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diff --git a/old/trgov10.txt b/old/trgov10.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f77523b --- /dev/null +++ b/old/trgov10.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5050 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Two Treatises of Government, by John Locke + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check the +copyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributing +this or any other Project Gutenberg eBook. + +This header should be the first thing seen when viewing this Project +Gutenberg file. Please do not remove it. Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** + + +Title: Two Treatises of Government + +Author: John Locke + +Release Date: January, 2005 [EBook #7370] +[This file was first posted on April 22, 2003] +[Date last updated: July 7, 2004] + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: US-ASCII + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT *** + + + + +SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT by JOHN LOCKE + +Digitized by Dave Gowan <dgowan@tfn.net>. John Locke's "Second +Treatise of Government" was published in 1690. The complete +unabridged text has been republished several times in edited +commentaries. This text is recovered entire from the paperback book, +"John Locke Second Treatise of Government", Edited, with an +Introduction, By C.B. McPherson, Hackett Publishing Company, +Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1980. None of the McPherson edition is +included in the Etext below; only the original words contained in the +1690 Locke text is included. The 1690 edition text is free of +copyright. +_____________________________________________________________________ + + + TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT + + BY IOHN LOCKE + + SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX ESTO + + + + LONDON PRINTED MDCLXXXVIII + + + + REPRINTED, THE SIXTH TIME, BY A. MILLAR, H. WOODFALL, 1. WHISTON AND +B. WHITE, 1. RIVINGTON, L. DAVIS AND C. REYMERS, R. BALDWIN, HAWES CLARKE +AND COLLINS; W. IOHNSTON, W. OWEN, 1. RICHARDSON, S. CROWDER, T. LONGMAN, +B. LAW, C. RIVINGTON, E. DILLY, R. WITHY, C. AND R. WARE, S. BAKER, T. +PAYNE, A. SHUCKBURGH, 1. HINXMAN + + + MDCCLXIII + + + + TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. IN THE FORMER THE FALSE PRINCIPLES AND +FOUNDATION OF SIR ROBERT FILMER AND HIS FOLLOWERS ARE DETECTED AND +OVERTHROWN. THE LATTER IS AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT +AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. + + + 1764 EDITOR'S NOTE The present Edition of this Book has not only +been collated with the first three Editions, which were published during +the Author's Life, but also has the Advantage of his last Corrections and +Improvements, from a Copy delivered by him to Mr. Peter Coste, +communicated to the Editor, and now lodged in Christ College, Cambridge. + + + PREFACE + +Reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning +government; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should +have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not +worth while to tell thee. These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to +establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William; to +make good his title, in the consent of the people, which being the only +one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any +prince in Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of England, +whose love of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to +preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery +and ruin. If these papers have that evidence, I flatter myself is to be +found in them, there will be no great miss of those which are lost, and +my reader may be satisfied without them: for I imagine, I shall have +neither the time, nor inclination to repeat my pains, and fill up the +wanting part of my answer, by tracing Sir Robert again, through all the +windings and obscurities, which are to be met with in the several +branches of his wonderful system. The king, and body of the nation, have +since so thoroughly confuted his Hypothesis, that I suppose no body +hereafter will have either the confidence to appear against our common +safety, and be again an advocate for slavery; or the weakness to be +deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular stile, and +well-turned periods: for if any one will be at the pains, himself, in +those parts, which are here untouched, to strip Sir Robert's discourses +of the flourish of doubtful expressions, and endeavour to reduce his +words to direct, positive, intelligible propositions, and then compare +them one with another, he will quickly be satisfied, there was never so +much glib nonsense put together in well-sounding English. If he think it +not worth while to examine his works all thro', let him make an +experiment in that part, where he treats of usurpation; and let him try, +whether he can, with all his skill, make Sir Robert intelligible, and +consistent with himself, or common sense. I should not speak so plainly +of a gentleman, long since past answering, had not the pulpit, of late +years, publicly owned his doctrine, and made it the current divinity of +the times. It is necessary those men, who taking on them to be teachers, +have so dangerously misled others, should be openly shewed of what +authority this their Patriarch is, whom they have so blindly followed, +that so they may either retract what upon so ill grounds they have +vented, and cannot be maintained; or else justify those principles which +they preached up for gospel; though they had no better an author than an +English courtier: for I should not have writ against Sir Robert, or taken +the pains to shew his mistakes, inconsistencies, and want of (what he so +much boasts of, and pretends wholly to build on) scripture-proofs, were +there not men amongst us, who, by crying up his books, and espousing his +doctrine, save me from the reproach of writing against a dead adversary. +They have been so zealous in this point, that, if I have done him any +wrong, I cannot hope they should spare me. I wish, where they have done +the truth and the public wrong, they would be as ready to redress it, and +allow its just weight to this reflection, viz. that there cannot be done +a greater mischief to prince and people, than the propagating wrong +notions concerning government; that so at last all times might not have +reason to complain of the Drum Ecclesiastic. If any one, concerned +really for truth, undertake the confutation of my Hypothesis, I promise +him either to recant my mistake, upon fair conviction; or to answer his +difficulties. But he must remember two things. + First, That cavilling here and there, at some expression, or little +incident of my discourse, is not an answer to my book. + Secondly, That I shall not take railing for arguments, nor think +either of these worth my notice, though I shall always look on myself as +bound to give satisfaction to any one, who shall appear to be +conscientiously scrupulous in the point, and shall shew any just grounds +for his scruples. + I have nothing more, but to advertise the reader, that Observations +stands for Observations on Hobbs, Milton, &c. and that a bare quotation +of pages always means pages of his Patriarcha, Edition 1680. +OF CIVIL-GOVERNMENT + + Book II + + Chap. I. Sect. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing discourse, + 1. That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by +positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, or +dominion over the world, as is pretended: + 2. That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it: + 3. That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive +law of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may +arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could +not have been certainly determined: + 4. That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which +is the eldest line of Adam's posterity, being so long since utterly lost, +that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not +to one above another, the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to +have the right of inheritance: + All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is +impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or +derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be +the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal +jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that +all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, +and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where +the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder +and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers +of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out +another rise of government, another original of political power, and +another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what +Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us. + Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down +what I take to be political power; that the power of a MAGISTRATE over a +subject may be distinguished from that of a FATHER over his children, a +MASTER over his servant, a HUSBAND over his wife, and a LORD over his +slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the +same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may +help us to distinguish these powers one from wealth, a father of a +family, and a captain of a galley. + Sect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of making laws +with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the +regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the +community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the +common-wealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public +good. + + + + C H A P. II. + + Of the State of Nature. + + Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its +original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that +is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of +their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of +the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of +any other man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and +jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being +nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, +promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of +the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without +subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all +should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, +and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted +right to dominion and sovereignty. + Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks +upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it +the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he +builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the +great maxims of justice and charity. His words are, The like natural +inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty, to +love others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, +must needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good, +even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, +how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless +myself be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in +other men, being of one and the same nature? To have any thing offered +them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as +much as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no +reason that others should shew greater measure of love to me, than they +have by me shewed unto them: my desire therefore to be loved of my equals +in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of +bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation of +equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several +rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no man +is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1. + Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state +of licence: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to +dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy +himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some +nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature +has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, +which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that +being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his +life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship +of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one +sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his +business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last +during his, not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like +faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be +supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to +destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the +inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to +preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like +reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as +much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it +be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what +tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or +goods of another. + Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others +rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be +observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the +execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's +hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that +law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature +would, as all other laws that concern men in this world 'be in vain, if +there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute +that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And +if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has +done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where +naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, +what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a +right to do. + Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power +over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, +when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or +boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so +far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his +transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and +restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully +do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing +the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule +than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set +to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes +dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and +violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass +against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for +by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to +preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, +destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, +who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, +and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like +mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT +TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE. + Sect. 9. 1 doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to +some men: but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by +what right any prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for +any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by +virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the +legislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they +did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority, by which +they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath no power +over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in England, +France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the world, men +without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature every man hath +not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case +to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an +alien of another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no +more power than what every man naturally may have over another. + Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and +varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes +degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature, +and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some +person or other, and some other man receives damage by his transgression: +in which case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the right of +punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek +reparation from him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it +just, may also join with him that is injured, and assist him in +recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the +harm he has suffered. + Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the +crime for restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of +punishing is in every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs +only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by +being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, +can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the law, +remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet +cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he +has received. That, he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand +in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person has this +power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender, +by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the +crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of +preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order +to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has +a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like +injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the +punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from +the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule +and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and +slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, +and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild +savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon +this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by +man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that every +one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his +brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain +was it writ in the hearts of all mankind. + Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish +the lesser breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with +death? I answer, each transgression may be punished to that degree, and +with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the +offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the +like. Every offence, that can be committed in the state of nature, may +in the state of nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it +may, in a commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present +purpose, to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its +measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there is such a law, and that +too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studier of +that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; +as much as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies and +intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests +put into words; for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of +countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of +nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted. + Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature +every one has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but +it will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in +their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and +their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and +revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing +but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath +certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of +men. I easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for the +inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be great, +where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be +imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will +scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those +who make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; +and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily +follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of +nature is therefore not to how much better it is than the state of +nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be +judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he +pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or controul +those who execute his pleasure and in whatsoever he cloth, whether led +by reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to7 much better it is in +the state of nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust +will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any +other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind. + Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever +were there any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as +an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of independent +governments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain +the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that +state. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether +they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact +that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of +agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body +politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with another, and +yet still be in the state of nature. The promises and bargains for +truck, &c. between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by +Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an +Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, though they are +perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for truth +and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of +society. + Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of +nature, I will not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, +Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where he says, The laws which have been +hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of nature, do bind men absolutely, even +as they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never +any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do, or not to do: but +forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with +competent store of things, needful for such a life as our nature doth +desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those +defects and imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by +ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with +others: this was the cause of men's uniting themselves at first in +politic societies. But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in +that state, and remain so, till by their own consents they make +themselves members of some politic society; and I doubt not in the sequel +of this discourse, to make it very clear. + + + + C H A P. III. + + Of the State of War. + + Sec. 16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and +therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a +sedate settled design upon another man's life, puts him in a state of war +with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has +exposed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him, or any one +that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being +reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which +threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man +being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, +the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may destroy a man +who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the +same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not +under the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no other rule, but that +of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those +dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him +whenever he falls into their power. + Sec. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into +his absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with +him; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his +life: for I have reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his +power without my consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me +there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body can +desire to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by +force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a +slave. To be free from such force is the only security of my +preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my +preservation, who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it; +so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into +a state of war with me. He that, in +the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to any one +in that state, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away +every thing else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as +he that, in the state of society, would take away the freedom belonging +to those of that society or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to +take away from them every thing else, and so be looked on as in a state +of war. + Sec. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not +in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther +than, by the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away +his money, or what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he +has no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence be what it will, +I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty, +would not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing else. And +therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himself +into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can; for to that hazard +does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of war, and is +aggressor in it. + Sec. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of +nature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded, are +as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and +preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual +destruction, are one from another. Men living together according to +reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge +between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared +design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common +superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it is +the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an +aggressor, tho' he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief, +whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that +I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or +coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it +cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is +capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of +war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not +time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for +remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common +judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without +right, upon a man's person, makes a state of war, both where there is, +and is not, a common judge. + Sec. 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases +between those that are in society, and are equally on both sides +subjected to the fair determination of the law; because then there lies +open the remedy of appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future +harm: but where no such appeal is, as in the state of nature, for want of +positive laws, and judges with authority to appeal to, the state of war +once begun, continues, with a right to the innocent party to destroy the +other whenever he can, until the aggressor offers peace, and desires +reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he has already +done, and secure the innocent for the future; nay, where an appeal to the +law, and constituted judges, lies open, but the remedy is denied by a +manifest perverting of justice, and a barefaced wresting of the laws to +protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party of +men, there it is hard to imagine any thing but a state of war: for +wherever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to +administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however coloured +with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to +protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to +all who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made +upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are +left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven. + Sec. 21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but +to heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where +there is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great +reason of men's putting themselves into society, and quitting the state +of nature: for where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which +relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is +excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power. Had there been +any such court, any superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the +right between Jephtha and the Ammonites, they had never come to a state +of war: but we see he was forced to appeal to heaven. The Lord the Judge +(says he) be judge this day between the children of Israel and the +children of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and then prosecuting, and relying on +his appeal, he leads out his army to battle: and therefore in such +controversies, where the question is put, who shall be judge? It cannot +be meant, who shall decide the controversy; every one knows what Jephtha +here tells us, that the Lord the Judge shall judge. Where there is no +judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That question then +cannot mean, who shall judge, whether another hath put himself in a state +of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal to heaven in +it? of that I myself can only be judge in my own conscience, as I will +answer it, at the great day, to the supreme judge of all men. + + + CHAP. IV. + + Of SLAVERY. + + + Sec. 22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior +power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of +man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of +man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but that +established, by consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of +any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact, +according to the trust put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert +Filmer tells us, Observations, A. 55. a liberty for every one to do what +he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws: but +freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live by, +common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power +erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the +rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, +unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be +under no other restraint but the law of nature. + Sec. 23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary +to, and closely joined with a man's preservation, that he cannot part +with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a +man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own +consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, +arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases. No +body can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take +away his own life, cannot give another power over it. Indeed, having by +his fault forfeited his own life, by some act that deserves death; he, to +whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his power) delay to +take it, and make use of him to his own service, and he does him no +injury by it: for, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh +the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his +master, to draw on himself the death he desires. + Sec. 24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing +else, but the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a +captive: for, if once compact enter between them, and make an agreement +for a limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the +state of war and slavery ceases, as long as the compact endures: for, as +has been said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which +he hath not in himself, a power over his own life. I confess, we find +among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell themselves; +but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for, it is +evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical +power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at any time, +whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his +service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an +arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure, so much as +maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free, Exod. xxi. + + + CHAP. V. + + Of PROPERTY. + + Sec. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that +men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and +consequently to meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords +for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives us an account of those +grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is +very clear, that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the +earth to the children of men; given it to mankind in common. But this +being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty, how any one +should ever come to have a property in any thing: I will not content +myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make out property, upon a +supposition that God gave the world to Adam, and his posterity in common, +it is impossible that any man, but one universal monarch, should have any +property upon a supposition, that God gave the world to Adam, and his +heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I +shall endeavour to shew, how men might come to have a property in several +parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any +express compact of all the commoners. + Sec. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also +given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and +convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the +support and comfort of their being. And tho' all the fruits it naturally +produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are +produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a +private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as +they are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of men, +there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, +before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular +man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows +no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, +i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, +before it can do him any good for the support of his life. + Sec. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to +all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has +any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his +hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of +the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his +labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby +makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state +nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, +that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the +unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right +to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as +good, left in common for others. + Sec. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an +oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly +appropriated them to himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is +his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or +when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he +picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not +his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and +common: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother +of all, had done; and so they became his private right. And will any one +say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, +because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a +robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such +a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the +plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, +that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of +the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property; without which +the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part, does not +depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my +horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have digged in +any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become my +property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labour +that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath +fixed my property in them. + Sec. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary +to any one's appropriating to himself any part of what is given in +common, children or servants could not cut the meat, which their father +or master had provided for them in common, without assigning to every one +his peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every +one's, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it +out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was +common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby +appropriated it to himself. + Sec. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who +hath killed it; it is allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his +labour upon it, though before it was the common right of every one. And +amongst those who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have +made and multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original +law of nature, for the beginning of property, in what was before common, +still takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in +the ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind; or what +ambergrise any one takes up here, is by the labour that removes it out of +that common state nature left it in, made his property, who takes that +pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any one is hunting, +is thought his who pursues her during the chase: for being a beast that +is still looked upon as common, and no man's private possession; whoever +has employed so much labour about any of that kind, as to find and pursue +her, has thereby removed her from the state of nature, wherein she was +common, and hath begun a property. + Sec. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the +acorns, or other fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any +one may ingross as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so. The same +law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does also bound +that property too. God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 12. +is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he +given it us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any +advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his Tabour fix a +property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs +to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy. And +thus, considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long time +in the world, and the few spenders; and to how small a part of that +provision the industry of one man could extend itself, and ingross it to +the prejudice of others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by +reason, of what might serve for his use; there could be then little room +for quarrels or contentions about property so established. + Sec. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of +the earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as +that which takes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is +plain, that property in that too is acquired as the former. As much land +as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, +so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it +from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right, to say every body +else has an equal title to it; and therefore he cannot appropriate, he +cannot inclose, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners, all +mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded +man also to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him. +God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e. improve it for +the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his +own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God, subdued, +tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was +his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury +take from him. + Sec. 33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by +improving it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was still +enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. So +that, in effect, there was never the less left for others because of his +enclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make use +of, does as good as take nothing at all. No body could think himself +injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, +who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst: +and the case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is +perfectly the same. + Sec. 34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it +them for their benefit, and the greatest conveniencies of life they were +capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always +remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious +and rational, (and labour was to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or +covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had as good +left for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain, +ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labour: +if he did, it is plain he desired the benefit of another's pains, which +he had no right to, and not the ground which God had given him in common +with others to labour on, and whereof there was as good left, as that +already possessed, and more than he knew what to do with, or his industry +could reach to. + Sec. 35. It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other +country, where there is plenty of people under government, who have money +and commerce, no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without the +consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common by +compact, i.e. by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And +though it be common, in respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind; +but is the joint property of this country, or this parish. Besides, the +remainder, after such enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the +commoners, as the whole was when they could all make use of the whole; +whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of the +world, it was quite otherwise. The law man was under, was rather for +appropriating. God commanded, and his wants forced him to labour. That +was his property which could not be taken from him where-ever he had +fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating the earth, and having +dominion, we see are joined together. The one gave title to the other. +So that God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to +appropriate: and the condition of human life, which requires labour and +materials to work on, necessarily introduces private possessions. + Sec. 36. The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of +men's labour and the conveniencies of life: no man's labour could subdue, +or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small +part; so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench upon +the right of another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice +of his neighbour, who would still have room for as good, and as large a +possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was +appropriated. This measure did confine every man's possession to a very +moderate proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself, without +injury to any body, in the first ages of the world, when men were more in +danger to be lost, by wandering from their company, in the then vast +wilderness of the earth, than to be straitened for want of room to plant +in. And the same measure may be allowed still without prejudice to any +body, as full as the world seems: for supposing a man, or family, in the +state they were at first peopling of the world by the children of Adam, +or Noah; let him plant in some inland, vacant places of America, we shall +find that the possessions he could make himself, upon the measures we +have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day, prejudice the +rest of mankind, or give them reason to complain, or think themselves +injured by this man's incroachment, though the race of men have now +spread themselves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely +exceed the small number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of ground +is of so little value, without labour, that I have heard it affirmed, +that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough, sow and reap, +without being disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his +making use of it. But, on the contrary, the inhabitants think themselves +beholden to him, who, by his industry on neglected, and consequently +waste land, has increased the stock of corn, which they wanted. But be +this as it will, which I lay no stress on; this I dare boldly affirm, +that the same rule of propriety, (viz.) that every man should have as +much as he could make use of, would hold still in the world, without +straitening any body; since there is land enough in the world to suffice +double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and the tacit +agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger +possessions, and a right to them; which, how it has done, I shall by and +by shew more at large. + Sec. 37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of +having more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, +which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man; or had agreed, +that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or +decay, should be worth a great piece of flesh, or a whole heap of corn; +though men had a right to appropriate, by their labour, each one of +himself, as much of the things of nature, as he could use: yet this could +not be much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the same plenty was +still left to those who would use the same industry. To which let me +add, that he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not +lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the provisions +serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre of inclosed +and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times more +than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness +lying waste in common. And therefore he that incloses land, and has a +greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could +have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety +acres to mankind: for his labour now supplies him with provisions out of +ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in common. I +have here rated the improved land very low, in making its product but as +ten to one, when it is much nearer an hundred to one: for I ask, whether +in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America, left to nature, +without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres yield the +needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life, as ten +acres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well +cultivated? Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much +of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of the beasts, as he +could; he that so imployed his pains about any of the spontaneous +products of nature, as any way to alter them from the state which nature +put them in, by placing any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire a +propriety in them: but if they perished, in his possession, without their +due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified, before he could +spend it, he offended against the common law of nature, and was liable to +be punished; he invaded his neighbour's share, for he had no right, +farther than his use called for any of them, and they might serve to +afford him conveniencies of life. + Sec. 38. The same measures governed the possession of land too: +whatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it +spoiled, that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could +feed, and make use of, the cattle and product was also his. But if +either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of +his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the +earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, +and might be the possession of any other. Thus, at the beginning, Cain +might take as much ground as he could till, and make it his own land, and +yet leave enough to Abel's sheep to feed on; a few acres would serve for +both their possessions. But as families increased, and industry inlarged +their stocks, their possessions inlarged with the need of them; but yet +it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use +of, till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and built +cities; and then, by consent, they came in time, to set out the bounds of +their distinct territories, and agree on limits between them and their +neighbours; and by laws within themselves, settled the properties of +those of the same society: for we see, that in that part of the world +which was first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even as +low down as Abraham's time, they wandered with their flocks, and their +herds, which was their substance, freely up and down; and this Abraham +did, in a country where he was a stranger. Whence it is plain, that at +least a great part of the land lay in common; that the inhabitants valued +it not, nor claimed property in any more than they made use of. But when +there was not room enough in the same place, for their herds to feed +together, they by consent, as Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5. +separated and inlarged their pasture, where it best liked them. And for +the same reason Esau went from his father, and his brother, and planted +in mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6. + Sec. 39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion, and +property in Adam, over all the world, exclusive of all other men, which +can no way be proved, nor any one's property be made out from it; but +supposing the world given, as it was, to the children of men in common, +we see how labour could make men distinct titles to several parcels of +it, for their private uses; wherein there could be no doubt of right, no +room for quarrel. + Sec. 40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may +appear, that the property of labour should be able to over-balance the +community of land: for it is labour indeed that puts the difference of +value on every thing; and let any one consider what the difference is +between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or +barley, and an acre of the same land lying in common, without any +husbandry upon it, and he will find, that the improvement of labour makes +the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modest +computation to say, that of the products of the earth useful to the life +of man nine tenths are the effects of labour: nay, if we will rightly +estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the several expences +about them, what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to labour, +we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to +be put on the account of labour. + Sec. 41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than +several nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land, and +poor in all the comforts of life; whom nature having furnished as +liberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty, i.e. a +fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might serve for food, +raiment, and delight; yet for want of improving it by labour, have not +one hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of a large +and fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a +day-labourer in England. + Sec. 42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the +ordinary provisions of life, through their several progresses, before +they come to our use, and see how much they receive of their value from +human industry. Bread, wine and cloth, are things of daily use, and +great plenty; yet notwithstanding, acorns, water and leaves, or skins, +must be our bread, drink and cloathing, did not labour furnish us with +these more useful commodities: for whatever bread is more worth than +acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins or moss, +that is wholly owing to labour and industry; the one of these being the +food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other, +provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how much +they exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then +see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we +enjoy in this world: and the ground which produces the materials, is +scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at most, but a very small part of +it; so little, that even amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, +that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, +as indeed it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to +little more than nothing. This shews how much numbers of men are to be +preferred to largeness of dominions; and that the increase of lands, and +the right employing of them, is the great art of government: and that +prince, who shall be so wise and godlike, as by established laws of +liberty to secure protection and encouragement to the honest industry of +mankind, against the oppression of power and narrowness of party, will +quickly be too hard for his neighbours: but this by the by. To return to +the argument in hand, + Sec. 43. An acre of land, that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, +and another in America, which, with the same husbandry, would do the +like, are, without doubt, of the same natural intrinsic value: but yet +the benefit mankind receives from the one in a year, is worth 5l. and +from the other possibly not worth a penny, if all the profit an Indian +received from it were to be valued, and sold here; at least, I may truly +say, not one thousandth. It is labour then which puts the greatest part +of value upon land, without which it would scarcely be worth any thing: +it is to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful products; for +all that the straw, bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, is more worth +than the product of an acre of as good land, which lies waste, is all the +effect of labour: for it is not barely the plough-man's pains, the +reaper's and thresher's toil, and the baker's sweat, is to be counted +into the bread we eat; the labour of those who broke the oxen, who digged +and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timber +employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are a +vast number, requisite to this corn, from its being feed to be sown to +its being made bread, must all be charged on the account of labour, and +received as an effect of that: nature and the earth furnished only the +almost worthless materials, as in themselves. It would be a strange +catalogue of things, that industry provided and made use of, about every +loaf of bread, before it came to our use, if we could trace them; iron, +wood, leather, bark, timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying +drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and all the materials made use of in the +ship, that brought any of the commodities made use of by any of the +workmen, to any part of the work; all which it would be almost +impossible, at least too long, to reckon up. + Sec. 44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of +nature are given in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and +proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still +in himself the great foundation of property; and that, which made up the +great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, +when invention and arts had improved the conveniencies of life, was +perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others. + Sec. 45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, +wherever any one was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which +remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind +makes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented themselves +with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities: and though +afterwards, in some parts of the world, (where the increase of people and +stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some value) +the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories, +and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of the private men +of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property +which labour and industry began; and the leagues that have been made +between several states and kingdoms, either expresly or tacitly disowning +all claim and right to the land in the others possession, have, by common +consent, given up their pretences to their natural common right, which +originally they had to those countries, and so have, by positive +agreement, settled a property amongst themselves, in distinct parts and +parcels of the earth; yet there are still great tracts of ground to be +found, which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of +mankind, in the consent of the use of their common money) lie waste, and +are more than the people who dwell on it do, or can make use of, and so +still lie in common; tho' this can scarce happen amongst that part of +mankind that have consented to the use of money. + Sec. 46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of +man, and such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of +the world look after, as it cloth the Americans now, are generally things +of short duration; such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay +and perish of themselves: gold, silver and diamonds, are things that +fancy or agreement hath put the value on, more than real use, and the +necessary support of life. Now of those good things which nature hath +provided in common, every one had a right (as hath been said) to as much +as he could use, and property in all that he could effect with his +labour; all that his industry could extend to, to alter from the state +nature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a hundred bushels of +acorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they were his goods as +soon as gathered. He was only to look, that he used them before they +spoiled, else he took more than his share, and robbed others. And indeed +it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he +could make use of. If he gave away a part to any body else, so that it +perished not uselesly in his possession, these he also made use of. And +if he also bartered away plums, that would have rotted in a week, for +nuts that would last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; +he wasted not the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods +that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselesly in his +hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased +with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a +sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by him all his life he +invaded not the right of others, he might heap up as much of these +durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just +property not lying in the largeness of his possession, but the perishing +of any thing uselesly in it. + Sec. 47. And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that +men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would +take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life. + Sec. 48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men +possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave +them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them: for supposing an +island, separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, +wherein there were but an hundred families, but there were sheep, horses +and cows, with other useful animals, wholsome fruits, and land enough for +corn for a hundred thousand times as many, but nothing in the island, +either because of its commonness, or perishableness, fit to supply the +place of money; what reason could any one have there to enlarge his +possessions beyond the use of his family, and a plentiful supply to its +consumption, either in what their own industry produced, or they could +barter for like perishable, useful commodities, with others? Where there +is not some thing, both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded +up, there men will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land, were +it never so rich, never so free for them to take: for I ask, what would a +man value ten thousand, or an hundred thousand acres of excellent land, +ready cultivated, and well stocked too with cattle, in the middle of the +inland parts of America, where he had no hopes of commerce with other +parts of the world, to draw money to him by the sale of the product? It +would not be worth the enclosing, and we should see him give up again to +the wild common of nature, whatever was more than would supply the +conveniencies of life to be had there for him and his family. + Sec. 49. Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so +than that is now; for no such thing as money was any where known. Find +out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his +neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge +his possessions. + Sec. 50. But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life +of man in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only +from the consent of men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the +measure, it is plain, that men have agreed to a disproportionate and +unequal possession of the earth, they having, by a tacit and voluntary +consent, found out, a way how a man may fairly possess more land than he +himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus +gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any one; these +metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor. This +partage of things in an inequality of private possessions, men have made +practicable out of the bounds of society, and without compact, only by +putting a value on gold and silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of +money: for in governments, the laws regulate the right of property, and +the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions. + Sec. 51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without any +difficulty, how labour could at first begin a title of property in the +common things of nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded +it. So that there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title, +nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it gave. Right and +conveniency went together; for as a man had a right to all he could +employ his labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than +he could make use of. This left no room for controversy about the title, +nor for encroachment on the right of others; what portion a man carved to +himself, was easily seen; and it was useless, as well as dishonest, to +carve himself too much, or take more than he needed. + + + CHAP. VI. + + Of Paternal Power. + + Sec. 52. IT may perhaps be censured as an impertinent criticism, in a +discourse of this nature, to find fault with words and names, that have +obtained in the world: and yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new +ones, when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes, as this of paternal +power probably has done, which seems so to place the power of parents +over their children wholly in the father, as if the mother had no share +in it; whereas, if we consult reason or revelation, we shall find, she +hath an equal title. This may give one reason to ask, whether this might +not be more properly called parental power? for whatever obligation +nature and the right of generation lays on children, it must certainly +bind them equal to both the concurrent causes of it. And accordingly we +see the positive law of God every where joins them together, without +distinction, when it commands the obedience of children, Honour thy +father and thy mother, Exod. xx. 12. Whosoever curseth his father or his +mother, Lev. xx. 9. Ye shall fear every man his mother and his father, +Lev. xix. 3. Children, obey your parents, &c. Eph. vi. 1. is the stile +of the Old and New Testament. + Sec. 53. Had but this one thing been well considered, without looking +any deeper into the matter, it might perhaps have kept men from running +into those gross mistakes, they have made, about this power of parents; +which, however it might, without any great harshness, bear the name of +absolute dominion, and regal authority, when under the title of paternal +power it seemed appropriated to the father, would yet have founded but +oddly, and in the very name shewn the absurdity, if this supposed +absolute power over children had been called parental; and thereby have +discovered, that it belonged to the mother too: for it will but very ill +serve the turn of those men, who contend so much for the absolute power +and authority of the fatherhood, as they call it, that the mother should +have any share in it; and it would have but ill supported the monarchy +they contend for, when by the very name it appeared, that that +fundamental authority, from whence they would derive their government of +a single person only, was not placed in one, but two persons jointly. +But to let this of names pass. + Sec. 54. Though I have said above, Chap. II. That all men by nature +are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality: age +or virtue may give men a just precedency: excellency of parts and merit +may place others above the common level: birth may subject some, and +alliance or benefits others, to pay an observance to those to whom +nature, gratitude, or other respects, may have made it due: and yet all +this consists with the equality, which all men are in, in respect of +jurisdiction or dominion one over another; which was the equality I there +spoke of, as proper to the business in hand, being that equal right, that +every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the +will or authority of any other man. + Sec. 55. Children, I confess, are not born in this full state of +equality, though they are born to it. Their parents have a sort of rule +and jurisdiction over them, when they come into the world, and for some +time after; but it is but a temporary one. The bonds of this subjection +are like the swaddling clothes they art wrapt up in, and supported by, in +the weakness of their infancy: age and reason as they grow up, loosen +them, till at length they drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free +disposal. + Sec. 56. Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in full +possession of their strength and reason, and so was capable, from the +first instant of his being to provide for his own support and +preservation, and govern his actions according to the dictates of the law +of reason which God had implanted in him. From him the world is peopled +with his descendants, who are all born infants, weak and helpless, +without knowledge or understanding: but to supply the defects of this +imperfect state, till the improvement of growth and age hath removed +them, Adam and Eve, and after them all parents were, by the law of +nature, under an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the +children they had begotten; not as their own workmanship, but the +workmanship of their own maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be +accountable for them. + Sec. 57. The law, that was to govern Adam, was the same that was to +govern all his posterity, the law of reason. But his offspring having +another way of entrance into the world, different from him, by a natural +birth, that produced them ignorant and without the use of reason, they +were not presently under that law; for no body can be under a law, which +is not promulgated to him; and this law being promulgated or made known +by reason only, he that is not come to the use of his reason, cannot be +said to be under this law; and Adam's children, being not presently as +soon as born under this law of reason, were not presently free: for law, +in its true notion, is not so much the limitation as the direction of a +free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no +farther than is for the general good of those under that law: could they +be happier without it, the law, as an useless thing, would of itself +vanish; and that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in +only from bogs and precipices. So that, however it may be mistaken, the +end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge +freedom: for in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where +there is no law, there is no freedom: for liberty is, to be free from +restraint and violence from others; which cannot be, where there is no +law: but freedom is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to do +what he lists: (for who could be free, when every other man's humour +might domineer over him?) but a liberty to dispose, and order as he +lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within +the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be +subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own. + Sec. 58. The power, then, that parents have over their children, +arises from that duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their +off-spring, during the imperfect state of childhood. To inform the mind, +and govern the actions of their yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall +take its place, and ease them of that trouble, is what the children want, +and the parents are bound to: for God having given man an understanding +to direct his actions, has allowed him a freedom of will, and liberty of +acting, as properly belonging thereunto, within the bounds of that law he +is under. But whilst he is in an estate, wherein he has not +understanding of his own to direct his will, he is not to have any will +of his own to follow: he that understands for him, must will for him too; +he must prescribe to his will, and regulate his actions; but when he +comes to the estate that made his father a freeman, the son is a freeman +too. + Sec. 59. This holds in all the laws a man is under, whether natural +or civil. Is a man under the law of nature? What made him free of that +law? what gave him a free disposing of his property, according to his own +will, within the compass of that law? I answer, a state of maturity +wherein he might be supposed capable to know that law, that so he might +keep his actions within the bounds of it. When he has acquired that +state, he is presumed to know how far that law is to be his guide, and +how far he may make use of his freedom, and so comes to have it; till +then, some body else must guide him, who is presumed to know how far the +law allows a liberty. If such a state of reason, such an age of +discretion made him free, the same shall make his son free too. Is a man +under the law of England? What made him free of that law? that is, to +have the liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions according to +his own will, within the permission of that law? A capacity of knowing +that law; which is supposed by that law, at the age of one and twenty +years, and in some cases sooner. If this made the father free, it shall +make the son free too. Till then we see the law allows the son to have +no will, but he is to be guided by the will of his father or guardian, +who is to understand for him. And if the father die, and fail to +substitute a deputy in his trust; if he hath not provided a tutor, to +govern his son, during his minority, during his want of understanding, +the law takes care to do it; some other must govern him, and be a will to +him, till he hath attained to a state of freedom, and his understanding +be fit to take the government of his will. But after that, the father +and son are equally free as much as tutor and pupil after nonage; equally +subjects of the same law together, without any dominion left in the +father over the life, liberty, or estate of his son, whether they be only +in the state and under the law of nature, or under the positive laws of +an established government. + Sec. 60. But if, through defects that may happen out of the ordinary +course of nature, any one comes not to such a degree of reason, wherein +he might be supposed capable of knowing the law, and so living within the +rules of it, he is never capable of being a free man, he is never let +loose to the disposure of his own will (because he knows no bounds to it, +has not understanding, its proper guide) but is continued under the +tuition and government of others, all the time his own understanding is +uncapable of that charge. And so lunatics and ideots are never set free +from the government of their parents; children, who are not as yet come +unto those years whereat they may have; and innocents which are excluded +by a natural defect from ever having; thirdly, madmen, which for the +present cannot possibly have the use of right reason to guide themselves, +have for their guide, the reason that guideth other men which are tutors +over them, to seek and procure their good for them, says Hooker, Eccl. +Pol. lib. i. sec. 7. All which seems no more than that duty, which God +and nature has laid on man, as well as other creatures, to preserve their +offspring, till they can be able to shift for themselves, and will scarce +amount to an instance or proof of parents regal authority. + Sec. 61. Thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we +have actually the exercise of either: age, that brings one, brings with +it the other too. And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to +parents may consist together, and are both founded on the same +principle. A child is free by his father's title, by his father's +understanding, which is to govern him till he hath it of his own. The +freedom of a man at years of discretion, and the subjection of a child to +his parents, whilst yet short of that age, are so consistent, and so +distinguishable, that the most blinded contenders for monarchy, by right +of fatherhood, cannot miss this difference; the most obstinate cannot but +allow their consistency: for were their doctrine all true, were the right +heir of Adam now known, and by that title settled a monarch in his +throne, invested with all the absolute unlimited power Sir Robert Filmer +talks of; if he should die as soon as his heir were born, must not the +child, notwithstanding he were never so free, never so much sovereign, be +in subjection to his mother and nurse, to tutors and governors, till age +and education brought him reason and ability to govern himself and +others? The necessities of his life, the health of his body, and the +information of his mind, would require him to be directed by the will of +others, and not his own; and yet will any one think, that this restraint +and subjection were inconsistent with, or spoiled him of that liberty or +sovereignty he had a right to, or gave away his empire to those who had +the government of his nonage? This government over him only prepared him +the better and sooner for it. If any body should ask me, when my son is +of age to be free? I shall answer, just when his monarch is of age to +govern. But at what time, says the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. l. i. +sect. 6. a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of +reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws whereby he is then +bound to guide his actions: this is a great deal more easy for sense to +discern, than for any one by skill and learning to determine. + Sec. 62. Common-wealths themselves take notice of, and allow, that +there is a time when men are to begin to act like free men, and therefore +till that time require not oaths of fealty, or allegiance, or other +public owning of, or submission to the government of their countries. + Sec. 63. The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to +his own will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct +him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he +is left to the freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an +unrestrained liberty, before he has reason to guide him, is not the +allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free; but to thrust him +out amongst brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much +beneath that of a man, as their's. This is that which puts the authority +into the parents hands to govern the minority of their children. God +hath made it their business to employ this care on their offspring, and +hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and concern to +temper this power, to apply it, as his wisdom designed it, to the +children's good, as long as they should need to be under it. + Sec. 64. But what reason can hence advance this care of the parents +due to their off-spring into an absolute arbitrary dominion of the +father, whose power reaches no farther, than by such a discipline, as he +finds most effectual, to give such strength and health to their bodies, +such vigour and rectitude to their minds, as may best fit his children to +be most useful to themselves and others; and, if it be necessary to his +condition, to make them work, when they are able, for their own +subsistence. But in this power the mother too has her share with the +father. + Sec. 65. Nay, this power so little belongs to the father by any +peculiar right of nature, but only as he is guardian of his children, +that when he quits his care of them, he loses his power over them, which +goes along with their nourishment and education, to which it is +inseparably annexed; and it belongs as much to the foster-father of an +exposed child, as to the natural father of another. So little power does +the bare act of begetting give a man over his issue; if all his care ends +there, and this be all the title he hath to the name and authority of a +father. And what will become of this paternal power in that part of the +world, where one woman hath more than one husband at a time? or in those +parts of America, where, when the husband and wife part, which happens +frequently, the children are all left to the mother, follow her, and are +wholly under her care and provision? If the father die whilst the +children are young, do they not naturally every where owe the same +obedience to their mother, during their minority, as to their father were +he alive? and will any one say, that the mother hath a legislative power +over her children? that she can make standing rules, which shall be of +perpetual obligation, by which they ought to regulate all the concerns of +their property, and bound their liberty all the course of their lives? or +can she inforce the observation of them with capital punishments? for +this is the proper power of the magistrate, of which the father hath not +so much as the shadow. His command over his children is but temporary, +and reaches not their life or property: it is but a help to the weakness +and imperfection of their nonage, a discipline necessary to their +education: and though a father may dispose of his own possessions as he +pleases, when his children are out of danger of perishing for want, yet +his power extends not to the lives or goods, which either their own +industry, or another's bounty has made their's; nor to their liberty +neither, when they are once arrived to the infranchisement of the years +of discretion. The father's empire then ceases, and he can from thence +forwards no more dispose of the liberty of his son, than that of any +other man: and it must be far from an absolute or perpetual jurisdiction, +from which a man may withdraw himself, having license from divine +authority to leave father and mother, and cleave to his wife. + Sec. 66. But though there be a time when a child comes to be as free +from subjection to the will and command of his father, as the father +himself is free from subjection to the will of any body else, and they +are each under no other restraint, but that which is common to them both, +whether it be the law of nature, or municipal law of their country; yet +this freedom exempts not a son from that honour which he ought, by the +law of God and nature, to pay his parents. God having made the parents +instruments in his great design of continuing the race of mankind, and +the occasions of life to their children; as he hath laid on them an +obligation to nourish, preserve, and bring up their offspring; so he has +laid on the children a perpetual obligation of honouring their parents, +which containing in it an inward esteem and reverence to be shewn by all +outward expressions, ties up the child from any thing that may ever +injure or affront, disturb or endanger, the happiness or life of those +from whom he received his; and engages him in all actions of defence, +relief, assistance and comfort of those, by whose means he entered into +being, and has been made capable of any enjoyments of life: from this +obligation no state, no freedom can absolve children. But this is very +far from giving parents a power of command over their children, or an +authority to make laws and dispose as they please of their lives or +liberties. It is one thing to owe honour, respect, gratitude and +assistance; another to require an absolute obedience and submission. The +honour due to parents, a monarch in his throne owes his mother; and yet +this lessens not his authority, nor subjects him to her government. + Sec. 67. The subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary +government, which terminates with the minority of the child: and the +honour due from a child, places in the parents a perpetual right to +respect, reverence, support and compliance too, more or less, as the +father's care, cost, and kindness in his education, has been more or +less. This ends not with minority, but holds in all parts and conditions +of a man's life. The want of distinguishing these two powers, viz. that +which the father hath in the right of tuition, during minority, and the +right of honour all his life, may perhaps have caused a great part of the +mistakes about this matter: for to speak properly of them, the first of +these is rather the privilege of children, and duty of parents, than any +prerogative of paternal power. The nourishment and education of their +children is a charge so incumbent on parents for their children's good, +that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it: and though the +power of commanding and chastising them go along with it, yet God hath +woven into the principles of human nature such a tenderness for their +off-spring, that there is little fear that parents should use their power +with too much rigour; the excess is seldom on the severe side, the strong +byass of nature drawing the other way. And therefore God almighty when +he would express his gentle dealing with the Israelites, he tells them, +that though he chastened them, he chastened them as a man chastens his +son, Deut. viii. 5. i.e. with tenderness and affection, and kept them +under no severer discipline than what was absolutely best for them, and +had been less kindness to have slackened. This is that power to which +children are commanded obedience, that the pains and care of their +parents may not be increased, or ill rewarded. + Sec. 68. On the other side, honour and support, all that which +gratitude requires to return for the benefits received by and from them, +is the indispensable duty of the child, and the proper privilege of the +parents. This is intended for the parents advantage, as the other is for +the child's; though education, the parents duty, seems to have most +power, because the ignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in need +of restraint and correction; which is a visible exercise of rule, and a +kind of dominion. And that duty which is comprehended in the word +honour, requires less obedience, though the obligation be stronger on +grown, than younger children: for who can think the command, Children +obey your parents, requires in a man, that has children of his own, the +same submission to his father, as it does in his yet young children to +him; and that by this precept he were bound to obey all his father's +commands, if, out of a conceit of authority, he should have the +indiscretion to treat him still as a boy? + Sec. 69. The first part then of paternal power, or rather duty, which +is education, belongs so to the father, that it terminates at a certain +season; when the business of education is over, it ceases of itself, and +is also alienable before: for a man may put the tuition of his son in +other hands; and he that has made his son an apprentice to another, has +discharged him, during that time, of a great part of his obedience both +to himself and to his mother. But all the duty of honour, the other +part, remains never the less entire to them; nothing can cancel that: it +is so inseparable from them both, that the father's authority cannot +dispossess the mother of this right, nor can any man discharge his son +from honouring her that bore him. But both these are very far from a +power to make laws, and enforcing them with penalties, that may reach +estate, liberty, limbs and life. The power of commanding ends with +nonage; and though, after that, honour and respect, support and defence, +and whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the highest benefits he +is naturally capable of, be always due from a son to his parents; yet all +this puts no scepter into the father's hand, no sovereign power of +commanding. He has no dominion over his son's property, or actions; nor +any right, that his will should prescribe to his son's in all things; +however it may become his son in many things, not very inconvenient to +him and his family, to pay a deference to it. + Sec. 70. A man may owe honour and respect to an ancient, or wise man; +defence to his child or friend; relief and support to the distressed; and +gratitude to a benefactor, to such a degree, that all he has, all he can +do, cannot sufficiently pay it: but all these give no authority, no right +to any one, of making laws over him from whom they are owing. And it is +plain, all this is due not only to the bare title of father; not only +because, as has been said, it is owing to the mother too; but because +these obligations to parents, and the degrees of what is required of +children, may be varied by the different care and kindness, trouble and +expence, which is often employed upon one child more than another. + Sec. 71. This shews the reason how it comes to pass, that parents in +societies, where they themselves are subjects, retain a power over their +children, and have as much right to their subjection, as those who are in +the state of nature. Which could not possibly be, if all political power +were only paternal, and that in truth they were one and the same thing: +for then, all paternal power being in the prince, the subject could +naturally have none of it. But these two powers, political and paternal, +are so perfectly distinct and separate; are built upon so different +foundations, and given to so different ends, that every subject that is a +father, has as much a paternal power over his children, as the prince has +over his: and every prince, that has parents, owes them as much filial +duty and obedience, as the meanest of his subjects do to their's; and can +therefore contain not any part or degree of that kind of dominion, which +a prince or magistrate has over his subject. + Sec. 72. Though the obligation on the parents to bring up their +children, and the obligation on children to honour their parents, contain +all the power on the one hand, and submission on the other, which are +proper to this relation, yet there is another power ordinarily in the +father, whereby he has a tie on the obedience of his children; which tho' +it be common to him with other men, yet the occasions of shewing it, +almost consich tho' it be common to him with other men, yet the occasions +of shewing it, almost constantly happening to fathers in their private +families, and the instances of it elsewhere being rare, and less taken +notice of, it passes in the world for a part of paternal jurisdiction. +And this is the power men generally have to bestow their estates on those +who please them best; the possession of the father being the expectation +and inheritance of the children, ordinarily in certain proportions, +according to the law and custom of each country; yet it is commonly in +the father's power to bestow it with a more sparing or liberal hand, +according as the behaviour of this or that child hath comported with his +will and humour. + Sec. 73. This is no small tie on the obedience of children: and there +being always annexed to the enjoyment of land, a submission to the +government of the country, of which that land is a part; it has been +commonly supposed, that a father could oblige his posterity to that +government, of which he himself was a subject, and that his compact held +them; whereas, it being only a necessary condition annexed to the land, +and the inheritance of an estate which is under that government, reaches +only those who will take it on that condition, and so is no natural tie +or engagement, but a voluntary submission: for every man's children being +by nature as free as himself, or any of his ancestors ever were, may, +whilst they are in that freedom, choose what society they will join +themselves to, what common-wealth they will put themselves under. But if +they will enjoy the inheritance of their ancestors, they must take it on +the same terms their ancestors had it, and submit to all the conditions +annexed to such a possession. By this power indeed fathers oblige their +children to obedience to themselves, even when they are past minority, +and most commonly too subject them to this or that political power: but +neither of these by any peculiar right of fatherhood, but by the reward +they have in their hands to inforce and recompence such a compliance; and +is no more power than what a French man has over an English man, who by +the hopes of an estate he will leave him, will certainly have a strong +tie on his obedience: and if, when it is left him, he will enjoy it, he +must certainly take it upon the conditions annexed to the possession of +land in that country where it lies, whether it be France or England. + Sec. 74. To conclude then, tho' the father's power of commanding +extends no farther than the minority of his children, and to a degree +only fit for the discipline and government of that age; and tho' that +honour and respect, and all that which the Latins called piety, which +they indispensably owe to their parents all their life-time, and in all +estates, with all that support and defence is due to them, gives the +father no power of governing, i.e. making laws and enacting penalties on +his children; though by all this he has no dominion over the property or +actions of his son: yet it is obvious to conceive how easy it was, in the +first ages of the world, and in places still, where the thinness of +people gives families leave to separate into unpossessed quarters, and +they have room to remove or plant themselves in yet vacant habitations, +for the father of the family to become the prince of* it; he had been a +ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children: and since +without some government it would be hard for them to live together, it +was likeliest it should, by the express or tacit consent of the children +when they were grown up, be in the father, where it seemed without any +change barely to continue; when indeed nothing more was required to it, +than the permitting the father to exercise alone, in his family, that +executive power of the law of nature, which every free man naturally +hath, and by that permission resigning up to him a monarchical power, +whilst they remained in it. But that this was not by any paternal right, +but only by the consent of his children, is evident from hence, that no +body doubts, but if a stranger, whom chance or business had brought to +his family, had there killed any of his children, or committed any other +fact, he might condemn and put him to death, or other-wise have punished +him, as well as any of his children; which it was impossible he should do +by virtue of any paternal authority over one who was not his child, but +by virtue of that executive power of the law of nature, which, as a man, +he had a right to: and he alone could punish him in his family, where the +respect of his children had laid by the exercise of such a power, to give +way to the dignity and authority they were willing should remain in him, +above the rest of his family. (*It is no improbable opinion therefore, +which the archphilosopher was of, that the chief person in every houshold +was always, as it were, a king: so when numbers of housholds joined +themselves in civil societies together, kings were the first kind of +governors amongst them, which is also, as it seemeth, the reason why the +name of fathers continued still in them, who, of fathers, were made +rulers; as also the ancient custom of governors to do as Melchizedec, and +being kings, to exercise the office of priests, which fathers did at the +first, grew perhaps by the same occasion. Howbeit, this is not the only +kind of regiment that has been received in the world. The inconveniences +of one kind have caused sundry others to be devised; so that in a word, +all public regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have risen +from the deliberate advice, consultation and composition between men, +judging it convenient and behoveful; there being no impossibility in +nature considered by itself, but that man might have lived without any +public regiment, Hooker's Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10.) + Sec. 75. Thus it was easy, and almost natural for children, by a +tacit, and scarce avoidable consent, to make way for the father's +authority and government. They had been accustomed in their childhood to +follow his direction, and to refer their little differences to him, and +when they were men, who fitter to rule them? Their little properties, and +less covetousness, seldom afforded greater controversies; and when any +should arise, where could they have a fitter umpire than he, by whose +care they had every one been sustained and brought up, and who had a +tenderness for them all? It is no wonder that they made no distinction +betwixt minority and full age; nor looked after one and twenty, or any +other age that might make them the free disposers of themselves and +fortunes, when they could have no desire to be out of their pupilage: the +government they had been under, during it, continued still to be more +their protection than restraint; and they could no where find a greater +security to their peace, liberties, and fortunes, than in the rule of a +father. + Sec. 76. Thus the natural fathers of families, by an insensible +change, became the politic monarchs of them too: and as they chanced to +live long, and leave able and worthy heirs, for several successions, or +otherwise; so they laid the foundations of hereditary, or elective +kingdoms, under several constitutions and mannors, according as chance, +contrivance, or occasions happened to mould them. But if princes have +their titles in their fathers right, and it be a sufficient proof of the +natural right of fathers to political authority, because they commonly +were those in whose hands we find, de facto, the exercise of government: +I say, if this argument be good, it will as strongly prove, that all +princes, nay princes only, ought to be priests, since it is as certain, +that in the beginning, the father of the family was priest, as that he +was ruler in his own houshold. + + + CHAP. VII. + + Of Political or Civil Society. + + Sec. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own +judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong +obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into +society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to +continue and enjoy it. The first society was between man and wife, which +gave beginning to that between parents and children; to which, in time, +that between master and servant came to be added: and though all these +might, and commonly did meet together, and make up but one family, +wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a +family; each of these, or all together, came short of political society, +as we shall see, if we consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of +each of these. + Sec. 78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man +and woman; and tho' it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in +one another's bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet +it draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of +interests too, as necessary not only to unite their care and affection, +but also necessary to their common off-spring, who have a right to be +nourished, and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for +themselves. + Sec. 79. For the end of conjunction, between male and female, being +not barely procreation, but the continuation of the species; this +conjunction betwixt male and female ought to last, even after +procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of +the young ones, who are to be sustained even after procreation, so long +as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones, who are +to be sustained by those that got them, till they are able to shift and +provide for themselves. This rule, which the infinite wise maker hath +set to the works of his hands, we find the inferior creatures steadily +obey. In those viviparous animals which feed on grass, the conjunction +between male and female lasts no longer than the very act of copulation; +because the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish the young, till +it be able to feed on grass, the male only begets, but concerns not +himself for the female or young, to whose sustenance he can contribute +nothing. But in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer: because the +dam not being able well to subsist herself, and nourish her numerous +off-spring by her own prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more +dangerous way of living, than by feeding on grass, the assistance of the +male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family, which cannot +subsist till they are able to prey for themselves, but by the joint care +of male and female. The same is to be observed in all birds, (except +some domestic ones, where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding, +and taking care of the young brood) whose young needing food in the nest, +the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are able to use their +wing, and provide for themselves. + Sec. 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reason, +why the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than +other creatures, viz. because the female is capable of conceiving, and +de facto is commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, +long before the former is out of a dependency for support on his parents +help, and able to shift for himself, and has all the assistance is due to +him from his parents: whereby the father, who is bound to take care for +those he hath begot, is under an obligation to continue in conjugal +society with the same woman longer than other creatures, whose young +being able to subsist of themselves, before the time of procreation +returns again, the conjugal bond dissolves of itself, and they are at +liberty, till Hymen at his usual anniversary season summons them again to +chuse new mates. Wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great +Creator, who having given to man foresight, and an ability to lay up for +the future, as well as to supply the present necessity, hath made it +necessary, that society of man and wife should be more lasting, than of +male and female amongst other creatures; that so their industry might be +encouraged, and their interest better united, to make provision and lay +up goods for their common issue, which uncertain mixture, or easy and +frequent solutions of conjugal society would mightily disturb. + Sec. 81. But tho' these are ties upon mankind, which make the +conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man, than the other species of +animals; yet it would give one reason to enquire, why this compact, where +procreation and education are secured, and inheritance taken care for, +may not be made determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or +upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there +being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, +that it should always be for life; I mean, to such as are under no +restraint of any positive law, which ordains all such contracts to be +perpetual. + Sec. 82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one common +concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes +have different wills too; it therefore being necessary that the last +determination, i. e. the rule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally +falls to the man's share, as the abler and the stronger. But this +reaching but to the things of their common interest and property, leaves +the wife in the full and free possession of what by contract is her +peculiar right, and gives the husband no more power over her life than +she has over his; the power of the husband being so far from that of an +absolute monarch, that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate +from him, where natural right, or their contract allows it; whether that +contract be made by themselves in the state of nature, or by the customs +or laws of the country they live in; and the children upon such +separation fall to the father or mother's lot, as such contract does +determine. + Sec. 83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under +politic government, as well as in the state of nature, the civil +magistrate cloth not abridge the right or power of either naturally +necessary to those ends, viz. procreation and mutual support and +assistance whilst they are together; but only decides any controversy +that may arise between man and wife about them. If it were otherwise, +and that absolute sovereignty and power of life and death naturally +belonged to the husband, and were necessary to the society between man +and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of those countries where the +husband is allowed no such absolute authority. But the ends of matrimony +requiring no such power in the husband, the condition of conjugal society +put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that state. Conjugal +society could subsist and attain its ends without it; nay, community of +goods, and the power over them, mutual assistance and maintenance, and +other things belonging to conjugal society, might be varied and regulated +by that contract which unites man and wife in that society, as far as may +consist with procreation and the bringing up of children till they could +shift for themselves; nothing being necessary to any society, that is not +necessary to the ends for which it is made. + Sec. 84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the distinct +rights and powers belonging respectively to them, I have treated of so +largely, in the foregoing chapter, that I shall not here need to say any +thing of it. And I think it is plain, that it is far different from a +politic society. + Sec. 85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but given to +those of far different condition; for a freeman makes himself a servant +to another, by selling him, for a certain time, the service he undertakes +to do, in exchange for wages he is to receive: and though this commonly +puts him into the family of his master, and under the ordinary discipline +thereof; yet it gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no +greater than what is contained in the contract between them. But there +is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who +being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature subjected +to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men +having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and +lost their estates; and being in the state of slavery, not capable of any +property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil +society; the chief end whereof is the preservation of property. + Sec. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all +these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, +united under the domestic rule of a family; which, what resemblance +soever it may have in its order, offices, and number too, with a little +common-wealth, yet is very far from it, both in its constitution, power +and end: or if it must be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the +absolute monarch in it, absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered +and short power, when it is plain, by what has been said before, that the +master of the family has a very distinct and differently limited power, +both as to time and extent, over those several persons that are in it; +for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family, and his +power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves in his +family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death over any of +them, and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as +he. And he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family, +who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how a +family, or any other society of men, differ from that which is properly +political society, we shall best see, by considering wherein political +society itself consists. + Sec. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect +freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges +of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the +world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that +is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of +other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in +others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, +in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires +it. But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having +in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, +punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and there only +is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this +natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all +cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law +established by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular +member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled +standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men +having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules, +decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that +society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which +any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as the +law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are +not, in political society together. Those who are united into one body, +and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with +authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are +in civil society one with another: but those who have no such common +appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, +where there is no other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as +I have before shewed it, the perfect state of nature. + Sec. 88. And thus the common-wealth comes by a power to set down what +punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think +worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that society, (which is +the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any +injury done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which +is the power of war and peace;) and all this for the preservation of the +property of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. But +though every man who has entered into civil society, and is become a +member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish +offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private +judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given up to the +legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has +given a right to the common-wealth to employ his force, for the execution +of the judgments of the common-wealth, whenever he shall be called to it; +which indeed are his own judgments, they being made by himself, or his +representative. And herein we have the original of the legislative and +executive power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws, how +far offences are to be punished, when committed within the common-wealth; +and also to determine, by occasional judgments founded on the present +circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be +vindicated; and in both these to employ all the force of all the members, +when there shall be need. + Sec. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into +one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of +nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a +political, or civil society. And this is done, where-ever any number of +men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one +body politic, under one supreme government; or else when any one joins +himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby +he authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, +to make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall require; to +the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is +due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a +common-wealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to +determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that may happen +to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or +magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men, +however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there +they are still in the state of nature. + Sec. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some +men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent +with civil society, and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for +the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those +inconveniencies of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from +every man's being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority, +to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, +or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the* society ought +to obey; where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to +appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those +persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every absolute +prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion. (*The public +power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society; +and the principal use of that power is, to give laws unto all that are +under it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless there be reason +shewed which may necessarily inforce, that the law of reason, or of God, +doth enjoin the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.) + Sec. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and +executive power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no +appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with +authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be +expected of any injury or inconviency, that may be suffered from the +prince, or by his order: so that such a man, however intitled, Czar, or +Grand Seignior, or how you please, is as much in the state of nature, +with all under his dominion, as he is with therest of mankind: for +where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and common judge +to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controversies of right +betwixt them, there they are still in the state of* nature, and under all +the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the +subject, or rather slave of an absolute prince: that whereas, in the +ordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and +according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his +property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only +no appeal, as those in society ought to have, but as if he were degraded +from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge +of, or to defend his right; and so is exposed to all the misery and +inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, who being in the +unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and armed +with power. + (*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e. +such as attend men in the state of nature, there was no way but only by +growing into composition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining +some kind of govemment public, and by yielding themselves subject +thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govem, by +them the peace, tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be +procured. Men always knew that where force and injury was offered, they +might be defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may seek +their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it +was not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be +withstood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon him +to determine his own right, and according to his own determination +proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards +himself, and them whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore that +strifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common +consent, all to be ordered by some, whom they should agree upon, without +which consent there would be no reason that one man should take upon him +to be lord or judge over another, Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.) + Sec. 92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men's blood, and +corrects the baseness of human nature, need read but the history of this, +or any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have +been insolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably +be much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be +found out to justify all that he shall do to his subjects, and the sword +presently silence all those that dare question it: for what the +protection of absolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their +countries it makes princes to be and to what a degree of happiness and +security it carries civil society, where this sort of government is grown +to perfection, he that will look into the late relation of Ceylon, may +easily see. + Sec. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments +of the world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to +decide any controversies, and restrain any violence that may happen +betwixt the subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one +thinks necessary, and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy +to society and mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether +this be from a true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we +owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no more +than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may +and naturally must do, keep those animals from hurting, or destroying one +another, who labour and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage; and +so are taken care of, not out of any love the master has for them, but +love of himself, and the profit they bring him: for if it be asked, what +security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the violence and +oppression of this absolute ruler? the very question can scarce be +borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves death only to ask +after safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must +be measures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and security: but as +for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such +circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is +right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or +injury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently +the voice of faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of +nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one, should +be under the restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the +liberty of the state of nature, increased with power, and made licentious +by impunity. This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take +care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but +are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions. + Sec. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people's +understandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they perceive, +that any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil +society which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against +any harm, they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in +the state of nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to +take care, as soon as they can, to have that safety and security in civil +society, for which it was first instituted, and for which only they +entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at first, (as shall be +shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this discourse) +some one good and excellent man having got a pre-eminency amongst the +rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue, as to a kind of +natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration of their +differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his hands, without any +other caution, but the assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom; +yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade us) +sacredness of customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing innocence of +the first ages began, had brought in successors of another stamp, the +people finding their properties not secure under the government, as then +it was, (whereas government has no other end but the preservation of * +property) could never be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil +society, till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men, +call them senate, parliament, or what you please. By which means every +single person became subject, equally with other the meanest men, to +those laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative, had +established; nor could any one, by his own authority; avoid the force of +the law, when once made; nor by any pretence of superiority plead +exemption, thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of any of his +dependents.** No man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of +it: for if any man may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on +earth, for redress or security against any harm he shall do; I ask, +whether he be not perfectly still in the state of nature, and so can be +no part or member of that civil society; unless any one will say, the +state of nature and civil society are one and the same thing, which I +have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm. + (*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once +appointed, it may be that nothing was then farther thought upon for the +manner of goveming, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, +which were to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very +inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy, did +indeed but increase the sore, which it should have cured. They saw, that +to live by one man's will, became the cause of all men's misery. This +constrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might see their duty +beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. Hooker's Eccl. +Pol. l. i. sect. 10.) + (**Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, cloth therefore +over-rule each several part of the same body. Hooker, ibid.) + + + CHAP. VIII. + + Of the Beginning of Political Societies. + + Sec. 95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and +independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the +political power of another, without his own consent. The only way +whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the +bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite +into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one +amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater +security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do, +because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they +were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have +so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby +presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority +have a right to act and conclude the rest. + Sec. 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every +individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one +body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and +determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being +only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that +which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move +that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of +the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one +body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united +into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent +to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in +assemblies, impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by +that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for +the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of +nature and reason, the power of the whole. + Sec. 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one +body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to +every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the +majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, +whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would signify +nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties +than he was in before in the state of nature. For what appearance would +there be of any compact? what new engagement if he were no farther tied +by any decrees of the society, than he himself thought fit, and did +actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty, as he +himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state of nature +hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinks +fit. + Sec. 98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be +received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing +but the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of +the whole: but such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had, if we +consider the infirmities of health, and avocations of business, which in +a number, though much less than that of a common-wealth, will necessarily +keep many away from the public assembly. To which if we add the variety +of opinions, and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably happen in +all collections of men, the coming into society upon such terms would be +only like Cato's coming into the theatre, only to go out again. Such a +constitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a shorter +duration, than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it +was born in: which cannot be supposed, till we can think, that rational +creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved: +for where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as +one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again. + Sec. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a +community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the +ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the community, +unless they expresly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And +this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, +which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals, +that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And thus that, which begins +and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the +consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and +incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which +did, or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world. + Sec. 100. To this I find two objections made. First, That there are +no instances to be found in story, of a company of men independent, and +equal one amongst another, that met together, and in this way began and +set up a government. + Secondly, It is impossible of right, that men should do so, because +all men being born under government, they are to submit to that, and are +not at liberty to begin a new one. + Sec. 101. To the first there is this to answer, That it is not at all +to be wondered, that history gives us but a very little account of men, +that lived together in the state of nature. The inconveniences of that +condition, and the love and want of society, no sooner brought any number +of them together, but they presently united and incorporated, if they +designed to continue together. And if we may not suppose men ever to +have been in the state of nature, because we hear not much of them in +such a state, we may as well suppose the armies of Salmanasser or Xerxes +were never children, because we hear little of them, till they were men, +and imbodied in armies. Government is every where antecedent to records, +and letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuation of +civil society has, by other more necessary arts, provided for their +safety, ease, and plenty: and then they begin to look after the history +of their founders, and search into their original, when they have +outlived the memory of it: for it is with commonwealths as with +particular persons, they are commonly ignorant of their own births and +infancies: and if they know any thing of their original, they are +beholden for it, to the accidental records that others have kept of it. +And those that we have, of the beginning of any polities in the world, +excepting that of the Jews, where God himself immediately interposed, and +which favours not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain +instances of such a beginning as I have mentioned, or at least have +manifest footsteps of it. + Sec. 102. He must shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter +of fact, when it agrees not with his hypothesis, who will not allow, that +shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact, when it agrees +not with his hypothesis, who will not allow, that the beginning of Rome +and Venice were by the uniting together of several men free and +independent one of another, amongst whom there was no natural superiority +or subjection. And if Josephus Acosta's word may be taken, he tells us, +that in many parts of America there was no government at all. There are +great and apparent conjectures, says he, that these men, speaking of +those of Peru, for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths, but +lived in troops, as they do this day in Florida, the Cheriquanas, those +of Brazil, and many other nations, which have no certain kings, but as +occasion is offered, in peace or war, they choose their captains as they +please, 1. i. c. 25. If it be said, that every man there was born +subject to his father, or the head of his family; that the subjection due +from a child to a father took not away his freedom of uniting into what +political society he thought fit, has been already proved. But be that +as it will, these men, it is evident, were actually free; and whatever +superiority some politicians now would place in any of them, they +themselves claimed it not, but by consent were all equal, till by the +same consent they set rulers over themselves. So that their politic +societies all began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of +men freely acting in the choice of their governors, and forms of +government. + Sec. 103. And I hope those who went away from Sparta with Palantus, +mentioned by Justin, 1. iii. c. 4. will be allowed to have been freemen +independent one of another, and to have set up a government over +themselves, by their own consent. Thus I have given several examples, +out of history, of people free and in the state of nature, that being met +together incorporated and began a commonwealth. And if the want of such +instances be an argument to prove that government were not, nor could not +be so begun, I suppose the contenders for paternal empire were better let +it alone, than urge it against natural liberty: for if they can give so +many instances, out of history, of governments begun upon paternal right, +I think (though at best an argument from what has been, to what should of +right be, has no great force) one might, without any great danger, yield +them the cause. But if I might advise them in the case, they would do +well not to search too much into the original of governments, as they +have begun de facto, lest they should find, at the foundation of most of +them, something very little favourable to the design they promote, and +such a power as they contend for. + Sec. 104. But to conclude, reason being plain on our side, that men +are naturally free, and the examples of history shewing, that the +governments of the world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning +laid on that foundation, and were made by the consent of the people; +there can be little room for doubt, either where the right is, or what +has been the opinion, or practice of mankind, about the first erecting of +governments. + Sec. 105. I will not deny, that if we look back as far as history +will direct us, towards the original of commonwealths, we shall generally +find them under the government and administration of one man. And I am +also apt to believe, that where a family was numerous enough to subsist +by itself, and continued entire together, without mixing with others, as +it often happens, where there is much land, and few people, the +government commonly began in the father: for the father having, by the +law of nature, the same power with every man else to punish, as he +thought fit, any offences against that law, might thereby punish his +transgressing children, even when they were men, and out of their +pupilage; and they were very likely to submit to his punishment, and all +join with him against the offender, in their turns, giving him thereby +power to execute his sentence against any transgression, and so in effect +make him the law-maker, and governor over all that remained in +conjunction with his family. He was fittest to be trusted; paternal +affection secured their property and interest under his care; and the +custom of obeying him, in their childhood, made it easier to submit to +him, rather than to any other. If therefore they must have one to rule +them, as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live +together; who so likely to be the man as he that was their common father; +unless negligence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body made him +unfit for it? But when either the father died, and left his next heir, +for want of age, wisdom, courage, or any other qualities, less fit for +rule; or where several families met, and consented to continue together; +there, it is not to be doubted, but they used their natural freedom, to +set up him, whom they judged the ablest, and most likely, to rule well +over them. Conformable hereunto we find the people of America, who +(living out of the reach of the conquering swords, and spreading +domination of the two great empires of Peru and Mexico) enjoyed their own +natural freedom, though, caeteris paribus, they commonly prefer the heir +of their deceased king; yet if they find him any way weak, or uncapable, +they pass him by, and set up the stoutest and bravest man for their +ruler. + Sec. 106. Thus, though looking back as far as records give us any +account of peopling the world, and the history of nations, we commonly +find the government to be in one hand; yet it destroys not that which I +affirm, viz. that the beginning of politic society depends upon the +consent of the individuals, to join into, and make one society; who, when +they are thus incorporated, might set up what form of government they +thought fit. But this having given occasion to men to mistake, and +think, that by nature government was monarchical, and belonged to the +father, it may not be amiss here to consider, why people in the beginning +generally pitched upon this form, which though perhaps the father's +pre-eminency might, in the first institution of some commonwealths, give +a rise to, and place in the beginning, the power in one hand; yet it is +plain that the reason, that continued the form of government in a single +person, was not any regard, or respect to paternal authority; since all +petty monarchies, that is, almost all monarchies, near their original, +have been commonly, at least upon occasion, elective. + Sec. 107. First then, in the beginning of things, the father's +government of the childhood of those sprung from him, having accustomed +them to the rule of one man, and taught them that where it was exercised +with care and skill, with affection and love to those under it, it was +sufficient to procure and preserve to men all the political happiness +they sought for in society. It was no wonder that they should pitch +upon, and naturally run into that form of government, which from their +infancy they had been all accustomed to; and which, by experience, they +had found both easy and safe. To which, if we add, that monarchy being +simple, and most obvious to men, whom neither experience had instructed +in forms of government, nor the ambition or insolence of empire had +taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative, or the +inconveniences of absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt to +lay claim to, and bring upon them, it was not at all strange, that they +should not much trouble themselves to think of methods of restraining any +exorbitances of those to whom they had given the authority over them, and +of balancing the power of government, by placing several parts of it in +different hands. They had neither felt the oppression of tyrannical +dominion, nor did the fashion of the age, nor their possessions, or way +of living, (which afforded little matter for covetousness or ambition) +give them any reason to apprehend or provide against it; and therefore it +is no wonder they put themselves into such a frame of government, as was +not only, as I said, most obvious and simple, but also best suited to +their present state and condition; which stood more in need of defence +against foreign invasions and injuries, than of multiplicity of laws. +The equality of a simple poor way of living, confining their desires +within the narrow bounds of each man's small property, made few +controversies, and so no need of many laws to decide them, or variety of +officers to superintend the process, or look after the execution of +justice, where there were but few trespasses, and few offenders. Since +then those, who like one another so well as to join into society, cannot +but be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together, and +some trust one in another; they could not but have greater apprehensions +of others, than of one another: and therefore their first care and +thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves against +foreign force. It was natural for them to put themselves under a frame +of government which might best serve to that end, and chuse the wisest +and bravest man to conduct them in their wars, and lead them out against +their enemies, and in this chiefly be their ruler. + Sec. 108. Thus we see, that the kings of the Indians in America, +which is still a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe, whilst the +inhabitants were too few for the country, and want of people and money +gave men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land, or contest +for wider extent of ground, are little more than generals of their +armies; and though they command absolutely in war, yet at home and in +time of peace they exercise very little dominion, and have but a very +moderate sovereignty, the resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily +either in the people, or in a council. Tho' the war itself, which admits +not of plurality of governors, naturally devolves the command into the +king's sole authority. + Sec. 109. And thus in Israel itself, the chief business of their +judges, and first kings, seems to have been to be captains in war, and +leaders of their armies; which (besides what is signified by going out +and in before the people, which was, to march forth to war, and home +again in the heads of their forces) appears plainly in the story of +lephtha. The Ammonites making war upon Israel, the Gileadites in fear +send to lephtha, a bastard of their family whom they had cast off, and +article with him, if he will assist them against the Ammonites, to make +him their ruler; which they do in these words, And the people made him +head and captain over them, Judg. xi, ii. which was, as it seems, all +one as to be judge. And he judged Israel, judg. xii. 7. that is, was +their captain-general six years. So when lotham upbraids the Shechemites +with the obligation they had to Gideon, who had been their judge and +ruler, he tells them, He fought for you, and adventured his life far, and +delivered you out of the hands of Midian, Judg. ix. 17. Nothing +mentioned of him but what he did as a general: and indeed that is all is +found in his history, or in any of the rest of the judges. And Abimelech +particularly is called king, though at most he was but their general. +And when, being weary of the ill conduct of Samuel's sons, the children +of Israel desired a king, like all the nations to judge them, and to go +out before them, and to fight their battles, I. Sam viii. 20. God +granting their desire, says to Samuel, I will send thee a man, and thou +shalt anoint him to be captain over my people Israel, that he may save my +people out of the hands of the Philistines, ix. 16. As if the only +business of a king had been to lead out their armies, and fight in their +defence; and accordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon +him, declares to Saul, that the Lord had anointed him to be captain over +his inheritance, x. 1. And therefore those, who after Saul's being +solemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at Mispah, were unwilling +to have him their king, made no other objection but this, How shall this +man save us? v. 27. as if they should have said, this man is unfit to be +our king, not having skill and conduct enough in war, to be able to +defend us. And when God resolved to transfer the government to David, it +is in these words, But now thy kingdom shall not continue: the Lord hath +sought him a man after his own heart, and the Lord hath commanded him to +be captain over his people, xiii. 14. As if the whole kingly authority +were nothing else but to be their general: and therefore the tribes who +had stuck to Saul's family, and opposed David's reign, when they came to +Hebron with terms of submission to him, they tell him, amongst other +arguments they had to submit to him as to their king, that he was in +effect their king in Saul's time, and therefore they had no reason but to +receive him as their king now. Also (say they) in time past, when Saul +was king over us, thou wast he that reddest out and broughtest in Israel, +and the Lord said unto thee, Thou shalt feed my people Israel, and thou +shalt be a captain over Israel. + Sec. 110. Thus, whether a family by degrees grew up into a +common-wealth, and the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder +son, every one in his turn growing up under it, tacitly submitted to it, +and the easiness and equality of it not offending any one, every one +acquiesced, till time seemed to have confirmed it, and settled a right of +succession by prescription: or whether several families, or the +descendants of several families, whom chance, neighbourhood, or business +brought together, uniting into society, the need of a general, whose +conduct might defend them against their enemies in war, and the great +confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age, +(such as are almost all those which begin governments, that ever come to +last in the world) gave men one of another, made the first beginners of +commonwealths generally put the rule into one man's hand, without any +other express limitation or restraint, but what the nature of the thing, +and the end of government required: which ever of those it was that at +first put the rule into the hands of a single person, certain it is no +body was intrusted with it but for the public good and safety, and to +those ends, in the infancies of commonwealths, those who had it commonly +used it. And unless they had done so, young societies could not have +subsisted; without such nursing fathers tender and careful of the public +weal, all governments would have sunk under the weakness and infirmities +of their infancy, and the prince and the people had soon perished +together. + Sec. 111. But though the golden age (before vain ambition, and amor +sceleratus habendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted men's minds into a +mistake of true power and honour) had more virtue, and consequently +better governors, as well as less vicious subjects, and there was then no +stretching prerogative on the one side, to oppress the people; nor +consequently on the other, any dispute about privilege, to lessen or +restrain the power of the magistrate, and so no contest betwixt rulers +and people about governors or goveernment: yet, when ambition and luxury +in future ages* would retain and increase the power, without doing the +business for which it was given; and aided by flattery, taught princes to +have distinct and separate interests from their people, men found it +necessary to examine more carefully the original and rights of +government; and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances, and +prevent the abuses of that power, which they having intrusted in +another's hands only for their own good, they found was made use of to +hurt them. (*At first, when some certain kind of regiment was once +approved, it may be nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner +of governing, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion which +were to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very +inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy, did +indeed but increase the sore which it should have cured. They saw, that +to live by one man's will, became the cause of all men's misery. This +constrained them to come unto laws wherein all men might see their duty +before hand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. Hooker's +Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.) Sec. 112. Thus we may see how probable it +is, that people that were naturally free, and by their own consent either +submitted to the government of their father, or united together out of +different families to make a government, should generally put the rule +into one man's hands, and chuse to be under the conduct of a single +person, without so much as by express conditions limiting or regulating +his power, which they thought safe enough in his honesty and prudence; +though they never dreamed of monarchy being lure Divino, which we never +heard of among mankind, till it was revealed to us by the divinity of +this last age; nor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to +dominion, or to be the foundation of all government. And thus much may +suffice to shew, that as far as we have any light from history, we have +reason to conclude, that all peaceful beginnings of government have been +laid in the consent of the people. I say peaceful, because I shall have +occasion in another place to speak of conquest, which some esteem a way +of beginning of governments. The other objection I find urged against +the beginning of polities, in the way I have mentioned, is this, viz. + Sec. 113. That all men being born under government, some or other, it +is impossible any of them should ever be free, and at liberty to unite +together, and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful +government. If this argument be good; I ask, how came so many lawful +monarchies into the world? for if any body, upon this supposition, can +shew me any one man in any age of the world free to begin a lawful +monarchy, I will be bound to shew him ten other free men at liberty, at +the same time to unite and begin a new government under a regal, or any +other form; it being demonstration, that if any one, born under the +dominion of another, may be so free as to have a right to command others +in a new and distinct empire, every one that is born under the dominion +of another may be so free too, and may become a ruler, or subject, of a +distinct separate government. And so by this their own principle, either +all men, however born, are free, or else there is but one lawful prince, +one lawful government in the world. And then they have nothing to do, +but barely to shew us which that is; which when they have done, I doubt +not but all mankind will easily agree to pay obedience to him. + Sec. 114. Though it be a sufficient answer to their objection, to +shew that it involves them in the same difficulties that it doth those +they use it against; yet I shall endeavour to discover the weakness of +this argument a little farther. All men, say they, are born under +government, and therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one. +Every one is born a subject to his father, or his prince, and is +therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection and allegiance. It is +plain mankind never owned nor considered any such natural subjection that +they were born in, to one or to the other that tied them, without their +own consents, to a subjection to them and their heirs. + Sec. 115. For there are no examples so frequent in history, both +sacred and profane, as those of men withdrawing themselves, and their +obedience, from the jurisdiction they were born under, and the family or +community they were bred up in, and setting up new governments in other +places; from whence sprang all that number of petty commonwealths in the +beginning of ages, and which always multiplied, as long as there was room +enough, till the stronger, or more fortunate, swallowed the weaker; and +those great ones again breaking to pieces, dissolved into lesser +dominions. All which are so many testimonies against paternal +sovereignty, and plainly prove, that it was not the natural right of the +father descending to his heirs, that made governments in the beginning, +since it was impossible, upon that ground, there should have been so many +little kingdoms; all must have been but only one universal monarchy, if +men had not been at liberty to separate themselves from their families, +and the government, be it what it will, that was set up in it, and go and +make distinct commonwealths and other governments, as they thought fit. + Sec. 116. This has been the practice of the world from its first +beginning to this day; nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of +mankind, that they are born under constituted and ancient polities, that +have established laws, and set forms of government, than if they were +born in the woods, amongst the unconfined inhabitants, that run loose in +them: for those, who would persuade us, that by being born under any +government, we are naturally subjects to it, and have no more any title +or pretence to the freedom of the state of nature, have no other reason +(bating that of paternal power, which we have already answered) to +produce for it, but only, because our fathers or progenitors passed away +their natural liberty, and thereby bound up themselves and their +posterity to a perpetual subjection to the government, which they +themselves submitted to. It is true, that whatever engagements or +promises any one has made for himself, he is under the obligation of +them, but cannot, by any compact whatsoever, bind his children or +posterity: for his son, when a man, being altogether as free as the +father, any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the +son, than it can of any body else: he may indeed annex such conditions to +the land, he enjoyed as a subject of any common-wealth, as may oblige his +son to be of that community, if he will enjoy those possessions which +were his father's; because that estate being his father's property, he +may dispose, or settle it, as he pleases. + Sec. 117. And this has generally given the occasion to mistake in +this matter; because commonwealths not permitting any part of their +dominions to be dismembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their +community, the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father, +but under the same terms his father did, by becoming a member of the +society; whereby he puts himself presently under the government he finds +there established, as much as any other subject of that common-wealth. +And thus the consent of freemen, born under government, which only makes +them members of it, being given separately in their turns, as each comes +to be of age, and not in a multitude together; people take no notice of +it, and thinking it not done at all, or not necessary, conclude they are +naturally subjects as they are men. + Sec. 118. But, it is plain, governments themselves understand it +otherwise; they claim no power over the son, because of that they had +over the father; nor look on children as being their subjects, by their +fathers being so. If a subject of England have a child, by an English +woman in France, whose subject is he? Not the king of England's; for he +must have leave to be admitted to the privileges of it: nor the king of +France's; for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away, and +breed him as he pleases? and who ever was judged as a traytor or +deserter, if he left, or warred against a country, for being barely born +in it of parents that were aliens there? It is plain then, by the +practice of governments themselves, as well as by the law of right +reason, that a child is born a subject of no country or government. He +is under his father's tuition and authority, till he comes to age of +discretion; and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he will +put himself under, what body politic he will unite himself to: for if an +Englishman's son, born in France, be at liberty, and may do so, it is +evident there is no tie upon him by his father's being a subject of this +kingdom; nor is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors. And why +then hath not his son, by the same reason, the same liberty, though he be +born any where else? Since the power that a father hath naturally over +his children, is the same, where-ever they be born, and the ties of +natural obligations, are not bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms +and commonwealths. + Sec. 119. Every man being, as has been shewed, naturally free, and +nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but +only his own consent; it is to be considered, what shall be understood to +be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent, to make him subject to +the laws of any government. There is a common distinction of an express +and a tacit consent, which will concern our present case. No body doubts +but an express consent, of any man entering into any society, makes him a +perfect member of that society, a subject of that government. The +difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and how +far it binds, i.e. how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, +and thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no expressions +of it at all. And to this I say, that every man, that hath any +possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any +government, cloth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth +obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such +enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land, +to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether +it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches +as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that +government. + Sec. 120. To understand this the better, it is fit to consider, that +every man, when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth, +he, by his uniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits to the +community, those possessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do not +already belong to any other government: for it would be a direct +contradiction, for any one to enter into society with others for the +securing and regulating of property; and yet to suppose his land, whose +property is to be regulated by the laws of the society, should be exempt +from the jurisdiction of that government, to which he himself, the +proprietor of the land, is a subject. By the same act therefore, whereby +any one unites his person, which was before free, to any common-wealth, +by the same he unites his possessions, which were before free, to it +also; and they become, both of them, person and possession, subject to +the government and dominion of that common-wealth, as long as it hath a +being. Whoever therefore, from thenceforth, by inheritance, purchase, +permission, or otherways, enjoys any part of the land, so annexed to, and +under the government of that common-wealth, must take it with the +condition it is under; that is, of submitting to the government of the +common-wealth, under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any +subject of it. + Sec. 121. But since the government has a direct jurisdiction only +over the land, and reaches the possessor of it, (before he has actually +incorporated himself in the society) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys +that; the obligation any one is under, by virtue of such enjoyment, to +submit to the government, begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that +whenever the owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit consent to the +government, will, by donation, sale, or otherwise, quit the said +possession, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other +common-wealth; or to agree with others to begin a new one, in vacuis +locis, in any part of the world, they can find free and unpossessed: +whereas he, that has once, by actual agreement, and any express +declaration, given his consent to be of any common-wealth, is perpetually +and indispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a subject to it, +and can never be again in the liberty of the state of nature; unless, by +any calamity, the government he was under comes to be dissolved; or else +by some public act cuts him off from being any longer a member of it. + Sec. 122. But submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, +and enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a +member of that society: this is only a local protection and homage due to +and from all those, who, not being in a state of war, come within the +territories belonging to any government, to all parts whereof the force +of its laws extends. But this no more makes a man a member of that +society, a perpetual subject of that common-wealth, than it would make a +man a subject to another, in whose family he found it convenient to abide +for some time; though, whilst he continued in it, he were obliged to +comply with the laws, and submit to the government he found there. And +thus we see, that foreigners, by living all their lives under another +government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, though they +are bound, even in conscience, to submit to its administration, as far +forth as any denison; yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members +of that common-wealth. Nothing can make any man so, but his actually +entering into it by positive engagement, and express promise and +compact. This is that, which I think, concerning the beginning of +political societies, and that consent which makes any one a member of any +common-wealth. + + + CHAP. IX. + + Of the Ends of Political Society and Government. + + Sec. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; +if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the +greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why +will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and +controul of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that +though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of +it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: +for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater +part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the +property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes +him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears +and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, +and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or +have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, +liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property. + Sec. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into +commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the +preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there +are many things wanting. + First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and +allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the +common measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the +law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet +men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of +study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the +application of it to their particular cases. + Sec. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and +indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according +to the established law: for every one in that state being both judge and +executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, +passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much +heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to +make them too remiss in other men's. + Sec. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to +back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution, +They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are +able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times +makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who +attempt it. + Sec. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the +state of nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, +are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom +find any number of men live any time together in this state. The +inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the irregular and +uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the +transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established +laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. +It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of +punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it +amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by +them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original +right and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of +the governments and societies themselves. + Sec. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of +innocent delights, a man has two powers. + The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of +himself, and others within the permission of the law of nature: by which +law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one +community, make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. And +were it not for the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there +would be no need of any other; no necessity that men should separate from +this great and natural community, and by positive agreements combine into +smaller and divided associations. + The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to +punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, +when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular politic +society, and incorporates into any common-wealth, separate from the rest +of mankind. + Sec. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for +the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be +regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation +of himself, and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the +society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature. + Sec. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and +engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution +of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to +assist the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall +require: for being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many +conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the +same community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to +part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, +as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require; which +is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the society +do the like. + Sec. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the +equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, +into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the +legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only +with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his +liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change +his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or +legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, +than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by +providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the +state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative +or supreme power of any common-wealth, is bound to govern by established +standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by +extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide +controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at +home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress +foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. +And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and +public good of the people. + + + CHAP. X. + + Of the Forms of a Common-wealth. + + Sec. 132. THE majority having, as has been shewed, upon men's first +uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, +may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to +time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing; and +then the form of the government is a perfect democracy: or else may put +the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their +heirs or successors; and then it is an oligarchy: or else into the hands +of one man, and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an +hereditary monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon his death the +power only of nominating a successor to return to them; an elective +monarchy. And so accordingly of these the community may make compounded +and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the +legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more +persons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the supreme +power to revert to them again; when it is so reverted, the community may +dispose of it again anew into what hands they please, and so constitute a +new form of government: for the form of government depending upon the +placing the supreme power, which is the legislative, it being impossible +to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior, or any +but the supreme make laws, according as the power of making laws is +placed, such is the form of the common-wealth. + Sec. 133. By common-wealth, I must be understood all along to mean, +not a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent +community, which the Latines signified by the word civitas, to which the +word which best answers in our language, is common-wealth, and most +properly expresses such a society of men, which community or city in +English does not; for there may be subordinate communities in a +government; and city amongst us has a quite different notion from +common-wealth: and therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use +the word common-wealth in that sense, in which I find it used by king +James the first; and I take it to be its genuine signification; which if +any body dislike, I consent with him to change it for a better. + + + CHAP. XI. + + Of the Extent of the Legislative Power. + + Sec. 134. THE great end of men's entering into society, being the +enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great +instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society; +the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the +establishing of the legislative power; as the first and fundamental +natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the +preservation of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public +good) of every person in it. This legislative is not only the supreme +power of the common-wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where +the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body else, in +what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the +force and obligation of a law, which has not its sanction from that +legislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without this +the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a +law, * the consent of the society, over whom no body can have a power to +make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received from them; +and therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one +can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and +is directed by those laws which it enacts: nor can any oaths to any +foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power, discharge +any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative, acting +pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the +laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to +imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society, +which is not the supreme. + (*The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies +of men, belonging so properly unto the same intire societies, that for +any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the +same of himself, and not by express commission immediately and personally +received from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their +consent, upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere +tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not +made so. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10. Of this point therefore we +are to note, that sith men naturally have no full and perfect power to +command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our +consent, we could in such sort be at no man's commandment living. And to +be commanded we do consent, when that society, whereof we be a part, hath +at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the like +universal agreement. + Laws therefore human, of what kind so ever, are available by consent. +Ibid.) + Sec. 135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, +whether it be always in being, or only by intervals, though it be the +supreme power in every common-wealth; yet, + First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the +lives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of +every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which +is legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of +nature before they entered into society, and gave up to the community: +for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; +and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any +other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of +another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the +arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no +arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but +only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of +himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he cloth, or can give up to +the common-wealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the +legislative can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost +bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It is a +power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never* +have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the +subjects. The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but +only in many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known +penalties annexed to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the law of +nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as +others. The rules that they make for other men's actions, must, as well +as their own and other men's actions, be conformable to the law of +nature, i.e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the +fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human +sanction can be good, or valid against it. + (*Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one a +natural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; +the other an order, expresly or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner +of their union in living together: the latter is that which we call the +law of a common-weal, the very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof +are by law animated, held together, and set on work in such actions as +the common good requireth. Laws politic, ordained for external order and +regiment amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless +presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and +averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, +unless presuming man to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better +than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to +frame his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common +good, for which societies are instituted. Unless they do this, they are +not perfect. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.) + Sec. 136. Secondly,* The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot +assume to its self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but +is bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by +promulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges: for the law of +nature being unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of +men, they who through passion or interest shall miscite, or misapply it, +cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no +established judge: and so it serves not, as it ought, to determine the +rights, and fence the properties of those that live under it, especially +where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and +that in his own case: and he that has right on his side, having +ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend +himself from injuries, or to punish delinquents. To avoid these +inconveniences, which disorder men's propperties in the state of nature, +men unite into societies, that they may have the united strength of the +whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have +standing rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To +this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society +which they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into +such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be +governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will +still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the state of nature. + (*Human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must +direct, howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules to +be measured by, which rules are two, the law of God, and the law of +nature; so that laws human must be made according to the general laws of +nature, and without contradiction to any positive law of scripture, +otherwise they are ill made. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. iii. sect. 9. + To constrain men to any thing inconvenient cloth seem unreasonable. +Ibid. l. i. sect. 10.) + Sec. 137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled +standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and +government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature +for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, +liberties and fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to +secure their peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should +intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an +absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put a force +into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon +them. This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state +of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the +injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, +whether invaded by a single man, or many in combination. Whereas by +supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power +and will of a legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him, +to make a prey of them when he pleases; he being in a much worse +condition, who is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the +command of 100,000, than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of +100,000 single men; no body being secure, that his will, who has such a +command, is better than that of other men, though his force be 100,000 +times stronger. And therefore, whatever form the common-wealth is under, +the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not +by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions: for then mankind +will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature, if they +shall have armed one, or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, +to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of +their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment unknown +wills, without having any measures set down which may guide and justify +their actions: for all the power the government has, being only for the +good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so +it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws; that both +the people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits +of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds, and not be +tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to such +purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have known, and own not +willingly. + Sec. 138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any +part of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of +property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into +society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should +have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that, by +entering into society, which was the end for which they entered into it; +too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men therefore in society +having property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of +the community are their's, that no body hath a right to take their +substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent: without +this they have no property at all; for I have truly no property in that, +which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my +consent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative +power of any common-wealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the +estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at +pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the +legislative consists, wholly or in part, in assemblies which are +variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the assembly, are +subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the rest. +But in governments, where the legislative is in one lasting assembly +always in being, or in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there is +danger still, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest +from the rest of the community; and so will be apt to increase their own +riches and power, by taking what they think fit from the people: for a +man's property is not at all secure, tho' there be good and equitable +laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects, if he +who commands those subjects have power to take from any private man, what +part he pleases of his property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks +good. + Sec. 139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as +I have before shewed, intrusted with this condition, and for this end, +that men might have and secure their properties; the prince, or senate, +however it may have power to make laws, for the regulating of property +between the subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a power to +take to themselves the whole, or any part of the subjects property, +without their own consent: for this would be in effect to leave them no +property at all. And to let us see, that even absolute power, where it +is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited by +that reason, and confined to those ends, which required it in some cases +to be absolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of +martial discipline: for the preservation of the army, and in it of the +whole common-wealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of +every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the +most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see, that neither the +serjeant, that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a +cannon, or stand in a breach, where he is almost sure to perish, can +command that soldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general, +that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or for not obeying +the most desperate orders, can yet, with all his absolute power of life +and death, dispose of one farthing of that soldier's estate, or seize one +jot of his goods; whom yet he can command any thing, and hang for the +least disobedience; because such a blind obedience is necessary to that +end, for which the commander has his power, viz. the preservation of the +rest; but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do with it. + Sec. 140. It is true, governments cannot be supported without great +charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection, +should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. +But still it must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the +majority, giving it either by themselves, or their representatives chosen +by them: for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the +people, by his own authority, and without such consent of the people, he +thereby invades the fundamental law of property, and subverts the end of +government: for what property have I in that, which another may by right +take, when he pleases, to himself? + Sec. 141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of +making laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from +the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people +alone can appoint the form of the common-wealth, which is by constituting +the legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when +the people have said, We will submit to rules, and be governed by laws +made by such men, and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall +make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but such as +are enacted by those whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws +for them. The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by +a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what +that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to +make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their +authority of making laws, and place it in other hands. + Sec. 142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them +by the society, and the law of God and nature, have set to the +legislative power of every common-wealth, in all forms of government. + First, They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be +varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for +the favourite at court, and the country man at plough. + Secondly, These laws also ought to be designed for no other end +ultimately, but the good of the people. + Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, +without the consent of the people, given by themselves, or their +deputies. And this properly concerns only such governments where the +legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not +reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to time +chosen by themselves. + Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of +making laws to any body else, or place it any where, but where the people +have. + + + CHAP. XII. + + Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative + Power of the Common-wealth. + + Sec. 143. THE legislative power is that, which has a right to direct +how the force of the common-wealth shall be employed for preserving the +community and the members of it. But because those laws which are +constantly to be executed, and whose force is always to continue, may be +made in a little time; therefore there is no need, that the legislative +should be always in being, not having always business to do. And because +it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, +for the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in +their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves +from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its +making, and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come +to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to +the end of society and government: therefore in wellordered +commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered, as it ought, +the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons, who duly +assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make +laws, which when they have done, being separated again, they are +themselves subject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near +tie upon them, to take care, that they make them for the public good. + Sec. 144. But because the laws, that are at once, and in a short time +made, have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution, +or an attendance thereunto; therefore it is necessary there should be a +power always in being, which should see to the execution of the laws that +are made, and remain in force. And thus the legislative and executive +power come often to be separated. + Sec. 145. There is another power in every common-wealth, which one +may call natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man +naturally had before he entered into society: for though in a +common-wealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference +to one another, and as such as governed by the laws of the society; yet +in reference to the rest of mankind, they make one body, which is, as +every member of it before was, still in the state of nature with the rest +of mankind. Hence it is, that the controversies that happen between any +man of the society with those that are out of it, are managed by the +public; and an injury done to a member of their body, engages the whole +in the reparation of it. So that under this consideration, the whole +community is one body in the state of nature, in respect of all other +states or persons out of its community. + Sec. 146. This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues +and alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities +without the common-wealth, and may be called federative, if any one +pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the name. + Sec. 147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be +really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the +municipal laws of the society within its self, upon all that are parts of +it; the other the management of the security and interest of the public +without, with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet +they are always almost united. And though this federative power in the +well or ill management of it be of great moment to the common-wealth, yet +it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive +laws, than the executive; and so must necessarily be left to the prudence +and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public +good: for the laws that concern subjects one amongst another, being to +direct their actions, may well enough precede them. But what is to be +done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon their actions, and +the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the +prudence of those, who have this power committed to them, to be managed +by the best of their skill, for the advantage of the common-wealth. + Sec. 148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of +every community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to +be separated, and placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct +persons: for both of them requiring the force of the society for their +exercise, it is almost impracticable to place the force of the +common-wealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands; or that the +executive and federative power should be placed in persons, that might +act separately, whereby the force of the public would be under different +commands: which would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and +ruin. + + + C H A P. XIII. + + Of the Subordination of the Powers of the + Common-wealth. + + Sec. 149. THOUGH in a constituted common-wealth, standing upon its +own basis, and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for +the preservation of the community, there can be but one supreme power, +which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be +subordinate, yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for +certain ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove +or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to +the trust reposed in them: for all power given with trust for the +attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is +manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be +forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, +who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and +security. And thus the community perpetually retains a supreme power of +saving themselves from the attempts and designs of any body, even of +their legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish, or so wicked, as to +lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the +subject: for no man or society of men, having a power to deliver up their +preservation, or consequently the means of it, to the absolute will and +arbitrary dominion of another; when ever any one shall go about to bring +them into such a slavish condition, they will always have a right to +preserve, what they have not a power to part with; and to rid themselves +of those, who invade this fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of +self-preservation, for which they entered into society. And thus the +community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power, but +not as considered under any form of government, because this power of the +people can never take place till the government be dissolved. + Sec. 150. In all cases, whilst the government subsists, the +legislative is the supreme power: for what can give laws to another, must +needs be superior to him; and since the legislative is no otherwise +legislative of the society, but by the right it has to make laws for all +the parts, and for every member of the society, prescribing rules to +their actions, and giving power of execution, where they are +transgressed, the legislative must needs be the supreme, and all other +powers, in any members or parts of the society, derived from and +subordinate to it. + Sec. 151. In some commonwealths, where the legislative is not always +in being, and the executive is vested in a single person, who has also a +share in the legislative; there that single person in a very tolerable +sense may also be called supreme: not that he has in himself all the +supreme power, which is that of law-making; but because he has in him the +supreme execution, from whom all inferior magistrates derive all their +several subordinate powers, or at least the greatest part of them: having +also no legislative superior to him, there being no law to be made +without his consent, which cannot be expected should ever subject him to +the other part of the legislative, he is properly enough in this sense +supreme. But yet it is to be observed, that tho' oaths of allegiance and +fealty are taken to him, it is not to him as supreme legislator, but as +supreme executor of the law, made by a joint power of him with others; +allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law, which when he +violates, he has no right to obedience, nor can claim it otherwise than +as the public person vested with the power of the law, and so is to be +considered as the image, phantom, or representative of the common-wealth, +acted by the will of the society, declared in its laws; and thus he has +no will, no power, but that of the law. But when he quits this +representation, this public will, and acts by his own private will, he +degrades himself, and is but a single private person without power, and +without will, that has any right to obedience; the members owing no +obedience but to the public will of the society. + Sec. 152. The executive power, placed any where but in a person that +has also a share in the legislative, is visibly subordinate and +accountable to it, and may be at pleasure changed and displaced; so that +it is not the supreme executive power, that is exempt from subordination, +but the supreme executive power vested in one, who having a share in the +legislative, has no distinct superior legislative to be subordinate and +accountable to, farther than he himself shall join and consent; so that +he is no more subordinate than he himself shall think fit, which one may +certainly conclude will be but very little. Of other ministerial and +subordinate powers in a commonwealth, we need not speak, they being so +multiplied with infinite variety, in the different customs and +constitutions of distinct commonwealths, that it is impossible to give a +particular account of them all. Only thus much, which is necessary to +our present purpose, we may take notice of concerning them, that they +have no manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is by positive +grant and commission delegated to them, and are all of them accountable +to some other power in the common-wealth. + Sec. 153. It is not necessary, no, nor so much as convenient, that +the legislative should be always in being; but absolutely necessary that +the executive power should, because there is not always need of new laws +to be made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made. When +the legislative hath put the execution of the laws, they make, into other +hands, they have a power still to resume it out of those hands, when they +find cause, and to punish for any maladministration against the laws. +The same holds also in regard of the federative power, that and the +executive being both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative, +which, as has been shewed, in a constituted common-wealth is the +supreme. The legislative also in this case being supposed to consist of +several persons, (for if it be a single person, it cannot but be always +in being, and so will, as supreme, naturally have the supreme executive +power, together with the legislative) may assemble, and exercise their +legislature, at the times that either their original constitution, or +their own adjournment, appoints, or when they please; if neither of these +hath appointed any time, or there be no other way prescribed to convoke +them: for the supreme power being placed in them by the people, it is +always in them, and they may exercise it when they please, unless by +their original constitution they are limited to certain seasons, or by an +act of their supreme power they have adjourned to a certain time; and +when that time comes, they have a right to assemble and act again. + Sec. 154. If the legislative, or any part of it, be made up of +representatives chosen for that time by the people, which afterwards +return into the ordinary state of subjects, and have no share in the +legislature but upon a new choice, this power of chusing must also be +exercised by the people, either at certain appointed seasons, or else +when they are summoned to it; and in this latter case the power of +convoking the legislative is ordinarily placed in the executive, and has +one of these two limitations in respect of time: that either the original +constitution requires their assembling and acting at certain intervals, +and then the executive power does nothing but ministerially issue +directions for their electing and assembling, according to due forms; or +else it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections, when the +occasions or exigencies of the public require the amendment of old, or +making of new laws, or the redress or prevention of any inconveniencies, +that lie on, or threaten the people. + Sec. 155. It may be demanded here, What if the executive power, being +possessed of the force of the common-wealth, shall make use of that force +to hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative, when the original +constitution, or the public exigencies require it? I say, using force +upon the people without authority, and contrary to the trust put in him +that does so, is a state of war with the people, who have a right to +reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their power: for having +erected a legislative, with an intent they should exercise the power of +making laws, either at certain set times, or when there is need of it, +when they are hindered by any force from what is so necessary to the +society, and wherein the safety and preservation of the people consists, +the people have a right to remove it by force. In all states and +conditions, the true remedy of force without authority, is to oppose +force to it. The use of force without authority, always puts him that +uses it into a state of war, as the aggressor, and renders him liable to +be treated accordingly. + Sec. 156. The power of assembling and dismissing the legislative, +placed in the executive, gives not the executive a superiority over it, +but is a fiduciary trust placed in him, for the safety of the people, in +a case where the uncertainty and variableness of human affairs could not +bear a steady fixed rule: for it not being possible, that the first +framers of the government should, by any foresight, be so much masters of +future events, as to be able to prefix so just periods of return and +duration to the assemblies of the legislative, in all times to come, that +might exactly answer all the exigencies of the common-wealth; the best +remedy could be found for this defect, was to trust this to the prudence +of one who was always to be present, and whose business it was to watch +over the public good. Constant frequent meetings of the legislative, and +long continuations of their assemblies, without necessary occasion, could +not but be burdensome to the people, and must necessarily in time produce +more dangerous inconveniencies, and yet the quick turn of affairs might +be sometimes such as to need their present help: any delay of their +convening might endanger the public; and sometimes too their business +might be so great, that the limited time of their sitting might be too +short for their work, and rob the public of that benefit which could be +had only from their mature deliberation. What then could be done in this +case to prevent the community from being exposed some time or other to +eminent hazard, on one side or the other, by fixed intervals and periods, +set to the meeting and acting of the legislative, but to intrust it to +the prudence of some, who being present, and acquainted with the state of +public affairs, might make use of this prerogative for the public good? +and where else could this be so well placed as in his hands, who was +intrusted with the execution of the laws for the same end? Thus supposing +the regulation of times for the assembling and sitting of the +legislative, not settled by the original constitution, it naturally fell +into the hands of the executive, not as an arbitrary power depending on +his good pleasure, but with this trust always to have it exercised only +for the public weal, as the occurrences of times and change of affairs +might require. Whether settled periods of their convening, or a liberty +left to the prince for convoking the legislative, or perhaps a mixture of +both, hath the least inconvenience attending it, it is not my business +here to inquire, but only to shew, that though the executive power may +have the prerogative of convoking and dissolving such conventions of the +legislative, yet it is not thereby superior to it. + Sec. 157. Things of this world are in so constant a flux, that +nothing remains long in the same state. Thus people, riches, trade, +power, change their stations, flourishing mighty cities come to ruin, and +prove in times neglected desolate corners, whilst other unfrequented +places grow into populous countries, filled with wealth and inhabitants. +But things not always changing equally, and private interest often +keeping up customs and privileges, when the reasons of them are ceased, +it often comes to pass, that in governments, where part of the +legislative consists of representatives chosen by the people, that in +tract of time this representation becomes very unequal and +disproportionate to the reasons it was at first established upon. To +what gross absurdities the following of custom, when reason has left it, +may lead, we may be satisfied, when we see the bare name of a town, of +which there remains not so much as the ruins, where scarce so much +housing as a sheepcote, or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be +found, sends as many representatives to the grand assembly of law-makers, +as a whole county numerous in people, and powerful in riches. This +strangers stand amazed at, and every one must confess needs a remedy; +tho' most think it hard to find one, because the constitution of the +legislative being the original and supreme act of the society, antecedent +to all positive laws in it, and depending wholly on the people, no +inferior power can alter it. And therefore the people, when the +legislative is once constituted, having, in such a government as we have +been speaking of, no power to act as long as the government stands; this +inconvenience is thought incapable of a remedy. + Sec. 158. Salus populi suprema lex, is certainly so just and +fundamental a rule, that he, who sincerely follows it, cannot dangerously +err. If therefore the executive, who has the power of convoking the +legislative, observing rather the true proportion, than fashion of +representation, regulates, not by old custom, but true reason, the number +of members, in all places that have a right to be distinctly represented, +which no part of the people however incorporated can pretend to, but in +proportion to the assistance which it affords to the public, it cannot be +judged to have set up a new legislative, but to have restored the old and +true one, and to have rectified the disorders which succession of time +had insensibly, as well as inevitably introduced: For it being the +interest as well as intention of the people, to have a fair and equal +representative; whoever brings it nearest to that, is an undoubted friend +to, and establisher of the government, and cannot miss the consent and +approbation of the community; prerogative being nothing but a power, in +the hands of the prince, to provide for the public good, in such cases, +which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences, certain and +unalterable laws could not safely direct; whatsoever shall be done +manifestly for the good of the people, and the establishing the +government upon its true foundations, is, and always will be, just +prerogative, The power of erecting new corporations, and therewith new +representatives, carries with it a supposition, that in time the measures +of representation might vary, and those places have a just right to be +represented which before had none; and by the same reason, those cease to +have a right, and be too inconsiderable for such a privilege, which +before had it. 'Tis not a change from the present state, which perhaps +corruption or decay has introduced, that makes an inroad upon the +government, but the tendency of it to injure or oppress the people, and +to set up one part or party, with a distinction from, and an unequal +subjection of the rest. Whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of +advantage to the society, and people in general, upon just and lasting +measures, will always, when done, justify itself; and whenever the people +shall chuse their representatives upon just and undeniably equal +measures, suitable to the original frame of the government, it cannot be +doubted to be the will and act of the society, whoever permitted or +caused them so to do. + + + CHAP. XIV. + + Of PREROGATIVE. + + Sec. 159. WHERE the legislative and executive power are in distinct +hands, (as they are in all moderated monarchies, and well-framed +governments) there the good of the society requires, that several things +should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power: for +the legislators not being able to foresee, and provide by laws, for all +that may be useful to the community, the executor of the laws having the +power in his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make use +of it for the good of the society, in many cases, where the municipal law +has given no direction, till the legislative can conveniently be +assembled to provide for it. Many things there are, which the law can by +no means provide for; and those must necessarily be left to the +discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands, to be +ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require: nay, it is +fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the +executive power, or rather to this fundamental law of nature and +government, viz. That as much as may be, all the members of the society +are to be preserved: for since many accidents may happen, wherein a +strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm; (as not to pull +down an innocent man's house to stop the fire, when the next to it is +burning) and a man may come sometimes within the reach of the law, which +makes no distinction of persons, by an action that may deserve reward and +pardon; 'tis fit the ruler should have a power, in many cases, to +mitigate the severity of the law, and pardon some offenders: for the end +of government being the preservation of all, as much as may be, even the +guilty are to be spared, where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent. + Sec. 160. This power to act according to discretion, for the public +good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, +is that which is called prerogative: for since in some governments the +lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and +so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it +is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all accidents +and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will +do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigour, on all +occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore +there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of +choice which the laws do not prescribe. + Sec. 161. This power, whilst employed for the benefit of the +community, and suitably to the trust and ends of the government, is +undoubted prerogative, and never is questioned: for the people are very +seldom or never scrupulous or nice in the point; they are far from +examining prerogative, whilst it is in any tolerable degree employed for +the use it was meant, that is, for the good of the people, and not +manifestly against it: but if there comes to be a question between the +executive power and the people, about a thing claimed as a prerogative; +the tendency of the exercise of such prerogative to the good or hurt of +the people, will easily decide that question. + Sec. 162. It is easy to conceive, that in the infancy of governments, +when commonwealths differed little from families in number of people, +they differed from them too but little in number of laws: and the +governors, being as the fathers of them, watching over them for their +good, the government was almost all prerogative. A few established laws +served the turn, and the discretion and care of the ruler supplied the +rest. But when mistake or flattery prevailed with weak princes to make +use of this power for private ends of their own, and not for the public +good, the people were fain by express laws to get prerogative determined +in those points wherein they found disadvantage from it: and thus +declared limitations of prerogative were by the people found necessary in +cases which they and their ancestors had left, in the utmost latitude, to +the wisdom of those princes who made no other but a right use of it, that +is, for the good of their people. + Sec. 163. And therefore they have a very wrong notion of government, +who say, that the people have encroached upon the prerogative, when they +have got any part of it to be defined by positive laws: for in so doing +they have not pulled from the prince any thing that of right belonged to +him, but only declared, that that power which they indefinitely left in +his or his ancestors hands, to be exercised for their good, was not a +thing which they intended him when he used it otherwise: for the end of +government being the good of the community, whatsoever alterations are +made in it, tending to that end, cannot be an encroachment upon any body, +since no body in government can have a right tending to any other end: +and those only are encroachments which prejudice or hinder the public +good. Those who say otherwise, speak as if the prince had a distinct and +separate interest from the good of the community, and was not made for +it; the root and source from which spring almost all those evils and +disorders which happen in kingly governments. And indeed, if that be so, +the people under his government are not a society of rational creatures, +entered into a community for their mutual good; they are not such as have +set rulers over themselves, to guard, and promote that good; but are to +be looked on as an herd of inferior creatures under the dominion of a +master, who keeps them and works them for his own pleasure or profit. If +men were so void of reason, and brutish, as to enter into society upon +such terms, prerogative might indeed be, what some men would have it, an +arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the people. + Sec. 164. But since a rational creature cannot be supposed, when +free, to put himself into subjection to another, for his own harm; +(though, where he finds a good and wise ruler, he may not perhaps think +it either necessary or useful to set precise bounds to his power in all +things) prerogative can be nothing but the people's permitting their +rulers to do several things, of their own free choice, where the law was +silent, and sometimes too against the direct letter of the law, for the +public good; and their acquiescing in it when so done: for as a good +prince, who is mindful of the trust put into his hands, and careful of +the good of his people, cannot have too much prerogative, that is, power +to do good; so a weak and ill prince, who would claim that power which +his predecessors exercised without the direction of the law, as a +prerogative belonging to him by right of his office, which he may +exercise at his pleasure, to make or promote an interest distinct from +that of the public, gives the people an occasion to claim their right, +and limit that power, which, whilst it was exercised for their good, they +were content should be tacitly allowed. + Sec. 165. And therefore he that will look into the history of +England, will find, that prerogative was always largest in the hands of +our wisest and best princes; because the people, observing the whole +tendency of their actions to be the public good, contested not what was +done without law to that end: or, if any human frailty or mistake (for +princes are but men, made as others) appeared in some small declinations +from that end; yet 'twas visible, the main of their conduct tended to +nothing but the care of the public. The people therefore, finding reason +to be satisfied with these princes, whenever they acted without, or +contrary to the letter of the law, acquiesced in what they did, and, +without the least complaint, let them inlarge their prerogative as they +pleased, judging rightly, that they did nothing herein to the prejudice +of their laws, since they acted conformable to the foundation and end of +all laws, the public good. + Sec. 166. Such god-like princes indeed had some title to arbitrary +power by that argument, that would prove absolute monarchy the best +government, as that which God himself governs the universe by; because +such kings partake of his wisdom and goodness. Upon this is founded that +saying, That the reigns of good princes have been always most dangerous +to the liberties of their people: for when their successors, managing the +government with different thoughts, would draw the actions of those good +rulers into precedent, and make them the standard of their prerogative, +as if what had been done only for the good of the people was a right in +them to do, for the harm of the people, if they so pleased; it has often +occasioned contest, and sometimes public disorders, before the people +could recover their original right, and get that to be declared not to be +prerogative, which truly was never so; since it is impossible that any +body in the society should ever have a right to do the people harm; +though it be very possible, and reasonable, that the people should not go +about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings, or rulers, who +themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good: for +prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a +rule. + Sec. 167. The power of calling parliaments in England, as to precise +time, place, and duration, is certainly a prerogative of the king, but +still with this trust, that it shall be made use of for the good of the +nation, as the exigencies of the times, and variety of occasions, shall +require: for it being impossible to foresee which should always be the +fittest place for them to assemble in, and what the best season; the +choice of these was left with the executive power, as might be most +subservient to the public good, and best suit the ends of parliaments. + Sec. 168. The old question will be asked in this matter of +prerogative, But who shall be judge when this power is made a right use +of one answer: between an executive power in being, with such a +prerogative, and a legislative that depends upon his will for their +convening, there can be no judge on earth; as there can be none between +the legislative and the people, should either the executive, or the +legislative, when they have got the power in their hands, design, or go +about to enslave or destroy them. The people have no other remedy in +this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to +appeal to heaven: for the rulers, in such attempts, exercising a power +the people never put into their hands, (who can never be supposed to +consent that any body should rule over them for their harm) do that which +they have not a right to do. And where the body of the people, or any +single man, is deprived of their right, or is under the exercise of a +power without right, and have no appeal on earth, then they have a +liberty to appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the cause of sufficient +moment. And therefore, though the people cannot be judge, so as to have, +by the constitution of that society, any superior power, to determine and +give effective sentence in the case; yet they have, by a law antecedent +and paramount to all positive laws of men, reserved that ultimate +determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind, where there +lies no appeal on earth, viz. to judge, whether they have just cause to +make their appeal to heaven. And this judgment they cannot part with, it +being out of a man's power so to submit himself to another, as to give +him a liberty to destroy him; God and nature never allowing a man so to +abandon himself, as to neglect his own preservation: and since he cannot +take away his own life, neither can he give another power to take it. +Nor let any one think, this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder; for +this operates not, till the inconveniency is so great, that the majority +feel it, and are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it amended. +But this the executive power, or wise princes, never need come in the +danger of: and it is the thing, of all others, they have most need to +avoid, as of all others the most perilous. + + + CHAP. XV. + + Of Paternal, Political, and Despotical Power, + considered together. + + Sec. 169. THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately +before, yet the great mistakes of late about government, having, as I +suppose, arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another, +it may not, perhaps, be amiss to consider them here together. + Sec. 170. First, then, Paternal or parental power is nothing but that +which parents have over their children, to govern them for the children's +good, till they come to the use of reason, or a state of knowledge, +wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule, whether it +be the law of nature, or the municipal law of their country, they are to +govern themselves by: capable, I say, to know it, as well as several +others, who live as freemen under that law. The affection and tenderness +which God hath planted in the breast of parents towards their children, +makes it evident, that this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary +government, but only for the help, instruction, and preservation of their +offspring. But happen it as it will, there is, as I have proved, no +reason why it should be thought to extend to life and death, at any time, +over their children, more than over any body else; neither can there be +any pretence why this parental power should keep the child, when grown to +a man, in subjection to the will of his parents, any farther than having +received life and education from his parents, obliges him to respect, +honour, gratitude, assistance and support, all his life, to both father +and mother. And thus, 'tis true, the paternal is a natural government, +but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that +which is political. The power of the father doth not reach at all to the +property of the child, which is only in his own disposing. + Sec. 171. Secondly, Political power is that power, which every man +having in the state of nature, has given up into the hands of the +society, and therein to the governors, whom the society hath set over +itself, with this express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for +their good, and the preservation of their property: now this power, which +every man has in the state of nature, and which he parts with to the +society in all such cases where the society can secure him, is to use +such means, for the preserving of his own property, as he thinks good, +and nature allows him; and to punish the breach of the law of nature in +others, so as (according to the best of his reason) may most conduce to +the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind. So that the end +and measure of this power, when in every man's hands in the state of +nature, being the preservation of all of his society, that is, all +mankind in general, it can have no other end or measure, when in the +hands of the magistrate, but to preserve the members of that society in +their lives, liberties, and possessions; and so cannot be an absolute, +arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as +possible to be preserved; but a power to make laws, and annex such +penalties to them, as may tend to the preservation of the whole, by +cutting off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt, that they +threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful. And +this power has its original only from compact and agreement, and the +mutual consent of those who make up the community. + Sec. 172. Thirdly, Despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power +one man has over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleases. +This is a power, which neither nature gives, for it has made no such +distinction between one man and another; nor compact can convey: for man +not having such an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give another +man such a power over it; but it is the effect only of forfeiture, which +the aggressor makes of his own life, when he puts himself into the state +of war with another: for having quitted reason, which God hath given to +be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bond whereby human kind +is united into one fellowship and society; and having renounced the way +of peace which that teaches, and made use of the force of war, to compass +his unjust ends upon another, where he has no right; and so revolting +from his own kind to that of beasts, by making force, which is their's, +to be his rule of right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the +injured person, and the rest of mankind, that will join with him in the +execution of justice, as any other wild beast, or noxious brute, with +whom mankind can have neither society nor security*. And thus captives, +taken in a just and lawful war, and such only, are subject to a +despotical power, which, as it arises not from compact, so neither is it +capable of any, but is the state of war continued: for what compact can +be made with a man that is not master of his own life? what condition can +he perform? and if he be once allowed to be master of his own life, the +despotical, arbitrary power of his master ceases. He that is master of +himself, and his own life, has a right too to the means of preserving it; +so that as soon as compact enters, slavery ceases, and he so far quits +his absolute power, and puts an end to the state of war, who enters into +conditions with his captive. (*Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, +has it thus, Noxious brute that is destructive to their being.) + Sec. 173. Nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal power to +parents for the benefit of their children during their minority, to +supply their want of ability, and understanding how to manage their +property. (By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to +mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods.) +Voluntary agreement gives the second, viz. political power to governors +for the benefit of their subjects, to secure them in the possession and +use of their properties. And forfeiture gives the third despotical power +to lords for their own benefit, over those who are stripped of all +property. + Sec. 174. He, that shall consider the distinct rise and extent, and +the different ends of these several powers, will plainly see, that +paternal power comes as far short of that of the magistrate, as +despotical exceeds it; and that absolute dominion, however placed, is so +far from being one kind of civil society, that it is as inconsistent with +it, as slavery is with property. Paternal power is only where minority +makes the child incapable to manage his property; political, where men +have property in their own disposal; and despotical, over such as have no +property at all. + + + CHAP. XVI. + + Of CONQUEST. + + Sec. 175. THOUGH governments can originally have no other rise than +that before mentioned, nor polities be founded on any thing but the +consent of the people; yet such have been the disorders ambition has +filled the world with, that in the noise of war, which makes so great a +part of the history of mankind, this consent is little taken notice of: +and therefore many have mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the +people, and reckon conquest as one of the originals of government. But +conquest is as far from setting up any government, as demolishing an +house is from building a new one in the place. Indeed, it often makes +way for a new frame of a common-wealth, by destroying the former; but, +without the consent of the people, can never erect a new one. + Sec. 176. That the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war +with another, and unjustly invades another man's right, can, by such an +unjust war, never come to have a right over the conquered, will be easily +agreed by all men, who will not think, that robbers and pyrates have a +right of empire over whomsoever they have force enough to master; or that +men are bound by promises, which unlawful force extorts from them. +Should a robber break into my house, and with a dagger at my throat make +me seal deeds to convey my estate to him, would this give him any title? +Just such a title, by his sword, has an unjust conqueror, who forces me +into submission. The injury and the crime is equal, whether committed by +the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain. The title of the offender, +and the number of his followers, make no difference in the offence, +unless it be to aggravate it. The only difference is, great robbers +punish little ones, to keep them in their obedience; but the great ones +are rewarded with laurels and triumphs, because they are too big for the +weak hands of justice in this world, and have the power in their own +possession, which should punish offenders. What is my remedy against a +robber, that so broke into my house? Appeal to the law for justice. But +perhaps justice is denied, or I am crippled and cannot stir, robbed and +have not the means to do it. If God has taken away all means of seeking +remedy, there is nothing left but patience. But my son, when able, may +seek the relief of the law, which I am denied: he or his son may renew +his appeal, till he recover his right. But the conquered, or their +children, have no court, no arbitrator on earth to appeal to. Then they +may appeal, as lephtha did, to heaven, and repeat their appeal till they +have recovered the native right of their ancestors, which was, to have +such a legislative over them, as the majority should approve, and freely +acquiesce in. If it be objected, This would cause endless trouble; I +answer, no more than justice does, where she lies open to all that appeal +to her. He that troubles his neighbour without a cause, is punished for +it by the justice of the court he appeals to: and he that appeals to +heaven must be sure he has right on his side; and a right too that is +worth the trouble and cost of the appeal, as he will answer at a tribunal +that cannot be deceived, and will be sure to retribute to every one +according to the mischiefs he hath created to his fellow subjects; that +is, any part of mankind: from whence it is plain, that he that conquers +in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection and +obedience of the conquered. + Sec. 177. But supposing victory favours the right side, let us +consider a conqueror in a lawful war, and see what power he gets, and +over whom. + First, It is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that +conquered with him. They that fought on his side cannot suffer by the +conquest, but must at least be as much freemen as they were before. And +most commonly they serve upon terms, and on condition to share with their +leader, and enjoy a part of the spoil, and other advantages that attend +the conquering sword; or at least have a part of the subdued country +bestowed upon them. And the conquering people are not, I hope, to be +slaves by conquest, and wear their laurels only to shew they are +sacrifices to their leaders triumph. They that found absolute monarchy +upon the title of the sword, make their heroes, who are the founders of +such monarchies, arrant Draw-can-sirs, and forget they had any officers +and soldiers that fought on their side in the battles they won, or +assisted them in the subduing, or shared in possessing, the countries +they mastered. We are told by some, that the English monarchy is founded +in the Norman conquest, and that our princes have thereby a title to +absolute dominion: which if it were true, (as by the history it appears +otherwise) and that William had a right to make war on this island; yet +his dominion by conquest could reach no farther than to the Saxons and +Britons, that were then inhabitants of this country. The Normans that +came with him, and helped to conquer, and all descended from them, are +freemen, and no subjects by conquest; let that give what dominion it +will. And if 1, or any body else, shall claim freedom, as derived from +them, it will be very hard to prove the contrary: and it is plain, the +law, that has made no distinction between the one and the other, intends +not there should be any difference in their freedom or privileges. + Sec. 178. But supposing, which seldom happens, that the conquerors +and conquered never incorporate into one people, under the same laws and +freedom; let us see next what power a lawful conqueror has over the +subdued: and that I say is purely despotical. He has an absolute power +over the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them; but not +over the lives or fortunes of those who engaged not in the war, nor over +the possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it. + Sec. 179. Secondly, I say then the conqueror gets no power but only +over those who have actually assisted, concurred, or consented to that +unjust force that is used against him: for the people having given to +their governors no power to do an unjust thing, such as is to make an +unjust war, (for they never had such a power in themselves) they ought +not to be charged as guilty of the violence and unjustice that is +committed in an unjust war, any farther than they actually abet it; no +more than they are to be thought guilty of any violence or oppression +their governors should use upon the people themselves, or any part of +their fellow subjects, they having empowered them no more to the one than +to the other. Conquerors, it is true, seldom trouble themselves to make +the distinction, but they willingly permit the confusion of war to sweep +all together: but yet this alters not the right; for the conquerors power +over the lives of the conquered, being only because they have used force +to do, or maintain an injustice, he can have that power only over those +who have concurred in that force; all the rest are innocent; and he has +no more title over the people of that country, who have done him no +injury, and so have made no forfeiture of their lives, than he has over +any other, who, without any injuries or provocations, have lived upon +fair terms with him. + Sec. 180. Thirdly, The power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes +in a just war, is perfectly despotical: he has an absolute power over the +lives of those, who, by putting themselves in a state of war, have +forfeited them; but he has not thereby a right and title to their +possessions. This I doubt not, but at first sight will seem a strange +doctrine, it being so quite contrary to the practice of the world; there +being nothing more familiar in speaking of the dominion of countries, +than to say such an one conquered it; as if conquest, without any more +ado, conveyed a right of possession. But when we consider, that the +practice of the strong and powerful, how universal soever it may be, is +seldom the rule of right, however it be one part of the subjection of the +conquered, not to argue against the conditions cut out to them by the +conquering sword. + Sec. 181. Though in all war there be usually a complication of force +and damage, and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate, when he +uses force against the persons of those he makes war upon; yet it is the +use of force only that puts a man into the state of war: for whether by +force he begins the injury, or else having quietly, and by fraud, done +the injury, he refuses to make reparation, and by force maintains it, +(which is the same thing, as at first to have done it by force) it is the +unjust use of force that makes the war: for he that breaks open my house, +and violently turns me out of doors; or having peaceably got in, by force +keeps me out, does in effect the same thing; supposing we are in such a +state, that we have no common judge on earth, whom I may appeal to, and +to whom we are both obliged to submit: for of such I am now speaking. It +is the unjust use of force then, that puts a man into the state of war +with another; and thereby he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of +his life: for quitting reason, which is the rule given between man and +man, and using force, the way of beasts, he becomes liable to be +destroyed by him he uses force against, as any savage ravenous beast, +that is dangerous to his being. + Sec. 182. But because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of +the children, and they may be rational and peaceable, notwithstanding the +brutishness and injustice of the father; the father, by his miscarriages +and violence, can forfeit but his own life, but involves not his children +in his guilt or destruction. His goods, which nature, that willeth the +preservation of all mankind as much as is possible, hath made to belong +to the children to keep them from perishing, do still continue to belong +to his children: for supposing them not to have joined in the war, either +thro' infancy, absence, or choice, they have done nothing to forfeit +them: nor has the conqueror any right to take them away, by the bare +title of having subdued him that by force attempted his destruction; +though perhaps he may have some right to them, to repair the damages he +has sustained by the war, and the defence of his own right; which how far +it reaches to the possessions of the conquered, we shall see by and by. +So that he that by conquest has a right over a man's person to destroy +him if he pleases, has not thereby a right over his estate to possess and +enjoy it: for it is the brutal force the aggressor has used, that gives +his adversary a right to take away his life, and destroy him if he +pleases, as a noxious creature; but it is damage sustained that alone +gives him title to another man's goods: for though I may kill a thief +that sets on me in the highway, yet I may not (which seems less) take +away his money, and let him go: this would be robbery on my side. His +force, and the state of war he put himself in, made him forfeit his life, +but gave me no title to his goods. The right then of conquest extends +only to the lives of those who joined in the war, not to their estates, +but only in order to make reparation for the damages received, and the +charges of the war, and that too with reservation of the right of the +innocent wife and children. + Sec. 183. Let the conqueror have as much justice on his side, as +could be supposed, he has no right to seize more than the vanquished +could forfeit: his life is at the victor's mercy; and his service and +goods he may appropriate, to make himself reparation; but he cannot take +the goods of his wife and children; they too had a title to the goods he +enjoyed, and their shares in the estate he possessed: for example, I in +the state of nature (and all commonwealths are in the state of nature one +with another) have injured another man, and refusing to give +satisfaction, it comes to a state of war, wherein my defending by force +what I had gotten unjustly, makes me the aggressor. I am conquered: my +life, it is true, as forfeit, is at mercy, but not my wife's and +children's. They made not the war, nor assisted in it. I could not +forfeit their lives; they were not mine to forfeit. My wife had a share +in my estate; that neither could I forfeit. And my children also, being +born of me, had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance. +Here then is the case: the conqueror has a title to reparation for +damages received, and the children have a title to their father's estate +for their subsistence: for as to the wife's share, whether her own +labour, or compact, gave her a title to it, it is plain, her husband +could not forfeit what was her's. What must be done in the case? I +answer; the fundamental law of nature being, that all, as much as may be, +should be preserved, it follows, that if there be not enough fully to +satisfy both, viz, for the conqueror's losses, and children's +maintenance, he that hath, and to spare, must remit something of his full +satisfaction, and give way to the pressing and preferable title of those +who are in danger to perish without it. + Sec. 184. But supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be +made up to the conqueror, to the utmost farthing; and that the children +of the vanquished, spoiled of all their father's goods, are to be left to +starve and perish; yet the satisfying of what shall, on this score, be +due to the conqueror, will scarce give him a title to any country he +shall conquer: for the damages of war can scarce amount to the value of +any considerable tract of land, in any part of the world, where all the +land is possessed, and none lies waste. And if I have not taken away the +conqueror's land, which, being vanquished, it is impossible I should; +scarce any other spoil I have done him can amount to the value of mine, +supposing it equally cultivated, and of an extent any way coming near +what I had overrun of his. The destruction of a year's product or two +(for it seldom reaches four or five) is the utmost spoil that usually can +be done: for as to money, and such riches and treasure taken away, these +are none of nature's goods, they have but a fantastical imaginary value: +nature has put no such upon them: they are of no more account by her +standard, than the wampompeke of the Americans to an European prince, or +the silver money of Europe would have been formerly to an American. And +five years product is not worth the perpetual inheritance of land, where +all is possessed, and none remains waste, to be taken up by him that is +disseized: which will be easily granted, if one do but take away the +imaginary value of money, the disproportion being more than between five +and five hundred; though, at the same time, half a year's product is more +worth than the inheritance, where there being more land than the +inhabitants possess and make use of, any one has liberty to make use of +the waste: but there conquerors take little care to possess themselves of +the lands of the vanquished, No damage therefore, that men in the state +of nature (as all princes and governments are in reference to one +another) suffer from one another, can give a conqueror power to +dispossess the posterity of the vanquished, and turn them out of that +inheritance, which ought to be the possession of them and their +descendants to all generations. The conqueror indeed will be apt to +think himself master: and it is the very condition of the subdued not to +be able to dispute their right. But if that be all, it gives no other +title than what bare force gives to the stronger over the weaker: and, by +this reason, he that is strongest will have a right to whatever he +pleases to seize on. + Sec. 185. Over those then that joined with him in the war, and over +those of the subdued country that opposed him not, and the posterity even +of those that did, the conqueror, even in a just war, hath, by his +conquest, no right of dominion: they are free from any subjection to him, +and if their former government be dissolved, they are at liberty to begin +and erect another to themselves. + Sec. 186. The conqueror, it is true, usually, by the force he has +over them, compels them, with a sword at their breasts, to stoop to his +conditions, and submit to such a government as he pleases to afford them; +but the enquiry is, what right he has to do so? If it be said, they +submit by their own consent, then this allows their own consent to be +necessary to give the conqueror a title to rule over them. It remains +only to be considered, whether promises extorted by force, without right, +can be thought consent, and how far they bind. To which I shall say, +they bind not at all; because whatsoever another gets from me by force, I +still retain the right of, and he is obliged presently to restore. He +that forces my horse from me, ought presently to restore him, and I have +still a right to retake him. By the same reason, he that forced a +promise from me, ought presently to restore it, i.e. quit me of the +obligation of it; or I may resume it myself, i.e. chuse whether I will +perform it: for the law of nature laying an obligation on me only by the +rules she prescribes, cannot oblige me by the violation of her rules: +such is the extorting any thing from me by force. Nor does it at all +alter the case to say, I gave my promise, no more than it excuses the +force, and passes the right, when I put my hand in my pocket, and deliver +my purse myself to a thief, who demands it with a pistol at my breast. + Sec. 187. From all which it follows, that the government of a +conqueror, imposed by force on the subdued, against whom he had no right +of war, or who joined not in the war against him, where he had right, has +no obligation upon them. + Sec. 188. But let us suppose, that all the men of that community, +being all members of the same body politic, may be taken to have joined +in that unjust war wherein they are subdued, and so their lives are at +the mercy of the conqueror. + Sec. 189. 1 say, this concerns not their children who are in their +minority: for since a father hath not, in himself, a power over the life +or liberty of his child, no act of his can possibly forfeit it. So that +the children, whatever may have happened to the fathers, are freemen, and +the absolute power of the conqueror reaches no farther than the persons +of the men that were subdued by him, and dies with them: and should he +govern them as slaves, subjected to his absolute arbitrary power, he has +no such right of dominion over their children. He can have no power over +them but by their own consent, whatever he may drive them to say or do; +and he has no lawfull authority, whilst force, and not choice, compels +them to submission. + Sec. 190. Every man is born with a double right: first, a right of +freedom to his person, which no other man has a power over, but the free +disposal of it lies in himself. Secondly, a right, before any other man, +to inherit with his brethren his father's goods. + Sec. 191. By the first of these, a man is naturally free from +subjection to any government, tho' he be born in a place under its +jurisdiction; but if he disclaim the lawful government of the country he +was born in, he must also quit the right that belonged to him by the laws +of it, and the possessions there descending to him from his ancestors, if +it were a government made by their consent. + Sec. 192. By the second, the inhabitants of any country, who are +descended, and derive a title to their estates from those who are +subdued, and had a government forced upon them against their free +consents, retain a right to the possession of their ancestors, though +they consent not freely to the government, whose hard conditions were by +force imposed on the possessors of that country: for the first conqueror +never having had a title to the land of that country, the people who are +the descendants of, or claim under those who were forced to submit to the +yoke of a government by constraint, have always a right to shake it off, +and free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny which the sword hath +brought in upon them, till their rulers put them under such a frame of +government as they willingly and of choice consent to. Who doubts but +the Grecian Christians, descendants of the ancient possessors of that +country, may justly cast off the Turkish yoke, which they have so long +groaned under, whenever they have an opportunity to do it? For no +government can have a right to obedience from a people who have not +freely consented to it; which they can never be supposed to do, till +either they are put in a full state of liberty to chuse their government +and governors, or at least till they have such standing laws, to which +they have by themselves or their representatives given their free +consent, and also till they are allowed their due property, which is so +to be proprietors of what they have, that no body can take away any part +of it without their own consent, without which, men under any government +are not in the state of freemen, but are direct slaves under the force of +war. + Sec. 193. But granting that the conqueror in a just war has a right +to the estates, as well as power over the persons, of the conquered; +which, it is plain, he hath not: nothing of absolute power will follow +from hence, in the continuance of the government; because the descendants +of these being all freemen, if he grants them estates and possessions to +inhabit his country, (without which it would be worth nothing) whatsoever +he grants them, they have, so far as it is granted, property in. The +nature whereof is, that without a man's own consent it cannot be taken +from him, + Sec. 194. Their persons are free by a native right, and their +properties, be they more or less, are their own, and at their own +dispose, and not at his; or else it is no property. Supposing the +conqueror gives to one man a thousand acres, to him and his heirs for +ever; to another he lets a thousand acres for his life, under the rent of +501. or 5001. per arm. has not the one of these a right to his +thousand acres for ever, and the other, during his life, paying the said +rent? and hath not the tenant for life a property in all that he gets +over and above his rent, by his labour and industry during the said term, +supposing it be double the rent? Can any one say, the king, or conqueror, +after his grant, may by his power of conqueror take away all, or part of +the land from the heirs of one, or from the other during his life, he +paying the rent? or can he take away from either the goods or money they +have got upon the said land, at his pleasure? If he can, then all free +and voluntary contracts cease, and are void in the world; there needs +nothing to dissolve them at any time, but power enough: and all the +grants and promises of men in power are but mockery and collusion: for +can there be any thing more ridiculous than to say, I give you and your's +this for ever, and that in the surest and most solemn way of conveyance +can be devised; and yet it is to be understood, that I have right, if I +please, to take it away from you again to morrow? + Sec. 195. 1 will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the +laws of their country; but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the +laws of God and nature. No body, no power, can exempt them from the +obligations of that eternal law. Those are so great, and so strong, in +the case of promises, that omnipotency itself can be tied by them. +Grants, promises, and oaths, are bonds that hold the Almighty: whatever +some flatterers say to princes of the world, who all together, with all +their people joined to them, are, in comparison of the great God, but as +a drop of the bucket, or a dust on the balance, inconsiderable, nothing! + Sec. 196. The short of the case in conquest is this: the conqueror, +if he have a just cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all, +that actually aided, and concurred in the war against him, and a right to +make up his damage and cost out of their labour and estates, so he injure +not the right of any other. Over the rest of the people, if there were +any that consented not to the war, and over the children of the captives +themselves, or the possessions of either, he has no power; and so can +have, by virtue of conquest, no lawful title himself to dominion over +them, or derive it to his posterity; but is an aggressor, if he attempts +upon their properties, and thereby puts himself in a state of war against +them, and has no better a right of principality, he, nor any of his +successors, than Hingar, or Hubba, the Danes, had here in England; or +Spartacus, had he conquered Italy, would have had; which is to have their +yoke cast off, as soon as God shall give those under their subjection +courage and opportunity to do it. Thus, notwithstanding whatever title +the kings of Assyria had over Judah, by the sword, God assisted Hezekiah +to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire. And the lord was +with Hezekiah, and he prospered; wherefore he went forth, and he rebelled +against the king of Assyria, and served him not, 2 Kings xviii. 7. +Whence it is plain, that shaking off a power, which force, and not right, +hath set over any one, though it hath the name of rebellion, yet is no +offence before God, but is that which he allows and countenances, though +even promises and covenants, when obtained by force, have intervened: for +it is very probable, to any one that reads the story of Ahaz and Hezekiah +attentively, that the Assyrians subdued Ahaz, and deposed him, and made +Hezekiah king in his father's lifetime; and that Hezekiah by agreement +had done him homage, and paid him tribute all this time. + + + CHAP. XVII. + + Of USURPATION. + + Sec. 197. AS conquest may be called a foreign usurpation, so +usurpation is a kind of domestic conquest, with this difference, that an +usurper can never have right on his side, it being no usurpation, but +where one is got into the possession of what another has right to. This, +so far as it is usurpation, is a change only of persons, but not of the +forms and rules of the government: for if the usurper extend his power +beyond what of right belonged to the lawful princes, or governors of the +commonwealth, it is tyranny added to usurpation. + Sec. 198. In all lawful governments, the designation of the persons, +who are to bear rule, is as natural and necessary a part as the form of +the government itself, and is that which had its establishment originally +from the people; the anarchy being much alike, to have no form of +government at all; or to agree, that it shall be monarchical, but to +appoint no way to design the person that shall have the power, and be the +monarch. Hence all commonwealths, with the form of government +established, have rules also of appointing those who are to have any +share in the public authority, and settled methods of conveying the right +to them: for the anarchy is much alike, to have no form of government at +all; or to agree that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to +know or design the person that shall have the power, and be the monarch. +Whoever gets into the exercise of any part of the power, by other ways +than what the laws of the community have prescribed, hath no right to be +obeyed, though the form of the commonwealth be still preserved; since he +is not the person the laws have appointed, and consequently not the +person the people have consented to. Nor can such an usurper, or any +deriving from him, ever have a title, till the people are both at liberty +to consent, and have actually consented to allow, and confirm in him the +power he hath till then usurped. + + + CHAP. XVIII. + + Of TYRANNY. + + Sec. 199. AS usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath +a right to; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no +body can have a right to. And this is making use of the power any one +has in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his +own private separate advantage. When the governor, however intitled, +makes not the law, but his will, the rule; and his commands and actions +are not directed to the preservation of the properties of his people, but +the satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any other +irregular passion. + Sec. 200. If one can doubt this to be truth, or reason, because it +comes from the obscure hand of a subject, I hope the authority of a king +will make it pass with him. King James the first, in his speech to the +parliament, 1603, tells them thus, I will ever prefer the weal of the +public, and of the whole commonwealth, in making of good laws and +constitutions, to any particular and private ends of mine; thinking ever +the wealth and weal of the commonwealth to be my greatest weal and +worldly felicity; a point wherein a lawful king doth directly differ from +a tyrant: for I do acknowledge, that the special and greatest point of +difference that is between a rightful king and an usurping tyrant, is +this, that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his kingdom +and people are only ordained for satisfaction of his desires and +unreasonable appetites, the righteous and just king doth by the contrary +acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and +property of his people, And again, in his speech to the parliament, 1609, +he hath these words, The king binds himself by a double oath, to the +observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom; tacitly, as by being +a king, and so bound to protect as well the people, as the laws of his +kingdom; and expressly, by his oath at his coronation, so as every just +king, in a settled kingdom, is bound to observe that paction made to his +people, by his laws, in framing his government agreeable thereunto, +according to that paction which God made with Noah after the deluge. +Hereafter, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and +winter, and day and night, shall not cease while the earth remaineth. +And therefore a king governing in a settled kingdom, leaves to be a king, +and degenerates into a tyrant, as soon as he leaves off to rule according +to his laws, And a little after, Therefore all kings that are not +tyrants, or perjured, will be glad to bound themselves within the limits +of their laws; and they that persuade them the contrary, are vipers, and +pests both against them and the commonwealth. Thus that learned king, +who well understood the notion of things, makes the difference betwixt a +king and a tyrant to consist only in this, that one makes the laws the +bounds of his power, and the good of the public, the end of his +government; the other makes all give way to his own will and appetite. + Sec. 201. It is a mistake, to think this fault is proper only to +monarchies; other forms of government are liable to it, as well as that: +for wherever the power, that is put in any hands for the government of +the people, and the preservation of their properties, is applied to other +ends, and made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the +arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have it; there it +presently becomes tyranny, whether those that thus use it are one or +many. Thus we read of the thirty tyrants at Athens, as well as one at +Syracuse; and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri at Rome was +nothing better. + Sec. 202. Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be +transgressed to another's harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the +power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his +command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, +ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be +opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another. +This is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. He that hath authority +to seize my person in the street, may be opposed as a thief and a robber, +if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ, +notwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant, and such a legal +authority, as will impower him to arrest me abroad. And why this should +not hold in the highest, as well as in the most inferior magistrate, I +would gladly be informed. Is it reasonable, that the eldest brother, +because he has the greatest part of his father's estate, should thereby +have a right to take away any of his younger brothers portions? or that a +rich man, who possessed a whole country, should from thence have a right +to seize, when he pleased, the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour? +The being rightfully possessed of great power and riches, exceedingly +beyond the greatest part of the sons of Adam, is so far from being an +excuse, much less a reason, for rapine and oppression, which the +endamaging another without authority is, that it is a great aggravation +of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a +great, than in a petty officer; no more justifiable in a king than a +constable; but is so much the worse in him, in that he has more trust put +in him, has already a much greater share than the rest of his brethren, +and is supposed, from the advantages of his education, employment, and +counsellors, to be more knowing in the measures of right and wrong. + Sec. 203. May the commands then of a prince be opposed? may he be +resisted as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but +imagine he has not right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all +polities, and, instead of government and order, leave nothing but anarchy +and confusion. + Sec. 204. To this I answer, that force is to be opposed to nothing, +but to unjust and unlawful force; whoever makes any opposition in any +other case, draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and man; +and so no such danger or confusion will follow, as is often suggested: +for, + Sec. 205. First, As, in some countries, the person of the prince by +the law is sacred; and so, whatever he commands or does, his person is +still free from all question or violence, not liable to force, or any +judicial censure or condemnation. But yet opposition may be made to the +illegal acts of any inferior officer, or other commissioned by him; +unless he will, by actually putting himself into a state of war with his +people, dissolve the government, and leave them to that defence which +belongs to every one in the state of nature: for of such things who can +tell what the end will be? and a neighbour kingdom has shewed the world +an odd example. In all other cases the sacredness of the person exempts +him from all inconveniencies, whereby he is secure, whilst the government +stands, from all violence and harm whatsoever; than which there cannot be +a wiser constitution: for the harm he can do in his own person not being +likely to happen often, nor to extend itself far; nor being able by his +single strength to subvert the laws, nor oppress the body of the people, +should any prince have so much weakness, and ill nature as to be willing +to do it, the inconveniency of some particular mischiefs, that may happen +sometimes, when a heady prince comes to the throne, are well recompensed +by the peace of the public, and security of the government, in the person +of the chief magistrate, thus set out of the reach of danger: it being +safer for the body, that some few private men should be sometimes in +danger to suffer, than that the head of the republic should be easily, +and upon slight occasions, exposed. + Sec. 206. Secondly, But this privilege, belonging only to the king's +person, hinders not, but they may be questioned, opposed, and resisted, +who use unjust force, though they pretend a commission from him, which +the law authorizes not; as is plain in the case of him that has the +king's writ to arrest a man, which is a full commission from the king; +and yet he that has it cannot break open a man's house to do it, nor +execute this command of the king upon certain days, nor in certain +places, though this commission have no such exception in it; but they are +the limitations of the law, which if any one transgress, the king's +commission excuses him not: for the king's authority being given him only +by the law, he cannot impower any one to act against the law, or justify +him, by his commission, in so doing; the commission, or command of any +magistrate, where he has no authority, being as void and insignificant, +as that of any private man; the difference between the one and the other, +being that the magistrate has some authority so far, and to such ends, +and the private man has none at all: for it is not the commission, but +the authority, that gives the right of acting; and against the laws there +can be no authority. But, notwithstanding such resistance, the king's +person and authority are still both secured, and so no danger to governor +or government, + Sec. 207. Thirdly, Supposing a government wherein the person of the +chief magistrate is not thus sacred; yet this doctrine of the lawfulness +of resisting all unlawful exercises of his power, will not upon every +slight occasion indanger him, or imbroil the government: for where the +injured party may be relieved, and his damages repaired by appeal to the +law, there can be no pretence for force, which is only to be used where a +man is intercepted from appealing to the law: for nothing is to be +accounted hostile force, but where it leaves not the remedy of such an +appeal; and it is such force alone, that puts him that uses it into a +state of war, and makes it lawful to resist him. A man with a sword in +his hand demands my purse in the high-way, when perhaps I have not twelve +pence in my pocket: this man I may lawfully kill. To another I deliver +100 pounds to hold only whilst I alight, which he refuses to restore me, when +I am got up again, but draws his sword to defend the possession of it by +force, if I endeavour to retake it. The mischief this man does me is a +hundred, or possibly a thousand times more than the other perhaps +intended me (whom I killed before he really did me any); and yet I might +lawfully kill the one, and cannot so much as hurt the other lawfully. +The reason whereof is plain; because the one using force, which +threatened my life, I could not have time to appeal to the law to secure +it: and when it was gone, it was too late to appeal. The law could not +restore life to my dead carcass: the loss was irreparable; which to +prevent, the law of nature gave me a right to destroy him, who had put +himself into a state of war with me, and threatened my destruction. But +in the other case, my life not being in danger, I may have the benefit of +appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 100 pounds that way. + Sec. 208. Fourthly, But if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate +be maintained (by the power he has got), and the remedy which is due by +law, be by the same power obstructed; yet the right of resisting, even in +such manifest acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight occasions, +disturb the government: for if it reach no farther than some private +men's cases, though they have a right to defend themselves, and to +recover by force what by unlawful force is taken from them; yet the right +to do so will not easily engage them in a contest, wherein they are sure +to perish; it being as impossible for one, or a few oppressed men to +disturb the government, where the body of the people do not think +themselves concerned in it, as for a raving mad-man, or heady malcontent +to overturn a well settled state; the people being as little apt to +follow the one, as the other. + Sec. 209. But if either these illegal acts have extended to the +majority of the people; or if the mischief and oppression has lighted +only on some few, but in such cases, as the precedent, and consequences +seem to threaten all; and they are persuaded in their consciences, that +their laws, and with them their estates, liberties, and lives are in +danger, and perhaps their religion too; how they will be hindered from +resisting illegal force, used against them, I cannot tell. This is an +inconvenience, I confess, that attends all governments whatsoever, when +the governors have brought it to this pass, to be generally suspected of +their people; the most dangerous state which they can possibly put +themselves in, wherein they are the less to be pitied, because it is so +easy to be avoided; it being as impossible for a governor, if he really +means the good of his people, and the preservation of them, and their +laws together, not to make them see and feel it, as it is for the father +of a family, not to let his children see he loves, and takes care of +them. + Sec. 210. But if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind, +and actions of another; arts used to elude the law, and the trust of +prerogative (which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the +prince's hand to do good, not harm to the people) employed contrary to +the end for which it was given: if the people shall find the ministers +and subordinate magistrates chosen suitable to such ends, and favoured, +or laid by, proportionably as they promote or oppose them: if they see +several experiments made of arbitrary power, and that religion underhand +favoured, (tho' publicly proclaimed against) which is readiest to +introduce it; and the operators in it supported, as much as may be; and +when that cannot be done, yet approved still, and liked the better: if a +long train of actions shew the councils all tending that way; how can a +man any more hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind, which +way things are going; or from casting about how to save himself, than he +could from believing the captain of the ship he was in, was carrying him, +and the rest of the company, to Algiers, when he found him always +steering that course, though cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of +men and provisions did often force him to turn his course another way for +some time, which he steadily returned to again, as soon as the wind, +weather, and other circumstances would let him? + + + CHAP. XIX. + + Of the Dissolution of Government. + + Sec. 211. HE that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of +government, ought in the first place to distinguish between the +dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government. That +which makes the community, and brings men out of the loose state of +nature, into one politic society, is the agreement which every one has +with the rest to incorporate, and act as one body, and so be one distinct +common-wealth. The usual, and almost only way whereby this union is +dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest upon them: +for in that case, (not being able to maintain and support themselves, as +one intire and independent body) the union belonging to that body which +consisted therein, must necessarily cease, and so every one return to the +state he was in before, with a liberty to shift for himself, and provide +for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some other society. Whenever +the society is dissolved, it is certain the government of that society +cannot remain. Thus conquerors swords often cut up governments by the +roots, and mangle societies to pieces, separating the subdued or +scattered multitude from the protection of, and dependence on, that +society which ought to have preserved them from violence. The world is +too well instructed in, and too forward to allow of, this way of +dissolving of governments, to need any more to be said of it; and there +wants not much argument to prove, that where the society is dissolved, +the government cannot remain; that being as impossible, as for the frame +of an house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered and +dissipated by a whirl-wind, or jumbled into a confused heap by an +earthquake. + Sec. 212. Besides this over-turning from without, governments are +dissolved from within, First, When the legislative is altered. Civil +society being a state of peace, amongst those who are of it, from whom +the state of war is excluded by the umpirage, which they have provided in +their legislative, for the ending all differences that may arise amongst +any of them, it is in their legislative, that the members of a +commonwealth are united, and combined together into one coherent living +body. This is the soul that gives form, life, and unity, to the +common-wealth: from hence the several members have their mutual +influence, sympathy, and connexion: and therefore, when the legislative +is broken, or dissolved, dissolution and death follows: for the essence +and union of the society consisting in having one will, the legislative, +when once established by the majority, has the declaring, and as it were +keeping of that will. The constitution of the legislative is the first +and fundamental act of society, whereby provision is made for the +continuation of their union, under the direction of persons, and bonds of +laws, made by persons authorized thereunto, by the consent and +appointment of the people, without which no one man, or number of men, +amongst them, can have authority of making laws that shall be binding to +the rest. When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make laws, whom +the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws without authority, +which the people are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they +come again to be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a +new legislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the +force of those, who without authority would impose any thing upon them. +Every one is at the disposure of his own will, when those who had, by the +delegation of the society, the declaring of the public will, are excluded +from it, and others usurp the place, who have no such authority or +delegation. + Sec. 213. This being usually brought about by such in the +commonwealth who misuse the power they have; it is hard to consider it +aright, and know at whose door to lay it, without knowing the form of +government in which it happens. Let us suppose then the legislative +placed in the concurrence of three distinct persons. + 1. A single hereditary person, having the constant, supreme, +executive power, and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the +other two within certain periods of time. + 2. An assembly of hereditary nobility. + 3. An assembly of representatives chosen, pro tempore, by the +people. Such a form of government supposed, it is evident, + Sec. 214. First, That when such a single person, or prince, sets up +his own arbitrary will in place of the laws, which are the will of the +society, declared by the legislative, then the legislative is changed: +for that being in effect the legislative, whose rules and laws are put in +execution, and required to be obeyed; when other laws are set up, and +other rules pretended, and inforced, than what the legislative, +constituted by the society, have enacted, it is plain that the +legislative is changed. Whoever introduces new laws, not being thereunto +authorized by the fundamental appointment of the society, or subverts the +old, disowns and overturns the power by which they were made, and so sets +up a new legislative. + Sec. 215. Secondly, When the prince hinders the legislative from +assembling in its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends +for which it was constituted, the legislative is altered: for it is not a +certain number of men, no, nor their meeting, unless they have also +freedom of debating, and leisure of perfecting, what is for the good of +the society, wherein the legislative consists: when these are taken away +or altered, so as to deprive the society of the due exercise of their +power, the legislative is truly altered; for it is not names that +constitute governments, but the use and exercise of those powers that +were intended to accompany them; so that he, who takes away the freedom, +or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due seasons, in effect +takes away the legislative, and puts an end to the government, + Sec. 216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the +electors, or ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and +contrary to the common interest of the people, there also the legislative +is altered: for, if others than those whom the society hath authorized +thereunto, do chuse, or in another way than what the society hath +prescribed, those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the people. + Sec. 217. Fourthly, The delivery also of the people into the +subjection of a foreign power, either by the prince, or by the +legislative, is certainly a change of the legislative, and so a +dissolution of the government: for the end why people entered into +society being to be preserved one intire, free, independent society, to +be governed by its own laws; this is lost, whenever they are given up +into the power of another. + Sec. 218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of the +government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince, is evident; +because he, having the force, treasure and offices of the state to +employ, and often persuading himself, or being flattered by others, that +as supreme magistrate he is uncapable of controul; he alone is in a +condition to make great advances toward such changes, under pretence of +lawful authority, and has it in his hands to terrify or suppress +opposers, as factious, seditious, and enemies to the government: whereas +no other part of the legislative, or people, is capable by themselves to +attempt any alteration of the legislative, without open and visible +rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which, when it prevails, +produces effects very little different from foreign conquest. Besides, +the prince in such a form of government, having the power of dissolving +the other parts of the legislative, and thereby rendering them private +persons, they can never in opposition to him, or without his concurrence, +alter the legislative by a law, his conse power, neglects and abandons +that charge, so that the laws already made can no longer be put in +execution. This is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy, and so +effectually to dissolve the government: for laws not being made for +themselves, but to be, by their execution, the bonds of the society, to +keep every part of the body politic in its due place and function; when +that totally ceases, the government visibly ceases, and the people become +a confused multitude, without order or connexion. Where there is no +longer the administration of justice, for the securing of men's rights, +nor any remaining power within the community to direct the force, or +provide for the necessities of the public, there certainly is no +government left. Where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one as if +there were no laws; and a government without laws is, I suppose, a +mystery in politics, unconceivable to human capacity, and inconsistent +with human society. + Sec. 220. In these and the like cases, when the government is +dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by +erecting a new legislative, differing from the other, by the change of +persons, or form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety +and good: for the society can never, by the fault of another, lose the +native and original right it has to preserve itself, which can only be +done by a settled legislative, and a fair and impartial execution of the +laws made by it. But the state of mankind is not so miserable that they +are not capable of using this remedy, till it be too late to look for +any. To tell people they may provide for themselves, by erecting a new +legislative, when by oppression, artifice, or being delivered over to a +foreign power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them, they may +expect relief when it is too late, and the evil is past cure. This is in +effect no more than to bid them first be slaves, and then to take care of +their liberty; and when their chains are on, tell them, they may act like +freemen. This, if barely so, is rather mockery than relief; and men can +never be secure from tyranny, if there be no means to escape it till they +are perfectly under it: and therefore it is, that they have not only a +right to get out of it, but to prevent it. + Sec. 221. There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby +governments are dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the +prince, either of them, act contrary to their trust. + First, The legislative acts against the trust reposed in them, when +they endeavour to invade the property of the subject, and to make +themselves, or any part of the community, masters, or arbitrary disposers +of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people. + Sec. 222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation +of their property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a +legislative, is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards +and fences to the properties of all the members of the society, to limit +the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the +society: for since it can never be supposed to be the will of the +society, that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which +every one designs to secure, by entering into society, and for which the +people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making; whenever +the legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the property of the +people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put +themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon +absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, +which God hath provided for all men, against force and violence. +Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental +rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, +endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an +absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by +this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their +hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have +a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a +new legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own +safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society. +What I have said here, concerning the legislative in general, holds true +also concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in +him, both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of +the law, acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own +arbitrary will as the law of the society. He acts also contrary to his +trust, when he either employs the force, treasure, and offices of the +society, to corrupt the representatives, and gain them to his purposes; +or openly preengages the electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, +whom he has, by sollicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to +his designs; and employs them to bring in such, who have promised +before-hand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates +and electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is it but to cut +up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of public +security? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of +their representatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for +no other end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, +freely act, and advise, as the necessity of the common-wealth, and the +public good should, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to +require. This, those who give their votes before they hear the debate, +and have weighed the reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing. To +prepare such an assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the declared +abettors of his own will, for the true representatives of the people, and +the law-makers of the society, is certainly as great a breach of trust, +and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the government, as is +possible to be met with. To which, if one shall add rewards and +punishments visibly employed to the same end, and all the arts of +perverted law made use of, to take off and destroy all that stand in the +way of such a design, and will not comply and consent to betray the +liberties of their country, it will be past doubt what is doing. What +power they ought to have in the society, who thus employ it contrary to +the trust went along with it in its first institution, is easy to +determine; and one cannot but see, that he, who has once attempted any +such thing as this, cannot any longer be trusted. + Sec. 223. To this perhaps it will be said, that the people being +ignorant, and always discontented, to lay the foundation of government in +the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people, is to expose it +to certain ruin; and no government will be able long to subsist, if the +people may set up a new legislative, whenever they take offence at the +old one. To this I answer, Quite the contrary. People are not so easily +got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly +to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they +have been accustomed to. And if there be any original defects, or +adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption; it is not an easy +thing to get them changed, even when all the world sees there is an +opportunity for it. This slowness and aversion in the people to quit +their old constitutions, has, in the many revolutions which have been +seen in this kingdom, in this and former ages, still kept us to, or, +after some interval of fruitless attempts, still brought us back again to +our old legislative of king, lords and commons: and whatever provocations +have made the crown be taken from some of our princes heads, they never +carried the people so far as to place it in another line. + Sec. 224. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for +frequent rebellion. To which I answer, + First, No more than any other hypothesis: for when the people are made +miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary +power, cry up their governors, as much as you will, for sons of Jupiter; +let them be sacred and divine, descended, or authorized from heaven; give +them out for whom or what you please, the same will happen. The people +generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any +occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them. They +will wish, and seek for the opportunity, which in the change, weakness +and accidents of human affairs, seldom delays long to offer itself. He +must have lived but a little while in the world, who has not seen +examples of this in his time; and he must have read very little, who +cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments in the world. + Sec. 225. Secondly, I answer, such revolutions happen not upon every +little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling +part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human +frailty, will be born by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a +long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices, all tending the same +way, make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what +they lie under, and see whither they are going; it is not to be wondered, +that they should then rouze themselves, and endeavour to put the rule +into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government +was at first erected; and without which, ancient names, and specious +forms, are so far from being better, that they are much worse, than the +state of nature, or pure anarchy; the inconveniencies being all as great +and as near, but the remedy farther off and more difficult. + Sec. 226. Thirdly, I answer, that this doctrine of a power in the +people of providing for their safety a-new, by a new legislative, when +their legislators have acted contrary to their trust, by invading their +property, is the best fence against rebellion, and the probablest means +to hinder it: for rebellion being an opposition, not to persons, but +authority, which is founded only in the constitutions and laws of the +government; those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by +force justify their violation of them, are truly and properly rebels: for +when men, by entering into society and civil-government, have excluded +force, and introduced laws for the preservation of property, peace, and +unity amongst themselves, those who set up force again in opposition to +the laws, do rebellare, that is, bring back again the state of war, and +are properly rebels: which they who are in power, (by the pretence they +have to authority, the temptation of force they have in their hands, and +the flattery of those about them) being likeliest to do; the properest +way to prevent the evil, is to shew them the danger and injustice of it, +who are under the greatest temptation to run into it. + Sec. 227. In both the fore-mentioned cases, when either the +legislative is changed, or the legislators act contrary to the end for +which they were constituted; those who are guilty are guilty of +rebellion: for if any one by force takes away the established legislative +of any society, and the laws by them made, pursuant to their trust, he +thereby takes away the umpirage, which every one had consented to, for a +peaceable decision of all their controversies, and a bar to the state of +war amongst them. They, who remove, or change the legislative, take away +this decisive power, which no body can have, but by the appointment and +consent of the people; and so destroying the authority which the people +did, and no body else can set up, and introducing a power which the +people hath not authorized, they actually introduce a state of war, which +is that of force without authority: and thus, by removing the legislative +established by the society, (in whose decisions the people acquiesced and +united, as to that of their own will) they untie the knot, and expose the +people a-new to the state of war, And if those, who by force take away +the legislative, are rebels, the legislators themselves, as has been +shewn, can be no less esteemed so; when they, who were set up for the +protection, and preservation of the people, their liberties and +properties, shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and so +they putting themselves into a state of war with those who made them the +protectors and guardians of their peace, are properly, and with the +greatest aggravation, rebellantes, rebels. + Sec. 228. But if they, who say it lays a foundation for rebellion, +mean that it may occasion civil wars, or intestine broils, to tell the +people they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made +upon their liberties or properties, and may oppose the unlawful violence +of those who were their magistrates, when they invade their properties +contrary to the trust put in them; and that therefore this doctrine is +not to be allowed, being so destructive to the peace of the world: they +may as well say, upon the same ground, that honest men may not oppose +robbers or pirates, because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed. If +any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who +defends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbours. If the +innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has, for peace sake, to him +who will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered, what a +kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only in violence +and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers +and oppressors. VVho would not think it an admirable peace betwix the +mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance, yielded his +throat to be torn by the imperious wolf? Polyphemus's den gives us a +perfect pattern of such a peace, and such a government, wherein Ulysses +and his companions had nothing to do, but quietly to suffer themselves to +be devoured. And no doubt Ulysses, who was a prudent man, preached up +passive obedience, and exhorted them to a quiet submission, by +representing to them of what concernment peace was to mankind; and by +shewing the inconveniences might happen, if they should offer to resist +Polyphemus, who had now the power over them. + Sec. 229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is +best for mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the +boundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable +to be opposed, when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and +employ it for the destruction, and not the preservation of the properties +of their people? + Sec. 230. Nor let any one say, that mischief can arise from hence, as +often as it shall please a busy head, or turbulent spirit, to desire the +alteration of the government. It is true, such men may stir, whenever +they please; but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition: +for till the mischief be grown general, and the ill designs of the rulers +become visible, or their attempts sensible to the greater part, the +people, who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by +resistance, are not apt to stir. The examples of particular injustice, +or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man, moves them not. But +if they universally have a persuation, grounded upon manifest evidence, +that designs are carrying on against their liberties, and the general +course and tendency of things cannot but give them strong suspicions of +the evil intention of their governors, who is to be blamed for it? Who +can help it, if they, who might avoid it, bring themselves into this +suspicion? Are the people to be blamed, if they have the sense of +rational creatures, and can think of things no otherwise than as they +find and feel them? And is it not rather their fault, who put things into +such a posture, that they would not have them thought to be as they are? +I grant, that the pride, ambition, and turbulency of private men have +sometimes caused great disorders in commonwealths, and factions have been +fatal to states and kingdoms. But whether the mischief hath oftener +begun in the peoples wantonness, and a desire to cast off the lawful +authority of their rulers, or in the rulers insolence, and endeavours to +get and exercise an arbitrary power over their people; whether +oppression, or disobedience, gave the first rise to the disorder, I leave +it to impartial history to determine. This I am sure, whoever, either +ruler or subject, by force goes about to invade the rights of either +prince or people, and lays the foundation for overturning the +constitution and frame of any just government, is highly guilty of the +greatest crime, I think, a man is capable of, being to answer for all +those mischiefs of blood, rapine, and desolation, which the breaking to +pieces of governments bring on a country. And he who does it, is justly +to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind, and is to be treated +accordingly. + Sec. 231. That subjects or foreigners, attempting by force on the +properties of any people, may be resisted with force, is agreed on all +hands. But that magistrates, doing the same thing, may be resisted, hath +of late been denied: as if those who had the greatest privileges and +advantages by the law, had thereby a power to break those laws, by which +alone they were set in a better place than their brethren: whereas their +offence is thereby the greater, both as being ungrateful for the greater +share they have by the law, and breaking also that trust, which is put +into their hands by their brethren. + Sec. 232. Whosoever uses force without right, as every one does in +society, who does it without law, puts himself into a state of war with +those against whom he so uses it; and in that state all former ties are +cancelled, all other rights cease, and every one has a right to defend +himself, and to resist the aggressor. This is so evident, that Barclay +himself, that great assertor of the power and sacredness of kings, is +forced to confess, That it is lawful for the people, in some cases, to +resist their king; and that too in a chapter, wherein he pretends to +shew, that the divine law shuts up the people from all manner of +rebellion. Whereby it is evident, even by his own doctrine, that, since +they may in some cases resist, all resisting of princes is not +rebellion. His words are these. Quod siquis dicat, Ergone populus +tyrannicae crudelitati & furori jugulum semper praebebit? Ergone +multitude civitates suas fame, ferro, & flamma vastari, seque, conjuges, +& liberos fortunae ludibrio & tyranni libidini exponi, inque omnia vitae +pericula omnesque miserias & molestias a rege deduci patientur? Num illis +quod omni animantium generi est a natura tributum, denegari debet, ut sc. +vim vi repellant, seseq; ab injuria, tueantur? Huic breviter responsum +sit, Populo universo negari defensionem, quae juris naturalis est, neque +ultionem quae praeter naturam est adversus regem concedi debere. +Quapropter si rex non in singulares tantum personas aliquot privatum +odium exerceat, sed corpus etiam reipublicae, cujus ipse caput est, i.e. +totum populum, vel insignem aliquam ejus partem immani & intoleranda +saevitia seu tyrannide divexet; populo, quidem hoc casu resistendi ac +tuendi se ab injuria potestas competit, sed tuendi se tantum, non enim in +principem invadendi: & restituendae injuriae illatae, non recedendi a +debita reverentia propter acceptam injuriam. Praesentem denique impetum +propulsandi non vim praeteritam ulciscenti jus habet. Horum enim alterum +a natura est, ut vitam scilicet corpusque tueamur. Alterum vero contra +naturam, ut inferior de superiori supplicium sumat. Quod itaque populus +malum, antequam factum sit, impedire potest, ne fiat, id postquam factum +est, in regem authorem sceleris vindicare non potest: populus igitur hoc +amplius quam privatus quispiam habet: quod huic, vel ipsis adversariis +judicibus, excepto Buchanano, nullum nisi in patientia remedium +superest. Cum ille si intolerabilis tyrannus est (modicum enim ferre +omnino debet) resistere cum reverentia possit, Barclay contra Monarchom. +1. iii. c. 8. In English thus: + Sec. 233. But if any one should ask, Must the people then always lay +themselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny? Must they see their +cities pillaged, and laid in ashes, their wives and children exposed to +the tyrant's lust and fury, and themselves and families reduced by their +king to ruin, and all the miseries of want and oppression, and yet sit +still? Must men alone be debarred the common privilege of opposing force +with force, which nature allows so freely to all other creatures for +their preservation from injury? I answer: Self-defence is a part of the +law of nature; nor can it be denied the community, even against the king +himself: but to revenge themselves upon him, must by no means be allowed +them; it being not agreeable to that law. Wherefore if the king shall +shew an hatred, not only to some particular persons, but sets himself +against the body of the common-wealth, whereof he is the head, and shall, +with intolerable ill usage, cruelly tyrannize over the whole, or a +considerable part of the people, in this case the people have a right to +resist and defend themselves from injury: but it must be with this +caution, that they only defend themselves, but do not attack their +prince: they may repair the damages received, but must not for any +provocation exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect. They may +repulse the present attempt, but must not revenge past violences: for it +is natural for us to defend life and limb, but that an inferior should +punish a superior, is against nature. The mischief which is designed +them, the people may prevent before it be done; but when it is done, they +must not revenge it on the king, though author of the villany. This +therefore is the privilege of the people in general, above what any +private person hath; that particular men are allowed by our adversaries +themselves (Buchanan only excepted) to have no other remedy but patience; +but the body of the people may with respect resist intolerable tyranny; +for when it is but moderate, they ought to endure it. + Sec. 234. Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of +resistance. + Sec. 235. It is true, he has annexed two limitations to it, to no +purpose: First, He says, it must be with reverence. + Secondly, It must be without retribution, or punishment; and the +reason he gives is, because an inferior cannot punish a superior. +First, How to resist force without striking again, or how to strike with +reverence, will need some skill to make intelligible. He that shall +oppose an assault only with a shield to receive the blows, or in any more +respectful posture, without a sword in his hand, to abate the confidence +and force of the assailant, will quickly be at an end of his resistance, +and will find such a defence serve only to draw on himself the worse +usage. This is as ridiculous a way of resisting, as juvenal thought it +of fighting; ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum. And the success of the +combat will be unavoidably the same he there describes it: + + ----- Libertas pauperis haec est: + Pulsatus rogat, & pugnis concisus, adorat, + Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti. + +This will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance, where men +may not strike again. He therefore who may resist, must be allowed to +strike. And then let our author, or any body else, join a knock on the +head, or a cut on the face, with as much reverence and respect as he +thinks fit. He that can reconcile blows and reverence, may, for aught I +know, desire for his pains, a civil, respectful cudgeling where-ever he +can meet with it. + Secondly, As to his second, An inferior cannot punish a superior; that +is true, generally speaking, whilst he is his superior. But to resist +force with force, being the state of war that levels the parties, cancels +all former relation of reverence, respect, and superiority: and then the +odds that remains, is, that he, who opposes the unjust agressor, has this +superiority over him, that he has a right, when he prevails, to punish +the offender, both for the breach of the peace, and all the evils that +followed upon it. Barclay therefore, in another place, more coherently +to himself, denies it to be lawful to resist a king in any case. But he +there assigns two cases, whereby a king may un-king himself. His words +are, + Quid ergo, nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere +atque in regem impotentius dominantem arma capere & invadere jure suo +suaque authoritate liceat? Nulli certe quamdiu rex manet. Semper enim ex +divinis id obstat, Regem honorificato; & qui potestati resistit, Dei +ordinationi resisit: non alias igitur in eum populo potestas est quam si +id committat propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat. Tunc enim se ipse +principatu exuit atque in privatis constituit liber: hoc modo populus & +superior efficitur, reverso ad eum sc. jure illo quod ante regem +inauguratum in interregno habuit. At sunt paucorum generum commissa +ejusmodi quae hunc effectum pariunt. At ego cum plurima animo +perlustrem, duo tantum invenio, duos, inquam, casus quibus rex ipso facto +ex rege non regem se facit & omni honore & dignitate regali atque in +subditos potestate destituit; quorum etiam meminit Winzerus. Horum unus +est, Si regnum disperdat, quemadmodum de Nerone fertur, quod is nempe +senatum populumque Romanum, atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque +vastare, ac novas sibi sedes quaerere decrevisset. Et de Caligula, quod +palam denunciarit se neque civem neque principem senatui amplius fore, +inque animo habuerit interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo quoque +Alexandriam commigrare, ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret, unam ei +cervicem optavit. Talia cum rex aliquis meditator & molitur serio, omnem +regnandi curam & animum ilico abjicit, ac proinde imperium in subditos +amittit, ut dominus servi pro derelicto habiti dominium. + Sec. 236. Alter casus est, Si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit, +ac regnum quod liberum a majoribus & populo traditum accepit, alienae +ditioni mancipavit. Nam tunc quamvis forte non ea mente id agit populo +plane ut incommodet: tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae dignitatis +amifit, ut summus scilicet in regno secundum Deum sit, & solo Deo +inferior, atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum, cujus +libertatem sartam & tectam conservare debuit, in alterius gentis ditionem +& potestatem dedidit; hac velut quadam regni ab alienatione effecit, ut +nec quod ipse in regno imperium habuit retineat, nec in eum cui collatum +voluit, juris quicquam transferat; atque ita eo facto liberum jam & suae +potestatis populum relinquit, cujus rei exemplum unum annales Scotici +suppeditant. Barclay contra Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 16. Which in English +runs thus: + Sec. 237. What then, can there no case happen wherein the people may +of right, and by their own authority, help themselves, take arms, and set +upon their king, imperiously domineering over them? None at all, whilst +he remains a king. Honour the king, and he that resists the power, +resists the ordinance of God; are divine oracles that will never permit +it, The people therefore can never come by a power over him, unless he +does something that makes him cease to be a king: for then he divests +himself of his crown and dignity, and returns to the state of a private +man, and the people become free and superior, the power which they had in +the interregnum, before they crowned him king, devolving to them again. +But there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to this state. +After considering it well on all sides, I can find but two. Two cases +there are, I say, whereby a king, ipso facto, becomes no king, and loses +all power and regal authority over his people; which are also taken +notice of by Winzerus. + The first is, If he endeavour to overturn the government, that is, if +he have a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth, as it +is recorded of Nero, that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of +Rome, lay the city waste with fire and sword, and then remove to some +other place. And of Caligula, that he openly declared, that he would be +no longer a head to the people or senate, and that he had it in his +thoughts to cut off the worthiest men of both ranks, and then retire to +Alexandria: and he wisht that the people had but one neck, that he might +dispatch them all at a blow, Such designs as these, when any king +harbours in his thoughts, and seriously promotes, he immediately gives up +all care and thought of the common-wealth; and consequently forfeits the +power of governing his subjects, as a master does the dominion over his +slaves whom he hath abandoned. + Sec. 238. The other case is, When a king makes himself the dependent +of another, and subjects his kingdom which his ancestors left him, and +the people put free into his hands, to the dominion of another: for +however perhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people; yet +because he has hereby lost the principal part of regal dignity, viz. to +be next and immediately under God, supreme in his kingdom; and also +because he betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought to have +carefully preserved, into the power and dominion of a foreign nation. By +this, as it were, alienation of his kingdom, he himself loses the power +he had in it before, without transferring any the least right to those on +whom he would have bestowed it; and so by this act sets the people free, +and leaves them at their own disposal. One example of this is to be +found in the Scotch Annals. + Sec. 239. In these cases Barclay, the great champion of absolute +monarchy, is forced to allow, that a king may be resisted, and ceases to +be a king. That is, in short, not to multiply cases, in whatsoever he +has no authority, there he is no king, and may be resisted: for +wheresoever the authority ceases, the king ceases too, and becomes like +other men who have no authority. And these two cases he instances in, +differ little from those above mentioned, to be destructive to +governments, only that he has omitted the principle from which his +doctrine flows: and that is, the breach of trust, in not preserving the +form of government agreed on, and in not intending the end of government +itself, which is the public good and preservation of property. When a +king has dethroned himself, and put himself in a state of war with his +people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king, as +they would any other man, who has put himself into a state of war with +them, Barclay, and those of his opinion, would do well to tell us. This +farther I desire may be taken notice of out of Barclay, that he says, The +mischief that is designed them, the people may prevent before it be +clone: whereby he allows resistance when tyranny is but in design. Such +designs as these (says he) when any king harbours in his thoughts and +seriously promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the +common-wealth; so that, according to him, the neglect of the public good +is to be taken as an evidence of such design, or at least for a +sufficient cause of resistance. And the reason of all, he gives in these +words, Because he betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought +carefully to have preserved. What he adds, into the power and dominion +of a foreign nation, signifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture lying in +the loss of their liberty, which he ought to have preserved, and not in +any distinction of the persons to whose dominion they were subjected. +The peoples right is equally invaded, and their liberty lost, whether +they are made slaves to any of their own, or a foreign nation; and in +this lies the injury, and against this only have they the right of +defence. And there are instances to be found in all countries, which +shew, that it is not the change of nations in the persons of their +governors, but the change of government, that gives the offence. Bilson, +a bishop of our church, and a great stickler for the power and +prerogative of princes, does, if I mistake not, in his treatise of +Christian subjection, acknowledge, that princes may forfeit their power, +and their title to the obedience of their subjects; and if there needed +authority in a case where reason is so plain, I could send my reader to +Bracton, Fortescue, and the author of the Mirrour, and others, writers +that cannot be suspected to be ignorant of our government, or enemies to +it. But I thought Hooker alone might be enough to satisfy those men, who +relying on him for their ecclesiastical polity, are by a strange fate +carried to deny those principles upon which he builds it. Whether they +are herein made the tools of cunninger workmen, to pull down their own +fabric, they were best look. This I am sure, their civil policy is so +new, so dangerous, and so destructive to both rulers and people, that as +former ages never could bear the broaching of it; so it may be hoped, +those to come, redeemed from the impositions of these Egyptian +under-task-masters, will abhor the memory of such servile flatterers, +who, whilst it seemed to serve their turn, resolved all government into +absolute tyranny, and would have all men born to, what their mean souls +fitted them for, slavery. + Sec. 240. Here, it is like, the common question will be made, Who +shall be judge, whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their +trust? This, perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst +the people, when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative. To +this I reply, The people shall be judge; for who shall be judge whether +his trustee or deputy acts well, and according to the trust reposed in +him, but he who deputes him, and must, by having deputed him, have still +a power to discard him, when he fails in his trust? If this be reasonable +in particular cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in that of +the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions is concerned, and also +where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the redress very +difficult, dear, and dangerous? + Sec. 241. But farther, this question, (Who shall be judge?) cannot +mean, that there is no judge at all: for where there is no judicature on +earth, to decide controversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge. He +alone, it is true, is judge of the right. But every man is judge for +himself, as in all other cases, so in this, whether another hath put +himself into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal to the +Supreme Judge, as leptha did. + Sec. 242. If a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the +people, in a matter where the law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing +be of great consequence, I should think the proper umpire, in such a +case, should be the body of the people: for in cases where the prince +hath a trust reposed in him, and is dispensed from the common ordinary +rules of the law; there, if any men find themselves aggrieved, and think +the prince acts contrary to, or beyond that trust, who so proper to judge +as the body of the people, (who, at first, lodged that trust in him) how +far they meant it should extend? But if the prince, or whoever they be in +the administration, decline that way of determination, the appeal then +lies no where but to heaven; force between either persons, who have no +known superior on earth, or which permits no appeal to a judge on earth, +being properly a state of war, wherein the appeal lies only to heaven; +and in that state the injured party must judge for himself, when he will +think fit to make use of that appeal, and put himself upon it. + Sec. 243. To conclude, The power that every individual gave the +society, when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals +again, as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the +community; because without this there can be no community, no +common-wealth, which is contrary to the original agreement: so also when +the society hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to +continue in them and their successors, with direction and authority for +providing such successors, the legislative can never revert to the people +whilst that government lasts; because having provided a legislative with +power to continue for ever, they have given up their political power to +the legislative, and cannot resume it. But if they have set limits to +the duration of their legislative, and made this supreme power in any +person, or assembly, only temporary; or else, when by the miscarriages of +those in authority, it is forfeited; upon the forfeiture, or at the +determination of the time set, it reverts to the society, and the people +have a right to act as supreme, and continue the legislative in +themselves; or erect a new form, or under the old form place it in new +hands, as they think good. + + +F I N I S. + + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT *** + +This file should be named trgov10.txt or trgov10.zip +Corrected EDITIONS of our eBooks get a new NUMBER, trgov11.txt +VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, trgov10a.txt + +Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the US +unless a copyright notice is included. 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