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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75711 ***
+
+
+ THE MEANING OF
+ A LIBERAL EDUCATION
+
+
+
+
+ _The People’s Institute
+ “Lectures-in-Print” Series_
+
+
+ PSYCHOLOGY
+ by Everett Dean Martin $3.00
+
+ BEHAVIORISM
+ by John B. Watson $3.00
+
+ INFLUENCING HUMAN BEHAVIOR
+ by H. A. Overstreet $3.00
+
+ INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY
+ by Charles S. Myers $2.50
+
+ THE MEANING OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION
+ by Everett Dean Martin $3.00
+
+ MODERN SCIENCE AND PEOPLE’S HEALTH
+ Edited by Benjamin C. Gruenberg $2.50
+
+
+_Other Volumes in Preparation_
+
+ _W·W·NORTON & COMPANY, INC._
+ 70 Fifth Avenue New York
+
+
+
+
+ THE MEANING OF
+ A LIBERAL EDUCATION
+
+ BY
+
+ EVERETT DEAN MARTIN
+
+ _Director, The People’s Institute, New York
+ Lecturer, The New School for
+ Social Research_
+
+ [Illustration]
+
+ NEW YORK
+ W·W·NORTON & COMPANY, INC.
+ _Publishers_
+
+
+
+
+ Copyright, 1926
+ W·W·NORTON & COMPANY, INC.
+
+
+ PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+ FOR THE PUBLISHERS BY THE VAIL-BALLOU PRESS
+
+
+
+
+ To her who lovingly gave me the first and most
+ important instruction, and inspired the
+ desire for scholarship,
+ MY MOTHER
+ THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+Most books that deal with the subject of education, and there are
+many, are concerned with the training of the young. Much is said about
+educational methods but very little about content. There is discussion,
+also, of the effectiveness of institutions, schools and colleges, and
+the interest of the State in education. This book does not deal with
+such matters.
+
+It is concerned with other problems. What is an educated person like?
+How does he differ from the uneducated? Does he think differently and,
+if so, why? We shall be empirical in our study. We shall study persons
+who are generally recognized as outstanding educated minds and ask what
+it is that characterizes them. Is an educated person one who is like
+Socrates, Erasmus, Montaigne, Goethe, Arnold, Santayana?
+
+The theme of this book is that education is more than information, or
+skill, or propaganda. In each age education must take into account
+the conditions of that age. But the educated mind is not a mere
+creature of its own time. Education is emancipation from herd opinion,
+self-mastery, capacity for self-criticism, suspended judgment, and
+urbanity.
+
+It is often believed that education, adult education in particular, is
+an avocation or an interest to occupy the individual in his leisure
+time, like music or stamp collecting. The work of The People’s
+Institute at Cooper Union, New York, where these lectures were given,
+is essentially that of adult education. I have tried to think through
+with those who attended the lectures what it is that for ten years
+we have been trying to achieve. Adult education is now becoming an
+important interest in American life, and the inquiry seems timely.
+
+This book, then, contends that education is a spiritual revaluation
+of human life. Its task is to _reorient_ the individual, to enable
+him to take a richer and more significant view of his experiences, to
+place him above and not within the system of his beliefs and ideals.
+If education is not liberalizing, it is not education in the sense of
+the title of the book. I use the term “liberal” not in the political
+sense, as if it meant half measures, but in its original sense meaning
+by a liberal education the kind of education which sets the mind free
+from the servitude of the crowd and from vulgar self-interests. In this
+sense, education is simply philosophy at work. It is the search for the
+“good life.” Education is itself a way of living.
+
+I have written the book not from the standpoint of the professional
+educator for whom education is frequently--if it be adult education--an
+enterprise designed for the uplift of other people, but from the
+standpoint of one who is concerned that his own education shall not
+stop in middle-life. No one is fit to be a teacher in whose own mental
+process education has ceased to go on. One is a student first and only
+incidentally a teacher. The best teacher is the seeker after truth
+amongst his students. Probably the most successful educator cannot tell
+what is the secret of his success in teaching. That which is important
+about the philosophy of education is not method but that background of
+knowledge which enables its possessor to judge what is worth knowing
+and doing.
+
+ EVERETT DEAN MARTIN.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+ CHAPTER PAGE
+
+ PREFACE vii
+
+ I. INTRODUCTION 1
+
+ II. LIBERAL EDUCATION VERSUS ANIMAL TRAINING 23
+
+ III. LIBERAL EDUCATION VERSUS PROPAGANDA 45
+
+ IV. LIBERAL EDUCATION VERSUS BOOK LEARNING 66
+
+ V. THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF DOUBT 84
+
+ VI. A MAN IS KNOWN BY THE DILEMMAS HE KEEPS 107
+
+ VII. THE FREE SPIRIT 127
+
+ VIII. THE APPRECIATION OF HUMAN WORTH 146
+
+ IX. EDUCATION AND WORK 160
+
+ X. EDUCATION AND MORALS 180
+
+ XI. THE CLASSICAL TRADITION: PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 197
+
+ XII. HUMANISM: ERASMUS AND MONTAIGNE 220
+
+ XIII. SCIENCE AND SUPERSTITION: HUXLEY 252
+
+ XIV. THE FRUIT OF THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE 286
+
+ XV. POSTSCRIPT--ADULT EDUCATION IN AMERICA 308
+
+
+
+
+ THE MEANING OF
+ A LIBERAL EDUCATION
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+The evidence is unmistakable that there is an important change in the
+attitude of the public toward education. There is an increasingly
+general demand for it in some form or other. Everywhere and in all
+classes of society the interest in acquiring better knowledge is
+apparent.
+
+In England and on the continent of Europe there are thousands of
+classes and groups patiently pursuing long and serious courses of
+study. American colleges and universities are crowded and many students
+are each year turned away. Vast and increasing numbers register
+annually for correspondence and university extension courses. The
+demand for more education is shown also in the increasing number
+of lecture courses, people’s colleges, and other centers of public
+discussion.
+
+While people do not always know just what it is they demand and
+frequently the thing which they receive is not education, nevertheless
+there is a new and very wide-spread interest. This new interest shows
+itself not only in the increasing number of persons engaged in some
+kind of educational activity but also in the fact that people are
+beginning to see that education properly may be extended into adult
+life.
+
+Until recently, people have thought of education as something for
+children, something which a man either got or missed in his early
+years, something which he generally forgot in his mature years. To
+the average person, education was a matter of fond memories or of
+unpleasant associations with teachers, school houses and experiences
+of childhood. The “highly” educated person was the exceptional person
+in the community, discussions of the philosophy of education did not
+appeal to a wide public interest. Now higher branches of learning
+are being pursued by numbers of people outside regular educational
+institutions. Something very significant is happening. Perhaps at no
+time since the thirteenth century has the desire for knowledge so
+nearly approached a mass movement.
+
+Certain qualifications must however be made. While much of the demand
+for education is genuine and spontaneous, much of it is spurious,
+irrelevant, inconsequential. The increased attendance at school or
+university does not necessarily mean that more education is going on.
+It is frequently said that our colleges are crowded with inferior
+students. Athletics, fraternities, schools of business and the
+automobile tend to displace science and the classics. American youth
+has acquired its ideal of college life from the motion pictures. We
+should not infer from the large numbers engaged in adult education
+that democracy has suddenly decided to rid itself of intellectual
+shoddiness. If the advertisements of correspondence courses in
+self-improvement which regularly appear in the popular magazines are
+an indication of the instruction offered for sale, people might better
+spend their money for patent medicine or in having their fortunes
+told. At best adult education consists largely of brief courses of
+a vocational nature. Even worker’s education, a movement which has
+inspired hope in many liberals, may easily be over estimated. Much
+of it is little more than a recrudescence of antiquated radical
+propaganda, designed to enable the proletariat to “emancipate itself
+from the slavery of capitalism,” and to get it “ready for a millennial
+industrial democracy.” The initiative often comes not from studious
+minded workers, but from enthusiastic intellectuals and idealistic
+uplifters. The cultural gesture is often pathetic or comic. It is
+not uncommon for those who have completed the courses of study in a
+“workers” college to find themselves more unadjusted than they were
+before.
+
+It is sought to make of adult education something which will broaden
+the interests and sympathies of people regardless of their daily
+occupation--or along with it--to lift men’s thought out of the monotony
+and drudgery which are the common lot, to free the mind from servitude
+and herd opinion, to train habits of judgment and of appreciation of
+value, to carry on the struggle for human excellence in our day and
+generation, to temper passion with wisdom, to dispel prejudice by
+better knowledge of self, to enlist all men, in the measure that they
+have capacity for it, in the achievement of civilization.
+
+Adult education is a way of living which should be open to all who care
+for it for its own sake. It is not surprising that it frequently fails
+of its true aims. Education has always been regarded as a mere means to
+ends that have nothing to do with it. It is to be expected, therefore,
+that education in our day should be regarded primarily as a means of
+entrance to the already overcrowded professions, or to material gain or
+better social position. Doubtless it must remain so until the community
+becomes sufficiently civilized so that some degree of liberal education
+is the expected thing in all classes, an interest and a goal, a
+spiritual bond of union somewhat like the idea of catholic religion in
+the middle ages. This is an ideal which will not be realized by magic.
+There is no cheap popular substitute for education. Nor are we nearing
+the goal while as now almost anything passes for education.
+
+Almost any method of salesmanship or trick of influencing people for
+any ends whatever is now “education.” Every one educates the public. It
+is marvelous how large a portion of the population of these states is
+qualified to instruct. Education has become the game men perpetually
+work to convert their neighbors. It is the cure for every social ill.
+How shall we put an end to the crime wave, abolish war, how to prevent
+social revolution,--or bring revolution about, how induce unwilling
+people to accept cheerfully the coercion of national prohibition or
+give lip service to some one’s favorite brand of patriotism? The answer
+is in all cases--education. If you are engaged in increasing the sale
+of a certain soap, in putting everyone on guard against that social
+disability of which one’s best friend will not tell him, if you can
+frighten a multitude with the danger of pyorrhea and thus increase your
+profit in tooth paste--all this is now called education.
+
+Many see in the general movement for more education a great hope for
+humanity. It was the belief in its political benefits that led to the
+compulsory education of children in the nineteenth century. Men were
+sure that all that held the world back was ignorance. People would
+surely wish to have their ignorance removed. Remove it, teach men the
+laws of a reasonable and beneficent nature, and mankind in general
+would be wise and happy and good. Ingersoll used to rejoice whenever he
+visited a town where the schoolhouse was larger than the church.
+
+As the humanitarians of the nineteenth century held that public school
+education must inevitably put an end to tyranny and superstition, so
+many of our contemporaries look upon adult education as the guarantor
+of a new and better civilization. There is to be an end of bigotry and
+partisan strife and of crowd hysteria and of the vulgarities which
+beset democracy. They see genius appreciated, a selection by the masses
+of a sincere and competent leadership. Men everywhere are to learn “not
+only how to make a living, but how to live.”
+
+Finally, it is hoped that adult education will give us new methods
+and aims which will be carried back into our schools and colleges and
+transform them. A better informed adult population will naturally take
+a more active and intelligent interest in the education of youth. And
+when teachers try to instruct adults it will become necessary for them
+to make their teaching interesting and significant. The teachers will
+also learn something about life, gleaning sheaves of ripe wisdom out
+of the mature experience of their students; they will become better
+teachers. All this may or may not come to pass. The point of interest
+is that there is this tendency to make a gospel of education.
+
+We Americans have a weakness for new gospels. They are a pleasant form
+of verbal exercise. Liberty, Democracy, Social Reform, the Cause of
+Labor, Psychoanalysis--all have been put to such evangelistic use. Now
+we are to become an educated nation by the simple process of everyone
+educating everyone else. Education is like reform, it is something
+which is always good for other people. There is much talk about adult
+education and there are many conferences. But I have not attended a
+conference for the discussion of this subject in which anyone spoke
+of adult education as his own pursuit of knowledge. And as with most
+gospels, we are in such a hurry to save souls that we would begin
+proclaiming the new salvation to the nation before pausing to find out
+what education is.
+
+Education has one thing in common with religion. One must come to it
+with clean hands and a pure heart or one can never know the secret
+power of it. This is as true of a nation as of an individual. As a
+people we have certain traits which may be praiseworthy in themselves,
+but are distinctly hostile to the work of education. I will enumerate
+them and then briefly indicate their element of hostility. They
+are, first, our genius for organization; second, our well-known
+utilitarianism; third, our cleverness in finding shortcuts to the ends
+we seek; and fourth, our tendency to make propaganda.
+
+The American way of doing things is to proceed to organize them. Our
+genius for organization is probably our most generally recognized
+national characteristic. It has given us such prestige as we enjoy
+among the nations of the earth. Ours is the land of the Woolworth
+Building, the Ford factories, the Anti-saloon League, Rotary, the Ku
+Klux Klan, and the college cheer leader. In organization there is power
+and there is efficiency, as seen in the success of our industries.
+Labor, politics, morals, religion, charity have all followed the
+same course. In fact a man gains recognition in this country only by
+virtue of his membership in some power-seeking group. He who remains
+unorganized is lost. And without a chairman, a committee, an executive
+secretary and a press agent no human interest can survive. We simply do
+not know what to do with it or how to think about it.
+
+Organization, which is instrument or means, tends to become an end in
+itself. This is the fate of most organized causes; a movement arises
+with its standardized labels and values, its stereotyped mannerisms,
+its rigamarole. Success is estimated in terms of material effects,
+tangible results, numbers and power. The organizer takes precedence
+over those who possess the interest which it is his task to serve.
+When a man becomes a labor organizer, he stops work. Many university
+presidents are not themselves teachers or even scholars. They are
+good organizers, and with very much the same methods and standards
+of value one could as well organize a labor union or an insurance
+company. This is no criticism of the college president. His practical
+ability is requisite of modern conditions. But ways of thinking and of
+feeling are elusive and essentially personal, and when the attempt is
+made to institutionalize them they vanish and a lifeless imitation is
+substituted. You may as well try to organize the weather as to organize
+faith, hope and love. “Organized charity” is almost a contradiction
+in terms. Organized religion is a garden of artificial flowers, badly
+faded too. The spiritual life of the race was carefully weeded out long
+ago.
+
+To know the effect of organization upon education, one need only attend
+a convention of the National Educational Association, or familiarize
+oneself with the public school system anywhere. The system supplants
+education. The present interest in adult education is in part a protest
+against the system. The thirst for knowledge is nowhere more genuine
+and healthy than in such groups as those which attend The People’s
+Institute of New York and other educational centers where learning
+is pursued with a minimum of organization. In such places people who
+desire further knowledge of some subject in which they are interested
+come together, voluntarily, and their only basis of association is
+their common intellectual interest. There is no cult or “movement”;
+there are no promoters for there is nothing to promote. There are
+no ulterior ends to serve and there are no outside influences or
+regulations save those necessary to insure honest scholarship and
+competent instruction. Many adult students would resent any attempt at
+further organization.
+
+There is in existence at the present time a World Association for adult
+education, and there was recently formed an American Association.
+But these associations have no ambition to guide or control or to
+standardize. Nor are they equipped to do so. One of the greatest
+services that such an association, made up of teachers and students,
+could perform would be to work to prevent the diversion of the present
+interest in popular education to ends that are not educational.
+
+“Adult Education” is becoming a slogan, a phrase to capitalize, a
+label to attach to various activities which have hitherto borne other
+brands,--Americanization for instance, or social work, or community
+organization, or reforms and propagandas of one sort or another. Much
+that is now labeled Adult Education has a curiously familiar look.
+There are faces one has seen before somewhere in other climes that then
+enjoyed the sunshine of popular interest. Praiseworthy enterprises
+no doubt, and not less praiseworthy is the somewhat tardy discovery
+that the organizers have all along been speaking the prose of adult
+education without knowing it.
+
+The danger is that persons with long experience in promoting and
+administering many things may also conceive of each educational task
+as primarily one of organization. In a recent conference on adult
+education in a New England state, an enthusiastic public school
+administrator in a burst of oratory proposed that adult education be
+made compulsory. Another called attention to the appalling extent of
+illiteracy, particularly as regards the use of the English language,
+and urged that adult education be promoted as a preventive of crime.
+A third, a dean in an eastern college, insisted that adult education
+at once be departmentalized; graded, I suppose, into its primary,
+secondary, collegiate and post-graduate branches. Nothing has yet
+been said about an adult kindergarten, though doubtless many people
+could profit by attending such an institution. Perhaps the associated
+kindergartens have not yet discovered the fact that they also have been
+engaged in adult education.
+
+We shall be disappointed if it is our hope to send the grown-up
+population of the country back to Public School to receive still more
+of the thing that caused many of them to leave. One of the leading
+educators in America recently asked a group of teachers whether any
+among them were so well satisfied with what they had accomplished in
+their own sphere that they could wish to extend their work through the
+adult years.
+
+It is very difficult for the man of the system to think of education
+itself, he is too much preoccupied with gradations, requirements,
+discipline, reports, with seeing that a given minimum of identical work
+is done by all in a given time. He thinks in terms of buildings and
+equipment, submission to authority, conformity to herd opinion, service
+to the state. All or at least some of these things are necessary, but
+it is obvious that they do not constitute an education. This lesson
+America has got to learn. There can be no quantity production of the
+things of the spirit.
+
+Another national trait which influences our education is our
+utilitarianism. I do not use this term in the sense that it was used by
+those philosophers who held the principle of the Greatest Happiness.
+I refer to that in us which is spoken of as “Yankee shrewdness.”
+Except in politics and religion, we are a sensible people. And by
+sensible I mean--and most Americans would agree--practical. We can be
+very efficient when we wish to,--that is, when there is anything to
+gain by it. We are straightforward, and except in matters concerning
+which we prefer to deceive ourselves, not easily taken in. Whatever we
+profess, we are born pragmatists. Our first question about anything is
+‘what good is it’, that is, what use is it? We demand results and we
+get them. We get things done because our philosophy of life is one of
+action, and our prevailing ethical standard is one of service. In the
+solution of a practical problem, and most problems to which we give our
+attention are practical, we pride ourselves on our directness. We come
+to the point. We dispense with the unnecessary, the ornamental, the
+traditional. It is a valuable trait.
+
+But things sometimes have meanings other than that of usefulness. There
+are values which can not be measured in terms of money or personal
+advantage, or of time lost or gained, or of industrial efficiency.
+Health for instance is good not merely because the healthy man can
+do more work; it is good for its own sake. Yet people are frequently
+advised to guard their health for strictly economic reasons, and
+practical people have the habit of showing us the cost of disease,
+presenting statistics of labor-time lost, estimating the loss to the
+community as so many thousands of dollars annually.
+
+I have known people to take a like utilitarian view of human
+relationships, making friends for the sake of commercial and social
+advancement, furnishing their houses, selecting their motor cars and
+even their clothes with the view to keeping up their credit at the
+bank. Many a man openly says that he belongs to certain clubs, and
+sometimes one even joins a church, for business reasons. How much the
+practical man misses is evident from the fact that it never occurs to
+him that there are other reasons for doing these things.
+
+Practical men love to philosophize about the value of education. When
+I was a student I once rode up to the college with a farmer who was
+passing the campus on his way home from town. He informed me in no
+uncertain terms that he had no use for that institution. It irritated
+him to see all those “young loafers” wasting their time learning Latin
+and Greek and lawn tennis. Not one of them, not even the faculty, knew
+how to do anything; he had recently tested them out. He had asked the
+professor of Greek how many feet of lumber could be sawed from a log
+twenty-three inches in diameter and twenty feet long, and the professor
+did not know.
+
+The farmer’s point of view is now that of many modern institutions of
+learning. Educators are determined to give people the knowledge they
+need for success in life and work. Courses are offered in scenario
+writing, millinery, salesmanship. Whether courses are anywhere offered
+in paper hanging--with credit toward the bachelor’s degree, I do not
+know. But it is held that as thinking is really part of acting, only
+that knowledge is real which can be put in operation. There is a truth
+in this statement if one takes a sufficiently broad view of activity.
+But the tendency is to make an easy and crude distinction between
+knowledge which is useful, and that which is merely “ornamental.” This
+distinction does not always hold. Knowledge may be like art, it may
+have values which are more than use or ornamentation. Dr. Horace Kallen
+divides values into economic values and æsthetic values. Economic goods
+are those which are valuable because they are the means of getting some
+good other than themselves. Aesthetic goods are those which have value
+in themselves. Art is excellence. Education is the art of making living
+itself an art. It is the achievement of human excellence; it transcends
+both the useful and the ornamental. It is a way of life, just as truly
+as the religious life is a way of life, or the moral life, or the
+single life.
+
+People motivated by a narrow utilitarianism do not really desire
+education. They are quite content with a vulgar substitute--if it
+pays. Education does not transform them; they tend to transform it
+after their own likeness. That many are seeking “education” from
+such motives is evident. One has only to study the advertising pages
+of the popular magazines to note the kind of appeal that is made to
+induce the ambitious to enroll in certain correspondence schools. The
+prospective student is given the promise that if he will subscribe for
+certain courses he may some day sit in the boss’s chair, and associate
+with the big men at the top who do real things. Usually there is an
+alluring picture of these big men at their desks, thinking great
+ideas; a picture which gives about the same notion of the lives of the
+successful as one sees in the motion pictures. Sometimes the picture
+is of two men one on either side of the manager’s desk. One stands
+meekly, hat in hand, dressed as a laborer. On his face are the marks of
+sorrow, humility, hunger. The other man has the look of the typical
+“go-getter.” The latter is seated; he is evidently giving an order.
+Such a picture is not intended to be a comment upon the inequalities
+of our industrial system. The reader is informed that both men started
+at the bottom, that one improved his mind and his opportunities, the
+other’s is a wasted life.
+
+Such advertisements are typical, and are worthy of note because they
+indicate something of the nature of the prevailing American interest in
+education. Here is an illustration of a domestic scene: The man stands
+at the door dejected. He has just been discharged from his position,
+and has come home to tell his wife. She sympathetically replies that he
+ought long ago to have bought that course of lessons. Or she consoles
+him with the question, “Why is it that all the others have gone ahead
+and you have not?”
+
+By contrast there is a series of invitations to enter the temple of
+knowledge in which a wife is portrayed leaning affectionately over
+her husband’s shoulder. He holds a pay envelope in his hand and says,
+“I am making real money now.” It is well, when telling people of the
+advantages of education, to give them an idea of the conversation which
+takes place in the homes of the cultured.
+
+But that anyone should seriously enter upon a course of study of
+the world’s classics in order that he may impress people with his
+knowledge, appear genteel, make himself attractive to women or gain
+entrance to an exclusive social set, is, I believe, a distinctly
+modern contribution to educational theory. There recently came into
+my possession half a shelf of little old books bound in leather.
+They contain a translation of the Iliad and the Odyssey, some novels
+of Fielding and Smollet, and a book or two of seventeenth century
+religious meditations. The volumes are discolored with age and are worn
+with much reading, broken bindings are carefully repaired with hand
+stitching and torn pages pasted together by someone who prized and
+reverenced their content. They are part of the small library of a New
+England farmer of the early years of the Republic, who read his books
+by his kitchen fireside when the day’s work was done, who lived with
+them for years, and found in them a perpetual source of interest and
+wisdom and a refuge in an existence of loneliness and toil. Imagine
+anyone trying to sell that man a work of art with the promise that a
+casual reading of it would enable him to appear more cultivated than he
+really was.
+
+Today a much advertised and in fact admirable selection of classic
+literature is offered with precisely this appeal. A full page display
+appears in the Sunday papers depicting a gaudy dining-room with three
+people conventionally dressed for dinner seated at the table. There are
+two men and a beautiful woman. She is talking to the man on her right,
+and is evidently fascinated with his brilliant conversation. The man
+on the left sits dumb and miserable and unnoticed; he can not join in
+such sophisticated and scintillating discussion. We are informed that
+the poor man has neglected to read his fifteen minutes a day. It is to
+this sort of thing that popular utilitarianism, aided and appealed to
+by commercialism, would divert a hesitating interest in education.
+
+Even in the best of educational institutions the utilitarian point of
+view with its emphasis upon a narrow efficiency has its dangers. It is
+the source of that specialization which crams the student’s head full
+of information concerning one subject, leaving him in ignorance of all
+else and hence unable to gain a proper perspective of the knowledge
+that he does possess.
+
+In “Science and the Modern World,” Whitehead says
+
+ “The modern chemist is likely to be weak in zoölogy, weaker still
+ in his general knowledge of the Elizabethan drama, and completely
+ ignorant of the principles of rhythm in English versification. It
+ is probably safe to ignore his knowledge of ancient history. Of
+ course I am speaking of general tendencies; for chemists are no worse
+ than engineers, or mathematicians, or classical scholars. Effective
+ knowledge is professionalised knowledge, supported by a restricted
+ acquaintance with useful subjects subservient to it.
+
+ This situation has its dangers. It produces minds in a groove. Each
+ profession makes progress, but it is progress in its own groove. Now
+ to be mentally in a groove is to live in contemplating a given set of
+ abstractions. The groove prevents straying across country, and the
+ abstraction abstracts from something to which no further attention is
+ paid. But there is no groove of abstraction which is adequate for the
+ comprehension of human life....
+
+ The dangers arising from this aspect of professionalism are great,
+ particularly in our democratic societies. The directive force of
+ reason is weakened. The leading intellects lack balance. They see
+ this set of circumstances, or that set; but not both sets together.
+ The task of coordination is left to those who lack either the force
+ or the character to succeed in some definite career.... The point is
+ that the discoveries of the nineteenth century were in the direction
+ of professionalism, so that we are left with no expansion of wisdom
+ and with greater need of it. Wisdom is the fruit of a balanced
+ development. It is this balanced growth of individuality which it
+ should be the aim of education to secure.”
+
+A philosophy which reduces learning to mere efficiency, makes of
+education only a means to something other than personal development.
+It sees each good as an economic good, a means only, making everything
+exist only for the sake of something else to be obtained. But there
+are goods which exist for their own sakes and one such good is human
+excellence.
+
+In the words of Dr. L. P. Jacks, “The civilization of power aims at
+the _exploitation of the world_, which is thought of as a dead or
+mechanical thing, existing that men may exploit it. That of culture
+aims at the _development of man_, thought of as a citizen of a universe
+which can be loved, enjoyed and reverenced: education being the name of
+the process which leads him to love, enjoy and reverence it.”
+
+Another and even more serious danger is our passion for shortcuts.
+Business prospers by rapid turnover. Practical men demand quick
+results. We are an impatient people, always in a hurry. We have not
+time for the tedious labor processes necessary to produce well-made
+articles of handicraft. Consequently we have learned to be satisfied
+with hastily and cheaply made commodities which somewhat resemble the
+real articles and will do just as well--for the time being. Why should
+we not buy cheap furniture, when we expect to move every first day of
+October? Why not wear garments made of shoddy, when everyone knows
+the fashions will change even before shoddy can be worn threadbare?
+Why erect buildings that will stand for centuries in cities where
+everything is torn-down and rebuilt in a decade, and even churches
+move about following the shifting elements of the population which
+constitute their membership? Just why we are all moving about in such
+a hurry no one knows. Some people think that this restless haste is
+progress. Whether it is or not, it is certainly modern.
+
+But something of the shoddiness enters into the minds and hearts of
+men, when shortcuts are sought in matters of mental growth which are
+essentially processes of slow maturing. Education requires time. The
+only time wasted is that spent trying to save time. There should be no
+haste or crowding or cramming. Mastery of any subject requires years of
+familiarity with it. The formal training one receives in an institution
+is but the introduction. Most people never get beyond a mere bowing
+acquaintance with knowledge.
+
+A prominent American manufacturer, so we are told, once made the
+statement that if he wished to know anything he would employ an expert
+to tell him about it in five minutes. Among workers in adult education
+there is a demand for easy text books, primers which will give to
+people in a few pages and in words of one syllable the essentials of
+philosophy, psychology, literature and natural science. Simple and
+clear statement is always desirable. No author really knows his subject
+matter until he can “talk United States” in presenting it. But that
+is another story. People who can read nothing more profound than the
+tabloid papers are a menace to education. They only retard the progress
+of any class they enter.
+
+Yet there is a wide demand for tabloid information. We like outlines
+of history, psychology, philosophy; primers of relativity; ABC’s of
+atoms. Such books have value only for the student who after reading
+them consults the original sources. But what people want is education
+without effort, ready-made education. I recently saw an advertisement
+in which there was offered for sale “a whole library in one volume.”
+Another advertisement offers “The Essentials of a Liberal Education;
+Twenty Centuries of thought on your Library Shelf,”--one shelf is all
+that is required! And in addition the publishers will provide you with
+“easy reading courses.”
+
+The following example is typical of what happens to education when
+wisdom lifteth up her voice in the street. A full page advertisement
+appears in a Sunday newspaper. There is a picture of two successful
+business men looking at a newspaper. The article which has caught their
+attention reads, “R. P. Clark Made President of Big Mercantile Corp.
+Began as Office Boy 21 years ago.” Here are a few lines quoted from
+their comments,
+
+ “That fellow amazes me! Do you remember when he first came to us as
+ an office boy?... and all the other fellows had a head start on him
+ with their college degrees. He must have found an unusual way to
+ make up for his lack of schooling--he must have found a secret means
+ of improving his chances both in business and society. Clark knew
+ how tremendously he was handicapped by his lack of schooling and he
+ determined to find _a shortcut to education_. And this he found in
+ Elbert Hubbard’s Famous Scrapbook.”
+
+There you have it. I have never seen a more complete statement of the
+average man’s idea of education. Mastery of the tricks which bring
+early success; belief that there is somewhere a secret magic, knowledge
+of which will immediately transform one’s personality;--the shortcut.
+No appreciation of the fact that it is never information which
+transforms a person, but the persistent effort put forth to acquire
+it. Education is on the air, in these enlightened times one can get
+it anywhere--like bootleg whiskey. It is proposed now to give adult
+education by radio. All you need do to achieve scholarship is to turn
+it on, close your eyes, and go to sleep. You can get it without effort,
+without knowing that you are getting it, or just who is educating you.
+
+I mentioned earlier that one of the dangers to education in America
+is our weakness for propaganda. Few people know the difference
+between education and advertising. The latter is commonly spoken
+of as education by those engaged in it. I once knew an advertising
+manager for a fruit grower’s organization. He conceived a brilliant
+idea. Just as we have Health Week, Clean-Up Week, Fire Prevention
+Week, he arranged in various localities an Orange Eating Week. He
+told me that he could educate the public to eat as many oranges as he
+chose. Press agents are everywhere busy “educating the public” for all
+sorts of objects; to respect the rights of vested capital, to give
+money to build cathedrals, to vote a straight party ticket. I once
+attended a banquet given by an organization of manufacturers. There
+I met a splendid-looking elderly gentleman and was told that he was
+the attorney for the organization. As I had never before seen him, I
+inquired if he had offices in New York. My informant said, “Oh, no, he
+lives in Washington. His job is to educate Congress.”
+
+In spite of all this popular interest, or perhaps because of it, the
+cause of education is in a bad way. It is dangerous to encourage
+people to think they are educated when they are not, or to believe
+they are acquiring it when they are in fact getting something else.
+Much that passes for adult education serves only to make people more
+superficial and opinionated than they were before. It is very doubtful
+if the general level of our intellectual life has been raised by such
+knowledge as the public has gained. The public can read and we have
+with us the Hearst papers and the tabloids. Literacy has placed the
+bulk of the population daily at the mercy of the propagandist and the
+press agent. With libraries and colleges and high schools everywhere,
+and after a century of science, vast sections of the population can be
+swept by such movements as the Ku Klux Klan and Fundamentalism. State
+after state prohibits the teaching in its schools of such scientific
+knowledge as will lead to a belief in evolution. Crazy reform,
+fantastic religious innovation, political foolishness and unbalanced
+partisanship may at any time sweep over the country. Intelligence in
+this country makes a poor showing in competition with quackery and
+complacent ignorance for popular leadership.
+
+It is common to lay the blame for the present state of affairs at the
+door of the schools and colleges. Without doubt they must accept some
+measure of responsibility in the matter. In many instances the only
+alternative to a general slump in standards of scholarship has been a
+narrow academic pedantry. There has been much yielding to the pressure
+of popular prejudice, much display of conventional morality as a
+cover for second-rate educational activity. Faculties are well aware
+how little a student may know and get through college. The colleges
+themselves seem to have participated in the general cheapening of
+education by their generosity in granting honorary degrees. Almost any
+one who is successful in business or prominent in politics becomes a
+“Doctor.” Erasmus in the fifteenth century, even though he had already
+become probably the leading classical scholar of his times, studied
+and taught at Paris for nine years before he was granted his doctor’s
+degree. When the late Mr. Bryan threatened to print all his college
+degrees on his card, in answer to the repeated statement that he was an
+ignoramus, the joke was really on the colleges.
+
+But too much is demanded of institutions of learning. Large numbers
+of students come to them with no background of cultural tradition,
+and they return to an environment which is distinctly hostile to
+intellectual pursuits. The public clamor that some one educate us in
+spite of ourselves is only another way of shouting, “We have piped
+unto you and ye have not danced.” The ultimate responsibility for the
+condition of education rests upon the average members of society,
+and it is reducible to a moral factor. Carlyle once said that people
+could only be taken in by quacks when they had a certain element of
+quackery in their own souls. When multitudes regard education merely
+as a shortcut to financial success, or as a device for appearing to be
+something they are not, or as an instrument for converting others to
+their own partisan beliefs, they will of course get the “education”
+they desire.
+
+Once I thought that ignorance was an innocent thing, a sort of
+spiritual vacuum passively waiting to be filled with precious truths.
+Except in children ignorance is by no means an innocent thing. It is a
+very active element in human life. We must overcome strong resistances
+before we may begin to learn some things. We keep ourselves in
+ignorance because there are facts and truths whose existence we prefer
+not to admit. The man who strives to educate himself--and no one else
+can educate him--must win a certain victory over his own nature. He
+must learn to smile at his dear idols, analyze his every prejudice,
+scrap if necessary his fondest and most consoling belief, question his
+presuppositions, and take his chances with the truth. The greater the
+need of education, the stronger the resistance to it.
+
+Whether the present increase of interest in education is to be an empty
+gesture depends upon whether the thing demanded is really education.
+There is no one right way, and certainly each age with its special
+needs and peculiar industrial and cultural environment should make its
+own contribution to educational achievement. But there is something
+which belongs to no special time and to all times, a way of approaching
+our tasks or valuing experiences. No one who is merely a creature of
+his own times is really educated. There is conceivable a world in
+which,--great as are the historical accidents that separate them--a
+Socrates, or a Plato, or a Cicero, or an Erasmus, a Voltaire, a Goethe,
+a Huxley would be at home. Much as they differ, there is yet something,
+which the educated have in common, a quality of spirit, something that
+may not be defined, but that right-minded people recognize. We shall
+strive from various avenues of approach to envisage it, for to miss it
+is to miss all. It is the meaning of a liberal education.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+LIBERAL EDUCATION VS. ANIMAL TRAINING
+
+
+In a sense no living person is yet educated, for the learning process
+is never completed. But there must come a time when the process results
+in some differences in behavior. Often these differences seem to be
+small and irrelevant, amounting merely to added social grace or more
+correct use of language. Something more than this must differentiate
+the educated from the uneducated or so much human energy would not be
+expended in the effort to get education.
+
+When we inquire what the difference is, we find there is much
+confusion. In the process of education knowledge is acquired. Many a
+person’s education consists of what he has learned. May one possess
+much knowledge or information and remain uneducated? I know a physician
+who has great skill and wide professional information, yet he is
+essentially vulgar in his tastes and enjoyments and bigoted in his
+human relationships, and his judgments concerning most things are
+narrow and hasty and are determined largely by passion and prejudice.
+You feel that his learning has never become integrated with his
+personality. It is a property annexed to his estate over which he is
+an absentee landlord. It has made no changes in his general habits of
+thought and behavior.
+
+There are people whom no one would think educated, who yet have an
+astounding amount of information. They know all about race horses, or
+bridge, or baseball scores, or stocks and bonds. Many have a knowledge
+of such things which may be greater both in range and accuracy than
+that which some professional scholars have of their special subjects.
+
+Shall we say then that some kinds of knowledge have educational value
+and that others have not? But why should not all knowledge be equally
+education? Is there a psychological reason for the alleged difference
+or is the exclusion of some kinds of knowledge the result merely of a
+conventional attitude? Our discussion of education resolves itself into
+a philosophical problem.
+
+The issue of practical education versus the so-called cultural comes
+up whenever people are interested in the subject. Partisans of the
+latter type of learning are inclined to look down upon the former. They
+say it is not education but only skill and efficiency. They hold that
+education is scholarship and properly has to do with such subjects as
+the classics, the humanities, philosophy, etc., which discipline the
+mind and ennoble the spirit. This is the traditional view.
+
+Those who take the opposite view ask what earthly purpose can useless
+and sequestered learning serve? They are suspicious of education for
+“refinement” or the “genteel tradition.” Is it not the aim of the
+pursuit of knowledge to enable one to do something, to attain mastery,
+to equip the mind to function well in an environment which demands
+activity of us all? Is not anything well learned culture? An excellent
+statement of this point of view can be found in Huxley’s lectures on
+education.
+
+There has been much discussion of this question in the universities
+and colleges. There are those who deplore the decline of interest in
+the classics and philosophy. They say that institutions of higher
+learning are becoming mere “intellectual cafeterias,” that the change
+from classical education to an elective system embracing all sorts of
+vocational courses is a distinct loss, inasmuch as the knowledge so
+acquired lacks coordination and balance, while specialization crowds
+out the general and cultural subjects that form the foundation of
+education.
+
+On the other hand, why should not a University teach anything
+that people wish to know? There was once resistance to including
+the sciences, chemistry and physics and biology. The liberalizing
+effect and cultural value of these subjects is now recognized, and
+their usefulness is a social gain. Then why not domestic science,
+agriculture, mechanics, business methods? What is wrong with the
+schools of business at Harvard and Columbia?
+
+A similar issue exists in secondary education. It is often said that
+high schools pay too much regard to college entrance requirements,
+since only a small portion of graduates expect to continue their
+education. The students have gained only a most superficial
+introduction to the classics and have learned nothing practical.
+Schools of trade, commerce, and of technology are increasing in number
+and the movement for such training is guided by principles of education
+very different from those of the classical tradition.
+
+Those of us who are interested in adult education meet the same
+problem. Writing of worker’s education Dr. Horace M. Kallen says,
+
+ “... The complexity of the tasks of any union official has grown so
+ great, their variety so considerable, that it is no longer possible
+ for an official merely to pass from the worker’s bench to the
+ official’s desk and completely discharge his duties.... Schools
+ would have to be provided analogous to the schools of business
+ administration maintained in the colleges.... Out of the instruction
+ there would in the course of time emerge a communicable permanent
+ record, on which the necessary accessories of books could be built.
+ Such a school of officials would be a nucleus from which the
+ educational process could ultimately radiate into every shop.
+
+ “Labor education would finally thus become conversant with control
+ rather than escape. In such a conversancy more and more of the
+ energies now seeking relief in the vapors of the social mechanisms
+ of escape, would find satisfactory enchannelment in the technique of
+ control.
+
+ “It is the essential function of labor education to envisage, to
+ forecast and to enable this transition. The various arts would then
+ develop no longer as compensations against, but as expressions
+ and prophetic fulfillments, as criticisms and mitigations of,
+ the processes of this movement; they too would more largely be
+ coterminous with industrial life.”
+
+Dr. Kallen would probably not go so far as to say that the sole aim
+of Labor Education is to equip the members of the working class
+with such knowledge as will enable them to master the industrial
+environment and change the social system. But there are those who hold
+such a view, just as there are those who hold that the worker should
+receive only such education as will make him a more competent workman.
+Both views, one held by extreme radicals, the other by conservative
+capitalists, have in common the belief that education for workers is
+purely practical training. “Cultural” subjects are sometimes studied,
+and there is a lively demand for them, but the tendency is to regard
+this interest as an “escape” from reality into a world of fanciful
+contemplation and mere verbal exercise. It is an intellectual luxury,
+a form of entertainment or inspiration to which a worker is entitled,
+but it is an interest which is a little under suspicion of being
+“bourgeois.”
+
+Hence in all phases of education, this issue is debated. The issue
+is inevitable in a time like the present, with a classical tradition
+surviving in an industrial civilization. Have we any need in the modern
+world of cultural traditions which have their origin in antiquity?
+Should we or could we dispense with all educational values except those
+which are coterminous with the present industrial situation?
+
+Wherever such an issue arises, I have learned to suspect both sides. As
+a rule both are based upon a common presupposition which is an error.
+Here the presupposition is that the important factor in education is
+the question what is to be taught, rather than the spirit of learning
+itself. Education is conceived of as knowledge acquired. Attention is
+fixed not on the learning process through which an individual becomes
+reoriented to his world, but upon the end result, something fixed
+and done, a certain amount of information stored up. Is this what we
+mean by learning? Is it receiving and memorizing a given something
+either cultural or practical? Or is it an adventure in any kind of
+truth-seeking which changes the quality of one’s future experience
+and enables one to behave not merely efficiently but wisely, with a
+broad view and a sympathetic understanding of the many ways in which
+men have striven to create meaning and value out of the possibilities
+of human life? If this last is correct, the real question is not what
+shall be learned but how and why and to what end. Is learning a venture
+in spiritual freedom that is humanism, or is it a routine process of
+animal training? Both cultural and practical knowledge may be reduced
+to animal training--and they generally are. It is there that the issue
+between them arises.
+
+To my mind, an educated person is not merely one who can do something,
+whether it is giving a lecture on the poetry of Horace, running a
+train, trying a lawsuit, or repairing the plumbing. He is also one who
+knows the significance of what he does, and he is one who cannot and
+will not do certain things. He has acquired a set of values. He has a
+“yes” and a “no,” and they are his own. He knows why he behaves as he
+does. He has learned what to prefer, for he has lived in the presence
+of things that are preferable. I do not mean that he is merely trained
+in the conventions of polite society or the conformities of crowd
+morality. He will doubtless depart from both in many things. Whether
+he conforms or not, he has learned enough about human life on this
+planet to see his behavior in the light of a body of experience and
+the relation of his actions to situations as a whole. Such a person is
+acquiring a liberal education and it makes little difference whether he
+has been trained in philosophy or mechanics. He is being transformed
+from an automaton into a thinking being.
+
+The antithesis of liberal education and practical training arises in
+part out of a misunderstanding on both sides of a principle stated
+in Aristotle’s “Politics.” In this book there is set forth the
+philosopher’s theory of education. He is seeking for his times just
+what our practical educators seek for ours--to train youth to deal
+masterfully with existing conditions. Unlike many moderns he sees
+that such training applies to the whole personality. This is evident
+for example in his discussion of music where he considers the general
+psychological effects of various kinds of rhythm.
+
+There were three important facts in the environment of the Greek youth
+to which the educator had to assist the student to adapt himself.
+The way in which the intelligent person faced these facts was the
+meaning of liberal education in Aristotle’s time. There was first
+a psychological fact. Popular myth was ceasing to function as an
+explanation of the processes of nature and as a basis for the control
+of behavior. Fortunately for the Greeks, no priestly class had gained
+control of their spiritual life. Stories of the doings of the gods
+were coming to be regarded as mere poetry, in the modern sense of the
+term. Philosophers did not hesitate to subject religious beliefs to
+the judgment of reason. The assertion had been made that “Man is the
+measure of all things.” A spirit of intellectual freedom prevailed
+that was unique in ancient times, I might say in any time. There was a
+disposition to investigate, to classify natural phenomena, to speculate
+upon their nature and causes. Men were faced with the necessity of
+thinking their experience through to find meanings which elsewhere were
+a matter of myth and folkway. Thought must be clarified and made exact
+if behavior was to be guided by reason. Philosophy, which included the
+beginnings of science, and education were almost the same thing,--the
+search for the good life. I will discuss this point further in a later
+lecture.
+
+The second fact concerning which the Greek youth must learn to behave
+intelligently was political in its nature. It was the existence of an
+aristocratic democracy in which as a citizen he must participate with
+important results for both himself and the state. The free citizen must
+have learned to judge what is good.
+
+The third fact which challenged the educator was sociological; it was
+the existence of slavery. This institution, which in the end was one
+of the causes of the breakdown of ancient civilization, seemed to be
+perfectly natural to the philosopher. Aristotle thinks that some people
+are slavish by nature. He has no thought of educating such persons,
+though they may be trained to perform their tasks well. All should be
+so trained that they may live happily and well in the stations in life
+where they are. As most mechanical labor was performed by slaves, and
+by hirelings whose social status was not very different from that of
+the slave, the Greeks candidly despised mechanic arts. Knowledge of
+them was thought to be a slavish kind of skill. Aristotle likewise
+looked down upon trade and commerce as debasing the mind, just as hard
+labor was thought to demean the body. The free man must be so trained
+that his privileges, his leisure and authority over others would make
+for general human happiness. This education of the free man was called
+“Liberal Education.” It was the education of a leisure class. It was
+a training for leadership and responsibility: not a mere initiation
+into the idealogy of an exploiting class, together with the passwords
+current in exclusive circles. Neither did it mean--at least for the
+ancient Greek--the accumulation of dead and inconsequential knowledge
+the only purpose of which was a pedantic display of erudition. In ages
+that followed, the study of the classics tended to become something of
+this sort. But this tendency marked a decline, a loss of the spirit of
+liberal education as it had once existed. Athenian education, in spite
+of the institution of slavery, developed men of wisdom and nobility
+of spirit and civilization of interest in such numbers that ancient
+Greece became the pioneer of western civilization and has remained the
+inspiration and guide to men in most of their efforts to attain a life
+of reason and beauty.
+
+The fact that the liberal tradition had its origin in a society in
+which slavery prevailed has left traces in education which persist
+even to the present time. It is one of the things that cause people
+to believe that there are different types of education proper to
+different social strata. Education becomes a mark of distinction. It is
+for the privileged few. It is itself a privilege and a kind of vested
+interest. There is a higher knowledge and a lower knowledge. In part
+this distinction goes back to primitive times. In early civilization,
+everyone learned to do everything which the people of the tribe could
+do. There was no specialization; all alike learned to fish, to hunt,
+to fight, to dance. The primitive magic was associated with every
+human interest and every form of activity, and for every type of
+performance there was a magic formula. In time it became the special
+function of the elders and medicine men to remember the formulae and
+pass them on to their successors. Knowledge of the formulae became the
+special privilege of the priestly class. Knowledge of labor processes
+remained with the mass. The former was higher knowledge and developed
+into ancient wisdom. In certain religions it led to an esoteric
+intellectualism. The distinction gains emphasis among peoples like the
+Hebrews, Moslems and Christians whose religion is the “Religion of the
+Book.” The “Higher Knowledge” is now a divine revelation preserved
+in the Sacred Book. With each of the peoples mentioned religious
+scholarship becomes the basis of all learning, and dominates education.
+Any accretions of general culture which are acquired and added to
+theology, become tinctured by it. A priestly tradition is mingled with
+the classic culture as the philosophy of Aristotle becomes elaborated
+first by the Arabs, and then by the Rabbis and Christian scholars of
+the Middle Ages. What Aristotle meant simply as the training of the
+free man in self-mastery, in time became a professionalized “higher
+learning,” a sequestered scholarship largely unrelated to the existing
+environment.
+
+Mediæval education became scholasticism. It was still a higher
+knowledge set apart from other interests: it did not include
+proficiency in the arts of industry, but rather in book learning and
+in disputation. Liberal it was not, though it still in a sense had to
+do with leisure. The good life had become one of pious contemplation.
+Aristotle’s free citizen was displaced by the cenobite and the
+candidate for holy orders. The life of Reason became one of skill
+in the formal logic with which a given system of life and thought
+was elaborated. Scholastic education made possible a high type of
+scholarship; it carried very far its training in the subtleties of
+argument. But it exhausted itself in a world of abstractions which it
+mistook for realities. It was a discipline, not a voyage of discovery.
+It was a matter of routine learning by memorizing. Its aim was to
+mold the mind of the student to a fixed type. It placed him in an
+environment so manipulated as to determine his habits of thinking once
+for all, to give support to required beliefs. It was education by
+indoctrination. It developed a type of mind which could be depended
+on to do and say the expected thing on the expected occasion, one
+which would hold certain desired convictions and no others. For such
+an educational system, learning was accepting and retaining something
+provided in advance. In this sense it was passive. Mentality was the
+product of environment. Scholastic education though it dealt with
+“things of the spirit” was from one point of view “animal training.”
+
+In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the scholars of the
+Renaissance turned from theological education to human letters. A
+revival of interest in the literature of antiquity became a sort of
+passion. Those who sought through the study of Greek and Latin poets,
+essayists, and philosophers to revive the spirit of the lost pagan
+civilization were called Humanists. They had a philosophy of education
+very different from that of scholasticism which was at that time on
+the decline. There was the promise that education might again become
+liberal, in the sense I use the term. Wherever the “New Learning”
+was carried it had a liberalizing influence. It roused the hostility
+of “obscurantists” and created a jolly row in many institutions of
+learning. It awakened pagan ideas throughout Italy, even in high
+ecclesiastical circles. It was bringing “refinement” to France. It
+was receiving something of a triumph in Northern Europe under the
+leadership of Erasmus, when the Reformation again turned general
+interest to theology. What the result of this humanistic movement in
+education might have been had it gone on unchecked no one can say. No
+one now believes it could have been what its leaders expected. They
+tried to produce an imitation in their own times of the manners and
+ways of men who had lived centuries earlier in a wholly different
+environment. Such an attempt of course is futile. But it is conceivable
+that as larger and larger numbers of people achieved freedom in the
+modern world a liberal education might have done in our day what the
+Greeks sought to do in theirs--lay the foundations of freedom in a
+well-considered basis of philosophy. In that event the whole of modern
+education might have been vitalized by a cultural tradition which could
+take into account the conditions under which modern men live and work
+without degenerating into narrow utilitarianism and mere mechanical
+efficiency.
+
+What chiefly survived from the Renaissance--at least in Protestant
+countries--is the traditional education, in which the ancient classics
+are taught as tedious drill in language with the aim of improving the
+student’s literary style, also of disciplining his soul by compelling
+him to do something disagreeable, and finally so that he may be able
+to repeat a few Latin or Greek phrases, remember the names of a few
+ancient writers and perhaps if he has been very diligent, retain a
+sufficient number of vague memory traces to enjoy a book like Professor
+Erskine’s “Private Life of Helen of Troy.”
+
+But to call this liberal education requires both humor and imagination.
+Little attempt is made to get behind the language into literary
+appreciation, or back of the literature to the ways and values of
+ancient life and the wisdom of the ages, or to see the relation of
+such wisdom to the problems of living in the modern world. Traditional
+education has again become an artificial thing, aloof from reality,
+a higher knowledge set apart by itself. That is, if one may call it
+knowledge at all. Most college graduates after a few years do not
+remember enough Latin to enable them to translate their own diplomas,
+so badly are the classics taught, even as mere language drill.
+
+Much of the spirit of scholasticism, though little of its thoroughness
+and subtlety, persisted in the later Protestantism. Its influence
+necessarily tended to make this teaching of the humanities formal and
+innocuous. After the Renaissance, members of the nobility and gentry,
+and later an increasing number of the middle class, sought higher
+education for its refining influence, as an adornment rather than as a
+way of life. The result is a culture that is for the most part external
+to the sphere of our activities and interests, something borrowed, not
+won; seldom an expression or valuation or glorification of modern life.
+This also is a routine and a moulding to type. It is again a form of
+animal training.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+The development of science in the nineteenth century led to a demand
+for the education requisite for modern life. The application of science
+to industry created a new environment. New knowledge was required and
+new mental habits must be formed if there was to be effective control.
+Natural science gave men a new intellectual discipline and a new
+world-view. With it came a new hope for the race. Mankind need only
+learn the laws of nature and obey them to become wise and happy and
+good. The new knowledge dispelled ignorance and superstition and set
+the mind free. There was much criticism of traditional education, and
+much faith in the liberalizing effects of scientific training as well
+as in its practical results. Today scientific research occupies a most
+important place in education. In many colleges and universities it has
+almost supplanted the classical studies. No modern person can be really
+educated without some training in scientific methods.
+
+But science also may become mere animal training. Each science is a
+profession, acquired as a technical training like learning a trade. Of
+things outside his own trade the scientist may be quite ignorant and
+lacking in curiosity. He is often unable to see the significance of his
+specialty for knowledge as a whole. Within his chosen field of study
+he may come to resent new discovery--especially if it fails to confirm
+some favorite theory. In some of the sciences, notably psychology,
+biology, medicine and the social sciences, there are intense partisan
+divisions, often rivalling in dogmatism and bitterness, those of
+theology. Each “school” develops its cult ideas, its jargon credo, and
+ritual. Herd opinion holds sway over scientists as over other men.
+Certain phrases and mannerisms are adopted, just as among Rotarians,
+because they show that one belongs to the crowd. The psychologist
+today, for instance, must boast his ignorance of philosophy and make a
+noise like a biologist. The advancement of knowledge is by no means the
+sole motive in scientific training; there is also much molding to type
+even though this latter objective is in conflict with the spirit of
+science itself.
+
+Much contemporary educational philosophy is openly and avowedly a
+technique of animal training; so much so that it quite properly
+borrows its pedagogical principles from animal psychology. It would be
+difficult to over estimate the importance of animal experimentation
+for modern theories of education. Schools of education are deeply
+interested in the psychology of the learning process. Education is
+learning, and learning is habit formulation. Habits are the acquired
+modes of response of men and animals. They may be organized in the
+nervous tissue by any environmental factors which “condition” certain
+reflexes; that is, chain certain responses to given stimuli. It is
+possible for an animal experimenter or an educator of children to
+organize the environmental situation in such a manner that definite
+systems of desired responses may be regularly obtained whenever a
+stimulus of a certain kind is given. A simple and well-known experiment
+which will serve to explain what we mean by the conditioned reflex is
+that of Pavlov. A hungry dog when shown meat secretes saliva. At the
+time the dog sees the meat a bell is rung. This is repeated a number
+of times until the dog will secrete saliva at the sound of the bell,
+without the presence of the meat stimulus. The saliva response, induced
+by the bell stimulus, is the conditioned reflex.
+
+It is said that all learning takes place after this fashion. An animal,
+a cat, may be placed in a cage, the door being so arranged that escape
+is possible only when the cat strikes a certain latch. After a period
+during which the cat makes all sorts of frantic random movements, the
+successful movement finally occurs and the cat escapes. The experiment
+is repeated and perhaps the period of futile activity will not be so
+long as at first. After a number of trials the cat will give up the
+random movements and at once unlock the door. The gradual shortening of
+the interval of time required for the desired response may be plotted.
+It is then called the animal’s “learning curve.”
+
+Such curves may also be made of human learning processes. It is said
+that there is no essential difference between this animal learning and
+our own learning whether it be to swim or play tennis, or to memorize
+a poem, or solve a problem in algebra, or to master the technique of
+a profession. One’s education thus consists wholly of one’s organized
+systems of responses, or habit patterns. We speak of education
+as the development of personality. But from this point of view
+personality is nothing but the sum total of an individual’s conditioned
+reflexes:--that is, it is merely the manner in which the organism has
+been taught to work. One eminent Behaviorist among the psychologists
+compares personality to the running of a gas engine.
+
+I will not enter upon a psychological discussion of this view of
+education, except to say that the method of animal training which is
+taken for granted is open to serious criticism. The theory proceeds
+on the assumption that _insight into the situation_ is not necessary
+to learning. The cat in the cage hits upon the successful gesture as
+a matter of pure chance. After a number of experiments, each said to
+place the animal in an identical situation, the successful action
+becomes “over determined,” and fixed as a habit. It is doubtful whether
+such training is learning at all. The animal--and conceivably the human
+being--need never take in the situation. The successful art, the more
+this learning process is perfected, degenerates into a mere gesture,
+related to the event in a purely external and arbitrary manner. It is
+difficult to see how educational methods guided by such a theory could
+do much to train the student in habits of independent judgment.
+
+Professor Wolfgang Köhler spent four years studying the intelligence
+of apes at the anthropoid station in Tenerife. His experiments with
+these animals followed a procedure quite the reverse of that we have
+been discussing. He arranged his experiments so that there could be
+no chance and no routine, so that the situation as a whole implied a
+definite action on the part of the animal, an action which would be
+natural to it once it gained insight into the situation. From simple
+tasks he moved to more complex ones, always keeping the moment of
+insight as the crucial factor in the experiment. An ape is placed in a
+cage and fruit is put outside beyond the animal’s reach. A stick has
+also been placed within reach. After vain attempts to reach the fruit
+with its hand, the ape suddenly sits quietly looking the situation
+over: it looks from the fruit to the stick, then seizes the latter and
+pulls in the fruit. Later the animal is required to choose between a
+long stick and a shorter one, then two sticks are put within reach
+which must be joined before success may be attained.
+
+From such tasks the animal is led on to those which finally test the
+limitations of its insight. So far as I know no use has yet been made
+of such psychological study of animal learning by our educators. But
+if we must resort to animal psychology in order to understand the
+processes of human learning it would seem that Köhler’s methods would
+be more suggestive to the educator than those which assume that the
+learner is throughout an automaton without understanding.
+
+The so-called “new psychology” has filled modern education with
+confusion. Fads and fancies of all sorts prevail, each with its
+psychological jargon. “Progressive” experimental schools everywhere
+give voice to “modern ideas.” In many such schools there is a minimum
+of discipline, pupils are encouraged to take the initiative in all
+things, to study what they like, and when they choose. Everything
+is made as easy and as interesting as possible, and there is much
+talk about permitting the student to express himself and develop
+his personality. So long as we confine our attention merely to the
+methods of teaching we have the impression that this “new” education
+is anything but standardized. We get a different impression when we
+turn to examine the ideals of scholarship, the valuations, and general
+outlook on life which the newer philosophy of education accepts
+uncritically. In fact very little thought is given to these matters.
+The prevailing interests and trends of a democratic, industrial age are
+taken as the ultimate criteria. It might almost be said that education
+has come to be regarded merely as a function of the environment.
+
+Now it is one thing to train a mind to deal effectively with its
+environment and to achieve some value in the modifications which it
+makes in that environment. It is a different thing to hold that mind
+is the product of the environment. A well-known psychologist says that
+the aim of his science is to predict and control behavior. He offers
+us the conditioned reflex as the means to any desired result, and says
+that if he could have full control of the environment of a given number
+of children, he would permit some one to select by lot the future life
+and career of each child, and he would form the mind of each according
+to the chosen pattern. Our modern environmentalists have more in common
+with mediæval scholasticism than they think. The aim of both is to
+produce an individual who will react under all circumstances according
+to a prearranged pattern.
+
+Scholasticism, as we have seen, consisted chiefly of memory drill and
+training in logic and disputation. Law and theology were sometimes
+studied, but proficiency in such subjects does not in itself mean
+that a man has acquired a liberal education. He may only have learned
+to do the conventional trick when the expected signal is given,
+much like a trained dog in a circus. The same must be said of much
+modern professional training. The scholastic spirit haunts the legal
+mind to this day. Also it is possible--perhaps usual--for one to
+study medicine, and never once get an idea of what medicine means to
+the scientist. Most people educated by school teachers and college
+professors are in fact trained in this way. Think of what passes for
+moral and religious training. With respect to the most important
+questions in life, people have been so “conditioned” that they do not
+try to solve problems as they arise, but to say and do the expected
+thing on occasion. I once heard a professor in a theological seminary
+instruct his class in the art of visiting the sick. The students were
+busy copying in their note books the speeches which it is correct for
+a pastor to make on such occasions. The following is typical of such
+instruction. “As you enter the sick-room it is well to say When God
+puts a man down on his back, it is so that he may look up into Heaven.”
+
+In such habit formation, learning is mere repetition. There is nothing
+of independence of judgment, no reflection on ends, no development of
+the capacity to deal with new situations. The better one is trained the
+more automatic one’s behavior becomes. And here we see the limitations
+to much so-called practical education,--“education for work and for
+life.”
+
+Yes, but do we live simply to do things and to serve, to perform,
+however well, the tasks required by our times? Is all the world a
+stage, and are men merely actors who have learned well or poorly the
+lines written for them by someone else or dictated by necessity? And
+is there to be no understanding of the meaning of the part we play, or
+of the drama as a whole? Is no one through his education to contribute
+something original to the drama of life?
+
+It seems to me that the animal training theory rests upon two
+presuppositions, both of which are wrong. The first is that the mind
+consists of what it has learned, that is, that it is the product
+of environment. This is really not a psychological doctrine, but a
+metaphysical assumption. It is the mechanist theory; an idea which
+works well as scientific method, but which leads to false conclusions
+when taken as a description of ultimate reality.
+
+The second presupposition is a by-product of present-day industrial
+democracy. It is that education is a means to efficient service, with
+its rewards, getting on, general prosperity, etc. But is industry
+the end and aim of our existence? It is said that man if he is to
+be happy must be able to express himself in his work. I would not
+dispute this statement, but it is important to consider what it is
+that finds expression in one’s work. If work, in addition to being the
+means to some material end or bodily good, is also to be a form of
+self-expression, then the point of interest is the kind of selfhood, or
+quality of experience expressed. Then work exists for education, not
+education for work.
+
+Something is possible to mankind, which transcends work and by which
+work itself is valued. As mere craftsmen we lose the sense of what
+good workmanship is and become the blind slaves of necessity or of
+desire the moment that education ceases to be the goal of labor. I
+do not mean merely that we learn by doing. That is the way animals
+learn and it is all they learn. By repeated performance an individual
+learns how to do a task, but he does not thereby learn what to do, nor
+why it is done. Education has to do with insight, with valuing, with
+understanding, with the development of the power of discrimination,
+the ability to make choice amongst the possibilities of experience and
+to think and act in ways that distinguish men from animals and higher
+men from lower. The ancients thought of education as the attainment of
+the virtues, wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. It is the pursuit
+of that knowledge which gives self-mastery. It is an interest which
+is never exhausted, but grows always broader and richer. It consists
+not in learning tricks but in developing ourselves. It is a victory
+won in some secret chamber of the mind which gradually transforms the
+whole personality and reveals itself as an indefinable quality in
+every word and act. It is a spiritual awakening; and if this awakening
+does not come, a person is not being educated however much he knows.
+I think it is the inability to win this psychological victory, or the
+disinclination to make the effort necessary to it, that accounts for
+the fact that some people cannot be educated. Though the change in
+the quality of the personality is indefinable, it is a very concrete
+fact in human life. Its presence is evident in the work of writers as
+different otherwise as Sir Thomas More, Galsworthy, Anatole France,
+Jonathan Edwards, Henry Adams, etc. There is a quality of the educated
+mind which may best be described as a kind of sincerity, and conversely
+the outstanding trait of ignorance is that of clever insincerity. The
+pathetic thing about the wrongly educated,--those who are trained
+merely to produce an effect, or get results, is that in the deeper
+human relationships they seldom know what sincerity is. Education is
+the antithesis of vulgarity.
+
+Directly and immediately, it is useless. It is a kind of living which
+is of value for its own sake, a personal achievement which possesses
+intrinsic worth. It is not _for_ anything. To subject it to an ulterior
+end--citizenship, efficiency, the economic emancipation of the working
+class, increased income; or to educate people for “character,” or to
+perpetuate a religious faith, or any other purpose however good, is to
+make education a means to something quite irrelevant. Such misuse shows
+that people are not interested in their education but in something
+else. Education, the development of people, is not a means, it is
+itself the true end of civilization.
+
+While education is not _for_ anything, indirectly it improves
+everything that people do. Make education the aim and meaning of
+living, and all becomes different. Experience has a new center of
+gravity. Facts fall into new and more significant perspective. Objects,
+distinctions, relationships, qualities, are seen which before passed
+unnoticed. And as personality does not exist in a vacuum but in
+the relationships established between organism and environment, no
+improvement of it can fail to make itself felt in the quality of one’s
+work. Animal training may give one the means to make a living; liberal
+education gives living a meaning.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+LIBERAL EDUCATION VS. PROPAGANDA
+
+
+Whoever is concerned about his education should be on his guard against
+propaganda. He who assists in the education of another should be doubly
+cautious. The temptation to convert people to our own particular
+cause, movement or belief is almost irresistible. An epidemic itch for
+manipulating the public has infected the whole population. Perhaps
+never was the business of “selling” ideas and interests of all sorts so
+common a practice or so cleverly done. Press agents, publicity experts,
+advertisers and propagandists have become a pest. Much of the news is
+“treated” for interests which may or may not be disclosed. Militarists,
+pacifists, prohibitionists, birth controlists, social workers, business
+interests, anti-vivisectionists, radicals, reactionaries and all kinds
+of reformers insinuate themselves everywhere like crawling insects.
+Every legislative body is over-run with lobbyists. Every government,
+our own included, fights with propaganda as deadly as poison gas.
+Churches have reduced even the spreading of the gospel to the level of
+advertising. And to judge by the popularity of one of the vulgarest
+books ever written about the founder of Christianity, a large number
+of churchmen are happy to believe that Jesus Christ was the world’s
+greatest salesman and business executive!
+
+It ought not to be necessary to say that propaganda is not education.
+But the confusion of the two is common. It is often very difficult
+to enlist the interest of people even in their own education if the
+propagandist motive is left out of it. I find that our students are
+often at first perplexed. They ask me, “What party or creed or social
+movement do you represent? What are you trying to convert us to?” I
+have even been asked why I lecture at all, if it is not my purpose to
+tell students what they should think and do. The idea of a course of
+study as an adventure in truth-seeking, an investigation deliberately
+planned without made-in-advance conclusions or ulterior aims, is
+difficult for many minds. If no partisan motive is apparent, students
+often suspect that there must be some dark and secret conspiracy.
+People like to have their instructors labeled and tagged. Otherwise
+they feel that they are not being given anything. They prefer to be
+told what to think.
+
+And of course everyone wishes to tell his fellows what to think. The
+general interest in our neighbor’s “education” rather than our own
+is responsible for much of the present confusion of education with
+propaganda. This is especially true in the education of children.
+Scarcely one person in ten believes children should be told the truth.
+Children are credulous and easily acquire habits which become fixed for
+life: hence the tendency to take advantage of their innocence and while
+giving them the instruction which it is now recognized that society
+owes them, to add something which certain people wish them to believe
+when they grow up. Consequently there has hardly ever been a time when
+education was not to some extent diverted into propagandist channels.
+Governments and churches and ruling classes and commercial groups have
+always sought to get their hands on the institutions for the education
+of youth and utilize them for their own interests. The tendency is
+universal. Radicals denounce the Fundamentalists, the capitalists and
+the Catholic Church for doing this sort of thing, and then do the same
+thing themselves; as for example, in the revolutionary propaganda that
+sometimes passes as “worker’s education,” the socialist Sunday School,
+the system of public education in Soviet Russia.
+
+The habit of speaking of propaganda as if it were education has
+grown with the activities of the advertising profession and other
+expert manufacturers of public opinion. Anyone with anything to sell
+“educates” the public to buy his product. The word is so commonly
+used for advertising that few question the legitimacy of such use. In
+fact the popularity of this use of the word education has a definite
+psychological cause. Many people would like to get their education
+by the easy method of reading subway advertisements. It is pleasant
+moreover to feel that we are being educated when we glance at the
+billboards on the way from New York to Philadelphia or look over the
+back pages in the Saturday Evening Post.
+
+I once heard an editor of a farm journal boast that his paper had
+educated the housewives of his state to buy cereal in packages
+rather than in bulk. A recent well-written book on the psychology of
+advertising by a gentleman who styles himself a “Public Relations
+Counsel” explains the technique of making propaganda. The author refers
+to such propagandist efforts as education, and says that the difference
+between education and propaganda is this: when your side of the case is
+given publicity, that is education; when your opponent publishes his
+side, that is propaganda.
+
+It is doubtful, however, if members of the advertising profession
+are the worst sinners in this respect. Nearly everyone with a cause
+to promote does the same. We often hear single-taxers, socialists,
+patriotic societies, or vegetarians, speak of their propaganda as
+education. In the report on the prohibition situation issued by the
+Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, the suggestion is
+made that there be a campaign of “education” in the interest of the
+enforcement of the Volstead Act.
+
+Although the educator and the propagandist are both concerned with
+the dissemination of information, they have nothing else in common.
+They use contrary methods and they strive for opposite goals. The
+propagandist is interested in _what_ people think; the educator in
+_how_ they think. The propagandist has a definite aim. He strives to
+convert, to sell, to secure assent, to prove a case, to support one
+side of an issue. He is striving for an _effect_. He wishes people
+to come to a conclusion; to accept his case and close their minds
+and act. The educator strives for the open mind. He has no case to
+prove, which may not later be reversed. He is willing to reconsider,
+to be experimental, to hold his conclusions tentatively. The result
+for which he strives is a type of student who will not jump at the
+propagandist’s hasty conclusions or be taken in by his catchwords.
+To the one “learning” is passively accepting something; criticism of
+the matter offered is not encouraged. To the other, learning comes by
+examining. The propagandist need have no respect for the personalities
+of those he manipulates. The educator must respect his student, since
+the development of personality is his aim. In the end the question is
+whether people are to be _used_ for purposes other than their own. This
+is the sole object of the propagandist; its successful achievement is
+the defeat of the educator.
+
+Even in the service of a good cause, propaganda makes for
+superficiality in both him who gives and him who receives it. The
+convert has seen the light. He is on the right side. He need have
+no more doubts or hesitation. Curiosity and further speculation
+are no longer necessary. Reasoning henceforth can become special
+pleading--mere rationalization, an array of clever plausibilities
+designed to strengthen the faith and protect the devotee against the
+danger that he may change his mind. He now becomes a propagandist
+himself, a lay preacher as it were, whose mission in life is to convert
+and uplift others. He begins to harp on one string. In his eagerness to
+convince he resorts to the obvious, the thing said for effect. He is
+more concerned with the force of his arguments than with the accuracy
+of his statements. He is so busy with the general good that he neglects
+to purify himself. With unwashed hands he breaks his bread and serves
+it to his neighbors. I have seldom seen a person who has spent years
+making converts, who has not lost in intellectual integrity. Emerson
+noted this trait in the abolitionists of his day. It is a quality which
+world menders of all types have in common. Sooner or later the passion
+to convert, like any other passion over-indulged, warps the whole
+personality. The propagandist becomes intemperate. He loses something
+in delicacy and sense of humor. There is in his manner a mixture
+of emotion and coercion and a kind of slyness. Finally from much
+repetition of stock phrases the great cause itself becomes hackneyed
+and professionalized. Most of the messages which men would carry to the
+masses slip through the propagandists’ fingers and dribble out before
+they arrive at their destination.
+
+I have tried to make clear the differences between propaganda and
+education. If I am correct, it follows that whenever the educator
+becomes a propagandist he gives up his proper function. I do not mean
+that a school teacher should not advocate political change or any other
+reform he chooses. He is a citizen as well as a teacher, and has the
+right to express his convictions, however unpopular they may be. But it
+is not as a teacher that he does so. Ordinarily the public insists that
+there are certain views that he may not express either in or outside
+his class-room. At the same time he is required to be the advocate of
+popular moral, religious and political prejudices, however erroneous
+he knows them to be. Public education suffers much from this lack of
+freedom, for it operates to keep independent minds out of the teaching
+profession. Unless any subject may be presented and every relevant fact
+discussed without fear or favor, the instruction offered students is a
+cheat.
+
+It is however in the process of teaching itself that the spirit of
+the propagandist may supplant that of the educator. It is much easier
+to appeal to authority than to experiment, to command assent than to
+awaken curiosity, to tell the student what he must believe than to
+wait for the maturing of his judgment. There are five devices commonly
+in use among propagandists which may defeat the effort for a liberal
+education. They are the fixation of ideas by repetition, the trick of
+over-simplification, insinuation by appeal to prejudice, distortion of
+fact, and coercion.
+
+Psychology has taught the advertising profession the selling power of
+mere monotonous repetition. At one of the stations of the Hudson Tube I
+counted five posters all displaying the same advertisement of a certain
+shaving cream. The advertiser had not leased so much space because of
+extravagance, nor was he afraid that people would fail to notice his
+advertisement if he displayed it on only one board. It was so large and
+vivid that the passerby could easily see it. His aim was to deepen the
+impression by repetition. For the same reason a flashing intermittent
+electric sign on which the same letters are illuminated again and again
+is more effective than one with a continuous light. Another example of
+this method is the poster containing the name of a popular cigarette
+together with the command, “Read this out loud.”
+
+Advertisement of this nature makes no attempt to argue or explain or
+persuade, or to call attention to the merit of the article for sale.
+Many commodities in common use owe their popularity not to the fact
+that people are persuaded that they are superior to a rival but because
+a trade word has become fixed in memory through endless repetition.
+
+A similar method is often used in selling ideas and movements.
+Santayana says, “A confused competition of propaganda is carried on
+by the most expert psychological methods--for instance, by always
+repeating a lie instead of retracting when it is exposed. A formula of
+this nature may not be a conscious lie, it need only be so fixed in
+the mind by long repetition that it becomes compulsive. The person who
+continues repeating it becomes unable to consider the facts which would
+contradict it.”
+
+Thus the religious propagandist will continue repeating an obsolete
+dogma long after its untruth is a matter of common knowledge. The use
+which propagandists make of rumor is another example of this principle.
+During the war we saw much of this sort of thing. The wildest
+fabrications were accepted uncritically; when everyone was repeating
+them it seemed disloyal to question their bases of fact. In any
+political campaign the editorials and speeches are made up largely of
+repetitions. Popular moral ideas are psychologically similar; we call
+them platitudes. In fact public discussion which is mostly propaganda
+of one sort or another consists almost wholly of monotonous repetition.
+Anyone who has had experience with an open forum will, I think, agree
+with me that the discussion from the floor--and not unfrequently the
+platform also--shows an amazing monotony of repetition. I have known
+men for years to gain the recognition of the chair and repeat the
+same phrases night after night, no matter what was the subject under
+discussion. We love routine.
+
+There is I believe less routine learning, less mere memory drill, in
+our schools now than in former years. I doubt if many students learn
+geography or history or the multiplication tables or Latin grammar
+in the manner I was made to learn these subjects. However, it is
+not in these subjects, which are at best the mere scaffolding of
+knowledge, that humdrum does the greatest harm. It is in its failure
+to stimulate genuine thinking about the important human interests that
+education commonly falls short of its liberalizing function. There is
+a dullness about sing-song repetition of the multiplication table or
+the recital of the names of the rivers of China, but it does not equal
+in monotony the uniformity with which college graduates will say the
+same things about politics, the protective tariff, the labor problem,
+the constitution of the United States, or the relation of commerce to
+culture. I recently heard a professor, who holds an important chair in
+one of our leading universities say that his institution strove not
+so much for scholarship as to develop a certain type of college man.
+No doubt he had in mind a desirable type of man, but any attempt to
+mould a group to a single form can succeed only at the expense of the
+individuality of the student. Moreover, such a goal naturally causes
+the authorities to adopt methods of drill and standardization. Whenever
+the aim of education is fixed in advance, it tends to propaganda and
+illiberalism.
+
+The habit of repetition develops a credulous and incurious mind. It
+produces a type of person who not only accepts his beliefs second-hand,
+but also tends to over-simplify any subject under consideration, and
+so never get to the bottom of it as an educated mind should strive
+to do. It is very convenient to stop speculation with a half-true
+generalization stated as the conclusion of the whole matter. We love
+big words; catch phrases are easy to remember and to repeat. Moral and
+religious teachers know this, hence their use of aphorisms. One does
+not stop to analyze an aphorism; it is self-evident, final.
+
+Propagandists and advertisers are also aware of this human trait, and
+they delight in making slogans for us. “I’d walk a mile for a Camel,”
+“Children cry for it,” “Four out of five now lose,” are examples of a
+type of advertising familiar to all. Recently an effort was made in New
+York to check the “crime wave” with a slogan. A poster addressed to
+potential robbers was displayed in various parts of the city containing
+the words, “You can’t win.” A comparison of the number of convictions
+with the number of crimes of violence would seem to indicate that this
+slogan had about the same measure of truthfulness as most others.
+
+Slogans used in commercial advertising are for the most part innocent
+enough. But there are slogans used in types of propaganda which are
+not innocent. I will discuss the distortion of fact later; my point
+is that the type of phrase-making we are discussing tends at best to
+close the mind. Every movement tends to dry up into a verbal cult
+with a fixed phraseology the repetition of which seems to satisfy
+the adherents’ hunger for truth. The thinking of most men consists of
+little more than the repetition of the phrases which characterize the
+group to which they belong. There are groups which regularly assemble
+to listen to their familiar verbal formulas repeated again and again,
+deriving much satisfaction from the time-worn phrases. Any deviation
+from regularity or omission of any part is resented in the same spirit
+that caused primitive men to hold that any deviation from the magic
+ritual was sinful. It was the observation of this wide-spread trait
+in many forms that led me to the conclusion that there is practically
+only one soap-box speech on socialism, one address on the principles
+of the single tax, one revival sermon, one type of campaign speech for
+each party. At least I find that most members of any movement all say
+the same thing. If one knows what kind of an “_ist_” a man happens to
+be and is familiar with the ritual of that “_ism_,” one can ordinarily
+predict what the man will say on any subject. Frequently propagandists
+do not recognize their own principles when they hear them stated in
+ordinary English.
+
+And once the cult phrases are thoroughly learned it is very difficult
+for an individual to learn anything more. This is why the teaching
+of any subject should never be permitted to take on a set form, for
+cult ideas reduce an issue or situation to a statement so simple that
+it is a mere caricature. Subjects that require exhaustive analysis
+and deep meditation or much more information than anyone possesses
+are settled with amazing finality by oracular-minded people. How many
+matters of vital importance are met with such phrases as “One hundred
+percent American,” “My country right or wrong,” “Every Bolshevik
+should be stood up against a wall and shot,” “Plenty of room at the
+top,” “Reward of Merit,” “Progressive,” “Reactionary,” “The cure
+for democracy is more democracy,” “Let the people rule,” “Down with
+capitalist exploitation,” “Labor produces all wealth,” “The demon rum,”
+“Godless evolution.”
+
+The habit which politicians, professional reformers and other
+propagandists have of appealing to popular prejudice in order to gain
+adherents is a well-known phenomenon of social psychology. Every
+political campaign is an orgy of this sort of thing. Mayor Hylan of
+New York, when his incompetence was exposed, diverted attention by
+denouncing the “interests.” In the same city a few years ago those who
+were opposed to modernizing the public school system stirred up a large
+section of the population with the assertion that the “Gary School” was
+a Steel Trust school. During the war men were elected to office not
+because of their record but according to how strenuously they professed
+their Americanism and denounced alleged pro-Germans and socialists. A
+“friend of the people” attacks Wall Street as a matter of course. Any
+man who questions the wisdom of the prohibition laws is immediately
+said to be in league with the “liquor interests.” In prohibition
+propaganda effective use was made of the fact that many brewers were
+of German descent. In the South the Ku Klux Klan is mainly anti-Negro,
+in the Middle West it is anti-Catholic. In the East it takes on an
+anti-Semitic coloring. It is by such appeals that multitudes are
+marshalled and led first in one direction and then in another, always
+to the temporary advantage of a group of leaders. Into all this an
+ulterior purpose, a quite personal interest is often insinuated. During
+the war I made a collection of advertisements in which all sorts of
+articles were urged upon the purchaser with the statement that in
+buying such goods the public was helping win the war.
+
+It is obvious that whenever a crowd movement is created its propaganda
+has a marked illiberal influence upon institutions of learning. During
+the war public education in this country suffered seriously. A spirit
+of intolerance often wholly irrelevant to the winning of the war took
+possession of many educators. Eminent scientists lost their heads and
+ceased to behave with that good judgment which people expect of a
+scholar in a critical situation.
+
+Such results of propaganda are not limited to times of warfare. I know
+a college where the work of every department was seriously disorganized
+for a semester by a religious revival in the town. The pressure of
+religious prejudices upon institutions of learning in this country is
+one of the most serious forces with which education has to contend.
+The hostility in the West and South toward the teaching of any other
+account of the origin of man than that contained in the book of
+Genesis, is not new. It is merely the giving of legislative support to
+religious dogma which strikes us as new. And that has also happened
+many times in history. Popular religion has always watched education
+with jealous eyes. However, there is one factor in the present
+Fundamentalist attack upon the theory of evolution which seems to have
+escaped general notice. There is revealed an attitude toward education
+in general which should give us concern because it seems to be held by
+many people who are not rural Fundamentalists. When those who conceived
+of teaching as imparting a doctrine--let us say of special creation
+or the authority of the Bible--found that students were being made
+acquainted with biological science and its various hypotheses regarding
+the evolution of species, they could not understand that science could
+be taught in any other spirit than that of theology. They still thought
+of teaching as imposing upon the uncritical student mind a system of
+belief, a rival creed but still something alleged to be a final truth,
+which must be accepted on authority. Persons who speak in this manner
+of teaching simply do not know what education is. How could a scientist
+go about teaching evolution in this way? Nobody but a propagandist
+ever teaches a theory. The scientific laboratory itself is a witness
+against such a philosophy of education. Here the student is exposed to
+the phenomena to be studied, and to the sources of information and is
+aided to discover the facts for himself and draw his own conclusions.
+Science learned by any other process is a mere pretense to knowledge. I
+suspect it was not the doctrine of evolution so much as permitting the
+student to draw his own conclusions from the facts that most disturbed
+the advocates of popular religious dogma. Yet few people saw the
+issue in this light. At the Dayton trial of the instructor who broke
+the statute passed by the legislature of Tennessee, chief emphasis
+seems to have been laid on the issue whether after all evolution is
+contrary to Genesis. Most people seem to have accepted without comment
+the Fundamentalist notion of what teaching is. The whole meaning of
+education is involved in this issue. Education is not the substitution
+of new creeds for old. Appeals to popular prejudice will continue
+to do harm to education so long as it is conceived of as “teaching”
+any beliefs whatsoever. As long as students are to be indoctrinated,
+naturally every group will wish its own propaganda taught.
+
+In this connection I should say a word about adult education. Those
+engaged in this branch of instruction are loud in their criticism
+of the propaganda which passes for education in school and college.
+Many of them have turned to adult education in order to spread some
+propaganda of their own. Teachers in this field are constantly
+tempted to yield to the prejudices of their students in order to
+gain popularity and keep up attendance. Each type of institution or
+special group has its peculiar prejudices and will insist that the
+instruction given in its classes be so presented as to lend support
+to its interests and beliefs. Where churches maintain classes, adult
+education will tend to take on a certain color. It will assume another
+in the trade union, still another when the appeal is to radicals. We
+have already seen that a school of adult education may be in fact a
+socialist theological seminary. Many others merely provide continued
+employment for people who had been professional Americanization
+propagandists in the hectic years that followed the war.
+
+A favorite method among propagandists is distortion of fact. It
+is difficult for anyone who takes an intensely partisan view of a
+situation to be honest with himself or careful about matters of
+fact. Respect for the truth is, I think, an acquired taste. And the
+propagandist is a special pleader. There is always the tendency to
+load the dice, to over-emphasize anything that lends support and to
+gloss over and explain away any fact that might weaken the case. Rumor,
+allegation, mere surmise, will, if it happens to be useful, to put
+out as fact established beyond the possibility of doubt. An excellent
+example of this practice is a statement recently issued by a committee
+of one of the large Protestant denominations attacking both the
+Governor of the State and the Mayor of New York. On the occasion of the
+latter’s visit to the South I quote a sentence or two.
+
+ “The South will be interested to know Mr. Walker’s connection with
+ New York’s odorous prize-fighting game and with those elements in
+ New York which are doing their best to murder American standards of
+ morality.... Let it remember the propaganda which is systematically
+ organized to incite to crime in the South and West in order that the
+ prohibition law may be overthrown by these criminal activities....
+ Let it remember that Governor Smith and his friends were the first
+ political group in America to introduce a religious issue into a
+ convention of a political party, an atrocious thing to do in a
+ country where all religions stand on the same basis.”
+
+Note how the impression is given that the Mayor’s alleged sympathy
+with those who wish to repeal the Volstead Act is a connection with
+propaganda systematically organized to incite to crime and undermine
+American morals. The reference to Governor Smith is typical of much
+propaganda.
+
+This method of championing causes is so common that it is almost
+impossible to get at the truth about any public question. I have very
+little interest in what is happening in Russia. If I had, I should not
+know what to believe. Spokesmen for both the Bolshevists and their
+enemies seem to be about equally unable to tell the truth.
+
+The pursuit of knowledge is the pursuit of the truth about something,
+and since propaganda is not the pursuit of truth, its influence upon
+educational institutions is illustrated by many of the text books on
+American History in common use in the Public Schools. When attempts
+were made to write the account of the American Revolution with
+fairness to both sides and, in the light of established fact, certain
+over-patriotic propagandists became much excited and thought they had
+discovered a pro-British conspiracy to deliver this republic again
+into the clutches of the British monarchy.
+
+Subject matter which is even remotely associated with popular
+dogmas of religion, morals, patriotism, is likely to be modified so
+as to appear to be in harmony with such dogmas when presented to
+students. Each religious sect has its own version of Church history.
+Radicals who wish to hold the environment--hence the present social
+system--responsible for human failure, are always inclined to accept
+uncritically the biological doctrine of the inheritance of acquired
+characters. Patriotism makes it almost impossible for students anywhere
+to gain a correct knowledge of the history of their own country. The
+moral interest inevitably influences the study of literature. We have
+already discussed the teaching of the classics. Their educational value
+consists chiefly in opening windows upon a way of life very different
+from our own. It broadens our sympathy with all that is human to gain
+an understanding of men who were inspired by ideals often the contrary
+of those held sacred in our own parish. Yet it is just this educational
+value which is commonly lost in the teaching of the classics,
+especially in Puritanical communities. The least significant books of
+antiquity, writings like Caesar’s Commentaries and Cicero’s political
+orations, are often selected as required studies. It is not an accident
+that the works most commonly studied are those least shocking to
+conventionally minded people, not those which give the student the
+best account of ancient civilization. Likewise in the teaching of
+modern literature, there is so much expurgation, censorship, evasion,
+that most students get the impression that literature is produced by
+Sunday School teachers for the edification of very nice people. If, as
+many believe, it is best to protect younger students in this manner,
+I think they should at least be led to understand what is happening.
+Otherwise they are likely to leave school convinced that their own
+one-sided and somewhat infantile view of life and letters is the
+correct and only possible view and so influence the public authorities
+to enact legislation establishing censorships over literature and art,
+designed to impose their own limitations upon everyone.
+
+Finally when opportunity is favorable or occasion requires it, most
+propagandists will resort to coercion. History has revealed this fact
+again and again. It has often been said that the martyrs of today are
+the persecutors of tomorrow. With the possibility of the seizure of
+power in sight, methods of moral suasion become irksome; they are too
+slow. Men must be forced to do what is good for them. Propaganda is
+designed to gather a crowd to the support of an idea. I have shown
+elsewhere that when the crowd mind appears any group will practice
+coercion if it can. Hardly a generation passed after the Edict of
+Milan, setting Christians free from persecution, before the Christians
+themselves practiced persecution. The French Revolution set up a
+guillotine in the name of liberty, equality and fraternity. New England
+pilgrims of religious liberty persecuted Quakers and other “heretics.”
+Radicals proclaim their faith in industrial democracy, free speech, the
+brotherhood of man, and the Bolsheviks gain power by a coup d’etat, and
+hold it by means of a policy of terror. Santayana says that the many
+propagandas which today float in the blue sky of liberalism are only
+waiting to show their true colors and resort to open attack and that
+whoever is victorious will make an end of liberalism. When physical
+force is not in actual use, it hides just around the corner. In much
+moral suasion there is a note of intolerance and of invasion. The man
+who knows he is right puts you always on the defensive.
+
+Even commercial advertising frequently reveals this spirit. Perhaps
+advertisers got the idea from the posters used by the government
+during the war. We all remember the commanding figure of Uncle Sam,
+finger pointed at our faces and beneath the figure the words, “_You_
+buy Liberty Bonds.” Many advertisements now seek to command in such
+a manner. We are ordered to buy this and that--not asked if we want
+it. Or our privacy is otherwise invaded. I recently saw on a subway
+platform an advertisement of soap which contained these words, “Are you
+clean or only nearly clean?”
+
+When a crowd of world reformers becomes a crusade, men do not confine
+themselves to asking impertinent questions. They are not even deterred
+by constitutional guaranties of personal rights. The storm rages
+until it blows itself out and leaves behind only the debris of what
+before had been good feeling among men. When a crusade is on--and
+there are usually several going at the same time in a democracy like
+ours--educational institutions are pressed into its service, and are
+forced to take sides, or at best maintain a precarious middle of the
+road policy. This is not the task of those interested in education.
+They are not “in the middle of the road.” They are not on the trampled
+highway at all. Their task, while others are wrangling over unreal
+issues that today take their toll of life and tomorrow are forgotten,
+is to keep the lights of civilization burning, to humanize their own
+behavior with reasonableness and good taste.
+
+As Emerson said, history has been mean: all nations have been mobs.
+The populace runs after this passing cause and that popular hero. To
+the populace your rejection of popular standards is a rejection of
+all standards. But there is a time in each man’s education when he
+arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance, that imitation is
+suicide, that he must take himself for better or for worse. All men
+preen themselves on the improvement of society and no man improves.
+Society never advances, it recedes as fast on one side as it gains on
+the other. Society is a wave; the wave moves forward, but the water
+of which it is composed does not. Whoso would be a man must be a
+non-conformist.
+
+Such a suggestion as this at once meets serious objection. It is
+contrary to the habits of this busybody age. Many will ask, how
+can we have done with propaganda? We live in the age of publicity
+and organization, of causes and needed reforms. Great movements
+challenge our complacency and invite our support. What, without these
+interests, could we live for? How could we accomplish anything for the
+common good? Is not the educated person as you depict him aloof and
+ineffective, a monastic sort of person who disdains the common ways
+and devotes his days to idle contemplation? And have you not yourself
+said again and again that intellect does not exist as a sequestered,
+inactive thing or end in itself, but that thinking is a part of doing?
+How then can intellect be trained in indifference to the affairs of men?
+
+But I have not argued that one seclude himself. Is there nothing to
+occupy the modern man except to stuff himself with half-truths and
+regulate society? Does existence lose its value at the mere suggestion
+that man mind his own business? What I have said is that a person
+cannot educate himself by filling his head with propaganda.
+
+I do think people of our age are too much devoted to causes and not
+enough to their own education. Perhaps I should say that people’s
+devotion to causes is too narrow, too impatient, too uncritical.
+Doubtless we should serve our cause better if we stopped to look before
+we leap. I am not sure that ignorance, however devoted and active, ever
+accomplishes much good for mankind.
+
+I might ask in turn, do our propagandas often get the results expected?
+Look at pacifist propaganda, or the slogan about the war to end war,
+look at socialist propaganda today after a half century and more of
+it, consider prohibition. The intellectuals of our generation have
+exhausted themselves running after this and that new sociological
+magic. And there is a general feeling of frustration and futility.
+Where progress has been made in our times, it has been in matters
+that do not lend themselves easily to propaganda; success had been
+achieved in the arts and sciences. Intellect has failed when playing at
+leadership of social movements.
+
+The ends sought by propaganda may be and often are good. But education
+is also an end. We are not required to occupy ourselves with any cause
+to the extent that we fail to educate ourselves. The first social
+obligation of any man is his own education. I am a mere muddler and
+a nuisance if I act on the principle that I have any obligations to
+society that go beyond my knowledge of means and ends and of good
+and evil. Social service should be a by-product of education. I do
+not imagine that Socrates or Erasmus sought education in order that
+they could be more useful to society. Social obligation or no social
+obligation, you and I have the right to such education as we have the
+native intelligence to acquire. We have that right because we are
+the kind of animals we are. No cause is more important than this. Let
+us serve where and when we can, but let us not surrender our mental
+integrity for any man’s sake.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+LIBERAL EDUCATION VS. BOOK LEARNING
+
+
+Is education something one can “get” in an institution? We are seeking
+to discover what an educated person is like,--as Plato would say, to
+“find” the educated man. Whether the learning process takes place
+in an institution or out of it is from this point of view a matter
+of small interest. I should like to picture the liberally educated
+individual as a mellow amateur, competent and well-informed, but with
+all natural and human, wholly at ease with his knowledge and master
+of his technique; one whose thinking is play and whose mind does not
+squeak as it runs along. But there frequently appears in educational
+circles a professionalism that is rather formidable and terrifying.
+I do not mean the specialized knowledge requisite for the so-called
+learned professions. One may be highly trained professionally, and like
+William James and Mr. Justice Holmes, retain the spirit of the amateur
+always. By professionalism I mean a certain artificiality of manner,
+bookishness, over-strictness in regard to petty rules, a disposition
+to identify education with the display of just that knowledge which
+the educated are conventionally supposed to possess. Many people think
+of education as something “high-brow,” a fastidiousness which belongs
+to the élite. There are those who give the impression that education
+is a thing of books and schools and formalities; and that there is a
+recognized fraternity of the finished products of the system. As proof
+that one belongs to this fraternity there are degrees and credits which
+show that the candidate has passed certain examinations and has done a
+required amount of reading. We have seen that people may seek education
+because they hope it will give them a certain prestige. I once heard
+a man say, “I’d give ten thousand dollars if I only knew Greek.” I
+wondered why Greek had such value in his eyes. I learned that he had
+been in the company of two elderly men, one a clergyman and the other a
+physician. He was humiliated because of his ignorance when the two fell
+to discussing some Greek text reminiscent of college days. It never
+occurred to him that he could secure a few text books and acquire this
+coveted knowledge in his spare time whenever he chose to do so.
+
+People persist in thinking that education comes to a man by virtue
+of his attendance at some place where it may be “got.” We frequently
+hear someone say, “I _had_ so many years of Latin,” or “I _took_
+mathematics,” or “I did not _get_ much history.” Formal education,
+which is book knowledge acquired in a school,--this possession which
+men measure and grade and standardize,--may or may not be an aid to
+general culture. The thing I mean by liberal education is too elusive
+for the man with the yard stick.
+
+With the modern theories of learning there has come some difference
+of opinion regarding the educational value of books. Traditional
+education consisted almost wholly of book knowledge. Knowledge of the
+books written about a subject was rated as familiarity with the subject
+itself.
+
+There is a recent tendency, both within and without institutions of
+learning, to skim over as many as possible of the latest books. This
+leaves little or no time for the great books, knowledge of which is
+essential to a liberal education. In the library of a very up-to-date
+writer on sociological and economic subjects, I did not find a single
+book, except a few school texts, written before nineteen hundred.
+Modern writers all seem to desire to express the movements of the day.
+But it is difficult to see how one’s judgment of the present can be
+very sound, if one has no background of the cultural traditions of the
+race. Ideas of life gained from an exclusive study of the present are
+necessarily second-rate. Professor John Erskine says, “To live only
+in the moment, to imagine only one’s own place was once thought to be
+the fate of the stupid. We have made it the ideal of education.... No
+college is liberal which trains its students to identify the excellent
+or the important exclusively with the contemporary.” He says that
+education should prejudice us in favor of authors who are wise, and
+that there have not been many great men nor many great ideas. One may
+acquire a liberal education from the reading of relatively few books.
+“The Student ... ought to know Hobbes; he ought to know Pascal, and
+Plato and Bacon and Homer, and Spinoza and Galileo, and Leonardo da
+Vinci.”
+
+And I would add that anyone pursuing his education ought to know
+Erasmus and Montaigne, Butler’s “Hudibras,” and something of Hume,
+Voltaire, Anatole France, and the best of the classic poets. This is
+not a great deal of reading. It can moreover be done in a leisurely
+manner, and this is important. Our modern habit of cluttering up the
+mind with all sorts of second-rate, up-to-date printed matter accounts
+in part for the jumpiness and hectic quality of the modern spirit. No
+one seems to take time for quiet reflection any more. Everyone is too
+busy keeping up-to-date, gaining a superficial knowledge of the latest
+thing, and before we can pause to separate the true from the false in
+it, it is already out of date and something still more “modern” is the
+fashion.
+
+There is a tendency among very modern educators to reduce book learning
+to a minimum. It is said that book knowledge is only hear-say,
+second-hand information. The student does not make a fact his own
+so long as he must take someone’s word for it. What books tell you
+prevents your finding out for yourself. You know an emotion only when
+you feel it, a fact when you deal with it, a truth when you discover
+it. “We learn by doing.” A leading progressive educator says, “The
+school of tomorrow is going to get away from mere reciting what has
+been got from books. That is, we are going to give up the notion that
+the school is the place where we assign certain set tasks and the child
+goes off and prepares those things and then comes back to convince us
+that he has done what was required.... In the school of the future,
+the child is going to live, really live. This means what he learns he
+learns because he needs it then and there.”
+
+This rather extreme form of protest against formal book learning is
+really an attempt to correct the opposite extreme. We all know persons,
+conventionally educated, who substitute reading for living, and the
+book for reality. There are those who never talk about events or ideas,
+but always quote what some book says about them, as if they believed
+that work, love, joy, pain, became fit subjects of contemplation
+only in print. The world of actions and things gives way to a world
+of words only. Human existence becomes a sort of grown-up children’s
+game of authors. Education becomes an evasion of the challenge of
+real situations. Emotion and fancy are exhausted in doing nothing. It
+becomes preferable to read about things than to experience them. The
+individual thinks he has acquired wisdom; he merely has a taste for
+reading and a good memory.
+
+In these days when educators are frantically striving to find some new
+method of teaching which will save democracy from mediocrity, it is
+the habit to blame the older education for any and all intellectual
+futility. I believe, however, that futile persons would be ineffective
+no matter what the method of instruction. The statement quoted above
+to the effect that in the schools of the future the children are going
+to live and are to stop reciting required lessons and learn what they
+need “here and now,” is a little like the platitude that one can learn
+more out of life than out of books, a saying which always flatters the
+illiterate. It seems to be thoroughly modern to believe that the best
+way to get an education is to stop studying and just _live_,--whatever
+that is.
+
+I am of the opinion, however, that anyone who can learn from life can
+also learn from books without spoiling his mind. There is a difference
+between learning from books and merely learning to repeat passages
+from them, and I had thought that in really learning from books one
+was learning from life. Whether one can get more information from
+books than from things depends somewhat on the books, also what it is
+one wishes to learn, as well as one’s capacity to learn. Manipulation
+of objects--doing--has no more educational value than repeating
+words. Either may become a mere routine exercise. Education is the
+organization of knowledge into human excellence. It is not the mere
+possession of knowledge, but the ability to reflect upon it and grow in
+wisdom. It would seem that as few people acquire wisdom from practical
+experience as from books.
+
+The high-school educated multitude, which prefers the radio to reading,
+finds the tales of classic literature tedious except when presented in
+the “movies,” reads history only in outline, and natural science only
+when popularized in a series of ABC books, is probably correct in its
+feeling that books cannot teach it much; and what it is learning from
+life is manifest in the sort of life it lives. The habit of reading
+good books, ability to know the good ones from the inferior, capacity
+to enjoy books for the beauty and wisdom that may be found in them, are
+essential parts of a liberal education. A school that implants good
+habits of discriminating reading in its students is a good school. One
+that fails to do this is a bad school. The modern educational system
+has taught the public to read,--and the public reads mostly trash.
+
+That education in a so-called democracy may be official and
+professionalized and at the same time superficial and illiberal is
+manifest. Thomas Davidson, a pioneer teacher of adults in this country,
+expressed great hope in the promise of public education in America.
+But there is one fact about such intellectual life as there is in
+this country which seems to have escaped Davidson’s attention, I
+suppose because his own case was an exception. It is a fact which I
+believe may be one of the causes of the small influence which learning
+exerts in the daily life and thought and preferences of our people.
+Thousands of people say that their education is of no use to them in
+later years. It is an interest which they do not keep up but leave
+behind at the school-house door. They think that education belongs
+properly in the school, and except for some practical advantage most
+people seldom think of making any cultural achievement of their own
+outside the school. Most advance in scholarship in this country is the
+work of professionals, members of university faculties. Outside the
+institutions of learning, there is very little independent creative
+thought. Exception must be made of our literary men, but these too are
+professionals. There are almost no men of leisure who carry on the
+progress of civilization as educated amateurs. In this respect we are
+much like Germany before the war, where advance in scholarship was
+almost confined to the universities and the attempt was made to create
+knowledge by the machinery of organized research.
+
+An example of the situation in our country is to be found in the fact
+that almost every member of the American Philosophical Association is
+a Ph.D. and a teacher of philosophy in a degree-granting institution.
+It might almost be said that philosophy, beyond the merest introduction
+to the subject, is studied in order that students may become teachers
+of still other teachers. I suspect that a similar situation exists
+in other learned societies. This confinement of scholarship to the
+professional student leaves the public without guidance and at the
+mercy of quacks. It causes a break between education and other
+interests which the public school strives in vain to bridge over,
+because in such a situation the school itself becomes official and
+sequestered. Thus education is constantly being done up in little
+packages and sent out from the places where it is grown, like the
+garden seeds which Congressmen used to send to their constituents and
+which nobody planted. Education does not take root because nobody
+plants it. People think that culture is the special function of the
+professional gardeners, and there are even educators who would be
+astonished and jealous if they saw anything but elementary scholarship
+growing at large outside their walls.
+
+In this respect, it seems to me, Great Britain has had the advantage.
+Many of her greatest contributions to science and philosophy came
+from outside the regular university faculties. Such men as Hobbes,
+Milton, Bacon, Locke, Hume, Spencer, Mill and Darwin may have received
+conventional training, but they went out and did something with it
+afterwards. They helped create an ideal of the educated man which we
+have yet to gain. Hence Great Britain has had many amateur scholars who
+were also men of affairs, men like Mr. Balfour and the Haldanes, whose
+influence has helped keep education from being over-professionalized.
+
+Some of the highest educational attainments in history have been
+reached without the setting up of any institution at all, in our sense
+of the term. Protagoras, Socrates, and Abelard simply gathered groups
+of fellow students about them who lived for years in their company,
+first as disciples then as assistants. Such education to be sure was
+for the selected few, but after a man had spent some time with his
+teacher, he acquired a philosophy which changed his way of life. The
+modern attempt to educate everyone really educates hardly anyone. The
+public school imparts a certain elementary instruction--in eight or ten
+years about as much as a normally intelligent youth could master in
+two years if he set his mind to it. In matters of taste and standards
+of value, public school education makes little difference; or in
+developing thirst for knowledge, tolerance, independence of judgment.
+The task of giving instruction to the youth of an entire community is
+so great that thoroughness is almost impossible. The task falls to the
+state, and the state is a vested interest and the protector of other
+vested interests, interests which are not always consistent with the
+desire for knowledge. There are factions in the community which the
+public authorities must conciliate. We have seen what can happen to the
+teaching of biology and history when such factions become organized to
+control the public education of a state. Public servants are nowhere
+eager to have education so free to pursue its proper function that
+there is developed an alert and critically minded public to whom they
+must justify certain of their practices. What the state desires of
+education is soldiers, reliable voters, law-abiding citizens, contented
+working men, prosperous traders. Hence a spirit of docility and
+credulity, often of timidity, prevails in the school.
+
+Where there are large numbers in attendance, the individual student
+receives little personal attention. The education of backward students
+is sometimes given more consideration than that of the normally
+intelligent. The chief aim is to get the student through and pass him
+along to the next grade, and the pace at which the instructor moves is
+set by the mediocre. Whether this state of affairs will be remedied by
+the use of intelligence tests remains to be seen. At present mental
+measurement is a sort of fad. The system requires that all shall learn
+the same lesson in the same manner at the same time.
+
+Standardization develops a kind of mass mind, which in mature years
+renders men very susceptible to crowd appeal. Learning imposed upon
+the student by the system is put on the outside like a mental uniform.
+Habits become stereotyped in the elementary, non-reflective aspects of
+behavior and knowledge. There is little in this to guide the student
+to the spiritual values of a liberal education. Most of those who pass
+through the system never know that such values exist.
+
+The public school system is a great bureaucracy with autocracy at the
+top and deference to authority all the way down through the hierarchy
+of superintendents, principals, and instructors, to the students.
+The administrator holds dominion over the teacher. Little is left to
+personal initiative. Any system which requires little responsibility of
+its employees but much deference to petty authority in time comes to
+be filled with persons to whom such servitude is not irksome. Serious
+scholarship is rare. The teacher is not encouraged to independence
+of judgment concerning the subject which for years it is his work
+to teach. Teaching becomes a trade and is practised with as little
+intellectual interest as most trades. Other than idealizing the
+existing situation together with whatever persons or interests control
+the school system, little attention is given to the social setting into
+which the school sends its students when they leave.
+
+Dr. Kallen says, “Free public education and private instruction
+purchasable at a price are both but the community’s device to meet
+present needs by transmitting the past unchanged. They provide a
+grammar of assent, not a logic of inquiry. The mental posture they
+habituate the youth in is not the posture of reflection. The mental
+posture they habituate the youth in is the posture of conformity.
+They require belief, not investigation. They impose reverence for
+the past and idealization of the present. They envision the future
+as a perpetuation of the past, not as a new creation of it. They are
+Main Street’s most powerful instrument of self-reproduction without
+variation.... They enable government both visible and invisible to
+continue by consent, for they forestall and inhibit in the citizens
+of the land the technique of doubt and dissent which is the necessary
+condition of good government and the true inwardness of that eternal
+vigilance so notoriously the price of liberty.”
+
+Here and there, in spite of the system, someone gets his feet on the
+path which leads to liberal education. But in general it cannot be
+said that the public school has realized the dreams of those who in
+the early nineteenth century hoped that free universal education would
+place democratic institutions on the solid foundations of enlightened
+public opinion and general respect for truth. It was believed that the
+curse of ignorance would be removed; that humbug and insolence would
+be driven from the control of affairs; that labor would be ennobled by
+understanding, and freedom secured by the attainment of self-mastery.
+All were now to have access to scholarship; the precious wisdom of the
+great minds of all times, no longer the possession of the favored few,
+should be made to live in the daily experience of the nations.
+
+We are not so utopian in our hopes for the future of society as were
+the Humanitarian idealists of the nineteenth century. Perhaps people
+have expected too much of public education and have required too
+little. We need not be astonished that the education of the public is
+committed to a system which becomes an end in itself; that is human.
+Nor need we be astonished that public education is administered and
+carried on by persons most of whom do not know what education is; that
+is the democratic way of dealing with public affairs. If you are to get
+your education, whoever you are you must not be content to let it be a
+public affair. You must make it your private affair.
+
+Severe criticism of both the public school and the university is
+common. There is much talk about capitalistic influence, and the
+denial of academic freedom by prominent business men who contribute
+to endowments and constitute boards of trustees. In so far as this
+criticism comes from professional radical propagandists it need not be
+taken very seriously. Such persons merely want their own propaganda
+included in the curriculum. University presidents no doubt often play
+politics and do other things common to professional money-raisers.
+Faculties are often little more than pedantic trade unions, and if we
+are to judge the colleges of the country by the number of first-rate
+scholars who graduate from them or by the extent of their influences as
+a whole on the cultural standards of the country, we may well question
+whether higher education in America succeeds any better than the public
+school.
+
+But I wonder why so much criticism is directed at trustees and
+faculties and so little at the students. The habit of constantly
+denouncing someone because we are not better educated is rather
+ludicrous. If our people really desire education they can have it. If
+I am dissatisfied with my ignorance, I may seek knowledge at any time,
+and no one else, in or out of college, can ever gain wisdom for me.
+Anyone who has kept up his interest in his education after graduation
+knows that what is learned in school and college is at best a small
+part of it--merely the beginning of an education. Anyone who does not
+continue his studies through the years of a busy life and thinks that
+the brief introduction to the tools of scholarship which he received
+in his adolescence is education, should apologize to his college, not
+criticize it. Granted that there is much bad teaching, there is more
+bad studying,--or I should say, hardly any studying at all. Professor
+James Harvey Robinson used to say, “A college is a place where there is
+much teaching and no learning.”
+
+Is it not possible that a large portion of the population cannot be
+educated? Such persons are not all necessarily dull, they may be
+naturally uninterested in education, and it is likely that many enter
+institutions of learning with the mistaken notion that it is education
+they desire, when what they really want is success, a good time, and a
+little training in what they think are the manners and ways of speech
+of polite society. The finishing school once supplied this need; now
+the colleges have to do it.
+
+The motives which lead people to seek college education divide the
+students into three types. First there are the few who love learning.
+The spirit which once caused groups of young men to follow Abelard or
+Erasmus still brings an occasional youth to college. Such students may
+need guidance, advice and the fellowship of mature scholars. It is not
+necessary to force them to study, or offer them “snap courses,” or
+cram them for examination. Much of the procedure and regulation--the
+regimentation common in institutions of learning--is unnecessary and
+sometimes harmful to them. Most of them would become educated persons
+even if they never saw a college class-room.
+
+A second type of student attends college and university in large
+numbers. The motive is preparation for a professional career. Many of
+the best students belong to this type. Whether in addition to their
+professional training they ever gain a liberal education--we have
+seen that the two are not necessarily the same--will depend largely
+upon what they do after they get their degrees. If they then have an
+interest in educating themselves, their technical training ought to be
+an advantage, for most of them have learned how to study. But so much
+purely technical knowledge must be drilled into a man’s head that the
+student who is preparing for a degree in engineering, law, medicine
+or scientific research has very little time for anything else. Many of
+the most successful physicians, engineers and scientists need adult
+education quite as much as do ordinary working men.
+
+The third type, the majority of undergraduate students, are for the
+most part pleasant young men and women of the upper middle class. Their
+parents are “putting them through college” because it is the expected
+thing to do. A man wishes to give his children every advantage. While
+a bachelor’s degree is not exactly a social necessity, there are many
+who would have something like an inferiority complex without it. I knew
+one family in New York City who almost went into mourning when the only
+son failed in his Harvard entrance examinations. Students of this type
+enjoy four happy years, largely at public expense, with other young
+people of their own age in an environment designed to keep them out of
+mischief. I have no doubt this grown-up kindergarten life is good for
+them; most of them seem to appreciate it. In later years they remain
+enthusiastically loyal to Alma Mater, coming back to football games
+and class reunions and contributing to the support of the college.
+As alumni their influence is not always on the side of progress in
+education, but perhaps they make up for this failure in other ways.
+
+I am prepared, moreover, to say that the existence of hundreds of
+centers filled with such care-free young people may be a good thing
+for the country. They keep alive a tradition of good cheer and of
+man’s right to happiness in a country that is otherwise sordidly
+commercial. A leisure class is a social necessity for it serves as an
+example to other people showing them how to enjoy their idle hours. The
+English aristocracy with its horse races and other out-door sports has
+done much to make life interesting to all classes in that otherwise
+factory-ridden country, and its example has been followed by people in
+other lands. Now about the only leisure class we have in America is the
+undergraduate student body. A privileged class is always popular with
+the rest of the population in a normally constituted state. And so the
+whole country enjoys vicariously the amusements of its undergraduate
+boys and girls. The college youth with his automobile, his pipe, and
+his big fur coat is a favorite hero in the motion pictures. Moreover,
+the fact that the period of loafing is limited to four years is a
+blessing, for by taking turns a greater number may enjoy the privilege
+than the industry of the country could possibly support in permanent
+idleness.
+
+But while all this may be good for the country, it is not very good for
+the colleges. It is bad for the morale of any institution to sail under
+false colors, and colleges are popularly supposed to be educational
+institutions. The college faculties themselves must to some extent
+share this popular delusion, or else they would not permit the public
+to go on believing it. The attempt to live up to this erroneous idea
+puts everybody under a strain, students and faculty alike, and is
+the one unpleasant thing about college life. Instructors are forever
+annoying the students, trying to get some work out of them. Attendance
+on classes is required, and a series of examinations is arranged which
+nobody enjoys and which do no good anyway. They only make it necessary
+to send an occasional student home, and then there are tears, other
+students are frightened and sometimes lose sleep cramming for the next
+examination, and the instructor loses popularity, especially if his
+course is an elective one.
+
+It is among this type of undergraduates that “campus opinion” has
+its origin. Campus opinion is distinctly hostile to learning, and it
+holds sway over students with the same tenacity as other crowd ideas
+among the uneducated elements of the population. The student who takes
+his education seriously loses caste and is regarded as a joke. Few
+young people are sufficiently non-gregarious to stand out against the
+scornful laughter of their fellows.
+
+What the average student gets from college, then, is an opportunity to
+complete his adolescence in an interesting and healthy environment, the
+experience of being away from home and on his own, and fraternity and
+club life--pleasant in itself--in which friendships are formed that
+last through life and are often useful business connections in after
+years. There is also athletics, through which the student may develop
+his muscles, gain the desirable moral quality of good sportsmanship,
+and satisfy any ambition he may have to become a college hero. One
+always becomes famous in college outside the class-room, never in it.
+Incidentally, if a student is naturally clever at picking up bits of
+information with a minimum of reading, he gains a bowing acquaintance
+with about as much knowledge as should be the possession of one with a
+fair secondary education. Finally, he forms certain habits and acquires
+certain manners and tastes which mould him to the type of the average
+college graduate, and goes out in the world to take his place in the
+social and business circles of his home town, where, if he should ever
+mention Aristotle, people would think he was crazy.
+
+The college graduate can play a good game of tennis, wear his clothes
+well, talk about the latest novel, walk across a room with grace and
+dignity, and share the club opinions of his set, and there is nothing
+offensive in his table manners. I do not mean to underrate these
+accomplishments. The person who does not have them, however great his
+achievement in scholarship, is a boor, too lacking in sensitiveness
+to assimilate the knowledge he has stored in his head. But these are
+accomplishments that should be learned at home, as a matter of course;
+colleges ought not to be necessary for training of this sort.
+
+Wherein the education of the average college graduate fails of its
+true ends is seen in what might be called the deeper things of the
+spirit. No profound intellectual passion has been awakened, no habit
+of independent judgment formed. The college man shares the usual
+popular prejudices of his community. He runs with the crowd after the
+hero of the hour, and shows the same lack of discrimination as do
+the uneducated. He votes the same party ticket, is intolerant along
+with his neighbors, and puts the same value on material success as do
+the illiterate. His education has made very little difference in his
+religious beliefs, his social philosophy, his ethical values, or his
+general outlook on the world. Like all opinionated and half-educated
+people, he jumps to hasty conclusions, believes what others believe,
+does things because others do them, worships the past, idealizes the
+present.
+
+In contrast with this, let me quote a passage from John Stuart Mill.
+The author meant it to be a description of the scientist. It stands as
+a suggestion of what a liberally educated mind should be.
+
+ “To question all things;--never to turn away from any difficulty;
+ to accept no doctrine either from ourselves or from other people
+ without a rigid scrutiny by negative criticism; letting no fallacy,
+ or incoherence, or confusion of thought, step by unperceived; above
+ all, to insist upon having the meaning of a word clearly understood
+ before using it, and the meaning of a proposition before assenting to
+ it;--these are the lessons we learn ‘from workers in Science.’ With
+ all this vigorous management of the negative element, they inspire no
+ scepticism about the reality of truth or indifference to its pursuit.
+ The noblest enthusiasm, both for the search after truth and for
+ applying it to its highest uses, pervades those writers.”
+
+When all is said, the ignorance and folly of men are things that
+institutions cannot cure. Each must discover the path of wisdom
+for himself. One does not “get” an education anywhere. One becomes
+an educated person by virtue of patient study, quiet meditation,
+intellectual courage, and a life devoted to the discovery and service
+of truth.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF DOUBT
+
+
+The seventh book of Plato’s Republic begins with the Parable of the
+Cave. To show “how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened” the
+philosopher draws a picture of human beings living in an underground
+den, all of them from childhood chained with their backs to the light
+so that all they can see is moving shadows cast upon the opposite
+wall. This world of shadows is the system of popular beliefs. To
+these people “the truth would be literally nothing but the shadow of
+images.” Plato tells us to imagine what would happen if the prisoners
+were released and disabused of their error. If any one of them is
+suddenly compelled to turn and face the light, the glare blinds him
+and he suffers a sharp pain. If he is reluctantly dragged up into
+the outside world of sunlight he is at first dazzled. After he is
+accustomed to the new vision, all reality will appear different. He
+will see the difference between shadow and substance. He will know that
+popular belief is error. If now he should return, what a difference
+there would be between his new wisdom and that which in the den passed
+for wisdom! “And if they were in the habit of conferring honors among
+themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows,
+and to remark which of them went before and which followed after,
+and which were together, and who were therefore best able to draw
+conclusions as to the future, do you think he would care for such
+honors and glories?--And if there were a contest and he had to compete
+in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of
+the den and while his eyes were yet weak,” we are told that he would
+fumble and be ridiculous, and men would say, “Up he went and down he
+came without his eyes,” and they would pass a law that no one should
+even think of ascending any more or try to release another and lead him
+up.
+
+I will not discuss the metaphysical implications of this parable about
+which there is dispute. Plato says we shall not misapprehend him if
+we interpret this upward journey as education. Whoever would face the
+light must turn his back on the crowd and its shadows. He must climb
+into another world of values. The educated man thinks differently. His
+beliefs are different from those of the herd. He is being set free from
+its delusions, even from what it holds to be important. This is not
+because he wishes to be aloof or superior, but because he is gaining a
+different conception of what believing itself is. He has a new approach
+to things in general, new habits of judging. He is beginning to form
+his own judgments, and to judge is to weigh, to consider, to question,
+to seek evidence, to doubt.
+
+Common men cherish their naïve faiths and ask no questions. They
+imagine that education is simply greater information of the same sort
+which they also possess in some measure, and that it is the part of
+wisdom to establish the reality of their shadows. They resent a wisdom
+which is different from their own and unsettles belief. He who acquires
+information without the will to doubt is a common man and his kind
+understand him. Hence men tend to display their information and conceal
+their education. However much a man may know, so long as he does not
+become _re-oriented_, the crowd does not suspect him, but admires
+his learning. He is like a former Mayor of New York in his high hat
+at the head of the Policeman’s Parade. The multitude used to stand
+with their mouths open gazing at him. Each in imagination saw in the
+exalted figure himself risen to a place of honor and success. So it
+is with the “brainy man.” The “lightening calculator” or the man who
+can recite from memory the population statistics of the cities of the
+United States is a museum wonder. But when it was announced in a New
+York theater that only twelve men could understand Einstein’s theory of
+relativity, I am told that the crowd hissed.
+
+Information is a kind of skill. Everyone can possess this skill to the
+extent he chooses, and people do not resent an exhibition of unusual
+skill of such a nature. In America most men and boys have some measure
+of skill at the game of baseball, so this game is the popular national
+form of sport. The skillful professional ball-player is simply one of
+the common boyhood ideals realized. He differs from the spectators of
+the game in degree, but not in kind. He plays the same game they all
+played, and is the same sort of person they all were as boys--only more
+so. So with most kinds of information, the amount one may acquire makes
+only a quantitative difference, not a difference in kind. But as a man
+becomes educated he discovers that he is playing a new game; he is
+becoming a different kind of person, with different likes and dislikes,
+different interests, different ideals and faiths, and such beliefs as
+he has he holds differently.
+
+What the multitude most fears in education is the danger that the
+crowd faith will be lost in the process. This fear is often justified.
+Old beliefs will be lost and they should be. The fear appears in
+consciousness as solicitude for the spiritual welfare of the person
+being educated. It is really anxiety over the menace of education to
+herd living and thinking. It is the function of education to lure the
+individual out of the pack and give him opportunity to know his own
+mind, a thing he can never do so long as he runs and barks and bites
+along with all the rest. To return to Plato’s figure, every person who
+climbs out of the cave not only loses his own faith in the reality of
+shadows but weakens the faith of those who remain behind. Cave men
+make strenuous efforts to resist education. Their common practice is
+to maintain their own systems of pseudo education in which no one is
+permitted to turn his eyes away from the wall.
+
+Again, education has been likened to leaven. When it is honest it is
+very much like yeast. Before the culture is introduced the solution
+of ideas is in equilibrium. The mind has simply accepted what was
+poured into it by parents, teachers, priests, and politicians. In the
+solution there is reflected a compact, “still,” neatly ordered little
+system of knowledge. “God’s in his heaven, all’s right with the world.”
+Duty is clear, all is conventionally arranged, truth is eternal and
+logic can prove it. Human rights are decreed by the founders of the
+republic. The course of destiny is disclosed to reason and faith and
+the promise sealed in divine revelation. At this stage, most minds
+are carefully sealed up or a prophylactic is stirred in, for if those
+sugary solutions are exposed to a live spiritual culture they begin
+to “work.” Then they are spoiled for certain purposes. With the
+fermentation there is sometimes foam and gas; but a chemical change is
+taking place, brewing a mind with a “kick” in it. It is interesting
+that bread and wine and education are all made by a similar process;
+hence an educational Volsteadism has often been enforced so that many
+of the best minds have had to be “home brewed.”
+
+Professor Dewey somewhere speaks of education as freeing the mind of
+“bunk.” It is a large task. No one wholly succeeds. I never saw a
+completely “debunked” individual. Strive as we may to eradicate it,
+there is always in our thinking an amount of error, of wish-fancy
+accepted as objective fact, of exaggeration, special pleading,
+self-justification. Many of our beliefs are not founded in reason at
+all, but are demanded by some unconscious and repressed impulse in
+our nature. Men make a virtue of their faith when in fact they are
+_victims_ of it; they can no more help believing certain things than a
+neurotic can stop a compulsive habit.
+
+It is said that it is easy to doubt and that to believe is an
+accomplishment. It is not so. It is easier to believe than to doubt.
+The things we must train ourselves to doubt are as a rule just
+the things we wish to believe. It is children and savages and the
+illiterate who have the most implicit faith. It is said that unbelief
+is sin. This is not so; it is nobler to doubt than to believe, for to
+doubt is often to take sides with fact against oneself. Nietzsche said
+that this trait is characteristic of “higher men.” It was Huxley, as I
+remember it, who considered that man could in nothing fall so low as
+when he deliberately took refuge in the absurd. Even with a rationalist
+like Huxley doubt is not merely a function of the intellect. Under
+certain circumstances it is a moral necessity.
+
+The pursuit of knowledge is not the same, however, as scrupulous
+avoidance of error. He who strives to do his own thinking must accept
+responsibility for himself. He must expect that he will make mistakes.
+He may end in total failure. He must take his chances and be willing
+to pay the cost of his adventure. I know professional scholars who
+are so afraid they may write or say something which their colleagues
+will show to be wrong that they never express an opinion of their own
+or commit themselves to any downright statement. Such equivocation
+and qualifying--playing safe--is not what I mean by doubt. I do not
+mean merely that one should be always on guard against the possibility
+of error, but that one should learn to hold all one’s beliefs with
+a half-amused light-heartedness. Most minds are loaded down with
+the seriousness of their convictions. Solemnity in the presence of
+our eternal verities is awkwardness, and makes us always a little
+ridiculous, giving us the appearance of one about to shake hands with
+the President. Why not enjoy the humor of the situation? Our great
+truths may all the while be “spoofing” us. It will do no harm to give
+them a sly wink now and then.
+
+Crowd men have no sense of humor. It is very difficult to educate
+solemn and opinionated people. Like Omar, they always come out by that
+same door wherein they went. I have known students to complete a course
+of study having learned nothing, because of their disinclination to
+consider any fact which might cause them to surrender some belief about
+religion or economic theory with which they entered. Whoever leaves an
+institution of learning with the same general outlook on life that he
+had when he first came might better have employed his time otherwise.
+He is not a student; he is a church-member.
+
+A well-known reformer says in his autobiography that his education,
+to the present time, has been a long process of “un-learning.” The
+progressive disillusionment began in college when he was forced to
+abandon the religious dogmas of his childhood. It continued through a
+series of hard experiences and misdirected efforts to improve the world
+from each of which he reaped a harvest of doubt, leaving behind the
+exposure of one economic or sociological fallacy after another, until
+in the end he had left only his faith in Woodrow Wilson and in the
+proletariat. Then he lost Wilson.
+
+Perhaps one who still has the proletariat is not utterly disillusioned.
+If the education continues that too may go the way of earlier beliefs.
+It is one thing to despair of a society only one section of which can
+stand the test of our idealism. It is quite another matter if one is
+led to re-examine one’s idealism. It is this latter kind of doubt which
+has the greater importance. The significant thing is not the particular
+belief which a man gives up or retains but the manner in which he
+believes what he does believe. Change the latter and you change a basic
+habit pattern; you change the man.
+
+Not all scepticism has educational value. There is a kind of doubting
+which is merely the negative response of the unteachable, the
+suspiciousness of the wilfully ignorant, the refusal of the incurious
+to examine disturbing and challenging evidence. There are, as an
+eighteenth century philosopher said, minds that are moulded to the form
+of one idea. Many people, after they have accepted one idea, tame it
+and keep it as a sort of watchdog to frighten all other ideas away.
+This refusal to be convinced may appear to be scepticism; it is only
+stubbornness. The late Mr. Bryan and his followers were very sceptical
+of evolution. But this hostile attitude is very different from the
+scepticism of those scientists who hold that the theory is a mere
+working hypothesis which is yet to be confirmed. The scepticism of
+ignorance is motivated by the desire to save an old faith. Savages have
+been known to exhibit this incredulity toward certain aspects of our
+more advanced knowledge. If you were to tell the natives of Borneo that
+there is no dragon in the sky which eats up the moon during an eclipse,
+that there are no spirits and no magic, I imagine they would laugh in
+your face and think you a fool. Many a discovery and invention has been
+greeted by a grinning and incredulous public even in civilized society.
+The scepticism which has value is that which leads one on to further
+study and investigation. And it is characterized by intellectual
+modesty.
+
+Philosophic doubt is not the pitiable condition of the soul that timid
+spirits imagine. It is not pessimism or cynicism, but a healthy and
+cheerful habit. It gives peace of mind. Men who stop pretending can
+sleep o’ nights. There is a certain scepticism which is in no sense the
+spirit that denies. It is a frank recognition of things as they come.
+It is almost a test of a man’s honesty, among those who have stopped
+to think about the nature and limitations of our knowledge. Certainly
+cultivated people do not exhibit the same degree of cock-sureness
+as do the ignorant. People think the old saying about “doubting the
+intelligence that doubts” is funny. Popular audiences will always
+laugh at it. But why not? It is a platitude that the more a man learns
+the more he realizes how little he knows. Existence is filled with
+inscrutable mystery. To none of the profound questions that we ask of
+it is there any final answer. We must be satisfied ultimately with
+surmise, with symbol and poetic fancy. Speculations about the soul,
+God, the ultimate nature of reality and the course of destiny, and as
+to whether existence has any meaning or purpose beyond our own, or
+whether our life itself is worthwhile--all these speculations and many
+others of similar nature lead to no conclusions in fact, and we return
+always to the point from which we started. The very terms in which we
+put such questions are often meaningless when closely examined by the
+intellect, and the answer to them is determined by our own moods.
+
+There is a general belief that science can answer the riddle. But
+science is only one possible view of things, the one best adapted to
+the needs of creatures like ourselves. It cannot deal with questions
+of value. It can tell us how things operate, their relative mass and
+positions in space and time, but it cannot tell us what they are in
+themselves, nor why they exist nor anything about their goodness
+or beauty. The more exact scientific knowledge becomes, the more
+closely it approaches mathematics. Pure mathematics deals only with
+abstractions and logical relations and can dismiss the whole world of
+objects. Science presupposes the data of experience and the validity
+of its own logical principles. It substitutes its mechanized order of
+things for things as we experience them.
+
+Human reasoning is partial in all its processes. We think successfully
+about things when we ignore all the aspects or qualities of them except
+those which are relevant to the purpose at hand. The H₂O-ness of water
+is no more the ultimate nature of water than is its wetness, or its
+thirst quenching quality. That it is H₂O is only one of the things that
+may be said about water. Now if we add together bits of one-sided and
+partial scientific knowledge, we do not thereby gain a sum total which
+is the equivalent of reality as a whole. We have a useful instrument
+for dealing with our environment, because in thought we have greatly
+simplified it by ignoring in each instance all that is irrelevant. But
+what we now have is a universe of discourse, a human construction which
+is what it is because we are always more interested in some aspects of
+things than in others.
+
+All our ideas are views--they have been likened to snapshots. The
+world of which we are part is in flux. It comes to us as process,
+and our intellect does not grasp the movement any more than we can
+restore the movement of a man running by adding together a series of
+photographs. The movement always takes place between the pictures.
+Intellect is an instrument, not a mirror. Our world is not reducible
+to a form of thought, and when men speak of truth, reality, cause,
+substance, they are really only saying what they mean by certain words.
+The world, as James said, has its meanings for us because we are
+interested spectators, and so far as we can see none of these meanings
+are final. Whitehead and others have shown that some of the basic
+concepts of physical science which have held sway since the seventeenth
+century are now subject to revision. Santayana says that knowledge
+is faith--animal faith. It would be strange if it were otherwise, if
+hairy little creatures such we are, whose ancestors lived in trees and
+made queer guttural noises, should so organize human discourse as to
+be able to say the last word about reality as a whole. It is well that
+we should marvel at our achievements of knowledge, for they are man’s
+noblest work; but let us remember that human reason, itself a phase and
+part of the process of nature, can only view the whole process from
+its own partial standpoint, and that is enough unless we aspire to
+infallibility.
+
+Man is a disputatious animal who loves to speak like Sir Oracle.
+Uneducated people, ashamed of their ignorance, commit themselves
+hastily and cling to their commitments, for to change one’s mind is an
+admission that one was mistaken. We wish to be vindicated as having
+all along been in the right. Hence it is more natural to contend for
+a principle than to test a hypothesis. The ego becomes identified
+with certain convictions. We feel ourselves personally injured if our
+convictions are subjected to criticism. We are not ordinarily grateful
+to the person who points out our errors and sets us right. But if our
+education is to proceed, we must get over our delusion of infallibility.
+
+This fiction of infallibility is very common, and those who have not
+learned to doubt this fiction, who are sure that they have the truth
+and are on the side of the right are as a rule the more ignorant
+and provincial elements of the population. It is no accident that
+Fundamentalism, prohibition, and other forms of moral regulation exist
+in inverse ratio to urbanity and have their strongholds in rural
+communities. People to whom it never occurs to ask how they know so
+clearly they are right when better informed people have doubts on the
+subject, are the ones who naturally strive to coerce their neighbors.
+To many minds there are no social or moral problems. The answer is
+always known by the crusader. It is very simple. To him there can be
+no two opinions. The standards which prevail in his own parish, the
+self-expression of his own type, are the will of God. Principles of
+right and wrong are known immediately without reflection or regard
+to the situations where they are to be applied; they are revealed to
+conscience. “Right is right and wrong is wrong everywhere and forever
+the same!”
+
+Men who hold such a view learn little from experience, and this is why
+crowds never change their minds. They have first to be disintegrated
+and a new crowd formed about new standards, because each crowd
+represents its will as a divine command, a matter of eternal principle.
+
+To learn anything from experience it is necessary to take into account
+the results of our behavior. But when you do a thing merely because
+it is demanded by a universal principle which must be vindicated at
+all costs, or because it is a divine command to be carried out with
+unquestioning obedience, you need not consider the results. Hence you
+cannot be shown that you were mistaken. In this sense men’s gods and
+their _a priori_ ideas have the function of preserving their fiction
+of infallibility. There always appears what Professor Overstreet calls
+the proclamation of “the One Right Way.” Differences of opinion are
+held to be not mere differences of point of view, but the difference
+between Right and Wrong, Good and Evil. Those who think differently
+are the wicked, the ungodly, the _enemy_. They must be convinced by
+being vanquished, silenced. Every knee must bow and every tongue
+confess. There is no longer a meeting of minds in the search for
+truth. The triumph of the Right is in the belief of the average man a
+knockout. There must be no compromise; any attitude other than intense
+partisanship is disloyalty. One in a discussion must line up for or
+against a proposition, take sides, have a ready answer for anything
+that the other side says, and be sure that nothing will cause one to
+modify one’s views. Is any one ever convinced by public debate? Or does
+one emerge from a church quarrel, a political campaign, a session of
+the legislature, a convention of a trade union with a broader outlook
+or better understanding?
+
+The egotism of the ignorant keeps them in ignorance. There is an
+amusing notion that the masses are kept in ignorance by clever
+conspirators against freedom and progress. The average man’s reasoning
+consists chiefly of the repetition of cant phrases in support of
+preconceived ideas. He wishes to hear only what he can applaud, and he
+applauds what saves his face and puts his enemies to shame. Theological
+disputation has always been carried on in this spirit, and so have most
+popular discussions of morals, politics and economic problems.
+
+Professor Overstreet says that this “One Right Way” attitude is
+essentially adolescent. This does not mean that it is essentially
+youthful. Adolescence is the period when there is normally an
+exaggerated emotional interest in the ego. A delayed adolescent type
+of mentality is common. Psychologists speak of it as narcissism,--a
+fixation of interest upon the idea of self. Among psychopathic
+individuals and also among crowds this _narcissism_ is very dominant
+and leads to exaggerated notions of self-importance and to other fixed
+ideas. Inability to entertain any doubt of self becomes inability to
+question any idea which one would like to believe true. Hence the
+delusion of infallibility. I think that vast numbers of otherwise
+normal people are made susceptible to crowd thinking because they
+simply do not know that there are ways of life and thought different
+from their own which good people may and do honestly hold. Crowd
+appeal at once entrenches prejudice and flatters the ego, compensating
+it perhaps for any half-conscious feeling of inferiority it may have
+because for instance a man over-rates school education and “did not get
+it.”
+
+It is interesting to note how this delusion of infallibility may often
+lead men to believe and assert the most incredible fabrications. I
+quote from a recent New York newspaper an exaggerated example which
+will illustrate what I mean.
+
+ “The League of Nations has been asked to do a lot of strange things
+ by people all over the world, but it remained for a New York business
+ man to request action on the most unusual topic of all. Announcement
+ is made by the league secretariat that it has received a letter
+ from the New Yorker declaring his opinion that ‘brain enslavement,’
+ otherwise known as spirit writing or receiving messages from the
+ dead, is the cause of many evils. He said he wanted the league to
+ stop this system all over the world, making the specific charge that
+ the American courts of ‘so-called justice’ are controlled by the
+ spirit movement.”
+
+Note the last sentence; the “specific charge” is very typical. There is
+not the least notion that so sweeping an indictment should be supported
+by evidence. It _must be_ so, for how can the alleged tolerant attitude
+of the courts be explained otherwise? An explanatory idea is asserted
+as an established fact. Here we have a mind incapable of entertaining
+doubt. As usual in unhealthy reasoning, the thinking in this case is
+a syllogism. Spiritualism is a form of brain enslavement which is the
+cause of wide-spread evil. All who do not sufficiently oppose it are
+controlled by it. The courts do not sufficiently resist it. Therefore
+the courts are controlled by the spirit movement. If the premises are
+true the conclusion of course follows logically. The trouble with
+diseased thinking is not its logic, but its inability to examine
+its premises in the light of fact. A healthy mind would doubt these
+premises before reaching such a ridiculous conclusion. Doubt makes for
+sanity.
+
+I do not wish the force of this example to be lost. Most people will
+see it so long as we are talking about spirits, for there is much
+wholesome doubt about the doings of spirits. But let us substitute for
+spirits something else concerning which surmise commonly passes as
+established fact, and we have something very familiar. “The American
+courts are controlled by Wall Street,” or by the Catholic Church, or
+by British propagandists, or the attempt is being made by labor unions
+or by Communists. So it is with popular thinking on most subjects.
+Acquaintance with facts does not seem to be necessary for the formation
+of opinion. I can easily assert alleged facts on my own authority;
+it hurts my pride when I am asked for evidence. I once heard a
+fundamentalist preacher say that everyone who doubted the infallibility
+of the Bible merely sought an excuse for living a life of sin. Such
+statements must be true; they are so logical, moreover they justify a
+man in his fixed beliefs and put doubters always in the wrong. Many
+people even in their reading do little more than seek confirmation
+for notions founded on such thinking. The censorship of books is
+hardly necessary to keep people’s minds in the beaten path. Many
+people cannot read a book with which they do not agree. We disguise
+our infallibility under the infallibility of our favorite author. He
+becomes an authority. We read our own meanings into his text when
+necessary. We pick out the passages which support us and quote them on
+all occasions. For instance, a mind saturated with the teachings of
+Karl Marx will take in nothing else and will view every other author
+from the standpoint of his agreement with Marx. It is always so with
+the sectarian mind, whether in religion or in politics.
+
+The sort of logic which we have just been considering leads men to
+assume extreme positions of all sorts. Opinionated and undisciplined
+minds always tend to carry an idea to extremes, to jump to a
+conclusion, to let enthusiasm carry belief beyond the limits of good
+judgment. This all or none attitude is supposed to be zeal in the
+service of principle. It is merely intemperance. Education strives for
+the virtue of temperance, and temperance--which among the uneducated
+becomes merely abstinence from the use of alcoholic beverages--is the
+avoidance of rash assertion, and of ill-considered and hasty inference.
+The temperate man stops to think. Careful thought seldom leads one
+wild. An educated mind is not so likely to “go off half-cocked.” It
+has fewer enthusiasms and so accumulates a reserve; a sense of the
+ridiculous helps it keep its balance.
+
+Most men feel uncomfortable when they must hold their minds open
+and judgment in abeyance. Judgment suspended gives a feeling of
+unstable equilibrium, of tension; it is irksome like resistance to
+temptation. In addition to this discomfort in being unsettled, there
+is a disturbing feeling of insecurity in the thought that we live in
+a world in which certitude is rare and difficult. In many situations
+it is necessary to act before all the evidence is at hand. We must act
+on faith and take our chances. All men cherish their faiths, but few
+have the courage to act on faith. We naturally wish to feel ourselves
+more secure than we really are in a world where much is left to chance.
+A formula generally believed gives such a delusion of security. The
+greater the number of those who believe, the more convinced is the
+average man of the truth of the formula and the more safe he feels.
+
+I think this wish to feel at home in the universe has inspired much of
+religion. It is also one of the reasons why, as older religions wane,
+each man must have his “cause,” his social gospel, his movement. These
+things afford a sense of comradeship in which there is safety. They
+give one “something to tie to,” something enduring to believe in. And
+as each cause or movement claims the future and looks forward to sure
+vindication and triumph, the future becomes predictable and congenial.
+
+This search for an ideal security has had its influence on philosophy.
+Many philosophers, from the time of the ancient Greeks till now,
+have sought to construct systems of ideas, verbal forms in which in
+contemplation they could find refuge from the universal change in
+which all things come and pass away. Inasmuch as it is possible to
+think of an object or class and to mean the same even when the objects
+themselves are no longer present, a system of abstract and unusual
+universal ideas is set up and thought of as existing in itself, outside
+the process of time and change. The system of thought so conceived
+is held to be more enduring than the world of changing objects. The
+ideal world is then the real world. In it alone is knowledge of the
+Truth which abides forever. Such systems appear to me to be elaborate
+attempts to sustain a fictitious security by taking refuge from reality
+in a logical arrangement of man’s own empty forms of thought. From the
+point of view of education it should be said that such philosophies
+require much learning before one can understand them, but they tend to
+dogmatism and the closed mind.
+
+A modern method of supporting the fiction of security--less austere and
+sophisticated than some of those of official philosophy--prevails among
+those who speak the language of science. It is known as mechanism.
+As scientific _method_, mechanism is indispensable. It is found by
+exact measurement and careful scrutiny that given two identical
+material situations, the same result will follow. There is a certain
+orderliness about the processes of nature, which if we ignore all else
+but the movement and masses and temporal and spatial relationships of
+particles of matter, lends itself to statement in mathematical terms.
+In this manner events are predictable with great accuracy. And now
+because it becomes possible for human reason to interpret facts of
+nature when they are thought of only with respect to mass, movement,
+position, it is held that nature itself is really nothing but mass,
+motion, position, etc. The laws and methods of interpretation are
+thought to constitute the nature of that which is interpreted. A method
+deliberately adopted in order to give a mathematically rational account
+of certain selected aspects of nature is now taken for a correct
+picture of ultimate reality. The reason which measures masses and
+distances believes it has discovered itself as the true nature of the
+thing measured. The universe is held to be at once like a machine, and
+at the same time essentially rational. Security is again grounded in
+forms of thought.
+
+It is said that all futures are predictable by the new logic of science
+if we only knew enough about complex phenomena to be able to strip them
+down to that which can be expressed in mathematical terms. Of course
+no one professes to be able to calculate the curve of the whole, or to
+have worked out a quantitative statement of many of the phenomena of
+life. But it is a scientific faith that it might conceivably be done.
+This seems to me to be merely saying that we could reduce the universe
+to reason if we only could do it, which is tautology. I am not sure
+that a universe so reduced would be anything more than a bare system of
+thought about only one aspect of the universe. But scepticism here is
+as distasteful to many scientists as the scientists’ own scepticism is
+distasteful to theologians.
+
+I am not asserting dogmatically that we cannot know truth or the
+nature of reality. I am not suggesting that we cannot be educated
+without ending in universal scepticism or agnostic negation. It seems
+to me that we have, or can have, such knowledge as will make our
+intellects fairly adequate instruments in the performance of their
+proper functions. But I do not see what such functioning has to do
+with ascribing finality to our beliefs or trying to legislate for
+all possible worlds. I am not suggesting an attitude of despair in
+the pursuit of truth, but am trying to state the very reason for any
+learning at all, for what is the use of it if we know it all before we
+start?
+
+Education may not end in doubt, but it ends when a man stops doubting.
+But why speak of the end of a process that should continue through
+life? As I see it, the process is more often discontinued at the point
+of some fictitious certainty than in any moment of doubt. Doubt, the
+willingness to admit that conjecture is subject to revision, is a spur
+to learning. The recognition that our truths are not copies of eternal
+realities but are human creations designed to meet human needs, puts
+one in a teachable frame of mind. And the discovery that thinking
+may be creative makes intellectual activity interesting. Much has
+been written by indoctrinators about the wretchedness of the dogmatic
+sceptic. I wonder how these writers, themselves so innocent of doubt,
+know so much about him. I have never found such a man. I do not believe
+he ever existed. There are writers who question things that most men
+do not even know exist, compared with whom professional “freethinkers”
+are often naïve. But such writers are often gentle and cheerful spirits
+whose minds are not at all paralyzed by doubt, but are active, subtle,
+stimulating.
+
+Humanity during the course of civilization has fixed certain habits,
+made certain discoveries, constructed certain systems of ordered
+knowledge by emphasizing the relevant and significant. There is little
+likelihood that the whole structure will come tumbling about our
+heads because somebody examines into its nature. In fact the highest
+achievement of civilization would appear to be a mind capable of
+understanding our human ways of thinking for what they are. But if
+our learning should cause us to abandon all our consoling beliefs and
+ideals and pet theories; if it should reveal human folly in our every
+great cause, and futility in our every scheme of social reconstruction,
+even then we cannot for such reasons shirk the task of educating
+ourselves. There would remain for each of us the ideal of what an
+educated mind might become; no knowledge could take from us the ideals
+of courage, of preserving our integrity, of standing undaunted before
+the challenge to our spirit.
+
+Again a question arises similar to that we discussed at the close
+of the chapter on propaganda. Does not education, then, cause doubt
+and indifference so that the educated remain aloof and fail to take
+their share of social responsibility or participate in the activities
+of their times? Is it not the mass of “common people” therefore, and
+not the scholars, which accomplishes the overthrow of tyrannies and
+achieves progress? In a day when everybody is a professional or amateur
+reformer and people are led to believe that they can make their lives
+count only as they participate in some mass movement, it is natural
+that this question should present itself as we consider what education
+means.
+
+History should aid us to an answer here. The author of “Our Times,”
+Mark Sullivan, after giving an account of the partisan strife and
+popular movements of the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
+suggests that perhaps all this expenditure of energy and intensity
+of enthusiasm was but part of the passing show and came to nothing,
+while the so-called leaders who seemed to be creating history were but
+the puppets of deeper and silent forces. He suggests that the enduring
+changes are those of science and the arts. I believe we have here one
+of the important lessons of history. Progress in civilization has been
+the work almost wholly of scientists, philosophers, artists, engineers,
+and unique individuals. The rest has been froth and foam, a struggle
+to liberate mankind from the clutches of its most recent liberators,
+crowd devouring crowd, mass movements marching to Utopia down blind
+alleys. Unfortunately there is some truth in the statement that the
+intelligence of the race has little influence upon mass movements.
+This is not because scholarship is aloof, however, so much as because
+the multitude in its enthusiasms does not heed the counsels of wisdom.
+When I become a zealot for a movement I lose my critical faculties.
+In exalting my cause I would persuade myself that my existence is of
+more importance to the world than it really is. No one so devoted and
+earnest could possibly be in the wrong, and in the righteousness of my
+cause, I have infallibility. What need have I of the wisdom that comes
+by taking thought when I have the truth by intuition and intensity of
+feeling?
+
+If it is true that men can only be made to act under the lash of blind
+faith and enthusiasm, then the estate of man is a sorry one indeed.
+For most of the things done will end in tragic failure. It is only the
+conceit of ignorance to believe that the world can be straightened once
+for all by people who do not know what they are doing. Moreover, to say
+that ignorance is necessary to the accomplishment of good is to say,
+that ignorance is desirable and better for man than knowledge. There
+have been those who held such a view. Obscurantists always hold it. It
+is the philosophy of pessimism, and it is interesting to note that it
+is the believer and the devotee, the man of action and not the gentle
+doubter who finally ends in pessimism.
+
+For want of intelligence the devotees of causes have been the mischief
+makers in all times. We cannot always know who does the most good
+in the world, but the evil that men do lives after them and it is
+sometimes possible to estimate the amount of harm done. Who has done
+the most harm in human history, the sceptics or the believers, the
+devotees of causes or the devotees of culture and urbanity? St. Bernard
+with his crusade, or Abelard with his doubts? The men who conducted the
+Inquisition, or the men who doubted the doctrine of the Trinity? Calvin
+and the obscurantists on both sides of the Reformation, or Erasmus and
+the Humanists? Cromwell and his Puritans or Voltaire and the Deists?
+Robespierre or Goethe?
+
+The devotees to causes have kept human life in turmoil. If the
+immorality they would cure has slain its thousands, their “morality”
+has slain its tens of thousands. In most cases the strife has been
+useless and for causes that might have been won in other ways, really
+won. The devotee of a cause requires little provocation to practice
+persecution, and only the opportunity to play the tyrant.
+
+Doubt not only has educational value: it preserves social sanity. I
+would suggest as part of everyone’s education the reading of such
+authors as Lucian, Epicurus, Abelard, Hobbes, Montaigne, Rabelais,
+Erasmus, Lessing, Voltaire, Hume and Anatole France. There is no blood
+on these men’s hands. They have quietly smiled in the face of bigotry
+and superstition. In their words there is laughter and there is light.
+Perhaps no one of them ever intended to be a liberator of mankind. They
+merely thought and spoke as free spirits, and their very presence puts
+sham and cant and unction and coercion and mistaken zeal to shame. They
+have done more for freedom and truth than all the armies of crusading
+devotees.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+A MAN IS KNOWN BY THE DILEMMAS HE KEEPS
+
+
+William James said that wherever there is selection among alternatives
+there is mental life. Man is a choosing animal, and his choices
+determine both the ends sought and the means to be employed. We
+will not discuss the question whether our choices are spontaneous
+or are determined wholly or in part by environmental and hereditary
+factors. Whatever determines them, our habits of choosing,--the
+general character of the things we prefer,--reveal the kind of people
+we are. And as learning is not merely the acquiring of more and more
+information but is accompanied by a gradual transformation of habit
+systems, its progress is manifest not merely by what a man knows at
+any stage in his education, but also by the kind of issue that is real
+to him, the questions which he permits life to put to him, the sort of
+temptations he has to struggle to avoid, the kind of goods that are
+vital to him. When I was a boy my parents used to tell me, “A man is
+known by the company he keeps.” The saying, while designed to protect
+youth from the dangerous influence of evil companionship, is not wholly
+true. Many persons, from ambition or other motives, seek the society of
+persons unlike themselves. Those who are more gregarious than selective
+may exercise little choice among their associates. But ordinarily
+people like to be with their own kind. Criminals keep company with
+other criminals, golfers with other golfers, stamp collectors with
+others who have the same interest. We wish our friends to be interested
+in the things that interest us. Groups long associated tend to become
+homogeneous. When marked differences of taste and opinion develop,
+companions drift apart. Hence it is obvious that the company one keeps
+is determined in part by the dilemmas he keeps.
+
+We do not normally keep the same set of dilemmas through life. Each
+stage of development presents new challenges, problems, alternatives;
+as we mature our habits of judgment change. We see things in a
+different light. What was once a matter of vital concern becomes a dead
+issue. Our interest is caught and our choice determined by aspects of
+situations to which we did not react at all at an earlier stage. We do
+not solve all the problems of any stage, but we outgrow them,--get over
+them.
+
+Psychopathology today has much to say about the nature and sequence of
+the dilemmas which at any period haunt the mind of an individual. The
+matter is so important that I wonder more has not been made of it by
+those interested in education. The public, it seems, would have the
+educator fill the student’s head with useful information but expects
+the student to keep the same beliefs and general outlook on life that
+he had before. We speak of rising to a higher mental plane; this is
+little else than learning to wrestle with more and more significant
+problems. A little girl in her third summer says, “I’m a nice girl;
+I don’t bite sister now.” To bite or not to bite, to keep one’s self
+clean, to refrain from crying, are normally the dilemmas of early
+childhood. If they are not dead issues to a person twenty years old,
+they may be regarded as psychopathic symptoms. When a mature individual
+is found wrestling with impulses which should have been reduced to
+habit and dismissed from consciousness in earlier years, we have a
+phenomenon which psychologists call “regression,” or “fixation” of
+emotional interest in mental habits that are normally outgrown. Toward
+the tasks and situations of adult life, the individual strives to
+maintain an infantile attitude and hence fails to adjust himself.
+Sometimes the regression shows a preoccupation with infantile wishes,
+and sometimes with those of early adolescence; in any case there is
+struggle to maintain the inhibitions or the defenses which veil the
+inadequately repressed impulses.
+
+The manner in which lessons learned from experience normally transform
+an impulse from its expression in very simple and crude dilemmas to
+its later and more subtle manifestations may be seen in the forms
+with which people exhibit and disguise their egoism during successive
+stages of development. When a very young child is beginning to
+discover himself and his little world, he finds his own body and its
+functions tremendously interesting. Soon he discovers that certain
+of his performances command attention. He learns to make use of such
+performances in order to get what he wants. He will exercise his power
+over parent or nurse by throwing his toys on the floor again and again
+and howling until some one picks them up. Long before he condescends to
+talk, he notices when people admire him and say complimentary things
+about him. A very young child will do little stunts by way of showing
+off, and will exhibit irritation if ignored or left alone. He cries out
+at any restraint upon his movements or resistance to his wishes.
+
+The egoism of everyone retains something of the infantile quality. But
+family discipline, social experience, and the awakening of powers of
+observation and thought result in new forms of expression. This ego
+interest becomes associated with an ideal of self and its importance
+which the individual guards as his honor, his reputation. Every man
+is intent upon keeping up his feeling of self-importance; each feels
+that one so important deserves special consideration. Egoism in normal
+people becomes to some extent liberated from its infantile interests
+and is sublimated, that is, attached to ends that are socially
+permissible. The original impulse remains, but it wrestles with new
+problems. The wish to be admired is a factor in all ambition, also in
+romantic love. A love affair is even more a mutual admiration society
+than a phenomenon of sex interest. The impulse to command which in the
+nursery led the child to throw toys on the floor for others to pick up,
+later becomes a desire for leadership, a struggle for political power,
+a passion for manipulating or reforming others.
+
+We also find the infantile egoism transferred to religion, where
+it plays an important part in adult life. Many of the very images
+and emotional attitudes of infancy may thus be kept alive. The
+believer may still feel that he is loved as the infant is loved by
+the parent,--loved now by the Heavenly Father. He may again feel
+that he can have what he desires by asking the father in prayer.
+Self-importance survives as belief in the immortality of the soul and
+as assurance of salvation. Thus with development and experience, the
+same ego interest becomes transformed in the tasks it progressively
+sets itself, and in widening the range of the ends for which it
+strives. Each stage of development presents its peculiar problems, its
+peculiar goods and evils, its possible alternative attitudes toward
+the values of experience. Therefore it ought to be quite as possible
+to determine a person’s mental age by noting the kind of things which
+satisfy his ego interest, as by any other device of mental measurement.
+In common practice this is the way in which we judge people.
+
+A man stands revealed both by the things he strives to gain and by
+those he seeks to avoid. The thing that most easily shocks him is
+usually that which he himself is struggling to overcome. It represents
+something to which in his secret heart he can say neither yes nor
+no. His dilemma troubles him. He seeks to avoid the inner gnawing by
+carrying the fight into the open. He turns his personal conflict into
+the appearance of a public issue, and you then have the moral reformer.
+People who repeat scandal, demand laws for the censorship of books and
+plays, and search through literature intent upon deleting passages they
+think are obscene, are too much preoccupied with vice and obscenity.
+They are like those compulsion neurotics who spend their time writing
+alibis to prove their innocence of the crime they are constantly
+tempted to commit.
+
+The thing a man must make an effort to conceal always betrays him.
+We all know the type of person who strives in all things to appear
+refined, who makes painful efforts for correct speech and proper
+manners. There are those who are seriously concerned about being in
+what they call society, and those who read books of etiquette and are
+disturbed by such important questions as whether when escorting a lady
+you should take her arm or let her take yours. And there is the man who
+signs his name with ornate flourish and tries to impress waiters and
+hotel servants with his importance, and there are the people who are
+much exercised over the forgiveness of their sins. All in one way or
+another place themselves on their own level.
+
+The correlation between people’s material desires and their general
+intellectual interests is so universal that it is used as a guide
+in placing advertisements. There are “class” papers, each designed
+to appeal to readers who occupy a certain cultural stratum. The
+advertising appeals which such papers carry vary with the reading
+matter. The older, more literary magazines present a sharp contrast
+both in reading matter and in advertising to the newer fiction
+magazines. In the first group the essay predominates, with poetry
+and literary criticism, and only an occasional work of fiction. In
+the second group there is hardly anything but fiction, with possibly
+a brief hortatory editorial. Both types are evidently published to
+interest readers of average wealth. The number of advertisements of
+automobiles, real estate, and securities and other investments is
+in about the same proportion in both. But the former group, which
+is obviously designed to appeal to more thoughtful and intelligent
+readers, contains a larger number of pages given over to advertisements
+of books, schools, colleges, places of travel, works of art.
+
+We need not discuss the cheaper fiction magazines. They are obviously
+prepared for a still different reading public. The public to which
+the better ones appeal is indicated by the dominant character of
+the advertising, which consists largely of aids to beauty and
+correspondence courses in self-improvement. The stories in such
+periodicals are as typical as the advertisements. Thus it is that in
+their daily preferences, as truly as in the greater issues of their
+lives, people select themselves and are segregated into classes,
+or spiritual types--types which may live in daily contact with one
+another, yet worlds apart.
+
+Democracy strives to ignore the cultural differences among people.
+Education intensifies them. The attempt to place everyone on the
+same mediocre plane, even though it be a level considerably above
+the lowest, is not education; it is a kind of social work. Education
+means finding one’s own level. Like all progress it is qualitative
+and differentiating. Just as organic evolution is a process which
+can be measured only in the extent of the differences it has made
+between higher and more complex organisms and lower ones, so with
+education. It brings out distinctions of human worth, places people
+on the rounds of a ladder, the gradations of which are discernible in
+the kind of interests they have, in the quality of their choices, the
+perplexities they wrestle with and overcome, the tasks and issues they
+set themselves.
+
+The general advance of civilization is in some respects like that of
+the individual. We may learn much about the general cultural attainment
+of any age by noting the issues that divided people at that time and
+the problems that troubled them. There are all sorts of “cultural lags”
+in the course of progress, but it helps us to estimate the general
+intellectual level Europe had attained at the close of the middle ages
+to learn that whole communities could be terribly disturbed over the
+question, “What is the evil omen of a comet which suddenly appears
+in the zenith?”--so disturbed indeed that on one occasion it is said
+popular pressure forced the Pope to go out and pronounce an official
+curse upon a comet and command it to leave the sky, which it did much
+to everybody’s peace of mind. Again, we can form something of an
+opinion of the mentality of an age in which there is general interest
+in such a question as “Shall a person accused of witchcraft be put to
+torture to compel him to testify against himself?” or, “How far may one
+walk on the Sabbath day without committing sin?” or “Does the doctrine
+of the rights of man apply to negro slaves?” or “Who amongst us has
+committed the unpardonable sin,” or “Will a child that dies without
+baptism go to Hell,” or, by way of illustrating something of the spirit
+of contemporary America, “Who’s your bootlegger?”
+
+I have said that many of our dilemmas are not resolved, but are
+outgrown. This leads us to a further observation of their educational
+significance. Many of the issues which stir a community are insoluble
+because they rest upon presuppositions which are unsound and so long as
+the assumption remains unchallenged the issue will haunt men’s minds.
+When one goes back of the issue and sees the premises to be false,
+the whole wrangle becomes meaningless. The question about torturing
+people accused of witchcraft presupposes the superstition that it is
+possible for an individual to enter into a contract with the devil.
+Get rid of belief in devils and witch trials themselves cease. So the
+nightmare about the “damnation of babes” ceases to be a live issue for
+a mind that has become sufficiently civilized to have passed beyond the
+primitive man’s terror of Hell. And so I think it is with most popular
+beliefs and public issues and partisan conflicts, as well as with many
+of our private dilemmas. As stated they presuppose a disguised error,
+or are the fruit of factors that remain unconscious. So long as we
+accept the fatal assumption the issue is real to us. We are caught and
+held in the dilemma and our educational progress stops.
+
+Progress in thinking, without which learning is mere repeating, comes
+by examining foundations. The educated mind differs from the uneducated
+in the insight which enables it to file a demurrer, dismiss the case,
+or restate it in terms that lead somewhere. It is in getting us over
+our dilemmas that education frees our minds.
+
+It is often said that the aim of education is to equip the student with
+a set of principles and beliefs which will serve him through life.
+Yes, but principles are _leading ideas_. Their function is to lead
+us to correct conclusion and right action. They are instruments, not
+ends in themselves, and they must occasionally be re-tested. They are
+not final statements of the issues of living. Much misunderstanding
+and mental suffering--most of our false dilemmas--grow out of popular
+confusion about principles. Men feel that if they change their beliefs
+or arrive at unexpected conclusions or resolve their dilemmas away they
+are losing or compromising their principles. There is no sacrifice of
+principle in re-stating an issue as a result of better knowledge and
+insight. There is no defense of principle in a controversial spirit
+which cares more for partisan victory than for truthfulness. The level
+on which a controversy is waged is often a matter of greater importance
+than the victory of either side. If the victory of either means the
+triumph of the same irrational type of man, it makes little difference
+who wins. In most partisan and sectarian struggles the principle at
+stake--if any--is lost sight of in a mass of confusion. It frequently
+happens that both sides contend for the same “ideal” and base their
+contentions upon the same mistaken premises. In most cases men’s
+principles are little more than phrases which justify in their own
+minds their contentiousness and will to power.
+
+An examination of its presuppositions may transform an issue into a
+very different sort of problem. There is, for instance, the controversy
+now raging in parts of America between religion and science. Many
+educated persons say there is no conflict between religion and science.
+In their own thought there may be none, because they do not mean by
+either of these terms what the man on the street means by them. To him
+religion is a system of dogma based upon divine revelation. He cannot
+conceive of religion without belief in the stories related in the
+Bible or belief in the teachings of his church. By belief he means the
+firm conviction that alleged historical events and miracles happened
+just as related. He conceives of science also as a body of doctrine
+according to which the specific teachings of religion are held to be
+untrue. Stated in these terms conflict is inevitable, a person who has
+scientific knowledge cannot be religious, and the issue must be fought
+to the end.
+
+For the thinking mind the problem becomes a quite different one.
+Science is a method, not primarily a system of doctrine. It is a way
+of discovering truth which must be followed wherever it leads, and it
+presents us with the problem of how we are to value and interpret its
+discoveries. The problem presents itself differently from an ascending
+series of points of view.
+
+A student who has grown up under traditional religious influences
+and has probably given the matter little thought, begins the study
+of natural science, biology or geology, let us say, and learns
+something of the evidence for the theory of evolution. He begins to
+speculate upon its implications. He may, as many do, strive in some
+manner to reconcile evolution with the account of creation set forth
+in the Bible. After further thought and study this simple device for
+reconciling science and religion may not satisfy him. He sees that
+something more than the reinterpretation of a text is necessary.
+He finds himself striving to reconcile two entirely different
+world-views. As a rational explanation of the world and its origin,
+religion is wholly incompatible with science. The student, considering
+that this is the function of religion, and finding that as a method
+of giving an account of natural processes religion fails, may discard
+it, and become an apostle of science, and an opponent of religion,
+save as a system of ethics. Persons who hold this rationalistic view
+of religion commonly try in turn to make a gospel of science. Religion
+is darkness; science is light. Religion enslaves; science liberates.
+Religion holds progress in check; science is the Religion of Humanity,
+and the triumph of Reason is the promise of the salvation of the
+world. This view was widely prevalent in the nineteenth century. It is
+the stage at which the average person with some knowledge of science
+breaks off and considers the problem settled. It is an honestly taken
+position, which often requires no small courage. I hope no one will
+think me an apologist for religion if I suggest that this is a rather
+innocent and unsophisticated attempt to solve the problem. It assumes
+that it is the proper function of religion to explain nature and
+improve the life of humanity. What a simple and straightforward affair
+the human spirit appears to be from this point of view. No subtle
+twistings and turnings, no hidden pitfalls, no twilight regions, no
+dark secrets.
+
+Suppose now one were to cease expecting religion to do the explanatory
+task of science, and were also to cease trying to make a new religion
+of science, is it not likely that the conflict, or contrast, between
+the two might appear in altered perspective? It is possible to regard
+both scientific and religious concepts as symbols--figures of speech,
+each expressive of its exclusive values. In another study, I likened
+the difference between science and religion to that which exists
+between the two recognized symbols of the United States of America--the
+map and the flag. The former is the scientific symbol; it has to do
+with position, movement, measurement of distance. Maps exist for the
+intellectual and practical interest. The flag stands for the emotional
+interest; it has to do with certain historical associations, but is
+itself no guarantee of the accuracy of any historical tradition. It is
+poetry.
+
+Once we grant that religion is poetry, a new set of problems emerges.
+Is the poetry good or bad? What valuations of the possibilities--or
+impossibilities--of experience are here expressed in these symbols?
+Which of my ideas about the world are maps and which are flags? Much
+of the popular conflict of religion and science arises out of general
+confusion on this point. A super-patriot might conceivably be such a
+worshipper of the flag that he would resent the disclosure of certain
+geographical or historical facts which would lead to revaluation of
+some of his emotional attitudes. Doubtless many Americans have an
+exaggerated and emotionally determined idea of the history if not of
+the geography of their country, yet it is unthinkable that they should
+confuse the flag with the map. But existence as a whole is not so
+easily surveyed, and such maps as we have of it often extend beyond
+the comprehension of the average man. In all lower approaches to the
+problem of religion, the flags which symbolize certain emotional
+appreciations of the universe are confused with maps of it. In his
+religion the average man is still an idolator, psychologically similiar
+to the poor heathen who cannot distinguish between his god and his
+wooden image. On the popular level, the conflict of religion and
+science is an elaborately rationalized struggle for supremacy by a type
+of mind which has not yet grasped the true inwardness of its emotional
+attitudes. While the consideration of the problem remains on this
+level, nothing is gained for education. There is mental grasp of the
+situation when the problem is re-stated in terms of the inwardness of
+religion and the objectivity of science. And it then becomes possible
+to form hypotheses which inspire further pursuit of knowledge. New
+knowledge leads to the better organization of knowledge previously
+acquired.
+
+We have another familiar example of the educational value of displacing
+lower dilemmas by higher ones by examination of the presuppositions.
+For a generation and more many minds have been preoccupied with
+some aspect or other of the controversy between conservatism and
+radicalism. There have been so many varieties of opinion on both sides
+that it is impossible to make a clear-cut statement of the issue or
+to find any particular group or theory which is representative of
+either side. From the standpoint of the majority of the United States
+Senate, the followers of Mr. La Follette were dangerous radicals.
+From the standpoint of the communists these same La Follette men
+were conservatives, counter-revolutionaries. In general the conflict
+has been between those who are interested in preserving the present
+order of things intact together with its traditions, established
+institutions, privileges and inequalities, and those who favor some
+basic changes which they believe will remedy the situation. We will not
+discuss the merits of either side to this conflict. In some form or
+other it comes up repeatedly. It is a real issue, but the discussion
+of it may proceed on various levels of thought, and this fact has
+something to do with education. Intellectuals believe that their
+radicalism is the result of enlightenment, while their opponents
+believe that on the whole education makes for conservatism and that
+radicals are ignorant foreigners who have been misled by professional
+trouble makers. The present controversy is not conducive to education
+in any of its forms, or on either side. It tends to divert education
+from its true aims into partisan service, and to produce in both
+parties a fixed and unteachable type of mind. As the case is ordinarily
+presented, a stupid and panicky conservatism is faced by a superficial
+and equally intemperate radicalism.
+
+The problem cannot be discussed intelligently, nor can the
+consideration of it lead to increase of knowledge, until its
+presuppositions are critically examined, and the whole matter is
+re-stated in more intelligible terms. It is these presuppositions to
+which I wish to call attention, for without them the controversy could
+not have arisen in its present forms. Although there is a great variety
+of these forms, the same presuppositions are common to all and are
+usually accepted without question by both sides. The disposition to
+go back and question the presuppositions is evidence that education
+is going on. We have some such evidence in recent years for many have
+modified their positions in regard to various aspects of the social
+problem.
+
+More attention has been given to the changes of view among radicals
+than to those which have taken place among conservatives. Since events
+of recent years have greatly encouraged self-expression on the part of
+misinformed noisy extremists who appoint themselves spokesmen of the
+latter group, we sometimes get the impression that conservatives learn
+nothing. But I incline to the opinion that there has been perhaps an
+equal proportion of learning by the more thoughtful minority on both
+sides of the controversy.
+
+Among radicals modification of views has occurred sufficiently to
+arouse general interest in the questions “What has become of the
+pre-war liberals?” “What has happened to radicalism?” A former
+member of the radical group some years ago wrote a book entitled
+“Tired Radicals,” in which he adopted the usual view that the change
+of outlook among radicals was the result of the loss of energy and
+enthusiasm which comes with middle age. But if radicalism were merely
+a form of youthful enthusiasm, I believe the movement would be more
+wide-spread than it has ever been in America. The suggestion is worth
+considering that in some cases the change of views might indicate that
+the individual has learned something. By learning I mean the better
+grasp of the subject which comes when one examines the presuppositions
+of both sides. Conversely, those who have not examined their
+presuppositions during the last twenty years have learned nothing.
+They continue talking, but they are addressing a generation that is
+past and gone. Anachronisms of this sort are common occurrences among
+conservatives. They occur with equal frequency among radicals. And when
+a man whose education has stopped leaves the radical movement and joins
+the opposition, he frequently shows himself to be not an aging prophet
+who has lost his enthusiasms, but the same intensely opinionated and
+militant person he was before.
+
+When, therefore, I suggest that a change of attitude toward the social
+question may be indicative of learning, I do not mean to imply that
+it is the function of education to turn radicals into conservatives.
+Rather its function is to give the men on each side a different mental
+outlook. Back of the controversy as it has existed in our times there
+is a certain presupposed philosophy which is passing away as education
+increases, and its passing modifies the thinking of persons on both
+sides. Humanism in education is supplanting the older Humanitarianism.
+Interest in cultural values is supplanting the earlier naturalism.
+Rousseau and Bentham and Comte and D. F. Strauss and William Morris
+are making way for the coming social psychologists. Social philosophy
+becomes analytical. The sweeping generalizations of Marx and the day
+dreams of Bellamy begin to have interest chiefly for the historical
+student. Democratic dogma, little questioned in the nineteenth century,
+is now subjected to criticism. A different intellectual spirit is
+abroad which necessarily modifies the general outlook of those who
+share in it.
+
+Let us note more specifically some of the presuppositions behind the
+Radical-Conservative dilemma. There is the Humanitarian doctrine that
+man is naturally good and daily growing better. All that is needed
+for his perfection is freedom or opportunity. This assumption is
+common to both parties, one holding that such opportunity is under
+the present system granted to all who wish to take advantage of it,
+the other that under the present system opportunity is granted only
+to the privileged few and denied to the toiling masses, who are kept
+down in wage slavery. All the evils of human life are attributed to
+the present system. Remove the evil system and everybody will be good
+and happy. There is much talk about “the emancipation of labor.” Both
+sides assume that social justice is possible, each maintaining that
+its own triumph is the triumph of justice. And both sides are disposed
+to estimate the values of civilization and the meaning of personal
+success in terms of material possession. The good life is the life of
+the man with plenty of money. We hear much of the materialism and the
+dominance of business interests today. Everyone is urged to get ahead.
+A man measures his worth by the amount of his income. Conservatives can
+see no ground for dissatisfaction with a system which makes for unusual
+prosperity. Radicals deny that prosperity is universal, say that the
+rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer, interpret
+all history in terms of the struggle for wealth, and spread before
+the masses the promise of abundance with a minimum of toil. On both
+sides we find that easy optimism which is said to be characteristic
+of half-educated minds. It is assumed that the evils of the world are
+only superficial, that they are contingent upon purely environmental
+factors, and can be removed by legislation or by mass action. Progress
+is assured. No one doubts that a prosperous and happy life is possible
+to all if only wealth were properly distributed. As the control of
+affairs passes more and more completely into plebeian hands and as the
+tastes and dilemmas of mediocrity come to set standards of value, the
+world is supposed to be getting better.
+
+This questionable assumption leads to distortion of fact by both
+parties, and must continue to do so as long as the controversy is kept
+on this level. I wonder what would happen if instead of merely drawing
+hasty inferences from these naïve assumptions, it should become the
+practice to examine them. Perhaps the issue might be re-stated in
+more significant terms. But what concerns us at present is not the
+social problem as such, but the fact that the attempt to clear up the
+intellectual muddle about it means that education is going on.
+
+A glance at the nature of the presuppositions we have been discussing
+will help us to understand why it is that they are so seldom examined.
+They flatter. Apart from their radical or conservative implications,
+such ideas are congenial to the average man. They pat him on the
+back. It is no small satisfaction to believe that the environment is
+responsible for all human ills, that evil may easily be removed by
+mass action; that given material abundance, the good life follows
+automatically; that distinctions among men are reducible to economic
+factors; that the supremacy of our own type is the goal of progress. I
+believe that the level at which one’s education stops, the particular
+set of dilemmas in which one’s mind becomes fixed is usually determined
+by some self-satisfying assumption. If my ego can remain elated over
+the possession of an automobile, or the right to vote, or the belief
+that I and my kind are or ought to be socially superior, or because I
+can play the saxophone, or am able to resist the temptation to pick
+pockets, the problems which have live interest for me will be the
+problems which lie on these levels. I recently talked with a man who
+was quite pleased with himself because for some years he had not been
+in jail. He frequently compared the advantages and disadvantages of
+life “on the inside” and “on the outside.” To his mind all days and all
+people were thought of as “inside” or “outside,” a point of view which
+I imagine few people linger over or find personally gratifying. But the
+virtues men pride themselves on are as a rule those which compensate
+them for the particular vices to which they are tempted.
+
+The house I live in had for a number of years been rented to an elderly
+Scotch woman who kept it as a “rooming house.” When she moved out she
+said to me, “I hear you are going to do this house over and make it
+your own home. Some day you may be sitting here and thinking, ‘What use
+to go on in this house of mine?’ It’ll be a satisfaction to you to
+know that you are in a respectable place. Never once in all the years
+that I rented out furnished rooms did the patrol wagon have to back up
+to this door at midnight.”
+
+The things which people find consoling both reveal and determine
+the plane on which their thinking takes place. I have heard a young
+man say with a note of defiance, “Yes, sir, I’m a single-taxer and
+I’m proud of it.” So involved is the ego in our dilemmas that we
+often require the assistance of a specialist in getting over them.
+Psychoanalysts whose task is chiefly that of helping people face
+certain facts about themselves, speak of their work as re-education.
+In a sense all education is re-education, the untying of the knots in
+which our self esteem in its defense has entangled itself. Perhaps
+nothing is so effective a bar to education as intellectual immodesty.
+A man’s education stops at the point where he becomes incapable of
+self-criticism. And because egotism is always a bit ridiculous, the
+conceited mind protects itself from criticism by making its interests
+sublime. In the presence of the sublime, laughter is taboo. The subject
+concerning which man has lost his sense of humor is just the subject
+concerning which criticism leads to self-criticism. There are persons
+who cannot take a joke about “The Grand Old Party,” or the Government
+at Washington, or the teachings of Karl Marx. Recently a group of
+church men publicly denounced the New York newspapers because of
+their humorous remarks about prohibition. Once when I was asked for a
+definition of a radical I seriously offended a prominent socialist with
+the innocent remark that a radical is a man who loves Labor and hates
+work.
+
+Lack of humor is always evidence of unteachableness. Ignorance is
+pompous. The holy tone with which people proclaim their convictions is
+uncivilized. When the American people are better educated, there will
+be less solemn pantomime in the land. We could not with straight faces
+indulge ourselves in the hysterical reforms, the bitter partisanships,
+religious fanaticism and race prejudice which at present show how
+seriously we take ourselves. Education should help people make an art
+of living, and the art of living, like all arts, is play. Learn to play
+with your ideals, even with your sublimities, and you will break the
+hold upon you of many a crude and hampering dilemma.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE FREE SPIRIT
+
+
+Freedom is not as precious to the members of this postwar generation
+as it was to some of their ancestors. The nation which once followed
+the leadership of Mazzini and Garibaldi now suffers a dictatorship with
+apparently little protest. In England, the stronghold of liberalism,
+a conservative government places a censorship upon the words of the
+man who is probably that country’s best-known writer. Socialism has
+its beginnings in that passion for freedom and humanity which inspired
+the youth of the early nineteenth century and ends at Moscow with a
+constitution from which even a Bill of Rights is omitted. In America
+we now see that democracy does not guarantee liberty. The government
+shows decreasing respect for the immunities of the individual. Crowd
+movements spread intolerance and are ever demanding more strict
+regulation in matters of personal conduct and private judgment. One
+frequently hears the remark, “The talk about personal liberty is
+disgusting nonsense.”
+
+There are various reasons for this change of spirit. The individual
+rather willingly permits himself to be transformed from a private
+person to a numerical unit in his group or mass because as part of
+a public he gains power through the force of numbers. Individualism
+in a society in which every one is chiefly interested in industrial
+competition tends to become little more than the stock argument of
+those who wish to defend economic privilege. Other privileges are lost
+sight of in a standardized world. Moreover, as people begin to see that
+freedom is not something with which all men are equally endowed by
+their creator, but is achieved in varying degree, there is a tendency
+to minimize its importance. We are naturally somewhat suspicious of
+the freedom of others. Those who themselves have little capacity for
+it would impose their own limitations upon all others. From childhood
+onward we wish to be able to do what we see others doing. When this
+is impossible, there is a tendency to restrain them from doing what
+we cannot do. Masterful spirits grant themselves privileges which may
+appear wicked to the crowd. The free mind allows too much. When on
+the other hand a person who has not attained some degree of mastery
+declares his independence, we do not speak of him as free, we say that
+he “takes liberties.”
+
+Thus where the ideals of the educated mind prevail there is a general
+gain in freedom through increase in mastery. Where the ideals of the
+ignorant and wrongly educated predominate, there is a decline in
+freedom and an increase in the disposition to take liberties. It is the
+custom today to rule out of the consideration of values any reference
+to the things of the mind, and to try to ground all values, freedom
+included, on a strictly economic and legal foundation, as if they were
+produced by and existed only for a brainless and impersonal equilibrium
+of social forces. We are beginning to see that for a people which loses
+sight of the inwardness of the sources of freedom, constitutional
+guarantees do not long guarantee, and each power-seeking group begins
+to take liberties with the organized life of the community. The
+so-called liberalism of those modern writers who make apology for this
+sort of thing has in it little of the spirit of liberal education. It
+is rather the plebeianization of scholarship. I as a liberal am not
+obliged to throw my hat in the air over each degradation of value that
+marks the triumphant progress of democracy.
+
+It is the ideal of the educated man, not the demands of the crowd which
+is the best guarantee of freedom. I believe we are chiefly indebted to
+this ideal for such freedom as we enjoy. Education when it is genuine
+must for its own sake move in an atmosphere of intellectual freedom.
+It must wander where truth leads the way. It must attain independence
+of judgment and a certain decent privacy for contemplation. It is in
+itself freedom from servitude and from routine. It broadens one’s
+interests and hence one’s sympathetic understanding of others. Nothing
+human is alien to it. The educated mind, having business of its own,
+minds its own business. Hence it grows in tolerance. Freedom is always
+freedom for something,--freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom
+from meddlesome interference, freedom from the crushing weight of
+authority and tradition, freedom in matters of religious belief. Every
+such freedom is largely the result of the influence of education, and
+each exists in any community in inverse ratio to its ignorance and
+provincialism.
+
+The classical tradition has its origin, as we saw, in the efforts of
+Greek philosophers to teach free men the essentials of the good life.
+It has by no means remained true to its ideal, but each rediscovery
+of its meaning has had a liberalizing effect. The modern sense of the
+worth of the individual--which is only recently on the decline--and
+the humanist philosophy of education alike show the influence of the
+Renaissance. The eighteenth century, stilted and formal as it was,
+could with some justification call itself the age of the Enlightenment.
+It was the age of Voltaire, the age of great educational advance. It
+was also the age from which we derive most of our pronouncements about
+liberty and the rights of man. I would almost go so far as to say that
+when education is not liberalizing, it is not really education but is
+a highly systematized species of propaganda. This liberalizing quality
+is so essential to education, and is so clearly a way of the spiritual
+life, that its presence determines the genuineness of any movement or
+philosophy that may bear the name Liberalism.
+
+The term “free spirit” has been so frequently abused, that I hesitate
+to use it. It suggests Rousseau’s Emile, educated to obey only the
+benign laws of nature and his own impulses. “He follows no formula,
+yields neither to authority nor to example, and neither acts nor speaks
+save as it seems best to him.” One thinks of such phrases as Max
+Stirner’s “Ego and His Own,” or Whitman’s “Spontaneous Me,” or “The
+Beautiful Soul” of nineteenth century Romanticism. One is reminded of
+the young woman from Nebraska who came to live in Greenwich Village,
+New York City, and said her soul felt as if it had taken off its shoes
+and stockings. The cult of spiritual freedom had quite a vogue in New
+York a few years ago. I believe it originated in the Latin Quarter of
+Paris. The devotee of it displayed his free spirit by wearing a flowing
+tie and corduroy trousers, by his obvious disdain of barbershops and
+laundries, by his talk which was mostly about sex, socialism and the
+new art, and by his general air of lassitude and disillusionment.
+
+I believe that this pose, together with much of the sentimental
+liberalism which passes for “emancipation” among intellectuals, may
+be traced back to Jean Jacques Rousseau. Nearly all the basic ideas
+of contemporary liberalism as well as those of the “newer education”
+frequently associated with the liberal movement, may be found in the
+writings of Rousseau. It is amusing to hear liberals proclaim these old
+ideas as if they were the most advanced theories of life and education.
+And you have but to compare Rousseau with Erasmus or Voltaire or Huxley
+to see how far away he is from the spirit of liberal education. The
+latter is tender-hearted and hard-headed. Rousseau is soft-headed and
+hard-hearted. An emotional egoism feeds on dreams of social revolt
+and of an idyllic return to nature. Rousseau hates civilization, with
+its duties and responsibilities. He becomes romantic and sentimental
+about Nature. His ideal of the free man is Robinson Crusoe. “We are
+born sensible.” “The natural man is complete in himself; he is the
+numerical unit, the absolute whole, who is related only to himself or
+to his fellow-man. Civilized man is but a fractional unit.” “Civilized
+man is born, lives and dies in a state of slavery. At his birth he
+is stitched in swaddling clothes; at his death he is nailed in a
+coffin, and as long as he preserves the human form he is fettered by
+our institutions.” Hence if you would educate, “Observe nature and
+follow the route which she traces for you.” “All wickedness comes from
+weakness. A child is bad only because he is weak; make him strong and
+he will be good.” “Keep the child dependent on things alone, and you
+will have followed the order of nature in his education.” “Do not let
+him know what obedience is when he acts, nor what control is when
+others act for him. Equally in his actions and in yours let him feel
+his liberty.”
+
+“O men, be humane; it is your foremost duty.... Why would you take from
+those little innocents the enjoyment of a time so short and of a good
+so precious which they cannot abuse? Why would you fill with bitterness
+and sorrow those early years so rapidly passing, which will no more
+return to them than to you? Fathers, do you know the moment when death
+awaits your children? Do not prepare for yourselves regrets by taking
+from them the few moments which nature has given them.”
+
+“The only habit which a child should be allowed to form is to contract
+no habit whatsoever.”
+
+“It is absolutely certain that the learned societies of Europe are but
+so many public schools of falsehood; and very surely there are more
+errors in the Academy of Sciences than in the whole tribe of Hurons.”
+
+“Happy the people among whom one can be good without effort and just
+without virtue.”
+
+I trust that these passages selected almost at random from Rousseau’s
+treatise on education, “Emile,” do not give a wholly unfair impression
+of this author’s philosophy of life. Man in the state of nature is wise
+and good. Civilization has corrupted him by enslaving him. If he does
+evil it is not because he is bad, but because he is weak. We should not
+hang the criminal but blame the society which made him what he is.
+
+The proper function of education is to enable the individual--the
+little innocent--to grow up naturally without discipline, without
+forming any habits, never sacrificing present enjoyment to future
+knowledge, inspired always by the ideal of that happy state in which
+one may be good without effort. The ideal education therefore is the
+life of the North American aborigine or what Rousseau imagined such a
+life to be. Freedom here is the return to nature.
+
+From the times of Hobbes and of Montaigne onward there seems to have
+been a growing interest in “Man in the state of nature.” But whereas
+with most writers this interest was largely a matter of theory and
+speculation, with Rousseau man in the state of nature becomes an ideal,
+a norm.
+
+It would appear that in this dream of the return to nature, there
+is symbolized an infantile wish to escape from the tasks and
+responsibilities and restraints of adult life. Psychologists speak
+of such an “infantile return” as _regression_. This regressive ideal
+of freedom is a very different thing from the liberalizing influence
+of education as I understand it. I have characterized education as a
+victory won over one’s wish-fancies and childish egoism, as the lifting
+of the problems of life to higher and more significant dilemmas, as
+the attainment of mastery. A humanistic liberalism seeks freedom
+as broadmindedness; it strives for a highly civilized, urbane and
+sophisticated state of mind in which insight is deepened and interest
+is widened. Rousseauian liberalism seeks freedom in relaxation of
+effort, in denial of the claims of civilization, in the idealization of
+nature and of primitive man.
+
+Many persons who today style themselves liberals are of the Rousseauian
+type. There are those who proudly call themselves rebels. A certain
+naturalism is carried to the point of hostility to form as such
+and to orderliness of any sort. There is frequently a disdain of
+“respectability,” and a tendency to play the intellectual vagabond.
+I think this is one reason why certain liberals are much taken with
+modern imitations of the primitive in art. The element of regression
+which characterizes the paintings and sculpture of certain “rebels” is
+patent to the psychologist. Many of these works of art closely resemble
+the typical drawings of dementia praecox patients. In dementia,
+regression, or infantile return, is complete and final. The patient
+is free from a disturbing world, having returned to precisely the
+“sensibility,” as Rousseau terms it, with which he was born.
+
+Utopian schemes of social reconstruction, and the notion that merely
+changing the present system would put an end once for all to human
+misery, are in many cases disguised forms of the wish to return to
+childhood and thus escape the vicissitudes of adult life in civilized
+society. The burden of our industrial civilization is so great that it
+is no wonder many should take this path of escape. However, the utopian
+fantasy is by no means confined to those who have the hardest struggle.
+And there can be no objection to it when it inspires well-considered
+efforts for social improvement. There is a type of “liberal” however,
+who regards the attempt to solve any concrete problem of civilization
+as a compromise of his idealism.
+
+Another aspect of the philosophy of Rousseau has influenced
+contemporary liberalism with somewhat paradoxical results. The basis of
+that happy state in which one may be just without virtue is elaborated
+in “The Social Contract.” Rousseau was not the first to hold the
+contract theory of organized society. Both Hobbes and Locke made use
+of this idea. But with Rousseau it becomes a doctrine with distinctly
+illiberal implications. The argument is somewhat as follows:
+
+Man finds it impossible to continue in the blissful state of nature.
+In order to preserve their freedom, men voluntarily enter into a
+mutual agreement, according to which each gives over his individual
+sovereignty and receives back an equal portion of the common will,
+leaving him as free as he was before. Thus there comes into being a
+collective sovereign power. All others are of course usurpations and
+are destructive of freedom. This new sovereign can do no wrong, there
+is no need to protect the individual against it because it is made up
+precisely of the wills of all individuals, and the people will not do
+injury to themselves since each seeks happiness. Such sovereignty,
+which is really the absolute dominion of the mass over its members, can
+neither be delegated nor divided, and its exercise is _liberty_.
+
+But is it? This tree is known by the fruit it bears. Notice that for
+purposes of this theory, all aspects of the individual will are now
+denied except those which may be pooled into a sort of group will and
+drawn out again in equal and identical portions for all men. That is,
+society is transformed from a plurality of individuals to the unity
+of a mass. Man acting as a mass unit takes precedence in all things
+over man acting as a private person. Privacy is gone. Liberty is not
+personal independence, but the freedom of the group to do what it wills
+unchecked. Mass action can do no wrong. According to the logic of this
+view no proper bounds may be set to the rule of “the people,” except
+such as the sovereign will itself chooses to set. Accordingly, liberty
+becomes the rule of all over each in any matter whatsoever concerning
+which neighbors choose to restrain or meddle with one another. This
+means that myself as person must in all things take orders from that
+attenuated public-meeting self of me and of other men which we have
+each received in equal portion from the mass will. Everything unique in
+me is whittled away from this mass-self and I count only by virtue of
+my membership as a numerical unit of the group. And now since any check
+or hindrance to the sovereignty of the mass is seen as an unjustifiable
+restriction upon its liberty, there is a tendency to extend the tyranny
+of the mass to every possible human concern. The demand for liberty
+is no longer the assertion of the right of private judgment for those
+capable of exercising it; it is “Let the people rule.” No wonder men
+come to distinguish between personal liberty and the rights of The
+People. The idolatry of the mass turns freedom inside out.
+
+So much for theory. In common practice each majority tends to regard
+itself as the sovereign will and play the tyrant, all in the name of
+liberty. Each militant minority and struggle group in society seeks
+by hook or crook to capture the machinery of law and force its will
+upon the public, and in the effort to make its own group will the
+sovereign will, the members of each group persuade themselves that in
+thus resisting restraint upon their particular mass movement they are
+fighting for liberty. A spirit of factiousness spreads through the
+community, restriction and regulation increase and multiply, all in
+the exercise of crowd-liberty. If your crowd is now in possession of
+social power, you are called a conservative. If it is still struggling
+to make its will supreme, you may call yourself a liberal. It is an
+ironical turn of history that brings it about that many restrictions
+upon the freedom of the individual are advocated in the name of
+liberalism. Liberalism shades off into a form of radicalism which would
+set up a dictatorship to accomplish its ends. Many people use the terms
+interchangeably. Radicals in recent years, as the illiberal aims of the
+movement unmask themselves, tend to repudiate the name liberal, and
+to denounce the liberal as one who having started out along a certain
+road, hesitates or turns back at the last minute. Such liberalism finds
+itself in the difficult position of having proposed measures which it
+hesitated to carry out. It is embarrassed by its own radical offspring.
+
+Such liberalism has little in common with that which is the aim of
+liberal education. As it appears in contemporary America, it is a
+sort of abortive mass movement caused by the mingling of two social
+philosophies which for want of better terms I will call the Lockean and
+the Rousseauian traditions.
+
+John Locke wrote his essay on Government at the close of the
+seventeenth century. This book together with his “Essay on the Human
+Understanding,” did much to shape the thinking of the eighteenth
+century, and made a strong impression upon Samuel Adams, Thomas
+Paine, Jefferson and other leaders of the American Revolution. The
+“self-evident truths” set forth in our Declaration of Independence
+clearly reveal this influence. I do not wish to imply that Locke
+was the author of American liberalism. He merely has his place in a
+tradition which goes back to Magna Charta and is essentially British.
+The quarrel between the colonies and the ministers of King George was
+a phase of the greater struggle between Parliament and the crown.
+For centuries the Englishman has stood up for his individual rights,
+has stubbornly resisted any attempt of the sovereign to invade his
+privacy or to seize his property without his consent. The Englishman is
+naturally jealous of his government. He looks upon it with suspicion
+and seeks to limit its exercise of power. He gives it no peace until it
+guarantees him security from interference with his personal freedom.
+Jefferson’s remark that that government is best which governs least
+is typical of the spirit of British liberalism. It was this spirit
+which inspired the revolt of the Puritans against both the King and the
+Church. The same sentiment is expressed in the petition of Rights which
+was presented to the throne about the time that Locke wrote the essay
+on government. And it was in this same spirit that the founders of the
+Republic framed the Constitution of the United States. They rather
+grudgingly granted the government certain specific powers, and sought
+by means of various checks and balances to limit the exercise of them.
+Even then the public was so alive to the dangers of the new sovereignty
+that it refused to adopt the constitution until it was amended by the
+addition of the Bill of Rights.
+
+There were added to this assertion of the inalienable rights of the
+individual in opposition to the sovereign power the deeper sense of
+the importance of the individual gained in the Reformation, and the
+insistence upon the right and duty of exercising private judgment which
+came with the rationalism of the eighteenth century. The eighteenth
+century, with its “appeal to reason” in opposition to the authority
+of priest and Bible, was in fact an intellectual declaration of
+independence which became for educated minds an essential part of the
+liberal tradition. Liberalism owes much to the Deists and men like
+Hume. It is not a mere coincidence that a large number of the leaders
+of the American Revolution were “freethinkers.” Thus liberalism became
+something more than a political movement. It became a philosophy of
+personal liberty, of independence of authority, of tolerance. The
+rights which the liberal claimed for himself he was--at least in
+theory--willing to grant to others. He took the side of the “under
+dog.” The tradition is best represented in England by such men as
+Priestley, Martineau, Kingsley, Cobden, Bright, Morley, J. S. Mill,
+Huxley, and in America by Paine, Jefferson, Channing, Emerson, Theodore
+Parker, Lincoln, and Ingersoll.
+
+The decline of liberalism to the level of Bryanism, the betrayal by
+“One Hundred Percent Americanism” of the spirit in which the Republic
+was founded, the spread of bigotry among the masses, the prevailing
+partisan spirit and the illiberalism of professed “liberals,” the
+changing of our constitution from a guarantee of personal liberty to
+the authorization of Federal interference with the daily habits and
+customs of the individual--these are not matters for which we may hold
+recent immigrants responsible. They are, I regret to say, symptomatic
+of tendencies which are most commonly manifest among Americans of
+British descent. They show how far the spirit of a nation may drift
+in one hundred and fifty years when it renounces its intellectual
+leadership.
+
+Liberalism as a political movement was early divorced from liberalism
+as an intellectual movement. The former became Andrew Jacksonism,
+“shirt-sleeve democracy,” free-soil-ism, abolitionism, populism, the
+Single Tax movement, opposition to big business, Progressiveism.
+Ever since the time of the settlement of New England the pioneer and
+frontiersman, the “debtor class,” the town laborer and the farmer,
+have had to carry on a struggle against the “money powers” of the
+large industrial centers. The conflict of “the poor against the
+rich”--generally characterized by a demand for governmental regulation
+of industry and cheap money--reached its culmination in the “Free
+Silver” issue of 1896. Of this “battle for humanity,” the author of
+“Our Times” quotes William Allen White.
+
+ “It was a fanaticism like the Crusades. Indeed, the delusion that was
+ working on the people took the form of religious frenzy. Sacred hymns
+ were torn from their pious tunes to give place to words which deified
+ the cause and made gold--and all its symbols, capital, wealth,
+ plutocracy--diabolical. At night, from ten thousand little white
+ schoolhouse windows, lights twinkled back vain hope to the stars.
+ For the thousands who assembled under the schoolhouse lamps believed
+ that when their legislature met and their governor was elected, the
+ millennium would come by proclamation. They sang their barbaric
+ songs in unrhythmic jargon, with something of the same mad faith
+ that inspired the martyrs going to the stake. Far into the night the
+ voices rose--women’s voices, children’s voices, the voices of old
+ men, of youths and of maidens, rose on the ebbing prairie breezes, as
+ the crusaders of the revolution rode home, praising the people’s will
+ as though it were God’s will, and cursing wealth for its iniquity. It
+ was a season of shibboleths and fetiches and slogans. Reason slept;
+ and the passions--jealousy, covetousness, hatred--ran amuck; and
+ whoever would check them was crucified in public contumely.”
+
+The demand for governmental regulation has been on the increase since
+1896 and has almost worked a revolution in our form of government. I
+will not discuss the degree to which such an extension of the powers
+of the central government is desirable. I am aware of the fact that
+the motive is largely that of protecting the economic independence
+of the average individual. The point I wish to make is that the
+methods advocated reveal the change that has come over liberalism.
+Notwithstanding Jefferson’s statement about the government which
+governed least, the extensions of the powers of government have not
+ever been limited to matters industrial, and we find men calling
+themselves liberals accepting all sorts of restrictions upon their
+liberty without complaint. Liberalism has taken on a partisan
+spirit with all the intolerance, hysteria, and coerciveness that
+usually characterizes crowd movements. The same elements that voted
+“liberal” with Mr. Bryan thirty years ago, later supported Bryan the
+fundamentalist, and today are staunch prohibitionists. I cannot help
+feeling that something of the fundamentalist was lurking under the
+skin of the American liberal all along. The tradition of personal
+independence derived from our British ancestors had about reached this
+stage of decline, when efforts were made to supplant it with a very
+different type of liberalism from continental Europe.
+
+The “old liberalism” was in theory individualistic; the “new
+liberalism” was socialistic. It brought with it such ideas as “the
+class struggle,” “mass action,” the “cooperative commonwealth.”
+Freedom was to be gained for all in the form of the “emancipation”
+of the working class. Youthful intellectuals idealized the
+proletariat, organized socialist locals, talked about the “materialist
+interpretation of history,” denounced “the capitalists,” addressed
+one another as “comrade,” closed their letters to one another with
+the words, “Yours for the Revolution,” and a few took the trouble to
+study the writings of Karl Marx. The old liberalism was seen as mere
+“bourgeois idealogy,” mental slavery, a system of ideas fabricated by
+the master class in order to keep the working class in perpetual wage
+slavery. The new liberal felt himself intellectually emancipated. If
+he was very, very liberal, he styled himself a radical. The movement
+reached its maximum strength about the year 1910, and then began
+to decline. It appealed to some who had been liberals of the older
+American type, but the response of labor was negligible. Radicalism
+professed to be a spontaneous revolt of oppressed working people. In
+fact it was a cult, with its dogmas about labor, which existed chiefly
+among middle-class intellectuals. Its leaders--and it consisted mostly
+of leaders with very little rank and file--were seldom working men.
+
+Although its economic creed is the product of the nineteenth century,
+a study of the history of this movement would show it to be in direct
+line of descent from Rousseau. Many of the basic ideas are distinctly
+Rousseauian. Civilization, which Rousseau hated, is now the wicked
+capitalist system. There is the same emphasis on the collective will,
+on mass action, on the idea of revolution, the same belief that The
+People is the only rightful sovereign, that society exists by virtue
+of a sort of covenant among men which can be altered at will, and that
+universal happiness may be attained by changing the system which is
+responsible for all misery and misbehavior.
+
+Radicalism, carried to its logical conclusion, is Communism, in which
+there is no pretense of liberalism, no place for freedom. It has
+greatest appeal for a type of mind which is by nature doctrinaire
+and inelastic, and its propaganda tends to fixed opinion and to
+illiberalism. A generation ago Nietzsche said of it,
+
+ “In every country of Europe, and the same in America, there is at
+ present something which makes an abuse of this name: a very narrow,
+ prepossessed, enchained class of spirits, who desire almost the
+ opposite of what our intentions and instincts prompt.... Briefly and
+ regrettably, they belong to the _levellers_, these wrongly named free
+ spirits--as glib-tongued and scribe-fingered slaves of the democratic
+ taste and its modern ideas: all of them men without solitude, without
+ personal solitude, blunt honest fellows to whom neither courage nor
+ honorable conduct ought to be denied; only, they are not free, and
+ are ludicrously superficial, especially in their innate partiality
+ for seeing the cause of almost _all_ human misery and failure in
+ the old forms in which society has hitherto existed--a notion which
+ happily inverts the truth entirely! What they would fain attain with
+ all their strength, is the universal, green-meadow happiness of the
+ herd, together with security, safety, comfort, and alleviation of
+ life for everyone.”
+
+The word liberal is commonly associated with that extension of
+democracy which the crowd thinks is progress. If you favor this
+progress, you are said to be a liberal. If you doubt that it is
+progress you are thought to oppose progress as such and so are
+a conservative. If the progress of democracy were accompanied
+by a corresponding advance of culture and gain in wisdom and
+broadmindedness, this use of the term liberal would be appropriate.
+
+Men become free only as they achieve self-government. I take it that a
+man governs himself to the degree that he acts upon his own judgment.
+Freedom thus presupposes first that people are capable of judging
+things for themselves, and second, that they are permitted to do so.
+If the progress of democracy resulted in fewer laws and wiser laws,
+we should in time have self-government. But the reverse is the case:
+the extension of democracy brings about an extension of the powers of
+government and the multiplication of foolish laws. It does not follow
+that people’s judgment is improved because they can vote about more
+and more things. Nor is there any assurance that they will not begin
+voting about things that are none of their business and thus destroy
+the right of private judgment, which is the exercise of freedom. You
+do not decide things for yourself when everything is submitted to a
+referendum or regulated by the legislature. If the people or their
+representatives should vote to establish a censorship of books, or to
+prohibit smoking tobacco, or to compel church attendance on Sunday,
+that would be democracy; but it would not be a gain for freedom.
+Self-government is impossible when every private matter is turned into
+a public question. Men with third-rate minds--and there are enough of
+them once they get together to constitute a solid majority--shrink from
+the responsibility of exercising private judgment, but are prepared and
+eager to decide any matter whatsoever once it becomes a public issue.
+They are, moreover, disinclined to allow a large measure of personal
+freedom to one another or to any one. Self-government in a democracy
+therefore means not private judgment but national independence,
+universal franchise, and no constitutional restraints upon the will of
+the majority. In common practice, “liberty” is the legally recognized
+right of the crowd to tell the individual what he may not do in matters
+which concern only himself. Any man has _liberty_ when he has a voice
+in the government of the land. He has _freedom_ when he governs
+himself. His freedom may be prevented either by lack of judgment or by
+outside interference. The effect of education in the community is to
+improve judgment and lessen outside interference with the exercise of
+it. Properly defined, a liberal is a person who strives for precisely
+these results. Liberalism, in this sense, and education are the same.
+
+I said that a man is free when he acts according to his own judgment.
+This does not mean that the free man is able to choose anything he
+wishes. Necessity constrains him just as it does the unfree. It means,
+however, that his assent or dissent in any matter follows from his
+personal insight into the implications of the situation. He does the
+required thing even when he does not like it, because he has the
+intelligence to see that it is required under the circumstances. He is
+not compelled to take some other person’s word as to what is required.
+He is free not only because he is independent of the will of another in
+reaching his decision, but primarily because he knows what he is doing
+and why he does it.
+
+There is a very old, extra-canonical legend according to which the Lord
+Jesus, passing by, saw a man digging in the field on the Sabbath day,
+and he said to the man, “If thou knowest what thou doest, blesséd art
+thou; if thou knowest not, curséd art thou.”
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+THE APPRECIATION OF HUMAN WORTH
+
+
+I have a number of neighbors whose sons and daughters are at present
+suffering the agony of preparation for college. What a nightmare it
+is possible to make of education! Three or four years of attendance
+at expensive private schools where the sole aim seems to be to get
+the student through his college entrance examinations with a passing
+grade. Students terrified, parents anxiously awaiting reports of work
+done or not done, teachers tired out, one student fails in his Latin,
+another in algebra, a third is sent home because of loss of interest in
+study, and there are tears, family conferences, special tutors, reviews
+and memory drills in vacation time, until finally the student “gets
+through” and drops the subject, his interest in it dead.
+
+I am not one of those who believe that education may be achieved
+without effort. But study is not work only, it is also a form a
+enjoyment. There are many things which it is a delight to know, not
+because such knowledge is useful or is required for a passing grade,
+but because it is an aid to the appreciation of value. It is fun.
+
+There are people who attend concerts from a sense of duty, striving
+thereby to improve their souls, but it is possible to listen to music
+with no other motive than the wish to enjoy it. It is the person who
+enjoys music who in the end becomes the discriminating listener. The
+same is true of the reading of books. William James once said the
+classics are necessary to education because knowledge of them makes us
+“connoisseurs of human excellence.” Literature has a charm which is
+often lost when it is made “required reading.”
+
+An intelligent boy of seventeen who was having difficulty with his
+school work recently said to me, “I think it is because I really am
+not interested, and the things I wish to know they do not teach in our
+school because the colleges will not give credit for them.” When I
+asked him what study would interest him, he replied that he thought he
+would like to try philosophy and requested me to suggest a good book
+for a beginner, declaring that he intended to take up this study in
+addition to his school work.
+
+I have no doubt that had he made this request of one of his instructors
+he would have been told that he had better spend his time preparing
+his lessons. But I took a chance that his interest might be genuine,
+and told him that I thought he would find Plato’s “Republic” a good
+introduction to Philosophy, and suggested that he read the first
+four books. During the previous semester he had been permitted to
+drop one of his courses because reading was “too great a strain upon
+his eyes.” When I next saw the boy I inquired how he had got on with
+the “Republic.” He said, “Why, I found it so exciting that I did not
+stop at the end of the first four books, but read all ten.” When I
+asked him what he found interesting in the dialogues, he said, “I do
+not understand many of the conclusions they reached, but I enjoyed
+listening in on those conversations. They are so logical, and I liked
+the way Socrates leads the others along, springs surprises on them, and
+makes them see what they mean by what they say. I begin to see what the
+difference is between thinking and just talking--and many passages
+were beautiful also.” For the first time in his life, he had realized
+that the pursuit of knowledge could be an interesting adventure.
+Moreover, his parents told me that he had shown improvement in his
+regular studies.
+
+When the ancients said that knowledge is knowledge of the good,
+they meant in part that with the increase of knowledge comes better
+discrimination. If education is _for_ anything it is that we learn to
+choose the good. By the “good” I do not mean good in general, or good
+as an abstraction of philosophical discourse, nor the conventionally
+good. I mean any excellence whatsoever. In order to see and appreciate
+excellence, you must yourself have struggled for it. He who has never
+striven to surpass himself, surrounds himself with the shoddy, the
+second-rate, the cheap. In matters of taste, of sentiment, of good
+workmanship, he cannot distinguish between that which is genuine and
+that which is imitation. In matters of taste there is much that is
+purely arbitrary and conventional, so that what is good taste in one
+age may be bad taste in another. Nevertheless, there is a psychological
+soundness in our use of the word taste to designate certain judgments
+of worth. It implies some degree of self-restraint, a sensitiveness to
+subtle stimuli which comes with the habit of giving attention to minute
+differences of quality. In contrast, animals which gulp down their food
+hastily and in great quantities do not pause to taste it. Similarly,
+the mind which has not disciplined itself “swallows things whole,”
+as we say. It is not disturbed by the incongruous or the hideous. It
+is sensitive only to coarser stimuli: it prefers the hackneyed, the
+raucous, the loud and flashy.
+
+I once knew a church in a small town which worshipped in a plain
+rectangular old building with colonial windows. When a rival
+denomination erected a monstrous building with a huge circular
+stained-glass window facing the street, the group which worshipped
+in the old structure became dissatisfied. After much difficulty
+in securing the money, a committee was sent to a near-by city and
+purchased a quantity of gaudily-colored translucent paper similar to
+that one used occasionally to see on the front door of a saloon. This
+paper the congregation proudly pasted on its colonial window panes.
+
+The architecture of the average church in this country and the hymns
+the people sing are much better indications of the level of their
+spiritual life than are the creeds they profess. The general cultural
+level of the population is revealed by the style of houses men build,
+the kind of furniture with which they surround themselves, the type of
+motion picture which becomes popular, the magazines on the news stands,
+the character of the journals which have the largest circulation,
+the “song hits” of the day, the programs which are broadcast for the
+radio. These things all have spiritual significance, they indicate a
+prevailing type of reaction toward all the values of experience.
+
+The public is curiously indifferent to the lack of genuineness of
+sentiment; “hocum” and bathos; deliberate and obvious counterfeits
+of emotional reactions characterize practically every appeal to
+the general public. Think of the popularity of a play like “Abie’s
+Irish Rose,” or of that, a generation ago, of a song like “After the
+Ball,” or of a book like “The Man Nobody Knows.” Think of the typical
+Chautauqua lecture or political address. Think of the notorious
+insincerity of the motion pictures. People ask, “What is the matter
+with the movies?” The answer is, the audience. Half-educated people do
+not seem to be sensitive to the difference either between good and bad
+workmanship or between artistic sincerity and insincerity. Standards
+of value, in all the older forms of art, have been set by the knowing
+ones. The artist was obliged to submit his creation to the criticism
+of persons who had some background of tradition and general knowledge.
+With the quantity production methods of the motion pictures, it becomes
+possible for the first time to make the man on the street the critic,
+on whose judgment depends survival, and as the New Testament says,
+“By what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged.” In selecting our
+preferences we pass judgment on ourselves.
+
+The multitude dupes itself with its desire to get something for
+nothing; hence its love of the miraculous. All appeals to it are thus
+over-capitalized, and made to appear grand and glorious. Shirking
+the effort necessary for real achievement leads to the preference of
+quackery. There is a story that a physician who had yielded to the
+temptation to make easy money by advertising himself as the discoverer
+of a magic remedy for disease, received a call from a former friend and
+colleague who disapproved of the practice. When the visitor sought to
+persuade him that such methods would not pay, the other stepped to the
+window and said, “Come now, look with me at the faces of the people
+passing along the street; how many of them do you think would become
+your patients and how many mine?” I am told by a professor of biology
+who gives a pre-medical course in a Western university that less than a
+third of the cases of sickness in the country are treated by reputable
+members of the medical profession.
+
+I have been somewhat interested in the popularization of psychology.
+On the occasion of a visit to a great public library, I was assured
+by the librarian that there was a tremendous popular demand for books
+which deal with the subject of psychology. I was shown a section in
+which these books were kept so that they would be easily accessible.
+The greater number were written by persons who had no knowledge of
+the subject. They were utterly misleading. Psychology was commonly
+presented as a wonderful, easily practiced device for performing
+miracles, a system of secret formulae for curing disease, for getting
+into harmony with the divine source of all being, for manipulating the
+“subconscious” in ways that assured peace, prosperity, self-mastery,
+and power over others. I think it is a conservative statement to
+say that nine-tenths of the stuff that bears the name “Psychology”
+in popular magazines devoted to the subject, in widely advertised
+books, in lectures and correspondence courses in self-improvement, is
+pure charlatanism and sleight-of-hand arranged for those who wish to
+indulge themselves in systematic self-deception. It is not mere lack of
+information which causes people to prefer the cheap. With respect to
+the things of the mind, people have various standards of living.
+
+A teacher of economics says that by a person’s standard of living we
+mean to designate those things which he insists upon having even if
+it is necessary to give up marriage and parenthood to possess them.
+However much people may desire and strive for comfort and abundance,
+from the standpoint of economics, those who marry and beget children
+in poverty have a low standard of living. Hence the standard is
+not directly a function of the amount of per capita wealth, but is
+psychologically determined. And the standard often applies to other
+things besides material possession. Persons who have a high standard
+are often poor. They might easily turn their efforts to the acquiring
+of wealth, but they will deprive themselves and postpone marriage for
+the sake of some cultural interest, education, a scholarly or literary
+career. They will go without a motor car in order to have money to
+buy books. It would be interesting to make a comparative study of the
+families of college professors and certain groups of artisans, who have
+about the same income as that of the average professor, in order to
+see which type had the greater number of children, and which sent the
+greater number of their young people to college, also which possessed
+the greater number of automobiles or radios. Thus the standard of
+living applies not to what one wishes to possess, but to what one is
+willing to pay for a certain kind of living. It has to do with quality,
+not mere quantity. This principle applies to intellectual standards of
+value. People are content with the second-rate because it is easier.
+
+With learning there comes a new reverence. Perhaps I might speak of
+it as the educated man’s faith. Respect for the excellent is possible
+only to a mind which has learned to recognize distinctions of worth.
+An undiscriminating multitude clings to its idols or substitutes new
+idolatries for old precisely because it is blind to those differences
+of value which constitute the meaning of existence for mankind. People
+seek something “given” to believe in, some universal formula of
+salvation, because they are unable to distinguish the relative worth
+of concrete experiences actual or possible. Those who shrink from the
+responsibility of their own yes or no take refuge in an imaginary
+_cosmic_ yes and no. But ground your faith in the difference between
+the better and the worse, and you have a faith which grows stronger
+with the increase of knowledge. All other “faiths” grow weaker because
+they are substitutes and evasions, futile attempts to possess value
+without the exercise of discrimination.
+
+If existence as a whole has a purpose or a universal meaning, I do
+not see how our minds could know it, or what use it could ever be to
+the mind that grasped it. I have tried to show that our thoughts and
+beliefs are _human ways_, that our thinking is partial. As James said,
+all meanings depend upon the fact that we are “interested spectators”
+and prefer some things to others. Aside from our human interests and
+preferences, everything being so far as we can see equally inevitable,
+has the same degree of existence, or right to be, and all is equally
+important. Nothing then has any special importance. And if nothing is
+important, nothing has any meaning. It might be said that each thing
+has meaning for the whole. But since the whole lies beyond our ken,
+such a statement does not help us much. The world of meanings and of
+truths therefore does not have an independent existence but is related
+to our preferences and is a human creation. I am not, however, at
+present concerned with the problem of the meaning of truth. Truth is
+itself a value. I am trying to state a simple creed by which a man may
+best order his life and discover that which an intelligent mind may
+reverence. It is, “I believe in the distinction of worth.”
+
+The loss of belief in distinction turns both society and the world of
+values upside down. It is symptomatic of the dominance of mediocrity.
+With the degradation of power there is a corresponding degradation of
+value. The power which rules the modern world is the power of numbers.
+Many will say it is the power of money. This too is a numerical force,
+having nothing to do with quality or the discrimination of value: the
+possession of money does not as such lift the possessor out of the
+mass. There is much talk about the conflict of the masses with the
+capitalists, but since on both sides the struggle is one for economic
+advantage rather than for spiritual value, it may be regarded merely
+as the conflict between successful and unsuccessful mass units over a
+common interest. Money power and the power of numbers are not really
+a confrontation of contrasting valuations of the possibilities of
+experience. On both sides the conflict is waged on about the same
+level and for identical ends. Capitalism is not really the foe of
+democracy, it is democracy’s first-born child. The self-made successful
+business man is the “success” in democratic society, its ideal. He is
+what the mass as a whole strives to become. Some people think this is
+individualism. Infrequently it is, usually it is not. Dollars still
+are numbered, and money power is the power of numbers. Its power is
+the same as concentrated mass power, since it is of this same order.
+We speak of “amassing” money. The mass idea and the ideals of the mass
+prevail all round. Capitalism holds sway by virtue of its mass appeal,
+and by virtue of the fact that the capitalist is the realization of the
+average man’s ambition. The mass because it is powerful and can grant
+or withold favors, lords it over the realm of values. Emphasis is laid
+upon that which produces an identical type of reaction in a maximum
+number of people. The commonplace is rated high because it is the
+average.
+
+The rare, the unique, the excellent, cannot be syndicated and
+drops out of consideration. The standards which prevail are those
+of undifferentiated men. Mass appeal asserts the equal importance
+of all individuals, as if a man’s worth consisted in his mere
+“number-oneness.” This is the democratic dogma of equality. Critics
+of the dogma frequently say that it represents the foolish attempt to
+declare all men equal in all respects. I doubt this. It seems to me
+that this dogma is perfectly correct so far as it goes. It declares
+all men to be equal _before the law_. And law is no respecter of
+persons, hence all men are equal before that which does not respect
+their personalities. Which is to say that all men are equal in one
+respect--that each is a numerical unit when he is considered as a
+member of the mass. It is not denied that men may be unequal in other
+respects. The point is that these “other respects” do not get a
+hearing. But the only recognition of the individual that amounts to
+anything is that which recognizes the differences of one from another.
+
+When we emphasize excellence, good workmanship, sincerity, ability,
+virtue, wisdom, we have in mind matters concerning which the
+differences among men are the differences between superiority
+and inferiority. Hence discrimination of value is recognition of
+distinctions of worth among men. Lose sight of distinctions of
+worth--of the very desirability of distinction as a social good--and
+all values decline to the level of mediocrity.
+
+In the supremacy of man as mass the mediocre man, he who in all things
+corresponds to type, and is most reducible to average, is King. For him
+books and journals are published; clergymen and editors speak for him
+and say what they think he believes; laws are made in his interest.
+Programs for the radio and motion pictures are made to please him. His
+dilemmas are held up as the dilemmas of every one. His goods become the
+standards to which all are expected to conform. He has purchasing power
+and he has votes. He can make and unmake heroes. He determines the
+direction of the course of events in his day and generation. Society
+moves in the direction of the type of man about whom there is most
+general concern, the man whose preferences set the pace.
+
+The goal set by “modern ideas” would seem to be not the attainment of
+a higher level of values, not greater personal worth among men, but
+the more complete supremacy of man as mass. Recognition of personal
+worth is discouraged, for it necessitates the admission that some
+persons are by nature, or as a result of effort, superior to others.
+Such an admission is contrary to the idealization of the mass, which is
+the worship of the power of numbers. Personal distinction is frowned
+upon and discounted. Differences of superiority or inferiority are,
+if grudgingly admitted, said to be the result not of difference in
+native endowment or of individual achievement, but mere products of
+environment. Hence human excellence is an accident.
+
+There is a wide-spread tendency to minimize and deny the significance
+of personality. An advanced school of psychology holds that belief
+in the existence of personality is a superstition. Personality is
+simply the way the nervous organization works and is similar to the
+running of a gas engine. Any hereditary differences of capacity or of
+teachableness are negligible. All individual traits are reducible to
+conditioned reflexes which are what they are because of the coincidence
+of certain stimuli. I am what I am because somebody co-operating with
+the environment conditioned me in this way. I have absolutely nothing
+to do with the matter. Consciousness, interest, attention, will, have
+no place in this psychology. The same may be said of all attempts to
+explain the phenomena of life in mechanistic terms. Historic movements
+are explained as if individuals had nothing to do with them. Social
+change is said to be the product of impersonal economic forces, and
+progress the result of mass action. Thus the Great Man at best only
+represents the mass tendencies of his times. Even for discoveries in
+science and creative achievement in the arts, the mass is given credit
+although it may have resisted these things when they were new.
+
+I believe that such attempts to _depersonalize_ humanity are
+consciously or unconsciously motivated by the wish to avoid the
+recognition of the possibility of superiority in an age when the
+values of civilization are largely committed to the tender custody of
+man acting as mass in the struggle for power. Whether distinctions of
+worth are recognized or not, deny that they may exist, deny that men
+may have greater or less worth in themselves, and human achievement
+becomes merely the attainment of bodily comfort, or social power, or
+satisfaction of egoistic desires. There are many who would hold that
+such is the case. But our existence is not measured by what we can
+get or what we can do, but by what with our getting and doing we may
+_become_. Mankind differs from other animals not merely in getting and
+doing, man is himself different, and is more than they. It is in this
+that his evolution is seen. The same is true of the individuals in the
+mass; some are more in themselves than others. So obvious a truth would
+never require statement except in a standardized, crowd-manipulating
+age in which there is much that encourages the inferior to abound.
+
+I am not suggesting that we devise some plan for picking out all the
+superior individuals for preferment and honor, or that we weed out the
+inferior ones by some process of elimination, or that the educated man
+should or could pose as a superior person. He who must make an effort
+to exhibit any excellence has attained little of it. If the world is
+spiritually right side up, people will be selected by the standards
+of value that prevail. When you buy a newspaper, vote a party ticket,
+go to a theatre, listen to a lecture, read a book, express a moral
+sentiment or show any preference whatever, you are doing more than just
+that thing. Our daily choices determine what we ourselves become, and
+they do something else also; the total of them has survival value for
+some particular type of man. We are thus daily deciding whose dilemmas
+shall determine the quality of living, and what kind of human life is
+to be lived on this planet, and who shall thrive and who shall perish.
+
+Human progress is not something we achieve directly by joining a
+movement and forcing our convictions upon others. It is something we
+help determine every day in the choices we make. The elements of it
+come like the variations which appear in the structure of plants and
+animals. And as Darwin said it is the function of the environment,
+in causing modifications of species, to select certain variants
+for survival and to eliminate others; so also in the progress of
+civilization do our daily preferences operate. Natural selection and
+primitive custom operate blindly and automatically and without reason.
+It is because education improves judgment and the appreciation of value
+that Thomas Davidson spoke of it as “conscious evolution.”
+
+The education of a people at any time is its answer to the riddle of
+life. This answer is more than giving an account of the processes of
+nature; it is the opening and closing of doors upon the possibilities
+of experience--and upon various human types. Thus education is
+selective. It is the sifting out of the relative worth of men. It finds
+the significance of living to be the struggle for excellence. Its goal
+is a higher type of living man and woman. Its great task therefore,
+in the modern world, is the reassertion of the _inequalities_ which
+mass appeal ignores, the rediscovery for the modern spirit of the
+distinction between superiority and inferiority. It is impossible
+to lift any mind from a lower to a higher plane when that which
+distinguishes one plane from another is obliterated by placing all on
+a level. Appreciation of distinctions of worth is an essential of a
+liberal education, as it is of the whole spiritual life of man.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+EDUCATION AND WORK
+
+
+In the closing sentence of the preceding chapter, I used the words
+“spiritual life.” Perhaps it is unnecessary to say that I did not have
+in mind anything vaguely metaphysical, supernatural or mystical. I
+meant the phrase to designate a hierarchy of values which is possible
+to an organism capable of exercising choice among its experiences.
+It is in the sense that it deals with qualities and their relative
+importance that education may be said to be spiritual, spiritual in a
+purely naturalistic sense. It is the ordering of interests and habit
+patterns so that behavior is characterized by a tone and a significance
+that it would not otherwise possess.
+
+There are those who write and speak of education as if the mind and its
+ideas existed in a world apart from the world of things. It is possible
+for a man to pursue his studies in complete isolation from the world
+about him. But as mental life is possible only in response to some
+environment, such pursuit of learning merely substitutes an artificial
+and sequestered environment for the actual one. If the meanings and
+values disclosed in this artificial environment remain permanently
+different from those which might be realized in the world of our daily
+tasks and relationships, such education is merely an elaborate escape
+from reality. The educated mind responds to our common world. It
+differs from the uneducated mind not in that it responds to a different
+set of situations, but in that it responds with a different system of
+values. Education is not so much a special interest separated from
+other interests as it is a method of transforming all our interests.
+
+It ought to have something of importance to do with work, since most
+people are engaged in some form of work most of their time. And when in
+an industrial age like the present, the whole life of society revolves
+about the system of production of wealth, it is impossible to precede
+with education and ignore the challenge to it of our industrialism. It
+may not be the task of education to provide a solution of the labor
+problem. But education certainly fails of its function when men are
+unable to retain its values while struggling with such problems.
+
+People rarely behave like educated human beings when they are
+confronted by an economic issue. Liberality of outlook, tolerance,
+temperance of judgment, self-control, ability to see when one is
+making oneself ridiculous, respect for the truth, are not often found
+on either side of an industrial conflict. Fantastic notions of the
+relation of education to work abound because there is much confusion
+about the meaning and value of work for human personality. Labor is at
+the same time idealized and despised.
+
+Ruskin, Carlyle, and many humanitarians have held labor to be most
+praiseworthy. Work is a blessing, in it are peace of mind and
+self-respect. Work is noble, and it ennobles him who does it. A
+contemporary writer on the subject of education warns us that the hand
+may not be “dishonored with impunity.” By dishonored he means that hand
+work may be considered inferior to brain work to the extent that there
+is great disparity between the rewards. Distinction has been made
+between work of hand and work of brain. The former is real work. Once
+in a parade of working men in Pittsburgh, I saw on a banner carried
+at the head of a column of metal workers, these words in very large
+capitals, _We Work_. The implication was that some others, slightly to
+their discredit, did not really work. From the idealization of work to
+the idealization of the worker is a logical step. The working class,
+a class which in earlier centuries was looked upon as the despised
+“proletariat,” attained a new status in nineteenth century thought.
+Men began to look to labor as the one class capable of righting the
+age-long wrongs of humanity, and to believe the control of society by
+organized labor to be the only means to the establishment of peace and
+justice. Most of the writers who praised labor were themselves members
+of the so-called leisure class. A few like Tolstoi vainly tried to
+support themselves by manual toil. Many who wrote convincingly of the
+blessings of labor did not personally avail themselves of its ennobling
+advantages. In the earlier humanitarian sentiment of the nobility of
+labor, the worker was envisaged as a free and independent person in
+whose wholesome activity there was healthfulness. Good workmanship
+commanded general respect and revealed the dignity of labor. There were
+simplicity and grandeur in the primitive act of a man eating his bread
+in the sweat of his brow. He who lived close to earth gained something
+of the silent, calm majesty of nature. Able to cope with natural forces
+and giving mankind as good as he received, he need ask favor of no man.
+
+Rousseau says, “Outside of society, an isolated man, owing nothing to
+any one, has a right to live as he pleases; but in society, where he
+necessarily lives at the expense of others, he owes them in labor the
+price of his support; to this there is no exception. To work, then, is
+a duty indispensable to social man. Rich or poor, powerful or weak,
+every idle citizen is a knave.
+
+“Now of all the occupations which can furnish subsistence to man, that
+which approaches nearest to the state of Nature is manual labor; of all
+the conditions the most independent of fortune and of men, is that of
+the artisan. The artisan depends only on his labor. He is free--as free
+as the husbandman is a slave; for the latter is dependent on his field,
+whose harvest is at the discretion of others. The enemy, the prince,
+a powerful neighbor, may take away from him this field; on account
+of it he may be harassed in a thousand ways; but wherever there is a
+purpose to harass the artisan, his baggage is soon ready; he folds his
+arms and walks off. Still, agriculture is the first employment of man;
+it is the most honorable, the most useful, and consequently the most
+noble that he can practice. I do not tell Emile to learn agriculture,
+for he knows it. All rustic employments are familiar to him; it is
+with them that he began, and to them he will ever be returning. I
+say to him, then, Cultivate the heritage of your fathers. But if you
+lose this heritage, or if you have none, what are you to do? Learn a
+trade.... I wish to give him a rank which he cannot lose, a rank which
+will honor him as long as he lives. I wish to raise him to the state of
+manhood; and whatever you may say of it, he will have fewer equals by
+this title than by all those which he will derive from you.... It is
+important to learn a trade, less for the sake of knowing the trade than
+for overcoming the prejudices which despise it. You say you will never
+be compelled to work for a living. Ah, so much the worse--so much the
+worse for you! But never mind; do not work from necessity, but work
+for glory....
+
+“You enter the first shop whose trade you have learned: ‘Foreman, I am
+in need of employment.’ ‘Fellow-workman, stand there and go to work.’
+Before noon comes you have earned your dinner, and if you are diligent
+and frugal, before the week has passed you will have the wherewithal
+to live for another week; you will have lived a free, healthy, true,
+industrious and just man. It is not to lose one’s time to gain it in
+this way.”
+
+Here as always Rousseau is romantic. This is all very beautiful--until
+you try it. I am inclined to think that most men who entertain this
+view have never worked for a living. The happy few amongst the
+toilers of earth may here and there have enjoyed this independence.
+It is certainly not the experience of the rank and file in our
+present industrial system. With the development of the system, and
+the consequent organization of labor, the idealization of work is
+supplanted by the idealization of the labor movement and its aims.
+In the writings of Marx, labor as work is represented merely as so
+much homogeneous effort-filled time which is measured and reckoned in
+strictly numerical terms, as if its qualitative or personal elements
+could be ignored or were non-existent. Skill and artistic genius are
+represented as the mere telescoping or contraction of a number of
+labor-time units into a given period--a speeding up, as it were, not
+something inherently superior in kind. This point of view might satisfy
+one who was concerned only with the number of hours of employment
+and indifferent to what he did or how he did it. But it takes little
+account of that pride in achievement without which those who assert the
+dignity of labor are making a virtue of necessity.
+
+Marxians assert with much truth that pride in achievement is crushed
+by the methods of machine production and by the exploitation of
+labor under a system of “wage slavery.” But this is to abandon the
+older idealization of work and of workmanship. Labor is now viewed
+_realistically_ as an irksome servitude. Marxians argue that labor
+creates all wealth and is therefore justly entitled to it all. It is
+beside our point to enter into a discussion of this proposition. I am
+merely seeking to show that in this philosophy, emphasis is shifted
+from the idealization of work to the idealization of the labor movement
+itself. A Marxian could agree with Aristotle that mechanical toil is
+debasing, only he would add “under the present system.” Emancipate
+labor, give it its rights, reward it justly and force all to do their
+share of it, and then work will be ennobling. Which is to say, work
+will be ennobling only in an ideal society. This position is an attempt
+to restore with one hand what is taken away with the other. Work is
+robbed of its dignity when excellence in it is not thought worthy
+of consideration, when superiority of workmanship is represented
+merely as a greater quantity of abstract labor-time. Advocates of
+the cause of labor do not say much about the distinction between
+superior and inferior workmanship. And here we have an example of
+the mass-psychology of which I spoke earlier. In the degree that you
+consider men as mass, you ignore individual worth.
+
+There has been a slight tendency to regard labor as an instinct. The
+impulse to work is of course a universal human trait. Work is normal,
+natural, right, and those who have no desire for it are going contrary
+to the demands of human nature. Some such position as this is taken by
+Mr. Veblin in his delightful satire, “The Instinct of Workmanship.”
+The author of this book holds with McDougall that man has an instinct
+to work, but that unfortunately the instinct has been corrupted. This
+corruption began in primitive times with elders, medicine men and
+warriors. And throughout historic time, with each succeeding privileged
+class, human nature has become steadily more perverted and abject,
+until this instinct reaches its final stage of corruption in the
+present capitalist system. Thus a last count is added to the indictment
+of capitalism. It has corrupted labor’s instinct of workmanship.
+
+I have never known whether Mr. Veblin meant his humor to be taken
+seriously, or intended his book to be a subtle thrust at the
+theologians. His argument may be regarded as a clever parody of
+the doctrine of the fall of man in Adam’s sin, with the consequent
+curse upon all the descendants of our first parent. In any case, his
+contention adds somewhat to the confusion as to the true significance
+of labor. I have not found evidence to prove that man has an instinct
+of workmanship. Hence the relation of education to work is not that of
+the rational control of instinct, for if the knowledge of simple labor
+processes were innate, men would not even need “practical” education in
+them.
+
+Not all men have held a high opinion of labor. Nietzsche says work is a
+disgrace. There are doubtless many people who secretly agree with him.
+I have known working men who suffered from an “inferiority complex.” It
+is possible that the protest of labor is not wholly against injustice,
+but is in part a protest against the feeling of inferiority. It is
+not uncommon to find young people who are ashamed to work. It is not
+only among the rich and privileged that we find those who look down
+on labor. The same attitude exists in all classes, for much the same
+reason that the majority of people despise the poor and emulate the
+rich. Work has in the past been the lot of the slave. Most men are at
+present driven to labor by necessity, and many entertain the hope of
+escaping from the necessity as soon as possible.
+
+We have even Biblical authority for this attitude. The punishment of
+Adam for his act of disobedience is a life of labor. Henceforth he must
+earn his living, tilling the ground and eating his bread in the sweat
+of his brow--in other words, labor is a curse. And so it is regarded
+by the law of the land. When a man is convicted of a crime the court
+sentences him to prison and to “hard labor”--until such time as he is
+pardoned and may return to his career of crime and life of leisure.
+
+It is interesting to note the place assigned to work by the Hebrew and
+Christian religions which, having their origin in the folkways and the
+daydreams of the masses, are very sympathetic to the poor toilers of
+earth. Yet we are told that to keep the Sabbath holy, the day must not
+be defiled with labor. There is no mention of the blessedness of labor
+in the Beatitudes; the command to consider the birds of the air and the
+lilies of the field which toil not neither do they spin and yet are
+clothed and fed, reveals a spirit very remote from that of industry.
+Heaven is thought of as a place of eternal rest.
+
+A similar popular valuation of labor is revealed in the myths of
+antiquity. The gods do not work. Vulcan, the exception to this rule,
+is always made to appear ridiculous among the gods; they are said to
+laugh at his awkwardness. The “labors” of Hercules are not really
+toil but exhibitions of miraculous strength. For the most part in the
+legends which have expressed the wish-fancies of mankind, the hero
+does everything but work; he fights, makes love, kills dragons, goes
+on strange voyages, wins a kingdom, in fact, his adventures may be
+interpreted as symbolic expressions of the wish of mankind to escape
+the common burden of toil.
+
+I think, moreover, men belittle their work when they accept the
+broad distinction between the “brain” worker and the “hand” worker.
+Psychologists say that thinking is as truly bodily activity as is any
+other form of labor, and there is very little so-called work that does
+not require thought. There is every conceivable gradation from that
+labor which is almost wholly routine, to that which consists of nothing
+but solving problems. No one knows the point where labor ceases to be
+brain work and becomes manual. The world’s work requires of men many
+kinds of activity, some of great importance, some of little. There is
+no use either of idealizing it or in despising it. Men do their work
+because they have to and are neither noble nor ignoble because of it.
+
+The problem is how can I in my situation make my position a place
+where a man has really lived and toiled and thought and realized
+values through his effort, and has not permitted himself to become an
+automaton or a fool. The labor problem however tends to become one
+primarily not of the significance of work at all, but of improving the
+material conditions of those who toil. This latter problem is wholly
+justifiable. But because of the prevailing mental confusion about labor
+itself, it is generally assumed that if a man works he should receive a
+different sort of “education” from that of other educated people, and
+that his training should be the means to ends that have little to do
+with interest in education as such.
+
+There are those who always view the education of workers strictly from
+the standpoint of its value for social security. Just as a well-known
+statistician not long ago advised the American investor to support
+the Church, whether or not he agreed with its doctrines, because
+the influence of the Church upon the masses, he said, was on the
+side of invested capital, so there are those who believe that giving
+educational opportunity to working men is a sort of premium paid upon a
+general policy of social insurance.
+
+The fear of the menace of labor often inspires efforts for the
+education of workers in the hope that with better knowledge labor will
+become safe and sane. There is a wide-spread belief that education
+like religion is a conservative influence. If working men were only
+better informed they would have a more sympathetic understanding of the
+intentions of their employers; they would show some appreciation of
+their economic opportunities under our free institutions; they would
+know better than to go on strike, or listen to their union leaders,
+or dally with socialistic ideas. Perhaps so, but I have yet to see an
+educational effort which was consciously directed to these ends that
+was either sincere or intellectually respectable.
+
+From a wholly different point of view, the relation of education to
+work would seem to present no problem at all. Work itself is said to
+be the only genuine method of education. A popular writer who holds
+advanced ideas on this subject, says that the four years at college are
+wasted, that “as early as fifteen or sixteen a youth should be brought
+into contact with realities and kept in contact with realities from
+that age on. That does not mean that he will make an end of learning
+then, but only that he will henceforth go on learning--and continue
+learning for the rest of his life--in relation not to the ‘subjects’ of
+a curriculum, but to the realities he is attacking.” In this passage
+one detects the odor of Rousseau. We discussed this theory when we were
+considering liberal education as animal training. At best it is but
+half true. If learning necessarily came from contact with realities,
+every one would be educated. But there is no assurance that people will
+see the significance of the realities they “attack.” The importance of
+experimental study is not a new discovery. Science has long employed
+the laboratory method. And even laboratory work, work done in an
+environment which is carefully arranged to stimulate discovery, does
+not always develop habits of independent judgment.
+
+The notion that experience is necessarily the best teacher is popular.
+The newspapers encourage it. If a man makes a success in business,
+interviewers seek his opinion on every conceivable subject. In worker’s
+classes there is occasionally a student who has no doubt that his
+experience in the shop is a better education than that which people get
+from books. Such students do not as a rule gain much from study, for no
+matter what subject is under discussion, they always know more about it
+than the instructor.
+
+Experience as such teaches just what is experienced and nothing more.
+Few minds are able to reflect judiciously upon experience or to draw
+correct conclusions from it. Labor is something that can be known only
+by one who has experienced it, and this experience is important for
+anyone who desires a broad knowledge of human life. But it is with work
+as it is with travel: each is an aid to education only as it quickens
+insight. The man on the Bowery who boasts that he has traveled over
+America from coast to coast may really never have left the Bowery; in
+each place he has visited, he finds himself in the same sort of lodging
+house, in the same environment, among the same sort of companions, all
+with the same interests.
+
+So with many kinds of work. Much of it is mere routine. He who from day
+to day does the same thing, until he is able to perform the movements
+with a minimum of effort and attention, is certainly acquiring a habit,
+but we have seen that not all habit formation is education. Those
+who work with certain kinds of machinery frequently complain of the
+monotony of their work. I think that one of the serious objections to
+such work is that it has so little educational value. Perhaps this
+objection may be offset by the fact that machine production makes
+possible a shortening of the working day and hence gives the worker
+more leisure time. Some think that adult education is important because
+it gives people something to do in their unemployed hours. But people
+do not always improve their minds during the time when they are free
+from labor, and many whose work is routine, possess by nature or
+develop routine habits of mind which interfere with their education.
+They become victims of fixed ideas, of slogans and catchwords.
+
+Perhaps the nearest approach to a real integration of education and
+work is vocational training. This is the “education” which most people
+seek. Universities offer an increasing number of courses in practical
+subjects such as engineering, mining, business methods. Various trades
+are taught in public schools. By far the greater number of courses
+offered to adult students are sold with the promise that they will
+increase the purchaser’s efficiency and “put more pay in his envelope.”
+I have already discussed this useful knowledge. Both the individual
+and society profit by it. And in addition to its practical advantages,
+there is a sincerity and lack of pretense about such education which
+distinguish it from much of the traditional education. It must be
+thorough or it cannot meet the test of practical experience. If
+men learned mechanics with no more thoroughness than that which
+characterizes the study of the classics, the country would go into
+bankruptcy.
+
+But as I have tried to show, this training for practical efficiency
+is too narrow. It does not necessarily widen the student’s interests
+or deepen his insight or improve his judgment concerning matters that
+lie outside the range of his technical information. Advocates of this
+type of education often become partisan and declare that it alone is
+education.
+
+It is doubtless too soon to speculate upon the effects of our new
+policy of reducing immigration to the point where it is almost
+negligible. Whether the effect is to intensify competition among
+working people, or to lessen it because of a labor shortage, in either
+case the result is obvious. Somebody must do the actual work of the
+country. We shall soon have a working class in America that is more
+than one generation old. That is, we are now for the first time in
+our history tending toward a relatively fixed and permanent working
+class. The various national strains in it will be held together long
+enough to become acquainted with one another, long enough to find more
+in common than a common opposition to capital, long enough to develop
+a working class tradition which is American. Workers will not only
+strive individually to become middle class; they will be obliged to
+improve their condition as a class. To the economic struggle there
+will be added efforts for culture. Many workers are already beginning
+to seek education as an aid to a more satisfactory and less sordid
+existence while working at their tasks. Sooner or later education
+must cease to be the distinguishing mark of a privileged class, or a
+device which aids a man to the goal of his ambition; it must become a
+universal practice of learning how to live like a civilized being in
+any occupation.
+
+I have said that people’s ideas of the relation of education to work
+are for the most part confused and fantastic, and that among the
+causes of this confusion was a misconception of the meaning of labor.
+We saw that the older romantic idealization of labor gives way to
+the idealization of Labor not as work but as an organized movement.
+There are “friends of Labor” who think of workers’ education as class
+education. And by class education they do not mean the extension of the
+opportunity for liberal education to people who toil for their daily
+bread. They are not interested in liberal education, any more than
+they are interested in work. They wish working men to be given such
+instruction as will be useful in the “class struggle.” Labor is to have
+its own kind of education.
+
+It is said that educators are but the retainers, the “high-brow”
+policemen of the vested interests and must always teach what the
+masters require. The educators’ task is to train the masses to be more
+productive and willing servants of the masters, to train the sons of
+the owners in the idealogy so that they may work it to advantage, to
+mould them to the type of the most successful and provide them with the
+insignia and passwords of culture which will show that they belong to
+the fraternity of the privileged. Traditional education, being nothing
+but a weapon of the ruling class, is not for the workers. The workers
+are now passing through a period of discipline which is preparing
+them to be the future masters of the world. As the old education was
+for the old master class, the new must likewise be the ideology of
+the future master class, the organized proletariat. The workers must
+educate themselves, for any education that capitalists provide for
+them will be the capitalist education which enslaves the worker. The
+new education in proletarian ideals must be wholly different from the
+past. Its aim is not to provide useless and ornamental knowledge, or
+escapes and consolations, but to equip labor to emancipate itself from
+the rule of capital and to conquer and control industrial society. Thus
+labor education is sometimes little more than old fashioned radical
+propaganda. Where this is not the case, workers may still be urged to
+the pursuit of knowledge by militant appeal. The following is quoted
+from a bulletin issued by a state director of labor education in the
+West:
+
+ “He (the worker) lives in a society committed to the practice of
+ buying his labor cheap and selling its product dear, to the theory
+ that property is sacred and life of little value. In support of this
+ position toward labor, the press, the pulpit, and too often the
+ school lend their aid....
+
+ “All this passion for justice will accomplish nothing, believe me,
+ unless you get knowledge. You may be strong and clamorous, you
+ may win a victory, you may effect a revolution, but you will be
+ trodden down again under the feet of knowledge unless you get it for
+ yourselves. Even if you should win that victory, you will be trodden
+ down again under the feet of knowledge if you leave knowledge in the
+ hands of privilege, because knowledge will always win over ignorance.”
+
+If as an individual a man is interested in his education only in so
+far as it may be to his economic advantage, we regard him as a rather
+stupid materialist. It is no less stupidly materialistic to urge a
+class to seek knowledge merely for the sake of a common economic
+advantage. As a rule, ignorant men place a strictly material valuation
+upon education. If education is nothing but the training of certain
+groups of animals in the best methods for taking material advantage
+of one another, it makes little difference which group wins in the
+class struggle. This theory means that the belief that education can
+make a difference in the kind of living is a delusion, and that the
+only significant differences in human life are the results of economic
+forces.
+
+Have we, in the notion of a special type of education for the working
+class, a correct view of the relation between education and work?
+Let us admit for the sake of argument, that traditional education is
+class education, elaborated in the interest of the dominant elements
+in society. Even then it might have a function other than that of an
+aid to systematic exploitation. It might serve as a guide to the use
+of leisure time. It might aid men in discriminating between ends which
+were worthy of effort and those which were not. It might be necessary
+for the development of personality, and to enable people to discover
+that which would give some intelligible meaning to their existence.
+Hitherto the privilege of the fortunate few, it might conceivably be a
+good which may now be the possession of the many.
+
+I cannot see that the interests I have just mentioned are necessarily
+those of any particular class. And it would seem that insofar as
+traditional education has failed, the failure has been the result of
+subordinating these very universal human interests to the special
+economic advantages of a particular class. Along with the class spirit,
+irrelevant factors enter into education. Education becomes illiberal
+and propagandist, a drill in herd opinion. Prejudice is not removed; it
+is intensified. A spirit of intolerance is bred concerning anything
+which might effect class interest.
+
+And now it is argued that since liberal education has been spoiled by
+one class in making it the servant of its class interests, the working
+class is justified in again spoiling it for its own special interests.
+If men prefer a substitute to the real thing, it is their own affair.
+But a person is either being educated or he is not, and whether he is
+or not is a matter quite independent of his particular occupation. Of
+course a man’s education will make a difference in the spirit in which
+he works and in the quality of his workmanship, for it changes the man.
+If traditional education is unfit for the working man, it is not fit
+for anyone. I can see no reason why economic differences should be made
+the basis of cultural differences. The knowledge that has value should
+be accessible to all regardless of their economic interests, or the
+profession they practice. If a bad education should not be given to a
+worker, it is not because he is a working man but because he is a man.
+Anything that it is good for one class to know is good for another. A
+banker may appreciate Shakespeare’s sonnets, so may a tailor; but there
+is not one Shakespeare for the first and another Shakespeare for the
+second. If biology is worth knowing, its value is not changed because a
+machinist studies it. If a philosophy is true, it is true for the man
+who can understand it, whether he be a railroad president or a coal
+miner. There is no proletarian arithmetic or capitalist algebra or
+Marxian astronomy.
+
+To be sure, a worker’s education should take account of the economic
+situations in his environment. So should the education of all men.
+It is sometimes said that within the ranks of labor there is a new
+civilization in the making. Working men are said to have ideals and
+standards, an ethic and culture of their own which are now manifest
+as working class “idealogy.” I have not noticed it. From the time I
+was a small boy, I have had somewhat unusual opportunities to know the
+labor movement, and during the last twenty years have sought to make
+a psychological study of it. The “labor point of view” is commonly
+that which propagandists wish the worker to have. In America the
+“revolutionary class-conscious proletariat” exists only on paper. If
+we consider the ideals, habits and ambitions of working people, it is
+difficult to conclude that they form a culture group apart. The working
+man votes for Al Smith and Calvin Coolidge, dresses like the grocer
+and the bank clerk, drives a motor car if he can afford it, reads the
+popular journals, has about the same ideas of patriotism, morals,
+government, and success in life as his employer, and tends in every way
+to become more and more “middle class.”
+
+Suppose the change contemplated by many radicals should occur and
+that there should be a “social revolution.” What of the education of
+workers then? The worker would still spend his days at the machine or
+bench. Is it not conceivable that men might then in their pursuit of
+knowledge have some interests other than the economic? Under no system
+should people permit their entire personalities to be drawn into and
+used up by industry. Industry is a means, not an end. It is in its
+proper place when it makes possible the achievement of culture. As a
+man becomes educated, he should learn so far as circumstances permit,
+to put his work in its proper place. The relation of education to work
+is no different from its relation to all the interests and activities
+and demands which life makes of us. A community may be said to have
+a culture only when all men--each in his own way,--cooperate in the
+realization of certain values, which give to all their actions and
+strivings a perspective, an order, a meaning. It is in this sense that
+Europe in the thirteenth century may be said to have had a culture.
+In discussing the cultural values of any period of history, there is
+danger of over-simplification. The picture which I have of that century
+may not be historically correct, but it will serve to illustrate my
+point. Catholic Christianity at the close of the Middle Ages possessed
+a set of values which entered into everything that people did or
+thought and gave it meaning. The secular did not really exist for
+the men of that age. All work was religious work. Everywhere there
+was ceremony, the shrine, sacredness. The fields were blessed before
+plowing; harvest was a gay religious festival. Every labor process
+and every station in society was brought to the service of the common
+ideal, and from it gained added significance. For it the peasant tilled
+the ground, its themes were the inspiration of the sculptor, the
+painter, the musician, the builder. In the service of this valuation of
+the experiences of life the King ruled, the soldier fought, the monk
+said his prayers, the philosopher meditated.
+
+The cultural ideal of an age is revealed in the type of man for whom
+the people have greatest reverence. Such a man is the meaning of
+living for the men of that age. Inquire of the thirteenth century in
+whom is its ideal realized, and the answer is clear. It is realized in
+the saints. I do not mean to suggest that everybody in those days was
+saintly. But there was common agreement that human life existed for
+the achievement of sainthood. People achieved it in varying degrees
+and by methods which appear strange to us of the twentieth century.
+But all men hoped to achieve it in the next world if not in this. The
+existence of the saints in Heaven was a storehouse of merit upon which
+all could draw. And one living saint was held to be enough to justify
+the existence of an entire age.
+
+I trust it is not necessary for me to add that the saint is
+not my ideal of the meaning of life. Ideals of asceticism and
+other-worldliness have no interest for me. But I wonder what would
+happen if people should “go in” for education with the unanimity
+of agreement as to its value that they once showed with regard to
+religion. I hesitate to make the suggestion lest I appear to suggest
+something solemn, sanctimonious, pious and official. We have enough of
+that sort of thing now among professional educators.
+
+If instead of the attainment of sainthood the attainment of wisdom
+could be made the commonly accepted goal and meaning of the activities
+of modern men, we should again have a culture in which industry would
+take its proper place. We have for it now no other goal than the
+making of money, and hence industry runs amuck while the spirit of
+commercialism crushes out all our values. We keep the wheels going
+round, but the quality of living and the meaning of our work decline.
+Cooperation in the service of the ideal gives way to a competitive
+struggle for material possession and power and our lives are used up in
+making a living. Only the peoples that have achieved a culture have a
+goal for which to labor.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+EDUCATION AND MORALS
+
+
+The source of much of our interest in public education is concern for
+our neighbors’ morals. This is doubtless why in America we commonly
+think of adult education as something which should exist for other
+people rather than for ourselves. We are a nation of moral reformers.
+Education is often proposed as an alternative to moral legislation.
+There is an increasing demand for more effective moral education in the
+public schools.
+
+When the educator becomes an “uplifter” the moral interest is always
+a little forced and education suffers. Moral enthusiasm, when it is
+enthusiasm for the good of others, tends to make of education a species
+of organized charity. Seek education for yourself and it is the search
+for the good life. From ancient times men have sought knowledge that
+they might become better judges of good and evil. To one who is seeking
+to know what is good, all popular moral conventions, taboos, and
+alleged divine commandments become proper subjects of study, criticism
+and possible revaluation. Moral education is not mere drill in the ways
+of the herd. The good man’s first duty, as Professor Erskine says, is
+to be intelligent. Good intentions alone do not enable a man to judge
+wisely or behave well. The prevailing idea that one can be at the same
+time good and stupid has strongly influenced our education. Moral
+education becomes moralizing. The phrase “ethical culture” is either
+tautological or it is a contradiction in terms.
+
+If we were each more genuinely interested in our education there would
+be much less talk about morality and less occasion for such talk. The
+moralist is as a rule the person with a lower middle-class mind, who
+insists upon calling general attention to his own dilemmas. Mediocrity
+makes parade of virtue a claim to superiority, presenting a picture of
+itself as the likeness of the good man. Goodness is defined in negative
+terms. The good man is he who observes the “thou shalt not,” not he
+who can do the rare and difficult thing. It is in the localities where
+there is least artistic appreciation or intellectual curiosity or
+cosmopolitan spirit, the places where people have nothing with which to
+occupy their minds, that we find the strongholds of “morality.” Where
+education prevails, people learn to behave themselves as a matter of
+wisdom and good taste. Those who are sufficiently practiced in the art
+of living to be able to observe the common decencies without always
+“watching their step,” may sometimes look up from the ground and take a
+broader view.
+
+Much of the ethical instruction which is given in school is both
+bad education and bad morals. Those colleges in which there is most
+talk about “education for character” are as a rule those which most
+patently fail as educational institutions. The instructor tends to
+“protest too much.” The attitude of authority discourages the spirit of
+search and criticism. Popular prejudice is intrenched. Non-essentials
+are over-emphasized. Crowd-mindedness, rather than independence of
+judgment, prevails. Every crowd persuades itself that it is vindicating
+the right and justifies its behavior with fine moral sentiments. The
+student in school is made susceptible to catchwords and is prepared
+to become the typical crowd man of the future. To this end he is
+given “ideals,” that is, he is taught to worship certain words such as
+“justice,” “purity,” “brotherly love.” Instead of learning to enquire
+what such words mean when applied to concrete situations, he is led
+to believe that he possesses the realities for which they stand when
+he has an attitude of adoration for the words. Henceforth, he can,
+without using his brains, be always right even in matters where he
+knows nothing, by the trick of seeing in each practical problem a moral
+issue. It is in this manner that the majority is always right in a
+democracy. If you question its wisdom, you are put in the position of
+one who attacks its moral ideals. From the first day in school on, the
+child is drilled in cant and in deference to prevailing public opinion.
+He is brought up in an atmosphere of sex morality by a stupid and
+shame-faced policy of expurgation and censorship, the assumption being
+that apparent ignorance is “purity.” A student in a woman’s college
+preparing to become a teacher of English literature, elected a course
+in the eighteenth century novel, and after listening to the lectures,
+she felt it her duty to look over some of the books. Unable to find
+the works of Fielding in the library, she inquired of the instructor
+where she could secure a copy of “Tom Jones.” The instructor replied,
+“Heavens, child, you are not going to _read_ it!” This is perhaps an
+extreme case, but it illustrates much of the influence of morals upon
+the education of the young.
+
+Is the student to acquire the virtue of patriotism? Then he is not
+to be shown the full force of the example of those who have resisted
+tyranny, but must have his head filled with a glorified version of
+his country’s history. Is he to learn respect for law? He is not
+equipped with principles which enable him to discriminate between
+wise and foolish legislation. His teachers and preachers tell him that
+law is divine and must be obeyed because it is the law. After three
+generations and more of such education, we have a population in which
+moral independence is decidedly on the wane. The statute book, not
+private judgment, becomes the guide to conduct, and the Federal courts
+the safeguard to morals. Open protest against official invasion of
+individual rights gives way to furtiveness and evasion. Moral training
+which does not encourage critical examination of popular ideas of what
+is right and good, does not tend to make men better, but only of one
+mind.
+
+Popular suspicion of intelligence and the belief that one may be good
+and do right without it, is carried over into the field of education.
+Moral education becomes a special kind of education. It is thought that
+there is a “moral knowledge” which is different from other knowledge.
+The attempt is made to train character as if character did not include
+intelligence. Education, then, intent upon character, distrusts
+intelligence. The moral interest results in routine drill in current
+precepts and values, not in the awakening of moral responsibility.
+Professor Dewey says,
+
+ “Morals are often thought to be an affair with which ordinary
+ knowledge has nothing to do. Moral knowledge is thought to be a
+ thing apart, and conscience is thought of as something radically
+ different from consciousness. This separation, if valid, is of
+ special significance for education. Moral education in school is
+ practically hopeless when we set up the development of character as
+ a supreme end, and at the same time treat the acquiring of knowledge
+ and the development of understanding, which of necessity occupy the
+ chief part of school time, as having nothing to do with character. On
+ such a basis, moral education is inevitably reduced to some kind of
+ catechetical instruction, or lessons about morals. Lessons ‘about
+ morals’ signify as a matter of course lessons in what other people
+ think about virtues and duties. It amounts to something only in the
+ degree in which pupils happen to be already animated by a sympathetic
+ and dignified regard for the sentiments of others. Without such a
+ regard, it has no more influence on character than information about
+ the mountains of Asia: with a servile regard, it increases dependence
+ upon others, and throws upon those in authority the responsibility
+ for conduct. As a matter of fact, direct instruction in morals has
+ been effective only in social groups where it was a part of the
+ authoritative control of the many by the few. Not the teaching as
+ such but the reënforcement of it by the whole régime of which it was
+ an incident made it effective. To attempt to get similar results
+ from lessons about morals in a democratic society is to rely upon
+ sentimental magic.”
+
+I do not see how it is possible to isolate moral education as a special
+discipline and have either a liberal education or a sound sense of
+moral values.
+
+In institutions of higher learning, “Moral Philosophy” or the “Science
+of Ethics” is sometimes thought to be training in morals. It is so
+only to the extent that such study is itself good education. I find
+that many students have the same experience that I had with my college
+course in Ethics. I took up the study believing that at last I should
+learn what is right and how to do it. I soon discovered that I had
+entered upon the driest and least practical course of study offered in
+the college. Insofar as I could see there was nothing in Ethics that I
+could turn to for advice about any of the problems of my own conduct.
+I understand that in some institutions the students’ demand for advice
+has resulted in courses of ethics which consist of case studies. No
+doubt the opinions of the students and the instructor concerning
+certain hypothetical dilemmas of conduct are very interesting. But as
+Plato would say, such study is made up of “opinion,” not “knowledge.”
+It is doubtful if such discourse ever results in modifying behavior.
+
+“Pure” ethics consists of _a priori_ arguments about the teachings of
+philosophy concerning such abstract concepts as the moral judgment, the
+nature of the Good, the idea of Duty in general, not of my particular
+duties. Such study may be good training in logic, but it has no more to
+do with conduct than has formal logic, and not as much as mathematics,
+for one may apply the principles of mathematics to concrete problems.
+Perhaps the greatest gain for the student from such study is the
+discovery that philosophers do not agree upon any one system of morals,
+and that in strict logic we do not know what we mean by our moral
+generalizations. The more universal an ethical concept is, the more
+it exists wholly within and for reason, the less is it a deduction
+from experience and the less use is it as a guide to behavior. Ethics,
+as moral philosophy, is not a descriptive study of the customs and
+practices of people, or of what things men in diverse times and places
+have held to be good or evil, right or wrong; this is anthropology.
+It is not the study of the mental processes of judging or of forming
+habits or of that quality of actual experience which men call good;
+this is psychology. Ethics, moreover, is not a scientific study of the
+means of accomplishing any good whatsoever; for this at once leads out
+of pure ethics into economics, mechanics, medicine, etc. Pure ethics is
+pure logic applied to ultimate concepts _about_ morality in general.
+It is the “formulation of the Good as it would hold for all possible
+worlds,” a kind of speculation or contemplation. Its good does not
+exist in experience anywhere; it is metaphysical and exists only for
+philosophizing. Hence ethic, strictly speaking, is concerned with ends
+not with means, and the ends are not experienced, they are only thought
+about. As an example of such an approach to morals, there is Kant’s
+Categorical Imperative, from the consideration of which everything
+concrete, empirical, personal is removed.
+
+I quote some typical passages from the discussion of the teaching of
+ethics in a contemporary Journal of Philosophy,
+
+ “The task of moral philosophy is, by analysis of the moral judgments
+ men actually make, to arrive at clear notions about obligation,
+ rights, good, punishment and the like. And the point of honor, the
+ chastity of the philosopher’s mind, should be never to suffer his
+ genuine moral judgments to be warped in deference to his theory. For
+ that is to poison the wells of truth. All that is valuable in ethics
+ is formal....
+
+ “Finally, it may be asked, has then moral philosophy no practical
+ value? I think its prime value is purely speculative,--the supreme
+ interest of the topic for thoughtful minds and its importance for
+ metaphysics. But, like everything else, it has its effects. I think
+ it is, when studied in its purity, an unrivalled mental training.
+ I believe that the more (apart from casuistry) we reflect on the
+ nature of the moral law the more we are likely to reverence it.
+ And lastly I think that nearly every human being does and must to
+ some extent philosophize. We are all apt to form crude principles,
+ as that morality consists in keeping the law, or obeying the ten
+ commandments, or realizing our selves, or seeking the common
+ good. And then we are apt pendantically and priggishly to distort
+ our genuine moral judgments in accordance with these inadequate
+ generalizations. Moral philosophy criticizes such formulas and shows
+ that they are either untrue or circular. Either self-realization
+ means realizing the _right_ part of the self or it is not always
+ right. Promoting the “common good” either means bringing about those
+ satisfactions which moral reason judges _ought_ to be brought about
+ (e. g., those which are _just_ or of a _higher_ value) or it is not
+ always right. And so a truer moral philosophy releases us from the
+ false dogmatisms which may, though usually they do not, corrupt our
+ practise....
+
+ “On the other hand, members of my class actually approached me, as if
+ I were a father-confessor, for the solution of special problems in
+ conduct!”
+
+In the following quotation from the same Journal, a different view is
+expressed. The author believes that ethics is sometimes concerned with
+the practical problems of conduct, but admits that this inclusion of
+practical interests results in some ambiguity and confusion.
+
+ “Conceding that there is a science of ethics that does not teach us
+ either to be good or that we ought to be good any more than logic
+ teaches us how to think or that we ought to think, or esthetics
+ teaches us how to appreciate beauty and that we ought to love it,
+ there yet remains the question, is there a legitimate place in
+ philosophical education for a science of ethics which frankly does
+ not disclaim a “practical” interest? Is there a science of ethics
+ that is “practical” in something more than the Protagorean sense of
+ supplying instruction in “how to manage our homes in the best way,
+ and to be able to speak and act the best in public life?” (Such
+ instruction might well encourage sophistry and the casuistry of which
+ Professor Carritt speaks.) Is there, in other words, a science of
+ ethics which is “practical,” not in the sense of telling the pupil
+ what moral decisions to make, but in cultivating the ἔρως φιλοσοφίας
+ which would render possible well-considered choices? If there is not
+ a place for such a science, it seems hardly forthright or consistent
+ to perpetuate the ambiguity. If there is a legitimate place for
+ it, it is the duty of moral philosophers to terminate the present
+ ambiguity by explaining it. We can scarcely afford to laugh at or
+ deny it.”
+
+The relation of morals to education is to be found neither in special
+discipline and habit formation in the effort for character apart from
+intelligence, nor in drill in the logic of an _a priori_ science. When
+moral training is made a special interest set off from other aims of
+education, it defeats itself. There is no such thing as a moral good
+separate from other goods. A moral good is simply the best choice among
+the conflicting goods of experience, actual or possible. As James said,
+the good is that which satisfies a desire. _A priori_, every desire
+should be satisfied, since considered in itself it is a demand for a
+satisfaction. But since desires are in conflict, choice is necessary.
+The good deed is the right thing to do, or the right way of doing it.
+All education if it is really education is moral education. It is
+because people do not grasp this fact that futile efforts at special
+moral training are made in which the connections with education are
+artificial and extraneous. Thus the pursuit of knowledge is shorn of
+its significance for conduct, and morals is divorced from intelligence.
+As Professor Dewey says,
+
+ “A narrow and moralistic view of morals is responsible for the
+ failure to recognize that all the aims and values which are desirable
+ in education are themselves moral. Discipline, natural development,
+ culture, social efficiency, are moral traits--marks of a person
+ who is a worthy member of that society which it is the business of
+ education to further. There is an old saying to the effect that it
+ is not enough for a man to be good; he must be good for something.
+ The something for which a man must be good is capacity to live
+ as a social member so that what he gets from living with others
+ balances with what he contributes. What he gets and gives as a human
+ being, a being with desires, emotions, and ideas, is not external
+ possessions, but a widening and deepening of conscious life--a more
+ intense, disciplined, and expanding realization of meanings. What
+ he _materially_ receives and gives is at most opportunities and
+ means for the evolution of conscious life. Otherwise, it is neither
+ giving nor taking, but a shifting about of the position of things in
+ space, like the stirring of water and sand with a stick. Discipline,
+ culture, social efficiency, personal refinement, improvement of
+ character are but phases of the growth of capacity nobly to share
+ in such a balanced experience. And education is not a mere means to
+ such a life. Education is such a life. To maintain capacity for such
+ education is the essence of morals.”
+
+Moral behavior is not only social. It is also _intelligent_ behavior.
+An act has moral significance when the performance shows _insight_ into
+the situation. An action done under compulsion or without understanding
+has no moral value. A machine may behave very correctly but it is not
+a moral being. An act has moral meaning to just the extent that its
+author grasps the implications of the situation in which he must act
+and is guided by consideration of the results. An act is judged, not as
+moralists would have it, merely by the intention, but by its results.
+It is the aim of education to develop the insight and foresight and
+breadth of vision which make it possible for an individual to take
+responsibility for the results of his behavior. The greater the
+intelligence, the more nearly does the consideration of an act approach
+the estimate of the total result. Thus _the aims of education and
+morals are the same_;--the good life in so far as it may be attained by
+intelligent choice and behavior.
+
+Men have long sought to reconcile the true and the good. But what they
+have sought to reconcile were as a rule mere _ideas_ about the true
+and the good. It is not as logical abstractions that the true and the
+good are one, but in the recognition that the really wise act is the
+good deed. It is in this sense that wisdom is virtue--in the sense
+that virtue is wisdom. But the objection will be made that educated
+men are sometimes clever rascals who are only the more evil for all
+their knowledge. I do not think I beg the question when I say that such
+men are not wise but merely clever. Nor do I mean that good conduct
+is merely a matter of reasoning and calculating. No one denies that
+desire and instinct and purpose are involved. But if I am not mistaken
+it is generally recognized that education and morals alike have
+something to do with training and controlling these aspects of human
+nature. Intelligence is not mere intellect. It is the whole man wisely
+directing himself with respect to his environment and its alternatives.
+
+From one age or locality to another fashions in behavior patterns
+change. These fashions seem to be important at the time they hold
+sway. People confuse them with morals. Efforts are sometimes made by
+reformers to introduce innovations similar to those which designers
+of clothing each season create in haberdashery. A liberal journal in
+New York recently published a series of articles dealing with “The New
+Morality.” But morality is neither new nor old. Rules of conduct which
+can be made mere matters of style are applicable chiefly to actions the
+results of which are unimportant. Such rules have really very little
+moral value. They constitute, however, the customs or folkways which
+prevail at a given time. Conformity in such matters is required by the
+herd. Often this requirement is the only reason for observing certain
+rules; the opposite course would be just as good. It is with respect to
+such matters that education has the effect of liberating the individual
+and improving morals. It breaks the hold of the taboo, makes it
+possible to discriminate between the important and the unimportant and
+leads to the formation of principles based upon consideration of the
+results of behavior. The differences in conduct that count are those
+between stupid deeds and well-considered deeds. Intelligence takes into
+account the fact that no action of man can be isolated and judged apart
+from its place in the social environment, and its effects both for the
+author and for his human relationships. Long ago Aristotle showed that
+each of our virtues unless intelligently exercised tends to extreme and
+to become a vice. A virtue is what it does, not what it feels like to
+its possessor. Much is said today about the necessity of loyalty. There
+can be no social stability without it; but there is probably no more
+serious social menace than unintelligent loyalty.
+
+Men persist in ascribing to their moral principles a sanctity,
+a sublimity, which makes them appear to have an independent and
+eternal existence and to be ends in themselves. I believe this to
+be a superstition. In what respect is a moral principle more to be
+reverenced than a principle of mechanics? To worship Duty in general
+is simply to make a god out of a human generalization. The “rightness”
+about which men grow eloquent exists simply as the implications of the
+concrete situation in which an act is performed. As the ability to
+grasp such implications improves, principles of conduct are employed
+which are relevant to the situation. I spoke of insight into the
+situation toward which action is taken as being alike essential to
+education and to the moral judgment. He whose conduct is regulated by
+his own insight and by principles which are relevant to the situation
+at hand is a morally responsible being, and to the degree that a man
+assumes responsibility for his conduct, he reveals the quality of his
+education. Those who seek to avoid responsibility substitute for their
+own insight rules of behavior which have as their basis something that
+lies outside the demands of the situation where the behavior takes
+place. Judge your conduct by this other, outside something and ignore
+the lessons written in the results of your deed, and you cease to learn
+anything from your behavior; your education in this direction has come
+to a stop.
+
+Education frequently comes to such a halt when moral teaching is
+carried on as part of religious instruction. There is a common belief
+that religion is the real basis of morals. I think this belief has
+its source in the fact that religious institutions in the past, being
+by nature conservative, have sought to perpetuate the folkways. The
+church is a form of social organization and has its own interest in
+maintaining among its members certain standards of behavior. Often
+it has been the only existing agency for the instruction of the
+young. Most religious systems carry with them certain commandments
+and precepts the keeping of which they secure by means of promises of
+future reward or threats of punishment. Since both the precepts and the
+religious beliefs and ceremonies have evolved together out of primitive
+man’s ideas of divine authorship and authority, men do not see that
+the basis of morals lies in social necessity--the need for mutual
+adjustment among men. The church’s preëmption of the field of morals is
+allowed to stand long after its squatter rights in other fields--art
+industry, science, etc.--have been challenged. We forget that religion
+was once thought to be the basis of all the interests of civilization,
+so that naturally the moral interest came under its sway.
+
+It is obvious that every society, whatever be its religion, must
+develop its moral codes as men learn to live together. In the community
+everyone is part of the environment of everyone else, and each must
+adjust himself to such a human environment. Adjustment is impossible
+if there is no order in the environment. Hence from the beginning
+certain habits and customs have existed which make it possible for men
+to predict to some extent what their neighbors will do. These habits
+and customs are the primitive morals which it is the task of wisdom
+to inquire into and revalue and gradually improve or discard, and
+substitute intelligently considered means and ends.
+
+When moral precepts are presented in the form of divine commandments,
+morality is merely obedience; it consists in keeping the commandments,
+not in acting according to the demands of the situation. The problems
+of the control of behavior are solved in advance, and the solutions
+learned by repetition and memory drill. If I act in strict obedience
+to a divine command, the results of my deed are not my affair. The
+responsibility for the result is upon the deity. I can ignore, in
+fact, should ignore, the lessons of experience and of conduct. The
+commandment does not require of me any insight into the situations in
+which I act. I have no moral responsibility. People whose conduct is
+guided by such morality have committed many outrageous deeds and have
+with good conscience closed their eyes to the terrible consequences
+of their behavior. From the standpoint of their education, they are
+children; they have never yet attained the age of moral responsibility.
+It is in matters of moral education that the infantile attitude of
+mind which religion preserves in the adult life of the race becomes a
+serious obstacle to a liberal education.
+
+Again there is a tendency to disregard the consequences of my acts if
+I seek, as many moderns do, to make a religion of morality itself. It
+is often said, religion is a life, the religious man is the good man.
+“My religion is the Golden Rule,” or some other rule. It all depends on
+what you mean. If you mean that in a vague sort of way you try to be
+good and that a certain moral earnestness is religion enough for you,
+very well, but you have not said much. Thomas Paine said, “To do good
+is my religion.” But I am not sure he added much to his good will by
+styling it a religion. He might as well have said, “I desire very much
+to do good.” So do all right-minded people, the difficulty comes when
+we try to find out what specifically we mean by doing good.
+
+Again it is said there is “salvation by character,” but one does not
+possess a character. One either is or is not a character. One does
+not become a character as a result of routine moralizing or of mere
+conformity to conventional standards. President Wilson is quoted as
+saying, “There is no more priggish business in the world than the
+development of one’s character.” Run away from the man who would be
+good to you in order to develop his character. Do the thing that in
+your best judgment is the thing to do under the existing circumstances,
+do it as well as you can, watch what happens and learn your lesson from
+it, and if you _are_ a character you will not go far wrong.
+
+In all behavior, he who takes responsibility takes chances. There
+are those who demand moral certainty. They imagine an absolute good,
+a universal principle of right and duty, to be the elemental law of
+the universe. Duty is sublime, the Moral Law is God. People persuade
+themselves that their adoration of this impersonal god develops in them
+the “moral will,” when in fact its function is to provide them with a
+fictitious sense of security. I think the ethical philosophy of Kant
+is motivated by this wish for security, rather than by an interest
+in morals as such. He seeks a good which is to be possessed merely by
+thinking it, a maxim which is universally valid. But if I have such a
+maxim, assuming that it can be made applicable to any concrete problem
+of conduct, then all I need consider is whether I have acted according
+to the rule. Here again I need not be concerned about the results of my
+behavior. It is not the consequences of my act that show it to be right
+or wrong. My deed is right if it is the act of the moral will.
+
+Another method of escaping moral responsibility is to run with the
+crowd. The crowd never considers consequences; it is bent upon
+vindicating its principles at any cost. It is anonymous; in it the
+individual may not be held to account. The crowd is not the same as
+the multitude; it is a distinct phenomena of social psychology. We
+all have in our natures certain anti-social impulses. The crowd is
+a sort of pseudo-social environment in which these impulses are not
+inhibited but are indulged with mutual moral approval. All crowds
+profess to be devoted to some moral ideal. Their moral idealism is
+mere self-justification and pretext for letting oneself go. It is
+a weapon useful in partisan strife; it puts the opposition in the
+wrong and justifies hostility. Hence public questions tend to become
+moral issues, and the attempt to understand the situation gives way
+to righteous indignation toward anyone who witholds approval of the
+crowd’s aims and methods.
+
+And the crowd strives to hold its members in line. Conformity to its
+ways and standards is required of all, and becomes an end in itself.
+One does things because others do them. The crowd man is shocked by
+the unconventional because it is unusual. His ideas of right and
+wrong, which he thinks he has by _a priori_ intuition or moral sense,
+are merely those which prevail in his set or parish. The average
+man’s conscience, which seems to him to be an infallible moral guide
+and which he holds to be sacred and personal, is little more than a
+reflection of herd opinion. And as men become marshalled in the mass
+movements of present-day society, they tend more and more to submit the
+control of conduct to the “public conscience” and to leave less and
+less to private judgment. _There is no judgment but private judgment._
+The public conscience is a creature of emotional instability. It is
+characterized by periodic obsessions similar to those of mania. It will
+remain utterly indifferent to glaring evil and every appeal to it is
+unheeded; then all of a sudden perhaps over a trifle, or an unconfirmed
+rumor, it is stirred to the highest pitch of excitement. It has a
+“cause” and for a time is occupied with nothing else. All realities
+are thrown out of perspective. The cause is vindicated regardless of
+consequences; it is carried triumphant at the head of a procession
+of human wreckage, bitterness and folly. As soon as the mischief is
+complete, the cause is abandoned. Men begin to “come to,” and public
+conscience sleeps until the next episodic attack.
+
+It is precisely in regard to matters which most deeply stir the public
+conscience that the educated man will be on his guard. He will not
+be easily bullied into surrendering his private judgment to public
+opinion. He will not permit the big words of herd morality to scare him
+away from the consideration of cold facts. Before a man can think for
+himself, he must have learned to think at all. There is only one sound
+method of moral education. It is in teaching people to think.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+THE CLASSICAL TRADITION--PLATO AND ARISTOTLE
+
+
+The classical tradition in education is one of the ironies of history.
+That pedants should have succeeded in making this tradition into a mere
+convention is almost incredible. In the poetry, drama and philosophy
+which we have inherited from ancient Athens there is a spirit of youth,
+of freedom, of inquiry, of adventure. In the estimation of Egypt or of
+India, the culture of Greece was _parvenu_. The striking thing about
+the Greek spirit is its humanism, its lack of priestly tradition, its
+independence of religious authority. The men of the fifth century
+before Christianity were creators, not imitators. They were following
+many lines of inquiry for the first time, unhampered by the prestige
+of orthodoxy. A noisy populace could condemn the philosopher but could
+not secure his deference to its beliefs. No idea, no institution was so
+venerable or sacred as to escape critical examination. The practice of
+examining all things was the method of education; its aim was the life
+of Reason. There was no official instruction, no established truth,
+no traditionally recognized knowledge. Student and teacher together
+pursued wisdom not as scribes and custodians of ancient and hallowed
+doctrine, but rather in the spirit of those who enter upon a voyage of
+new discovery. Such is the spirit of the classical tradition and no
+education is liberal which loses that spirit.
+
+If we wish to know the meaning of a liberal education, we should turn
+to those in whose lives and thoughts it was a living reality. I do
+not believe that the student who grasps the significance of Plato’s
+Apology, or the Phædo, or the Republic, can ever after be quite the
+same. I once overheard a group of sophomores discussing the relative
+greatness of various historical characters. Each had his favorite hero,
+a conqueror, a statesman, an orator. One of the boys, who I afterwards
+learned had discovered Plato’s dialogues for himself, said, “You
+fellows are just repeating what you have heard people say or have read
+in your history books. You’ll never know what a great man is till you
+know Socrates. I think he was the greatest man who ever lived.” I saw
+in his face a look of quiet earnestness which I have never forgotten.
+Something was happening in that boy’s thinking. He was living through
+an educational experience.
+
+To the question what is an educated person like, one answer is, he
+is like Socrates, or like Plato. Whitman said, “I and my kind do not
+convince by argument; we convince by our presence.” In the Dialogues
+there is a presence. Here the personality of a great genius stands
+revealed. You really come to know Socrates. In his company you cannot
+fail to delight in his humor, his brilliant flashes of insight, the
+subtlety and tenacity and wide sweep of his thought, his daring, his
+unfailing reasonableness, his candor and freedom of spirit. Whether
+this personality is the Socrates of history or a creation of Plato’s
+genius or a mixture of both is a matter that need not concern us
+at present. Our aim is to “find” the educated man. Here by common
+agreement is the supreme type.
+
+Outside the Dialogues and a few such sources of information as the
+writing of Xenophon, we know little that is authentic about Socrates.
+Before Socrates there had been much speculation about natural phenomena
+and the laws which govern the universe. Philosophers had begun to seek
+naturalistic rather than mythological explanations of the world of
+objects. This scientific interest was genuine, but the Greeks lacked a
+logic of scientific method. Before man may think correctly, understand
+his world or live wisely he must develop habits of exact thinking;
+he must know what he means by what he says. He must examine his own
+sentiments and beliefs, and presuppositions.
+
+As an educator Socrates was positively revolutionary, subversive,
+disconcerting. He stands out in sharp contrast to the other great
+teachers of antiquity, and to most of those who have lived after him.
+He gives mankind an entirely different idea of what education is. He
+pursues knowledge; the others proclaim it. Unlike the philosophers of
+India and Egypt or the prophets of Judea, _Socrates has no gospel_, no
+creed, no made-in-advance message, no “thus saith the Lord,” no system
+of “truth.” Others indoctrinate; Socrates proclaims his ignorance. He
+is not a sceptic, for he believes that knowledge is not only possible,
+but that men possess it, though they seldom make use of that which they
+possess. Although not a sceptic, Socrates is decidedly an agnostic. He
+shows popular ideas to be ignorance, mere opinion. Living at a time
+when even the intelligent few had hardly begun to question traditional
+illusions, he did not seek to lure his students back to acquiescence to
+authority, but to develop a technique for testing all things. To use a
+modern colloquialism, Socrates simply strove to “debunk” the minds of
+his students. He tried to aid Athenian youths to understand themselves,
+to think their way to some degree of freedom and mastery, to ground
+their ideas of virtue, justice, government, in well-considered reason,
+to gain temperance of judgment, to re-examine what they thought they
+knew and see if it were knowledge or only opinion. And his was no mere
+idle curiosity, but a serious and courageous facing of the elemental
+problems of human living. He set the precedent for all subsequent
+liberal education.
+
+The herd loves nothing so little as the Socratic dealing with its
+opinions. Such questioning is a challenge to popular faiths; it demands
+that men reorient their minds to the values of experience. It arouses
+in the opinionated the unwelcome suspicion that possibly they may be
+deceiving themselves. It carries with it the suggestion that those
+who uncritically accept dogma and custom are possibly intellectually
+less alert than the critically minded few. It gives the hint that
+conformity and moral earnestness are not enough for the good life and
+that those who lay claim to ideas they have not thought out are a
+little ridiculous. Every man who rises out of crowd-mindedness into
+independent thinking weakens to that extent the faith of the crowd in
+itself, and puts it on the defensive. Aristophanes gained popularity in
+Athenian democracy by holding up the figure of Socrates to ridicule.
+And when Socrates’ challenge could no longer be met with laughter, the
+Fundamentalists of his day condemned the old philosopher to death on
+the charge that he was corrupting the youth. As Woodrow Wilson once
+said, “The human race has inexhaustible resources for resisting the
+introduction of knowledge.”
+
+How the influence of Socrates survives in the work of his pupil Plato
+every school boy knows. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in
+the beautiful dialogues which Plato wrote many years after his master’s
+death, the figure of Socrates becomes little more at times than a
+vehicle of the author’s own thought. But not every one thinks of the
+dialogues as primarily a record of a great work of adult education.
+The Socratic method of education is retained by Plato, but he modifies
+the objectives. Plato has something to “teach.” Knowledge is still
+found by the method of clarifying men’s thinking. But if men are to
+live the life of reason, their knowledge must give them a definite
+outlook on life. Plato seeks something to tie to. He is occupied with
+the search for reality, “pure being.” His interest in mathematics
+leads him to attempt to construe the world according to principles
+of abstract thought. The world of _ideas_ is seen to be the ultimate
+reality, the world of objects is but a manifestation,--as James put
+it, but a “stereotyped copy of the deluxe edition” which exists in the
+eternal. Hence knowledge is not only clear thinking; to know is to
+possess reality. The real world consists of form, of idea, of universal
+and abstract principle. Education becomes philosophic contemplation
+of the ideas of the good, the true, the beautiful. A Francis Bacon or
+an Isaac Newton in Plato’s situation would doubtless have developed a
+logic of science. Plato elaborates a metaphysic. But it would be an
+error to suppose that Plato is occupied merely with meditation upon
+the transcendental. All knowledge is one. The truth, of which the mind
+bears witness to itself, must ultimately prevail in the affairs of men.
+The idea of the good must take the place of the old mythology. Wisdom
+is virtue. The people are enemies of the truth and hate philosophy
+largely because they have never known “a human being who in word
+and work is perfectly moulded as far as he can be into the likeness
+of virtue--such a man ruling a city which bears the same image.” Of
+existing states, “not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature.”
+
+“But no one is satisfied with the appearance of good,--the reality
+is what they seek; in the case of good, appearance is despised by
+everyone.”
+
+“Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of
+all his actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end and
+yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same
+assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever
+good there is in other things--of a principle such and so great as this
+ought the best men in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be
+in the darkness of ignorance?”
+
+Thus Plato’s greatest dialogue, “The Republic,” interweaves the
+speculative with the practical; it is at once a treatise on reality
+and appearance, an inquiry into the nature of the good, an elaboration
+of the abstract principle of justice into the constitution of an ideal
+aristocratic republic, and a philosophy of education.
+
+Jowett, in his introduction to the third edition to the English
+translation of this dialogue, says,
+
+ “The Republic of Plato is also the first treatise upon education,
+ of which the writings of Milton and Locke, Rousseau, Jean Paul, and
+ Goethe are the legitimate descendants. Like Dante or Bunyan, he has
+ a revelation of another life; like Bacon, he is profoundly impressed
+ with the unity of knowledge; in the early Church he exercised a real
+ influence on theology, and at the Revival of Literature on politics.
+ Even the fragments of his words when ‘repeated at secondhand’ (Symp.
+ 215 D) have in all ages ravished the hearts of men, who have seen
+ reflected in them their own higher nature. He is the father of
+ idealism in philosophy, in politics, in literature. And many of the
+ latest conceptions of modern thinkers and statesmen, such as the
+ unity of knowledge, the reign of law, and the equality of the sexes,
+ have been anticipated in a dream by him.”
+
+“The Republic” begins with a discussion of justice. It is agreed that
+justice is virtue and wisdom, and injustice is vice and ignorance.
+Justice is the virtue both of an individual and of a state. In order
+to discover the nature of this virtue, the author proceeds to “create
+in idea a State.” The state must be protected from evil, it must
+have guardians. The guardians need to have both natural gifts and
+the qualities of a philosopher. The good watchdog must be able to
+distinguish between the face of the friend and that of the foe. “And
+must not an animal be a lover of learning who distinguishes what he
+likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?”
+
+“When we have found the desired natures, and now that we have found
+them, how are they to be educated? Is not this an inquiry which may
+be expected to throw light on the greater inquiry which is our final
+end--How do justice and injustice grow up in States?”
+
+Justice, he says, is each man doing his own business and not being a
+busybody. One should practice the thing to which his nature is best
+adapted. Justice is harmony, and harmony in the State is like harmony
+in the nature of the individual. Intelligence must direct and control
+the emotions, and the movements of the body. Hence in the just State,
+men are to be divided into classes according to their degree of native
+superiority.
+
+This is not an easy task, for men will not easily be persuaded to
+accept such distinctions of worth among themselves.
+
+“How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods ... just one
+royal lie which may deceive the rulers if that be possible, and at any
+rate the rest of the city?”
+
+“Well then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you
+in the face, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which
+I propose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the
+soldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be told that their
+youth was a dream, and the education and training which they received
+from us, an appearance only; in reality during all that time they were
+being formed and fed in the womb of the earth, where they themselves
+and their arms and appurtenances were manufactured; when they were
+completed, the earth, their mother, sent them up; and so, their country
+being their mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for
+her good, and to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are
+to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers....
+
+“‘Citizens,’ we shall say to them in our tale, ‘you are brothers, yet
+God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command,
+and in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also
+they have the greatest honour; others he has made of silver, to be
+auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has
+composed of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved
+in the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden
+parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden
+son. And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers, and above
+all else, that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard,
+or of which they are to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the
+race. They should observe what elements mingle in their offspring; for
+if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and
+iron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the
+ruler must not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend
+in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be
+sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are
+raised to honour, and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle
+says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be
+destroyed.’”
+
+Plato’s ideal state is thus an aristocracy of intelligence and of
+virtue. There must be selection of those who are to rule. A series of
+tests is proposed. Those selected must have shown greatest eagerness
+to do what is good for their country. The youth are to be subjected
+to various trials, toils, pains, conflicts, to determine whether they
+can be forced to change their opinions by suffering pain, or by the
+influence of enchantments, or the lure of pleasure, or as a result of
+fear. Only those who come out of the trials victorious are to be made
+rulers.
+
+Their education is to be a rigid discipline, and it is to continue as
+long as they live. Along with the tests which they must endure, the
+young are to grow up in a healthy environment, and in an atmosphere of
+simplicity. First a censorship is established to guard them against
+evil influences. Only authorized tales are to be told them. Erroneous
+representation of the gods is forbidden. As the young cannot judge
+what is allegorical and what is literal, the state is to determine the
+general forms in which the poets may cast their tales. Mothers may not
+frighten children with myths. The Gods must never be represented as
+the authors of evil. Nor may one be allowed to say that wicked men are
+often happy and the good miserable. Elsewhere Plato says that no one
+shall be permitted to travel abroad until he reaches the age of forty.
+When he comes home he must tell the youth that the institutions of
+other states are inferior to their own. If any man blasphemes, he is
+to be put in the reformatory for five years. If in the end he remains
+unrepentant he is to be put to death.
+
+Plato requires that the young receive training in gymnastics and music
+before entering upon the study of philosophy. Certain kinds of music
+they may not be allowed to hear. Flute players are not to be admitted
+to Plato’s state. Those who are clever at pantomime are to be exiled.
+The theater is frowned upon, for the guardians must not be trained
+to be imitators. Certainly they may not learn to imitate any kind of
+illiberalism or baseness. In their acting they may not imitate slaves,
+nor bad men, nor madmen, nor the neighing of horses, the bellowing
+of bulls, nor the roll of thunder; nor may they represent smiths,
+boatswains, or other artificers. And they may not play the part of a
+woman old or young quarreling with her husband, or in conceit of her
+happiness or when she is in affliction or sorrow or weeping--“and
+certainly not one who is in sickness, love, or labor.”
+
+There must be temperance and order and not too much laughter. There
+must be no sensuality and coarseness. There will be no need of lawyers
+and physicians. “There can be no more disgraceful state of education
+than this; that not only artisans and the meaner sort of people need
+the skill of first-rate physicians and judges, but also those who
+profess to have had a liberal education.”
+
+Thus would Plato direct the early education of the guardians of the
+state. He has much more to say about protecting them from what he
+regards as dangerous influences than about the subject matter in which
+they are to be trained. His guardians are to become noble men; they are
+not to be imitators or trained animals or exploiters or traders. It
+is often said by those who believe in the materialist conception of
+history that education is an instrument for exploitation by the ruling
+class. In Plato’s state education is a mark of privilege, but his ideal
+nobleman is a communist. He must not touch silver or gold; he must live
+like a Spartan. He may call nothing his own, neither house nor wife nor
+child. The rulers are to be philosophers, and philosophers, kings.
+
+Hence the education of later life is the pursuit of philosophy. It is
+knowledge of the idea of the good. True knowledge is drawn from within,
+it is the turning of the eyes toward the light shed by the world of the
+Idea, the spiritual world. It is the awakening of memories of ideas
+seen by the soul of an earlier existence. Our world of concrete objects
+and of sense experience cannot give this knowledge. Education deals
+almost wholly with abstractions and with universals, and its method is
+dialectic.
+
+I think that much of the illiberalism of Plato grows out of his theory
+of knowledge. To him as to Socrates, knowledge is of universals. Mere
+awareness of concrete objects we will agree is not knowledge. If we
+only knew unrelated things--just one thing and then another, as we have
+them in sense experience, we could have knowledge _of_ them but not
+_about_ them. It is the knowledge about things that gives the world
+its meanings. Much of the significance of things depends upon how we
+conceive their relations. Every concept is an abstraction; it signifies
+not some concrete fact, but a class or a common quality which inheres
+in a number of objects. So the Greeks sought to find concepts which
+would not be self-contradictory and would hold for all of the class
+to which they were applied, and for nothing else. The Greeks did not
+seek accurate information concerning facts. They believed they had
+exact knowledge when they had discovered just what they meant by any
+concept. They had almost no experimental science. They had begun to
+be deeply interested in the phenomena of nature but their interest
+was largely speculative as yet. If they had possessed the modern
+scientific laboratory their knowledge could still have been abstract
+but it would have remained knowledge about nature. Knowledge would
+have increased as men carefully observed objects, classified them,
+studied their relations and made note of the changes which take place
+under fixed conditions. By the method of forming hypotheses and then
+trying to verify them by fact, knowledge could have been at once both
+of the universal and of the concrete. It would have been recognized
+all along that universals are merely descriptive terms signifying
+common properties and that they do not stand for realities which are
+independent of or outside the several individual objects in which these
+properties are found. With Socrates, I believe, knowledge is about
+universals, but he is primarily concerned with attaining clear and
+workable abstractions, that is, he is interested chiefly in sharpening
+the _instruments_ of thinking.
+
+With Plato the interest in ideas is very different. He is a
+mathematician. He is fascinated with ideas of number and of geometrical
+form. Mathematics to many minds seems to consist of a world of pure
+reason which is more permanent than the world of things. Philosophers
+before Plato had wrestled with the problem of change. Existence was
+seen to be a stream in which everything is carried along toward
+its inevitable destruction. Every object at any moment is but the
+cross-section of the process of its becoming something different. Our
+bodies grow and perish, so also does all pass away. The rivers run to
+the sea, the plants die, the temples of the gods crumble. Even the
+mountains are but waves on the surface of a sea of time into which all
+things sink and are lost forever. How can the temporary objects which
+whirl past in the course of their transformation be said really to
+exist? Existence surely must be endurance.
+
+I think that Plato, like many thinkers since, saw the terrifying
+significance of the flow of things and sought security and “reality”
+in something permanent outside the process of change. What was more
+natural than that he should turn to the realm of abstract thought? The
+objects we perceive change, but a concept always means the same. The
+world may pass away, things may each turn into other things, as water
+into vapor and fire to smoke and the body to dust, but two and two are
+still four, and the sum of the angles of a triangle remains constant.
+Hence above and behind the world of objects there is a world of ideas
+into which the teeth of time cannot gnaw.
+
+You have only to believe that ideas have an existence independent of
+the minds which think them and all is transformed. Instantly you step
+out of Time into Eternity; form without content; number without things
+to be counted; common properties of objects stripped of the objects in
+which such properties inhere; the forms of logical discourse, minus
+the things talked about and the talkers as well; goodness, without
+anything in particular to be good; beauty in general, independent
+of any concrete beautiful thing, truth universal and absolute and
+outside experience. All this is now the _real_ world, and the world
+of troublesome, fleeting objects becomes a shadow and a delusion.
+Knowledge is knowledge of the “real.” In other words, knowledge is
+about itself. The more abstract and universal an idea is the more
+reality it has. The mind persuades itself that it possesses Being,
+Motion, the Good and the Beautiful merely by the magic of thinking
+about them in abstract terms. The universe is transformed into an
+ordered system of postulates and verbal exercises. Education now is
+something more than the clarification of concepts; it is initiation
+into the superworld of eternal verities.
+
+It is not my purpose to attempt a discussion of Platonic Idealism.
+It has fascinated many of the most subtle minds of the race down to
+our own times. It is the foundation of much Christian theology. Its
+re-affirmation at the time of the Renaissance has brought with it the
+restatement of many problems which must be considered in the course of
+one’s education. My point is that Plato with all his genius contributed
+to the tradition of liberal education a system of values very different
+from the humanism and agnosticism of Socrates. His influence has often
+tended to make the aim of education mere intellectuality, rather than
+intelligent grappling with the problems of living, and to transform the
+search for the good life into a flight from the realities of experience.
+
+Go one step further and you land in ascetic mysticism. The Soul,
+the Knower, is no more at home in the world of objects than is the
+philosopher in the market place. It belongs to the spiritual world, the
+higher realms of Being, in which ideas are forever pure and free of
+distortion by matter. In the Phædo, Plato says that if we are to have
+pure knowledge, the soul must be quit of the body which ever thwarts
+it. Body and soul belong to different worlds. Plato thus prepares the
+way for St. Paul and his doctrine that the spirit lusteth against the
+flesh and the flesh against the spirit, and that to be present in the
+body is to be absent from the Lord.
+
+If matter is corruption and mankind is during life chained to the
+material body, human nature ceases to be trustworthy. Plato’s distrust
+of human nature bears fruit some centuries later in the statement that
+the natural man is sin and death, and in the doctrine of regeneration.
+And unregenerate man is prone to error. Knowledge of the truth comes
+by divine revelation and is to be sustained by infallible authority.
+Dissent is heresy; assent may be required in the interest of salvation.
+We have not yet reached the position of Tertullian, “I believe that
+which is absurd,” but Platonism is headed in that direction. Knowledge
+which feeds on itself in the end eats itself up.
+
+But there is in Plato something of far greater educational importance
+than any metaphysic or theory of knowledge. When James said that in
+the study of the classics one learns to recognize human excellence,
+I wonder if he had Plato in mind. I have no doubt that Nietzsche was
+thinking of him when he turned to philosophy for an answer to his
+question, “what is noble?” One who deliberately strives to imitate
+the manners and acquire the virtues of noble spirits, is a prig and
+a clown. But unless education ennobles the mind, one becomes only a
+well-informed cad. Nietzsche’s catalogue of noble traits is a little
+absurd. We learn what is noble only when we see it. And efforts at
+education “for character” are little more than cheap conventional
+substitutes for such excellence. But there is a loftiness and sweep in
+Plato’s thought which are more than genius; a graciousness which is
+more than skill; a sincerity which is more than moral earnestness. He
+has wrestled with the most searching problems that existence presents
+to the mind of man, problems which each must face and to which he must
+give his answer if ever he is to become a master spirit. Would you know
+what nobility of mind is? Study Plato.
+
+The tradition of liberal education is a golden thread woven into the
+fabric of civilization. Viewed in the perspective of history, the
+thread is often broken. It is worked into various patterns according to
+the divergent interests of successive ages, each pattern expressive of
+the values and meanings which men once held important. The patterns,
+whether lovely or grotesque, whether they are woven in or are merely
+_appliqué_, are the creations of the time. The thread belongs to all
+times, and whether for this tradition we are more indebted to Plato
+than to Aristotle is a question we leave to those who are interested in
+the history of education. We are seeking to know what the tradition is.
+
+I recently heard a teacher of philosophy say, “Aristotle is dead.” His
+influence has died many times since the early death of his pupil, the
+Macedonian conqueror, left the philosopher to the tender mercies of a
+suspicious Athens. It would seem that the interest in Aristotle dies,
+only to reappear subsequently in new configurations. He has something
+that we always come back to when sanity returns after an epoch of
+exaggeration and over-emphasis. If Socrates is critical intelligence,
+and Plato nobility of spirit, Aristotle is sanity. All three are
+essentials of liberal education.
+
+One can hardly over-rate the extent of Aristotle’s influence upon the
+education of western Europe. For many centuries men spoke of him as
+“The Philosopher,” drilled their minds in his logic, added little to
+his metaphysics, his natural philosophy, his principles of ethics and
+politics. Three periods of intellectual awakening may be attributed
+largely to the revival of interest in his writings--that of Rome at
+the time of Cicero, whose education and philosophy was essentially
+Aristotelian; that of the brilliant Arabic culture which preceded the
+Crusades; and that of the scholastic education of western Europe,
+at the close of the Middle Ages. In the last, Aristotle’s teaching
+was very much distorted as a result of theological interest and of
+ignorance of the Greek language; and his hold upon education had with
+much difficulty to be broken before men could turn their attention to
+the study of nature or develop a logic of science. Aristotle could not
+have anticipated that his authority would one day become an obstacle to
+the study of nature. He himself was the great naturalist of his age.
+His extensive work of research and classification of natural phenomena
+remained unequalled until modern times. Had the Greeks not despised
+mechanics, Aristotle might have possessed the necessary instruments
+for scientific experiment, and our knowledge of nature might have been
+centuries ahead of where it is today.
+
+Unlike Plato, his former master, Aristotle did not displace the world
+of objects by a world of abstract thought. He seems to have held that
+universals are real, but only as an account of the order which prevails
+in the world. His logic is primarily instrumental. His whole philosophy
+is an attempt at well-ordered common sense.
+
+The “Politics” and “Ethics” contain Aristotle’s philosophy of
+education. It is the task of the legislator to consider how his
+citizens may be good men. This is also the task of the educator.
+Goodness is not represented as obedience to divine commands. Neither
+is its aim that of securing reward in a future life. The aim of
+goodness is the good life, and the good life is the happy life, the
+life that is lived well. Such a life requires certain material goods,
+also friendships, health, good looks, leisure and _aretè_. There is no
+word in English which is the exact equivalent of _aretè_. It is often
+translated virtue, or excellence. But Aristotle has in mind a definite
+quality of excellence, which includes distinction, good breeding,
+self-command, wisdom, balance and poise, and equanimity in all things.
+_Aretè_ is the art of living.
+
+Nothing could be farther from Aristotle’s thought than that education
+should become a separate interest or pursuit of a knowledge that
+has nothing to do with the kind of life a man leads. To his mind
+the central question for education is, what sort of man is it most
+desirable that one should become. Moderns may justly criticise him
+because he omits any reference to work, other than to say that it is
+debasing. His philosophy of education is that of a leisure class. And
+since work makes up the greater portion of most men’s experience in
+life, it may be said that Aristotle would train men to possess the
+subjective qualities of virtue only, and without reference to their
+tasks and duties. It cannot be denied that his theory of education
+has often been so employed. I have already discussed at some length
+the relation of education to work. While Aristotle, like others of
+his time, looks down upon labor, it does not follow that a man is
+necessarily shut off from the good life as Aristotle depicts it merely
+because he earns his own bread. Let us say that Aristotle is in error
+when he says that work is debasing. We may still hold that if his “good
+life” is good at all, it is good for the man who works for his living.
+My point is that this philosophy of education is not unrelated to the
+ordinary affairs of life, but that it points out those habits which
+best enable one to turn such affairs to value and to happy use.
+
+Aristotle has set forth his idea of the good man in no uncertain terms.
+The good is not Plato’s absolute or ideal good--good in general; it
+is _happiness_. It is to be attained not merely by philosophical
+speculation, but by “an energy of the soul according to reason,”
+by well-considered habits of choosing. Happiness is the aim of all
+knowledge and of every act. But the educated do not agree with the
+vulgar as to what it is. The latter believe it to be the accident of
+good fortune. The former hold that it is the result of virtue. Virtues
+are praiseworthy habits. “Virtue” therefore is a habit accompanied
+with deliberate preference, in the relative mean defined by reason,
+and as the prudent man would define it, “It is the mean state between
+two vices, one in excess, the other in defect. Temperance and courage
+are destroyed both by the excess and the defect, but are preserved by
+the mean. Virtues are neither passions nor capacities.” They are not
+mere moral enthusiasms nor any subjective state of mind. Wisdom and
+deliberation are required for virtue. _The good man is the educated
+man._
+
+Education is not merely the teaching of morals, or the laying down
+rules for behavior. The virtuous habits are not acquired by rote nor
+exercised automatically. The habit of virtue is that of _appropriate
+response_ to the situation, the response which is right because
+“nothing may be” taken away from it nor added to it without causing it
+to tend toward vicious excess or defect. There must be discrimination
+or one will go to extreme. Courage is not mere bravery; it is that
+well-considered “mean state” between fear and over-confidence.
+Aristotle quotes Socrates to the effect that courage is a “kind of
+science.”
+
+The temperate man does not feel desire “except in moderation, nor more
+than he ought, nor in any case improperly.” He does not desire things
+which are dishonorable or beyond his means. He is in the mean in all
+things, his desires are “according to the suggestions of right reason.”
+Liberality is the mean between prodigality and stinginess. It is not
+virtuous to give unless one gives wisely. “The liberal man therefore
+will give for the sake of the honorable, and he will give properly for
+he will give to proper objects, in proper quantities, at proper times,
+and his giving will have all the other qualities of right giving, and
+he will do this pleasantly and without pain; for that which is done
+according to virtue is pleasant.”... “But if it should happen to a
+liberal man to spend in a manner inconsistent with propriety and what
+is honorable, he will feel pain, but only moderately and as he ought,
+for it is characteristic of virtue to feel pleasure and pain at proper
+objects, and in a proper manner.”
+
+Magnanimity is a virtue if accompanied by intelligence. The magnanimous
+are concerned with honor. He who being really worthy, estimates his own
+worth highly, is magnanimous. He whose worth is low and who estimates
+it lowly is not magnanimous, but modest. He who estimates his worth
+lightly when he is really unworthy is vain. He who estimates it less
+highly than it deserves is “little-minded.” In good or bad fortune,
+the magnanimous will behave with moderation, he will not be too much
+delighted with success nor too much grieved at failure. He must take
+more care for truth than for the good opinion of men. He will not be
+servile, for all flatterers are mercenary and low-minded. He will
+not be given to the habit of too much admiring the great, nor will he
+be fond of talking about himself or about other people; he will not
+recollect injuries, nor be over-anxious, nor disposed to praise or
+blame. “The step of the magnanimous man is slow, his voice deep and
+his language steady: for he who only feels anxiety about a few things
+is not apt to be in a hurry: and he who thinks highly of nothing is
+not vehement and shrillness and quickness of speaking arise from these
+things.... But vain men are foolish and ignorant of themselves ...
+little-mindedness is more opposed to magnanimity than vanity, for it
+is oftener found and is worse.” Hence a just appreciation of one’s
+worth--knowledge of self, as Socrates would have said--is essential to
+Aristotle’s ideal man.
+
+Furthermore, meekness is a virtue only when it is a sign of
+intelligence. “He who feels anger on proper occasions, at proper
+persons, and besides in a proper manner, at proper times, and for a
+proper length of time is an object of praise.” The meek man is not
+carried away by passion. He who is excessively sensitive to anger is
+irascible. He who is unsensitive is a fool.
+
+Even the virtue of truthfulness must be exercised in moderation and
+with good judgment. The excess of it is arrogance, the defect is
+cunning or false modesty. Wit is also a virtue; the excess, Aristotle
+says, is buffoonery or sarcasm, the defect is clownishness.
+
+Justice is discussed in a manner quite different from that of Plato.
+The problem of universal justice is dismissed, and justice is
+considered in relation to various transactions between man and man.
+Hence the necessity of defining “right reason.” Aristotle turns to a
+discussion of Prudence, Intelligence, Deliberation, Wisdom. He says,
+“It is not sufficient to know the theory of virtue,”--the end is
+in “practical matters.” Aristotle holds the relation of morals to
+education is much the same as that which we found it to be in the
+preceding chapter. Mere precept and example are not enough; there must
+be general culture, and education should extend throughout a lifetime.
+
+“But reasoning and teaching, it is to be feared, will not avail in
+every case, but the mind of the hearer must be previously cultivated
+by habits to feel pleasure and aversion properly just as the soil
+must be which nourishes the seed. For he who lives in obedience to
+passion would not listen to reasoning which turns him away from it:
+nay more, he would not understand it. And how is it possible to change
+the convictions of such a man as this? On the whole, it appears that
+passion does not submit to reasoning, but to force....
+
+“Perhaps it is not sufficient that we should meet with good education
+when young: but since when we arrive at manhood we ought also study
+and practice what we have learnt we should require laws also for this
+purpose.”
+
+Aristotle discusses the desirability of public education. He thinks
+that first men must become fitted for the duties of the legislator.
+And since, he says, all previous writers have discussed the subject of
+politics without scientific examination of the subject, he proposes to
+undertake such an examination for himself.
+
+Let us note that neither Plato nor Aristotle when considering the good
+life, thinks that the individual may attain it in isolation. It is not
+merely a quality of the soul, but has to do with all of one’s human
+relationships. Aristotle says that it is very difficult for the young
+to receive a good education under a bad government. He would seem to
+make the state and the laws a means to education. And it is the aim
+of both the state and education to enable the citizen to live happily.
+Education is training in wisdom and virtue, and the exercise of these
+is freedom. Those who are incapable of education are slaves by nature;
+those who obey only passion and abstain from vicious things not because
+they are disgraceful but for fear of punishment, cannot be reasoned
+with; they must be restrained by force. Education is liberal in that it
+enables a man to govern himself.
+
+In comparison with Plato, Aristotle appears prosaic, worldly,
+and lacking in charm and humor. Much that he says appears to us
+platitudinous, for the same reason that the woman found Shakespeare’s
+dramas full of familiar quotations. We forget how subversive of
+convention and dogma it is to found the good life in the life of
+reason. Aristotle has passed by mythology and tradition and the
+sanctions of religion and has achieved a purely secular guide to
+conduct. He has made freedom and happiness the goal of virtue and
+education, and has done this without descending to utilitarianism. He
+has made right reason the standard of life and has at the same time
+given to the standard an æsthetic valuation. He has linked education
+with conduct, and suggested a moral training which gives human nature
+credit for some degree of intelligence. Aristotle is no longer “the
+Philosopher.” Education in the modern world is necessarily set to tasks
+very different from those of ancient Greece. But the good life is still
+the goal, and Aristotle’s good man has remained one of the ideals of
+liberal education.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+HUMANISM: ERASMUS AND MONTAIGNE
+
+
+Each man’s education is a unique achievement. There are as many kinds
+of education as there are kinds of men. In every educated mind there
+is a mixture of temperament and learning, a selection and emphasis, an
+elusive quality like that which haunts a work of art. We may recognize
+this elusive something but we cannot define it or describe it. Such
+words as wisdom, virtue, independence of judgment, freedom, cannot give
+us the meaning of education. We must know the educated man. If you
+read and understand Erasmus of Rotterdam, you will see what education
+is better than if you read all the books written about theories of
+education. A liberally educated person is like Erasmus.
+
+I do not mean that Erasmus is the only type of educated mind, or that
+the educated man is like him in all respects. Certainly I would not
+suggest that one living in the twentieth century should strive to
+imitate a scholar who lived in the fifteenth. Change of environment
+calls for a different response. But there are certain constant factors.
+New modes of response may be necessary in order to recreate the
+values which men of other times discovered, values the loss of which
+in our times would cheapen our whole existence. If this were not so
+there would be no point in trying to learn anything from men of other
+times. There are those who have such faith in the infallibility of
+contemporary opinion that they are convinced the past has nothing to
+teach us. The ways of the present are “progress,” and progress is its
+own criterion of the good and needs no other guide than the interests
+of the hour. Such persons are usually to be found cheering for “the
+latest thing.” As a rule they are people without background or reserve.
+We live in the present, to be sure. But if we are really to live in it
+and are not content merely to act a part in the passing show, we must
+consider the values which are at issue in the responses we make. To
+that end there is enlightenment in knowing the values for which other
+men of other times struggled. The kind of living we are to achieve with
+our environment is not determined by the environment itself, but by the
+kind of men and women we are--by what we bring to our environment from
+the widest possible knowledge of what is worth doing. Men like Erasmus
+and Montaigne lived better lives than most of their contemporaries
+because of the wisdom of the ages that was in them. It may be said that
+other men in their times also shared this ancient knowledge, for was
+not The Revival of Learning at its height? Many did and were better
+men for it. Many were fascinated by the Renaissance who merely shared
+its externalities but did not thereby become wiser men; they remained
+creatures of their own times. It became “the latest thing” to ape the
+ancients without understanding them. Among obscurantists, and fanatics
+and corruptionists, Erasmus and Montaigne lived like educated men.
+
+At the close of the fifteenth century, it was said, “Whatever is
+artistic, finished, learned and wise is called Erasmian.” It is
+difficult to speak of Erasmus except in terms of the superlative.
+The most broadly educated man of his times, he was not only the
+representative scholar of his generation; he remains an example to
+us all of the truly civilized man. His polished wit, his humanity,
+his gentle irony, his unfailing reasonableness, his ability to see
+through cant and superstition, his philosophic calm in the midst of
+intense partisan strife, his good taste and sense of proportion: these
+qualities of mind belong to no one age, they are the constants of which
+I spoke a moment ago; they are the essentials of a civilized attitude
+toward life in any age. Without them man is a barbarian.
+
+The Great Humanist saw as no one else did the spiritual significance
+of the revival of learning, and he came to represent all that was best
+in it. Scholarship to him was more than erudition and pedantry and
+literary style. He found in classic literature a window opening upon a
+new vision of the meaning and possibilities of living. He became the
+champion of a new way of life and thought. Past and present met and
+mingled in his thought and became a new life of reason. “He quietly
+stepped out of medievalism,” the first modern man, the forerunner of
+Descartes and Voltaire.
+
+In a time when all human interests were submerged in religion, Erasmus
+sought to humanize the Church, and leave it an international fellowship
+of culture, free of dogma and superstition. He turns from knowledge of
+divine things to human letters as the guide to living, and from blind
+faith to reason. The Gospel becomes for him the “philosophy of Christ.”
+With equal impartiality he could translate the mocking dialogues of
+Lucian and provide the coming Reformation with its first standard Greek
+text of the New Testament. His boldness in omitting passages from this
+latter work, which he found not to be authentic, and his occasional
+unconventional commentary on the text brought him under the suspicion
+of being at heart a sceptic and a heretic.
+
+With bigotry and persecution almost universal all around him, Erasmus
+taught tolerance, moderation, respect for truth. In a splendid
+biographical study, Professor Preserved Smith says that Erasmus’s
+“Colloquies” did more for the spread of liberal ideas than any book
+of the sixteenth century. Another historian says, “Almost all the
+liberating ideas on which the international culture of the present
+rests, are present in germ in his thought.”
+
+The continent of Europe in the year fifteen hundred was culturally far
+inferior to Asia. Compared to the civilization of Greece and Rome, all
+Christendom was barbarian. The wave of interest in education which in
+the thirteenth century had caused the universities to become crowded,
+while it had not passed, had subsided into a dull scholastic dialectic.
+Education had little effect upon the life of the masses or their
+rulers. In Italy art and letters were breaking away from religious
+tradition, but the new spirit which prevailed at Florence, Padua, and
+Rome had little sway north of the Alps. Mediæval Christianity had
+reached its culmination and was in a period of moral and intellectual
+decline. Thoughtful men everywhere were dissatisfied. The time was soon
+to come when this dissatisfaction could no longer be held in restraint,
+when throughout a century of bloodshed, civil war, and violence and
+hatred such as Europe had never known, the Church would be torn asunder
+and anarchy and terror reign until modern nationalism and industrialism
+could painfully emerge from the smouldering ruins.
+
+It is said that when Leo X ascended the Papal throne, there was placed
+above his head in Latin the inscription, “_Nunc tempora Pallas
+habet_,”--Now Athene reigns. Not many years were to pass before the
+sacred walls, which had under the Pontificate of his predecessor been
+decorated by Michelangelo and Raphael, were to echo the sound of church
+bells ringing out the tidings of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day.
+Soon all over Europe the floodgates would be open and Christendom would
+be inundated by torrents of fury. Soon in defense of the sacred Gospel,
+Christians would tear at Christians’ throats. With instruments of iron,
+tongues would be wrenched from the mouths of men and women, eyes gouged
+from their sockets, limbs broken on the rack. The bed of torture and
+the heap of burning faggots would become commonplace spectacles for
+the public to gaze upon. For a hundred years and more Europe was to
+be ablaze with war on every hand, until it should sink exhausted by
+the mutual destruction of Christian armies into almost unimaginable
+misery and poverty. And this struggle which was destined to breed
+hatreds and sectarian divisions lasting even till today, might have
+been avoided, probably could have been averted, could the spirit of
+Erasmus have prevailed. Protestants hold the Catholics responsible for
+the horrors of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century. Catholics
+hold the Protestants responsible. Both were equally guilty, for they
+were equally ignorant and barbarous and deluded with superstition. This
+is the kind of thing that happens and always will happen when ignorance
+breaks loose in the world. Then in the general madness even learned men
+like Melanchthon and Œcolampadius and the Medicis lose their poise and
+become partisans.
+
+Erasmus during the most trying time kept his sanity. And both sides
+denounced him bitterly. He was accused of taking a cowardly middle of
+the road position. What neither group of militant partisans could
+see was that Erasmus, far from being in the middle of the road, was
+not on their wretched highway at all. He remained true to the issue
+for which he had struggled from the first. Erasmus saw that what was
+wrong with Europe, indeed what really gave rise to the abuses of
+mediæval society, was barbarism sanctioned by religious superstition.
+He knew that vice and folly and brutality and hypocrisy were not to
+be removed by religious warfare, but rather deepened. He saw the same
+spirit of doctrinaire scholasticism, the same intolerance and cruelty
+and pious ignorance on both sides of the coming controversy. He knew
+that conditions could be improved only when the leading minds of
+contemporary Europe could acquire the decencies which characterize the
+liberally educated of all times. Whether history has vindicated Erasmus
+in this conviction of his is a matter concerning which opinions differ.
+I think it has. Such liberty and cultural progress as the modern world
+enjoys it would seem to have derived from the Erasmian tradition, not
+that of Luther, Calvin or Wesley. Protestantism without the humanism
+of Erasmus is Fundamentalism. And conversely, Paris and Vienna and
+Munich are nominally Catholic, but they have known the influence of
+Erasmus and Voltaire to a degree that many Protestant communities have
+not known such influence, and so far as the advance of civilization is
+concerned, I think that life in such localities will compare rather
+favorably with that of certain strictly Protestant communities. I
+believe that those movements of the present day which have greatest
+spiritual significance and value--modernism in religion, liberalism in
+education, the dawning recognition of the necessity of intelligence and
+of individual responsibility in matters of belief and conduct, efforts
+for the humanization of industry and the state--are but the belated
+resumption of the humanizing work begun in northern Europe by Erasmus
+and others and broken off by the Reformation. From this point of view
+the Reformation is not the continuation of the Renaissance, but would
+appear to have been something of a bourgeois reaction against it.
+
+Long before the storm broke, Erasmus was carrying on a brave work
+against ignorance and obscurantism. In our times, we have seen
+something of the conflict of science with theology. This issue is
+tame in comparison with the conflict of theology with Humanism which
+occupied scholars at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It is
+difficult for us now to imagine that there could be bitter opposition
+to the teaching of the Latin and Greek literatures. The issue is
+blurred for us. Theologians are less acrimonious than they once
+were, and Scholasticism has long been on the decline. The classics
+moreover, are taught in such a manner that few students see the deep
+spiritual chasm which separates the Christian approach to life from
+that of the Latin and Greek poets and philosophers. It was pretty well
+recognized on both sides of the dispute that the ancients were pagans,
+rank heathen. Those who opposed these unchristian writers did so for
+much the same reason that early Christians in the second century had
+assailed “the present evil world” and all its works.
+
+In Italy the Renaissance tended for a time to take on a definitely
+pagan aspect. Imitation of the ancients became a rather ridiculous
+gesture, and the fad was often carried to extremes which were little
+less than childish. Cardinals assumed the speech and manners of ancient
+Roman senators. Sermons were preached in sonorous Ciceronian style. In
+certain quarters Christ was identified with Apollo, and God the Father
+with Jupiter. Nuns were spoken of as “vestal virgins,” and painters and
+sculptors created figures of Mars and Venus and mingled these and other
+heathen idols with the images of the saints.
+
+The apparent sympathy of high ecclesiastical personages with such
+goings on was one of the causes of the hostility to the Papacy which
+later swept over northern Europe.
+
+The sanity of Erasmus saved him and helped save the revival of learning
+from such superficiality. He found in Humanism a balanced and serious
+wisdom which he strove to combine with the Christian philosophy of
+life. The synthesis he achieved was not a new system of theology;
+it was the gradual merging of an older outlook upon life into a new
+outlook, a transformation of intellectual interests. Professor Smith
+quotes a passage which indicates something of Erasmus’s position
+regarding the classics. That this literature was pagan he well knew,
+but its paganism did not to his mind exclude it from the spiritual life
+of mankind. He says of an essay of Cicero’s, “A heathen wrote this to
+heathen and yet his moral principles have justice, sincerity, truth,
+fidelity to nature; nothing false or careless is in them.” “When I read
+certain passages of these great men, ... I can hardly refrain from
+saying, ‘St. Socrates, pray for me.’”
+
+Erasmus found himself the leader of Humanism as an educational
+movement. He stated the issue in precisely the terms that gave sincere
+and intelligent men a new vision of the spiritual life. And he did it
+with such a wealth of learning, such reasonableness, such unanswerable
+irony and wit that his name became the symbol of the new scholarship.
+His books had a larger circulation than those of any other writer of
+his generation. And as for many years he travelled about Europe,
+moving from one center of learning to another, his coming was hailed
+with triumph. Scholars everywhere attended him, sat at his feet, took
+up the cause he championed. The Humanists were winning victory after
+victory and could look forward to the triumph of their movement in the
+education of western Europe. How rapidly the spread and advance of
+culture might have proceeded or what directions it might have taken if
+men’s thoughts had not been turned again to theological controversy
+and to bitter warfare, no one can say. Perhaps the masses were not
+prepared to accept or tolerate so sudden a change as that for which
+Erasmus strove, for Humanism was a much more radical departure from
+the mental habits and standards of value of the Middle Ages than was
+Protestantism. The leaders of the Renaissance did not accept the
+Reformation because they regarded it as a backward step. Perhaps they
+had themselves gone too far ahead. Perhaps the representation of the
+good man as the intelligent man, an ancient Greek idea which the
+Humanists revived, will always be offensive to the masses. Erasmus
+seemed--he still seems to many--to have lacked moral earnestness. He
+generated light and what mankind wants is heat. At any rate, the masses
+in the nations where the new scholarship was being carried, showed
+that they did not want the pagan wisdom. Instead they suddenly became
+possessed with a longing for the primitive faith of the first Christian
+century, or what they thought was that faith. They followed the leader
+who gave them not insight, but a moral issue.
+
+Both Luther and Erasmus had visited Rome. Each was impressed by the
+“sight of antique monuments.” Each saw evidence of the corruption and
+veniality which along with luxury surrounded the gay Papal court.
+Luther later spoke of Rome as the “sink of every abomination,” a
+conviction which doubtless had much to do with determining the course
+of events which led to his break with Papal authority.
+
+Of the effect of all this on the mind of Erasmus, we have the record in
+a book, one of the great classics of literature, “In Praise of Folly.”
+In the letter of dedication to his friend Sir Thomas More, Erasmus says
+that in his late travels from Italy, that he might not trifle away his
+time in the rehearsal of old wives’ fables, he began reflecting upon his
+past studies, and thought it good to divert himself by drawing up a
+“panegyrick upon Folly.” He suggests that this trifling may be a whet
+to more serious thought and that “comical matters may be so treated
+of, as that a reader of ordinary sense may possibly thence reap more
+advantage than from some more big and stately argument.” He hints that
+he does not wish to be so carping that he will fail to instruct, and
+says that he who points indifferently at all, can hardly be accused of
+being angry with any one man or one vice. And he wonders at the “tender
+humor” of an age in which some are so “preposterously devout that they
+would sooner wink at the greatest affront against our Saviour, than be
+content that a prince or a pope should be nettled with the least joke
+or gird, especially in what relates to their ordinary customs.”
+
+Here we have the characteristic reactions of two contrasting types
+of men who probably can never understand each other. To Luther the
+vices of Rome are sin; to Erasmus they are folly. The one is filled
+with moral indignation at the iniquity of the world, and rushes into
+the fray to stamp it out, puts it on the defensive, attacks it in its
+stronghold. The other makes iniquity ridiculous, renders it defenseless
+by laughing away its pretexts at justification, showing it to itself
+as folly and reminding all men that their foolishness may be removed
+only by wisdom. No doubt without more moral indignation in the world
+than Erasmus seems to have shown there would be too easy tolerance of
+abuse. On the other hand, without his insight and scepticism and irony,
+indignation turns to malice, men lose their perspective, and their
+power of self-criticism; they become so intent upon the struggle for
+righteousness that they forget what they are struggling for, and when
+the great cause finally triumphs, it carries to victory the same old
+iniquities in new dress.
+
+It is evident from a reading of “In Praise of Folly” that Erasmus’
+thought made deeper inroads into the very spirit of Mediæval thought
+and religion than did Luther’s moral indignation. It undermined many
+things that the Reformer left standing. “In Praise of Folly” was
+written eight years before Luther’s break with the Pope, and it reveals
+a mind emancipated from much more than the Papacy. The man who could
+write this satire must have regarded the Reformation as a quarrel which
+dealt with only the surface of the problem. I do not wonder that later
+both Catholics and Protestants considered him a sceptic. It is my
+belief that he was too sceptical to become greatly excited about the
+Reformation. He is impressed with the whole stupid comedy of the life
+about him.
+
+Knowledge of this book should be part of every man’s education. It has
+much more than a historical interest for the modern student. In form
+it is an oration which Folly delivers in praise of herself. She makes
+a good case; perhaps too good a case. Folly says that however slightly
+she is esteemed in the common vogue of the world--being often decried
+even by those who are themselves the greatest fools--yet she is _the
+deity who really rules the world_ and is the source of most men’s
+happiness. “At first sight of me you all unmask and appear in more
+lively colors.”
+
+Without Folly society would go to pieces. Indeed no one would ever be
+born, for would women ever have children or marry except for Folly? And
+except for Folly marriages would be few and divorces many. How could
+the government exist without Folly? Have not wise legislators in all
+times recognized the necessity of fooling the people? After showing
+how Folly reigns in the arts and the professions, and how each nation
+has its pet folly and self-conceit, the speaker sums up, “I am so
+communicative and bountiful as to let no particular person pass without
+some token of my favor, whereas other deities bestow gifts sparingly
+and to their elects only.”
+
+Let us note this reference to Folly as “deity.” Does Erasmus mean to
+imply that Folly is the deity that mankind really worships and has been
+worshipping all the while? He makes Folly say,
+
+ “Well, but there are none (say you) build any altars, or dedicate
+ any temple to Folly. I admire (as I have before intimated) that the
+ world should be so wretchedly ungrateful. But I am so good natured
+ as to pass by and pardon this seeming affront, though indeed the
+ charge thereof, as unnecessary, may well be saved; for to what
+ purpose should I demand the sacrifice of frankincense, cakes,
+ goats, and swine, since all persons everywhere pay me that more
+ acceptable service, which all divines agree to be more effectual and
+ meritorious, namely, an imitation of my communicable attributes?...
+ Farther, why should I desire a temple, since the whole world is but
+ one ample continued choir, entirely dedicated to my use and service?
+ Nor do I want worshippers at any place where the earth wants not
+ inhabitants. And as to the manner of my worship, I am not yet so
+ irrecoverably foolish, as to be prayed to by proxy, and to have my
+ honour intermediately bestowed upon images and pictures, which quite
+ subvert the true end of religion....”
+
+But Folly has not time to recount all the foolishness of the ignorant,
+neither is it necessary. She confines herself to the follies of those
+who make pretense of wisdom. Of these the theologians doubtless “least
+like to be reminded of their dependence upon Folly,” but in evidence of
+this fact,
+
+ “They will cut asunder the toughest argument with as much ease
+ as Alexander did the Gordian knot; they will thunder out so many
+ rattling terms as shall fright an adversary into conviction. They
+ are exquisitely dexterous in unfolding the most intricate mysteries;
+ they will tell you to a tittle all the successive proceedings of
+ omnipotence in the creation of the universe; they will explain
+ the precise manner of original sin being derived from our first
+ parents; they will satisfy you in what manner, by what degrees, and
+ in how long a time our Saviour was conceived in the Virgin’s womb,
+ and demonstrate in the consecrated wafer how accidents may subsist
+ without a subject. Nay, these are accounted trivial, easy questions;
+ they have yet far greater difficulties behind, which nothwithstanding
+ they solve with as much expedition as the former; ... whether Christ,
+ as a son, bears a double specifically distinct relation to God the
+ Father, and his virgin mother? whether this proposition is possible
+ to be true, the first person of the Trinity hated the second? whether
+ God, who took our nature upon him in the form of a man, could as
+ well have become a woman, a devil, a beast, an herb, or a stone? and
+ were it so possible that the Godhead had appeared in any shape of an
+ inanimate substance, how he should then have preached his gospel?
+ or how have been nailed to the cross? whether if St. Peter had
+ celebrated the eucharist at the same time our Saviour was hanging on
+ the cross, the consecrated bread would have been transsubstantiated
+ into the same body that remained on the tree?”
+
+ “Further, does any one appear a candidate for any ecclesiastical
+ dignity, why an ass or a plough jobber shall sooner gain it than a
+ wise man.”...
+
+ “All their preaching is mere stage-playing, and their delivery the
+ very transports of ridicule and drollery. Good Lord! how mimical are
+ these gestures? What heights and falls in their voice? What toning,
+ what bawling, what singing, what squeaking, what grimaces, making
+ of mouths, and apes’ faces, and distorting of their countenance;
+ and this art of oratory as a choice mystery, they convey down by
+ tradition to one another. The manner of it I may adventure thus
+ farther to enlarge upon. First, in a kind of mockery they implore the
+ divine assistance, which they borrowed from the solemn custom of the
+ poets....
+
+ “Now as to the popes of Rome, who pretend themselves Christ’s vicars,
+ if they would but imitate his exemplary life, in the being employed
+ in an unintermitted course of preaching; in the being attended with
+ poverty, nakedness, hunger, and a contempt of this world; if they did
+ but consider the import of the word pope, which signifies a father;
+ or if they did but practice their surname of most holy, what order or
+ degrees of men would be in a worse condition? There would be then no
+ such vigorous making of parties, and buying of votes, in the conclave
+ upon a vacancy of that see: and those who by bribery, or other
+ indirect courses, should get themselves elected, would never secure
+ their sitting firm in the chair by pistol, poison, force of violence.
+ How much of their pleasure would be abated if they were but endowed
+ with one dram of wisdom? Wisdom, did I say? Nay, with one grain of
+ that salt which our Saviour bid them not lose the savour of. All
+ their riches, all their honour, their jurisdictions, their Peter’s
+ patrimony, their offices, their dispensations, their licences, their
+ indulgences, their long train and attendants, (see in how short a
+ compass I have abbreviated all their marketing of religion;) in a
+ word, all their perquisities would be forfeited and lost.”...
+
+Finally, after quoting many passages in praise of Folly and of foolish
+actions and foolish persons which occur in his precious classic
+literature, Erasmus does a surprising thing. At the time this book
+was written those who later were to become the Reformers were already
+disposed to appeal to the Bible as an infallible authority equal to, if
+not above, that of the Church. That Erasmus placed the Holy Scriptures
+in the same category as other ancient literature is indicated by his
+free and easy treatment of it. He humorously quotes many passages to
+prove that the Bible actually enjoins men to practice folly and eschew
+wisdom. Were not our first parents expelled from Eden in punishment for
+the sin of eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge? He does not
+even spare the New Testament.
+
+ “Now therefore I return to St. Paul, who uses these expressions ‘Ye
+ suffer fools gladly,’ applying it to himself; and again, ‘As a fool
+ receive me,’ and ‘That which I speak, I speak not after the Lord,
+ but as it were foolishly’; and in another place, ‘We are fools for
+ Christ’s sake.’ See how these commendations of Folly are equal to the
+ author of them, both great and sacred. The same holy person does yet
+ enjoin and command the being a fool, as a virtue of all others most
+ requisite and necessary: for, says he, ‘If any man seem to be wise in
+ this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise.’...
+
+ “Nor may this seem strange in comparison to what is yet farther
+ delivered by St. Paul, who adventures to attribute something of Folly
+ even to the all-wise God himself, ‘The foolishness of God (says he)
+ is wiser than men’ ... wherein is to be understood that other passage
+ of St. Paul, ‘The preaching of the cross to them that perish, is
+ foolishness.’ But why do I put myself to the trouble of citing so
+ many proofs, since this one may suffice for all, namely, that in
+ those mystical psalms wherein David represents the type of Christ,
+ it is there acknowledged by our Saviour, in way of confession, that
+ even he himself was guilty of Folly; ‘thou (says he) O God knowest
+ my foolishness?’ Nor is it without some reason that fools for their
+ plainness and sincerity of heart have always been most acceptable to
+ God Almighty.... So our Saviour in like manner dislikes and condemns
+ the wise and crafty, as St. Paul does expressly declare in these
+ words, ‘God hath chosen the foolish things of the world’; and again,
+ ‘it pleased God by foolishness to save the world’; implying that by
+ wisdom it could never have been saved. Nay, God himself testifies
+ as much when he speaks by the mouth of his prophet, ‘I will destroy
+ the wisdom of the wise, and bring to nought the understanding of the
+ learned.’ Again, our Saviour does solemnly return his Father thanks
+ for that he had ‘hidden the mysteries of salvation from the wise, and
+ revealed them to babes,’ i. e. to fools.”
+
+The book ends with these words, “I hate a pot-companion with a good
+memory: so indeed I hate a hearer that will carry anything away with
+him. Wherefore in short, farewell: be jolly, live long, drink deep, ye
+most illustrious votaries of Folly.”
+
+It is said that Luther was repelled by this book. I do not wonder.
+Erasmus would seem to be as far removed from the spirit of
+Protestantism as from that of mediæval Catholicism. Has Erasmus,
+perhaps without wholly realizing the fact himself, stepped quite
+outside the traditional Christian system of beliefs and values into
+a world-view which is partly that of the ancient philosophies and
+partly that of the eighteenth century Rationalist? I do not know. He is
+certainly a liberal in matters of religion, but unlike our contemporary
+liberals, he shows little interest in natural science.
+
+He was severely criticised for refusing to participate in the
+Reformation on the side of the Reformers. The following bits of
+correspondence which I quote from Professor Smith’s biography indicate
+the esteem in which he and Luther finally held each other. Luther wrote
+about the year 1524:
+
+ “Since we see that the Lord has not given you courage and sense to
+ assail those monsters openly and confidently with us, we are not the
+ men to expect what is beyond your power and measure.... We only fear
+ that you may be induced by our enemies to fall upon our doctrine with
+ some publication, in which case we should be obliged to resist you to
+ your face.... Hitherto I have controlled my pen as often as you prick
+ me, and have written in letters to friends, which you have seen, that
+ I would control it until you publish something openly. For although
+ you will not side with us, and although you injure and make skeptical
+ many pious men by your impiety and hypocrisy, yet I cannot and do
+ not accuse you of willful obstinancy.... We have fought long enough;
+ we must take care not to eat each other up. This would be a terrible
+ catastrophe, as neither of us wishes to harm religion, and without
+ judging each other both may do good.”
+
+Erasmus wrote to his friend, Everard,
+
+ “With what odium Luther burdens the cause of learning and that of
+ Christianity! As far as he can he involves all men in his business.
+ Everyone confessed that the Church suffered under the tyranny of
+ certain men, and many were taking counsel to remedy this state of
+ affairs. Now this man has arisen to treat the matter in such a way
+ that he fastens the yoke on us more firmly, and that no one dares to
+ defend even what he has said well. Six months ago I warned him to
+ beware of hatred. ‘The Babylonian Captivity’ (a bitter treatise which
+ Luther wrote) has alienated many from him, and he daily puts forth
+ more atrocious things.”
+
+And again to Luther, in reply to a very unkind letter,
+
+ “Your letter was delivered to me late and had it come on time it
+ would not have moved me.... The whole world knows your nature,
+ according to which you have guided your pen against no one more
+ bitterly and, what is more detestable, more maliciously than against
+ me.... The same admirable ferocity which you formerly used against
+ Cochlaeus and against Fisher, who provoked you to it by reviling,
+ you now use against my book in spite of its courtesy. How do your
+ scurrilous charges that I am an atheist, an Epicurean, and a skeptic
+ help the argument?... It terribly pains me, as it must all good men,
+ that your arrogant, insolent, rebellious nature has set the world in
+ arms.... You treat the Evangelic cause so as to confound together all
+ things sacred and profane as if it were your chief aim to prevent the
+ tempest from ever becoming calm, while it is my greatest desire that
+ it should die down.... I should wish you a better disposition were
+ you not so marvelously satisfied with the one you have. Wish me any
+ curse you will except your temper, unless the Lord change it for you.”
+
+Much has been made of the following “damning” admission:
+
+ “Would that some ‘deus ex machina’ might make a happy ending for this
+ drama so inauspiciously begun by Luther! He himself gives his enemies
+ the dart by which they transfix him, and acts as if he did not wish
+ to be saved, though frequently warned by me and by his friends to
+ tone down the sharpness of his style.... I cannot sufficiently wonder
+ at the spirit in which he has written. Certainly he has loaded the
+ cultivators of literature with heavy odium. Many of his teachings and
+ admonitions were splendid, but would that he had not vitiated these
+ good things by mixing intolerable evils! If he had written all things
+ piously, yet I should not have courage to risk my life for the truth.
+ All men have not strength for martyrdom. I fear least, if any tumult
+ should arise, I should imitate Peter (in denying the Lord).”
+
+It is doubtful if Erasmus meant this confession of weakness to be taken
+literally. Cowards are not often so honest with themselves, nor do
+they make such candid revelations of their fears, but rather affect a
+show of bravery so long as it is possible to disguise their weakness
+of character. Had Erasmus been less strong, he would have yielded to
+pressure, joined the reformers and sought refuge among them. Instead,
+he stood against the crowd, knowing well that although he might decline
+to join the ranks of Luther, there was no refuge for him amongst the
+churchmen whom he had been attacking for many years. He did not betray
+his own cause, the Renaissance, but remained true to it in opposition
+to bigotry and ignorance on both sides of the controversy. In support
+of the revival of learning he was courageous enough. Surrounded as he
+was by madness, he conceived it to be the task of the wise man to keep
+his balance and work for peace and sanity.
+
+I believe this to be the first social task of the educated. Could
+a Socrates, or a Seneca, or Cicero have returned to life in the
+year 1525, it is difficult to imagine that he would have pursued a
+course very different from that Erasmus pursued. A man’s intellectual
+integrity does not require that he take sides when he believes that
+neither side has the truth. I believe Erasmus took the longer view, for
+today we find Humanism gradually supplanting orthodoxy among educated
+Protestants, and I have no doubt that something similar is taking place
+in Catholic centers of culture. The liberal Catholic and the liberal
+Protestant are more nearly of one mind than is either of them with the
+Fundamentalist in his own sect. And they are each nearer to Erasmus.
+Erasmus did not suffer martyrdom, neither did he make martyrs of those
+who opposed him. Persecution and martyrdom are the first things that
+the uneducated think of in any social crisis. The masses are prepared
+to make any conflict the occasion of both, and with only the vaguest
+idea of what the killing is all about. If there were more men like
+Erasmus there would be less occasion for such practices. His is the
+cause which will never triumph by force.
+
+Humanism, which in the Italian Renaissance was something of a _parvenu_
+effort at culture, comes to its maturity with Montaigne. It is an
+educational experience lived through, a wisdom grown into, as Montaigne
+says, with everything in its season. Montaigne’s mind is stored with
+the fruits of the wisdom of all historic times. He quotes the ancients
+as only Erasmus could, yet he is never an imitator or copier. His is
+one of the most original minds in literature, and his originality
+increases as he grows older and has time to think. It is very different
+from the rebelliousness of certain contemporary radicals, whose
+liberalism might be characterized as retarded adolescence.
+
+A contemporary critic says of him, “Montaigne ... was one of the most
+civilized men of whom we have any record: his intellectual curiosity
+was matched by his magnanimity. He hated cruelty, prejudice, violence
+and stupidity: his love of life was so great that it illumined every
+object in the world of sense and in the world of thought. His style was
+so original that his remarks on little things have outlived thousands
+of works dealing soberly with portentous ideas. He could write on
+trivial themes without becoming trivial.”
+
+Like Erasmus, he has a delicious sense of humor in which there is no
+bitterness. He is so accustomed to ideas that he can play with them.
+He can smile at his own weaknesses, and discuss every question with
+open mind and with that “kindly irony which is perhaps the ripest of
+all moods in which poor humanity can look at itself.” But Erasmus
+was the professional scholar, and we think of him always moving in
+circles where learning is of special interest. One does not think of
+educational institutions when one reads Montaigne’s essays, but of the
+educated man himself. He is the learned layman, the _amateur_ whose
+learning is assimilated with all the interests of the daily routine of
+living. He is not “taken in” by his culture so as to make it an end in
+itself. He says,
+
+ “I labor not to be beloved more and esteemed better being dead than
+ alive.... If I were one of those to whom the world may be indebted
+ for praise, I would quit it for one moytie, on condition it would
+ pay me before hand.... I make no account of goods which I could
+ not employ to the use of my life. Such as I am, so I would not be
+ elsewhere than on paper. Mine art and industry have been employed
+ to make myself of some worth; my study and endeavor to doe, and not
+ to write. I have applied all my skill and devoire to frame my life.
+ Lo--heere mine occupation and my work. I am a less maker of books
+ than of anything else.... Whosoever hath any worth in him, let him
+ shew it in his behaviour, manners and ordinary discourses; be it
+ to treat of love or of quarrels; of sport and play or bed-matters,
+ at board or elsewhere; or be it in the conduct of his own affairs
+ or private household matters.... Demand a Spartan whether he would
+ rather be a cunning Rhethorician, then an excellent souldier;
+ nay, were I asked, I wuld say a good Cooke, had I not some one to
+ serve me. Good Lord--how I would hate such a commendation, to be a
+ sufficient man in writing and a foolish, shallow-headed braine or
+ coxcombe in all things else.”
+
+He ridicules those who strive to make a show of learning and “alledge
+Plato and Saint Thomas for things which the first man they meete would
+decide as well.... Such learning as could not enter into their middle
+hath staid on their tongues.”
+
+ “Being young I studied for ostentation; then a little to enoble
+ myselfe and become wiser; now for delight and recreation, never for
+ gaine. A vaine conceit and lavish humour I had after this kinde of
+ stuffe; not only to provide for my need, but some what further to
+ adorne and embellish my selfe withall; I have since partlie left it.”
+
+He loves Letters but does not worship them. He remains a little
+surprised and amused at his own bits of wisdom and does not quite know
+how he came into the company of the philosophers.
+
+ “Nothing may be spoken so absurdly but that it is spoken by some of
+ the philosophers. And therefore do I suffer my humors or caprices
+ more freely to pass in publike. For as much as though they are borne
+ with, and of me, and without any patterne; well I wot, they will
+ be found to have relation to some ancient humour, and some shall
+ be found, that will both know and tell whence, and of whom I have
+ borrowed them. My customes are naturall; when I contrived them, I
+ called not for the help of any discipline: And weake and faint as
+ they were, when I have had a desire to expresse them, and to make
+ them appeare to the world a little more comely and decent, I have
+ somewhat endevoured to aide them with discourse, and assist them with
+ examples. I have wondred at my selfe, that by mere chance I have
+ met with them, agreeing and sutable to so many ancient examples and
+ Philosophicall discourses. What regiment my life was of, I never knew
+ nor learned but after it was much worne and spent. A new figure: An
+ unpremeditated Philosopher and a casuall.”
+
+It is this unostentatious, unpremeditated, casual and chatty quality
+of Montaigne’s writing that reveals the genuineness of his education.
+A present-day critic would lead us to believe that he kept a note
+book and patiently copied out of his classics the passages which he
+might use as illustrations. In a characteristic bit of humor at his
+own expense, Montaigne seems to justify this idea that he was a mere
+compiler of other men’s thoughts.
+
+ “We labor and toyle and plod to fill the memorie and leave both
+ understanding and conscience empty. Even as birds flutter and skip
+ from field to field to peck up corn or any grain and without tasting
+ the same carrie it in their bills therewith to feed their little
+ ones: so doe our pedants glean and pick learning from books and
+ never lodge it further than their lips only to disgorge and cast
+ it to the wind. It is strange how filthy sottishness takes hold of
+ mine example. Is not that which I do in the greatest part of this
+ composition all one and self same thing? I am forever here and there
+ picking and culling from this and that book the sentences that please
+ me, not to keepe them (for I have no store house to reserve them in)
+ but to transport them into this: where to say truth, they are no more
+ mine than in their first place.”
+
+But it is obvious that these essays were not the product of a mind
+which worked in such a sophomoric manner as this. Montaigne’s mind
+is saturated with “ancient humor.” There is no pretense or conscious
+effort to appear erudite. While many other Renaissance scholars were
+writing in Latin and affecting a Ciceronian style, Montaigne wrote
+in French. He is, I believe, the creator of the essay as a form of
+literary expression, a style which is more free and informal than the
+conventional forms of his day.
+
+A man who spent his days in seclusion in his library in the tower
+of his castle, he writes not of books but of every conceivable
+human interest and commonplace reality. His wisdom turns to such
+considerations as, “By diverse means men come to a like end.” “How
+the soul dischargeth her passions upon false objects.” “Whether the
+captaine of a place besieged ought to sally forth to parley.” He writes
+of “Idleness,” of “Liars,” or “Virtue,” of “Drunkenness,” of “Exercise
+or Practice,” of “Profit and Honesty,” of “Repenting,” of “Coaches,”
+of “The Verses of Virgil,” of “Vanity,” of “The affection of fathers to
+their Children,” of “Seneca” and “Plutarch” and “Julius Caesar.” Always
+his interest is in human experience. Shrewd personal observations are
+mingled with stories from antiquity and quaint philosophic maxims in a
+mind which is at once mature and inquisitive, loquacious and sceptical,
+candidly self-revealing, without pretention, equally at home among
+books and things. Let those who object to the teaching of the classics
+on the ground that they tend to a “separation of education from life”
+go back and re-read Montaigne.
+
+Although the two were by temperament very different, Montaigne would
+have pleased Erasmus. His education and philosophy of life were very
+much the type that Erasmus strove to encourage. When Montaigne was
+born, in 1533, the influence of the Renaissance had already made
+itself felt in France. He was three years old when Erasmus died. But
+his casual mention of “The Adages” and “Colloquies” of Erasmus would
+indicate that sometime in his youth these books formed part of his
+education. His knowledge of Greek and Latin began at a very early
+period in his life. It is said that when he was a mere infant his
+father placed him in the home of a neighboring scholar so that he would
+grow up with the same familiarity with these languages as with his
+mother tongue. He entered what was called a “college” at the age of
+six. It was, I suppose, a preparatory school. It must have come under
+the influence of the revival of learning for it had on its faculty some
+of the ablest scholars in France at that time. At the age of thirteen
+he entered a university to study Law, took his degree at twenty, and at
+twenty-one was appointed councilor for the Parliament of Bordeaux. He
+seems to have had some military experience also, and to have spent some
+gay years at court.
+
+When he was thirty-nine years old he inherited the estate and castle
+of Montaigne near Bordeaux. He married, and except for the few years,
+when against his inclination he served as Mayor of Bordeaux, he spent
+the remainder of his days in private life, looking after his estate and
+enjoying hours of unbroken meditation in his tower library, reading his
+Horace and Plutarch and the ancient poets and philosophers generally.
+He says he was not a great reader, but that he liked to have his
+books about him. He especially enjoyed the privacy of his library,
+from which, he gives us to understand, his wife and the rest of the
+household were excluded.
+
+Montaigne began writing brief essays when he was forty-five years old,
+not at first for publication but rather so that he might present a true
+picture of himself to his family and friends. The writing evidently
+amused him for as the years passed the essays grew longer and their
+content more serious.
+
+If we are to see the full significance of the essays as the revelation
+of an achievement in education--and that is our present interest in
+them--we must remember what was happening in the world at the time
+they were written. The struggle of the Reformation was in full swing.
+Montaigne’s lifetime coincides with what was doubtless the most bitter
+and acrimonious period of that religious conflict. Everywhere there
+was persecution, riot, intrigue, retaliation; men seemed to have lost
+utterly the liberal spirit of the Renaissance and to have forgotten
+that there was such a virtue as tolerance.
+
+Montaigne was an exception. It is said that during the years of
+bloodshed in France, his castle was never fortified, nor closed, and
+that both Catholics and Protestants were welcome there. The battle does
+not disturb Montaigne’s equanimity, nor warp his judgment; it remains
+to him a little more than a fight in the street. I should like to call
+attention to this indifference to the great mass movement of the times,
+for there are those who contend that philosophy, art and letters are
+but the by-products of such movements. At a time when nearly every
+one is eaten up with partisan zeal, Montaigne hardly mentions the
+Reformation. He says, “I perswade you, in your opinions and discourses,
+as much as in your custom, and in every other thing, to use moderation
+and temperance, and avoid all newfangled inventions and strangenesses.
+All extravagant wais displease me.”
+
+While others are resorting to torture and massacre for the sake of a
+faith which they do not question, Montaigne quietly retires and has
+time to see when he is making himself ridiculous.
+
+ “It is not long since I retired my selfe unto mine owne house, with
+ full purpose, as much as lay in me, not to trouble myselfe with any
+ businesse, but solitarily and quietly to weare out the remainder
+ of my wellnigh spent life: when me thought I could doe my spirit
+ no greater favor than to give him the full scope of idlenesse, and
+ entertaine him as best he pleased, and withall to settle himselfe as
+ best he liked: which I hoped he might, now being by time become more
+ settled and ripe, accomplish very easily: but I finde
+
+ ‘... evermore idlenesse
+ Doth wavering mindes addresse.’
+
+ That contrariwise, playing the skittish and loose broken jade, he
+ takes a hundred times more cariere and libertie unto himselfe than
+ he did for others: and begets in me so many extravagant chimeraes
+ and fantastical monsters, so orderless, and without any reason, one
+ huddled upon the other, that at leisure to view the foolishnesse and
+ monstrous strangeness of them, I have begun to keep a register of
+ them, hoping, if I live, one day to make him ashamed and blush at
+ himselfe.”
+
+Toward the multitude and its judgments of value he is indifferent,
+
+ “Our soule must play her part, but inwardly, within our selves,
+ where no eyes shine but ours: ... not for any advantage but for the
+ gracefulness of honestie itselfe. This benefit is much greater, and
+ more worthie to be wished and hoped, then honor and glory, which is
+ naught but a favorable judgment that is made of us.... Is it reason
+ to make the life of a wise man depend on the judgment of fooles?
+ Nothing is so incomprehensible to be just waied as the mindes of the
+ multitude....
+
+ “... In this breathie confusion of brutes and frothy chaos of reports
+ and of vulgar opinions which still push us on, no good can be
+ established. Let us not propose so fleeting and so wavering an end
+ unto ourselves. Let us constantly follow reason: And let the vulgar
+ approbation follow us that way, if it please. Of the many thousands
+ of worthie, valiant men which fifteen hundred years since [the day of
+ Juvenal] have died in France with their weapons in their hands, not
+ one in a hundred have come to our knowledge.... It shall be much, if
+ a hundred years hence the civil warres which lately we have had in
+ France be but remembered in grosse.”
+
+Yes, the multitude may follow if it pleases; Montaigne will not urge
+it. He may remind it that in a few years its cause may be forgotten.
+But how free he is from the righteous indignation and vindictiveness
+and factiousness which everywhere storm about him. He has that urbanity
+of which I spoke, and the serenity of one who has learned to laugh at
+his own prejudices.
+
+ “Surely, man is a wonderful, vaine, divers and wavering subject: it
+ is very hard to ground any directly constant and uniforme judgment
+ upon him.”
+
+His wisdom leads him to see not only the folly of mankind, but also
+his own folly and weakness, which he does not strive to conceal, but
+relates with amusing candor.
+
+ “I have, a kind of raving, fanciful behavior that retireth well into
+ myselfe: and on the other side a grosse and childish ignorance of
+ many ordinary things: by means of which two qualities I have in my
+ daies committed five or six as sottish trickes as any one whatsoever:
+ which to my derogration may be reported....
+
+ “For my part, I may in generall wish to be other than I am: I may
+ condenme and mislike my universall forme: I may beseech God to
+ grant me an undefiled reformation and excuse my natural weaknesse:
+ but me seemeth I ought to tearme this repentance, no more than the
+ displeasure of being neither an Angell nor Cato....
+
+ “When I consult with my age of my youthe’s proceedings, I finde that
+ commonly (according to my opinion) I managed them in order. This
+ is all my resistance is able to perform. I flatter not myselfe: in
+ like circumstances I should be ever the same. It is not a spot, but
+ a whole dye that staynes mee. I acknowledge no repentence (that) is
+ superficiall, meane, and ceremonious.
+
+ “Crosses and afflictions (works of penance) make me doe nothing but
+ curse them. They are for people that cannot be arroused but by the
+ whip.... The happy life (in my opinion, not as said Antisthenes, the
+ happy death,) is it that makes man’s happinesse in this world.
+
+ “I have not preposterously busied myselfe to tie the taile of a
+ Philosopher unto the head and bodie of a varlet: nor that this
+ paultrie end, should disavow and belie the fairest soundest and
+ longest part of my life. I will present myselfe and make a generall
+ muster of my whole, everywhere uniformally. Were I to live againe, it
+ should be as I have already lived. I neither deplore the past, nor
+ dread what is to come.”
+
+The man who can speak so of himself is not likely to hold up any
+universal standard of faith or practice. He is not the man with the
+message for humanity, as were the Reformers and their enemies in the
+church. He is not a partisan because he has gone beyond such dilemmas.
+His knowledge of many books and of many and diverse explantations of
+the riddle of life and many kinds of goods and evils has made him
+see that there is no “one right way.” Reason has often been opposed
+to faith. Montaigne sees that reason too is faith, and faith all too
+human. There can be no finality.
+
+I suspect that his tolerance and aloofness during the Reformation in
+France were the result of a point of view somewhat similar to that of
+Lessing’s “Nathan the Wise,” and his story of the three rings. No one
+possessed the original, which was supposed to entitle the owner to
+the ancestral blessing and inheritance. All, like all religions, were
+counterfeits of the lost article.
+
+Montaigne gives his ideas of religion and philosophy in the longest of
+his essays, “An Apologie of Raymond Sebond.” He says that his father
+once requested him to translate a book on natural Theology by an
+unknown Spanish writer of this name. His remarks reveal the extent to
+which his mind is freed from both rationalism and religious dogmatism.
+
+ “We should accompany our faith with all the reason we possess: yet
+ always with this proviso, that we think it does not depend on us,
+ and that all our strength and arguments can never attain to so
+ supernaturall and divine a knowledge.”
+
+His remarkable detachment is seen in the following. He says that the
+best test of Verity is the practice of virtue.
+
+ “And therefore was our good Saint Lewis in the right, when that
+ Tartan King who was to become a Christian intended to come to Lions
+ to kisse the Pope’s feet, and there to view the sanctitie he hoped
+ to find in our lives and manners, instantly to divert him from it
+ fearing lest our dissolute manners and licentious kind of life might
+ scandalize him and so alter his opinion foreconceived of so sacred a
+ religion. How be it the contrary happened to another who for the same
+ effect being come to Rome, and there viewing the dissoluteness of the
+ prelates and people of those days, was so much more confirmed in our
+ religion, considering with himselfe what force and divinity it must
+ of consequence have since it was able, amidst so many corruptions and
+ so viciously poluted hands to maintain her dignitie and splendor....
+
+ “Our zeale worketh wonders when ever it secondeth our inclination
+ toward hatred, cruelitie, ambition, avarice, detraction or
+ rebellion.... Among other discommodities of our nature this is
+ one, there is darkness in our minds, and in us not only necessity
+ of erring but love of errors.... Presumption is our naturall and
+ originall infirmitie. Of all creatures, man is the most miserable
+ and fraile, and therewithall the proudest and disdainfullest ...
+ he ascribeth divine conditions unto himselfe that he selecteth and
+ separateth himselfe from out the ranke of other creatures.... By
+ what comparison from them to us doth he conclude the brutishness he
+ ascribeth unto them? When I am playing with my cat who knows whether
+ she have more sport in dallying with me than I in gaming with her? We
+ entertain one another with mutuall apish tricks.”
+
+ “We understand them (the beasts) no more than they us. By the same
+ reason may they as well esteem us Beasts, as we them. It is no great
+ marvell if we understand them not: no more doe we understand the
+ Cornish, the Welch, or Irish.”
+
+He is persuaded he says, that if anyone who has pursued knowledge will
+“speak in conscience, he will confess that all the benefit he hath
+gotten by so tedious a pursuit, hath been that he hath learned to know
+his own weaknesse.”
+
+ “My profession is not to know the truth nor to attaine it. I rather
+ open than discover things. The wisest that ever was, being demanded
+ what he knew, answered that he knew nothing.”
+
+He speaks with approval of the doubters, the Phyrronians who “but
+desire to be contradicted, thereby to engender doubt and suspense of
+judgment which is their end and drift.” Thus these men have attained
+the condition of a quiet and contented life, exempted from the
+agitations which beset ourselves because we imagine we have a certainty
+and a knowledge that we do not possess.
+
+After all “that ignorance which knoweth and condemneth itselfe,” is
+not absolute ignorance. Montaigne seems to hold that it is the best
+we may attain and that in knowing and condemning our ignorance we may
+avoid much of the misery and mischief we inflict upon ourselves and one
+another. The fears and revenge and jealousies and partisan strife and
+rebellion and envy and immoderate desires which everywhere he finds
+about him all proceed, he thinks, from presumptuous ignorance which
+does not know itself to be ignorance. In the midst of theological
+disputation he smilingly reminds his neighbors that as,
+
+ “Xenophanes said pleasantly that if beastes frame any gods unto
+ themselves (as likely it is they doe) they surely frame them like
+ unto themselves and glorifie themselves as we do. For what may not a
+ Goose say this? All parts of the world behold me, the earth serveth
+ me to tread upon, the sunne to give me light, the starres to inspire
+ me with influence: this commodity I have of the winds, and this
+ benefit of the waters: there is nothing that this world’s vault doth
+ so favorably looke upon as me selfe: I am the favorite of nature. Is
+ it not man that careth for me, that keepeth me, and serveth me? For
+ me it is he soweth and reapeth and grindeth. If he eat me, so doth
+ man feede on his fellow, and so doe I on the wormes that consume and
+ eat him.”
+
+ “I commend the Milesian wench who seeing Thales the Philosoper
+ continually amusing hemselfe in the contemplation of heaven’s wide
+ bounding vault and ever holding his eyes aloft, laid something in
+ his way to make him stumble, thereby to warne and put him in minde
+ that he should not amuse his thoughts about matters above the clouds
+ before he had provided for and well considered those at his feet.
+ Verily she advised him well, and it better became him rather to looke
+ to himselfe than to gaze on heaven.”
+
+“_The wisest judging of heaven is not to judge of it at all._” His own
+modest answer to the riddle of existence in contrast to those who would
+“turne and winde God Almighty according to their own measure,” is “Que
+scay-je?”--What do I know?
+
+Montaigne is not a hard and soulless sceptic. He is a well poised,
+modest thinker and an honest man. He is not a denier, but one whose
+mind is free from cant, humbug, pretentiousness. Historically he is one
+of the links between the best in modern education and the questioning
+Socrates whom he knew and loved. I trust that in presenting the
+Humanist tradition in this concrete manner, I have been able to suggest
+something of its spirit. It has a necessary place in liberal education
+because it helps liberate the mind from the clutches of opinionated
+ignorance, from the follies which prevail as truth in our own age, and
+from conceit and vanity to which our human nature is ever prone.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+SCIENCE AND SUPERSTITION--HUXLEY
+
+
+When the ancient Humanist, Protagoras, said, “Man is the measure of
+all things,” he probably did not mean that all things may be measured
+by man, for in his following sentence he is sceptical of our knowledge
+of many things. He meant rather that all our measurements are human.
+This independence of supernaturalism was not always characteristic
+of educated minds of antiquity, but it is one of the distinguishing
+features of the educational tradition which we have derived from Greece
+and Rome. Thus Aristotle would establish ethics in the life of reason.
+This same naturalistic bias also inspires those early attempts at
+science which were broken off under the influence of Christianity.
+
+The Renaissance was accompanied by a re-awakened interest in nature,
+and in human nature as part of nature as a whole. The trend toward
+naturalism is seen in art, in the resumption of scientific research and
+experimentation, and in the effort to supplant scholastic theology by
+the study of human letters. To Da Vinci, for instance, science, art,
+and letters were but the varied aspects of the same cultural awakening.
+But for the greater number of those who felt the influence of the
+Renaissance, science and letters became quite separate interests.
+The new learning of the Humanists was almost exclusively a literary
+scholarship. Erasmus and his followers had very little interest in
+natural science. They found in classic literature a body of mature
+wisdom ready to hand. Science on the contrary, was obliged to begin
+_de novo_, and slowly construct its instruments of thought, building,
+gradually a new system of knowledge. The brunt of the conflict with
+scholastic education fell upon the humanists. The real renaissance of
+science did not take place until the seventeenth century.
+
+Meanwhile the Reformation had caused a revival of religious interest,
+and in Protestant countries like England, and later America, the
+influence of religion upon higher learning remained powerful. It
+permitted the classical tradition to survive in letter rather than in
+spirit. The naturalistic implications of the classics were ignored;
+commentators whenever possible read into the texts the conventional
+beliefs and sentiments of Protestantism. Humanism became “traditional
+education,” a new scholasticism, formal and innocuous, a mark of
+intellectual respectability, a “refining” influence, an embroidery of
+familiar quotation in the speech of parsons and country squires.
+
+Successive generations of grown-up schoolboys in Gothic halls,
+laboriously translated, over and over again, hackneyed passages from a
+literature that in the fifteenth century had been carried about like
+the fire of Prometheus, kindling defiance to Heaven all over Europe.
+Often men could think of no better reason for the study of the ancient
+classics than that in the tedium and monotony of language drill there
+was a “discipline” which was good for the soul. The student’s attention
+was centered upon the niceties of construction and upon the task of
+memorizing rules of grammar and a vocabulary, all stuffed into his head
+in the most artificial manner conceivable. He was not likely to be
+puzzled over the discovery that there might be something spiritually
+irreconcilable between Lucretius and the Thirty Nine Articles, or
+between the dialectic of Socrates and the Westminster confession of
+faith.
+
+There is a world of difference between this _denatured_ Humanism and
+that of Erasmus or Montaigne. That this traditional education made
+for polish and good breeding cannot be denied. Neither, I think,
+can it be denied that there was something sterile and illiberal in
+Protestant-classical education. It is significant that both the
+Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and the progress of science in
+the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries took place chiefly outside the
+established universities and sometimes in spite of their opposition.
+
+I do not see how the situation could well have been otherwise. In the
+first place the older Humanists themselves dealt the naturalism of
+the ancients and such of it as was again coming to life a severe blow
+when they championed letters and remained indifferent to science.
+In the second place, the Reformation quite side-tracked the revival
+of learning, superseded it, and took over into its own service only
+so much of it as it found congenial to its religious interests. It
+was a mass movement, an attempt at a restatement of Christianity in
+terms of the philosophy of the common man, a philosophy to which
+the questioning, enlightened common sense and worldly wisdom of a
+Montaigne, a Voltaire or a Hume is never very congenial. Santayana
+says, “The philosophy of the common man is an old wife that gives him
+no pleasure, yet he cannot do without her, and resents any aspersions
+that strangers may cast on her character.
+
+“Of this homely philosophy the tender cuticle is religious belief;
+really the least vital and most arbitrary part of human opinion, the
+outer ring, as it were, of the fortifications of prejudice, but for
+that very reason the most jealously defended; since it is on being
+attacked there, at the least defensible point, that rage and alarm at
+being attacked at all are first aroused in the citadel. People are not
+naturally sceptics, wondering if a single one of their intellectual
+habits can be reasonably preserved; they are dogmatists angrily
+confident of maintaining them all. Integral minds, pupils of a single
+coherent tradition, regard their religion, whatever it may be, as
+certain, as sublime, and as the only rational basis of morality and
+policy. Yet in fact religious belief is terribly precarious, partly
+because it is arbitrary, so that in the next tribe or in the next
+century it will wear quite a different form; and partly because,
+when genuine, it is spontaneous and continually remodelled, like
+poetry, in the heart that gives it birth. A man of the world soon
+learns to discredit established religions on account of their variety
+and absurdity, although he may good-naturedly continue to conform
+to his own; and a mystic before long begins fervently to condemn
+current dogmas, on account of his own different inspiration. Without
+philosophical criticism, therefore, mere experience and good sense
+suggest that all positive religions are false, or at least (which
+is enough for my present purpose) that they are all fantastic and
+insecure.”
+
+Speaking of the Reformation and its relation to science, Whitehead
+says, “We cannot look upon it as introducing a new principle into human
+life.” Perhaps he is inclined to over-emphasize the assertions of
+the Reformers that they were only restoring what had been forgotten.
+But he says, “It is quite otherwise with the rise of modern science.
+In every way it contrasts with the contemporary religious movement.
+The Reformation was a popular uprising and for a century and a half
+drenched Europe in blood. The beginnings of the scientific movement
+were confined to a minority among the intellectual élite.”
+
+It is doubtless because the Humanists remained relatively indifferent
+to science, that its early struggles with theology were comparatively
+mild. It was permitted to make remarkable progress in the seventeenth
+century without raising an issue too great for its strength. It is
+interesting to note that when in the nineteenth century the conflict
+of natural science with theology became acute, science was at the same
+time engaged in a struggle for recognition by the official educational
+system in which the classical tradition held sway.
+
+The outstanding public champion of science in this conflict was Thomas
+H. Huxley. He could say of university education in England in the year
+1868, that the colleges no longer promoted research in science, and
+were hardly more than “boarding schools for bigger boys.” Once they
+had been homes for the life study of the most abstruse and important
+branches of knowledge.
+
+ “I believe there can be no doubt that the foreigner who should wish
+ to become acquainted with the scientific, or the literary, activity
+ of modern England, would simply lose his time and his pains if he
+ visited our universities with that object.
+
+ “The countrymen of Grote and of Mill, of Faraday, of Robert Brown, of
+ Lyell, and Darwin, to go no further back than the contemporaries of
+ men of middle age, can afford to smile at such a suggestion. England
+ can show now, and she has been able to show in every generation
+ since civilization spread over the West, individual men who hold
+ their own against the world, and keep alive the old tradition of her
+ intellectual eminence.
+
+ “But in the majority of cases, these men are what they are in virtue
+ of their native intellectual force, and of a strength of character
+ which will not recognise impediments. They are not trained in the
+ courts of the Temple of Science, but storm the walls of that edifice
+ in all sorts of irregular ways, and with much loss of time and power,
+ in order to obtain their legitimate positions.
+
+ “Our universities not only do not encourage such men; do not offer
+ them positions, in which it should be their highest duty to do,
+ thoroughly, that which they are most capable of doing; but, as far as
+ possible, university training shuts out of the minds of those among
+ them, who are subjected to it, the prospect that there is anything in
+ the world for which they are specially fitted.--Imagine the success
+ of the attempt to still the intellectual hunger of any of the men I
+ have mentioned, by putting before him, as the object of existence,
+ the successful mimicry of the measure of a Greek song, or the roll of
+ Ciceronian prose!”
+
+Twelve years later Huxley was still waging his contest for the
+admission of science to the curricula of school and college against an
+opposition the obstinacy of which is a little difficult for us today to
+understand.
+
+ “For I hold very strongly by two convictions--The first is, that
+ neither the discipline nor the subject-matter of classical education
+ is of such direct value to the student of physical science as to
+ justify the expenditure of valuable time upon either; and the second
+ is, that for the purpose of attaining real culture, an exclusively
+ scientific education is at least as effectual as an exclusively
+ literary education.
+
+ “I need hardly point out to you that these opinions, especially the
+ latter, are diametrically opposed to those of the great majority of
+ educated Englishmen, influenced as they are by school and university
+ traditions. In their belief, culture is obtainable only by a liberal
+ education; and a liberal education is synonymous, not merely with
+ education and instruction in literature, but in one particular form
+ of literature, namely, that of Greek and Roman antiquity. They hold
+ that the man who has learned Latin and Greek, however little, is
+ educated; while he who is versed in other branches of knowledge,
+ however deeply, is a more or less respectable specialist, not
+ admissable into the cultured caste. The stamp of the educated man,
+ the University degree, is not for him.”
+
+ “The representatives of the Humanists, in the nineteenth century,
+ take their stand upon classical education as the sole avenue to
+ culture, as firmly as if we were still in the age of Renascence. Yet,
+ surely, the present intellectual relations of the modern and the
+ ancient worlds are profoundly different from those which obtained
+ three centuries ago. Leaving aside the existence of a great and
+ characteristic modern literature, of modern painting, and, especially
+ of modern music, there is one feature of the present state of the
+ civilized world which separates it more widely from the Renascence,
+ than the Renascence was separated from the middle ages.
+
+ “This distinctive character of our own times lies in the vast and
+ constantly increasing part which is played by natural knowledge. Not
+ only is our daily life shaped by it, not only does the prosperity
+ of millions of men depend upon it, but our whole theory of life has
+ long been influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the general
+ conceptions of the universe, which have been forced upon us by
+ physical science.”
+
+ “The scientist, no longer disposed to remain on the defensive with
+ the usual apology for science, carries the battle into the opposing
+ camp and indicts the opposition, with some justice I think, for
+ its failure even when judged by its own traditional standards of
+ education.
+
+ “There is no great force in the _tu quoque_ argument, or else the
+ advocates of scientific education might fairly enough retort upon
+ the modern Humanists that they may be learned specialists, but that
+ they possess no such sound foundation for a criticism of life as
+ deserves the name of culture. And, indeed, if we were disposed to be
+ cruel, we might urge that the Humanists have brought this reproach
+ upon themselves, not because they are too full of the spirit of the
+ ancient Greek, but because they lack it.
+
+ “The period of the Renascence is commonly called that of the “Revival
+ of Letters,” as if the influences then brought to bear upon the
+ mind of Western Europe had been wholly exhausted in the field of
+ literature. I think it is very commonly forgotten that the revival of
+ science, effected by the same agency, although less conspicuous, was
+ not less momentous....
+
+ “We cannot know all the best thoughts and sayings of the Greeks
+ unless we know what they thought about natural phenomena. We cannot
+ fully apprehend their criticism of life unless we understand
+ the extent to which that criticism was affected by scientific
+ conceptions. We falsely pretend to be the inheritors of their
+ culture, unless we are penetrated, as the best minds among them were,
+ with an unhesitating faith that the free employment of reason, in
+ accordance with scientific method, is the sole method of reaching
+ truth.
+
+ “Thus I venture to think that the pretensions of our modern Humanists
+ to the possession of the monopoly of culture and to the exclusive
+ inheritance of the spirit of antiquity must be abated, if not
+ abandoned.”
+
+Huxley was one of the few educators of his time who ought to have seen
+clearly that in the education of the ancients there was no conflict
+of interest between science and letters; the two were one in the
+naturalistic minds of the Greeks. He is aware of the fact that both
+science and letters were revived by the Renaissance, but it would seem
+that he permits his zeal in the cause of scientific training to force
+him at times into a rather one-sided and partisan position.
+
+ “But for those who mean to make science their serious occupation;
+ or who intend to follow the profession of medicine; or who have to
+ enter early upon the business of life; for all these, in my opinion,
+ classical education is a mistake; and it is for this reason that I
+ am glad to see ‘mere literary education and instruction’ shut out
+ from the curriculum of Sir Josiah Mason’s College, seeing that its
+ inclusion would probably lead to the introduction of the ordinary
+ smattering of Latin and Greek....”
+
+ “The great peculiarity of scientific training, that in virtue of
+ which it cannot be replaced by any other discipline whatsoever,
+ is this bringing of the mind directly into contact with fact, and
+ practising the intellect in the completest form of induction; that is
+ to say, in drawing conclusions from particular facts made known by
+ immediate observation of nature.”
+
+The struggle for recognition of the liberalizing educational value of
+science was carried to successful issue in the nineteenth century.
+In backward communities, Fundamentalism still sets its face against
+certain of the anti-supernaturalist implications of science, and it is
+always possible that if at any time the populace now dazzled by the
+“wonders” of science, should suspect the full meaning of the world-view
+which science would substitute for the older anthropomorphic ideas
+about the universe, there may be a wide-spread popular reaction against
+it in the name of religion. But at present in educational institutions
+generally, scientific courses tend to predominate over the classical.
+Most of the struggles for “academic freedom” and most of the live
+problems in education revolve about the teaching of the sciences.
+A vastly greater number of minds are today set free from dogma and
+superstition and childish deference to authority by methods of
+scientific research than by the study of the classics. The latter is on
+the decline and I suppose must continue to be so until Humanism again
+possesses that vitality and naturalism, and independence of judgment
+which men had when the Greeks set out to discover the Good Life.
+
+Dewey says that without initiation into the scientific spirit one is
+not in possession of the best tools which humanity has so far devised
+for effectively directed reflection. In it may be realized that desire
+for exact knowledge as different from mere opinion which the ancients
+sought. It tests all things in the light of experiment and by appeal
+to cold objective fact. It is often said that science is Reason in
+contrast with Faith. Certainly the scientist cannot in his research
+permit himself to be swayed by religious belief and remain scientific.
+He must accept no conclusion on authority or because he wishes to
+believe it. But the scientific mind is not, as a matter of fact, as
+strictly rationalistic as was the scholastic mind. The logic of the
+latter is a formal vindication of The Truth conceived in advance of
+knowledge of fact. The reasoning of the former proceeds by a succession
+of shrewd guesses which are held to be mere hypothesis until verified
+by the facts. This necessity of holding judgment in abeyance, and
+of being willing to discard any belief or postulate that may not be
+confirmed by objective reality, has the greatest educational value. In
+spite of the everlasting deceitfulness and conceit of human nature and
+notwithstanding the fact that pompous ignorance and fraud are often
+palmed off upon the public as scientific knowledge, I should say,
+precisely because of these things, training in scientific methods is
+the best device available to the educator for instilling into the human
+mind some measure of respect for truth.
+
+To this end Huxley would introduce scientific experimentation into the
+elementary school and would establish “scientific Sunday schools,”
+
+ “Would there really be anything wrong in using part of Sunday for
+ the purpose of instructing those who have no other leisure, in a
+ knowledge of the phenomena of Nature, and of man’s relation to
+ Nature?
+
+ “I should like to see a scientific Sunday-school in every parish,
+ not for the purpose of superseding any existing means of teaching
+ the people the things that are for their good, but side by side with
+ them. I cannot but think that there is room for all of us to work in
+ helping to bridge over the great abyss of ignorance which lies at our
+ feet.
+
+ “And if any of the ecclesiastical persons to whom I have referred
+ object that they find it derogatory to the honour of the God whom
+ they worship, to awaken the minds of the young to the infinite wonder
+ and majesty of the works which they proclaim His, and to teach them
+ those laws which must needs be His laws, and therefore of all things
+ needful for man to know--I can only recommend them to be let blood
+ and put on low diet. There must be something very wrong going on in
+ the instrument of logic if it turns out such conclusions from such
+ premises.”
+
+There is an intellectual cleanness, something downright and honest
+about the scientific pursuit of knowledge, and this uncompromising
+mental integrity characterizes everything that Huxley said and did.
+There is nothing shifty in a mind trained as his was. His is like a
+cool north breeze on one of those clear summer days that sometimes
+follow a period of sultriness, fog and rain. If things are a little too
+sharply outlined, they are at least recognized for what they are. No
+evasive mistiness obscures the landscape. To Huxley the foundation of
+morality is to give up pretending to believe that for which there is no
+evidence. He held that the lowest depths to which the human race could
+fall--after knowing what science now reveals of nature--would be to go
+back and deceive itself with comforting fictions. You will remember
+his correspondence with Kingsley when death had entered his home. The
+grief-stricken Huxley refused the consolations of a faith in which he
+could not whole-heartedly believe. Like Socrates and Montaigne and
+many educated men today, Huxley was candidly agnostic with respect to
+matters which lie beyond the radius of human knowledge.
+
+Huxley was a determinist, but it is doubtful if he was a materialist.
+At least he held to a materialism which in one sense might be
+reconciled with a form of idealism. In the address in honor of Joseph
+Priestley he said,
+
+ “Without containing much that will be new to the readers or Hobbs,
+ Spinoza, Collins, Hume, and Hartley, and indeed, while making no
+ pretensions to originality, Priestley’s ‘Disquisitions relating to
+ Matter and Spirit,’ and his ‘Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity
+ Illustrated,’ are among the most powerful, clear, and unflinching
+ expositions of materialism and necessarianism which exist in the
+ English language, and are still well worth reading.
+
+ “Priestley denied the freedom of the will in the sense of its
+ self-determination; he denied the existence of a soul distinct
+ from the body; and as a natural consequence, he denied the natural
+ immortality of man.
+
+ “In relation to these matters English opinion a century ago was very
+ much what it is now.
+
+ “A man may be a necessarian without incurring graver reproach than
+ that implied in being called a gloomy fanatic, necessarianism,
+ though very shocking, having a note of Calvinistic orthodoxy; but,
+ if a man is a materialist; or, if good authorities say he is and
+ must be so, in spite of his assertion to the contrary; or, if he
+ acknowledge himself unable to see good reasons for believing in the
+ natural immortality of man, respectable folks look upon him as an
+ unsafe neighbour of a cashbox, as an actual or potential sensualist,
+ the more virtuous in outward seeming, the more certainly loaded with
+ secret ‘grave personal sins.’
+
+ “... I must confess that what interests me most about Priestley’s
+ materialism, is the evidence that he saw dimly the seed of
+ destruction which such materialism carries within its own bosom. In
+ the course of his reading for his ‘History of Discoveries relating
+ to Vision, Light, and Colours,’ he had come upon the speculations of
+ Boscovich and Michell, and had been led to admit the sufficiently
+ obvious truth that our knowledge of matter is a knowledge of its
+ properties; and that of its substance--if it have a substance--we
+ know nothing. And this led to the further admission that, so far
+ as we can know, there may be no difference between the substance
+ of matter and the substance of spirit (‘Disquisitions, p. 16’).
+ A step farther would have shown Priestley that his materialism
+ was, essentially, very little different from the Idealism of his
+ contemporary, the Bishop of Cloyne.”
+
+Perhaps William James may have had Huxley or his type in mind when
+he wrote his famous passage about learning “to stand this universe.”
+Yet I suspect that Huxley’s universe was more simple and benevolent,
+more naïvely conceived than was that of James. Huxley was to the end a
+rationalist, and lived and worked in a period when Nature was thought
+to be essentially reasonable. Man need only learn the laws of nature
+and obey them to become wise and happy and good. The aim of education
+was to acquaint the student with the laws of nature.
+
+ “Well, what I mean by Education is learning the rules of this mighty
+ game. In other words, education is the instruction of the intellect
+ in the laws of Nature, under which name I include not merely things
+ and their forces, but men and their ways; and the fashioning of the
+ affections and of the will into an earnest and loving desire to move
+ in harmony with those laws. For me, education means neither more nor
+ less than this....
+
+ “Suppose it were perfectly certain that the life and fortune of every
+ one of us would, one day or other, depend upon his winning or losing
+ a game of chess. Don’t you think that we should all consider it to
+ be a primary duty to learn at least the names and the moves of the
+ pieces; to have a notion of a gambit, and a keen eye for all the
+ means of giving and getting out of check?
+
+ “Yet it is a very plain and elementary truth, that the life, the
+ fortune, and the happiness of every one of us, and, more or less, of
+ those who are connected with us, do depend upon our knowing something
+ of the rules of a game infinitely more difficult and complicated than
+ chess. It is a game which has been played for untold ages, every man
+ and woman of us being one of the two players in a game of his or
+ her own. The chess-board is the world, the pieces are the phenomena
+ of the universe, the rules of the game are what we call the laws
+ of Nature. The player on the other side is hidden from us. We know
+ that his play is always fair, just and patient. But we also know, to
+ our cost, that he never overlooks a mistake, or makes the smallest
+ allowance for ignorance. To the man who plays well, the highest
+ stakes are paid, with that sort of overflowing generosity with which
+ the strong shows delight in strength. And one who plays ill is
+ checkmated--without haste, but without remorse.
+
+ “My metaphor will remind some of you of the famous picture in which
+ Retzsch has depicted Satan playing at chess with man for his soul.
+ Substitute for the mocking friend in that picture a calm, strong
+ angel who is playing for love, as we say, and would rather lose than
+ win--and I should accept it as an image of human life....
+
+ “That man, I think, has had a liberal education who has been so
+ trained in youth that his body is the ready servant of his will, and
+ does with ease and pleasure all the work that, as a mechanism, it
+ is capable of; whose intellect is a clear, cold, logic engine, with
+ all its parts of equal strength, and in smooth working order; ready,
+ like a steam engine, to be turned to any kind of work, and spin the
+ gossamers as well as forge the anchors of the mind; whose mind is
+ stored with a knowledge of the great and fundamental truths of Nature
+ and of the laws of her operations; one who, no stunted ascetic, is
+ full of life and fire, but whose passions are trained to come to
+ heel by a vigorous will, the servant of a tender conscience; who has
+ learned to love all beauty, whether of Nature or of art, to hate all
+ vileness, and to respect others as himself.
+
+ “Such an one and no other, I conceive, has had a liberal education;
+ for he is, as completely as a man can be, in harmony with Nature. He
+ will make the best of her, and she of him. They will get on together
+ rarely; she as his ever beneficent mother; he as her mouthpiece, her
+ conscious self, her minister and interpreter.”
+
+But surely liberal education is more than becoming the mouthpiece
+of a benevolent nature. It seems to me that Huxley omits one of the
+essentials. Just as the nineteenth century Humanists, because of
+their neglect of science, possessed only a distorted and one-sided
+view of Humanist education, so it would seem to me that nineteenth
+century science in its opposition to traditional education, failed to
+see that science is itself a part of Humanism. It is not merely the
+discovery of given “Laws” which exist independently in a benevolent
+and rational universe. It is the observation of certain relationships
+and recurrences and the statement of these things in general terms
+that will give them significance for _human beings_. What nature is
+aside from the fact that we are interested spectators does not concern
+us. Science grows out of the fact that we are more interested in
+some things than in others. It is a human achievement; it is one of
+the answers that mankind gives to the riddle of existence. It is not
+existence which gives that answer, it is man. And education must not
+only seek knowledge of the facts of nature, but having obtained such
+knowledge, _must try to understand what to do about it_. Now that we
+understand our natural environment, what kind of life can we best
+achieve with it? What valuations have men put upon deeds and things?
+What values is it possible to achieve? Our education is not done when
+we have learned Nature’s _yes_ and _no_; we have our own _yes_ and _no_
+to give.
+
+Scientists quietly observing certain aspects of reality--those which
+lend themselves to knowing as a specialized undertaking--are happy
+to find that their abstract conceptions mutually imply and support
+one another in an ordered system of knowledge. Their own reason which
+they are thus able to impose upon nature, they believe they have
+discovered in nature itself. Hence nature appears to be more ordered
+than it really is, and to be essentially reasonable and beneficent.
+Compare Huxley’s picture of nature as a beneficent mother of whom the
+educated mind “makes the best, and she of him,” he “her conscious
+self, her minister and interpreter,” with William James’ statement
+about “this partially hospitable and ‘stepmotherly’ world of ours.”
+The latter is surely the more profound and correct view. Water is not
+only H₂O, it may drown you or quench your thirst. Fire is not merely
+a process of oxidation, it is hot. It may be your willing servant, or
+your relentless enemy. The modification of species which nineteenth
+century scientists held to be the outcome of natural selection is not
+what natural selection means to the organisms which experienced it.
+To them it is a relentless struggle for a precarious and fleeting
+existence in which satisfactions and victories are mingled with terror
+and starvation and agony. And man placed in the midst of such a world
+seeks education not only that he may interpret its happenings to an
+intelligence which is part of the natural process, but that he may
+select wisely among the alternatives which Nature presents to him, lift
+himself above chaos and the slime, and achieve an existence that, at
+least while it lasts, has some significance and quality of decency and
+worth.
+
+It is to this end that science is education; a true Humanism is
+impossible without it. Such a Humanism is as anti-supernaturalistic as
+determinism. But it is naturalism with mankind, however, not merely
+pictured as a passive resultant of natural forces, but actively
+selecting and creating value. As Huxley himself says, its aim is to
+provide criteria for a “criticism of life.”
+
+ “Moreover this scientific ‘criticism of life’ presents itself to
+ us with different credentials from any other. It appeals not to
+ authority, nor to what anybody may have thought or said, but to
+ nature. It admits that all our interpretations of natural fact are
+ more or less imperfect and symbolic, and bids the learner seek for
+ the truth not among words but among things. It warns us that the
+ assertion which outstrips evidence is not only a blunder but a crime.”
+
+He saw a new culture in process of development, one which would enlist
+the whole spiritual life of mankind,
+
+ “The scenes are shifting the great theatre of the world. The act
+ which commenced with the Protestant Reformation is nearly played out,
+ and a wider and deeper change than that effected three centuries
+ ago--a reformation, or rather a revolution of thought, the extremes
+ of which are represented by the intellectual heirs of John of Leyden
+ and of Ignatius Loyola, rather than by those of Luther and of
+ Leo--is waiting to come on, nay, visible behind the scenes to those
+ who have good eyes. Men are beginning, once more, to awake to the
+ fact that matters of belief and of speculation are of absolutely
+ infinite practical importance; and are drawing off from that sunny
+ country ‘where it is always afternoon’--the sleepy hollow of broad
+ indifferentism--to range themselves under their natural banners.
+ Change is in the air. It is whirling feather-heads into all sorts
+ of eccentric orbits, and filling the steadiest with a sense of
+ insecurity. It insists on reopening all questions and asking all
+ institutions, however venerable, by what right they exist, and
+ whether they are, or are not, in harmony with the real or supposed
+ wants of mankind.”
+
+Huxley’s services to education were more than his struggle for the
+recognition of the educational value of science. His own contributions
+to the science of biology and his able championing of the case which
+Darwin had made in favor of the hypotheses of evolution did much to
+place the biological sciences in their present position of preëminence
+and to aid in placing both education and modern thought upon the basis
+of a philosophy of evolution.
+
+After receiving his degree in medicine, Huxley was appointed to the
+position of assistant surgeon in the British navy. As he cruised about
+on the war-ship ‘Rattlesnake,’ he began his studies of marine animals.
+Darwin, you will remember, had also spent long months on southern seas
+as government naturalist assigned to the Beagle. During the years that
+followed each had risen to a high position as a British scientist,
+conducting research, publishing papers, making new discoveries, all of
+which contributed to make the nineteenth century, as John Fiske said,
+“the century of science.”
+
+During the years when Darwin was patiently elaborating the theory of
+“descent with modification” which was destined within his own lifetime
+to bring about a revolutionary transformation in the philosophy of
+nature, Huxley did much to organize the science of Biology as a
+definite branch of natural history. His great energy and industry, his
+passion for exact knowledge and his genius for clear and comprehensive
+statement made him one of the outstanding scientists of England. As
+professor of Natural History at the Royal School of Mines, and later in
+the Royal College of Surgeons, and as publicist and member of numerous
+commissions on science and education, he was in a position to throw
+a tremendous weight of influence to the support of his convictions,
+should he be drawn into a scientific controversy.
+
+When in 1859 Darwin published the “Origin of Species,” Huxley was one
+of the small group of eminent scientists whose favorable judgment
+Darwin felt would be necessary if the theory of natural selection were
+to command the attention of the scientific world. Darwin did not invent
+the doctrine of evolution. This idea had from time to time suggested
+itself to men’s minds whenever a naturalistic account of creation was
+attempted. The increase of knowledge of comparative anatomy, of geology
+and of zoölogy, and the discovery of certain structural likenesses
+and differences among both living organisms and the fossil remains
+which were found in the several layers of the earth’s surface, could
+not fail to suggest to many minds the thought that perhaps all forms
+of life might be related in one comprehensive evolutionary process.
+Although the evidence against the dogma of special creation was rapidly
+accumulating, no valid explanation had been found. Lamarcks’ theory
+that the structural modifications which characterize the various
+species of organisms were the result of effort and use and of special
+energizing and development of various organs, was under discussion.
+The theory did not, however, interest Huxley, because it implied that
+modifications which occurred as a result of effort and use could be
+inherited, a belief for which there was not sufficient evidence.
+
+Darwin’s book put the whole problem in a new light, and stated the
+hypotheses of organic evolution as an alternative to “special creation”
+in terms which were comprehensible to a mind trained in natural
+science. Heretofore a mysterious principle of development had been
+substituted for a miracle of creation. Darwin did not invoke any such
+principle but with good scientific logic sought his explanation of the
+origin of species in the casual connections among observable facts.
+
+It is not my purpose now to enter upon a discussion of Darwinism, or
+its present status in biology, a general understanding of which I think
+should be part of the education of a modern man. I suspect that many
+moderns who “believe in evolution” merely cherish a popular faith in
+some mystical law of unusual progress, such as is expressed in the
+verse, “Some call it evolution and some God.”
+
+Huxley was uncompromisingly opposed to all such romantic theologizing
+in science. He was moreover, aware, as Darwin himself was, of the
+difficulties of Darwin’s theory. But he grasped the significance of
+what Darwin had done and saw the ground upon which he had placed the
+discussion of the problem, and he held that in the main Darwin was
+correct. Gracefully and courageously he took his stand at Darwin’s
+side. In various addresses, essays, books, he drew upon his extensive
+knowledge for evidence in support of the theory. In “Man’s Place in
+Nature” he uncompromisingly placed the origin and development of the
+human race within the process of the evolution of animal organisms. He
+did not remain indifferent to the storm of ecclesiastical indignation
+and popular abuse and ridicule with which a grateful humanity greeted
+the most important scientific discovery of the century. He accepted
+the challenge, and during the decades that followed 1860 he was
+probably the outstanding champion in England, not only of evolution,
+but of science itself. In 1925, upon the centennial of his birth, his
+grandson, Julian Huxley wrote,
+
+ “Of the general truth of the evolutionary hypothesis, its enormous
+ value to biology, and the necessary reorientation which it would give
+ to the general current of thought, he had no doubts; nor did he spare
+ himself in the cause. It is sometimes as well, in these easier-going
+ and theologically more tolerant days, when we are reaping what he
+ and others like him sowed, and may sometimes be tempted to think of
+ his criticism as essentially destructive, to remember what power of
+ inertia, what violence of the odium theologicum there was in the
+ opposition. ‘Professor Huxley’ became a sort of bogy in orthodox
+ lower middle-class families, almost as ‘Boney’ had done for the
+ nation in earlier days. He was attacked as irreligious, immoral,
+ unscrupulous, on the platform, in the press, by letter. That sort of
+ opposition cannot be persuaded; it must die out or be destroyed.”
+
+The scholar confronted by the fury and stupidity of the mob, and
+counted a fool for his pains when he strives to induce it to listen to
+reason, has often turned aside in disgust. Henceforth he will write and
+speak for the learned few. Let the masses, who think that a scientific
+demonstration may be satisfactorily refuted with derision and slander,
+consume themselves in their own ignorance. They have made it clear
+that learning is not for such as they. In the Theatetus Plato tells
+us of the discomfiture of the philosopher in the marketplace. As “the
+rabble” is in all times heedless or hostile to reason, there has often
+developed the idea that any belief that is popular is thereby shown
+to be untrue and vulgar. Cato at once became suspicious of himself
+when any utterance of his met with applause. Among would-be educated
+minds this suspicion becomes a cult. Anything is “refined” and true
+to the extent that it is unpopular--and for the reason that it is not
+shared by the many. Today this attitude--which is really intellectual
+snobbishness--gains plausibility from the fact that much of the
+popularization of science is base caricature and misrepresentation.
+
+It is obvious that the wider the circulation of pseudo-science, the
+greater is the need of genuine instruction in the elements of science
+and of general culture. I can see no other way by which modern learning
+or modern civilization may be sustained. The man on the street has
+power to determine which values shall survive in our common life, and
+which shall perish, to a degree that he never had before. He exercises
+this influence upon our culture in many ways both direct and indirect,
+and his sway is not likely to be diminished in an industrial society
+which increasingly tends to give social power to the various groups
+which compose it in direct proportion to their numerical strength.
+
+Moreover, it is not likely that a strictly esoteric intellectualism can
+survive at all, much less attain that leadership which is the proper
+function of intelligence in human affairs in a world organized as ours
+is. As I have said before, our intellectual hold upon reality, even
+for the best trained minds, is more precarious than we think. A slight
+general shifting of emotional interest or of perspective--the spread,
+let us suppose, of Fundamentalism through lower middle class minds
+generally,--a sudden spasm of popular disillusionment regarding the
+“wonders” of science or of hostility toward scientific methods which
+are ever upsetting the consolations of faith,--might conceivably occur
+at any time, and bring the beginning of the end of all that scholars
+have struggled for since the Renaissance. If as Huxley said, the epoch
+which began with the Reformation is about played out, it is not by
+any means a foregone conclusion what the sequel is to be. If science
+and letters are to join forces in the achievement of a truly Humanist
+culture, this culture must be rooted in the life and thought of the
+community. It will not likely be again a fifteenth century Italian
+mimicry of the age of Cicero; neither can it support itself like a
+bridge over an illiterate and enslaved populace, after the fashion of
+ancient Athenian Humanism. This modern public can read, it is very
+vociferous, it has votes and purchasing power and it pays to flatter
+it. But there is in the modern public a small and growing minority,
+scattered throughout all classes in the community, who honestly desire
+knowledge of science and the humanities.
+
+Professional scholarship has in the example of Huxley a splendid
+precedent for any attempts it may care to make to ally itself with
+this teachable minority. I once invited a neighboring biologist to
+participate with other research scholars, in a course of lectures at
+Cooper Union on scientific methods. He declined, because he believed
+that a scientist who lectured to popular audiences cheapened his
+reputation. I wondered if he had forgotten the great service to science
+rendered by Huxley, who did not think it beneath the dignity of one
+who was perhaps the leading biologist of England to wage the struggle
+for scientific advance in the presence of a public which was much
+less trained in the principles of natural science than the people who
+regularly attend the lectures at Cooper Union.
+
+Huxley seemed to believe that the outcome of the struggle of evolution
+against popular ignorance and superstition was inseparable from the
+fate of science itself. He set himself to make knowledge of the
+principles of science universal. He did a work of adult education
+that has not been surpassed in modern times. If today there is greater
+freedom for scientific research and teaching, and in general a more
+liberal and tolerant attitude on the part of official and popular
+religion toward scientific discovery, our generation is in no small
+measure indebted to Huxley.
+
+In reply to the commonly expressed fear that liberal education may give
+us a type of mind which is sceptical and ineffective, I offer Huxley.
+The educated man may not perhaps take sides on the ever recurrent
+question who is to profit at another’s expense, nor easily give his
+devotion to the particular Utopian scheme of social reorganization
+which happens to be the fashion of the reformers of his day. But if he
+is like Huxley, he will be alert enough when he finds that intellectual
+integrity and cultural progress are at stake. Like Erasmus, Huxley
+survives in the philosophy of modern education as a symbol of
+enlightenment in its struggle against obscurantism. Both insist upon
+the recognition of the value of one aspect of a developing educational
+tradition which has its origin in ancient Greece, and is in sharp
+contrast both with popular opinion and with mediæval scholasticism.
+As I have indicated, it was unfortunate that these two educational
+interests did not develop out of the Renaissance, as one, for a
+well-rounded Humanism is an integration of both. Erasmus champions the
+cause of “human letters” and in the end classical education degenerates
+into a species of Protestant scholasticism. Huxley champions science,
+but is unable to liberate science itself from a mechanistic philosophy
+which became associated with it two centuries earlier. The struggle
+of science with theology was but a continuation of the spirit of the
+Renaissance. The struggle of science against an entrenched classical
+tradition meant that _the Renaissance had become divided against
+itself_. This dualism is reflected in science down to the present time.
+It is revealed in Huxley’s type of agnosticism, which is really naïve
+in comparison with the sophisticated, mellow scepticism of Montaigne or
+Hume, or in our own day with that of Mr. Santayana, who sees that all
+knowledge is faith.
+
+It was not so with Huxley; about the finality of the knowledge that
+can be brought within the scope of scientific method he had no doubt
+whatever. Of other knowledge he is sceptical because of want of
+evidence. This is courageous and honest, and, from the standpoint
+of the struggle in which science was then engaged with theological
+rationalism, the issue cannot be compromised without the surrender of
+science to superstition. Although Huxley is an evolutionist and clearly
+sees that human intelligence is part of the behavior of an organism
+which is itself a cross-section as it were of a process of nature,
+he seems to hold that morality and truth are absolute and eternal
+principles which exist outside the process and constitute the very
+basis of existence. Reason which knows these eternal principles and
+in which they inhere, must then also exist outside the process. But
+we have seen that reason is a function of the behavior of an animal.
+Huxley is thus a Rationalist; as much so as any Scholastic. The body
+of scientific knowledge which we possess is the revelation of the
+true nature of the facts which we experienced. It is the intellectual
+equivalent of reality.
+
+But is scientific knowledge knowledge of facts taken in their
+wholeness, or is it in each instance knowledge of some special _aspect_
+of the facts--fact reduced to abstract quality, to number and point in
+space and to a multiple of smaller and “more real” units all conceived
+in logical relationship rather than as experienced? Suppose we should
+say that scientific ideas do not exist independent of the minds that
+think them, are not equivalents of independent truths which reason
+discovers, but are the devices which an unusually intelligent animal
+constructs out of the many kinds of relationships it is able to notice
+amongst the objects which interest it.
+
+From this point of view, the one most consistent, I believe, with
+a biology and a psychology which must take evolution into account,
+scientific ideas are seen to be humanly created symbols, not cerebral
+photographs of the ultimate nature of things. Why should the ultimate
+nature of a lobster be the fact that a morphologist discovers it to be
+an “articulate,” anymore than that I discover that it turns red when
+put in boiling water? Scientific ideas are instruments. Abstraction and
+classification are in a sense labor-saving devices, according to which
+we may hold that what is true for one object or event is true for all
+of its kind.
+
+But the success of our thinking depends upon which of these many
+aspects and relationships we observe and hence how we classify them.
+All aspects and relationships are equally true, as James said, if true
+at all. Correct thinking is the thinking which seizes upon those which
+are relevant to our interest and purpose. And the interest and purpose
+are human, not inherent in the world of things. Hence the order science
+finds in nature is not _given_; it is the order of human thought
+itself. Thus science also is “human letters.”
+
+The humanist, or organic, view of the world of science differentiates
+the twentieth century philosophy of nature from the mechanistic
+philosophy of earlier science. Mechanism, which is faith that the
+universe is reducible to Reason is, I hold, a survival from the old
+religious dualism, according to which matter and spirit were separate
+entities each belonging to its own world of phenomenon. The existence
+of Reason as an entity in itself could be taken for granted, because
+Reason belonged to the realm of spirit or mind, which though it existed
+outside the material order of being, had yet established this order in
+conformity to Reason.
+
+Huxley’s agnosticism properly denies that man can have knowledge of
+this world of spirit, yet retains from that realm the principle of
+reason which it re-discovers in the world of material phenomena. Hence
+Huxley was more religious than he knew. It is not the agnostic who is
+the non-religious man, but the naïve realist who sees every fact and
+situation uncolored by fancy or theory or illusion. For such a mind,
+spiritual values do not exist. This kind of materialism is a different
+thing from philosophical materialism, which is very theoretical and
+fanciful. There are persons who approach this naïve realism, but I
+doubt if anyone is wholly lacking in poetry and fancy. Certainly Huxley
+was not.
+
+Ordinarily we see our environment in a perspective of wish-fancy and
+traditional myth and magic. To more logical minds the world of objects
+is colored by the “sentiment of Rationality.” The universe appears to
+them to be governed, not by an indulgent or harsh imaginary Father, but
+by a principle of Reason. In each case, the fiction of security gives
+the feeling of salvation. In a wholly rational universe salvation is
+explanation. Everything is reasonable, hence right, if only we could
+explain it and show its place in the whole. Nineteenth century science
+could conceive of the world order as a mechanism and believe that it
+had passed from faith to knowledge in its agnosticism of the things of
+the spirit, but as Whitehead says, “the faith in the possibility of
+science generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific
+theory is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology.”
+
+The conflict in the nineteenth century on behalf of science has
+effected education in various ways. It has not emptied the churches,
+but it has had a marked liberalizing influence, causing various groups
+of believers to seek to modify the public expressions of their faith
+in the light of modern knowledge. It has given the average educated
+person of today a very different conception of his world from that
+commonly held a century ago. It has to some extent revived the Socratic
+insistence upon clear and accurate thinking as the first requirement
+of an educated mind. It has brought a greater degree of objectivity
+and wholesomeness of outlook to bear upon the formation of the mental
+habits of students. It is by its insistence upon the biological point
+of view, causing marked changes in men’s ideas of human nature and
+society, gradually turning their thought away from the political dogma
+of the eighteenth century to a less doctrinaire social philosophy.
+
+On the other side, it may be said to be in part responsible for the
+over-specialization common in our educational institutions. It has
+left on the mind of the public the impression that science is a new
+kind of magic, sometimes actually augmenting the general credulity and
+gullibility. Almost any sort of nonsense may now find space in the
+columns of the Sunday papers and pass current with the assertion that
+it is “scientific.” Minds stuffed with a smattering of science may be
+just as opinionated as minds stuffed with a smattering of theology.
+
+A result which could perhaps not have been foreseen in 1875--and
+which I believe twentieth century science is destined to remedy--grew
+out of the one-sidedness of the Humanism of Huxley and others of his
+day which I have discussed. The scientific interest tended to have
+a mechanizing influence upon all life and culture, to ignore and
+sometimes deny all values which resisted laboratory methods. And having
+reduced all possible phenomena of life to a statement of the movements
+of particles of matter which were said to underlie and cause all else,
+this purposeless correlation of matter, space and movement expressed in
+mathematical formulae was frequently given out as the true picture of
+the nature of all existence--human life included.
+
+Biologists and psychologists often have resorted to rather amusing
+gestures and have deliberately ignored possible lines of inquiry
+in order to imitate as closely as possible the physicists and the
+astronomers. Just as matter was thought to consist of combinations
+of atoms, so living organisms consisted of cells, and complex acts
+of behavior were seen to consist of combinations of simple reflexes.
+The cell and the reflex, being the irreducible minimum of physiology
+and of psychology, were said to be the realities which constituted
+the nature of the organism and its acts. All phenomena of life were
+but combinations of these elemental realities. Find the smallest
+particles in the combination, show how by a mechanical principle
+they are inevitably placed in certain temporal and spacial and
+other quantitative relationships, and behold, science has led you
+to _Reality_. All this seemed to be very certain in the nineteenth
+century; it alone was _knowledge_, all else was mere opinion and error.
+
+Professor Whitehead says, “But the progress of biology and psychology
+has probably been checked by the uncritical assumption of half-truths.
+If science is not to degenerate into a medley of _ad hoc_ hypotheses,
+it must become philosophical and must enter upon a thorough criticism
+of its own foundations....
+
+“There persists, however, throughout the whole period the fixed
+scientific cosmology which presupposes the ultimate fact of an
+irreducible brute matter, or material, spread throughout space in
+a flux of configurations. In itself such a material is senseless,
+valueless, purposeless. It just does what it does do, following a
+fixed routine imposed by external relations which do not spring from
+the nature of its being. It is this assumption that I call ‘scientific
+materialism.’”
+
+“The progress of science has now reached a turning point. The stable
+foundations of physics have broken up: also for the first time
+physiology is asserting itself as an effective body of knowledge, as
+distinct from a scrap-heap. The old foundations of scientific thought
+are becoming unintelligible. Time, space, matter, material, ether,
+electricity, mechanism, organism, configuration, structure, pattern,
+function, all require reinterpretation. What is the sense of talking
+about a mechanical explanation when you do not know what you mean by
+mechanics?”
+
+It is this disposition to find the real nature of the facts in the
+smallest homogeneous particles, in other words, “atomism,” which
+science in the twentieth century modifies. The parts themselves,
+considered without regard to their position in the whole event, are
+nothing. The reality is the organism, the situation as a whole. The
+unity of a tree is very different from that of a machine, and even
+physicists are beginning to suspect that they also deal with the
+former kind of unity. The effect of this change of view upon education
+is difficult to predict. I believe there are indications of a better
+synthesis of science with general culture than that which obtained in
+Huxley’s time. And as science modifies its mechanistic presuppositions,
+there will doubtless be an increase of the importance of philosophy
+in education, less pretense at finality, greater intellectual modesty
+and more general appreciation of human worth than is possible when
+educational philosophy is under the sway of a scientific dogma which
+dehumanizes the individual, reduces him to atoms, and regards him as a
+machine.
+
+The recognition of the probability that much even of our established
+scientific knowledge is a human convention, should have a liberalizing
+effect upon the education of the present generation. Compare the
+assurance of Huxley with the following passages which I quote from the
+writings of Bertrand Russell, the first from his book on “Relativity,”
+and the second from the closing words of “The ABC of Atoms.”
+
+“What we know about the physical world, I repeat, is much more
+abstract than was formerly supposed. Between bodies there are
+occurrences, such as light waves; of the _laws_ of these occurrences,
+we know something--just as much as can be expressed in mathematical
+formulae--but of their _nature_ we know nothing. Of the bodies
+themselves, as we saw in the preceding chapter, we know so little
+that we cannot even be sure that they are anything: they _may_ be
+merely groups of events in other places, those events which we should
+naturally regard as their effects.... Perhaps an illustration may make
+the matter clear. Between a piece of orchestral music as played, and
+the same piece of music as printed in the score, there is a certain
+resemblance, which may be described as a resemblance in structure.
+The resemblance is of such a sort that, when you know the rules,
+you can infer the music from the score or the score from the music.
+But suppose you had been stone deaf from birth, but had lived among
+musical people. You could understand, if you had learned to speak
+and to do lip-reading, that the musical scores represented something
+quite different from themselves in intrinsic quality, though similar
+in structure. The value of music would be completely unimaginable to
+you, but you could infer all its mathematical characteristics, since
+they are the same as those of the score. Now our knowledge of nature is
+something like this. We can read the scores, and infer just so much as
+our stone-deaf person could have inferred about music. But we have not
+the advantages which he derived from association with musical people.
+We cannot know whether the music represented by the scores is beautiful
+or hideous; perhaps, in the last analysis, we cannot be quite sure that
+the scores represent anything but themselves.”
+
+“The theory of relativity has shown that most of traditional dynamics,
+which was supposed to contain scientific laws, really consisted of
+conventions as to measurement, and was strictly analogous to the
+‘great law’ that there are always three feet to a yard. In particular,
+this applies to the conservation of energy. This makes it plausible
+to suppose that every apparent law of nature which strikes us as
+reasonable is not really a law of nature, but a concealed convention,
+plastered on to nature by our love of what we, in our arrogance, choose
+to consider rational. Eddington hints that a real law of nature is
+likely to stand out by the fact that it appears to us irrational,
+since in that case it is less likely that we have invented it to
+satisfy our intellectual taste. And from this point of view he inclines
+to the belief that the quantum-principle is the first real law of
+nature that has been discovered in physics.
+
+“This raises a somewhat important question: Is the world ‘rational,’
+i. e., such as to conform to our intellectual habits? Or is it
+‘irrational,’ i. e., not such as we should have made it if we had been
+in the position of the Creator? I do not propose to suggest an answer
+to this question.”
+
+No, we do not know whether the world is such as we would have made
+it if we had been in the position of the Creator. But it is possible
+for us to gain some intelligent idea of what we can and should make
+of our world so far as lies within our human power and understanding.
+Throughout all historic times men have striven to attain that insight,
+discrimination and foreknowledge which would enable them to become
+“legislators of values”--to give their existence quality and their
+experiences an order of preference that would lend beauty and harmony
+and some permanence to the half-chaotic stream of events and objects
+which swept through their lives. This is the aim of the pursuit of
+knowledge. It is to give to existence an “order of rank.” What if the
+order be a human one? General coöperation in its development is what we
+mean by culture. And education is not mere perpetuation of the order of
+the past. The hierarchy of values must be constantly recreated if it is
+to survive. Knowledge of the past is the inspiration to such creative
+effort and knowledge of nature is a guide to it. A generation ago
+William James, whose philosophy of science was thoroughly Humanistic,
+suggested that the fascination of the pursuit of knowledge was that
+we might thus be in at the places where truth is actually in the
+making, and that we should never know what sort of world this would be
+“till the last man’s vote is in and counted.” What we are to make of
+this unfinished world depends largely upon the power and wisdom and
+appreciation of value which we may attain through our education.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+THE FRUIT OF THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE
+
+
+Finally, with what appraisement may the seeker for knowledge view
+education itself? In the course of our study we have cast aside
+numerous idols and comforting fictions. We have seen that in the
+process of a liberal education old dilemmas are outgrown; that the
+habit is formed of questioning all things; that the educated mind
+becomes capable of amused self-criticism, attains urbanity of spirit
+and tolerant scepticism of the crowd and its partisan controversies,
+and with civilized resignation learns that it may not possess finality
+in matters of truth and right, but that a man must order his life
+according to the wisest discrimination of value of which he is capable.
+
+Now, I believe, the wise man will pursue his education always viewing
+it with a certain light-heartedness and detachment. Wisdom itself will
+not be taken too seriously by one who sees that in the best of it there
+is an entertaining amount of human folly. Like Falstaff’s confession,
+“I am not much better than one of the wicked,” Socrates, the wisest,
+knows he is not much better than one of the foolish. People who
+solemnly try to improve their minds, with groanings of the spirit that
+cannot be uttered, determined to reach some cultural “Pike’s peak or
+bust,” do not often become educated; they become intellectual bores.
+
+Education is a way of living, but it is never a substitute for life.
+Rational living does not mean that interest, feeling, love, respect,
+practical achievement, do not count, or that in the end education
+should make of life a mere _knowledge affair_. One does not pursue
+scholarship merely for the sake of philosophical contemplation, or as
+an intellectual trick. And there is no magic about education, but plain
+common sense. I think we may safely say that a life guided by reason
+and good taste is better than one enslaved to tradition, tabu, narrow
+utilitarianism, conventionalism and passion. But surely education is
+not a hair shirt to be worn in order to discipline the spirit and
+achieve the modern idea of salvation. Neither is it something to be
+attained by practicing before the mirror. It is nothing ostentatious.
+Nor is it to be made a cult of. It does not work miracles, nor can it
+create out of airy nothingness an intelligence that does not exist.
+
+I think much of the criticism of education that one frequently hears
+these days grows out of an exaggerated notion of the transformation
+which some people expect a few years of education to work. I know a
+number of college graduates who are very bitter in their criticism of
+college education, protesting that they did not learn anything that did
+them any good. Perhaps they expected too much for the amount of effort
+put forth and tried to do too great a business on a small intellectual
+capital. Or perhaps such criticism is in part a pose; in certain
+circles it is now “the thing.”
+
+An article which recently appeared in a student’s journal is typical
+of this attitude toward College education. The writer asks, “Are the
+American colleges worth their keep?” They have not, he says, given to
+the nation the trained leadership which we had the right to expect of
+them. Enter any University Club and you will find yourself far removed
+from that intellectual atmosphere which should be characteristic of
+education in a great democracy. Few college men may be found fighting
+on the side of social justice. Few have the courage to deviate in any
+way from the totums and tabus of a plutocratic, materialistic society.
+Few have any very different ideas from those of their chauffeurs of
+what constitutes success in life. Men’s colleges are no different
+from girl’s finishing schools; they are not educational institutions,
+but exist merely to impart information of the ways and manners of
+upper-class society. Instructors are devitalized, for none but a
+devitalized person could endure the system. Trustees have the habit
+of judging colleges by the same standards they apply to business, yet
+judged even by such standards, the author thinks higher education is a
+failure. If Mr. Henry Ford turned out motor cars as bad as the products
+the colleges turn out, he would soon be bankrupt!
+
+In so far as such sweeping indictments are inspired by a feeling of
+antipathy toward the so-called upper classes, it is not necessary for
+us to discuss them. But I think that criticisms of this sort also
+reveal a tendency to expect too much of education. We become more
+charitable when we pause to consider how small a part, even at best,
+intelligence plays in the control of human behavior. We have seen what
+Erasmus thought about this subject. Most of those who call attention to
+the general lack of intelligence, draw a distinction between the amount
+of it in existence and the amount in common use. This is a democratic
+view of the matter. It flatters the average man if you tell him that he
+possesses more intelligence than he is using. A more correct view is
+perhaps that of Freud, who says that most of us in modern civilization
+are living “psychologically beyond our means.”
+
+A good example of this democratic view may be found in a discussion
+of “Intelligence in Our Time,” by a very able professor in one of
+the Eastern colleges. “The general state of intelligence in our time
+is of the strangest. It is richly and splendidly equipped and it is
+tragically unsuccessful,--unsuccessful, that is, in the conduct of
+life, both personal and social.” You may test it, broadly speaking,
+by the troubles of the world. “One of the foremost failures of human
+intelligence is not to remember its own importance.” In other words,
+I suppose we haven’t enough intelligence to use our intelligence. We
+live in “a sea of loose and floating ideas, more of them produced
+daily, and no clearly recognized way of deciding, to the coercion of
+all trained minds, which is right.... When people go wrong in reasoning
+they usually do so in obvious ways, by violating obvious rules.”
+Intelligence has its standards, but does not enforce them; it “lacks
+confidence in itself.... On most important subjects opinions differ. In
+each case something else appears as more important than intelligence,
+something else has the right of way.”
+
+In other words, we know better than to believe and behave as we do
+most of the time. But I doubt if this unfortunate state of man is a
+peculiarity of our times. I suspect that there has long been more
+knowledge than intelligence in the world. The difficulty is that we
+frequently do not know how to use the knowledge we possess, for to
+use knowledge well requires wisdom, and no one can give us wisdom.
+I can see no gain in condemning the human race for not using its
+intelligence. I suspect that the beliefs we entertain and the deeds
+we perform or leave undone are the best measure of the intelligence
+we possess. Let us each own up to a certain native stupidity and
+deceitfulness of heart which no amount of education can wholly cure or
+even successfully disguise. The admission will to some extent save us
+from that childish pride of intellect which is a common affliction of
+those who “go in” for education.
+
+Sometimes pride of intellect disguises itself with a holy tone and
+reverential mien, as if education were a very solemn affair. When I
+was a school boy, there was in our town a woman librarian who presided
+over our little public library with deadly seriousness. She filled the
+place with a crushing and awesome silence, as with reverential whispers
+she quietly moved on tiptoe among the books like one ministering in the
+house of the dead. I have known people to behave in this spirit toward
+literature. I have seen school teachers and professors take such an
+attitude toward education. It characterizes the average baccalaureate
+address and is discernible in much that is said and written about
+education. I know several “prophets” of adult education who succeed in
+giving a similar impression. Their very souls creak under the weight of
+the world-mending “spiritual values” of adult education. If people will
+take their education as hard as the Kantians take morality, they are
+welcome to their “sublimities.” There are minds which seem to have been
+formed only for the service of the sublime and do not work well except
+when closeted in its presence. But I would rather dwell in the tents of
+the wicked than be a door-keeper in such a house of serious thinkers.
+Extravagant claims for education lead to pretense, to painful efforts
+at keeping up appearances, to exposure and ultimate disillusionment.
+
+Several times in history there has occurred a wide-spread reaction
+against education, followed by a long period of decline of interest
+in it. Usually such reactions have taken the form of a revival of
+religion and have followed upon a period of general intellectual
+awakening. The Augustan age is followed by primitive Christianity, the
+Renaissance by the Reformation, the eighteenth century, the age of “the
+Enlightenment,” by those distinctly anti-intellectualist movements, the
+Revival, the Revolution and Romanticism. May not one of the causes of
+such reactions be the fact that people have been led to expect too much
+of the prevailing education? Men for a time believe that education will
+disclose some wonderful secret which is about to transform the world,
+and when they find that the learned doctors do not reveal the secret
+because they have none to reveal, and that the world does not at once
+proceed to transform itself, they turn from learning to religion where
+the secret is kept from the wise and revealed unto babes. No one is
+more concerned than I that the interest in education be as wide-spread
+and as genuine as possible. But I would not force its growth lest we
+get all foliage and no fruit. It is better that in its due season the
+tree be known by the fruit it bears.
+
+Just as some believe that education is a sort of gospel, there are
+others who contend that knowledge makes for unhappiness. One evening
+at an informal dinner in New York a small group of thoughtful people,
+all of middle age, were discussing in a rather desultory manner the
+education of the younger generation. Suddenly the conversation became
+serious. One of the women said, “They are hard, disillusioned young
+realists. What else could we expect? It is the result of the education
+we are giving them. They know too much.” She continued, “I wish, though
+I do not see how it could have been done, that we could have retained
+the simple beliefs of our parents. It was very comforting to believe
+those things. It seems to me that everything I learn robs me of some
+consoling ideal and makes the world appear cruel and terrible.”
+
+To the question, what shall we put in the place of the old faiths which
+education leads us to doubt, there is perhaps no other answer than
+that we shall _exchange an infantile mentality for a mature one_. Most
+people will agree that it is better to grow up, but as to whether we
+are happier without our childish illusions, opinions differ.
+
+Much of the tenderness which people show for small children is a
+mixture of pity and envy. The other day I saw a business man about
+fifty years old gaze long and wistfully at an infant playing with his
+toys. He said as he turned away, “I wish I could remember what it feels
+like to be his age. Can you imagine what this world must look like to
+him?” There is my own small son who is now just learning to stand on
+his feet and speak a word or two. How trusting and sweet he is. He is
+not afraid of any one or any thing. No one would of course wish him to
+live always surrounded only by pretty pictures and parental kindness.
+But it is easy to understand how one in moments of weariness and doubt
+might envy him his brief day of blessed ignorance. Think of it, he does
+not even know that people have to work, and that it is the common lot
+of mankind both to endure and inflict suffering. He does not suspect
+the existence of such things as hospitals, slaughter houses, war,
+slums, jails, policemen or Congress. He does not know that he is not
+immortal, or that he must ever part with those he loves. He must know
+these things since they exist, and must learn about many other facts
+equally hard to endure. And as he grows up I want him to learn to cut
+his way through the fictions with which men strive to disguise the
+significance of many painful realities from which there is no escape.
+
+Such is knowledge, and such is the price we pay for it. One reason
+why mankind persistently resists the introduction of knowledge is the
+disinclination to pay the price. It is not altogether easy, as James
+said, to “stand this universe.” The longing for the irresponsibility
+of childhood is very common among mankind, and it gives rise to many
+comforting fictions which yield reluctantly to knowledge of fact. The
+general attitude toward wisdom has in it always a touch of the dread
+of the unknown. There is a very old legend that our first parents
+were expelled from paradise after eating of the fruit of the tree of
+knowledge.
+
+Even our boasted practical knowledge of nature and of mechanics can
+hardly be said to be an unmixed blessing. We are not quite so utopian
+in our enthusiasm over applied science as we were twenty years ago. I
+once burst into eloquence with an entertaining peroration something
+like the following: “Everywhere as science displaces the hallowed
+survivals of primitive magic and superstition, man emerges from
+darkness with dignity and freedom in his bearing and titanic power in
+his hands. The great friend for whom humanity has waited is the quiet
+man in the laboratory amongst his test tubes and apparatus. What kings
+could not command, nor priests call down from an unanswering heaven, he
+can command and bring into being to enrich the heritage of happiness
+for all. The earth blossoms for science. Where the medicine man in the
+desert once vainly prayed for rain, science digs an irrigation ditch
+and waste lands turn into fields of grain. Since the beginning of time
+men have cringed in the shadow of death as the specter of plague
+walked in their midst heedless of the prayers of faith. Science offers
+no sacrifice to propitiate revengeful gods: it drains the swamps: it
+resorts to such mundane devices as screens, vaccine and the quarantine,
+and for the first time in all history the human race is freed of its
+most terrifying scourge. Science has drawn the nations together as
+its lines of mechanical communication have annihilated the spacial
+distances which have hitherto isolated man from man. It has lightened
+the burden of toil and has multiplied the productive force of labor a
+hundredfold. It has lengthened the span of the average human life by
+nearly a decade.
+
+“And with what a wealth of unforeseen goods it has supplied us, motor
+cars, and aëroplanes, and talking machines, and a countless variety of
+new chemical products. What indeed can we not achieve with its aid; we
+can send our messages around the world, dig the Panama Canal, throw a
+dam across the Mississippi and turn the wheels and light the homes of
+distant cities. We can make the lightning our household servant, we
+can fly through the clouds, we can weigh distant suns, and by throwing
+their light waves through a spectroscope, analyze them chemically and
+tell whether they are composed of gas or solid matter and whether they
+are moving towards us or receding. As science is giving us mastery
+over nature, why should it not likewise give man control over his own
+nature? The existence in a scientific age of poverty and crime and
+injustice and corruption is an anachronism. Human reason has at last
+decided to make itself at home and put the house of life in order, and
+all nature smilingly welcomes it. It is flushed with success and well
+it may be, for in it is the promise of the final triumph of man on the
+earth.”
+
+We are not so sanguine now. We have seen the destructive uses to which
+scientific knowledge may be put in warfare. We are not so hopeful about
+the easy control of human nature by means of it. It cannot be said that
+there has been a general gain in intelligence, corresponding to the
+increase of specialized scientific knowledge. The disturbing thought
+has been expressed that the tremendous power of the engines created
+by applied science for our generation is something like dangerous
+explosives in the hands of young children. We are like passengers on a
+steamship speeding through fog with an empty pilot house.
+
+We move swiftly from one place to another, but it is doubtful if we
+find more happiness or good when we reach our destination, or if we
+behave more wisely than do men who know nothing of the fruits of
+science. Those who are acquainted with China, a country in which a vast
+population has maintained the oldest civilization extant without any
+science at all, say that the cultural level of that nation has not been
+raised by the occasional importation of western methods of sanitation,
+military science, electric lights and chewing gum.
+
+Medical research has saved the lives of countless numbers of children,
+so that infant mortality is negligible now as compared with that of the
+ages that had no science. I am sure no one would wish to give up such
+a splendid application of modern knowledge to human welfare. Yet even
+this has its price. There are biologists who doubt if the amount of
+human suffering has been so greatly reduced as we at first supposed.
+They say that many physically unfit persons are thus preserved, only to
+suffer in later life, and that the survival to maturity, of such poorly
+equipped organisms and their reproduction lowers the quality of the
+racial stock of the nation. This is an extreme position and is perhaps
+a premature conclusion, but it illustrates my point that at best our
+modern knowledge may not be had without paying some price for it.
+
+Theoretical knowledge of nature may be said to be no less costly than
+applied science. In the sixteenth century man could without fear of
+contradiction proclaim the earth to be the center of the Universe and
+his own welfare and salvation the purpose of creation. Every step in
+the progress of science from Newton to Einstein has tended to rebuke
+the egotism of man--unless perchance he could find compensation in
+the fact that he is a creature who has the intellectual courage to
+saw off the bough of sustaining belief that he is sitting on. Early
+astronomy revealed to man that his earth, far from being “the Center”
+was but a perishable and relatively very small kind of moon whirling
+about a slowing cooling sun, by no means the best of a galaxy of bigger
+and brighter suns all moving by necessity through freezing space in
+utter indifference to the inhabitants of this little planet. Chemistry
+showed man that his glowing life was a molecular process. Physics
+taught him that all change and movement were but the redistribution of
+a meaningless and purposeless energy the quantity of which remained
+forever constant. Geology reminded him that he was but a newcomer among
+the forms of life which had lived and left their remains in the crust
+of the earth. Biology revealed to him his kinship with other animals
+and his lowly origin. Psychology sought to find his soul, and gave up
+the search, finding it easier to account for his behavior in terms
+of animal impulse and reflex action. Anthropology discovered for him
+the origin of his cherished beliefs in the customs of primitive man.
+Sociology reduced his individual existence to that of a statistical
+unit in the mass.
+
+It now appears probable that science may abandon in time its
+traditional mechanistic conceptions of the cosmos and of life, but
+there is little likelihood that such a change of outlook will restore
+man to the place in nature which he once thought he occupied. Nor may
+we expect it to envisage for him a world more conducive to his wishes
+than that pictured by the science of the nineteenth century. Indeed,
+it is possible that he may have to learn to live without even those
+fictions of security which were features of the older rationalism of
+science.
+
+Now I have tried to state the situation in its bold harshness, for the
+educated mind today must know all this and must wrestle with it. The
+knowledge cannot of itself lead to happiness, nor do I think that it
+necessarily leads to unhappiness. All depends upon what we are able to
+make of our existence in such a world. Although we possess different
+and more precise instruments of knowledge, I do not think this is the
+first time that thoughtful minds have seen through popular fancy and
+the shows of things. I believe wise men of all times have suspected
+that existence is different from what people naïvely imagine it to be.
+And it is precisely because they wrestled with such suspicions, asked,
+“what then?”, and have sought to give their existence some meaning and
+worth, that their words are precious. Now that education is general,
+and vast numbers seek it, it is well to remind ourselves that no one of
+us can really find wisdom until he has alone struggled for value with
+destiny and naked fact.
+
+The fear that most men cannot do this, and that they will turn aside
+with some substitute for knowledge or with that “little learning
+which is a dangerous thing” has led some writers, wrongly I think, to
+question that any good may come of universal education. This esoteric
+point of view is dramatically stated by Dostoevsky in “The Brothers
+Karamazov,” in the person of the Grand Inquisitor who rebukes the
+Christ on the occasion of his return to Seville to comfort the victims
+of the Inquisition. The Inquisitor tells the Christ that he has
+demanded too much of mankind. What the masses need is not freedom of
+the spirit, but mystery, miracle, and authority; someone to take their
+bread from their hands, bless it and give it back to them; someone who
+will permit them to sin, and take the responsibility on his own soul,
+someone who will _guard the secret_ and deceive mankind every step of
+the way as he leads it down to death. The old Inquisitor says to the
+Christ, “If at the last day you condemn me, I will defy you to your
+face, for I too have eaten bitter roots in the wilderness.”
+
+Nietzsche in his lectures on “The Future of our Educational
+Institutions” at Bâle, takes a similar position. Nietzsche believed
+that to the degree that education is extended it is weakened and
+minimized. The masses think they can reach at a single bound what the
+wise man has had to win for himself only after long and determined
+struggles to live like a philosopher.
+
+ “And do you not fear that solitude will wreak its vengeance upon you?
+ Just try living the life of a hermit of culture. One must be blessed
+ with overflowing wealth in order to live for the good of all on one’s
+ own resources! Extraordinary youngsters! They felt it incumbent upon
+ them to imitate what is precisely most difficult and most high,--what
+ is possible only to the master, when they, above all, should know
+ how difficult and dangerous this is, and how many excellent gifts
+ may be ruined by attempting it!... No one would strive to attain to
+ culture if he knew how incredibly small the number of really cultured
+ people actually is, and can ever be.”
+
+ “... those blatant heralds of educational needs, when examined at
+ close quarters, are suddenly seen to be transformed into zealous,
+ yea, fanatical opponents of true culture, i. e., all those who
+ hold fast to the aristocratic nature of the mind; for, at bottom,
+ they regard as their goal the emancipation of the masses from the
+ mastery of the great few; they seek to overthrow the most sacred
+ hierarchy in the kingdom of the intellect--the servitude of the
+ masses, their submissive obedience, their instinct of loyalty to the
+ rule of genius.... The education of the masses cannot, therefore,
+ be our aim; but rather the education of a few picked men for great
+ and lasting works. We well know that a just posterity judges the
+ collective intellectual state of a time only by those few great and
+ lonely figures of the period.... What is called the ‘education of the
+ masses’ cannot be accomplished except with difficulty; and even if a
+ system of universal compulsory education be applied, they can only be
+ reached outwardly....
+
+ “We know, however, what the aspiration is of those who would disturb
+ the healthy slumber of the people, and continually call out to them:
+ ‘Keep your eyes open! Be sensible! Be wise!’ we know the aim of those
+ who profess to satisfy excessive educational requirements by means of
+ an extraordinary increase in the number of educational institutions
+ and the conceited tribe of teachers originated thereby. These very
+ people, using these very means, are fighting against the natural
+ hierarchy in the realm of the intellect, and destroying the roots of
+ all those noble and sublime plastic forces which have their material
+ origin in the unconsciousness of the people.”
+
+ “This eternal hierarchy, towards which all things naturally tend, is
+ always threatened by that pseudo-culture which now sits on the throne
+ of the present. It endeavors either to bring the leaders down to the
+ level of its own servitude or else to cast them out altogether.”
+
+Whether Nietzsche’s theories of education were derived from his
+political philosophy, or the reverse, I do not know. We are not,
+however, interested in discussing political and sociological theories.
+The point is that Nietzsche held that education is difficult and
+dangerous, and that only the rare, strong, courageous spirits may
+attain it. The many really do not want education at all, he thinks, but
+only that cheaper knowledge which will give them success and enable
+them to take their places in the rank and file; seeking such education
+the herd tramples culture under foot, like cattle in growing corn when
+the fences are down. Difficult and dangerous as knowledge is, it is
+to Nietzsche the most precious possession of man. All his writing on
+this subject is a warning cry that the cultural values of civilization
+are in danger of being lost in an education for democracy. I think he
+had a real issue, although I wish he had possessed more self-control
+in arguing his case; he had always something of the intemperance and
+over-excited gestures of a religious evangelist or soap-box orator.
+
+A much more sane statement of the true aims of education in conflict
+with Philistinism is that of Matthew Arnold. I hesitate to mention
+Arnold because those who are still guilty of the errors he exposed will
+say he was a Victorian, and how could his ideas of education have any
+value for a progressive twentieth century population? I doubt if many
+men of today, advocates of advanced theories of education included, are
+as far removed from the vulgarities and pseudo-culture of the Victorian
+age as Arnold was. Like Nietzsche, he holds that the multitude gives
+evidence that it does not really want education. Unlike Nietzsche, he
+does not think that knowledge is some grim secret which only a few
+heroic supermen may attain. The fruits of knowledge are not merely
+ideas about life and reality which men may or may not believe in, but
+are to be known in the quality of life and thought which characterize
+the educated mind.
+
+Arnold’s phrase “sweetness and light” is a little suggestive of a
+Unitarian sermon, or of some cult of the “higher life.” It is obvious
+that if a man deliberately set out to drill his soul in the ways of
+sweetness and light he might become a very lady-like individual; he
+would not necessarily become an educated person. All such deliberate
+efforts at self-improvement, if they are not characterized by a
+sentimental insincerity which is content with imitation and appearance,
+are at least a little like the effort of Benjamin Franklin to school
+himself in the moral virtues, who, finding the task too great, decided
+that he could best gain proficiency by practicing his desired virtues
+one at a time.
+
+You may rest assured that Arnold had nothing of this sort in mind,
+much as he seems at one time to have admired the wisdom of Franklin.
+He meant that certain mental traits are sufficiently characteristic
+of educated minds generally to be the distinguishing marks which
+differentiate them from the uneducated. To be sure, it is a thankless
+task to call attention to such traits, and no one who does it may
+expect to be very popular, but sometimes, when the culture of a
+nation is in danger, it has to be done. Arnold has in mind characters
+like Socrates, Erasmus, Montaigne--no muddle-headed, opinionated or
+narrow-minded men, but men who had attained clarity of thought and the
+insight which pierces the glamour of things and the follies of men, and
+yet could speak and write without bitterness or rancor or malice.
+
+ “Here culture goes beyond religion, as religion is generally
+ conceived by us.
+
+ “If culture, then, is a study of perfection, and of harmonious
+ perfection, general perfection, and perfection which consists
+ in becoming something rather than in having something, in an
+ inward condition of the mind and spirit, not in an outward set of
+ circumstances,--it is clear that culture, instead of being the
+ frivolous and useless thing which Mr. Bright, and Mr. Frederic
+ Harrison, and many other Liberals are apt to call it, has a very
+ important function to fulfill for mankind. And this function is
+ particularly important in our modern world, of which the whole
+ civilisation is, to a much greater degree than the civilisation
+ of Greece and Rome, mechanical and external, and tends constantly
+ to become more so. But above all in our own country has culture a
+ weighty part to perform, because here that mechanical character,
+ which civilization tends to take everywhere, is shown in the most
+ eminent degree. Indeed nearly all the characters of perfection,
+ as culture teaches us to fix them, meet in this country with some
+ powerful tendency which thwarts them and sets them at defiance.... So
+ culture has a rough task to achieve in this country. Its preachers
+ have, and are likely to long have, a hard time of it, and they will
+ much oftener be regarded, for a great while to come, as elegant or
+ spurious Jeremiahs than as friends and benefactors....
+
+ “Faith in machinery is, I said, our besetting danger; often in
+ machinery most absurdly disproportioned to the end which this
+ machinery, if it is to do any good at all, is to serve; but always in
+ machinery, as if it had a value in and for itself. What is freedom
+ but machinery? what is population but machinery? what is coal but
+ machinery? what are railroads but machinery? what is wealth but
+ machinery? what are, even, religious organisations but machinery? Now
+ almost every voice in England is accustomed to speak of these things
+ as if they were precious ends in themselves, and therefore had some
+ of the characters of perfection indisputably joined to them.... But
+ culture indefatigably tries, not to make what each raw person may
+ like the rule by which he fashions himself; but to draw ever nearer
+ to a sense of what is indeed beautiful, graceful, and becoming, and
+ to get the raw person to like that....
+
+ “The people who believe most that our greatness and welfare are
+ proved by our being very rich, and who most give their lives and
+ thoughts to becoming rich, are just the very people whom we call
+ Philistines. Culture says, ‘Consider these people, then, their way of
+ life, their habits, their manners, the very tones of their voices;
+ look at them attentively; observe the literature they read, the
+ things which give them pleasure, the words which come forth out of
+ their mouths, the thoughts which make the furniture of their minds;
+ would any amount of wealth be worth having with the condition that
+ one was to become just like these people by having it?’”
+
+As Nietzsche sees that education must struggle for its values if it is
+to survive in a democracy, Arnold is equally aware of its conflict with
+middle-class English Puritanism. He will give the Puritan credit for
+his moral earnestness, but--
+
+ “the Puritan’s ideal of perfection remains narrow and inadequate,
+ although for what he did well he has been richly rewarded.
+ Notwithstanding the mighty results of the Pilgrim Fathers’ voyage,
+ they and their standard of perfection are rightly judged when
+ we figure to ourselves Shakespeare or Virgil,--souls in whom
+ sweetness and light, and all that in human nature is most humane,
+ were eminent,--accompanying them on their voyage, and think what
+ intolerable company Shakespeare and Virgil would have found them! In
+ the same way let us judge the religious organizations which we see
+ all around us. Do not let us deny the good and the happiness which
+ they have accomplished; but do not let us fail to see clearly that
+ their idea of human perfection is narrow and inadequate, and that
+ the Dissidence of Dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant
+ religion will never bring humanity to its true goal.”
+
+Of the relation of education to the growing power of nineteenth century
+democracy, Arnold says,
+
+ “Other well-meaning friends of this new power are for leading it,
+ not in the old ruts of middle-class Philistinism, but in ways which
+ are naturally alluring to the feet of democracy, though in this
+ country they are novel and untried ways. I may call them the ways of
+ Jacobinism. Violent indignation with the past, abstract systems of
+ renovation applied wholesale, a new doctrine drawn up in black and
+ white for elaborating down to the very smallest details a rational
+ society for the future.... Culture is the eternal opponent of the two
+ things which are the signal marks of Jacobinism,--its fierceness,
+ and its addiction to an abstract system. Culture is always assigning
+ to system-makers and systems a smaller share in the bent of human
+ destiny than their friends like.”
+
+The following is as truly the problem of education today as it was on
+the day it was written, and the answer that our generation gives to the
+problem will determine the whole quality of the fruit of knowledge for
+our lives.
+
+ “... Plenty of people will try to give the masses, as they call them,
+ an intellectual food prepared and adapted in the way they think
+ proper for the actual condition of the masses. The ordinary popular
+ literature is an example of this way of working on the masses.
+ Plenty of people will try to indoctrinate the masses with the set of
+ ideas and judgments constituting the creed of their own profession
+ or party. Our religious and political organisations give an example
+ of this way of working on the masses. I condemn neither way; but
+ culture works differently. It does not try to teach down to the level
+ of inferior classes; it does not try to win them for this or that
+ sect of its own, with ready-made judgments and watchwords. It seeks
+ to do away with classes; to make the best that has been thought and
+ known in the world current everywhere; to make all men live in an
+ atmosphere of sweetness and light, where they may use ideas, as it
+ uses them itself, freely,--nourished, and not bound by them.
+
+ “The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for
+ diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society
+ to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time; who
+ have laboured to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth,
+ difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive; to humanise it, to
+ make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned,
+ yet still remaining the _best_ knowledge and thought of the time,
+ and a true source, therefore, of sweetness and light. Such a man was
+ Abelard in the Middle Ages, in spite of all his imperfections; and
+ thence the boundless emotion and enthusiasm which Abelard excited.
+ Such were Lessing and Herder in Germany, at the end of the last
+ century; and their services to Germany were in this way inestimably
+ precious.... And why? Because they _humanized_ knowledge; because
+ they broadened the basis of life and intelligence.”
+
+The human race has demonstrated how it can get along without knowledge;
+it has not on any general scale demonstrated how it can get along with
+knowledge. Ignorance and vulgarity have amazing survival value in human
+society. Knowledge has its dangers. One may lose one’s faith in the
+pursuit of it or expend much effort, and never attain it; and, what is
+worse, never know that one has not attained it. Or having gained some
+bit of knowledge, one may not store it up as final truth and abide with
+it, but having seen must pass on to other knowledge. The pursuit of
+knowledge is an open road.
+
+All, or nearly all, who have pursued knowledge will say that such a
+pursuit is a great adventure. It is an adventure which never goes
+stale, nor loses its lure, nor grows old, and there are indirect
+results of such an adventure which cannot be measured. Just as he who
+has traveled in many lands returns and views his home with new eyes
+never really having seen it before, so he who follows knowledge in time
+sees the things about him in new light. They have a richer meaning and
+better perspective for they have a wider reference.
+
+What might happen if a considerable portion of the population should,
+or could, become devoted to education in the way that men have engaged
+themselves in religion, war, and commerce, we perhaps can never know.
+Men have been converted to religion and have “back-slid” or have
+outgrown their faith. Men have gaily marched off to war and before
+the conflict ended have grown sick of it. Men have given up commerce,
+finding that it does not satisfy some deep longing in their natures.
+Most of those who begin their education leave off before they learn
+what it is about. But the few who have remained to taste the fruit of
+knowledge as a rule become addicted to it, and never leave off, being
+never satisfied with what they have yet attained. If for eating this
+fruit they find themselves outside the paradise of childish innocence
+and popular belief, they do by their bearing give us the impression
+that the experience is worth its cost. It is only the half-educated,
+those who would follow wisdom and at the same time look back over their
+shoulders casting longing glances at comforting ignorance, unable to
+say farewell, who dwell upon the painfulness of knowledge. I have the
+suspicion that those who wear a long face as if they knew some dreadful
+secret that would break the heart of the world if the rest of mankind
+knew it, are men who find in the Byronic attitude a convenient way of
+convincing themselves that they are intellectual heroes. Or they are
+romanticists who enjoy the sorrows of Werther.
+
+For the encouragement of those who might wish to continue their
+education or assist in the education of another, I have tried to
+present certain historical examples of men who have attained wisdom.
+They are brave men and true; they do not make us ashamed of our race.
+It is a pleasure to try to understand such minds, and I trust that in
+these times when every fence is down and there are in the field of
+education many strange animals and much shouting and confusion, we
+may have been able to gain something, from turning our attention to
+Socrates and Plato and Aristotle and Erasmus and Montaigne and Huxley
+and Nietzsche and Arnold, that will help us to see the meaning of
+education. But we can never be sure whether we like its fruits until we
+taste them.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV--POSTSCRIPT
+
+ADULT EDUCATION IN AMERICA
+
+
+When the European universities were established in the late
+Middle Ages, they were not, like our modern American colleges,
+super-high-schools. It was not their primary purpose to give to
+undergraduates and aspiring professional students a maximum fund
+of information during a brief period of residence. There were many
+thousands of such students, but the college or university was in a real
+sense an institution for adult education. It was a place of residence
+for mature scholars, a center where such men could pursue their
+studies and live the life of education, just as in the monasteries men
+could live the “religious” life. The teaching which went on in these
+universities was in a sense a secondary activity.
+
+Among the many changes which have occurred in life and education
+since the thirteenth century, that represented by Goethe’s “Faust”
+has special interest for us. The modern man attempts to live the life
+of the spirit outside the cloister. In this respect we are, as I have
+said, more like the ancient Athenians who formed themselves into little
+groups and attached themselves as disciples to their teacher for an
+indefinite period of time. We may easily imagine the students and
+friends of Socrates continuing with him for years their philosophical
+inquiries, while at the same time engaged in the conduct of their
+duties as citizens and householders. Both Plato and Aristotle, as we
+have seen, thought of education in this way. It was an interest which
+as a matter of course extended into adult life. This continued emphasis
+upon the education of the mature mind is important, for it is in
+contrast with much modern thought on the subject. Modern educators are
+chiefly interested in the problems of teaching children.
+
+But there is a still more significant fact about such adult education
+as we may have today which necessarily differentiates it from both the
+thirteenth century and the ancients. The average mature individual,
+is not like the ancient Greek student, a member of the leisure class,
+nor may he like the mediæval scholar retreat to a cloister. He must
+earn his living and seek education during his leisure time. To be
+sure, the formal and professional education of our time has still the
+advantages of a certain privilege and seclusion. Adult education must
+necessarily proceed without these valuable aids to learning. In earlier
+ages it was generally believed that education could not be achieved
+without these advantages. Modern men insist that the spiritual values
+of life be realized not in contemplative aloofness but in the life of
+activity. They also demand a satisfactory existence for as many people
+as possible; hence all are to have opportunity to share in the cultural
+goods of civilization. Education is made universal and, below a certain
+age, compulsory. But it is obvious that unless education is to remain
+the privilege of a few professionally trained scholars, large numbers
+of people must be given the facilities for continued study after school
+or college days are passed.
+
+In other words, the aim of adult education is the cultivated amateur.
+I have tried to show that this is precisely the aim of all liberal
+education. Learning which is discontinued when one leaves school has
+been for the most part wasted effort. Education is not culture unless
+outside college halls it is a permanent and wide-spread interest
+which makes a difference in the tastes and habits of thought of the
+community. We have seen that Huxley deplored the fact that much of the
+intellectual leadership of Victorian England was found outside the
+university faculties. While this may have been a just criticism of
+the universities, it was a sign of intellectual vigor in the nation.
+Education may be said to be achieving its purposes in a nation to the
+extent that quiet reflection supplants superficial cleverness, and that
+minds with patience and grace and breadth of outlook, with indifference
+to fads and catchwords and with respect for excellence, supplant the
+“go-getter,” the “movie-fan,” the worshipper of Mammon, the sensation
+monger and the narrow sectarian.
+
+The extent to which our education is a reality in the life of this
+Republic is almost daily brought to our attention. A very small
+percentage of the population spends four years at college, during which
+time most of it retains very much the same general habit patterns
+and beliefs and outlook on life that it had when it entered. After
+graduation, students bring home little cultural interest or added civic
+virtue. They for the most part vote the regular party ticket, support a
+church in which they happen to have been brought up, play golf, dance
+to jazz music, talk prohibition and drink synthetic gin, repeat the
+shibboleths of the group in which they grew to maturity, and make money.
+
+A small minority of students attend post-graduate schools, become
+research scholars, and within the radius of their special branch of
+study often reach high proficiency and unequalled scholarship. In the
+universities of New York City are gathered many of the most eminent
+scholars in America. But it must be said that very little educational
+influence passes over the chasm which separates our professionalized
+education from the man in the street. Today a mob is moved to tears of
+a patriotic fervor and to murderous indignation at the sight of a woman
+removing from the front of her property some faded red, white and blue
+bunting which had been hung up by a tenant for the occasion of a street
+festival some days previous; tomorrow an empty-pated multitude tries to
+break into an undertaker’s establishment and tramples hysterical women
+under foot in the effort to view the body of a deceased motion picture
+actor; and anon half the city runs oggling and open-mouthed after a
+young woman who can swim across the English Channel.
+
+Without background or tradition other than folkway and a perishing
+ancient dogma, and with quantity production methods devised to pamper
+to its fancy, this multitude tends to cheapen the quality of everything
+it comes near, while it parades its material prosperity before the
+world as evidence of superior American virtue. Education has not
+yet taken root in our soil. It is a potted plant, like those little
+evergreen trees which may be seen growing in painted tubs on the stoops
+of New York houses. Such ancestral systems for valuing experience and
+controlling behavior as people brought to this country were mostly
+cast aside in the process of Americanization; the swift tempo of
+industrialism supplanted the slow process of spiritual maturing, and a
+newspaper-fashioned public opinion became the dominant cultural force
+for the country at large.
+
+We do not know at present whether the alleged general interest in
+adult education is evidence of a spontaneous and growing desire for
+knowledge, or is something promoted, worked up by interests which
+would “educate the masses” in order to attain certain economic ends,
+individual or social. Nearly three million persons are said to be
+annually enrolled for various courses of study outside the resident
+classes of established institutions of learning. Undoubtedly a great
+variety of motives prompts these hundreds of thousands of people
+to take up the task of study. But wide-spread as this interest is,
+popularization of knowledge is not the same as the humanization of
+knowledge. We have seen how the values of religion may decline into
+empty caricatures of the spiritual life amongst certain popular sects.
+
+Those engaged in the work of adult education, often fear that the
+movement may become standardized after the fashion of the public school
+system. Is it possible to keep up the standards without resorting to
+the mechanical uniformity we commonly call standardization? I think
+this is possible only if we are guided by a philosophy of liberal
+education. Lose sight of such a philosophy and adult education
+becomes a confusion of tongues. In such confusion there is of course
+freedom from uniformity, yet there may be much standardization; each
+educational cult may easily degenerate into a doctrinaire, misguided
+sect. If I am correct in holding that the aim of liberal education
+is to produce the cultivated amateur, who possesses in general the
+mental traits which in the preceding chapters of this book we have
+seen to characterize the liberally educated mind, we have in the
+pursuit of such a goal the very thing that will save adult education
+from degenerating, like Protestantism, into a conflict of narrow
+orthodoxies. Without such a goal, any passing fancy or popular
+prejudice, however ungrounded in philosophy, may come to serve as a
+dominant ideal of education. Adult education then becomes the means to
+every sort of propaganda and personal ambition.
+
+One educator of adults conducts short-time “institutes” for farmers
+in which during a period of two or three weeks instruction is given
+in such subjects as the fertilization of the soil, rotation of crops,
+marketing, and the elements of bookkeeping. Others offer instruction to
+industrial workers which will improve their efficiency and deepen their
+loyalty to the company. Others teach various trades and professions.
+Much of the Americanization propaganda which gave employment to
+uplifters during the years following the war is now called adult
+education. There is a group of very serious idealists who believe that
+by means of adult education they may initiate working people into the
+“proletarian culture of the future,” and arm the working class with
+the necessary weapons for a social revolution. Others would conduct
+schools in which young people may be trained to become professional
+labor leaders. To still others the task of adult education is very
+clear and simple: it is nothing else than the transformation of our
+entire civilization by the method of leading people back to nature
+and enabling them to express their emotions, to which end classes in
+appreciation and self-expression are organized, and students are sent
+out after two or three months of such training prepared to teach the
+emotional awakening to others.
+
+Adult education thus becomes a matter of slogans. Each educator is sure
+he has it and can give the formula. It is that “every man be given
+opportunity to think for himself,” or it is to give people “a new and
+modern world view,” or to help people “get out of the ruts in which
+they find themselves,” or to enable one to “evaluate his experience,”
+or it is “an adventure in independence.”
+
+Many of these things may be very desirable, but are they education?
+Taken together, they reveal something of the confusion which always
+results when men try to find their standards of value in the passing
+interests of the hour. Adult education is a democratic movement and
+hence tends to make the desires and ideals of the uneducated rather
+than those of the educated its standards and aims. The idea sometimes
+prevails in education, just as it has prevailed in religion and in
+politics, that if only the masses may emancipate themselves from the
+past and start all over again, setting up their own values, there will
+necessarily be great improvement. Hence Labor, for instance, is to have
+“its own education,” whatever that is. To be sure, every person, be he
+a laborer or anyone else, must in the end educate himself, and perhaps
+the masses in insisting upon their own values and ideals can make
+no worse business of their education than when they are “given” the
+education which someone equally uneducated and materialistic thinks is
+good for them.
+
+It is obvious that the _methods_ of adult education must be different
+from those in common use in teaching children. The instructor cannot
+compel attendance; he cannot require submission to his authority; he
+must realize that he is among people who, though they have not his
+special knowledge, have yet each his own experience, and he must see
+the relations of his knowledge to such experience; and in fact he must
+make himself a student with the others. Now because the methods differ
+from those of formal education, people frequently infer that the _aim_
+also is different. There are many things which would seem to lead to
+such an inference.
+
+In the first place, in all education, attention is focused almost
+exclusively upon methods of teaching rather than upon the question,
+“what is an educated person?” Again many of those who are interested in
+adult education both as instructors or as students have grown up in an
+environment of traditional education, they have seen the futility and
+meaninglessness of much that passes for education in the schools and
+colleges, and are often moved to protest against the system and all its
+works. I have tried to show that the failure of formal education is the
+result of the fact that educators frequently do not know what liberal
+education is. But many people who are irritated with the school system
+seem never to have raised the question whether what is taught in school
+is liberal education. They assume that it is what it appears to be, and
+hence, instead of seeking the meaning of liberal education, they turn
+away and strive to set up a hastily considered educational aim of their
+own.
+
+Finally, adult students are sometimes very opinionated--especially
+when they first come to class. Often they have violent prejudices and
+are extremely “advanced.” Such minds are very much creatures of the
+popular movement of the hour. The educator, if he is to keep his hold
+upon these persons, must gain their favor and sustain their interest.
+The easiest way to gain and keep a following is to make concession to
+popular prejudice. Classes in adult education, like the reading public,
+wish to be told what they would like to regard as true. One of the
+great “truths” for which they often seek support is the belief that
+the increasing or anticipated supremacy of the mass is “progress.”
+Men wish adult education to be modern, to reflect current thought and
+present-day tendencies. In an earlier chapter I tried to show how
+much of the popular thought that men believe very advanced is really
+unrecognized Rousseauism. Often the idea of a new start in education
+is only a survival of Rousseau’s revolt against civilization. Since
+the influence of Rousseau serves always to rationalize any plebeian
+wish-fancy whatsoever, it is not surprising that it should sometimes
+appear to set the goal of adult education. To the degree that the
+desire for education is genuine and spontaneous, the demand will
+naturally be for what people think, is education.
+
+But in spite of all the chaos and confusion as to aims, adult
+education, when the initiative comes from people who are hungry for
+knowledge, even though they do not know what education is, shows more
+promise than when the initiative comes from the professional school
+teacher. In the former case, there is some likelihood that someone will
+stumble upon the meaning of a liberal education. As a form of protest
+against the established educational system, I think adult education
+is a wholesome movement. The school authorities frequently show an
+interest in this new thirst for knowledge which is met with suspicion.
+I do not wonder. They have not shown themselves so uniformly successful
+in the training of youth that they are justified in seeking to extend
+their machinery over adult efforts for knowledge. Much that school
+superintendents regard as adult education is really only elementary
+education, primary instruction offered to adults. _The surest way to
+defeat learning is to place it in charge of those whose own education
+has stopped._ Their influence is everywhere to divert this mature
+interest in learning to the only ends such professional educators know;
+service to the state, conformity and routine, material advancement and
+industrial efficiency, the uplift of the masses.
+
+In the words of a great educator of the nineteenth century, we should
+“inquire whether it is the masses alone who need a reformed and
+improved education.” Adult education is not something to be “given”
+to the masses, while college education may be kept for the sons of
+privilege. There is no such thing as “mass education.” Throughout
+the mass of mankind, college graduates included, there are scattered
+here and there persons who can learn something and have the desire
+to continue learning. It is as important for us to consider for whom
+adult educational opportunities should exist as it is to consider what
+education is. Such opportunities are for people who are worth educating.
+
+Adult education is selective. Its aim is not to provide a slight
+increase of information and a few noble sentiments for the rank and
+file, but to select out of the undifferentiated mass those who are
+naturally capable of becoming something more than automatons. These
+need no credits or examinations or promise of diplomas to spur them
+to intellectual effort. They would gain wisdom if there were no
+educational institutions, or classes, or lectures. But they need advice
+and the fellowship of other studious minds, for they are often lonely.
+Very few even professional students can easily carry on their studies
+when isolated from their kind. Hence the existence of universities.
+The rush and racket of our industrial civilization are so great that
+there is need to establish for those whose minds can rise above it, an
+environment where thought is leisurely and where people may be found
+who have had learning long enough to be at home with it. The isolated
+student, like the person learning to swim, makes much needless effort.
+He tries to stuff his head with learning. He needs time to meditate
+upon what he learns, talk about it, assimilate it, see its relations to
+his knowledge and experience as a whole. I believe this to be the value
+of group discussion, where there is a real meeting of minds. I do
+not, however, as some seem to do, believe that a company of uninformed
+people talking nonsense are necessarily engaged in a work of mutual
+education. It is not as groups that men may attain wisdom. With all
+the aid possible from others, education is necessarily an individual
+achievement.
+
+We need adult education not because it is a path to some Utopia,
+or imaginary triumph of the masses, or because it will add to the
+contentment of the poor, or improve their morals and their industrial
+efficiency, or raise the tone of politics. We need adult education for
+the same reason that we need any education at all. From the beginning
+of time men of a certain type have sought such knowledge of the riddle
+of existence as would make some measure of excellence possible to
+man. The result of all their striving is a vast body of knowledge
+which is the heritage of the men and women of our time. To share in
+the possession of this knowledge and to work for its improvement and
+increase is to men and women of a certain type simply to attain to
+their true human estate. They desire education because that is the kind
+of animal they happen to be. Such persons are different from the common
+lot. It is not that they may possess some secret information which the
+others may not have. They have a different _goal_.
+
+Such decency and tolerance and good sense and genuine idealism as exist
+in the midst of general human folly are largely the indirect results of
+the efforts of these men and women for knowledge and wisdom. Society as
+a whole is the gainer for their education. To the end that such minds
+may find themselves, together with the work and the adventure which
+are their destiny, the widest possible efforts at general education
+should be made. It is because of what people are in themselves and may
+become, not because of something they may get, that liberal education
+is the duty of man. What Huxley said of England in 1868 is true for
+America today:
+
+ “a few voices are lifted up in favour of the doctrine that the masses
+ should be educated because they are men and women with unlimited
+ capacities of being, doing, and suffering, and that it is as true
+ now, as it ever was, that the people perish for lack of knowledge.”
+
+
+THE END
+
+
+
+
+_Announcing_
+
+THE NEW SCIENCE SERIES
+
+
+One of the most significant developments in our life today is that as
+scientific knowledge almost daily advances, educated people are left
+more and more in ignorance of its achievements. Scientists for the most
+part write for each other and the general reader is forced to resort to
+popularizers of science for his information. It is apparently forgotten
+that many of the greatest scientists from Galileo and Copernicus to
+Darwin and Huxley wrote largely for the public they wished to reach
+with their ideas.
+
+The publishers have this tradition in mind in offering THE NEW SCIENCE
+SERIES which will present the latest scientific trends and discoveries
+from all parts of the world in a series of books written by leading
+scientists or those in close touch with their work. It is the aim of
+this series to help modern men and women to know more about themselves
+and their world, and to feel that they understand something of what it
+is all about.
+
+
+EDITED BY C. K. OGDEN
+
+ VOL. I. MYTH IN PRIMITIVE PSYCHOLOGY BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, Ph.D.,
+ D.Sc.
+
+ VOL. II. SCIENCE AND POETRY I. A. RICHARDS, M.A.
+
+ VOL. III. FATALISM OR FREEDOM C. JUDSON HERRICK, Sc.D., Ph.D.
+
+
+_Other Volumes in Preparation_
+
+EACH VOLUME $1.00
+
+
+ _For descriptive catalogue, ask your bookseller or write
+ W · W · NORTON & COMPANY_
+ 70 Fifth Avenue New York
+
+ * * * * *
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber’s note
+
+
+
+
+Minor punctuation errors have been changed without notice. Spelling
+was standardized except for quotes. Hyphenation was standardized where
+appropriate.
+
+The following changes were made:
+
+ Page 37: “Pavlow. A hungry dog” “Pavlov. A hungry dog”
+ Page 54: “information that anyone” “information than anyone”
+ Page 76: “in the early nineteeth” “in the early nineteenth”
+ Page 88: “Nietsche said that” “Nietzsche said that”
+ Page 123: “it not the social problem” “is not the social problem”
+ Page 130: “Max Sterner’s “Ego”” “Max Stirner’s “Ego””
+ Page 137: “it hestitated to carry” “it hesitated to carry”
+ Page 141: “organized soicalist locals” “organized socialist locals”
+ Page 142: “sort of convenant among” “sort of covenant among”
+ Page 176: “its value it not” “its value is not”
+ Page 176: “a philosophy it true” “a philosophy is true”
+ Page 198: “creation of Plato’s genuis” “creation of Plato’s genius”
+ Page 199: “to aquiescence to authority” “to acquiescence to authority”
+ Page 224: “Michaelangelo and Raphael” “Michelangelo and Raphael”
+ Page 224: “Melanchthon and Œcolampadus” “Melanchthon and Œcolampadius”
+ Page 239: “matched by his magnaminity” “matched by his magnanimity”
+ Page 253: “fire of Promethus” “fire of Prometheus”
+ Page 256: “believe there an be” “believe there can be”
+ Page 304: “system-makers and sytems” “system-makers and systems”
+ Page 304: “destiny then their friends” “destiny than their friends”
+ Page 306: “a covenient way” “a convenient way”
+
+
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75711 ***