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diff --git a/7370-h/7370-h.htm b/7370-h/7370-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8861bf8 --- /dev/null +++ b/7370-h/7370-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,5978 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Second Treatise Of Government, by John Locke</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + +body{margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify;} + +h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 {text-align: center; font-style: normal; font-weight: +normal; line-height: 1.5; margin-top: .5em; margin-bottom: .5em;} + +h1 {font-size: 300%; + margin-top: 0.6em; + margin-bottom: 0.6em; + letter-spacing: 0.12em; + word-spacing: 0.2em; + text-indent: 0em;} +h2 {font-size: 150%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 1em;} +h3 {font-size: 130%; margin-top: 1em;} +h4 {font-size: 120%;} +h5 {font-size: 110%;} + +.no-break {page-break-before: avoid;} /* for epubs */ + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always; margin-top: 4em;} + +p {text-indent: 1em; margin-top: 0.25em; margin-bottom: 0.25em;} + +p.letter {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +.c {text-align:center;text-indent:0%;} + + h1,h2,h4 {text-align:center;clear:both;} + + hr {width:60%;margin:2em auto 2em auto;clear:both;color:black;} + +.blockquot {margin:5% 5% 5% 5%;} + +a:link {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:visited {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:hover {color:red} + +</style> +</head> +<body> + +<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Second Treatise of Government, by John Locke</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Second Treatise of Government</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: John Locke</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: April 22, 2003 [eBook #7370]<br /> +[Most recently updated: December 25, 2021]</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Dave Gowan and Chuck Greif</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ***</div> + +<h1>SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT</h1> + +<h2 class="no-break">by JOHN LOCKE</h2> + +<p class="letter"> +Digitized by Dave Gowan. John Locke’s “Second Treatise of +Government” was published in 1690. The complete unabridged text has been +republished several times in edited commentaries. This text is recovered entire +from the paperback book, “John Locke Second Treatise of +Government”, Edited, with an Introduction, By C.B. McPherson, Hackett +Publishing Company, Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1980. None of the McPherson +edition is included in the Etext below; only the original words contained in +the 1690 Locke text is included. The 1690 edition text is free of copyright. +</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2>TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT</h2> + +<h2>BY IOHN LOCKE</h2> + +<p class="c">SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX ESTO</p> + +<p class="c">LONDON PRINTED MDCLXXXVIII</p> + +<p>REPRINTED, THE SIXTH TIME, BY A. MILLAR, H. WOODFALL, 1. WHISTON AND B. +WHITE, 1. RIVINGTON, L. DAVIS AND C. REYMERS, R. BALDWIN, HAWES CLARKE +AND COLLINS; W. IOHNSTON, W. OWEN, 1. RICHARDSON, S. CROWDER, T. +LONGMAN, B. LAW, C. RIVINGTON, E. DILLY, R. WITHY, C. AND R. WARE, S. +BAKER, T. PAYNE, A. SHUCKBURGH, 1. HINXMAN</p> + +<p class="c">MDCCLXIII</p> + +<p>TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. IN THE FORMER THE FALSE PRINCIPLES AND +FOUNDATION OF SIR ROBERT FILMER AND HIS FOLLOWERS ARE DETECTED AND +OVERTHROWN. THE LATTER IS AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT +AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.</p> + +<p>1764 EDITOR’S NOTE The present Edition of this Book has not only been +collated with the first three Editions, which were published during the +Author’s Life, but also has the Advantage of his last Corrections and +Improvements, from a Copy delivered by him to Mr. Peter Coste, +communicated to the Editor, and now lodged in Christ College, Cambridge.</p> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style=""> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">CHAPTER XIII.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">CHAPTER XIV.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_XV">CHAPTER XV.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">CHAPTER XVI.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_XVII">CHAPTER XVII.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_XVIII">CHAPTER XVIII.</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#CHAPTER_XIX">CHAPTER XIX.</a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>PREFACE</h2> + +<p> +Reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning +government; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should have +filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not worth while to +tell thee. These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the throne +of our great restorer, our present King William; to make good his title, in the +consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful governments, he +has more fully and clearly, than any prince in Christendom; and to justify to +the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights, +with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the +very brink of slavery and ruin. If these papers have that evidence, I flatter +myself is to be found in them, there will be no great miss of those which are +lost, and my reader may be satisfied without them: for I imagine, I shall have +neither the time, nor inclination to repeat my pains, and fill up the wanting +part of my answer, by tracing Sir Robert again, through all the windings and +obscurities, which are to be met with in the several branches of his wonderful +system. The king, and body of the nation, have since so thoroughly confuted his +Hypothesis, that I suppose no body hereafter will have either the confidence to +appear against our common safety, and be again an advocate for slavery; or the +weakness to be deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular stile, and +well-turned periods: for if any one will be at the pains, himself, in those +parts, which are here untouched, to strip Sir Robert’s discourses of the +flourish of doubtful expressions, and endeavour to reduce his words to direct, +positive, intelligible propositions, and then compare them one with another, he +will quickly be satisfied, there was never so much glib nonsense put together +in well-sounding English. If he think it not worth while to examine his works +all thro’, let him make an experiment in that part, where he treats of +usurpation; and let him try, whether he can, with all his skill, make Sir +Robert intelligible, and consistent with himself, or common sense. I should not +speak so plainly of a gentleman, long since past answering, had not the pulpit, +of late years, publicly owned his doctrine, and made it the current divinity of +the times. It is necessary those men, who taking on them to be teachers, have +so dangerously misled others, should be openly shewed of what authority this +their Patriarch is, whom they have so blindly followed, that so they may either +retract what upon so ill grounds they have vented, and cannot be maintained; or +else justify those principles which they preached up for gospel; though they +had no better an author than an English courtier: for I should not have writ +against Sir Robert, or taken the pains to shew his mistakes, inconsistencies, +and want of (what he so much boasts of, and pretends wholly to build on) +scripture-proofs, were there not men amongst us, who, by crying up his books, +and espousing his doctrine, save me from the reproach of writing against a dead +adversary. They have been so zealous in this point, that, if I have done him +any wrong, I cannot hope they should spare me. I wish, where they have done the +truth and the public wrong, they would be as ready to redress it, and allow its +just weight to this reflection, viz. that there cannot be done a greater +mischief to prince and people, than the propagating wrong notions concerning +government; that so at last all times might not have reason to complain of the +Drum Ecclesiastic. If any one, concerned really for truth, undertake the +confutation of my Hypothesis, I promise him either to recant my mistake, upon +fair conviction; or to answer his difficulties. But he must remember two +things. +</p> + +<p> +First, That cavilling here and there, at some expression, or little incident of +my discourse, is not an answer to my book. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly, That I shall not take railing for arguments, nor think either of +these worth my notice, though I shall always look on myself as bound to give +satisfaction to any one, who shall appear to be conscientiously scrupulous in +the point, and shall shew any just grounds for his scruples. +</p> + +<p> +I have nothing more, but to advertise the reader, that Observations stands for +Observations on Hobbs, Milton, &c. and that a bare quotation of pages +always means pages of his Patriarcha, Edition 1680. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2>Book II</h2> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER. I.</h2> + +<h3>AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL +GOVERNMENT</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing discourse, +</p> + +<p> +(<i>1</i>). That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by +positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, or dominion +over the world, as is pretended: +</p> + +<p> +(<i>2</i>). That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it: +</p> + +<p> +(<i>3</i>). That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive +law of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, +the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been +certainly determined: +</p> + +<p> +(<i>4</i>). That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which +is the eldest line of Adam’s posterity, being so long since utterly lost, +that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to +one above another, the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to have the +right of inheritance: +</p> + +<p> +All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible +that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least +shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, +Adam’s private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will +not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product +only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but +that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for +perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that +the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity +find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and +another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir +Robert Filmer hath taught us. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what I take +to be political power; that the power of a MAGISTRATE over a subject may be +distinguished from that of a FATHER over his children, a MASTER over his +servant, a HUSBAND over his wife, and a LORD over his slave. All which distinct +powers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under +these different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one from +wealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of making laws with +penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and +preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in the +execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign +injury; and all this only for the public good. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER. II.</h2> + +<h3>OF THE STATE OF NATURE.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, +we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of +perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and +persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without +asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. +</p> + +<p> +A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, +no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that +creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same +advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal +one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and +master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one +above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an +undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so +evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of +that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they +owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and +charity. His words are, +</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p> +The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their +duty, to love others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, +must needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as +much at every man’s hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how +should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be +careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being of +one and the same nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to this +desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that if I do +harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should shew +greater measure of love to me, than they have by me shewed unto them: my desire +therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be, +imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like +affection; from which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are +as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for +direction of life, no man is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1. +</p> + +</div> + +<p> +Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of +licence: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of +his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so +much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare +preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern +it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all +mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one +ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men +being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the +servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about +his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last +during his, not one another’s pleasure: and being furnished with like +faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any +such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as +if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of +creatures are for our’s. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, +and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own +preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve +the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, +take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, +the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and +from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which +willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of +nature is, in that state, put into every man’s hands, whereby every one +has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may +hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that +concern men in this world be in vain, if there were no body that in the state +of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent +and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish +another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of +perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of +one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must +needs have a right to do. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over +another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has +got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless +extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm +reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, +which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are +the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we +call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares +himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is +that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and +so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from +injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass +against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the +law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve +mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things +noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed +that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by +his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon +this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER +OF THE LAW OF NATURE. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men: +but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what right any +prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commits +in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction they +receive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a stranger: +they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The +legislative authority, by which they are in force over the subjects of that +commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those who have the supreme power of +making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest +of the world, men without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature +every man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges +the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish +an alien of another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no more +power than what every man naturally may have over another. +</p> + +<p> +Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying +from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and +declares himself to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious +creature, there is commonly injury done to some person or other, and some other +man receives damage by his transgression: in which case he who hath received +any damage, has, besides the right of punishment common to him with other men, +a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it: and any other +person, who finds it just, may also join with him that is injured, and assist +him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the +harm he has suffered. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for +restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in +every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured +party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the +common right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the public good +demands not the execution of the law, remit the punishment of criminal offences +by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private +man for the damage he has received. That, he who has suffered the damage has a +right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person +has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the +offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the +crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving +all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: and +thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a +murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparation +can compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it from every +body, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal, who having +renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, +by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war +against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one +of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: +and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man’s +blood, by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that +every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his +brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain was +it writ in the hearts of all mankind. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser +breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer, each +transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as +will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to +repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence, that can be +committed in the state of nature, may in the state of nature be also punished +equally, and as far forth as it may, in a commonwealth: for though it would be +besides my present purpose, to enter here into the particulars of the law of +nature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there is such a law, +and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studier +of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; as +much as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies and intricate +contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words; +for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are +only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are +to be regulated and interpreted. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one +has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be +objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that +self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the +other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in +punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and +that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the +partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the +proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must +certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy +to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will +scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who +make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and if +government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily follow from +men’s being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is +therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, +and how much better it is than the state of nature, where one man, commanding a +multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his +subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question +or controul those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether +led by reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to? much better it is in +the state of nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of +another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he +is answerable for it to the rest of mankind. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were +there any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer +at present, that since all princes and rulers of independent governments all +through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the world never was, +nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all +governors of independent communities, whether they are, or are not, in league +with others: for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of +nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter +into one community, and make one body politic; other promises, and compacts, +men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature. The +promises and bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the desert +island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between +a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, though +they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for truth +and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of society. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of nature, I +will not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. +sect. 10, where he says, +</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p> +The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of nature, do bind +men absolutely, even as they are men, although they have never any settled +fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do, or not to +do: but forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves +with competent store of things, needful for such a life as our nature doth +desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those defects +and imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by ourselves, we +are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others: this was +the cause of men’s uniting themselves at first in politic societies. +</p> + +</div> + +<p> +But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, +till by their own consents they make themselves members of some politic +society; and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse, to make it very +clear. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER. III.</h2> + +<h3>OF THE STATE OF WAR.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and therefore +declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled +design upon another man’s life, puts him in a state of war with him +against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to +the other’s power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with him +in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just, I +should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction: for, +by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as +possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be +preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered +an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; +because such men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no +other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of +prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him +whenever he falls into their power. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into his +absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it being +to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life: for I have reason +to conclude, that he who would get me into his power without my consent, would +use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a +fancy to it; for no body can desire to have me in his absolute power, unless it +be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. +make me a slave. To be free from such force is the only security of my +preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my preservation, +who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it; so that he who makes +an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. He +that, in the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to any +one in that state, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away +every thing else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he +that, in the state of society, would take away the freedom belonging to those +of that society or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away from +them every thing else, and so be looked on as in a state of war. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the +least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than, by the +use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or what he +pleases, from him; because using force, where he has no right, to get me into +his power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to suppose, that +he, who would take away my liberty, would not, when he had me in his power, +take away every thing else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as +one who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can; +for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of +war, and is aggressor in it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and +the state of war, which however some men have confounded, are as far distant, +as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state +of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction, are one from another. Men +living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with +authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or +a declared design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no +common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it +is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an +aggressor, tho’ he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief, whom +I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, +I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the +law, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my +life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits +me my own defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, +because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the +decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may be +irreparable. Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of +nature: force without right, upon a man’s person, makes a state of war, +both where there is, and is not, a common judge. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between +those that are in society, and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair +determination of the law; because then there lies open the remedy of appeal for +the past injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no such appeal is, as in +the state of nature, for want of positive laws, and judges with authority to +appeal to, the state of war once begun, continues, with a right to the innocent +party to destroy the other whenever he can, until the aggressor offers peace, +and desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he has +already done, and secure the innocent for the future; nay, where an appeal to +the law, and constituted judges, lies open, but the remedy is denied by a +manifest perverting of justice, and a barefaced wresting of the laws to protect +or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is +hard to imagine any thing but a state of war: for wherever violence is used, +and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer justice, it is still +violence and injury, however coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of +law, the end whereof being to protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed +application of it, to all who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide +done, war is made upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right +them, they are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, +and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no +authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason of men’s +putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature: for where +there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by +appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the +controversy is decided by that power. Had there been any such court, any +superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the right between Jephtha and the +Ammonites, they had never come to a state of war: but we see he was forced to +appeal to heaven. The Lord the Judge (says he) be judge this day between the +children of Israel and the children of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and then +prosecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to battle: and +therefore in such controversies, where the question is put, who shall be judge? +It cannot be meant, who shall decide the controversy; every one knows what +Jephtha here tells us, that the Lord the Judge shall judge. Where there is no +judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That question then cannot +mean, who shall judge, whether another hath put himself in a state of war with +me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal to heaven in it? of that I myself +can only be judge in my own conscience, as I will answer it, at the great day, +to the supreme judge of all men. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER. IV.</h2> + +<h3>OF SLAVERY.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on +earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to +have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to +be under no other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the +commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but +what that legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it. Freedom +then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us, Observations, A. 55. a liberty for +every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any +laws: but freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live +by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power +erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule +prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, +arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other +restraint but the law of nature. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and +closely joined with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it, +but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not having +the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave +himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of +another, to take away his life, when he pleases. No body can give more power +than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give +another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life, by +some act that deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has +him in his power) delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service, and +he does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery +outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of +his master, to draw on himself the death he desires. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, but +the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive: for, if +once compact enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited power on +the one side, and obedience on the other, the state of war and slavery ceases, +as long as the compact endures: for, as has been said, no man can, by +agreement, pass over to another that which he hath not in himself, a power over +his own life. +</p> + +<p> +I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell +themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for, +it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical +power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at a +certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master +of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life, that +he could not, at pleasure, so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye, or +tooth, set him free, Exod. xxi. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER. V.</h2> + +<h3>OF PROPERTY.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being +once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and +drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence: or +revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to +Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king David +says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the children of men; given it to +mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to some a very great +difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a property in any thing: I +will not content myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make out +property, upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam, and his posterity +in common, it is impossible that any man, but one universal monarch, should +have any property upon a supposition, that God gave the world to Adam, and his +heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I shall +endeavour to shew, how men might come to have a property in several parts of +that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact +of all the commoners. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them +reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The +earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of +their being. And tho’ all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it +feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous +hand of nature; and no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the +rest of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state: yet +being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to +appropriate them some way or other, before they can be of any use, or at all +beneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes the +wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be +his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right +to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, +yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to +but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are +properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath +provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it +something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him +removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour +something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this +labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can +have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, +and as good, left in common for others. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the +apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them +to himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did +they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or +when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the +first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a +distinction between them and common: that added something to them more than +nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private +right. And will any one say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus +appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? +Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If +such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the +plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that +it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state +nature leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of +no use. And the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express +consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my +servant has cut; and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right +to them in common with others, become my property, without the assignation or +consent of any body. The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common +state they were in, hath fixed my property in them. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to any +one’s appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common, +children or servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master had +provided for them in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar part. +Though the water running in the fountain be every one’s, yet who can +doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labour hath +taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged equally +to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian’s who hath +killed it; it is allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labour upon it, +though before it was the common right of every one. And amongst those who are +counted the civilized part of mankind, who have made and multiplied positive +laws to determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning of +property, in what was before common, still takes place; and by virtue thereof, +what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common +of mankind; or what ambergrise any one takes up here, is by the labour that +removes it out of that common state nature left it in, made his property, who +takes that pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any one is +hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the chase: for being a beast +that is still looked upon as common, and no man’s private possession; +whoever has employed so much labour about any of that kind, as to find and +pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of nature, wherein she was +common, and hath begun a property. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or +other fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one may +ingross as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so. The same law of nature, +that does by this means give us property, does also bound that property too. +God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice of reason +confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much as +any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he +may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his +share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or +destroy. And thus, considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a +long time in the world, and the few spenders; and to how small a part of that +provision the industry of one man could extend itself, and ingross it to the +prejudice of others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of +what might serve for his use; there could be then little room for quarrels or +contentions about property so established. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the +earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as that which +takes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is plain, that property +in that too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, +improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He +by his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common. Nor will it +invalidate his right, to say every body else has an equal title to it; and +therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot inclose, without the consent of all +his fellow-commoners, all mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all +mankind, commanded man also to labour, and the penury of his condition required +it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e. improve +it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his +own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled +and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his +property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from +him. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, +any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; +and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was never +the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself: for he that +leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. +No body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he +took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench +his thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is +perfectly the same. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for +their benefit, and the greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to draw +from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and +uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational, (and +labour was to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or covetousness of the +quarrelsome and contentious. He that had as good left for his improvement, as +was already taken up, needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what was +already improved by another’s labour: if he did, it is plain he desired +the benefit of another’s pains, which he had no right to, and not the +ground which God had given him in common with others to labour on, and whereof +there was as good left, as that already possessed, and more than he knew what +to do with, or his industry could reach to. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 35. It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other country, +where there is plenty of people under government, who have money and commerce, +no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without the consent of all his +fellow-commoners; because this is left common by compact, i.e. by the law of +the land, which is not to be violated. And though it be common, in respect of +some men, it is not so to all mankind; but is the joint property of this +country, or this parish. Besides, the remainder, after such enclosure, would +not be as good to the rest of the commoners, as the whole was when they could +all make use of the whole; whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the +great common of the world, it was quite otherwise. The law man was under, was +rather for appropriating. God commanded, and his wants forced him to labour. +That was his property which could not be taken from him where-ever he had fixed +it. And hence subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see +are joined together. The one gave title to the other. So that God, by +commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate: and the condition +of human life, which requires labour and materials to work on, necessarily +introduces private possessions. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 36. The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of +men’s labour and the conveniencies of life: no man’s labour could +subdue, or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small +part; so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench upon the +right of another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice of his +neighbour, who would still have room for as good, and as large a possession +(after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. This measure +did confine every man’s possession to a very moderate proportion, and +such as he might appropriate to himself, without injury to any body, in the +first ages of the world, when men were more in danger to be lost, by wandering +from their company, in the then vast wilderness of the earth, than to be +straitened for want of room to plant in. And the same measure may be allowed +still without prejudice to any body, as full as the world seems: for supposing +a man, or family, in the state they were at first peopling of the world by the +children of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in some inland, vacant places of +America, we shall find that the possessions he could make himself, upon the +measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day, +prejudice the rest of mankind, or give them reason to complain, or think +themselves injured by this man’s incroachment, though the race of men +have now spread themselves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely +exceed the small number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of ground is of +so little value, without labour, that I have heard it affirmed, that in Spain +itself a man may be permitted to plough, sow and reap, without being disturbed, +upon land he has no other title to, but only his making use of it. But, on the +contrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him, who, by his +industry on neglected, and consequently waste land, has increased the stock of +corn, which they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no stress on; this +I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety, (viz.) that every man +should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the world, +without straitening any body; since there is land enough in the world to +suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and the tacit +agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger +possessions, and a right to them; which, how it has done, I shall by and by +shew more at large. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having +more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends +only on their usefulness to the life of man; or had agreed, that a little piece +of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, should be worth a +great piece of flesh, or a whole heap of corn; though men had a right to +appropriate, by their labour, each one of himself, as much of the things of +nature, as he could use: yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice of +others, where the same plenty was still left to those who would use the same +industry. To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to himself by his +labour, does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the +provisions serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre of +inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times more +than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness lying +waste in common. And therefore he that incloses land, and has a greater plenty +of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred +left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind: for his +labour now supplies him with provisions out of ten acres, which were but the +product of an hundred lying in common. I have here rated the improved land very +low, in making its product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an hundred +to one: for I ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America, +left to nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres +yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life, as ten +acres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well cultivated? +</p> + +<p> +Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, +killed, caught, or tamed, as many of the beasts, as he could; he that so +imployed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature, as any way +to alter them from the state which nature put them in, by placing any of his +labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them: but if they perished, +in his possession, without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison +putrified, before he could spend it, he offended against the common law of +nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour’s share, +for he had no right, farther than his use called for any of them, and they +might serve to afford him conveniencies of life. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 38. The same measures governed the possession of land too: whatsoever he +tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, that was his +peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed, and make use of, the +cattle and product was also his. But if either the grass of his enclosure +rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering, +and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still +to be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of any other. Thus, at +the beginning, Cain might take as much ground as he could till, and make it his +own land, and yet leave enough to Abel’s sheep to feed on; a few acres +would serve for both their possessions. But as families increased, and industry +inlarged their stocks, their possessions inlarged with the need of them; but +yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of, +till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and built cities; and +then, by consent, they came in time, to set out the bounds of their distinct +territories, and agree on limits between them and their neighbours; and by laws +within themselves, settled the properties of those of the same society: for we +see, that in that part of the world which was first inhabited, and therefore +like to be best peopled, even as low down as Abraham’s time, they +wandered with their flocks, and their herds, which was their substance, freely +up and down; and this Abraham did, in a country where he was a stranger. Whence +it is plain, that at least a great part of the land lay in common; that the +inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed property in any more than they made use +of. But when there was not room enough in the same place, for their herds to +feed together, they by consent, as Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5. separated +and inlarged their pasture, where it best liked them. And for the same reason +Esau went from his father, and his brother, and planted in mount Seir, Gen. +xxxvi. 6. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion, and property in +Adam, over all the world, exclusive of all other men, which can no way be +proved, nor any one’s property be made out from it; but supposing the +world given, as it was, to the children of men in common, we see how labour +could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it, for their private +uses; wherein there could be no doubt of right, no room for quarrel. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may appear, +that the property of labour should be able to over-balance the community of +land: for it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing; +and let any one consider what the difference is between an acre of land planted +with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the same land +lying in common, without any husbandry upon it, and he will find, that the +improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value. I think it will +be but a very modest computation to say, that of the products of the earth +useful to the life of man nine tenths are the effects of labour: nay, if we +will rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the several +expences about them, what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to +labour, we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly +to be put on the account of labour. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than several +nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the +comforts of life; whom nature having furnished as liberally as any other +people, with the materials of plenty, i.e. a fruitful soil, apt to produce in +abundance, what might serve for food, raiment, and delight; yet for want of +improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies we +enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges, and +is clad worse than a day-labourer in England. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinary +provisions of life, through their several progresses, before they come to our +use, and see how much they receive of their value from human industry. Bread, +wine and cloth, are things of daily use, and great plenty; yet notwithstanding, +acorns, water and leaves, or skins, must be our bread, drink and cloathing, did +not labour furnish us with these more useful commodities: for whatever bread is +more worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins +or moss, that is wholly owing to labour and industry; the one of these being +the food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other, +provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how much they +exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then see how +much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this +world: and the ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be reckoned +in, as any, or at most, but a very small part of it; so little, that even +amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of +pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we +shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing. +</p> + +<p> +This shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to largeness of +dominions; and that the increase of lands, and the right employing of them, is +the great art of government: and that prince, who shall be so wise and godlike, +as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and encouragement to the +honest industry of mankind, against the oppression of power and narrowness of +party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbours: but this by the by. +</p> + +<p> +To return to the argument in hand. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 43. An acre of land, that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and another +in America, which, with the same husbandry, would do the like, are, without +doubt, of the same natural intrinsic value: but yet the benefit mankind +receives from the one in a year, is worth 5l. and from the other possibly not +worth a penny, if all the profit an Indian received from it were to be valued, +and sold here; at least, I may truly say, not one thousandth. It is labour then +which puts the greatest part of value upon land, without which it would +scarcely be worth any thing: it is to that we owe the greatest part of all its +useful products; for all that the straw, bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, is +more worth than the product of an acre of as good land, which lies waste, is +all the effect of labour: for it is not barely the plough-man’s pains, +the reaper’s and thresher’s toil, and the baker’s sweat, is +to be counted into the bread we eat; the labour of those who broke the oxen, +who digged and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timber +employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are a vast +number, requisite to this corn, from its being feed to be sown to its being +made bread, must all be charged on the account of labour, and received as an +effect of that: nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless +materials, as in themselves. It would be a strange catalogue of things, that +industry provided and made use of, about every loaf of bread, before it came to +our use, if we could trace them; iron, wood, leather, bark, timber, stone, +bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and all the +materials made use of in the ship, that brought any of the commodities made use +of by any of the workmen, to any part of the work; all which it would be almost +impossible, at least too long, to reckon up. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are +given in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own +person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great +foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of what he +applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had +improved the conveniencies of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong +in common to others. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever any +one was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which remained a long while +the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes use of. Men, at first, +for the most part, contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to +their necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the world, (where +the increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, +and so of some value) the several communities settled the bounds of their +distinct territories, and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of +the private men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the +property which labour and industry began; and the leagues that have been made +between several states and kingdoms, either expresly or tacitly disowning all +claim and right to the land in the others possession, have, by common consent, +given up their pretences to their natural common right, which originally they +had to those countries, and so have, by positive agreement, settled a property +amongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet there are +still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not +having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their +common money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it do, or +can make use of, and so still lie in common; tho’ this can scarce happen +amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of man, and +such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world look +after, as it doth the Americans now, are generally things of short duration; +such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of themselves: +gold, silver and diamonds, are things that fancy or agreement hath put the +value on, more than real use, and the necessary support of life. Now of those +good things which nature hath provided in common, every one had a right (as +hath been said) to as much as he could use, and property in all that he could +effect with his labour; all that his industry could extend to, to alter from +the state nature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a hundred bushels of +acorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they were his goods as soon +as gathered. He was only to look, that he used them before they spoiled, else +he took more than his share, and robbed others. And indeed it was a foolish +thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could make use of. If he +gave away a part to any body else, so that it perished not uselesly in his +possession, these he also made use of. And if he also bartered away plums, that +would have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last good for his eating a +whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not the common stock; destroyed no part +of the portion of goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished +uselesly in his hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, +pleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a +sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by him all his life he invaded +not the right of others, he might heap up as much of these durable things as he +pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in the +largeness of his possession, but the perishing of any thing uselesly in it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 47. And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men might +keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in exchange +for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions +in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunity +to continue and enlarge them: for supposing an island, separate from all +possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein there were but an hundred +families, but there were sheep, horses and cows, with other useful animals, +wholsome fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as many, +but nothing in the island, either because of its commonness, or perishableness, +fit to supply the place of money; what reason could any one have there to +enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his family, and a plentiful supply to +its consumption, either in what their own industry produced, or they could +barter for like perishable, useful commodities, with others? Where there is not +some thing, both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there +men will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land, were it never so +rich, never so free for them to take: for I ask, what would a man value ten +thousand, or an hundred thousand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated, and +well stocked too with cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of America, +where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money +to him by the sale of the product? It would not be worth the enclosing, and we +should see him give up again to the wild common of nature, whatever was more +than would supply the conveniencies of life to be had there for him and his +family. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 49. Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so than +that is now; for no such thing as money was any where known. Find out something +that hath the use and value of money amongst his neighbours, you shall see the +same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 50. But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man in +proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the consent +of men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is plain, that +men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth, they +having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out, a way how a man may fairly +possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in +exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without +injury to any one; these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the +possessor. This partage of things in an inequality of private possessions, men +have made practicable out of the bounds of society, and without compact, only +by putting a value on gold and silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of +money: for in governments, the laws regulate the right of property, and the +possession of land is determined by positive constitutions. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without any +difficulty, how labour could at first begin a title of property in the common +things of nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it. So that +there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt about +the largeness of possession it gave. Right and conveniency went together; for +as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon, so he had no +temptation to labour for more than he could make use of. This left no room for +controversy about the title, nor for encroachment on the right of others; what +portion a man carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was useless, as well +as dishonest, to carve himself too much, or take more than he needed. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER. VI.</h2> + +<h3>OF PATERNAL POWER.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 52. IT may perhaps be censured as an impertinent criticism, in a +discourse of this nature, to find fault with words and names, that have +obtained in the world: and yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new ones, +when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes, as this of paternal power +probably has done, which seems so to place the power of parents over their +children wholly in the father, as if the mother had no share in it; whereas, if +we consult reason or revelation, we shall find, she hath an equal title. This +may give one reason to ask, whether this might not be more properly called +parental power? for whatever obligation nature and the right of generation lays +on children, it must certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent causes of +it. And accordingly we see the positive law of God every where joins them +together, without distinction, when it commands the obedience of children, +Honour thy father and thy mother, Exod. xx. 12. Whosoever curseth his father or +his mother, Lev. xx. 9. Ye shall fear every man his mother and his father, Lev. +xix. 3. Children, obey your parents, &c. Eph. vi. 1. is the stile of the +Old and New Testament. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 53. Had but this one thing been well considered, without looking any +deeper into the matter, it might perhaps have kept men from running into those +gross mistakes, they have made, about this power of parents; which, however it +might, without any great harshness, bear the name of absolute dominion, and +regal authority, when under the title of paternal power it seemed appropriated +to the father, would yet have founded but oddly, and in the very name shewn the +absurdity, if this supposed absolute power over children had been called +parental; and thereby have discovered, that it belonged to the mother too: for +it will but very ill serve the turn of those men, who contend so much for the +absolute power and authority of the fatherhood, as they call it, that the +mother should have any share in it; and it would have but ill supported the +monarchy they contend for, when by the very name it appeared, that that +fundamental authority, from whence they would derive their government of a +single person only, was not placed in one, but two persons jointly. But to let +this of names pass. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 54. Though I have said above, Chap. II. That all men by nature are equal, +I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality: age or virtue may +give men a just precedency: excellency of parts and merit may place others +above the common level: birth may subject some, and alliance or benefits +others, to pay an observance to those to whom nature, gratitude, or other +respects, may have made it due: and yet all this consists with the equality, +which all men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another; +which was the equality I there spoke of, as proper to the business in hand, +being that equal right, that every man hath, to his natural freedom, without +being subjected to the will or authority of any other man. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 55. Children, I confess, are not born in this full state of equality, +though they are born to it. Their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction +over them, when they come into the world, and for some time after; but it is +but a temporary one. The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling +clothes they are wrapt up in, and supported by, in the weakness of their +infancy: age and reason as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they drop +quite off, and leave a man at his own free disposal. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 56. Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in full possession +of their strength and reason, and so was capable, from the first instant of his +being to provide for his own support and preservation, and govern his actions +according to the dictates of the law of reason which God had implanted in him. +From him the world is peopled with his descendants, who are all born infants, +weak and helpless, without knowledge or understanding: but to supply the +defects of this imperfect state, till the improvement of growth and age hath +removed them, Adam and Eve, and after them all parents were, by the law of +nature, under an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the children they +had begotten; not as their own workmanship, but the workmanship of their own +maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for them. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 57. The law, that was to govern Adam, was the same that was to govern all +his posterity, the law of reason. But his offspring having another way of +entrance into the world, different from him, by a natural birth, that produced +them ignorant and without the use of reason, they were not presently under that +law; for no body can be under a law, which is not promulgated to him; and this +law being promulgated or made known by reason only, he that is not come to the +use of his reason, cannot be said to be under this law; and Adam’s +children, being not presently as soon as born under this law of reason, were +not presently free: for law, in its true notion, is not so much the limitation +as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and +prescribes no farther than is for the general good of those under that law: +could they be happier without it, the law, as an useless thing, would of itself +vanish; and that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in only +from bogs and precipices. So that, however it may be mistaken, the end of law +is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom: for in all +the states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law, there is +no freedom: for liberty is, to be free from restraint and violence from others; +which cannot be, where there is no law: but freedom is not, as we are told, a +liberty for every man to do what he lists: (for who could be free, when every +other man’s humour might domineer over him?) but a liberty to dispose, +and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole +property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not +to be subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 58. The power, then, that parents have over their children, arises from +that duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their off-spring, during +the imperfect state of childhood. To inform the mind, and govern the actions of +their yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place, and ease them of +that trouble, is what the children want, and the parents are bound to: for God +having given man an understanding to direct his actions, has allowed him a +freedom of will, and liberty of acting, as properly belonging thereunto, within +the bounds of that law he is under. But whilst he is in an estate, wherein he +has not understanding of his own to direct his will, he is not to have any will +of his own to follow: he that understands for him, must will for him too; he +must prescribe to his will, and regulate his actions; but when he comes to the +estate that made his father a freeman, the son is a freeman too. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 59. This holds in all the laws a man is under, whether natural or civil. +Is a man under the law of nature? What made him free of that law? what gave him +a free disposing of his property, according to his own will, within the compass +of that law? I answer, a state of maturity wherein he might be supposed capable +to know that law, that so he might keep his actions within the bounds of it. +When he has acquired that state, he is presumed to know how far that law is to +be his guide, and how far he may make use of his freedom, and so comes to have +it; till then, some body else must guide him, who is presumed to know how far +the law allows a liberty. If such a state of reason, such an age of discretion +made him free, the same shall make his son free too. Is a man under the law of +England? What made him free of that law? that is, to have the liberty to +dispose of his actions and possessions according to his own will, within the +permission of that law? A capacity of knowing that law; which is supposed by +that law, at the age of one and twenty years, and in some cases sooner. If this +made the father free, it shall make the son free too. Till then we see the law +allows the son to have no will, but he is to be guided by the will of his +father or guardian, who is to understand for him. And if the father die, and +fail to substitute a deputy in his trust; if he hath not provided a tutor, to +govern his son, during his minority, during his want of understanding, the law +takes care to do it; some other must govern him, and be a will to him, till he +hath attained to a state of freedom, and his understanding be fit to take the +government of his will. But after that, the father and son are equally free as +much as tutor and pupil after nonage; equally subjects of the same law +together, without any dominion left in the father over the life, liberty, or +estate of his son, whether they be only in the state and under the law of +nature, or under the positive laws of an established government. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 60. But if, through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of +nature, any one comes not to such a degree of reason, wherein he might be +supposed capable of knowing the law, and so living within the rules of it, he +is never capable of being a free man, he is never let loose to the disposure of +his own will (because he knows no bounds to it, has not understanding, its +proper guide) but is continued under the tuition and government of others, all +the time his own understanding is uncapable of that charge. And so lunatics and +ideots are never set free from the government of their parents; +</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p> +children, who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may have; and +innocents which are excluded by a natural defect from ever having; thirdly, +madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right reason to +guide themselves, have for their guide, the reason that guideth other men which +are tutors over them, to seek and procure their good for them, +</p> + +</div> + +<p> +says Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sec. 7. All which seems no more than that duty, +which God and nature has laid on man, as well as other creatures, to preserve +their offspring, till they can be able to shift for themselves, and will scarce +amount to an instance or proof of parents regal authority. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 61. Thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we have +actually the exercise of either: age, that brings one, brings with it the other +too. And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist +together, and are both founded on the same principle. A child is free by his +father’s title, by his father’s understanding, which is to govern +him till he hath it of his own. The freedom of a man at years of discretion, +and the subjection of a child to his parents, whilst yet short of that age, are +so consistent, and so distinguishable, that the most blinded contenders for +monarchy, by right of fatherhood, cannot miss this difference; the most +obstinate cannot but allow their consistency: for were their doctrine all true, +were the right heir of Adam now known, and by that title settled a monarch in +his throne, invested with all the absolute unlimited power Sir Robert Filmer +talks of; if he should die as soon as his heir were born, must not the child, +notwithstanding he were never so free, never so much sovereign, be in +subjection to his mother and nurse, to tutors and governors, till age and +education brought him reason and ability to govern himself and others? The +necessities of his life, the health of his body, and the information of his +mind, would require him to be directed by the will of others, and not his own; +and yet will any one think, that this restraint and subjection were +inconsistent with, or spoiled him of that liberty or sovereignty he had a right +to, or gave away his empire to those who had the government of his nonage? This +government over him only prepared him the better and sooner for it. If any body +should ask me, when my son is of age to be free? I shall answer, just when his +monarch is of age to govern. But at what time, says the judicious Hooker, Eccl. +Pol. l. i. sect. 6. a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of +reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws whereby he is then bound +to guide his actions: this is a great deal more easy for sense to discern, than +for any one by skill and learning to determine. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 62. Common-wealths themselves take notice of, and allow, that there is a +time when men are to begin to act like free men, and therefore till that time +require not oaths of fealty, or allegiance, or other public owning of, or +submission to the government of their countries. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 63. The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to his own +will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in that +law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the +freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty, before +he has reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature +to be free; but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and abandon him to a state as +wretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as their’s. This is that +which puts the authority into the parents hands to govern the minority of their +children. God hath made it their business to employ this care on their +offspring, and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and +concern to temper this power, to apply it, as his wisdom designed it, to the +children’s good, as long as they should need to be under it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 64. But what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due to +their off-spring into an absolute arbitrary dominion of the father, whose power +reaches no farther, than by such a discipline, as he finds most effectual, to +give such strength and health to their bodies, such vigour and rectitude to +their minds, as may best fit his children to be most useful to themselves and +others; and, if it be necessary to his condition, to make them work, when they +are able, for their own subsistence. But in this power the mother too has her +share with the father. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 65. Nay, this power so little belongs to the father by any peculiar right +of nature, but only as he is guardian of his children, that when he quits his +care of them, he loses his power over them, which goes along with their +nourishment and education, to which it is inseparably annexed; and it belongs +as much to the foster-father of an exposed child, as to the natural father of +another. So little power does the bare act of begetting give a man over his +issue; if all his care ends there, and this be all the title he hath to the +name and authority of a father. And what will become of this paternal power in +that part of the world, where one woman hath more than one husband at a time? +or in those parts of America, where, when the husband and wife part, which +happens frequently, the children are all left to the mother, follow her, and +are wholly under her care and provision? If the father die whilst the children +are young, do they not naturally every where owe the same obedience to their +mother, during their minority, as to their father were he alive? and will any +one say, that the mother hath a legislative power over her children? that she +can make standing rules, which shall be of perpetual obligation, by which they +ought to regulate all the concerns of their property, and bound their liberty +all the course of their lives? or can she inforce the observation of them with +capital punishments? for this is the proper power of the magistrate, of which +the father hath not so much as the shadow. His command over his children is but +temporary, and reaches not their life or property: it is but a help to the +weakness and imperfection of their nonage, a discipline necessary to their +education: and though a father may dispose of his own possessions as he +pleases, when his children are out of danger of perishing for want, yet his +power extends not to the lives or goods, which either their own industry, or +another’s bounty has made their’s; nor to their liberty neither, +when they are once arrived to the infranchisement of the years of discretion. +The father’s empire then ceases, and he can from thence forwards no more +dispose of the liberty of his son, than that of any other man: and it must be +far from an absolute or perpetual jurisdiction, from which a man may withdraw +himself, having license from divine authority to leave father and mother, and +cleave to his wife. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 66. But though there be a time when a child comes to be as free from +subjection to the will and command of his father, as the father himself is free +from subjection to the will of any body else, and they are each under no other +restraint, but that which is common to them both, whether it be the law of +nature, or municipal law of their country; yet this freedom exempts not a son +from that honour which he ought, by the law of God and nature, to pay his +parents. God having made the parents instruments in his great design of +continuing the race of mankind, and the occasions of life to their children; as +he hath laid on them an obligation to nourish, preserve, and bring up their +offspring; so he has laid on the children a perpetual obligation of honouring +their parents, which containing in it an inward esteem and reverence to be +shewn by all outward expressions, ties up the child from any thing that may +ever injure or affront, disturb or endanger, the happiness or life of those +from whom he received his; and engages him in all actions of defence, relief, +assistance and comfort of those, by whose means he entered into being, and has +been made capable of any enjoyments of life: from this obligation no state, no +freedom can absolve children. But this is very far from giving parents a power +of command over their children, or an authority to make laws and dispose as +they please of their lives or liberties. It is one thing to owe honour, +respect, gratitude and assistance; another to require an absolute obedience and +submission. The honour due to parents, a monarch in his throne owes his mother; +and yet this lessens not his authority, nor subjects him to her government. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 67. The subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary +government, which terminates with the minority of the child: and the honour due +from a child, places in the parents a perpetual right to respect, reverence, +support and compliance too, more or less, as the father’s care, cost, and +kindness in his education, has been more or less. This ends not with minority, +but holds in all parts and conditions of a man’s life. The want of +distinguishing these two powers, viz. that which the father hath in the right +of tuition, during minority, and the right of honour all his life, may perhaps +have caused a great part of the mistakes about this matter: for to speak +properly of them, the first of these is rather the privilege of children, and +duty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power. The nourishment and +education of their children is a charge so incumbent on parents for their +children’s good, that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it: +and though the power of commanding and chastising them go along with it, yet +God hath woven into the principles of human nature such a tenderness for their +off-spring, that there is little fear that parents should use their power with +too much rigour; the excess is seldom on the severe side, the strong byass of +nature drawing the other way. And therefore God almighty when he would express +his gentle dealing with the Israelites, he tells them, that though he chastened +them, he chastened them as a man chastens his son, Deut. viii. 5. i.e. with +tenderness and affection, and kept them under no severer discipline than what +was absolutely best for them, and had been less kindness to have slackened. +This is that power to which children are commanded obedience, that the pains +and care of their parents may not be increased, or ill rewarded. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 68. On the other side, honour and support, all that which gratitude +requires to return for the benefits received by and from them, is the +indispensable duty of the child, and the proper privilege of the parents. This +is intended for the parents advantage, as the other is for the child’s; +though education, the parents duty, seems to have most power, because the +ignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in need of restraint and +correction; which is a visible exercise of rule, and a kind of dominion. And +that duty which is comprehended in the word honour, requires less obedience, +though the obligation be stronger on grown, than younger children: for who can +think the command, Children obey your parents, requires in a man, that has +children of his own, the same submission to his father, as it does in his yet +young children to him; and that by this precept he were bound to obey all his +father’s commands, if, out of a conceit of authority, he should have the +indiscretion to treat him still as a boy? +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 69. The first part then of paternal power, or rather duty, which is +education, belongs so to the father, that it terminates at a certain season; +when the business of education is over, it ceases of itself, and is also +alienable before: for a man may put the tuition of his son in other hands; and +he that has made his son an apprentice to another, has discharged him, during +that time, of a great part of his obedience both to himself and to his mother. +But all the duty of honour, the other part, remains never the less entire to +them; nothing can cancel that: it is so inseparable from them both, that the +father’s authority cannot dispossess the mother of this right, nor can +any man discharge his son from honouring her that bore him. But both these are +very far from a power to make laws, and enforcing them with penalties, that may +reach estate, liberty, limbs and life. The power of commanding ends with +nonage; and though, after that, honour and respect, support and defence, and +whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the highest benefits he is +naturally capable of, be always due from a son to his parents; yet all this +puts no scepter into the father’s hand, no sovereign power of commanding. +He has no dominion over his son’s property, or actions; nor any right, +that his will should prescribe to his son’s in all things; however it may +become his son in many things, not very inconvenient to him and his family, to +pay a deference to it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 70. A man may owe honour and respect to an ancient, or wise man; defence +to his child or friend; relief and support to the distressed; and gratitude to +a benefactor, to such a degree, that all he has, all he can do, cannot +sufficiently pay it: but all these give no authority, no right to any one, of +making laws over him from whom they are owing. And it is plain, all this is due +not only to the bare title of father; not only because, as has been said, it is +owing to the mother too; but because these obligations to parents, and the +degrees of what is required of children, may be varied by the different care +and kindness, trouble and expence, which is often employed upon one child more +than another. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 71. This shews the reason how it comes to pass, that parents in +societies, where they themselves are subjects, retain a power over their +children, and have as much right to their subjection, as those who are in the +state of nature. Which could not possibly be, if all political power were only +paternal, and that in truth they were one and the same thing: for then, all +paternal power being in the prince, the subject could naturally have none of +it. But these two powers, political and paternal, are so perfectly distinct and +separate; are built upon so different foundations, and given to so different +ends, that every subject that is a father, has as much a paternal power over +his children, as the prince has over his: and every prince, that has parents, +owes them as much filial duty and obedience, as the meanest of his subjects do +to their’s; and can therefore contain not any part or degree of that kind +of dominion, which a prince or magistrate has over his subject. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 72. Though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children, and +the obligation on children to honour their parents, contain all the power on +the one hand, and submission on the other, which are proper to this relation, +yet there is another power ordinarily in the father, whereby he has a tie on +the obedience of his children; which tho’ it be common to him with other +men, yet the occasions of shewing it, almost constantly happening to fathers in +their private families, and the instances of it elsewhere being rare, and less +taken notice of, it passes in the world for a part of paternal jurisdiction. +And this is the power men generally have to bestow their estates on those who +please them best; the possession of the father being the expectation and +inheritance of the children, ordinarily in certain proportions, according to +the law and custom of each country; yet it is commonly in the father’s +power to bestow it with a more sparing or liberal hand, according as the +behaviour of this or that child hath comported with his will and humour. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 73. This is no small tie on the obedience of children: and there being +always annexed to the enjoyment of land, a submission to the government of the +country, of which that land is a part; it has been commonly supposed, that a +father could oblige his posterity to that government, of which he himself was a +subject, and that his compact held them; whereas, it being only a necessary +condition annexed to the land, and the inheritance of an estate which is under +that government, reaches only those who will take it on that condition, and so +is no natural tie or engagement, but a voluntary submission: for every +man’s children being by nature as free as himself, or any of his +ancestors ever were, may, whilst they are in that freedom, choose what society +they will join themselves to, what commonwealth they will put themselves under. +But if they will enjoy the inheritance of their ancestors, they must take it on +the same terms their ancestors had it, and submit to all the conditions annexed +to such a possession. By this power indeed fathers oblige their children to +obedience to themselves, even when they are past minority, and most commonly +too subject them to this or that political power: but neither of these by any +peculiar right of fatherhood, but by the reward they have in their hands to +inforce and recompence such a compliance; and is no more power than what a +French man has over an English man, who by the hopes of an estate he will leave +him, will certainly have a strong tie on his obedience: and if, when it is left +him, he will enjoy it, he must certainly take it upon the conditions annexed to +the possession of land in that country where it lies, whether it be France or +England. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 74. To conclude then, tho’ the father’s power of commanding +extends no farther than the minority of his children, and to a degree only fit +for the discipline and government of that age; and tho’ that honour and +respect, and all that which the Latins called piety, which they indispensably +owe to their parents all their life-time, and in all estates, with all that +support and defence is due to them, gives the father no power of governing, +i.e. making laws and enacting penalties on his children; though by all this he +has no dominion over the property or actions of his son: yet it is obvious to +conceive how easy it was, in the first ages of the world, and in places still, +where the thinness of people gives families leave to separate into unpossessed +quarters, and they have room to remove or plant themselves in yet vacant +habitations, for the father of the family to become the prince of it;* he had +been a ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children: and since +without some government it would be hard for them to live together, it was +likeliest it should, by the express or tacit consent of the children when they +were grown up, be in the father, where it seemed without any change barely to +continue; when indeed nothing more was required to it, than the permitting the +father to exercise alone, in his family, that executive power of the law of +nature, which every free man naturally hath, and by that permission resigning +up to him a monarchical power, whilst they remained in it. But that this was +not by any paternal right, but only by the consent of his children, is evident +from hence, that no body doubts, but if a stranger, whom chance or business had +brought to his family, had there killed any of his children, or committed any +other fact, he might condemn and put him to death, or other-wise have punished +him, as well as any of his children; which it was impossible he should do by +virtue of any paternal authority over one who was not his child, but by virtue +of that executive power of the law of nature, which, as a man, he had a right +to: and he alone could punish him in his family, where the respect of his +children had laid by the exercise of such a power, to give way to the dignity +and authority they were willing should remain in him, above the rest of his +family. +</p> + +<p> +(*It is no improbable opinion therefore, which the archphilosopher was of, that +the chief person in every houshold was always, as it were, a king: so when +numbers of housholds joined themselves in civil societies together, kings were +the first kind of governors amongst them, which is also, as it seemeth, the +reason why the name of fathers continued still in them, who, of fathers, were +made rulers; as also the ancient custom of governors to do as Melchizedec, and +being kings, to exercise the office of priests, which fathers did at the first, +grew perhaps by the same occasion. Howbeit, this is not the only kind of +regiment that has been received in the world. The inconveniences of one kind +have caused sundry others to be devised; so that in a word, all public +regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have risen from the +deliberate advice, consultation and composition between men, judging it +convenient and behoveful; there being no impossibility in nature considered by +itself, but that man might have lived without any public regiment, +Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10.) +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 75. Thus it was easy, and almost natural for children, by a tacit, and +scarce avoidable consent, to make way for the father’s authority and +government. They had been accustomed in their childhood to follow his +direction, and to refer their little differences to him, and when they were +men, who fitter to rule them? Their little properties, and less covetousness, +seldom afforded greater controversies; and when any should arise, where could +they have a fitter umpire than he, by whose care they had every one been +sustained and brought up, and who had a tenderness for them all? It is no +wonder that they made no distinction betwixt minority and full age; nor looked +after one and twenty, or any other age that might make them the free disposers +of themselves and fortunes, when they could have no desire to be out of their +pupilage: the government they had been under, during it, continued still to be +more their protection than restraint; and they could no where find a greater +security to their peace, liberties, and fortunes, than in the rule of a father. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 76. Thus the natural fathers of families, by an insensible change, became +the politic monarchs of them too: and as they chanced to live long, and leave +able and worthy heirs, for several successions, or otherwise; so they laid the +foundations of hereditary, or elective kingdoms, under several constitutions +and manners, according as chance, contrivance, or occasions happened to mould +them. But if princes have their titles in their fathers right, and it be a +sufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political authority, +because they commonly were those in whose hands we find, de facto, the exercise +of government: I say, if this argument be good, it will as strongly prove, that +all princes, nay princes only, ought to be priests, since it is as certain, +that in the beginning, the father of the family was priest, as that he was +ruler in his own houshold. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER. VII.</h2> + +<h3>OF POLITICAL OR CIVIL SOCIETY.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it was +not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, +convenience, and inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted him +with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it. The first society was +between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and +children; to which, in time, that between master and servant came to be added: +and though all these might, and commonly did meet together, and make up but one +family, wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a +family; each of these, or all together, came short of political society, as we +shall see, if we consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of +these. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man and +woman; and tho’ it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one +another’s bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet it +draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of interests too, +as necessary not only to unite their care and affection, but also necessary to +their common off-spring, who have a right to be nourished, and maintained by +them, till they are able to provide for themselves. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 79. For the end of conjunction, between male and female, being not barely +procreation, but the continuation of the species; this conjunction betwixt male +and female ought to last, even after procreation, so long as is necessary to +the nourishment and support of the young ones, who are to be sustained by those +that got them, till they are able to shift and provide for themselves. This +rule, which the infinite wise maker hath set to the works of his hands, we find +the inferior creatures steadily obey. In those viviparous animals which feed on +grass, the conjunction between male and female lasts no longer than the very +act of copulation; because the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish the +young, till it be able to feed on grass, the male only begets, but concerns not +himself for the female or young, to whose sustenance he can contribute nothing. +But in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer: because the dam not being +able well to subsist herself, and nourish her numerous off-spring by her own +prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more dangerous way of living, than by +feeding on grass, the assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of +their common family, which cannot subsist till they are able to prey for +themselves, but by the joint care of male and female. The same is to be +observed in all birds, (except some domestic ones, where plenty of food excuses +the cock from feeding, and taking care of the young brood) whose young needing +food in the nest, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are able to +use their wing, and provide for themselves. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reason, why the +male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other +creatures, viz. because the female is capable of conceiving, and de facto is +commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, long before the +former is out of a dependency for support on his parents help, and able to +shift for himself, and has all the assistance is due to him from his parents: +whereby the father, who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is under +an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same woman longer than +other creatures, whose young being able to subsist of themselves, before the +time of procreation returns again, the conjugal bond dissolves of itself, and +they are at liberty, till Hymen at his usual anniversary season summons them +again to chuse new mates. Wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great +Creator, who having given to man foresight, and an ability to lay up for the +future, as well as to supply the present necessity, hath made it necessary, +that society of man and wife should be more lasting, than of male and female +amongst other creatures; that so their industry might be encouraged, and their +interest better united, to make provision and lay up goods for their common +issue, which uncertain mixture, or easy and frequent solutions of conjugal +society would mightily disturb. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 81. But tho’ these are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugal +bonds more firm and lasting in man, than the other species of animals; yet it +would give one reason to enquire, why this compact, where procreation and +education are secured, and inheritance taken care for, may not be made +determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain +conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no necessity +in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should always be for +life; I mean, to such as are under no restraint of any positive law, which +ordains all such contracts to be perpetual. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one common concern, +yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different +wills too; it therefore being necessary that the last determination, i. e. the +rule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally falls to the man’s share, +as the abler and the stronger. But this reaching but to the things of their +common interest and property, leaves the wife in the full and free possession +of what by contract is her peculiar right, and gives the husband no more power +over her life than she has over his; the power of the husband being so far from +that of an absolute monarch, that the wife has in many cases a liberty to +separate from him, where natural right, or their contract allows it; whether +that contract be made by themselves in the state of nature, or by the customs +or laws of the country they live in; and the children upon such separation fall +to the father or mother’s lot, as such contract does determine. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under politic +government, as well as in the state of nature, the civil magistrate doth not +abridge the right or power of either naturally necessary to those ends, viz. +procreation and mutual support and assistance whilst they are together; but +only decides any controversy that may arise between man and wife about them. If +it were otherwise, and that absolute sovereignty and power of life and death +naturally belonged to the husband, and were necessary to the society between +man and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of those countries where the +husband is allowed no such absolute authority. But the ends of matrimony +requiring no such power in the husband, the condition of conjugal society put +it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that state. Conjugal society +could subsist and attain its ends without it; nay, community of goods, and the +power over them, mutual assistance and maintenance, and other things belonging +to conjugal society, might be varied and regulated by that contract which +unites man and wife in that society, as far as may consist with procreation and +the bringing up of children till they could shift for themselves; nothing being +necessary to any society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it is +made. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the distinct rights and +powers belonging respectively to them, I have treated of so largely, in the +foregoing chapter, that I shall not here need to say any thing of it. And I +think it is plain, that it is far different from a politic society. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but given to those of +far different condition; for a freeman makes himself a servant to another, by +selling him, for a certain time, the service he undertakes to do, in exchange +for wages he is to receive: and though this commonly puts him into the family +of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof; yet it gives the +master but a temporary power over him, and no greater than what is contained in +the contract between them. But there is another sort of servants, which by a +peculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by +the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of +their masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with it +their liberties, and lost their estates; and being in the state of slavery, not +capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of +civil society; the chief end whereof is the preservation of property. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these +subordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, united under the +domestic rule of a family; which, what resemblance soever it may have in its +order, offices, and number too, with a little commonwealth, yet is very far +from it, both in its constitution, power and end: or if it must be thought a +monarchy, and the paterfamilias the absolute monarch in it, absolute monarchy +will have but a very shattered and short power, when it is plain, by what has +been said before, that the master of the family has a very distinct and +differently limited power, both as to time and extent, over those several +persons that are in it; for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a +family, and his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves in +his family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death over any of +them, and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he. And +he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family, who has but a +very limited one over every individual in it. But how a family, or any other +society of men, differ from that which is properly political society, we shall +best see, by considering wherein political society itself consists. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, +and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of +nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by +nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty +and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, +and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence +deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, +in his opinion, requires it. But because no political society can be, nor +subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in +order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and +there only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted +this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases +that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by +it. And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, +the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and +the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for +the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen +between any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and +punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society, +with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, +who are, and who are not, in political society together. Those who are united +into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, +with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are +in civil society one with another: but those who have no such common appeal, I +mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no +other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed +it, the perfect state of nature. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what +punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy +of it, committed amongst the members of that society, (which is the power of +making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of +its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war and +peace;) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of +that society, as far as is possible. But though every man who has entered into +civil society, and is become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted +his power to punish offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his +own private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given up +to the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has +given a right to the commonwealth to employ his force, for the execution of the +judgments of the commonwealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed +are his own judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. And +herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil +society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be +punished, when committed within the commonwealth; and also to determine, by +occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far +injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ all the +force of all the members, when there shall be need. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one +society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to +resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society. +And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter +into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme +government; or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any +government already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or which is all +one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the +society shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his +own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a +commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all +the controversies, and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of +the commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by +it. And where-ever there are any number of men, however associated, that have +no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of +nature. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is +counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil +society, and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the end of civil +society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of +nature, which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in his own +case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that society may +appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which every +one of the society ought to obey;* where-ever any persons are, who have not +such an authority to appeal to, for the decision of any difference between +them, there those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every +absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion. +</p> + +<p> +(*The public power of all society is above every soul contained in the same +society; and the principal use of that power is, to give laws unto all that are +under it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless there be reason shewed +which may necessarily inforce, that the law of reason, or of God, doth enjoin +the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.) +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive +power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to +any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from +whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any injury or inconviency, +that may be suffered from the prince, or by his order: so that such a man, +however intitled, Czar, or Grand Seignior, or how you please, is as much in the +state of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with the rest of +mankind: for where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and common +judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controversies of right +betwixt them, there they are still in the state of* nature, and under all the +inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the subject, or +rather slave of an absolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary state of +nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the best of +his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his property is invaded by the will +and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in society ought +to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational +creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so is +exposed to all the misery and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, +who being in the unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, +and armed with power. +</p> + +<p> +(*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e. such as +attend men in the state of nature, there was no way but only by growing into +composition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind of +govemment public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom +they granted authority to rule and govem, by them the peace, tranquillity and +happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men always knew that where force +and injury was offered, they might be defenders of themselves; they knew that +however men may seek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury +unto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good means to +be withstood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to +determine his own right, and according to his own determination proceed in +maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards himself, and them whom +he greatly affects, partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be +endless, except they gave their common consent, all to be ordered by some, whom +they should agree upon, without which consent there would be no reason that one +man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another, Hooker’s Eccl. +Pol. l. i. sect. 10.) +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men’s blood, and +corrects the baseness of human nature, need read but the history of this, or +any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been +insolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be much +better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out to +justify all that he shall do to his subjects, and the sword presently silence +all those that dare question it: for what the protection of absolute monarchy +is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be and to what +a degree of happiness and security it carries civil society, where this sort of +government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation of +Ceylon, may easily see. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of the +world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any +controversies, and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects +themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary, and believes +he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind, who should +go about to take it away. But whether this be from a true love of mankind and +society, and such a charity as we owe all one to another, there is reason to +doubt: for this is no more than what every man, who loves his own power, +profit, or greatness, may and naturally must do, keep those animals from +hurting, or destroying one another, who labour and drudge only for his pleasure +and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out of any love the master has for +them, but love of himself, and the profit they bring him: for if it be asked, +what security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the violence and +oppression of this absolute ruler? the very question can scarce be borne. They +are ready to tell you, that it deserves death only to ask after safety. Betwixt +subject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures, laws and judges, +for their mutual peace and security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be +absolute, and is above all such circumstances; because he has power to do more +hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from +harm, or injury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is +presently the voice of faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state +of nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be +under the restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of +the state of nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. +This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what +mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think +it safety, to be devoured by lions. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people’s +understandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they perceive, that +any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil society +which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against any harm, they +may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature, +in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon as they +can, to have that safety and security in civil society, for which it was first +instituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though +perhaps at first, (as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the following +part of this discourse) some one good and excellent man having got a +pre-eminency amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and +virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with +arbitration of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his hands, +without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his uprightness and +wisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade us) +sacredness of customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing innocence of the +first ages began, had brought in successors of another stamp, the people +finding their properties not secure under the government, as then it was, +(whereas government has no other end but the preservation of* property) could +never be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till the +legislature was placed in collective bodies of men, call them senate, +parliament, or what you please. By which means every single person became +subject, equally with other the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself, +as part of the legislative, had established; nor could any one, by his own +authority; avoid the force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence of +superiority plead exemption, thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of +any of his dependents.** No man in civil society can be exempted from the laws +of it: for if any man may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on +earth, for redress or security against any harm he shall do; I ask, whether he +be not perfectly still in the state of nature, and so can be no part or member +of that civil society; unless any one will say, the state of nature and civil +society are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found any one so +great a patron of anarchy as to affirm. +</p> + +<p> +(*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed, it may +be that nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of goveming, but +all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, which were to rule, till by +experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing +which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the sore, which it +should have cured. They saw, that to live by one man’s will, became the +cause of all men’s misery. This constrained them to come unto laws, +wherein all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the penalties of +transgressing them. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.) +</p> + +<p> +(**Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore over-rule +each several part of the same body. Hooker, ibid.) +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER. VIII.</h2> + +<h3>OF THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and +independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the +political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby any +one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil +society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for +their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure +enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not +of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the +rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When +any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they +are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the +majority have a right to act and conclude the rest. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, +made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power +to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the +majority: for that which acts any community, being only the consent of the +individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one +way; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force +carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it +should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every +individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is +bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, +that in assemblies, impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set +by that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for +the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature +and reason, the power of the whole. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body +politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to every one of +that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be +concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others +incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he +be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of +nature. For what appearance would there be of any compact? what new engagement +if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himself +thought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a +liberty, as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state of +nature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinks +fit. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be received +as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the consent +of every individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole: but such a +consent is next to impossible ever to be had, if we consider the infirmities of +health, and avocations of business, which in a number, though much less than +that of a commonwealth, will necessarily keep many away from the public +assembly. To which if we add the variety of opinions, and contrariety of +interests, which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, the coming into +society upon such terms would be only like Cato’s coming into the +theatre, only to go out again. Such a constitution as this would make the +mighty Leviathan of a shorter duration, than the feeblest creatures, and not +let it outlast the day it was born in: which cannot be supposed, till we can +think, that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to +be dissolved: for where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they +cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community, +must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which +they unite into society, to the majority of the community, unless they expresly +agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely +agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, +or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into, or make up a +commonwealth. And thus that, which begins and actually constitutes any +political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable +of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, +and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful government in +the world. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 100. To this I find two objections made. First, That there are no +instances to be found in story, of a company of men independent, and equal one +amongst another, that met together, and in this way began and set up a +government. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly, It is impossible of right, that men should do so, because all men +being born under government, they are to submit to that, and are not at liberty +to begin a new one. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 101. To the first there is this to answer, That it is not at all to be +wondered, that history gives us but a very little account of men, that lived +together in the state of nature. The inconveniences of that condition, and the +love and want of society, no sooner brought any number of them together, but +they presently united and incorporated, if they designed to continue together. +And if we may not suppose men ever to have been in the state of nature, because +we hear not much of them in such a state, we may as well suppose the armies of +Salmanasser or Xerxes were never children, because we hear little of them, till +they were men, and imbodied in armies. Government is every where antecedent to +records, and letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuation +of civil society has, by other more necessary arts, provided for their safety, +ease, and plenty: and then they begin to look after the history of their +founders, and search into their original, when they have outlived the memory of +it: for it is with commonwealths as with particular persons, they are commonly +ignorant of their own births and infancies: and if they know any thing of their +original, they are beholden for it, to the accidental records that others have +kept of it. And those that we have, of the beginning of any polities in the +world, excepting that of the Jews, where God himself immediately interposed, +and which favours not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain instances +of such a beginning as I have mentioned, or at least have manifest footsteps of +it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 102. He must shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact, +when it agrees not with his hypothesis, who will not allow, that the beginning +of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of several men free and +independent one of another, amongst whom there was no natural superiority or +subjection. And if Josephus Acosta’s word may be taken, he tells us, that +in many parts of America there was no government at all. +</p> + +<p> +There are great and apparent conjectures, says he, that these men, speaking of +those of Peru, for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths, but lived +in troops, as they do this day in Florida, the Cheriquanas, those of Brazil, +and many other nations, which have no certain kings, but as occasion is +offered, in peace or war, they choose their captains as they please, 1. i. c. +25. +</p> + +<p> +If it be said, that every man there was born subject to his father, or the head +of his family; that the subjection due from a child to a father took not away +his freedom of uniting into what political society he thought fit, has been +already proved. But be that as it will, these men, it is evident, were actually +free; and whatever superiority some politicians now would place in any of them, +they themselves claimed it not, but by consent were all equal, till by the same +consent they set rulers over themselves. So that their politic societies all +began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in +the choice of their governors, and forms of government. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 103. And I hope those who went away from Sparta with Palantus, mentioned +by Justin, 1. iii. c. 4. will be allowed to have been freemen independent one +of another, and to have set up a government over themselves, by their own +consent. Thus I have given several examples, out of history, of people free and +in the state of nature, that being met together incorporated and began a +commonwealth. And if the want of such instances be an argument to prove that +government were not, nor could not be so begun, I suppose the contenders for +paternal empire were better let it alone, than urge it against natural liberty: +for if they can give so many instances, out of history, of governments begun +upon paternal right, I think (though at best an argument from what has been, to +what should of right be, has no great force) one might, without any great +danger, yield them the cause. But if I might advise them in the case, they +would do well not to search too much into the original of governments, as they +have begun de facto, lest they should find, at the foundation of most of them, +something very little favourable to the design they promote, and such a power +as they contend for. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 104. But to conclude, reason being plain on our side, that men are +naturally free, and the examples of history shewing, that the governments of +the world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning laid on that +foundation, and were made by the consent of the people; there can be little +room for doubt, either where the right is, or what has been the opinion, or +practice of mankind, about the first erecting of governments. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 105. I will not deny, that if we look back as far as history will direct +us, towards the original of commonwealths, we shall generally find them under +the government and administration of one man. And I am also apt to believe, +that where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself, and continued +entire together, without mixing with others, as it often happens, where there +is much land, and few people, the government commonly began in the father: for +the father having, by the law of nature, the same power with every man else to +punish, as he thought fit, any offences against that law, might thereby punish +his transgressing children, even when they were men, and out of their pupilage; +and they were very likely to submit to his punishment, and all join with him +against the offender, in their turns, giving him thereby power to execute his +sentence against any transgression, and so in effect make him the law-maker, +and governor over all that remained in conjunction with his family. He was +fittest to be trusted; paternal affection secured their property and interest +under his care; and the custom of obeying him, in their childhood, made it +easier to submit to him, rather than to any other. If therefore they must have +one to rule them, as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live +together; who so likely to be the man as he that was their common father; +unless negligence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body made him unfit +for it? But when either the father died, and left his next heir, for want of +age, wisdom, courage, or any other qualities, less fit for rule; or where +several families met, and consented to continue together; there, it is not to +be doubted, but they used their natural freedom, to set up him, whom they +judged the ablest, and most likely, to rule well over them. Conformable +hereunto we find the people of America, who (living out of the reach of the +conquering swords, and spreading domination of the two great empires of Peru +and Mexico) enjoyed their own natural freedom, though, caeteris paribus, they +commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king; yet if they find him any way +weak, or uncapable, they pass him by, and set up the stoutest and bravest man +for their ruler. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 106. Thus, though looking back as far as records give us any account of +peopling the world, and the history of nations, we commonly find the government +to be in one hand; yet it destroys not that which I affirm, viz. that the +beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals, to +join into, and make one society; who, when they are thus incorporated, might +set up what form of government they thought fit. But this having given occasion +to men to mistake, and think, that by nature government was monarchical, and +belonged to the father, it may not be amiss here to consider, why people in the +beginning generally pitched upon this form, which though perhaps the +father’s pre-eminency might, in the first institution of some +commonwealths, give a rise to, and place in the beginning, the power in one +hand; yet it is plain that the reason, that continued the form of government in +a single person, was not any regard, or respect to paternal authority; since +all petty monarchies, that is, almost all monarchies, near their original, have +been commonly, at least upon occasion, elective. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 107. First then, in the beginning of things, the father’s +government of the childhood of those sprung from him, having accustomed them to +the rule of one man, and taught them that where it was exercised with care and +skill, with affection and love to those under it, it was sufficient to procure +and preserve to men all the political happiness they sought for in society. It +was no wonder that they should pitch upon, and naturally run into that form of +government, which from their infancy they had been all accustomed to; and +which, by experience, they had found both easy and safe. To which, if we add, +that monarchy being simple, and most obvious to men, whom neither experience +had instructed in forms of government, nor the ambition or insolence of empire +had taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative, or the inconveniences +of absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt to lay claim to, and +bring upon them, it was not at all strange, that they should not much trouble +themselves to think of methods of restraining any exorbitances of those to whom +they had given the authority over them, and of balancing the power of +government, by placing several parts of it in different hands. They had neither +felt the oppression of tyrannical dominion, nor did the fashion of the age, nor +their possessions, or way of living, (which afforded little matter for +covetousness or ambition) give them any reason to apprehend or provide against +it; and therefore it is no wonder they put themselves into such a frame of +government, as was not only, as I said, most obvious and simple, but also best +suited to their present state and condition; which stood more in need of +defence against foreign invasions and injuries, than of multiplicity of laws. +The equality of a simple poor way of living, confining their desires within the +narrow bounds of each man’s small property, made few controversies, and +so no need of many laws to decide them, or variety of officers to superintend +the process, or look after the execution of justice, where there were but few +trespasses, and few offenders. Since then those, who like one another so well +as to join into society, cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and +friendship together, and some trust one in another; they could not but have +greater apprehensions of others, than of one another: and therefore their first +care and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves against +foreign force. It was natural for them to put themselves under a frame of +government which might best serve to that end, and chuse the wisest and bravest +man to conduct them in their wars, and lead them out against their enemies, and +in this chiefly be their ruler. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 108. Thus we see, that the kings of the Indians in America, which is +still a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe, whilst the inhabitants +were too few for the country, and want of people and money gave men no +temptation to enlarge their possessions of land, or contest for wider extent of +ground, are little more than generals of their armies; and though they command +absolutely in war, yet at home and in time of peace they exercise very little +dominion, and have but a very moderate sovereignty, the resolutions of peace +and war being ordinarily either in the people, or in a council. Tho’ the +war itself, which admits not of plurality of governors, naturally devolves the +command into the king’s sole authority. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 109. And thus in Israel itself, the chief business of their judges, and +first kings, seems to have been to be captains in war, and leaders of their +armies; which (besides what is signified by going out and in before the people, +which was, to march forth to war, and home again in the heads of their forces) +appears plainly in the story of Jephtha. The Ammonites making war upon Israel, +the Gileadites in fear send to Jephtha, a bastard of their family whom they had +cast off, and article with him, if he will assist them against the Ammonites, +to make him their ruler; which they do in these words, And the people made him +head and captain over them, Judg. xi, 11. which was, as it seems, all one as to +be judge. And he judged Israel, judg. xii. 7. that is, was their +captain-general six years. So when Jotham upbraids the Shechemites with the +obligation they had to Gideon, who had been their judge and ruler, he tells +them, He fought for you, and adventured his life far, and delivered you out of +the hands of Midian, Judg. ix. 17. Nothing mentioned of him but what he did as +a general: and indeed that is all is found in his history, or in any of the +rest of the judges. And Abimelech particularly is called king, though at most +he was but their general. And when, being weary of the ill conduct of +Samuel’s sons, the children of Israel desired a king, like all the +nations to judge them, and to go out before them, and to fight their battles, +I. Sam viii. 20. God granting their desire, says to Samuel, I will send thee a +man, and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over my people Israel, that he may +save my people out of the hands of the Philistines, ix. 16. As if the only +business of a king had been to lead out their armies, and fight in their +defence; and accordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon him, +declares to Saul, that the Lord had anointed him to be captain over his +inheritance, x. 1. And therefore those, who after Saul’s being solemnly +chosen and saluted king by the tribes at Mispah, were unwilling to have him +their king, made no other objection but this, How shall this man save us? v. +27. as if they should have said, this man is unfit to be our king, not having +skill and conduct enough in war, to be able to defend us. And when God resolved +to transfer the government to David, it is in these words, But now thy kingdom +shall not continue: the Lord hath sought him a man after his own heart, and the +Lord hath commanded him to be captain over his people, xiii. 14. As if the +whole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their general: and therefore +the tribes who had stuck to Saul’s family, and opposed David’s +reign, when they came to Hebron with terms of submission to him, they tell him, +amongst other arguments they had to submit to him as to their king, that he was +in effect their king in Saul’s time, and therefore they had no reason but +to receive him as their king now. Also (say they) in time past, when Saul was +king over us, thou wast he that reddest out and broughtest in Israel, and the +Lord said unto thee, Thou shalt feed my people Israel, and thou shalt be a +captain over Israel. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 110. Thus, whether a family by degrees grew up into a commonwealth, and +the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder son, every one in his +turn growing up under it, tacitly submitted to it, and the easiness and +equality of it not offending any one, every one acquiesced, till time seemed to +have confirmed it, and settled a right of succession by prescription: or +whether several families, or the descendants of several families, whom chance, +neighbourhood, or business brought together, uniting into society, the need of +a general, whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in war, and +the great confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age, +(such as are almost all those which begin governments, that ever come to last +in the world) gave men one of another, made the first beginners of +commonwealths generally put the rule into one man’s hand, without any +other express limitation or restraint, but what the nature of the thing, and +the end of government required: which ever of those it was that at first put +the rule into the hands of a single person, certain it is no body was intrusted +with it but for the public good and safety, and to those ends, in the infancies +of commonwealths, those who had it commonly used it. And unless they had done +so, young societies could not have subsisted; without such nursing fathers +tender and careful of the public weal, all governments would have sunk under +the weakness and infirmities of their infancy, and the prince and the people +had soon perished together. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 111. But though the golden age (before vain ambition, and amor sceleratus +habendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted men’s minds into a mistake of +true power and honour) had more virtue, and consequently better governors, as +well as less vicious subjects, and there was then no stretching prerogative on +the one side, to oppress the people; nor consequently on the other, any dispute +about privilege, to lessen or restrain the power of the magistrate, and so no +contest betwixt rulers and people about governors or government: yet, when +ambition and luxury in future ages* would retain and increase the power, +without doing the business for which it was given; and aided by flattery, +taught princes to have distinct and separate interests from their people, men +found it necessary to examine more carefully the original and rights of +government; and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances, and prevent the +abuses of that power, which they having intrusted in another’s hands only +for their own good, they found was made use of to hurt them. +</p> + +<p> +(*At first, when some certain kind of regiment was once approved, it may be +nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of governing, but all +permitted unto their wisdom and discretion which were to rule, till by +experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing +which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the sore which it +should have cured. They saw, that to live by one man’s will, became the +cause of all men’s misery. This constrained them to come unto laws +wherein all men might see their duty before hand, and know the penalties of +transgressing them. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.) +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 112. Thus we may see how probable it is, that people that were naturally +free, and by their own consent either submitted to the government of their +father, or united together out of different families to make a government, +should generally put the rule into one man’s hands, and chuse to be under +the conduct of a single person, without so much as by express conditions +limiting or regulating his power, which they thought safe enough in his honesty +and prudence; though they never dreamed of monarchy being lure Divino, which we +never heard of among mankind, till it was revealed to us by the divinity of +this last age; nor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion, or +to be the foundation of all government. And thus much may suffice to shew, that +as far as we have any light from history, we have reason to conclude, that all +peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people. +I say peaceful, because I shall have occasion in another place to speak of +conquest, which some esteem a way of beginning of governments. +</p> + +<p> +The other objection I find urged against the beginning of polities, in the way +I have mentioned, is this, viz. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 113. That all men being born under government, some or other, it is +impossible any of them should ever be free, and at liberty to unite together, +and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful government. +</p> + +<p> +If this argument be good; I ask, how came so many lawful monarchies into the +world? for if any body, upon this supposition, can shew me any one man in any +age of the world free to begin a lawful monarchy, I will be bound to shew him +ten other free men at liberty, at the same time to unite and begin a new +government under a regal, or any other form; it being demonstration, that if +any one, born under the dominion of another, may be so free as to have a right +to command others in a new and distinct empire, every one that is born under +the dominion of another may be so free too, and may become a ruler, or subject, +of a distinct separate government. And so by this their own principle, either +all men, however born, are free, or else there is but one lawful prince, one +lawful government in the world. And then they have nothing to do, but barely to +shew us which that is; which when they have done, I doubt not but all mankind +will easily agree to pay obedience to him. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 114. Though it be a sufficient answer to their objection, to shew that it +involves them in the same difficulties that it doth those they use it against; +yet I shall endeavour to discover the weakness of this argument a little +farther. All men, say they, are born under government, and therefore they +cannot be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a subject to his +father, or his prince, and is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection +and allegiance. It is plain mankind never owned nor considered any such natural +subjection that they were born in, to one or to the other that tied them, +without their own consents, to a subjection to them and their heirs. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 115. For there are no examples so frequent in history, both sacred and +profane, as those of men withdrawing themselves, and their obedience, from the +jurisdiction they were born under, and the family or community they were bred +up in, and setting up new governments in other places; from whence sprang all +that number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of ages, and which always +multiplied, as long as there was room enough, till the stronger, or more +fortunate, swallowed the weaker; and those great ones again breaking to pieces, +dissolved into lesser dominions. All which are so many testimonies against +paternal sovereignty, and plainly prove, that it was not the natural right of +the father descending to his heirs, that made governments in the beginning, +since it was impossible, upon that ground, there should have been so many +little kingdoms; all must have been but only one universal monarchy, if men had +not been at liberty to separate themselves from their families, and the +government, be it what it will, that was set up in it, and go and make distinct +commonwealths and other governments, as they thought fit. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 116. This has been the practice of the world from its first beginning to +this day; nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind, that they +are born under constituted and ancient polities, that have established laws, +and set forms of government, than if they were born in the woods, amongst the +unconfined inhabitants, that run loose in them: for those, who would persuade +us, that by being born under any government, we are naturally subjects to it, +and have no more any title or pretence to the freedom of the state of nature, +have no other reason (bating that of paternal power, which we have already +answered) to produce for it, but only, because our fathers or progenitors +passed away their natural liberty, and thereby bound up themselves and their +posterity to a perpetual subjection to the government, which they themselves +submitted to. It is true, that whatever engagements or promises any one has +made for himself, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot, by any +compact whatsoever, bind his children or posterity: for his son, when a man, +being altogether as free as the father, any act of the father can no more give +away the liberty of the son, than it can of any body else: he may indeed annex +such conditions to the land, he enjoyed as a subject of any commonwealth, as +may oblige his son to be of that community, if he will enjoy those possessions +which were his father’s; because that estate being his father’s +property, he may dispose, or settle it, as he pleases. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 117. And this has generally given the occasion to mistake in this matter; +because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be +dismembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community, the son +cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father, but under the same terms +his father did, by becoming a member of the society; whereby he puts himself +presently under the government he finds there established, as much as any other +subject of that commonwealth. And thus the consent of freemen, born under +government, which only makes them members of it, being given separately in +their turns, as each comes to be of age, and not in a multitude together; +people take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not necessary, +conclude they are naturally subjects as they are men. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 118. But, it is plain, governments themselves understand it otherwise; +they claim no power over the son, because of that they had over the father; nor +look on children as being their subjects, by their fathers being so. If a +subject of England have a child, by an English woman in France, whose subject +is he? Not the king of England’s; for he must have leave to be admitted +to the privileges of it: nor the king of France’s; for how then has his +father a liberty to bring him away, and breed him as he pleases? and who ever +was judged as a traytor or deserter, if he left, or warred against a country, +for being barely born in it of parents that were aliens there? It is plain +then, by the practice of governments themselves, as well as by the law of right +reason, that a child is born a subject of no country or government. He is under +his father’s tuition and authority, till he comes to age of discretion; +and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he will put himself under, +what body politic he will unite himself to: for if an Englishman’s son, +born in France, be at liberty, and may do so, it is evident there is no tie +upon him by his father’s being a subject of this kingdom; nor is he bound +up by any compact of his ancestors. And why then hath not his son, by the same +reason, the same liberty, though he be born any where else? Since the power +that a father hath naturally over his children, is the same, where-ever they be +born, and the ties of natural obligations, are not bounded by the positive +limits of kingdoms and commonwealths. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 119. Every man being, as has been shewed, naturally free, and nothing +being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only his own +consent; it is to be considered, what shall be understood to be a sufficient +declaration of a man’s consent, to make him subject to the laws of any +government. There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent, +which will concern our present case. No body doubts but an express consent, of +any man entering into any society, makes him a perfect member of that society, +a subject of that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon +as a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e. how far any one shall be looked +on to have consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has +made no expressions of it at all. And to this I say, that every man, that hath +any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, +doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience +to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it; +whether this his possession be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a +lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the +highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within +the territories of that government. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 120. To understand this the better, it is fit to consider, that every +man, when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth, he, by his +uniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits to the community, those +possessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do not already belong to any +other government: for it would be a direct contradiction, for any one to enter +into society with others for the securing and regulating of property; and yet +to suppose his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws of the +society, should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government, to which he +himself, the proprietor of the land, is a subject. By the same act therefore, +whereby any one unites his person, which was before free, to any commonwealth, +by the same he unites his possessions, which were before free, to it also; and +they become, both of them, person and possession, subject to the government and +dominion of that commonwealth, as long as it hath a being. Whoever therefore, +from thenceforth, by inheritance, purchase, permission, or otherways, enjoys +any part of the land, so annexed to, and under the government of that +commonwealth, must take it with the condition it is under; that is, of +submitting to the government of the commonwealth, under whose jurisdiction it +is, as far forth as any subject of it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 121. But since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over the +land, and reaches the possessor of it, (before he has actually incorporated +himself in the society) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys that; the obligation +any one is under, by virtue of such enjoyment, to submit to the government, +begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that whenever the owner, who has given +nothing but such a tacit consent to the government, will, by donation, sale, or +otherwise, quit the said possession, he is at liberty to go and incorporate +himself into any other commonwealth; or to agree with others to begin a new +one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the world, they can find free and +unpossessed: whereas he, that has once, by actual agreement, and any express +declaration, given his consent to be of any commonwealth, is perpetually and +indispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a subject to it, and can +never be again in the liberty of the state of nature; unless, by any calamity, +the government he was under comes to be dissolved; or else by some public act +cuts him off from being any longer a member of it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 122. But submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, and +enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of that +society: this is only a local protection and homage due to and from all those, +who, not being in a state of war, come within the territories belonging to any +government, to all parts whereof the force of its laws extends. But this no +more makes a man a member of that society, a perpetual subject of that +commonwealth, than it would make a man a subject to another, in whose family he +found it convenient to abide for some time; though, whilst he continued in it, +he were obliged to comply with the laws, and submit to the government he found +there. And thus we see, that foreigners, by living all their lives under +another government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, though +they are bound, even in conscience, to submit to its administration, as far +forth as any denison; yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that +commonwealth. Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by +positive engagement, and express promise and compact. This is that, which I +think, concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent which +makes any one a member of any commonwealth. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX"></a>CHAPTER. IX.</h2> + +<h3>OF THE ENDS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be +absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and +subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this +empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other power? To +which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such +a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to +the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, +and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment +of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes +him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and +continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is +willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind +to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, +which I call by the general name, property. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into +commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of +their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting. +</p> + +<p> +First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by +common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to +decide all controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plain +and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their +interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of +it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent +judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established +law: for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of +nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to +carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as +negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men’s. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and +support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution, They who by any +injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make +good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment +dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of +nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly +driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of +men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are +therein exposed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every +man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary +under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of +their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single +power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it +amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by them +to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and +rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the governments +and societies themselves. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent +delights, a man has two powers. +</p> + +<p> +The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, +and others within the permission of the law of nature: by which law, common to +them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one +society, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption +and vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no +necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and +by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations. +</p> + +<p> +The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the +crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in a +private, if I may so call it, or particular politic society, and incorporates +into any commonwealth, separate from the rest of mankind. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the +preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated +by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and +the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many +things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his +natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of +nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive +power of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now in a new +state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, +and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its +whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in +providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall +require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the +society do the like. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, +liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of +the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the +society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the +better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature +can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the +power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed +to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every +one’s property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, +that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the +legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by +established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by +extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide +controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, +only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign +injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to +be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the +people. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X"></a>CHAPTER. X.</h2> + +<h3>OF THE FORMS OF A COMMON-WEALTH.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 132. THE majority having, as has been shewed, upon men’s first +uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may +employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and +executing those laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form of +the government is a perfect democracy: or else may put the power of making laws +into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors; and then it +is an oligarchy: or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy: +if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary monarchy: if to him only for life, +but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor to return to them; +an elective monarchy. And so accordingly of these the community may make +compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the +legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons only +for their lives, or any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert to +them again; when it is so reverted, the community may dispose of it again anew +into what hands they please, and so constitute a new form of government: for +the form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power, which is +the legislative, it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power should +prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws, according as the +power of making laws is placed, such is the form of the commonwealth. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 133. By commonwealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not a +democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community, which the +Latines signified by the word civitas, to which the word which best answers in +our language, is commonwealth, and most properly expresses such a society of +men, which community or city in English does not; for there may be subordinate +communities in a government; and city amongst us has a quite different notion +from commonwealth: and therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use the +word commonwealth in that sense, in which I find it used by king James the +first; and I take it to be its genuine signification; which if any body +dislike, I consent with him to change it for a better. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI"></a>CHAPTER. XI.</h2> + +<h3>OF THE EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 134. THE great end of men’s entering into society, being the +enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and +means of that being the laws established in that society; the first and +fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the +legislative power; as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern +even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society, and (as far as +will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative is +not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in +the hands where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any +body else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have +the force and obligation of a law, which has not its sanction from that +legislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without this the law +could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a law,* the +consent of the society, over whom no body can have a power to make laws, but by +their own consent, and by authority received from them; and therefore all the +obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, +ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws +which it enacts: nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or any +domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the society from his +obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to +any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow; +it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in +the society, which is not the supreme. +</p> + +<p> +(*The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men, +belonging so properly unto the same intire societies, that for any prince or +potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of himself, and +not by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or else +by authority derived at the first from their consent, upon whose persons they +impose laws, it is no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not therefore +which public approbation hath not made so. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. +sect. 10. +</p> + +<p> +Of this point therefore we are to note, that such men naturally have no full +and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly +without our consent, we could in such sort be at no man’s commandment +living. And to be commanded we do consent, when that society, whereof we be a +part, hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the +like universal agreement. Laws therefore human, of what kind so ever, are +available by consent. Ibid.) +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be +always in being, or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power in every +commonwealth; yet: +</p> + +<p> +First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and +fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the +society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no +more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into +society, and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more +power than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over +himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or +property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the +arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary +power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the +law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of +mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to +the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. +Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the +society. It is a power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore +can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the +subjects.* The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only +in many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known penalties annexed +to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an +eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they +make for other men’s actions, must, as well as their own and other +men’s actions, be conformable to the law of nature, i.e. to the will of +God, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being +the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against +it. +</p> + +<p> +(*Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one a natural +inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other an +order, expresly or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner of their union in +living together: the latter is that which we call the law of a common-weal, the +very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held +together, and set on work in such actions as the common good requireth. Laws +politic, ordained for external order and regiment amongst men, are never framed +as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, +rebellious, and averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature; in +a word, unless presuming man to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little +better than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to +frame his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common good, for +which societies are instituted. Unless they do this, they are not perfect. +Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.) +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 136. Secondly, The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to +its self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to +dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing +laws, and known authorized judges:* for the law of nature being unwritten, and +so no where to be found but in the minds of men, they who through passion or +interest shall miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their +mistake where there is no established judge: and so it serves not, as it ought, +to determine the rights, and fence the properties of those that live under it, +especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, +and that in his own case: and he that has right on his side, having ordinarily +but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from +injuries, or to punish delinquents. To avoid these inconveniences, which +disorder men’s propperties in the state of nature, men unite into +societies, that they may have the united strength of the whole society to +secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it, by +which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up all +their natural power to the society which they enter into, and the community put +the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that +they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and +property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the state of +nature. +</p> + +<p> +(*Human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must direct, +howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules to be measured +by, which rules are two, the law of God, and the law of nature; so that laws +human must be made according to the general laws of nature, and without +contradiction to any positive law of scripture, otherwise they are ill made. +Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. iii. sect. 9. +</p> + +<p> +To constrain men to any thing inconvenient doth seem unreasonable. Ibid. l. i. +sect. 10.) +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing +laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, +which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for, and tie +themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and +fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and +quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to +do, to give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their persons +and estates, and put a force into the magistrate’s hand to execute his +unlimited will arbitrarily upon them. This were to put themselves into a worse +condition than the state of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their +right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to +maintain it, whether invaded by a single man, or many in combination. Whereas +by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and +will of a legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him, to make a +prey of them when he pleases; he being in a much worse condition, who is +exposed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of 100,000, than +he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 single men; no body being +secure, that his will, who has such a command, is better than that of other +men, though his force be 100,000 times stronger. And therefore, whatever form +the commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and +received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions: +for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature, +if they shall have armed one, or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, +to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their +sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment unknown wills, without +having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions: for all +the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it +ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by +established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty, and +be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within +their bounds, and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to +employ it to such purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have known, +and own not willingly. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his +property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the +end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily +supposes and requires, that the people should have property, without which they +must be supposed to lose that, by entering into society, which was the end for +which they entered into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men +therefore in society having property, they have such a right to the goods, +which by the law of the community are their’s, that no body hath a right +to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent: +without this they have no property at all; for I have truly no property in +that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my +consent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative power +of any commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the +subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to +be feared in governments where the legislative consists, wholly or in part, in +assemblies which are variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the +assembly, are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the +rest. But in governments, where the legislative is in one lasting assembly +always in being, or in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there is danger +still, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the +rest of the community; and so will be apt to increase their own riches and +power, by taking what they think fit from the people: for a man’s +property is not at all secure, tho’ there be good and equitable laws to +set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands +those subjects have power to take from any private man, what part he pleases of +his property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks good. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as I have +before shewed, intrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men might +have and secure their properties; the prince, or senate, however it may have +power to make laws, for the regulating of property between the subjects one +amongst another, yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or +any part of the subjects property, without their own consent: for this would be +in effect to leave them no property at all. And to let us see, that even +absolute power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute, but +is still limited by that reason, and confined to those ends, which required it +in some cases to be absolute, we need look no farther than the common practice +of martial discipline: for the preservation of the army, and in it of the whole +commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior +officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or +unreasonable of them; but yet we see, that neither the serjeant, that could +command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach, +where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one +penny of his money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death for +deserting his post, or for not obeying the most desperate orders, can yet, with +all his absolute power of life and death, dispose of one farthing of that +soldier’s estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command +any thing, and hang for the least disobedience; because such a blind obedience +is necessary to that end, for which the commander has his power, viz. the +preservation of the rest; but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do with +it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 140. It is true, governments cannot be supported without great charge, +and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection, should pay out +of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be +with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it either by +themselves, or their representatives chosen by them: for if any one shall claim +a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and without +such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, +and subverts the end of government: for what property have I in that, which +another may by right take, when he pleases, to himself? +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws +to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they +who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the +form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and +appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said, We will +submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, +no body else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be +bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen, and +authorized to make laws for them. The power of the legislative, being derived +from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other +than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not +to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their +authority of making laws, and place it in other hands. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the +society, and the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of +every commonwealth, in all forms of government. +</p> + +<p> +First, They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in +particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at +court, and the country man at plough. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly, These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately, but +the good of the people. +</p> + +<p> +Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the +consent of the people, given by themselves, or their deputies. And this +properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in +being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the +legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves. +</p> + +<p> +Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making +laws to any body else, or place it any where, but where the people have. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII"></a>CHAPTER. XII.</h2> + +<h3>OF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND FEDERATIVE POWER OF THE +COMMON-WEALTH.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 143. THE legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how the +force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and +the members of it. But because those laws which are constantly to be executed, +and whose force is always to continue, may be made in a little time; therefore +there is no need, that the legislative should be always in being, not having +always business to do. And because it may be too great a temptation to human +frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have the power of +making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby +they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the +law, both in its making, and execution, to their own private advantage, and +thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community, +contrary to the end of society and government: therefore in wellordered +commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered, as it ought, the +legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons, who duly assembled, +have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when +they have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws +they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that they +make them for the public good. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 144. But because the laws, that are at once, and in a short time made, +have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution, or an +attendance thereunto; therefore it is necessary there should be a power always +in being, which should see to the execution of the laws that are made, and +remain in force. And thus the legislative and executive power come often to be +separated. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 145. There is another power in every commonwealth, which one may call +natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man naturally had +before he entered into society: for though in a commonwealth the members of it +are distinct persons still in reference to one another, and as such as governed +by the laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest of mankind, they make +one body, which is, as every member of it before was, still in the state of +nature with the rest of mankind. Hence it is, that the controversies that +happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it, are +managed by the public; and an injury done to a member of their body, engages +the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this consideration, the whole +community is one body in the state of nature, in respect of all other states or +persons out of its community. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 146. This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues and +alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities without +the commonwealth, and may be called federative, if any one pleases. So the +thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the name. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be really +distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal +laws of the society within its self, upon all that are parts of it; the other +the management of the security and interest of the public without, with all +those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are always almost +united. And though this federative power in the well or ill management of it be +of great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed +by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the executive; and so must +necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in, +to be managed for the public good: for the laws that concern subjects one +amongst another, being to direct their actions, may well enough precede them. +But what is to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon their +actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part +to the prudence of those, who have this power committed to them, to be managed +by the best of their skill, for the advantage of the commonwealth. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every +community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be +separated, and placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct persons: for +both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is +almost impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct, and +not subordinate hands; or that the executive and federative power should be +placed in persons, that might act separately, whereby the force of the public +would be under different commands: which would be apt some time or other to +cause disorder and ruin. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIII" id="CHAPTER_XIII"></a>CHAPTER. XIII.</h2> + +<h3>OF THE SUBORDINATION OF THE POWERS OF THE COMMON-WEALTH.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 149. THOUGH in a constituted commonwealth, standing upon its own basis, +and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for the preservation of +the community, there can be but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to +which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the legislative being only +a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the people a +supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the +legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them: for all power given with +trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is +manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and +the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew +where they shall think best for their safety and security. And thus the +community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the +attempts and designs of any body, even of their legislators, whenever they +shall be so foolish, or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against the +liberties and properties of the subject: for no man or society of men, having a +power to deliver up their preservation, or consequently the means of it, to the +absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another; when ever any one shall go +about to bring them into such a slavish condition, they will always have a +right to preserve, what they have not a power to part with; and to rid +themselves of those, who invade this fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law +of self-preservation, for which they entered into society. And thus the +community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power, but not +as considered under any form of government, because this power of the people +can never take place till the government be dissolved. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 150. In all cases, whilst the government subsists, the legislative is the +supreme power: for what can give laws to another, must needs be superior to +him; and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative of the society, but +by the right it has to make laws for all the parts, and for every member of the +society, prescribing rules to their actions, and giving power of execution, +where they are transgressed, the legislative must needs be the supreme, and all +other powers, in any members or parts of the society, derived from and +subordinate to it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 151. In some commonwealths, where the legislative is not always in being, +and the executive is vested in a single person, who has also a share in the +legislative; there that single person in a very tolerable sense may also be +called supreme: not that he has in himself all the supreme power, which is that +of law-making; but because he has in him the supreme execution, from whom all +inferior magistrates derive all their several subordinate powers, or at least +the greatest part of them: having also no legislative superior to him, there +being no law to be made without his consent, which cannot be expected should +ever subject him to the other part of the legislative, he is properly enough in +this sense supreme. But yet it is to be observed, that tho’ oaths of +allegiance and fealty are taken to him, it is not to him as supreme legislator, +but as supreme executor of the law, made by a joint power of him with others; +allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law, which when he +violates, he has no right to obedience, nor can claim it otherwise than as the +public person vested with the power of the law, and so is to be considered as +the image, phantom, or representative of the commonwealth, acted by the will of +the society, declared in its laws; and thus he has no will, no power, but that +of the law. But when he quits this representation, this public will, and acts +by his own private will, he degrades himself, and is but a single private +person without power, and without will, that has any right to obedience; the +members owing no obedience but to the public will of the society. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 152. The executive power, placed any where but in a person that has also +a share in the legislative, is visibly subordinate and accountable to it, and +may be at pleasure changed and displaced; so that it is not the supreme +executive power, that is exempt from subordination, but the supreme executive +power vested in one, who having a share in the legislative, has no distinct +superior legislative to be subordinate and accountable to, farther than he +himself shall join and consent; so that he is no more subordinate than he +himself shall think fit, which one may certainly conclude will be but very +little. Of other ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth, we need +not speak, they being so multiplied with infinite variety, in the different +customs and constitutions of distinct commonwealths, that it is impossible to +give a particular account of them all. Only thus much, which is necessary to +our present purpose, we may take notice of concerning them, that they have no +manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is by positive grant and +commission delegated to them, and are all of them accountable to some other +power in the commonwealth. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 153. It is not necessary, no, nor so much as convenient, that the +legislative should be always in being; but absolutely necessary that the +executive power should, because there is not always need of new laws to be +made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made. When the +legislative hath put the execution of the laws, they make, into other hands, +they have a power still to resume it out of those hands, when they find cause, +and to punish for any maladministration against the laws. The same holds also +in regard of the federative power, that and the executive being both +ministerial and subordinate to the legislative, which, as has been shewed, in a +constituted commonwealth is the supreme. The legislative also in this case +being supposed to consist of several persons, (for if it be a single person, it +cannot but be always in being, and so will, as supreme, naturally have the +supreme executive power, together with the legislative) may assemble, and +exercise their legislature, at the times that either their original +constitution, or their own adjournment, appoints, or when they please; if +neither of these hath appointed any time, or there be no other way prescribed +to convoke them: for the supreme power being placed in them by the people, it +is always in them, and they may exercise it when they please, unless by their +original constitution they are limited to certain seasons, or by an act of +their supreme power they have adjourned to a certain time; and when that time +comes, they have a right to assemble and act again. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 154. If the legislative, or any part of it, be made up of representatives +chosen for that time by the people, which afterwards return into the ordinary +state of subjects, and have no share in the legislature but upon a new choice, +this power of chusing must also be exercised by the people, either at certain +appointed seasons, or else when they are summoned to it; and in this latter +case the power of convoking the legislative is ordinarily placed in the +executive, and has one of these two limitations in respect of time: that either +the original constitution requires their assembling and acting at certain +intervals, and then the executive power does nothing but ministerially issue +directions for their electing and assembling, according to due forms; or else +it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections, when the occasions or +exigencies of the public require the amendment of old, or making of new laws, +or the redress or prevention of any inconveniencies, that lie on, or threaten +the people. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 155. It may be demanded here, What if the executive power, being +possessed of the force of the commonwealth, shall make use of that force to +hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative, when the original +constitution, or the public exigencies require it? I say, using force upon the +people without authority, and contrary to the trust put in him that does so, is +a state of war with the people, who have a right to reinstate their legislative +in the exercise of their power: for having erected a legislative, with an +intent they should exercise the power of making laws, either at certain set +times, or when there is need of it, when they are hindered by any force from +what is so necessary to the society, and wherein the safety and preservation of +the people consists, the people have a right to remove it by force. In all +states and conditions, the true remedy of force without authority, is to oppose +force to it. The use of force without authority, always puts him that uses it +into a state of war, as the aggressor, and renders him liable to be treated +accordingly. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 156. The power of assembling and dismissing the legislative, placed in +the executive, gives not the executive a superiority over it, but is a +fiduciary trust placed in him, for the safety of the people, in a case where +the uncertainty and variableness of human affairs could not bear a steady fixed +rule: for it not being possible, that the first framers of the government +should, by any foresight, be so much masters of future events, as to be able to +prefix so just periods of return and duration to the assemblies of the +legislative, in all times to come, that might exactly answer all the exigencies +of the commonwealth; the best remedy could be found for this defect, was to +trust this to the prudence of one who was always to be present, and whose +business it was to watch over the public good. Constant frequent meetings of +the legislative, and long continuations of their assemblies, without necessary +occasion, could not but be burdensome to the people, and must necessarily in +time produce more dangerous inconveniencies, and yet the quick turn of affairs +might be sometimes such as to need their present help: any delay of their +convening might endanger the public; and sometimes too their business might be +so great, that the limited time of their sitting might be too short for their +work, and rob the public of that benefit which could be had only from their +mature deliberation. What then could be done in this case to prevent the +community from being exposed some time or other to eminent hazard, on one side +or the other, by fixed intervals and periods, set to the meeting and acting of +the legislative, but to intrust it to the prudence of some, who being present, +and acquainted with the state of public affairs, might make use of this +prerogative for the public good? and where else could this be so well placed as +in his hands, who was intrusted with the execution of the laws for the same +end? Thus supposing the regulation of times for the assembling and sitting of +the legislative, not settled by the original constitution, it naturally fell +into the hands of the executive, not as an arbitrary power depending on his +good pleasure, but with this trust always to have it exercised only for the +public weal, as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require. +Whether settled periods of their convening, or a liberty left to the prince for +convoking the legislative, or perhaps a mixture of both, hath the least +inconvenience attending it, it is not my business here to inquire, but only to +shew, that though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking and +dissolving such conventions of the legislative, yet it is not thereby superior +to it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 157. Things of this world are in so constant a flux, that nothing remains +long in the same state. Thus people, riches, trade, power, change their +stations, flourishing mighty cities come to ruin, and prove in times neglected +desolate corners, whilst other unfrequented places grow into populous +countries, filled with wealth and inhabitants. But things not always changing +equally, and private interest often keeping up customs and privileges, when the +reasons of them are ceased, it often comes to pass, that in governments, where +part of the legislative consists of representatives chosen by the people, that +in tract of time this representation becomes very unequal and disproportionate +to the reasons it was at first established upon. To what gross absurdities the +following of custom, when reason has left it, may lead, we may be satisfied, +when we see the bare name of a town, of which there remains not so much as the +ruins, where scarce so much housing as a sheepcote, or more inhabitants than a +shepherd is to be found, sends as many representatives to the grand assembly of +law-makers, as a whole county numerous in people, and powerful in riches. This +strangers stand amazed at, and every one must confess needs a remedy; +tho’ most think it hard to find one, because the constitution of the +legislative being the original and supreme act of the society, antecedent to +all positive laws in it, and depending wholly on the people, no inferior power +can alter it. And therefore the people, when the legislative is once +constituted, having, in such a government as we have been speaking of, no power +to act as long as the government stands; this inconvenience is thought +incapable of a remedy. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 158. Salus populi suprema lex, is certainly so just and fundamental a +rule, that he, who sincerely follows it, cannot dangerously err. If therefore +the executive, who has the power of convoking the legislative, observing rather +the true proportion, than fashion of representation, regulates, not by old +custom, but true reason, the number of members, in all places that have a right +to be distinctly represented, which no part of the people however incorporated +can pretend to, but in proportion to the assistance which it affords to the +public, it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative, but to have +restored the old and true one, and to have rectified the disorders which +succession of time had insensibly, as well as inevitably introduced: For it +being the interest as well as intention of the people, to have a fair and equal +representative; whoever brings it nearest to that, is an undoubted friend to, +and establisher of the government, and cannot miss the consent and approbation +of the community; prerogative being nothing but a power, in the hands of the +prince, to provide for the public good, in such cases, which depending upon +unforeseen and uncertain occurrences, certain and unalterable laws could not +safely direct; whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the good of the people, +and the establishing the government upon its true foundations, is, and always +will be, just prerogative, The power of erecting new corporations, and +therewith new representatives, carries with it a supposition, that in time the +measures of representation might vary, and those places have a just right to be +represented which before had none; and by the same reason, those cease to have +a right, and be too inconsiderable for such a privilege, which before had it. +’Tis not a change from the present state, which perhaps corruption or +decay has introduced, that makes an inroad upon the government, but the +tendency of it to injure or oppress the people, and to set up one part or +party, with a distinction from, and an unequal subjection of the rest. +Whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society, and +people in general, upon just and lasting measures, will always, when done, +justify itself; and whenever the people shall chuse their representatives upon +just and undeniably equal measures, suitable to the original frame of the +government, it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society, whoever +permitted or caused them so to do. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIV" id="CHAPTER_XIV"></a>CHAPTER. XIV.</h2> + +<h3>OF PREROGATIVE.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 159. WHERE the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands, (as +they are in all moderated monarchies, and well-framed governments) there the +good of the society requires, that several things should be left to the +discretion of him that has the executive power: for the legislators not being +able to foresee, and provide by laws, for all that may be useful to the +community, the executor of the laws having the power in his hands, has by the +common law of nature a right to make use of it for the good of the society, in +many cases, where the municipal law has given no direction, till the +legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it. Many things there +are, which the law can by no means provide for; and those must necessarily be +left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands, to be +ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require: nay, it is fit +that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the executive power, +or rather to this fundamental law of nature and government, viz. That as much +as may be, all the members of the society are to be preserved: for since many +accidents may happen, wherein a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do +harm; (as not to pull down an innocent man’s house to stop the fire, when +the next to it is burning) and a man may come sometimes within the reach of the +law, which makes no distinction of persons, by an action that may deserve +reward and pardon; ’tis fit the ruler should have a power, in many cases, +to mitigate the severity of the law, and pardon some offenders: for the end of +government being the preservation of all, as much as may be, even the guilty +are to be spared, where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 160. This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, +without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is that +which is called prerogative: for since in some governments the lawmaking power +is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the +dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, +and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that may concern +the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with +an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in +their way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do +many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 161. This power, whilst employed for the benefit of the community, and +suitably to the trust and ends of the government, is undoubted prerogative, and +never is questioned: for the people are very seldom or never scrupulous or nice +in the point; they are far from examining prerogative, whilst it is in any +tolerable degree employed for the use it was meant, that is, for the good of +the people, and not manifestly against it: but if there comes to be a question +between the executive power and the people, about a thing claimed as a +prerogative; the tendency of the exercise of such prerogative to the good or +hurt of the people, will easily decide that question. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 162. It is easy to conceive, that in the infancy of governments, when +commonwealths differed little from families in number of people, they differed +from them too but little in number of laws: and the governors, being as the +fathers of them, watching over them for their good, the government was almost +all prerogative. A few established laws served the turn, and the discretion and +care of the ruler supplied the rest. But when mistake or flattery prevailed +with weak princes to make use of this power for private ends of their own, and +not for the public good, the people were fain by express laws to get +prerogative determined in those points wherein they found disadvantage from it: +and thus declared limitations of prerogative were by the people found necessary +in cases which they and their ancestors had left, in the utmost latitude, to +the wisdom of those princes who made no other but a right use of it, that is, +for the good of their people. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 163. And therefore they have a very wrong notion of government, who say, +that the people have encroached upon the prerogative, when they have got any +part of it to be defined by positive laws: for in so doing they have not pulled +from the prince any thing that of right belonged to him, but only declared, +that that power which they indefinitely left in his or his ancestors hands, to +be exercised for their good, was not a thing which they intended him when he +used it otherwise: for the end of government being the good of the community, +whatsoever alterations are made in it, tending to that end, cannot be an +encroachment upon any body, since no body in government can have a right +tending to any other end: and those only are encroachments which prejudice or +hinder the public good. Those who say otherwise, speak as if the prince had a +distinct and separate interest from the good of the community, and was not made +for it; the root and source from which spring almost all those evils and +disorders which happen in kingly governments. And indeed, if that be so, the +people under his government are not a society of rational creatures, entered +into a community for their mutual good; they are not such as have set rulers +over themselves, to guard, and promote that good; but are to be looked on as an +herd of inferior creatures under the dominion of a master, who keeps them and +works them for his own pleasure or profit. If men were so void of reason, and +brutish, as to enter into society upon such terms, prerogative might indeed be, +what some men would have it, an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the +people. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 164. But since a rational creature cannot be supposed, when free, to put +himself into subjection to another, for his own harm; (though, where he finds a +good and wise ruler, he may not perhaps think it either necessary or useful to +set precise bounds to his power in all things) prerogative can be nothing but +the people’s permitting their rulers to do several things, of their own +free choice, where the law was silent, and sometimes too against the direct +letter of the law, for the public good; and their acquiescing in it when so +done: for as a good prince, who is mindful of the trust put into his hands, and +careful of the good of his people, cannot have too much prerogative, that is, +power to do good; so a weak and ill prince, who would claim that power which +his predecessors exercised without the direction of the law, as a prerogative +belonging to him by right of his office, which he may exercise at his pleasure, +to make or promote an interest distinct from that of the public, gives the +people an occasion to claim their right, and limit that power, which, whilst it +was exercised for their good, they were content should be tacitly allowed. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 165. And therefore he that will look into the history of England, will +find, that prerogative was always largest in the hands of our wisest and best +princes; because the people, observing the whole tendency of their actions to +be the public good, contested not what was done without law to that end: or, if +any human frailty or mistake (for princes are but men, made as others) appeared +in some small declinations from that end; yet ’twas visible, the main of +their conduct tended to nothing but the care of the public. The people +therefore, finding reason to be satisfied with these princes, whenever they +acted without, or contrary to the letter of the law, acquiesced in what they +did, and, without the least complaint, let them inlarge their prerogative as +they pleased, judging rightly, that they did nothing herein to the prejudice of +their laws, since they acted conformable to the foundation and end of all laws, +the public good. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 166. Such god-like princes indeed had some title to arbitrary power by +that argument, that would prove absolute monarchy the best government, as that +which God himself governs the universe by; because such kings partake of his +wisdom and goodness. Upon this is founded that saying, That the reigns of good +princes have been always most dangerous to the liberties of their people: for +when their successors, managing the government with different thoughts, would +draw the actions of those good rulers into precedent, and make them the +standard of their prerogative, as if what had been done only for the good of +the people was a right in them to do, for the harm of the people, if they so +pleased; it has often occasioned contest, and sometimes public disorders, +before the people could recover their original right, and get that to be +declared not to be prerogative, which truly was never so; since it is +impossible that any body in the society should ever have a right to do the +people harm; though it be very possible, and reasonable, that the people should +not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings, or rulers, +who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good: for prerogative +is nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 167. The power of calling parliaments in England, as to precise time, +place, and duration, is certainly a prerogative of the king, but still with +this trust, that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation, as the +exigencies of the times, and variety of occasions, shall require: for it being +impossible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to +assemble in, and what the best season; the choice of these was left with the +executive power, as might be most subservient to the public good, and best suit +the ends of parliaments. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 168. The old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative, But +who shall be judge when this power is made a right use of one answer: between +an executive power in being, with such a prerogative, and a legislative that +depends upon his will for their convening, there can be no judge on earth; as +there can be none between the legislative and the people, should either the +executive, or the legislative, when they have got the power in their hands, +design, or go about to enslave or destroy them. The people have no other remedy +in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal +to heaven: for the rulers, in such attempts, exercising a power the people +never put into their hands, (who can never be supposed to consent that any body +should rule over them for their harm) do that which they have not a right to +do. And where the body of the people, or any single man, is deprived of their +right, or is under the exercise of a power without right, and have no appeal on +earth, then they have a liberty to appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the +cause of sufficient moment. And therefore, though the people cannot be judge, +so as to have, by the constitution of that society, any superior power, to +determine and give effective sentence in the case; yet they have, by a law +antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men, reserved that ultimate +determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind, where there lies no +appeal on earth, viz. to judge, whether they have just cause to make their +appeal to heaven. And this judgment they cannot part with, it being out of a +man’s power so to submit himself to another, as to give him a liberty to +destroy him; God and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself, as to +neglect his own preservation: and since he cannot take away his own life, +neither can he give another power to take it. Nor let any one think, this lays +a perpetual foundation for disorder; for this operates not, till the +inconveniency is so great, that the majority feel it, and are weary of it, and +find a necessity to have it amended. But this the executive power, or wise +princes, never need come in the danger of: and it is the thing, of all others, +they have most need to avoid, as of all others the most perilous. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XV" id="CHAPTER_XV"></a>CHAPTER. XV.</h2> + +<h3>OF PATERNAL, POLITICAL, AND DESPOTICAL POWER, CONSIDERED TOGETHER.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 169. THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately before, yet +the great mistakes of late about government, having, as I suppose, arisen from +confounding these distinct powers one with another, it may not, perhaps, be +amiss to consider them here together. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 170. First, then, Paternal or parental power is nothing but that which +parents have over their children, to govern them for the children’s good, +till they come to the use of reason, or a state of knowledge, wherein they may +be supposed capable to understand that rule, whether it be the law of nature, +or the municipal law of their country, they are to govern themselves by: +capable, I say, to know it, as well as several others, who live as freemen +under that law. The affection and tenderness which God hath planted in the +breast of parents towards their children, makes it evident, that this is not +intended to be a severe arbitrary government, but only for the help, +instruction, and preservation of their offspring. But happen it as it will, +there is, as I have proved, no reason why it should be thought to extend to +life and death, at any time, over their children, more than over any body else; +neither can there be any pretence why this parental power should keep the +child, when grown to a man, in subjection to the will of his parents, any +farther than having received life and education from his parents, obliges him +to respect, honour, gratitude, assistance and support, all his life, to both +father and mother. And thus, ’tis true, the paternal is a natural +government, but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of +that which is political. The power of the father doth not reach at all to the +property of the child, which is only in his own disposing. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 171. Secondly, Political power is that power, which every man having in +the state of nature, has given up into the hands of the society, and therein to +the governors, whom the society hath set over itself, with this express or +tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good, and the preservation of +their property: now this power, which every man has in the state of nature, and +which he parts with to the society in all such cases where the society can +secure him, is to use such means, for the preserving of his own property, as he +thinks good, and nature allows him; and to punish the breach of the law of +nature in others, so as (according to the best of his reason) may most conduce +to the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind. So that the end and +measure of this power, when in every man’s hands in the state of nature, +being the preservation of all of his society, that is, all mankind in general, +it can have no other end or measure, when in the hands of the magistrate, but +to preserve the members of that society in their lives, liberties, and +possessions; and so cannot be an absolute, arbitrary power over their lives and +fortunes, which are as much as possible to be preserved; but a power to make +laws, and annex such penalties to them, as may tend to the preservation of the +whole, by cutting off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt, that +they threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful. And +this power has its original only from compact and agreement, and the mutual +consent of those who make up the community. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 172. Thirdly, Despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power one man +has over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleases. This is a power, +which neither nature gives, for it has made no such distinction between one man +and another; nor compact can convey: for man not having such an arbitrary power +over his own life, cannot give another man such a power over it; but it is the +effect only of forfeiture, which the aggressor makes of his own life, when he +puts himself into the state of war with another: for having quitted reason, +which God hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bond +whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and having +renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of the force of +war, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where he has no right; and so +revolting from his own kind to that of beasts, by making force, which is +their’s, to be his rule of right, he renders himself liable to be +destroyed by the injured person, and the rest of mankind, that will join with +him in the execution of justice, as any other wild beast, or noxious brute, +with whom mankind can have neither society nor security*. And thus captives, +taken in a just and lawful war, and such only, are subject to a despotical +power, which, as it arises not from compact, so neither is it capable of any, +but is the state of war continued: for what compact can be made with a man that +is not master of his own life? what condition can he perform? and if he be once +allowed to be master of his own life, the despotical, arbitrary power of his +master ceases. He that is master of himself, and his own life, has a right too +to the means of preserving it; so that as soon as compact enters, slavery +ceases, and he so far quits his absolute power, and puts an end to the state of +war, who enters into conditions with his captive. +</p> + +<p> +(*Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus, Noxious brute that is +destructive to their being.) +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 173. Nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal power to parents for +the benefit of their children during their minority, to supply their want of +ability, and understanding how to manage their property. (By property I must be +understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men have in +their persons as well as goods.) Voluntary agreement gives the second, viz. +political power to governors for the benefit of their subjects, to secure them +in the possession and use of their properties. And forfeiture gives the third +despotical power to lords for their own benefit, over those who are stripped of +all property. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 174. He, that shall consider the distinct rise and extent, and the +different ends of these several powers, will plainly see, that paternal power +comes as far short of that of the magistrate, as despotical exceeds it; and +that absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from being one kind of civil +society, that it is as inconsistent with it, as slavery is with property. +Paternal power is only where minority makes the child incapable to manage his +property; political, where men have property in their own disposal; and +despotical, over such as have no property at all. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVI" id="CHAPTER_XVI"></a>CHAPTER. XVI.</h2> + +<h3>OF CONQUEST.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 175. THOUGH governments can originally have no other rise than that +before mentioned, nor polities be founded on any thing but the consent of the +people; yet such have been the disorders ambition has filled the world with, +that in the noise of war, which makes so great a part of the history of +mankind, this consent is little taken notice of: and therefore many have +mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people, and reckon conquest +as one of the originals of government. But conquest is as far from setting up +any government, as demolishing an house is from building a new one in the +place. Indeed, it often makes way for a new frame of a commonwealth, by +destroying the former; but, without the consent of the people, can never erect +a new one. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 176. That the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war with +another, and unjustly invades another man’s right, can, by such an unjust +war, never come to have a right over the conquered, will be easily agreed by +all men, who will not think, that robbers and pyrates have a right of empire +over whomsoever they have force enough to master; or that men are bound by +promises, which unlawful force extorts from them. Should a robber break into my +house, and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to convey my estate to +him, would this give him any title? Just such a title, by his sword, has an +unjust conqueror, who forces me into submission. The injury and the crime is +equal, whether committed by the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain. The +title of the offender, and the number of his followers, make no difference in +the offence, unless it be to aggravate it. The only difference is, great +robbers punish little ones, to keep them in their obedience; but the great ones +are rewarded with laurels and triumphs, because they are too big for the weak +hands of justice in this world, and have the power in their own possession, +which should punish offenders. What is my remedy against a robber, that so +broke into my house? Appeal to the law for justice. But perhaps justice is +denied, or I am crippled and cannot stir, robbed and have not the means to do +it. If God has taken away all means of seeking remedy, there is nothing left +but patience. But my son, when able, may seek the relief of the law, which I am +denied: he or his son may renew his appeal, till he recover his right. But the +conquered, or their children, have no court, no arbitrator on earth to appeal +to. Then they may appeal, as Jephtha did, to heaven, and repeat their appeal +till they have recovered the native right of their ancestors, which was, to +have such a legislative over them, as the majority should approve, and freely +acquiesce in. If it be objected, This would cause endless trouble; I answer, no +more than justice does, where she lies open to all that appeal to her. He that +troubles his neighbour without a cause, is punished for it by the justice of +the court he appeals to: and he that appeals to heaven must be sure he has +right on his side; and a right too that is worth the trouble and cost of the +appeal, as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived, and will be +sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he hath created to +his fellow subjects; that is, any part of mankind: from whence it is plain, +that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the +subjection and obedience of the conquered. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 177. But supposing victory favours the right side, let us consider a +conqueror in a lawful war, and see what power he gets, and over whom. +</p> + +<p> +First, It is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered +with him. They that fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest, but must +at least be as much freemen as they were before. And most commonly they serve +upon terms, and on condition to share with their leader, and enjoy a part of +the spoil, and other advantages that attend the conquering sword; or at least +have a part of the subdued country bestowed upon them. And the conquering +people are not, I hope, to be slaves by conquest, and wear their laurels only +to shew they are sacrifices to their leaders triumph. They that found absolute +monarchy upon the title of the sword, make their heroes, who are the founders +of such monarchies, arrant Draw-can-sirs, and forget they had any officers and +soldiers that fought on their side in the battles they won, or assisted them in +the subduing, or shared in possessing, the countries they mastered. We are told +by some, that the English monarchy is founded in the Norman conquest, and that +our princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion: which if it were true, +(as by the history it appears otherwise) and that William had a right to make +war on this island; yet his dominion by conquest could reach no farther than to +the Saxons and Britons, that were then inhabitants of this country. The Normans +that came with him, and helped to conquer, and all descended from them, are +freemen, and no subjects by conquest; let that give what dominion it will. And +if I, or any body else, shall claim freedom, as derived from them, it will be +very hard to prove the contrary: and it is plain, the law, that has made no +distinction between the one and the other, intends not there should be any +difference in their freedom or privileges. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 178. But supposing, which seldom happens, that the conquerors and +conquered never incorporate into one people, under the same laws and freedom; +let us see next what power a lawful conqueror has over the subdued: and that I +say is purely despotical. He has an absolute power over the lives of those who +by an unjust war have forfeited them; but not over the lives or fortunes of +those who engaged not in the war, nor over the possessions even of those who +were actually engaged in it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 179. Secondly, I say then the conqueror gets no power but only over those +who have actually assisted, concurred, or consented to that unjust force that +is used against him: for the people having given to their governors no power to +do an unjust thing, such as is to make an unjust war, (for they never had such +a power in themselves) they ought not to be charged as guilty of the violence +and unjustice that is committed in an unjust war, any farther than they +actually abet it; no more than they are to be thought guilty of any violence or +oppression their governors should use upon the people themselves, or any part +of their fellow subjects, they having empowered them no more to the one than to +the other. Conquerors, it is true, seldom trouble themselves to make the +distinction, but they willingly permit the confusion of war to sweep all +together: but yet this alters not the right; for the conquerors power over the +lives of the conquered, being only because they have used force to do, or +maintain an injustice, he can have that power only over those who have +concurred in that force; all the rest are innocent; and he has no more title +over the people of that country, who have done him no injury, and so have made +no forfeiture of their lives, than he has over any other, who, without any +injuries or provocations, have lived upon fair terms with him. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 180. Thirdly, The power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes in a +just war, is perfectly despotical: he has an absolute power over the lives of +those, who, by putting themselves in a state of war, have forfeited them; but +he has not thereby a right and title to their possessions. This I doubt not, +but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine, it being so quite contrary to +the practice of the world; there being nothing more familiar in speaking of the +dominion of countries, than to say such an one conquered it; as if conquest, +without any more ado, conveyed a right of possession. But when we consider, +that the practice of the strong and powerful, how universal soever it may be, +is seldom the rule of right, however it be one part of the subjection of the +conquered, not to argue against the conditions cut out to them by the +conquering sword. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 181. Though in all war there be usually a complication of force and +damage, and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate, when he uses force +against the persons of those he makes war upon; yet it is the use of force only +that puts a man into the state of war: for whether by force he begins the +injury, or else having quietly, and by fraud, done the injury, he refuses to +make reparation, and by force maintains it, (which is the same thing, as at +first to have done it by force) it is the unjust use of force that makes the +war: for he that breaks open my house, and violently turns me out of doors; or +having peaceably got in, by force keeps me out, does in effect the same thing; +supposing we are in such a state, that we have no common judge on earth, whom I +may appeal to, and to whom we are both obliged to submit: for of such I am now +speaking. It is the unjust use of force then, that puts a man into the state of +war with another; and thereby he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of his +life: for quitting reason, which is the rule given between man and man, and +using force, the way of beasts, he becomes liable to be destroyed by him he +uses force against, as any savage ravenous beast, that is dangerous to his +being. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 182. But because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of the +children, and they may be rational and peaceable, notwithstanding the +brutishness and injustice of the father; the father, by his miscarriages and +violence, can forfeit but his own life, but involves not his children in his +guilt or destruction. His goods, which nature, that willeth the preservation of +all mankind as much as is possible, hath made to belong to the children to keep +them from perishing, do still continue to belong to his children: for supposing +them not to have joined in the war, either thro’ infancy, absence, or +choice, they have done nothing to forfeit them: nor has the conqueror any right +to take them away, by the bare title of having subdued him that by force +attempted his destruction; though perhaps he may have some right to them, to +repair the damages he has sustained by the war, and the defence of his own +right; which how far it reaches to the possessions of the conquered, we shall +see by and by. So that he that by conquest has a right over a man’s +person to destroy him if he pleases, has not thereby a right over his estate to +possess and enjoy it: for it is the brutal force the aggressor has used, that +gives his adversary a right to take away his life, and destroy him if he +pleases, as a noxious creature; but it is damage sustained that alone gives him +title to another man’s goods: for though I may kill a thief that sets on +me in the highway, yet I may not (which seems less) take away his money, and +let him go: this would be robbery on my side. His force, and the state of war +he put himself in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his +goods. The right then of conquest extends only to the lives of those who joined +in the war, not to their estates, but only in order to make reparation for the +damages received, and the charges of the war, and that too with reservation of +the right of the innocent wife and children. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 183. Let the conqueror have as much justice on his side, as could be +supposed, he has no right to seize more than the vanquished could forfeit: his +life is at the victor’s mercy; and his service and goods he may +appropriate, to make himself reparation; but he cannot take the goods of his +wife and children; they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed, and their +shares in the estate he possessed: for example, I in the state of nature (and +all commonwealths are in the state of nature one with another) have injured +another man, and refusing to give satisfaction, it comes to a state of war, +wherein my defending by force what I had gotten unjustly, makes me the +aggressor. I am conquered: my life, it is true, as forfeit, is at mercy, but +not my wife’s and children’s. They made not the war, nor assisted +in it. I could not forfeit their lives; they were not mine to forfeit. My wife +had a share in my estate; that neither could I forfeit. And my children also, +being born of me, had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance. +Here then is the case: the conqueror has a title to reparation for damages +received, and the children have a title to their father’s estate for +their subsistence: for as to the wife’s share, whether her own labour, or +compact, gave her a title to it, it is plain, her husband could not forfeit +what was her’s. What must be done in the case? I answer; the fundamental +law of nature being, that all, as much as may be, should be preserved, it +follows, that if there be not enough fully to satisfy both, viz, for the +conqueror’s losses, and children’s maintenance, he that hath, and +to spare, must remit something of his full satisfaction, and give way to the +pressing and preferable title of those who are in danger to perish without it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 184. But supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be made up to +the conqueror, to the utmost farthing; and that the children of the vanquished, +spoiled of all their father’s goods, are to be left to starve and perish; +yet the satisfying of what shall, on this score, be due to the conqueror, will +scarce give him a title to any country he shall conquer: for the damages of war +can scarce amount to the value of any considerable tract of land, in any part +of the world, where all the land is possessed, and none lies waste. And if I +have not taken away the conqueror’s land, which, being vanquished, it is +impossible I should; scarce any other spoil I have done him can amount to the +value of mine, supposing it equally cultivated, and of an extent any way coming +near what I had overrun of his. The destruction of a year’s product or +two (for it seldom reaches four or five) is the utmost spoil that usually can +be done: for as to money, and such riches and treasure taken away, these are +none of nature’s goods, they have but a fantastical imaginary value: +nature has put no such upon them: they are of no more account by her standard, +than the wampompeke of the Americans to an European prince, or the silver money +of Europe would have been formerly to an American. And five years product is +not worth the perpetual inheritance of land, where all is possessed, and none +remains waste, to be taken up by him that is disseized: which will be easily +granted, if one do but take away the imaginary value of money, the +disproportion being more than between five and five hundred; though, at the +same time, half a year’s product is more worth than the inheritance, +where there being more land than the inhabitants possess and make use of, any +one has liberty to make use of the waste: but there conquerors take little care +to possess themselves of the lands of the vanquished, No damage therefore, that +men in the state of nature (as all princes and governments are in reference to +one another) suffer from one another, can give a conqueror power to dispossess +the posterity of the vanquished, and turn them out of that inheritance, which +ought to be the possession of them and their descendants to all generations. +The conqueror indeed will be apt to think himself master: and it is the very +condition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right. But if that be +all, it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the stronger over +the weaker: and, by this reason, he that is strongest will have a right to +whatever he pleases to seize on. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 185. Over those then that joined with him in the war, and over those of +the subdued country that opposed him not, and the posterity even of those that +did, the conqueror, even in a just war, hath, by his conquest, no right of +dominion: they are free from any subjection to him, and if their former +government be dissolved, they are at liberty to begin and erect another to +themselves. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 186. The conqueror, it is true, usually, by the force he has over them, +compels them, with a sword at their breasts, to stoop to his conditions, and +submit to such a government as he pleases to afford them; but the enquiry is, +what right he has to do so? If it be said, they submit by their own consent, +then this allows their own consent to be necessary to give the conqueror a +title to rule over them. It remains only to be considered, whether promises +extorted by force, without right, can be thought consent, and how far they +bind. To which I shall say, they bind not at all; because whatsoever another +gets from me by force, I still retain the right of, and he is obliged presently +to restore. He that forces my horse from me, ought presently to restore him, +and I have still a right to retake him. By the same reason, he that forced a +promise from me, ought presently to restore it, i.e. quit me of the obligation +of it; or I may resume it myself, i.e. chuse whether I will perform it: for the +law of nature laying an obligation on me only by the rules she prescribes, +cannot oblige me by the violation of her rules: such is the extorting any thing +from me by force. Nor does it at all alter the case to say, I gave my promise, +no more than it excuses the force, and passes the right, when I put my hand in +my pocket, and deliver my purse myself to a thief, who demands it with a pistol +at my breast. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 187. From all which it follows, that the government of a conqueror, +imposed by force on the subdued, against whom he had no right of war, or who +joined not in the war against him, where he had right, has no obligation upon +them. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 188. But let us suppose, that all the men of that community, being all +members of the same body politic, may be taken to have joined in that unjust +war wherein they are subdued, and so their lives are at the mercy of the +conqueror. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 189. I say this concerns not their children who are in their minority: +for since a father hath not, in himself, a power over the life or liberty of +his child, no act of his can possibly forfeit it. So that the children, +whatever may have happened to the fathers, are freemen, and the absolute power +of the conqueror reaches no farther than the persons of the men that were +subdued by him, and dies with them: and should he govern them as slaves, +subjected to his absolute arbitrary power, he has no such right of dominion +over their children. He can have no power over them but by their own consent, +whatever he may drive them to say or do; and he has no lawfull authority, +whilst force, and not choice, compels them to submission. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 190. Every man is born with a double right: first, a right of freedom to +his person, which no other man has a power over, but the free disposal of it +lies in himself. Secondly, a right, before any other man, to inherit with his +brethren his father’s goods. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 191. By the first of these, a man is naturally free from subjection to +any government, tho’ he be born in a place under its jurisdiction; but if +he disclaim the lawful government of the country he was born in, he must also +quit the right that belonged to him by the laws of it, and the possessions +there descending to him from his ancestors, if it were a government made by +their consent. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 192. By the second, the inhabitants of any country, who are descended, +and derive a title to their estates from those who are subdued, and had a +government forced upon them against their free consents, retain a right to the +possession of their ancestors, though they consent not freely to the +government, whose hard conditions were by force imposed on the possessors of +that country: for the first conqueror never having had a title to the land of +that country, the people who are the descendants of, or claim under those who +were forced to submit to the yoke of a government by constraint, have always a +right to shake it off, and free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny which +the sword hath brought in upon them, till their rulers put them under such a +frame of government as they willingly and of choice consent to. Who doubts but +the Grecian Christians, descendants of the ancient possessors of that country, +may justly cast off the Turkish yoke, which they have so long groaned under, +whenever they have an opportunity to do it? For no government can have a right +to obedience from a people who have not freely consented to it; which they can +never be supposed to do, till either they are put in a full state of liberty to +chuse their government and governors, or at least till they have such standing +laws, to which they have by themselves or their representatives given their +free consent, and also till they are allowed their due property, which is so to +be proprietors of what they have, that no body can take away any part of it +without their own consent, without which, men under any government are not in +the state of freemen, but are direct slaves under the force of war. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 193. But granting that the conqueror in a just war has a right to the +estates, as well as power over the persons, of the conquered; which, it is +plain, he hath not: nothing of absolute power will follow from hence, in the +continuance of the government; because the descendants of these being all +freemen, if he grants them estates and possessions to inhabit his country, +(without which it would be worth nothing) whatsoever he grants them, they have, +so far as it is granted, property in. The nature whereof is, that without a +man’s own consent it cannot be taken from him. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 194. Their persons are free by a native right, and their properties, be +they more or less, are their own, and at their own dispose, and not at his; or +else it is no property. Supposing the conqueror gives to one man a thousand +acres, to him and his heirs for ever; to another he lets a thousand acres for +his life, under the rent of 50£. or 500£. per ann. has not the one of +these a right to his thousand acres for ever, and the other, during his life, +paying the said rent? and hath not the tenant for life a property in all that +he gets over and above his rent, by his labour and industry during the said +term, supposing it be double the rent? Can any one say, the king, or conqueror, +after his grant, may by his power of conqueror take away all, or part of the +land from the heirs of one, or from the other during his life, he paying the +rent? or can he take away from either the goods or money they have got upon the +said land, at his pleasure? If he can, then all free and voluntary contracts +cease, and are void in the world; there needs nothing to dissolve them at any +time, but power enough: and all the grants and promises of men in power are but +mockery and collusion: for can there be any thing more ridiculous than to say, +I give you and your’s this for ever, and that in the surest and most +solemn way of conveyance can be devised; and yet it is to be understood, that I +have right, if I please, to take it away from you again to morrow? +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 195. I will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the laws of +their country; but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the laws of God and +nature. No body, no power, can exempt them from the obligations of that eternal +law. Those are so great, and so strong, in the case of promises, that +omnipotency itself can be tied by them. Grants, promises, and oaths, are bonds +that hold the Almighty: whatever some flatterers say to princes of the world, +who all together, with all their people joined to them, are, in comparison of +the great God, but as a drop of the bucket, or a dust on the balance, +inconsiderable, nothing! +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 196. The short of the case in conquest is this: the conqueror, if he have +a just cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all, that actually +aided, and concurred in the war against him, and a right to make up his damage +and cost out of their labour and estates, so he injure not the right of any +other. Over the rest of the people, if there were any that consented not to the +war, and over the children of the captives themselves, or the possessions of +either, he has no power; and so can have, by virtue of conquest, no lawful +title himself to dominion over them, or derive it to his posterity; but is an +aggressor, if he attempts upon their properties, and thereby puts himself in a +state of war against them, and has no better a right of principality, he, nor +any of his successors, than Hingar, or Hubba, the Danes, had here in England; +or Spartacus, had he conquered Italy, would have had; which is to have their +yoke cast off, as soon as God shall give those under their subjection courage +and opportunity to do it. Thus, notwithstanding whatever title the kings of +Assyria had over Judah, by the sword, God assisted Hezekiah to throw off the +dominion of that conquering empire. And the lord was with Hezekiah, and he +prospered; wherefore he went forth, and he rebelled against the king of +Assyria, and served him not, 2 Kings xviii. 7. Whence it is plain, that shaking +off a power, which force, and not right, hath set over any one, though it hath +the name of rebellion, yet is no offence before God, but is that which he +allows and countenances, though even promises and covenants, when obtained by +force, have intervened: for it is very probable, to any one that reads the +story of Ahaz and Hezekiah attentively, that the Assyrians subdued Ahaz, and +deposed him, and made Hezekiah king in his father’s lifetime; and that +Hezekiah by agreement had done him homage, and paid him tribute all this time. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVII" id="CHAPTER_XVII"></a>CHAPTER. XVII.</h2> + +<h3>OF USURPATION.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 197. AS conquest may be called a foreign usurpation, so usurpation is a +kind of domestic conquest, with this difference, that an usurper can never have +right on his side, it being no usurpation, but where one is got into the +possession of what another has right to. This, so far as it is usurpation, is a +change only of persons, but not of the forms and rules of the government: for +if the usurper extend his power beyond what of right belonged to the lawful +princes, or governors of the commonwealth, it is tyranny added to usurpation. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 198. In all lawful governments, the designation of the persons, who are +to bear rule, is as natural and necessary a part as the form of the government +itself, and is that which had its establishment originally from the people; the +anarchy being much alike, to have no form of government at all; or to agree, +that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to design the person that +shall have the power, and be the monarch. Hence all commonwealths, with the +form of government established, have rules also of appointing those who are to +have any share in the public authority, and settled methods of conveying the +right to them: for the anarchy is much alike, to have no form of government at +all; or to agree that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to know or +design the person that shall have the power, and be the monarch. Whoever gets +into the exercise of any part of the power, by other ways than what the laws of +the community have prescribed, hath no right to be obeyed, though the form of +the commonwealth be still preserved; since he is not the person the laws have +appointed, and consequently not the person the people have consented to. Nor +can such an usurper, or any deriving from him, ever have a title, till the +people are both at liberty to consent, and have actually consented to allow, +and confirm in him the power he hath till then usurped. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVIII" id="CHAPTER_XVIII"></a>CHAPTER. XVIII.</h2> + +<h3>OF TYRANNY.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 199. AS usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a right +to; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no body can have a +right to. And this is making use of the power any one has in his hands, not for +the good of those who are under it, but for his own private separate advantage. +When the governor, however intitled, makes not the law, but his will, the rule; +and his commands and actions are not directed to the preservation of the +properties of his people, but the satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, +covetousness, or any other irregular passion. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 200. If one can doubt this to be truth, or reason, because it comes from +the obscure hand of a subject, I hope the authority of a king will make it pass +with him. King James the first, in his speech to the parliament, 1603, tells +them thus, +</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p> +I will ever prefer the weal of the public, and of the whole commonwealth, in +making of good laws and constitutions, to any particular and private ends of +mine; thinking ever the wealth and weal of the commonwealth to be my greatest +weal and worldly felicity; a point wherein a lawful king doth directly differ +from a tyrant: for I do acknowledge, that the special and greatest point of +difference that is between a rightful king and an usurping tyrant, is this, +that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his kingdom and people +are only ordained for satisfaction of his desires and unreasonable appetites, +the righteous and just king doth by the contrary acknowledge himself to be +ordained for the procuring of the wealth and property of his people. +</p> + +</div> + +<p> +And again, in his speech to the parliament, 1609, he hath these words: +</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p> +The king binds himself by a double oath, to the observation of the fundamental +laws of his kingdom; tacitly, as by being a king, and so bound to protect as +well the people, as the laws of his kingdom; and expressly, by his oath at his +coronation, so as every just king, in a settled kingdom, is bound to observe +that paction made to his people, by his laws, in framing his government +agreeable thereunto, according to that paction which God made with Noah after +the deluge. Hereafter, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and +winter, and day and night, shall not cease while the earth remaineth. And +therefore a king governing in a settled kingdom, leaves to be a king, and +degenerates into a tyrant, as soon as he leaves off to rule according to his +laws. +</p> + +</div> + +<p> +And a little after, +</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p> +Therefore all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad to bound +themselves within the limits of their laws; and they that persuade them the +contrary, are vipers, and pests both against them and the commonwealth. +</p> + +</div> + +<p> +Thus that learned king, who well understood the notion of things, makes the +difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to consist only in this, that one makes +the laws the bounds of his power, and the good of the public, the end of his +government; the other makes all give way to his own will and appetite. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 201. It is a mistake, to think this fault is proper only to monarchies; +other forms of government are liable to it, as well as that: for wherever the +power, that is put in any hands for the government of the people, and the +preservation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and made use of to +impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands of +those that have it; there it presently becomes tyranny, whether those that thus +use it are one or many. Thus we read of the thirty tyrants at Athens, as well +as one at Syracuse; and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri at Rome was +nothing better. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 202. Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to +another’s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by +the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass that +upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate; +and, acting without authority, may be opposed, as any other man, who by force +invades the right of another. This is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. +He that hath authority to seize my person in the street, may be opposed as a +thief and a robber, if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ, +notwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant, and such a legal authority, +as will impower him to arrest me abroad. And why this should not hold in the +highest, as well as in the most inferior magistrate, I would gladly be +informed. Is it reasonable, that the eldest brother, because he has the +greatest part of his father’s estate, should thereby have a right to take +away any of his younger brothers portions? or that a rich man, who possessed a +whole country, should from thence have a right to seize, when he pleased, the +cottage and garden of his poor neighbour? The being rightfully possessed of +great power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of +Adam, is so far from being an excuse, much less a reason, for rapine and +oppression, which the endamaging another without authority is, that it is a +great aggravation of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a +right in a great, than in a petty officer; no more justifiable in a king than a +constable; but is so much the worse in him, in that he has more trust put in +him, has already a much greater share than the rest of his brethren, and is +supposed, from the advantages of his education, employment, and counsellors, to +be more knowing in the measures of right and wrong. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 203. May the commands then of a prince be opposed? may he be resisted as +often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he has not right +done him? This will unhinge and overturn all polities, and, instead of +government and order, leave nothing but anarchy and confusion. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 204. To this I answer, that force is to be opposed to nothing, but to +unjust and unlawful force; whoever makes any opposition in any other case, +draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and man; and so no such +danger or confusion will follow, as is often suggested: for, +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 205. First, As, in some countries, the person of the prince by the law is +sacred; and so, whatever he commands or does, his person is still free from all +question or violence, not liable to force, or any judicial censure or +condemnation. But yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of any +inferior officer, or other commissioned by him; unless he will, by actually +putting himself into a state of war with his people, dissolve the government, +and leave them to that defence which belongs to every one in the state of +nature: for of such things who can tell what the end will be? and a neighbour +kingdom has shewed the world an odd example. In all other cases the sacredness +of the person exempts him from all inconveniencies, whereby he is secure, +whilst the government stands, from all violence and harm whatsoever; than which +there cannot be a wiser constitution: for the harm he can do in his own person +not being likely to happen often, nor to extend itself far; nor being able by +his single strength to subvert the laws, nor oppress the body of the people, +should any prince have so much weakness, and ill nature as to be willing to do +it, the inconveniency of some particular mischiefs, that may happen sometimes, +when a heady prince comes to the throne, are well recompensed by the peace of +the public, and security of the government, in the person of the chief +magistrate, thus set out of the reach of danger: it being safer for the body, +that some few private men should be sometimes in danger to suffer, than that +the head of the republic should be easily, and upon slight occasions, exposed. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 206. Secondly, But this privilege, belonging only to the king’s +person, hinders not, but they may be questioned, opposed, and resisted, who use +unjust force, though they pretend a commission from him, which the law +authorizes not; as is plain in the case of him that has the king’s writ +to arrest a man, which is a full commission from the king; and yet he that has +it cannot break open a man’s house to do it, nor execute this command of +the king upon certain days, nor in certain places, though this commission have +no such exception in it; but they are the limitations of the law, which if any +one transgress, the king’s commission excuses him not: for the +king’s authority being given him only by the law, he cannot impower any +one to act against the law, or justify him, by his commission, in so doing; the +commission, or command of any magistrate, where he has no authority, being as +void and insignificant, as that of any private man; the difference between the +one and the other, being that the magistrate has some authority so far, and to +such ends, and the private man has none at all: for it is not the commission, +but the authority, that gives the right of acting; and against the laws there +can be no authority. But, notwithstanding such resistance, the king’s +person and authority are still both secured, and so no danger to governor or +government. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 207. Thirdly, Supposing a government wherein the person of the chief +magistrate is not thus sacred; yet this doctrine of the lawfulness of resisting +all unlawful exercises of his power, will not upon every slight occasion +indanger him, or imbroil the government: for where the injured party may be +relieved, and his damages repaired by appeal to the law, there can be no +pretence for force, which is only to be used where a man is intercepted from +appealing to the law: for nothing is to be accounted hostile force, but where +it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal; and it is such force alone, that +puts him that uses it into a state of war, and makes it lawful to resist him. A +man with a sword in his hand demands my purse in the high-way, when perhaps I +have not twelve pence in my pocket: this man I may lawfully kill. To another I +deliver 100 pounds to hold only whilst I alight, which he refuses to restore +me, when I am got up again, but draws his sword to defend the possession of it +by force, if I endeavour to retake it. The mischief this man does me is a +hundred, or possibly a thousand times more than the other perhaps intended me +(whom I killed before he really did me any); and yet I might lawfully kill the +one, and cannot so much as hurt the other lawfully. The reason whereof is +plain; because the one using force, which threatened my life, I could not have +time to appeal to the law to secure it: and when it was gone, it was too late +to appeal. The law could not restore life to my dead carcass: the loss was +irreparable; which to prevent, the law of nature gave me a right to destroy +him, who had put himself into a state of war with me, and threatened my +destruction. But in the other case, my life not being in danger, I may have the +benefit of appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 100 pounds that +way. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 208. Fourthly, But if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate be +maintained (by the power he has got), and the remedy which is due by law, be by +the same power obstructed; yet the right of resisting, even in such manifest +acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight occasions, disturb the +government: for if it reach no farther than some private men’s cases, +though they have a right to defend themselves, and to recover by force what by +unlawful force is taken from them; yet the right to do so will not easily +engage them in a contest, wherein they are sure to perish; it being as +impossible for one, or a few oppressed men to disturb the government, where the +body of the people do not think themselves concerned in it, as for a raving +mad-man, or heady malcontent to overturn a well settled state; the people being +as little apt to follow the one, as the other. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 209. But if either these illegal acts have extended to the majority of +the people; or if the mischief and oppression has lighted only on some few, but +in such cases, as the precedent, and consequences seem to threaten all; and +they are persuaded in their consciences, that their laws, and with them their +estates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion too; +how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force, used against them, I +cannot tell. This is an inconvenience, I confess, that attends all governments +whatsoever, when the governors have brought it to this pass, to be generally +suspected of their people; the most dangerous state which they can possibly put +themselves in, wherein they are the less to be pitied, because it is so easy to +be avoided; it being as impossible for a governor, if he really means the good +of his people, and the preservation of them, and their laws together, not to +make them see and feel it, as it is for the father of a family, not to let his +children see he loves, and takes care of them. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 210. But if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind, and +actions of another; arts used to elude the law, and the trust of prerogative +(which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the prince’s hand to +do good, not harm to the people) employed contrary to the end for which it was +given: if the people shall find the ministers and subordinate magistrates +chosen suitable to such ends, and favoured, or laid by, proportionably as they +promote or oppose them: if they see several experiments made of arbitrary +power, and that religion underhand favoured, (tho’ publicly proclaimed +against) which is readiest to introduce it; and the operators in it supported, +as much as may be; and when that cannot be done, yet approved still, and liked +the better: if a long train of actions shew the councils all tending that way; +how can a man any more hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind, +which way things are going; or from casting about how to save himself, than he +could from believing the captain of the ship he was in, was carrying him, and +the rest of the company, to Algiers, when he found him always steering that +course, though cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of men and provisions +did often force him to turn his course another way for some time, which he +steadily returned to again, as soon as the wind, weather, and other +circumstances would let him? +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIX" id="CHAPTER_XIX"></a>CHAPTER. XIX.</h2> + +<h3>OF THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT.</h3> + +<p> +Sect. 211. HE that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of +government, ought in the first place to distinguish between the dissolution of +the society and the dissolution of the government. That which makes the +community, and brings men out of the loose state of nature, into one politic +society, is the agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate, and +act as one body, and so be one distinct commonwealth. The usual, and almost +only way whereby this union is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force making +a conquest upon them: for in that case, (not being able to maintain and support +themselves, as one intire and independent body) the union belonging to that +body which consisted therein, must necessarily cease, and so every one return +to the state he was in before, with a liberty to shift for himself, and provide +for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some other society. Whenever the +society is dissolved, it is certain the government of that society cannot +remain. Thus conquerors swords often cut up governments by the roots, and +mangle societies to pieces, separating the subdued or scattered multitude from +the protection of, and dependence on, that society which ought to have +preserved them from violence. The world is too well instructed in, and too +forward to allow of, this way of dissolving of governments, to need any more to +be said of it; and there wants not much argument to prove, that where the +society is dissolved, the government cannot remain; that being as impossible, +as for the frame of an house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered +and dissipated by a whirl-wind, or jumbled into a confused heap by an +earthquake. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 212. Besides this over-turning from without, governments are dissolved +from within. +</p> + +<p> +First, When the legislative is altered. Civil society being a state of peace, +amongst those who are of it, from whom the state of war is excluded by the +umpirage, which they have provided in their legislative, for the ending all +differences that may arise amongst any of them, it is in their legislative, +that the members of a commonwealth are united, and combined together into one +coherent living body. This is the soul that gives form, life, and unity, to the +commonwealth: from hence the several members have their mutual influence, +sympathy, and connexion: and therefore, when the legislative is broken, or +dissolved, dissolution and death follows: for the essence and union of the +society consisting in having one will, the legislative, when once established +by the majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that will. The +constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society, +whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union, under the +direction of persons, and bonds of laws, made by persons authorized thereunto, +by the consent and appointment of the people, without which no one man, or +number of men, amongst them, can have authority of making laws that shall be +binding to the rest. When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make laws, +whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws without authority, +which the people are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come +again to be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a new +legislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the force of +those, who without authority would impose any thing upon them. Every one is at +the disposure of his own will, when those who had, by the delegation of the +society, the declaring of the public will, are excluded from it, and others +usurp the place, who have no such authority or delegation. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 213. This being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth who +misuse the power they have; it is hard to consider it aright, and know at whose +door to lay it, without knowing the form of government in which it happens. Let +us suppose then the legislative placed in the concurrence of three distinct +persons. +</p> + +<p> +(<i>1</i>). A single hereditary person, having the constant, supreme, executive +power, and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the other two within +certain periods of time. +</p> + +<p> +(<i>2</i>). An assembly of hereditary nobility. +</p> + +<p> +(<i>3</i>). An assembly of representatives chosen, pro tempore, by the people. +Such a form of government supposed, it is evident, +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 214. First, That when such a single person, or prince, sets up his own +arbitrary will in place of the laws, which are the will of the society, +declared by the legislative, then the legislative is changed: for that being in +effect the legislative, whose rules and laws are put in execution, and required +to be obeyed; when other laws are set up, and other rules pretended, and +inforced, than what the legislative, constituted by the society, have enacted, +it is plain that the legislative is changed. Whoever introduces new laws, not +being thereunto authorized by the fundamental appointment of the society, or +subverts the old, disowns and overturns the power by which they were made, and +so sets up a new legislative. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 215. Secondly, When the prince hinders the legislative from assembling in +its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends for which it was +constituted, the legislative is altered: for it is not a certain number of men, +no, nor their meeting, unless they have also freedom of debating, and leisure +of perfecting, what is for the good of the society, wherein the legislative +consists: when these are taken away or altered, so as to deprive the society of +the due exercise of their power, the legislative is truly altered; for it is +not names that constitute governments, but the use and exercise of those powers +that were intended to accompany them; so that he, who takes away the freedom, +or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due seasons, in effect takes +away the legislative, and puts an end to the government. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors, +or ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and contrary to the +common interest of the people, there also the legislative is altered: for, if +others than those whom the society hath authorized thereunto, do chuse, or in +another way than what the society hath prescribed, those chosen are not the +legislative appointed by the people. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 217. Fourthly, The delivery also of the people into the subjection of a +foreign power, either by the prince, or by the legislative, is certainly a +change of the legislative, and so a dissolution of the government: for the end +why people entered into society being to be preserved one intire, free, +independent society, to be governed by its own laws; this is lost, whenever +they are given up into the power of another. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of the +government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince, is evident; because +he, having the force, treasure and offices of the state to employ, and often +persuading himself, or being flattered by others, that as supreme magistrate he +is uncapable of controul; he alone is in a condition to make great advances +toward such changes, under pretence of lawful authority, and has it in his +hands to terrify or suppress opposers, as factious, seditious, and enemies to +the government: whereas no other part of the legislative, or people, is capable +by themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative, without open and +visible rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which, when it prevails, +produces effects very little different from foreign conquest. Besides, the +prince in such a form of government, having the power of dissolving the other +parts of the legislative, and thereby rendering them private persons, they can +never in opposition to him, or without his concurrence, alter the legislative +by a law, his consent being necessary to give any of their decrees that +sanction. But yet, so far as the other parts of the legislative any way +contribute to any attempt upon the government, and do either promote, or not, +what lies in them, hinder such designs, they are guilty, and partake in this, +which is certainly the greatest crime which men can partake of one towards +another. +</p> + +<p> +Sec. 219.There is one way more whereby such a government may be dissolved, and +that is: When he who has the supreme executive power, neglects and abandons +that charge, so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution. +This is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy, and so effectually to +dissolve the government: for laws not being made for themselves, but to be, by +their execution, the bonds of the society, to keep every part of the body +politic in its due place and function; when that totally ceases, the government +visibly ceases, and the people become a confused multitude, without order or +connexion. Where there is no longer the administration of justice, for the +securing of men’s rights, nor any remaining power within the community to +direct the force, or provide for the necessities of the public, there certainly +is no government left. Where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one as if +there were no laws; and a government without laws is, I suppose, a mystery in +politics, unconceivable to human capacity, and inconsistent with human society. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 220. In these and the like cases, when the government is dissolved, the +people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new legislative, +differing from the other, by the change of persons, or form, or both, as they +shall find it most for their safety and good: for the society can never, by the +fault of another, lose the native and original right it has to preserve itself, +which can only be done by a settled legislative, and a fair and impartial +execution of the laws made by it. But the state of mankind is not so miserable +that they are not capable of using this remedy, till it be too late to look for +any. To tell people they may provide for themselves, by erecting a new +legislative, when by oppression, artifice, or being delivered over to a foreign +power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them, they may expect relief when +it is too late, and the evil is past cure. This is in effect no more than to +bid them first be slaves, and then to take care of their liberty; and when +their chains are on, tell them, they may act like freemen. This, if barely so, +is rather mockery than relief; and men can never be secure from tyranny, if +there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly under it: and therefore +it is, that they have not only a right to get out of it, but to prevent it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 221. There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby governments are +dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the prince, either of them, +act contrary to their trust. +</p> + +<p> +First, The legislative acts against the trust reposed in them, when they +endeavour to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any +part of the community, masters, or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, +or fortunes of the people. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their +property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a legislative, is, that +there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties +of all the members of the society, to limit the power, and moderate the +dominion, of every part and member of the society: for since it can never be +supposed to be the will of the society, that the legislative should have a +power to destroy that which every one designs to secure, by entering into +society, and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of their +own making; whenever the legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the +property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, +they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon +absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which +God hath provided for all men, against force and violence. Whensoever therefore +the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society; and either +by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put +into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and +estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the +people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the +people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the +establishment of a new legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide for +their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society. +What I have said here, concerning the legislative in general, holds true also +concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him, both to +have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, acts +against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of +the society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when he either employs the +force, treasure, and offices of the society, to corrupt the representatives, +and gain them to his purposes; or openly preengages the electors, and +prescribes to their choice, such, whom he has, by sollicitations, threats, +promises, or otherwise, won to his designs; and employs them to bring in such, +who have promised before-hand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate +candidates and electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is it but to +cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of public +security? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their +representatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other +end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act, +and advise, as the necessity of the commonwealth, and the public good should, +upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to require. This, those who give +their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reasons on all +sides, are not capable of doing. To prepare such an assembly as this, and +endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his own will, for the true +representatives of the people, and the law-makers of the society, is certainly +as great a breach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert +the government, as is possible to be met with. To which, if one shall add +rewards and punishments visibly employed to the same end, and all the arts of +perverted law made use of, to take off and destroy all that stand in the way of +such a design, and will not comply and consent to betray the liberties of their +country, it will be past doubt what is doing. What power they ought to have in +the society, who thus employ it contrary to the trust went along with it in its +first institution, is easy to determine; and one cannot but see, that he, who +has once attempted any such thing as this, cannot any longer be trusted. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 223. To this perhaps it will be said, that the people being ignorant, and +always discontented, to lay the foundation of government in the unsteady +opinion and uncertain humour of the people, is to expose it to certain ruin; +and no government will be able long to subsist, if the people may set up a new +legislative, whenever they take offence at the old one. To this I answer, Quite +the contrary. People are not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are +apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged +faults in the frame they have been accustomed to. And if there be any original +defects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption; it is not an +easy thing to get them changed, even when all the world sees there is an +opportunity for it. This slowness and aversion in the people to quit their old +constitutions, has, in the many revolutions which have been seen in this +kingdom, in this and former ages, still kept us to, or, after some interval of +fruitless attempts, still brought us back again to our old legislative of king, +lords and commons: and whatever provocations have made the crown be taken from +some of our princes heads, they never carried the people so far as to place it +in another line. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 224. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent +rebellion. To which I answer, +</p> + +<p> +First, No more than any other hypothesis: for when the people are made +miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power, cry +up their governors, as much as you will, for sons of Jupiter; let them be +sacred and divine, descended, or authorized from heaven; give them out for whom +or what you please, the same will happen. The people generally ill treated, and +contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a +burden that sits heavy upon them. They will wish, and seek for the opportunity, +which in the change, weakness and accidents of human affairs, seldom delays +long to offer itself. He must have lived but a little while in the world, who +has not seen examples of this in his time; and he must have read very little, +who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments in the world. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 225. Secondly, I answer, such revolutions happen not upon every little +mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong +and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty, will be born by the +people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of abuses, prevarications +and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the people, +and they cannot but feel what they lie under, and see whither they are going; +it is not to be wondered, that they should then rouze themselves, and endeavour +to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which +government was at first erected; and without which, ancient names, and specious +forms, are so far from being better, that they are much worse, than the state +of nature, or pure anarchy; the inconveniencies being all as great and as near, +but the remedy farther off and more difficult. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 226. Thirdly, I answer, that this doctrine of a power in the people of +providing for their safety a-new, by a new legislative, when their legislators +have acted contrary to their trust, by invading their property, is the best +fence against rebellion, and the probablest means to hinder it: for rebellion +being an opposition, not to persons, but authority, which is founded only in +the constitutions and laws of the government; those, whoever they be, who by +force break through, and by force justify their violation of them, are truly +and properly rebels: for when men, by entering into society and +civil-government, have excluded force, and introduced laws for the preservation +of property, peace, and unity amongst themselves, those who set up force again +in opposition to the laws, do rebellare, that is, bring back again the state of +war, and are properly rebels: which they who are in power, (by the pretence +they have to authority, the temptation of force they have in their hands, and +the flattery of those about them) being likeliest to do; the properest way to +prevent the evil, is to shew them the danger and injustice of it, who are under +the greatest temptation to run into it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 227. In both the fore-mentioned cases, when either the legislative is +changed, or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they were +constituted; those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion: for if any one by +force takes away the established legislative of any society, and the laws by +them made, pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes away the umpirage, which +every one had consented to, for a peaceable decision of all their +controversies, and a bar to the state of war amongst them. They, who remove, or +change the legislative, take away this decisive power, which no body can have, +but by the appointment and consent of the people; and so destroying the +authority which the people did, and no body else can set up, and introducing a +power which the people hath not authorized, they actually introduce a state of +war, which is that of force without authority: and thus, by removing the +legislative established by the society, (in whose decisions the people +acquiesced and united, as to that of their own will) they untie the knot, and +expose the people a-new to the state of war, And if those, who by force take +away the legislative, are rebels, the legislators themselves, as has been +shewn, can be no less esteemed so; when they, who were set up for the +protection, and preservation of the people, their liberties and properties, +shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and so they putting +themselves into a state of war with those who made them the protectors and +guardians of their peace, are properly, and with the greatest aggravation, +rebellantes, rebels. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 228. But if they, who say it lays a foundation for rebellion, mean that +it may occasion civil wars, or intestine broils, to tell the people they are +absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or +properties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were their +magistrates, when they invade their properties contrary to the trust put in +them; and that therefore this doctrine is not to be allowed, being so +destructive to the peace of the world: they may as well say, upon the same +ground, that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because this may +occasion disorder or bloodshed. If any mischief come in such cases, it is not +to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on him that invades his +neighbours. If the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has, for peace +sake, to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered, +what a kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only in +violence and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of +robbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an admirable peace betwix the +mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance, yielded his throat to +be torn by the imperious wolf? Polyphemus’s den gives us a perfect +pattern of such a peace, and such a government, wherein Ulysses and his +companions had nothing to do, but quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured. +And no doubt Ulysses, who was a prudent man, preached up passive obedience, and +exhorted them to a quiet submission, by representing to them of what +concernment peace was to mankind; and by shewing the inconveniences might +happen, if they should offer to resist Polyphemus, who had now the power over +them. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is best for +mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of +tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed, when they +grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruction, +and not the preservation of the properties of their people? +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 230. Nor let any one say, that mischief can arise from hence, as often as +it shall please a busy head, or turbulent spirit, to desire the alteration of +the government. It is true, such men may stir, whenever they please; but it +will be only to their own just ruin and perdition: for till the mischief be +grown general, and the ill designs of the rulers become visible, or their +attempts sensible to the greater part, the people, who are more disposed to +suffer than right themselves by resistance, are not apt to stir. The examples +of particular injustice, or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man, +moves them not. But if they universally have a persuation, grounded upon +manifest evidence, that designs are carrying on against their liberties, and +the general course and tendency of things cannot but give them strong +suspicions of the evil intention of their governors, who is to be blamed for +it? Who can help it, if they, who might avoid it, bring themselves into this +suspicion? Are the people to be blamed, if they have the sense of rational +creatures, and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel +them? And is it not rather their fault, who put things into such a posture, +that they would not have them thought to be as they are? I grant, that the +pride, ambition, and turbulency of private men have sometimes caused great +disorders in commonwealths, and factions have been fatal to states and +kingdoms. But whether the mischief hath oftener begun in the peoples +wantonness, and a desire to cast off the lawful authority of their rulers, or +in the rulers insolence, and endeavours to get and exercise an arbitrary power +over their people; whether oppression, or disobedience, gave the first rise to +the disorder, I leave it to impartial history to determine. This I am sure, +whoever, either ruler or subject, by force goes about to invade the rights of +either prince or people, and lays the foundation for overturning the +constitution and frame of any just government, is highly guilty of the greatest +crime, I think, a man is capable of, being to answer for all those mischiefs of +blood, rapine, and desolation, which the breaking to pieces of governments +bring on a country. And he who does it, is justly to be esteemed the common +enemy and pest of mankind, and is to be treated accordingly. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 231. That subjects or foreigners, attempting by force on the properties +of any people, may be resisted with force, is agreed on all hands. But that +magistrates, doing the same thing, may be resisted, hath of late been denied: +as if those who had the greatest privileges and advantages by the law, had +thereby a power to break those laws, by which alone they were set in a better +place than their brethren: whereas their offence is thereby the greater, both +as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the law, and breaking +also that trust, which is put into their hands by their brethren. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 232. Whosoever uses force without right, as every one does in society, +who does it without law, puts himself into a state of war with those against +whom he so uses it; and in that state all former ties are cancelled, all other +rights cease, and every one has a right to defend himself, and to resist the +aggressor. This is so evident, that Barclay himself, that great assertor of the +power and sacredness of kings, is forced to confess, That it is lawful for the +people, in some cases, to resist their king; and that too in a chapter, wherein +he pretends to shew, that the divine law shuts up the people from all manner of +rebellion. Whereby it is evident, even by his own doctrine, that, since they +may in some cases resist, all resisting of princes is not rebellion. His words +are these. Quod siquis dicat, Ergone populus tyrannicae crudelitati & +furori jugulum semper praebebit? Ergone multitude civitates suas fame, ferro, +& flamma vastari, seque, conjuges, & liberos fortunae ludibrio & +tyranni libidini exponi, inque omnia vitae pericula omnesque miserias & +molestias a rege deduci patientur? Num illis quod omni animantium generi est a +natura tributum, denegari debet, ut sc. vim vi repellant, seseq; ab injuria, +tueantur? Huic breviter responsum sit, Populo universo negari defensionem, quae +juris naturalis est, neque ultionem quae praeter naturam est adversus regem +concedi debere. Quapropter si rex non in singulares tantum personas aliquot +privatum odium exerceat, sed corpus etiam reipublicae, cujus ipse caput est, +i.e. totum populum, vel insignem aliquam ejus partem immani & intoleranda +saevitia seu tyrannide divexet; populo, quidem hoc casu resistendi ac tuendi se +ab injuria potestas competit, sed tuendi se tantum, non enim in principem +invadendi: & restituendae injuriae illatae, non recedendi a debita +reverentia propter acceptam injuriam. Praesentem denique impetum propulsandi +non vim praeteritam ulciscenti jus habet. Horum enim alterum a natura est, ut +vitam scilicet corpusque tueamur. Alterum vero contra naturam, ut inferior de +superiori supplicium sumat. Quod itaque populus malum, antequam factum sit, +impedire potest, ne fiat, id postquam factum est, in regem authorem sceleris +vindicare non potest: populus igitur hoc amplius quam privatus quispiam habet: +quod huic, vel ipsis adversariis judicibus, excepto Buchanano, nullum nisi in +patientia remedium superest. Cum ille si intolerabilis tyrannus est (modicum +enim ferre omnino debet) resistere cum reverentia possit, Barclay contra +Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 8. +</p> + +<p> +In English thus: +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 233. But if any one should ask, Must the people then always lay +themselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny? Must they see their cities +pillaged, and laid in ashes, their wives and children exposed to the +tyrant’s lust and fury, and themselves and families reduced by their king +to ruin, and all the miseries of want and oppression, and yet sit still? Must +men alone be debarred the common privilege of opposing force with force, which +nature allows so freely to all other creatures for their preservation from +injury? I answer: Self-defence is a part of the law of nature; nor can it be +denied the community, even against the king himself: but to revenge themselves +upon him, must by no means be allowed them; it being not agreeable to that law. +Wherefore if the king shall shew an hatred, not only to some particular +persons, but sets himself against the body of the commonwealth, whereof he is +the head, and shall, with intolerable ill usage, cruelly tyrannize over the +whole, or a considerable part of the people, in this case the people have a +right to resist and defend themselves from injury: but it must be with this +caution, that they only defend themselves, but do not attack their prince: they +may repair the damages received, but must not for any provocation exceed the +bounds of due reverence and respect. They may repulse the present attempt, but +must not revenge past violences: for it is natural for us to defend life and +limb, but that an inferior should punish a superior, is against nature. The +mischief which is designed them, the people may prevent before it be done; but +when it is done, they must not revenge it on the king, though author of the +villany. This therefore is the privilege of the people in general, above what +any private person hath; that particular men are allowed by our adversaries +themselves (Buchanan only excepted) to have no other remedy but patience; but +the body of the people may with respect resist intolerable tyranny; for when it +is but moderate, they ought to endure it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 234. Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of +resistance. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 235. It is true, he has annexed two limitations to it, to no purpose: +</p> + +<p> +First, He says, it must be with reverence. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly, It must be without retribution, or punishment; and the reason he +gives is, because an inferior cannot punish a superior. First, How to resist +force without striking again, or how to strike with reverence, will need some +skill to make intelligible. He that shall oppose an assault only with a shield +to receive the blows, or in any more respectful posture, without a sword in his +hand, to abate the confidence and force of the assailant, will quickly be at an +end of his resistance, and will find such a defence serve only to draw on +himself the worse usage. This is as ridiculous a way of resisting, as juvenal +thought it of fighting; ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum. And the success of +the combat will be unavoidably the same he there describes it: +</p> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary="poetry"> <tr><td +align="left"><span style="margin-left: 3em;">——-Libertas pauperis +haec est:</span></td></tr> <tr><td align="left">Pulsatus rogat, et pugnis +concisus, adorat,</td></tr> <tr><td align="left">Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus +inde reverti.</td></tr> </table> + +<p> +This will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance, where men may +not strike again. He therefore who may resist, must be allowed to strike. And +then let our author, or any body else, join a knock on the head, or a cut on +the face, with as much reverence and respect as he thinks fit. He that can +reconcile blows and reverence, may, for aught I know, desire for his pains, a +civil, respectful cudgeling where-ever he can meet with it. +</p> + +<p> +Secondly, As to his second, An inferior cannot punish a superior; that is true, +generally speaking, whilst he is his superior. But to resist force with force, +being the state of war that levels the parties, cancels all former relation of +reverence, respect, and superiority: and then the odds that remains, is, that +he, who opposes the unjust agressor, has this superiority over him, that he has +a right, when he prevails, to punish the offender, both for the breach of the +peace, and all the evils that followed upon it. Barclay therefore, in another +place, more coherently to himself, denies it to be lawful to resist a king in +any case. But he there assigns two cases, whereby a king may un-king himself. +His words are, +</p> + +<p> +Quid ergo, nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere atque in +regem impotentius dominantem arma capere & invadere jure suo suaque +authoritate liceat? Nulli certe quamdiu rex manet. Semper enim ex divinis id +obstat, Regem honorificato; & qui potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi +resisit: non alias igitur in eum populo potestas est quam si id committat +propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat. Tunc enim se ipse principatu exuit +atque in privatis constituit liber: hoc modo populus & superior efficitur, +reverso ad eum sc. jure illo quod ante regem inauguratum in interregno habuit. +At sunt paucorum generum commissa ejusmodi quae hunc effectum pariunt. At ego +cum plurima animo perlustrem, duo tantum invenio, duos, inquam, casus quibus +rex ipso facto ex rege non regem se facit & omni honore & dignitate +regali atque in subditos potestate destituit; quorum etiam meminit Winzerus. +Horum unus est, Si regnum disperdat, quemadmodum de Nerone fertur, quod is +nempe senatum populumque Romanum, atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque +vastare, ac novas sibi sedes quaerere decrevisset. Et de Caligula, quod palam +denunciarit se neque civem neque principem senatui amplius fore, inque animo +habuerit interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo quoque Alexandriam +commigrare, ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret, unam ei cervicem optavit. Talia +cum rex aliquis meditator & molitur serio, omnem regnandi curam & +animum ilico abjicit, ac proinde imperium in subditos amittit, ut dominus servi +pro derelicto habiti dominium. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 236. Alter casus est, Si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit, ac +regnum quod liberum a majoribus & populo traditum accepit, alienae ditioni +mancipavit. Nam tunc quamvis forte non ea mente id agit populo plane ut +incommodet: tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae dignitatis amifit, ut summus +scilicet in regno secundum Deum sit, & solo Deo inferior, atque populum +etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum, cujus libertatem sartam & tectam +conservare debuit, in alterius gentis ditionem & potestatem dedidit; hac +velut quadam regni ab alienatione effecit, ut nec quod ipse in regno imperium +habuit retineat, nec in eum cui collatum voluit, juris quicquam transferat; +atque ita eo facto liberum jam & suae potestatis populum relinquit, cujus +rei exemplum unum annales Scotici suppeditant. Barclay contra Monarchom. 1. +iii. c. 16. +</p> + +<p> +Which in English runs thus: +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 237. What then, can there no case happen wherein the people may of right, +and by their own authority, help themselves, take arms, and set upon their +king, imperiously domineering over them? None at all, whilst he remains a king. +Honour the king, and he that resists the power, resists the ordinance of God; +are divine oracles that will never permit it, The people therefore can never +come by a power over him, unless he does something that makes him cease to be a +king: for then he divests himself of his crown and dignity, and returns to the +state of a private man, and the people become free and superior, the power +which they had in the interregnum, before they crowned him king, devolving to +them again. But there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to this +state. After considering it well on all sides, I can find but two. Two cases +there are, I say, whereby a king, ipso facto, becomes no king, and loses all +power and regal authority over his people; which are also taken notice of by +Winzerus. +</p> + +<p> +The first is, If he endeavour to overturn the government, that is, if he have a +purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth, as it is recorded of +Nero, that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of Rome, lay the city +waste with fire and sword, and then remove to some other place. And of +Caligula, that he openly declared, that he would be no longer a head to the +people or senate, and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the worthiest +men of both ranks, and then retire to Alexandria: and he wisht that the people +had but one neck, that he might dispatch them all at a blow, Such designs as +these, when any king harbours in his thoughts, and seriously promotes, he +immediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth; and consequently +forfeits the power of governing his subjects, as a master does the dominion +over his slaves whom he hath abandoned. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 238. The other case is, When a king makes himself the dependent of +another, and subjects his kingdom which his ancestors left him, and the people +put free into his hands, to the dominion of another: for however perhaps it may +not be his intention to prejudice the people; yet because he has hereby lost +the principal part of regal dignity, viz. to be next and immediately under God, +supreme in his kingdom; and also because he betrayed or forced his people, +whose liberty he ought to have carefully preserved, into the power and dominion +of a foreign nation. By this, as it were, alienation of his kingdom, he himself +loses the power he had in it before, without transferring any the least right +to those on whom he would have bestowed it; and so by this act sets the people +free, and leaves them at their own disposal. One example of this is to be found +in the Scotch Annals. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 239. In these cases Barclay, the great champion of absolute monarchy, is +forced to allow, that a king may be resisted, and ceases to be a king. That is, +in short, not to multiply cases, in whatsoever he has no authority, there he is +no king, and may be resisted: for wheresoever the authority ceases, the king +ceases too, and becomes like other men who have no authority. And these two +cases he instances in, differ little from those above mentioned, to be +destructive to governments, only that he has omitted the principle from which +his doctrine flows: and that is, the breach of trust, in not preserving the +form of government agreed on, and in not intending the end of government +itself, which is the public good and preservation of property. When a king has +dethroned himself, and put himself in a state of war with his people, what +shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king, as they would any other +man, who has put himself into a state of war with them, Barclay, and those of +his opinion, would do well to tell us. This farther I desire may be taken +notice of out of Barclay, that he says, The mischief that is designed them, the +people may prevent before it be done: whereby he allows resistance when tyranny +is but in design. Such designs as these (says he) when any king harbours in his +thoughts and seriously promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought +of the commonwealth; so that, according to him, the neglect of the public good +is to be taken as an evidence of such design, or at least for a sufficient +cause of resistance. And the reason of all, he gives in these words, Because he +betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought carefully to have +preserved. What he adds, into the power and dominion of a foreign nation, +signifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture lying in the loss of their liberty, +which he ought to have preserved, and not in any distinction of the persons to +whose dominion they were subjected. The peoples right is equally invaded, and +their liberty lost, whether they are made slaves to any of their own, or a +foreign nation; and in this lies the injury, and against this only have they +the right of defence. And there are instances to be found in all countries, +which shew, that it is not the change of nations in the persons of their +governors, but the change of government, that gives the offence. Bilson, a +bishop of our church, and a great stickler for the power and prerogative of +princes, does, if I mistake not, in his treatise of Christian subjection, +acknowledge, that princes may forfeit their power, and their title to the +obedience of their subjects; and if there needed authority in a case where +reason is so plain, I could send my reader to Bracton, Fortescue, and the +author of the Mirrour, and others, writers that cannot be suspected to be +ignorant of our government, or enemies to it. But I thought Hooker alone might +be enough to satisfy those men, who relying on him for their ecclesiastical +polity, are by a strange fate carried to deny those principles upon which he +builds it. Whether they are herein made the tools of cunninger workmen, to pull +down their own fabric, they were best look. This I am sure, their civil policy +is so new, so dangerous, and so destructive to both rulers and people, that as +former ages never could bear the broaching of it; so it may be hoped, those to +come, redeemed from the impositions of these Egyptian under-task-masters, will +abhor the memory of such servile flatterers, who, whilst it seemed to serve +their turn, resolved all government into absolute tyranny, and would have all +men born to, what their mean souls fitted them for, slavery. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 240. Here, it is like, the common question will be made, Who shall be +judge, whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust? This, +perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst the people, when the +prince only makes use of his due prerogative. To this I reply, The people shall +be judge; for who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well, and +according to the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him, and must, by +having deputed him, have still a power to discard him, when he fails in his +trust? If this be reasonable in particular cases of private men, why should it +be otherwise in that of the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions is +concerned, and also where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the +redress very difficult, dear, and dangerous? +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 241. But farther, this question, (Who shall be judge?) cannot mean, that +there is no judge at all: for where there is no judicature on earth, to decide +controversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge. He alone, it is true, is +judge of the right. But every man is judge for himself, as in all other cases, +so in this, whether another hath put himself into a state of war with him, and +whether he should appeal to the Supreme Judge, as Jeptha did. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 242. If a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the people, in a +matter where the law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing be of great +consequence, I should think the proper umpire, in such a case, should be the +body of the people: for in cases where the prince hath a trust reposed in him, +and is dispensed from the common ordinary rules of the law; there, if any men +find themselves aggrieved, and think the prince acts contrary to, or beyond +that trust, who so proper to judge as the body of the people, (who, at first, +lodged that trust in him) how far they meant it should extend? But if the +prince, or whoever they be in the administration, decline that way of +determination, the appeal then lies no where but to heaven; force between +either persons, who have no known superior on earth, or which permits no appeal +to a judge on earth, being properly a state of war, wherein the appeal lies +only to heaven; and in that state the injured party must judge for himself, +when he will think fit to make use of that appeal, and put himself upon it. +</p> + +<p> +Sect. 243. To conclude, The power that every individual gave the society, when +he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the +society lasts, but will always remain in the community; because without this +there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary to the original +agreement: so also when the society hath placed the legislative in any assembly +of men, to continue in them and their successors, with direction and authority +for providing such successors, the legislative can never revert to the people +whilst that government lasts; because having provided a legislative with power +to continue for ever, they have given up their political power to the +legislative, and cannot resume it. But if they have set limits to the duration +of their legislative, and made this supreme power in any person, or assembly, +only temporary; or else, when by the miscarriages of those in authority, it is +forfeited; upon the forfeiture, or at the determination of the time set, it +reverts to the society, and the people have a right to act as supreme, and +continue the legislative in themselves; or erect a new form, or under the old +form place it in new hands, as they think good. +</p> + +<h3>FINIS.</h3> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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