaging, and +entering the Tegean territory, began to turn off into that of Mantinea the +water about which the Mantineans and Tegeans are always fighting, on account of +the extensive damage it does to whichever of the two countries it falls into. +His object in this was to make the Argives and their allies come down from the +hill, to resist the diversion of the water, as they would be sure to do when +they knew of it, and thus to fight the battle in the plain. He accordingly +stayed that day where he was, engaged in turning off the water. The Argives and +their allies were at first amazed at the sudden retreat of the enemy after +advancing so near, and did not know what to make of it; but when he had gone +away and disappeared, without their having stirred to pursue him, they began +anew to find fault with their generals, who had not only let the Lacedaemonians +get off before, when they were so happily intercepted before Argos, but who now +again allowed them to run away, without any one pursuing them, and to escape at +their leisure while the Argive army was leisurely betrayed. The generals, +half-stunned for the moment, afterwards led them down from the hill, and went +forward and encamped in the plain, with the intention of attacking the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +The next day the Argives and their allies formed in the order in which they +meant to fight, if they chanced to encounter the enemy; and the Lacedaemonians +returning from the water to their old encampment by the temple of Heracles, +suddenly saw their adversaries close in front of them, all in complete order, +and advanced from the hill. A shock like that of the present moment the +Lacedaemonians do not ever remember to have experienced: there was scant time +for preparation, as they instantly and hastily fell into their ranks, Agis, +their king, directing everything, agreeably to the law. For when a king is in +the field all commands proceed from him: he gives the word to the Polemarchs; +they to the Lochages; these to the Pentecostyes; these again to the +Enomotarchs, and these last to the Enomoties. In short all orders required pass +in the same way and quickly reach the troops; as almost the whole Lacedaemonian +army, save for a small part, consists of officers under officers, and the care +of what is to be done falls upon many. +</p> + +<p> +In this battle the left wing was composed of the Sciritae, who in a +Lacedaemonian army have always that post to themselves alone; next to these +were the soldiers of Brasidas from Thrace, and the Neodamodes with them; then +came the Lacedaemonians themselves, company after company, with the Arcadians +of Heraea at their side. After these were the Maenalians, and on the right wing +the Tegeans with a few of the Lacedaemonians at the extremity; their cavalry +being posted upon the two wings. Such was the Lacedaemonian formation. That of +their opponents was as follows: On the right were the Mantineans, the action +taking place in their country; next to them the allies from Arcadia; after whom +came the thousand picked men of the Argives, to whom the state had given a long +course of military training at the public expense; next to them the rest of the +Argives, and after them their allies, the Cleonaeans and Orneans, and lastly +the Athenians on the extreme left, and lastly the Athenians on the extreme +left, and their own cavalry with them. +</p> + +<p> +Such were the order and the forces of the two combatants. The Lacedaemonian +army looked the largest; though as to putting down the numbers of either host, +or of the contingents composing it, I could not do so with any accuracy. Owing +to the secrecy of their government the number of the Lacedaemonians was not +known, and men are so apt to brag about the forces of their country that the +estimate of their opponents was not trusted. The following calculation, +however, makes it possible to estimate the numbers of the Lacedaemonians +present upon this occasion. There were seven companies in the field without +counting the Sciritae, who numbered six hundred men: in each company there were +four Pentecostyes, and in the Pentecosty four Enomoties. The first rank of the +Enomoty was composed of four soldiers: as to the depth, although they had not +been all drawn up alike, but as each captain chose, they were generally ranged +eight deep; the first rank along the whole line, exclusive of the Sciritae, +consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men. +</p> + +<p> +The armies being now on the eve of engaging, each contingent received some +words of encouragement from its own commander. The Mantineans were, reminded +that they were going to fight for their country and to avoid returning to the +experience of servitude after having tasted that of empire; the Argives, that +they would contend for their ancient supremacy, to regain their once equal +share of Peloponnese of which they had been so long deprived, and to punish an +enemy and a neighbour for a thousand wrongs; the Athenians, of the glory of +gaining the honours of the day with so many and brave allies in arms, and that +a victory over the Lacedaemonians in Peloponnese would cement and extend their +empire, and would besides preserve Attica from all invasions in future. These +were the incitements addressed to the Argives and their allies. The +Lacedaemonians meanwhile, man to man, and with their war-songs in the ranks, +exhorted each brave comrade to remember what he had learnt before; well aware +that the long training of action was of more saving virtue than any brief +verbal exhortation, though never so well delivered. +</p> + +<p> +After this they joined battle, the Argives and their allies advancing with +haste and fury, the Lacedaemonians slowly and to the music of many +flute-players—a standing institution in their army, that has nothing to +do with religion, but is meant to make them advance evenly, stepping in time, +without break their order, as large armies are apt to do in the moment of +engaging. +</p> + +<p> +Just before the battle joined, King Agis resolved upon the following manoeuvre. +All armies are alike in this: on going into action they get forced out rather +on their right wing, and one and the other overlap with this adversary’s +left; because fear makes each man do his best to shelter his unarmed side with +the shield of the man next him on the right, thinking that the closer the +shields are locked together the better will he be protected. The man primarily +responsible for this is the first upon the right wing, who is always striving +to withdraw from the enemy his unarmed side; and the same apprehension makes +the rest follow him. On the present occasion the Mantineans reached with their +wing far beyond the Sciritae, and the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans still farther +beyond the Athenians, as their army was the largest. Agis, afraid of his left +being surrounded, and thinking that the Mantineans outflanked it too far, +ordered the Sciritae and Brasideans to move out from their place in the ranks +and make the line even with the Mantineans, and told the Polemarchs Hipponoidas +and Aristocles to fill up the gap thus formed, by throwing themselves into it +with two companies taken from the right wing; thinking that his right would +still be strong enough and to spare, and that the line fronting the Mantineans +would gain in solidity. +</p> + +<p> +However, as he gave these orders in the moment of the onset, and at short +notice, it so happened that Aristocles and Hipponoidas would not move over, for +which offence they were afterwards banished from Sparta, as having been guilty +of cowardice; and the enemy meanwhile closed before the Sciritae (whom Agis on +seeing that the two companies did not move over ordered to return to their +place) had time to fill up the breach in question. Now it was, however, that +the Lacedaemonians, utterly worsted in respect of skill, showed themselves as +superior in point of courage. As soon as they came to close quarters with the +enemy, the Mantinean right broke their Sciritae and Brasideans, and, bursting +in with their allies and the thousand picked Argives into the unclosed breach +in their line, cut up and surrounded the Lacedaemonians, and drove them in full +rout to the wagons, slaying some of the older men on guard there. But the +Lacedaemonians, worsted in this part of the field, with the rest of their army, +and especially the centre, where the three hundred knights, as they are called, +fought round King Agis, fell on the older men of the Argives and the five +companies so named, and on the Cleonaeans, the Orneans, and the Athenians next +them, and instantly routed them; the greater number not even waiting to strike +a blow, but giving way the moment that they came on, some even being trodden +under foot, in their fear of being overtaken by their assailants. +</p> + +<p> +The army of the Argives and their allies, having given way in this quarter, was +now completely cut in two, and the Lacedaemonian and Tegean right +simultaneously closing round the Athenians with the troops that outflanked +them, these last found themselves placed between two fires, being surrounded on +one side and already defeated on the other. Indeed they would have suffered +more severely than any other part of the army, but for the services of the +cavalry which they had with them. Agis also on perceiving the distress of his +left opposed to the Mantineans and the thousand Argives, ordered all the army +to advance to the support of the defeated wing; and while this took place, as +the enemy moved past and slanted away from them, the Athenians escaped at their +leisure, and with them the beaten Argive division. Meanwhile the Mantineans and +their allies and the picked body of the Argives ceased to press the enemy, and +seeing their friends defeated and the Lacedaemonians in full advance upon them, +took to flight. Many of the Mantineans perished; but the bulk of the picked +body of the Argives made good their escape. The flight and retreat, however, +were neither hurried nor long; the Lacedaemonians fighting long and stubbornly +until the rout of their enemy, but that once effected, pursuing for a short +time and not far. +</p> + +<p> +Such was the battle, as nearly as possible as I have described it; the greatest +that had occurred for a very long while among the Hellenes, and joined by the +most considerable states. The Lacedaemonians took up a position in front of the +enemy’s dead, and immediately set up a trophy and stripped the slain; +they took up their own dead and carried them back to Tegea, where they buried +them, and restored those of the enemy under truce. The Argives, Orneans, and +Cleonaeans had seven hundred killed; the Mantineans two hundred, and the +Athenians and Aeginetans also two hundred, with both their generals. On the +side of the Lacedaemonians, the allies did not suffer any loss worth speaking +of: as to the Lacedaemonians themselves it was difficult to learn the truth; it +is said, however, that there were slain about three hundred of them. +</p> + +<p> +While the battle was impending, Pleistoanax, the other king, set out with a +reinforcement composed of the oldest and youngest men, and got as far as Tegea, +where he heard of the victory and went back again. The Lacedaemonians also sent +and turned back the allies from Corinth and from beyond the Isthmus, and +returning themselves dismissed their allies, and kept the Carnean holidays, +which happened to be at that time. The imputations cast upon them by the +Hellenes at the time, whether of cowardice on account of the disaster in the +island, or of mismanagement and slowness generally, were all wiped out by this +single action: fortune, it was thought, might have humbled them, but the men +themselves were the same as ever. +</p> + +<p> +The day before this battle, the Epidaurians with all their forces invaded the +deserted Argive territory, and cut off many of the guards left there in the +absence of the Argive army. After the battle three thousand Elean heavy +infantry arriving to aid the Mantineans, and a reinforcement of one thousand +Athenians, all these allies marched at once against Epidaurus, while the +Lacedaemonians were keeping the Carnea, and dividing the work among them began +to build a wall round the city. The rest left off; but the Athenians finished +at once the part assigned to them round Cape Heraeum; and having all joined in +leaving a garrison in the fortification in question, they returned to their +respective cities. +</p> + +<p> +Summer now came to an end. In the first days of the next winter, when the +Carnean holidays were over, the Lacedaemonians took the field, and arriving at +Tegea sent on to Argos proposals of accommodation. They had before had a party +in the town desirous of overthrowing the democracy; and after the battle that +had been fought, these were now far more in a position to persuade the people +to listen to terms. Their plan was first to make a treaty with the +Lacedaemonians, to be followed by an alliance, and after this to fall upon the +commons. Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, the Argive proxenus, accordingly arrived at +Argos with two proposals from Lacedaemon, to regulate the conditions of war or +peace, according as they preferred the one or the other. After much discussion, +Alcibiades happening to be in the town, the Lacedaemonian party, who now +ventured to act openly, persuaded the Argives to accept the proposal for +accommodation; which ran as follows: +</p> + +<p> +The assembly of the Lacedaemonians agrees to treat with the Argives upon the +terms following: +</p> + +<p> +1. The Argives shall restore to the Orchomenians their children, and to the +Maenalians their men, and shall restore the men they have in Mantinea to the +Lacedaemonians. +</p> + +<p> +2. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fortification there. If the +Athenians refuse to withdraw from Epidaurus, they shall be declared enemies of +the Argives and of the Lacedaemonians, and of the allies of the Lacedaemonians +and the allies of the Argives. +</p> + +<p> +3. If the Lacedaemonians have any children in their custody, they shall restore +them every one to his city. +</p> + +<p> +4. As to the offering to the god, the Argives, if they wish, shall impose an +oath upon the Epidaurians, but, if not, they shall swear it themselves. +</p> + +<p> +5. All the cities in Peloponnese, both small and great, shall be independent +according to the customs of their country. +</p> + +<p> +6. If any of the powers outside Peloponnese invade Peloponnesian territory, the +parties contracting shall unite to repel them, on such terms as they may agree +upon, as being most fair for the Peloponnesians. +</p> + +<p> +7. All allies of the Lacedaemonians outside Peloponnese shall be on the same +footing as the Lacedaemonians, and the allies of the Argives shall be on the +same footing as the Argives, being left in enjoyment of their own possessions. +</p> + +<p> +8. This treaty shall be shown to the allies, and shall be concluded, if they +approve; if the allies think fit, they may send the treaty to be considered at +home. +</p> + +<p> +The Argives began by accepting this proposal, and the Lacedaemonian army +returned home from Tegea. After this intercourse was renewed between them, and +not long afterwards the same party contrived that the Argives should give up +the league with the Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and should make a treaty +and alliance with the Lacedaemonians; which was consequently done upon the +terms following: +</p> + +<p> +The Lacedaemonians and Argives agree to a treaty and alliance for fifty years +upon the terms following: +</p> + +<p> +1. All disputes shall be decided by fair and impartial arbitration, agreeably +to the customs of the two countries. +</p> + +<p> +2. The rest of the cities in Peloponnese may be included in this treaty and +alliance, as independent and sovereign, in full enjoyment of what they possess, +all disputes being decided by fair and impartial arbitration, agreeably to the +customs of the said cities. +</p> + +<p> +3. All allies of the Lacedaemonians outside Peloponnese shall be upon the same +footing as the Lacedaemonians themselves, and the allies of the Argives shall +be upon the same footing as the Argives themselves, continuing to enjoy what +they possess. +</p> + +<p> +4. If it shall be anywhere necessary to make an expedition in common, the +Lacedaemonians and Argives shall consult upon it and decide, as may be most +fair for the allies. +</p> + +<p> +5. If any of the cities, whether inside or outside Peloponnese, have a question +whether of frontiers or otherwise, it must be settled, but if one allied city +should have a quarrel with another allied city, it must be referred to some +third city thought impartial by both parties. Private citizens shall have their +disputes decided according to the laws of their several countries. +</p> + +<p> +The treaty and above alliance concluded, each party at once released everything +whether acquired by war or otherwise, and thenceforth acting in common voted to +receive neither herald nor embassy from the Athenians unless they evacuated +their forts and withdrew from Peloponnese, and also to make neither peace nor +war with any, except jointly. Zeal was not wanting: both parties sent envoys to +the Thracian places and to Perdiccas, and persuaded the latter to join their +league. Still he did not at once break off from Athens, although minded to do +so upon seeing the way shown him by Argos, the original home of his family. +They also renewed their old oaths with the Chalcidians and took new ones: the +Argives, besides, sent ambassadors to the Athenians, bidding them evacuate the +fort at Epidaurus. The Athenians, seeing their own men outnumbered by the rest +of the garrison, sent Demosthenes to bring them out. This general, under colour +of a gymnastic contest which he arranged on his arrival, got the rest of the +garrison out of the place, and shut the gates behind them. Afterwards the +Athenians renewed their treaty with the Epidaurians, and by themselves gave up +the fortress. +</p> + +<p> +After the defection of Argos from the league, the Mantineans, though they held +out at first, in the end finding themselves powerless without the Argives, +themselves too came to terms with Lacedaemon, and gave up their sovereignty +over the towns. The Lacedaemonians and Argives, each a thousand strong, now +took the field together, and the former first went by themselves to Sicyon and +made the government there more oligarchical than before, and then both, +uniting, put down the democracy at Argos and set up an oligarchy favourable to +Lacedaemon. These events occurred at the close of the winter, just before +spring; and the fourteenth year of the war ended. The next summer the people of +Dium, in Athos, revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidians, and the +Lacedaemonians settled affairs in Achaea in a way more agreeable to the +interests of their country. Meanwhile the popular party at Argos little by +little gathered new consistency and courage, and waited for the moment of the +Gymnopaedic festival at Lacedaemon, and then fell upon the oligarchs. After a +fight in the city, victory declared for the commons, who slew some of their +opponents and banished others. The Lacedaemonians for a long while let the +messages of their friends at Argos remain without effect. At last they put off +the Gymnopaediae and marched to their succour, but learning at Tegea the defeat +of the oligarchs, refused to go any further in spite of the entreaties of those +who had escaped, and returned home and kept the festival. Later on, envoys +arrived with messages from the Argives in the town and from the exiles, when +the allies were also at Sparta; and after much had been said on both sides, the +Lacedaemonians decided that the party in the town had done wrong, and resolved +to march against Argos, but kept delaying and putting off the matter. Meanwhile +the commons at Argos, in fear of the Lacedaemonians, began again to court the +Athenian alliance, which they were convinced would be of the greatest service +to them; and accordingly proceeded to build long walls to the sea, in order +that in case of a blockade by land; with the help of the Athenians they might +have the advantage of importing what they wanted by sea. Some of the cities in +Peloponnese were also privy to the building of these walls; and the Argives +with all their people, women and slaves not excepted, addressed themselves to +the work, while carpenters and masons came to them from Athens. +</p> + +<p> +Summer was now over. The winter following the Lacedaemonians, hearing of the +walls that were building, marched against Argos with their allies, the +Corinthians excepted, being also not without intelligence in the city itself; +Agis, son of Archidamus, their king, was in command. The intelligence which +they counted upon within the town came to nothing; they however took and razed +the walls which were being built, and after capturing the Argive town Hysiae +and killing all the freemen that fell into their hands, went back and dispersed +every man to his city. After this the Argives marched into Phlius and plundered +it for harbouring their exiles, most of whom had settled there, and so returned +home. The same winter the Athenians blockaded Macedonia, on the score of the +league entered into by Perdiccas with the Argives and Lacedaemonians, and also +of his breach of his engagements on the occasion of the expedition prepared by +Athens against the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace and against +Amphipolis, under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, which had to be +broken up mainly because of his desertion. He was therefore proclaimed an +enemy. And thus the winter ended, and the fifteenth year of the war ended with +it. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0017" id="link2HCH0017"></a> +CHAPTER XVII </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Sixteenth Year of the War—The Melian Conference—Fate of Melos +</p> + +<p> +The next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to Argos and seized the +suspected persons still left of the Lacedaemonian faction to the number of +three hundred, whom the Athenians forthwith lodged in the neighbouring islands +of their empire. The Athenians also made an expedition against the isle of +Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, +sixteen hundred heavy infantry, three hundred archers, and twenty mounted +archers from Athens, and about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies +and the islanders. The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not submit +to the Athenians like the other islanders, and at first remained neutral and +took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon the Athenians using violence +and plundering their territory, assumed an attitude of open hostility. +Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, son of Tisimachus, the generals, +encamping in their territory with the above armament, before doing any harm to +their land, sent envoys to negotiate. These the Melians did not bring before +the people, but bade them state the object of their mission to the magistrates +and the few; upon which the Athenian envoys spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. Since the negotiations are not to go on before the people, in order +that we may not be able to speak straight on without interruption, and deceive +the ears of the multitude by seductive arguments which would pass without +refutation (for we know that this is the meaning of our being brought before +the few), what if you who sit there were to pursue a method more cautious +still? Make no set speech yourselves, but take us up at whatever you do not +like, and settle that before going any farther. And first tell us if this +proposition of ours suits you. +</p> + +<p> +The Melian commissioners answered: +</p> + +<p> +Melians. To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as you propose there +is nothing to object; but your military preparations are too far advanced to +agree with what you say, as we see you are come to be judges in your own cause, +and that all we can reasonably expect from this negotiation is war, if we prove +to have right on our side and refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, +slavery. +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. If you have met to reason about presentiments of the future, or for +anything else than to consult for the safety of your state upon the facts that +you see before you, we will give over; otherwise we will go on. +</p> + +<p> +Melians. It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn more ways +than one both in thought and utterance. However, the question in this +conference is, as you say, the safety of our country; and the discussion, if +you please, can proceed in the way which you propose. +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious +pretences—either of how we have a right to our empire because we +overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have +done us—and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return +we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did +not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us +no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of +us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only +in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the +weak suffer what they must. +</p> + +<p> +Melians. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient—we speak as we are +obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of +interest—that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the +privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right, and even +to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got to pass current. +And you are as much interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal +for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate upon. +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten us: a +rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real antagonist, is +not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by themselves attack and +overpower their rulers. This, however, is a risk that we are content to take. +We will now proceed to show you that we are come here in the interest of our +empire, and that we shall say what we are now going to say, for the +preservation of your country; as we would fain exercise that empire over you +without trouble, and see you preserved for the good of us both. +</p> + +<p> +Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to +rule? +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering +the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you. +</p> + +<p> +Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends instead of +enemies, but allies of neither side. +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship +will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our +power. +</p> + +<p> +Melians. Is that your subjects’ idea of equity, to put those who have +nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most of them +your own colonists, and some conquered rebels? +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the other, +and that if any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and +that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid; so that besides +extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection; the fact +that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more +important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea. +</p> + +<p> +Melians. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy which we +indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about justice and invite +us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours, and try to persuade you, +if the two happen to coincide. How can you avoid making enemies of all existing +neutrals who shall look at case from it that one day or another you will attack +them? And what is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, +and to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it? +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but little +alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their taking precautions +against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves, outside our empire, and +subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be the most likely to take a rash +step and lead themselves and us into obvious danger. +</p> + +<p> +Melians. Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and your +subjects to get rid of it, it were surely great baseness and cowardice in us +who are still free not to try everything that can be tried, before submitting +to your yoke. +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an equal one, +with honour as the prize and shame as the penalty, but a question of +self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger than you are. +</p> + +<p> +Melians. But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more impartial than +the disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose; to submit is to give +ourselves over to despair, while action still preserves for us a hope that we +may stand erect. +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. Hope, danger’s comforter, may be indulged in by those who have +abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; but its +nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their all upon +the venture see it in its true colours only when they are ruined; but so long +as the discovery would enable them to guard against it, it is never found +wanting. Let not this be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a single +turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as +human means may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn +to invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude +men with hopes to their destruction. +</p> + +<p> +Melians. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the difficulty of +contending against your power and fortune, unless the terms be equal. But we +trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just +men fighting against unjust, and that what we want in power will be made up by +the alliance of the Lacedaemonians, who are bound, if only for very shame, to +come to the aid of their kindred. Our confidence, therefore, after all is not +so utterly irrational. +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as fairly hope for +that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct being in any way +contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise among themselves. Of the +gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature +they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this +law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall +leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing +that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the +same as we do. Thus, as far as the gods are concerned, we have no fear and no +reason to fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we come to your +notion about the Lacedaemonians, which leads you to believe that shame will +make them help you, here we bless your simplicity but do not envy your folly. +The Lacedaemonians, when their own interests or their country’s laws are +in question, are the worthiest men alive; of their conduct towards others much +might be said, but no clearer idea of it could be given than by shortly saying +that of all the men we know they are most conspicuous in considering what is +agreeable honourable, and what is expedient just. Such a way of thinking does +not promise much for the safety which you now unreasonably count upon. +</p> + +<p> +Melians. But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their respect for +expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians, their colonists, and +thereby losing the confidence of their friends in Hellas and helping their +enemies. +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes with security, +while justice and honour cannot be followed without danger; and danger the +Lacedaemonians generally court as little as possible. +</p> + +<p> +Melians. But we believe that they would be more likely to face even danger for +our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as our nearness to +Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our common blood ensures our +fidelity. +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to is not the goodwill of +those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of power for action; and the +Lacedaemonians look to this even more than others. At least, such is their +distrust of their home resources that it is only with numerous allies that they +attack a neighbour; now is it likely that while we are masters of the sea they +will cross over to an island? +</p> + +<p> +Melians. But they would have others to send. The Cretan Sea is a wide one, and +it is more difficult for those who command it to intercept others, than for +those who wish to elude them to do so safely. And should the Lacedaemonians +miscarry in this, they would fall upon your land, and upon those left of your +allies whom Brasidas did not reach; and instead of places which are not yours, +you will have to fight for your own country and your own confederacy. +</p> + +<p> +Athenians. Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may one day experience, +only to learn, as others have done, that the Athenians never once yet withdrew +from a siege for fear of any. But we are struck by the fact that, after saying +you would consult for the safety of your country, in all this discussion you +have mentioned nothing which men might trust in and think to be saved by. Your +strongest arguments depend upon hope and the future, and your actual resources +are too scanty, as compared with those arrayed against you, for you to come out +victorious. You will therefore show great blindness of judgment, unless, after +allowing us to retire, you can find some counsel more prudent than this. You +will surely not be caught by that idea of disgrace, which in dangers that are +disgraceful, and at the same time too plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to +mankind; since in too many cases the very men that have their eyes perfectly +open to what they are rushing into, let the thing called disgrace, by the mere +influence of a seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they become so +enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall wilfully into hopeless disaster, and +incur disgrace more disgraceful as the companion of error, than when it comes +as the result of misfortune. This, if you are well advised, you will guard +against; and you will not think it dishonourable to submit to the greatest city +in Hellas, when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally, +without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to you; nor when you have the +choice given you between war and security, will you be so blinded as to choose +the worse. And it is certain that those who do not yield to their equals, who +keep terms with their superiors, and are moderate towards their inferiors, on +the whole succeed best. Think over the matter, therefore, after our withdrawal, +and reflect once and again that it is for your country that you are consulting, +that you have not more than one, and that upon this one deliberation depends +its prosperity or ruin. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, left to +themselves, came to a decision corresponding with what they had maintained in +the discussion, and answered: “Our resolution, Athenians, is the same as +it was at first. We will not in a moment deprive of freedom a city that has +been inhabited these seven hundred years; but we put our trust in the fortune +by which the gods have preserved it until now, and in the help of men, that is, +of the Lacedaemonians; and so we will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we +invite you to allow us to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to +retire from our country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us +both.” +</p> + +<p> +Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians now departing from the +conference said: “Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from these +resolutions, regard what is future as more certain than what is before your +eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as already coming to pass; +and as you have staked most on, and trusted most in, the Lacedaemonians, your +fortune, and your hopes, so will you be most completely deceived.” +</p> + +<p> +The Athenian envoys now returned to the army; and the Melians showing no signs +of yielding, the generals at once betook themselves to hostilities, and drew a +line of circumvallation round the Melians, dividing the work among the +different states. Subsequently the Athenians returned with most of their army, +leaving behind them a certain number of their own citizens and of the allies to +keep guard by land and sea. The force thus left stayed on and besieged the +place. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius and lost eighty +men cut off in an ambush by the Phliasians and Argive exiles. Meanwhile the +Athenians at Pylos took so much plunder from the Lacedaemonians that the +latter, although they still refrained from breaking off the treaty and going to +war with Athens, yet proclaimed that any of their people that chose might +plunder the Athenians. The Corinthians also commenced hostilities with the +Athenians for private quarrels of their own; but the rest of the Peloponnesians +stayed quiet. Meanwhile the Melians attacked by night and took the part of the +Athenian lines over against the market, and killed some of the men, and brought +in corn and all else that they could find useful to them, and so returned and +kept quiet, while the Athenians took measures to keep better guard in future. +</p> + +<p> +Summer was now over. The next winter the Lacedaemonians intended to invade the +Argive territory, but arriving at the frontier found the sacrifices for +crossing unfavourable, and went back again. This intention of theirs gave the +Argives suspicions of certain of their fellow citizens, some of whom they +arrested; others, however, escaped them. About the same time the Melians again +took another part of the Athenian lines which were but feebly garrisoned. +Reinforcements afterwards arriving from Athens in consequence, under the +command of Philocrates, son of Demeas, the siege was now pressed vigorously; +and some treachery taking place inside, the Melians surrendered at discretion +to the Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold +the women and children for slaves, and subsequently sent out five hundred +colonists and inhabited the place themselves. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2H_4_0023" id="link2H_4_0023"></a> +BOOK VI </h2> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0018" id="link2HCH0018"></a> +CHAPTER XVIII </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Seventeenth Year of the War—The Sicilian Campaign—Affair of the +Hermae—Departure of the Expedition +</p> + +<p> +The same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again to Sicily, with a greater +armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and, if possible, to conquer the +island; most of them being ignorant of its size and of the number of its +inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and of the fact that they were undertaking +a war not much inferior to that against the Peloponnesians. For the voyage +round Sicily in a merchantman is not far short of eight days; and yet, large as +the island is, there are only two miles of sea to prevent its being mainland. +</p> + +<p> +It was settled originally as follows, and the peoples that occupied it are +these. The earliest inhabitants spoken of in any part of the country are the +Cyclopes and Laestrygones; but I cannot tell of what race they were, or whence +they came or whither they went, and must leave my readers to what the poets +have said of them and to what may be generally known concerning them. The +Sicanians appear to have been the next settlers, although they pretend to have +been the first of all and aborigines; but the facts show that they were +Iberians, driven by the Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. It was from +them that the island, before called Trinacria, took its name of Sicania, and to +the present day they inhabit the west of Sicily. On the fall of Ilium, some of +the Trojans escaped from the Achaeans, came in ships to Sicily, and settled +next to the Sicanians under the general name of Elymi; their towns being called +Eryx and Egesta. With them settled some of the Phocians carried on their way +from Troy by a storm, first to Libya, and afterwards from thence to Sicily. The +Sicels crossed over to Sicily from their first home Italy, flying from the +Opicans, as tradition says and as seems not unlikely, upon rafts, having +watched till the wind set down the strait to effect the passage; although +perhaps they may have sailed over in some other way. Even at the present day +there are still Sicels in Italy; and the country got its name of Italy from +Italus, a king of the Sicels, so called. These went with a great host to +Sicily, defeated the Sicanians in battle and forced them to remove to the south +and west of the island, which thus came to be called Sicily instead of Sicania, +and after they crossed over continued to enjoy the richest parts of the country +for near three hundred years before any Hellenes came to Sicily; indeed they +still hold the centre and north of the island. There were also Phoenicians +living all round Sicily, who had occupied promontories upon the sea coasts and +the islets adjacent for the purpose of trading with the Sicels. But when the +Hellenes began to arrive in considerable numbers by sea, the Phoenicians +abandoned most of their stations, and drawing together took up their abode in +Motye, Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymi, partly because they confided in +their alliance, and also because these are the nearest points for the voyage +between Carthage and Sicily. +</p> + +<p> +These were the barbarians in Sicily, settled as I have said. Of the Hellenes, +the first to arrive were Chalcidians from Euboea with Thucles, their founder. +They founded Naxos and built the altar to Apollo Archegetes, which now stands +outside the town, and upon which the deputies for the games sacrifice before +sailing from Sicily. Syracuse was founded the year afterwards by Archias, one +of the Heraclids from Corinth, who began by driving out the Sicels from the +island upon which the inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded +by water: in process of time the outer town also was taken within the walls and +became populous. Meanwhile Thucles and the Chalcidians set out from Naxos in +the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, and drove out the Sicels by +arms and founded Leontini and afterwards Catana; the Catanians themselves +choosing Evarchus as their founder. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony from Megara, and +after founding a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas, and +afterwards leaving it and for a short while joining the Chalcidians at +Leontini, was driven out by them and founded Thapsus. After his death his +companions were driven out of Thapsus, and founded a place called the Hyblaean +Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, having given up the place and inviting them +thither. Here they lived two hundred and forty-five years; after which they +were expelled from the city and the country by the Syracusan tyrant Gelo. +Before their expulsion, however, a hundred years after they had settled there, +they sent out Pamillus and founded Selinus; he having come from their mother +country Megara to join them in its foundation. Gela was founded by Antiphemus +from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who joined in leading a colony thither, in +the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse. The town took its name +from the river Gelas, the place where the citadel now stands, and which was +first fortified, being called Lindii. The institutions which they adopted were +Dorian. Near one hundred and eight years after the foundation of Gela, the +Geloans founded Acragas (Agrigentum), so called from the river of that name, +and made Aristonous and Pystilus their founders; giving their own institutions +to the colony. Zancle was originally founded by pirates from Cuma, the +Chalcidian town in the country of the Opicans: afterwards, however, large +numbers came from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, and helped to people the +place; the founders being Perieres and Crataemenes from Cuma and Chalcis +respectively. It first had the name of Zancle given it by the Sicels, because +the place is shaped like a sickle, which the Sicels call zanclon; but upon the +original settlers being afterwards expelled by some Samians and other Ionians +who landed in Sicily flying from the Medes, and the Samians in their turn not +long afterwards by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, the town was by him colonized +with a mixed population, and its name changed to Messina, after his old +country. +</p> + +<p> +Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, most of those who +went to the colony being Chalcidians; though they were joined by some exiles +from Syracuse, defeated in a civil war, called the Myletidae. The language was +a mixture of Chalcidian and Doric, but the institutions which prevailed were +the Chalcidian. Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae +seventy years after Syracuse, Casmenae nearly twenty after Acrae. Camarina was +first founded by the Syracusans, close upon a hundred and thirty-five years +after the building of Syracuse; its founders being Daxon and Menecolus. But the +Camarinaeans being expelled by arms by the Syracusans for having revolted, +Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, some time later receiving their land in ransom for +some Syracusan prisoners, resettled Camarina, himself acting as its founder. +Lastly, it was again depopulated by Gelo, and settled once more for the third +time by the Geloans. +</p> + +<p> +Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, inhabiting Sicily, and +such the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were now bent upon +invading; being ambitious in real truth of conquering the whole, although they +had also the specious design of succouring their kindred and other allies in +the island. But they were especially incited by envoys from Egesta, who had +come to Athens and invoked their aid more urgently than ever. The Egestaeans +had gone to war with their neighbours the Selinuntines upon questions of +marriage and disputed territory, and the Selinuntines had procured the alliance +of the Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard by land and sea. The Egestaeans now +reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in the time of Laches, during the +former Leontine war, and begged them to send a fleet to their aid, and among a +number of other considerations urged as a capital argument that if the +Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished for their depopulation of Leontini, to +ruin the allies still left to Athens in Sicily, and to get the whole power of +the island into their hands, there would be a danger of their one day coming +with a large force, as Dorians, to the aid of their Dorian brethren, and as +colonists, to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and joining +these in pulling down the Athenian empire. The Athenians would, therefore, do +well to unite with the allies still left to them, and to make a stand against +the Syracusans; especially as they, the Egestaeans, were prepared to furnish +money sufficient for the war. The Athenians, hearing these arguments constantly +repeated in their assemblies by the Egestaeans and their supporters, voted +first to send envoys to Egesta, to see if there was really the money that they +talked of in the treasury and temples, and at the same time to ascertain in +what posture was the war with the Selinuntines. +</p> + +<p> +The envoys of the Athenians were accordingly dispatched to Sicily. The same +winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, the Corinthians excepted, marched +into the Argive territory, and ravaged a small part of the land, and took some +yokes of oxen and carried off some corn. They also settled the Argive exiles at +Orneae, and left them a few soldiers taken from the rest of the army; and after +making a truce for a certain while, according to which neither Orneatae nor +Argives were to injure each other’s territory, returned home with the +army. Not long afterwards the Athenians came with thirty ships and six hundred +heavy infantry, and the Argives joining them with all their forces, marched out +and besieged the men in Orneae for one day; but the garrison escaped by night, +the besiegers having bivouacked some way off. The next day the Argives, +discovering it, razed Orneae to the ground, and went back again; after which +the Athenians went home in their ships. Meanwhile the Athenians took by sea to +Methone on the Macedonian border some cavalry of their own and the Macedonian +exiles that were at Athens, and plundered the country of Perdiccas. Upon this +the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who had a truce with +Athens from one ten days to another, urging them to join Perdiccas in the war, +which they refused to do. And the winter ended, and with it ended the sixteenth +year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian. +</p> + +<p> +Early in the spring of the following summer the Athenian envoys arrived from +Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined +silver, as a month’s pay for sixty ships, which they were to ask to have +sent them. The Athenians held an assembly and, after hearing from the +Egestaeans and their own envoys a report, as attractive as it was untrue, upon +the state of affairs generally, and in particular as to the money, of which, it +was said, there was abundance in the temples and the treasury, voted to send +sixty ships to Sicily, under the command of Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias, +son of Niceratus, and Lamachus, son of Xenophanes, who were appointed with full +powers; they were to help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines, to restore +Leontini upon gaining any advantage in the war, and to order all other matters +in Sicily as they should deem best for the interests of Athens. Five days after +this a second assembly was held, to consider the speediest means of equipping +the ships, and to vote whatever else might be required by the generals for the +expedition; and Nicias, who had been chosen to the command against his will, +and who thought that the state was not well advised, but upon a slight aid +specious pretext was aspiring to the conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great +matter to achieve, came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the +enterprise, and gave them the following counsel: +</p> + +<p> +“Although this assembly was convened to consider the preparations to be +made for sailing to Sicily, I think, notwithstanding, that we have still this +question to examine, whether it be better to send out the ships at all, and +that we ought not to give so little consideration to a matter of such moment, +or let ourselves be persuaded by foreigners into undertaking a war with which +we have nothing to do. And yet, individually, I gain in honour by such a +course, and fear as little as other men for my person—not that I think a +man need be any the worse citizen for taking some thought for his person and +estate; on the contrary, such a man would for his own sake desire the +prosperity of his country more than others—nevertheless, as I have never +spoken against my convictions to gain honour, I shall not begin to do so now, +but shall say what I think best. Against your character any words of mine would +be weak enough, if I were to advise your keeping what you have got and not +risking what is actually yours for advantages which are dubious in themselves, +and which you may or may not attain. I will, therefore, content myself with +showing that your ardour is out of season, and your ambition not easy of +accomplishment. +</p> + +<p> +“I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go yonder +and bring more back with you. You imagine, perhaps, that the treaty which you +have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue to exist nominally, as +long as you keep quiet—for nominal it has become, owing to the practices +of certain men here and at Sparta—but which in the event of a serious +reverse in any quarter would not delay our enemies a moment in attacking us; +first, because the convention was forced upon them by disaster and was less +honourable to them than to us; and secondly, because in this very convention +there are many points that are still disputed. Again, some of the most powerful +states have never yet accepted the arrangement at all. Some of these are at +open war with us; others (as the Lacedaemonians do not yet move) are restrained +by truces renewed every ten days, and it is only too probable that if they +found our power divided, as we are hurrying to divide it, they would attack us +vigorously with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would have in the past +valued as they would that of few others. A man ought, therefore, to consider +these points, and not to think of running risks with a country placed so +critically, or of grasping at another empire before we have secured the one we +have already; for in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have been all these years in +revolt from us without being yet subdued, and others on the continents yield us +but a doubtful obedience. Meanwhile the Egestaeans, our allies, have been +wronged, and we run to help them, while the rebels who have so long wronged us +still wait for punishment. +</p> + +<p> +“And yet the latter, if brought under, might be kept under; while the +Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous to be ruled +without difficulty. Now it is folly to go against men who could not be kept +under even if conquered, while failure would leave us in a very different +position from that which we occupied before the enterprise. The Siceliots, +again, to take them as they are at present, in the event of a Syracusan +conquest (the favourite bugbear of the Egestaeans), would to my thinking be +even less dangerous to us than before. At present they might possibly come here +as separate states for love of Lacedaemon; in the other case one empire would +scarcely attack another; for after joining the Peloponnesians to overthrow +ours, they could only expect to see the same hands overthrow their own in the +same way. The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if we never went there at +all, and next to this, if after displaying our power we went away again as soon +as possible. We all know that that which is farthest off, and the reputation of +which can least be tested, is the object of admiration; at the least reverse +they would at once begin to look down upon us, and would join our enemies here +against us. You have yourselves experienced this with regard to the +Lacedaemonians and their allies, whom your unexpected success, as compared with +what you feared at first, has made you suddenly despise, tempting you further +to aspire to the conquest of Sicily. Instead, however, of being puffed up by +the misfortunes of your adversaries, you ought to think of breaking their +spirit before giving yourselves up to confidence, and to understand that the +one thought awakened in the Lacedaemonians by their disgrace is how they may +even now, if possible, overthrow us and repair their dishonour; inasmuch as +military reputation is their oldest and chiefest study. Our struggle, +therefore, if we are wise, will not be for the barbarian Egestaeans in Sicily, +but how to defend ourselves most effectually against the oligarchical +machinations of Lacedaemon. +</p> + +<p> +“We should also remember that we are but now enjoying some respite from a +great pestilence and from war, to the no small benefit of our estates and +persons, and that it is right to employ these at home on our own behalf, +instead of using them on behalf of these exiles whose interest it is to lie as +fairly as they can, who do nothing but talk themselves and leave the danger to +others, and who if they succeed will show no proper gratitude, and if they fail +will drag down their friends with them. And if there be any man here, overjoyed +at being chosen to command, who urges you to make the expedition, merely for +ends of his own—specially if he be still too young to command—who +seeks to be admired for his stud of horses, but on account of its heavy +expenses hopes for some profit from his appointment, do not allow such a one to +maintain his private splendour at his country’s risk, but remember that +such persons injure the public fortune while they squander their own, and that +this is a matter of importance, and not for a young man to decide or hastily to +take in hand. +</p> + +<p> +“When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same +individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn, summon any +of the older men that may have such a person sitting next him not to let +himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a coward if he do not vote +for war, but, remembering how rarely success is got by wishing and how often by +forecast, to leave to them the mad dream of conquest, and as a true lover of +his country, now threatened by the greatest danger in its history, to hold up +his hand on the other side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the limits +now existing between us, limits of which no one can complain (the Ionian sea +for the coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the open main), to enjoy their +own possessions and to settle their own quarrels; that the Egestaeans, for +their part, be told to end by themselves with the Selinuntines the war which +they began without consulting the Athenians; and that for the future we do not +enter into alliance, as we have been used to do, with people whom we must help +in their need, and who can never help us in ours. +</p> + +<p> +“And you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the +commonwealth, and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put the question +to the vote, and take a second time the opinions of the Athenians. If you are +afraid to move the question again, consider that a violation of the law cannot +carry any prejudice with so many abettors, that you will be the physician of +your misguided city, and that the virtue of men in office is briefly this, to +do their country as much good as they can, or in any case no harm that they can +avoid.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians that came forward spoke in +favour of the expedition, and of not annulling what had been voted, although +some spoke on the other side. By far the warmest advocate of the expedition +was, however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as +his political opponent and also because of the attack he had made upon him in +his speech, and who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which +he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and +reputation by means of his successes. For the position he held among the +citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, +both in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on +had not a little to do with the ruin of the Athenian state. Alarmed at the +greatness of his licence in his own life and habits, and of the ambition which +he showed in all things soever that he undertook, the mass of the people set +him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became his enemies; and although +publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired, individually, +his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to +other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city. Meanwhile he now came +forward and gave the following advice to the Athenians: +</p> + +<p> +“Athenians, I have a better right to command than others—I must +begin with this as Nicias has attacked me—and at the same time I believe +myself to be worthy of it. The things for which I am abused, bring fame to my +ancestors and to myself, and to the country profit besides. The Hellenes, after +expecting to see our city ruined by the war, concluded it to be even greater +than it really is, by reason of the magnificence with which I represented it at +the Olympic games, when I sent into the lists seven chariots, a number never +before entered by any private person, and won the first prize, and was second +and fourth, and took care to have everything else in a style worthy of my +victory. Custom regards such displays as honourable, and they cannot be made +without leaving behind them an impression of power. Again, any splendour that I +may have exhibited at home in providing choruses or otherwise, is naturally +envied by my fellow citizens, but in the eyes of foreigners has an air of +strength as in the other instance. And this is no useless folly, when a man at +his own private cost benefits not himself only, but his city: nor is it unfair +that he who prides himself on his position should refuse to be upon an equality +with the rest. He who is badly off has his misfortunes all to himself, and as +we do not see men courted in adversity, on the like principle a man ought to +accept the insolence of prosperity; or else, let him first mete out equal +measure to all, and then demand to have it meted out to him. What I know is +that persons of this kind and all others that have attained to any distinction, +although they may be unpopular in their lifetime in their relations with their +fellow-men and especially with their equals, leave to posterity the desire of +claiming connection with them even without any ground, and are vaunted by the +country to which they belonged, not as strangers or ill-doers, but as +fellow-countrymen and heroes. Such are my aspirations, and however I am abused +for them in private, the question is whether any one manages public affairs +better than I do. Having united the most powerful states of Peloponnese, +without great danger or expense to you, I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake +their all upon the issue of a single day at Mantinea; and although victorious +in the battle, they have never since fully recovered confidence. +</p> + +<p> +“Thus did my youth and so-called monstrous folly find fitting arguments +to deal with the power of the Peloponnesians, and by its ardour win their +confidence and prevail. And do not be afraid of my youth now, but while I am +still in its flower, and Nicias appears fortunate, avail yourselves to the +utmost of the services of us both. Neither rescind your resolution to sail to +Sicily, on the ground that you would be going to attack a great power. The +cities in Sicily are peopled by motley rabbles, and easily change their +institutions and adopt new ones in their stead; and consequently the +inhabitants, being without any feeling of patriotism, are not provided with +arms for their persons, and have not regularly established themselves on the +land; every man thinks that either by fair words or by party strife he can +obtain something at the public expense, and then in the event of a catastrophe +settle in some other country, and makes his preparations accordingly. From a +mob like this you need not look for either unanimity in counsel or concert in +action; but they will probably one by one come in as they get a fair offer, +especially if they are torn by civil strife as we are told. Moreover, the +Siceliots have not so many heavy infantry as they boast; just as the Hellenes +generally did not prove so numerous as each state reckoned itself, but Hellas +greatly over-estimated their numbers, and has hardly had an adequate force of +heavy infantry throughout this war. The states in Sicily, therefore, from all +that I can hear, will be found as I say, and I have not pointed out all our +advantages, for we shall have the help of many barbarians, who from their +hatred of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them; nor will the powers at +home prove any hindrance, if you judge rightly. Our fathers with these very +adversaries, which it is said we shall now leave behind us when we sail, and +the Mede as their enemy as well, were able to win the empire, depending solely +on their superiority at sea. The Peloponnesians had never so little hope +against us as at present; and let them be ever so sanguine, although strong +enough to invade our country even if we stay at home, they can never hurt us +with their navy, as we leave one of our own behind us that is a match for them. +</p> + +<p> +“In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for holding +back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily for not helping them? +They are our confederates, and we are bound to assist them, without objecting +that they have not assisted us. We did not take them into alliance to have them +to help us in Hellas, but that they might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to +prevent them from coming over here and attacking us. It is thus that empire has +been won, both by us and by all others that have held it, by a constant +readiness to support all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that invite +assistance; since if all were to keep quiet or to pick and choose whom they +ought to assist, we should make but few new conquests, and should imperil those +we have already won. Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a +superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being made. And +we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a +position in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to +extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled +ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the same point of view as others, +unless you are prepared to change your habits and make them like theirs. +</p> + +<p> +“Be convinced, then, that we shall augment our power at home by this +adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the pride of +the Peloponnesians by sailing off to Sicily, and letting them see how little we +care for the peace that we are now enjoying; and at the same time we shall +either become masters, as we very easily may, of the whole of Hellas through +the accession of the Sicilian Hellenes, or in any case ruin the Syracusans, to +the no small advantage of ourselves and our allies. The faculty of staying if +successful, or of returning, will be secured to us by our navy, as we shall be +superior at sea to all the Siceliots put together. And do not let the +do-nothing policy which Nicias advocates, or his setting of the young against +the old, turn you from your purpose, but in the good old fashion by which our +fathers, old and young together, by their united counsels brought our affairs +to their present height, do you endeavour still to advance them; understanding +that neither youth nor old age can do anything the one without the other, but +that levity, sobriety, and deliberate judgment are strongest when united, and +that, by sinking into inaction, the city, like everything else, will wear +itself out, and its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle will +give it fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself not in word +but in deed. In short, my conviction is that a city not inactive by nature +could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting such a +policy, and that the safest rule of life is to take one’s character and +institutions for better and for worse, and to live up to them as closely as one +can.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the Egestaeans and +some Leontine exiles, who came forward reminding them of their oaths and +imploring their assistance, the Athenians became more eager for the expedition +than before. Nicias, perceiving that it would be now useless to try to deter +them by the old line of argument, but thinking that he might perhaps alter +their resolution by the extravagance of his estimates, came forward a second +time and spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upon the expedition, and +therefore hope that all will turn out as we wish, and proceed to give you my +opinion at the present juncture. From all that I hear we are going against +cities that are great and not subject to one another, or in need of change, so +as to be glad to pass from enforced servitude to an easier condition, or in the +least likely to accept our rule in exchange for freedom; and, to take only the +Hellenic towns, they are very numerous for one island. Besides Naxos and +Catana, which I expect to join us from their connection with Leontini, there +are seven others armed at all points just like our own power, particularly +Selinus and Syracuse, the chief objects of our expedition. These are full of +heavy infantry, archers, and darters, have galleys in abundance and crowds to +man them; they have also money, partly in the hands of private persons, partly +in the temples at Selinus, and at Syracuse first-fruits from some of the +barbarians as well. But their chief advantage over us lies in the number of +their horses, and in the fact that they grow their corn at home instead of +importing it. +</p> + +<p> +“Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak naval +armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail with us, if we are +to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are not to be shut out from the +country by a numerous cavalry; especially if the cities should take alarm and +combine, and we should be left without friends (except the Egestaeans) to +furnish us with horse to defend ourselves with. It would be disgraceful to have +to retire under compulsion, or to send back for reinforcements, owing to want +of reflection at first: we must therefore start from home with a competent +force, seeing that we are going to sail far from our country, and upon an +expedition not like any which you may undertaken undertaken the quality of +allies, among your subject states here in Hellas, where any additional supplies +needed were easily drawn from the friendly territory; but we are cutting +ourselves off, and going to a land entirely strange, from which during four +months in winter it is not even easy for a messenger get to Athens. +</p> + +<p> +“I think, therefore, that we ought to take great numbers of heavy +infantry, both from Athens and from our allies, and not merely from our +subjects, but also any we may be able to get for love or for money in +Peloponnese, and great numbers also of archers and slingers, to make head +against the Sicilian horse. Meanwhile we must have an overwhelming superiority +at sea, to enable us the more easily to carry in what we want; and we must take +our own corn in merchant vessels, that is to say, wheat and parched barley, and +bakers from the mills compelled to serve for pay in the proper proportion; in +order that in case of our being weather-bound the armament may not want +provisions, as it is not every city that will be able to entertain numbers like +ours. We must also provide ourselves with everything else as far as we can, so +as not to be dependent upon others; and above all we must take with us from +home as much money as possible, as the sums talked of as ready at Egesta are +readier, you may be sure, in talk than in any other way. +</p> + +<p> +“Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force not only equal to that of +the enemy except in the number of heavy infantry in the field, but even at all +points superior to him, we shall still find it difficult to conquer Sicily or +save ourselves. We must not disguise from ourselves that we go to found a city +among strangers and enemies, and that he who undertakes such an enterprise +should be prepared to become master of the country the first day he lands, or +failing in this to find everything hostile to him. Fearing this, and knowing +that we shall have need of much good counsel and more good fortune—a hard +matter for mortal man to aspire to—I wish as far as may be to make myself +independent of fortune before sailing, and when I do sail, to be as safe as a +strong force can make me. This I believe to be surest for the country at large, +and safest for us who are to go on the expedition. If any one thinks +differently I resign to him my command.” +</p> + +<p> +With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should either disgust the +Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if obliged to sail on the +expedition, would thus do so in the safest way possible. The Athenians, +however, far from having their taste for the voyage taken away by the +burdensomeness of the preparations, became more eager for it than ever; and +just the contrary took place of what Nicias had thought, as it was held that he +had given good advice, and that the expedition would be the safest in the +world. All alike fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that +they would either subdue the places against which they were to sail, or at all +events, with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime of +life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no doubt that +they should come safe home again; while the idea of the common people and the +soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would supply +a never-ending fund of pay for the future. With this enthusiasm of the +majority, the few that liked it not, feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up +their hands against it, and so kept quiet. +</p> + +<p> +At last one of the Athenians came forward and called upon Nicias and told him +that he ought not to make excuses or put them off, but say at once before them +all what forces the Athenians should vote him. Upon this he said, not without +reluctance, that he would advise upon that matter more at leisure with his +colleagues; as far however as he could see at present, they must sail with at +least one hundred galleys—the Athenians providing as many transports as +they might determine, and sending for others from the allies—not less +than five thousand heavy infantry in all, Athenian and allied, and if possible +more; and the rest of the armament in proportion; archers from home and from +Crete, and slingers, and whatever else might seem desirable, being got ready by +the generals and taken with them. +</p> + +<p> +Upon hearing this the Athenians at once voted that the generals should have +full powers in the matter of the numbers of the army and of the expedition +generally, to do as they judged best for the interests of Athens. After this +the preparations began; messages being sent to the allies and the rolls drawn +up at home. And as the city had just recovered from the plague and the long +war, and a number of young men had grown up and capital had accumulated by +reason of the truce, everything was the more easily provided. +</p> + +<p> +In the midst of these preparations all the stone Hermae in the city of Athens, +that is to say the customary square figures, so common in the doorways of +private houses and temples, had in one night most of them their fares +mutilated. No one knew who had done it, but large public rewards were offered +to find the authors; and it was further voted that any one who knew of any +other act of impiety having been committed should come and give information +without fear of consequences, whether he were citizen, alien, or slave. The +matter was taken up the more seriously, as it was thought to be ominous for the +expedition, and part of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and to upset +the democracy. +</p> + +<p> +Information was given accordingly by some resident aliens and body servants, +not about the Hermae but about some previous mutilations of other images +perpetrated by young men in a drunken frolic, and of mock celebrations of the +mysteries, averred to take place in private houses. Alcibiades being implicated +in this charge, it was taken hold of by those who could least endure him, +because he stood in the way of their obtaining the undisturbed direction of the +people, and who thought that if he were once removed the first place would be +theirs. These accordingly magnified the matter and loudly proclaimed that the +affair of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae were part and parcel +of a scheme to overthrow the democracy, and that nothing of all this had been +done without Alcibiades; the proofs alleged being the general and undemocratic +licence of his life and habits. +</p> + +<p> +Alcibiades repelled on the spot the charges in question, and also before going +on the expedition, the preparations for which were now complete, offered to +stand his trial, that it might be seen whether he was guilty of the acts +imputed to him; desiring to be punished if found guilty, but, if acquitted, to +take the command. Meanwhile he protested against their receiving slanders +against him in his absence, and begged them rather to put him to death at once +if he were guilty, and pointed out the imprudence of sending him out at the +head of so large an army, with so serious a charge still undecided. But his +enemies feared that he would have the army for him if he were tried +immediately, and that the people might relent in favour of the man whom they +already caressed as the cause of the Argives and some of the Mantineans joining +in the expedition, and did their utmost to get this proposition rejected, +putting forward other orators who said that he ought at present to sail and not +delay the departure of the army, and be tried on his return within a fixed +number of days; their plan being to have him sent for and brought home for +trial upon some graver charge, which they would the more easily get up in his +absence. Accordingly it was decreed that he should sail. +</p> + +<p> +After this the departure for Sicily took place, it being now about midsummer. +Most of the allies, with the corn transports and the smaller craft and the rest +of the expedition, had already received orders to muster at Corcyra, to cross +the Ionian Sea from thence in a body to the Iapygian promontory. But the +Athenians themselves, and such of their allies as happened to be with them, +went down to Piraeus upon a day appointed at daybreak, and began to man the +ships for putting out to sea. With them also went down the whole population, +one may say, of the city, both citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants of the +country each escorting those that belonged to them, their friends, their +relatives, or their sons, with hope and lamentation upon their way, as they +thought of the conquests which they hoped to make, or of the friends whom they +might never see again, considering the long voyage which they were going to +make from their country. Indeed, at this moment, when they were now upon the +point of parting from one another, the danger came more home to them than when +they voted for the expedition; although the strength of the armament, and the +profuse provision which they remarked in every department, was a sight that +could not but comfort them. As for the foreigners and the rest of the crowd, +they simply went to see a sight worth looking at and passing all belief. +</p> + +<p> +Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far the most costly and +splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single city up to that +time. In mere number of ships and heavy infantry that against Epidaurus under +Pericles, and the same when going against Potidæa under Hagnon, was not +inferior; containing as it did four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three +hundred horse, and one hundred galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian +vessels and many allies besides. But these were sent upon a short voyage and +with a scanty equipment. The present expedition was formed in contemplation of +a long term of service by land and sea alike, and was furnished with ships and +troops so as to be ready for either as required. The fleet had been elaborately +equipped at great cost to the captains and the state; the treasury giving a +drachma a day to each seaman, and providing empty ships, sixty men-of-war and +forty transports, and manning these with the best crews obtainable; while the +captains gave a bounty in addition to the pay from the treasury to the +thranitae and crews generally, besides spending lavishly upon figure-heads and +equipments, and one and all making the utmost exertions to enable their own +ships to excel in beauty and fast sailing. Meanwhile the land forces had been +picked from the best muster-rolls, and vied with each other in paying great +attention to their arms and personal accoutrements. From this resulted not only +a rivalry among themselves in their different departments, but an idea among +the rest of the Hellenes that it was more a display of power and resources than +an armament against an enemy. For if any one had counted up the public +expenditure of the state, and the private outlay of individuals—that is +to say, the sums which the state had already spent upon the expedition and was +sending out in the hands of the generals, and those which individuals had +expended upon their personal outfit, or as captains of galleys had laid out and +were still to lay out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the +journey money which each was likely to have provided himself with, +independently of the pay from the treasury, for a voyage of such length, and +what the soldiers or traders took with them for the purpose of +exchange—it would have been found that many talents in all were being +taken out of the city. Indeed the expedition became not less famous for its +wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its appearance, than for its +overwhelming strength as compared with the peoples against whom it was +directed, and for the fact that this was the longest passage from home hitherto +attempted, and the most ambitious in its objects considering the resources of +those who undertook it. +</p> + +<p> +The ships being now manned, and everything put on board with which they meant +to sail, the trumpet commanded silence, and the prayers customary before +putting out to sea were offered, not in each ship by itself, but by all +together to the voice of a herald; and bowls of wine were mixed through all the +armament, and libations made by the soldiers and their officers in gold and +silver goblets. In their prayers joined also the crowds on shore, the citizens +and all others that wished them well. The hymn sung and the libations finished, +they put out to sea, and first out in column then raced each other as far as +Aegina, and so hastened to reach Corcyra, where the rest of the allied forces +were also assembling. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0019" id="link2HCH0019"></a> +CHAPTER XIX </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Seventeenth Year of the War—Parties at Syracuse—Story of Harmodius +and Aristogiton—Disgrace of Alcibiades +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in from many quarters of the expedition, but +for a long while met with no credence whatever. Indeed, an assembly was held in +which speeches, as will be seen, were delivered by different orators, believing +or contradicting the report of the Athenian expedition; among whom Hermocrates, +son of Hermon, came forward, being persuaded that he knew the truth of the +matter, and gave the following counsel: +</p> + +<p> +“Although I shall perhaps be no better believed than others have been +when I speak upon the reality of the expedition, and although I know that those +who either make or repeat statements thought not worthy of belief not only gain +no converts but are thought fools for their pains, I shall certainly not be +frightened into holding my tongue when the state is in danger, and when I am +persuaded that I can speak with more authority on the matter than other +persons. Much as you wonder at it, the Athenians nevertheless have set out +against us with a large force, naval and military, professedly to help the +Egestaeans and to restore Leontini, but really to conquer Sicily, and above all +our city, which once gained, the rest, they think, will easily follow. Make up +your minds, therefore, to see them speedily here, and see how you can best +repel them with the means under your hand, and do be taken off your guard +through despising the news, or neglect the common weal through disbelieving it. +Meanwhile those who believe me need not be dismayed at the force or daring of +the enemy. They will not be able to do us more hurt than we shall do them; nor +is the greatness of their armament altogether without advantage to us. Indeed, +the greater it is the better, with regard to the rest of the Siceliots, whom +dismay will make more ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive them away, +disappointed of the objects of their ambition (for I do not fear for a moment +that they will get what they want), it will be a most glorious exploit for us, +and in my judgment by no means an unlikely one. Few indeed have been the large +armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian, that have gone far from home and been +successful. They cannot be more numerous than the people of the country and +their neighbours, all of whom fear leagues together; and if they miscarry for +want of supplies in a foreign land, to those against whom their plans were laid +none the less they leave renown, although they may themselves have been the +main cause of their own discomfort. Thus these very Athenians rose by the +defeat of the Mede, in a great measure due to accidental causes, from the mere +fact that Athens had been the object of his attack; and this may very well be +the case with us also. +</p> + +<p> +“Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send and +confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance of others, +and dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that the danger is common to +all, and to Italy to get them to become our allies, or at all events to refuse +to receive the Athenians. I also think that it would be best to send to +Carthage as well; they are by no means there without apprehension, but it is +their constant fear that the Athenians may one day attack their city, and they +may perhaps think that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be +sacrificed, and be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one way if not +in another. They are the best able to do so, if they will, of any of the +present day, as they possess most gold and silver, by which war, like +everything else, flourishes. Let us also send to Lacedaemon and Corinth, and +ask them to come here and help us as soon as possible, and to keep alive the +war in Hellas. But the true thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the +present moment, is what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, will be +slow to see, and what I must nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all +together, or at least as many as possible besides ourselves, would only launch +the whole of our actual navy with two months’ provisions, and meet the +Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and show them that before +fighting for Sicily they must first fight for their passage across the Ionian +Sea, we should strike dismay into their army, and set them on thinking that we +have a base for our defensive—for Tarentum is ready to receive +us—while they have a wide sea to cross with all their armament, which +could with difficulty keep its order through so long a voyage, and would be +easy for us to attack as it came on slowly and in small detachments. On the +other hand, if they were to lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast +sailers and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them when they were +wearied with rowing, or if we did not choose to do so, we could retire to +Tarentum; while they, having crossed with few provisions just to give battle, +would be hard put to it in desolate places, and would either have to remain and +be blockaded, or to try to sail along the coast, abandoning the rest of their +armament, and being further discouraged by not knowing for certain whether the +cities would receive them. In my opinion this consideration alone would be +sufficient to deter them from putting out from Corcyra; and what with +deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts, they would let the +season go on until winter was upon them, or, confounded by so unexpected a +circumstance, would break up the expedition, especially as their most +experienced general has, as I hear, taken the command against his will, and +would grasp at the first excuse offered by any serious demonstration of ours. +We should also be reported, I am certain, as more numerous than we really are, +and men’s minds are affected by what they hear, and besides the first to +attack, or to show that they mean to defend themselves against an attack, +inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for the emergency. +This would just be the case with the Athenians at present. They are now +attacking us in the belief that we shall not resist, having a right to judge us +severely because we did not help the Lacedaemonians in crushing them; but if +they were to see us showing a courage for which they are not prepared, they +would be more dismayed by the surprise than they could ever be by our actual +power. I could wish to persuade you to show this courage; but if this cannot +be, at all events lose not a moment in preparing generally for the war; and +remember all of you that contempt for an assailant is best shown by bravery in +action, but that for the present the best course is to accept the preparations +which fear inspires as giving the surest promise of safety, and to act as if +the danger was real. That the Athenians are coming to attack us, and are +already upon the voyage, and all but here—this is what I am sure +of.” +</p> + +<p> +Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile the people of Syracuse were at great +strife among themselves; some contending that the Athenians had no idea of +coming and that there was no truth in what he said; some asking if they did +come what harm they could do that would not be repaid them tenfold in return; +while others made light of the whole affair and turned it into ridicule. In +short, there were few that believed Hermocrates and feared for the future. +Meanwhile Athenagoras, the leader of the people and very powerful at that time +with the masses, came forward and spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“For the Athenians, he who does not wish that they may be as misguided as +they are supposed to be, and that they may come here to become our subjects, is +either a coward or a traitor to his country; while as for those who carry such +tidings and fill you with so much alarm, I wonder less at their audacity than +at their folly if they flatter themselves that we do not see through them. The +fact is that they have their private reasons to be afraid, and wish to throw +the city into consternation to have their own terrors cast into the shade by +the public alarm. In short, this is what these reports are worth; they do not +arise of themselves, but are concocted by men who are always causing agitation +here in Sicily. However, if you are well advised, you will not be guided in +your calculation of probabilities by what these persons tell you, but by what +shrewd men and of large experience, as I esteem the Athenians to be, would be +likely to do. Now it is not likely that they would leave the Peloponnesians +behind them, and before they have well ended the war in Hellas wantonly come in +quest of a new war quite as arduous in Sicily; indeed, in my judgment, they are +only too glad that we do not go and attack them, being so many and so great +cities as we are. +</p> + +<p> +“However, if they should come as is reported, I consider Sicily better +able to go through with the war than Peloponnese, as being at all points better +prepared, and our city by itself far more than a match for this pretended army +of invasion, even were it twice as large again. I know that they will not have +horses with them, or get any here, except a few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or +be able to bring a force of heavy infantry equal in number to our own, in ships +which will already have enough to do to come all this distance, however lightly +laden, not to speak of the transport of the other stores required against a +city of this magnitude, which will be no slight quantity. In fact, so strong is +my opinion upon the subject, that I do not well see how they could avoid +annihilation if they brought with them another city as large as Syracuse, and +settled down and carried on war from our frontier; much less can they hope to +succeed with all Sicily hostile to them, as all Sicily will be, and with only a +camp pitched from the ships, and composed of tents and bare necessaries, from +which they would not be able to stir far for fear of our cavalry. +</p> + +<p> +“But the Athenians see this as I tell you, and as I have reason to know +are looking after their possessions at home, while persons here invent stories +that neither are true nor ever will be. Nor is this the first time that I see +these persons, when they cannot resort to deeds, trying by such stories and by +others even more abominable to frighten your people and get into their hands +the government: it is what I see always. And I cannot help fearing that trying +so often they may one day succeed, and that we, as long as we do not feel the +smart, may prove too weak for the task of prevention, or, when the offenders +are known, of pursuit. The result is that our city is rarely at rest, but is +subject to constant troubles and to contests as frequent against herself as +against the enemy, not to speak of occasional tyrannies and infamous cabals. +However, I will try, if you will support me, to let nothing of this happen in +our time, by gaining you, the many, and by chastising the authors of such +machinations, not merely when they are caught in the act—a difficult feat +to accomplish—but also for what they have the wish though not the power +to do; as it is necessary to punish an enemy not only for what he does, but +also beforehand for what he intends to do, if the first to relax precaution +would not be also the first to suffer. I shall also reprove, watch, and on +occasion warn the few—the most effectual way, in my opinion, of turning +them from their evil courses. And after all, as I have often asked, what would +you have, young men? Would you hold office at once? The law forbids it, a law +enacted rather because you are not competent than to disgrace you when +competent. Meanwhile you would not be on a legal equality with the many! But +how can it be right that citizens of the same state should be held unworthy of +the same privileges? +</p> + +<p> +“It will be said, perhaps, that democracy is neither wise nor equitable, +but that the holders of property are also the best fitted to rule. I say, on +the contrary, first, that the word demos, or people, includes the whole state, +oligarchy only a part; next, that if the best guardians of property are the +rich, and the best counsellors the wise, none can hear and decide so well as +the many; and that all these talents, severally and collectively, have their +just place in a democracy. But an oligarchy gives the many their share of the +danger, and not content with the largest part takes and keeps the whole of the +profit; and this is what the powerful and young among you aspire to, but in a +great city cannot possibly obtain. +</p> + +<p> +“But even now, foolish men, most senseless of all the Hellenes that I +know, if you have no sense of the wickedness of your designs, or most criminal +if you have that sense and still dare to pursue them—even now, if it is +not a case for repentance, you may still learn wisdom, and thus advance the +interest of the country, the common interest of us all. Reflect that in the +country’s prosperity the men of merit in your ranks will have a share and +a larger share than the great mass of your fellow countrymen, but that if you +have other designs you run a risk of being deprived of all; and desist from +reports like these, as the people know your object and will not put up with it. +If the Athenians arrive, this city will repulse them in a manner worthy of +itself; we have moreover, generals who will see to this matter. And if nothing +of this be true, as I incline to believe, the city will not be thrown into a +panic by your intelligence, or impose upon itself a self-chosen servitude by +choosing you for its rulers; the city itself will look into the matter, and +will judge your words as if they were acts, and, instead of allowing itself to +be deprived of its liberty by listening to you, will strive to preserve that +liberty, by taking care to have always at hand the means of making itself +respected.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of Athenagoras. One of the generals now stood up and +stopped any other speakers coming forward, adding these words of his own with +reference to the matter in hand: “It is not well for speakers to utter +calumnies against one another, or for their hearers to entertain them; we ought +rather to look to the intelligence that we have received, and see how each man +by himself and the city as a whole may best prepare to repel the invaders. Even +if there be no need, there is no harm in the state being furnished with horses +and arms and all other insignia of war; and we will undertake to see to and +order this, and to send round to the cities to reconnoitre and do all else that +may appear desirable. Part of this we have seen to already, and whatever we +discover shall be laid before you.” After these words from the general, +the Syracusans departed from the assembly. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime the Athenians with all their allies had now arrived at Corcyra. +Here the generals began by again reviewing the armament, and made arrangements +as to the order in which they were to anchor and encamp, and dividing the whole +fleet into three divisions, allotted one to each of their number, to avoid +sailing all together and being thus embarrassed for water, harbourage, or +provisions at the stations which they might touch at, and at the same time to +be generally better ordered and easier to handle, by each squadron having its +own commander. Next they sent on three ships to Italy and Sicily to find out +which of the cities would receive them, with instructions to meet them on the +way and let them know before they put in to land. +</p> + +<p> +After this the Athenians weighed from Corcyra, and proceeded to cross to Sicily +with an armament now consisting of one hundred and thirty-four galleys in all +(besides two Rhodian fifty-oars), of which one hundred were Athenian +vessels—sixty men-of-war, and forty troopships—and the remainder +from Chios and the other allies; five thousand and one hundred heavy infantry +in all, that is to say, fifteen hundred Athenian citizens from the rolls at +Athens and seven hundred Thetes shipped as marines, and the rest allied troops, +some of them Athenian subjects, and besides these five hundred Argives, and two +hundred and fifty Mantineans serving for hire; four hundred and eighty archers +in all, eighty of whom were Cretans, seven hundred slingers from Rhodes, one +hundred and twenty light-armed exiles from Megara, and one horse-transport +carrying thirty horses. +</p> + +<p> +Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed over for the war. The +supplies for this force were carried by thirty ships of burden laden with corn, +which conveyed the bakers, stone-masons, and carpenters, and the tools for +raising fortifications, accompanied by one hundred boats, like the former +pressed into the service, besides many other boats and ships of burden which +followed the armament voluntarily for purposes of trade; all of which now left +Corcyra and struck across the Ionian Sea together. The whole force making land +at the Iapygian promontory and Tarentum, with more or less good fortune, +coasted along the shores of Italy, the cities shutting their markets and gates +against them, and according them nothing but water and liberty to anchor, and +Tarentum and Locri not even that, until they arrived at Rhegium, the extreme +point of Italy. Here at length they reunited, and not gaining admission within +the walls pitched a camp outside the city in the precinct of Artemis, where a +market was also provided for them, and drew their ships on shore and kept +quiet. Meanwhile they opened negotiations with the Rhegians, and called upon +them as Chalcidians to assist their Leontine kinsmen; to which the Rhegians +replied that they would not side with either party, but should await the +decision of the rest of the Italiots, and do as they did. Upon this the +Athenians now began to consider what would be the best action to take in the +affairs of Sicily, and meanwhile waited for the ships sent on to come back from +Egesta, in order to know whether there was really there the money mentioned by +the messengers at Athens. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime came in from all quarters to the Syracusans, as well as from +their own officers sent to reconnoitre, the positive tidings that the fleet was +at Rhegium; upon which they laid aside their incredulity and threw themselves +heart and soul into the work of preparation. Guards or envoys, as the case +might be, were sent round to the Sicels, garrisons put into the posts of the +Peripoli in the country, horses and arms reviewed in the city to see that +nothing was wanting, and all other steps taken to prepare for a war which might +be upon them at any moment. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the three ships that had been sent on came from Egesta to the +Athenians at Rhegium, with the news that so far from there being the sums +promised, all that could be produced was thirty talents. The generals were not +a little disheartened at being thus disappointed at the outset, and by the +refusal to join in the expedition of the Rhegians, the people they had first +tried to gain and had had had most reason to count upon, from their +relationship to the Leontines and constant friendship for Athens. If Nicias was +prepared for the news from Egesta, his two colleagues were taken completely by +surprise. The Egestaeans had had recourse to the following stratagem, when the +first envoys from Athens came to inspect their resources. They took the envoys +in question to the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the treasures +deposited there: bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and a large number of other +pieces of plate, which from being in silver gave an impression of wealth quite +out of proportion to their really small value. They also privately entertained +the ships’ crews, and collected all the cups of gold and silver that they +could find in Egesta itself or could borrow in the neighbouring Phoenician and +Hellenic towns, and each brought them to the banquets as their own; and as all +used pretty nearly the same, and everywhere a great quantity of plate was +shown, the effect was most dazzling upon the Athenian sailors, and made them +talk loudly of the riches they had seen when they got back to Athens. The dupes +in question—who had in their turn persuaded the rest—when the news +got abroad that there was not the money supposed at Egesta, were much blamed by +the soldiers. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what was to be done. The opinion of +Nicias was to sail with all the armament to Selinus, the main object of the +expedition, and if the Egestaeans could provide money for the whole force, to +advise accordingly; but if they could not, to require them to supply provisions +for the sixty ships that they had asked for, to stay and settle matters between +them and the Selinuntines either by force or by agreement, and then to coast +past the other cities, and after displaying the power of Athens and proving +their zeal for their friends and allies, to sail home again (unless they should +have some sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the Leontines, or of +bringing over some of the other cities), and not to endanger the state by +wasting its home resources. +</p> + +<p> +Alcibiades said that a great expedition like the present must not disgrace +itself by going away without having done anything; heralds must be sent to all +the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and efforts be made to make some of the +Sicels revolt from the Syracusans, and to obtain the friendship of others, in +order to have corn and troops; and first of all to gain the Messinese, who lay +right in the passage and entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent +harbour and base for the army. Thus, after bringing over the towns and knowing +who would be their allies in the war, they might at length attack Syracuse and +Selinus; unless the latter came to terms with Egesta and the former ceased to +oppose the restoration of Leontini. +</p> + +<p> +Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to sail straight to Syracuse, +and fight their battle at once under the walls of the town while the people +were still unprepared, and the panic at its height. Every armament was most +terrible at first; if it allowed time to run on without showing itself, +men’s courage revived, and they saw it appear at last almost with +indifference. By attacking suddenly, while Syracuse still trembled at their +coming, they would have the best chance of gaining a victory for themselves and +of striking a complete panic into the enemy by the aspect of their +numbers—which would never appear so considerable as at present—by +the anticipation of coming disaster, and above all by the immediate danger of +the engagement. They might also count upon surprising many in the fields +outside, incredulous of their coming; and at the moment that the enemy was +carrying in his property the army would not want for booty if it sat down in +force before the city. The rest of the Siceliots would thus be immediately less +disposed to enter into alliance with the Syracusans, and would join the +Athenians, without waiting to see which were the strongest. They must make +Megara their naval station as a place to retreat to and a base from which to +attack: it was an uninhabited place at no great distance from Syracuse either +by land or by sea. +</p> + +<p> +After speaking to this effect, Lamachus nevertheless gave his support to the +opinion of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades sailed in his own vessel across to +Messina with proposals of alliance, but met with no success, the inhabitants +answering that they could not receive him within their walls, though they would +provide him with a market outside. Upon this he sailed back to Rhegium. +Immediately upon his return the generals manned and victualled sixty ships out +of the whole fleet and coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament +behind them at Rhegium with one of their number. Received by the Naxians, they +then coasted on to Catana, and being refused admittance by the inhabitants, +there being a Syracusan party in the town, went on to the river Terias. Here +they bivouacked, and the next day sailed in single file to Syracuse with all +their ships except ten which they sent on in front to sail into the great +harbour and see if there was any fleet launched, and to proclaim by herald from +shipboard that the Athenians were come to restore the Leontines to their +country, as being their allies and kinsmen, and that such of them, therefore, +as were in Syracuse should leave it without fear and join their friends and +benefactors the Athenians. After making this proclamation and reconnoitring the +city and the harbours, and the features of the country which they would have to +make their base of operations in the war, they sailed back to Catana. +</p> + +<p> +An assembly being held here, the inhabitants refused to receive the armament, +but invited the generals to come in and say what they desired; and while +Alcibiades was speaking and the citizens were intent on the assembly, the +soldiers broke down an ill-walled-up postern gate without being observed, and +getting inside the town, flocked into the marketplace. The Syracusan party in +the town no sooner saw the army inside than they became frightened and +withdrew, not being at all numerous; while the rest voted for an alliance with +the Athenians and invited them to fetch the rest of their forces from Rhegium. +After this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and put off, this time with all the +armament, for Catana, and fell to work at their camp immediately upon their +arrival. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile word was brought them from Camarina that if they went there the town +would go over to them, and also that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. The +Athenians accordingly sailed alongshore with all their armament, first to +Syracuse, where they found no fleet manning, and so always along the coast to +Camarina, where they brought to at the beach, and sent a herald to the people, +who, however, refused to receive them, saying that their oaths bound them to +receive the Athenians only with a single vessel, unless they themselves sent +for more. Disappointed here, the Athenians now sailed back again, and after +landing and plundering on Syracusan territory and losing some stragglers from +their light infantry through the coming up of the Syracusan horse, so got back +to Catana. +</p> + +<p> +There they found the Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades, with orders for +him to sail home to answer the charges which the state brought against him, and +for certain others of the soldiers who with him were accused of sacrilege in +the matter of the mysteries and of the Hermae. For the Athenians, after the +departure of the expedition, had continued as active as ever in investigating +the facts of the mysteries and of the Hermae, and, instead of testing the +informers, in their suspicious temper welcomed all indifferently, arresting and +imprisoning the best citizens upon the evidence of rascals, and preferring to +sift the matter to the bottom sooner than to let an accused person of good +character pass unquestioned, owing to the rascality of the informer. The +commons had heard how oppressive the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had +become before it ended, and further that that had been put down at last, not by +themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians, and so were always in fear +and took everything suspiciously. +</p> + +<p> +Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton and Harmodius was undertaken in +consequence of a love affair, which I shall relate at some length, to show that +the Athenians are not more accurate than the rest of the world in their +accounts of their own tyrants and of the facts of their own history. +Pisistratus dying at an advanced age in possession of the tyranny, was +succeeded by his eldest son, Hippias, and not Hipparchus, as is vulgarly +believed. Harmodius was then in the flower of youthful beauty, and Aristogiton, +a citizen in the middle rank of life, was his lover and possessed him. +Solicited without success by Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, Harmodius told +Aristogiton, and the enraged lover, afraid that the powerful Hipparchus might +take Harmodius by force, immediately formed a design, such as his condition in +life permitted, for overthrowing the tyranny. In the meantime Hipparchus, after +a second solicitation of Harmodius, attended with no better success, unwilling +to use violence, arranged to insult him in some covert way. Indeed, generally +their government was not grievous to the multitude, or in any way odious in +practice; and these tyrants cultivated wisdom and virtue as much as any, and +without exacting from the Athenians more than a twentieth of their income, +splendidly adorned their city, and carried on their wars, and provided +sacrifices for the temples. For the rest, the city was left in full enjoyment +of its existing laws, except that care was always taken to have the offices in +the hands of some one of the family. Among those of them that held the yearly +archonship at Athens was Pisistratus, son of the tyrant Hippias, and named +after his grandfather, who dedicated during his term of office the altar to the +twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in the Pythian precinct. +The Athenian people afterwards built on to and lengthened the altar in the +market-place, and obliterated the inscription; but that in the Pythian precinct +can still be seen, though in faded letters, and is to the following effect: +</p> + +<p> +Pisistratus, the son of Hippias, Sent up this record of his archonship In +precinct of Apollo Pythias. +</p> + +<p> +That Hippias was the eldest son and succeeded to the government, is what I +positively assert as a fact upon which I have had more exact accounts than +others, and may be also ascertained by the following circumstance. He is the +only one of the legitimate brothers that appears to have had children; as the +altar shows, and the pillar placed in the Athenian Acropolis, commemorating the +crime of the tyrants, which mentions no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, +but five of Hippias, which he had by Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, son of +Hyperechides; and naturally the eldest would have married first. Again, his +name comes first on the pillar after that of his father; and this too is quite +natural, as he was the eldest after him, and the reigning tyrant. Nor can I +ever believe that Hippias would have obtained the tyranny so easily, if +Hipparchus had been in power when he was killed, and he, Hippias, had had to +establish himself upon the same day; but he had no doubt been long accustomed +to overawe the citizens, and to be obeyed by his mercenaries, and thus not only +conquered, but conquered with ease, without experiencing any of the +embarrassment of a younger brother unused to the exercise of authority. It was +the sad fate which made Hipparchus famous that got him also the credit with +posterity of having been tyrant. +</p> + +<p> +To return to Harmodius; Hipparchus having been repulsed in his solicitations +insulted him as he had resolved, by first inviting a sister of his, a young +girl, to come and bear a basket in a certain procession, and then rejecting +her, on the plea that she had never been invited at all owing to her +unworthiness. If Harmodius was indignant at this, Aristogiton for his sake now +became more exasperated than ever; and having arranged everything with those +who were to join them in the enterprise, they only waited for the great feast +of the Panathenaea, the sole day upon which the citizens forming part of the +procession could meet together in arms without suspicion. Aristogiton and +Harmodius were to begin, but were to be supported immediately by their +accomplices against the bodyguard. The conspirators were not many, for better +security, besides which they hoped that those not in the plot would be carried +away by the example of a few daring spirits, and use the arms in their hands to +recover their liberty. +</p> + +<p> +At last the festival arrived; and Hippias with his bodyguard was outside the +city in the Ceramicus, arranging how the different parts of the procession were +to proceed. Harmodius and Aristogiton had already their daggers and were +getting ready to act, when seeing one of their accomplices talking familiarly +with Hippias, who was easy of access to every one, they took fright, and +concluded that they were discovered and on the point of being taken; and eager +if possible to be revenged first upon the man who had wronged them and for whom +they had undertaken all this risk, they rushed, as they were, within the gates, +and meeting with Hipparchus by the Leocorium recklessly fell upon him at once, +infuriated, Aristogiton by love, and Harmodius by insult, and smote him and +slew him. Aristogiton escaped the guards at the moment, through the crowd +running up, but was afterwards taken and dispatched in no merciful way: +Harmodius was killed on the spot. +</p> + +<p> +When the news was brought to Hippias in the Ceramicus, he at once proceeded not +to the scene of action, but to the armed men in the procession, before they, +being some distance away, knew anything of the matter, and composing his +features for the occasion, so as not to betray himself, pointed to a certain +spot, and bade them repair thither without their arms. They withdrew +accordingly, fancying he had something to say; upon which he told the +mercenaries to remove the arms, and there and then picked out the men he +thought guilty and all found with daggers, the shield and spear being the usual +weapons for a procession. +</p> + +<p> +In this way offended love first led Harmodius and Aristogiton to conspire, and +the alarm of the moment to commit the rash action recounted. After this the +tyranny pressed harder on the Athenians, and Hippias, now grown more fearful, +put to death many of the citizens, and at the same time began to turn his eyes +abroad for a refuge in case of revolution. Thus, although an Athenian, he gave +his daughter, Archedice, to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of the tyrant of +Lampsacus, seeing that they had great influence with Darius. And there is her +tomb in Lampsacus with this inscription: +</p> + +<p> +Archedice lies buried in this earth, Hippias her sire, and Athens gave her +birth; Unto her bosom pride was never known, Though daughter, wife, and sister +to the throne. +</p> + +<p> +Hippias, after reigning three years longer over the Athenians, was deposed in +the fourth by the Lacedaemonians and the banished Alcmaeonidae, and went with a +safe conduct to Sigeum, and to Aeantides at Lampsacus, and from thence to King +Darius; from whose court he set out twenty years after, in his old age, and +came with the Medes to Marathon. +</p> + +<p> +With these events in their minds, and recalling everything they knew by hearsay +on the subject, the Athenian people grow difficult of humour and suspicious of +the persons charged in the affair of the mysteries, and persuaded that all that +had taken place was part of an oligarchical and monarchical conspiracy. In the +state of irritation thus produced, many persons of consideration had been +already thrown into prison, and far from showing any signs of abating, public +feeling grew daily more savage, and more arrests were made; until at last one +of those in custody, thought to be the most guilty of all, was induced by a +fellow prisoner to make a revelation, whether true or not is a matter on which +there are two opinions, no one having been able, either then or since, to say +for certain who did the deed. However this may be, the other found arguments to +persuade him, that even if he had not done it, he ought to save himself by +gaining a promise of impunity, and free the state of its present suspicions; as +he would be surer of safety if he confessed after promise of impunity than if +he denied and were brought to trial. He accordingly made a revelation, +affecting himself and others in the affair of the Hermae; and the Athenian +people, glad at last, as they supposed, to get at the truth, and furious until +then at not being able to discover those who had conspired against the commons, +at once let go the informer and all the rest whom he had not denounced, and +bringing the accused to trial executed as many as were apprehended, and +condemned to death such as had fled and set a price upon their heads. In this +it was, after all, not clear whether the sufferers had been punished unjustly, +while in any case the rest of the city received immediate and manifest relief. +</p> + +<p> +To return to Alcibiades: public feeling was very hostile to him, being worked +on by the same enemies who had attacked him before he went out; and now that +the Athenians fancied that they had got at the truth of the matter of the +Hermae, they believed more firmly than ever that the affair of the mysteries +also, in which he was implicated, had been contrived by him in the same +intention and was connected with the plot against the democracy. Meanwhile it +so happened that, just at the time of this agitation, a small force of +Lacedaemonians had advanced as far as the Isthmus, in pursuance of some scheme +with the Boeotians. It was now thought that this had come by appointment, at +his instigation, and not on account of the Boeotians, and that, if the citizens +had not acted on the information received, and forestalled them by arresting +the prisoners, the city would have been betrayed. The citizens went so far as +to sleep one night armed in the temple of Theseus within the walls. The friends +also of Alcibiades at Argos were just at this time suspected of a design to +attack the commons; and the Argive hostages deposited in the islands were given +up by the Athenians to the Argive people to be put to death upon that account: +in short, everywhere something was found to create suspicion against +Alcibiades. It was therefore decided to bring him to trial and execute him, and +the Salaminia was sent to Sicily for him and the others named in the +information, with instructions to order him to come and answer the charges +against him, but not to arrest him, because they wished to avoid causing any +agitation in the army or among the enemy in Sicily, and above all to retain the +services of the Mantineans and Argives, who, it was thought, had been induced +to join by his influence. Alcibiades, with his own ship and his fellow accused, +accordingly sailed off with the Salaminia from Sicily, as though to return to +Athens, and went with her as far as Thurii, and there they left the ship and +disappeared, being afraid to go home for trial with such a prejudice existing +against them. The crew of the Salaminia stayed some time looking for Alcibiades +and his companions, and at length, as they were nowhere to be found, set sail +and departed. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, crossed in a boat not long after from +Thurii to Peloponnese; and the Athenians passed sentence of death by default +upon him and those in his company. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0020" id="link2HCH0020"></a> +CHAPTER XX </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of the War—Inaction of the Athenian +Army—Alcibiades at Sparta—Investment of Syracuse +</p> + +<p> +The Athenian generals left in Sicily now divided the armament into two parts, +and, each taking one by lot, sailed with the whole for Selinus and Egesta, +wishing to know whether the Egestaeans would give the money, and to look into +the question of Selinus and ascertain the state of the quarrel between her and +Egesta. Coasting along Sicily, with the shore on their left, on the side +towards the Tyrrhene Gulf they touched at Himera, the only Hellenic city in +that part of the island, and being refused admission resumed their voyage. On +their way they took Hyccara, a petty Sicanian seaport, nevertheless at war with +Egesta, and making slaves of the inhabitants gave up the town to the +Egestaeans, some of whose horse had joined them; after which the army proceeded +through the territory of the Sicels until it reached Catana, while the fleet +sailed along the coast with the slaves on board. Meanwhile Nicias sailed +straight from Hyccara along the coast and went to Egesta and, after transacting +his other business and receiving thirty talents, rejoined the forces. They now +sold their slaves for the sum of one hundred and twenty talents, and sailed +round to their Sicel allies to urge them to send troops; and meanwhile went +with half their own force to the hostile town of Hybla in the territory of +Gela, but did not succeed in taking it. +</p> + +<p> +Summer was now over. The winter following, the Athenians at once began to +prepare for moving on Syracuse, and the Syracusans on their side for marching +against them. From the moment when the Athenians failed to attack them +instantly as they at first feared and expected, every day that passed did +something to revive their courage; and when they saw them sailing far away from +them on the other side of Sicily, and going to Hybla only to fail in their +attempts to storm it, they thought less of them than ever, and called upon +their generals, as the multitude is apt to do in its moments of confidence, to +lead them to Catana, since the enemy would not come to them. Parties also of +the Syracusan horse employed in reconnoitring constantly rode up to the +Athenian armament, and among other insults asked them whether they had not +really come to settle with the Syracusans in a foreign country rather than to +resettle the Leontines in their own. +</p> + +<p> +Aware of this, the Athenian generals determined to draw them out in mass as far +as possible from the city, and themselves in the meantime to sail by night +alongshore, and take up at their leisure a convenient position. This they knew +they could not so well do, if they had to disembark from their ships in front +of a force prepared for them, or to go by land openly. The numerous cavalry of +the Syracusans (a force which they were themselves without) would then be able +to do the greatest mischief to their light troops and the crowd that followed +them; but this plan would enable them to take up a position in which the horse +could do them no hurt worth speaking of, some Syracusan exiles with the army +having told them of the spot near the Olympieum, which they afterwards +occupied. In pursuance of their idea, the generals imagined the following +stratagem. They sent to Syracuse a man devoted to them, and by the Syracusan +generals thought to be no less in their interest; he was a native of Catana, +and said he came from persons in that place, whose names the Syracusan generals +were acquainted with, and whom they knew to be among the members of their party +still left in the city. He told them that the Athenians passed the night in the +town, at some distance from their arms, and that if the Syracusans would name a +day and come with all their people at daybreak to attack the armament, they, +their friends, would close the gates upon the troops in the city, and set fire +to the vessels, while the Syracusans would easily take the camp by an attack +upon the stockade. In this they would be aided by many of the Catanians, who +were already prepared to act, and from whom he himself came. +</p> + +<p> +The generals of the Syracusans, who did not want confidence, and who had +intended even without this to march on Catana, believed the man without any +sufficient inquiry, fixed at once a day upon which they would be there, and +dismissed him, and the Selinuntines and others of their allies having now +arrived, gave orders for all the Syracusans to march out in mass. Their +preparations completed, and the time fixed for their arrival being at hand, +they set out for Catana, and passed the night upon the river Symaethus, in the +Leontine territory. Meanwhile the Athenians no sooner knew of their approach +than they took all their forces and such of the Sicels or others as had joined +them, put them on board their ships and boats, and sailed by night to Syracuse. +Thus, when morning broke the Athenians were landing opposite the Olympieum +ready to seize their camping ground, and the Syracusan horse having ridden up +first to Catana and found that all the armament had put to sea, turned back and +told the infantry, and then all turned back together, and went to the relief of +the city. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime, as the march before the Syracusans was a long one, the +Athenians quietly sat down their army in a convenient position, where they +could begin an engagement when they pleased, and where the Syracusan cavalry +would have least opportunity of annoying them, either before or during the +action, being fenced off on one side by walls, houses, trees, and by a marsh, +and on the other by cliffs. They also felled the neighbouring trees and carried +them down to the sea, and formed a palisade alongside of their ships, and with +stones which they picked up and wood hastily raised a fort at Daskon, the most +vulnerable point of their position, and broke down the bridge over the Anapus. +These preparations were allowed to go on without any interruption from the +city, the first hostile force to appear being the Syracusan cavalry, followed +afterwards by all the foot together. At first they came close up to the +Athenian army, and then, finding that they did not offer to engage, crossed the +Helorine road and encamped for the night. +</p> + +<p> +The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle, their +dispositions being as follows: Their right wing was occupied by the Argives and +Mantineans, the centre by the Athenians, and the rest of the field by the other +allies. Half their army was drawn up eight deep in advance, half close to their +tents in a hollow square, formed also eight deep, which had orders to look out +and be ready to go to the support of the troops hardest pressed. The camp +followers were placed inside this reserve. The Syracusans, meanwhile, formed +their heavy infantry sixteen deep, consisting of the mass levy of their own +people, and such allies as had joined them, the strongest contingent being that +of the Selinuntines; next to them the cavalry of the Geloans, numbering two +hundred in all, with about twenty horse and fifty archers from Camarina. The +cavalry was posted on their right, full twelve hundred strong, and next to it +the darters. As the Athenians were about to begin the attack, Nicias went along +the lines, and addressed these words of encouragement to the army and the +nations composing it: +</p> + +<p> +“Soldiers, a long exhortation is little needed by men like ourselves, who +are here to fight in the same battle, the force itself being, to my thinking, +more fit to inspire confidence than a fine speech with a weak army. Where we +have Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the first of the islanders in the +ranks together, it were strange indeed, with so many and so brave companions in +arms, if we did not feel confident of victory; especially when we have mass +levies opposed to our picked troops, and what is more, Siceliots, who may +disdain us but will not stand against us, their skill not being at all +commensurate to their rashness. You may also remember that we are far from home +and have no friendly land near, except what your own swords shall win you; and +here I put before you a motive just the reverse of that which the enemy are +appealing to; their cry being that they shall fight for their country, mine +that we shall fight for a country that is not ours, where we must conquer or +hardly get away, as we shall have their horse upon us in great numbers. +Remember, therefore, your renown, and go boldly against the enemy, thinking the +present strait and necessity more terrible than they.” +</p> + +<p> +After this address Nicias at once led on the army. The Syracusans were not at +that moment expecting an immediate engagement, and some had even gone away to +the town, which was close by; these now ran up as hard as they could and, +though behind time, took their places here or there in the main body as fast as +they joined it. Want of zeal or daring was certainly not the fault of the +Syracusans, either in this or the other battles, but although not inferior in +courage, so far as their military science might carry them, when this failed +them they were compelled to give up their resolution also. On the present +occasion, although they had not supposed that the Athenians would begin the +attack, and although constrained to stand upon their defence at short notice, +they at once took up their arms and advanced to meet them. First, the +stone-throwers, slingers, and archers of either army began skirmishing, and +routed or were routed by one another, as might be expected between light +troops; next, soothsayers brought forward the usual victims, and trumpeters +urged on the heavy infantry to the charge; and thus they advanced, the +Syracusans to fight for their country, and each individual for his safety that +day and liberty hereafter; in the enemy’s army, the Athenians to make +another’s country theirs and to save their own from suffering by their +defeat; the Argives and independent allies to help them in getting what they +came for, and to earn by victory another sight of the country they had left +behind; while the subject allies owed most of their ardour to the desire of +self-preservation, which they could only hope for if victorious; next to which, +as a secondary motive, came the chance of serving on easier terms, after +helping the Athenians to a fresh conquest. +</p> + +<p> +The armies now came to close quarters, and for a long while fought without +either giving ground. Meanwhile there occurred some claps of thunder with +lightning and heavy rain, which did not fail to add to the fears of the party +fighting for the first time, and very little acquainted with war; while to +their more experienced adversaries these phenomena appeared to be produced by +the time of year, and much more alarm was felt at the continued resistance of +the enemy. At last the Argives drove in the Syracusan left, and after them the +Athenians routed the troops opposed to them, and the Syracusan army was thus +cut in two and betook itself to flight. The Athenians did not pursue far, being +held in check by the numerous and undefeated Syracusan horse, who attacked and +drove back any of their heavy infantry whom they saw pursuing in advance of the +rest; in spite of which the victors followed so far as was safe in a body, and +then went back and set up a trophy. Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied at the +Helorine road, where they re-formed as well as they could under the +circumstances, and even sent a garrison of their own citizens to the Olympieum, +fearing that the Athenians might lay hands on some of the treasures there. The +rest returned to the town. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple, but collected their dead and +laid them upon a pyre, and passed the night upon the field. The next day they +gave the enemy back their dead under truce, to the number of about two hundred +and sixty, Syracusans and allies, and gathered together the bones of their own, +some fifty, Athenians and allies, and taking the spoils of the enemy, sailed +back to Catana. It was now winter; and it did not seem possible for the moment +to carry on the war before Syracuse, until horse should have been sent for from +Athens and levied among the allies in Sicily—to do away with their utter +inferiority in cavalry—and money should have been collected in the +country and received from Athens, and until some of the cities, which they +hoped would be now more disposed to listen to them after the battle, should +have been brought over, and corn and all other necessaries provided, for a +campaign in the spring against Syracuse. +</p> + +<p> +With this intention they sailed off to Naxos and Catana for the winter. +Meanwhile the Syracusans burned their dead and then held an assembly, in which +Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a man who with a general ability of the first order +had given proofs of military capacity and brilliant courage in the war, came +forward and encouraged them, and told them not to let what had occurred make +them give way, since their spirit had not been conquered, but their want of +discipline had done the mischief. Still they had not been beaten by so much as +might have been expected, especially as they were, one might say, novices in +the art of war, an army of artisans opposed to the most practised soldiers in +Hellas. What had also done great mischief was the number of the generals (there +were fifteen of them) and the quantity of orders given, combined with the +disorder and insubordination of the troops. But if they were to have a few +skilful generals, and used this winter in preparing their heavy infantry, +finding arms for such as had not got any, so as to make them as numerous as +possible, and forcing them to attend to their training generally, they would +have every chance of beating their adversaries, courage being already theirs +and discipline in the field having thus been added to it. Indeed, both these +qualities would improve, since danger would exercise them in discipline, while +their courage would be led to surpass itself by the confidence which skill +inspires. The generals should be few and elected with full powers, and an oath +should be taken to leave them entire discretion in their command: if they +adopted this plan, their secrets would be better kept, all preparations would +be properly made, and there would be no room for excuses. +</p> + +<p> +The Syracusans heard him, and voted everything as he advised, and elected three +generals, Hermocrates himself, Heraclides, son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus, son +of Execestes. They also sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon to procure a +force of allies to join them, and to induce the Lacedaemonians for their sakes +openly to address themselves in real earnest to the war against the Athenians, +that they might either have to leave Sicily or be less able to send +reinforcements to their army there. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenian forces at Catana now at once sailed against Messina, in the +expectation of its being betrayed to them. The intrigue, however, after all +came to nothing: Alcibiades, who was in the secret, when he left his command +upon the summons from home, foreseeing that he would be outlawed, gave +information of the plot to the friends of the Syracusans in Messina, who had at +once put to death its authors, and now rose in arms against the opposite +faction with those of their way of thinking, and succeeded in preventing the +admission of the Athenians. The latter waited for thirteen days, and then, as +they were exposed to the weather and without provisions, and met with no +success, went back to Naxos, where they made places for their ships to lie in, +erected a palisade round their camp, and retired into winter quarters; +meanwhile they sent a galley to Athens for money and cavalry to join them in +the spring. During the winter the Syracusans built a wall on to the city, so as +to take in the statue of Apollo Temenites, all along the side looking towards +Epipolae, to make the task of circumvallation longer and more difficult, in +case of their being defeated, and also erected a fort at Megara and another in +the Olympieum, and stuck palisades along the sea wherever there was a landing +Place. Meanwhile, as they knew that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they +marched with all their people to Catana, and ravaged the land and set fire to +the tents and encampment of the Athenians, and so returned home. Learning also +that the Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina, on the strength of the +alliance concluded in the time of Laches, to gain, if possible, that city, they +sent another from Syracuse to oppose them. They had a shrewd suspicion that the +Camarinaeans had not sent what they did send for the first battle very +willingly; and they now feared that they would refuse to assist them at all in +future, after seeing the success of the Athenians in the action, and would join +the latter on the strength of their old friendship. Hermocrates, with some +others, accordingly arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and Euphemus and others +from the Athenians; and an assembly of the Camarinaeans having been convened, +Hermocrates spoke as follows, in the hope of prejudicing them against the +Athenians: +</p> + +<p> +“Camarinaeans, we did not come on this embassy because we were afraid of +your being frightened by the actual forces of the Athenians, but rather of your +being gained by what they would say to you before you heard anything from us. +They are come to Sicily with the pretext that you know, and the intention which +we all suspect, in my opinion less to restore the Leontines to their homes than +to oust us from ours; as it is out of all reason that they should restore in +Sicily the cities that they lay waste in Hellas, or should cherish the Leontine +Chalcidians because of their Ionian blood and keep in servitude the Euboean +Chalcidians, of whom the Leontines are a colony. No; but the same policy which +has proved so successful in Hellas is now being tried in Sicily. After being +chosen as the leaders of the Ionians and of the other allies of Athenian +origin, to punish the Mede, the Athenians accused some of failure in military +service, some of fighting against each other, and others, as the case might be, +upon any colourable pretext that could be found, until they thus subdued them +all. In fine, in the struggle against the Medes, the Athenians did not fight +for the liberty of the Hellenes, or the Hellenes for their own liberty, but the +former to make their countrymen serve them instead of him, the latter to change +one master for another, wiser indeed than the first, but wiser for evil. +</p> + +<p> +“But we are not now come to declare to an audience familiar with them the +misdeeds of a state so open to accusation as is the Athenian, but much rather +to blame ourselves, who, with the warnings we possess in the Hellenes in those +parts that have been enslaved through not supporting each other, and seeing the +same sophisms being now tried upon ourselves—such as restorations of +Leontine kinsfolk and support of Egestaean allies—do not stand together +and resolutely show them that here are no Ionians, or Hellespontines, or +islanders, who change continually, but always serve a master, sometimes the +Mede and sometimes some other, but free Dorians from independent Peloponnese, +dwelling in Sicily. Or, are we waiting until we be taken in detail, one city +after another; knowing as we do that in no other way can we be conquered, and +seeing that they turn to this plan, so as to divide some of us by words, to +draw some by the bait of an alliance into open war with each other, and to ruin +others by such flattery as different circumstances may render acceptable? And +do we fancy when destruction first overtakes a distant fellow countryman that +the danger will not come to each of us also, or that he who suffers before us +will suffer in himself alone? +</p> + +<p> +“As for the Camarinaean who says that it is the Syracusan, not he, that +is the enemy of the Athenian, and who thinks it hard to have to encounter risk +in behalf of my country, I would have him bear in mind that he will fight in my +country, not more for mine than for his own, and by so much the more safely in +that he will enter on the struggle not alone, after the way has been cleared by +my ruin, but with me as his ally, and that the object of the Athenian is not so +much to punish the enmity of the Syracusan as to use me as a blind to secure +the friendship of the Camarinaean. As for him who envies or even fears us (and +envied and feared great powers must always be), and who on this account wishes +Syracuse to be humbled to teach us a lesson, but would still have her survive, +in the interest of his own security the wish that he indulges is not humanly +possible. A man can control his own desires, but he cannot likewise control +circumstances; and in the event of his calculations proving mistaken, he may +live to bewail his own misfortune, and wish to be again envying my prosperity. +An idle wish, if he now sacrifice us and refuse to take his share of perils +which are the same, in reality though not in name, for him as for us; what is +nominally the preservation of our power being really his own salvation. It was +to be expected that you, of all people in the world, Camarinaeans, being our +immediate neighbours and the next in danger, would have foreseen this, and +instead of supporting us in the lukewarm way that you are now doing, would +rather come to us of your own accord, and be now offering at Syracuse the aid +which you would have asked for at Camarina, if to Camarina the Athenians had +first come, to encourage us to resist the invader. Neither you, however, nor +the rest have as yet bestirred yourselves in this direction. +</p> + +<p> +“Fear perhaps will make you study to do right both by us and by the +invaders, and plead that you have an alliance with the Athenians. But you made +that alliance, not against your friends, but against the enemies that might +attack you, and to help the Athenians when they were wronged by others, not +when as now they are wronging their neighbours. Even the Rhegians, Chalcidians +though they be, refuse to help to restore the Chalcidian Leontines; and it +would be strange if, while they suspect the gist of this fine pretence and are +wise without reason, you, with every reason on your side, should yet choose to +assist your natural enemies, and should join with their direst foes in undoing +those whom nature has made your own kinsfolk. This is not to do right; but you +should help us without fear of their armament, which has no terrors if we hold +together, but only if we let them succeed in their endeavours to separate us; +since even after attacking us by ourselves and being victorious in battle, they +had to go off without effecting their purpose. +</p> + +<p> +“United, therefore, we have no cause to despair, but rather new +encouragement to league together; especially as succour will come to us from +the Peloponnesians, in military matters the undoubted superiors of the +Athenians. And you need not think that your prudent policy of taking sides with +neither, because allies of both, is either safe for you or fair to us. +Practically it is not as fair as it pretends to be. If the vanquished be +defeated, and the victor conquer, through your refusing to join, what is the +effect of your abstention but to leave the former to perish unaided, and to +allow the latter to offend unhindered? And yet it were more honourable to join +those who are not only the injured party, but your own kindred, and by so doing +to defend the common interests of Sicily and save your friends the Athenians +from doing wrong. +</p> + +<p> +“In conclusion, we Syracusans say that it is useless for us to +demonstrate either to you or to the rest what you know already as well as we +do; but we entreat, and if our entreaty fail, we protest that we are menaced by +our eternal enemies the Ionians, and are betrayed by you our fellow Dorians. If +the Athenians reduce us, they will owe their victory to your decision, but in +their own name will reap the honour, and will receive as the prize of their +triumph the very men who enabled them to gain it. On the other hand, if we are +the conquerors, you will have to pay for having been the cause of our danger. +Consider, therefore; and now make your choice between the security which +present servitude offers and the prospect of conquering with us and so escaping +disgraceful submission to an Athenian master and avoiding the lasting enmity of +Syracuse.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of Hermocrates; after whom Euphemus, the Athenian +ambassador, spoke as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Although we came here only to renew the former alliance, the attack of +the Syracusans compels us to speak of our empire and of the good right we have +to it. The best proof of this the speaker himself furnished, when he called the +Ionians eternal enemies of the Dorians. It is the fact; and the Peloponnesian +Dorians being our superiors in numbers and next neighbours, we Ionians looked +out for the best means of escaping their domination. After the Median War we +had a fleet, and so got rid of the empire and supremacy of the Lacedaemonians, +who had no right to give orders to us more than we to them, except that of +being the strongest at that moment; and being appointed leaders of the +King’s former subjects, we continue to be so, thinking that we are least +likely to fall under the dominion of the Peloponnesians, if we have a force to +defend ourselves with, and in strict truth having done nothing unfair in +reducing to subjection the Ionians and islanders, the kinsfolk whom the +Syracusans say we have enslaved. They, our kinsfolk, came against their mother +country, that is to say against us, together with the Mede, and, instead of +having the courage to revolt and sacrifice their property as we did when we +abandoned our city, chose to be slaves themselves, and to try to make us so. +</p> + +<p> +“We, therefore, deserve to rule because we placed the largest fleet and +an unflinching patriotism at the service of the Hellenes, and because these, +our subjects, did us mischief by their ready subservience to the Medes; and, +desert apart, we seek to strengthen ourselves against the Peloponnesians. We +make no fine profession of having a right to rule because we overthrew the +barbarian single-handed, or because we risked what we did risk for the freedom +of the subjects in question any more than for that of all, and for our own: no +one can be quarrelled with for providing for his proper safety. If we are now +here in Sicily, it is equally in the interest of our security, with which we +perceive that your interest also coincides. We prove this from the conduct +which the Syracusans cast against us and which you somewhat too timorously +suspect; knowing that those whom fear has made suspicious may be carried away +by the charm of eloquence for the moment, but when they come to act follow +their interests. +</p> + +<p> +“Now, as we have said, fear makes us hold our empire in Hellas, and fear +makes us now come, with the help of our friends, to order safely matters in +Sicily, and not to enslave any but rather to prevent any from being enslaved. +Meanwhile, let no one imagine that we are interesting ourselves in you without +your having anything to do with us, seeing that, if you are preserved and able +to make head against the Syracusans, they will be less likely to harm us by +sending troops to the Peloponnesians. In this way you have everything to do +with us, and on this account it is perfectly reasonable for us to restore the +Leontines, and to make them, not subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea, but as +powerful as possible, to help us by annoying the Syracusans from their +frontier. In Hellas we are alone a match for our enemies; and as for the +assertion that it is out of all reason that we should free the Sicilian, while +we enslave the Chalcidian, the fact is that the latter is useful to us by being +without arms and contributing money only; while the former, the Leontines and +our other friends, cannot be too independent. +</p> + +<p> +“Besides, for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is unreasonable if +expedient, no one a kinsman unless sure; but friendship or enmity is everywhere +an affair of time and circumstance. Here, in Sicily, our interest is not to +weaken our friends, but by means of their strength to cripple our enemies. Why +doubt this? In Hellas we treat our allies as we find them useful. The Chians +and Methymnians govern themselves and furnish ships; most of the rest have +harder terms and pay tribute in money; while others, although islanders and +easy for us to take, are free altogether, because they occupy convenient +positions round Peloponnese. In our settlement of the states here in Sicily, we +should therefore; naturally be guided by our interest, and by fear, as we say, +of the Syracusans. Their ambition is to rule you, their object to use the +suspicions that we excite to unite you, and then, when we have gone away +without effecting anything, by force or through your isolation, to become the +masters of Sicily. And masters they must become, if you unite with them; as a +force of that magnitude would be no longer easy for us to deal with united, and +they would be more than a match for you as soon as we were away. +</p> + +<p> +“Any other view of the case is condemned by the facts. When you first +asked us over, the fear which you held out was that of danger to Athens if we +let you come under the dominion of Syracuse; and it is not right now to +mistrust the very same argument by which you claimed to convince us, or to give +way to suspicion because we are come with a larger force against the power of +that city. Those whom you should really distrust are the Syracusans. We are not +able to stay here without you, and if we proved perfidious enough to bring you +into subjection, we should be unable to keep you in bondage, owing to the +length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding large, and in a military +sense continental, towns: they, the Syracusans, live close to you, not in a +camp, but in a city greater than the force we have with us, plot always against +you, never let slip an opportunity once offered, as they have shown in the case +of the Leontines and others, and now have the face, just as if you were fools, +to invite you to aid them against the power that hinders this, and that has +thus far maintained Sicily independent. We, as against them, invite you to a +much more real safety, when we beg you not to betray that common safety which +we each have in the other, and to reflect that they, even without allies, will, +by their numbers, have always the way open to you, while you will not often +have the opportunity of defending yourselves with such numerous auxiliaries; +if, through your suspicions, you once let these go away unsuccessful or +defeated, you will wish to see if only a handful of them back again, when the +day is past in which their presence could do anything for you. +</p> + +<p> +“But we hope, Camarinaeans, that the calumnies of the Syracusans will not +be allowed to succeed either with you or with the rest: we have told you the +whole truth upon the things we are suspected of, and will now briefly +recapitulate, in the hope of convincing you. We assert that we are rulers in +Hellas in order not to be subjects; liberators in Sicily that we may not be +harmed by the Sicilians; that we are compelled to interfere in many things, +because we have many things to guard against; and that now, as before, we are +come as allies to those of you who suffer wrong in this island, not without +invitation but upon invitation. Accordingly, instead of making yourselves +judges or censors of our conduct, and trying to turn us, which it were now +difficult to do, so far as there is anything in our interfering policy or in +our character that chimes in with your interest, this take and make use of; and +be sure that, far from being injurious to all alike, to most of the Hellenes +that policy is even beneficial. Thanks to it, all men in all places, even where +we are not, who either apprehend or meditate aggression, from the near prospect +before them, in the one case, of obtaining our intervention in their favour, in +the other, of our arrival making the venture dangerous, find themselves +constrained, respectively, to be moderate against their will, and to be +preserved without trouble of their own. Do not you reject this security that is +open to all who desire it, and is now offered to you; but do like others, and +instead of being always on the defensive against the Syracusans, unite with us, +and in your turn at last threaten them.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of Euphemus. What the Camarinaeans felt was this. +Sympathizing with the Athenians, except in so far as they might be afraid of +their subjugating Sicily, they had always been at enmity with their neighbour +Syracuse. From the very fact, however, that they were their neighbours, they +feared the Syracusans most of the two, and being apprehensive of their +conquering even without them, both sent them in the first instance the few +horsemen mentioned, and for the future determined to support them most in fact, +although as sparingly as possible; but for the moment in order not to seem to +slight the Athenians, especially as they had been successful in the engagement, +to answer both alike. Agreeably to this resolution they answered that as both +the contending parties happened to be allies of theirs, they thought it most +consistent with their oaths at present to side with neither; with which answer +the ambassadors of either party departed. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime, while Syracuse pursued her preparations for war, the Athenians +were encamped at Naxos, and tried by negotiation to gain as many of the Sicels +as possible. Those more in the low lands, and subjects of Syracuse, mostly held +aloof; but the peoples of the interior who had never been otherwise than +independent, with few exceptions, at once joined the Athenians, and brought +down corn to the army, and in some cases even money. The Athenians marched +against those who refused to join, and forced some of them to do so; in the +case of others they were stopped by the Syracusans sending garrisons and +reinforcements. Meanwhile the Athenians moved their winter quarters from Naxos +to Catana, and reconstructed the camp burnt by the Syracusans, and stayed there +the rest of the winter. They also sent a galley to Carthage, with proffers of +friendship, on the chance of obtaining assistance, and another to Tyrrhenia; +some of the cities there having spontaneously offered to join them in the war. +They also sent round to the Sicels and to Egesta, desiring them to send them as +many horses as possible, and meanwhile prepared bricks, iron, and all other +things necessary for the work of circumvallation, intending by the spring to +begin hostilities. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime the Syracusan envoys dispatched to Corinth and Lacedaemon tried +as they passed along the coast to persuade the Italiots to interfere with the +proceedings of the Athenians, which threatened Italy quite as much as Syracuse, +and having arrived at Corinth made a speech calling on the Corinthians to +assist them on the ground of their common origin. The Corinthians voted at once +to aid them heart and soul themselves, and then sent on envoys with them to +Lacedaemon, to help them to persuade her also to prosecute the war with the +Athenians more openly at home and to send succours to Sicily. The envoys from +Corinth having reached Lacedaemon found there Alcibiades with his fellow +refugees, who had at once crossed over in a trading vessel from Thurii, first +to Cyllene in Elis, and afterwards from thence to Lacedaemon; upon the +Lacedaemonians’ own invitation, after first obtaining a safe conduct, as +he feared them for the part he had taken in the affair of Mantinea. The result +was that the Corinthians, Syracusans, and Alcibiades, pressing all the same +request in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians, succeeded in persuading them; +but as the ephors and the authorities, although resolved to send envoys to +Syracuse to prevent their surrendering to the Athenians, showed no disposition +to send them any assistance, Alcibiades now came forward and inflamed and +stirred the Lacedaemonians by speaking as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“I am forced first to speak to you of the prejudice with which I am +regarded, in order that suspicion may not make you disinclined to listen to me +upon public matters. The connection, with you as your proxeni, which the +ancestors of our family by reason of some discontent renounced, I personally +tried to renew by my good offices towards you, in particular upon the occasion +of the disaster at Pylos. But although I maintained this friendly attitude, you +yet chose to negotiate the peace with the Athenians through my enemies, and +thus to strengthen them and to discredit me. You had therefore no right to +complain if I turned to the Mantineans and Argives, and seized other occasions +of thwarting and injuring you; and the time has now come when those among you, +who in the bitterness of the moment may have been then unfairly angry with me, +should look at the matter in its true light, and take a different view. Those +again who judged me unfavourably, because I leaned rather to the side of the +commons, must not think that their dislike is any better founded. We have +always been hostile to tyrants, and all who oppose arbitrary power are called +commons; hence we continued to act as leaders of the multitude; besides which, +as democracy was the government of the city, it was necessary in most things to +conform to established conditions. However, we endeavoured to be more moderate +than the licentious temper of the times; and while there were others, formerly +as now, who tried to lead the multitude astray—the same who banished +me—our party was that of the whole people, our creed being to do our part +in preserving the form of government under which the city enjoyed the utmost +greatness and freedom, and which we had found existing. As for democracy, the +men of sense among us knew what it was, and I perhaps as well as any, as I have +the more cause to complain of it; but there is nothing new to be said of a +patent absurdity; meanwhile we did not think it safe to alter it under the +pressure of your hostility. +</p> + +<p> +“So much then for the prejudices with which I am regarded: I now can call +your attention to the questions you must consider, and upon which superior +knowledge perhaps permits me to speak. We sailed to Sicily first to conquer, if +possible, the Siceliots, and after them the Italiots also, and finally to +assail the empire and city of Carthage. In the event of all or most of these +schemes succeeding, we were then to attack Peloponnese, bringing with us the +entire force of the Hellenes lately acquired in those parts, and taking a +number of barbarians into our pay, such as the Iberians and others in those +countries, confessedly the most warlike known, and building numerous galleys in +addition to those which we had already, timber being plentiful in Italy; and +with this fleet blockading Peloponnese from the sea and assailing it with our +armies by land, taking some of the cities by storm, drawing works of +circumvallation round others, we hoped without difficulty to effect its +reduction, and after this to rule the whole of the Hellenic name. Money and +corn meanwhile for the better execution of these plans were to be supplied in +sufficient quantities by the newly acquired places in those countries, +independently of our revenues here at home. +</p> + +<p> +“You have thus heard the history of the present expedition from the man +who most exactly knows what our objects were; and the remaining generals will, +if they can, carry these out just the same. But that the states in Sicily must +succumb if you do not help them, I will now show. Although the Siceliots, with +all their inexperience, might even now be saved if their forces were united, +the Syracusans alone, beaten already in one battle with all their people and +blockaded from the sea, will be unable to withstand the Athenian armament that +is now there. But if Syracuse falls, all Sicily falls also, and Italy +immediately afterwards; and the danger which I just now spoke of from that +quarter will before long be upon you. None need therefore fancy that Sicily +only is in question; Peloponnese will be so also, unless you speedily do as I +tell you, and send on board ship to Syracuse troops that shall able to row +their ships themselves, and serve as heavy infantry the moment that they land; +and what I consider even more important than the troops, a Spartan as +commanding officer to discipline the forces already on foot and to compel +recusants to serve. The friends that you have already will thus become more +confident, and the waverers will be encouraged to join you. Meanwhile you must +carry on the war here more openly, that the Syracusans, seeing that you do not +forget them, may put heart into their resistance, and that the Athenians may be +less able to reinforce their armament. You must fortify Decelea in Attica, the +blow of which the Athenians are always most afraid and the only one that they +think they have not experienced in the present war; the surest method of +harming an enemy being to find out what he most fears, and to choose this means +of attacking him, since every one naturally knows best his own weak points and +fears accordingly. The fortification in question, while it benefits you, will +create difficulties for your adversaries, of which I shall pass over many, and +shall only mention the chief. Whatever property there is in the country will +most of it become yours, either by capture or surrender; and the Athenians will +at once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, of +their present gains from their land and from the law courts, and above all of +the revenue from their allies, which will be paid less regularly, as they lose +their awe of Athens and see you addressing yourselves with vigour to the war. +The zeal and speed with which all this shall be done depends, Lacedaemonians, +upon yourselves; as to its possibility, I am quite confident, and I have little +fear of being mistaken. +</p> + +<p> +“Meanwhile I hope that none of you will think any the worse of me if, +after having hitherto passed as a lover of my country, I now actively join its +worst enemies in attacking it, or will suspect what I say as the fruit of an +outlaw’s enthusiasm. I am an outlaw from the iniquity of those who drove +me forth, not, if you will be guided by me, from your service; my worst enemies +are not you who only harmed your foes, but they who forced their friends to +become enemies; and love of country is what I do not feel when I am wronged, +but what I felt when secure in my rights as a citizen. Indeed I do not consider +that I am now attacking a country that is still mine; I am rather trying to +recover one that is mine no longer; and the true lover of his country is not he +who consents to lose it unjustly rather than attack it, but he who longs for it +so much that he will go all lengths to recover it. For myself, therefore, +Lacedaemonians, I beg you to use me without scruple for danger and trouble of +every kind, and to remember the argument in every one’s mouth, that if I +did you great harm as an enemy, I could likewise do you good service as a +friend, inasmuch as I know the plans of the Athenians, while I only guessed +yours. For yourselves I entreat you to believe that your most capital interests +are now under deliberation; and I urge you to send without hesitation the +expeditions to Sicily and Attica; by the presence of a small part of your +forces you will save important cities in that island, and you will destroy the +power of Athens both present and prospective; after this you will dwell in +security and enjoy the supremacy over all Hellas, resting not on force but upon +consent and affection.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the words of Alcibiades. The Lacedaemonians, who had themselves +before intended to march against Athens, but were still waiting and looking +about them, at once became much more in earnest when they received this +particular information from Alcibiades, and considered that they had heard it +from the man who best knew the truth of the matter. Accordingly they now turned +their attention to the fortifying of Decelea and sending immediate aid to the +Sicilians; and naming Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, to the command of the +Syracusans, bade him consult with that people and with the Corinthians and +arrange for succours reaching the island, in the best and speediest way +possible under the circumstances. Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send him +at once two ships to Asine, and to prepare the rest that they intended to send, +and to have them ready to sail at the proper time. Having settled this, the +envoys departed from Lacedaemon. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime arrived the Athenian galley from Sicily sent by the generals +for money and cavalry; and the Athenians, after hearing what they wanted, voted +to send the supplies for the armament and the cavalry. And the winter ended, +and with it ended the seventeenth year of the present war of which Thucydides +is the historian. +</p> + +<p> +The next summer, at the very beginning of the season, the Athenians in Sicily +put out from Catana, and sailed along shore to Megara in Sicily, from which, as +I have mentioned above, the Syracusans expelled the inhabitants in the time of +their tyrant Gelo, themselves occupying the territory. Here the Athenians +landed and laid waste the country, and after an unsuccessful attack upon a fort +of the Syracusans, went on with the fleet and army to the river Terias, and +advancing inland laid waste the plain and set fire to the corn; and after +killing some of a small Syracusan party which they encountered, and setting up +a trophy, went back again to their ships. They now sailed to Catana and took in +provisions there, and going with their whole force against Centoripa, a town of +the Sicels, acquired it by capitulation, and departed, after also burning the +corn of the Inessaeans and Hybleans. Upon their return to Catana they found the +horsemen arrived from Athens, to the number of two hundred and fifty (with +their equipments, but without their horses which were to be procured upon the +spot), and thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents of silver. +</p> + +<p> +The same spring the Lacedaemonians marched against Argos, and went as far as +Cleonae, when an earthquake occurred and caused them to return. After this the +Argives invaded the Thyreatid, which is on their border, and took much booty +from the Lacedaemonians, which was sold for no less than twenty-five talents. +The same summer, not long after, the Thespian commons made an attack upon the +party in office, which was not successful, but succours arrived from Thebes, +and some were caught, while others took refuge at Athens. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer the Syracusans learned that the Athenians had been joined by +their cavalry, and were on the point of marching against them; and seeing that +without becoming masters of Epipolae, a precipitous spot situated exactly over +the town, the Athenians could not, even if victorious in battle, easily invest +them, they determined to guard its approaches, in order that the enemy might +not ascend unobserved by this, the sole way by which ascent was possible, as +the remainder is lofty ground, and falls right down to the city, and can all be +seen from inside; and as it lies above the rest the place is called by the +Syracusans Epipolae or Overtown. They accordingly went out in mass at daybreak +into the meadow along the river Anapus, their new generals, Hermocrates and his +colleagues, having just come into office, and held a review of their heavy +infantry, from whom they first selected a picked body of six hundred, under the +command of Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to guard Epipolae, and to be ready +to muster at a moment’s notice to help wherever help should be required. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Athenians, the very same morning, were holding a review, having +already made land unobserved with all the armament from Catana, opposite a +place called Leon, not much more than half a mile from Epipolae, where they +disembarked their army, bringing the fleet to anchor at Thapsus, a peninsula +running out into the sea, with a narrow isthmus, and not far from the city of +Syracuse either by land or water. While the naval force of the Athenians threw +a stockade across the isthmus and remained quiet at Thapsus, the land army +immediately went on at a run to Epipolae, and succeeded in getting up by +Euryelus before the Syracusans perceived them, or could come up from the meadow +and the review. Diomilus with his six hundred and the rest advanced as quickly +as they could, but they had nearly three miles to go from the meadow before +reaching them. Attacking in this way in considerable disorder, the Syracusans +were defeated in battle at Epipolae and retired to the town, with a loss of +about three hundred killed, and Diomilus among the number. After this the +Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans their dead under +truce, and next day descended to Syracuse itself; and no one coming out to meet +them, reascended and built a fort at Labdalum, upon the edge of the cliffs of +Epipolae, looking towards Megara, to serve as a magazine for their baggage and +money, whenever they advanced to battle or to work at the lines. +</p> + +<p> +Not long afterwards three hundred cavalry came to them from Egesta, and about a +hundred from the Sicels, Naxians, and others; and thus, with the two hundred +and fifty from Athens, for whom they had got horses from the Egestaeans and +Catanians, besides others that they bought, they now mustered six hundred and +fifty cavalry in all. After posting a garrison in Labdalum, they advanced to +Syca, where they sat down and quickly built the Circle or centre of their wall +of circumvallation. The Syracusans, appalled at the rapidity with which the +work advanced, determined to go out against them and give battle and interrupt +it; and the two armies were already in battle array, when the Syracusan +generals observed that their troops found such difficulty in getting into line, +and were in such disorder, that they led them back into the town, except part +of the cavalry. These remained and hindered the Athenians from carrying stones +or dispersing to any great distance, until a tribe of the Athenian heavy +infantry, with all the cavalry, charged and routed the Syracusan horse with +some loss; after which they set up a trophy for the cavalry action. +</p> + +<p> +The next day the Athenians began building the wall to the north of the Circle, +at the same time collecting stone and timber, which they kept laying down +towards Trogilus along the shortest line for their works from the great harbour +to the sea; while the Syracusans, guided by their generals, and above all by +Hermocrates, instead of risking any more general engagements, determined to +build a counterwork in the direction in which the Athenians were going to carry +their wall. If this could be completed in time, the enemy’s lines would +be cut; and meanwhile, if he were to attempt to interrupt them by an attack, +they would send a part of their forces against him, and would secure the +approaches beforehand with their stockade, while the Athenians would have to +leave off working with their whole force in order to attend to them. They +accordingly sallied forth and began to build, starting from their city, running +a cross wall below the Athenian Circle, cutting down the olives and erecting +wooden towers. As the Athenian fleet had not yet sailed round into the great +harbour, the Syracusans still commanded the seacoast, and the Athenians brought +their provisions by land from Thapsus. +</p> + +<p> +The Syracusans now thought the stockades and stonework of their counterwall +sufficiently far advanced; and as the Athenians, afraid of being divided and so +fighting at a disadvantage, and intent upon their own wall, did not come out to +interrupt them, they left one tribe to guard the new work and went back into +the city. Meanwhile the Athenians destroyed their pipes of drinking-water +carried underground into the city; and watching until the rest of the +Syracusans were in their tents at midday, and some even gone away into the +city, and those in the stockade keeping but indifferent guard, appointed three +hundred picked men of their own, and some men picked from the light troops and +armed for the purpose, to run suddenly as fast as they could to the +counterwork, while the rest of the army advanced in two divisions, the one with +one of the generals to the city in case of a sortie, the other with the other +general to the stockade by the postern gate. The three hundred attacked and +took the stockade, abandoned by its garrison, who took refuge in the outworks +round the statue of Apollo Temenites. Here the pursuers burst in with them, and +after getting in were beaten out by the Syracusans, and some few of the Argives +and Athenians slain; after which the whole army retired, and having demolished +the counterwork and pulled up the stockade, carried away the stakes to their +own lines, and set up a trophy. +</p> + +<p> +The next day the Athenians from the Circle proceeded to fortify the cliff above +the marsh which on this side of Epipolae looks towards the great harbour; this +being also the shortest line for their work to go down across the plain and the +marsh to the harbour. Meanwhile the Syracusans marched out and began a second +stockade, starting from the city, across the middle of the marsh, digging a +trench alongside to make it impossible for the Athenians to carry their wall +down to the sea. As soon as the Athenians had finished their work at the cliff +they again attacked the stockade and ditch of the Syracusans. Ordering the +fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the great harbour of Syracuse, they +descended at about dawn from Epipolae into the plain, and laying doors and +planks over the marsh, where it was muddy and firmest, crossed over on these, +and by daybreak took the ditch and the stockade, except a small portion which +they captured afterwards. A battle now ensued, in which the Athenians were +victorious, the right wing of the Syracusans flying to the town and the left to +the river. The three hundred picked Athenians, wishing to cut off their +passage, pressed on at a run to the bridge, when the alarmed Syracusans, who +had with them most of their cavalry, closed and routed them, hurling them back +upon the Athenian right wing, the first tribe of which was thrown into a panic +by the shock. Seeing this, Lamachus came to their aid from the Athenian left +with a few archers and with the Argives, and crossing a ditch, was left alone +with a few that had crossed with him, and was killed with five or six of his +men. These the Syracusans managed immediately to snatch up in haste and get +across the river into a place of security, themselves retreating as the rest of +the Athenian army now came up. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile those who had at first fled for refuge to the city, seeing the turn +affairs were taking, now rallied from the town and formed against the Athenians +in front of them, sending also a part of their number to the Circle on +Epipolae, which they hoped to take while denuded of its defenders. These took +and destroyed the Athenian outwork of a thousand feet, the Circle itself being +saved by Nicias, who happened to have been left in it through illness, and who +now ordered the servants to set fire to the engines and timber thrown down +before the wall; want of men, as he was aware, rendering all other means of +escape impossible. This step was justified by the result, the Syracusans not +coming any further on account of the fire, but retreating. Meanwhile succours +were coming up from the Athenians below, who had put to flight the troops +opposed to them; and the fleet also, according to orders, was sailing from +Thapsus into the great harbour. Seeing this, the troops on the heights retired +in haste, and the whole army of the Syracusans re-entered the city, thinking +that with their present force they would no longer be able to hinder the wall +reaching the sea. +</p> + +<p> +After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans their +dead under truce, receiving in return Lamachus and those who had fallen with +him. The whole of their forces, naval and military, being now with them, they +began from Epipolae and the cliffs and enclosed the Syracusans with a double +wall down to the sea. Provisions were now brought in for the armament from all +parts of Italy; and many of the Sicels, who had hitherto been looking to see +how things went, came as allies to the Athenians: there also arrived three +ships of fifty oars from Tyrrhenia. Meanwhile everything else progressed +favourably for their hopes. The Syracusans began to despair of finding safety +in arms, no relief having reached them from Peloponnese, and were now proposing +terms of capitulation among themselves and to Nicias, who after the death of +Lamachus was left sole commander. No decision was come to, but, as was natural +with men in difficulties and besieged more straitly than before, there was much +discussion with Nicias and still more in the town. Their present misfortunes +had also made them suspicious of one another; and the blame of their disasters +was thrown upon the ill-fortune or treachery of the generals under whose +command they had happened; and these were deposed and others, Heraclides, +Eucles, and Tellias, elected in their stead. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian, Gylippus, and the ships from Corinth were now off +Leucas, intent upon going with all haste to the relief of Sicily. The reports +that reached them being of an alarming kind, and all agreeing in the falsehood +that Syracuse was already completely invested, Gylippus abandoned all hope of +Sicily, and wishing to save Italy, rapidly crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum +with the Corinthian, Pythen, two Laconian, and two Corinthian vessels, leaving +the Corinthians to follow him after manning, in addition to their own ten, two +Leucadian and two Ambraciot ships. From Tarentum Gylippus first went on an +embassy to Thurii, and claimed anew the rights of citizenship which his father +had enjoyed; failing to bring over the townspeople, he weighed anchor and +coasted along Italy. Opposite the Terinaean Gulf he was caught by the wind +which blows violently and steadily from the north in that quarter, and was +carried out to sea; and after experiencing very rough weather, remade Tarentum, +where he hauled ashore and refitted such of his ships as had suffered most from +the tempest. Nicias heard of his approach, but, like the Thurians, despised the +scanty number of his ships, and set down piracy as the only probable object of +the voyage, and so took no precautions for the present. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time in this summer, the Lacedaemonians invaded Argos with their +allies, and laid waste most of the country. The Athenians went with thirty +ships to the relief of the Argives, thus breaking their treaty with the +Lacedaemonians in the most overt manner. Up to this time incursions from Pylos, +descents on the coast of the rest of Peloponnese, instead of on the Laconian, +had been the extent of their co-operation with the Argives and Mantineans; and +although the Argives had often begged them to land, if only for a moment, with +their heavy infantry in Laconia, lay waste ever so little of it with them, and +depart, they had always refused to do so. Now, however, under the command of +Phytodorus, Laespodius, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera, +Prasiae, and other places, and plundered the country; and thus furnished the +Lacedaemonians with a better pretext for hostilities against Athens. After the +Athenians had retired from Argos with their fleet, and the Lacedaemonians also, +the Argives made an incursion into the Phlisaid, and returned home after +ravaging their land and killing some of the inhabitants. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2H_4_0027" id="link2H_4_0027"></a> +BOOK VII </h2> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0021" id="link2HCH0021"></a> +CHAPTER XXI </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Eighteenth and Nineteenth Years of the War—Arrival of Gylippus at +Syracuse—Fortification of Decelea—Successes of the Syracusans +</p> + +<p> +After refitting their ships, Gylippus and Pythen coasted along from Tarentum to +Epizephyrian Locris. They now received the more correct information that +Syracuse was not yet completely invested, but that it was still possible for an +army arriving at Epipolae to effect an entrance; and they consulted, +accordingly, whether they should keep Sicily on their right and risk sailing in +by sea, or, leaving it on their left, should first sail to Himera and, taking +with them the Himeraeans and any others that might agree to join them, go to +Syracuse by land. Finally they determined to sail for Himera, especially as the +four Athenian ships which Nicias had at length sent off, on hearing that they +were at Locris, had not yet arrived at Rhegium. Accordingly, before these +reached their post, the Peloponnesians crossed the strait and, after touching +at Rhegium and Messina, came to Himera. Arrived there, they persuaded the +Himeraeans to join in the war, and not only to go with them themselves but to +provide arms for the seamen from their vessels which they had drawn ashore at +Himera; and they sent and appointed a place for the Selinuntines to meet them +with all their forces. A few troops were also promised by the Geloans and some +of the Sicels, who were now ready to join them with much greater alacrity, +owing to the recent death of Archonidas, a powerful Sicel king in that +neighbourhood and friendly to Athens, and owing also to the vigour shown by +Gylippus in coming from Lacedaemon. Gylippus now took with him about seven +hundred of his sailors and marines, that number only having arms, a thousand +heavy infantry and light troops from Himera with a body of a hundred horse, +some light troops and cavalry from Selinus, a few Geloans, and Sicels numbering +a thousand in all, and set out on his march for Syracuse. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Corinthian fleet from Leucas made all haste to arrive; and one of +their commanders, Gongylus, starting last with a single ship, was the first to +reach Syracuse, a little before Gylippus. Gongylus found the Syracusans on the +point of holding an assembly to consider whether they should put an end to the +war. This he prevented, and reassured them by telling them that more vessels +were still to arrive, and that Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, had been +dispatched by the Lacedaemonians to take the command. Upon this the Syracusans +took courage, and immediately marched out with all their forces to meet +Gylippus, who they found was now close at hand. Meanwhile Gylippus, after +taking Ietae, a fort of the Sicels, on his way, formed his army in order of +battle, and so arrived at Epipolae, and ascending by Euryelus, as the Athenians +had done at first, now advanced with the Syracusans against the Athenian lines. +His arrival chanced at a critical moment. The Athenians had already finished a +double wall of six or seven furlongs to the great harbour, with the exception +of a small portion next the sea, which they were still engaged upon; and in the +remainder of the circle towards Trogilus on the other sea, stones had been laid +ready for building for the greater part of the distance, and some points had +been left half finished, while others were entirely completed. The danger of +Syracuse had indeed been great. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Athenians, recovering from the confusion into which they had been +first thrown by the sudden approach of Gylippus and the Syracusans, formed in +order of battle. Gylippus halted at a short distance off and sent on a herald +to tell them that, if they would evacuate Sicily with bag and baggage within +five days’ time, he was willing to make a truce accordingly. The +Athenians treated this proposition with contempt, and dismissed the herald +without an answer. After this both sides began to prepare for action. Gylippus, +observing that the Syracusans were in disorder and did not easily fall into +line, drew off his troops more into the open ground, while Nicias did not lead +on the Athenians but lay still by his own wall. When Gylippus saw that they did +not come on, he led off his army to the citadel of the quarter of Apollo +Temenites, and passed the night there. On the following day he led out the main +body of his army, and, drawing them up in order of battle before the walls of +the Athenians to prevent their going to the relief of any other quarter, +dispatched a strong force against Fort Labdalum, and took it, and put all whom +he found in it to the sword, the place not being within sight of the Athenians. +On the same day an Athenian galley that lay moored off the harbour was captured +by the Syracusans. +</p> + +<p> +After this the Syracusans and their allies began to carry a single wall, +starting from the city, in a slanting direction up Epipolae, in order that the +Athenians, unless they could hinder the work, might be no longer able to invest +them. Meanwhile the Athenians, having now finished their wall down to the sea, +had come up to the heights; and part of their wall being weak, Gylippus drew +out his army by night and attacked it. However, the Athenians who happened to +be bivouacking outside took the alarm and came out to meet him, upon seeing +which he quickly led his men back again. The Athenians now built their wall +higher, and in future kept guard at this point themselves, disposing their +confederates along the remainder of the works, at the stations assigned to +them. Nicias also determined to fortify Plemmyrium, a promontory over against +the city, which juts out and narrows the mouth of the Great Harbour. He thought +that the fortification of this place would make it easier to bring in supplies, +as they would be able to carry on their blockade from a less distance, near to +the port occupied by the Syracusans; instead of being obliged, upon every +movement of the enemy’s navy, to put out against them from the bottom of +the great harbour. Besides this, he now began to pay more attention to the war +by sea, seeing that the coming of Gylippus had diminished their hopes by land. +Accordingly, he conveyed over his ships and some troops, and built three forts +in which he placed most of his baggage, and moored there for the future the +larger craft and men-of-war. This was the first and chief occasion of the +losses which the crews experienced. The water which they used was scarce and +had to be fetched from far, and the sailors could not go out for firewood +without being cut off by the Syracusan horse, who were masters of the country; +a third of the enemy’s cavalry being stationed at the little town of +Olympieum, to prevent plundering incursions on the part of the Athenians at +Plemmyrium. Meanwhile Nicias learned that the rest of the Corinthian fleet was +approaching, and sent twenty ships to watch for them, with orders to be on the +look-out for them about Locris and Rhegium and the approach to Sicily. +</p> + +<p> +Gylippus, meanwhile, went on with the wall across Epipolae, using the stones +which the Athenians had laid down for their own wall, and at the same time +constantly led out the Syracusans and their allies, and formed them in order of +battle in front of the lines, the Athenians forming against him. At last he +thought that the moment was come, and began the attack; and a hand-to-hand +fight ensued between the lines, where the Syracusan cavalry could be of no use; +and the Syracusans and their allies were defeated and took up their dead under +truce, while the Athenians erected a trophy. After this Gylippus called the +soldiers together, and said that the fault was not theirs but his; he had kept +their lines too much within the works, and had thus deprived them of the +services of their cavalry and darters. He would now, therefore, lead them on a +second time. He begged them to remember that in material force they would be +fully a match for their opponents, while, with respect to moral advantages, it +were intolerable if Peloponnesians and Dorians should not feel confident of +overcoming Ionians and islanders with the motley rabble that accompanied them, +and of driving them out of the country. +</p> + +<p> +After this he embraced the first opportunity that offered of again leading them +against the enemy. Now Nicias and the Athenians held the opinion that even if +the Syracusans should not wish to offer battle, it was necessary for them to +prevent the building of the cross wall, as it already almost overlapped the +extreme point of their own, and if it went any further it would from that +moment make no difference whether they fought ever so many successful actions, +or never fought at all. They accordingly came out to meet the Syracusans. +Gylippus led out his heavy infantry further from the fortifications than on the +former occasion, and so joined battle; posting his horse and darters upon the +flank of the Athenians in the open space, where the works of the two walls +terminated. During the engagement the cavalry attacked and routed the left wing +of the Athenians, which was opposed to them; and the rest of the Athenian army +was in consequence defeated by the Syracusans and driven headlong within their +lines. The night following the Syracusans carried their wall up to the Athenian +works and passed them, thus putting it out of their power any longer to stop +them, and depriving them, even if victorious in the field, of all chance of +investing the city for the future. +</p> + +<p> +After this the remaining twelve vessels of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and +Leucadians sailed into the harbour under the command of Erasinides, a +Corinthian, having eluded the Athenian ships on guard, and helped the +Syracusans in completing the remainder of the cross wall. Meanwhile Gylippus +went into the rest of Sicily to raise land and naval forces, and also to bring +over any of the cities that either were lukewarm in the cause or had hitherto +kept out of the war altogether. Syracusan and Corinthian envoys were also +dispatched to Lacedaemon and Corinth to get a fresh force sent over, in any way +that might offer, either in merchant vessels or transports, or in any other +manner likely to prove successful, as the Athenians too were sending for +reinforcements; while the Syracusans proceeded to man a fleet and to exercise, +meaning to try their fortune in this way also, and generally became exceedingly +confident. +</p> + +<p> +Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and his own +difficulties daily increasing, himself also sent to Athens. He had before sent +frequent reports of events as they occurred, and felt it especially incumbent +upon him to do so now, as he thought that they were in a critical position, and +that, unless speedily recalled or strongly reinforced from home, they had no +hope of safety. He feared, however, that the messengers, either through +inability to speak, or through failure of memory, or from a wish to please the +multitude, might not report the truth, and so thought it best to write a +letter, to ensure that the Athenians should know his own opinion without its +being lost in transmission, and be able to decide upon the real facts of the +case. +</p> + +<p> +His emissaries, accordingly, departed with the letter and the requisite verbal +instructions; and he attended to the affairs of the army, making it his aim now +to keep on the defensive and to avoid any unnecessary danger. +</p> + +<p> +At the close of the same summer the Athenian general Euetion marched in concert +with Perdiccas with a large body of Thracians against Amphipolis, and failing +to take it brought some galleys round into the Strymon, and blockaded the town +from the river, having his base at Himeraeum. +</p> + +<p> +Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the persons sent by Nicias, reaching +Athens, gave the verbal messages which had been entrusted to them, and answered +any questions that were asked them, and delivered the letter. The clerk of the +city now came forward and read out to the Athenians the letter, which was as +follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Our past operations, Athenians, have been made known to you by many +other letters; it is now time for you to become equally familiar with our +present condition, and to take your measures accordingly. We had defeated in +most of our engagements with them the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, +and we had built the works which we now occupy, when Gylippus arrived from +Lacedaemon with an army obtained from Peloponnese and from some of the cities +in Sicily. In our first battle with him we were victorious; in the battle on +the following day we were overpowered by a multitude of cavalry and darters, +and compelled to retire within our lines. We have now, therefore, been forced +by the numbers of those opposed to us to discontinue the work of +circumvallation, and to remain inactive; being unable to make use even of all +the force we have, since a large portion of our heavy infantry is absorbed in +the defence of our lines. Meanwhile the enemy have carried a single wall past +our lines, thus making it impossible for us to invest them in future, until +this cross wall be attacked by a strong force and captured. So that the +besieger in name has become, at least from the land side, the besieged in +reality; as we are prevented by their cavalry from even going for any distance +into the country. +</p> + +<p> +“Besides this, an embassy has been dispatched to Peloponnese to procure +reinforcements, and Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily, partly in the +hope of inducing those that are at present neutral to join him in the war, +partly of bringing from his allies additional contingents for the land forces +and material for the navy. For I understand that they contemplate a combined +attack, upon our lines with their land forces and with their fleet by sea. You +must none of you be surprised that I say by sea also. They have discovered that +the length of the time we have now been in commission has rotted our ships and +wasted our crews, and that with the entireness of our crews and the soundness +of our ships the pristine efficiency of our navy has departed. For it is +impossible for us to haul our ships ashore and careen them, because, the +enemy’s vessels being as many or more than our own, we are constantly +anticipating an attack. Indeed, they may be seen exercising, and it lies with +them to take the initiative; and not having to maintain a blockade, they have +greater facilities for drying their ships. +</p> + +<p> +“This we should scarcely be able to do, even if we had plenty of ships to +spare, and were freed from our present necessity of exhausting all our strength +upon the blockade. For it is already difficult to carry in supplies past +Syracuse; and were we to relax our vigilance in the slightest degree it would +become impossible. The losses which our crews have suffered and still continue +to suffer arise from the following causes. Expeditions for fuel and for forage, +and the distance from which water has to be fetched, cause our sailors to be +cut off by the Syracusan cavalry; the loss of our previous superiority +emboldens our slaves to desert; our foreign seamen are impressed by the +unexpected appearance of a navy against us, and the strength of the +enemy’s resistance; such of them as were pressed into the service take +the first opportunity of departing to their respective cities; such as were +originally seduced by the temptation of high pay, and expected little fighting +and large gains, leave us either by desertion to the enemy or by availing +themselves of one or other of the various facilities of escape which the +magnitude of Sicily affords them. Some even engage in trade themselves and +prevail upon the captains to take Hyccaric slaves on board in their place; thus +they have ruined the efficiency of our navy. +</p> + +<p> +“Now I need not remind you that the time during which a crew is in its +prime is short, and that the number of sailors who can start a ship on her way +and keep the rowing in time is small. But by far my greatest trouble is, that +holding the post which I do, I am prevented by the natural indocility of the +Athenian seaman from putting a stop to these evils; and that meanwhile we have +no source from which to recruit our crews, which the enemy can do from many +quarters, but are compelled to depend both for supplying the crews in service +and for making good our losses upon the men whom we brought with us. For our +present confederates, Naxos and Catana, are incapable of supplying us. There is +only one thing more wanting to our opponents, I mean the defection of our +Italian markets. If they were to see you neglect to relieve us from our present +condition, and were to go over to the enemy, famine would compel us to +evacuate, and Syracuse would finish the war without a blow. +</p> + +<p> +“I might, it is true, have written to you something different and more +agreeable than this, but nothing certainly more useful, if it is desirable for +you to know the real state of things here before taking your measures. Besides +I know that it is your nature to love to be told the best side of things, and +then to blame the teller if the expectations which he has raised in your minds +are not answered by the result; and I therefore thought it safest to declare to +you the truth. +</p> + +<p> +“Now you are not to think that either your generals or your soldiers have +ceased to be a match for the forces originally opposed to them. But you are to +reflect that a general Sicilian coalition is being formed against us; that a +fresh army is expected from Peloponnese, while the force we have here is unable +to cope even with our present antagonists; and you must promptly decide either +to recall us or to send out to us another fleet and army as numerous again, +with a large sum of money, and someone to succeed me, as a disease in the +kidneys unfits me for retaining my post. I have, I think, some claim on your +indulgence, as while I was in my prime I did you much good service in my +commands. But whatever you mean to do, do it at the commencement of spring and +without delay, as the enemy will obtain his Sicilian reinforcements shortly, +those from Peloponnese after a longer interval; and unless you attend to the +matter the former will be here before you, while the latter will elude you as +they have done before.” +</p> + +<p> +Such were the contents of Nicias’s letter. When the Athenians had heard +it they refused to accept his resignation, but chose him two colleagues, naming +Menander and Euthydemus, two of the officers at the seat of war, to fill their +places until their arrival, that Nicias might not be left alone in his sickness +to bear the whole weight of affairs. They also voted to send out another army +and navy, drawn partly from the Athenians on the muster-roll, partly from the +allies. The colleagues chosen for Nicias were Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, +and Eurymedon, son of Thucles. Eurymedon was sent off at once, about the time +of the winter solstice, with ten ships, a hundred and twenty talents of silver, +and instructions to tell the army that reinforcements would arrive, and that +care would be taken of them; but Demosthenes stayed behind to organize the +expedition, meaning to start as soon as it was spring, and sent for troops to +the allies, and meanwhile got together money, ships, and heavy infantry at +home. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians also sent twenty vessels round Peloponnese to prevent any one +crossing over to Sicily from Corinth or Peloponnese. For the Corinthians, +filled with confidence by the favourable alteration in Sicilian affairs which +had been reported by the envoys upon their arrival, and convinced that the +fleet which they had before sent out had not been without its use, were now +preparing to dispatch a force of heavy infantry in merchant vessels to Sicily, +while the Lacedaemonians did the like for the rest of Peloponnese. The +Corinthians also manned a fleet of twenty-five vessels, intending to try the +result of a battle with the squadron on guard at Naupactus, and meanwhile to +make it less easy for the Athenians there to hinder the departure of their +merchantmen, by obliging them to keep an eye upon the galleys thus arrayed +against them. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime the Lacedaemonians prepared for their invasion of Attica, in +accordance with their own previous resolve, and at the instigation of the +Syracusans and Corinthians, who wished for an invasion to arrest the +reinforcements which they heard that Athens was about to send to Sicily. +Alcibiades also urgently advised the fortification of Decelea, and a vigorous +prosecution of the war. But the Lacedaemonians derived most encouragement from +the belief that Athens, with two wars on her hands, against themselves and +against the Siceliots, would be more easy to subdue, and from the conviction +that she had been the first to infringe the truce. In the former war, they +considered, the offence had been more on their own side, both on account of the +entrance of the Thebans into Plataea in time of peace, and also of their own +refusal to listen to the Athenian offer of arbitration, in spite of the clause +in the former treaty that where arbitration should be offered there should be +no appeal to arms. For this reason they thought that they deserved their +misfortunes, and took to heart seriously the disaster at Pylos and whatever +else had befallen them. But when, besides the ravages from Pylos, which went on +without any intermission, the thirty Athenian ships came out from Argos and +wasted part of Epidaurus, Prasiae, and other places; when upon every dispute +that arose as to the interpretation of any doubtful point in the treaty, their +own offers of arbitration were always rejected by the Athenians, the +Lacedaemonians at length decided that Athens had now committed the very same +offence as they had before done, and had become the guilty party; and they +began to be full of ardour for the war. They spent this winter in sending round +to their allies for iron, and in getting ready the other implements for +building their fort; and meanwhile began raising at home, and also by forced +requisitions in the rest of Peloponnese, a force to be sent out in the +merchantmen to their allies in Sicily. Winter thus ended, and with it the +eighteenth year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian. +</p> + +<p> +In the first days of the spring following, at an earlier period than usual, the +Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis, son +of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. They began by devastating the parts +bordering upon the plain, and next proceeded to fortify Decelea, dividing the +work among the different cities. Decelea is about thirteen or fourteen miles +from the city of Athens, and the same distance or not much further from +Boeotia; and the fort was meant to annoy the plain and the richest parts of the +country, being in sight of Athens. While the Peloponnesians and their allies in +Attica were engaged in the work of fortification, their countrymen at home sent +off, at about the same time, the heavy infantry in the merchant vessels to +Sicily; the Lacedaemonians furnishing a picked force of Helots and Neodamodes +(or freedmen), six hundred heavy infantry in all, under the command of +Eccritus, a Spartan; and the Boeotians three hundred heavy infantry, commanded +by two Thebans, Xenon and Nicon, and by Hegesander, a Thespian. These were +among the first to put out into the open sea, starting from Taenarus in +Laconia. Not long after their departure the Corinthians sent off a force of +five hundred heavy infantry, consisting partly of men from Corinth itself, and +partly of Arcadian mercenaries, placed under the command of Alexarchus, a +Corinthian. The Sicyonians also sent off two hundred heavy infantry at same +time as the Corinthians, under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian. Meantime +the five-and-twenty vessels manned by Corinth during the winter lay confronting +the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus until the heavy infantry in the +merchantmen were fairly on their way from Peloponnese; thus fulfilling the +object for which they had been manned originally, which was to divert the +attention of the Athenians from the merchantmen to the galleys. +</p> + +<p> +During this time the Athenians were not idle. Simultaneously with the +fortification of Decelea, at the very beginning of spring, they sent thirty +ships round Peloponnese, under Charicles, son of Apollodorus, with instructions +to call at Argos and demand a force of their heavy infantry for the fleet, +agreeably to the alliance. At the same time they dispatched Demosthenes to +Sicily, as they had intended, with sixty Athenian and five Chian vessels, +twelve hundred Athenian heavy infantry from the muster-roll, and as many of the +islanders as could be raised in the different quarters, drawing upon the other +subject allies for whatever they could supply that would be of use for the war. +Demosthenes was instructed first to sail round with Charicles and to operate +with him upon the coasts of Laconia, and accordingly sailed to Aegina and there +waited for the remainder of his armament, and for Charicles to fetch the Argive +troops. +</p> + +<p> +In Sicily, about the same time in this spring, Gylippus came to Syracuse with +as many troops as he could bring from the cities which he had persuaded to +join. Calling the Syracusans together, he told them that they must man as many +ships as possible, and try their hand at a sea-fight, by which he hoped to +achieve an advantage in the war not unworthy of the risk. With him Hermocrates +actively joined in trying to encourage his countrymen to attack the Athenians +at sea, saying that the latter had not inherited their naval prowess nor would +they retain it for ever; they had been landsmen even to a greater degree than +the Syracusans, and had only become a maritime power when obliged by the Mede. +Besides, to daring spirits like the Athenians, a daring adversary would seem +the most formidable; and the Athenian plan of paralysing by the boldness of +their attack a neighbour often not their inferior in strength could now be used +against them with as good effect by the Syracusans. He was convinced also that +the unlooked-for spectacle of Syracusans daring to face the Athenian navy would +cause a terror to the enemy, the advantages of which would far outweigh any +loss that Athenian science might inflict upon their inexperience. He +accordingly urged them to throw aside their fears and to try their fortune at +sea; and the Syracusans, under the influence of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and +perhaps some others, made up their minds for the sea-fight and began to man +their vessels. +</p> + +<p> +When the fleet was ready, Gylippus led out the whole army by night; his plan +being to assault in person the forts on Plemmyrium by land, while thirty-five +Syracusan galleys sailed according to appointment against the enemy from the +great harbour, and the forty-five remaining came round from the lesser harbour, +where they had their arsenal, in order to effect a junction with those inside +and simultaneously to attack Plemmyrium, and thus to distract the Athenians by +assaulting them on two sides at once. The Athenians quickly manned sixty ships, +and with twenty-five of these engaged the thirty-five of the Syracusans in the +great harbour, sending the rest to meet those sailing round from the arsenal; +and an action now ensued directly in front of the mouth of the great harbour, +maintained with equal tenacity on both sides; the one wishing to force the +passage, the other to prevent them. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime, while the Athenians in Plemmyrium were down at the sea, +attending to the engagement, Gylippus made a sudden attack on the forts in the +early morning and took the largest first, and afterwards the two smaller, whose +garrisons did not wait for him, seeing the largest so easily taken. At the fall +of the first fort, the men from it who succeeded in taking refuge in their +boats and merchantmen, found great difficulty in reaching the camp, as the +Syracusans were having the best of it in the engagement in the great harbour, +and sent a fast-sailing galley to pursue them. But when the two others fell, +the Syracusans were now being defeated; and the fugitives from these sailed +alongshore with more ease. The Syracusan ships fighting off the mouth of the +harbour forced their way through the Athenian vessels and sailing in without +any order fell foul of one another, and transferred the victory to the +Athenians; who not only routed the squadron in question, but also that by which +they were at first being defeated in the harbour, sinking eleven of the +Syracusan vessels and killing most of the men, except the crews of three ships +whom they made prisoners. Their own loss was confined to three vessels; and +after hauling ashore the Syracusan wrecks and setting up a trophy upon the +islet in front of Plemmyrium, they retired to their own camp. +</p> + +<p> +Unsuccessful at sea, the Syracusans had nevertheless the forts in Plemmyrium, +for which they set up three trophies. One of the two last taken they razed, but +put in order and garrisoned the two others. In the capture of the forts a great +many men were killed and made prisoners, and a great quantity of property was +taken in all. As the Athenians had used them as a magazine, there was a large +stock of goods and corn of the merchants inside, and also a large stock +belonging to the captains; the masts and other furniture of forty galleys being +taken, besides three galleys which had been drawn up on shore. Indeed the first +and chiefest cause of the ruin of the Athenian army was the capture of +Plemmyrium; even the entrance of the harbour being now no longer safe for +carrying in provisions, as the Syracusan vessels were stationed there to +prevent it, and nothing could be brought in without fighting; besides the +general impression of dismay and discouragement produced upon the army. +</p> + +<p> +After this the Syracusans sent out twelve ships under the command of +Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of these went to Peloponnese with ambassadors to +describe the hopeful state of their affairs, and to incite the Peloponnesians +to prosecute the war there even more actively than they were now doing, while +the eleven others sailed to Italy, hearing that vessels laden with stores were +on their way to the Athenians. After falling in with and destroying most of the +vessels in question, and burning in the Caulonian territory a quantity of +timber for shipbuilding, which had been got ready for the Athenians, the +Syracusan squadron went to Locri, and one of the merchantmen from Peloponnese +coming in, while they were at anchor there, carrying Thespian heavy infantry, +took these on board and sailed alongshore towards home. The Athenians were on +the look-out for them with twenty ships at Megara, but were only able to take +one vessel with its crew; the rest getting clear off to Syracuse. There was +also some skirmishing in the harbour about the piles which the Syracusans had +driven in the sea in front of the old docks, to allow their ships to lie at +anchor inside, without being hurt by the Athenians sailing up and running them +down. The Athenians brought up to them a ship of ten thousand talents burden +furnished with wooden turrets and screens, and fastened ropes round the piles +from their boats, wrenched them up and broke them, or dived down and sawed them +in two. Meanwhile the Syracusans plied them with missiles from the docks, to +which they replied from their large vessel; until at last most of the piles +were removed by the Athenians. But the most awkward part of the stockade was +the part out of sight: some of the piles which had been driven in did not +appear above water, so that it was dangerous to sail up, for fear of running +the ships upon them, just as upon a reef, through not seeing them. However +divers went down and sawed off even these for reward; although the Syracusans +drove in others. Indeed there was no end to the contrivances to which they +resorted against each other, as might be expected between two hostile armies +confronting each other at such a short distance: and skirmishes and all kinds +of other attempts were of constant occurrence. Meanwhile the Syracusans sent +embassies to the cities, composed of Corinthians, Ambraciots, and +Lacedaemonians, to tell them of the capture of Plemmyrium, and that their +defeat in the sea-fight was due less to the strength of the enemy than to their +own disorder; and generally, to let them know that they were full of hope, and +to desire them to come to their help with ships and troops, as the Athenians +were expected with a fresh army, and if the one already there could be +destroyed before the other arrived, the war would be at an end. +</p> + +<p> +While the contending parties in Sicily were thus engaged, Demosthenes, having +now got together the armament with which he was to go to the island, put out +from Aegina, and making sail for Peloponnese, joined Charicles and the thirty +ships of the Athenians. Taking on board the heavy infantry from Argos they +sailed to Laconia, and, after first plundering part of Epidaurus Limera, landed +on the coast of Laconia, opposite Cythera, where the temple of Apollo stands, +and, laying waste part of the country, fortified a sort of isthmus, to which +the Helots of the Lacedaemonians might desert, and from whence plundering +incursions might be made as from Pylos. Demosthenes helped to occupy this +place, and then immediately sailed on to Corcyra to take up some of the allies +in that island, and so to proceed without delay to Sicily; while Charicles +waited until he had completed the fortification of the place and, leaving a +garrison there, returned home subsequently with his thirty ships and the +Argives also. +</p> + +<p> +This same summer arrived at Athens thirteen hundred targeteers, Thracian +swordsmen of the tribe of the Dii, who were to have sailed to Sicily with +Demosthenes. Since they had come too late, the Athenians determined to send +them back to Thrace, whence they had come; to keep them for the Decelean war +appearing too expensive, as the pay of each man was a drachma a day. Indeed +since Decelea had been first fortified by the whole Peloponnesian army during +this summer, and then occupied for the annoyance of the country by the +garrisons from the cities relieving each other at stated intervals, it had been +doing great mischief to the Athenians; in fact this occupation, by the +destruction of property and loss of men which resulted from it, was one of the +principal causes of their ruin. Previously the invasions were short, and did +not prevent their enjoying their land during the rest of the time: the enemy +was now permanently fixed in Attica; at one time it was an attack in force, at +another it was the regular garrison overrunning the country and making forays +for its subsistence, and the Lacedaemonian king, Agis, was in the field and +diligently prosecuting the war; great mischief was therefore done to the +Athenians. They were deprived of their whole country: more than twenty thousand +slaves had deserted, a great part of them artisans, and all their sheep and +beasts of burden were lost; and as the cavalry rode out daily upon excursions +to Decelea and to guard the country, their horses were either lamed by being +constantly worked upon rocky ground, or wounded by the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +Besides, the transport of provisions from Euboea, which had before been carried +on so much more quickly overland by Decelea from Oropus, was now effected at +great cost by sea round Sunium; everything the city required had to be imported +from abroad, and instead of a city it became a fortress. Summer and winter the +Athenians were worn out by having to keep guard on the fortifications, during +the day by turns, by night all together, the cavalry excepted, at the different +military posts or upon the wall. But what most oppressed them was that they had +two wars at once, and had thus reached a pitch of frenzy which no one would +have believed possible if he had heard of it before it had come to pass. For +could any one have imagined that even when besieged by the Peloponnesians +entrenched in Attica, they would still, instead of withdrawing from Sicily, +stay on there besieging in like manner Syracuse, a town (taken as a town) in no +way inferior to Athens, or would so thoroughly upset the Hellenic estimate of +their strength and audacity, as to give the spectacle of a people which, at the +beginning of the war, some thought might hold out one year, some two, none more +than three, if the Peloponnesians invaded their country, now seventeen years +after the first invasion, after having already suffered from all the evils of +war, going to Sicily and undertaking a new war nothing inferior to that which +they already had with the Peloponnesians? These causes, the great losses from +Decelea, and the other heavy charges that fell upon them, produced their +financial embarrassment; and it was at this time that they imposed upon their +subjects, instead of the tribute, the tax of a twentieth upon all imports and +exports by sea, which they thought would bring them in more money; their +expenditure being now not the same as at first, but having grown with the war +while their revenues decayed. +</p> + +<p> +Accordingly, not wishing to incur expense in their present want of money, they +sent back at once the Thracians who came too late for Demosthenes, under the +conduct of Diitrephes, who was instructed, as they were to pass through the +Euripus, to make use of them if possible in the voyage alongshore to injure the +enemy. Diitrephes first landed them at Tanagra and hastily snatched some booty; +he then sailed across the Euripus in the evening from Chalcis in Euboea and +disembarking in Boeotia led them against Mycalessus. The night he passed +unobserved near the temple of Hermes, not quite two miles from Mycalessus, and +at daybreak assaulted and took the town, which is not a large one; the +inhabitants being off their guard and not expecting that any one would ever +come up so far from the sea to molest them, the wall too being weak, and in +some places having tumbled down, while in others it had not been built to any +height, and the gates also being left open through their feeling of security. +The Thracians bursting into Mycalessus sacked the houses and temples, and +butchered the inhabitants, sparing neither youth nor age, but killing all they +fell in with, one after the other, children and women, and even beasts of +burden, and whatever other living creatures they saw; the Thracian race, like +the bloodiest of the barbarians, being even more so when it has nothing to +fear. Everywhere confusion reigned and death in all its shapes; and in +particular they attacked a boys’ school, the largest that there was in +the place, into which the children had just gone, and massacred them all. In +short, the disaster falling upon the whole town was unsurpassed in magnitude, +and unapproached by any in suddenness and in horror. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Thebans heard of it and marched to the rescue, and overtaking the +Thracians before they had gone far, recovered the plunder and drove them in +panic to the Euripus and the sea, where the vessels which brought them were +lying. The greatest slaughter took place while they were embarking, as they did +not know how to swim, and those in the vessels on seeing what was going on on +on shore moored them out of bowshot: in the rest of the retreat the Thracians +made a very respectable defence against the Theban horse, by which they were +first attacked, dashing out and closing their ranks according to the tactics of +their country, and lost only a few men in that part of the affair. A good +number who were after plunder were actually caught in the town and put to +death. Altogether the Thracians had two hundred and fifty killed out of +thirteen hundred, the Thebans and the rest who came to the rescue about twenty, +troopers and heavy infantry, with Scirphondas, one of the Boeotarchs. The +Mycalessians lost a large proportion of their population. +</p> + +<p> +While Mycalessus thus experienced a calamity for its extent as lamentable as +any that happened in the war, Demosthenes, whom we left sailing to Corcyra, +after the building of the fort in Laconia, found a merchantman lying at Phea in +Elis, in which the Corinthian heavy infantry were to cross to Sicily. The ship +he destroyed, but the men escaped, and subsequently got another in which they +pursued their voyage. After this, arriving at Zacynthus and Cephallenia, he +took a body of heavy infantry on board, and sending for some of the Messenians +from Naupactus, crossed over to the opposite coast of Acarnania, to Alyzia, and +to Anactorium which was held by the Athenians. While he was in these parts he +was met by Eurymedon returning from Sicily, where he had been sent, as has been +mentioned, during the winter, with the money for the army, who told him the +news, and also that he had heard, while at sea, that the Syracusans had taken +Plemmyrium. Here, also, Conon came to them, the commander at Naupactus, with +news that the twenty-five Corinthian ships stationed opposite to him, far from +giving over the war, were meditating an engagement; and he therefore begged +them to send him some ships, as his own eighteen were not a match for the +enemy’s twenty-five. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, accordingly, sent ten of +their best sailers with Conon to reinforce the squadron at Naupactus, and +meanwhile prepared for the muster of their forces; Eurymedon, who was now the +colleague of Demosthenes, and had turned back in consequence of his +appointment, sailing to Corcyra to tell them to man fifteen ships and to enlist +heavy infantry; while Demosthenes raised slingers and darters from the parts +about Acarnania. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the envoys, already mentioned, who had gone from Syracuse to the +cities after the capture of Plemmyrium, had succeeded in their mission, and +were about to bring the army that they had collected, when Nicias got scent of +it, and sent to the Centoripae and Alicyaeans and other of the friendly Sicels, +who held the passes, not to let the enemy through, but to combine to prevent +their passing, there being no other way by which they could even attempt it, as +the Agrigentines would not give them a passage through their country. Agreeably +to this request the Sicels laid a triple ambuscade for the Siceliots upon their +march, and attacking them suddenly, while off their guard, killed about eight +hundred of them and all the envoys, the Corinthian only excepted, by whom +fifteen hundred who escaped were conducted to Syracuse. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time the Camarinaeans also came to the assistance of Syracuse +with five hundred heavy infantry, three hundred darters, and as many archers, +while the Geloans sent crews for five ships, four hundred darters, and two +hundred horse. Indeed almost the whole of Sicily, except the Agrigentines, who +were neutral, now ceased merely to watch events as it had hitherto done, and +actively joined Syracuse against the Athenians. +</p> + +<p> +While the Syracusans after the Sicel disaster put off any immediate attack upon +the Athenians, Demosthenes and Eurymedon, whose forces from Corcyra and the +continent were now ready, crossed the Ionian Gulf with all their armament to +the Iapygian promontory, and starting from thence touched at the Choerades +Isles lying off Iapygia, where they took on board a hundred and fifty Iapygian +darters of the Messapian tribe, and after renewing an old friendship with Artas +the chief, who had furnished them with the darters, arrived at Metapontium in +Italy. Here they persuaded their allies the Metapontines to send with them +three hundred darters and two galleys, and with this reinforcement coasted on +to Thurii, where they found the party hostile to Athens recently expelled by a +revolution, and accordingly remained there to muster and review the whole army, +to see if any had been left behind, and to prevail upon the Thurians resolutely +to join them in their expedition, and in the circumstances in which they found +themselves to conclude a defensive and offensive alliance with the Athenians. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time the Peloponnesians in the twenty-five ships stationed +opposite to the squadron at Naupactus to protect the passage of the transports +to Sicily had got ready for engaging, and manning some additional vessels, so +as to be numerically little inferior to the Athenians, anchored off Erineus in +Achaia in the Rhypic country. The place off which they lay being in the form of +a crescent, the land forces furnished by the Corinthians and their allies on +the spot came up and ranged themselves upon the projecting headlands on either +side, while the fleet, under the command of Polyanthes, a Corinthian, held the +intervening space and blocked up the entrance. The Athenians under Diphilus now +sailed out against them with thirty-three ships from Naupactus, and the +Corinthians, at first not moving, at length thought they saw their opportunity, +raised the signal, and advanced and engaged the Athenians. After an obstinate +struggle, the Corinthians lost three ships, and without sinking any altogether, +disabled seven of the enemy, which were struck prow to prow and had their +foreships stove in by the Corinthian vessels, whose cheeks had been +strengthened for this very purpose. After an action of this even character, in +which either party could claim the victory (although the Athenians became +masters of the wrecks through the wind driving them out to sea, the Corinthians +not putting out again to meet them), the two combatants parted. No pursuit took +place, and no prisoners were made on either side; the Corinthians and +Peloponnesians who were fighting near the shore escaping with ease, and none of +the Athenian vessels having been sunk. The Athenians now sailed back to +Naupactus, and the Corinthians immediately set up a trophy as victors, because +they had disabled a greater number of the enemy’s ships. Moreover they +held that they had not been worsted, for the very same reason that their +opponent held that he had not been victorious; the Corinthians considering that +they were conquerors, if not decidedly conquered, and the Athenians thinking +themselves vanquished, because not decidedly victorious. However, when the +Peloponnesians sailed off and their land forces had dispersed, the Athenians +also set up a trophy as victors in Achaia, about two miles and a quarter from +Erineus, the Corinthian station. +</p> + +<p> +This was the termination of the action at Naupactus. To return to Demosthenes +and Eurymedon: the Thurians having now got ready to join in the expedition with +seven hundred heavy infantry and three hundred darters, the two generals +ordered the ships to sail along the coast to the Crotonian territory, and +meanwhile held a review of all the land forces upon the river Sybaris, and then +led them through the Thurian country. Arrived at the river Hylias, they here +received a message from the Crotonians, saying that they would not allow the +army to pass through their country; upon which the Athenians descended towards +the shore, and bivouacked near the sea and the mouth of the Hylias, where the +fleet also met them, and the next day embarked and sailed along the coast +touching at all the cities except Locri, until they came to Petra in the +Rhegian territory. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Syracusans hearing of their approach resolved to make a second +attempt with their fleet and their other forces on shore, which they had been +collecting for this very purpose in order to do something before their arrival. +In addition to other improvements suggested by the former sea-fight which they +now adopted in the equipment of their navy, they cut down their prows to a +smaller compass to make them more solid and made their cheeks stouter, and from +these let stays into the vessels’ sides for a length of six cubits within +and without, in the same way as the Corinthians had altered their prows before +engaging the squadron at Naupactus. The Syracusans thought that they would thus +have an advantage over the Athenian vessels, which were not constructed with +equal strength, but were slight in the bows, from their being more used to sail +round and charge the enemy’s side than to meet him prow to prow, and that +the battle being in the great harbour, with a great many ships in not much +room, was also a fact in their favour. Charging prow to prow, they would stave +in the enemy’s bows, by striking with solid and stout beaks against +hollow and weak ones; and secondly, the Athenians for want of room would be +unable to use their favourite manoeuvre of breaking the line or of sailing +round, as the Syracusans would do their best not to let them do the one, and +want of room would prevent their doing the other. This charging prow to prow, +which had hitherto been thought want of skill in a helmsman, would be the +Syracusans’ chief manoeuvre, as being that which they should find most +useful, since the Athenians, if repulsed, would not be able to back water in +any direction except towards the shore, and that only for a little way, and in +the little space in front of their own camp. The rest of the harbour would be +commanded by the Syracusans; and the Athenians, if hard pressed, by crowding +together in a small space and all to the same point, would run foul of one +another and fall into disorder, which was, in fact, the thing that did the +Athenians most harm in all the sea-fights, they not having, like the +Syracusans, the whole harbour to retreat over. As to their sailing round into +the open sea, this would be impossible, with the Syracusans in possession of +the way out and in, especially as Plemmyrium would be hostile to them, and the +mouth of the harbour was not large. +</p> + +<p> +With these contrivances to suit their skill and ability, and now more confident +after the previous sea-fight, the Syracusans attacked by land and sea at once. +The town force Gylippus led out a little the first and brought them up to the +wall of the Athenians, where it looked towards the city, while the force from +the Olympieum, that is to say, the heavy infantry that were there with the +horse and the light troops of the Syracusans, advanced against the wall from +the opposite side; the ships of the Syracusans and allies sailing out +immediately afterwards. The Athenians at first fancied that they were to be +attacked by land only, and it was not without alarm that they saw the fleet +suddenly approaching as well; and while some were forming upon the walls and in +front of them against the advancing enemy, and some marching out in haste +against the numbers of horse and darters coming from the Olympieum and from +outside, others manned the ships or rushed down to the beach to oppose the +enemy, and when the ships were manned put out with seventy-five sail against +about eighty of the Syracusans. +</p> + +<p> +After spending a great part of the day in advancing and retreating and +skirmishing with each other, without either being able to gain any advantage +worth speaking of, except that the Syracusans sank one or two of the Athenian +vessels, they parted, the land force at the same time retiring from the lines. +The next day the Syracusans remained quiet, and gave no signs of what they were +going to do; but Nicias, seeing that the battle had been a drawn one, and +expecting that they would attack again, compelled the captains to refit any of +the ships that had suffered, and moored merchant vessels before the stockade +which they had driven into the sea in front of their ships, to serve instead of +an enclosed harbour, at about two hundred feet from each other, in order that +any ship that was hard pressed might be able to retreat in safety and sail out +again at leisure. These preparations occupied the Athenians all day until +nightfall. +</p> + +<p> +The next day the Syracusans began operations at an earlier hour, but with the +same plan of attack by land and sea. A great part of the day the rivals spent +as before, confronting and skirmishing with each other; until at last Ariston, +son of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, the ablest helmsman in the Syracusan service, +persuaded their naval commanders to send to the officials in the city, and tell +them to move the sale market as quickly as they could down to the sea, and +oblige every one to bring whatever eatables he had and sell them there, thus +enabling the commanders to land the crews and dine at once close to the ships, +and shortly afterwards, the selfsame day, to attack the Athenians again when +they were not expecting it. +</p> + +<p> +In compliance with this advice a messenger was sent and the market got ready, +upon which the Syracusans suddenly backed water and withdrew to the town, and +at once landed and took their dinner upon the spot; while the Athenians, +supposing that they had returned to the town because they felt they were +beaten, disembarked at their leisure and set about getting their dinners and +about their other occupations, under the idea that they done with fighting for +that day. Suddenly the Syracusans had manned their ships and again sailed +against them; and the Athenians, in great confusion and most of them fasting, +got on board, and with great difficulty put out to meet them. For some time +both parties remained on the defensive without engaging, until the Athenians at +last resolved not to let themselves be worn out by waiting where they were, but +to attack without delay, and giving a cheer, went into action. The Syracusans +received them, and charging prow to prow as they had intended, stove in a great +part of the Athenian foreships by the strength of their beaks; the darters on +the decks also did great damage to the Athenians, but still greater damage was +done by the Syracusans who went about in small boats, ran in upon the oars of +the Athenian galleys, and sailed against their sides, and discharged from +thence their darts upon the sailors. +</p> + +<p> +At last, fighting hard in this fashion, the Syracusans gained the victory, and +the Athenians turned and fled between the merchantmen to their own station. The +Syracusan ships pursued them as far as the merchantmen, where they were stopped +by the beams armed with dolphins suspended from those vessels over the passage. +Two of the Syracusan vessels went too near in the excitement of victory and +were destroyed, one of them being taken with its crew. After sinking seven of +the Athenian vessels and disabling many, and taking most of the men prisoners +and killing others, the Syracusans retired and set up trophies for both the +engagements, being now confident of having a decided superiority by sea, and by +no means despairing of equal success by land. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0022" id="link2HCH0022"></a> +CHAPTER XXII </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Nineteenth Year of the War—Arrival of Demosthenes—Defeat of the +Athenians at Epipolae—Folly and Obstinancy of Nicias +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime, while the Syracusans were preparing for a second attack upon +both elements, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the succours from Athens, +consisting of about seventy-three ships, including the foreigners; nearly five +thousand heavy infantry, Athenian and allied; a large number of darters, +Hellenic and barbarian, and slingers and archers and everything else upon a +corresponding scale. The Syracusans and their allies were for the moment not a +little dismayed at the idea that there was to be no term or ending to their +dangers, seeing, in spite of the fortification of Decelea, a new army arrive +nearly equal to the former, and the power of Athens proving so great in every +quarter. On the other hand, the first Athenian armament regained a certain +confidence in the midst of its misfortunes. Demosthenes, seeing how matters +stood, felt that he could not drag on and fare as Nicias had done, who by +wintering in Catana instead of at once attacking Syracuse had allowed the +terror of his first arrival to evaporate in contempt, and had given time to +Gylippus to arrive with a force from Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would +never have sent for if he had attacked immediately; for they fancied that they +were a match for him by themselves, and would not have discovered their +inferiority until they were already invested, and even if they then sent for +succours, they would no longer have been equally able to profit by their +arrival. Recollecting this, and well aware that it was now on the first day +after his arrival that he like Nicias was most formidable to the enemy, +Demosthenes determined to lose no time in drawing the utmost profit from the +consternation at the moment inspired by his army; and seeing that the +counterwall of the Syracusans, which hindered the Athenians from investing +them, was a single one, and that he who should become master of the way up to +Epipolae, and afterwards of the camp there, would find no difficulty in taking +it, as no one would even wait for his attack, made all haste to attempt the +enterprise. This he took to be the shortest way of ending the war, as he would +either succeed and take Syracuse, or would lead back the armament instead of +frittering away the lives of the Athenians engaged in the expedition and the +resources of the country at large. +</p> + +<p> +First therefore the Athenians went out and laid waste the lands of the +Syracusans about the Anapus and carried all before them as at first by land and +by sea, the Syracusans not offering to oppose them upon either element, unless +it were with their cavalry and darters from the Olympieum. Next Demosthenes +resolved to attempt the counterwall first by means of engines. As however the +engines that he brought up were burnt by the enemy fighting from the wall, and +the rest of the forces repulsed after attacking at many different points, he +determined to delay no longer, and having obtained the consent of Nicias and +his fellow commanders, proceeded to put in execution his plan of attacking +Epipolae. As by day it seemed impossible to approach and get up without being +observed, he ordered provisions for five days, took all the masons and +carpenters, and other things, such as arrows, and everything else that they +could want for the work of fortification if successful, and, after the first +watch, set out with Eurymedon and Menander and the whole army for Epipolae, +Nicias being left behind in the lines. Having come up by the hill of Euryelus +(where the former army had ascended at first) unobserved by the enemy’s +guards, they went up to the fort which the Syracusans had there, and took it, +and put to the sword part of the garrison. The greater number, however, escaped +at once and gave the alarm to the camps, of which there were three upon +Epipolae, defended by outworks, one of the Syracusans, one of the other +Siceliots, and one of the allies; and also to the six hundred Syracusans +forming the original garrison for this part of Epipolae. These at once advanced +against the assailants and, falling in with Demosthenes and the Athenians, were +routed by them after a sharp resistance, the victors immediately pushing on, +eager to achieve the objects of the attack without giving time for their ardour +to cool; meanwhile others from the very beginning were taking the counterwall +of the Syracusans, which was abandoned by its garrison, and pulling down the +battlements. The Syracusans and the allies, and Gylippus with the troops under +his command, advanced to the rescue from the outworks, but engaged in some +consternation (a night attack being a piece of audacity which they had never +expected), and were at first compelled to retreat. But while the Athenians, +flushed with their victory, now advanced with less order, wishing to make their +way as quickly as possible through the whole force of the enemy not yet +engaged, without relaxing their attack or giving them time to rally, the +Boeotians made the first stand against them, attacked them, routed them, and +put them to flight. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians now fell into great disorder and perplexity, so that it was not +easy to get from one side or the other any detailed account of the affair. By +day certainly the combatants have a clearer notion, though even then by no +means of all that takes place, no one knowing much of anything that does not go +on in his own immediate neighbourhood; but in a night engagement (and this was +the only one that occurred between great armies during the war) how could any +one know anything for certain? Although there was a bright moon they saw each +other only as men do by moonlight, that is to say, they could distinguish the +form of the body, but could not tell for certain whether it was a friend or an +enemy. Both had great numbers of heavy infantry moving about in a small space. +Some of the Athenians were already defeated, while others were coming up yet +unconquered for their first attack. A large part also of the rest of their +forces either had only just got up, or were still ascending, so that they did +not know which way to march. Owing to the rout that had taken place all in +front was now in confusion, and the noise made it difficult to distinguish +anything. The victorious Syracusans and allies were cheering each other on with +loud cries, by night the only possible means of communication, and meanwhile +receiving all who came against them; while the Athenians were seeking for one +another, taking all in front of them for enemies, even although they might be +some of their now flying friends; and by constantly asking for the watchword, +which was their only means of recognition, not only caused great confusion +among themselves by asking all at once, but also made it known to the enemy, +whose own they did not so readily discover, as the Syracusans were victorious +and not scattered, and thus less easily mistaken. The result was that if the +Athenians fell in with a party of the enemy that was weaker than they, it +escaped them through knowing their watchword; while if they themselves failed +to answer they were put to the sword. But what hurt them as much, or indeed +more than anything else, was the singing of the paean, from the perplexity +which it caused by being nearly the same on either side; the Argives and +Corcyraeans and any other Dorian peoples in the army, struck terror into the +Athenians whenever they raised their paean, no less than did the enemy. Thus, +after being once thrown into disorder, they ended by coming into collision with +each other in many parts of the field, friends with friends, and citizens with +citizens, and not only terrified one another, but even came to blows and could +only be parted with difficulty. In the pursuit many perished by throwing +themselves down the cliffs, the way down from Epipolae being narrow; and of +those who got down safely into the plain, although many, especially those who +belonged to the first armament, escaped through their better acquaintance with +the locality, some of the newcomers lost their way and wandered over the +country, and were cut off in the morning by the Syracusan cavalry and killed. +</p> + +<p> +The next day the Syracusans set up two trophies, one upon Epipolae where the +ascent had been made, and the other on the spot where the first check was given +by the Boeotians; and the Athenians took back their dead under truce. A great +many of the Athenians and allies were killed, although still more arms were +taken than could be accounted for by the number of the dead, as some of those +who were obliged to leap down from the cliffs without their shields escaped +with their lives and did not perish like the rest. +</p> + +<p> +After this the Syracusans, recovering their old confidence at such an +unexpected stroke of good fortune, dispatched Sicanus with fifteen ships to +Agrigentum where there was a revolution, to induce if possible the city to join +them; while Gylippus again went by land into the rest of Sicily to bring up +reinforcements, being now in hope of taking the Athenian lines by storm, after +the result of the affair on Epipolae. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime the Athenian generals consulted upon the disaster which had +happened, and upon the general weakness of the army. They saw themselves +unsuccessful in their enterprises, and the soldiers disgusted with their stay; +disease being rife among them owing to its being the sickly season of the year, +and to the marshy and unhealthy nature of the spot in which they were encamped; +and the state of their affairs generally being thought desperate. Accordingly, +Demosthenes was of opinion that they ought not to stay any longer; but +agreeably to his original idea in risking the attempt upon Epipolae, now that +this had failed, he gave his vote for going away without further loss of time, +while the sea might yet be crossed, and their late reinforcement might give +them the superiority at all events on that element. He also said that it would +be more profitable for the state to carry on the war against those who were +building fortifications in Attica, than against the Syracusans whom it was no +longer easy to subdue; besides which it was not right to squander large sums of +money to no purpose by going on with the siege. +</p> + +<p> +This was the opinion of Demosthenes. Nicias, without denying the bad state of +their affairs, was unwilling to avow their weakness, or to have it reported to +the enemy that the Athenians in full council were openly voting for retreat; +for in that case they would be much less likely to effect it when they wanted +without discovery. Moreover, his own particular information still gave him +reason to hope that the affairs of the enemy would soon be in a worse state +than their own, if the Athenians persevered in the siege; as they would wear +out the Syracusans by want of money, especially with the more extensive command +of the sea now given them by their present navy. Besides this, there was a +party in Syracuse who wished to betray the city to the Athenians, and kept +sending him messages and telling him not to raise the siege. Accordingly, +knowing this and really waiting because he hesitated between the two courses +and wished to see his way more clearly, in his public speech on this occasion +he refused to lead off the army, saying he was sure the Athenians would never +approve of their returning without a vote of theirs. Those who would vote upon +their conduct, instead of judging the facts as eye-witnesses like themselves +and not from what they might hear from hostile critics, would simply be guided +by the calumnies of the first clever speaker; while many, indeed most, of the +soldiers on the spot, who now so loudly proclaimed the danger of their +position, when they reached Athens would proclaim just as loudly the opposite, +and would say that their generals had been bribed to betray them and return. +For himself, therefore, who knew the Athenian temper, sooner than perish under +a dishonourable charge and by an unjust sentence at the hands of the Athenians, +he would rather take his chance and die, if die he must, a soldier’s +death at the hand of the enemy. Besides, after all, the Syracusans were in a +worse case than themselves. What with paying mercenaries, spending upon +fortified posts, and now for a full year maintaining a large navy, they were +already at a loss and would soon be at a standstill: they had already spent two +thousand talents and incurred heavy debts besides, and could not lose even ever +so small a fraction of their present force through not paying it, without ruin +to their cause; depending as they did more upon mercenaries than upon soldiers +obliged to serve, like their own. He therefore said that they ought to stay and +carry on the siege, and not depart defeated in point of money, in which they +were much superior. +</p> + +<p> +Nicias spoke positively because he had exact information of the financial +distress at Syracuse, and also because of the strength of the Athenian party +there which kept sending him messages not to raise the siege; besides which he +had more confidence than before in his fleet, and felt sure at least of its +success. Demosthenes, however, would not hear for a moment of continuing the +siege, but said that if they could not lead off the army without a decree from +Athens, and if they were obliged to stay on, they ought to remove to Thapsus or +Catana; where their land forces would have a wide extent of country to overrun, +and could live by plundering the enemy, and would thus do them damage; while +the fleet would have the open sea to fight in, that is to say, instead of a +narrow space which was all in the enemy’s favour, a wide sea-room where +their science would be of use, and where they could retreat or advance without +being confined or circumscribed either when they put out or put in. In any case +he was altogether opposed to their staying on where they were, and insisted on +removing at once, as quickly and with as little delay as possible; and in this +judgment Eurymedon agreed. Nicias however still objecting, a certain diffidence +and hesitation came over them, with a suspicion that Nicias might have some +further information to make him so positive. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0023" id="link2HCH0023"></a> +CHAPTER XXIII </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Nineteenth Year of the War—Battles in the Great Harbour—Retreat and +Annihilation of the Athenian Army +</p> + +<p> +While the Athenians lingered on in this way without moving from where they +were, Gylippus and Sicanus now arrived at Syracuse. Sicanus had failed to gain +Agrigentum, the party friendly to the Syracusans having been driven out while +he was still at Gela; but Gylippus was accompanied not only by a large number +of troops raised in Sicily, but by the heavy infantry sent off in the spring +from Peloponnese in the merchantmen, who had arrived at Selinus from Libya. +They had been carried to Libya by a storm, and having obtained two galleys and +pilots from the Cyrenians, on their voyage alongshore had taken sides with the +Euesperitae and had defeated the Libyans who were besieging them, and from +thence coasting on to Neapolis, a Carthaginian mart, and the nearest point to +Sicily, from which it is only two days’ and a night’s voyage, there +crossed over and came to Selinus. Immediately upon their arrival the Syracusans +prepared to attack the Athenians again by land and sea at once. The Athenian +generals seeing a fresh army come to the aid of the enemy, and that their own +circumstances, far from improving, were becoming daily worse, and above all +distressed by the sickness of the soldiers, now began to repent of not having +removed before; and Nicias no longer offering the same opposition, except by +urging that there should be no open voting, they gave orders as secretly as +possible for all to be prepared to sail out from the camp at a given signal. +All was at last ready, and they were on the point of sailing away, when an +eclipse of the moon, which was then at the full, took place. Most of the +Athenians, deeply impressed by this occurrence, now urged the generals to wait; +and Nicias, who was somewhat over-addicted to divination and practices of that +kind, refused from that moment even to take the question of departure into +consideration, until they had waited the thrice nine days prescribed by the +soothsayers. +</p> + +<p> +The besiegers were thus condemned to stay in the country; and the Syracusans, +getting wind of what had happened, became more eager than ever to press the +Athenians, who had now themselves acknowledged that they were no longer their +superiors either by sea or by land, as otherwise they would never have planned +to sail away. Besides which the Syracusans did not wish them to settle in any +other part of Sicily, where they would be more difficult to deal with, but +desired to force them to fight at sea as quickly as possible, in a position +favourable to themselves. Accordingly they manned their ships and practised for +as many days as they thought sufficient. When the moment arrived they assaulted +on the first day the Athenian lines, and upon a small force of heavy infantry +and horse sallying out against them by certain gates, cut off some of the +former and routed and pursued them to the lines, where, as the entrance was +narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses and some few of the heavy infantry. +</p> + +<p> +Drawing off their troops for this day, on the next the Syracusans went out with +a fleet of seventy-six sail, and at the same time advanced with their land +forces against the lines. The Athenians put out to meet them with eighty-six +ships, came to close quarters, and engaged. The Syracusans and their allies +first defeated the Athenian centre, and then caught Eurymedon, the commander of +the right wing, who was sailing out from the line more towards the land in +order to surround the enemy, in the hollow and recess of the harbour, and +killed him and destroyed the ships accompanying him; after which they now +chased the whole Athenian fleet before them and drove them ashore. +</p> + +<p> +Gylippus seeing the enemy’s fleet defeated and carried ashore beyond +their stockades and camp, ran down to the breakwater with some of his troops, +in order to cut off the men as they landed and make it easier for the +Syracusans to tow off the vessels by the shore being friendly ground. The +Tyrrhenians who guarded this point for the Athenians, seeing them come on in +disorder, advanced out against them and attacked and routed their van, hurling +it into the marsh of Lysimeleia. Afterwards the Syracusan and allied troops +arrived in greater numbers, and the Athenians fearing for their ships came up +also to the rescue and engaged them, and defeated and pursued them to some +distance and killed a few of their heavy infantry. They succeeded in rescuing +most of their ships and brought them down by their camp; eighteen however were +taken by the Syracusans and their allies, and all the men killed. The rest the +enemy tried to burn by means of an old merchantman which they filled with +faggots and pine-wood, set on fire, and let drift down the wind which blew full +on the Athenians. The Athenians, however, alarmed for their ships, contrived +means for stopping it and putting it out, and checking the flames and the +nearer approach of the merchantman, thus escaped the danger. +</p> + +<p> +After this the Syracusans set up a trophy for the sea-fight and for the heavy +infantry whom they had cut off up at the lines, where they took the horses; and +the Athenians for the rout of the foot driven by the Tyrrhenians into the +marsh, and for their own victory with the rest of the army. +</p> + +<p> +The Syracusans had now gained a decisive victory at sea, where until now they +had feared the reinforcement brought by Demosthenes, and deep, in consequence, +was the despondency of the Athenians, and great their disappointment, and +greater still their regret for having come on the expedition. These were the +only cities that they had yet encountered, similar to their own in character, +under democracies like themselves, which had ships and horses, and were of +considerable magnitude. They had been unable to divide and bring them over by +holding out the prospect of changes in their governments, or to crush them by +their great superiority in force, but had failed in most of their attempts, and +being already in perplexity, had now been defeated at sea, where defeat could +never have been expected, and were thus plunged deeper in embarrassment than +ever. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Syracusans immediately began to sail freely along the harbour, +and determined to close up its mouth, so that the Athenians might not be able +to steal out in future, even if they wished. Indeed, the Syracusans no longer +thought only of saving themselves, but also how to hinder the escape of the +enemy; thinking, and thinking rightly, that they were now much the stronger, +and that to conquer the Athenians and their allies by land and sea would win +them great glory in Hellas. The rest of the Hellenes would thus immediately be +either freed or released from apprehension, as the remaining forces of Athens +would be henceforth unable to sustain the war that would be waged against her; +while they, the Syracusans, would be regarded as the authors of this +deliverance, and would be held in high admiration, not only with all men now +living but also with posterity. Nor were these the only considerations that +gave dignity to the struggle. They would thus conquer not only the Athenians +but also their numerous allies, and conquer not alone, but with their +companions in arms, commanding side by side with the Corinthians and +Lacedaemonians, having offered their city to stand in the van of danger, and +having been in a great measure the pioneers of naval success. +</p> + +<p> +Indeed, there were never so many peoples assembled before a single city, if we +except the grand total gathered together in this war under Athens and +Lacedaemon. The following were the states on either side who came to Syracuse +to fight for or against Sicily, to help to conquer or defend the island. Right +or community of blood was not the bond of union between them, so much as +interest or compulsion as the case might be. The Athenians themselves being +Ionians went against the Dorians of Syracuse of their own free will; and the +peoples still speaking Attic and using the Athenian laws, the Lemnians, +Imbrians, and Aeginetans, that is to say the then occupants of Aegina, being +their colonists, went with them. To these must be also added the Hestiaeans +dwelling at Hestiaea in Euboea. Of the rest some joined in the expedition as +subjects of the Athenians, others as independent allies, others as mercenaries. +To the number of the subjects paying tribute belonged the Eretrians, +Chalcidians, Styrians, and Carystians from Euboea; the Ceans, Andrians, and +Tenians from the islands; and the Milesians, Samians, and Chians from Ionia. +The Chians, however, joined as independent allies, paying no tribute, but +furnishing ships. Most of these were Ionians and descended from the Athenians, +except the Carystians, who are Dryopes, and although subjects and obliged to +serve, were still Ionians fighting against Dorians. Besides these there were +men of Aeolic race, the Methymnians, subjects who provided ships, not tribute, +and the Tenedians and Aenians who paid tribute. These Aeolians fought against +their Aeolian founders, the Boeotians in the Syracusan army, because they were +obliged, while the Plataeans, the only native Boeotians opposed to Boeotians, +did so upon a just quarrel. Of the Rhodians and Cytherians, both Dorians, the +latter, Lacedaemonian colonists, fought in the Athenian ranks against their +Lacedaemonian countrymen with Gylippus; while the Rhodians, Argives by race, +were compelled to bear arms against the Dorian Syracusans and their own +colonists, the Geloans, serving with the Syracusans. Of the islanders round +Peloponnese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians accompanied the Athenians as +independent allies, although their insular position really left them little +choice in the matter, owing to the maritime supremacy of Athens, while the +Corcyraeans, who were not only Dorians but Corinthians, were openly serving +against Corinthians and Syracusans, although colonists of the former and of the +same race as the latter, under colour of compulsion, but really out of free +will through hatred of Corinth. The Messenians, as they are now called in +Naupactus and from Pylos, then held by the Athenians, were taken with them to +the war. There were also a few Megarian exiles, whose fate it was to be now +fighting against the Megarian Selinuntines. +</p> + +<p> +The engagement of the rest was more of a voluntary nature. It was less the +league than hatred of the Lacedaemonians and the immediate private advantage of +each individual that persuaded the Dorian Argives to join the Ionian Athenians +in a war against Dorians; while the Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries, +accustomed to go against the enemy pointed out to them at the moment, were led +by interest to regard the Arcadians serving with the Corinthians as just as +much their enemies as any others. The Cretans and Aetolians also served for +hire, and the Cretans who had joined the Rhodians in founding Gela, thus came +to consent to fight for pay against, instead of for, their colonists. There +were also some Acarnanians paid to serve, although they came chiefly for love +of Demosthenes and out of goodwill to the Athenians whose allies they were. +These all lived on the Hellenic side of the Ionian Gulf. Of the Italiots, there +were the Thurians and Metapontines, dragged into the quarrel by the stern +necessities of a time of revolution; of the Siceliots, the Naxians and the +Catanians; and of the barbarians, the Egestaeans, who called in the Athenians, +most of the Sicels, and outside Sicily some Tyrrhenian enemies of Syracuse and +Iapygian mercenaries. +</p> + +<p> +Such were the peoples serving with the Athenians. Against these the Syracusans +had the Camarinaeans their neighbours, the Geloans who live next to them; then +passing over the neutral Agrigentines, the Selinuntines settled on the farther +side of the island. These inhabit the part of Sicily looking towards Libya; the +Himeraeans came from the side towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, being the only +Hellenic inhabitants in that quarter, and the only people that came from thence +to the aid of the Syracusans. Of the Hellenes in Sicily the above peoples +joined in the war, all Dorians and independent, and of the barbarians the +Sicels only, that is to say, such as did not go over to the Athenians. Of the +Hellenes outside Sicily there were the Lacedaemonians, who provided a Spartan +to take the command, and a force of Neodamodes or Freedmen, and of Helots; the +Corinthians, who alone joined with naval and land forces, with their Leucadian +and Ambraciot kinsmen; some mercenaries sent by Corinth from Arcadia; some +Sicyonians forced to serve, and from outside Peloponnese the Boeotians. In +comparison, however, with these foreign auxiliaries, the great Siceliot cities +furnished more in every department—numbers of heavy infantry, ships, and +horses, and an immense multitude besides having been brought together; while in +comparison, again, one may say, with all the rest put together, more was +provided by the Syracusans themselves, both from the greatness of the city and +from the fact that they were in the greatest danger. +</p> + +<p> +Such were the auxiliaries brought together on either side, all of which had by +this time joined, neither party experiencing any subsequent accession. It was +no wonder, therefore, if the Syracusans and their allies thought that it would +win them great glory if they could follow up their recent victory in the +sea-fight by the capture of the whole Athenian armada, without letting it +escape either by sea or by land. They began at once to close up the Great +Harbour by means of boats, merchant vessels, and galleys moored broadside +across its mouth, which is nearly a mile wide, and made all their other +arrangements for the event of the Athenians again venturing to fight at sea. +There was, in fact, nothing little either in their plans or their ideas. +</p> + +<p> +The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbour and informed of their further +designs, called a council of war. The generals and colonels assembled and +discussed the difficulties of the situation; the point which pressed most being +that they no longer had provisions for immediate use (having sent on to Catana +to tell them not to send any, in the belief that they were going away), and +that they would not have any in future unless they could command the sea. They +therefore determined to evacuate their upper lines, to enclose with a cross +wall and garrison a small space close to the ships, only just sufficient to +hold their stores and sick, and manning all the ships, seaworthy or not, with +every man that could be spared from the rest of their land forces, to fight it +out at sea, and, if victorious, to go to Catana, if not, to burn their vessels, +form in close order, and retreat by land for the nearest friendly place they +could reach, Hellenic or barbarian. This was no sooner settled than carried +into effect; they descended gradually from the upper lines and manned all their +vessels, compelling all to go on board who were of age to be in any way of use. +They thus succeeded in manning about one hundred and ten ships in all, on board +of which they embarked a number of archers and darters taken from the +Acarnanians and from the other foreigners, making all other provisions allowed +by the nature of their plan and by the necessities which imposed it. All was +now nearly ready, and Nicias, seeing the soldiery disheartened by their +unprecedented and decided defeat at sea, and by reason of the scarcity of +provisions eager to fight it out as soon as possible, called them all together, +and first addressed them, speaking as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“Soldiers of the Athenians and of the allies, we have all an equal +interest in the coming struggle, in which life and country are at stake for us +quite as much as they can be for the enemy; since if our fleet wins the day, +each can see his native city again, wherever that city may be. You must not +lose heart, or be like men without any experience, who fail in a first essay +and ever afterwards fearfully forebode a future as disastrous. But let the +Athenians among you who have already had experience of many wars, and the +allies who have joined us in so many expeditions, remember the surprises of +war, and with the hope that fortune will not be always against us, prepare to +fight again in a manner worthy of the number which you see yourselves to be. +</p> + +<p> +“Now, whatever we thought would be of service against the crush of +vessels in such a narrow harbour, and against the force upon the decks of the +enemy, from which we suffered before, has all been considered with the +helmsmen, and, as far as our means allowed, provided. A number of archers and +darters will go on board, and a multitude that we should not have employed in +an action in the open sea, where our science would be crippled by the weight of +the vessels; but in the present land-fight that we are forced to make from +shipboard all this will be useful. We have also discovered the changes in +construction that we must make to meet theirs; and against the thickness of +their cheeks, which did us the greatest mischief, we have provided +grappling-irons, which will prevent an assailant backing water after charging, +if the soldiers on deck here do their duty; since we are absolutely compelled +to fight a land battle from the fleet, and it seems to be our interest neither +to back water ourselves, nor to let the enemy do so, especially as the shore, +except so much of it as may be held by our troops, is hostile ground. +</p> + +<p> +“You must remember this and fight on as long as you can, and must not let +yourselves be driven ashore, but once alongside must make up your minds not to +part company until you have swept the heavy infantry from the enemy’s +deck. I say this more for the heavy infantry than for the seamen, as it is more +the business of the men on deck; and our land forces are even now on the whole +the strongest. The sailors I advise, and at the same time implore, not to be +too much daunted by their misfortunes, now that we have our decks better armed +and greater number of vessels. Bear in mind how well worth preserving is the +pleasure felt by those of you who through your knowledge of our language and +imitation of our manners were always considered Athenians, even though not so +in reality, and as such were honoured throughout Hellas, and had your full +share of the advantages of our empire, and more than your share in the respect +of our subjects and in protection from ill treatment. You, therefore, with whom +alone we freely share our empire, we now justly require not to betray that +empire in its extremity, and in scorn of Corinthians, whom you have often +conquered, and of Siceliots, none of whom so much as presumed to stand against +us when our navy was in its prime, we ask you to repel them, and to show that +even in sickness and disaster your skill is more than a match for the fortune +and vigour of any other. +</p> + +<p> +“For the Athenians among you I add once more this reflection: You left +behind you no more such ships in your docks as these, no more heavy infantry in +their flower; if you do aught but conquer, our enemies here will immediately +sail thither, and those that are left of us at Athens will become unable to +repel their home assailants, reinforced by these new allies. Here you will fall +at once into the hands of the Syracusans—I need not remind you of the +intentions with which you attacked them—and your countrymen at home will +fall into those of the Lacedaemonians. Since the fate of both thus hangs upon +this single battle, now, if ever, stand firm, and remember, each and all, that +you who are now going on board are the army and navy of the Athenians, and all +that is left of the state and the great name of Athens, in whose defence if any +man has any advantage in skill or courage, now is the time for him to show it, +and thus serve himself and save all.” +</p> + +<p> +After this address Nicias at once gave orders to man the ships. Meanwhile +Gylippus and the Syracusans could perceive by the preparations which they saw +going on that the Athenians meant to fight at sea. They had also notice of the +grappling-irons, against which they specially provided by stretching hides over +the prows and much of the upper part of their vessels, in order that the irons +when thrown might slip off without taking hold. All being now ready, the +generals and Gylippus addressed them in the following terms: +</p> + +<p> +“Syracusans and allies, the glorious character of our past achievements +and the no less glorious results at issue in the coming battle are, we think, +understood by most of you, or you would never have thrown yourselves with such +ardour into the struggle; and if there be any one not as fully aware of the +facts as he ought to be, we will declare them to him. The Athenians came to +this country first to effect the conquest of Sicily, and after that, if +successful, of Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas, possessing already the +greatest empire yet known, of present or former times, among the Hellenes. Here +for the first time they found in you men who faced their navy which made them +masters everywhere; you have already defeated them in the previous sea-fights, +and will in all likelihood defeat them again now. When men are once checked in +what they consider their special excellence, their whole opinion of themselves +suffers more than if they had not at first believed in their superiority, the +unexpected shock to their pride causing them to give way more than their real +strength warrants; and this is probably now the case with the Athenians. +</p> + +<p> +“With us it is different. The original estimate of ourselves which gave +us courage in the days of our unskilfulness has been strengthened, while the +conviction superadded to it that we must be the best seamen of the time, if we +have conquered the best, has given a double measure of hope to every man among +us; and, for the most part, where there is the greatest hope, there is also the +greatest ardour for action. The means to combat us which they have tried to +find in copying our armament are familiar to our warfare, and will be met by +proper provisions; while they will never be able to have a number of heavy +infantry on their decks, contrary to their custom, and a number of darters +(born landsmen, one may say, Acarnanians and others, embarked afloat, who will +not know how to discharge their weapons when they have to keep still), without +hampering their vessels and falling all into confusion among themselves through +fighting not according to their own tactics. For they will gain nothing by the +number of their ships—I say this to those of you who may be alarmed by +having to fight against odds—as a quantity of ships in a confined space +will only be slower in executing the movements required, and most exposed to +injury from our means of offence. Indeed, if you would know the plain truth, as +we are credibly informed, the excess of their sufferings and the necessities of +their present distress have made them desperate; they have no confidence in +their force, but wish to try their fortune in the only way they can, and either +to force their passage and sail out, or after this to retreat by land, it being +impossible for them to be worse off than they are. +</p> + +<p> +“The fortune of our greatest enemies having thus betrayed itself, and +their disorder being what I have described, let us engage in anger, convinced +that, as between adversaries, nothing is more legitimate than to claim to sate +the whole wrath of one’s soul in punishing the aggressor, and nothing +more sweet, as the proverb has it, than the vengeance upon an enemy, which it +will now be ours to take. That enemies they are and mortal enemies you all +know, since they came here to enslave our country, and if successful had in +reserve for our men all that is most dreadful, and for our children and wives +all that is most dishonourable, and for the whole city the name which conveys +the greatest reproach. None should therefore relent or think it gain if they go +away without further danger to us. This they will do just the same, even if +they get the victory; while if we succeed, as we may expect, in chastising +them, and in handing down to all Sicily her ancient freedom strengthened and +confirmed, we shall have achieved no mean triumph. And the rarest dangers are +those in which failure brings little loss and success the greatest +advantage.” +</p> + +<p> +After the above address to the soldiers on their side, the Syracusan generals +and Gylippus now perceived that the Athenians were manning their ships, and +immediately proceeded to man their own also. Meanwhile Nicias, appalled by the +position of affairs, realizing the greatness and the nearness of the danger now +that they were on the point of putting out from shore, and thinking, as men are +apt to think in great crises, that when all has been done they have still +something left to do, and when all has been said that they have not yet said +enough, again called on the captains one by one, addressing each by his +father’s name and by his own, and by that of his tribe, and adjured them +not to belie their own personal renown, or to obscure the hereditary virtues +for which their ancestors were illustrious: he reminded them of their country, +the freest of the free, and of the unfettered discretion allowed in it to all +to live as they pleased; and added other arguments such as men would use at +such a crisis, and which, with little alteration, are made to serve on all +occasions alike—appeals to wives, children, and national +gods—without caring whether they are thought commonplace, but loudly +invoking them in the belief that they will be of use in the consternation of +the moment. Having thus admonished them, not, he felt, as he would, but as he +could, Nicias withdrew and led the troops to the sea, and ranged them in as +long a line as he was able, in order to aid as far as possible in sustaining +the courage of the men afloat; while Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who +took the command on board, put out from their own camp and sailed straight to +the barrier across the mouth of the harbour and to the passage left open, to +try to force their way out. +</p> + +<p> +The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with about the same number +of ships as before, a part of which kept guard at the outlet, and the remainder +all round the rest of the harbour, in order to attack the Athenians on all +sides at once; while the land forces held themselves in readiness at the points +at which the vessels might put into the shore. The Syracusan fleet was +commanded by Sicanus and Agatharchus, who had each a wing of the whole force, +with Pythen and the Corinthians in the centre. When the rest of the Athenians +came up to the barrier, with the first shock of their charge they overpowered +the ships stationed there, and tried to undo the fastenings; after this, as the +Syracusans and allies bore down upon them from all quarters, the action spread +from the barrier over the whole harbour, and was more obstinately disputed than +any of the preceding ones. On either side the rowers showed great zeal in +bringing up their vessels at the boatswains’ orders, and the helmsmen +great skill in manoeuvring, and great emulation one with another; while the +ships once alongside, the soldiers on board did their best not to let the +service on deck be outdone by the others; in short, every man strove to prove +himself the first in his particular department. And as many ships were engaged +in a small compass (for these were the largest fleets fighting in the narrowest +space ever known, being together little short of two hundred), the regular +attacks with the beak were few, there being no opportunity of backing water or +of breaking the line; while the collisions caused by one ship chancing to run +foul of another, either in flying from or attacking a third, were more +frequent. So long as a vessel was coming up to the charge the men on the decks +rained darts and arrows and stones upon her; but once alongside, the heavy +infantry tried to board each other’s vessel, fighting hand to hand. In +many quarters it happened, by reason of the narrow room, that a vessel was +charging an enemy on one side and being charged herself on another, and that +two or sometimes more ships had perforce got entangled round one, obliging the +helmsmen to attend to defence here, offence there, not to one thing at once, +but to many on all sides; while the huge din caused by the number of ships +crashing together not only spread terror, but made the orders of the boatswains +inaudible. The boatswains on either side in the discharge of their duty and in +the heat of the conflict shouted incessantly orders and appeals to their men; +the Athenians they urged to force the passage out, and now if ever to show +their mettle and lay hold of a safe return to their country; to the Syracusans +and their allies they cried that it would be glorious to prevent the escape of +the enemy, and, conquering, to exalt the countries that were theirs. The +generals, moreover, on either side, if they saw any in any part of the battle +backing ashore without being forced to do so, called out to the captain by name +and asked him—the Athenians, whether they were retreating because they +thought the thrice hostile shore more their own than that sea which had cost +them so much labour to win; the Syracusans, whether they were flying from the +flying Athenians, whom they well knew to be eager to escape in whatever way +they could. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the two armies on shore, while victory hung in the balance, were a +prey to the most agonizing and conflicting emotions; the natives thirsting for +more glory than they had already won, while the invaders feared to find +themselves in even worse plight than before. The all of the Athenians being set +upon their fleet, their fear for the event was like nothing they had ever felt; +while their view of the struggle was necessarily as chequered as the battle +itself. Close to the scene of action and not all looking at the same point at +once, some saw their friends victorious and took courage and fell to calling +upon heaven not to deprive them of salvation, while others who had their eyes +turned upon the losers, wailed and cried aloud, and, although spectators, were +more overcome than the actual combatants. Others, again, were gazing at some +spot where the battle was evenly disputed; as the strife was protracted without +decision, their swaying bodies reflected the agitation of their minds, and they +suffered the worst agony of all, ever just within reach of safety or just on +the point of destruction. In short, in that one Athenian army as long as the +sea-fight remained doubtful there was every sound to be heard at once, shrieks, +cheers, “We win,” “We lose,” and all the other manifold +exclamations that a great host would necessarily utter in great peril; and with +the men in the fleet it was nearly the same; until at last the Syracusans and +their allies, after the battle had lasted a long while, put the Athenians to +flight, and with much shouting and cheering chased them in open rout to the +shore. The naval force, one one way, one another, as many as were not taken +afloat now ran ashore and rushed from on board their ships to their camp; while +the army, no more divided, but carried away by one impulse, all with shrieks +and groans deplored the event, and ran down, some to help the ships, others to +guard what was left of their wall, while the remaining and most numerous part +already began to consider how they should save themselves. Indeed, the panic of +the present moment had never been surpassed. They now suffered very nearly what +they had inflicted at Pylos; as then the Lacedaemonians with the loss of their +fleet lost also the men who had crossed over to the island, so now the +Athenians had no hope of escaping by land, without the help of some +extraordinary accident. +</p> + +<p> +The sea-fight having been a severe one, and many ships and lives having been +lost on both sides, the victorious Syracusans and their allies now picked up +their wrecks and dead, and sailed off to the city and set up a trophy. The +Athenians, overwhelmed by their misfortune, never even thought of asking leave +to take up their dead or wrecks, but wished to retreat that very night. +Demosthenes, however, went to Nicias and gave it as his opinion that they +should man the ships they had left and make another effort to force their +passage out next morning; saying that they had still left more ships fit for +service than the enemy, the Athenians having about sixty remaining as against +less than fifty of their opponents. Nicias was quite of his mind; but when they +wished to man the vessels, the sailors refused to go on board, being so utterly +overcome by their defeat as no longer to believe in the possibility of success. +</p> + +<p> +Accordingly they all now made up their minds to retreat by land. Meanwhile the +Syracusan Hermocrates—suspecting their intention, and impressed by the +danger of allowing a force of that magnitude to retire by land, establish +itself in some other part of Sicily, and from thence renew the war—went +and stated his views to the authorities, and pointed out to them that they +ought not to let the enemy get away by night, but that all the Syracusans and +their allies should at once march out and block up the roads and seize and +guard the passes. The authorities were entirely of his opinion, and thought +that it ought to be done, but on the other hand felt sure that the people, who +had given themselves over to rejoicing, and were taking their ease after a +great battle at sea, would not be easily brought to obey; besides, they were +celebrating a festival, having on that day a sacrifice to Heracles, and most of +them in their rapture at the victory had fallen to drinking at the festival, +and would probably consent to anything sooner than to take up their arms and +march out at that moment. For these reasons the thing appeared impracticable to +the magistrates; and Hermocrates, finding himself unable to do anything further +with them, had now recourse to the following stratagem of his own. What he +feared was that the Athenians might quietly get the start of them by passing +the most difficult places during the night; and he therefore sent, as soon as +it was dusk, some friends of his own to the camp with some horsemen who rode up +within earshot and called out to some of the men, as though they were +well-wishers of the Athenians, and told them to tell Nicias (who had in fact +some correspondents who informed him of what went on inside the town) not to +lead off the army by night as the Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to +make his preparations at his leisure and to retreat by day. After saying this +they departed; and their hearers informed the Athenian generals, who put off +going for that night on the strength of this message, not doubting its +sincerity. +</p> + +<p> +Since after all they had not set out at once, they now determined to stay also +the following day to give time to the soldiers to pack up as well as they could +the most useful articles, and, leaving everything else behind, to start only +with what was strictly necessary for their personal subsistence. Meanwhile the +Syracusans and Gylippus marched out and blocked up the roads through the +country by which the Athenians were likely to pass, and kept guard at the fords +of the streams and rivers, posting themselves so as to receive them and stop +the army where they thought best; while their fleet sailed up to the beach and +towed off the ships of the Athenians. Some few were burned by the Athenians +themselves as they had intended; the rest the Syracusans lashed on to their own +at their leisure as they had been thrown up on shore, without any one trying to +stop them, and conveyed to the town. +</p> + +<p> +After this, Nicias and Demosthenes now thinking that enough had been done in +the way of preparation, the removal of the army took place upon the second day +after the sea-fight. It was a lamentable scene, not merely from the single +circumstance that they were retreating after having lost all their ships, their +great hopes gone, and themselves and the state in peril; but also in leaving +the camp there were things most grievous for every eye and heart to +contemplate. The dead lay unburied, and each man as he recognized a friend +among them shuddered with grief and horror; while the living whom they were +leaving behind, wounded or sick, were to the living far more shocking than the +dead, and more to be pitied than those who had perished. These fell to +entreating and bewailing until their friends knew not what to do, begging them +to take them and loudly calling to each individual comrade or relative whom +they could see, hanging upon the necks of their tent-fellows in the act of +departure, and following as far as they could, and, when their bodily strength +failed them, calling again and again upon heaven and shrieking aloud as they +were left behind. So that the whole army being filled with tears and distracted +after this fashion found it not easy to go, even from an enemy’s land, +where they had already suffered evils too great for tears and in the unknown +future before them feared to suffer more. Dejection and self-condemnation were +also rife among them. Indeed they could only be compared to a starved-out town, +and that no small one, escaping; the whole multitude upon the march being not +less than forty thousand men. All carried anything they could which might be of +use, and the heavy infantry and troopers, contrary to their wont, while under +arms carried their own victuals, in some cases for want of servants, in others +through not trusting them; as they had long been deserting and now did so in +greater numbers than ever. Yet even thus they did not carry enough, as there +was no longer food in the camp. Moreover their disgrace generally, and the +universality of their sufferings, however to a certain extent alleviated by +being borne in company, were still felt at the moment a heavy burden, +especially when they contrasted the splendour and glory of their setting out +with the humiliation in which it had ended. For this was by far the greatest +reverse that ever befell an Hellenic army. They had come to enslave others, and +were departing in fear of being enslaved themselves: they had sailed out with +prayer and paeans, and now started to go back with omens directly contrary; +travelling by land instead of by sea, and trusting not in their fleet but in +their heavy infantry. Nevertheless the greatness of the danger still impending +made all this appear tolerable. +</p> + +<p> +Nicias seeing the army dejected and greatly altered, passed along the ranks and +encouraged and comforted them as far as was possible under the circumstances, +raising his voice still higher and higher as he went from one company to +another in his earnestness, and in his anxiety that the benefit of his words +might reach as many as possible: +</p> + +<p> +“Athenians and allies, even in our present position we must still hope +on, since men have ere now been saved from worse straits than this; and you +must not condemn yourselves too severely either because of your disasters or +because of your present unmerited sufferings. I myself who am not superior to +any of you in strength—indeed you see how I am in my sickness—and +who in the gifts of fortune am, I think, whether in private life or otherwise, +the equal of any, am now exposed to the same danger as the meanest among you; +and yet my life has been one of much devotion toward the gods, and of much +justice and without offence toward men. I have, therefore, still a strong hope +for the future, and our misfortunes do not terrify me as much as they might. +Indeed we may hope that they will be lightened: our enemies have had good +fortune enough; and if any of the gods was offended at our expedition, we have +been already amply punished. Others before us have attacked their neighbours +and have done what men will do without suffering more than they could bear; and +we may now justly expect to find the gods more kind, for we have become fitter +objects for their pity than their jealousy. And then look at yourselves, mark +the numbers and efficiency of the heavy infantry marching in your ranks, and do +not give way too much to despondency, but reflect that you are yourselves at +once a city wherever you sit down, and that there is no other in Sicily that +could easily resist your attack, or expel you when once established. The safety +and order of the march is for yourselves to look to; the one thought of each +man being that the spot on which he may be forced to fight must be conquered +and held as his country and stronghold. Meanwhile we shall hasten on our way +night and day alike, as our provisions are scanty; and if we can reach some +friendly place of the Sicels, whom fear of the Syracusans still keeps true to +us, you may forthwith consider yourselves safe. A message has been sent on to +them with directions to meet us with supplies of food. To sum up, be convinced, +soldiers, that you must be brave, as there is no place near for your cowardice +to take refuge in, and that if you now escape from the enemy, you may all see +again what your hearts desire, while those of you who are Athenians will raise +up again the great power of the state, fallen though it be. Men make the city +and not walls or ships without men in them.” +</p> + +<p> +As he made this address, Nicias went along the ranks, and brought back to their +place any of the troops that he saw straggling out of the line; while +Demosthenes did as much for his part of the army, addressing them in words very +similar. The army marched in a hollow square, the division under Nicias +leading, and that of Demosthenes following, the heavy infantry being outside +and the baggage-carriers and the bulk of the army in the middle. When they +arrived at the ford of the river Anapus there they found drawn up a body of the +Syracusans and allies, and routing these, made good their passage and pushed +on, harassed by the charges of the Syracusan horse and by the missiles of their +light troops. On that day they advanced about four miles and a half, halting +for the night upon a certain hill. On the next they started early and got on +about two miles further, and descended into a place in the plain and there +encamped, in order to procure some eatables from the houses, as the place was +inhabited, and to carry on with them water from thence, as for many furlongs in +front, in the direction in which they were going, it was not plentiful. The +Syracusans meanwhile went on and fortified the pass in front, where there was a +steep hill with a rocky ravine on each side of it, called the Acraean cliff. +The next day the Athenians advancing found themselves impeded by the missiles +and charges of the horse and darters, both very numerous, of the Syracusans and +allies; and after fighting for a long while, at length retired to the same +camp, where they had no longer provisions as before, it being impossible to +leave their position by reason of the cavalry. +</p> + +<p> +Early next morning they started afresh and forced their way to the hill, which +had been fortified, where they found before them the enemy’s infantry +drawn up many shields deep to defend the fortification, the pass being narrow. +The Athenians assaulted the work, but were greeted by a storm of missiles from +the hill, which told with the greater effect through its being a steep one, and +unable to force the passage, retreated again and rested. Meanwhile occurred +some claps of thunder and rain, as often happens towards autumn, which still +further disheartened the Athenians, who thought all these things to be omens of +their approaching ruin. While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans +sent a part of their army to throw up works in their rear on the way by which +they had advanced; however, the Athenians immediately sent some of their men +and prevented them; after which they retreated more towards the plain and +halted for the night. When they advanced the next day the Syracusans surrounded +and attacked them on every side, and disabled many of them, falling back if the +Athenians advanced and coming on if they retired, and in particular assaulting +their rear, in the hope of routing them in detail, and thus striking a panic +into the whole army. For a long while the Athenians persevered in this fashion, +but after advancing for four or five furlongs halted to rest in the plain, the +Syracusans also withdrawing to their own camp. +</p> + +<p> +During the night Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the wretched condition of their +troops, now in want of every kind of necessary, and numbers of them disabled in +the numerous attacks of the enemy, determined to light as many fires as +possible, and to lead off the army, no longer by the same route as they had +intended, but towards the sea in the opposite direction to that guarded by the +Syracusans. The whole of this route was leading the army not to Catana but to +the other side of Sicily, towards Camarina, Gela, and the other Hellenic and +barbarian towns in that quarter. They accordingly lit a number of fires and set +out by night. Now all armies, and the greatest most of all, are liable to fears +and alarms, especially when they are marching by night through an enemy’s +country and with the enemy near; and the Athenians falling into one of these +panics, the leading division, that of Nicias, kept together and got on a good +way in front, while that of Demosthenes, comprising rather more than half the +army, got separated and marched on in some disorder. By morning, however, they +reached the sea, and getting into the Helorine road, pushed on in order to +reach the river Cacyparis, and to follow the stream up through the interior, +where they hoped to be met by the Sicels whom they had sent for. Arrived at the +river, they found there also a Syracusan party engaged in barring the passage +of the ford with a wall and a palisade, and forcing this guard, crossed the +river and went on to another called the Erineus, according to the advice of +their guides. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile, when day came and the Syracusans and allies found that the Athenians +were gone, most of them accused Gylippus of having let them escape on purpose, +and hastily pursuing by the road which they had no difficulty in finding that +they had taken, overtook them about dinner-time. They first came up with the +troops under Demosthenes, who were behind and marching somewhat slowly and in +disorder, owing to the night panic above referred to, and at once attacked and +engaged them, the Syracusan horse surrounding them with more ease now that they +were separated from the rest and hemming them in on one spot. The division of +Nicias was five or six miles on in front, as he led them more rapidly, thinking +that under the circumstances their safety lay not in staying and fighting, +unless obliged, but in retreating as fast as possible, and only fighting when +forced to do so. On the other hand, Demosthenes was, generally speaking, +harassed more incessantly, as his post in the rear left him the first exposed +to the attacks of the enemy; and now, finding that the Syracusans were in +pursuit, he omitted to push on, in order to form his men for battle, and so +lingered until he was surrounded by his pursuers and himself and the Athenians +with him placed in the most distressing position, being huddled into an +enclosure with a wall all round it, a road on this side and on that, and +olive-trees in great number, where missiles were showered in upon them from +every quarter. This mode of attack the Syracusans had with good reason adopted +in preference to fighting at close quarters, as to risk a struggle with +desperate men was now more for the advantage of the Athenians than for their +own; besides, their success had now become so certain that they began to spare +themselves a little in order not to be cut off in the moment of victory, +thinking too that, as it was, they would be able in this way to subdue and +capture the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +In fact, after plying the Athenians and allies all day long from every side +with missiles, they at length saw that they were worn out with their wounds and +other sufferings; and Gylippus and the Syracusans and their allies made a +proclamation, offering their liberty to any of the islanders who chose to come +over to them; and some few cities went over. Afterwards a capitulation was +agreed upon for all the rest with Demosthenes, to lay down their arms on +condition that no one was to be put to death either by violence or imprisonment +or want of the necessaries of life. Upon this they surrendered to the number of +six thousand in all, laying down all the money in their possession, which +filled the hollows of four shields, and were immediately conveyed by the +Syracusans to the town. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Nicias with his division arrived that day at the river Erineus, +crossed over, and posted his army upon some high ground upon the other side. +The next day the Syracusans overtook him and told him that the troops under +Demosthenes had surrendered, and invited him to follow their example. +Incredulous of the fact, Nicias asked for a truce to send a horseman to see, +and upon the return of the messenger with the tidings that they had +surrendered, sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans, saying that he was +ready to agree with them on behalf of the Athenians to repay whatever money the +Syracusans had spent upon the war if they would let his army go; and offered +until the money was paid to give Athenians as hostages, one for every talent. +The Syracusans and Gylippus rejected this proposition, and attacked this +division as they had the other, standing all round and plying them with +missiles until the evening. Food and necessaries were as miserably wanting to +the troops of Nicias as they had been to their comrades; nevertheless they +watched for the quiet of the night to resume their march. But as they were +taking up their arms the Syracusans perceived it and raised their paean, upon +which the Athenians, finding that they were discovered, laid them down again, +except about three hundred men who forced their way through the guards and went +on during the night as they were able. +</p> + +<p> +As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion, pressed, as before, by the +Syracusans and their allies, pelted from every side by their missiles, and +struck down by their javelins. The Athenians pushed on for the Assinarus, +impelled by the attacks made upon them from every side by a numerous cavalry +and the swarm of other arms, fancying that they should breathe more freely if +once across the river, and driven on also by their exhaustion and craving for +water. Once there they rushed in, and all order was at an end, each man wanting +to cross first, and the attacks of the enemy making it difficult to cross at +all; forced to huddle together, they fell against and trod down one another, +some dying immediately upon the javelins, others getting entangled together and +stumbling over the articles of baggage, without being able to rise again. +Meanwhile the opposite bank, which was steep, was lined by the Syracusans, who +showered missiles down upon the Athenians, most of them drinking greedily and +heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of the river. The Peloponnesians +also came down and butchered them, especially those in the water, which was +thus immediately spoiled, but which they went on drinking just the same, mud +and all, bloody as it was, most even fighting to have it. +</p> + +<p> +At last, when many dead now lay piled one upon another in the stream, and part +of the army had been destroyed at the river, and the few that escaped from +thence cut off by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, whom he +trusted more than he did the Syracusans, and told him and the Lacedaemonians to +do what they liked with him, but to stop the slaughter of the soldiers. +Gylippus, after this, immediately gave orders to make prisoners; upon which the +rest were brought together alive, except a large number secreted by the +soldiery, and a party was sent in pursuit of the three hundred who had got +through the guard during the night, and who were now taken with the rest. The +number of the enemy collected as public property was not considerable; but that +secreted was very large, and all Sicily was filled with them, no convention +having been made in their case as for those taken with Demosthenes. Besides +this, a large portion were killed outright, the carnage being very great, and +not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war. In the numerous other encounters upon +the march, not a few also had fallen. Nevertheless many escaped, some at the +moment, others served as slaves, and then ran away subsequently. These found +refuge at Catana. +</p> + +<p> +The Syracusans and their allies now mustered and took up the spoils and as many +prisoners as they could, and went back to the city. The rest of their Athenian +and allied captives were deposited in the quarries, this seeming the safest way +of keeping them; but Nicias and Demosthenes were butchered, against the will of +Gylippus, who thought that it would be the crown of his triumph if he could +take the enemy’s generals to Lacedaemon. One of them, as it happened, +Demosthenes, was one of her greatest enemies, on account of the affair of the +island and of Pylos; while the other, Nicias, was for the same reasons one of +her greatest friends, owing to his exertions to procure the release of the +prisoners by persuading the Athenians to make peace. For these reasons the +Lacedaemonians felt kindly towards him; and it was in this that Nicias himself +mainly confided when he surrendered to Gylippus. But some of the Syracusans who +had been in correspondence with him were afraid, it was said, of his being put +to the torture and troubling their success by his revelations; others, +especially the Corinthians, of his escaping, as he was wealthy, by means of +bribes, and living to do them further mischief; and these persuaded the allies +and put him to death. This or the like was the cause of the death of a man who, +of all the Hellenes in my time, least deserved such a fate, seeing that the +whole course of his life had been regulated with strict attention to virtue. +</p> + +<p> +The prisoners in the quarries were at first hardly treated by the Syracusans. +Crowded in a narrow hole, without any roof to cover them, the heat of the sun +and the stifling closeness of the air tormented them during the day, and then +the nights, which came on autumnal and chilly, made them ill by the violence of +the change; besides, as they had to do everything in the same place for want of +room, and the bodies of those who died of their wounds or from the variation in +the temperature, or from similar causes, were left heaped together one upon +another, intolerable stenches arose; while hunger and thirst never ceased to +afflict them, each man during eight months having only half a pint of water and +a pint of corn given him daily. In short, no single suffering to be apprehended +by men thrust into such a place was spared them. For some seventy days they +thus lived all together, after which all, except the Athenians and any +Siceliots or Italiots who had joined in the expedition, were sold. The total +number of prisoners taken it would be difficult to state exactly, but it could +not have been less than seven thousand. +</p> + +<p> +This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in thig war, or, in my +opinion, in Hellenic history; at once most glorious to the victors, and most +calamitous to the conquered. They were beaten at all points and altogether; all +that they suffered was great; they were destroyed, as the saying is, with a +total destruction, their fleet, their army, everything was destroyed, and few +out of many returned home. Such were the events in Sicily. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2H_4_0031" id="link2H_4_0031"></a> +BOOK VIII </h2> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0024" id="link2HCH0024"></a> +CHAPTER XXIV </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Nineteenth and Twentieth Years of the War—Revolt of Ionia— +Intervention of Persia—The War in Ionia +</p> + +<p> +When the news was brought to Athens, for a long while they disbelieved even the +most respectable of the soldiers who had themselves escaped from the scene of +action and clearly reported the matter, a destruction so complete not being +thought credible. When the conviction was forced upon them, they were angry +with the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition, just as if they +had not themselves voted it, and were enraged also with the reciters of oracles +and soothsayers, and all other omen-mongers of the time who had encouraged them +to hope that they should conquer Sicily. Already distressed at all points and +in all quarters, after what had now happened, they were seized by a fear and +consternation quite without example. It was grievous enough for the state and +for every man in his proper person to lose so many heavy infantry, cavalry, and +able-bodied troops, and to see none left to replace them; but when they saw, +also, that they had not sufficient ships in their docks, or money in the +treasury, or crews for the ships, they began to despair of salvation. They +thought that their enemies in Sicily would immediately sail with their fleet +against Piraeus, inflamed by so signal a victory; while their adversaries at +home, redoubling all their preparations, would vigorously attack them by sea +and land at once, aided by their own revolted confederates. Nevertheless, with +such means as they had, it was determined to resist to the last, and to provide +timber and money, and to equip a fleet as they best could, to take steps to +secure their confederates and above all Euboea, to reform things in the city +upon a more economical footing, and to elect a board of elders to advise upon +the state of affairs as occasion should arise. In short, as is the way of a +democracy, in the panic of the moment they were ready to be as prudent as +possible. +</p> + +<p> +These resolves were at once carried into effect. Summer was now over. The +winter ensuing saw all Hellas stirring under the impression of the great +Athenian disaster in Sicily. Neutrals now felt that even if uninvited they +ought no longer to stand aloof from the war, but should volunteer to march +against the Athenians, who, as they severally reflected, would probably have +come against them if the Sicilian campaign had succeeded. Besides, they +considered that the war would now be short, and that it would be creditable for +them to take part in it. Meanwhile the allies of the Lacedaemonians felt all +more anxious than ever to see a speedy end to their heavy labours. But above +all, the subjects of the Athenians showed a readiness to revolt even beyond +their ability, judging the circumstances with passion, and refusing even to +hear of the Athenians being able to last out the coming summer. Beyond all +this, Lacedaemon was encouraged by the near prospect of being joined in great +force in the spring by her allies in Sicily, lately forced by events to acquire +their navy. With these reasons for confidence in every quarter, the +Lacedaemonians now resolved to throw themselves without reserve into the war, +considering that, once it was happily terminated, they would be finally +delivered from such dangers as that which would have threatened them from +Athens, if she had become mistress of Sicily, and that the overthrow of the +Athenians would leave them in quiet enjoyment of the supremacy over all Hellas. +</p> + +<p> +Their king, Agis, accordingly set out at once during this winter with some +troops from Decelea, and levied from the allies contributions for the fleet, +and turning towards the Malian Gulf exacted a sum of money from the Oetaeans by +carrying off most of their cattle in reprisal for their old hostility, and, in +spite of the protests and opposition of the Thessalians, forced the Achaeans of +Phthiotis and the other subjects of the Thessalians in those parts to give him +money and hostages, and deposited the hostages at Corinth, and tried to bring +their countrymen into the confederacy. The Lacedaemonians now issued a +requisition to the cities for building a hundred ships, fixing their own quota +and that of the Boeotians at twenty-five each; that of the Phocians and +Locrians together at fifteen; that of the Corinthians at fifteen; that of the +Arcadians, Pellenians, and Sicyonians together at ten; and that of the +Megarians, Troezenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians together at ten also; and +meanwhile made every other preparation for commencing hostilities by the +spring. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime the Athenians were not idle. During this same winter, as they +had determined, they contributed timber and pushed on their ship-building, and +fortified Sunium to enable their corn-ships to round it in safety, and +evacuated the fort in Laconia which they had built on their way to Sicily; +while they also, for economy, cut down any other expenses that seemed +unnecessary, and above all kept a careful look-out against the revolt of their +confederates. +</p> + +<p> +While both parties were thus engaged, and were as intent upon preparing for the +war as they had been at the outset, the Euboeans first of all sent envoys +during this winter to Agis to treat of their revolting from Athens. Agis +accepted their proposals, and sent for Alcamenes, son of Sthenelaidas, and +Melanthus from Lacedaemon, to take the command in Euboea. These accordingly +arrived with some three hundred Neodamodes, and Agis began to arrange for their +crossing over. But in the meanwhile arrived some Lesbians, who also wished to +revolt; and these being supported by the Boeotians, Agis was persuaded to defer +acting in the matter of Euboea, and made arrangements for the revolt of the +Lesbians, giving them Alcamenes, who was to have sailed to Euboea, as governor, +and himself promising them ten ships, and the Boeotians the same number. All +this was done without instructions from home, as Agis while at Decelea with the +army that he commanded had power to send troops to whatever quarter he pleased, +and to levy men and money. During this period, one might say, the allies obeyed +him much more than they did the Lacedaemonians in the city, as the force he had +with him made him feared at once wherever he went. While Agis was engaged with +the Lesbians, the Chians and Erythraeans, who were also ready to revolt, +applied, not to him but at Lacedaemon; where they arrived accompanied by an +ambassador from Tissaphernes, the commander of King Darius, son of Artaxerxes, +in the maritime districts, who invited the Peloponnesians to come over, and +promised to maintain their army. The King had lately called upon him for the +tribute from his government, for which he was in arrears, being unable to raise +it from the Hellenic towns by reason of the Athenians; and he therefore +calculated that by weakening the Athenians he should get the tribute better +paid, and should also draw the Lacedaemonians into alliance with the King; and +by this means, as the King had commanded him, take alive or dead Amorges, the +bastard son of Pissuthnes, who was in rebellion on the coast of Caria. +</p> + +<p> +While the Chians and Tissaphernes thus joined to effect the same object, about +the same time Calligeitus, son of Laophon, a Megarian, and Timagoras, son of +Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both of them exiles from their country and living at +the court of Pharnabazus, son of Pharnaces, arrived at Lacedaemon upon a +mission from Pharnabazus, to procure a fleet for the Hellespont; by means of +which, if possible, he might himself effect the object of Tissaphernes’ +ambition and cause the cities in his government to revolt from the Athenians, +and so get the tribute, and by his own agency obtain for the King the alliance +of the Lacedaemonians. +</p> + +<p> +The emissaries of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes treating apart, a keen +competition now ensued at Lacedaemon as to whether a fleet and army should be +sent first to Ionia and Chios, or to the Hellespont. The Lacedaemonians, +however, decidedly favoured the Chians and Tissaphernes, who were seconded by +Alcibiades, the family friend of Endius, one of the ephors for that year. +Indeed, this is how their house got its Laconic name, Alcibiades being the +family name of Endius. Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians first sent to Chios +Phrynis, one of the Perioeci, to see whether they had as many ships as they +said, and whether their city generally was as great as was reported; and upon +his bringing word that they had been told the truth, immediately entered into +alliance with the Chians and Erythraeans, and voted to send them forty ships, +there being already, according to the statement of the Chians, not less than +sixty in the island. At first the Lacedaemonians meant to send ten of these +forty themselves, with Melanchridas their admiral; but afterwards, an +earthquake having occurred, they sent Chalcideus instead of Melanchridas, and +instead of the ten ships equipped only five in Laconia. And the winter ended, +and with it ended also the nineteenth year of this war of which Thucydides is +the historian. +</p> + +<p> +At the beginning of the next summer the Chians were urging that the fleet +should be sent off, being afraid that the Athenians, from whom all these +embassies were kept a secret, might find out what was going on, and the +Lacedaemonians at once sent three Spartans to Corinth to haul the ships as +quickly as possible across the Isthmus from the other sea to that on the side +of Athens, and to order them all to sail to Chios, those which Agis was +equipping for Lesbos not excepted. The number of ships from the allied states +was thirty-nine in all. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Calligeitus and Timagoras did not join on behalf of Pharnabazus in +the expedition to Chios or give the money—twenty-five talents—which +they had brought with them to help in dispatching a force, but determined to +sail afterwards with another force by themselves. Agis, on the other hand, +seeing the Lacedaemonians bent upon going to Chios first, himself came in to +their views; and the allies assembled at Corinth and held a council, in which +they decided to sail first to Chios under the command of Chalcideus, who was +equipping the five vessels in Laconia, then to Lesbos, under the command of +Alcamenes, the same whom Agis had fixed upon, and lastly to go to the +Hellespont, where the command was given to Clearchus, son of Ramphias. +Meanwhile they would take only half the ships across the Isthmus first, and let +those sail off at once, in order that the Athenians might attend less to the +departing squadron than to those to be taken across afterwards, as no care had +been taken to keep this voyage secret through contempt of the impotence of the +Athenians, who had as yet no fleet of any account upon the sea. Agreeably to +this determination, twenty-one vessels were at once conveyed across the +Isthmus. +</p> + +<p> +They were now impatient to set sail, but the Corinthians were not willing to +accompany them until they had celebrated the Isthmian festival, which fell at +that time. Upon this Agis proposed to them to save their scruples about +breaking the Isthmian truce by taking the expedition upon himself. The +Corinthians not consenting to this, a delay ensued, during which the Athenians +conceived suspicions of what was preparing at Chios, and sent Aristocrates, one +of their generals, and charged them with the fact, and, upon the denial of the +Chians, ordered them to send with them a contingent of ships, as faithful +confederates. Seven were sent accordingly. The reason of the dispatch of the +ships lay in the fact that the mass of the Chians were not privy to the +negotiations, while the few who were in the secret did not wish to break with +the multitude until they had something positive to lean upon, and no longer +expected the Peloponnesians to arrive by reason of their delay. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime the Isthmian games took place, and the Athenians, who had been +also invited, went to attend them, and now seeing more clearly into the designs +of the Chians, as soon as they returned to Athens took measures to prevent the +fleet putting out from Cenchreae without their knowledge. After the festival +the Peloponnesians set sail with twenty-one ships for Chios, under the command +of Alcamenes. The Athenians first sailed against them with an equal number, +drawing off towards the open sea. The enemy, however, turning back before he +had followed them far, the Athenians returned also, not trusting the seven +Chian ships which formed part of their number, and afterwards manned +thirty-seven vessels in all and chased him on his passage alongshore into +Spiraeum, a desert Corinthian port on the edge of the Epidaurian frontier. +After losing one ship out at sea, the Peloponnesians got the rest together and +brought them to anchor. The Athenians now attacked not only from the sea with +their fleet, but also disembarked upon the coast; and a melee ensued of the +most confused and violent kind, in which the Athenians disabled most of the +enemy’s vessels and killed Alcamenes their commander, losing also a few +of their own men. +</p> + +<p> +After this they separated, and the Athenians, detaching a sufficient number of +ships to blockade those of the enemy, anchored with the rest at the islet +adjacent, upon which they proceeded to encamp, and sent to Athens for +reinforcements; the Peloponnesians having been joined on the day after the +battle by the Corinthians, who came to help the ships, and by the other +inhabitants in the vicinity not long afterwards. These saw the difficulty of +keeping guard in a desert place, and in their perplexity at first thought of +burning the ships, but finally resolved to haul them up on shore and sit down +and guard them with their land forces until a convenient opportunity for +escaping should present itself. Agis also, on being informed of the disaster, +sent them a Spartan of the name of Thermon. The Lacedaemonians first received +the news of the fleet having put out from the Isthmus, Alcamenes having been +ordered by the ephors to send off a horseman when this took place, and +immediately resolved to dispatch their own five vessels under Chalcideus, and +Alcibiades with him. But while they were full of this resolution came the +second news of the fleet having taken refuge in Spiraeum; and disheartened at +their first step in the Ionian war proving a failure, they laid aside the idea +of sending the ships from their own country, and even wished to recall some +that had already sailed. +</p> + +<p> +Perceiving this, Alcibiades again persuaded Endius and the other ephors to +persevere in the expedition, saying that the voyage would be made before the +Chians heard of the fleet’s misfortune, and that as soon as he set foot +in Ionia, he should, by assuring them of the weakness of the Athenians and the +zeal of Lacedaemon, have no difficulty in persuading the cities to revolt, as +they would readily believe his testimony. He also represented to Endius himself +in private that it would be glorious for him to be the means of making Ionia +revolt and the King become the ally of Lacedaemon, instead of that honour being +left to Agis (Agis, it must be remembered, was the enemy of Alcibiades); and +Endius and his colleagues thus persuaded, he put to sea with the five ships and +the Lacedaemonian Chalcideus, and made all haste upon the voyage. +</p> + +<p> +About this time the sixteen Peloponnesian ships from Sicily, which had served +through the war with Gylippus, were caught on their return off Leucadia and +roughly handled by the twenty-seven Athenian vessels under Hippocles, son of +Menippus, on the lookout for the ships from Sicily. After losing one of their +number, the rest escaped from the Athenians and sailed into Corinth. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades seized all they met with on their voyage, +to prevent news of their coming, and let them go at Corycus, the first point +which they touched at in the continent. Here they were visited by some of their +Chian correspondents and, being urged by them to sail up to the town without +announcing their coming, arrived suddenly before Chios. The many were amazed +and confounded, while the few had so arranged that the council should be +sitting at the time; and after speeches from Chalcideus and Alcibiades stating +that many more ships were sailing up, but saying nothing of the fleet being +blockaded in Spiraeum, the Chians revolted from the Athenians, and the +Erythraeans immediately afterwards. After this three vessels sailed over to +Clazomenae, and made that city revolt also; and the Clazomenians immediately +crossed over to the mainland and began to fortify Polichna, in order to retreat +there, in case of necessity, from the island where they dwelt. +</p> + +<p> +While the revolted places were all engaged in fortifying and preparing for the +war, news of Chios speedily reached Athens. The Athenians thought the danger by +which they were now menaced great and unmistakable, and that the rest of their +allies would not consent to keep quiet after the secession of the greatest of +their number. In the consternation of the moment they at once took off the +penalty attaching to whoever proposed or put to the vote a proposal for using +the thousand talents which they had jealously avoided touching throughout the +whole war, and voted to employ them to man a large number of ships, and to send +off at once under Strombichides, son of Diotimus, the eight vessels, forming +part of the blockading fleet at Spiraeum, which had left the blockade and had +returned after pursuing and failing to overtake the vessels with Chalcideus. +These were to be followed shortly afterwards by twelve more under Thrasycles, +also taken from the blockade. They also recalled the seven Chian vessels, +forming part of their squadron blockading the fleet in Spiraeum, and giving the +slaves on board their liberty, put the freemen in confinement, and speedily +manned and sent out ten fresh ships to blockade the Peloponnesians in the place +of all those that had departed, and decided to man thirty more. Zeal was not +wanting, and no effort was spared to send relief to Chios. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime Strombichides with his eight ships arrived at Samos, and, +taking one Samian vessel, sailed to Teos and required them to remain quiet. +Chalcideus also set sail with twenty-three ships for Teos from Chios, the land +forces of the Clazomenians and Erythraeans moving alongshore to support him. +Informed of this in time, Strombichides put out from Teos before their arrival, +and while out at sea, seeing the number of the ships from Chios, fled towards +Samos, chased by the enemy. The Teians at first would not receive the land +forces, but upon the flight of the Athenians took them into the town. There +they waited for some time for Chalcideus to return from the pursuit, and as +time went on without his appearing, began themselves to demolish the wall which +the Athenians had built on the land side of the city of the Teians, being +assisted by a few of the barbarians who had come up under the command of +Stages, the lieutenant of Tissaphernes. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades, after chasing Strombichides into Samos, +armed the crews of the ships from Peloponnese and left them at Chios, and +filling their places with substitutes from Chios and manning twenty others, +sailed off to effect the revolt of Miletus. The wish of Alcibiades, who had +friends among the leading men of the Milesians, was to bring over the town +before the arrival of the ships from Peloponnese, and thus, by causing the +revolt of as many cities as possible with the help of the Chian power and of +Chalcideus, to secure the honour for the Chians and himself and Chalcideus, +and, as he had promised, for Endius who had sent them out. Not discovered until +their voyage was nearly completed, they arrived a little before Strombichides +and Thrasycles (who had just come with twelve ships from Athens, and had joined +Strombichides in pursuing them), and occasioned the revolt of Miletus. The +Athenians sailing up close on their heels with nineteen ships found Miletus +closed against them, and took up their station at the adjacent island of Lade. +The first alliance between the King and the Lacedaemonians was now concluded +immediately upon the revolt of the Milesians, by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, +and was as follows: +</p> + +<p> +The Lacedaemonians and their allies made a treaty with the King and +Tissaphernes upon the terms following: +</p> + +<p> +1. Whatever country or cities the King has, or the King’s ancestors had, +shall be the king’s: and whatever came in to the Athenians from these +cities, either money or any other thing, the King and the Lacedaemonians and +their allies shall jointly hinder the Athenians from receiving either money or +any other thing. +</p> + +<p> +2. The war with the Athenians shall be carried on jointly by the King and by +the Lacedaemonians and their allies: and it shall not be lawful to make peace +with the Athenians except both agree, the King on his side and the +Lacedaemonians and their allies on theirs. +</p> + +<p> +3. If any revolt from the King, they shall be the enemies of the Lacedaemonians +and their allies. And if any revolt from the Lacedaemonians and their allies, +they shall be the enemies of the King in like manner. +</p> + +<p> +This was the alliance. After this the Chians immediately manned ten more +vessels and sailed for Anaia, in order to gain intelligence of those in +Miletus, and also to make the cities revolt. A message, however, reaching them +from Chalcideus to tell them to go back again, and that Amorges was at hand +with an army by land, they sailed to the temple of Zeus, and there sighting ten +more ships sailing up with which Diomedon had started from Athens after +Thrasycles, fled, one ship to Ephesus, the rest to Teos. The Athenians took +four of their ships empty, the men finding time to escape ashore; the rest took +refuge in the city of the Teians; after which the Athenians sailed off to +Samos, while the Chians put to sea with their remaining vessels, accompanied by +the land forces, and caused Lebedos to revolt, and after it Erae. After this +they both returned home, the fleet and the army. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time the twenty ships of the Peloponnesians in Spiraeum, which +we left chased to land and blockaded by an equal number of Athenians, suddenly +sallied out and defeated the blockading squadron, took four of their ships, +and, sailing back to Cenchreae, prepared again for the voyage to Chios and +Ionia. Here they were joined by Astyochus as high admiral from Lacedaemon, +henceforth invested with the supreme command at sea. The land forces now +withdrawing from Teos, Tissaphernes repaired thither in person with an army and +completed the demolition of anything that was left of the wall, and so +departed. Not long after his departure Diomedon arrived with ten Athenian +ships, and, having made a convention by which the Teians admitted him as they +had the enemy, coasted along to Erae, and, failing in an attempt upon the town, +sailed back again. +</p> + +<p> +About this time took place the rising of the commons at Samos against the upper +classes, in concert with some Athenians, who were there in three vessels. The +Samian commons put to death some two hundred in all of the upper classes, and +banished four hundred more, and themselves took their land and houses; after +which the Athenians decreed their independence, being now sure of their +fidelity, and the commons henceforth governed the city, excluding the +landholders from all share in affairs, and forbidding any of the commons to +give his daughter in marriage to them or to take a wife from them in future. +</p> + +<p> +After this, during the same summer, the Chians, whose zeal continued as active +as ever, and who even without the Peloponnesians found themselves in sufficient +force to effect the revolt of the cities and also wished to have as many +companions in peril as possible, made an expedition with thirteen ships of +their own to Lesbos; the instructions from Lacedaemon being to go to that +island next, and from thence to the Hellespont. Meanwhile the land forces of +the Peloponnesians who were with the Chians and of the allies on the spot, +moved alongshore for Clazomenae and Cuma, under the command of Eualas, a +Spartan; while the fleet under Diniadas, one of the Perioeci, first sailed up +to Methymna and caused it to revolt, and, leaving four ships there, with the +rest procured the revolt of Mitylene. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, set sail from Cenchreae +with four ships, as he had intended, and arrived at Chios. On the third day +after his arrival, the Athenian ships, twenty-five in number, sailed to Lesbos +under Diomedon and Leon, who had lately arrived with a reinforcement of ten +ships from Athens. Late in the same day Astyochus put to sea, and taking one +Chian vessel with him sailed to Lesbos to render what assistance he could. +Arrived at Pyrrha, and from thence the next day at Eresus, he there learned +that Mitylene had been taken, almost without a blow, by the Athenians, who had +sailed up and unexpectedly put into the harbour, had beaten the Chian ships, +and landing and defeating the troops opposed to them had become masters of the +city. Informed of this by the Eresians and the Chian ships, which had been left +with Eubulus at Methymna, and had fled upon the capture of Mitylene, and three +of which he now fell in with, one having been taken by the Athenians, Astyochus +did not go on to Mitylene, but raised and armed Eresus, and, sending the heavy +infantry from his own ships by land under Eteonicus to Antissa and Methymna, +himself proceeded alongshore thither with the ships which he had with him and +with the three Chians, in the hope that the Methymnians upon seeing them would +be encouraged to persevere in their revolt. As, however, everything went +against him in Lesbos, he took up his own force and sailed back to Chios; the +land forces on board, which were to have gone to the Hellespont, being also +conveyed back to their different cities. After this six of the allied +Peloponnesian ships at Cenchreae joined the forces at Chios. The Athenians, +after restoring matters to their old state in Lesbos, set sail from thence and +took Polichna, the place that the Clazomenians were fortifying on the +continent, and carried the inhabitants back to their town upon the island, +except the authors of the revolt, who withdrew to Daphnus; and thus Clazomenae +became once more Athenian. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer the Athenians in the twenty ships at Lade, blockading Miletus, +made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, and killed Chalcideus the +Lacedaemonian commander, who had come with a few men against them, and the +third day after sailed over and set up a trophy, which, as they were not +masters of the country, was however pulled down by the Milesians. Meanwhile +Leon and Diomedon with the Athenian fleet from Lesbos issuing from the +Oenussae, the isles off Chios, and from their forts of Sidussa and Pteleum in +the Erythraeid, and from Lesbos, carried on the war against the Chians from the +ships, having on board heavy infantry from the rolls pressed to serve as +marines. Landing in Cardamyle and in Bolissus they defeated with heavy loss the +Chians that took the field against them and, laying desolate the places in that +neighbourhood, defeated the Chians again in another battle at Phanae, and in a +third at Leuconium. After this the Chians ceased to meet them in the field, +while the Athenians devastated the country, which was beautifully stocked and +had remained uninjured ever since the Median wars. Indeed, after the +Lacedaemonians, the Chians are the only people that I have known who knew how +to be wise in prosperity, and who ordered their city the more securely the +greater it grew. Nor was this revolt, in which they might seem to have erred on +the side of rashness, ventured upon until they had numerous and gallant allies +to share the danger with them, and until they perceived the Athenians after the +Sicilian disaster themselves no longer denying the thoroughly desperate state +of their affairs. And if they were thrown out by one of the surprises which +upset human calculations, they found out their mistake in company with many +others who believed, like them, in the speedy collapse of the Athenian power. +While they were thus blockaded from the sea and plundered by land, some of the +citizens undertook to bring the city over to the Athenians. Apprised of this +the authorities took no action themselves, but brought Astyochus, the admiral, +from Erythrae, with four ships that he had with him, and considered how they +could most quietly, either by taking hostages or by some other means, put an +end to the conspiracy. +</p> + +<p> +While the Chians were thus engaged, a thousand Athenian heavy infantry and +fifteen hundred Argives (five hundred of whom were light troops furnished with +armour by the Athenians), and one thousand of the allies, towards the close of +the same summer sailed from Athens in forty-eight ships, some of which were +transports, under the command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides, and +putting into Samos crossed over and encamped at Miletus. Upon this the +Milesians came out to the number of eight hundred heavy infantry, with the +Peloponnesians who had come with Chalcideus, and some foreign mercenaries of +Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes himself and his cavalry, and engaged the Athenians +and their allies. While the Argives rushed forward on their own wing with the +careless disdain of men advancing against Ionians who would never stand their +charge, and were defeated by the Milesians with a loss little short of three +hundred men, the Athenians first defeated the Peloponnesians, and driving +before them the barbarians and the ruck of the army, without engaging the +Milesians, who after the rout of the Argives retreated into the town upon +seeing their comrades worsted, crowned their victory by grounding their arms +under the very walls of Miletus. Thus, in this battle, the Ionians on both +sides overcame the Dorians, the Athenians defeating the Peloponnesians opposed +to them, and the Milesians the Argives. After setting up a trophy, the +Athenians prepared to draw a wall round the place, which stood upon an isthmus; +thinking that, if they could gain Miletus, the other towns also would easily +come over to them. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile about dusk tidings reached them that the fifty-five ships from +Peloponnese and Sicily might be instantly expected. Of these the Siceliots, +urged principally by the Syracusan Hermocrates to join in giving the finishing +blow to the power of Athens, furnished twenty-two—twenty from Syracuse, +and two from Silenus; and the ships that we left preparing in Peloponnese being +now ready, both squadrons had been entrusted to Therimenes, a Lacedaemonian, to +take to Astyochus, the admiral. They now put in first at Leros the island off +Miletus, and from thence, discovering that the Athenians were before the town, +sailed into the Iasic Gulf, in order to learn how matters stood at Miletus. +Meanwhile Alcibiades came on horseback to Teichiussa in the Milesian territory, +the point of the gulf at which they had put in for the night, and told them of +the battle in which he had fought in person by the side of the Milesians and +Tissaphernes, and advised them, if they did not wish to sacrifice Ionia and +their cause, to fly to the relief of Miletus and hinder its investment. +</p> + +<p> +Accordingly they resolved to relieve it the next morning. Meanwhile Phrynichus, +the Athenian commander, had received precise intelligence of the fleet from +Leros, and when his colleagues expressed a wish to keep the sea and fight it +out, flatly refused either to stay himself or to let them or any one else do so +if he could help it. Where they could hereafter contend, after full and +undisturbed preparation, with an exact knowledge of the number of the +enemy’s fleet and of the force which they could oppose to him, he would +never allow the reproach of disgrace to drive him into a risk that was +unreasonable. It was no disgrace for an Athenian fleet to retreat when it +suited them: put it as they would, it would be more disgraceful to be beaten, +and to expose the city not only to disgrace, but to the most serious danger. +After its late misfortunes it could hardly be justified in voluntarily taking +the offensive even with the strongest force, except in a case of absolute +necessity: much less then without compulsion could it rush upon peril of its +own seeking. He told them to take up their wounded as quickly as they could and +the troops and stores which they had brought with them, and leaving behind what +they had taken from the enemy’s country, in order to lighten the ships, +to sail off to Samos, and there concentrating all their ships to attack as +opportunity served. As he spoke so he acted; and thus not now more than +afterwards, nor in this alone but in all that he had to do with, did Phrynichus +show himself a man of sense. In this way that very evening the Athenians broke +up from before Miletus, leaving their victory unfinished, and the Argives, +mortified at their disaster, promptly sailed off home from Samos. +</p> + +<p> +As soon as it was morning the Peloponnesians weighed from Teichiussa and put +into Miletus after the departure of the Athenians; they stayed one day, and on +the next took with them the Chian vessels originally chased into port with +Chalcideus, and resolved to sail back for the tackle which they had put on +shore at Teichiussa. Upon their arrival Tissaphernes came to them with his land +forces and induced them to sail to Iasus, which was held by his enemy Amorges. +Accordingly they suddenly attacked and took Iasus, whose inhabitants never +imagined that the ships could be other than Athenian. The Syracusans +distinguished themselves most in the action. Amorges, a bastard of Pissuthnes +and a rebel from the King, was taken alive and handed over to Tissaphernes, to +carry to the King, if he chose, according to his orders: Iasus was sacked by +the army, who found a very great booty there, the place being wealthy from +ancient date. The mercenaries serving with Amorges the Peloponnesians received +and enrolled in their army without doing them any harm, since most of them came +from Peloponnese, and handed over the town to Tissaphernes with all the +captives, bond or free, at the stipulated price of one Doric stater a head; +after which they returned to Miletus. Pedaritus, son of Leon, who had been sent +by the Lacedaemonians to take the command at Chios, they dispatched by land as +far as Erythrae with the mercenaries taken from Amorges; appointing Philip to +remain as governor of Miletus. +</p> + +<p> +Summer was now over. The winter following, Tissaphernes put Iasus in a state of +defence, and passing on to Miletus distributed a month’s pay to all the +ships as he had promised at Lacedaemon, at the rate of an Attic drachma a day +for each man. In future, however, he was resolved not to give more than three +obols, until he had consulted the King; when if the King should so order he +would give, he said, the full drachma. However, upon the protest of the +Syracusan general Hermocrates (for as Therimenes was not admiral, but only +accompanied them in order to hand over the ships to Astyochus, he made little +difficulty about the pay), it was agreed that the amount of five ships’ +pay should be given over and above the three obols a day for each man; +Tissaphernes paying thirty talents a month for fifty-five ships, and to the +rest, for as many ships as they had beyond that number, at the same rate. +</p> + +<p> +The same winter the Athenians in Samos, having been joined by thirty-five more +vessels from home under Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon, called in their +squadron at Chios and all the rest, intending to blockade Miletus with their +navy, and to send a fleet and an army against Chios; drawing lots for the +respective services. This intention they carried into effect; Strombichides, +Onamacles, and Euctemon sailing against Chios, which fell to their lot, with +thirty ships and a part of the thousand heavy infantry, who had been to +Miletus, in transports; while the rest remained masters of the sea with +seventy-four ships at Samos, and advanced upon Miletus. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Astyochus, whom we left at Chios collecting the hostages required in +consequence of the conspiracy, stopped upon learning that the fleet with +Therimenes had arrived, and that the affairs of the league were in a more +flourishing condition, and putting out to sea with ten Peloponnesian and as +many Chian vessels, after a futile attack upon Pteleum, coasted on to +Clazomenae, and ordered the Athenian party to remove inland to Daphnus, and to +join the Peloponnesians, an order in which also joined Tamos the king’s +lieutenant in Ionia. This order being disregarded, Astyochus made an attack +upon the town, which was unwalled, and having failed to take it was himself +carried off by a strong gale to Phocaea and Cuma, while the rest of the ships +put in at the islands adjacent to Clazomenae—Marathussa, Pele, and +Drymussa. Here they were detained eight days by the winds, and, plundering and +consuming all the property of the Clazomenians there deposited, put the rest on +shipboard and sailed off to Phocaea and Cuma to join Astyochus. +</p> + +<p> +While he was there, envoys arrived from the Lesbians who wished to revolt +again. With Astyochus they were successful; but the Corinthians and the other +allies being averse to it by reason of their former failure, he weighed anchor +and set sail for Chios, where they eventually arrived from different quarters, +the fleet having been scattered by a storm. After this Pedaritus, whom we left +marching along the coast from Miletus, arrived at Erythrae, and thence crossed +over with his army to Chios, where he found also about five hundred soldiers +who had been left there by Chalcideus from the five ships with their arms. +Meanwhile some Lesbians making offers to revolt, Astyochus urged upon Pedaritus +and the Chians that they ought to go with their ships and effect the revolt of +Lesbos, and so increase the number of their allies, or, if not successful, at +all events harm the Athenians. The Chians, however, turned a deaf ear to this, +and Pedaritus flatly refused to give up to him the Chian vessels. +</p> + +<p> +Upon this Astyochus took five Corinthian and one Megarian vessel, with another +from Hermione, and the ships which had come with him from Laconia, and set sail +for Miletus to assume his command as admiral; after telling the Chians with +many threats that he would certainly not come and help them if they should be +in need. At Corycus in the Erythraeid he brought to for the night; the Athenian +armament sailing from Samos against Chios being only separated from him by a +hill, upon the other side of which it brought to; so that neither perceived the +other. But a letter arriving in the night from Pedaritus to say that some +liberated Erythraean prisoners had come from Samos to betray Erythrae, +Astyochus at once put back to Erythrae, and so just escaped falling in with the +Athenians. Here Pedaritus sailed over to join him; and after inquiry into the +pretended treachery, finding that the whole story had been made up to procure +the escape of the men from Samos, they acquitted them of the charge, and sailed +away, Pedaritus to Chios and Astyochus to Miletus as he had intended. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Athenian armament sailing round Corycus fell in with three Chian +men-of-war off Arginus, and gave immediate chase. A great storm coming on, the +Chians with difficulty took refuge in the harbour; the three Athenian vessels +most forward in the pursuit being wrecked and thrown up near the city of Chios, +and the crews slain or taken prisoners. The rest of the Athenian fleet took +refuge in the harbour called Phoenicus, under Mount Mimas, and from thence +afterwards put into Lesbos and prepared for the work of fortification. +</p> + +<p> +The same winter the Lacedaemonian Hippocrates sailed out from Peloponnese with +ten Thurian ships under the command of Dorieus, son of Diagoras, and two +colleagues, one Laconian and one Syracusan vessel, and arrived at Cnidus, which +had already revolted at the instigation of Tissaphernes. When their arrival was +known at Miletus, orders came to them to leave half their squadron to guard +Cnidus, and with the rest to cruise round Triopium and seize all the +merchantmen arriving from Egypt. Triopium is a promontory of Cnidus and sacred +to Apollo. This coming to the knowledge of the Athenians, they sailed from +Samos and captured the six ships on the watch at Triopium, the crews escaping +out of them. After this the Athenians sailed into Cnidus and made an assault +upon the town, which was unfortified, and all but took it; and the next day +assaulted it again, but with less effect, as the inhabitants had improved their +defences during the night, and had been reinforced by the crews escaped from +the ships at Triopium. The Athenians now withdrew, and after plundering the +Cnidian territory sailed back to Samos. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time Astyochus came to the fleet at Miletus. The Peloponnesian +camp was still plentifully supplied, being in receipt of sufficient pay, and +the soldiers having still in hand the large booty taken at Iasus. The Milesians +also showed great ardour for the war. Nevertheless the Peloponnesians thought +the first convention with Tissaphernes, made with Chalcideus, defective, and +more advantageous to him than to them, and consequently while Therimenes was +still there concluded another, which was as follows: +</p> + +<p> +The convention of the Lacedaemonians and the allies with King Darius and the +sons of the King, and with Tissaphernes for a treaty and friendship, as +follows: +</p> + +<p> +1. Neither the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the Lacedaemonians shall make +war against or otherwise injure any country or cities that belong to King +Darius or did belong to his father or to his ancestors; neither shall the +Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the Lacedaemonians exact tribute from such +cities. Neither shall King Darius nor any of the subjects of the King make war +against or otherwise injure the Lacedaemonians or their allies. +</p> + +<p> +2. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies should require any assistance from the +King, or the King from the Lacedaemonians or their allies, whatever they both +agree upon they shall be right in doing. +</p> + +<p> +3. Both shall carry on jointly the war against the Athenians and their allies: +and if they make peace, both shall do so jointly. +</p> + +<p> +4. The expense of all troops in the King’s country, sent for by the King, +shall be borne by the King. +</p> + +<p> +5. If any of the states comprised in this convention with the King attack the +King’s country, the rest shall stop them and aid the King to the best of +their power. And if any in the King’s country or in the countries under +the King’s rule attack the country of the Lacedaemonians or their allies, +the King shall stop it and help them to the best of his power. +</p> + +<p> +After this convention Therimenes handed over the fleet to Astyochus, sailed off +in a small boat, and was lost. The Athenian armament had now crossed over from +Lesbos to Chios, and being master by sea and land began to fortify Delphinium, +a place naturally strong on the land side, provided with more than one harbour, +and also not far from the city of Chios. Meanwhile the Chians remained +inactive. Already defeated in so many battles, they were now also at discord +among themselves; the execution of the party of Tydeus, son of Ion, by +Pedaritus upon the charge of Atticism, followed by the forcible imposition of +an oligarchy upon the rest of the city, having made them suspicious of one +another; and they therefore thought neither themselves not the mercenaries +under Pedaritus a match for the enemy. They sent, however, to Miletus to beg +Astyochus to assist them, which he refused to do, and was accordingly denounced +at Lacedaemon by Pedaritus as a traitor. Such was the state of the Athenian +affairs at Chios; while their fleet at Samos kept sailing out against the enemy +in Miletus, until they found that he would not accept their challenge, and then +retired again to Samos and remained quiet. +</p> + +<p> +In the same winter the twenty-seven ships equipped by the Lacedaemonians for +Pharnabazus through the agency of the Megarian Calligeitus, and the Cyzicene +Timagoras, put out from Peloponnese and sailed for Ionia about the time of the +solstice, under the command of Antisthenes, a Spartan. With them the +Lacedaemonians also sent eleven Spartans as advisers to Astyochus; Lichas, son +of Arcesilaus, being among the number. Arrived at Miletus, their orders were to +aid in generally superintending the good conduct of the war; to send off the +above ships or a greater or less number to the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, if +they thought proper, appointing Clearchus, son of Ramphias, who sailed with +them, to the command; and further, if they thought proper, to make Antisthenes +admiral, dismissing Astyochus, whom the letters of Pedaritus had caused to be +regarded with suspicion. Sailing accordingly from Malea across the open sea, +the squadron touched at Melos and there fell in with ten Athenian ships, three +of which they took empty and burned. After this, being afraid that the Athenian +vessels escaped from Melos might, as they in fact did, give information of +their approach to the Athenians at Samos, they sailed to Crete, and having +lengthened their voyage by way of precaution made land at Caunus in Asia, from +whence considering themselves in safety they sent a message to the fleet at +Miletus for a convoy along the coast. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Chians and Pedaritus, undeterred by the backwardness of +Astyochus, went on sending messengers pressing him to come with all the fleet +to assist them against their besiegers, and not to leave the greatest of the +allied states in Ionia to be shut up by sea and overrun and pillaged by land. +There were more slaves at Chios than in any one other city except Lacedaemon, +and being also by reason of their numbers punished more rigorously when they +offended, most of them, when they saw the Athenian armament firmly established +in the island with a fortified position, immediately deserted to the enemy, and +through their knowledge of the country did the greatest mischief. The Chians +therefore urged upon Astyochus that it was his duty to assist them, while there +was still a hope and a possibility of stopping the enemy’s progress, +while Delphinium was still in process of fortification and unfinished, and +before the completion of a higher rampart which was being added to protect the +camp and fleet of their besiegers. Astyochus now saw that the allies also +wished it and prepared to go, in spite of his intention to the contrary owing +to the threat already referred to. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime news came from Caunus of the arrival of the twenty-seven ships +with the Lacedaemonian commissioners; and Astyochus, postponing everything to +the duty of convoying a fleet of that importance, in order to be more able to +command the sea, and to the safe conduct of the Lacedaemonians sent as spies +over his behaviour, at once gave up going to Chios and set sail for Caunus. As +he coasted along he landed at the Meropid Cos and sacked the city, which was +unfortified and had been lately laid in ruins by an earthquake, by far the +greatest in living memory, and, as the inhabitants had fled to the mountains, +overran the country and made booty of all it contained, letting go, however, +the free men. From Cos arriving in the night at Cnidus he was constrained by +the representations of the Cnidians not to disembark the sailors, but to sail +as he was straight against the twenty Athenian vessels, which with Charminus, +one of the commanders at Samos, were on the watch for the very twenty-seven +ships from Peloponnese which Astyochus was himself sailing to join; the +Athenians in Samos having heard from Melos of their approach, and Charminus +being on the look-out off Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and Lycia, as he now heard that +they were at Caunus. +</p> + +<p> +Astyochus accordingly sailed as he was to Syme, before he was heard of, in the +hope of catching the enemy somewhere out at sea. Rain, however, and foggy +weather encountered him, and caused his ships to straggle and get into disorder +in the dark. In the morning his fleet had parted company and was most of it +still straggling round the island, and the left wing only in sight of Charminus +and the Athenians, who took it for the squadron which they were watching for +from Caunus, and hastily put out against it with part only of their twenty +vessels, and attacking immediately sank three ships and disabled others, and +had the advantage in the action until the main body of the fleet unexpectedly +hove in sight, when they were surrounded on every side. Upon this they took to +flight, and after losing six ships with the rest escaped to Teutlussa or Beet +Island, and from thence to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians put +into Cnidus and, being joined by the twenty-seven ships from Caunus, sailed all +together and set up a trophy in Syme, and then returned to anchor at Cnidus. +</p> + +<p> +As soon as the Athenians knew of the sea-fight, they sailed with all the ships +at Samos to Syme, and, without attacking or being attacked by the fleet at +Cnidus, took the ships’ tackle left at Syme, and touching at Lorymi on +the mainland sailed back to Samos. Meanwhile the Peloponnesian ships, being now +all at Cnidus, underwent such repairs as were needed; while the eleven +Lacedaemonian commissioners conferred with Tissaphernes, who had come to meet +them, upon the points which did not satisfy them in the past transactions, and +upon the best and mutually most advantageous manner of conducting the war in +future. The severest critic of the present proceedings was Lichas, who said +that neither of the treaties could stand, neither that of Chalcideus, nor that +of Therimenes; it being monstrous that the King should at this date pretend to +the possession of all the country formerly ruled by himself or by his +ancestors—a pretension which implicitly put back under the yoke all the +islands—Thessaly, Locris, and everything as far as Boeotia—and made +the Lacedaemonians give to the Hellenes instead of liberty a Median master. He +therefore invited Tissaphernes to conclude another and a better treaty, as they +certainly would not recognize those existing and did not want any of his pay +upon such conditions. This offended Tissaphernes so much that he went away in a +rage without settling anything. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0025" id="link2HCH0025"></a> +CHAPTER XXV </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Twentieth and Twenty-first Years of the War—Intrigues of +Alcibiades—Withdrawal of the Persian Subsidies—Oligarchical Coup +d’Etat at Athens—Patriotism of the Army at Samos +</p> + +<p> +The Peloponnesians now determined to sail to Rhodes, upon the invitation of +some of the principal men there, hoping to gain an island powerful by the +number of its seamen and by its land forces, and also thinking that they would +be able to maintain their fleet from their own confederacy, without having to +ask for money from Tissaphernes. They accordingly at once set sail that same +winter from Cnidus, and first put in with ninety-four ships at Camirus in the +Rhodian country, to the great alarm of the mass of the inhabitants, who were +not privy to the intrigue, and who consequently fled, especially as the town +was unfortified. They were afterwards, however, assembled by the Lacedaemonians +together with the inhabitants of the two other towns of Lindus and Ialysus; and +the Rhodians were persuaded to revolt from the Athenians and the island went +over to the Peloponnesians. Meanwhile the Athenians had received the alarm and +set sail with the fleet from Samos to forestall them, and came within sight of +the island, but being a little too late sailed off for the moment to Chalce, +and from thence to Samos, and subsequently waged war against Rhodes, issuing +from Chalce, Cos, and Samos. +</p> + +<p> +The Peloponnesians now levied a contribution of thirty-two talents from the +Rhodians, after which they hauled their ships ashore and for eighty days +remained inactive. During this time, and even earlier, before they removed to +Rhodes, the following intrigues took place. After the death of Chalcideus and +the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades began to be suspected by the Peloponnesians; +and Astyochus received from Lacedaemon an order from them to put him to death, +he being the personal enemy of Agis, and in other respects thought unworthy of +confidence. Alcibiades in his alarm first withdrew to Tissaphernes, and +immediately began to do all he could with him to injure the Peloponnesian +cause. Henceforth becoming his adviser in everything, he cut down the pay from +an Attic drachma to three obols a day, and even this not paid too regularly; +and told Tissaphernes to say to the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, whose +maritime experience was of an older date than their own, only gave their men +three obols, not so much from poverty as to prevent their seamen being +corrupted by being too well off, and injuring their condition by spending money +upon enervating indulgences, and also paid their crews irregularly in order to +have a security against their deserting in the arrears which they would leave +behind them. He also told Tissaphernes to bribe the captains and generals of +the cities, and so to obtain their connivance—an expedient which +succeeded with all except the Syracusans, Hermocrates alone opposing him on +behalf of the whole confederacy. Meanwhile the cities asking for money +Alcibiades sent off, by roundly telling them in the name of Tissaphernes that +it was great impudence in the Chians, the richest people in Hellas, not content +with being defended by a foreign force, to expect others to risk not only their +lives but their money as well in behalf of their freedom; while the other +cities, he said, had had to pay largely to Athens before their rebellion, and +could not justly refuse to contribute as much or even more now for their own +selves. He also pointed out that Tissaphernes was at present carrying on the +war at his own charges, and had good cause for economy, but that as soon as he +received remittances from the king he would give them their pay in full and do +what was reasonable for the cities. +</p> + +<p> +Alcibiades further advised Tissaphernes not to be in too great a hurry to end +the war, or to let himself be persuaded to bring up the Phoenician fleet which +he was equipping, or to provide pay for more Hellenes, and thus put the power +by land and sea into the same hands; but to leave each of the contending +parties in possession of one element, thus enabling the king when he found one +troublesome to call in the other. For if the command of the sea and land were +united in one hand, he would not know where to turn for help to overthrow the +dominant power; unless he at last chose to stand up himself, and go through +with the struggle at great expense and hazard. The cheapest plan was to let the +Hellenes wear each other out, at a small share of the expense and without risk +to himself. Besides, he would find the Athenians the most convenient partners +in empire as they did not aim at conquests on shore, and carried on the war +upon principles and with a practice most advantageous to the King; being +prepared to combine to conquer the sea for Athens, and for the King all the +Hellenes inhabiting his country, whom the Peloponnesians, on the contrary, had +come to liberate. Now it was not likely that the Lacedaemonians would free the +Hellenes from the Hellenic Athenians, without freeing them also from the +barbarian Mede, unless overthrown by him in the meanwhile. Alcibiades therefore +urged him to wear them both out at first, and, after docking the Athenian power +as much as he could, forthwith to rid the country of the Peloponnesians. In the +main Tissaphernes approved of this policy, so far at least as could be +conjectured from his behaviour; since he now gave his confidence to Alcibiades +in recognition of his good advice, and kept the Peloponnesians short of money, +and would not let them fight at sea, but ruined their cause by pretending that +the Phoenician fleet would arrive, and that they would thus be enabled to +contend with the odds in their favour, and so made their navy lose its +efficiency, which had been very remarkable, and generally betrayed a coolness +in the war that was too plain to be mistaken. +</p> + +<p> +Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, with whom he then +was, not merely because he thought it really the best, but because he was +studying means to effect his restoration to his country, well knowing that if +he did not destroy it he might one day hope to persuade the Athenians to recall +him, and thinking that his best chance of persuading them lay in letting them +see that he possessed the favour of Tissaphernes. The event proved him to be +right. When the Athenians at Samos found that he had influence with +Tissaphernes, principally of their own motion (though partly also through +Alcibiades himself sending word to their chief men to tell the best men in the +army that, if there were only an oligarchy in the place of the rascally +democracy that had banished him, he would be glad to return to his country and +to make Tissaphernes their friend), the captains and chief men in the armament +at once embraced the idea of subverting the democracy. +</p> + +<p> +The design was first mooted in the camp, and afterwards from thence reached the +city. Some persons crossed over from Samos and had an interview with +Alcibiades, who immediately offered to make first Tissaphernes, and afterwards +the King, their friend, if they would give up the democracy and make it +possible for the King to trust them. The higher class, who also suffered most +severely from the war, now conceived great hopes of getting the government into +their own hands, and of triumphing over the enemy. Upon their return to Samos +the emissaries formed their partisans into a club, and openly told the mass of +the armament that the King would be their friend, and would provide them with +money, if Alcibiades were restored and the democracy abolished. The multitude, +if at first irritated by these intrigues, were nevertheless kept quiet by the +advantageous prospect of the pay from the King; and the oligarchical +conspirators, after making this communication to the people, now re-examined +the proposals of Alcibiades among themselves, with most of their associates. +Unlike the rest, who thought them advantageous and trustworthy, Phrynichus, who +was still general, by no means approved of the proposals. Alcibiades, he +rightly thought, cared no more for an oligarchy than for a democracy, and only +sought to change the institutions of his country in order to get himself +recalled by his associates; while for themselves their one object should be to +avoid civil discord. It was not the King’s interest, when the +Peloponnesians were now their equals at sea, and in possession of some of the +chief cities in his empire, to go out of his way to side with the Athenians +whom he did not trust, when he might make friends of the Peloponnesians who had +never injured him. And as for the allied states to whom oligarchy was now +offered, because the democracy was to be put down at Athens, he well knew that +this would not make the rebels come in any the sooner, or confirm the loyal in +their allegiance; as the allies would never prefer servitude with an oligarchy +or democracy to freedom with the constitution which they actually enjoyed, to +whichever type it belonged. Besides, the cities thought that the so-called +better classes would prove just as oppressive as the commons, as being those +who originated, proposed, and for the most part benefited from the acts of the +commons injurious to the confederates. Indeed, if it depended on the better +classes, the confederates would be put to death without trial and with +violence; while the commons were their refuge and the chastiser of these men. +This he positively knew that the cities had learned by experience, and that +such was their opinion. The propositions of Alcibiades, and the intrigues now +in progress, could therefore never meet with his approval. +</p> + +<p> +However, the members of the club assembled, agreeably to their original +determination, accepted what was proposed, and prepared to send Pisander and +others on an embassy to Athens to treat for the restoration of Alcibiades and +the abolition of the democracy in the city, and thus to make Tissaphernes the +friend of the Athenians. +</p> + +<p> +Phrynichus now saw that there would be a proposal to restore Alcibiades, and +that the Athenians would consent to it; and fearing after what he had said +against it that Alcibiades, if restored, would revenge himself upon him for his +opposition, had recourse to the following expedient. He sent a secret letter to +the Lacedaemonian admiral Astyochus, who was still in the neighbourhood of +Miletus, to tell him that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by making +Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians, and containing an express revelation +of the rest of the intrigue, desiring to be excused if he sought to harm his +enemy even at the expense of the interests of his country. However, Astyochus, +instead of thinking of punishing Alcibiades, who, besides, no longer ventured +within his reach as formerly, went up to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, +communicated to them the letter from Samos, and turned informer, and, if report +may be trusted, became the paid creature of Tissaphernes, undertaking to inform +him as to this and all other matters; which was also the reason why he did not +remonstrate more strongly against the pay not being given in full. Upon this +Alcibiades instantly sent to the authorities at Samos a letter against +Phrynichus, stating what he had done, and requiring that he should be put to +death. Phrynichus distracted, and placed in the utmost peril by the +denunciation, sent again to Astyochus, reproaching him with having so ill kept +the secret of his previous letter, and saying that he was now prepared to give +them an opportunity of destroying the whole Athenian armament at Samos; giving +a detailed account of the means which he should employ, Samos being +unfortified, and pleading that, being in danger of his life on their account, +he could not now be blamed for doing this or anything else to escape being +destroyed by his mortal enemies. This also Astyochus revealed to Alcibiades. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Phrynichus having had timely notice that he was playing him false, +and that a letter on the subject was on the point of arriving from Alcibiades, +himself anticipated the news, and told the army that the enemy, seeing that +Samos was unfortified and the fleet not all stationed within the harbour, meant +to attack the camp, that he could be certain of this intelligence, and that +they must fortify Samos as quickly as possible, and generally look to their +defences. It will be remembered that he was general, and had himself authority +to carry out these measures. Accordingly they addressed themselves to the work +of fortification, and Samos was thus fortified sooner than it would otherwise +have been. Not long afterwards came the letter from Alcibiades, saying that the +army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and the enemy about to attack it. Alcibiades, +however, gained no credit, it being thought that he was in the secret of the +enemy’s designs, and had tried to fasten them upon Phrynichus, and to +make out that he was their accomplice, out of hatred; and consequently far from +hurting him he rather bore witness to what he had said by this intelligence. +</p> + +<p> +After this Alcibiades set to work to persuade Tissaphernes to become the friend +of the Athenians. Tissaphernes, although afraid of the Peloponnesians because +they had more ships in Asia than the Athenians, was yet disposed to be +persuaded if he could, especially after his quarrel with the Peloponnesians at +Cnidus about the treaty of Therimenes. The quarrel had already taken place, as +the Peloponnesians were by this time actually at Rhodes; and in it the original +argument of Alcibiades touching the liberation of all the towns by the +Lacedaemonians had been verified by the declaration of Lichas that it was +impossible to submit to a convention which made the King master of all the +states at any former time ruled by himself or by his fathers. +</p> + +<p> +While Alcibiades was besieging the favour of Tissaphernes with an earnestness +proportioned to the greatness of the issue, the Athenian envoys who had been +dispatched from Samos with Pisander arrived at Athens, and made a speech before +the people, giving a brief summary of their views, and particularly insisting +that, if Alcibiades were recalled and the democratic constitution changed, they +could have the King as their ally, and would be able to overcome the +Peloponnesians. A number of speakers opposed them on the question of the +democracy, the enemies of Alcibiades cried out against the scandal of a +restoration to be effected by a violation of the constitution, and the +Eumolpidae and Ceryces protested in behalf of the mysteries, the cause of his +banishment, and called upon the gods to avert his recall; when Pisander, in the +midst of much opposition and abuse, came forward, and taking each of his +opponents aside asked him the following question: In the face of the fact that +the Peloponnesians had as many ships as their own confronting them at sea, more +cities in alliance with them, and the King and Tissaphernes to supply them with +money, of which the Athenians had none left, had he any hope of saving the +state, unless someone could induce the King to come over to their side? Upon +their replying that they had not, he then plainly said to them: “This we +cannot have unless we have a more moderate form of government, and put the +offices into fewer hands, and so gain the King’s confidence, and +forthwith restore Alcibiades, who is the only man living that can bring this +about. The safety of the state, not the form of its government, is for the +moment the most pressing question, as we can always change afterwards whatever +we do not like.” +</p> + +<p> +The people were at first highly irritated at the mention of an oligarchy, but +upon understanding clearly from Pisander that this was the only resource left, +they took counsel of their fears, and promised themselves some day to change +the government again, and gave way. They accordingly voted that Pisander should +sail with ten others and make the best arrangement that they could with +Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. At the same time the people, upon a false +accusation of Pisander, dismissed Phrynichus from his post together with his +colleague Scironides, sending Diomedon and Leon to replace them in the command +of the fleet. The accusation was that Phrynichus had betrayed Iasus and +Amorges; and Pisander brought it because he thought him a man unfit for the +business now in hand with Alcibiades. Pisander also went the round of all the +clubs already existing in the city for help in lawsuits and elections, and +urged them to draw together and to unite their efforts for the overthrow of the +democracy; and after taking all other measures required by the circumstances, +so that no time might be lost, set off with his ten companions on his voyage to +Tissaphernes. +</p> + +<p> +In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had by this time joined the fleet, +made an attack upon Rhodes. The ships of the Peloponnesians they found hauled +up on shore, and, after making a descent upon the coast and defeating the +Rhodians who appeared in the field against them, withdrew to Chalce and made +that place their base of operations instead of Cos, as they could better +observe from thence if the Peloponnesian fleet put out to sea. Meanwhile +Xenophantes, a Laconian, came to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, with the news +that the fortification of the Athenians was now finished, and that, unless the +whole Peloponnesian fleet came to the rescue, the cause in Chios must be lost. +Upon this they resolved to go to his relief. In the meantime Pedaritus, with +the mercenaries that he had with him and the whole force of the Chians, made an +assault upon the work round the Athenian ships and took a portion of it, and +got possession of some vessels that were hauled up on shore, when the Athenians +sallied out to the rescue, and first routing the Chians, next defeated the +remainder of the force round Pedaritus, who was himself killed, with many of +the Chians, a great number of arms being also taken. +</p> + +<p> +After this the Chians were besieged even more straitly than before by land and +sea, and the famine in the place was great. Meanwhile the Athenian envoys with +Pisander arrived at the court of Tissaphernes, and conferred with him about the +proposed agreement. However, Alcibiades, not being altogether sure of +Tissaphernes (who feared the Peloponnesians more than the Athenians, and +besides wished to wear out both parties, as Alcibiades himself had +recommended), had recourse to the following stratagem to make the treaty +between the Athenians and Tissaphernes miscarry by reason of the magnitude of +his demands. In my opinion Tissaphernes desired this result, fear being his +motive; while Alcibiades, who now saw that Tissaphernes was determined not to +treat on any terms, wished the Athenians to think, not that he was unable to +persuade Tissaphernes, but that after the latter had been persuaded and was +willing to join them, they had not conceded enough to him. For the demands of +Alcibiades, speaking for Tissaphernes, who was present, were so extravagant +that the Athenians, although for a long while they agreed to whatever he asked, +yet had to bear the blame of failure: he required the cession of the whole of +Ionia, next of the islands adjacent, besides other concessions, and these +passed without opposition; at last, in the third interview, Alcibiades, who now +feared a complete discovery of his inability, required them to allow the King +to build ships and sail along his own coast wherever and with as many as he +pleased. Upon this the Athenians would yield no further, and concluding that +there was nothing to be done, but that they had been deceived by Alcibiades, +went away in a passion and proceeded to Samos. +</p> + +<p> +Tissaphernes immediately after this, in the same winter, proceeded along shore +to Caunus, desiring to bring the Peloponnesian fleet back to Miletus, and to +supply them with pay, making a fresh convention upon such terms as he could +get, in order not to bring matters to an absolute breach between them. He was +afraid that if many of their ships were left without pay they would be +compelled to engage and be defeated, or that their vessels being left without +hands the Athenians would attain their objects without his assistance. Still +more he feared that the Peloponnesians might ravage the continent in search of +supplies. Having calculated and considered all this, agreeably to his plan of +keeping the two sides equal, he now sent for the Peloponnesians and gave them +pay, and concluded with them a third treaty in words following: +</p> + +<p> +In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas was ephor at +Lacedaemon, a convention was concluded in the plain of the Maeander by the +Lacedaemonians and their allies with Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of +Pharnaces, concerning the affairs of the King and of the Lacedaemonians and +their allies. +</p> + +<p> +1. The country of the King in Asia shall be the King’s, and the King +shall treat his own country as he pleases. +</p> + +<p> +2. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not invade or injure the +King’s country: neither shall the King invade or injure that of the +Lacedaemonians or of their allies. If any of the Lacedaemonians or of their +allies invade or injure the King’s country, the Lacedaemonians and their +allies shall prevent it: and if any from the King’s country invade or +injure the country of the Lacedaemonians or of their allies, the King shall +prevent it. +</p> + +<p> +3. Tissaphernes shall provide pay for the ships now present, according to the +agreement, until the arrival of the King’s vessels: but after the arrival +of the King’s vessels the Lacedaemonians and their allies may pay their +own ships if they wish it. If, however, they choose to receive the pay from +Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall furnish it: and the Lacedaemonians and their +allies shall repay him at the end of the war such moneys as they shall have +received. +</p> + +<p> +4. After the vessels have arrived, the ships of the Lacedaemonians and of their +allies and those of the King shall carry on the war jointly, according as +Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall think best. If they +wish to make peace with the Athenians, they shall make peace also jointly. +</p> + +<p> +This was the treaty. After this Tissaphernes prepared to bring up the +Phoenician fleet according to agreement, and to make good his other promises, +or at all events wished to make it appear that he was so preparing. +</p> + +<p> +Winter was now drawing towards its close, when the Boeotians took Oropus by +treachery, though held by an Athenian garrison. Their accomplices in this were +some of the Eretrians and of the Oropians themselves, who were plotting the +revolt of Euboea, as the place was exactly opposite Eretria, and while in +Athenian hands was necessarily a source of great annoyance to Eretria and the +rest of Euboea. Oropus being in their hands, the Eretrians now came to Rhodes +to invite the Peloponnesians into Euboea. The latter, however, were rather bent +on the relief of the distressed Chians, and accordingly put out to sea and +sailed with all their ships from Rhodes. Off Triopium they sighted the Athenian +fleet out at sea sailing from Chalce, and, neither attacking the other, +arrived, the latter at Samos, the Peloponnesians at Miletus, seeing that it was +no longer possible to relieve Chios without a battle. And this winter ended, +and with it ended the twentieth year of this war of which Thucydides is the +historian. +</p> + +<p> +Early in the spring of the summer following, Dercyllidas, a Spartan, was sent +with a small force by land to the Hellespont to effect the revolt of Abydos, +which is a Milesian colony; and the Chians, while Astyochus was at a loss how +to help them, were compelled to fight at sea by the pressure of the siege. +While Astyochus was still at Rhodes they had received from Miletus, as their +commander after the death of Pedaritus, a Spartan named Leon, who had come out +with Antisthenes, and twelve vessels which had been on guard at Miletus, five +of which were Thurian, four Syracusans, one from Anaia, one Milesian, and one +Leon’s own. Accordingly the Chians marched out in mass and took up a +strong position, while thirty-six of their ships put out and engaged thirty-two +of the Athenians; and after a tough fight, in which the Chians and their allies +had rather the best of it, as it was now late, retired to their city. +</p> + +<p> +Immediately after this Dercyllidas arrived by land from Miletus; and Abydos in +the Hellespont revolted to him and Pharnabazus, and Lampsacus two days later. +Upon receipt of this news Strombichides hastily sailed from Chios with +twenty-four Athenian ships, some transports carrying heavy infantry being of +the number, and defeating the Lampsacenes who came out against him, took +Lampsacus, which was unfortified, at the first assault, and making prize of the +slaves and goods restored the freemen to their homes, and went on to Abydos. +The inhabitants, however, refusing to capitulate, and his assaults failing to +take the place, he sailed over to the coast opposite, and appointed Sestos, the +town in the Chersonese held by the Medes at a former period in this history, as +the centre for the defence of the whole Hellespont. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime the Chians commanded the sea more than before; and the +Peloponnesians at Miletus and Astyochus, hearing of the sea-fight and of the +departure of the squadron with Strombichides, took fresh courage. Coasting +along with two vessels to Chios, Astyochus took the ships from that place, and +now moved with the whole fleet upon Samos, from whence, however, he sailed back +to Miletus, as the Athenians did not put out against him, owing to their +suspicions of one another. For it was about this time, or even before, that the +democracy was put down at Athens. When Pisander and the envoys returned from +Tissaphernes to Samos they at once strengthened still further their interest in +the army itself, and instigated the upper class in Samos to join them in +establishing an oligarchy, the very form of government which a party of them +had lately risen to avoid. At the same time the Athenians at Samos, after a +consultation among themselves, determined to let Alcibiades alone, since he +refused to join them, and besides was not the man for an oligarchy; and now +that they were once embarked, to see for themselves how they could best prevent +the ruin of their cause, and meanwhile to sustain the war, and to contribute +without stint money and all else that might be required from their own private +estates, as they would henceforth labour for themselves alone. +</p> + +<p> +After encouraging each other in these resolutions, they now at once sent off +half the envoys and Pisander to do what was necessary at Athens (with +instructions to establish oligarchies on their way in all the subject cities +which they might touch at), and dispatched the other half in different +directions to the other dependencies. Diitrephes also, who was in the +neighbourhood of Chios, and had been elected to the command of the Thracian +towns, was sent off to his government, and arriving at Thasos abolished the +democracy there. Two months, however, had not elapsed after his departure +before the Thasians began to fortify their town, being already tired of an +aristocracy with Athens, and in daily expectation of freedom from Lacedaemon. +Indeed there was a party of them (whom the Athenians had banished), with the +Peloponnesians, who with their friends in the town were already making every +exertion to bring a squadron, and to effect the revolt of Thasos; and this +party thus saw exactly what they most wanted done, that is to say, the +reformation of the government without risk, and the abolition of the democracy +which would have opposed them. Things at Thasos thus turned out just the +contrary to what the oligarchical conspirators at Athens expected; and the same +in my opinion was the case in many of the other dependencies; as the cities no +sooner got a moderate government and liberty of action, than they went on to +absolute freedom without being at all seduced by the show of reform offered by +the Athenians. +</p> + +<p> +Pisander and his colleagues on their voyage alongshore abolished, as had been +determined, the democracies in the cities, and also took some heavy infantry +from certain places as their allies, and so came to Athens. Here they found +most of the work already done by their associates. Some of the younger men had +banded together, and secretly assassinated one Androcles, the chief leader of +the commons, and mainly responsible for the banishment of Alcibiades; Androcles +being singled out both because he was a popular leader and because they sought +by his death to recommend themselves to Alcibiades, who was, as they supposed, +to be recalled, and to make Tissaphernes their friend. There were also some +other obnoxious persons whom they secretly did away with in the same manner. +Meanwhile their cry in public was that no pay should be given except to persons +serving in the war, and that not more than five thousand should share in the +government, and those such as were most able to serve the state in person and +in purse. +</p> + +<p> +But this was a mere catchword for the multitude, as the authors of the +revolution were really to govern. However, the Assembly and the Council of the +Bean still met notwithstanding, although they discussed nothing that was not +approved of by the conspirators, who both supplied the speakers and reviewed in +advance what they were to say. Fear, and the sight of the numbers of the +conspirators, closed the mouths of the rest; or if any ventured to rise in +opposition, he was presently put to death in some convenient way, and there was +neither search for the murderers nor justice to be had against them if +suspected; but the people remained motionless, being so thoroughly cowed that +men thought themselves lucky to escape violence, even when they held their +tongues. An exaggerated belief in the numbers of the conspirators also +demoralized the people, rendered helpless by the magnitude of the city, and by +their want of intelligence with each other, and being without means of finding +out what those numbers really were. For the same reason it was impossible for +any one to open his grief to a neighbour and to concert measures to defend +himself, as he would have had to speak either to one whom he did not know, or +whom he knew but did not trust. Indeed all the popular party approached each +other with suspicion, each thinking his neighbour concerned in what was going +on, the conspirators having in their ranks persons whom no one could ever have +believed capable of joining an oligarchy; and these it was who made the many so +suspicious, and so helped to procure impunity for the few, by confirming the +commons in their mistrust of one another. +</p> + +<p> +At this juncture arrived Pisander and his colleagues, who lost no time in doing +the rest. First they assembled the people, and moved to elect ten commissioners +with full powers to frame a constitution, and that when this was done they +should on an appointed day lay before the people their opinion as to the best +mode of governing the city. Afterwards, when the day arrived, the conspirators +enclosed the assembly in Colonus, a temple of Poseidon, a little more than a +mile outside the city; when the commissioners simply brought forward this +single motion, that any Athenian might propose with impunity whatever measure +he pleased, heavy penalties being imposed upon any who should indict for +illegality, or otherwise molest him for so doing. The way thus cleared, it was +now plainly declared that all tenure of office and receipt of pay under the +existing institutions were at an end, and that five men must be elected as +presidents, who should in their turn elect one hundred, and each of the hundred +three apiece; and that this body thus made up to four hundred should enter the +council chamber with full powers and govern as they judged best, and should +convene the five thousand whenever they pleased. +</p> + +<p> +The man who moved this resolution was Pisander, who was throughout the chief +ostensible agent in putting down the democracy. But he who concerted the whole +affair, and prepared the way for the catastrophe, and who had given the +greatest thought to the matter, was Antiphon, one of the best men of his day in +Athens; who, with a head to contrive measures and a tongue to recommend them, +did not willingly come forward in the assembly or upon any public scene, being +ill looked upon by the multitude owing to his reputation for talent; and who +yet was the one man best able to aid in the courts, or before the assembly, the +suitors who required his opinion. Indeed, when he was afterwards himself tried +for his life on the charge of having been concerned in setting up this very +government, when the Four Hundred were overthrown and hardly dealt with by the +commons, he made what would seem to be the best defence of any known up to my +time. Phrynichus also went beyond all others in his zeal for the oligarchy. +Afraid of Alcibiades, and assured that he was no stranger to his intrigues with +Astyochus at Samos, he held that no oligarchy was ever likely to restore him, +and once embarked in the enterprise, proved, where danger was to be faced, by +far the staunchest of them all. Theramenes, son of Hagnon, was also one of the +foremost of the subverters of the democracy—a man as able in council as +in debate. Conducted by so many and by such sagacious heads, the enterprise, +great as it was, not unnaturally went forward; although it was no light matter +to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom, almost a hundred years after the +deposition of the tyrants, when it had been not only not subject to any during +the whole of that period, but accustomed during more than half of it to rule +over subjects of its own. +</p> + +<p> +The assembly ratified the proposed constitution, without a single opposing +voice, and was then dissolved; after which the Four Hundred were brought into +the council chamber in the following way. On account of the enemy at Decelea, +all the Athenians were constantly on the wall or in the ranks at the various +military posts. On that day the persons not in the secret were allowed to go +home as usual, while orders were given to the accomplices of the conspirators +to hang about, without making any demonstration, at some little distance from +the posts, and in case of any opposition to what was being done, to seize the +arms and put it down. There were also some Andrians and Tenians, three hundred +Carystians, and some of the settlers in Aegina come with their own arms for +this very purpose, who had received similar instructions. These dispositions +completed, the Four Hundred went, each with a dagger concealed about his +person, accompanied by one hundred and twenty Hellenic youths, whom they +employed wherever violence was needed, and appeared before the Councillors of +the Bean in the council chamber, and told them to take their pay and be gone; +themselves bringing it for the whole of the residue of their term of office, +and giving it to them as they went out. +</p> + +<p> +Upon the Council withdrawing in this way without venturing any objection, and +the rest of the citizens making no movement, the Four Hundred entered the +council chamber, and for the present contented themselves with drawing lots for +their Prytanes, and making their prayers and sacrifices to the gods upon +entering office, but afterwards departed widely from the democratic system of +government, and except that on account of Alcibiades they did not recall the +exiles, ruled the city by force; putting to death some men, though not many, +whom they thought it convenient to remove, and imprisoning and banishing +others. They also sent to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, at Decelea, to say that +they desired to make peace, and that he might reasonably be more disposed to +treat now that he had them to deal with instead of the inconstant commons. +</p> + +<p> +Agis, however, did not believe in the tranquillity of the city, or that the +commons would thus in a moment give up their ancient liberty, but thought that +the sight of a large Lacedaemonian force would be sufficient to excite them if +they were not already in commotion, of which he was by no means certain. He +accordingly gave to the envoys of the Four Hundred an answer which held out no +hopes of an accommodation, and sending for large reinforcements from +Peloponnese, not long afterwards, with these and his garrison from Decelea, +descended to the very walls of Athens; hoping either that civil disturbances +might help to subdue them to his terms, or that, in the confusion to be +expected within and without the city, they might even surrender without a blow +being struck; at all events he thought he would succeed in seizing the Long +Walls, bared of their defenders. However, the Athenians saw him come close up, +without making the least disturbance within the city; and sending out their +cavalry, and a number of their heavy infantry, light troops, and archers, shot +down some of his soldiers who approached too near, and got possession of some +arms and dead. Upon this Agis, at last convinced, led his army back again and, +remaining with his own troops in the old position at Decelea, sent the +reinforcement back home, after a few days’ stay in Attica. After this the +Four Hundred persevering sent another embassy to Agis, and now meeting with a +better reception, at his suggestion dispatched envoys to Lacedaemon to +negotiate a treaty, being desirous of making peace. +</p> + +<p> +They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army, and to explain that the +oligarchy was not established for the hurt of the city or the citizens, but for +the salvation of the country at large; and that there were five thousand, not +four hundred only, concerned; although, what with their expeditions and +employments abroad, the Athenians had never yet assembled to discuss a question +important enough to bring five thousand of them together. The emissaries were +also told what to say upon all other points, and were so sent off immediately +after the establishment of the new government, which feared, as it turned out +justly, that the mass of seamen would not be willing to remain under the +oligarchical constitution, and, the evil beginning there, might be the means of +their overthrow. +</p> + +<p> +Indeed at Samos the question of the oligarchy had already entered upon a new +phase, the following events having taken place just at the time that the Four +Hundred were conspiring. That part of the Samian population which has been +mentioned as rising against the upper class, and as being the democratic party, +had now turned round, and yielding to the solicitations of Pisander during his +visit, and of the Athenians in the conspiracy at Samos, had bound themselves by +oaths to the number of three hundred, and were about to fall upon the rest of +their fellow citizens, whom they now in their turn regarded as the democratic +party. Meanwhile they put to death one Hyperbolus, an Athenian, a pestilent +fellow that had been ostracized, not from fear of his influence or position, +but because he was a rascal and a disgrace to the city; being aided in this by +Charminus, one of the generals, and by some of the Athenians with them, to whom +they had sworn friendship, and with whom they perpetrated other acts of the +kind, and now determined to attack the people. The latter got wind of what was +coming, and told two of the generals, Leon and Diomedon, who, on account of the +credit which they enjoyed with the commons, were unwilling supporters of the +oligarchy; and also Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the former a captain of a +galley, the latter serving with the heavy infantry, besides certain others who +had ever been thought most opposed to the conspirators, entreating them not to +look on and see them destroyed, and Samos, the sole remaining stay of their +empire, lost to the Athenians. Upon hearing this, the persons whom they +addressed now went round the soldiers one by one, and urged them to resist, +especially the crew of the Paralus, which was made up entirely of Athenians and +freemen, and had from time out of mind been enemies of oligarchy, even when +there was no such thing existing; and Leon and Diomedon left behind some ships +for their protection in case of their sailing away anywhere themselves. +Accordingly, when the Three Hundred attacked the people, all these came to the +rescue, and foremost of all the crew of the Paralus; and the Samian commons +gained the victory, and putting to death some thirty of the Three Hundred, and +banishing three others of the ringleaders, accorded an amnesty to the rest, and +lived together under a democratic government for the future. +</p> + +<p> +The ship Paralus, with Chaereas, son of Archestratus, on board, an Athenian who +had taken an active part in the revolution, was now without loss of time sent +off by the Samians and the army to Athens to report what had occurred; the fact +that the Four Hundred were in power not being yet known. When they sailed into +harbour the Four Hundred immediately arrested two or three of the Parali and, +taking the vessel from the rest, shifted them into a troopship and set them to +keep guard round Euboea. Chaereas, however, managed to secrete himself as soon +as he saw how things stood, and returning to Samos, drew a picture to the +soldiers of the horrors enacting at Athens, in which everything was +exaggerated; saying that all were punished with stripes, that no one could say +a word against the holders of power, that the soldiers’ wives and +children were outraged, and that it was intended to seize and shut up the +relatives of all in the army at Samos who were not of the government’s +way of thinking, to be put to death in case of their disobedience; besides a +host of other injurious inventions. +</p> + +<p> +On hearing this the first thought of the army was to fall upon the chief +authors of the oligarchy and upon all the rest concerned. Eventually, however, +they desisted from this idea upon the men of moderate views opposing it and +warning them against ruining their cause, with the enemy close at hand and +ready for battle. After this, Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, the +chief leaders in the revolution, now wishing in the most public manner to +change the government at Samos to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by the +most tremendous oaths, and those of the oligarchical party more than any, to +accept a democratic government, to be united, to prosecute actively the war +with the Peloponnesians, and to be enemies of the Four Hundred, and to hold no +communication with them. The same oath was also taken by all the Samians of +full age; and the soldiers associated the Samians in all their affairs and in +the fruits of their dangers, having the conviction that there was no way of +escape for themselves or for them, but that the success of the Four Hundred or +of the enemy at Miletus must be their ruin. +</p> + +<p> +The struggle now was between the army trying to force a democracy upon the +city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy upon the camp. Meanwhile the soldiers +forthwith held an assembly, in which they deposed the former generals and any +of the captains whom they suspected, and chose new captains and generals to +replace them, besides Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, whom they had already. They +also stood up and encouraged one another, and among other things urged that +they ought not to lose heart because the city had revolted from them, as the +party seceding was smaller and in every way poorer in resources than +themselves. They had the whole fleet with which to compel the other cities in +their empire to give them money just as if they had their base in the capital, +having a city in Samos which, so far from wanting strength, had when at war +been within an ace of depriving the Athenians of the command of the sea, while +as far as the enemy was concerned they had the same base of operations as +before. Indeed, with the fleet in their hands, they were better able to provide +themselves with supplies than the government at home. It was their advanced +position at Samos which had throughout enabled the home authorities to command +the entrance into Piraeus; and if they refused to give them back the +constitution, they would now find that the army was more in a position to +exclude them from the sea than they were to exclude the army. Besides, the city +was of little or no use towards enabling them to overcome the enemy; and they +had lost nothing in losing those who had no longer either money to send them +(the soldiers having to find this for themselves), or good counsel, which +entitles cities to direct armies. On the contrary, even in this the home +government had done wrong in abolishing the institutions of their ancestors, +while the army maintained the said institutions, and would try to force the +home government to do so likewise. So that even in point of good counsel the +camp had as good counsellors as the city. Moreover, they had but to grant him +security for his person and his recall, and Alcibiades would be only too glad +to procure them the alliance of the King. And above all if they failed +altogether, with the navy which they possessed, they had numbers of places to +retire to in which they would find cities and lands. +</p> + +<p> +Debating together and comforting themselves after this manner, they pushed on +their war measures as actively as ever; and the ten envoys sent to Samos by the +Four Hundred, learning how matters stood while they were still at Delos, stayed +quiet there. +</p> + +<p> +About this time a cry arose a Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus that Astyochus and +Tissaphernes were ruining their cause. Astyochus had not been willing to fight +at sea—either before, while they were still in full vigour and the fleet +of the Athenians small, or now, when the enemy was, as they were informed, in a +state of sedition and his ships not yet united—but kept them waiting for +the Phoenician fleet from Tissaphernes, which had only a nominal existence, at +the risk of wasting away in inactivity. While Tissaphernes not only did not +bring up the fleet in question, but was ruining their navy by payments made +irregularly, and even then not made in full. They must therefore, they +insisted, delay no longer, but fight a decisive naval engagement. The +Syracusans were the most urgent of any. +</p> + +<p> +The confederates and Astyochus, aware of these murmurs, had already decided in +council to fight a decisive battle; and when the news reached them of the +disturbance at Samos, they put to sea with all their ships, one hundred and ten +in number, and, ordering the Milesians to move by land upon Mycale, set sail +thither. The Athenians with the eighty-two ships from Samos were at the moment +lying at Glauce in Mycale, a point where Samos approaches near to the +continent; and, seeing the Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them, retired +into Samos, not thinking themselves numerically strong enough to stake their +all upon a battle. Besides, they had notice from Miletus of the wish of the +enemy to engage, and were expecting to be joined from the Hellespont by +Strombichides, to whom a messenger had been already dispatched, with the ships +that had gone from Chios to Abydos. The Athenians accordingly withdrew to +Samos, and the Peloponnesians put in at Mycale, and encamped with the land +forces of the Milesians and the people of the neighbourhood. The next day they +were about to sail against Samos, when tidings reached them of the arrival of +Strombichides with the squadron from the Hellespont, upon which they +immediately sailed back to Miletus. The Athenians, thus reinforced, now in +their turn sailed against Miletus with a hundred and eight ships, wishing to +fight a decisive battle, but, as no one put out to meet them, sailed back to +Samos. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="link2HCH0026" id="link2HCH0026"></a> +CHAPTER XXVI </h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Twenty-first Year of the War—Recall of Alcibiades to Samos—Revolt +of Euboea and Downfall of the Four Hundred—Battle of Cynossema +</p> + +<p> +In the same summer, immediately after this, the Peloponnesians having refused +to fight with their fleet united, through not thinking themselves a match for +the enemy, and being at a loss where to look for money for such a number of +ships, especially as Tissaphernes proved so bad a paymaster, sent off +Clearchus, son of Ramphias, with forty ships to Pharnabazus, agreeably to the +original instructions from Peloponnese; Pharnabazus inviting them and being +prepared to furnish pay, and Byzantium besides sending offers to revolt to +them. These Peloponnesian ships accordingly put out into the open sea, in order +to escape the observation of the Athenians, and being overtaken by a storm, the +majority with Clearchus got into Delos, and afterwards returned to Miletus, +whence Clearchus proceeded by land to the Hellespont to take the command: ten, +however, of their number, under the Megarian Helixus, made good their passage +to the Hellespont, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. After this, the +commanders at Samos were informed of it, and sent a squadron against them to +guard the Hellespont; and an encounter took place before Byzantium between +eight vessels on either side. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the chiefs at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who from the moment +that he had changed the government had remained firmly resolved to recall +Alcibiades, at last in an assembly brought over the mass of the soldiery, and +upon their voting for his recall and amnesty, sailed over to Tissaphernes and +brought Alcibiades to Samos, being convinced that their only chance of +salvation lay in his bringing over Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to +themselves. An assembly was then held in which Alcibiades complained of and +deplored his private misfortune in having been banished, and speaking at great +length upon public affairs, highly incited their hopes for the future, and +extravagantly magnified his own influence with Tissaphernes. His object in this +was to make the oligarchical government at Athens afraid of him, to hasten the +dissolution of the clubs, to increase his credit with the army at Samos and +heighten their own confidence, and lastly to prejudice the enemy as strongly as +possible against Tissaphernes, and blast the hopes which they entertained. +Alcibiades accordingly held out to the army such extravagant promises as the +following: that Tissaphernes had solemnly assured him that if he could only +trust the Athenians they should never want for supplies while he had anything +left, no, not even if he should have to coin his own silver couch, and that he +would bring the Phoenician fleet now at Aspendus to the Athenians instead of to +the Peloponnesians; but that he could only trust the Athenians if Alcibiades +were recalled to be his security for them. +</p> + +<p> +Upon hearing this and much more besides, the Athenians at once elected him +general together with the former ones, and put all their affairs into his +hands. There was now not a man in the army who would have exchanged his present +hopes of safety and vengeance upon the Four Hundred for any consideration +whatever; and after what they had been told they were now inclined to disdain +the enemy before them, and to sail at once for Piraeus. To the plan of sailing +for Piraeus, leaving their more immediate enemies behind them, Alcibiades +opposed the most positive refusal, in spite of the numbers that insisted upon +it, saying that now that he had been elected general he would first sail to +Tissaphernes and concert with him measures for carrying on the war. +Accordingly, upon leaving this assembly, he immediately took his departure in +order to have it thought that there was an entire confidence between them, and +also wishing to increase his consideration with Tissaphernes, and to show that +he had now been elected general and was in a position to do him good or evil as +he chose; thus managing to frighten the Athenians with Tissaphernes and +Tissaphernes with the Athenians. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of Alcibiades and, +already distrustful of Tissaphernes, now became far more disgusted with him +than ever. Indeed after their refusal to go out and give battle to the +Athenians when they appeared before Miletus, Tissaphernes had grown slacker +than ever in his payments; and even before this, on account of Alcibiades, his +unpopularity had been on the increase. Gathering together, just as before, the +soldiers and some persons of consideration besides the soldiery began to reckon +up how they had never yet received their pay in full; that what they did +receive was small in quantity, and even that paid irregularly, and that unless +they fought a decisive battle or removed to some station where they could get +supplies, the ships’ crews would desert; and that it was all the fault of +Astyochus, who humoured Tissaphernes for his own private advantage. +</p> + +<p> +The army was engaged in these reflections, when the following disturbance took +place about the person of Astyochus. Most of the Syracusan and Thurian sailors +were freemen, and these the freest crews in the armament were likewise the +boldest in setting upon Astyochus and demanding their pay. The latter answered +somewhat stiffly and threatened them, and when Dorieus spoke up for his own +sailors even went so far as to lift his baton against him; upon seeing which +the mass of men, in sailor fashion, rushed in a fury to strike Astyochus. He, +however, saw them in time and fled for refuge to an altar; and they were thus +parted without his being struck. Meanwhile the fort built by Tissaphernes in +Miletus was surprised and taken by the Milesians, and the garrison in it turned +out—an act which met with the approval of the rest of the allies, and in +particular of the Syracusans, but which found no favour with Lichas, who said +moreover that the Milesians and the rest in the King’s country ought to +show a reasonable submission to Tissaphernes and to pay him court, until the +war should be happily settled. The Milesians were angry with him for this and +for other things of the kind, and upon his afterwards dying of sickness, would +not allow him to be buried where the Lacedaemonians with the army desired. +</p> + +<p> +The discontent of the army with Astyochus and Tissaphernes had reached this +pitch, when Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon to succeed Astyochus as admiral, +and assumed the command. Astyochus now set sail for home; and Tissaphernes sent +with him one of his confidants, Gaulites, a Carian, who spoke the two +languages, to complain of the Milesians for the affair of the fort, and at the +same time to defend himself against the Milesians, who were, as he was aware, +on their way to Sparta chiefly to denounce his conduct, and had with them +Hermocrates, who was to accuse Tissaphernes of joining with Alcibiades to ruin +the Peloponnesian cause and of playing a double game. Indeed Hermocrates had +always been at enmity with him about the pay not being restored in full; and +eventually when he was banished from Syracuse, and new +commanders—Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus—had come out to Miletus +to the ships of the Syracusans, Tissaphernes, pressed harder than ever upon him +in his exile, and among other charges against him accused him of having once +asked him for money, and then given himself out as his enemy because he failed +to obtain it. +</p> + +<p> +While Astyochus and the Milesians and Hermocrates made sail for Lacedaemon, +Alcibiades had now crossed back from Tissaphernes to Samos. After his return +the envoys of the Four Hundred sent, as has been mentioned above, to pacify and +explain matters to the forces at Samos, arrived from Delos; and an assembly was +held in which they attempted to speak. The soldiers at first would not hear +them, and cried out to put to death the subverters of the democracy, but at +last, after some difficulty, calmed down and gave them a hearing. Upon this the +envoys proceeded to inform them that the recent change had been made to save +the city, and not to ruin it or to deliver it over to the enemy, for they had +already had an opportunity of doing this when he invaded the country during +their government; that all the Five Thousand would have their proper share in +the government; and that their hearers’ relatives had neither outrage, as +Chaereas had slanderously reported, nor other ill treatment to complain of, but +were all in undisturbed enjoyment of their property just as they had left them. +Besides these they made a number of other statements which had no better +success with their angry auditors; and amid a host of different opinions the +one which found most favour was that of sailing to Piraeus. Now it was that +Alcibiades for the first time did the state a service, and one of the most +signal kind. For when the Athenians at Samos were bent upon sailing against +their countrymen, in which case Ionia and the Hellespont would most certainly +at once have passed into possession of the enemy, Alcibiades it was who +prevented them. At that moment, when no other man would have been able to hold +back the multitude, he put a stop to the intended expedition, and rebuked and +turned aside the resentment felt, on personal grounds, against the envoys; he +dismissed them with an answer from himself, to the effect that he did not +object to the government of the Five Thousand, but insisted that the Four +Hundred should be deposed and the Council of Five Hundred reinstated in power: +meanwhile any retrenchments for economy, by which pay might be better found for +the armament, met with his entire approval. Generally, he bade them hold out +and show a bold face to the enemy, since if the city were saved there was good +hope that the two parties might some day be reconciled, whereas if either were +once destroyed, that at Samos, or that at Athens, there would no longer be any +one to be reconciled to. Meanwhile arrived envoys from the Argives, with offers +of support to the Athenian commons at Samos: these were thanked by Alcibiades, +and dismissed with a request to come when called upon. The Argives were +accompanied by the crew of the Paralus, whom we left placed in a troopship by +the Four Hundred with orders to cruise round Euboea, and who being employed to +carry to Lacedaemon some Athenian envoys sent by the Four +Hundred—Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias—as they sailed by +Argos laid hands upon the envoys, and delivering them over to the Argives as +the chief subverters of the democracy, themselves, instead of returning to +Athens, took the Argive envoys on board, and came to Samos in the galley which +had been confided to them. +</p> + +<p> +The same summer at the time that the return of Alcibiades coupled with the +general conduct of Tissaphernes had carried to its height the discontent of the +Peloponnesians, who no longer entertained any doubt of his having joined the +Athenians, Tissaphernes wishing, it would seem, to clear himself to them of +these charges, prepared to go after the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus, and +invited Lichas to go with him; saying that he would appoint Tamos as his +lieutenant to provide pay for the armament during his own absence. Accounts +differ, and it is not easy to ascertain with what intention he went to +Aspendus, and did not bring the fleet after all. That one hundred and +forty-seven Phoenician ships came as far as Aspendus is certain; but why they +did not come on has been variously accounted for. Some think that he went away +in pursuance of his plan of wasting the Peloponnesian resources, since at any +rate Tamos, his lieutenant, far from being any better, proved a worse paymaster +than himself: others that he brought the Phoenicians to Aspendus to exact money +from them for their discharge, having never intended to employ them: others +again that it was in view of the outcry against him at Lacedaemon, in order +that it might be said that he was not in fault, but that the ships were really +manned and that he had certainly gone to fetch them. To myself it seems only +too evident that he did not bring up the fleet because he wished to wear out +and paralyse the Hellenic forces, that is, to waste their strength by the time +lost during his journey to Aspendus, and to keep them evenly balanced by not +throwing his weight into either scale. Had he wished to finish the war, he +could have done so, assuming of course that he made his appearance in a way +which left no room for doubt; as by bringing up the fleet he would in all +probability have given the victory to the Lacedaemonians, whose navy, even as +it was, faced the Athenian more as an equal than as an inferior. But what +convicts him most clearly, is the excuse which he put forward for not bringing +the ships. He said that the number assembled was less than the King had +ordered; but surely it would only have enhanced his credit if he spent little +of the King’s money and effected the same end at less cost. In any case, +whatever was his intention, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and saw the +Phoenicians; and the Peloponnesians at his desire sent a Lacedaemonian called +Philip with two galleys to fetch the fleet. +</p> + +<p> +Alcibiades finding that Tissaphernes had gone to Aspendus, himself sailed +thither with thirteen ships, promising to do a great and certain service to the +Athenians at Samos, as he would either bring the Phoenician fleet to the +Athenians, or at all events prevent its joining the Peloponnesians. In all +probability he had long known that Tissaphernes never meant to bring the fleet +at all, and wished to compromise him as much as possible in the eyes of the +Peloponnesians through his apparent friendship for himself and the Athenians, +and thus in a manner to oblige him to join their side. +</p> + +<p> +While Alcibiades weighed anchor and sailed eastward straight for Phaselis and +Caunus, the envoys sent by the Four Hundred to Samos arrived at Athens. Upon +their delivering the message from Alcibiades, telling them to hold out and to +show a firm front to the enemy, and saying that he had great hopes of +reconciling them with the army and of overcoming the Peloponnesians, the +majority of the members of the oligarchy, who were already discontented and +only too much inclined to be quit of the business in any safe way that they +could, were at once greatly strengthened in their resolve. These now banded +together and strongly criticized the administration, their leaders being some +of the principal generals and men in office under the oligarchy, such as +Theramenes, son of Hagnon, Aristocrates, son of Scellias, and others; who, +although among the most prominent members of the government (being afraid, as +they said, of the army at Samos, and most especially of Alcibiades, and also +lest the envoys whom they had sent to Lacedaemon might do the state some harm +without the authority of the people), without insisting on objections to the +excessive concentration of power in a few hands, yet urged that the Five +Thousand must be shown to exist not merely in name but in reality, and the +constitution placed upon a fairer basis. But this was merely their political +cry; most of them being driven by private ambition into the line of conduct so +surely fatal to oligarchies that arise out of democracies. For all at once +pretend to be not only equals but each the chief and master of his fellows; +while under a democracy a disappointed candidate accepts his defeat more +easily, because he has not the humiliation of being beaten by his equals. But +what most clearly encouraged the malcontents was the power of Alcibiades at +Samos, and their own disbelief in the stability of the oligarchy; and it was +now a race between them as to which should first become the leader of the +commons. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the leaders and members of the Four Hundred most opposed to a +democratic form of government—Phrynichus who had had the quarrel with +Alcibiades during his command at Samos, Aristarchus the bitter and inveterate +enemy of the commons, and Pisander and Antiphon and others of the chiefs who +already as soon as they entered upon power, and again when the army at Samos +seceded from them and declared for a democracy, had sent envoys from their own +body to Lacedaemon and made every effort for peace, and had built the wall in +Eetionia—now redoubled their exertions when their envoys returned from +Samos, and they saw not only the people but their own most trusted associates +turning against them. Alarmed at the state of things at Athens as at Samos, +they now sent off in haste Antiphon and Phrynichus and ten others with +injunctions to make peace with Lacedaemon upon any terms, no matter what, that +should be at all tolerable. Meanwhile they pushed on more actively than ever +with the wall in Eetionia. Now the meaning of this wall, according to +Theramenes and his supporters, was not so much to keep out the army of Samos, +in case of its trying to force its way into Piraeus, as to be able to let in, +at pleasure, the fleet and army of the enemy. For Eetionia is a mole of +Piraeus, close alongside of the entrance of the harbour, and was now fortified +in connection with the wall already existing on the land side, so that a few +men placed in it might be able to command the entrance; the old wall on the +land side and the new one now being built within on the side of the sea, both +ending in one of the two towers standing at the narrow mouth of the harbour. +They also walled off the largest porch in Piraeus which was in immediate +connection with this wall, and kept it in their own hands, compelling all to +unload there the corn that came into the harbour, and what they had in stock, +and to take it out from thence when they sold it. +</p> + +<p> +These measures had long provoked the murmurs of Theramenes, and when the envoys +returned from Lacedaemon without having effected any general pacification, he +affirmed that this wall was like to prove the ruin of the state. At this moment +forty-two ships from Peloponnese, including some Siceliot and Italiot vessels +from Locri and Tarentum, had been invited over by the Euboeans and were already +riding off Las in Laconia preparing for the voyage to Euboea, under the command +of Agesandridas, son of Agesander, a Spartan. Theramenes now affirmed that this +squadron was destined not so much to aid Euboea as the party fortifying +Eetionia, and that unless precautions were speedily taken the city would be +surprised and lost. This was no mere calumny, there being really some such plan +entertained by the accused. Their first wish was to have the oligarchy without +giving up the empire; failing this to keep their ships and walls and be +independent; while, if this also were denied them, sooner than be the first +victims of the restored democracy, they were resolved to call in the enemy and +make peace, give up their walls and ships, and at all costs retain possession +of the government, if their lives were only assured to them. +</p> + +<p> +For this reason they pushed forward the construction of their work with +posterns and entrances and means of introducing the enemy, being eager to have +it finished in time. Meanwhile the murmurs against them were at first confined +to a few persons and went on in secret, until Phrynichus, after his return from +the embassy to Lacedaemon, was laid wait for and stabbed in full market by one +of the Peripoli, falling down dead before he had gone far from the council +chamber. The assassin escaped; but his accomplice, an Argive, was taken and put +to the torture by the Four Hundred, without their being able to extract from +him the name of his employer, or anything further than that he knew of many men +who used to assemble at the house of the commander of the Peripoli and at other +houses. Here the matter was allowed to drop. This so emboldened Theramenes and +Aristocrates and the rest of their partisans in the Four Hundred and out of +doors, that they now resolved to act. For by this time the ships had sailed +round from Las, and anchoring at Epidaurus had overrun Aegina; and Theramenes +asserted that, being bound for Euboea, they would never have sailed in to +Aegina and come back to anchor at Epidaurus, unless they had been invited to +come to aid in the designs of which he had always accused the government. +Further inaction had therefore now become impossible. In the end, after a great +many seditious harangues and suspicions, they set to work in real earnest. The +heavy infantry in Piraeus building the wall in Eetionia, among whom was +Aristocrates, a colonel, with his own tribe, laid hands upon Alexicles, a +general under the oligarchy and the devoted adherent of the cabal, and took him +into a house and confined him there. In this they were assisted by one Hermon, +commander of the Peripoli in Munychia, and others, and above all had with them +the great bulk of the heavy infantry. As soon as the news reached the Four +Hundred, who happened to be sitting in the council chamber, all except the +disaffected wished at once to go to the posts where the arms were, and menaced +Theramenes and his party. Theramenes defended himself, and said that he was +ready immediately to go and help to rescue Alexicles; and taking with him one +of the generals belonging to his party, went down to Piraeus, followed by +Aristarchus and some young men of the cavalry. All was now panic and confusion. +Those in the city imagined that Piraeus was already taken and the prisoner put +to death, while those in Piraeus expected every moment to be attacked by the +party in the city. The older men, however, stopped the persons running up and +down the town and making for the stands of arms; and Thucydides the Pharsalian, +proxenus of the city, came forward and threw himself in the way of the rival +factions, and appealed to them not to ruin the state, while the enemy was still +at hand waiting for his opportunity, and so at length succeeded in quieting +them and in keeping their hands off each other. Meanwhile Theramenes came down +to Piraeus, being himself one of the generals, and raged and stormed against +the heavy infantry, while Aristarchus and the adversaries of the people were +angry in right earnest. Most of the heavy infantry, however, went on with the +business without faltering, and asked Theramenes if he thought the wall had +been constructed for any good purpose, and whether it would not be better that +it should be pulled down. To this he answered that if they thought it best to +pull it down, he for his part agreed with them. Upon this the heavy infantry +and a number of the people in Piraeus immediately got up on the fortification +and began to demolish it. Now their cry to the multitude was that all should +join in the work who wished the Five Thousand to govern instead of the Four +Hundred. For instead of saying in so many words “all who wished the +commons to govern,” they still disguised themselves under the name of the +Five Thousand; being afraid that these might really exist, and that they might +be speaking to one of their number and get into trouble through ignorance. +Indeed this was why the Four Hundred neither wished the Five Thousand to exist, +nor to have it known that they did not exist; being of opinion that to give +themselves so many partners in empire would be downright democracy, while the +mystery in question would make the people afraid of one another. +</p> + +<p> +The next day the Four Hundred, although alarmed, nevertheless assembled in the +council chamber, while the heavy infantry in Piraeus, after having released +their prisoner Alexicles and pulled down the fortification, went with their +arms to the theatre of Dionysus, close to Munychia, and there held an assembly +in which they decided to march into the city, and setting forth accordingly +halted in the Anaceum. Here they were joined by some delegates from the Four +Hundred, who reasoned with them one by one, and persuaded those whom they saw +to be the most moderate to remain quiet themselves, and to keep in the rest; +saying that they would make known the Five Thousand, and have the Four Hundred +chosen from them in rotation, as should be decided by the Five Thousand, and +meanwhile entreated them not to ruin the state or drive it into the arms of the +enemy. After a great many had spoken and had been spoken to, the whole body of +heavy infantry became calmer than before, absorbed by their fears for the +country at large, and now agreed to hold upon an appointed day an assembly in +the theatre of Dionysus for the restoration of concord. +</p> + +<p> +When the day came for the assembly in the theatre, and they were upon the point +of assembling, news arrived that the forty-two ships under Agesandridas were +sailing from Megara along the coast of Salamis. The people to a man now thought +that it was just what Theramenes and his party had so often said, that the +ships were sailing to the fortification, and concluded that they had done well +to demolish it. But though it may possibly have been by appointment that +Agesandridas hovered about Epidaurus and the neighbourhood, he would also +naturally be kept there by the hope of an opportunity arising out of the +troubles in the town. In any case the Athenians, on receipt of the news +immediately ran down in mass to Piraeus, seeing themselves threatened by the +enemy with a worse war than their war among themselves, not at a distance, but +close to the harbour of Athens. Some went on board the ships already afloat, +while others launched fresh vessels, or ran to defend the walls and the mouth +of the harbour. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the Peloponnesian vessels sailed by, and rounding Sunium anchored +between Thoricus and Prasiae, and afterwards arrived at Oropus. The Athenians, +with revolution in the city, and unwilling to lose a moment in going to the +relief of their most important possession (for Euboea was everything to them +now that they were shut out from Attica), were compelled to put to sea in haste +and with untrained crews, and sent Thymochares with some vessels to Eretria. +These upon their arrival, with the ships already in Euboea, made up a total of +thirty-six vessels, and were immediately forced to engage. For Agesandridas, +after his crews had dined, put out from Oropus, which is about seven miles from +Eretria by sea; and the Athenians, seeing him sailing up, immediately began to +man their vessels. The sailors, however, instead of being by their ships, as +they supposed, were gone away to purchase provisions for their dinner in the +houses in the outskirts of the town; the Eretrians having so arranged that +there should be nothing on sale in the marketplace, in order that the Athenians +might be a long time in manning their ships, and, the enemy’s attack +taking them by surprise, might be compelled to put to sea just as they were. A +signal also was raised in Eretria to give them notice in Oropus when to put to +sea. The Athenians, forced to put out so poorly prepared, engaged off the +harbour of Eretria, and after holding their own for some little while +notwithstanding, were at length put to flight and chased to the shore. Such of +their number as took refuge in Eretria, which they presumed to be friendly to +them, found their fate in that city, being butchered by the inhabitants; while +those who fled to the Athenian fort in the Eretrian territory, and the vessels +which got to Chalcis, were saved. The Peloponnesians, after taking twenty-two +Athenian ships, and killing or making prisoners of the crews, set up a trophy, +and not long afterwards effected the revolt of the whole of Euboea (except +Oreus, which was held by the Athenians themselves), and made a general +settlement of the affairs of the island. +</p> + +<p> +When the news of what had happened in Euboea reached Athens, a panic ensued +such as they had never before known. Neither the disaster in Sicily, great as +it seemed at the time, nor any other had ever so much alarmed them. The camp at +Samos was in revolt; they had no more ships or men to man them; they were at +discord among themselves and might at any moment come to blows; and a disaster +of this magnitude coming on the top of all, by which they lost their fleet, and +worst of all Euboea, which was of more value to them than Attica, could not +occur without throwing them into the deepest despondency. Meanwhile their +greatest and most immediate trouble was the possibility that the enemy, +emboldened by his victory, might make straight for them and sail against +Piraeus, which they had no longer ships to defend; and every moment they +expected him to arrive. This, with a little more courage, he might easily have +done, in which case he would either have increased the dissensions of the city +by his presence, or, if he had stayed to besiege it, have compelled the fleet +from Ionia, although the enemy of the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their +country and of their relatives, and in the meantime would have become master of +the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and of everything as far as Euboea, or, to +speak roundly, of the whole Athenian empire. But here, as on so many other +occasions, the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people in the world +for the Athenians to be at war with. The wide difference between the two +characters, the slowness and want of energy of the Lacedaemonians as contrasted +with the dash and enterprise of their opponents, proved of the greatest +service, especially to a maritime empire like Athens. Indeed this was shown by +the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character, and also most +successful in combating them. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless, upon receipt of the news, the Athenians manned twenty ships and +called immediately a first assembly in the Pnyx, where they had been used to +meet formerly, and deposed the Four Hundred and voted to hand over the +government to the Five Thousand, of which body all who furnished a suit of +armour were to be members, decreeing also that no one should receive pay for +the discharge of any office, or if he did should be held accursed. Many other +assemblies were held afterwards, in which law-makers were elected and all other +measures taken to form a constitution. It was during the first period of this +constitution that the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best government that +they ever did, at least in my time. For the fusion of the high and the low was +effected with judgment, and this was what first enabled the state to raise up +her head after her manifold disasters. They also voted for the recall of +Alcibiades and of other exiles, and sent to him and to the camp at Samos, and +urged them to devote themselves vigorously to the war. +</p> + +<p> +Upon this revolution taking place, the party of Pisander and Alexicles and the +chiefs of the oligarchs immediately withdrew to Decelea, with the single +exception of Aristarchus, one of the generals, who hastily took some of the +most barbarian of the archers and marched to Oenoe. This was a fort of the +Athenians upon the Boeotian border, at that moment besieged by the Corinthians, +irritated by the loss of a party returning from Decelea, who had been cut off +by the garrison. The Corinthians had volunteered for this service, and had +called upon the Boeotians to assist them. After communicating with them, +Aristarchus deceived the garrison in Oenoe by telling them that their +countrymen in the city had compounded with the Lacedaemonians, and that one of +the terms of the capitulation was that they must surrender the place to the +Boeotians. The garrison believed him as he was general, and besides knew +nothing of what had occurred owing to the siege, and so evacuated the fort +under truce. In this way the Boeotians gained possession of Oenoe, and the +oligarchy and the troubles at Athens ended. +</p> + +<p> +To return to the Peloponnesians in Miletus. No pay was forthcoming from any of +the agents deputed by Tissaphernes for that purpose upon his departure for +Aspendus; neither the Phoenician fleet nor Tissaphernes showed any signs of +appearing, and Philip, who had been sent with him, and another Spartan, +Hippocrates, who was at Phaselis, wrote word to Mindarus, the admiral, that the +ships were not coming at all, and that they were being grossly abused by +Tissaphernes. Meanwhile Pharnabazus was inviting them to come, and making every +effort to get the fleet and, like Tissaphernes, to cause the revolt of the +cities in his government still subject to Athens, founding great hopes on his +success; until at length, at about the period of the summer which we have now +reached, Mindarus yielded to his importunities, and, with great order and at a +moment’s notice, in order to elude the enemy at Samos, weighed anchor +with seventy-three ships from Miletus and set sail for the Hellespont. Thither +sixteen vessels had already preceded him in the same summer, and had overrun +part of the Chersonese. Being caught in a storm, Mindarus was compelled to run +in to Icarus and, after being detained five or six days there by stress of +weather, arrived at Chios. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile Thrasyllus had heard of his having put out from Miletus, and +immediately set sail with fifty-five ships from Samos, in haste to arrive +before him in the Hellespont. But learning that he was at Chios, and expecting +that he would stay there, he posted scouts in Lesbos and on the continent +opposite to prevent the fleet moving without his knowing it, and himself +coasted along to Methymna, and gave orders to prepare meal and other +necessaries, in order to attack them from Lesbos in the event of their +remaining for any length of time at Chios. Meanwhile he resolved to sail +against Eresus, a town in Lesbos which had revolted, and, if he could, to take +it. For some of the principal Methymnian exiles had carried over about fifty +heavy infantry, their sworn associates, from Cuma, and hiring others from the +continent, so as to make up three hundred in all, chose Anaxander, a Theban, to +command them, on account of the community of blood existing between the Thebans +and the Lesbians, and first attacked Methymna. Balked in this attempt by the +advance of the Athenian guards from Mitylene, and repulsed a second time in a +battle outside the city, they then crossed the mountain and effected the revolt +of Eresus. Thrasyllus accordingly determined to go there with all his ships and +to attack the place. Meanwhile Thrasybulus had preceded him thither with five +ships from Samos, as soon as he heard that the exiles had crossed over, and +coming too late to save Eresus, went on and anchored before the town. Here they +were joined also by two vessels on their way home from the Hellespont, and by +the ships of the Methymnians, making a grand total of sixty-seven vessels; and +the forces on board now made ready with engines and every other means available +to do their utmost to storm Eresus. +</p> + +<p> +In the meantime Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, after taking +provisions for two days and receiving three Chian pieces of money for each man +from the Chians, on the third day put out in haste from the island; in order to +avoid falling in with the ships at Eresus, they did not make for the open sea, +but keeping Lesbos on their left, sailed for the continent. After touching at +the port of Carteria, in the Phocaeid, and dining, they went on along the +Cumaean coast and supped at Arginusae, on the continent over against Mitylene. +From thence they continued their voyage along the coast, although it was late +in the night, and arriving at Harmatus on the continent opposite Methymna, +dined there; and swiftly passing Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the +neighbouring towns, arrived a little before midnight at Rhoeteum. Here they +were now in the Hellespont. Some of the ships also put in at Sigeum and at +other places in the neighbourhood. +</p> + +<p> +Meanwhile the warnings of the fire signals and the sudden increase in the +number of fires on the enemy’s shore informed the eighteen Athenian ships +at Sestos of the approach of the Peloponnesian fleet. That very night they set +sail in haste just as they were, and, hugging the shore of the Chersonese, +coasted along to Elaeus, in order to sail out into the open sea away from the +fleet of the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +After passing unobserved the sixteen ships at Abydos, which had nevertheless +been warned by their approaching friends to be on the alert to prevent their +sailing out, at dawn they sighted the fleet of Mindarus, which immediately gave +chase. All had not time to get away; the greater number however escaped to +Imbros and Lemnos, while four of the hindmost were overtaken off Elaeus. One of +these was stranded opposite to the temple of Protesilaus and taken with its +crew, two others without their crews; the fourth was abandoned on the shore of +Imbros and burned by the enemy. +</p> + +<p> +After this the Peloponnesians were joined by the squadron from Abydos, which +made up their fleet to a grand total of eighty-six vessels; they spent the day +in unsuccessfully besieging Elaeus, and then sailed back to Abydos. Meanwhile +the Athenians, deceived by their scouts, and never dreaming of the +enemy’s fleet getting by undetected, were tranquilly besieging Eresus. As +soon as they heard the news they instantly abandoned Eresus, and made with all +speed for the Hellespont, and after taking two of the Peloponnesian ships which +had been carried out too far into the open sea in the ardour of the pursuit and +now fell in their way, the next day dropped anchor at Elaeus, and, bringing +back the ships that had taken refuge at Imbros, during five days prepared for +the coming engagement. +</p> + +<p> +After this they engaged in the following way. The Athenians formed in column +and sailed close alongshore to Sestos; upon perceiving which the Peloponnesians +put out from Abydos to meet them. Realizing that a battle was now imminent, +both combatants extended their flank; the Athenians along the Chersonese from +Idacus to Arrhiani with seventy-six ships; the Peloponnesians from Abydos to +Dardanus with eighty-six. The Peloponnesian right wing was occupied by the +Syracusans, their left by Mindarus in person with the best sailers in the navy; +the Athenian left by Thrasyllus, their right by Thrasybulus, the other +commanders being in different parts of the fleet. The Peloponnesians hastened +to engage first, and outflanking with their left the Athenian right sought to +cut them off, if possible, from sailing out of the straits, and to drive their +centre upon the shore, which was not far off. The Athenians perceiving their +intention extended their own wing and outsailed them, while their left had by +this time passed the point of Cynossema. This, however, obliged them to thin +and weaken their centre, especially as they had fewer ships than the enemy, and +as the coast round Point Cynossema formed a sharp angle which prevented their +seeing what was going on on the other side of it. +</p> + +<p> +The Peloponnesians now attacked their centre and drove ashore the ships of the +Athenians, and disembarked to follow up their victory. No help could be given +to the centre either by the squadron of Thrasybulus on the right, on account of +the number of ships attacking him, or by that of Thrasyllus on the left, from +whom the point of Cynossema hid what was going on, and who was also hindered by +his Syracusan and other opponents, whose numbers were fully equal to his own. +At length, however, the Peloponnesians in the confidence of victory began to +scatter in pursuit of the ships of the enemy, and allowed a considerable part +of their fleet to get into disorder. On seeing this the squadron of Thrasybulus +discontinued their lateral movement and, facing about, attacked and routed the +ships opposed to them, and next fell roughly upon the scattered vessels of the +victorious Peloponnesian division, and put most of them to flight without a +blow. The Syracusans also had by this time given way before the squadron of +Thrasyllus, and now openly took to flight upon seeing the flight of their +comrades. +</p> + +<p> +The rout was now complete. Most of the Peloponnesians fled for refuge first to +the river Midius, and afterwards to Abydos. Only a few ships were taken by the +Athenians; as owing to the narrowness of the Hellespont the enemy had not far +to go to be in safety. Nevertheless nothing could have been more opportune for +them than this victory. Up to this time they had feared the Peloponnesian +fleet, owing to a number of petty losses and to the disaster in Sicily; but +they now ceased to mistrust themselves or any longer to think their enemies +good for anything at sea. Meanwhile they took from the enemy eight Chian +vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian, one Leucadian, +Lacedaemonian, Syracusan, and Pellenian, losing fifteen of their own. After +setting up a trophy upon Point Cynossema, securing the wrecks, and restoring to +the enemy his dead under truce, they sent off a galley to Athens with the news +of their victory. The arrival of this vessel with its unhoped-for good news, +after the recent disasters of Euboea, and in the revolution at Athens, gave +fresh courage to the Athenians, and caused them to believe that if they put +their shoulders to the wheel their cause might yet prevail. +</p> + +<p> +On the fourth day after the sea-fight the Athenians in Sestos having hastily +refitted their ships sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted. Off Harpagium +and Priapus they sighted at anchor the eight vessels from Byzantium, and, +sailing up and routing the troops on shore, took the ships, and then went on +and recovered the town of Cyzicus, which was unfortified, and levied money from +the citizens. In the meantime the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus, +and recovered such of their captured galleys as were still uninjured, the rest +having been burned by the Elaeusians, and sent Hippocrates and Epicles to +Euboea to fetch the squadron from that island. +</p> + +<p> +About the same time Alcibiades returned with his thirteen ships from Caunus and +Phaselis to Samos, bringing word that he had prevented the Phoenician fleet +from joining the Peloponnesians, and had made Tissaphernes more friendly to the +Athenians than before. Alcibiades now manned nine more ships, and levied large +sums of money from the Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After doing this and +placing a governor in Cos, he sailed back to Samos, autumn being now at hand. +Meanwhile Tissaphernes, upon hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed +from Miletus to the Hellespont, set off again back from Aspendus, and made all +sail for Ionia. While the Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the +Antandrians, a people of Aeolic extraction, conveyed by land across Mount Ida +some heavy infantry from Abydos, and introduced them into the town; having been +ill-treated by Arsaces, the Persian lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This same +Arsaces had, upon pretence of a secret quarrel, invited the chief men of the +Delians to undertake military service (these were Delians who had settled at +Atramyttium after having been driven from their homes by the Athenians for the +sake of purifying Delos); and after drawing them out from their town as his +friends and allies, had laid wait for them at dinner, and surrounded them and +caused them to be shot down by his soldiers. This deed made the Antandrians +fear that he might some day do them some mischief; and as he also laid upon +them burdens too heavy for them to bear, they expelled his garrison from their +citadel. +</p> + +<p> +Tissaphernes, upon hearing of this act of the Peloponnesians in addition to +what had occurred at Miletus and Cnidus, where his garrisons had been also +expelled, now saw that the breach between them was serious; and fearing further +injury from them, and being also vexed to think that Pharnabazus should receive +them, and in less time and at less cost perhaps succeed better against Athens +than he had done, determined to rejoin them in the Hellespont, in order to +complain of the events at Antandros and excuse himself as best he could in the +matter of the Phoenician fleet and of the other charges against him. +Accordingly he went first to Ephesus and offered sacrifice to Artemis.... +</p> + +<p> +[When the winter after this summer is over the twenty-first year of this war +will be completed. ] +</p> + +<p> +THE END +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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