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+
+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75912 ***
+
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber’s Notes: Italics are enclosed in _underscores_.
+
+References to same-page footnotes are alphameric, e.g., [1-A].
+The number is the Chapter number; the letter is the sequence
+within the chapter.
+
+References to endnotes (near the end of the book) are numeric,
+e.g., [1-1]. The first number is the Chapter number; the second
+number is the sequence within the chapter.
+
+Additional notes will be found near the end of this ebook.
+
+
+
+
+                        U.S. MARINES IN VIETNAM
+                  THE ADVISORY & COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA
+                               1954–1964
+
+
+                                  _by_
+                    Captain Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR
+
+
+[Illustration: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS]
+
+
+                      HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
+                    HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
+                            WASHINGTON, D.C.
+                                  1977
+
+
+
+
+                 Library of Congress Card No. 76-600051
+
+PCN 190 003064 00
+
+             For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
+                    U.S. Government Printing Office
+                   Washington, D.C. 20402 (Buckram)
+
+                     Stock Number 008-055-00094-7
+
+
+
+
+Foreword
+
+
+This is the first of a series of nine chronological histories being
+prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the
+entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam conflict. This
+particular volume covers a relatively obscure chapter in U.S. Marine
+Corps history--the activities of Marines in Vietnam between 1954 and
+1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities from a
+one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina
+War in 1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some
+700 Marines at the end of 1964. As the introductory volume for the
+series this account has an important secondary objective: to establish
+a geographical, political, and military foundation upon which the
+subsequent histories can be developed.
+
+The author is a Marine Reservist who was a member of the History and
+Museums Division from September 1972 until August 1974. Promoted to
+major soon after his return to inactive duty, he is now working for the
+Kentucky State Government. A native of Kentucky, he holds a Bachelor
+of Arts degree from Morehead State College (1965) and a Master of Arts
+degree in American History from the University of Kentucky (1972).
+Commissioned in 1965, Major Whitlow served as an infantry platoon
+commander with the 6th Marines, an aerial observer with the 1st Marine
+Division in Vietnam, and later as a platoon commander at Officer
+Candidate School, Quantico. For services in the Republic of Vietnam
+during 1967 and 1968 he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and
+26 awards of the Air Medal.
+
+[Illustration: (Signature of) _E. H. Simmons_]
+
+                                       E. H. SIMMONS
+                        Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
+                        Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
+
+  Reviewed and Approved:
+  15 September 1976
+
+
+
+
+Preface
+
+
+_U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1964_ is a narrative account of the
+initial decade of Marine Corps operations in South Vietnam. The
+monograph had two immediate forerunners, both classified studies
+prepared in the middle 1960s by the former Historical Branch, G-3
+Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Authored by Major James M.
+Yingling, Captain Harvey D. Bradshaw, and Mr. Benis M. Frank, the
+first of these was entitled “United States Marine Corps Activities in
+Vietnam, 1954–1963.” The second, entitled “United States Marine Corps
+Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, 1964,” was authored by Major
+Harvey D. Bradshaw. Although unpublished, these studies served as
+important sources for the material contained in this text. Otherwise,
+this history has been derived from official Marine Corps records,
+the Oral History Collection of the History and Museums Division, the
+comment files of the division, and appropriate historical works. Of
+particular value in its compilation have been the command diaries of
+the various Marine organizations involved.
+
+Unfortunately, few official documents relative to either the early
+Marine advisory program or to the early operations of the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps still exist. Therefore, that portion of the text which
+deals with those areas has been reconstructed from interviews with
+various former Marine advisors. Even their generous assistance,
+however, has not completely overcome the dearth of documentary sources.
+Any reader possessing a knowledge of this period and subject is invited
+to submit pertinent comments to the History and Museums Division.
+
+This monograph has not been the product of a single individual’s labor.
+A comment draft of the manuscript was reviewed by over 40 persons,
+most of whom were directly associated with the described events. (A
+list of these contributors appears as Appendix E.) Their remarks have
+been of immense value in reconstructing with accuracy the origin,
+nature, and scope of the various Marine operations. The manuscript
+was prepared under the editorial direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr.,
+Chief Historian of the History and Museums Division. Final editing and
+the preparation of the index was done by Mr. Charles R. Smith of the
+Historical Branch. Miss Kay P. Sue, editorial clerk and manuscript
+typist for the division, performed valuable services in typing and
+proof reading both the comment and final drafts. Staff Sergeant Paul
+A. Lloyd and Sergeant Eric A. Clark, also members of the History and
+Museums Division, were responsible for preparing all maps and charts.
+Unless otherwise credited, photographs are from official Marine Corps
+files.
+
+[Illustration: (Signature of) _Robert Whitlow_]
+
+                                          ROBERT H. WHITLOW
+                                  Captain, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
+
+
+
+
+Table of Contents
+
+
+                                                                  _Page_
+
+  Foreword                                                           iii
+  Preface                                                              v
+  Table of Contents                                                  vii
+
+
+  PART I THE WATERSHED                                                 1
+
+  Chapter 1 Background to Military Assistance                          3
+      The Geographic Setting                                           3
+      The People                                                       6
+      Vietnam’s Recent History                                         9
+      Post-Geneva South Vietnam                                       12
+      The American Response                                           14
+
+  Chapter 2 The Formative Years                                       15
+      Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam                     15
+      Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance                               16
+      Political Stabilization and Its Effects                         18
+      Reorganization and Progress                                     20
+      Summing Up Developments                                         25
+
+  Chapter 3 Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency           26
+      Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency                          26
+      Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps                      31
+      Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands                    39
+      American Decisions at the Close of 1961                         42
+
+  Chapter 4 An Expanding War, 1962                                    44
+      The War’s New Context                                           44
+      Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division                   46
+      The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962                               49
+      Some Conclusions                                                53
+
+
+  PART II MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR                                55
+
+  Chapter 5 SHUFLY at Soc Trang                                       57
+      The Decision                                                    57
+      Deployment to Soc Trang                                         59
+      Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations                          65
+      Preparations and Redeployment                                   73
+      Accomplishments                                                 74
+
+  Chapter 6 SHUFLY Moves North                                        75
+      Arrival at Da Nang                                              75
+      I Corps Tactical Zone                                           76
+      Military Situation, September 1962                              79
+      Initial Helicopter Operations                                   80
+      Marine People-to-People Program                                 85
+      SHUFLY Operations in I Corps                                    85
+
+  Chapter 7 The Laotian Crisis, 1962                                  86
+      Genesis of the Problem                                          86
+      The American Response                                           88
+      The Marine Corps Role                                           88
+      Marine Participation: A Summary                                 94
+
+
+  PART III THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963                               97
+
+  Chapter 8 The Marine Advisory Effort                                99
+      The Political Climate                                           99
+      The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations                      100
+      Accomplishments                                                110
+
+  Chapter 9 SHUFLY Operations                                        111
+      Development of the Compound Continues                          111
+      Combat Support Operations                                      113
+      The Situation in Vietnam                                       121
+
+
+  PART IV AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964                              125
+
+  Chapter 10 Marines Meet the Challenge                              127
+      New American Decisions                                         127
+      A Restructured Military Assistance Command                     130
+      Changes in Marine Leadership                                   130
+      Redesignation and Reorganization                               131
+      The Vietnamese Marine Brigade                                  132
+      Additional Marine Activities                                   138
+
+  Chapter 11 Spring and Summer Fighting                              144
+      The Monsoons                                                   144
+      The Weather Breaks                                             148
+      Sure Wind 202                                                  152
+      Operations Elsewhere in I Corps                                154
+      Changing the Watch                                             156
+
+  Chapter 12 Fall and Winter Operations                              157
+      Dry Weather Fighting                                           157
+      Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations                            159
+      Changes and Improvements                                       162
+      Action as the Year Ends                                        164
+
+  Chapter 13 Prelude to Escalation                                   166
+
+  NOTES                                                              169
+
+  APPENDICES                                                         175
+      A. USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954–1964                    175
+      B. Awards and Decorations, RVN, Through 1964                   176
+      C. Glossary of Acronyms                                        178
+      D. Chronology                                                  179
+      E. List of Reviewers                                           182
+
+  INDEX                                                              184
+
+
+
+
+PART I
+
+THE WATERSHED
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1
+
+Background to Military Assistance
+
+_The Geographic Setting--The People--Vietnam’s Recent
+History--Post-Geneva South Vietnam--The American Response_
+
+
+_The Geographic Setting_
+
+Hanging like a bulbous pendant from China’s southern border, the
+Southeast Asian land mass projects itself southward to within 100 miles
+of the equator. Often referred to as the Indochinese Peninsula, this
+land mass is contained by the Andaman Sea on the west, the Gulf of
+Siam on the south, and the South China Sea and the Tonkin Gulf on the
+east. Along with the extensive Indonesian island chain which lies to
+the immediate south, mainland Southeast Asia dominates the key water
+routes between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. So positioned, the
+Indochinese Peninsula and the offshore islands resemble the Middle East
+in that they traditionally have been recognized as a “crossroads of
+commerce and history.”[1-1]
+
+Seven sovereign states currently make up the Indochinese Peninsula.
+Burma and Thailand occupy what is roughly the western two-thirds of
+the entire peninsula. To the south, the Moslem state of Malaysia
+occupies the southern third of the rugged, southward-reaching Malaysian
+Peninsula. East of Thailand lies Cambodia, which possesses a relatively
+abbreviated coastline on the Gulf of Siam, and Laos, a landlocked
+country. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), which
+borders to the north on China, and the Republic of Vietnam (South
+Vietnam) form the eastern rim of the Indochinese Peninsula.
+
+Vietnamese have often described the area currently administered by the
+two separate Vietnamese states as resembling “two rice baskets at the
+ends of their carrying poles.”[1-2] This description is derived from
+the position of extensive rice producing river deltas at the northern
+and southern extremities of the long, narrow expanse of coastline
+and adjacent mountains. Vietnamese civilization originated in the
+northernmost of these so-called “rice baskets,” the Red River Delta,
+centuries before the birth of Christ. Pressured at various stages in
+their history by the vastly more powerful Chinese and by increasingly
+crowded conditions in the Red River Delta, the Vietnamese gradually
+pushed southward down the narrow coastal plain in search of new rice
+lands. Eventually their migration displaced several rival cultures and
+carried them into every arable corner of the Mekong Delta, the more
+extensive river delta located at the southern end of the proverbial
+“carrying pole.” Although unified since the eighteenth century under
+the Vietnamese, the area between the Chinese border and the Gulf of
+Siam came to be divided into three more or less different regions:
+Tonkin, centered on the Red River Delta; Cochinchina, centered on the
+Mekong Delta; and Annam, the intervening coastal region.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  MAINLAND
+  SOUTHEAST ASIA
+]
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  FRENCH
+  INDOCHINA
+  1954
+]
+
+Since mid-1954 the area known collectively as Vietnam has been divided
+into northern and southern states. South Vietnam (known after 1956 as
+the Republic of Vietnam), where the earliest U.S. military activities
+were focused, came to include all of former Cochinchina and the
+southern half of Annam. The geography of this small state, described
+in general terms, is rugged and difficult. The lengthy country shares
+often ill-defined jungle boundaries with Laos and Cambodia in the west
+and with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to the north. Its
+land borders total almost 1,000 miles--600 with Cambodia, 300 with
+Laos, and roughly 40 with North Vietnam. Approximately 1,500 miles
+of irregular coastline on the Tonkin Gulf and the South China Sea
+complete the enclosure of its 66,000-square mile area.
+
+South Vietnam is divided into four relatively distinct physiographic
+regions--the Mekong Delta, the coastal plain, the Annamite Mountains,
+and the forested plain. The Mekong Delta, an extensive and fertile
+lowland centered on the Mekong River, covers roughly the southern
+quarter of the country. This region is essentially a marshy flat
+land well suited for rice growing and is recognized as one of Asia’s
+richest agricultural areas. South Vietnam’s second physiographic
+region, the coastal plain, is similar to the Mekong Delta in that it is
+predominantly flat and generally well suited for rice growing. Properly
+known as the coastal lowland, this region extends from the country’s
+northern border to the Mekong Delta. Its width is never constant, being
+defined on the west by the rugged Annamite Mountains--the region which
+dominates the northern two thirds of South Vietnam. The jungle-covered
+mountains, whose highest elevations measure over 8,000 feet, stand in
+sharp contrast to the low and flat coastal plain. The eastern slopes of
+the mountains normally rise from the lowlands at a distance of five or
+10 miles from the sea. At several points along the coast, however, the
+emerald mountains crowd to the water’s edge, dividing the coastal plain
+into compartments and creating a seascape breathtaking in its beauty.
+At other locations the mountain chain recedes from the coast, allowing
+the lowlands to extend inland as far as 40 miles. An extensive upland
+plateau sprawls over the central portion of South Vietnam’s mountain
+region.
+
+This important subregion, known as the Central Highlands, possesses
+relatively fertile soil and has great potential for agricultural
+development. The highest elevations in the Annamite chain are recorded
+south of the Central Highlands. From heights of 6,000 to 7,000 feet,
+the mountains dissolve southward into the forested plain, a hilly
+transition zone which forms a strip between the Mekong lowlands and the
+southernmost mountains.
+
+South Vietnam lies entirely below the Tropic of Cancer. Its climate
+is best described as hot and humid. Because the country is situated
+within Southeast Asia’s twin tropical monsoon belt, it experiences two
+distinct rainy seasons. The southwest (or summer) monsoon settles over
+the Mekong Delta and the southern part of the country in mid-May and
+lasts until early October. In the northern reaches, the northeast (or
+winter) monsoon season begins in November and continues through most of
+March. Unlike the rainy season in the south, fog, wind, and noticeably
+lower temperatures characterize the wet season in the north. While
+the reversed monsoon seasons provide an abundance of water for rice
+growing throughout the Mekong Delta and most of the long coastal plain,
+rainfall is not distributed uniformly. Parts of the central coast
+record only about 28 inches of annual precipitation. In contrast, other
+areas along the northern coast receive as much as 126 inches of rain
+during the course of a year. Even worse, a percentage of this rainfall
+can be expected to occur as a result of typhoons. The tropical storms
+usually lash the Annamese coast between July and November. Almost
+always they cause extensive flooding along normally sluggish rivers
+which dissect the coastal plain.
+
+
+_The People_
+
+Slightly over 16 million people currently inhabit South Vietnam. Of
+these, over 13 million are ethnic Vietnamese. Primarily rice farmers
+and fishermen, the Vietnamese have tended to compress themselves into
+the country’s most productive agricultural areas--the Mekong Delta and
+the coastal plain. Chinese, numbering around one million, form South
+Vietnam’s largest ethnic minority. Concentrated for the most part in
+the major cities, the Chinese traditionally have played a leading role
+in Vietnam’s commerce. About 700,000 Montagnard tribesmen, scattered
+across the upland plateau and the rugged northern mountains, constitute
+South Vietnam’s second largest minority. Some 400,000 Khmers, closely
+akin to the dominant population of Cambodia, inhabit the lowlands
+along the Cambodian border. Roughly 35,000 Chams, remnants of a once
+powerful kingdom that blocked the southern migration of the Vietnamese
+until the late 1400s, form the country’s smallest and least influential
+ethnic minority. The Chams, whose ancestors once controlled most of
+the central and southern Annamese coast, are confined to a few small
+villages on the central coast near Phan Rang.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  TERRAIN FEATURES
+  SOUTH VIETNAM
+]
+
+South Vietnamese adhere to a broad range of religions. Between 70
+and 80 percent of the country’s 16 million people are classified as
+Buddhist. It is estimated, however, that a much smaller percentage are
+actually practitioners. Roman Catholics comprise roughly 10 percent
+of the total population. Usually found in and around the country’s
+urban centers, the Catholics are products of Vietnam’s contacts with
+Europeans. Two so-called politico-religious sects, the Cao Dai and
+the Hoa Hao, have attracted large segments of the rural population,
+particularly in the Mekong Delta.[1-A] For the most part, the scattered
+Montagnard tribes worship animal forms and have no organized religion,
+although many have been converted to Christianity.
+
+    [1-A] Founded just after World War I, the Cao Dai claims
+          more than one and a half million faithful in South
+          Vietnam. The religion incorporates elements of Taoism,
+          Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, and large doses
+          of spiritualism. Its clergy, headed by a “pope,” is
+          organized in a hierarchy modelled on that of the Roman
+          Catholic Church. The extent of its borrowing is suggested
+          by the fact that adherents count the French author
+          Victor Hugo as one of their saints. Politically, the
+          Cao Dai moved sharply in the direction of nationalism
+          during the 1940s, organized its own army, and fought
+          sporadic actions against the French and the subsequent
+          French-controlled government of Emperor Bao Dai until
+          suppressed by the Diem government in 1954.
+
+          Like the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao is peculiarly Vietnamese. In
+          the late 1930s, a Buddhist monk named Huynh Pho So began a
+          “protestant” movement within the worldly, easy-going
+          Buddhist faith then prevalent. His followers, whose ranks
+          grew rapidly, called themselves Hoa Hao after the village
+          where Phu So began his crusade. Like the Cao Dai faithful
+          and Catholics, they tended to live apart in their own
+          villages and hamlets concentrated in the very south and
+          west of Vietnam, primarily along the Cambodian border.
+          Intensely nationalistic and xenophobic, they were under
+          constant attack from the French, Japanese, and Viet Minh,
+          and by the late 1940s had recruited a large militia
+          which was subsequently disbanded. Today their overall
+          membership stands at about one million.
+
+Fundamentally, South Vietnamese society is rural and agrarian. Over
+the centuries the Vietnamese have tended to cluster in tiny hamlets
+strewn down the coastal plain and across the Mekong Delta. Usually
+composed of a handful of closely knit families whose ancestors settled
+the surrounding land generations earlier, the hamlet is South Vietnam’s
+basic community unit. Next larger is the village which resembles the
+American township in function in that it encompasses a number of
+adjacent hamlets. The Vietnamese people have naturally developed strong
+emotional ties with their native villages. “To the Vietnamese,” it has
+been said without exaggeration, “the village is his land’s heart,
+mind, and soul.”[1-3] Given the rural nature of the country it is
+understandable that the inhabitants of the villages and hamlets have
+retained a large degree of self-government. “The laws of the emperor,”
+states an ancient Vietnamese proverb, “are less than the customs of the
+village.”[1-4]
+
+Overlaying this rural mosaic are two intermediate governmental
+echelons--the districts and the provinces, The district, the smaller
+of these political and geographic subdivisions, first appeared in
+Vietnamese history following the earliest annexation of Tonkin by
+the Chinese in 111 B.C. It remained in use and was extended down the
+Annamese coast and into Cochinchina by the successive Vietnamese
+dynasties which came to power in the ensuing centuries. Provinces,
+larger geographic subdivisions, eventually were superimposed over
+groups of contiguous districts, thus adding another echelon between
+the reigning central government and the villages. This structure
+remained in existence under the French after they took control of all
+Vietnam in the late 19th century. In order to make their administration
+more efficient French colonial authorities modernized the cumbersome
+administrative machinery and adjusted provincial boundaries. It is
+essentially this French-influenced structure that exists in South
+Vietnam today. Still, after years of use and modification, the system
+seems somewhat superficial as traditional self-rule of the villages
+tends to nullify the efforts of provinces and districts to govern rural
+areas. Often the central government’s influence is unable to seep lower
+than the district headquarters, particularly in more remote areas.
+
+While South Vietnam is predominantly rural, it does possess several
+important urban centers. As might be expected, these are found
+primarily in the densely populated Mekong Delta and along the coastal
+lowland. Saigon, the nation’s capital and largest city, presently has
+a population estimated at 3.5 million. Located slightly north of the
+Mekong River complex and inland from the coast, the city dominates the
+country in both an economic and political sense. Saigon has excellent
+port facilities for ocean-going ships, although such traffic must
+first negotiate the tangled Saigon River which leads inland from the
+South China Sea. Da Nang, located on the Annamese coast 84 miles
+below the northern border, is the country’s second largest city.
+With a population of roughly 500,000 and a protected harbor, Da Nang
+constitutes the principal economic center in northern South Vietnam.
+The old imperial capital of Hue (population of roughly 200,000),
+situated about 50 miles north of Da Nang, historically has exerted a
+strong cultural influence over the Annamese coast.[1-B] Scores of large
+towns, such as Quang Tri, Hoi An, Quang Ngai, Can Tho, and Vinh Long,
+extend down the coast and across the Mekong Delta. Often these serve as
+provincial capitals. A few lesser population centers, notably Pleiku,
+Kontum, and Ban Me Thuot, are situated in the Central Highlands.
+
+    [1-B] The population of most of South Vietnam’s cities and
+          towns has been swollen by the influx of refugees which
+          occurred as the Vietnam War intensified in the middle
+          1960s. In 1965, for example, refugee population estimates
+          for the three major cities were as follows: Saigon--1.5
+          million; Da Nang--144,000; Hue--105,000.
+
+Most of South Vietnam’s major towns and cities are connected by one
+highway--Route 1. Constructed by the French during the early 20th
+century, Route 1 originally extended from Hanoi, the principal city
+of Tonkin in northern Vietnam, down the coast and inland to Saigon.
+While Route 1 and a French-built railroad which parallels it helped
+unify South Vietnam’s most densely populated areas, the country’s
+road network is otherwise underdeveloped. A few tortuous roads do
+twist westward from Route 1 into the mountains to reach the remote
+towns there. Of these the most noteworthy are Route 19, built to serve
+Pleiku in the Central Highlands, and Route 9, which extends westward
+into Laos from Dong Ha, South Vietnam’s northernmost town. A number
+of roads radiate outward from Saigon to the population centers of
+the Mekong Delta. For the most part, however, the Vietnamese people
+traditionally have depended on trail networks, inland waterways, and
+the sea to satisfy their transportation needs. The location of the bulk
+of the population in the watery Mekong Delta and along the seacoast has
+encouraged their reliance on waterborne transportation.
+
+
+_Vietnam’s Recent History_
+
+Prior to July 1954 the expanse of mainland Southeast Asia now occupied
+by South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia belonged to
+France. Together these possessions constituted French-Indochina
+over which the French had exercised political control in one form
+or another, with one exception, since the last quarter of the 19th
+century. The only interruption occurred following the capitulation of
+France in June 1940. Exploiting the disrupted power balance in Europe,
+and attracted by the natural resources and strategic value of the
+area, Japan moved into northern French-Indochina less than four months
+after France had fallen. In 1941 the Vichy French government agreed
+to Japanese occupation of southern French-Indochina. Soon Japanese
+forces controlled every airfield and major port in Indochina. Under
+this arrangement the Japanese permitted French colonial authorities
+to maintain their administrative responsibilities. But as the tide of
+war began to turn against the Japanese, the French became increasingly
+defiant. The Japanese terminated this relationship on 9 March 1945
+when, without warning, they arrested colonial officials throughout
+Indochina and brutally seized control of all governmental functions.
+
+Six months after the dissolution of the French colonial apparatus in
+Indochina, World War II ended. The grip which Japan had held on most
+of Southeast Asia for nearly half a decade was broken on 2 September
+1945 when her foreign minister signed the instrument of unconditional
+surrender on board the battleship USS _Missouri_. Shortly thereafter,
+in accordance with a previously reached Allied agreement, Chinese
+Nationalist forces moved into Tonkin and northern Annam to accept the
+surrender of Japanese forces. South of the 16th parallel, British units
+arrived from India to disarm the defeated Japanese. A detachment of 150
+men from a small French Expeditionary Corps arrived by air in Saigon
+on the 12th to assist the British, who had included them only as a
+courtesy since France was not among the powers slated to receive the
+surrender of the Japanese in Indochina.
+
+But the end of World War II and the arrival of Allied forces did not
+end the struggle for control of French-Indochina. Instead, it signalled
+the beginning of a new conflict in which the contestants were, in many
+respects, more formidable. One of these, the French, moved quickly to
+restore their former presence in Cochinchina and Annam. Reinforced with
+additional units, they occupied most major towns between the Mekong
+Delta and the 16th parallel by the end of 1945. Two months later
+French negotiators secured an agreement with the Chinese Nationalists
+whereby French units would replace the Chinese occupation forces north
+of the 16th parallel.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  MAJOR CITIES OF
+  SOUTH VIETNAM
+]
+
+Wartime developments in French-Indochina, however, had brought about
+profound political changes which eventually would doom the French
+effort to re-establish political and economic influence in the region.
+During World War II, Ho Chi Minh, an avowed Communist, had transformed
+a relatively feeble political party into a sizable guerrilla
+organization. Known as the Viet Minh, the Communist guerrillas had been
+organized, trained, and led by Vo Nguyen Giap, a former history teacher
+from Annam. During the latter stages of the war, the United States had
+supplied the Viet Minh with limited quantities of military supplies.
+In return, Ho’s guerrillas had assisted downed American pilots and
+occasionally had clashed with small Japanese units. But the Viet Minh
+had wasted few men on costly major actions against the Japanese.
+Conserving their forces, Ho and Giap had concentrated on organization
+and had managed to extend their strength into the densely populated Red
+River Delta and along the Annamese coast. In Cochinchina, where their
+numbers were considerably smaller, the Communists had limited their
+activities almost entirely to organization and recruitment. Thus, by
+the end of the war Ho’s organization was able to emerge as a definite
+military-political force in northern French-Indochina.
+
+Following the Japanese surrender and before the arrival of the Chinese
+Nationalist occupation forces, the Viet Minh seized control of Hanoi,
+the capital of Tonkin, and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of
+Vietnam. At Ho’s direction the Viet Minh promptly shifted from their
+anti-Japanese posture and prepared to contest the French return.
+
+Confronted with this situation in northern Indochina, the French were
+forced to bargain with the Communists. A preliminary agreement was
+reached on 6 March 1946 whereby the French agreed to recognize the
+newly founded but relatively weak Democratic Republic of Vietnam as
+a “free state within the French Union.” In return, Ho’s government
+declared itself “ready to welcome in friendly fashion the French Army,
+when in conformance with international agreement, it would relieve
+the Chinese forces” which had accepted the Japanese surrender in
+Tonkin.[1-5] Shortly after the conclusion of this agreement, French
+forces began reoccupying Tonkin and northern Annam. Within six months
+they controlled every major strategic position from the Chinese border
+to the Ca Mau Peninsula, Cochinchina’s southern tip.
+
+The uneasy peace was broken in December 1946 after Viet Minh and French
+negotiators failed to reach a final agreement on actual political
+control of Tonkin and Annam. When open warfare erupted, Ho withdrew
+the bulk of his military forces into mountainous sanctuaries along
+the Chinese border, but left small groups of guerrillas scattered
+throughout the heavily populated Red River Delta. Reinforced with
+contingents from Europe and Africa, the French Expeditionary Corps
+initially managed to hold its own and, in some cases, even extend its
+control. But, drawing strength from its natural appeal to Vietnamese
+nationalism, the Communist movement began gaining momentum in the late
+1940s. Gradually the war intensified and spread into central Annam and
+Cochinchina.
+
+In January 1950, the French moved to undercut the Viet Minh’s appeal
+to non-Communist nationalists by granting nominal independence to its
+Indochina possessions. Under the terms of a formal treaty, all of
+Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina) was brought together under a
+Saigon-based government headed by Emperor Bao Dai. Laos and Cambodia
+likewise formed their own governments, whereupon all three countries
+became known as the Associated States of Indochina.
+
+This new arrangement, however, had little effect on the ongoing war
+with the Viet Minh. In accordance with the treaties, the Associated
+States became members of the French Union and agreed to prosecute
+the war under French direction. Moreover, French political dominance
+in the region continued, virtually undiluted by the existence of the
+Associated States.
+
+In related developments, Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese Communist armies seized
+control of mainland China in 1949 and Communist North Korean forces
+invaded the pro-Western Republic of Korea in 1950. These events added
+new meaning to the French struggle in Indochina as American policy
+makers came to view the war on the Southeast Asian mainland within the
+context of a larger design to bring Asia entirely under Communist
+domination. Following the invasion of South Korea, President Truman
+immediately announced his intention to step up U.S. military aid to
+the French in Indochina. Congress responded quickly by adding four
+billion dollars to existing military assistance funds. Of this, $303
+million was earmarked for Korea, the Philippines, and “the general area
+of China.”[1-6][1-C] Thus, the Truman Administration, now confronted
+by the possibility that Communism might engulf all of mainland Asia,
+extended its containment policy to Indochina.
+
+    [1-C] The following year would see a half billion U.S. dollars
+          allocated to support French operations in Indochina.
+          By 1954 that figure would climb to an even one billion
+          dollars.
+
+Even with rapidly increasing amounts of U.S. material assistance,
+the French proved unable to wrest the initiative from Giap’s growing
+armies. Although national armies drawn from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam
+were now fighting alongside the French, the Expeditionary Corps was
+over-extended. Moreover, the French cause was extremely vulnerable
+to Communist propaganda. On the home front, public support for the
+so-called _sale guerre_ (dirty war) eroded steadily during the early
+1950s as the Expeditionary Corps’ failures and casualties mounted.
+Finally, on 7 May 1954, the besieged 13,000-man French garrison at Dien
+Bien Phu surrendered to the Viet Minh, thus shattering what remained
+of French determination to prosecute the war in Indochina. In Geneva,
+where Communist and Free World diplomats had gathered to consider a
+formal peace in Korea along with the Indochina problem, French and Viet
+Minh representatives signed a cease-fire agreement on 20 July which
+ended the eight-year conflict.
+
+The bilateral cease-fire agreement substantially altered the map of the
+Indochinese Peninsula. France agreed to relinquish political control
+throughout the area. Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam all gained full
+independence. The most controversial provision of the 20 July agreement
+divided Vietnam at the Ben Hai River and superimposed a demilitarized
+zone over the partition line. This division, intended to facilitate
+the disengagement of the opposing forces, was to be temporary pending
+a reunification election scheduled for mid-1956. In accordance with
+the agreement, France immediately turned over political control of the
+northern zone (Tonkin and the northern half of Annam) to the Communist
+Viet Minh. Ho promptly re-established the Democratic Republic of
+Vietnam (DRV) with its capital in Hanoi.
+
+Other provisions of the Geneva Agreement called for the opposing armies
+to regroup in their respective zones within 300 days. Following their
+regroupment, the French military forces were to be completely withdrawn
+from the North within 300 days and from the South by mid-1956.
+Civilians living both north and south of the partition line were to
+be allowed to emigrate to the opposite zone in accordance with their
+political convictions. It was anticipated that thousands of Catholics
+living in Tonkin would seek refuge in the non-Communist South. Other
+articles of the agreement dealt with the creation and responsibilities
+of an International Control Commission (ICC) to supervise the
+cease-fire. Canadian, Indian, and Polish delegations were to comprise
+this commission.
+
+On 21 July, the day following the bilateral agreement, Great Britain,
+the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, Cambodia, and Laos
+joined France and the Viet Minh in endorsing a “Final Declaration”
+which sanctioned the previously reached cease-fire agreement. The
+United States refused to endorse this declaration, but issued a
+statement to the effect that it would not use force to disturb the
+cease-fire.
+
+
+_Post-Geneva South Vietnam_
+
+The execution of the Geneva Agreement thrust that area of Vietnam
+south of the partition line into a period of profound confusion and
+instability. Even worse, the colonial period had done little to
+prepare the Cochinchinese and Annamese for the tremendous problems
+at hand. No real apparatus for central government existed. Likewise,
+the long colonial period left the area with few experienced political
+leaders capable of establishing and managing the required governmental
+machinery. Political control passed nominally to the French-sponsored
+emperor, Bao Dai, who was living in France at the time. For all
+practical purposes, leadership in the South devolved upon Bao Dai’s
+recently appointed pro-Western premier, Ngo Dinh Diem. The product of a
+prosperous and well-educated Catholic family from Hue, Diem had served
+the French briefly as a province chief prior to World War II. Always a
+strong nationalist but staunchly anti-Communist, he had been unable to
+reconcile his anti-French attitudes with the Viet Minh movement during
+the Indochina War. As a result Diem had left his homeland in the early
+1950s to live at a Catholic seminary in the United States. There he
+remained until his appointment as premier in mid-June of 1954.
+
+The months immediately following the Geneva agreement found Ngo Dinh
+Diem struggling to create the necessary governmental machinery in
+Saigon, the capital of the southern zone. At best, however, his hold
+on the feeble institutions was tenuous. A serious confrontation was
+developing between the premier and the absent Bao Dai, still residing
+in France. Further complicating the political scene was the presence of
+Hoa Hao and Cao Dai armies in the provinces surrounding the capital,
+and the existence in Saigon of an underworld organization named the
+Binh Xuyen.[1-D] As 1955 opened the leaders of these three politically
+oriented factions were pressing demands for concessions from the new
+central government. Among these were permission to maintain their
+private armies, and the authority to exercise political control over
+large, heavily populated areas.
+
+    [1-D] The Binh Xuyen originally operated from the swamps south
+          of the Chinese-dominated Cholon district of Saigon.
+          Controlling the vice and crime of the city, by 1954 they
+          had gained control of the police under circumstances that
+          reeked of bribery. A year later the organization was
+          brutally crushed by Ngo Dinh Diem.
+
+The outcome of the embryonic power struggle in Saigon hinged largely
+on control of the Vietnamese National Army (VNA). Although not
+considered an efficient military organization by even the most liberal
+estimates, the 210,000-man National Army was the principal source
+of organized power available to the quarreling leaders of southern
+Vietnam. Originally created by the French in 1950 to supplement their
+Expeditionary Corps, the VNA had since suffered from structural
+deficiencies. It actually had no organizational echelon between the
+French-controlled General Staff and the 160 separate battalions. Tied
+to no regiments or divisions, the Vietnamese battalions naturally
+were dependent on the French Expeditionary Corps for operational
+instructions and logistical support.[1-E]
+
+    [1-E] Selected VNA battalions were sometimes task organized
+          into _groupes mobiles_ (mobile groups) by the French for
+          specific offensive operations. But these groups, which
+          were roughly equivalent to a regimental combat team,
+          were never composed entirely of VNA battalions under a
+          Vietnamese command group.
+A dearth of qualified Vietnamese officers and a degree of inattention
+on the part of the French compounded the problems which stemmed from
+the army’s structural flaw. Partially as a result of these shortcomings
+the morale of the VNA had deteriorated sharply in the waning stages of
+the French-Indochina War. At the time of the cease-fire agreement, high
+desertion rates were reported in almost every Vietnamese battalion.
+Still, it was evident that he who controlled the National Army would
+most likely control the government in the area south of the partition
+line.
+
+The danger that the pro-Western zone might become the victim of a
+sudden Communist attack from the north, as had been the case on the
+Korean Peninsula, injected another element of uncertainty into the
+overall situation in southern Vietnam. The conditions which settled
+over the area in the immediate aftermath of the Geneva settlement
+suggested this possibility since they were alarmingly similar to the
+conditions which had prevailed in Korea prior to the North Korean
+invasion of 1950. Like Korea, Vietnam was divided both geographically
+and ideologically: the North clearly within the orbit of the Soviet
+Union and Communist China, and the South under the influence of the
+Western powers. As in Korea in 1950, there also existed a very real
+armed threat to the weaker pro-Western southern state. Immediately
+after the Geneva cease-fire, the Viet Minh army regrouped north of the
+17th parallel and was redesignated the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN).
+American intelligence reported that the PAVN, which numbered roughly
+240,000 disciplined veterans, was being reorganized and re-equipped
+with Soviet and Chinese weapons in violation of the Geneva Agreement.
+At the same time Western intelligence sources estimated that the Viet
+Minh had intentionally left between 5,000 and 10,000 men south of the
+partition line following their withdrawal. Also done in violation of
+the cease-fire agreement, this meant that Communist guerrillas could be
+expected to surface throughout the South in the event of an outright
+invasion.
+
+A related condition heightened fears that a Korea-type invasion might
+occur in Vietnam. In South Korea a military vacuum had been allowed to
+form in 1949 when American units withdrew from the area. Apparently
+that vacuum, coupled with a statement by the American Secretary of
+State to the effect that the U.S. defensive perimeter in the Pacific
+did not include South Korea, had encouraged Communist aggression.
+Now, with the scheduled evacuation of French armies from Indochina by
+mid-1956, there emerged the distinct possibility that such a military
+vacuum would recur, this time in southern Vietnam. “Vietnam,” warned
+one American scholar familiar with the region, “may very soon become
+either a dam against aggression from the north or a bridge serving the
+communist block to transform the countries of the Indochinese peninsula
+into satellites of China.”[1-7]
+
+
+_The American Response_
+
+It was in the face of this uncertain situation on the Southeast Asian
+mainland that the Eisenhower administration moved to discourage renewed
+Communist military activity. First, the United States sought to create
+a regional international organization to promote collective military
+action under the threat of aggression. This was obtained on 8 September
+1954 when eight nations--the United States, Great Britain, France, New
+Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand--signed the
+Manila Pact. The treaty area encompassed by the pact included Southeast
+Asia, the Southwest Pacific below 21°31′ north latitude, and Pakistan.
+Two weeks later the pact was transformed into the Southeast Asia Treaty
+Organization (SEATO). In a separate protocol, the member nations agreed
+that Cambodia, Laos, and the “Free Territory under the jurisdiction of
+the State of Vietnam” all resided within their defense sphere.[1-8]
+
+Next, after several months of hesitation, the United States settled
+on a policy of comprehensive assistance to South Vietnam, as the
+area south of the 1954 partition line was already being called. As
+conceived, the immediate objective of the new American policy was
+to bring political stability to South Vietnam. The longer range
+goal was the creation of a bulwark to discourage renewed Communist
+expansion down the Indochinese Peninsula. In this scheme, military
+assistance was to play a key role. “One of the most efficient means
+of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become strong,” explained
+Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, “is to assist it
+in reorganizing the National Army and in training that Army.”[1-9]
+In short, the State Department’s position was that a stronger, more
+responsive Vietnamese National Army would help Premier Diem consolidate
+his political power. Later that same force would serve as a shield
+behind which South Vietnam would attempt to recover from the ravages of
+the French-Indochina War and the after effects of the Geneva Agreement.
+
+So by early 1955 a combination of circumstances--South Vietnam’s
+position adjacent to a Communist state, the unsavory memories of
+the Korean invasion, and the impending withdrawal of the French
+Expeditionary Corps--had influenced the United States to adopt a policy
+of military support for Premier Diem’s struggling government.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 2
+
+The Formative Years
+
+_Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam--Origins of U.S. Marine
+Assistance--Political Stabilization and Its Effects--Reorganization and
+Progress--Summing Up Developments_
+
+
+_Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam_
+
+When the Geneva cease-fire went into effect in the late summer of 1954,
+the machinery for implementing the military phase of the American
+assistance program for South Vietnam already existed. President
+Truman had ordered the establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance
+Advisory Group (USMAAG or MAAG) in French Indochina in mid-1950 as
+one of several reactions to the North Korean invasion of the Republic
+of Korea. Established to provide materiel support to the French
+Expeditionary Corps, the MAAG constituted little more than a logistical
+funnel through which U.S. military aid had been poured.
+
+Lieutenant General John M. (“Iron Mike”) O’Daniel, U.S. Army, had
+been assigned to command the MAAG in the spring of 1954. O’Daniel’s
+selection for the Saigon post anticipated a more active U.S. role in
+training of the Vietnamese National Army. He had been chosen for the
+assignment largely on the basis of his successful role in creating
+and supervising the training programs which had transformed the South
+Korean Army into an effective fighting force during the Korean War.
+Now, in the aftermath of the Geneva settlement, he and his 342-man
+group began preparing for the immense task of rebuilding South
+Vietnam’s armed forces.
+
+The entire American project to assist the South Vietnamese in the
+construction of a viable state was delayed during the fall of 1954
+while the necessary diplomatic agreements were negotiated among
+American, French, and South Vietnamese officials. President Eisenhower
+dispatched General J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Army (Retired), to Saigon
+in November to complete the details of the triangular arrangements.
+Collins carried with him the broad powers which would be required to
+expedite the negotiations.
+
+By mid-January 1955, the president’s special envoy had paved the
+way for the transfer of responsibility for training, equipping, and
+advising the Vietnamese National Army from the French to the USMAAG.
+He and General Paul Ely, the officer appointed by the Paris government
+to oversee the French withdrawal from Indochina, had initialed a
+“Minute of Understanding.” In accordance with this document, the
+United States agreed to provide financial assistance to the French
+military in Vietnam in exchange for two important concessions. First,
+the French pledged to conduct a gradual military withdrawal from South
+Vietnam in order to prevent the development of a military vacuum
+which might precipitate a North Vietnamese invasion. Secondly, they
+accepted an American plan to assist in a transition stage during which
+the responsibility for rebuilding the Vietnamese military could be
+transferred to the MAAG in an orderly fashion. General Collins, in
+addition to engineering the understanding with General Ely, had advised
+Premier Diem to reduce his 210,000-man military and naval forces to a
+level of 100,000, a figure which the U.S. State Department felt the
+United States could realistically support and train.
+
+The American plan to begin assisting South Vietnam encountered further
+delay even after the Ely-Collins understanding had been reached. Ely’s
+government, arguing that the United States had agreed to provide only
+one-third of the amount France had requested to finance its Indochina
+forces, refused to ratify the agreement. The deadlock was finally
+resolved on 11 February 1955 when French officials accepted the terms
+of the Ely-Collins arrangement in a revised form.
+
+A combined Franco-American training command, designated the Training
+Relations Instruction Mission (TRIM), became operational in Saigon
+the day following the French ratification of the Ely-Collins
+understanding.[2-A] Headed by Lieutenant General O’Daniel but under
+the “overall authority” of General Ely, TRIM was structured to prevent
+domination by either French or Americans. The training mission was
+composed of four divisions, Army, Navy, Air Force, and National
+Security, each of which was headed alternately by either an American
+or a French officer. The chief of each division had as his deputy an
+officer of the opposite nationality. U.S. officers, however, headed the
+divisions considered by MAAG officials as the most important--Army and
+National Security. Operating through TRIM and assisted by the French
+military, the USMAAG was tasked with implementing the U.S. Military
+Assistance Program in a manner that would help shape the Vietnamese
+national forces into a cohesive defense establishment prior to the
+withdrawal of French forces.
+
+    [2-A] The combined training mission originally was designated
+          the Allied Training Operations Mission. This designation
+          was changed prior to the time the mission became
+          operational.
+
+
+_Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance_
+
+Only one U.S. Marine was serving with the USMAAG in Saigon when
+TRIM became operational--Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat.[2-B]
+Croizat’s assignment to the U.S. advisory group had resulted when
+General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps,
+nominated him to fill a newly created billet as liaison officer between
+the MAAG and the French High Command during the latter stages of the
+Indochina War. Largely because of his French language fluency and his
+former association with many French officers while attending their war
+college in 1949, Croizat was chosen for the assignment.
+
+    [2-B] Other Marines, however, were present in Saigon at
+          the time. They were those assigned to the American
+          Embassy. One officer was serving as Assistant Naval
+          Attache/Assistant Naval Attache for Air, and 12 other
+          Marines were serving as security guards.
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Croizat, however, did not arrive in Vietnam until 2
+August 1954. By then the cease-fire agreement had been signed at Geneva
+and the need for a liaison officer with the French High Command no
+longer existed. General O’Daniel, therefore, assigned the newly arrived
+Marine officer to serve on the General Commission for Refugees which
+had been created by the South Vietnamese Government immediately after
+the cease-fire. In this capacity Croizat became directly involved in
+the construction of refugee reception centers and the selection and
+development of resettlement areas in the South. When U.S. naval forces
+began assisting in the evacuation of North Vietnam, Lieutenant Colonel
+Croizat was sent to Haiphong, the principal seaport of Tonkin. There
+he headed the MAAG detachment and was responsible for coordinating
+U.S. operations in the area with those of the French and Vietnamese.
+When the so-called “Passage to Freedom” concluded in May 1955, 807,000
+people, 469,000 tons of equipment and supplies, and 23,000 vehicles
+had been evacuated from Communist North Vietnam.[2-C] It was not until
+February 1955 that the Marine returned to Saigon.
+
+    [2-C] The French moved 497,000 people, 400,000 tons of
+          equipment and supplies, and 15,000 vehicles. The U.S.
+          Navy moved the balance.
+
+During Lieutenant Colonel Croizat’s absence, Premier Diem had acted on
+a long-standing proposal to create a small Vietnamese Marine Corps.
+The issue of a separate Marine force composed of Vietnamese national
+troops had surfaced frequently since the birth of the Vietnamese Navy
+in the early 1950s. Although the proposal had been heartily endorsed
+by a number of senior French Navy officers, the downward spiral of the
+French war effort had intervened to prevent the subject from being
+advanced beyond a conceptual stage. Largely as a result of earlier
+discussions with Croizat, Premier Diem acted on the matter on 13
+October when he signed a decree which included the following articles:
+
+    ARTICLE 1. Effective 1 October 1954 there is created within the
+    Naval Establishment a corps of infantry specializing in the
+    surveillance of waterways and amphibious operations on the coast
+    and rivers, to be designated as:
+
+                             ‘THE MARINE CORPS’
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+    ARTICLE 3. The Marine Corps shall consist of various type units
+    suited to their functions and either already existing in the Army
+    or Naval forces or to be created in accordance with the development
+    plan for the armed forces.[2-1]
+
+In accordance with this decree a miscellaneous collection of
+commando-type units was transferred from the Vietnamese National Army
+and Navy to the Marine Corps. Except for a naval commando unit, which
+had conducted amphibious raids along the coastal plains, these forces
+had operated in the Red River Delta with the French and Vietnamese
+Navy _dinassauts_ (river assault divisions). First employed in 1946,
+the _dinassauts_ had evolved into relatively effective naval commands
+capable of landing light infantry companies along Indochina’s tangled
+riverbanks. Normally the _dinassaut_ was composed of about a dozen
+armored and armed landing craft, patrol boats, and command vessels.
+An Army commando unit, consisting of approximately 100 men, would
+be attached to such naval commands for specific operations. Thus
+organized, the _dinassauts_ could transport light infantry units
+into otherwise inaccessible areas and support landings with heavy
+caliber automatic weapons and mortar fire. Such operations had been
+particularly successful in the sprawling Red River Delta of Tonkin
+where navigable estuaries and Viet Minh abounded.[2-D] Later in the
+war, as the concept was refined, the French created a number of
+Vietnamese National Army commando units for specific service with the
+_dinassauts_. Still attached to the Navy commands these units were
+sometimes responsible for security around the _dinassaut_ bases when
+not involved in preplanned operations. A number of these rather elite
+Vietnamese units, variously designated light support companies, river
+boat companies, and commandos, were now transferred to the newly
+decreed Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC).
+
+    [2-D] Of the _dinassaut_ Bernard Fall wrote: “[It] may well
+          have been one of the few worthwhile contributions
+          of the Indochina war to military knowledge.” (Fall,
+          _Street Without Joy_, p. 39) A more thorough analysis
+          of _dinassaut_ operations is included in Croizat, _A
+          Translation From The French Lessons of the War_, pp.
+          348–351.
+
+By the time Lieutenant Colonel Croizat returned to Saigon in early
+1955 these units, which totalled approximately 2,400 officers and men,
+had been evacuated from North Vietnam. Several of the commandos had
+been assembled at Nha Trang on South Vietnam’s central coast where
+the French still maintained an extensive naval training facility.
+There, under the supervision of a junior French commando officer,
+several former commandos had been organized into the 1st Marine
+Landing Battalion (or 1st Landing Battalion). The balance of the newly
+designated Marine units, however, were scattered in small, widely
+separated garrisons from Hue to the Mekong Delta. These units included
+six river boat companies, five combat support light companies, and
+a small training flotilla. Diem had appointed a former Vietnamese
+National Army officer, Major Le Quang Trong, as Senior Marine Officer.
+But because no formal headquarters had been created and because no real
+command structure existed, Major Trong remained relatively isolated
+from his far-flung Marine infantry units.
+
+Upon returning to Saigon, Croizat was assigned to the MAAG’s Naval
+Section and subsequently to TRIM’S Naval Division as the senior U.S.
+advisor to the newly created Vietnamese Marine Corps. In this capacity
+the Marine officer quickly determined that the small Vietnamese
+amphibious force was faced with several serious problems. First, and
+perhaps its most critical, was that despite Premier Diem’s decree,
+the Marine Corps continued to exist essentially on an informal basis.
+“The Marine Corps itself had no real identity,” its U.S. advisor later
+explained. “It was a scattering of dissimilar units extending from Hue
+to the Mekong Delta area.”[2-2] The fact that its widespread units
+were still dependent on the French Expeditionary Corps for logistical
+support underscored the weakness inherent in the VNMC’s initial status.
+
+Other problems arose from the continuation of French officers in
+command billets throughout the Vietnamese naval forces. Under the
+Franco-American agreement which had created TRIM, a French Navy captain
+doubled as chief of the combined training missions’ Naval Division
+and as commanding officer of the Vietnamese naval forces. This placed
+the French in a position to review any proposals advanced by the U.S.
+Marine advisor. Complicating the situation even further, a French
+Army captain, Jean Louis Delayen, actually commanded the 1st Landing
+Battalion at Nha Trang.[2-E]
+
+    [2-E] Delayen, described by Croizat as “an exceptionally
+          qualified French Commando officer,” later attended the
+          U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico.
+          (Croizat, “Notes on The Organization,” p. 3.)
+
+Demobilization presented another potential difficulty for the
+Vietnamese Marine Corps in early 1955. Under the U.S.-Vietnamese
+force level agreements, the Vietnamese naval forces were limited to
+3,000 men. The Marine Corps, which alone totalled a disproportionate
+2,400 men, had been instructed to reduce its strength to 1,137 men
+and officers. With no effective centralized command structure and
+so many widely separated units, even the relatively simple task of
+mustering out troops assumed the dimensions of a complex administrative
+undertaking.
+
+In short, the very existence of the Vietnamese Marine Corps was
+threatened in a number of inter-related situations. The continuation
+of a separate and distinct Marine Corps hinged ultimately, of course,
+on the overall reorganization of the Vietnamese armed forces and their
+support structure. Essentially it would be necessary to establish a
+requirement for such an organization within South Vietnam’s future
+military-naval structure. Croizat personally sensed that this would
+be the pivotal issue in determining the VNMC’s future. “There were
+numerous representatives of the three military services from each of
+the three countries concerned with the fate of the Vietnamese Army,
+Navy, and Air Force,” he pointed out. “But, there was no champion
+from within the Vietnamese Marine Corps since no Corps existed except
+on paper.”[2-3] Thus, it was left initially to a French captain, a
+Vietnamese major, and a U.S. Marine lieutenant colonel to keep alive
+the idea that South Vietnam’s defense establishment needed a separate
+Marine Corps.
+
+
+_Political Stabilization and Its Effects_
+
+During early 1955 the entire South Vietnamese government was engulfed
+by a crisis which threatened to disrupt the American plans to help
+build a viable anti-Communist country. The crisis occurred not in the
+form of an overt North Vietnamese attack but rather as a result of
+the South’s political instability. In February the leaders of the Hoa
+Hao, the Cao Dai, and the Binh Xuyen, dissatisfied with Premier Diem’s
+refusal to accede to their various demands, formed the United Front of
+National Forces.
+
+By mid-March the disaffected leaders of these organizations felt
+strong enough to test the premier’s strength. Trouble began late that
+month when the Hoa Hao began undertaking guerrilla-type activities
+against Diem’s National Army units in the sect’s stronghold southwest
+of Saigon. On 28 March Diem ordered a company of paratroops to seize
+the Saigon Central Police Headquarters which the French had allowed
+the Binh Xuyen to control. Fighting erupted throughout the capital the
+next day as Binh Xuyen units clashed with loyal government forces. A
+truce was arranged finally in the city on 31 March after three days of
+intermittent but fierce fighting. That same day the Cao Dai broke with
+the United Front and accepted a government offer to integrate some of
+its troops into the National Army.
+
+An uneasy peace prevailed over South Vietnam until 28 April when new
+fighting broke out. By the middle of May, government forces had driven
+the Binh Xuyen forces from Saigon, fracturing their organization.
+Remnants of the bandit group, however, escaped into the extensive
+Rung Sat swamps south of the capital where they continued fighting
+individually and in small groups. In the countryside south of Saigon,
+30 of Diem’s battalions, including the 1st Landing Battalion, took the
+offensive against the Hoa Hao regular and guerrilla forces.
+
+The national crisis, for all practical purposes, ended in the last
+week of June when a Hoa Hao leader surrendered 8,000 regulars and
+ordered his followers to cease all anti-government activities. Sporadic
+fighting continued, however, as Diem’s forces sought to mop-up Hoa Hao
+splinter groups fighting in the western Mekong Delta and Binh Xuyen
+elements still resisting in the rugged mangrove swamps south of the
+capital. In August the Marine Landing Battalion fought a decisive
+action against the remaining Hoa Hao in Kien Giang Province about 120
+miles southwest of Saigon, destroying the rebel headquarters. Later
+in the year the 1st Landing Battalion, joined by several river boat
+companies, reduced one of the last pockets of Binh Xuyen resistance
+in the Rung Sat. As a result of these and similar actions being fought
+simultaneously by loyal Army units, organized resistance to Premier
+Diem gradually collapsed.[2-F]
+
+    [2-F] Some sources contend that remnants of the Hoa Hao and Cao
+          Dai armies survived to operate alongside the Viet Cong
+          guerrillas who began threatening the Diem government in
+          the late 1950s. (Kahin and Lewis, _The U.S. in Vietnam_,
+          p. 111.)
+
+The sect crisis of 1955 proved to be the turning point in Diem’s
+political fortunes. At the height of the crisis, Emperor Bao Dai
+attempted to remove Diem as premier by ordering him to France for
+“consultations.” Electing to remain in Saigon and direct his government
+efforts to quell the rebellion, the premier declined Bao Dai’s summons.
+The Vietnamese military forces proved loyal to the premier, having
+faithfully executed Diem’s commands throughout the emergency. Having
+successfully met the armed challenge of the sects and the Binh Xuyen
+and having openly repudiated Bao Dai’s authority, Premier Diem had
+imposed at least a measure of political stability on South Vietnam.
+
+An epilogue to the sect crisis was written on 23 October when a
+nationwide referendum was held in South Vietnam to settle the issue of
+national leadership. In the balloting, since criticized as having been
+rigged, Premier Diem received 98.2 percent of the total vote against
+Bao Dai. Three days later, on 26 October, South Vietnam’s new president
+proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).
+
+The Vietnamese Marine Corps benefited greatly from Premier Diem’s
+successful confrontation with his political rivals. On 1 May, in
+preparation for the 1st Landing Battalion’s deployment to combat, Major
+Trong had established a small Marine Corps headquarters in Saigon.
+Shortly thereafter, Diem had appointed a Vietnamese officer, Captain
+Bui Pho Chi, to replace Captain Delayen as commander of the landing
+battalion. The French commando officer, who was a member of TRIM,
+remained at Nha Trang as an advisor to the VNMC. Then, on the last
+day of June, Diem removed the remaining French officers from command
+positions throughout South Vietnam’s naval forces. The combined effect
+of these actions was to reduce French influence throughout the nation’s
+naval establishment while making the Vietnamese Marine Corps more
+responsive to the central government.
+
+The burdens of demobilization also were lightened somewhat as a result
+of the sect crisis when a new force level was approved by the United
+States in mid-summer of 1955. The new agreement, dictated in part by
+the requirement to integrate portions of the sects’ armies into the
+national forces, raised the force level to 150,000 men and placed the
+personnel ceiling of the Vietnamese naval forces at 4,000 men. This
+revision enhanced the prospects for a corresponding increase in the
+authorized strength of the VNMC.
+
+The 1st Landing Battalion’s performance against the sect forces in the
+Mekong Delta and the Rung Sat, moreover, tempered much of the previous
+opposition to a separate VNMC. Heretofore, U.S. and Vietnamese Army
+officers had opposed the existence of a Vietnamese amphibious force
+apart from the National Army. Until the sect uprising, Lieutenant
+Colonel Croizat had used the influence afforded by his position as
+naval advisor to the general staff to advocate the continuation of the
+VNMC. But during the sect battles the Vietnamese Marines had firmly
+established their value to the new government. By displaying loyalty,
+discipline, and efficiency in combat, they had spoken out in their own
+behalf at a critical juncture in their corp’s existence.
+
+Shortly before the 1st Landing Battalion deployed to fight the
+rebellious sect forces, two additional U.S. Marine advisors--an officer
+and a noncommissioned officer--arrived in South Vietnam for duty with
+the MAAG. Both Marines were assigned to TRIM. Croizat dispatched the
+officer, Captain James T. Breckinridge, to Nha Trang where he soon
+replaced Captain Delayen as advisor to the 1st Landing Battalion.
+As State Department policy prohibited U.S. military personnel from
+participating in combat activities with indigenous forces, Breckinridge
+was forced to await the battalion’s return from the field. During
+its absence he divided his time between Nha Trang and Saigon where
+he assisted Colonel Croizat with planning and logistics matters. The
+noncommissioned officer, Technical Sergeant Jackson E. Tracy, initially
+remained in Saigon but later moved to Nha Trang. There, serving
+principally as a small unit tactics instructor to the Vietnamese
+Marines, Tracy impressed Breckinridge as a “first-rate Marine
+‘NCO’--one who could carry out the most complex assignment with little
+or no supervision.”[2-4]
+
+[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat, first U.S. Marine
+Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, translates during discussions
+between Lieutenant General John “Iron Mike” O’Daniel, USA, Chief,
+USMAAG, Vietnam, and Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. (Photo courtesy of Colonel
+Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.))._]
+
+Soon after 1956 opened, President Diem appointed a new officer to head
+the Vietnamese Marine Corps. On 18 January Major Phan Van Lieu assumed
+command of the VNMC, and thereby became the second Senior Marine
+Officer.
+
+
+_Reorganization and Progress_
+
+The 1st Landing Battalion remained in action against the Binh Xuyen
+remnants until February 1956. During this period Lieutenant Colonel
+Croizat reviewed the entire organizational structure of the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps. By now the size of the service had been reduced to
+roughly 1,800 officers and men although it retained its original
+organization of six river boat companies, five light support companies,
+a landing battalion, a training flotilla, and a small headquarters.
+
+This organization, with so many dissimilar units existing on one
+echelon, influenced Croizat to suggest that Major Lieu restructure
+the service. Assisted by Croizat, Captain Breckinridge, and Technical
+Sergeant Tracy, Lieu and his small staff spent several months
+developing and refining plans for the comprehensive reorganization
+of the Marine Corps. Lieu submitted this package to the Vietnamese
+Joint General Staff (JGS) on 21 December 1955. The salient feature
+of the plan was to create an additional landing battalion without
+increasing the 1,837-man ceiling which then governed the size of
+the VNMC. Significantly, the plan contained a clause proposing that
+the Vietnamese Marine Corps be expanded to regimental size in the
+future.[2-5]
+
+[Illustration: VNMC TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 18 FEBRUARY 1956
+
+AUTHORIZED STRENGTH, 1,837]
+
+[Illustration: LANDING BATTALION TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 18
+FEBRUARY 1956
+
+AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 728]
+
+The Vietnamese Joint General Staff approved the new structure, and
+reorganization of the VNMC was begun when the 1st Landing Battalion
+finally returned to Nha Trang in February. The old river boat and
+light support companies were disbanded and three new units--a 4.2-inch
+mortar company, a headquarters and service company, and a new landing
+battalion--were formed. Designated the 2d Landing Battalion, this new
+unit formed about 25 miles south of Nha Trang at Cam Ranh Bay where the
+French had trained amphibious forces during the latter stages of the
+Indochina War.
+
+As a result of the 1956 reorganization effort, the tables of
+organization and tables of equipment for the Vietnamese Marine
+battalions were completely revised. Three infantry companies, a heavy
+weapons company, and a headquarters and service company now comprised
+a landing battalion.[2-G] Each infantry company was organized into
+three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. In turn, the rifle platoons
+each consisted of three 10-man squads (three 3-man fire teams and a
+squad leader). The individual Vietnamese Marine rifleman was armed
+with the .30 caliber M-1 carbine, a weapon formerly carried by many
+French and Vietnamese commandos. It had been retained for use within
+the VNMC because it was substantially shorter and lighter than the
+standard U.S. infantry weapon, the M-1 rifle, and was therefore better
+suited to the small Vietnamese fighting man. The automatic rifleman in
+each Vietnamese Marine fire team carried the Browning automatic rifle
+(BAR), a heavier .30 caliber automatic weapon. The weapons platoon
+of the rifle company was built around six .30 caliber light machine
+guns. Within the heavy weapons company of the landing battalions was a
+mortar platoon, equipped with four 81mm mortars, and a recoilless rifle
+platoon.
+
+    [2-G] Whereas U.S. Marine infantry companies were designated
+          by letters (A, B, C, D, etc.), the Vietnamese Marine
+          infantry companies were given number designations.
+
+While this reorganization was underway, Lieutenant Colonel Croizat
+initiated a search for acceptable means of expanding the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps to regimental size. A staff study produced by the Senior
+Marine Advisor a month before the first phase of the reorganization
+effort had begun included several important recommendations. Croizat
+proposed to General O’Daniel that authorization be granted to raise the
+ceiling on the VNMC from 1,837 to 2,435 officers and men. This, the
+Marine advisor pointed out, could be accomplished without affecting
+the overall ceiling on all South Vietnamese military and naval forces.
+By reassigning to the Vietnamese Marine Corps an amphibious battalion
+still organized within the National Army, the 150,000-man force level
+would not be altered. This would transform the Vietnamese Marine Corps
+into a three battalion regiment and would unify all South Vietnamese
+amphibious forces under a single command. Croizat’s study further
+recommended that the Vietnamese Marine Corps be designated part of the
+general reserve of the nation’s armed forces and that it be controlled
+directly by the Vietnamese Joint General Staff. Although no immediate
+action was taken on these recommendations, they were to serve as a
+blueprint for the future expansion of the VNMC. Equally important, they
+bore the seed that would eventually make the Vietnamese Marine Corps a
+fully integrated component of South Vietnam’s defense establishment.
+
+During the ensuing three years, several apparently unrelated
+occurrences impacted either directly or indirectly on the U.S. Marine
+advisory effort in South Vietnam. The French completed their military
+withdrawal from South Vietnam and dissolved their High Command in April
+1956, slightly ahead of schedule.[2-H] In conjunction with this final
+phase of the French withdrawal, the Training Relations Instructions
+Mission was abolished. Thus, it was no longer necessary for the MAAG
+programs to be executed through the combined training mission.
+
+    [2-H] A few French naval officers and noncommissioned officers
+          remained at Nha Trang as instructors until late May 1957.
+
+Shortly after the departure of the last French troops, Lieutenant
+Colonel Croizat ended his assignment as Senior Marine Advisor. He was
+replaced by Lieutenant Colonel William N. Wilkes, Jr., in June 1956.
+A veteran of the Guadalcanal campaign, Wilkes came to Vietnam from
+Washington, D.C. where he had recently completed a French language
+course. Like his predecessor, the new Senior Marine Advisor was
+scheduled to serve in Vietnam for two years.
+
+In August, less than two months after Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes’
+arrival, President Diem appointed a new officer to head his Marine
+Corps. This time Bui Pho Chi, the captain who had commanded the 1st
+Landing Battalion during the sect uprising, was selected for the
+assignment. Chi’s appointment was only temporary, however, for in
+October Diem ordered Major Le Nhu Hung to assume command of the Marine
+Corps. Major Hung, who became the VNMC’s fourth Senior Officer, was to
+hold the position for four years.
+
+An attempt to abolish the Vietnamese Marine Corps coincided with the
+series of changes in its leadership and the departure of Lieutenant
+Colonel Croizat. During the summer months, the Vietnamese Minister of
+Defense proposed that the VNMC be made a branch of South Vietnam’s
+Army. Fortunately, the recent combat record of the 1st Landing
+Battalion outweighed the minister’s influence and the effort to
+disestablish the Vietnamese Marine Corps was thwarted.
+
+Another noteworthy incident in the record of the early relations
+between the U.S. and Vietnamese Marines occurred when the Marine
+noncommissioned officer billet within the MAAG was upgraded to an
+officer position. This adjustment, which anticipated the creation
+of the 2d Landing Battalion, had the effect of making a U.S. Marine
+officer available to advise individual VNMC battalions on a permanent
+basis. Thus originated a plan whereby a U.S. Marine officer would
+advise each Vietnamese Marine battalion--a concept abandoned only
+temporarily between 1959 and 1962.
+
+The Vietnamese Marine Corps continued as a two-battalion regiment
+under the command of Major Le Nhu Hung from mid-1956 through 1959.
+During this period Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes and his successor,
+Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., a Marine who had served
+as an aide to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, instituted a variety
+of programs intended to provide the Vietnamese Marines with a common
+base of experience and training.[2-I] Perhaps the most important of
+these was one implemented in 1958 whereby Vietnamese Marine officers
+began attending basic and intermediate level schools at Marine Corps
+Schools, Quantico. Other formal schools for noncommissioned officers
+were established by the Vietnamese Marine Corps in South Vietnam. In
+an effort to build _esprit de corps_ among the lower ranking Vietnamese
+Marines, the U.S. advisors encouraged voluntary enlistments. They
+also persuaded their Vietnamese counterparts to adopt a corps-wide
+marksmanship training program similar to the one then in use by the
+U.S. Marine Corps.
+
+    [2-I] See Appendix A for complete listings of VNMC Commandants
+          and Senior Marine Advisors to the VNMC during the
+          1954–1964 period.
+
+In conjunction with the reorganization of the VNMC and the stress
+being placed upon small unit and individual training, much of the
+U.S. advisory effort during this period was devoted to logistics. The
+Marine advisors soon discovered that the Vietnamese officers, who had
+not been directly concerned with supply matters under the French,
+tended to ignore this important area. “The real problem,” explained
+Captain Breckinridge, “was the newness of it all. The Vietnamese
+officers simply possessed no base of experience or training in logistic
+matters.”[2-6] This shortcoming dictated that the American advisors
+not only design a workable logistics system but closely supervise its
+operation as well. Wilkes and Wilkinson instituted intensive schooling
+of supply and maintenance personnel and emphasized the value of command
+supervision to the Vietnamese leaders. The Marine advisors, for
+example, taught their counterparts that equipment shortages could often
+be prevented if command attention were given to requisitions. Still,
+even with constant supervision and formal schooling, the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps continued to experience problems in this area throughout
+the 1950s and well into the next decade. Breckinridge, who returned to
+serve with the Vietnamese Marines again as a lieutenant colonel in the
+late 1960s, recalled shortages of such vital and common items as small
+arms ammunition even then.
+
+The years between 1955 and 1959 also saw the Marine advisors working
+to overcome a potentially more serious problem, one that also dated
+from the French-Indochina War. From the outset of their experience
+with the Vietnamese Marine Corps, the Marine advisors perceived that
+a strong defensive orientation seemed to pervade every echelon of the
+small service. Most Americans, including U.S. Army advisors who were
+encountering similar difficulties with the Vietnamese Army, agreed that
+this “defensive psychology” was a by-product of the long subordination
+of the Vietnamese National forces to the French High Command. Indeed,
+a criticism frequently voiced by USMAAG officials during the Indochina
+War had been that the French tended to frustrate the development of
+the Vietnamese military forces by assigning them static security tasks
+rather than offensive missions. Even though the forerunners of the
+Vietnamese Marine battalions had operated as commando units, they too
+had seen extensive duty protecting _dinassaut_ bases and other French
+installations. Now this defensive thinking was affecting the attitude
+of the Vietnamese Marine toward training. Moreover, it was threatening
+the American effort to transform the service into an aggressive
+amphibious strike force.
+
+[Illustration: _First group of Vietnamese Marine officers to attend
+U.S. Marine Officers Basic School, Quantico, Virginia, pose with
+Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (second from right), and
+Captain Michael Gott (extreme right). At the extreme left is Captain Le
+Nguyen Khang, a future Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. To
+his immediate left is Major Le Nhu Hung, a senior officer of the VNMC.
+(Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael Gott, USMC)._]
+
+By nature this particular problem defied quick, simple solutions. The
+Marine advisors, therefore, undertook to adjust the orientation of
+the entire Vietnamese Marine Corps over a prolonged period through
+continuous emphasis on offensive training. The advisors consistently
+encouraged their Vietnamese counterparts to develop training schedules
+which stressed patrolling, ambushing, fire and maneuver, and night
+movement. In this same connection the Marine advisors translated U.S.
+Marine small unit tactics manuals into French, whereupon the same
+manuals were further translated by Vietnamese Marines into Vietnamese.
+This process assured that adequate training literature was made
+available to the individual Marine and his small unit leaders. The
+offensively oriented training programs and the translation project
+complemented one another, and combined with continuous supervision by
+the U.S. advisors and the return of young Vietnamese officers from
+Quantico, gradually helped impart a more aggressive offensive spirit
+to the entire Marine Corps.
+
+
+_Summing Up Developments_
+
+The years between 1955 and 1959 constitute perhaps the most critical
+and challenging span in the chronicle of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.
+Born out of the confusion which dominated South Vietnam in the
+aftermath of the Geneva Agreement, the embryonic Marine Corps had
+survived against heavy odds. Even before its scattered components
+could be drawn together under a centralized command, the Corps had
+been hurled into combat against the rebellious sects. Over the course
+of their commitment the Vietnamese Marines had strengthened their own
+cause through demonstrations of their fighting capability and loyalty.
+In terms of the VNMC’s continued existence, equally critical battles
+were being waged in Saigon where the Senior U.S. Marine Advisor and
+the Vietnamese Senior Marine Officer struggled to gain support for
+the infant service. It was there, ironically, that the destiny of the
+Vietnamese Marine Corps ultimately had been decided.
+
+On balance, the interval between 1955 and 1959 was characterized by
+uncertainty, transition, and problem solving. Never sure of the Marine
+Corps’ future, the Senior Vietnamese Marine Officer and a handful of
+U.S. Marine advisors had carried forward their efforts to transform
+scattered French-inspired river commando units into a coherent and
+responsive American-style amphibious force. While this transformation
+was only partially realized, definite progress was apparent. Vietnamese
+officers had replaced French commanders, and with American guidance,
+had given their service a strong interim structure. Many of the more
+serious problems which had plagued the struggling organization since
+its inception had been identified. With American assistance, solutions
+to those problems were being developed and tested. So, despite a stormy
+beginning and a threatened early childhood, the Vietnamese Marine Corps
+lived.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 3
+
+Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency
+
+_Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency--Insurgency and the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps--Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands--American
+Decisions at the Close of 1961_
+
+
+_Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency_
+
+South Vietnam gave every outward indication that it had achieved a
+measure of overall stability in the two-year period following President
+Diem’s election in the fall of 1955. In early 1956 Diem felt strong
+enough politically to announce his government’s refusal to participate
+in the reunification elections scheduled for midyear. He based this
+position upon the argument that free elections were impossible in
+Communist North Vietnam. The proposed July election deadline passed
+without a serious reaction by North Vietnam. Equally encouraging was
+the fact that there had been no noticeable resurgence in the armed
+power of either the politico-religious sects or the Binh Xuyen. At the
+same time the American-backed South Vietnamese economy appeared to be
+gaining considerable strength.
+
+[Illustration: _Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, USA, Commander,
+Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. (USA Photo SC494954)._]
+
+The threat of invasion from the North had also been tempered somewhat
+by 1958. The MAAG, now headed by Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams,
+U.S. Army, a commander respected as a tough disciplinarian, was
+beginning to reshape the former Vietnamese national forces.[3-A]
+Renamed the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the army now
+consisted of four field divisions (8,500 men each), six light divisions
+(5,000 men each), 13 territorial regiments (whose strength varied), and
+a parachute regiment. Although General Williams viewed this as merely
+an interim organization, it had provided the South Vietnamese army with
+a unified command structure based on sound organizational principles.
+The arrival of a 350-man U.S. Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission
+(TERM) in 1956, moreover, had freed U.S. Army advisors for assignment
+to each ARVN regiment. American officers were likewise reorganizing
+and helping train the small Vietnamese Navy (2,160 officers and
+men) and Air Force (4,000 officers and men). The Vietnamese Marine
+Corps continued to exist as a two-battalion amphibious force within
+the nation’s naval establishment. General Williams felt confident
+that by 1958 South Vietnam’s regular military establishment had been
+strengthened enough to discourage North Vietnamese leaders from
+seriously considering an outright invasion.[3-1]
+
+    [3-A] General Williams would head the MAAG until his retirement
+          in 1960.
+
+Backing these developing regular forces, at least on paper, were two
+generally feeble paramilitary organizations--the Civil Guard (CG)
+and the Village Self Defense Corps (SDC). The larger of these, the
+Civil Guard, existed within the Ministry of Interior and was funded
+and advised by the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM). Its 48,000 men,
+therefore, were not charged against the 150,000-man force level ceiling
+that regulated the size of Diem’s regular forces. Nor were the 47,000
+members of the Self Defense Corps, even though this organization
+received limited amounts of U.S. military assistance funds for payroll
+purposes. In any case, serious shortcomings were evident in both the CG
+and the SDC. Organized into provincial companies directly responsible
+to the various province chiefs, the Civil Guard was entirely separate
+from the ARVN chain of command. Furthermore, American civilians under
+government contract had armed and trained the CG for police-type as
+opposed to military missions. The SDC, essentially a scattering of
+local militia units, was even weaker, having been organized at the
+village level into squads and an occasional platoon. Although the SDC
+units were subordinate to the respective village chief, the ARVN bore
+the responsibility for providing them with arms and training. More
+often than not the Vietnamese Army units gave their obsolete weapons
+to the SDC and showed little genuine interest in training the small
+units.[3-2]
+
+Although a measure of stability was obviously returning to South
+Vietnam by 1958, one of the country’s more serious problems remained
+unsolved--the threat of subversion by Communist Viet Minh agents
+who had remained south of the 17th parallel following the Geneva
+cease-fire. Following the resolution of the sect crisis in 1955,
+Diem turned to neutralize this potential threat. Initially his army
+experienced some success with pacification operations conducted in
+former Viet Minh strongholds. While they did help extend government
+control into the rural areas of several provinces, such operations were
+discontinued in 1956.
+
+Another policy initiated that same year seems to have nullified the
+moderate gains produced by the pacification campaigns. Acting both
+to eliminate Viet Minh sympathizers from positions of leadership at
+the local level and to extend his own grip downward to the rural
+population, Diem replaced elected village officials with appointed
+chiefs. The new policy, which threatened the traditional autonomy of
+the individual Vietnamese village, was immediately unpopular.
+
+So was another government program which Diem implemented to undercut
+Communist strength throughout the country--the Anti-Communist
+Denunciation Campaign. Initiated in mid-1955 to discredit former Viet
+Minh, the denunciation campaign evolved into something of a witch
+hunt. By the late 1950s large numbers of Vietnamese with only minimal
+Communist connections were allegedly being confined in political
+re-education camps. Like the appointment of village leaders, the
+denunciation campaign served to alienate Vietnamese who might otherwise
+have supported the central government in its struggle for control of
+the rural regions.
+
+Forced underground by the Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, Viet
+Minh agents concentrated on strengthening their political posture for
+the proposed general election in the period immediately following the
+Geneva Agreement. When the hope of reunification by plebiscite passed
+in mid-1956, the so-called “stay behinds” began rebuilding clandestine
+political cells in their former strongholds. Having retained their
+aptitude for the adroit manipulation of local grievances, the
+Communists gradually won support from rural Vietnamese who saw
+themselves threatened by the new government policies. In mid-1957,
+the Communists, who were now being labelled “Viet Cong” by the Diem
+government (a derogatory but accurate term which, literally translated,
+meant “Vietnamese Communist”) began assassinating government officials
+in several of the country’s rural provinces. Aimed at unpopular village
+chiefs, rural police, district officials, and school teachers, the Viet
+Cong’s assassination campaign was undertaken to erode the government’s
+contacts with the local populace and thereby enhance their own
+organizational efforts.
+
+Still faced with the possibility of a conventional attack across
+the demilitarized zone, President Diem was reluctant to commit his
+regular military units to a problem which seemed to demand police-type
+operations. Seeing no clear-cut threat, he relied on the Village Self
+Defense Corps and the Civil Guard to maintain order in the provinces.
+Poorly led and equipped, and trained primarily in urban police methods,
+the paramilitary forces proved unable to prevent the diffuse terrorist
+attacks. In the 12-month period between July 1957 and July 1958, for
+example, some 700 more South Vietnamese officials reportedly died at
+the hands of Communist terrorists.[3-3]
+
+The Viet Cong terror-propaganda campaigns continued apace throughout
+1958. The occurrence of the first attacks on U.S. facilities in Saigon
+and the initiation of an anti-American propaganda campaign near the end
+of that year, moreover, indicated that the Communists were broadening
+the scope of their activities. By this time, the internal disturbances
+were beginning to assume the dimensions of a concerted guerrilla
+movement in several of the country’s more heavily populated regions,
+including parts of the important Mekong Delta. Near the close of 1958
+President Diem finally began ordering regular military units into the
+provinces with instructions to eliminate the Viet Cong and restore
+government control.
+
+The very nature of the enemy, however, tended to render such government
+operations ineffective. Essentially, the Viet Cong derived their
+strength from the clandestine political structure which agents had
+established in portions of the countryside. Interwoven into the social
+fabric of the hamlets and villages, this political infrastructure, as
+it later came to be called, served a dual purpose. It was both the
+machinery by which the Communists exercised control over the population
+and a vital base of support for the growing guerrilla forces, providing
+the Viet Cong with men, food, intelligence information, and refuge.
+
+As the Viet Cong guerrillas were recruited from and lived among the
+local populace, outsiders found it virtually impossible to identify
+them. Their familiarity with the local terrain, their methods of
+operating in small groups, and massing for attacks mostly at night made
+locating them equally difficult. Even their patience seemed to enhance
+their ability to survive. Unwilling to engage a stronger military force
+and realizing that a specific government operation could not continue
+indefinitely, the Viet Cong normally would melt into their environment
+with the arrival of regular units. When the operation terminated
+and the regular government forces withdrew, the Communists would
+re-emerge, often stronger than before. In many cases the guerrillas
+could give real meaning to their anti-government propaganda once the
+local population had felt the weight of military operations in their
+particular community. Operating in this manner, the Viet Cong were
+able to husband their strength while simultaneously expanding their
+influence.
+
+There was ample indication that the Communist movement was not wholly
+indigenous to South Vietnam. Indeed, evidence of increasing North
+Vietnamese support for the Viet Cong was becoming apparent near the
+end of the decade. In May 1959, the Central Committee of the North
+Vietnamese Communist Party publicly announced its intention “to smash”
+the government of Ngo Dinh Diem.[3-4] By the summer of that year
+the Viet Cong were being reinforced with men and limited quantities
+of equipment infiltrated from North Vietnam. Many of the Communist
+infiltrators, who at this early stage were entering Diem’s country
+across the DMZ and by sea, were southerners who had gone North with the
+Viet Minh in late 1954. Trained in political and military operations,
+these returnees added substantially to the Viet Cong’s discipline and
+technical capabilities.[3-B]
+
+    [3-B] A State Department publication released in 1965 placed
+          the number of confirmed North Vietnamese infiltrators
+          for the years 1959 and 1960 at 1,800. It also noted that
+          an additional 2,700 North Vietnamese were estimated to
+          have been infiltrated during this two-year period. The
+          vast majority of these were thought to have been former
+          residents of southern Vietnam. (Department of State,
+          _Aggression from the North_, p. 33.)
+
+So strengthened, the Communist guerrillas reportedly were operating
+in battalion strength (300– to 400-man battalions) in some areas by
+mid-1959. Throughout the country they had expanded their activities
+to include hit-and-run attacks on paramilitary posts, district
+headquarters, hospitals, schools, and agricultural stations. Like the
+assassination campaign which was underway concurrently in areas still
+controlled by the GVN, these attacks were conceived with political
+considerations in mind. By successfully raiding remote, poorly defended
+facilities, the Viet Cong was able to embarrass the central government
+while demonstrating their own strength to the local population. The
+raids, furthermore, produced weapons which enabled the guerrillas to
+operate without total dependence on the North.
+
+By mid-1959 the security situation in the Republic of Vietnam had
+deteriorated to the point that much of the optimism formerly voiced
+by American and South Vietnamese officials had begun to disappear.
+The National Intelligence Estimate released in Washington during
+August accurately described the conditions which were settling over
+South Vietnam. This paper disclosed that the nation’s economy was
+beginning to falter noticeably and that President Diem’s government was
+growing increasingly unpopular. Furthermore, the estimate warned that
+harassment by the Viet Cong could be expected to intensify.[3-5]
+
+As predicted, security conditions in South Vietnam did grow worse
+in the period following the August intelligence estimate. In the
+last four months of 1959 almost 200 assassinations were reported. In
+January 1960 another 96 civilians were killed by the Communists and
+in the following month the total reached 122. By the fall of 1960 the
+Viet Cong were strong enough to begin ambushing regular ARVN units
+in several provinces. Like their raids on fixed installations, their
+ambush tactics were resulting in frequent and demoralizing defeats for
+the government. Like the raids, they were also providing weapons and
+ammunition for the growing guerrilla forces.
+
+By 1960 the government’s inability to contain the disturbing malaise
+was beginning to produce political tensions in Saigon. On 26 April a
+group of 18 distinguished Vietnamese political figures, including a
+number of former cabinet members, issued a public demand for President
+Diem’s resignation. Diem refused, eventually ordering the arrest of all
+who signed the manifesto.
+
+A more serious effort to bring down the central government occurred in
+November when a group of military officers led by Colonel Nguyen Chanh
+Thi, the commander of a newly formed (1959) ARVN airborne brigade,
+staged an abortive coup d’etat in Saigon. Two companies of Vietnamese
+Marines joined Thi’s rebellious paratroops.[3-C] But the power
+struggle, which began in the early morning hours of 11 November, ended
+when units loyal to President Diem converged on the capital. Realizing
+that the balance had been tipped against them, the coup leaders fled
+the country and the incident was closed. While it had failed to
+bring down the Diem government, Thi’s attempted coup had revived the
+possibility of efforts by military leaders to seize control of the
+government and had injected a new element of uncertainty into South
+Vietnam’s already unstable internal situation.
+
+    [3-C] Vietnamese Marine participation in the abortive coup of
+          10 November 1960 is covered in greater detail elsewhere
+          in this chapter.
+
+Two other danger signals flashed across Southeast Asia shortly after
+the abortive coup. In January 1961, Communist leaders in Hanoi
+announced that the National Liberation Front (NLF) had been founded
+in the South on 20 December 1960 with the stated purpose of closely
+uniting the “various classes of the South Vietnamese patriotic
+population in the struggle against the Americans and Diem....”[3-6]
+In truth, the NLF emerged as a fully developed Communist political
+organization imported from North Vietnam for the purpose of
+controlling, directing, and coordinating the insurgency south of the
+17th parallel. For American officials, the announced establishment
+of the NLF signified that Ho Chi Minh’s government had opted for the
+forceful reunification of North and South.
+
+Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, another event led to further speculation
+that the war in Vietnam was about to enter a new phase. Backed by the
+North Vietnamese Army, Communist Pathet Lao forces seized control
+of the southeastern portion of the Laotian panhandle. Thus, the
+North Vietnamese obtained a protected corridor along South Vietnam’s
+northwestern border through which men and materiel could be infiltrated
+to the South.
+
+The establishment of the NLF and the Communist takeover in southern
+Laos coincided roughly with approval in Washington of a comprehensive
+plan designed to help President Diem restore internal order. Designated
+the Counter-Insurgency Plan (CIP), this study had been ordered by
+President Eisenhower in early 1960. Developed by Lieutenant General
+Lionel C. McGarr, U.S. Army, the officer who had relieved General
+Williams as MAAG Chief, the completed CIP reached the White House
+shortly after President John F. Kennedy’s inauguration in January 1961.
+Significantly, its arrival came at a time when the Soviet Premier,
+Nikita Khrushchev, was publicly pledging his country’s support for
+“wars of national liberation.”
+
+The plan presented for the new president’s consideration drew clear
+connections between the military and political aspects of the war
+in Vietnam. It included a conditional offer of U.S. support for a
+20,000-man increase in the regular South Vietnamese military forces and
+a 32,000-man increase in the size of the Civil Guard. These military
+and paramilitary increases were to be dependent upon President Diem’s
+agreement to effect major reforms in his military and political
+apparatus--measures which American officials in Saigon considered
+necessary for the success of any counterinsurgency effort.
+
+President Kennedy approved the main provisions of the
+Counter-Insurgency Plan on 28 January 1961 and negotiations on the
+package opened with Diem two weeks later. But the talks soon deadlocked
+on the issue of political and military reforms. Meanwhile, with the
+discussions in Saigon dragging on inconclusively, the situation in
+the provinces continued to worsen. A National Intelligence Estimate
+released in March estimated that Viet Cong military strength had
+reached 10,000 men. Furthermore, the number of violent incidents
+reported in the country had risen to 650 per month. Even worse, it was
+estimated that 58 percent of South Vietnam was under some degree of
+Communist control.[3-7]
+
+Convinced that the situation was becoming critical and fearing that it
+might soon become hopeless, President Kennedy approved a new program
+of military assistance to the Diem government on 29 April. Inspired in
+part by Kennedy’s desire to increase Diem’s confidence in the new U.S.
+administration, the 29 April program did not require concrete pledges
+of reform from the South Vietnamese. In its specifics, however, the new
+package was similar to the CIP. It contained provisions for supporting
+a 20,000 man increase in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
+(RVNAF)--a move which would raise the ceiling on the South Vietnamese
+regular forces from 150,000 to 170,000. Another provision approved
+the use of Military Assistance Program appropriations for the Civil
+Guard and Self Defense Corps and expanded the MAAG’s responsibility to
+include training and equipping these forces. Under the 29 April plan,
+the paramilitary forces were to be transferred from Diem’s Ministry of
+the Interior to his Ministry of Defense. In order to meet its increased
+advisory responsibilities, authorization was given to increase the size
+of the MAAG by 100 men to a strength of 785. This provision allowed the
+first enlargement of the group since the introduction of the Temporary
+Equipment Recovery Mission in 1956.[3-D]
+
+    [3-D] With the dissolution of TERM in the late 1950s, the
+          International Control Commission had granted permission
+          for the MAAG to maintain a strength of 685 men. When the
+          logistics personnel departed Vietnam, new advisor billets
+          were created within the MAAG’s table of organization.
+
+General McGarr’s advisory group began implementing President Kennedy’s
+29 April program during the summer of 1961. But the increases in the
+government’s regular and paramilitary establishments and in the size
+of the MAAG failed to arrest the trend of warfare on South Vietnam’s
+battlefields. The remainder of 1961 was characterized by increasingly
+aggressive guerrilla operations and the steady growth of Viet Cong
+military forces. In August, for example, the ARVN reported 41 major
+armed attacks on its units. The following month brought 450 Viet
+Cong-initiated incidents, including several involving multi-battalion
+forces of over 1,000 guerrillas. In mid-September, for example, an
+estimated 1,500 Viet Cong overran Phuoc Vin, the capital of Phuoc
+Thuan Province, and held the town for an entire day before escaping
+unmolested into the countryside.[3-8]
+
+Equally alarming was the rapid rise in the Viet Cong’s overall
+strength. Increasing numbers of Communist troops were now being
+infiltrated over recently opened trails through Laos. Curving
+southwestward out of the North Vietnamese panhandle, these infiltration
+routes enabled the Communists to bypass the demilitarized zone which
+separated the two Vietnamese states and continue their southward
+movement down the length of Laos and into Cambodia. From sanctuaries
+within these countries the North Vietnamese could easily infiltrate
+into South Vietnam by using trails through the rugged mountains.
+Relying primarily on these routes, over 3,750 North Vietnamese
+infiltrators reportedly entered South Vietnam during 1961. Successful
+recruiting in the South served as another source of manpower for
+the Viet Cong. Well propagandized, the steady cadence of victories
+greatly enhanced the Viet Cong’s prestige and thereby made recruitment
+less difficult. By the end of 1961 infiltration from the North and
+recruitment in the South had swollen the Viet Cong regular military
+forces to an estimated 25,000 men.
+
+
+_Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps_
+
+At the end of 1958, when President Diem began ordering his regular
+military forces into action against the Viet Cong, the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps was a two-battalion infantry force organized within South
+Vietnam’s naval establishment. The 1,837-man corps was still commanded
+by Major Le Nhu Hung. Hung maintained his headquarters at the Cuu Long
+Navy Yard, an installation situated on an estuary near the Saigon-Gia
+Dinh boundary. Although they continued to maintain barracks at Nha
+Trang and Cam Ranh Bay respectively, the 1st and 2d Landing Battalions
+were now being rotated to crude little camps near Bien Hoa, a town
+located about 20 miles northeast of the capital. Lieutenant Colonel
+Wilkinson, who had replaced Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes as Senior
+Marine Advisor in mid-1958, operated out of the MAAG headquarters in
+Saigon but maintained an office in the VNMC headquarters at Cuu Long.
+Wilkinson’s two assistants, Captains Gary Wilder and Dale N. Davis,
+lived with their battalions.
+
+Elements of Hung’s Marine Corps were among the first regular government
+units committed to the counterguerrilla effort. The 1st Landing
+Battalion was ordered into action by the Joint General Staff in the
+closing weeks of 1958. After deploying from Bien Hoa, the battalion
+spent nearly two months searching for Viet Cong in a mosquito-infested
+region of An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost province. Primarily,
+the Vietnamese Marines conducted company and platoon-sized patrols
+through rugged mangrove swamps in search of guerrillas. When the
+operation ended in late January 1959, the Vietnamese commanders
+reported that their units had killed and captured several Communist
+guerrillas and political leaders. Their troops had also reported
+finding a suspected guerrilla training camp which contained small
+quantities of food and some weapons. The Vietnamese Marines suffered
+no casualties during their deployment. Adhering to prevailing USMAAG
+policy, the U.S. Marine advisors did not accompany the unit into
+combat. Unable to observe the operation, the American advisors could
+not accurately assess the battalion’s tactical proficiency.
+
+[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., USMC,
+Senior Marine Advisor. (USMC Photo A229373)._]
+
+A few months after this initial operation, both VNMC battalions were
+deployed against the Viet Cong--the 1st again to An Xuyen Province
+and the 2d to Vinh Binh Province south of Saigon on the seacoast.
+So deployed, both units came under the operational control of the
+respective province chiefs. In widely-scattered actions fought during
+May, the 1st Battalion and a Civil Guard unit claimed to have inflicted
+over 200 casualties on the Viet Cong. In Vinh Binh Province, one
+company of the 2d Landing Battalion reported killing 18 guerrillas and
+capturing over 100 more. Again, U.S. Marine advisors were not present
+and therefore could not assess the accuracy of these reports. In any
+case, these were the final combat operations for the Vietnamese Marine
+Corps as a two-battalion force.
+
+Obviously, U.S. and Vietnamese authorities in Saigon were giving
+increased attention to the growing internal threat. Still, they
+had yet to initiate any sweeping changes in the orientation of the
+RVNAF. Indeed, in early 1959, the entire ARVN was in the final phase
+of a reorganization program which would culminate by midyear in the
+formation of seven divisions of uniform size (10,500 men each), five
+territorial regiments, and an airborne brigade (formed from the old
+Army parachute regiment). Under the new organization the seven standard
+divisions were to be deployed in or near population centers throughout
+the country and were to be organized under two corps headquarters,
+one (I Corps) located at Da Nang, and the other (II Corps) located at
+Pleiku in the Central Highlands. A third provisional corps headquarters
+had also been formed in Saigon for activation in the event of a
+national emergency.[3-E]
+
+    [3-E] By 1961 the third corps headquarters would be activated
+          and geographic boundaries of all three corps would
+          be delineated to facilitate the coordination of the
+          government’s military efforts against the Viet Cong.
+          These military-geographic subdivisions were termed corps
+          tactical zones (CTZ).
+
+One of the MAAG’s reactions to the emerging guerrilla threat was to
+urge that President Diem transfer the Civil Guard to his Ministry of
+Defense. This adjustment, General Williams pointed out, would permit
+the MAAG to train and equip the CG for a mobile counterguerrilla
+mission. But it also entailed raising the 150,000-man force level
+ceiling. When both the Diem government and the U.S. Embassy objected
+to the proposed transfer, the MAAG turned to another alternative:
+the strengthening and use of the regular units whose assignment to
+counterguerrilla operations would not seriously disturb the country’s
+counterinvasion potential. The Vietnamese Marine Corps, whose infantry
+battalions had already participated in several operations against the
+Viet Cong, fell into this category of units to be bolstered for the
+counterguerrilla role.
+
+It was against this background that the VNMC was enlarged again
+in mid-1959. This latest expansion was generally accomplished in
+accordance with the staff study prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Croizat
+some three years earlier. On 1 June, after both Marine battalions
+had returned from their combat assignments in the Mekong Delta, a 3d
+Landing Battalion was formed at a camp just outside the Cuu Long
+Navy Yard. This new unit, manned primarily by troops transferred from
+amphibious elements then being phased out of the reorganized ARVN,
+was built around a small nucleus of seasoned Marine officers and
+noncommissioned officers. Transferred from the 1st and 2d Battalions,
+most of these Marines had seen combat against the Viet Minh, the sects,
+and the Viet Cong.
+
+Another development saw a fourth rifle company added to each Marine
+infantry battalion. In turn, the old heavy weapons companies were
+abolished. The 81mm mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles were reorganized
+into platoons within the battalions’ headquarters and service
+companies. New weapons, two 60mm mortars, and personnel to man them
+were added to each Marine rifle company. These adjustments raised the
+strength of the infantry battalions to around 900 officers and men
+and provided the Vietnamese Marine Corps with a basic organizational
+structure which its infantry battalions would retain throughout the
+coming decade.[3-F]
+
+    [3-F] A side-effect of this reorganization was the modification
+          of the VNMC’s table of equipment. The most important
+          change saw the Vietnamese Marine riflemen exchange their
+          M-1 carbines for the heavier M-1 rifle, the weapon with
+          which the ARVN infantry forces were equipped.
+
+Concurrent with the formation of the 3d Battalion and the modification
+of the organizational tables, the VNMC was formally designated the
+“Marine Corps Group.” Now numbering 2,276 officers and men, the
+Vietnamese Marines were formed into a group headquarters, a group
+headquarters and service company, a 4.2-inch mortar battery, and the
+three infantry battalions.[3-G]
+
+    [3-G] The Vietnamese Marine Group continued to be known as the
+          Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) in spite of its formal
+          redesignation.
+
+As important as the VNMC’s expansion, reorganization, and redesignation
+was the dramatic change in its role within the Vietnamese armed forces.
+On 1 June the Joint General Staff directed the Vietnamese Marine Corps
+and the newly formed ARVN airborne brigade to assume the mission of the
+general reserve force for the entire RVNAF. So assigned, the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps became a “force in readiness”--a service directly
+responsible to the Joint General Staff for any assigned ground warfare
+mission.[3-9]
+
+[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE GROUP) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JUNE
+1959
+
+AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 2,276]
+
+The Vietnamese Marine battalions and elements of the ARVN airborne
+brigade (also garrisoned near Saigon) were ordered into action against
+the Viet Cong with increasing frequency after being designated the
+RVNAF general reserve. Usually, the Marine battalions, like their
+airborne counterparts, were assigned to operate in a particular
+province for a specified time period. In such assignments the battalion
+commander was directly responsible to the province chief who, in most
+cases, was a military officer. The province chiefs sometimes utilized
+the Marines in conjunction with their Civil Guard units. It was not
+uncommon for the Vietnamese Marines to find themselves conducting
+operations in the most rugged and inaccessible regions of the province
+to which they were assigned. In such deployments the Marine battalions
+often bore the brunt of hostile action or suffered the physical
+hardships associated with living and fighting in the most adverse
+swamps and jungles.
+
+[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marine riflemen traverse mosquito-infested
+swamps of the Ca Mau Peninsula on August 1961 operation. (Photo
+courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC.)_]
+
+In connection with their continuing campaign to transform the
+Vietnamese Marine Corps into a truly elite fighting organization, the
+U.S. Marine Advisors encouraged the Vietnamese Leathernecks to take
+pride in the difficult and dangerous missions now being assigned. In a
+related effort intended to generate _esprit de corps_ throughout the
+service, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson proposed that the Marine Corps
+adopt an official emblem and a distinctive uniform. These suggestions
+produced results when a board of Vietnamese officers selected an emblem
+design similar to that of the U.S. Marines. Shortly thereafter the VNMC
+adopted a light weight, black and green “tiger stripe” camouflaged
+utility uniform similar to that formerly worn in Indochina by French
+commando units. Although designed and procured primarily for use in
+steamy tropical jungles, the colorful uniform came to be worn in
+garrison with a dark green beret. Along with the newly adopted emblem,
+which was worn as a patch over the left breast pocket, this uniform
+became the distinguishing mark of the Vietnamese Marine and his U.S.
+Marine advisor. Together, the uniform and emblem did much to set the
+VNMC apart from the other South Vietnamese armed services.[3-10]
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson instigated another change during this
+same period which did much to improve the effectiveness of the Marine
+advisory program. Since the sect rebellion of 1955 American policy had
+prohibited all U.S. military personnel from participating in combat
+with South Vietnamese forces. Because the prevailing restrictions
+prevented his assistants from accurately assessing the combat
+capabilities of the Vietnamese Marine battalions, Wilkinson requested
+that they be allowed to accompany their units into action. After some
+study, General Williams, still the MAAG Chief, approved this request
+with the stipulation that the U.S. Marines were to act strictly as
+non-participating observers.[3-11] This privilege was not extended to
+other MAAG personnel. Wilkinson and his assistants, therefore, became
+the first American servicemen to witness actual combat operations
+against the Viet Cong. So through an informal and relatively unknown
+arrangement, a handful of Marine advisors were able to insure that
+principles being stressed in training were being applied in combat.
+Now operating alongside the Vietnamese Marines in action, the advisors
+were also able to obtain a better appreciation of the terrain and enemy
+and a more thorough understanding of the frustrating problems being
+encountered by the VNMC units.
+
+The first half of 1960 brought changes in both the leadership of the
+Vietnamese Marine Corps and the U.S. Marine advisory program. In May
+President Diem relieved Major Hung as Senior Marine Officer. His
+replacement was Major Le Nguyen Khang, an officer who spoke fluent
+English and who had been the first Vietnamese Marine graduated from
+the U.S. Marine Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico. A capable and
+inspiring officer who had formerly commanded a landing battalion
+in combat against the Viet Cong, Khang was to head the VNMC for
+over three years. The following month Lieutenant Colonel Clifford
+J. Robichaud relieved Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson as Senior Marine
+Advisor. Like Khang, Robichaud had seen combat previously. A former
+master sergeant, he had been commissioned during World War II and had
+fought as an infantry unit leader on Guadalcanal and later in Korea.
+Like all U.S. Marines assigned as advisors to the VNMC after 1960,
+Robichaud was scheduled to serve only a one year tour in South Vietnam.
+
+[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marine Corps Emblem._]
+
+Combat assignments against the Viet Cong continued to dominate the
+VNMC’s activities during the remainder of 1960. With Communist forces
+now capable of battalion-sized operations in some areas, the Joint
+General Staff began deploying government forces to the provinces
+in multi-battalion strength. By late 1960 the Vietnamese Marines
+were conducting two-battalion operations controlled by a task force
+headquarters. Khang, now a lieutenant colonel, normally commanded these
+Marine task forces.
+
+[Illustration: _Colonel Clifford J. Robichaud, USMC, Senior Marine
+Advisor. (USMC Photo A25342)._]
+
+It was during one such operation, in which the 1st and 2d VNMC
+Battalions were operating together in the provinces south of Saigon,
+that elements of the 3d Battalion became involved in the abortive
+coup of November 1960. The power struggle began in the early morning
+hours of the 11th while the U.S. Marine advisors were attending an
+informal celebration of the Marine Corps birthday at Lieutenant Colonel
+Robichaud’s quarters in Saigon. At the appointed hour Colonel Thi’s
+rebellious paratroops, accompanied by the 3d VNMC battalion commander
+and two Marine companies from Cuu Long, moved into the capital on
+trucks and seized the Joint General Staff Headquarters. The remainder
+of the 3d battalion, led by the battalion executive officer, who was
+unaware of his superior’s intentions, moved to the presidential palace
+and established protection for Diem. Word of the coup, meanwhile,
+had reached Khang at his field headquarters in the Mekong Delta. Led
+by the Senior Marine Officer, the 1st and 2d Battalions returned to
+Saigon by truck convoy and immediately joined the two Marine companies
+already around the palace. For several hours the possibility existed
+that Khang’s Marines might clash with Thi’s paratroops or even with
+the two rebellious Marine companies of the 3d Battalion. But pro-Diem
+units soon began converging on Saigon in such numbers that the coup
+collapsed. Thi and his associates fled the country, whereupon Diem
+appointed new officers to command the insubordinate units. With
+loyalists in charge throughout South Vietnam’s military and naval
+services, the incident was closed. Both the airborne brigade and the
+VNMC resumed their functions as the RVNAF general reserve.[3-12]
+
+By the summer of 1961 the USMAAG, now headed by General McGarr, was
+ready to implement the 20,000-man expansion of the RVNAF as authorized
+in the package approved by President Kennedy the previous spring.
+Included in this U.S. program were plans to increase the size of the
+Vietnamese Marine Corps by over 1,000 men. This expansion got underway
+in July when the initial steps were taken to form a fourth infantry
+battalion and a 75mm pack-howitzer battery--additions which were to
+raise the authorized strength of the VNMC to 3,321 officers and men.
+The transfer of ARVN artillerymen provided the personnel necessary to
+man the pack-howitzer unit, which formed near Thu Duc, a small town
+about 13 miles north of the capital. Officers and noncommissioned
+officers were drawn from the three existing VNMC battalions to form
+a nucleus for the new infantry battalion while its ranks were filled
+gradually by recruitment. This 4th Battalion was organized at Vung
+Tau, a coastal resort town situated on Cape St. Jacques about 40 miles
+southeast of Saigon. Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Brown, a World War II
+veteran who replaced Robichaud as Senior Marine Advisor in August, was
+on hand to assist with this latest reorganization of the VNMC.
+
+While the new Marine units were forming the JGS ordered the Vietnamese
+Navy and Marine Corps to conduct an amphibious assault against a
+suspected Communist stronghold near South Vietnam’s southern tip.
+The objective area was a portion of the U Minh Forest, an extensive
+inundated region located along the western coast of the Ca Mau
+Peninsula. Because it was inaccessible by land, the forest had served
+as Communist base area since the French Indochina War. The concept
+of operation called for the Marines to land at daybreak, move inland
+through the mangrove swamps, and hopefully push Viet Cong elements into
+ARVN units which would have established a blocking force inland from
+the beach. Captains Michael J. Gott and James S. G. Turner, two U.S.
+Marine advisors, embarked on board two World War II vintage Vietnamese
+Navy LCIs (landing craft, infantry) at Saigon with the 1st and 3d
+Battalions respectively.
+
+[Illustration: _Captain Michael J. Gott, infantry advisor to the
+Vietnamese Marine Corps, discusses tactical plans with Vietnamese
+officers. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott,
+USMC)._]
+
+A series of problems arose on the morning of the operation to delay the
+landing for several hours. When the Marines finally came ashore late
+in the morning they failed to locate any enemy forces. Captain Gott,
+who accompanied the 1st Battalion for the duration of the operations
+ashore, later recounted the difficulties. He noted, for instance, that
+no U.S. Navy advisors were embarked on board the Vietnamese ships. As
+a result, the relatively inexperienced Vietnamese sailors encountered
+technical difficulties with their navigational aids, and the ships
+arrived at the objective area late. Inexperience on the part of the
+Vietnamese Marines and sailors in debarkation techniques compounded
+the delay. Once ashore, outdated French maps and dense mangrove jungle
+combined to retard the Marines’ progress inland, thus allowing the
+Viet Cong ample time to melt away. Gott concluded that some of the
+difficulties encountered after the landing phase of the operation might
+have been offset by the presence of observation aircraft. As it was,
+the Marines’ visibility was restricted throughout the operation by
+thick mangrove vegetation. Thus a combination of unforeseen factors had
+rendered this particular operation ineffective.[3-13]
+
+[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE GROUP) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 AUGUST
+1961
+
+AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 3,321]
+
+A similar landing was repeated in the same area the following month.
+Again the participating Marine units failed to engage Viet Cong forces.
+Vietnamese Navy and Marine officers complained that there were no
+enemy troops in the area and that the government’s intelligence was
+inaccurate. Whatever the reason, the results of these two unsuccessful
+offensives typified the problems which plagued most South Vietnamese
+ground forces throughout the country during the 1960–1961 period. The
+Communist guerrillas, aided by difficult terrain, a well-developed
+intelligence network, and sometimes by the local population, could
+usually evade government units whenever escape was desirable. Because
+the Marines normally operated in unfamiliar areas where the Viet
+Cong political apparatus was strong, their units were particularly
+frustrated. In regions such as the U Minh Forest intelligence
+information simply did not flow upward from the people. Instead, in
+such Communist-controlled environments, the local Vietnamese served
+the Viet Cong, warning them of strengths, locations, and movements of
+Marine units.
+
+While combat deployments such as the Ca Mau landings highlighted
+the remainder of 1961, the Marine battalions nevertheless spent the
+majority of their time in non-combat assignments. During such periods
+the battalions occupied their respective base camps around Saigon and
+Vung Tau, awaiting orders from the Joint General Staff. Even though
+held in reserve, they frequently were called upon to provide security
+detachments for vital points such as bridges, naval facilities,
+and communications installations. Most U.S. Marine advisors tended
+to oppose such assignments, contending that they detracted from
+the overall readiness of the battalions and disrupted much needed
+training. The utilization of the VNMC units in static security roles
+also conflicted with the advisor’s continuing efforts to convince the
+Vietnamese Marine that he belonged to an elite, offensively oriented
+strike force. Still, despite the protestations of the American
+advisors, the JGS persisted in dispersing VNMC detachments in and
+around the capital.
+
+Although its battalions were sometimes being frustrated, both in
+their attempts to accomplish unit training and in their attempts to
+fix Communist troop formations, the VNMC’s involvement in the war
+effort was forcing improvement of the service in other areas. Frequent
+inspections by U.S. advisors revealed that the Vietnamese were placing
+more emphasis on the care of individual equipment and weapons.
+Replacement items were being requisitioned with more promptness and
+unit commanders were beginning to show increasing concern about the
+slow receipt of requested supply items. The replacement of worn-out
+World War II trucks with new vehicles removed a long-standing source
+of trouble in that it greatly reduced the time consumed in performing
+major mechanical repairs on the older vehicles. Even the frequent
+deployments of the VNMC battalions were helping to improve the overall
+combat readiness of the service by preparing a solid core of small unit
+leaders and troops for operations against the Viet Cong.
+
+
+_Ancillary Effects of Marine Pacific Commands_
+
+At the same time the intensified conflict in South Vietnam was
+forcing improvement on the VNMC, it was having a similar but less
+direct effect on U.S. Marine commands in the Pacific. In early 1961
+Lieutenant General Alan Shapley, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine
+Force, Pacific (FMFPac), approved a plan to assign individual Marines
+from his scattered commands to temporary duty in Vietnam. The purpose
+of this program, which became known as On-The-Job Training (OJT),
+was to allow Marine officers and noncommissioned officers to obtain
+first-hand knowledge of the complex nature of the conflict being waged
+in South Vietnam. Beginning in May 1961 small groups of officers and
+noncommissioned officers from various FMFPac commands were sent each
+month to observe the counterguerrilla techniques being developed and
+employed in Vietnam. Although the OJTs were normally “in country” for
+only a two-week period, the program was gradually producing a pool
+of small unit leaders somewhat acquainted with the situation in the
+Republic of Vietnam by the end of 1961.[3-H]
+
+    [3-H] The OJT program would be suspended briefly near the end
+          of 1962 but would be reinstituted in the first months of
+          1963.
+
+[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marines wade ashore from a Vietnamese
+Navy Landing Ship, initiating a search for Viet Cong on the Ca Mau
+Peninsula. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott,
+USMC)._]
+
+The major Marine command to feel the impact of the war in Southeast
+Asia during the early 1960s was the 3d Marine Division, a 20,000-man
+combat-ready force headquartered on Okinawa. In addition to its
+participation in the OJT program, the 3d Marine Division began altering
+its conventional amphibious orientation. Major General Donald M.
+Weller, the division commander, provided the initial impetus for this
+shift away from a purely conventional posture. Weller, who in early
+1961 had commanded a task force headquarters formed in response to
+the deteriorating military situation in Laos, anticipated that his
+command might be committed to combat somewhere on the Southeast Asian
+mainland. He therefore instructed his staff to begin studying possible
+counterinsurgency training programs which would help “turn the entire
+orientation of the division toward the type of intervention [which] we
+would be faced with in Southeast Asia.”[3-14]
+
+[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marines advance from concealment during
+search operations on the Ca Mau Peninsula. (Photo courtesy of
+Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC)._]
+
+Major General Robert E. Cushman, holder of a Navy Cross and a future
+Commandant of the Marine Corps, assumed command of the 3d Marine
+Division in September 1961 before General Weller’s objectives could
+be fully realized. The new commanding general immediately convened a
+Counterguerrilla Warfare Study Group to consider the problem. This
+study group framed a set of recommendations for Cushman in late 1961.
+His approval of their proposals led to the creation of an Infantry Unit
+Training Course and a Command and Staff Training Course early the next
+year.
+
+Conducted in Okinawa’s rugged Northern Training Area, the infantry
+course prepared rifle companies from the various infantry battalions
+for participation in counterguerrilla warfare. The instructors,
+graduates of either the Jungle Warfare School in Johore, Malaya, or the
+new Army Special Warfare School at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, placed
+much emphasis on the origins and nature of guerrilla movements, small
+units tactics, and night operations. The training syllabus for this
+course included several live firing exercises designed for individual
+Marines and fire teams. Some of these exercises required the Marines to
+negotiate “jungle lanes” equipped with pop-up targets. The week-long
+infantry course culminated with a two and one-half day field operation
+for the individual infantry platoons.
+
+The Command and Staff Training course was somewhat less rigorous,
+being designed primarily to prepare battalion staffs to support their
+companies in a counterinsurgency environment. Less than 10 hours in
+length, this course was based primarily on lectures and map exercises.
+
+At General Cushman’s direction, the division G-3 (Operations Section)
+began stressing the significance of counterinsurgency training at all
+echelons of the division. Unconventional warfare training soon became
+an integral part of the training schedules at every echelon. Under this
+program the various infantry battalions were required to conduct an
+extended battalion-sized counterguerrilla operation, and to report to
+the G-3 on the progress of their efforts.[3-15]
+
+The FMFPac On-The-Job Training program and the 3d Marine Division’s
+new approach to training complemented each other in several ways.
+Whereas the OJT program helped create an awareness of counterguerrilla
+operations among individual Marine officers and noncommissioned
+officers, the division’s training programs achieved the same results at
+the staff and battalion level. At points the two programs overlapped
+to the further benefit of the 3d Marine Division. Attuned to the
+nature of guerrilla warfare and the problems involved in countering
+the guerrilla, the officers and noncommissioned officers who returned
+from OJT assignments in Vietnam provided assistance in planning and
+supervising the division’s counterinsurgency training programs. Short
+of actual commitment to combat in a guerrilla-type environment, it
+is doubtful that any other combination of training could have better
+prepared the 3d Marine Division for a future assignment in Vietnam.
+
+
+_American Decisions at the Close of 1961_
+
+The progressive erosion of the government’s strength and the steady
+growth of the Viet Cong during 1961 prompted President Kennedy to
+dispatch his special military advisor, General Maxwell D. Taylor, to
+Vietnam in mid-October. Taylor, who had retired in the late 1950s after
+having served as Chief of Staff of the Army, carried the following
+instructions from the president:
+
+    I should like you to proceed to Saigon for the purpose of
+    appraising the situation in South Vietnam, particularly as it
+    concerns the threat to the internal security and defense of
+    that country and adjacent areas. After you have conferred with
+    the appropriate United States and South Vietnamese authorities,
+    including the Commander in Chief, Pacific, I would like your views
+    on the courses of action which our Government might take at this
+    juncture to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in South
+    Vietnam; and eventually to contain and eliminate the threat to its
+    independence.[3-16]
+
+Like other American officials who had visited Diem’s republic during
+the course of the year, General Taylor returned to Washington convinced
+that South Vietnam was in grave danger. In a report delivered to
+President Kennedy in November, the general outlined his formula for
+salvaging the situation. This included the broad recommendation that
+the United States abandon its existing policy of strict military
+advice and begin cooperating with the Vietnamese in a form of “limited
+partnership.” The American role in such a partnership, Taylor
+explained, would be to provide “working” advisors and “working”
+military units to aid South Vietnam’s military forces.
+
+General Taylor’s report offered several specific proposals for
+implementing such a program. Among these were recommendations that
+three U.S. Army helicopter companies and approximately 6,000–8,000
+American ground troops be deployed quickly to the Republic of Vietnam.
+The helicopter units would support the government’s ground operations
+but the American ground forces were to be used only in a defensive
+posture. Taylor believed that their presence would underscore the
+United States’ determination to stand by South Vietnam. A side-effect
+of this display of determination would be to stimulate the morale of
+the republic’s armed forces. He added that in order to support such a
+build-up, it would be necessary to restructure and increase the size of
+the USMAAG.
+
+President Kennedy’s consideration of Taylor’s proposals resulted in a
+compromise decision which cleared the way for more intense American
+involvement in the Vietnam conflict. After securing Diem’s approval in
+early December, Kennedy authorized the Department of Defense to expand
+its advisory and assistance programs. To enhance the effectiveness of
+the advisory program, he removed some of the official restrictions
+under which most U.S. military advisors had operated since 1955. One
+important change would allow all advisors to accompany their Vietnamese
+units into combat. At the same time President Kennedy decided against
+ordering U.S. ground forces into the war zone; however, he instructed
+the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, to prepare plans for such
+a contingency. He also approved General Taylor’s recommendation that
+American helicopter units be sent to support the RVNAF. The arrival of
+the first of these reinforcements just before 1961 ended, signalled
+the beginning of a new and more dynamic phase of American military
+participation in the struggle to preserve the independence of South
+Vietnam.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 4
+
+An Expanding War, 1962
+
+_The War’s New Context--Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory
+Division--The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962--Some Conclusions_
+
+
+_The War’s New Context_
+
+More than any previous year, 1962 was to be a period of deepened
+commitment for all participants in the continuing struggle for control
+of South Vietnam. On the American side plans already set in motion by
+President Kennedy’s recent decisions promised to loosen the flow of
+dollars, equipment, advisors, and combat support personnel to South
+Vietnam. Administration officials envisioned that this sharp influx of
+assistance would stimulate a redoubled war effort on the part of the
+Diem government.
+
+Viet Cong strength and operational capabilities likewise were on the
+upswing as 1962 opened. U.S. and South Vietnamese sources were placing
+total Viet Cong military strength at roughly 25,000 men. Backing these
+military forces was a far greater number of sympathizers. American
+agencies tended to divide the Communist military forces into three
+rough categories according to function and composition--main forces,
+local forces, and village activists. Thought to total around 9,000 men
+at the beginning of the year, the main forces constituted the pillar
+of Communist military strength in the South. They were organized into
+approximately 20 small (200– to 400-man) and highly mobile battalions
+and a number of independent companies. Main force units as a rule
+were cadred by North Vietnamese (or returnees trained in the North)
+and were capable of conducting operations on an interprovincial
+scale. (They often were referred to as interprovincial battalions and
+companies. Later in the war Americans came to call the main forces
+“hard core” units.) Next in terms of operational capabilities were the
+Viet Cong local forces whose aggregate strength stood at around 8,000
+part-time but well-trained soldiers. The local forces were organized
+into platoons and companies which operated independently within
+their respective districts. Finally, there were some 8,000 village
+activists. Part-time guerrillas in the truest sense of the term, the
+activists commonly worked in the paddies by day and engaged in military
+pursuits at night. For the most part their ranks were filled with men
+considered either too young or too old for service with organized Viet
+Cong military units. Nevertheless, they played an important role in the
+struggle for South Vietnam’s rural areas by providing various forms
+of support for larger Viet Cong formations. Living and working within
+the rural hamlets and villages as they did, the activists were a ready
+source of intelligence information for the Viet Cong. Often they served
+as porters and guides for main force units which had been assigned to
+operate within their locale. Otherwise, the activists were responsible
+for defending their particular villages against the government’s
+military and police forces--a defense which normally took the form of
+harassment with mines and sniper fire.[4-A]
+
+    [4-A] The three-way division was the most commonly used method
+          of categorizing the Communist forces. (See U.S. Army,
+          _The Viet Cong_, p. I:52.) A USMAAG document published
+          during this period, however, divided the Viet Cong
+          into two somewhat broader categories--main forces and
+          guerrillas. Both local force units and village activists
+          were classified as guerrillas under this system. (USMAAG,
+          Vietnam, _Tactics and Techniques of Counterinsurgent
+          Operations_, p. II-5.) Other sources tended to make more
+          elaborate divisions. (See Pike, _Viet Cong_.)
+
+After early 1962 the activities of these Viet Cong military and
+paramilitary forces were carefully coordinated with Communist political
+activities on the national level by a Central Office for South Vietnam
+(COSVN).[4-B] From its headquarters, believed to have been located
+northeast of Saigon in Binh Duong Province, COSVN exercised direct
+control over six military regions (MRs). Designated MR-5 through MR-9
+(arranged in a north to south pattern) with an additional Saigon-Gia
+Dinh Special Zone, the Communist military regions served essentially
+the same purpose as the government’s corps tactical zones. Within
+these six regions COSVN utilized a province and district structure
+only slightly different from that of the Diem government to exercise
+administrative and military control. At each level within this
+organization a small, disciplined Communist political committee
+orchestrated the activities of its subordinate military units with the
+actions of its political apparatus.
+
+    [4-B] COSVN apparently was established in March. Prior to this
+          the NLF had functioned through two separate geographic
+          headquarters--Interzone V, responsible for roughly the
+          northern three-quarters of South Vietnam, and the NAMBO
+          Interzone, responsible for the area roughly described by
+          the forested hills and Mekong Delta physiographic regions.
+
+To counter the strengthened NLF organization and to satisfy American
+demands that he adopt some form of national strategy, President Diem
+launched one of the most controversial large-scale undertakings of the
+war--the Strategic Hamlet Program. Instituted on an informal basis
+in the closing stages of 1961, the program became fully operative in
+mid-1962. Although heralded as a new concept, the campaign actually
+grew out of an existing program whose broad objective had been to bring
+improved economic and social conditions to South Vietnam’s rural areas.
+Named the Agroville Program, this effort had been in effect since late
+1959 under the direction of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president’s brother and
+principal advisor. Since its institution, however, the program had
+achieved little aside from the resettlement of many rural families
+into government constructed communities. Few meaningful reforms,
+either social or economic, had been realized. During the early 1960s,
+moreover, many of the Agrovilles had been victimized by the Viet Cong,
+who saw the developments as symbols of the government’s presence in
+contested areas. By mid-1961, in an effort to protect the more remote
+Agrovilles, authorities in several provinces had begun fortifying the
+otherwise helpless population centers.
+
+Concurrent with this evolution of the Agrovilles into fortified
+communities, Sir Robert G. K. Thompson, the head of a newly formed
+British Advisory Mission in Saigon, suggested that President Diem
+consider adopting a similar scheme with broader strategic objectives.
+Thompson, who had helped implement such an effort in Malaya in
+the 1950s during the struggle there against Communist insurgents,
+specifically proposed that the South Vietnamese integrate various
+economic and social programs into an effective campaign to reestablish
+its influence in the heavily populated Mekong Delta. This campaign,
+Thompson advised, “should lead by stages to a reorganization of the
+government machinery for directing and coordinating all action against
+the communists and the production of an overall strategic operational
+plan for the country as a whole....”[4-1]
+
+Under pressure from the U.S. Embassy to develop some sort of national
+strategy for countering the insurgency, President Diem accepted the
+concept of Thompson’s proposal. Shortly thereafter, Diem named Ngo
+Dinh Nhu to head a campaign formally designated the Strategic Hamlet
+Program. Nhu was instructed to plan the program and to create a
+combined agency that would insure its coordination within the various
+government ministries. These instructions resulted in the creation (in
+February) of the Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets. A
+counterpart American organization, the U.S. Interagency Committee for
+Province Rehabilitation, was formed in April to provide assistance to
+Nhu’s agency.
+
+With advice from Thompson and the U.S. Embassy, the Vietnamese
+formulated a program which in theory was to evolve in several rather
+distinct phases. First it would be necessary to select specific
+geographic areas wherein the Strategic Hamlet Program would be
+implemented. Once specific objective areas had been established,
+regular military units would initiate operations to clear those areas
+of Viet Cong formations. Following the completion of these operations
+RVNAF units would resettle the inhabitants of the area in fortified
+hamlets. Initially these hamlets were to be defended by Civil Guard
+units while regular forces continued screening operations in the
+surrounding countryside. In the final phase, Self Defense Corps units
+would assume responsibility for local security while regular units
+continued to screen Viet Cong forces from the developments. During this
+phase district civil authorities would initiate economic and social
+programs within the newly formed communities in an effort to recapture
+the allegiance of the local populace. Thus, in this final phase, it was
+expected that the Communist political infrastructure would be broken.
+
+Following the pacification of a few contiguous hamlets, the same
+process was to be repeated over and over, in an expanding pattern.
+In this manner Diem hoped to expand the GVN’s control progressively
+outward from the initial secure hamlets over large areas of the
+countryside. Ultimately the GVN intended to construct nearly 11,000
+such protected communities in several of the country’s most critical
+rural areas.
+
+A principal shortcoming of this method of pacification was that the
+success of the entire program within a specific area depended on the
+successful completion of virtually every developmental phase in every
+strategic hamlet. Should the Communist infrastructure remain intact
+in even one hamlet, that hamlet could precipitate the collapse of the
+entire campaign by contaminating the surrounding communities in a
+geometric progression.
+
+Given this critical requirement that all phases be accomplished in a
+deliberate and orderly manner, it was unfortunate that Nhu initiated
+the program in an uncoordinated fashion. By the first of the year,
+months before the appropriate American and South Vietnamese agencies
+had been formed to guide the program, the construction of hamlets
+had begun on a scale which already suggested a nationwide campaign.
+Furthermore, the government failed to test the plan in a pilot project
+such as Thompson (as well as U.S. advisors) had recommended. Instead,
+it launched rather extensive campaigns simultaneously in several
+traditional Communist strongholds during the spring of 1962.
+
+Nevertheless, once formally initiated, the Strategic Hamlet Program
+constituted the government’s first real effort to implement a concerted
+counterinsurgency strategy on a national scale. Regardless of its
+weaknesses and its somewhat abortive start, the program would serve
+as the context within which the Diem government would wage its battle
+with the Viet Cong during 1962 and most of 1963. From this military
+standpoint, moreover, Diem’s adoption of the Strategic Hamlet Program
+marked somewhat of a watershed in the evolution of ground strategy in
+the Vietnam war. Inherent in its selection was the decision to opt for
+a “clear-and-hold” as opposed to a “search-and-destroy” strategy. In
+accordance with the dictates of the pacification campaign, RVNAF ground
+forces would focus primarily during the next two years on operations
+to clear Communist military formations from the more densely populated
+rural areas.
+
+
+_The Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division_
+
+The American military build-up called for by the Washington decisions
+of December 1961 was well underway as the new year opened. Several
+U.S. units introduced in the closing weeks of 1961 had already
+begun operations by January. These included two U.S. Army transport
+helicopter companies and a composite U.S. Air Force detachment.
+Designated FARM GATE and composed initially of 151 officers and
+men, the Air Force detachment had a dual mission of training VNAF
+elements and conducting attack sorties in support of President Diem’s
+forces. The arrival of another U.S. Air Force unit, a C-123 transport
+squadron, another Army helicopter company, and an Army communications
+organization, the 3d Radio Research Unit, just after the first of
+the year raised the number of American military personnel serving on
+permanent assignment in Vietnam to over 3,000. Assigned to the Army’s
+radio unit, which immediately began operations from Pleiku in II
+Corps Tactical Zone, were 42 Marines from the 1st Radio Company, FMF.
+Designated Detachment A, 1st Radio Company, these were the first U.S.
+Marines to participate in the ongoing build-up.
+
+Thus far, however, the U.S. troops arriving in Vietnam were for combat
+support rather than advisory type duty. At a meeting held in Honolulu
+in mid-January, Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the ranking
+American military officials concerned with Vietnam to make substantial
+increases in the number of advisors serving with the Vietnamese armed
+forces.
+
+Less than a month after the Honolulu conference, a new U.S. command was
+created in Saigon to manage the expected influx of advisors and the
+intensified military assistance effort more efficiently. On 8 February,
+the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV or MACV)
+supplanted the MAAG as the senior American command in the Republic
+of Vietnam. Its commander, Army General Paul D. Harkins (ComUSMACV),
+assumed direct responsibility for all U.S. military policy, operations,
+and assistance to President Diem’s government. Harkins was directly
+subordinate to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt,
+whose headquarters was in Hawaii.
+
+The number of U.S. Marines assigned to MACV’s staff indicated that
+they would play an important role in its operations. In all, 21 staff
+billets in the new command were allocated to the Marine Corps. The
+most important of these was the chief of staff billet. This assignment
+went to Major General Richard G. Weede, a veteran who had commanded
+an artillery battalion during the campaigns for Saipan and Okinawa
+during World War II. Later, in Korea, he had distinguished himself
+as the commander of the 5th Marines. Weede arrived in Saigon from
+Hawaii where he had commanded the 1st Marine Brigade since 1959. Other
+Marines joined General Harkins’ command as Deputy Chief of Staff, J-2
+and as branch chiefs for the J-3 through J-6 divisions. Two other
+positions assigned to Marine officers were the project officer for
+a Joint Operations Evaluation Group and a research and development
+project officer for a Department of Defense agency. Both of these were
+operationally controlled by the newly organized Military Assistance
+Command.
+
+[Illustration: _Major General Richard G. Weede, USMC, Chief of Staff,
+U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. (USMC Photo A150562)._]
+
+Under the new U.S. command arrangement, the old Military Assistance
+Advisory Group became subordinate to General Harkins’ command.
+Headed by Major General Charles J. Timmes, U.S. Army, the MAAG was
+now responsible primarily for the advisory aspect of the assistance
+program. To accommodate the impending increases in the number of
+advisors, the MAAG’s staff was restructured. Under its new table of
+organization, Marine officers were to serve as deputy chief of staff
+and head of the plans branch of the J-3 division. Later, in 1963, the
+MAAG’s table of distribution would be modified with the effect that
+the chief of staff billet would be held by a Marine colonel. The first
+Marine to serve as General Timmes’ chief of staff would be Colonel Earl
+E. Anderson, a much-decorated aviator who eventually would become the
+Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.
+
+The reorganization of the MAAG brought about a dramatic change in
+the size and scope of the U.S. Marine advisory effort. The new table
+of organization included a provision for an 18-man Marine Advisory
+Division within the MAAG’s Naval Section. The organizational charts
+for this division included advisor billets for a lieutenant colonel,
+a major, six captains, a gunnery sergeant, and four staff sergeants.
+Administrative positions were to make up the balance of the new
+organization.
+
+As had been the case previous to this expansion, the lieutenant colonel
+was to serve as the Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine
+Corps. The inclusion of the major’s billet was expected to enhance the
+overall effectiveness of the advisory division as he was to double as
+Assistant Senior Advisor and as senior artillery advisor. The gunnery
+sergeant was to assist in the artillery advisory duties. Of the six
+captains, four were to be assigned as advisors to VNMC infantry
+battalions while the two others were slated to advise on engineer and
+supply matters. The four logistics-trained staff sergeants were to be
+assigned as assistant infantry battalion advisors and were expected to
+free the officer advisors from direct involvement in time-consuming
+supply matters.
+
+Marines required to man this enlarged advisory unit began arriving in
+Vietnam as early as February. All of the new officer advisors were
+graduates of either Junior School at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico or
+the U.S. Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
+Following their assignments, but before departing for Vietnam, many
+advisors received schooling in military assistance operations. This
+normally included a five-month course of instruction in the French
+language, a requirement which more and more Marine advisors were
+beginning to question as a result of the Vietnamese desire to converse
+in their own language rather than French. Upon arrival in Saigon,
+the Marines were given two days of orientation briefings at MACV
+headquarters before assuming their jobs in the Marine Advisory Division.
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Brown continued to serve as the Senior Marine
+Advisor and headed the new advisory division throughout the summer of
+1962. In October he was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G.
+Moody, Jr., a veteran who held the Navy Cross for heroism as a company
+commander during the Korean War. Having served with the British Royal
+Marines following Korea, Moody was somewhat familiar with the problems
+involved in dealing with foreign military services.
+
+[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody, Jr., USMC, Senior
+Marine Advisor. (USMC Photo A412981)._]
+
+Encouraged by both Brown and Moody, the U.S. Marine advisors
+participated in every combat operation undertaken by the VNMC during
+1962. Prior to planned operations they helped their Vietnamese
+counterparts coordinate the more sophisticated means of support which
+became available as the American military build-up took hold. During
+planning phases, for example, they assisted with the development of
+detailed orders and helped plan for employing artillery fire and air
+support. If the impending operation was to be amphibious in nature, the
+Marine officers coordinated with the U.S. Navy advisors assigned to
+the supporting Vietnamese Navy units, thereby insuring that planning
+for embarkation had been accomplished. On occasion the advisors were
+required to coordinate helicopter support for the VNMC units--a task
+sometimes complicated by the Vietnamese Marines’ lack of experience
+in heliborne operations. Unfortunately, the almost constant combat
+assignments being drawn by the handful of U.S. and VNAF helicopter
+units available in Vietnam made training in such operations impossible.
+
+Even more difficult were the advisor’s responsibilities after their
+units deployed to combat. The U.S. Marines were experiencing the often
+frustrating task of actually searching out the elusive Viet Cong on a
+continuing daily basis. Additionally, the Americans found themselves
+faced with the unenviable task of advising Vietnamese officers, who,
+in some cases, had been fighting Communist guerrillas since the
+French-Indochina War. These circumstances presented a unique set of
+challenges for the advisors. For American officers with relatively
+little actual experience in this brand of warfare to offer tactical
+advice in a form acceptable to their Vietnamese counterparts demanded a
+combination of tact, patience, and subtle persuasive powers.
+
+The U.S. Marine advisors quickly learned that success in this peculiar
+assignment depended largely on the degree of respect they commanded
+among the Vietnamese Marines. To help build this intangible yet vital
+foundation of mutual understanding and confidence, the Marine advisors
+stayed with their units in combat, sharing with the Vietnamese Marine
+the same foods, the same dangers, the same discomforts, and the same
+routines. The Marine advisors lived in U.S. bachelor quarters in Saigon
+when their respective battalions were in garrison. Nevertheless, they
+spent much of this time at the Marine base camps, inspecting troops
+and equipment and making preparations for the battalion’s next combat
+assignment. Among others, Lieutenant Colonels Brown and Moody viewed
+this continuous association with the Vietnamese Marines as the single
+most essential ingredient to a successful advisory program.
+
+
+_The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962_
+
+For the Vietnamese Marine Corps 1962 was characterized by expansion,
+redesignation, and continued combat operations against the Viet Cong.
+On 1 January the former Vietnamese Marine Group was redesignated the
+Vietnamese Marine Brigade and was enlarged to 5,483 officers and men.
+Under its new table of organization, the number of infantry battalions
+remained at four but two new battalions were added. One battery of
+eight 105mm howitzers, two batteries of eight 75mm pack howitzers, and
+a headquarters and service battery comprised an artillery battalion
+which was created to provide artillery fire support to the infantry
+units. An amphibious support battalion of 1,038 officers and men was
+also formed. This unit contained the personnel necessary to provide
+the entire Marine brigade with reconnaissance, communications, motor
+transport, medical, engineer, and training support. Lieutenant Colonel
+Khang continued in his position as Commandant of the expanded and
+restructured Vietnamese Marine Corps.
+
+The infantry battalions of the Vietnamese Marine Brigade performed
+a variety of combat missions ranging from security duty around key
+government installations to helicopter landings in suspected Viet Cong
+redoubts during 1962. The four infantry battalions (the 4th Battalion
+became available for combat assignment at midyear) participated in
+23 combat operations which involved 404 days in the field. These
+operations included 12 amphibious landings and eight heliborne
+assaults. With the exception of two howitzer batteries which saw
+some combat, the artillery battalion devoted the year to training.
+Supervised by Major Alfred J. Croft and Gunnery Sergeant William A.
+Loyko, their new Marine advisors, the Vietnamese artillerymen learned
+their skills in a number of field firing exercises conducted on ARVN
+artillery ranges.
+
+In terms of casualties the VNMC battalions fought no major engagements
+with the Communists during the year. A typical operation was one
+conducted in An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost province, early in
+the year. The 2d Battalion, which was assigned to the An Xuyen province
+chief for the period between 18 February and 26 April, conducted one
+helicopter landing, provided troop escorts for numerous truck convoys,
+and fought several minor engagements with the Viet Cong. Although the
+Vietnamese commander reported 112 enemy killed and another 40 wounded
+during the two-month assignment, the figures contradicted those of
+Captain Evan L. Parker, the Marine advisor, which placed the Viet Cong
+casualties at about 40 dead and 20 wounded. This difference, which was
+not uncommon, stemmed largely from the fact that the Marine advisors
+limited their reports to enemy dead and wounded actually sighted.
+Still, the conflicting reports sometimes led to tensions between the
+Vietnamese commander and the Marine advisor.
+
+In other instances the Vietnamese Marine battalions were ordered to
+serve as the reserve force for one of the three corps tactical zones.
+The 1st Battalion, for example, accompanied by Captain Bradley S.
+Snell, assumed the mission as II Corps reserve on 16 May and remained
+in that role until mid-September. Based at Ban Me Thuot deep in the
+Central Highlands, the battalion provided security for government
+installations while remaining ready to react to enemy threats. As
+the corps reserve it conducted one heliborne operation and several
+search-type missions. In one of these searches the Vietnamese Marines
+uncovered and destroyed a Viet Cong small arms factory. During its
+assignment in II Corps, the 1st Battalion accounted for only four Viet
+Cong dead and one wounded while suffering 16 dead and 28 wounded. These
+statistics attested both to the grim effectiveness of enemy sniper fire
+and mines and to the enemy’s elusiveness.
+
+[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE BRIGADE) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1
+JANUARY 1962
+
+AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 5,483]
+
+The newly activated 4th Battalion, advised by Captain Don R.
+Christensen, entered combat for the first time during an operation in
+Binh Thuan Province in the first week in August. Supported by Battery
+A (a 75mm howitzer unit) of the artillery battalion, it joined the 43d
+ARVN Infantry Regiment in an attempt to locate and destroy Viet Cong
+forces operating around Phan Thiet, the provincial capital, located on
+the coast 95 miles east of Saigon. Following the conclusion of this
+operation on 22 August, the Marine units reverted to the control of the
+Binh Thuan province chief. In this capacity they assisted in clearing
+and resettlement operations being conducted in conjunction with the
+Strategic Hamlet Program. Between 4 August and 15 October, when its
+assignment in the province ended, the 4th Battalion reported 12 Viet
+Cong killed and seven captured. Vietnamese Marine casualties were one
+killed and five wounded. During the assignment the Marines resettled
+some 600 civilians in fortified hamlets.[4-2][4-C]
+
+    [4-C] Major Croft, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor during
+          this period, later recalled that province chiefs tended
+          to misuse the Marine units by assigning them unproductive
+          missions such as static security. (Col Alfred J. Croft,
+          Comments on 2d Draft MS, Whitlow, “Marine Activities in
+          Vietnam, 1954–1964,” hereafter _Croft Comments_.)
+
+[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marines search dense jungle for Viet Cong
+base areas. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott,
+USMC)._]
+
+In the last week of September General David M. Shoup, Commandant of
+the U.S. Marine Corps, arrived in Saigon to begin a four-day tour of
+South Vietnam. Shoup, who held the Medal of Honor for his actions as
+a regimental commander on Tarawa in World War II, was recognized as
+one of President Kennedy’s most trusted military advisors. Acting in
+his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant was
+scheduled to visit a number of U.S. and South Vietnamese installations,
+including several strategic hamlets.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  CORPS TACTICAL ZONES
+  1962
+]
+
+After a series of briefings at MACV and MAAG headquarters in Saigon,
+the Commandant and his party journeyed by automobile to the base camp
+of the 3d Vietnamese Marine Battalion at Thu Duc on the outskirts
+of the capital. There, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonels Brown and
+Khang, Shoup reviewed a Vietnamese Marine honor guard and inspected
+the 3d Battalion. Impressed with the units he had seen, General Shoup
+commended President Diem on the status of his Marine Brigade. “From my
+observation,” he wrote from Washington, “the Vietnamese Marine Corps
+is in an excellent state of readiness from the standpoint of equipment
+as well as the degree of training of its members.” “Indeed,” he added,
+“your Corps of Marines seemed to be a splendid and competent fighting
+organization.”[4-3]
+
+The Commandant was less complimentary of the Strategic Hamlet Program.
+After visiting several of the developments, he concluded that the
+government’s effort to concentrate the Vietnamese civilians into
+defended communities was counter-productive to the program’s stated
+objective of winning the allegiance of the rural population. As Shoup
+reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon his return to Washington,
+the forced resettlement of the peasants from their native hamlets and
+villages into what amounted to fortified camps seemed to be generating
+antagonism rather than good will.[4-4]
+
+At the close of 1962 Vietnamese Marine commanders reported a total of
+192 Viet Cong killed, 77 wounded, and another 158 taken prisoner. U.S.
+Marine advisors felt that even these moderate figures were inflated.
+They estimated that only about 98 enemy soldiers had been killed, 27
+wounded, and roughly half as many actual Viet Cong captured as had
+been reported by their Vietnamese Marine counterparts. The Vietnamese
+Marines also had failed to inflict any serious damage on the enemy’s
+logistic system, capturing only 16,000 rounds of small arms ammunition,
+45 grenades, 31 mines, and 50 individual weapons, a printing press, two
+typewriters, several motors, and an assortment of medical supplies.[4-5]
+
+
+_Some Conclusions_
+
+In retrospect, 1962 bears assessment as an important watershed in the
+chronicle of U.S. Marine activities in Vietnam. As the year began only
+three Marine advisors and a handful of embassy guards were serving
+in the Republic. The initial months, however, brought a dramatic
+expansion of that role, both in terms of numbers and responsibilities.
+By March Marines were functioning on MAAG and MACV staffs in Saigon,
+in U.S. Army communications facilities in the Central Highlands, and
+throughout the provinces where Vietnamese Marine units operated.
+Their contributions to the war effort, therefore, were broad and
+varied, ranging from high level planning to infantry advisory duties.
+The Marine role had expanded in rough proportion to the broad-based
+expansion of the overall U.S. military assistance program. In this
+connection, Marine contributions tended to be concealed within the
+context of the American assistance effort. Still, by mid-1962 it could
+be said that the Marines in Vietnam were leaving the impact of their
+service on virtually every stage of the ground war.
+
+
+
+
+                                PART II
+
+                           MARINE HELICOPTERS
+                               GO TO WAR
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 5
+
+SHUFLY at Soc Trang
+
+_The Decision--Deployment to Soc Trang--Mekong Delta Combat Support
+Operations--Preparations and Redeployment--Accomplishments_
+
+
+One of the most important developments in the chronicle of U.S.
+Marine activities in South Vietnam during the early 1960s occurred
+shortly after the creation of MACV. In mid-April 1962, a Marine medium
+helicopter squadron was deployed to the Mekong Delta to provide support
+for the Government of Vietnam forces in their battle with the Communist
+guerrillas. The significance of the squadron’s arrival went beyond the
+added mobility that it afforded those Vietnamese units attempting to
+hold the rice producing delta region. Coinciding as it did with the
+increases in the number of Marines serving on the MACV staff and under
+the MAAG, its arrival indicated that the Marine role would expand in
+direct proportion to the widening U.S. effort to defend the Republic of
+Vietnam.
+
+
+_The Decision_
+
+The decision to deploy the Marine aviation unit to the combat zone
+originated in the immediate aftermath of General Taylor’s report to
+President Kennedy. On 17 January 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CinCPac), Admiral Harry
+D. Felt, to prepare for increased operations in South Vietnam. This
+order implied that the Pacific command should stand ready to deploy
+additional helicopter units to Diem’s republic in the event that it
+became necessary to augment the Army companies already operating there.
+(By now the number of Army helicopter companies in South Vietnam stood
+at three.) CinCPac was also instructed to explore South Vietnam’s
+requirements for additional helicopter units beyond the Army companies
+already present.[5-1]
+
+Shortly afterward, Admiral Felt advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
+a valid requirement for additional helicopter support did exist in the
+Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. He recommended that a fourth U.S.
+Army light helicopter company be deployed to the area. Included in the
+admiral’s recommendation was a proposal to support the aviation unit
+with a composite maintenance, avionics, and medical group.[5-2]
+
+Admiral Felt’s recommendations were approved by the Secretary of
+Defense on 6 March. The Joint Chiefs immediately assigned the
+responsibility for providing the support package and helicopter unit
+to the Army. In turn, Army authorities alerted the 33d Transportation
+Light Helicopter Company at Fort Ord, California for the move. Its
+departure date was set for 18 April.[5-3]
+
+Unknown to the officers and men of the alerted unit, the plans for its
+deployment to combat were being reconsidered at the time the orders
+were received. Two days before Admiral Felt’s recommendation reached
+the joint Chiefs, a proposal to augment Army helicopter units with
+Marine pilots had been advanced by General Timmes, the MAAG chief. This
+proposal triggered a brief but eventful debate within U.S. military
+circles. With General Harkins’ concurrence, Timmes recommended that
+nine Marine helicopter pilots be assigned to the Army aviation units in
+Vietnam for periods of 60 to 90 days. This arrangement, he pointed out,
+would enable the Marine pilots to become familiar with the nature of
+the combat support operations in South Vietnam and would provide them
+with transitional training in the Army’s Piasecki-built tandem-rotored
+H-21 helicopter (nicknamed the “Flying Banana”).[5-4]
+
+Admiral Felt turned to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,
+Pacific (FMFPac), Lieutenant General Alan Shapley, for his comments
+on the MAAG chief’s plan. Shapley in turn instructed Major General
+Carson A. Roberts, the Commanding General, Aircraft, FMFPac to study
+the proposal and to frame a set of recommendations. Roberts, who had
+been selected for promotion to lieutenant general and was scheduled to
+relieve Shapley as Commanding General, FMFPac, found the prospect of
+Marine aviators participating in combat support operations in Vietnam
+appealing but felt that the proposal under review had some definite
+disadvantages. He pointed out that under Timmes’ plan the Marine pilots
+would be flying a type of helicopter unfamiliar to them instead of the
+ones they would operate if the Marine squadrons were later deployed
+to Vietnam. Furthermore, General Roberts warned that the piecemeal
+assignment of his pilots would reduce the combat readiness of the unit
+from which they would be drawn.[5-5]
+
+At Roberts’ suggestion, General Shapley offered CinCPac a
+counterproposal which he believed would benefit both the South
+Vietnamese government and the Marine Corps. He suggested that a
+complete Marine medium helicopter squadron from Marine Aircraft Group
+16 (MAG-16), 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) and supporting elements
+be moved from Okinawa to the war zone. The Marine squadron, operating
+24 HUS-1s (a single-rotor, Sikorsky-built transport helicopter later
+known as the UH-34D) would replace the Army helicopter company at Da
+Nang in the northernmost corps tactical zone, I Corps. The Army unit
+would then be freed for redeployment southward into either II or III
+Corps Tactical Zones.
+
+General Shapley emphasized several advantages which he saw in this
+plan. First, it would provide additional helicopter support for the
+Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces while concurrently providing an entire
+Marine helicopter squadron with an opportunity to gain first-hand
+experience in a counterguerrilla environment. It would also provide
+Marine Corps units with operational experience in I Corps, the area
+to which they would be committed if standing contingency plans were
+later executed. Finally, Shapley explained that his proposal offered an
+almost entirely self-sufficient aviation unit which could be supported
+administratively and logistically by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The
+unit would require only minimal support from the Military Assistance
+Command, Vietnam.[5-6]
+
+On the same day that he had heard the Marine commander’s proposal,
+Admiral Felt received a message from Admiral John H. Sides, Commander
+in Chief, Pacific Fleet, which strongly advised that Roberts’ plan
+be implemented.[5-7] Admiral Felt then solicited General Harkins’
+opinion on the matter. He reminded the MACV commander that the proposed
+deployment would provide the Marines with operational experience in
+an area where they might some day be committed. The admiral further
+pointed out that the location of a Marine helicopter unit at Da Nang
+would enable the Army aviation companies to move south into one of the
+other corps tactical zones--a move that would facilitate the logistical
+support of those units by shortening their supply lines.[5-8]
+
+Harkins generally concurred with Admiral Felt’s viewpoint. He noted
+that the more powerful Marine HUS helicopter (Sea Horse) could be
+expected to out perform the Army’s H-21 in the higher elevations around
+Da Nang. He also felt that the Marines, with their seaborne supply
+network, were better equipped to cope with the logistics problems in
+the more isolated northern reaches of South Vietnam. But he objected
+to the deployment of the Marine unit to Da Nang on the basis that
+the relocation of the Army’s 93d Helicopter Company from I Corps
+in the immediate future would disrupt a series of operations which
+were already underway in I Corps. As an alternative, General Harkins
+proposed that the Marine helicopters be located initially at Soc
+Trang in the Mekong Delta. Later, when the tempo of operations in the
+northern corps tactical zone permitted, it could exchange places with
+the Army unit at Da Nang.[5-9]
+
+One Army general raised a specific objection to the proposal that the
+Marine squadron be deployed from Okinawa. General James F. Collins, the
+Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific (CinCUSArPac) argued that the
+presence of the Marine helicopters at Soc Trang would introduce yet
+“another supply and maintenance feature into the III Corps area.”[5-10]
+This argument was followed by the recommendation that the Army’s 81st
+Light Helicopter Company, then based in Hawaii, be ordered to the
+Mekong Delta. The 81st, General Collins contended, was already trained
+in troop transportation operations in jungle terrain.
+
+General David M. Shoup, the Marine Corps Commandant, who approved the
+FMFPac plan in concept, harbored one reservation regarding General
+Roberts’ proposals. His concern stemmed from the possibility that the
+Marine Corps might be required to replace the squadron from Okinawa
+with another in order to maintain the level of operational forces
+available to CinCPac--an eventuality which would upset long-range
+Marine Corps deployment schedules. General Shoup indicated that he,
+too, would oppose the deployment of a Marine helicopter squadron to
+South Vietnam if this proved to be the case.[5-11]
+
+At this juncture in the debate, Admiral Felt journeyed to Saigon to
+discuss the matter more thoroughly with General Harkins. Following
+consultations, the two commanders jointly communicated their
+recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 March. They advised
+that it would be more desirable to deploy one of the Marine helicopter
+squadrons from Okinawa than either the Army unit already on alert
+in California or the one in Hawaii. This decision, Felt and Harkins
+informed the Joint Chiefs, was influenced heavily by the readiness
+posture of the various units under consideration. A Marine squadron,
+they pointed out, could be on station and ready for combat operations
+by 15 April--three days before the company already alerted by the Army
+could depart California.[5-12]
+
+Admiral Felt and General Harkins then dealt with the CinCUSARPac
+contention that additional supply problems would be created by the
+deployment of a Marine unit to the Mekong Delta. The Pacific commanders
+advised that, in their opinion, the logistical support “can be handled
+relatively easily by [the] Marines.”[5-13] They added that should
+requirements for a fifth helicopter unit arise in South Vietnam, the
+Army’s 81st Helicopter Company would be selected for the assignment. It
+would be replaced in Hawaii by the 33d Transportation Light Helicopter
+Company from Fort Ord. Finally, Admiral Felt and General Harkins
+recommended that the Marine squadron be deployed initially to the
+Mekong Delta area of III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). Later, when
+operational conditions in I Corps were more favorable, the Marines
+could replace the Army helicopter unit there.
+
+After meeting to discuss the matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved
+the entire package of recommendations on 16 March. Admiral Felt
+immediately ordered the Pacific Fleet to deploy a Marine helicopter
+squadron to South Vietnam and authorized direct liaison between the
+1st Marine Aircraft Wing and ComUSMACV. In turn, Admiral Sides, the
+Commander of the Pacific Fleet, notified the Commander, Seventh Fleet,
+Vice Admiral William A. Schoech, of the decision and directed him to
+take appropriate action.[5-14]
+
+
+_Deployment to Soc Trang_
+
+The Commanding General of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Major General
+John P. Condon, a Michigan native who had earned a Distinguished Flying
+Cross and three Legions of Merit for service during World War II and
+Korea, was informed of the impending deployment on 22 March. At the
+time, Condon, his staff, and elements of his command were participating
+in SEATO exercise TULUNGAN in the Philippines. The arrival of the
+orders proved timely for most of the affected units were in close
+proximity to the wing commander. As the Marine helicopter squadron and
+its supporting elements were scheduled to arrive in Vietnam just two
+weeks after the SEATO exercise ended, preparations for the move were
+begun immediately. General Condon quickly dispatched several officers
+to Saigon to establish liaison with USMACV.
+
+The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing fortunately possessed a background which
+facilitated the rapid preparations for the movement. Since August of
+the previous year General Condon’s command regularly had deployed a
+medium helicopter squadron (HMM) and its supporting elements with the
+Special Landing Force (SLF), a Marine air-ground team embarked on board
+the Seventh Fleet’s Amphibious Ready Group. Since 1961 this naval
+task force had cruised Southeast Asian waters ready to implement U.S.
+contingency plans. These deployments had given the Marines of the wing
+a reservoir of experience which enabled them to make maximum use of the
+short period of time available for planning.
+
+By 30 March, the wing’s planning had progressed to the stage that
+General Condon could provide the Commander of the Seventh Fleet with
+specific recommendations for the entire operation. The general concept
+of the plan was that Task Unit 79.3.5, under the command of a Marine
+colonel, was to be built around a Marine medium helicopter squadron
+which was participating in Operation TULUNGAN. This task unit, code
+named SHUFLY, was to occupy an old Japanese-built landing strip near
+Soc Trang, a small town located about 85 miles southwest of Saigon in
+Ba Xuyen Province. Situated only 20 miles from the coast, Soc Trang
+possessed one of the few hard surfaced runways in the area. Condon
+informed the Seventh Fleet commander of the arrangements which his
+liaison officers had made during their trip to Saigon. An ARVN infantry
+battalion and two 4.2-inch mortar companies were to assume the defense
+of the air strip at Soc Trang the same day that the Marines began
+landing.
+
+[Illustration: _Major General John P. Condon, USMC, Commanding General,
+1st Marine Aircraft Wing. (USMC Photo A420792)._]
+
+The Marine general then proceeded to outline the chain of command and
+method of support which he considered best for the Marine task unit.
+SHUFLY, he suggested, should be under the operational control of
+ComUSMACV but should remain under the administrative control of the 1st
+Marine Aircraft Wing. Most of its logistic support, the wing commander
+thought, could come through normal Marine and Navy channels with fuels,
+lubricant oils, rations, and ammunition, being the exceptions. Rations
+and ammunition were to be provided by MACV, while fuels would be
+supplied by private Vietnamese distributers operating under contracts
+with the U.S. government.
+
+Next, General Condon explained to Admiral Schoech his desires for the
+organization of the task unit. He felt that SHUFLY would function best
+if organized into three distinct task elements. First, he proposed
+that a headquarters be formed under the command of Colonel John F.
+Carey, a veteran Marine aviator who had been awarded the Navy Cross
+for heroism during the battle for Midway. Carey was currently serving
+as Chief of Staff of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. This headquarters,
+General Condon advised, should consist of eight officers and six
+enlisted men. The second element of the task unit, the wing commander
+continued, would be Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362),
+reinforced, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp.
+The squadron, whose normal complement was 63 officers and 196 enlisted
+Marines, was to be augmented by 50 additional maintenance personnel.
+Its equipment would include 24 HUS helicopters (which under normal
+operating conditions could lift eight to 12 combat-loaded Vietnamese
+troops), three Cessna single-engine OE-1 observation aircraft, one
+R4D transport aircraft, and supplemental maintenance equipment.
+Prior to its deployment, HMM-362 would exchange its helicopters for
+recently overhauled aircraft in order to reduce maintenance problems
+once operations in Vietnam began. SHUFLY’s third element would be a
+sub unit of Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS-16). Designated Task
+Element 79.3.5.2, it would be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William
+W. Eldridge. Navy medical, dental, and chaplain personnel would be
+included in the sub unit’s 193 enlisted men and 18 officers.
+
+The wing commander intended to provide the MABS-16 sub unit with
+a Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System (TAFDS) and a Marine
+Airfield Traffic Control Unit (MATCU). The traffic control unit would
+be equipped with Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) and Ground Control
+Approach (GCA) systems which would enable the helicopter squadron to
+conduct landings during periods of reduced visibility.[5-15]
+
+Colonel Carey, the task unit commander, was to be assigned
+responsibility for liaison with MACV and military authorities in
+III Corps, the tactical zone which encompassed the entire Mekong
+Delta and the transition zone between the delta and the highlands.
+All operational planning, security, external communications, and
+administrative matters also were to fall under his cognizance. This
+arrangement would allow Lieutenant Colonel Clapp and his squadron
+to concentrate on daily flight operations and aircraft maintenance.
+Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge’s MABS-16 sub unit would be responsible for
+all normal base support and airfield operations.[5-16]
+
+General Condon’s report to Admiral Schoech concluded with a rough
+outline of the schedule for the task unit’s deployment. On 9
+April--only eight days after the termination of the SEATO exercise in
+the Philippines--Marine transport aircraft from the 1st MAW, augmented
+by three transports from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW), would
+begin airlifting the task unit headquarters and the MABS-16 detachment
+from Okinawa. The Marine general anticipated that all “housekeeping”
+facilities would be in position at Soc Trang within five days.
+Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s HMM-362 would fly into Soc Trang from the
+amphibious assault ship (helicopter carrier) USS _Princeton_ (LPH-5)
+on the morning of 15 April. The proposal that the helicopters be flown
+ashore satisfied a Department of Defense requirement that conspicuous
+unloading activities were to be avoided in the Saigon area.
+
+Admiral Schoech approved the 1st MAW’s proposed plan on 3 April and
+ordered Task Unit 79.3.5 to be transferred to General Harkins’ command
+on 15 April. He then instructed the Commander, Task Group 76.5 (the
+Amphibious Ready Group) to provide SHUFLY with whatever supply and
+administrative support it might require for the movement. At the same
+time the fleet commander ordered appropriate subordinate commanders
+to provide an escort of destroyers for the USS _Princeton_ and an
+inconspicuous air cover when the LPH arrived and began unloading
+HMM-362. Accordingly, the covering aircraft were instructed not to
+approach within 20 miles of South Vietnam unless the situation around
+Soc Trang endangered the Marine helicopters.[5-17]
+
+The day following Schoech’s approval of the Marine plan, the carrier
+task unit was formed to transport HMM-362 to South Vietnam. SHUFLY was
+activated simultaneously and given orders which reflected General
+Condon’s planning. Colonel Carey was instructed to establish his
+headquarters at the Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan, in order
+to prepare for the deployment. The task unit commander was advised that
+he would receive more detailed instructions relative to administration
+and logistics at a later date.
+
+Colonel Carey’s task group headquarters in Japan had only one week in
+which to complete preparations for the move to the Republic of Vietnam.
+His staff’s responsibility for coordinating between units located at
+Atsugi, Japan, and Futema, Okinawa, made this task even more difficult.
+Carey’s officers worked out the details of the airlift with the staff
+of Marine Aerial Refueler-Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152), the
+GV-1[5-A] unit assigned to carry the MABS-16 sub unit and the task unit
+headquarters to Soc Trang.
+
+    [5-A] The GV-1 (later KC-130), a four-engine, turbo-prop
+          refueler-transport built by Lockheed, is the Marine
+          refueling version of the Air Force C-130.
+
+The airlift portion of the movement began as scheduled on 9 April with
+the MABS-16 detachment being transported from Futema directly to Soc
+Trang. At 0800 Colonel Carey and part of his staff landed at Soc Trang
+in a twin-engine Douglas R4D Skytrain. As planned, the 400-man ARVN
+battalion had already established a perimeter around the airfield.
+Using the R4D’s radio, the crew provided landing instructions for the
+GV-1s of VMGR-152 and VMGR-352 which began landing and unloading their
+cargoes at half hour intervals. Several key American and Vietnamese
+military officers were on hand to watch the lead elements of SHUFLY
+arrive. Major General Condon, the 1st MAW commander, flew the first
+GV-1 into Soc Trang but departed after the aircraft had been unloaded.
+General Harkins and Brigadier General Le Van Nghiem, the Vietnamese
+commander of III Corps, also made appearances at the airstrip to
+welcome Colonel Carey and his Marines.
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge’s MABS-16 detachment began readying the
+airfield for HMM-362’s arrival shortly after the first transport
+aircraft had unloaded. To serve as living spaces the Marines raised
+75 strongback tents, all with plywood decks. They set up a water
+purification system and began trucking water from the town of Soc
+Trang, about two and a half miles away. Within two days, 9,000 gallons
+of water had been purified. Other conveniences improved the camp’s
+living conditions. A field laundry and a mess hall were set up and by
+12 April, hot meals were being served to the Marines. A post office
+began operations and telephones were installed to connect living and
+working areas.
+
+By 14 April, the day before HMM-362 was scheduled to arrive at Soc
+Trang, most of the airfield facilities were ready to support flight
+operations. An old hangar, which had been constructed by the Japanese
+during their World War II occupation of Indochina, had been repaired
+to house some of the squadron’s aircraft and equipment. The MABS-16
+communications section was operational and had established radio and
+teletype links with MACV in Saigon and MAG-16 on Okinawa. The TAFDS
+had been assembled and filled with aviation fuel and MATCU-68, the air
+traffic control unit assigned to SHUFLY, was prepared to control flight
+operations.
+
+The Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5) steamed from Okinawa on 10 April
+with HMM-362, its reinforcements, and HMM-261 embarked on the USS
+_Princeton_. The task group arrived off the coast of South Vietnam
+in the early morning hours of 15 April. At dawn Lieutenant Colonel
+Clapp, who had seen action as a fighter pilot during the Iwo Jima and
+Okinawa campaigns in World War II, led the first flight of helicopters
+from the deck of the _Princeton_. The operation proceeded smoothly
+with aircraft from both squadrons ferrying HMM-362’s equipment inland
+to the Soc Trang airstrip. Far out at sea, jets of the Seventh Fleet
+orbited, ready to provide protection to the Marine helicopters. They
+were not needed, however, as the Viet Cong made no effort to oppose
+the movement. By mid-afternoon the airlift of HMM-362’s personnel
+and equipment to the Soc Trang airfield had been completed. HMM-261
+returned to the _Princeton_ where it continued to function as the
+helicopter element of the Special Landing Force.
+
+The day after arriving at Soc Trang, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s
+squadron, nicknamed “Archie’s Angels,” was prepared to support the
+ARVN. Since the squadron’s combat support was not required immediately,
+the pilots and crews began flying missions to familiarize themselves
+with their new surroundings. They learned that their operations were to
+be conducted over the vast expanse of South Vietnam which stretched
+from just north and east of Saigon to the nation’s southernmost tip,
+the Ca Mau Peninsula, and from the South China Sea westward to the
+Cambodian border. Their initial flights over the Mekong Delta revealed
+a predominantly flat and monotonous landscape. Parched by the long dry
+season, the dusty brown rice paddies stood in sharp contrast with the
+verdant mangrove swamps which abounded near major streams and along
+the coast. Numerous hamlets, most enclosed by dense hedgerows and
+treelines, were scattered across the countryside. Thousands of canals
+and trails and a few crude roads completed the rural landscape in which
+the Viet Cong guerrilla thrived. Larger towns, such as Soc Trang, Can
+Tho (located about 80 miles southwest of Saigon), and My Tho (located
+about half way between the capital and Can Tho) were under the control
+of the Government of Vietnam.
+
+While the pilots and crews of HMM-362 were acquainting themselves
+with the geography of the Mekong Delta, Colonel Carey and his staff
+met in Saigon with U.S. and Vietnamese officers from the MACV and
+III Corps headquarters. There, they established liaison with the
+three ARVN divisions subordinate to General Nhgiem’s III Corps--the
+21st, the 7th, and the 5th--and discussed operational matters. After
+several conferences, the final details of the command arrangements
+were completed. It was agreed that all Marine missions would require
+the approval of MACV, III Corps, and the task unit commander. This
+arrangement would enable General Harkins’ command to retain actual
+operational control of the Marine helicopters even though they would
+be supporting III Corps exclusively. Final approval of all mission
+requests for Marine support would rest with the Joint Operations Center
+(JOC) at JGS headquarters in Saigon. Manned by U.S. Army, U.S. Air
+Force, ARVN, and VNAF officers, this agency was part of a recently
+instituted Tactical Air Support System, the purpose of which was to
+provide positive control over all military aircraft in South Vietnam.
+To insure maximum coordination at lower echelons, Marine liaison
+officers were assigned to the corps headquarters and to the 21st ARVN
+Division. It was anticipated that this division, headquartered at Can
+Tho, only 35 miles northwest of Soc Trang, would require more Marine
+helicopter support than the other divisions that were operating within
+the corps tactical zone.[5-B]
+
+    [5-B] I and II Corps had their own agencies within the corps
+          headquarters for control of air assets whereas III CTZ
+          relied directly on the JOC. Under this arrangement, I
+          Corps and II Corps were required to pass mission requests
+          for air support on to the JOC.
+
+[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Archie Clapp (second from left),
+HMM-362 squadron commander, Major General John Condon (fourth from
+left), Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Colonel John
+Carey (extreme right), task unit commander, confer briefly after
+arriving at Soc Trang. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P.
+Kizer, USMC)._]
+
+While operational planning was underway, the MABS-16 Marines set about
+to improve the newly occupied compound. Two diesel-powered generators
+were put into operation and began furnishing electrical power for the
+camp. The utilities section, which maintained the generators, then
+began installing electrical wiring throughout the compound. Toilet and
+shower facilities were constructed to accommodate the Marines.
+
+Measures were also taken during this interlude to strengthen the
+airfield’s defenses. Expecting that the Viet Cong might attempt
+to infiltrate the Marine position, Colonel Carey created a 40-man
+security unit to protect the inner camp and flight lines. This unit,
+composed of men from MABS-16 and HMM-362 and responsible to a permanent
+sergeant-of-the-guard, maintained roving patrols and security posts
+during hours of darkness. A network of concertina wire, trip flares,
+and machine gun emplacements provided additional protection around the
+helicopters and living area. Attack alerts were conducted periodically
+to coordinate the ARVN’s outer defenses and the Marine guard within the
+perimeter.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE
+  1962
+]
+
+Within less than two weeks after the first Marines had arrived at Soc
+Trang, the camp had been adequately prepared to support sustained
+combat helicopter operations. In addition, defenses had been
+established and the lines of logistical support from MACV had been
+opened. Food and water were readily available. All necessary liaison
+with the Vietnamese units to be supported had been accomplished. Pilots
+and crews had gained a rudimentary knowledge of the area in which they
+would fly and SHUFLY’s entire command structure had undergone a one
+week “shake down” in which it had proven sound.
+
+
+_Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations_
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s squadron began combat operations on Easter
+Sunday, 22 April, exactly one week after arriving in the Republic of
+Vietnam. The unit’s first combat assignment was to assist the Army’s
+Saigon-based 57th Helicopter Company in an operation code named
+LOCKJAW. The American helicopters were to support the ARVN 7th Division
+which was headquartered at My Tho, 53 miles northeast of Soc Trang. The
+Marine helicopters, which departed Soc Trang at 0900, flew 29 sorties
+and lifted 400 Vietnamese soldiers without incident during the course
+of their first operation.
+
+Unlike the U.S. Army helicopters already operating in other parts
+of South Vietnam, the Marine HUS-1s were not armed with machine
+guns during their initial operations from Soc Trang. Prior to their
+deployment, the Marine commanders had reasoned that weapons mounted
+in the cargo hatch would hinder loading and unloading during critical
+periods while the helicopters were in landing zones. Additionally,
+armed aircraft would tend to present a more hostile appearance to
+Vietnamese civilians, thereby providing the Viet Cong ready-made
+material for their anti-American propaganda themes. The only weapons
+on board the helicopters, therefore, were the individual side arms and
+two M3A1 .45 caliber submachine guns carried by the crew members. The
+automatic weapons enabled Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s men to return fire
+at short ranges and would also enhance their survival capabilities in
+the event an aircraft was forced down in unsecure territory.[5-C]
+
+    [5-C] By the summer the new light weight AR-15, the forerunner
+          of the M-16, would replace the M3A1 “greaseguns.” Near
+          the end of the year, however, the Leatherneck crews were
+          carrying M-14 rifles, the standard U.S. 7.62mm infantry
+          weapon of this period.
+
+Once HMM-362 began combat flight operations the tempo of activities
+at Soc Trang quickened. The same day that SHUFLY helicopters
+participated in the coordinated helilift from My Tho, an HUS was
+called upon to evacuate an American advisor from Vinh Long, 46 miles
+north of Soc Trang. The following day the first combined operation
+involving Vietnamese Marine ground forces and U.S. Marine helicopters
+was conducted. A company of Vietnamese Marines was helilifted into a
+threatened government outpost south of the town of Ca Mau, located near
+the southern tip of South Vietnam, to provide security while HMM-362’s
+helicopters evacuated the 57-man garrison.
+
+On 24 April, 16 Marine helicopters supported the 21st ARVN Division in
+Operation NIGHTINGALE conducted near Can Tho. In this operation 591
+ARVN troops were lifted into eight landing zones along two canals where
+a large group of Viet Cong had been reported. Shortly after the first
+wave of the assault force landed, a vicious small arms fight erupted.
+HMM-362 suffered its first combat damage when a helicopter was forced
+down after its oil line was punctured by enemy fire. An accompanying
+HUS quickly landed and retrieved the crew. Four other helicopters
+proceeded to the forward loading site, picked up a Marine repair
+team and enough ARVN troops to protect the team while it worked, and
+returned to the downed aircraft. The mechanics completed their repairs
+in two hours after which the crew returned the helicopter to Soc Trang.
+The security force was then lifted out of the area.
+
+Despite the damage suffered by the Marine aircraft, the Can Tho
+operation apparently achieved some success. The Viet Cong reportedly
+suffered 70 dead and lost three prisoners to the South Vietnamese while
+the ARVN units lost only three killed and six wounded. The Marines of
+HMM-362, moreover, had responded to a new challenge by demonstrating
+that they could recover helicopters which had been forced to land in
+insecure territory. Although the principle of providing security while
+accomplishing field repairs had been employed previously by the Army
+helicopter companies, the Can Tho operation of 24 April marked the
+first time the Marines had been required to use the technique.
+
+[Illustration: _Aerial view of Soc Trang airstrip. (Photo courtesy of
+Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kizer, USMC)._]
+
+HMM-362 again joined the Army’s 57th Helicopter Company for a
+coordinated troop lift on 25 April. This time the objective was the
+small town of Chau Doc on the Bassac River near the Cambodian
+border which had been raided and burned by a force whose identity was
+undetermined. Fourteen Marine helicopters transported 168 troops from
+the 21st ARVN Division to the scene of the incident while two other
+squadron aircraft lifted the Deputy Commander of III Corps, the 21st
+Division Commander, and the Senior U.S. Advisor in III Corps, Colonel
+Daniel B. Potter, Jr., U.S. Army, to the village. The landing was
+uncontested as the marauding band had fled across the international
+border into Cambodia.
+
+The conditions which confronted HMM-362 in the Mekong Delta during its
+first weeks of combat operations encouraged the squadron’s pilots to
+experiment with new tactics. One such instance occurred in the first
+week of May in Ba Xuyen Province when the province chief requested
+that the Marine helicopters support his Civil Guard company in a
+raid on a fortified Viet Cong village about 12 miles southwest of
+Soc Trang. Because the objective was located so near the Soc Trang
+airfield, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp ordered an unusual technique used
+for approaching the landing zone. The flight would rendezvous over Soc
+Trang at tree-top level and proceed to the objective with the flight
+leader slightly to the rear and above the formation. From this vantage
+point the flight leader could keep the other aircraft in sight and
+exercise better control over each element of the flight. The success of
+the new procedure led Lieutenant Colonel Clapp to remark later that the
+technique was similar to “calling the plays from the grandstand.”[5-18]
+It became another tactic available for the squadron’s future use.
+
+In terms of lessons learned, HMM-362’s most significant operation
+during its initial month of combat support came on 9 May. Twenty-three
+helicopters and two OE-1 observation aircraft launched from Ca Mau at
+1100 for an assault on Cai Ngai, a Viet Cong-controlled village 21
+miles to the south. At 1200 the helicopters began landing the ARVN
+troops in six landing zones which had been attacked only five minutes
+earlier by Vietnamese Air Force fighter bombers. Firing broke out even
+before the Vietnamese troops could jump from the helicopters. During
+this clash eight of the Marine aircraft were hit by small arms fire
+and two Vietnamese troops were wounded while still on board. One HUS,
+struck in the oil return line, was forced to land a few miles from
+the objective. Troops were flown in quickly to establish a perimeter
+around the downed aircraft while repairs were made. After the temporary
+repairs had been completed, its crew flew the helicopter to Ca Mau,
+where it remained until more extensive work could be accomplished. The
+other aircraft, including an OE-1, suffered only superficial damage and
+continued to support the ARVN operation.
+
+From this encounter with the Viet Cong, the Marine pilots learned that
+air strikes conducted just prior to a helicopter landing in the heavily
+populated delta country tended to disclose the location of the landing
+zone to the enemy. In this instance the Communists had been able to
+reach the landing zone in the few minutes which elapsed between the
+last air strike and the arrival of the Marine helicopters. Following
+this experience, the Marines would no longer allow VNAF air strikes on
+landing zones prior to operations in the flat delta region.[5-D]
+
+    [5-D] The development of helicopter tactics and techniques in
+          Vietnam will be covered in detail in a separate monograph
+          being prepared for publication by the History and Museums
+          Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
+
+The Americans and Vietnamese, however, soon learned to use fixed-wing
+aircraft to support helicopter operations in another manner. By
+mid-June, FARM GATE T-28 Trojans (a single-engine two-seat trainer
+built by North American) modified to carry bombs, rockets, and machine
+guns were flying escort missions for the Marine helicopter squadron.
+This particular aircraft could fly slowly enough to cruise with the HUS
+yet fast enough to deliver an air strike en route to the objective and
+then catch up with the helicopter formation. Normally an element of two
+T-28s accompanied the helicopters and were used primarily to attack
+targets near the landing zone after the ARVN troops were on the ground.
+The placement of an American pilot-instructor and a Vietnamese student
+in the T-28, a requirement imposed by MACV, helped avert language
+problems which invariably developed when coordinating ARVN ground
+operations and U.S. air operations. The effectiveness of the escort
+tactic increased as the Marine and Air Force pilots became accustomed
+to planning, coordinating, and executing the missions.
+
+The Marines quickly learned the value of utilizing the OE-1 in
+conjunction with their helicopter operations. Three single-engine,
+two-man aircraft, a detachment from Marine Observation Squadron 2
+(VMO-2), proved remarkably versatile in day-to-day operations over the
+delta. Primarily, they were used in daylight visual reconnaissance,
+usually to study objective areas and the approach routes which the
+helicopters would later use. Sometimes their crews were called upon
+to photograph proposed landing zones for briefing purposes. Often the
+aircraft’s radios were used to relay messages between various ARVN
+ground units which were operating beyond the range of their radios.
+Equipped with two frequency-modulated (FM) radios for work with ground
+stations and one ultra high-frequency (UHF) radio for communicating
+with other aircraft, the OE-1 was perfectly suited for controlling
+helicopter landings. The Marine aviators also found that, unlike
+their helicopters, the observation aircraft did not arouse suspicion
+in the area over which it flew. This advantage was due probably to
+several factors. First, the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) routinely
+operated similar aircraft over the entire region; secondly, the enemy
+could not readily determine whether the OE-1 was on a reconnaissance
+mission or merely flying from one point to another; and finally, the
+small aircraft made little noise. Given these characteristics it was
+no accident that the helicopter squadron relied on the observation
+aircraft more and more as the pattern of operations unfolded.
+
+[Illustration: _Vietnamese infantrymen disembark from HMM-362
+helicopters and move toward treeline in one of the first helicopter
+assault operations attempted by a Marine unit in the Mekong Delta.
+(Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kizer, USMC)._]
+
+Shortly after their arrival in Vietnam, the Marines of HMM-362 began
+experimenting with one of the more imaginative techniques developed in
+the early stages of the intensified U.S.-GVN counterinsurgency effort.
+Marine air crews had noticed that the enemy often managed to elude the
+larger ARVN units by fleeing the operations area in small groups. Even
+the smallest breach between ARVN units seemed to allow large numbers
+of guerrillas to escape into covered or heavily populated areas where
+they became impossible to find. Colonel Carey and Lieutenant Colonel
+Clapp devised a plan to prevent escapes of this nature. Their idea was
+to have a flight of four Marine helicopters loaded with about 50 ARVN
+soldiers circle above the contested area. This so-called “Eagle Flight”
+would be on the alert for any Viet Cong attempting to evade the ground
+forces. Once the enemy was located, often by the OE-1 observation
+aircraft, the helicopters would land the Vietnamese soldiers at a
+position where they could block his escape. The Marine commanders felt
+that the adoption of such a tactic would increase the effectiveness of
+the ARVN’s helicopter assault operations.
+
+After several weeks of planning by HMM-362 and the affected III Corps
+commands, the concept was put into practice. The Eagle Flight was first
+tested in a large operation on 18 June when HMM-362 helilifted ARVN
+troops into 16 different landing zones. Heavy monsoon rains made the
+enemy particularly difficult to pin down, but the Marine pilots managed
+to sight 10 Viet Cong near the main landing zone. After landing near
+the enemy, the ARVN troops captured 10 Communist soldiers and wounded
+one other. Shortly after this incident another Eagle Flight made two
+eventful contacts with the enemy. The Marine helicopters landed their
+small force and the ARVN promptly killed four Viet Cong and captured
+another. Twenty minutes later, after reboarding the helicopters, the
+South Vietnamese swept down upon a new prey, this time capturing four
+prisoners.
+
+The novel concept was employed successfully again on 10 July. While
+HMM-362 aircraft lifted 968 ARVN troops into the Ca Mau area, an Eagle
+Flight spotted a sampan moving northward from the operations area. The
+flight leader landed the troops nearby and the ARVN intercepted the
+craft. Later that day the Marines and ARVN of the Eagle Flight clashed
+twice with an estimated platoon of Viet Cong. In the first encounter
+seven enemy were killed and several weapons were captured. In the
+second skirmish, the enemy suffered six dead and lost more weapons. All
+four Marine helicopters, however, were hit by small arms fire during
+the two brief fights.
+
+By the middle of July, the Eagle Flight had become a proven combat
+tactic. By reducing the enemy’s opportunity to escape when the
+government forces possessed the advantage on the battlefield, it had
+favorably influenced the tactical situation when used in the Mekong
+Delta. Equally important, SHUFLY’s commanders had demonstrated their
+ability to adapt their technological resources to the Viet Cong’s
+methods of operations. Variants of the Eagle Flight tactic, under
+different names such as Tiger Flight, Sparrow Hawk, Pacifier, and Quick
+Reaction Force, would be used by the Marines throughout the Vietnam war.
+
+The Marines were quick to apply their technological knowhow to other
+problems which were to confront them during their early operations in
+the III Corps Tactical Zone. One example was their adaptation of the
+TAFDS to the problem which arose when the helicopters were called upon
+to operate far beyond their normal fuel range. HMM-362 helicopters
+would airlift a TAFDS unit, complete with a 10,000 gallon fuel bladder,
+pumps, and MABS-16 personnel, to the site where the ARVN troops were
+to be loaded. The fuel bladders were filled by gasoline trucks which
+travelled from the nearest source of fuel. The Marine helicopters could
+then use the TAFDS as a temporary base of operations, refueling between
+troop pick-ups when necessary. Thus employed, the TAFDS allowed the
+operating radius of the helicopters to be extended to support even the
+most distant South Vietnamese operation.
+
+While the Marines were learning to adapt their technology to the
+guerrilla war environment, the enemy was applying his ingenuity in
+attempts to frustrate the American and South Vietnamese helicopter
+operations. The Viet Cong quickly learned to capitalize on the presence
+of large crowds of civilians who sometimes gathered near helicopter
+landing zones to watch the strange aircraft. One such incident occurred
+in June when Communist soldiers mingled with a crowd and delivered
+fire on helicopters which were lifting elements of the 21st ARVN
+Division. Two aircraft were hit by enemy fire although the damage was
+not extensive enough to force them to land. The Marines, who refused
+to return fire with their individual weapons unless the Viet Cong
+could be separated from the civilian populace, found no effective
+method of countering this tactic. Later in June, the Marines of HMM-362
+encountered another tactic when they found that hundreds of upright
+bamboo stakes had been prepositioned in the intended landing zone. The
+perpendicular spikes, each four or five feet high, not only prevented
+the helicopters from landing but also made it impossible to disembark
+the ARVN troops while hovering. Fortunately, the abundance of landing
+zones in the delta region tended to make this particular tactic
+ineffective.[5-E]
+
+    [5-E] The German army had used a similar technique (upright
+          poles) to obstruct landing zones against U.S. paratroops
+          at Normandy during World War II. (Taylor, _Swords and
+          Plowshares_, p. 80.)
+
+On 20 July, HMM-362 added a new dimension to the counterguerrilla
+capabilities of the South Vietnamese forces when it executed the first
+night helicopter assault of the war. The mission, which began at 0415
+at Soc Trang, involved lifting three waves of ARVN troops into an
+objective on the Plain of Reeds, about 40 miles southwest of Ben Tre.
+The ARVN force intended to encircle a suspected Viet Cong village
+before dawn and then attack it at daybreak. The Marine portion of the
+airlift was completed 10 minutes before daylight after which the Army’s
+57th Helicopter Company joined the operation. Although the night troop
+lift was executed without incident, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp attributed
+its success at least partially to the near perfect conditions. The
+moonlight, reflected from the flat, flooded rice paddies, had aided the
+Marine pilots in the tricky operation.[5-19]
+
+Prior to SHUFLY’s deployment to Soc Trang, General Roberts’ staff at
+FMFPac had developed a policy for the periodic rotation of the task
+unit’s Marines for which the Commandant’s approval had been gained.
+The helicopter squadron would be replaced by a similar unit after
+approximately four months of operations in the combat zone. But
+rather than being drawn from the 1st MAW on Okinawa, the replacement
+squadron was to be provided by the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in
+California. Officers and men serving with the supporting headquarters
+and MABS-16 elements, however, were to be replaced by Marines from
+MAG-16 at approximately four-month intervals. So as not to disrupt the
+operational efficiency of the task unit, individual replacements would
+be made in increments.
+
+In accordance with this rotation policy, HMM-163, the HUS unit
+scheduled to relieve HMM-362, began arriving at Soc Trang on 23 July.
+Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Rathbun, a veteran fighter
+pilot of World War II and Korea, the squadron continued to arrive
+during the last week of July. Airlifted by GV-1s from the Marine Corps
+Air Facility, Santa Ana, California, the new squadron brought neither
+helicopters nor maintenance equipment. The squadron commander had
+orders to continue operations with HMM-362’s aircraft and equipment.
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s squadron maintained a steady operational
+pace even after the new unit’s appearance. On 27 July, 18 of HMM-362’s
+helicopters participated in an operation about 30 miles northeast
+of Soc Trang. The next day the task unit commander committed 21
+helicopters and OE-1s to a 21st ARVN Division operation near Ca Mau.
+The Eagle Flight was committed on four different occasions during this
+operation.
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s “Ridge Runners” officially relieved
+“Archie’s Angels” on 1 August after a week of orientation flying with
+HMM-362’s crews. The men of the departing squadron could reflect
+on their tour in South Vietnam with a sense of satisfaction and
+accomplishment. Since their arrival in mid-April, they had executed
+50 combat helicopter assaults, had flown 4,439 sorties, and had
+amassed 5,262 hours of combat flight time, all in unarmed aircraft.
+During the course of these missions they had made approximately 130
+different landings against Viet Cong opposition. Seventeen of their
+24 helicopters and two of the three OE-1 aircraft had received battle
+damage. To the credit of the squadron’s maintenance personnel and
+aircrews, HMM-362 had not lost a single aircraft during its operations
+in the Republic of Vietnam. Miraculously the squadron had suffered no
+casualties while testing the Marine Corps’ vertical envelopment concept
+in the guerrilla war situation.[5-20]
+
+During their three and a half months at Soc Trang, Lieutenant Colonel
+Clapp’s men had contributed significantly to another facet of the war
+effort--one usually considered unrelated to normal combat operations.
+Sensing the unique links between the political and military aspects
+of the struggle in South Vietnam, Colonel Carey had initiated a
+“People-to-People-Program,” the objective of which was to assist the
+Government of Vietnam in winning the allegiance of the Vietnamese
+people. Within a few days after occupying the Soc Trang airfield,
+Colonel Carey had ordered the task unit’s medical facilities made
+available to Vietnamese civilians requiring emergency medical
+treatment. U.S. Navy doctors and corpsmen began visiting nearby
+villages to hold “sick call” for the local inhabitants. On an average
+visit these medical teams would examine around 60 Vietnamese of all
+ages. They would then dispense soap, vitamins, and aspirin--commodities
+which some rural Vietnamese had never seen. Gradually, the medical
+teams expanded their operations until by mid-June they were being flown
+by helicopter as far away as Ca Mau.
+
+HMM-362’s departure from Vietnam coincided roughly with the departure
+of most of the Marine task unit’s senior officers--the men who had
+directed the efforts to win the “other war” for the allegiance of the
+Vietnamese people. On 30 July, Colonel Julius W. Ireland, another
+Marine aviator who had seen combat in two previous wars, relieved
+Colonel Carey as the task unit commander. The new commander was one of
+few Marines who had been in Vietnam previously. In April 1954 he had
+landed at Da Nang (then known by its French name, Tourane) as squadron
+commander of Marine Attack Squadron 324 (VMA-324) and delivered 25
+F4U/FG Corsair fighter bombers to the French who were in desperate
+need of attack aircraft to support Dien Bien Phu. Five days after
+Ireland assumed command of Task Unit 79.3.5, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph
+R. Davis replaced Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge as commanding officer of
+the MABS-16 sub unit. On 13 August another change occurred when the
+executive officer of the Marine task unit, Lieutenant Colonel Harry C.
+Dees, was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Alton W. McCully. Except that
+it left few original members of the task unit, the departure of these
+Marines for new duty stations in Okinawa, Japan, and the United States
+did not affect the operations at Soc Trang. Thoroughly briefed on their
+responsibilities, the new officers would continue to direct Marine
+support of the Vietnamese government on both the battlefield and the
+psychological front.
+
+HMM-163 participated in its first combat mission as a squadron on
+1 August when it joined the Army’s 57th Helicopter Company in a
+coordinated troop lift. Like their predecessors, “Rathbun’s Ridge
+Runners” maintained a brisk pace of operations during the weeks
+following their initial assignment. Shortly after its first troop
+lift, the squadron participated in a 2,000-man South Vietnamese
+spoiling operation in An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost province.
+Anticipating a major Viet Cong offensive in the four southern
+provinces, III Corps authorities moved their headquarters to Soc Trang
+and established a forward command post at Ca Mau. The Vietnamese Air
+Force then positioned a composite detachment of four AD-6 Skyraiders
+(single-engine, propeller-driven attack bombers built by Douglas), two
+T-28s, and a number of H-34 helicopters (the U.S. Army, Air Force, and
+VNAF version of the HUS) at Soc Trang to support the operation. Joined
+by the VNAF H-34s, the Marine squadron conducted numerous troop lifts
+during the week-long operation. At the end of the action the ARVN
+reported 84 Viet Cong killed, another 30 captured, and the confiscation
+of nearly 15,000 pounds of arms, ammunition, and explosives. The first
+Marine helicopter loss in Vietnam occurred during the operation when
+a VNAF fighter careened off the runway and damaged a parked HUS to
+the extent that it could not be repaired. Marine mechanics stripped
+undamaged parts from the helicopter for use as replacements.[5-F]
+
+    [5-F] Marine helicopters lost in Vietnam during the 1962–1964
+          period were replaced by new ones airlifted from Okinawa
+          by U.S. Air Force C-124 Globemaster transports. By
+          replacing aircraft losses on a one-to-one basis the task
+          unit was able to maintain a level of 24 helicopters
+          except for brief periods.
+
+HMM-163 suffered its first aircraft damage as a result of combat a few
+day’s later on 18 August during a mission led by Lieutenant Colonel
+Rathbun. Fourteen HUSs arrived at a prearranged pickup point to
+rendezvous with an ARVN infantry force but the Marine pilots discovered
+that the unit had not appeared. One crewman then reported having seen
+some ARVN troops about a half mile away from the landing zone. At this
+juncture, a white smoke signal appeared at approximately the same
+location that the Marine had observed the South Vietnamese troops.
+Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun and his wingmate, assuming that the smoke
+marked the actual pickup point, took off to investigate the area. While
+making a low pass over the smoke signal, the squadron commander’s
+helicopter was hit several times by small arms fire which severed the
+rudder control cable and punctured the main rotor transmission. The
+loss of oil required Rathbun to make a forced landing on a nearby road.
+After mechanics had been flown in and repairs had been accomplished,
+the helicopter was flown to a secure area.
+
+[Illustration: _Marine officers visit Father Phuoc’s village. Left
+to right: Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp; Colonel John F. Carey;
+Father Phuoc; Colonel Julius W. Ireland; Colonel Gordon Gale; Major
+General Richard G. Weede; French Interpreter Gilles H. Rocheleau; and
+three unidentified Marine officers. (USMC Photo A420824)._]
+
+An investigation of the incident later revealed that the confusion had
+begun when the ARVN unit scheduled to be helilifted became involved in
+a skirmish with guerrillas less than a mile from the pick up point. A
+VNAF Forward Air Controller (FAC) in an observation aircraft had then
+marked the Viet Cong position for an air strike with a white smoke
+grenade rather than red smoke, as was normally used. This was the smoke
+which Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun had attempted to identify when his
+aircraft was hit.
+
+From this incident the pilots of HMM-163 learned several valuable
+lessons about helicopter support in conjunction with ARVN ground
+operations. First, helilifts of government forces from the field at
+prearranged times required thorough last minute coordination. Secondly,
+helicopters could not be used safely on low-level reconnaissance or
+identification passes. Finally, prearranged colored smoke signals were
+easily confused and when used routinely were subject to enemy attempts
+at deception. Such signalling methods were most effective when used in
+conjunction with radio communications between air and ground units.
+
+A somewhat humorous sequel to this incident took place later in the
+day when Rathbun learned that he had been selected for promotion to
+colonel. The timing of the notification prompted one squadron wit to
+quip: “Lost a bird, gained a bird.”[5-21]
+
+“Rathbun’s Ridge Runners” continued intensive support operations in
+III Corps Tactical Zone throughout the month of August. Their daily
+missions normally included both scheduled troop lifts and unscheduled
+medical evacuations. During the week of 19–25 August HMM-163
+helicopters logged slightly over 800 combat flying hours. A squadron
+record for a single day was established on 24 August when 197.6
+helicopter hours were flown. Flight time for the helicopters during
+the entire month totalled 2,543 hours--a new Marine Corps record for
+an HUS squadron. The OE-1 aircraft added 63 missions and 212 hours to
+this total. Another statistic revealed that 21 of the squadron’s pilots
+logged over 100 hours of combat flying time during August.[5-22] This
+record was even more impressive considering that flight operations were
+hampered by the monsoon season which reached its peak during August in
+the Mekong Delta.
+
+In August Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s men made a significant
+modification to their helicopters when they began mounting M-60
+machine guns inside the cargo hatch. So as not to obstruct the hatch
+during loading and unloading phases, the squadron’s metalsmiths
+designed a flexible mount which allowed the crew chiefs to swing the
+belt-fed, 7.62mm automatic weapon back into the cabin when necessary.
+The addition of the machine gun enabled the crew chief to protect
+the otherwise defenseless helicopter during critical landing and
+take off phases. Still, the Marine gunners were restricted in their
+action by MACV’s “rules of engagement” which at this time stipulated
+that American servicemen could fire only after being fired upon and
+then only at clearly identified enemy. Intended to prevent offensive
+combat action by U.S. military personnel operating in Vietnam, these
+regulations prevented Americans from returning fire except when
+the enemy was clearly identified.[5-G] Primarily because of these
+restrictions the Marines seldom employed their M-60s in the heavily
+populated Mekong Delta.
+
+    [5-G] The rules of engagement applied to U.S. advisors as
+          well as aviation crews. Although they underwent several
+          modifications during the course of the war, the above
+          definition was virtually unaltered during the period
+          between 1962 and 1964.
+
+
+_Preparations and Redeployment_
+
+In early September General Harkins directed that Colonel Ireland begin
+planning for the redeployment of his helicopter task unit northward
+to Da Nang. The shift to I Corps, which had been the subject of
+much debate prior to SHUFLY’s assignment at Soc Trang, came as no
+surprise. Shortly after the task unit’s arrival in the Mekong Delta,
+Colonel Carey accompanied General Condon on a visit to the Army’s 93d
+Helicopter Company at Da Nang. There they discussed details of the
+relocation with Army officers. In early July General Harkins set 1
+August as the date on which the Marine task unit and the 93d Helicopter
+Company would switch locations. But personal appeals by General Nghiem,
+the III Corps commander and his senior U.S. advisor, Colonel Porter,
+that the Marine helicopters be retained at Soc Trang caused Harkins to
+postpone the date for the exchange until 15 September.
+
+In that the airlift was executed in phases, the Marines’ movement to
+Da Nang was accomplished in much the same manner as had been the task
+unit’s initial move into Soc Trang. On 4 September Colonel Ireland
+dispatched the task unit’s assistant communications officer and an
+advance party to Da Nang to assess the communications requirements
+there and to prepare for the arrival of the remainder of the Marines
+and their equipment. Four days later Marine wiremen, message center
+personnel, and radio operators began preparing a communications center
+at their new home. The next day the advance party established radio
+contact with SHUFLY headquarters in order to help coordinate the move.
+By 9 September MABS-16 technicians had assembled a TAFDS at the Da Nang
+airfield. This facility would enable the GV-1 transports participating
+in the airlift to refuel for the 460-mile return flight to Soc Trang
+after unloading their cargoes at Da Nang.
+
+While the advance party readied the facilities at Da Nang for its
+unit’s arrival, combat support operations and preparations for the move
+northward continued simultaneously at Soc Trang. During an operation on
+5 September, three of HMM-163’s helicopters were hit by several rounds
+of enemy small arms fire. Although all three aircraft returned safely
+to base, the Marines suffered their first casualty to Viet Cong fire
+when Corporal Billy S. Watson, a crew chief, was slightly wounded.
+Troop lifts from Soc Trang continued until 1740 on 13 September when
+helicopter support operations were ended and the final preparations for
+the move to Da Nang began.
+
+On the evening of 14 September, the first of the Marine GV-1s slated
+to transport the task unit arrived at Soc Trang from Okinawa. At dawn
+the next morning, the refueler-transports began shuttling Marines and
+their equipment to Da Nang and the Army’s 93d Helicopter Company to Soc
+Trang. By the end of the day much of the airlift had been completed.
+The crews and helicopters of Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s squadron,
+however, did not begin displacing northward until the 16th when 12 HUSs
+made the seven-hour flight to Da Nang with three en route refueling
+stops. The 12 remaining helicopters arrived at SHUFLY’s new base of
+operations the next day. The move was completed on 20 September when
+the last cargo carrying GV-1 landed at Da Nang.
+
+
+_Accomplishments_
+
+As SHUFLY’s Marines began preparing for their impending operations
+in the northern provinces they could look with pride on their
+accomplishments at Soc Trang. Since their arrival in the Mekong Delta
+in April the Leathernecks had clearly demonstrated their ability to
+conduct sustained and effective helicopter operations in support of
+non-English-speaking ground forces. While it could not be said that
+their presence had completely transformed the complexion of the GVN’s
+struggle to control the critical Mekong Delta region, the Marine
+helicopters had provided the ARVN units operating there with a degree
+of mobility they had not previously possessed. This new-found mobility
+in turn had helped generate a new offensive spirit within government
+units assigned to southern III Corps. In his letter to ComUSMACV
+requesting the retention of the task unit at Soc Trang, Colonel Porter,
+the Senior U.S. Advisor to the corps tactical zone, reported: “Now
+they [ARVN forces] have a taste of victory and for the first time are
+beginning to believe there is a possibility of defeating the Viet
+Cong.”[5-23]
+
+During the course of their operations throughout South Vietnam’s
+southern provinces, the SHUFLY Marines displayed an instinct for
+recognizing and coping with the challenges of unconventional warfare.
+Confronted by a war without front lines in which an elusive, highly
+mobile enemy blended readily with the local populace, the task unit’s
+leaders devised new and successful helicopter tactics. Likewise,
+SHUFLY’s Marine and Navy personnel moved to prevent a possible
+conflict of cultures and to discredit Communist propaganda through the
+initiation of the People-to-People Program. Although only an informal
+beginning, this program would serve as a foundation upon which the U.S.
+Marine Corps would later build a doctrine defining the relationship
+between Marines on duty in Vietnam and the Vietnamese people.
+
+Beyond the innovative thinking of its leaders, much of SHUFLY’s success
+in III Corps was produced by hard work on a sustained basis. For this
+the individual Marines, particularly the maintenance crews which
+often worked around the clock in primitive surroundings to keep the
+helicopters airworthy, deserved heavy credit. Although unglamorous,
+their daily contributions underwrote the success of the combat support
+operations. So, functioning as a team, the task unit’s members blended
+innovation, hard work, and technical expertise with perseverance and
+courage to carve out a reputation for themselves in the faraway rice
+lands of the Mekong Delta.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 6
+
+SHUFLY Moves North
+
+_Arrival at Da Nang--I Corps Tactical Zone--Military Situation,
+September 1962--Initial Helicopter Operations--Marine People-to-People
+Program--SHUFLY Operations in I Corps_
+
+
+_Arrival at Da Nang_
+
+Da Nang retained many characteristics of an old French colonial port
+city when the Marines arrived there in mid-September 1962. With its
+thriving market place, its throngs of bicycles, and a noticeable dearth
+of automobile traffic, the city was certainly more Asian than European
+in appearance. Still, the former French presence was evident in the
+architecture of public buildings, electric and telephone lines, paved
+streets, built-up waterfront, and an airfield. Although the French
+influence seemed not to have disturbed the traditional Vietnamese
+culture, it had imparted a picturesque charm to South Vietnam’s second
+largest city.
+
+Virtually surrounded by the city itself, Da Nang’s airfield was to
+serve as SHUFLY’s new base of operations. Having been rebuilt as
+a military base by the French following World War II, the Da Nang
+facility was relatively modern. Understandably, it differed in many
+ways from the crude little airfield the Marines had left behind in the
+steamy Mekong Delta. The runway, for example, was considerably longer,
+having 8,000 feet of paved surface. The Da Nang base was also busier,
+having already been occupied by Vietnamese and U.S. Air Force units.
+Furthermore, it served the city as a commercial airport.
+
+Scattered around the long north-south runway were numerous clusters of
+French-built masonry structures. A group of 50 of these yellow-walled
+buildings, located about one half mile west of the runway, had been
+designated as living quarters for the newly arrived Marines. Although
+the actual living spaces were somewhat crowded and in need of much
+repair, the indoor toilets, showers, ceiling fans, and fluorescent
+lights (none of which functioned properly) were welcomed by the men
+who had experienced the discomforts of life in Soc Trang’s “tent
+city.” Once the Marines had moved in, their compound would include a
+chapel, medical and dental facilities, service clubs, a movie, a barber
+shop, a laundry, and a mess hall.
+
+While many of the problems encountered initially by the Marines at
+Da Nang were similar to those that had greeted their predecessors at
+Soc Trang, there were also some new ones to be resolved. The two most
+imposing of these stemmed from the distance between the living compound
+and working areas. Located along the southeast side of the airstrip,
+the flight line and hangar were nearly three miles from the Marine
+quarters by road. Located still farther away, about a quarter mile
+south of the hangar, were the motor pool and communications facility.
+In addition to creating a new requirement for transportation, the
+distances between the various areas necessitated adjustments in the
+security arrangements which had been used at Soc Trang.
+
+Fortunately SHUFLY’s first commander, Colonel Carey, had foreseen
+the requirement for transportation between the living area and the
+flight line during his visit to the Da Nang installation in April. The
+problem was solved by the purchase of three used American school buses
+which were already on hand when the Marines arrived from Soc Trang.
+The security situation proved somewhat more perplexing. Initially
+Colonel Ireland handled the problem in much the same manner as it had
+been at Soc Trang. A permanent sergeant-of-the-guard was detailed to
+supervise a security force composed of men from the MABS-16 sub unit
+and HMM-163. Guard posts were established around the helicopter flight
+line, the hangar, the TAFDS, the motor pool-communications area, and
+the billeting compound. But this arrangement, while serving the
+intended purpose, was not ideal. Frequently the Marines who served
+on security watch at night were called upon to perform long hours
+of work the following day. This prompted Colonel Ireland to request
+that a permanent security force be assigned to his command in order
+that the overworked mechanics, cooks, carpenters, electricians, and
+communicators could concentrate on their particular jobs. The request
+was placed under consideration by ComUSMACV and FMFPac authorities but
+was not approved immediately.[6-A]
+
+    [6-A] General Weede explained that, because such increases
+          could not be made without the approval of the Department
+          of Defense, such requests were forwarded first to MACV
+          Headquarters for approval. (_Weede Interview._)
+
+[Illustration: _A portion of the Marine Compound at Da Nang. (Official
+USMC Photo)._]
+
+At Da Nang Colonel Ireland’s task unit was not responsible for every
+facet of airfield operations as had been the case previously at Soc
+Trang. The U.S. Air Force provided radar, ground control approach,
+tactical air navigation, and meteorological services at the new
+installation while the Vietnamese operated the control tower. These
+conveniences allowed Ireland to make a small reduction in the overall
+size of the Marine task unit. Those MABS-16 specialists who had
+operated these systems at Soc Trang were returned to their parent
+organizations on Okinawa.
+
+
+_I Corps Tactical Zone_
+
+At the time the Marine task unit arrived in Da Nang, I Corps Tactical
+Zone encompassed South Vietnam’s five northern provinces. Quang Tri
+Province, located immediately south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ)
+topped this tier of political subdivisions. Below Quang Tri Province
+lay Thua Thien, followed by Quang Nam, Quang Tin (recently created),
+and Quang Ngai Provinces. All are coastal provinces and, with the
+exception of Quang Ngai, extend inland from the seacoast to the Laotian
+border, a distance which varies between 30 and 70 miles. Together, they
+occupy the central portion of the region formerly known as Annam and
+extend 225 miles to the south of the DMZ.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  I CORPS 1962
+]
+
+The climatic pattern in the northern provinces is the exact reverse
+of that which affects the southern portion of the nation. In I Corps
+the dry season occurs in the summer months while the monsoons, which
+blow from the northeast, dominate the winter. Heavy monsoon rains
+accompanied by wind and fog normally begin in October. After reaching
+their peak usually in November, the monsoon rains tend to diminish
+gradually until their disappearance around mid-March.
+
+The differences between the physical structure of the northern
+provinces and the Mekong Delta is even more striking than their
+reversed climatic patterns. White beaches stretch almost unbroken along
+the entire length of I Corps. Just inland and roughly parallel to the
+coast south of Da Nang lies a lightly populated strip of sand dunes and
+generally unproductive soil. This strip varies in width from one half
+to two miles. In the west it dissolves into the flat, densely populated
+coastal plain. Any similarity between the Mekong Delta and the northern
+provinces is found in this expanse of fertile rice-producing land where
+tiny rural hamlets and slightly larger villages, each enclosed by thick
+hedgerows and treelines, abound. North of Da Nang the semi-barren
+coastal sands tend to extend farther inland, and thereby reduce the
+productive portion of the coastal plains.
+
+The most distinct geographic feature of I Corps, and one easily visible
+to the Marines at Da Nang, is the chain of towering mountains which
+protrude from the flat coastal plain several miles west of the city.
+There is a conspicuous absence of foothills leading to the mountains
+which seem to surround Da Nang on the north and west. North of the Hai
+Van Peninsula, a rugged promonotory which juts into the South China
+Sea about 10 miles north of the Marines’ new home, a zone of foothills
+eases the transition from the wide coastal plain to the rugged
+jungle-covered mountains.
+
+The coastal plains of the five northern provinces are broken by several
+significant streams along which most of the region’s principal
+population centers are located. Roughly 10 miles south of the 1954
+partition line the Cua Viet empties into the southern portion of the
+Tonkin Gulf. Both Quang Tri City, the capital of Quang Tri Province,
+and Dong Ha, South Vietnam’s northernmost population center of any
+significance, are situated on the Cua Viet and its major tributary, the
+Song Cam Lo. The Song Huong (often referred to as the Perfume River),
+which flows past the old imperial capital of Hue, enters the sea at a
+point approximately half way between Da Nang and the nation’s northern
+boundary.[6-B] At Da Nang the Song Han (also called the Da Nang River)
+flows into Da Nang Harbor after its main tributary, the Song Cau Do,
+curves through the coastal plains immediately south and west of the
+city. Eighteen miles south of the Marines’ new base of operations,
+the Song Cau Dai empties into the South China Sea near Hoi An, the
+capital of Quang Nam Province. The Song Cau Dai originates about 18
+miles inland at the confluence of the Song Thu Bon and the Song Vu Gia
+which twist seaward from the south and west respectively. Together
+these three estuaries constitute the most important geographic feature
+of the sprawling coastal plain south of Da Nang. Another major stream,
+the Song Tra Bong, flows on an eastward course about 32 miles south of
+the Song Cau Dai. Still further south is the Song Tra Khuc, a river
+which dominates the wide coastal plain of Quang Ngai Province in much
+the same fashion as does the Song Cau Dai and its tributaries in the
+area south of Da Nang. The provincial capital, Quang Ngai, once a major
+railroad center for South Vietnam, is situated several miles inland on
+the south bank of the Song Tra Khuc. The southernmost stream of any
+significance in I Corps is the Song Ve, which angles northeastward
+through central Quang Ngai Province. While none of these waterways is
+navigable far beyond its mouth by ocean-going vessels, each serves the
+local population as convenient local routes of communication as well as
+vital sources of irrigation water during the long dry seasons.
+
+    [6-B] In the Vietnamese language the word “song” means stream
+          and normally precedes the name of rivers.
+
+The two and a half million people who inhabited I Corps in 1962 had
+developed along social and economic lines dictated largely by the
+geography and climate of their region. Rice growing, centered on
+the coastal plains, dominated the economic activities of the area.
+Combined, the provinces of I Corps produced nearly half a million
+tons of rice annually. Fishing, concentrated along the coast and the
+major rivers, ranked as the second most important economic pursuit.
+Unlike most of South Vietnam, I Corps did possess some potential for
+industrial development. A small but productive surface coal mine was
+located about 25 miles southwest of Da Nang at Nong Son along the
+western bank of the Song Thu Bon. Although the mine was operating in
+1962, it had made little discernable impact on the overall economic
+picture of the region.
+
+[Illustration: _Aerial view of Marine helicopter flight line at Da
+Nang shortly after SHUFLY’s relocation to I Corps in September 1962.
+(Official USMC Photo)._]
+
+
+_Military Situation, September 1962_
+
+From its new base at Da Nang, Colonel Ireland’s task unit was
+responsible for directly supporting the forces under Major General
+Tran Van Don’s I Corps headquarters. The 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions,
+headquartered respectively at Hue and Da Nang, were the major tactical
+units at General Don’s disposal. Occasionally elements of the 25th ARVN
+Division, headquartered at Kontum in northwestern II Corps, joined I
+Corps forces for offensive operations along the southern fringe of
+Quang Ngai Province. Several ARVN Ranger battalions served as mobile
+reaction forces for the corps tactical zone.[6-C] Also scattered over
+the northern corps tactical zone were numerous paramilitary units of
+assorted sizes. These, too, were garrisoned primarily along the heavily
+populated coastal plain.
+
+    [6-C] The ranger battalions had been organized in late 1960
+          from existing ARVN forces. They were conceived as highly
+          mobile infantry units and were under the direct control
+          of the CTZ commander.
+
+Opposing these government forces in the early fall of 1962 were Viet
+Cong forces of formidable strength. Four interprovincial battalions
+(main force), four interprovincial companies, five provincial
+companies, 18 district companies, and three district platoons were
+known to be operating within the boundaries of I Corps. Together, these
+units totalled an estimated 4,750 men.[6-1] Added to the presence
+of these known Viet Cong units was the threat posed to I Corps by
+its proximity to North Vietnam and to the so-called “Ho Chi Minh
+Trails” located across the Laotian border. The relative position of
+the northern provinces naturally invited Communist infiltration. In
+June, for example, the _4th Viet Cong Battalion_, a main force unit,
+was infiltrated into Quang Nam Province from sanctuaries in Laos. By
+September MACV intelligence estimates reported one North Vietnamese
+(PAVN) infantry division, two independent PAVN infantry regiments, and
+an artillery regiment poised in areas of Laos adjacent to the I Corps
+border. “These units,” the U.S. report warned, “... could be committed
+anywhere in I Corps or [the] northern part of II Corps 20 days after
+starting movement.”[6-2]
+
+While the government’s nationwide strategy focused on clearing and
+holding the populated areas, the physiographic configuration of I
+Corps (as well as II Corps to the south) demanded that offensive
+operations be conducted in the mountains adjacent to the coastal plains
+against Viet Cong base areas. Since the arrival of the U.S. Army
+helicopter company at Da Nang early in the year, General Don had shown
+an increasing tendency to mount battalion and regimental heliborne
+assaults deep into the western mountains. Capitalizing on the mobility
+which the American helicopters afforded, the ARVN command had hoped to
+disrupt remote Communist base areas inside the international border.
+Still, heliborne offensives into western I Corps were often hampered by
+bad weather, particularly during the monsoon season.
+
+Another facet of the government effort to deny the enemy unrestricted
+access to the mountains was a system characterized by a network of
+small, relatively isolated outposts. In late 1961, at the urging
+of U.S. officials in Saigon, the Diem government had launched a
+program whose ultimate objective was similar to that of the Strategic
+Hamlet Program. First, U.S. Army Special Forces teams entered
+remote Montagnard villages located in the Annamite Chain and built
+small fortified camps. This accomplished, the Americans initiated
+pacification activities with the hope of securing the allegiance of the
+traditionally independent Montagnard tribesmen.
+
+By mid-1962 the Special Forces effort appeared on its way to success.
+Already Montagnard tribesmen had been organized into a number of
+Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDGs) throughout the mountains of
+I and II Corps. Advised by Special Forces teams, the CIDG units were
+monitoring infiltration routes and harassing the Communists as they
+attempted to move through the mountains. By the summer of 1962 the
+distinctive little barbed wire enclosed camps were scattered over the
+length of western I Corps.
+
+Although it played an important role in the government’s strategy for
+controlling the insurgency in the northern provinces, the outpost
+system had obvious shortcomings. Roads between the distant camps and
+the towns along the coastal plain were almost nonexistent. Those that
+did exist, such as Route 9, the road which extended from Route 1
+westward across Quang Tri Province and into Laos, were vulnerable to
+ambush or interdiction by guerrilla forces. Truck convoys, furthermore,
+consumed time and required protection by security forces. As a result
+of their relative isolation, the CIDG camps had come to depend heavily
+on aircraft as a means of resupply. While crude runways had been
+constructed at many of the outposts, they were often better suited for
+helicopter operations than for fixed-wing transport landings. The newly
+arrived Marine commanders anticipated that their squadron, like the
+Army helicopter company it had replaced, would be required to devote a
+sizable percentage of sorties to resupplying the far-flung outposts.
+
+
+_Initial Helicopter Operations_
+
+The system of helicopter coordination in I Corps promised to be
+somewhat different from that which had governed Marine operations in
+the Mekong Delta. At Da Nang, an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)
+was organized within the corps headquarters to process all requests
+for aviation support. Manned by ARVN, VNAF, U.S. Air Force, and U.S.
+Marine officers, the ASOC processed mission requests from the various
+field commands, passing them on to the Joint Operations Center at JGS
+headquarters for final approval. Once approved, the ASOC assigned
+specific missions to the American and Vietnamese units which supported
+I CTZ. This arrangement enabled the corps headquarters to plan and
+coordinate all combat support missions flown within the five northern
+provinces.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  MAJOR OUTPOSTS I CORPS 1962
+]
+
+The Vietnamese commanders in I Corps, who had learned to value
+helicopter support as a result of the Army aviation company’s
+eight-month presence at Da Nang, lost no time in employing the newly
+arrived Marine squadron. HMM-163 flew its first combat operation from
+Da Nang on 18 September, the day after the last flight of helicopters
+arrived from Soc Trang. Fourteen HUSs lifted troops of the 2d ARVN
+Division into two landing zones in the rugged hills about 35 miles
+south of Da Nang and 25 miles inland from the coast. The scarcity of
+suitable landing zones in the steep hill country and the fact that
+the enemy could deliver fire on those that did exist from nearby
+high ground and the surrounding jungle prompted the Marine pilots
+to adjust their tactics in preparation for this mission. After VNAF
+fighters bombed and strafed the objective area, the helicopters made an
+unopposed landing.
+
+The tactic of preparing helicopter landing zones with air strikes
+was continued and refined in the ensuing weeks. The Marines began
+using artillery fire in conjunction with air strikes to neutralize
+enemy troops in the vicinity of the objective. The OE-1 was well
+suited for assisting in the employment of the artillery fire support.
+Having familiarized themselves with the landing site during a prior
+reconnaissance mission, the pilot and observer of the OE-1 would arrive
+over the designated area prior to the operation and adjust artillery
+fire until the helicopters appeared. During the landing the crew of the
+observation aircraft often coordinated between the helicopters and the
+escorting aircraft and were available to assist the ground units with
+artillery fire missions.
+
+The task unit’s staff borrowed another idea from their experience
+in the Mekong Delta which allowed HMM-163 to provide more efficient
+helicopter support in the northern provinces. In this case the concept
+of temporarily positioning the TAFDS to support specific operations
+was refined somewhat by placing the portable refueling bladders at
+secure, permanent locations throughout I Corps. Several days after
+arriving in I Corps, the Marines emplaced a 10,000-gallon section of
+the TAFDS at Quang Ngai, about 65 miles south of Da Nang, to serve as a
+permanent refueling point for aircraft operating in southern I Corps.
+Within the month, another fuel bladder was positioned at Hue and a
+third was emplaced at Tam Ky, the capital of Quang Tin Province, which
+was situated on Route 1 about half way between Da Nang and Quang Ngai.
+These well-chosen refueling points greatly enhanced the squadron’s
+operational potential. Used to support daily operations, they enabled
+the helicopters to operate deep into the adjacent mountain areas on
+resupply and medical evacuation missions.
+
+On 19 September, the day after their initial combat support assignment
+in I Corps, the Marine helicopter crews were called upon to conduct an
+operation which they would repeat often in the coming months. They were
+ordered to evacuate a threatened government outpost from the mountains
+18 miles west of Da Nang. That day the HMM-163 pilots lifted an odd
+cargo of troops, dependents, personal belongings and an assortment of
+pigs, cows, chickens, and ducks to a secure area on the coastal plain.
+
+Unfortunately, helicopter evacuations of encircled or endangered South
+Vietnamese outposts would become almost routine for Marine helicopter
+squadrons assigned to Vietnam during the period between 1962 and 1965.
+As the North Vietnamese stepped up their support for the Viet Cong,
+the isolated government outposts along the infiltration routes became
+particularly vulnerable. The increased number of helicopter evacuation
+missions during the next three years would be grim testimony of the
+trend of warfare which was unfolding in the South. Reinforced with more
+and more North Vietnamese and growing amounts of Communist bloc and
+captured U.S. equipment, the Viet Cong would press the initiative even
+in South Vietnam’s most isolated areas.
+
+The Communists operating in I Corps lost little time in challenging the
+newly arrived Marine unit. HMM-163 suffered its first battle damage
+while lifting elements of the 2d ARVN Division into a landing zone
+southwest of Tam Ky on 26 September. One of 22 helicopters involved
+in the mission was struck in the fuselage by small arms fire despite
+the use of preparatory air and artillery strikes on the landing zone.
+The day after this incident another of the squadron’s helicopters was
+hit by enemy fire while attempting to evacuate wounded ARVN soldiers
+from the battlefield. On the 29th two more aircraft were damaged by
+ground fire while participating in another troop lift. One round passed
+through the windshield and exited at the rear of the cockpit, missing
+the copilot’s head by inches. During the first week of October another
+HUS was struck while landing at Tien Phuoc, a government outpost about
+15 miles southwest of Tam Ky. In this incident two ARVN troops were
+killed and the Marine crew chief, Lance Corporal James I. Mansfield,
+was wounded before the pilot could fly the aircraft out of the danger
+area. In each of the instances the helicopters were able to return to
+Da Nang where necessary repairs were made.
+
+The most serious incident recorded during the early operations in I
+Corps ironically resulted from mechanical failure rather than Viet Cong
+fire. It occurred on 6 October when a search and rescue helicopter
+crashed and burned on a hillside 15 miles southeast of Tam Ky while
+covering a 20-plane helilift of 2d ARVN Division elements.[6-D] Unable
+to land near the downed aircraft because of the thick jungle, other
+helicopters landed troops at the base of the hill with instructions to
+proceed to the crash site on foot. When the Vietnamese soldiers reached
+the downed aircraft after cutting their way through dense vegetation,
+they found the copilot, crew chief, and five other members of the task
+unit dead. The pilot, First Lieutenant William T. Sinnott, who was
+injured seriously, was hoisted through the trees and evacuated by an
+HUS which came to the rescue. The five Marines killed in the crash
+were First Lieutenant Michael J. Tunney, Sergeant Richard E. Hamilton,
+Sergeant Jerald W. Pendell, Corporal Thomas E. Anderson, and Lance
+Corporal Miguel A. Valentin. Two Navy personnel, Lieutenant Gerald
+Griffin, a doctor, and Hospitalman G. O. Norton were also dead. These
+were the first deaths suffered by Marine Task Unit 79.5 since deploying
+to Vietnam.[6-3]
+
+    [6-D] For larger operations the task unit commander usually
+          designated one HUS as a search and rescue aircraft. This
+          helicopter normally carried several mechanics and Navy
+          medical personnel and was equipped with a hoist.
+
+An administrative measure which eventually resulted in the extension of
+the length of tours for the Marine helicopter squadron as well as all
+other personnel assigned to SHUFLY was initiated in the first week of
+October. Colonel Ireland dispatched a recommendation to the Commanding
+General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing proposing that the tours for both
+the squadron and the individual Marines serving with the sub unit and
+the task unit headquarters be set at six months. Pointing out that the
+U.S. Army helicopter company which had occupied Da Nang previously had
+operated from January to September without rotating personnel, the task
+unit commander outlined the positive features of such an adjustment.
+It would, he contended, provide more continuity for administration
+and operations, thereby resulting in a more effective utilization of
+manpower. To underscore his argument, Ireland emphasized the number of
+man hours involved in the rotation of a helicopter squadron. Adding his
+opinion that the two-month extension of all tours would not measurably
+affect the morale of the Marines at Da Nang, he recommended that the
+next rotation of helicopter squadrons be postponed until January.
+After being forwarded to FMFPac for consideration, Colonel Ireland’s
+proposals were approved later in the fall and instructions were passed
+to all involved commands to implement the new policy.[6-4]
+
+Another adjustment--this one in the area of tactics--had been made
+during the task unit’s first two months at Da Nang. By November
+the Eagle Flight concept had been tailored to complement reaction
+force plans which already existed in I Corps at the time of SHUFLY’s
+relocation. ARVN authorities in the northern corps tactical zone had
+developed a system whereby their various infantry units were placed on
+alert for use as heliborne reaction forces. Designated the Tiger Force,
+the alert unit was staged at its base, ready to react to any tactical
+emergency.
+
+HMM-163 Marines executed one of their earliest Tiger Flights on 7
+November in response to a train ambush sprung by the Viet Cong several
+miles northwest of the Hai Van Peninsula. Four Marine helicopters
+launched from Da Nang, made an airborne rendezvous with two other
+HUSs, and proceeded to Hoa My, four miles away, to pick up a 52-man
+ARVN Tiger Force. The Marines then helilifted the South Vietnamese
+into a suitable landing zone near the ambush site. The relatively
+short amount of time consumed in the reaction did not prevent the
+Communist attackers from vanishing into the surrounding jungle.
+Generally, however, the tactic was more successful, particularly when
+the reaction force was used to reinforce a threatened static position
+or to establish hasty blocking positions in support of ground offensive
+operations that were already underway.
+
+While the task unit encountered few major problems during the early
+operations from Da Nang, minor difficulties were commonplace. Most
+often these developed during the execution phase of combat support
+missions. One that particularly concerned the Marine commanders was
+the tendency of South Vietnamese units not to prepare properly for
+scheduled helilifts. To the dismay of the Leatherneck helicopter crews,
+ARVN activities at the pickup points were usually characterized by
+confusion. More often than not the Vietnamese unit scheduled to be
+helilifted had not been organized into heliteams prior to the arrival
+of the transport aircraft. Given the fact that heliborne operations
+were still somewhat of a novelty to most ARVN small unit leaders (and
+to many U.S. advisors) at this stage of the war, these circumstances
+were perhaps understandable. Nevertheless, lack of prior preparation
+at pickup points on the part of the ground units often threatened to
+disrupt the timing of preplanned operations.
+
+To help remedy this situation and to insure that their helicopters
+were not overloaded, the U.S. Marines began designating one of the
+squadron’s noncommissioned officers as “loadmaster.” Equipped with
+a radio, the loadmaster would arrive at the assembly area on board
+the first helicopter, whereupon he would disembark and supervise the
+entire loading process. This technique was particularly valuable during
+operations in which ARVN units were being helilifted from the field.
+In such cases the loadmaster performed the same function as did those
+who supervised the loading process at secure assembly areas. This, of
+course, required that the Leatherneck remain in the landing zone until
+the last Vietnamese troops had boarded the final helicopter. Although
+dangerous, this technique enabled the Marines to eliminate many
+problems which might otherwise have occurred.
+
+By early November the monsoon season had begun to settle over the
+northern portions of South Vietnam. Unlike the summer rains in the
+Mekong Delta in which Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s crews had managed to
+set new helicopter flight records, the winter monsoons that struck the
+northern provinces seriously restricted flight operations. Heavy fog
+and low clouds frequently made it impossible to conduct air operations
+in the mountainous areas; therefore, the squadron was forced to
+concentrate most of its operations in the coastal plains. In an effort
+to maintain his support at a maximum level, Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun
+began dispatching an OE-1 to the objective area prior to scheduled
+missions in order to obtain a current report on the local weather
+conditions. Despite these efforts, the monsoon rains, which often moved
+in quickly from the South China Sea, still disrupted flight operations.
+A typical weather-related incident occurred on 13 November when a
+scheduled troop lift was cancelled because of heavy fog after 200
+Vietnamese Special Forces troops had loaded onto 20 Marine helicopters
+for an early morning operation.
+
+Several unrelated changes in official designations occurred at
+approximately the same time that the monsoons began affecting
+operations in the northern provinces. In November all Marine aircraft
+were redesignated in accordance with a Department of Defense order
+which standardized aircraft designations throughout the U.S. armed
+services. Thereafter, SHUFLY’s HUS helicopters would be known as
+UH-34Ds, its OE-1s as O-1Bs, and its R4D as a C-117. In another
+adjustment, the Joint General Staff in Saigon ordered the realignment
+of South Vietnam’s tactical zones. A fourth corps tactical zone (IV
+CTZ), which encompassed the entire Mekong Delta, and a Capital Military
+District, which included Saigon and its environs, were created. The
+composition of I Corps was affected by the adjustments as the new
+alignment shifted Quang Ngai Province into II Corps. The Marines,
+however, continued to provide helicopter support to the province, which
+was relatively isolated from the remainder of II Corps.
+
+More important than either the new aircraft designations or the
+realignment of the tactical zones were several internal changes within
+the Marine task unit. On 6 November the task unit was redesignated
+Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6. That same day Lieutenant Colonel Alton
+W. McCully, who had been functioning as Colonel Ireland’s executive
+officer, assumed command of the task element. Ireland returned to
+Okinawa where he took command of Marine Aircraft Group 16, which, under
+the new arrangement, became responsible for both the administrative and
+logistical support of SHUFLY.
+
+
+_Marine People-to-People Program_
+
+The concept of the People-to-People Program, which had been initiated
+with a degree of success in the Mekong Delta, was brought to Da Nang
+by Colonel Ireland and his Marines. During the fall and early winter
+of 1962, as weather caused flight operations to subside, the Marines
+were able to increase the tempo of the program. SHUFLY’s men actively
+supported an orphanage in Da Nang which was maintained by an American
+missionary family. On Christmas day the Marines participated in a
+“Father-For-A-Day” program which had been arranged by the task element
+chaplain, Lieutenant Richard P. Vinson, U.S. Navy. Each orphan spent
+the day with a Marine who had volunteered to serve as his “father.”
+The Vietnamese children were treated to dinner in the mess hall,
+presented with Christmas gifts, and then joined in singing carols with
+the Marines. At the conclusion of the festivities, Chaplain Vinson
+presented the director of the orphanage with a gift in Vietnamese
+currency equivalent to over 800 dollars--money which the men of the
+task element had donated.
+
+In addition to their activities associated with the orphanage, the
+Marine officers taught English to a number of Vietnamese civilians.
+Held three nights weekly, the classes were received enthusiastically.
+Beyond the foundations of good will which it helped shape, the
+People-to-People Program enabled the Marines to acquire a better
+understanding of the Vietnamese people, their culture, and their
+problems.
+
+
+_SHUFLY Operations in I Corps_
+
+SHUFLY’s initial helicopter support operations in I Corps represented
+the beginnings of what would become a long association of U.S. Marines
+with South Vietnam’s rugged northern provinces. Essentially these early
+operations were characterized by continuity and adjustment. Since their
+arrival at Da Nang in September the Marines had extended the standard
+of consistent and effective combat support operations set earlier in
+the flat Mekong Delta. Necessarily, SHUFLY’s commanders had modified
+the previously developed tactics and techniques to fit the mountainous
+terrain and the nature of warfare being waged in I Corps. For the most
+part these adjustments had proven successful by allowing the Marines to
+continue the pace of helicopter support with a reduction of the risks
+involved. That SHUFLY had suffered its first fatalities during these
+initial months in I Corps dampened but did not detract from its overall
+achievements. As 1962 closed, the Marines had begun establishing a
+reputation in the northern provinces as courageous, professional
+fighting men and generous allies. It was this reputation upon which a
+generation of Marines would build in the ensuing decade.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 7
+
+The Laotian Crisis, 1962
+
+_Genesis of the Problem--The American Response--The Marine Corps
+Role--Marine Participation: A Summary_
+
+
+_Genesis of the Problem_
+
+Almost simultaneous with SHUFLY’s deployment to Soc Trang in April
+1962, U.S. Marine combat forces were ordered to Thailand in response
+to the growing crisis in Laos. Inhabited for the most part by peaceful
+hill tribes, the small, landlocked Kingdom of Laos seemed an unlikely
+setting for any significant military confrontation. Even more
+improbable was the possibility that a serious international crisis
+could stem from what had begun as a political rivalry among relatively
+obscure princes.
+
+To be certain, the context of what should have been a rather
+meaningless political feud had been altered substantively by North
+Vietnam’s drive to extend its control over the Republic of Vietnam.
+Recognizing Laos as a strategic stepping stone for their southward
+thrust, the North Vietnamese, joined by the Soviet Union, had
+begun providing military aid to the Pathet Lao army of the leftist
+prince, Souphanauvong, in the late 1950s. To counter these Communist
+activities, the United States had extended military assistance to
+the anti-Communist government of Prince Boun Oum. In the resultant
+struggle, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who previously had proclaimed
+neutrality, sided with the Pathet Lao. With the lines drawn and the
+contenders now reinforced by powerful allies, the conflict naturally
+escalated. Laos, like South Vietnam, had become a pawn in the Cold War.
+
+Administered through a small USMAAG, the American military assistance
+to Boun Oum, however, did little to slow the advances of the Pathet
+Lao. Early in 1960, they had joined forces with North Vietnamese
+units to seize control of the eastern portion of the country’s long,
+southward extending panhandle. In early 1961, again backed by North
+Vietnamese forces, the Pathet Lao had opened an offensive on the Plain
+of Jars in central Laos. Boun Oum’s units, commanded by General Phoumi
+Nosavan, proved unable to contain this push into central Laos.
+
+By March 1961 the situation had become critical enough for President
+Kennedy to direct that CinCPac alert U.S. military units for possible
+deployment. In response, Admiral Felt activated a task force
+headquarters and assigned Major General Donald M. Weller, who was then
+serving as Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, as its commander.
+Designated Joint Task Force 116 in accordance with existing CinCPac
+contingency plans, Weller’s command was to consist predominantly of
+Marine air and ground forces with Army and Air Force units making up
+the balance. Simultaneous with the activation of Weller’s headquarters
+on Okinawa, CinCPac alerted the scattered forces earmarked for
+assignment to the joint task force.
+
+Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration managed to defuse the situation
+somewhat by securing Soviet assistance in arranging a cease-fire in
+Laos. The crisis cooled further when 14 governments, including the
+Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Vietnam, agreed to reconvene
+the Geneva Conference to consider neutralization of the Kingdom of
+Laos. This conference convened on 16 May 1961, and together with
+the shaky cease-fire, brought a modicum of stability to Laos. With
+international tensions eased, the alert of U.S. forces in the Pacific
+ended. Subsequently, General Weller’s JTF 116 headquarters was
+deactivated.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  MAINLAND
+  SOUTHEAST ASIA
+]
+
+The negotiations in Geneva proved to be long and tedious. In Laos,
+frequent fighting, usually of a localized nature, punctuated the
+cease-fire almost from the day it was effected. Finally, in the first
+weeks of 1962 heavy fighting broke out anew, this time on a general
+scale, and precipitated a new and more intense crisis. For U.S.
+observers the situation seemed to reach its critical point in early May
+when Pathet Lao forces, backed by North Vietnamese formations, routed
+a major element of Phouma’s army from Nam Tha, a town located east of
+the Mekong River in extreme northwestern Laos. Following this action,
+Phoumi’s forces retreated southwestward across the Mekong into northern
+Thailand. Now in full control of the east bank of the Mekong, the
+Communists appeared poised for a drive into Thailand, a full-fledged
+member of SEATO. The collapse of Phoumi’s military forces, moreover,
+seriously threatened the U.S. bargaining position at the ongoing Geneva
+talks.
+
+
+_The American Response_
+
+In the face of the situation along the Laotian-Thai border, the U.S.
+Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed CinCPac to upgrade the readiness
+of Joint Task Force 116 for possible deployment. Accordingly, on 10
+May Admiral Felt directed Major General John Condon, the Commanding
+General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, to activate the joint task force
+headquarters, assemble its staff, and refine its deployment plans.
+The Amphibious Ready Group of the Seventh Fleet, carrying the Special
+Landing Force, promptly sailed into the Gulf of Siam.
+
+Both to reassure Thailand of the U.S. commitment to its defense and
+to discourage further Communist advances on the Southeast Asian
+Peninsula, President Kennedy ordered U.S. forces deployed to Thailand
+on 15 May. Admiral Felt moved immediately to execute this decision.
+In simultaneous actions CinCPac designated Army Lieutenant General
+John L. Richardson, then serving as Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S.
+Army, Pacific, to replace Major General Condon as Commander, JTF 116
+and instructed Richardson to execute CinCPac Operations Plan 32-59,
+Phase II (Laos). Felt’s instructions to the new Commander, JTF 116 were
+explicit. General Richardson’s command was to act in such a way that
+would leave no doubt as to American intentions to defend Thailand.
+Through these same actions JTF 116 was to exert a “precautionary
+impact” on the situation in Laos. Furthermore, the Commander, JTF 116
+was directed to position his forces in a manner so that they could
+respond to any armed Communist threat to Thailand.[7-1]
+
+Concurrently with the order to deploy JTF 116, CinCPac instructed the
+Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, General Harkins,
+to establish and assume command of a U.S. Military Assistance Command,
+Thailand (USMACThai). Thus Harkins, in a dual role as ComUSMACV and
+ComUSMACThai, was to be responsible to CinCPac for all U.S. military
+activities and operations in both Thailand and South Vietnam. Once it
+became operational in Thailand, JTF 116 plus the already existing Joint
+U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group, Thailand (JUSMAAG), were to
+come under Harkins’ purview. Until USMACThai and the JTF staffs could
+become operational, however, the various task force components were to
+report to the Chief JUSMAAG, Thailand, Major General J. F. Conway, U.S.
+Army.
+
+One element of the joint task force was already in Thailand when
+President Kennedy issued the order to commit U.S. forces--the Army’s
+1st Brigade, 27th Infantry. At the time this infantry brigade was
+participating in a SEATO exercise near Korat, a town located about 130
+miles northeast of Bangkok in the central portion of the country. In
+response to CinCPac orders it promptly moved into bivouac at a position
+40 miles west of Korat.
+
+
+_The Marine Corps Role_
+
+Operations Plan 32-59, Phase II (Laos), called for a U.S. Marine
+expeditionary brigade composed of a regimental landing team (three
+reinforced infantry battalions), a jet attack squadron, a helicopter
+transport squadron, and supporting units, to operate from Udorn, a
+provincial capital located nearly 350 miles northeast of Bangkok.
+Strategically situated only 35 miles south of Vientiane, the political
+capital of Laos, Udorn was the site of a 7,000-foot concrete runway. A
+300-man Marine aviation support unit, Marine Air Base Squadron 16, had
+actually been positioned at this airstrip for over six months during
+1961. While at Udorn the MABS-16 Marines had provided maintenance
+support for helicopters which were assisting General Phoumi’s forces in
+Laos. A Royal Thai regiment had provided security for the base during
+this unit’s deployment and was still in the area in 1962 when the
+decision was made to commit JTF 116 to Thailand.
+
+[Illustration: _Aerial view of Udorn airstrip. (USMC Photo A182977)._]
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Harvey M. Patton’s VMA-332, an A-4C (Skyhawk) jet
+attack squadron, claimed the distinction of being the first Marine
+unit to arrive in Thailand in response to the 1962 Laotian crisis. The
+20 single-placed Skyhawks departed the Cubi Point Naval Air Station
+in the Philippines on the morning of 18 May, were refueled in flight
+by aircraft from VMA-211, another Marine A-4 squadron, and landed at
+Udorn around noon. The bulk of the Marine units began arriving in
+Thailand the following day. At Bangkok the Special Landing Force,
+composed of Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Adams’ 1,500-man Battalion
+Landing Team 3/9 and Lieutenant Colonel Fred A. Steele’s HMM-261, an
+HUS-1 helicopter squadron, disembarked from the ships of the Amphibious
+Ready Group.[7-A] That same day Marine GV-1 refueler-transports began
+airlifting additional aviation support detachments from Okinawa to
+Udorn. These included detachments of Marine Air Control Squadrons 2
+and 4 (MACS-2 and -4), Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12), and a
+Provisional Marine Aircraft Group (ProvMAG) headquarters. Upon landing
+Colonel Ross S. Mickey, the commander of the ProvMAG, established his
+headquarters at the airfield and assumed operational control of all
+USMC aviation elements at Udorn. On the 18th, HMM-261’s helicopters
+began arriving at the now busy airfield, having flown from the
+Amphibious Ready Group with a refueling stop at Korat. Lieutenant
+Colonel Steele reported to the newly activated ProvMAG.
+
+    [7-A] A Marine battalion landing team derives its designation
+          from the infantry battalion around which it is built,
+          in this case the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. In 1962,
+          the BLT included a howitzer battery, a tank platoon, an
+          amphibious tractor platoon, a pioneer platoon, a motor
+          transport platoon, an anti-tank platoon, and air and
+          naval gunfire liaison teams.
+
+          Following the commitment of the SLF on 19 May, another BLT
+          and helicopter squadron from Okinawa reconstituted the
+          Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force.
+
+On 19 May Brigadier General Ormand B. Simpson arrived at Udorn with
+the staff and communications personnel of the 3d Marine Expeditionary
+Brigade (3d MEB) headquarters. Simpson, a Texan who had been serving
+as Assistant Division Commander, 3d Marine Division, had assembled
+and activated this headquarters on Okinawa shortly after CinCPac’s
+activation of JTF 116. As Commanding General, 3d MEB, Simpson was to
+assume command of all Marine elements, air and ground, deployed to
+Udorn. In addition to being the CG 3d MEB, General Simpson carried
+the designation, Naval Component Commander, a title which gave him
+responsibility for all Navy as well as Marine forces operating at Udorn
+under JTF 116.
+
+Concurrent with General Simpson’s arrival, U.S. Air Force C-130 and
+C-123 transports were ferrying Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ Battalion
+Landing Team from Bangkok to Udorn. The BLT had placed its supplies
+and trucks, along with HMM-261’s heavier equipment, on rail cars
+for transport to Udorn. Because the Thai flat cars were too small
+to accommodate such massive vehicles, Adams ordered his tank and
+amphibious tractor platoons to re-embark on board the USS _Point
+Defiance_ (LSD-31). Once on the ground at Udorn the battalion and its
+remaining reinforcements assembled alongside the airstrip. From there
+the Leathernecks were transported by Thai Army trucks some eight miles
+south to Nong Ta Kai, a small town situated astride the main service
+road. Adams’ battalion established a temporary camp on some high ground
+just beyond the town. With the BLT’s arrival, the initial Marine combat
+forces assigned to JTF 116 were in position. The next day, 20 May,
+General Simpson assumed command of all U.S. Marine and Navy units at
+Udorn and the 3d MEB, a complete air-ground team, was in being.
+
+Elsewhere in Thailand the U.S. military build-up was continuing apace.
+A squadron of 20 U.S. Air Force F-100 Super Sabre tactical fighter
+bombers and a detachment of three refueler aircraft had deployed to
+Takhli airfield from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Two USAF
+transport squadrons had also begun operations from this base. At
+Korat, the 1st Brigade, 27th Infantry was being reinforced with Army
+units from Hawaii. Another Army unit, a logistics support command, was
+being activated near Bangkok.
+
+To command this growing assortment of military units, General
+Richardson established the JTF 116 headquarters at Korat. Major
+General Donald M. Weller, who had been serving as Deputy Commanding
+General, FMFPac, since leaving the 3d Marine Division in 1961, joined
+Richardson’s headquarters as chief of staff. General Weller’s offices
+were located at Korat initially. Later he relocated at Bangkok where he
+headed a rear echelon responsible for coordination with the JUSMAAG,
+ComUSMACThai, and the American representatives to SEATO. While in the
+capital Weller was also responsible for implementing a logistic plan,
+the objective of which was to upgrade lines of communication being used
+by JTF-116 elements.
+
+It is of interest to note that Colonel Croizat, who had been the first
+U.S. Marine advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, was serving at
+this time as the senior U.S. military representative on the SEATO
+planning staff in Bangkok. Both Weller, who had commanded JTF 116 for
+a period during early 1961, and Croizat who had served as its chief
+of staff during that interval, were intimately familiar with the
+JTF’s structure, capabilities, and functions. In fact, the operations
+plan being executed had been developed in large part under their
+guidance.[7-2]
+
+[Illustration: _Marines disembark from attack transports at Bangkok,
+Thailand. (USMC Photo A182785)._]
+
+Another facet of this particular situation was that portions of
+Operations Plan 32-59 Phase II, (Laos) were to exert a profound
+influence on later U.S. Marine operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
+A key provision of this particular document outlined the command
+relationships which would govern Marine and Air Force tactical air
+support in the event JTF 116 actually became involved in combat.
+This provision designated the Commander JTF 116 as the “coordinating
+authority” responsible for synchronizing all JTF tactical air support.
+But at the same time it assigned the CG, 3d MEB, operational control
+of all Marine tactical aircraft, thereby insuring that the Marine
+air-ground team would not be fractured. Later, in the mid-1960s when
+American tactical jet squadrons would be called upon to support U.S.
+and RVNAF ground forces in South Vietnam, the CinCPac staff would
+borrow heavily from this arrangement to define the relationships of
+Marine and Air Force tactical aviation assets.
+
+[Illustration: _Major General Donald M. Weller, Chief of Staff, Joint
+Task Force-116. (USMC Photo A407463)._]
+
+Training began almost immediately after the Marine units were in
+position at Udorn and Nong Ta Kai. Generally the MEB adhered to a
+training program designed to help fulfill three requirements: to
+make its presence known and thereby enhance its credibility as a
+“show of force”; to acclimatize the individual Marines to the hot,
+humid, tropical climate; and finally, to familiarize the operational
+elements and their commanders with the surrounding terrain. The primary
+objective of this program, of course, was to prepare the brigade for
+combat should that contingency arise out of the troubled situation
+in Laos. Coordinated air-ground exercises conducted around Udorn
+enabled General Simpson’s command to publicize its presence in the
+area while concurrently refining its heliborne and close air support
+capabilities.[7-B] In addition to air-ground exercises, Lieutenant
+Colonel Adams’ infantry companies sharpened their skills in patrolling
+of all types and made frequent use of nearby Thai Army firing ranges to
+maintain their weapons proficiency. All field training was conducted in
+an unpopulated area defined by the Thai government and every precaution
+was taken so as not to disturb the local population. The Marine units
+utilized blank ammunition exclusively in training except for the
+closely supervised live fire exercises.
+
+    [7-B] The MEB’s after action report pointed out one flaw in
+          the composition of the Provisional MAG. There had been
+          no provision made to include light observation aircraft
+          in its organization. As a result, aerial reconnaissance
+          had to be accomplished from either A-4Cs or HUS-1s,
+          neither of which was configured for such a mission. The
+          A-4C, which could carry only the pilot, and the HUS-1
+          proved equally unsuited for reconnaissance missions.
+          The 3d MEB report specifically recommended that future
+          composite aviation packages of this nature should include
+          a detachment of OEs with pilots and trained aerial
+          observers.
+
+[Illustration: _Brigadier General Ormond R. Simpson and Brigadier
+General John F. Dobbin confer at Udorn, Thailand. (USMC Photo
+A182779)._]
+
+Realizing that the ultimate success or failure of the American
+commitment in Thailand might hinge on the relationships U.S. military
+men established with the Thai populace, General Simpson ordered his
+command to initiate a civic action program. The day after his arrival
+at Udorn, Simpson met with local civilian officials and established the
+basis for a people-to-people program similar to the one instituted by
+SHUFLY Marines at Soc Trang. Thereafter, the MEB’s goal in this area
+was to foster among the Thai a favorable impression of the individual
+Marine, his commanders, and his unit. The people-to-people program
+which followed was, in all respects, a concerted and integrated
+effort. Officers taught conversational English classes to interested
+civilians both at Udorn and at Nong Ta Kai, while Leatherneck
+engineers and Navy Seabees (who arrived near the end of May) helped
+repair public buildings. Navy medical and dental personnel attached
+to Colonel Mickey’s ProvMAG and Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT joined
+the effort by administering almost daily to the physical ailments of
+the local populace and occasionally visiting the more remote villages
+by helicopter. In an action intended to help prevent friction between
+Marines and Thai townspeople, General Simpson directed that MEB units
+disembark from trucks as they approached towns, march through the
+population centers at sling arms, and re-embark aboard their trucks at
+the opposite end of the town. Relying on this broad array of simple but
+effective programs, the 3d MEB was able to impress upon the civilian
+population that its mission was one of assistance and good will rather
+than occupation.
+
+This crisis in Laos eased somewhat after the U.S. joint task force
+established its presence in northeastern Thailand, and Communist
+forces halted their advance short of the international border. With
+these two developments there was no requirement for additional Marine
+infantry battalions. Accordingly, General Simpson redesignated his
+force the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit (3d MEU), even though other
+reinforcements continued to arrive at Udorn throughout May and most
+of June. Near the end of May, a 70-man Seabee detachment from Navy
+Mobile Construction Battalion 10 was airlifted to the position. This
+detachment, the initial increment of a larger Logistics Support Group
+(LSG), moved to Nong Ta Kai where it helped the BLT’s pioneer platoon
+complete a more permanent camp designed to withstand the approaching
+monsoon season. In mid-June, with no end to the MEU’s assignment in
+sight, the remainder of the 500-man LSG deployed from Okinawa to Udorn.
+Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Hudson, this group included a
+motor transport detachment, a medical detachment, a supply unit, and an
+engineer detachment.[7-C] These reinforcements brought the number of
+Marines, Seabees, and Navy medical and dental personnel under General
+Simpson’s command to its highest level--3,426 officers and men. A final
+change in the composition of the 3d MEU occurred in the final week of
+June when HMM-162, an HUS-1 squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
+Reinhardt Leu, replaced HMM-261 as the helicopter element.
+
+    [7-C] Lieutenant Colonel Hudson was relieved by Lieutenant
+          Colonel Angus J. Cronin on 22 July.
+
+While General Simpson’s MEU was strengthening its posture in
+northeastern Thailand, U.S. officials were reporting definite progress
+in the negotiations being held in Geneva and Vientiane. Encouraged by
+these signs and hoping to influence the Geneva talks even further,
+President Kennedy ordered major elements of the U.S. combat forces
+withdrawn from Thailand on 29 June, just four days after HMM-162’s
+arrival at Udorn. In response General Richardson directed General
+Simpson to prepare for the immediate withdrawal of the ProvMAG and one
+infantry company. Two days later, on the morning of 1 July, VMA-332’s
+Skyhawks launched for Cubi Point in the Philippines. Subsequently,
+HMM-162’s helicopters departed for Bangkok where they re-embarked on
+board the USS _Valley Forge_. Okinawa-based GV-1s airlifted one of BLT
+3/9’s companies to the Philippines while elements of the Marine air
+control squadrons traveled by rail to Bangkok for embarkation on board
+ships of the Seventh Fleet. By 6 July General Simpson’s 3d MEU had been
+reduced by just over 1,000 men.
+
+At Geneva, the first weeks of July were marked by steady progress
+toward a diplomatic solution to the long-standing Laotian problem.
+By the 20th it was evident that a formal agreement would soon be
+forthcoming. With these encouraging developments, General Richardson
+was directed to prepare for the withdrawal of the remainder of his
+forces from Thailand. In Laos, the quarreling political factions had
+already agreed to participate in a coalition government headed by
+Prince Souvanna Phouma which would serve as the basis for a neutral
+state. At Geneva on the 23d, the United States, the Soviet Union,
+North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Burma, Great Britain, France, Canada,
+India, Communist China, Thailand, Poland, the Kingdom of Laos, and
+Cambodia finally signed the Declaration of Neutrality of Laos and an
+attached protocol. In so doing the 14 signatories agreed to recognize
+and respect the sovereignty, independence, and neutrality of the
+Kingdom of Laos. Under the terms of this agreement, foreign troops were
+prohibited from entering or operating within the borders of Laos. Had
+it been adhered to, this provision would have denied North Vietnam the
+use of the corridor down the length of eastern Laos, altering the scope
+and nature of the conflict in the Republic of Vietnam.
+
+[Illustration: _Marines of BLT 3/9 assemble before being airlifted to
+the Philippines. (USMC Photo A182883)._]
+
+Following the signing of this declaration in Geneva, CinCPac directed
+General Richardson to effect the withdrawal of the remainder of his
+joint task force. General Simpson’s 3d MEU began executing these
+instructions on the 28th when Marine GV-1s and Air Force C-130s began
+airlifting Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT 3/9 to Okinawa. By the 31st no
+Marine combat units were left at Udorn. General Simpson and his staff
+departed the airfield a few days later, and shortly thereafter the 3d
+Marine Expeditionary Unit was deactivated.
+
+
+_Marine Participation: A Summary_
+
+The deactivation of the 3d MEU marked the end of the first deployment
+of a Marine air-ground combat team to mainland Southeast Asia. Since
+the decision to commit American forces to Thailand in mid-May, the
+Marine units assigned to General Simpson had demonstrated anew the
+value of their service as a force capable of supporting U.S. foreign
+policy on short notice. Within the period of a few days, the various
+FMFPac commands had assembled a complete air-ground-support team, and,
+assisted by the Seventh Fleet, had deployed the affected units to a
+position over 1,800 miles from the nearest major Marine base. Located
+far inland from the seacoast, a Marine unit’s normal habitat, the 3d
+MEU had been sustained solely by air while maintaining its combat
+readiness in a difficult tropical environment.
+
+In so doing the Marines had shown that a substantial American combat
+force could be brought to bear quickly in the remote areas chosen
+by the Communists as targets for their so-called “wars of national
+liberation.” Furthermore, the MEU by relying on a vigorous civic action
+program, had established that a sizable Marine command could maintain
+its combat readiness almost indefinitely without eroding the respect of
+the indigenous population. Thus, General Simpson’s Marines had created
+a solid foundation of mutual respect and confidence with the Thai
+people. This accomplishment alone would prove valuable when American
+military forces would be required to return to northern Thailand later
+in the decade. Against the backdrop of these accomplishments, the 3d
+Marine Expeditionary Unit’s operations in Thailand could be assessed as
+having extended the tradition of the U.S. Marine Corps as an effective
+instrument of American diplomacy.
+
+
+
+
+                                PART III
+
+                        THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES,
+                                  1963
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 8
+
+The Marine Advisory Effort
+
+_The Political Climate--The Advisory Division and VNMC
+Operations--Accomplishments_
+
+
+_The Political Climate_
+
+A sudden rupture occurred in South Vietnam’s internal political
+situation during 1963 which largely determined the course of the
+war as well as the nation’s future. Following the sect uprising of
+1955–1956, the Diem government had experienced a three-year period of
+relative political tranquility. Beginning in 1959, however, political
+dissent had begun to re-emerge from several influential segments of
+South Vietnamese society. The results of the August 1959 national
+elections, in which pro-Diem candidates captured every seat in the
+National Assembly, served to stimulate political opposition which
+had lain dormant for nearly four years. Opposition to the government
+mounted steadily in the months following the elections within military
+as well as political circles as some South Vietnamese officers began
+privately expressing disenchantment with Diem’s management of the war.
+Then came the abortive coup in November 1960. The regime’s popularity
+diminished in the wake of this crisis as Diem tightened his control on
+the war-torn nation.
+
+Another problem--religious unrest--which was to play a key role in
+determining South Vietnam’s political direction as the decade unfolded,
+also emerged during this period. Buddhist leaders throughout South
+Vietnam began protesting against various policies enacted by the
+Catholic-controlled government. The tensions gradually mounted, and
+by early 1963 the protests were highlighted by spectacular and highly
+publicized self-immolations by Buddhist monks. Finally, in May, the
+religious problem erupted into violence when the Vietnamese police and
+military forces killed 12 Buddhist demonstrators while suppressing a
+religious demonstration at Hue. This action triggered a protracted
+crisis of public confidence in the Diem government which deepened as
+the summer wore on. Then, on 21 August, Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president’s
+closest political advisor, ordered the national police to raid key
+Buddhist pagodas throughout the nation. Following the raids, which
+uncovered some weapons, Nhu attempted to blame the attacks on several
+key South Vietnamese generals. His effort to shift the responsibility
+for the police raids served only to alienate some of the nation’s most
+powerful military leaders.
+
+On 1 November, a junta of South Vietnamese generals led by Major
+General Duong Van Minh reacted to the deepening political crisis by
+deposing President Diem and seizing control of the Government of
+Vietnam. Both the president and his brother were murdered by an ARVN
+officer the following day. The U.S. government, which had advance
+knowledge of the coup and was in contact with the plotting generals,
+publically declared its intention to remain neutral. General Harkins
+ordered USMACV to cease all activities and to withdraw its advisors
+from South Vietnamese units pending the outcome of the power struggle.
+
+The overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem stirred fresh hope among many Americans
+and South Vietnamese that the new government could attract the solid
+public support of the Vietnamese people, and thereby wage a more
+effective war against the Communists. South Vietnam’s new leaders
+immediately focused their attention upon healing the nation’s deep
+political divisions and securing continued U.S. assistance for the
+war effort. They pledged to respect religious freedom, to return the
+government to civilian control, and to continue the struggle against
+the Viet Cong. Appreciating the interrelationship of these assurances,
+the United States officially recognized the new government on 7
+November, whereupon ComUSMACV lifted the temporary ban on military
+assistance.
+
+The American hopes that the new political climate in the Republic of
+Vietnam would stimulate a more effective military effort, however,
+proved to be shortlived. Confusion reminiscent of the sect uprising
+in 1955 spread throughout the government following Diem’s death.
+The dismissal of more than 30 high-ranking military officers for
+actively supporting the former president during the coup typified the
+new regime’s campaign to realign top personnel in all governmental
+agencies. Far from enhancing the efficiency of the Vietnamese military,
+the power struggle and the chaos which prevailed in its wake dragged
+the war effort to its most ineffective level since before the U.S.
+stepped-up its military assistance program in early 1962. It was on
+this unfortunate note that the year 1963 ended.
+
+
+_The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations_
+
+At the beginning of 1963, the Marine Advisory Division, still headed
+by Lieutenant Colonel Moody, consisted of eight Marine officers and 10
+noncommissioned officers. In April, however, the table of organization
+was adjusted slightly when the first sergeant and four assistant
+infantry advisor (noncommissioned officers) billets were eliminated.
+Another small unit training advisor was added to the organization,
+changing the strength of Lieutenant Colonel Moody’s command to eight
+officers and six noncommissioned officers. Men from the 3d Marine
+Division continued to augment the advisory effort and gain combat
+experience while serving in Vietnam on temporary assignments.
+
+Like the U.S. organization which advised and assisted it, the
+Vietnamese Marine Corps began the new year at the same strength that it
+had achieved when it had been expanded to brigade size in early 1962.
+Still commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang, the Vietnamese
+Marine Brigade continued to operate as part of the nation’s general
+reserve under the direct control of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff.
+
+As the year opened three of the four VNMC infantry battalions were
+garrisoned separately in small, crude, self-sustaining camps around Thu
+Duc on the northern outskirts of Saigon. The 4th Battalion maintained
+its camp at Vung Tau on the coast. The newly formed artillery
+battalion, which became fully operational in mid-January when B and C
+Batteries passed their final gunnery examinations, was garrisoned near
+Thu Duc. While the Marine units spent little time in their base camps,
+being deployed almost continuously in combat, the Joint General Staff
+normally kept one battalion at Thu Duc to enable it to respond to any
+emergency which might develop.
+
+For the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1963 was to be highlighted by
+innovations in the important areas of training and operations. Prior
+to Lieutenant Colonel Moody’s arrival in Vietnam, all Vietnamese
+Marine recruits had received basic training at ARVN installations,
+an arrangement tolerated but never appreciated by the U.S. Marine
+advisors. Before his departure in the fall of 1963, Moody was able to
+convince Khang that he should push for the authority to establish a
+separate Marine training center. In late 1963 the JGS approved this
+proposal, whereupon the Vietnamese Marine engineers, advised by Captain
+Robert C. Jones, began building a small training facility at Thu Duc.
+In a related action Moody set in motion plans to have a small number
+of specially selected Vietnamese Marine noncommissioned officers
+sent to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at San Diego for training as
+drill instructors. Although these plans would not come to fruition
+during Moody’s assignment, the concept of a separate recruit training
+center promised to permit the Vietnamese Marine Corps to establish and
+maintain its own standards for basic training.
+
+Another change to occur in 1963, this one in the area of tactical
+operations, was the reinstitution of multi-battalion combat operations
+under the control of provisional Marine Brigade headquarters.[8-A]
+Although the VNMC had performed such operations in 1960, they had been
+abandoned in the ensuing years in favor of battalion-sized deployments
+to the various provinces and corps tactical zones. Moody, however,
+prevailed upon Khang to alter this pattern by seeking assignments that
+would enable the brigade headquarters to exercise tactical control of
+its battalions.
+
+    [8-A] Such task-organized Marine forces were usually called
+          either provisional brigades or provisional regiments but
+          on at least one occasion the organization was designated
+          a Marine Task Force. In each case the composition was
+          similar--two or three infantry battalions, an artillery
+          unit, an engineer or reconnaissance company, and a
+          command element.
+
+[Illustration: _Lieutenant General Carson A. Roberts, Commanding
+General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (right center), inspects an
+honor guard of Vietnamese Marines in Saigon. With him, from left,
+are Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang, Commandant of the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps; Major General Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff, Military
+Assistance Command, Vietnam; and Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody,
+Jr., Senior USMC Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (Official USA
+Photo)._]
+
+The first such operation was launched in the first week of the new
+year. On 1 January a provisional brigade headquarters, commanded by
+Khang and advised by Moody, embarked on board a Vietnamese Navy LST
+(landing ship, tank) at Saigon along with the 2d VNMC battalion. The
+4th VNMC Battalion, advised by Captain Don R. Christensen, embarked on
+board two Vietnamese LSMs (landing ship, medium) at the same time. The
+mission of the provisional brigade was to conduct an amphibious landing
+near the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula and clear Viet Cong units from a
+series of villages in conjunction with the Strategic Hamlet Program.
+Subsequent to the clearing operations, VNMC engineers were to construct
+a fortified hamlet. The entire operation was to extend until mid-April.
+
+Elaborate precautions were taken not to disclose the location of the
+objective area. The small flotilla sailed beyond sight of land and
+remained afloat for two days before moving into position off Ca Mau. On
+3 January the two LSMs proceeded to the coast, moved up a river lined
+with thick mangrove vegetation, and landed the 4th Battalion. The 2d
+Battalion, accompanied by Captain Richard B. Taylor, came ashore from
+the LST in Dong Nai boats, small styrofoam craft specifically designed
+for use in swampy terrain. The provisional brigade headquarters
+remained on board the LST as the designated operations area did not
+extend far inland.
+
+[Illustration: _U.S. Marine-trained drill instructor with Vietnamese
+recruits. (USMC Photo A183561)._]
+
+To their surprise the VNMC assault elements found the first objective,
+a large village, completely deserted. As Lieutenant Colonel Moody later
+recalled, “They had removed everything, even the cattle and other
+livestock.”[8-1] At the second objective, a nearby village, the Marines
+found definite evidence of recent Viet Cong activity but no enemy
+troops. There they captured a handful of rifles, carbines, and light
+mortars along with a printed document that contained detailed excerpts
+of the Marine operations plan. Quite obviously the operation had been
+compromised in Saigon during the planning stages. In any case, this
+discovery explained the evacuation of the initial objective as well as
+the relative dearth of action during the remainder of the operation.
+
+The provisional headquarters and the 4th Battalion returned to
+Saigon after the initial phases of the operation had been executed,
+leaving the 2d Battalion and an engineer platoon to continue security
+operations in the area and build the strategic hamlet.[8-B] When the
+operation finally ended on 11 April, the Vietnamese Marines had lost a
+total of five men killed and 14 wounded. Mines and snipers had produced
+most of these casualties. The Marines accounted for 11 Viet Cong killed
+and 14 wounded.
+
+    [8-B] Lieutenant Colonel Moody noted that the Vietnamese
+          Marines seldom were involved in the actual construction
+          of strategic hamlets. This task was normally left to
+          the civil authorities in the area who more often than
+          not used the local population as a labor force. (_Moody
+          Comments._)
+
+In the closing days of April, the JGS ordered Lieutenant Colonel
+Khang to form two infantry battalions and an artillery element into a
+provisional brigade for immediate assignment to II Corps. There the
+Vietnamese Marines were to join elements of the 2d and 25th ARVN
+Divisions for a multi-regiment thrust into the rugged mountains just
+south of the I Corps-II Corps border. Code named BACH PHOUNG XI, this
+offensive was to penetrate the Do Xa, a Viet Cong base area never
+before entered by government forces. Centered in that portion of the
+Annamite Mountains where the borders of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and
+Kontum Provinces converged, the Do Xa had been under Communist control
+since the early stages of the French-Indochina War. In this remote,
+inaccessible mountainous zone the Viet Cong reportedly had built-up
+extensive staging areas and training camps. Prisoner interrogations
+obtained throughout the early 1960s revealed that many North Vietnamese
+soldiers entering the South’s northern provinces had infiltrated the
+Do Xa before moving into the densely populated coastal lowlands of
+Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. Additionally, the area was thought
+to contain the Communist military headquarters for Military Region 5
+(MR-5).
+
+After alerting his 2d and 4th Battalions, a pack howitzer battery, a
+reconnaissance platoon, and a headquarters element, Khang flew with
+Lieutenant Colonel Moody to Pleiku for planning conferences with Major
+General Nguyen Khanh and his II Corps staff. The concept of BACH
+PHOUNG XI, Khang and Moody learned, called for U.S. Marine and Army
+helicopters to lift ARVN infantry and artillery elements into positions
+which would form a loose ring around the suspected center of the Do Xa
+base area. The ARVN units would then begin contracting this ring in
+stages, whereupon the provisional Marine brigade would be helilifted
+into its center, the heart of the Do Xa, to search for Communist camps.
+To control the entire operation General Khanh would establish a corps
+headquarters forward at Plateau Gi, a Montagnard village located on
+the southern edge of the operations area, about 25 miles northeast of
+Kontum.
+
+On 1 May, U.S. Air Force C-123 transports airlifted Khang and the
+2,000-man provisional Marine brigade from the capital to Quang Ngai.
+Both Lieutenant Colonel Moody and Major Croft, the Assistant Senior
+Marine Advisor and artillery advisor, accompanied the Marine force. The
+next day an ARVN truck convoy transported the Marines from Quang Ngai
+some 40 miles north to Tam Ky, the roadside town which served as the
+capital of Quang Tin Province. The 2d Battalion, advised by Captain
+Taylor, dismounted from the trucks and assembled at Tam Ky air strip
+while the remainder of the convoy turned west onto a narrow dirt road
+which curved through the foothills and deep into the jungle-covered
+Annamite Chain. Meanwhile, Army H-21s from Pleiku landed at Tam Ky,
+loaded assault elements of the 2d Battalion, and began helilifting
+them into a stream-side landing zone some 30 miles southwest of the
+provincial capital. The convoy carrying the balance of the Marine
+force continued its southwest motor march until it reached the small
+ARVN-held town of Tra My. There, some 24 miles southwest of Tam Ky,
+Khang established his command post in a school house adjacent to a
+crude little dirt airstrip. The 75mm pack howitzer battery, advised by
+Major Croft, set up its weapons nearby while the reconnaissance platoon
+and elements of the 4th Battalion, advised by Captain Christensen,
+established security. When these units were in place U.S. Marine
+UH-34Ds from Da Nang lifted a TAFDS fuel bladder and pump to the
+airfield. Once the helilift of the 2d Battalion was completed, the
+Army H-21s, refueling from the TAFDS bladder, began lifting the 4th
+Battalion into the 2d Battalion’s landing zone, which was located
+several miles south of Tra My.
+
+With the initial movement into the operations area accomplished and the
+brigade command post functioning, the two infantry battalions began
+combing a deep valley and the adjacent mountains for Communist base
+camps. After several days Khang’s Marines located one rather complete
+camp but encountered no resistance upon entering the position. Once
+again the occupants, probably forewarned by the initial movement of the
+ARVN units into the area, had withdrawn ahead of the Marines. The only
+people found in the camp were a North Vietnamese doctor and nurse. A
+subsequent search of the bamboo huts and the underlying tunnel complex
+did produce a supply cache. The Vietnamese Marines discovered several
+rifles, six typewriters, three sewing machines, a radio, 44 maps, a
+French artillery computing board, and scores of flashlight batteries.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  LOCATION OF DO XA
+  BASE AREA
+]
+
+ARVN and Marine operations in the area during the next two weeks
+failed to locate any large Viet Cong elements. For the most part the
+Marines busied themselves by destroying a few abandoned camps and
+some cultivated crops. ARVN units operating around the Marines reported
+scattered action as they engaged small groups of Viet Cong attempting
+to escape from the center of the Do Xa. BACH PHOUNG XI concluded in
+mid-May when U.S. Marine UH-34Ds lifted the VNMC battalions back to Tra
+My. From there the Marines returned by convoy to Quang Ngai where they
+staged for the airlift back to Saigon. The statistics for the Marine
+portion of the operation revealed that only two Viet Cong soldiers had
+been killed. Khang’s force suffered 36 wounded, most as a result of
+encounters with booby traps constructed from sharpened bamboo spikes.
+ARVN forces fared only slightly better, having killed barely a score
+of Communists. Except for the fact that they had demonstrated their
+ability to penetrate the most difficult Viet Cong sanctuary, the two
+week offensive into the Do Xa base area had little impact on the war
+effort. From the standpoint of training and experience, however, the
+operation was beneficial. The Vietnamese Marines and their advisors
+learned a great deal about construction of landing zones and about
+directing helicopters, fields in which they had received little
+previous training.[8-C]
+
+    [8-C] An interesting sidelight to this operation was that it
+          stimulated somewhat of a fad in the offices at MACV and
+          the JGS. Military officials from Saigon who visited the
+          brigade command post, including General Weede, took back
+          large water-smoothed rocks as souvenirs of their trip to
+          the infamous Viet Cong stronghold. Printed on the side
+          of these ornate stones were the words “Do Xa, May 1963.”
+          (_Moody Comments._)
+
+In early September Lieutenant Colonel Wesley C. Noren, recently
+transferred from the 2d Marine Division where he had served as
+Assistant G-3, arrived in Saigon to replace Lieutenant Colonel Moody
+as the Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. Already
+selected for promotion to colonel, Noren would become the seventh
+Senior Marine Advisor when Moody left Vietnam in October.
+
+In mid-October the Vietnamese Marine commanders formed a provisional
+regiment for Operation PHI-HOA 5, which was to be conducted in III
+Corps Tactical Zone.[8-D] The 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions, supported by
+a composite artillery battery and the reconnaissance company, joined
+ARVN, VNAF, and Vietnamese Navy units in a major search and clear
+campaign in the northwest corner of Gia Dinh Province, only about 20
+miles southeast of Saigon. Like many other large government military
+operations undertaken in 1963, this one failed to uncover any major
+enemy forces. The Communist soldiers again managed to elude government
+forces. An extensive tunnel and cave network, which the Marines
+systematically destroyed with demolitions, was discovered under the
+entire area. Still, the Marines managed to kill only six Viet Cong and
+capture 10. Two Vietnamese Marines were killed and 36 others wounded
+before the operation terminated on 1 November.
+
+    [8-D] After the realignment of the CTZs the previous December,
+          III Corps included a 200-mile-long section of Vietnam
+          which encompassed the southern one third of the Central
+          Highlands and the area south to the boundary of the
+          Capital Military District near Saigon.
+
+[Illustration: _General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the
+Marine Corps, and Lieutenant Colonel Wesley G. Noren, Senior Marine
+Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, confer with Lieutenant Colonel
+Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (USMC Photo
+A420917)._]
+
+The coup d’etat which toppled President Diem from power began the same
+day that Operation PHI-HOA 5 concluded. Instead of returning to their
+base camps, the 1st and 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalions, accompanied
+by the composite battery, moved into the capital to participate in the
+power struggle. These units actually launched the coup by seizing key
+installations in the heart of the city while the 2d VNMC Battalion
+blocked the highway to Bien Hoa, thus preventing loyalist intervention.
+Sporadic fighting against troops loyal to Diem continued until the
+early morning of 2 November when the 4th Battalion finally stormed
+and captured the presidental palace. Four Vietnamese Marines were
+killed and 12 wounded during the battles in Saigon. No U.S. Marines
+were involved in the fighting as Lieutenant Colonel Noren directed his
+subordinate advisors to remain in their quarters. When the situation
+stabilized, the advisors rejoined their units and resumed their normal
+duties.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  CORPS TACTICAL ZONES
+  1963–1964
+]
+
+Combat operations against the Communist guerrillas resumed for the
+Vietnamese Marine Brigade in the second week of November. Accompanied
+by its U.S. Marine advisor, Captain James P. McWilliams, the 3d
+Battalion initiated a search and clear operation in III Corps in
+conjunction with the 11th ARVN Regiment on 10 November. The next day
+the Vietnamese Marines clashed sharply with a substantial Viet Cong
+force west of My Tho and suffered six killed and 21 wounded. Nineteen
+enemy bodies were found on the battlefield along with four weapons,
+several grenades, and some documents. McWilliams, respected by his
+fellow advisors for his candid and forthright assessments, later
+recalled that such encounters were the exception rather than the
+rule. “While the Vietnamese Marines were individually good fighters
+and showed tenacity in most cases against forces that would stand and
+fight, this was not the nature of the conflict,” he lamented. More
+often than not, McWilliams went on to explain, the highly mobile Viet
+Cong could elude the larger, more cumbersome government units.[8-2]
+
+On 14 November, the same day that the combined Marine-ARVN operation
+in III Corps terminated, the Vietnamese Marine command formed a
+provisional regiment to control operations DAI-PHONG 28 and 29, which
+were to be conducted concurrently in the same general area. Composed of
+the 1st and 3d Battalions, and a 75mm pack howitzer platoon, the Marine
+force searched until 21 November for Viet Cong units thought to be in
+Binh Duong Province but with discouraging results. Only one enemy was
+killed, two prisoners taken, and three weapons captured at the expense
+of five dead and 13 wounded Marines.
+
+A week later the 2d Battalion, now advised by Captain Joseph N. Smith,
+fought a more typical action while participating in Operation DAI-PHONG
+30. The battalion commander, Captain Nguyen Thanh Yen, received orders
+for the operation during the early morning hours of 25 November.
+Shortly after daybreak nearly 550 Vietnamese Marines boarded trucks
+at their camp near Thu Duc for the trip to Bien Hoa airfield. Upon
+arrival, officers from III Corps headquarters informed Captain Yen
+that his battalion was to conduct a heliborne assault against Hoi Dong
+Sam, a Viet Cong-held village in western Hau Nghia Province just west
+of Saigon. The purpose of the operation was to intercept a guerrilla
+force which had overrun the nearby Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp the
+previous day and had taken several American prisoners. The enemy unit
+was believed to be using Hoi Dong Sam as a way station while attempting
+to escape across the Cambodian border.[8-3]
+
+The operation began at about 0800 when eight U.S. Army H-21 “Flying
+Bananas” from the 145th Aviation Battalion helilifted Captain Smith,
+a Vietnamese company commander, and his 90-man assault force from
+Bien Hoa. Eight Army UH-1B gunships and a U.S. Air Force O-1B Bird
+Dog observation aircraft escorted the transport helicopters on the
+20-minute flight to the objective area. The gunships were put to
+use almost immediately when Communist .50 caliber machine gun fire
+erupted from a treeline at the eastern edge of the village. Under the
+suppressive fire of the UH-1Bs, the first wave of H-21s landed the
+assault force in some partially flooded rice paddies about 700 meters
+east of the Viet Cong positions. The Marine assault force quickly
+deployed into a treeline on the western edge of the landing zone.
+From this position the company began returning fire with rifles and
+.30 caliber machine guns. The Air Force forward air controller (FAC)
+overhead in the O-1B and the Army gunships prevented the enemy from
+withdrawing across the open rice paddies which surrounded the objective
+on the north, south, and west.
+
+The distance between the assembly area at Bien Hoa and the landing
+zone combined with the scarcity of transport helicopters to slow the
+progress of the helilift. The landings continued at 40-minute intervals
+while the UH-1B gunships teamed with the Vietnamese Marine assault
+force to suppress the enemy’s fire. The last elements of the battalion
+were finally landed about two hours after the initial assault. Largely
+because of the effective suppressive fires from the air and ground, no
+aircraft were hit during the helilift.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  2d VNMC BATTALION ATTACK ON
+  HOI DONG SAM 25 NOV 1963
+]
+
+Once the entire battalion was on the ground, the assault company,
+augmented by a pair of 60mm mortars and two 57mm recoilless rifles,
+provided a base of fire to protect the movement of its sister
+companies. Captain Yen maneuvered his three remaining rifle companies
+and a battalion command group north to a position from which they could
+launch an envelopment on the fortified village. Using a treeline which
+bordered an irrigation canal as cover, the force hooked westward until
+it was directly north of the Viet Cong position. Meanwhile, a FARM
+GATE twin-engine B-26 relieved the UH-1B gunships on station. At this
+point in the action the Air Force FAC observed a group of 30–40 enemy
+attempting to flee from the northwest corner of Hoi Dong Sam. After
+clearing the target with the Marine battalion, he directed the B-26 to
+attack the target with its 250-pound bombs. The aircraft made several
+bombing passes and dispersed the Viet Cong. When the air strike ended
+the enveloping force began its assault against the northern edge of the
+village with two companies abreast and one following in reserve several
+hundred meters to the rear. Once the assault force was in motion the
+base of fire displaced forward, firing as they moved, to a small canal
+about 120 meters in front of the .50 caliber positions in the treeline.
+The two assault companies, followed closely by Yen, Smith, and the
+battalion command group, penetrated the northern end of the village and
+swept through to its southern periphery. The commander of the company
+on the east (or left) flank, deployed elements into the treeline where
+the Viet Cong automatic weapons had been active. Following a sharp but
+brief exchange of gunfire, the Marines cleared the position. They found
+eight enemy dead and three .50 caliber machine guns.
+
+By noon the 2d Battalion had secured the entire village. Captain Yen
+ordered his assault companies to establish a perimeter defense and
+the reserve company to begin a systematic search of the position. His
+Marines uncovered a number of well-camouflaged bunkers and fighting
+positions. In a small canal just east of the village the Marines
+found the mount for another heavy caliber automatic weapon. They also
+discovered eight Viet Cong suspects and detained them for questioning.
+One rifle company moved to investigate the area where the B-26 had
+attacked the fleeing enemy earlier in the morning but found no evidence
+of additional casualties. Following the capture of Hoi Dong Sam, Yen’s
+battalion conducted patrols for several days in search of the Viet
+Cong force that had attacked the Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp on the
+25th. The enemy force, however, eluded the Marines by gaining refuge in
+Cambodia. The battalion returned to garrison at Thu Duc on 28 November.
+
+In many ways the results of DAI-PHONG 30 pointed up the problems
+which frequently frustrated GVN military forces and their American
+advisors. The 2d Battalion had seized its objective and in so doing
+had killed a handful of Viet Cong and detained a number of suspects.
+The Marines had captured three heavy caliber automatic weapons and
+an assortment of small arms--all without suffering a single casualty
+of their own. Still, it was difficult to translate the action into
+victory. The Marines, along with the other government forces involved
+in the operation, had failed to intercept the Viet Cong raiding force
+in its flight toward the international boundary. Moreover, most of
+the occupants of Hoi Dong Sam had made good their escape despite the
+presence of observation and attack aircraft. Like many other government
+military operations undertaken during the 1961–1964 period, DAI-PHONG
+30 was successful from a statistical standpoint but did little to wrest
+the tactical initiative from the guerrillas.
+
+In the first week of December, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff
+ordered VNMC units to conduct an extended search in the jungles of
+western Tay Ninh Province in III Corps. A special Marine Task Force
+composed of the 1st and 3d Battalions was helilifted into the area
+on 3 December to begin Operation DAI-PHONG 31. This operation was
+punctuated by two major engagements and frequent enemy harassment. In
+one particularly vicious clash, the Vietnamese Marines incurred heavy
+casualties while attempting to fight out of a skillfully executed Viet
+Cong ambush. When the operation concluded on 9 December, the Vietnamese
+Marines had suffered 11 men killed, 58 wounded, and 1 captured. Nine
+Viet Cong bodies were found and another Communist soldier was captured.
+The enemy left four individual weapons on the battlefield.
+
+In mid-December, South Vietnam’s new leaders removed Lieutenant Colonel
+Khang from his position as Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.
+Although he had not participated in the November coup, Khang had been
+a political appointee of President Diem and as such was viewed as a
+potential threat to the new regime. After being promoted to colonel,
+he was assigned to the Philippines as the Republic of Vietnam’s Armed
+Forces Attache. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, who had been serving
+as Assistant Commandant and Chief of Staff of the VNMC, was appointed
+as Khang’s successor. He assumed command of the Vietnamese Marine Corps
+on 16 December.
+
+Vietnamese Marine Brigade units continued operations against the Viet
+Cong following Khang’s relief but fought no major engagements. Near the
+end of December, with the nation drifting into political uncertainty
+and its own top leadership changed, the morale of the Vietnamese Marine
+Corps plummeted. Lieutenant Colonel Noren saw this unfortunate trend as
+a by-product of the general political instability which was beginning
+to grip the country rather than a reflection of Lien’s leadership.
+Indeed, Noren thought the new VNMC commandant to be an extraordinarily
+capable officer.[8-4] In any case, as 1963 ended the U.S. Marine
+advisors were reporting climbing desertion rates in almost every
+battalion.
+
+
+_Accomplishments_
+
+Even though 1963 closed upon a discouraging note, the Marine Advisory
+Division could report positively on its own activities. At the
+urging of the Senior Marine Advisor, the Vietnamese Marine Corps had
+reinstituted multi-battalion combat operations. Steps had also been
+taken to cut the VNMC’s last formal ties to the ARVN by creating a
+separate Marine Corps recruit training facility. When activated this
+training center was expected to provide VNMC battalions with a stream
+of enlisted men who would possess a background of higher quality basic
+training.
+
+As for personal achievements, the U.S. Marine advisors had accompanied
+their units in every combat operation during 1963 except the November
+coup. No advisors had been killed in the 12-month period and only four
+(two of whom were on temporary assignment from the 3d Marine Division)
+had been wounded. The first combat decorations other than Purple Heart
+Medals for wounds were also approved and awarded to the advisors during
+the year. On 13 December, Captains Don Christensen and Frank Zimolzak,
+former advisors to the 4th and 3d Battalions respectively, were awarded
+the Bronze Star Medals with the Combat “V” for meritorious service.
+Captain Richard Taylor, an advisor with the 2d Battalion, earned
+the first Silver Star Medal during the same period for “conspicuous
+gallantry” between November 1962 and October 1963. Captain Joseph N.
+Smith, advisor to the 2d and 4th VNMC Battalions, earned the second
+Silver Star for gallantry displayed between October 1963 and April
+1964.[8-E]
+
+    [8-E] Both Silver Star Medals were awarded during 1964.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 9
+
+SHUFLY Operations
+
+_Development of the Compound Continues--Combat Support Operations--The
+Situation in Vietnam_
+
+
+SHUFLY, the only U.S. Marine tactical command assigned to South
+Vietnam, continued its combat support operations in the semi-isolated
+northern provinces throughout 1963. Although the size of I Corps had
+been reduced in late 1962 when the Vietnamese Joint General Staff
+shifted Quang Ngai Province to II CTZ, the mission of the Marine
+task element remained essentially unchanged. As the new year opened
+Lieutenant Colonel McCully’s command was still responsible for
+providing direct helicopter support to the forces of the five northern
+provinces. Likewise, the government’s order of battle in the northern
+provinces had not changed to any great degree. The 1st ARVN Division
+still occupied the coastal plains south of the DMZ in Quang Tri and
+Thua Thien Provinces. Headquartered at Da Nang, the 2d ARVN Division
+continued to carry the main burden of operations against the Viet Cong
+in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. Operating in Quang Ngai Province
+to the south of the new I Corps-II Corps border were elements of the
+25th ARVN Division. Interspersed along the coastal lowlands among
+the various regular battalions of these three divisions were small
+paramilitary garrisons. In the mountains to the west, the scattered
+Special Forces outposts with their Montagnard defenders continued their
+struggle for survival while monitoring Communist infiltration.
+
+
+_Development of the Compound Continues_
+
+The first month of 1963 saw three important changes in the composition
+and leadership of Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6. On 11 January, HMM-162,
+a UH-34D squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu,
+replaced Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s HMM-163 as the task element’s
+helicopter unit. Five days later, on the 16th, Lieutenant Colonel
+George H. Linnemeier, winner of four Distinguished Flying Crosses
+during World War II and Korea, relieved Lieutenant Colonel Davis as
+the MABS-16 sub unit commander. In the last week of January Lieutenant
+Colonel Harold F. Brown, a veteran aviator who had piloted scout-dive
+bombers during the Second World War, arrived at Da Nang and assumed
+command of the task element from Lieutenant Colonel McCully.
+
+During McCully’s tour as the Commander, Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6,
+the Marine compound at Da Nang had begun to assume a quality of
+permanency which had never been evident at Soc Trang. The utilities
+section of the MABS-16 detachment was responsible for many of the
+more noticeable improvements. By the first of the new year they had
+constructed several shelters on the west side of the runway to cover
+the motor transport section’s working area. They also had replaced the
+electrical system and repaired some of the damaged plumbing in the
+living areas. The task element’s special services section had begun
+to provide the Da Nang Marines with entertainment by showing nightly
+movies, arranging fishing trips into Da Nang harbor, and issuing
+athletic equipment.
+
+The monsoon season, which was characterized by cold rains, high
+winds, and deep mud, proved to be a source of much irritation to the
+Marines during the winter of 1962–1963. In addition to slowing flight
+operations and creating almost constant discomfort, the weather caused
+some unforeseen complications. In October 1962, heavy rainfall had
+combined with constant vehicle usage to turn the road between the
+living area and the flight line into a quagmire that was virtually
+impassable. At the time, Colonel Ireland, then the task unit commander,
+had responded by requesting equipment from Okinawa to improve the
+Marines’ only road link with their aircraft. Wing authorities promptly
+complied and a road grader was flown in by KC-130 (the new designation
+for the GV-1 Hercules). Within days a 700-foot section of the road was
+opened and a drainage ditch dug along its entire length.
+
+This measure proved to be only temporary, however, for in January the
+mud again threatened to cut the Marine vehicles off from the east side
+of the airfield. Lieutenant Colonel McCully obtained a bulldozer from
+Okinawa to make more permanent repairs. With the help of this piece of
+equipment, the Marines constructed a new 400-foot section of road on
+an eight-inch rock base. These repairs proved to be satisfactory and
+the road caused no further problem during the remainder of the monsoon
+season.
+
+Improvements in the compound continued to be made under the task
+element’s new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Brown. In April action was
+taken on an earlier request for the assignment of a security detachment
+to guard the Marine area. A reconnaissance platoon of 47 Marines from
+the 3d Marine Division joined the task element, thus freeing the men
+of the helicopter squadron and the MABS-16 sub unit of the important
+secondary responsibility they had held since the task unit’s deployment
+to Soc Trang. The assignment of the ground Marines was timely in that
+it corresponded with a reduction by the ARVN of its forces guarding the
+perimeter of the Da Nang airbase. One Marine general later observed
+that with the arrival of the infantry unit, “the air-ground team was in
+being in Vietnam.”[9-1]
+
+Other less obvious changes that contributed to the overall efficiency
+of the Marine task element also occurred during the early spring. In
+April, the task element commander was able to assign a better facility
+to medical and dental services. They had been crowded into one of the
+small structures along with other offices since the displacement from
+Soc Trang, but now were moved into a separate building in the living
+compound.
+
+Another problem that plagued the Marines during their entire first
+year at Da Nang--inadequate water supply--was finally solved in late
+1963. Originally the task unit had depended on a shallow well from
+which water was pumped and purified. The Marines nearly exhausted this
+source shortly after their arrival at Da Nang late in the dry season
+and their commanders were forced to impose strict water discipline. The
+monsoon rains eased the water crisis but by January production again
+dropped, this time as a result of the accumulation of heavy silt in
+the pumps. A Vietnamese contractor was engaged to clean and repair the
+pumping system but the problem soon recurred. In the early spring two
+new shallow wells were dug, one in the motor transport working area and
+the other in the living compound. With the onset of the dry season,
+however, the Marines again were forced to conserve water. This time the
+shortage became so acute that tank trucks were required to haul some
+16,000 gallons of water a day from a nearby Air Force installation.
+Finally, in November, a detachment from a Navy construction battalion
+completed a well 450 feet deep and capped it with a high pressure pump.
+This proved to be the permanent solution to the long-standing water
+shortage.
+
+Over the course of the year the Marines received several new
+vehicles which helped relieve the burden on the rebuilt buses
+which were beginning to falter under heavy use. Four 10-passenger,
+four-wheel-drive trucks and two M-442 “Mighty Mite” jeeps were flown
+in by KC-130s from Okinawa and assigned to the task element’s motor
+transport section. By summer, two of the old buses were replaced with
+tactical passenger vehicles which were better suited for transporting
+personnel between the barracks and work areas. The addition of the new
+vehicles also allowed the mess hall to begin transporting hot noon
+meals to the men working on the east side of the airstrip. A mess line
+set up in the hangar area fed those Marines who previously had lost
+time by travelling to the living compound for noon meals.
+
+Two changes were made in the task element’s command structure in
+midyear. On 5 July Lieutenant Colonel Earl W. Cassidy, a veteran
+aviator with 20 years service, relieved Lieutenant Colonel Linnemeier
+as commanding officer of the MABS-16 sub unit. Two weeks later, on the
+18th, Colonel Andre D. Gomez, a Marine who had distinguished himself
+as an artillery officer during World War II before becoming a pilot,
+assumed command of Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6.
+
+In summary, the improvements made in the task element’s compound during
+the course of 1963 helped insure the successful support of sustained
+combat helicopter operations. Although overshadowed by the publicity
+which the actual flight operations attracted, the continued improvement
+of the Da Nang base was vital to the overall effectiveness of the
+Marine combat support effort.
+
+
+_Combat Support Operations_
+
+Marine helicopter support for government forces in I Corps encountered
+a brief interruption shortly after the new year began when HMM-163 was
+replaced by a fresh UH-34D squadron. Marine KC-130s shuttled between
+Okinawa and Da Nang for several days during the second week of January
+bringing the officers and men of HMM-162 to Vietnam and returning
+with members of HMM-163. The change-over of units was completed on 11
+January when Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun officially transferred his
+squadron’s aircraft and maintenance equipment to the newly-arrived unit.
+
+In the five months and ten days since they initiated operations at Soc
+Trang, “Rathbun’s Ridge Runners” had amassed an enviable combat record.
+The squadron’s crews had flown a total of 10,869 hours, 15,200 sorties,
+and had lifted over 25,216 combat assault troops and 59,024 other
+passengers. In one month alone (August) they had established a Marine
+Corps record for medium helicopter squadrons by flying 2,543 helicopter
+hours. These records had not been set without risks, however. During
+the course of their operations in the Mekong Delta and in I Corps,
+helicopters operated by HMM-163’s crews had been hit on 32 occasions by
+Communist small arms fire.[9-2] Moreover, the squadron had become the
+first Marine unit to suffer combat casualties in the Vietnam conflict.
+
+HMM-162, led by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu, the veteran Marine
+aviator who had commanded the squadron during the recent deployment
+to Thailand as part of the 3d MEU, began full-fledged combat support
+operations the same day that the last of Rathbun’s squadron departed
+Da Nang. HMM-162’s crews, many of whom had participated in similar
+operations around Udorn the previous summer, limited their early
+flights to routine resupply missions and a few medical evacuations.
+Such missions enabled the squadron’s personnel to become better
+acquainted with the terrain over which they would operate during the
+next six months.
+
+The new squadron participated in its first major combat troop lift on
+January 19, when a break in the monsoon allowed the 2d ARVN Division
+to execute a heliborne operation into the mountains about 15 miles
+west of Da Nang. Eighteen Marine UH-34Ds lifted 300 ARVN troops into
+three separate landing zones near a suspected Communist base area.
+The squadron’s pilots and crews encountered their first Viet Cong
+opposition during this troop lift. Upright bamboo stakes obstructed one
+of the landing zones while at another the enemy fired at the Marine
+aircraft with small arms. Although two UH-34Ds were hit, none were shot
+down and the mission was completed successfully.
+
+A month later, on 18 February, the Marine pilots experienced another
+of the hazards associated with flight operations in Vietnam while
+attempting to land troops from the 1st ARVN Division in a clearing
+about 18 miles southwest of Hue. Five helicopters sustained punctures
+in the bottoms of their fuselages when they accidentally landed on tree
+stumps concealed by high grass in the landing zone. One stump caused
+extensive damage to an aircraft when it ripped into its forward fuel
+cell. The crew was forced to leave the UH-34D in the field under ARVN
+protection overnight. The next morning Marine mechanics were flown in
+from Da Nang to repair the helicopter.
+
+Despite several troop lifts involving a dozen or more aircraft,
+heliborne assault missions did not dominate HMM-162’s operations during
+the unit’s first three months in South Vietnam. Poor weather conditions
+over the northern provinces continued to restrict flight operations
+generally to resupply and medical evacuation missions. Statistics
+for the first quarter of 1963, for example, indicated that Marine
+helicopters conducted 6,537 logistics sorties as opposed to 1,181
+tactical support sorties.
+
+The single most significant incident during HMM-162’s initial three
+months in Vietnam took place in the second week of March when the
+squadron suffered its first aircraft losses and casualties. These
+were incurred during a salvage-rescue attempt in the mountains of
+northern II Corps. The incident began on 10 March as two Marine UH-34Ds
+attempted to insert a four-man American-Vietnamese ground rescue team
+into the jungle about 30 miles southwest of Quang Ngai. The team’s
+assignment was to locate a U.S. Army OV-1 Mohawk (a twin-engine,
+turboprop, electronic reconnaissance aircraft manufactured by Grumman)
+which had crashed, and its pilot, who had parachuted into the jungle.
+The exact site of the accident had not been located but the general
+area was known to be a steep jungle-covered mountain, the elevation of
+which approached 5,000 feet. While attempting to lower search personnel
+into the jungle by means of a hoist, one of the helicopters lost power
+and crashed. The ARVN ranger who was on the hoist when the accident
+occurred was killed but the helicopter’s crew managed to climb from
+the wreckage shortly before it erupted in flames. The copilot, Captain
+David N. Webster, was severely burned in the explosion.
+
+Other Marine UH-34Ds from Da Nang joined in the rescue operation,
+refueling from the TAFDS at Quang Ngai for the flight into the
+mountains. The situation was complicated further when a second Marine
+helicopter experienced a power loss and crashed near the burned-out
+UH-34D hulk while attempting to land a rescue team composed of MABS-16
+Marines. Fortunately, the aircraft did not burn and the only injury
+incurred in the crash was a sprained ankle, but the extremely steep
+and densely jungled terrain kept the Marines from reaching the site
+of the other downed helicopter. Bad weather and darkness prevented
+further efforts to extricate the various American and South Vietnamese
+personnel from the jungle that day. During the night Captain Webster
+died of injuries.
+
+The next day, the Marines stripped a UH-34D of some 700 pounds of
+equipment so as to enable it to operate more efficiently at the
+extreme elevations in the vicinity of the crash sites. After carefully
+maneuvering the helicopter into a hovering position, the pilot was able
+to extract the survivors and the dead copilot from the site where the
+first UH-34D had crashed and burned. The survivors were flown to Quang
+Ngai. There the wounded were treated and later evacuated by U.S. Air
+Force transport to an American hospital at Nha Trang.
+
+While these events were taking place, the Marines from the second
+downed helicopter, guided by search aircraft operating over the area,
+located and recovered the injured Army Mohawk pilot. This accomplished,
+the Marines hacked out a small clearing from which they were evacuated
+by another Marine helicopter.
+
+The episode was not yet over, however, as the crashed OV-1 and its
+payload of advanced electronics equipment still had not been secured.
+Finally, an ARVN ranger company, which had joined the search, reached
+the remnants of the Mohawk and established security around the site
+while U.S. Army technicians were helilifted in to examine the debris.
+The Marine UH-34D, which had crashed nearby without burning and was
+damaged beyond repair, was cannibalized for usable parts and then
+destroyed.
+
+On 13 March, with the search and rescue tasks completed, Marine
+helicopters began shuttling South Vietnamese rangers to Mang Buc,
+a nearby government outpost. During this phase of the mission the
+helicopters received fire from Viet Cong who had moved into positions
+near the rangers’ perimeter. Three UH-34Ds delivered suppressive fire
+on the enemy with their door-mounted M-60 machine guns while the
+remaining helicopters picked up the troops in the landing zone. This
+was the first recorded instance of a Marine helicopter providing close
+air support in actual combat.
+
+Other developments occurred in the early months of 1963 which either
+directly or indirectly affected the conduct of Marine helicopter
+operations. One was the improved coordination of intelligence gathering
+and usage among all South Vietnamese and American agencies within
+I Corps. This effort, which was essentially a concerted drive to
+streamline the collection and flow of intelligence information, was
+stimulated by a series of corps-wide intelligence seminars, the first
+of which was held in early February. Of special interest to the Marine
+aviators was the establishment of closer liaison between the Marine
+task element, U.S. Army Special Forces, and South Vietnamese units in
+the northern corps tactical zone.
+
+Closely related to the improvement of the overall intelligence
+situation was the acquisition of some new equipment by the SHUFLY
+Marines. In March the task element received two new model hand-held
+aerial cameras for use by the crews of the O-1B observation aircraft.
+Later in the month a photo lab was completed to facilitate the rapid
+processing of the photographs. By the end of the month the Marines were
+also being provided with high altitude photographic coverage of some
+objective areas taken by U.S. Air Force reconnaissance jets.
+
+The tempo of Marine helicopter operations began to quicken in early
+April with the advent of sustained periods of clear weather. On 13
+April, HMM-162 participated in a major heliborne assault in which
+435 2d ARVN Division troops were lifted into a suspected Communist
+stronghold in the mountains along the Song Thu Bon, about 30 miles
+south of Da Nang. As in most troop lift missions, the Marine O-1Bs
+provided reconnaissance and radio relay support. For the first time
+in the war Marine transport helicopters were escorted by helicopter
+gunships, the UH-1B Iroquois (a single-engine, turbine-powered utility
+helicopter built by the Bell Helicopter Company). Five UH-1Bs from a
+detachment of the Army’s Da Nang-based 68th Aviation Company, armed
+with M-60 machine gun clusters and 2.75-inch rockets, joined the VNAF
+fighter bombers to conduct preparatory airstrikes on the landing zones.
+
+The initial landing met no enemy resistance but later in the day action
+in the operational area intensified. A Marine UH-34D was hit by eight
+rounds of enemy small arms fire while attempting to evacuate wounded
+South Vietnamese soldiers and U.S. Army advisors from a landing zone
+near the point where the ARVN forces had been landed that morning. With
+the copilot, First Lieutenant John D. Olmen, wounded, the badly damaged
+aircraft force landed in the Vietnamese position.
+
+Two other Marine helicopters were dispatched to the scene to pick up
+the Marine crew and complete the evacuation. They managed to evacuate
+Lieutenant Olmen, a wounded American advisor, and one dead and four
+wounded ARVN soldiers without incident. On a return trip to pick up
+more wounded, however, one of the two UH-34Ds suffered heavy damage
+from Viet Cong fire. In this incident the crew chief, Corporal Charley
+M. Campbell, was wounded in the thigh, chest, and back by small arms
+fire, and the aircraft was forced to land near the first downed
+helicopter. The accompanying UH-34D landed, picked up Campbell, and
+returned him to Da Nang for emergency treatment. Repair teams were
+helilifted to the position on the afternoon of the 13th, and began
+repairing both helicopters. One was able to return to Da Nang later
+that day but the other required extensive repairs and could not be
+flown to safety until the 15th.
+
+While HMM-162 repair crews were working feverishly to extricate their
+aircraft from the predicament along the banks of the Song Thu Bon,
+another of their helicopters was shot down nearby while supporting the
+same operation. This aircraft was hit four times while approaching an
+ARVN landing zone located in a small valley about three miles south of
+the action in which the two helicopters had been lost earlier. After
+temporary repairs were made, its crew flew the damaged UH-34D to Da
+Nang where more detailed repair work was accomplished.
+
+The number of combat support sorties flown into the mountains by
+HMM-162’s crews rose steadily as the weather improved. Near the end
+of April, the Marines helilifted three battalions of the 1st ARVN
+Division into the mountains of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces near
+the Laotian border. These units were to participate in an extended
+multi-regiment drive against suspected Communist infiltration routes
+there. This operation, for which Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s squadron
+provided daily support after the initial landing, taxed the durability
+of both the Marine crews and their aircraft. For 90 days task element
+helicopters flew into and out of hazardous landing zones located at
+elevations as high as 4,500 feet. The majority of these sorties were
+resupply and medical evacuation missions with the occasional exception
+being the heliborne displacement of infantry and artillery units when
+distance or terrain prohibited overland movement. Despite the dangers
+inherent in helicopter operations conducted over mountainous terrain,
+the squadron incurred no aircraft or personnel losses while supporting
+the offensive in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.
+
+While his squadron’s support of the 1st ARVN Division’s ongoing drive
+near the Laotian border continued, Lieutenant Colonel Leu committed 21
+UH-34Ds to support the offensive against the Do Xa base area along the
+southern edge of I Corps. On 27 April, Marine crews helilifted over
+567 troops of the 2d ARVN Division into the mountainous area roughly
+22 miles southwest of Tam Ky to begin Operation BACH PHUONG XI. The
+squadron was less fortunate during this operation than it was during
+the lengthy Quang Tri effort. One helicopter was shot down by Viet Cong
+fire which wounded the pilot, Captain Virgil R. Hughes, in the leg. The
+crew and the embarked ARVN soldiers escaped further injury when the
+aircraft made a crash landing in which it suffered extensive damage.
+After the crew was rescued, a salvage team from Da Nang stripped the
+helicopter of all usable parts and burned the hulk so the Viet Cong
+could not make use of it. This was the first Marine helicopter loss
+definitely attributed to direct enemy action.[9-3]
+
+Following the initial heliborne assaults into the Do Xa area, two
+UH-34Ds were rotated to Tra My from Da Nang on a daily basis. Refueling
+from the TAFDS bladder, these standby aircraft were used primarily to
+perform medical evacuation missions for VNMC and ARVN units involved
+in BACH PHOUNG XI. Before the operation ended in mid-May, HMM-162’s
+crews had evacuated nearly 100 Marine and ARVN casualties from
+hazardous landing zones scattered along the border of I and II Corps.
+The task element’s O-1Bs also provided aerial reconnaissance support
+for all phases of the operation. On 19 May, the day before BACH PHOUNG
+XI terminated, 12 Marine UH-34Ds lifted the two Vietnamese Marine
+battalions to the provisional brigade command post at Tra My. This
+particular phase of the operation evoked favorable comment from an
+anonymous U.S. Marine pilot who noted on an unsigned debriefing form
+that the heliborne withdrawal had gone smoothly and that the Vietnamese
+Marines appeared “well organized in the landing zones and at Tra
+My.”[9-4] BACH PHOUNG XI ended unceremoniously the following day when
+HMM-162 helilifted the ARVN battalions from the Do Xa base area.
+
+One trend which became increasingly apparent as the spring of 1963
+unfolded was the growing utilization of the Army UH-1B helicopter
+gunships as escorts to and from landing zones. The gunships
+accompanied all Marine assault helilifts and medical evacuations, and
+when available, also escorted resupply flights in order to provide
+suppressive fire around government positions while landings were in
+progress. Although well suited for the escort missions, the lightly
+armed UH-1Bs did not replace the Vietnamese Air Force attack aircraft
+as the principal source of preparatory air strikes around landing zones
+being used for assault helilifts. The Marines continued to rely on the
+more heavily armed VNAF T-28s and A-1Hs to conduct the so-called “prep
+strikes.”[9-A]
+
+    [9-A] As a result of the joint helicopter operations in I
+          Corps, a vigorous debate developed within the Marine
+          Corps concerning the value of armed helicopters. This
+          debate and the subsequent development, procurement, and
+          operations of Marine helicopter gunships will be covered
+          in a separate historical monograph being prepared by the
+          History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
+          Corps.
+
+May was the last full month of combat support operations for Lieutenant
+Colonel Leu’s squadron. In the first week of June, transports from
+VMGR-152 began landing at Da Nang with the Marines of a new UH-34D
+squadron. Since assuming responsibility for helicopter support in I
+Corps in mid-January, HMM-162 had compiled a solid combat record. While
+under the squadron’s operations, the UH-34D helicopters had flown
+17,670 sorties for a total of 8,579 flight hours. The O-1Bs added
+approximately 400 sorties and another 1,000 hours to these figures. In
+the month of May alone HMM-162’s helicopters flew over 2,000 flight
+hours--a number which approached the record set by HMM-163 during the
+previous summer in the Mekong Delta. Other statistics reflected the
+growing intensity of the Vietnam war. Since its deployment to Da Nang,
+Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s unit had lost three helicopters--two as a
+result of operations at extreme elevations and one to enemy fire. One
+member of the unit had been killed and three others wounded since the
+squadron entered the combat zone.[9-5]
+
+After a brief change-over period, the outgoing squadron commander
+officially turned over his unit’s aircraft and maintenance equipment on
+8 June to Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Shook, the commanding officer of
+HMM-261. Shook, who had flown Marine helicopters in combat during the
+Korean War, committed his crews to their first actual combat missions
+that same day.
+
+A significant change took place in the coordinating arrangements that
+governed U.S. helicopter units supporting I Corps at approximately
+the same time that HMM-261 initiated combat support operations. Since
+its relocation at Da Nang, the Marine task element, along with all
+other aviation units in I CTZ, had received its missions from the Air
+Support Operations Center located within the corps headquarters. As
+the number of U.S. and VNAF aviation organizations assigned to I Corps
+grew and the total number of missions multiplied, it became necessary
+to modify the system of coordination and control. In accordance with
+a ComUSMACV directive, I Corps headquarters created an Aviation
+Headquarters Operations Center (AHOC) to oversee the employment of
+Marine and Army aircraft in the CTZ. The AHOC, which was composed of
+a senior Army representative, a senior Marine representative, and an
+operations section, was to be directed by the Commander, Task Element
+79.3.3.6. Formally stated, its primary mission was to “plan, direct,
+and control the employment of all Army and Marine Corps Aviation
+Units and aircraft operations in direct support of I Corps.” The
+newly organized AHOC was also ordered to “participate in, and provide
+assistance to operational planning and the coordination of employment
+of USA/USMC Aviation with VNAF/USAF tactical air.”[9-6] The AHOC,
+therefore, was formed to supplement rather than replace the older Air
+Support Operations Center, which continued to direct and control all
+U.S. Air Force and VNAF operations over the northern provinces. It
+was under this arrangement that U.S. Marine and Army aviation units
+operated after mid-1963.
+
+HMM-261’s Marines began encountering systematic Viet Cong resistance
+to their operations shortly after their first combat missions in early
+June. A 21-aircraft assault mission into the mountains west of Da
+Nang was aborted on 6 July when the Marine pilots discovered that the
+Viet Cong had obstructed the two available landing zones with upright
+stakes. While inspecting one of the landing zones on a low pass, a
+helicopter was hit in the forward fuel cell by Communist small arms
+fire. The damage to the aircraft was not serious enough to force a
+landing, but the pilot of an escorting U.S. Army UH-1B was mortally
+wounded while attempting to suppress the ground fire.
+
+Ten days after the enemy forced the cancellation of the assault mission
+west of Da Nang, HMM-261 suffered its first aircraft loss in Vietnam.
+The crash, which was later attributed to mechanical failure, occurred
+about 37 miles southwest of Da Nang while one of the squadron’s
+helicopters was on a routine logistics mission. Six passengers, two
+American advisors and four ARVN soldiers, were injured in the accident.
+The squadron commander dispatched two other UH-34Ds to the scene of
+the crash to evacuate the wounded and insert a salvage team. The badly
+damaged aircraft was assessed as beyond repair and was destroyed.
+
+In the second week of August, officers from HMM-261 and the task
+element’s staff (under the command of Colonel Gomez) met with American
+and Vietnamese officers at I Corps headquarters to plan a large-scale
+heliborne retrograde movement. The planned helilift was to mark the
+culmination of Operation LAM SON XII, a three-week long offensive
+by several battalions of the 2d ARVN Division against Communist
+infiltration routes in Quang Nam Province along the Laotian border.
+Although not encircled, the ARVN battalions had encountered increasing
+Viet Cong pressure since early August. I Corps authorities feared that
+unless their units were withdrawn promptly they might be cut off from
+the few landing zones that existed in the rugged operations area.
+
+As planned, the retrograde operation involved helilifting some
+1,300 troops with their artillery and equipment to Thuong Duc, a
+government-held town situated 30 miles southwest of Da Nang along
+the Song Vu Gia. The operation plan called for the commitment of 20
+Marine helicopters, 18 of which would participate in the actual troop
+lifts. The two extra UH-34Ds would be used in the event it became
+necessary either to replace helicopters assigned to the troop lift or
+to conduct search and rescue operations for downed aircraft. Three VNAF
+UH-34s and two U.S. Army unarmed UH-1Bs were designated by the I Corps
+headquarters to assist HMM-261 with the helilift.
+
+The Da Nang Air Support Operations Center assigned a variety of other
+aircraft to support the operation. These included two VNAF T-28s, one
+FARM GATE B-26, and two U.S. Army UH-1B gunships. These aircraft would
+share the task of providing close air support for the troop lift. A
+Marine O-1B was scheduled to perform weather reconnaissance missions.
+
+The entire air operation was to be coordinated from two aircraft. An
+American forward air controller in a VNAF observation plane was to
+direct all air strikes while overall control for the multiservice,
+bilingual effort was to come from a U.S. Air Force U-10 Super Courier.
+This six-man, single engine aircraft, which possessed an eight hour
+fuel capacity and carried three radios, would serve as an airborne air
+support operations center (Airborne ASOC). It would be flown by an Air
+Force pilot and would carry a Marine officer from the task element
+along with U.S. and Vietnamese representatives from the Da Nang ASOC.
+These officers would be in continuous radio contact with all aircraft
+in the operations area, and also with the U.S. Air Force liaison
+officer to I Corps who would be positioned with the ground troops.
+
+The concept of the operation called for the ARVN units to be lifted
+from two hazardous landing zones over a three-day period. According to
+the plan 500 ARVN soldiers were to be removed from Landing Zone HOTEL
+on Thursday, 15 August. Landing Zone HOTEL, a small clearing which
+could accommodate only three UH-34Ds, was situated along a river and
+was crowded between two 1,000-foot-high ridgelines only five miles
+from the Laotian border. The steep, jungle-covered ridges generally
+paralleled each other less than 400 meters apart on either side of the
+landing zone. Slightly west of the small clearing the ridges joined to
+form a box canyon. The physical structure of the location dictated that
+the transport helicopters use the same approach and retirement routes.
+
+Due largely to the proximity of the high terrain which surrounded
+Landing Zone HOTEL, the ARVN adopted a Marine proposal to leave a
+125-man security force on the two ridges. This force would provide
+cover for the helicopters conducting the final troop lift during this
+first phase of the retrograde movement. The 125 South Vietnamese
+soldiers would move cross-country to another landing zone to be picked
+up by helicopters following the completion of the helilift from Landing
+Zone HOTEL.
+
+The second landing zone, codename ZULU, was nearly as treacherous
+as the first. ZULU was completely encircled by a rim of hills some
+500 feet higher than the floor of the landing site. In addition to
+the 125-man security force from HOTEL, the Marine, Army, and VNAF
+helicopters were scheduled to lift 200 ARVN troops and two 105mm
+howitzers from this landing zone on 16 and 17 August (the second and
+third days of the operation).
+
+An unexpected complication developed the morning the operation began
+when the Air Force grounded its B-26s after one of the attack bombers
+crashed elsewhere in the northern portion of Vietnam as a result of
+undetermined causes. Shortly after this crash, HMM-261 was called
+upon to divert a flight of helicopters to assist in search and rescue
+operations for the downed B-26, thus reducing even further the assets
+available to support the heliborne retrograde.
+
+Despite the loss of some of the air power assigned to the operation,
+I Corps authorities elected to proceed with the helilift from Landing
+Zone HOTEL as planned. After the crew of a Marine O-1B confirmed that
+good weather prevailed over the operations area, the first helicopters
+departed Da Nang on schedule. Less than half an hour after take off the
+Marine and Vietnamese pilots began maneuvering their aircraft between
+the two ridges which dominated Landing Zone HOTEL. Twice during the
+pickup the armed UH-1B escorts drew fire from the thick jungle on one
+side of the approach lanes being used by the transports. Both times
+they returned fire in the direction of the unseen enemy and forced him
+to silence his weapons. The first phase of the operation was completed
+without serious incident four hours after it had begun.
+
+The second phase of the helilift began the next morning with the two
+unarmed U.S. Army UH-1Bs making several trips to Landing Zone ZULU to
+lift out the disassembled ARVN 105mm howitzers. The Marine and VNAF
+transport helicopters followed and continued to shuttle troops out of
+the landing zone for three hours without encountering enemy opposition.
+Then a departing flight of UH-34Ds drew fire from a nearby ridgeline.
+One of the escorting UH-1Bs immediately marked the suspected target for
+the VNAF T-28s and the attack aircraft bombed and strafed the position.
+The Communist activity ceased.
+
+After an overnight march, the covering force from Landing Zone HOTEL
+arrived at Landing Zone ZULU. Although they were not scheduled to be
+removed from the field until the next day, the schedule was adjusted
+and the 125 weary ARVN soldiers were flown to the secure assembly area
+on the afternoon of their arrival. This modification reduced the amount
+of work which would be required of the helicopters on the final day of
+the operation.
+
+The next phase of the helilift from ZULU on 17 August was characterized
+by increasing concern for security around the landing site. The general
+scheme for protecting the helicopters during this critical stage of
+the exercise was to establish two perimeters, one around the rim of
+high ground which surrounded the zone and another around the immediate
+landing site. The outer perimeter would be withdrawn first, leaving the
+inside ring of troops to deny the enemy direct access to the landing
+zone while the force from the outer perimeter boarded the helicopters.
+Once the Vietnamese soldiers were withdrawn from the rim of hills, the
+area within 300 meters of the close-in defenses would be automatically
+cleared for air strikes. Even with these precautions the helicopters
+would be extremely vulnerable to any enemy force that might rapidly
+occupy the high ground above Landing Zone ZULU following the withdrawal
+of the outer perimeter. Accordingly, once the troops from the outer
+defenses were staged for the helilift, the transport helicopters would
+be directed by the airborne ASOC to tighten the landing interval
+between aircraft from the usual five minutes to as short a time span
+as possible. By landing in such rapid succession, the dangerous final
+stage of the operation could be accomplished more quickly.
+
+Two hours after the helilift began on Saturday morning, the air
+liaison officer at ZULU reported that the outer perimeter had been
+withdrawn and that all remaining Vietnamese troops were in positions
+around the landing zone. At this point the operation, now in its most
+critical phase, began to experience agonizing delays. First, a loaded
+helicopter arrived at the assembly area with a rough running engine.
+Fearing that the fuel in the TAFDS had somehow become contaminated,
+Lieutenant Colonel Shook instructed all HMM-261 pilots to check their
+aircraft’s fuel strainers while their passengers disembarked at the
+assembly point. No evidence was found to indicate that the fuel
+contained contaminants, but the operation was slowed at the exact point
+where the intensified helilift was to have begun. Another minor delay
+occurred after a helicopter flying near the landing zone reported
+having drawn enemy ground fire. The approach and departure routes were
+adjusted slightly so that the transport helicopters would not fly over
+the area and VNAF T-28s were directed to attack the suspected enemy
+position. Shortly after the air strike ended the air liaison officer
+at the landing zone reported more enemy activity only 500 meters from
+his position. This momentary crisis was resolved when the American air
+liaison officer personally directed armed UH-1Bs to neutralize the
+target area.
+
+Finally, the airborne ASOC passed instructions to proceed with the
+operation, whereupon HMM-261 and VNAF helicopters began spiraling down
+into the landing zone. The escorting UH-1B gunships provided continuous
+protection for the transport helicopters by flying concentric but
+opposite patterns around them. One after another the transports landed,
+took on troops, climbed out of the landing zone, and turned toward
+Thuong Duc. Less than five minutes after the stepped-up helilift began,
+the last troops were airborne. The crew chief of the helicopter which
+embarked the final ARVN heliteam then dropped a purple smoke grenade
+into the empty landing zone to signal all other aircraft that the lift
+was complete.
+
+The three-day heliborne retrograde from the Laotian border proved
+to be one of the most efficient helicopter operations conducted by
+the Marines in the Republic of Vietnam during the early 1960s. Its
+success was due largely to detailed planning, particularly the South
+Vietnamese plans for the ground defense of both landing zones. These
+plans and their subsequent execution led a grateful Colonel Gomez,
+the task element commander, to declare: “This was the first time in
+our experience that a helicopter-borne withdrawal had been treated as
+a retrograde operation rather than an administrative lift. Without a
+sound retrograde plan the operation might well have failed.”[9-7]
+
+Although this observation was correct, it should be added that the
+close coordination between the airborne ASOC, the operational aircraft,
+and the air liaison officer on the ground had contributed to the
+successful execution of the plans. These agencies were instrumental in
+coordinating the bilingual, multiservice effort, particularly when it
+was beset with difficulties in its critical final stage.
+
+HMM-261’s combat support missions continued at a normal rate following
+the completion of the mid-August retrograde helilift. A month later,
+on 16 September, Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s squadron lost its second
+UH-34D in a crash 25 miles west-southwest of Hue. The helicopter, which
+had developed mechanical problems while carrying troops of a South
+Vietnamese assault force, was damaged beyond repair. Its crew members
+and passengers fortunately escaped injury. The aircraft was stripped of
+usable parts by a salvage team from Da Nang and burned.
+
+Shortly after this incident, the first elements of a new squadron
+began arriving at Da Nang and HMM-261 turned to preparations for its
+departure. Since early June, when it had become the fourth Marine
+helicopter squadron assigned to SHUFLY, Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s unit
+had accumulated 5,288 combat flying hours and 11,406 sorties in the
+UH-34Ds alone. The squadron’s crews had helilifted over 6,000 troops,
+nearly 1,900,000 pounds of cargo, and had accomplished over 600 medical
+evacuation missions.[9-8]
+
+The new squadron, HMM-361, assumed responsibility for helicopter
+support in I Corps on 2 October after a short period of orientation
+flying with the crews of the departing unit. HMM-361’s commanding
+officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Ross, was well qualified to
+direct a tactical aviation unit in a combat situation. Decorated with
+five Distinguished Flying Crosses during World War II and Korea, he was
+a recent graduate of the Air Force Command and Staff College.
+
+Barely a week after Ross’ squadron initiated combat support operations
+at Da Nang, it suffered its first aircraft and personnel losses.
+The incident occurred on 8 October when two UH-34Ds crashed almost
+simultaneously while on a search and rescue mission 38 miles southwest
+of Da Nang. Both helicopters burned, killing 10 men; the pilots,
+copilots, the squadron’s flight surgeon, and five crewmen. A search
+of the area was initiated immediately for the downed aircraft, but
+darkness prevented their discovery until the next morning. By then
+the Viet Cong had surrounded both crash sites and were waiting to
+ambush the search and rescue helicopters which they knew would arrive.
+When the rescue aircraft attempted to land, they met determined enemy
+opposition. Colonel Gomez requested ARVN assistance and 254 South
+Vietnamese troops were lifted into nearby clearings with instructions
+to dislodge the enemy force from the area around the downed aircraft.
+While executing the landing, HMM-361 helicopters were hit nine times by
+small arms fire, but suffered only superficial damage. One ARVN soldier
+was killed.
+
+The following day, as the South Vietnamese forces moved toward the
+downed UH-34Ds, three Marine helicopters escorted by three armed UH-1Bs
+and two VNAF T-28s lifted an inspection team into the crash site to
+recover the bodies and investigate the wreckage. Enemy automatic
+weapons fire broke out while the UH-34Ds waited in the landing zone
+and forced the pilots to take off while the inspection team found
+cover on the ground. After the Communist fire had been suppressed, the
+helicopters returned for the stranded Marines. Their investigation of
+the aircraft hulks had been fruitful: the evidence of enemy small arms
+fire in the wreckage and the relative positions of the two helicopters
+led Lieutenant Colonel Ross to conclude that the aircraft had been shot
+down by the Viet Cong.[9-9] But this was not a conclusive finding.
+There was room for speculation that the two helicopters had actually
+collided in midair while attempting to evade ground fire.
+
+Ground action in the hills around the crash sites continued. On 11
+October, another Marine helicopter was hit by Viet Cong fire while
+resupplying ARVN units in the area. In this incident the UH-34D was
+struck twice in the engine and once in the wheel strut while in a
+landing zone about two miles from the point where the crashes had
+occurred. After assessing the damage, a maintenance team from Da Nang
+determined that the helicopter would require a new engine. Marines from
+the security platoon were utilized to provide security until 13 October
+when an additional 120 ARVN troops were helilifted into the area and
+established a perimeter around the aircraft. Other helicopters then
+delivered the new engine and a maintenance crew to the landing zone.
+After the engines were exchanged, a crew returned the UH-34D to Da Nang.
+
+By the time HMM-361 had removed the last ARVN troops from the hills
+around the scene of the tragic accidents, monsoon weather had begun
+to restrict flight operations. The remaining two weeks of October
+were characterized by a reduced number of missions, most of which
+were either resupply or medical evacuations. By the end of October,
+despite numerous flight cancellations, Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ crews
+had gained the unenviable distinction of having attracted more enemy
+fire during a one month period than any previous squadron to serve with
+SHUFLY. Their helicopters had been shot at on 46 different occasions
+and had been hit 18 times.[9-10]
+
+SHUFLY’s combat support operations came to a halt in the first days of
+November as the reverberations from Diem’s overthrow spread to South
+Vietnam’s northern provinces. American officials in Washington and
+Saigon, aware of the pitfalls that might accompany open support of
+either side in the power struggle, ordered all U.S. military forces
+to cease advisory and combat support activities. As a result of the
+sensitive political situation, no U.S. aircraft left the ground on 2
+November. Two days after the new regime seized power in Saigon, the
+U.S. Marine helicopters were permitted to perform emergency medical
+evacuation and emergency resupply missions. Even these flights were
+to be approved beforehand by ARVN military officers in Saigon. Four
+days after Diem’s overthrow, the new leaders in Saigon eased the
+political restrictions and SHUFLY’s operations returned to near normal.
+One remaining limitation stipulated that U.S. helicopters could not
+transport ARVN units into population centers even though troops could
+be helilifted from the cities into rural areas.
+
+Due to torrential monsoon rains which began striking the Da Nang
+area in mid-November, HMM-361’s combat support operations continued
+at a relatively low level throughout the remainder of the year. This
+trend was confirmed by the flight totals compiled for the final two
+months of 1963. In November, the squadron’s UH-34Ds flew only 145
+sorties for 233 flight hours. December’s statistics, 230 helicopter
+sorties for 338 flight hours, indicated a slight upswing but fell far
+short of the monthly figures achieved earlier in the year. With rain
+and fog frequently rendering the mountains inaccessible by air, the
+preponderance of the squadron’s missions were conducted along the
+coastal plains. As 1963 ended SHUFLY’s combat support operations were
+continuing at a greatly reduced rate.
+
+
+_The Situation in Vietnam_
+
+Although not yet desperate, the overall situation in South Vietnam
+at the end of 1963 was far from favorable. Mismanaged and poorly
+coordinated from the outset, the Strategic Hamlet Program had failed
+to fulfill even the most moderate of American and South Vietnamese
+expectations. Little discernable headway had been made toward restoring
+any large segment of the populated rural areas to government control.
+Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese had disregarded the Geneva Agreement
+of 1962 and had continued to infiltrate troops and material down the
+Laotian corridor into the South. Although the 1963 figure of 4,200
+confirmed infiltrators was roughly 1,000 men lower than the figure for
+the previous year, it was substantial enough to force the government
+to deviate more and more from its avowed strategy of clearing Viet
+Cong formations from the vital populated areas. To help meet this
+continuing influx of Communist regulars, the government had committed
+its ground force to operations against base areas located in the remote
+hinterlands with increasing frequency. More often than not these
+multi-battalion offensives, such as the VNMC-ARVN drive into the Do
+Xa base area in May, proved futile, usually resulting in scattered
+and inconsequential clashes with small groups of Viet Cong. The
+continuation of such actions, of course, worked to the advantage of the
+Communists as the government forces expended time, energy, and lives
+without exacting a commensurate price from the enemy.
+
+Other disturbing trends had emerged on the South’s battlefields during
+the course of the year. Following an action fought in the Mekong
+Delta during early January in which the Viet Cong soundly defeated a
+multi-battalion ARVN heliborne force, enemy main force units continued
+to maintain their integrity and fought back when confronted with
+helicopter assaults. This trend was evident even in the northern
+provinces where each successive assault by Marine helicopters appeared
+to meet more determined resistance. Aside from the Viet Cong’s
+new-found confidence in countering heliborne offensives, another source
+of concern to U.S. and Vietnamese officials was the appearance in the
+South of several Viet Cong regimental headquarters during the year.
+The activation of these headquarters, which assumed control of already
+operational main force battalions, seemed to presage another phase of
+Communist military escalation.
+
+The situation throughout South Vietnam worsened in the aftermath of
+the Diem coup. Subsequent to the widespread command changes ordered
+by the new government, the morale, and in turn the effectiveness,
+of the Vietnamese armed forces declined sharply. The Viet Cong moved
+quickly to exploit the prevailing state of confusion by staging a
+rash of attacks in the weeks after Diem’s overthrow--attacks which
+worked a profound influence on the already faltering Strategic Hamlet
+Program. “The fall of the Ngo regime,” wrote one American scholar,
+“was accompanied by the complete collapse of the pacification efforts
+in many areas, and vast regions that had been under government control
+quickly came under the influence of the Viet Cong.”[9-11] The nation’s
+new leaders therefore formally terminated the badly damaged Strategic
+Hamlet Program. Although it was soon to be replaced with similar
+pacification campaigns, most Vietnamese and American officials conceded
+that much time and energy would be required to restore momentum to
+the government’s efforts at securing the allegiance of the rural
+population. So, by the end of 1963 both the tempo and effectiveness
+of South Vietnam’s overall war effort was at its lowest ebb since the
+intensification of the U.S. military assistance program in early 1962.
+
+[Illustration: _ARVN troops fan out from an HMM-361 helicopter during
+an assault into the mountains of I Corps. (USMC Photo A420866)._]
+
+This threatening situation was hardly consistent with American military
+plans which were being implemented at year’s end. Drawn up at Secretary
+of Defense McNamara’s direction and approved by him in the late summer
+of 1963, these plans called for a phased withdrawal of 1,000 U.S.
+servicemen from Vietnam by January 1964. The phased withdrawal plan,
+whose ultimate objective was to end direct American participation in
+the war, envisioned a gradual scaling down of U.S. involvement while
+simultaneously turning over more military responsibility to the South
+Vietnamese. Included in the initial 1,000-man reduction was the 47-man
+security platoon which had guarded the U.S. Marine task element’s
+compound at Da Nang since April. For the Marines serving with the task
+element, 1963 thus ended on an incongruous note. While the Viet Cong
+threat appeared on the rise, their own defenses were being reduced.
+Clearly, events in Vietnam had overtaken long-range plans already in
+motion.
+
+
+
+
+                                PART IV
+
+                     AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 10
+
+Marines Meet the Challenge
+
+_New American Decisions--A Restructured Military Assistance
+Command--Changes in Marine Leadership--Redesignation and
+Reorganization--The Vietnamese Marine Brigade--Additional Marine
+Activities_
+
+
+_New American Decisions_
+
+Less than three weeks after the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, the
+U.S. Presidency changed hands. On 22 November President Kennedy was
+assassinated in Dallas and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson took
+the reigns of the American government. By late November, when the
+new president assumed office, the process of political and military
+disintegration which had begun in South Vietnam following the Diem
+coup was already well underway. This process continued into the early
+weeks of 1964 when, in late January, General Nguyen Khanh, the newly
+appointed commander of I Corps, seized power in a bloodless coup.
+This second turnover in the government of South Vietnam in less than
+three months had its most serious impact on the nation’s armed forces.
+A new series of command changes ensued and again the government’s
+operations against the Communists suffered. As had been the case in the
+closing months of 1963, the Viet Cong continued to capitalize on the
+government’s disarray by expanding its control into previously secure
+areas.
+
+By March the rapidly declining effectiveness of the South Vietnamese
+military forces led the Johnson Administration to review the earlier
+decisions to withdraw American servicemen and to cut back the military
+assistance program. In a 16 March memorandum to President Johnson,
+Secretary of Defense McNamara warned that “the [military] situation
+had unquestionably been growing worse” in South Vietnam.[10-1] To
+counteract this threatening trend, McNamara offered a broad set of
+recommendations which included a proposal to support a 50,000-man
+increase in the size of the Vietnamese military and paramilitary
+forces. The memorandum did not address the question of additional
+American advisors who might be needed to supervise the proposed
+expansion. In any case, President Johnson approved McNamara’s plan the
+following day, thus setting the stage for increases in U.S. military
+assistance to South Vietnam.[10-2]
+
+Shortly after his most recent decision on Vietnam, President Johnson
+ordered changes in his top civilian and military representatives in
+Saigon. On 22 June, General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Army, who
+had been serving since January as Deputy Commander, USMACV, succeeded
+General Harkins as ComUSMACV. One day later, on the 23d, President
+Johnson announced that General Maxwell D. Taylor would replace Henry
+Cabot Lodge as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam. Taylor, who
+had been serving since 1962 as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
+Staff, had been closely associated with the Vietnam problem since his
+1961 fact-finding mission. Both he and Westmoreland were thoroughly
+familiar with U.S. programs and objectives in Vietnam.
+
+Soon after assuming his new responsibilities, General Westmoreland
+requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff augment his command with 5,100
+additional military personnel. In his opinion, these men were needed
+to support and supervise the expansion of the Vietnamese military and
+paramilitary forces. Secretary McNamara met with the Joint Chiefs on 20
+July to discuss this request for 900 more advisors and 4,200 additional
+support personnel. All agreed that the deteriorating situation in
+Vietnam demanded the measure and recommended its approval. The proposal
+was forwarded to President Johnson who approved it in early August.
+Emphasizing the urgency of the military situation, McNamara then
+ordered the Joint Chiefs to complete the entire build-up before 30
+September. At this juncture, however, General Westmoreland pointed
+out that such a rapid influx of personnel would “overload existing
+facilities [in South Vietnam]” and stated his desire to see the
+build-up accomplished in a more orderly progression over a period of
+several months. After considering the general’s latest request, the
+Secretary of Defense withdrew his earlier demand for an accelerated
+deployment.[10-3]
+
+[Illustration: _The MACV staff, spring 1964. Seated at head of table
+are General Paul D. Harkins, USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance
+Command, Vietnam, and his relief General William C. Westmoreland, USA.
+Major General Richard G. Weede, USMC, MACV Chief of Staff, is seated to
+General Westmoreland’s immediate left, and Brigadier General Carl A.
+Youngdale, USMC, Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, is seated two positions
+to General Weede’s left. (Photo courtesy of Major General Carl A.
+Youngdale, USMC (Ret.))._]
+
+While the details of the expanded U S. advisory program were being
+hammered out in Washington, the focus of the administration’s concern
+swung abruptly from the battlefields of South Vietnam to the Tonkin
+Gulf off the coast of North Vietnam. In two separate incidents during
+the first week of August, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked U.S.
+Navy ships operating in international waters.[10-A] An international
+crisis ensued when the United States retaliated with limited air
+strikes against North Vietnamese naval facilities. On 6 August, the
+U.S. Congress unanimously passed a joint resolution authorizing the
+President “to use all measures, including the commitment of armed
+forces to assist [South Vietnam] in the defense of its independence
+and territorial integrity....”[10-4] President Johnson signed the
+so-called Tonkin Gulf Resolution five days after it was passed, and in
+so doing, reaffirmed his pledge of full support for the Government of
+Vietnam.[10-B]
+
+   [10-A] A vigorous debate has since developed concerning the
+          actual origins of the Tonkin Gulf incidents. It has been
+          claimed that the Americans precipitated the attacks by
+          supporting aggressive South Vietnamese naval patrols off
+          the North Vietnamese coast.
+
+   [10-B] U.S. Marines figured prominently in the crisis which
+          followed the North Vietnamese attacks. A Marine
+          expeditionary brigade, the 9th MEB, was activated from
+          elements of the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine
+          Aircraft Wing and deployed on board amphibious shipping
+          to a position off Da Nang where it was available to
+          support U.S. contingency plans. Its commander, Brigadier
+          General Raymond G. Davis, and his staff attended planning
+          conferences in Da Nang and reconnoitered possible landing
+          sites near the city, but the MEB was not committed.
+          Instead, the organization remained in existence
+          throughout the remainder of 1964 and into early 1965
+          when, in March, two of its battalions were landed at Da
+          Nang. The formation and subsequent commitment of the 9th
+          MEB in the Republic of Vietnam are covered in detail
+          in the 1965 history of U.S. Marine operations in the
+          Republic of Vietnam.
+
+While the tensions generated by the Tonkin Gulf incidents never really
+subsided, the immediate crisis soon passed. Thereafter the American
+attentions focused once again on South Vietnam where the political and
+military situation began to deteriorate at an unprecedented rate after
+midyear. Ironically, this process of accelerated decay coincided with
+the initiation of a new South Vietnamese pacification strategy designed
+to prevent just such an occurrence. One aspect of the strategy was the
+Chien Tang (“Struggle for Victory”) Plan. Announced by General Khanh
+shortly after his rise to power, this campaign was similar in method
+and objective to the defunct Strategic Hamlet Program. Like the earlier
+program, the Chien Tang Plan envisioned the restoration of government
+influence in selected rural areas through the coordination of military
+and paramilitary operations with social and economic development
+programs.[10-C] While the Chien Tang campaign was better planned and
+far less ambitious than the Strategic Hamlet Program, there were
+definite similarities between the two. The instrument for the social,
+economic, and political developmental phase of the new effort, for
+example, was the New Life Hamlet--a variation of the planned government
+community. Begun in some areas around midyear, the New Life Hamlets
+were to become the symbol of the new pacification effort in much the
+same manner that the fortified hamlets had symbolized the earlier
+Strategic Hamlet Program.
+
+   [10-C] Motivated at least partially by the requirement to
+          provide better support for the pacification strategy,
+          the Vietnamese government restructured its paramilitary
+          forces in the spring of 1964. The old Self Defense Corps
+          was expanded dramatically and renamed the Popular Force
+          (PF). The Civil Guard was reorganized and designated the
+          Regional Force (RF). More importantly, the RVNAF extended
+          its control over both paramilitary organizations for the
+          first time since their creation.
+
+Coincident with the Chien Tang campaign, a similar but locally
+concentrated pacification effort was instituted in the rural areas
+around Saigon. Designated the Hop Tac Program, this campaign was
+conceived in order to link the seven provinces around the capital into
+a zone of intensive pacification in which closely coordinated military,
+paramilitary, police, and civil activities would systematically reduce
+Viet Cong strength. Because of their proximity to the area and their
+availability, the Vietnamese Marine Brigade and the ARVN Airborne
+Brigade were assigned primary responsibility for military operations in
+support of the Hop Tac campaign. By midyear, the Chien Tang and Hop Tac
+plans emerged as the backbone of General Khanh’s strategy to stave off
+further Communist advances in critical areas of the country.
+
+The development of the government’s newest pacification strategy,
+however, was based on the assumption that the Viet Cong would pursue
+a campaign to strengthen their control in South Vietnam’s populated
+rural areas. Such was not the case. Instead, at midyear the Communists
+began waging a brand of warfare characterized by large-scale mobile
+operations against government military forces. Obviously the enemy had
+shifted to the “general counter-offensive”--that phase of guerrilla
+warfare designed to bring on the complete political and military
+collapse of the opposition.
+
+The new Viet Cong strategy revealed itself in two general geographic
+areas during the fall months. In Binh Dinh Province on the coast of
+northern II Corps, two Viet Cong main force regiments staged a series
+of particularly swift and successful attacks which virtually eliminated
+the government’s presence except in the province capital, Qui Nhon,
+and a few district towns. In a coordinated offensive the Communists
+increased pressure throughout that portion of the Central Highlands
+west of Binh Dinh Province, thereby threatening to sever South Vietnam
+along an axis that extended roughly between Qui Nhon on the coast and
+Pleiku in the highlands. Meanwhile, another phase of the new initiative
+unfolded in III Corps where the government’s Hop Tac campaign was
+just getting underway. There the Communist offensive threatened to
+neutralize the government’s concentrated pacification campaign.
+
+Eroded by the political side-effects of the battlefield developments,
+South Vietnam’s fragile power structure became increasingly unstable.
+The last five months of 1964 brought frequent changes in the Saigon
+government although General Khanh was able to maintain a semblance of
+control until December. The turmoil then climaxed when Air Vice Marshal
+Nguyen Cao Ky, the commander of the Vietnamese Air Force, engineered a
+bloodless coup that forced Khanh from the Saigon political scene.
+
+The frequent changes of government coupled with the stepped-up Viet
+Cong military pressure throughout Vietnam produced a downward spiral
+in the effectiveness of the republic’s armed forces. By the end of the
+year it was becoming increasingly doubtful that the government could
+stave off total collapse even with the increased volume of military
+assistance it was already receiving from the United States. Against
+this backdrop of Communist military activities, unprecedented political
+instability on the part of the South Vietnamese, and mounting combat
+losses, American military involvement in Vietnam deepened.
+
+
+_A Restructured Military Assistance Command_
+
+In many respects 1964 was a year of transition for the U.S. Military
+Assistance Command, Vietnam. Not only did the command experience a
+change in leadership when General Westmoreland replaced General Harkins
+as ComUSMACV, but it was thoroughly reorganized in preparation for the
+more vigorous U.S. advisory program which was expected to begin about
+midyear.
+
+The major organizational change within MACV took place on 15 May when
+the MAAG was abolished and its staff integrated into that of the
+senior command. In June MACV itself was restructured under a new table
+of distribution. These changes reflected the anticipated influx of
+advisors and support personnel, and therefore concerned the Army more
+than the other U.S. armed services.
+
+Initially, the number of Marine billets on the restructured Military
+Assistance Command staff did not change substantially. Twenty-four
+Marines (15 officers and nine enlisted) were included in the new table
+of distribution. This represented a net increase of only one over the
+number previously assigned to the MAAG and MACV staffs. By the end of
+September, however, Marines temporarily assigned to the MACV staff from
+FMFPac commands brought the on-board strength to 37. Another increase
+occurred in the early fall when eight more permanent Marine billets
+(three officers and five enlisted) were approved.
+
+
+_Changes in Marine Leadership_
+
+Two key links in the Marine command chain that joined government policy
+decisions in Washington to Marine Corps operations in Vietnam changed
+hands during the first 60 days of 1964. On 1 January, General Wallace
+M. Greene, Jr., replaced General Shoup as Commandant of the Marine
+Corps. Greene, known in American military circles as a brilliant staff
+officer, had been serving since 1960 as Chief of Staff of the Marine
+Corps. By 1964 he had become an outspoken supporter of South Vietnam’s
+struggle for independence. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
+as a Chief of Service, his presence in administration policies would be
+felt until his tour as commandant ended on 31 January 1967.
+
+An equally important change occurred in early March when General
+Greene named Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak to replace General
+Roberts as Commanding General, FMFPac. A 1934 graduate of the U.S.
+Naval Academy, Krulak had won the Navy Cross during ground action in
+World War II. He arrived in the Pacific from Washington where he had
+served both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as special assistant for
+counterinsurgency matters. Having made numerous fact-finding trips to
+Vietnam in this capacity, he was intimately familiar with the unique
+political-military struggle being waged there. He also had a reputation
+of being one of Washington’s most vocal advocates of resisting
+Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. A dynamic leader and a man of
+strong convictions, Krulak was to exert a pervasive influence over all
+Marine operations in the Pacific for nearly half a decade.
+
+Less obvious but of immense importance to both the Marine Corps and
+to the future of U.S. military operations in Vietnam was a change
+instituted within MACV by General Westmoreland during the early part
+of the year. The command’s modified table of organization called for
+the establishment of a Deputy ComUSMACV billet to be filled by an Army
+general officer. The joint table of distribution for the reorganized
+command specified that an Army general would also fill the chief
+of staff billet--a position which had been held by General Weede
+since MACV’s creation in early 1962. Thus, when Weede’s assignment
+ended in May, Major General Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army, became
+Westmoreland’s chief of staff while Lieutenant General John L.
+Throckmorton, U.S. Army, became Deputy ComUSMACV.[10-D] The Marine
+Corps, however, did not lose its entire senior presence on the MACV
+staff. Brigadier General Carl A. Youngdale, an officer whose 30-year
+career included distinguished combat tours in both World War II and
+Korea, arrived 15 January for assignment as Assistant Chief of Staff,
+J-2 (Intelligence). His presence on the MACV staff would insure a
+Marine voice in U.S. military planning at the Saigon level. Still, many
+Marines saw their relative strength on Westmoreland’s staff seriously
+reduced--a change which seemed to mark somewhat of a turning point in
+the overall management of the military assistance effort.
+
+   [10-D] For his service as MACV chief of staff, General Weede was
+          awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.
+
+
+_Redesignation and Reorganization_
+
+The reorganization of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,
+had little initial effect on the Marine advisory program. With the
+dissolution of the MAAG, the old Naval Section, under which the Marine
+advisors had operated since 1955, was redesignated the Naval Advisory
+Group, MACV. Lieutenant Colonel Noren’s Marine Advisory Division,
+whose authorized strength remained at 11 officers and nine enlisted
+men through the first half of the year, was also renamed in mid-May.
+Known thereafter as the Marine Advisory Unit, Vietnam, the organization
+continued to function in much the same manner as it had under the
+previous arrangements.
+
+The last five months of the year, however, saw some substantial changes
+in the composition of the Marine Advisory Unit as the advisor build-up
+recently approved by the Secretary of Defense began. Colonel William P.
+Nesbit, a recent graduate of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode
+Island, relieved Colonel Noren (promoted from lieutenant colonel on
+1 July) as the Senior Marine Advisor on 4 September. Colonel Nesbit
+arrived in time to supervise the implementation of a new table of
+organization which added eight first lieutenants and a captain to the
+advisory unit in November.[10-E] The captain and one of the lieutenants
+were assigned as advisor and assistant advisor respectively to a new
+Vietnamese Marine infantry battalion which was in the process of
+being formed. Four other first lieutenants joined Colonel Nesbit’s
+command as assistant advisors to existing infantry battalions and one
+became the assistant artillery advisor. The two remaining lieutenants
+were assigned as advisors to the brigade’s motor transport and
+communications companies, replacing noncommissioned advisors. Two
+billets were downgraded in rank: the engineer advisor from captain to
+first lieutenant, and the artillery advisor from major to captain.
+
+   [10-E] A number of the Marines scheduled to fill the newly
+          created billets did not arrive until early 1965.
+
+In addition to phasing out three enlisted advisor billets, these
+changes relieved the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor of his artillery
+responsibilities. Colonel Earl E. Anderson, who had been serving since
+mid-1963 as the MAAG Chief of Staff, was instrumental in bringing
+about this particular modification. Under the old arrangement, the
+Senior Marine Advisor’s presence frequently had been required at
+the MAAG headquarters in Saigon while the Vietnamese Marine Brigade
+headquarters was deployed to combat. As the Assistant Senior Marine
+Advisor was likewise torn between two jobs, Anderson had directed that
+he be relieved of artillery advisory duties. Thus, Major Raymond C.
+Damm, an officer who had served as Assistant Naval Attache in Saigon
+between 1959 and 1961, became the first full-time Assistant Senior
+Marine Advisor after he joined Colonel Nesbit’s command in May. When
+the changes were finally completed, the restructured and redesignated
+Marine Advisory Unit included permanent billets for 24 officers and
+men (18 officers and six enlisted men).
+
+Another important aspect of the overall Marine advisory program was
+altered in the closing months of 1964. Since Lieutenant Colonel
+Croizat’s tour with the Vietnamese Marines in the immediate post-Geneva
+period, most Marine advisors had attended French language courses
+prior to departing for service in Vietnam. As French influence in
+Vietnam faded during the late 1950s, however, the requirement for
+the language had gradually diminished, particularly as French maps
+were replaced by American ones. By the early 1960s this situation had
+prompted several Marine advisors to recommend that instruction in
+French be replaced by Vietnamese language training. Primarily through
+the persistence of Colonels Moody and Noren, the policy was revised in
+1964. The arrival of the new advisors in the fall marked the first time
+that Marine officers had received formal Vietnamese language training
+before beginning their tours. Colonel Nesbit, who had the advantage of
+commanding advisors trained in both languages, saw the change as “a
+marked step forward,” in improving the advisory effort.[10-5]
+
+
+_The Vietnamese Marine Brigade_
+
+At the beginning of 1964, the 6,109-man Vietnamese Marine Brigade,
+commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, experienced a crisis
+of morale. The recent command changes that had occurred at almost
+every echelon and a soaring desertion rate combined to undermine
+the brigade’s combat readiness. In February the Khanh government
+recalled Colonel Le Nguyen Khang from the Philippines, promoted him to
+brigadier general, and reinstated him as commandant in an attempt to
+restore the unit’s spirit. A veteran Marine who had been instrumental
+in the development of the VNMC since its inception, Khang commanded
+confidence throughout the corps. Following his return, increased
+attention was given to the welfare of the individual Marine and his
+dependents in order to reduce the climbing desertion rate. Under the
+close supervision of the senior Vietnamese officers and their American
+advisors, the morale problem was gradually overcome.
+
+Throughout the year the Vietnamese Marine Brigade continued to share
+the role of South Vietnam’s general reserve force with an ARVN airborne
+brigade. Normally at least one Marine battalion was held in the
+vicinity of Saigon, ready to respond to tactical emergencies while
+others operated nearby in support of the Hop Tac campaign. Still, the
+brigade’s infantry battalions managed to see action in every corps
+tactical zone except I Corps, which was the farthest removed from
+the capital.[10-F] Although sometimes combined into regimental-sized
+task forces for specific operations, the individual Marine battalions
+normally were attached to either a corps, a province, or an ARVN
+division for combat operations. When so attached, the Vietnamese
+Marines often were assigned to clear particularly hazardous or
+difficult terrain. At times they served as a reserve force, responding
+to crucial situations to either recoup or exploit actions initiated by
+other government units.
+
+   [10-F] South Vietnam’s corps boundaries were adjusted again in
+          late 1964. The southern boundary of I Corps was moved
+          south to include Quang Ngai Province. The southern border
+          of II Corps was also moved southward to include eight
+          provinces formerly encompassed by III Corps. Under the
+          new arrangement, III CTZ formed a narrow strip across
+          the nation which centered roughly on Saigon. The Capital
+          Military District, the boundaries of which coincided with
+          those of Gia Dinh Province, formed an enclave within
+          III Corps. The southernmost tactical zone, IV Corps,
+          encompassed the entire Mekong Delta.
+
+In early January, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff assigned a Marine
+task force to a pacification mission in Go Cong and Long An Provinces,
+located just southeast of Saigon. Two VNMC battalions, controlled by
+a task force headquarters, moved into the operations area later in
+the month and remained until mid-September when the operation was
+terminated. The object of the Marine unit’s presence was to reestablish
+government control over the region through systematic small unit
+operations designed to deny the enemy his usual freedom of movement.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  CORPS TACTICAL ZONES
+  AT THE END OF 1964
+]
+
+Despite the length of this particular deployment, the Vietnamese
+Marines fought no major engagements. Furthermore, they had not
+translated their improved morale into an effective pacification
+operation. While desertions and unauthorized absences remained low
+considering the duration of this particular assignment, Colonel Noren
+later recalled several flaws in the campaign. These operations, he
+remarked “were characterized by inadequate coordination of military
+operations and intelligence reporting ... too little operational
+activity ... and a seeming lack of appreciation of the objectives of
+pacification.”[10-6] Colonel Nesbit, who became the Senior Marine
+Advisor as the operation entered its final stages, tended to confirm
+this assessment. “The capacity of the task force headquarters in staff
+functioning,” he reported, “was marginal.”[10-7]
+
+[Illustration: _General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the
+Marine Corps, inspects an honor guard of Vietnamese Marines. With him
+are Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant of the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps, and Major General Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff,
+Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. (Official USMC Photo)._]
+
+While the drive to pacify the Go Cong-Long An areas was in progress,
+other Vietnamese Marine task forces were organized to undertake
+different combat assignments elsewhere in the southern portion of
+Vietnam. One, composed of two battalions, an artillery detachment, and
+a headquarters element, launched a brief clearing operation northwest
+of Saigon in heavily populated Tay Ninh Province in January. A similar
+operation involving another task force was conducted the next month in
+the difficult mangrove swamps of An Xuyen Province at the southern tip
+of the nation. In both cases the government offensives enjoyed local
+success, but failed to reduce significantly the enemy’s capabilities
+and influence in the area.
+
+Midyear 1964 found the Vietnamese Marine commanders and their American
+advisors engaged in renewed efforts to restructure and expand the
+Vietnamese Marine Brigade. Accomplished for the most part in July, the
+salient feature of this latest reorganization was the creation of a new
+infantry battalion. With its nucleus garrisoned at a small base about
+12 miles northwest of Saigon, the newly organized 5th Battalion devoted
+the remainder of the year and the first six months of 1965 to forming
+and training its companies. It finally became combat ready in June
+1965.
+
+[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE BRIGADE) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JULY
+1964
+
+AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 6,555]
+
+Aside from the addition of the new infantry battalion, the mid-1964
+reorganization produced other noteworthy changes in the structure
+of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. In the artillery battalion, the two
+75mm pack howitzer batteries were combined into one battery of eight
+weapons, while the one 105mm howitzer battery was divided to form two
+new batteries of six howitzers each. The tables of equipment were
+revised to reflect these adjustments. Another significant change
+occurred in the area of training. The Training Company was deleted from
+the Amphibious Support Battalion and a separate recruit training center
+was created at Thu Duc near Saigon. Tactical planning and control was
+also improved when the Brigade Headquarters was reduced in size and two
+smaller Task Force Headquarters (Task Force A and Task Force B) were
+formed.
+
+Following the mid-1964 reorganization, the Vietnamese Marines performed
+combat missions not unlike those they had been assigned prior to
+July. One exception was that the brigade no longer found itself
+tasked with actual pacification phases of operations. Instead, the
+Marine battalions concentrated on clearing operations around Saigon
+in conjunction with the Hop Tac campaign. Additionally, the various
+battalions were called upon occasionally during this period to provide
+security for key government installations located in Saigon and Vung
+Tau--assignments which gave the infantry units much needed respites
+from field duty.
+
+By the end of the year the Vietnamese Marine Corps had been improved in
+several areas. In the motor transport field two new pieces of equipment
+were put into full-time operation--a high pressure steam cleaner and
+an M-108 wrecker. Progress also was made in upgrading the entire
+communications capability of the brigade when the table of equipment
+was revised in accordance with the modified table of organization. The
+new tables provided for modern test and repair equipment and eliminated
+obsolete and impractical items. Other unrealized improvements were
+still in their formative stages as the year closed. In the field of
+supply, for example, the brigade supply officer, with assistance
+from his American advisor, was drawing up plans which would give the
+Vietnamese Marines a more responsive and more manageable system.
+
+While the technically oriented programs were being developed and
+implemented, intensified training programs were preparing more
+and better trained Vietnamese Marines for their responsibilities.
+Established in July, the Marine Training Center at Thu Duc had
+graduated 1,464 recruits before the end of the year. These recruits,
+moreover, were trained by Vietnamese noncommissioned officers who had
+recently completed the drill instructor course at Marine Corps Recruit
+Depot, San Diego. For the first time since its inception, the VNMC was
+benefiting from a flow of recruits trained by Vietnamese Marines at a
+separate Marine training facility.
+
+Other programs likewise were helping prepare Vietnamese officers
+and noncommissioned officers to command and manage their growing
+service. A total of 718 officers and noncommissioned officers attended
+various training courses in South Vietnam during the year while 42
+more officers attended formal schools in the United States during the
+same period. Another 52 small unit leaders participated in on-the-job
+training programs with U.S. Marine units on Okinawa between January and
+December.[10-8]
+
+Unfortunately, these developments were overshadowed by a military
+disaster which befell the 4th VNMC Battalion on the last day of the
+year. The Marine unit had been serving since early December as the
+reserve force for III Corps Tactical Zone. On the 27th an estimated
+Viet Cong battalion overran the small pro-government town of Binh
+Gia located in Phuoc Thy Province roughly 35 miles east of Saigon.
+III Corps officials reacted by dispatching the 4th Battalion and an
+ARVN Ranger battalion to the area. The 4th Battalion, accompanied by
+two U.S. Marine advisors and three OJT observers from the 3d Marine
+Division, was ordered to recapture the town. It proceeded to do so on
+the 30th, encountering no enemy opposition. Later in the day, while the
+Marines were developing defensive positions around the town, a spotter
+aircraft sighted a large Viet Cong force approximately two miles to the
+west and called for air strikes. A U.S. Army helicopter gunship was
+shot down and its crew killed while attacking the target.
+
+Against the advice of his senior U.S. Marine Advisor, Captain Franklin
+P. Eller, the 4th Battalion commander ordered one of his companies
+to secure the crash site and recover the bodies of the dead crewmen.
+Accompanied by Eller, First Lieutenant James P. Kelliher, and Staff
+Sergeant Clifford J. Beaver, two of the 3d Division OJTs, the company
+moved west from Binh Gia on the morning of the 31st to carry out the
+mission. After reaching the crash site, the Marine unit was ambushed
+by a large Viet Cong force using 82mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles,
+and .50 caliber machine guns. Unable to maneuver because of the intense
+fire, the company radioed for assistance and began withdrawing from the
+ambush site in small groups.
+
+[Illustration: _Marine Captain Franklin P. Eller, advisor to the 4th
+Vietnamese Marine Battalion, coordinates with other American-advised
+units operating nearby. (USMC Photo A183570)._]
+
+The battalion commander, accompanied by the assistant Marine advisor,
+First Lieutenant Philip O. Brady and the other OJTs, responded to the
+call for assistance by leading the remaining three companies from
+their positions at Binh Gia. Just outside the town they met Captain
+Eller, who had been wounded in the face, along with Lieutenant Kelliher
+and the remnants of the hard-hit company. Eller and the survivors of
+the morning ambush returned to Binh Gia while the remainder of the
+battalion pushed westward in an attempt to locate the enemy force.
+Later in the morning, the Marine column was surprised while moving
+through an abandoned rubber plantation by a Communist force of between
+1,200 and 1,800 men.
+
+No artillery was available to support the beleaguered battalion.
+Vietnamese Air Force A-1 Skyraiders, however, were able to deliver
+close air strikes for about 45 minutes. U.S. Army helicopter gunships
+replaced the Skyraiders on station, but their rocket and machine gun
+fire proved too light to dislodge the enemy from his positions under
+the dense vegetation. By late afternoon, 29 of the 4th Battalion’s 35
+officers, including the battalion commander, were dead. In desperation,
+the Americans organized the surviving Vietnamese Marines into small
+groups some of which managed to slip past the Viet Cong and find their
+way back to Binh Gia.
+
+The Vietnamese Marines had suffered their most decisive defeat of the
+war. Their losses were extremely high: 112 killed, 71 wounded, and
+13 missing out of a 326-man battalion. Equipment losses included 142
+weapons and over a dozen radios. Additionally, all four of the U.S.
+Marines who had participated in the disastrous action had been wounded.
+Both Captain Eller and Lieutenant Brady were later awarded the Silver
+Star Medal for their roles in the battle.[10-G] Captain Donald G. Cook,
+one of the OJT observers from the 3d Marine Division, was missing in
+action at the close of the battle.[10-H]
+
+   [10-G] Personal decorations for heroism were awarded more
+          frequently to Marine advisors through 1964. Earlier
+          in the year (16 February), a Marine captain, Donald
+          E. Koelper, an advisor to the 4th Vietnamese Marine
+          Battalion earned a Navy Cross, the nation’s second
+          highest award for heroism. Koelper was decorated for
+          warning the occupants of a crowded American theater in
+          Saigon to take cover just prior to the detonation of a
+          Viet Cong terrorist bomb. The Marine was killed by a Viet
+          Cong satchel charge. But his sacrifice limited the number
+          of casualties to three killed and 51 wounded.
+
+   [10-H] It was later learned that Captain Cook had been wounded
+          and captured by the Viet Cong. Cook reportedly died in
+          captivity in 1967.
+
+The ranger battalion operating nearby suffered a similar fate,
+incurring nearly 400 casualties in another violent ambush. Thus, within
+a 24-hour period two elite government battalions had been shattered.
+Only later was it learned that the Marines and rangers had clashed with
+two main force regiments of the _9th Viet Cong Division_--the first
+Communist division to become operational in South Vietnam.
+
+As a result of the disastrous engagement at Binh Gia, the 4th
+Vietnamese Marine Battalion was rendered ineffective as a fighting
+force for a period of three months. This loss created two immediate
+problems for General Khang and his American advisors. It reduced the
+brigade’s available infantry strength by approximately 25 percent and
+placed an added burden on the recruit training center which was already
+laboring to provide enough new troops to fill the 5th Battalion. For
+the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1964 ended on a discouraging note.
+
+[Illustration: _Marine Captain Donald E. Koelper, advisor to the 4th
+Vietnamese Marine Battalion, was posthumously awarded the first Navy
+Cross for action in Vietnam. (USMC Photo A411741)._]
+
+
+_Additional Marine Activities_
+
+U.S. Marine participation in the Vietnam War during 1964 was not
+limited to the activities of the advisory division and the helicopter
+task element. Various other Marine units and detachments made
+significant, although less publicized, contributions to the war effort
+throughout the year. One of these was the Marine security detachment
+which continued to protect the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. Twice during
+the year the growing political unrest and the increasing threat of
+Communist terrorist attacks prompted the expansion of the security
+detachment, first in April and again in October. By the end of the year
+the detachment’s strength stood at 30 Marines--a figure which made it
+the second largest such unit in the world. Only the Marine detachment
+in Paris, with 37 officers and men, was larger. And nowhere was an
+embassy guard assignment more dangerous than in Vietnam where terrorist
+attacks were apt to occur at anytime.
+
+Other groups of Marines performed an assortment of missions in
+support of the Government of Vietnam during the course of the year.
+The Detachment, 1st Composite Radio Company, for example, continued
+its duties at the U.S. Army Communications installation in Pleiku.
+A handful of these Marines also served at a newly opened U.S. Army
+communications station at Phu Bai some eight miles southeast of Hue.
+The strength of the Detachment, 1st Composite Radio Company, however,
+was reduced from 42 officers and men to only 16 by the end of December.
+
+The spring of 1964 saw a new, substantially larger Marine
+communications detachment introduced into the northern provinces of
+South Vietnam. Unlike its predecessors at Pleiku and Phu Bai, this unit
+was composed exclusively of Marines and included an infantry element
+for security purposes. Designated the Signal Engineering Survey Unit,
+the radio detachment consisted of three officers and 27 enlisted men
+drawn from the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac, and from Headquarters Marine
+Corps. This element, commanded by Major Alfred M. Gray, Jr. arrived
+at Da Nang on 20 May along with a 76-man infantry detachment from
+Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. The infantry element, reinforced
+with an 81mm mortar section (two mortars), was commanded by First
+Lieutenant Raymond J. Otlowski. Major Gray assumed overall command of
+the composite force which was designated Marine Detachment, Advisory
+Team One. Advisory Team One became the first actual Marine ground unit
+to conduct independent operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
+
+U.S. Air Force C-123 transports airlifted the bulk of the newly formed
+unit to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp at Khe Sanh
+in northwestern Quang Tri Province in the closing days of May. Two
+officers and five enlisted communicators remained behind at Da Nang
+and a four-man team positioned itself in the U.S. Army compound at Phu
+Bai to provide radio support for the main body. At Khe Sanh, Advisory
+Team One initially concentrated on building a solid supply base prior
+to undertaking actual communications operations. ARVN truck convoys
+brought the preponderance of its supplies from Quang Tri over Route 9,
+the old colonial road that snaked through the Annamite Mountains into
+Laos. While Major Gray and his men proceeded with this task, Marine
+UH-34Ds from Da Nang helilifted an ARVN infantry company onto Tiger
+Tooth Mountain (Dong Voi Mep), a jungle-covered mountain located eight
+miles north of the CIDG Camp. With an elevation of 5,500 feet, Tiger
+Tooth Mountain is the highest terrain feature in northern I Corps. On
+13 June U.S. Army UH-1B helicopters lifted Major Gray, nine enlisted
+men, and several thousand pounds of equipment into a tiny landing
+zone which the South Vietnamese troops had hacked out near the top of
+the rugged mountain. The ARVN soldiers, who had established a rough
+perimeter around a peak slightly below the mountain’s highest point,
+were on hand to greet the small group of Americans. After the initial
+helilift, however, bad weather in the form of dense clouds intervened
+to delay the remainder of the movement for an entire week. SHUFLY
+helicopters finally completed the mission on 21 June. When the helilift
+concluded 73 Marines and roughly 100 Vietnamese troops were strung
+around and across a 5,000-foot peak just south of Tiger Tooth’s highest
+elevation. Another 81 Leathernecks remained at Khe Sanh to provide a
+pool from which fresh security forces and radiomen could be drawn when
+needed.
+
+MACV orders explicitly prohibited the Marines on Tiger Tooth Mountain
+from patrolling or engaging in any other activity which could have been
+construed as offensive in nature. As a result of this restriction,
+Major Gray’s men were confined to defensive positions around the crude
+little landing zone and the tents which housed the radio equipment.
+Even so, life on the mountain was extremely rigorous. The clouds
+which frequently enshrouded the mountain top left the Marines, their
+clothing, weapons, and equipment constantly damp. High winds heightened
+their discomfort. The local weather conditions also made food and water
+deliveries to the position hazardous and irregular. Marine UH-34Ds
+prepositioned at Khe Sanh brought C rations and water cans whenever the
+clouds revealed Tiger Tooth’s higher elevations. Often, however, the
+weather did not break for days. Normally the men were limited to two
+canteens of water daily--a restriction which made bathing and shaving
+impossible. Because of the harsh living conditions on the mountain,
+fresh security forces and radio men were rotated from Khe Sanh at two
+week intervals, weather permitting.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  MARINE DETACHMENT
+  ADVISORY TEAM ONE
+  OPERATIONS IN I CTZ
+
+  MAY-AUGUST 1964
+]
+
+Advisory Team One operated in the extreme northwestern corner of the
+republic without incident until the second week of July. Then a severe
+storm struck its mountaintop base, blowing away tents and antennae,
+collapsing fighting positions, and generally disrupting operations.
+Several nights later, on the 17th, a Viet Cong force of undetermined
+size probed the Marine sector of the perimeter. An intense exchange
+of small arms and automatic weapons fire ensued for nearly two hours.
+Although the Marines suffered no casualties and could find no dead or
+wounded Viet Cong the next day, it was apparent that their location had
+been compromised.
+
+Amid reports of increasing Communist activity throughout the area, MACV
+authorities in Saigon promptly ordered Major Gray to withdraw his force
+from Tiger Tooth Mountain. Fortunately good weather permitted Marine
+helicopters from Da Nang to helilift the men and their equipment from
+the mountain to Khe Sanh the day after the firefight. On the 22d, Air
+Force C-123 transports airlifted the entire Marine detachment to Da
+Nang. There Gray and his Marines crowded into the old French compound
+occupied by the helicopter task element. Although cramped, the SHUFLY
+facilities provided welcome relief for the men who had endured the
+rigors of Tiger Tooth Mountain and Khe Sanh for nearly two months.
+
+While at Da Nang, Major Gray detached a small group of radiomen to
+Monkey Mountain, a rocky, jungle-covered peninsula that jutted into the
+South China Sea just northeast of the city. There in relative comfort
+and safety, the technicians conducted equipment tests for two weeks.
+Several changes in the leadership and composition of the advisory
+team took place during this interval. Captain Raymond A. Becker, a
+communications officer from the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac, relieved
+Major Gray as the commander of the unit on 13 August. Soon thereafter
+a reinforced infantry company, Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines,
+commanded by Captain William R. Irwin, replaced Lieutenant Otlowski and
+the Company G Marines as the advisory team’s security element.
+
+Under Captain Becker’s command, Advisory Team One redeployed, this
+time to Dong Bach Ma, a 3,500-foot mountain located roughly 25 miles
+west-northwest of Da Nang. An abandoned French resort, still untouched
+by the war, sprawled across the higher elevations of Bach Ma and a hard
+surface road curved up its steep northern face from Route 1. Using this
+road ARVN trucks moved Captain Irwin and the infantry element to the
+newly selected site in advance of the radio personnel. Once atop the
+mountain, Irwin had his men establish a perimeter around an abandoned
+monastery. This accomplished, Marines cleared a small helicopter
+landing zone near the old but well-preserved religious building
+which was to serve as their base of operations. On 19 August Marine
+helicopters lifted Captain Becker, his communicators, and some 4,000
+pounds of equipment to the site from Da Nang.
+
+Advisory Team One, relying heavily on Marine helicopters for logistical
+support, operated without incident from the quaint old monastery
+until the second week of September. The composite unit completed its
+operations at Bach Ma on the 10th whereupon it returned to Da Nang.
+Within days the detachment was disbanded without fanfare. The radio
+experts returned to their parent commands in Hawaii and Washington
+while Company K was airlifted to Okinawa where it rejoined the 3d
+Battalion, 3d Marines. The quiet dissolution of the Marine Detachment,
+Advisory Team One, ended the first brief and little publicized chapter
+of Marine ground unit operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
+
+In October an element of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 3d Marine
+Division, operating from ships of the Seventh Fleet, conducted an
+extensive survey of Cam Ranh Bay in southern II Corps. The purpose
+of its survey was to determine the feasibility of establishing a
+naval facility. Marine counterintelligence teams from FMFPac also
+were temporarily assigned to MACV for 30-day periods throughout the
+year. These officers and noncommissioned officers normally augmented
+the U.S. Army 704th Counterintelligence Unit during their stay in
+Vietnam. Another group of Marines to employ their skills in the
+counterinsurgency environment was a small Special Operations Group of
+six officers and 21 enlisted men. These Marines conducted operations
+under the auspices of MACV.
+
+A more permanent influx of Marines into the war-torn republic occurred
+in the last quarter of the year. In response to the intensified
+advisory effort ordered by Secretary McNamara in July, General Greene,
+the new Marine Commandant, assured the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
+Staff that the Marines could be expected to carry their share of the
+increased burden. Shortly thereafter, the Marine Corps was directed to
+provide 60 officers and noncommissioned officers to serve as advisors
+with ARVN units in I Corps Tactical Zone. These orders, later described
+by Major Damm, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor to the VNMC as
+“very short fused ones,” were executed without delay.[10-9] The 3d
+Marine Division was given short notice to select suitable personnel
+and to transfer them immediately to ComUSMACV. In response to these
+instructions, the Okinawa-based command quickly formed four advisory
+teams, each composed of four men--a captain, a first lieutenant, a
+gunnery sergeant, and a corporal (who was to serve as the team’s radio
+operator). Accompanied by Major John W. Walker, the first increment of
+Marine advisors was airlifted to Da Nang by KC-130 in mid-September.
+
+Upon reporting to the I Corps Senior U.S. Advisor, Colonel Howard B.
+St. Clair, U.S. Army, the four teams were broken up, the Marines being
+assigned individually to battalions of the 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions.
+Major Walker joined the I Corps advisory staff in Da Nang as assistant
+operations officer. The balance of the 60 new Marine advisors were
+formed into teams on Okinawa and airlifted to Da Nang in the ensuing
+weeks. By December the advisors, who had initially been drawn from
+the 3d Marine Division, were being replaced gradually by officers and
+noncommissioned officers just beginning their normal 12-month overseas
+tours.
+
+Two additional permanent Marine advisor billets were also approved
+in the closing weeks of 1964. These were created within the Naval
+Advisory Group to assist the Vietnamese Navy in controlling one of
+South Vietnam’s most troublesome areas--the Rung Sat Special Zone
+(RSSZ). Located southeast of Saigon on both sides of the Long Tao
+River, the main ship channel to the capital, the Rung Sat was a vast,
+difficult-to-penetrate, mangrove swamp. Due largely to its relative
+inaccessibility, the area had been developed by the Viet Cong into a
+key base for supporting their operations in the surrounding provinces.
+More significantly, by early 1964 the Communist-held Rung Sat posed a
+serious threat to commercial ships bound for Saigon. For this reason
+the responsibility for pacifying the area was turned over to the
+Vietnamese Navy in April.
+
+Initially one Marine major, Edward J. Bronars, was assigned to assist
+and advise the Vietnamese Navy in its attempts to secure the Rung
+Sat. In November, however, the RSSZ advisory staff was reorganized to
+include one Marine captain and one sergeant. Although they did not
+arrive for duty until early the following year, the newly approved
+billets created the third distinct group of Marine ground advisors
+assigned to the Republic of Vietnam.[10-10]
+
+The OJT program continued in effect for junior Marine officers and
+staff noncommissioned officers throughout 1964. Near the end of
+the year the program was broadened somewhat to include members of
+Hawaii-based Marine commands. Each month 10 Leathernecks arrived at
+Da Nang to begin their 30-day assignments. At SHUFLY headquarters the
+visitors were briefed as a group before being attached individually
+to specific South Vietnamese units for the duration of their stay in
+Vietnam. Normally, the officers and staff noncommissioned officers
+joined a unit already being advised by a U.S. Marine. When possible,
+the OJT was assigned to a unit which could benefit from his particular
+military and technical skills. Still, the on-the-job-trainee was not
+always considered an asset. “In honesty,” one permanent advisor to the
+Vietnamese Marine Corps conceded, “OJTs were a mixed blessing--they
+provided some help but they also were an added responsibility for the
+VNMC commander who was charged with their safety.” “Some OJTs,” he
+added, “received misperceptions of the capability of the Viet Cong
+since their knowledge/experience was limited to the events occurring
+during their brief 30-day tour.”[10-11] Nevertheless, a significant
+number of Marine small unit leaders were able to gain some degree
+of first-hand experience in counter guerrilla warfare under the
+provisions on the OJT program.[10-I]
+
+   [10-I] The 3d Marine Division’s OJT program did not end until
+          after elements of the division landed at Da Nang in March
+          1965. The Marine Advisory Unit experimented successfully
+          with another form of augmentation in the first days of
+          1965. When the Vietnamese Marines deployed to the Binh
+          Gia area with a provisional brigade in early January,
+          Colonel Nesbit, who was still serving as Senior Marine
+          Advisor, requested additional personnel to assist
+          and advise at the staff level. FMFPac responded by
+          temporarily detaching eight officers and 11 enlisted men
+          to the advisory division. MACV provided two more Marine
+          officers and seven additional enlisted men, all of whom
+          remained attached to the Marine Advisory Unit for the
+          duration of the operation. The temporarily assigned
+          Marines returned to their parent organizations when the
+          operation terminated. This is covered in more detail in
+          the 1965 account of U.S. Marine activities in Vietnam.
+
+A similar but shorter term program for field grade officers and
+colonels, the Job Related Orientation (JRO) Program, also took hold
+during the early months of 1964. Instituted in the last half of the
+previous year, the JRO program provided for a small number of staff
+officers from the various FMFPac commands to visit U.S. Headquarters
+in Vietnam and Thailand for an eight-day period. Small groups of these
+officers arrived at Da Nang from Okinawa and, like the OJTs, were
+briefed by the helicopter task element commander and his staff. Later
+they were afforded an orientation flight over the northern provinces.
+Next, the visiting officers were flown to Saigon where they received
+more briefings at MACV headquarters. In the capital, where they were
+hosted by the Senior Marine Advisor, they visited Vietnamese Marine
+units and discussed tactics and problem areas with the advisors.
+After four days in the Republic of Vietnam the Marines travelled on
+to Bangkok where they spent the balance of their visit. Upon the
+conclusion of these JRO trips, each officer was required to submit a
+detailed written report to the Commanding General, FMFPac. In turn,
+extracts of these reports were forwarded to the Commandant of the
+Marine Corps in Washington.
+
+Generally these reports addressed tactical, operational, logistics,
+and intelligence matters. But a number of the Marine officers used
+the reporting system to articulate their opinions relative to the
+overall direction of the war. Colonel Warren P. Baker, a member of the
+3d Marine Division staff who visited Vietnam in March, pointed out
+that field advisors and MACV staff members differed sharply in their
+personal assessments of progress being made. The field advisors, Baker
+observed, demonstrated far less optimism than did the staff members.
+Furthermore, he reported that unless the people of South Vietnam
+could be won over to the government, the Viet Cong’s success could be
+expected to continue.[10-12] Another officer, Lieutenant Colonel Harry
+E. Dickinson, summarized his conclusions with an even more emphatic
+warning:
+
+    The commitment of sizeable U.S. combat units should not be effected
+    except to protect the seat of government. While local success might
+    be achieved in certain areas, it is extremely doubtful whether any
+    lasting degree of success would entail in the northern and western
+    sections. As combat units were increased, the forces of Vietnam
+    would do less and less with the inevitable conflict of overall
+    command. The end result would be the ringing of the country with
+    combat units but no solution for the internal conflict. I strongly
+    disagree that any two or three divisions could achieve real victory
+    as has been stated in the press.[10-13]
+
+Through candid reporting of this nature, Marine commanders from Okinawa
+to Washington were kept abreast of the complex and difficult problems
+being generated by the war in Southeast Asia.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 11
+
+Spring and Summer Fighting
+
+_The Monsoons--The Weather Breaks--Sure Wind 202--Operations Elsewhere
+in I Corps--Changing the Watch_
+
+
+Commanded by Colonel Andre D. Gomez, the strength of the Marine task
+element at Da Nang stood at 450 officers and men as 1964 opened.
+Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ HMM-361 continued its assignment as the task
+element’s helicopter squadron while Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy’s
+204-man MABS-16 sub unit retained responsibility for maintaining and
+operating the support facilities.
+
+Shortly after New Year’s Day, ComUSMACV advised Colonel Gomez that
+the entire Marine task element would be withdrawn from the Republic
+of Vietnam during the first half of 1964. This decision was one of
+CinCPac’s continuing responses to the Defense Department plans for
+reducing the level of direct American military involvement in Vietnam.
+Additionally, Gomez was informed that the task element would be called
+upon to initiate a training program designed to prepare Vietnamese Air
+Force pilots and mechanics to operate and maintain the UH-34Ds. This
+program was scheduled to culminate with the takeover of the 24 Marine
+helicopters by a new VNAF squadron on 30 June, and the subsequent
+departure of the entire task element for Okinawa where it would rejoin
+MAG-16, its parent organization.[11-1]
+
+
+_The Monsoons_
+
+The new year broke with Marine flight operations at Da Nang still
+proceeding at a reduced rate due to the heavy monsoon weather. As had
+been the case at the close of 1963, medical evacuation and resupply
+missions continued to constitute the major source of work for HMM-361’s
+crews. The first Marine helicopter loss during 1964 occurred during
+one such mission on 3 January when an aircraft was shot down while
+attempting to perform a medical evacuation about 30 miles due west
+of Da Nang. Hit at least six times on its descent toward the landing
+zone, the UH-34D crashed into the jungle. Its crew miraculously escaped
+injury and was rescued by another Marine helicopter. The aircraft,
+damaged beyond repair, was intentionally destroyed by U.S. Special
+Forces personnel. This was only the second Marine helicopter loss
+definitely attributed to Communist fire since SHUFLY’s arrival at Soc
+Trang nearly two years earlier.
+
+In the second week of January the weather over the mountains west to
+Da Nang broke long enough for Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ squadron to
+accomplish a critical trooplift. On short notice the Marines were
+ordered to remove a 200-man CIDG force from the hills about 30 miles
+west-southwest of Da Nang. Accompanied by a U.S. Army advisor, the
+South Vietnamese unit had been conducting a reconnaissance in force
+about eight miles west of its camp at An Diem.[11-A] Under cover of the
+monsoon clouds, which limited effective U.S. or VNAF air support, Viet
+Cong elements of undetermined strength had closed in on the government
+force, threatening to isolate and destroy it before the weather lifted.
+
+   [11-A] See map of outposts in I CTZ, page 81.
+
+The immediate nature of this particular mission left little time for
+detailed planning and briefing. I Corps headquarters could only advise
+the Marines of such vital information as the unit’s radio call sign,
+radio frequency, size, and location. To familiarize himself with
+the terrain in the vicinity of the pickup site, Lieutenant Colonel
+Ross first made a reconnaissance flight to the area in an O-1B. His
+reconnaissance revealed the landing zone to be “a precarious hill top
+knob exposed to a 360° field of fire,” Ross later recalled.[11-2]
+
+The reconnaissance accomplished, the squadron commander returned to
+Da Nang, exchanged the O-1B for a UH-34D, and led a flight of 14
+helicopters to the pickup point. In accordance with the squadron’s
+standing operating procedure, Ross, the flight leader, was to land
+first, drop off a loadmaster, and lift out the first Vietnamese
+heliteam. Upon approaching the hilltop, however, the lead helicopter
+was forced away by heavy small arms fire which punctured the aft
+section of the aircraft’s fuselage, wounding the loadmaster.
+
+The second aircraft, following at close interval, was also hit.
+Lieutenant Colonel Ross then ordered the entire formation into a
+holding pattern out of small arms range while he attempted to persuade
+the American advisor to move the Vietnamese unit overland a short
+distance to a less exposed landing zone beside a stream. This the U.S.
+advisor was reluctant to do. “I was convinced,” Ross concluded, “that
+his real concern was the shattered morale of his ARVN troops and doubts
+about being able to get them moving to the alternate site.”[11-3] After
+some delay the Vietnamese unit finally moved to the new landing zone,
+whereupon the Marines completed the troop lift. Still, the helicopters
+were exposed to unnecessary risks.
+
+Understandably concerned with problems of this nature which tended to
+plague all but the larger preplanned operations, Lieutenant Colonel
+Ross questioned the “ability of the advisors to make operational
+decisions based upon considerations beyond their own tactical
+problems.”[11-4] In this particular case the selection of the exposed
+hilltop landing zone tended to substantiate the Marine commander’s
+complaints.
+
+[Illustration: _Loadmaster directs a helicopter into a recently cleared
+landing zone. (USMC Photo A329576)._]
+
+During the second week of January, General Greene, the newly appointed
+Commandant of the Marine Corps, visited the Marine installation at Da
+Nang. The Commandant conducted an inspection of the compound and was
+briefed on operations by Colonel Gomez and his staff. After presenting
+combat decorations to several members of the task element, Greene
+departed for Hawaii where he was to visit the FMFPac headquarters.
+
+The Commandant summed up his impressions of the Marine helicopter task
+element in testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services
+several weeks after his return to Washington. “I was assured by
+General Harkins and his officers--and by the officers of the supported
+Vietnamese units--that this squadron has performed its supporting
+mission in an outstanding manner,” related Greene. “Everything that
+I observed,” he added, “certainly attested to the high morale and
+effectiveness of this unit.”[11-5][11-A]
+
+   [11-A] A more frequent visitor to the Marine helicopter task
+          element was Colonel Anderson, the MAAG Chief of Staff.
+          An experienced aviator, Colonel Anderson had commanded a
+          Marine bomber squadron (VMB-443) in the latter stages of
+          World War II. While serving as the MAAG Chief of Staff
+          during 1963 and 1964, Anderson participated in a number
+          of combat missions as a pilot with the various squadrons
+          assigned to SHUFLY.
+
+Late January and early February saw the normal rotation of several of
+the task element’s key personnel as well as its helicopter squadron.
+On 14 January, Colonel Robert A. Merchant, an officer with a diverse
+military background, assumed command of SHUFLY. Merchant had commanded
+an artillery battalion on Okinawa in World War II, a Marine attack
+squadron in Korea, and had served on the joint staff of the Specified
+Commander for the Middle East in Beirut during the 1958 Lebanon
+Operation. More recently he had graduated from the Industrial College
+of the Armed Forces. Having flown with the task element’s squadron
+while on temporary duty in Vietnam the previous October and since
+his arrival in early January, Merchant was thoroughly familiar with
+SHUFLY’s operations.
+
+Command of the MABS-16 sub unit changed hands two weeks later when
+Lieutenant Colonel Samuel G. Beal relieved Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy.
+Beal, also a veteran of World War II and Korea, came from the 4th
+Marines in Hawaii where he had served as that unit’s air liaison
+officer.
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ HMM-361 ended its tour at Da Nang on 1
+February. The squadron’s arrival in I Corps unfortunately had coincided
+with the arrival of the early monsoon rains. The unit’s flight
+statistics had suffered also from the interruption caused by the
+political infighting which had deposed President Diem. As a result, its
+operations never reached the sustained tempo which had characterized
+the records of the Marine helicopter squadrons previously assigned to
+SHUFLY. Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ UH-34Ds totalled 4,236 combat flight
+hours and just under 7,000 combat sorties--figures which, considering
+the conditions surrounding their accumulation, compared favorably with
+the number of combat flight hours (7,249) and sorties (11,900) averaged
+by the four previous UH-34D squadrons to serve in Vietnam.[11-6]
+
+HMM-364, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John H. La Voy, a pilot who
+had flown his first combat helicopter missions during the Korean War,
+initiated support operations from Da Nang on 1 February. Under the
+existing plans to deactivate the Marine task element, La Voy’s squadron
+was scheduled to be the last Marine helicopter unit to operate in
+South Vietnam. As such, HMM-364’s pilots and maintenance crews were to
+launch the training program that would prepare the Vietnamese Air Force
+personnel to take over the Marine helicopters upon the task element’s
+departure from Da Nang.
+
+On 4 February the first class of eight Vietnamese pilots began a
+50-hour package of flight instruction under the supervision of
+Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s pilots. Included in the course of
+instruction were operational missions, night and instrument flying,
+formation work, and landing practice. Each student was already a
+qualified copilot with at least 25 flight hours in VNAF UH-34s--a
+factor which allowed the training to be conducted concurrently with
+normal operations. This was accomplished by having the Vietnamese
+trainees fly as copilots with a Marine pilot on operational flights.
+In addition to being an effective training method this system had two
+other advantages. First, it enabled the Vietnamese students to acquire
+a first-hand knowledge of the helicopter tactics most commonly used
+in the northern provinces. Secondly, it allowed Lieutenant Colonel
+La Voy’s squadron to concentrate on its primary mission of providing
+combat support for the ground forces in I Corps.
+
+Another vital aspect of the training program involved preparing
+Vietnamese ground personnel to keep the squadron operational. This
+demanded extensive training of mechanics, crew chiefs, engineering,
+supply, operations, and ordnance personnel. “This additional duty,”
+Lieutenant Colonel La Voy explained, “was a tremendous burden on all
+departments of my squadron, whose primary job was to keep aircraft in
+commission and to conduct combat operations.” The language barrier
+understandably threatened the success of the overall training effort.
+In La Voy’s opinion, however, “the eagerness of the students to learn
+and the wealth of practical experience and varied demonstrations”
+combined to help reduce problems imposed by the language
+difference.[11-7]
+
+The progress of the program proved the concepts sound. The first small
+group of student pilots was graduated on 9 March despite numerous
+flight cancellations due to bad weather during the training period.
+Subsequent classes of VNAF pilots continued to train with the Marine
+helicopter task element throughout 1964. Eventually, a more advanced
+training program would have the Vietnamese pilots flying sections
+of two and four helicopters as integral elements of larger Marine
+helicopter operations.
+
+Although heavy monsoon clouds lingered over I Corps throughout most of
+the month of March, brief periods of good weather sometimes allowed
+heliborne incursions into the mountainous areas. One such period
+began on the 5th and lasted long enough for Marine, Army, and VNAF
+helicopters to lift a 54-man ARVN patrol from An Diem to a landing
+zone near the Laotian border. During the operation one escorting
+U.S. Army UH-1B gunship accidentally struck a tree and was forced
+to land in a nearby jungle clearing. Two Marine helicopters quickly
+rescued the crew and weapons of the downed UH-1B, but drew automatic
+weapons fire in the process. That afternoon 15 Marine helicopters and
+two armed UH-1Bs returned to the crash site with 64 ARVN troops who
+established a perimeter around the damaged helicopter after being
+landed. A maintenance team then landed and repaired the aircraft which
+subsequently was flown back to Da Nang.
+
+Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s crews undertook to correct several problems
+which they identified during these initial combat operations. One
+was the need for machine gun fire to protect the port (left) side
+of the transport helicopters as they approached contested landing
+zones. To fill this requirement the squadron’s metalsmiths designed
+and fabricated a flexible mount for an additional M-60 machine gun.
+This new mount was designed to allow the machine gun to be swung out
+a portside window from the cabin. Placed on each of HMM-364’s 24
+helicopters, this modification ultimately added a gunner to each crew
+and enabled the Marines to deliver fire to either or both sides of the
+aircraft during the critical landing phase of helilifts.[11-8]
+
+La Voy personally instituted another change which made the coordination
+of trooplifts more effective. Prior to HMM-364’s arrival in Vietnam,
+different Marines had served as loadmasters for each heliborne
+operation. While this system of rotating the loadmaster assignment had
+stood the test of numerous operations since its inception in late 1962,
+La Voy believed that it could be improved. Accordingly, he assigned
+one pilot and two crew chiefs permanent additional responsibilities
+as loadmasters. Thereafter, this three-man team was responsible for
+coordinating loading and unloading activities at pickup points and
+landing zones for all troop lifts. Thus, through a relatively minor
+adjustment, the Marines helped insure the closer coordination of their
+helicopter operations with ARVN ground forces.[11-9]
+
+In early March hostile incidents around the Da Nang air base increased
+dramatically. The incidents usually took the form of sniper fire from
+the village situated just across the perimeter fence from the living
+compound. The primary target of the enemy snipers seemed to be the
+task element’s electrical generators whose high noise level prevented
+sentries from determining the firing position. Tensions heightened on
+the night of the 15th when a terrorist hurled a gasoline-filled bottle
+into the doorway of the staff noncommissioned officers quarters. The
+crude bomb fortunately failed to ignite. Several days later, however,
+a Marine in the compound was wounded by sniper fire from beyond the
+perimeter wire.
+
+These latest incidents led Colonel Merchant to request that the
+security platoon from the 3d Marine Division be redeployed to help
+protect the base camp and flight line. This request was approved by
+ComUSMACV and CGFMFPac without delay. On 24 March a 53-man platoon from
+the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines arrived at Da Nang on a Marine KC-130
+and assumed responsibility for security around the Marine compound and
+flight line. Attached to the MABS-16 sub unit, the infantry platoon
+freed Colonel Merchant’s aviation personnel to devote full time to
+their primary mission--providing helicopter support to I Corps. Like
+its predecessor which had been withdrawn only three months earlier, the
+new infantry unit would assist with rescue operations in insecure areas
+and on occasion would be called upon to provide security around TAFDS
+bladders during helicopter operations in more remote areas.
+
+[Illustration: _South Vietnamese troops unload ammunition from a
+UH-34D while a Marine loadmaster, braced against wheel and wheel
+strut, exchanges information with the Leatherneck pilot. (USMC Photo
+A329570)._]
+
+The same day that the platoon from the 3d Marine Division arrived
+at Da Nang, a task element Marine was involved in an act of heroism
+which later earned him the Bronze Star Medal. While escorting Marine
+helicopters on a resupply mission about five miles west-northwest of
+Tam Ky, a U.S. Army UH-1B gunship from Da Nang was hit by Viet Cong
+fire and crashed in flames. Marine Lance Corporal Walter L. Rupp, a
+volunteer machine gunner on board the Army gunship, acted rapidly to
+help secure the area despite having suffered injuries in the crash.
+Manning an M-60 machine gun, Rupp delivered fire on the approaching
+enemy while the pilot, copilot, and three other passengers were pulled
+from the wreckage. All six American personnel, including the injured
+Marine, were evacuated safely to Da Nang, and then flown to the U.S.
+Army Field Hospital at Nha Trang for more extensive medical attention.
+
+
+_The Weather Breaks_
+
+Much of I Corps began experiencing improved weather conditions during
+the first days of April. Relying on helicopter support, the ARVN
+resumed its offensives into the rugged mountainous regions. On the 6th
+a combined Allied helicopter flight lifted 42 ARVN soldiers from Tam Ky
+to a landing zone about 18 miles directly west of Quang Ngai. An Army
+UH-1B was shot down by Communist fire during the operation. Shortly
+after the crash, one of HMM-364’s helicopters landed to rescue the crew
+and strip the weapons from the downed aircraft. Marine mechanics then
+helped Army aviation technicians disassemble the UH-1B whereupon it was
+suspended beneath an Army UH-37 (a twin-engine, piston-powered, heavy
+helicopter manufactured by Sikorsky) in a specially designed sling and
+helilifted back to Da Nang for repairs.
+
+Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s squadron suffered its first combat aircraft
+loss on 14 April. The incident occurred after one of HMM-364’s
+helicopters was hit in the engine by Viet Cong fire while attempting
+to evacuate wounded Vietnamese infantrymen from a hillside landing
+zone about 40 miles west of Da Nang near the Laotian border. Struck
+while taking off, the UH-34D plunged 150 feet down the steep hillside
+and crashed through the jungle into a stream bed. One Marine manning
+an M-60 machine gun suffered a broken leg in the crash. The other crew
+members and passengers, however, were able to carry him up the hill to
+the ARVN landing zone. Heavy thunder showers prevented rescue for two
+hours, but the weather finally broke and the men were helilifted to Da
+Nang. The aircraft was destroyed the next day.
+
+Four days after this incident, HMM-364 committed all available aircraft
+to a battalion-size heliborne assault into rugged northwestern Thua
+Thien Province. The ARVN’s objective was a mountainous area on the
+northern rim of the A Shau Valley, a 30-mile-long, two-mile-wide
+trough whose location adjacent to the Laotian border invited Communist
+infiltration. Although enemy activity would eventually force the
+government to abandon its string of outposts in the valley, the issue
+of control of the area was still unresolved in early 1964.
+
+Colonel Merchant, as commander of the Aviation Headquarters Operations
+Center for I Corps, assigned 20 Marine UH-34Ds, four VNAF UH-34s, five
+U.S. Army UH-1B gunships, and three Marine O-1Bs to the operation
+which the ARVN code named LAM SON 115. Additionally, 14 VNAF T-28s,
+four A-1H Skyraiders, and two observation aircraft were assigned by
+the Joint General Staff to provide support for the helicopter assault.
+The operation was to be controlled by Colonel Merchant as the Tactical
+Air Commander Airborne (TACA) from a U.S. Air Force U-10, whose radios
+would permit the commander and his staff to communicate with every
+aircraft participating in the effort. (The Marine helicopters had UHF
+and VHF communications, while the Marine observation aircraft used UHF
+and FM. The Army UH-1Bs had UHF; the VNAF transport helicopters also
+relied upon UHF radios.)
+
+In addition to Merchant, the airborne control staff from the ASOC
+included Lieutenant Colonel William Montgomery, USAF, and a Vietnamese
+officer. The Vietnamese representative was to assist in clearing close
+air strikes with ARVN ground forces and also was to help resolve any
+language problems which developed.
+
+The one-day operation began early on 18 April with Marine and VNAF
+transport helicopters lifting 200 South Vietnamese soldiers from an
+outpost in the northwestern portion of the A Shau Valley into a rugged
+landing zone approximately six miles further north. Later the same
+morning 300 more Vietnamese troops were helilifted from a government
+outpost in the central portion of the valley to a second landing zone
+situated six miles north of the 200-man unit which had been flown in
+earlier. HMM-364’s helicopters averaged almost 8 hours per aircraft
+while flying 160 total hours in support of LAM SON 115. Only one Marine
+UH-34D and one VNAF helicopter were hit by enemy fire during the
+execution of the well-planned and efficiently coordinated operation. No
+aircraft were lost.
+
+Often the daily support flights proved more hazardous then the large
+assault operations whose details were planned in advance. An incident
+that occurred on 21 April while a UH-34D was evacuating a wounded South
+Vietnamese soldier from the mountains 15 miles west of Tam Ky confirmed
+the dangers inherent in such daily operations. In an effort to lure the
+evacuation helicopter within range of their weapons, the Communists
+ignited a yellow smoke grenade in a clearing close by the actual
+landing zone. The pilot alertly identified the correct landing zone,
+thereby foiling the enemy ruse.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  MAJOR MARINE HELICOPTER
+  OPERATIONS FIRST HALF 1964
+]
+
+[Illustration: _HMM-364 loadmaster directs loaded UH-34D into a hilltop
+landing zone during operations in I Corps. (USMC Photo A329571)._]
+
+Several days later, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s Marines encountered an
+equally clever Viet Cong tactic while performing another evacuation
+mission, this time in support of a U.S. Special Forces patrol 20
+miles west of Thuong Duc. Army UH-1B gunships made several low-level
+reconnaissance passes over the pickup site while the UH-34D pilot
+prepared to hoist the casualties through the dense jungle. When the
+gunship crews reported no enemy activity, the Marine pilot maneuvered
+his aircraft into a hovering position above the invisible patrol. At
+this juncture, well-concealed Viet Cong began firing automatic weapons
+at the hovering helicopter and forced it to seek safety away from
+the pickup area. The escorting gunships then wheeled in from above,
+returning the Viet Cong’s fire with rockets and machine guns. The
+enemy promptly ceased firing, whereupon the Marine helicopter again
+maneuvered into position above the patrol. Again the enemy challenged
+the aircraft with fire, this time striking it in the rear portion of
+the fuselage. Although no serious damage was done, the evacuation
+helicopter was again forced away from the patrol’s position.
+
+The UH-1Bs once more placed suppressive fire on the enemy position,
+finally allowing a second Marine helicopter to hoist the wounded man
+through the trees. A new burst of enemy fire, however, interrupted a
+subsequent effort to retrieve the body of a dead patrol member. An
+HMM-364 helicopter returned to the area the following day and completed
+the evacuation.
+
+Although neither resulted in U.S. or VNAF aircraft losses, the
+incidents of 21 and 24 April confirmed that the Viet Cong was devising
+new methods with which to counter the Allies’ helicopters. His use
+of false smoke signals and his persistent refusal to compromise his
+position by firing on the faster, more heavily armed U.S. gunships
+represented crude but effective additions to his expanding repertoire
+of counter-helicopter tactics. Although unappreciated by the
+Leatherneck crews, the enemy’s most recent flurry of actions had no
+lasting effect on the overall pattern of helicopter operations.
+
+
+_Sure Wind 202_
+
+In late April Colonel Merchant’s Marines joined with VNAF and U.S.
+Army elements to launch what would be the costliest and most viciously
+opposed heliborne assault attempted in South Vietnam during the
+1962–1965 period. On the 26th, Merchant, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy, and
+Lieutenant Colonel George Brigham, the task element operations officer,
+flew to Quang Ngai and Pleiku to participate in the final stages of
+planning for a multi-battalion heliborne offensive into the Do Xa area,
+the mountainous Viet Cong stronghold located along the northern border
+of II Corps. At Quang Ngai officials from the II Corps headquarters
+had already completed the general plans for Operation SURE WIND 202
+(Vietnamese code name: QUYET THANG 202), the size of which demanded
+the use of all transport helicopters available in both I and II Corps.
+The Marine representatives learned that HMM-364’s role in the upcoming
+operation would be to helilift a 420-man South Vietnamese battalion
+from the Quang Ngai airfield to Landing Zone BRAVO, an objective
+located about 30 miles due west of the pickup point. Simultaneous
+with this assault, a U.S. Army helicopter company based at Pleiku was
+scheduled to transport two ARVN battalions (960 troops) from Gi Lang,
+an outpost located 24 miles west-southwest of Quang Ngai, to a second
+landing zone about eight miles west-southwest of Landing Zone BRAVO.
+The operation was to begin on the morning of 27 April, with the first
+assault waves scheduled to land at 0930.
+
+Due to the distance between the mountainous landing zones and because
+two different helicopter units would be conducting the respective
+trooplifts, the operation plan treated the two assaults as separate
+operations. A U.S. Air Force U-10 aircraft had been assigned to carry
+Colonel Merchant, the TACA, and other ASOC representatives who would
+coordinate the helilift into Landing Zone BRAVO. Twenty Vietnamese A-1H
+Skyraiders had been assigned to provide tactical air support for the
+Marine portion of the operation. Twelve of these attack aircraft were
+scheduled to conduct preparatory strikes on and around the landing
+zones, four were to orbit above the area after the helicopter landing
+began, and the remaining four were to be positioned on airstrip alert
+at Da Nang. Five Army UH-1B gunships were assigned to escort the Marine
+UH-34Ds to and from the landing zone.
+
+The preparatory air strikes around Landing Zone BRAVO began as the
+first ARVN heliteams boarded the 19 Marine and two VNAF helicopters
+at Quang Ngai. Following the VNAF’s air strikes, the escorting Army
+gunships swept in for a prelanding reconnaissance of the zone. They
+were met by fire from Viet Cong .50 and .30 caliber machine guns.
+The gunships countered with repeated rocket and machine gun attacks
+on those enemy positions that could be located but were unable to
+silence the Communist weapons. Meanwhile, the loaded Marine and VNAF
+helicopters cleared Quang Ngai and were closing on the objective. After
+the UH-1Bs expended their entire ordnance load and most of their fuel
+in attempts to neutralize enemy fire, Colonel Merchant ordered all
+helicopters, transports and gunships alike, back to Quang Ngai to rearm
+and refuel.
+
+With the transports and gunships enroute to Quang Ngai, the ASOC
+summoned the on-call VNAF A-1Hs to attack the Viet Cong positions.
+During ensuing strikes one Skyraider was damaged severely by .50
+caliber machine gun fire. The Vietnamese pilot turned his smoking
+aircraft eastward in an unsuccessful effort to nurse it to the Quang
+Ngai airstrip. The attack bomber crashed less than one mile from the
+west end of the small airstrip.
+
+The A-1H air strikes on and around Landing Zone BRAVO continued until
+1225. Shortly after the strikes ceased Colonel Merchant ordered the
+first wave of transport helicopters to land the ARVN assault force.
+Escorting UH-1Bs were still drawing fire as the first flight of three
+UH-34Ds approached the contested landing zone. This time, however,
+the Marine and VNAF pilots were not deterred. The first UH-34Ds
+touched down at 1230 with their machine gunners pouring streams of
+orange tracers into the surrounding jungle. Despite the high volume
+of suppressive fire, several helicopters in the first wave sustained
+hits from Viet Cong automatic weapons. One, damaged critically, crashed
+in the landing zone. Its crew members, all of whom escaped injury,
+were picked up by another Marine helicopter, piloted by Major John R.
+Braddon, which had been designated as the search and rescue aircraft
+for the operation. Another UH-34D with battle damage proceeded to the
+outpost from which the Army helicopter missions were originating and
+made an emergency landing.
+
+[Illustration: _A formation of Marine UH-34Ds lift South Vietnamese
+troops into mountains southwest of Da Nang. (USMC Photo A329574)._]
+
+The second assault wave was delayed while VNAF Skyraiders renewed their
+efforts to dislodge the enemy from his positions around the embattled
+landing zone. The helilift resumed at 1355 in the face of reduced but
+stubborn Communist resistance. During this phase of the troop lift,
+one VNAF and several Marine helicopters were hit by enemy .50 caliber
+fire. The Vietnamese aircraft, which lost its tail rotor controls,
+spun sharply while trying to take off and crashed near the center of
+the zone. Its crew members escaped injury and were picked up by Major
+Braddon’s rescue helicopter.[11-B]
+
+   [11-B] For his role in the two successful rescue attempts,
+          Braddon was awarded the Silver Star Medal.
+
+After this incident, as the South Vietnamese soldiers began fanning out
+from the landing zone and forcing the Communist gunners to withdraw
+deeper into the jungle, the landing proceeded somewhat faster. The
+fourth and final assault lift of the day was executed at 1730, after
+which 357 of the 420 ARVN troops had been transported into Landing
+Zone BRAVO. During the first day of the operation, 15 of the 19
+participating Marine UH-34Ds were hit. Only 11 Marine and VNAF
+helicopters originally assigned to support the operation remained
+airworthy.
+
+[Illustration: _At the loadmaster’s direction, a Marine UH-34D waits in
+a crude landing zone as an unidentified U.S. advisor and two Vietnamese
+soldiers unload supplies. Other ARVN troops provide security. (USMC
+Photo A329572)._]
+
+The heliborne assault portion of SURE WIND 202 was completed the next
+morning. Fourteen UH-34Ds from HMM-364, several of which had been
+repaired during the night, and four Army UH-1Bs lifted the remainder
+of the South Vietnamese battalion into the landing zone. By then the
+intensity of the enemy action in the surrounding hills had diminished
+greatly. Only one Marine helicopter was hit and it suffered only minor
+damage. Upon finishing their tasks, HMM-364’s aircraft proceeded to Gi
+Lang, the outpost from which the Army helicopter company was operating,
+to help it complete its portion of the assault lift.
+
+Aircraft losses for the operation continued to accumulate on the second
+day when a Marine UH-34D was caught in the rotor wash of other landing
+helicopters and crashed while approaching the runway at Quang Ngai. The
+aircraft plummeted into an irrigation canal adjacent to the airstrip,
+rolled over onto its side, and completely submerged. The crewmen
+managed to climb to safety but the helicopter was a total loss.
+
+On 29 April, three UH-34Ds flew a maintenance-inspection team and a
+Marine security squad from Da Nang into Landing Zone BRAVO to assess
+the damage suffered by the two helicopters which had been shot down on
+the first day of SURE WIND 202. The inspection team found that four
+bullets had struck the Marine aircraft. The VNAF aircraft, on the
+other hand, was riddled by nearly 30 bullets, including a .50 caliber
+round that had severed the tail rotor control cable. The inspection
+team concluded that both helicopters were damaged beyond repair and
+proceeded to destroy them where they had fallen.
+
+Originally, MACV and II Corps planners had anticipated that the
+Marine helicopters would not be required to support SURE WIND 202
+beyond the initial assault. It soon became apparent, however, that
+the daily helicopter requirements for the operation would exceed the
+aviation assets available in II Corps. The American command in Saigon,
+therefore, directed Colonel Merchant’s task element to continue
+providing support for the duration of the offensive. Accordingly,
+the task element commander assigned a liaison officer to the 2d ARVN
+Division headquarters. This officer was tasked with coordinating daily
+aircraft requirements. When SURE WIND 202 finally ended on 25 May,
+HMM-364’s crews had contributed 983 sorties and 800 flight hours to the
+South Vietnamese effort in northwestern II Corps.[11-10]
+
+
+_Operations Elsewhere in I Corps_
+
+While some of HMM-364’s crews continued flying support missions from
+Quang Ngai, others conducted a critical operation in western I Corps.
+The mission, which already had been delayed five days because of the
+Marines’ extensive commitment during the early stages of SURE WIND
+202, was executed on 30 April. It involved 17 Marine UH-34Ds, four
+Army UH-1Bs (two transports and two gunships), two Marine O-1Bs,
+two VNAF Skyraiders, and one South Vietnamese observation aircraft.
+Their assignment was to evacuate a 78-man ARVN patrol which had
+been under frequent enemy fire for six days in the rugged jungle
+about 42 miles west of Da Nang. The transport helicopters encountered
+almost continuous small arms fire during the landing and subsequent
+evacuation. One Marine helicopter carrying a crew of four Marines
+and five ARVN passengers was shot down while climbing away from
+the contested landing zone. The pilot made a forced landing in a
+nearby clearing and the nine men were evacuated under fire by other
+UH-34Ds. Despite the hazardous nature of the mission, the entire
+South Vietnamese patrol was removed to the safety of Nam Dong, a
+well-defended Special Forces camp located in a valley 34 miles west of
+Da Nang.
+
+Acts of heroism were commonplace during the 30 April evacuation. One
+Marine copilot assumed control of his severely damaged helicopter and
+flew it to Nam Dong after the pilot and crew chief had been wounded.
+Staff Sergeant John C. Thompson, who served as one of the loadmasters
+for the operation, was later awarded the Navy Cross for his role in the
+action. Having arrived in the landing zone aboard the first transport
+helicopter, the Marine noncommissioned officer exposed himself to Viet
+Cong fire almost continuously while supervising the loading of each
+aircraft. After the last five South Vietnamese troops had boarded the
+final helicopter, Thompson shouted to its pilot that he would remain on
+the ground to provide covering fire while the aircraft took off. But
+the pilot ordered Staff Sergeant Thompson on board and then succeeded
+in maneuvering the heavily loaded UH-34D out of the empty landing zone.
+
+By late May it had become apparent to U.S. military authorities in
+South Vietnam that the demand for American transport helicopters in I
+Corps would continue beyond the 30 June date which had been set earlier
+for SHUFLY’s departure. General Westmoreland, therefore, proposed to
+the Commander in Chief, Pacific, that the Marine unit be retained at Da
+Nang indefinitely. He further recommended that HMM-364 turn over its
+helicopters and maintenance equipment to the Vietnamese Air Force on
+30 June as scheduled, and that the unit be replaced by another Marine
+UH-34D squadron. These recommendations were forwarded to the Joint
+Chiefs of Staff who approved them on 10 June. In response, the Marine
+Corps began immediate preparations to deploy a new, fully equipped,
+medium helicopter squadron to Da Nang.
+
+HMM-364 began its final month in Vietnam by supporting another
+heliborne assault into II Corps. This time the Marines teamed with the
+U.S. Army’s 52d Aviation Battalion to lift an ARVN battalion from Dak
+To, a town situated in western Kontum Province, to an objective in
+the Do Xa base area. To support the operation, which was code named
+SURE WIND 303, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s crews positioned a TAFDS
+fuel bladder at the Dak To airstrip on 1 June. Two days later, 15
+Marine UH-34Ds contributed 180 sorties to the assault phase of the new
+government operation. No battle damage was recorded by Marine aircraft
+during this latest incursion into northern II Corps.
+
+The Marine task element’s responsibilities were expanded slightly
+in the first week of June when MACV directed Colonel Merchant to
+provide search and rescue (SAR) support for U.S. aerial reconnaissance
+operations which had begun over Laos and North Vietnam. After 7 June
+at least two UH-34Ds (one section) were positioned together either at
+Quang Tri or at Khe Sanh, ready to conduct SAR missions for downed
+American and VNAF pilots. While based at Khe Sanh the helicopters were
+also used to support Advisory Team One on Tiger Tooth Mountain. At
+Quang Tri the SAR helicopters operated from a clearing adjacent to a
+local soccer field. Years later, Marine pilots who had stood the SAR
+duty there would recall the incongruous sight of small Vietnamese boys
+playfully pursuing their soccer games alongside parked combat aircraft
+and a TAFDS bladder.
+
+In addition to normal support operations, HMM-364’s pilots devoted
+much of the second week of June to a search for Privates First Class
+Fred T. Schrenkengost and Robert L. Greer, two MABS-16 Marines who had
+disappeared from the Da Nang compound on 7 June. Intelligence reports
+indicated that both men had been captured by Communist guerrillas about
+five miles south of the airfield while sight-seeing on rented motor
+bikes. The aerial search produced no signs of the missing enlisted
+men but reliable Vietnamese sources reported that the Viet Cong had
+displayed them in several villages. The task element commander finally
+called off the fruitless search on 15 June, a full week after it had
+begun. Ground efforts by the South Vietnamese to locate the men
+continued but were also futile. The two Marines were never found.[11-C]
+
+   [11-C] The status of PFC Fred T. Schrenkengost was changed
+          from missing in action to killed in action, body not
+          recovered, on 23 July 1974. The status of PFC Robert L.
+          Greer was likewise changed on 14 November 1975.
+
+While the aerial search south of Da Nang was in its final stages,
+HMM-364 suffered its last aircraft loss in Vietnam when a helicopter
+crashed while carrying supplies from Khe Sanh to Major Gray’s Advisory
+Team One on Tiger Tooth Mountain. The accident occurred on 13 June when
+a UH-34D was caught in severe down drafts while attempting to land in
+the small landing zone near the top of the jagged 5,000-foot-high peak.
+The crew and passengers luckily escaped injury and were rescued but the
+aircraft was damaged too extensively to be repaired. Marines stripped
+the UH-34D of radios and machine guns and then burned the hulk.
+
+
+_Changing the Watch_
+
+On 16 June, three days after the crash on Tiger Tooth Mountain,
+Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s unit ceased its operations and began
+preparations for turning over its helicopters and equipment to the
+Vietnamese Air Force. The Marines spent three days removing the
+automatic stabilization equipment (the helicopter’s equivalent of an
+automatic pilot) and the USMC identification from the 24 UH-34Ds. While
+HMM-364’s men accomplished the necessary last-minute preparations,
+pilots from a new Marine medium helicopter squadron, HMM-162, began
+flying their UH-34Ds ashore from the LPH-8, USS _Valley Forge_.
+Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver W. Curtis, an Oklahoman who
+held four Distinguished Flying Crosses for air actions fought during
+World War II and Korea, HMM-162 was the first Marine squadron since
+Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s to deploy to Vietnam with its complement of
+aircraft and maintenance equipment. With HMM-162’s arrival, elements of
+Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s unit began departing for Okinawa on board
+refueler-transport aircraft from VMGR-152. Also on board one of the
+KC-130s bound for Okinawa was Lieutenant Colonel Beal, who relinquished
+command of the MABS-16 sub unit to Major Marion R. Green on the last
+day of June.
+
+The newly commissioned VNAF 217th Squadron informally accepted the
+aircraft from HMM-364 on 19 June. Formal acceptance occurred 10 days
+later with Major General Paul J. Fontana, the commanding general of
+the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, attending a ceremony presided over by
+the I Corps commanding general. Following the exchange of equipment,
+the Vietnamese officials presented various orders of the Cross of
+Valor, their nation’s second highest decoration, to Marine pilots who
+had distinguished themselves during Operation SURE WIND 202. Vice
+Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, commanding general of the Vietnamese Air
+Force, then presented Vietnamese pilot wings to Colonel Merchant,
+Lieutenant Colonel La Voy, and to each Marine instructor-pilot who
+had participated in the helicopter pilot training program. HMM-364’s
+tour in South Vietnam ended officially on 30 June when the last of
+its members boarded KC-130’s bound for Okinawa. Since initiating
+combat flight operations in February, the squadron’s helicopters
+had logged 2,665 combat sorties and 2,365 combat hours. Another
+statistic underscored the intensity of the actions in which the unit
+had participated. Well over half of the squadron’s 24 helicopters
+had been damaged by enemy fire during its five-month deployment in
+Vietnam.[11-11]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 12
+
+Fall and Winter Operations
+
+_Dry Weather Fighting--Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations--Changes and
+Improvements--Action as the Year Ends_
+
+
+_Dry Weather Fighting_
+
+The military situation in I Corps remained essentially unchanged as
+HMM-162 began its assignment with SHUFLY. Hot, dry weather, with its
+promise of near perfect flying conditions and spirited fighting,
+continued over the mountainous northern provinces.
+
+After a series of orientation briefings and familiarization flights,
+Lieutenant Colonel Curtis’ squadron initiated support operations in
+the closing days of June. HMM-162’s first real taste of action came on
+the last day of the month when six UH-34Ds, escorted by two armed U.S.
+Army UH-1Bs, attempted to resupply ARVN troops operating in the hills
+nine miles west of Tam Ky. While trying to locate a Communist position
+which was firing on the resupply aircraft, one of the gunships was hit
+and crashed in flames. Two transport helicopters landed immediately to
+rescue the crew. The Marines pulled three of the four injured men from
+the wreckage before being driven away from the scene by approaching
+guerrillas. During takeoff, one UH-34D was struck by ground fire but
+was able to continue its flight to Da Nang. The wounded copilot of the
+downed Army aircraft died while enroute to the dispensary, but the
+injured pilot survived and later was evacuated to the Nha Trang Field
+Hospital. The heat from the still-smoldering aircraft hulk prevented a
+second attempt to extricate the body of the fourth soldier later in the
+day. It was finally recovered on 1 July.
+
+The squadron’s first critical troop lift came within days of its
+initial action when the task element was called upon to helilift
+urgently needed reinforcements to the Nam Dong CIDG camp which had come
+under heavy Communist attack. Situated in south central Thua Thien
+Province at a point where two prominent mountain valleys converge,
+Nam Dong held special strategic appeal to both sides engaged in the
+struggle for South Vietnam. It sat astride natural infiltration
+routes from Laos into the lowlands around Da Nang and Phu Bai and
+also protected some 5,000 Montagnard tribesmen who occupied a string
+of villages along the valley floor. The camp and the villages were
+defended by only a handful of U.S. Special Forces personnel and three
+CIDG companies, none of which could muster more than 90 men. Its
+status as a thorn in the enemy’s side, its relative isolation, and its
+proximity to Communist base areas along the Laotian border, combined to
+make the outpost a particularly lucrative target for the Viet Cong.
+
+Nam Dong’s hour of crisis came shortly after midnight on 7 July when
+the Communists launched a large-scale ground assault against the barbed
+wire-enclosed main camp. Shortly after 0400, with his position holding
+out against heavy mortar and machine gun fire, Captain Roger H. Donlon,
+the Special Forces officer in charge, radioed for assistance. Two hours
+later, six Marine helicopters, loaded with U.S. Special Forces and
+South Vietnamese personnel, launched from Da Nang for the beleaguered
+little fortress. Colonel Merchant, flying an O-1B, led the transport
+helicopters to the objective area while two U.S. Army UH-1B gunships
+provided escort. Meanwhile, two other HMM-162 helicopters launched for
+An Diem carrying U.S. Special Forces officers with instructions to
+assemble a company-sized reaction force for commitment to Nam Dong.
+
+Intense enemy mortar and ground fire at Nam Dong initially prevented
+the six UH-34Ds from landing the reinforcements, whereupon Colonel
+Merchant and the flight returned to Da Nang for fuel. At the airfield
+the task element commander briefed VNAF A-1H Skyraider pilots and the
+crew of a Marine O-1B on the battlefield situation. He took off again
+at 0910, this time to act as TACA in an Air Force U-10. Meanwhile, a
+U.S. Army CV-2 Caribou (a twin-engine, fixed-wing light transport)
+had managed to airdrop small arms ammunition to Donlon and the
+embattled defenders. Following this emergency resupply, air strikes
+were conducted on the hills to the south and west of the outpost,
+causing enemy ground fire to diminish somewhat. At 0945, a flight of
+18 Marine helicopters, led by Lieutenant Colonel Curtis and escorted
+by four UH-1B gunships and two VNAF Skyraiders, began landing a 93-man
+relief force which had been collected earlier from Da Nang and An Diem.
+Evacuation of the dead and wounded began immediately. At 1545, a flight
+of 10 UH-34Ds lifted 9,500 pounds of ammunition, medical supplies,
+radios, and miscellaneous equipment to Nam Dong. Six passengers, five
+wounded Vietnamese, and eight more bodies were evacuated to Da Nang on
+the return trip. By then, the battle was finished. Two Americans, one
+Australian advisor, and 55 South Vietnamese had been killed. Captain
+Donlon, who earned the first Medal of Honor awarded for action in
+Vietnam, and 64 other defenders had been wounded. The Viet Cong, who
+had failed to eliminate the Nam Dong outpost, left 62 bodies on the
+battlefield.[12-A]
+
+   [12-A] For a more detailed account of the battle for Nam Dong,
+          see Donlon, _Outpost of Freedom_.
+
+Four days after the battle for Nam Dong, Colonel Merchant’s tour in
+Vietnam ended. He returned to Okinawa to assume command of Marine
+Aircraft Group 16 whereupon Colonel Hardy (“Tex”) Hay, a 1940 graduate
+of Texas A&M, assumed command of Task Element 79.3.3.6.[12-B]
+
+   [12-B] For his role as Task Element Commander, ARVN I Corps
+          Aviation Headquarters Commander, and Senior U.S.
+          Aviation Advisor to I Corps, Colonel Merchant was later
+          awarded the Legion of Merit with Combat “V.” He was also
+          decorated with two Vietnamese Crosses of Valor--one for
+          SURE WIND 202 and the other for the relief of Nam Dong.
+
+Normal flight operations continued during the remainder of July with no
+major heliborne assaults conducted and no Marine aircraft lost. These
+operations, however, did not lack excitement. Supporting the Marine
+and ARVN forces on Tiger Tooth Mountain proved extremely hazardous as
+the HMM-162 crews soon came to realize. On 11 July, for example, the
+mountain nearly claimed one of their helicopters when a UH-34D lost
+power as a result of the extreme altitude while delivering supplies to
+Advisory Team One. As the aircraft plummeted into the hillside landing
+zone, its tail pylon struck the vegetation around the edge of the tiny
+clearing causing some structural damage. Fortunately, the damage was
+such that the crewmen were able to make emergency repairs while Major
+Gray’s men provided security around the aircraft. This accomplished,
+the crew returned their damaged helicopter to Khe Sanh without further
+incident.
+
+Daily operations continued to produce action for the newly arrived
+squadron as July wore on. On the 15th a UH-34D was hit by Viet Cong
+fire while performing a routine resupply mission south of Da Nang.
+Again, damage was only minor and the aircraft continued its mission.
+Support for Tiger Tooth Mountain dominated SHUFLY’s operations on
+the 18th after MACV officials ordered Major Gray’s Advisory Team
+One withdrawn to safety. Colonel Hay directed HMM-162 to commit all
+available aircraft in order to complete the withdrawal as rapidly as
+possible. Good weather and flying expertise helped the helicopter crews
+transport the entire Marine force (92 men) and over 21,000 pounds of
+equipment to Khe Sanh before nightfall on the 19th.
+
+In a simultaneous but unrelated development, HMM-162 was called upon
+to detach four helicopters to Udorn, Thailand, for temporary duty.
+These aircraft and crews were assigned to assist with search and rescue
+operations in support of ongoing U.S. aerial reconnaissance efforts in
+that area.
+
+In early August, the heightened international tensions which
+accompanied the Gulf of Tonkin crisis prompted General Westmoreland to
+order all American military installations throughout South Vietnam to
+brace for possible enemy attacks. Colonel Hay responded to ComUSMACV’s
+instructions by placing his Marines on high alert status for several
+weeks. The precautions were relaxed gradually as the crisis eased and
+the likelihood of a sudden Communist attack diminished.
+
+The pattern of helicopter operations in the northern provinces
+throughout the remainder of the summer differed little from that which
+had emerged earlier in the dry season. Medical evacuation and resupply
+sorties continued to constitute the majority of the task element’s
+support missions. Generally, medical evacuation missions, many of
+which were executed while Viet Cong and South Vietnamese forces were
+engaged in combat, provided the major source of action for Lieutenant
+Colonel Curtis’ squadron during this period. On 6 August, for example,
+a UH-34D was hit by enemy fire while its crew was evacuating ARVN
+casualties from a landing zone along the Song Tra Bon. Two days later,
+a second Marine helicopter was hit during an attempt to evacuate dead
+and wounded from the mountains about eight miles west of Tam Ky. The
+following day, on 9 August, another HMM-162 UH-34D drew fire while
+evacuating a wounded U.S. advisor from a village on the coastal plain
+12 miles southeast of Tam Ky. In all three incidents the aircraft
+received only minor damage and were able to return safely to Da Nang.
+
+Although the medical evacuation missions generally attracted more
+Viet Cong attention, many resupply flights also proved hazardous.
+Small landing zones, high elevations, and bad weather often made even
+the most routine missions difficult. HMM-162 lost a helicopter as a
+result of a combination of two of these adverse conditions--extreme
+elevation and a small landing zone--on 30 August. While resupplying
+a mountain-top outpost five miles southwest of Nam Dong, the UH-34D
+struck a tree at the edge of a tiny clearing and crashed. The crew
+members were uninjured, but the extent of the aircraft’s damage was
+too great to permit repair. It was stripped of radios, machine guns,
+machine gun mounts, and other usable parts before being destroyed.
+
+In mid-August the Marines also lost their first observation aircraft
+since deploying to Vietnam in 1962 when an O-1B crashed after
+experiencing mechanical failure. The incident occurred on the 15th
+while the pilot and observer were conducting a reconnaissance of
+the northwestern corner of Quang Ngai Province. Bad weather delayed
+rescue attempts for over an hour, but the two injured crewmen were
+finally recovered by helicopter and flown to the Da Nang dispensary
+for treatment. The pilot’s injuries were severe enough that he was
+evacuated to the U.S. field hospital at Nha Trang.
+
+The last major heliborne assault conducted in extreme western I Corps
+during 1964 was initiated in the first week of September. Eighteen
+Marine UH-34Ds, four Army UH-1Bs, six VNAF Skyraiders, two Marine
+O-1Bs, and two U.S. Air Force liaison aircraft were assigned to support
+a 2d ARVN Division heliborne offensive against Communist infiltration
+routes in remote southwestern Quang Nam Province. The operation, code
+named CHINH BIEN, began on the morning of 4 September when 15 HMM-162
+helicopters (the other three UH-34Ds participating in the operation
+were serving as search and rescue aircraft) lifted the first wave
+of South Vietnamese soldiers from Kham Duc, a government-controlled
+town located 12 miles from the Laotian border in northwestern Quang
+Tin Province. Their objective was a landing zone situated 24 miles
+northwest of the assembly area in Quang Nam Province and only three
+miles from the Laotian border. No enemy resistance was encountered
+and the initial assault helilifts were completed shortly after noon.
+Support for CHINH BIEN continued the next morning. When the helilifts
+were finally completed shortly before 1000, Marine UH-34Ds had flown
+265 sorties for 180.2 flight hours in another effort to place ARVN
+ground forces in remote areas of I Corps.
+
+
+_Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations_
+
+Adverse weather began influencing SHUFLY’s operations a few days
+after CHINH BIEN ended. On 14 September all flights were cancelled by
+rain and high winds from Typhoon Violet, a severe tropical storm. All
+aircraft remained grounded until late afternoon of the next day when
+HMM-162 helicopters conducted an emergency evacuation of storm victims
+from Tam Ky which had been hard hit by Violet. The typhoon caused some
+minor damage to SHUFLY’s facilities when electrical power was lost for
+a few hours. By the morning of the 16th, power was restored and all
+Marine operations returned to normal.
+
+Within a week, however, a more severe weather disturbance--Typhoon
+Tilda--struck the coast near Da Nang. On the morning of 21 September,
+in the face of the approaching storm, Colonel Hay ordered Lieutenant
+Colonel Curtis to displace his squadron to Nha Trang in central II
+Corps. Later in the day, the unit’s entire complement of aircraft
+departed Da Nang on the 325-mile flight to safety. The task element’s
+C-117D found refuge at Saigon. HMM-162 remained at Nha Trang until the
+23d when it returned to I Corps.
+
+[Illustration: _Marine helicopters enroute to an objective overfly the
+coastal plain south of Da Nang. (Official USMC Photo)._]
+
+Typhoon Tilda caused considerably more damage to the Marine base of
+operations than had her immediate forerunner. Most of the permanent
+structures in the compound showed signs of water damage and the
+electrical power was lost for an entire week, except at the waterpoint
+and the mess hall where a concerted repair effort restored power
+promptly. Teletype communications circuits were closed for a full week
+as a result of damage, and the radio link with the 1st MAW was broken
+for nearly two hours.
+
+While the Marines of the MABS-16 sub unit concerned themselves with
+cleaning up the debris and repairing their damaged facilities,
+HMM-162’s crews resumed combat support operations. On the
+afternoon of their return from Nha Trang, a flight of UH-34Ds
+delivered 19 passengers and 4,000 pounds of cargo to Tien Phuoc, a
+government-controlled town located seven miles west of Tam Ky. The next
+day Major General Paul J. Fontana, who as commanding general of the
+1st Marine Aircraft Wing was responsible for the administrative and
+logistical support of the task element, arrived at Da Nang for a one
+day visit to assess the damage and to confer with Colonel Hay. Flood
+relief missions and clean up activities combined with normal flight
+operations to consume the remainder of September.
+
+Two changes were made in the composition of the Marine task element in
+late September and early October. On 29 September, the security force
+from the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines rotated back to its parent unit
+on Okinawa. It was replaced by a 78-man element from Company E, 2d
+Battalion, 9th Marines the same day. Led by Second Lieutenant Anthony
+A. Monroe, the newly arrived Marines would provide protection for the
+aviation unit until late November.
+
+The second alteration occurred about a week later when HMM-162 was
+relieved on-station by the officers and men of a fresh squadron.
+The rotation of helicopter units was completed on 8 October when
+Lieutenant Colonel Curtis officially signed over the aircraft and
+maintenance equipment to the new squadron’s commanding officer. In
+a three month deployment to the war zone HMM-162’s helicopters had
+conducted approximately 6,600 sorties for a total of slightly over
+4,400 flight hours. Many of these sorties had been missions of mercy
+flown in the wake of the typhoons which had ravaged Vietnam’s northern
+provinces. During three months of sustained combat support activities,
+the squadron had lost two UH-34Ds and one O-1B in operational
+accidents.[12-1]
+
+The newly arrived squadron, HMM-365, was commanded by Lieutenant
+Colonel Joseph Koler, Jr., an experienced Marine officer who had
+begun his career shortly after World War II as an infantry platoon
+leader with the 1st Marine Division in China. Under his leadership
+the squadron began performing resupply missions the same day that
+the last of HMM-162’s personnel departed Da Nang. On their first day
+of operations, Koler’s crews airlifted over 25,000 pounds of cargo
+to various outposts around Da Nang. The following day a flight of
+12 HMM-365 helicopters provided transportation for ARVN troops who
+were being rotated between Kham Duc and A Roe, an isolated outpost in
+southwestern Quang Nam Province less than seven miles from the Laotian
+border. On 11 October the newly arrived Marine pilots and crews tasted
+their first actual combat when eight UH-34Ds drew Viet Cong fire while
+landing a 112-man Vietnamese unit in the hills 10 miles west-southwest
+of Tam Ky.
+
+The day after its crews had witnessed their first ground fire, Koler’s
+squadron lost its first aircraft in Vietnam. The incident occurred in
+western Quang Nam Province while a UH-34D was attempting to take off
+from a South Vietnamese landing zone located high in the mountains.
+The crash, in which the pilot was slightly injured, resulted from a
+loss of power due to the high altitude. After the crew was evacuated, a
+maintenance team salvaged the usable parts and destroyed the aircraft.
+
+In mid-October Colonel Hay summarized the situation in I Corps for his
+superiors at the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The task element commander
+was particularly concerned about a new phase of Viet Cong activity
+which he saw developing in the coastal lowlands of the northern
+provinces. Although there were few visible signs of either combat or
+enemy movement to confirm the trend, intelligence sources indicated
+that Viet Cong main force battalions in I Corps had increased in number
+from nine to 11 in the past several months. During this same period,
+the number of local force Viet Cong companies in the area had jumped by
+50 percent to a total of 17. These growth patterns, Colonel Hay noted,
+enabled the Communists to tighten their grip on the civilian populace.
+Likewise, they were responsible for increased enemy harassment of
+lines of communications in I Corps and posed a particular threat to Da
+Nang.[12-2]
+
+Colonel Hay’s tour as task element commander ended on 17 October.
+After a brief change of command ceremony during which he expressed his
+appreciation to his subordinates for their assistance, Hay departed
+for Okinawa to assume command of MAG-16. His replacement at Da Nang,
+Colonel John H. King, Jr., an officer who had seen his first action
+as a fighter pilot during World War II, was well prepared to direct
+the task element’s operations. A recent graduate of the National War
+College, King had commanded the first operational Marine transport
+helicopter unit, Marine Helicopter Squadron 161, during the Korean War.
+
+HMM-365’s operations continued throughout the remainder of October
+with only a few significant actions reported. One of these was an
+abortive medical evacuation mission attempted on 26 October during
+which the squadron suffered its first combat casualties. The incident,
+in which both the copilot and crew chief were wounded by Viet Cong
+small arms fire, occurred while the helicopter was approaching a poorly
+protected landing zone 10 miles southwest of Tam Ky. The pilot managed
+to return the damaged helicopter to Tam Ky and land safely, whereupon
+the seriously wounded copilot was evacuated to Nha Trang and the crew
+chief was administered first aid.
+
+In early November, at the height of the monsoon season, Typhoon Iris
+struck the Annamese coast. The tropical storm, whose full force was
+felt on 4 November, was followed by nearly a week of continuous
+rain, wind, and fog. The conditions caused flight operations to be
+suspended except for emergency medical evacuations. When the operations
+resumed on the 10th, the Marine Corps birthday, the Leatherneck crews
+concentrated on rescuing Vietnamese civilians from the inundated
+coastal plains. Between 1700 and 1900 on their first day of the flood
+relief operation, Lieutenant Colonel Koler’s Marines rescued 144 flood
+victims. These rescues, many of which were accomplished by hoisting
+the Vietnamese from precarious positions in trees or on roof tops were
+complicated by sporadic Viet Cong harassing fire. Many of the stranded
+civilians were evacuated to the Da Nang airfield. Following emergency
+medical treatment administered by Navy doctors and hospitalmen, the
+civilians were given shelter in the task unit hangar. Lieutenant Robert
+P. Heim, the Navy chaplain assigned to SHUFLY at the time, later
+praised the Marines who shared their birthday cake with the homeless
+Vietnamese that night.[12-3] The next day, although poor visibility
+continued to hamper flights, the Marines helilifted 1,136 more flood
+victims to safety. Again the guerrillas harassed the rescue attempts
+with small arms fire, this time hitting three of the participating
+aircraft.
+
+The humanitarian operation continued until 16 November, when another
+typhoon--Kate--threatened to make matters even worse. The weather on
+the storm’s periphery forced the cancellation of many Marine flights
+but the center of the disturbance passed about 200 miles south of Da
+Nang. The flooding which resulted from the two back-to-back storms,
+however, demanded a rescue effort beyond the capabilities of the Marine
+and VNAF helicopter units located in I Corps. Accordingly, the Special
+Landing Force (SLF) of the U.S. Seventh Fleet joined the operations on
+17 November. Lieutenant Colonel Curtis’ HMM-162, the helicopter element
+of the SLF, returned to its former operations area and spent six days
+rescuing flood victims. The Marines evacuated the most seriously
+injured to the USS _Princeton_ where they received emergency treatment
+before being returned to civilian hospitals. When the SLF departed
+Vietnamese waters on 23 November, HMM-162’s helicopters had flown over
+600 hours and completed 1,020 sorties in support of the disaster relief
+operations. Unfortunately, one UH-34D was lost at sea in an operational
+accident on 21 November while participating in these operations. Two
+crewmen, Corporal Richard D. Slack, Jr. and Lance Corporal David
+Nipper, died in the crash.[12-4]
+
+With the SLF’s departure, the Marine task element and the VNAF 217th
+Squadron reassumed the full burden of rescue operations until they
+were finally terminated on 10 December. During this period HMM-365 was
+forced to divide its flights judiciously between combat support and
+missions of mercy.[12-C]
+
+   [12-C] The magnitude of the damage inflicted upon the
+          inhabitants of Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin
+          Provinces by the November storms is borne out by the
+          following statistics. In these three provinces over
+          50,600 houses were destroyed while 4,870 civilians
+          were reported either dead or missing. Another 12,240
+          Vietnamese were forced to seek refuge at government
+          centers in the wake of the flood. (CTU 79.3.5 ComdD,
+          17Oct64–14Jan65.)
+
+
+_Changes and Improvements_
+
+While some of Lieutenant Colonel Koler’s men were employed in
+evacuating the flood-stricken Vietnamese, others were modifying three
+of the squadron’s helicopters to carry a new weapons system which
+had been developed specifically for use on the UH-34D. The TK-1, an
+externally mounted combination of M-60 machine guns and 2.75-inch
+rocket launchers, was first used on 19 November in support of a Tiger
+Flight mission conducted just south of the Song Thu Bon about 17 miles
+from Da Nang. Two armed UH-34Ds expended 90 rockets and 500 rounds
+of 7.62mm ammunition on enemy positions during prelanding strikes.
+The effectiveness of the new system could not be determined after
+this particular strike, but an estimated 10–15 Viet Cong were killed
+in a similar action by the armed UH-34Ds the next day. The transport
+aircraft armed with the TK-1 would continue to escort troop carrying
+helicopters regularly throughout the remainder of the year. At best,
+however, the TK-1 was of only marginal value. The inherent limitations
+of the UH-34D, which possessed neither the maneuverability nor the
+speed to conduct truly effective attacks, reduced the overall value
+of the system. Because of these limitations the Marines seldom relied
+solely on the UH-34D for fire suppression during assault missions.
+The system would eventually be phased out in 1965 with the arrival of
+Marine jet attack squadrons in Vietnam.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+  MAJOR MARINE HELICOPTER
+  OPERATIONS SECOND HALF 1964
+]
+
+Two improvements, one in the physical facilities available to the task
+element and the other in the size and composition of its security
+detachment, were made shortly after the Marines began using the UH-34Ds
+in the gunship role. On 25 November, HMM-365 moved its aircraft and
+maintenance equipment across the airfield into a newly constructed
+hangar just west of the strip. The second change took place the next
+day when the security force from the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was
+replaced by Company L, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, reinforced with
+engineers, 81mm mortar teams, and counter-mortar radar personnel.
+This adjustment came in response to the reports of the growing Viet
+Cong threat to Da Nang. Designated the Security Detachment, Marine
+Unit Vietnam, the 255-man organization was under the command of Major
+William F. Alsop, the battalion’s executive officer. Captain John
+Sheridan, the company commander, retained tactical control of the
+infantry unit.
+
+Although responsibility for the overall defense of the Da Nang airstrip
+still resided with the ARVN, the enlarged security detachment greatly
+strengthened the Marine defenses within the installation. Major Alsop
+divided his reinforced rifle company into two groups--one to protect
+the living compound and the other to defend the flight line and the
+new hangar. Around the living compound the engineers constructed a
+complex of machine gun positions, mortar pits, and ammunition bunkers.
+A barricade was also erected at a gate near the Marine compound which
+previously had been open and manned only by Vietnamese sentries. Strong
+defensive positions were also constructed around the task element’s
+new hangar and flight line. This network included fox holes, barbed
+wire, and cleared fields of fire. As an added precaution, Company L
+maintained a reaction force at the living compound. This force was
+prepared to board trucks and rush to reinforce the critical defenses
+around the aircraft and maintenance facilities in the event of an enemy
+ground attack.[12-5]
+
+Despite the stronger defenses and the presence of the larger Marine
+infantry force, several security-related problems were still unsolved.
+One which remained outside of Colonel King’s influence was the laxity
+of the ARVN sentries around the outer perimeter who sometimes allowed
+Vietnamese civilians to wander into the installation. Another was
+that a small village close to the Marine compound, but outside the
+perimeter fence, still harbored an occasional sniper. The task element
+commander had lodged repeated complaints about both situations with the
+appropriate South Vietnamese authorities but no action had been taken
+to eliminate them. In spite of these minor sources of irritation, the
+recent changes in its defenses greatly enhanced the task element’s
+ability to protect itself against Communist ground attacks.
+
+
+_Action as the Year Ends_
+
+While Company L was developing defensive positions at the airbase,
+HMM-365’s crews continued to provide support for both flood relief
+and military operations throughout I Corps. On 7 December, 17 Marine
+helicopters and eight Army UH-1B transports were called upon to help
+trap a Viet Cong force known to be hiding in a village less than five
+miles west of Da Nang. Code named DA NANG SIX, the operation began at
+daybreak when the American helicopters lifted 240 men of the 11th ARVN
+Ranger Battalion into the objective area. Two UH-1B gunships teamed
+with two armed UH-34Ds to suppress ground fire that erupted as the
+first wave of transport aircraft began their approach to the landing
+zone. One Army gunship sustained minor damage when hit three times
+during the exchange of fire. After the enemy had been silenced, the
+landing proceeded without incident and the Vietnamese rangers quickly
+secured their objective. In the process, nine Viet Cong were killed and
+four others captured along with nine rifles and one automatic weapon.
+Successful though it was, the action on the outskirts of Da Nang
+confirmed previous reports that the Communists were tightening their
+grip on Quang Nam Province.[12-6]
+
+Another indication of the enemy’s growing strength in I Corps came only
+two days later when a large Viet Cong force overran an ARVN outpost
+four and a half miles southwest of Tam Ky. I Corps Headquarters quickly
+drew up plans for a multi-company search of the area even though the
+Communists had withdrawn from the badly damaged government position
+shortly after their final assault. At 0845, 18 Marine UH-34Ds (three
+armed) and four Army UH-1Bs (two armed) helilifted a 208-man Tiger
+Force from Da Nang to Tam Ky where it had orders to stage with other
+units for the operation. While the U.S. helicopters were in the process
+of transporting the Vietnamese troops to Tam Ky, an aerial observer
+sighted a large formation of Viet Cong moving southwest from the scene
+of the previous night’s battle. The observer immediately brought air
+strikes and artillery fire to bear on the enemy, blocking his escape.
+
+Firepower contained the enemy throughout the morning while the infantry
+units at Tam Ky prepared to exploit the situation with a heliborne
+assault. The helilift was launched at 1345. Enroute to a landing
+zone, located six miles southwest of Tam Ky, the helicopter formation
+passed over the smoldering ruins of the ARVN outpost where ammunition
+stockpiles were still exploding. Once at the objective, the armed
+helicopters began delivering suppressive fire into the surrounding
+hedge rows and treelines as the troop carrying aircraft approached
+the landing zone. Still, after nearly six hours of air and artillery
+strikes, the Communist force was able to oppose the landing with
+intense small arms fire. No helicopters were hit during the landing,
+however, and the assault force managed to secure the landing zone.
+This accomplished, two companies from the 11th ARVN Ranger Battalion
+were helilifted into the position without incident. After the final
+troop lifts, the Marine transport helicopters began evacuating
+casualties from the outpost where eight Vietnamese soldiers and one
+American advisor had died and 20 ARVN and an Australian advisor had
+been wounded. The government’s response to the enemy-initiated action,
+including air and artillery strikes, accounted for 70 Viet Cong
+killed and 39 weapons captured. While reflecting a moderate success,
+these statistics were little compensation for the knowledge that the
+Communists could destroy a well-fortified position within five miles of
+a provincial capital.[12-7]
+
+Weather caused many Marine flights to be delayed and some to be
+cancelled during the closing month of 1964. But the interruptions
+were not frequent enough to prevent the task element from fulfilling
+its support commitments. The only type of support operation actually
+curtailed due to the monsoons was the preplanned heliborne assault into
+the mountains. Brief periods of favorable weather usually enabled the
+Marine crews to accomplish resupply and medical evacuation missions
+even into the most remote areas of I Corps, although delays of such
+flights were not uncommon.
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Koler’s HMM-365 was past the midpoint of its
+assignment in Vietnam as 1964 drew to a close. Through 31 December the
+unit’s helicopters had already flown over 6,700 sorties for a total of
+nearly 4,700 hours of flight time. Since its arrival in early October,
+Koler’s squadron had distinguished itself not only by providing support
+to military units throughout I Corps but by its extensive participation
+in the flood relief operations of November and December. During the
+30-day period after 10 November, HMM-365 had contributed a substantial
+percentage of its flights to the prolonged effort to rescue and
+evacuate Vietnamese civilians from flooded areas.[12-8]
+
+FMFPac changed the designation of the task element on the final day of
+1964. From that date until mid-March of the following year the Marine
+helicopter squadron and its supporting elements in Vietnam would be
+known officially as Task Unit 79.3.5, Marine Unit Vietnam. This change,
+however, did not alter the existing command relationships. ComUSMACV
+continued to exercise operational control over the Marine task unit
+while the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing retained
+responsibility for its administrative and logistic support.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 13
+
+Prelude to Escalation
+
+
+The close of 1964 marked the end of a full decade of American
+political, economic, and military advice and assistance to South
+Vietnam. That 10-year period saw a fragile state born and begin its
+struggle for survival only to have its existence threatened by a new
+brand of Communist aggression--the “war of national liberation.” It
+also saw the U.S. commitment to Vietnam’s defense deepen in almost
+direct proportion to the increasing threat. Despite growing amounts
+of American aid and advice, there was little doubt that South Vietnam
+stood near the brink of destruction at the hands of the Viet Cong and
+their North Vietnamese allies as 1964 ended.
+
+In many respects, the disaster which befell the Vietnamese Marines and
+ARVN Rangers at Binh Gia on the final day of 1964 marked a critical
+turning point in the war being waged in South Vietnam. General
+Westmoreland feared that the battle heralded “the beginning of the
+classic and final ‘mobile’ phase of the war.” “To the South Vietnamese
+government,” he reported, “it meant the beginning of an intensive
+military challenge which the Vietnamese government could not meet
+within its own resources.”[13-1] Brigadier General Carl Youngdale,
+Westmoreland’s assistant chief of staff for intelligence and the
+ranking Marine assigned to Vietnam, assessed the meaning of the battle
+in equally distressing terms. “Binh Gia,” he explained, “was just part
+of the whole thing. All the reserve--the strategic reserve--was fixed:
+the airborne and the four Marine battalions had all been committed.
+There was absolutely no strategic reserve left.”[13-2] So, as 1964
+ended, hope was fading rapidly among American military officials in
+Saigon that the ground war for South Vietnam could continue for long
+without more vigorous participation of the United States.
+
+Pressures other than those produced by military events in the South
+were also working to move the United States toward direct military
+intervention against the Communists in Indochina. Although sustained
+open warfare had not occurred as a result of the Tonkin Gulf crisis of
+early August, tensions continued to mount between North Vietnam and
+the United States throughout the autumn. On 1 November, just after
+the cessation of the U.S. air strikes which followed the Tonkin Gulf
+incidents, Viet Cong mortar squads attacked American facilities at the
+Bien Hoa airbase near Saigon. Four American servicemen were killed,
+five B-57 medium bombers destroyed, and eight others heavily damaged in
+the raid.
+
+President Johnson’s reaction to the Bien Hoa attack was to initiate
+a month-long review of U.S. policy regarding North Vietnam. In early
+December that review culminated in the adoption of a two-phased plan
+to discourage further North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong
+by expanding the air war. Phase I, approved for implementation in
+December, called for stepped-up air operations against the vital
+Communist infiltration routes in Laos, and for the intensification
+of covert operations against North Vietnam. Approved “in principle,”
+Phase II involved “a continuous program of progressively more serious
+air strikes” against North Vietnam. The implementation of Phase II,
+it was agreed, would depend on future enemy actions.[13-3] As if to
+indicate that Communist policy makers had settled on a parallel course
+of escalation, Viet Cong terrorists bombed a U.S. officers’ quarters
+in Saigon on Christmas Eve, killing two Americans and wounding over 50
+others.[13-A]
+
+   [13-A] Among the wounded was Major Damm, the Assistant Senior
+          Marine Advisor.
+
+The new year, 1965, would open against this portentous combination
+of intensified U.S. air activities over Laos, a worsening military
+situation on South Vietnam’s battlefields, and the existence of the
+Phase II contingency plans. It was this situation which would spawn
+a new series of events as the first months of 1965 unfolded--events
+which would determine the direction of American and North Vietnamese
+military involvement in the war for South Vietnam. In January, MACV
+intelligence would learn that two new North Vietnamese Army regiments,
+the _32d_ and the _101st_, had infiltrated the South and had initiated
+combat operations. Intelligence sources would also report the existence
+of another NVA regiment in the first stages of formation in Quang Tri
+Province. When added to a unit of similar size which had appeared in
+Kontum Province (II Corps Tactical Zone) in the final weeks of 1964,
+the new arrivals would raise to four the number of North Vietnamese
+regiments known to be operating on South Vietnamese soil.[13-4]
+
+The pace of escalation would quicken in early February. The Viet Cong
+would attack a U.S. installation at Pleiku in the Central Highlands on
+the 7th. Eight Americans would die in this incident, over 100 would be
+wounded, and a score of aircraft would be either destroyed or damaged.
+President Johnson would react quickly to the Pleiku attack by ordering
+a series of reprisal air strikes under the code name FLAMING DART.
+Recognizing the possibility of surprise North Vietnamese air strikes
+against U.S. installations in Vietnam, Johnson would also order a
+Marine light antiaircraft missile (LAAM) battalion to Da Nang, the
+American base located closest to Communist airfields. Armed with Hawk
+missiles, the Marines would protect the growing Da Nang airbase from
+which many of the FLAMING DART raids were to originate.
+
+American reaction to the Communists’ escalation would not be limited
+to the bombing of North Vietnam. Washington also would authorize
+the use of U.S. jet attack aircraft to engage targets in the south.
+On 19 February, U.S. Air Force B-57s would conduct the first jet
+strikes flown by Americans in support of Government of Vietnam ground
+units. Less than one week later, on the 24th, Air Force jets would
+strike again, this time to break up a Communist ambush in the Central
+Highlands with a massive series of tactical air sorties.[13-5]
+
+While the events of February would serve to focus world opinion more
+sharply on the intensifying conflict already raging over Southeast
+Asia, March would prove the decisive month in terms of the commitment
+of American combat power to the war in Vietnam. On 2 March, the
+President would order the FLAMING DART raids replaced by Operation
+ROLLING THUNDER--a sustained air campaign against the Democratic
+Republic of Vietnam designed to escalate gradually in response to
+continued Communist military activities in South Vietnam. ROLLING
+THUNDER would constitute a transition from the earlier reprisal type
+raids to a continuing air campaign based upon strategic considerations.
+
+Within a week after the first ROLLING THUNDER strikes over the North,
+the ground war in South Vietnam would also shift toward deeper and more
+active American involvement. On 7 March, the 9th Marine Expeditionary
+Brigade--the force which had been poised in the South China Sea since
+the Tonkin Gulf crisis of the previous August--would finally land at
+Da Nang to provide protection for the air base. Although the Pentagon
+would announce their mission as purely defensive, the Marines would
+become the first actual American ground combat battalions on hand for
+use in Vietnam. With that commitment, the stage would be set for a
+new and more dramatic phase of what was already becoming known as the
+“Second Indochina War.”
+
+
+
+
+Notes
+
+
+PART I
+
+THE WATERSHED
+
+
+Chapter 1
+
+Background to Military Assistance
+
+Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from:
+Department of Defense, _United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1947_,
+12 books (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter _Pentagon Papers_; The
+Senator Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department
+History of Decision Making On Vietnam_, 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon
+press, n.d.), hereafter Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_; Foreign
+Area Studies Division, American University, _Area Handbook for South
+Vietnam_ (Washington: GPO, 1967), hereafter American University, _Area
+Handbook_; Chester L. Cooper, _et al._, _The American Experience With
+Pacification in Vietnam_, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Institute For
+Defense Analysis, 1972), hereafter Cooper, _et al._, _The American
+Experience With Pacification_; Joseph Buttinger, _The Smaller Dragon:
+A Political History of Vietnam_ (New York: Praeger, 1958), hereafter
+Buttinger, _The Smaller Dragon_; Bernard Fall, _Two Viet-Nams: A
+Political and Military Analysis_ (New York: Praeger, 1967, 2d rev.
+ed.), hereafter Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_; D. G. E. Hall, _A History of
+South-East Asia_ (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966), hereafter
+Hall, _A History of South-East Asia_; Frances FitzGerald, _Fire In
+The Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans In Vietnam_ (Boston:
+Little, Brown and Company, 1972), hereafter FitzGerald, _Fire In The
+Lake_; Ellen J. Hammer, _The Struggle for Indochina_ (Stanford, Cal.:
+Stanford University Press, 1954), hereafter Hammer, _The Struggle for
+Indochina_; Douglas Pike, _Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques
+of The National Liberation Front_ (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press,
+1966), hereafter Pike, _Viet Cong_.
+
+    [1-1] Hanson W. Baldwin, _Strategy for Tomorrow_ (New York:
+          Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 261.
+
+    [1-2] Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_, p. 3.
+
+    [1-3] Pike, _Viet Cong_, p. 81.
+
+    [1-4] FitzGerald, _Fire In The Lake_, p. 42.
+
+    [1-5] Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), _A Translation From
+          The French Lessons of The War In Indochina_, v. II (Santa
+          Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation, 1967), p. 12, hereafter
+          Croizat, _A Translation From the French Lessons_.
+
+    [1-6] Dean Acheson, _Present At The Creation: My Years in The
+          State Department_ (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
+          Inc., 1969), p. 673.
+
+    [1-7] Buttinger, _The Smaller Dragon_, p. 46.
+
+    [1-8] B. S. N. Murti, _Vietnam Divided_ (New York, 1954), p. 49.
+
+    [1-9] Letter, SecState to SecDef, 18Aug54 as quoted in “U.S.
+          Training of the Vietnamese National Army 1954–1959,”
+          _Pentagon Papers_, bk. 2, sec. IV.A.4, p. 3.
+
+
+Chapter 2
+
+The Formative Years
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
+from: MajGen Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (Ret.), _In the Midst of Wars:
+An American’s Mission To Southeast Asia_ (New York: Harper & Row,
+1972), hereafter Lansdale, _In the Midst of Wars_; George McTurnam
+Kahin and John W. Lewis, _The United States in Vietnam_ (New York:
+Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), hereafter Kahin and Lewis, _The
+U.S. In Vietnam_; Joseph Buttinger, _Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled_, 2
+vols (New York: Praeger, 1967), Vol. II, _Vietnam at War_, hereafter
+Buttinger, _Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled_, v. II; Robert Scigliano,
+_South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963),
+hereafter Scigliano, _South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress_; Fall, _Two
+Viet-Nams_; Pike, _Viet Cong_; Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, vs.
+I & II; Vietnam Histories Comment File, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, hereafter
+Vietnam Comment File; U.S. Marine Activities in RVN, 1954–1964 Project
+Interview Folder Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, hereafter 1954–1964 Project
+Interview Folder.
+
+
+_Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
+Bernard B. Fall, _Street Without Joy: Indochina At War, 1946–1954_,
+(Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1961), hereafter Fall,
+_Street Without Joy_; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), “Vietnamese
+Naval Forces: Origin of the Species,” _USNI Proceedings_, v. 99, no.
+2 (Feb73), pp. 48–58, hereafter Croizat, “Vietnamese Naval Forces”;
+Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd
+10–11 Feb70 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter _Croizat
+Interview_; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), Comments and supporting
+materials on Draft MS, Jack Shulimson, “U.S. Marines in Vietnam,” pt.
+1 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Croizat Comments and Supporting
+Materials_; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS,
+Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Croizat Comments On Whitlow MS_; Col
+James T. Breckinridge, USMC, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow,
+“U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment
+File), hereafter _Breckinridge Comments_; MajGen William B. Fulton,
+USA (Ret.), _Riverine Operations_ (Washington, D.C.: Department of
+The Army, 1973), hereafter Fulton, _Riverine Operations_; Croizat, _A
+Translation From The French Lessons_.
+
+    [2-1] Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), “Notes on The
+          Organization of the Vietnamese Marine Corps,” p. 3
+          (_Croizat Comments and Materials_), hereafter Croizat,
+          “Notes on The Organization.”
+
+    [2-2] _Ibid._, p. 5.
+
+    [2-3] _Ibid._, p. 6.
+
+
+_Political Stabilization and its Effects_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
+Buttinger, _Vietnam; A Dragon Embattled_, v. II; Gravel Edition,
+_Pentagon Papers_, v. I; Fall, _Two Viet-nams_; Robert Shaplen, _The
+Lost Revolution_ (New York: Harper, 1965); Kahin and Lewis, _The U.S.
+In Vietnam_; Lansdale, _In The Midst of Wars_.
+
+    [2-4] Col John T. Breckinridge, telephone conversation
+          with Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 21 Feb 74, subj: Early
+          Experiences with the VN Marine Corps (Addenda to
+          _Breckinridge Comments_, Vietnam Comments File),
+          hereafter _Breckinridge Conversation_.
+
+    [2-5] Croizat, “Notes on The Organization,” p. 5.
+
+    [2-6] _Breckinridge Conversation._
+
+
+Chapter 3
+
+Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
+Department of State, _Aggression From The North; The Record of North
+Viet-Nam’s Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam_ (Washington: GPO,
+1965), hereafter Department of State, _Aggression From The North_;
+Buttinger, _Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled_, v. II; Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_;
+FitzGerald, _Fire In The Lake_; Kahin and Lewis, _The U.S. In Vietnam_;
+Pike, _Viet Cong_.
+
+    [3-1] _U.S. News & World Report_, 9Nov64, p. 63.
+
+    [3-2] Scigliano, _South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress_, p. 164.
+
+    [3-3] Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_, p. 360.
+
+    [3-4] Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. II, p. 35.
+
+    [3-5] “Evolution of The War,” _Pentagon Papers_, bk. 2, sec.
+          IV.B.1, p. 1.
+
+    [3-6] Pike, _Viet Cong_, p. 81.
+
+    [3-7] Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. II, p. 36.
+
+    [3-8] HistBr, G-3, HQMC, “General Chronology of Events in
+          Vietnam, 1945–1964,” p. 41.
+
+
+_Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps_
+
+Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from:
+SMA to CMC, ltr dtd 22 March 1973, Subj: Vietnamese Marine Corps/Marine
+Advisory Unit Historical Summary, 1954–1973, hereafter VNMC/MAU
+HistSum, 22Mar73; Maj James Yingling, Capt Harvey D. Bradshaw, and
+Mr. Benis M. Frank, “United States Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam
+1954–1963,” MS (HistDiv, HQMC, 1963), hereafter Yingling, _et al._,
+“USMC Activities 1954–1963”; Col Frank R. Wilkinson, USMC (Ret.), intvw
+by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 14Jul74 (Oral HistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC),
+hereafter _Wilkinson Interview_; LtCol Robert E. Brown, Comments on
+Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam,
+1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter, _R. E. Brown Comments_;
+Col Raymond C. Damm, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S.
+Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File)
+hereafter _Damm Comments_; LtCol Michael J. Gott, Comments on Draft MS,
+Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File) hereafter _Gott Comments_; Col Gary L. Wilder,
+Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “Marine Activities in
+Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Wilder Comments_.
+
+    [3-9] VNMC/MAU HistSumm, 22Mar73.
+
+   [3-10] _Wilkinson Interview._
+
+   [3-11] _Ibid._
+
+   [3-12] _Damm Comments._
+
+   [3-13] _Gott Comments._
+
+
+_Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
+Maj T. C. Edwards, “3d MarDiv Counterguerrilla Training: A Readiness
+Report,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 47, no. 5 (May 1963), pp. 45–48,
+hereafter Edwards, “Counterguerrilla Training”; MajGen Donald M.
+Weller, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S.
+Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File),
+hereafter _Weller Comments_; MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.),
+intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC),
+hereafter _Weller Interview_; MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.),
+Intvw with Captain Robert Whitlow, dtd 26Sep73, Subj: 3d MarDiv
+Training Program (1954–1964 Project Interview Folder), hereafter
+_Weller Interview on Training Programs_.
+
+   [3-14] _Weller Interview on Training Programs._
+
+   [3-15] Edwards, “Counterguerrilla Training,” p. 46.
+
+
+_American Decisions at the Close of 1961_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
+Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. II; “The Fall Decisions,”
+_Pentagon Papers_, bk. 2, sec. IV.B, ch. V and VI; Arthur M.
+Schlesinger, Jr., _A Thousand Days_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
+1965), hereafter Schlesinger, _A Thousand Days_; Maxwell D. Taylor,
+_Swords and Plowshares_ (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972),
+hereafter Taylor, _Swords and Plowshares_; Chester L. Cooper, _The Lost
+Crusade: America In Vietnam_ (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1970),
+hereafter Cooper, _The Lost Crusade_; Gen. William C. Westmoreland and
+Adm U. S. G. Sharp, _Report On The War In Vietnam_ (Washington: GPO
+1969), hereafter Westmoreland and Sharp, _Report On The War_.
+
+   [3-16] Taylor, _Swords and Plowshares_, p. 225.
+
+
+Chapter 4
+
+An Expanding War, 1962
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
+William A. Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification in Vietnam 1962–1965_
+(Washington: Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1966), hereafter
+Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification, 1962–65_; USMAAG, Vietnam, “Tactics
+and Techniques of Counterinsurgent Operations” (Saigon, RVN: USMAAG,
+1961), hereafter, USMAAG Vietnam, “Tactics and Techniques of
+Counterinsurgent Opns”; Hdqts, U.S. Army, _The Viet Cong_ (Ft. Bragg,
+N.C.: 1965) hereafter, U.S. Army, _Viet Cong_; Cooper, _et al._, _The
+American Experience With Pacification_; Gravel Edition, _Pentagon
+Papers_, v. II; “The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961–63,” _Pentagon
+Papers_, bk. 3, sec. IV.B.2; Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_.
+
+    [4-1] As quoted in the Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v.
+          II, p. 140.
+
+
+_Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
+Senior Marine Advisor letter to CMC, dtd 24Jan64, hereafter _SMA ltr
+to CMC, 24Jan64_; CinCPac Command History, 1962; MACV Command History,
+1962; Marine Corps Command Center, Items of Significant Interest,
+Jan-Feb62, hereafter _MCC Items_; LtGen Richard G. Weede, Intvw by
+Hist&MusDiv, HQMC dtd 23Jul73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC),
+hereafter _Weede Interview_.
+
+
+_The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
+_SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64_; Capt Don R. Christensen, “A Special Gazette
+Report: Dateline ... Vietnam,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 47, no. 9
+(Sep63), p. 5, hereafter Christensen, “Dateline”; Gen David M. Shoup,
+SE Asia Trip Folder, Sep62, hereafter _Shoup SEA Trip Folder_; LtCol
+Harold F. Brown, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S.
+Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File),
+hereafter _H. F. Brown Comments_.
+
+    [4-2] _SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64._
+
+    [4-3] Gen David M. Shoup, ltr to President Ngo Dinh Diem, dtd
+          Oct62 (_Shoup SEA Trip Folder_).
+
+    [4-4] Gen David M. Shoup conversation with BGen Edwin H.
+          Simmons, dtd Feb74 (1954–64 Project Interview Folder).
+
+    [4-5] _SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64._
+
+
+PART II
+
+MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR
+
+
+Chapter 5
+
+SHUFLY at Soc Trang
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
+HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File _MCC Items_; CinCPac Command
+History, 1962; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation In Vietnam,
+1962–1970,” _Naval Review_, v. 10 (1971), hereafter McCutcheon, “Marine
+Aviation.”
+
+    [5-1] JCS to CinCPac, 17Jan62, 1212Z (HQMC Msg File).
+
+    [5-2] CinCPac to JCS, 28Feb62, 0217Z (HQMC Msg File).
+
+    [5-3] JCS to CinCPac, 6Mar62, 1838Z (HQMC Msg File). DA to
+          CinCPac and CinCUSARPac, 2Mar63 (HQMC Msg File).
+
+    [5-4] ChMAAG, VN to CinCPac, 26Feb62, 0945Z (HQMC Msg File).
+
+    [5-5] CGFMPac to CinCPac, 28Feb62, 0113Z (HQMC Msg File).
+
+    [5-6] _Ibid._
+
+    [5-7] CinCPacFlt to CinCPac, 28Feb62, 2044Z (HQMC Msg File).
+
+    [5-8] CinCPac (Bangkok Th) to ComUSMACV, 5Mar62, 0340Z (HQMC
+          Msg File).
+
+    [5-9] ComUSMACV to CinCPac, 8Mar62, 0941Z (HQMC Msg File).
+
+   [5-10] CinCUSARPac to CinCPac, 9Mar62, 2100Z (HQMC Msg File).
+
+   [5-11] Dir, DivAv, HQMC, Briefing Item, dtd 14Mar62, for CMC
+          Weekly Conf., Subj: Assignment of Marine Helicopter
+          Squadron to ChMAAG, Vietnam.
+
+  [5-12] CinCPac to JCS, 14Mar62, 0712Z (HQMC Msg File).
+
+   [5-13] _Ibid._
+
+   [5-14] CinCPac to CinCPacFlt and ComUSMACV, 21Mar62, 0412Z (HQMC
+          Msg File); CinCPacFlt to ComSeventhFlt, 21Mar62, 2048Z
+          (HQMC Msg File).
+
+
+_Deployment to Soc Trang_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
+Commander Task Unit 79.3.5 ComdDiary, 31Jul–5Nov62, hereafter _CTU
+79.3.5 CmdD, 31Jul-Nov62_; CG 1st MAW, SHUFLY, OpSums, Apr-Sep62; CG,
+1st MAW, Ltr of Instruction, SHUFLY, dtd 12Nov62, hereafter _CG, 1st
+MAW LOI_; LtCol Archie J. Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary,” _USNI Proceedings_,
+v. 89, no. 10 (Oct63), hereafter Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary”; Cdr Withers
+M. Moore, Chaplain Corps, USN, _Navy Chaplains in Vietnam, 1954–1964_
+(Washington: Department of Navy, 1968), hereafter Moore, _Navy
+Chaplains_; Capt Robert B. Asprey, “Saga At Soc Trang: Marines In
+Viet-Nam,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 46, no. 12 (Dec62), pp. 2–3,
+hereafter Asprey, “Saga At Soc Trang”; VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN
+(Ret.), Intvw by Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 15Apr74 (1954–64 Project
+Interview Folder), hereafter _Hooper Interview_.
+
+   [5-15] CG, 1st MAW to ComSeventhFlt, 30Mar62, 0700Z, (HQMC Msg
+          File).
+
+   [5-16] _Ibid._
+
+   [5-17] ComSeventhFlt to CTF 76 and CTG 79.3, 3Apr62 (HQMC Msg
+          File).
+
+
+_Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
+Marine Corps Operational Analysis Group, Study No. 1, dtd 12Mar63,
+“Characteristics of U.S. Marine Helicopter Operations in the Mekong
+Delta,” hereafter _MCOAG Study No. 1_; LtCol Robert L. Rathbun,
+Comments on Yingling, _et al._, “USMC Activities 1954–1963,” (Vietnam
+Comment File), hereafter _Rathbun Comments on Yingling MS_; Richard
+Tregaskis, _Vietnam Diary_ (New York: Popular Library, 1963), hereafter
+Tregaskis, _Vietnam Diary_; Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary”; CTU 79.3.5 ComdD,
+31Jul–5Nov62; CG, 1stMAW SHUFLY OpSums, Apr-Sep62.
+
+   [5-18] Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary,” p. 46.
+
+   [5-19] _Ibid._, p. 51.
+
+   [5-20] CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul–5Nov62.
+
+   [5-21] Yingling, _et al._, “USMC Activities 1954–1963,” p. 118.
+
+   [5-22] CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul-Nov62.
+
+   [5-23] C of S memo 007A20763, as quoted in Yingling, _et al._,
+          “USMC Activities, 1954–1963,” p. 153.
+
+
+Chapter 6
+
+SHUFLY Moves North
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
+Col Julius W. Ireland, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow,
+“U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File),
+hereafter _Ireland Comments_; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; _Weede
+Interview_; _Rathbun Comments on Yingling MS_.
+
+
+_I Corps Tactical Zone_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
+BGen Edwin H. Simmons, “Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1965–1966,”
+_Naval Review_, 1968, hereafter Simmons, “Marine Corps Operations in
+RVN, 65–66”; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; Fall, _Street Without Joy_;
+Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification, 1962–65_.
+
+
+_Military Situation, September 1962_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
+Col Francis J. Kelly, USA, _U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971_
+(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), hereafter Kelly,
+_U.S. Army Special Forces_; MACV J-2 ltr to CTU 79.3.5, dtd 11Oct62,
+Subj: Intelligence Estimate, Period Oct62–Feb63 (Encl D-17 to CTU
+79.3.5 ComdD), hereafter _MACV Intell Est, 11Oct62_.
+
+    [6-1] _MACV Intel Est, 11Oct62._
+
+    [6-2] _Ibid._
+
+
+_Initial Helicopter Operations_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: _CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul–5Nov62_; CG 1st MAW, SHUFLY, OpSums,
+Sep-Dec62; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; _Ireland Comments_; _Rathbun
+Comments on Yingling MS_.
+
+    [6-3] _MCC Items_, 7Oct62.
+
+    [6-4] CTU 79.3.5 ltr to CG 1st MAW, dtd 4Oct62, Subj: Rotation
+          of Task Unit Personnel to South Vietnam (encl D-15, _CTU
+          79.3.5 ComdD, 6Apr–5Nov62_).
+
+
+Chapter 7
+
+The Laotian Crisis, 1962
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
+3d Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Report, 16May–7Aug 1962, hereafter
+_3d MEU Special Report_; CinCPac Operations Plan 32-59 Phase II (Laos),
+hereafter _OpPlan 32-59_; _Weller Interview_; _Croizat Interview_; _MCC
+Items_, May, Jun, Jul62; Schlesinger, _A Thousand Days_; Cooper, _The
+Lost Crusade_; Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, _North Vietnam
+and The Pathet Lao: Partners in The Struggle For Laos_ (Cambridge,
+Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), hereafter Langer and Zasloff,
+_North Vietnam and The Pathet Lao_; LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC
+(Ret.) Comments on 2d Draft MS, Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities
+In Vietnam, 1954–1963,” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Simpson
+Comments_; Foster Rhea Dulles, _American Policy Toward Communist China:
+The Historical Record_ (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972),
+hereafter Dulles, _American Policy Toward Communist China_; Taylor,
+_Swords and Plowshares_.
+
+    [7-1] _MCC Items_: 16 May 62.
+
+    [7-2] _Croizat Interview_; _Weller Interview_.
+
+
+PART III
+
+THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963
+
+
+Chapter 8
+
+The Marine Advisory Effort
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
+FitzGerald, _Fire In The Lake_; “The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem,
+May-November, 1963,” _Pentagon Papers_, bk. 3, sec. IV.B.5; Gravel
+Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. III; Shaplen, _The Lost Revolution_;
+Kahin and Lewis, _The U.S. In Vietnam_.
+
+
+_The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations_
+
+Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from:
+Senior Marine Advisor, MACV, Monthly Historical Summaries, 1963–1965,
+hereafter _SMA, MACV HistSums_; Col Wesley C. Noren, Comments on Draft
+MS, Maj Harvey Bradshaw, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations in RVN, 1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Noren Comments on Bradshaw MS_;
+Col Wesley C. Noren, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S.
+Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964”. (Vietnam Comment File),
+hereafter _Noren Comments on Whitlow MS_; Col Clarence G. Moody,
+Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In
+Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Moody Comments_;
+LtCol James P. McWilliams, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow,
+“U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File),
+hereafter _McWilliams Comments_; LtCol Joseph N. Smith, Comments on
+Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam,
+1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Smith Comments_; LtCol
+Joseph N. Smith intvw by Capt Robert Whitlow (1954–1964 Project
+Interview Folder), hereafter _Smith Interview_; Col Edwin F. Black,
+USA, and Lt R. P. W. Murphy, USNR, “The South Vietnamese Navy,” _USNI
+Proceedings_, v. 90, no. 1 (Jan64) pp. 52–62, hereafter, Black and
+Murphy, “The South Vietnamese Navy”; Maj Alfred J. Croft, “A Special
+Gazette Report: Dateline, Vietnam,” _Marine Corps Gazette_ v. 47, n.
+10 (Oct63), p. 18, hereafter Croft, “Dateline, Vietnam”; Christenson,
+“Dateline”; Capt. James P. McWilliams, “Pacify and Hold,” _Marine Corps
+Gazette_, v. 49, no. 2 (Feb65), p. 56, hereafter McWilliams, _Pacify
+and Hold_.
+
+    [8-1] _Moody Comments_; _Weede Interview_.
+
+    [8-2] _McWilliams Comments._
+
+    [8-3] _Smith Interview._
+
+    [8-4] _Noren Comments on Whitlow MS._
+
+
+Chapter 9
+
+SHUFLY Operations
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
+from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov62–31Oct63; CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD,
+31Oct63–14Jan64; Col Thomas J. Ross, Comments on Draft MS, Bradshaw,
+“U.S. Marine Corps Operations in RVN, 1964,” (Vietnam Comment File),
+hereafter _Ross Comments on Bradshaw MS_.
+
+    [9-1] McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation.”
+
+
+_Combat Support Operations_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov62–31Oct63; CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD,
+31Oct63–14Jan64; CTE 79.3.3.6 After Action Reports, 26Apr–20May63,
+hereafter _CTE 79.3.3.6 AAR_; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; MajGen
+Paul J. Fontana, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S.
+Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964,” (Vietnam Comment File),
+hereafter _Fontana Comments_; Col Thomas J. Ross, Comments on Draft MS,
+Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Ross Comments On Whitlow MS_; _Ross
+Comments On Bradshaw MS_; _H. F. Brown Comments_.
+
+    [9-2] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov–31Oct63.
+
+    [9-3] _Ibid._
+
+    [9-4] CTE 79.3.3.6 AAR, 19May63.
+
+    [9-5] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov–31Oct63.
+
+    [9-6] Aviation Headquarters Operations Center SOP, p. 1 (encl
+          5, CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 18Jul–31Oct63).
+
+    [9-7] Col A. D. Gomez ltr to Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing
+          Force Development Center, dated 23Oct63 (encl 1, CTE
+          79.3.3.6 ComdD, 18Jul–31Oct63).
+
+    [9-8] 1st MAW OpSums, 8Jun–20Oct63.
+
+    [9-9] _Ross Comments on Bradshaw MS._
+
+   [9-10] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov63–14Jan64.
+
+
+_The Situation in Vietnam_
+
+Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived
+from: Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. II; Nighswonger, _Rural
+Pacification, 1962–65_; Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_; Cooper, _The Lost
+Crusade_; Department of State, _Aggression from the North_.
+
+   [9-11] Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification, 1962–65_.
+
+
+PART IV
+
+AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964
+
+
+Chapter 10
+
+Marines Meet the Challenge
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
+MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.) intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC,
+dtd 24Jul73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter _Youngdale
+Interview_; MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft
+MS, Capt Robert Whitlow “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–64”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter, _Youngdale Comments_; Westmoreland
+and Sharp, _Report On The War_; Cooper, _et al._, _The American
+Experience With Pacification, 1962–65_; “Military Pressures Against
+North Vietnam, July-Oct 1964,” _Pentagon Papers_, bk. 4, sec. IV.C.2;
+Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. III; CinCPac Command History,
+1964, hereafter _CinCPac ComdHist, 64_; U.S. Military Assistance
+Command, Vietnam, Command History, 1964, hereafter MACV ComdHist, 64;
+Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification, 1962–65_.
+
+   [10-1] Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. III, p. 501.
+
+   [10-2] _Ibid._
+
+   [10-3] _Ibid._, v. II, p. 471.
+
+   [10-4] “Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, Jul-Oct 1964,”
+          _Pentagon Papers_, bk. 4, sec. IV.C.2(b), p. 42.
+
+
+_Redesignation and Reorganization_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
+Senior Marine Advisor, MACV, After Action Reports, 1964–65, hereafter
+_SMA, MACV, AARs 64-65_; Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.), Comments
+on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam,
+1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Nesbit Comments On
+Whitlow MS_; Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft
+MS, Maj Harvey Bradshaw, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations In RVN, 1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Nesbit Comments on Bradshaw MS_;
+_Noren Comments on Whitlow MS_; _Noren Comments on Bradshaw MS_; James
+C. Pickerell, “Marine Advisor: Vietnam,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 48,
+n. 4 (Apr64), hereafter Pickerall, “Marine Advisor”; _Damm Comments_.
+
+   [10-5] _Nesbit Comments on Bradshaw MS._
+
+
+_The Vietnamese Marine Brigade_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
+_SMA, MACV, AARs, 64-65_; CG FMFPac On-The-Job-Training, RVN, Monthly
+Reports, Jan-Dec, 1964, hereafter _OJT Monthly Repts, 64_; Capt Philip
+O. Brady, intvw by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Jan66 (OralHistColl,
+Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter _Brady Interview_; Westmoreland and
+Sharp, _Report On The War_; Pickerell, “Marine Advisor”; Naval Advisory
+Group, MACV, Historical Review, 1964–65, hereafter NAVGP, MACV,
+HistRevw, 64-65.
+
+   [10-6] _Noren Comments on Whitlow MS._
+
+   [10-7] _Nesbit Comments on Whitlow MS._
+
+   [10-8] NAVGP, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65, p. 21.
+
+
+_Additional Marine Activities_
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:
+LtCol Raymond Becker, intvw with Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 25Jan74
+(1954–64 Project Interview Folder), hereafter _Becker Interview_;
+Capt Charles H. Gallina, Intvw with Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 29Jan74
+(1954–64 Project Interview Folder), hereafter _Gallina Interview_;
+Director of Intelligence, HQMC, to Director, History and Museums
+Division, dtd 31Jan74, Subj: Summary of U.S. Marine Corps Operations
+at Tiger Tooth Mountain and Dong Bach Ma in 1964, hereafter “Summary
+of USMC Opns at Tiger Tooth Mountain”; Col Raymond C. Damm intvw with
+Captain Robert H. Whitlow, dtd 19Jul73 (1954–64 Project Interview
+Folder), hereafter _Damm Interview_; NAVG, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65; CTE
+79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.
+
+   [10-9] _Damm Interview._
+
+  [10-10] NAVG, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65, p. 14.
+
+  [10-11] _Smith Comments._
+
+  [10-12] Col Warren P. Baker, ltr to CG, 3dMarDiv, dtd 3Apr64,
+          Subj: Job Related Orientation Report.
+
+  [10-13] CG, FMFPac ltr to CMC 18Mar64, Subj: SVN Observations.
+
+
+Chapter 11
+
+Spring and Summer Fighting
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
+CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; Col Andre Gomez, Comments on Draft
+MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam 1954–64”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Gomez Comments_; Col Robert A.
+Merchant, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine
+Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter
+_Merchant Comments_; Col John H. La Voy, Comments on Draft MS, Capt
+Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam
+Comment File), hereafter _La Voy Comments_; _Ross Comments on Whitlow
+MS_; LtGen Herman Nickerson, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt
+Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam
+Comment File), hereafter _Nickerson Comments_.
+
+   [11-1] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.
+
+   [11-2] _Ross Comments on Whitlow MS._
+
+   [11-3] _Ibid._
+
+   [11-4] _Ibid._
+
+   [11-5] Statement of General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., CMC, before
+          the House Committee On Armed Services, dtd March 1964
+          (Greene Papers Collection).
+
+   [11-6] CTE ComdD 79.3.3.6, 1Nov63–16Oct64.
+
+   [11-7] _La Voy Comments._
+
+   [11-8] _Ibid._
+
+   [11-9] _Ibid._
+
+  [11-10] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; _Merchant Comments_;
+          _La Voy Comments_.
+
+  [11-11] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.
+
+
+Chapter 12
+
+Fall and Winter Operations
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from:
+CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 17Oct64–14Jan65;
+1st MAW OpSums, 9Jul64–7Oct64; CinCPac CmdHist 64; _Fontana Comments_;
+BGen Joseph Koler, USMC, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow,
+“U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File),
+hereafter _Koler Comments_; Col Hardy Hay, Comments on Draft MS, Capt
+Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam
+Comment File), hereafter _Hay Comments_; _Becker Comments_; _Merchant
+Comments_; _Nickerson Comments_; Capt Roger H. Donlon, USA, _Outpost of
+Freedom_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), hereafter Donlon, _Outpost of
+Freedom_; Moore, _Navy Chaplains_.
+
+   [12-1] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; CG 1st MAW OpSums,
+          9Jul–7Oct64.
+
+   [12-2] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.
+
+   [12-3] Moore, _Navy Chaplains_, p. 92.
+
+   [12-4] _MCC Items_, 23Nov64.
+
+   [12-5] CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 17Oct64–14Jan65.
+
+   [12-6] _Ibid._
+
+   [12-7] _Ibid._
+
+   [12-8] _Ibid._
+
+
+Chapter 13
+
+Prelude to Escalation
+
+   [13-1] Westmoreland and Sharp, _Report On The War_, p. 95.
+
+   [13-2] _Youngdale Interview._
+
+   [13-3] Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. III, p. 289.
+
+   [13-4] Westmoreland and Sharp, _Report On The War_, pp. 95, 97.
+
+   [13-5] _Ibid._, p. 98.
+
+
+
+
+Appendix A
+
+USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954–1964
+
+
+USMC SENIOR MARINE ADVISORS
+
+  LtCol Victor J. Croizat                 Aug 1954–Jun 1956
+  LtCol William N. Wilkes, Jr             Jun 1956–Jun 1958
+  LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr            Jun 1958–Jun 1960
+  LtCol Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr         Jun 1960–Aug 1961
+  LtCol Robert E. Brown                   Aug 1961–Oct 1962
+  LtCol Clarence G. Moody, Jr             Oct 1962–Oct 1963
+  LtCol Wesley C. Noren                   Oct 1963–Sep 1964
+  Col William P. Nesbit                   Sep 1964–
+
+
+VNMC SENIOR OFFICERS AND COMMANDANTS
+
+  Maj Le Quang Trong                    1 Oct 1954–17 Jun 1956
+  Maj Phan Van Lieu                    18 Jan 1956–22 Aug 1956
+  Capt Bui Pho Chi                     23 Aug 1956– 1 Oct 1956
+  Maj Le Nhu Hung                       2 Oct 1956–23 May 1960
+  LtCol Le Nguyen Khang                24 May 1960–15 Dec 1963
+  LtCol Nguyen Ba Lien                 16 Dec 1963–   Feb 1964
+  BGen Le Nguyen Khang                    Feb 1964–
+
+
+SHUFLY, SQUADRON, AND SUB UNIT COMMANDERS[14-A]
+
+  _SHUFLY Commanders_                          _Dates_
+  Col John F. Carey                    15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962
+  Col Julius W. Ireland                 1 Aug 1962– 5 Nov 1962
+  LtCol Alton W. McCully                6 Nov 1962–28 Jan 1963
+  LtCol Harold F. Brown                29 Jan 1963–17 Jul 1963
+  Col Andre D. Gomez                   18 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964
+  Col Robert A. Merchant               16 Jan 1964– 9 Jul 1964
+  Col Hardy Hay                        10 Jul 1964–16 Oct 1964
+  Col John H. King, Jr                 17 Oct 1964–
+
+  _Squadron Commanders_    _Squadron_          _Dates_
+  LtCol Archie J. Clapp     HMM-362    15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962
+  LtCol Robert L. Rathbun   HMM-163     1 Aug 1962–11 Jan 1963
+  LtCol Reinhardt Leu       HMM-162    12 Jan 1963– 7 Jun 1963
+  LtCol Frank A. Shook      HMM-261     8 Jun 1963– 1 Oct 1963
+  LtCol Thomas J. Ross      HMM-361     2 Oct 1963–31 Jan 1964
+  LtCol John H. La Voy      HMM-364     1 Feb 1964–21 Jun 1964
+  LtCol Oliver W. Curtis    HMM-162    17 Jun 1964– 7 Oct 1964
+  LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr    HMM-365     8 Oct 1964–
+
+  _Sub Unit Commanders_                        _Dates_
+  LtCol William W. Eldridge, Jr        15 Apr 1962– 3 Aug 1962
+  LtCol Ralph R. Davis                  4 Aug 1962–15 Jan 1963
+  LtCol George H. Linnemeier           16 Jan 1963– 4 Jul 1963
+  LtCol Earl W. Cassidy                 5 Jul 1963– 6 Feb 1964
+  LtCol Samuel G. Beal                  7 Feb 1964–26 Jun 1964
+  Maj Marion R. Green                  27 Jun 1964–14 Dec 1964
+  LtCol Thomas E. Vernon               15 Dec 1964–
+
+   [14-A] SHUFLY was designated Task Unit 79.3.5 from 15 April
+          1962 until 6 November 1962; Task Element 79.3.3.6 from 6
+          November 1962 through 31 December 1964.
+
+
+
+
+Appendix B
+
+Awards and Decorations, Vietnam, through 1964[14-B]
+
+
+_Navy Cross_
+
+  Maj Donald E. Koelper[14-C]                     16 Feb 1964
+  SSgt John C. Thompson                           30 Apr 1964
+
+
+_Navy Distinguished Service Medal_
+
+  MajGen Richard G. Weede[14-D]             Feb 1962–May 1964
+  MajGen Carl A. Youngdale            25 Jan 1964–20 Jul 1965
+
+
+_Silver Star Medal_
+
+  Maj John R. Braddon                             27 Apr 1964
+  1stLt Phillip O. Brady                          31 Dec 1964
+  Capt Franklin P. Eller, Jr                      31 Dec 1964
+  Capt Joseph N. Smith                27 Oct 1963–25 Apr 1964
+  Capt Richard B. Taylor[14-E]        25 Nov 1962–31 Oct 1963
+
+
+_Legion of Merit_
+
+  Col Earl E. Anderson                 8 Jul 1963–15 May 1964
+  LtCol Earl W. Cassidy                2 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964
+  Col John F. Carey[14-F]              9 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962
+  LtCol Archie J. Clapp[14-G]         15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962
+  Col Andre D. Gomez                  19 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964
+  Col John H. King, Jr                16 Oct 1964–15 May 1965
+  LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr               7 Oct 1964–18 Feb 1965
+  LtCol John H. La Voy                 1 Feb 1964–22 Jun 1964
+  Col Robert A. Merchant               2 Jan 1964–10 Jul 1964
+  LtCol Clarence C. Moody, Jr         18 Jan 1962–24 Oct 1963
+  Col Wesley C. Noren                 13 Oct 1963–13 Sep 1964
+  LtCol Thomas J. Ross                 1 Oct 1963–31 Jan 1964
+  Col Roy H. Thompson                 27 Feb 1962–16 Jun 1964
+  Col Charles E. Warren                8 Feb 1962– 9 Jul 1964
+  Col Edwin B. Wheeler                 1 Aug 1964–23 Aug 1965
+
+
+_Distinguished Flying Cross_
+
+  Maj Albert N. Allen                             27 Apr 1964
+  Capt William J. Burrows                         27 Apr 1964
+  Capt Charles E. Cannon                          27 Apr 1964
+  Capt William Cunningham                         27 Apr 1964
+  1stLt Ronald V. Debrincat                       27 Apr 1964
+  Capt George H. Dunn II                          27 Apr 1964
+  Capt George H. Dunn II                          30 Apr 1964
+  Capt Robert K. Ervi                             31 Dec 1963
+  1stLt Melvin T. Graves                          27 Apr 1964
+  Capt Theodore A. Heister                         1 Aug 1963
+  1stLt Donald A. Hodgen[14-H]        10 Mar 1963–11 Mar 1963
+  LtCol John H. La Voy                            27 Apr 1964
+  Capt Peter A. Love                              27 Apr 1964
+  WO Dennis T. McKee                              27 Apr 1964
+  1stLt Edward P. Moore                           27 Apr 1964
+  CWO Robert F. Patton                             5 Jun 1964
+  1stLt Thomas H. Peters[14-I]         9 Mar 1963–10 Mar 1963
+  Capt Eugene W. Rawlins                          27 Apr 1964
+  Capt Howard G. Taylor                           27 Apr 1964
+  1stLt Charles R. Upshaw                         27 Apr 1964
+  Capt William W. Wamel, Jr.                      27 Apr 1964
+  Capt William W. Wamel, Jr.                      30 Apr 1964
+  Maj Goodell P. Warren                           27 Apr 1964
+  1stLt Charles C. Wood, Jr.                      27 Apr 1964
+  Capt Grant T. Yule                              27 Apr 1964
+
+
+_Bronze Star Medal_
+
+  SSgt John Baran                                 12 Dec 1964
+  LtCol Samuel G. Beal                 3 Feb 1964– 1 Jul 1964
+  SSgt Clifford J. Beaver             30 Dec 1964–31 Dec 1964
+  LtCol George A. Brigham              3 Apr 1964– 3 Jul 1964
+  SSgt Marvin I. Bryant               12 Oct 1964– 8 Mar 1965
+  Cpl Clarence L. Chester                         30 Jun 1964
+  Capt Don R. Christensen[14-J]       28 Sep 1962–31 Jul 1963
+  2dLt Francis R. Ciccone                         16 Oct 1964
+  SSgt James A. Coryer                            30 Jun 1964
+  Maj Alfred J. Croft                  1 Feb 1962– 7 Feb 1964
+  LtCol Oliver W. Curtis              17 Jun 1964–23 Nov 1964
+  LtCol Raymond C. Damm               10 May 1964– 1 Dec 1964
+  Maj Alfred M. Gray, Jr.             11 Apr 1964–15 Aug 1964
+  Capt James J. Harp                  10 Mar 1963–11 Mar 1963
+  Cpl Cary F. Janulewicz                           9 Dec 1964
+  1stLt Weston L. Johnson                         10 Nov 1964
+  2dLt James P. Kelliher                          31 Dec 1964
+  1stLt Donald H. Larson               4 Apr 1964– 1 Feb 1965
+  GySgt Richard L. Latimer                         9 Dec 1964
+  Capt John P. Monahan                21 Mar 1964–28 Feb 1965
+  Capt James P. McWilliams             2 May 1963– 9 Jun 1964
+  GySgt Charles D. Peck               14 Apr 1963–22 Apr 1964
+  LCpl James N. Phinney                           10 Apr 1964
+  LCpl Walter L. Rupp                             24 Mar 1964
+  GySgt Edmund R. Sewell                          20 Sep 1964
+  SSgt Cecil C. Stibbens                 Dec 1962–   Dec 1964
+  Capt Edward H. Walsh                28 Sep 1964– 1 May 1964
+  Maj Charles K. Whitfield            31 Jan 1964–20 Jan 1965
+  Capt Frank Zimolzak[14-K]           27 Apr 1962–25 May 1963
+
+   [14-B] Other awards, such as Navy Commendation Medals, Air
+          Medals, and Purple Hearts are not included in this list.
+
+   [14-C] First Navy Cross approved for Vietnam.
+
+   [14-D] First Navy Distinguished Service Medal awarded for
+          Vietnam.
+
+   [14-E] First Silver Star Medal awarded to a Marine for Vietnam.
+
+   [14-F] First Legions of Merit awarded to USMC personnel for
+          Vietnam.
+
+   [14-G] First Legions of Merit awarded to USMC personnel for
+          Vietnam.
+
+   [14-H] First Distinguished Flying Crosses approved for USMC
+          personnel in Vietnam.
+
+   [14-I] First Distinguished Flying Crosses approved for USMC
+          personnel in Vietnam.
+
+   [14-J] One of the first two Bronze Star Medals (approved the
+          same date) for USMC personnel in Vietnam.
+
+   [14-K] One of the first two Bronze Star Medals (approved the
+          same date) for USMC personnel in Vietnam.
+
+
+
+
+Appendix C
+
+Glossary of Acronyms
+
+
+  AHOC           Aviation Headquarters Operations Center
+  ARVN           Army of The Republic of Vietnam
+  ASOC           Air Support Operation Center
+  BLT            Battalion Landing Team
+  CG             Civil Guard
+  ChMAAG         Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
+  CIDG           Civil Irregular Defense Group
+  CinCPac        Commander in Chief, Pacific
+  CIP            Counter Insurgency Plan
+  ComUSMACV      Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
+  COSVN          Central Office for South Vietnam
+  CTZ            Corps Tactical Zone
+  DMZ            Demilitarized Zone
+  DRV            Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
+  FAC            Forward Air Controller
+  FEC            French Expeditionary Corps
+  FMFPac         Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
+  GCA            Ground Controlled Approach (system)
+  GVN            Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
+  HMM            Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron
+  ICC            International Control Commission
+  JCS            Joint Chiefs of Staff
+  JGS            Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
+  JRO            Job Related Orientation (Program)
+  JTF            Joint Task Force
+  LSG            Logistics Support Group
+  MABS           Marine Air Base Squadron
+  MAG            Marine Aircraft Group
+  MATCU          Marine Airfield Traffic Control Unit
+  MAW            Marine Aircraft Wing
+  MEB            Marine Expeditionary Brigade
+  MEU            Marine Expeditionary Unit
+  MR             Military Region
+  NLF            National Liberation Front
+  OJT            On-The-Job Training (Program)
+  PAVN           Peoples Army of Vietnam
+  PF             Popular Forces
+  RF             Regional Forces
+  RLT            Regimental Landing Team
+  RSSZ           Rung Sat Special Zone
+  RVN            Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
+  RVNAF          Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
+  SAR            Search and Rescue
+  SDC            Self Defense Corps
+  SEATO          Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
+  SLF            Special Landing Force
+  TACAN          Tactical Air Navigation (system)
+  TAFDS          Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System
+  TERM           Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission
+  TRIM           Training Relations Instruction Mission
+  USMAAG (MAAG)  U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group
+  USMACThai      U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
+  USOM           U.S. Operations Mission
+  VC             Viet Cong
+  VMGR           Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron
+  VNA            Vietnamese National Army
+  VNAF           Vietnamese Air Force
+  VNMC           Vietnamese Marine Corps
+
+
+
+
+Appendix D
+
+Chronology
+
+
+1954
+
+  7 May--French garrison at Dien Bien Phu surrenders to Viet Minh.
+
+  16 Jun--Ngo Dinh Diem named premier of Vietnam by French-sponsored
+        emperor, Bao Dai.
+
+  20 Jul--French and Viet Minh representatives sign Geneva
+        cease-fire. Vietnam is divided into northern and southern zones
+        pending reunification elections to be held in 1956.
+
+  2 Aug--LtCol Victor J. Croizat, USMC, arrives in South Vietnam
+        for duty with USMAAG.
+
+  8 Sep--Manila Pact signed by U.S. and seven other nations. Within
+        weeks (Sep 1954) the Manila Pact is transformed into the
+        Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
+
+  13 Oct--Premier Diem decrees the establishment of a 1,137-man
+        Marine Corps (VNMC).
+
+
+1955
+
+  Feb--LtCol Croizat becomes first advisor to VNMC.
+
+  Apr--Sect rebellion threatens to topple the Diem government. Marine
+        Landing Battalion deploys to the Mekong Delta.
+
+  31 May--Diem names Major Le Quang Trong as Senior Marine Officer
+        of VNMC.
+
+  Sep--Two USMC advisors, a captain and a technical sergeant, are
+        assigned to the USMAAG, Vietnam, for duty with the VNMC.
+
+  23 Oct--Premier Diem receives 98 percent of South Vietnamese vote
+        during a national referendum in which he was opposed by Bao Dai.
+
+  26 Oct--Ngo Dinh Diem proclaims the Republic of Vietnam and
+        becomes the republic’s first president.
+
+
+1956
+
+  18 Jan--Diem appoints Major Phan Van Lieu as Senior Officer of
+        VNMC.
+
+  Feb--Marine Landing Battalion returns to garrison at Nha Trang. VNMC
+        reorganized into two landing battalions, a 4.2-inch mortar
+        company, and a small headquarters.
+
+  Jun--LtCol William N. Wilkes, Jr., replaces LtCol Croizat as Senior
+        Marine Advisor to VNMC.
+
+  Jul--Election deadline for reunification of northern and southern
+        zones passes without serious incident.
+
+  Aug--Diem appoints Captain Bui Pho Chi as Senior Officer of VNMC.
+
+  Oct--Diem appoints Major Le Nhu Hung as Senior Officer of VNMC.
+
+  Nov--LtGen Samuel T. Williams, USA, relieves LtGen John O’Daniel as
+        Chief USMAAG, Vietnam.
+
+
+1958
+
+  Jun--LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., relieves LtCol Wilkes as Senior
+        Marine Advisor to VNMC.
+
+
+1959
+
+  May--1st VNMC Landing Battalion conducts operations against Viet
+        Cong in An Xuyen Province while 2d Landing Battalion conducts
+        similar operation against Communist guerrillas in Vinh Binh
+        Province.
+
+  1 Jun--The VNMC is expanded to a Marine Corps Group of 2,276
+        officers and men. A 3d Landing Battalion is formed and the
+        battalions are reorganized into four infantry companies.
+
+
+1960
+
+  Jun--LtCol Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr., relieves LtCol Wilkinson as
+        Senior Marine Advisor to VNMC.
+
+  Sep--LtGen Lionel C. McGarr, USA, relieves LtGen Williams as Chief
+        USMAAG, Vietnam.
+
+  11 Nov--An abortive attempt by ARVN paratroops and two Marine
+        companies to overthrow the Diem Government.
+
+  20 Dec--The Communist “National Front for Liberation of South
+        Vietnam” was formed.
+
+
+1961
+
+  May--On The Job Training (OJT) program for USMC junior officers and
+        staff noncommissioned officers is initiated. Thereafter, 20
+        Marines per month enter Vietnam to observe operations.
+
+  16 May--A 14 nation conference on the deteriorating Laotian
+        situation convenes at Geneva.
+
+  Jul--VNMC again reorganized and expanded. The addition of a fourth
+        infantry battalion and a 75mm pack howitzer battery raises the
+        strength of the VNMC to 3,321.
+
+  Aug--LtCol Robert E. Brown relieves LtCol Robichaud as Senior Marine
+        Advisor to VNMC.
+
+  Aug--VNMC battalion conducts operations in the inundated U Minh
+        Forest region of the Ca Mau Peninsula.
+
+  Nov--General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (ret.), President Kennedy’s
+        special military advisor, visits South Vietnam on fact-finding
+        mission.
+
+  11 Dec--The first direct support contingent of U.S. military
+        forces arrives in Vietnam--400 Army Troops and two helicopter
+        companies.
+
+  Dec--USMAAG approves plan for new 18-man Marine Advisory Division.
+
+
+1962
+
+  1 Jan--VNMC expanded to 6,109 officers and men, and redesignated
+        the Vietnamese Marine Brigade. A new amphibious support
+        battalion is formed.
+
+  3 Jan--First element of USAF transport aircraft arrive in South
+        Vietnam to support government forces.
+
+  Jan--Detachment A, 1st Radio Company, FMF arrives in Vietnam for duty
+        with Army communications unit.
+
+  20 Jan--CinCPac authorizes all MAAG advisors to accompany their
+        Vietnamese units into combat.
+
+  3 Feb--President Diem issues decree formalizing initiation of the
+        Strategic Hamlet Program.
+
+  8 Feb--U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV)
+        activated in Saigon with General Paul D. Harkins as commander.
+        MajGen Richard G. Weede, USMC, becomes MACV’s first chief of
+        staff.
+
+  7 Feb--Vietnamese Air Force fighters bomb and strafe the
+        Presidential Palace in Saigon but fail to injure President Diem.
+
+  9 Apr--The leading elements of Marine Task Unit 79.3.5 (SHUFLY),
+        commanded by Col John F. Carey, arrive at Soc Trang, Republic
+        of Vietnam.
+
+  15 Apr--HMM-362 (Reinforced), a Marine medium transport helicopter
+        squadron, arrives at Soc Trang to begin operations in support
+        of government forces.
+
+  22 Apr--HMM-362 helicopters fly their first combat support
+        missions in Vietnam.
+
+  9 May--Eight Marine helicopters hit by small arms fire during
+        landing on Ca Mau Peninsula.
+
+  18 May--The 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit (3d MEU) began moving
+        into position at Udorn, Thailand, in response to the
+        deteriorating situation in Laos. The 3d MEU was part of Joint
+        Task Force 116, organized for use in the mounting crisis.
+
+  20 May--BGen Ormond R. Simpson assumes command of 3d MEU.
+
+  18 Jun--Eagle Flight first employed in combat by Marine
+        helicopters operating from Soc Trang.
+
+  25 Jun--HMM-162 replaces HMM-261 at Udorn as 3d MEW (MEB)
+        helicopter element.
+
+  1 Jul--First Marine Combat units withdraw from Udorn, Thailand,
+        as a display of good faith.
+
+  23 Jul--An agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of Laos is signed
+        by the U.S., the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Vietnam,
+        and 10 other nations at Geneva.
+
+  30 Jul--Col Julius W. Ireland relieves Col Carey as SHUFLY
+        commander.
+
+  31 Jul--Last Marine combat units withdrawn from Udorn, Thailand.
+
+  1 Aug--HMM-163 replaces HMM-362 as operational squadron assigned
+        to SHUFLY.
+
+  Aug--First machine guns mounted on Marine helicopters operating in
+        Vietnam.
+
+  4 Sep--Initial SHUFLY elements begin displacing to Da Nang in I
+        Corps Tactical Zone.
+
+  18 Sep--HMM-163 conducts first combat operations in I Corps.
+
+  20 Sep--All SHUFLY elements are in place at Da Nang.
+
+  Oct--LtCol Clarence G. Moody relieves LtCol Brown as Senior Marine
+        Advisor to VNMC.
+
+  6 Oct--Five Marines and two U.S. Navy personnel killed in HUS
+        crash near Tam Ky.
+
+  7 Nov--HMM-163 executes first tiger flight reaction force mission
+        in I Corps.
+
+  Nov--All Marine Corps aircraft redesignated.
+
+  6 Nov--Marine Task Unit (SHUFLY) redesignated Task Element
+        79.3.3.6.
+
+  6 Nov--LtCol Alton W. McCully assumes command of SHUFLY.
+
+  Dec--Vietnamese Joint General Staff realigns South Vietnam’s Corps
+        Tactical Zones, creating a fourth CTZ and a Capital Military
+        District.
+
+
+1963
+
+  11 Jan--HMM-162 replaces HMM-163 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron.
+
+  19 Jan--HMM-162 conducts its first combat troop lift in Vietnam.
+
+  10–13 Mar--HMM-162 helicopters participate in search and rescue
+        attempts for U.S. Army OV-1 Mohawk and crew. Two Marine
+        helicopters crash in high mountains of northern II Corps.
+
+  13 Apr--Marine transport helicopters conduct first operation with
+        U.S. Army UH-1B armed helicopters.
+
+  Apr--Organization of Marine Advisory Division modified slightly.
+
+  1 May--Provisional Marine Brigade joins ARVN forces for operation
+        in Do Xa base area.
+
+  8 Jun--HMM-261 replaces HMM-162 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron.
+
+  15–16 Aug--HMM-261 helilifts 2d ARVN Division units from field to
+        culminate operation LAM SON XII.
+
+  21 Aug--Vietnamese National Police raid Buddhist pagodas
+        throughout South Vietnam.
+
+  Sep--LtCol Wesley C. Noren relieves LtCol Moody as Senior Marine
+        Advisor to VNMC.
+
+  2 Oct--HMM-361 replaces HMM-261 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron.
+
+  Oct--Provisional Marine Regiment conducts operation PHI-HOA 5 in Gia
+        Dinh Province.
+
+  1 Nov--Diem government overthrown by coup of military leaders.
+        Diem and brother Ngo Dinh Nhu assassinated.
+
+  14 Nov--Provisional Marine Regiment launches Operation DAI-PHONG
+        28 and 29 in III Corps Tactical Zone.
+
+  25 Nov--2d VNMC Battalion participates in Operation DAI-PHONG 30.
+
+  16 Dec--LtCol Khang relieved as Commandant of Vietnamese Marine
+        Corps. Replaced by LtCol Nguyen Ba Lien.
+
+
+1964
+
+  1 Jan--General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., relieves General David
+        Shoup as Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps.
+
+  Jan--General Greene visits Vietnam.
+
+  15 Jan--BGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC, becomes MACV Assistant Chief
+        of Staff for Intelligence (J-2).
+
+  1 Feb--HMM-364 replaces HMM-361 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron.
+
+  Feb--Col Khang recalled from Philippines and relieves LtCol Lien as
+        Commandant of VNMC.
+
+  Mar--LtGen Victor H. Krulak relieves LtGen Carson A. Roberts as
+        Commanding General, FMFPac.
+
+  27 Apr--HMM-364 participates in Operation SURE WIND 202 in
+        northern II Corps.
+
+  May--MajGen Weede, USMC, relieved as MACV Chief of Staff.
+
+  15 May--USMAAG abolished. Marine Advisory Division renamed Marine
+        Advisory Unit and placed under Naval Advisory Group, MACV.
+
+  20 May--Marine Advisory Team One arrives at Da Nang.
+
+  7 Jun--Two Marines from SHUFLY compound reported missing south of
+        Da Nang.
+
+  13 Jun--Advisory Team One moves to Tiger Tooth Mountain in
+        northwestern I Corps.
+
+  19 Jun--HMM-364 turn over helicopters and maintenance equipment to
+        VNAF 217th Squadron.
+
+  21 Jun--HMM-162 replaces HMM-364 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron.
+
+  Jul--Vietnamese Marine Recruit Training Center opens at Thu Due. VNMC
+        expanded with the creation of a fifth infantry battalion.
+
+  7 Jul--HMM-162 participates in relief of Nam Dong Special Forces
+        Camp.
+
+  2–5 Aug--North Vietnamese patrol boats and U.S. ships clash in
+        Tonkin Gulf.
+
+  6 Aug--U.S. Congress passes Tonkin Gulf resolution.
+
+  11 Aug--President Johnson signs the so-called Tonkin Gulf
+        Resolution.
+
+  19 Aug--Advisory Team One moves to Bach Ma and continues
+        operations.
+
+  4 Sep--Col William P. Nesbit replaces Col Noren as Senior Marine
+        Advisor to VNMC.
+
+  13 Sep--Advisory Team One dissolved, departs Vietnam.
+
+  14 Sep--SHUFLY aircraft flown to safety in face of severe tropical
+        storm.
+
+  Sep--Marine Advisory Unit reorganized and expanded.
+
+  8 Oct HMM-365 replaces HMM-364 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron.
+
+  Oct--Marine reconnaissance element conducts survey of Cam Ranh Bay in
+        southern II Corps.
+
+  31 Dec--Viet Cong terrorist bomb American BOQ in Saigon.
+
+  31 Dec--4th VNMC Battalion defeated at Binh Gia in III Corps.
+
+
+
+
+Appendix E
+
+List of Reviewers
+
+
+  _General Officers_
+  Gen Earl E. Anderson, USMC
+  Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
+  Gen David M. Shoup, USMC (Ret.)
+  LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret.)
+  LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
+  LtGen Carson A. Roberts, USMC (Ret.)
+  LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC (Ret.)
+  LtGen Richard G. Weede, USMC (Ret.)
+  MajGen Norman Anderson, USMC (Ret.)
+  MajGen Paul J. Fontana, USMC (Ret.)
+  MajGen Charles J. Timmes, U.S. Army (Ret.)
+  MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.)
+  MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.)
+  BGen Joseph Koler, Jr., USMC
+
+  _Colonels_
+  Col Frederick S. Aldridge, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Samual Beal, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col John T. Breckinridge, USMC
+  Col Harold F. Brown, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col John F. Carey, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Archie J. Clapp, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Alfred J. Croft, USMC
+  Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Oliver W. Curtis, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Raymond C. Damm, USMC
+  Col Andre Gomez, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Hardy Hay, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Julius W. Ireland, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col John H. La Voy, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Reinhardt Leu, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Robert A. Merchant, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Ross S. Mickey, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Clarence G. Moody, Jr., USMC
+  Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Wesley C. Noren, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Robert L. Rathbum, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Thomas J. Ross, USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
+  Col Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
+
+  _Lieutenant Colonels_
+  LtCol Robert E. Brown, USMC (Ret.)
+  LtCol Earl W. Cassidy, USMC (Ret.)
+  LtCol Michael J. Gott, USMC
+  LtCol George H. Linnemeier, USMC (Ret.)
+  LtCol James P. McWilliams, USMC
+  LtCol Joseph N. Smith, USMC
+
+  _CMC Advisory Committee on Marine Corps History_
+  Col Frederick S. Aldridge, USMC (Ret.)[14-L]
+  MajGen Norman Anderson, USMC (Ret.)[14-M]
+  Dr. Gordon A. Craig
+  Dr. Philip K. Lundeberg
+  Mr. Robert L. Sherrod
+  MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.)[14-N]
+
+  _Others_
+  Center of Military History, Department of the Army
+  Dr. Philip A. Crowl
+  Capt Joseph Drachnik, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
+  Naval Historical Division, Department of the Navy
+  Office of Air Force History, Department of the Air Force
+
+   [14-L] Cited previously.
+
+   [14-M] Cited previously.
+
+   [14-N] Cited previously.
+
+
+
+
+Index
+
+
+  Adams, LtCol Harold W., 89–90, 92–94
+
+  Africa, 11
+
+  Agroville Program, 45
+
+  Aircraft
+    Types
+      AD-6, _See_ A1-H
+      A1-H (Skyraider), 71, 116, 137, 149, 152–154, 158–159
+      A-4C, (Skyhawk), 89, 92
+      B-26, 109, 117–118
+      B-57, 166–167
+      F4U (Corsair), 71
+      F-100 (Super Sabre), 90
+      C-117 (Skytrain), 60–61, 84, 160
+      C-124 (Globemaster), 71
+      C-123 (Provider), 46, 90, 103, 139, 141
+      CH-21 (Shawnee), 58, 103, 107
+      CV-2 (Caribou), 158
+      GV-1. _See_ KC-130
+      H-21. _See_ CH-21
+      HUS-1. _See_ UH-34D
+      KC-130 (Hercules), 61, 70, 73, 89–90, 93–94, 112–114, 142, 147,
+        156
+      O-1B (Bird Dog), 60, 67–69, 73, 82, 84, 92, 107, 115–118,
+        144–145, 149, 154, 157–159, 161
+      OE-1. _See_ O-1B
+      OV-1 (Mohawk), 114
+      R4D. _See_ C-117
+      T-28 (Trojans), 46, 67, 71, 116–118, 120, 149
+      U-10 (Super Courier), 118, 149, 152, 158
+      UH-1B (Iroquois), 107, 109, 115–120, 139, 147–149, 151–152, 154,
+        157–159, 164–165
+      UH-34D, 57–58, 65, 71, 84, 89, 92–93, 103, 105, 111, 113–121, 139,
+        144–146, 149, 151–161, 164–165
+      UH-37 (Mojave), 149
+
+  Air Force, 46, 62, 71, 76, 82, 112, 114–115, 117, 149, 152,
+        158–159, 167
+
+  Air Force Command and Staff College, 120
+
+  Air Support Operations Center, 80, 82, 117–119, 149, 152
+
+  Allied Training Operations Mission, 16
+
+  Alsop, Maj William F., 164
+
+  Amphibious Ready Group, 59, 88–90
+
+  Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5), 61–62
+
+  Andaman Sea, 3
+
+  Anderson, Col Earl E., 47, 131, 146
+
+  Anderson, Cpl Thomas E., 83
+
+  An Diem, 144, 147, 158
+
+  Annam, 3, 9, 11–12, 78
+
+  Annamese Coast, 8, 162
+
+  Annamite Mountains, 6, 80, 103, 139
+
+  Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, 27
+
+  An Xuyen Province, 31, 49, 71, 133
+
+  Armed Services Committee, 146
+
+  Army, 23, 26, 42, 46, 62, 80, 83, 117, 136, 152, 154, 157–158
+    Units
+      27th Infantry Brigade, 88, 90
+      52d Aviation Battalion, 155
+      145th Aviation Battalion, 107
+      33d Helicopter Company, 57, 59
+      57th Helicopter Company, 65, 70–71
+      68th Aviation Company, 115
+      81st Helicopter Company, 58–59
+      93d Helicopter Company, 58, 73–74
+      704th Counterintelligence Unit, 141
+      3d Radio Research Unit, 46
+      Paratroopers, 70
+      Special Forces, 80, 111, 114, 151, 155, 157
+
+  Army Communications Station, Phu Bai, 139
+
+  Army Communications Station, Pleiku, 139
+
+  Army Field Hospital, Nha Trang, 148, 157, 159
+
+  Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, NC, 41, 47
+
+  A Shau Valley, 149
+
+  Asia, 12
+
+  Associated States of Indochina, 11
+
+  Atsugi, Japan, 61
+
+  Australia, 14, 165
+
+  Aviation Headquarters Operations Center, 117
+
+
+  Bach Phoung XI, 103, 105, 116
+
+  Baker, Col Warren P., 143
+
+  Bangkok, Thailand, 88–89, 93, 143
+
+  Ban Me Thuot, 9, 49
+
+  Bassac River, 65
+
+  Ba Xuyen Province, 61, 67
+
+  Beal, LtCol Samuel G., 146, 156
+
+  Beaver, SSgt Clifford J., 137
+
+  Becker, Raymond A., 141
+
+  Beirut, Lebanon, 146
+
+  Bell Helicopter Company, 115
+
+  Ben Hai River, 12
+
+  Ben Tre, 70
+
+  Bien Hoa, 105, 107, 166
+
+  Binh Dinh Province, 129
+
+  Binh Duong Province, 45, 107
+
+  Binh Gia, 136–138, 143, 166
+
+  Binh Thuan Province, 49, 51
+
+  Binh Xuyen, 13, 18–20, 26
+
+  Braddon, Maj John R., 153
+
+  Brady, Lt Philip O., 137–138
+
+  Breckinridge, Capt James T., 19–20, 23
+
+  Brigham, LtCol George, 152
+
+  British Advisory Mission, 45
+
+  Bronars, Maj Edward J., 142
+
+  Bronze Star, 110, 148
+
+  Brown, LtCol Harold F., 111–112
+
+  Brown, LtCol Robert E., 36, 48–49, 53
+
+  Buddhist, 8, 99
+
+  Burma, 3, 93
+
+
+  Cai Ngai, 67
+
+  California, 59, 70
+
+  Ca Mau, 40, 65, 67, 69–71
+
+  Ca Mau Peninsula, 11, 36, 62, 101
+
+  Cambodia, 3, 8–9, 11–12, 14, 30, 67, 93, 109
+
+  Cambodian Border, 107
+
+  Campbell, Cpl Charley M., 115
+
+  Cam Ranh Bay, 22, 31, 141
+
+  Canada, 12, 93
+
+  Can Tho, 9, 62, 65
+
+  Cao Dai, 8, 13, 18–19
+
+  Cape St. Jacques, 36
+
+  Capital Military District, 84, 105, 132
+
+  Carey, Col John F., 60–61, 63, 69–71, 73
+
+  Cassidy, LtCol Earl W., 112, 144, 146
+
+  Catholicism, 8, 12–13, 99
+
+  Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, 28
+
+  Central Highlands, 6, 9, 32, 49, 53, 105, 129, 167
+
+  Central Office for South Vietnam, 44–45
+
+  Chai Doc, 65
+
+  Chams, 6
+
+  Chien Tang (“Struggle for Victory”) Plan, 129
+
+  Chi, Capt Bui Pho, 19, 23
+
+  China, 3, 11–13, 93, 96, 161
+
+  Chinese, 6, 8
+
+  Chinese Nationalist Forces, 9, 11
+
+  CHINH BIEN, 159
+
+  Cholon District, 13
+
+  Christanity, 3, 8
+
+  Christensen, Capt Don R., 49, 101, 103, 110
+
+  Civil Guard, 27–28, 30–32, 34, 45, 67, 129
+
+  Civilian Irregular Defense Group, 80, 139, 144, 157
+
+  Clapp, LtCol Archie J., 60–62, 65, 67, 69–70, 156
+
+  Clark Air Force Base, Philippines, 90
+
+  Cochinchina, 3, 8, 11
+
+  Cold War, 86
+
+  Collins, Gen James F., CinCUSARPac, 58
+
+  Collins, Gen J. Lawton, 15
+
+  Command and Staff Training Course, 41–42
+
+  Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, 94, 144, 155
+
+  Condon, MajGen John P., 59–61, 73, 88
+
+  Confucianism, 8
+
+  Conway, MajGen J. F., 88
+
+  Cook, Capt Donald G., 138
+
+  Corps Tactical Zones
+    I Corps, 46, 58, 63, 73, 76, 78–80, 82–85, 103, 111, 113–114,
+        116–118, 120, 127, 132, 139, 142, 144, 146, 148–149, 152,
+        154–162, 164–165
+    II Corps, 46, 49, 58, 63, 79–80, 84, 102–103, 111, 114, 129, 132,
+        141, 152, 154–155, 160, 167
+    III Corps, 58–59, 61–63, 67, 69, 71, 73–74, 107, 109, 129, 132, 136
+    IV Corps, 84, 132
+
+  Counter-Insurgency Plan, 29–30
+
+  Counterguerrilla Warfare Study Group, 41
+
+  Croft, Maj Alfred J., 49, 51, 103
+
+  Croizat, LtCol Victor J., 16, 18–20, 22–23, 32, 90, 132
+
+  Cronin, LtCol Angus J., 93
+
+  Cross of Valor, 156
+
+  Cua Viet, 78
+
+  Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Philippines, 89
+
+  Curtis, LtCol Oliver W., 156–159, 161–162
+
+  Cushman, MajGen Robert E., 41–42
+
+  Cuu Long, 36
+
+  Cuu Long Navy Yard, 31–32
+
+
+  Dai, Emperor Bao, 8, 11–13, 19
+
+  DAI-PHONG 28, 107
+
+  DAI-PHONG 29, 107
+
+  DAI-PHONG 30, 107, 109
+
+  DAI-PHONG 31, 109
+
+  Dak To, 155
+
+  Damm, Maj Raymond C., 131, 142, 166
+
+  Da Nang, 9, 32, 58, 71, 73–76, 78–80, 83–85, 103, 111–118,
+        120–121, 123, 129, 139, 141–149, 154–162, 164–165, 167
+
+  Da Nang Harbor, 78, 111
+
+  Da Nang River, 78
+
+  DA NANG SIX, 164
+
+  Davis, Capt Dale N., 31
+
+  Davis, LtCol Ralph R., 71, 111
+
+  Davis, BGen Raymond G., 129
+
+  Declaration of Neutrality of Laos, 93
+
+  Dees, LtCol Harry C., 71
+
+  Delayen, Capt Jean Louis, 17, 19
+
+  Demilitarized Zone, 13, 27–29, 76, 78, 111
+
+  Democratic Republic of Vietnam. _See_ North Vietnam
+
+  Department of Defense, 42, 47, 61, 76, 84, 144
+
+  Department of State, 15, 19, 28
+
+  Dickinson, LtCol Harry E., 143
+
+  Diem, President Ngo Dinh, 8, 12–16, 18–20, 22–23, 26–32, 35–36, 42,
+        45, 53, 80, 99–100, 105, 121–122, 127, 146
+
+  Dien Bien Phu, 12, 71
+
+  Distinguished Flying Cross, 59, 111, 120, 156
+
+  Distinguished Service Medal, 131
+
+  Don, MajGen Tran Van, 79–80
+
+  Dong Bach Ma, 141
+
+  Dong Ha, 9, 78
+
+  Dong Nai boats, 101
+
+  Donlon, Capt Roger H. C., 157–158
+
+  Do Xa Base Area, 103, 105, 115–116, 121, 152, 155
+
+  Dulles, Secretary of State John Foster, 14
+
+
+  Eagle Flight, 69–70, 83
+
+  Eisenhower, President Dwight D., 14–15, 29
+
+  Eldridge, LtCol William W., 60–61, 71
+
+  Eller, Capt Franklin P., 137–138
+
+  Ely, Gen Paul, 15–16
+
+  Europe, 11
+
+
+  Father-For-A-Day Program, 85
+
+  Felt, Adm Harry D., 47, 57–58, 86, 88, 90
+
+  FLAMING DART, 167
+
+  Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 40, 42, 58, 70, 76, 83, 90, 94, 141,
+        143, 147, 165.
+    _See Also_ Marine Corps, FMF Units
+
+  Fontana, MajGen Paul J., 156, 160
+
+  Fort Ord, California, 57, 59
+
+  Forward Air Controller, 72, 107, 109
+
+  France, 8, 9, 11–14, 19, 22, 93
+
+  French Expeditionary Corps, 9, 11–16
+
+  French High Command, 16, 22, 24
+
+  French-Indochina, 9, 11, 15
+
+  French-Indochina War, 13–14, 16, 22–24, 36, 48, 103
+
+  French Navy, 16
+
+  French Union, 11
+
+  Futema, Okinawa, 61
+
+
+  General Commission for Refugees, 16
+
+  Geneva Conference, 12–16, 25, 27, 86, 88, 93–94, 121, 132
+
+  German Army, 70
+
+  Gia Dinh Province, 105, 132
+
+  Giap, Gen Vo Nyguyen, 11–12
+
+  Gi Lang, 152, 154
+
+  Go Cong, 132–133
+
+  Gomez, Col Andre D., 112, 117, 119–120, 144, 146
+
+  Gott, Capt Michael J., 37
+
+  Gray, Maj Alfred M., 139, 141, 156, 158
+
+  Great Britain, 9, 12, 14, 93
+
+  Green, Maj Marion R., 156
+
+  Greene, Gen Wallace M., Jr., 142, 145–146
+
+  Greer, PFC Robert L., 155–156
+
+  Griffin, Lt Gerald, 83
+
+  Ground Control Approach, 60
+
+  Guadalcanal, 22, 35
+
+  Gulf of Siam, 3, 88
+
+  Gulf of Tonkin, 6, 78, 128–129, 158, 166–167
+
+
+  Haiphong, 16
+
+  Hai Van Peninsula, 78, 83
+
+  Hamilton, Sgt Richard E., 83
+
+  Hanoi, 11–12, 29
+
+  Harkins, Gen Paul D., 46–47, 57–59, 61–62, 73, 88, 99, 127, 146
+
+  Hau Nghia Province, 107
+
+  Hawaii, 47, 59, 90, 141–142, 146
+
+  Hay, Col Hardy, 158, 160–161
+
+  Heim, Lt Robert P., 162
+
+  Hiep Hoa Special Forces Camp, 107, 109
+
+  Hoa Hao, 8, 13, 18–19
+
+  Hoa My, 83
+
+  Ho Chi Minh. _See_ Minh, Ho Chi
+
+  Ho Chi Minh Trail, 80
+
+  Hoi An, 9, 78
+
+  Hoi Dong Sam, 107, 109
+
+  Honolulu Conference, 46
+
+  Hop Tac Program, 129, 132, 136
+
+  Hudson, LtCol Robert S., 93
+
+  Hue, 9, 12, 16, 78–79, 82, 99, 113, 119
+
+  Hughes, Capt Virgil R., 116
+
+  Hugo, Victor, 8
+
+  Hung, Maj Le Nhu, 23, 31, 35
+
+
+  India, 93
+
+  Indian Ocean, 3, 12
+
+  Indochina, 3, 11–12, 16, 35, 62, 166
+
+  Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 146
+
+  Infantry Unit Training Course, 41
+
+  Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets, 45.
+    _See Also_ Strategic Hamlet Program
+
+  International Control Commission, 12, 30.
+    _See Also_ Canada, India, and Poland
+
+  Interzone V, 44
+
+  Ireland, Col Julius W., 71, 73, 75–76, 79, 83, 85, 112
+
+  Irwin, Capt William R., 141
+
+  Iwo Jima, 62
+
+
+  Japan, 8–9, 11, 62, 71
+
+  Jeep, M-442 “Mighty Mite,” 112
+
+  Job Related Orientation Program, 143
+
+  Johnson, President Lyndon B., 127, 166–167
+
+  Johore, Malaya, 41
+
+  Joint Chiefs of Staff, 51, 53, 57, 59, 88, 127, 142, 155
+
+  Joint General Staff, 20, 22, 31–32, 35–36, 40, 82, 84, 100, 102, 109,
+        111, 132, 149
+
+  Joint Operations Center, 62–63, 82
+
+  Joint Operations Evaluation Group, 47
+
+  Joint Task Force 116, 86, 88–90.
+    _See Also_ Marine Corps, FMF Units
+
+  Joint U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group, Thailand, 88, 90
+
+  Jones, Capt Robert C., 100
+
+  Jungle Warfare School, 41
+
+
+  Kelliher, Lt James P., 137
+
+  Kennedy, President John F., 30, 36, 42–44, 57, 86, 88, 93, 127
+
+  Kham Duc, 159, 161
+
+  Khang, BGen Le Nguyen, 35–36, 49, 53, 100–103, 105, 109–110, 132, 138
+
+  Khanh, MajGen Nguyen, 103, 127, 129, 132
+
+  Ke Sanh, 139, 141, 155–156, 158
+
+  Khmers, 6
+
+  Khrushchev, Premier Nikita, 30
+
+  Kien Giang Province, 18
+
+  King, Col John H., Jr., 161–164
+
+  Koler, LtCol Joseph, Jr., 161–162, 165
+
+  Kontum, 9, 79, 103
+
+  Kontum Province, 103, 155, 167
+
+  Korat, Thailand, 88, 90
+
+  Korean War, 15, 35, 47–48, 59, 70, 111, 116, 120, 131, 146, 156, 161
+
+  Ky, Vice Air Marshal Nguyen Cao, 156
+
+
+  LAM SON XII, 117
+
+  LAM SON, 115, 149
+
+  Laos, 3, 9, 11–12, 14, 29–30, 80, 86, 88, 92–94, 139, 155, 166
+
+  Laotian Border, 78, 80, 117–119, 121, 147, 149, 157, 159
+
+  La Voy, LtCol John H., 146–147, 149, 151–152, 155–156
+
+  Legion of Merit, 59, 158
+
+  Leu, LtCol Reinhardt, 93, 111, 113, 115–116
+
+  Lien, Lt Col Nguyen Ba, 110, 132
+
+  Lieu, Maj Pham Van, 20
+
+  Linnemeier, LtCol George H., 111–112
+
+  LOCKJAW, 65
+
+  Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot, 127
+
+  Logistics Support Group, Thailand, 93
+
+  Long An, 133
+
+  Long An Province, 132
+
+  Long Tao River, 142
+
+  Loyko, GSgt William A., 49
+
+
+  Malaya, _See_ Malaysia
+
+  Malaysia, 3, 45
+
+  Mang Buc, 114
+
+  Manila Pact, 14
+
+  Mansfield, LCpl James I., 83
+
+  Mao Tse-tung, 11
+
+  Marine Corps, 22–25, 34–35, 40–41, 46–48, 53, 57–58, 65, 73–74, 82,
+        85, 90, 95, 100, 103, 107, 110–111, 116–117, 121, 123, 136–139,
+        142, 156
+    FMF Air Units:
+      1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 59–61, 70, 83, 88, 129, 156, 160–161,
+        165
+      3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 71, 70
+      Task Unit 79.3.5. _See_ SHUFLY
+      Task Element 79.3.3.6. _See_ SHUFLY
+      MAG-16, 58, 62, 70, 85, 158, 161
+      ProvMAG, 89–90, 92
+      MACS-2, 89
+      MABS-12, 89
+      MABS-16, 60–63, 69–71, 73, 75–76, 88, 111–114, 144, 146, 148,
+        155–156, 160
+      VMA-211, 89
+      VMA-324, 71
+      VMA-332, 89, 93
+      VMB-443, 146n
+      VMGR-152, 61, 116, 156
+      VMGR-352, 61
+      VMO-2, 68
+      HMM-161, 161
+      HMM-162, 93, 111, 113, 115–116, 156–162
+      HMM-163, 70–73, 75, 80, 83, 111, 113, 116
+      HMM-261, 61, 89–90, 93, 117–120
+      HMM-361, 120–121, 144, 146
+      HMM-362, 60–63, 65, 67–71
+      HMM-364, 146–147, 149, 151–152, 155–156
+      HMM-365, 161–162, 164–165
+      MATCU-68, 60, 62
+      Task Element 79.3.5.2, 60.
+        _See also_ MABS-16
+    FMF Ground Units
+      1st Marine Division, 161
+      3d Marine Division, 40–41, 86, 90, 100, 110, 112, 129, 136–138,
+        142, 147–158
+      4th Marine Division, 146
+      3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 88, 90, 92–93
+      9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 129, 167
+      5th Marines, 47
+      3d Marine Expeditionary Unit, 93–95, 113
+      Marine Advisory Unit, Vietnam, 131, 143
+    Infantry Battalions
+      1/9, 147, 160
+      2/9, 164
+      3/9, 89, 93–94
+    Infantry Companies
+      G/2/3, 139, 141
+      K/3/3, 141
+      E/2/9, 161
+      L/3/9, 164
+      Advisory Team One, 139, 141, 155–156, 158
+      1st Radio Company, 46, 139, 141
+      Signal Engineering Survey Unit, 139.
+        _See Also_ 1st Radio Company
+      Security Detachment, Marine Unit Vietnam, 164
+
+  Marine Corps Air Facility, Santa Ana, 70
+
+  Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan, 61
+
+  Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, 16, 18, 23, 24, 35
+
+  Marine Corps Junior School, Quantico, 47
+
+  Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, 100, 136
+
+  McCully, LtCol Alton W., 71, 84, 111–112
+
+  McGarr, LtGen Lionel C, 29, 36
+
+  McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert S., 43, 46, 122, 127, 142
+
+  McWilliams, Capt James P., 107
+
+  Medal of Honor, 51, 158
+
+  Mekong Delta, 3, 6, 8–9, 16, 18–19, 28, 32, 36, 44–45, 57–59, 61–62,
+        67, 69, 73–75, 78, 80, 82, 84–85, 113, 116, 121, 132
+
+  Mekong River, 6, 8, 88
+
+  Merchant, Col Robert A., 146–149, 152, 154–158
+
+  Mickey, Col Ross S., 89, 93
+
+  Middle East, 3, 146
+
+  Midway, 60
+
+  Military Assistance Program, 30
+
+  Military Region 5, 45, 103
+
+  Military Region 9, 45
+
+  Minh, MajGen Duong Van, 99
+
+  Minh, Ho Chi, 11, 29
+
+  “Minute of Understanding,” 15
+
+  _Missouri_ (BB-63), 9
+
+  M-108 Wrecker, 136
+
+  Monkey Mountain, 141
+
+  Monroe, Lt Anthony A., 161
+
+  Montagnards, 6, 103, 111, 157
+
+  Montgomery, LtCol William, 149
+
+  Moody, LtCol Clarence G., 48–49, 100–103, 105, 132
+
+  My Tho, 62, 65, 107
+
+
+  NAMBO Interzone, 44
+
+  Nam Dong, 155, 157–159
+
+  Nam Tha, 88
+
+  National Intelligence Estimate, 29
+
+  National Liberation Front, 29, 44, 45
+
+  National War College, 161
+
+  Navy, 37, 48, 71, 90, 128
+
+  Navy Cross, 60, 48, 155
+
+  Navy Mobile Construction Battalion, 93, 112
+
+  New Life Hamlets. _See_ Hop Tac Program
+
+  Newport, Rhode Island, 131
+
+  New Zealand, 14
+
+  Nesbit, Col William P., 131–133, 143
+
+  Nghiem, BGen LeVan, 61–62, 73
+
+  Nha Trang, 16, 18–19, 22, 31, 114, 157, 160, 162
+
+  Nhu, Ngo Dinh, 45–46, 99
+
+  NIGHTINGALE, 65
+
+  Nipper, LCpl David, 162
+
+  Nong Son, 79
+
+  Nong Ta Kai, Thailand, 90, 92–93
+
+  Noren, LtCol Wesley C., 105, 107, 110, 131, 132
+
+  Normandy, France, 70
+
+  Northern Training Area, Okinawa, 41
+
+  North Korea, 11, 13, 15
+
+  North Vietnam, 3, 9, 11–12, 16, 26, 28–29, 44, 80, 86, 93–94, 128,
+        155, 166–167
+
+  North Vietnamese, 27, 29, 30, 88, 103, 121, 129
+
+  North Vietnamese Army
+    Units
+      32d Regiment, 167
+      101st Regiment, 167
+
+  Norton, H. G. O., 83
+
+  Nosavan, Gen Phoumi, 86
+
+
+  O’Daniel, LtGen John M., 15–16, 22
+
+  Olmen, Lt John D., 115
+
+  Okinawa, 41, 47, 58, 61–62, 70–71, 74, 76, 85–86, 89–90, 93, 112–113,
+        136, 141–144, 146, 156, 161
+
+  On-The-Job Training Program, 40, 42, 136–137, 142–143
+
+  Otlowski, Lt Raymond J., 139, 141
+
+  Oum, Prince Boun, 86
+
+
+  Pacific Ocean, 3
+
+  Pacifier, _See_ Eagle Flight
+
+  Pakistan, 14
+
+  Paris, France, 138
+
+  Parker, Capt Evan L., 49
+
+  “Passage to Freedom,” 16
+
+  Pathet Lao, 29, 86, 88
+
+  Patton, LtCol Harvey M., 89
+
+  Pendell, Sgt Jerald W., 83
+
+  People-to-People Program, 71, 74, 85, 92–93
+
+  People’s Army of Vietnam, 13, 80
+
+  People’s Republic of China. _See_ China
+
+  Perfume River, 78
+
+  Phan Rang, 6
+
+  Phan Thiet, 51
+
+  PHI-HOA 5, 105
+
+  Philippines, 12, 14, 59, 61, 89–90, 93, 110, 132
+
+  Phouma, Prince Souvanna, 86, 88, 93
+
+  Phu Bai, 139
+
+  Phouc Thuan Province, 30
+
+  Phouc Thy Province, 136
+
+  Phouc Vin, 30
+
+  Plain of Jars, 86
+
+  Plain of Reeds, 70
+
+  Plateau Gi, 103
+
+  Pleiku, 9, 32, 46, 103, 129, 139, 152, 167
+
+  _Point Defiance_ (LSD-31), 90
+
+  Poland, 12, 93
+
+  Popular Forces, 129
+
+  Porter, Col Daniel B., Jr., 67, 73–74
+
+  _Princeton_ (CV-37) (LPH-5), 61–62, 162
+
+  Purple Heart Medal, 110
+
+
+  Radar, counter-mortar, 164
+
+  Radios, 61, 68, 149
+
+  Rathbun, LtCol Robert L., 70–74, 84, 111, 113
+
+  Red River Delta, 3, 11, 16
+
+  Regional Forces, 129
+
+  Republic of Korea. _See_ South Korea
+
+  Republic of Vietnam. _See_ South Vietnam
+
+  Richardson, LtGen John L., 88, 90, 93–94
+
+  Roberts, MajGen Carson A., 57–58, 70
+
+  Robichaud, LtCol Clifford J., 35–36
+
+  Roe, 161
+
+  ROLLING THUNDER, 167
+
+  Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 23
+
+  Ross, LtCol Thomas J., 120, 144–146
+
+  Route 1, 9, 80, 141
+
+  Route 9, 9, 80, 139
+
+  Route 19, 9
+
+  Royal Marines, 48
+
+  Royal Thai Regiment, 88
+
+  Rung Sat, 18–19
+
+  Rung Sat Special Zone, 142
+
+  Rupp, LCpl Walter L., 148
+
+
+  Saigon, 8–9, 15–16, 18–19, 28, 30–32, 34–36, 40, 45–48, 51, 53, 58,
+        60, 62, 65, 80, 100–102, 105, 107, 121, 129, 131–133, 136, 138,
+        141–153, 160, 166
+
+  Saigon Central Police Headquarters, 18
+
+  Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone, 45
+
+  Saigon River, 8
+
+  St. Clair, Col Howard B., 142
+
+  Saipan, 47
+
+  Secretary of Defense, 57, 128, 131
+
+  Self Defense Corps, 30, 45, 129
+
+  Seventh Fleet, 59–60, 88, 93–94, 141, 162
+
+  Schoech, VAdm William A., 59–61
+
+  Schrenkengost, PFC Fred T., 155–156
+
+  Shapley, LtGen Alan, 40, 57–58
+
+  Sheperd, Gen Lemuel C., 16
+
+  Sheridan, Capt John, 164
+
+  Shook, LtCol Frank A., 116, 119–120
+
+  Shoup, Gen David M., 51, 53, 58
+
+  SHUFLY, 59–62, 65, 69–71, 73–75, 83–86, 92, 111, 113–114, 117, 120,
+        121, 139, 141, 142, 144, 146, 157–159, 165
+
+  Sides, Adm John H., 58–59
+
+  Silver Star Medal, 110, 138
+
+  Simpson, BGen Ormand B., 90, 92–95
+
+  Sinnott, Lt William T., 83
+
+  Slack, Cpl Richard D., Jr., 162
+
+  Smith, Capt Joseph N., 107, 109–110
+
+  Snell, Capt Bradley S., 49
+
+  SocTrang, 58, 60–63, 65, 67, 70–71, 73–76, 82, 86, 92, 111–113, 144
+
+  So Huynh Pho, 8
+
+  Son, MajGen Tran Van, 79
+
+  Song Cam Lo, 78
+
+  Song Cau Dai, 78
+
+  Song Cau Do, 78
+
+  Song Han, 78
+
+  Song Huong, 78
+
+  Song Thu Bonm, 78–79, 115, 162
+
+  Song Tra Bon, 159
+
+  Song Tra Bong, 78
+
+  Song Tra Khuc, 78
+
+  Song Ve, 78
+
+  Song Vu Gia, 78, 117
+
+  Souphanauvong, Prince, 86
+
+  South China Sea, 3, 6, 8, 78, 84, 141, 167
+
+  South Korea, 11–13, 15
+
+  South Vietnam, 3, 6, 8–9, 12, 14–16, 18–19, 22–23, 25, 27–30, 35, 40,
+        42–45, 48, 51, 53, 57–58, 61, 65, 68, 70–71, 74, 78–79, 84,
+        86, 88, 90, 93–94, 100, 109, 110–111, 119, 121–123, 127–129,
+        138–139, 141–144, 152, 155–158, 166–167
+
+  South Vietnamese Armed Forces, 30, 32, 34, 36, 43, 45–46, 58, 129
+    Units
+      Vietnamese Air Force, 27, 46, 48, 62, 67–69, 72, 80, 82, 105,
+        115–120, 137, 144, 146–147, 149, 151–152, 154–156, 158, 162
+      Vietnamese Army, 13–16, 18, 22–23, 26–27, 32, 49, 60–61, 63, 65,
+        67, 72, 74, 80, 83–84, 103, 105, 110, 112, 116–121, 129, 139,
+        141–142, 145, 147–149, 152–153, 155, 157–159, 161, 164–165
+      1st ARVN Division, 79, 111, 113, 115, 142
+      2d ARVN Division, 79, 82–83, 103, 105, 111, 113, 115, 117, 142,
+        154, 159
+      5th ARVN Division, 62
+      7th ARVN Division, 62, 65
+      21st ARVN Division, 62, 65, 67, 79–80
+      25th ARVN Division, 79, 103, 111
+      Airborne Brigade, 34, 129, 132
+      11th ARVN Regiment, 107
+      43d ARVN Regiment, 51
+      Ranger Battalions, 79, 114, 136, 164–166
+      Special Forces, 84
+      Vietnamese Marine Corps, 16, 18–20, 22–24, 29–30, 32, 34–37, 40,
+        47–49, 53, 58, 65, 84, 90, 100, 102–103, 105, 107, 109–110,
+        116, 121, 129, 131–133, 136, 138, 142–143, 166
+      Amphibious Support Battalion, 136
+      1st Battalion, 16, 18–20, 22–23, 31, 37, 49, 105, 107, 109
+      2d Battalion, 22–23, 31, 35, 49, 101–103, 107, 109–110
+      3d Battalion, 32, 36–37, 53, 105, 107, 109–110
+      4th Battalion, 36, 49, 51, 100–103, 105, 110, 136–138
+      5th Battalion, 133, 138
+      Reconnaissance Company, 105
+      Training Company, 136
+      Artillery Batteries, 51, 100, 105
+      Vietnamese Navy, 16, 36–37, 48, 101, 105, 142
+
+  South Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, 32
+
+  South Vietnamese Ministry of Interior, 27, 30
+
+  Southeast Asia, 3, 9, 11, 14, 29, 40–41, 94, 167
+
+  Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 14, 59, 61, 88, 90
+
+  Soviet Union, 12–13, 86, 93
+
+  Sparrow Hawk, _See_ Eagle Flight
+
+  Special Landing Force, 59, 62, 88–89, 162
+
+  Special Operations Group, 141
+
+  Steele, Col Fred A., 89–90
+
+  Stilwell, MajGen Richard G., 131
+
+  Strategic Hamlet Program, 45–46, 51, 53, 80, 101, 121–122, 129
+
+  SURE WIND 202, 152, 154–156, 158
+
+
+  Tactical Air Commander Airborne, 149
+
+  Tactical Air Navigation, 60
+
+  Tactical Air Support System, 62
+
+  Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, 60, 62, 69, 73, 75, 82,
+        103, 114, 119, 148, 155
+
+  Takjli, 90
+
+  Tam Ky, 82–83, 103, 116, 149, 157, 159–161, 165
+
+  Taoism, 8
+
+  Tarawa, 51
+
+  Taylor, Gen Maxwell D., 42–43, 57, 127
+
+  Taylor, Capt Richard B., 101, 103, 110
+
+  Tay Ninh Province, 109, 133
+
+  Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, 26, 30
+
+  Texas A&M, 158
+
+  Thailand, 3, 14, 86, 88–90, 92–94, 113, 143
+
+  Thi, Col Nguyen Chanh, 29, 36
+
+  Thompson, SSgt John C., 155
+
+  Thompson, Sir Robert G. K., 45–46
+
+  Thoung Duc, 117, 119, 151
+
+  Throckmorton, LtGen John L., 131
+
+  Thua Thien Province, 76, 111, 115, 149, 157
+
+  Thu Duc, 36, 53, 100, 107, 136
+
+  Tien Phouc, 83, 160
+
+  Tiger Flight. _See_ Eagle Flight
+
+  Tiger Force, 83, 162, 165
+
+  Tiger Tooth Mountain, (Dong Voi Mep), 139, 141, 155–156, 158
+
+  Timmes, MajGen Charles J., 47, 57
+
+  Tonkin, 3, 8–9, 11–12, 16
+
+  Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 128
+
+  Tourane, 71.
+    _See Also_ Da Nang
+
+  Tracy, TSgt Jackson E., 19–20
+
+  Training Relations Instruction Mission, 16, 19, 22
+
+  Tra My, 103, 105, 116
+
+  Trong, Maj Le Quang, 16, 19
+
+  Tropic of Cancer, 6
+
+  Truman, President Harry S., 12, 15
+
+  TULUNGAN, 59–60
+
+  Tunny, Lt Michael J., 83
+
+  Turner, Capt James S. G., 37
+
+  Typhoon Kate, 162
+
+  Typhoon Tilda, 159–160
+
+  Typhoon Violet, 159
+
+
+  Udorn, Thailand, 88–90, 92–93, 113, 158
+
+  U Minh Forest, 36, 40
+
+  United Front of National Forces, 18
+
+  United States, 13, 15, 19, 42, 71, 93, 99, 136, 166
+
+  U.S. Air Force. _See_ Air Force
+
+  U.S. Army. _See_ Army
+
+  U.S. Congress, 12
+
+  U.S. Embassy, Saigon, 32, 45, 138
+
+  U.S. Interagency Committee for Province Rehabilitation, 45
+
+  U.S. Marine Corps. _See_ Marine Corps
+
+  U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, 15–16, 19, 22–24, 26, 29,
+        31–32, 35–36, 42, 44, 46–48, 53, 57, 86, 131, 146
+
+  U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand, 88, 90
+
+  U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 46–48, 53, 57–63, 67, 73,
+        76, 80, 88, 99–100, 117, 127, 131, 139, 141–144, 147, 154–155,
+        158, 165, 167
+
+  U.S. Military Assistance Program, 16
+
+  U.S. Navy. _See_ Navy
+
+  U.S. Operations Mission, 27
+
+
+  Valentin, LCpl Miguel A., 83
+
+  _Valley Forge_ (LPH-8), 93, 156
+
+  Vichy Government, 9
+
+  Vientiane, Laos, 88, 93
+
+  Viet Cong, 19, 27–32, 34–37, 40, 43, 45–46, 49, 51, 53, 62–63, 65,
+        67, 69–74, 80, 82–83, 99, 101–103, 105, 107, 109–111, 113–116,
+        120–123, 127, 129, 136, 138, 141–144, 148–149, 151–153, 155,
+        157–159, 161–162, 164–167
+    Units
+      9th Viet Cong Division, 138
+      4th Viet Cong Battalion, 80
+
+  Viet Minh, 8, 11–13, 16, 27, 32.
+    _See Also_ Viet Cong
+
+  Village Self Defense Corps, 27–28
+
+  Vinh Binh Province, 31
+
+  Vinh Long, 9, 65
+
+  Vinson, Lt Richard P., 85
+
+  Vung Tau, 36, 40, 100, 136
+
+
+  Walker, Maj John W., 142
+
+  Washington, D.C., 22, 29–30, 42, 46, 121, 128, 141, 143, 167
+
+  Watson, Cpl Billy S., 74
+
+  Weapons
+    Types
+      AR-15 automatic rifles, 65
+      Browning automatic rifles, 22
+      81mm mortars, 32, 164
+      82mm mortars, 137
+      57mm recoilless rifles, 32, 109, 137
+      .50 caliber machine guns, 107, 109, 137, 152–154
+      4.2-inch mortars, 22, 32, 60
+      Hawk missiles, 167
+      Light antiaircraft missiles, 167
+      M-14 rifles, 65
+      M-1 carbines, 22, 32
+      M-1 rifles, 32
+      M-16 rifles, 65
+      M-60 machine guns, 73, 114–115, 147–149, 162
+      M3A1 submachine guns, 65
+      105mm howitzers, 49, 118, 136
+      75mm pack howitzers, 36, 49, 136
+      60mm mortars, 32, 109
+      .30 caliber machine guns, 107, 152
+      TK-1, 162, 164
+      2.75-inch rockets, 115, 162
+
+  Webster, Capt David N., 114
+
+  Weede, MajGen Richard G., 47, 76, 131
+
+  Weller, MajGen Donald M., 40–41, 86, 90
+
+  Westmoreland, Gen William C., 127–128, 131, 155, 158, 166
+
+  Wilder, Capt Gary, 31
+
+  Wilkes, LtCol William N., Jr., 22–23, 31
+
+  Wilkinson, LtCol Frank R., Jr., 23, 31, 34–35
+
+  Williams, LtGen Samuel T., 26–27, 29, 32, 35
+
+  World War II, 9, 11, 13, 35–37, 40, 47, 51, 59, 62, 70, 75, 111–112,
+        120, 131, 146, 156, 161
+
+
+  Yen, Capt Nguyen Thanh, 107, 109
+
+  Youngdale, BGen Carl A., 131, 166
+
+
+  Zimolzak, Capt Frank, 110
+
+
+U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977 O-211-623
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber’s Notes
+
+
+Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
+predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they
+were not changed.
+
+Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation
+marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left
+unbalanced.
+
+Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs and
+outside quotations.
+
+The original book uses bottom-of-page footnotes and end-of-volume
+endnotes. In this ebook, the footnotes have been moved directly
+below the paragraphs that reference them, and their symbols have
+been replaced by letters, so as to be unique within the eBook, while
+retaining the original physical sequence. The endnotes remain in their
+original positions, and their numbers have been modified to be unique
+within the eBook. The modifications are intended to allow successful
+hyper-linking in HTML and ereaders that support such links.
+
+The modified footnote numbering uses chapter numbers and sequences
+within those chapters. The bottom-of-page sequences are alphabetic,
+while the endnote sequences retain their original numeric values.
+
+In the original book, several footnotes were referenced multiple times.
+In this eBook, those footnotes have been duplicated and assigned new,
+unique letters, so that the references lead to separate footnotes. This
+is intended to facilitate back-linking from the footnotes to their
+references.
+
+The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page
+references.
+
+
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75912 ***
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+<body>
+<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75912 ***</div>
+
+<div class="transnote section">
+<p class="center larger">Transcriber’s Notes</p>
+
+<p>Larger versions of most illustrations may be seen by right-clicking them
+and selecting an option to view them separately, or by double-tapping and/or
+stretching them.</p>
+
+<p>References to same-page footnotes are alphameric, <span class="italic">e.g.</span>, [1-A]. The
+number is the Chapter number; the letter is the sequence within the
+chapter.</p>
+
+<p>References to <a href="#Notes">endnotes</a> (near the end of the book) are numeric, <span class="italic">e.g.</span>, [1-1].
+The first number is the Chapter number; the second number is the sequence
+within the chapter.</p>
+
+<p><a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Additional notes</a> will be found near the end of this ebook.</p>
+<div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           </div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="section">
+<figure id="coversmall" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 25em;">
+  <img src="images/coversmall.jpg" width="1200" height="1651" alt="">
+</figure><div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           </div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="section center wspace">
+<h1>U.S. MARINES IN VIETNAM<br>
+<span class="xxsmall">THE ADVISORY &amp; COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA</span><br>
+1954–1964</h1>
+
+<p class="p2 vspace"><i>by</i><br>
+Captain Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR</p>
+
+<figure id="i_1" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 15em;">
+  <img src="images/i_001.png" width="641" height="631" style="width: 67%;" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY<br>
+    UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p class="p4 vspace small">HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION<br>
+HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS<br>
+WASHINGTON, D.C.<br>
+<span class="larger">1977</span>
+</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+</div>
+
+<div class="section p4">
+<p class="center">
+Library of Congress Card No. 76-600051
+</p>
+
+<p class="p2 in0">PCN 190 003064 00</p>
+
+<p class="center small bt">
+For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office<br>
+Washington, D.C. 20402 (Buckram)<br>
+<br>
+Stock Number 008-055-00094-7
+</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           </div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">iii</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="Foreword"><span id="toclink_iii"></span>Foreword</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p>This is the first of a series of nine chronological histories being prepared by the
+Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps
+involvement in the Vietnam conflict. This particular volume covers a relatively
+obscure chapter in U.S. Marine Corps history—the activities of Marines in Vietnam
+between 1954 and 1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities from
+a one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina War in
+1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some 700 Marines at the end
+of 1964. As the introductory volume for the series this account has an important
+secondary objective: to establish a geographical, political, and military foundation
+upon which the subsequent histories can be developed.</p>
+
+<p>The author is a Marine Reservist who was a member of the History and Museums
+Division from September 1972 until August 1974. Promoted to major soon after his
+return to inactive duty, he is now working for the Kentucky State Government. A
+native of Kentucky, he holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Morehead State College
+(1965) and a Master of Arts degree in American History from the University of Kentucky
+(1972). Commissioned in 1965, Major Whitlow served as an infantry platoon
+commander with the 6th Marines, an aerial observer with the 1st Marine Division in
+Vietnam, and later as a platoon commander at Officer Candidate School, Quantico.
+For services in the Republic of Vietnam during 1967 and 1968 he was awarded the Distinguished
+Flying Cross and 26 awards of the Air Medal.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_2" class="figright l2" style="max-width: 15em;">
+  <img src="images/i_002.png" width="748" height="231" alt="(Signature of) <i>E.&nbsp;H. Simmons</i>">
+</figure>
+
+<p class="right clear">
+<span style="margin-right: 6em;">E.&nbsp;H. SIMMONS</span><br>
+<span style="margin-right: 0.5em;">Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)</span><br>
+Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
+</p>
+
+<p class="in0">
+Reviewed and Approved:<br>
+15 September 1976
+</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">v</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="Preface"><span id="toclink_v"></span>Preface</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p><i>U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1964</i> is a narrative account of the initial decade of
+Marine Corps operations in South Vietnam. The monograph had two immediate
+forerunners, both classified studies prepared in the middle 1960s by the former Historical
+Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Authored by Major
+James M. Yingling, Captain Harvey D. Bradshaw, and Mr. Benis M. Frank, the
+first of these was entitled “United States Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1963.”
+The second, entitled “United States Marine Corps Operations in the Republic
+of Vietnam, 1964,” was authored by Major Harvey D. Bradshaw. Although unpublished,
+these studies served as important sources for the material contained in this
+text. Otherwise, this history has been derived from official Marine Corps records, the
+Oral History Collection of the History and Museums Division, the comment files of
+the division, and appropriate historical works. Of particular value in its compilation
+have been the command diaries of the various Marine organizations involved.</p>
+
+<p>Unfortunately, few official documents relative to either the early Marine advisory
+program or to the early operations of the Vietnamese Marine Corps still exist. Therefore,
+that portion of the text which deals with those areas has been reconstructed
+from interviews with various former Marine advisors. Even their generous assistance,
+however, has not completely overcome the dearth of documentary sources.
+Any reader possessing a knowledge of this period and subject is invited to submit
+pertinent comments to the History and Museums Division.</p>
+
+<p>This monograph has not been the product of a single individual’s labor. A comment
+draft of the manuscript was reviewed by over 40 persons, most of whom were
+directly associated with the described events. (A list of these contributors appears as
+Appendix E.) Their remarks have been of immense value in reconstructing with
+accuracy the origin, nature, and scope of the various Marine operations. The manuscript
+was prepared under the editorial direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Chief
+Historian of the History and Museums Division. Final editing and the preparation
+of the index was done by Mr. Charles R. Smith of the Historical Branch. Miss Kay P.
+Sue, editorial clerk and manuscript typist for the division, performed valuable services
+in typing and proof reading both the comment and final drafts. Staff Sergeant Paul A.
+Lloyd and Sergeant Eric A. Clark, also members of the History and Museums
+Division, were responsible for preparing all maps and charts. Unless otherwise
+credited, photographs are from official Marine Corps files.</p>
+
+<figure id="i_3" class="figright l2" style="max-width: 14em;">
+  <img src="images/i_003.png" width="648" height="181" alt="(Signature of) <i>Robert Whitlow</i>">
+</figure>
+
+<p class="right clear">
+<span style="margin-right: 2em;">ROBERT H. WHITLOW</span><br>
+Captain, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
+</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">vii</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="Table_of_Contents"><span id="toclink_vii"></span>Table of Contents</h2>
+</div>
+
+<table id="toc">
+<tr>
+  <td></td>
+  <td class="tdr"><i>Page</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Foreword</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_iii">iii</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Preface</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_v">v</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Table of Contents</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_vii">vii</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="part">
+  <td class="tdl">PART I    THE WATERSHED</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_1">1</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Chapter 1    Background to Military Assistance</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_3">3</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The Geographic Setting</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_3a">3</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The People</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_6">6</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Vietnam’s Recent History</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_9">9</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Post-Geneva South Vietnam</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_12">12</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The American Response</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_14">14</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Chapter 2    The Formative Years</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_15">15</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_15a">15</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_16">16</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Political Stabilization and Its Effects</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_18">18</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Reorganization and Progress</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_20">20</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Summing Up Developments</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_25">25</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Chapter 3    Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_26">26</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_26a">26</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_31">31</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_39">39</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">American Decisions at the Close of 1961</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_42">42</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Chapter 4    An Expanding War, 1962</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_44">44</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The War’s New Context</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_44a">44</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_46">46</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_49">49</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Some Conclusions</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_53">53</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="part">
+  <td class="tdl">PART II    MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_55">55</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Chapter 5    SHUFLY at Soc Trang</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_57">57</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The Decision</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_57a">57</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Deployment to Soc Trang</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_59">59</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_65">65</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Preparations and Redeployment</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_73">73</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Accomplishments</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_74">74</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Chapter 6    SHUFLY Moves North</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_75">75</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Arrival at Da Nang</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_75a">75</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">I Corps Tactical Zone</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_76">76</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Military Situation, September 1962</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_79">79</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Initial Helicopter Operations</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_80">80</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Marine People-to-People Program</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_85">85</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">SHUFLY Operations in I Corps</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_85a">85</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">viii</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Chapter 7    The Laotian Crisis, 1962</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_86">86</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Genesis of the Problem</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_86a">86</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The American Response</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_88">88</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The Marine Corps Role</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_88a">88</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Marine Participation: A Summary</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_94">94</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="part">
+  <td class="tdl">PART III    THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_97">97</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Chapter 8    The Marine Advisory Effort</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_99">99</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The Political Climate</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_99a">99</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_100">100</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Accomplishments</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_110">110</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Chapter 9    SHUFLY Operations</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_111">111</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Development of the Compound Continues</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_111a">111</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Combat Support Operations</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_113">113</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The Situation in Vietnam</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_121">121</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="part">
+  <td class="tdl">PART IV    AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_125">125</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Chapter 10    Marines Meet the Challenge</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_127">127</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">New American Decisions</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_127a">127</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">A Restructured Military Assistance Command</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_130">130</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Changes in Marine Leadership</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_130a">130</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Redesignation and Reorganization</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_131">131</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The Vietnamese Marine Brigade</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_132">132</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Additional Marine Activities</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_138">138</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Chapter 11    Spring and Summer Fighting</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_144">144</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The Monsoons</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_144a">144</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">The Weather Breaks</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_148">148</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Sure Wind 202</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_152">152</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Operations Elsewhere in I Corps</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_154">154</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Changing the Watch</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_156">156</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Chapter 12    Fall and Winter Operations</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_157">157</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Dry Weather Fighting</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_157a">157</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_159">159</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Changes and Improvements</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_162">162</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Action as the Year Ends</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_164">164</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="chap">
+  <td class="tdl">Chapter 13    Prelude to Escalation</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_166">166</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="part">
+  <td class="tdl">NOTES</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_169">169</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="part">
+  <td class="tdl">APPENDICES</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_175">175</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">A. USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954–1964</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_175a">175</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">B. Awards and Decorations, RVN, Through 1964</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_176">176</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">C. Glossary of Acronyms</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_178">178</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">D. Chronology</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_179">179</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">E. List of Reviewers</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_182">182</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="part">
+  <td class="tdl">INDEX</td>
+  <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_184">184</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="main">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">1</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak part" id="PART_I"><span id="toclink_1">PART I</span><br>
+
+<span class="subhead">THE WATERSHED</span></h2>
+<div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           </div>
+</div>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">3</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_1"><span id="toclink_3"></span>CHAPTER 1<br>
+<span class="subhead large">Background to Military Assistance</span><br>
+<span class="subhead notbold"><i>The Geographic Setting—The People—Vietnam’s Recent History—Post-Geneva
+South Vietnam—The American Response</i></span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_3a"><i>The Geographic Setting</i></h3>
+
+<p>Hanging like a bulbous pendant from China’s
+southern border, the Southeast Asian land mass
+projects itself southward to within 100 miles of the
+equator. Often referred to as the Indochinese
+Peninsula, this land mass is contained by the
+Andaman Sea on the west, the Gulf of Siam on the
+south, and the South China Sea and the Tonkin
+Gulf on the east. Along with the extensive Indonesian
+island chain which lies to the immediate
+south, mainland Southeast Asia dominates the key
+water routes between the Pacific and the Indian
+Oceans. So positioned, the Indochinese Peninsula
+and the offshore islands resemble the Middle East
+in that they traditionally have been recognized as a
+“crossroads of commerce and history.”<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[1-1]</a></p>
+
+<p>Seven sovereign states currently make up the
+Indochinese Peninsula. Burma and Thailand occupy
+what is roughly the western two-thirds of the entire
+peninsula. To the south, the Moslem state of
+Malaysia occupies the southern third of the rugged,
+southward-reaching Malaysian Peninsula. East of
+Thailand lies Cambodia, which possesses a relatively
+abbreviated coastline on the Gulf of Siam,
+and Laos, a landlocked country. The Democratic
+Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), which
+borders to the north on China, and the Republic of
+Vietnam (South Vietnam) form the eastern rim of
+the Indochinese Peninsula.</p>
+
+<p>Vietnamese have often described the area currently
+administered by the two separate Vietnamese
+states as resembling “two rice baskets at the
+ends of their carrying poles.”<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[1-2]</a> This description
+is derived from the position of extensive rice producing
+river deltas at the northern and southern
+extremities of the long, narrow expanse of coastline
+and adjacent mountains. Vietnamese civilization
+originated in the northernmost of these so-called
+“rice baskets,” the Red River Delta, centuries
+before the birth of Christ. Pressured at
+various stages in their history by the vastly more
+powerful Chinese and by increasingly crowded
+conditions in the Red River Delta, the Vietnamese
+gradually pushed southward down the narrow
+coastal plain in search of new rice lands. Eventually
+their migration displaced several rival cultures
+and carried them into every arable corner of the
+Mekong Delta, the more extensive river delta
+located at the southern end of the proverbial
+“carrying pole.” Although unified since the
+eighteenth century under the Vietnamese, the area
+between the Chinese border and the Gulf of Siam
+came to be divided into three more or less different
+regions: Tonkin, centered on the Red River Delta;
+Cochinchina, centered on the Mekong Delta; and
+Annam, the intervening coastal region.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_3" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 28em;">
+  <img src="images/i_004.jpg" width="1763" height="2549" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+MAINLAND<br>
+SOUTHEAST ASIA<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<figure id="ip_3b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;">
+  <img src="images/i_005.jpg" width="1797" height="2588" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+FRENCH<br>
+INDOCHINA<br>
+1954<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Since mid-1954 the area known collectively as
+Vietnam has been divided into northern and
+southern states. South Vietnam (known after 1956
+as the Republic of Vietnam), where the earliest
+U.S. military activities were focused, came to
+include all of former Cochinchina and the southern
+half of Annam. The geography of this small state,
+described in general terms, is rugged and difficult.
+The lengthy country shares often ill-defined jungle
+boundaries with Laos and Cambodia in the west
+and with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
+(DRV) to the north. Its land borders total almost
+1,000 miles—600 with Cambodia, 300 with Laos,
+and roughly 40 with North Vietnam. Approximately<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">6</span><span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">5</span>
+1,500 miles of irregular coastline on the
+Tonkin Gulf and the South China Sea complete
+the enclosure of its 66,000-square mile area.</p>
+
+<p>South Vietnam is divided into four relatively
+distinct physiographic regions—the Mekong Delta,
+the coastal plain, the Annamite Mountains, and the
+forested plain. The Mekong Delta, an extensive and
+fertile lowland centered on the Mekong River,
+covers roughly the southern quarter of the country.
+This region is essentially a marshy flat land well
+suited for rice growing and is recognized as one of
+Asia’s richest agricultural areas. South Vietnam’s
+second physiographic region, the coastal plain, is
+similar to the Mekong Delta in that it is predominantly
+flat and generally well suited for rice
+growing. Properly known as the coastal lowland,
+this region extends from the country’s northern
+border to the Mekong Delta. Its width is never
+constant, being defined on the west by the rugged
+Annamite Mountains—the region which dominates
+the northern two thirds of South Vietnam. The
+jungle-covered mountains, whose highest elevations
+measure over 8,000 feet, stand in sharp contrast
+to the low and flat coastal plain. The eastern
+slopes of the mountains normally rise from the
+lowlands at a distance of five or 10 miles from the
+sea. At several points along the coast, however,
+the emerald mountains crowd to the water’s edge,
+dividing the coastal plain into compartments and
+creating a seascape breathtaking in its beauty.
+At other locations the mountain chain recedes
+from the coast, allowing the lowlands to extend
+inland as far as 40 miles. An extensive upland
+plateau sprawls over the central portion of South
+Vietnam’s mountain region.</p>
+
+<p>This important subregion, known as the Central
+Highlands, possesses relatively fertile soil and has
+great potential for agricultural development. The
+highest elevations in the Annamite chain are recorded
+south of the Central Highlands. From
+heights of 6,000 to 7,000 feet, the mountains dissolve
+southward into the forested plain, a hilly
+transition zone which forms a strip between the
+Mekong lowlands and the southernmost mountains.</p>
+
+<p>South Vietnam lies entirely below the Tropic of
+Cancer. Its climate is best described as hot and
+humid. Because the country is situated within
+Southeast Asia’s twin tropical monsoon belt, it
+experiences two distinct rainy seasons. The southwest
+(or summer) monsoon settles over the Mekong
+Delta and the southern part of the country in mid-May
+and lasts until early October. In the northern
+reaches, the northeast (or winter) monsoon season
+begins in November and continues through most
+of March. Unlike the rainy season in the south,
+fog, wind, and noticeably lower temperatures
+characterize the wet season in the north. While the
+reversed monsoon seasons provide an abundance of
+water for rice growing throughout the Mekong
+Delta and most of the long coastal plain, rainfall
+is not distributed uniformly. Parts of the central
+coast record only about 28 inches of annual precipitation.
+In contrast, other areas along the
+northern coast receive as much as 126 inches of
+rain during the course of a year. Even worse, a
+percentage of this rainfall can be expected to occur
+as a result of typhoons. The tropical storms
+usually lash the Annamese coast between July and
+November. Almost always they cause extensive
+flooding along normally sluggish rivers which
+dissect the coastal plain.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_6"><i>The People</i></h3>
+
+<p>Slightly over 16 million people currently inhabit
+South Vietnam. Of these, over 13 million are
+ethnic Vietnamese. Primarily rice farmers and
+fishermen, the Vietnamese have tended to compress
+themselves into the country’s most productive
+agricultural areas—the Mekong Delta and the
+coastal plain. Chinese, numbering around one
+million, form South Vietnam’s largest ethnic
+minority. Concentrated for the most part in the
+major cities, the Chinese traditionally have played
+a leading role in Vietnam’s commerce. About
+700,000 Montagnard tribesmen, scattered across
+the upland plateau and the rugged northern mountains,
+constitute South Vietnam’s second largest
+minority. Some 400,000 Khmers, closely akin to
+the dominant population of Cambodia, inhabit the
+lowlands along the Cambodian border. Roughly
+35,000 Chams, remnants of a once powerful kingdom
+that blocked the southern migration of the
+Vietnamese until the late 1400s, form the country’s
+smallest and least influential ethnic minority. The
+Chams, whose ancestors once controlled most of
+the central and southern Annamese coast, are confined
+to a few small villages on the central coast
+near Phan Rang.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">7</span></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_7" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;">
+  <img src="images/i_007.jpg" width="1823" height="2571" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+TERRAIN FEATURES<br>
+SOUTH VIETNAM<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">8</span></p>
+
+<p>South Vietnamese adhere to a broad range of
+religions. Between 70 and 80 percent of the country’s
+16 million people are classified as Buddhist.
+It is estimated, however, that a much smaller
+percentage are actually practitioners. Roman Catholics
+comprise roughly 10 percent of the total
+population. Usually found in and around the country’s
+urban centers, the Catholics are products of
+Vietnam’s contacts with Europeans. Two so-called
+politico-religious sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa
+Hao, have attracted large segments of the rural
+population, particularly in the Mekong Delta.<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1-A]</a> For
+the most part, the scattered Montagnard tribes
+worship animal forms and have no organized
+religion, although many have been converted to
+Christianity.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1-A]</a> Founded just after World War I, the Cao Dai claims more
+than one and a half million faithful in South Vietnam. The
+religion incorporates elements of Taoism, Buddhism, Christianity,
+Confucianism, and large doses of spiritualism. Its
+clergy, headed by a “pope,” is organized in a hierarchy modelled
+on that of the Roman Catholic Church. The extent of its borrowing
+is suggested by the fact that adherents count the French
+author Victor Hugo as one of their saints. Politically, the Cao
+Dai moved sharply in the direction of nationalism during the
+1940s, organized its own army, and fought sporadic actions
+against the French and the subsequent French-controlled government
+of Emperor Bao Dai until suppressed by the Diem government
+in 1954.</p>
+
+<p>Like the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao is peculiarly Vietnamese. In
+the late 1930s, a Buddhist monk named Huynh Pho So began a
+“protestant” movement within the worldly, easy-going Buddhist
+faith then prevalent. His followers, whose ranks grew rapidly,
+called themselves Hoa Hao after the village where Phu So began
+his crusade. Like the Cao Dai faithful and Catholics, they
+tended to live apart in their own villages and hamlets concentrated
+in the very south and west of Vietnam, primarily along the
+Cambodian border. Intensely nationalistic and xenophobic,
+they were under constant attack from the French, Japanese, and
+Viet Minh, and by the late 1940s had recruited a large militia
+which was subsequently disbanded. Today their overall membership
+stands at about one million.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Fundamentally, South Vietnamese society is
+rural and agrarian. Over the centuries the Vietnamese
+have tended to cluster in tiny hamlets
+strewn down the coastal plain and across the Mekong
+Delta. Usually composed of a handful of
+closely knit families whose ancestors settled the
+surrounding land generations earlier, the hamlet is
+South Vietnam’s basic community unit. Next
+larger is the village which resembles the American
+township in function in that it encompasses a
+number of adjacent hamlets. The Vietnamese
+people have naturally developed strong emotional
+ties with their native villages. “To the Vietnamese,”
+it has been said without exaggeration,
+“the village is his land’s heart, mind, and soul.”<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[1-3]</a>
+Given the rural nature of the country it is understandable
+that the inhabitants of the villages
+and hamlets have retained a large degree of self-government.
+“The laws of the emperor,” states an
+ancient Vietnamese proverb, “are less than the
+customs of the village.”<a id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[1-4]</a></p>
+
+<p>Overlaying this rural mosaic are two intermediate
+governmental echelons—the districts and
+the provinces, The district, the smaller of these
+political and geographic subdivisions, first appeared
+in Vietnamese history following the earliest
+annexation of Tonkin by the Chinese in 111 B.C. It
+remained in use and was extended down the Annamese
+coast and into Cochinchina by the successive
+Vietnamese dynasties which came to power in the
+ensuing centuries. Provinces, larger geographic
+subdivisions, eventually were superimposed over
+groups of contiguous districts, thus adding another
+echelon between the reigning central government
+and the villages. This structure remained in existence
+under the French after they took control of all
+Vietnam in the late 19th century. In order to make
+their administration more efficient French colonial
+authorities modernized the cumbersome administrative
+machinery and adjusted provincial boundaries.
+It is essentially this French-influenced structure
+that exists in South Vietnam today. Still,
+after years of use and modification, the system
+seems somewhat superficial as traditional self-rule
+of the villages tends to nullify the efforts of
+provinces and districts to govern rural areas. Often
+the central government’s influence is unable to
+seep lower than the district headquarters, particularly
+in more remote areas.</p>
+
+<p>While South Vietnam is predominantly rural, it
+does possess several important urban centers. As
+might be expected, these are found primarily in the
+densely populated Mekong Delta and along the
+coastal lowland. Saigon, the nation’s capital and
+largest city, presently has a population estimated
+at 3.5 million. Located slightly north of the Mekong
+River complex and inland from the coast, the
+city dominates the country in both an economic
+and political sense. Saigon has excellent port facilities
+for ocean-going ships, although such traffic
+must first negotiate the tangled Saigon River which
+leads inland from the South China Sea. Da Nang,
+located on the Annamese coast 84 miles below the
+northern border, is the country’s second largest<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">9</span>
+city. With a population of roughly 500,000 and a
+protected harbor, Da Nang constitutes the principal
+economic center in northern South Vietnam.
+The old imperial capital of Hue (population of
+roughly 200,000), situated about 50 miles north of
+Da Nang, historically has exerted a strong cultural
+influence over the Annamese coast.<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[1-B]</a> Scores of
+large towns, such as Quang Tri, Hoi An, Quang
+Ngai, Can Tho, and Vinh Long, extend down the
+coast and across the Mekong Delta. Often these
+serve as provincial capitals. A few lesser population
+centers, notably Pleiku, Kontum, and Ban Me
+Thuot, are situated in the Central Highlands.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[1-B]</a> The population of most of South Vietnam’s cities and towns
+has been swollen by the influx of refugees which occurred as the
+Vietnam War intensified in the middle 1960s. In 1965, for example,
+refugee population estimates for the three major cities
+were as follows: Saigon—1.5 million; Da Nang—144,000; Hue—105,000.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Most of South Vietnam’s major towns and
+cities are connected by one highway—Route 1.
+Constructed by the French during the early 20th
+century, Route 1 originally extended from Hanoi,
+the principal city of Tonkin in northern Vietnam,
+down the coast and inland to Saigon. While Route
+1 and a French-built railroad which parallels it
+helped unify South Vietnam’s most densely populated
+areas, the country’s road network is otherwise
+underdeveloped. A few tortuous roads do
+twist westward from Route 1 into the mountains
+to reach the remote towns there. Of these the most
+noteworthy are Route 19, built to serve Pleiku in
+the Central Highlands, and Route 9, which extends
+westward into Laos from Dong Ha, South
+Vietnam’s northernmost town. A number of roads
+radiate outward from Saigon to the population
+centers of the Mekong Delta. For the most part,
+however, the Vietnamese people traditionally have
+depended on trail networks, inland waterways,
+and the sea to satisfy their transportation needs.
+The location of the bulk of the population in the
+watery Mekong Delta and along the seacoast has
+encouraged their reliance on waterborne
+transportation.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_9"><i>Vietnam’s Recent History</i></h3>
+
+<p>Prior to July 1954 the expanse of mainland Southeast
+Asia now occupied by South Vietnam, North
+Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia belonged to France.
+Together these possessions constituted French-Indochina
+over which the French had exercised
+political control in one form or another, with one
+exception, since the last quarter of the 19th century.
+The only interruption occurred following the
+capitulation of France in June 1940. Exploiting
+the disrupted power balance in Europe, and attracted
+by the natural resources and strategic
+value of the area, Japan moved into northern
+French-Indochina less than four months after
+France had fallen. In 1941 the Vichy French government
+agreed to Japanese occupation of southern
+French-Indochina. Soon Japanese forces controlled
+every airfield and major port in Indochina. Under
+this arrangement the Japanese permitted French
+colonial authorities to maintain their administrative
+responsibilities. But as the tide of war began
+to turn against the Japanese, the French became
+increasingly defiant. The Japanese terminated this
+relationship on 9 March 1945 when, without
+warning, they arrested colonial officials throughout
+Indochina and brutally seized control of all
+governmental functions.</p>
+
+<p>Six months after the dissolution of the French
+colonial apparatus in Indochina, World War II
+ended. The grip which Japan had held on most of
+Southeast Asia for nearly half a decade was broken
+on 2 September 1945 when her foreign minister
+signed the instrument of unconditional surrender
+on board the battleship USS <i>Missouri</i>. Shortly thereafter,
+in accordance with a previously reached
+Allied agreement, Chinese Nationalist forces moved
+into Tonkin and northern Annam to accept the
+surrender of Japanese forces. South of the 16th
+parallel, British units arrived from India to disarm
+the defeated Japanese. A detachment of 150 men
+from a small French Expeditionary Corps arrived
+by air in Saigon on the 12th to assist the British,
+who had included them only as a courtesy since
+France was not among the powers slated to receive
+the surrender of the Japanese in Indochina.</p>
+
+<p>But the end of World War II and the arrival of
+Allied forces did not end the struggle for control of
+French-Indochina. Instead, it signalled the beginning
+of a new conflict in which the contestants
+were, in many respects, more formidable. One of
+these, the French, moved quickly to restore their
+former presence in Cochinchina and Annam. Reinforced
+with additional units, they occupied most
+major towns between the Mekong Delta and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">11</span>
+16th parallel by the end of 1945. Two months later
+French negotiators secured an agreement with the
+Chinese Nationalists whereby French units would
+replace the Chinese occupation forces north of the
+16th parallel.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_11" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;">
+  <img src="images/i_010.jpg" width="1825" height="2580" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+MAJOR CITIES OF<br>
+SOUTH VIETNAM<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Wartime developments in French-Indochina,
+however, had brought about profound political
+changes which eventually would doom the French
+effort to re-establish political and economic influence
+in the region. During World War II, Ho Chi
+Minh, an avowed Communist, had transformed a
+relatively feeble political party into a sizable
+guerrilla organization. Known as the Viet Minh,
+the Communist guerrillas had been organized,
+trained, and led by Vo Nguyen Giap, a former history
+teacher from Annam. During the latter stages
+of the war, the United States had supplied the Viet
+Minh with limited quantities of military supplies.
+In return, Ho’s guerrillas had assisted downed
+American pilots and occasionally had clashed with
+small Japanese units. But the Viet Minh had
+wasted few men on costly major actions against
+the Japanese. Conserving their forces, Ho and Giap
+had concentrated on organization and had managed
+to extend their strength into the densely
+populated Red River Delta and along the Annamese
+coast. In Cochinchina, where their numbers
+were considerably smaller, the Communists had
+limited their activities almost entirely to organization
+and recruitment. Thus, by the end of the war
+Ho’s organization was able to emerge as a definite
+military-political force in northern French-Indochina.</p>
+
+<p>Following the Japanese surrender and before the
+arrival of the Chinese Nationalist occupation forces,
+the Viet Minh seized control of Hanoi, the capital
+of Tonkin, and proclaimed the Democratic Republic
+of Vietnam. At Ho’s direction the Viet
+Minh promptly shifted from their anti-Japanese
+posture and prepared to contest the French return.</p>
+
+<p>Confronted with this situation in northern
+Indochina, the French were forced to bargain with
+the Communists. A preliminary agreement was
+reached on 6 March 1946 whereby the French
+agreed to recognize the newly founded but relatively
+weak Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a
+“free state within the French Union.” In return,
+Ho’s government declared itself “ready to welcome
+in friendly fashion the French Army, when in
+conformance with international agreement, it
+would relieve the Chinese forces” which had accepted
+the Japanese surrender in Tonkin.<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[1-5]</a> Shortly
+after the conclusion of this agreement, French
+forces began reoccupying Tonkin and northern
+Annam. Within six months they controlled every
+major strategic position from the Chinese border
+to the Ca Mau Peninsula, Cochinchina’s southern
+tip.</p>
+
+<p>The uneasy peace was broken in December 1946
+after Viet Minh and French negotiators failed to
+reach a final agreement on actual political control
+of Tonkin and Annam. When open warfare erupted,
+Ho withdrew the bulk of his military forces into
+mountainous sanctuaries along the Chinese border,
+but left small groups of guerrillas scattered
+throughout the heavily populated Red River Delta.
+Reinforced with contingents from Europe and
+Africa, the French Expeditionary Corps initially
+managed to hold its own and, in some cases, even
+extend its control. But, drawing strength from its
+natural appeal to Vietnamese nationalism, the
+Communist movement began gaining momentum
+in the late 1940s. Gradually the war intensified
+and spread into central Annam and Cochinchina.</p>
+
+<p>In January 1950, the French moved to undercut
+the Viet Minh’s appeal to non-Communist nationalists
+by granting nominal independence to its
+Indochina possessions. Under the terms of a formal
+treaty, all of Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina)
+was brought together under a Saigon-based
+government headed by Emperor Bao Dai.
+Laos and Cambodia likewise formed their own
+governments, whereupon all three countries became
+known as the Associated States of Indochina.</p>
+
+<p>This new arrangement, however, had little
+effect on the ongoing war with the Viet Minh. In
+accordance with the treaties, the Associated States
+became members of the French Union and agreed
+to prosecute the war under French direction.
+Moreover, French political dominance in the region
+continued, virtually undiluted by the existence of
+the Associated States.</p>
+
+<p>In related developments, Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese
+Communist armies seized control of mainland
+China in 1949 and Communist North Korean
+forces invaded the pro-Western Republic of Korea
+in 1950. These events added new meaning to the
+French struggle in Indochina as American policy
+makers came to view the war on the Southeast
+Asian mainland within the context of a larger<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">12</span>
+design to bring Asia entirely under Communist
+domination. Following the invasion of South
+Korea, President Truman immediately announced
+his intention to step up U.S. military aid to the
+French in Indochina. Congress responded quickly
+by adding four billion dollars to existing military
+assistance funds. Of this, $303 million was earmarked
+for Korea, the Philippines, and “the general
+area of China.”<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[1-6]</a><a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[1-C]</a> Thus, the Truman Administration,
+now confronted by the possibility
+that Communism might engulf all of mainland
+Asia, extended its containment policy to Indochina.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">[1-C]</a> The following year would see a half billion U.S. dollars
+allocated to support French operations in Indochina. By 1954
+that figure would climb to an even one billion dollars.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Even with rapidly increasing amounts of U.S.
+material assistance, the French proved unable to
+wrest the initiative from Giap’s growing armies.
+Although national armies drawn from Cambodia,
+Laos, and Vietnam were now fighting alongside
+the French, the Expeditionary Corps was over-extended.
+Moreover, the French cause was extremely
+vulnerable to Communist propaganda. On
+the home front, public support for the so-called
+<i lang="fr">sale guerre</i> (dirty war) eroded steadily during the
+early 1950s as the Expeditionary Corps’ failures and
+casualties mounted. Finally, on 7 May 1954, the
+besieged 13,000-man French garrison at Dien Bien
+Phu surrendered to the Viet Minh, thus shattering
+what remained of French determination to prosecute
+the war in Indochina. In Geneva, where Communist
+and Free World diplomats had gathered to
+consider a formal peace in Korea along with the
+Indochina problem, French and Viet Minh representatives
+signed a cease-fire agreement on 20 July
+which ended the eight-year conflict.</p>
+
+<p>The bilateral cease-fire agreement substantially
+altered the map of the Indochinese Peninsula.
+France agreed to relinquish political control
+throughout the area. Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam
+all gained full independence. The most controversial
+provision of the 20 July agreement divided
+Vietnam at the Ben Hai River and superimposed a
+demilitarized zone over the partition line. This
+division, intended to facilitate the disengagement
+of the opposing forces, was to be temporary pending
+a reunification election scheduled for mid-1956.
+In accordance with the agreement, France immediately
+turned over political control of the
+northern zone (Tonkin and the northern half of
+Annam) to the Communist Viet Minh. Ho
+promptly re-established the Democratic Republic
+of Vietnam (DRV) with its capital in Hanoi.</p>
+
+<p>Other provisions of the Geneva Agreement
+called for the opposing armies to regroup in their
+respective zones within 300 days. Following their
+regroupment, the French military forces were to be
+completely withdrawn from the North within
+300 days and from the South by mid-1956. Civilians
+living both north and south of the partition line
+were to be allowed to emigrate to the opposite
+zone in accordance with their political convictions.
+It was anticipated that thousands of Catholics
+living in Tonkin would seek refuge in the non-Communist
+South. Other articles of the agreement
+dealt with the creation and responsibilities of an
+International Control Commission (ICC) to
+supervise the cease-fire. Canadian, Indian, and Polish
+delegations were to comprise this commission.</p>
+
+<p>On 21 July, the day following the bilateral agreement,
+Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the Peoples
+Republic of China, Cambodia, and Laos joined
+France and the Viet Minh in endorsing a “Final
+Declaration” which sanctioned the previously
+reached cease-fire agreement. The United States
+refused to endorse this declaration, but issued a
+statement to the effect that it would not use force to
+disturb the cease-fire.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_12"><i>Post-Geneva South Vietnam</i></h3>
+
+<p>The execution of the Geneva Agreement thrust
+that area of Vietnam south of the partition line
+into a period of profound confusion and instability.
+Even worse, the colonial period had done
+little to prepare the Cochinchinese and Annamese
+for the tremendous problems at hand. No real apparatus
+for central government existed. Likewise,
+the long colonial period left the area with few
+experienced political leaders capable of establishing
+and managing the required governmental
+machinery. Political control passed nominally to
+the French-sponsored emperor, Bao Dai, who was
+living in France at the time. For all practical purposes,
+leadership in the South devolved upon Bao
+Dai’s recently appointed pro-Western premier,
+Ngo Dinh Diem. The product of a prosperous and
+well-educated Catholic family from Hue, Diem
+had served the French briefly as a province chief<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">13</span>
+prior to World War II. Always a strong nationalist
+but staunchly anti-Communist, he had been unable
+to reconcile his anti-French attitudes with the
+Viet Minh movement during the Indochina War.
+As a result Diem had left his homeland in the
+early 1950s to live at a Catholic seminary in the
+United States. There he remained until his appointment
+as premier in mid-June of 1954.</p>
+
+<p>The months immediately following the Geneva
+agreement found Ngo Dinh Diem struggling to
+create the necessary governmental machinery in
+Saigon, the capital of the southern zone. At best,
+however, his hold on the feeble institutions was
+tenuous. A serious confrontation was developing
+between the premier and the absent Bao Dai, still
+residing in France. Further complicating the
+political scene was the presence of Hoa Hao and
+Cao Dai armies in the provinces surrounding the
+capital, and the existence in Saigon of an underworld
+organization named the Binh Xuyen.<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[1-D]</a> As
+1955 opened the leaders of these three politically
+oriented factions were pressing demands for concessions
+from the new central government. Among
+these were permission to maintain their private
+armies, and the authority to exercise political
+control over large, heavily populated areas.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">[1-D]</a> The Binh Xuyen originally operated from the swamps south
+of the Chinese-dominated Cholon district of Saigon. Controlling
+the vice and crime of the city, by 1954 they had gained control
+of the police under circumstances that reeked of bribery. A year
+later the organization was brutally crushed by Ngo Dinh Diem.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>The outcome of the embryonic power struggle
+in Saigon hinged largely on control of the Vietnamese
+National Army (VNA). Although not
+considered an efficient military organization by
+even the most liberal estimates, the 210,000-man
+National Army was the principal source of organized
+power available to the quarreling leaders of
+southern Vietnam. Originally created by the French
+in 1950 to supplement their Expeditionary Corps,
+the VNA had since suffered from structural deficiencies.
+It actually had no organizational echelon
+between the French-controlled General Staff and
+the 160 separate battalions. Tied to no regiments
+or divisions, the Vietnamese battalions naturally
+were dependent on the French Expeditionary Corps
+for operational instructions and logistical support.<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[1-E]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">[1-E]</a> Selected VNA battalions were sometimes task organized into
+<i lang="fr">groupes mobiles</i> (mobile groups) by the French for specific offensive
+operations. But these groups, which were roughly equivalent to a
+regimental combat team, were never composed entirely of VNA
+battalions under a Vietnamese command group.</p>
+
+</div>
+A dearth of qualified Vietnamese officers and a
+degree of inattention on the part of the French
+compounded the problems which stemmed from
+the army’s structural flaw. Partially as a result of
+these shortcomings the morale of the VNA had deteriorated
+sharply in the waning stages of the
+French-Indochina War. At the time of the cease-fire
+agreement, high desertion rates were reported
+in almost every Vietnamese battalion. Still, it was
+evident that he who controlled the National Army
+would most likely control the government in the
+area south of the partition line.
+
+<p>The danger that the pro-Western zone might become
+the victim of a sudden Communist attack
+from the north, as had been the case on the Korean
+Peninsula, injected another element of uncertainty
+into the overall situation in southern Vietnam.
+The conditions which settled over the area in the
+immediate aftermath of the Geneva settlement suggested
+this possibility since they were alarmingly
+similar to the conditions which had prevailed in
+Korea prior to the North Korean invasion of 1950.
+Like Korea, Vietnam was divided both geographically
+and ideologically: the North clearly within
+the orbit of the Soviet Union and Communist
+China, and the South under the influence of the
+Western powers. As in Korea in 1950, there also
+existed a very real armed threat to the weaker pro-Western
+southern state. Immediately after the
+Geneva cease-fire, the Viet Minh army regrouped
+north of the 17th parallel and was redesignated the
+People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). American
+intelligence reported that the PAVN, which numbered
+roughly 240,000 disciplined veterans, was
+being reorganized and re-equipped with Soviet and
+Chinese weapons in violation of the Geneva Agreement.
+At the same time Western intelligence
+sources estimated that the Viet Minh had intentionally
+left between 5,000 and 10,000 men south
+of the partition line following their withdrawal.
+Also done in violation of the cease-fire agreement,
+this meant that Communist guerrillas could be
+expected to surface throughout the South in the
+event of an outright invasion.</p>
+
+<p>A related condition heightened fears that a
+Korea-type invasion might occur in Vietnam. In
+South Korea a military vacuum had been allowed
+to form in 1949 when American units withdrew
+from the area. Apparently that vacuum, coupled
+with a statement by the American Secretary of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">14</span>
+State to the effect that the U.S. defensive perimeter
+in the Pacific did not include South Korea, had
+encouraged Communist aggression. Now, with the
+scheduled evacuation of French armies from Indochina
+by mid-1956, there emerged the distinct
+possibility that such a military vacuum would
+recur, this time in southern Vietnam. “Vietnam,”
+warned one American scholar familiar with the
+region, “may very soon become either a dam
+against aggression from the north or a bridge serving
+the communist block to transform the countries
+of the Indochinese peninsula into satellites of
+China.”<a id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[1-7]</a></p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_14"><i>The American Response</i></h3>
+
+<p>It was in the face of this uncertain situation on
+the Southeast Asian mainland that the Eisenhower
+administration moved to discourage renewed Communist
+military activity. First, the United States
+sought to create a regional international organization
+to promote collective military action under
+the threat of aggression. This was obtained on
+8 September 1954 when eight nations—the United
+States, Great Britain, France, New Zealand, Australia,
+the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand—signed
+the Manila Pact. The treaty area encompassed
+by the pact included Southeast Asia, the
+Southwest Pacific below 21°31′ north latitude, and
+Pakistan. Two weeks later the pact was transformed
+into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
+(SEATO). In a separate protocol, the member
+nations agreed that Cambodia, Laos, and the
+“Free Territory under the jurisdiction of the State
+of Vietnam” all resided within their defense
+sphere.<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[1-8]</a></p>
+
+<p>Next, after several months of hesitation, the
+United States settled on a policy of comprehensive
+assistance to South Vietnam, as the area south
+of the 1954 partition line was already being called.
+As conceived, the immediate objective of the new
+American policy was to bring political stability
+to South Vietnam. The longer range goal was
+the creation of a bulwark to discourage renewed
+Communist expansion down the Indochinese Peninsula.
+In this scheme, military assistance was to
+play a key role. “One of the most efficient means
+of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become
+strong,” explained Eisenhower’s Secretary of
+State, John Foster Dulles, “is to assist it in reorganizing
+the National Army and in training
+that Army.”<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[1-9]</a> In short, the State Department’s
+position was that a stronger, more responsive
+Vietnamese National Army would help Premier
+Diem consolidate his political power. Later that
+same force would serve as a shield behind which
+South Vietnam would attempt to recover from the
+ravages of the French-Indochina War and the
+after effects of the Geneva Agreement.</p>
+
+<p>So by early 1955 a combination of circumstances—South
+Vietnam’s position adjacent to a
+Communist state, the unsavory memories of the
+Korean invasion, and the impending withdrawal
+of the French Expeditionary Corps—had influenced
+the United States to adopt a policy of military
+support for Premier Diem’s struggling government.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">15</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_2"><span id="toclink_15"></span>CHAPTER 2<br>
+<span class="subhead large">The Formative Years</span><br>
+<span class="subhead notbold"><i>Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam—Origins of U.S. Marine
+Assistance—Political Stabilization and Its Effects—Reorganization and
+Progress—Summing Up Developments</i></span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_15a"><i>Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam</i></h3>
+
+<p>When the Geneva cease-fire went into effect in
+the late summer of 1954, the machinery for implementing
+the military phase of the American assistance
+program for South Vietnam already existed.
+President Truman had ordered the establishment
+of a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group
+(USMAAG or MAAG) in French Indochina in
+mid-1950 as one of several reactions to the North
+Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea. Established
+to provide materiel support to the French
+Expeditionary Corps, the MAAG constituted little
+more than a logistical funnel through which U.S.
+military aid had been poured.</p>
+
+<p>Lieutenant General John M. (“Iron Mike”)
+O’Daniel, U.S. Army, had been assigned to command
+the MAAG in the spring of 1954. O’Daniel’s
+selection for the Saigon post anticipated a more
+active U.S. role in training of the Vietnamese
+National Army. He had been chosen for the assignment
+largely on the basis of his successful role
+in creating and supervising the training programs
+which had transformed the South Korean Army
+into an effective fighting force during the Korean
+War. Now, in the aftermath of the Geneva settlement,
+he and his 342-man group began preparing
+for the immense task of rebuilding South Vietnam’s
+armed forces.</p>
+
+<p>The entire American project to assist the South
+Vietnamese in the construction of a viable state
+was delayed during the fall of 1954 while the necessary
+diplomatic agreements were negotiated among
+American, French, and South Vietnamese officials.
+President Eisenhower dispatched General J. Lawton
+Collins, U.S. Army (Retired), to Saigon in
+November to complete the details of the triangular
+arrangements. Collins carried with him the broad
+powers which would be required to expedite the
+negotiations.</p>
+
+<p>By mid-January 1955, the president’s special envoy
+had paved the way for the transfer of responsibility
+for training, equipping, and advising the
+Vietnamese National Army from the French to the
+USMAAG. He and General Paul Ely, the officer
+appointed by the Paris government to oversee the
+French withdrawal from Indochina, had initialed
+a “Minute of Understanding.” In accordance with
+this document, the United States agreed to provide
+financial assistance to the French military in Vietnam
+in exchange for two important concessions.
+First, the French pledged to conduct a gradual
+military withdrawal from South Vietnam in order
+to prevent the development of a military vacuum
+which might precipitate a North Vietnamese
+invasion. Secondly, they accepted an American
+plan to assist in a transition stage during which the
+responsibility for rebuilding the Vietnamese military
+could be transferred to the MAAG in an orderly
+fashion. General Collins, in addition to engineering
+the understanding with General Ely,
+had advised Premier Diem to reduce his 210,000-man
+military and naval forces to a level of 100,000,
+a figure which the U.S. State Department felt the
+United States could realistically support and
+train.</p>
+
+<p>The American plan to begin assisting South
+Vietnam encountered further delay even after the
+Ely-Collins understanding had been reached. Ely’s
+government, arguing that the United States had
+agreed to provide only one-third of the amount
+France had requested to finance its Indochina forces,
+refused to ratify the agreement. The deadlock was
+finally resolved on 11 February 1955 when French<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">16</span>
+officials accepted the terms of the Ely-Collins arrangement
+in a revised form.</p>
+
+<p>A combined Franco-American training command,
+designated the Training Relations Instruction Mission
+(TRIM), became operational in Saigon the
+day following the French ratification of the Ely-Collins
+understanding.<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[2-A]</a> Headed by Lieutenant
+General O’Daniel but under the “overall authority”
+of General Ely, TRIM was structured to prevent
+domination by either French or Americans.
+The training mission was composed of four divisions,
+Army, Navy, Air Force, and National
+Security, each of which was headed alternately by
+either an American or a French officer. The chief of
+each division had as his deputy an officer of the
+opposite nationality. U.S. officers, however, headed
+the divisions considered by MAAG officials as the
+most important—Army and National Security.
+Operating through TRIM and assisted by the
+French military, the USMAAG was tasked with
+implementing the U.S. Military Assistance Program
+in a manner that would help shape the
+Vietnamese national forces into a cohesive defense
+establishment prior to the withdrawal of French
+forces.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">[2-A]</a> The combined training mission originally was designated the
+Allied Training Operations Mission. This designation was
+changed prior to the time the mission became operational.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_16"><i>Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance</i></h3>
+
+<p>Only one U.S. Marine was serving with the
+USMAAG in Saigon when TRIM became operational—Lieutenant
+Colonel Victor J. Croizat.<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[2-B]</a>
+Croizat’s assignment to the U.S. advisory group
+had resulted when General Lemuel C. Shepherd,
+Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, nominated
+him to fill a newly created billet as liaison officer
+between the MAAG and the French High Command
+during the latter stages of the Indochina
+War. Largely because of his French language
+fluency and his former association with many
+French officers while attending their war college
+in 1949, Croizat was chosen for the assignment.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">[2-B]</a> Other Marines, however, were present in Saigon at the time.
+They were those assigned to the American Embassy. One officer
+was serving as Assistant Naval Attache/Assistant Naval Attache
+for Air, and 12 other Marines were serving as security guards.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Croizat, however, did not
+arrive in Vietnam until 2 August 1954. By then
+the cease-fire agreement had been signed at Geneva
+and the need for a liaison officer with the French
+High Command no longer existed. General
+O’Daniel, therefore, assigned the newly arrived
+Marine officer to serve on the General Commission
+for Refugees which had been created by the South
+Vietnamese Government immediately after the
+cease-fire. In this capacity Croizat became directly
+involved in the construction of refugee reception
+centers and the selection and development of
+resettlement areas in the South. When U.S. naval
+forces began assisting in the evacuation of North
+Vietnam, Lieutenant Colonel Croizat was sent
+to Haiphong, the principal seaport of Tonkin.
+There he headed the MAAG detachment and was
+responsible for coordinating U.S. operations in the
+area with those of the French and Vietnamese.
+When the so-called “Passage to Freedom” concluded
+in May 1955, 807,000 people, 469,000 tons
+of equipment and supplies, and 23,000 vehicles
+had been evacuated from Communist North
+Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[2-C]</a> It was not until February 1955 that the
+Marine returned to Saigon.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">[2-C]</a> The French moved 497,000 people, 400,000 tons of equipment
+and supplies, and 15,000 vehicles. The U.S. Navy moved the
+balance.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>During Lieutenant Colonel Croizat’s absence,
+Premier Diem had acted on a long-standing proposal
+to create a small Vietnamese Marine Corps. The
+issue of a separate Marine force composed of
+Vietnamese national troops had surfaced frequently
+since the birth of the Vietnamese Navy in the
+early 1950s. Although the proposal had been
+heartily endorsed by a number of senior French
+Navy officers, the downward spiral of the French
+war effort had intervened to prevent the subject
+from being advanced beyond a conceptual stage.
+Largely as a result of earlier discussions with
+Croizat, Premier Diem acted on the matter on
+13 October when he signed a decree which included
+the following articles:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p class="hang">ARTICLE 1. Effective 1 October 1954 there is created
+within the Naval Establishment a corps of infantry
+specializing in the surveillance of waterways and amphibious
+operations on the coast and rivers, to be designated
+as:</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">17</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">
+‘THE MARINE CORPS’
+</p>
+
+<div class="tb">* * * * *</div>
+
+<p class="hang">ARTICLE 3. The Marine Corps shall consist of various
+type units suited to their functions and either already
+existing in the Army or Naval forces or to be created in
+accordance with the development plan for the armed
+forces.<a id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[2-1]</a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In accordance with this decree a miscellaneous
+collection of commando-type units was transferred
+from the Vietnamese National Army and
+Navy to the Marine Corps. Except for a naval
+commando unit, which had conducted amphibious
+raids along the coastal plains, these forces had
+operated in the Red River Delta with the French
+and Vietnamese Navy <i lang="fr">dinassauts</i> (river assault
+divisions). First employed in 1946, the <i lang="fr">dinassauts</i>
+had evolved into relatively effective naval commands
+capable of landing light infantry
+companies along Indochina’s tangled riverbanks.
+Normally the <i lang="fr">dinassaut</i> was composed of about a
+dozen armored and armed landing craft, patrol
+boats, and command vessels. An Army commando
+unit, consisting of approximately 100 men, would
+be attached to such naval commands for specific
+operations. Thus organized, the <i lang="fr">dinassauts</i> could
+transport light infantry units into otherwise inaccessible
+areas and support landings with heavy
+caliber automatic weapons and mortar fire. Such
+operations had been particularly successful in the
+sprawling Red River Delta of Tonkin where
+navigable estuaries and Viet Minh abounded.<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[2-D]</a>
+Later in the war, as the concept was refined, the
+French created a number of Vietnamese National
+Army commando units for specific service with the
+<i lang="fr">dinassauts</i>. Still attached to the Navy commands
+these units were sometimes responsible for security
+around the <i lang="fr">dinassaut</i> bases when not involved in
+preplanned operations. A number of these rather
+elite Vietnamese units, variously designated light
+support companies, river boat companies, and commandos,
+were now transferred to the newly decreed
+Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC).</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">[2-D]</a> Of the <i lang="fr">dinassaut</i> Bernard Fall wrote: “[It] may well have
+been one of the few worthwhile contributions of the Indochina
+war to military knowledge.” (Fall, <cite>Street Without Joy</cite>, p. 39)
+A more thorough analysis of <i lang="fr">dinassaut</i> operations is included
+in Croizat, <cite>A Translation From The French Lessons of the War</cite>, pp.
+348–351.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>By the time Lieutenant Colonel Croizat returned
+to Saigon in early 1955 these units, which totalled
+approximately 2,400 officers and men, had been
+evacuated from North Vietnam. Several of the
+commandos had been assembled at Nha Trang on
+South Vietnam’s central coast where the French
+still maintained an extensive naval training facility.
+There, under the supervision of a junior
+French commando officer, several former commandos
+had been organized into the 1st Marine
+Landing Battalion (or 1st Landing Battalion).
+The balance of the newly designated Marine units,
+however, were scattered in small, widely separated
+garrisons from Hue to the Mekong Delta.
+These units included six river boat companies, five
+combat support light companies, and a small training
+flotilla. Diem had appointed a former Vietnamese
+National Army officer, Major Le Quang
+Trong, as Senior Marine Officer. But because no
+formal headquarters had been created and because
+no real command structure existed, Major Trong
+remained relatively isolated from his far-flung Marine
+infantry units.</p>
+
+<p>Upon returning to Saigon, Croizat was assigned
+to the MAAG’s Naval Section and subsequently to
+TRIM’S Naval Division as the senior U.S. advisor
+to the newly created Vietnamese Marine Corps.
+In this capacity the Marine officer quickly determined
+that the small Vietnamese amphibious force
+was faced with several serious problems. First,
+and perhaps its most critical, was that despite
+Premier Diem’s decree, the Marine Corps continued
+to exist essentially on an informal basis. “The
+Marine Corps itself had no real identity,” its U.S.
+advisor later explained. “It was a scattering of dissimilar
+units extending from Hue to the Mekong
+Delta area.”<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[2-2]</a> The fact that its widespread units
+were still dependent on the French Expeditionary
+Corps for logistical support underscored the weakness
+inherent in the VNMC’s initial status.</p>
+
+<p>Other problems arose from the continuation of
+French officers in command billets throughout the
+Vietnamese naval forces. Under the Franco-American
+agreement which had created TRIM, a
+French Navy captain doubled as chief of the combined
+training missions’ Naval Division and as
+commanding officer of the Vietnamese naval
+forces. This placed the French in a position to
+review any proposals advanced by the U.S. Marine
+advisor. Complicating the situation even further, a
+French Army captain, Jean Louis Delayen, actually<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">18</span>
+commanded the 1st Landing Battalion at Nha
+Trang.<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[2-E]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="label">[2-E]</a> Delayen, described by Croizat as “an exceptionally qualified
+French Commando officer,” later attended the U.S. Marine
+Corps Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico. (Croizat,
+“Notes on The Organization,” p. 3.)</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Demobilization presented another potential difficulty
+for the Vietnamese Marine Corps in early
+1955. Under the U.S.-Vietnamese force level
+agreements, the Vietnamese naval forces were
+limited to 3,000 men. The Marine Corps, which
+alone totalled a disproportionate 2,400 men, had
+been instructed to reduce its strength to 1,137
+men and officers. With no effective centralized
+command structure and so many widely separated
+units, even the relatively simple task of mustering
+out troops assumed the dimensions of a complex
+administrative undertaking.</p>
+
+<p>In short, the very existence of the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps was threatened in a number of inter-related
+situations. The continuation of a separate
+and distinct Marine Corps hinged ultimately, of
+course, on the overall reorganization of the Vietnamese
+armed forces and their support structure.
+Essentially it would be necessary to establish a
+requirement for such an organization within South
+Vietnam’s future military-naval structure. Croizat
+personally sensed that this would be the pivotal
+issue in determining the VNMC’s future. “There
+were numerous representatives of the three military
+services from each of the three countries concerned
+with the fate of the Vietnamese Army, Navy, and
+Air Force,” he pointed out. “But, there was no
+champion from within the Vietnamese Marine
+Corps since no Corps existed except on paper.”<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[2-3]</a>
+Thus, it was left initially to a French captain, a
+Vietnamese major, and a U.S. Marine lieutenant
+colonel to keep alive the idea that South Vietnam’s
+defense establishment needed a separate Marine
+Corps.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_18"><i>Political Stabilization and Its Effects</i></h3>
+
+<p>During early 1955 the entire South Vietnamese
+government was engulfed by a crisis which threatened
+to disrupt the American plans to help build
+a viable anti-Communist country. The crisis
+occurred not in the form of an overt North Vietnamese
+attack but rather as a result of the South’s
+political instability. In February the leaders of the
+Hoa Hao, the Cao Dai, and the Binh Xuyen,
+dissatisfied with Premier Diem’s refusal to accede
+to their various demands, formed the United Front
+of National Forces.</p>
+
+<p>By mid-March the disaffected leaders of these
+organizations felt strong enough to test the premier’s
+strength. Trouble began late that month
+when the Hoa Hao began undertaking guerrilla-type
+activities against Diem’s National Army
+units in the sect’s stronghold southwest of Saigon.
+On 28 March Diem ordered a company of paratroops
+to seize the Saigon Central Police Headquarters
+which the French had allowed the Binh
+Xuyen to control. Fighting erupted throughout
+the capital the next day as Binh Xuyen units
+clashed with loyal government forces. A truce was
+arranged finally in the city on 31 March after three
+days of intermittent but fierce fighting. That
+same day the Cao Dai broke with the United
+Front and accepted a government offer to integrate
+some of its troops into the National Army.</p>
+
+<p>An uneasy peace prevailed over South Vietnam
+until 28 April when new fighting broke out. By the
+middle of May, government forces had driven the
+Binh Xuyen forces from Saigon, fracturing their
+organization. Remnants of the bandit group,
+however, escaped into the extensive Rung Sat
+swamps south of the capital where they continued
+fighting individually and in small groups. In the
+countryside south of Saigon, 30 of Diem’s battalions,
+including the 1st Landing Battalion, took
+the offensive against the Hoa Hao regular and
+guerrilla forces.</p>
+
+<p>The national crisis, for all practical purposes,
+ended in the last week of June when a Hoa Hao
+leader surrendered 8,000 regulars and ordered his
+followers to cease all anti-government activities.
+Sporadic fighting continued, however, as Diem’s
+forces sought to mop-up Hoa Hao splinter groups
+fighting in the western Mekong Delta and Binh
+Xuyen elements still resisting in the rugged mangrove
+swamps south of the capital. In August the
+Marine Landing Battalion fought a decisive action
+against the remaining Hoa Hao in Kien Giang
+Province about 120 miles southwest of Saigon,
+destroying the rebel headquarters. Later in the
+year the 1st Landing Battalion, joined by several
+river boat companies, reduced one of the last<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">19</span>
+pockets of Binh Xuyen resistance in the Rung Sat.
+As a result of these and similar actions being
+fought simultaneously by loyal Army units, organized
+resistance to Premier Diem gradually
+collapsed.<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[2-F]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="label">[2-F]</a> Some sources contend that remnants of the Hoa Hao and
+Cao Dai armies survived to operate alongside the Viet Cong
+guerrillas who began threatening the Diem government in the
+late 1950s. (Kahin and Lewis, <cite>The U.S. in Vietnam</cite>, p. 111.)</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>The sect crisis of 1955 proved to be the turning
+point in Diem’s political fortunes. At the height
+of the crisis, Emperor Bao Dai attempted to remove
+Diem as premier by ordering him to France for
+“consultations.” Electing to remain in Saigon and
+direct his government efforts to quell the rebellion,
+the premier declined Bao Dai’s summons. The
+Vietnamese military forces proved loyal to the
+premier, having faithfully executed Diem’s commands
+throughout the emergency. Having successfully
+met the armed challenge of the sects and
+the Binh Xuyen and having openly repudiated
+Bao Dai’s authority, Premier Diem had imposed at
+least a measure of political stability on South
+Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>An epilogue to the sect crisis was written on
+23 October when a nationwide referendum was
+held in South Vietnam to settle the issue of national
+leadership. In the balloting, since criticized as
+having been rigged, Premier Diem received 98.2
+percent of the total vote against Bao Dai. Three
+days later, on 26 October, South Vietnam’s new
+president proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam
+(RVN).</p>
+
+<p>The Vietnamese Marine Corps benefited greatly
+from Premier Diem’s successful confrontation with
+his political rivals. On 1 May, in preparation for
+the 1st Landing Battalion’s deployment to combat,
+Major Trong had established a small Marine Corps
+headquarters in Saigon. Shortly thereafter, Diem
+had appointed a Vietnamese officer, Captain Bui
+Pho Chi, to replace Captain Delayen as commander
+of the landing battalion. The French commando
+officer, who was a member of TRIM, remained
+at Nha Trang as an advisor to the VNMC. Then,
+on the last day of June, Diem removed the remaining
+French officers from command positions
+throughout South Vietnam’s naval forces. The
+combined effect of these actions was to reduce
+French influence throughout the nation’s naval
+establishment while making the Vietnamese Marine
+Corps more responsive to the central government.</p>
+
+<p>The burdens of demobilization also were lightened
+somewhat as a result of the sect crisis when a
+new force level was approved by the United States
+in mid-summer of 1955. The new agreement,
+dictated in part by the requirement to integrate
+portions of the sects’ armies into the national
+forces, raised the force level to 150,000 men and
+placed the personnel ceiling of the Vietnamese
+naval forces at 4,000 men. This revision enhanced
+the prospects for a corresponding increase in the
+authorized strength of the VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Landing Battalion’s performance against
+the sect forces in the Mekong Delta and the Rung
+Sat, moreover, tempered much of the previous
+opposition to a separate VNMC. Heretofore, U.S.
+and Vietnamese Army officers had opposed the
+existence of a Vietnamese amphibious force apart
+from the National Army. Until the sect uprising,
+Lieutenant Colonel Croizat had used the influence
+afforded by his position as naval advisor to the
+general staff to advocate the continuation of the
+VNMC. But during the sect battles the Vietnamese
+Marines had firmly established their value to the
+new government. By displaying loyalty, discipline,
+and efficiency in combat, they had spoken out in
+their own behalf at a critical juncture in their
+corp’s existence.</p>
+
+<p>Shortly before the 1st Landing Battalion deployed
+to fight the rebellious sect forces, two additional
+U.S. Marine advisors—an officer and a noncommissioned
+officer—arrived in South Vietnam
+for duty with the MAAG. Both Marines were
+assigned to TRIM. Croizat dispatched the officer,
+Captain James T. Breckinridge, to Nha Trang
+where he soon replaced Captain Delayen as advisor
+to the 1st Landing Battalion. As State Department
+policy prohibited U.S. military personnel
+from participating in combat activities with indigenous
+forces, Breckinridge was forced to await
+the battalion’s return from the field. During its
+absence he divided his time between Nha Trang
+and Saigon where he assisted Colonel Croizat with
+planning and logistics matters. The noncommissioned
+officer, Technical Sergeant Jackson E.
+Tracy, initially remained in Saigon but later
+moved to Nha Trang. There, serving principally
+as a small unit tactics instructor to the Vietnamese
+Marines, Tracy impressed Breckinridge as a “first-rate<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">20</span>
+Marine ‘NCO’—one who could carry out the
+most complex assignment with little or no supervision.”<a id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[2-4]</a></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_20" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_020.jpg" width="1888" height="1284" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat, first U.S. Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, translates during
+discussions between Lieutenant General John “Iron Mike” O’Daniel, USA, Chief, USMAAG, Vietnam, and Premier
+Ngo Dinh Diem. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Colonel Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.)</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Soon after 1956 opened, President Diem appointed
+a new officer to head the Vietnamese Marine Corps.
+On 18 January Major Phan Van Lieu assumed command
+of the VNMC, and thereby became the second
+Senior Marine Officer.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_20"><i>Reorganization and Progress</i></h3>
+
+<p>The 1st Landing Battalion remained in action
+against the Binh Xuyen remnants until February
+1956. During this period Lieutenant Colonel Croizat
+reviewed the entire organizational structure
+of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. By now the size
+of the service had been reduced to roughly 1,800
+officers and men although it retained its original
+organization of six river boat companies, five
+light support companies, a landing battalion, a
+training flotilla, and a small headquarters.</p>
+
+<p>This organization, with so many dissimilar units
+existing on one echelon, influenced Croizat to
+suggest that Major Lieu restructure the service.
+Assisted by Croizat, Captain Breckinridge, and
+Technical Sergeant Tracy, Lieu and his small staff
+spent several months developing and refining plans
+for the comprehensive reorganization of the Marine
+Corps. Lieu submitted this package to the
+Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) on 21 December
+1955. The salient feature of the plan was to
+create an additional landing battalion without
+increasing the 1,837-man ceiling which then governed
+the size of the VNMC. Significantly, the
+plan contained a clause proposing that the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps be expanded to regimental
+size in the future.<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[2-5]</a></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_20b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 42em;">
+  <img src="images/i_021.png" width="2679" height="934" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><p>VNMC TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 18 FEBRUARY 1956</p>
+
+<p>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH, 1,837</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<figure id="ip_20c" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 42em;">
+  <img src="images/i_021b.png" width="2667" height="945" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><p>LANDING BATTALION TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 18 FEBRUARY 1956</p>
+
+<p>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 728</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The Vietnamese Joint General Staff approved
+the new structure, and reorganization of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">22</span>
+VNMC was begun when the 1st Landing Battalion
+finally returned to Nha Trang in February. The
+old river boat and light support companies were
+disbanded and three new units—a 4.2-inch mortar
+company, a headquarters and service company,
+and a new landing battalion—were formed. Designated
+the 2d Landing Battalion, this new unit
+formed about 25 miles south of Nha Trang at
+Cam Ranh Bay where the French had trained
+amphibious forces during the latter stages of the
+Indochina War.</p>
+
+<p>As a result of the 1956 reorganization effort, the
+tables of organization and tables of equipment for
+the Vietnamese Marine battalions were completely
+revised. Three infantry companies, a heavy
+weapons company, and a headquarters and service
+company now comprised a landing battalion.<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[2-G]</a>
+Each infantry company was organized into three
+rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. In turn,
+the rifle platoons each consisted of three 10-man
+squads (three 3-man fire teams and a squad
+leader). The individual Vietnamese Marine rifleman
+was armed with the .30 caliber M-1 carbine,
+a weapon formerly carried by many French and
+Vietnamese commandos. It had been retained for
+use within the VNMC because it was substantially
+shorter and lighter than the standard U.S. infantry
+weapon, the M-1 rifle, and was therefore better
+suited to the small Vietnamese fighting man. The
+automatic rifleman in each Vietnamese Marine
+fire team carried the Browning automatic rifle
+(BAR), a heavier .30 caliber automatic weapon.
+The weapons platoon of the rifle company was
+built around six .30 caliber light machine guns.
+Within the heavy weapons company of the landing
+battalions was a mortar platoon, equipped with
+four 81mm mortars, and a recoilless rifle platoon.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="label">[2-G]</a> Whereas U.S. Marine infantry companies were designated by
+letters (A, B, C, D, etc.), the Vietnamese Marine infantry companies
+were given number designations.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>While this reorganization was underway, Lieutenant
+Colonel Croizat initiated a search for
+acceptable means of expanding the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps to regimental size. A staff study
+produced by the Senior Marine Advisor a month
+before the first phase of the reorganization effort
+had begun included several important recommendations.
+Croizat proposed to General O’Daniel
+that authorization be granted to raise the ceiling
+on the VNMC from 1,837 to 2,435 officers and
+men. This, the Marine advisor pointed out, could
+be accomplished without affecting the overall
+ceiling on all South Vietnamese military and
+naval forces. By reassigning to the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps an amphibious battalion still
+organized within the National Army, the 150,000-man
+force level would not be altered. This would
+transform the Vietnamese Marine Corps into a
+three battalion regiment and would unify all South
+Vietnamese amphibious forces under a single
+command. Croizat’s study further recommended
+that the Vietnamese Marine Corps be designated
+part of the general reserve of the nation’s armed
+forces and that it be controlled directly by the
+Vietnamese Joint General Staff. Although no
+immediate action was taken on these recommendations,
+they were to serve as a blueprint for the
+future expansion of the VNMC. Equally important,
+they bore the seed that would eventually
+make the Vietnamese Marine Corps a fully integrated
+component of South Vietnam’s defense
+establishment.</p>
+
+<p>During the ensuing three years, several apparently
+unrelated occurrences impacted either directly or
+indirectly on the U.S. Marine advisory effort in
+South Vietnam. The French completed their military
+withdrawal from South Vietnam and dissolved
+their High Command in April 1956, slightly
+ahead of schedule.<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[2-H]</a> In conjunction with this final
+phase of the French withdrawal, the Training
+Relations Instructions Mission was abolished.
+Thus, it was no longer necessary for the MAAG
+programs to be executed through the combined
+training mission.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="label">[2-H]</a> A few French naval officers and noncommissioned officers
+remained at Nha Trang as instructors until late May 1957.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Shortly after the departure of the last French
+troops, Lieutenant Colonel Croizat ended his assignment
+as Senior Marine Advisor. He was replaced
+by Lieutenant Colonel William N. Wilkes,
+Jr., in June 1956. A veteran of the Guadalcanal
+campaign, Wilkes came to Vietnam from Washington,
+D.C. where he had recently completed a
+French language course. Like his predecessor, the
+new Senior Marine Advisor was scheduled to serve
+in Vietnam for two years.</p>
+
+<p>In August, less than two months after Lieutenant
+Colonel Wilkes’ arrival, President Diem appointed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">23</span>
+a new officer to head his Marine Corps. This time
+Bui Pho Chi, the captain who had commanded
+the 1st Landing Battalion during the sect uprising,
+was selected for the assignment. Chi’s appointment
+was only temporary, however, for in October Diem
+ordered Major Le Nhu Hung to assume command
+of the Marine Corps. Major Hung, who became the
+VNMC’s fourth Senior Officer, was to hold the
+position for four years.</p>
+
+<p>An attempt to abolish the Vietnamese Marine
+Corps coincided with the series of changes in its
+leadership and the departure of Lieutenant Colonel
+Croizat. During the summer months, the Vietnamese
+Minister of Defense proposed that the
+VNMC be made a branch of South Vietnam’s
+Army. Fortunately, the recent combat record of
+the 1st Landing Battalion outweighed the minister’s
+influence and the effort to disestablish the
+Vietnamese Marine Corps was thwarted.</p>
+
+<p>Another noteworthy incident in the record of
+the early relations between the U.S. and Vietnamese
+Marines occurred when the Marine noncommissioned
+officer billet within the MAAG
+was upgraded to an officer position. This adjustment,
+which anticipated the creation of the 2d
+Landing Battalion, had the effect of making a
+U.S. Marine officer available to advise individual
+VNMC battalions on a permanent basis. Thus
+originated a plan whereby a U.S. Marine officer
+would advise each Vietnamese Marine battalion—a
+concept abandoned only temporarily between
+1959 and 1962.</p>
+
+<p>The Vietnamese Marine Corps continued as a
+two-battalion regiment under the command of
+Major Le Nhu Hung from mid-1956 through
+1959. During this period Lieutenant Colonel
+Wilkes and his successor, Lieutenant Colonel
+Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., a Marine who had
+served as an aide to President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
+instituted a variety of programs intended to
+provide the Vietnamese Marines with a common
+base of experience and training.<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[2-I]</a> Perhaps the
+most important of these was one implemented in
+1958 whereby Vietnamese Marine officers began
+attending basic and intermediate level schools
+at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico. Other formal
+schools for noncommissioned officers were
+established by the Vietnamese Marine Corps in
+South Vietnam. In an effort to build <i lang="fr">esprit de
+corps</i> among the lower ranking Vietnamese Marines,
+the U.S. advisors encouraged voluntary enlistments.
+They also persuaded their Vietnamese
+counterparts to adopt a corps-wide marksmanship
+training program similar to the one then in use
+by the U.S. Marine Corps.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="label">[2-I]</a> See <a href="#Appendix_A">Appendix A</a> for complete listings of VNMC Commandants
+and Senior Marine Advisors to the VNMC during
+the 1954–1964 period.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>In conjunction with the reorganization of the
+VNMC and the stress being placed upon small
+unit and individual training, much of the U.S.
+advisory effort during this period was devoted
+to logistics. The Marine advisors soon discovered
+that the Vietnamese officers, who had not been
+directly concerned with supply matters under the
+French, tended to ignore this important area.
+“The real problem,” explained Captain Breckinridge,
+“was the newness of it all. The Vietnamese
+officers simply possessed no base of experience or
+training in logistic matters.”<a id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[2-6]</a> This shortcoming
+dictated that the American advisors not only
+design a workable logistics system but closely
+supervise its operation as well. Wilkes and Wilkinson
+instituted intensive schooling of supply and
+maintenance personnel and emphasized the value
+of command supervision to the Vietnamese leaders.
+The Marine advisors, for example, taught their
+counterparts that equipment shortages could often
+be prevented if command attention were given to
+requisitions. Still, even with constant supervision
+and formal schooling, the Vietnamese Marine
+Corps continued to experience problems in this
+area throughout the 1950s and well into the
+next decade. Breckinridge, who returned to serve
+with the Vietnamese Marines again as a lieutenant
+colonel in the late 1960s, recalled shortages of
+such vital and common items as small arms ammunition
+even then.</p>
+
+<p>The years between 1955 and 1959 also saw the
+Marine advisors working to overcome a potentially
+more serious problem, one that also
+dated from the French-Indochina War. From the
+outset of their experience with the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps, the Marine advisors perceived that
+a strong defensive orientation seemed to pervade
+every echelon of the small service. Most Americans,
+including U.S. Army advisors who were encountering
+similar difficulties with the Vietnamese Army,
+agreed that this “defensive psychology” was a
+by-product of the long subordination of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">24</span>
+Vietnamese National forces to the French High
+Command. Indeed, a criticism frequently voiced
+by USMAAG officials during the Indochina War
+had been that the French tended to frustrate the
+development of the Vietnamese military forces
+by assigning them static security tasks rather
+than offensive missions. Even though the forerunners
+of the Vietnamese Marine battalions had
+operated as commando units, they too had seen
+extensive duty protecting <i lang="fr">dinassaut</i> bases and
+other French installations. Now this defensive
+thinking was affecting the attitude of the Vietnamese
+Marine toward training. Moreover, it
+was threatening the American effort to transform
+the service into an aggressive amphibious strike
+force.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_24" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 35em;">
+  <img src="images/i_024.jpg" width="1901" height="1169" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>First group of Vietnamese Marine officers to attend U.S. Marine Officers Basic School, Quantico, Virginia, pose with
+Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (second from right), and Captain Michael Gott (extreme right). At the
+extreme left is Captain Le Nguyen Khang, a future Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. To his immediate
+left is Major Le Nhu Hung, a senior officer of the VNMC. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael Gott, USMC</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>By nature this particular problem defied quick,
+simple solutions. The Marine advisors, therefore,
+undertook to adjust the orientation of the entire
+Vietnamese Marine Corps over a prolonged period
+through continuous emphasis on offensive training.
+The advisors consistently encouraged their Vietnamese
+counterparts to develop training schedules
+which stressed patrolling, ambushing, fire and
+maneuver, and night movement. In this same
+connection the Marine advisors translated U.S.
+Marine small unit tactics manuals into French,
+whereupon the same manuals were further translated
+by Vietnamese Marines into Vietnamese.
+This process assured that adequate training literature
+was made available to the individual Marine
+and his small unit leaders. The offensively oriented
+training programs and the translation project
+complemented one another, and combined with
+continuous supervision by the U.S. advisors and
+the return of young Vietnamese officers from
+Quantico, gradually helped impart a more aggressive<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">25</span>
+offensive spirit to the entire Marine
+Corps.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_25"><i>Summing Up Developments</i></h3>
+
+<p>The years between 1955 and 1959 constitute perhaps
+the most critical and challenging span in the
+chronicle of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. Born
+out of the confusion which dominated South Vietnam
+in the aftermath of the Geneva Agreement,
+the embryonic Marine Corps had survived against
+heavy odds. Even before its scattered components
+could be drawn together under a centralized command,
+the Corps had been hurled into combat
+against the rebellious sects. Over the course of
+their commitment the Vietnamese Marines had
+strengthened their own cause through demonstrations
+of their fighting capability and loyalty.
+In terms of the VNMC’s continued existence,
+equally critical battles were being waged in Saigon
+where the Senior U.S. Marine Advisor and the
+Vietnamese Senior Marine Officer struggled to gain
+support for the infant service. It was there, ironically,
+that the destiny of the Vietnamese Marine
+Corps ultimately had been decided.</p>
+
+<p>On balance, the interval between 1955 and 1959
+was characterized by uncertainty, transition, and
+problem solving. Never sure of the Marine Corps’
+future, the Senior Vietnamese Marine Officer and a
+handful of U.S. Marine advisors had carried forward
+their efforts to transform scattered French-inspired
+river commando units into a coherent and
+responsive American-style amphibious force. While
+this transformation was only partially realized,
+definite progress was apparent. Vietnamese officers
+had replaced French commanders, and with American
+guidance, had given their service a strong interim
+structure. Many of the more serious problems
+which had plagued the struggling organization
+since its inception had been identified. With
+American assistance, solutions to those problems
+were being developed and tested. So, despite a
+stormy beginning and a threatened early childhood,
+the Vietnamese Marine Corps lived.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">26</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_3"><span id="toclink_26"></span>CHAPTER 3<br>
+<span class="subhead large">Vietnamese Marines
+and the Communist Insurgency</span><br>
+<span class="subhead notbold"><i>Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency—Insurgency and the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps—Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands—American
+Decisions at the Close of 1961</i></span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_26a"><i>Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency</i></h3>
+
+<p>South Vietnam gave every outward indication
+that it had achieved a measure of overall stability
+in the two-year period following President Diem’s
+election in the fall of 1955. In early 1956 Diem
+felt strong enough politically to announce his
+government’s refusal to participate in the reunification
+elections scheduled for midyear. He
+based this position upon the argument that free
+elections were impossible in Communist North
+Vietnam. The proposed July election deadline
+passed without a serious reaction by North Vietnam.
+Equally encouraging was the fact that there
+had been no noticeable resurgence in the armed
+power of either the politico-religious sects or the
+Binh Xuyen. At the same time the American-backed
+South Vietnamese economy appeared to
+be gaining considerable strength.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_26" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;">
+  <img src="images/i_026.jpg" width="922" height="1128" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, USA, Commander,
+Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam.
+(<cite>USA Photo SC494954</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The threat of invasion from the North had also
+been tempered somewhat by 1958. The MAAG,
+now headed by Lieutenant General Samuel T.
+Williams, U.S. Army, a commander respected as
+a tough disciplinarian, was beginning to reshape
+the former Vietnamese national forces.<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[3-A]</a> Renamed
+the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN),
+the army now consisted of four field divisions
+(8,500 men each), six light divisions (5,000 men
+each), 13 territorial regiments (whose strength
+varied), and a parachute regiment. Although
+General Williams viewed this as merely an interim
+organization, it had provided the South Vietnamese
+army with a unified command structure
+based on sound organizational principles. The
+arrival of a 350-man U.S. Temporary Equipment
+Recovery Mission (TERM) in 1956, moreover,
+had freed U.S. Army advisors for assignment to
+each ARVN regiment. American officers were
+likewise reorganizing and helping train the small<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">27</span>
+Vietnamese Navy (2,160 officers and men) and
+Air Force (4,000 officers and men). The Vietnamese
+Marine Corps continued to exist as a two-battalion
+amphibious force within the nation’s naval
+establishment. General Williams felt confident
+that by 1958 South Vietnam’s regular military
+establishment had been strengthened enough to
+discourage North Vietnamese leaders from seriously
+considering an outright invasion.<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[3-1]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="label">[3-A]</a> General Williams would head the MAAG until his retirement
+in 1960.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Backing these developing regular forces, at
+least on paper, were two generally feeble paramilitary
+organizations—the Civil Guard (CG)
+and the Village Self Defense Corps (SDC). The
+larger of these, the Civil Guard, existed within the
+Ministry of Interior and was funded and advised
+by the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM). Its
+48,000 men, therefore, were not charged against
+the 150,000-man force level ceiling that regulated
+the size of Diem’s regular forces. Nor were the
+47,000 members of the Self Defense Corps, even
+though this organization received limited amounts
+of U.S. military assistance funds for payroll purposes.
+In any case, serious shortcomings were
+evident in both the CG and the SDC. Organized
+into provincial companies directly responsible to
+the various province chiefs, the Civil Guard was
+entirely separate from the ARVN chain of command.
+Furthermore, American civilians under
+government contract had armed and trained the
+CG for police-type as opposed to military missions.
+The SDC, essentially a scattering of local militia
+units, was even weaker, having been organized
+at the village level into squads and an occasional
+platoon. Although the SDC units were subordinate
+to the respective village chief, the ARVN bore
+the responsibility for providing them with arms
+and training. More often than not the Vietnamese
+Army units gave their obsolete weapons to the
+SDC and showed little genuine interest in training
+the small units.<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[3-2]</a></p>
+
+<p>Although a measure of stability was obviously
+returning to South Vietnam by 1958, one of the
+country’s more serious problems remained unsolved—the
+threat of subversion by Communist
+Viet Minh agents who had remained south of the
+17th parallel following the Geneva cease-fire.
+Following the resolution of the sect crisis in 1955,
+Diem turned to neutralize this potential threat.
+Initially his army experienced some success with
+pacification operations conducted in former Viet
+Minh strongholds. While they did help extend
+government control into the rural areas of several
+provinces, such operations were discontinued in
+1956.</p>
+
+<p>Another policy initiated that same year seems to
+have nullified the moderate gains produced by the
+pacification campaigns. Acting both to eliminate
+Viet Minh sympathizers from positions of leadership
+at the local level and to extend his own grip
+downward to the rural population, Diem replaced
+elected village officials with appointed chiefs. The
+new policy, which threatened the traditional
+autonomy of the individual Vietnamese village,
+was immediately unpopular.</p>
+
+<p>So was another government program which
+Diem implemented to undercut Communist strength
+throughout the country—the Anti-Communist
+Denunciation Campaign. Initiated in mid-1955 to
+discredit former Viet Minh, the denunciation
+campaign evolved into something of a witch hunt.
+By the late 1950s large numbers of Vietnamese with
+only minimal Communist connections were allegedly
+being confined in political re-education
+camps. Like the appointment of village leaders,
+the denunciation campaign served to alienate
+Vietnamese who might otherwise have supported
+the central government in its struggle for control of
+the rural regions.</p>
+
+<p>Forced underground by the Anti-Communist
+Denunciation Campaign, Viet Minh agents concentrated
+on strengthening their political posture
+for the proposed general election in the period
+immediately following the Geneva Agreement.
+When the hope of reunification by plebiscite passed
+in mid-1956, the so-called “stay behinds” began
+rebuilding clandestine political cells in their
+former strongholds. Having retained their aptitude
+for the adroit manipulation of local grievances, the
+Communists gradually won support from rural
+Vietnamese who saw themselves threatened by the
+new government policies. In mid-1957, the Communists,
+who were now being labelled “Viet
+Cong” by the Diem government (a derogatory but
+accurate term which, literally translated, meant
+“Vietnamese Communist”) began assassinating
+government officials in several of the country’s
+rural provinces. Aimed at unpopular village chiefs,
+rural police, district officials, and school teachers,
+the Viet Cong’s assassination campaign was undertaken
+to erode the government’s contacts with the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">28</span>
+local populace and thereby enhance their own
+organizational efforts.</p>
+
+<p>Still faced with the possibility of a conventional
+attack across the demilitarized zone, President
+Diem was reluctant to commit his regular military
+units to a problem which seemed to demand police-type
+operations. Seeing no clear-cut threat, he
+relied on the Village Self Defense Corps and the
+Civil Guard to maintain order in the provinces.
+Poorly led and equipped, and trained primarily in
+urban police methods, the paramilitary forces
+proved unable to prevent the diffuse terrorist
+attacks. In the 12-month period between July 1957
+and July 1958, for example, some 700 more South
+Vietnamese officials reportedly died at the hands of
+Communist terrorists.<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[3-3]</a></p>
+
+<p>The Viet Cong terror-propaganda campaigns
+continued apace throughout 1958. The occurrence
+of the first attacks on U.S. facilities in Saigon and
+the initiation of an anti-American propaganda
+campaign near the end of that year, moreover,
+indicated that the Communists were broadening the
+scope of their activities. By this time, the internal
+disturbances were beginning to assume the dimensions
+of a concerted guerrilla movement in several
+of the country’s more heavily populated regions,
+including parts of the important Mekong Delta.
+Near the close of 1958 President Diem finally began
+ordering regular military units into the provinces
+with instructions to eliminate the Viet Cong and
+restore government control.</p>
+
+<p>The very nature of the enemy, however, tended
+to render such government operations ineffective.
+Essentially, the Viet Cong derived their strength
+from the clandestine political structure which
+agents had established in portions of the countryside.
+Interwoven into the social fabric of the hamlets
+and villages, this political infrastructure, as it
+later came to be called, served a dual purpose. It
+was both the machinery by which the Communists
+exercised control over the population and a vital
+base of support for the growing guerrilla forces,
+providing the Viet Cong with men, food, intelligence
+information, and refuge.</p>
+
+<p>As the Viet Cong guerrillas were recruited from
+and lived among the local populace, outsiders
+found it virtually impossible to identify them.
+Their familiarity with the local terrain, their
+methods of operating in small groups, and massing
+for attacks mostly at night made locating them
+equally difficult. Even their patience seemed to
+enhance their ability to survive. Unwilling to
+engage a stronger military force and realizing that
+a specific government operation could not continue
+indefinitely, the Viet Cong normally would melt
+into their environment with the arrival of regular
+units. When the operation terminated and the
+regular government forces withdrew, the Communists
+would re-emerge, often stronger than before.
+In many cases the guerrillas could give real meaning
+to their anti-government propaganda once the local
+population had felt the weight of military operations
+in their particular community. Operating in
+this manner, the Viet Cong were able to husband
+their strength while simultaneously expanding
+their influence.</p>
+
+<p>There was ample indication that the Communist
+movement was not wholly indigenous to South
+Vietnam. Indeed, evidence of increasing North
+Vietnamese support for the Viet Cong was becoming
+apparent near the end of the decade. In May
+1959, the Central Committee of the North Vietnamese
+Communist Party publicly announced its
+intention “to smash” the government of Ngo Dinh
+Diem.<a id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[3-4]</a> By the summer of that year the Viet Cong
+were being reinforced with men and limited quantities
+of equipment infiltrated from North Vietnam.
+Many of the Communist infiltrators, who at this
+early stage were entering Diem’s country across the
+DMZ and by sea, were southerners who had gone
+North with the Viet Minh in late 1954. Trained in
+political and military operations, these returnees
+added substantially to the Viet Cong’s discipline
+and technical capabilities.<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[3-B]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="label">[3-B]</a> A State Department publication released in 1965 placed the
+number of confirmed North Vietnamese infiltrators for the years
+1959 and 1960 at 1,800. It also noted that an additional 2,700
+North Vietnamese were estimated to have been infiltrated during
+this two-year period. The vast majority of these were thought
+to have been former residents of southern Vietnam. (Department
+of State, <cite>Aggression from the North</cite>, p. 33.)</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>So strengthened, the Communist guerrillas
+reportedly were operating in battalion strength
+(300– to 400-man battalions) in some areas by mid-1959.
+Throughout the country they had expanded
+their activities to include hit-and-run attacks on
+paramilitary posts, district headquarters, hospitals,
+schools, and agricultural stations. Like the assassination
+campaign which was underway concurrently
+in areas still controlled by the GVN, these attacks<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">29</span>
+were conceived with political considerations in
+mind. By successfully raiding remote, poorly defended
+facilities, the Viet Cong was able to embarrass
+the central government while demonstrating
+their own strength to the local population. The
+raids, furthermore, produced weapons which
+enabled the guerrillas to operate without total
+dependence on the North.</p>
+
+<p>By mid-1959 the security situation in the Republic
+of Vietnam had deteriorated to the point
+that much of the optimism formerly voiced by
+American and South Vietnamese officials had begun
+to disappear. The National Intelligence Estimate
+released in Washington during August accurately
+described the conditions which were settling over
+South Vietnam. This paper disclosed that the
+nation’s economy was beginning to falter noticeably
+and that President Diem’s government was growing
+increasingly unpopular. Furthermore, the estimate
+warned that harassment by the Viet Cong could be
+expected to intensify.<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[3-5]</a></p>
+
+<p>As predicted, security conditions in South
+Vietnam did grow worse in the period following
+the August intelligence estimate. In the last four
+months of 1959 almost 200 assassinations were
+reported. In January 1960 another 96 civilians were
+killed by the Communists and in the following
+month the total reached 122. By the fall of 1960
+the Viet Cong were strong enough to begin ambushing
+regular ARVN units in several provinces.
+Like their raids on fixed installations, their ambush
+tactics were resulting in frequent and demoralizing
+defeats for the government. Like the raids, they
+were also providing weapons and ammunition for
+the growing guerrilla forces.</p>
+
+<p>By 1960 the government’s inability to contain
+the disturbing malaise was beginning to produce
+political tensions in Saigon. On 26 April a group
+of 18 distinguished Vietnamese political figures,
+including a number of former cabinet members,
+issued a public demand for President Diem’s
+resignation. Diem refused, eventually ordering the
+arrest of all who signed the manifesto.</p>
+
+<p>A more serious effort to bring down the central
+government occurred in November when a group of
+military officers led by Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi,
+the commander of a newly formed (1959) ARVN
+airborne brigade, staged an abortive coup d’etat
+in Saigon. Two companies of Vietnamese Marines
+joined Thi’s rebellious paratroops.<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[3-C]</a> But the power
+struggle, which began in the early morning hours
+of 11 November, ended when units loyal to President
+Diem converged on the capital. Realizing
+that the balance had been tipped against them, the
+coup leaders fled the country and the incident was
+closed. While it had failed to bring down the Diem
+government, Thi’s attempted coup had revived
+the possibility of efforts by military leaders to
+seize control of the government and had injected
+a new element of uncertainty into South Vietnam’s
+already unstable internal situation.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="label">[3-C]</a> Vietnamese Marine participation in the abortive coup of
+10 November 1960 is covered in greater detail elsewhere in this
+chapter.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Two other danger signals flashed across Southeast
+Asia shortly after the abortive coup. In
+January 1961, Communist leaders in Hanoi announced
+that the National Liberation Front (NLF)
+had been founded in the South on 20 December 1960
+with the stated purpose of closely uniting the
+“various classes of the South Vietnamese patriotic
+population in the struggle against the Americans
+and Diem....”<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[3-6]</a> In truth, the NLF emerged as
+a fully developed Communist political organization
+imported from North Vietnam for the purpose of
+controlling, directing, and coordinating the insurgency
+south of the 17th parallel. For American
+officials, the announced establishment of the NLF
+signified that Ho Chi Minh’s government had opted
+for the forceful reunification of North and South.</p>
+
+<p>Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, another event led
+to further speculation that the war in Vietnam was
+about to enter a new phase. Backed by the North
+Vietnamese Army, Communist Pathet Lao forces
+seized control of the southeastern portion of the
+Laotian panhandle. Thus, the North Vietnamese
+obtained a protected corridor along South Vietnam’s
+northwestern border through which men and
+materiel could be infiltrated to the South.</p>
+
+<p>The establishment of the NLF and the Communist
+takeover in southern Laos coincided roughly
+with approval in Washington of a comprehensive
+plan designed to help President Diem restore
+internal order. Designated the Counter-Insurgency
+Plan (CIP), this study had been ordered by President
+Eisenhower in early 1960. Developed by
+Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr, U.S. Army,
+the officer who had relieved General Williams as
+MAAG Chief, the completed CIP reached the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">30</span>
+White House shortly after President John F.
+Kennedy’s inauguration in January 1961. Significantly,
+its arrival came at a time when the Soviet
+Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, was publicly pledging
+his country’s support for “wars of national
+liberation.”</p>
+
+<p>The plan presented for the new president’s consideration
+drew clear connections between the
+military and political aspects of the war in Vietnam.
+It included a conditional offer of U.S. support
+for a 20,000-man increase in the regular South
+Vietnamese military forces and a 32,000-man increase
+in the size of the Civil Guard. These military
+and paramilitary increases were to be dependent
+upon President Diem’s agreement to effect major
+reforms in his military and political apparatus—measures
+which American officials in Saigon considered
+necessary for the success of any counterinsurgency
+effort.</p>
+
+<p>President Kennedy approved the main provisions
+of the Counter-Insurgency Plan on 28 January 1961
+and negotiations on the package opened with Diem
+two weeks later. But the talks soon deadlocked on
+the issue of political and military reforms. Meanwhile,
+with the discussions in Saigon dragging on
+inconclusively, the situation in the provinces
+continued to worsen. A National Intelligence
+Estimate released in March estimated that Viet
+Cong military strength had reached 10,000 men.
+Furthermore, the number of violent incidents
+reported in the country had risen to 650 per month.
+Even worse, it was estimated that 58 percent of
+South Vietnam was under some degree of Communist
+control.<a id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[3-7]</a></p>
+
+<p>Convinced that the situation was becoming
+critical and fearing that it might soon become
+hopeless, President Kennedy approved a new program
+of military assistance to the Diem government
+on 29 April. Inspired in part by Kennedy’s desire
+to increase Diem’s confidence in the new U.S.
+administration, the 29 April program did not
+require concrete pledges of reform from the South
+Vietnamese. In its specifics, however, the new
+package was similar to the CIP. It contained provisions
+for supporting a 20,000 man increase in the
+Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)—a
+move which would raise the ceiling on the South
+Vietnamese regular forces from 150,000 to 170,000.
+Another provision approved the use of Military
+Assistance Program appropriations for the Civil
+Guard and Self Defense Corps and expanded the
+MAAG’s responsibility to include training and
+equipping these forces. Under the 29 April plan,
+the paramilitary forces were to be transferred from
+Diem’s Ministry of the Interior to his Ministry of
+Defense. In order to meet its increased advisory
+responsibilities, authorization was given to increase
+the size of the MAAG by 100 men to a strength of
+785. This provision allowed the first enlargement
+of the group since the introduction of the Temporary
+Equipment Recovery Mission in 1956.<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[3-D]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="label">[3-D]</a> With the dissolution of TERM in the late 1950s, the International
+Control Commission had granted permission for the
+MAAG to maintain a strength of 685 men. When the logistics
+personnel departed Vietnam, new advisor billets were created
+within the MAAG’s table of organization.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>General McGarr’s advisory group began implementing
+President Kennedy’s 29 April program
+during the summer of 1961. But the increases in the
+government’s regular and paramilitary establishments
+and in the size of the MAAG failed to arrest
+the trend of warfare on South Vietnam’s battlefields.
+The remainder of 1961 was characterized by
+increasingly aggressive guerrilla operations and the
+steady growth of Viet Cong military forces. In
+August, for example, the ARVN reported 41 major
+armed attacks on its units. The following month
+brought 450 Viet Cong-initiated incidents, including
+several involving multi-battalion forces of over
+1,000 guerrillas. In mid-September, for example, an
+estimated 1,500 Viet Cong overran Phuoc Vin, the
+capital of Phuoc Thuan Province, and held the
+town for an entire day before escaping unmolested
+into the countryside.<a id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[3-8]</a></p>
+
+<p>Equally alarming was the rapid rise in the
+Viet Cong’s overall strength. Increasing numbers
+of Communist troops were now being infiltrated
+over recently opened trails through Laos. Curving
+southwestward out of the North Vietnamese
+panhandle, these infiltration routes enabled the
+Communists to bypass the demilitarized zone
+which separated the two Vietnamese states and
+continue their southward movement down the
+length of Laos and into Cambodia. From sanctuaries
+within these countries the North Vietnamese
+could easily infiltrate into South Vietnam by using
+trails through the rugged mountains. Relying
+primarily on these routes, over 3,750 North Vietnamese
+infiltrators reportedly entered South Vietnam
+during 1961. Successful recruiting in the
+South served as another source of manpower for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">31</span>
+the Viet Cong. Well propagandized, the steady
+cadence of victories greatly enhanced the Viet
+Cong’s prestige and thereby made recruitment less
+difficult. By the end of 1961 infiltration from the
+North and recruitment in the South had swollen
+the Viet Cong regular military forces to an estimated
+25,000 men.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_31"><i>Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps</i></h3>
+
+<p>At the end of 1958, when President Diem began
+ordering his regular military forces into action
+against the Viet Cong, the Vietnamese Marine
+Corps was a two-battalion infantry force organized
+within South Vietnam’s naval establishment. The
+1,837-man corps was still commanded by Major
+Le Nhu Hung. Hung maintained his headquarters
+at the Cuu Long Navy Yard, an installation
+situated on an estuary near the Saigon-Gia Dinh
+boundary. Although they continued to maintain
+barracks at Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay respectively,
+the 1st and 2d Landing Battalions were now
+being rotated to crude little camps near Bien Hoa,
+a town located about 20 miles northeast of the
+capital. Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, who had
+replaced Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes as Senior
+Marine Advisor in mid-1958, operated out of the
+MAAG headquarters in Saigon but maintained an
+office in the VNMC headquarters at Cuu Long.
+Wilkinson’s two assistants, Captains Gary Wilder
+and Dale N. Davis, lived with their battalions.</p>
+
+<p>Elements of Hung’s Marine Corps were among
+the first regular government units committed to the
+counterguerrilla effort. The 1st Landing Battalion
+was ordered into action by the Joint General Staff
+in the closing weeks of 1958. After deploying from
+Bien Hoa, the battalion spent nearly two months
+searching for Viet Cong in a mosquito-infested
+region of An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost
+province. Primarily, the Vietnamese Marines
+conducted company and platoon-sized patrols
+through rugged mangrove swamps in search of
+guerrillas. When the operation ended in late
+January 1959, the Vietnamese commanders reported
+that their units had killed and captured several
+Communist guerrillas and political leaders. Their
+troops had also reported finding a suspected
+guerrilla training camp which contained small
+quantities of food and some weapons. The Vietnamese
+Marines suffered no casualties during their
+deployment. Adhering to prevailing USMAAG
+policy, the U.S. Marine advisors did not accompany
+the unit into combat. Unable to observe the operation,
+the American advisors could not accurately
+assess the battalion’s tactical proficiency.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_31" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;">
+  <img src="images/i_031.jpg" width="865" height="1084" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., USMC,
+Senior Marine Advisor. (<cite>USMC Photo A229373</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>A few months after this initial operation, both
+VNMC battalions were deployed against the Viet
+Cong—the 1st again to An Xuyen Province and the
+2d to Vinh Binh Province south of Saigon on the
+seacoast. So deployed, both units came under the
+operational control of the respective province
+chiefs. In widely-scattered actions fought during
+May, the 1st Battalion and a Civil Guard unit
+claimed to have inflicted over 200 casualties on the
+Viet Cong. In Vinh Binh Province, one company of
+the 2d Landing Battalion reported killing 18
+guerrillas and capturing over 100 more. Again, U.S.
+Marine advisors were not present and therefore
+could not assess the accuracy of these reports. In
+any case, these were the final combat operations for
+the Vietnamese Marine Corps as a two-battalion
+force.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">32</span></p>
+
+<p>Obviously, U.S. and Vietnamese authorities in
+Saigon were giving increased attention to the
+growing internal threat. Still, they had yet to
+initiate any sweeping changes in the orientation of
+the RVNAF. Indeed, in early 1959, the entire
+ARVN was in the final phase of a reorganization
+program which would culminate by midyear in
+the formation of seven divisions of uniform size
+(10,500 men each), five territorial regiments, and
+an airborne brigade (formed from the old Army
+parachute regiment). Under the new organization
+the seven standard divisions were to be deployed
+in or near population centers throughout the
+country and were to be organized under two corps
+headquarters, one (I Corps) located at Da Nang, and
+the other (II Corps) located at Pleiku in the Central
+Highlands. A third provisional corps headquarters
+had also been formed in Saigon for activation in the
+event of a national emergency.<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[3-E]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="label">[3-E]</a> By 1961 the third corps headquarters would be activated and
+geographic boundaries of all three corps would be delineated to
+facilitate the coordination of the government’s military efforts
+against the Viet Cong. These military-geographic subdivisions
+were termed corps tactical zones (CTZ).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>One of the MAAG’s reactions to the emerging
+guerrilla threat was to urge that President Diem
+transfer the Civil Guard to his Ministry of Defense.
+This adjustment, General Williams pointed out,
+would permit the MAAG to train and equip
+the CG for a mobile counterguerrilla mission.
+But it also entailed raising the 150,000-man force
+level ceiling. When both the Diem government and
+the U.S. Embassy objected to the proposed transfer,
+the MAAG turned to another alternative: the
+strengthening and use of the regular units whose
+assignment to counterguerrilla operations would
+not seriously disturb the country’s counterinvasion
+potential. The Vietnamese Marine Corps, whose
+infantry battalions had already participated in
+several operations against the Viet Cong, fell into
+this category of units to be bolstered for the
+counterguerrilla role.</p>
+
+<p>It was against this background that the VNMC
+was enlarged again in mid-1959. This latest expansion
+was generally accomplished in accordance
+with the staff study prepared by Lieutenant Colonel
+Croizat some three years earlier. On 1 June, after
+both Marine battalions had returned from their
+combat assignments in the Mekong Delta, a 3d
+Landing Battalion was formed at a camp just
+outside the Cuu Long Navy Yard. This new unit,
+manned primarily by troops transferred from
+amphibious elements then being phased out of the
+reorganized ARVN, was built around a small
+nucleus of seasoned Marine officers and noncommissioned
+officers. Transferred from the 1st and 2d
+Battalions, most of these Marines had seen combat
+against the Viet Minh, the sects, and the Viet
+Cong.</p>
+
+<p>Another development saw a fourth rifle company
+added to each Marine infantry battalion. In turn,
+the old heavy weapons companies were abolished.
+The 81mm mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles were
+reorganized into platoons within the battalions’
+headquarters and service companies. New weapons,
+two 60mm mortars, and personnel to man them
+were added to each Marine rifle company. These
+adjustments raised the strength of the infantry
+battalions to around 900 officers and men and
+provided the Vietnamese Marine Corps with a
+basic organizational structure which its infantry
+battalions would retain throughout the coming
+decade.<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[3-F]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="label">[3-F]</a> A side-effect of this reorganization was the modification of
+the VNMC’s table of equipment. The most important change
+saw the Vietnamese Marine riflemen exchange their M-1 carbines
+for the heavier M-1 rifle, the weapon with which the ARVN
+infantry forces were equipped.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Concurrent with the formation of the 3d Battalion
+and the modification of the organizational
+tables, the VNMC was formally designated the
+“Marine Corps Group.” Now numbering 2,276
+officers and men, the Vietnamese Marines were
+formed into a group headquarters, a group headquarters
+and service company, a 4.2-inch mortar
+battery, and the three infantry battalions.<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[3-G]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="label">[3-G]</a> The Vietnamese Marine Group continued to be known as
+the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) in spite of its formal
+redesignation.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>As important as the VNMC’s expansion, reorganization,
+and redesignation was the dramatic
+change in its role within the Vietnamese armed
+forces. On 1 June the Joint General Staff directed
+the Vietnamese Marine Corps and the newly formed
+ARVN airborne brigade to assume the mission of
+the general reserve force for the entire RVNAF. So
+assigned, the Vietnamese Marine Corps became a
+“force in readiness”—a service directly responsible
+to the Joint General Staff for any assigned ground
+warfare mission.<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[3-9]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">33</span></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_33" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 41em;">
+  <img src="images/i_033.png" width="2566" height="1765" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><p>VNMC (MARINE GROUP) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JUNE 1959</p>
+
+<p>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 2,276</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">34</span></p>
+
+<p>The Vietnamese Marine battalions and elements
+of the ARVN airborne brigade (also garrisoned
+near Saigon) were ordered into action against the
+Viet Cong with increasing frequency after being
+designated the RVNAF general reserve. Usually,
+the Marine battalions, like their airborne counterparts,
+were assigned to operate in a particular
+province for a specified time period. In such assignments
+the battalion commander was directly
+responsible to the province chief who, in most
+cases, was a military officer. The province chiefs
+sometimes utilized the Marines in conjunction with
+their Civil Guard units. It was not uncommon for
+the Vietnamese Marines to find themselves conducting
+operations in the most rugged and inaccessible
+regions of the province to which they were
+assigned. In such deployments the Marine battalions
+often bore the brunt of hostile action or
+suffered the physical hardships associated with
+living and fighting in the most adverse swamps
+and jungles.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_34" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_034.jpg" width="1905" height="1409" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Vietnamese Marine riflemen traverse mosquito-infested swamps of the Ca Mau Peninsula on August 1961 operation.
+(<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC.</cite>)</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>In connection with their continuing campaign
+to transform the Vietnamese Marine Corps into a
+truly elite fighting organization, the U.S. Marine
+Advisors encouraged the Vietnamese Leathernecks
+to take pride in the difficult and dangerous missions
+now being assigned. In a related effort intended to
+generate <i lang="fr">esprit de corps</i> throughout the service,
+Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson proposed that the
+Marine Corps adopt an official emblem and a
+distinctive uniform. These suggestions produced
+results when a board of Vietnamese officers selected
+an emblem design similar to that of the U.S.
+Marines. Shortly thereafter the VNMC adopted a
+light weight, black and green “tiger stripe”
+camouflaged utility uniform similar to that formerly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">35</span>
+worn in Indochina by French commando
+units. Although designed and procured primarily
+for use in steamy tropical jungles, the colorful
+uniform came to be worn in garrison with a dark
+green beret. Along with the newly adopted emblem,
+which was worn as a patch over the left breast
+pocket, this uniform became the distinguishing
+mark of the Vietnamese Marine and his U.S.
+Marine advisor. Together, the uniform and emblem
+did much to set the VNMC apart from the other
+South Vietnamese armed services.<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[3-10]</a></p>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson instigated another
+change during this same period which did much to
+improve the effectiveness of the Marine advisory
+program. Since the sect rebellion of 1955 American
+policy had prohibited all U.S. military personnel
+from participating in combat with South Vietnamese
+forces. Because the prevailing restrictions prevented
+his assistants from accurately assessing the
+combat capabilities of the Vietnamese Marine
+battalions, Wilkinson requested that they be
+allowed to accompany their units into action. After
+some study, General Williams, still the MAAG
+Chief, approved this request with the stipulation
+that the U.S. Marines were to act strictly as non-participating
+observers.<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[3-11]</a> This privilege was not
+extended to other MAAG personnel. Wilkinson
+and his assistants, therefore, became the first
+American servicemen to witness actual combat
+operations against the Viet Cong. So through an
+informal and relatively unknown arrangement, a
+handful of Marine advisors were able to insure
+that principles being stressed in training were
+being applied in combat. Now operating alongside
+the Vietnamese Marines in action, the advisors
+were also able to obtain a better appreciation of the
+terrain and enemy and a more thorough understanding
+of the frustrating problems being encountered
+by the VNMC units.</p>
+
+<p>The first half of 1960 brought changes in both
+the leadership of the Vietnamese Marine Corps and
+the U.S. Marine advisory program. In May President
+Diem relieved Major Hung as Senior Marine
+Officer. His replacement was Major Le Nguyen
+Khang, an officer who spoke fluent English and
+who had been the first Vietnamese Marine graduated
+from the U.S. Marine Amphibious Warfare
+School at Quantico. A capable and inspiring officer
+who had formerly commanded a landing battalion
+in combat against the Viet Cong, Khang was to
+head the VNMC for over three years. The following
+month Lieutenant Colonel Clifford J. Robichaud
+relieved Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson as Senior
+Marine Advisor. Like Khang, Robichaud had seen
+combat previously. A former master sergeant, he
+had been commissioned during World War II and
+had fought as an infantry unit leader on Guadalcanal
+and later in Korea. Like all U.S. Marines
+assigned as advisors to the VNMC after 1960,
+Robichaud was scheduled to serve only a one year
+tour in South Vietnam.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_35" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 14em;">
+  <img src="images/i_035.png" width="861" height="1144" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Vietnamese Marine Corps Emblem.</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Combat assignments against the Viet Cong
+continued to dominate the VNMC’s activities
+during the remainder of 1960. With Communist
+forces now capable of battalion-sized operations in
+some areas, the Joint General Staff began deploying
+government forces to the provinces in multi-battalion
+strength. By late 1960 the Vietnamese
+Marines were conducting two-battalion operations
+controlled by a task force headquarters. Khang,
+now a lieutenant colonel, normally commanded
+these Marine task forces.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_35b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;">
+  <img src="images/i_036.jpg" width="927" height="1107" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Colonel Clifford J. Robichaud, USMC, Senior Marine
+Advisor. (<cite>USMC Photo A25342</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>It was during one such operation, in which the
+1st and 2d VNMC Battalions were operating
+together in the provinces south of Saigon, that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">36</span>
+elements of the 3d Battalion became involved in
+the abortive coup of November 1960. The power
+struggle began in the early morning hours of the
+11th while the U.S. Marine advisors were attending
+an informal celebration of the Marine Corps
+birthday at Lieutenant Colonel Robichaud’s quarters
+in Saigon. At the appointed hour Colonel Thi’s
+rebellious paratroops, accompanied by the 3d
+VNMC battalion commander and two Marine
+companies from Cuu Long, moved into the capital
+on trucks and seized the Joint General Staff Headquarters.
+The remainder of the 3d battalion, led by
+the battalion executive officer, who was unaware
+of his superior’s intentions, moved to the presidential
+palace and established protection for Diem.
+Word of the coup, meanwhile, had reached Khang
+at his field headquarters in the Mekong Delta. Led
+by the Senior Marine Officer, the 1st and 2d
+Battalions returned to Saigon by truck convoy and
+immediately joined the two Marine companies
+already around the palace. For several hours the
+possibility existed that Khang’s Marines might
+clash with Thi’s paratroops or even with the two
+rebellious Marine companies of the 3d Battalion.
+But pro-Diem units soon began converging on
+Saigon in such numbers that the coup collapsed.
+Thi and his associates fled the country, whereupon
+Diem appointed new officers to command the
+insubordinate units. With loyalists in charge
+throughout South Vietnam’s military and naval
+services, the incident was closed. Both the airborne
+brigade and the VNMC resumed their functions
+as the RVNAF general reserve.<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[3-12]</a></p>
+
+<p>By the summer of 1961 the USMAAG, now
+headed by General McGarr, was ready to implement
+the 20,000-man expansion of the RVNAF as
+authorized in the package approved by President
+Kennedy the previous spring. Included in this U.S.
+program were plans to increase the size of the
+Vietnamese Marine Corps by over 1,000 men. This
+expansion got underway in July when the initial
+steps were taken to form a fourth infantry battalion
+and a 75mm pack-howitzer battery—additions
+which were to raise the authorized strength of the
+VNMC to 3,321 officers and men. The transfer of
+ARVN artillerymen provided the personnel necessary
+to man the pack-howitzer unit, which formed
+near Thu Duc, a small town about 13 miles north
+of the capital. Officers and noncommissioned
+officers were drawn from the three existing VNMC
+battalions to form a nucleus for the new infantry
+battalion while its ranks were filled gradually by
+recruitment. This 4th Battalion was organized at
+Vung Tau, a coastal resort town situated on Cape
+St. Jacques about 40 miles southeast of Saigon.
+Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Brown, a World
+War II veteran who replaced Robichaud as Senior
+Marine Advisor in August, was on hand to assist
+with this latest reorganization of the VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>While the new Marine units were forming the
+JGS ordered the Vietnamese Navy and Marine
+Corps to conduct an amphibious assault against a
+suspected Communist stronghold near South Vietnam’s
+southern tip. The objective area was a
+portion of the U Minh Forest, an extensive inundated
+region located along the western coast of
+the Ca Mau Peninsula. Because it was inaccessible
+by land, the forest had served as Communist base
+area since the French Indochina War. The concept
+of operation called for the Marines to land at
+daybreak, move inland through the mangrove
+swamps, and hopefully push Viet Cong elements
+into ARVN units which would have established a
+blocking force inland from the beach. Captains<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">37</span>
+Michael J. Gott and James S.&nbsp;G. Turner, two U.S.
+Marine advisors, embarked on board two World
+War II vintage Vietnamese Navy LCIs (landing
+craft, infantry) at Saigon with the 1st and 3d
+Battalions respectively.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_37" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 35em;">
+  <img src="images/i_037.jpg" width="1885" height="1083" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Captain Michael J. Gott, infantry advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, discusses tactical plans with Vietnamese
+officers. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>A series of problems arose on the morning of
+the operation to delay the landing for several
+hours. When the Marines finally came ashore late
+in the morning they failed to locate any enemy
+forces. Captain Gott, who accompanied the 1st
+Battalion for the duration of the operations ashore,
+later recounted the difficulties. He noted, for
+instance, that no U.S. Navy advisors were embarked
+on board the Vietnamese ships. As a result, the
+relatively inexperienced Vietnamese sailors encountered
+technical difficulties with their navigational
+aids, and the ships arrived at the objective
+area late. Inexperience on the part of the Vietnamese
+Marines and sailors in debarkation techniques
+compounded the delay. Once ashore, outdated
+French maps and dense mangrove jungle combined
+to retard the Marines’ progress inland, thus allowing
+the Viet Cong ample time to melt away. Gott
+concluded that some of the difficulties encountered
+after the landing phase of the operation might
+have been offset by the presence of observation
+aircraft. As it was, the Marines’ visibility was
+restricted throughout the operation by thick
+mangrove vegetation. Thus a combination of
+unforeseen factors had rendered this particular
+operation ineffective.<a id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[3-13]</a></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_37b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 41em;">
+  <img src="images/i_038.png" width="2607" height="1800" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><p>VNMC (MARINE GROUP) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 AUGUST 1961</p>
+
+<p>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 3,321</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>A similar landing was repeated in the same area
+the following month. Again the participating
+Marine units failed to engage Viet Cong forces.
+Vietnamese Navy and Marine officers complained
+that there were no enemy troops in the area and
+that the government’s intelligence was inaccurate.
+Whatever the reason, the results of these two
+unsuccessful offensives typified the problems which
+plagued most South Vietnamese ground forces
+throughout the country during the 1960–1961
+period. The Communist guerrillas, aided by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">39</span>
+difficult terrain, a well-developed intelligence
+network, and sometimes by the local population,
+could usually evade government units whenever
+escape was desirable. Because the Marines normally
+operated in unfamiliar areas where the Viet Cong
+political apparatus was strong, their units were
+particularly frustrated. In regions such as the
+U Minh Forest intelligence information simply
+did not flow upward from the people. Instead, in
+such Communist-controlled environments, the local
+Vietnamese served the Viet Cong, warning them
+of strengths, locations, and movements of Marine
+units.</p>
+
+<p>While combat deployments such as the Ca Mau
+landings highlighted the remainder of 1961, the
+Marine battalions nevertheless spent the majority
+of their time in non-combat assignments. During
+such periods the battalions occupied their respective
+base camps around Saigon and Vung Tau, awaiting
+orders from the Joint General Staff. Even though
+held in reserve, they frequently were called upon
+to provide security detachments for vital points
+such as bridges, naval facilities, and communications
+installations. Most U.S. Marine advisors
+tended to oppose such assignments, contending
+that they detracted from the overall readiness
+of the battalions and disrupted much needed
+training. The utilization of the VNMC units in
+static security roles also conflicted with the advisor’s
+continuing efforts to convince the Vietnamese
+Marine that he belonged to an elite, offensively
+oriented strike force. Still, despite the protestations
+of the American advisors, the JGS persisted in
+dispersing VNMC detachments in and around the
+capital.</p>
+
+<p>Although its battalions were sometimes being
+frustrated, both in their attempts to accomplish
+unit training and in their attempts to fix Communist
+troop formations, the VNMC’s involvement in the
+war effort was forcing improvement of the service
+in other areas. Frequent inspections by U.S.
+advisors revealed that the Vietnamese were placing
+more emphasis on the care of individual equipment
+and weapons. Replacement items were being
+requisitioned with more promptness and unit commanders
+were beginning to show increasing concern
+about the slow receipt of requested supply
+items. The replacement of worn-out World War II
+trucks with new vehicles removed a long-standing
+source of trouble in that it greatly reduced the
+time consumed in performing major mechanical
+repairs on the older vehicles. Even the frequent
+deployments of the VNMC battalions were helping
+to improve the overall combat readiness of the
+service by preparing a solid core of small unit
+leaders and troops for operations against the Viet
+Cong.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_39"><i>Ancillary Effects of Marine Pacific Commands</i></h3>
+
+<p>At the same time the intensified conflict in South
+Vietnam was forcing improvement on the VNMC,
+it was having a similar but less direct effect on
+U.S. Marine commands in the Pacific. In early 1961
+Lieutenant General Alan Shapley, the Commanding
+General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac),
+approved a plan to assign individual Marines from
+his scattered commands to temporary duty in
+Vietnam. The purpose of this program, which
+became known as On-The-Job Training (OJT), was
+to allow Marine officers and noncommissioned
+officers to obtain first-hand knowledge of the complex
+nature of the conflict being waged in South
+Vietnam. Beginning in May 1961 small groups of
+officers and noncommissioned officers from various
+FMFPac commands were sent each month to
+observe the counterguerrilla techniques being
+developed and employed in Vietnam. Although the
+OJTs were normally “in country” for only a two-week
+period, the program was gradually producing
+a pool of small unit leaders somewhat acquainted
+with the situation in the Republic of Vietnam by
+the end of 1961.<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[3-H]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="label">[3-H]</a> The OJT program would be suspended briefly near the end
+of 1962 but would be reinstituted in the first months of 1963.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<figure id="ip_39" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;">
+  <img src="images/i_040.jpg" width="1796" height="2166" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Vietnamese Marines wade ashore from a Vietnamese Navy Landing Ship, initiating a search for Viet Cong on the Ca
+Mau Peninsula. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The major Marine command to feel the impact
+of the war in Southeast Asia during the early
+1960s was the 3d Marine Division, a 20,000-man
+combat-ready force headquartered on Okinawa. In
+addition to its participation in the OJT program,
+the 3d Marine Division began altering its conventional
+amphibious orientation. Major General
+Donald M. Weller, the division commander, provided
+the initial impetus for this shift away from
+a purely conventional posture. Weller, who in early
+1961 had commanded a task force headquarters
+formed in response to the deteriorating military
+situation in Laos, anticipated that his command<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">41</span>
+might be committed to combat somewhere on the
+Southeast Asian mainland. He therefore instructed
+his staff to begin studying possible counterinsurgency
+training programs which would help “turn
+the entire orientation of the division toward the
+type of intervention [which] we would be faced
+with in Southeast Asia.”<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[3-14]</a></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_41" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 31em;">
+  <img src="images/i_041.jpg" width="1924" height="1468" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Vietnamese Marines advance from concealment during search operations on the Ca Mau Peninsula. (<cite>Photo courtesy of
+Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Major General Robert E. Cushman, holder of a
+Navy Cross and a future Commandant of the
+Marine Corps, assumed command of the 3d Marine
+Division in September 1961 before General Weller’s
+objectives could be fully realized. The new commanding
+general immediately convened a Counterguerrilla
+Warfare Study Group to consider the
+problem. This study group framed a set of recommendations
+for Cushman in late 1961. His approval
+of their proposals led to the creation of an Infantry
+Unit Training Course and a Command and Staff
+Training Course early the next year.</p>
+
+<p>Conducted in Okinawa’s rugged Northern Training
+Area, the infantry course prepared rifle companies
+from the various infantry battalions for
+participation in counterguerrilla warfare. The
+instructors, graduates of either the Jungle Warfare
+School in Johore, Malaya, or the new Army
+Special Warfare School at Ft. Bragg, North
+Carolina, placed much emphasis on the origins
+and nature of guerrilla movements, small units
+tactics, and night operations. The training syllabus
+for this course included several live firing exercises
+designed for individual Marines and fire teams.
+Some of these exercises required the Marines to
+negotiate “jungle lanes” equipped with pop-up
+targets. The week-long infantry course culminated<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">42</span>
+with a two and one-half day field operation for
+the individual infantry platoons.</p>
+
+<p>The Command and Staff Training course was
+somewhat less rigorous, being designed primarily
+to prepare battalion staffs to support their companies
+in a counterinsurgency environment. Less
+than 10 hours in length, this course was based
+primarily on lectures and map exercises.</p>
+
+<p>At General Cushman’s direction, the division
+G-3 (Operations Section) began stressing the
+significance of counterinsurgency training at all
+echelons of the division. Unconventional warfare
+training soon became an integral part of the training
+schedules at every echelon. Under this program
+the various infantry battalions were required to
+conduct an extended battalion-sized counterguerrilla
+operation, and to report to the G-3 on the
+progress of their efforts.<a id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[3-15]</a></p>
+
+<p>The FMFPac On-The-Job Training program and
+the 3d Marine Division’s new approach to training
+complemented each other in several ways. Whereas
+the OJT program helped create an awareness of
+counterguerrilla operations among individual Marine
+officers and noncommissioned officers, the
+division’s training programs achieved the same
+results at the staff and battalion level. At points
+the two programs overlapped to the further
+benefit of the 3d Marine Division. Attuned to the
+nature of guerrilla warfare and the problems involved
+in countering the guerrilla, the officers and
+noncommissioned officers who returned from OJT
+assignments in Vietnam provided assistance in
+planning and supervising the division’s counterinsurgency
+training programs. Short of actual
+commitment to combat in a guerrilla-type environment,
+it is doubtful that any other combination
+of training could have better prepared the 3d
+Marine Division for a future assignment in Vietnam.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_42"><i>American Decisions at the Close of 1961</i></h3>
+
+<p>The progressive erosion of the government’s
+strength and the steady growth of the Viet Cong
+during 1961 prompted President Kennedy to dispatch
+his special military advisor, General Maxwell
+D. Taylor, to Vietnam in mid-October. Taylor,
+who had retired in the late 1950s after having
+served as Chief of Staff of the Army, carried the
+following instructions from the president:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>I should like you to proceed to Saigon for the purpose of
+appraising the situation in South Vietnam, particularly as
+it concerns the threat to the internal security and defense
+of that country and adjacent areas. After you have conferred
+with the appropriate United States and South Vietnamese
+authorities, including the Commander in Chief, Pacific,
+I would like your views on the courses of action which our
+Government might take at this juncture to avoid a further
+deterioration in the situation in South Vietnam; and
+eventually to contain and eliminate the threat to its
+independence.<a id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[3-16]</a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Like other American officials who had visited
+Diem’s republic during the course of the year,
+General Taylor returned to Washington convinced
+that South Vietnam was in grave danger. In a
+report delivered to President Kennedy in November,
+the general outlined his formula for salvaging
+the situation. This included the broad recommendation
+that the United States abandon its existing
+policy of strict military advice and begin cooperating
+with the Vietnamese in a form of “limited
+partnership.” The American role in such a partnership,
+Taylor explained, would be to provide
+“working” advisors and “working” military units
+to aid South Vietnam’s military forces.</p>
+
+<p>General Taylor’s report offered several specific
+proposals for implementing such a program.
+Among these were recommendations that three
+U.S. Army helicopter companies and approximately
+6,000–8,000 American ground troops be
+deployed quickly to the Republic of Vietnam. The
+helicopter units would support the government’s
+ground operations but the American ground forces
+were to be used only in a defensive posture. Taylor
+believed that their presence would underscore the
+United States’ determination to stand by South
+Vietnam. A side-effect of this display of determination
+would be to stimulate the morale of the republic’s
+armed forces. He added that in order to
+support such a build-up, it would be necessary to
+restructure and increase the size of the USMAAG.</p>
+
+<p>President Kennedy’s consideration of Taylor’s
+proposals resulted in a compromise decision which
+cleared the way for more intense American involvement
+in the Vietnam conflict. After securing Diem’s
+approval in early December, Kennedy authorized
+the Department of Defense to expand its advisory
+and assistance programs. To enhance the effectiveness
+of the advisory program, he removed some of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">43</span>
+the official restrictions under which most U.S.
+military advisors had operated since 1955. One
+important change would allow all advisors to
+accompany their Vietnamese units into combat. At
+the same time President Kennedy decided against
+ordering U.S. ground forces into the war zone;
+however, he instructed the Secretary of Defense,
+Robert S. McNamara, to prepare plans for such a
+contingency. He also approved General Taylor’s
+recommendation that American helicopter units
+be sent to support the RVNAF. The arrival of the
+first of these reinforcements just before 1961 ended,
+signalled the beginning of a new and more dynamic
+phase of American military participation in the
+struggle to preserve the independence of South
+Vietnam.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">44</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_4"><span id="toclink_44"></span>CHAPTER 4<br>
+<span class="subhead large">An Expanding War, 1962</span><br>
+<span class="subhead notbold"><i>The War’s New Context—Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory
+Division—The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962—Some Conclusions</i></span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_44a"><i>The War’s New Context</i></h3>
+
+<p>More than any previous year, 1962 was to be a
+period of deepened commitment for all participants
+in the continuing struggle for control of South
+Vietnam. On the American side plans already set
+in motion by President Kennedy’s recent decisions
+promised to loosen the flow of dollars, equipment,
+advisors, and combat support personnel to South
+Vietnam. Administration officials envisioned that
+this sharp influx of assistance would stimulate a
+redoubled war effort on the part of the Diem
+government.</p>
+
+<p>Viet Cong strength and operational capabilities
+likewise were on the upswing as 1962 opened.
+U.S. and South Vietnamese sources were placing
+total Viet Cong military strength at roughly
+25,000 men. Backing these military forces was a
+far greater number of sympathizers. American
+agencies tended to divide the Communist military
+forces into three rough categories according to
+function and composition—main forces, local forces,
+and village activists. Thought to total around
+9,000 men at the beginning of the year, the main
+forces constituted the pillar of Communist military
+strength in the South. They were organized into
+approximately 20 small (200– to 400-man) and
+highly mobile battalions and a number of independent
+companies. Main force units as a rule
+were cadred by North Vietnamese (or returnees
+trained in the North) and were capable of conducting
+operations on an interprovincial scale.
+(They often were referred to as interprovincial
+battalions and companies. Later in the war Americans
+came to call the main forces “hard core”
+units.) Next in terms of operational capabilities
+were the Viet Cong local forces whose aggregate
+strength stood at around 8,000 part-time but well-trained
+soldiers. The local forces were organized
+into platoons and companies which operated
+independently within their respective districts.
+Finally, there were some 8,000 village activists.
+Part-time guerrillas in the truest sense of the
+term, the activists commonly worked in the
+paddies by day and engaged in military pursuits at
+night. For the most part their ranks were filled
+with men considered either too young or too old
+for service with organized Viet Cong military
+units. Nevertheless, they played an important
+role in the struggle for South Vietnam’s rural areas
+by providing various forms of support for larger
+Viet Cong formations. Living and working within
+the rural hamlets and villages as they did, the
+activists were a ready source of intelligence
+information for the Viet Cong. Often they served
+as porters and guides for main force units which
+had been assigned to operate within their locale.
+Otherwise, the activists were responsible for defending
+their particular villages against the government’s
+military and police forces—a defense which
+normally took the form of harassment with mines
+and sniper fire.<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[4-A]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="label">[4-A]</a> The three-way division was the most commonly used method
+of categorizing the Communist forces. (See U.S. Army, <cite>The
+Viet Cong</cite>, p. I:52.) A USMAAG document published during
+this period, however, divided the Viet Cong into two somewhat
+broader categories—main forces and guerrillas. Both local force
+units and village activists were classified as guerrillas under this
+system. (USMAAG, Vietnam, <cite>Tactics and Techniques of Counterinsurgent
+Operations</cite>, p. II-5.) Other sources tended to make more
+elaborate divisions. (See Pike, <cite>Viet Cong</cite>.)</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>After early 1962 the activities of these Viet Cong
+military and paramilitary forces were carefully
+coordinated with Communist political activities
+on the national level by a Central Office for South
+Vietnam (COSVN).<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[4-B]</a> From its headquarters,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">45</span>
+believed to have been located northeast of Saigon in
+Binh Duong Province, COSVN exercised direct
+control over six military regions (MRs). Designated
+MR-5 through MR-9 (arranged in a north
+to south pattern) with an additional Saigon-Gia
+Dinh Special Zone, the Communist military regions
+served essentially the same purpose as the government’s
+corps tactical zones. Within these six regions
+COSVN utilized a province and district structure
+only slightly different from that of the Diem
+government to exercise administrative and military
+control. At each level within this organization a
+small, disciplined Communist political committee
+orchestrated the activities of its subordinate
+military units with the actions of its political
+apparatus.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="label">[4-B]</a> COSVN apparently was established in March. Prior to this
+the NLF had functioned through two separate geographic headquarters—Interzone
+V, responsible for roughly the northern
+three-quarters of South Vietnam, and the NAMBO Interzone,
+responsible for the area roughly described by the forested hills
+and Mekong Delta physiographic regions.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>To counter the strengthened NLF organization
+and to satisfy American demands that he adopt
+some form of national strategy, President Diem
+launched one of the most controversial large-scale
+undertakings of the war—the Strategic Hamlet
+Program. Instituted on an informal basis in the
+closing stages of 1961, the program became fully
+operative in mid-1962. Although heralded as a new
+concept, the campaign actually grew out of an
+existing program whose broad objective had been
+to bring improved economic and social conditions
+to South Vietnam’s rural areas. Named the Agroville
+Program, this effort had been in effect since
+late 1959 under the direction of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the
+president’s brother and principal advisor. Since its
+institution, however, the program had achieved
+little aside from the resettlement of many rural
+families into government constructed communities.
+Few meaningful reforms, either social or economic,
+had been realized. During the early 1960s, moreover,
+many of the Agrovilles had been victimized
+by the Viet Cong, who saw the developments as
+symbols of the government’s presence in contested
+areas. By mid-1961, in an effort to protect the more
+remote Agrovilles, authorities in several provinces
+had begun fortifying the otherwise helpless population
+centers.</p>
+
+<p>Concurrent with this evolution of the Agrovilles
+into fortified communities, Sir Robert G.&nbsp;K.
+Thompson, the head of a newly formed British
+Advisory Mission in Saigon, suggested that
+President Diem consider adopting a similar scheme
+with broader strategic objectives. Thompson,
+who had helped implement such an effort in
+Malaya in the 1950s during the struggle there
+against Communist insurgents, specifically proposed
+that the South Vietnamese integrate various
+economic and social programs into an effective
+campaign to reestablish its influence in the heavily
+populated Mekong Delta. This campaign, Thompson
+advised, “should lead by stages to a reorganization
+of the government machinery for directing
+and coordinating all action against the communists
+and the production of an overall strategic operational
+plan for the country as a whole....”<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[4-1]</a></p>
+
+<p>Under pressure from the U.S. Embassy to develop
+some sort of national strategy for countering the
+insurgency, President Diem accepted the concept
+of Thompson’s proposal. Shortly thereafter, Diem
+named Ngo Dinh Nhu to head a campaign formally
+designated the Strategic Hamlet Program. Nhu
+was instructed to plan the program and to create a
+combined agency that would insure its coordination
+within the various government ministries. These
+instructions resulted in the creation (in February)
+of the Interministerial Committee for Strategic
+Hamlets. A counterpart American organization,
+the U.S. Interagency Committee for Province
+Rehabilitation, was formed in April to provide
+assistance to Nhu’s agency.</p>
+
+<p>With advice from Thompson and the U.S. Embassy,
+the Vietnamese formulated a program which
+in theory was to evolve in several rather distinct
+phases. First it would be necessary to select specific
+geographic areas wherein the Strategic Hamlet
+Program would be implemented. Once specific
+objective areas had been established, regular military
+units would initiate operations to clear those
+areas of Viet Cong formations. Following the
+completion of these operations RVNAF units
+would resettle the inhabitants of the area in fortified
+hamlets. Initially these hamlets were to be
+defended by Civil Guard units while regular forces
+continued screening operations in the surrounding
+countryside. In the final phase, Self Defense Corps
+units would assume responsibility for local security
+while regular units continued to screen Viet Cong
+forces from the developments. During this phase
+district civil authorities would initiate economic
+and social programs within the newly formed
+communities in an effort to recapture the allegiance
+of the local populace. Thus, in this final phase, it
+was expected that the Communist political infrastructure
+would be broken.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">46</span></p>
+
+<p>Following the pacification of a few contiguous
+hamlets, the same process was to be repeated over
+and over, in an expanding pattern. In this manner
+Diem hoped to expand the GVN’s control progressively
+outward from the initial secure hamlets
+over large areas of the countryside. Ultimately the
+GVN intended to construct nearly 11,000 such protected
+communities in several of the country’s
+most critical rural areas.</p>
+
+<p>A principal shortcoming of this method of
+pacification was that the success of the entire program
+within a specific area depended on the successful
+completion of virtually every developmental
+phase in every strategic hamlet. Should the Communist
+infrastructure remain intact in even one
+hamlet, that hamlet could precipitate the collapse
+of the entire campaign by contaminating
+the surrounding communities in a geometric
+progression.</p>
+
+<p>Given this critical requirement that all phases be
+accomplished in a deliberate and orderly manner, it
+was unfortunate that Nhu initiated the program
+in an uncoordinated fashion. By the first of the
+year, months before the appropriate American and
+South Vietnamese agencies had been formed to
+guide the program, the construction of hamlets had
+begun on a scale which already suggested a nationwide
+campaign. Furthermore, the government
+failed to test the plan in a pilot project such as
+Thompson (as well as U.S. advisors) had recommended.
+Instead, it launched rather extensive
+campaigns simultaneously in several traditional
+Communist strongholds during the spring of 1962.</p>
+
+<p>Nevertheless, once formally initiated, the Strategic
+Hamlet Program constituted the government’s
+first real effort to implement a concerted counterinsurgency
+strategy on a national scale. Regardless
+of its weaknesses and its somewhat abortive start,
+the program would serve as the context within
+which the Diem government would wage its battle
+with the Viet Cong during 1962 and most of 1963.
+From this military standpoint, moreover, Diem’s
+adoption of the Strategic Hamlet Program marked
+somewhat of a watershed in the evolution of ground
+strategy in the Vietnam war. Inherent in its
+selection was the decision to opt for a “clear-and-hold”
+as opposed to a “search-and-destroy”
+strategy. In accordance with the dictates of the
+pacification campaign, RVNAF ground forces would
+focus primarily during the next two years on
+operations to clear Communist military formations
+from the more densely populated rural areas.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_46"><i>The Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division</i></h3>
+
+<p>The American military build-up called for by
+the Washington decisions of December 1961 was
+well underway as the new year opened. Several
+U.S. units introduced in the closing weeks of 1961
+had already begun operations by January. These
+included two U.S. Army transport helicopter
+companies and a composite U.S. Air Force detachment.
+Designated FARM GATE and composed
+initially of 151 officers and men, the Air Force
+detachment had a dual mission of training VNAF
+elements and conducting attack sorties in support
+of President Diem’s forces. The arrival of another
+U.S. Air Force unit, a C-123 transport squadron,
+another Army helicopter company, and an Army
+communications organization, the 3d Radio Research
+Unit, just after the first of the year raised
+the number of American military personnel serving
+on permanent assignment in Vietnam to over 3,000.
+Assigned to the Army’s radio unit, which immediately
+began operations from Pleiku in II Corps
+Tactical Zone, were 42 Marines from the 1st
+Radio Company, FMF. Designated Detachment A,
+1st Radio Company, these were the first U.S.
+Marines to participate in the ongoing build-up.</p>
+
+<p>Thus far, however, the U.S. troops arriving in
+Vietnam were for combat support rather than
+advisory type duty. At a meeting held in Honolulu
+in mid-January, Secretary of Defense McNamara
+ordered the ranking American military officials
+concerned with Vietnam to make substantial
+increases in the number of advisors serving with
+the Vietnamese armed forces.</p>
+
+<p>Less than a month after the Honolulu conference,
+a new U.S. command was created in Saigon to
+manage the expected influx of advisors and the
+intensified military assistance effort more efficiently.
+On 8 February, the U.S. Military Assistance Command,
+Vietnam (USMACV or MACV) supplanted
+the MAAG as the senior American command in
+the Republic of Vietnam. Its commander, Army
+General Paul D. Harkins (ComUSMACV), assumed
+direct responsibility for all U.S. military policy,
+operations, and assistance to President Diem’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">47</span>
+government. Harkins was directly subordinate to
+the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry
+D. Felt, whose headquarters was in Hawaii.</p>
+
+<p>The number of U.S. Marines assigned to MACV’s
+staff indicated that they would play an important
+role in its operations. In all, 21 staff billets in the
+new command were allocated to the Marine Corps.
+The most important of these was the chief of staff
+billet. This assignment went to Major General
+Richard G. Weede, a veteran who had commanded
+an artillery battalion during the campaigns for
+Saipan and Okinawa during World War II. Later,
+in Korea, he had distinguished himself as the
+commander of the 5th Marines. Weede arrived in
+Saigon from Hawaii where he had commanded the
+1st Marine Brigade since 1959. Other Marines
+joined General Harkins’ command as Deputy Chief
+of Staff, J-2 and as branch chiefs for the J-3 through
+J-6 divisions. Two other positions assigned to
+Marine officers were the project officer for a Joint
+Operations Evaluation Group and a research and
+development project officer for a Department of
+Defense agency. Both of these were operationally
+controlled by the newly organized Military
+Assistance Command.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_47" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;">
+  <img src="images/i_047.jpg" width="934" height="1074" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Major General Richard G. Weede, USMC, Chief of
+Staff, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
+(<cite>USMC Photo A150562</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Under the new U.S. command arrangement, the
+old Military Assistance Advisory Group became
+subordinate to General Harkins’ command. Headed
+by Major General Charles J. Timmes, U.S. Army,
+the MAAG was now responsible primarily for the
+advisory aspect of the assistance program. To
+accommodate the impending increases in the number
+of advisors, the MAAG’s staff was restructured.
+Under its new table of organization, Marine
+officers were to serve as deputy chief of staff and
+head of the plans branch of the J-3 division. Later,
+in 1963, the MAAG’s table of distribution would
+be modified with the effect that the chief of staff
+billet would be held by a Marine colonel. The first
+Marine to serve as General Timmes’ chief of staff
+would be Colonel Earl E. Anderson, a much-decorated
+aviator who eventually would become
+the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.</p>
+
+<p>The reorganization of the MAAG brought about
+a dramatic change in the size and scope of the U.S.
+Marine advisory effort. The new table of organization
+included a provision for an 18-man Marine
+Advisory Division within the MAAG’s Naval
+Section. The organizational charts for this division
+included advisor billets for a lieutenant colonel, a
+major, six captains, a gunnery sergeant, and four
+staff sergeants. Administrative positions were to
+make up the balance of the new organization.</p>
+
+<p>As had been the case previous to this expansion,
+the lieutenant colonel was to serve as the Senior
+Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps.
+The inclusion of the major’s billet was expected to
+enhance the overall effectiveness of the advisory
+division as he was to double as Assistant Senior
+Advisor and as senior artillery advisor. The gunnery
+sergeant was to assist in the artillery advisory
+duties. Of the six captains, four were to be assigned
+as advisors to VNMC infantry battalions while the
+two others were slated to advise on engineer and
+supply matters. The four logistics-trained staff
+sergeants were to be assigned as assistant infantry
+battalion advisors and were expected to free the
+officer advisors from direct involvement in time-consuming
+supply matters.</p>
+
+<p>Marines required to man this enlarged advisory
+unit began arriving in Vietnam as early as February.
+All of the new officer advisors were graduates
+of either Junior School at Marine Corps Schools,
+Quantico or the U.S. Army Special Warfare
+School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Following<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">48</span>
+their assignments, but before departing for Vietnam,
+many advisors received schooling in military
+assistance operations. This normally included a
+five-month course of instruction in the French
+language, a requirement which more and more
+Marine advisors were beginning to question as a
+result of the Vietnamese desire to converse in
+their own language rather than French. Upon
+arrival in Saigon, the Marines were given two days
+of orientation briefings at MACV headquarters
+before assuming their jobs in the Marine Advisory
+Division.</p>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Brown continued to serve as
+the Senior Marine Advisor and headed the new
+advisory division throughout the summer of 1962.
+In October he was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel
+Clarence G. Moody, Jr., a veteran who held the
+Navy Cross for heroism as a company commander
+during the Korean War. Having served with the
+British Royal Marines following Korea, Moody
+was somewhat familiar with the problems involved
+in dealing with foreign military services.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_48" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;">
+  <img src="images/i_048.jpg" width="923" height="1086" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody, Jr., USMC,
+Senior Marine Advisor. (<cite>USMC Photo A412981</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Encouraged by both Brown and Moody, the U.S.
+Marine advisors participated in every combat
+operation undertaken by the VNMC during 1962.
+Prior to planned operations they helped their
+Vietnamese counterparts coordinate the more
+sophisticated means of support which became
+available as the American military build-up took
+hold. During planning phases, for example, they
+assisted with the development of detailed orders
+and helped plan for employing artillery fire and air
+support. If the impending operation was to be
+amphibious in nature, the Marine officers coordinated
+with the U.S. Navy advisors assigned to the
+supporting Vietnamese Navy units, thereby insuring
+that planning for embarkation had been
+accomplished. On occasion the advisors were
+required to coordinate helicopter support for the
+VNMC units—a task sometimes complicated by
+the Vietnamese Marines’ lack of experience in
+heliborne operations. Unfortunately, the almost
+constant combat assignments being drawn by the
+handful of U.S. and VNAF helicopter units available
+in Vietnam made training in such operations
+impossible.</p>
+
+<p>Even more difficult were the advisor’s responsibilities
+after their units deployed to combat. The
+U.S. Marines were experiencing the often frustrating
+task of actually searching out the elusive
+Viet Cong on a continuing daily basis. Additionally,
+the Americans found themselves faced with
+the unenviable task of advising Vietnamese officers,
+who, in some cases, had been fighting Communist
+guerrillas since the French-Indochina War. These
+circumstances presented a unique set of challenges
+for the advisors. For American officers with
+relatively little actual experience in this brand of
+warfare to offer tactical advice in a form acceptable
+to their Vietnamese counterparts demanded a
+combination of tact, patience, and subtle persuasive
+powers.</p>
+
+<p>The U.S. Marine advisors quickly learned that
+success in this peculiar assignment depended
+largely on the degree of respect they commanded
+among the Vietnamese Marines. To help build this
+intangible yet vital foundation of mutual understanding
+and confidence, the Marine advisors
+stayed with their units in combat, sharing with the
+Vietnamese Marine the same foods, the same
+dangers, the same discomforts, and the same
+routines. The Marine advisors lived in U.S.
+bachelor quarters in Saigon when their respective
+battalions were in garrison. Nevertheless, they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">49</span>
+spent much of this time at the Marine base camps,
+inspecting troops and equipment and making
+preparations for the battalion’s next combat
+assignment. Among others, Lieutenant Colonels
+Brown and Moody viewed this continuous association
+with the Vietnamese Marines as the single
+most essential ingredient to a successful advisory
+program.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_49"><i>The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962</i></h3>
+
+<p>For the Vietnamese Marine Corps 1962 was
+characterized by expansion, redesignation, and
+continued combat operations against the Viet
+Cong. On 1 January the former Vietnamese Marine
+Group was redesignated the Vietnamese Marine
+Brigade and was enlarged to 5,483 officers and men.
+Under its new table of organization, the number of
+infantry battalions remained at four but two new
+battalions were added. One battery of eight 105mm
+howitzers, two batteries of eight 75mm pack
+howitzers, and a headquarters and service battery
+comprised an artillery battalion which was created
+to provide artillery fire support to the infantry
+units. An amphibious support battalion of 1,038
+officers and men was also formed. This unit contained
+the personnel necessary to provide the entire
+Marine brigade with reconnaissance, communications,
+motor transport, medical, engineer, and
+training support. Lieutenant Colonel Khang continued
+in his position as Commandant of the
+expanded and restructured Vietnamese Marine
+Corps.</p>
+
+<p>The infantry battalions of the Vietnamese
+Marine Brigade performed a variety of combat
+missions ranging from security duty around key
+government installations to helicopter landings in
+suspected Viet Cong redoubts during 1962. The
+four infantry battalions (the 4th Battalion became
+available for combat assignment at midyear) participated
+in 23 combat operations which involved
+404 days in the field. These operations included
+12 amphibious landings and eight heliborne
+assaults. With the exception of two howitzer
+batteries which saw some combat, the artillery
+battalion devoted the year to training. Supervised
+by Major Alfred J. Croft and Gunnery Sergeant
+William A. Loyko, their new Marine advisors, the
+Vietnamese artillerymen learned their skills in a
+number of field firing exercises conducted on ARVN
+artillery ranges.</p>
+
+<p>In terms of casualties the VNMC battalions
+fought no major engagements with the Communists
+during the year. A typical operation was
+one conducted in An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s
+southernmost province, early in the year. The 2d
+Battalion, which was assigned to the An Xuyen
+province chief for the period between 18 February
+and 26 April, conducted one helicopter landing,
+provided troop escorts for numerous truck convoys,
+and fought several minor engagements with the
+Viet Cong. Although the Vietnamese commander
+reported 112 enemy killed and another 40 wounded
+during the two-month assignment, the figures
+contradicted those of Captain Evan L. Parker, the
+Marine advisor, which placed the Viet Cong
+casualties at about 40 dead and 20 wounded. This
+difference, which was not uncommon, stemmed
+largely from the fact that the Marine advisors
+limited their reports to enemy dead and wounded
+actually sighted. Still, the conflicting reports sometimes
+led to tensions between the Vietnamese
+commander and the Marine advisor.</p>
+
+<p>In other instances the Vietnamese Marine
+battalions were ordered to serve as the reserve force
+for one of the three corps tactical zones. The 1st
+Battalion, for example, accompanied by Captain
+Bradley S. Snell, assumed the mission as II Corps
+reserve on 16 May and remained in that role until
+mid-September. Based at Ban Me Thuot deep in the
+Central Highlands, the battalion provided security
+for government installations while remaining ready
+to react to enemy threats. As the corps reserve it
+conducted one heliborne operation and several
+search-type missions. In one of these searches the
+Vietnamese Marines uncovered and destroyed a
+Viet Cong small arms factory. During its assignment
+in II Corps, the 1st Battalion accounted for
+only four Viet Cong dead and one wounded while
+suffering 16 dead and 28 wounded. These statistics
+attested both to the grim effectiveness of
+enemy sniper fire and mines and to the enemy’s
+elusiveness.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_49" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 42em;">
+  <img src="images/i_050.png" width="2649" height="1821" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><p>VNMC (MARINE BRIGADE) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JANUARY 1962</p>
+
+<p>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 5,483</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The newly activated 4th Battalion, advised by
+Captain Don R. Christensen, entered combat for the
+first time during an operation in Binh Thuan<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">51</span>
+Province in the first week in August. Supported
+by Battery A (a 75mm howitzer unit) of the
+artillery battalion, it joined the 43d ARVN
+Infantry Regiment in an attempt to locate and
+destroy Viet Cong forces operating around Phan
+Thiet, the provincial capital, located on the coast
+95 miles east of Saigon. Following the conclusion
+of this operation on 22 August, the Marine units
+reverted to the control of the Binh Thuan province
+chief. In this capacity they assisted in clearing and
+resettlement operations being conducted in conjunction
+with the Strategic Hamlet Program.
+Between 4 August and 15 October, when its assignment
+in the province ended, the 4th Battalion
+reported 12 Viet Cong killed and seven captured.
+Vietnamese Marine casualties were one killed and
+five wounded. During the assignment the Marines
+resettled some 600 civilians in fortified hamlets.<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[4-2]</a><a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[4-C]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="label">[4-C]</a> Major Croft, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor during
+this period, later recalled that province chiefs tended to misuse
+the Marine units by assigning them unproductive missions such
+as static security. (Col Alfred J. Croft, Comments on 2d Draft
+MS, Whitlow, “Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964,”
+hereafter <cite>Croft Comments</cite>.)</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<figure id="ip_51" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_051.jpg" width="1883" height="1414" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Vietnamese Marines search dense jungle for Viet Cong base areas. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott,
+USMC</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>In the last week of September General David M.
+Shoup, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps,
+arrived in Saigon to begin a four-day tour of South
+Vietnam. Shoup, who held the Medal of Honor for
+his actions as a regimental commander on Tarawa
+in World War II, was recognized as one of President
+Kennedy’s most trusted military advisors. Acting
+in his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
+the Commandant was scheduled to visit a number
+of U.S. and South Vietnamese installations, including
+several strategic hamlets.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">52</span></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_52" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;">
+  <img src="images/i_052.jpg" width="1822" height="2574" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+CORPS TACTICAL ZONES<br>
+1962<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">53</span></p>
+
+<p>After a series of briefings at MACV and MAAG
+headquarters in Saigon, the Commandant and his
+party journeyed by automobile to the base camp of
+the 3d Vietnamese Marine Battalion at Thu Duc
+on the outskirts of the capital. There, accompanied
+by Lieutenant Colonels Brown and Khang, Shoup
+reviewed a Vietnamese Marine honor guard and
+inspected the 3d Battalion. Impressed with the
+units he had seen, General Shoup commended
+President Diem on the status of his Marine Brigade.
+“From my observation,” he wrote from Washington,
+“the Vietnamese Marine Corps is in an excellent
+state of readiness from the standpoint of
+equipment as well as the degree of training of its
+members.” “Indeed,” he added, “your Corps of
+Marines seemed to be a splendid and competent
+fighting organization.”<a id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[4-3]</a></p>
+
+<p>The Commandant was less complimentary of the
+Strategic Hamlet Program. After visiting several
+of the developments, he concluded that the government’s
+effort to concentrate the Vietnamese civilians
+into defended communities was counter-productive
+to the program’s stated objective of
+winning the allegiance of the rural population. As
+Shoup reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon his
+return to Washington, the forced resettlement of
+the peasants from their native hamlets and villages
+into what amounted to fortified camps seemed to
+be generating antagonism rather than good will.<a id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[4-4]</a></p>
+
+<p>At the close of 1962 Vietnamese Marine commanders
+reported a total of 192 Viet Cong killed,
+77 wounded, and another 158 taken prisoner. U.S.
+Marine advisors felt that even these moderate
+figures were inflated. They estimated that only
+about 98 enemy soldiers had been killed, 27 wounded,
+and roughly half as many actual Viet Cong
+captured as had been reported by their Vietnamese
+Marine counterparts. The Vietnamese Marines also
+had failed to inflict any serious damage on the
+enemy’s logistic system, capturing only 16,000
+rounds of small arms ammunition, 45 grenades,
+31 mines, and 50 individual weapons, a printing
+press, two typewriters, several motors, and an
+assortment of medical supplies.<a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[4-5]</a></p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_53"><i>Some Conclusions</i></h3>
+
+<p>In retrospect, 1962 bears assessment as an important
+watershed in the chronicle of U.S. Marine
+activities in Vietnam. As the year began only
+three Marine advisors and a handful of embassy
+guards were serving in the Republic. The initial
+months, however, brought a dramatic expansion
+of that role, both in terms of numbers and responsibilities.
+By March Marines were functioning on
+MAAG and MACV staffs in Saigon, in U.S. Army
+communications facilities in the Central Highlands,
+and throughout the provinces where Vietnamese
+Marine units operated. Their contributions to the
+war effort, therefore, were broad and varied, ranging
+from high level planning to infantry advisory
+duties. The Marine role had expanded in rough
+proportion to the broad-based expansion of the
+overall U.S. military assistance program. In this
+connection, Marine contributions tended to be
+concealed within the context of the American
+assistance effort. Still, by mid-1962 it could be
+said that the Marines in Vietnam were leaving
+the impact of their service on virtually every stage
+of the ground war.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">55</span></p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2 class="nobreak part" id="PART_II"><span id="toclink_55">PART II</span><br>
+
+<span class="subhead">MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR</span></h2>
+<div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           </div>
+</div>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">57</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_5"><span id="toclink_57"></span>CHAPTER 5<br>
+<span class="subhead large">SHUFLY at Soc Trang</span><br>
+<span class="subhead notbold"><i>The Decision—Deployment to Soc Trang—Mekong Delta Combat Support
+Operations—Preparations and Redeployment—Accomplishments</i></span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p>One of the most important developments in the
+chronicle of U.S. Marine activities in South
+Vietnam during the early 1960s occurred shortly
+after the creation of MACV. In mid-April 1962, a
+Marine medium helicopter squadron was deployed
+to the Mekong Delta to provide support for the
+Government of Vietnam forces in their battle with
+the Communist guerrillas. The significance of the
+squadron’s arrival went beyond the added mobility
+that it afforded those Vietnamese units attempting
+to hold the rice producing delta region. Coinciding
+as it did with the increases in the number of Marines
+serving on the MACV staff and under the MAAG,
+its arrival indicated that the Marine role would
+expand in direct proportion to the widening U.S.
+effort to defend the Republic of Vietnam.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_57a"><i>The Decision</i></h3>
+
+<p>The decision to deploy the Marine aviation unit
+to the combat zone originated in the immediate
+aftermath of General Taylor’s report to President
+Kennedy. On 17 January 1962, the Joint Chiefs of
+Staff directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific
+(CinCPac), Admiral Harry D. Felt, to prepare for
+increased operations in South Vietnam. This order
+implied that the Pacific command should stand
+ready to deploy additional helicopter units to
+Diem’s republic in the event that it became necessary
+to augment the Army companies already operating
+there. (By now the number of Army helicopter
+companies in South Vietnam stood at three.)
+CinCPac was also instructed to explore South
+Vietnam’s requirements for additional helicopter
+units beyond the Army companies already present.<a id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[5-1]</a></p>
+
+<p>Shortly afterward, Admiral Felt advised the
+Joint Chiefs of Staff that a valid requirement for
+additional helicopter support did exist in the
+Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. He
+recommended that a fourth U.S. Army light helicopter
+company be deployed to the area. Included
+in the admiral’s recommendation was a proposal
+to support the aviation unit with a composite
+maintenance, avionics, and medical group.<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[5-2]</a></p>
+
+<p>Admiral Felt’s recommendations were approved
+by the Secretary of Defense on 6 March. The Joint
+Chiefs immediately assigned the responsibility for
+providing the support package and helicopter unit
+to the Army. In turn, Army authorities alerted
+the 33d Transportation Light Helicopter Company
+at Fort Ord, California for the move. Its departure
+date was set for 18 April.<a id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[5-3]</a></p>
+
+<p>Unknown to the officers and men of the alerted
+unit, the plans for its deployment to combat
+were being reconsidered at the time the orders
+were received. Two days before Admiral Felt’s
+recommendation reached the joint Chiefs, a proposal
+to augment Army helicopter units with Marine
+pilots had been advanced by General Timmes, the
+MAAG chief. This proposal triggered a brief but
+eventful debate within U.S. military circles. With
+General Harkins’ concurrence, Timmes recommended
+that nine Marine helicopter pilots be
+assigned to the Army aviation units in Vietnam
+for periods of 60 to 90 days. This arrangement, he
+pointed out, would enable the Marine pilots to
+become familiar with the nature of the combat
+support operations in South Vietnam and would
+provide them with transitional training in the
+Army’s Piasecki-built tandem-rotored H-21 helicopter
+(nicknamed the “Flying Banana”).<a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[5-4]</a></p>
+
+<p>Admiral Felt turned to the Commanding General,
+Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), Lieutenant
+General Alan Shapley, for his comments on the
+MAAG chief’s plan. Shapley in turn instructed
+Major General Carson A. Roberts, the Commanding
+General, Aircraft, FMFPac to study the proposal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">58</span>
+and to frame a set of recommendations. Roberts,
+who had been selected for promotion to lieutenant
+general and was scheduled to relieve Shapley as
+Commanding General, FMFPac, found the prospect
+of Marine aviators participating in combat support
+operations in Vietnam appealing but felt that the
+proposal under review had some definite disadvantages.
+He pointed out that under Timmes’ plan
+the Marine pilots would be flying a type of helicopter
+unfamiliar to them instead of the ones they
+would operate if the Marine squadrons were later
+deployed to Vietnam. Furthermore, General Roberts
+warned that the piecemeal assignment of his
+pilots would reduce the combat readiness of the
+unit from which they would be drawn.<a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[5-5]</a></p>
+
+<p>At Roberts’ suggestion, General Shapley offered
+CinCPac a counterproposal which he believed
+would benefit both the South Vietnamese government
+and the Marine Corps. He suggested that a
+complete Marine medium helicopter squadron from
+Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16), 1st Marine
+Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) and supporting elements
+be moved from Okinawa to the war zone. The
+Marine squadron, operating 24 HUS-1s (a single-rotor,
+Sikorsky-built transport helicopter later
+known as the UH-34D) would replace the Army
+helicopter company at Da Nang in the northernmost
+corps tactical zone, I Corps. The Army unit
+would then be freed for redeployment southward
+into either II or III Corps Tactical Zones.</p>
+
+<p>General Shapley emphasized several advantages
+which he saw in this plan. First, it would provide
+additional helicopter support for the Republic of
+Vietnam Armed Forces while concurrently providing
+an entire Marine helicopter squadron with
+an opportunity to gain first-hand experience in a
+counterguerrilla environment. It would also provide
+Marine Corps units with operational experience
+in I Corps, the area to which they would be
+committed if standing contingency plans were later
+executed. Finally, Shapley explained that his
+proposal offered an almost entirely self-sufficient
+aviation unit which could be supported administratively
+and logistically by the 1st Marine
+Aircraft Wing. The unit would require only
+minimal support from the Military Assistance
+Command, Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">[5-6]</a></p>
+
+<p>On the same day that he had heard the Marine
+commander’s proposal, Admiral Felt received a
+message from Admiral John H. Sides, Commander
+in Chief, Pacific Fleet, which strongly advised
+that Roberts’ plan be implemented.<a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[5-7]</a> Admiral Felt
+then solicited General Harkins’ opinion on the
+matter. He reminded the MACV commander that
+the proposed deployment would provide the
+Marines with operational experience in an area
+where they might some day be committed. The
+admiral further pointed out that the location of a
+Marine helicopter unit at Da Nang would enable
+the Army aviation companies to move south into
+one of the other corps tactical zones—a move that
+would facilitate the logistical support of those
+units by shortening their supply lines.<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[5-8]</a></p>
+
+<p>Harkins generally concurred with Admiral Felt’s
+viewpoint. He noted that the more powerful
+Marine HUS helicopter (Sea Horse) could be
+expected to out perform the Army’s H-21 in the
+higher elevations around Da Nang. He also felt
+that the Marines, with their seaborne supply
+network, were better equipped to cope with the
+logistics problems in the more isolated northern
+reaches of South Vietnam. But he objected to the
+deployment of the Marine unit to Da Nang on the
+basis that the relocation of the Army’s 93d Helicopter
+Company from I Corps in the immediate
+future would disrupt a series of operations which
+were already underway in I Corps. As an alternative,
+General Harkins proposed that the Marine
+helicopters be located initially at Soc Trang in the
+Mekong Delta. Later, when the tempo of operations
+in the northern corps tactical zone permitted, it
+could exchange places with the Army unit at
+Da Nang.<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[5-9]</a></p>
+
+<p>One Army general raised a specific objection to
+the proposal that the Marine squadron be deployed
+from Okinawa. General James F. Collins, the
+Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific (CinCUSArPac)
+argued that the presence of the Marine
+helicopters at Soc Trang would introduce yet
+“another supply and maintenance feature into the
+III Corps area.”<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[5-10]</a> This argument was followed by
+the recommendation that the Army’s 81st Light
+Helicopter Company, then based in Hawaii, be
+ordered to the Mekong Delta. The 81st, General
+Collins contended, was already trained in troop
+transportation operations in jungle terrain.</p>
+
+<p>General David M. Shoup, the Marine Corps
+Commandant, who approved the FMFPac plan in
+concept, harbored one reservation regarding
+General Roberts’ proposals. His concern stemmed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">59</span>
+from the possibility that the Marine Corps might
+be required to replace the squadron from Okinawa
+with another in order to maintain the level of
+operational forces available to CinCPac—an eventuality
+which would upset long-range Marine
+Corps deployment schedules. General Shoup indicated
+that he, too, would oppose the deployment
+of a Marine helicopter squadron to South Vietnam
+if this proved to be the case.<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[5-11]</a></p>
+
+<p>At this juncture in the debate, Admiral Felt
+journeyed to Saigon to discuss the matter more
+thoroughly with General Harkins. Following
+consultations, the two commanders jointly communicated
+their recommendations to the Joint
+Chiefs of Staff on 14 March. They advised that
+it would be more desirable to deploy one of the
+Marine helicopter squadrons from Okinawa than
+either the Army unit already on alert in California
+or the one in Hawaii. This decision, Felt and
+Harkins informed the Joint Chiefs, was influenced
+heavily by the readiness posture of the various
+units under consideration. A Marine squadron,
+they pointed out, could be on station and ready
+for combat operations by 15 April—three days
+before the company already alerted by the Army
+could depart California.<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[5-12]</a></p>
+
+<p>Admiral Felt and General Harkins then dealt with
+the CinCUSARPac contention that additional
+supply problems would be created by the deployment
+of a Marine unit to the Mekong Delta. The
+Pacific commanders advised that, in their opinion,
+the logistical support “can be handled relatively
+easily by [the] Marines.”<a id="FNanchor_111" href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[5-13]</a> They added that should
+requirements for a fifth helicopter unit arise in
+South Vietnam, the Army’s 81st Helicopter Company
+would be selected for the assignment. It
+would be replaced in Hawaii by the 33d Transportation
+Light Helicopter Company from Fort
+Ord. Finally, Admiral Felt and General Harkins
+recommended that the Marine squadron be deployed
+initially to the Mekong Delta area of III
+Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). Later, when
+operational conditions in I Corps were more
+favorable, the Marines could replace the Army
+helicopter unit there.</p>
+
+<p>After meeting to discuss the matter, the Joint
+Chiefs of Staff approved the entire package of
+recommendations on 16 March. Admiral Felt
+immediately ordered the Pacific Fleet to deploy
+a Marine helicopter squadron to South Vietnam
+and authorized direct liaison between the 1st
+Marine Aircraft Wing and ComUSMACV. In turn,
+Admiral Sides, the Commander of the Pacific
+Fleet, notified the Commander, Seventh Fleet,
+Vice Admiral William A. Schoech, of the decision
+and directed him to take appropriate action.<a id="FNanchor_112" href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[5-14]</a></p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_59"><i>Deployment to Soc Trang</i></h3>
+
+<p>The Commanding General of the 1st Marine
+Aircraft Wing, Major General John P. Condon, a
+Michigan native who had earned a Distinguished
+Flying Cross and three Legions of Merit for service
+during World War II and Korea, was informed of
+the impending deployment on 22 March. At the
+time, Condon, his staff, and elements of his command
+were participating in SEATO exercise
+TULUNGAN in the Philippines. The arrival of the
+orders proved timely for most of the affected units
+were in close proximity to the wing commander.
+As the Marine helicopter squadron and its supporting
+elements were scheduled to arrive in Vietnam
+just two weeks after the SEATO exercise ended,
+preparations for the move were begun immediately.
+General Condon quickly dispatched several officers
+to Saigon to establish liaison with USMACV.</p>
+
+<p>The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing fortunately
+possessed a background which facilitated the rapid
+preparations for the movement. Since August of the
+previous year General Condon’s command regularly
+had deployed a medium helicopter squadron
+(HMM) and its supporting elements with the
+Special Landing Force (SLF), a Marine air-ground
+team embarked on board the Seventh Fleet’s
+Amphibious Ready Group. Since 1961 this naval
+task force had cruised Southeast Asian waters ready
+to implement U.S. contingency plans. These
+deployments had given the Marines of the wing a
+reservoir of experience which enabled them to make
+maximum use of the short period of time available
+for planning.</p>
+
+<p>By 30 March, the wing’s planning had progressed
+to the stage that General Condon could
+provide the Commander of the Seventh Fleet with
+specific recommendations for the entire operation.
+The general concept of the plan was that Task Unit
+79.3.5, under the command of a Marine colonel,
+was to be built around a Marine medium helicopter
+squadron which was participating in Operation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">60</span>
+TULUNGAN. This task unit, code named SHUFLY,
+was to occupy an old Japanese-built landing
+strip near Soc Trang, a small town located about
+85 miles southwest of Saigon in Ba Xuyen Province.
+Situated only 20 miles from the coast, Soc Trang
+possessed one of the few hard surfaced runways in
+the area. Condon informed the Seventh Fleet
+commander of the arrangements which his liaison
+officers had made during their trip to Saigon. An
+ARVN infantry battalion and two 4.2-inch mortar
+companies were to assume the defense of the air
+strip at Soc Trang the same day that the Marines
+began landing.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_60" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;">
+  <img src="images/i_060.jpg" width="919" height="1111" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Major General John P. Condon, USMC, Commanding
+General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. (<cite>USMC Photo
+A420792</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The Marine general then proceeded to outline the
+chain of command and method of support which he
+considered best for the Marine task unit. SHUFLY,
+he suggested, should be under the operational
+control of ComUSMACV but should remain under
+the administrative control of the 1st Marine Aircraft
+Wing. Most of its logistic support, the wing
+commander thought, could come through normal
+Marine and Navy channels with fuels, lubricant
+oils, rations, and ammunition, being the exceptions.
+Rations and ammunition were to be provided
+by MACV, while fuels would be supplied by
+private Vietnamese distributers operating under
+contracts with the U.S. government.</p>
+
+<p>Next, General Condon explained to Admiral
+Schoech his desires for the organization of the task
+unit. He felt that SHUFLY would function best if
+organized into three distinct task elements. First,
+he proposed that a headquarters be formed under
+the command of Colonel John F. Carey, a veteran
+Marine aviator who had been awarded the Navy
+Cross for heroism during the battle for Midway.
+Carey was currently serving as Chief of Staff of the
+1st Marine Aircraft Wing. This headquarters,
+General Condon advised, should consist of eight
+officers and six enlisted men. The second element of
+the task unit, the wing commander continued,
+would be Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362
+(HMM-362), reinforced, under the command of
+Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp. The squadron,
+whose normal complement was 63 officers and 196
+enlisted Marines, was to be augmented by 50
+additional maintenance personnel. Its equipment
+would include 24 HUS helicopters (which under
+normal operating conditions could lift eight to 12
+combat-loaded Vietnamese troops), three Cessna
+single-engine OE-1 observation aircraft, one R4D
+transport aircraft, and supplemental maintenance
+equipment. Prior to its deployment, HMM-362
+would exchange its helicopters for recently overhauled
+aircraft in order to reduce maintenance
+problems once operations in Vietnam began.
+SHUFLY’s third element would be a sub unit of
+Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS-16). Designated
+Task Element 79.3.5.2, it would be commanded
+by Lieutenant Colonel William W. Eldridge.
+Navy medical, dental, and chaplain personnel
+would be included in the sub unit’s 193
+enlisted men and 18 officers.</p>
+
+<p>The wing commander intended to provide the
+MABS-16 sub unit with a Tactical Airfield Fuel
+Dispensing System (TAFDS) and a Marine Airfield
+Traffic Control Unit (MATCU). The traffic control
+unit would be equipped with Tactical Air
+Navigation (TACAN) and Ground Control Approach
+(GCA) systems which would enable the
+helicopter squadron to conduct landings during
+periods of reduced visibility.<a id="FNanchor_113" href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[5-15]</a></p>
+
+<p>Colonel Carey, the task unit commander, was
+to be assigned responsibility for liaison with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">61</span>
+MACV and military authorities in III Corps, the
+tactical zone which encompassed the entire Mekong
+Delta and the transition zone between the delta
+and the highlands. All operational planning,
+security, external communications, and administrative
+matters also were to fall under his cognizance.
+This arrangement would allow Lieutenant Colonel
+Clapp and his squadron to concentrate on daily
+flight operations and aircraft maintenance. Lieutenant
+Colonel Eldridge’s MABS-16 sub unit would
+be responsible for all normal base support and
+airfield operations.<a id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[5-16]</a></p>
+
+<p>General Condon’s report to Admiral Schoech
+concluded with a rough outline of the schedule for
+the task unit’s deployment. On 9 April—only eight
+days after the termination of the SEATO exercise
+in the Philippines—Marine transport aircraft from
+the 1st MAW, augmented by three transports from
+the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW), would
+begin airlifting the task unit headquarters and the
+MABS-16 detachment from Okinawa. The Marine
+general anticipated that all “housekeeping” facilities
+would be in position at Soc Trang within five
+days. Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s HMM-362 would
+fly into Soc Trang from the amphibious assault
+ship (helicopter carrier) USS <i>Princeton</i> (LPH-5) on
+the morning of 15 April. The proposal that the
+helicopters be flown ashore satisfied a Department
+of Defense requirement that conspicuous unloading
+activities were to be avoided in the Saigon area.</p>
+
+<p>Admiral Schoech approved the 1st MAW’s proposed
+plan on 3 April and ordered Task Unit 79.3.5
+to be transferred to General Harkins’ command
+on 15 April. He then instructed the Commander,
+Task Group 76.5 (the Amphibious Ready Group)
+to provide SHUFLY with whatever supply and
+administrative support it might require for the
+movement. At the same time the fleet commander
+ordered appropriate subordinate commanders to
+provide an escort of destroyers for the USS <i>Princeton</i>
+and an inconspicuous air cover when the LPH
+arrived and began unloading HMM-362. Accordingly,
+the covering aircraft were instructed not to
+approach within 20 miles of South Vietnam unless
+the situation around Soc Trang endangered the
+Marine helicopters.<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[5-17]</a></p>
+
+<p>The day following Schoech’s approval of the
+Marine plan, the carrier task unit was formed to
+transport HMM-362 to South Vietnam. SHUFLY
+was activated simultaneously and given orders
+which reflected General Condon’s planning. Colonel
+Carey was instructed to establish his headquarters
+at the Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan,
+in order to prepare for the deployment. The task
+unit commander was advised that he would receive
+more detailed instructions relative to administration
+and logistics at a later date.</p>
+
+<p>Colonel Carey’s task group headquarters in Japan
+had only one week in which to complete preparations
+for the move to the Republic of Vietnam. His
+staff’s responsibility for coordinating between units
+located at Atsugi, Japan, and Futema, Okinawa,
+made this task even more difficult. Carey’s officers
+worked out the details of the airlift with the staff
+of Marine Aerial Refueler-Transport Squadron 152
+(VMGR-152), the GV-1<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[5-A]</a> unit assigned to carry
+the MABS-16 sub unit and the task unit headquarters
+to Soc Trang.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="label">[5-A]</a> The GV-1 (later KC-130), a four-engine, turbo-prop
+refueler-transport built by Lockheed, is the Marine refueling
+version of the Air Force C-130.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>The airlift portion of the movement began as
+scheduled on 9 April with the MABS-16 detachment
+being transported from Futema directly to
+Soc Trang. At 0800 Colonel Carey and part of his
+staff landed at Soc Trang in a twin-engine Douglas
+R4D Skytrain. As planned, the 400-man ARVN
+battalion had already established a perimeter
+around the airfield. Using the R4D’s radio, the
+crew provided landing instructions for the GV-1s
+of VMGR-152 and VMGR-352 which began landing
+and unloading their cargoes at half hour
+intervals. Several key American and Vietnamese
+military officers were on hand to watch the lead
+elements of SHUFLY arrive. Major General
+Condon, the 1st MAW commander, flew the first
+GV-1 into Soc Trang but departed after the aircraft
+had been unloaded. General Harkins and Brigadier
+General Le Van Nghiem, the Vietnamese commander
+of III Corps, also made appearances at the
+airstrip to welcome Colonel Carey and his Marines.</p>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge’s MABS-16 detachment
+began readying the airfield for HMM-362’s
+arrival shortly after the first transport aircraft had
+unloaded. To serve as living spaces the Marines
+raised 75 strongback tents, all with plywood decks.
+They set up a water purification system and began
+trucking water from the town of Soc Trang, about
+two and a half miles away. Within two days, 9,000
+gallons of water had been purified. Other conveniences<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">62</span>
+improved the camp’s living conditions.
+A field laundry and a mess hall were set up and by
+12 April, hot meals were being served to the
+Marines. A post office began operations and telephones
+were installed to connect living and
+working areas.</p>
+
+<p>By 14 April, the day before HMM-362 was
+scheduled to arrive at Soc Trang, most of the
+airfield facilities were ready to support flight
+operations. An old hangar, which had been
+constructed by the Japanese during their World
+War II occupation of Indochina, had been repaired
+to house some of the squadron’s aircraft and equipment.
+The MABS-16 communications section was
+operational and had established radio and teletype
+links with MACV in Saigon and MAG-16 on
+Okinawa. The TAFDS had been assembled and
+filled with aviation fuel and MATCU-68, the air
+traffic control unit assigned to SHUFLY, was
+prepared to control flight operations.</p>
+
+<p>The Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5)
+steamed from Okinawa on 10 April with HMM-362,
+its reinforcements, and HMM-261 embarked on the
+USS <i>Princeton</i>. The task group arrived off the coast
+of South Vietnam in the early morning hours of 15
+April. At dawn Lieutenant Colonel Clapp, who had
+seen action as a fighter pilot during the Iwo Jima
+and Okinawa campaigns in World War II, led the
+first flight of helicopters from the deck of the
+<i>Princeton</i>. The operation proceeded smoothly with
+aircraft from both squadrons ferrying HMM-362’s
+equipment inland to the Soc Trang airstrip. Far
+out at sea, jets of the Seventh Fleet orbited, ready
+to provide protection to the Marine helicopters.
+They were not needed, however, as the Viet Cong
+made no effort to oppose the movement. By mid-afternoon
+the airlift of HMM-362’s personnel and
+equipment to the Soc Trang airfield had been
+completed. HMM-261 returned to the <i>Princeton</i>
+where it continued to function as the helicopter
+element of the Special Landing Force.</p>
+
+<p>The day after arriving at Soc Trang, Lieutenant
+Colonel Clapp’s squadron, nicknamed “Archie’s
+Angels,” was prepared to support the ARVN.
+Since the squadron’s combat support was not required
+immediately, the pilots and crews began
+flying missions to familiarize themselves with their
+new surroundings. They learned that their operations
+were to be conducted over the vast expanse
+of South Vietnam which stretched from just north
+and east of Saigon to the nation’s southernmost tip,
+the Ca Mau Peninsula, and from the South China
+Sea westward to the Cambodian border. Their
+initial flights over the Mekong Delta revealed a
+predominantly flat and monotonous landscape.
+Parched by the long dry season, the dusty brown
+rice paddies stood in sharp contrast with the verdant
+mangrove swamps which abounded near major
+streams and along the coast. Numerous hamlets,
+most enclosed by dense hedgerows and treelines,
+were scattered across the countryside. Thousands
+of canals and trails and a few crude roads completed
+the rural landscape in which the Viet Cong
+guerrilla thrived. Larger towns, such as Soc Trang,
+Can Tho (located about 80 miles southwest of
+Saigon), and My Tho (located about half way
+between the capital and Can Tho) were under the
+control of the Government of Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>While the pilots and crews of HMM-362 were
+acquainting themselves with the geography of the
+Mekong Delta, Colonel Carey and his staff met in
+Saigon with U.S. and Vietnamese officers from the
+MACV and III Corps headquarters. There, they
+established liaison with the three ARVN divisions
+subordinate to General Nhgiem’s III Corps—the
+21st, the 7th, and the 5th—and discussed operational
+matters. After several conferences, the final
+details of the command arrangements were completed.
+It was agreed that all Marine missions
+would require the approval of MACV, III Corps,
+and the task unit commander. This arrangement
+would enable General Harkins’ command to retain
+actual operational control of the Marine helicopters
+even though they would be supporting III Corps
+exclusively. Final approval of all mission requests
+for Marine support would rest with the Joint
+Operations Center (JOC) at JGS headquarters in
+Saigon. Manned by U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force,
+ARVN, and VNAF officers, this agency was part of
+a recently instituted Tactical Air Support System,
+the purpose of which was to provide positive control
+over all military aircraft in South Vietnam.
+To insure maximum coordination at lower echelons,
+Marine liaison officers were assigned to the corps
+headquarters and to the 21st ARVN Division. It
+was anticipated that this division, headquartered
+at Can Tho, only 35 miles northwest of Soc Trang,
+would require more Marine helicopter support than<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">63</span>
+the other divisions that were operating within the
+corps tactical zone.<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[5-B]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="label">[5-B]</a> I and II Corps had their own agencies within the corps headquarters
+for control of air assets whereas III CTZ relied directly
+on the JOC. Under this arrangement, I Corps and II Corps were
+required to pass mission requests for air support on to the JOC.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<figure id="ip_63" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_063.jpg" width="1915" height="1426" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Lieutenant Colonel Archie Clapp (second from left), HMM-362 squadron commander, Major General John Condon
+(fourth from left), Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Colonel John Carey (extreme right), task
+unit commander, confer briefly after arriving at Soc Trang. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kizer, USMC</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>While operational planning was underway, the
+MABS-16 Marines set about to improve the newly
+occupied compound. Two diesel-powered generators
+were put into operation and began furnishing
+electrical power for the camp. The utilities section,
+which maintained the generators, then began installing
+electrical wiring throughout the compound.
+Toilet and shower facilities were constructed
+to accommodate the Marines.</p>
+
+<p>Measures were also taken during this interlude
+to strengthen the airfield’s defenses. Expecting that
+the Viet Cong might attempt to infiltrate the
+Marine position, Colonel Carey created a 40-man
+security unit to protect the inner camp and flight
+lines. This unit, composed of men from MABS-16
+and HMM-362 and responsible to a permanent
+sergeant-of-the-guard, maintained roving patrols
+and security posts during hours of darkness. A
+network of concertina wire, trip flares, and machine
+gun emplacements provided additional protection
+around the helicopters and living area. Attack
+alerts were conducted periodically to coordinate
+the ARVN’s outer defenses and the Marine guard
+within the perimeter.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_63b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 28em;">
+  <img src="images/i_064.jpg" width="1761" height="2575" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE<br>
+1962<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Within less than two weeks after the first
+Marines had arrived at Soc Trang, the camp had
+been adequately prepared to support sustained
+combat helicopter operations. In addition, defenses
+had been established and the lines of logistical
+support from MACV had been opened. Food and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">65</span>
+water were readily available. All necessary liaison
+with the Vietnamese units to be supported had
+been accomplished. Pilots and crews had gained a
+rudimentary knowledge of the area in which they
+would fly and SHUFLY’s entire command structure
+had undergone a one week “shake down” in which
+it had proven sound.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_65"><i>Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations</i></h3>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s squadron began combat
+operations on Easter Sunday, 22 April, exactly
+one week after arriving in the Republic of Vietnam.
+The unit’s first combat assignment was to assist
+the Army’s Saigon-based 57th Helicopter Company
+in an operation code named LOCKJAW. The
+American helicopters were to support the ARVN
+7th Division which was headquartered at My Tho,
+53 miles northeast of Soc Trang. The Marine helicopters,
+which departed Soc Trang at 0900, flew 29
+sorties and lifted 400 Vietnamese soldiers without
+incident during the course of their first operation.</p>
+
+<p>Unlike the U.S. Army helicopters already operating
+in other parts of South Vietnam, the Marine
+HUS-1s were not armed with machine guns during
+their initial operations from Soc Trang. Prior to
+their deployment, the Marine commanders had
+reasoned that weapons mounted in the cargo hatch
+would hinder loading and unloading during
+critical periods while the helicopters were in
+landing zones. Additionally, armed aircraft would
+tend to present a more hostile appearance to
+Vietnamese civilians, thereby providing the Viet
+Cong ready-made material for their anti-American
+propaganda themes. The only weapons on board the
+helicopters, therefore, were the individual side
+arms and two M3A1 .45 caliber submachine guns
+carried by the crew members. The automatic
+weapons enabled Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s men
+to return fire at short ranges and would also enhance
+their survival capabilities in the event an
+aircraft was forced down in unsecure territory.<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[5-C]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="label">[5-C]</a> By the summer the new light weight AR-15, the forerunner
+of the M-16, would replace the M3A1 “greaseguns.”
+Near the end of the year, however, the Leatherneck crews
+were carrying M-14 rifles, the standard U.S. 7.62mm infantry
+weapon of this period.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Once HMM-362 began combat flight operations
+the tempo of activities at Soc Trang quickened.
+The same day that SHUFLY helicopters participated
+in the coordinated helilift from My Tho, an
+HUS was called upon to evacuate an American
+advisor from Vinh Long, 46 miles north of Soc
+Trang. The following day the first combined operation
+involving Vietnamese Marine ground forces
+and U.S. Marine helicopters was conducted. A
+company of Vietnamese Marines was helilifted into
+a threatened government outpost south of the
+town of Ca Mau, located near the southern tip of
+South Vietnam, to provide security while HMM-362’s
+helicopters evacuated the 57-man garrison.</p>
+
+<p>On 24 April, 16 Marine helicopters supported the
+21st ARVN Division in Operation NIGHTINGALE
+conducted near Can Tho. In this operation 591
+ARVN troops were lifted into eight landing zones
+along two canals where a large group of Viet
+Cong had been reported. Shortly after the first
+wave of the assault force landed, a vicious small
+arms fight erupted. HMM-362 suffered its first
+combat damage when a helicopter was forced
+down after its oil line was punctured by enemy fire.
+An accompanying HUS quickly landed and retrieved
+the crew. Four other helicopters proceeded
+to the forward loading site, picked up a Marine
+repair team and enough ARVN troops to protect
+the team while it worked, and returned to the
+downed aircraft. The mechanics completed their
+repairs in two hours after which the crew returned
+the helicopter to Soc Trang. The security force
+was then lifted out of the area.</p>
+
+<p>Despite the damage suffered by the Marine
+aircraft, the Can Tho operation apparently achieved
+some success. The Viet Cong reportedly suffered
+70 dead and lost three prisoners to the South
+Vietnamese while the ARVN units lost only three
+killed and six wounded. The Marines of HMM-362,
+moreover, had responded to a new challenge by
+demonstrating that they could recover helicopters
+which had been forced to land in insecure territory.
+Although the principle of providing security while
+accomplishing field repairs had been employed
+previously by the Army helicopter companies, the
+Can Tho operation of 24 April marked the first
+time the Marines had been required to use the
+technique.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_65" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_066.jpg" width="1896" height="2431" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Aerial view of Soc Trang airstrip. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kizer, USMC</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>HMM-362 again joined the Army’s 57th Helicopter
+Company for a coordinated troop lift on
+25 April. This time the objective was the small
+town of Chau Doc on the Bassac River near the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">67</span>
+Cambodian border which had been raided and
+burned by a force whose identity was undetermined.
+Fourteen Marine helicopters transported 168 troops
+from the 21st ARVN Division to the scene of the
+incident while two other squadron aircraft lifted
+the Deputy Commander of III Corps, the 21st
+Division Commander, and the Senior U.S. Advisor
+in III Corps, Colonel Daniel B. Potter, Jr., U.S.
+Army, to the village. The landing was uncontested
+as the marauding band had fled across the international
+border into Cambodia.</p>
+
+<p>The conditions which confronted HMM-362 in
+the Mekong Delta during its first weeks of combat
+operations encouraged the squadron’s pilots to
+experiment with new tactics. One such instance
+occurred in the first week of May in Ba Xuyen
+Province when the province chief requested that
+the Marine helicopters support his Civil Guard
+company in a raid on a fortified Viet Cong village
+about 12 miles southwest of Soc Trang. Because the
+objective was located so near the Soc Trang airfield,
+Lieutenant Colonel Clapp ordered an unusual
+technique used for approaching the landing zone.
+The flight would rendezvous over Soc Trang at
+tree-top level and proceed to the objective with the
+flight leader slightly to the rear and above the
+formation. From this vantage point the flight
+leader could keep the other aircraft in sight and
+exercise better control over each element of the
+flight. The success of the new procedure led
+Lieutenant Colonel Clapp to remark later that the
+technique was similar to “calling the plays from
+the grandstand.”<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[5-18]</a> It became another tactic available
+for the squadron’s future use.</p>
+
+<p>In terms of lessons learned, HMM-362’s most
+significant operation during its initial month of
+combat support came on 9 May. Twenty-three
+helicopters and two OE-1 observation aircraft
+launched from Ca Mau at 1100 for an assault on
+Cai Ngai, a Viet Cong-controlled village 21 miles
+to the south. At 1200 the helicopters began landing
+the ARVN troops in six landing zones which had
+been attacked only five minutes earlier by Vietnamese
+Air Force fighter bombers. Firing broke out
+even before the Vietnamese troops could jump
+from the helicopters. During this clash eight of
+the Marine aircraft were hit by small arms fire
+and two Vietnamese troops were wounded while
+still on board. One HUS, struck in the oil return
+line, was forced to land a few miles from the
+objective. Troops were flown in quickly to establish
+a perimeter around the downed aircraft while
+repairs were made. After the temporary repairs
+had been completed, its crew flew the helicopter
+to Ca Mau, where it remained until more extensive
+work could be accomplished. The other aircraft,
+including an OE-1, suffered only superficial damage
+and continued to support the ARVN operation.</p>
+
+<p>From this encounter with the Viet Cong, the
+Marine pilots learned that air strikes conducted
+just prior to a helicopter landing in the heavily
+populated delta country tended to disclose the
+location of the landing zone to the enemy. In this
+instance the Communists had been able to reach the
+landing zone in the few minutes which elapsed
+between the last air strike and the arrival of the
+Marine helicopters. Following this experience,
+the Marines would no longer allow VNAF air
+strikes on landing zones prior to operations in the
+flat delta region.<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[5-D]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="label">[5-D]</a> The development of helicopter tactics and techniques in
+Vietnam will be covered in detail in a separate monograph being
+prepared for publication by the History and Museums Division,
+Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>The Americans and Vietnamese, however, soon
+learned to use fixed-wing aircraft to support
+helicopter operations in another manner. By mid-June,
+FARM GATE T-28 Trojans (a single-engine
+two-seat trainer built by North American) modified
+to carry bombs, rockets, and machine guns were
+flying escort missions for the Marine helicopter
+squadron. This particular aircraft could fly slowly
+enough to cruise with the HUS yet fast enough to
+deliver an air strike en route to the objective and
+then catch up with the helicopter formation. Normally
+an element of two T-28s accompanied the
+helicopters and were used primarily to attack
+targets near the landing zone after the ARVN
+troops were on the ground. The placement of an
+American pilot-instructor and a Vietnamese student
+in the T-28, a requirement imposed by MACV,
+helped avert language problems which invariably
+developed when coordinating ARVN ground operations
+and U.S. air operations. The effectiveness of
+the escort tactic increased as the Marine and Air
+Force pilots became accustomed to planning, coordinating,
+and executing the missions.</p>
+
+<p>The Marines quickly learned the value of utilizing
+the OE-1 in conjunction with their helicopter
+operations. Three single-engine, two-man aircraft,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">68</span>
+a detachment from Marine Observation Squadron
+2 (VMO-2), proved remarkably versatile in day-to-day
+operations over the delta. Primarily, they
+were used in daylight visual reconnaissance, usually
+to study objective areas and the approach routes
+which the helicopters would later use. Sometimes
+their crews were called upon to photograph proposed
+landing zones for briefing purposes. Often
+the aircraft’s radios were used to relay messages
+between various ARVN ground units which were
+operating beyond the range of their radios.
+Equipped with two frequency-modulated (FM)
+radios for work with ground stations and one
+ultra high-frequency (UHF) radio for communicating
+with other aircraft, the OE-1 was perfectly
+suited for controlling helicopter landings. The
+Marine aviators also found that, unlike their
+helicopters, the observation aircraft did not arouse
+suspicion in the area over which it flew. This
+advantage was due probably to several factors.
+First, the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) routinely
+operated similar aircraft over the entire region;
+secondly, the enemy could not readily determine
+whether the OE-1 was on a reconnaissance mission
+or merely flying from one point to another; and
+finally, the small aircraft made little noise. Given
+these characteristics it was no accident that the
+helicopter squadron relied on the observation aircraft
+more and more as the pattern of operations
+unfolded.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_68" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 31em;">
+  <img src="images/i_068.jpg" width="1928" height="1386" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Vietnamese infantrymen disembark from HMM-362 helicopters and move toward treeline in one of the first helicopter
+assault operations attempted by a Marine unit in the Mekong Delta. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P.
+Kizer, USMC</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Shortly after their arrival in Vietnam, the
+Marines of HMM-362 began experimenting with
+one of the more imaginative techniques developed
+in the early stages of the intensified U.S.-GVN
+counterinsurgency effort. Marine air crews had
+noticed that the enemy often managed to elude the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">69</span>
+larger ARVN units by fleeing the operations area
+in small groups. Even the smallest breach between
+ARVN units seemed to allow large numbers of
+guerrillas to escape into covered or heavily populated
+areas where they became impossible to find.
+Colonel Carey and Lieutenant Colonel Clapp
+devised a plan to prevent escapes of this nature.
+Their idea was to have a flight of four Marine
+helicopters loaded with about 50 ARVN soldiers
+circle above the contested area. This so-called
+“Eagle Flight” would be on the alert for any
+Viet Cong attempting to evade the ground forces.
+Once the enemy was located, often by the OE-1
+observation aircraft, the helicopters would land
+the Vietnamese soldiers at a position where they
+could block his escape. The Marine commanders
+felt that the adoption of such a tactic would
+increase the effectiveness of the ARVN’s helicopter
+assault operations.</p>
+
+<p>After several weeks of planning by HMM-362
+and the affected III Corps commands, the concept
+was put into practice. The Eagle Flight was first
+tested in a large operation on 18 June when
+HMM-362 helilifted ARVN troops into 16 different
+landing zones. Heavy monsoon rains made the
+enemy particularly difficult to pin down, but the
+Marine pilots managed to sight 10 Viet Cong near
+the main landing zone. After landing near the
+enemy, the ARVN troops captured 10 Communist
+soldiers and wounded one other. Shortly after this
+incident another Eagle Flight made two eventful
+contacts with the enemy. The Marine helicopters
+landed their small force and the ARVN promptly
+killed four Viet Cong and captured another.
+Twenty minutes later, after reboarding the helicopters,
+the South Vietnamese swept down upon a
+new prey, this time capturing four prisoners.</p>
+
+<p>The novel concept was employed successfully
+again on 10 July. While HMM-362 aircraft lifted
+968 ARVN troops into the Ca Mau area, an Eagle
+Flight spotted a sampan moving northward from
+the operations area. The flight leader landed the
+troops nearby and the ARVN intercepted the craft.
+Later that day the Marines and ARVN of the Eagle
+Flight clashed twice with an estimated platoon of
+Viet Cong. In the first encounter seven enemy were
+killed and several weapons were captured. In the
+second skirmish, the enemy suffered six dead and
+lost more weapons. All four Marine helicopters,
+however, were hit by small arms fire during the
+two brief fights.</p>
+
+<p>By the middle of July, the Eagle Flight had
+become a proven combat tactic. By reducing the
+enemy’s opportunity to escape when the government
+forces possessed the advantage on the battlefield,
+it had favorably influenced the tactical situation
+when used in the Mekong Delta. Equally
+important, SHUFLY’s commanders had demonstrated
+their ability to adapt their technological
+resources to the Viet Cong’s methods of operations.
+Variants of the Eagle Flight tactic, under different
+names such as Tiger Flight, Sparrow Hawk,
+Pacifier, and Quick Reaction Force, would be used
+by the Marines throughout the Vietnam war.</p>
+
+<p>The Marines were quick to apply their technological
+knowhow to other problems which were
+to confront them during their early operations in
+the III Corps Tactical Zone. One example was their
+adaptation of the TAFDS to the problem which
+arose when the helicopters were called upon to
+operate far beyond their normal fuel range. HMM-362
+helicopters would airlift a TAFDS unit,
+complete with a 10,000 gallon fuel bladder, pumps,
+and MABS-16 personnel, to the site where the
+ARVN troops were to be loaded. The fuel bladders
+were filled by gasoline trucks which travelled from
+the nearest source of fuel. The Marine helicopters
+could then use the TAFDS as a temporary base of
+operations, refueling between troop pick-ups when
+necessary. Thus employed, the TAFDS allowed the
+operating radius of the helicopters to be extended
+to support even the most distant South Vietnamese
+operation.</p>
+
+<p>While the Marines were learning to adapt
+their technology to the guerrilla war environment,
+the enemy was applying his ingenuity in attempts
+to frustrate the American and South Vietnamese
+helicopter operations. The Viet Cong quickly
+learned to capitalize on the presence of large
+crowds of civilians who sometimes gathered near
+helicopter landing zones to watch the strange
+aircraft. One such incident occurred in June when
+Communist soldiers mingled with a crowd and
+delivered fire on helicopters which were lifting
+elements of the 21st ARVN Division. Two aircraft
+were hit by enemy fire although the damage was
+not extensive enough to force them to land. The
+Marines, who refused to return fire with their
+individual weapons unless the Viet Cong could be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">70</span>
+separated from the civilian populace, found no
+effective method of countering this tactic. Later in
+June, the Marines of HMM-362 encountered
+another tactic when they found that hundreds of
+upright bamboo stakes had been prepositioned in
+the intended landing zone. The perpendicular
+spikes, each four or five feet high, not only prevented
+the helicopters from landing but also made
+it impossible to disembark the ARVN troops while
+hovering. Fortunately, the abundance of landing
+zones in the delta region tended to make this
+particular tactic ineffective.<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[5-E]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="label">[5-E]</a> The German army had used a similar technique (upright
+poles) to obstruct landing zones against U.S. paratroops at
+Normandy during World War II. (Taylor, <cite>Swords and Plowshares</cite>,
+p. 80.)</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>On 20 July, HMM-362 added a new dimension
+to the counterguerrilla capabilities of the South
+Vietnamese forces when it executed the first night
+helicopter assault of the war. The mission, which
+began at 0415 at Soc Trang, involved lifting three
+waves of ARVN troops into an objective on the
+Plain of Reeds, about 40 miles southwest of Ben
+Tre. The ARVN force intended to encircle a suspected
+Viet Cong village before dawn and then
+attack it at daybreak. The Marine portion of the
+airlift was completed 10 minutes before daylight
+after which the Army’s 57th Helicopter Company
+joined the operation. Although the night troop
+lift was executed without incident, Lieutenant
+Colonel Clapp attributed its success at least partially
+to the near perfect conditions. The moonlight,
+reflected from the flat, flooded rice paddies,
+had aided the Marine pilots in the tricky
+operation.<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[5-19]</a></p>
+
+<p>Prior to SHUFLY’s deployment to Soc Trang,
+General Roberts’ staff at FMFPac had developed a
+policy for the periodic rotation of the task unit’s
+Marines for which the Commandant’s approval
+had been gained. The helicopter squadron would be
+replaced by a similar unit after approximately
+four months of operations in the combat zone.
+But rather than being drawn from the 1st MAW
+on Okinawa, the replacement squadron was to be
+provided by the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in
+California. Officers and men serving with the
+supporting headquarters and MABS-16 elements,
+however, were to be replaced by Marines from
+MAG-16 at approximately four-month intervals.
+So as not to disrupt the operational efficiency of
+the task unit, individual replacements would be
+made in increments.</p>
+
+<p>In accordance with this rotation policy, HMM-163,
+the HUS unit scheduled to relieve HMM-362,
+began arriving at Soc Trang on 23 July. Commanded
+by Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Rathbun, a
+veteran fighter pilot of World War II and Korea,
+the squadron continued to arrive during the last
+week of July. Airlifted by GV-1s from the Marine
+Corps Air Facility, Santa Ana, California, the
+new squadron brought neither helicopters nor
+maintenance equipment. The squadron commander
+had orders to continue operations with HMM-362’s
+aircraft and equipment.</p>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s squadron maintained
+a steady operational pace even after the new unit’s
+appearance. On 27 July, 18 of HMM-362’s helicopters
+participated in an operation about 30
+miles northeast of Soc Trang. The next day the
+task unit commander committed 21 helicopters and
+OE-1s to a 21st ARVN Division operation near
+Ca Mau. The Eagle Flight was committed on four
+different occasions during this operation.</p>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s “Ridge Runners”
+officially relieved “Archie’s Angels” on 1 August
+after a week of orientation flying with HMM-362’s
+crews. The men of the departing squadron could
+reflect on their tour in South Vietnam with a
+sense of satisfaction and accomplishment. Since
+their arrival in mid-April, they had executed 50
+combat helicopter assaults, had flown 4,439 sorties,
+and had amassed 5,262 hours of combat flight time,
+all in unarmed aircraft. During the course of these
+missions they had made approximately 130 different
+landings against Viet Cong opposition. Seventeen
+of their 24 helicopters and two of the three OE-1
+aircraft had received battle damage. To the credit
+of the squadron’s maintenance personnel and aircrews,
+HMM-362 had not lost a single aircraft
+during its operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
+Miraculously the squadron had suffered no casualties
+while testing the Marine Corps’ vertical envelopment
+concept in the guerrilla war situation.<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">[5-20]</a></p>
+
+<p>During their three and a half months at Soc
+Trang, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s men had contributed
+significantly to another facet of the war
+effort—one usually considered unrelated to normal
+combat operations. Sensing the unique links between
+the political and military aspects of the
+struggle in South Vietnam, Colonel Carey had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">71</span>
+initiated a “People-to-People-Program,” the objective
+of which was to assist the Government of
+Vietnam in winning the allegiance of the Vietnamese
+people. Within a few days after occupying
+the Soc Trang airfield, Colonel Carey had ordered
+the task unit’s medical facilities made available to
+Vietnamese civilians requiring emergency medical
+treatment. U.S. Navy doctors and corpsmen began
+visiting nearby villages to hold “sick call” for the
+local inhabitants. On an average visit these medical
+teams would examine around 60 Vietnamese of all
+ages. They would then dispense soap, vitamins, and
+aspirin—commodities which some rural Vietnamese
+had never seen. Gradually, the medical teams
+expanded their operations until by mid-June they
+were being flown by helicopter as far away as
+Ca Mau.</p>
+
+<p>HMM-362’s departure from Vietnam coincided
+roughly with the departure of most of the Marine
+task unit’s senior officers—the men who had
+directed the efforts to win the “other war” for the
+allegiance of the Vietnamese people. On 30 July,
+Colonel Julius W. Ireland, another Marine aviator
+who had seen combat in two previous wars,
+relieved Colonel Carey as the task unit commander.
+The new commander was one of few Marines who
+had been in Vietnam previously. In April 1954 he
+had landed at Da Nang (then known by its French
+name, Tourane) as squadron commander of Marine
+Attack Squadron 324 (VMA-324) and delivered 25
+F4U/FG Corsair fighter bombers to the French who
+were in desperate need of attack aircraft to support
+Dien Bien Phu. Five days after Ireland assumed
+command of Task Unit 79.3.5, Lieutenant Colonel
+Ralph R. Davis replaced Lieutenant Colonel
+Eldridge as commanding officer of the MABS-16
+sub unit. On 13 August another change occurred
+when the executive officer of the Marine task unit,
+Lieutenant Colonel Harry C. Dees, was relieved by
+Lieutenant Colonel Alton W. McCully. Except
+that it left few original members of the task unit,
+the departure of these Marines for new duty
+stations in Okinawa, Japan, and the United States
+did not affect the operations at Soc Trang. Thoroughly
+briefed on their responsibilities, the new
+officers would continue to direct Marine support of
+the Vietnamese government on both the battlefield
+and the psychological front.</p>
+
+<p>HMM-163 participated in its first combat
+mission as a squadron on 1 August when it joined
+the Army’s 57th Helicopter Company in a coordinated
+troop lift. Like their predecessors,
+“Rathbun’s Ridge Runners” maintained a brisk
+pace of operations during the weeks following
+their initial assignment. Shortly after its first troop
+lift, the squadron participated in a 2,000-man
+South Vietnamese spoiling operation in An Xuyen,
+South Vietnam’s southernmost province. Anticipating
+a major Viet Cong offensive in the four
+southern provinces, III Corps authorities moved
+their headquarters to Soc Trang and established a
+forward command post at Ca Mau. The Vietnamese
+Air Force then positioned a composite detachment
+of four AD-6 Skyraiders (single-engine, propeller-driven
+attack bombers built by Douglas), two
+T-28s, and a number of H-34 helicopters (the U.S.
+Army, Air Force, and VNAF version of the HUS)
+at Soc Trang to support the operation. Joined by
+the VNAF H-34s, the Marine squadron conducted
+numerous troop lifts during the week-long operation.
+At the end of the action the ARVN reported
+84 Viet Cong killed, another 30 captured, and the
+confiscation of nearly 15,000 pounds of arms,
+ammunition, and explosives. The first Marine helicopter
+loss in Vietnam occurred during the operation
+when a VNAF fighter careened off the runway
+and damaged a parked HUS to the extent that it
+could not be repaired. Marine mechanics stripped
+undamaged parts from the helicopter for use as
+replacements.<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[5-F]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="label">[5-F]</a> Marine helicopters lost in Vietnam during the 1962–1964
+period were replaced by new ones airlifted from Okinawa by
+U.S. Air Force C-124 Globemaster transports. By replacing
+aircraft losses on a one-to-one basis the task unit was able to
+maintain a level of 24 helicopters except for brief periods.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>HMM-163 suffered its first aircraft damage as a
+result of combat a few day’s later on 18 August during
+a mission led by Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun.
+Fourteen HUSs arrived at a prearranged pickup
+point to rendezvous with an ARVN infantry force
+but the Marine pilots discovered that the unit had
+not appeared. One crewman then reported having
+seen some ARVN troops about a half mile away
+from the landing zone. At this juncture, a white
+smoke signal appeared at approximately the same
+location that the Marine had observed the South
+Vietnamese troops. Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun
+and his wingmate, assuming that the smoke
+marked the actual pickup point, took off to investigate
+the area. While making a low pass over<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">72</span>
+the smoke signal, the squadron commander’s
+helicopter was hit several times by small arms fire
+which severed the rudder control cable and punctured
+the main rotor transmission. The loss of oil
+required Rathbun to make a forced landing on a
+nearby road. After mechanics had been flown in and
+repairs had been accomplished, the helicopter was
+flown to a secure area.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_72" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 35em;">
+  <img src="images/i_072.jpg" width="1923" height="1222" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Marine officers visit Father Phuoc’s village. Left to right: Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp; Colonel John F. Carey;
+Father Phuoc; Colonel Julius W. Ireland; Colonel Gordon Gale; Major General Richard G. Weede; French Interpreter
+Gilles H. Rocheleau; and three unidentified Marine officers. (<cite>USMC Photo A420824</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>An investigation of the incident later revealed
+that the confusion had begun when the ARVN
+unit scheduled to be helilifted became involved
+in a skirmish with guerrillas less than a mile from
+the pick up point. A VNAF Forward Air Controller
+(FAC) in an observation aircraft had then marked
+the Viet Cong position for an air strike with a
+white smoke grenade rather than red smoke, as
+was normally used. This was the smoke which
+Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun had attempted to
+identify when his aircraft was hit.</p>
+
+<p>From this incident the pilots of HMM-163
+learned several valuable lessons about helicopter
+support in conjunction with ARVN ground
+operations. First, helilifts of government forces
+from the field at prearranged times required
+thorough last minute coordination. Secondly,
+helicopters could not be used safely on low-level
+reconnaissance or identification passes. Finally,
+prearranged colored smoke signals were easily
+confused and when used routinely were subject to
+enemy attempts at deception. Such signalling
+methods were most effective when used in conjunction
+with radio communications between air and
+ground units.</p>
+
+<p>A somewhat humorous sequel to this incident<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">73</span>
+took place later in the day when Rathbun learned
+that he had been selected for promotion to colonel.
+The timing of the notification prompted one
+squadron wit to quip: “Lost a bird, gained a
+bird.”<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[5-21]</a></p>
+
+<p>“Rathbun’s Ridge Runners” continued intensive
+support operations in III Corps Tactical Zone
+throughout the month of August. Their daily
+missions normally included both scheduled troop
+lifts and unscheduled medical evacuations. During
+the week of 19–25 August HMM-163 helicopters
+logged slightly over 800 combat flying hours. A
+squadron record for a single day was established on
+24 August when 197.6 helicopter hours were flown.
+Flight time for the helicopters during the entire
+month totalled 2,543 hours—a new Marine Corps
+record for an HUS squadron. The OE-1 aircraft
+added 63 missions and 212 hours to this total.
+Another statistic revealed that 21 of the squadron’s
+pilots logged over 100 hours of combat flying time
+during August.<a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[5-22]</a> This record was even more
+impressive considering that flight operations were
+hampered by the monsoon season which reached
+its peak during August in the Mekong Delta.</p>
+
+<p>In August Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s men
+made a significant modification to their helicopters
+when they began mounting M-60 machine guns
+inside the cargo hatch. So as not to obstruct the
+hatch during loading and unloading phases, the
+squadron’s metalsmiths designed a flexible mount
+which allowed the crew chiefs to swing the belt-fed,
+7.62mm automatic weapon back into the
+cabin when necessary. The addition of the machine
+gun enabled the crew chief to protect the otherwise
+defenseless helicopter during critical landing and
+take off phases. Still, the Marine gunners were
+restricted in their action by MACV’s “rules of
+engagement” which at this time stipulated that
+American servicemen could fire only after being
+fired upon and then only at clearly identified
+enemy. Intended to prevent offensive combat
+action by U.S. military personnel operating in
+Vietnam, these regulations prevented Americans
+from returning fire except when the enemy was
+clearly identified.<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[5-G]</a> Primarily because of these
+restrictions the Marines seldom employed their
+M-60s in the heavily populated Mekong Delta.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="label">[5-G]</a> The rules of engagement applied to U.S. advisors as well as
+aviation crews. Although they underwent several modifications
+during the course of the war, the above definition was virtually
+unaltered during the period between 1962 and 1964.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_73"><i>Preparations and Redeployment</i></h3>
+
+<p>In early September General Harkins directed
+that Colonel Ireland begin planning for the redeployment
+of his helicopter task unit northward to
+Da Nang. The shift to I Corps, which had been
+the subject of much debate prior to SHUFLY’s
+assignment at Soc Trang, came as no surprise.
+Shortly after the task unit’s arrival in the Mekong
+Delta, Colonel Carey accompanied General Condon
+on a visit to the Army’s 93d Helicopter Company
+at Da Nang. There they discussed details of the
+relocation with Army officers. In early July
+General Harkins set 1 August as the date on which
+the Marine task unit and the 93d Helicopter Company
+would switch locations. But personal appeals
+by General Nghiem, the III Corps commander and
+his senior U.S. advisor, Colonel Porter, that the
+Marine helicopters be retained at Soc Trang caused
+Harkins to postpone the date for the exchange
+until 15 September.</p>
+
+<p>In that the airlift was executed in phases, the
+Marines’ movement to Da Nang was accomplished
+in much the same manner as had been the task
+unit’s initial move into Soc Trang. On 4 September
+Colonel Ireland dispatched the task unit’s assistant
+communications officer and an advance party to
+Da Nang to assess the communications requirements
+there and to prepare for the arrival of the
+remainder of the Marines and their equipment.
+Four days later Marine wiremen, message center
+personnel, and radio operators began preparing a
+communications center at their new home. The
+next day the advance party established radio
+contact with SHUFLY headquarters in order to
+help coordinate the move. By 9 September MABS-16
+technicians had assembled a TAFDS at the Da
+Nang airfield. This facility would enable the GV-1
+transports participating in the airlift to refuel for
+the 460-mile return flight to Soc Trang after
+unloading their cargoes at Da Nang.</p>
+
+<p>While the advance party readied the facilities at
+Da Nang for its unit’s arrival, combat support
+operations and preparations for the move northward
+continued simultaneously at Soc Trang.
+During an operation on 5 September, three of
+HMM-163’s helicopters were hit by several rounds
+of enemy small arms fire. Although all three aircraft
+returned safely to base, the Marines suffered
+their first casualty to Viet Cong fire when Corporal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">74</span>
+Billy S. Watson, a crew chief, was slightly
+wounded. Troop lifts from Soc Trang continued
+until 1740 on 13 September when helicopter support
+operations were ended and the final preparations
+for the move to Da Nang began.</p>
+
+<p>On the evening of 14 September, the first of the
+Marine GV-1s slated to transport the task unit
+arrived at Soc Trang from Okinawa. At dawn the
+next morning, the refueler-transports began shuttling
+Marines and their equipment to Da Nang and
+the Army’s 93d Helicopter Company to Soc Trang.
+By the end of the day much of the airlift had been
+completed. The crews and helicopters of Lieutenant
+Colonel Rathbun’s squadron, however, did not
+begin displacing northward until the 16th when
+12 HUSs made the seven-hour flight to Da Nang
+with three en route refueling stops. The 12 remaining
+helicopters arrived at SHUFLY’s new base of
+operations the next day. The move was completed
+on 20 September when the last cargo carrying GV-1
+landed at Da Nang.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_74"><i>Accomplishments</i></h3>
+
+<p>As SHUFLY’s Marines began preparing for their
+impending operations in the northern provinces
+they could look with pride on their accomplishments
+at Soc Trang. Since their arrival in the
+Mekong Delta in April the Leathernecks had
+clearly demonstrated their ability to conduct sustained
+and effective helicopter operations in support
+of non-English-speaking ground forces. While it
+could not be said that their presence had completely
+transformed the complexion of the GVN’s
+struggle to control the critical Mekong Delta
+region, the Marine helicopters had provided the
+ARVN units operating there with a degree of
+mobility they had not previously possessed. This
+new-found mobility in turn had helped generate a
+new offensive spirit within government units
+assigned to southern III Corps. In his letter to
+ComUSMACV requesting the retention of the task
+unit at Soc Trang, Colonel Porter, the Senior U.S.
+Advisor to the corps tactical zone, reported: “Now
+they [ARVN forces] have a taste of victory and
+for the first time are beginning to believe there is a
+possibility of defeating the Viet Cong.”<a id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[5-23]</a></p>
+
+<p>During the course of their operations throughout
+South Vietnam’s southern provinces, the SHUFLY
+Marines displayed an instinct for recognizing
+and coping with the challenges of unconventional
+warfare. Confronted by a war without front
+lines in which an elusive, highly mobile enemy
+blended readily with the local populace, the
+task unit’s leaders devised new and successful
+helicopter tactics. Likewise, SHUFLY’s Marine
+and Navy personnel moved to prevent a possible
+conflict of cultures and to discredit Communist
+propaganda through the initiation of the People-to-People
+Program. Although only an informal
+beginning, this program would serve as a foundation
+upon which the U.S. Marine Corps would
+later build a doctrine defining the relationship
+between Marines on duty in Vietnam and the
+Vietnamese people.</p>
+
+<p>Beyond the innovative thinking of its leaders,
+much of SHUFLY’s success in III Corps was
+produced by hard work on a sustained basis. For
+this the individual Marines, particularly the
+maintenance crews which often worked around the
+clock in primitive surroundings to keep the
+helicopters airworthy, deserved heavy credit.
+Although unglamorous, their daily contributions
+underwrote the success of the combat support
+operations. So, functioning as a team, the task
+unit’s members blended innovation, hard work, and
+technical expertise with perseverance and courage
+to carve out a reputation for themselves in the faraway
+rice lands of the Mekong Delta.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">75</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_6"><span id="toclink_75"></span>CHAPTER 6<br>
+<span class="subhead large">SHUFLY Moves North</span><br>
+<span class="subhead notbold"><i>Arrival at Da Nang—I Corps Tactical Zone—Military Situation,
+September 1962—Initial Helicopter Operations—Marine People-to-People
+Program—SHUFLY Operations in I Corps</i></span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_75a"><i>Arrival at Da Nang</i></h3>
+
+<p>Da Nang retained many characteristics of an old
+French colonial port city when the Marines arrived
+there in mid-September 1962. With its thriving
+market place, its throngs of bicycles, and a noticeable
+dearth of automobile traffic, the city was
+certainly more Asian than European in appearance.
+Still, the former French presence was evident in
+the architecture of public buildings, electric and
+telephone lines, paved streets, built-up waterfront,
+and an airfield. Although the French influence
+seemed not to have disturbed the traditional
+Vietnamese culture, it had imparted a picturesque
+charm to South Vietnam’s second largest city.</p>
+
+<p>Virtually surrounded by the city itself, Da
+Nang’s airfield was to serve as SHUFLY’s new base
+of operations. Having been rebuilt as a military
+base by the French following World War II, the
+Da Nang facility was relatively modern. Understandably,
+it differed in many ways from the crude
+little airfield the Marines had left behind in the
+steamy Mekong Delta. The runway, for example,
+was considerably longer, having 8,000 feet of paved
+surface. The Da Nang base was also busier, having
+already been occupied by Vietnamese and U.S. Air
+Force units. Furthermore, it served the city as a
+commercial airport.</p>
+
+<p>Scattered around the long north-south runway
+were numerous clusters of French-built masonry
+structures. A group of 50 of these yellow-walled
+buildings, located about one half mile west of the
+runway, had been designated as living quarters for
+the newly arrived Marines. Although the actual
+living spaces were somewhat crowded and in need
+of much repair, the indoor toilets, showers, ceiling
+fans, and fluorescent lights (none of which functioned
+properly) were welcomed by the men who
+had experienced the discomforts of life in Soc
+Trang’s “tent city.” Once the Marines had moved
+in, their compound would include a chapel,
+medical and dental facilities, service clubs, a movie,
+a barber shop, a laundry, and a mess hall.</p>
+
+<p>While many of the problems encountered
+initially by the Marines at Da Nang were similar
+to those that had greeted their predecessors at Soc
+Trang, there were also some new ones to be
+resolved. The two most imposing of these stemmed
+from the distance between the living compound and
+working areas. Located along the southeast side of
+the airstrip, the flight line and hangar were nearly
+three miles from the Marine quarters by road.
+Located still farther away, about a quarter mile
+south of the hangar, were the motor pool and
+communications facility. In addition to creating a
+new requirement for transportation, the distances
+between the various areas necessitated adjustments
+in the security arrangements which had been used
+at Soc Trang.</p>
+
+<p>Fortunately SHUFLY’s first commander, Colonel
+Carey, had foreseen the requirement for transportation
+between the living area and the flight line
+during his visit to the Da Nang installation in
+April. The problem was solved by the purchase of
+three used American school buses which were already
+on hand when the Marines arrived from Soc
+Trang. The security situation proved somewhat
+more perplexing. Initially Colonel Ireland handled
+the problem in much the same manner as it had
+been at Soc Trang. A permanent sergeant-of-the-guard
+was detailed to supervise a security force
+composed of men from the MABS-16 sub unit and
+HMM-163. Guard posts were established around
+the helicopter flight line, the hangar, the TAFDS,
+the motor pool-communications area, and the
+billeting compound. But this arrangement, while<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">76</span>
+serving the intended purpose, was not ideal.
+Frequently the Marines who served on security
+watch at night were called upon to perform long
+hours of work the following day. This prompted
+Colonel Ireland to request that a permanent security
+force be assigned to his command in order that the
+overworked mechanics, cooks, carpenters, electricians,
+and communicators could concentrate on
+their particular jobs. The request was placed under
+consideration by ComUSMACV and FMFPac
+authorities but was not approved immediately.<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[6-A]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="label">[6-A]</a> General Weede explained that, because such increases could
+not be made without the approval of the Department of Defense,
+such requests were forwarded first to MACV Headquarters for
+approval. (<cite>Weede Interview.</cite>)</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<figure id="ip_76" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_076.jpg" width="1917" height="1405" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>A portion of the Marine Compound at Da Nang. (<cite>Official USMC Photo</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>At Da Nang Colonel Ireland’s task unit was not
+responsible for every facet of airfield operations as
+had been the case previously at Soc Trang. The
+U.S. Air Force provided radar, ground control
+approach, tactical air navigation, and meteorological
+services at the new installation while the Vietnamese
+operated the control tower. These conveniences
+allowed Ireland to make a small reduction
+in the overall size of the Marine task unit. Those
+MABS-16 specialists who had operated these
+systems at Soc Trang were returned to their parent
+organizations on Okinawa.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_76"><i>I Corps Tactical Zone</i></h3>
+
+<p>At the time the Marine task unit arrived in Da
+Nang, I Corps Tactical Zone encompassed South
+Vietnam’s five northern provinces. Quang Tri
+Province, located immediately south of the demilitarized
+zone (DMZ) topped this tier of political
+subdivisions. Below Quang Tri Province lay
+Thua Thien, followed by Quang Nam, Quang Tin<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">78</span>
+(recently created), and Quang Ngai Provinces. All
+are coastal provinces and, with the exception of
+Quang Ngai, extend inland from the seacoast to
+the Laotian border, a distance which varies between
+30 and 70 miles. Together, they occupy the
+central portion of the region formerly known as
+Annam and extend 225 miles to the south of the
+DMZ.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_78" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_077.jpg" width="1871" height="2603" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+I CORPS 1962<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The climatic pattern in the northern provinces
+is the exact reverse of that which affects the southern
+portion of the nation. In I Corps the dry season
+occurs in the summer months while the monsoons,
+which blow from the northeast, dominate the
+winter. Heavy monsoon rains accompanied by wind
+and fog normally begin in October. After reaching
+their peak usually in November, the monsoon rains
+tend to diminish gradually until their disappearance
+around mid-March.</p>
+
+<p>The differences between the physical structure
+of the northern provinces and the Mekong Delta
+is even more striking than their reversed climatic
+patterns. White beaches stretch almost unbroken
+along the entire length of I Corps. Just inland and
+roughly parallel to the coast south of Da Nang
+lies a lightly populated strip of sand dunes and
+generally unproductive soil. This strip varies in
+width from one half to two miles. In the west it
+dissolves into the flat, densely populated coastal
+plain. Any similarity between the Mekong Delta
+and the northern provinces is found in this expanse
+of fertile rice-producing land where tiny rural
+hamlets and slightly larger villages, each enclosed
+by thick hedgerows and treelines, abound. North
+of Da Nang the semi-barren coastal sands tend to
+extend farther inland, and thereby reduce the
+productive portion of the coastal plains.</p>
+
+<p>The most distinct geographic feature of I Corps,
+and one easily visible to the Marines at Da Nang,
+is the chain of towering mountains which protrude
+from the flat coastal plain several miles west of
+the city. There is a conspicuous absence of foothills
+leading to the mountains which seem to surround
+Da Nang on the north and west. North of the Hai
+Van Peninsula, a rugged promonotory which juts
+into the South China Sea about 10 miles north of
+the Marines’ new home, a zone of foothills eases
+the transition from the wide coastal plain to the
+rugged jungle-covered mountains.</p>
+
+<p>The coastal plains of the five northern provinces
+are broken by several significant streams along
+which most of the region’s principal population
+centers are located. Roughly 10 miles south of the
+1954 partition line the Cua Viet empties into the
+southern portion of the Tonkin Gulf. Both Quang
+Tri City, the capital of Quang Tri Province, and
+Dong Ha, South Vietnam’s northernmost population
+center of any significance, are situated on the
+Cua Viet and its major tributary, the Song Cam Lo.
+The Song Huong (often referred to as the Perfume
+River), which flows past the old imperial capital
+of Hue, enters the sea at a point approximately half
+way between Da Nang and the nation’s northern
+boundary.<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[6-B]</a> At Da Nang the Song Han (also called
+the Da Nang River) flows into Da Nang Harbor
+after its main tributary, the Song Cau Do, curves
+through the coastal plains immediately south and
+west of the city. Eighteen miles south of the
+Marines’ new base of operations, the Song Cau Dai
+empties into the South China Sea near Hoi An, the
+capital of Quang Nam Province. The Song Cau Dai
+originates about 18 miles inland at the confluence
+of the Song Thu Bon and the Song Vu Gia which
+twist seaward from the south and west respectively.
+Together these three estuaries constitute the
+most important geographic feature of the sprawling
+coastal plain south of Da Nang. Another major
+stream, the Song Tra Bong, flows on an eastward
+course about 32 miles south of the Song Cau Dai.
+Still further south is the Song Tra Khuc, a river
+which dominates the wide coastal plain of Quang
+Ngai Province in much the same fashion as does
+the Song Cau Dai and its tributaries in the area
+south of Da Nang. The provincial capital, Quang
+Ngai, once a major railroad center for South
+Vietnam, is situated several miles inland on the
+south bank of the Song Tra Khuc. The southernmost
+stream of any significance in I Corps is the
+Song Ve, which angles northeastward through
+central Quang Ngai Province. While none of these
+waterways is navigable far beyond its mouth by
+ocean-going vessels, each serves the local population
+as convenient local routes of communication
+as well as vital sources of irrigation water
+during the long dry seasons.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="label">[6-B]</a> In the Vietnamese language the word “song” means stream
+and normally precedes the name of rivers.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>The two and a half million people who inhabited
+I Corps in 1962 had developed along social and
+economic lines dictated largely by the geography
+and climate of their region. Rice growing, centered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">79</span>
+on the coastal plains, dominated the economic
+activities of the area. Combined, the provinces of
+I Corps produced nearly half a million tons of
+rice annually. Fishing, concentrated along the
+coast and the major rivers, ranked as the second
+most important economic pursuit. Unlike most of
+South Vietnam, I Corps did possess some potential
+for industrial development. A small but productive
+surface coal mine was located about 25 miles
+southwest of Da Nang at Nong Son along the
+western bank of the Song Thu Bon. Although the
+mine was operating in 1962, it had made little
+discernable impact on the overall economic picture
+of the region.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_79" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_079.jpg" width="1914" height="1412" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Aerial view of Marine helicopter flight line at Da Nang shortly after SHUFLY’s relocation to I Corps in September
+1962. (<cite>Official USMC Photo</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_79"><i>Military Situation, September 1962</i></h3>
+
+<p>From its new base at Da Nang, Colonel Ireland’s
+task unit was responsible for directly supporting
+the forces under Major General Tran Van Don’s
+I Corps headquarters. The 1st and 2d ARVN
+Divisions, headquartered respectively at Hue and
+Da Nang, were the major tactical units at General
+Don’s disposal. Occasionally elements of the 25th
+ARVN Division, headquartered at Kontum in
+northwestern II Corps, joined I Corps forces for
+offensive operations along the southern fringe of
+Quang Ngai Province. Several ARVN Ranger
+battalions served as mobile reaction forces for the
+corps tactical zone.<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[6-C]</a> Also scattered over the northern
+corps tactical zone were numerous paramilitary
+units of assorted sizes. These, too, were garrisoned
+primarily along the heavily populated coastal
+plain.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="label">[6-C]</a> The ranger battalions had been organized in late 1960 from
+existing ARVN forces. They were conceived as highly mobile
+infantry units and were under the direct control of the CTZ
+commander.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">80</span></p>
+
+<p>Opposing these government forces in the early
+fall of 1962 were Viet Cong forces of formidable
+strength. Four interprovincial battalions (main
+force), four interprovincial companies, five provincial
+companies, 18 district companies, and three
+district platoons were known to be operating within
+the boundaries of I Corps. Together, these units
+totalled an estimated 4,750 men.<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">[6-1]</a> Added to the
+presence of these known Viet Cong units was the
+threat posed to I Corps by its proximity to North
+Vietnam and to the so-called “Ho Chi Minh
+Trails” located across the Laotian border. The
+relative position of the northern provinces naturally
+invited Communist infiltration. In June, for
+example, the <i>4th Viet Cong Battalion</i>, a main force
+unit, was infiltrated into Quang Nam Province
+from sanctuaries in Laos. By September MACV
+intelligence estimates reported one North Vietnamese
+(PAVN) infantry division, two independent
+PAVN infantry regiments, and an artillery regiment
+poised in areas of Laos adjacent to the I Corps
+border. “These units,” the U.S. report warned,
+“... could be committed anywhere in I Corps or
+[the] northern part of II Corps 20 days after
+starting movement.”<a id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">[6-2]</a></p>
+
+<p>While the government’s nationwide strategy
+focused on clearing and holding the populated
+areas, the physiographic configuration of I Corps
+(as well as II Corps to the south) demanded that
+offensive operations be conducted in the mountains
+adjacent to the coastal plains against Viet Cong
+base areas. Since the arrival of the U.S. Army
+helicopter company at Da Nang early in the year,
+General Don had shown an increasing tendency to
+mount battalion and regimental heliborne assaults
+deep into the western mountains. Capitalizing on
+the mobility which the American helicopters
+afforded, the ARVN command had hoped to
+disrupt remote Communist base areas inside the
+international border. Still, heliborne offensives
+into western I Corps were often hampered by bad
+weather, particularly during the monsoon season.</p>
+
+<p>Another facet of the government effort to deny
+the enemy unrestricted access to the mountains was
+a system characterized by a network of small,
+relatively isolated outposts. In late 1961, at the
+urging of U.S. officials in Saigon, the Diem government
+had launched a program whose ultimate
+objective was similar to that of the Strategic
+Hamlet Program. First, U.S. Army Special Forces
+teams entered remote Montagnard villages located
+in the Annamite Chain and built small fortified
+camps. This accomplished, the Americans initiated
+pacification activities with the hope of securing the
+allegiance of the traditionally independent Montagnard
+tribesmen.</p>
+
+<p>By mid-1962 the Special Forces effort appeared
+on its way to success. Already Montagnard tribesmen
+had been organized into a number of Civilian
+Irregular Defense Groups (CIDGs) throughout the
+mountains of I and II Corps. Advised by Special
+Forces teams, the CIDG units were monitoring infiltration
+routes and harassing the Communists as
+they attempted to move through the mountains.
+By the summer of 1962 the distinctive little barbed
+wire enclosed camps were scattered over the length
+of western I Corps.</p>
+
+<p>Although it played an important role in the
+government’s strategy for controlling the insurgency
+in the northern provinces, the outpost system
+had obvious shortcomings. Roads between the
+distant camps and the towns along the coastal
+plain were almost nonexistent. Those that did
+exist, such as Route 9, the road which extended
+from Route 1 westward across Quang Tri Province
+and into Laos, were vulnerable to ambush or
+interdiction by guerrilla forces. Truck convoys,
+furthermore, consumed time and required protection
+by security forces. As a result of their relative
+isolation, the CIDG camps had come to depend
+heavily on aircraft as a means of resupply. While
+crude runways had been constructed at many of
+the outposts, they were often better suited for
+helicopter operations than for fixed-wing transport
+landings. The newly arrived Marine commanders
+anticipated that their squadron, like the Army
+helicopter company it had replaced, would be required
+to devote a sizable percentage of sorties to
+resupplying the far-flung outposts.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_80"><i>Initial Helicopter Operations</i></h3>
+
+<p>The system of helicopter coordination in I
+Corps promised to be somewhat different from
+that which had governed Marine operations in
+the Mekong Delta. At Da Nang, an Air Support
+Operations Center (ASOC) was organized within
+the corps headquarters to process all requests for
+aviation support. Manned by ARVN, VNAF, U.S.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">82</span>
+Air Force, and U.S. Marine officers, the ASOC
+processed mission requests from the various field
+commands, passing them on to the Joint Operations
+Center at JGS headquarters for final approval.
+Once approved, the ASOC assigned specific missions
+to the American and Vietnamese units which
+supported I CTZ. This arrangement enabled the
+corps headquarters to plan and coordinate all
+combat support missions flown within the five
+northern provinces.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_82" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_081.jpg" width="1867" height="2603" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+MAJOR OUTPOSTS I CORPS 1962<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The Vietnamese commanders in I Corps, who
+had learned to value helicopter support as a result
+of the Army aviation company’s eight-month
+presence at Da Nang, lost no time in employing the
+newly arrived Marine squadron. HMM-163 flew its
+first combat operation from Da Nang on 18 September,
+the day after the last flight of helicopters
+arrived from Soc Trang. Fourteen HUSs lifted
+troops of the 2d ARVN Division into two landing
+zones in the rugged hills about 35 miles south of
+Da Nang and 25 miles inland from the coast. The
+scarcity of suitable landing zones in the steep hill
+country and the fact that the enemy could deliver
+fire on those that did exist from nearby high ground
+and the surrounding jungle prompted the Marine
+pilots to adjust their tactics in preparation for this
+mission. After VNAF fighters bombed and strafed
+the objective area, the helicopters made an unopposed
+landing.</p>
+
+<p>The tactic of preparing helicopter landing zones
+with air strikes was continued and refined in the
+ensuing weeks. The Marines began using artillery
+fire in conjunction with air strikes to neutralize
+enemy troops in the vicinity of the objective. The
+OE-1 was well suited for assisting in the employment
+of the artillery fire support. Having familiarized
+themselves with the landing site during a
+prior reconnaissance mission, the pilot and observer
+of the OE-1 would arrive over the designated area
+prior to the operation and adjust artillery fire until
+the helicopters appeared. During the landing the
+crew of the observation aircraft often coordinated
+between the helicopters and the escorting aircraft
+and were available to assist the ground units with
+artillery fire missions.</p>
+
+<p>The task unit’s staff borrowed another idea from
+their experience in the Mekong Delta which
+allowed HMM-163 to provide more efficient helicopter
+support in the northern provinces. In this
+case the concept of temporarily positioning the
+TAFDS to support specific operations was refined
+somewhat by placing the portable refueling bladders
+at secure, permanent locations throughout I Corps.
+Several days after arriving in I Corps, the Marines
+emplaced a 10,000-gallon section of the TAFDS at
+Quang Ngai, about 65 miles south of Da Nang, to
+serve as a permanent refueling point for aircraft
+operating in southern I Corps. Within the month,
+another fuel bladder was positioned at Hue and a
+third was emplaced at Tam Ky, the capital of
+Quang Tin Province, which was situated on Route
+1 about half way between Da Nang and Quang
+Ngai. These well-chosen refueling points greatly
+enhanced the squadron’s operational potential.
+Used to support daily operations, they enabled the
+helicopters to operate deep into the adjacent
+mountain areas on resupply and medical evacuation
+missions.</p>
+
+<p>On 19 September, the day after their initial
+combat support assignment in I Corps, the Marine
+helicopter crews were called upon to conduct an
+operation which they would repeat often in the
+coming months. They were ordered to evacuate a
+threatened government outpost from the mountains
+18 miles west of Da Nang. That day the HMM-163
+pilots lifted an odd cargo of troops, dependents,
+personal belongings and an assortment of pigs,
+cows, chickens, and ducks to a secure area on the
+coastal plain.</p>
+
+<p>Unfortunately, helicopter evacuations of encircled
+or endangered South Vietnamese outposts
+would become almost routine for Marine helicopter
+squadrons assigned to Vietnam during the period
+between 1962 and 1965. As the North Vietnamese
+stepped up their support for the Viet Cong, the
+isolated government outposts along the infiltration
+routes became particularly vulnerable. The increased
+number of helicopter evacuation missions
+during the next three years would be grim testimony
+of the trend of warfare which was unfolding
+in the South. Reinforced with more and more North
+Vietnamese and growing amounts of Communist
+bloc and captured U.S. equipment, the Viet Cong
+would press the initiative even in South Vietnam’s
+most isolated areas.</p>
+
+<p>The Communists operating in I Corps lost little
+time in challenging the newly arrived Marine unit.
+HMM-163 suffered its first battle damage while
+lifting elements of the 2d ARVN Division into a
+landing zone southwest of Tam Ky on 26 September.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">83</span>
+One of 22 helicopters involved in the mission was
+struck in the fuselage by small arms fire despite the
+use of preparatory air and artillery strikes on the
+landing zone. The day after this incident another
+of the squadron’s helicopters was hit by enemy fire
+while attempting to evacuate wounded ARVN
+soldiers from the battlefield. On the 29th two more
+aircraft were damaged by ground fire while participating
+in another troop lift. One round passed
+through the windshield and exited at the rear of the
+cockpit, missing the copilot’s head by inches.
+During the first week of October another HUS was
+struck while landing at Tien Phuoc, a government
+outpost about 15 miles southwest of Tam Ky. In
+this incident two ARVN troops were killed and
+the Marine crew chief, Lance Corporal James I.
+Mansfield, was wounded before the pilot could fly
+the aircraft out of the danger area. In each of the
+instances the helicopters were able to return to Da
+Nang where necessary repairs were made.</p>
+
+<p>The most serious incident recorded during the
+early operations in I Corps ironically resulted from
+mechanical failure rather than Viet Cong fire. It
+occurred on 6 October when a search and rescue
+helicopter crashed and burned on a hillside 15 miles
+southeast of Tam Ky while covering a 20-plane
+helilift of 2d ARVN Division elements.<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[6-D]</a> Unable to
+land near the downed aircraft because of the thick
+jungle, other helicopters landed troops at the base
+of the hill with instructions to proceed to the crash
+site on foot. When the Vietnamese soldiers reached
+the downed aircraft after cutting their way through
+dense vegetation, they found the copilot, crew
+chief, and five other members of the task unit dead.
+The pilot, First Lieutenant William T. Sinnott,
+who was injured seriously, was hoisted through
+the trees and evacuated by an HUS which came to
+the rescue. The five Marines killed in the crash were
+First Lieutenant Michael J. Tunney, Sergeant
+Richard E. Hamilton, Sergeant Jerald W. Pendell,
+Corporal Thomas E. Anderson, and Lance Corporal
+Miguel A. Valentin. Two Navy personnel, Lieutenant
+Gerald Griffin, a doctor, and Hospitalman
+G.&nbsp;O. Norton were also dead. These were the first
+deaths suffered by Marine Task Unit 79.5 since
+deploying to Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[6-3]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="label">[6-D]</a> For larger operations the task unit commander usually
+designated one HUS as a search and rescue aircraft. This helicopter
+normally carried several mechanics and Navy medical
+personnel and was equipped with a hoist.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>An administrative measure which eventually
+resulted in the extension of the length of tours for
+the Marine helicopter squadron as well as all other
+personnel assigned to SHUFLY was initiated in the
+first week of October. Colonel Ireland dispatched
+a recommendation to the Commanding General,
+1st Marine Aircraft Wing proposing that the
+tours for both the squadron and the individual
+Marines serving with the sub unit and the task
+unit headquarters be set at six months. Pointing
+out that the U.S. Army helicopter company which
+had occupied Da Nang previously had operated
+from January to September without rotating
+personnel, the task unit commander outlined the
+positive features of such an adjustment. It would,
+he contended, provide more continuity for administration
+and operations, thereby resulting in a
+more effective utilization of manpower. To underscore
+his argument, Ireland emphasized the number
+of man hours involved in the rotation of a helicopter
+squadron. Adding his opinion that the two-month
+extension of all tours would not measurably
+affect the morale of the Marines at Da Nang, he
+recommended that the next rotation of helicopter
+squadrons be postponed until January. After being
+forwarded to FMFPac for consideration, Colonel
+Ireland’s proposals were approved later in the fall
+and instructions were passed to all involved
+commands to implement the new policy.<a id="FNanchor_125" href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[6-4]</a></p>
+
+<p>Another adjustment—this one in the area of
+tactics—had been made during the task unit’s
+first two months at Da Nang. By November the
+Eagle Flight concept had been tailored to complement
+reaction force plans which already existed
+in I Corps at the time of SHUFLY’s relocation.
+ARVN authorities in the northern corps tactical
+zone had developed a system whereby their various
+infantry units were placed on alert for use as
+heliborne reaction forces. Designated the Tiger
+Force, the alert unit was staged at its base, ready
+to react to any tactical emergency.</p>
+
+<p>HMM-163 Marines executed one of their earliest
+Tiger Flights on 7 November in response to a train
+ambush sprung by the Viet Cong several miles
+northwest of the Hai Van Peninsula. Four Marine
+helicopters launched from Da Nang, made an
+airborne rendezvous with two other HUSs, and
+proceeded to Hoa My, four miles away, to pick up
+a 52-man ARVN Tiger Force. The Marines then
+helilifted the South Vietnamese into a suitable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">84</span>
+landing zone near the ambush site. The relatively
+short amount of time consumed in the reaction did
+not prevent the Communist attackers from vanishing
+into the surrounding jungle. Generally, however,
+the tactic was more successful, particularly
+when the reaction force was used to reinforce a
+threatened static position or to establish hasty
+blocking positions in support of ground offensive
+operations that were already underway.</p>
+
+<p>While the task unit encountered few major
+problems during the early operations from Da
+Nang, minor difficulties were commonplace. Most
+often these developed during the execution phase
+of combat support missions. One that particularly
+concerned the Marine commanders was the tendency
+of South Vietnamese units not to prepare
+properly for scheduled helilifts. To the dismay of
+the Leatherneck helicopter crews, ARVN activities
+at the pickup points were usually characterized by
+confusion. More often than not the Vietnamese unit
+scheduled to be helilifted had not been organized
+into heliteams prior to the arrival of the transport
+aircraft. Given the fact that heliborne operations
+were still somewhat of a novelty to most ARVN
+small unit leaders (and to many U.S. advisors) at
+this stage of the war, these circumstances were
+perhaps understandable. Nevertheless, lack of prior
+preparation at pickup points on the part of the
+ground units often threatened to disrupt the timing
+of preplanned operations.</p>
+
+<p>To help remedy this situation and to insure that
+their helicopters were not overloaded, the U.S.
+Marines began designating one of the squadron’s
+noncommissioned officers as “loadmaster.”
+Equipped with a radio, the loadmaster would
+arrive at the assembly area on board the first helicopter,
+whereupon he would disembark and supervise
+the entire loading process. This technique was
+particularly valuable during operations in which
+ARVN units were being helilifted from the field.
+In such cases the loadmaster performed the same
+function as did those who supervised the loading
+process at secure assembly areas. This, of course,
+required that the Leatherneck remain in the landing
+zone until the last Vietnamese troops had boarded
+the final helicopter. Although dangerous, this
+technique enabled the Marines to eliminate many
+problems which might otherwise have occurred.</p>
+
+<p>By early November the monsoon season had
+begun to settle over the northern portions of South
+Vietnam. Unlike the summer rains in the Mekong
+Delta in which Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s
+crews had managed to set new helicopter flight
+records, the winter monsoons that struck the
+northern provinces seriously restricted flight operations.
+Heavy fog and low clouds frequently made
+it impossible to conduct air operations in the mountainous
+areas; therefore, the squadron was forced
+to concentrate most of its operations in the coastal
+plains. In an effort to maintain his support at a
+maximum level, Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun began
+dispatching an OE-1 to the objective area prior
+to scheduled missions in order to obtain a current
+report on the local weather conditions. Despite
+these efforts, the monsoon rains, which often
+moved in quickly from the South China Sea, still
+disrupted flight operations. A typical weather-related
+incident occurred on 13 November when a
+scheduled troop lift was cancelled because of heavy
+fog after 200 Vietnamese Special Forces troops had
+loaded onto 20 Marine helicopters for an early
+morning operation.</p>
+
+<p>Several unrelated changes in official designations
+occurred at approximately the same time that the
+monsoons began affecting operations in the northern
+provinces. In November all Marine aircraft
+were redesignated in accordance with a Department
+of Defense order which standardized aircraft designations
+throughout the U.S. armed services.
+Thereafter, SHUFLY’s HUS helicopters would be
+known as UH-34Ds, its OE-1s as O-1Bs, and its
+R4D as a C-117. In another adjustment, the Joint
+General Staff in Saigon ordered the realignment of
+South Vietnam’s tactical zones. A fourth corps
+tactical zone (IV CTZ), which encompassed the
+entire Mekong Delta, and a Capital Military
+District, which included Saigon and its environs,
+were created. The composition of I Corps was
+affected by the adjustments as the new alignment
+shifted Quang Ngai Province into II Corps. The
+Marines, however, continued to provide helicopter
+support to the province, which was relatively
+isolated from the remainder of II Corps.</p>
+
+<p>More important than either the new aircraft
+designations or the realignment of the tactical
+zones were several internal changes within the
+Marine task unit. On 6 November the task unit
+was redesignated Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6.
+That same day Lieutenant Colonel Alton W.
+McCully, who had been functioning as Colonel<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">85</span>
+Ireland’s executive officer, assumed command of
+the task element. Ireland returned to Okinawa
+where he took command of Marine Aircraft
+Group 16, which, under the new arrangement,
+became responsible for both the administrative
+and logistical support of SHUFLY.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_85"><i>Marine People-to-People Program</i></h3>
+
+<p>The concept of the People-to-People Program,
+which had been initiated with a degree of success
+in the Mekong Delta, was brought to Da Nang by
+Colonel Ireland and his Marines. During the fall
+and early winter of 1962, as weather caused flight
+operations to subside, the Marines were able to
+increase the tempo of the program. SHUFLY’s
+men actively supported an orphanage in Da Nang
+which was maintained by an American missionary
+family. On Christmas day the Marines participated
+in a “Father-For-A-Day” program which
+had been arranged by the task element chaplain,
+Lieutenant Richard P. Vinson, U.S. Navy. Each
+orphan spent the day with a Marine who had
+volunteered to serve as his “father.” The Vietnamese
+children were treated to dinner in the mess
+hall, presented with Christmas gifts, and then
+joined in singing carols with the Marines. At the
+conclusion of the festivities, Chaplain Vinson
+presented the director of the orphanage with a gift
+in Vietnamese currency equivalent to over 800
+dollars—money which the men of the task element
+had donated.</p>
+
+<p>In addition to their activities associated with the
+orphanage, the Marine officers taught English to
+a number of Vietnamese civilians. Held three
+nights weekly, the classes were received enthusiastically.
+Beyond the foundations of good will
+which it helped shape, the People-to-People Program
+enabled the Marines to acquire a better
+understanding of the Vietnamese people, their
+culture, and their problems.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_85a"><i>SHUFLY Operations in I Corps</i></h3>
+
+<p>SHUFLY’s initial helicopter support operations
+in I Corps represented the beginnings of what
+would become a long association of U.S. Marines
+with South Vietnam’s rugged northern provinces.
+Essentially these early operations were characterized
+by continuity and adjustment. Since their
+arrival at Da Nang in September the Marines had
+extended the standard of consistent and effective
+combat support operations set earlier in the flat
+Mekong Delta. Necessarily, SHUFLY’s commanders
+had modified the previously developed tactics
+and techniques to fit the mountainous terrain and
+the nature of warfare being waged in I Corps. For
+the most part these adjustments had proven successful
+by allowing the Marines to continue the pace of
+helicopter support with a reduction of the risks
+involved. That SHUFLY had suffered its first
+fatalities during these initial months in I Corps
+dampened but did not detract from its overall
+achievements. As 1962 closed, the Marines had
+begun establishing a reputation in the northern
+provinces as courageous, professional fighting
+men and generous allies. It was this reputation
+upon which a generation of Marines would build
+in the ensuing decade.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">86</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_7"><span id="toclink_86"></span>CHAPTER 7<br>
+<span class="subhead large">The Laotian Crisis, 1962</span><br>
+<span class="subhead notbold"><i>Genesis of the Problem—The American Response—The Marine Corps
+Role—Marine Participation: A Summary</i></span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_86a"><i>Genesis of the Problem</i></h3>
+
+<p>Almost simultaneous with SHUFLY’s deployment
+to Soc Trang in April 1962, U.S. Marine combat
+forces were ordered to Thailand in response to
+the growing crisis in Laos. Inhabited for the most
+part by peaceful hill tribes, the small, landlocked
+Kingdom of Laos seemed an unlikely setting for
+any significant military confrontation. Even more
+improbable was the possibility that a serious
+international crisis could stem from what had
+begun as a political rivalry among relatively
+obscure princes.</p>
+
+<p>To be certain, the context of what should have
+been a rather meaningless political feud had been
+altered substantively by North Vietnam’s drive to
+extend its control over the Republic of Vietnam.
+Recognizing Laos as a strategic stepping stone for
+their southward thrust, the North Vietnamese,
+joined by the Soviet Union, had begun providing
+military aid to the Pathet Lao army of the leftist
+prince, Souphanauvong, in the late 1950s. To
+counter these Communist activities, the United
+States had extended military assistance to the anti-Communist
+government of Prince Boun Oum. In
+the resultant struggle, Prince Souvanna Phouma,
+who previously had proclaimed neutrality, sided
+with the Pathet Lao. With the lines drawn and
+the contenders now reinforced by powerful allies,
+the conflict naturally escalated. Laos, like South
+Vietnam, had become a pawn in the Cold War.</p>
+
+<p>Administered through a small USMAAG, the
+American military assistance to Boun Oum, however,
+did little to slow the advances of the Pathet
+Lao. Early in 1960, they had joined forces with
+North Vietnamese units to seize control of the
+eastern portion of the country’s long, southward
+extending panhandle. In early 1961, again backed
+by North Vietnamese forces, the Pathet Lao had
+opened an offensive on the Plain of Jars in central
+Laos. Boun Oum’s units, commanded by General
+Phoumi Nosavan, proved unable to contain this
+push into central Laos.</p>
+
+<p>By March 1961 the situation had become critical
+enough for President Kennedy to direct that
+CinCPac alert U.S. military units for possible deployment.
+In response, Admiral Felt activated a
+task force headquarters and assigned Major General
+Donald M. Weller, who was then serving as
+Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, as its
+commander. Designated Joint Task Force 116 in
+accordance with existing CinCPac contingency
+plans, Weller’s command was to consist predominantly
+of Marine air and ground forces with Army
+and Air Force units making up the balance.
+Simultaneous with the activation of Weller’s
+headquarters on Okinawa, CinCPac alerted the
+scattered forces earmarked for assignment to the
+joint task force.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration managed
+to defuse the situation somewhat by securing
+Soviet assistance in arranging a cease-fire in Laos.
+The crisis cooled further when 14 governments,
+including the Soviet Union, Communist China,
+and North Vietnam, agreed to reconvene the
+Geneva Conference to consider neutralization of the
+Kingdom of Laos. This conference convened on
+16 May 1961, and together with the shaky cease-fire,
+brought a modicum of stability to Laos. With
+international tensions eased, the alert of U.S.
+forces in the Pacific ended. Subsequently, General
+Weller’s JTF 116 headquarters was deactivated.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_86" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 28em;">
+  <img src="images/i_087.jpg" width="1772" height="2558" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+MAINLAND<br>
+SOUTHEAST ASIA<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The negotiations in Geneva proved to be long
+and tedious. In Laos, frequent fighting, usually of
+a localized nature, punctuated the cease-fire almost
+from the day it was effected. Finally, in the first<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">88</span>
+weeks of 1962 heavy fighting broke out anew, this
+time on a general scale, and precipitated a new and
+more intense crisis. For U.S. observers the situation
+seemed to reach its critical point in early May when
+Pathet Lao forces, backed by North Vietnamese
+formations, routed a major element of Phouma’s
+army from Nam Tha, a town located east of the
+Mekong River in extreme northwestern Laos.
+Following this action, Phoumi’s forces retreated
+southwestward across the Mekong into northern
+Thailand. Now in full control of the east bank of
+the Mekong, the Communists appeared poised for
+a drive into Thailand, a full-fledged member of
+SEATO. The collapse of Phoumi’s military forces,
+moreover, seriously threatened the U.S. bargaining
+position at the ongoing Geneva talks.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_88"><i>The American Response</i></h3>
+
+<p>In the face of the situation along the Laotian-Thai
+border, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed
+CinCPac to upgrade the readiness of Joint Task
+Force 116 for possible deployment. Accordingly, on
+10 May Admiral Felt directed Major General John
+Condon, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft
+Wing, to activate the joint task force headquarters,
+assemble its staff, and refine its deployment
+plans. The Amphibious Ready Group of the Seventh
+Fleet, carrying the Special Landing Force, promptly
+sailed into the Gulf of Siam.</p>
+
+<p>Both to reassure Thailand of the U.S. commitment
+to its defense and to discourage further Communist
+advances on the Southeast Asian Peninsula, President
+Kennedy ordered U.S. forces deployed to Thailand
+on 15 May. Admiral Felt moved immediately
+to execute this decision. In simultaneous actions
+CinCPac designated Army Lieutenant General
+John L. Richardson, then serving as Deputy Commander
+in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, to replace
+Major General Condon as Commander, JTF 116 and
+instructed Richardson to execute CinCPac Operations
+Plan 32-59, Phase II (Laos). Felt’s instructions
+to the new Commander, JTF 116 were
+explicit. General Richardson’s command was to
+act in such a way that would leave no doubt as to
+American intentions to defend Thailand. Through
+these same actions JTF 116 was to exert a “precautionary
+impact” on the situation in Laos.
+Furthermore, the Commander, JTF 116 was directed
+to position his forces in a manner so that
+they could respond to any armed Communist threat
+to Thailand.<a id="FNanchor_126" href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[7-1]</a></p>
+
+<p>Concurrently with the order to deploy JTF 116,
+CinCPac instructed the Commander, U.S. Military
+Assistance Command, Vietnam, General Harkins,
+to establish and assume command of a U.S. Military
+Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACThai).
+Thus Harkins, in a dual role as ComUSMACV
+and ComUSMACThai, was to be responsible to
+CinCPac for all U.S. military activities and operations
+in both Thailand and South Vietnam. Once
+it became operational in Thailand, JTF 116 plus
+the already existing Joint U.S. Military Advisory
+Assistance Group, Thailand (JUSMAAG), were to
+come under Harkins’ purview. Until USMACThai
+and the JTF staffs could become operational, however,
+the various task force components were to
+report to the Chief JUSMAAG, Thailand, Major
+General J.&nbsp;F. Conway, U.S. Army.</p>
+
+<p>One element of the joint task force was already
+in Thailand when President Kennedy issued the
+order to commit U.S. forces—the Army’s 1st
+Brigade, 27th Infantry. At the time this infantry
+brigade was participating in a SEATO exercise
+near Korat, a town located about 130 miles northeast
+of Bangkok in the central portion of the country.
+In response to CinCPac orders it promptly
+moved into bivouac at a position 40 miles west of
+Korat.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_88a"><i>The Marine Corps Role</i></h3>
+
+<p>Operations Plan 32-59, Phase II (Laos), called
+for a U.S. Marine expeditionary brigade composed
+of a regimental landing team (three reinforced
+infantry battalions), a jet attack squadron, a
+helicopter transport squadron, and supporting
+units, to operate from Udorn, a provincial capital
+located nearly 350 miles northeast of Bangkok.
+Strategically situated only 35 miles south of
+Vientiane, the political capital of Laos, Udorn
+was the site of a 7,000-foot concrete runway. A
+300-man Marine aviation support unit, Marine
+Air Base Squadron 16, had actually been positioned
+at this airstrip for over six months during 1961.
+While at Udorn the MABS-16 Marines had provided
+maintenance support for helicopters which
+were assisting General Phoumi’s forces in Laos. A
+Royal Thai regiment had provided security for the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">89</span>
+base during this unit’s deployment and was still
+in the area in 1962 when the decision was made to
+commit JTF 116 to Thailand.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_89" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_089.jpg" width="1906" height="1396" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Aerial view of Udorn airstrip. (<cite>USMC Photo A182977</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Harvey M. Patton’s VMA-332,
+an A-4C (Skyhawk) jet attack squadron,
+claimed the distinction of being the first Marine
+unit to arrive in Thailand in response to the 1962
+Laotian crisis. The 20 single-placed Skyhawks
+departed the Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the
+Philippines on the morning of 18 May, were
+refueled in flight by aircraft from VMA-211, another
+Marine A-4 squadron, and landed at Udorn
+around noon. The bulk of the Marine units began
+arriving in Thailand the following day. At Bangkok
+the Special Landing Force, composed of
+Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Adams’ 1,500-man
+Battalion Landing Team 3/9 and Lieutenant
+Colonel Fred A. Steele’s HMM-261, an HUS-1
+helicopter squadron, disembarked from the ships
+of the Amphibious Ready Group.<a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[7-A]</a> That same day
+Marine GV-1 refueler-transports began airlifting
+additional aviation support detachments from
+Okinawa to Udorn. These included detachments
+of Marine Air Control Squadrons 2 and 4 (MACS-2
+and -4), Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12),
+and a Provisional Marine Aircraft Group (ProvMAG)
+headquarters. Upon landing Colonel Ross
+S. Mickey, the commander of the ProvMAG,
+established his headquarters at the airfield and
+assumed operational control of all USMC aviation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">90</span>
+elements at Udorn. On the 18th, HMM-261’s
+helicopters began arriving at the now busy airfield,
+having flown from the Amphibious Ready Group
+with a refueling stop at Korat. Lieutenant Colonel
+Steele reported to the newly activated ProvMAG.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="label">[7-A]</a> A Marine battalion landing team derives its designation
+from the infantry battalion around which it is built, in this
+case the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. In 1962, the BLT included
+a howitzer battery, a tank platoon, an amphibious tractor
+platoon, a pioneer platoon, a motor transport platoon, an anti-tank
+platoon, and air and naval gunfire liaison teams.</p>
+
+<p>Following the commitment of the SLF on 19 May, another
+BLT and helicopter squadron from Okinawa reconstituted the
+Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>On 19 May Brigadier General Ormand B. Simpson
+arrived at Udorn with the staff and communications
+personnel of the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade
+(3d MEB) headquarters. Simpson, a Texan who
+had been serving as Assistant Division Commander,
+3d Marine Division, had assembled and activated
+this headquarters on Okinawa shortly after
+CinCPac’s activation of JTF 116. As Commanding
+General, 3d MEB, Simpson was to assume command
+of all Marine elements, air and ground,
+deployed to Udorn. In addition to being the CG
+3d MEB, General Simpson carried the designation,
+Naval Component Commander, a title which
+gave him responsibility for all Navy as well as
+Marine forces operating at Udorn under JTF 116.</p>
+
+<p>Concurrent with General Simpson’s arrival, U.S.
+Air Force C-130 and C-123 transports were ferrying
+Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ Battalion Landing
+Team from Bangkok to Udorn. The BLT had placed
+its supplies and trucks, along with HMM-261’s
+heavier equipment, on rail cars for transport to
+Udorn. Because the Thai flat cars were too small to
+accommodate such massive vehicles, Adams ordered
+his tank and amphibious tractor platoons to re-embark
+on board the USS <i>Point Defiance</i> (LSD-31).
+Once on the ground at Udorn the battalion and its
+remaining reinforcements assembled alongside the
+airstrip. From there the Leathernecks were transported
+by Thai Army trucks some eight miles
+south to Nong Ta Kai, a small town situated astride
+the main service road. Adams’ battalion established
+a temporary camp on some high ground just beyond
+the town. With the BLT’s arrival, the initial
+Marine combat forces assigned to JTF 116 were in
+position. The next day, 20 May, General Simpson
+assumed command of all U.S. Marine and Navy
+units at Udorn and the 3d MEB, a complete air-ground
+team, was in being.</p>
+
+<p>Elsewhere in Thailand the U.S. military build-up
+was continuing apace. A squadron of 20 U.S. Air
+Force F-100 Super Sabre tactical fighter bombers
+and a detachment of three refueler aircraft had
+deployed to Takhli airfield from Clark Air Force
+Base in the Philippines. Two USAF transport
+squadrons had also begun operations from this
+base. At Korat, the 1st Brigade, 27th Infantry was
+being reinforced with Army units from Hawaii.
+Another Army unit, a logistics support command,
+was being activated near Bangkok.</p>
+
+<p>To command this growing assortment of military
+units, General Richardson established the
+JTF 116 headquarters at Korat. Major General
+Donald M. Weller, who had been serving as Deputy
+Commanding General, FMFPac, since leaving the
+3d Marine Division in 1961, joined Richardson’s
+headquarters as chief of staff. General Weller’s
+offices were located at Korat initially. Later he
+relocated at Bangkok where he headed a rear
+echelon responsible for coordination with the
+JUSMAAG, ComUSMACThai, and the American
+representatives to SEATO. While in the capital
+Weller was also responsible for implementing a
+logistic plan, the objective of which was to upgrade
+lines of communication being used by JTF-116
+elements.</p>
+
+<p>It is of interest to note that Colonel Croizat, who
+had been the first U.S. Marine advisor to the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps, was serving at this time as
+the senior U.S. military representative on the
+SEATO planning staff in Bangkok. Both Weller,
+who had commanded JTF 116 for a period during
+early 1961, and Croizat who had served as its
+chief of staff during that interval, were intimately
+familiar with the JTF’s structure, capabilities, and
+functions. In fact, the operations plan being executed
+had been developed in large part under their
+guidance.<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[7-2]</a></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_90" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_091.jpg" width="1917" height="2510" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Marines disembark from attack transports at Bangkok, Thailand. (<cite>USMC Photo A182785</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Another facet of this particular situation was
+that portions of Operations Plan 32-59 Phase II,
+(Laos) were to exert a profound influence on later
+U.S. Marine operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
+A key provision of this particular document outlined
+the command relationships which would
+govern Marine and Air Force tactical air support in
+the event JTF 116 actually became involved in
+combat. This provision designated the Commander
+JTF 116 as the “coordinating authority” responsible
+for synchronizing all JTF tactical air support.
+But at the same time it assigned the CG, 3d MEB,
+operational control of all Marine tactical aircraft,
+thereby insuring that the Marine air-ground team
+would not be fractured. Later, in the mid-1960s
+when American tactical jet squadrons would be
+called upon to support U.S. and RVNAF ground
+forces in South Vietnam, the CinCPac staff would<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">92</span>
+borrow heavily from this arrangement to define
+the relationships of Marine and Air Force tactical
+aviation assets.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_92" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;">
+  <img src="images/i_092.jpg" width="933" height="1110" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Major General Donald M. Weller, Chief of Staff,
+Joint Task Force-116. (<cite>USMC Photo A407463</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Training began almost immediately after the
+Marine units were in position at Udorn and Nong
+Ta Kai. Generally the MEB adhered to a training
+program designed to help fulfill three requirements:
+to make its presence known and thereby enhance
+its credibility as a “show of force”; to acclimatize
+the individual Marines to the hot, humid, tropical
+climate; and finally, to familiarize the operational
+elements and their commanders with the surrounding
+terrain. The primary objective of this program,
+of course, was to prepare the brigade for combat
+should that contingency arise out of the troubled
+situation in Laos. Coordinated air-ground exercises
+conducted around Udorn enabled General Simpson’s
+command to publicize its presence in the area while
+concurrently refining its heliborne and close air
+support capabilities.<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[7-B]</a> In addition to air-ground
+exercises, Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ infantry companies
+sharpened their skills in patrolling of all
+types and made frequent use of nearby Thai Army
+firing ranges to maintain their weapons proficiency.
+All field training was conducted in an unpopulated
+area defined by the Thai government and every
+precaution was taken so as not to disturb the local
+population. The Marine units utilized blank ammunition
+exclusively in training except for the closely
+supervised live fire exercises.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="label">[7-B]</a> The MEB’s after action report pointed out one flaw in the
+composition of the Provisional MAG. There had been no provision
+made to include light observation aircraft in its organization.
+As a result, aerial reconnaissance had to be accomplished
+from either A-4Cs or HUS-1s, neither of which was configured
+for such a mission. The A-4C, which could carry only the pilot,
+and the HUS-1 proved equally unsuited for reconnaissance missions.
+The 3d MEB report specifically recommended that future
+composite aviation packages of this nature should include a
+detachment of OEs with pilots and trained aerial observers.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<figure id="ip_92b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;">
+  <img src="images/i_092b.jpg" width="926" height="1083" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Brigadier General Ormond R. Simpson and Brigadier
+General John F. Dobbin confer at Udorn, Thailand.
+(<cite>USMC Photo A182779</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Realizing that the ultimate success or failure of
+the American commitment in Thailand might hinge
+on the relationships U.S. military men established
+with the Thai populace, General Simpson ordered
+his command to initiate a civic action program.
+The day after his arrival at Udorn, Simpson met
+with local civilian officials and established the
+basis for a people-to-people program similar to the
+one instituted by SHUFLY Marines at Soc Trang.
+Thereafter, the MEB’s goal in this area was to
+foster among the Thai a favorable impression of
+the individual Marine, his commanders, and his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">93</span>
+unit. The people-to-people program which followed
+was, in all respects, a concerted and integrated
+effort. Officers taught conversational English
+classes to interested civilians both at Udorn and at
+Nong Ta Kai, while Leatherneck engineers and
+Navy Seabees (who arrived near the end of May)
+helped repair public buildings. Navy medical and
+dental personnel attached to Colonel Mickey’s
+ProvMAG and Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT
+joined the effort by administering almost daily to
+the physical ailments of the local populace and
+occasionally visiting the more remote villages by
+helicopter. In an action intended to help prevent
+friction between Marines and Thai townspeople,
+General Simpson directed that MEB units disembark
+from trucks as they approached towns, march
+through the population centers at sling arms, and
+re-embark aboard their trucks at the opposite end
+of the town. Relying on this broad array of simple
+but effective programs, the 3d MEB was able to
+impress upon the civilian population that its mission
+was one of assistance and good will rather
+than occupation.</p>
+
+<p>This crisis in Laos eased somewhat after the
+U.S. joint task force established its presence in
+northeastern Thailand, and Communist forces
+halted their advance short of the international
+border. With these two developments there was
+no requirement for additional Marine infantry
+battalions. Accordingly, General Simpson redesignated
+his force the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit
+(3d MEU), even though other reinforcements
+continued to arrive at Udorn throughout May and
+most of June. Near the end of May, a 70-man
+Seabee detachment from Navy Mobile Construction
+Battalion 10 was airlifted to the position.
+This detachment, the initial increment of a larger
+Logistics Support Group (LSG), moved to Nong
+Ta Kai where it helped the BLT’s pioneer platoon
+complete a more permanent camp designed to
+withstand the approaching monsoon season. In
+mid-June, with no end to the MEU’s assignment
+in sight, the remainder of the 500-man LSG
+deployed from Okinawa to Udorn. Commanded
+by Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Hudson, this
+group included a motor transport detachment,
+a medical detachment, a supply unit, and an
+engineer detachment.<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[7-C]</a> These reinforcements
+brought the number of Marines, Seabees, and Navy
+medical and dental personnel under General
+Simpson’s command to its highest level—3,426
+officers and men. A final change in the composition
+of the 3d MEU occurred in the final week of
+June when HMM-162, an HUS-1 squadron commanded
+by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu,
+replaced HMM-261 as the helicopter element.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="label">[7-C]</a> Lieutenant Colonel Hudson was relieved by Lieutenant
+Colonel Angus J. Cronin on 22 July.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>While General Simpson’s MEU was strengthening
+its posture in northeastern Thailand, U.S.
+officials were reporting definite progress in the
+negotiations being held in Geneva and Vientiane.
+Encouraged by these signs and hoping to influence
+the Geneva talks even further, President Kennedy
+ordered major elements of the U.S. combat forces
+withdrawn from Thailand on 29 June, just four
+days after HMM-162’s arrival at Udorn. In
+response General Richardson directed General
+Simpson to prepare for the immediate withdrawal
+of the ProvMAG and one infantry company.
+Two days later, on the morning of 1 July, VMA-332’s
+Skyhawks launched for Cubi Point in the
+Philippines. Subsequently, HMM-162’s helicopters
+departed for Bangkok where they re-embarked
+on board the USS <i>Valley Forge</i>. Okinawa-based
+GV-1s airlifted one of BLT 3/9’s companies to
+the Philippines while elements of the Marine air
+control squadrons traveled by rail to Bangkok
+for embarkation on board ships of the Seventh
+Fleet. By 6 July General Simpson’s 3d MEU had
+been reduced by just over 1,000 men.</p>
+
+<p>At Geneva, the first weeks of July were marked
+by steady progress toward a diplomatic solution
+to the long-standing Laotian problem. By the 20th
+it was evident that a formal agreement would soon
+be forthcoming. With these encouraging developments,
+General Richardson was directed to prepare
+for the withdrawal of the remainder of his forces
+from Thailand. In Laos, the quarreling political
+factions had already agreed to participate in a
+coalition government headed by Prince Souvanna
+Phouma which would serve as the basis for a
+neutral state. At Geneva on the 23d, the United
+States, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, South
+Vietnam, Burma, Great Britain, France, Canada,
+India, Communist China, Thailand, Poland, the
+Kingdom of Laos, and Cambodia finally signed the
+Declaration of Neutrality of Laos and an attached
+protocol. In so doing the 14 signatories agreed to
+recognize and respect the sovereignty, independence,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">94</span>
+and neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos.
+Under the terms of this agreement, foreign troops
+were prohibited from entering or operating within
+the borders of Laos. Had it been adhered to, this
+provision would have denied North Vietnam the
+use of the corridor down the length of eastern
+Laos, altering the scope and nature of the conflict
+in the Republic of Vietnam.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_94" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_094.jpg" width="1905" height="1386" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Marines of BLT 3/9 assemble before being airlifted to the Philippines. (<cite>USMC Photo A182883</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Following the signing of this declaration in
+Geneva, CinCPac directed General Richardson to
+effect the withdrawal of the remainder of his
+joint task force. General Simpson’s 3d MEU began
+executing these instructions on the 28th when
+Marine GV-1s and Air Force C-130s began airlifting
+Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT 3/9 to
+Okinawa. By the 31st no Marine combat units
+were left at Udorn. General Simpson and his staff
+departed the airfield a few days later, and shortly
+thereafter the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit was
+deactivated.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_94"><i>Marine Participation: A Summary</i></h3>
+
+<p>The deactivation of the 3d MEU marked the end
+of the first deployment of a Marine air-ground combat
+team to mainland Southeast Asia. Since the
+decision to commit American forces to Thailand
+in mid-May, the Marine units assigned to General
+Simpson had demonstrated anew the value of their
+service as a force capable of supporting U.S. foreign
+policy on short notice. Within the period of a few
+days, the various FMFPac commands had assembled
+a complete air-ground-support team, and, assisted
+by the Seventh Fleet, had deployed the affected
+units to a position over 1,800 miles from the nearest
+major Marine base. Located far inland from the
+seacoast, a Marine unit’s normal habitat, the 3d
+MEU had been sustained solely by air while maintaining
+its combat readiness in a difficult tropical
+environment.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">95</span></p>
+
+<p>In so doing the Marines had shown that a substantial
+American combat force could be brought
+to bear quickly in the remote areas chosen by the
+Communists as targets for their so-called “wars
+of national liberation.” Furthermore, the MEU
+by relying on a vigorous civic action program, had
+established that a sizable Marine command could
+maintain its combat readiness almost indefinitely
+without eroding the respect of the indigenous
+population. Thus, General Simpson’s Marines had
+created a solid foundation of mutual respect and
+confidence with the Thai people. This accomplishment
+alone would prove valuable when
+American military forces would be required to
+return to northern Thailand later in the decade.
+Against the backdrop of these accomplishments,
+the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit’s operations in
+Thailand could be assessed as having extended the
+tradition of the U.S. Marine Corps as an effective
+instrument of American diplomacy.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">97</span></p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2 class="nobreak part" id="PART_III"><span id="toclink_97">PART III</span><br>
+
+<span class="subhead">THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963</span></h2>
+<div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           </div>
+</div>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">99</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_8"><span id="toclink_99"></span>CHAPTER 8<br>
+<span class="subhead large">The Marine Advisory Effort</span><br>
+<span class="subhead notbold"><i>The Political Climate—The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations—Accomplishments</i></span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_99a"><i>The Political Climate</i></h3>
+
+<p>A sudden rupture occurred in South Vietnam’s
+internal political situation during 1963 which
+largely determined the course of the war as well
+as the nation’s future. Following the sect uprising
+of 1955–1956, the Diem government had experienced
+a three-year period of relative political
+tranquility. Beginning in 1959, however, political
+dissent had begun to re-emerge from several influential
+segments of South Vietnamese society. The
+results of the August 1959 national elections, in
+which pro-Diem candidates captured every seat in
+the National Assembly, served to stimulate political
+opposition which had lain dormant for nearly
+four years. Opposition to the government mounted
+steadily in the months following the elections
+within military as well as political circles as some
+South Vietnamese officers began privately expressing
+disenchantment with Diem’s management of
+the war. Then came the abortive coup in November
+1960. The regime’s popularity diminished in the
+wake of this crisis as Diem tightened his control
+on the war-torn nation.</p>
+
+<p>Another problem—religious unrest—which was
+to play a key role in determining South Vietnam’s
+political direction as the decade unfolded, also
+emerged during this period. Buddhist leaders
+throughout South Vietnam began protesting
+against various policies enacted by the Catholic-controlled
+government. The tensions gradually
+mounted, and by early 1963 the protests were
+highlighted by spectacular and highly publicized
+self-immolations by Buddhist monks. Finally, in
+May, the religious problem erupted into violence
+when the Vietnamese police and military forces
+killed 12 Buddhist demonstrators while suppressing
+a religious demonstration at Hue. This action
+triggered a protracted crisis of public confidence
+in the Diem government which deepened as the
+summer wore on. Then, on 21 August, Ngo Dinh
+Nhu, the president’s closest political advisor,
+ordered the national police to raid key Buddhist
+pagodas throughout the nation. Following the
+raids, which uncovered some weapons, Nhu
+attempted to blame the attacks on several key
+South Vietnamese generals. His effort to shift the
+responsibility for the police raids served only to
+alienate some of the nation’s most powerful military
+leaders.</p>
+
+<p>On 1 November, a junta of South Vietnamese
+generals led by Major General Duong Van Minh
+reacted to the deepening political crisis by deposing
+President Diem and seizing control of the Government
+of Vietnam. Both the president and his
+brother were murdered by an ARVN officer the
+following day. The U.S. government, which had
+advance knowledge of the coup and was in contact
+with the plotting generals, publically declared its
+intention to remain neutral. General Harkins ordered
+USMACV to cease all activities and to withdraw
+its advisors from South Vietnamese units
+pending the outcome of the power struggle.</p>
+
+<p>The overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem stirred fresh
+hope among many Americans and South Vietnamese
+that the new government could attract the
+solid public support of the Vietnamese people, and
+thereby wage a more effective war against the
+Communists. South Vietnam’s new leaders immediately
+focused their attention upon healing the
+nation’s deep political divisions and securing continued
+U.S. assistance for the war effort. They
+pledged to respect religious freedom, to return the
+government to civilian control, and to continue
+the struggle against the Viet Cong. Appreciating
+the interrelationship of these assurances, the
+United States officially recognized the new government<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">100</span>
+on 7 November, whereupon ComUSMACV
+lifted the temporary ban on military assistance.</p>
+
+<p>The American hopes that the new political
+climate in the Republic of Vietnam would stimulate
+a more effective military effort, however,
+proved to be shortlived. Confusion reminiscent of
+the sect uprising in 1955 spread throughout the
+government following Diem’s death. The dismissal
+of more than 30 high-ranking military officers for
+actively supporting the former president during the
+coup typified the new regime’s campaign to realign
+top personnel in all governmental agencies. Far
+from enhancing the efficiency of the Vietnamese
+military, the power struggle and the chaos which
+prevailed in its wake dragged the war effort to its
+most ineffective level since before the U.S. stepped-up
+its military assistance program in early 1962. It
+was on this unfortunate note that the year 1963
+ended.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_100"><i>The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations</i></h3>
+
+<p>At the beginning of 1963, the Marine Advisory
+Division, still headed by Lieutenant Colonel
+Moody, consisted of eight Marine officers and 10
+noncommissioned officers. In April, however, the
+table of organization was adjusted slightly when
+the first sergeant and four assistant infantry advisor
+(noncommissioned officers) billets were eliminated.
+Another small unit training advisor was added to
+the organization, changing the strength of Lieutenant
+Colonel Moody’s command to eight
+officers and six noncommissioned officers. Men from
+the 3d Marine Division continued to augment the
+advisory effort and gain combat experience while
+serving in Vietnam on temporary assignments.</p>
+
+<p>Like the U.S. organization which advised and
+assisted it, the Vietnamese Marine Corps began the
+new year at the same strength that it had achieved
+when it had been expanded to brigade size in early
+1962. Still commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
+Le Nguyen Khang, the Vietnamese Marine Brigade
+continued to operate as part of the nation’s
+general reserve under the direct control of the Vietnamese
+Joint General Staff.</p>
+
+<p>As the year opened three of the four VNMC infantry
+battalions were garrisoned separately in
+small, crude, self-sustaining camps around Thu
+Duc on the northern outskirts of Saigon. The 4th
+Battalion maintained its camp at Vung Tau on the
+coast. The newly formed artillery battalion, which
+became fully operational in mid-January when B
+and C Batteries passed their final gunnery examinations,
+was garrisoned near Thu Duc. While the
+Marine units spent little time in their base camps,
+being deployed almost continuously in combat,
+the Joint General Staff normally kept one battalion
+at Thu Duc to enable it to respond to any
+emergency which might develop.</p>
+
+<p>For the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1963 was to
+be highlighted by innovations in the important
+areas of training and operations. Prior to Lieutenant
+Colonel Moody’s arrival in Vietnam, all
+Vietnamese Marine recruits had received basic
+training at ARVN installations, an arrangement
+tolerated but never appreciated by the U.S. Marine
+advisors. Before his departure in the fall of 1963,
+Moody was able to convince Khang that he should
+push for the authority to establish a separate
+Marine training center. In late 1963 the JGS
+approved this proposal, whereupon the Vietnamese
+Marine engineers, advised by Captain Robert C.
+Jones, began building a small training facility at
+Thu Duc. In a related action Moody set in motion
+plans to have a small number of specially selected
+Vietnamese Marine noncommissioned officers sent
+to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at San Diego
+for training as drill instructors. Although these
+plans would not come to fruition during Moody’s
+assignment, the concept of a separate recruit
+training center promised to permit the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps to establish and maintain its own
+standards for basic training.</p>
+
+<p>Another change to occur in 1963, this one in
+the area of tactical operations, was the reinstitution
+of multi-battalion combat operations under
+the control of provisional Marine Brigade headquarters.<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[8-A]</a>
+Although the VNMC had performed
+such operations in 1960, they had been abandoned
+in the ensuing years in favor of battalion-sized
+deployments to the various provinces and corps
+tactical zones. Moody, however, prevailed upon
+Khang to alter this pattern by seeking assignments<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">101</span>
+that would enable the brigade headquarters to
+exercise tactical control of its battalions.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="label">[8-A]</a> Such task-organized Marine forces were usually called either
+provisional brigades or provisional regiments but on at least one
+occasion the organization was designated a Marine Task Force.
+In each case the composition was similar—two or three infantry
+battalions, an artillery unit, an engineer or reconnaissance
+company, and a command element.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<figure id="ip_101" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_101.jpg" width="1896" height="1422" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Lieutenant General Carson A. Roberts, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (right center), inspects an
+honor guard of Vietnamese Marines in Saigon. With him, from left, are Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang, Commandant
+of the Vietnamese Marine Corps; Major General Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff, Military Assistance
+Command, Vietnam; and Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody, Jr., Senior USMC Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine
+Corps. (<cite>Official USA Photo</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The first such operation was launched in the first
+week of the new year. On 1 January a provisional
+brigade headquarters, commanded by Khang and
+advised by Moody, embarked on board a Vietnamese
+Navy LST (landing ship, tank) at Saigon
+along with the 2d VNMC battalion. The 4th
+VNMC Battalion, advised by Captain Don R.
+Christensen, embarked on board two Vietnamese
+LSMs (landing ship, medium) at the same time.
+The mission of the provisional brigade was to
+conduct an amphibious landing near the tip of the
+Ca Mau Peninsula and clear Viet Cong units from
+a series of villages in conjunction with the Strategic
+Hamlet Program. Subsequent to the clearing
+operations, VNMC engineers were to construct
+a fortified hamlet. The entire operation was to
+extend until mid-April.</p>
+
+<p>Elaborate precautions were taken not to disclose
+the location of the objective area. The small
+flotilla sailed beyond sight of land and remained
+afloat for two days before moving into position
+off Ca Mau. On 3 January the two LSMs proceeded
+to the coast, moved up a river lined with thick
+mangrove vegetation, and landed the 4th Battalion.
+The 2d Battalion, accompanied by Captain Richard
+B. Taylor, came ashore from the LST in Dong Nai
+boats, small styrofoam craft specifically designed
+for use in swampy terrain. The provisional brigade
+headquarters remained on board the LST as the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">102</span>
+designated operations area did not extend far
+inland.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_102" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_102.jpg" width="1893" height="1389" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>U.S. Marine-trained drill instructor with Vietnamese recruits. (<cite>USMC Photo A183561</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>To their surprise the VNMC assault elements
+found the first objective, a large village, completely
+deserted. As Lieutenant Colonel Moody
+later recalled, “They had removed everything,
+even the cattle and other livestock.”<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">[8-1]</a> At the
+second objective, a nearby village, the Marines
+found definite evidence of recent Viet Cong activity
+but no enemy troops. There they captured a handful
+of rifles, carbines, and light mortars along with
+a printed document that contained detailed excerpts
+of the Marine operations plan. Quite
+obviously the operation had been compromised
+in Saigon during the planning stages. In any case,
+this discovery explained the evacuation of the
+initial objective as well as the relative dearth of
+action during the remainder of the operation.</p>
+
+<p>The provisional headquarters and the 4th Battalion
+returned to Saigon after the initial phases of
+the operation had been executed, leaving the 2d
+Battalion and an engineer platoon to continue
+security operations in the area and build the strategic
+hamlet.<a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[8-B]</a> When the operation finally ended
+on 11 April, the Vietnamese Marines had lost a
+total of five men killed and 14 wounded. Mines
+and snipers had produced most of these casualties.
+The Marines accounted for 11 Viet Cong killed
+and 14 wounded.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="label">[8-B]</a> Lieutenant Colonel Moody noted that the Vietnamese
+Marines seldom were involved in the actual construction of
+strategic hamlets. This task was normally left to the civil
+authorities in the area who more often than not used the local
+population as a labor force. (<cite>Moody Comments.</cite>)</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>In the closing days of April, the JGS ordered
+Lieutenant Colonel Khang to form two infantry
+battalions and an artillery element into a provisional
+brigade for immediate assignment to II
+Corps. There the Vietnamese Marines were to join<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">103</span>
+elements of the 2d and 25th ARVN Divisions for a
+multi-regiment thrust into the rugged mountains
+just south of the I Corps-II Corps border. Code
+named BACH PHOUNG XI, this offensive was to
+penetrate the Do Xa, a Viet Cong base area never
+before entered by government forces. Centered in
+that portion of the Annamite Mountains where
+the borders of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and Kontum
+Provinces converged, the Do Xa had been
+under Communist control since the early stages of
+the French-Indochina War. In this remote, inaccessible
+mountainous zone the Viet Cong reportedly
+had built-up extensive staging areas and training
+camps. Prisoner interrogations obtained throughout
+the early 1960s revealed that many North
+Vietnamese soldiers entering the South’s northern
+provinces had infiltrated the Do Xa before moving
+into the densely populated coastal lowlands of
+Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. Additionally,
+the area was thought to contain the Communist
+military headquarters for Military Region
+5 (MR-5).</p>
+
+<p>After alerting his 2d and 4th Battalions, a pack
+howitzer battery, a reconnaissance platoon, and a
+headquarters element, Khang flew with Lieutenant
+Colonel Moody to Pleiku for planning conferences
+with Major General Nguyen Khanh and his II
+Corps staff. The concept of BACH PHOUNG XI,
+Khang and Moody learned, called for U.S. Marine
+and Army helicopters to lift ARVN infantry and
+artillery elements into positions which would form
+a loose ring around the suspected center of the
+Do Xa base area. The ARVN units would then
+begin contracting this ring in stages, whereupon
+the provisional Marine brigade would be helilifted
+into its center, the heart of the Do Xa, to search for
+Communist camps. To control the entire operation
+General Khanh would establish a corps headquarters
+forward at Plateau Gi, a Montagnard village
+located on the southern edge of the operations
+area, about 25 miles northeast of Kontum.</p>
+
+<p>On 1 May, U.S. Air Force C-123 transports
+airlifted Khang and the 2,000-man provisional
+Marine brigade from the capital to Quang Ngai.
+Both Lieutenant Colonel Moody and Major Croft,
+the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor and artillery
+advisor, accompanied the Marine force. The next
+day an ARVN truck convoy transported the
+Marines from Quang Ngai some 40 miles north to
+Tam Ky, the roadside town which served as the
+capital of Quang Tin Province. The 2d Battalion,
+advised by Captain Taylor, dismounted from the
+trucks and assembled at Tam Ky air strip while the
+remainder of the convoy turned west onto a narrow
+dirt road which curved through the foothills
+and deep into the jungle-covered Annamite Chain.
+Meanwhile, Army H-21s from Pleiku landed at
+Tam Ky, loaded assault elements of the 2d Battalion,
+and began helilifting them into a stream-side
+landing zone some 30 miles southwest of the
+provincial capital. The convoy carrying the balance
+of the Marine force continued its southwest motor
+march until it reached the small ARVN-held town
+of Tra My. There, some 24 miles southwest of Tam
+Ky, Khang established his command post in a
+school house adjacent to a crude little dirt airstrip.
+The 75mm pack howitzer battery, advised
+by Major Croft, set up its weapons nearby while the
+reconnaissance platoon and elements of the 4th
+Battalion, advised by Captain Christensen, established
+security. When these units were in place
+U.S. Marine UH-34Ds from Da Nang lifted a
+TAFDS fuel bladder and pump to the airfield.
+Once the helilift of the 2d Battalion was completed,
+the Army H-21s, refueling from the TAFDS
+bladder, began lifting the 4th Battalion into the
+2d Battalion’s landing zone, which was located
+several miles south of Tra My.</p>
+
+<p>With the initial movement into the operations
+area accomplished and the brigade command post
+functioning, the two infantry battalions began
+combing a deep valley and the adjacent mountains
+for Communist base camps. After several days
+Khang’s Marines located one rather complete camp
+but encountered no resistance upon entering the
+position. Once again the occupants, probably forewarned
+by the initial movement of the ARVN
+units into the area, had withdrawn ahead of the
+Marines. The only people found in the camp were
+a North Vietnamese doctor and nurse. A subsequent
+search of the bamboo huts and the underlying
+tunnel complex did produce a supply cache.
+The Vietnamese Marines discovered several rifles,
+six typewriters, three sewing machines, a radio,
+44 maps, a French artillery computing board, and
+scores of flashlight batteries.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_103" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_104.jpg" width="1883" height="2586" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+LOCATION OF DO XA<br>
+BASE AREA<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>ARVN and Marine operations in the area during
+the next two weeks failed to locate any large Viet
+Cong elements. For the most part the Marines
+busied themselves by destroying a few abandoned<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">105</span>
+camps and some cultivated crops. ARVN units
+operating around the Marines reported scattered
+action as they engaged small groups of Viet Cong
+attempting to escape from the center of the Do Xa.
+BACH PHOUNG XI concluded in mid-May when
+U.S. Marine UH-34Ds lifted the VNMC battalions
+back to Tra My. From there the Marines returned
+by convoy to Quang Ngai where they staged for
+the airlift back to Saigon. The statistics for the
+Marine portion of the operation revealed that only
+two Viet Cong soldiers had been killed. Khang’s
+force suffered 36 wounded, most as a result of
+encounters with booby traps constructed from
+sharpened bamboo spikes. ARVN forces fared only
+slightly better, having killed barely a score of
+Communists. Except for the fact that they had
+demonstrated their ability to penetrate the most
+difficult Viet Cong sanctuary, the two week offensive
+into the Do Xa base area had little impact on
+the war effort. From the standpoint of training
+and experience, however, the operation was
+beneficial. The Vietnamese Marines and their
+advisors learned a great deal about construction of
+landing zones and about directing helicopters,
+fields in which they had received little previous
+training.<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[8-C]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="label">[8-C]</a> An interesting sidelight to this operation was that it stimulated
+somewhat of a fad in the offices at MACV and the JGS.
+Military officials from Saigon who visited the brigade command
+post, including General Weede, took back large water-smoothed
+rocks as souvenirs of their trip to the infamous Viet Cong
+stronghold. Printed on the side of these ornate stones were the
+words “Do Xa, May 1963.” (<cite>Moody Comments.</cite>)</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>In early September Lieutenant Colonel Wesley C.
+Noren, recently transferred from the 2d Marine
+Division where he had served as Assistant G-3,
+arrived in Saigon to replace Lieutenant Colonel
+Moody as the Senior Marine Advisor to the
+Vietnamese Marine Corps. Already selected for
+promotion to colonel, Noren would become the
+seventh Senior Marine Advisor when Moody
+left Vietnam in October.</p>
+
+<p>In mid-October the Vietnamese Marine commanders
+formed a provisional regiment for Operation
+PHI-HOA 5, which was to be conducted
+in III Corps Tactical Zone.<a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[8-D]</a> The 1st, 3d, and
+4th Battalions, supported by a composite artillery
+battery and the reconnaissance company, joined
+ARVN, VNAF, and Vietnamese Navy units in
+a major search and clear campaign in the northwest
+corner of Gia Dinh Province, only about 20 miles
+southeast of Saigon. Like many other large government
+military operations undertaken in 1963,
+this one failed to uncover any major enemy forces.
+The Communist soldiers again managed to elude
+government forces. An extensive tunnel and cave
+network, which the Marines systematically destroyed
+with demolitions, was discovered under
+the entire area. Still, the Marines managed to
+kill only six Viet Cong and capture 10. Two
+Vietnamese Marines were killed and 36 others
+wounded before the operation terminated on 1
+November.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="label">[8-D]</a> After the realignment of the CTZs the previous December,
+III Corps included a 200-mile-long section of Vietnam which
+encompassed the southern one third of the Central Highlands
+and the area south to the boundary of the Capital Military
+District near Saigon.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<figure id="ip_105" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_105.jpg" width="914" height="679" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the
+Marine Corps, and Lieutenant Colonel Wesley G. Noren,
+Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps,
+confer with Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant
+of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (<cite>USMC
+Photo A420917</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The coup d’etat which toppled President Diem
+from power began the same day that Operation
+PHI-HOA 5 concluded. Instead of returning to
+their base camps, the 1st and 4th Vietnamese
+Marine Battalions, accompanied by the composite
+battery, moved into the capital to participate in
+the power struggle. These units actually launched
+the coup by seizing key installations in the heart
+of the city while the 2d VNMC Battalion blocked
+the highway to Bien Hoa, thus preventing loyalist
+intervention. Sporadic fighting against troops loyal
+to Diem continued until the early morning of
+2 November when the 4th Battalion finally stormed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">107</span>
+and captured the presidental palace. Four Vietnamese
+Marines were killed and 12 wounded during
+the battles in Saigon. No U.S. Marines were involved
+in the fighting as Lieutenant Colonel Noren
+directed his subordinate advisors to remain in their
+quarters. When the situation stabilized, the advisors
+rejoined their units and resumed their normal
+duties.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_107" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;">
+  <img src="images/i_106.jpg" width="1834" height="2580" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+CORPS TACTICAL ZONES<br>
+1963–1964<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Combat operations against the Communist guerrillas
+resumed for the Vietnamese Marine Brigade
+in the second week of November. Accompanied by
+its U.S. Marine advisor, Captain James P. McWilliams,
+the 3d Battalion initiated a search and clear
+operation in III Corps in conjunction with the 11th
+ARVN Regiment on 10 November. The next day
+the Vietnamese Marines clashed sharply with a
+substantial Viet Cong force west of My Tho and
+suffered six killed and 21 wounded. Nineteen enemy
+bodies were found on the battlefield along with
+four weapons, several grenades, and some documents.
+McWilliams, respected by his fellow advisors
+for his candid and forthright assessments,
+later recalled that such encounters were the exception
+rather than the rule. “While the Vietnamese
+Marines were individually good fighters and
+showed tenacity in most cases against forces that
+would stand and fight, this was not the nature of
+the conflict,” he lamented. More often than not,
+McWilliams went on to explain, the highly mobile
+Viet Cong could elude the larger, more cumbersome
+government units.<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">[8-2]</a></p>
+
+<p>On 14 November, the same day that the combined
+Marine-ARVN operation in III Corps terminated,
+the Vietnamese Marine command formed a provisional
+regiment to control operations DAI-PHONG
+28 and 29, which were to be conducted
+concurrently in the same general area. Composed
+of the 1st and 3d Battalions, and a 75mm pack
+howitzer platoon, the Marine force searched until
+21 November for Viet Cong units thought to be in
+Binh Duong Province but with discouraging results.
+Only one enemy was killed, two prisoners
+taken, and three weapons captured at the expense
+of five dead and 13 wounded Marines.</p>
+
+<p>A week later the 2d Battalion, now advised
+by Captain Joseph N. Smith, fought a more typical
+action while participating in Operation DAI-PHONG
+30. The battalion commander, Captain
+Nguyen Thanh Yen, received orders for the operation
+during the early morning hours of 25 November.
+Shortly after daybreak nearly 550 Vietnamese
+Marines boarded trucks at their camp near Thu
+Duc for the trip to Bien Hoa airfield. Upon arrival,
+officers from III Corps headquarters informed
+Captain Yen that his battalion was to conduct a
+heliborne assault against Hoi Dong Sam, a Viet
+Cong-held village in western Hau Nghia Province
+just west of Saigon. The purpose of the operation
+was to intercept a guerrilla force which had overrun
+the nearby Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp the
+previous day and had taken several American
+prisoners. The enemy unit was believed to be using
+Hoi Dong Sam as a way station while attempting
+to escape across the Cambodian border.<a id="FNanchor_130" href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[8-3]</a></p>
+
+<p>The operation began at about 0800 when eight
+U.S. Army H-21 “Flying Bananas” from the
+145th Aviation Battalion helilifted Captain Smith,
+a Vietnamese company commander, and his
+90-man assault force from Bien Hoa. Eight Army
+UH-1B gunships and a U.S. Air Force O-1B
+Bird Dog observation aircraft escorted the transport
+helicopters on the 20-minute flight to the
+objective area. The gunships were put to use almost
+immediately when Communist .50 caliber machine
+gun fire erupted from a treeline at the eastern edge
+of the village. Under the suppressive fire of the
+UH-1Bs, the first wave of H-21s landed the assault
+force in some partially flooded rice paddies about
+700 meters east of the Viet Cong positions. The
+Marine assault force quickly deployed into a
+treeline on the western edge of the landing zone.
+From this position the company began returning
+fire with rifles and .30 caliber machine guns.
+The Air Force forward air controller (FAC)
+overhead in the O-1B and the Army gunships
+prevented the enemy from withdrawing across
+the open rice paddies which surrounded the
+objective on the north, south, and west.</p>
+
+<p>The distance between the assembly area at Bien
+Hoa and the landing zone combined with the
+scarcity of transport helicopters to slow the
+progress of the helilift. The landings continued at
+40-minute intervals while the UH-1B gunships
+teamed with the Vietnamese Marine assault force
+to suppress the enemy’s fire. The last elements
+of the battalion were finally landed about two hours
+after the initial assault. Largely because of the
+effective suppressive fires from the air and ground,
+no aircraft were hit during the helilift.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">108</span></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_108" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;">
+  <img src="images/i_108.jpg" width="1847" height="2604" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+2d VNMC BATTALION ATTACK ON<br>
+HOI DONG SAM 25 NOV 1963<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">109</span></p>
+
+<p>Once the entire battalion was on the ground, the
+assault company, augmented by a pair of 60mm
+mortars and two 57mm recoilless rifles, provided
+a base of fire to protect the movement of its sister
+companies. Captain Yen maneuvered his three
+remaining rifle companies and a battalion command
+group north to a position from which they could
+launch an envelopment on the fortified village.
+Using a treeline which bordered an irrigation
+canal as cover, the force hooked westward until
+it was directly north of the Viet Cong position.
+Meanwhile, a FARM GATE twin-engine B-26
+relieved the UH-1B gunships on station. At this
+point in the action the Air Force FAC observed a
+group of 30–40 enemy attempting to flee from the
+northwest corner of Hoi Dong Sam. After clearing
+the target with the Marine battalion, he directed
+the B-26 to attack the target with its 250-pound
+bombs. The aircraft made several bombing passes
+and dispersed the Viet Cong. When the air strike
+ended the enveloping force began its assault against
+the northern edge of the village with two companies
+abreast and one following in reserve several
+hundred meters to the rear. Once the assault force
+was in motion the base of fire displaced forward,
+firing as they moved, to a small canal about 120
+meters in front of the .50 caliber positions in the
+treeline. The two assault companies, followed
+closely by Yen, Smith, and the battalion command
+group, penetrated the northern end of the village
+and swept through to its southern periphery. The
+commander of the company on the east (or left)
+flank, deployed elements into the treeline where
+the Viet Cong automatic weapons had been active.
+Following a sharp but brief exchange of gunfire,
+the Marines cleared the position. They found eight
+enemy dead and three .50 caliber machine guns.</p>
+
+<p>By noon the 2d Battalion had secured the entire
+village. Captain Yen ordered his assault companies
+to establish a perimeter defense and the reserve
+company to begin a systematic search of the position.
+His Marines uncovered a number of well-camouflaged
+bunkers and fighting positions. In
+a small canal just east of the village the Marines
+found the mount for another heavy caliber automatic
+weapon. They also discovered eight Viet
+Cong suspects and detained them for questioning.
+One rifle company moved to investigate the area
+where the B-26 had attacked the fleeing enemy
+earlier in the morning but found no evidence of
+additional casualties. Following the capture of
+Hoi Dong Sam, Yen’s battalion conducted patrols
+for several days in search of the Viet Cong force
+that had attacked the Hiep Hoa Special Forces
+camp on the 25th. The enemy force, however,
+eluded the Marines by gaining refuge in Cambodia.
+The battalion returned to garrison at Thu Duc on
+28 November.</p>
+
+<p>In many ways the results of DAI-PHONG 30
+pointed up the problems which frequently frustrated
+GVN military forces and their American
+advisors. The 2d Battalion had seized its objective
+and in so doing had killed a handful of Viet Cong
+and detained a number of suspects. The Marines
+had captured three heavy caliber automatic weapons
+and an assortment of small arms—all without
+suffering a single casualty of their own. Still, it
+was difficult to translate the action into victory.
+The Marines, along with the other government
+forces involved in the operation, had failed to
+intercept the Viet Cong raiding force in its flight
+toward the international boundary. Moreover,
+most of the occupants of Hoi Dong Sam had made
+good their escape despite the presence of observation
+and attack aircraft. Like many other government
+military operations undertaken during the
+1961–1964 period, DAI-PHONG 30 was successful
+from a statistical standpoint but did little to wrest
+the tactical initiative from the guerrillas.</p>
+
+<p>In the first week of December, the Vietnamese
+Joint General Staff ordered VNMC units to conduct
+an extended search in the jungles of western Tay
+Ninh Province in III Corps. A special Marine Task
+Force composed of the 1st and 3d Battalions was
+helilifted into the area on 3 December to begin
+Operation DAI-PHONG 31. This operation was
+punctuated by two major engagements and frequent
+enemy harassment. In one particularly vicious
+clash, the Vietnamese Marines incurred heavy
+casualties while attempting to fight out of a skillfully
+executed Viet Cong ambush. When the operation
+concluded on 9 December, the Vietnamese
+Marines had suffered 11 men killed, 58 wounded,
+and 1 captured. Nine Viet Cong bodies were
+found and another Communist soldier was captured.
+The enemy left four individual weapons on
+the battlefield.</p>
+
+<p>In mid-December, South Vietnam’s new leaders
+removed Lieutenant Colonel Khang from his position
+as Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">110</span>
+Corps. Although he had not participated in the
+November coup, Khang had been a political appointee
+of President Diem and as such was viewed
+as a potential threat to the new regime. After being
+promoted to colonel, he was assigned to the Philippines
+as the Republic of Vietnam’s Armed Forces
+Attache. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, who
+had been serving as Assistant Commandant and
+Chief of Staff of the VNMC, was appointed as
+Khang’s successor. He assumed command of the
+Vietnamese Marine Corps on 16 December.</p>
+
+<p>Vietnamese Marine Brigade units continued
+operations against the Viet Cong following
+Khang’s relief but fought no major engagements.
+Near the end of December, with the nation drifting
+into political uncertainty and its own top
+leadership changed, the morale of the Vietnamese
+Marine Corps plummeted. Lieutenant Colonel
+Noren saw this unfortunate trend as a by-product
+of the general political instability which was
+beginning to grip the country rather than a reflection
+of Lien’s leadership. Indeed, Noren thought
+the new VNMC commandant to be an extraordinarily
+capable officer.<a id="FNanchor_131" href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[8-4]</a> In any case, as 1963 ended
+the U.S. Marine advisors were reporting climbing
+desertion rates in almost every battalion.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_110"><i>Accomplishments</i></h3>
+
+<p>Even though 1963 closed upon a discouraging
+note, the Marine Advisory Division could report
+positively on its own activities. At the urging of
+the Senior Marine Advisor, the Vietnamese Marine
+Corps had reinstituted multi-battalion combat
+operations. Steps had also been taken to cut the
+VNMC’s last formal ties to the ARVN by creating
+a separate Marine Corps recruit training facility.
+When activated this training center was expected
+to provide VNMC battalions with a stream of enlisted
+men who would possess a background of
+higher quality basic training.</p>
+
+<p>As for personal achievements, the U.S. Marine
+advisors had accompanied their units in every combat
+operation during 1963 except the November
+coup. No advisors had been killed in the 12-month
+period and only four (two of whom were on temporary
+assignment from the 3d Marine Division)
+had been wounded. The first combat decorations
+other than Purple Heart Medals for wounds were
+also approved and awarded to the advisors during
+the year. On 13 December, Captains Don Christensen
+and Frank Zimolzak, former advisors to
+the 4th and 3d Battalions respectively, were
+awarded the Bronze Star Medals with the Combat
+“V” for meritorious service. Captain Richard
+Taylor, an advisor with the 2d Battalion, earned
+the first Silver Star Medal during the same period
+for “conspicuous gallantry” between November
+1962 and October 1963. Captain Joseph N. Smith,
+advisor to the 2d and 4th VNMC Battalions, earned
+the second Silver Star for gallantry displayed
+between October 1963 and April 1964.<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[8-E]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="label">[8-E]</a> Both Silver Star Medals were awarded during 1964.</p>
+
+</div>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">111</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_9"><span id="toclink_111"></span>CHAPTER 9<br>
+<span class="subhead large">SHUFLY Operations</span><br>
+<span class="subhead notbold"><i>Development of the Compound Continues—Combat Support Operations—The
+Situation in Vietnam</i></span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p>SHUFLY, the only U.S. Marine tactical command
+assigned to South Vietnam, continued its
+combat support operations in the semi-isolated
+northern provinces throughout 1963. Although
+the size of I Corps had been reduced in late 1962
+when the Vietnamese Joint General Staff shifted
+Quang Ngai Province to II CTZ, the mission of
+the Marine task element remained essentially
+unchanged. As the new year opened Lieutenant
+Colonel McCully’s command was still responsible
+for providing direct helicopter support to the
+forces of the five northern provinces. Likewise,
+the government’s order of battle in the northern
+provinces had not changed to any great degree.
+The 1st ARVN Division still occupied the coastal
+plains south of the DMZ in Quang Tri and Thua
+Thien Provinces. Headquartered at Da Nang, the
+2d ARVN Division continued to carry the main
+burden of operations against the Viet Cong in
+Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. Operating
+in Quang Ngai Province to the south of the new
+I Corps-II Corps border were elements of the 25th
+ARVN Division. Interspersed along the coastal
+lowlands among the various regular battalions
+of these three divisions were small paramilitary
+garrisons. In the mountains to the west, the
+scattered Special Forces outposts with their Montagnard
+defenders continued their struggle for
+survival while monitoring Communist infiltration.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_111a"><i>Development of the Compound Continues</i></h3>
+
+<p>The first month of 1963 saw three important
+changes in the composition and leadership of
+Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6. On 11 January,
+HMM-162, a UH-34D squadron commanded by
+Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu, replaced Lieutenant
+Colonel Rathbun’s HMM-163 as the task
+element’s helicopter unit. Five days later, on the
+16th, Lieutenant Colonel George H. Linnemeier,
+winner of four Distinguished Flying Crosses during
+World War II and Korea, relieved Lieutenant
+Colonel Davis as the MABS-16 sub unit commander.
+In the last week of January Lieutenant
+Colonel Harold F. Brown, a veteran aviator who
+had piloted scout-dive bombers during the Second
+World War, arrived at Da Nang and assumed
+command of the task element from Lieutenant
+Colonel McCully.</p>
+
+<p>During McCully’s tour as the Commander,
+Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6, the Marine compound
+at Da Nang had begun to assume a quality
+of permanency which had never been evident at
+Soc Trang. The utilities section of the MABS-16
+detachment was responsible for many of the more
+noticeable improvements. By the first of the
+new year they had constructed several shelters
+on the west side of the runway to cover the motor
+transport section’s working area. They also had
+replaced the electrical system and repaired some of
+the damaged plumbing in the living areas. The
+task element’s special services section had begun
+to provide the Da Nang Marines with entertainment
+by showing nightly movies, arranging
+fishing trips into Da Nang harbor, and issuing
+athletic equipment.</p>
+
+<p>The monsoon season, which was characterized
+by cold rains, high winds, and deep mud, proved
+to be a source of much irritation to the Marines
+during the winter of 1962–1963. In addition to
+slowing flight operations and creating almost
+constant discomfort, the weather caused some
+unforeseen complications. In October 1962, heavy
+rainfall had combined with constant vehicle usage
+to turn the road between the living area and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">112</span>
+flight line into a quagmire that was virtually
+impassable. At the time, Colonel Ireland, then
+the task unit commander, had responded by
+requesting equipment from Okinawa to improve
+the Marines’ only road link with their aircraft.
+Wing authorities promptly complied and a road
+grader was flown in by KC-130 (the new designation
+for the GV-1 Hercules). Within days a 700-foot
+section of the road was opened and a drainage
+ditch dug along its entire length.</p>
+
+<p>This measure proved to be only temporary,
+however, for in January the mud again threatened
+to cut the Marine vehicles off from the east side
+of the airfield. Lieutenant Colonel McCully
+obtained a bulldozer from Okinawa to make more
+permanent repairs. With the help of this piece
+of equipment, the Marines constructed a new 400-foot
+section of road on an eight-inch rock base.
+These repairs proved to be satisfactory and the
+road caused no further problem during the remainder
+of the monsoon season.</p>
+
+<p>Improvements in the compound continued to be
+made under the task element’s new commander,
+Lieutenant Colonel Brown. In April action was
+taken on an earlier request for the assignment of a
+security detachment to guard the Marine area. A
+reconnaissance platoon of 47 Marines from the 3d
+Marine Division joined the task element, thus
+freeing the men of the helicopter squadron and the
+MABS-16 sub unit of the important secondary
+responsibility they had held since the task unit’s
+deployment to Soc Trang. The assignment of the
+ground Marines was timely in that it corresponded
+with a reduction by the ARVN of its forces guarding
+the perimeter of the Da Nang airbase. One
+Marine general later observed that with the arrival
+of the infantry unit, “the air-ground team was in
+being in Vietnam.”<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">[9-1]</a></p>
+
+<p>Other less obvious changes that contributed to
+the overall efficiency of the Marine task element
+also occurred during the early spring. In April, the
+task element commander was able to assign a better
+facility to medical and dental services. They had
+been crowded into one of the small structures along
+with other offices since the displacement from Soc
+Trang, but now were moved into a separate building
+in the living compound.</p>
+
+<p>Another problem that plagued the Marines
+during their entire first year at Da Nang—inadequate
+water supply—was finally solved in late
+1963. Originally the task unit had depended on a
+shallow well from which water was pumped and
+purified. The Marines nearly exhausted this source
+shortly after their arrival at Da Nang late in the
+dry season and their commanders were forced to
+impose strict water discipline. The monsoon rains
+eased the water crisis but by January production
+again dropped, this time as a result of the accumulation
+of heavy silt in the pumps. A Vietnamese
+contractor was engaged to clean and repair the
+pumping system but the problem soon recurred.
+In the early spring two new shallow wells were
+dug, one in the motor transport working area and
+the other in the living compound. With the onset
+of the dry season, however, the Marines again
+were forced to conserve water. This time the shortage
+became so acute that tank trucks were required
+to haul some 16,000 gallons of water a day from a
+nearby Air Force installation. Finally, in November,
+a detachment from a Navy construction battalion
+completed a well 450 feet deep and capped
+it with a high pressure pump. This proved to be
+the permanent solution to the long-standing water
+shortage.</p>
+
+<p>Over the course of the year the Marines received
+several new vehicles which helped relieve the burden
+on the rebuilt buses which were beginning to
+falter under heavy use. Four 10-passenger, four-wheel-drive
+trucks and two M-442 “Mighty
+Mite” jeeps were flown in by KC-130s from Okinawa
+and assigned to the task element’s motor
+transport section. By summer, two of the old buses
+were replaced with tactical passenger vehicles
+which were better suited for transporting personnel
+between the barracks and work areas. The addition
+of the new vehicles also allowed the mess hall to
+begin transporting hot noon meals to the men
+working on the east side of the airstrip. A mess
+line set up in the hangar area fed those Marines
+who previously had lost time by travelling to the
+living compound for noon meals.</p>
+
+<p>Two changes were made in the task element’s
+command structure in midyear. On 5 July Lieutenant
+Colonel Earl W. Cassidy, a veteran aviator
+with 20 years service, relieved Lieutenant Colonel
+Linnemeier as commanding officer of the MABS-16
+sub unit. Two weeks later, on the 18th, Colonel
+Andre D. Gomez, a Marine who had distinguished
+himself as an artillery officer during World War II<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">113</span>
+before becoming a pilot, assumed command of
+Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6.</p>
+
+<p>In summary, the improvements made in the
+task element’s compound during the course of
+1963 helped insure the successful support of sustained
+combat helicopter operations. Although
+overshadowed by the publicity which the actual
+flight operations attracted, the continued improvement
+of the Da Nang base was vital to the overall
+effectiveness of the Marine combat support effort.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_113"><i>Combat Support Operations</i></h3>
+
+<p>Marine helicopter support for government forces
+in I Corps encountered a brief interruption shortly
+after the new year began when HMM-163 was
+replaced by a fresh UH-34D squadron. Marine
+KC-130s shuttled between Okinawa and Da Nang
+for several days during the second week of January
+bringing the officers and men of HMM-162 to
+Vietnam and returning with members of HMM-163.
+The change-over of units was completed on
+11 January when Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun
+officially transferred his squadron’s aircraft and
+maintenance equipment to the newly-arrived unit.</p>
+
+<p>In the five months and ten days since they initiated
+operations at Soc Trang, “Rathbun’s Ridge
+Runners” had amassed an enviable combat record.
+The squadron’s crews had flown a total of 10,869
+hours, 15,200 sorties, and had lifted over 25,216
+combat assault troops and 59,024 other passengers.
+In one month alone (August) they had established
+a Marine Corps record for medium helicopter
+squadrons by flying 2,543 helicopter hours. These
+records had not been set without risks, however.
+During the course of their operations in the Mekong
+Delta and in I Corps, helicopters operated
+by HMM-163’s crews had been hit on 32 occasions
+by Communist small arms fire.<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">[9-2]</a> Moreover, the
+squadron had become the first Marine unit to suffer
+combat casualties in the Vietnam conflict.</p>
+
+<p>HMM-162, led by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt
+Leu, the veteran Marine aviator who had
+commanded the squadron during the recent deployment
+to Thailand as part of the 3d MEU, began
+full-fledged combat support operations the same
+day that the last of Rathbun’s squadron departed
+Da Nang. HMM-162’s crews, many of whom had
+participated in similar operations around Udorn
+the previous summer, limited their early flights
+to routine resupply missions and a few medical
+evacuations. Such missions enabled the squadron’s
+personnel to become better acquainted with the
+terrain over which they would operate during the
+next six months.</p>
+
+<p>The new squadron participated in its first major
+combat troop lift on January 19, when a break in
+the monsoon allowed the 2d ARVN Division to
+execute a heliborne operation into the mountains
+about 15 miles west of Da Nang. Eighteen Marine
+UH-34Ds lifted 300 ARVN troops into three
+separate landing zones near a suspected Communist
+base area. The squadron’s pilots and crews
+encountered their first Viet Cong opposition during
+this troop lift. Upright bamboo stakes obstructed
+one of the landing zones while at another the enemy
+fired at the Marine aircraft with small arms.
+Although two UH-34Ds were hit, none were
+shot down and the mission was completed successfully.</p>
+
+<p>A month later, on 18 February, the Marine pilots
+experienced another of the hazards associated with
+flight operations in Vietnam while attempting to
+land troops from the 1st ARVN Division in a
+clearing about 18 miles southwest of Hue. Five
+helicopters sustained punctures in the bottoms
+of their fuselages when they accidentally landed on
+tree stumps concealed by high grass in the landing
+zone. One stump caused extensive damage to an
+aircraft when it ripped into its forward fuel cell.
+The crew was forced to leave the UH-34D in
+the field under ARVN protection overnight. The
+next morning Marine mechanics were flown in
+from Da Nang to repair the helicopter.</p>
+
+<p>Despite several troop lifts involving a dozen
+or more aircraft, heliborne assault missions did
+not dominate HMM-162’s operations during the
+unit’s first three months in South Vietnam. Poor
+weather conditions over the northern provinces
+continued to restrict flight operations generally
+to resupply and medical evacuation missions.
+Statistics for the first quarter of 1963, for example,
+indicated that Marine helicopters conducted 6,537
+logistics sorties as opposed to 1,181 tactical support
+sorties.</p>
+
+<p>The single most significant incident during
+HMM-162’s initial three months in Vietnam took
+place in the second week of March when the
+squadron suffered its first aircraft losses and casualties.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">114</span>
+These were incurred during a salvage-rescue
+attempt in the mountains of northern II Corps.
+The incident began on 10 March as two Marine
+UH-34Ds attempted to insert a four-man American-Vietnamese
+ground rescue team into the jungle
+about 30 miles southwest of Quang Ngai. The
+team’s assignment was to locate a U.S. Army OV-1
+Mohawk (a twin-engine, turboprop, electronic reconnaissance
+aircraft manufactured by Grumman)
+which had crashed, and its pilot, who had parachuted
+into the jungle. The exact site of the
+accident had not been located but the general area
+was known to be a steep jungle-covered mountain,
+the elevation of which approached 5,000 feet.
+While attempting to lower search personnel into
+the jungle by means of a hoist, one of the helicopters
+lost power and crashed. The ARVN ranger
+who was on the hoist when the accident occurred
+was killed but the helicopter’s crew managed to
+climb from the wreckage shortly before it erupted
+in flames. The copilot, Captain David N. Webster,
+was severely burned in the explosion.</p>
+
+<p>Other Marine UH-34Ds from Da Nang joined in
+the rescue operation, refueling from the TAFDS at
+Quang Ngai for the flight into the mountains. The
+situation was complicated further when a second
+Marine helicopter experienced a power loss and
+crashed near the burned-out UH-34D hulk while
+attempting to land a rescue team composed of
+MABS-16 Marines. Fortunately, the aircraft did
+not burn and the only injury incurred in the crash
+was a sprained ankle, but the extremely steep and
+densely jungled terrain kept the Marines from
+reaching the site of the other downed helicopter.
+Bad weather and darkness prevented further efforts
+to extricate the various American and South Vietnamese
+personnel from the jungle that day. During
+the night Captain Webster died of injuries.</p>
+
+<p>The next day, the Marines stripped a UH-34D of
+some 700 pounds of equipment so as to enable it to
+operate more efficiently at the extreme elevations
+in the vicinity of the crash sites. After carefully
+maneuvering the helicopter into a hovering position,
+the pilot was able to extract the survivors
+and the dead copilot from the site where the first
+UH-34D had crashed and burned. The survivors
+were flown to Quang Ngai. There the wounded
+were treated and later evacuated by U.S. Air Force
+transport to an American hospital at Nha Trang.</p>
+
+<p>While these events were taking place, the Marines
+from the second downed helicopter, guided by
+search aircraft operating over the area, located and
+recovered the injured Army Mohawk pilot. This
+accomplished, the Marines hacked out a small
+clearing from which they were evacuated by
+another Marine helicopter.</p>
+
+<p>The episode was not yet over, however, as the
+crashed OV-1 and its payload of advanced electronics
+equipment still had not been secured.
+Finally, an ARVN ranger company, which had
+joined the search, reached the remnants of the
+Mohawk and established security around the site
+while U.S. Army technicians were helilifted in to
+examine the debris. The Marine UH-34D, which
+had crashed nearby without burning and was
+damaged beyond repair, was cannibalized for usable
+parts and then destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>On 13 March, with the search and rescue tasks
+completed, Marine helicopters began shuttling
+South Vietnamese rangers to Mang Buc, a nearby
+government outpost. During this phase of the
+mission the helicopters received fire from Viet
+Cong who had moved into positions near the rangers’
+perimeter. Three UH-34Ds delivered suppressive
+fire on the enemy with their door-mounted
+M-60 machine guns while the remaining helicopters
+picked up the troops in the landing zone. This
+was the first recorded instance of a Marine helicopter
+providing close air support in actual combat.</p>
+
+<p>Other developments occurred in the early months
+of 1963 which either directly or indirectly affected
+the conduct of Marine helicopter operations. One
+was the improved coordination of intelligence
+gathering and usage among all South Vietnamese
+and American agencies within I Corps. This effort,
+which was essentially a concerted drive to streamline
+the collection and flow of intelligence information,
+was stimulated by a series of corps-wide
+intelligence seminars, the first of which was held
+in early February. Of special interest to the Marine
+aviators was the establishment of closer liaison
+between the Marine task element, U.S. Army
+Special Forces, and South Vietnamese units in the
+northern corps tactical zone.</p>
+
+<p>Closely related to the improvement of the overall
+intelligence situation was the acquisition of
+some new equipment by the SHUFLY Marines.
+In March the task element received two new
+model hand-held aerial cameras for use by the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">115</span>
+crews of the O-1B observation aircraft. Later in
+the month a photo lab was completed to facilitate
+the rapid processing of the photographs. By the
+end of the month the Marines were also being
+provided with high altitude photographic coverage
+of some objective areas taken by U.S. Air
+Force reconnaissance jets.</p>
+
+<p>The tempo of Marine helicopter operations began
+to quicken in early April with the advent of sustained
+periods of clear weather. On 13 April,
+HMM-162 participated in a major heliborne
+assault in which 435 2d ARVN Division troops
+were lifted into a suspected Communist stronghold
+in the mountains along the Song Thu Bon, about 30
+miles south of Da Nang. As in most troop lift missions,
+the Marine O-1Bs provided reconnaissance
+and radio relay support. For the first time in the
+war Marine transport helicopters were escorted
+by helicopter gunships, the UH-1B Iroquois (a
+single-engine, turbine-powered utility helicopter
+built by the Bell Helicopter Company). Five
+UH-1Bs from a detachment of the Army’s Da
+Nang-based 68th Aviation Company, armed with
+M-60 machine gun clusters and 2.75-inch rockets,
+joined the VNAF fighter bombers to conduct preparatory
+airstrikes on the landing zones.</p>
+
+<p>The initial landing met no enemy resistance but
+later in the day action in the operational area
+intensified. A Marine UH-34D was hit by eight
+rounds of enemy small arms fire while attempting
+to evacuate wounded South Vietnamese soldiers
+and U.S. Army advisors from a landing zone near
+the point where the ARVN forces had been landed
+that morning. With the copilot, First Lieutenant
+John D. Olmen, wounded, the badly damaged
+aircraft force landed in the Vietnamese position.</p>
+
+<p>Two other Marine helicopters were dispatched
+to the scene to pick up the Marine crew and complete
+the evacuation. They managed to evacuate
+Lieutenant Olmen, a wounded American advisor,
+and one dead and four wounded ARVN soldiers
+without incident. On a return trip to pick up more
+wounded, however, one of the two UH-34Ds suffered
+heavy damage from Viet Cong fire. In this
+incident the crew chief, Corporal Charley M.
+Campbell, was wounded in the thigh, chest, and
+back by small arms fire, and the aircraft was forced
+to land near the first downed helicopter. The accompanying
+UH-34D landed, picked up Campbell,
+and returned him to Da Nang for emergency treatment.
+Repair teams were helilifted to the position
+on the afternoon of the 13th, and began repairing
+both helicopters. One was able to return to Da Nang
+later that day but the other required extensive
+repairs and could not be flown to safety until the
+15th.</p>
+
+<p>While HMM-162 repair crews were working
+feverishly to extricate their aircraft from the
+predicament along the banks of the Song Thu Bon,
+another of their helicopters was shot down nearby
+while supporting the same operation. This aircraft
+was hit four times while approaching an
+ARVN landing zone located in a small valley about
+three miles south of the action in which the two
+helicopters had been lost earlier. After temporary
+repairs were made, its crew flew the damaged UH-34D
+to Da Nang where more detailed repair work
+was accomplished.</p>
+
+<p>The number of combat support sorties flown
+into the mountains by HMM-162’s crews rose
+steadily as the weather improved. Near the end
+of April, the Marines helilifted three battalions
+of the 1st ARVN Division into the mountains of
+Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces near the
+Laotian border. These units were to participate
+in an extended multi-regiment drive against suspected
+Communist infiltration routes there. This
+operation, for which Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s
+squadron provided daily support after the initial
+landing, taxed the durability of both the Marine
+crews and their aircraft. For 90 days task element
+helicopters flew into and out of hazardous landing
+zones located at elevations as high as 4,500 feet.
+The majority of these sorties were resupply and
+medical evacuation missions with the occasional
+exception being the heliborne displacement of
+infantry and artillery units when distance or
+terrain prohibited overland movement. Despite the
+dangers inherent in helicopter operations conducted
+over mountainous terrain, the squadron
+incurred no aircraft or personnel losses while
+supporting the offensive in western Quang Tri and
+Thua Thien Provinces.</p>
+
+<p>While his squadron’s support of the 1st ARVN
+Division’s ongoing drive near the Laotian border
+continued, Lieutenant Colonel Leu committed
+21 UH-34Ds to support the offensive against the
+Do Xa base area along the southern edge of I
+Corps. On 27 April, Marine crews helilifted over
+567 troops of the 2d ARVN Division into the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">116</span>
+mountainous area roughly 22 miles southwest
+of Tam Ky to begin Operation BACH PHUONG
+XI. The squadron was less fortunate during this
+operation than it was during the lengthy Quang
+Tri effort. One helicopter was shot down by Viet
+Cong fire which wounded the pilot, Captain
+Virgil R. Hughes, in the leg. The crew and the
+embarked ARVN soldiers escaped further injury
+when the aircraft made a crash landing in which
+it suffered extensive damage. After the crew was
+rescued, a salvage team from Da Nang stripped
+the helicopter of all usable parts and burned the
+hulk so the Viet Cong could not make use of it.
+This was the first Marine helicopter loss definitely
+attributed to direct enemy action.<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">[9-3]</a></p>
+
+<p>Following the initial heliborne assaults into the
+Do Xa area, two UH-34Ds were rotated to Tra My
+from Da Nang on a daily basis. Refueling from the
+TAFDS bladder, these standby aircraft were used
+primarily to perform medical evacuation missions
+for VNMC and ARVN units involved in BACH
+PHOUNG XI. Before the operation ended in mid-May,
+HMM-162’s crews had evacuated nearly 100
+Marine and ARVN casualties from hazardous landing
+zones scattered along the border of I and II
+Corps. The task element’s O-1Bs also provided
+aerial reconnaissance support for all phases of the
+operation. On 19 May, the day before BACH
+PHOUNG XI terminated, 12 Marine UH-34Ds
+lifted the two Vietnamese Marine battalions to
+the provisional brigade command post at Tra My.
+This particular phase of the operation evoked favorable
+comment from an anonymous U.S. Marine
+pilot who noted on an unsigned debriefing form
+that the heliborne withdrawal had gone smoothly
+and that the Vietnamese Marines appeared “well
+organized in the landing zones and at Tra My.”<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" class="fnanchor">[9-4]</a>
+BACH PHOUNG XI ended unceremoniously the
+following day when HMM-162 helilifted the
+ARVN battalions from the Do Xa base area.</p>
+
+<p>One trend which became increasingly apparent
+as the spring of 1963 unfolded was the growing
+utilization of the Army UH-1B helicopter gunships
+as escorts to and from landing zones. The gunships
+accompanied all Marine assault helilifts and medical
+evacuations, and when available, also escorted
+resupply flights in order to provide suppressive fire
+around government positions while landings were
+in progress. Although well suited for the escort
+missions, the lightly armed UH-1Bs did not replace
+the Vietnamese Air Force attack aircraft as
+the principal source of preparatory air strikes
+around landing zones being used for assault helilifts.
+The Marines continued to rely on the more
+heavily armed VNAF T-28s and A-1Hs to conduct
+the so-called “prep strikes.”<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[9-A]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="label">[9-A]</a> As a result of the joint helicopter operations in I Corps, a
+vigorous debate developed within the Marine Corps concerning
+the value of armed helicopters. This debate and the subsequent
+development, procurement, and operations of Marine helicopter
+gunships will be covered in a separate historical monograph
+being prepared by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters,
+U.S. Marine Corps.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>May was the last full month of combat support
+operations for Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s squadron.
+In the first week of June, transports from VMGR-152
+began landing at Da Nang with the Marines
+of a new UH-34D squadron. Since assuming
+responsibility for helicopter support in I Corps
+in mid-January, HMM-162 had compiled a solid
+combat record. While under the squadron’s operations,
+the UH-34D helicopters had flown 17,670
+sorties for a total of 8,579 flight hours. The O-1Bs
+added approximately 400 sorties and another 1,000
+hours to these figures. In the month of May alone
+HMM-162’s helicopters flew over 2,000 flight
+hours—a number which approached the record
+set by HMM-163 during the previous summer in
+the Mekong Delta. Other statistics reflected the
+growing intensity of the Vietnam war. Since its
+deployment to Da Nang, Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s
+unit had lost three helicopters—two as a result of
+operations at extreme elevations and one to enemy
+fire. One member of the unit had been killed and
+three others wounded since the squadron entered
+the combat zone.<a id="FNanchor_136" href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[9-5]</a></p>
+
+<p>After a brief change-over period, the outgoing
+squadron commander officially turned over his
+unit’s aircraft and maintenance equipment on 8
+June to Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Shook, the
+commanding officer of HMM-261. Shook, who had
+flown Marine helicopters in combat during the
+Korean War, committed his crews to their first
+actual combat missions that same day.</p>
+
+<p>A significant change took place in the coordinating
+arrangements that governed U.S. helicopter
+units supporting I Corps at approximately the same
+time that HMM-261 initiated combat support
+operations. Since its relocation at Da Nang, the
+Marine task element, along with all other aviation
+units in I CTZ, had received its missions from the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">117</span>
+Air Support Operations Center located within the
+corps headquarters. As the number of U.S. and
+VNAF aviation organizations assigned to I Corps
+grew and the total number of missions multiplied,
+it became necessary to modify the system
+of coordination and control. In accordance with a
+ComUSMACV directive, I Corps headquarters
+created an Aviation Headquarters Operations
+Center (AHOC) to oversee the employment of
+Marine and Army aircraft in the CTZ. The AHOC,
+which was composed of a senior Army representative,
+a senior Marine representative, and an
+operations section, was to be directed by the
+Commander, Task Element 79.3.3.6. Formally
+stated, its primary mission was to “plan, direct,
+and control the employment of all Army and
+Marine Corps Aviation Units and aircraft operations
+in direct support of I Corps.” The newly
+organized AHOC was also ordered to “participate
+in, and provide assistance to operational planning
+and the coordination of employment of USA/USMC
+Aviation with VNAF/USAF tactical air.”<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" class="fnanchor">[9-6]</a> The
+AHOC, therefore, was formed to supplement rather
+than replace the older Air Support Operations
+Center, which continued to direct and control
+all U.S. Air Force and VNAF operations over the
+northern provinces. It was under this arrangement
+that U.S. Marine and Army aviation units operated
+after mid-1963.</p>
+
+<p>HMM-261’s Marines began encountering systematic
+Viet Cong resistance to their operations
+shortly after their first combat missions in early
+June. A 21-aircraft assault mission into the mountains
+west of Da Nang was aborted on 6 July
+when the Marine pilots discovered that the Viet
+Cong had obstructed the two available landing
+zones with upright stakes. While inspecting one of
+the landing zones on a low pass, a helicopter was
+hit in the forward fuel cell by Communist small
+arms fire. The damage to the aircraft was not
+serious enough to force a landing, but the pilot
+of an escorting U.S. Army UH-1B was mortally
+wounded while attempting to suppress the ground
+fire.</p>
+
+<p>Ten days after the enemy forced the cancellation
+of the assault mission west of Da Nang, HMM-261
+suffered its first aircraft loss in Vietnam. The crash,
+which was later attributed to mechanical failure,
+occurred about 37 miles southwest of Da Nang
+while one of the squadron’s helicopters was on a
+routine logistics mission. Six passengers, two
+American advisors and four ARVN soldiers, were
+injured in the accident. The squadron commander
+dispatched two other UH-34Ds to the scene of the
+crash to evacuate the wounded and insert a salvage
+team. The badly damaged aircraft was assessed
+as beyond repair and was destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>In the second week of August, officers from
+HMM-261 and the task element’s staff (under the
+command of Colonel Gomez) met with American
+and Vietnamese officers at I Corps headquarters to
+plan a large-scale heliborne retrograde movement.
+The planned helilift was to mark the culmination
+of Operation LAM SON XII, a three-week long
+offensive by several battalions of the 2d ARVN
+Division against Communist infiltration routes in
+Quang Nam Province along the Laotian border.
+Although not encircled, the ARVN battalions had
+encountered increasing Viet Cong pressure since
+early August. I Corps authorities feared that unless
+their units were withdrawn promptly they might
+be cut off from the few landing zones that existed
+in the rugged operations area.</p>
+
+<p>As planned, the retrograde operation involved
+helilifting some 1,300 troops with their artillery
+and equipment to Thuong Duc, a government-held
+town situated 30 miles southwest of Da Nang along
+the Song Vu Gia. The operation plan called for
+the commitment of 20 Marine helicopters, 18 of
+which would participate in the actual troop lifts.
+The two extra UH-34Ds would be used in the event
+it became necessary either to replace helicopters
+assigned to the troop lift or to conduct search and
+rescue operations for downed aircraft. Three VNAF
+UH-34s and two U.S. Army unarmed UH-1Bs
+were designated by the I Corps headquarters to
+assist HMM-261 with the helilift.</p>
+
+<p>The Da Nang Air Support Operations Center
+assigned a variety of other aircraft to support the
+operation. These included two VNAF T-28s,
+one FARM GATE B-26, and two U.S. Army
+UH-1B gunships. These aircraft would share the
+task of providing close air support for the troop
+lift. A Marine O-1B was scheduled to perform
+weather reconnaissance missions.</p>
+
+<p>The entire air operation was to be coordinated
+from two aircraft. An American forward air controller
+in a VNAF observation plane was to direct
+all air strikes while overall control for the multiservice,
+bilingual effort was to come from a U.S.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">118</span>
+Air Force U-10 Super Courier. This six-man, single
+engine aircraft, which possessed an eight hour
+fuel capacity and carried three radios, would serve
+as an airborne air support operations center (Airborne
+ASOC). It would be flown by an Air Force
+pilot and would carry a Marine officer from the
+task element along with U.S. and Vietnamese
+representatives from the Da Nang ASOC. These
+officers would be in continuous radio contact with
+all aircraft in the operations area, and also with
+the U.S. Air Force liaison officer to I Corps who
+would be positioned with the ground troops.</p>
+
+<p>The concept of the operation called for the
+ARVN units to be lifted from two hazardous landing
+zones over a three-day period. According to the
+plan 500 ARVN soldiers were to be removed from
+Landing Zone HOTEL on Thursday, 15 August.
+Landing Zone HOTEL, a small clearing which
+could accommodate only three UH-34Ds, was
+situated along a river and was crowded between
+two 1,000-foot-high ridgelines only five miles
+from the Laotian border. The steep, jungle-covered
+ridges generally paralleled each other less than 400
+meters apart on either side of the landing zone.
+Slightly west of the small clearing the ridges
+joined to form a box canyon. The physical structure
+of the location dictated that the transport
+helicopters use the same approach and retirement
+routes.</p>
+
+<p>Due largely to the proximity of the high terrain
+which surrounded Landing Zone HOTEL, the
+ARVN adopted a Marine proposal to leave a 125-man
+security force on the two ridges. This force
+would provide cover for the helicopters conducting
+the final troop lift during this first phase of the
+retrograde movement. The 125 South Vietnamese
+soldiers would move cross-country to another
+landing zone to be picked up by helicopters following
+the completion of the helilift from Landing
+Zone HOTEL.</p>
+
+<p>The second landing zone, codename ZULU, was
+nearly as treacherous as the first. ZULU was completely
+encircled by a rim of hills some 500 feet
+higher than the floor of the landing site. In addition
+to the 125-man security force from HOTEL,
+the Marine, Army, and VNAF helicopters were
+scheduled to lift 200 ARVN troops and two 105mm
+howitzers from this landing zone on 16 and 17 August
+(the second and third days of the operation).</p>
+
+<p>An unexpected complication developed the
+morning the operation began when the Air Force
+grounded its B-26s after one of the attack bombers
+crashed elsewhere in the northern portion of Vietnam
+as a result of undetermined causes. Shortly
+after this crash, HMM-261 was called upon to
+divert a flight of helicopters to assist in search
+and rescue operations for the downed B-26, thus
+reducing even further the assets available to support
+the heliborne retrograde.</p>
+
+<p>Despite the loss of some of the air power assigned
+to the operation, I Corps authorities elected to
+proceed with the helilift from Landing Zone
+HOTEL as planned. After the crew of a Marine
+O-1B confirmed that good weather prevailed over
+the operations area, the first helicopters departed
+Da Nang on schedule. Less than half an hour after
+take off the Marine and Vietnamese pilots began
+maneuvering their aircraft between the two ridges
+which dominated Landing Zone HOTEL. Twice
+during the pickup the armed UH-1B escorts drew
+fire from the thick jungle on one side of the approach
+lanes being used by the transports. Both
+times they returned fire in the direction of the
+unseen enemy and forced him to silence his weapons.
+The first phase of the operation was completed
+without serious incident four hours after it
+had begun.</p>
+
+<p>The second phase of the helilift began the next
+morning with the two unarmed U.S. Army UH-1Bs
+making several trips to Landing Zone ZULU to
+lift out the disassembled ARVN 105mm howitzers.
+The Marine and VNAF transport helicopters followed
+and continued to shuttle troops out of the
+landing zone for three hours without encountering
+enemy opposition. Then a departing flight of
+UH-34Ds drew fire from a nearby ridgeline. One
+of the escorting UH-1Bs immediately marked the
+suspected target for the VNAF T-28s and the
+attack aircraft bombed and strafed the position.
+The Communist activity ceased.</p>
+
+<p>After an overnight march, the covering force
+from Landing Zone HOTEL arrived at Landing
+Zone ZULU. Although they were not scheduled
+to be removed from the field until the next day,
+the schedule was adjusted and the 125 weary
+ARVN soldiers were flown to the secure assembly
+area on the afternoon of their arrival. This modification
+reduced the amount of work which would
+be required of the helicopters on the final day of
+the operation.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">119</span></p>
+
+<p>The next phase of the helilift from ZULU on
+17 August was characterized by increasing concern
+for security around the landing site. The general
+scheme for protecting the helicopters during this
+critical stage of the exercise was to establish two
+perimeters, one around the rim of high ground
+which surrounded the zone and another around
+the immediate landing site. The outer perimeter
+would be withdrawn first, leaving the inside ring
+of troops to deny the enemy direct access to the
+landing zone while the force from the outer perimeter
+boarded the helicopters. Once the Vietnamese
+soldiers were withdrawn from the rim of hills,
+the area within 300 meters of the close-in defenses
+would be automatically cleared for air strikes.
+Even with these precautions the helicopters
+would be extremely vulnerable to any enemy
+force that might rapidly occupy the high ground
+above Landing Zone ZULU following the withdrawal
+of the outer perimeter. Accordingly, once
+the troops from the outer defenses were staged for
+the helilift, the transport helicopters would be
+directed by the airborne ASOC to tighten the landing
+interval between aircraft from the usual five
+minutes to as short a time span as possible. By
+landing in such rapid succession, the dangerous
+final stage of the operation could be accomplished
+more quickly.</p>
+
+<p>Two hours after the helilift began on Saturday
+morning, the air liaison officer at ZULU reported
+that the outer perimeter had been withdrawn and
+that all remaining Vietnamese troops were in
+positions around the landing zone. At this point
+the operation, now in its most critical phase,
+began to experience agonizing delays. First, a
+loaded helicopter arrived at the assembly area
+with a rough running engine. Fearing that the
+fuel in the TAFDS had somehow become contaminated,
+Lieutenant Colonel Shook instructed all
+HMM-261 pilots to check their aircraft’s fuel
+strainers while their passengers disembarked at
+the assembly point. No evidence was found to
+indicate that the fuel contained contaminants, but
+the operation was slowed at the exact point where
+the intensified helilift was to have begun. Another
+minor delay occurred after a helicopter flying near
+the landing zone reported having drawn enemy
+ground fire. The approach and departure routes
+were adjusted slightly so that the transport helicopters
+would not fly over the area and VNAF
+T-28s were directed to attack the suspected enemy
+position. Shortly after the air strike ended the air
+liaison officer at the landing zone reported more
+enemy activity only 500 meters from his position.
+This momentary crisis was resolved when the
+American air liaison officer personally directed
+armed UH-1Bs to neutralize the target area.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, the airborne ASOC passed instructions
+to proceed with the operation, whereupon HMM-261
+and VNAF helicopters began spiraling down
+into the landing zone. The escorting UH-1B
+gunships provided continuous protection for the
+transport helicopters by flying concentric but
+opposite patterns around them. One after another
+the transports landed, took on troops, climbed
+out of the landing zone, and turned toward Thuong
+Duc. Less than five minutes after the stepped-up
+helilift began, the last troops were airborne. The
+crew chief of the helicopter which embarked the
+final ARVN heliteam then dropped a purple smoke
+grenade into the empty landing zone to signal
+all other aircraft that the lift was complete.</p>
+
+<p>The three-day heliborne retrograde from the
+Laotian border proved to be one of the most
+efficient helicopter operations conducted by the
+Marines in the Republic of Vietnam during the
+early 1960s. Its success was due largely to detailed
+planning, particularly the South Vietnamese plans
+for the ground defense of both landing zones. These
+plans and their subsequent execution led a grateful
+Colonel Gomez, the task element commander, to
+declare: “This was the first time in our experience
+that a helicopter-borne withdrawal had been
+treated as a retrograde operation rather than an
+administrative lift. Without a sound retrograde
+plan the operation might well have failed.”<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">[9-7]</a></p>
+
+<p>Although this observation was correct, it should
+be added that the close coordination between the
+airborne ASOC, the operational aircraft, and the
+air liaison officer on the ground had contributed to
+the successful execution of the plans. These agencies
+were instrumental in coordinating the bilingual,
+multiservice effort, particularly when it was beset
+with difficulties in its critical final stage.</p>
+
+<p>HMM-261’s combat support missions continued
+at a normal rate following the completion of the
+mid-August retrograde helilift. A month later, on
+16 September, Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s squadron
+lost its second UH-34D in a crash 25 miles west-southwest
+of Hue. The helicopter, which had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">120</span>
+developed mechanical problems while carrying
+troops of a South Vietnamese assault force, was
+damaged beyond repair. Its crew members and passengers
+fortunately escaped injury. The aircraft
+was stripped of usable parts by a salvage team from
+Da Nang and burned.</p>
+
+<p>Shortly after this incident, the first elements of a
+new squadron began arriving at Da Nang and
+HMM-261 turned to preparations for its departure.
+Since early June, when it had become the fourth
+Marine helicopter squadron assigned to SHUFLY,
+Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s unit had accumulated
+5,288 combat flying hours and 11,406 sorties in
+the UH-34Ds alone. The squadron’s crews had
+helilifted over 6,000 troops, nearly 1,900,000
+pounds of cargo, and had accomplished over 600
+medical evacuation missions.<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">[9-8]</a></p>
+
+<p>The new squadron, HMM-361, assumed responsibility
+for helicopter support in I Corps on 2 October
+after a short period of orientation flying with
+the crews of the departing unit. HMM-361’s commanding
+officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J.
+Ross, was well qualified to direct a tactical aviation
+unit in a combat situation. Decorated with
+five Distinguished Flying Crosses during World
+War II and Korea, he was a recent graduate of the
+Air Force Command and Staff College.</p>
+
+<p>Barely a week after Ross’ squadron initiated
+combat support operations at Da Nang, it suffered
+its first aircraft and personnel losses. The incident
+occurred on 8 October when two UH-34Ds crashed
+almost simultaneously while on a search and rescue
+mission 38 miles southwest of Da Nang. Both helicopters
+burned, killing 10 men; the pilots, copilots,
+the squadron’s flight surgeon, and five crewmen. A
+search of the area was initiated immediately for
+the downed aircraft, but darkness prevented their
+discovery until the next morning. By then the Viet
+Cong had surrounded both crash sites and were
+waiting to ambush the search and rescue helicopters
+which they knew would arrive. When the
+rescue aircraft attempted to land, they met determined
+enemy opposition. Colonel Gomez requested
+ARVN assistance and 254 South Vietnamese troops
+were lifted into nearby clearings with instructions
+to dislodge the enemy force from the area around
+the downed aircraft. While executing the landing,
+HMM-361 helicopters were hit nine times by small
+arms fire, but suffered only superficial damage. One
+ARVN soldier was killed.</p>
+
+<p>The following day, as the South Vietnamese
+forces moved toward the downed UH-34Ds, three
+Marine helicopters escorted by three armed UH-1Bs
+and two VNAF T-28s lifted an inspection
+team into the crash site to recover the bodies and
+investigate the wreckage. Enemy automatic weapons
+fire broke out while the UH-34Ds waited in
+the landing zone and forced the pilots to take off
+while the inspection team found cover on the
+ground. After the Communist fire had been suppressed,
+the helicopters returned for the stranded
+Marines. Their investigation of the aircraft hulks
+had been fruitful: the evidence of enemy small
+arms fire in the wreckage and the relative positions
+of the two helicopters led Lieutenant Colonel
+Ross to conclude that the aircraft had been shot
+down by the Viet Cong.<a id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[9-9]</a> But this was not a conclusive
+finding. There was room for speculation
+that the two helicopters had actually collided in
+midair while attempting to evade ground fire.</p>
+
+<p>Ground action in the hills around the crash
+sites continued. On 11 October, another Marine
+helicopter was hit by Viet Cong fire while resupplying
+ARVN units in the area. In this incident the
+UH-34D was struck twice in the engine and once
+in the wheel strut while in a landing zone about
+two miles from the point where the crashes had
+occurred. After assessing the damage, a maintenance
+team from Da Nang determined that the
+helicopter would require a new engine. Marines
+from the security platoon were utilized to provide
+security until 13 October when an additional
+120 ARVN troops were helilifted into the area
+and established a perimeter around the aircraft.
+Other helicopters then delivered the new engine
+and a maintenance crew to the landing zone. After
+the engines were exchanged, a crew returned the
+UH-34D to Da Nang.</p>
+
+<p>By the time HMM-361 had removed the last
+ARVN troops from the hills around the scene
+of the tragic accidents, monsoon weather had
+begun to restrict flight operations. The remaining
+two weeks of October were characterized by a
+reduced number of missions, most of which were
+either resupply or medical evacuations. By the
+end of October, despite numerous flight cancellations,
+Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ crews had gained
+the unenviable distinction of having attracted
+more enemy fire during a one month period than
+any previous squadron to serve with SHUFLY.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">121</span>
+Their helicopters had been shot at on 46 different
+occasions and had been hit 18 times.<a id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[9-10]</a></p>
+
+<p>SHUFLY’s combat support operations came to a
+halt in the first days of November as the reverberations
+from Diem’s overthrow spread to South
+Vietnam’s northern provinces. American officials
+in Washington and Saigon, aware of the pitfalls
+that might accompany open support of either side
+in the power struggle, ordered all U.S. military
+forces to cease advisory and combat support activities.
+As a result of the sensitive political situation,
+no U.S. aircraft left the ground on 2 November.
+Two days after the new regime seized power in
+Saigon, the U.S. Marine helicopters were permitted
+to perform emergency medical evacuation and
+emergency resupply missions. Even these flights
+were to be approved beforehand by ARVN military
+officers in Saigon. Four days after Diem’s
+overthrow, the new leaders in Saigon eased the
+political restrictions and SHUFLY’s operations
+returned to near normal. One remaining limitation
+stipulated that U.S. helicopters could not transport
+ARVN units into population centers even though
+troops could be helilifted from the cities into rural
+areas.</p>
+
+<p>Due to torrential monsoon rains which began
+striking the Da Nang area in mid-November,
+HMM-361’s combat support operations continued
+at a relatively low level throughout the remainder
+of the year. This trend was confirmed by the flight
+totals compiled for the final two months of 1963.
+In November, the squadron’s UH-34Ds flew only
+145 sorties for 233 flight hours. December’s statistics,
+230 helicopter sorties for 338 flight hours,
+indicated a slight upswing but fell far short of the
+monthly figures achieved earlier in the year. With
+rain and fog frequently rendering the mountains
+inaccessible by air, the preponderance of the squadron’s
+missions were conducted along the coastal
+plains. As 1963 ended SHUFLY’s combat support
+operations were continuing at a greatly reduced
+rate.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_121"><i>The Situation in Vietnam</i></h3>
+
+<p>Although not yet desperate, the overall situation
+in South Vietnam at the end of 1963 was far from
+favorable. Mismanaged and poorly coordinated
+from the outset, the Strategic Hamlet Program had
+failed to fulfill even the most moderate of American
+and South Vietnamese expectations. Little discernable
+headway had been made toward restoring
+any large segment of the populated rural areas to
+government control. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese
+had disregarded the Geneva Agreement of
+1962 and had continued to infiltrate troops and
+material down the Laotian corridor into the South.
+Although the 1963 figure of 4,200 confirmed infiltrators
+was roughly 1,000 men lower than the
+figure for the previous year, it was substantial
+enough to force the government to deviate more and
+more from its avowed strategy of clearing Viet
+Cong formations from the vital populated areas.
+To help meet this continuing influx of Communist
+regulars, the government had committed its ground
+force to operations against base areas located in the
+remote hinterlands with increasing frequency.
+More often than not these multi-battalion offensives,
+such as the VNMC-ARVN drive into the Do
+Xa base area in May, proved futile, usually resulting
+in scattered and inconsequential clashes with
+small groups of Viet Cong. The continuation of
+such actions, of course, worked to the advantage
+of the Communists as the government forces expended
+time, energy, and lives without exacting
+a commensurate price from the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>Other disturbing trends had emerged on the
+South’s battlefields during the course of the year.
+Following an action fought in the Mekong Delta
+during early January in which the Viet Cong
+soundly defeated a multi-battalion ARVN heliborne
+force, enemy main force units continued to
+maintain their integrity and fought back when
+confronted with helicopter assaults. This trend
+was evident even in the northern provinces where
+each successive assault by Marine helicopters appeared
+to meet more determined resistance. Aside
+from the Viet Cong’s new-found confidence in
+countering heliborne offensives, another source of
+concern to U.S. and Vietnamese officials was the
+appearance in the South of several Viet Cong regimental
+headquarters during the year. The activation
+of these headquarters, which assumed control
+of already operational main force battalions,
+seemed to presage another phase of Communist
+military escalation.</p>
+
+<p>The situation throughout South Vietnam worsened
+in the aftermath of the Diem coup. Subsequent
+to the widespread command changes ordered by
+the new government, the morale, and in turn the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">122</span>
+effectiveness, of the Vietnamese armed forces declined
+sharply. The Viet Cong moved quickly to
+exploit the prevailing state of confusion by staging
+a rash of attacks in the weeks after Diem’s overthrow—attacks
+which worked a profound influence
+on the already faltering Strategic Hamlet Program.
+“The fall of the Ngo regime,” wrote one American
+scholar, “was accompanied by the complete collapse
+of the pacification efforts in many areas, and
+vast regions that had been under government control
+quickly came under the influence of the Viet
+Cong.”<a id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142" class="fnanchor">[9-11]</a> The nation’s new leaders therefore formally
+terminated the badly damaged Strategic
+Hamlet Program. Although it was soon to be
+replaced with similar pacification campaigns, most
+Vietnamese and American officials conceded that
+much time and energy would be required to restore
+momentum to the government’s efforts at securing
+the allegiance of the rural population. So, by the
+end of 1963 both the tempo and effectiveness of
+South Vietnam’s overall war effort was at its lowest
+ebb since the intensification of the U.S. military
+assistance program in early 1962.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_122" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_122.jpg" width="1908" height="1392" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>ARVN troops fan out from an HMM-361 helicopter during an assault into the mountains of I Corps. (<cite>USMC Photo
+A420866</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>This threatening situation was hardly consistent
+with American military plans which were being
+implemented at year’s end. Drawn up at Secretary
+of Defense McNamara’s direction and approved
+by him in the late summer of 1963, these plans
+called for a phased withdrawal of 1,000 U.S.
+servicemen from Vietnam by January 1964. The
+phased withdrawal plan, whose ultimate objective
+was to end direct American participation in the
+war, envisioned a gradual scaling down of U.S.
+involvement while simultaneously turning over
+more military responsibility to the South Vietnamese.
+Included in the initial 1,000-man reduction<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">123</span>
+was the 47-man security platoon which had guarded
+the U.S. Marine task element’s compound at Da
+Nang since April. For the Marines serving with the
+task element, 1963 thus ended on an incongruous
+note. While the Viet Cong threat appeared on the
+rise, their own defenses were being reduced.
+Clearly, events in Vietnam had overtaken long-range
+plans already in motion.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">125</span></p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2 class="nobreak part" id="PART_IV"><span id="toclink_125">PART IV</span><br>
+
+<span class="subhead">AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964</span></h2>
+<div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           </div>
+</div>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">127</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_10"><span id="toclink_127"></span>CHAPTER 10<br>
+<span class="subhead large">Marines Meet the Challenge</span><br>
+<span class="subhead notbold"><i>New American Decisions—A Restructured Military Assistance Command—Changes
+in Marine Leadership—Redesignation and Reorganization—The
+Vietnamese Marine Brigade—Additional Marine Activities</i></span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_127a"><i>New American Decisions</i></h3>
+
+<p>Less than three weeks after the overthrow of
+Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. Presidency changed hands.
+On 22 November President Kennedy was assassinated
+in Dallas and Vice President Lyndon B.
+Johnson took the reigns of the American government.
+By late November, when the new president
+assumed office, the process of political and military
+disintegration which had begun in South Vietnam
+following the Diem coup was already well underway.
+This process continued into the early weeks
+of 1964 when, in late January, General Nguyen
+Khanh, the newly appointed commander of I
+Corps, seized power in a bloodless coup. This
+second turnover in the government of South Vietnam
+in less than three months had its most serious
+impact on the nation’s armed forces. A new series
+of command changes ensued and again the government’s
+operations against the Communists suffered.
+As had been the case in the closing months of 1963,
+the Viet Cong continued to capitalize on the government’s
+disarray by expanding its control into
+previously secure areas.</p>
+
+<p>By March the rapidly declining effectiveness of
+the South Vietnamese military forces led the
+Johnson Administration to review the earlier
+decisions to withdraw American servicemen and
+to cut back the military assistance program. In a
+16 March memorandum to President Johnson,
+Secretary of Defense McNamara warned that “the
+[military] situation had unquestionably been
+growing worse” in South Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_143" href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">[10-1]</a> To counteract
+this threatening trend, McNamara offered a
+broad set of recommendations which included a
+proposal to support a 50,000-man increase in the
+size of the Vietnamese military and paramilitary
+forces. The memorandum did not address the question
+of additional American advisors who might
+be needed to supervise the proposed expansion.
+In any case, President Johnson approved McNamara’s
+plan the following day, thus setting the
+stage for increases in U.S. military assistance to
+South Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_144" href="#Footnote_144" class="fnanchor">[10-2]</a></p>
+
+<p>Shortly after his most recent decision on Vietnam,
+President Johnson ordered changes in his
+top civilian and military representatives in Saigon.
+On 22 June, General William C. Westmoreland,
+U.S. Army, who had been serving since January
+as Deputy Commander, USMACV, succeeded
+General Harkins as ComUSMACV. One day later,
+on the 23d, President Johnson announced that
+General Maxwell D. Taylor would replace Henry
+Cabot Lodge as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic
+of Vietnam. Taylor, who had been serving since
+1962 as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
+had been closely associated with the Vietnam
+problem since his 1961 fact-finding mission. Both
+he and Westmoreland were thoroughly familiar
+with U.S. programs and objectives in Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>Soon after assuming his new responsibilities,
+General Westmoreland requested that the Joint
+Chiefs of Staff augment his command with 5,100
+additional military personnel. In his opinion,
+these men were needed to support and supervise
+the expansion of the Vietnamese military and
+paramilitary forces. Secretary McNamara met with
+the Joint Chiefs on 20 July to discuss this request
+for 900 more advisors and 4,200 additional support
+personnel. All agreed that the deteriorating situation
+in Vietnam demanded the measure and recommended
+its approval. The proposal was forwarded
+to President Johnson who approved it in
+early August. Emphasizing the urgency of the
+military situation, McNamara then ordered the
+Joint Chiefs to complete the entire build-up<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">128</span>
+before 30 September. At this juncture, however,
+General Westmoreland pointed out that such a
+rapid influx of personnel would “overload existing
+facilities [in South Vietnam]” and stated his
+desire to see the build-up accomplished in a more
+orderly progression over a period of several months.
+After considering the general’s latest request,
+the Secretary of Defense withdrew his earlier
+demand for an accelerated deployment.<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">[10-3]</a></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_128" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 31em;">
+  <img src="images/i_128.jpg" width="1921" height="1424" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>The MACV staff, spring 1964. Seated at head of table are General Paul D. Harkins, USA, Commander, U.S. Military
+Assistance Command, Vietnam, and his relief General William C. Westmoreland, USA. Major General Richard G.
+Weede, USMC, MACV Chief of Staff, is seated to General Westmoreland’s immediate left, and Brigadier General Carl
+A. Youngdale, USMC, Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, is seated two positions to General Weede’s left. (<cite>Photo courtesy
+of Major General Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.)</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>While the details of the expanded U S. advisory
+program were being hammered out in Washington,
+the focus of the administration’s concern swung
+abruptly from the battlefields of South Vietnam to
+the Tonkin Gulf off the coast of North Vietnam.
+In two separate incidents during the first week of
+August, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked
+U.S. Navy ships operating in international waters.<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[10-A]</a>
+An international crisis ensued when the United
+States retaliated with limited air strikes against
+North Vietnamese naval facilities. On 6 August,
+the U.S. Congress unanimously passed a joint resolution
+authorizing the President “to use all measures,
+including the commitment of armed forces to
+assist [South Vietnam] in the defense of its independence
+and territorial integrity....”<a id="FNanchor_146" href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">[10-4]</a> President
+Johnson signed the so-called Tonkin Gulf
+Resolution five days after it was passed, and in so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">129</span>
+doing, reaffirmed his pledge of full support for the
+Government of Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[10-B]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="label">[10-A]</a> A vigorous debate has since developed concerning the actual
+origins of the Tonkin Gulf incidents. It has been claimed that
+the Americans precipitated the attacks by supporting aggressive
+South Vietnamese naval patrols off the North Vietnamese coast.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="label">[10-B]</a> U.S. Marines figured prominently in the crisis which followed
+the North Vietnamese attacks. A Marine expeditionary
+brigade, the 9th MEB, was activated from elements of the 3d
+Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and deployed on
+board amphibious shipping to a position off Da Nang where it
+was available to support U.S. contingency plans. Its commander,
+Brigadier General Raymond G. Davis, and his staff attended
+planning conferences in Da Nang and reconnoitered possible
+landing sites near the city, but the MEB was not committed.
+Instead, the organization remained in existence throughout the
+remainder of 1964 and into early 1965 when, in March, two of
+its battalions were landed at Da Nang. The formation and
+subsequent commitment of the 9th MEB in the Republic of
+Vietnam are covered in detail in the 1965 history of U.S. Marine
+operations in the Republic of Vietnam.</p>
+
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<p>While the tensions generated by the Tonkin Gulf
+incidents never really subsided, the immediate
+crisis soon passed. Thereafter the American attentions
+focused once again on South Vietnam where
+the political and military situation began to deteriorate
+at an unprecedented rate after midyear. Ironically,
+this process of accelerated decay coincided
+with the initiation of a new South Vietnamese
+pacification strategy designed to prevent just such
+an occurrence. One aspect of the strategy was the
+Chien Tang (“Struggle for Victory”) Plan. Announced
+by General Khanh shortly after his rise to
+power, this campaign was similar in method and
+objective to the defunct Strategic Hamlet Program.
+Like the earlier program, the Chien Tang Plan
+envisioned the restoration of government influence
+in selected rural areas through the coordination of
+military and paramilitary operations with social
+and economic development programs.<a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[10-C]</a> While the
+Chien Tang campaign was better planned and far
+less ambitious than the Strategic Hamlet Program,
+there were definite similarities between the two.
+The instrument for the social, economic, and political
+developmental phase of the new effort, for
+example, was the New Life Hamlet—a variation of
+the planned government community. Begun in some
+areas around midyear, the New Life Hamlets were
+to become the symbol of the new pacification effort
+in much the same manner that the fortified hamlets
+had symbolized the earlier Strategic Hamlet
+Program.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="label">[10-C]</a> Motivated at least partially by the requirement to provide
+better support for the pacification strategy, the Vietnamese
+government restructured its paramilitary forces in the spring
+of 1964. The old Self Defense Corps was expanded dramatically
+and renamed the Popular Force (PF). The Civil Guard was
+reorganized and designated the Regional Force (RF). More
+importantly, the RVNAF extended its control over both paramilitary
+organizations for the first time since their creation.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Coincident with the Chien Tang campaign, a
+similar but locally concentrated pacification effort
+was instituted in the rural areas around Saigon.
+Designated the Hop Tac Program, this campaign
+was conceived in order to link the seven provinces
+around the capital into a zone of intensive pacification
+in which closely coordinated military, paramilitary,
+police, and civil activities would systematically
+reduce Viet Cong strength. Because of
+their proximity to the area and their availability,
+the Vietnamese Marine Brigade and the ARVN
+Airborne Brigade were assigned primary responsibility
+for military operations in support of the
+Hop Tac campaign. By midyear, the Chien Tang
+and Hop Tac plans emerged as the backbone of
+General Khanh’s strategy to stave off further
+Communist advances in critical areas of the
+country.</p>
+
+<p>The development of the government’s newest
+pacification strategy, however, was based on the
+assumption that the Viet Cong would pursue a
+campaign to strengthen their control in South Vietnam’s
+populated rural areas. Such was not the case.
+Instead, at midyear the Communists began waging
+a brand of warfare characterized by large-scale
+mobile operations against government military
+forces. Obviously the enemy had shifted to the
+“general counter-offensive”—that phase of guerrilla
+warfare designed to bring on the complete
+political and military collapse of the opposition.</p>
+
+<p>The new Viet Cong strategy revealed itself in
+two general geographic areas during the fall
+months. In Binh Dinh Province on the coast of
+northern II Corps, two Viet Cong main force
+regiments staged a series of particularly swift and
+successful attacks which virtually eliminated the
+government’s presence except in the province
+capital, Qui Nhon, and a few district towns. In
+a coordinated offensive the Communists increased
+pressure throughout that portion of the Central
+Highlands west of Binh Dinh Province, thereby
+threatening to sever South Vietnam along an
+axis that extended roughly between Qui Nhon
+on the coast and Pleiku in the highlands. Meanwhile,
+another phase of the new initiative unfolded
+in III Corps where the government’s Hop
+Tac campaign was just getting underway. There
+the Communist offensive threatened to neutralize<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">130</span>
+the government’s concentrated pacification
+campaign.</p>
+
+<p>Eroded by the political side-effects of the battlefield
+developments, South Vietnam’s fragile power
+structure became increasingly unstable. The last
+five months of 1964 brought frequent changes
+in the Saigon government although General
+Khanh was able to maintain a semblance of control
+until December. The turmoil then climaxed
+when Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, the
+commander of the Vietnamese Air Force, engineered
+a bloodless coup that forced Khanh from the
+Saigon political scene.</p>
+
+<p>The frequent changes of government coupled
+with the stepped-up Viet Cong military pressure
+throughout Vietnam produced a downward spiral
+in the effectiveness of the republic’s armed forces.
+By the end of the year it was becoming increasingly
+doubtful that the government could stave off
+total collapse even with the increased volume of
+military assistance it was already receiving from
+the United States. Against this backdrop of
+Communist military activities, unprecedented political
+instability on the part of the South Vietnamese,
+and mounting combat losses, American
+military involvement in Vietnam deepened.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_130"><i>A Restructured Military Assistance Command</i></h3>
+
+<p>In many respects 1964 was a year of transition for
+the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
+Not only did the command experience a change in
+leadership when General Westmoreland replaced
+General Harkins as ComUSMACV, but it was
+thoroughly reorganized in preparation for the
+more vigorous U.S. advisory program which was
+expected to begin about midyear.</p>
+
+<p>The major organizational change within MACV
+took place on 15 May when the MAAG was
+abolished and its staff integrated into that of the
+senior command. In June MACV itself was restructured
+under a new table of distribution. These
+changes reflected the anticipated influx of advisors
+and support personnel, and therefore concerned
+the Army more than the other U.S. armed services.</p>
+
+<p>Initially, the number of Marine billets on the
+restructured Military Assistance Command staff
+did not change substantially. Twenty-four Marines
+(15 officers and nine enlisted) were included in the
+new table of distribution. This represented a net
+increase of only one over the number previously
+assigned to the MAAG and MACV staffs. By the
+end of September, however, Marines temporarily
+assigned to the MACV staff from FMFPac commands
+brought the on-board strength to 37.
+Another increase occurred in the early fall when
+eight more permanent Marine billets (three officers
+and five enlisted) were approved.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_130a"><i>Changes in Marine Leadership</i></h3>
+
+<p>Two key links in the Marine command chain
+that joined government policy decisions in Washington
+to Marine Corps operations in Vietnam
+changed hands during the first 60 days of 1964.
+On 1 January, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.,
+replaced General Shoup as Commandant of the
+Marine Corps. Greene, known in American military
+circles as a brilliant staff officer, had been
+serving since 1960 as Chief of Staff of the Marine
+Corps. By 1964 he had become an outspoken supporter
+of South Vietnam’s struggle for independence.
+As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
+as a Chief of Service, his presence in administration
+policies would be felt until his tour as commandant
+ended on 31 January 1967.</p>
+
+<p>An equally important change occurred in early
+March when General Greene named Lieutenant
+General Victor H. Krulak to replace General
+Roberts as Commanding General, FMFPac. A 1934
+graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Krulak had
+won the Navy Cross during ground action in World
+War II. He arrived in the Pacific from Washington
+where he had served both Presidents Kennedy and
+Johnson as special assistant for counterinsurgency
+matters. Having made numerous fact-finding trips
+to Vietnam in this capacity, he was intimately
+familiar with the unique political-military struggle
+being waged there. He also had a reputation of
+being one of Washington’s most vocal advocates
+of resisting Communist aggression in Southeast
+Asia. A dynamic leader and a man of strong convictions,
+Krulak was to exert a pervasive influence
+over all Marine operations in the Pacific for nearly
+half a decade.</p>
+
+<p>Less obvious but of immense importance to both
+the Marine Corps and to the future of U.S. military<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">131</span>
+operations in Vietnam was a change instituted
+within MACV by General Westmoreland during
+the early part of the year. The command’s modified
+table of organization called for the establishment
+of a Deputy ComUSMACV billet to be filled by an
+Army general officer. The joint table of distribution
+for the reorganized command specified that an
+Army general would also fill the chief of staff
+billet—a position which had been held by General
+Weede since MACV’s creation in early 1962.
+Thus, when Weede’s assignment ended in May,
+Major General Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army,
+became Westmoreland’s chief of staff while Lieutenant
+General John L. Throckmorton, U.S. Army,
+became Deputy ComUSMACV.<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[10-D]</a> The Marine Corps,
+however, did not lose its entire senior presence
+on the MACV staff. Brigadier General Carl A.
+Youngdale, an officer whose 30-year career included
+distinguished combat tours in both World
+War II and Korea, arrived 15 January for assignment
+as Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2 (Intelligence).
+His presence on the MACV staff would insure a
+Marine voice in U.S. military planning at the
+Saigon level. Still, many Marines saw their relative
+strength on Westmoreland’s staff seriously reduced—a
+change which seemed to mark somewhat
+of a turning point in the overall management of
+the military assistance effort.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="label">[10-D]</a> For his service as MACV chief of staff, General Weede was
+awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_131"><i>Redesignation and Reorganization</i></h3>
+
+<p>The reorganization of the U.S. Military Assistance
+Command, Vietnam, had little initial effect
+on the Marine advisory program. With the dissolution
+of the MAAG, the old Naval Section, under
+which the Marine advisors had operated since 1955,
+was redesignated the Naval Advisory Group,
+MACV. Lieutenant Colonel Noren’s Marine Advisory
+Division, whose authorized strength remained
+at 11 officers and nine enlisted men through
+the first half of the year, was also renamed in mid-May.
+Known thereafter as the Marine Advisory
+Unit, Vietnam, the organization continued to
+function in much the same manner as it had under
+the previous arrangements.</p>
+
+<p>The last five months of the year, however, saw
+some substantial changes in the composition of the
+Marine Advisory Unit as the advisor build-up
+recently approved by the Secretary of Defense
+began. Colonel William P. Nesbit, a recent graduate
+of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode
+Island, relieved Colonel Noren (promoted from
+lieutenant colonel on 1 July) as the Senior Marine
+Advisor on 4 September. Colonel Nesbit arrived in
+time to supervise the implementation of a new
+table of organization which added eight first lieutenants
+and a captain to the advisory unit in
+November.<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[10-E]</a> The captain and one of the lieutenants
+were assigned as advisor and assistant advisor
+respectively to a new Vietnamese Marine infantry
+battalion which was in the process of being formed.
+Four other first lieutenants joined Colonel Nesbit’s
+command as assistant advisors to existing infantry
+battalions and one became the assistant artillery
+advisor. The two remaining lieutenants were assigned
+as advisors to the brigade’s motor transport
+and communications companies, replacing noncommissioned
+advisors. Two billets were downgraded
+in rank: the engineer advisor from captain
+to first lieutenant, and the artillery advisor from
+major to captain.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="label">[10-E]</a> A number of the Marines scheduled to fill the newly created
+billets did not arrive until early 1965.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>In addition to phasing out three enlisted advisor
+billets, these changes relieved the Assistant
+Senior Marine Advisor of his artillery responsibilities.
+Colonel Earl E. Anderson, who had been
+serving since mid-1963 as the MAAG Chief of
+Staff, was instrumental in bringing about this
+particular modification. Under the old arrangement,
+the Senior Marine Advisor’s presence frequently
+had been required at the MAAG headquarters
+in Saigon while the Vietnamese Marine
+Brigade headquarters was deployed to combat.
+As the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor was
+likewise torn between two jobs, Anderson had
+directed that he be relieved of artillery advisory
+duties. Thus, Major Raymond C. Damm, an
+officer who had served as Assistant Naval Attache
+in Saigon between 1959 and 1961, became the
+first full-time Assistant Senior Marine Advisor
+after he joined Colonel Nesbit’s command in May.
+When the changes were finally completed, the
+restructured and redesignated Marine Advisory<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">132</span>
+Unit included permanent billets for 24 officers
+and men (18 officers and six enlisted men).</p>
+
+<p>Another important aspect of the overall Marine
+advisory program was altered in the closing
+months of 1964. Since Lieutenant Colonel Croizat’s
+tour with the Vietnamese Marines in the immediate
+post-Geneva period, most Marine advisors
+had attended French language courses prior to
+departing for service in Vietnam. As French
+influence in Vietnam faded during the late 1950s,
+however, the requirement for the language had
+gradually diminished, particularly as French maps
+were replaced by American ones. By the early
+1960s this situation had prompted several Marine
+advisors to recommend that instruction in French
+be replaced by Vietnamese language training.
+Primarily through the persistence of Colonels
+Moody and Noren, the policy was revised in
+1964. The arrival of the new advisors in the fall
+marked the first time that Marine officers had
+received formal Vietnamese language training
+before beginning their tours. Colonel Nesbit, who
+had the advantage of commanding advisors
+trained in both languages, saw the change as
+“a marked step forward,” in improving the
+advisory effort.<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147" class="fnanchor">[10-5]</a></p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_132"><i>The Vietnamese Marine Brigade</i></h3>
+
+<p>At the beginning of 1964, the 6,109-man Vietnamese
+Marine Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant
+Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, experienced a crisis
+of morale. The recent command changes that had
+occurred at almost every echelon and a soaring
+desertion rate combined to undermine the brigade’s
+combat readiness. In February the Khanh government
+recalled Colonel Le Nguyen Khang from the
+Philippines, promoted him to brigadier general,
+and reinstated him as commandant in an attempt
+to restore the unit’s spirit. A veteran Marine who
+had been instrumental in the development of the
+VNMC since its inception, Khang commanded
+confidence throughout the corps. Following his
+return, increased attention was given to the welfare
+of the individual Marine and his dependents in
+order to reduce the climbing desertion rate. Under
+the close supervision of the senior Vietnamese
+officers and their American advisors, the morale
+problem was gradually overcome.</p>
+
+<p>Throughout the year the Vietnamese Marine
+Brigade continued to share the role of South
+Vietnam’s general reserve force with an ARVN
+airborne brigade. Normally at least one Marine
+battalion was held in the vicinity of Saigon, ready
+to respond to tactical emergencies while others
+operated nearby in support of the Hop Tac campaign.
+Still, the brigade’s infantry battalions
+managed to see action in every corps tactical zone
+except I Corps, which was the farthest removed
+from the capital.<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[10-F]</a> Although sometimes combined
+into regimental-sized task forces for specific operations,
+the individual Marine battalions normally
+were attached to either a corps, a province, or an
+ARVN division for combat operations. When so
+attached, the Vietnamese Marines often were
+assigned to clear particularly hazardous or difficult
+terrain. At times they served as a reserve force,
+responding to crucial situations to either recoup
+or exploit actions initiated by other government
+units.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="label">[10-F]</a> South Vietnam’s corps boundaries were adjusted again in
+late 1964. The southern boundary of I Corps was moved south
+to include Quang Ngai Province. The southern border of II
+Corps was also moved southward to include eight provinces
+formerly encompassed by III Corps. Under the new arrangement,
+III CTZ formed a narrow strip across the nation which centered
+roughly on Saigon. The Capital Military District, the boundaries
+of which coincided with those of Gia Dinh Province,
+formed an enclave within III Corps. The southernmost tactical
+zone, IV Corps, encompassed the entire Mekong Delta.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>In early January, the Vietnamese Joint General
+Staff assigned a Marine task force to a pacification
+mission in Go Cong and Long An Provinces, located
+just southeast of Saigon. Two VNMC battalions,
+controlled by a task force headquarters, moved into
+the operations area later in the month and remained
+until mid-September when the operation was terminated.
+The object of the Marine unit’s presence
+was to reestablish government control over the
+region through systematic small unit operations
+designed to deny the enemy his usual freedom of
+movement.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">133</span></p>
+<figure id="ip_133" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;">
+  <img src="images/i_133.jpg" width="1843" height="2575" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+CORPS TACTICAL ZONES<br>
+AT THE END OF 1964<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Despite the length of this particular deployment,
+the Vietnamese Marines fought no major engagements.
+Furthermore, they had not translated their
+improved morale into an effective pacification operation.
+While desertions and unauthorized absences
+remained low considering the duration of this
+particular assignment, Colonel Noren later recalled
+several flaws in the campaign. These operations, he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">134</span>
+remarked “were characterized by inadequate coordination
+of military operations and intelligence
+reporting ... too little operational activity ...
+and a seeming lack of appreciation of the objectives
+of pacification.”<a id="FNanchor_148" href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">[10-6]</a> Colonel Nesbit, who became the
+Senior Marine Advisor as the operation entered its
+final stages, tended to confirm this assessment.
+“The capacity of the task force headquarters in
+staff functioning,” he reported, “was marginal.”<a id="FNanchor_149" href="#Footnote_149" class="fnanchor">[10-7]</a></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_134" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_134.jpg" width="1899" height="1399" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, inspects an honor guard of Vietnamese Marines.
+With him are Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, and Major General
+Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. (<cite>Official USMC Photo</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>While the drive to pacify the Go Cong-Long An
+areas was in progress, other Vietnamese Marine
+task forces were organized to undertake different
+combat assignments elsewhere in the southern portion
+of Vietnam. One, composed of two battalions,
+an artillery detachment, and a headquarters element,
+launched a brief clearing operation northwest
+of Saigon in heavily populated Tay Ninh Province
+in January. A similar operation involving another
+task force was conducted the next month in the
+difficult mangrove swamps of An Xuyen Province
+at the southern tip of the nation. In both cases the
+government offensives enjoyed local success, but
+failed to reduce significantly the enemy’s capabilities
+and influence in the area.</p>
+
+<p>Midyear 1964 found the Vietnamese Marine
+commanders and their American advisors engaged
+in renewed efforts to restructure and expand the
+Vietnamese Marine Brigade. Accomplished for the
+most part in July, the salient feature of this latest
+reorganization was the creation of a new infantry
+battalion. With its nucleus garrisoned at a small
+base about 12 miles northwest of Saigon, the newly
+organized 5th Battalion devoted the remainder of
+the year and the first six months of 1965 to forming
+and training its companies. It finally became combat
+ready in June 1965.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">135</span></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_135" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 41em;">
+  <img src="images/i_135.png" width="2619" height="1887" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><p>VNMC (MARINE BRIGADE) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JULY 1964</p>
+
+<p>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 6,555</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">136</span></p>
+
+<p>Aside from the addition of the new infantry
+battalion, the mid-1964 reorganization produced
+other noteworthy changes in the structure of the
+Vietnamese Marine Corps. In the artillery battalion,
+the two 75mm pack howitzer batteries
+were combined into one battery of eight weapons,
+while the one 105mm howitzer battery was divided
+to form two new batteries of six howitzers
+each. The tables of equipment were revised to
+reflect these adjustments. Another significant
+change occurred in the area of training. The
+Training Company was deleted from the Amphibious
+Support Battalion and a separate recruit
+training center was created at Thu Duc near
+Saigon. Tactical planning and control was also
+improved when the Brigade Headquarters was
+reduced in size and two smaller Task Force Headquarters
+(Task Force A and Task Force B) were
+formed.</p>
+
+<p>Following the mid-1964 reorganization, the
+Vietnamese Marines performed combat missions
+not unlike those they had been assigned prior
+to July. One exception was that the brigade no
+longer found itself tasked with actual pacification
+phases of operations. Instead, the Marine battalions
+concentrated on clearing operations around
+Saigon in conjunction with the Hop Tac campaign.
+Additionally, the various battalions were called
+upon occasionally during this period to provide
+security for key government installations located
+in Saigon and Vung Tau—assignments which
+gave the infantry units much needed respites
+from field duty.</p>
+
+<p>By the end of the year the Vietnamese Marine
+Corps had been improved in several areas. In the
+motor transport field two new pieces of equipment
+were put into full-time operation—a high pressure
+steam cleaner and an M-108 wrecker. Progress
+also was made in upgrading the entire communications
+capability of the brigade when the table
+of equipment was revised in accordance with the
+modified table of organization. The new tables
+provided for modern test and repair equipment
+and eliminated obsolete and impractical items.
+Other unrealized improvements were still in their
+formative stages as the year closed. In the field
+of supply, for example, the brigade supply officer,
+with assistance from his American advisor, was
+drawing up plans which would give the Vietnamese
+Marines a more responsive and more manageable
+system.</p>
+
+<p>While the technically oriented programs were
+being developed and implemented, intensified
+training programs were preparing more and better
+trained Vietnamese Marines for their responsibilities.
+Established in July, the Marine Training
+Center at Thu Duc had graduated 1,464 recruits
+before the end of the year. These recruits, moreover,
+were trained by Vietnamese noncommissioned
+officers who had recently completed the drill
+instructor course at Marine Corps Recruit Depot,
+San Diego. For the first time since its inception,
+the VNMC was benefiting from a flow of recruits
+trained by Vietnamese Marines at a separate
+Marine training facility.</p>
+
+<p>Other programs likewise were helping prepare
+Vietnamese officers and noncommissioned officers
+to command and manage their growing service.
+A total of 718 officers and noncommissioned
+officers attended various training courses in South
+Vietnam during the year while 42 more officers
+attended formal schools in the United States during
+the same period. Another 52 small unit leaders
+participated in on-the-job training programs with
+U.S. Marine units on Okinawa between January
+and December.<a id="FNanchor_150" href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">[10-8]</a></p>
+
+<p>Unfortunately, these developments were overshadowed
+by a military disaster which befell the
+4th VNMC Battalion on the last day of the year.
+The Marine unit had been serving since early
+December as the reserve force for III Corps Tactical
+Zone. On the 27th an estimated Viet Cong battalion
+overran the small pro-government town of Binh
+Gia located in Phuoc Thy Province roughly 35
+miles east of Saigon. III Corps officials reacted
+by dispatching the 4th Battalion and an ARVN
+Ranger battalion to the area. The 4th Battalion,
+accompanied by two U.S. Marine advisors and
+three OJT observers from the 3d Marine Division,
+was ordered to recapture the town. It proceeded
+to do so on the 30th, encountering no enemy
+opposition. Later in the day, while the Marines
+were developing defensive positions around the
+town, a spotter aircraft sighted a large Viet Cong
+force approximately two miles to the west and
+called for air strikes. A U.S. Army helicopter
+gunship was shot down and its crew killed while
+attacking the target.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">137</span></p>
+
+<p>Against the advice of his senior U.S. Marine
+Advisor, Captain Franklin P. Eller, the 4th Battalion
+commander ordered one of his companies to
+secure the crash site and recover the bodies of the
+dead crewmen. Accompanied by Eller, First Lieutenant
+James P. Kelliher, and Staff Sergeant Clifford
+J. Beaver, two of the 3d Division OJTs, the
+company moved west from Binh Gia on the
+morning of the 31st to carry out the mission. After
+reaching the crash site, the Marine unit was ambushed
+by a large Viet Cong force using 82mm
+mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, and .50 caliber
+machine guns. Unable to maneuver because of the
+intense fire, the company radioed for assistance and
+began withdrawing from the ambush site in small
+groups.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_137" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_137.jpg" width="1916" height="1230" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Marine Captain Franklin P. Eller, advisor to the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion, coordinates with other American-advised
+units operating nearby. (<cite>USMC Photo A183570</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The battalion commander, accompanied by the
+assistant Marine advisor, First Lieutenant Philip
+O. Brady and the other OJTs, responded to the
+call for assistance by leading the remaining three
+companies from their positions at Binh Gia. Just
+outside the town they met Captain Eller, who had
+been wounded in the face, along with Lieutenant
+Kelliher and the remnants of the hard-hit company.
+Eller and the survivors of the morning ambush
+returned to Binh Gia while the remainder of the
+battalion pushed westward in an attempt to locate
+the enemy force. Later in the morning, the Marine
+column was surprised while moving through an
+abandoned rubber plantation by a Communist
+force of between 1,200 and 1,800 men.</p>
+
+<p>No artillery was available to support the beleaguered
+battalion. Vietnamese Air Force A-1
+Skyraiders, however, were able to deliver close
+air strikes for about 45 minutes. U.S. Army helicopter
+gunships replaced the Skyraiders on station,
+but their rocket and machine gun fire proved too
+light to dislodge the enemy from his positions
+under the dense vegetation. By late afternoon,
+29 of the 4th Battalion’s 35 officers, including the
+battalion commander, were dead. In desperation,
+the Americans organized the surviving Vietnamese<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">138</span>
+Marines into small groups some of which
+managed to slip past the Viet Cong and find their
+way back to Binh Gia.</p>
+
+<p>The Vietnamese Marines had suffered their most
+decisive defeat of the war. Their losses were extremely
+high: 112 killed, 71 wounded, and 13
+missing out of a 326-man battalion. Equipment
+losses included 142 weapons and over a dozen
+radios. Additionally, all four of the U.S. Marines
+who had participated in the disastrous action had
+been wounded. Both Captain Eller and Lieutenant
+Brady were later awarded the Silver Star Medal
+for their roles in the battle.<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[10-G]</a> Captain Donald G.
+Cook, one of the OJT observers from the 3d Marine
+Division, was missing in action at the close of
+the battle.<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[10-H]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="label">[10-G]</a> Personal decorations for heroism were awarded more frequently
+to Marine advisors through 1964. Earlier in the year
+(16 February), a Marine captain, Donald E. Koelper, an advisor
+to the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion earned a Navy Cross,
+the nation’s second highest award for heroism. Koelper was
+decorated for warning the occupants of a crowded American
+theater in Saigon to take cover just prior to the detonation of a
+Viet Cong terrorist bomb. The Marine was killed by a Viet
+Cong satchel charge. But his sacrifice limited the number of
+casualties to three killed and 51 wounded.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="label">[10-H]</a> It was later learned that Captain Cook had been wounded
+and captured by the Viet Cong. Cook reportedly died in captivity
+in 1967.</p>
+
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<p>The ranger battalion operating nearby suffered a
+similar fate, incurring nearly 400 casualties in another
+violent ambush. Thus, within a 24-hour
+period two elite government battalions had been
+shattered. Only later was it learned that the Marines
+and rangers had clashed with two main force regiments
+of the <i>9th Viet Cong Division</i>—the first
+Communist division to become operational in
+South Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>As a result of the disastrous engagement at
+Binh Gia, the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion
+was rendered ineffective as a fighting force for a
+period of three months. This loss created two
+immediate problems for General Khang and his
+American advisors. It reduced the brigade’s available
+infantry strength by approximately 25 percent
+and placed an added burden on the recruit training
+center which was already laboring to provide
+enough new troops to fill the 5th Battalion. For
+the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1964 ended on a
+discouraging note.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_138" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 18em;">
+  <img src="images/i_138.jpg" width="907" height="1113" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Marine Captain Donald E. Koelper, advisor to the 4th
+Vietnamese Marine Battalion, was posthumously
+awarded the first Navy Cross for action in Vietnam.
+(<cite>USMC Photo A411741</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_138"><i>Additional Marine Activities</i></h3>
+
+<p>U.S. Marine participation in the Vietnam War
+during 1964 was not limited to the activities of
+the advisory division and the helicopter task
+element. Various other Marine units and detachments
+made significant, although less publicized,
+contributions to the war effort throughout the
+year. One of these was the Marine security detachment
+which continued to protect the U.S. Embassy
+in Saigon. Twice during the year the growing
+political unrest and the increasing threat of
+Communist terrorist attacks prompted the expansion
+of the security detachment, first in April and
+again in October. By the end of the year the
+detachment’s strength stood at 30 Marines—a
+figure which made it the second largest such unit
+in the world. Only the Marine detachment in
+Paris, with 37 officers and men, was larger. And
+nowhere was an embassy guard assignment more
+dangerous than in Vietnam where terrorist attacks
+were apt to occur at anytime.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">139</span></p>
+
+<p>Other groups of Marines performed an assortment
+of missions in support of the Government
+of Vietnam during the course of the year. The
+Detachment, 1st Composite Radio Company, for
+example, continued its duties at the U.S. Army
+Communications installation in Pleiku. A handful
+of these Marines also served at a newly opened
+U.S. Army communications station at Phu Bai
+some eight miles southeast of Hue. The strength
+of the Detachment, 1st Composite Radio Company,
+however, was reduced from 42 officers and men to
+only 16 by the end of December.</p>
+
+<p>The spring of 1964 saw a new, substantially
+larger Marine communications detachment introduced
+into the northern provinces of South
+Vietnam. Unlike its predecessors at Pleiku and
+Phu Bai, this unit was composed exclusively of
+Marines and included an infantry element for
+security purposes. Designated the Signal Engineering
+Survey Unit, the radio detachment consisted
+of three officers and 27 enlisted men drawn from
+the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac, and from
+Headquarters Marine Corps. This element, commanded
+by Major Alfred M. Gray, Jr. arrived at
+Da Nang on 20 May along with a 76-man infantry
+detachment from Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d
+Marines. The infantry element, reinforced with an
+81mm mortar section (two mortars), was commanded
+by First Lieutenant Raymond J. Otlowski.
+Major Gray assumed overall command of the
+composite force which was designated Marine
+Detachment, Advisory Team One. Advisory Team
+One became the first actual Marine ground unit
+to conduct independent operations in the Republic
+of Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>U.S. Air Force C-123 transports airlifted the
+bulk of the newly formed unit to the Civilian
+Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp at Khe
+Sanh in northwestern Quang Tri Province in the
+closing days of May. Two officers and five enlisted
+communicators remained behind at Da Nang and
+a four-man team positioned itself in the U.S. Army
+compound at Phu Bai to provide radio support for
+the main body. At Khe Sanh, Advisory Team One
+initially concentrated on building a solid supply
+base prior to undertaking actual communications
+operations. ARVN truck convoys brought the
+preponderance of its supplies from Quang Tri over
+Route 9, the old colonial road that snaked through
+the Annamite Mountains into Laos. While Major
+Gray and his men proceeded with this task,
+Marine UH-34Ds from Da Nang helilifted an
+ARVN infantry company onto Tiger Tooth
+Mountain (Dong Voi Mep), a jungle-covered
+mountain located eight miles north of the CIDG
+Camp. With an elevation of 5,500 feet, Tiger Tooth
+Mountain is the highest terrain feature in northern
+I Corps. On 13 June U.S. Army UH-1B helicopters
+lifted Major Gray, nine enlisted men, and several
+thousand pounds of equipment into a tiny landing
+zone which the South Vietnamese troops had
+hacked out near the top of the rugged mountain.
+The ARVN soldiers, who had established a rough
+perimeter around a peak slightly below the mountain’s
+highest point, were on hand to greet the
+small group of Americans. After the initial helilift,
+however, bad weather in the form of dense clouds
+intervened to delay the remainder of the movement
+for an entire week. SHUFLY helicopters finally
+completed the mission on 21 June. When the
+helilift concluded 73 Marines and roughly 100
+Vietnamese troops were strung around and across
+a 5,000-foot peak just south of Tiger Tooth’s
+highest elevation. Another 81 Leathernecks remained
+at Khe Sanh to provide a pool from which
+fresh security forces and radiomen could be drawn
+when needed.</p>
+
+<p>MACV orders explicitly prohibited the Marines
+on Tiger Tooth Mountain from patrolling or
+engaging in any other activity which could have
+been construed as offensive in nature. As a result
+of this restriction, Major Gray’s men were confined
+to defensive positions around the crude little
+landing zone and the tents which housed the
+radio equipment. Even so, life on the mountain
+was extremely rigorous. The clouds which frequently
+enshrouded the mountain top left the
+Marines, their clothing, weapons, and equipment
+constantly damp. High winds heightened
+their discomfort. The local weather conditions
+also made food and water deliveries to the position
+hazardous and irregular. Marine UH-34Ds prepositioned
+at Khe Sanh brought C rations and
+water cans whenever the clouds revealed Tiger
+Tooth’s higher elevations. Often, however, the
+weather did not break for days. Normally the
+men were limited to two canteens of water daily—a
+restriction which made bathing and shaving impossible.
+Because of the harsh living conditions
+on the mountain, fresh security forces and radio<span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">141</span>
+men were rotated from Khe Sanh at two week intervals,
+weather permitting.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_141" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 41em;">
+  <img src="images/i_140.jpg" width="2576" height="1682" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+MARINE DETACHMENT<br>
+ADVISORY TEAM ONE<br>
+OPERATIONS IN I CTZ<br>
+
+MAY-AUGUST 1964<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Advisory Team One operated in the extreme
+northwestern corner of the republic without
+incident until the second week of July. Then
+a severe storm struck its mountaintop base,
+blowing away tents and antennae, collapsing
+fighting positions, and generally disrupting operations.
+Several nights later, on the 17th, a Viet
+Cong force of undetermined size probed the Marine
+sector of the perimeter. An intense exchange of
+small arms and automatic weapons fire ensued for
+nearly two hours. Although the Marines suffered
+no casualties and could find no dead or wounded
+Viet Cong the next day, it was apparent that their
+location had been compromised.</p>
+
+<p>Amid reports of increasing Communist activity
+throughout the area, MACV authorities in Saigon
+promptly ordered Major Gray to withdraw his
+force from Tiger Tooth Mountain. Fortunately
+good weather permitted Marine helicopters from
+Da Nang to helilift the men and their equipment
+from the mountain to Khe Sanh the day after the
+firefight. On the 22d, Air Force C-123 transports
+airlifted the entire Marine detachment to Da
+Nang. There Gray and his Marines crowded into
+the old French compound occupied by the helicopter
+task element. Although cramped, the
+SHUFLY facilities provided welcome relief for
+the men who had endured the rigors of Tiger
+Tooth Mountain and Khe Sanh for nearly two
+months.</p>
+
+<p>While at Da Nang, Major Gray detached a small
+group of radiomen to Monkey Mountain, a rocky,
+jungle-covered peninsula that jutted into the
+South China Sea just northeast of the city. There
+in relative comfort and safety, the technicians
+conducted equipment tests for two weeks. Several
+changes in the leadership and composition of the
+advisory team took place during this interval.
+Captain Raymond A. Becker, a communications
+officer from the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac,
+relieved Major Gray as the commander of the unit
+on 13 August. Soon thereafter a reinforced infantry
+company, Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines,
+commanded by Captain William R. Irwin, replaced
+Lieutenant Otlowski and the Company G Marines
+as the advisory team’s security element.</p>
+
+<p>Under Captain Becker’s command, Advisory
+Team One redeployed, this time to Dong Bach Ma,
+a 3,500-foot mountain located roughly 25 miles
+west-northwest of Da Nang. An abandoned
+French resort, still untouched by the war, sprawled
+across the higher elevations of Bach Ma and a
+hard surface road curved up its steep northern face
+from Route 1. Using this road ARVN trucks
+moved Captain Irwin and the infantry element to
+the newly selected site in advance of the radio
+personnel. Once atop the mountain, Irwin had his
+men establish a perimeter around an abandoned
+monastery. This accomplished, Marines cleared a
+small helicopter landing zone near the old but well-preserved
+religious building which was to serve
+as their base of operations. On 19 August Marine
+helicopters lifted Captain Becker, his communicators,
+and some 4,000 pounds of equipment to
+the site from Da Nang.</p>
+
+<p>Advisory Team One, relying heavily on Marine
+helicopters for logistical support, operated without
+incident from the quaint old monastery until the
+second week of September. The composite unit
+completed its operations at Bach Ma on the 10th
+whereupon it returned to Da Nang. Within days
+the detachment was disbanded without fanfare.
+The radio experts returned to their parent commands
+in Hawaii and Washington while Company
+K was airlifted to Okinawa where it rejoined the
+3d Battalion, 3d Marines. The quiet dissolution
+of the Marine Detachment, Advisory Team One,
+ended the first brief and little publicized chapter
+of Marine ground unit operations in the Republic
+of Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>In October an element of the 3d Reconnaissance
+Battalion, 3d Marine Division, operating from
+ships of the Seventh Fleet, conducted an extensive
+survey of Cam Ranh Bay in southern II Corps.
+The purpose of its survey was to determine the
+feasibility of establishing a naval facility. Marine
+counterintelligence teams from FMFPac also were
+temporarily assigned to MACV for 30-day periods
+throughout the year. These officers and noncommissioned
+officers normally augmented the U.S.
+Army 704th Counterintelligence Unit during their
+stay in Vietnam. Another group of Marines to
+employ their skills in the counterinsurgency
+environment was a small Special Operations Group
+of six officers and 21 enlisted men. These Marines
+conducted operations under the auspices of MACV.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">142</span></p>
+
+<p>A more permanent influx of Marines into the
+war-torn republic occurred in the last quarter
+of the year. In response to the intensified advisory
+effort ordered by Secretary McNamara in July,
+General Greene, the new Marine Commandant,
+assured the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+that the Marines could be expected to carry their
+share of the increased burden. Shortly thereafter,
+the Marine Corps was directed to provide 60
+officers and noncommissioned officers to serve as
+advisors with ARVN units in I Corps Tactical
+Zone. These orders, later described by Major
+Damm, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor to
+the VNMC as “very short fused ones,” were
+executed without delay.<a id="FNanchor_151" href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">[10-9]</a> The 3d Marine Division
+was given short notice to select suitable personnel
+and to transfer them immediately to ComUSMACV.
+In response to these instructions, the Okinawa-based
+command quickly formed four advisory
+teams, each composed of four men—a captain,
+a first lieutenant, a gunnery sergeant, and a corporal
+(who was to serve as the team’s radio operator).
+Accompanied by Major John W. Walker, the
+first increment of Marine advisors was airlifted to
+Da Nang by KC-130 in mid-September.</p>
+
+<p>Upon reporting to the I Corps Senior U.S.
+Advisor, Colonel Howard B. St. Clair, U.S.
+Army, the four teams were broken up, the Marines
+being assigned individually to battalions of the
+1st and 2d ARVN Divisions. Major Walker
+joined the I Corps advisory staff in Da Nang as
+assistant operations officer. The balance of the 60
+new Marine advisors were formed into teams on
+Okinawa and airlifted to Da Nang in the ensuing
+weeks. By December the advisors, who had
+initially been drawn from the 3d Marine Division,
+were being replaced gradually by officers and
+noncommissioned officers just beginning their
+normal 12-month overseas tours.</p>
+
+<p>Two additional permanent Marine advisor
+billets were also approved in the closing weeks of
+1964. These were created within the Naval Advisory
+Group to assist the Vietnamese Navy in
+controlling one of South Vietnam’s most troublesome
+areas—the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ).
+Located southeast of Saigon on both sides of the
+Long Tao River, the main ship channel to the
+capital, the Rung Sat was a vast, difficult-to-penetrate,
+mangrove swamp. Due largely to its
+relative inaccessibility, the area had been developed
+by the Viet Cong into a key base for
+supporting their operations in the surrounding
+provinces. More significantly, by early 1964 the
+Communist-held Rung Sat posed a serious threat
+to commercial ships bound for Saigon. For this
+reason the responsibility for pacifying the area was
+turned over to the Vietnamese Navy in April.</p>
+
+<p>Initially one Marine major, Edward J. Bronars,
+was assigned to assist and advise the Vietnamese
+Navy in its attempts to secure the Rung Sat. In
+November, however, the RSSZ advisory staff was
+reorganized to include one Marine captain and one
+sergeant. Although they did not arrive for duty
+until early the following year, the newly approved
+billets created the third distinct group of
+Marine ground advisors assigned to the Republic
+of Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_152" href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">[10-10]</a></p>
+
+<p>The OJT program continued in effect for junior
+Marine officers and staff noncommissioned officers
+throughout 1964. Near the end of the year the
+program was broadened somewhat to include
+members of Hawaii-based Marine commands. Each
+month 10 Leathernecks arrived at Da Nang to
+begin their 30-day assignments. At SHUFLY headquarters
+the visitors were briefed as a group before
+being attached individually to specific South Vietnamese
+units for the duration of their stay in
+Vietnam. Normally, the officers and staff noncommissioned
+officers joined a unit already being advised
+by a U.S. Marine. When possible, the OJT
+was assigned to a unit which could benefit from
+his particular military and technical skills. Still,
+the on-the-job-trainee was not always considered
+an asset. “In honesty,” one permanent advisor to
+the Vietnamese Marine Corps conceded, “OJTs
+were a mixed blessing—they provided some help
+but they also were an added responsibility for the
+VNMC commander who was charged with their
+safety.” “Some OJTs,” he added, “received misperceptions
+of the capability of the Viet Cong
+since their knowledge/experience was limited to
+the events occurring during their brief 30-day
+tour.”<a id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">[10-11]</a> Nevertheless, a significant number of
+Marine small unit leaders were able to gain some
+degree of first-hand experience in counter guerrilla<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">143</span>
+warfare under the provisions on the OJT
+program.<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[10-I]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="label">[10-I]</a> The 3d Marine Division’s OJT program did not end until
+after elements of the division landed at Da Nang in March 1965.
+The Marine Advisory Unit experimented successfully with
+another form of augmentation in the first days of 1965. When
+the Vietnamese Marines deployed to the Binh Gia area with a
+provisional brigade in early January, Colonel Nesbit, who was
+still serving as Senior Marine Advisor, requested additional
+personnel to assist and advise at the staff level. FMFPac responded
+by temporarily detaching eight officers and 11 enlisted men to
+the advisory division. MACV provided two more Marine officers
+and seven additional enlisted men, all of whom remained attached
+to the Marine Advisory Unit for the duration of the operation.
+The temporarily assigned Marines returned to their parent
+organizations when the operation terminated. This is covered
+in more detail in the 1965 account of U.S. Marine activities in
+Vietnam.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>A similar but shorter term program for field
+grade officers and colonels, the Job Related Orientation
+(JRO) Program, also took hold during the
+early months of 1964. Instituted in the last half
+of the previous year, the JRO program provided for
+a small number of staff officers from the various
+FMFPac commands to visit U.S. Headquarters
+in Vietnam and Thailand for an eight-day period.
+Small groups of these officers arrived at Da Nang
+from Okinawa and, like the OJTs, were briefed by
+the helicopter task element commander and his
+staff. Later they were afforded an orientation flight
+over the northern provinces. Next, the visiting
+officers were flown to Saigon where they received
+more briefings at MACV headquarters. In the
+capital, where they were hosted by the Senior
+Marine Advisor, they visited Vietnamese Marine
+units and discussed tactics and problem areas with
+the advisors. After four days in the Republic of
+Vietnam the Marines travelled on to Bangkok
+where they spent the balance of their visit. Upon
+the conclusion of these JRO trips, each officer was
+required to submit a detailed written report to the
+Commanding General, FMFPac. In turn, extracts
+of these reports were forwarded to the Commandant
+of the Marine Corps in Washington.</p>
+
+<p>Generally these reports addressed tactical, operational,
+logistics, and intelligence matters. But a
+number of the Marine officers used the reporting
+system to articulate their opinions relative to the
+overall direction of the war. Colonel Warren P.
+Baker, a member of the 3d Marine Division staff
+who visited Vietnam in March, pointed out that
+field advisors and MACV staff members differed
+sharply in their personal assessments of progress
+being made. The field advisors, Baker observed,
+demonstrated far less optimism than did the staff
+members. Furthermore, he reported that unless the
+people of South Vietnam could be won over to the
+government, the Viet Cong’s success could be
+expected to continue.<a id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154" class="fnanchor">[10-12]</a> Another officer, Lieutenant
+Colonel Harry E. Dickinson, summarized his
+conclusions with an even more emphatic warning:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>The commitment of sizeable U.S. combat units should
+not be effected except to protect the seat of government.
+While local success might be achieved in certain areas, it
+is extremely doubtful whether any lasting degree of success
+would entail in the northern and western sections. As combat
+units were increased, the forces of Vietnam would do less
+and less with the inevitable conflict of overall command. The
+end result would be the ringing of the country with combat
+units but no solution for the internal conflict. I strongly
+disagree that any two or three divisions could achieve real
+victory as has been stated in the press.<a id="FNanchor_155" href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[10-13]</a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="in0">Through candid reporting of this nature, Marine
+commanders from Okinawa to Washington were
+kept abreast of the complex and difficult problems
+being generated by the war in Southeast Asia.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">144</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_11"><span id="toclink_144"></span>CHAPTER 11<br>
+<span class="subhead large">Spring and Summer Fighting</span><br>
+<span class="subhead notbold"><i>The Monsoons—The Weather Breaks—Sure Wind 202—Operations
+Elsewhere in I Corps—Changing the Watch</i></span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p>Commanded by Colonel Andre D. Gomez, the
+strength of the Marine task element at Da Nang
+stood at 450 officers and men as 1964 opened.
+Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ HMM-361 continued
+its assignment as the task element’s helicopter
+squadron while Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy’s
+204-man MABS-16 sub unit retained responsibility
+for maintaining and operating the support facilities.</p>
+
+<p>Shortly after New Year’s Day, ComUSMACV
+advised Colonel Gomez that the entire Marine
+task element would be withdrawn from the
+Republic of Vietnam during the first half of 1964.
+This decision was one of CinCPac’s continuing
+responses to the Defense Department plans for
+reducing the level of direct American military
+involvement in Vietnam. Additionally, Gomez
+was informed that the task element would be
+called upon to initiate a training program designed
+to prepare Vietnamese Air Force pilots and mechanics
+to operate and maintain the UH-34Ds.
+This program was scheduled to culminate with the
+takeover of the 24 Marine helicopters by a new
+VNAF squadron on 30 June, and the subsequent
+departure of the entire task element for Okinawa
+where it would rejoin MAG-16, its parent
+organization.<a id="FNanchor_156" href="#Footnote_156" class="fnanchor">[11-1]</a></p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_144a"><i>The Monsoons</i></h3>
+
+<p>The new year broke with Marine flight operations
+at Da Nang still proceeding at a reduced
+rate due to the heavy monsoon weather. As had
+been the case at the close of 1963, medical evacuation
+and resupply missions continued to constitute
+the major source of work for HMM-361’s crews.
+The first Marine helicopter loss during 1964 occurred
+during one such mission on 3 January when
+an aircraft was shot down while attempting to
+perform a medical evacuation about 30 miles due
+west of Da Nang. Hit at least six times on its
+descent toward the landing zone, the UH-34D
+crashed into the jungle. Its crew miraculously
+escaped injury and was rescued by another Marine
+helicopter. The aircraft, damaged beyond repair,
+was intentionally destroyed by U.S. Special
+Forces personnel. This was only the second Marine
+helicopter loss definitely attributed to Communist
+fire since SHUFLY’s arrival at Soc Trang
+nearly two years earlier.</p>
+
+<p>In the second week of January the weather over
+the mountains west to Da Nang broke long enough
+for Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ squadron to accomplish
+a critical trooplift. On short notice the
+Marines were ordered to remove a 200-man CIDG
+force from the hills about 30 miles west-southwest
+of Da Nang. Accompanied by a U.S. Army advisor,
+the South Vietnamese unit had been conducting
+a reconnaissance in force about eight miles west
+of its camp at An Diem.<a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[11-A]</a> Under cover of the
+monsoon clouds, which limited effective U.S. or
+VNAF air support, Viet Cong elements of undetermined
+strength had closed in on the government
+force, threatening to isolate and destroy it before
+the weather lifted.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="label">[11-A]</a> See <a href="#ip_82">map of outposts</a> in I CTZ, page 81.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>The immediate nature of this particular mission
+left little time for detailed planning and briefing.
+I Corps headquarters could only advise the Marines
+of such vital information as the unit’s radio call
+sign, radio frequency, size, and location. To
+familiarize himself with the terrain in the vicinity
+of the pickup site, Lieutenant Colonel Ross first
+made a reconnaissance flight to the area in an
+O-1B. His reconnaissance revealed the landing
+zone to be “a precarious hill top knob exposed to
+a 360° field of fire,” Ross later recalled.<a id="FNanchor_157" href="#Footnote_157" class="fnanchor">[11-2]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">145</span></p>
+
+<p>The reconnaissance accomplished, the squadron
+commander returned to Da Nang, exchanged the
+O-1B for a UH-34D, and led a flight of 14 helicopters
+to the pickup point. In accordance with the
+squadron’s standing operating procedure, Ross,
+the flight leader, was to land first, drop off a loadmaster,
+and lift out the first Vietnamese heliteam.
+Upon approaching the hilltop, however, the lead
+helicopter was forced away by heavy small arms
+fire which punctured the aft section of the aircraft’s
+fuselage, wounding the loadmaster.</p>
+
+<p>The second aircraft, following at close interval,
+was also hit. Lieutenant Colonel Ross then ordered
+the entire formation into a holding pattern out of
+small arms range while he attempted to persuade
+the American advisor to move the Vietnamese
+unit overland a short distance to a less exposed
+landing zone beside a stream. This the U.S. advisor
+was reluctant to do. “I was convinced,”
+Ross concluded, “that his real concern was the
+shattered morale of his ARVN troops and doubts
+about being able to get them moving to the alternate
+site.”<a id="FNanchor_158" href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[11-3]</a> After some delay the Vietnamese unit
+finally moved to the new landing zone, whereupon
+the Marines completed the troop lift. Still, the
+helicopters were exposed to unnecessary risks.</p>
+
+<p>Understandably concerned with problems of
+this nature which tended to plague all but the
+larger preplanned operations, Lieutenant Colonel
+Ross questioned the “ability of the advisors to
+make operational decisions based upon considerations
+beyond their own tactical problems.”<a id="FNanchor_159" href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">[11-4]</a>
+In this particular case the selection of the exposed
+hilltop landing zone tended to substantiate the
+Marine commander’s complaints.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_145" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_145.jpg" width="1914" height="1429" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Loadmaster directs a helicopter into a recently cleared landing zone. (<cite>USMC Photo A329576</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>During the second week of January, General
+Greene, the newly appointed Commandant of the
+Marine Corps, visited the Marine installation at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">146</span>
+Da Nang. The Commandant conducted an inspection
+of the compound and was briefed on operations
+by Colonel Gomez and his staff. After presenting
+combat decorations to several members of the task
+element, Greene departed for Hawaii where he was
+to visit the FMFPac headquarters.</p>
+
+<p>The Commandant summed up his impressions of
+the Marine helicopter task element in testimony
+before the House Committee on Armed Services
+several weeks after his return to Washington. “I
+was assured by General Harkins and his officers—and
+by the officers of the supported Vietnamese
+units—that this squadron has performed its supporting
+mission in an outstanding manner,” related
+Greene. “Everything that I observed,” he added,
+“certainly attested to the high morale and effectiveness
+of this unit.”<a id="FNanchor_160" href="#Footnote_160" class="fnanchor">[11-5]</a><a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">[11-A]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="label">[11-A]</a> A more frequent visitor to the Marine helicopter task element
+was Colonel Anderson, the MAAG Chief of Staff. An experienced
+aviator, Colonel Anderson had commanded a Marine bomber
+squadron (VMB-443) in the latter stages of World War II. While
+serving as the MAAG Chief of Staff during 1963 and 1964,
+Anderson participated in a number of combat missions as a pilot
+with the various squadrons assigned to SHUFLY.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Late January and early February saw the normal
+rotation of several of the task element’s key
+personnel as well as its helicopter squadron. On 14
+January, Colonel Robert A. Merchant, an officer
+with a diverse military background, assumed
+command of SHUFLY. Merchant had commanded
+an artillery battalion on Okinawa in World War
+II, a Marine attack squadron in Korea, and had
+served on the joint staff of the Specified Commander
+for the Middle East in Beirut during the 1958
+Lebanon Operation. More recently he had graduated
+from the Industrial College of the Armed
+Forces. Having flown with the task element’s
+squadron while on temporary duty in Vietnam the
+previous October and since his arrival in early
+January, Merchant was thoroughly familiar with
+SHUFLY’s operations.</p>
+
+<p>Command of the MABS-16 sub unit changed
+hands two weeks later when Lieutenant Colonel
+Samuel G. Beal relieved Lieutenant Colonel
+Cassidy. Beal, also a veteran of World War II and
+Korea, came from the 4th Marines in Hawaii where
+he had served as that unit’s air liaison officer.</p>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ HMM-361 ended its
+tour at Da Nang on 1 February. The squadron’s
+arrival in I Corps unfortunately had coincided with
+the arrival of the early monsoon rains. The unit’s
+flight statistics had suffered also from the interruption
+caused by the political infighting which had
+deposed President Diem. As a result, its operations
+never reached the sustained tempo which had
+characterized the records of the Marine helicopter
+squadrons previously assigned to SHUFLY. Lieutenant
+Colonel Ross’ UH-34Ds totalled 4,236
+combat flight hours and just under 7,000 combat
+sorties—figures which, considering the conditions
+surrounding their accumulation, compared favorably
+with the number of combat flight hours
+(7,249) and sorties (11,900) averaged by the four
+previous UH-34D squadrons to serve in Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_161" href="#Footnote_161" class="fnanchor">[11-6]</a></p>
+
+<p>HMM-364, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
+John H. La Voy, a pilot who had flown his first
+combat helicopter missions during the Korean
+War, initiated support operations from Da Nang
+on 1 February. Under the existing plans to deactivate
+the Marine task element, La Voy’s
+squadron was scheduled to be the last Marine
+helicopter unit to operate in South Vietnam.
+As such, HMM-364’s pilots and maintenance
+crews were to launch the training program that
+would prepare the Vietnamese Air Force personnel
+to take over the Marine helicopters upon the task
+element’s departure from Da Nang.</p>
+
+<p>On 4 February the first class of eight Vietnamese
+pilots began a 50-hour package of flight instruction
+under the supervision of Lieutenant Colonel La
+Voy’s pilots. Included in the course of instruction
+were operational missions, night and instrument
+flying, formation work, and landing practice. Each
+student was already a qualified copilot with at
+least 25 flight hours in VNAF UH-34s—a factor
+which allowed the training to be conducted concurrently
+with normal operations. This was accomplished
+by having the Vietnamese trainees
+fly as copilots with a Marine pilot on operational
+flights. In addition to being an effective training
+method this system had two other advantages.
+First, it enabled the Vietnamese students to acquire
+a first-hand knowledge of the helicopter tactics
+most commonly used in the northern provinces.
+Secondly, it allowed Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s
+squadron to concentrate on its primary mission of
+providing combat support for the ground forces
+in I Corps.</p>
+
+<p>Another vital aspect of the training program
+involved preparing Vietnamese ground personnel
+to keep the squadron operational. This demanded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">147</span>
+extensive training of mechanics, crew chiefs,
+engineering, supply, operations, and ordnance
+personnel. “This additional duty,” Lieutenant
+Colonel La Voy explained, “was a tremendous
+burden on all departments of my squadron, whose
+primary job was to keep aircraft in commission
+and to conduct combat operations.” The language
+barrier understandably threatened the success of
+the overall training effort. In La Voy’s opinion,
+however, “the eagerness of the students to learn
+and the wealth of practical experience and varied
+demonstrations” combined to help reduce problems
+imposed by the language difference.<a id="FNanchor_162" href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[11-7]</a></p>
+
+<p>The progress of the program proved the concepts
+sound. The first small group of student pilots was
+graduated on 9 March despite numerous flight
+cancellations due to bad weather during the
+training period. Subsequent classes of VNAF
+pilots continued to train with the Marine helicopter
+task element throughout 1964. Eventually, a more
+advanced training program would have the
+Vietnamese pilots flying sections of two and four
+helicopters as integral elements of larger Marine
+helicopter operations.</p>
+
+<p>Although heavy monsoon clouds lingered over
+I Corps throughout most of the month of March,
+brief periods of good weather sometimes allowed
+heliborne incursions into the mountainous areas.
+One such period began on the 5th and lasted long
+enough for Marine, Army, and VNAF helicopters
+to lift a 54-man ARVN patrol from An Diem to a
+landing zone near the Laotian border. During the
+operation one escorting U.S. Army UH-1B gunship
+accidentally struck a tree and was forced to land
+in a nearby jungle clearing. Two Marine helicopters
+quickly rescued the crew and weapons of the
+downed UH-1B, but drew automatic weapons fire
+in the process. That afternoon 15 Marine helicopters
+and two armed UH-1Bs returned to the
+crash site with 64 ARVN troops who established
+a perimeter around the damaged helicopter after
+being landed. A maintenance team then landed and
+repaired the aircraft which subsequently was flown
+back to Da Nang.</p>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s crews undertook
+to correct several problems which they identified
+during these initial combat operations. One was
+the need for machine gun fire to protect the port
+(left) side of the transport helicopters as they
+approached contested landing zones. To fill this
+requirement the squadron’s metalsmiths designed
+and fabricated a flexible mount for an additional
+M-60 machine gun. This new mount was designed
+to allow the machine gun to be swung out a portside
+window from the cabin. Placed on each of
+HMM-364’s 24 helicopters, this modification
+ultimately added a gunner to each crew and enabled
+the Marines to deliver fire to either or both
+sides of the aircraft during the critical landing
+phase of helilifts.<a id="FNanchor_163" href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">[11-8]</a></p>
+
+<p>La Voy personally instituted another change
+which made the coordination of trooplifts more
+effective. Prior to HMM-364’s arrival in Vietnam,
+different Marines had served as loadmasters for
+each heliborne operation. While this system of
+rotating the loadmaster assignment had stood the
+test of numerous operations since its inception in
+late 1962, La Voy believed that it could be improved.
+Accordingly, he assigned one pilot and
+two crew chiefs permanent additional responsibilities
+as loadmasters. Thereafter, this three-man
+team was responsible for coordinating loading and
+unloading activities at pickup points and landing
+zones for all troop lifts. Thus, through a relatively
+minor adjustment, the Marines helped insure the
+closer coordination of their helicopter operations
+with ARVN ground forces.<a id="FNanchor_164" href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">[11-9]</a></p>
+
+<p>In early March hostile incidents around the Da
+Nang air base increased dramatically. The incidents
+usually took the form of sniper fire from the village
+situated just across the perimeter fence from the
+living compound. The primary target of the enemy
+snipers seemed to be the task element’s electrical
+generators whose high noise level prevented
+sentries from determining the firing position.
+Tensions heightened on the night of the 15th when
+a terrorist hurled a gasoline-filled bottle into the
+doorway of the staff noncommissioned officers
+quarters. The crude bomb fortunately failed to
+ignite. Several days later, however, a Marine in
+the compound was wounded by sniper fire from
+beyond the perimeter wire.</p>
+
+<p>These latest incidents led Colonel Merchant to
+request that the security platoon from the 3d
+Marine Division be redeployed to help protect the
+base camp and flight line. This request was approved
+by ComUSMACV and CGFMFPac without
+delay. On 24 March a 53-man platoon from the
+1st Battalion, 9th Marines arrived at Da Nang on a
+Marine KC-130 and assumed responsibility for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">148</span>
+security around the Marine compound and flight
+line. Attached to the MABS-16 sub unit, the
+infantry platoon freed Colonel Merchant’s aviation
+personnel to devote full time to their primary
+mission—providing helicopter support to I Corps.
+Like its predecessor which had been withdrawn
+only three months earlier, the new infantry unit
+would assist with rescue operations in insecure
+areas and on occasion would be called upon to
+provide security around TAFDS bladders during
+helicopter operations in more remote areas.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_148" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 31em;">
+  <img src="images/i_148.jpg" width="1921" height="1432" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>South Vietnamese troops unload ammunition from a UH-34D while a Marine loadmaster, braced against wheel and
+wheel strut, exchanges information with the Leatherneck pilot. (<cite>USMC Photo A329570</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The same day that the platoon from the 3d
+Marine Division arrived at Da Nang, a task element
+Marine was involved in an act of heroism which
+later earned him the Bronze Star Medal. While
+escorting Marine helicopters on a resupply mission
+about five miles west-northwest of Tam Ky, a
+U.S. Army UH-1B gunship from Da Nang was
+hit by Viet Cong fire and crashed in flames. Marine
+Lance Corporal Walter L. Rupp, a volunteer
+machine gunner on board the Army gunship,
+acted rapidly to help secure the area despite
+having suffered injuries in the crash. Manning
+an M-60 machine gun, Rupp delivered fire on the
+approaching enemy while the pilot, copilot, and
+three other passengers were pulled from the
+wreckage. All six American personnel, including
+the injured Marine, were evacuated safely to Da
+Nang, and then flown to the U.S. Army Field
+Hospital at Nha Trang for more extensive medical
+attention.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_148"><i>The Weather Breaks</i></h3>
+
+<p>Much of I Corps began experiencing improved
+weather conditions during the first days of April.
+Relying on helicopter support, the ARVN resumed
+its offensives into the rugged mountainous regions.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">149</span>
+On the 6th a combined Allied helicopter flight
+lifted 42 ARVN soldiers from Tam Ky to a landing
+zone about 18 miles directly west of Quang Ngai.
+An Army UH-1B was shot down by Communist
+fire during the operation. Shortly after the crash,
+one of HMM-364’s helicopters landed to rescue
+the crew and strip the weapons from the downed
+aircraft. Marine mechanics then helped Army
+aviation technicians disassemble the UH-1B whereupon
+it was suspended beneath an Army UH-37
+(a twin-engine, piston-powered, heavy helicopter
+manufactured by Sikorsky) in a specially designed
+sling and helilifted back to Da Nang for repairs.</p>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s squadron suffered
+its first combat aircraft loss on 14 April. The
+incident occurred after one of HMM-364’s helicopters
+was hit in the engine by Viet Cong fire
+while attempting to evacuate wounded Vietnamese
+infantrymen from a hillside landing zone
+about 40 miles west of Da Nang near the Laotian
+border. Struck while taking off, the UH-34D
+plunged 150 feet down the steep hillside and
+crashed through the jungle into a stream bed.
+One Marine manning an M-60 machine gun suffered
+a broken leg in the crash. The other crew members
+and passengers, however, were able to carry him
+up the hill to the ARVN landing zone. Heavy
+thunder showers prevented rescue for two hours,
+but the weather finally broke and the men were
+helilifted to Da Nang. The aircraft was destroyed
+the next day.</p>
+
+<p>Four days after this incident, HMM-364 committed
+all available aircraft to a battalion-size
+heliborne assault into rugged northwestern Thua
+Thien Province. The ARVN’s objective was a
+mountainous area on the northern rim of the
+A Shau Valley, a 30-mile-long, two-mile-wide
+trough whose location adjacent to the Laotian
+border invited Communist infiltration. Although
+enemy activity would eventually force the government
+to abandon its string of outposts in the valley,
+the issue of control of the area was still unresolved
+in early 1964.</p>
+
+<p>Colonel Merchant, as commander of the Aviation
+Headquarters Operations Center for I Corps,
+assigned 20 Marine UH-34Ds, four VNAF UH-34s,
+five U.S. Army UH-1B gunships, and three Marine
+O-1Bs to the operation which the ARVN code
+named LAM SON 115. Additionally, 14 VNAF
+T-28s, four A-1H Skyraiders, and two observation
+aircraft were assigned by the Joint General Staff to
+provide support for the helicopter assault. The
+operation was to be controlled by Colonel Merchant
+as the Tactical Air Commander Airborne (TACA)
+from a U.S. Air Force U-10, whose radios would
+permit the commander and his staff to communicate
+with every aircraft participating in the effort. (The
+Marine helicopters had UHF and VHF communications,
+while the Marine observation aircraft used
+UHF and FM. The Army UH-1Bs had UHF; the
+VNAF transport helicopters also relied upon UHF
+radios.)</p>
+
+<p>In addition to Merchant, the airborne control
+staff from the ASOC included Lieutenant Colonel
+William Montgomery, USAF, and a Vietnamese
+officer. The Vietnamese representative was to
+assist in clearing close air strikes with ARVN
+ground forces and also was to help resolve any
+language problems which developed.</p>
+
+<p>The one-day operation began early on 18 April
+with Marine and VNAF transport helicopters
+lifting 200 South Vietnamese soldiers from an
+outpost in the northwestern portion of the A Shau
+Valley into a rugged landing zone approximately
+six miles further north. Later the same morning
+300 more Vietnamese troops were helilifted from a
+government outpost in the central portion of the
+valley to a second landing zone situated six miles
+north of the 200-man unit which had been flown
+in earlier. HMM-364’s helicopters averaged almost
+8 hours per aircraft while flying 160 total hours
+in support of LAM SON 115. Only one Marine
+UH-34D and one VNAF helicopter were hit by
+enemy fire during the execution of the well-planned
+and efficiently coordinated operation. No aircraft
+were lost.</p>
+
+<p>Often the daily support flights proved more
+hazardous then the large assault operations whose
+details were planned in advance. An incident
+that occurred on 21 April while a UH-34D was
+evacuating a wounded South Vietnamese soldier
+from the mountains 15 miles west of Tam Ky
+confirmed the dangers inherent in such daily
+operations. In an effort to lure the evacuation
+helicopter within range of their weapons, the
+Communists ignited a yellow smoke grenade in
+a clearing close by the actual landing zone. The
+pilot alertly identified the correct landing zone,
+thereby foiling the enemy ruse.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">150</span></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_150" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_150.jpg" width="1867" height="2599" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+MAJOR MARINE HELICOPTER<br>
+OPERATIONS FIRST HALF 1964<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">151</span></p>
+
+<figure id="ip_151" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_151.jpg" width="1904" height="1370" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>HMM-364 loadmaster directs loaded UH-34D into a hilltop landing zone during operations in I Corps. (<cite>USMC Photo
+A329571</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Several days later, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s
+Marines encountered an equally clever Viet Cong
+tactic while performing another evacuation mission,
+this time in support of a U.S. Special Forces
+patrol 20 miles west of Thuong Duc. Army UH-1B
+gunships made several low-level reconnaissance
+passes over the pickup site while the UH-34D
+pilot prepared to hoist the casualties through the
+dense jungle. When the gunship crews reported
+no enemy activity, the Marine pilot maneuvered
+his aircraft into a hovering position above the
+invisible patrol. At this juncture, well-concealed
+Viet Cong began firing automatic weapons at the
+hovering helicopter and forced it to seek safety
+away from the pickup area. The escorting gunships
+then wheeled in from above, returning the Viet
+Cong’s fire with rockets and machine guns. The
+enemy promptly ceased firing, whereupon the
+Marine helicopter again maneuvered into position
+above the patrol. Again the enemy challenged
+the aircraft with fire, this time striking it in the
+rear portion of the fuselage. Although no serious
+damage was done, the evacuation helicopter was
+again forced away from the patrol’s position.</p>
+
+<p>The UH-1Bs once more placed suppressive fire
+on the enemy position, finally allowing a second
+Marine helicopter to hoist the wounded man
+through the trees. A new burst of enemy fire,
+however, interrupted a subsequent effort to retrieve
+the body of a dead patrol member. An
+HMM-364 helicopter returned to the area the
+following day and completed the evacuation.</p>
+
+<p>Although neither resulted in U.S. or VNAF
+aircraft losses, the incidents of 21 and 24 April
+confirmed that the Viet Cong was devising new
+methods with which to counter the Allies’ helicopters.
+His use of false smoke signals and his
+persistent refusal to compromise his position by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">152</span>
+firing on the faster, more heavily armed U.S.
+gunships represented crude but effective additions
+to his expanding repertoire of counter-helicopter
+tactics. Although unappreciated by the Leatherneck
+crews, the enemy’s most recent flurry of
+actions had no lasting effect on the overall pattern
+of helicopter operations.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_152"><i>Sure Wind 202</i></h3>
+
+<p>In late April Colonel Merchant’s Marines joined
+with VNAF and U.S. Army elements to launch
+what would be the costliest and most viciously
+opposed heliborne assault attempted in South
+Vietnam during the 1962–1965 period. On the 26th,
+Merchant, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy, and
+Lieutenant Colonel George Brigham, the task
+element operations officer, flew to Quang Ngai and
+Pleiku to participate in the final stages of planning
+for a multi-battalion heliborne offensive into the
+Do Xa area, the mountainous Viet Cong stronghold
+located along the northern border of II
+Corps. At Quang Ngai officials from the II
+Corps headquarters had already completed the
+general plans for Operation SURE WIND 202
+(Vietnamese code name: QUYET THANG 202),
+the size of which demanded the use of all transport
+helicopters available in both I and II Corps. The
+Marine representatives learned that HMM-364’s
+role in the upcoming operation would be to helilift
+a 420-man South Vietnamese battalion from the
+Quang Ngai airfield to Landing Zone BRAVO,
+an objective located about 30 miles due west of the
+pickup point. Simultaneous with this assault, a
+U.S. Army helicopter company based at Pleiku
+was scheduled to transport two ARVN battalions
+(960 troops) from Gi Lang, an outpost located 24
+miles west-southwest of Quang Ngai, to a second
+landing zone about eight miles west-southwest
+of Landing Zone BRAVO. The operation was to
+begin on the morning of 27 April, with the first
+assault waves scheduled to land at 0930.</p>
+
+<p>Due to the distance between the mountainous
+landing zones and because two different helicopter
+units would be conducting the respective trooplifts,
+the operation plan treated the two assaults
+as separate operations. A U.S. Air Force U-10 aircraft
+had been assigned to carry Colonel Merchant,
+the TACA, and other ASOC representatives who
+would coordinate the helilift into Landing Zone
+BRAVO. Twenty Vietnamese A-1H Skyraiders
+had been assigned to provide tactical air support
+for the Marine portion of the operation. Twelve
+of these attack aircraft were scheduled to conduct
+preparatory strikes on and around the landing
+zones, four were to orbit above the area after the
+helicopter landing began, and the remaining four
+were to be positioned on airstrip alert at Da Nang.
+Five Army UH-1B gunships were assigned to
+escort the Marine UH-34Ds to and from the landing
+zone.</p>
+
+<p>The preparatory air strikes around Landing Zone
+BRAVO began as the first ARVN heliteams boarded
+the 19 Marine and two VNAF helicopters at
+Quang Ngai. Following the VNAF’s air strikes,
+the escorting Army gunships swept in for a prelanding
+reconnaissance of the zone. They were
+met by fire from Viet Cong .50 and .30 caliber
+machine guns. The gunships countered with repeated
+rocket and machine gun attacks on those
+enemy positions that could be located but were
+unable to silence the Communist weapons. Meanwhile,
+the loaded Marine and VNAF helicopters
+cleared Quang Ngai and were closing on the
+objective. After the UH-1Bs expended their
+entire ordnance load and most of their fuel in
+attempts to neutralize enemy fire, Colonel Merchant
+ordered all helicopters, transports and gunships
+alike, back to Quang Ngai to rearm and refuel.</p>
+
+<p>With the transports and gunships enroute to
+Quang Ngai, the ASOC summoned the on-call
+VNAF A-1Hs to attack the Viet Cong positions.
+During ensuing strikes one Skyraider was
+damaged severely by .50 caliber machine gun fire.
+The Vietnamese pilot turned his smoking aircraft
+eastward in an unsuccessful effort to nurse it to
+the Quang Ngai airstrip. The attack bomber
+crashed less than one mile from the west end of
+the small airstrip.</p>
+
+<p>The A-1H air strikes on and around Landing
+Zone BRAVO continued until 1225. Shortly after
+the strikes ceased Colonel Merchant ordered the
+first wave of transport helicopters to land the
+ARVN assault force. Escorting UH-1Bs were still
+drawing fire as the first flight of three UH-34Ds
+approached the contested landing zone. This time,
+however, the Marine and VNAF pilots were not
+deterred. The first UH-34Ds touched down at 1230
+with their machine gunners pouring streams of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">153</span>
+orange tracers into the surrounding jungle. Despite
+the high volume of suppressive fire, several helicopters
+in the first wave sustained hits from Viet
+Cong automatic weapons. One, damaged critically,
+crashed in the landing zone. Its crew members, all
+of whom escaped injury, were picked up by another
+Marine helicopter, piloted by Major John R.
+Braddon, which had been designated as the search
+and rescue aircraft for the operation. Another
+UH-34D with battle damage proceeded to the
+outpost from which the Army helicopter missions
+were originating and made an emergency landing.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_153" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_153.jpg" width="1908" height="1430" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>A formation of Marine UH-34Ds lift South Vietnamese troops into mountains southwest of Da Nang. (<cite>USMC Photo
+A329574</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The second assault wave was delayed while
+VNAF Skyraiders renewed their efforts to dislodge
+the enemy from his positions around the embattled
+landing zone. The helilift resumed at 1355 in the
+face of reduced but stubborn Communist resistance.
+During this phase of the troop lift, one VNAF and
+several Marine helicopters were hit by enemy .50
+caliber fire. The Vietnamese aircraft, which lost
+its tail rotor controls, spun sharply while trying
+to take off and crashed near the center of the zone.
+Its crew members escaped injury and were picked
+up by Major Braddon’s rescue helicopter.<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[11-B]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="label">[11-B]</a> For his role in the two successful rescue attempts, Braddon
+was awarded the Silver Star Medal.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>After this incident, as the South Vietnamese
+soldiers began fanning out from the landing zone
+and forcing the Communist gunners to withdraw
+deeper into the jungle, the landing proceeded
+somewhat faster. The fourth and final assault lift
+of the day was executed at 1730, after which 357
+of the 420 ARVN troops had been transported into
+Landing Zone BRAVO. During the first day of the
+operation, 15 of the 19 participating Marine
+UH-34Ds were hit. Only 11 Marine and VNAF<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">154</span>
+helicopters originally assigned to support the
+operation remained airworthy.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_154" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;">
+  <img src="images/i_154.jpg" width="944" height="1026" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>At the loadmaster’s direction, a Marine UH-34D waits
+in a crude landing zone as an unidentified U.S. advisor
+and two Vietnamese soldiers unload supplies. Other
+ARVN troops provide security. (<cite>USMC Photo A329572</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>The heliborne assault portion of SURE WIND
+202 was completed the next morning. Fourteen
+UH-34Ds from HMM-364, several of which had
+been repaired during the night, and four Army
+UH-1Bs lifted the remainder of the South Vietnamese
+battalion into the landing zone. By then
+the intensity of the enemy action in the surrounding
+hills had diminished greatly. Only one Marine
+helicopter was hit and it suffered only minor
+damage. Upon finishing their tasks, HMM-364’s
+aircraft proceeded to Gi Lang, the outpost from
+which the Army helicopter company was operating,
+to help it complete its portion of the assault
+lift.</p>
+
+<p>Aircraft losses for the operation continued to
+accumulate on the second day when a Marine
+UH-34D was caught in the rotor wash of other
+landing helicopters and crashed while approaching
+the runway at Quang Ngai. The aircraft plummeted
+into an irrigation canal adjacent to the airstrip,
+rolled over onto its side, and completely submerged.
+The crewmen managed to climb to safety
+but the helicopter was a total loss.</p>
+
+<p>On 29 April, three UH-34Ds flew a maintenance-inspection
+team and a Marine security squad
+from Da Nang into Landing Zone BRAVO to
+assess the damage suffered by the two helicopters
+which had been shot down on the first day of SURE
+WIND 202. The inspection team found that four
+bullets had struck the Marine aircraft. The VNAF
+aircraft, on the other hand, was riddled by nearly
+30 bullets, including a .50 caliber round that had
+severed the tail rotor control cable. The inspection
+team concluded that both helicopters were damaged
+beyond repair and proceeded to destroy them
+where they had fallen.</p>
+
+<p>Originally, MACV and II Corps planners had
+anticipated that the Marine helicopters would
+not be required to support SURE WIND 202
+beyond the initial assault. It soon became apparent,
+however, that the daily helicopter requirements
+for the operation would exceed the
+aviation assets available in II Corps. The American
+command in Saigon, therefore, directed Colonel
+Merchant’s task element to continue providing
+support for the duration of the offensive. Accordingly,
+the task element commander assigned a
+liaison officer to the 2d ARVN Division headquarters.
+This officer was tasked with coordinating
+daily aircraft requirements. When SURE
+WIND 202 finally ended on 25 May, HMM-364’s
+crews had contributed 983 sorties and 800 flight
+hours to the South Vietnamese effort in northwestern
+II Corps.<a id="FNanchor_165" href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">[11-10]</a></p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_154"><i>Operations Elsewhere in I Corps</i></h3>
+
+<p>While some of HMM-364’s crews continued
+flying support missions from Quang Ngai, others
+conducted a critical operation in western I Corps.
+The mission, which already had been delayed five
+days because of the Marines’ extensive commitment
+during the early stages of SURE WIND 202, was
+executed on 30 April. It involved 17 Marine
+UH-34Ds, four Army UH-1Bs (two transports
+and two gunships), two Marine O-1Bs, two VNAF
+Skyraiders, and one South Vietnamese observation
+aircraft. Their assignment was to evacuate a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">155</span>
+78-man ARVN patrol which had been under
+frequent enemy fire for six days in the rugged
+jungle about 42 miles west of Da Nang. The
+transport helicopters encountered almost continuous
+small arms fire during the landing and
+subsequent evacuation. One Marine helicopter
+carrying a crew of four Marines and five ARVN
+passengers was shot down while climbing away
+from the contested landing zone. The pilot made
+a forced landing in a nearby clearing and the nine
+men were evacuated under fire by other UH-34Ds.
+Despite the hazardous nature of the mission, the
+entire South Vietnamese patrol was removed to
+the safety of Nam Dong, a well-defended Special
+Forces camp located in a valley 34 miles west of
+Da Nang.</p>
+
+<p>Acts of heroism were commonplace during the
+30 April evacuation. One Marine copilot assumed
+control of his severely damaged helicopter and
+flew it to Nam Dong after the pilot and crew chief
+had been wounded. Staff Sergeant John C. Thompson,
+who served as one of the loadmasters for the
+operation, was later awarded the Navy Cross for
+his role in the action. Having arrived in the landing
+zone aboard the first transport helicopter, the
+Marine noncommissioned officer exposed himself
+to Viet Cong fire almost continuously while
+supervising the loading of each aircraft. After the
+last five South Vietnamese troops had boarded the
+final helicopter, Thompson shouted to its pilot
+that he would remain on the ground to provide
+covering fire while the aircraft took off. But the
+pilot ordered Staff Sergeant Thompson on board and
+then succeeded in maneuvering the heavily loaded
+UH-34D out of the empty landing zone.</p>
+
+<p>By late May it had become apparent to U.S.
+military authorities in South Vietnam that the
+demand for American transport helicopters in I
+Corps would continue beyond the 30 June date
+which had been set earlier for SHUFLY’s departure.
+General Westmoreland, therefore, proposed to the
+Commander in Chief, Pacific, that the Marine unit
+be retained at Da Nang indefinitely. He further
+recommended that HMM-364 turn over its helicopters
+and maintenance equipment to the Vietnamese
+Air Force on 30 June as scheduled, and
+that the unit be replaced by another Marine
+UH-34D squadron. These recommendations were
+forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who approved
+them on 10 June. In response, the Marine
+Corps began immediate preparations to deploy a
+new, fully equipped, medium helicopter squadron
+to Da Nang.</p>
+
+<p>HMM-364 began its final month in Vietnam by
+supporting another heliborne assault into II Corps.
+This time the Marines teamed with the U.S.
+Army’s 52d Aviation Battalion to lift an ARVN
+battalion from Dak To, a town situated in western
+Kontum Province, to an objective in the Do Xa base
+area. To support the operation, which was code
+named SURE WIND 303, Lieutenant Colonel La
+Voy’s crews positioned a TAFDS fuel bladder at the
+Dak To airstrip on 1 June. Two days later, 15 Marine
+UH-34Ds contributed 180 sorties to the assault
+phase of the new government operation. No battle
+damage was recorded by Marine aircraft during
+this latest incursion into northern II Corps.</p>
+
+<p>The Marine task element’s responsibilities were
+expanded slightly in the first week of June when
+MACV directed Colonel Merchant to provide
+search and rescue (SAR) support for U.S. aerial
+reconnaissance operations which had begun over
+Laos and North Vietnam. After 7 June at least two
+UH-34Ds (one section) were positioned together
+either at Quang Tri or at Khe Sanh, ready to
+conduct SAR missions for downed American and
+VNAF pilots. While based at Khe Sanh the helicopters
+were also used to support Advisory Team
+One on Tiger Tooth Mountain. At Quang Tri the
+SAR helicopters operated from a clearing adjacent
+to a local soccer field. Years later, Marine pilots
+who had stood the SAR duty there would recall
+the incongruous sight of small Vietnamese boys
+playfully pursuing their soccer games alongside
+parked combat aircraft and a TAFDS bladder.</p>
+
+<p>In addition to normal support operations,
+HMM-364’s pilots devoted much of the second
+week of June to a search for Privates First Class
+Fred T. Schrenkengost and Robert L. Greer, two
+MABS-16 Marines who had disappeared from the
+Da Nang compound on 7 June. Intelligence reports
+indicated that both men had been captured by
+Communist guerrillas about five miles south of the
+airfield while sight-seeing on rented motor bikes.
+The aerial search produced no signs of the missing
+enlisted men but reliable Vietnamese sources
+reported that the Viet Cong had displayed them
+in several villages. The task element commander
+finally called off the fruitless search on 15 June, a
+full week after it had begun. Ground efforts by the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">156</span>
+South Vietnamese to locate the men continued but
+were also futile. The two Marines were never
+found.<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[11-C]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="label">[11-C]</a> The status of PFC Fred T. Schrenkengost was changed from
+missing in action to killed in action, body not recovered, on
+23 July 1974. The status of PFC Robert L. Greer was likewise
+changed on 14 November 1975.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>While the aerial search south of Da Nang was
+in its final stages, HMM-364 suffered its last
+aircraft loss in Vietnam when a helicopter crashed
+while carrying supplies from Khe Sanh to Major
+Gray’s Advisory Team One on Tiger Tooth Mountain.
+The accident occurred on 13 June when a
+UH-34D was caught in severe down drafts while
+attempting to land in the small landing zone near
+the top of the jagged 5,000-foot-high peak. The
+crew and passengers luckily escaped injury and
+were rescued but the aircraft was damaged too
+extensively to be repaired. Marines stripped the
+UH-34D of radios and machine guns and then
+burned the hulk.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_156"><i>Changing the Watch</i></h3>
+
+<p>On 16 June, three days after the crash on Tiger
+Tooth Mountain, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s
+unit ceased its operations and began preparations
+for turning over its helicopters and equipment to
+the Vietnamese Air Force. The Marines spent
+three days removing the automatic stabilization
+equipment (the helicopter’s equivalent of an
+automatic pilot) and the USMC identification
+from the 24 UH-34Ds. While HMM-364’s men
+accomplished the necessary last-minute preparations,
+pilots from a new Marine medium helicopter
+squadron, HMM-162, began flying their
+UH-34Ds ashore from the LPH-8, USS <i>Valley
+Forge</i>. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
+W. Curtis, an Oklahoman who held four Distinguished
+Flying Crosses for air actions fought
+during World War II and Korea, HMM-162 was
+the first Marine squadron since Lieutenant Colonel
+Clapp’s to deploy to Vietnam with its complement
+of aircraft and maintenance equipment. With
+HMM-162’s arrival, elements of Lieutenant
+Colonel La Voy’s unit began departing for Okinawa
+on board refueler-transport aircraft from VMGR-152.
+Also on board one of the KC-130s bound for
+Okinawa was Lieutenant Colonel Beal, who
+relinquished command of the MABS-16 sub unit to
+Major Marion R. Green on the last day of June.</p>
+
+<p>The newly commissioned VNAF 217th Squadron
+informally accepted the aircraft from HMM-364
+on 19 June. Formal acceptance occurred 10 days
+later with Major General Paul J. Fontana, the
+commanding general of the 1st Marine Aircraft
+Wing, attending a ceremony presided over by the
+I Corps commanding general. Following the
+exchange of equipment, the Vietnamese officials
+presented various orders of the Cross of Valor,
+their nation’s second highest decoration, to Marine
+pilots who had distinguished themselves during
+Operation SURE WIND 202. Vice Air Marshal
+Nguyen Cao Ky, commanding general of the Vietnamese
+Air Force, then presented Vietnamese
+pilot wings to Colonel Merchant, Lieutenant
+Colonel La Voy, and to each Marine instructor-pilot
+who had participated in the helicopter pilot
+training program. HMM-364’s tour in South
+Vietnam ended officially on 30 June when the last
+of its members boarded KC-130’s bound for
+Okinawa. Since initiating combat flight operations
+in February, the squadron’s helicopters had logged
+2,665 combat sorties and 2,365 combat hours.
+Another statistic underscored the intensity of the
+actions in which the unit had participated. Well
+over half of the squadron’s 24 helicopters had been
+damaged by enemy fire during its five-month
+deployment in Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_166" href="#Footnote_166" class="fnanchor">[11-11]</a></p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">157</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_12"><span id="toclink_157"></span>CHAPTER 12<br>
+<span class="subhead large">Fall and Winter Operations</span><br>
+<span class="subhead notbold"><i>Dry Weather Fighting—Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations—Changes
+and Improvements—Action as the Year Ends</i></span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_157a"><i>Dry Weather Fighting</i></h3>
+
+<p>The military situation in I Corps remained
+essentially unchanged as HMM-162 began its
+assignment with SHUFLY. Hot, dry weather,
+with its promise of near perfect flying conditions
+and spirited fighting, continued over the mountainous
+northern provinces.</p>
+
+<p>After a series of orientation briefings and familiarization
+flights, Lieutenant Colonel Curtis’ squadron
+initiated support operations in the closing
+days of June. HMM-162’s first real taste of action
+came on the last day of the month when six UH-34Ds,
+escorted by two armed U.S. Army UH-1Bs,
+attempted to resupply ARVN troops operating in
+the hills nine miles west of Tam Ky. While trying
+to locate a Communist position which was firing
+on the resupply aircraft, one of the gunships was
+hit and crashed in flames. Two transport helicopters
+landed immediately to rescue the crew.
+The Marines pulled three of the four injured men
+from the wreckage before being driven away from
+the scene by approaching guerrillas. During takeoff,
+one UH-34D was struck by ground fire but was
+able to continue its flight to Da Nang. The wounded
+copilot of the downed Army aircraft died while enroute
+to the dispensary, but the injured pilot
+survived and later was evacuated to the Nha
+Trang Field Hospital. The heat from the still-smoldering
+aircraft hulk prevented a second attempt
+to extricate the body of the fourth soldier
+later in the day. It was finally recovered on 1 July.</p>
+
+<p>The squadron’s first critical troop lift came
+within days of its initial action when the task
+element was called upon to helilift urgently needed
+reinforcements to the Nam Dong CIDG camp
+which had come under heavy Communist attack.
+Situated in south central Thua Thien Province
+at a point where two prominent mountain valleys
+converge, Nam Dong held special strategic appeal
+to both sides engaged in the struggle for South
+Vietnam. It sat astride natural infiltration routes
+from Laos into the lowlands around Da Nang and
+Phu Bai and also protected some 5,000 Montagnard
+tribesmen who occupied a string of villages along
+the valley floor. The camp and the villages were
+defended by only a handful of U.S. Special Forces
+personnel and three CIDG companies, none of
+which could muster more than 90 men. Its status
+as a thorn in the enemy’s side, its relative isolation,
+and its proximity to Communist base areas along
+the Laotian border, combined to make the outpost
+a particularly lucrative target for the Viet Cong.</p>
+
+<p>Nam Dong’s hour of crisis came shortly after
+midnight on 7 July when the Communists launched
+a large-scale ground assault against the barbed
+wire-enclosed main camp. Shortly after 0400, with
+his position holding out against heavy mortar and
+machine gun fire, Captain Roger H. Donlon, the
+Special Forces officer in charge, radioed for assistance.
+Two hours later, six Marine helicopters,
+loaded with U.S. Special Forces and South Vietnamese
+personnel, launched from Da Nang for the
+beleaguered little fortress. Colonel Merchant, flying
+an O-1B, led the transport helicopters to the
+objective area while two U.S. Army UH-1B gunships
+provided escort. Meanwhile, two other
+HMM-162 helicopters launched for An Diem carrying
+U.S. Special Forces officers with instructions to
+assemble a company-sized reaction force for commitment
+to Nam Dong.</p>
+
+<p>Intense enemy mortar and ground fire at Nam
+Dong initially prevented the six UH-34Ds from
+landing the reinforcements, whereupon Colonel
+Merchant and the flight returned to Da Nang
+for fuel. At the airfield the task element commander<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">158</span>
+briefed VNAF A-1H Skyraider pilots and
+the crew of a Marine O-1B on the battlefield
+situation. He took off again at 0910, this time to
+act as TACA in an Air Force U-10. Meanwhile, a
+U.S. Army CV-2 Caribou (a twin-engine, fixed-wing
+light transport) had managed to airdrop
+small arms ammunition to Donlon and the embattled
+defenders. Following this emergency resupply,
+air strikes were conducted on the hills to
+the south and west of the outpost, causing enemy
+ground fire to diminish somewhat. At 0945, a
+flight of 18 Marine helicopters, led by Lieutenant
+Colonel Curtis and escorted by four UH-1B gunships
+and two VNAF Skyraiders, began landing
+a 93-man relief force which had been collected
+earlier from Da Nang and An Diem. Evacuation
+of the dead and wounded began immediately.
+At 1545, a flight of 10 UH-34Ds lifted 9,500
+pounds of ammunition, medical supplies, radios,
+and miscellaneous equipment to Nam Dong. Six
+passengers, five wounded Vietnamese, and eight
+more bodies were evacuated to Da Nang on the
+return trip. By then, the battle was finished. Two
+Americans, one Australian advisor, and 55 South
+Vietnamese had been killed. Captain Donlon, who
+earned the first Medal of Honor awarded for action
+in Vietnam, and 64 other defenders had been
+wounded. The Viet Cong, who had failed to
+eliminate the Nam Dong outpost, left 62 bodies on
+the battlefield.<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[12-A]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="label">[12-A]</a> For a more detailed account of the battle for Nam Dong,
+see Donlon, <cite>Outpost of Freedom</cite>.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Four days after the battle for Nam Dong, Colonel
+Merchant’s tour in Vietnam ended. He returned to
+Okinawa to assume command of Marine Aircraft
+Group 16 whereupon Colonel Hardy (“Tex”) Hay,
+a 1940 graduate of Texas A&amp;M, assumed command
+of Task Element 79.3.3.6.<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[12-B]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="label">[12-B]</a> For his role as Task Element Commander, ARVN I Corps
+Aviation Headquarters Commander, and Senior U.S. Aviation
+Advisor to I Corps, Colonel Merchant was later awarded the
+Legion of Merit with Combat “V.” He was also decorated with
+two Vietnamese Crosses of Valor—one for SURE WIND 202
+and the other for the relief of Nam Dong.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>Normal flight operations continued during the
+remainder of July with no major heliborne assaults
+conducted and no Marine aircraft lost. These
+operations, however, did not lack excitement.
+Supporting the Marine and ARVN forces on Tiger
+Tooth Mountain proved extremely hazardous as
+the HMM-162 crews soon came to realize. On
+11 July, for example, the mountain nearly claimed
+one of their helicopters when a UH-34D lost
+power as a result of the extreme altitude while
+delivering supplies to Advisory Team One. As the
+aircraft plummeted into the hillside landing zone,
+its tail pylon struck the vegetation around the
+edge of the tiny clearing causing some structural
+damage. Fortunately, the damage was such that the
+crewmen were able to make emergency repairs
+while Major Gray’s men provided security around
+the aircraft. This accomplished, the crew returned
+their damaged helicopter to Khe Sanh without
+further incident.</p>
+
+<p>Daily operations continued to produce action
+for the newly arrived squadron as July wore on.
+On the 15th a UH-34D was hit by Viet Cong fire
+while performing a routine resupply mission south
+of Da Nang. Again, damage was only minor and the
+aircraft continued its mission. Support for Tiger
+Tooth Mountain dominated SHUFLY’s operations
+on the 18th after MACV officials ordered Major
+Gray’s Advisory Team One withdrawn to safety.
+Colonel Hay directed HMM-162 to commit all
+available aircraft in order to complete the withdrawal
+as rapidly as possible. Good weather and
+flying expertise helped the helicopter crews transport
+the entire Marine force (92 men) and over
+21,000 pounds of equipment to Khe Sanh before
+nightfall on the 19th.</p>
+
+<p>In a simultaneous but unrelated development,
+HMM-162 was called upon to detach four helicopters
+to Udorn, Thailand, for temporary duty.
+These aircraft and crews were assigned to assist
+with search and rescue operations in support of
+ongoing U.S. aerial reconnaissance efforts in that
+area.</p>
+
+<p>In early August, the heightened international
+tensions which accompanied the Gulf of Tonkin
+crisis prompted General Westmoreland to order all
+American military installations throughout South
+Vietnam to brace for possible enemy attacks.
+Colonel Hay responded to ComUSMACV’s instructions
+by placing his Marines on high alert
+status for several weeks. The precautions were
+relaxed gradually as the crisis eased and the
+likelihood of a sudden Communist attack
+diminished.</p>
+
+<p>The pattern of helicopter operations in the
+northern provinces throughout the remainder of
+the summer differed little from that which had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">159</span>
+emerged earlier in the dry season. Medical evacuation
+and resupply sorties continued to constitute
+the majority of the task element’s support missions.
+Generally, medical evacuation missions, many of
+which were executed while Viet Cong and South
+Vietnamese forces were engaged in combat, provided
+the major source of action for Lieutenant
+Colonel Curtis’ squadron during this period. On
+6 August, for example, a UH-34D was hit by enemy
+fire while its crew was evacuating ARVN casualties
+from a landing zone along the Song Tra Bon.
+Two days later, a second Marine helicopter was hit
+during an attempt to evacuate dead and wounded
+from the mountains about eight miles west of
+Tam Ky. The following day, on 9 August, another
+HMM-162 UH-34D drew fire while evacuating a
+wounded U.S. advisor from a village on the coastal
+plain 12 miles southeast of Tam Ky. In all three
+incidents the aircraft received only minor damage
+and were able to return safely to Da Nang.</p>
+
+<p>Although the medical evacuation missions
+generally attracted more Viet Cong attention,
+many resupply flights also proved hazardous.
+Small landing zones, high elevations, and bad
+weather often made even the most routine missions
+difficult. HMM-162 lost a helicopter as a result
+of a combination of two of these adverse conditions—extreme
+elevation and a small landing zone—on
+30 August. While resupplying a mountain-top
+outpost five miles southwest of Nam Dong, the
+UH-34D struck a tree at the edge of a tiny clearing
+and crashed. The crew members were uninjured,
+but the extent of the aircraft’s damage was too
+great to permit repair. It was stripped of radios,
+machine guns, machine gun mounts, and other
+usable parts before being destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>In mid-August the Marines also lost their first
+observation aircraft since deploying to Vietnam
+in 1962 when an O-1B crashed after experiencing
+mechanical failure. The incident occurred on the
+15th while the pilot and observer were conducting
+a reconnaissance of the northwestern corner of
+Quang Ngai Province. Bad weather delayed rescue
+attempts for over an hour, but the two injured
+crewmen were finally recovered by helicopter and
+flown to the Da Nang dispensary for treatment.
+The pilot’s injuries were severe enough that he
+was evacuated to the U.S. field hospital at Nha
+Trang.</p>
+
+<p>The last major heliborne assault conducted in
+extreme western I Corps during 1964 was initiated
+in the first week of September. Eighteen Marine
+UH-34Ds, four Army UH-1Bs, six VNAF Skyraiders,
+two Marine O-1Bs, and two U.S. Air Force
+liaison aircraft were assigned to support a 2d
+ARVN Division heliborne offensive against Communist
+infiltration routes in remote southwestern
+Quang Nam Province. The operation, code named
+CHINH BIEN, began on the morning of 4 September
+when 15 HMM-162 helicopters (the other
+three UH-34Ds participating in the operation were
+serving as search and rescue aircraft) lifted the
+first wave of South Vietnamese soldiers from Kham
+Duc, a government-controlled town located 12
+miles from the Laotian border in northwestern
+Quang Tin Province. Their objective was a landing
+zone situated 24 miles northwest of the assembly
+area in Quang Nam Province and only three miles
+from the Laotian border. No enemy resistance was
+encountered and the initial assault helilifts were
+completed shortly after noon. Support for CHINH
+BIEN continued the next morning. When the
+helilifts were finally completed shortly before
+1000, Marine UH-34Ds had flown 265 sorties for
+180.2 flight hours in another effort to place ARVN
+ground forces in remote areas of I Corps.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_159"><i>Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations</i></h3>
+
+<p>Adverse weather began influencing SHUFLY’s
+operations a few days after CHINH BIEN ended.
+On 14 September all flights were cancelled by rain
+and high winds from Typhoon Violet, a severe
+tropical storm. All aircraft remained grounded
+until late afternoon of the next day when HMM-162
+helicopters conducted an emergency evacuation
+of storm victims from Tam Ky which had been
+hard hit by Violet. The typhoon caused some
+minor damage to SHUFLY’s facilities when
+electrical power was lost for a few hours. By the
+morning of the 16th, power was restored and all
+Marine operations returned to normal.</p>
+
+<p>Within a week, however, a more severe weather
+disturbance—Typhoon Tilda—struck the coast
+near Da Nang. On the morning of 21 September, in
+the face of the approaching storm, Colonel Hay
+ordered Lieutenant Colonel Curtis to displace his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">160</span>
+squadron to Nha Trang in central II Corps.
+Later in the day, the unit’s entire complement of
+aircraft departed Da Nang on the 325-mile flight
+to safety. The task element’s C-117D found refuge
+at Saigon. HMM-162 remained at Nha Trang
+until the 23d when it returned to I Corps.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_160" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_160.jpg" width="1906" height="1248" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Marine helicopters enroute to an objective overfly the coastal plain south of Da Nang. (<cite>Official USMC Photo</cite>).</i>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Typhoon Tilda caused considerably more damage
+to the Marine base of operations than had her
+immediate forerunner. Most of the permanent
+structures in the compound showed signs of water
+damage and the electrical power was lost for an
+entire week, except at the waterpoint and the mess
+hall where a concerted repair effort restored power
+promptly. Teletype communications circuits were
+closed for a full week as a result of damage, and the
+radio link with the 1st MAW was broken for
+nearly two hours.</p>
+
+<p>While the Marines of the MABS-16 sub unit
+concerned themselves with cleaning up the debris
+and repairing their damaged facilities, HMM-162’s
+crews resumed combat support operations.
+On the afternoon of their return from Nha Trang,
+a flight of UH-34Ds delivered 19 passengers and
+4,000 pounds of cargo to Tien Phuoc, a government-controlled
+town located seven miles west of Tam
+Ky. The next day Major General Paul J. Fontana,
+who as commanding general of the 1st Marine
+Aircraft Wing was responsible for the administrative
+and logistical support of the task element,
+arrived at Da Nang for a one day visit to assess
+the damage and to confer with Colonel Hay.
+Flood relief missions and clean up activities
+combined with normal flight operations to consume
+the remainder of September.</p>
+
+<p>Two changes were made in the composition of
+the Marine task element in late September and
+early October. On 29 September, the security force
+from the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines rotated back<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">161</span>
+to its parent unit on Okinawa. It was replaced by
+a 78-man element from Company E, 2d Battalion,
+9th Marines the same day. Led by Second Lieutenant
+Anthony A. Monroe, the newly arrived
+Marines would provide protection for the aviation
+unit until late November.</p>
+
+<p>The second alteration occurred about a week
+later when HMM-162 was relieved on-station by
+the officers and men of a fresh squadron. The
+rotation of helicopter units was completed on
+8 October when Lieutenant Colonel Curtis officially
+signed over the aircraft and maintenance equipment
+to the new squadron’s commanding officer. In a
+three month deployment to the war zone HMM-162’s
+helicopters had conducted approximately
+6,600 sorties for a total of slightly over 4,400
+flight hours. Many of these sorties had been
+missions of mercy flown in the wake of the typhoons
+which had ravaged Vietnam’s northern
+provinces. During three months of sustained
+combat support activities, the squadron had lost
+two UH-34Ds and one O-1B in operational
+accidents.<a id="FNanchor_167" href="#Footnote_167" class="fnanchor">[12-1]</a></p>
+
+<p>The newly arrived squadron, HMM-365, was
+commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Koler,
+Jr., an experienced Marine officer who had begun
+his career shortly after World War II as an infantry
+platoon leader with the 1st Marine Division in
+China. Under his leadership the squadron began
+performing resupply missions the same day that
+the last of HMM-162’s personnel departed Da
+Nang. On their first day of operations, Koler’s
+crews airlifted over 25,000 pounds of cargo to
+various outposts around Da Nang. The following
+day a flight of 12 HMM-365 helicopters provided
+transportation for ARVN troops who were being
+rotated between Kham Duc and A Roe, an isolated
+outpost in southwestern Quang Nam Province
+less than seven miles from the Laotian border.
+On 11 October the newly arrived Marine pilots
+and crews tasted their first actual combat when
+eight UH-34Ds drew Viet Cong fire while landing
+a 112-man Vietnamese unit in the hills 10 miles
+west-southwest of Tam Ky.</p>
+
+<p>The day after its crews had witnessed their
+first ground fire, Koler’s squadron lost its first
+aircraft in Vietnam. The incident occurred in
+western Quang Nam Province while a UH-34D
+was attempting to take off from a South Vietnamese
+landing zone located high in the mountains.
+The crash, in which the pilot was slightly injured,
+resulted from a loss of power due to the high
+altitude. After the crew was evacuated, a maintenance
+team salvaged the usable parts and destroyed
+the aircraft.</p>
+
+<p>In mid-October Colonel Hay summarized the
+situation in I Corps for his superiors at the 1st
+Marine Aircraft Wing. The task element commander
+was particularly concerned about a new
+phase of Viet Cong activity which he saw developing
+in the coastal lowlands of the northern
+provinces. Although there were few visible signs
+of either combat or enemy movement to confirm
+the trend, intelligence sources indicated that Viet
+Cong main force battalions in I Corps had increased
+in number from nine to 11 in the past several
+months. During this same period, the number of
+local force Viet Cong companies in the area had
+jumped by 50 percent to a total of 17. These growth
+patterns, Colonel Hay noted, enabled the Communists
+to tighten their grip on the civilian populace.
+Likewise, they were responsible for increased
+enemy harassment of lines of communications in
+I Corps and posed a particular threat to Da Nang.<a id="FNanchor_168" href="#Footnote_168" class="fnanchor">[12-2]</a></p>
+
+<p>Colonel Hay’s tour as task element commander
+ended on 17 October. After a brief change of
+command ceremony during which he expressed
+his appreciation to his subordinates for their
+assistance, Hay departed for Okinawa to assume
+command of MAG-16. His replacement at Da
+Nang, Colonel John H. King, Jr., an officer who
+had seen his first action as a fighter pilot during
+World War II, was well prepared to direct the task
+element’s operations. A recent graduate of the
+National War College, King had commanded the
+first operational Marine transport helicopter unit,
+Marine Helicopter Squadron 161, during the
+Korean War.</p>
+
+<p>HMM-365’s operations continued throughout
+the remainder of October with only a few significant
+actions reported. One of these was an abortive
+medical evacuation mission attempted on 26
+October during which the squadron suffered its
+first combat casualties. The incident, in which
+both the copilot and crew chief were wounded by
+Viet Cong small arms fire, occurred while the
+helicopter was approaching a poorly protected
+landing zone 10 miles southwest of Tam Ky. The
+pilot managed to return the damaged helicopter
+to Tam Ky and land safely, whereupon the seriously<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">162</span>
+wounded copilot was evacuated to Nha
+Trang and the crew chief was administered first
+aid.</p>
+
+<p>In early November, at the height of the monsoon
+season, Typhoon Iris struck the Annamese coast.
+The tropical storm, whose full force was felt on
+4 November, was followed by nearly a week of
+continuous rain, wind, and fog. The conditions
+caused flight operations to be suspended except
+for emergency medical evacuations. When the
+operations resumed on the 10th, the Marine Corps
+birthday, the Leatherneck crews concentrated
+on rescuing Vietnamese civilians from the inundated
+coastal plains. Between 1700 and 1900 on
+their first day of the flood relief operation, Lieutenant
+Colonel Koler’s Marines rescued 144 flood
+victims. These rescues, many of which were
+accomplished by hoisting the Vietnamese from
+precarious positions in trees or on roof tops were
+complicated by sporadic Viet Cong harassing
+fire. Many of the stranded civilians were evacuated
+to the Da Nang airfield. Following emergency
+medical treatment administered by Navy doctors
+and hospitalmen, the civilians were given shelter
+in the task unit hangar. Lieutenant Robert P.
+Heim, the Navy chaplain assigned to SHUFLY
+at the time, later praised the Marines who shared
+their birthday cake with the homeless Vietnamese
+that night.<a id="FNanchor_169" href="#Footnote_169" class="fnanchor">[12-3]</a> The next day, although poor visibility
+continued to hamper flights, the Marines helilifted
+1,136 more flood victims to safety. Again the
+guerrillas harassed the rescue attempts with small
+arms fire, this time hitting three of the participating
+aircraft.</p>
+
+<p>The humanitarian operation continued until
+16 November, when another typhoon—Kate—threatened
+to make matters even worse. The
+weather on the storm’s periphery forced the cancellation
+of many Marine flights but the center of
+the disturbance passed about 200 miles south of
+Da Nang. The flooding which resulted from the
+two back-to-back storms, however, demanded a
+rescue effort beyond the capabilities of the Marine
+and VNAF helicopter units located in I Corps.
+Accordingly, the Special Landing Force (SLF) of
+the U.S. Seventh Fleet joined the operations on 17
+November. Lieutenant Colonel Curtis’ HMM-162,
+the helicopter element of the SLF, returned to its
+former operations area and spent six days rescuing
+flood victims. The Marines evacuated the most
+seriously injured to the USS <i>Princeton</i> where they
+received emergency treatment before being returned
+to civilian hospitals. When the SLF departed
+Vietnamese waters on 23 November, HMM-162’s
+helicopters had flown over 600 hours and completed
+1,020 sorties in support of the disaster
+relief operations. Unfortunately, one UH-34D
+was lost at sea in an operational accident on 21
+November while participating in these operations.
+Two crewmen, Corporal Richard D. Slack, Jr.
+and Lance Corporal David Nipper, died in the
+crash.<a id="FNanchor_170" href="#Footnote_170" class="fnanchor">[12-4]</a></p>
+
+<p>With the SLF’s departure, the Marine task element
+and the VNAF 217th Squadron reassumed
+the full burden of rescue operations until they
+were finally terminated on 10 December. During
+this period HMM-365 was forced to divide its
+flights judiciously between combat support and
+missions of mercy.<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[12-C]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="label">[12-C]</a> The magnitude of the damage inflicted upon the inhabitants
+of Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin Provinces by the
+November storms is borne out by the following statistics. In
+these three provinces over 50,600 houses were destroyed while
+4,870 civilians were reported either dead or missing. Another
+12,240 Vietnamese were forced to seek refuge at government
+centers in the wake of the flood. (CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 17Oct64–14Jan65.)</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_162"><i>Changes and Improvements</i></h3>
+
+<p>While some of Lieutenant Colonel Koler’s men
+were employed in evacuating the flood-stricken
+Vietnamese, others were modifying three of the
+squadron’s helicopters to carry a new weapons
+system which had been developed specifically for
+use on the UH-34D. The TK-1, an externally
+mounted combination of M-60 machine guns and
+2.75-inch rocket launchers, was first used on 19
+November in support of a Tiger Flight mission
+conducted just south of the Song Thu Bon about
+17 miles from Da Nang. Two armed UH-34Ds
+expended 90 rockets and 500 rounds of 7.62mm
+ammunition on enemy positions during prelanding
+strikes. The effectiveness of the new system could
+not be determined after this particular strike, but
+an estimated 10–15 Viet Cong were killed in a
+similar action by the armed UH-34Ds the next
+day. The transport aircraft armed with the TK-1
+would continue to escort troop carrying helicopters
+regularly throughout the remainder of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">164</span>
+year. At best, however, the TK-1 was of only
+marginal value. The inherent limitations of the
+UH-34D, which possessed neither the maneuverability
+nor the speed to conduct truly effective
+attacks, reduced the overall value of the system.
+Because of these limitations the Marines seldom
+relied solely on the UH-34D for fire suppression
+during assault missions. The system would eventually
+be phased out in 1965 with the arrival of
+Marine jet attack squadrons in Vietnam.</p>
+
+<figure id="ip_164" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;">
+  <img src="images/i_163.jpg" width="1870" height="2593" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">
+
+<p>
+MAJOR MARINE HELICOPTER<br>
+OPERATIONS SECOND HALF 1964<br>
+</p>
+  </figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<p>Two improvements, one in the physical facilities
+available to the task element and the other in the
+size and composition of its security detachment,
+were made shortly after the Marines began using
+the UH-34Ds in the gunship role. On 25 November,
+HMM-365 moved its aircraft and maintenance
+equipment across the airfield into a newly constructed
+hangar just west of the strip. The second
+change took place the next day when the security
+force from the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was
+replaced by Company L, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines,
+reinforced with engineers, 81mm mortar teams,
+and counter-mortar radar personnel. This adjustment
+came in response to the reports of the growing
+Viet Cong threat to Da Nang. Designated the
+Security Detachment, Marine Unit Vietnam, the
+255-man organization was under the command of
+Major William F. Alsop, the battalion’s executive
+officer. Captain John Sheridan, the company
+commander, retained tactical control of the
+infantry unit.</p>
+
+<p>Although responsibility for the overall defense
+of the Da Nang airstrip still resided with the
+ARVN, the enlarged security detachment greatly
+strengthened the Marine defenses within the
+installation. Major Alsop divided his reinforced
+rifle company into two groups—one to protect
+the living compound and the other to defend the
+flight line and the new hangar. Around the living
+compound the engineers constructed a complex of
+machine gun positions, mortar pits, and ammunition
+bunkers. A barricade was also erected at a
+gate near the Marine compound which previously
+had been open and manned only by Vietnamese
+sentries. Strong defensive positions were also constructed
+around the task element’s new hangar
+and flight line. This network included fox holes,
+barbed wire, and cleared fields of fire. As an added
+precaution, Company L maintained a reaction force
+at the living compound. This force was prepared
+to board trucks and rush to reinforce the critical
+defenses around the aircraft and maintenance
+facilities in the event of an enemy ground attack.<a id="FNanchor_171" href="#Footnote_171" class="fnanchor">[12-5]</a></p>
+
+<p>Despite the stronger defenses and the presence
+of the larger Marine infantry force, several security-related
+problems were still unsolved. One which
+remained outside of Colonel King’s influence was
+the laxity of the ARVN sentries around the outer
+perimeter who sometimes allowed Vietnamese
+civilians to wander into the installation. Another
+was that a small village close to the Marine
+compound, but outside the perimeter fence, still
+harbored an occasional sniper. The task element
+commander had lodged repeated complaints about
+both situations with the appropriate South
+Vietnamese authorities but no action had been
+taken to eliminate them. In spite of these minor
+sources of irritation, the recent changes in its
+defenses greatly enhanced the task element’s
+ability to protect itself against Communist ground
+attacks.</p>
+
+<h3 id="toclink_164"><i>Action as the Year Ends</i></h3>
+
+<p>While Company L was developing defensive
+positions at the airbase, HMM-365’s crews continued
+to provide support for both flood relief
+and military operations throughout I Corps. On
+7 December, 17 Marine helicopters and eight
+Army UH-1B transports were called upon to help
+trap a Viet Cong force known to be hiding in a
+village less than five miles west of Da Nang. Code
+named DA NANG SIX, the operation began at
+daybreak when the American helicopters lifted
+240 men of the 11th ARVN Ranger Battalion into
+the objective area. Two UH-1B gunships teamed
+with two armed UH-34Ds to suppress ground fire
+that erupted as the first wave of transport aircraft
+began their approach to the landing zone. One
+Army gunship sustained minor damage when hit
+three times during the exchange of fire. After the
+enemy had been silenced, the landing proceeded
+without incident and the Vietnamese rangers
+quickly secured their objective. In the process,
+nine Viet Cong were killed and four others captured
+along with nine rifles and one automatic
+weapon. Successful though it was, the action on
+the outskirts of Da Nang confirmed previous reports
+that the Communists were tightening their
+grip on Quang Nam Province.<a id="FNanchor_172" href="#Footnote_172" class="fnanchor">[12-6]</a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">165</span></p>
+
+<p>Another indication of the enemy’s growing
+strength in I Corps came only two days later when
+a large Viet Cong force overran an ARVN outpost
+four and a half miles southwest of Tam Ky. I
+Corps Headquarters quickly drew up plans for a
+multi-company search of the area even though the
+Communists had withdrawn from the badly
+damaged government position shortly after their
+final assault. At 0845, 18 Marine UH-34Ds (three
+armed) and four Army UH-1Bs (two armed)
+helilifted a 208-man Tiger Force from Da Nang to
+Tam Ky where it had orders to stage with other
+units for the operation. While the U.S. helicopters
+were in the process of transporting the Vietnamese
+troops to Tam Ky, an aerial observer sighted a
+large formation of Viet Cong moving southwest
+from the scene of the previous night’s battle. The
+observer immediately brought air strikes and artillery
+fire to bear on the enemy, blocking his escape.</p>
+
+<p>Firepower contained the enemy throughout the
+morning while the infantry units at Tam Ky
+prepared to exploit the situation with a heliborne
+assault. The helilift was launched at 1345. Enroute
+to a landing zone, located six miles southwest
+of Tam Ky, the helicopter formation passed over the
+smoldering ruins of the ARVN outpost where
+ammunition stockpiles were still exploding. Once
+at the objective, the armed helicopters began delivering
+suppressive fire into the surrounding hedge
+rows and treelines as the troop carrying aircraft
+approached the landing zone. Still, after nearly
+six hours of air and artillery strikes, the Communist
+force was able to oppose the landing with
+intense small arms fire. No helicopters were hit
+during the landing, however, and the assault force
+managed to secure the landing zone. This accomplished,
+two companies from the 11th ARVN
+Ranger Battalion were helilifted into the position
+without incident. After the final troop lifts, the
+Marine transport helicopters began evacuating
+casualties from the outpost where eight Vietnamese
+soldiers and one American advisor had
+died and 20 ARVN and an Australian advisor had
+been wounded. The government’s response to the
+enemy-initiated action, including air and artillery
+strikes, accounted for 70 Viet Cong killed and 39
+weapons captured. While reflecting a moderate
+success, these statistics were little compensation
+for the knowledge that the Communists could
+destroy a well-fortified position within five miles
+of a provincial capital.<a id="FNanchor_173" href="#Footnote_173" class="fnanchor">[12-7]</a></p>
+
+<p>Weather caused many Marine flights to be
+delayed and some to be cancelled during the closing
+month of 1964. But the interruptions were not
+frequent enough to prevent the task element
+from fulfilling its support commitments. The
+only type of support operation actually curtailed
+due to the monsoons was the preplanned heliborne
+assault into the mountains. Brief periods of favorable
+weather usually enabled the Marine crews to
+accomplish resupply and medical evacuation missions
+even into the most remote areas of I Corps, although
+delays of such flights were not uncommon.</p>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Koler’s HMM-365 was past
+the midpoint of its assignment in Vietnam as 1964
+drew to a close. Through 31 December the unit’s
+helicopters had already flown over 6,700 sorties
+for a total of nearly 4,700 hours of flight time.
+Since its arrival in early October, Koler’s squadron
+had distinguished itself not only by providing
+support to military units throughout I Corps but
+by its extensive participation in the flood relief
+operations of November and December. During
+the 30-day period after 10 November, HMM-365
+had contributed a substantial percentage of its
+flights to the prolonged effort to rescue and evacuate
+Vietnamese civilians from flooded areas.<a id="FNanchor_174" href="#Footnote_174" class="fnanchor">[12-8]</a></p>
+
+<p>FMFPac changed the designation of the task
+element on the final day of 1964. From that date
+until mid-March of the following year the Marine
+helicopter squadron and its supporting elements
+in Vietnam would be known officially as Task
+Unit 79.3.5, Marine Unit Vietnam. This change,
+however, did not alter the existing command relationships.
+ComUSMACV continued to exercise
+operational control over the Marine task unit
+while the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft
+Wing retained responsibility for its administrative
+and logistic support.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">166</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_13"><span id="toclink_166"></span>CHAPTER 13<br>
+<span class="subhead large">Prelude to Escalation</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p>The close of 1964 marked the end of a full decade
+of American political, economic, and military
+advice and assistance to South Vietnam. That
+10-year period saw a fragile state born and begin
+its struggle for survival only to have its existence
+threatened by a new brand of Communist aggression—the
+“war of national liberation.” It
+also saw the U.S. commitment to Vietnam’s
+defense deepen in almost direct proportion to the
+increasing threat. Despite growing amounts of
+American aid and advice, there was little doubt
+that South Vietnam stood near the brink of destruction
+at the hands of the Viet Cong and their
+North Vietnamese allies as 1964 ended.</p>
+
+<p>In many respects, the disaster which befell the
+Vietnamese Marines and ARVN Rangers at Binh
+Gia on the final day of 1964 marked a critical
+turning point in the war being waged in South
+Vietnam. General Westmoreland feared that the
+battle heralded “the beginning of the classic and
+final ‘mobile’ phase of the war.” “To the South
+Vietnamese government,” he reported, “it meant
+the beginning of an intensive military challenge
+which the Vietnamese government could not
+meet within its own resources.”<a id="FNanchor_175" href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">[13-1]</a> Brigadier
+General Carl Youngdale, Westmoreland’s assistant
+chief of staff for intelligence and the ranking
+Marine assigned to Vietnam, assessed the meaning
+of the battle in equally distressing terms. “Binh
+Gia,” he explained, “was just part of the whole
+thing. All the reserve—the strategic reserve—was
+fixed: the airborne and the four Marine battalions
+had all been committed. There was absolutely
+no strategic reserve left.”<a id="FNanchor_176" href="#Footnote_176" class="fnanchor">[13-2]</a> So, as 1964 ended, hope
+was fading rapidly among American military
+officials in Saigon that the ground war for South
+Vietnam could continue for long without more
+vigorous participation of the United States.</p>
+
+<p>Pressures other than those produced by military
+events in the South were also working to move the
+United States toward direct military intervention
+against the Communists in Indochina. Although
+sustained open warfare had not occurred as a
+result of the Tonkin Gulf crisis of early August,
+tensions continued to mount between North
+Vietnam and the United States throughout the
+autumn. On 1 November, just after the cessation
+of the U.S. air strikes which followed the Tonkin
+Gulf incidents, Viet Cong mortar squads attacked
+American facilities at the Bien Hoa airbase near
+Saigon. Four American servicemen were killed,
+five B-57 medium bombers destroyed, and eight
+others heavily damaged in the raid.</p>
+
+<p>President Johnson’s reaction to the Bien Hoa
+attack was to initiate a month-long review of
+U.S. policy regarding North Vietnam. In early
+December that review culminated in the adoption
+of a two-phased plan to discourage further North
+Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong by expanding
+the air war. Phase I, approved for implementation
+in December, called for stepped-up air operations
+against the vital Communist infiltration routes in
+Laos, and for the intensification of covert operations
+against North Vietnam. Approved “in principle,”
+Phase II involved “a continuous program
+of progressively more serious air strikes” against
+North Vietnam. The implementation of Phase II,
+it was agreed, would depend on future enemy
+actions.<a id="FNanchor_177" href="#Footnote_177" class="fnanchor">[13-3]</a> As if to indicate that Communist policy
+makers had settled on a parallel course of escalation,
+Viet Cong terrorists bombed a U.S. officers’
+quarters in Saigon on Christmas Eve, killing two
+Americans and wounding over 50 others.<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[13-A]</a></p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="label">[13-A]</a> Among the wounded was Major Damm, the Assistant
+Senior Marine Advisor.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>The new year, 1965, would open against this
+portentous combination of intensified U.S. air
+activities over Laos, a worsening military situation
+on South Vietnam’s battlefields, and the existence
+of the Phase II contingency plans. It was this
+situation which would spawn a new series of
+events as the first months of 1965 unfolded—events
+which would determine the direction of American<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">167</span>
+and North Vietnamese military involvement in
+the war for South Vietnam. In January, MACV
+intelligence would learn that two new North
+Vietnamese Army regiments, the <em>32d</em> and the <em>101st</em>,
+had infiltrated the South and had initiated combat
+operations. Intelligence sources would also report
+the existence of another NVA regiment in the
+first stages of formation in Quang Tri Province.
+When added to a unit of similar size which had
+appeared in Kontum Province (II Corps Tactical
+Zone) in the final weeks of 1964, the new arrivals
+would raise to four the number of North Vietnamese
+regiments known to be operating on
+South Vietnamese soil.<a id="FNanchor_178" href="#Footnote_178" class="fnanchor">[13-4]</a></p>
+
+<p>The pace of escalation would quicken in early
+February. The Viet Cong would attack a U.S.
+installation at Pleiku in the Central Highlands on
+the 7th. Eight Americans would die in this incident,
+over 100 would be wounded, and a score of
+aircraft would be either destroyed or damaged.
+President Johnson would react quickly to the
+Pleiku attack by ordering a series of reprisal air
+strikes under the code name FLAMING DART.
+Recognizing the possibility of surprise North
+Vietnamese air strikes against U.S. installations
+in Vietnam, Johnson would also order a Marine
+light antiaircraft missile (LAAM) battalion to
+Da Nang, the American base located closest to
+Communist airfields. Armed with Hawk missiles,
+the Marines would protect the growing Da Nang
+airbase from which many of the FLAMING
+DART raids were to originate.</p>
+
+<p>American reaction to the Communists’ escalation
+would not be limited to the bombing of North
+Vietnam. Washington also would authorize the
+use of U.S. jet attack aircraft to engage targets in
+the south. On 19 February, U.S. Air Force B-57s
+would conduct the first jet strikes flown by Americans
+in support of Government of Vietnam ground
+units. Less than one week later, on the 24th, Air
+Force jets would strike again, this time to break
+up a Communist ambush in the Central Highlands
+with a massive series of tactical air sorties.<a id="FNanchor_179" href="#Footnote_179" class="fnanchor">[13-5]</a></p>
+
+<p>While the events of February would serve to
+focus world opinion more sharply on the intensifying
+conflict already raging over Southeast
+Asia, March would prove the decisive month in
+terms of the commitment of American combat
+power to the war in Vietnam. On 2 March, the
+President would order the FLAMING DART
+raids replaced by Operation ROLLING THUNDER—a
+sustained air campaign against the
+Democratic Republic of Vietnam designed to
+escalate gradually in response to continued Communist
+military activities in South Vietnam.
+ROLLING THUNDER would constitute a transition
+from the earlier reprisal type raids to a continuing
+air campaign based upon strategic
+considerations.</p>
+
+<p>Within a week after the first ROLLING THUNDER
+strikes over the North, the ground war in
+South Vietnam would also shift toward deeper
+and more active American involvement. On 7
+March, the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade—the
+force which had been poised in the South
+China Sea since the Tonkin Gulf crisis of the
+previous August—would finally land at Da Nang
+to provide protection for the air base. Although
+the Pentagon would announce their mission as
+purely defensive, the Marines would become the
+first actual American ground combat battalions
+on hand for use in Vietnam. With that commitment,
+the stage would be set for a new and more
+dramatic phase of what was already becoming
+known as the “Second Indochina War.”</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">169</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="Notes"><span id="toclink_169"></span>Notes</h2>
+</div>
+
+<div class="endnotes">
+
+<h3>PART I<br>
+<span class="subhead">THE WATERSHED</span></h3>
+
+<h4>Chapter 1<br>
+<span class="subhead">Background to Military Assistance</span></h4>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived
+from: Department of Defense, <cite>United States-Vietnam Relations,
+1945–1947</cite>, 12 books (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter <cite>Pentagon
+Papers</cite>; The Senator Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers: The Defense
+Department History of Decision Making On Vietnam</cite>, 4 vols. (Boston:
+Beacon press, n.d.), hereafter Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>;
+Foreign Area Studies Division, American University, <cite>Area Handbook
+for South Vietnam</cite> (Washington: GPO, 1967), hereafter
+American University, <cite>Area Handbook</cite>; Chester L. Cooper, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>,
+<cite>The American Experience With Pacification in Vietnam</cite>, 3 vols.
+(Washington, D.C.: Institute For Defense Analysis, 1972),
+hereafter Cooper, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, <cite>The American Experience With Pacification</cite>;
+Joseph Buttinger, <cite>The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam</cite>
+(New York: Praeger, 1958), hereafter Buttinger, <cite>The Smaller
+Dragon</cite>; Bernard Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military
+Analysis</cite> (New York: Praeger, 1967, 2d rev. ed.), hereafter Fall,
+<cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>; D.&nbsp;G.&nbsp;E. Hall, <cite>A History of South-East Asia</cite> (New
+York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966), hereafter Hall, <cite>A History of South-East
+Asia</cite>; Frances FitzGerald, <cite>Fire In The Lake: The Vietnamese and
+the Americans In Vietnam</cite> (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
+1972), hereafter FitzGerald, <cite>Fire In The Lake</cite>; Ellen J. Hammer,
+<cite>The Struggle for Indochina</cite> (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University
+Press, 1954), hereafter Hammer, <cite>The Struggle for Indochina</cite>; Douglas
+Pike, <cite>Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of The National
+Liberation Front</cite> (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), hereafter
+Pike, <cite>Viet Cong</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="label">[1-1]</a> Hanson W. Baldwin, <cite>Strategy for Tomorrow</cite> (New York:
+Harper &amp; Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 261.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="label">[1-2]</a> Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>, p. 3.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="label">[1-3]</a> Pike, <cite>Viet Cong</cite>, p. 81.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="label">[1-4]</a> FitzGerald, <cite>Fire In The Lake</cite>, p. 42.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="label">[1-5]</a> Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), <cite>A Translation From
+The French Lessons of The War In Indochina</cite>, v. II (Santa Monica,
+Cal.: Rand Corporation, 1967), p. 12, hereafter Croizat, <cite>A
+Translation From the French Lessons</cite>.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="label">[1-6]</a> Dean Acheson, <cite>Present At The Creation: My Years in The State
+Department</cite> (New York: W.&nbsp;W. Norton &amp; Company, Inc., 1969),
+p. 673.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="label">[1-7]</a> Buttinger, <cite>The Smaller Dragon</cite>, p. 46.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="label">[1-8]</a> B.&nbsp;S.&nbsp;N. Murti, <cite>Vietnam Divided</cite> (New York, 1954), p. 49.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="label">[1-9]</a> Letter, SecState to SecDef, 18Aug54 as quoted in “U.S.
+Training of the Vietnamese National Army 1954–1959,” <cite>Pentagon
+Papers</cite>, bk. 2, sec. IV.A.4, p. 3.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h4>Chapter 2<br>
+<span class="subhead">The Formative Years</span></h4>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
+from: MajGen Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (Ret.), <cite>In the Midst
+of Wars: An American’s Mission To Southeast Asia</cite> (New York:
+Harper &amp; Row, 1972), hereafter Lansdale, <cite>In the Midst of Wars</cite>;
+George McTurnam Kahin and John W. Lewis, <cite>The United States
+in Vietnam</cite> (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), hereafter
+Kahin and Lewis, <cite>The U.S. In Vietnam</cite>; Joseph Buttinger,
+<cite>Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled</cite>, 2 vols (New York: Praeger, 1967),
+Vol. II, <cite>Vietnam at War</cite>, hereafter Buttinger, <cite>Vietnam: A Dragon
+Embattled</cite>, v. II; Robert Scigliano, <cite>South Vietnam: Nation Under
+Stress</cite> (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), hereafter Scigliano,
+<cite>South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress</cite>; Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>; Pike,
+<cite>Viet Cong</cite>; Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, vs. I &amp; II; Vietnam
+Histories Comment File, Hist&amp;MusDiv, HQMC, hereafter Vietnam
+Comment File; U.S. Marine Activities in RVN, 1954–1964
+Project Interview Folder Hist&amp;MusDiv, HQMC, hereafter
+1954–1964 Project Interview Folder.</p>
+
+<h5><i>Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: Bernard B. Fall, <cite>Street Without Joy: Indochina At War,
+1946–1954</cite>, (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1961),
+hereafter Fall, <cite>Street Without Joy</cite>; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC
+(Ret.), “Vietnamese Naval Forces: Origin of the Species,”
+<cite>USNI Proceedings</cite>, v. 99, no. 2 (Feb73), pp. 48–58, hereafter
+Croizat, “Vietnamese Naval Forces”; Col Victor J. Croizat,
+USMC (Ret.), intvw by Hist&amp;MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 10–11
+Feb70 (OralHistColl, Hist&amp;MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter <cite>Croizat
+Interview</cite>; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), Comments and supporting
+materials on Draft MS, Jack Shulimson, “U.S. Marines in
+Vietnam,” pt. 1 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Croizat
+Comments and Supporting Materials</cite>; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC
+(Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S.
+Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment
+File), hereafter <cite>Croizat Comments On Whitlow MS</cite>; Col James T.
+Breckinridge, USMC, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert
+Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Breckinridge Comments</cite>;
+MajGen William B. Fulton, USA (Ret.), <cite>Riverine Operations</cite>
+(Washington, D.C.: Department of The Army, 1973), hereafter
+Fulton, <cite>Riverine Operations</cite>; Croizat, <cite>A Translation From The
+French Lessons</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="label">[2-1]</a> Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), “Notes on The Organization
+of the Vietnamese Marine Corps,” p. 3 (<cite>Croizat Comments
+and Materials</cite>), hereafter Croizat, “Notes on The Organization.”</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="label">[2-2]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite>, p. 5.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="label">[2-3]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite>, p. 6.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">170</span></p>
+
+<h5><i>Political Stabilization and its Effects</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: Buttinger, <cite>Vietnam; A Dragon Embattled</cite>, v. II; Gravel
+Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. I; Fall, <cite>Two Viet-nams</cite>; Robert Shaplen,
+<cite>The Lost Revolution</cite> (New York: Harper, 1965); Kahin and Lewis,
+<cite>The U.S. In Vietnam</cite>; Lansdale, <cite>In The Midst of Wars</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="label">[2-4]</a> Col John T. Breckinridge, telephone conversation with
+Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 21 Feb 74, subj: Early Experiences
+with the VN Marine Corps (Addenda to <cite>Breckinridge Comments</cite>,
+Vietnam Comments File), hereafter <cite>Breckinridge Conversation</cite>.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_76" href="#FNanchor_76" class="label">[2-5]</a> Croizat, “Notes on The Organization,” p. 5.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_77" href="#FNanchor_77" class="label">[2-6]</a> <cite>Breckinridge Conversation.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h4>Chapter 3<br>
+<span class="subhead">Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency</span></h4>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
+from: Department of State, <cite>Aggression From The North; The
+Record of North Viet-Nam’s Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam</cite>
+(Washington: GPO, 1965), hereafter Department of State,
+<cite>Aggression From The North</cite>; Buttinger, <cite>Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled</cite>,
+v. II; Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>; FitzGerald, <cite>Fire In The Lake</cite>;
+Kahin and Lewis, <cite>The U.S. In Vietnam</cite>; Pike, <cite>Viet Cong</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_78" href="#FNanchor_78" class="label">[3-1]</a> <cite>U.S. News &amp; World Report</cite>, 9Nov64, p. 63.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_79" href="#FNanchor_79" class="label">[3-2]</a> Scigliano, <cite>South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress</cite>, p. 164.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_80" href="#FNanchor_80" class="label">[3-3]</a> Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>, p. 360.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_81" href="#FNanchor_81" class="label">[3-4]</a> Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. II, p. 35.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_82" href="#FNanchor_82" class="label">[3-5]</a> “Evolution of The War,” <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, bk. 2, sec. IV.B.1,
+p. 1.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_83" href="#FNanchor_83" class="label">[3-6]</a> Pike, <cite>Viet Cong</cite>, p. 81.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_84" href="#FNanchor_84" class="label">[3-7]</a> Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. II, p. 36.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_85" href="#FNanchor_85" class="label">[3-8]</a> HistBr, G-3, HQMC, “General Chronology of Events in
+Vietnam, 1945–1964,” p. 41.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h5><i>Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived
+from: SMA to CMC, ltr dtd 22 March 1973, Subj: Vietnamese
+Marine Corps/Marine Advisory Unit Historical Summary,
+1954–1973, hereafter VNMC/MAU HistSum, 22Mar73; Maj
+James Yingling, Capt Harvey D. Bradshaw, and Mr. Benis M.
+Frank, “United States Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam
+1954–1963,” MS (HistDiv, HQMC, 1963), hereafter Yingling,
+<abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, “USMC Activities 1954–1963”; Col Frank R. Wilkinson,
+USMC (Ret.), intvw by Hist&amp;MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 14Jul74
+(Oral HistColl, Hist&amp;MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter <cite>Wilkinson
+Interview</cite>; LtCol Robert E. Brown, Comments on Draft MS, Capt
+Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter, <cite>R.&nbsp;E. Brown Comments</cite>;
+Col Raymond C. Damm, Comments on Draft MS, Capt
+Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File) hereafter <cite>Damm Comments</cite>; LtCol
+Michael J. Gott, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow,
+“U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment
+File) hereafter <cite>Gott Comments</cite>; Col Gary L. Wilder, Comments
+on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “Marine Activities in
+Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter
+<cite>Wilder Comments</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_86" href="#FNanchor_86" class="label">[3-9]</a> VNMC/MAU HistSumm, 22Mar73.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_87" href="#FNanchor_87" class="label">[3-10]</a> <cite>Wilkinson Interview.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_88" href="#FNanchor_88" class="label">[3-11]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_89" href="#FNanchor_89" class="label">[3-12]</a> <cite>Damm Comments.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_90" href="#FNanchor_90" class="label">[3-13]</a> <cite>Gott Comments.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h5><i>Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: Maj T.&nbsp;C. Edwards, “3d MarDiv Counterguerrilla Training:
+A Readiness Report,” <cite>Marine Corps Gazette</cite>, v. 47, no. 5
+(May 1963), pp. 45–48, hereafter Edwards, “Counterguerrilla
+Training”; MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.), Comments
+on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities
+in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter
+<cite>Weller Comments</cite>; MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.),
+intvw by Hist&amp;MusDiv, HQMC, dtd (OralHistColl, Hist&amp;MusDiv,
+HQMC), hereafter <cite>Weller Interview</cite>; MajGen Donald M.
+Weller, USMC (Ret.), Intvw with Captain Robert Whitlow, dtd
+26Sep73, Subj: 3d MarDiv Training Program (1954–1964 Project
+Interview Folder), hereafter <cite>Weller Interview on Training Programs</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_91" href="#FNanchor_91" class="label">[3-14]</a> <cite>Weller Interview on Training Programs.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_92" href="#FNanchor_92" class="label">[3-15]</a> Edwards, “Counterguerrilla Training,” p. 46.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h5><i>American Decisions at the Close of 1961</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. II; “The Fall Decisions,”
+<cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, bk. 2, sec. IV.B, ch. V and VI; Arthur
+M. Schlesinger, Jr., <cite>A Thousand Days</cite> (Boston: Houghton
+Mifflin Company, 1965), hereafter Schlesinger, <cite>A Thousand
+Days</cite>; Maxwell D. Taylor, <cite>Swords and Plowshares</cite> (New York:
+W.&nbsp;W. Norton &amp; Company, Inc., 1972), hereafter Taylor, <cite>Swords
+and Plowshares</cite>; Chester L. Cooper, <cite>The Lost Crusade: America In
+Vietnam</cite> (New York: Dodd, Mead &amp; Company, 1970), hereafter
+Cooper, <cite>The Lost Crusade</cite>; Gen. William C. Westmoreland and
+Adm U.&nbsp;S.&nbsp;G. Sharp, <cite>Report On The War In Vietnam</cite> (Washington:
+GPO 1969), hereafter Westmoreland and Sharp, <cite>Report On The
+War</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_93" href="#FNanchor_93" class="label">[3-16]</a> Taylor, <cite>Swords and Plowshares</cite>, p. 225.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h4>Chapter 4<br>
+<span class="subhead">An Expanding War, 1962</span></h4>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
+from: William A. Nighswonger, <cite>Rural Pacification in Vietnam
+1962–1965</cite> (Washington: Advanced Research Projects Agency,
+1966), hereafter Nighswonger, <cite>Rural Pacification, 1962–65</cite>;
+USMAAG, Vietnam, “Tactics and Techniques of Counterinsurgent
+Operations” (Saigon, RVN: USMAAG, 1961), hereafter,
+USMAAG Vietnam, “Tactics and Techniques of Counterinsurgent
+Opns”; Hdqts, U.S. Army, <cite>The Viet Cong</cite> (Ft. Bragg,
+N.C.: 1965) hereafter, U.S. Army, <cite>Viet Cong</cite>; Cooper, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, <cite>The
+American Experience With Pacification</cite>; Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon
+Papers</cite>, v. II; “The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961–63,” <cite>Pentagon
+Papers</cite>, bk. 3, sec. IV.B.2; Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_94" href="#FNanchor_94" class="label">[4-1]</a> As quoted in the Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. II,
+p. 140.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h5><i>Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: Senior Marine Advisor letter to CMC, dtd 24Jan64, hereafter
+<cite>SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64</cite>; CinCPac Command History,
+1962; MACV Command History, 1962; Marine Corps Command
+Center, Items of Significant Interest, Jan-Feb62, hereafter <cite>MCC
+Items</cite>; LtGen Richard G. Weede, Intvw by Hist&amp;MusDiv, HQMC
+dtd 23Jul73 (OralHistColl, Hist&amp;MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter
+<cite>Weede Interview</cite>.</p>
+
+<h5><i>The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: <cite>SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64</cite>; Capt Don R. Christensen, “A
+Special Gazette Report: Dateline ... Vietnam,” <cite>Marine Corps
+Gazette</cite>, v. 47, no. 9 (Sep63), p. 5, hereafter Christensen, “Dateline”;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">171</span>
+Gen David M. Shoup, SE Asia Trip Folder, Sep62, hereafter
+<cite>Shoup SEA Trip Folder</cite>; LtCol Harold F. Brown, Comments
+on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in
+Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter
+<cite>H.&nbsp;F. Brown Comments</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_95" href="#FNanchor_95" class="label">[4-2]</a> <cite>SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_96" href="#FNanchor_96" class="label">[4-3]</a> Gen David M. Shoup, ltr to President Ngo Dinh Diem, dtd
+Oct62 (<cite>Shoup SEA Trip Folder</cite>).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_97" href="#FNanchor_97" class="label">[4-4]</a> Gen David M. Shoup conversation with BGen Edwin H.
+Simmons, dtd Feb74 (1954–64 Project Interview Folder).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_98" href="#FNanchor_98" class="label">[4-5]</a> <cite>SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h3>PART II<br>
+<span class="subhead">MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR</span></h3>
+
+<h4>Chapter 5<br>
+<span class="subhead">SHUFLY at Soc Trang</span></h4>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
+from: HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File <cite>MCC Items</cite>;
+CinCPac Command History, 1962; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon,
+“Marine Aviation In Vietnam, 1962–1970,” <cite>Naval Review</cite>, v. 10
+(1971), hereafter McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation.”</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_99" href="#FNanchor_99" class="label">[5-1]</a> JCS to CinCPac, 17Jan62, 1212Z (HQMC Msg File).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_100" href="#FNanchor_100" class="label">[5-2]</a> CinCPac to JCS, 28Feb62, 0217Z (HQMC Msg File).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_101" href="#FNanchor_101" class="label">[5-3]</a> JCS to CinCPac, 6Mar62, 1838Z (HQMC Msg File). DA to
+CinCPac and CinCUSARPac, 2Mar63 (HQMC Msg File).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_102" href="#FNanchor_102" class="label">[5-4]</a> ChMAAG, VN to CinCPac, 26Feb62, 0945Z (HQMC Msg
+File).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_103" href="#FNanchor_103" class="label">[5-5]</a> CGFMPac to CinCPac, 28Feb62, 0113Z (HQMC Msg File).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_104" href="#FNanchor_104" class="label">[5-6]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_105" href="#FNanchor_105" class="label">[5-7]</a> CinCPacFlt to CinCPac, 28Feb62, 2044Z (HQMC Msg
+File).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_106" href="#FNanchor_106" class="label">[5-8]</a> CinCPac (Bangkok Th) to ComUSMACV, 5Mar62, 0340Z
+(HQMC Msg File).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_107" href="#FNanchor_107" class="label">[5-9]</a> ComUSMACV to CinCPac, 8Mar62, 0941Z (HQMC Msg File).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_108" href="#FNanchor_108" class="label">[5-10]</a> CinCUSARPac to CinCPac, 9Mar62, 2100Z (HQMC Msg File).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_109" href="#FNanchor_109" class="label">[5-11]</a> Dir, DivAv, HQMC, Briefing Item, dtd 14Mar62, for CMC
+Weekly Conf., Subj: Assignment of Marine Helicopter Squadron
+to ChMAAG, Vietnam.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_110" href="#FNanchor_110" class="label">[5-12]</a> CinCPac to JCS, 14Mar62, 0712Z (HQMC Msg File).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_111" href="#FNanchor_111" class="label">[5-13]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_112" href="#FNanchor_112" class="label">[5-14]</a> CinCPac to CinCPacFlt and ComUSMACV, 21Mar62,
+0412Z (HQMC Msg File); CinCPacFlt to ComSeventhFlt,
+21Mar62, 2048Z (HQMC Msg File).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h5><i>Deployment to Soc Trang</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: Commander Task Unit 79.3.5 ComdDiary, 31Jul–5Nov62,
+hereafter <cite>CTU 79.3.5 CmdD, 31Jul-Nov62</cite>; CG 1st MAW,
+SHUFLY, OpSums, Apr-Sep62; CG, 1st MAW, Ltr of Instruction,
+SHUFLY, dtd 12Nov62, hereafter <cite>CG, 1st MAW LOI</cite>;
+LtCol Archie J. Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary,” <cite>USNI Proceedings</cite>, v.
+89, no. 10 (Oct63), hereafter Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary”; Cdr
+Withers M. Moore, Chaplain Corps, USN, <cite>Navy Chaplains in
+Vietnam, 1954–1964</cite> (Washington: Department of Navy, 1968),
+hereafter Moore, <cite>Navy Chaplains</cite>; Capt Robert B. Asprey, “Saga
+At Soc Trang: Marines In Viet-Nam,” <cite>Marine Corps Gazette</cite>, v.
+46, no. 12 (Dec62), pp. 2–3, hereafter Asprey, “Saga At Soc
+Trang”; VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret.), Intvw by Capt
+Robert Whitlow, dtd 15Apr74 (1954–64 Project Interview
+Folder), hereafter <cite>Hooper Interview</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_113" href="#FNanchor_113" class="label">[5-15]</a> CG, 1st MAW to ComSeventhFlt, 30Mar62, 0700Z, (HQMC
+Msg File).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_114" href="#FNanchor_114" class="label">[5-16]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_115" href="#FNanchor_115" class="label">[5-17]</a> ComSeventhFlt to CTF 76 and CTG 79.3, 3Apr62 (HQMC
+Msg File).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h5><i>Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: Marine Corps Operational Analysis Group, Study No. 1,
+dtd 12Mar63, “Characteristics of U.S. Marine Helicopter Operations
+in the Mekong Delta,” hereafter <cite>MCOAG Study No. 1</cite>;
+LtCol Robert L. Rathbun, Comments on Yingling, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, “USMC
+Activities 1954–1963,” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter
+<cite>Rathbun Comments on Yingling MS</cite>; Richard Tregaskis, <cite>Vietnam
+Diary</cite> (New York: Popular Library, 1963), hereafter Tregaskis,
+<cite>Vietnam Diary</cite>; Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary”; CTU 79.3.5 ComdD,
+31Jul–5Nov62; CG, 1stMAW SHUFLY OpSums, Apr-Sep62.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_116" href="#FNanchor_116" class="label">[5-18]</a> Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary,” p. 46.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_117" href="#FNanchor_117" class="label">[5-19]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite>, p. 51.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_118" href="#FNanchor_118" class="label">[5-20]</a> CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul–5Nov62.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_119" href="#FNanchor_119" class="label">[5-21]</a> Yingling, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, “USMC Activities 1954–1963,” p. 118.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_120" href="#FNanchor_120" class="label">[5-22]</a> CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul-Nov62.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_121" href="#FNanchor_121" class="label">[5-23]</a> C of S memo 007A20763, as quoted in Yingling, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>,
+“USMC Activities, 1954–1963,” p. 153.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h4>Chapter 6<br>
+<span class="subhead">SHUFLY Moves North</span></h4>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
+from: Col Julius W. Ireland, Comments on Draft MS, Capt
+Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Ireland Comments</cite>;
+McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; <cite>Weede Interview</cite>; <cite>Rathbun
+Comments on Yingling MS</cite>.</p>
+
+<h5><i>I Corps Tactical Zone</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: BGen Edwin H. Simmons, “Marine Corps Operations in
+Vietnam, 1965–1966,” <cite>Naval Review</cite>, 1968, hereafter Simmons,
+“Marine Corps Operations in RVN, 65–66”; McCutcheon,
+“Marine Aviation”; Fall, <cite>Street Without Joy</cite>; Nighswonger,
+<cite>Rural Pacification, 1962–65</cite>.</p>
+
+<h5><i>Military Situation, September 1962</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: Col Francis J. Kelly, USA, <cite>U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971</cite>
+(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), hereafter
+Kelly, <cite>U.S. Army Special Forces</cite>; MACV J-2 ltr to CTU
+79.3.5, dtd 11Oct62, Subj: Intelligence Estimate, Period Oct62–Feb63
+(Encl D-17 to CTU 79.3.5 ComdD), hereafter <cite>MACV
+Intell Est, 11Oct62</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_122" href="#FNanchor_122" class="label">[6-1]</a> <cite>MACV Intel Est, 11Oct62.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_123" href="#FNanchor_123" class="label">[6-2]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h5><i>Initial Helicopter Operations</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: <cite>CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul–5Nov62</cite>; CG 1st MAW, SHUFLY,
+OpSums, Sep-Dec62; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; <cite>Ireland
+Comments</cite>; <cite>Rathbun Comments on Yingling MS</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_124" href="#FNanchor_124" class="label">[6-3]</a> <cite>MCC Items</cite>, 7Oct62.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_125" href="#FNanchor_125" class="label">[6-4]</a> CTU 79.3.5 ltr to CG 1st MAW, dtd 4Oct62, Subj: Rotation
+of Task Unit Personnel to South Vietnam (encl D-15, <cite>CTU
+79.3.5 ComdD, 6Apr–5Nov62</cite>).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">172</span></p>
+
+<h4>Chapter 7<br>
+<span class="subhead">The Laotian Crisis, 1962</span></h4>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
+from: 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Report, 16May–7Aug
+1962, hereafter <cite>3d MEU Special Report</cite>; CinCPac Operations
+Plan 32-59 Phase II (Laos), hereafter <cite>OpPlan 32-59</cite>; <cite>Weller
+Interview</cite>; <cite>Croizat Interview</cite>; <cite>MCC Items</cite>, May, Jun, Jul62;
+Schlesinger, <cite>A Thousand Days</cite>; Cooper, <cite>The Lost Crusade</cite>; Paul F.
+Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, <cite>North Vietnam and The Pathet Lao:
+Partners in The Struggle For Laos</cite> (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
+University Press, 1970), hereafter Langer and Zasloff, <cite>North
+Vietnam and The Pathet Lao</cite>; LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC
+(Ret.) Comments on 2d Draft MS, Whitlow, “U.S. Marine
+Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1963,” (Vietnam Comment File),
+hereafter <cite>Simpson Comments</cite>; Foster Rhea Dulles, <cite>American Policy
+Toward Communist China: The Historical Record</cite> (New York:
+Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972), hereafter Dulles, <cite>American
+Policy Toward Communist China</cite>; Taylor, <cite>Swords and Plowshares</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_126" href="#FNanchor_126" class="label">[7-1]</a> <cite>MCC Items</cite>: 16 May 62.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_127" href="#FNanchor_127" class="label">[7-2]</a> <cite>Croizat Interview</cite>; <cite>Weller Interview</cite>.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h3>PART III<br>
+<span class="subhead">THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963</span></h3>
+
+<h4>Chapter 8<br>
+<span class="subhead">The Marine Advisory Effort</span></h4>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
+from: FitzGerald, <cite>Fire In The Lake</cite>; “The Overthrow of Ngo
+Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963,” <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, bk. 3,
+sec. IV.B.5; Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. III; Shaplen,
+<cite>The Lost Revolution</cite>; Kahin and Lewis, <cite>The U.S. In Vietnam</cite>.</p>
+
+<h5><i>The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived
+from: Senior Marine Advisor, MACV, Monthly Historical
+Summaries, 1963–1965, hereafter <cite>SMA, MACV HistSums</cite>; Col
+Wesley C. Noren, Comments on Draft MS, Maj Harvey
+Bradshaw, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations in RVN, 1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Noren Comments on Bradshaw
+MS</cite>; Col Wesley C. Noren, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert
+Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964”.
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Noren Comments on Whitlow
+MS</cite>; Col Clarence G. Moody, Comments on Draft MS, Capt
+Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Moody Comments</cite>;
+LtCol James P. McWilliams, Comments on Draft MS, Capt
+Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>McWilliams Comments</cite>;
+LtCol Joseph N. Smith, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert
+Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Smith Comments</cite>; LtCol
+Joseph N. Smith intvw by Capt Robert Whitlow (1954–1964
+Project Interview Folder), hereafter <cite>Smith Interview</cite>; Col Edwin
+F. Black, USA, and Lt R.&nbsp;P.&nbsp;W. Murphy, USNR, “The South
+Vietnamese Navy,” <cite>USNI Proceedings</cite>, v. 90, no. 1 (Jan64)
+pp. 52–62, hereafter, Black and Murphy, “The South Vietnamese
+Navy”; Maj Alfred J. Croft, “A Special Gazette Report:
+Dateline, Vietnam,” <cite>Marine Corps Gazette</cite> v. 47, n. 10 (Oct63),
+p. 18, hereafter Croft, “Dateline, Vietnam”; Christenson,
+“Dateline”; Capt. James P. McWilliams, “Pacify and Hold,”
+<cite>Marine Corps Gazette</cite>, v. 49, no. 2 (Feb65), p. 56, hereafter
+McWilliams, <cite>Pacify and Hold</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_128" href="#FNanchor_128" class="label">[8-1]</a> <cite>Moody Comments</cite>; <cite>Weede Interview</cite>.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_129" href="#FNanchor_129" class="label">[8-2]</a> <cite>McWilliams Comments.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_130" href="#FNanchor_130" class="label">[8-3]</a> <cite>Smith Interview.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_131" href="#FNanchor_131" class="label">[8-4]</a> <cite>Noren Comments on Whitlow MS.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h4>Chapter 9<br>
+<span class="subhead">SHUFLY Operations</span></h4>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
+from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov62–31Oct63; CTE 79.3.3.6
+ComdD, 31Oct63–14Jan64; Col Thomas J. Ross, Comments on
+Draft MS, Bradshaw, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations in RVN,
+1964,” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Ross Comments on
+Bradshaw MS</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_132" href="#FNanchor_132" class="label">[9-1]</a> McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation.”</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h5><i>Combat Support Operations</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov62–31Oct63; CTE 79.3.3.6
+ComdD, 31Oct63–14Jan64; CTE 79.3.3.6 After Action Reports,
+26Apr–20May63, hereafter <cite>CTE 79.3.3.6 AAR</cite>; McCutcheon,
+“Marine Aviation”; MajGen Paul J. Fontana, Comments on
+Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In
+Vietnam, 1954–1964,” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter
+<cite>Fontana Comments</cite>; Col Thomas J. Ross, Comments on Draft MS,
+Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam,
+1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Ross Comments
+On Whitlow MS</cite>; <cite>Ross Comments On Bradshaw MS</cite>; <cite>H.&nbsp;F. Brown
+Comments</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_133" href="#FNanchor_133" class="label">[9-2]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov–31Oct63.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_134" href="#FNanchor_134" class="label">[9-3]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_135" href="#FNanchor_135" class="label">[9-4]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 AAR, 19May63.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_136" href="#FNanchor_136" class="label">[9-5]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov–31Oct63.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_137" href="#FNanchor_137" class="label">[9-6]</a> Aviation Headquarters Operations Center SOP, p. 1 (encl
+5, CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 18Jul–31Oct63).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_138" href="#FNanchor_138" class="label">[9-7]</a> Col A.&nbsp;D. Gomez ltr to Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing
+Force Development Center, dated 23Oct63 (encl 1, CTE 79.3.3.6
+ComdD, 18Jul–31Oct63).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_139" href="#FNanchor_139" class="label">[9-8]</a> 1st MAW OpSums, 8Jun–20Oct63.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_140" href="#FNanchor_140" class="label">[9-9]</a> <cite>Ross Comments on Bradshaw MS.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_141" href="#FNanchor_141" class="label">[9-10]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov63–14Jan64.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h5><i>The Situation in Vietnam</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived
+from: Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. II; Nighswonger,
+<cite>Rural Pacification, 1962–65</cite>; Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>; Cooper, <cite>The
+Lost Crusade</cite>; Department of State, <cite>Aggression from the North</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_142" href="#FNanchor_142" class="label">[9-11]</a> Nighswonger, <cite>Rural Pacification, 1962–65</cite>.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h3>PART IV<br>
+<span class="subhead">AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964</span></h3>
+
+<h4>Chapter 10<br>
+<span class="subhead">Marines Meet the Challenge</span></h4>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
+from: MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.) intvw by Hist&amp;MusDiv,
+HQMC, dtd 24Jul73 (OralHistColl, Hist&amp;MusDiv,
+HQMC), hereafter <cite>Youngdale Interview</cite>; MajGen Carl A. Youngdale,
+USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow
+“U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–64” (Vietnam
+Comment File), hereafter, <cite>Youngdale Comments</cite>; Westmoreland and
+Sharp, <cite>Report On The War</cite>; Cooper, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, <cite>The American Experience
+With Pacification, 1962–65</cite>; “Military Pressures Against North
+Vietnam, July-Oct 1964,” <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, bk. 4, sec. IV.C.2;
+Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. III; CinCPac Command
+History, 1964, hereafter <cite>CinCPac ComdHist, 64</cite>; U.S. Military
+Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History, 1964, hereafter
+MACV ComdHist, 64; Nighswonger, <cite>Rural Pacification,
+1962–65</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_143" href="#FNanchor_143" class="label">[10-1]</a> Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. III, p. 501.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_144" href="#FNanchor_144" class="label">[10-2]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_145" href="#FNanchor_145" class="label">[10-3]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite>, v. II, p. 471.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_146" href="#FNanchor_146" class="label">[10-4]</a> “Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, Jul-Oct 1964,”
+<cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, bk. 4, sec. IV.C.2(b), p. 42.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">173</span></p>
+
+<h5><i>Redesignation and Reorganization</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: Senior Marine Advisor, MACV, After Action Reports,
+1964–65, hereafter <cite>SMA, MACV, AARs 64-65</cite>; Col William P.
+Nesbit, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert
+Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Nesbit Comments On Whitlow
+MS</cite>; Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft
+MS, Maj Harvey Bradshaw, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations In
+RVN, 1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Nesbit Comments
+on Bradshaw MS</cite>; <cite>Noren Comments on Whitlow MS</cite>; <cite>Noren
+Comments on Bradshaw MS</cite>; James C. Pickerell, “Marine Advisor:
+Vietnam,” <cite>Marine Corps Gazette</cite>, v. 48, n. 4 (Apr64), hereafter
+Pickerall, “Marine Advisor”; <cite>Damm Comments</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_147" href="#FNanchor_147" class="label">[10-5]</a> <cite>Nesbit Comments on Bradshaw MS.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h5><i>The Vietnamese Marine Brigade</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: <cite>SMA, MACV, AARs, 64-65</cite>; CG FMFPac On-The-Job-Training,
+RVN, Monthly Reports, Jan-Dec, 1964, hereafter
+<cite>OJT Monthly Repts, 64</cite>; Capt Philip O. Brady, intvw by HistBr,
+G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Jan66 (OralHistColl, Hist&amp;MusDiv,
+HQMC), hereafter <cite>Brady Interview</cite>; Westmoreland and Sharp,
+<cite>Report On The War</cite>; Pickerell, “Marine Advisor”; Naval Advisory
+Group, MACV, Historical Review, 1964–65, hereafter NAVGP,
+MACV, HistRevw, 64-65.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_148" href="#FNanchor_148" class="label">[10-6]</a> <cite>Noren Comments on Whitlow MS.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_149" href="#FNanchor_149" class="label">[10-7]</a> <cite>Nesbit Comments on Whitlow MS.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_150" href="#FNanchor_150" class="label">[10-8]</a> NAVGP, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65, p. 21.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h5><i>Additional Marine Activities</i></h5>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
+from: LtCol Raymond Becker, intvw with Capt Robert Whitlow,
+dtd 25Jan74 (1954–64 Project Interview Folder), hereafter
+<cite>Becker Interview</cite>; Capt Charles H. Gallina, Intvw with Capt
+Robert Whitlow, dtd 29Jan74 (1954–64 Project Interview
+Folder), hereafter <cite>Gallina Interview</cite>; Director of Intelligence,
+HQMC, to Director, History and Museums Division, dtd
+31Jan74, Subj: Summary of U.S. Marine Corps Operations at
+Tiger Tooth Mountain and Dong Bach Ma in 1964, hereafter
+“Summary of USMC Opns at Tiger Tooth Mountain”; Col
+Raymond C. Damm intvw with Captain Robert H. Whitlow,
+dtd 19Jul73 (1954–64 Project Interview Folder), hereafter <cite>Damm
+Interview</cite>; NAVG, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65; CTE 79.3.3.6
+ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_151" href="#FNanchor_151" class="label">[10-9]</a> <cite>Damm Interview.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_152" href="#FNanchor_152" class="label">[10-10]</a> NAVG, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65, p. 14.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_153" href="#FNanchor_153" class="label">[10-11]</a> <cite>Smith Comments.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_154" href="#FNanchor_154" class="label">[10-12]</a> Col Warren P. Baker, ltr to CG, 3dMarDiv, dtd 3Apr64,
+Subj: Job Related Orientation Report.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_155" href="#FNanchor_155" class="label">[10-13]</a> CG, FMFPac ltr to CMC 18Mar64, Subj: SVN Observations.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h4>Chapter 11<br>
+<span class="subhead">Spring and Summer Fighting</span></h4>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
+from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; Col Andre
+Gomez, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S.
+Marine Activities in Vietnam 1954–64” (Vietnam Comment
+File), hereafter <cite>Gomez Comments</cite>; Col Robert A. Merchant,
+Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine
+Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File),
+hereafter <cite>Merchant Comments</cite>; Col John H. La Voy, Comments
+on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities
+In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter
+<cite>La Voy Comments</cite>; <cite>Ross Comments on Whitlow MS</cite>; LtGen Herman
+Nickerson, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert
+Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964”
+(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Nickerson Comments</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_156" href="#FNanchor_156" class="label">[11-1]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_157" href="#FNanchor_157" class="label">[11-2]</a> <cite>Ross Comments on Whitlow MS.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_158" href="#FNanchor_158" class="label">[11-3]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_159" href="#FNanchor_159" class="label">[11-4]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_160" href="#FNanchor_160" class="label">[11-5]</a> Statement of General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., CMC, before
+the House Committee On Armed Services, dtd March 1964
+(Greene Papers Collection).</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_161" href="#FNanchor_161" class="label">[11-6]</a> CTE ComdD 79.3.3.6, 1Nov63–16Oct64.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_162" href="#FNanchor_162" class="label">[11-7]</a> <cite>La Voy Comments.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_163" href="#FNanchor_163" class="label">[11-8]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_164" href="#FNanchor_164" class="label">[11-9]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_165" href="#FNanchor_165" class="label">[11-10]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; <cite>Merchant Comments</cite>;
+<cite>La Voy Comments</cite>.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_166" href="#FNanchor_166" class="label">[11-11]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h4>Chapter 12<br>
+<span class="subhead">Fall and Winter Operations</span></h4>
+
+<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived
+from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; CTU 79.3.5
+ComdD, 17Oct64–14Jan65; 1st MAW OpSums, 9Jul64–7Oct64;
+CinCPac CmdHist 64; <cite>Fontana Comments</cite>; BGen Joseph Koler,
+USMC, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S.
+Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment
+File), hereafter <cite>Koler Comments</cite>; Col Hardy Hay, Comments on
+Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In
+Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Hay
+Comments</cite>; <cite>Becker Comments</cite>; <cite>Merchant Comments</cite>; <cite>Nickerson Comments</cite>;
+Capt Roger H. Donlon, USA, <cite>Outpost of Freedom</cite> (New
+York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), hereafter Donlon, <cite>Outpost of Freedom</cite>;
+Moore, <cite>Navy Chaplains</cite>.</p>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_167" href="#FNanchor_167" class="label">[12-1]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; CG 1st MAW
+OpSums, 9Jul–7Oct64.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_168" href="#FNanchor_168" class="label">[12-2]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_169" href="#FNanchor_169" class="label">[12-3]</a> Moore, <cite>Navy Chaplains</cite>, p. 92.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_170" href="#FNanchor_170" class="label">[12-4]</a> <cite>MCC Items</cite>, 23Nov64.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_171" href="#FNanchor_171" class="label">[12-5]</a> CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 17Oct64–14Jan65.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_172" href="#FNanchor_172" class="label">[12-6]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_173" href="#FNanchor_173" class="label">[12-7]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_174" href="#FNanchor_174" class="label">[12-8]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<h4>Chapter 13<br>
+<span class="subhead">Prelude to Escalation</span></h4>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_175" href="#FNanchor_175" class="label">[13-1]</a> Westmoreland and Sharp, <cite>Report On The War</cite>, p. 95.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_176" href="#FNanchor_176" class="label">[13-2]</a> <cite>Youngdale Interview.</cite></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_177" href="#FNanchor_177" class="label">[13-3]</a> Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. III, p. 289.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_178" href="#FNanchor_178" class="label">[13-4]</a> Westmoreland and Sharp, <cite>Report On The War</cite>, pp. 95, 97.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_179" href="#FNanchor_179" class="label">[13-5]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite>, p. 98.</p>
+
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">175</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_A"><span id="toclink_175"></span>Appendix A<br>
+<span class="subhead">USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954–1964</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<table id="officers">
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="3"><span id="toclink_175a"></span>USMC SENIOR MARINE ADVISORS</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Victor J. Croizat</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">Aug 1954–Jun 1956</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol William N. Wilkes, Jr</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">Jun 1956–Jun 1958</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">Jun 1958–Jun 1960</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">Jun 1960–Aug 1961</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Robert E. Brown</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">Aug 1961–Oct 1962</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Clarence G. Moody, Jr</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">Oct 1962–Oct 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Wesley C. Noren</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">Oct 1963–Sep 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col William P. Nesbit</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr l3">Sep 1964–</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="3">VNMC SENIOR OFFICERS AND COMMANDANTS</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Maj Le Quang Trong</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">1 Oct 1954–17 Jun 1956</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Maj Phan Van Lieu</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">18 Jan 1956–22 Aug 1956</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Bui Pho Chi</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">23 Aug 1956– 1 Oct 1956</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Maj Le Nhu Hung</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">2 Oct 1956–23 May 1960</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Le Nguyen Khang</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">24 May 1960–15 Dec 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Nguyen Ba Lien</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">16 Dec 1963– Feb 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">BGen Le Nguyen Khang</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr l3">Feb 1964– </td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="3">SHUFLY, SQUADRON, AND SUB UNIT COMMANDERS<a id="FNanchor_180" href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[14-A]</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl"><i>SHUFLY Commanders</i></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdc"><i>Dates</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col John F. Carey</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col Julius W. Ireland</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">1 Aug 1962– 5 Nov 1962</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Alton W. McCully</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">6 Nov 1962–28 Jan 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Harold F. Brown</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">29 Jan 1963–17 Jul 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col Andre D. Gomez</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">18 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col Robert A. Merchant</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">16 Jan 1964– 9 Jul 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col Hardy Hay</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">10 Jul 1964–16 Oct 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col John H. King, Jr</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr l3">17 Oct 1964–    </td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="subhead">
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Squadron Commanders</i></td>
+  <td class="tdc"><i>Squadron</i></td>
+  <td class="tdc"><i>Dates</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Archie J. Clapp</td>
+  <td class="tdc">HMM-362</td>
+  <td class="tdr">15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Robert L. Rathbun</td>
+  <td class="tdc">HMM-163</td>
+  <td class="tdr">1 Aug 1962–11 Jan 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Reinhardt Leu</td>
+  <td class="tdc">HMM-162</td>
+  <td class="tdr">12 Jan 1963– 7 Jun 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Frank A. Shook</td>
+  <td class="tdc">HMM-261</td>
+  <td class="tdr">8 Jun 1963– 1 Oct 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Thomas J. Ross</td>
+  <td class="tdc">HMM-361</td>
+  <td class="tdr">2 Oct 1963–31 Jan 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol John H. La Voy</td>
+  <td class="tdc">HMM-364</td>
+  <td class="tdr">1 Feb 1964–21 Jun 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Oliver W. Curtis</td>
+  <td class="tdc">HMM-162</td>
+  <td class="tdr">17 Jun 1964– 7 Oct 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr</td>
+  <td class="tdc">HMM-365</td>
+  <td class="tdr l3">8 Oct 1964–    </td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="subhead">
+  <td class="tdl"><i>Sub Unit Commanders</i></td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdc"><i>Dates</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol William W. Eldridge, Jr</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">15 Apr 1962– 3 Aug 1962</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Ralph R. Davis</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">4 Aug 1962–15 Jan 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol George H. Linnemeier</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">16 Jan 1963– 4 Jul 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Earl W. Cassidy</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">5 Jul 1963– 6 Feb 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Samuel G. Beal</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">7 Feb 1964–26 Jun 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Maj Marion R. Green</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Jun 1964–14 Dec 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Thomas E. Vernon</td>
+  <td class="tdc"> </td>
+  <td class="tdr l3">15 Dec 1964–    </td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_180" href="#FNanchor_180" class="label">[14-A]</a> SHUFLY was designated Task Unit 79.3.5 from 15 April 1962 until 6 November 1962; Task Element 79.3.3.6 from 6 November
+1962 through 31 December 1964.</p>
+
+</div>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">176</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_B"><span id="toclink_176"></span>Appendix B<br>
+<span class="subhead">Awards and Decorations, Vietnam,
+through 1964<a id="FNanchor_181" href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">[14-B]</a></span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<table id="awards">
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2"><i>Navy Cross</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Maj Donald E. Koelper<a id="FNanchor_182" href="#Footnote_182" class="fnanchor">[14-C]</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">16 Feb 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">SSgt John C. Thompson</td>
+  <td class="tdr">30 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2"><i>Navy Distinguished Service Medal</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">MajGen Richard G. Weede<a id="FNanchor_183" href="#Footnote_183" class="fnanchor">[14-D]</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">Feb 1962–May 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">MajGen Carl A. Youngdale</td>
+  <td class="tdr">25 Jan 1964–20 Jul 1965</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2"><i>Silver Star Medal</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Maj John R. Braddon</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">1stLt Phillip O. Brady</td>
+  <td class="tdr">31 Dec 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Franklin P. Eller, Jr</td>
+  <td class="tdr">31 Dec 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Joseph N. Smith</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Oct 1963–25 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Richard B. Taylor<a id="FNanchor_184" href="#Footnote_184" class="fnanchor">[14-E]</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">25 Nov 1962–31 Oct 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2"><i>Legion of Merit</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col Earl E. Anderson</td>
+  <td class="tdr">8 Jul 1963–15 May 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Earl W. Cassidy</td>
+  <td class="tdr">2 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col John F. Carey<a id="FNanchor_185" href="#Footnote_185" class="fnanchor">[14-F]</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">9 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Archie J. Clapp<a id="FNanchor_186" href="#Footnote_186" class="fnanchor">[14-G]</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col Andre D. Gomez</td>
+  <td class="tdr">19 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col John H. King, Jr</td>
+  <td class="tdr">16 Oct 1964–15 May 1965</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr</td>
+  <td class="tdr">7 Oct 1964–18 Feb 1965</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol John H. La Voy</td>
+  <td class="tdr">1 Feb 1964–22 Jun 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col Robert A. Merchant</td>
+  <td class="tdr">2 Jan 1964–10 Jul 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Clarence C. Moody, Jr</td>
+  <td class="tdr">18 Jan 1962–24 Oct 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col Wesley C. Noren</td>
+  <td class="tdr">13 Oct 1963–13 Sep 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Thomas J. Ross</td>
+  <td class="tdr">1 Oct 1963–31 Jan 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col Roy H. Thompson</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Feb 1962–16 Jun 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col Charles E. Warren</td>
+  <td class="tdr">8 Feb 1962– 9 Jul 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Col Edwin B. Wheeler</td>
+  <td class="tdr">1 Aug 1964–23 Aug 1965</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2"><i>Distinguished Flying Cross</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Maj Albert N. Allen</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt William J. Burrows</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Charles E. Cannon</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt William Cunningham</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">1stLt Ronald V. Debrincat</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt George H. Dunn II</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt George H. Dunn II</td>
+  <td class="tdr">30 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Robert K. Ervi</td>
+  <td class="tdr">31 Dec 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">1stLt Melvin T. Graves</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Theodore A. Heister</td>
+  <td class="tdr">1 Aug 1963<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">177</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">1stLt Donald A. Hodgen<a id="FNanchor_187" href="#Footnote_187" class="fnanchor">[14-H]</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">10 Mar 1963–11 Mar 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol John H. La Voy</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Peter A. Love</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">WO Dennis T. McKee</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">1stLt Edward P. Moore</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">CWO Robert F. Patton</td>
+  <td class="tdr">5 Jun 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">1stLt Thomas H. Peters<a id="FNanchor_188" href="#Footnote_188" class="fnanchor">[14-I]</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">9 Mar 1963–10 Mar 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Eugene W. Rawlins</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Howard G. Taylor</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">1stLt Charles R. Upshaw</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt William W. Wamel, Jr.</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt William W. Wamel, Jr.</td>
+  <td class="tdr">30 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Maj Goodell P. Warren</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">1stLt Charles C. Wood, Jr.</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Grant T. Yule</td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2"><i>Bronze Star Medal</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">SSgt John Baran</td>
+  <td class="tdr">12 Dec 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Samuel G. Beal</td>
+  <td class="tdr">3 Feb 1964– 1 Jul 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">SSgt Clifford J. Beaver</td>
+  <td class="tdr">30 Dec 1964–31 Dec 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol George A. Brigham</td>
+  <td class="tdr">3 Apr 1964– 3 Jul 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">SSgt Marvin I. Bryant</td>
+  <td class="tdr">12 Oct 1964– 8 Mar 1965</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Cpl Clarence L. Chester</td>
+  <td class="tdr">30 Jun 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Don R. Christensen<a id="FNanchor_189" href="#Footnote_189" class="fnanchor">[14-J]</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">28 Sep 1962–31 Jul 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">2dLt Francis R. Ciccone</td>
+  <td class="tdr">16 Oct 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">SSgt James A. Coryer</td>
+  <td class="tdr">30 Jun 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Maj Alfred J. Croft</td>
+  <td class="tdr">1 Feb 1962– 7 Feb 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Oliver W. Curtis</td>
+  <td class="tdr">17 Jun 1964–23 Nov 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LtCol Raymond C. Damm</td>
+  <td class="tdr">10 May 1964– 1 Dec 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Maj Alfred M. Gray, Jr.</td>
+  <td class="tdr">11 Apr 1964–15 Aug 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt James J. Harp</td>
+  <td class="tdr">10 Mar 1963–11 Mar 1963</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Cpl Cary F. Janulewicz</td>
+  <td class="tdr">9 Dec 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">1stLt Weston L. Johnson</td>
+  <td class="tdr">10 Nov 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">2dLt James P. Kelliher</td>
+  <td class="tdr">31 Dec 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">1stLt Donald H. Larson</td>
+  <td class="tdr">4 Apr 1964– 1 Feb 1965</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">GySgt Richard L. Latimer</td>
+  <td class="tdr">9 Dec 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt John P. Monahan</td>
+  <td class="tdr">21 Mar 1964–28 Feb 1965</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt James P. McWilliams</td>
+  <td class="tdr">2 May 1963– 9 Jun 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">GySgt Charles D. Peck</td>
+  <td class="tdr">14 Apr 1963–22 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LCpl James N. Phinney</td>
+  <td class="tdr">10 Apr 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LCpl Walter L. Rupp</td>
+  <td class="tdr">24 Mar 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">GySgt Edmund R. Sewell</td>
+  <td class="tdr">20 Sep 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">SSgt Cecil C. Stibbens</td>
+  <td class="tdr">Dec 1962– Dec 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Edward H. Walsh</td>
+  <td class="tdr">28 Sep 1964– 1 May 1964</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Maj Charles K. Whitfield</td>
+  <td class="tdr">31 Jan 1964–20 Jan 1965</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">Capt Frank Zimolzak<a id="FNanchor_190" href="#Footnote_190" class="fnanchor">[14-K]</a></td>
+  <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1962–25 May 1963</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_181" href="#FNanchor_181" class="label">[14-B]</a> Other awards, such as Navy Commendation Medals, Air Medals, and Purple Hearts are not included in this list.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_182" href="#FNanchor_182" class="label">[14-C]</a> First Navy Cross approved for Vietnam.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_183" href="#FNanchor_183" class="label">[14-D]</a> First Navy Distinguished Service Medal awarded for Vietnam.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_184" href="#FNanchor_184" class="label">[14-E]</a> First Silver Star Medal awarded to a Marine for Vietnam.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_185" href="#FNanchor_185" class="label">[14-F]</a> First Legions of Merit awarded to USMC personnel for Vietnam.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_186" href="#FNanchor_186" class="label">[14-G]</a> First Legions of Merit awarded to USMC personnel for Vietnam.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_187" href="#FNanchor_187" class="label">[14-H]</a> First Distinguished Flying Crosses approved for USMC personnel in Vietnam.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_188" href="#FNanchor_188" class="label">[14-I]</a> First Distinguished Flying Crosses approved for USMC personnel in Vietnam.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_189" href="#FNanchor_189" class="label">[14-J]</a> One of the first two Bronze Star Medals (approved the same date) for USMC personnel in Vietnam.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_190" href="#FNanchor_190" class="label">[14-K]</a> One of the first two Bronze Star Medals (approved the same date) for USMC personnel in Vietnam.</p>
+
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">178</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_C"><span id="toclink_178"></span>Appendix C<br>
+<span class="subhead">Glossary of Acronyms</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<table id="acronyms">
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">AHOC</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Aviation Headquarters Operations Center</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">ARVN</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Army of The Republic of Vietnam</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">ASOC</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Air Support Operation Center</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">BLT</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Battalion Landing Team</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">CG</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Civil Guard</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">ChMAAG</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">CIDG</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Civil Irregular Defense Group</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">CinCPac</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Commander in Chief, Pacific</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">CIP</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Counter Insurgency Plan</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">ComUSMACV</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">COSVN</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Central Office for South Vietnam</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">CTZ</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Corps Tactical Zone</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">DMZ</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Demilitarized Zone</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">DRV</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">FAC</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Forward Air Controller</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">FEC</td>
+  <td class="tdl">French Expeditionary Corps</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">FMFPac</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Fleet Marine Force, Pacific</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">GCA</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Ground Controlled Approach (system)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">GVN</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">HMM</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">ICC</td>
+  <td class="tdl">International Control Commission</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">JCS</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">JGS</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">JRO</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Job Related Orientation (Program)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">JTF</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Joint Task Force</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">LSG</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Logistics Support Group</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">MABS</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Marine Air Base Squadron</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">MAG</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Marine Aircraft Group</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">MATCU</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Marine Airfield Traffic Control Unit</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">MAW</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Marine Aircraft Wing</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">MEB</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Marine Expeditionary Brigade</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">MEU</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">MR</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Military Region</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">NLF</td>
+  <td class="tdl">National Liberation Front</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">OJT</td>
+  <td class="tdl">On-The-Job Training (Program)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">PAVN</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Peoples Army of Vietnam</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">PF</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Popular Forces</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">RF</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Regional Forces</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">RLT</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Regimental Landing Team</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">RSSZ</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Rung Sat Special Zone</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">RVN</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">RVNAF</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">SAR</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Search and Rescue</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">SDC</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Self Defense Corps</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">SEATO</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">SLF</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Special Landing Force</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">TACAN</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Tactical Air Navigation (system)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">TAFDS</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">TERM</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">TRIM</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Training Relations Instruction Mission</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">USMAAG (MAAG)</td>
+  <td class="tdl">U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">USMACThai</td>
+  <td class="tdl">U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">USOM</td>
+  <td class="tdl">U.S. Operations Mission</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">VC</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Viet Cong</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">VMGR</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">VNA</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Vietnamese National Army</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">VNAF</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Vietnamese Air Force</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+  <td class="tdl">VNMC</td>
+  <td class="tdl">Vietnamese Marine Corps</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">179</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_D"><span id="toclink_179"></span>Appendix D<br>
+<span class="subhead">Chronology</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="chronyear">1954</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang">
+
+<p>7 May—French garrison at Dien Bien Phu surrenders to Viet
+Minh.</p>
+
+<p>16 Jun—Ngo Dinh Diem named premier of Vietnam by French-sponsored
+emperor, Bao Dai.</p>
+
+<p>20 Jul—French and Viet Minh representatives sign Geneva
+cease-fire. Vietnam is divided into northern and southern
+zones pending reunification elections to be held in 1956.</p>
+
+<p>2 Aug—LtCol Victor J. Croizat, USMC, arrives in South Vietnam
+for duty with USMAAG.</p>
+
+<p>8 Sep—Manila Pact signed by U.S. and seven other nations.
+Within weeks (Sep 1954) the Manila Pact is transformed
+into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).</p>
+
+<p>13 Oct—Premier Diem decrees the establishment of a 1,137-man
+Marine Corps (VNMC).</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="chronyear">1955</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang">
+
+<p>Feb—LtCol Croizat becomes first advisor to VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>Apr—Sect rebellion threatens to topple the Diem government.
+Marine Landing Battalion deploys to the Mekong Delta.</p>
+
+<p>31 May—Diem names Major Le Quang Trong as Senior Marine
+Officer of VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>Sep—Two USMC advisors, a captain and a technical sergeant,
+are assigned to the USMAAG, Vietnam, for duty with the
+VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>23 Oct—Premier Diem receives 98 percent of South Vietnamese
+vote during a national referendum in which he was opposed
+by Bao Dai.</p>
+
+<p>26 Oct—Ngo Dinh Diem proclaims the Republic of Vietnam
+and becomes the republic’s first president.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="chronyear">1956</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang">
+
+<p>18 Jan—Diem appoints Major Phan Van Lieu as Senior Officer of
+VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>Feb—Marine Landing Battalion returns to garrison at Nha
+Trang. VNMC reorganized into two landing battalions, a
+4.2-inch mortar company, and a small headquarters.</p>
+
+<p>Jun—LtCol William N. Wilkes, Jr., replaces LtCol Croizat as
+Senior Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>Jul—Election deadline for reunification of northern and southern
+zones passes without serious incident.</p>
+
+<p>Aug—Diem appoints Captain Bui Pho Chi as Senior Officer of
+VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>Oct—Diem appoints Major Le Nhu Hung as Senior Officer of
+VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>Nov—LtGen Samuel T. Williams, USA, relieves LtGen John
+O’Daniel as Chief USMAAG, Vietnam.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="chronyear">1958</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang">
+
+<p>Jun—LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., relieves LtCol Wilkes as
+Senior Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="chronyear">1959</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang">
+
+<p>May—1st VNMC Landing Battalion conducts operations against
+Viet Cong in An Xuyen Province while 2d Landing Battalion
+conducts similar operation against Communist guerrillas
+in Vinh Binh Province.</p>
+
+<p>1 Jun—The VNMC is expanded to a Marine Corps Group of
+2,276 officers and men. A 3d Landing Battalion is formed
+and the battalions are reorganized into four infantry companies.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="chronyear">1960</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang">
+
+<p>Jun—LtCol Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr., relieves LtCol Wilkinson
+as Senior Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>Sep—LtGen Lionel C. McGarr, USA, relieves LtGen Williams
+as Chief USMAAG, Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>11 Nov—An abortive attempt by ARVN paratroops and two
+Marine companies to overthrow the Diem Government.</p>
+
+<p>20 Dec—The Communist “National Front for Liberation of
+South Vietnam” was formed.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="chronyear">1961</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang">
+
+<p>May—On The Job Training (OJT) program for USMC junior
+officers and staff noncommissioned officers is initiated.
+Thereafter, 20 Marines per month enter Vietnam to observe
+operations.</p>
+
+<p>16 May—A 14 nation conference on the deteriorating Laotian
+situation convenes at Geneva.</p>
+
+<p>Jul—VNMC again reorganized and expanded. The addition of a
+fourth infantry battalion and a 75mm pack howitzer battery
+raises the strength of the VNMC to 3,321.</p>
+
+<p>Aug—LtCol Robert E. Brown relieves LtCol Robichaud as
+Senior Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>Aug—VNMC battalion conducts operations in the inundated
+U Minh Forest region of the Ca Mau Peninsula.</p>
+
+<p>Nov—General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (ret.), President
+Kennedy’s special military advisor, visits South Vietnam on
+fact-finding mission.</p>
+
+<p>11 Dec—The first direct support contingent of U.S. military
+forces arrives in Vietnam—400 Army Troops and two
+helicopter companies.</p>
+
+<p>Dec—USMAAG approves plan for new 18-man Marine Advisory
+Division.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="chronyear">1962</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang">
+
+<p>1 Jan—VNMC expanded to 6,109 officers and men, and redesignated
+the Vietnamese Marine Brigade. A new amphibious
+support battalion is formed.</p>
+
+<p>3 Jan—First element of USAF transport aircraft arrive in South
+Vietnam to support government forces.</p>
+
+<p>Jan—Detachment A, 1st Radio Company, FMF arrives in
+Vietnam for duty with Army communications unit.</p>
+
+<p>20 Jan—CinCPac authorizes all MAAG advisors to accompany
+their Vietnamese units into combat.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">180</span></p>
+
+<p>3 Feb—President Diem issues decree formalizing initiation of
+the Strategic Hamlet Program.</p>
+
+<p>8 Feb—U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV)
+activated in Saigon with General Paul D. Harkins as commander.
+MajGen Richard G. Weede, USMC, becomes
+MACV’s first chief of staff.</p>
+
+<p>7 Feb—Vietnamese Air Force fighters bomb and strafe the
+Presidential Palace in Saigon but fail to injure President
+Diem.</p>
+
+<p>9 Apr—The leading elements of Marine Task Unit 79.3.5
+(SHUFLY), commanded by Col John F. Carey, arrive at
+Soc Trang, Republic of Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>15 Apr—HMM-362 (Reinforced), a Marine medium transport
+helicopter squadron, arrives at Soc Trang to begin operations
+in support of government forces.</p>
+
+<p>22 Apr—HMM-362 helicopters fly their first combat support
+missions in Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>9 May—Eight Marine helicopters hit by small arms fire during
+landing on Ca Mau Peninsula.</p>
+
+<p>18 May—The 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit (3d MEU) began
+moving into position at Udorn, Thailand, in response to
+the deteriorating situation in Laos. The 3d MEU was part
+of Joint Task Force 116, organized for use in the mounting
+crisis.</p>
+
+<p>20 May—BGen Ormond R. Simpson assumes command of 3d
+MEU.</p>
+
+<p>18 Jun—Eagle Flight first employed in combat by Marine
+helicopters operating from Soc Trang.</p>
+
+<p>25 Jun—HMM-162 replaces HMM-261 at Udorn as 3d MEW
+(MEB) helicopter element.</p>
+
+<p>1 Jul—First Marine Combat units withdraw from Udorn,
+Thailand, as a display of good faith.</p>
+
+<p>23 Jul—An agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of Laos is
+signed by the U.S., the Soviet Union, Communist China,
+North Vietnam, and 10 other nations at Geneva.</p>
+
+<p>30 Jul—Col Julius W. Ireland relieves Col Carey as SHUFLY
+commander.</p>
+
+<p>31 Jul—Last Marine combat units withdrawn from Udorn,
+Thailand.</p>
+
+<p>1 Aug—HMM-163 replaces HMM-362 as operational squadron
+assigned to SHUFLY.</p>
+
+<p>Aug—First machine guns mounted on Marine helicopters
+operating in Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>4 Sep—Initial SHUFLY elements begin displacing to Da Nang
+in I Corps Tactical Zone.</p>
+
+<p>18 Sep—HMM-163 conducts first combat operations in I Corps.</p>
+
+<p>20 Sep—All SHUFLY elements are in place at Da Nang.</p>
+
+<p>Oct—LtCol Clarence G. Moody relieves LtCol Brown as Senior
+Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>6 Oct—Five Marines and two U.S. Navy personnel killed in
+HUS crash near Tam Ky.</p>
+
+<p>7 Nov—HMM-163 executes first tiger flight reaction force
+mission in I Corps.</p>
+
+<p>Nov—All Marine Corps aircraft redesignated.</p>
+
+<p>6 Nov—Marine Task Unit (SHUFLY) redesignated Task Element
+79.3.3.6.</p>
+
+<p>6 Nov—LtCol Alton W. McCully assumes command of SHUFLY.</p>
+
+<p>Dec—Vietnamese Joint General Staff realigns South Vietnam’s
+Corps Tactical Zones, creating a fourth CTZ and a Capital
+Military District.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="chronyear">1963</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang">
+
+<p>11 Jan—HMM-162 replaces HMM-163 as SHUFLY’s operational
+squadron.</p>
+
+<p>19 Jan—HMM-162 conducts its first combat troop lift in Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>10–13 Mar—HMM-162 helicopters participate in search and
+rescue attempts for U.S. Army OV-1 Mohawk and crew.
+Two Marine helicopters crash in high mountains of northern
+II Corps.</p>
+
+<p>13 Apr—Marine transport helicopters conduct first operation
+with U.S. Army UH-1B armed helicopters.</p>
+
+<p>Apr—Organization of Marine Advisory Division modified
+slightly.</p>
+
+<p>1 May—Provisional Marine Brigade joins ARVN forces for
+operation in Do Xa base area.</p>
+
+<p>8 Jun—HMM-261 replaces HMM-162 as SHUFLY’s operational
+squadron.</p>
+
+<p>15–16 Aug—HMM-261 helilifts 2d ARVN Division units from
+field to culminate operation LAM SON XII.</p>
+
+<p>21 Aug—Vietnamese National Police raid Buddhist pagodas
+throughout South Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>Sep—LtCol Wesley C. Noren relieves LtCol Moody as Senior
+Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>2 Oct—HMM-361 replaces HMM-261 as SHUFLY’s operational
+squadron.</p>
+
+<p>Oct—Provisional Marine Regiment conducts operation PHI-HOA
+5 in Gia Dinh Province.</p>
+
+<p>1 Nov—Diem government overthrown by coup of military
+leaders. Diem and brother Ngo Dinh Nhu assassinated.</p>
+
+<p>14 Nov—Provisional Marine Regiment launches Operation
+DAI-PHONG 28 and 29 in III Corps Tactical Zone.</p>
+
+<p>25 Nov—2d VNMC Battalion participates in Operation DAI-PHONG
+30.</p>
+
+<p>16 Dec—LtCol Khang relieved as Commandant of Vietnamese
+Marine Corps. Replaced by LtCol Nguyen Ba Lien.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="chronyear">1964</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot hang">
+
+<p>1 Jan—General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., relieves General David
+Shoup as Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps.</p>
+
+<p>Jan—General Greene visits Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>15 Jan—BGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC, becomes MACV
+Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (J-2).</p>
+
+<p>1 Feb—HMM-364 replaces HMM-361 as SHUFLY’s operational
+squadron.</p>
+
+<p>Feb—Col Khang recalled from Philippines and relieves LtCol
+Lien as Commandant of VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>Mar—LtGen Victor H. Krulak relieves LtGen Carson A. Roberts
+as Commanding General, FMFPac.</p>
+
+<p>27 Apr—HMM-364 participates in Operation SURE WIND 202
+in northern II Corps.</p>
+
+<p>May—MajGen Weede, USMC, relieved as MACV Chief of Staff.</p>
+
+<p>15 May—USMAAG abolished. Marine Advisory Division renamed
+Marine Advisory Unit and placed under Naval
+Advisory Group, MACV.</p>
+
+<p>20 May—Marine Advisory Team One arrives at Da Nang.</p>
+
+<p>7 Jun—Two Marines from SHUFLY compound reported missing
+south of Da Nang.</p>
+
+<p>13 Jun—Advisory Team One moves to Tiger Tooth Mountain
+in northwestern I Corps.</p>
+
+<p>19 Jun—HMM-364 turn over helicopters and maintenance
+equipment to VNAF 217th Squadron.</p>
+
+<p>21 Jun—HMM-162 replaces HMM-364 as SHUFLY’s operational
+squadron.</p>
+
+<p>Jul—Vietnamese Marine Recruit Training Center opens at Thu
+Due. VNMC expanded with the creation of a fifth infantry
+battalion.</p>
+
+<p>7 Jul—HMM-162 participates in relief of Nam Dong Special
+Forces Camp.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">181</span></p>
+
+<p>2–5 Aug—North Vietnamese patrol boats and U.S. ships clash
+in Tonkin Gulf.</p>
+
+<p>6 Aug—U.S. Congress passes Tonkin Gulf resolution.</p>
+
+<p>11 Aug—President Johnson signs the so-called Tonkin Gulf
+Resolution.</p>
+
+<p>19 Aug—Advisory Team One moves to Bach Ma and continues
+operations.</p>
+
+<p>4 Sep—Col William P. Nesbit replaces Col Noren as Senior
+Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p>
+
+<p>13 Sep—Advisory Team One dissolved, departs Vietnam.</p>
+
+<p>14 Sep—SHUFLY aircraft flown to safety in face of severe
+tropical storm.</p>
+
+<p>Sep—Marine Advisory Unit reorganized and expanded.</p>
+
+<p>8 Oct HMM-365 replaces HMM-364 as SHUFLY’s operational
+squadron.</p>
+
+<p>Oct—Marine reconnaissance element conducts survey of Cam
+Ranh Bay in southern II Corps.</p>
+
+<p>31 Dec—Viet Cong terrorist bomb American BOQ in Saigon.</p>
+
+<p>31 Dec—4th VNMC Battalion defeated at Binh Gia in III Corps.</p>
+</div>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">183</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_E"><span id="toclink_182"></span>Appendix E<br>
+<span class="subhead">List of Reviewers</span></h2>
+</div>
+
+<div class="officers">
+<ul>
+<li class="p1">
+<i>General Officers</i></li>
+<li>Gen Earl E. Anderson, USMC</li>
+<li>Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Gen David M. Shoup, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>LtGen Carson A. Roberts, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>LtGen Richard G. Weede, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>MajGen Norman Anderson, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>MajGen Paul J. Fontana, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>MajGen Charles J. Timmes, U.S. Army (Ret.)</li>
+<li>MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>BGen Joseph Koler, Jr., USMC</li>
+
+<li class="p1"><i>Colonels</i></li>
+<li>Col Frederick S. Aldridge, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Samual Beal, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col John T. Breckinridge, USMC</li>
+<li>Col Harold F. Brown, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col John F. Carey, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Archie J. Clapp, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Alfred J. Croft, USMC</li>
+<li>Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Oliver W. Curtis, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Raymond C. Damm, USMC</li>
+<li>Col Andre Gomez, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Hardy Hay, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Julius W. Ireland, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col John H. La Voy, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Reinhardt Leu, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Robert A. Merchant, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Ross S. Mickey, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Clarence G. Moody, Jr., USMC</li>
+<li>Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Wesley C. Noren, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Robert L. Rathbum, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Thomas J. Ross, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr., USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Col Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., USMC (Ret.)</li>
+
+<li class="p1"><i>Lieutenant Colonels</i></li>
+<li>LtCol Robert E. Brown, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>LtCol Earl W. Cassidy, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>LtCol Michael J. Gott, USMC</li>
+<li>LtCol George H. Linnemeier, USMC (Ret.)</li>
+<li>LtCol James P. McWilliams, USMC</li>
+<li>LtCol Joseph N. Smith, USMC</li>
+
+<li class="p1"><i>CMC Advisory Committee on Marine Corps History</i></li>
+<li>Col Frederick S. Aldridge, USMC (Ret.)<a id="FNanchor_191" href="#Footnote_191" class="fnanchor">[14-L]</a></li>
+<li>MajGen Norman Anderson, USMC (Ret.)<a id="FNanchor_192" href="#Footnote_192" class="fnanchor">[14-M]</a></li>
+<li>Dr. Gordon A. Craig</li>
+<li>Dr. Philip K. Lundeberg</li>
+<li>Mr. Robert L. Sherrod</li>
+<li>MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.)<a id="FNanchor_193" href="#Footnote_193" class="fnanchor">[14-N]</a></li>
+
+<li class="p1"><i>Others</i></li>
+<li>Center of Military History, Department of the Army</li>
+<li>Dr. Philip A. Crowl</li>
+<li>Capt Joseph Drachnik, U.S. Navy (Ret.)</li>
+<li>Naval Historical Division, Department of the Navy</li>
+<li>Office of Air Force History, Department of the Air Force</li>
+</ul>
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_191" href="#FNanchor_191" class="label">[14-L]</a> Cited previously.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_192" href="#FNanchor_192" class="label">[14-M]</a> Cited previously.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_193" href="#FNanchor_193" class="label">[14-N]</a> Cited previously.</p>
+
+</div>
+</div>
+</div>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">185</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="Index"><span id="toclink_184"></span>Index</h2>
+
+<div class="index">
+<ul class="index">
+<li class="ifrst">Adams, LtCol Harold W., <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–94</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Africa, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Agroville Program, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Aircraft</li>
+<li class="isub1">Types</li>
+<li class="isub2">AD-6, <i>See</i> <a href="#A1-H">A1-H</a></li>
+<li class="isub2"><a id="A1-H"></a>A1-H (Skyraider), <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152–154</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_158">158–159</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">A-4C, (Skyhawk), <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">B-26, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117–118</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">B-57, <a href="#Page_166">166–167</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">F4U (Corsair), <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">F-100 (Super Sabre), <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+<li class="isub2"><a id="C-117"></a>C-117 (Skytrain), <a href="#Page_60">60–61</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">C-124 (Globemaster), <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">C-123 (Provider), <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+<li class="isub2"><a id="CH-21"></a>CH-21 (Shawnee), <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">CV-2 (Caribou), <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">GV-1. <i>See</i> <a href="#KC-130">KC-130</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">H-21. <i>See</i> <a href="#CH-21">CH-21</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">HUS-1. <i>See</i> <a href="#UH-34D">UH-34D</a></li>
+<li class="isub2"><a id="KC-130"></a>KC-130 (Hercules), <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_112">112–114</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+<li class="isub2"><a id="O-1B"></a>O-1B (Bird Dog), <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67–69</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–118</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144–145</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–159</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">OE-1. <i>See</i> <a href="#O-1B">O-1B</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">OV-1 (Mohawk), <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">R4D. <i>See</i> <a href="#C-117">C-117</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">T-28 (Trojans), <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116–118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">U-10 (Super Courier), <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">UH-1B (Iroquois), <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–120</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147–149</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_151">151–152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–159</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–165</a></li>
+<li class="isub2"><a id="UH-34D"></a>UH-34D, <a href="#Page_57">57–58</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–93</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113–121</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144–146</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_151">151–161</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–165</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">UH-37 (Mojave), <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Air_Force"></a>Air Force, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_114">114–115</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158–159</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Air Force Command and Staff College, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Air Support Operations Center, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117–119</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Allied Training Operations Mission, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Alsop, Maj William F., <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Amphibious Ready Group, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88–90</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5), <a href="#Page_61">61–62</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Andaman Sea, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Anderson, Col Earl E., <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Anderson, Cpl Thomas E., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">An Diem, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Annam, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Annamese Coast, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Annamite Mountains, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">An Xuyen Province, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Armed Services Committee, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Army"></a>Army, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–158</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Units</li>
+<li class="isub2">27th Infantry Brigade, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">52d Aviation Battalion, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">145th Aviation Battalion, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">33d Helicopter Company, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">57th Helicopter Company, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70–71</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">68th Aviation Company, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">81st Helicopter Company, <a href="#Page_58">58–59</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">93d Helicopter Company, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–74</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">704th Counterintelligence Unit, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">3d Radio Research Unit, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Paratroopers, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Special Forces, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Army Communications Station, Phu Bai, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Army Communications Station, Pleiku, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Army Field Hospital, Nha Trang, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, NC, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">A Shau Valley, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Asia, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Associated States of Indochina, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Atsugi, Japan, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Australia, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Aviation Headquarters Operations Center, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Bach Phoung XI, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Baker, Col Warren P., <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bangkok, Thailand, <a href="#Page_88">88–89</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ban Me Thuot, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bassac River, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ba Xuyen Province, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Beal, LtCol Samuel G., <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Beaver, SSgt Clifford J., <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Becker, Raymond A., <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Beirut, Lebanon, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bell Helicopter Company, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ben Hai River, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ben Tre, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bien Hoa, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Binh Dinh Province, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Binh Duong Province, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Binh Gia, <a href="#Page_136">136–138</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Binh Thuan Province, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Binh Xuyen, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–20</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Braddon, Maj John R., <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Brady, Lt Philip O., <a href="#Page_137">137–138</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Breckinridge, Capt James T., <a href="#Page_19">19–20</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Brigham, LtCol George, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">British Advisory Mission, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bronars, Maj Edward J., <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bronze Star, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Brown, LtCol Harold F., <a href="#Page_111">111–112</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Brown, LtCol Robert E., <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48–49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Buddhist, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">186</span>Burma, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Cai Ngai, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">California, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ca Mau, <a href="#Page_37">40</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69–71</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ca Mau Peninsula, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cambodia, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8–9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cambodian Border, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Campbell, Cpl Charley M., <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cam Ranh Bay, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Canada"></a>Canada, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Can Tho, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cao Dai, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cape St. Jacques, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Capital Military District, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Carey, Col John F., <a href="#Page_60">60–61</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69–71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cassidy, LtCol Earl W., <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Catholicism, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12–13</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Central Highlands, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Central Office for South Vietnam, <a href="#Page_44">44–45</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Chai Doc, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Chams, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Chien Tang (“Struggle for Victory”) Plan, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Chi, Capt Bui Pho, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="China"></a>China, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–13</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">96</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Chinese, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Chinese Nationalist Forces, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">CHINH BIEN, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cholon District, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Christanity, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Christensen, Capt Don R., <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Civil Guard, <a href="#Page_27">27–28</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30–32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Civilian Irregular Defense Group, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Clapp, LtCol Archie J., <a href="#Page_60">60–62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69–70</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Clark Air Force Base, Philippines, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cochinchina, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cold War, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Collins, Gen James F., CinCUSARPac, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Collins, Gen J. Lawton, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Command and Staff Training Course, <a href="#Page_41">41–42</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Condon, MajGen John P., <a href="#Page_59">59–61</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Confucianism, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Conway, MajGen J.&nbsp;F., <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cook, Capt Donald G., <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Corps Tactical Zones</li>
+<li class="isub1">I Corps, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78–80</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_82">82–85</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113–114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116–118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_148">148–149</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–162</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–165</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">II Corps, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79–80</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_102">102–103</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–155</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">III Corps, <a href="#Page_58">58–59</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61–63</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–74</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">IV Corps, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Counter-Insurgency Plan, <a href="#Page_29">29–30</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Counterguerrilla Warfare Study Group, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Croft, Maj Alfred J., <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Croizat, LtCol Victor J., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cronin, LtCol Angus J., <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cross of Valor, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cua Viet, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Philippines, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Curtis, LtCol Oliver W., <a href="#Page_156">156–159</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161–162</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cushman, MajGen Robert E., <a href="#Page_41">41–42</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cuu Long, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cuu Long Navy Yard, <a href="#Page_31">31–32</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Dai, Emperor Bao, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–13</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">DAI-PHONG 28, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">DAI-PHONG 29, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">DAI-PHONG 30, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">DAI-PHONG 31, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dak To, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Damm, Maj Raymond C., <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Da_Nang"></a>Da Nang, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–76</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78–80</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_83">83–85</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111–118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120–121</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–149</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–162</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–165</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Da Nang Harbor, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Da Nang River, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">DA NANG SIX, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Davis, Capt Dale N., <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Davis, LtCol Ralph R., <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Davis, BGen Raymond G., <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Declaration of Neutrality of Laos, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dees, LtCol Harry C., <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Delayen, Capt Jean Louis, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Demilitarized Zone, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27–29</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Democratic Republic of Vietnam. <i>See</i> <a href="#North_Vietnam">North Vietnam</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Department of Defense, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Department of State, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dickinson, LtCol Harry E., <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Diem, President Ngo Dinh, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12–16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26–32</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_35">35–36</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99–100</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_121">121–122</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dien Bien Phu, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Distinguished Flying Cross, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Distinguished Service Medal, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Don, MajGen Tran Van, <a href="#Page_79">79–80</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dong Bach Ma, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dong Ha, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dong Nai boats, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Donlon, Capt Roger H.&nbsp;C., <a href="#Page_157">157–158</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Do Xa Base Area, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–116</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Dulles, Secretary of State John Foster, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst"><a id="Eagle_Flight"></a>Eagle Flight, <a href="#Page_69">69–70</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Eisenhower, President Dwight D., <a href="#Page_14">14–15</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Eldridge, LtCol William W., <a href="#Page_60">60–61</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Eller, Capt Franklin P., <a href="#Page_137">137–138</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ely, Gen Paul, <a href="#Page_15">15–16</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Europe, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Father-For-A-Day Program, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Felt, Adm Harry D., <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57–58</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">FLAMING DART, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, <a href="#Page_37">40</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_165">165</a>.</li>
+<li class="isub1"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#Marine_Corps">Marine Corps</a>, <a href="#FMF_Air_Units">FMF Unit</a>s</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fontana, MajGen Paul J., <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fort Ord, California, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Forward Air Controller, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">France, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–14</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">French Expeditionary Corps, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–16</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">French High Command, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">French-Indochina, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">French-Indochina War, <a href="#Page_13">13–14</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–24</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">French Navy, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">French Union, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Futema, Okinawa, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">General Commission for Refugees, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Geneva Conference, <a href="#Page_12">12–16</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">German Army, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gia Dinh Province, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Giap, Gen Vo Nyguyen, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gi Lang, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">187</span>Go Cong, <a href="#Page_132">132–133</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gomez, Col Andre D., <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119–120</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gott, Capt Michael J., <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gray, Maj Alfred M., <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Great Britain, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Green, Maj Marion R., <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Greene, Gen Wallace M., Jr., <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145–146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Greer, PFC Robert L., <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Griffin, Lt Gerald, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ground Control Approach, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Guadalcanal, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gulf of Siam, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gulf of Tonkin, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128–129</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166–167</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Haiphong, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hai Van Peninsula, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hamilton, Sgt Richard E., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hanoi, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Harkins, Gen Paul D., <a href="#Page_46">46–47</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57–59</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61–62</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hau Nghia Province, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hawaii, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–142</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hay, Col Hardy, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160–161</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Heim, Lt Robert P., <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hiep Hoa Special Forces Camp, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hoa Hao, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hoa My, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ho Chi Minh. <i>See</i> <a href="#Minh_Ho_Chi">Minh, Ho Chi</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ho Chi Minh Trail, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hoi An, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hoi Dong Sam, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Honolulu Conference, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Hop_Tac_Program"></a>Hop Tac Program, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hudson, LtCol Robert S., <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hue, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78–79</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hughes, Capt Virgil R., <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hugo, Victor, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hung, Maj Le Nhu, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst"><a id="India"></a>India, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Indian Ocean, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Indochina, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Industrial College of the Armed Forces, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Infantry Unit Training Course, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>.</li>
+<li class="isub1"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#Strategic_Hamlet_Program">Strategic Hamlet Program</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">International Control Commission, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.</li>
+<li class="isub1"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#Canada">Canada</a>, <a href="#India">India</a>, and <a href="#Poland">Poland</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Interzone V, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ireland, Col Julius W., <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75–76</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Irwin, Capt William R., <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Iwo Jima, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Japan, <a href="#Page_8">8–9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Jeep, M-442 “Mighty Mite,” <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Job Related Orientation Program, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Johnson, President Lyndon B., <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166–167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Johore, Malaya, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Joint Chiefs of Staff, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Joint General Staff, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31–32</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35–36</a>, <a href="#Page_37">40</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Joint Operations Center, <a href="#Page_62">62–63</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Joint Operations Evaluation Group, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Joint Task Force 116, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88–90</a>.</li>
+<li class="isub1"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#Marine_Corps">Marine Corps</a>, <a href="#FMF_Air_Units">FMF Units</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Joint U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group, Thailand, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Jones, Capt Robert C., <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Jungle Warfare School, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Kelliher, Lt James P., <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kennedy, President John F., <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42–44</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kham Duc, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Khang, BGen Le Nguyen, <a href="#Page_35">35–36</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100–103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_109">109–110</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Khanh, MajGen Nguyen, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ke Sanh, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Khmers, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Khrushchev, Premier Nikita, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kien Giang Province, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">King, Col John H., Jr., <a href="#Page_161">161–164</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Koler, LtCol Joseph, Jr., <a href="#Page_161">161–162</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kontum, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kontum Province, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Korat, Thailand, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Korean War, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47–48</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ky, Vice Air Marshal Nguyen Cao, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">LAM SON XII, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">LAM SON, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Laos, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29–30</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–94</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Laotian Border, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117–119</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">La Voy, LtCol John H., <a href="#Page_146">146–147</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151–152</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Legion of Merit, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Leu, LtCol Reinhardt, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–116</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lien, Lt Col Nguyen Ba, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lieu, Maj Pham Van, <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Linnemeier, LtCol George H., <a href="#Page_111">111–112</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">LOCKJAW, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Logistics Support Group, Thailand, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Long An, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Long An Province, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Long Tao River, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Loyko, GSgt William A., <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Malaya, <i>See</i> <a href="#Malaysia">Malaysia</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Malaysia"></a>Malaysia, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mang Buc, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Manila Pact, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mansfield, LCpl James I., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mao Tse-tung, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Marine_Corps"></a>Marine Corps, <a href="#Page_22">22–25</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34–35</a>, <a href="#Page_37">40–41</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46–48</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_57">57–58</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–74</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110–111</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116–117</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136–139</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+<li class="isub1"><a id="FMF_Air_Units"></a>FMF Air Units:</li>
+<li class="isub2">1st Marine Aircraft Wing, <a href="#Page_59">59–61</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160–161</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">3d Marine Aircraft Wing, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Task Unit 79.3.5. <i>See</i> <a href="#SHUFLY">SHUFLY</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Task Element 79.3.3.6. <i>See</i> <a href="#SHUFLY">SHUFLY</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">MAG-16, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">ProvMAG, <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">MACS-2, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">MABS-12, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li>
+<li class="isub2"><a id="MABS-16"></a>MABS-16, <a href="#Page_60">60–63</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69–71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75–76</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111–114</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">VMA-211, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">VMA-324, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">VMA-332, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">VMB-443, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>n</li>
+<li class="isub2">VMGR-152, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">VMGR-352, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">VMO-2, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">HMM-161, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">HMM-162, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–116</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156–162</a></li>
+<li class="isub2"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">188</span>HMM-163, <a href="#Page_70">70–73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">HMM-261, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117–120</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">HMM-361, <a href="#Page_120">120–121</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">HMM-362, <a href="#Page_60">60–63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67–71</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">HMM-364, <a href="#Page_146">146–147</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151–152</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">HMM-365, <a href="#Page_161">161–162</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–165</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">MATCU-68, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Task Element 79.3.5.2, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.</li>
+<li class="isub3"><i>See also</i> <a href="#MABS-16">MABS-16</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">FMF Ground Units</li>
+<li class="isub2">1st Marine Division, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">3d Marine Division, <a href="#Page_41">40–41</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136–138</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147–158</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">4th Marine Division, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–93</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">5th Marines, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">3d Marine Expeditionary Unit, <a href="#Page_93">93–95</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Marine Advisory Unit, Vietnam, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Infantry Battalions</li>
+<li class="isub2">1/9, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">2/9, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">3/9, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Infantry Companies</li>
+<li class="isub2">G/2/3, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">K/3/3, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">E/2/9, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">L/3/9, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Advisory Team One, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+<li class="isub2"><a id="1st_Radio_Company"></a>1st Radio Company, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Signal Engineering Survey Unit, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.</li>
+<li class="isub3"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#1st_Radio_Company">1st Radio Company</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Security Detachment, Marine Unit Vietnam, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Marine Corps Air Facility, Santa Ana, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Marine Corps Junior School, Quantico, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">McCully, LtCol Alton W., <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111–112</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">McGarr, LtGen Lionel C, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert S., <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">McWilliams, Capt James P., <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Medal of Honor, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mekong Delta, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8–9</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44–45</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57–59</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61–62</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_73">73–75</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84–85</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mekong River, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Merchant, Col Robert A., <a href="#Page_146">146–149</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–158</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mickey, Col Ross S., <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Middle East, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Midway, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Military Assistance Program, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Military Region 5, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Military Region 9, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Minh, MajGen Duong Van, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Minh_Ho_Chi"></a>Minh, Ho Chi, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">“Minute of Understanding,” <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Missouri</i> (BB-63), <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">M-108 Wrecker, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Monkey Mountain, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Monroe, Lt Anthony A., <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Montagnards, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Montgomery, LtCol William, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Moody, LtCol Clarence G., <a href="#Page_48">48–49</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100–103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">My Tho, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">NAMBO Interzone, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nam Dong, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–159</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nam Tha, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">National Intelligence Estimate, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">National Liberation Front, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">National War College, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Navy"></a>Navy, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Navy Cross, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Navy Mobile Construction Battalion, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">New Life Hamlets. <i>See</i> <a href="#Hop_Tac_Program">Hop Tac Program</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Newport, Rhode Island, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">New Zealand, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nesbit, Col William P., <a href="#Page_131">131–133</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nghiem, BGen LeVan, <a href="#Page_61">61–62</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nha Trang, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nhu, Ngo Dinh, <a href="#Page_45">45–46</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">NIGHTINGALE, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nipper, LCpl David, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nong Son, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nong Ta Kai, Thailand, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Noren, LtCol Wesley C., <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Normandy, France, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Northern Training Area, Okinawa, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">North Korea, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="North_Vietnam"></a>North Vietnam, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28–29</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_166">166–167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">North Vietnamese, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">North Vietnamese Army</li>
+<li class="isub1">Units</li>
+<li class="isub2">32d Regiment, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">101st Regiment, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Norton, H.&nbsp;G.&nbsp;O., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nosavan, Gen Phoumi, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">O’Daniel, LtGen John M., <a href="#Page_15">15–16</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Olmen, Lt John D., <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Okinawa, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61–62</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70–71</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85–86</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112–113</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_141">141–144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">On-The-Job Training Program, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136–137</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142–143</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Otlowski, Lt Raymond J., <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Oum, Prince Boun, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Pacific Ocean, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pacifier, <i>See</i> <a href="#Eagle_Flight">Eagle Flight</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pakistan, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Paris, France, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Parker, Capt Evan L., <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">“Passage to Freedom,” <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pathet Lao, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Patton, LtCol Harvey M., <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pendell, Sgt Jerald W., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">People-to-People Program, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">People’s Army of Vietnam, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">People’s Republic of China. <i>See</i> <a href="#China">China</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Perfume River, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Phan Rang, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Phan Thiet, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">PHI-HOA 5, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Philippines, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Phouma, Prince Souvanna, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Phu Bai, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Phouc Thuan Province, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Phouc Thy Province, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Phouc Vin, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Plain of Jars, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Plain of Reeds, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Plateau Gi, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">189</span>Pleiku, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Point Defiance</i> (LSD-31), <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Poland"></a>Poland, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Popular Forces, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Porter, Col Daniel B., Jr., <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–74</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Princeton</i> (CV-37) (LPH-5), <a href="#Page_61">61–62</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Purple Heart Medal, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Radar, counter-mortar, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Radios, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Rathbun, LtCol Robert L., <a href="#Page_70">70–74</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Red River Delta, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Regional Forces, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Republic of Korea. <i>See</i> <a href="#South_Korea">South Korea</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Republic of Vietnam. <i>See</i> <a href="#South_Vietnam">South Vietnam</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Richardson, LtGen John L., <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Roberts, MajGen Carson A., <a href="#Page_57">57–58</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Robichaud, LtCol Clifford J., <a href="#Page_35">35–36</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Roe, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">ROLLING THUNDER, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Roosevelt, President Franklin D., <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ross, LtCol Thomas J., <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144–146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Route 1, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Route 9, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Route 19, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Royal Marines, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Royal Thai Regiment, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Rung Sat, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Rung Sat Special Zone, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Rupp, LCpl Walter L., <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Saigon, <a href="#Page_8">8–9</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15–16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30–32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34–36</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45–48</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100–102</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131–133</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–153</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Saigon Central Police Headquarters, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Saigon River, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">St. Clair, Col Howard B., <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Saipan, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Secretary of Defense, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Self Defense Corps, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Seventh Fleet, <a href="#Page_59">59–60</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Schoech, VAdm William A., <a href="#Page_59">59–61</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Schrenkengost, PFC Fred T., <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Shapley, LtGen Alan, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57–58</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sheperd, Gen Lemuel C., <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sheridan, Capt John, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Shook, LtCol Frank A., <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119–120</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Shoup, Gen David M., <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="SHUFLY"></a>SHUFLY, <a href="#Page_59">59–62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69–71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–75</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83–86</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113–114</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–159</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sides, Adm John H., <a href="#Page_58">58–59</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Silver Star Medal, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Simpson, BGen Ormand B., <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–95</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sinnott, Lt William T., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Slack, Cpl Richard D., Jr., <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Smith, Capt Joseph N., <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109–110</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Snell, Capt Bradley S., <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">SocTrang, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60–63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70–71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–76</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111–113</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">So Huynh Pho, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Son, MajGen Tran Van, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Song Cam Lo, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Song Cau Dai, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Song Cau Do, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Song Han, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Song Huong, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Song Thu Bonm, <a href="#Page_78">78–79</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Song Tra Bon, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Song Tra Bong, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Song Tra Khuc, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Song Ve, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Song Vu Gia, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Souphanauvong, Prince, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">South China Sea, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="South_Korea"></a>South Korea, <a href="#Page_11">11–13</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="South_Vietnam"></a>South Vietnam, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8–9</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14–16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27–30</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42–45</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57–58</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70–71</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78–79</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110–111</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121–123</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127–129</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_138">138–139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–144</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–158</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166–167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">South Vietnamese Armed Forces, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_45">45–46</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Units</li>
+<li class="isub2">Vietnamese Air Force, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67–69</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–120</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_146">146–147</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151–152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Vietnamese Army, <a href="#Page_13">13–16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26–27</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60–61</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83–84</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_116">116–121</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–142</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147–149</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_152">152–153</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–159</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–165</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">1st ARVN Division, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">2d ARVN Division, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82–83</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">5th ARVN Division, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">7th ARVN Division, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">21st ARVN Division, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79–80</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">25th ARVN Division, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Airborne Brigade, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">11th ARVN Regiment, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">43d ARVN Regiment, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Ranger Battalions, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–166</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Special Forces, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Vietnamese Marine Corps, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–24</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29–30</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_34">34–37</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47–49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102–103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109–110</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131–133</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_142">142–143</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Amphibious Support Battalion, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">1st Battalion, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">2d Battalion, <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101–103</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_109">109–110</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">3d Battalion, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36–37</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_109">109–110</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">4th Battalion, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100–103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_136">136–138</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">5th Battalion, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Reconnaissance Company, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Training Company, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Artillery Batteries, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Vietnamese Navy, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36–37</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">South Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">South Vietnamese Ministry of Interior, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Southeast Asia, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40–41</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Soviet Union, <a href="#Page_12">12–13</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sparrow Hawk, <i>See</i> <a href="#Eagle_Flight">Eagle Flight</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Special Landing Force, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88–89</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Special Operations Group, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Steele, Col Fred A., <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stilwell, MajGen Richard G., <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Strategic_Hamlet_Program"></a>Strategic Hamlet Program, <a href="#Page_45">45–46</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_121">121–122</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">SURE WIND 202, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Tactical Air Commander Airborne, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tactical Air Navigation, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tactical Air Support System, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Takjli, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tam Ky, <a href="#Page_82">82–83</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159–161</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Taoism, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tarawa, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">190</span>Taylor, Gen Maxwell D., <a href="#Page_42">42–43</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Taylor, Capt Richard B., <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tay Ninh Province, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Texas A&amp;M, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Thailand, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88–90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–94</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Thi, Col Nguyen Chanh, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Thompson, SSgt John C., <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Thompson, Sir Robert G.&nbsp;K., <a href="#Page_45">45–46</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Thoung Duc, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Throckmorton, LtGen John L., <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Thua Thien Province, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Thu Duc, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tien Phouc, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tiger Flight. <i>See</i> <a href="#Eagle_Flight">Eagle Flight</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tiger Force, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tiger Tooth Mountain, (Dong Voi Mep), <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Timmes, MajGen Charles J., <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tonkin, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8–9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tonkin Gulf Resolution, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tourane, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>.</li>
+<li class="isub1"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#Da_Nang">Da Nang</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tracy, TSgt Jackson E., <a href="#Page_19">19–20</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Training Relations Instruction Mission, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tra My, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Trong, Maj Le Quang, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tropic of Cancer, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Truman, President Harry S., <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">TULUNGAN, <a href="#Page_59">59–60</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Tunny, Lt Michael J., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Turner, Capt James S.&nbsp;G., <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Typhoon Kate, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Typhoon Tilda, <a href="#Page_159">159–160</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Typhoon Violet, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Udorn, Thailand, <a href="#Page_88">88–90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–93</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">U Minh Forest, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">United Front of National Forces, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">United States, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">U.S. Air Force. <i>See</i> <a href="#Air_Force">Air Force</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">U.S. Army. <i>See</i> <a href="#Army">Army</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">U.S. Congress, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">U.S. Embassy, Saigon, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">U.S. Interagency Committee for Province Rehabilitation, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">U.S. Marine Corps. <i>See</i> <a href="#Marine_Corps">Marine Corps</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, <a href="#Page_15">15–16</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–24</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_31">31–32</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35–36</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46–48</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, <a href="#Page_46">46–48</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57–63</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99–100</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–144</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–155</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">U.S. Military Assistance Program, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">U.S. Navy. <i>See</i> <a href="#Navy">Navy</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">U.S. Operations Mission, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Valentin, LCpl Miguel A., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Valley Forge</i> (LPH-8), <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Vichy Government, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Vientiane, Laos, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><a id="Viet_Cong"></a>Viet Cong, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27–32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34–37</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45–46</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62–63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69–74</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82–83</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101–103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_109">109–111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113–116</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120–123</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–144</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148–149</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151–153</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–159</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_161">161–162</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–167</a></li>
+<li class="isub1">Units</li>
+<li class="isub2">9th Viet Cong Division, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">4th Viet Cong Battalion, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Viet Minh, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–13</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li>
+<li class="isub1"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#Viet_Cong">Viet Cong</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Village Self Defense Corps, <a href="#Page_27">27–28</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Vinh Binh Province, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Vinh Long, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Vinson, Lt Richard P., <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Vung Tau, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Walker, Maj John W., <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Washington, D.C., <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29–30</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Watson, Cpl Billy S., <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Weapons</li>
+<li class="isub1">Types</li>
+<li class="isub2">AR-15 automatic rifles, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Browning automatic rifles, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">81mm mortars, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">82mm mortars, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">57mm recoilless rifles, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">.50 caliber machine guns, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152–154</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">4.2-inch mortars, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Hawk missiles, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">Light antiaircraft missiles, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">M-14 rifles, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">M-1 carbines, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">M-1 rifles, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">M-16 rifles, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">M-60 machine guns, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114–115</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147–149</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">M3A1 submachine guns, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">105mm howitzers, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">75mm pack howitzers, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">60mm mortars, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">.30 caliber machine guns, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">TK-1, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
+<li class="isub2">2.75-inch rockets, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Webster, Capt David N., <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Weede, MajGen Richard G., <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Weller, MajGen Donald M., <a href="#Page_41">40–41</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Westmoreland, Gen William C., <a href="#Page_127">127–128</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wilder, Capt Gary, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wilkes, LtCol William N., Jr., <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wilkinson, LtCol Frank R., Jr., <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34–35</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Williams, LtGen Samuel T., <a href="#Page_26">26–27</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">World War II, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35–37</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111–112</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Yen, Capt Nguyen Thanh, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Youngdale, BGen Carl A., <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
+
+<li class="ifrst">Zimolzak, Capt Frank, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
+</ul>
+</div></div>
+
+<p class="p2 right"><span class="small">U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977 O-211-623</span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter transnote">
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
+
+<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made
+consistent when a predominant preference was found
+in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.</p>
+
+<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced
+quotation marks were remedied when the change was
+obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.</p>
+
+<p>Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned
+between paragraphs and outside quotations.</p>
+
+<p>The original book uses bottom-of-page footnotes and
+end-of-volume endnotes. In this ebook, the footnotes
+have been moved directly below the paragraphs that
+reference them, and their symbols have been replaced
+by letters, so as to be unique within the eBook,
+while retaining the original physical sequence.
+The endnotes remain in their original positions,
+and their numbers have been modified to be unique
+within the eBook. The modifications are intended to allow
+successful hyper-linking in HTML and ereaders that
+support such links.</p>
+
+<p>The modified footnote numbering uses chapter
+numbers and sequences within those chapters. The
+bottom-of-page sequences are alphabetic, while
+the endnote sequences retain their original
+numeric values.</p>
+
+<p>In the original book, several footnotes were
+referenced multiple times. In this eBook, those
+footnotes have been duplicated and assigned new,
+unique letters, so that the references lead to
+separate footnotes. This is intended to facilitate
+back-linking from the footnotes to their
+references.</p>
+
+<p>The index was not checked for proper alphabetization
+or correct page references.
+</p>
+</div>
+<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75912 ***</div>
+</body>
+</html>
+
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diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt
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@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+This book, including all associated images, markup, improvements,
+metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be
+in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES.
+
+Procedures for determining public domain status are described in
+the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org.
+
+No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in
+jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize
+this book outside of the United States should confirm copyright
+status under the laws that apply to them.
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for
+book #75912 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/75912)