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diff --git a/75912-0.txt b/75912-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..62413e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/75912-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11732 @@ + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75912 *** + + + + + +Transcriber’s Notes: Italics are enclosed in _underscores_. + +References to same-page footnotes are alphameric, e.g., [1-A]. +The number is the Chapter number; the letter is the sequence +within the chapter. + +References to endnotes (near the end of the book) are numeric, +e.g., [1-1]. The first number is the Chapter number; the second +number is the sequence within the chapter. + +Additional notes will be found near the end of this ebook. + + + + + U.S. MARINES IN VIETNAM + THE ADVISORY & COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA + 1954–1964 + + + _by_ + Captain Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR + + +[Illustration: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS] + + + HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION + HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS + WASHINGTON, D.C. + 1977 + + + + + Library of Congress Card No. 76-600051 + +PCN 190 003064 00 + + For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, + U.S. Government Printing Office + Washington, D.C. 20402 (Buckram) + + Stock Number 008-055-00094-7 + + + + +Foreword + + +This is the first of a series of nine chronological histories being +prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the +entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam conflict. This +particular volume covers a relatively obscure chapter in U.S. Marine +Corps history--the activities of Marines in Vietnam between 1954 and +1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities from a +one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina +War in 1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some +700 Marines at the end of 1964. As the introductory volume for the +series this account has an important secondary objective: to establish +a geographical, political, and military foundation upon which the +subsequent histories can be developed. + +The author is a Marine Reservist who was a member of the History and +Museums Division from September 1972 until August 1974. Promoted to +major soon after his return to inactive duty, he is now working for the +Kentucky State Government. A native of Kentucky, he holds a Bachelor +of Arts degree from Morehead State College (1965) and a Master of Arts +degree in American History from the University of Kentucky (1972). +Commissioned in 1965, Major Whitlow served as an infantry platoon +commander with the 6th Marines, an aerial observer with the 1st Marine +Division in Vietnam, and later as a platoon commander at Officer +Candidate School, Quantico. For services in the Republic of Vietnam +during 1967 and 1968 he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and +26 awards of the Air Medal. + +[Illustration: (Signature of) _E. H. Simmons_] + + E. H. SIMMONS + Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.) + Director of Marine Corps History and Museums + + Reviewed and Approved: + 15 September 1976 + + + + +Preface + + +_U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1964_ is a narrative account of the +initial decade of Marine Corps operations in South Vietnam. The +monograph had two immediate forerunners, both classified studies +prepared in the middle 1960s by the former Historical Branch, G-3 +Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Authored by Major James M. +Yingling, Captain Harvey D. Bradshaw, and Mr. Benis M. Frank, the +first of these was entitled “United States Marine Corps Activities in +Vietnam, 1954–1963.” The second, entitled “United States Marine Corps +Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, 1964,” was authored by Major +Harvey D. Bradshaw. Although unpublished, these studies served as +important sources for the material contained in this text. Otherwise, +this history has been derived from official Marine Corps records, +the Oral History Collection of the History and Museums Division, the +comment files of the division, and appropriate historical works. Of +particular value in its compilation have been the command diaries of +the various Marine organizations involved. + +Unfortunately, few official documents relative to either the early +Marine advisory program or to the early operations of the Vietnamese +Marine Corps still exist. Therefore, that portion of the text which +deals with those areas has been reconstructed from interviews with +various former Marine advisors. Even their generous assistance, +however, has not completely overcome the dearth of documentary sources. +Any reader possessing a knowledge of this period and subject is invited +to submit pertinent comments to the History and Museums Division. + +This monograph has not been the product of a single individual’s labor. +A comment draft of the manuscript was reviewed by over 40 persons, +most of whom were directly associated with the described events. (A +list of these contributors appears as Appendix E.) Their remarks have +been of immense value in reconstructing with accuracy the origin, +nature, and scope of the various Marine operations. The manuscript +was prepared under the editorial direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., +Chief Historian of the History and Museums Division. Final editing and +the preparation of the index was done by Mr. Charles R. Smith of the +Historical Branch. Miss Kay P. Sue, editorial clerk and manuscript +typist for the division, performed valuable services in typing and +proof reading both the comment and final drafts. Staff Sergeant Paul +A. Lloyd and Sergeant Eric A. Clark, also members of the History and +Museums Division, were responsible for preparing all maps and charts. +Unless otherwise credited, photographs are from official Marine Corps +files. + +[Illustration: (Signature of) _Robert Whitlow_] + + ROBERT H. WHITLOW + Captain, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve + + + + +Table of Contents + + + _Page_ + + Foreword iii + Preface v + Table of Contents vii + + + PART I THE WATERSHED 1 + + Chapter 1 Background to Military Assistance 3 + The Geographic Setting 3 + The People 6 + Vietnam’s Recent History 9 + Post-Geneva South Vietnam 12 + The American Response 14 + + Chapter 2 The Formative Years 15 + Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam 15 + Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance 16 + Political Stabilization and Its Effects 18 + Reorganization and Progress 20 + Summing Up Developments 25 + + Chapter 3 Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency 26 + Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency 26 + Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps 31 + Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands 39 + American Decisions at the Close of 1961 42 + + Chapter 4 An Expanding War, 1962 44 + The War’s New Context 44 + Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division 46 + The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962 49 + Some Conclusions 53 + + + PART II MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR 55 + + Chapter 5 SHUFLY at Soc Trang 57 + The Decision 57 + Deployment to Soc Trang 59 + Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations 65 + Preparations and Redeployment 73 + Accomplishments 74 + + Chapter 6 SHUFLY Moves North 75 + Arrival at Da Nang 75 + I Corps Tactical Zone 76 + Military Situation, September 1962 79 + Initial Helicopter Operations 80 + Marine People-to-People Program 85 + SHUFLY Operations in I Corps 85 + + Chapter 7 The Laotian Crisis, 1962 86 + Genesis of the Problem 86 + The American Response 88 + The Marine Corps Role 88 + Marine Participation: A Summary 94 + + + PART III THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963 97 + + Chapter 8 The Marine Advisory Effort 99 + The Political Climate 99 + The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations 100 + Accomplishments 110 + + Chapter 9 SHUFLY Operations 111 + Development of the Compound Continues 111 + Combat Support Operations 113 + The Situation in Vietnam 121 + + + PART IV AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964 125 + + Chapter 10 Marines Meet the Challenge 127 + New American Decisions 127 + A Restructured Military Assistance Command 130 + Changes in Marine Leadership 130 + Redesignation and Reorganization 131 + The Vietnamese Marine Brigade 132 + Additional Marine Activities 138 + + Chapter 11 Spring and Summer Fighting 144 + The Monsoons 144 + The Weather Breaks 148 + Sure Wind 202 152 + Operations Elsewhere in I Corps 154 + Changing the Watch 156 + + Chapter 12 Fall and Winter Operations 157 + Dry Weather Fighting 157 + Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations 159 + Changes and Improvements 162 + Action as the Year Ends 164 + + Chapter 13 Prelude to Escalation 166 + + NOTES 169 + + APPENDICES 175 + A. USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954–1964 175 + B. Awards and Decorations, RVN, Through 1964 176 + C. Glossary of Acronyms 178 + D. Chronology 179 + E. List of Reviewers 182 + + INDEX 184 + + + + +PART I + +THE WATERSHED + + + + +CHAPTER 1 + +Background to Military Assistance + +_The Geographic Setting--The People--Vietnam’s Recent +History--Post-Geneva South Vietnam--The American Response_ + + +_The Geographic Setting_ + +Hanging like a bulbous pendant from China’s southern border, the +Southeast Asian land mass projects itself southward to within 100 miles +of the equator. Often referred to as the Indochinese Peninsula, this +land mass is contained by the Andaman Sea on the west, the Gulf of +Siam on the south, and the South China Sea and the Tonkin Gulf on the +east. Along with the extensive Indonesian island chain which lies to +the immediate south, mainland Southeast Asia dominates the key water +routes between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. So positioned, the +Indochinese Peninsula and the offshore islands resemble the Middle East +in that they traditionally have been recognized as a “crossroads of +commerce and history.”[1-1] + +Seven sovereign states currently make up the Indochinese Peninsula. +Burma and Thailand occupy what is roughly the western two-thirds of +the entire peninsula. To the south, the Moslem state of Malaysia +occupies the southern third of the rugged, southward-reaching Malaysian +Peninsula. East of Thailand lies Cambodia, which possesses a relatively +abbreviated coastline on the Gulf of Siam, and Laos, a landlocked +country. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), which +borders to the north on China, and the Republic of Vietnam (South +Vietnam) form the eastern rim of the Indochinese Peninsula. + +Vietnamese have often described the area currently administered by the +two separate Vietnamese states as resembling “two rice baskets at the +ends of their carrying poles.”[1-2] This description is derived from +the position of extensive rice producing river deltas at the northern +and southern extremities of the long, narrow expanse of coastline +and adjacent mountains. Vietnamese civilization originated in the +northernmost of these so-called “rice baskets,” the Red River Delta, +centuries before the birth of Christ. Pressured at various stages in +their history by the vastly more powerful Chinese and by increasingly +crowded conditions in the Red River Delta, the Vietnamese gradually +pushed southward down the narrow coastal plain in search of new rice +lands. Eventually their migration displaced several rival cultures and +carried them into every arable corner of the Mekong Delta, the more +extensive river delta located at the southern end of the proverbial +“carrying pole.” Although unified since the eighteenth century under +the Vietnamese, the area between the Chinese border and the Gulf of +Siam came to be divided into three more or less different regions: +Tonkin, centered on the Red River Delta; Cochinchina, centered on the +Mekong Delta; and Annam, the intervening coastal region. + +[Illustration: + + MAINLAND + SOUTHEAST ASIA +] + +[Illustration: + + FRENCH + INDOCHINA + 1954 +] + +Since mid-1954 the area known collectively as Vietnam has been divided +into northern and southern states. South Vietnam (known after 1956 as +the Republic of Vietnam), where the earliest U.S. military activities +were focused, came to include all of former Cochinchina and the +southern half of Annam. The geography of this small state, described +in general terms, is rugged and difficult. The lengthy country shares +often ill-defined jungle boundaries with Laos and Cambodia in the west +and with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to the north. Its +land borders total almost 1,000 miles--600 with Cambodia, 300 with +Laos, and roughly 40 with North Vietnam. Approximately 1,500 miles +of irregular coastline on the Tonkin Gulf and the South China Sea +complete the enclosure of its 66,000-square mile area. + +South Vietnam is divided into four relatively distinct physiographic +regions--the Mekong Delta, the coastal plain, the Annamite Mountains, +and the forested plain. The Mekong Delta, an extensive and fertile +lowland centered on the Mekong River, covers roughly the southern +quarter of the country. This region is essentially a marshy flat +land well suited for rice growing and is recognized as one of Asia’s +richest agricultural areas. South Vietnam’s second physiographic +region, the coastal plain, is similar to the Mekong Delta in that it is +predominantly flat and generally well suited for rice growing. Properly +known as the coastal lowland, this region extends from the country’s +northern border to the Mekong Delta. Its width is never constant, being +defined on the west by the rugged Annamite Mountains--the region which +dominates the northern two thirds of South Vietnam. The jungle-covered +mountains, whose highest elevations measure over 8,000 feet, stand in +sharp contrast to the low and flat coastal plain. The eastern slopes of +the mountains normally rise from the lowlands at a distance of five or +10 miles from the sea. At several points along the coast, however, the +emerald mountains crowd to the water’s edge, dividing the coastal plain +into compartments and creating a seascape breathtaking in its beauty. +At other locations the mountain chain recedes from the coast, allowing +the lowlands to extend inland as far as 40 miles. An extensive upland +plateau sprawls over the central portion of South Vietnam’s mountain +region. + +This important subregion, known as the Central Highlands, possesses +relatively fertile soil and has great potential for agricultural +development. The highest elevations in the Annamite chain are recorded +south of the Central Highlands. From heights of 6,000 to 7,000 feet, +the mountains dissolve southward into the forested plain, a hilly +transition zone which forms a strip between the Mekong lowlands and the +southernmost mountains. + +South Vietnam lies entirely below the Tropic of Cancer. Its climate +is best described as hot and humid. Because the country is situated +within Southeast Asia’s twin tropical monsoon belt, it experiences two +distinct rainy seasons. The southwest (or summer) monsoon settles over +the Mekong Delta and the southern part of the country in mid-May and +lasts until early October. In the northern reaches, the northeast (or +winter) monsoon season begins in November and continues through most of +March. Unlike the rainy season in the south, fog, wind, and noticeably +lower temperatures characterize the wet season in the north. While +the reversed monsoon seasons provide an abundance of water for rice +growing throughout the Mekong Delta and most of the long coastal plain, +rainfall is not distributed uniformly. Parts of the central coast +record only about 28 inches of annual precipitation. In contrast, other +areas along the northern coast receive as much as 126 inches of rain +during the course of a year. Even worse, a percentage of this rainfall +can be expected to occur as a result of typhoons. The tropical storms +usually lash the Annamese coast between July and November. Almost +always they cause extensive flooding along normally sluggish rivers +which dissect the coastal plain. + + +_The People_ + +Slightly over 16 million people currently inhabit South Vietnam. Of +these, over 13 million are ethnic Vietnamese. Primarily rice farmers +and fishermen, the Vietnamese have tended to compress themselves into +the country’s most productive agricultural areas--the Mekong Delta and +the coastal plain. Chinese, numbering around one million, form South +Vietnam’s largest ethnic minority. Concentrated for the most part in +the major cities, the Chinese traditionally have played a leading role +in Vietnam’s commerce. About 700,000 Montagnard tribesmen, scattered +across the upland plateau and the rugged northern mountains, constitute +South Vietnam’s second largest minority. Some 400,000 Khmers, closely +akin to the dominant population of Cambodia, inhabit the lowlands +along the Cambodian border. Roughly 35,000 Chams, remnants of a once +powerful kingdom that blocked the southern migration of the Vietnamese +until the late 1400s, form the country’s smallest and least influential +ethnic minority. The Chams, whose ancestors once controlled most of +the central and southern Annamese coast, are confined to a few small +villages on the central coast near Phan Rang. + +[Illustration: + + TERRAIN FEATURES + SOUTH VIETNAM +] + +South Vietnamese adhere to a broad range of religions. Between 70 +and 80 percent of the country’s 16 million people are classified as +Buddhist. It is estimated, however, that a much smaller percentage are +actually practitioners. Roman Catholics comprise roughly 10 percent +of the total population. Usually found in and around the country’s +urban centers, the Catholics are products of Vietnam’s contacts with +Europeans. Two so-called politico-religious sects, the Cao Dai and +the Hoa Hao, have attracted large segments of the rural population, +particularly in the Mekong Delta.[1-A] For the most part, the scattered +Montagnard tribes worship animal forms and have no organized religion, +although many have been converted to Christianity. + + [1-A] Founded just after World War I, the Cao Dai claims + more than one and a half million faithful in South + Vietnam. The religion incorporates elements of Taoism, + Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, and large doses + of spiritualism. Its clergy, headed by a “pope,” is + organized in a hierarchy modelled on that of the Roman + Catholic Church. The extent of its borrowing is suggested + by the fact that adherents count the French author + Victor Hugo as one of their saints. Politically, the + Cao Dai moved sharply in the direction of nationalism + during the 1940s, organized its own army, and fought + sporadic actions against the French and the subsequent + French-controlled government of Emperor Bao Dai until + suppressed by the Diem government in 1954. + + Like the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao is peculiarly Vietnamese. In + the late 1930s, a Buddhist monk named Huynh Pho So began a + “protestant” movement within the worldly, easy-going + Buddhist faith then prevalent. His followers, whose ranks + grew rapidly, called themselves Hoa Hao after the village + where Phu So began his crusade. Like the Cao Dai faithful + and Catholics, they tended to live apart in their own + villages and hamlets concentrated in the very south and + west of Vietnam, primarily along the Cambodian border. + Intensely nationalistic and xenophobic, they were under + constant attack from the French, Japanese, and Viet Minh, + and by the late 1940s had recruited a large militia + which was subsequently disbanded. Today their overall + membership stands at about one million. + +Fundamentally, South Vietnamese society is rural and agrarian. Over +the centuries the Vietnamese have tended to cluster in tiny hamlets +strewn down the coastal plain and across the Mekong Delta. Usually +composed of a handful of closely knit families whose ancestors settled +the surrounding land generations earlier, the hamlet is South Vietnam’s +basic community unit. Next larger is the village which resembles the +American township in function in that it encompasses a number of +adjacent hamlets. The Vietnamese people have naturally developed strong +emotional ties with their native villages. “To the Vietnamese,” it has +been said without exaggeration, “the village is his land’s heart, +mind, and soul.”[1-3] Given the rural nature of the country it is +understandable that the inhabitants of the villages and hamlets have +retained a large degree of self-government. “The laws of the emperor,” +states an ancient Vietnamese proverb, “are less than the customs of the +village.”[1-4] + +Overlaying this rural mosaic are two intermediate governmental +echelons--the districts and the provinces, The district, the smaller +of these political and geographic subdivisions, first appeared in +Vietnamese history following the earliest annexation of Tonkin by +the Chinese in 111 B.C. It remained in use and was extended down the +Annamese coast and into Cochinchina by the successive Vietnamese +dynasties which came to power in the ensuing centuries. Provinces, +larger geographic subdivisions, eventually were superimposed over +groups of contiguous districts, thus adding another echelon between +the reigning central government and the villages. This structure +remained in existence under the French after they took control of all +Vietnam in the late 19th century. In order to make their administration +more efficient French colonial authorities modernized the cumbersome +administrative machinery and adjusted provincial boundaries. It is +essentially this French-influenced structure that exists in South +Vietnam today. Still, after years of use and modification, the system +seems somewhat superficial as traditional self-rule of the villages +tends to nullify the efforts of provinces and districts to govern rural +areas. Often the central government’s influence is unable to seep lower +than the district headquarters, particularly in more remote areas. + +While South Vietnam is predominantly rural, it does possess several +important urban centers. As might be expected, these are found +primarily in the densely populated Mekong Delta and along the coastal +lowland. Saigon, the nation’s capital and largest city, presently has +a population estimated at 3.5 million. Located slightly north of the +Mekong River complex and inland from the coast, the city dominates the +country in both an economic and political sense. Saigon has excellent +port facilities for ocean-going ships, although such traffic must +first negotiate the tangled Saigon River which leads inland from the +South China Sea. Da Nang, located on the Annamese coast 84 miles +below the northern border, is the country’s second largest city. +With a population of roughly 500,000 and a protected harbor, Da Nang +constitutes the principal economic center in northern South Vietnam. +The old imperial capital of Hue (population of roughly 200,000), +situated about 50 miles north of Da Nang, historically has exerted a +strong cultural influence over the Annamese coast.[1-B] Scores of large +towns, such as Quang Tri, Hoi An, Quang Ngai, Can Tho, and Vinh Long, +extend down the coast and across the Mekong Delta. Often these serve as +provincial capitals. A few lesser population centers, notably Pleiku, +Kontum, and Ban Me Thuot, are situated in the Central Highlands. + + [1-B] The population of most of South Vietnam’s cities and + towns has been swollen by the influx of refugees which + occurred as the Vietnam War intensified in the middle + 1960s. In 1965, for example, refugee population estimates + for the three major cities were as follows: Saigon--1.5 + million; Da Nang--144,000; Hue--105,000. + +Most of South Vietnam’s major towns and cities are connected by one +highway--Route 1. Constructed by the French during the early 20th +century, Route 1 originally extended from Hanoi, the principal city +of Tonkin in northern Vietnam, down the coast and inland to Saigon. +While Route 1 and a French-built railroad which parallels it helped +unify South Vietnam’s most densely populated areas, the country’s +road network is otherwise underdeveloped. A few tortuous roads do +twist westward from Route 1 into the mountains to reach the remote +towns there. Of these the most noteworthy are Route 19, built to serve +Pleiku in the Central Highlands, and Route 9, which extends westward +into Laos from Dong Ha, South Vietnam’s northernmost town. A number +of roads radiate outward from Saigon to the population centers of +the Mekong Delta. For the most part, however, the Vietnamese people +traditionally have depended on trail networks, inland waterways, and +the sea to satisfy their transportation needs. The location of the bulk +of the population in the watery Mekong Delta and along the seacoast has +encouraged their reliance on waterborne transportation. + + +_Vietnam’s Recent History_ + +Prior to July 1954 the expanse of mainland Southeast Asia now occupied +by South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia belonged to +France. Together these possessions constituted French-Indochina +over which the French had exercised political control in one form +or another, with one exception, since the last quarter of the 19th +century. The only interruption occurred following the capitulation of +France in June 1940. Exploiting the disrupted power balance in Europe, +and attracted by the natural resources and strategic value of the +area, Japan moved into northern French-Indochina less than four months +after France had fallen. In 1941 the Vichy French government agreed +to Japanese occupation of southern French-Indochina. Soon Japanese +forces controlled every airfield and major port in Indochina. Under +this arrangement the Japanese permitted French colonial authorities +to maintain their administrative responsibilities. But as the tide of +war began to turn against the Japanese, the French became increasingly +defiant. The Japanese terminated this relationship on 9 March 1945 +when, without warning, they arrested colonial officials throughout +Indochina and brutally seized control of all governmental functions. + +Six months after the dissolution of the French colonial apparatus in +Indochina, World War II ended. The grip which Japan had held on most +of Southeast Asia for nearly half a decade was broken on 2 September +1945 when her foreign minister signed the instrument of unconditional +surrender on board the battleship USS _Missouri_. Shortly thereafter, +in accordance with a previously reached Allied agreement, Chinese +Nationalist forces moved into Tonkin and northern Annam to accept the +surrender of Japanese forces. South of the 16th parallel, British units +arrived from India to disarm the defeated Japanese. A detachment of 150 +men from a small French Expeditionary Corps arrived by air in Saigon +on the 12th to assist the British, who had included them only as a +courtesy since France was not among the powers slated to receive the +surrender of the Japanese in Indochina. + +But the end of World War II and the arrival of Allied forces did not +end the struggle for control of French-Indochina. Instead, it signalled +the beginning of a new conflict in which the contestants were, in many +respects, more formidable. One of these, the French, moved quickly to +restore their former presence in Cochinchina and Annam. Reinforced with +additional units, they occupied most major towns between the Mekong +Delta and the 16th parallel by the end of 1945. Two months later +French negotiators secured an agreement with the Chinese Nationalists +whereby French units would replace the Chinese occupation forces north +of the 16th parallel. + +[Illustration: + + MAJOR CITIES OF + SOUTH VIETNAM +] + +Wartime developments in French-Indochina, however, had brought about +profound political changes which eventually would doom the French +effort to re-establish political and economic influence in the region. +During World War II, Ho Chi Minh, an avowed Communist, had transformed +a relatively feeble political party into a sizable guerrilla +organization. Known as the Viet Minh, the Communist guerrillas had been +organized, trained, and led by Vo Nguyen Giap, a former history teacher +from Annam. During the latter stages of the war, the United States had +supplied the Viet Minh with limited quantities of military supplies. +In return, Ho’s guerrillas had assisted downed American pilots and +occasionally had clashed with small Japanese units. But the Viet Minh +had wasted few men on costly major actions against the Japanese. +Conserving their forces, Ho and Giap had concentrated on organization +and had managed to extend their strength into the densely populated Red +River Delta and along the Annamese coast. In Cochinchina, where their +numbers were considerably smaller, the Communists had limited their +activities almost entirely to organization and recruitment. Thus, by +the end of the war Ho’s organization was able to emerge as a definite +military-political force in northern French-Indochina. + +Following the Japanese surrender and before the arrival of the Chinese +Nationalist occupation forces, the Viet Minh seized control of Hanoi, +the capital of Tonkin, and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of +Vietnam. At Ho’s direction the Viet Minh promptly shifted from their +anti-Japanese posture and prepared to contest the French return. + +Confronted with this situation in northern Indochina, the French were +forced to bargain with the Communists. A preliminary agreement was +reached on 6 March 1946 whereby the French agreed to recognize the +newly founded but relatively weak Democratic Republic of Vietnam as +a “free state within the French Union.” In return, Ho’s government +declared itself “ready to welcome in friendly fashion the French Army, +when in conformance with international agreement, it would relieve +the Chinese forces” which had accepted the Japanese surrender in +Tonkin.[1-5] Shortly after the conclusion of this agreement, French +forces began reoccupying Tonkin and northern Annam. Within six months +they controlled every major strategic position from the Chinese border +to the Ca Mau Peninsula, Cochinchina’s southern tip. + +The uneasy peace was broken in December 1946 after Viet Minh and French +negotiators failed to reach a final agreement on actual political +control of Tonkin and Annam. When open warfare erupted, Ho withdrew +the bulk of his military forces into mountainous sanctuaries along +the Chinese border, but left small groups of guerrillas scattered +throughout the heavily populated Red River Delta. Reinforced with +contingents from Europe and Africa, the French Expeditionary Corps +initially managed to hold its own and, in some cases, even extend its +control. But, drawing strength from its natural appeal to Vietnamese +nationalism, the Communist movement began gaining momentum in the late +1940s. Gradually the war intensified and spread into central Annam and +Cochinchina. + +In January 1950, the French moved to undercut the Viet Minh’s appeal +to non-Communist nationalists by granting nominal independence to its +Indochina possessions. Under the terms of a formal treaty, all of +Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina) was brought together under a +Saigon-based government headed by Emperor Bao Dai. Laos and Cambodia +likewise formed their own governments, whereupon all three countries +became known as the Associated States of Indochina. + +This new arrangement, however, had little effect on the ongoing war +with the Viet Minh. In accordance with the treaties, the Associated +States became members of the French Union and agreed to prosecute +the war under French direction. Moreover, French political dominance +in the region continued, virtually undiluted by the existence of the +Associated States. + +In related developments, Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese Communist armies seized +control of mainland China in 1949 and Communist North Korean forces +invaded the pro-Western Republic of Korea in 1950. These events added +new meaning to the French struggle in Indochina as American policy +makers came to view the war on the Southeast Asian mainland within the +context of a larger design to bring Asia entirely under Communist +domination. Following the invasion of South Korea, President Truman +immediately announced his intention to step up U.S. military aid to +the French in Indochina. Congress responded quickly by adding four +billion dollars to existing military assistance funds. Of this, $303 +million was earmarked for Korea, the Philippines, and “the general area +of China.”[1-6][1-C] Thus, the Truman Administration, now confronted +by the possibility that Communism might engulf all of mainland Asia, +extended its containment policy to Indochina. + + [1-C] The following year would see a half billion U.S. dollars + allocated to support French operations in Indochina. + By 1954 that figure would climb to an even one billion + dollars. + +Even with rapidly increasing amounts of U.S. material assistance, +the French proved unable to wrest the initiative from Giap’s growing +armies. Although national armies drawn from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam +were now fighting alongside the French, the Expeditionary Corps was +over-extended. Moreover, the French cause was extremely vulnerable +to Communist propaganda. On the home front, public support for the +so-called _sale guerre_ (dirty war) eroded steadily during the early +1950s as the Expeditionary Corps’ failures and casualties mounted. +Finally, on 7 May 1954, the besieged 13,000-man French garrison at Dien +Bien Phu surrendered to the Viet Minh, thus shattering what remained +of French determination to prosecute the war in Indochina. In Geneva, +where Communist and Free World diplomats had gathered to consider a +formal peace in Korea along with the Indochina problem, French and Viet +Minh representatives signed a cease-fire agreement on 20 July which +ended the eight-year conflict. + +The bilateral cease-fire agreement substantially altered the map of the +Indochinese Peninsula. France agreed to relinquish political control +throughout the area. Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam all gained full +independence. The most controversial provision of the 20 July agreement +divided Vietnam at the Ben Hai River and superimposed a demilitarized +zone over the partition line. This division, intended to facilitate +the disengagement of the opposing forces, was to be temporary pending +a reunification election scheduled for mid-1956. In accordance with +the agreement, France immediately turned over political control of the +northern zone (Tonkin and the northern half of Annam) to the Communist +Viet Minh. Ho promptly re-established the Democratic Republic of +Vietnam (DRV) with its capital in Hanoi. + +Other provisions of the Geneva Agreement called for the opposing armies +to regroup in their respective zones within 300 days. Following their +regroupment, the French military forces were to be completely withdrawn +from the North within 300 days and from the South by mid-1956. +Civilians living both north and south of the partition line were to +be allowed to emigrate to the opposite zone in accordance with their +political convictions. It was anticipated that thousands of Catholics +living in Tonkin would seek refuge in the non-Communist South. Other +articles of the agreement dealt with the creation and responsibilities +of an International Control Commission (ICC) to supervise the +cease-fire. Canadian, Indian, and Polish delegations were to comprise +this commission. + +On 21 July, the day following the bilateral agreement, Great Britain, +the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, Cambodia, and Laos +joined France and the Viet Minh in endorsing a “Final Declaration” +which sanctioned the previously reached cease-fire agreement. The +United States refused to endorse this declaration, but issued a +statement to the effect that it would not use force to disturb the +cease-fire. + + +_Post-Geneva South Vietnam_ + +The execution of the Geneva Agreement thrust that area of Vietnam +south of the partition line into a period of profound confusion and +instability. Even worse, the colonial period had done little to +prepare the Cochinchinese and Annamese for the tremendous problems +at hand. No real apparatus for central government existed. Likewise, +the long colonial period left the area with few experienced political +leaders capable of establishing and managing the required governmental +machinery. Political control passed nominally to the French-sponsored +emperor, Bao Dai, who was living in France at the time. For all +practical purposes, leadership in the South devolved upon Bao Dai’s +recently appointed pro-Western premier, Ngo Dinh Diem. The product of a +prosperous and well-educated Catholic family from Hue, Diem had served +the French briefly as a province chief prior to World War II. Always a +strong nationalist but staunchly anti-Communist, he had been unable to +reconcile his anti-French attitudes with the Viet Minh movement during +the Indochina War. As a result Diem had left his homeland in the early +1950s to live at a Catholic seminary in the United States. There he +remained until his appointment as premier in mid-June of 1954. + +The months immediately following the Geneva agreement found Ngo Dinh +Diem struggling to create the necessary governmental machinery in +Saigon, the capital of the southern zone. At best, however, his hold +on the feeble institutions was tenuous. A serious confrontation was +developing between the premier and the absent Bao Dai, still residing +in France. Further complicating the political scene was the presence of +Hoa Hao and Cao Dai armies in the provinces surrounding the capital, +and the existence in Saigon of an underworld organization named the +Binh Xuyen.[1-D] As 1955 opened the leaders of these three politically +oriented factions were pressing demands for concessions from the new +central government. Among these were permission to maintain their +private armies, and the authority to exercise political control over +large, heavily populated areas. + + [1-D] The Binh Xuyen originally operated from the swamps south + of the Chinese-dominated Cholon district of Saigon. + Controlling the vice and crime of the city, by 1954 they + had gained control of the police under circumstances that + reeked of bribery. A year later the organization was + brutally crushed by Ngo Dinh Diem. + +The outcome of the embryonic power struggle in Saigon hinged largely +on control of the Vietnamese National Army (VNA). Although not +considered an efficient military organization by even the most liberal +estimates, the 210,000-man National Army was the principal source +of organized power available to the quarreling leaders of southern +Vietnam. Originally created by the French in 1950 to supplement their +Expeditionary Corps, the VNA had since suffered from structural +deficiencies. It actually had no organizational echelon between the +French-controlled General Staff and the 160 separate battalions. Tied +to no regiments or divisions, the Vietnamese battalions naturally +were dependent on the French Expeditionary Corps for operational +instructions and logistical support.[1-E] + + [1-E] Selected VNA battalions were sometimes task organized + into _groupes mobiles_ (mobile groups) by the French for + specific offensive operations. But these groups, which + were roughly equivalent to a regimental combat team, + were never composed entirely of VNA battalions under a + Vietnamese command group. +A dearth of qualified Vietnamese officers and a degree of inattention +on the part of the French compounded the problems which stemmed from +the army’s structural flaw. Partially as a result of these shortcomings +the morale of the VNA had deteriorated sharply in the waning stages of +the French-Indochina War. At the time of the cease-fire agreement, high +desertion rates were reported in almost every Vietnamese battalion. +Still, it was evident that he who controlled the National Army would +most likely control the government in the area south of the partition +line. + +The danger that the pro-Western zone might become the victim of a +sudden Communist attack from the north, as had been the case on the +Korean Peninsula, injected another element of uncertainty into the +overall situation in southern Vietnam. The conditions which settled +over the area in the immediate aftermath of the Geneva settlement +suggested this possibility since they were alarmingly similar to the +conditions which had prevailed in Korea prior to the North Korean +invasion of 1950. Like Korea, Vietnam was divided both geographically +and ideologically: the North clearly within the orbit of the Soviet +Union and Communist China, and the South under the influence of the +Western powers. As in Korea in 1950, there also existed a very real +armed threat to the weaker pro-Western southern state. Immediately +after the Geneva cease-fire, the Viet Minh army regrouped north of the +17th parallel and was redesignated the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). +American intelligence reported that the PAVN, which numbered roughly +240,000 disciplined veterans, was being reorganized and re-equipped +with Soviet and Chinese weapons in violation of the Geneva Agreement. +At the same time Western intelligence sources estimated that the Viet +Minh had intentionally left between 5,000 and 10,000 men south of the +partition line following their withdrawal. Also done in violation of +the cease-fire agreement, this meant that Communist guerrillas could be +expected to surface throughout the South in the event of an outright +invasion. + +A related condition heightened fears that a Korea-type invasion might +occur in Vietnam. In South Korea a military vacuum had been allowed to +form in 1949 when American units withdrew from the area. Apparently +that vacuum, coupled with a statement by the American Secretary of +State to the effect that the U.S. defensive perimeter in the Pacific +did not include South Korea, had encouraged Communist aggression. +Now, with the scheduled evacuation of French armies from Indochina by +mid-1956, there emerged the distinct possibility that such a military +vacuum would recur, this time in southern Vietnam. “Vietnam,” warned +one American scholar familiar with the region, “may very soon become +either a dam against aggression from the north or a bridge serving the +communist block to transform the countries of the Indochinese peninsula +into satellites of China.”[1-7] + + +_The American Response_ + +It was in the face of this uncertain situation on the Southeast Asian +mainland that the Eisenhower administration moved to discourage renewed +Communist military activity. First, the United States sought to create +a regional international organization to promote collective military +action under the threat of aggression. This was obtained on 8 September +1954 when eight nations--the United States, Great Britain, France, New +Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand--signed the +Manila Pact. The treaty area encompassed by the pact included Southeast +Asia, the Southwest Pacific below 21°31′ north latitude, and Pakistan. +Two weeks later the pact was transformed into the Southeast Asia Treaty +Organization (SEATO). In a separate protocol, the member nations agreed +that Cambodia, Laos, and the “Free Territory under the jurisdiction of +the State of Vietnam” all resided within their defense sphere.[1-8] + +Next, after several months of hesitation, the United States settled +on a policy of comprehensive assistance to South Vietnam, as the +area south of the 1954 partition line was already being called. As +conceived, the immediate objective of the new American policy was +to bring political stability to South Vietnam. The longer range +goal was the creation of a bulwark to discourage renewed Communist +expansion down the Indochinese Peninsula. In this scheme, military +assistance was to play a key role. “One of the most efficient means +of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become strong,” explained +Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, “is to assist it +in reorganizing the National Army and in training that Army.”[1-9] +In short, the State Department’s position was that a stronger, more +responsive Vietnamese National Army would help Premier Diem consolidate +his political power. Later that same force would serve as a shield +behind which South Vietnam would attempt to recover from the ravages of +the French-Indochina War and the after effects of the Geneva Agreement. + +So by early 1955 a combination of circumstances--South Vietnam’s +position adjacent to a Communist state, the unsavory memories of +the Korean invasion, and the impending withdrawal of the French +Expeditionary Corps--had influenced the United States to adopt a policy +of military support for Premier Diem’s struggling government. + + + + +CHAPTER 2 + +The Formative Years + +_Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam--Origins of U.S. Marine +Assistance--Political Stabilization and Its Effects--Reorganization and +Progress--Summing Up Developments_ + + +_Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam_ + +When the Geneva cease-fire went into effect in the late summer of 1954, +the machinery for implementing the military phase of the American +assistance program for South Vietnam already existed. President +Truman had ordered the establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance +Advisory Group (USMAAG or MAAG) in French Indochina in mid-1950 as +one of several reactions to the North Korean invasion of the Republic +of Korea. Established to provide materiel support to the French +Expeditionary Corps, the MAAG constituted little more than a logistical +funnel through which U.S. military aid had been poured. + +Lieutenant General John M. (“Iron Mike”) O’Daniel, U.S. Army, had +been assigned to command the MAAG in the spring of 1954. O’Daniel’s +selection for the Saigon post anticipated a more active U.S. role in +training of the Vietnamese National Army. He had been chosen for the +assignment largely on the basis of his successful role in creating +and supervising the training programs which had transformed the South +Korean Army into an effective fighting force during the Korean War. +Now, in the aftermath of the Geneva settlement, he and his 342-man +group began preparing for the immense task of rebuilding South +Vietnam’s armed forces. + +The entire American project to assist the South Vietnamese in the +construction of a viable state was delayed during the fall of 1954 +while the necessary diplomatic agreements were negotiated among +American, French, and South Vietnamese officials. President Eisenhower +dispatched General J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Army (Retired), to Saigon +in November to complete the details of the triangular arrangements. +Collins carried with him the broad powers which would be required to +expedite the negotiations. + +By mid-January 1955, the president’s special envoy had paved the +way for the transfer of responsibility for training, equipping, and +advising the Vietnamese National Army from the French to the USMAAG. +He and General Paul Ely, the officer appointed by the Paris government +to oversee the French withdrawal from Indochina, had initialed a +“Minute of Understanding.” In accordance with this document, the +United States agreed to provide financial assistance to the French +military in Vietnam in exchange for two important concessions. First, +the French pledged to conduct a gradual military withdrawal from South +Vietnam in order to prevent the development of a military vacuum +which might precipitate a North Vietnamese invasion. Secondly, they +accepted an American plan to assist in a transition stage during which +the responsibility for rebuilding the Vietnamese military could be +transferred to the MAAG in an orderly fashion. General Collins, in +addition to engineering the understanding with General Ely, had advised +Premier Diem to reduce his 210,000-man military and naval forces to a +level of 100,000, a figure which the U.S. State Department felt the +United States could realistically support and train. + +The American plan to begin assisting South Vietnam encountered further +delay even after the Ely-Collins understanding had been reached. Ely’s +government, arguing that the United States had agreed to provide only +one-third of the amount France had requested to finance its Indochina +forces, refused to ratify the agreement. The deadlock was finally +resolved on 11 February 1955 when French officials accepted the terms +of the Ely-Collins arrangement in a revised form. + +A combined Franco-American training command, designated the Training +Relations Instruction Mission (TRIM), became operational in Saigon +the day following the French ratification of the Ely-Collins +understanding.[2-A] Headed by Lieutenant General O’Daniel but under +the “overall authority” of General Ely, TRIM was structured to prevent +domination by either French or Americans. The training mission was +composed of four divisions, Army, Navy, Air Force, and National +Security, each of which was headed alternately by either an American +or a French officer. The chief of each division had as his deputy an +officer of the opposite nationality. U.S. officers, however, headed the +divisions considered by MAAG officials as the most important--Army and +National Security. Operating through TRIM and assisted by the French +military, the USMAAG was tasked with implementing the U.S. Military +Assistance Program in a manner that would help shape the Vietnamese +national forces into a cohesive defense establishment prior to the +withdrawal of French forces. + + [2-A] The combined training mission originally was designated + the Allied Training Operations Mission. This designation + was changed prior to the time the mission became + operational. + + +_Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance_ + +Only one U.S. Marine was serving with the USMAAG in Saigon when +TRIM became operational--Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat.[2-B] +Croizat’s assignment to the U.S. advisory group had resulted when +General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, +nominated him to fill a newly created billet as liaison officer between +the MAAG and the French High Command during the latter stages of the +Indochina War. Largely because of his French language fluency and his +former association with many French officers while attending their war +college in 1949, Croizat was chosen for the assignment. + + [2-B] Other Marines, however, were present in Saigon at + the time. They were those assigned to the American + Embassy. One officer was serving as Assistant Naval + Attache/Assistant Naval Attache for Air, and 12 other + Marines were serving as security guards. + +Lieutenant Colonel Croizat, however, did not arrive in Vietnam until 2 +August 1954. By then the cease-fire agreement had been signed at Geneva +and the need for a liaison officer with the French High Command no +longer existed. General O’Daniel, therefore, assigned the newly arrived +Marine officer to serve on the General Commission for Refugees which +had been created by the South Vietnamese Government immediately after +the cease-fire. In this capacity Croizat became directly involved in +the construction of refugee reception centers and the selection and +development of resettlement areas in the South. When U.S. naval forces +began assisting in the evacuation of North Vietnam, Lieutenant Colonel +Croizat was sent to Haiphong, the principal seaport of Tonkin. There +he headed the MAAG detachment and was responsible for coordinating +U.S. operations in the area with those of the French and Vietnamese. +When the so-called “Passage to Freedom” concluded in May 1955, 807,000 +people, 469,000 tons of equipment and supplies, and 23,000 vehicles +had been evacuated from Communist North Vietnam.[2-C] It was not until +February 1955 that the Marine returned to Saigon. + + [2-C] The French moved 497,000 people, 400,000 tons of + equipment and supplies, and 15,000 vehicles. The U.S. + Navy moved the balance. + +During Lieutenant Colonel Croizat’s absence, Premier Diem had acted on +a long-standing proposal to create a small Vietnamese Marine Corps. +The issue of a separate Marine force composed of Vietnamese national +troops had surfaced frequently since the birth of the Vietnamese Navy +in the early 1950s. Although the proposal had been heartily endorsed +by a number of senior French Navy officers, the downward spiral of the +French war effort had intervened to prevent the subject from being +advanced beyond a conceptual stage. Largely as a result of earlier +discussions with Croizat, Premier Diem acted on the matter on 13 +October when he signed a decree which included the following articles: + + ARTICLE 1. Effective 1 October 1954 there is created within the + Naval Establishment a corps of infantry specializing in the + surveillance of waterways and amphibious operations on the coast + and rivers, to be designated as: + + ‘THE MARINE CORPS’ + + * * * * * + + ARTICLE 3. The Marine Corps shall consist of various type units + suited to their functions and either already existing in the Army + or Naval forces or to be created in accordance with the development + plan for the armed forces.[2-1] + +In accordance with this decree a miscellaneous collection of +commando-type units was transferred from the Vietnamese National Army +and Navy to the Marine Corps. Except for a naval commando unit, which +had conducted amphibious raids along the coastal plains, these forces +had operated in the Red River Delta with the French and Vietnamese +Navy _dinassauts_ (river assault divisions). First employed in 1946, +the _dinassauts_ had evolved into relatively effective naval commands +capable of landing light infantry companies along Indochina’s tangled +riverbanks. Normally the _dinassaut_ was composed of about a dozen +armored and armed landing craft, patrol boats, and command vessels. +An Army commando unit, consisting of approximately 100 men, would +be attached to such naval commands for specific operations. Thus +organized, the _dinassauts_ could transport light infantry units +into otherwise inaccessible areas and support landings with heavy +caliber automatic weapons and mortar fire. Such operations had been +particularly successful in the sprawling Red River Delta of Tonkin +where navigable estuaries and Viet Minh abounded.[2-D] Later in the +war, as the concept was refined, the French created a number of +Vietnamese National Army commando units for specific service with the +_dinassauts_. Still attached to the Navy commands these units were +sometimes responsible for security around the _dinassaut_ bases when +not involved in preplanned operations. A number of these rather elite +Vietnamese units, variously designated light support companies, river +boat companies, and commandos, were now transferred to the newly +decreed Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC). + + [2-D] Of the _dinassaut_ Bernard Fall wrote: “[It] may well + have been one of the few worthwhile contributions + of the Indochina war to military knowledge.” (Fall, + _Street Without Joy_, p. 39) A more thorough analysis + of _dinassaut_ operations is included in Croizat, _A + Translation From The French Lessons of the War_, pp. + 348–351. + +By the time Lieutenant Colonel Croizat returned to Saigon in early +1955 these units, which totalled approximately 2,400 officers and men, +had been evacuated from North Vietnam. Several of the commandos had +been assembled at Nha Trang on South Vietnam’s central coast where +the French still maintained an extensive naval training facility. +There, under the supervision of a junior French commando officer, +several former commandos had been organized into the 1st Marine +Landing Battalion (or 1st Landing Battalion). The balance of the newly +designated Marine units, however, were scattered in small, widely +separated garrisons from Hue to the Mekong Delta. These units included +six river boat companies, five combat support light companies, and +a small training flotilla. Diem had appointed a former Vietnamese +National Army officer, Major Le Quang Trong, as Senior Marine Officer. +But because no formal headquarters had been created and because no real +command structure existed, Major Trong remained relatively isolated +from his far-flung Marine infantry units. + +Upon returning to Saigon, Croizat was assigned to the MAAG’s Naval +Section and subsequently to TRIM’S Naval Division as the senior U.S. +advisor to the newly created Vietnamese Marine Corps. In this capacity +the Marine officer quickly determined that the small Vietnamese +amphibious force was faced with several serious problems. First, and +perhaps its most critical, was that despite Premier Diem’s decree, +the Marine Corps continued to exist essentially on an informal basis. +“The Marine Corps itself had no real identity,” its U.S. advisor later +explained. “It was a scattering of dissimilar units extending from Hue +to the Mekong Delta area.”[2-2] The fact that its widespread units +were still dependent on the French Expeditionary Corps for logistical +support underscored the weakness inherent in the VNMC’s initial status. + +Other problems arose from the continuation of French officers in +command billets throughout the Vietnamese naval forces. Under the +Franco-American agreement which had created TRIM, a French Navy captain +doubled as chief of the combined training missions’ Naval Division +and as commanding officer of the Vietnamese naval forces. This placed +the French in a position to review any proposals advanced by the U.S. +Marine advisor. Complicating the situation even further, a French +Army captain, Jean Louis Delayen, actually commanded the 1st Landing +Battalion at Nha Trang.[2-E] + + [2-E] Delayen, described by Croizat as “an exceptionally + qualified French Commando officer,” later attended the + U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico. + (Croizat, “Notes on The Organization,” p. 3.) + +Demobilization presented another potential difficulty for the +Vietnamese Marine Corps in early 1955. Under the U.S.-Vietnamese +force level agreements, the Vietnamese naval forces were limited to +3,000 men. The Marine Corps, which alone totalled a disproportionate +2,400 men, had been instructed to reduce its strength to 1,137 men +and officers. With no effective centralized command structure and +so many widely separated units, even the relatively simple task of +mustering out troops assumed the dimensions of a complex administrative +undertaking. + +In short, the very existence of the Vietnamese Marine Corps was +threatened in a number of inter-related situations. The continuation +of a separate and distinct Marine Corps hinged ultimately, of course, +on the overall reorganization of the Vietnamese armed forces and their +support structure. Essentially it would be necessary to establish a +requirement for such an organization within South Vietnam’s future +military-naval structure. Croizat personally sensed that this would +be the pivotal issue in determining the VNMC’s future. “There were +numerous representatives of the three military services from each of +the three countries concerned with the fate of the Vietnamese Army, +Navy, and Air Force,” he pointed out. “But, there was no champion +from within the Vietnamese Marine Corps since no Corps existed except +on paper.”[2-3] Thus, it was left initially to a French captain, a +Vietnamese major, and a U.S. Marine lieutenant colonel to keep alive +the idea that South Vietnam’s defense establishment needed a separate +Marine Corps. + + +_Political Stabilization and Its Effects_ + +During early 1955 the entire South Vietnamese government was engulfed +by a crisis which threatened to disrupt the American plans to help +build a viable anti-Communist country. The crisis occurred not in the +form of an overt North Vietnamese attack but rather as a result of +the South’s political instability. In February the leaders of the Hoa +Hao, the Cao Dai, and the Binh Xuyen, dissatisfied with Premier Diem’s +refusal to accede to their various demands, formed the United Front of +National Forces. + +By mid-March the disaffected leaders of these organizations felt +strong enough to test the premier’s strength. Trouble began late that +month when the Hoa Hao began undertaking guerrilla-type activities +against Diem’s National Army units in the sect’s stronghold southwest +of Saigon. On 28 March Diem ordered a company of paratroops to seize +the Saigon Central Police Headquarters which the French had allowed +the Binh Xuyen to control. Fighting erupted throughout the capital the +next day as Binh Xuyen units clashed with loyal government forces. A +truce was arranged finally in the city on 31 March after three days of +intermittent but fierce fighting. That same day the Cao Dai broke with +the United Front and accepted a government offer to integrate some of +its troops into the National Army. + +An uneasy peace prevailed over South Vietnam until 28 April when new +fighting broke out. By the middle of May, government forces had driven +the Binh Xuyen forces from Saigon, fracturing their organization. +Remnants of the bandit group, however, escaped into the extensive +Rung Sat swamps south of the capital where they continued fighting +individually and in small groups. In the countryside south of Saigon, +30 of Diem’s battalions, including the 1st Landing Battalion, took the +offensive against the Hoa Hao regular and guerrilla forces. + +The national crisis, for all practical purposes, ended in the last +week of June when a Hoa Hao leader surrendered 8,000 regulars and +ordered his followers to cease all anti-government activities. Sporadic +fighting continued, however, as Diem’s forces sought to mop-up Hoa Hao +splinter groups fighting in the western Mekong Delta and Binh Xuyen +elements still resisting in the rugged mangrove swamps south of the +capital. In August the Marine Landing Battalion fought a decisive +action against the remaining Hoa Hao in Kien Giang Province about 120 +miles southwest of Saigon, destroying the rebel headquarters. Later +in the year the 1st Landing Battalion, joined by several river boat +companies, reduced one of the last pockets of Binh Xuyen resistance +in the Rung Sat. As a result of these and similar actions being fought +simultaneously by loyal Army units, organized resistance to Premier +Diem gradually collapsed.[2-F] + + [2-F] Some sources contend that remnants of the Hoa Hao and Cao + Dai armies survived to operate alongside the Viet Cong + guerrillas who began threatening the Diem government in + the late 1950s. (Kahin and Lewis, _The U.S. in Vietnam_, + p. 111.) + +The sect crisis of 1955 proved to be the turning point in Diem’s +political fortunes. At the height of the crisis, Emperor Bao Dai +attempted to remove Diem as premier by ordering him to France for +“consultations.” Electing to remain in Saigon and direct his government +efforts to quell the rebellion, the premier declined Bao Dai’s summons. +The Vietnamese military forces proved loyal to the premier, having +faithfully executed Diem’s commands throughout the emergency. Having +successfully met the armed challenge of the sects and the Binh Xuyen +and having openly repudiated Bao Dai’s authority, Premier Diem had +imposed at least a measure of political stability on South Vietnam. + +An epilogue to the sect crisis was written on 23 October when a +nationwide referendum was held in South Vietnam to settle the issue of +national leadership. In the balloting, since criticized as having been +rigged, Premier Diem received 98.2 percent of the total vote against +Bao Dai. Three days later, on 26 October, South Vietnam’s new president +proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). + +The Vietnamese Marine Corps benefited greatly from Premier Diem’s +successful confrontation with his political rivals. On 1 May, in +preparation for the 1st Landing Battalion’s deployment to combat, Major +Trong had established a small Marine Corps headquarters in Saigon. +Shortly thereafter, Diem had appointed a Vietnamese officer, Captain +Bui Pho Chi, to replace Captain Delayen as commander of the landing +battalion. The French commando officer, who was a member of TRIM, +remained at Nha Trang as an advisor to the VNMC. Then, on the last +day of June, Diem removed the remaining French officers from command +positions throughout South Vietnam’s naval forces. The combined effect +of these actions was to reduce French influence throughout the nation’s +naval establishment while making the Vietnamese Marine Corps more +responsive to the central government. + +The burdens of demobilization also were lightened somewhat as a result +of the sect crisis when a new force level was approved by the United +States in mid-summer of 1955. The new agreement, dictated in part by +the requirement to integrate portions of the sects’ armies into the +national forces, raised the force level to 150,000 men and placed the +personnel ceiling of the Vietnamese naval forces at 4,000 men. This +revision enhanced the prospects for a corresponding increase in the +authorized strength of the VNMC. + +The 1st Landing Battalion’s performance against the sect forces in the +Mekong Delta and the Rung Sat, moreover, tempered much of the previous +opposition to a separate VNMC. Heretofore, U.S. and Vietnamese Army +officers had opposed the existence of a Vietnamese amphibious force +apart from the National Army. Until the sect uprising, Lieutenant +Colonel Croizat had used the influence afforded by his position as +naval advisor to the general staff to advocate the continuation of the +VNMC. But during the sect battles the Vietnamese Marines had firmly +established their value to the new government. By displaying loyalty, +discipline, and efficiency in combat, they had spoken out in their own +behalf at a critical juncture in their corp’s existence. + +Shortly before the 1st Landing Battalion deployed to fight the +rebellious sect forces, two additional U.S. Marine advisors--an officer +and a noncommissioned officer--arrived in South Vietnam for duty with +the MAAG. Both Marines were assigned to TRIM. Croizat dispatched the +officer, Captain James T. Breckinridge, to Nha Trang where he soon +replaced Captain Delayen as advisor to the 1st Landing Battalion. +As State Department policy prohibited U.S. military personnel from +participating in combat activities with indigenous forces, Breckinridge +was forced to await the battalion’s return from the field. During +its absence he divided his time between Nha Trang and Saigon where +he assisted Colonel Croizat with planning and logistics matters. The +noncommissioned officer, Technical Sergeant Jackson E. Tracy, initially +remained in Saigon but later moved to Nha Trang. There, serving +principally as a small unit tactics instructor to the Vietnamese +Marines, Tracy impressed Breckinridge as a “first-rate Marine +‘NCO’--one who could carry out the most complex assignment with little +or no supervision.”[2-4] + +[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat, first U.S. Marine +Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, translates during discussions +between Lieutenant General John “Iron Mike” O’Daniel, USA, Chief, +USMAAG, Vietnam, and Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. (Photo courtesy of Colonel +Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.))._] + +Soon after 1956 opened, President Diem appointed a new officer to head +the Vietnamese Marine Corps. On 18 January Major Phan Van Lieu assumed +command of the VNMC, and thereby became the second Senior Marine +Officer. + + +_Reorganization and Progress_ + +The 1st Landing Battalion remained in action against the Binh Xuyen +remnants until February 1956. During this period Lieutenant Colonel +Croizat reviewed the entire organizational structure of the Vietnamese +Marine Corps. By now the size of the service had been reduced to +roughly 1,800 officers and men although it retained its original +organization of six river boat companies, five light support companies, +a landing battalion, a training flotilla, and a small headquarters. + +This organization, with so many dissimilar units existing on one +echelon, influenced Croizat to suggest that Major Lieu restructure +the service. Assisted by Croizat, Captain Breckinridge, and Technical +Sergeant Tracy, Lieu and his small staff spent several months +developing and refining plans for the comprehensive reorganization +of the Marine Corps. Lieu submitted this package to the Vietnamese +Joint General Staff (JGS) on 21 December 1955. The salient feature +of the plan was to create an additional landing battalion without +increasing the 1,837-man ceiling which then governed the size of +the VNMC. Significantly, the plan contained a clause proposing that +the Vietnamese Marine Corps be expanded to regimental size in the +future.[2-5] + +[Illustration: VNMC TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 18 FEBRUARY 1956 + +AUTHORIZED STRENGTH, 1,837] + +[Illustration: LANDING BATTALION TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 18 +FEBRUARY 1956 + +AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 728] + +The Vietnamese Joint General Staff approved the new structure, and +reorganization of the VNMC was begun when the 1st Landing Battalion +finally returned to Nha Trang in February. The old river boat and +light support companies were disbanded and three new units--a 4.2-inch +mortar company, a headquarters and service company, and a new landing +battalion--were formed. Designated the 2d Landing Battalion, this new +unit formed about 25 miles south of Nha Trang at Cam Ranh Bay where the +French had trained amphibious forces during the latter stages of the +Indochina War. + +As a result of the 1956 reorganization effort, the tables of +organization and tables of equipment for the Vietnamese Marine +battalions were completely revised. Three infantry companies, a heavy +weapons company, and a headquarters and service company now comprised +a landing battalion.[2-G] Each infantry company was organized into +three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. In turn, the rifle platoons +each consisted of three 10-man squads (three 3-man fire teams and a +squad leader). The individual Vietnamese Marine rifleman was armed +with the .30 caliber M-1 carbine, a weapon formerly carried by many +French and Vietnamese commandos. It had been retained for use within +the VNMC because it was substantially shorter and lighter than the +standard U.S. infantry weapon, the M-1 rifle, and was therefore better +suited to the small Vietnamese fighting man. The automatic rifleman in +each Vietnamese Marine fire team carried the Browning automatic rifle +(BAR), a heavier .30 caliber automatic weapon. The weapons platoon +of the rifle company was built around six .30 caliber light machine +guns. Within the heavy weapons company of the landing battalions was a +mortar platoon, equipped with four 81mm mortars, and a recoilless rifle +platoon. + + [2-G] Whereas U.S. Marine infantry companies were designated + by letters (A, B, C, D, etc.), the Vietnamese Marine + infantry companies were given number designations. + +While this reorganization was underway, Lieutenant Colonel Croizat +initiated a search for acceptable means of expanding the Vietnamese +Marine Corps to regimental size. A staff study produced by the Senior +Marine Advisor a month before the first phase of the reorganization +effort had begun included several important recommendations. Croizat +proposed to General O’Daniel that authorization be granted to raise the +ceiling on the VNMC from 1,837 to 2,435 officers and men. This, the +Marine advisor pointed out, could be accomplished without affecting +the overall ceiling on all South Vietnamese military and naval forces. +By reassigning to the Vietnamese Marine Corps an amphibious battalion +still organized within the National Army, the 150,000-man force level +would not be altered. This would transform the Vietnamese Marine Corps +into a three battalion regiment and would unify all South Vietnamese +amphibious forces under a single command. Croizat’s study further +recommended that the Vietnamese Marine Corps be designated part of the +general reserve of the nation’s armed forces and that it be controlled +directly by the Vietnamese Joint General Staff. Although no immediate +action was taken on these recommendations, they were to serve as a +blueprint for the future expansion of the VNMC. Equally important, they +bore the seed that would eventually make the Vietnamese Marine Corps a +fully integrated component of South Vietnam’s defense establishment. + +During the ensuing three years, several apparently unrelated +occurrences impacted either directly or indirectly on the U.S. Marine +advisory effort in South Vietnam. The French completed their military +withdrawal from South Vietnam and dissolved their High Command in April +1956, slightly ahead of schedule.[2-H] In conjunction with this final +phase of the French withdrawal, the Training Relations Instructions +Mission was abolished. Thus, it was no longer necessary for the MAAG +programs to be executed through the combined training mission. + + [2-H] A few French naval officers and noncommissioned officers + remained at Nha Trang as instructors until late May 1957. + +Shortly after the departure of the last French troops, Lieutenant +Colonel Croizat ended his assignment as Senior Marine Advisor. He was +replaced by Lieutenant Colonel William N. Wilkes, Jr., in June 1956. +A veteran of the Guadalcanal campaign, Wilkes came to Vietnam from +Washington, D.C. where he had recently completed a French language +course. Like his predecessor, the new Senior Marine Advisor was +scheduled to serve in Vietnam for two years. + +In August, less than two months after Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes’ +arrival, President Diem appointed a new officer to head his Marine +Corps. This time Bui Pho Chi, the captain who had commanded the 1st +Landing Battalion during the sect uprising, was selected for the +assignment. Chi’s appointment was only temporary, however, for in +October Diem ordered Major Le Nhu Hung to assume command of the Marine +Corps. Major Hung, who became the VNMC’s fourth Senior Officer, was to +hold the position for four years. + +An attempt to abolish the Vietnamese Marine Corps coincided with the +series of changes in its leadership and the departure of Lieutenant +Colonel Croizat. During the summer months, the Vietnamese Minister of +Defense proposed that the VNMC be made a branch of South Vietnam’s +Army. Fortunately, the recent combat record of the 1st Landing +Battalion outweighed the minister’s influence and the effort to +disestablish the Vietnamese Marine Corps was thwarted. + +Another noteworthy incident in the record of the early relations +between the U.S. and Vietnamese Marines occurred when the Marine +noncommissioned officer billet within the MAAG was upgraded to an +officer position. This adjustment, which anticipated the creation +of the 2d Landing Battalion, had the effect of making a U.S. Marine +officer available to advise individual VNMC battalions on a permanent +basis. Thus originated a plan whereby a U.S. Marine officer would +advise each Vietnamese Marine battalion--a concept abandoned only +temporarily between 1959 and 1962. + +The Vietnamese Marine Corps continued as a two-battalion regiment +under the command of Major Le Nhu Hung from mid-1956 through 1959. +During this period Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes and his successor, +Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., a Marine who had served +as an aide to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, instituted a variety +of programs intended to provide the Vietnamese Marines with a common +base of experience and training.[2-I] Perhaps the most important of +these was one implemented in 1958 whereby Vietnamese Marine officers +began attending basic and intermediate level schools at Marine Corps +Schools, Quantico. Other formal schools for noncommissioned officers +were established by the Vietnamese Marine Corps in South Vietnam. In +an effort to build _esprit de corps_ among the lower ranking Vietnamese +Marines, the U.S. advisors encouraged voluntary enlistments. They +also persuaded their Vietnamese counterparts to adopt a corps-wide +marksmanship training program similar to the one then in use by the +U.S. Marine Corps. + + [2-I] See Appendix A for complete listings of VNMC Commandants + and Senior Marine Advisors to the VNMC during the + 1954–1964 period. + +In conjunction with the reorganization of the VNMC and the stress +being placed upon small unit and individual training, much of the +U.S. advisory effort during this period was devoted to logistics. The +Marine advisors soon discovered that the Vietnamese officers, who had +not been directly concerned with supply matters under the French, +tended to ignore this important area. “The real problem,” explained +Captain Breckinridge, “was the newness of it all. The Vietnamese +officers simply possessed no base of experience or training in logistic +matters.”[2-6] This shortcoming dictated that the American advisors +not only design a workable logistics system but closely supervise its +operation as well. Wilkes and Wilkinson instituted intensive schooling +of supply and maintenance personnel and emphasized the value of command +supervision to the Vietnamese leaders. The Marine advisors, for +example, taught their counterparts that equipment shortages could often +be prevented if command attention were given to requisitions. Still, +even with constant supervision and formal schooling, the Vietnamese +Marine Corps continued to experience problems in this area throughout +the 1950s and well into the next decade. Breckinridge, who returned to +serve with the Vietnamese Marines again as a lieutenant colonel in the +late 1960s, recalled shortages of such vital and common items as small +arms ammunition even then. + +The years between 1955 and 1959 also saw the Marine advisors working +to overcome a potentially more serious problem, one that also dated +from the French-Indochina War. From the outset of their experience +with the Vietnamese Marine Corps, the Marine advisors perceived that +a strong defensive orientation seemed to pervade every echelon of the +small service. Most Americans, including U.S. Army advisors who were +encountering similar difficulties with the Vietnamese Army, agreed that +this “defensive psychology” was a by-product of the long subordination +of the Vietnamese National forces to the French High Command. Indeed, +a criticism frequently voiced by USMAAG officials during the Indochina +War had been that the French tended to frustrate the development of +the Vietnamese military forces by assigning them static security tasks +rather than offensive missions. Even though the forerunners of the +Vietnamese Marine battalions had operated as commando units, they too +had seen extensive duty protecting _dinassaut_ bases and other French +installations. Now this defensive thinking was affecting the attitude +of the Vietnamese Marine toward training. Moreover, it was threatening +the American effort to transform the service into an aggressive +amphibious strike force. + +[Illustration: _First group of Vietnamese Marine officers to attend +U.S. Marine Officers Basic School, Quantico, Virginia, pose with +Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (second from right), and +Captain Michael Gott (extreme right). At the extreme left is Captain Le +Nguyen Khang, a future Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. To +his immediate left is Major Le Nhu Hung, a senior officer of the VNMC. +(Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael Gott, USMC)._] + +By nature this particular problem defied quick, simple solutions. The +Marine advisors, therefore, undertook to adjust the orientation of +the entire Vietnamese Marine Corps over a prolonged period through +continuous emphasis on offensive training. The advisors consistently +encouraged their Vietnamese counterparts to develop training schedules +which stressed patrolling, ambushing, fire and maneuver, and night +movement. In this same connection the Marine advisors translated U.S. +Marine small unit tactics manuals into French, whereupon the same +manuals were further translated by Vietnamese Marines into Vietnamese. +This process assured that adequate training literature was made +available to the individual Marine and his small unit leaders. The +offensively oriented training programs and the translation project +complemented one another, and combined with continuous supervision by +the U.S. advisors and the return of young Vietnamese officers from +Quantico, gradually helped impart a more aggressive offensive spirit +to the entire Marine Corps. + + +_Summing Up Developments_ + +The years between 1955 and 1959 constitute perhaps the most critical +and challenging span in the chronicle of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. +Born out of the confusion which dominated South Vietnam in the +aftermath of the Geneva Agreement, the embryonic Marine Corps had +survived against heavy odds. Even before its scattered components +could be drawn together under a centralized command, the Corps had +been hurled into combat against the rebellious sects. Over the course +of their commitment the Vietnamese Marines had strengthened their own +cause through demonstrations of their fighting capability and loyalty. +In terms of the VNMC’s continued existence, equally critical battles +were being waged in Saigon where the Senior U.S. Marine Advisor and +the Vietnamese Senior Marine Officer struggled to gain support for +the infant service. It was there, ironically, that the destiny of the +Vietnamese Marine Corps ultimately had been decided. + +On balance, the interval between 1955 and 1959 was characterized by +uncertainty, transition, and problem solving. Never sure of the Marine +Corps’ future, the Senior Vietnamese Marine Officer and a handful of +U.S. Marine advisors had carried forward their efforts to transform +scattered French-inspired river commando units into a coherent and +responsive American-style amphibious force. While this transformation +was only partially realized, definite progress was apparent. Vietnamese +officers had replaced French commanders, and with American guidance, +had given their service a strong interim structure. Many of the more +serious problems which had plagued the struggling organization since +its inception had been identified. With American assistance, solutions +to those problems were being developed and tested. So, despite a stormy +beginning and a threatened early childhood, the Vietnamese Marine Corps +lived. + + + + +CHAPTER 3 + +Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency + +_Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency--Insurgency and the Vietnamese +Marine Corps--Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands--American +Decisions at the Close of 1961_ + + +_Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency_ + +South Vietnam gave every outward indication that it had achieved a +measure of overall stability in the two-year period following President +Diem’s election in the fall of 1955. In early 1956 Diem felt strong +enough politically to announce his government’s refusal to participate +in the reunification elections scheduled for midyear. He based this +position upon the argument that free elections were impossible in +Communist North Vietnam. The proposed July election deadline passed +without a serious reaction by North Vietnam. Equally encouraging was +the fact that there had been no noticeable resurgence in the armed +power of either the politico-religious sects or the Binh Xuyen. At the +same time the American-backed South Vietnamese economy appeared to be +gaining considerable strength. + +[Illustration: _Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, USA, Commander, +Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. (USA Photo SC494954)._] + +The threat of invasion from the North had also been tempered somewhat +by 1958. The MAAG, now headed by Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, +U.S. Army, a commander respected as a tough disciplinarian, was +beginning to reshape the former Vietnamese national forces.[3-A] +Renamed the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the army now +consisted of four field divisions (8,500 men each), six light divisions +(5,000 men each), 13 territorial regiments (whose strength varied), and +a parachute regiment. Although General Williams viewed this as merely +an interim organization, it had provided the South Vietnamese army with +a unified command structure based on sound organizational principles. +The arrival of a 350-man U.S. Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission +(TERM) in 1956, moreover, had freed U.S. Army advisors for assignment +to each ARVN regiment. American officers were likewise reorganizing +and helping train the small Vietnamese Navy (2,160 officers and +men) and Air Force (4,000 officers and men). The Vietnamese Marine +Corps continued to exist as a two-battalion amphibious force within +the nation’s naval establishment. General Williams felt confident +that by 1958 South Vietnam’s regular military establishment had been +strengthened enough to discourage North Vietnamese leaders from +seriously considering an outright invasion.[3-1] + + [3-A] General Williams would head the MAAG until his retirement + in 1960. + +Backing these developing regular forces, at least on paper, were two +generally feeble paramilitary organizations--the Civil Guard (CG) +and the Village Self Defense Corps (SDC). The larger of these, the +Civil Guard, existed within the Ministry of Interior and was funded +and advised by the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM). Its 48,000 men, +therefore, were not charged against the 150,000-man force level ceiling +that regulated the size of Diem’s regular forces. Nor were the 47,000 +members of the Self Defense Corps, even though this organization +received limited amounts of U.S. military assistance funds for payroll +purposes. In any case, serious shortcomings were evident in both the CG +and the SDC. Organized into provincial companies directly responsible +to the various province chiefs, the Civil Guard was entirely separate +from the ARVN chain of command. Furthermore, American civilians under +government contract had armed and trained the CG for police-type as +opposed to military missions. The SDC, essentially a scattering of +local militia units, was even weaker, having been organized at the +village level into squads and an occasional platoon. Although the SDC +units were subordinate to the respective village chief, the ARVN bore +the responsibility for providing them with arms and training. More +often than not the Vietnamese Army units gave their obsolete weapons +to the SDC and showed little genuine interest in training the small +units.[3-2] + +Although a measure of stability was obviously returning to South +Vietnam by 1958, one of the country’s more serious problems remained +unsolved--the threat of subversion by Communist Viet Minh agents +who had remained south of the 17th parallel following the Geneva +cease-fire. Following the resolution of the sect crisis in 1955, +Diem turned to neutralize this potential threat. Initially his army +experienced some success with pacification operations conducted in +former Viet Minh strongholds. While they did help extend government +control into the rural areas of several provinces, such operations were +discontinued in 1956. + +Another policy initiated that same year seems to have nullified the +moderate gains produced by the pacification campaigns. Acting both +to eliminate Viet Minh sympathizers from positions of leadership at +the local level and to extend his own grip downward to the rural +population, Diem replaced elected village officials with appointed +chiefs. The new policy, which threatened the traditional autonomy of +the individual Vietnamese village, was immediately unpopular. + +So was another government program which Diem implemented to undercut +Communist strength throughout the country--the Anti-Communist +Denunciation Campaign. Initiated in mid-1955 to discredit former Viet +Minh, the denunciation campaign evolved into something of a witch +hunt. By the late 1950s large numbers of Vietnamese with only minimal +Communist connections were allegedly being confined in political +re-education camps. Like the appointment of village leaders, the +denunciation campaign served to alienate Vietnamese who might otherwise +have supported the central government in its struggle for control of +the rural regions. + +Forced underground by the Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, Viet +Minh agents concentrated on strengthening their political posture for +the proposed general election in the period immediately following the +Geneva Agreement. When the hope of reunification by plebiscite passed +in mid-1956, the so-called “stay behinds” began rebuilding clandestine +political cells in their former strongholds. Having retained their +aptitude for the adroit manipulation of local grievances, the +Communists gradually won support from rural Vietnamese who saw +themselves threatened by the new government policies. In mid-1957, +the Communists, who were now being labelled “Viet Cong” by the Diem +government (a derogatory but accurate term which, literally translated, +meant “Vietnamese Communist”) began assassinating government officials +in several of the country’s rural provinces. Aimed at unpopular village +chiefs, rural police, district officials, and school teachers, the Viet +Cong’s assassination campaign was undertaken to erode the government’s +contacts with the local populace and thereby enhance their own +organizational efforts. + +Still faced with the possibility of a conventional attack across +the demilitarized zone, President Diem was reluctant to commit his +regular military units to a problem which seemed to demand police-type +operations. Seeing no clear-cut threat, he relied on the Village Self +Defense Corps and the Civil Guard to maintain order in the provinces. +Poorly led and equipped, and trained primarily in urban police methods, +the paramilitary forces proved unable to prevent the diffuse terrorist +attacks. In the 12-month period between July 1957 and July 1958, for +example, some 700 more South Vietnamese officials reportedly died at +the hands of Communist terrorists.[3-3] + +The Viet Cong terror-propaganda campaigns continued apace throughout +1958. The occurrence of the first attacks on U.S. facilities in Saigon +and the initiation of an anti-American propaganda campaign near the end +of that year, moreover, indicated that the Communists were broadening +the scope of their activities. By this time, the internal disturbances +were beginning to assume the dimensions of a concerted guerrilla +movement in several of the country’s more heavily populated regions, +including parts of the important Mekong Delta. Near the close of 1958 +President Diem finally began ordering regular military units into the +provinces with instructions to eliminate the Viet Cong and restore +government control. + +The very nature of the enemy, however, tended to render such government +operations ineffective. Essentially, the Viet Cong derived their +strength from the clandestine political structure which agents had +established in portions of the countryside. Interwoven into the social +fabric of the hamlets and villages, this political infrastructure, as +it later came to be called, served a dual purpose. It was both the +machinery by which the Communists exercised control over the population +and a vital base of support for the growing guerrilla forces, providing +the Viet Cong with men, food, intelligence information, and refuge. + +As the Viet Cong guerrillas were recruited from and lived among the +local populace, outsiders found it virtually impossible to identify +them. Their familiarity with the local terrain, their methods of +operating in small groups, and massing for attacks mostly at night made +locating them equally difficult. Even their patience seemed to enhance +their ability to survive. Unwilling to engage a stronger military force +and realizing that a specific government operation could not continue +indefinitely, the Viet Cong normally would melt into their environment +with the arrival of regular units. When the operation terminated +and the regular government forces withdrew, the Communists would +re-emerge, often stronger than before. In many cases the guerrillas +could give real meaning to their anti-government propaganda once the +local population had felt the weight of military operations in their +particular community. Operating in this manner, the Viet Cong were +able to husband their strength while simultaneously expanding their +influence. + +There was ample indication that the Communist movement was not wholly +indigenous to South Vietnam. Indeed, evidence of increasing North +Vietnamese support for the Viet Cong was becoming apparent near the +end of the decade. In May 1959, the Central Committee of the North +Vietnamese Communist Party publicly announced its intention “to smash” +the government of Ngo Dinh Diem.[3-4] By the summer of that year +the Viet Cong were being reinforced with men and limited quantities +of equipment infiltrated from North Vietnam. Many of the Communist +infiltrators, who at this early stage were entering Diem’s country +across the DMZ and by sea, were southerners who had gone North with the +Viet Minh in late 1954. Trained in political and military operations, +these returnees added substantially to the Viet Cong’s discipline and +technical capabilities.[3-B] + + [3-B] A State Department publication released in 1965 placed + the number of confirmed North Vietnamese infiltrators + for the years 1959 and 1960 at 1,800. It also noted that + an additional 2,700 North Vietnamese were estimated to + have been infiltrated during this two-year period. The + vast majority of these were thought to have been former + residents of southern Vietnam. (Department of State, + _Aggression from the North_, p. 33.) + +So strengthened, the Communist guerrillas reportedly were operating +in battalion strength (300– to 400-man battalions) in some areas by +mid-1959. Throughout the country they had expanded their activities +to include hit-and-run attacks on paramilitary posts, district +headquarters, hospitals, schools, and agricultural stations. Like the +assassination campaign which was underway concurrently in areas still +controlled by the GVN, these attacks were conceived with political +considerations in mind. By successfully raiding remote, poorly defended +facilities, the Viet Cong was able to embarrass the central government +while demonstrating their own strength to the local population. The +raids, furthermore, produced weapons which enabled the guerrillas to +operate without total dependence on the North. + +By mid-1959 the security situation in the Republic of Vietnam had +deteriorated to the point that much of the optimism formerly voiced +by American and South Vietnamese officials had begun to disappear. +The National Intelligence Estimate released in Washington during +August accurately described the conditions which were settling over +South Vietnam. This paper disclosed that the nation’s economy was +beginning to falter noticeably and that President Diem’s government was +growing increasingly unpopular. Furthermore, the estimate warned that +harassment by the Viet Cong could be expected to intensify.[3-5] + +As predicted, security conditions in South Vietnam did grow worse +in the period following the August intelligence estimate. In the +last four months of 1959 almost 200 assassinations were reported. In +January 1960 another 96 civilians were killed by the Communists and +in the following month the total reached 122. By the fall of 1960 the +Viet Cong were strong enough to begin ambushing regular ARVN units +in several provinces. Like their raids on fixed installations, their +ambush tactics were resulting in frequent and demoralizing defeats for +the government. Like the raids, they were also providing weapons and +ammunition for the growing guerrilla forces. + +By 1960 the government’s inability to contain the disturbing malaise +was beginning to produce political tensions in Saigon. On 26 April a +group of 18 distinguished Vietnamese political figures, including a +number of former cabinet members, issued a public demand for President +Diem’s resignation. Diem refused, eventually ordering the arrest of all +who signed the manifesto. + +A more serious effort to bring down the central government occurred in +November when a group of military officers led by Colonel Nguyen Chanh +Thi, the commander of a newly formed (1959) ARVN airborne brigade, +staged an abortive coup d’etat in Saigon. Two companies of Vietnamese +Marines joined Thi’s rebellious paratroops.[3-C] But the power +struggle, which began in the early morning hours of 11 November, ended +when units loyal to President Diem converged on the capital. Realizing +that the balance had been tipped against them, the coup leaders fled +the country and the incident was closed. While it had failed to +bring down the Diem government, Thi’s attempted coup had revived the +possibility of efforts by military leaders to seize control of the +government and had injected a new element of uncertainty into South +Vietnam’s already unstable internal situation. + + [3-C] Vietnamese Marine participation in the abortive coup of + 10 November 1960 is covered in greater detail elsewhere + in this chapter. + +Two other danger signals flashed across Southeast Asia shortly after +the abortive coup. In January 1961, Communist leaders in Hanoi +announced that the National Liberation Front (NLF) had been founded +in the South on 20 December 1960 with the stated purpose of closely +uniting the “various classes of the South Vietnamese patriotic +population in the struggle against the Americans and Diem....”[3-6] +In truth, the NLF emerged as a fully developed Communist political +organization imported from North Vietnam for the purpose of +controlling, directing, and coordinating the insurgency south of the +17th parallel. For American officials, the announced establishment +of the NLF signified that Ho Chi Minh’s government had opted for the +forceful reunification of North and South. + +Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, another event led to further speculation +that the war in Vietnam was about to enter a new phase. Backed by the +North Vietnamese Army, Communist Pathet Lao forces seized control +of the southeastern portion of the Laotian panhandle. Thus, the +North Vietnamese obtained a protected corridor along South Vietnam’s +northwestern border through which men and materiel could be infiltrated +to the South. + +The establishment of the NLF and the Communist takeover in southern +Laos coincided roughly with approval in Washington of a comprehensive +plan designed to help President Diem restore internal order. Designated +the Counter-Insurgency Plan (CIP), this study had been ordered by +President Eisenhower in early 1960. Developed by Lieutenant General +Lionel C. McGarr, U.S. Army, the officer who had relieved General +Williams as MAAG Chief, the completed CIP reached the White House +shortly after President John F. Kennedy’s inauguration in January 1961. +Significantly, its arrival came at a time when the Soviet Premier, +Nikita Khrushchev, was publicly pledging his country’s support for +“wars of national liberation.” + +The plan presented for the new president’s consideration drew clear +connections between the military and political aspects of the war +in Vietnam. It included a conditional offer of U.S. support for a +20,000-man increase in the regular South Vietnamese military forces and +a 32,000-man increase in the size of the Civil Guard. These military +and paramilitary increases were to be dependent upon President Diem’s +agreement to effect major reforms in his military and political +apparatus--measures which American officials in Saigon considered +necessary for the success of any counterinsurgency effort. + +President Kennedy approved the main provisions of the +Counter-Insurgency Plan on 28 January 1961 and negotiations on the +package opened with Diem two weeks later. But the talks soon deadlocked +on the issue of political and military reforms. Meanwhile, with the +discussions in Saigon dragging on inconclusively, the situation in +the provinces continued to worsen. A National Intelligence Estimate +released in March estimated that Viet Cong military strength had +reached 10,000 men. Furthermore, the number of violent incidents +reported in the country had risen to 650 per month. Even worse, it was +estimated that 58 percent of South Vietnam was under some degree of +Communist control.[3-7] + +Convinced that the situation was becoming critical and fearing that it +might soon become hopeless, President Kennedy approved a new program +of military assistance to the Diem government on 29 April. Inspired in +part by Kennedy’s desire to increase Diem’s confidence in the new U.S. +administration, the 29 April program did not require concrete pledges +of reform from the South Vietnamese. In its specifics, however, the new +package was similar to the CIP. It contained provisions for supporting +a 20,000 man increase in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces +(RVNAF)--a move which would raise the ceiling on the South Vietnamese +regular forces from 150,000 to 170,000. Another provision approved +the use of Military Assistance Program appropriations for the Civil +Guard and Self Defense Corps and expanded the MAAG’s responsibility to +include training and equipping these forces. Under the 29 April plan, +the paramilitary forces were to be transferred from Diem’s Ministry of +the Interior to his Ministry of Defense. In order to meet its increased +advisory responsibilities, authorization was given to increase the size +of the MAAG by 100 men to a strength of 785. This provision allowed the +first enlargement of the group since the introduction of the Temporary +Equipment Recovery Mission in 1956.[3-D] + + [3-D] With the dissolution of TERM in the late 1950s, the + International Control Commission had granted permission + for the MAAG to maintain a strength of 685 men. When the + logistics personnel departed Vietnam, new advisor billets + were created within the MAAG’s table of organization. + +General McGarr’s advisory group began implementing President Kennedy’s +29 April program during the summer of 1961. But the increases in the +government’s regular and paramilitary establishments and in the size +of the MAAG failed to arrest the trend of warfare on South Vietnam’s +battlefields. The remainder of 1961 was characterized by increasingly +aggressive guerrilla operations and the steady growth of Viet Cong +military forces. In August, for example, the ARVN reported 41 major +armed attacks on its units. The following month brought 450 Viet +Cong-initiated incidents, including several involving multi-battalion +forces of over 1,000 guerrillas. In mid-September, for example, an +estimated 1,500 Viet Cong overran Phuoc Vin, the capital of Phuoc +Thuan Province, and held the town for an entire day before escaping +unmolested into the countryside.[3-8] + +Equally alarming was the rapid rise in the Viet Cong’s overall +strength. Increasing numbers of Communist troops were now being +infiltrated over recently opened trails through Laos. Curving +southwestward out of the North Vietnamese panhandle, these infiltration +routes enabled the Communists to bypass the demilitarized zone which +separated the two Vietnamese states and continue their southward +movement down the length of Laos and into Cambodia. From sanctuaries +within these countries the North Vietnamese could easily infiltrate +into South Vietnam by using trails through the rugged mountains. +Relying primarily on these routes, over 3,750 North Vietnamese +infiltrators reportedly entered South Vietnam during 1961. Successful +recruiting in the South served as another source of manpower for +the Viet Cong. Well propagandized, the steady cadence of victories +greatly enhanced the Viet Cong’s prestige and thereby made recruitment +less difficult. By the end of 1961 infiltration from the North and +recruitment in the South had swollen the Viet Cong regular military +forces to an estimated 25,000 men. + + +_Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps_ + +At the end of 1958, when President Diem began ordering his regular +military forces into action against the Viet Cong, the Vietnamese +Marine Corps was a two-battalion infantry force organized within South +Vietnam’s naval establishment. The 1,837-man corps was still commanded +by Major Le Nhu Hung. Hung maintained his headquarters at the Cuu Long +Navy Yard, an installation situated on an estuary near the Saigon-Gia +Dinh boundary. Although they continued to maintain barracks at Nha +Trang and Cam Ranh Bay respectively, the 1st and 2d Landing Battalions +were now being rotated to crude little camps near Bien Hoa, a town +located about 20 miles northeast of the capital. Lieutenant Colonel +Wilkinson, who had replaced Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes as Senior +Marine Advisor in mid-1958, operated out of the MAAG headquarters in +Saigon but maintained an office in the VNMC headquarters at Cuu Long. +Wilkinson’s two assistants, Captains Gary Wilder and Dale N. Davis, +lived with their battalions. + +Elements of Hung’s Marine Corps were among the first regular government +units committed to the counterguerrilla effort. The 1st Landing +Battalion was ordered into action by the Joint General Staff in the +closing weeks of 1958. After deploying from Bien Hoa, the battalion +spent nearly two months searching for Viet Cong in a mosquito-infested +region of An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost province. Primarily, +the Vietnamese Marines conducted company and platoon-sized patrols +through rugged mangrove swamps in search of guerrillas. When the +operation ended in late January 1959, the Vietnamese commanders +reported that their units had killed and captured several Communist +guerrillas and political leaders. Their troops had also reported +finding a suspected guerrilla training camp which contained small +quantities of food and some weapons. The Vietnamese Marines suffered +no casualties during their deployment. Adhering to prevailing USMAAG +policy, the U.S. Marine advisors did not accompany the unit into +combat. Unable to observe the operation, the American advisors could +not accurately assess the battalion’s tactical proficiency. + +[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., USMC, +Senior Marine Advisor. (USMC Photo A229373)._] + +A few months after this initial operation, both VNMC battalions were +deployed against the Viet Cong--the 1st again to An Xuyen Province +and the 2d to Vinh Binh Province south of Saigon on the seacoast. +So deployed, both units came under the operational control of the +respective province chiefs. In widely-scattered actions fought during +May, the 1st Battalion and a Civil Guard unit claimed to have inflicted +over 200 casualties on the Viet Cong. In Vinh Binh Province, one +company of the 2d Landing Battalion reported killing 18 guerrillas and +capturing over 100 more. Again, U.S. Marine advisors were not present +and therefore could not assess the accuracy of these reports. In any +case, these were the final combat operations for the Vietnamese Marine +Corps as a two-battalion force. + +Obviously, U.S. and Vietnamese authorities in Saigon were giving +increased attention to the growing internal threat. Still, they +had yet to initiate any sweeping changes in the orientation of the +RVNAF. Indeed, in early 1959, the entire ARVN was in the final phase +of a reorganization program which would culminate by midyear in the +formation of seven divisions of uniform size (10,500 men each), five +territorial regiments, and an airborne brigade (formed from the old +Army parachute regiment). Under the new organization the seven standard +divisions were to be deployed in or near population centers throughout +the country and were to be organized under two corps headquarters, +one (I Corps) located at Da Nang, and the other (II Corps) located at +Pleiku in the Central Highlands. A third provisional corps headquarters +had also been formed in Saigon for activation in the event of a +national emergency.[3-E] + + [3-E] By 1961 the third corps headquarters would be activated + and geographic boundaries of all three corps would + be delineated to facilitate the coordination of the + government’s military efforts against the Viet Cong. + These military-geographic subdivisions were termed corps + tactical zones (CTZ). + +One of the MAAG’s reactions to the emerging guerrilla threat was to +urge that President Diem transfer the Civil Guard to his Ministry of +Defense. This adjustment, General Williams pointed out, would permit +the MAAG to train and equip the CG for a mobile counterguerrilla +mission. But it also entailed raising the 150,000-man force level +ceiling. When both the Diem government and the U.S. Embassy objected +to the proposed transfer, the MAAG turned to another alternative: +the strengthening and use of the regular units whose assignment to +counterguerrilla operations would not seriously disturb the country’s +counterinvasion potential. The Vietnamese Marine Corps, whose infantry +battalions had already participated in several operations against the +Viet Cong, fell into this category of units to be bolstered for the +counterguerrilla role. + +It was against this background that the VNMC was enlarged again +in mid-1959. This latest expansion was generally accomplished in +accordance with the staff study prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Croizat +some three years earlier. On 1 June, after both Marine battalions +had returned from their combat assignments in the Mekong Delta, a 3d +Landing Battalion was formed at a camp just outside the Cuu Long +Navy Yard. This new unit, manned primarily by troops transferred from +amphibious elements then being phased out of the reorganized ARVN, +was built around a small nucleus of seasoned Marine officers and +noncommissioned officers. Transferred from the 1st and 2d Battalions, +most of these Marines had seen combat against the Viet Minh, the sects, +and the Viet Cong. + +Another development saw a fourth rifle company added to each Marine +infantry battalion. In turn, the old heavy weapons companies were +abolished. The 81mm mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles were reorganized +into platoons within the battalions’ headquarters and service +companies. New weapons, two 60mm mortars, and personnel to man them +were added to each Marine rifle company. These adjustments raised the +strength of the infantry battalions to around 900 officers and men +and provided the Vietnamese Marine Corps with a basic organizational +structure which its infantry battalions would retain throughout the +coming decade.[3-F] + + [3-F] A side-effect of this reorganization was the modification + of the VNMC’s table of equipment. The most important + change saw the Vietnamese Marine riflemen exchange their + M-1 carbines for the heavier M-1 rifle, the weapon with + which the ARVN infantry forces were equipped. + +Concurrent with the formation of the 3d Battalion and the modification +of the organizational tables, the VNMC was formally designated the +“Marine Corps Group.” Now numbering 2,276 officers and men, the +Vietnamese Marines were formed into a group headquarters, a group +headquarters and service company, a 4.2-inch mortar battery, and the +three infantry battalions.[3-G] + + [3-G] The Vietnamese Marine Group continued to be known as the + Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) in spite of its formal + redesignation. + +As important as the VNMC’s expansion, reorganization, and redesignation +was the dramatic change in its role within the Vietnamese armed forces. +On 1 June the Joint General Staff directed the Vietnamese Marine Corps +and the newly formed ARVN airborne brigade to assume the mission of the +general reserve force for the entire RVNAF. So assigned, the Vietnamese +Marine Corps became a “force in readiness”--a service directly +responsible to the Joint General Staff for any assigned ground warfare +mission.[3-9] + +[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE GROUP) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JUNE +1959 + +AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 2,276] + +The Vietnamese Marine battalions and elements of the ARVN airborne +brigade (also garrisoned near Saigon) were ordered into action against +the Viet Cong with increasing frequency after being designated the +RVNAF general reserve. Usually, the Marine battalions, like their +airborne counterparts, were assigned to operate in a particular +province for a specified time period. In such assignments the battalion +commander was directly responsible to the province chief who, in most +cases, was a military officer. The province chiefs sometimes utilized +the Marines in conjunction with their Civil Guard units. It was not +uncommon for the Vietnamese Marines to find themselves conducting +operations in the most rugged and inaccessible regions of the province +to which they were assigned. In such deployments the Marine battalions +often bore the brunt of hostile action or suffered the physical +hardships associated with living and fighting in the most adverse +swamps and jungles. + +[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marine riflemen traverse mosquito-infested +swamps of the Ca Mau Peninsula on August 1961 operation. (Photo +courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC.)_] + +In connection with their continuing campaign to transform the +Vietnamese Marine Corps into a truly elite fighting organization, the +U.S. Marine Advisors encouraged the Vietnamese Leathernecks to take +pride in the difficult and dangerous missions now being assigned. In a +related effort intended to generate _esprit de corps_ throughout the +service, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson proposed that the Marine Corps +adopt an official emblem and a distinctive uniform. These suggestions +produced results when a board of Vietnamese officers selected an emblem +design similar to that of the U.S. Marines. Shortly thereafter the VNMC +adopted a light weight, black and green “tiger stripe” camouflaged +utility uniform similar to that formerly worn in Indochina by French +commando units. Although designed and procured primarily for use in +steamy tropical jungles, the colorful uniform came to be worn in +garrison with a dark green beret. Along with the newly adopted emblem, +which was worn as a patch over the left breast pocket, this uniform +became the distinguishing mark of the Vietnamese Marine and his U.S. +Marine advisor. Together, the uniform and emblem did much to set the +VNMC apart from the other South Vietnamese armed services.[3-10] + +Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson instigated another change during this +same period which did much to improve the effectiveness of the Marine +advisory program. Since the sect rebellion of 1955 American policy had +prohibited all U.S. military personnel from participating in combat +with South Vietnamese forces. Because the prevailing restrictions +prevented his assistants from accurately assessing the combat +capabilities of the Vietnamese Marine battalions, Wilkinson requested +that they be allowed to accompany their units into action. After some +study, General Williams, still the MAAG Chief, approved this request +with the stipulation that the U.S. Marines were to act strictly as +non-participating observers.[3-11] This privilege was not extended to +other MAAG personnel. Wilkinson and his assistants, therefore, became +the first American servicemen to witness actual combat operations +against the Viet Cong. So through an informal and relatively unknown +arrangement, a handful of Marine advisors were able to insure that +principles being stressed in training were being applied in combat. +Now operating alongside the Vietnamese Marines in action, the advisors +were also able to obtain a better appreciation of the terrain and enemy +and a more thorough understanding of the frustrating problems being +encountered by the VNMC units. + +The first half of 1960 brought changes in both the leadership of the +Vietnamese Marine Corps and the U.S. Marine advisory program. In May +President Diem relieved Major Hung as Senior Marine Officer. His +replacement was Major Le Nguyen Khang, an officer who spoke fluent +English and who had been the first Vietnamese Marine graduated from +the U.S. Marine Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico. A capable and +inspiring officer who had formerly commanded a landing battalion +in combat against the Viet Cong, Khang was to head the VNMC for +over three years. The following month Lieutenant Colonel Clifford +J. Robichaud relieved Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson as Senior Marine +Advisor. Like Khang, Robichaud had seen combat previously. A former +master sergeant, he had been commissioned during World War II and had +fought as an infantry unit leader on Guadalcanal and later in Korea. +Like all U.S. Marines assigned as advisors to the VNMC after 1960, +Robichaud was scheduled to serve only a one year tour in South Vietnam. + +[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marine Corps Emblem._] + +Combat assignments against the Viet Cong continued to dominate the +VNMC’s activities during the remainder of 1960. With Communist forces +now capable of battalion-sized operations in some areas, the Joint +General Staff began deploying government forces to the provinces +in multi-battalion strength. By late 1960 the Vietnamese Marines +were conducting two-battalion operations controlled by a task force +headquarters. Khang, now a lieutenant colonel, normally commanded these +Marine task forces. + +[Illustration: _Colonel Clifford J. Robichaud, USMC, Senior Marine +Advisor. (USMC Photo A25342)._] + +It was during one such operation, in which the 1st and 2d VNMC +Battalions were operating together in the provinces south of Saigon, +that elements of the 3d Battalion became involved in the abortive +coup of November 1960. The power struggle began in the early morning +hours of the 11th while the U.S. Marine advisors were attending an +informal celebration of the Marine Corps birthday at Lieutenant Colonel +Robichaud’s quarters in Saigon. At the appointed hour Colonel Thi’s +rebellious paratroops, accompanied by the 3d VNMC battalion commander +and two Marine companies from Cuu Long, moved into the capital on +trucks and seized the Joint General Staff Headquarters. The remainder +of the 3d battalion, led by the battalion executive officer, who was +unaware of his superior’s intentions, moved to the presidential palace +and established protection for Diem. Word of the coup, meanwhile, +had reached Khang at his field headquarters in the Mekong Delta. Led +by the Senior Marine Officer, the 1st and 2d Battalions returned to +Saigon by truck convoy and immediately joined the two Marine companies +already around the palace. For several hours the possibility existed +that Khang’s Marines might clash with Thi’s paratroops or even with +the two rebellious Marine companies of the 3d Battalion. But pro-Diem +units soon began converging on Saigon in such numbers that the coup +collapsed. Thi and his associates fled the country, whereupon Diem +appointed new officers to command the insubordinate units. With +loyalists in charge throughout South Vietnam’s military and naval +services, the incident was closed. Both the airborne brigade and the +VNMC resumed their functions as the RVNAF general reserve.[3-12] + +By the summer of 1961 the USMAAG, now headed by General McGarr, was +ready to implement the 20,000-man expansion of the RVNAF as authorized +in the package approved by President Kennedy the previous spring. +Included in this U.S. program were plans to increase the size of the +Vietnamese Marine Corps by over 1,000 men. This expansion got underway +in July when the initial steps were taken to form a fourth infantry +battalion and a 75mm pack-howitzer battery--additions which were to +raise the authorized strength of the VNMC to 3,321 officers and men. +The transfer of ARVN artillerymen provided the personnel necessary to +man the pack-howitzer unit, which formed near Thu Duc, a small town +about 13 miles north of the capital. Officers and noncommissioned +officers were drawn from the three existing VNMC battalions to form +a nucleus for the new infantry battalion while its ranks were filled +gradually by recruitment. This 4th Battalion was organized at Vung +Tau, a coastal resort town situated on Cape St. Jacques about 40 miles +southeast of Saigon. Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Brown, a World War II +veteran who replaced Robichaud as Senior Marine Advisor in August, was +on hand to assist with this latest reorganization of the VNMC. + +While the new Marine units were forming the JGS ordered the Vietnamese +Navy and Marine Corps to conduct an amphibious assault against a +suspected Communist stronghold near South Vietnam’s southern tip. +The objective area was a portion of the U Minh Forest, an extensive +inundated region located along the western coast of the Ca Mau +Peninsula. Because it was inaccessible by land, the forest had served +as Communist base area since the French Indochina War. The concept +of operation called for the Marines to land at daybreak, move inland +through the mangrove swamps, and hopefully push Viet Cong elements into +ARVN units which would have established a blocking force inland from +the beach. Captains Michael J. Gott and James S. G. Turner, two U.S. +Marine advisors, embarked on board two World War II vintage Vietnamese +Navy LCIs (landing craft, infantry) at Saigon with the 1st and 3d +Battalions respectively. + +[Illustration: _Captain Michael J. Gott, infantry advisor to the +Vietnamese Marine Corps, discusses tactical plans with Vietnamese +officers. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, +USMC)._] + +A series of problems arose on the morning of the operation to delay the +landing for several hours. When the Marines finally came ashore late +in the morning they failed to locate any enemy forces. Captain Gott, +who accompanied the 1st Battalion for the duration of the operations +ashore, later recounted the difficulties. He noted, for instance, that +no U.S. Navy advisors were embarked on board the Vietnamese ships. As +a result, the relatively inexperienced Vietnamese sailors encountered +technical difficulties with their navigational aids, and the ships +arrived at the objective area late. Inexperience on the part of the +Vietnamese Marines and sailors in debarkation techniques compounded +the delay. Once ashore, outdated French maps and dense mangrove jungle +combined to retard the Marines’ progress inland, thus allowing the +Viet Cong ample time to melt away. Gott concluded that some of the +difficulties encountered after the landing phase of the operation might +have been offset by the presence of observation aircraft. As it was, +the Marines’ visibility was restricted throughout the operation by +thick mangrove vegetation. Thus a combination of unforeseen factors had +rendered this particular operation ineffective.[3-13] + +[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE GROUP) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 AUGUST +1961 + +AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 3,321] + +A similar landing was repeated in the same area the following month. +Again the participating Marine units failed to engage Viet Cong forces. +Vietnamese Navy and Marine officers complained that there were no +enemy troops in the area and that the government’s intelligence was +inaccurate. Whatever the reason, the results of these two unsuccessful +offensives typified the problems which plagued most South Vietnamese +ground forces throughout the country during the 1960–1961 period. The +Communist guerrillas, aided by difficult terrain, a well-developed +intelligence network, and sometimes by the local population, could +usually evade government units whenever escape was desirable. Because +the Marines normally operated in unfamiliar areas where the Viet +Cong political apparatus was strong, their units were particularly +frustrated. In regions such as the U Minh Forest intelligence +information simply did not flow upward from the people. Instead, in +such Communist-controlled environments, the local Vietnamese served +the Viet Cong, warning them of strengths, locations, and movements of +Marine units. + +While combat deployments such as the Ca Mau landings highlighted +the remainder of 1961, the Marine battalions nevertheless spent the +majority of their time in non-combat assignments. During such periods +the battalions occupied their respective base camps around Saigon and +Vung Tau, awaiting orders from the Joint General Staff. Even though +held in reserve, they frequently were called upon to provide security +detachments for vital points such as bridges, naval facilities, +and communications installations. Most U.S. Marine advisors tended +to oppose such assignments, contending that they detracted from +the overall readiness of the battalions and disrupted much needed +training. The utilization of the VNMC units in static security roles +also conflicted with the advisor’s continuing efforts to convince the +Vietnamese Marine that he belonged to an elite, offensively oriented +strike force. Still, despite the protestations of the American +advisors, the JGS persisted in dispersing VNMC detachments in and +around the capital. + +Although its battalions were sometimes being frustrated, both in +their attempts to accomplish unit training and in their attempts to +fix Communist troop formations, the VNMC’s involvement in the war +effort was forcing improvement of the service in other areas. Frequent +inspections by U.S. advisors revealed that the Vietnamese were placing +more emphasis on the care of individual equipment and weapons. +Replacement items were being requisitioned with more promptness and +unit commanders were beginning to show increasing concern about the +slow receipt of requested supply items. The replacement of worn-out +World War II trucks with new vehicles removed a long-standing source +of trouble in that it greatly reduced the time consumed in performing +major mechanical repairs on the older vehicles. Even the frequent +deployments of the VNMC battalions were helping to improve the overall +combat readiness of the service by preparing a solid core of small unit +leaders and troops for operations against the Viet Cong. + + +_Ancillary Effects of Marine Pacific Commands_ + +At the same time the intensified conflict in South Vietnam was +forcing improvement on the VNMC, it was having a similar but less +direct effect on U.S. Marine commands in the Pacific. In early 1961 +Lieutenant General Alan Shapley, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine +Force, Pacific (FMFPac), approved a plan to assign individual Marines +from his scattered commands to temporary duty in Vietnam. The purpose +of this program, which became known as On-The-Job Training (OJT), +was to allow Marine officers and noncommissioned officers to obtain +first-hand knowledge of the complex nature of the conflict being waged +in South Vietnam. Beginning in May 1961 small groups of officers and +noncommissioned officers from various FMFPac commands were sent each +month to observe the counterguerrilla techniques being developed and +employed in Vietnam. Although the OJTs were normally “in country” for +only a two-week period, the program was gradually producing a pool +of small unit leaders somewhat acquainted with the situation in the +Republic of Vietnam by the end of 1961.[3-H] + + [3-H] The OJT program would be suspended briefly near the end + of 1962 but would be reinstituted in the first months of + 1963. + +[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marines wade ashore from a Vietnamese +Navy Landing Ship, initiating a search for Viet Cong on the Ca Mau +Peninsula. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, +USMC)._] + +The major Marine command to feel the impact of the war in Southeast +Asia during the early 1960s was the 3d Marine Division, a 20,000-man +combat-ready force headquartered on Okinawa. In addition to its +participation in the OJT program, the 3d Marine Division began altering +its conventional amphibious orientation. Major General Donald M. +Weller, the division commander, provided the initial impetus for this +shift away from a purely conventional posture. Weller, who in early +1961 had commanded a task force headquarters formed in response to +the deteriorating military situation in Laos, anticipated that his +command might be committed to combat somewhere on the Southeast Asian +mainland. He therefore instructed his staff to begin studying possible +counterinsurgency training programs which would help “turn the entire +orientation of the division toward the type of intervention [which] we +would be faced with in Southeast Asia.”[3-14] + +[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marines advance from concealment during +search operations on the Ca Mau Peninsula. (Photo courtesy of +Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC)._] + +Major General Robert E. Cushman, holder of a Navy Cross and a future +Commandant of the Marine Corps, assumed command of the 3d Marine +Division in September 1961 before General Weller’s objectives could +be fully realized. The new commanding general immediately convened a +Counterguerrilla Warfare Study Group to consider the problem. This +study group framed a set of recommendations for Cushman in late 1961. +His approval of their proposals led to the creation of an Infantry Unit +Training Course and a Command and Staff Training Course early the next +year. + +Conducted in Okinawa’s rugged Northern Training Area, the infantry +course prepared rifle companies from the various infantry battalions +for participation in counterguerrilla warfare. The instructors, +graduates of either the Jungle Warfare School in Johore, Malaya, or the +new Army Special Warfare School at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, placed +much emphasis on the origins and nature of guerrilla movements, small +units tactics, and night operations. The training syllabus for this +course included several live firing exercises designed for individual +Marines and fire teams. Some of these exercises required the Marines to +negotiate “jungle lanes” equipped with pop-up targets. The week-long +infantry course culminated with a two and one-half day field operation +for the individual infantry platoons. + +The Command and Staff Training course was somewhat less rigorous, +being designed primarily to prepare battalion staffs to support their +companies in a counterinsurgency environment. Less than 10 hours in +length, this course was based primarily on lectures and map exercises. + +At General Cushman’s direction, the division G-3 (Operations Section) +began stressing the significance of counterinsurgency training at all +echelons of the division. Unconventional warfare training soon became +an integral part of the training schedules at every echelon. Under this +program the various infantry battalions were required to conduct an +extended battalion-sized counterguerrilla operation, and to report to +the G-3 on the progress of their efforts.[3-15] + +The FMFPac On-The-Job Training program and the 3d Marine Division’s +new approach to training complemented each other in several ways. +Whereas the OJT program helped create an awareness of counterguerrilla +operations among individual Marine officers and noncommissioned +officers, the division’s training programs achieved the same results at +the staff and battalion level. At points the two programs overlapped +to the further benefit of the 3d Marine Division. Attuned to the +nature of guerrilla warfare and the problems involved in countering +the guerrilla, the officers and noncommissioned officers who returned +from OJT assignments in Vietnam provided assistance in planning and +supervising the division’s counterinsurgency training programs. Short +of actual commitment to combat in a guerrilla-type environment, it +is doubtful that any other combination of training could have better +prepared the 3d Marine Division for a future assignment in Vietnam. + + +_American Decisions at the Close of 1961_ + +The progressive erosion of the government’s strength and the steady +growth of the Viet Cong during 1961 prompted President Kennedy to +dispatch his special military advisor, General Maxwell D. Taylor, to +Vietnam in mid-October. Taylor, who had retired in the late 1950s after +having served as Chief of Staff of the Army, carried the following +instructions from the president: + + I should like you to proceed to Saigon for the purpose of + appraising the situation in South Vietnam, particularly as it + concerns the threat to the internal security and defense of + that country and adjacent areas. After you have conferred with + the appropriate United States and South Vietnamese authorities, + including the Commander in Chief, Pacific, I would like your views + on the courses of action which our Government might take at this + juncture to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in South + Vietnam; and eventually to contain and eliminate the threat to its + independence.[3-16] + +Like other American officials who had visited Diem’s republic during +the course of the year, General Taylor returned to Washington convinced +that South Vietnam was in grave danger. In a report delivered to +President Kennedy in November, the general outlined his formula for +salvaging the situation. This included the broad recommendation that +the United States abandon its existing policy of strict military +advice and begin cooperating with the Vietnamese in a form of “limited +partnership.” The American role in such a partnership, Taylor +explained, would be to provide “working” advisors and “working” +military units to aid South Vietnam’s military forces. + +General Taylor’s report offered several specific proposals for +implementing such a program. Among these were recommendations that +three U.S. Army helicopter companies and approximately 6,000–8,000 +American ground troops be deployed quickly to the Republic of Vietnam. +The helicopter units would support the government’s ground operations +but the American ground forces were to be used only in a defensive +posture. Taylor believed that their presence would underscore the +United States’ determination to stand by South Vietnam. A side-effect +of this display of determination would be to stimulate the morale of +the republic’s armed forces. He added that in order to support such a +build-up, it would be necessary to restructure and increase the size of +the USMAAG. + +President Kennedy’s consideration of Taylor’s proposals resulted in a +compromise decision which cleared the way for more intense American +involvement in the Vietnam conflict. After securing Diem’s approval in +early December, Kennedy authorized the Department of Defense to expand +its advisory and assistance programs. To enhance the effectiveness of +the advisory program, he removed some of the official restrictions +under which most U.S. military advisors had operated since 1955. One +important change would allow all advisors to accompany their Vietnamese +units into combat. At the same time President Kennedy decided against +ordering U.S. ground forces into the war zone; however, he instructed +the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, to prepare plans for such +a contingency. He also approved General Taylor’s recommendation that +American helicopter units be sent to support the RVNAF. The arrival of +the first of these reinforcements just before 1961 ended, signalled +the beginning of a new and more dynamic phase of American military +participation in the struggle to preserve the independence of South +Vietnam. + + + + +CHAPTER 4 + +An Expanding War, 1962 + +_The War’s New Context--Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory +Division--The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962--Some Conclusions_ + + +_The War’s New Context_ + +More than any previous year, 1962 was to be a period of deepened +commitment for all participants in the continuing struggle for control +of South Vietnam. On the American side plans already set in motion by +President Kennedy’s recent decisions promised to loosen the flow of +dollars, equipment, advisors, and combat support personnel to South +Vietnam. Administration officials envisioned that this sharp influx of +assistance would stimulate a redoubled war effort on the part of the +Diem government. + +Viet Cong strength and operational capabilities likewise were on the +upswing as 1962 opened. U.S. and South Vietnamese sources were placing +total Viet Cong military strength at roughly 25,000 men. Backing these +military forces was a far greater number of sympathizers. American +agencies tended to divide the Communist military forces into three +rough categories according to function and composition--main forces, +local forces, and village activists. Thought to total around 9,000 men +at the beginning of the year, the main forces constituted the pillar +of Communist military strength in the South. They were organized into +approximately 20 small (200– to 400-man) and highly mobile battalions +and a number of independent companies. Main force units as a rule +were cadred by North Vietnamese (or returnees trained in the North) +and were capable of conducting operations on an interprovincial +scale. (They often were referred to as interprovincial battalions and +companies. Later in the war Americans came to call the main forces +“hard core” units.) Next in terms of operational capabilities were the +Viet Cong local forces whose aggregate strength stood at around 8,000 +part-time but well-trained soldiers. The local forces were organized +into platoons and companies which operated independently within +their respective districts. Finally, there were some 8,000 village +activists. Part-time guerrillas in the truest sense of the term, the +activists commonly worked in the paddies by day and engaged in military +pursuits at night. For the most part their ranks were filled with men +considered either too young or too old for service with organized Viet +Cong military units. Nevertheless, they played an important role in the +struggle for South Vietnam’s rural areas by providing various forms +of support for larger Viet Cong formations. Living and working within +the rural hamlets and villages as they did, the activists were a ready +source of intelligence information for the Viet Cong. Often they served +as porters and guides for main force units which had been assigned to +operate within their locale. Otherwise, the activists were responsible +for defending their particular villages against the government’s +military and police forces--a defense which normally took the form of +harassment with mines and sniper fire.[4-A] + + [4-A] The three-way division was the most commonly used method + of categorizing the Communist forces. (See U.S. Army, + _The Viet Cong_, p. I:52.) A USMAAG document published + during this period, however, divided the Viet Cong + into two somewhat broader categories--main forces and + guerrillas. Both local force units and village activists + were classified as guerrillas under this system. (USMAAG, + Vietnam, _Tactics and Techniques of Counterinsurgent + Operations_, p. II-5.) Other sources tended to make more + elaborate divisions. (See Pike, _Viet Cong_.) + +After early 1962 the activities of these Viet Cong military and +paramilitary forces were carefully coordinated with Communist political +activities on the national level by a Central Office for South Vietnam +(COSVN).[4-B] From its headquarters, believed to have been located +northeast of Saigon in Binh Duong Province, COSVN exercised direct +control over six military regions (MRs). Designated MR-5 through MR-9 +(arranged in a north to south pattern) with an additional Saigon-Gia +Dinh Special Zone, the Communist military regions served essentially +the same purpose as the government’s corps tactical zones. Within +these six regions COSVN utilized a province and district structure +only slightly different from that of the Diem government to exercise +administrative and military control. At each level within this +organization a small, disciplined Communist political committee +orchestrated the activities of its subordinate military units with the +actions of its political apparatus. + + [4-B] COSVN apparently was established in March. Prior to this + the NLF had functioned through two separate geographic + headquarters--Interzone V, responsible for roughly the + northern three-quarters of South Vietnam, and the NAMBO + Interzone, responsible for the area roughly described by + the forested hills and Mekong Delta physiographic regions. + +To counter the strengthened NLF organization and to satisfy American +demands that he adopt some form of national strategy, President Diem +launched one of the most controversial large-scale undertakings of the +war--the Strategic Hamlet Program. Instituted on an informal basis +in the closing stages of 1961, the program became fully operative in +mid-1962. Although heralded as a new concept, the campaign actually +grew out of an existing program whose broad objective had been to bring +improved economic and social conditions to South Vietnam’s rural areas. +Named the Agroville Program, this effort had been in effect since late +1959 under the direction of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president’s brother and +principal advisor. Since its institution, however, the program had +achieved little aside from the resettlement of many rural families +into government constructed communities. Few meaningful reforms, +either social or economic, had been realized. During the early 1960s, +moreover, many of the Agrovilles had been victimized by the Viet Cong, +who saw the developments as symbols of the government’s presence in +contested areas. By mid-1961, in an effort to protect the more remote +Agrovilles, authorities in several provinces had begun fortifying the +otherwise helpless population centers. + +Concurrent with this evolution of the Agrovilles into fortified +communities, Sir Robert G. K. Thompson, the head of a newly formed +British Advisory Mission in Saigon, suggested that President Diem +consider adopting a similar scheme with broader strategic objectives. +Thompson, who had helped implement such an effort in Malaya in +the 1950s during the struggle there against Communist insurgents, +specifically proposed that the South Vietnamese integrate various +economic and social programs into an effective campaign to reestablish +its influence in the heavily populated Mekong Delta. This campaign, +Thompson advised, “should lead by stages to a reorganization of the +government machinery for directing and coordinating all action against +the communists and the production of an overall strategic operational +plan for the country as a whole....”[4-1] + +Under pressure from the U.S. Embassy to develop some sort of national +strategy for countering the insurgency, President Diem accepted the +concept of Thompson’s proposal. Shortly thereafter, Diem named Ngo +Dinh Nhu to head a campaign formally designated the Strategic Hamlet +Program. Nhu was instructed to plan the program and to create a +combined agency that would insure its coordination within the various +government ministries. These instructions resulted in the creation (in +February) of the Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets. A +counterpart American organization, the U.S. Interagency Committee for +Province Rehabilitation, was formed in April to provide assistance to +Nhu’s agency. + +With advice from Thompson and the U.S. Embassy, the Vietnamese +formulated a program which in theory was to evolve in several rather +distinct phases. First it would be necessary to select specific +geographic areas wherein the Strategic Hamlet Program would be +implemented. Once specific objective areas had been established, +regular military units would initiate operations to clear those areas +of Viet Cong formations. Following the completion of these operations +RVNAF units would resettle the inhabitants of the area in fortified +hamlets. Initially these hamlets were to be defended by Civil Guard +units while regular forces continued screening operations in the +surrounding countryside. In the final phase, Self Defense Corps units +would assume responsibility for local security while regular units +continued to screen Viet Cong forces from the developments. During this +phase district civil authorities would initiate economic and social +programs within the newly formed communities in an effort to recapture +the allegiance of the local populace. Thus, in this final phase, it was +expected that the Communist political infrastructure would be broken. + +Following the pacification of a few contiguous hamlets, the same +process was to be repeated over and over, in an expanding pattern. +In this manner Diem hoped to expand the GVN’s control progressively +outward from the initial secure hamlets over large areas of the +countryside. Ultimately the GVN intended to construct nearly 11,000 +such protected communities in several of the country’s most critical +rural areas. + +A principal shortcoming of this method of pacification was that the +success of the entire program within a specific area depended on the +successful completion of virtually every developmental phase in every +strategic hamlet. Should the Communist infrastructure remain intact +in even one hamlet, that hamlet could precipitate the collapse of the +entire campaign by contaminating the surrounding communities in a +geometric progression. + +Given this critical requirement that all phases be accomplished in a +deliberate and orderly manner, it was unfortunate that Nhu initiated +the program in an uncoordinated fashion. By the first of the year, +months before the appropriate American and South Vietnamese agencies +had been formed to guide the program, the construction of hamlets +had begun on a scale which already suggested a nationwide campaign. +Furthermore, the government failed to test the plan in a pilot project +such as Thompson (as well as U.S. advisors) had recommended. Instead, +it launched rather extensive campaigns simultaneously in several +traditional Communist strongholds during the spring of 1962. + +Nevertheless, once formally initiated, the Strategic Hamlet Program +constituted the government’s first real effort to implement a concerted +counterinsurgency strategy on a national scale. Regardless of its +weaknesses and its somewhat abortive start, the program would serve +as the context within which the Diem government would wage its battle +with the Viet Cong during 1962 and most of 1963. From this military +standpoint, moreover, Diem’s adoption of the Strategic Hamlet Program +marked somewhat of a watershed in the evolution of ground strategy in +the Vietnam war. Inherent in its selection was the decision to opt for +a “clear-and-hold” as opposed to a “search-and-destroy” strategy. In +accordance with the dictates of the pacification campaign, RVNAF ground +forces would focus primarily during the next two years on operations +to clear Communist military formations from the more densely populated +rural areas. + + +_The Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division_ + +The American military build-up called for by the Washington decisions +of December 1961 was well underway as the new year opened. Several +U.S. units introduced in the closing weeks of 1961 had already +begun operations by January. These included two U.S. Army transport +helicopter companies and a composite U.S. Air Force detachment. +Designated FARM GATE and composed initially of 151 officers and +men, the Air Force detachment had a dual mission of training VNAF +elements and conducting attack sorties in support of President Diem’s +forces. The arrival of another U.S. Air Force unit, a C-123 transport +squadron, another Army helicopter company, and an Army communications +organization, the 3d Radio Research Unit, just after the first of +the year raised the number of American military personnel serving on +permanent assignment in Vietnam to over 3,000. Assigned to the Army’s +radio unit, which immediately began operations from Pleiku in II +Corps Tactical Zone, were 42 Marines from the 1st Radio Company, FMF. +Designated Detachment A, 1st Radio Company, these were the first U.S. +Marines to participate in the ongoing build-up. + +Thus far, however, the U.S. troops arriving in Vietnam were for combat +support rather than advisory type duty. At a meeting held in Honolulu +in mid-January, Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the ranking +American military officials concerned with Vietnam to make substantial +increases in the number of advisors serving with the Vietnamese armed +forces. + +Less than a month after the Honolulu conference, a new U.S. command was +created in Saigon to manage the expected influx of advisors and the +intensified military assistance effort more efficiently. On 8 February, +the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV or MACV) +supplanted the MAAG as the senior American command in the Republic +of Vietnam. Its commander, Army General Paul D. Harkins (ComUSMACV), +assumed direct responsibility for all U.S. military policy, operations, +and assistance to President Diem’s government. Harkins was directly +subordinate to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, +whose headquarters was in Hawaii. + +The number of U.S. Marines assigned to MACV’s staff indicated that +they would play an important role in its operations. In all, 21 staff +billets in the new command were allocated to the Marine Corps. The +most important of these was the chief of staff billet. This assignment +went to Major General Richard G. Weede, a veteran who had commanded +an artillery battalion during the campaigns for Saipan and Okinawa +during World War II. Later, in Korea, he had distinguished himself +as the commander of the 5th Marines. Weede arrived in Saigon from +Hawaii where he had commanded the 1st Marine Brigade since 1959. Other +Marines joined General Harkins’ command as Deputy Chief of Staff, J-2 +and as branch chiefs for the J-3 through J-6 divisions. Two other +positions assigned to Marine officers were the project officer for +a Joint Operations Evaluation Group and a research and development +project officer for a Department of Defense agency. Both of these were +operationally controlled by the newly organized Military Assistance +Command. + +[Illustration: _Major General Richard G. Weede, USMC, Chief of Staff, +U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. (USMC Photo A150562)._] + +Under the new U.S. command arrangement, the old Military Assistance +Advisory Group became subordinate to General Harkins’ command. +Headed by Major General Charles J. Timmes, U.S. Army, the MAAG was +now responsible primarily for the advisory aspect of the assistance +program. To accommodate the impending increases in the number of +advisors, the MAAG’s staff was restructured. Under its new table of +organization, Marine officers were to serve as deputy chief of staff +and head of the plans branch of the J-3 division. Later, in 1963, the +MAAG’s table of distribution would be modified with the effect that +the chief of staff billet would be held by a Marine colonel. The first +Marine to serve as General Timmes’ chief of staff would be Colonel Earl +E. Anderson, a much-decorated aviator who eventually would become the +Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. + +The reorganization of the MAAG brought about a dramatic change in +the size and scope of the U.S. Marine advisory effort. The new table +of organization included a provision for an 18-man Marine Advisory +Division within the MAAG’s Naval Section. The organizational charts +for this division included advisor billets for a lieutenant colonel, +a major, six captains, a gunnery sergeant, and four staff sergeants. +Administrative positions were to make up the balance of the new +organization. + +As had been the case previous to this expansion, the lieutenant colonel +was to serve as the Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine +Corps. The inclusion of the major’s billet was expected to enhance the +overall effectiveness of the advisory division as he was to double as +Assistant Senior Advisor and as senior artillery advisor. The gunnery +sergeant was to assist in the artillery advisory duties. Of the six +captains, four were to be assigned as advisors to VNMC infantry +battalions while the two others were slated to advise on engineer and +supply matters. The four logistics-trained staff sergeants were to be +assigned as assistant infantry battalion advisors and were expected to +free the officer advisors from direct involvement in time-consuming +supply matters. + +Marines required to man this enlarged advisory unit began arriving in +Vietnam as early as February. All of the new officer advisors were +graduates of either Junior School at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico or +the U.S. Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. +Following their assignments, but before departing for Vietnam, many +advisors received schooling in military assistance operations. This +normally included a five-month course of instruction in the French +language, a requirement which more and more Marine advisors were +beginning to question as a result of the Vietnamese desire to converse +in their own language rather than French. Upon arrival in Saigon, +the Marines were given two days of orientation briefings at MACV +headquarters before assuming their jobs in the Marine Advisory Division. + +Lieutenant Colonel Brown continued to serve as the Senior Marine +Advisor and headed the new advisory division throughout the summer of +1962. In October he was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. +Moody, Jr., a veteran who held the Navy Cross for heroism as a company +commander during the Korean War. Having served with the British Royal +Marines following Korea, Moody was somewhat familiar with the problems +involved in dealing with foreign military services. + +[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody, Jr., USMC, Senior +Marine Advisor. (USMC Photo A412981)._] + +Encouraged by both Brown and Moody, the U.S. Marine advisors +participated in every combat operation undertaken by the VNMC during +1962. Prior to planned operations they helped their Vietnamese +counterparts coordinate the more sophisticated means of support which +became available as the American military build-up took hold. During +planning phases, for example, they assisted with the development of +detailed orders and helped plan for employing artillery fire and air +support. If the impending operation was to be amphibious in nature, the +Marine officers coordinated with the U.S. Navy advisors assigned to +the supporting Vietnamese Navy units, thereby insuring that planning +for embarkation had been accomplished. On occasion the advisors were +required to coordinate helicopter support for the VNMC units--a task +sometimes complicated by the Vietnamese Marines’ lack of experience +in heliborne operations. Unfortunately, the almost constant combat +assignments being drawn by the handful of U.S. and VNAF helicopter +units available in Vietnam made training in such operations impossible. + +Even more difficult were the advisor’s responsibilities after their +units deployed to combat. The U.S. Marines were experiencing the often +frustrating task of actually searching out the elusive Viet Cong on a +continuing daily basis. Additionally, the Americans found themselves +faced with the unenviable task of advising Vietnamese officers, who, +in some cases, had been fighting Communist guerrillas since the +French-Indochina War. These circumstances presented a unique set of +challenges for the advisors. For American officers with relatively +little actual experience in this brand of warfare to offer tactical +advice in a form acceptable to their Vietnamese counterparts demanded a +combination of tact, patience, and subtle persuasive powers. + +The U.S. Marine advisors quickly learned that success in this peculiar +assignment depended largely on the degree of respect they commanded +among the Vietnamese Marines. To help build this intangible yet vital +foundation of mutual understanding and confidence, the Marine advisors +stayed with their units in combat, sharing with the Vietnamese Marine +the same foods, the same dangers, the same discomforts, and the same +routines. The Marine advisors lived in U.S. bachelor quarters in Saigon +when their respective battalions were in garrison. Nevertheless, they +spent much of this time at the Marine base camps, inspecting troops +and equipment and making preparations for the battalion’s next combat +assignment. Among others, Lieutenant Colonels Brown and Moody viewed +this continuous association with the Vietnamese Marines as the single +most essential ingredient to a successful advisory program. + + +_The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962_ + +For the Vietnamese Marine Corps 1962 was characterized by expansion, +redesignation, and continued combat operations against the Viet Cong. +On 1 January the former Vietnamese Marine Group was redesignated the +Vietnamese Marine Brigade and was enlarged to 5,483 officers and men. +Under its new table of organization, the number of infantry battalions +remained at four but two new battalions were added. One battery of +eight 105mm howitzers, two batteries of eight 75mm pack howitzers, and +a headquarters and service battery comprised an artillery battalion +which was created to provide artillery fire support to the infantry +units. An amphibious support battalion of 1,038 officers and men was +also formed. This unit contained the personnel necessary to provide +the entire Marine brigade with reconnaissance, communications, motor +transport, medical, engineer, and training support. Lieutenant Colonel +Khang continued in his position as Commandant of the expanded and +restructured Vietnamese Marine Corps. + +The infantry battalions of the Vietnamese Marine Brigade performed +a variety of combat missions ranging from security duty around key +government installations to helicopter landings in suspected Viet Cong +redoubts during 1962. The four infantry battalions (the 4th Battalion +became available for combat assignment at midyear) participated in +23 combat operations which involved 404 days in the field. These +operations included 12 amphibious landings and eight heliborne +assaults. With the exception of two howitzer batteries which saw +some combat, the artillery battalion devoted the year to training. +Supervised by Major Alfred J. Croft and Gunnery Sergeant William A. +Loyko, their new Marine advisors, the Vietnamese artillerymen learned +their skills in a number of field firing exercises conducted on ARVN +artillery ranges. + +In terms of casualties the VNMC battalions fought no major engagements +with the Communists during the year. A typical operation was one +conducted in An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost province, early in +the year. The 2d Battalion, which was assigned to the An Xuyen province +chief for the period between 18 February and 26 April, conducted one +helicopter landing, provided troop escorts for numerous truck convoys, +and fought several minor engagements with the Viet Cong. Although the +Vietnamese commander reported 112 enemy killed and another 40 wounded +during the two-month assignment, the figures contradicted those of +Captain Evan L. Parker, the Marine advisor, which placed the Viet Cong +casualties at about 40 dead and 20 wounded. This difference, which was +not uncommon, stemmed largely from the fact that the Marine advisors +limited their reports to enemy dead and wounded actually sighted. +Still, the conflicting reports sometimes led to tensions between the +Vietnamese commander and the Marine advisor. + +In other instances the Vietnamese Marine battalions were ordered to +serve as the reserve force for one of the three corps tactical zones. +The 1st Battalion, for example, accompanied by Captain Bradley S. +Snell, assumed the mission as II Corps reserve on 16 May and remained +in that role until mid-September. Based at Ban Me Thuot deep in the +Central Highlands, the battalion provided security for government +installations while remaining ready to react to enemy threats. As +the corps reserve it conducted one heliborne operation and several +search-type missions. In one of these searches the Vietnamese Marines +uncovered and destroyed a Viet Cong small arms factory. During its +assignment in II Corps, the 1st Battalion accounted for only four Viet +Cong dead and one wounded while suffering 16 dead and 28 wounded. These +statistics attested both to the grim effectiveness of enemy sniper fire +and mines and to the enemy’s elusiveness. + +[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE BRIGADE) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 +JANUARY 1962 + +AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 5,483] + +The newly activated 4th Battalion, advised by Captain Don R. +Christensen, entered combat for the first time during an operation in +Binh Thuan Province in the first week in August. Supported by Battery +A (a 75mm howitzer unit) of the artillery battalion, it joined the 43d +ARVN Infantry Regiment in an attempt to locate and destroy Viet Cong +forces operating around Phan Thiet, the provincial capital, located on +the coast 95 miles east of Saigon. Following the conclusion of this +operation on 22 August, the Marine units reverted to the control of the +Binh Thuan province chief. In this capacity they assisted in clearing +and resettlement operations being conducted in conjunction with the +Strategic Hamlet Program. Between 4 August and 15 October, when its +assignment in the province ended, the 4th Battalion reported 12 Viet +Cong killed and seven captured. Vietnamese Marine casualties were one +killed and five wounded. During the assignment the Marines resettled +some 600 civilians in fortified hamlets.[4-2][4-C] + + [4-C] Major Croft, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor during + this period, later recalled that province chiefs tended + to misuse the Marine units by assigning them unproductive + missions such as static security. (Col Alfred J. Croft, + Comments on 2d Draft MS, Whitlow, “Marine Activities in + Vietnam, 1954–1964,” hereafter _Croft Comments_.) + +[Illustration: _Vietnamese Marines search dense jungle for Viet Cong +base areas. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, +USMC)._] + +In the last week of September General David M. Shoup, Commandant of +the U.S. Marine Corps, arrived in Saigon to begin a four-day tour of +South Vietnam. Shoup, who held the Medal of Honor for his actions as +a regimental commander on Tarawa in World War II, was recognized as +one of President Kennedy’s most trusted military advisors. Acting in +his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant was +scheduled to visit a number of U.S. and South Vietnamese installations, +including several strategic hamlets. + +[Illustration: + + CORPS TACTICAL ZONES + 1962 +] + +After a series of briefings at MACV and MAAG headquarters in Saigon, +the Commandant and his party journeyed by automobile to the base camp +of the 3d Vietnamese Marine Battalion at Thu Duc on the outskirts +of the capital. There, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonels Brown and +Khang, Shoup reviewed a Vietnamese Marine honor guard and inspected +the 3d Battalion. Impressed with the units he had seen, General Shoup +commended President Diem on the status of his Marine Brigade. “From my +observation,” he wrote from Washington, “the Vietnamese Marine Corps +is in an excellent state of readiness from the standpoint of equipment +as well as the degree of training of its members.” “Indeed,” he added, +“your Corps of Marines seemed to be a splendid and competent fighting +organization.”[4-3] + +The Commandant was less complimentary of the Strategic Hamlet Program. +After visiting several of the developments, he concluded that the +government’s effort to concentrate the Vietnamese civilians into +defended communities was counter-productive to the program’s stated +objective of winning the allegiance of the rural population. As Shoup +reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon his return to Washington, +the forced resettlement of the peasants from their native hamlets and +villages into what amounted to fortified camps seemed to be generating +antagonism rather than good will.[4-4] + +At the close of 1962 Vietnamese Marine commanders reported a total of +192 Viet Cong killed, 77 wounded, and another 158 taken prisoner. U.S. +Marine advisors felt that even these moderate figures were inflated. +They estimated that only about 98 enemy soldiers had been killed, 27 +wounded, and roughly half as many actual Viet Cong captured as had +been reported by their Vietnamese Marine counterparts. The Vietnamese +Marines also had failed to inflict any serious damage on the enemy’s +logistic system, capturing only 16,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, +45 grenades, 31 mines, and 50 individual weapons, a printing press, two +typewriters, several motors, and an assortment of medical supplies.[4-5] + + +_Some Conclusions_ + +In retrospect, 1962 bears assessment as an important watershed in the +chronicle of U.S. Marine activities in Vietnam. As the year began only +three Marine advisors and a handful of embassy guards were serving +in the Republic. The initial months, however, brought a dramatic +expansion of that role, both in terms of numbers and responsibilities. +By March Marines were functioning on MAAG and MACV staffs in Saigon, +in U.S. Army communications facilities in the Central Highlands, and +throughout the provinces where Vietnamese Marine units operated. +Their contributions to the war effort, therefore, were broad and +varied, ranging from high level planning to infantry advisory duties. +The Marine role had expanded in rough proportion to the broad-based +expansion of the overall U.S. military assistance program. In this +connection, Marine contributions tended to be concealed within the +context of the American assistance effort. Still, by mid-1962 it could +be said that the Marines in Vietnam were leaving the impact of their +service on virtually every stage of the ground war. + + + + + PART II + + MARINE HELICOPTERS + GO TO WAR + + + + +CHAPTER 5 + +SHUFLY at Soc Trang + +_The Decision--Deployment to Soc Trang--Mekong Delta Combat Support +Operations--Preparations and Redeployment--Accomplishments_ + + +One of the most important developments in the chronicle of U.S. +Marine activities in South Vietnam during the early 1960s occurred +shortly after the creation of MACV. In mid-April 1962, a Marine medium +helicopter squadron was deployed to the Mekong Delta to provide support +for the Government of Vietnam forces in their battle with the Communist +guerrillas. The significance of the squadron’s arrival went beyond the +added mobility that it afforded those Vietnamese units attempting to +hold the rice producing delta region. Coinciding as it did with the +increases in the number of Marines serving on the MACV staff and under +the MAAG, its arrival indicated that the Marine role would expand in +direct proportion to the widening U.S. effort to defend the Republic of +Vietnam. + + +_The Decision_ + +The decision to deploy the Marine aviation unit to the combat zone +originated in the immediate aftermath of General Taylor’s report to +President Kennedy. On 17 January 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff +directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CinCPac), Admiral Harry +D. Felt, to prepare for increased operations in South Vietnam. This +order implied that the Pacific command should stand ready to deploy +additional helicopter units to Diem’s republic in the event that it +became necessary to augment the Army companies already operating there. +(By now the number of Army helicopter companies in South Vietnam stood +at three.) CinCPac was also instructed to explore South Vietnam’s +requirements for additional helicopter units beyond the Army companies +already present.[5-1] + +Shortly afterward, Admiral Felt advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that +a valid requirement for additional helicopter support did exist in the +Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. He recommended that a fourth U.S. +Army light helicopter company be deployed to the area. Included in the +admiral’s recommendation was a proposal to support the aviation unit +with a composite maintenance, avionics, and medical group.[5-2] + +Admiral Felt’s recommendations were approved by the Secretary of +Defense on 6 March. The Joint Chiefs immediately assigned the +responsibility for providing the support package and helicopter unit +to the Army. In turn, Army authorities alerted the 33d Transportation +Light Helicopter Company at Fort Ord, California for the move. Its +departure date was set for 18 April.[5-3] + +Unknown to the officers and men of the alerted unit, the plans for its +deployment to combat were being reconsidered at the time the orders +were received. Two days before Admiral Felt’s recommendation reached +the joint Chiefs, a proposal to augment Army helicopter units with +Marine pilots had been advanced by General Timmes, the MAAG chief. This +proposal triggered a brief but eventful debate within U.S. military +circles. With General Harkins’ concurrence, Timmes recommended that +nine Marine helicopter pilots be assigned to the Army aviation units in +Vietnam for periods of 60 to 90 days. This arrangement, he pointed out, +would enable the Marine pilots to become familiar with the nature of +the combat support operations in South Vietnam and would provide them +with transitional training in the Army’s Piasecki-built tandem-rotored +H-21 helicopter (nicknamed the “Flying Banana”).[5-4] + +Admiral Felt turned to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, +Pacific (FMFPac), Lieutenant General Alan Shapley, for his comments +on the MAAG chief’s plan. Shapley in turn instructed Major General +Carson A. Roberts, the Commanding General, Aircraft, FMFPac to study +the proposal and to frame a set of recommendations. Roberts, who had +been selected for promotion to lieutenant general and was scheduled to +relieve Shapley as Commanding General, FMFPac, found the prospect of +Marine aviators participating in combat support operations in Vietnam +appealing but felt that the proposal under review had some definite +disadvantages. He pointed out that under Timmes’ plan the Marine pilots +would be flying a type of helicopter unfamiliar to them instead of the +ones they would operate if the Marine squadrons were later deployed +to Vietnam. Furthermore, General Roberts warned that the piecemeal +assignment of his pilots would reduce the combat readiness of the unit +from which they would be drawn.[5-5] + +At Roberts’ suggestion, General Shapley offered CinCPac a +counterproposal which he believed would benefit both the South +Vietnamese government and the Marine Corps. He suggested that a +complete Marine medium helicopter squadron from Marine Aircraft Group +16 (MAG-16), 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) and supporting elements +be moved from Okinawa to the war zone. The Marine squadron, operating +24 HUS-1s (a single-rotor, Sikorsky-built transport helicopter later +known as the UH-34D) would replace the Army helicopter company at Da +Nang in the northernmost corps tactical zone, I Corps. The Army unit +would then be freed for redeployment southward into either II or III +Corps Tactical Zones. + +General Shapley emphasized several advantages which he saw in this +plan. First, it would provide additional helicopter support for the +Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces while concurrently providing an entire +Marine helicopter squadron with an opportunity to gain first-hand +experience in a counterguerrilla environment. It would also provide +Marine Corps units with operational experience in I Corps, the area +to which they would be committed if standing contingency plans were +later executed. Finally, Shapley explained that his proposal offered an +almost entirely self-sufficient aviation unit which could be supported +administratively and logistically by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The +unit would require only minimal support from the Military Assistance +Command, Vietnam.[5-6] + +On the same day that he had heard the Marine commander’s proposal, +Admiral Felt received a message from Admiral John H. Sides, Commander +in Chief, Pacific Fleet, which strongly advised that Roberts’ plan +be implemented.[5-7] Admiral Felt then solicited General Harkins’ +opinion on the matter. He reminded the MACV commander that the proposed +deployment would provide the Marines with operational experience in +an area where they might some day be committed. The admiral further +pointed out that the location of a Marine helicopter unit at Da Nang +would enable the Army aviation companies to move south into one of the +other corps tactical zones--a move that would facilitate the logistical +support of those units by shortening their supply lines.[5-8] + +Harkins generally concurred with Admiral Felt’s viewpoint. He noted +that the more powerful Marine HUS helicopter (Sea Horse) could be +expected to out perform the Army’s H-21 in the higher elevations around +Da Nang. He also felt that the Marines, with their seaborne supply +network, were better equipped to cope with the logistics problems in +the more isolated northern reaches of South Vietnam. But he objected +to the deployment of the Marine unit to Da Nang on the basis that +the relocation of the Army’s 93d Helicopter Company from I Corps +in the immediate future would disrupt a series of operations which +were already underway in I Corps. As an alternative, General Harkins +proposed that the Marine helicopters be located initially at Soc +Trang in the Mekong Delta. Later, when the tempo of operations in the +northern corps tactical zone permitted, it could exchange places with +the Army unit at Da Nang.[5-9] + +One Army general raised a specific objection to the proposal that the +Marine squadron be deployed from Okinawa. General James F. Collins, the +Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific (CinCUSArPac) argued that the +presence of the Marine helicopters at Soc Trang would introduce yet +“another supply and maintenance feature into the III Corps area.”[5-10] +This argument was followed by the recommendation that the Army’s 81st +Light Helicopter Company, then based in Hawaii, be ordered to the +Mekong Delta. The 81st, General Collins contended, was already trained +in troop transportation operations in jungle terrain. + +General David M. Shoup, the Marine Corps Commandant, who approved the +FMFPac plan in concept, harbored one reservation regarding General +Roberts’ proposals. His concern stemmed from the possibility that the +Marine Corps might be required to replace the squadron from Okinawa +with another in order to maintain the level of operational forces +available to CinCPac--an eventuality which would upset long-range +Marine Corps deployment schedules. General Shoup indicated that he, +too, would oppose the deployment of a Marine helicopter squadron to +South Vietnam if this proved to be the case.[5-11] + +At this juncture in the debate, Admiral Felt journeyed to Saigon to +discuss the matter more thoroughly with General Harkins. Following +consultations, the two commanders jointly communicated their +recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 March. They advised +that it would be more desirable to deploy one of the Marine helicopter +squadrons from Okinawa than either the Army unit already on alert +in California or the one in Hawaii. This decision, Felt and Harkins +informed the Joint Chiefs, was influenced heavily by the readiness +posture of the various units under consideration. A Marine squadron, +they pointed out, could be on station and ready for combat operations +by 15 April--three days before the company already alerted by the Army +could depart California.[5-12] + +Admiral Felt and General Harkins then dealt with the CinCUSARPac +contention that additional supply problems would be created by the +deployment of a Marine unit to the Mekong Delta. The Pacific commanders +advised that, in their opinion, the logistical support “can be handled +relatively easily by [the] Marines.”[5-13] They added that should +requirements for a fifth helicopter unit arise in South Vietnam, the +Army’s 81st Helicopter Company would be selected for the assignment. It +would be replaced in Hawaii by the 33d Transportation Light Helicopter +Company from Fort Ord. Finally, Admiral Felt and General Harkins +recommended that the Marine squadron be deployed initially to the +Mekong Delta area of III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). Later, when +operational conditions in I Corps were more favorable, the Marines +could replace the Army helicopter unit there. + +After meeting to discuss the matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved +the entire package of recommendations on 16 March. Admiral Felt +immediately ordered the Pacific Fleet to deploy a Marine helicopter +squadron to South Vietnam and authorized direct liaison between the +1st Marine Aircraft Wing and ComUSMACV. In turn, Admiral Sides, the +Commander of the Pacific Fleet, notified the Commander, Seventh Fleet, +Vice Admiral William A. Schoech, of the decision and directed him to +take appropriate action.[5-14] + + +_Deployment to Soc Trang_ + +The Commanding General of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Major General +John P. Condon, a Michigan native who had earned a Distinguished Flying +Cross and three Legions of Merit for service during World War II and +Korea, was informed of the impending deployment on 22 March. At the +time, Condon, his staff, and elements of his command were participating +in SEATO exercise TULUNGAN in the Philippines. The arrival of the +orders proved timely for most of the affected units were in close +proximity to the wing commander. As the Marine helicopter squadron and +its supporting elements were scheduled to arrive in Vietnam just two +weeks after the SEATO exercise ended, preparations for the move were +begun immediately. General Condon quickly dispatched several officers +to Saigon to establish liaison with USMACV. + +The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing fortunately possessed a background which +facilitated the rapid preparations for the movement. Since August of +the previous year General Condon’s command regularly had deployed a +medium helicopter squadron (HMM) and its supporting elements with the +Special Landing Force (SLF), a Marine air-ground team embarked on board +the Seventh Fleet’s Amphibious Ready Group. Since 1961 this naval +task force had cruised Southeast Asian waters ready to implement U.S. +contingency plans. These deployments had given the Marines of the wing +a reservoir of experience which enabled them to make maximum use of the +short period of time available for planning. + +By 30 March, the wing’s planning had progressed to the stage that +General Condon could provide the Commander of the Seventh Fleet with +specific recommendations for the entire operation. The general concept +of the plan was that Task Unit 79.3.5, under the command of a Marine +colonel, was to be built around a Marine medium helicopter squadron +which was participating in Operation TULUNGAN. This task unit, code +named SHUFLY, was to occupy an old Japanese-built landing strip near +Soc Trang, a small town located about 85 miles southwest of Saigon in +Ba Xuyen Province. Situated only 20 miles from the coast, Soc Trang +possessed one of the few hard surfaced runways in the area. Condon +informed the Seventh Fleet commander of the arrangements which his +liaison officers had made during their trip to Saigon. An ARVN infantry +battalion and two 4.2-inch mortar companies were to assume the defense +of the air strip at Soc Trang the same day that the Marines began +landing. + +[Illustration: _Major General John P. Condon, USMC, Commanding General, +1st Marine Aircraft Wing. (USMC Photo A420792)._] + +The Marine general then proceeded to outline the chain of command and +method of support which he considered best for the Marine task unit. +SHUFLY, he suggested, should be under the operational control of +ComUSMACV but should remain under the administrative control of the 1st +Marine Aircraft Wing. Most of its logistic support, the wing commander +thought, could come through normal Marine and Navy channels with fuels, +lubricant oils, rations, and ammunition, being the exceptions. Rations +and ammunition were to be provided by MACV, while fuels would be +supplied by private Vietnamese distributers operating under contracts +with the U.S. government. + +Next, General Condon explained to Admiral Schoech his desires for the +organization of the task unit. He felt that SHUFLY would function best +if organized into three distinct task elements. First, he proposed +that a headquarters be formed under the command of Colonel John F. +Carey, a veteran Marine aviator who had been awarded the Navy Cross +for heroism during the battle for Midway. Carey was currently serving +as Chief of Staff of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. This headquarters, +General Condon advised, should consist of eight officers and six +enlisted men. The second element of the task unit, the wing commander +continued, would be Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362), +reinforced, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp. +The squadron, whose normal complement was 63 officers and 196 enlisted +Marines, was to be augmented by 50 additional maintenance personnel. +Its equipment would include 24 HUS helicopters (which under normal +operating conditions could lift eight to 12 combat-loaded Vietnamese +troops), three Cessna single-engine OE-1 observation aircraft, one +R4D transport aircraft, and supplemental maintenance equipment. +Prior to its deployment, HMM-362 would exchange its helicopters for +recently overhauled aircraft in order to reduce maintenance problems +once operations in Vietnam began. SHUFLY’s third element would be a +sub unit of Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS-16). Designated Task +Element 79.3.5.2, it would be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William +W. Eldridge. Navy medical, dental, and chaplain personnel would be +included in the sub unit’s 193 enlisted men and 18 officers. + +The wing commander intended to provide the MABS-16 sub unit with +a Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System (TAFDS) and a Marine +Airfield Traffic Control Unit (MATCU). The traffic control unit would +be equipped with Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) and Ground Control +Approach (GCA) systems which would enable the helicopter squadron to +conduct landings during periods of reduced visibility.[5-15] + +Colonel Carey, the task unit commander, was to be assigned +responsibility for liaison with MACV and military authorities in +III Corps, the tactical zone which encompassed the entire Mekong +Delta and the transition zone between the delta and the highlands. +All operational planning, security, external communications, and +administrative matters also were to fall under his cognizance. This +arrangement would allow Lieutenant Colonel Clapp and his squadron +to concentrate on daily flight operations and aircraft maintenance. +Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge’s MABS-16 sub unit would be responsible for +all normal base support and airfield operations.[5-16] + +General Condon’s report to Admiral Schoech concluded with a rough +outline of the schedule for the task unit’s deployment. On 9 +April--only eight days after the termination of the SEATO exercise in +the Philippines--Marine transport aircraft from the 1st MAW, augmented +by three transports from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW), would +begin airlifting the task unit headquarters and the MABS-16 detachment +from Okinawa. The Marine general anticipated that all “housekeeping” +facilities would be in position at Soc Trang within five days. +Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s HMM-362 would fly into Soc Trang from the +amphibious assault ship (helicopter carrier) USS _Princeton_ (LPH-5) +on the morning of 15 April. The proposal that the helicopters be flown +ashore satisfied a Department of Defense requirement that conspicuous +unloading activities were to be avoided in the Saigon area. + +Admiral Schoech approved the 1st MAW’s proposed plan on 3 April and +ordered Task Unit 79.3.5 to be transferred to General Harkins’ command +on 15 April. He then instructed the Commander, Task Group 76.5 (the +Amphibious Ready Group) to provide SHUFLY with whatever supply and +administrative support it might require for the movement. At the same +time the fleet commander ordered appropriate subordinate commanders +to provide an escort of destroyers for the USS _Princeton_ and an +inconspicuous air cover when the LPH arrived and began unloading +HMM-362. Accordingly, the covering aircraft were instructed not to +approach within 20 miles of South Vietnam unless the situation around +Soc Trang endangered the Marine helicopters.[5-17] + +The day following Schoech’s approval of the Marine plan, the carrier +task unit was formed to transport HMM-362 to South Vietnam. SHUFLY was +activated simultaneously and given orders which reflected General +Condon’s planning. Colonel Carey was instructed to establish his +headquarters at the Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan, in order +to prepare for the deployment. The task unit commander was advised that +he would receive more detailed instructions relative to administration +and logistics at a later date. + +Colonel Carey’s task group headquarters in Japan had only one week in +which to complete preparations for the move to the Republic of Vietnam. +His staff’s responsibility for coordinating between units located at +Atsugi, Japan, and Futema, Okinawa, made this task even more difficult. +Carey’s officers worked out the details of the airlift with the staff +of Marine Aerial Refueler-Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152), the +GV-1[5-A] unit assigned to carry the MABS-16 sub unit and the task unit +headquarters to Soc Trang. + + [5-A] The GV-1 (later KC-130), a four-engine, turbo-prop + refueler-transport built by Lockheed, is the Marine + refueling version of the Air Force C-130. + +The airlift portion of the movement began as scheduled on 9 April with +the MABS-16 detachment being transported from Futema directly to Soc +Trang. At 0800 Colonel Carey and part of his staff landed at Soc Trang +in a twin-engine Douglas R4D Skytrain. As planned, the 400-man ARVN +battalion had already established a perimeter around the airfield. +Using the R4D’s radio, the crew provided landing instructions for the +GV-1s of VMGR-152 and VMGR-352 which began landing and unloading their +cargoes at half hour intervals. Several key American and Vietnamese +military officers were on hand to watch the lead elements of SHUFLY +arrive. Major General Condon, the 1st MAW commander, flew the first +GV-1 into Soc Trang but departed after the aircraft had been unloaded. +General Harkins and Brigadier General Le Van Nghiem, the Vietnamese +commander of III Corps, also made appearances at the airstrip to +welcome Colonel Carey and his Marines. + +Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge’s MABS-16 detachment began readying the +airfield for HMM-362’s arrival shortly after the first transport +aircraft had unloaded. To serve as living spaces the Marines raised +75 strongback tents, all with plywood decks. They set up a water +purification system and began trucking water from the town of Soc +Trang, about two and a half miles away. Within two days, 9,000 gallons +of water had been purified. Other conveniences improved the camp’s +living conditions. A field laundry and a mess hall were set up and by +12 April, hot meals were being served to the Marines. A post office +began operations and telephones were installed to connect living and +working areas. + +By 14 April, the day before HMM-362 was scheduled to arrive at Soc +Trang, most of the airfield facilities were ready to support flight +operations. An old hangar, which had been constructed by the Japanese +during their World War II occupation of Indochina, had been repaired +to house some of the squadron’s aircraft and equipment. The MABS-16 +communications section was operational and had established radio and +teletype links with MACV in Saigon and MAG-16 on Okinawa. The TAFDS +had been assembled and filled with aviation fuel and MATCU-68, the air +traffic control unit assigned to SHUFLY, was prepared to control flight +operations. + +The Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5) steamed from Okinawa on 10 April +with HMM-362, its reinforcements, and HMM-261 embarked on the USS +_Princeton_. The task group arrived off the coast of South Vietnam +in the early morning hours of 15 April. At dawn Lieutenant Colonel +Clapp, who had seen action as a fighter pilot during the Iwo Jima and +Okinawa campaigns in World War II, led the first flight of helicopters +from the deck of the _Princeton_. The operation proceeded smoothly +with aircraft from both squadrons ferrying HMM-362’s equipment inland +to the Soc Trang airstrip. Far out at sea, jets of the Seventh Fleet +orbited, ready to provide protection to the Marine helicopters. They +were not needed, however, as the Viet Cong made no effort to oppose +the movement. By mid-afternoon the airlift of HMM-362’s personnel +and equipment to the Soc Trang airfield had been completed. HMM-261 +returned to the _Princeton_ where it continued to function as the +helicopter element of the Special Landing Force. + +The day after arriving at Soc Trang, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s +squadron, nicknamed “Archie’s Angels,” was prepared to support the +ARVN. Since the squadron’s combat support was not required immediately, +the pilots and crews began flying missions to familiarize themselves +with their new surroundings. They learned that their operations were to +be conducted over the vast expanse of South Vietnam which stretched +from just north and east of Saigon to the nation’s southernmost tip, +the Ca Mau Peninsula, and from the South China Sea westward to the +Cambodian border. Their initial flights over the Mekong Delta revealed +a predominantly flat and monotonous landscape. Parched by the long dry +season, the dusty brown rice paddies stood in sharp contrast with the +verdant mangrove swamps which abounded near major streams and along +the coast. Numerous hamlets, most enclosed by dense hedgerows and +treelines, were scattered across the countryside. Thousands of canals +and trails and a few crude roads completed the rural landscape in which +the Viet Cong guerrilla thrived. Larger towns, such as Soc Trang, Can +Tho (located about 80 miles southwest of Saigon), and My Tho (located +about half way between the capital and Can Tho) were under the control +of the Government of Vietnam. + +While the pilots and crews of HMM-362 were acquainting themselves +with the geography of the Mekong Delta, Colonel Carey and his staff +met in Saigon with U.S. and Vietnamese officers from the MACV and +III Corps headquarters. There, they established liaison with the +three ARVN divisions subordinate to General Nhgiem’s III Corps--the +21st, the 7th, and the 5th--and discussed operational matters. After +several conferences, the final details of the command arrangements +were completed. It was agreed that all Marine missions would require +the approval of MACV, III Corps, and the task unit commander. This +arrangement would enable General Harkins’ command to retain actual +operational control of the Marine helicopters even though they would +be supporting III Corps exclusively. Final approval of all mission +requests for Marine support would rest with the Joint Operations Center +(JOC) at JGS headquarters in Saigon. Manned by U.S. Army, U.S. Air +Force, ARVN, and VNAF officers, this agency was part of a recently +instituted Tactical Air Support System, the purpose of which was to +provide positive control over all military aircraft in South Vietnam. +To insure maximum coordination at lower echelons, Marine liaison +officers were assigned to the corps headquarters and to the 21st ARVN +Division. It was anticipated that this division, headquartered at Can +Tho, only 35 miles northwest of Soc Trang, would require more Marine +helicopter support than the other divisions that were operating within +the corps tactical zone.[5-B] + + [5-B] I and II Corps had their own agencies within the corps + headquarters for control of air assets whereas III CTZ + relied directly on the JOC. Under this arrangement, I + Corps and II Corps were required to pass mission requests + for air support on to the JOC. + +[Illustration: _Lieutenant Colonel Archie Clapp (second from left), +HMM-362 squadron commander, Major General John Condon (fourth from +left), Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Colonel John +Carey (extreme right), task unit commander, confer briefly after +arriving at Soc Trang. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P. +Kizer, USMC)._] + +While operational planning was underway, the MABS-16 Marines set about +to improve the newly occupied compound. Two diesel-powered generators +were put into operation and began furnishing electrical power for the +camp. The utilities section, which maintained the generators, then +began installing electrical wiring throughout the compound. Toilet and +shower facilities were constructed to accommodate the Marines. + +Measures were also taken during this interlude to strengthen the +airfield’s defenses. Expecting that the Viet Cong might attempt +to infiltrate the Marine position, Colonel Carey created a 40-man +security unit to protect the inner camp and flight lines. This unit, +composed of men from MABS-16 and HMM-362 and responsible to a permanent +sergeant-of-the-guard, maintained roving patrols and security posts +during hours of darkness. A network of concertina wire, trip flares, +and machine gun emplacements provided additional protection around the +helicopters and living area. Attack alerts were conducted periodically +to coordinate the ARVN’s outer defenses and the Marine guard within the +perimeter. + +[Illustration: + + III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE + 1962 +] + +Within less than two weeks after the first Marines had arrived at Soc +Trang, the camp had been adequately prepared to support sustained +combat helicopter operations. In addition, defenses had been +established and the lines of logistical support from MACV had been +opened. Food and water were readily available. All necessary liaison +with the Vietnamese units to be supported had been accomplished. Pilots +and crews had gained a rudimentary knowledge of the area in which they +would fly and SHUFLY’s entire command structure had undergone a one +week “shake down” in which it had proven sound. + + +_Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations_ + +Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s squadron began combat operations on Easter +Sunday, 22 April, exactly one week after arriving in the Republic of +Vietnam. The unit’s first combat assignment was to assist the Army’s +Saigon-based 57th Helicopter Company in an operation code named +LOCKJAW. The American helicopters were to support the ARVN 7th Division +which was headquartered at My Tho, 53 miles northeast of Soc Trang. The +Marine helicopters, which departed Soc Trang at 0900, flew 29 sorties +and lifted 400 Vietnamese soldiers without incident during the course +of their first operation. + +Unlike the U.S. Army helicopters already operating in other parts +of South Vietnam, the Marine HUS-1s were not armed with machine +guns during their initial operations from Soc Trang. Prior to their +deployment, the Marine commanders had reasoned that weapons mounted +in the cargo hatch would hinder loading and unloading during critical +periods while the helicopters were in landing zones. Additionally, +armed aircraft would tend to present a more hostile appearance to +Vietnamese civilians, thereby providing the Viet Cong ready-made +material for their anti-American propaganda themes. The only weapons +on board the helicopters, therefore, were the individual side arms and +two M3A1 .45 caliber submachine guns carried by the crew members. The +automatic weapons enabled Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s men to return fire +at short ranges and would also enhance their survival capabilities in +the event an aircraft was forced down in unsecure territory.[5-C] + + [5-C] By the summer the new light weight AR-15, the forerunner + of the M-16, would replace the M3A1 “greaseguns.” Near + the end of the year, however, the Leatherneck crews were + carrying M-14 rifles, the standard U.S. 7.62mm infantry + weapon of this period. + +Once HMM-362 began combat flight operations the tempo of activities +at Soc Trang quickened. The same day that SHUFLY helicopters +participated in the coordinated helilift from My Tho, an HUS was +called upon to evacuate an American advisor from Vinh Long, 46 miles +north of Soc Trang. The following day the first combined operation +involving Vietnamese Marine ground forces and U.S. Marine helicopters +was conducted. A company of Vietnamese Marines was helilifted into a +threatened government outpost south of the town of Ca Mau, located near +the southern tip of South Vietnam, to provide security while HMM-362’s +helicopters evacuated the 57-man garrison. + +On 24 April, 16 Marine helicopters supported the 21st ARVN Division in +Operation NIGHTINGALE conducted near Can Tho. In this operation 591 +ARVN troops were lifted into eight landing zones along two canals where +a large group of Viet Cong had been reported. Shortly after the first +wave of the assault force landed, a vicious small arms fight erupted. +HMM-362 suffered its first combat damage when a helicopter was forced +down after its oil line was punctured by enemy fire. An accompanying +HUS quickly landed and retrieved the crew. Four other helicopters +proceeded to the forward loading site, picked up a Marine repair +team and enough ARVN troops to protect the team while it worked, and +returned to the downed aircraft. The mechanics completed their repairs +in two hours after which the crew returned the helicopter to Soc Trang. +The security force was then lifted out of the area. + +Despite the damage suffered by the Marine aircraft, the Can Tho +operation apparently achieved some success. The Viet Cong reportedly +suffered 70 dead and lost three prisoners to the South Vietnamese while +the ARVN units lost only three killed and six wounded. The Marines of +HMM-362, moreover, had responded to a new challenge by demonstrating +that they could recover helicopters which had been forced to land in +insecure territory. Although the principle of providing security while +accomplishing field repairs had been employed previously by the Army +helicopter companies, the Can Tho operation of 24 April marked the +first time the Marines had been required to use the technique. + +[Illustration: _Aerial view of Soc Trang airstrip. (Photo courtesy of +Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kizer, USMC)._] + +HMM-362 again joined the Army’s 57th Helicopter Company for a +coordinated troop lift on 25 April. This time the objective was the +small town of Chau Doc on the Bassac River near the Cambodian +border which had been raided and burned by a force whose identity was +undetermined. Fourteen Marine helicopters transported 168 troops from +the 21st ARVN Division to the scene of the incident while two other +squadron aircraft lifted the Deputy Commander of III Corps, the 21st +Division Commander, and the Senior U.S. Advisor in III Corps, Colonel +Daniel B. Potter, Jr., U.S. Army, to the village. The landing was +uncontested as the marauding band had fled across the international +border into Cambodia. + +The conditions which confronted HMM-362 in the Mekong Delta during its +first weeks of combat operations encouraged the squadron’s pilots to +experiment with new tactics. One such instance occurred in the first +week of May in Ba Xuyen Province when the province chief requested +that the Marine helicopters support his Civil Guard company in a +raid on a fortified Viet Cong village about 12 miles southwest of +Soc Trang. Because the objective was located so near the Soc Trang +airfield, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp ordered an unusual technique used +for approaching the landing zone. The flight would rendezvous over Soc +Trang at tree-top level and proceed to the objective with the flight +leader slightly to the rear and above the formation. From this vantage +point the flight leader could keep the other aircraft in sight and +exercise better control over each element of the flight. The success of +the new procedure led Lieutenant Colonel Clapp to remark later that the +technique was similar to “calling the plays from the grandstand.”[5-18] +It became another tactic available for the squadron’s future use. + +In terms of lessons learned, HMM-362’s most significant operation +during its initial month of combat support came on 9 May. Twenty-three +helicopters and two OE-1 observation aircraft launched from Ca Mau at +1100 for an assault on Cai Ngai, a Viet Cong-controlled village 21 +miles to the south. At 1200 the helicopters began landing the ARVN +troops in six landing zones which had been attacked only five minutes +earlier by Vietnamese Air Force fighter bombers. Firing broke out even +before the Vietnamese troops could jump from the helicopters. During +this clash eight of the Marine aircraft were hit by small arms fire +and two Vietnamese troops were wounded while still on board. One HUS, +struck in the oil return line, was forced to land a few miles from +the objective. Troops were flown in quickly to establish a perimeter +around the downed aircraft while repairs were made. After the temporary +repairs had been completed, its crew flew the helicopter to Ca Mau, +where it remained until more extensive work could be accomplished. The +other aircraft, including an OE-1, suffered only superficial damage and +continued to support the ARVN operation. + +From this encounter with the Viet Cong, the Marine pilots learned that +air strikes conducted just prior to a helicopter landing in the heavily +populated delta country tended to disclose the location of the landing +zone to the enemy. In this instance the Communists had been able to +reach the landing zone in the few minutes which elapsed between the +last air strike and the arrival of the Marine helicopters. Following +this experience, the Marines would no longer allow VNAF air strikes on +landing zones prior to operations in the flat delta region.[5-D] + + [5-D] The development of helicopter tactics and techniques in + Vietnam will be covered in detail in a separate monograph + being prepared for publication by the History and Museums + Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. + +The Americans and Vietnamese, however, soon learned to use fixed-wing +aircraft to support helicopter operations in another manner. By +mid-June, FARM GATE T-28 Trojans (a single-engine two-seat trainer +built by North American) modified to carry bombs, rockets, and machine +guns were flying escort missions for the Marine helicopter squadron. +This particular aircraft could fly slowly enough to cruise with the HUS +yet fast enough to deliver an air strike en route to the objective and +then catch up with the helicopter formation. Normally an element of two +T-28s accompanied the helicopters and were used primarily to attack +targets near the landing zone after the ARVN troops were on the ground. +The placement of an American pilot-instructor and a Vietnamese student +in the T-28, a requirement imposed by MACV, helped avert language +problems which invariably developed when coordinating ARVN ground +operations and U.S. air operations. The effectiveness of the escort +tactic increased as the Marine and Air Force pilots became accustomed +to planning, coordinating, and executing the missions. + +The Marines quickly learned the value of utilizing the OE-1 in +conjunction with their helicopter operations. Three single-engine, +two-man aircraft, a detachment from Marine Observation Squadron 2 +(VMO-2), proved remarkably versatile in day-to-day operations over the +delta. Primarily, they were used in daylight visual reconnaissance, +usually to study objective areas and the approach routes which the +helicopters would later use. Sometimes their crews were called upon +to photograph proposed landing zones for briefing purposes. Often the +aircraft’s radios were used to relay messages between various ARVN +ground units which were operating beyond the range of their radios. +Equipped with two frequency-modulated (FM) radios for work with ground +stations and one ultra high-frequency (UHF) radio for communicating +with other aircraft, the OE-1 was perfectly suited for controlling +helicopter landings. The Marine aviators also found that, unlike +their helicopters, the observation aircraft did not arouse suspicion +in the area over which it flew. This advantage was due probably to +several factors. First, the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) routinely +operated similar aircraft over the entire region; secondly, the enemy +could not readily determine whether the OE-1 was on a reconnaissance +mission or merely flying from one point to another; and finally, the +small aircraft made little noise. Given these characteristics it was +no accident that the helicopter squadron relied on the observation +aircraft more and more as the pattern of operations unfolded. + +[Illustration: _Vietnamese infantrymen disembark from HMM-362 +helicopters and move toward treeline in one of the first helicopter +assault operations attempted by a Marine unit in the Mekong Delta. +(Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kizer, USMC)._] + +Shortly after their arrival in Vietnam, the Marines of HMM-362 began +experimenting with one of the more imaginative techniques developed in +the early stages of the intensified U.S.-GVN counterinsurgency effort. +Marine air crews had noticed that the enemy often managed to elude the +larger ARVN units by fleeing the operations area in small groups. Even +the smallest breach between ARVN units seemed to allow large numbers +of guerrillas to escape into covered or heavily populated areas where +they became impossible to find. Colonel Carey and Lieutenant Colonel +Clapp devised a plan to prevent escapes of this nature. Their idea was +to have a flight of four Marine helicopters loaded with about 50 ARVN +soldiers circle above the contested area. This so-called “Eagle Flight” +would be on the alert for any Viet Cong attempting to evade the ground +forces. Once the enemy was located, often by the OE-1 observation +aircraft, the helicopters would land the Vietnamese soldiers at a +position where they could block his escape. The Marine commanders felt +that the adoption of such a tactic would increase the effectiveness of +the ARVN’s helicopter assault operations. + +After several weeks of planning by HMM-362 and the affected III Corps +commands, the concept was put into practice. The Eagle Flight was first +tested in a large operation on 18 June when HMM-362 helilifted ARVN +troops into 16 different landing zones. Heavy monsoon rains made the +enemy particularly difficult to pin down, but the Marine pilots managed +to sight 10 Viet Cong near the main landing zone. After landing near +the enemy, the ARVN troops captured 10 Communist soldiers and wounded +one other. Shortly after this incident another Eagle Flight made two +eventful contacts with the enemy. The Marine helicopters landed their +small force and the ARVN promptly killed four Viet Cong and captured +another. Twenty minutes later, after reboarding the helicopters, the +South Vietnamese swept down upon a new prey, this time capturing four +prisoners. + +The novel concept was employed successfully again on 10 July. While +HMM-362 aircraft lifted 968 ARVN troops into the Ca Mau area, an Eagle +Flight spotted a sampan moving northward from the operations area. The +flight leader landed the troops nearby and the ARVN intercepted the +craft. Later that day the Marines and ARVN of the Eagle Flight clashed +twice with an estimated platoon of Viet Cong. In the first encounter +seven enemy were killed and several weapons were captured. In the +second skirmish, the enemy suffered six dead and lost more weapons. All +four Marine helicopters, however, were hit by small arms fire during +the two brief fights. + +By the middle of July, the Eagle Flight had become a proven combat +tactic. By reducing the enemy’s opportunity to escape when the +government forces possessed the advantage on the battlefield, it had +favorably influenced the tactical situation when used in the Mekong +Delta. Equally important, SHUFLY’s commanders had demonstrated their +ability to adapt their technological resources to the Viet Cong’s +methods of operations. Variants of the Eagle Flight tactic, under +different names such as Tiger Flight, Sparrow Hawk, Pacifier, and Quick +Reaction Force, would be used by the Marines throughout the Vietnam war. + +The Marines were quick to apply their technological knowhow to other +problems which were to confront them during their early operations in +the III Corps Tactical Zone. One example was their adaptation of the +TAFDS to the problem which arose when the helicopters were called upon +to operate far beyond their normal fuel range. HMM-362 helicopters +would airlift a TAFDS unit, complete with a 10,000 gallon fuel bladder, +pumps, and MABS-16 personnel, to the site where the ARVN troops were +to be loaded. The fuel bladders were filled by gasoline trucks which +travelled from the nearest source of fuel. The Marine helicopters could +then use the TAFDS as a temporary base of operations, refueling between +troop pick-ups when necessary. Thus employed, the TAFDS allowed the +operating radius of the helicopters to be extended to support even the +most distant South Vietnamese operation. + +While the Marines were learning to adapt their technology to the +guerrilla war environment, the enemy was applying his ingenuity in +attempts to frustrate the American and South Vietnamese helicopter +operations. The Viet Cong quickly learned to capitalize on the presence +of large crowds of civilians who sometimes gathered near helicopter +landing zones to watch the strange aircraft. One such incident occurred +in June when Communist soldiers mingled with a crowd and delivered +fire on helicopters which were lifting elements of the 21st ARVN +Division. Two aircraft were hit by enemy fire although the damage was +not extensive enough to force them to land. The Marines, who refused +to return fire with their individual weapons unless the Viet Cong +could be separated from the civilian populace, found no effective +method of countering this tactic. Later in June, the Marines of HMM-362 +encountered another tactic when they found that hundreds of upright +bamboo stakes had been prepositioned in the intended landing zone. The +perpendicular spikes, each four or five feet high, not only prevented +the helicopters from landing but also made it impossible to disembark +the ARVN troops while hovering. Fortunately, the abundance of landing +zones in the delta region tended to make this particular tactic +ineffective.[5-E] + + [5-E] The German army had used a similar technique (upright + poles) to obstruct landing zones against U.S. paratroops + at Normandy during World War II. (Taylor, _Swords and + Plowshares_, p. 80.) + +On 20 July, HMM-362 added a new dimension to the counterguerrilla +capabilities of the South Vietnamese forces when it executed the first +night helicopter assault of the war. The mission, which began at 0415 +at Soc Trang, involved lifting three waves of ARVN troops into an +objective on the Plain of Reeds, about 40 miles southwest of Ben Tre. +The ARVN force intended to encircle a suspected Viet Cong village +before dawn and then attack it at daybreak. The Marine portion of the +airlift was completed 10 minutes before daylight after which the Army’s +57th Helicopter Company joined the operation. Although the night troop +lift was executed without incident, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp attributed +its success at least partially to the near perfect conditions. The +moonlight, reflected from the flat, flooded rice paddies, had aided the +Marine pilots in the tricky operation.[5-19] + +Prior to SHUFLY’s deployment to Soc Trang, General Roberts’ staff at +FMFPac had developed a policy for the periodic rotation of the task +unit’s Marines for which the Commandant’s approval had been gained. +The helicopter squadron would be replaced by a similar unit after +approximately four months of operations in the combat zone. But +rather than being drawn from the 1st MAW on Okinawa, the replacement +squadron was to be provided by the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in +California. Officers and men serving with the supporting headquarters +and MABS-16 elements, however, were to be replaced by Marines from +MAG-16 at approximately four-month intervals. So as not to disrupt the +operational efficiency of the task unit, individual replacements would +be made in increments. + +In accordance with this rotation policy, HMM-163, the HUS unit +scheduled to relieve HMM-362, began arriving at Soc Trang on 23 July. +Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Rathbun, a veteran fighter +pilot of World War II and Korea, the squadron continued to arrive +during the last week of July. Airlifted by GV-1s from the Marine Corps +Air Facility, Santa Ana, California, the new squadron brought neither +helicopters nor maintenance equipment. The squadron commander had +orders to continue operations with HMM-362’s aircraft and equipment. + +Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s squadron maintained a steady operational +pace even after the new unit’s appearance. On 27 July, 18 of HMM-362’s +helicopters participated in an operation about 30 miles northeast +of Soc Trang. The next day the task unit commander committed 21 +helicopters and OE-1s to a 21st ARVN Division operation near Ca Mau. +The Eagle Flight was committed on four different occasions during this +operation. + +Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s “Ridge Runners” officially relieved +“Archie’s Angels” on 1 August after a week of orientation flying with +HMM-362’s crews. The men of the departing squadron could reflect +on their tour in South Vietnam with a sense of satisfaction and +accomplishment. Since their arrival in mid-April, they had executed +50 combat helicopter assaults, had flown 4,439 sorties, and had +amassed 5,262 hours of combat flight time, all in unarmed aircraft. +During the course of these missions they had made approximately 130 +different landings against Viet Cong opposition. Seventeen of their +24 helicopters and two of the three OE-1 aircraft had received battle +damage. To the credit of the squadron’s maintenance personnel and +aircrews, HMM-362 had not lost a single aircraft during its operations +in the Republic of Vietnam. Miraculously the squadron had suffered no +casualties while testing the Marine Corps’ vertical envelopment concept +in the guerrilla war situation.[5-20] + +During their three and a half months at Soc Trang, Lieutenant Colonel +Clapp’s men had contributed significantly to another facet of the war +effort--one usually considered unrelated to normal combat operations. +Sensing the unique links between the political and military aspects +of the struggle in South Vietnam, Colonel Carey had initiated a +“People-to-People-Program,” the objective of which was to assist the +Government of Vietnam in winning the allegiance of the Vietnamese +people. Within a few days after occupying the Soc Trang airfield, +Colonel Carey had ordered the task unit’s medical facilities made +available to Vietnamese civilians requiring emergency medical +treatment. U.S. Navy doctors and corpsmen began visiting nearby +villages to hold “sick call” for the local inhabitants. On an average +visit these medical teams would examine around 60 Vietnamese of all +ages. They would then dispense soap, vitamins, and aspirin--commodities +which some rural Vietnamese had never seen. Gradually, the medical +teams expanded their operations until by mid-June they were being flown +by helicopter as far away as Ca Mau. + +HMM-362’s departure from Vietnam coincided roughly with the departure +of most of the Marine task unit’s senior officers--the men who had +directed the efforts to win the “other war” for the allegiance of the +Vietnamese people. On 30 July, Colonel Julius W. Ireland, another +Marine aviator who had seen combat in two previous wars, relieved +Colonel Carey as the task unit commander. The new commander was one of +few Marines who had been in Vietnam previously. In April 1954 he had +landed at Da Nang (then known by its French name, Tourane) as squadron +commander of Marine Attack Squadron 324 (VMA-324) and delivered 25 +F4U/FG Corsair fighter bombers to the French who were in desperate +need of attack aircraft to support Dien Bien Phu. Five days after +Ireland assumed command of Task Unit 79.3.5, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph +R. Davis replaced Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge as commanding officer of +the MABS-16 sub unit. On 13 August another change occurred when the +executive officer of the Marine task unit, Lieutenant Colonel Harry C. +Dees, was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Alton W. McCully. Except that +it left few original members of the task unit, the departure of these +Marines for new duty stations in Okinawa, Japan, and the United States +did not affect the operations at Soc Trang. Thoroughly briefed on their +responsibilities, the new officers would continue to direct Marine +support of the Vietnamese government on both the battlefield and the +psychological front. + +HMM-163 participated in its first combat mission as a squadron on +1 August when it joined the Army’s 57th Helicopter Company in a +coordinated troop lift. Like their predecessors, “Rathbun’s Ridge +Runners” maintained a brisk pace of operations during the weeks +following their initial assignment. Shortly after its first troop +lift, the squadron participated in a 2,000-man South Vietnamese +spoiling operation in An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost province. +Anticipating a major Viet Cong offensive in the four southern +provinces, III Corps authorities moved their headquarters to Soc Trang +and established a forward command post at Ca Mau. The Vietnamese Air +Force then positioned a composite detachment of four AD-6 Skyraiders +(single-engine, propeller-driven attack bombers built by Douglas), two +T-28s, and a number of H-34 helicopters (the U.S. Army, Air Force, and +VNAF version of the HUS) at Soc Trang to support the operation. Joined +by the VNAF H-34s, the Marine squadron conducted numerous troop lifts +during the week-long operation. At the end of the action the ARVN +reported 84 Viet Cong killed, another 30 captured, and the confiscation +of nearly 15,000 pounds of arms, ammunition, and explosives. The first +Marine helicopter loss in Vietnam occurred during the operation when +a VNAF fighter careened off the runway and damaged a parked HUS to +the extent that it could not be repaired. Marine mechanics stripped +undamaged parts from the helicopter for use as replacements.[5-F] + + [5-F] Marine helicopters lost in Vietnam during the 1962–1964 + period were replaced by new ones airlifted from Okinawa + by U.S. Air Force C-124 Globemaster transports. By + replacing aircraft losses on a one-to-one basis the task + unit was able to maintain a level of 24 helicopters + except for brief periods. + +HMM-163 suffered its first aircraft damage as a result of combat a few +day’s later on 18 August during a mission led by Lieutenant Colonel +Rathbun. Fourteen HUSs arrived at a prearranged pickup point to +rendezvous with an ARVN infantry force but the Marine pilots discovered +that the unit had not appeared. One crewman then reported having seen +some ARVN troops about a half mile away from the landing zone. At this +juncture, a white smoke signal appeared at approximately the same +location that the Marine had observed the South Vietnamese troops. +Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun and his wingmate, assuming that the smoke +marked the actual pickup point, took off to investigate the area. While +making a low pass over the smoke signal, the squadron commander’s +helicopter was hit several times by small arms fire which severed the +rudder control cable and punctured the main rotor transmission. The +loss of oil required Rathbun to make a forced landing on a nearby road. +After mechanics had been flown in and repairs had been accomplished, +the helicopter was flown to a secure area. + +[Illustration: _Marine officers visit Father Phuoc’s village. Left +to right: Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp; Colonel John F. Carey; +Father Phuoc; Colonel Julius W. Ireland; Colonel Gordon Gale; Major +General Richard G. Weede; French Interpreter Gilles H. Rocheleau; and +three unidentified Marine officers. (USMC Photo A420824)._] + +An investigation of the incident later revealed that the confusion had +begun when the ARVN unit scheduled to be helilifted became involved in +a skirmish with guerrillas less than a mile from the pick up point. A +VNAF Forward Air Controller (FAC) in an observation aircraft had then +marked the Viet Cong position for an air strike with a white smoke +grenade rather than red smoke, as was normally used. This was the smoke +which Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun had attempted to identify when his +aircraft was hit. + +From this incident the pilots of HMM-163 learned several valuable +lessons about helicopter support in conjunction with ARVN ground +operations. First, helilifts of government forces from the field at +prearranged times required thorough last minute coordination. Secondly, +helicopters could not be used safely on low-level reconnaissance or +identification passes. Finally, prearranged colored smoke signals were +easily confused and when used routinely were subject to enemy attempts +at deception. Such signalling methods were most effective when used in +conjunction with radio communications between air and ground units. + +A somewhat humorous sequel to this incident took place later in the +day when Rathbun learned that he had been selected for promotion to +colonel. The timing of the notification prompted one squadron wit to +quip: “Lost a bird, gained a bird.”[5-21] + +“Rathbun’s Ridge Runners” continued intensive support operations in +III Corps Tactical Zone throughout the month of August. Their daily +missions normally included both scheduled troop lifts and unscheduled +medical evacuations. During the week of 19–25 August HMM-163 +helicopters logged slightly over 800 combat flying hours. A squadron +record for a single day was established on 24 August when 197.6 +helicopter hours were flown. Flight time for the helicopters during +the entire month totalled 2,543 hours--a new Marine Corps record for +an HUS squadron. The OE-1 aircraft added 63 missions and 212 hours to +this total. Another statistic revealed that 21 of the squadron’s pilots +logged over 100 hours of combat flying time during August.[5-22] This +record was even more impressive considering that flight operations were +hampered by the monsoon season which reached its peak during August in +the Mekong Delta. + +In August Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s men made a significant +modification to their helicopters when they began mounting M-60 +machine guns inside the cargo hatch. So as not to obstruct the hatch +during loading and unloading phases, the squadron’s metalsmiths +designed a flexible mount which allowed the crew chiefs to swing the +belt-fed, 7.62mm automatic weapon back into the cabin when necessary. +The addition of the machine gun enabled the crew chief to protect +the otherwise defenseless helicopter during critical landing and +take off phases. Still, the Marine gunners were restricted in their +action by MACV’s “rules of engagement” which at this time stipulated +that American servicemen could fire only after being fired upon and +then only at clearly identified enemy. Intended to prevent offensive +combat action by U.S. military personnel operating in Vietnam, these +regulations prevented Americans from returning fire except when +the enemy was clearly identified.[5-G] Primarily because of these +restrictions the Marines seldom employed their M-60s in the heavily +populated Mekong Delta. + + [5-G] The rules of engagement applied to U.S. advisors as + well as aviation crews. Although they underwent several + modifications during the course of the war, the above + definition was virtually unaltered during the period + between 1962 and 1964. + + +_Preparations and Redeployment_ + +In early September General Harkins directed that Colonel Ireland begin +planning for the redeployment of his helicopter task unit northward +to Da Nang. The shift to I Corps, which had been the subject of +much debate prior to SHUFLY’s assignment at Soc Trang, came as no +surprise. Shortly after the task unit’s arrival in the Mekong Delta, +Colonel Carey accompanied General Condon on a visit to the Army’s 93d +Helicopter Company at Da Nang. There they discussed details of the +relocation with Army officers. In early July General Harkins set 1 +August as the date on which the Marine task unit and the 93d Helicopter +Company would switch locations. But personal appeals by General Nghiem, +the III Corps commander and his senior U.S. advisor, Colonel Porter, +that the Marine helicopters be retained at Soc Trang caused Harkins to +postpone the date for the exchange until 15 September. + +In that the airlift was executed in phases, the Marines’ movement to +Da Nang was accomplished in much the same manner as had been the task +unit’s initial move into Soc Trang. On 4 September Colonel Ireland +dispatched the task unit’s assistant communications officer and an +advance party to Da Nang to assess the communications requirements +there and to prepare for the arrival of the remainder of the Marines +and their equipment. Four days later Marine wiremen, message center +personnel, and radio operators began preparing a communications center +at their new home. The next day the advance party established radio +contact with SHUFLY headquarters in order to help coordinate the move. +By 9 September MABS-16 technicians had assembled a TAFDS at the Da Nang +airfield. This facility would enable the GV-1 transports participating +in the airlift to refuel for the 460-mile return flight to Soc Trang +after unloading their cargoes at Da Nang. + +While the advance party readied the facilities at Da Nang for its +unit’s arrival, combat support operations and preparations for the move +northward continued simultaneously at Soc Trang. During an operation on +5 September, three of HMM-163’s helicopters were hit by several rounds +of enemy small arms fire. Although all three aircraft returned safely +to base, the Marines suffered their first casualty to Viet Cong fire +when Corporal Billy S. Watson, a crew chief, was slightly wounded. +Troop lifts from Soc Trang continued until 1740 on 13 September when +helicopter support operations were ended and the final preparations for +the move to Da Nang began. + +On the evening of 14 September, the first of the Marine GV-1s slated +to transport the task unit arrived at Soc Trang from Okinawa. At dawn +the next morning, the refueler-transports began shuttling Marines and +their equipment to Da Nang and the Army’s 93d Helicopter Company to Soc +Trang. By the end of the day much of the airlift had been completed. +The crews and helicopters of Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s squadron, +however, did not begin displacing northward until the 16th when 12 HUSs +made the seven-hour flight to Da Nang with three en route refueling +stops. The 12 remaining helicopters arrived at SHUFLY’s new base of +operations the next day. The move was completed on 20 September when +the last cargo carrying GV-1 landed at Da Nang. + + +_Accomplishments_ + +As SHUFLY’s Marines began preparing for their impending operations +in the northern provinces they could look with pride on their +accomplishments at Soc Trang. Since their arrival in the Mekong Delta +in April the Leathernecks had clearly demonstrated their ability to +conduct sustained and effective helicopter operations in support of +non-English-speaking ground forces. While it could not be said that +their presence had completely transformed the complexion of the GVN’s +struggle to control the critical Mekong Delta region, the Marine +helicopters had provided the ARVN units operating there with a degree +of mobility they had not previously possessed. This new-found mobility +in turn had helped generate a new offensive spirit within government +units assigned to southern III Corps. In his letter to ComUSMACV +requesting the retention of the task unit at Soc Trang, Colonel Porter, +the Senior U.S. Advisor to the corps tactical zone, reported: “Now +they [ARVN forces] have a taste of victory and for the first time are +beginning to believe there is a possibility of defeating the Viet +Cong.”[5-23] + +During the course of their operations throughout South Vietnam’s +southern provinces, the SHUFLY Marines displayed an instinct for +recognizing and coping with the challenges of unconventional warfare. +Confronted by a war without front lines in which an elusive, highly +mobile enemy blended readily with the local populace, the task unit’s +leaders devised new and successful helicopter tactics. Likewise, +SHUFLY’s Marine and Navy personnel moved to prevent a possible +conflict of cultures and to discredit Communist propaganda through the +initiation of the People-to-People Program. Although only an informal +beginning, this program would serve as a foundation upon which the U.S. +Marine Corps would later build a doctrine defining the relationship +between Marines on duty in Vietnam and the Vietnamese people. + +Beyond the innovative thinking of its leaders, much of SHUFLY’s success +in III Corps was produced by hard work on a sustained basis. For this +the individual Marines, particularly the maintenance crews which +often worked around the clock in primitive surroundings to keep the +helicopters airworthy, deserved heavy credit. Although unglamorous, +their daily contributions underwrote the success of the combat support +operations. So, functioning as a team, the task unit’s members blended +innovation, hard work, and technical expertise with perseverance and +courage to carve out a reputation for themselves in the faraway rice +lands of the Mekong Delta. + + + + +CHAPTER 6 + +SHUFLY Moves North + +_Arrival at Da Nang--I Corps Tactical Zone--Military Situation, +September 1962--Initial Helicopter Operations--Marine People-to-People +Program--SHUFLY Operations in I Corps_ + + +_Arrival at Da Nang_ + +Da Nang retained many characteristics of an old French colonial port +city when the Marines arrived there in mid-September 1962. With its +thriving market place, its throngs of bicycles, and a noticeable dearth +of automobile traffic, the city was certainly more Asian than European +in appearance. Still, the former French presence was evident in the +architecture of public buildings, electric and telephone lines, paved +streets, built-up waterfront, and an airfield. Although the French +influence seemed not to have disturbed the traditional Vietnamese +culture, it had imparted a picturesque charm to South Vietnam’s second +largest city. + +Virtually surrounded by the city itself, Da Nang’s airfield was to +serve as SHUFLY’s new base of operations. Having been rebuilt as +a military base by the French following World War II, the Da Nang +facility was relatively modern. Understandably, it differed in many +ways from the crude little airfield the Marines had left behind in the +steamy Mekong Delta. The runway, for example, was considerably longer, +having 8,000 feet of paved surface. The Da Nang base was also busier, +having already been occupied by Vietnamese and U.S. Air Force units. +Furthermore, it served the city as a commercial airport. + +Scattered around the long north-south runway were numerous clusters of +French-built masonry structures. A group of 50 of these yellow-walled +buildings, located about one half mile west of the runway, had been +designated as living quarters for the newly arrived Marines. Although +the actual living spaces were somewhat crowded and in need of much +repair, the indoor toilets, showers, ceiling fans, and fluorescent +lights (none of which functioned properly) were welcomed by the men +who had experienced the discomforts of life in Soc Trang’s “tent +city.” Once the Marines had moved in, their compound would include a +chapel, medical and dental facilities, service clubs, a movie, a barber +shop, a laundry, and a mess hall. + +While many of the problems encountered initially by the Marines at +Da Nang were similar to those that had greeted their predecessors at +Soc Trang, there were also some new ones to be resolved. The two most +imposing of these stemmed from the distance between the living compound +and working areas. Located along the southeast side of the airstrip, +the flight line and hangar were nearly three miles from the Marine +quarters by road. Located still farther away, about a quarter mile +south of the hangar, were the motor pool and communications facility. +In addition to creating a new requirement for transportation, the +distances between the various areas necessitated adjustments in the +security arrangements which had been used at Soc Trang. + +Fortunately SHUFLY’s first commander, Colonel Carey, had foreseen +the requirement for transportation between the living area and the +flight line during his visit to the Da Nang installation in April. The +problem was solved by the purchase of three used American school buses +which were already on hand when the Marines arrived from Soc Trang. +The security situation proved somewhat more perplexing. Initially +Colonel Ireland handled the problem in much the same manner as it had +been at Soc Trang. A permanent sergeant-of-the-guard was detailed to +supervise a security force composed of men from the MABS-16 sub unit +and HMM-163. Guard posts were established around the helicopter flight +line, the hangar, the TAFDS, the motor pool-communications area, and +the billeting compound. But this arrangement, while serving the +intended purpose, was not ideal. Frequently the Marines who served +on security watch at night were called upon to perform long hours +of work the following day. This prompted Colonel Ireland to request +that a permanent security force be assigned to his command in order +that the overworked mechanics, cooks, carpenters, electricians, and +communicators could concentrate on their particular jobs. The request +was placed under consideration by ComUSMACV and FMFPac authorities but +was not approved immediately.[6-A] + + [6-A] General Weede explained that, because such increases + could not be made without the approval of the Department + of Defense, such requests were forwarded first to MACV + Headquarters for approval. (_Weede Interview._) + +[Illustration: _A portion of the Marine Compound at Da Nang. (Official +USMC Photo)._] + +At Da Nang Colonel Ireland’s task unit was not responsible for every +facet of airfield operations as had been the case previously at Soc +Trang. The U.S. Air Force provided radar, ground control approach, +tactical air navigation, and meteorological services at the new +installation while the Vietnamese operated the control tower. These +conveniences allowed Ireland to make a small reduction in the overall +size of the Marine task unit. Those MABS-16 specialists who had +operated these systems at Soc Trang were returned to their parent +organizations on Okinawa. + + +_I Corps Tactical Zone_ + +At the time the Marine task unit arrived in Da Nang, I Corps Tactical +Zone encompassed South Vietnam’s five northern provinces. Quang Tri +Province, located immediately south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) +topped this tier of political subdivisions. Below Quang Tri Province +lay Thua Thien, followed by Quang Nam, Quang Tin (recently created), +and Quang Ngai Provinces. All are coastal provinces and, with the +exception of Quang Ngai, extend inland from the seacoast to the Laotian +border, a distance which varies between 30 and 70 miles. Together, they +occupy the central portion of the region formerly known as Annam and +extend 225 miles to the south of the DMZ. + +[Illustration: + + I CORPS 1962 +] + +The climatic pattern in the northern provinces is the exact reverse +of that which affects the southern portion of the nation. In I Corps +the dry season occurs in the summer months while the monsoons, which +blow from the northeast, dominate the winter. Heavy monsoon rains +accompanied by wind and fog normally begin in October. After reaching +their peak usually in November, the monsoon rains tend to diminish +gradually until their disappearance around mid-March. + +The differences between the physical structure of the northern +provinces and the Mekong Delta is even more striking than their +reversed climatic patterns. White beaches stretch almost unbroken along +the entire length of I Corps. Just inland and roughly parallel to the +coast south of Da Nang lies a lightly populated strip of sand dunes and +generally unproductive soil. This strip varies in width from one half +to two miles. In the west it dissolves into the flat, densely populated +coastal plain. Any similarity between the Mekong Delta and the northern +provinces is found in this expanse of fertile rice-producing land where +tiny rural hamlets and slightly larger villages, each enclosed by thick +hedgerows and treelines, abound. North of Da Nang the semi-barren +coastal sands tend to extend farther inland, and thereby reduce the +productive portion of the coastal plains. + +The most distinct geographic feature of I Corps, and one easily visible +to the Marines at Da Nang, is the chain of towering mountains which +protrude from the flat coastal plain several miles west of the city. +There is a conspicuous absence of foothills leading to the mountains +which seem to surround Da Nang on the north and west. North of the Hai +Van Peninsula, a rugged promonotory which juts into the South China +Sea about 10 miles north of the Marines’ new home, a zone of foothills +eases the transition from the wide coastal plain to the rugged +jungle-covered mountains. + +The coastal plains of the five northern provinces are broken by several +significant streams along which most of the region’s principal +population centers are located. Roughly 10 miles south of the 1954 +partition line the Cua Viet empties into the southern portion of the +Tonkin Gulf. Both Quang Tri City, the capital of Quang Tri Province, +and Dong Ha, South Vietnam’s northernmost population center of any +significance, are situated on the Cua Viet and its major tributary, the +Song Cam Lo. The Song Huong (often referred to as the Perfume River), +which flows past the old imperial capital of Hue, enters the sea at a +point approximately half way between Da Nang and the nation’s northern +boundary.[6-B] At Da Nang the Song Han (also called the Da Nang River) +flows into Da Nang Harbor after its main tributary, the Song Cau Do, +curves through the coastal plains immediately south and west of the +city. Eighteen miles south of the Marines’ new base of operations, +the Song Cau Dai empties into the South China Sea near Hoi An, the +capital of Quang Nam Province. The Song Cau Dai originates about 18 +miles inland at the confluence of the Song Thu Bon and the Song Vu Gia +which twist seaward from the south and west respectively. Together +these three estuaries constitute the most important geographic feature +of the sprawling coastal plain south of Da Nang. Another major stream, +the Song Tra Bong, flows on an eastward course about 32 miles south of +the Song Cau Dai. Still further south is the Song Tra Khuc, a river +which dominates the wide coastal plain of Quang Ngai Province in much +the same fashion as does the Song Cau Dai and its tributaries in the +area south of Da Nang. The provincial capital, Quang Ngai, once a major +railroad center for South Vietnam, is situated several miles inland on +the south bank of the Song Tra Khuc. The southernmost stream of any +significance in I Corps is the Song Ve, which angles northeastward +through central Quang Ngai Province. While none of these waterways is +navigable far beyond its mouth by ocean-going vessels, each serves the +local population as convenient local routes of communication as well as +vital sources of irrigation water during the long dry seasons. + + [6-B] In the Vietnamese language the word “song” means stream + and normally precedes the name of rivers. + +The two and a half million people who inhabited I Corps in 1962 had +developed along social and economic lines dictated largely by the +geography and climate of their region. Rice growing, centered on +the coastal plains, dominated the economic activities of the area. +Combined, the provinces of I Corps produced nearly half a million +tons of rice annually. Fishing, concentrated along the coast and the +major rivers, ranked as the second most important economic pursuit. +Unlike most of South Vietnam, I Corps did possess some potential for +industrial development. A small but productive surface coal mine was +located about 25 miles southwest of Da Nang at Nong Son along the +western bank of the Song Thu Bon. Although the mine was operating in +1962, it had made little discernable impact on the overall economic +picture of the region. + +[Illustration: _Aerial view of Marine helicopter flight line at Da +Nang shortly after SHUFLY’s relocation to I Corps in September 1962. +(Official USMC Photo)._] + + +_Military Situation, September 1962_ + +From its new base at Da Nang, Colonel Ireland’s task unit was +responsible for directly supporting the forces under Major General +Tran Van Don’s I Corps headquarters. The 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions, +headquartered respectively at Hue and Da Nang, were the major tactical +units at General Don’s disposal. Occasionally elements of the 25th ARVN +Division, headquartered at Kontum in northwestern II Corps, joined I +Corps forces for offensive operations along the southern fringe of +Quang Ngai Province. Several ARVN Ranger battalions served as mobile +reaction forces for the corps tactical zone.[6-C] Also scattered over +the northern corps tactical zone were numerous paramilitary units of +assorted sizes. These, too, were garrisoned primarily along the heavily +populated coastal plain. + + [6-C] The ranger battalions had been organized in late 1960 + from existing ARVN forces. They were conceived as highly + mobile infantry units and were under the direct control + of the CTZ commander. + +Opposing these government forces in the early fall of 1962 were Viet +Cong forces of formidable strength. Four interprovincial battalions +(main force), four interprovincial companies, five provincial +companies, 18 district companies, and three district platoons were +known to be operating within the boundaries of I Corps. Together, these +units totalled an estimated 4,750 men.[6-1] Added to the presence +of these known Viet Cong units was the threat posed to I Corps by +its proximity to North Vietnam and to the so-called “Ho Chi Minh +Trails” located across the Laotian border. The relative position of +the northern provinces naturally invited Communist infiltration. In +June, for example, the _4th Viet Cong Battalion_, a main force unit, +was infiltrated into Quang Nam Province from sanctuaries in Laos. By +September MACV intelligence estimates reported one North Vietnamese +(PAVN) infantry division, two independent PAVN infantry regiments, and +an artillery regiment poised in areas of Laos adjacent to the I Corps +border. “These units,” the U.S. report warned, “... could be committed +anywhere in I Corps or [the] northern part of II Corps 20 days after +starting movement.”[6-2] + +While the government’s nationwide strategy focused on clearing and +holding the populated areas, the physiographic configuration of I +Corps (as well as II Corps to the south) demanded that offensive +operations be conducted in the mountains adjacent to the coastal plains +against Viet Cong base areas. Since the arrival of the U.S. Army +helicopter company at Da Nang early in the year, General Don had shown +an increasing tendency to mount battalion and regimental heliborne +assaults deep into the western mountains. Capitalizing on the mobility +which the American helicopters afforded, the ARVN command had hoped to +disrupt remote Communist base areas inside the international border. +Still, heliborne offensives into western I Corps were often hampered by +bad weather, particularly during the monsoon season. + +Another facet of the government effort to deny the enemy unrestricted +access to the mountains was a system characterized by a network of +small, relatively isolated outposts. In late 1961, at the urging +of U.S. officials in Saigon, the Diem government had launched a +program whose ultimate objective was similar to that of the Strategic +Hamlet Program. First, U.S. Army Special Forces teams entered +remote Montagnard villages located in the Annamite Chain and built +small fortified camps. This accomplished, the Americans initiated +pacification activities with the hope of securing the allegiance of the +traditionally independent Montagnard tribesmen. + +By mid-1962 the Special Forces effort appeared on its way to success. +Already Montagnard tribesmen had been organized into a number of +Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDGs) throughout the mountains of +I and II Corps. Advised by Special Forces teams, the CIDG units were +monitoring infiltration routes and harassing the Communists as they +attempted to move through the mountains. By the summer of 1962 the +distinctive little barbed wire enclosed camps were scattered over the +length of western I Corps. + +Although it played an important role in the government’s strategy for +controlling the insurgency in the northern provinces, the outpost +system had obvious shortcomings. Roads between the distant camps and +the towns along the coastal plain were almost nonexistent. Those that +did exist, such as Route 9, the road which extended from Route 1 +westward across Quang Tri Province and into Laos, were vulnerable to +ambush or interdiction by guerrilla forces. Truck convoys, furthermore, +consumed time and required protection by security forces. As a result +of their relative isolation, the CIDG camps had come to depend heavily +on aircraft as a means of resupply. While crude runways had been +constructed at many of the outposts, they were often better suited for +helicopter operations than for fixed-wing transport landings. The newly +arrived Marine commanders anticipated that their squadron, like the +Army helicopter company it had replaced, would be required to devote a +sizable percentage of sorties to resupplying the far-flung outposts. + + +_Initial Helicopter Operations_ + +The system of helicopter coordination in I Corps promised to be +somewhat different from that which had governed Marine operations in +the Mekong Delta. At Da Nang, an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) +was organized within the corps headquarters to process all requests +for aviation support. Manned by ARVN, VNAF, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. +Marine officers, the ASOC processed mission requests from the various +field commands, passing them on to the Joint Operations Center at JGS +headquarters for final approval. Once approved, the ASOC assigned +specific missions to the American and Vietnamese units which supported +I CTZ. This arrangement enabled the corps headquarters to plan and +coordinate all combat support missions flown within the five northern +provinces. + +[Illustration: + + MAJOR OUTPOSTS I CORPS 1962 +] + +The Vietnamese commanders in I Corps, who had learned to value +helicopter support as a result of the Army aviation company’s +eight-month presence at Da Nang, lost no time in employing the newly +arrived Marine squadron. HMM-163 flew its first combat operation from +Da Nang on 18 September, the day after the last flight of helicopters +arrived from Soc Trang. Fourteen HUSs lifted troops of the 2d ARVN +Division into two landing zones in the rugged hills about 35 miles +south of Da Nang and 25 miles inland from the coast. The scarcity of +suitable landing zones in the steep hill country and the fact that +the enemy could deliver fire on those that did exist from nearby +high ground and the surrounding jungle prompted the Marine pilots +to adjust their tactics in preparation for this mission. After VNAF +fighters bombed and strafed the objective area, the helicopters made an +unopposed landing. + +The tactic of preparing helicopter landing zones with air strikes +was continued and refined in the ensuing weeks. The Marines began +using artillery fire in conjunction with air strikes to neutralize +enemy troops in the vicinity of the objective. The OE-1 was well +suited for assisting in the employment of the artillery fire support. +Having familiarized themselves with the landing site during a prior +reconnaissance mission, the pilot and observer of the OE-1 would arrive +over the designated area prior to the operation and adjust artillery +fire until the helicopters appeared. During the landing the crew of the +observation aircraft often coordinated between the helicopters and the +escorting aircraft and were available to assist the ground units with +artillery fire missions. + +The task unit’s staff borrowed another idea from their experience +in the Mekong Delta which allowed HMM-163 to provide more efficient +helicopter support in the northern provinces. In this case the concept +of temporarily positioning the TAFDS to support specific operations +was refined somewhat by placing the portable refueling bladders at +secure, permanent locations throughout I Corps. Several days after +arriving in I Corps, the Marines emplaced a 10,000-gallon section of +the TAFDS at Quang Ngai, about 65 miles south of Da Nang, to serve as a +permanent refueling point for aircraft operating in southern I Corps. +Within the month, another fuel bladder was positioned at Hue and a +third was emplaced at Tam Ky, the capital of Quang Tin Province, which +was situated on Route 1 about half way between Da Nang and Quang Ngai. +These well-chosen refueling points greatly enhanced the squadron’s +operational potential. Used to support daily operations, they enabled +the helicopters to operate deep into the adjacent mountain areas on +resupply and medical evacuation missions. + +On 19 September, the day after their initial combat support assignment +in I Corps, the Marine helicopter crews were called upon to conduct an +operation which they would repeat often in the coming months. They were +ordered to evacuate a threatened government outpost from the mountains +18 miles west of Da Nang. That day the HMM-163 pilots lifted an odd +cargo of troops, dependents, personal belongings and an assortment of +pigs, cows, chickens, and ducks to a secure area on the coastal plain. + +Unfortunately, helicopter evacuations of encircled or endangered South +Vietnamese outposts would become almost routine for Marine helicopter +squadrons assigned to Vietnam during the period between 1962 and 1965. +As the North Vietnamese stepped up their support for the Viet Cong, +the isolated government outposts along the infiltration routes became +particularly vulnerable. The increased number of helicopter evacuation +missions during the next three years would be grim testimony of the +trend of warfare which was unfolding in the South. Reinforced with more +and more North Vietnamese and growing amounts of Communist bloc and +captured U.S. equipment, the Viet Cong would press the initiative even +in South Vietnam’s most isolated areas. + +The Communists operating in I Corps lost little time in challenging the +newly arrived Marine unit. HMM-163 suffered its first battle damage +while lifting elements of the 2d ARVN Division into a landing zone +southwest of Tam Ky on 26 September. One of 22 helicopters involved +in the mission was struck in the fuselage by small arms fire despite +the use of preparatory air and artillery strikes on the landing zone. +The day after this incident another of the squadron’s helicopters was +hit by enemy fire while attempting to evacuate wounded ARVN soldiers +from the battlefield. On the 29th two more aircraft were damaged by +ground fire while participating in another troop lift. One round passed +through the windshield and exited at the rear of the cockpit, missing +the copilot’s head by inches. During the first week of October another +HUS was struck while landing at Tien Phuoc, a government outpost about +15 miles southwest of Tam Ky. In this incident two ARVN troops were +killed and the Marine crew chief, Lance Corporal James I. Mansfield, +was wounded before the pilot could fly the aircraft out of the danger +area. In each of the instances the helicopters were able to return to +Da Nang where necessary repairs were made. + +The most serious incident recorded during the early operations in I +Corps ironically resulted from mechanical failure rather than Viet Cong +fire. It occurred on 6 October when a search and rescue helicopter +crashed and burned on a hillside 15 miles southeast of Tam Ky while +covering a 20-plane helilift of 2d ARVN Division elements.[6-D] Unable +to land near the downed aircraft because of the thick jungle, other +helicopters landed troops at the base of the hill with instructions to +proceed to the crash site on foot. When the Vietnamese soldiers reached +the downed aircraft after cutting their way through dense vegetation, +they found the copilot, crew chief, and five other members of the task +unit dead. The pilot, First Lieutenant William T. Sinnott, who was +injured seriously, was hoisted through the trees and evacuated by an +HUS which came to the rescue. The five Marines killed in the crash +were First Lieutenant Michael J. Tunney, Sergeant Richard E. Hamilton, +Sergeant Jerald W. Pendell, Corporal Thomas E. Anderson, and Lance +Corporal Miguel A. Valentin. Two Navy personnel, Lieutenant Gerald +Griffin, a doctor, and Hospitalman G. O. Norton were also dead. These +were the first deaths suffered by Marine Task Unit 79.5 since deploying +to Vietnam.[6-3] + + [6-D] For larger operations the task unit commander usually + designated one HUS as a search and rescue aircraft. This + helicopter normally carried several mechanics and Navy + medical personnel and was equipped with a hoist. + +An administrative measure which eventually resulted in the extension of +the length of tours for the Marine helicopter squadron as well as all +other personnel assigned to SHUFLY was initiated in the first week of +October. Colonel Ireland dispatched a recommendation to the Commanding +General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing proposing that the tours for both +the squadron and the individual Marines serving with the sub unit and +the task unit headquarters be set at six months. Pointing out that the +U.S. Army helicopter company which had occupied Da Nang previously had +operated from January to September without rotating personnel, the task +unit commander outlined the positive features of such an adjustment. +It would, he contended, provide more continuity for administration +and operations, thereby resulting in a more effective utilization of +manpower. To underscore his argument, Ireland emphasized the number of +man hours involved in the rotation of a helicopter squadron. Adding his +opinion that the two-month extension of all tours would not measurably +affect the morale of the Marines at Da Nang, he recommended that the +next rotation of helicopter squadrons be postponed until January. +After being forwarded to FMFPac for consideration, Colonel Ireland’s +proposals were approved later in the fall and instructions were passed +to all involved commands to implement the new policy.[6-4] + +Another adjustment--this one in the area of tactics--had been made +during the task unit’s first two months at Da Nang. By November +the Eagle Flight concept had been tailored to complement reaction +force plans which already existed in I Corps at the time of SHUFLY’s +relocation. ARVN authorities in the northern corps tactical zone had +developed a system whereby their various infantry units were placed on +alert for use as heliborne reaction forces. Designated the Tiger Force, +the alert unit was staged at its base, ready to react to any tactical +emergency. + +HMM-163 Marines executed one of their earliest Tiger Flights on 7 +November in response to a train ambush sprung by the Viet Cong several +miles northwest of the Hai Van Peninsula. Four Marine helicopters +launched from Da Nang, made an airborne rendezvous with two other +HUSs, and proceeded to Hoa My, four miles away, to pick up a 52-man +ARVN Tiger Force. The Marines then helilifted the South Vietnamese +into a suitable landing zone near the ambush site. The relatively +short amount of time consumed in the reaction did not prevent the +Communist attackers from vanishing into the surrounding jungle. +Generally, however, the tactic was more successful, particularly when +the reaction force was used to reinforce a threatened static position +or to establish hasty blocking positions in support of ground offensive +operations that were already underway. + +While the task unit encountered few major problems during the early +operations from Da Nang, minor difficulties were commonplace. Most +often these developed during the execution phase of combat support +missions. One that particularly concerned the Marine commanders was +the tendency of South Vietnamese units not to prepare properly for +scheduled helilifts. To the dismay of the Leatherneck helicopter crews, +ARVN activities at the pickup points were usually characterized by +confusion. More often than not the Vietnamese unit scheduled to be +helilifted had not been organized into heliteams prior to the arrival +of the transport aircraft. Given the fact that heliborne operations +were still somewhat of a novelty to most ARVN small unit leaders (and +to many U.S. advisors) at this stage of the war, these circumstances +were perhaps understandable. Nevertheless, lack of prior preparation +at pickup points on the part of the ground units often threatened to +disrupt the timing of preplanned operations. + +To help remedy this situation and to insure that their helicopters +were not overloaded, the U.S. Marines began designating one of the +squadron’s noncommissioned officers as “loadmaster.” Equipped with +a radio, the loadmaster would arrive at the assembly area on board +the first helicopter, whereupon he would disembark and supervise the +entire loading process. This technique was particularly valuable during +operations in which ARVN units were being helilifted from the field. +In such cases the loadmaster performed the same function as did those +who supervised the loading process at secure assembly areas. This, of +course, required that the Leatherneck remain in the landing zone until +the last Vietnamese troops had boarded the final helicopter. Although +dangerous, this technique enabled the Marines to eliminate many +problems which might otherwise have occurred. + +By early November the monsoon season had begun to settle over the +northern portions of South Vietnam. Unlike the summer rains in the +Mekong Delta in which Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s crews had managed to +set new helicopter flight records, the winter monsoons that struck the +northern provinces seriously restricted flight operations. Heavy fog +and low clouds frequently made it impossible to conduct air operations +in the mountainous areas; therefore, the squadron was forced to +concentrate most of its operations in the coastal plains. In an effort +to maintain his support at a maximum level, Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun +began dispatching an OE-1 to the objective area prior to scheduled +missions in order to obtain a current report on the local weather +conditions. Despite these efforts, the monsoon rains, which often moved +in quickly from the South China Sea, still disrupted flight operations. +A typical weather-related incident occurred on 13 November when a +scheduled troop lift was cancelled because of heavy fog after 200 +Vietnamese Special Forces troops had loaded onto 20 Marine helicopters +for an early morning operation. + +Several unrelated changes in official designations occurred at +approximately the same time that the monsoons began affecting +operations in the northern provinces. In November all Marine aircraft +were redesignated in accordance with a Department of Defense order +which standardized aircraft designations throughout the U.S. armed +services. Thereafter, SHUFLY’s HUS helicopters would be known as +UH-34Ds, its OE-1s as O-1Bs, and its R4D as a C-117. In another +adjustment, the Joint General Staff in Saigon ordered the realignment +of South Vietnam’s tactical zones. A fourth corps tactical zone (IV +CTZ), which encompassed the entire Mekong Delta, and a Capital Military +District, which included Saigon and its environs, were created. The +composition of I Corps was affected by the adjustments as the new +alignment shifted Quang Ngai Province into II Corps. The Marines, +however, continued to provide helicopter support to the province, which +was relatively isolated from the remainder of II Corps. + +More important than either the new aircraft designations or the +realignment of the tactical zones were several internal changes within +the Marine task unit. On 6 November the task unit was redesignated +Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6. That same day Lieutenant Colonel Alton +W. McCully, who had been functioning as Colonel Ireland’s executive +officer, assumed command of the task element. Ireland returned to +Okinawa where he took command of Marine Aircraft Group 16, which, under +the new arrangement, became responsible for both the administrative and +logistical support of SHUFLY. + + +_Marine People-to-People Program_ + +The concept of the People-to-People Program, which had been initiated +with a degree of success in the Mekong Delta, was brought to Da Nang +by Colonel Ireland and his Marines. During the fall and early winter +of 1962, as weather caused flight operations to subside, the Marines +were able to increase the tempo of the program. SHUFLY’s men actively +supported an orphanage in Da Nang which was maintained by an American +missionary family. On Christmas day the Marines participated in a +“Father-For-A-Day” program which had been arranged by the task element +chaplain, Lieutenant Richard P. Vinson, U.S. Navy. Each orphan spent +the day with a Marine who had volunteered to serve as his “father.” +The Vietnamese children were treated to dinner in the mess hall, +presented with Christmas gifts, and then joined in singing carols with +the Marines. At the conclusion of the festivities, Chaplain Vinson +presented the director of the orphanage with a gift in Vietnamese +currency equivalent to over 800 dollars--money which the men of the +task element had donated. + +In addition to their activities associated with the orphanage, the +Marine officers taught English to a number of Vietnamese civilians. +Held three nights weekly, the classes were received enthusiastically. +Beyond the foundations of good will which it helped shape, the +People-to-People Program enabled the Marines to acquire a better +understanding of the Vietnamese people, their culture, and their +problems. + + +_SHUFLY Operations in I Corps_ + +SHUFLY’s initial helicopter support operations in I Corps represented +the beginnings of what would become a long association of U.S. Marines +with South Vietnam’s rugged northern provinces. Essentially these early +operations were characterized by continuity and adjustment. Since their +arrival at Da Nang in September the Marines had extended the standard +of consistent and effective combat support operations set earlier in +the flat Mekong Delta. Necessarily, SHUFLY’s commanders had modified +the previously developed tactics and techniques to fit the mountainous +terrain and the nature of warfare being waged in I Corps. For the most +part these adjustments had proven successful by allowing the Marines to +continue the pace of helicopter support with a reduction of the risks +involved. That SHUFLY had suffered its first fatalities during these +initial months in I Corps dampened but did not detract from its overall +achievements. As 1962 closed, the Marines had begun establishing a +reputation in the northern provinces as courageous, professional +fighting men and generous allies. It was this reputation upon which a +generation of Marines would build in the ensuing decade. + + + + +CHAPTER 7 + +The Laotian Crisis, 1962 + +_Genesis of the Problem--The American Response--The Marine Corps +Role--Marine Participation: A Summary_ + + +_Genesis of the Problem_ + +Almost simultaneous with SHUFLY’s deployment to Soc Trang in April +1962, U.S. Marine combat forces were ordered to Thailand in response +to the growing crisis in Laos. Inhabited for the most part by peaceful +hill tribes, the small, landlocked Kingdom of Laos seemed an unlikely +setting for any significant military confrontation. Even more +improbable was the possibility that a serious international crisis +could stem from what had begun as a political rivalry among relatively +obscure princes. + +To be certain, the context of what should have been a rather +meaningless political feud had been altered substantively by North +Vietnam’s drive to extend its control over the Republic of Vietnam. +Recognizing Laos as a strategic stepping stone for their southward +thrust, the North Vietnamese, joined by the Soviet Union, had +begun providing military aid to the Pathet Lao army of the leftist +prince, Souphanauvong, in the late 1950s. To counter these Communist +activities, the United States had extended military assistance to +the anti-Communist government of Prince Boun Oum. In the resultant +struggle, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who previously had proclaimed +neutrality, sided with the Pathet Lao. With the lines drawn and the +contenders now reinforced by powerful allies, the conflict naturally +escalated. Laos, like South Vietnam, had become a pawn in the Cold War. + +Administered through a small USMAAG, the American military assistance +to Boun Oum, however, did little to slow the advances of the Pathet +Lao. Early in 1960, they had joined forces with North Vietnamese +units to seize control of the eastern portion of the country’s long, +southward extending panhandle. In early 1961, again backed by North +Vietnamese forces, the Pathet Lao had opened an offensive on the Plain +of Jars in central Laos. Boun Oum’s units, commanded by General Phoumi +Nosavan, proved unable to contain this push into central Laos. + +By March 1961 the situation had become critical enough for President +Kennedy to direct that CinCPac alert U.S. military units for possible +deployment. In response, Admiral Felt activated a task force +headquarters and assigned Major General Donald M. Weller, who was then +serving as Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, as its commander. +Designated Joint Task Force 116 in accordance with existing CinCPac +contingency plans, Weller’s command was to consist predominantly of +Marine air and ground forces with Army and Air Force units making up +the balance. Simultaneous with the activation of Weller’s headquarters +on Okinawa, CinCPac alerted the scattered forces earmarked for +assignment to the joint task force. + +Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration managed to defuse the situation +somewhat by securing Soviet assistance in arranging a cease-fire in +Laos. The crisis cooled further when 14 governments, including the +Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Vietnam, agreed to reconvene +the Geneva Conference to consider neutralization of the Kingdom of +Laos. This conference convened on 16 May 1961, and together with +the shaky cease-fire, brought a modicum of stability to Laos. With +international tensions eased, the alert of U.S. forces in the Pacific +ended. Subsequently, General Weller’s JTF 116 headquarters was +deactivated. + +[Illustration: + + MAINLAND + SOUTHEAST ASIA +] + +The negotiations in Geneva proved to be long and tedious. In Laos, +frequent fighting, usually of a localized nature, punctuated the +cease-fire almost from the day it was effected. Finally, in the first +weeks of 1962 heavy fighting broke out anew, this time on a general +scale, and precipitated a new and more intense crisis. For U.S. +observers the situation seemed to reach its critical point in early May +when Pathet Lao forces, backed by North Vietnamese formations, routed +a major element of Phouma’s army from Nam Tha, a town located east of +the Mekong River in extreme northwestern Laos. Following this action, +Phoumi’s forces retreated southwestward across the Mekong into northern +Thailand. Now in full control of the east bank of the Mekong, the +Communists appeared poised for a drive into Thailand, a full-fledged +member of SEATO. The collapse of Phoumi’s military forces, moreover, +seriously threatened the U.S. bargaining position at the ongoing Geneva +talks. + + +_The American Response_ + +In the face of the situation along the Laotian-Thai border, the U.S. +Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed CinCPac to upgrade the readiness +of Joint Task Force 116 for possible deployment. Accordingly, on 10 +May Admiral Felt directed Major General John Condon, the Commanding +General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, to activate the joint task force +headquarters, assemble its staff, and refine its deployment plans. +The Amphibious Ready Group of the Seventh Fleet, carrying the Special +Landing Force, promptly sailed into the Gulf of Siam. + +Both to reassure Thailand of the U.S. commitment to its defense and +to discourage further Communist advances on the Southeast Asian +Peninsula, President Kennedy ordered U.S. forces deployed to Thailand +on 15 May. Admiral Felt moved immediately to execute this decision. +In simultaneous actions CinCPac designated Army Lieutenant General +John L. Richardson, then serving as Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. +Army, Pacific, to replace Major General Condon as Commander, JTF 116 +and instructed Richardson to execute CinCPac Operations Plan 32-59, +Phase II (Laos). Felt’s instructions to the new Commander, JTF 116 were +explicit. General Richardson’s command was to act in such a way that +would leave no doubt as to American intentions to defend Thailand. +Through these same actions JTF 116 was to exert a “precautionary +impact” on the situation in Laos. Furthermore, the Commander, JTF 116 +was directed to position his forces in a manner so that they could +respond to any armed Communist threat to Thailand.[7-1] + +Concurrently with the order to deploy JTF 116, CinCPac instructed the +Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, General Harkins, +to establish and assume command of a U.S. Military Assistance Command, +Thailand (USMACThai). Thus Harkins, in a dual role as ComUSMACV and +ComUSMACThai, was to be responsible to CinCPac for all U.S. military +activities and operations in both Thailand and South Vietnam. Once it +became operational in Thailand, JTF 116 plus the already existing Joint +U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group, Thailand (JUSMAAG), were to +come under Harkins’ purview. Until USMACThai and the JTF staffs could +become operational, however, the various task force components were to +report to the Chief JUSMAAG, Thailand, Major General J. F. Conway, U.S. +Army. + +One element of the joint task force was already in Thailand when +President Kennedy issued the order to commit U.S. forces--the Army’s +1st Brigade, 27th Infantry. At the time this infantry brigade was +participating in a SEATO exercise near Korat, a town located about 130 +miles northeast of Bangkok in the central portion of the country. In +response to CinCPac orders it promptly moved into bivouac at a position +40 miles west of Korat. + + +_The Marine Corps Role_ + +Operations Plan 32-59, Phase II (Laos), called for a U.S. Marine +expeditionary brigade composed of a regimental landing team (three +reinforced infantry battalions), a jet attack squadron, a helicopter +transport squadron, and supporting units, to operate from Udorn, a +provincial capital located nearly 350 miles northeast of Bangkok. +Strategically situated only 35 miles south of Vientiane, the political +capital of Laos, Udorn was the site of a 7,000-foot concrete runway. A +300-man Marine aviation support unit, Marine Air Base Squadron 16, had +actually been positioned at this airstrip for over six months during +1961. While at Udorn the MABS-16 Marines had provided maintenance +support for helicopters which were assisting General Phoumi’s forces in +Laos. A Royal Thai regiment had provided security for the base during +this unit’s deployment and was still in the area in 1962 when the +decision was made to commit JTF 116 to Thailand. + +[Illustration: _Aerial view of Udorn airstrip. (USMC Photo A182977)._] + +Lieutenant Colonel Harvey M. Patton’s VMA-332, an A-4C (Skyhawk) jet +attack squadron, claimed the distinction of being the first Marine +unit to arrive in Thailand in response to the 1962 Laotian crisis. The +20 single-placed Skyhawks departed the Cubi Point Naval Air Station +in the Philippines on the morning of 18 May, were refueled in flight +by aircraft from VMA-211, another Marine A-4 squadron, and landed at +Udorn around noon. The bulk of the Marine units began arriving in +Thailand the following day. At Bangkok the Special Landing Force, +composed of Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Adams’ 1,500-man Battalion +Landing Team 3/9 and Lieutenant Colonel Fred A. Steele’s HMM-261, an +HUS-1 helicopter squadron, disembarked from the ships of the Amphibious +Ready Group.[7-A] That same day Marine GV-1 refueler-transports began +airlifting additional aviation support detachments from Okinawa to +Udorn. These included detachments of Marine Air Control Squadrons 2 +and 4 (MACS-2 and -4), Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12), and a +Provisional Marine Aircraft Group (ProvMAG) headquarters. Upon landing +Colonel Ross S. Mickey, the commander of the ProvMAG, established his +headquarters at the airfield and assumed operational control of all +USMC aviation elements at Udorn. On the 18th, HMM-261’s helicopters +began arriving at the now busy airfield, having flown from the +Amphibious Ready Group with a refueling stop at Korat. Lieutenant +Colonel Steele reported to the newly activated ProvMAG. + + [7-A] A Marine battalion landing team derives its designation + from the infantry battalion around which it is built, + in this case the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. In 1962, + the BLT included a howitzer battery, a tank platoon, an + amphibious tractor platoon, a pioneer platoon, a motor + transport platoon, an anti-tank platoon, and air and + naval gunfire liaison teams. + + Following the commitment of the SLF on 19 May, another BLT + and helicopter squadron from Okinawa reconstituted the + Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force. + +On 19 May Brigadier General Ormand B. Simpson arrived at Udorn with +the staff and communications personnel of the 3d Marine Expeditionary +Brigade (3d MEB) headquarters. Simpson, a Texan who had been serving +as Assistant Division Commander, 3d Marine Division, had assembled +and activated this headquarters on Okinawa shortly after CinCPac’s +activation of JTF 116. As Commanding General, 3d MEB, Simpson was to +assume command of all Marine elements, air and ground, deployed to +Udorn. In addition to being the CG 3d MEB, General Simpson carried +the designation, Naval Component Commander, a title which gave him +responsibility for all Navy as well as Marine forces operating at Udorn +under JTF 116. + +Concurrent with General Simpson’s arrival, U.S. Air Force C-130 and +C-123 transports were ferrying Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ Battalion +Landing Team from Bangkok to Udorn. The BLT had placed its supplies +and trucks, along with HMM-261’s heavier equipment, on rail cars +for transport to Udorn. Because the Thai flat cars were too small +to accommodate such massive vehicles, Adams ordered his tank and +amphibious tractor platoons to re-embark on board the USS _Point +Defiance_ (LSD-31). Once on the ground at Udorn the battalion and its +remaining reinforcements assembled alongside the airstrip. From there +the Leathernecks were transported by Thai Army trucks some eight miles +south to Nong Ta Kai, a small town situated astride the main service +road. Adams’ battalion established a temporary camp on some high ground +just beyond the town. With the BLT’s arrival, the initial Marine combat +forces assigned to JTF 116 were in position. The next day, 20 May, +General Simpson assumed command of all U.S. Marine and Navy units at +Udorn and the 3d MEB, a complete air-ground team, was in being. + +Elsewhere in Thailand the U.S. military build-up was continuing apace. +A squadron of 20 U.S. Air Force F-100 Super Sabre tactical fighter +bombers and a detachment of three refueler aircraft had deployed to +Takhli airfield from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Two USAF +transport squadrons had also begun operations from this base. At +Korat, the 1st Brigade, 27th Infantry was being reinforced with Army +units from Hawaii. Another Army unit, a logistics support command, was +being activated near Bangkok. + +To command this growing assortment of military units, General +Richardson established the JTF 116 headquarters at Korat. Major +General Donald M. Weller, who had been serving as Deputy Commanding +General, FMFPac, since leaving the 3d Marine Division in 1961, joined +Richardson’s headquarters as chief of staff. General Weller’s offices +were located at Korat initially. Later he relocated at Bangkok where he +headed a rear echelon responsible for coordination with the JUSMAAG, +ComUSMACThai, and the American representatives to SEATO. While in the +capital Weller was also responsible for implementing a logistic plan, +the objective of which was to upgrade lines of communication being used +by JTF-116 elements. + +It is of interest to note that Colonel Croizat, who had been the first +U.S. Marine advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, was serving at +this time as the senior U.S. military representative on the SEATO +planning staff in Bangkok. Both Weller, who had commanded JTF 116 for +a period during early 1961, and Croizat who had served as its chief +of staff during that interval, were intimately familiar with the +JTF’s structure, capabilities, and functions. In fact, the operations +plan being executed had been developed in large part under their +guidance.[7-2] + +[Illustration: _Marines disembark from attack transports at Bangkok, +Thailand. (USMC Photo A182785)._] + +Another facet of this particular situation was that portions of +Operations Plan 32-59 Phase II, (Laos) were to exert a profound +influence on later U.S. Marine operations in the Republic of Vietnam. +A key provision of this particular document outlined the command +relationships which would govern Marine and Air Force tactical air +support in the event JTF 116 actually became involved in combat. +This provision designated the Commander JTF 116 as the “coordinating +authority” responsible for synchronizing all JTF tactical air support. +But at the same time it assigned the CG, 3d MEB, operational control +of all Marine tactical aircraft, thereby insuring that the Marine +air-ground team would not be fractured. Later, in the mid-1960s when +American tactical jet squadrons would be called upon to support U.S. +and RVNAF ground forces in South Vietnam, the CinCPac staff would +borrow heavily from this arrangement to define the relationships of +Marine and Air Force tactical aviation assets. + +[Illustration: _Major General Donald M. Weller, Chief of Staff, Joint +Task Force-116. (USMC Photo A407463)._] + +Training began almost immediately after the Marine units were in +position at Udorn and Nong Ta Kai. Generally the MEB adhered to a +training program designed to help fulfill three requirements: to +make its presence known and thereby enhance its credibility as a +“show of force”; to acclimatize the individual Marines to the hot, +humid, tropical climate; and finally, to familiarize the operational +elements and their commanders with the surrounding terrain. The primary +objective of this program, of course, was to prepare the brigade for +combat should that contingency arise out of the troubled situation +in Laos. Coordinated air-ground exercises conducted around Udorn +enabled General Simpson’s command to publicize its presence in the +area while concurrently refining its heliborne and close air support +capabilities.[7-B] In addition to air-ground exercises, Lieutenant +Colonel Adams’ infantry companies sharpened their skills in patrolling +of all types and made frequent use of nearby Thai Army firing ranges to +maintain their weapons proficiency. All field training was conducted in +an unpopulated area defined by the Thai government and every precaution +was taken so as not to disturb the local population. The Marine units +utilized blank ammunition exclusively in training except for the +closely supervised live fire exercises. + + [7-B] The MEB’s after action report pointed out one flaw in + the composition of the Provisional MAG. There had been + no provision made to include light observation aircraft + in its organization. As a result, aerial reconnaissance + had to be accomplished from either A-4Cs or HUS-1s, + neither of which was configured for such a mission. The + A-4C, which could carry only the pilot, and the HUS-1 + proved equally unsuited for reconnaissance missions. + The 3d MEB report specifically recommended that future + composite aviation packages of this nature should include + a detachment of OEs with pilots and trained aerial + observers. + +[Illustration: _Brigadier General Ormond R. Simpson and Brigadier +General John F. Dobbin confer at Udorn, Thailand. (USMC Photo +A182779)._] + +Realizing that the ultimate success or failure of the American +commitment in Thailand might hinge on the relationships U.S. military +men established with the Thai populace, General Simpson ordered his +command to initiate a civic action program. The day after his arrival +at Udorn, Simpson met with local civilian officials and established the +basis for a people-to-people program similar to the one instituted by +SHUFLY Marines at Soc Trang. Thereafter, the MEB’s goal in this area +was to foster among the Thai a favorable impression of the individual +Marine, his commanders, and his unit. The people-to-people program +which followed was, in all respects, a concerted and integrated +effort. Officers taught conversational English classes to interested +civilians both at Udorn and at Nong Ta Kai, while Leatherneck +engineers and Navy Seabees (who arrived near the end of May) helped +repair public buildings. Navy medical and dental personnel attached +to Colonel Mickey’s ProvMAG and Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT joined +the effort by administering almost daily to the physical ailments of +the local populace and occasionally visiting the more remote villages +by helicopter. In an action intended to help prevent friction between +Marines and Thai townspeople, General Simpson directed that MEB units +disembark from trucks as they approached towns, march through the +population centers at sling arms, and re-embark aboard their trucks at +the opposite end of the town. Relying on this broad array of simple but +effective programs, the 3d MEB was able to impress upon the civilian +population that its mission was one of assistance and good will rather +than occupation. + +This crisis in Laos eased somewhat after the U.S. joint task force +established its presence in northeastern Thailand, and Communist +forces halted their advance short of the international border. With +these two developments there was no requirement for additional Marine +infantry battalions. Accordingly, General Simpson redesignated his +force the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit (3d MEU), even though other +reinforcements continued to arrive at Udorn throughout May and most +of June. Near the end of May, a 70-man Seabee detachment from Navy +Mobile Construction Battalion 10 was airlifted to the position. This +detachment, the initial increment of a larger Logistics Support Group +(LSG), moved to Nong Ta Kai where it helped the BLT’s pioneer platoon +complete a more permanent camp designed to withstand the approaching +monsoon season. In mid-June, with no end to the MEU’s assignment in +sight, the remainder of the 500-man LSG deployed from Okinawa to Udorn. +Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Hudson, this group included a +motor transport detachment, a medical detachment, a supply unit, and an +engineer detachment.[7-C] These reinforcements brought the number of +Marines, Seabees, and Navy medical and dental personnel under General +Simpson’s command to its highest level--3,426 officers and men. A final +change in the composition of the 3d MEU occurred in the final week of +June when HMM-162, an HUS-1 squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel +Reinhardt Leu, replaced HMM-261 as the helicopter element. + + [7-C] Lieutenant Colonel Hudson was relieved by Lieutenant + Colonel Angus J. Cronin on 22 July. + +While General Simpson’s MEU was strengthening its posture in +northeastern Thailand, U.S. officials were reporting definite progress +in the negotiations being held in Geneva and Vientiane. Encouraged by +these signs and hoping to influence the Geneva talks even further, +President Kennedy ordered major elements of the U.S. combat forces +withdrawn from Thailand on 29 June, just four days after HMM-162’s +arrival at Udorn. In response General Richardson directed General +Simpson to prepare for the immediate withdrawal of the ProvMAG and one +infantry company. Two days later, on the morning of 1 July, VMA-332’s +Skyhawks launched for Cubi Point in the Philippines. Subsequently, +HMM-162’s helicopters departed for Bangkok where they re-embarked on +board the USS _Valley Forge_. Okinawa-based GV-1s airlifted one of BLT +3/9’s companies to the Philippines while elements of the Marine air +control squadrons traveled by rail to Bangkok for embarkation on board +ships of the Seventh Fleet. By 6 July General Simpson’s 3d MEU had been +reduced by just over 1,000 men. + +At Geneva, the first weeks of July were marked by steady progress +toward a diplomatic solution to the long-standing Laotian problem. +By the 20th it was evident that a formal agreement would soon be +forthcoming. With these encouraging developments, General Richardson +was directed to prepare for the withdrawal of the remainder of his +forces from Thailand. In Laos, the quarreling political factions had +already agreed to participate in a coalition government headed by +Prince Souvanna Phouma which would serve as the basis for a neutral +state. At Geneva on the 23d, the United States, the Soviet Union, +North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Burma, Great Britain, France, Canada, +India, Communist China, Thailand, Poland, the Kingdom of Laos, and +Cambodia finally signed the Declaration of Neutrality of Laos and an +attached protocol. In so doing the 14 signatories agreed to recognize +and respect the sovereignty, independence, and neutrality of the +Kingdom of Laos. Under the terms of this agreement, foreign troops were +prohibited from entering or operating within the borders of Laos. Had +it been adhered to, this provision would have denied North Vietnam the +use of the corridor down the length of eastern Laos, altering the scope +and nature of the conflict in the Republic of Vietnam. + +[Illustration: _Marines of BLT 3/9 assemble before being airlifted to +the Philippines. (USMC Photo A182883)._] + +Following the signing of this declaration in Geneva, CinCPac directed +General Richardson to effect the withdrawal of the remainder of his +joint task force. General Simpson’s 3d MEU began executing these +instructions on the 28th when Marine GV-1s and Air Force C-130s began +airlifting Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT 3/9 to Okinawa. By the 31st no +Marine combat units were left at Udorn. General Simpson and his staff +departed the airfield a few days later, and shortly thereafter the 3d +Marine Expeditionary Unit was deactivated. + + +_Marine Participation: A Summary_ + +The deactivation of the 3d MEU marked the end of the first deployment +of a Marine air-ground combat team to mainland Southeast Asia. Since +the decision to commit American forces to Thailand in mid-May, the +Marine units assigned to General Simpson had demonstrated anew the +value of their service as a force capable of supporting U.S. foreign +policy on short notice. Within the period of a few days, the various +FMFPac commands had assembled a complete air-ground-support team, and, +assisted by the Seventh Fleet, had deployed the affected units to a +position over 1,800 miles from the nearest major Marine base. Located +far inland from the seacoast, a Marine unit’s normal habitat, the 3d +MEU had been sustained solely by air while maintaining its combat +readiness in a difficult tropical environment. + +In so doing the Marines had shown that a substantial American combat +force could be brought to bear quickly in the remote areas chosen +by the Communists as targets for their so-called “wars of national +liberation.” Furthermore, the MEU by relying on a vigorous civic action +program, had established that a sizable Marine command could maintain +its combat readiness almost indefinitely without eroding the respect of +the indigenous population. Thus, General Simpson’s Marines had created +a solid foundation of mutual respect and confidence with the Thai +people. This accomplishment alone would prove valuable when American +military forces would be required to return to northern Thailand later +in the decade. Against the backdrop of these accomplishments, the 3d +Marine Expeditionary Unit’s operations in Thailand could be assessed as +having extended the tradition of the U.S. Marine Corps as an effective +instrument of American diplomacy. + + + + + PART III + + THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, + 1963 + + + + +CHAPTER 8 + +The Marine Advisory Effort + +_The Political Climate--The Advisory Division and VNMC +Operations--Accomplishments_ + + +_The Political Climate_ + +A sudden rupture occurred in South Vietnam’s internal political +situation during 1963 which largely determined the course of the +war as well as the nation’s future. Following the sect uprising of +1955–1956, the Diem government had experienced a three-year period of +relative political tranquility. Beginning in 1959, however, political +dissent had begun to re-emerge from several influential segments of +South Vietnamese society. The results of the August 1959 national +elections, in which pro-Diem candidates captured every seat in the +National Assembly, served to stimulate political opposition which +had lain dormant for nearly four years. Opposition to the government +mounted steadily in the months following the elections within military +as well as political circles as some South Vietnamese officers began +privately expressing disenchantment with Diem’s management of the war. +Then came the abortive coup in November 1960. The regime’s popularity +diminished in the wake of this crisis as Diem tightened his control on +the war-torn nation. + +Another problem--religious unrest--which was to play a key role in +determining South Vietnam’s political direction as the decade unfolded, +also emerged during this period. Buddhist leaders throughout South +Vietnam began protesting against various policies enacted by the +Catholic-controlled government. The tensions gradually mounted, and +by early 1963 the protests were highlighted by spectacular and highly +publicized self-immolations by Buddhist monks. Finally, in May, the +religious problem erupted into violence when the Vietnamese police and +military forces killed 12 Buddhist demonstrators while suppressing a +religious demonstration at Hue. This action triggered a protracted +crisis of public confidence in the Diem government which deepened as +the summer wore on. Then, on 21 August, Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president’s +closest political advisor, ordered the national police to raid key +Buddhist pagodas throughout the nation. Following the raids, which +uncovered some weapons, Nhu attempted to blame the attacks on several +key South Vietnamese generals. His effort to shift the responsibility +for the police raids served only to alienate some of the nation’s most +powerful military leaders. + +On 1 November, a junta of South Vietnamese generals led by Major +General Duong Van Minh reacted to the deepening political crisis by +deposing President Diem and seizing control of the Government of +Vietnam. Both the president and his brother were murdered by an ARVN +officer the following day. The U.S. government, which had advance +knowledge of the coup and was in contact with the plotting generals, +publically declared its intention to remain neutral. General Harkins +ordered USMACV to cease all activities and to withdraw its advisors +from South Vietnamese units pending the outcome of the power struggle. + +The overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem stirred fresh hope among many Americans +and South Vietnamese that the new government could attract the solid +public support of the Vietnamese people, and thereby wage a more +effective war against the Communists. South Vietnam’s new leaders +immediately focused their attention upon healing the nation’s deep +political divisions and securing continued U.S. assistance for the +war effort. They pledged to respect religious freedom, to return the +government to civilian control, and to continue the struggle against +the Viet Cong. Appreciating the interrelationship of these assurances, +the United States officially recognized the new government on 7 +November, whereupon ComUSMACV lifted the temporary ban on military +assistance. + +The American hopes that the new political climate in the Republic of +Vietnam would stimulate a more effective military effort, however, +proved to be shortlived. Confusion reminiscent of the sect uprising +in 1955 spread throughout the government following Diem’s death. +The dismissal of more than 30 high-ranking military officers for +actively supporting the former president during the coup typified the +new regime’s campaign to realign top personnel in all governmental +agencies. Far from enhancing the efficiency of the Vietnamese military, +the power struggle and the chaos which prevailed in its wake dragged +the war effort to its most ineffective level since before the U.S. +stepped-up its military assistance program in early 1962. It was on +this unfortunate note that the year 1963 ended. + + +_The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations_ + +At the beginning of 1963, the Marine Advisory Division, still headed +by Lieutenant Colonel Moody, consisted of eight Marine officers and 10 +noncommissioned officers. In April, however, the table of organization +was adjusted slightly when the first sergeant and four assistant +infantry advisor (noncommissioned officers) billets were eliminated. +Another small unit training advisor was added to the organization, +changing the strength of Lieutenant Colonel Moody’s command to eight +officers and six noncommissioned officers. Men from the 3d Marine +Division continued to augment the advisory effort and gain combat +experience while serving in Vietnam on temporary assignments. + +Like the U.S. organization which advised and assisted it, the +Vietnamese Marine Corps began the new year at the same strength that it +had achieved when it had been expanded to brigade size in early 1962. +Still commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang, the Vietnamese +Marine Brigade continued to operate as part of the nation’s general +reserve under the direct control of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff. + +As the year opened three of the four VNMC infantry battalions were +garrisoned separately in small, crude, self-sustaining camps around Thu +Duc on the northern outskirts of Saigon. The 4th Battalion maintained +its camp at Vung Tau on the coast. The newly formed artillery +battalion, which became fully operational in mid-January when B and C +Batteries passed their final gunnery examinations, was garrisoned near +Thu Duc. While the Marine units spent little time in their base camps, +being deployed almost continuously in combat, the Joint General Staff +normally kept one battalion at Thu Duc to enable it to respond to any +emergency which might develop. + +For the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1963 was to be highlighted by +innovations in the important areas of training and operations. Prior +to Lieutenant Colonel Moody’s arrival in Vietnam, all Vietnamese +Marine recruits had received basic training at ARVN installations, +an arrangement tolerated but never appreciated by the U.S. Marine +advisors. Before his departure in the fall of 1963, Moody was able to +convince Khang that he should push for the authority to establish a +separate Marine training center. In late 1963 the JGS approved this +proposal, whereupon the Vietnamese Marine engineers, advised by Captain +Robert C. Jones, began building a small training facility at Thu Duc. +In a related action Moody set in motion plans to have a small number +of specially selected Vietnamese Marine noncommissioned officers +sent to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at San Diego for training as +drill instructors. Although these plans would not come to fruition +during Moody’s assignment, the concept of a separate recruit training +center promised to permit the Vietnamese Marine Corps to establish and +maintain its own standards for basic training. + +Another change to occur in 1963, this one in the area of tactical +operations, was the reinstitution of multi-battalion combat operations +under the control of provisional Marine Brigade headquarters.[8-A] +Although the VNMC had performed such operations in 1960, they had been +abandoned in the ensuing years in favor of battalion-sized deployments +to the various provinces and corps tactical zones. Moody, however, +prevailed upon Khang to alter this pattern by seeking assignments that +would enable the brigade headquarters to exercise tactical control of +its battalions. + + [8-A] Such task-organized Marine forces were usually called + either provisional brigades or provisional regiments but + on at least one occasion the organization was designated + a Marine Task Force. In each case the composition was + similar--two or three infantry battalions, an artillery + unit, an engineer or reconnaissance company, and a + command element. + +[Illustration: _Lieutenant General Carson A. Roberts, Commanding +General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (right center), inspects an +honor guard of Vietnamese Marines in Saigon. With him, from left, +are Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang, Commandant of the Vietnamese +Marine Corps; Major General Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff, Military +Assistance Command, Vietnam; and Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody, +Jr., Senior USMC Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (Official USA +Photo)._] + +The first such operation was launched in the first week of the new +year. On 1 January a provisional brigade headquarters, commanded by +Khang and advised by Moody, embarked on board a Vietnamese Navy LST +(landing ship, tank) at Saigon along with the 2d VNMC battalion. The +4th VNMC Battalion, advised by Captain Don R. Christensen, embarked on +board two Vietnamese LSMs (landing ship, medium) at the same time. The +mission of the provisional brigade was to conduct an amphibious landing +near the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula and clear Viet Cong units from a +series of villages in conjunction with the Strategic Hamlet Program. +Subsequent to the clearing operations, VNMC engineers were to construct +a fortified hamlet. The entire operation was to extend until mid-April. + +Elaborate precautions were taken not to disclose the location of the +objective area. The small flotilla sailed beyond sight of land and +remained afloat for two days before moving into position off Ca Mau. On +3 January the two LSMs proceeded to the coast, moved up a river lined +with thick mangrove vegetation, and landed the 4th Battalion. The 2d +Battalion, accompanied by Captain Richard B. Taylor, came ashore from +the LST in Dong Nai boats, small styrofoam craft specifically designed +for use in swampy terrain. The provisional brigade headquarters +remained on board the LST as the designated operations area did not +extend far inland. + +[Illustration: _U.S. Marine-trained drill instructor with Vietnamese +recruits. (USMC Photo A183561)._] + +To their surprise the VNMC assault elements found the first objective, +a large village, completely deserted. As Lieutenant Colonel Moody later +recalled, “They had removed everything, even the cattle and other +livestock.”[8-1] At the second objective, a nearby village, the Marines +found definite evidence of recent Viet Cong activity but no enemy +troops. There they captured a handful of rifles, carbines, and light +mortars along with a printed document that contained detailed excerpts +of the Marine operations plan. Quite obviously the operation had been +compromised in Saigon during the planning stages. In any case, this +discovery explained the evacuation of the initial objective as well as +the relative dearth of action during the remainder of the operation. + +The provisional headquarters and the 4th Battalion returned to +Saigon after the initial phases of the operation had been executed, +leaving the 2d Battalion and an engineer platoon to continue security +operations in the area and build the strategic hamlet.[8-B] When the +operation finally ended on 11 April, the Vietnamese Marines had lost a +total of five men killed and 14 wounded. Mines and snipers had produced +most of these casualties. The Marines accounted for 11 Viet Cong killed +and 14 wounded. + + [8-B] Lieutenant Colonel Moody noted that the Vietnamese + Marines seldom were involved in the actual construction + of strategic hamlets. This task was normally left to + the civil authorities in the area who more often than + not used the local population as a labor force. (_Moody + Comments._) + +In the closing days of April, the JGS ordered Lieutenant Colonel +Khang to form two infantry battalions and an artillery element into a +provisional brigade for immediate assignment to II Corps. There the +Vietnamese Marines were to join elements of the 2d and 25th ARVN +Divisions for a multi-regiment thrust into the rugged mountains just +south of the I Corps-II Corps border. Code named BACH PHOUNG XI, this +offensive was to penetrate the Do Xa, a Viet Cong base area never +before entered by government forces. Centered in that portion of the +Annamite Mountains where the borders of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and +Kontum Provinces converged, the Do Xa had been under Communist control +since the early stages of the French-Indochina War. In this remote, +inaccessible mountainous zone the Viet Cong reportedly had built-up +extensive staging areas and training camps. Prisoner interrogations +obtained throughout the early 1960s revealed that many North Vietnamese +soldiers entering the South’s northern provinces had infiltrated the +Do Xa before moving into the densely populated coastal lowlands of +Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. Additionally, the area was thought +to contain the Communist military headquarters for Military Region 5 +(MR-5). + +After alerting his 2d and 4th Battalions, a pack howitzer battery, a +reconnaissance platoon, and a headquarters element, Khang flew with +Lieutenant Colonel Moody to Pleiku for planning conferences with Major +General Nguyen Khanh and his II Corps staff. The concept of BACH +PHOUNG XI, Khang and Moody learned, called for U.S. Marine and Army +helicopters to lift ARVN infantry and artillery elements into positions +which would form a loose ring around the suspected center of the Do Xa +base area. The ARVN units would then begin contracting this ring in +stages, whereupon the provisional Marine brigade would be helilifted +into its center, the heart of the Do Xa, to search for Communist camps. +To control the entire operation General Khanh would establish a corps +headquarters forward at Plateau Gi, a Montagnard village located on +the southern edge of the operations area, about 25 miles northeast of +Kontum. + +On 1 May, U.S. Air Force C-123 transports airlifted Khang and the +2,000-man provisional Marine brigade from the capital to Quang Ngai. +Both Lieutenant Colonel Moody and Major Croft, the Assistant Senior +Marine Advisor and artillery advisor, accompanied the Marine force. The +next day an ARVN truck convoy transported the Marines from Quang Ngai +some 40 miles north to Tam Ky, the roadside town which served as the +capital of Quang Tin Province. The 2d Battalion, advised by Captain +Taylor, dismounted from the trucks and assembled at Tam Ky air strip +while the remainder of the convoy turned west onto a narrow dirt road +which curved through the foothills and deep into the jungle-covered +Annamite Chain. Meanwhile, Army H-21s from Pleiku landed at Tam Ky, +loaded assault elements of the 2d Battalion, and began helilifting +them into a stream-side landing zone some 30 miles southwest of the +provincial capital. The convoy carrying the balance of the Marine +force continued its southwest motor march until it reached the small +ARVN-held town of Tra My. There, some 24 miles southwest of Tam Ky, +Khang established his command post in a school house adjacent to a +crude little dirt airstrip. The 75mm pack howitzer battery, advised by +Major Croft, set up its weapons nearby while the reconnaissance platoon +and elements of the 4th Battalion, advised by Captain Christensen, +established security. When these units were in place U.S. Marine +UH-34Ds from Da Nang lifted a TAFDS fuel bladder and pump to the +airfield. Once the helilift of the 2d Battalion was completed, the +Army H-21s, refueling from the TAFDS bladder, began lifting the 4th +Battalion into the 2d Battalion’s landing zone, which was located +several miles south of Tra My. + +With the initial movement into the operations area accomplished and the +brigade command post functioning, the two infantry battalions began +combing a deep valley and the adjacent mountains for Communist base +camps. After several days Khang’s Marines located one rather complete +camp but encountered no resistance upon entering the position. Once +again the occupants, probably forewarned by the initial movement of the +ARVN units into the area, had withdrawn ahead of the Marines. The only +people found in the camp were a North Vietnamese doctor and nurse. A +subsequent search of the bamboo huts and the underlying tunnel complex +did produce a supply cache. The Vietnamese Marines discovered several +rifles, six typewriters, three sewing machines, a radio, 44 maps, a +French artillery computing board, and scores of flashlight batteries. + +[Illustration: + + LOCATION OF DO XA + BASE AREA +] + +ARVN and Marine operations in the area during the next two weeks +failed to locate any large Viet Cong elements. For the most part the +Marines busied themselves by destroying a few abandoned camps and +some cultivated crops. ARVN units operating around the Marines reported +scattered action as they engaged small groups of Viet Cong attempting +to escape from the center of the Do Xa. BACH PHOUNG XI concluded in +mid-May when U.S. Marine UH-34Ds lifted the VNMC battalions back to Tra +My. From there the Marines returned by convoy to Quang Ngai where they +staged for the airlift back to Saigon. The statistics for the Marine +portion of the operation revealed that only two Viet Cong soldiers had +been killed. Khang’s force suffered 36 wounded, most as a result of +encounters with booby traps constructed from sharpened bamboo spikes. +ARVN forces fared only slightly better, having killed barely a score +of Communists. Except for the fact that they had demonstrated their +ability to penetrate the most difficult Viet Cong sanctuary, the two +week offensive into the Do Xa base area had little impact on the war +effort. From the standpoint of training and experience, however, the +operation was beneficial. The Vietnamese Marines and their advisors +learned a great deal about construction of landing zones and about +directing helicopters, fields in which they had received little +previous training.[8-C] + + [8-C] An interesting sidelight to this operation was that it + stimulated somewhat of a fad in the offices at MACV and + the JGS. Military officials from Saigon who visited the + brigade command post, including General Weede, took back + large water-smoothed rocks as souvenirs of their trip to + the infamous Viet Cong stronghold. Printed on the side + of these ornate stones were the words “Do Xa, May 1963.” + (_Moody Comments._) + +In early September Lieutenant Colonel Wesley C. Noren, recently +transferred from the 2d Marine Division where he had served as +Assistant G-3, arrived in Saigon to replace Lieutenant Colonel Moody +as the Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. Already +selected for promotion to colonel, Noren would become the seventh +Senior Marine Advisor when Moody left Vietnam in October. + +In mid-October the Vietnamese Marine commanders formed a provisional +regiment for Operation PHI-HOA 5, which was to be conducted in III +Corps Tactical Zone.[8-D] The 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions, supported by +a composite artillery battery and the reconnaissance company, joined +ARVN, VNAF, and Vietnamese Navy units in a major search and clear +campaign in the northwest corner of Gia Dinh Province, only about 20 +miles southeast of Saigon. Like many other large government military +operations undertaken in 1963, this one failed to uncover any major +enemy forces. The Communist soldiers again managed to elude government +forces. An extensive tunnel and cave network, which the Marines +systematically destroyed with demolitions, was discovered under the +entire area. Still, the Marines managed to kill only six Viet Cong and +capture 10. Two Vietnamese Marines were killed and 36 others wounded +before the operation terminated on 1 November. + + [8-D] After the realignment of the CTZs the previous December, + III Corps included a 200-mile-long section of Vietnam + which encompassed the southern one third of the Central + Highlands and the area south to the boundary of the + Capital Military District near Saigon. + +[Illustration: _General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the +Marine Corps, and Lieutenant Colonel Wesley G. Noren, Senior Marine +Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, confer with Lieutenant Colonel +Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (USMC Photo +A420917)._] + +The coup d’etat which toppled President Diem from power began the same +day that Operation PHI-HOA 5 concluded. Instead of returning to their +base camps, the 1st and 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalions, accompanied +by the composite battery, moved into the capital to participate in the +power struggle. These units actually launched the coup by seizing key +installations in the heart of the city while the 2d VNMC Battalion +blocked the highway to Bien Hoa, thus preventing loyalist intervention. +Sporadic fighting against troops loyal to Diem continued until the +early morning of 2 November when the 4th Battalion finally stormed +and captured the presidental palace. Four Vietnamese Marines were +killed and 12 wounded during the battles in Saigon. No U.S. Marines +were involved in the fighting as Lieutenant Colonel Noren directed his +subordinate advisors to remain in their quarters. When the situation +stabilized, the advisors rejoined their units and resumed their normal +duties. + +[Illustration: + + CORPS TACTICAL ZONES + 1963–1964 +] + +Combat operations against the Communist guerrillas resumed for the +Vietnamese Marine Brigade in the second week of November. Accompanied +by its U.S. Marine advisor, Captain James P. McWilliams, the 3d +Battalion initiated a search and clear operation in III Corps in +conjunction with the 11th ARVN Regiment on 10 November. The next day +the Vietnamese Marines clashed sharply with a substantial Viet Cong +force west of My Tho and suffered six killed and 21 wounded. Nineteen +enemy bodies were found on the battlefield along with four weapons, +several grenades, and some documents. McWilliams, respected by his +fellow advisors for his candid and forthright assessments, later +recalled that such encounters were the exception rather than the +rule. “While the Vietnamese Marines were individually good fighters +and showed tenacity in most cases against forces that would stand and +fight, this was not the nature of the conflict,” he lamented. More +often than not, McWilliams went on to explain, the highly mobile Viet +Cong could elude the larger, more cumbersome government units.[8-2] + +On 14 November, the same day that the combined Marine-ARVN operation +in III Corps terminated, the Vietnamese Marine command formed a +provisional regiment to control operations DAI-PHONG 28 and 29, which +were to be conducted concurrently in the same general area. Composed of +the 1st and 3d Battalions, and a 75mm pack howitzer platoon, the Marine +force searched until 21 November for Viet Cong units thought to be in +Binh Duong Province but with discouraging results. Only one enemy was +killed, two prisoners taken, and three weapons captured at the expense +of five dead and 13 wounded Marines. + +A week later the 2d Battalion, now advised by Captain Joseph N. Smith, +fought a more typical action while participating in Operation DAI-PHONG +30. The battalion commander, Captain Nguyen Thanh Yen, received orders +for the operation during the early morning hours of 25 November. +Shortly after daybreak nearly 550 Vietnamese Marines boarded trucks +at their camp near Thu Duc for the trip to Bien Hoa airfield. Upon +arrival, officers from III Corps headquarters informed Captain Yen +that his battalion was to conduct a heliborne assault against Hoi Dong +Sam, a Viet Cong-held village in western Hau Nghia Province just west +of Saigon. The purpose of the operation was to intercept a guerrilla +force which had overrun the nearby Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp the +previous day and had taken several American prisoners. The enemy unit +was believed to be using Hoi Dong Sam as a way station while attempting +to escape across the Cambodian border.[8-3] + +The operation began at about 0800 when eight U.S. Army H-21 “Flying +Bananas” from the 145th Aviation Battalion helilifted Captain Smith, +a Vietnamese company commander, and his 90-man assault force from +Bien Hoa. Eight Army UH-1B gunships and a U.S. Air Force O-1B Bird +Dog observation aircraft escorted the transport helicopters on the +20-minute flight to the objective area. The gunships were put to +use almost immediately when Communist .50 caliber machine gun fire +erupted from a treeline at the eastern edge of the village. Under the +suppressive fire of the UH-1Bs, the first wave of H-21s landed the +assault force in some partially flooded rice paddies about 700 meters +east of the Viet Cong positions. The Marine assault force quickly +deployed into a treeline on the western edge of the landing zone. +From this position the company began returning fire with rifles and +.30 caliber machine guns. The Air Force forward air controller (FAC) +overhead in the O-1B and the Army gunships prevented the enemy from +withdrawing across the open rice paddies which surrounded the objective +on the north, south, and west. + +The distance between the assembly area at Bien Hoa and the landing +zone combined with the scarcity of transport helicopters to slow the +progress of the helilift. The landings continued at 40-minute intervals +while the UH-1B gunships teamed with the Vietnamese Marine assault +force to suppress the enemy’s fire. The last elements of the battalion +were finally landed about two hours after the initial assault. Largely +because of the effective suppressive fires from the air and ground, no +aircraft were hit during the helilift. + +[Illustration: + + 2d VNMC BATTALION ATTACK ON + HOI DONG SAM 25 NOV 1963 +] + +Once the entire battalion was on the ground, the assault company, +augmented by a pair of 60mm mortars and two 57mm recoilless rifles, +provided a base of fire to protect the movement of its sister +companies. Captain Yen maneuvered his three remaining rifle companies +and a battalion command group north to a position from which they could +launch an envelopment on the fortified village. Using a treeline which +bordered an irrigation canal as cover, the force hooked westward until +it was directly north of the Viet Cong position. Meanwhile, a FARM +GATE twin-engine B-26 relieved the UH-1B gunships on station. At this +point in the action the Air Force FAC observed a group of 30–40 enemy +attempting to flee from the northwest corner of Hoi Dong Sam. After +clearing the target with the Marine battalion, he directed the B-26 to +attack the target with its 250-pound bombs. The aircraft made several +bombing passes and dispersed the Viet Cong. When the air strike ended +the enveloping force began its assault against the northern edge of the +village with two companies abreast and one following in reserve several +hundred meters to the rear. Once the assault force was in motion the +base of fire displaced forward, firing as they moved, to a small canal +about 120 meters in front of the .50 caliber positions in the treeline. +The two assault companies, followed closely by Yen, Smith, and the +battalion command group, penetrated the northern end of the village and +swept through to its southern periphery. The commander of the company +on the east (or left) flank, deployed elements into the treeline where +the Viet Cong automatic weapons had been active. Following a sharp but +brief exchange of gunfire, the Marines cleared the position. They found +eight enemy dead and three .50 caliber machine guns. + +By noon the 2d Battalion had secured the entire village. Captain Yen +ordered his assault companies to establish a perimeter defense and +the reserve company to begin a systematic search of the position. His +Marines uncovered a number of well-camouflaged bunkers and fighting +positions. In a small canal just east of the village the Marines +found the mount for another heavy caliber automatic weapon. They also +discovered eight Viet Cong suspects and detained them for questioning. +One rifle company moved to investigate the area where the B-26 had +attacked the fleeing enemy earlier in the morning but found no evidence +of additional casualties. Following the capture of Hoi Dong Sam, Yen’s +battalion conducted patrols for several days in search of the Viet +Cong force that had attacked the Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp on the +25th. The enemy force, however, eluded the Marines by gaining refuge in +Cambodia. The battalion returned to garrison at Thu Duc on 28 November. + +In many ways the results of DAI-PHONG 30 pointed up the problems +which frequently frustrated GVN military forces and their American +advisors. The 2d Battalion had seized its objective and in so doing +had killed a handful of Viet Cong and detained a number of suspects. +The Marines had captured three heavy caliber automatic weapons and +an assortment of small arms--all without suffering a single casualty +of their own. Still, it was difficult to translate the action into +victory. The Marines, along with the other government forces involved +in the operation, had failed to intercept the Viet Cong raiding force +in its flight toward the international boundary. Moreover, most of +the occupants of Hoi Dong Sam had made good their escape despite the +presence of observation and attack aircraft. Like many other government +military operations undertaken during the 1961–1964 period, DAI-PHONG +30 was successful from a statistical standpoint but did little to wrest +the tactical initiative from the guerrillas. + +In the first week of December, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff +ordered VNMC units to conduct an extended search in the jungles of +western Tay Ninh Province in III Corps. A special Marine Task Force +composed of the 1st and 3d Battalions was helilifted into the area +on 3 December to begin Operation DAI-PHONG 31. This operation was +punctuated by two major engagements and frequent enemy harassment. In +one particularly vicious clash, the Vietnamese Marines incurred heavy +casualties while attempting to fight out of a skillfully executed Viet +Cong ambush. When the operation concluded on 9 December, the Vietnamese +Marines had suffered 11 men killed, 58 wounded, and 1 captured. Nine +Viet Cong bodies were found and another Communist soldier was captured. +The enemy left four individual weapons on the battlefield. + +In mid-December, South Vietnam’s new leaders removed Lieutenant Colonel +Khang from his position as Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. +Although he had not participated in the November coup, Khang had been +a political appointee of President Diem and as such was viewed as a +potential threat to the new regime. After being promoted to colonel, +he was assigned to the Philippines as the Republic of Vietnam’s Armed +Forces Attache. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, who had been serving +as Assistant Commandant and Chief of Staff of the VNMC, was appointed +as Khang’s successor. He assumed command of the Vietnamese Marine Corps +on 16 December. + +Vietnamese Marine Brigade units continued operations against the Viet +Cong following Khang’s relief but fought no major engagements. Near the +end of December, with the nation drifting into political uncertainty +and its own top leadership changed, the morale of the Vietnamese Marine +Corps plummeted. Lieutenant Colonel Noren saw this unfortunate trend as +a by-product of the general political instability which was beginning +to grip the country rather than a reflection of Lien’s leadership. +Indeed, Noren thought the new VNMC commandant to be an extraordinarily +capable officer.[8-4] In any case, as 1963 ended the U.S. Marine +advisors were reporting climbing desertion rates in almost every +battalion. + + +_Accomplishments_ + +Even though 1963 closed upon a discouraging note, the Marine Advisory +Division could report positively on its own activities. At the +urging of the Senior Marine Advisor, the Vietnamese Marine Corps had +reinstituted multi-battalion combat operations. Steps had also been +taken to cut the VNMC’s last formal ties to the ARVN by creating a +separate Marine Corps recruit training facility. When activated this +training center was expected to provide VNMC battalions with a stream +of enlisted men who would possess a background of higher quality basic +training. + +As for personal achievements, the U.S. Marine advisors had accompanied +their units in every combat operation during 1963 except the November +coup. No advisors had been killed in the 12-month period and only four +(two of whom were on temporary assignment from the 3d Marine Division) +had been wounded. The first combat decorations other than Purple Heart +Medals for wounds were also approved and awarded to the advisors during +the year. On 13 December, Captains Don Christensen and Frank Zimolzak, +former advisors to the 4th and 3d Battalions respectively, were awarded +the Bronze Star Medals with the Combat “V” for meritorious service. +Captain Richard Taylor, an advisor with the 2d Battalion, earned +the first Silver Star Medal during the same period for “conspicuous +gallantry” between November 1962 and October 1963. Captain Joseph N. +Smith, advisor to the 2d and 4th VNMC Battalions, earned the second +Silver Star for gallantry displayed between October 1963 and April +1964.[8-E] + + [8-E] Both Silver Star Medals were awarded during 1964. + + + + +CHAPTER 9 + +SHUFLY Operations + +_Development of the Compound Continues--Combat Support Operations--The +Situation in Vietnam_ + + +SHUFLY, the only U.S. Marine tactical command assigned to South +Vietnam, continued its combat support operations in the semi-isolated +northern provinces throughout 1963. Although the size of I Corps had +been reduced in late 1962 when the Vietnamese Joint General Staff +shifted Quang Ngai Province to II CTZ, the mission of the Marine +task element remained essentially unchanged. As the new year opened +Lieutenant Colonel McCully’s command was still responsible for +providing direct helicopter support to the forces of the five northern +provinces. Likewise, the government’s order of battle in the northern +provinces had not changed to any great degree. The 1st ARVN Division +still occupied the coastal plains south of the DMZ in Quang Tri and +Thua Thien Provinces. Headquartered at Da Nang, the 2d ARVN Division +continued to carry the main burden of operations against the Viet Cong +in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. Operating in Quang Ngai Province +to the south of the new I Corps-II Corps border were elements of the +25th ARVN Division. Interspersed along the coastal lowlands among +the various regular battalions of these three divisions were small +paramilitary garrisons. In the mountains to the west, the scattered +Special Forces outposts with their Montagnard defenders continued their +struggle for survival while monitoring Communist infiltration. + + +_Development of the Compound Continues_ + +The first month of 1963 saw three important changes in the composition +and leadership of Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6. On 11 January, HMM-162, +a UH-34D squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu, +replaced Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s HMM-163 as the task element’s +helicopter unit. Five days later, on the 16th, Lieutenant Colonel +George H. Linnemeier, winner of four Distinguished Flying Crosses +during World War II and Korea, relieved Lieutenant Colonel Davis as +the MABS-16 sub unit commander. In the last week of January Lieutenant +Colonel Harold F. Brown, a veteran aviator who had piloted scout-dive +bombers during the Second World War, arrived at Da Nang and assumed +command of the task element from Lieutenant Colonel McCully. + +During McCully’s tour as the Commander, Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6, +the Marine compound at Da Nang had begun to assume a quality of +permanency which had never been evident at Soc Trang. The utilities +section of the MABS-16 detachment was responsible for many of the +more noticeable improvements. By the first of the new year they had +constructed several shelters on the west side of the runway to cover +the motor transport section’s working area. They also had replaced the +electrical system and repaired some of the damaged plumbing in the +living areas. The task element’s special services section had begun +to provide the Da Nang Marines with entertainment by showing nightly +movies, arranging fishing trips into Da Nang harbor, and issuing +athletic equipment. + +The monsoon season, which was characterized by cold rains, high +winds, and deep mud, proved to be a source of much irritation to the +Marines during the winter of 1962–1963. In addition to slowing flight +operations and creating almost constant discomfort, the weather caused +some unforeseen complications. In October 1962, heavy rainfall had +combined with constant vehicle usage to turn the road between the +living area and the flight line into a quagmire that was virtually +impassable. At the time, Colonel Ireland, then the task unit commander, +had responded by requesting equipment from Okinawa to improve the +Marines’ only road link with their aircraft. Wing authorities promptly +complied and a road grader was flown in by KC-130 (the new designation +for the GV-1 Hercules). Within days a 700-foot section of the road was +opened and a drainage ditch dug along its entire length. + +This measure proved to be only temporary, however, for in January the +mud again threatened to cut the Marine vehicles off from the east side +of the airfield. Lieutenant Colonel McCully obtained a bulldozer from +Okinawa to make more permanent repairs. With the help of this piece of +equipment, the Marines constructed a new 400-foot section of road on +an eight-inch rock base. These repairs proved to be satisfactory and +the road caused no further problem during the remainder of the monsoon +season. + +Improvements in the compound continued to be made under the task +element’s new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Brown. In April action was +taken on an earlier request for the assignment of a security detachment +to guard the Marine area. A reconnaissance platoon of 47 Marines from +the 3d Marine Division joined the task element, thus freeing the men +of the helicopter squadron and the MABS-16 sub unit of the important +secondary responsibility they had held since the task unit’s deployment +to Soc Trang. The assignment of the ground Marines was timely in that +it corresponded with a reduction by the ARVN of its forces guarding the +perimeter of the Da Nang airbase. One Marine general later observed +that with the arrival of the infantry unit, “the air-ground team was in +being in Vietnam.”[9-1] + +Other less obvious changes that contributed to the overall efficiency +of the Marine task element also occurred during the early spring. In +April, the task element commander was able to assign a better facility +to medical and dental services. They had been crowded into one of the +small structures along with other offices since the displacement from +Soc Trang, but now were moved into a separate building in the living +compound. + +Another problem that plagued the Marines during their entire first +year at Da Nang--inadequate water supply--was finally solved in late +1963. Originally the task unit had depended on a shallow well from +which water was pumped and purified. The Marines nearly exhausted this +source shortly after their arrival at Da Nang late in the dry season +and their commanders were forced to impose strict water discipline. The +monsoon rains eased the water crisis but by January production again +dropped, this time as a result of the accumulation of heavy silt in +the pumps. A Vietnamese contractor was engaged to clean and repair the +pumping system but the problem soon recurred. In the early spring two +new shallow wells were dug, one in the motor transport working area and +the other in the living compound. With the onset of the dry season, +however, the Marines again were forced to conserve water. This time the +shortage became so acute that tank trucks were required to haul some +16,000 gallons of water a day from a nearby Air Force installation. +Finally, in November, a detachment from a Navy construction battalion +completed a well 450 feet deep and capped it with a high pressure pump. +This proved to be the permanent solution to the long-standing water +shortage. + +Over the course of the year the Marines received several new +vehicles which helped relieve the burden on the rebuilt buses +which were beginning to falter under heavy use. Four 10-passenger, +four-wheel-drive trucks and two M-442 “Mighty Mite” jeeps were flown +in by KC-130s from Okinawa and assigned to the task element’s motor +transport section. By summer, two of the old buses were replaced with +tactical passenger vehicles which were better suited for transporting +personnel between the barracks and work areas. The addition of the new +vehicles also allowed the mess hall to begin transporting hot noon +meals to the men working on the east side of the airstrip. A mess line +set up in the hangar area fed those Marines who previously had lost +time by travelling to the living compound for noon meals. + +Two changes were made in the task element’s command structure in +midyear. On 5 July Lieutenant Colonel Earl W. Cassidy, a veteran +aviator with 20 years service, relieved Lieutenant Colonel Linnemeier +as commanding officer of the MABS-16 sub unit. Two weeks later, on the +18th, Colonel Andre D. Gomez, a Marine who had distinguished himself +as an artillery officer during World War II before becoming a pilot, +assumed command of Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6. + +In summary, the improvements made in the task element’s compound during +the course of 1963 helped insure the successful support of sustained +combat helicopter operations. Although overshadowed by the publicity +which the actual flight operations attracted, the continued improvement +of the Da Nang base was vital to the overall effectiveness of the +Marine combat support effort. + + +_Combat Support Operations_ + +Marine helicopter support for government forces in I Corps encountered +a brief interruption shortly after the new year began when HMM-163 was +replaced by a fresh UH-34D squadron. Marine KC-130s shuttled between +Okinawa and Da Nang for several days during the second week of January +bringing the officers and men of HMM-162 to Vietnam and returning +with members of HMM-163. The change-over of units was completed on 11 +January when Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun officially transferred his +squadron’s aircraft and maintenance equipment to the newly-arrived unit. + +In the five months and ten days since they initiated operations at Soc +Trang, “Rathbun’s Ridge Runners” had amassed an enviable combat record. +The squadron’s crews had flown a total of 10,869 hours, 15,200 sorties, +and had lifted over 25,216 combat assault troops and 59,024 other +passengers. In one month alone (August) they had established a Marine +Corps record for medium helicopter squadrons by flying 2,543 helicopter +hours. These records had not been set without risks, however. During +the course of their operations in the Mekong Delta and in I Corps, +helicopters operated by HMM-163’s crews had been hit on 32 occasions by +Communist small arms fire.[9-2] Moreover, the squadron had become the +first Marine unit to suffer combat casualties in the Vietnam conflict. + +HMM-162, led by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu, the veteran Marine +aviator who had commanded the squadron during the recent deployment +to Thailand as part of the 3d MEU, began full-fledged combat support +operations the same day that the last of Rathbun’s squadron departed +Da Nang. HMM-162’s crews, many of whom had participated in similar +operations around Udorn the previous summer, limited their early +flights to routine resupply missions and a few medical evacuations. +Such missions enabled the squadron’s personnel to become better +acquainted with the terrain over which they would operate during the +next six months. + +The new squadron participated in its first major combat troop lift on +January 19, when a break in the monsoon allowed the 2d ARVN Division +to execute a heliborne operation into the mountains about 15 miles +west of Da Nang. Eighteen Marine UH-34Ds lifted 300 ARVN troops into +three separate landing zones near a suspected Communist base area. +The squadron’s pilots and crews encountered their first Viet Cong +opposition during this troop lift. Upright bamboo stakes obstructed one +of the landing zones while at another the enemy fired at the Marine +aircraft with small arms. Although two UH-34Ds were hit, none were shot +down and the mission was completed successfully. + +A month later, on 18 February, the Marine pilots experienced another +of the hazards associated with flight operations in Vietnam while +attempting to land troops from the 1st ARVN Division in a clearing +about 18 miles southwest of Hue. Five helicopters sustained punctures +in the bottoms of their fuselages when they accidentally landed on tree +stumps concealed by high grass in the landing zone. One stump caused +extensive damage to an aircraft when it ripped into its forward fuel +cell. The crew was forced to leave the UH-34D in the field under ARVN +protection overnight. The next morning Marine mechanics were flown in +from Da Nang to repair the helicopter. + +Despite several troop lifts involving a dozen or more aircraft, +heliborne assault missions did not dominate HMM-162’s operations during +the unit’s first three months in South Vietnam. Poor weather conditions +over the northern provinces continued to restrict flight operations +generally to resupply and medical evacuation missions. Statistics +for the first quarter of 1963, for example, indicated that Marine +helicopters conducted 6,537 logistics sorties as opposed to 1,181 +tactical support sorties. + +The single most significant incident during HMM-162’s initial three +months in Vietnam took place in the second week of March when the +squadron suffered its first aircraft losses and casualties. These +were incurred during a salvage-rescue attempt in the mountains of +northern II Corps. The incident began on 10 March as two Marine UH-34Ds +attempted to insert a four-man American-Vietnamese ground rescue team +into the jungle about 30 miles southwest of Quang Ngai. The team’s +assignment was to locate a U.S. Army OV-1 Mohawk (a twin-engine, +turboprop, electronic reconnaissance aircraft manufactured by Grumman) +which had crashed, and its pilot, who had parachuted into the jungle. +The exact site of the accident had not been located but the general +area was known to be a steep jungle-covered mountain, the elevation of +which approached 5,000 feet. While attempting to lower search personnel +into the jungle by means of a hoist, one of the helicopters lost power +and crashed. The ARVN ranger who was on the hoist when the accident +occurred was killed but the helicopter’s crew managed to climb from +the wreckage shortly before it erupted in flames. The copilot, Captain +David N. Webster, was severely burned in the explosion. + +Other Marine UH-34Ds from Da Nang joined in the rescue operation, +refueling from the TAFDS at Quang Ngai for the flight into the +mountains. The situation was complicated further when a second Marine +helicopter experienced a power loss and crashed near the burned-out +UH-34D hulk while attempting to land a rescue team composed of MABS-16 +Marines. Fortunately, the aircraft did not burn and the only injury +incurred in the crash was a sprained ankle, but the extremely steep +and densely jungled terrain kept the Marines from reaching the site +of the other downed helicopter. Bad weather and darkness prevented +further efforts to extricate the various American and South Vietnamese +personnel from the jungle that day. During the night Captain Webster +died of injuries. + +The next day, the Marines stripped a UH-34D of some 700 pounds of +equipment so as to enable it to operate more efficiently at the +extreme elevations in the vicinity of the crash sites. After carefully +maneuvering the helicopter into a hovering position, the pilot was able +to extract the survivors and the dead copilot from the site where the +first UH-34D had crashed and burned. The survivors were flown to Quang +Ngai. There the wounded were treated and later evacuated by U.S. Air +Force transport to an American hospital at Nha Trang. + +While these events were taking place, the Marines from the second +downed helicopter, guided by search aircraft operating over the area, +located and recovered the injured Army Mohawk pilot. This accomplished, +the Marines hacked out a small clearing from which they were evacuated +by another Marine helicopter. + +The episode was not yet over, however, as the crashed OV-1 and its +payload of advanced electronics equipment still had not been secured. +Finally, an ARVN ranger company, which had joined the search, reached +the remnants of the Mohawk and established security around the site +while U.S. Army technicians were helilifted in to examine the debris. +The Marine UH-34D, which had crashed nearby without burning and was +damaged beyond repair, was cannibalized for usable parts and then +destroyed. + +On 13 March, with the search and rescue tasks completed, Marine +helicopters began shuttling South Vietnamese rangers to Mang Buc, +a nearby government outpost. During this phase of the mission the +helicopters received fire from Viet Cong who had moved into positions +near the rangers’ perimeter. Three UH-34Ds delivered suppressive fire +on the enemy with their door-mounted M-60 machine guns while the +remaining helicopters picked up the troops in the landing zone. This +was the first recorded instance of a Marine helicopter providing close +air support in actual combat. + +Other developments occurred in the early months of 1963 which either +directly or indirectly affected the conduct of Marine helicopter +operations. One was the improved coordination of intelligence gathering +and usage among all South Vietnamese and American agencies within +I Corps. This effort, which was essentially a concerted drive to +streamline the collection and flow of intelligence information, was +stimulated by a series of corps-wide intelligence seminars, the first +of which was held in early February. Of special interest to the Marine +aviators was the establishment of closer liaison between the Marine +task element, U.S. Army Special Forces, and South Vietnamese units in +the northern corps tactical zone. + +Closely related to the improvement of the overall intelligence +situation was the acquisition of some new equipment by the SHUFLY +Marines. In March the task element received two new model hand-held +aerial cameras for use by the crews of the O-1B observation aircraft. +Later in the month a photo lab was completed to facilitate the rapid +processing of the photographs. By the end of the month the Marines were +also being provided with high altitude photographic coverage of some +objective areas taken by U.S. Air Force reconnaissance jets. + +The tempo of Marine helicopter operations began to quicken in early +April with the advent of sustained periods of clear weather. On 13 +April, HMM-162 participated in a major heliborne assault in which +435 2d ARVN Division troops were lifted into a suspected Communist +stronghold in the mountains along the Song Thu Bon, about 30 miles +south of Da Nang. As in most troop lift missions, the Marine O-1Bs +provided reconnaissance and radio relay support. For the first time +in the war Marine transport helicopters were escorted by helicopter +gunships, the UH-1B Iroquois (a single-engine, turbine-powered utility +helicopter built by the Bell Helicopter Company). Five UH-1Bs from a +detachment of the Army’s Da Nang-based 68th Aviation Company, armed +with M-60 machine gun clusters and 2.75-inch rockets, joined the VNAF +fighter bombers to conduct preparatory airstrikes on the landing zones. + +The initial landing met no enemy resistance but later in the day action +in the operational area intensified. A Marine UH-34D was hit by eight +rounds of enemy small arms fire while attempting to evacuate wounded +South Vietnamese soldiers and U.S. Army advisors from a landing zone +near the point where the ARVN forces had been landed that morning. With +the copilot, First Lieutenant John D. Olmen, wounded, the badly damaged +aircraft force landed in the Vietnamese position. + +Two other Marine helicopters were dispatched to the scene to pick up +the Marine crew and complete the evacuation. They managed to evacuate +Lieutenant Olmen, a wounded American advisor, and one dead and four +wounded ARVN soldiers without incident. On a return trip to pick up +more wounded, however, one of the two UH-34Ds suffered heavy damage +from Viet Cong fire. In this incident the crew chief, Corporal Charley +M. Campbell, was wounded in the thigh, chest, and back by small arms +fire, and the aircraft was forced to land near the first downed +helicopter. The accompanying UH-34D landed, picked up Campbell, and +returned him to Da Nang for emergency treatment. Repair teams were +helilifted to the position on the afternoon of the 13th, and began +repairing both helicopters. One was able to return to Da Nang later +that day but the other required extensive repairs and could not be +flown to safety until the 15th. + +While HMM-162 repair crews were working feverishly to extricate their +aircraft from the predicament along the banks of the Song Thu Bon, +another of their helicopters was shot down nearby while supporting the +same operation. This aircraft was hit four times while approaching an +ARVN landing zone located in a small valley about three miles south of +the action in which the two helicopters had been lost earlier. After +temporary repairs were made, its crew flew the damaged UH-34D to Da +Nang where more detailed repair work was accomplished. + +The number of combat support sorties flown into the mountains by +HMM-162’s crews rose steadily as the weather improved. Near the end +of April, the Marines helilifted three battalions of the 1st ARVN +Division into the mountains of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces near +the Laotian border. These units were to participate in an extended +multi-regiment drive against suspected Communist infiltration routes +there. This operation, for which Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s squadron +provided daily support after the initial landing, taxed the durability +of both the Marine crews and their aircraft. For 90 days task element +helicopters flew into and out of hazardous landing zones located at +elevations as high as 4,500 feet. The majority of these sorties were +resupply and medical evacuation missions with the occasional exception +being the heliborne displacement of infantry and artillery units when +distance or terrain prohibited overland movement. Despite the dangers +inherent in helicopter operations conducted over mountainous terrain, +the squadron incurred no aircraft or personnel losses while supporting +the offensive in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. + +While his squadron’s support of the 1st ARVN Division’s ongoing drive +near the Laotian border continued, Lieutenant Colonel Leu committed 21 +UH-34Ds to support the offensive against the Do Xa base area along the +southern edge of I Corps. On 27 April, Marine crews helilifted over +567 troops of the 2d ARVN Division into the mountainous area roughly +22 miles southwest of Tam Ky to begin Operation BACH PHUONG XI. The +squadron was less fortunate during this operation than it was during +the lengthy Quang Tri effort. One helicopter was shot down by Viet Cong +fire which wounded the pilot, Captain Virgil R. Hughes, in the leg. The +crew and the embarked ARVN soldiers escaped further injury when the +aircraft made a crash landing in which it suffered extensive damage. +After the crew was rescued, a salvage team from Da Nang stripped the +helicopter of all usable parts and burned the hulk so the Viet Cong +could not make use of it. This was the first Marine helicopter loss +definitely attributed to direct enemy action.[9-3] + +Following the initial heliborne assaults into the Do Xa area, two +UH-34Ds were rotated to Tra My from Da Nang on a daily basis. Refueling +from the TAFDS bladder, these standby aircraft were used primarily to +perform medical evacuation missions for VNMC and ARVN units involved +in BACH PHOUNG XI. Before the operation ended in mid-May, HMM-162’s +crews had evacuated nearly 100 Marine and ARVN casualties from +hazardous landing zones scattered along the border of I and II Corps. +The task element’s O-1Bs also provided aerial reconnaissance support +for all phases of the operation. On 19 May, the day before BACH PHOUNG +XI terminated, 12 Marine UH-34Ds lifted the two Vietnamese Marine +battalions to the provisional brigade command post at Tra My. This +particular phase of the operation evoked favorable comment from an +anonymous U.S. Marine pilot who noted on an unsigned debriefing form +that the heliborne withdrawal had gone smoothly and that the Vietnamese +Marines appeared “well organized in the landing zones and at Tra +My.”[9-4] BACH PHOUNG XI ended unceremoniously the following day when +HMM-162 helilifted the ARVN battalions from the Do Xa base area. + +One trend which became increasingly apparent as the spring of 1963 +unfolded was the growing utilization of the Army UH-1B helicopter +gunships as escorts to and from landing zones. The gunships +accompanied all Marine assault helilifts and medical evacuations, and +when available, also escorted resupply flights in order to provide +suppressive fire around government positions while landings were in +progress. Although well suited for the escort missions, the lightly +armed UH-1Bs did not replace the Vietnamese Air Force attack aircraft +as the principal source of preparatory air strikes around landing zones +being used for assault helilifts. The Marines continued to rely on the +more heavily armed VNAF T-28s and A-1Hs to conduct the so-called “prep +strikes.”[9-A] + + [9-A] As a result of the joint helicopter operations in I + Corps, a vigorous debate developed within the Marine + Corps concerning the value of armed helicopters. This + debate and the subsequent development, procurement, and + operations of Marine helicopter gunships will be covered + in a separate historical monograph being prepared by the + History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine + Corps. + +May was the last full month of combat support operations for Lieutenant +Colonel Leu’s squadron. In the first week of June, transports from +VMGR-152 began landing at Da Nang with the Marines of a new UH-34D +squadron. Since assuming responsibility for helicopter support in I +Corps in mid-January, HMM-162 had compiled a solid combat record. While +under the squadron’s operations, the UH-34D helicopters had flown +17,670 sorties for a total of 8,579 flight hours. The O-1Bs added +approximately 400 sorties and another 1,000 hours to these figures. In +the month of May alone HMM-162’s helicopters flew over 2,000 flight +hours--a number which approached the record set by HMM-163 during the +previous summer in the Mekong Delta. Other statistics reflected the +growing intensity of the Vietnam war. Since its deployment to Da Nang, +Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s unit had lost three helicopters--two as a +result of operations at extreme elevations and one to enemy fire. One +member of the unit had been killed and three others wounded since the +squadron entered the combat zone.[9-5] + +After a brief change-over period, the outgoing squadron commander +officially turned over his unit’s aircraft and maintenance equipment on +8 June to Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Shook, the commanding officer of +HMM-261. Shook, who had flown Marine helicopters in combat during the +Korean War, committed his crews to their first actual combat missions +that same day. + +A significant change took place in the coordinating arrangements that +governed U.S. helicopter units supporting I Corps at approximately +the same time that HMM-261 initiated combat support operations. Since +its relocation at Da Nang, the Marine task element, along with all +other aviation units in I CTZ, had received its missions from the Air +Support Operations Center located within the corps headquarters. As +the number of U.S. and VNAF aviation organizations assigned to I Corps +grew and the total number of missions multiplied, it became necessary +to modify the system of coordination and control. In accordance with +a ComUSMACV directive, I Corps headquarters created an Aviation +Headquarters Operations Center (AHOC) to oversee the employment of +Marine and Army aircraft in the CTZ. The AHOC, which was composed of +a senior Army representative, a senior Marine representative, and an +operations section, was to be directed by the Commander, Task Element +79.3.3.6. Formally stated, its primary mission was to “plan, direct, +and control the employment of all Army and Marine Corps Aviation +Units and aircraft operations in direct support of I Corps.” The +newly organized AHOC was also ordered to “participate in, and provide +assistance to operational planning and the coordination of employment +of USA/USMC Aviation with VNAF/USAF tactical air.”[9-6] The AHOC, +therefore, was formed to supplement rather than replace the older Air +Support Operations Center, which continued to direct and control all +U.S. Air Force and VNAF operations over the northern provinces. It +was under this arrangement that U.S. Marine and Army aviation units +operated after mid-1963. + +HMM-261’s Marines began encountering systematic Viet Cong resistance +to their operations shortly after their first combat missions in early +June. A 21-aircraft assault mission into the mountains west of Da +Nang was aborted on 6 July when the Marine pilots discovered that the +Viet Cong had obstructed the two available landing zones with upright +stakes. While inspecting one of the landing zones on a low pass, a +helicopter was hit in the forward fuel cell by Communist small arms +fire. The damage to the aircraft was not serious enough to force a +landing, but the pilot of an escorting U.S. Army UH-1B was mortally +wounded while attempting to suppress the ground fire. + +Ten days after the enemy forced the cancellation of the assault mission +west of Da Nang, HMM-261 suffered its first aircraft loss in Vietnam. +The crash, which was later attributed to mechanical failure, occurred +about 37 miles southwest of Da Nang while one of the squadron’s +helicopters was on a routine logistics mission. Six passengers, two +American advisors and four ARVN soldiers, were injured in the accident. +The squadron commander dispatched two other UH-34Ds to the scene of +the crash to evacuate the wounded and insert a salvage team. The badly +damaged aircraft was assessed as beyond repair and was destroyed. + +In the second week of August, officers from HMM-261 and the task +element’s staff (under the command of Colonel Gomez) met with American +and Vietnamese officers at I Corps headquarters to plan a large-scale +heliborne retrograde movement. The planned helilift was to mark the +culmination of Operation LAM SON XII, a three-week long offensive +by several battalions of the 2d ARVN Division against Communist +infiltration routes in Quang Nam Province along the Laotian border. +Although not encircled, the ARVN battalions had encountered increasing +Viet Cong pressure since early August. I Corps authorities feared that +unless their units were withdrawn promptly they might be cut off from +the few landing zones that existed in the rugged operations area. + +As planned, the retrograde operation involved helilifting some +1,300 troops with their artillery and equipment to Thuong Duc, a +government-held town situated 30 miles southwest of Da Nang along +the Song Vu Gia. The operation plan called for the commitment of 20 +Marine helicopters, 18 of which would participate in the actual troop +lifts. The two extra UH-34Ds would be used in the event it became +necessary either to replace helicopters assigned to the troop lift or +to conduct search and rescue operations for downed aircraft. Three VNAF +UH-34s and two U.S. Army unarmed UH-1Bs were designated by the I Corps +headquarters to assist HMM-261 with the helilift. + +The Da Nang Air Support Operations Center assigned a variety of other +aircraft to support the operation. These included two VNAF T-28s, one +FARM GATE B-26, and two U.S. Army UH-1B gunships. These aircraft would +share the task of providing close air support for the troop lift. A +Marine O-1B was scheduled to perform weather reconnaissance missions. + +The entire air operation was to be coordinated from two aircraft. An +American forward air controller in a VNAF observation plane was to +direct all air strikes while overall control for the multiservice, +bilingual effort was to come from a U.S. Air Force U-10 Super Courier. +This six-man, single engine aircraft, which possessed an eight hour +fuel capacity and carried three radios, would serve as an airborne air +support operations center (Airborne ASOC). It would be flown by an Air +Force pilot and would carry a Marine officer from the task element +along with U.S. and Vietnamese representatives from the Da Nang ASOC. +These officers would be in continuous radio contact with all aircraft +in the operations area, and also with the U.S. Air Force liaison +officer to I Corps who would be positioned with the ground troops. + +The concept of the operation called for the ARVN units to be lifted +from two hazardous landing zones over a three-day period. According to +the plan 500 ARVN soldiers were to be removed from Landing Zone HOTEL +on Thursday, 15 August. Landing Zone HOTEL, a small clearing which +could accommodate only three UH-34Ds, was situated along a river and +was crowded between two 1,000-foot-high ridgelines only five miles +from the Laotian border. The steep, jungle-covered ridges generally +paralleled each other less than 400 meters apart on either side of the +landing zone. Slightly west of the small clearing the ridges joined to +form a box canyon. The physical structure of the location dictated that +the transport helicopters use the same approach and retirement routes. + +Due largely to the proximity of the high terrain which surrounded +Landing Zone HOTEL, the ARVN adopted a Marine proposal to leave a +125-man security force on the two ridges. This force would provide +cover for the helicopters conducting the final troop lift during this +first phase of the retrograde movement. The 125 South Vietnamese +soldiers would move cross-country to another landing zone to be picked +up by helicopters following the completion of the helilift from Landing +Zone HOTEL. + +The second landing zone, codename ZULU, was nearly as treacherous +as the first. ZULU was completely encircled by a rim of hills some +500 feet higher than the floor of the landing site. In addition to +the 125-man security force from HOTEL, the Marine, Army, and VNAF +helicopters were scheduled to lift 200 ARVN troops and two 105mm +howitzers from this landing zone on 16 and 17 August (the second and +third days of the operation). + +An unexpected complication developed the morning the operation began +when the Air Force grounded its B-26s after one of the attack bombers +crashed elsewhere in the northern portion of Vietnam as a result of +undetermined causes. Shortly after this crash, HMM-261 was called +upon to divert a flight of helicopters to assist in search and rescue +operations for the downed B-26, thus reducing even further the assets +available to support the heliborne retrograde. + +Despite the loss of some of the air power assigned to the operation, +I Corps authorities elected to proceed with the helilift from Landing +Zone HOTEL as planned. After the crew of a Marine O-1B confirmed that +good weather prevailed over the operations area, the first helicopters +departed Da Nang on schedule. Less than half an hour after take off the +Marine and Vietnamese pilots began maneuvering their aircraft between +the two ridges which dominated Landing Zone HOTEL. Twice during the +pickup the armed UH-1B escorts drew fire from the thick jungle on one +side of the approach lanes being used by the transports. Both times +they returned fire in the direction of the unseen enemy and forced him +to silence his weapons. The first phase of the operation was completed +without serious incident four hours after it had begun. + +The second phase of the helilift began the next morning with the two +unarmed U.S. Army UH-1Bs making several trips to Landing Zone ZULU to +lift out the disassembled ARVN 105mm howitzers. The Marine and VNAF +transport helicopters followed and continued to shuttle troops out of +the landing zone for three hours without encountering enemy opposition. +Then a departing flight of UH-34Ds drew fire from a nearby ridgeline. +One of the escorting UH-1Bs immediately marked the suspected target for +the VNAF T-28s and the attack aircraft bombed and strafed the position. +The Communist activity ceased. + +After an overnight march, the covering force from Landing Zone HOTEL +arrived at Landing Zone ZULU. Although they were not scheduled to be +removed from the field until the next day, the schedule was adjusted +and the 125 weary ARVN soldiers were flown to the secure assembly area +on the afternoon of their arrival. This modification reduced the amount +of work which would be required of the helicopters on the final day of +the operation. + +The next phase of the helilift from ZULU on 17 August was characterized +by increasing concern for security around the landing site. The general +scheme for protecting the helicopters during this critical stage of +the exercise was to establish two perimeters, one around the rim of +high ground which surrounded the zone and another around the immediate +landing site. The outer perimeter would be withdrawn first, leaving the +inside ring of troops to deny the enemy direct access to the landing +zone while the force from the outer perimeter boarded the helicopters. +Once the Vietnamese soldiers were withdrawn from the rim of hills, the +area within 300 meters of the close-in defenses would be automatically +cleared for air strikes. Even with these precautions the helicopters +would be extremely vulnerable to any enemy force that might rapidly +occupy the high ground above Landing Zone ZULU following the withdrawal +of the outer perimeter. Accordingly, once the troops from the outer +defenses were staged for the helilift, the transport helicopters would +be directed by the airborne ASOC to tighten the landing interval +between aircraft from the usual five minutes to as short a time span +as possible. By landing in such rapid succession, the dangerous final +stage of the operation could be accomplished more quickly. + +Two hours after the helilift began on Saturday morning, the air +liaison officer at ZULU reported that the outer perimeter had been +withdrawn and that all remaining Vietnamese troops were in positions +around the landing zone. At this point the operation, now in its most +critical phase, began to experience agonizing delays. First, a loaded +helicopter arrived at the assembly area with a rough running engine. +Fearing that the fuel in the TAFDS had somehow become contaminated, +Lieutenant Colonel Shook instructed all HMM-261 pilots to check their +aircraft’s fuel strainers while their passengers disembarked at the +assembly point. No evidence was found to indicate that the fuel +contained contaminants, but the operation was slowed at the exact point +where the intensified helilift was to have begun. Another minor delay +occurred after a helicopter flying near the landing zone reported +having drawn enemy ground fire. The approach and departure routes were +adjusted slightly so that the transport helicopters would not fly over +the area and VNAF T-28s were directed to attack the suspected enemy +position. Shortly after the air strike ended the air liaison officer +at the landing zone reported more enemy activity only 500 meters from +his position. This momentary crisis was resolved when the American air +liaison officer personally directed armed UH-1Bs to neutralize the +target area. + +Finally, the airborne ASOC passed instructions to proceed with the +operation, whereupon HMM-261 and VNAF helicopters began spiraling down +into the landing zone. The escorting UH-1B gunships provided continuous +protection for the transport helicopters by flying concentric but +opposite patterns around them. One after another the transports landed, +took on troops, climbed out of the landing zone, and turned toward +Thuong Duc. Less than five minutes after the stepped-up helilift began, +the last troops were airborne. The crew chief of the helicopter which +embarked the final ARVN heliteam then dropped a purple smoke grenade +into the empty landing zone to signal all other aircraft that the lift +was complete. + +The three-day heliborne retrograde from the Laotian border proved +to be one of the most efficient helicopter operations conducted by +the Marines in the Republic of Vietnam during the early 1960s. Its +success was due largely to detailed planning, particularly the South +Vietnamese plans for the ground defense of both landing zones. These +plans and their subsequent execution led a grateful Colonel Gomez, +the task element commander, to declare: “This was the first time in +our experience that a helicopter-borne withdrawal had been treated as +a retrograde operation rather than an administrative lift. Without a +sound retrograde plan the operation might well have failed.”[9-7] + +Although this observation was correct, it should be added that the +close coordination between the airborne ASOC, the operational aircraft, +and the air liaison officer on the ground had contributed to the +successful execution of the plans. These agencies were instrumental in +coordinating the bilingual, multiservice effort, particularly when it +was beset with difficulties in its critical final stage. + +HMM-261’s combat support missions continued at a normal rate following +the completion of the mid-August retrograde helilift. A month later, +on 16 September, Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s squadron lost its second +UH-34D in a crash 25 miles west-southwest of Hue. The helicopter, which +had developed mechanical problems while carrying troops of a South +Vietnamese assault force, was damaged beyond repair. Its crew members +and passengers fortunately escaped injury. The aircraft was stripped of +usable parts by a salvage team from Da Nang and burned. + +Shortly after this incident, the first elements of a new squadron +began arriving at Da Nang and HMM-261 turned to preparations for its +departure. Since early June, when it had become the fourth Marine +helicopter squadron assigned to SHUFLY, Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s unit +had accumulated 5,288 combat flying hours and 11,406 sorties in the +UH-34Ds alone. The squadron’s crews had helilifted over 6,000 troops, +nearly 1,900,000 pounds of cargo, and had accomplished over 600 medical +evacuation missions.[9-8] + +The new squadron, HMM-361, assumed responsibility for helicopter +support in I Corps on 2 October after a short period of orientation +flying with the crews of the departing unit. HMM-361’s commanding +officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Ross, was well qualified to +direct a tactical aviation unit in a combat situation. Decorated with +five Distinguished Flying Crosses during World War II and Korea, he was +a recent graduate of the Air Force Command and Staff College. + +Barely a week after Ross’ squadron initiated combat support operations +at Da Nang, it suffered its first aircraft and personnel losses. +The incident occurred on 8 October when two UH-34Ds crashed almost +simultaneously while on a search and rescue mission 38 miles southwest +of Da Nang. Both helicopters burned, killing 10 men; the pilots, +copilots, the squadron’s flight surgeon, and five crewmen. A search +of the area was initiated immediately for the downed aircraft, but +darkness prevented their discovery until the next morning. By then +the Viet Cong had surrounded both crash sites and were waiting to +ambush the search and rescue helicopters which they knew would arrive. +When the rescue aircraft attempted to land, they met determined enemy +opposition. Colonel Gomez requested ARVN assistance and 254 South +Vietnamese troops were lifted into nearby clearings with instructions +to dislodge the enemy force from the area around the downed aircraft. +While executing the landing, HMM-361 helicopters were hit nine times by +small arms fire, but suffered only superficial damage. One ARVN soldier +was killed. + +The following day, as the South Vietnamese forces moved toward the +downed UH-34Ds, three Marine helicopters escorted by three armed UH-1Bs +and two VNAF T-28s lifted an inspection team into the crash site to +recover the bodies and investigate the wreckage. Enemy automatic +weapons fire broke out while the UH-34Ds waited in the landing zone +and forced the pilots to take off while the inspection team found +cover on the ground. After the Communist fire had been suppressed, the +helicopters returned for the stranded Marines. Their investigation of +the aircraft hulks had been fruitful: the evidence of enemy small arms +fire in the wreckage and the relative positions of the two helicopters +led Lieutenant Colonel Ross to conclude that the aircraft had been shot +down by the Viet Cong.[9-9] But this was not a conclusive finding. +There was room for speculation that the two helicopters had actually +collided in midair while attempting to evade ground fire. + +Ground action in the hills around the crash sites continued. On 11 +October, another Marine helicopter was hit by Viet Cong fire while +resupplying ARVN units in the area. In this incident the UH-34D was +struck twice in the engine and once in the wheel strut while in a +landing zone about two miles from the point where the crashes had +occurred. After assessing the damage, a maintenance team from Da Nang +determined that the helicopter would require a new engine. Marines from +the security platoon were utilized to provide security until 13 October +when an additional 120 ARVN troops were helilifted into the area and +established a perimeter around the aircraft. Other helicopters then +delivered the new engine and a maintenance crew to the landing zone. +After the engines were exchanged, a crew returned the UH-34D to Da Nang. + +By the time HMM-361 had removed the last ARVN troops from the hills +around the scene of the tragic accidents, monsoon weather had begun +to restrict flight operations. The remaining two weeks of October +were characterized by a reduced number of missions, most of which +were either resupply or medical evacuations. By the end of October, +despite numerous flight cancellations, Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ crews +had gained the unenviable distinction of having attracted more enemy +fire during a one month period than any previous squadron to serve with +SHUFLY. Their helicopters had been shot at on 46 different occasions +and had been hit 18 times.[9-10] + +SHUFLY’s combat support operations came to a halt in the first days of +November as the reverberations from Diem’s overthrow spread to South +Vietnam’s northern provinces. American officials in Washington and +Saigon, aware of the pitfalls that might accompany open support of +either side in the power struggle, ordered all U.S. military forces +to cease advisory and combat support activities. As a result of the +sensitive political situation, no U.S. aircraft left the ground on 2 +November. Two days after the new regime seized power in Saigon, the +U.S. Marine helicopters were permitted to perform emergency medical +evacuation and emergency resupply missions. Even these flights were +to be approved beforehand by ARVN military officers in Saigon. Four +days after Diem’s overthrow, the new leaders in Saigon eased the +political restrictions and SHUFLY’s operations returned to near normal. +One remaining limitation stipulated that U.S. helicopters could not +transport ARVN units into population centers even though troops could +be helilifted from the cities into rural areas. + +Due to torrential monsoon rains which began striking the Da Nang +area in mid-November, HMM-361’s combat support operations continued +at a relatively low level throughout the remainder of the year. This +trend was confirmed by the flight totals compiled for the final two +months of 1963. In November, the squadron’s UH-34Ds flew only 145 +sorties for 233 flight hours. December’s statistics, 230 helicopter +sorties for 338 flight hours, indicated a slight upswing but fell far +short of the monthly figures achieved earlier in the year. With rain +and fog frequently rendering the mountains inaccessible by air, the +preponderance of the squadron’s missions were conducted along the +coastal plains. As 1963 ended SHUFLY’s combat support operations were +continuing at a greatly reduced rate. + + +_The Situation in Vietnam_ + +Although not yet desperate, the overall situation in South Vietnam +at the end of 1963 was far from favorable. Mismanaged and poorly +coordinated from the outset, the Strategic Hamlet Program had failed +to fulfill even the most moderate of American and South Vietnamese +expectations. Little discernable headway had been made toward restoring +any large segment of the populated rural areas to government control. +Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese had disregarded the Geneva Agreement +of 1962 and had continued to infiltrate troops and material down the +Laotian corridor into the South. Although the 1963 figure of 4,200 +confirmed infiltrators was roughly 1,000 men lower than the figure for +the previous year, it was substantial enough to force the government +to deviate more and more from its avowed strategy of clearing Viet +Cong formations from the vital populated areas. To help meet this +continuing influx of Communist regulars, the government had committed +its ground force to operations against base areas located in the remote +hinterlands with increasing frequency. More often than not these +multi-battalion offensives, such as the VNMC-ARVN drive into the Do +Xa base area in May, proved futile, usually resulting in scattered +and inconsequential clashes with small groups of Viet Cong. The +continuation of such actions, of course, worked to the advantage of the +Communists as the government forces expended time, energy, and lives +without exacting a commensurate price from the enemy. + +Other disturbing trends had emerged on the South’s battlefields during +the course of the year. Following an action fought in the Mekong +Delta during early January in which the Viet Cong soundly defeated a +multi-battalion ARVN heliborne force, enemy main force units continued +to maintain their integrity and fought back when confronted with +helicopter assaults. This trend was evident even in the northern +provinces where each successive assault by Marine helicopters appeared +to meet more determined resistance. Aside from the Viet Cong’s +new-found confidence in countering heliborne offensives, another source +of concern to U.S. and Vietnamese officials was the appearance in the +South of several Viet Cong regimental headquarters during the year. +The activation of these headquarters, which assumed control of already +operational main force battalions, seemed to presage another phase of +Communist military escalation. + +The situation throughout South Vietnam worsened in the aftermath of +the Diem coup. Subsequent to the widespread command changes ordered +by the new government, the morale, and in turn the effectiveness, +of the Vietnamese armed forces declined sharply. The Viet Cong moved +quickly to exploit the prevailing state of confusion by staging a +rash of attacks in the weeks after Diem’s overthrow--attacks which +worked a profound influence on the already faltering Strategic Hamlet +Program. “The fall of the Ngo regime,” wrote one American scholar, +“was accompanied by the complete collapse of the pacification efforts +in many areas, and vast regions that had been under government control +quickly came under the influence of the Viet Cong.”[9-11] The nation’s +new leaders therefore formally terminated the badly damaged Strategic +Hamlet Program. Although it was soon to be replaced with similar +pacification campaigns, most Vietnamese and American officials conceded +that much time and energy would be required to restore momentum to +the government’s efforts at securing the allegiance of the rural +population. So, by the end of 1963 both the tempo and effectiveness +of South Vietnam’s overall war effort was at its lowest ebb since the +intensification of the U.S. military assistance program in early 1962. + +[Illustration: _ARVN troops fan out from an HMM-361 helicopter during +an assault into the mountains of I Corps. (USMC Photo A420866)._] + +This threatening situation was hardly consistent with American military +plans which were being implemented at year’s end. Drawn up at Secretary +of Defense McNamara’s direction and approved by him in the late summer +of 1963, these plans called for a phased withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. +servicemen from Vietnam by January 1964. The phased withdrawal plan, +whose ultimate objective was to end direct American participation in +the war, envisioned a gradual scaling down of U.S. involvement while +simultaneously turning over more military responsibility to the South +Vietnamese. Included in the initial 1,000-man reduction was the 47-man +security platoon which had guarded the U.S. Marine task element’s +compound at Da Nang since April. For the Marines serving with the task +element, 1963 thus ended on an incongruous note. While the Viet Cong +threat appeared on the rise, their own defenses were being reduced. +Clearly, events in Vietnam had overtaken long-range plans already in +motion. + + + + + PART IV + + AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964 + + + + +CHAPTER 10 + +Marines Meet the Challenge + +_New American Decisions--A Restructured Military Assistance +Command--Changes in Marine Leadership--Redesignation and +Reorganization--The Vietnamese Marine Brigade--Additional Marine +Activities_ + + +_New American Decisions_ + +Less than three weeks after the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, the +U.S. Presidency changed hands. On 22 November President Kennedy was +assassinated in Dallas and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson took +the reigns of the American government. By late November, when the +new president assumed office, the process of political and military +disintegration which had begun in South Vietnam following the Diem +coup was already well underway. This process continued into the early +weeks of 1964 when, in late January, General Nguyen Khanh, the newly +appointed commander of I Corps, seized power in a bloodless coup. +This second turnover in the government of South Vietnam in less than +three months had its most serious impact on the nation’s armed forces. +A new series of command changes ensued and again the government’s +operations against the Communists suffered. As had been the case in the +closing months of 1963, the Viet Cong continued to capitalize on the +government’s disarray by expanding its control into previously secure +areas. + +By March the rapidly declining effectiveness of the South Vietnamese +military forces led the Johnson Administration to review the earlier +decisions to withdraw American servicemen and to cut back the military +assistance program. In a 16 March memorandum to President Johnson, +Secretary of Defense McNamara warned that “the [military] situation +had unquestionably been growing worse” in South Vietnam.[10-1] To +counteract this threatening trend, McNamara offered a broad set of +recommendations which included a proposal to support a 50,000-man +increase in the size of the Vietnamese military and paramilitary +forces. The memorandum did not address the question of additional +American advisors who might be needed to supervise the proposed +expansion. In any case, President Johnson approved McNamara’s plan the +following day, thus setting the stage for increases in U.S. military +assistance to South Vietnam.[10-2] + +Shortly after his most recent decision on Vietnam, President Johnson +ordered changes in his top civilian and military representatives in +Saigon. On 22 June, General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Army, who +had been serving since January as Deputy Commander, USMACV, succeeded +General Harkins as ComUSMACV. One day later, on the 23d, President +Johnson announced that General Maxwell D. Taylor would replace Henry +Cabot Lodge as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam. Taylor, who +had been serving since 1962 as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of +Staff, had been closely associated with the Vietnam problem since his +1961 fact-finding mission. Both he and Westmoreland were thoroughly +familiar with U.S. programs and objectives in Vietnam. + +Soon after assuming his new responsibilities, General Westmoreland +requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff augment his command with 5,100 +additional military personnel. In his opinion, these men were needed +to support and supervise the expansion of the Vietnamese military and +paramilitary forces. Secretary McNamara met with the Joint Chiefs on 20 +July to discuss this request for 900 more advisors and 4,200 additional +support personnel. All agreed that the deteriorating situation in +Vietnam demanded the measure and recommended its approval. The proposal +was forwarded to President Johnson who approved it in early August. +Emphasizing the urgency of the military situation, McNamara then +ordered the Joint Chiefs to complete the entire build-up before 30 +September. At this juncture, however, General Westmoreland pointed +out that such a rapid influx of personnel would “overload existing +facilities [in South Vietnam]” and stated his desire to see the +build-up accomplished in a more orderly progression over a period of +several months. After considering the general’s latest request, the +Secretary of Defense withdrew his earlier demand for an accelerated +deployment.[10-3] + +[Illustration: _The MACV staff, spring 1964. Seated at head of table +are General Paul D. Harkins, USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance +Command, Vietnam, and his relief General William C. Westmoreland, USA. +Major General Richard G. Weede, USMC, MACV Chief of Staff, is seated to +General Westmoreland’s immediate left, and Brigadier General Carl A. +Youngdale, USMC, Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, is seated two positions +to General Weede’s left. (Photo courtesy of Major General Carl A. +Youngdale, USMC (Ret.))._] + +While the details of the expanded U S. advisory program were being +hammered out in Washington, the focus of the administration’s concern +swung abruptly from the battlefields of South Vietnam to the Tonkin +Gulf off the coast of North Vietnam. In two separate incidents during +the first week of August, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked U.S. +Navy ships operating in international waters.[10-A] An international +crisis ensued when the United States retaliated with limited air +strikes against North Vietnamese naval facilities. On 6 August, the +U.S. Congress unanimously passed a joint resolution authorizing the +President “to use all measures, including the commitment of armed +forces to assist [South Vietnam] in the defense of its independence +and territorial integrity....”[10-4] President Johnson signed the +so-called Tonkin Gulf Resolution five days after it was passed, and in +so doing, reaffirmed his pledge of full support for the Government of +Vietnam.[10-B] + + [10-A] A vigorous debate has since developed concerning the + actual origins of the Tonkin Gulf incidents. It has been + claimed that the Americans precipitated the attacks by + supporting aggressive South Vietnamese naval patrols off + the North Vietnamese coast. + + [10-B] U.S. Marines figured prominently in the crisis which + followed the North Vietnamese attacks. A Marine + expeditionary brigade, the 9th MEB, was activated from + elements of the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine + Aircraft Wing and deployed on board amphibious shipping + to a position off Da Nang where it was available to + support U.S. contingency plans. Its commander, Brigadier + General Raymond G. Davis, and his staff attended planning + conferences in Da Nang and reconnoitered possible landing + sites near the city, but the MEB was not committed. + Instead, the organization remained in existence + throughout the remainder of 1964 and into early 1965 + when, in March, two of its battalions were landed at Da + Nang. The formation and subsequent commitment of the 9th + MEB in the Republic of Vietnam are covered in detail + in the 1965 history of U.S. Marine operations in the + Republic of Vietnam. + +While the tensions generated by the Tonkin Gulf incidents never really +subsided, the immediate crisis soon passed. Thereafter the American +attentions focused once again on South Vietnam where the political and +military situation began to deteriorate at an unprecedented rate after +midyear. Ironically, this process of accelerated decay coincided with +the initiation of a new South Vietnamese pacification strategy designed +to prevent just such an occurrence. One aspect of the strategy was the +Chien Tang (“Struggle for Victory”) Plan. Announced by General Khanh +shortly after his rise to power, this campaign was similar in method +and objective to the defunct Strategic Hamlet Program. Like the earlier +program, the Chien Tang Plan envisioned the restoration of government +influence in selected rural areas through the coordination of military +and paramilitary operations with social and economic development +programs.[10-C] While the Chien Tang campaign was better planned and +far less ambitious than the Strategic Hamlet Program, there were +definite similarities between the two. The instrument for the social, +economic, and political developmental phase of the new effort, for +example, was the New Life Hamlet--a variation of the planned government +community. Begun in some areas around midyear, the New Life Hamlets +were to become the symbol of the new pacification effort in much the +same manner that the fortified hamlets had symbolized the earlier +Strategic Hamlet Program. + + [10-C] Motivated at least partially by the requirement to + provide better support for the pacification strategy, + the Vietnamese government restructured its paramilitary + forces in the spring of 1964. The old Self Defense Corps + was expanded dramatically and renamed the Popular Force + (PF). The Civil Guard was reorganized and designated the + Regional Force (RF). More importantly, the RVNAF extended + its control over both paramilitary organizations for the + first time since their creation. + +Coincident with the Chien Tang campaign, a similar but locally +concentrated pacification effort was instituted in the rural areas +around Saigon. Designated the Hop Tac Program, this campaign was +conceived in order to link the seven provinces around the capital into +a zone of intensive pacification in which closely coordinated military, +paramilitary, police, and civil activities would systematically reduce +Viet Cong strength. Because of their proximity to the area and their +availability, the Vietnamese Marine Brigade and the ARVN Airborne +Brigade were assigned primary responsibility for military operations in +support of the Hop Tac campaign. By midyear, the Chien Tang and Hop Tac +plans emerged as the backbone of General Khanh’s strategy to stave off +further Communist advances in critical areas of the country. + +The development of the government’s newest pacification strategy, +however, was based on the assumption that the Viet Cong would pursue +a campaign to strengthen their control in South Vietnam’s populated +rural areas. Such was not the case. Instead, at midyear the Communists +began waging a brand of warfare characterized by large-scale mobile +operations against government military forces. Obviously the enemy had +shifted to the “general counter-offensive”--that phase of guerrilla +warfare designed to bring on the complete political and military +collapse of the opposition. + +The new Viet Cong strategy revealed itself in two general geographic +areas during the fall months. In Binh Dinh Province on the coast of +northern II Corps, two Viet Cong main force regiments staged a series +of particularly swift and successful attacks which virtually eliminated +the government’s presence except in the province capital, Qui Nhon, +and a few district towns. In a coordinated offensive the Communists +increased pressure throughout that portion of the Central Highlands +west of Binh Dinh Province, thereby threatening to sever South Vietnam +along an axis that extended roughly between Qui Nhon on the coast and +Pleiku in the highlands. Meanwhile, another phase of the new initiative +unfolded in III Corps where the government’s Hop Tac campaign was +just getting underway. There the Communist offensive threatened to +neutralize the government’s concentrated pacification campaign. + +Eroded by the political side-effects of the battlefield developments, +South Vietnam’s fragile power structure became increasingly unstable. +The last five months of 1964 brought frequent changes in the Saigon +government although General Khanh was able to maintain a semblance of +control until December. The turmoil then climaxed when Air Vice Marshal +Nguyen Cao Ky, the commander of the Vietnamese Air Force, engineered a +bloodless coup that forced Khanh from the Saigon political scene. + +The frequent changes of government coupled with the stepped-up Viet +Cong military pressure throughout Vietnam produced a downward spiral +in the effectiveness of the republic’s armed forces. By the end of the +year it was becoming increasingly doubtful that the government could +stave off total collapse even with the increased volume of military +assistance it was already receiving from the United States. Against +this backdrop of Communist military activities, unprecedented political +instability on the part of the South Vietnamese, and mounting combat +losses, American military involvement in Vietnam deepened. + + +_A Restructured Military Assistance Command_ + +In many respects 1964 was a year of transition for the U.S. Military +Assistance Command, Vietnam. Not only did the command experience a +change in leadership when General Westmoreland replaced General Harkins +as ComUSMACV, but it was thoroughly reorganized in preparation for the +more vigorous U.S. advisory program which was expected to begin about +midyear. + +The major organizational change within MACV took place on 15 May when +the MAAG was abolished and its staff integrated into that of the +senior command. In June MACV itself was restructured under a new table +of distribution. These changes reflected the anticipated influx of +advisors and support personnel, and therefore concerned the Army more +than the other U.S. armed services. + +Initially, the number of Marine billets on the restructured Military +Assistance Command staff did not change substantially. Twenty-four +Marines (15 officers and nine enlisted) were included in the new table +of distribution. This represented a net increase of only one over the +number previously assigned to the MAAG and MACV staffs. By the end of +September, however, Marines temporarily assigned to the MACV staff from +FMFPac commands brought the on-board strength to 37. Another increase +occurred in the early fall when eight more permanent Marine billets +(three officers and five enlisted) were approved. + + +_Changes in Marine Leadership_ + +Two key links in the Marine command chain that joined government policy +decisions in Washington to Marine Corps operations in Vietnam changed +hands during the first 60 days of 1964. On 1 January, General Wallace +M. Greene, Jr., replaced General Shoup as Commandant of the Marine +Corps. Greene, known in American military circles as a brilliant staff +officer, had been serving since 1960 as Chief of Staff of the Marine +Corps. By 1964 he had become an outspoken supporter of South Vietnam’s +struggle for independence. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and +as a Chief of Service, his presence in administration policies would be +felt until his tour as commandant ended on 31 January 1967. + +An equally important change occurred in early March when General +Greene named Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak to replace General +Roberts as Commanding General, FMFPac. A 1934 graduate of the U.S. +Naval Academy, Krulak had won the Navy Cross during ground action in +World War II. He arrived in the Pacific from Washington where he had +served both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as special assistant for +counterinsurgency matters. Having made numerous fact-finding trips to +Vietnam in this capacity, he was intimately familiar with the unique +political-military struggle being waged there. He also had a reputation +of being one of Washington’s most vocal advocates of resisting +Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. A dynamic leader and a man of +strong convictions, Krulak was to exert a pervasive influence over all +Marine operations in the Pacific for nearly half a decade. + +Less obvious but of immense importance to both the Marine Corps and +to the future of U.S. military operations in Vietnam was a change +instituted within MACV by General Westmoreland during the early part +of the year. The command’s modified table of organization called for +the establishment of a Deputy ComUSMACV billet to be filled by an Army +general officer. The joint table of distribution for the reorganized +command specified that an Army general would also fill the chief +of staff billet--a position which had been held by General Weede +since MACV’s creation in early 1962. Thus, when Weede’s assignment +ended in May, Major General Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army, became +Westmoreland’s chief of staff while Lieutenant General John L. +Throckmorton, U.S. Army, became Deputy ComUSMACV.[10-D] The Marine +Corps, however, did not lose its entire senior presence on the MACV +staff. Brigadier General Carl A. Youngdale, an officer whose 30-year +career included distinguished combat tours in both World War II and +Korea, arrived 15 January for assignment as Assistant Chief of Staff, +J-2 (Intelligence). His presence on the MACV staff would insure a +Marine voice in U.S. military planning at the Saigon level. Still, many +Marines saw their relative strength on Westmoreland’s staff seriously +reduced--a change which seemed to mark somewhat of a turning point in +the overall management of the military assistance effort. + + [10-D] For his service as MACV chief of staff, General Weede was + awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. + + +_Redesignation and Reorganization_ + +The reorganization of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, +had little initial effect on the Marine advisory program. With the +dissolution of the MAAG, the old Naval Section, under which the Marine +advisors had operated since 1955, was redesignated the Naval Advisory +Group, MACV. Lieutenant Colonel Noren’s Marine Advisory Division, +whose authorized strength remained at 11 officers and nine enlisted +men through the first half of the year, was also renamed in mid-May. +Known thereafter as the Marine Advisory Unit, Vietnam, the organization +continued to function in much the same manner as it had under the +previous arrangements. + +The last five months of the year, however, saw some substantial changes +in the composition of the Marine Advisory Unit as the advisor build-up +recently approved by the Secretary of Defense began. Colonel William P. +Nesbit, a recent graduate of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode +Island, relieved Colonel Noren (promoted from lieutenant colonel on +1 July) as the Senior Marine Advisor on 4 September. Colonel Nesbit +arrived in time to supervise the implementation of a new table of +organization which added eight first lieutenants and a captain to the +advisory unit in November.[10-E] The captain and one of the lieutenants +were assigned as advisor and assistant advisor respectively to a new +Vietnamese Marine infantry battalion which was in the process of +being formed. Four other first lieutenants joined Colonel Nesbit’s +command as assistant advisors to existing infantry battalions and one +became the assistant artillery advisor. The two remaining lieutenants +were assigned as advisors to the brigade’s motor transport and +communications companies, replacing noncommissioned advisors. Two +billets were downgraded in rank: the engineer advisor from captain to +first lieutenant, and the artillery advisor from major to captain. + + [10-E] A number of the Marines scheduled to fill the newly + created billets did not arrive until early 1965. + +In addition to phasing out three enlisted advisor billets, these +changes relieved the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor of his artillery +responsibilities. Colonel Earl E. Anderson, who had been serving since +mid-1963 as the MAAG Chief of Staff, was instrumental in bringing +about this particular modification. Under the old arrangement, the +Senior Marine Advisor’s presence frequently had been required at +the MAAG headquarters in Saigon while the Vietnamese Marine Brigade +headquarters was deployed to combat. As the Assistant Senior Marine +Advisor was likewise torn between two jobs, Anderson had directed that +he be relieved of artillery advisory duties. Thus, Major Raymond C. +Damm, an officer who had served as Assistant Naval Attache in Saigon +between 1959 and 1961, became the first full-time Assistant Senior +Marine Advisor after he joined Colonel Nesbit’s command in May. When +the changes were finally completed, the restructured and redesignated +Marine Advisory Unit included permanent billets for 24 officers and +men (18 officers and six enlisted men). + +Another important aspect of the overall Marine advisory program was +altered in the closing months of 1964. Since Lieutenant Colonel +Croizat’s tour with the Vietnamese Marines in the immediate post-Geneva +period, most Marine advisors had attended French language courses +prior to departing for service in Vietnam. As French influence in +Vietnam faded during the late 1950s, however, the requirement for +the language had gradually diminished, particularly as French maps +were replaced by American ones. By the early 1960s this situation had +prompted several Marine advisors to recommend that instruction in +French be replaced by Vietnamese language training. Primarily through +the persistence of Colonels Moody and Noren, the policy was revised in +1964. The arrival of the new advisors in the fall marked the first time +that Marine officers had received formal Vietnamese language training +before beginning their tours. Colonel Nesbit, who had the advantage of +commanding advisors trained in both languages, saw the change as “a +marked step forward,” in improving the advisory effort.[10-5] + + +_The Vietnamese Marine Brigade_ + +At the beginning of 1964, the 6,109-man Vietnamese Marine Brigade, +commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, experienced a crisis +of morale. The recent command changes that had occurred at almost +every echelon and a soaring desertion rate combined to undermine +the brigade’s combat readiness. In February the Khanh government +recalled Colonel Le Nguyen Khang from the Philippines, promoted him to +brigadier general, and reinstated him as commandant in an attempt to +restore the unit’s spirit. A veteran Marine who had been instrumental +in the development of the VNMC since its inception, Khang commanded +confidence throughout the corps. Following his return, increased +attention was given to the welfare of the individual Marine and his +dependents in order to reduce the climbing desertion rate. Under the +close supervision of the senior Vietnamese officers and their American +advisors, the morale problem was gradually overcome. + +Throughout the year the Vietnamese Marine Brigade continued to share +the role of South Vietnam’s general reserve force with an ARVN airborne +brigade. Normally at least one Marine battalion was held in the +vicinity of Saigon, ready to respond to tactical emergencies while +others operated nearby in support of the Hop Tac campaign. Still, the +brigade’s infantry battalions managed to see action in every corps +tactical zone except I Corps, which was the farthest removed from +the capital.[10-F] Although sometimes combined into regimental-sized +task forces for specific operations, the individual Marine battalions +normally were attached to either a corps, a province, or an ARVN +division for combat operations. When so attached, the Vietnamese +Marines often were assigned to clear particularly hazardous or +difficult terrain. At times they served as a reserve force, responding +to crucial situations to either recoup or exploit actions initiated by +other government units. + + [10-F] South Vietnam’s corps boundaries were adjusted again in + late 1964. The southern boundary of I Corps was moved + south to include Quang Ngai Province. The southern border + of II Corps was also moved southward to include eight + provinces formerly encompassed by III Corps. Under the + new arrangement, III CTZ formed a narrow strip across + the nation which centered roughly on Saigon. The Capital + Military District, the boundaries of which coincided with + those of Gia Dinh Province, formed an enclave within + III Corps. The southernmost tactical zone, IV Corps, + encompassed the entire Mekong Delta. + +In early January, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff assigned a Marine +task force to a pacification mission in Go Cong and Long An Provinces, +located just southeast of Saigon. Two VNMC battalions, controlled by +a task force headquarters, moved into the operations area later in +the month and remained until mid-September when the operation was +terminated. The object of the Marine unit’s presence was to reestablish +government control over the region through systematic small unit +operations designed to deny the enemy his usual freedom of movement. + +[Illustration: + + CORPS TACTICAL ZONES + AT THE END OF 1964 +] + +Despite the length of this particular deployment, the Vietnamese +Marines fought no major engagements. Furthermore, they had not +translated their improved morale into an effective pacification +operation. While desertions and unauthorized absences remained low +considering the duration of this particular assignment, Colonel Noren +later recalled several flaws in the campaign. These operations, he +remarked “were characterized by inadequate coordination of military +operations and intelligence reporting ... too little operational +activity ... and a seeming lack of appreciation of the objectives of +pacification.”[10-6] Colonel Nesbit, who became the Senior Marine +Advisor as the operation entered its final stages, tended to confirm +this assessment. “The capacity of the task force headquarters in staff +functioning,” he reported, “was marginal.”[10-7] + +[Illustration: _General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the +Marine Corps, inspects an honor guard of Vietnamese Marines. With him +are Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant of the Vietnamese +Marine Corps, and Major General Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff, +Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. (Official USMC Photo)._] + +While the drive to pacify the Go Cong-Long An areas was in progress, +other Vietnamese Marine task forces were organized to undertake +different combat assignments elsewhere in the southern portion of +Vietnam. One, composed of two battalions, an artillery detachment, and +a headquarters element, launched a brief clearing operation northwest +of Saigon in heavily populated Tay Ninh Province in January. A similar +operation involving another task force was conducted the next month in +the difficult mangrove swamps of An Xuyen Province at the southern tip +of the nation. In both cases the government offensives enjoyed local +success, but failed to reduce significantly the enemy’s capabilities +and influence in the area. + +Midyear 1964 found the Vietnamese Marine commanders and their American +advisors engaged in renewed efforts to restructure and expand the +Vietnamese Marine Brigade. Accomplished for the most part in July, the +salient feature of this latest reorganization was the creation of a new +infantry battalion. With its nucleus garrisoned at a small base about +12 miles northwest of Saigon, the newly organized 5th Battalion devoted +the remainder of the year and the first six months of 1965 to forming +and training its companies. It finally became combat ready in June +1965. + +[Illustration: VNMC (MARINE BRIGADE) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JULY +1964 + +AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 6,555] + +Aside from the addition of the new infantry battalion, the mid-1964 +reorganization produced other noteworthy changes in the structure +of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. In the artillery battalion, the two +75mm pack howitzer batteries were combined into one battery of eight +weapons, while the one 105mm howitzer battery was divided to form two +new batteries of six howitzers each. The tables of equipment were +revised to reflect these adjustments. Another significant change +occurred in the area of training. The Training Company was deleted from +the Amphibious Support Battalion and a separate recruit training center +was created at Thu Duc near Saigon. Tactical planning and control was +also improved when the Brigade Headquarters was reduced in size and two +smaller Task Force Headquarters (Task Force A and Task Force B) were +formed. + +Following the mid-1964 reorganization, the Vietnamese Marines performed +combat missions not unlike those they had been assigned prior to +July. One exception was that the brigade no longer found itself +tasked with actual pacification phases of operations. Instead, the +Marine battalions concentrated on clearing operations around Saigon +in conjunction with the Hop Tac campaign. Additionally, the various +battalions were called upon occasionally during this period to provide +security for key government installations located in Saigon and Vung +Tau--assignments which gave the infantry units much needed respites +from field duty. + +By the end of the year the Vietnamese Marine Corps had been improved in +several areas. In the motor transport field two new pieces of equipment +were put into full-time operation--a high pressure steam cleaner and +an M-108 wrecker. Progress also was made in upgrading the entire +communications capability of the brigade when the table of equipment +was revised in accordance with the modified table of organization. The +new tables provided for modern test and repair equipment and eliminated +obsolete and impractical items. Other unrealized improvements were +still in their formative stages as the year closed. In the field of +supply, for example, the brigade supply officer, with assistance +from his American advisor, was drawing up plans which would give the +Vietnamese Marines a more responsive and more manageable system. + +While the technically oriented programs were being developed and +implemented, intensified training programs were preparing more +and better trained Vietnamese Marines for their responsibilities. +Established in July, the Marine Training Center at Thu Duc had +graduated 1,464 recruits before the end of the year. These recruits, +moreover, were trained by Vietnamese noncommissioned officers who had +recently completed the drill instructor course at Marine Corps Recruit +Depot, San Diego. For the first time since its inception, the VNMC was +benefiting from a flow of recruits trained by Vietnamese Marines at a +separate Marine training facility. + +Other programs likewise were helping prepare Vietnamese officers +and noncommissioned officers to command and manage their growing +service. A total of 718 officers and noncommissioned officers attended +various training courses in South Vietnam during the year while 42 +more officers attended formal schools in the United States during the +same period. Another 52 small unit leaders participated in on-the-job +training programs with U.S. Marine units on Okinawa between January and +December.[10-8] + +Unfortunately, these developments were overshadowed by a military +disaster which befell the 4th VNMC Battalion on the last day of the +year. The Marine unit had been serving since early December as the +reserve force for III Corps Tactical Zone. On the 27th an estimated +Viet Cong battalion overran the small pro-government town of Binh +Gia located in Phuoc Thy Province roughly 35 miles east of Saigon. +III Corps officials reacted by dispatching the 4th Battalion and an +ARVN Ranger battalion to the area. The 4th Battalion, accompanied by +two U.S. Marine advisors and three OJT observers from the 3d Marine +Division, was ordered to recapture the town. It proceeded to do so on +the 30th, encountering no enemy opposition. Later in the day, while the +Marines were developing defensive positions around the town, a spotter +aircraft sighted a large Viet Cong force approximately two miles to the +west and called for air strikes. A U.S. Army helicopter gunship was +shot down and its crew killed while attacking the target. + +Against the advice of his senior U.S. Marine Advisor, Captain Franklin +P. Eller, the 4th Battalion commander ordered one of his companies +to secure the crash site and recover the bodies of the dead crewmen. +Accompanied by Eller, First Lieutenant James P. Kelliher, and Staff +Sergeant Clifford J. Beaver, two of the 3d Division OJTs, the company +moved west from Binh Gia on the morning of the 31st to carry out the +mission. After reaching the crash site, the Marine unit was ambushed +by a large Viet Cong force using 82mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, +and .50 caliber machine guns. Unable to maneuver because of the intense +fire, the company radioed for assistance and began withdrawing from the +ambush site in small groups. + +[Illustration: _Marine Captain Franklin P. Eller, advisor to the 4th +Vietnamese Marine Battalion, coordinates with other American-advised +units operating nearby. (USMC Photo A183570)._] + +The battalion commander, accompanied by the assistant Marine advisor, +First Lieutenant Philip O. Brady and the other OJTs, responded to the +call for assistance by leading the remaining three companies from +their positions at Binh Gia. Just outside the town they met Captain +Eller, who had been wounded in the face, along with Lieutenant Kelliher +and the remnants of the hard-hit company. Eller and the survivors of +the morning ambush returned to Binh Gia while the remainder of the +battalion pushed westward in an attempt to locate the enemy force. +Later in the morning, the Marine column was surprised while moving +through an abandoned rubber plantation by a Communist force of between +1,200 and 1,800 men. + +No artillery was available to support the beleaguered battalion. +Vietnamese Air Force A-1 Skyraiders, however, were able to deliver +close air strikes for about 45 minutes. U.S. Army helicopter gunships +replaced the Skyraiders on station, but their rocket and machine gun +fire proved too light to dislodge the enemy from his positions under +the dense vegetation. By late afternoon, 29 of the 4th Battalion’s 35 +officers, including the battalion commander, were dead. In desperation, +the Americans organized the surviving Vietnamese Marines into small +groups some of which managed to slip past the Viet Cong and find their +way back to Binh Gia. + +The Vietnamese Marines had suffered their most decisive defeat of the +war. Their losses were extremely high: 112 killed, 71 wounded, and +13 missing out of a 326-man battalion. Equipment losses included 142 +weapons and over a dozen radios. Additionally, all four of the U.S. +Marines who had participated in the disastrous action had been wounded. +Both Captain Eller and Lieutenant Brady were later awarded the Silver +Star Medal for their roles in the battle.[10-G] Captain Donald G. Cook, +one of the OJT observers from the 3d Marine Division, was missing in +action at the close of the battle.[10-H] + + [10-G] Personal decorations for heroism were awarded more + frequently to Marine advisors through 1964. Earlier + in the year (16 February), a Marine captain, Donald + E. Koelper, an advisor to the 4th Vietnamese Marine + Battalion earned a Navy Cross, the nation’s second + highest award for heroism. Koelper was decorated for + warning the occupants of a crowded American theater in + Saigon to take cover just prior to the detonation of a + Viet Cong terrorist bomb. The Marine was killed by a Viet + Cong satchel charge. But his sacrifice limited the number + of casualties to three killed and 51 wounded. + + [10-H] It was later learned that Captain Cook had been wounded + and captured by the Viet Cong. Cook reportedly died in + captivity in 1967. + +The ranger battalion operating nearby suffered a similar fate, +incurring nearly 400 casualties in another violent ambush. Thus, within +a 24-hour period two elite government battalions had been shattered. +Only later was it learned that the Marines and rangers had clashed with +two main force regiments of the _9th Viet Cong Division_--the first +Communist division to become operational in South Vietnam. + +As a result of the disastrous engagement at Binh Gia, the 4th +Vietnamese Marine Battalion was rendered ineffective as a fighting +force for a period of three months. This loss created two immediate +problems for General Khang and his American advisors. It reduced the +brigade’s available infantry strength by approximately 25 percent and +placed an added burden on the recruit training center which was already +laboring to provide enough new troops to fill the 5th Battalion. For +the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1964 ended on a discouraging note. + +[Illustration: _Marine Captain Donald E. Koelper, advisor to the 4th +Vietnamese Marine Battalion, was posthumously awarded the first Navy +Cross for action in Vietnam. (USMC Photo A411741)._] + + +_Additional Marine Activities_ + +U.S. Marine participation in the Vietnam War during 1964 was not +limited to the activities of the advisory division and the helicopter +task element. Various other Marine units and detachments made +significant, although less publicized, contributions to the war effort +throughout the year. One of these was the Marine security detachment +which continued to protect the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. Twice during +the year the growing political unrest and the increasing threat of +Communist terrorist attacks prompted the expansion of the security +detachment, first in April and again in October. By the end of the year +the detachment’s strength stood at 30 Marines--a figure which made it +the second largest such unit in the world. Only the Marine detachment +in Paris, with 37 officers and men, was larger. And nowhere was an +embassy guard assignment more dangerous than in Vietnam where terrorist +attacks were apt to occur at anytime. + +Other groups of Marines performed an assortment of missions in +support of the Government of Vietnam during the course of the year. +The Detachment, 1st Composite Radio Company, for example, continued +its duties at the U.S. Army Communications installation in Pleiku. +A handful of these Marines also served at a newly opened U.S. Army +communications station at Phu Bai some eight miles southeast of Hue. +The strength of the Detachment, 1st Composite Radio Company, however, +was reduced from 42 officers and men to only 16 by the end of December. + +The spring of 1964 saw a new, substantially larger Marine +communications detachment introduced into the northern provinces of +South Vietnam. Unlike its predecessors at Pleiku and Phu Bai, this unit +was composed exclusively of Marines and included an infantry element +for security purposes. Designated the Signal Engineering Survey Unit, +the radio detachment consisted of three officers and 27 enlisted men +drawn from the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac, and from Headquarters Marine +Corps. This element, commanded by Major Alfred M. Gray, Jr. arrived +at Da Nang on 20 May along with a 76-man infantry detachment from +Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. The infantry element, reinforced +with an 81mm mortar section (two mortars), was commanded by First +Lieutenant Raymond J. Otlowski. Major Gray assumed overall command of +the composite force which was designated Marine Detachment, Advisory +Team One. Advisory Team One became the first actual Marine ground unit +to conduct independent operations in the Republic of Vietnam. + +U.S. Air Force C-123 transports airlifted the bulk of the newly formed +unit to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp at Khe Sanh +in northwestern Quang Tri Province in the closing days of May. Two +officers and five enlisted communicators remained behind at Da Nang +and a four-man team positioned itself in the U.S. Army compound at Phu +Bai to provide radio support for the main body. At Khe Sanh, Advisory +Team One initially concentrated on building a solid supply base prior +to undertaking actual communications operations. ARVN truck convoys +brought the preponderance of its supplies from Quang Tri over Route 9, +the old colonial road that snaked through the Annamite Mountains into +Laos. While Major Gray and his men proceeded with this task, Marine +UH-34Ds from Da Nang helilifted an ARVN infantry company onto Tiger +Tooth Mountain (Dong Voi Mep), a jungle-covered mountain located eight +miles north of the CIDG Camp. With an elevation of 5,500 feet, Tiger +Tooth Mountain is the highest terrain feature in northern I Corps. On +13 June U.S. Army UH-1B helicopters lifted Major Gray, nine enlisted +men, and several thousand pounds of equipment into a tiny landing +zone which the South Vietnamese troops had hacked out near the top of +the rugged mountain. The ARVN soldiers, who had established a rough +perimeter around a peak slightly below the mountain’s highest point, +were on hand to greet the small group of Americans. After the initial +helilift, however, bad weather in the form of dense clouds intervened +to delay the remainder of the movement for an entire week. SHUFLY +helicopters finally completed the mission on 21 June. When the helilift +concluded 73 Marines and roughly 100 Vietnamese troops were strung +around and across a 5,000-foot peak just south of Tiger Tooth’s highest +elevation. Another 81 Leathernecks remained at Khe Sanh to provide a +pool from which fresh security forces and radiomen could be drawn when +needed. + +MACV orders explicitly prohibited the Marines on Tiger Tooth Mountain +from patrolling or engaging in any other activity which could have been +construed as offensive in nature. As a result of this restriction, +Major Gray’s men were confined to defensive positions around the crude +little landing zone and the tents which housed the radio equipment. +Even so, life on the mountain was extremely rigorous. The clouds +which frequently enshrouded the mountain top left the Marines, their +clothing, weapons, and equipment constantly damp. High winds heightened +their discomfort. The local weather conditions also made food and water +deliveries to the position hazardous and irregular. Marine UH-34Ds +prepositioned at Khe Sanh brought C rations and water cans whenever the +clouds revealed Tiger Tooth’s higher elevations. Often, however, the +weather did not break for days. Normally the men were limited to two +canteens of water daily--a restriction which made bathing and shaving +impossible. Because of the harsh living conditions on the mountain, +fresh security forces and radio men were rotated from Khe Sanh at two +week intervals, weather permitting. + +[Illustration: + + MARINE DETACHMENT + ADVISORY TEAM ONE + OPERATIONS IN I CTZ + + MAY-AUGUST 1964 +] + +Advisory Team One operated in the extreme northwestern corner of the +republic without incident until the second week of July. Then a severe +storm struck its mountaintop base, blowing away tents and antennae, +collapsing fighting positions, and generally disrupting operations. +Several nights later, on the 17th, a Viet Cong force of undetermined +size probed the Marine sector of the perimeter. An intense exchange +of small arms and automatic weapons fire ensued for nearly two hours. +Although the Marines suffered no casualties and could find no dead or +wounded Viet Cong the next day, it was apparent that their location had +been compromised. + +Amid reports of increasing Communist activity throughout the area, MACV +authorities in Saigon promptly ordered Major Gray to withdraw his force +from Tiger Tooth Mountain. Fortunately good weather permitted Marine +helicopters from Da Nang to helilift the men and their equipment from +the mountain to Khe Sanh the day after the firefight. On the 22d, Air +Force C-123 transports airlifted the entire Marine detachment to Da +Nang. There Gray and his Marines crowded into the old French compound +occupied by the helicopter task element. Although cramped, the SHUFLY +facilities provided welcome relief for the men who had endured the +rigors of Tiger Tooth Mountain and Khe Sanh for nearly two months. + +While at Da Nang, Major Gray detached a small group of radiomen to +Monkey Mountain, a rocky, jungle-covered peninsula that jutted into the +South China Sea just northeast of the city. There in relative comfort +and safety, the technicians conducted equipment tests for two weeks. +Several changes in the leadership and composition of the advisory +team took place during this interval. Captain Raymond A. Becker, a +communications officer from the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac, relieved +Major Gray as the commander of the unit on 13 August. Soon thereafter +a reinforced infantry company, Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, +commanded by Captain William R. Irwin, replaced Lieutenant Otlowski and +the Company G Marines as the advisory team’s security element. + +Under Captain Becker’s command, Advisory Team One redeployed, this +time to Dong Bach Ma, a 3,500-foot mountain located roughly 25 miles +west-northwest of Da Nang. An abandoned French resort, still untouched +by the war, sprawled across the higher elevations of Bach Ma and a hard +surface road curved up its steep northern face from Route 1. Using this +road ARVN trucks moved Captain Irwin and the infantry element to the +newly selected site in advance of the radio personnel. Once atop the +mountain, Irwin had his men establish a perimeter around an abandoned +monastery. This accomplished, Marines cleared a small helicopter +landing zone near the old but well-preserved religious building +which was to serve as their base of operations. On 19 August Marine +helicopters lifted Captain Becker, his communicators, and some 4,000 +pounds of equipment to the site from Da Nang. + +Advisory Team One, relying heavily on Marine helicopters for logistical +support, operated without incident from the quaint old monastery +until the second week of September. The composite unit completed its +operations at Bach Ma on the 10th whereupon it returned to Da Nang. +Within days the detachment was disbanded without fanfare. The radio +experts returned to their parent commands in Hawaii and Washington +while Company K was airlifted to Okinawa where it rejoined the 3d +Battalion, 3d Marines. The quiet dissolution of the Marine Detachment, +Advisory Team One, ended the first brief and little publicized chapter +of Marine ground unit operations in the Republic of Vietnam. + +In October an element of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 3d Marine +Division, operating from ships of the Seventh Fleet, conducted an +extensive survey of Cam Ranh Bay in southern II Corps. The purpose +of its survey was to determine the feasibility of establishing a +naval facility. Marine counterintelligence teams from FMFPac also +were temporarily assigned to MACV for 30-day periods throughout the +year. These officers and noncommissioned officers normally augmented +the U.S. Army 704th Counterintelligence Unit during their stay in +Vietnam. Another group of Marines to employ their skills in the +counterinsurgency environment was a small Special Operations Group of +six officers and 21 enlisted men. These Marines conducted operations +under the auspices of MACV. + +A more permanent influx of Marines into the war-torn republic occurred +in the last quarter of the year. In response to the intensified +advisory effort ordered by Secretary McNamara in July, General Greene, +the new Marine Commandant, assured the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of +Staff that the Marines could be expected to carry their share of the +increased burden. Shortly thereafter, the Marine Corps was directed to +provide 60 officers and noncommissioned officers to serve as advisors +with ARVN units in I Corps Tactical Zone. These orders, later described +by Major Damm, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor to the VNMC as +“very short fused ones,” were executed without delay.[10-9] The 3d +Marine Division was given short notice to select suitable personnel +and to transfer them immediately to ComUSMACV. In response to these +instructions, the Okinawa-based command quickly formed four advisory +teams, each composed of four men--a captain, a first lieutenant, a +gunnery sergeant, and a corporal (who was to serve as the team’s radio +operator). Accompanied by Major John W. Walker, the first increment of +Marine advisors was airlifted to Da Nang by KC-130 in mid-September. + +Upon reporting to the I Corps Senior U.S. Advisor, Colonel Howard B. +St. Clair, U.S. Army, the four teams were broken up, the Marines being +assigned individually to battalions of the 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions. +Major Walker joined the I Corps advisory staff in Da Nang as assistant +operations officer. The balance of the 60 new Marine advisors were +formed into teams on Okinawa and airlifted to Da Nang in the ensuing +weeks. By December the advisors, who had initially been drawn from +the 3d Marine Division, were being replaced gradually by officers and +noncommissioned officers just beginning their normal 12-month overseas +tours. + +Two additional permanent Marine advisor billets were also approved +in the closing weeks of 1964. These were created within the Naval +Advisory Group to assist the Vietnamese Navy in controlling one of +South Vietnam’s most troublesome areas--the Rung Sat Special Zone +(RSSZ). Located southeast of Saigon on both sides of the Long Tao +River, the main ship channel to the capital, the Rung Sat was a vast, +difficult-to-penetrate, mangrove swamp. Due largely to its relative +inaccessibility, the area had been developed by the Viet Cong into a +key base for supporting their operations in the surrounding provinces. +More significantly, by early 1964 the Communist-held Rung Sat posed a +serious threat to commercial ships bound for Saigon. For this reason +the responsibility for pacifying the area was turned over to the +Vietnamese Navy in April. + +Initially one Marine major, Edward J. Bronars, was assigned to assist +and advise the Vietnamese Navy in its attempts to secure the Rung +Sat. In November, however, the RSSZ advisory staff was reorganized to +include one Marine captain and one sergeant. Although they did not +arrive for duty until early the following year, the newly approved +billets created the third distinct group of Marine ground advisors +assigned to the Republic of Vietnam.[10-10] + +The OJT program continued in effect for junior Marine officers and +staff noncommissioned officers throughout 1964. Near the end of +the year the program was broadened somewhat to include members of +Hawaii-based Marine commands. Each month 10 Leathernecks arrived at +Da Nang to begin their 30-day assignments. At SHUFLY headquarters the +visitors were briefed as a group before being attached individually +to specific South Vietnamese units for the duration of their stay in +Vietnam. Normally, the officers and staff noncommissioned officers +joined a unit already being advised by a U.S. Marine. When possible, +the OJT was assigned to a unit which could benefit from his particular +military and technical skills. Still, the on-the-job-trainee was not +always considered an asset. “In honesty,” one permanent advisor to the +Vietnamese Marine Corps conceded, “OJTs were a mixed blessing--they +provided some help but they also were an added responsibility for the +VNMC commander who was charged with their safety.” “Some OJTs,” he +added, “received misperceptions of the capability of the Viet Cong +since their knowledge/experience was limited to the events occurring +during their brief 30-day tour.”[10-11] Nevertheless, a significant +number of Marine small unit leaders were able to gain some degree +of first-hand experience in counter guerrilla warfare under the +provisions on the OJT program.[10-I] + + [10-I] The 3d Marine Division’s OJT program did not end until + after elements of the division landed at Da Nang in March + 1965. The Marine Advisory Unit experimented successfully + with another form of augmentation in the first days of + 1965. When the Vietnamese Marines deployed to the Binh + Gia area with a provisional brigade in early January, + Colonel Nesbit, who was still serving as Senior Marine + Advisor, requested additional personnel to assist + and advise at the staff level. FMFPac responded by + temporarily detaching eight officers and 11 enlisted men + to the advisory division. MACV provided two more Marine + officers and seven additional enlisted men, all of whom + remained attached to the Marine Advisory Unit for the + duration of the operation. The temporarily assigned + Marines returned to their parent organizations when the + operation terminated. This is covered in more detail in + the 1965 account of U.S. Marine activities in Vietnam. + +A similar but shorter term program for field grade officers and +colonels, the Job Related Orientation (JRO) Program, also took hold +during the early months of 1964. Instituted in the last half of the +previous year, the JRO program provided for a small number of staff +officers from the various FMFPac commands to visit U.S. Headquarters +in Vietnam and Thailand for an eight-day period. Small groups of these +officers arrived at Da Nang from Okinawa and, like the OJTs, were +briefed by the helicopter task element commander and his staff. Later +they were afforded an orientation flight over the northern provinces. +Next, the visiting officers were flown to Saigon where they received +more briefings at MACV headquarters. In the capital, where they were +hosted by the Senior Marine Advisor, they visited Vietnamese Marine +units and discussed tactics and problem areas with the advisors. +After four days in the Republic of Vietnam the Marines travelled on +to Bangkok where they spent the balance of their visit. Upon the +conclusion of these JRO trips, each officer was required to submit a +detailed written report to the Commanding General, FMFPac. In turn, +extracts of these reports were forwarded to the Commandant of the +Marine Corps in Washington. + +Generally these reports addressed tactical, operational, logistics, +and intelligence matters. But a number of the Marine officers used +the reporting system to articulate their opinions relative to the +overall direction of the war. Colonel Warren P. Baker, a member of the +3d Marine Division staff who visited Vietnam in March, pointed out +that field advisors and MACV staff members differed sharply in their +personal assessments of progress being made. The field advisors, Baker +observed, demonstrated far less optimism than did the staff members. +Furthermore, he reported that unless the people of South Vietnam +could be won over to the government, the Viet Cong’s success could be +expected to continue.[10-12] Another officer, Lieutenant Colonel Harry +E. Dickinson, summarized his conclusions with an even more emphatic +warning: + + The commitment of sizeable U.S. combat units should not be effected + except to protect the seat of government. While local success might + be achieved in certain areas, it is extremely doubtful whether any + lasting degree of success would entail in the northern and western + sections. As combat units were increased, the forces of Vietnam + would do less and less with the inevitable conflict of overall + command. The end result would be the ringing of the country with + combat units but no solution for the internal conflict. I strongly + disagree that any two or three divisions could achieve real victory + as has been stated in the press.[10-13] + +Through candid reporting of this nature, Marine commanders from Okinawa +to Washington were kept abreast of the complex and difficult problems +being generated by the war in Southeast Asia. + + + + +CHAPTER 11 + +Spring and Summer Fighting + +_The Monsoons--The Weather Breaks--Sure Wind 202--Operations Elsewhere +in I Corps--Changing the Watch_ + + +Commanded by Colonel Andre D. Gomez, the strength of the Marine task +element at Da Nang stood at 450 officers and men as 1964 opened. +Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ HMM-361 continued its assignment as the task +element’s helicopter squadron while Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy’s +204-man MABS-16 sub unit retained responsibility for maintaining and +operating the support facilities. + +Shortly after New Year’s Day, ComUSMACV advised Colonel Gomez that +the entire Marine task element would be withdrawn from the Republic +of Vietnam during the first half of 1964. This decision was one of +CinCPac’s continuing responses to the Defense Department plans for +reducing the level of direct American military involvement in Vietnam. +Additionally, Gomez was informed that the task element would be called +upon to initiate a training program designed to prepare Vietnamese Air +Force pilots and mechanics to operate and maintain the UH-34Ds. This +program was scheduled to culminate with the takeover of the 24 Marine +helicopters by a new VNAF squadron on 30 June, and the subsequent +departure of the entire task element for Okinawa where it would rejoin +MAG-16, its parent organization.[11-1] + + +_The Monsoons_ + +The new year broke with Marine flight operations at Da Nang still +proceeding at a reduced rate due to the heavy monsoon weather. As had +been the case at the close of 1963, medical evacuation and resupply +missions continued to constitute the major source of work for HMM-361’s +crews. The first Marine helicopter loss during 1964 occurred during +one such mission on 3 January when an aircraft was shot down while +attempting to perform a medical evacuation about 30 miles due west +of Da Nang. Hit at least six times on its descent toward the landing +zone, the UH-34D crashed into the jungle. Its crew miraculously escaped +injury and was rescued by another Marine helicopter. The aircraft, +damaged beyond repair, was intentionally destroyed by U.S. Special +Forces personnel. This was only the second Marine helicopter loss +definitely attributed to Communist fire since SHUFLY’s arrival at Soc +Trang nearly two years earlier. + +In the second week of January the weather over the mountains west to +Da Nang broke long enough for Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ squadron to +accomplish a critical trooplift. On short notice the Marines were +ordered to remove a 200-man CIDG force from the hills about 30 miles +west-southwest of Da Nang. Accompanied by a U.S. Army advisor, the +South Vietnamese unit had been conducting a reconnaissance in force +about eight miles west of its camp at An Diem.[11-A] Under cover of the +monsoon clouds, which limited effective U.S. or VNAF air support, Viet +Cong elements of undetermined strength had closed in on the government +force, threatening to isolate and destroy it before the weather lifted. + + [11-A] See map of outposts in I CTZ, page 81. + +The immediate nature of this particular mission left little time for +detailed planning and briefing. I Corps headquarters could only advise +the Marines of such vital information as the unit’s radio call sign, +radio frequency, size, and location. To familiarize himself with +the terrain in the vicinity of the pickup site, Lieutenant Colonel +Ross first made a reconnaissance flight to the area in an O-1B. His +reconnaissance revealed the landing zone to be “a precarious hill top +knob exposed to a 360° field of fire,” Ross later recalled.[11-2] + +The reconnaissance accomplished, the squadron commander returned to +Da Nang, exchanged the O-1B for a UH-34D, and led a flight of 14 +helicopters to the pickup point. In accordance with the squadron’s +standing operating procedure, Ross, the flight leader, was to land +first, drop off a loadmaster, and lift out the first Vietnamese +heliteam. Upon approaching the hilltop, however, the lead helicopter +was forced away by heavy small arms fire which punctured the aft +section of the aircraft’s fuselage, wounding the loadmaster. + +The second aircraft, following at close interval, was also hit. +Lieutenant Colonel Ross then ordered the entire formation into a +holding pattern out of small arms range while he attempted to persuade +the American advisor to move the Vietnamese unit overland a short +distance to a less exposed landing zone beside a stream. This the U.S. +advisor was reluctant to do. “I was convinced,” Ross concluded, “that +his real concern was the shattered morale of his ARVN troops and doubts +about being able to get them moving to the alternate site.”[11-3] After +some delay the Vietnamese unit finally moved to the new landing zone, +whereupon the Marines completed the troop lift. Still, the helicopters +were exposed to unnecessary risks. + +Understandably concerned with problems of this nature which tended to +plague all but the larger preplanned operations, Lieutenant Colonel +Ross questioned the “ability of the advisors to make operational +decisions based upon considerations beyond their own tactical +problems.”[11-4] In this particular case the selection of the exposed +hilltop landing zone tended to substantiate the Marine commander’s +complaints. + +[Illustration: _Loadmaster directs a helicopter into a recently cleared +landing zone. (USMC Photo A329576)._] + +During the second week of January, General Greene, the newly appointed +Commandant of the Marine Corps, visited the Marine installation at Da +Nang. The Commandant conducted an inspection of the compound and was +briefed on operations by Colonel Gomez and his staff. After presenting +combat decorations to several members of the task element, Greene +departed for Hawaii where he was to visit the FMFPac headquarters. + +The Commandant summed up his impressions of the Marine helicopter task +element in testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services +several weeks after his return to Washington. “I was assured by +General Harkins and his officers--and by the officers of the supported +Vietnamese units--that this squadron has performed its supporting +mission in an outstanding manner,” related Greene. “Everything that +I observed,” he added, “certainly attested to the high morale and +effectiveness of this unit.”[11-5][11-A] + + [11-A] A more frequent visitor to the Marine helicopter task + element was Colonel Anderson, the MAAG Chief of Staff. + An experienced aviator, Colonel Anderson had commanded a + Marine bomber squadron (VMB-443) in the latter stages of + World War II. While serving as the MAAG Chief of Staff + during 1963 and 1964, Anderson participated in a number + of combat missions as a pilot with the various squadrons + assigned to SHUFLY. + +Late January and early February saw the normal rotation of several of +the task element’s key personnel as well as its helicopter squadron. +On 14 January, Colonel Robert A. Merchant, an officer with a diverse +military background, assumed command of SHUFLY. Merchant had commanded +an artillery battalion on Okinawa in World War II, a Marine attack +squadron in Korea, and had served on the joint staff of the Specified +Commander for the Middle East in Beirut during the 1958 Lebanon +Operation. More recently he had graduated from the Industrial College +of the Armed Forces. Having flown with the task element’s squadron +while on temporary duty in Vietnam the previous October and since +his arrival in early January, Merchant was thoroughly familiar with +SHUFLY’s operations. + +Command of the MABS-16 sub unit changed hands two weeks later when +Lieutenant Colonel Samuel G. Beal relieved Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy. +Beal, also a veteran of World War II and Korea, came from the 4th +Marines in Hawaii where he had served as that unit’s air liaison +officer. + +Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ HMM-361 ended its tour at Da Nang on 1 +February. The squadron’s arrival in I Corps unfortunately had coincided +with the arrival of the early monsoon rains. The unit’s flight +statistics had suffered also from the interruption caused by the +political infighting which had deposed President Diem. As a result, its +operations never reached the sustained tempo which had characterized +the records of the Marine helicopter squadrons previously assigned to +SHUFLY. Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ UH-34Ds totalled 4,236 combat flight +hours and just under 7,000 combat sorties--figures which, considering +the conditions surrounding their accumulation, compared favorably with +the number of combat flight hours (7,249) and sorties (11,900) averaged +by the four previous UH-34D squadrons to serve in Vietnam.[11-6] + +HMM-364, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John H. La Voy, a pilot who +had flown his first combat helicopter missions during the Korean War, +initiated support operations from Da Nang on 1 February. Under the +existing plans to deactivate the Marine task element, La Voy’s squadron +was scheduled to be the last Marine helicopter unit to operate in +South Vietnam. As such, HMM-364’s pilots and maintenance crews were to +launch the training program that would prepare the Vietnamese Air Force +personnel to take over the Marine helicopters upon the task element’s +departure from Da Nang. + +On 4 February the first class of eight Vietnamese pilots began a +50-hour package of flight instruction under the supervision of +Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s pilots. Included in the course of +instruction were operational missions, night and instrument flying, +formation work, and landing practice. Each student was already a +qualified copilot with at least 25 flight hours in VNAF UH-34s--a +factor which allowed the training to be conducted concurrently with +normal operations. This was accomplished by having the Vietnamese +trainees fly as copilots with a Marine pilot on operational flights. +In addition to being an effective training method this system had two +other advantages. First, it enabled the Vietnamese students to acquire +a first-hand knowledge of the helicopter tactics most commonly used +in the northern provinces. Secondly, it allowed Lieutenant Colonel +La Voy’s squadron to concentrate on its primary mission of providing +combat support for the ground forces in I Corps. + +Another vital aspect of the training program involved preparing +Vietnamese ground personnel to keep the squadron operational. This +demanded extensive training of mechanics, crew chiefs, engineering, +supply, operations, and ordnance personnel. “This additional duty,” +Lieutenant Colonel La Voy explained, “was a tremendous burden on all +departments of my squadron, whose primary job was to keep aircraft in +commission and to conduct combat operations.” The language barrier +understandably threatened the success of the overall training effort. +In La Voy’s opinion, however, “the eagerness of the students to learn +and the wealth of practical experience and varied demonstrations” +combined to help reduce problems imposed by the language +difference.[11-7] + +The progress of the program proved the concepts sound. The first small +group of student pilots was graduated on 9 March despite numerous +flight cancellations due to bad weather during the training period. +Subsequent classes of VNAF pilots continued to train with the Marine +helicopter task element throughout 1964. Eventually, a more advanced +training program would have the Vietnamese pilots flying sections +of two and four helicopters as integral elements of larger Marine +helicopter operations. + +Although heavy monsoon clouds lingered over I Corps throughout most of +the month of March, brief periods of good weather sometimes allowed +heliborne incursions into the mountainous areas. One such period +began on the 5th and lasted long enough for Marine, Army, and VNAF +helicopters to lift a 54-man ARVN patrol from An Diem to a landing +zone near the Laotian border. During the operation one escorting +U.S. Army UH-1B gunship accidentally struck a tree and was forced +to land in a nearby jungle clearing. Two Marine helicopters quickly +rescued the crew and weapons of the downed UH-1B, but drew automatic +weapons fire in the process. That afternoon 15 Marine helicopters and +two armed UH-1Bs returned to the crash site with 64 ARVN troops who +established a perimeter around the damaged helicopter after being +landed. A maintenance team then landed and repaired the aircraft which +subsequently was flown back to Da Nang. + +Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s crews undertook to correct several problems +which they identified during these initial combat operations. One +was the need for machine gun fire to protect the port (left) side +of the transport helicopters as they approached contested landing +zones. To fill this requirement the squadron’s metalsmiths designed +and fabricated a flexible mount for an additional M-60 machine gun. +This new mount was designed to allow the machine gun to be swung out +a portside window from the cabin. Placed on each of HMM-364’s 24 +helicopters, this modification ultimately added a gunner to each crew +and enabled the Marines to deliver fire to either or both sides of the +aircraft during the critical landing phase of helilifts.[11-8] + +La Voy personally instituted another change which made the coordination +of trooplifts more effective. Prior to HMM-364’s arrival in Vietnam, +different Marines had served as loadmasters for each heliborne +operation. While this system of rotating the loadmaster assignment had +stood the test of numerous operations since its inception in late 1962, +La Voy believed that it could be improved. Accordingly, he assigned +one pilot and two crew chiefs permanent additional responsibilities +as loadmasters. Thereafter, this three-man team was responsible for +coordinating loading and unloading activities at pickup points and +landing zones for all troop lifts. Thus, through a relatively minor +adjustment, the Marines helped insure the closer coordination of their +helicopter operations with ARVN ground forces.[11-9] + +In early March hostile incidents around the Da Nang air base increased +dramatically. The incidents usually took the form of sniper fire from +the village situated just across the perimeter fence from the living +compound. The primary target of the enemy snipers seemed to be the +task element’s electrical generators whose high noise level prevented +sentries from determining the firing position. Tensions heightened on +the night of the 15th when a terrorist hurled a gasoline-filled bottle +into the doorway of the staff noncommissioned officers quarters. The +crude bomb fortunately failed to ignite. Several days later, however, +a Marine in the compound was wounded by sniper fire from beyond the +perimeter wire. + +These latest incidents led Colonel Merchant to request that the +security platoon from the 3d Marine Division be redeployed to help +protect the base camp and flight line. This request was approved by +ComUSMACV and CGFMFPac without delay. On 24 March a 53-man platoon from +the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines arrived at Da Nang on a Marine KC-130 +and assumed responsibility for security around the Marine compound and +flight line. Attached to the MABS-16 sub unit, the infantry platoon +freed Colonel Merchant’s aviation personnel to devote full time to +their primary mission--providing helicopter support to I Corps. Like +its predecessor which had been withdrawn only three months earlier, the +new infantry unit would assist with rescue operations in insecure areas +and on occasion would be called upon to provide security around TAFDS +bladders during helicopter operations in more remote areas. + +[Illustration: _South Vietnamese troops unload ammunition from a +UH-34D while a Marine loadmaster, braced against wheel and wheel +strut, exchanges information with the Leatherneck pilot. (USMC Photo +A329570)._] + +The same day that the platoon from the 3d Marine Division arrived +at Da Nang, a task element Marine was involved in an act of heroism +which later earned him the Bronze Star Medal. While escorting Marine +helicopters on a resupply mission about five miles west-northwest of +Tam Ky, a U.S. Army UH-1B gunship from Da Nang was hit by Viet Cong +fire and crashed in flames. Marine Lance Corporal Walter L. Rupp, a +volunteer machine gunner on board the Army gunship, acted rapidly to +help secure the area despite having suffered injuries in the crash. +Manning an M-60 machine gun, Rupp delivered fire on the approaching +enemy while the pilot, copilot, and three other passengers were pulled +from the wreckage. All six American personnel, including the injured +Marine, were evacuated safely to Da Nang, and then flown to the U.S. +Army Field Hospital at Nha Trang for more extensive medical attention. + + +_The Weather Breaks_ + +Much of I Corps began experiencing improved weather conditions during +the first days of April. Relying on helicopter support, the ARVN +resumed its offensives into the rugged mountainous regions. On the 6th +a combined Allied helicopter flight lifted 42 ARVN soldiers from Tam Ky +to a landing zone about 18 miles directly west of Quang Ngai. An Army +UH-1B was shot down by Communist fire during the operation. Shortly +after the crash, one of HMM-364’s helicopters landed to rescue the crew +and strip the weapons from the downed aircraft. Marine mechanics then +helped Army aviation technicians disassemble the UH-1B whereupon it was +suspended beneath an Army UH-37 (a twin-engine, piston-powered, heavy +helicopter manufactured by Sikorsky) in a specially designed sling and +helilifted back to Da Nang for repairs. + +Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s squadron suffered its first combat aircraft +loss on 14 April. The incident occurred after one of HMM-364’s +helicopters was hit in the engine by Viet Cong fire while attempting +to evacuate wounded Vietnamese infantrymen from a hillside landing +zone about 40 miles west of Da Nang near the Laotian border. Struck +while taking off, the UH-34D plunged 150 feet down the steep hillside +and crashed through the jungle into a stream bed. One Marine manning +an M-60 machine gun suffered a broken leg in the crash. The other crew +members and passengers, however, were able to carry him up the hill to +the ARVN landing zone. Heavy thunder showers prevented rescue for two +hours, but the weather finally broke and the men were helilifted to Da +Nang. The aircraft was destroyed the next day. + +Four days after this incident, HMM-364 committed all available aircraft +to a battalion-size heliborne assault into rugged northwestern Thua +Thien Province. The ARVN’s objective was a mountainous area on the +northern rim of the A Shau Valley, a 30-mile-long, two-mile-wide +trough whose location adjacent to the Laotian border invited Communist +infiltration. Although enemy activity would eventually force the +government to abandon its string of outposts in the valley, the issue +of control of the area was still unresolved in early 1964. + +Colonel Merchant, as commander of the Aviation Headquarters Operations +Center for I Corps, assigned 20 Marine UH-34Ds, four VNAF UH-34s, five +U.S. Army UH-1B gunships, and three Marine O-1Bs to the operation +which the ARVN code named LAM SON 115. Additionally, 14 VNAF T-28s, +four A-1H Skyraiders, and two observation aircraft were assigned by +the Joint General Staff to provide support for the helicopter assault. +The operation was to be controlled by Colonel Merchant as the Tactical +Air Commander Airborne (TACA) from a U.S. Air Force U-10, whose radios +would permit the commander and his staff to communicate with every +aircraft participating in the effort. (The Marine helicopters had UHF +and VHF communications, while the Marine observation aircraft used UHF +and FM. The Army UH-1Bs had UHF; the VNAF transport helicopters also +relied upon UHF radios.) + +In addition to Merchant, the airborne control staff from the ASOC +included Lieutenant Colonel William Montgomery, USAF, and a Vietnamese +officer. The Vietnamese representative was to assist in clearing close +air strikes with ARVN ground forces and also was to help resolve any +language problems which developed. + +The one-day operation began early on 18 April with Marine and VNAF +transport helicopters lifting 200 South Vietnamese soldiers from an +outpost in the northwestern portion of the A Shau Valley into a rugged +landing zone approximately six miles further north. Later the same +morning 300 more Vietnamese troops were helilifted from a government +outpost in the central portion of the valley to a second landing zone +situated six miles north of the 200-man unit which had been flown in +earlier. HMM-364’s helicopters averaged almost 8 hours per aircraft +while flying 160 total hours in support of LAM SON 115. Only one Marine +UH-34D and one VNAF helicopter were hit by enemy fire during the +execution of the well-planned and efficiently coordinated operation. No +aircraft were lost. + +Often the daily support flights proved more hazardous then the large +assault operations whose details were planned in advance. An incident +that occurred on 21 April while a UH-34D was evacuating a wounded South +Vietnamese soldier from the mountains 15 miles west of Tam Ky confirmed +the dangers inherent in such daily operations. In an effort to lure the +evacuation helicopter within range of their weapons, the Communists +ignited a yellow smoke grenade in a clearing close by the actual +landing zone. The pilot alertly identified the correct landing zone, +thereby foiling the enemy ruse. + +[Illustration: + + MAJOR MARINE HELICOPTER + OPERATIONS FIRST HALF 1964 +] + +[Illustration: _HMM-364 loadmaster directs loaded UH-34D into a hilltop +landing zone during operations in I Corps. (USMC Photo A329571)._] + +Several days later, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s Marines encountered an +equally clever Viet Cong tactic while performing another evacuation +mission, this time in support of a U.S. Special Forces patrol 20 +miles west of Thuong Duc. Army UH-1B gunships made several low-level +reconnaissance passes over the pickup site while the UH-34D pilot +prepared to hoist the casualties through the dense jungle. When the +gunship crews reported no enemy activity, the Marine pilot maneuvered +his aircraft into a hovering position above the invisible patrol. At +this juncture, well-concealed Viet Cong began firing automatic weapons +at the hovering helicopter and forced it to seek safety away from +the pickup area. The escorting gunships then wheeled in from above, +returning the Viet Cong’s fire with rockets and machine guns. The +enemy promptly ceased firing, whereupon the Marine helicopter again +maneuvered into position above the patrol. Again the enemy challenged +the aircraft with fire, this time striking it in the rear portion of +the fuselage. Although no serious damage was done, the evacuation +helicopter was again forced away from the patrol’s position. + +The UH-1Bs once more placed suppressive fire on the enemy position, +finally allowing a second Marine helicopter to hoist the wounded man +through the trees. A new burst of enemy fire, however, interrupted a +subsequent effort to retrieve the body of a dead patrol member. An +HMM-364 helicopter returned to the area the following day and completed +the evacuation. + +Although neither resulted in U.S. or VNAF aircraft losses, the +incidents of 21 and 24 April confirmed that the Viet Cong was devising +new methods with which to counter the Allies’ helicopters. His use +of false smoke signals and his persistent refusal to compromise his +position by firing on the faster, more heavily armed U.S. gunships +represented crude but effective additions to his expanding repertoire +of counter-helicopter tactics. Although unappreciated by the +Leatherneck crews, the enemy’s most recent flurry of actions had no +lasting effect on the overall pattern of helicopter operations. + + +_Sure Wind 202_ + +In late April Colonel Merchant’s Marines joined with VNAF and U.S. +Army elements to launch what would be the costliest and most viciously +opposed heliborne assault attempted in South Vietnam during the +1962–1965 period. On the 26th, Merchant, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy, and +Lieutenant Colonel George Brigham, the task element operations officer, +flew to Quang Ngai and Pleiku to participate in the final stages of +planning for a multi-battalion heliborne offensive into the Do Xa area, +the mountainous Viet Cong stronghold located along the northern border +of II Corps. At Quang Ngai officials from the II Corps headquarters +had already completed the general plans for Operation SURE WIND 202 +(Vietnamese code name: QUYET THANG 202), the size of which demanded +the use of all transport helicopters available in both I and II Corps. +The Marine representatives learned that HMM-364’s role in the upcoming +operation would be to helilift a 420-man South Vietnamese battalion +from the Quang Ngai airfield to Landing Zone BRAVO, an objective +located about 30 miles due west of the pickup point. Simultaneous +with this assault, a U.S. Army helicopter company based at Pleiku was +scheduled to transport two ARVN battalions (960 troops) from Gi Lang, +an outpost located 24 miles west-southwest of Quang Ngai, to a second +landing zone about eight miles west-southwest of Landing Zone BRAVO. +The operation was to begin on the morning of 27 April, with the first +assault waves scheduled to land at 0930. + +Due to the distance between the mountainous landing zones and because +two different helicopter units would be conducting the respective +trooplifts, the operation plan treated the two assaults as separate +operations. A U.S. Air Force U-10 aircraft had been assigned to carry +Colonel Merchant, the TACA, and other ASOC representatives who would +coordinate the helilift into Landing Zone BRAVO. Twenty Vietnamese A-1H +Skyraiders had been assigned to provide tactical air support for the +Marine portion of the operation. Twelve of these attack aircraft were +scheduled to conduct preparatory strikes on and around the landing +zones, four were to orbit above the area after the helicopter landing +began, and the remaining four were to be positioned on airstrip alert +at Da Nang. Five Army UH-1B gunships were assigned to escort the Marine +UH-34Ds to and from the landing zone. + +The preparatory air strikes around Landing Zone BRAVO began as the +first ARVN heliteams boarded the 19 Marine and two VNAF helicopters +at Quang Ngai. Following the VNAF’s air strikes, the escorting Army +gunships swept in for a prelanding reconnaissance of the zone. They +were met by fire from Viet Cong .50 and .30 caliber machine guns. +The gunships countered with repeated rocket and machine gun attacks +on those enemy positions that could be located but were unable to +silence the Communist weapons. Meanwhile, the loaded Marine and VNAF +helicopters cleared Quang Ngai and were closing on the objective. After +the UH-1Bs expended their entire ordnance load and most of their fuel +in attempts to neutralize enemy fire, Colonel Merchant ordered all +helicopters, transports and gunships alike, back to Quang Ngai to rearm +and refuel. + +With the transports and gunships enroute to Quang Ngai, the ASOC +summoned the on-call VNAF A-1Hs to attack the Viet Cong positions. +During ensuing strikes one Skyraider was damaged severely by .50 +caliber machine gun fire. The Vietnamese pilot turned his smoking +aircraft eastward in an unsuccessful effort to nurse it to the Quang +Ngai airstrip. The attack bomber crashed less than one mile from the +west end of the small airstrip. + +The A-1H air strikes on and around Landing Zone BRAVO continued until +1225. Shortly after the strikes ceased Colonel Merchant ordered the +first wave of transport helicopters to land the ARVN assault force. +Escorting UH-1Bs were still drawing fire as the first flight of three +UH-34Ds approached the contested landing zone. This time, however, +the Marine and VNAF pilots were not deterred. The first UH-34Ds +touched down at 1230 with their machine gunners pouring streams of +orange tracers into the surrounding jungle. Despite the high volume +of suppressive fire, several helicopters in the first wave sustained +hits from Viet Cong automatic weapons. One, damaged critically, crashed +in the landing zone. Its crew members, all of whom escaped injury, +were picked up by another Marine helicopter, piloted by Major John R. +Braddon, which had been designated as the search and rescue aircraft +for the operation. Another UH-34D with battle damage proceeded to the +outpost from which the Army helicopter missions were originating and +made an emergency landing. + +[Illustration: _A formation of Marine UH-34Ds lift South Vietnamese +troops into mountains southwest of Da Nang. (USMC Photo A329574)._] + +The second assault wave was delayed while VNAF Skyraiders renewed their +efforts to dislodge the enemy from his positions around the embattled +landing zone. The helilift resumed at 1355 in the face of reduced but +stubborn Communist resistance. During this phase of the troop lift, +one VNAF and several Marine helicopters were hit by enemy .50 caliber +fire. The Vietnamese aircraft, which lost its tail rotor controls, +spun sharply while trying to take off and crashed near the center of +the zone. Its crew members escaped injury and were picked up by Major +Braddon’s rescue helicopter.[11-B] + + [11-B] For his role in the two successful rescue attempts, + Braddon was awarded the Silver Star Medal. + +After this incident, as the South Vietnamese soldiers began fanning out +from the landing zone and forcing the Communist gunners to withdraw +deeper into the jungle, the landing proceeded somewhat faster. The +fourth and final assault lift of the day was executed at 1730, after +which 357 of the 420 ARVN troops had been transported into Landing +Zone BRAVO. During the first day of the operation, 15 of the 19 +participating Marine UH-34Ds were hit. Only 11 Marine and VNAF +helicopters originally assigned to support the operation remained +airworthy. + +[Illustration: _At the loadmaster’s direction, a Marine UH-34D waits in +a crude landing zone as an unidentified U.S. advisor and two Vietnamese +soldiers unload supplies. Other ARVN troops provide security. (USMC +Photo A329572)._] + +The heliborne assault portion of SURE WIND 202 was completed the next +morning. Fourteen UH-34Ds from HMM-364, several of which had been +repaired during the night, and four Army UH-1Bs lifted the remainder +of the South Vietnamese battalion into the landing zone. By then the +intensity of the enemy action in the surrounding hills had diminished +greatly. Only one Marine helicopter was hit and it suffered only minor +damage. Upon finishing their tasks, HMM-364’s aircraft proceeded to Gi +Lang, the outpost from which the Army helicopter company was operating, +to help it complete its portion of the assault lift. + +Aircraft losses for the operation continued to accumulate on the second +day when a Marine UH-34D was caught in the rotor wash of other landing +helicopters and crashed while approaching the runway at Quang Ngai. The +aircraft plummeted into an irrigation canal adjacent to the airstrip, +rolled over onto its side, and completely submerged. The crewmen +managed to climb to safety but the helicopter was a total loss. + +On 29 April, three UH-34Ds flew a maintenance-inspection team and a +Marine security squad from Da Nang into Landing Zone BRAVO to assess +the damage suffered by the two helicopters which had been shot down on +the first day of SURE WIND 202. The inspection team found that four +bullets had struck the Marine aircraft. The VNAF aircraft, on the +other hand, was riddled by nearly 30 bullets, including a .50 caliber +round that had severed the tail rotor control cable. The inspection +team concluded that both helicopters were damaged beyond repair and +proceeded to destroy them where they had fallen. + +Originally, MACV and II Corps planners had anticipated that the +Marine helicopters would not be required to support SURE WIND 202 +beyond the initial assault. It soon became apparent, however, that +the daily helicopter requirements for the operation would exceed the +aviation assets available in II Corps. The American command in Saigon, +therefore, directed Colonel Merchant’s task element to continue +providing support for the duration of the offensive. Accordingly, +the task element commander assigned a liaison officer to the 2d ARVN +Division headquarters. This officer was tasked with coordinating daily +aircraft requirements. When SURE WIND 202 finally ended on 25 May, +HMM-364’s crews had contributed 983 sorties and 800 flight hours to the +South Vietnamese effort in northwestern II Corps.[11-10] + + +_Operations Elsewhere in I Corps_ + +While some of HMM-364’s crews continued flying support missions from +Quang Ngai, others conducted a critical operation in western I Corps. +The mission, which already had been delayed five days because of the +Marines’ extensive commitment during the early stages of SURE WIND +202, was executed on 30 April. It involved 17 Marine UH-34Ds, four +Army UH-1Bs (two transports and two gunships), two Marine O-1Bs, +two VNAF Skyraiders, and one South Vietnamese observation aircraft. +Their assignment was to evacuate a 78-man ARVN patrol which had +been under frequent enemy fire for six days in the rugged jungle +about 42 miles west of Da Nang. The transport helicopters encountered +almost continuous small arms fire during the landing and subsequent +evacuation. One Marine helicopter carrying a crew of four Marines +and five ARVN passengers was shot down while climbing away from +the contested landing zone. The pilot made a forced landing in a +nearby clearing and the nine men were evacuated under fire by other +UH-34Ds. Despite the hazardous nature of the mission, the entire +South Vietnamese patrol was removed to the safety of Nam Dong, a +well-defended Special Forces camp located in a valley 34 miles west of +Da Nang. + +Acts of heroism were commonplace during the 30 April evacuation. One +Marine copilot assumed control of his severely damaged helicopter and +flew it to Nam Dong after the pilot and crew chief had been wounded. +Staff Sergeant John C. Thompson, who served as one of the loadmasters +for the operation, was later awarded the Navy Cross for his role in the +action. Having arrived in the landing zone aboard the first transport +helicopter, the Marine noncommissioned officer exposed himself to Viet +Cong fire almost continuously while supervising the loading of each +aircraft. After the last five South Vietnamese troops had boarded the +final helicopter, Thompson shouted to its pilot that he would remain on +the ground to provide covering fire while the aircraft took off. But +the pilot ordered Staff Sergeant Thompson on board and then succeeded +in maneuvering the heavily loaded UH-34D out of the empty landing zone. + +By late May it had become apparent to U.S. military authorities in +South Vietnam that the demand for American transport helicopters in I +Corps would continue beyond the 30 June date which had been set earlier +for SHUFLY’s departure. General Westmoreland, therefore, proposed to +the Commander in Chief, Pacific, that the Marine unit be retained at Da +Nang indefinitely. He further recommended that HMM-364 turn over its +helicopters and maintenance equipment to the Vietnamese Air Force on +30 June as scheduled, and that the unit be replaced by another Marine +UH-34D squadron. These recommendations were forwarded to the Joint +Chiefs of Staff who approved them on 10 June. In response, the Marine +Corps began immediate preparations to deploy a new, fully equipped, +medium helicopter squadron to Da Nang. + +HMM-364 began its final month in Vietnam by supporting another +heliborne assault into II Corps. This time the Marines teamed with the +U.S. Army’s 52d Aviation Battalion to lift an ARVN battalion from Dak +To, a town situated in western Kontum Province, to an objective in +the Do Xa base area. To support the operation, which was code named +SURE WIND 303, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s crews positioned a TAFDS +fuel bladder at the Dak To airstrip on 1 June. Two days later, 15 +Marine UH-34Ds contributed 180 sorties to the assault phase of the new +government operation. No battle damage was recorded by Marine aircraft +during this latest incursion into northern II Corps. + +The Marine task element’s responsibilities were expanded slightly +in the first week of June when MACV directed Colonel Merchant to +provide search and rescue (SAR) support for U.S. aerial reconnaissance +operations which had begun over Laos and North Vietnam. After 7 June +at least two UH-34Ds (one section) were positioned together either at +Quang Tri or at Khe Sanh, ready to conduct SAR missions for downed +American and VNAF pilots. While based at Khe Sanh the helicopters were +also used to support Advisory Team One on Tiger Tooth Mountain. At +Quang Tri the SAR helicopters operated from a clearing adjacent to a +local soccer field. Years later, Marine pilots who had stood the SAR +duty there would recall the incongruous sight of small Vietnamese boys +playfully pursuing their soccer games alongside parked combat aircraft +and a TAFDS bladder. + +In addition to normal support operations, HMM-364’s pilots devoted +much of the second week of June to a search for Privates First Class +Fred T. Schrenkengost and Robert L. Greer, two MABS-16 Marines who had +disappeared from the Da Nang compound on 7 June. Intelligence reports +indicated that both men had been captured by Communist guerrillas about +five miles south of the airfield while sight-seeing on rented motor +bikes. The aerial search produced no signs of the missing enlisted +men but reliable Vietnamese sources reported that the Viet Cong had +displayed them in several villages. The task element commander finally +called off the fruitless search on 15 June, a full week after it had +begun. Ground efforts by the South Vietnamese to locate the men +continued but were also futile. The two Marines were never found.[11-C] + + [11-C] The status of PFC Fred T. Schrenkengost was changed + from missing in action to killed in action, body not + recovered, on 23 July 1974. The status of PFC Robert L. + Greer was likewise changed on 14 November 1975. + +While the aerial search south of Da Nang was in its final stages, +HMM-364 suffered its last aircraft loss in Vietnam when a helicopter +crashed while carrying supplies from Khe Sanh to Major Gray’s Advisory +Team One on Tiger Tooth Mountain. The accident occurred on 13 June when +a UH-34D was caught in severe down drafts while attempting to land in +the small landing zone near the top of the jagged 5,000-foot-high peak. +The crew and passengers luckily escaped injury and were rescued but the +aircraft was damaged too extensively to be repaired. Marines stripped +the UH-34D of radios and machine guns and then burned the hulk. + + +_Changing the Watch_ + +On 16 June, three days after the crash on Tiger Tooth Mountain, +Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s unit ceased its operations and began +preparations for turning over its helicopters and equipment to the +Vietnamese Air Force. The Marines spent three days removing the +automatic stabilization equipment (the helicopter’s equivalent of an +automatic pilot) and the USMC identification from the 24 UH-34Ds. While +HMM-364’s men accomplished the necessary last-minute preparations, +pilots from a new Marine medium helicopter squadron, HMM-162, began +flying their UH-34Ds ashore from the LPH-8, USS _Valley Forge_. +Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver W. Curtis, an Oklahoman who +held four Distinguished Flying Crosses for air actions fought during +World War II and Korea, HMM-162 was the first Marine squadron since +Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s to deploy to Vietnam with its complement of +aircraft and maintenance equipment. With HMM-162’s arrival, elements of +Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s unit began departing for Okinawa on board +refueler-transport aircraft from VMGR-152. Also on board one of the +KC-130s bound for Okinawa was Lieutenant Colonel Beal, who relinquished +command of the MABS-16 sub unit to Major Marion R. Green on the last +day of June. + +The newly commissioned VNAF 217th Squadron informally accepted the +aircraft from HMM-364 on 19 June. Formal acceptance occurred 10 days +later with Major General Paul J. Fontana, the commanding general of +the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, attending a ceremony presided over by +the I Corps commanding general. Following the exchange of equipment, +the Vietnamese officials presented various orders of the Cross of +Valor, their nation’s second highest decoration, to Marine pilots who +had distinguished themselves during Operation SURE WIND 202. Vice +Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, commanding general of the Vietnamese Air +Force, then presented Vietnamese pilot wings to Colonel Merchant, +Lieutenant Colonel La Voy, and to each Marine instructor-pilot who +had participated in the helicopter pilot training program. HMM-364’s +tour in South Vietnam ended officially on 30 June when the last of +its members boarded KC-130’s bound for Okinawa. Since initiating +combat flight operations in February, the squadron’s helicopters +had logged 2,665 combat sorties and 2,365 combat hours. Another +statistic underscored the intensity of the actions in which the unit +had participated. Well over half of the squadron’s 24 helicopters +had been damaged by enemy fire during its five-month deployment in +Vietnam.[11-11] + + + + +CHAPTER 12 + +Fall and Winter Operations + +_Dry Weather Fighting--Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations--Changes and +Improvements--Action as the Year Ends_ + + +_Dry Weather Fighting_ + +The military situation in I Corps remained essentially unchanged as +HMM-162 began its assignment with SHUFLY. Hot, dry weather, with its +promise of near perfect flying conditions and spirited fighting, +continued over the mountainous northern provinces. + +After a series of orientation briefings and familiarization flights, +Lieutenant Colonel Curtis’ squadron initiated support operations in +the closing days of June. HMM-162’s first real taste of action came on +the last day of the month when six UH-34Ds, escorted by two armed U.S. +Army UH-1Bs, attempted to resupply ARVN troops operating in the hills +nine miles west of Tam Ky. While trying to locate a Communist position +which was firing on the resupply aircraft, one of the gunships was hit +and crashed in flames. Two transport helicopters landed immediately to +rescue the crew. The Marines pulled three of the four injured men from +the wreckage before being driven away from the scene by approaching +guerrillas. During takeoff, one UH-34D was struck by ground fire but +was able to continue its flight to Da Nang. The wounded copilot of the +downed Army aircraft died while enroute to the dispensary, but the +injured pilot survived and later was evacuated to the Nha Trang Field +Hospital. The heat from the still-smoldering aircraft hulk prevented a +second attempt to extricate the body of the fourth soldier later in the +day. It was finally recovered on 1 July. + +The squadron’s first critical troop lift came within days of its +initial action when the task element was called upon to helilift +urgently needed reinforcements to the Nam Dong CIDG camp which had come +under heavy Communist attack. Situated in south central Thua Thien +Province at a point where two prominent mountain valleys converge, +Nam Dong held special strategic appeal to both sides engaged in the +struggle for South Vietnam. It sat astride natural infiltration +routes from Laos into the lowlands around Da Nang and Phu Bai and +also protected some 5,000 Montagnard tribesmen who occupied a string +of villages along the valley floor. The camp and the villages were +defended by only a handful of U.S. Special Forces personnel and three +CIDG companies, none of which could muster more than 90 men. Its +status as a thorn in the enemy’s side, its relative isolation, and its +proximity to Communist base areas along the Laotian border, combined to +make the outpost a particularly lucrative target for the Viet Cong. + +Nam Dong’s hour of crisis came shortly after midnight on 7 July when +the Communists launched a large-scale ground assault against the barbed +wire-enclosed main camp. Shortly after 0400, with his position holding +out against heavy mortar and machine gun fire, Captain Roger H. Donlon, +the Special Forces officer in charge, radioed for assistance. Two hours +later, six Marine helicopters, loaded with U.S. Special Forces and +South Vietnamese personnel, launched from Da Nang for the beleaguered +little fortress. Colonel Merchant, flying an O-1B, led the transport +helicopters to the objective area while two U.S. Army UH-1B gunships +provided escort. Meanwhile, two other HMM-162 helicopters launched for +An Diem carrying U.S. Special Forces officers with instructions to +assemble a company-sized reaction force for commitment to Nam Dong. + +Intense enemy mortar and ground fire at Nam Dong initially prevented +the six UH-34Ds from landing the reinforcements, whereupon Colonel +Merchant and the flight returned to Da Nang for fuel. At the airfield +the task element commander briefed VNAF A-1H Skyraider pilots and the +crew of a Marine O-1B on the battlefield situation. He took off again +at 0910, this time to act as TACA in an Air Force U-10. Meanwhile, a +U.S. Army CV-2 Caribou (a twin-engine, fixed-wing light transport) +had managed to airdrop small arms ammunition to Donlon and the +embattled defenders. Following this emergency resupply, air strikes +were conducted on the hills to the south and west of the outpost, +causing enemy ground fire to diminish somewhat. At 0945, a flight of +18 Marine helicopters, led by Lieutenant Colonel Curtis and escorted +by four UH-1B gunships and two VNAF Skyraiders, began landing a 93-man +relief force which had been collected earlier from Da Nang and An Diem. +Evacuation of the dead and wounded began immediately. At 1545, a flight +of 10 UH-34Ds lifted 9,500 pounds of ammunition, medical supplies, +radios, and miscellaneous equipment to Nam Dong. Six passengers, five +wounded Vietnamese, and eight more bodies were evacuated to Da Nang on +the return trip. By then, the battle was finished. Two Americans, one +Australian advisor, and 55 South Vietnamese had been killed. Captain +Donlon, who earned the first Medal of Honor awarded for action in +Vietnam, and 64 other defenders had been wounded. The Viet Cong, who +had failed to eliminate the Nam Dong outpost, left 62 bodies on the +battlefield.[12-A] + + [12-A] For a more detailed account of the battle for Nam Dong, + see Donlon, _Outpost of Freedom_. + +Four days after the battle for Nam Dong, Colonel Merchant’s tour in +Vietnam ended. He returned to Okinawa to assume command of Marine +Aircraft Group 16 whereupon Colonel Hardy (“Tex”) Hay, a 1940 graduate +of Texas A&M, assumed command of Task Element 79.3.3.6.[12-B] + + [12-B] For his role as Task Element Commander, ARVN I Corps + Aviation Headquarters Commander, and Senior U.S. + Aviation Advisor to I Corps, Colonel Merchant was later + awarded the Legion of Merit with Combat “V.” He was also + decorated with two Vietnamese Crosses of Valor--one for + SURE WIND 202 and the other for the relief of Nam Dong. + +Normal flight operations continued during the remainder of July with no +major heliborne assaults conducted and no Marine aircraft lost. These +operations, however, did not lack excitement. Supporting the Marine +and ARVN forces on Tiger Tooth Mountain proved extremely hazardous as +the HMM-162 crews soon came to realize. On 11 July, for example, the +mountain nearly claimed one of their helicopters when a UH-34D lost +power as a result of the extreme altitude while delivering supplies to +Advisory Team One. As the aircraft plummeted into the hillside landing +zone, its tail pylon struck the vegetation around the edge of the tiny +clearing causing some structural damage. Fortunately, the damage was +such that the crewmen were able to make emergency repairs while Major +Gray’s men provided security around the aircraft. This accomplished, +the crew returned their damaged helicopter to Khe Sanh without further +incident. + +Daily operations continued to produce action for the newly arrived +squadron as July wore on. On the 15th a UH-34D was hit by Viet Cong +fire while performing a routine resupply mission south of Da Nang. +Again, damage was only minor and the aircraft continued its mission. +Support for Tiger Tooth Mountain dominated SHUFLY’s operations on +the 18th after MACV officials ordered Major Gray’s Advisory Team +One withdrawn to safety. Colonel Hay directed HMM-162 to commit all +available aircraft in order to complete the withdrawal as rapidly as +possible. Good weather and flying expertise helped the helicopter crews +transport the entire Marine force (92 men) and over 21,000 pounds of +equipment to Khe Sanh before nightfall on the 19th. + +In a simultaneous but unrelated development, HMM-162 was called upon +to detach four helicopters to Udorn, Thailand, for temporary duty. +These aircraft and crews were assigned to assist with search and rescue +operations in support of ongoing U.S. aerial reconnaissance efforts in +that area. + +In early August, the heightened international tensions which +accompanied the Gulf of Tonkin crisis prompted General Westmoreland to +order all American military installations throughout South Vietnam to +brace for possible enemy attacks. Colonel Hay responded to ComUSMACV’s +instructions by placing his Marines on high alert status for several +weeks. The precautions were relaxed gradually as the crisis eased and +the likelihood of a sudden Communist attack diminished. + +The pattern of helicopter operations in the northern provinces +throughout the remainder of the summer differed little from that which +had emerged earlier in the dry season. Medical evacuation and resupply +sorties continued to constitute the majority of the task element’s +support missions. Generally, medical evacuation missions, many of +which were executed while Viet Cong and South Vietnamese forces were +engaged in combat, provided the major source of action for Lieutenant +Colonel Curtis’ squadron during this period. On 6 August, for example, +a UH-34D was hit by enemy fire while its crew was evacuating ARVN +casualties from a landing zone along the Song Tra Bon. Two days later, +a second Marine helicopter was hit during an attempt to evacuate dead +and wounded from the mountains about eight miles west of Tam Ky. The +following day, on 9 August, another HMM-162 UH-34D drew fire while +evacuating a wounded U.S. advisor from a village on the coastal plain +12 miles southeast of Tam Ky. In all three incidents the aircraft +received only minor damage and were able to return safely to Da Nang. + +Although the medical evacuation missions generally attracted more +Viet Cong attention, many resupply flights also proved hazardous. +Small landing zones, high elevations, and bad weather often made even +the most routine missions difficult. HMM-162 lost a helicopter as a +result of a combination of two of these adverse conditions--extreme +elevation and a small landing zone--on 30 August. While resupplying +a mountain-top outpost five miles southwest of Nam Dong, the UH-34D +struck a tree at the edge of a tiny clearing and crashed. The crew +members were uninjured, but the extent of the aircraft’s damage was +too great to permit repair. It was stripped of radios, machine guns, +machine gun mounts, and other usable parts before being destroyed. + +In mid-August the Marines also lost their first observation aircraft +since deploying to Vietnam in 1962 when an O-1B crashed after +experiencing mechanical failure. The incident occurred on the 15th +while the pilot and observer were conducting a reconnaissance of +the northwestern corner of Quang Ngai Province. Bad weather delayed +rescue attempts for over an hour, but the two injured crewmen were +finally recovered by helicopter and flown to the Da Nang dispensary +for treatment. The pilot’s injuries were severe enough that he was +evacuated to the U.S. field hospital at Nha Trang. + +The last major heliborne assault conducted in extreme western I Corps +during 1964 was initiated in the first week of September. Eighteen +Marine UH-34Ds, four Army UH-1Bs, six VNAF Skyraiders, two Marine +O-1Bs, and two U.S. Air Force liaison aircraft were assigned to support +a 2d ARVN Division heliborne offensive against Communist infiltration +routes in remote southwestern Quang Nam Province. The operation, code +named CHINH BIEN, began on the morning of 4 September when 15 HMM-162 +helicopters (the other three UH-34Ds participating in the operation +were serving as search and rescue aircraft) lifted the first wave +of South Vietnamese soldiers from Kham Duc, a government-controlled +town located 12 miles from the Laotian border in northwestern Quang +Tin Province. Their objective was a landing zone situated 24 miles +northwest of the assembly area in Quang Nam Province and only three +miles from the Laotian border. No enemy resistance was encountered +and the initial assault helilifts were completed shortly after noon. +Support for CHINH BIEN continued the next morning. When the helilifts +were finally completed shortly before 1000, Marine UH-34Ds had flown +265 sorties for 180.2 flight hours in another effort to place ARVN +ground forces in remote areas of I Corps. + + +_Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations_ + +Adverse weather began influencing SHUFLY’s operations a few days +after CHINH BIEN ended. On 14 September all flights were cancelled by +rain and high winds from Typhoon Violet, a severe tropical storm. All +aircraft remained grounded until late afternoon of the next day when +HMM-162 helicopters conducted an emergency evacuation of storm victims +from Tam Ky which had been hard hit by Violet. The typhoon caused some +minor damage to SHUFLY’s facilities when electrical power was lost for +a few hours. By the morning of the 16th, power was restored and all +Marine operations returned to normal. + +Within a week, however, a more severe weather disturbance--Typhoon +Tilda--struck the coast near Da Nang. On the morning of 21 September, +in the face of the approaching storm, Colonel Hay ordered Lieutenant +Colonel Curtis to displace his squadron to Nha Trang in central II +Corps. Later in the day, the unit’s entire complement of aircraft +departed Da Nang on the 325-mile flight to safety. The task element’s +C-117D found refuge at Saigon. HMM-162 remained at Nha Trang until the +23d when it returned to I Corps. + +[Illustration: _Marine helicopters enroute to an objective overfly the +coastal plain south of Da Nang. (Official USMC Photo)._] + +Typhoon Tilda caused considerably more damage to the Marine base of +operations than had her immediate forerunner. Most of the permanent +structures in the compound showed signs of water damage and the +electrical power was lost for an entire week, except at the waterpoint +and the mess hall where a concerted repair effort restored power +promptly. Teletype communications circuits were closed for a full week +as a result of damage, and the radio link with the 1st MAW was broken +for nearly two hours. + +While the Marines of the MABS-16 sub unit concerned themselves with +cleaning up the debris and repairing their damaged facilities, +HMM-162’s crews resumed combat support operations. On the +afternoon of their return from Nha Trang, a flight of UH-34Ds +delivered 19 passengers and 4,000 pounds of cargo to Tien Phuoc, a +government-controlled town located seven miles west of Tam Ky. The next +day Major General Paul J. Fontana, who as commanding general of the +1st Marine Aircraft Wing was responsible for the administrative and +logistical support of the task element, arrived at Da Nang for a one +day visit to assess the damage and to confer with Colonel Hay. Flood +relief missions and clean up activities combined with normal flight +operations to consume the remainder of September. + +Two changes were made in the composition of the Marine task element in +late September and early October. On 29 September, the security force +from the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines rotated back to its parent unit +on Okinawa. It was replaced by a 78-man element from Company E, 2d +Battalion, 9th Marines the same day. Led by Second Lieutenant Anthony +A. Monroe, the newly arrived Marines would provide protection for the +aviation unit until late November. + +The second alteration occurred about a week later when HMM-162 was +relieved on-station by the officers and men of a fresh squadron. +The rotation of helicopter units was completed on 8 October when +Lieutenant Colonel Curtis officially signed over the aircraft and +maintenance equipment to the new squadron’s commanding officer. In +a three month deployment to the war zone HMM-162’s helicopters had +conducted approximately 6,600 sorties for a total of slightly over +4,400 flight hours. Many of these sorties had been missions of mercy +flown in the wake of the typhoons which had ravaged Vietnam’s northern +provinces. During three months of sustained combat support activities, +the squadron had lost two UH-34Ds and one O-1B in operational +accidents.[12-1] + +The newly arrived squadron, HMM-365, was commanded by Lieutenant +Colonel Joseph Koler, Jr., an experienced Marine officer who had +begun his career shortly after World War II as an infantry platoon +leader with the 1st Marine Division in China. Under his leadership +the squadron began performing resupply missions the same day that +the last of HMM-162’s personnel departed Da Nang. On their first day +of operations, Koler’s crews airlifted over 25,000 pounds of cargo +to various outposts around Da Nang. The following day a flight of +12 HMM-365 helicopters provided transportation for ARVN troops who +were being rotated between Kham Duc and A Roe, an isolated outpost in +southwestern Quang Nam Province less than seven miles from the Laotian +border. On 11 October the newly arrived Marine pilots and crews tasted +their first actual combat when eight UH-34Ds drew Viet Cong fire while +landing a 112-man Vietnamese unit in the hills 10 miles west-southwest +of Tam Ky. + +The day after its crews had witnessed their first ground fire, Koler’s +squadron lost its first aircraft in Vietnam. The incident occurred in +western Quang Nam Province while a UH-34D was attempting to take off +from a South Vietnamese landing zone located high in the mountains. +The crash, in which the pilot was slightly injured, resulted from a +loss of power due to the high altitude. After the crew was evacuated, a +maintenance team salvaged the usable parts and destroyed the aircraft. + +In mid-October Colonel Hay summarized the situation in I Corps for his +superiors at the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The task element commander +was particularly concerned about a new phase of Viet Cong activity +which he saw developing in the coastal lowlands of the northern +provinces. Although there were few visible signs of either combat or +enemy movement to confirm the trend, intelligence sources indicated +that Viet Cong main force battalions in I Corps had increased in number +from nine to 11 in the past several months. During this same period, +the number of local force Viet Cong companies in the area had jumped by +50 percent to a total of 17. These growth patterns, Colonel Hay noted, +enabled the Communists to tighten their grip on the civilian populace. +Likewise, they were responsible for increased enemy harassment of +lines of communications in I Corps and posed a particular threat to Da +Nang.[12-2] + +Colonel Hay’s tour as task element commander ended on 17 October. +After a brief change of command ceremony during which he expressed his +appreciation to his subordinates for their assistance, Hay departed +for Okinawa to assume command of MAG-16. His replacement at Da Nang, +Colonel John H. King, Jr., an officer who had seen his first action +as a fighter pilot during World War II, was well prepared to direct +the task element’s operations. A recent graduate of the National War +College, King had commanded the first operational Marine transport +helicopter unit, Marine Helicopter Squadron 161, during the Korean War. + +HMM-365’s operations continued throughout the remainder of October +with only a few significant actions reported. One of these was an +abortive medical evacuation mission attempted on 26 October during +which the squadron suffered its first combat casualties. The incident, +in which both the copilot and crew chief were wounded by Viet Cong +small arms fire, occurred while the helicopter was approaching a poorly +protected landing zone 10 miles southwest of Tam Ky. The pilot managed +to return the damaged helicopter to Tam Ky and land safely, whereupon +the seriously wounded copilot was evacuated to Nha Trang and the crew +chief was administered first aid. + +In early November, at the height of the monsoon season, Typhoon Iris +struck the Annamese coast. The tropical storm, whose full force was +felt on 4 November, was followed by nearly a week of continuous +rain, wind, and fog. The conditions caused flight operations to be +suspended except for emergency medical evacuations. When the operations +resumed on the 10th, the Marine Corps birthday, the Leatherneck crews +concentrated on rescuing Vietnamese civilians from the inundated +coastal plains. Between 1700 and 1900 on their first day of the flood +relief operation, Lieutenant Colonel Koler’s Marines rescued 144 flood +victims. These rescues, many of which were accomplished by hoisting +the Vietnamese from precarious positions in trees or on roof tops were +complicated by sporadic Viet Cong harassing fire. Many of the stranded +civilians were evacuated to the Da Nang airfield. Following emergency +medical treatment administered by Navy doctors and hospitalmen, the +civilians were given shelter in the task unit hangar. Lieutenant Robert +P. Heim, the Navy chaplain assigned to SHUFLY at the time, later +praised the Marines who shared their birthday cake with the homeless +Vietnamese that night.[12-3] The next day, although poor visibility +continued to hamper flights, the Marines helilifted 1,136 more flood +victims to safety. Again the guerrillas harassed the rescue attempts +with small arms fire, this time hitting three of the participating +aircraft. + +The humanitarian operation continued until 16 November, when another +typhoon--Kate--threatened to make matters even worse. The weather on +the storm’s periphery forced the cancellation of many Marine flights +but the center of the disturbance passed about 200 miles south of Da +Nang. The flooding which resulted from the two back-to-back storms, +however, demanded a rescue effort beyond the capabilities of the Marine +and VNAF helicopter units located in I Corps. Accordingly, the Special +Landing Force (SLF) of the U.S. Seventh Fleet joined the operations on +17 November. Lieutenant Colonel Curtis’ HMM-162, the helicopter element +of the SLF, returned to its former operations area and spent six days +rescuing flood victims. The Marines evacuated the most seriously +injured to the USS _Princeton_ where they received emergency treatment +before being returned to civilian hospitals. When the SLF departed +Vietnamese waters on 23 November, HMM-162’s helicopters had flown over +600 hours and completed 1,020 sorties in support of the disaster relief +operations. Unfortunately, one UH-34D was lost at sea in an operational +accident on 21 November while participating in these operations. Two +crewmen, Corporal Richard D. Slack, Jr. and Lance Corporal David +Nipper, died in the crash.[12-4] + +With the SLF’s departure, the Marine task element and the VNAF 217th +Squadron reassumed the full burden of rescue operations until they +were finally terminated on 10 December. During this period HMM-365 was +forced to divide its flights judiciously between combat support and +missions of mercy.[12-C] + + [12-C] The magnitude of the damage inflicted upon the + inhabitants of Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin + Provinces by the November storms is borne out by the + following statistics. In these three provinces over + 50,600 houses were destroyed while 4,870 civilians + were reported either dead or missing. Another 12,240 + Vietnamese were forced to seek refuge at government + centers in the wake of the flood. (CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, + 17Oct64–14Jan65.) + + +_Changes and Improvements_ + +While some of Lieutenant Colonel Koler’s men were employed in +evacuating the flood-stricken Vietnamese, others were modifying three +of the squadron’s helicopters to carry a new weapons system which +had been developed specifically for use on the UH-34D. The TK-1, an +externally mounted combination of M-60 machine guns and 2.75-inch +rocket launchers, was first used on 19 November in support of a Tiger +Flight mission conducted just south of the Song Thu Bon about 17 miles +from Da Nang. Two armed UH-34Ds expended 90 rockets and 500 rounds +of 7.62mm ammunition on enemy positions during prelanding strikes. +The effectiveness of the new system could not be determined after +this particular strike, but an estimated 10–15 Viet Cong were killed +in a similar action by the armed UH-34Ds the next day. The transport +aircraft armed with the TK-1 would continue to escort troop carrying +helicopters regularly throughout the remainder of the year. At best, +however, the TK-1 was of only marginal value. The inherent limitations +of the UH-34D, which possessed neither the maneuverability nor the +speed to conduct truly effective attacks, reduced the overall value +of the system. Because of these limitations the Marines seldom relied +solely on the UH-34D for fire suppression during assault missions. +The system would eventually be phased out in 1965 with the arrival of +Marine jet attack squadrons in Vietnam. + +[Illustration: + + MAJOR MARINE HELICOPTER + OPERATIONS SECOND HALF 1964 +] + +Two improvements, one in the physical facilities available to the task +element and the other in the size and composition of its security +detachment, were made shortly after the Marines began using the UH-34Ds +in the gunship role. On 25 November, HMM-365 moved its aircraft and +maintenance equipment across the airfield into a newly constructed +hangar just west of the strip. The second change took place the next +day when the security force from the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was +replaced by Company L, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, reinforced with +engineers, 81mm mortar teams, and counter-mortar radar personnel. +This adjustment came in response to the reports of the growing Viet +Cong threat to Da Nang. Designated the Security Detachment, Marine +Unit Vietnam, the 255-man organization was under the command of Major +William F. Alsop, the battalion’s executive officer. Captain John +Sheridan, the company commander, retained tactical control of the +infantry unit. + +Although responsibility for the overall defense of the Da Nang airstrip +still resided with the ARVN, the enlarged security detachment greatly +strengthened the Marine defenses within the installation. Major Alsop +divided his reinforced rifle company into two groups--one to protect +the living compound and the other to defend the flight line and the +new hangar. Around the living compound the engineers constructed a +complex of machine gun positions, mortar pits, and ammunition bunkers. +A barricade was also erected at a gate near the Marine compound which +previously had been open and manned only by Vietnamese sentries. Strong +defensive positions were also constructed around the task element’s +new hangar and flight line. This network included fox holes, barbed +wire, and cleared fields of fire. As an added precaution, Company L +maintained a reaction force at the living compound. This force was +prepared to board trucks and rush to reinforce the critical defenses +around the aircraft and maintenance facilities in the event of an enemy +ground attack.[12-5] + +Despite the stronger defenses and the presence of the larger Marine +infantry force, several security-related problems were still unsolved. +One which remained outside of Colonel King’s influence was the laxity +of the ARVN sentries around the outer perimeter who sometimes allowed +Vietnamese civilians to wander into the installation. Another was +that a small village close to the Marine compound, but outside the +perimeter fence, still harbored an occasional sniper. The task element +commander had lodged repeated complaints about both situations with the +appropriate South Vietnamese authorities but no action had been taken +to eliminate them. In spite of these minor sources of irritation, the +recent changes in its defenses greatly enhanced the task element’s +ability to protect itself against Communist ground attacks. + + +_Action as the Year Ends_ + +While Company L was developing defensive positions at the airbase, +HMM-365’s crews continued to provide support for both flood relief +and military operations throughout I Corps. On 7 December, 17 Marine +helicopters and eight Army UH-1B transports were called upon to help +trap a Viet Cong force known to be hiding in a village less than five +miles west of Da Nang. Code named DA NANG SIX, the operation began at +daybreak when the American helicopters lifted 240 men of the 11th ARVN +Ranger Battalion into the objective area. Two UH-1B gunships teamed +with two armed UH-34Ds to suppress ground fire that erupted as the +first wave of transport aircraft began their approach to the landing +zone. One Army gunship sustained minor damage when hit three times +during the exchange of fire. After the enemy had been silenced, the +landing proceeded without incident and the Vietnamese rangers quickly +secured their objective. In the process, nine Viet Cong were killed and +four others captured along with nine rifles and one automatic weapon. +Successful though it was, the action on the outskirts of Da Nang +confirmed previous reports that the Communists were tightening their +grip on Quang Nam Province.[12-6] + +Another indication of the enemy’s growing strength in I Corps came only +two days later when a large Viet Cong force overran an ARVN outpost +four and a half miles southwest of Tam Ky. I Corps Headquarters quickly +drew up plans for a multi-company search of the area even though the +Communists had withdrawn from the badly damaged government position +shortly after their final assault. At 0845, 18 Marine UH-34Ds (three +armed) and four Army UH-1Bs (two armed) helilifted a 208-man Tiger +Force from Da Nang to Tam Ky where it had orders to stage with other +units for the operation. While the U.S. helicopters were in the process +of transporting the Vietnamese troops to Tam Ky, an aerial observer +sighted a large formation of Viet Cong moving southwest from the scene +of the previous night’s battle. The observer immediately brought air +strikes and artillery fire to bear on the enemy, blocking his escape. + +Firepower contained the enemy throughout the morning while the infantry +units at Tam Ky prepared to exploit the situation with a heliborne +assault. The helilift was launched at 1345. Enroute to a landing +zone, located six miles southwest of Tam Ky, the helicopter formation +passed over the smoldering ruins of the ARVN outpost where ammunition +stockpiles were still exploding. Once at the objective, the armed +helicopters began delivering suppressive fire into the surrounding +hedge rows and treelines as the troop carrying aircraft approached +the landing zone. Still, after nearly six hours of air and artillery +strikes, the Communist force was able to oppose the landing with +intense small arms fire. No helicopters were hit during the landing, +however, and the assault force managed to secure the landing zone. +This accomplished, two companies from the 11th ARVN Ranger Battalion +were helilifted into the position without incident. After the final +troop lifts, the Marine transport helicopters began evacuating +casualties from the outpost where eight Vietnamese soldiers and one +American advisor had died and 20 ARVN and an Australian advisor had +been wounded. The government’s response to the enemy-initiated action, +including air and artillery strikes, accounted for 70 Viet Cong +killed and 39 weapons captured. While reflecting a moderate success, +these statistics were little compensation for the knowledge that the +Communists could destroy a well-fortified position within five miles of +a provincial capital.[12-7] + +Weather caused many Marine flights to be delayed and some to be +cancelled during the closing month of 1964. But the interruptions +were not frequent enough to prevent the task element from fulfilling +its support commitments. The only type of support operation actually +curtailed due to the monsoons was the preplanned heliborne assault into +the mountains. Brief periods of favorable weather usually enabled the +Marine crews to accomplish resupply and medical evacuation missions +even into the most remote areas of I Corps, although delays of such +flights were not uncommon. + +Lieutenant Colonel Koler’s HMM-365 was past the midpoint of its +assignment in Vietnam as 1964 drew to a close. Through 31 December the +unit’s helicopters had already flown over 6,700 sorties for a total of +nearly 4,700 hours of flight time. Since its arrival in early October, +Koler’s squadron had distinguished itself not only by providing support +to military units throughout I Corps but by its extensive participation +in the flood relief operations of November and December. During the +30-day period after 10 November, HMM-365 had contributed a substantial +percentage of its flights to the prolonged effort to rescue and +evacuate Vietnamese civilians from flooded areas.[12-8] + +FMFPac changed the designation of the task element on the final day of +1964. From that date until mid-March of the following year the Marine +helicopter squadron and its supporting elements in Vietnam would be +known officially as Task Unit 79.3.5, Marine Unit Vietnam. This change, +however, did not alter the existing command relationships. ComUSMACV +continued to exercise operational control over the Marine task unit +while the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing retained +responsibility for its administrative and logistic support. + + + + +CHAPTER 13 + +Prelude to Escalation + + +The close of 1964 marked the end of a full decade of American +political, economic, and military advice and assistance to South +Vietnam. That 10-year period saw a fragile state born and begin its +struggle for survival only to have its existence threatened by a new +brand of Communist aggression--the “war of national liberation.” It +also saw the U.S. commitment to Vietnam’s defense deepen in almost +direct proportion to the increasing threat. Despite growing amounts +of American aid and advice, there was little doubt that South Vietnam +stood near the brink of destruction at the hands of the Viet Cong and +their North Vietnamese allies as 1964 ended. + +In many respects, the disaster which befell the Vietnamese Marines and +ARVN Rangers at Binh Gia on the final day of 1964 marked a critical +turning point in the war being waged in South Vietnam. General +Westmoreland feared that the battle heralded “the beginning of the +classic and final ‘mobile’ phase of the war.” “To the South Vietnamese +government,” he reported, “it meant the beginning of an intensive +military challenge which the Vietnamese government could not meet +within its own resources.”[13-1] Brigadier General Carl Youngdale, +Westmoreland’s assistant chief of staff for intelligence and the +ranking Marine assigned to Vietnam, assessed the meaning of the battle +in equally distressing terms. “Binh Gia,” he explained, “was just part +of the whole thing. All the reserve--the strategic reserve--was fixed: +the airborne and the four Marine battalions had all been committed. +There was absolutely no strategic reserve left.”[13-2] So, as 1964 +ended, hope was fading rapidly among American military officials in +Saigon that the ground war for South Vietnam could continue for long +without more vigorous participation of the United States. + +Pressures other than those produced by military events in the South +were also working to move the United States toward direct military +intervention against the Communists in Indochina. Although sustained +open warfare had not occurred as a result of the Tonkin Gulf crisis of +early August, tensions continued to mount between North Vietnam and +the United States throughout the autumn. On 1 November, just after +the cessation of the U.S. air strikes which followed the Tonkin Gulf +incidents, Viet Cong mortar squads attacked American facilities at the +Bien Hoa airbase near Saigon. Four American servicemen were killed, +five B-57 medium bombers destroyed, and eight others heavily damaged in +the raid. + +President Johnson’s reaction to the Bien Hoa attack was to initiate +a month-long review of U.S. policy regarding North Vietnam. In early +December that review culminated in the adoption of a two-phased plan +to discourage further North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong +by expanding the air war. Phase I, approved for implementation in +December, called for stepped-up air operations against the vital +Communist infiltration routes in Laos, and for the intensification +of covert operations against North Vietnam. Approved “in principle,” +Phase II involved “a continuous program of progressively more serious +air strikes” against North Vietnam. The implementation of Phase II, +it was agreed, would depend on future enemy actions.[13-3] As if to +indicate that Communist policy makers had settled on a parallel course +of escalation, Viet Cong terrorists bombed a U.S. officers’ quarters +in Saigon on Christmas Eve, killing two Americans and wounding over 50 +others.[13-A] + + [13-A] Among the wounded was Major Damm, the Assistant Senior + Marine Advisor. + +The new year, 1965, would open against this portentous combination +of intensified U.S. air activities over Laos, a worsening military +situation on South Vietnam’s battlefields, and the existence of the +Phase II contingency plans. It was this situation which would spawn +a new series of events as the first months of 1965 unfolded--events +which would determine the direction of American and North Vietnamese +military involvement in the war for South Vietnam. In January, MACV +intelligence would learn that two new North Vietnamese Army regiments, +the _32d_ and the _101st_, had infiltrated the South and had initiated +combat operations. Intelligence sources would also report the existence +of another NVA regiment in the first stages of formation in Quang Tri +Province. When added to a unit of similar size which had appeared in +Kontum Province (II Corps Tactical Zone) in the final weeks of 1964, +the new arrivals would raise to four the number of North Vietnamese +regiments known to be operating on South Vietnamese soil.[13-4] + +The pace of escalation would quicken in early February. The Viet Cong +would attack a U.S. installation at Pleiku in the Central Highlands on +the 7th. Eight Americans would die in this incident, over 100 would be +wounded, and a score of aircraft would be either destroyed or damaged. +President Johnson would react quickly to the Pleiku attack by ordering +a series of reprisal air strikes under the code name FLAMING DART. +Recognizing the possibility of surprise North Vietnamese air strikes +against U.S. installations in Vietnam, Johnson would also order a +Marine light antiaircraft missile (LAAM) battalion to Da Nang, the +American base located closest to Communist airfields. Armed with Hawk +missiles, the Marines would protect the growing Da Nang airbase from +which many of the FLAMING DART raids were to originate. + +American reaction to the Communists’ escalation would not be limited +to the bombing of North Vietnam. Washington also would authorize +the use of U.S. jet attack aircraft to engage targets in the south. +On 19 February, U.S. Air Force B-57s would conduct the first jet +strikes flown by Americans in support of Government of Vietnam ground +units. Less than one week later, on the 24th, Air Force jets would +strike again, this time to break up a Communist ambush in the Central +Highlands with a massive series of tactical air sorties.[13-5] + +While the events of February would serve to focus world opinion more +sharply on the intensifying conflict already raging over Southeast +Asia, March would prove the decisive month in terms of the commitment +of American combat power to the war in Vietnam. On 2 March, the +President would order the FLAMING DART raids replaced by Operation +ROLLING THUNDER--a sustained air campaign against the Democratic +Republic of Vietnam designed to escalate gradually in response to +continued Communist military activities in South Vietnam. ROLLING +THUNDER would constitute a transition from the earlier reprisal type +raids to a continuing air campaign based upon strategic considerations. + +Within a week after the first ROLLING THUNDER strikes over the North, +the ground war in South Vietnam would also shift toward deeper and more +active American involvement. On 7 March, the 9th Marine Expeditionary +Brigade--the force which had been poised in the South China Sea since +the Tonkin Gulf crisis of the previous August--would finally land at +Da Nang to provide protection for the air base. Although the Pentagon +would announce their mission as purely defensive, the Marines would +become the first actual American ground combat battalions on hand for +use in Vietnam. With that commitment, the stage would be set for a +new and more dramatic phase of what was already becoming known as the +“Second Indochina War.” + + + + +Notes + + +PART I + +THE WATERSHED + + +Chapter 1 + +Background to Military Assistance + +Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: +Department of Defense, _United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1947_, +12 books (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter _Pentagon Papers_; The +Senator Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department +History of Decision Making On Vietnam_, 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon +press, n.d.), hereafter Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_; Foreign +Area Studies Division, American University, _Area Handbook for South +Vietnam_ (Washington: GPO, 1967), hereafter American University, _Area +Handbook_; Chester L. Cooper, _et al._, _The American Experience With +Pacification in Vietnam_, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Institute For +Defense Analysis, 1972), hereafter Cooper, _et al._, _The American +Experience With Pacification_; Joseph Buttinger, _The Smaller Dragon: +A Political History of Vietnam_ (New York: Praeger, 1958), hereafter +Buttinger, _The Smaller Dragon_; Bernard Fall, _Two Viet-Nams: A +Political and Military Analysis_ (New York: Praeger, 1967, 2d rev. +ed.), hereafter Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_; D. G. E. Hall, _A History of +South-East Asia_ (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966), hereafter +Hall, _A History of South-East Asia_; Frances FitzGerald, _Fire In +The Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans In Vietnam_ (Boston: +Little, Brown and Company, 1972), hereafter FitzGerald, _Fire In The +Lake_; Ellen J. Hammer, _The Struggle for Indochina_ (Stanford, Cal.: +Stanford University Press, 1954), hereafter Hammer, _The Struggle for +Indochina_; Douglas Pike, _Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques +of The National Liberation Front_ (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, +1966), hereafter Pike, _Viet Cong_. + + [1-1] Hanson W. Baldwin, _Strategy for Tomorrow_ (New York: + Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 261. + + [1-2] Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_, p. 3. + + [1-3] Pike, _Viet Cong_, p. 81. + + [1-4] FitzGerald, _Fire In The Lake_, p. 42. + + [1-5] Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), _A Translation From + The French Lessons of The War In Indochina_, v. II (Santa + Monica, Cal.: Rand Corporation, 1967), p. 12, hereafter + Croizat, _A Translation From the French Lessons_. + + [1-6] Dean Acheson, _Present At The Creation: My Years in The + State Department_ (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, + Inc., 1969), p. 673. + + [1-7] Buttinger, _The Smaller Dragon_, p. 46. + + [1-8] B. S. N. Murti, _Vietnam Divided_ (New York, 1954), p. 49. + + [1-9] Letter, SecState to SecDef, 18Aug54 as quoted in “U.S. + Training of the Vietnamese National Army 1954–1959,” + _Pentagon Papers_, bk. 2, sec. IV.A.4, p. 3. + + +Chapter 2 + +The Formative Years + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived +from: MajGen Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (Ret.), _In the Midst of Wars: +An American’s Mission To Southeast Asia_ (New York: Harper & Row, +1972), hereafter Lansdale, _In the Midst of Wars_; George McTurnam +Kahin and John W. Lewis, _The United States in Vietnam_ (New York: +Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), hereafter Kahin and Lewis, _The +U.S. In Vietnam_; Joseph Buttinger, _Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled_, 2 +vols (New York: Praeger, 1967), Vol. II, _Vietnam at War_, hereafter +Buttinger, _Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled_, v. II; Robert Scigliano, +_South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), +hereafter Scigliano, _South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress_; Fall, _Two +Viet-Nams_; Pike, _Viet Cong_; Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, vs. +I & II; Vietnam Histories Comment File, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, hereafter +Vietnam Comment File; U.S. Marine Activities in RVN, 1954–1964 Project +Interview Folder Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, hereafter 1954–1964 Project +Interview Folder. + + +_Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: +Bernard B. Fall, _Street Without Joy: Indochina At War, 1946–1954_, +(Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1961), hereafter Fall, +_Street Without Joy_; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), “Vietnamese +Naval Forces: Origin of the Species,” _USNI Proceedings_, v. 99, no. +2 (Feb73), pp. 48–58, hereafter Croizat, “Vietnamese Naval Forces”; +Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd +10–11 Feb70 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter _Croizat +Interview_; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), Comments and supporting +materials on Draft MS, Jack Shulimson, “U.S. Marines in Vietnam,” pt. +1 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Croizat Comments and Supporting +Materials_; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, +Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Croizat Comments On Whitlow MS_; Col +James T. Breckinridge, USMC, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, +“U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment +File), hereafter _Breckinridge Comments_; MajGen William B. Fulton, +USA (Ret.), _Riverine Operations_ (Washington, D.C.: Department of +The Army, 1973), hereafter Fulton, _Riverine Operations_; Croizat, _A +Translation From The French Lessons_. + + [2-1] Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), “Notes on The + Organization of the Vietnamese Marine Corps,” p. 3 + (_Croizat Comments and Materials_), hereafter Croizat, + “Notes on The Organization.” + + [2-2] _Ibid._, p. 5. + + [2-3] _Ibid._, p. 6. + + +_Political Stabilization and its Effects_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: +Buttinger, _Vietnam; A Dragon Embattled_, v. II; Gravel Edition, +_Pentagon Papers_, v. I; Fall, _Two Viet-nams_; Robert Shaplen, _The +Lost Revolution_ (New York: Harper, 1965); Kahin and Lewis, _The U.S. +In Vietnam_; Lansdale, _In The Midst of Wars_. + + [2-4] Col John T. Breckinridge, telephone conversation + with Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 21 Feb 74, subj: Early + Experiences with the VN Marine Corps (Addenda to + _Breckinridge Comments_, Vietnam Comments File), + hereafter _Breckinridge Conversation_. + + [2-5] Croizat, “Notes on The Organization,” p. 5. + + [2-6] _Breckinridge Conversation._ + + +Chapter 3 + +Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: +Department of State, _Aggression From The North; The Record of North +Viet-Nam’s Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam_ (Washington: GPO, +1965), hereafter Department of State, _Aggression From The North_; +Buttinger, _Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled_, v. II; Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_; +FitzGerald, _Fire In The Lake_; Kahin and Lewis, _The U.S. In Vietnam_; +Pike, _Viet Cong_. + + [3-1] _U.S. News & World Report_, 9Nov64, p. 63. + + [3-2] Scigliano, _South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress_, p. 164. + + [3-3] Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_, p. 360. + + [3-4] Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. II, p. 35. + + [3-5] “Evolution of The War,” _Pentagon Papers_, bk. 2, sec. + IV.B.1, p. 1. + + [3-6] Pike, _Viet Cong_, p. 81. + + [3-7] Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. II, p. 36. + + [3-8] HistBr, G-3, HQMC, “General Chronology of Events in + Vietnam, 1945–1964,” p. 41. + + +_Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps_ + +Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from: +SMA to CMC, ltr dtd 22 March 1973, Subj: Vietnamese Marine Corps/Marine +Advisory Unit Historical Summary, 1954–1973, hereafter VNMC/MAU +HistSum, 22Mar73; Maj James Yingling, Capt Harvey D. Bradshaw, and +Mr. Benis M. Frank, “United States Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam +1954–1963,” MS (HistDiv, HQMC, 1963), hereafter Yingling, _et al._, +“USMC Activities 1954–1963”; Col Frank R. Wilkinson, USMC (Ret.), intvw +by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 14Jul74 (Oral HistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), +hereafter _Wilkinson Interview_; LtCol Robert E. Brown, Comments on +Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, +1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter, _R. E. Brown Comments_; +Col Raymond C. Damm, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. +Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File) +hereafter _Damm Comments_; LtCol Michael J. Gott, Comments on Draft MS, +Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” +(Vietnam Comment File) hereafter _Gott Comments_; Col Gary L. Wilder, +Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “Marine Activities in +Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Wilder Comments_. + + [3-9] VNMC/MAU HistSumm, 22Mar73. + + [3-10] _Wilkinson Interview._ + + [3-11] _Ibid._ + + [3-12] _Damm Comments._ + + [3-13] _Gott Comments._ + + +_Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: +Maj T. C. Edwards, “3d MarDiv Counterguerrilla Training: A Readiness +Report,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 47, no. 5 (May 1963), pp. 45–48, +hereafter Edwards, “Counterguerrilla Training”; MajGen Donald M. +Weller, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. +Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), +hereafter _Weller Comments_; MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.), +intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), +hereafter _Weller Interview_; MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.), +Intvw with Captain Robert Whitlow, dtd 26Sep73, Subj: 3d MarDiv +Training Program (1954–1964 Project Interview Folder), hereafter +_Weller Interview on Training Programs_. + + [3-14] _Weller Interview on Training Programs._ + + [3-15] Edwards, “Counterguerrilla Training,” p. 46. + + +_American Decisions at the Close of 1961_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: +Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. II; “The Fall Decisions,” +_Pentagon Papers_, bk. 2, sec. IV.B, ch. V and VI; Arthur M. +Schlesinger, Jr., _A Thousand Days_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, +1965), hereafter Schlesinger, _A Thousand Days_; Maxwell D. Taylor, +_Swords and Plowshares_ (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972), +hereafter Taylor, _Swords and Plowshares_; Chester L. Cooper, _The Lost +Crusade: America In Vietnam_ (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1970), +hereafter Cooper, _The Lost Crusade_; Gen. William C. Westmoreland and +Adm U. S. G. Sharp, _Report On The War In Vietnam_ (Washington: GPO +1969), hereafter Westmoreland and Sharp, _Report On The War_. + + [3-16] Taylor, _Swords and Plowshares_, p. 225. + + +Chapter 4 + +An Expanding War, 1962 + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: +William A. Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification in Vietnam 1962–1965_ +(Washington: Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1966), hereafter +Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification, 1962–65_; USMAAG, Vietnam, “Tactics +and Techniques of Counterinsurgent Operations” (Saigon, RVN: USMAAG, +1961), hereafter, USMAAG Vietnam, “Tactics and Techniques of +Counterinsurgent Opns”; Hdqts, U.S. Army, _The Viet Cong_ (Ft. Bragg, +N.C.: 1965) hereafter, U.S. Army, _Viet Cong_; Cooper, _et al._, _The +American Experience With Pacification_; Gravel Edition, _Pentagon +Papers_, v. II; “The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961–63,” _Pentagon +Papers_, bk. 3, sec. IV.B.2; Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_. + + [4-1] As quoted in the Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. + II, p. 140. + + +_Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: +Senior Marine Advisor letter to CMC, dtd 24Jan64, hereafter _SMA ltr +to CMC, 24Jan64_; CinCPac Command History, 1962; MACV Command History, +1962; Marine Corps Command Center, Items of Significant Interest, +Jan-Feb62, hereafter _MCC Items_; LtGen Richard G. Weede, Intvw by +Hist&MusDiv, HQMC dtd 23Jul73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), +hereafter _Weede Interview_. + + +_The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: +_SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64_; Capt Don R. Christensen, “A Special Gazette +Report: Dateline ... Vietnam,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 47, no. 9 +(Sep63), p. 5, hereafter Christensen, “Dateline”; Gen David M. Shoup, +SE Asia Trip Folder, Sep62, hereafter _Shoup SEA Trip Folder_; LtCol +Harold F. Brown, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. +Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), +hereafter _H. F. Brown Comments_. + + [4-2] _SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64._ + + [4-3] Gen David M. Shoup, ltr to President Ngo Dinh Diem, dtd + Oct62 (_Shoup SEA Trip Folder_). + + [4-4] Gen David M. Shoup conversation with BGen Edwin H. + Simmons, dtd Feb74 (1954–64 Project Interview Folder). + + [4-5] _SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64._ + + +PART II + +MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR + + +Chapter 5 + +SHUFLY at Soc Trang + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: +HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File _MCC Items_; CinCPac Command +History, 1962; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation In Vietnam, +1962–1970,” _Naval Review_, v. 10 (1971), hereafter McCutcheon, “Marine +Aviation.” + + [5-1] JCS to CinCPac, 17Jan62, 1212Z (HQMC Msg File). + + [5-2] CinCPac to JCS, 28Feb62, 0217Z (HQMC Msg File). + + [5-3] JCS to CinCPac, 6Mar62, 1838Z (HQMC Msg File). DA to + CinCPac and CinCUSARPac, 2Mar63 (HQMC Msg File). + + [5-4] ChMAAG, VN to CinCPac, 26Feb62, 0945Z (HQMC Msg File). + + [5-5] CGFMPac to CinCPac, 28Feb62, 0113Z (HQMC Msg File). + + [5-6] _Ibid._ + + [5-7] CinCPacFlt to CinCPac, 28Feb62, 2044Z (HQMC Msg File). + + [5-8] CinCPac (Bangkok Th) to ComUSMACV, 5Mar62, 0340Z (HQMC + Msg File). + + [5-9] ComUSMACV to CinCPac, 8Mar62, 0941Z (HQMC Msg File). + + [5-10] CinCUSARPac to CinCPac, 9Mar62, 2100Z (HQMC Msg File). + + [5-11] Dir, DivAv, HQMC, Briefing Item, dtd 14Mar62, for CMC + Weekly Conf., Subj: Assignment of Marine Helicopter + Squadron to ChMAAG, Vietnam. + + [5-12] CinCPac to JCS, 14Mar62, 0712Z (HQMC Msg File). + + [5-13] _Ibid._ + + [5-14] CinCPac to CinCPacFlt and ComUSMACV, 21Mar62, 0412Z (HQMC + Msg File); CinCPacFlt to ComSeventhFlt, 21Mar62, 2048Z + (HQMC Msg File). + + +_Deployment to Soc Trang_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: +Commander Task Unit 79.3.5 ComdDiary, 31Jul–5Nov62, hereafter _CTU +79.3.5 CmdD, 31Jul-Nov62_; CG 1st MAW, SHUFLY, OpSums, Apr-Sep62; CG, +1st MAW, Ltr of Instruction, SHUFLY, dtd 12Nov62, hereafter _CG, 1st +MAW LOI_; LtCol Archie J. Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary,” _USNI Proceedings_, +v. 89, no. 10 (Oct63), hereafter Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary”; Cdr Withers +M. Moore, Chaplain Corps, USN, _Navy Chaplains in Vietnam, 1954–1964_ +(Washington: Department of Navy, 1968), hereafter Moore, _Navy +Chaplains_; Capt Robert B. Asprey, “Saga At Soc Trang: Marines In +Viet-Nam,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 46, no. 12 (Dec62), pp. 2–3, +hereafter Asprey, “Saga At Soc Trang”; VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN +(Ret.), Intvw by Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 15Apr74 (1954–64 Project +Interview Folder), hereafter _Hooper Interview_. + + [5-15] CG, 1st MAW to ComSeventhFlt, 30Mar62, 0700Z, (HQMC Msg + File). + + [5-16] _Ibid._ + + [5-17] ComSeventhFlt to CTF 76 and CTG 79.3, 3Apr62 (HQMC Msg + File). + + +_Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: +Marine Corps Operational Analysis Group, Study No. 1, dtd 12Mar63, +“Characteristics of U.S. Marine Helicopter Operations in the Mekong +Delta,” hereafter _MCOAG Study No. 1_; LtCol Robert L. Rathbun, +Comments on Yingling, _et al._, “USMC Activities 1954–1963,” (Vietnam +Comment File), hereafter _Rathbun Comments on Yingling MS_; Richard +Tregaskis, _Vietnam Diary_ (New York: Popular Library, 1963), hereafter +Tregaskis, _Vietnam Diary_; Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary”; CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, +31Jul–5Nov62; CG, 1stMAW SHUFLY OpSums, Apr-Sep62. + + [5-18] Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary,” p. 46. + + [5-19] _Ibid._, p. 51. + + [5-20] CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul–5Nov62. + + [5-21] Yingling, _et al._, “USMC Activities 1954–1963,” p. 118. + + [5-22] CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul-Nov62. + + [5-23] C of S memo 007A20763, as quoted in Yingling, _et al._, + “USMC Activities, 1954–1963,” p. 153. + + +Chapter 6 + +SHUFLY Moves North + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: +Col Julius W. Ireland, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, +“U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), +hereafter _Ireland Comments_; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; _Weede +Interview_; _Rathbun Comments on Yingling MS_. + + +_I Corps Tactical Zone_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: +BGen Edwin H. Simmons, “Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1965–1966,” +_Naval Review_, 1968, hereafter Simmons, “Marine Corps Operations in +RVN, 65–66”; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; Fall, _Street Without Joy_; +Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification, 1962–65_. + + +_Military Situation, September 1962_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: +Col Francis J. Kelly, USA, _U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971_ +(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), hereafter Kelly, +_U.S. Army Special Forces_; MACV J-2 ltr to CTU 79.3.5, dtd 11Oct62, +Subj: Intelligence Estimate, Period Oct62–Feb63 (Encl D-17 to CTU +79.3.5 ComdD), hereafter _MACV Intell Est, 11Oct62_. + + [6-1] _MACV Intel Est, 11Oct62._ + + [6-2] _Ibid._ + + +_Initial Helicopter Operations_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: _CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul–5Nov62_; CG 1st MAW, SHUFLY, OpSums, +Sep-Dec62; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; _Ireland Comments_; _Rathbun +Comments on Yingling MS_. + + [6-3] _MCC Items_, 7Oct62. + + [6-4] CTU 79.3.5 ltr to CG 1st MAW, dtd 4Oct62, Subj: Rotation + of Task Unit Personnel to South Vietnam (encl D-15, _CTU + 79.3.5 ComdD, 6Apr–5Nov62_). + + +Chapter 7 + +The Laotian Crisis, 1962 + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: +3d Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Report, 16May–7Aug 1962, hereafter +_3d MEU Special Report_; CinCPac Operations Plan 32-59 Phase II (Laos), +hereafter _OpPlan 32-59_; _Weller Interview_; _Croizat Interview_; _MCC +Items_, May, Jun, Jul62; Schlesinger, _A Thousand Days_; Cooper, _The +Lost Crusade_; Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, _North Vietnam +and The Pathet Lao: Partners in The Struggle For Laos_ (Cambridge, +Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), hereafter Langer and Zasloff, +_North Vietnam and The Pathet Lao_; LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC +(Ret.) Comments on 2d Draft MS, Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities +In Vietnam, 1954–1963,” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Simpson +Comments_; Foster Rhea Dulles, _American Policy Toward Communist China: +The Historical Record_ (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972), +hereafter Dulles, _American Policy Toward Communist China_; Taylor, +_Swords and Plowshares_. + + [7-1] _MCC Items_: 16 May 62. + + [7-2] _Croizat Interview_; _Weller Interview_. + + +PART III + +THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963 + + +Chapter 8 + +The Marine Advisory Effort + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: +FitzGerald, _Fire In The Lake_; “The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, +May-November, 1963,” _Pentagon Papers_, bk. 3, sec. IV.B.5; Gravel +Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. III; Shaplen, _The Lost Revolution_; +Kahin and Lewis, _The U.S. In Vietnam_. + + +_The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations_ + +Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from: +Senior Marine Advisor, MACV, Monthly Historical Summaries, 1963–1965, +hereafter _SMA, MACV HistSums_; Col Wesley C. Noren, Comments on Draft +MS, Maj Harvey Bradshaw, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations in RVN, 1964” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Noren Comments on Bradshaw MS_; +Col Wesley C. Noren, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. +Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964”. (Vietnam Comment File), +hereafter _Noren Comments on Whitlow MS_; Col Clarence G. Moody, +Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In +Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Moody Comments_; +LtCol James P. McWilliams, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, +“U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), +hereafter _McWilliams Comments_; LtCol Joseph N. Smith, Comments on +Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, +1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Smith Comments_; LtCol +Joseph N. Smith intvw by Capt Robert Whitlow (1954–1964 Project +Interview Folder), hereafter _Smith Interview_; Col Edwin F. Black, +USA, and Lt R. P. W. Murphy, USNR, “The South Vietnamese Navy,” _USNI +Proceedings_, v. 90, no. 1 (Jan64) pp. 52–62, hereafter, Black and +Murphy, “The South Vietnamese Navy”; Maj Alfred J. Croft, “A Special +Gazette Report: Dateline, Vietnam,” _Marine Corps Gazette_ v. 47, n. +10 (Oct63), p. 18, hereafter Croft, “Dateline, Vietnam”; Christenson, +“Dateline”; Capt. James P. McWilliams, “Pacify and Hold,” _Marine Corps +Gazette_, v. 49, no. 2 (Feb65), p. 56, hereafter McWilliams, _Pacify +and Hold_. + + [8-1] _Moody Comments_; _Weede Interview_. + + [8-2] _McWilliams Comments._ + + [8-3] _Smith Interview._ + + [8-4] _Noren Comments on Whitlow MS._ + + +Chapter 9 + +SHUFLY Operations + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived +from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov62–31Oct63; CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, +31Oct63–14Jan64; Col Thomas J. Ross, Comments on Draft MS, Bradshaw, +“U.S. Marine Corps Operations in RVN, 1964,” (Vietnam Comment File), +hereafter _Ross Comments on Bradshaw MS_. + + [9-1] McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation.” + + +_Combat Support Operations_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov62–31Oct63; CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, +31Oct63–14Jan64; CTE 79.3.3.6 After Action Reports, 26Apr–20May63, +hereafter _CTE 79.3.3.6 AAR_; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; MajGen +Paul J. Fontana, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. +Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964,” (Vietnam Comment File), +hereafter _Fontana Comments_; Col Thomas J. Ross, Comments on Draft MS, +Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Ross Comments On Whitlow MS_; _Ross +Comments On Bradshaw MS_; _H. F. Brown Comments_. + + [9-2] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov–31Oct63. + + [9-3] _Ibid._ + + [9-4] CTE 79.3.3.6 AAR, 19May63. + + [9-5] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov–31Oct63. + + [9-6] Aviation Headquarters Operations Center SOP, p. 1 (encl + 5, CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 18Jul–31Oct63). + + [9-7] Col A. D. Gomez ltr to Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing + Force Development Center, dated 23Oct63 (encl 1, CTE + 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 18Jul–31Oct63). + + [9-8] 1st MAW OpSums, 8Jun–20Oct63. + + [9-9] _Ross Comments on Bradshaw MS._ + + [9-10] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov63–14Jan64. + + +_The Situation in Vietnam_ + +Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived +from: Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. II; Nighswonger, _Rural +Pacification, 1962–65_; Fall, _Two Viet-Nams_; Cooper, _The Lost +Crusade_; Department of State, _Aggression from the North_. + + [9-11] Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification, 1962–65_. + + +PART IV + +AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964 + + +Chapter 10 + +Marines Meet the Challenge + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: +MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.) intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, +dtd 24Jul73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter _Youngdale +Interview_; MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft +MS, Capt Robert Whitlow “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–64” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter, _Youngdale Comments_; Westmoreland +and Sharp, _Report On The War_; Cooper, _et al._, _The American +Experience With Pacification, 1962–65_; “Military Pressures Against +North Vietnam, July-Oct 1964,” _Pentagon Papers_, bk. 4, sec. IV.C.2; +Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. III; CinCPac Command History, +1964, hereafter _CinCPac ComdHist, 64_; U.S. Military Assistance +Command, Vietnam, Command History, 1964, hereafter MACV ComdHist, 64; +Nighswonger, _Rural Pacification, 1962–65_. + + [10-1] Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. III, p. 501. + + [10-2] _Ibid._ + + [10-3] _Ibid._, v. II, p. 471. + + [10-4] “Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, Jul-Oct 1964,” + _Pentagon Papers_, bk. 4, sec. IV.C.2(b), p. 42. + + +_Redesignation and Reorganization_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: +Senior Marine Advisor, MACV, After Action Reports, 1964–65, hereafter +_SMA, MACV, AARs 64-65_; Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.), Comments +on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, +1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Nesbit Comments On +Whitlow MS_; Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft +MS, Maj Harvey Bradshaw, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations In RVN, 1964” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Nesbit Comments on Bradshaw MS_; +_Noren Comments on Whitlow MS_; _Noren Comments on Bradshaw MS_; James +C. Pickerell, “Marine Advisor: Vietnam,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 48, +n. 4 (Apr64), hereafter Pickerall, “Marine Advisor”; _Damm Comments_. + + [10-5] _Nesbit Comments on Bradshaw MS._ + + +_The Vietnamese Marine Brigade_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: +_SMA, MACV, AARs, 64-65_; CG FMFPac On-The-Job-Training, RVN, Monthly +Reports, Jan-Dec, 1964, hereafter _OJT Monthly Repts, 64_; Capt Philip +O. Brady, intvw by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Jan66 (OralHistColl, +Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter _Brady Interview_; Westmoreland and +Sharp, _Report On The War_; Pickerell, “Marine Advisor”; Naval Advisory +Group, MACV, Historical Review, 1964–65, hereafter NAVGP, MACV, +HistRevw, 64-65. + + [10-6] _Noren Comments on Whitlow MS._ + + [10-7] _Nesbit Comments on Whitlow MS._ + + [10-8] NAVGP, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65, p. 21. + + +_Additional Marine Activities_ + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: +LtCol Raymond Becker, intvw with Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 25Jan74 +(1954–64 Project Interview Folder), hereafter _Becker Interview_; +Capt Charles H. Gallina, Intvw with Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 29Jan74 +(1954–64 Project Interview Folder), hereafter _Gallina Interview_; +Director of Intelligence, HQMC, to Director, History and Museums +Division, dtd 31Jan74, Subj: Summary of U.S. Marine Corps Operations +at Tiger Tooth Mountain and Dong Bach Ma in 1964, hereafter “Summary +of USMC Opns at Tiger Tooth Mountain”; Col Raymond C. Damm intvw with +Captain Robert H. Whitlow, dtd 19Jul73 (1954–64 Project Interview +Folder), hereafter _Damm Interview_; NAVG, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65; CTE +79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64. + + [10-9] _Damm Interview._ + + [10-10] NAVG, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65, p. 14. + + [10-11] _Smith Comments._ + + [10-12] Col Warren P. Baker, ltr to CG, 3dMarDiv, dtd 3Apr64, + Subj: Job Related Orientation Report. + + [10-13] CG, FMFPac ltr to CMC 18Mar64, Subj: SVN Observations. + + +Chapter 11 + +Spring and Summer Fighting + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: +CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; Col Andre Gomez, Comments on Draft +MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam 1954–64” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter _Gomez Comments_; Col Robert A. +Merchant, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine +Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter +_Merchant Comments_; Col John H. La Voy, Comments on Draft MS, Capt +Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam +Comment File), hereafter _La Voy Comments_; _Ross Comments on Whitlow +MS_; LtGen Herman Nickerson, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt +Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam +Comment File), hereafter _Nickerson Comments_. + + [11-1] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64. + + [11-2] _Ross Comments on Whitlow MS._ + + [11-3] _Ibid._ + + [11-4] _Ibid._ + + [11-5] Statement of General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., CMC, before + the House Committee On Armed Services, dtd March 1964 + (Greene Papers Collection). + + [11-6] CTE ComdD 79.3.3.6, 1Nov63–16Oct64. + + [11-7] _La Voy Comments._ + + [11-8] _Ibid._ + + [11-9] _Ibid._ + + [11-10] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; _Merchant Comments_; + _La Voy Comments_. + + [11-11] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64. + + +Chapter 12 + +Fall and Winter Operations + +Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: +CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 17Oct64–14Jan65; +1st MAW OpSums, 9Jul64–7Oct64; CinCPac CmdHist 64; _Fontana Comments_; +BGen Joseph Koler, USMC, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, +“U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), +hereafter _Koler Comments_; Col Hardy Hay, Comments on Draft MS, Capt +Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam +Comment File), hereafter _Hay Comments_; _Becker Comments_; _Merchant +Comments_; _Nickerson Comments_; Capt Roger H. Donlon, USA, _Outpost of +Freedom_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), hereafter Donlon, _Outpost of +Freedom_; Moore, _Navy Chaplains_. + + [12-1] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; CG 1st MAW OpSums, + 9Jul–7Oct64. + + [12-2] CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64. + + [12-3] Moore, _Navy Chaplains_, p. 92. + + [12-4] _MCC Items_, 23Nov64. + + [12-5] CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 17Oct64–14Jan65. + + [12-6] _Ibid._ + + [12-7] _Ibid._ + + [12-8] _Ibid._ + + +Chapter 13 + +Prelude to Escalation + + [13-1] Westmoreland and Sharp, _Report On The War_, p. 95. + + [13-2] _Youngdale Interview._ + + [13-3] Gravel Edition, _Pentagon Papers_, v. III, p. 289. + + [13-4] Westmoreland and Sharp, _Report On The War_, pp. 95, 97. + + [13-5] _Ibid._, p. 98. + + + + +Appendix A + +USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954–1964 + + +USMC SENIOR MARINE ADVISORS + + LtCol Victor J. Croizat Aug 1954–Jun 1956 + LtCol William N. Wilkes, Jr Jun 1956–Jun 1958 + LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr Jun 1958–Jun 1960 + LtCol Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr Jun 1960–Aug 1961 + LtCol Robert E. Brown Aug 1961–Oct 1962 + LtCol Clarence G. Moody, Jr Oct 1962–Oct 1963 + LtCol Wesley C. Noren Oct 1963–Sep 1964 + Col William P. Nesbit Sep 1964– + + +VNMC SENIOR OFFICERS AND COMMANDANTS + + Maj Le Quang Trong 1 Oct 1954–17 Jun 1956 + Maj Phan Van Lieu 18 Jan 1956–22 Aug 1956 + Capt Bui Pho Chi 23 Aug 1956– 1 Oct 1956 + Maj Le Nhu Hung 2 Oct 1956–23 May 1960 + LtCol Le Nguyen Khang 24 May 1960–15 Dec 1963 + LtCol Nguyen Ba Lien 16 Dec 1963– Feb 1964 + BGen Le Nguyen Khang Feb 1964– + + +SHUFLY, SQUADRON, AND SUB UNIT COMMANDERS[14-A] + + _SHUFLY Commanders_ _Dates_ + Col John F. Carey 15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962 + Col Julius W. Ireland 1 Aug 1962– 5 Nov 1962 + LtCol Alton W. McCully 6 Nov 1962–28 Jan 1963 + LtCol Harold F. Brown 29 Jan 1963–17 Jul 1963 + Col Andre D. Gomez 18 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964 + Col Robert A. Merchant 16 Jan 1964– 9 Jul 1964 + Col Hardy Hay 10 Jul 1964–16 Oct 1964 + Col John H. King, Jr 17 Oct 1964– + + _Squadron Commanders_ _Squadron_ _Dates_ + LtCol Archie J. Clapp HMM-362 15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962 + LtCol Robert L. Rathbun HMM-163 1 Aug 1962–11 Jan 1963 + LtCol Reinhardt Leu HMM-162 12 Jan 1963– 7 Jun 1963 + LtCol Frank A. Shook HMM-261 8 Jun 1963– 1 Oct 1963 + LtCol Thomas J. Ross HMM-361 2 Oct 1963–31 Jan 1964 + LtCol John H. La Voy HMM-364 1 Feb 1964–21 Jun 1964 + LtCol Oliver W. Curtis HMM-162 17 Jun 1964– 7 Oct 1964 + LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr HMM-365 8 Oct 1964– + + _Sub Unit Commanders_ _Dates_ + LtCol William W. Eldridge, Jr 15 Apr 1962– 3 Aug 1962 + LtCol Ralph R. Davis 4 Aug 1962–15 Jan 1963 + LtCol George H. Linnemeier 16 Jan 1963– 4 Jul 1963 + LtCol Earl W. Cassidy 5 Jul 1963– 6 Feb 1964 + LtCol Samuel G. Beal 7 Feb 1964–26 Jun 1964 + Maj Marion R. Green 27 Jun 1964–14 Dec 1964 + LtCol Thomas E. Vernon 15 Dec 1964– + + [14-A] SHUFLY was designated Task Unit 79.3.5 from 15 April + 1962 until 6 November 1962; Task Element 79.3.3.6 from 6 + November 1962 through 31 December 1964. + + + + +Appendix B + +Awards and Decorations, Vietnam, through 1964[14-B] + + +_Navy Cross_ + + Maj Donald E. Koelper[14-C] 16 Feb 1964 + SSgt John C. Thompson 30 Apr 1964 + + +_Navy Distinguished Service Medal_ + + MajGen Richard G. Weede[14-D] Feb 1962–May 1964 + MajGen Carl A. Youngdale 25 Jan 1964–20 Jul 1965 + + +_Silver Star Medal_ + + Maj John R. Braddon 27 Apr 1964 + 1stLt Phillip O. Brady 31 Dec 1964 + Capt Franklin P. Eller, Jr 31 Dec 1964 + Capt Joseph N. Smith 27 Oct 1963–25 Apr 1964 + Capt Richard B. Taylor[14-E] 25 Nov 1962–31 Oct 1963 + + +_Legion of Merit_ + + Col Earl E. Anderson 8 Jul 1963–15 May 1964 + LtCol Earl W. Cassidy 2 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964 + Col John F. Carey[14-F] 9 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962 + LtCol Archie J. Clapp[14-G] 15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962 + Col Andre D. Gomez 19 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964 + Col John H. King, Jr 16 Oct 1964–15 May 1965 + LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr 7 Oct 1964–18 Feb 1965 + LtCol John H. La Voy 1 Feb 1964–22 Jun 1964 + Col Robert A. Merchant 2 Jan 1964–10 Jul 1964 + LtCol Clarence C. Moody, Jr 18 Jan 1962–24 Oct 1963 + Col Wesley C. Noren 13 Oct 1963–13 Sep 1964 + LtCol Thomas J. Ross 1 Oct 1963–31 Jan 1964 + Col Roy H. Thompson 27 Feb 1962–16 Jun 1964 + Col Charles E. Warren 8 Feb 1962– 9 Jul 1964 + Col Edwin B. Wheeler 1 Aug 1964–23 Aug 1965 + + +_Distinguished Flying Cross_ + + Maj Albert N. Allen 27 Apr 1964 + Capt William J. Burrows 27 Apr 1964 + Capt Charles E. Cannon 27 Apr 1964 + Capt William Cunningham 27 Apr 1964 + 1stLt Ronald V. Debrincat 27 Apr 1964 + Capt George H. Dunn II 27 Apr 1964 + Capt George H. Dunn II 30 Apr 1964 + Capt Robert K. Ervi 31 Dec 1963 + 1stLt Melvin T. Graves 27 Apr 1964 + Capt Theodore A. Heister 1 Aug 1963 + 1stLt Donald A. Hodgen[14-H] 10 Mar 1963–11 Mar 1963 + LtCol John H. La Voy 27 Apr 1964 + Capt Peter A. Love 27 Apr 1964 + WO Dennis T. McKee 27 Apr 1964 + 1stLt Edward P. Moore 27 Apr 1964 + CWO Robert F. Patton 5 Jun 1964 + 1stLt Thomas H. Peters[14-I] 9 Mar 1963–10 Mar 1963 + Capt Eugene W. Rawlins 27 Apr 1964 + Capt Howard G. Taylor 27 Apr 1964 + 1stLt Charles R. Upshaw 27 Apr 1964 + Capt William W. Wamel, Jr. 27 Apr 1964 + Capt William W. Wamel, Jr. 30 Apr 1964 + Maj Goodell P. Warren 27 Apr 1964 + 1stLt Charles C. Wood, Jr. 27 Apr 1964 + Capt Grant T. Yule 27 Apr 1964 + + +_Bronze Star Medal_ + + SSgt John Baran 12 Dec 1964 + LtCol Samuel G. Beal 3 Feb 1964– 1 Jul 1964 + SSgt Clifford J. Beaver 30 Dec 1964–31 Dec 1964 + LtCol George A. Brigham 3 Apr 1964– 3 Jul 1964 + SSgt Marvin I. Bryant 12 Oct 1964– 8 Mar 1965 + Cpl Clarence L. Chester 30 Jun 1964 + Capt Don R. Christensen[14-J] 28 Sep 1962–31 Jul 1963 + 2dLt Francis R. Ciccone 16 Oct 1964 + SSgt James A. Coryer 30 Jun 1964 + Maj Alfred J. Croft 1 Feb 1962– 7 Feb 1964 + LtCol Oliver W. Curtis 17 Jun 1964–23 Nov 1964 + LtCol Raymond C. Damm 10 May 1964– 1 Dec 1964 + Maj Alfred M. Gray, Jr. 11 Apr 1964–15 Aug 1964 + Capt James J. Harp 10 Mar 1963–11 Mar 1963 + Cpl Cary F. Janulewicz 9 Dec 1964 + 1stLt Weston L. Johnson 10 Nov 1964 + 2dLt James P. Kelliher 31 Dec 1964 + 1stLt Donald H. Larson 4 Apr 1964– 1 Feb 1965 + GySgt Richard L. Latimer 9 Dec 1964 + Capt John P. Monahan 21 Mar 1964–28 Feb 1965 + Capt James P. McWilliams 2 May 1963– 9 Jun 1964 + GySgt Charles D. Peck 14 Apr 1963–22 Apr 1964 + LCpl James N. Phinney 10 Apr 1964 + LCpl Walter L. Rupp 24 Mar 1964 + GySgt Edmund R. Sewell 20 Sep 1964 + SSgt Cecil C. Stibbens Dec 1962– Dec 1964 + Capt Edward H. Walsh 28 Sep 1964– 1 May 1964 + Maj Charles K. Whitfield 31 Jan 1964–20 Jan 1965 + Capt Frank Zimolzak[14-K] 27 Apr 1962–25 May 1963 + + [14-B] Other awards, such as Navy Commendation Medals, Air + Medals, and Purple Hearts are not included in this list. + + [14-C] First Navy Cross approved for Vietnam. + + [14-D] First Navy Distinguished Service Medal awarded for + Vietnam. + + [14-E] First Silver Star Medal awarded to a Marine for Vietnam. + + [14-F] First Legions of Merit awarded to USMC personnel for + Vietnam. + + [14-G] First Legions of Merit awarded to USMC personnel for + Vietnam. + + [14-H] First Distinguished Flying Crosses approved for USMC + personnel in Vietnam. + + [14-I] First Distinguished Flying Crosses approved for USMC + personnel in Vietnam. + + [14-J] One of the first two Bronze Star Medals (approved the + same date) for USMC personnel in Vietnam. + + [14-K] One of the first two Bronze Star Medals (approved the + same date) for USMC personnel in Vietnam. + + + + +Appendix C + +Glossary of Acronyms + + + AHOC Aviation Headquarters Operations Center + ARVN Army of The Republic of Vietnam + ASOC Air Support Operation Center + BLT Battalion Landing Team + CG Civil Guard + ChMAAG Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group + CIDG Civil Irregular Defense Group + CinCPac Commander in Chief, Pacific + CIP Counter Insurgency Plan + ComUSMACV Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam + COSVN Central Office for South Vietnam + CTZ Corps Tactical Zone + DMZ Demilitarized Zone + DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) + FAC Forward Air Controller + FEC French Expeditionary Corps + FMFPac Fleet Marine Force, Pacific + GCA Ground Controlled Approach (system) + GVN Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam) + HMM Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron + ICC International Control Commission + JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff + JGS Joint General Staff (Vietnamese) + JRO Job Related Orientation (Program) + JTF Joint Task Force + LSG Logistics Support Group + MABS Marine Air Base Squadron + MAG Marine Aircraft Group + MATCU Marine Airfield Traffic Control Unit + MAW Marine Aircraft Wing + MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade + MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit + MR Military Region + NLF National Liberation Front + OJT On-The-Job Training (Program) + PAVN Peoples Army of Vietnam + PF Popular Forces + RF Regional Forces + RLT Regimental Landing Team + RSSZ Rung Sat Special Zone + RVN Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) + RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces + SAR Search and Rescue + SDC Self Defense Corps + SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization + SLF Special Landing Force + TACAN Tactical Air Navigation (system) + TAFDS Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System + TERM Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission + TRIM Training Relations Instruction Mission + USMAAG (MAAG) U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group + USMACThai U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand + USOM U.S. Operations Mission + VC Viet Cong + VMGR Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron + VNA Vietnamese National Army + VNAF Vietnamese Air Force + VNMC Vietnamese Marine Corps + + + + +Appendix D + +Chronology + + +1954 + + 7 May--French garrison at Dien Bien Phu surrenders to Viet Minh. + + 16 Jun--Ngo Dinh Diem named premier of Vietnam by French-sponsored + emperor, Bao Dai. + + 20 Jul--French and Viet Minh representatives sign Geneva + cease-fire. Vietnam is divided into northern and southern zones + pending reunification elections to be held in 1956. + + 2 Aug--LtCol Victor J. Croizat, USMC, arrives in South Vietnam + for duty with USMAAG. + + 8 Sep--Manila Pact signed by U.S. and seven other nations. Within + weeks (Sep 1954) the Manila Pact is transformed into the + Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). + + 13 Oct--Premier Diem decrees the establishment of a 1,137-man + Marine Corps (VNMC). + + +1955 + + Feb--LtCol Croizat becomes first advisor to VNMC. + + Apr--Sect rebellion threatens to topple the Diem government. Marine + Landing Battalion deploys to the Mekong Delta. + + 31 May--Diem names Major Le Quang Trong as Senior Marine Officer + of VNMC. + + Sep--Two USMC advisors, a captain and a technical sergeant, are + assigned to the USMAAG, Vietnam, for duty with the VNMC. + + 23 Oct--Premier Diem receives 98 percent of South Vietnamese vote + during a national referendum in which he was opposed by Bao Dai. + + 26 Oct--Ngo Dinh Diem proclaims the Republic of Vietnam and + becomes the republic’s first president. + + +1956 + + 18 Jan--Diem appoints Major Phan Van Lieu as Senior Officer of + VNMC. + + Feb--Marine Landing Battalion returns to garrison at Nha Trang. VNMC + reorganized into two landing battalions, a 4.2-inch mortar + company, and a small headquarters. + + Jun--LtCol William N. Wilkes, Jr., replaces LtCol Croizat as Senior + Marine Advisor to VNMC. + + Jul--Election deadline for reunification of northern and southern + zones passes without serious incident. + + Aug--Diem appoints Captain Bui Pho Chi as Senior Officer of VNMC. + + Oct--Diem appoints Major Le Nhu Hung as Senior Officer of VNMC. + + Nov--LtGen Samuel T. Williams, USA, relieves LtGen John O’Daniel as + Chief USMAAG, Vietnam. + + +1958 + + Jun--LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., relieves LtCol Wilkes as Senior + Marine Advisor to VNMC. + + +1959 + + May--1st VNMC Landing Battalion conducts operations against Viet + Cong in An Xuyen Province while 2d Landing Battalion conducts + similar operation against Communist guerrillas in Vinh Binh + Province. + + 1 Jun--The VNMC is expanded to a Marine Corps Group of 2,276 + officers and men. A 3d Landing Battalion is formed and the + battalions are reorganized into four infantry companies. + + +1960 + + Jun--LtCol Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr., relieves LtCol Wilkinson as + Senior Marine Advisor to VNMC. + + Sep--LtGen Lionel C. McGarr, USA, relieves LtGen Williams as Chief + USMAAG, Vietnam. + + 11 Nov--An abortive attempt by ARVN paratroops and two Marine + companies to overthrow the Diem Government. + + 20 Dec--The Communist “National Front for Liberation of South + Vietnam” was formed. + + +1961 + + May--On The Job Training (OJT) program for USMC junior officers and + staff noncommissioned officers is initiated. Thereafter, 20 + Marines per month enter Vietnam to observe operations. + + 16 May--A 14 nation conference on the deteriorating Laotian + situation convenes at Geneva. + + Jul--VNMC again reorganized and expanded. The addition of a fourth + infantry battalion and a 75mm pack howitzer battery raises the + strength of the VNMC to 3,321. + + Aug--LtCol Robert E. Brown relieves LtCol Robichaud as Senior Marine + Advisor to VNMC. + + Aug--VNMC battalion conducts operations in the inundated U Minh + Forest region of the Ca Mau Peninsula. + + Nov--General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (ret.), President Kennedy’s + special military advisor, visits South Vietnam on fact-finding + mission. + + 11 Dec--The first direct support contingent of U.S. military + forces arrives in Vietnam--400 Army Troops and two helicopter + companies. + + Dec--USMAAG approves plan for new 18-man Marine Advisory Division. + + +1962 + + 1 Jan--VNMC expanded to 6,109 officers and men, and redesignated + the Vietnamese Marine Brigade. A new amphibious support + battalion is formed. + + 3 Jan--First element of USAF transport aircraft arrive in South + Vietnam to support government forces. + + Jan--Detachment A, 1st Radio Company, FMF arrives in Vietnam for duty + with Army communications unit. + + 20 Jan--CinCPac authorizes all MAAG advisors to accompany their + Vietnamese units into combat. + + 3 Feb--President Diem issues decree formalizing initiation of the + Strategic Hamlet Program. + + 8 Feb--U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV) + activated in Saigon with General Paul D. Harkins as commander. + MajGen Richard G. Weede, USMC, becomes MACV’s first chief of + staff. + + 7 Feb--Vietnamese Air Force fighters bomb and strafe the + Presidential Palace in Saigon but fail to injure President Diem. + + 9 Apr--The leading elements of Marine Task Unit 79.3.5 (SHUFLY), + commanded by Col John F. Carey, arrive at Soc Trang, Republic + of Vietnam. + + 15 Apr--HMM-362 (Reinforced), a Marine medium transport helicopter + squadron, arrives at Soc Trang to begin operations in support + of government forces. + + 22 Apr--HMM-362 helicopters fly their first combat support + missions in Vietnam. + + 9 May--Eight Marine helicopters hit by small arms fire during + landing on Ca Mau Peninsula. + + 18 May--The 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit (3d MEU) began moving + into position at Udorn, Thailand, in response to the + deteriorating situation in Laos. The 3d MEU was part of Joint + Task Force 116, organized for use in the mounting crisis. + + 20 May--BGen Ormond R. Simpson assumes command of 3d MEU. + + 18 Jun--Eagle Flight first employed in combat by Marine + helicopters operating from Soc Trang. + + 25 Jun--HMM-162 replaces HMM-261 at Udorn as 3d MEW (MEB) + helicopter element. + + 1 Jul--First Marine Combat units withdraw from Udorn, Thailand, + as a display of good faith. + + 23 Jul--An agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of Laos is signed + by the U.S., the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Vietnam, + and 10 other nations at Geneva. + + 30 Jul--Col Julius W. Ireland relieves Col Carey as SHUFLY + commander. + + 31 Jul--Last Marine combat units withdrawn from Udorn, Thailand. + + 1 Aug--HMM-163 replaces HMM-362 as operational squadron assigned + to SHUFLY. + + Aug--First machine guns mounted on Marine helicopters operating in + Vietnam. + + 4 Sep--Initial SHUFLY elements begin displacing to Da Nang in I + Corps Tactical Zone. + + 18 Sep--HMM-163 conducts first combat operations in I Corps. + + 20 Sep--All SHUFLY elements are in place at Da Nang. + + Oct--LtCol Clarence G. Moody relieves LtCol Brown as Senior Marine + Advisor to VNMC. + + 6 Oct--Five Marines and two U.S. Navy personnel killed in HUS + crash near Tam Ky. + + 7 Nov--HMM-163 executes first tiger flight reaction force mission + in I Corps. + + Nov--All Marine Corps aircraft redesignated. + + 6 Nov--Marine Task Unit (SHUFLY) redesignated Task Element + 79.3.3.6. + + 6 Nov--LtCol Alton W. McCully assumes command of SHUFLY. + + Dec--Vietnamese Joint General Staff realigns South Vietnam’s Corps + Tactical Zones, creating a fourth CTZ and a Capital Military + District. + + +1963 + + 11 Jan--HMM-162 replaces HMM-163 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron. + + 19 Jan--HMM-162 conducts its first combat troop lift in Vietnam. + + 10–13 Mar--HMM-162 helicopters participate in search and rescue + attempts for U.S. Army OV-1 Mohawk and crew. Two Marine + helicopters crash in high mountains of northern II Corps. + + 13 Apr--Marine transport helicopters conduct first operation with + U.S. Army UH-1B armed helicopters. + + Apr--Organization of Marine Advisory Division modified slightly. + + 1 May--Provisional Marine Brigade joins ARVN forces for operation + in Do Xa base area. + + 8 Jun--HMM-261 replaces HMM-162 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron. + + 15–16 Aug--HMM-261 helilifts 2d ARVN Division units from field to + culminate operation LAM SON XII. + + 21 Aug--Vietnamese National Police raid Buddhist pagodas + throughout South Vietnam. + + Sep--LtCol Wesley C. Noren relieves LtCol Moody as Senior Marine + Advisor to VNMC. + + 2 Oct--HMM-361 replaces HMM-261 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron. + + Oct--Provisional Marine Regiment conducts operation PHI-HOA 5 in Gia + Dinh Province. + + 1 Nov--Diem government overthrown by coup of military leaders. + Diem and brother Ngo Dinh Nhu assassinated. + + 14 Nov--Provisional Marine Regiment launches Operation DAI-PHONG + 28 and 29 in III Corps Tactical Zone. + + 25 Nov--2d VNMC Battalion participates in Operation DAI-PHONG 30. + + 16 Dec--LtCol Khang relieved as Commandant of Vietnamese Marine + Corps. Replaced by LtCol Nguyen Ba Lien. + + +1964 + + 1 Jan--General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., relieves General David + Shoup as Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps. + + Jan--General Greene visits Vietnam. + + 15 Jan--BGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC, becomes MACV Assistant Chief + of Staff for Intelligence (J-2). + + 1 Feb--HMM-364 replaces HMM-361 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron. + + Feb--Col Khang recalled from Philippines and relieves LtCol Lien as + Commandant of VNMC. + + Mar--LtGen Victor H. Krulak relieves LtGen Carson A. Roberts as + Commanding General, FMFPac. + + 27 Apr--HMM-364 participates in Operation SURE WIND 202 in + northern II Corps. + + May--MajGen Weede, USMC, relieved as MACV Chief of Staff. + + 15 May--USMAAG abolished. Marine Advisory Division renamed Marine + Advisory Unit and placed under Naval Advisory Group, MACV. + + 20 May--Marine Advisory Team One arrives at Da Nang. + + 7 Jun--Two Marines from SHUFLY compound reported missing south of + Da Nang. + + 13 Jun--Advisory Team One moves to Tiger Tooth Mountain in + northwestern I Corps. + + 19 Jun--HMM-364 turn over helicopters and maintenance equipment to + VNAF 217th Squadron. + + 21 Jun--HMM-162 replaces HMM-364 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron. + + Jul--Vietnamese Marine Recruit Training Center opens at Thu Due. VNMC + expanded with the creation of a fifth infantry battalion. + + 7 Jul--HMM-162 participates in relief of Nam Dong Special Forces + Camp. + + 2–5 Aug--North Vietnamese patrol boats and U.S. ships clash in + Tonkin Gulf. + + 6 Aug--U.S. Congress passes Tonkin Gulf resolution. + + 11 Aug--President Johnson signs the so-called Tonkin Gulf + Resolution. + + 19 Aug--Advisory Team One moves to Bach Ma and continues + operations. + + 4 Sep--Col William P. Nesbit replaces Col Noren as Senior Marine + Advisor to VNMC. + + 13 Sep--Advisory Team One dissolved, departs Vietnam. + + 14 Sep--SHUFLY aircraft flown to safety in face of severe tropical + storm. + + Sep--Marine Advisory Unit reorganized and expanded. + + 8 Oct HMM-365 replaces HMM-364 as SHUFLY’s operational squadron. + + Oct--Marine reconnaissance element conducts survey of Cam Ranh Bay in + southern II Corps. + + 31 Dec--Viet Cong terrorist bomb American BOQ in Saigon. + + 31 Dec--4th VNMC Battalion defeated at Binh Gia in III Corps. + + + + +Appendix E + +List of Reviewers + + + _General Officers_ + Gen Earl E. Anderson, USMC + Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC (Ret.) + Gen David M. Shoup, USMC (Ret.) + LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret.) + LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC (Ret.) + LtGen Carson A. Roberts, USMC (Ret.) + LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC (Ret.) + LtGen Richard G. Weede, USMC (Ret.) + MajGen Norman Anderson, USMC (Ret.) + MajGen Paul J. Fontana, USMC (Ret.) + MajGen Charles J. Timmes, U.S. Army (Ret.) + MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.) + MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.) + BGen Joseph Koler, Jr., USMC + + _Colonels_ + Col Frederick S. Aldridge, USMC (Ret.) + Col Samual Beal, USMC (Ret.) + Col John T. Breckinridge, USMC + Col Harold F. Brown, USMC (Ret.) + Col John F. Carey, USMC (Ret.) + Col Archie J. Clapp, USMC (Ret.) + Col Alfred J. Croft, USMC + Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.) + Col Oliver W. Curtis, USMC (Ret.) + Col Raymond C. Damm, USMC + Col Andre Gomez, USMC (Ret.) + Col Hardy Hay, USMC (Ret.) + Col Julius W. Ireland, USMC (Ret.) + Col John H. La Voy, USMC (Ret.) + Col Reinhardt Leu, USMC (Ret.) + Col Robert A. Merchant, USMC (Ret.) + Col Ross S. Mickey, USMC (Ret.) + Col Clarence G. Moody, Jr., USMC + Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.) + Col Wesley C. Noren, USMC (Ret.) + Col Robert L. Rathbum, USMC (Ret.) + Col Thomas J. Ross, USMC (Ret.) + Col Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr., USMC (Ret.) + Col Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., USMC (Ret.) + + _Lieutenant Colonels_ + LtCol Robert E. Brown, USMC (Ret.) + LtCol Earl W. Cassidy, USMC (Ret.) + LtCol Michael J. Gott, USMC + LtCol George H. Linnemeier, USMC (Ret.) + LtCol James P. McWilliams, USMC + LtCol Joseph N. Smith, USMC + + _CMC Advisory Committee on Marine Corps History_ + Col Frederick S. Aldridge, USMC (Ret.)[14-L] + MajGen Norman Anderson, USMC (Ret.)[14-M] + Dr. Gordon A. Craig + Dr. Philip K. Lundeberg + Mr. Robert L. Sherrod + MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.)[14-N] + + _Others_ + Center of Military History, Department of the Army + Dr. Philip A. Crowl + Capt Joseph Drachnik, U.S. Navy (Ret.) + Naval Historical Division, Department of the Navy + Office of Air Force History, Department of the Air Force + + [14-L] Cited previously. + + [14-M] Cited previously. + + [14-N] Cited previously. + + + + +Index + + + Adams, LtCol Harold W., 89–90, 92–94 + + Africa, 11 + + Agroville Program, 45 + + Aircraft + Types + AD-6, _See_ A1-H + A1-H (Skyraider), 71, 116, 137, 149, 152–154, 158–159 + A-4C, (Skyhawk), 89, 92 + B-26, 109, 117–118 + B-57, 166–167 + F4U (Corsair), 71 + F-100 (Super Sabre), 90 + C-117 (Skytrain), 60–61, 84, 160 + C-124 (Globemaster), 71 + C-123 (Provider), 46, 90, 103, 139, 141 + CH-21 (Shawnee), 58, 103, 107 + CV-2 (Caribou), 158 + GV-1. _See_ KC-130 + H-21. _See_ CH-21 + HUS-1. _See_ UH-34D + KC-130 (Hercules), 61, 70, 73, 89–90, 93–94, 112–114, 142, 147, + 156 + O-1B (Bird Dog), 60, 67–69, 73, 82, 84, 92, 107, 115–118, + 144–145, 149, 154, 157–159, 161 + OE-1. _See_ O-1B + OV-1 (Mohawk), 114 + R4D. _See_ C-117 + T-28 (Trojans), 46, 67, 71, 116–118, 120, 149 + U-10 (Super Courier), 118, 149, 152, 158 + UH-1B (Iroquois), 107, 109, 115–120, 139, 147–149, 151–152, 154, + 157–159, 164–165 + UH-34D, 57–58, 65, 71, 84, 89, 92–93, 103, 105, 111, 113–121, 139, + 144–146, 149, 151–161, 164–165 + UH-37 (Mojave), 149 + + Air Force, 46, 62, 71, 76, 82, 112, 114–115, 117, 149, 152, + 158–159, 167 + + Air Force Command and Staff College, 120 + + Air Support Operations Center, 80, 82, 117–119, 149, 152 + + Allied Training Operations Mission, 16 + + Alsop, Maj William F., 164 + + Amphibious Ready Group, 59, 88–90 + + Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5), 61–62 + + Andaman Sea, 3 + + Anderson, Col Earl E., 47, 131, 146 + + Anderson, Cpl Thomas E., 83 + + An Diem, 144, 147, 158 + + Annam, 3, 9, 11–12, 78 + + Annamese Coast, 8, 162 + + Annamite Mountains, 6, 80, 103, 139 + + Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, 27 + + An Xuyen Province, 31, 49, 71, 133 + + Armed Services Committee, 146 + + Army, 23, 26, 42, 46, 62, 80, 83, 117, 136, 152, 154, 157–158 + Units + 27th Infantry Brigade, 88, 90 + 52d Aviation Battalion, 155 + 145th Aviation Battalion, 107 + 33d Helicopter Company, 57, 59 + 57th Helicopter Company, 65, 70–71 + 68th Aviation Company, 115 + 81st Helicopter Company, 58–59 + 93d Helicopter Company, 58, 73–74 + 704th Counterintelligence Unit, 141 + 3d Radio Research Unit, 46 + Paratroopers, 70 + Special Forces, 80, 111, 114, 151, 155, 157 + + Army Communications Station, Phu Bai, 139 + + Army Communications Station, Pleiku, 139 + + Army Field Hospital, Nha Trang, 148, 157, 159 + + Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, NC, 41, 47 + + A Shau Valley, 149 + + Asia, 12 + + Associated States of Indochina, 11 + + Atsugi, Japan, 61 + + Australia, 14, 165 + + Aviation Headquarters Operations Center, 117 + + + Bach Phoung XI, 103, 105, 116 + + Baker, Col Warren P., 143 + + Bangkok, Thailand, 88–89, 93, 143 + + Ban Me Thuot, 9, 49 + + Bassac River, 65 + + Ba Xuyen Province, 61, 67 + + Beal, LtCol Samuel G., 146, 156 + + Beaver, SSgt Clifford J., 137 + + Becker, Raymond A., 141 + + Beirut, Lebanon, 146 + + Bell Helicopter Company, 115 + + Ben Hai River, 12 + + Ben Tre, 70 + + Bien Hoa, 105, 107, 166 + + Binh Dinh Province, 129 + + Binh Duong Province, 45, 107 + + Binh Gia, 136–138, 143, 166 + + Binh Thuan Province, 49, 51 + + Binh Xuyen, 13, 18–20, 26 + + Braddon, Maj John R., 153 + + Brady, Lt Philip O., 137–138 + + Breckinridge, Capt James T., 19–20, 23 + + Brigham, LtCol George, 152 + + British Advisory Mission, 45 + + Bronars, Maj Edward J., 142 + + Bronze Star, 110, 148 + + Brown, LtCol Harold F., 111–112 + + Brown, LtCol Robert E., 36, 48–49, 53 + + Buddhist, 8, 99 + + Burma, 3, 93 + + + Cai Ngai, 67 + + California, 59, 70 + + Ca Mau, 40, 65, 67, 69–71 + + Ca Mau Peninsula, 11, 36, 62, 101 + + Cambodia, 3, 8–9, 11–12, 14, 30, 67, 93, 109 + + Cambodian Border, 107 + + Campbell, Cpl Charley M., 115 + + Cam Ranh Bay, 22, 31, 141 + + Canada, 12, 93 + + Can Tho, 9, 62, 65 + + Cao Dai, 8, 13, 18–19 + + Cape St. Jacques, 36 + + Capital Military District, 84, 105, 132 + + Carey, Col John F., 60–61, 63, 69–71, 73 + + Cassidy, LtCol Earl W., 112, 144, 146 + + Catholicism, 8, 12–13, 99 + + Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, 28 + + Central Highlands, 6, 9, 32, 49, 53, 105, 129, 167 + + Central Office for South Vietnam, 44–45 + + Chai Doc, 65 + + Chams, 6 + + Chien Tang (“Struggle for Victory”) Plan, 129 + + Chi, Capt Bui Pho, 19, 23 + + China, 3, 11–13, 93, 96, 161 + + Chinese, 6, 8 + + Chinese Nationalist Forces, 9, 11 + + CHINH BIEN, 159 + + Cholon District, 13 + + Christanity, 3, 8 + + Christensen, Capt Don R., 49, 101, 103, 110 + + Civil Guard, 27–28, 30–32, 34, 45, 67, 129 + + Civilian Irregular Defense Group, 80, 139, 144, 157 + + Clapp, LtCol Archie J., 60–62, 65, 67, 69–70, 156 + + Clark Air Force Base, Philippines, 90 + + Cochinchina, 3, 8, 11 + + Cold War, 86 + + Collins, Gen James F., CinCUSARPac, 58 + + Collins, Gen J. Lawton, 15 + + Command and Staff Training Course, 41–42 + + Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, 94, 144, 155 + + Condon, MajGen John P., 59–61, 73, 88 + + Confucianism, 8 + + Conway, MajGen J. F., 88 + + Cook, Capt Donald G., 138 + + Corps Tactical Zones + I Corps, 46, 58, 63, 73, 76, 78–80, 82–85, 103, 111, 113–114, + 116–118, 120, 127, 132, 139, 142, 144, 146, 148–149, 152, + 154–162, 164–165 + II Corps, 46, 49, 58, 63, 79–80, 84, 102–103, 111, 114, 129, 132, + 141, 152, 154–155, 160, 167 + III Corps, 58–59, 61–63, 67, 69, 71, 73–74, 107, 109, 129, 132, 136 + IV Corps, 84, 132 + + Counter-Insurgency Plan, 29–30 + + Counterguerrilla Warfare Study Group, 41 + + Croft, Maj Alfred J., 49, 51, 103 + + Croizat, LtCol Victor J., 16, 18–20, 22–23, 32, 90, 132 + + Cronin, LtCol Angus J., 93 + + Cross of Valor, 156 + + Cua Viet, 78 + + Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Philippines, 89 + + Curtis, LtCol Oliver W., 156–159, 161–162 + + Cushman, MajGen Robert E., 41–42 + + Cuu Long, 36 + + Cuu Long Navy Yard, 31–32 + + + Dai, Emperor Bao, 8, 11–13, 19 + + DAI-PHONG 28, 107 + + DAI-PHONG 29, 107 + + DAI-PHONG 30, 107, 109 + + DAI-PHONG 31, 109 + + Dak To, 155 + + Damm, Maj Raymond C., 131, 142, 166 + + Da Nang, 9, 32, 58, 71, 73–76, 78–80, 83–85, 103, 111–118, + 120–121, 123, 129, 139, 141–149, 154–162, 164–165, 167 + + Da Nang Harbor, 78, 111 + + Da Nang River, 78 + + DA NANG SIX, 164 + + Davis, Capt Dale N., 31 + + Davis, LtCol Ralph R., 71, 111 + + Davis, BGen Raymond G., 129 + + Declaration of Neutrality of Laos, 93 + + Dees, LtCol Harry C., 71 + + Delayen, Capt Jean Louis, 17, 19 + + Demilitarized Zone, 13, 27–29, 76, 78, 111 + + Democratic Republic of Vietnam. _See_ North Vietnam + + Department of Defense, 42, 47, 61, 76, 84, 144 + + Department of State, 15, 19, 28 + + Dickinson, LtCol Harry E., 143 + + Diem, President Ngo Dinh, 8, 12–16, 18–20, 22–23, 26–32, 35–36, 42, + 45, 53, 80, 99–100, 105, 121–122, 127, 146 + + Dien Bien Phu, 12, 71 + + Distinguished Flying Cross, 59, 111, 120, 156 + + Distinguished Service Medal, 131 + + Don, MajGen Tran Van, 79–80 + + Dong Bach Ma, 141 + + Dong Ha, 9, 78 + + Dong Nai boats, 101 + + Donlon, Capt Roger H. C., 157–158 + + Do Xa Base Area, 103, 105, 115–116, 121, 152, 155 + + Dulles, Secretary of State John Foster, 14 + + + Eagle Flight, 69–70, 83 + + Eisenhower, President Dwight D., 14–15, 29 + + Eldridge, LtCol William W., 60–61, 71 + + Eller, Capt Franklin P., 137–138 + + Ely, Gen Paul, 15–16 + + Europe, 11 + + + Father-For-A-Day Program, 85 + + Felt, Adm Harry D., 47, 57–58, 86, 88, 90 + + FLAMING DART, 167 + + Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 40, 42, 58, 70, 76, 83, 90, 94, 141, + 143, 147, 165. + _See Also_ Marine Corps, FMF Units + + Fontana, MajGen Paul J., 156, 160 + + Fort Ord, California, 57, 59 + + Forward Air Controller, 72, 107, 109 + + France, 8, 9, 11–14, 19, 22, 93 + + French Expeditionary Corps, 9, 11–16 + + French High Command, 16, 22, 24 + + French-Indochina, 9, 11, 15 + + French-Indochina War, 13–14, 16, 22–24, 36, 48, 103 + + French Navy, 16 + + French Union, 11 + + Futema, Okinawa, 61 + + + General Commission for Refugees, 16 + + Geneva Conference, 12–16, 25, 27, 86, 88, 93–94, 121, 132 + + German Army, 70 + + Gia Dinh Province, 105, 132 + + Giap, Gen Vo Nyguyen, 11–12 + + Gi Lang, 152, 154 + + Go Cong, 132–133 + + Gomez, Col Andre D., 112, 117, 119–120, 144, 146 + + Gott, Capt Michael J., 37 + + Gray, Maj Alfred M., 139, 141, 156, 158 + + Great Britain, 9, 12, 14, 93 + + Green, Maj Marion R., 156 + + Greene, Gen Wallace M., Jr., 142, 145–146 + + Greer, PFC Robert L., 155–156 + + Griffin, Lt Gerald, 83 + + Ground Control Approach, 60 + + Guadalcanal, 22, 35 + + Gulf of Siam, 3, 88 + + Gulf of Tonkin, 6, 78, 128–129, 158, 166–167 + + + Haiphong, 16 + + Hai Van Peninsula, 78, 83 + + Hamilton, Sgt Richard E., 83 + + Hanoi, 11–12, 29 + + Harkins, Gen Paul D., 46–47, 57–59, 61–62, 73, 88, 99, 127, 146 + + Hau Nghia Province, 107 + + Hawaii, 47, 59, 90, 141–142, 146 + + Hay, Col Hardy, 158, 160–161 + + Heim, Lt Robert P., 162 + + Hiep Hoa Special Forces Camp, 107, 109 + + Hoa Hao, 8, 13, 18–19 + + Hoa My, 83 + + Ho Chi Minh. _See_ Minh, Ho Chi + + Ho Chi Minh Trail, 80 + + Hoi An, 9, 78 + + Hoi Dong Sam, 107, 109 + + Honolulu Conference, 46 + + Hop Tac Program, 129, 132, 136 + + Hudson, LtCol Robert S., 93 + + Hue, 9, 12, 16, 78–79, 82, 99, 113, 119 + + Hughes, Capt Virgil R., 116 + + Hugo, Victor, 8 + + Hung, Maj Le Nhu, 23, 31, 35 + + + India, 93 + + Indian Ocean, 3, 12 + + Indochina, 3, 11–12, 16, 35, 62, 166 + + Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 146 + + Infantry Unit Training Course, 41 + + Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets, 45. + _See Also_ Strategic Hamlet Program + + International Control Commission, 12, 30. + _See Also_ Canada, India, and Poland + + Interzone V, 44 + + Ireland, Col Julius W., 71, 73, 75–76, 79, 83, 85, 112 + + Irwin, Capt William R., 141 + + Iwo Jima, 62 + + + Japan, 8–9, 11, 62, 71 + + Jeep, M-442 “Mighty Mite,” 112 + + Job Related Orientation Program, 143 + + Johnson, President Lyndon B., 127, 166–167 + + Johore, Malaya, 41 + + Joint Chiefs of Staff, 51, 53, 57, 59, 88, 127, 142, 155 + + Joint General Staff, 20, 22, 31–32, 35–36, 40, 82, 84, 100, 102, 109, + 111, 132, 149 + + Joint Operations Center, 62–63, 82 + + Joint Operations Evaluation Group, 47 + + Joint Task Force 116, 86, 88–90. + _See Also_ Marine Corps, FMF Units + + Joint U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group, Thailand, 88, 90 + + Jones, Capt Robert C., 100 + + Jungle Warfare School, 41 + + + Kelliher, Lt James P., 137 + + Kennedy, President John F., 30, 36, 42–44, 57, 86, 88, 93, 127 + + Kham Duc, 159, 161 + + Khang, BGen Le Nguyen, 35–36, 49, 53, 100–103, 105, 109–110, 132, 138 + + Khanh, MajGen Nguyen, 103, 127, 129, 132 + + Ke Sanh, 139, 141, 155–156, 158 + + Khmers, 6 + + Khrushchev, Premier Nikita, 30 + + Kien Giang Province, 18 + + King, Col John H., Jr., 161–164 + + Koler, LtCol Joseph, Jr., 161–162, 165 + + Kontum, 9, 79, 103 + + Kontum Province, 103, 155, 167 + + Korat, Thailand, 88, 90 + + Korean War, 15, 35, 47–48, 59, 70, 111, 116, 120, 131, 146, 156, 161 + + Ky, Vice Air Marshal Nguyen Cao, 156 + + + LAM SON XII, 117 + + LAM SON, 115, 149 + + Laos, 3, 9, 11–12, 14, 29–30, 80, 86, 88, 92–94, 139, 155, 166 + + Laotian Border, 78, 80, 117–119, 121, 147, 149, 157, 159 + + La Voy, LtCol John H., 146–147, 149, 151–152, 155–156 + + Legion of Merit, 59, 158 + + Leu, LtCol Reinhardt, 93, 111, 113, 115–116 + + Lien, Lt Col Nguyen Ba, 110, 132 + + Lieu, Maj Pham Van, 20 + + Linnemeier, LtCol George H., 111–112 + + LOCKJAW, 65 + + Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot, 127 + + Logistics Support Group, Thailand, 93 + + Long An, 133 + + Long An Province, 132 + + Long Tao River, 142 + + Loyko, GSgt William A., 49 + + + Malaya, _See_ Malaysia + + Malaysia, 3, 45 + + Mang Buc, 114 + + Manila Pact, 14 + + Mansfield, LCpl James I., 83 + + Mao Tse-tung, 11 + + Marine Corps, 22–25, 34–35, 40–41, 46–48, 53, 57–58, 65, 73–74, 82, + 85, 90, 95, 100, 103, 107, 110–111, 116–117, 121, 123, 136–139, + 142, 156 + FMF Air Units: + 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 59–61, 70, 83, 88, 129, 156, 160–161, + 165 + 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 71, 70 + Task Unit 79.3.5. _See_ SHUFLY + Task Element 79.3.3.6. _See_ SHUFLY + MAG-16, 58, 62, 70, 85, 158, 161 + ProvMAG, 89–90, 92 + MACS-2, 89 + MABS-12, 89 + MABS-16, 60–63, 69–71, 73, 75–76, 88, 111–114, 144, 146, 148, + 155–156, 160 + VMA-211, 89 + VMA-324, 71 + VMA-332, 89, 93 + VMB-443, 146n + VMGR-152, 61, 116, 156 + VMGR-352, 61 + VMO-2, 68 + HMM-161, 161 + HMM-162, 93, 111, 113, 115–116, 156–162 + HMM-163, 70–73, 75, 80, 83, 111, 113, 116 + HMM-261, 61, 89–90, 93, 117–120 + HMM-361, 120–121, 144, 146 + HMM-362, 60–63, 65, 67–71 + HMM-364, 146–147, 149, 151–152, 155–156 + HMM-365, 161–162, 164–165 + MATCU-68, 60, 62 + Task Element 79.3.5.2, 60. + _See also_ MABS-16 + FMF Ground Units + 1st Marine Division, 161 + 3d Marine Division, 40–41, 86, 90, 100, 110, 112, 129, 136–138, + 142, 147–158 + 4th Marine Division, 146 + 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 88, 90, 92–93 + 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 129, 167 + 5th Marines, 47 + 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit, 93–95, 113 + Marine Advisory Unit, Vietnam, 131, 143 + Infantry Battalions + 1/9, 147, 160 + 2/9, 164 + 3/9, 89, 93–94 + Infantry Companies + G/2/3, 139, 141 + K/3/3, 141 + E/2/9, 161 + L/3/9, 164 + Advisory Team One, 139, 141, 155–156, 158 + 1st Radio Company, 46, 139, 141 + Signal Engineering Survey Unit, 139. + _See Also_ 1st Radio Company + Security Detachment, Marine Unit Vietnam, 164 + + Marine Corps Air Facility, Santa Ana, 70 + + Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan, 61 + + Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, 16, 18, 23, 24, 35 + + Marine Corps Junior School, Quantico, 47 + + Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, 100, 136 + + McCully, LtCol Alton W., 71, 84, 111–112 + + McGarr, LtGen Lionel C, 29, 36 + + McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert S., 43, 46, 122, 127, 142 + + McWilliams, Capt James P., 107 + + Medal of Honor, 51, 158 + + Mekong Delta, 3, 6, 8–9, 16, 18–19, 28, 32, 36, 44–45, 57–59, 61–62, + 67, 69, 73–75, 78, 80, 82, 84–85, 113, 116, 121, 132 + + Mekong River, 6, 8, 88 + + Merchant, Col Robert A., 146–149, 152, 154–158 + + Mickey, Col Ross S., 89, 93 + + Middle East, 3, 146 + + Midway, 60 + + Military Assistance Program, 30 + + Military Region 5, 45, 103 + + Military Region 9, 45 + + Minh, MajGen Duong Van, 99 + + Minh, Ho Chi, 11, 29 + + “Minute of Understanding,” 15 + + _Missouri_ (BB-63), 9 + + M-108 Wrecker, 136 + + Monkey Mountain, 141 + + Monroe, Lt Anthony A., 161 + + Montagnards, 6, 103, 111, 157 + + Montgomery, LtCol William, 149 + + Moody, LtCol Clarence G., 48–49, 100–103, 105, 132 + + My Tho, 62, 65, 107 + + + NAMBO Interzone, 44 + + Nam Dong, 155, 157–159 + + Nam Tha, 88 + + National Intelligence Estimate, 29 + + National Liberation Front, 29, 44, 45 + + National War College, 161 + + Navy, 37, 48, 71, 90, 128 + + Navy Cross, 60, 48, 155 + + Navy Mobile Construction Battalion, 93, 112 + + New Life Hamlets. _See_ Hop Tac Program + + Newport, Rhode Island, 131 + + New Zealand, 14 + + Nesbit, Col William P., 131–133, 143 + + Nghiem, BGen LeVan, 61–62, 73 + + Nha Trang, 16, 18–19, 22, 31, 114, 157, 160, 162 + + Nhu, Ngo Dinh, 45–46, 99 + + NIGHTINGALE, 65 + + Nipper, LCpl David, 162 + + Nong Son, 79 + + Nong Ta Kai, Thailand, 90, 92–93 + + Noren, LtCol Wesley C., 105, 107, 110, 131, 132 + + Normandy, France, 70 + + Northern Training Area, Okinawa, 41 + + North Korea, 11, 13, 15 + + North Vietnam, 3, 9, 11–12, 16, 26, 28–29, 44, 80, 86, 93–94, 128, + 155, 166–167 + + North Vietnamese, 27, 29, 30, 88, 103, 121, 129 + + North Vietnamese Army + Units + 32d Regiment, 167 + 101st Regiment, 167 + + Norton, H. G. O., 83 + + Nosavan, Gen Phoumi, 86 + + + O’Daniel, LtGen John M., 15–16, 22 + + Olmen, Lt John D., 115 + + Okinawa, 41, 47, 58, 61–62, 70–71, 74, 76, 85–86, 89–90, 93, 112–113, + 136, 141–144, 146, 156, 161 + + On-The-Job Training Program, 40, 42, 136–137, 142–143 + + Otlowski, Lt Raymond J., 139, 141 + + Oum, Prince Boun, 86 + + + Pacific Ocean, 3 + + Pacifier, _See_ Eagle Flight + + Pakistan, 14 + + Paris, France, 138 + + Parker, Capt Evan L., 49 + + “Passage to Freedom,” 16 + + Pathet Lao, 29, 86, 88 + + Patton, LtCol Harvey M., 89 + + Pendell, Sgt Jerald W., 83 + + People-to-People Program, 71, 74, 85, 92–93 + + People’s Army of Vietnam, 13, 80 + + People’s Republic of China. _See_ China + + Perfume River, 78 + + Phan Rang, 6 + + Phan Thiet, 51 + + PHI-HOA 5, 105 + + Philippines, 12, 14, 59, 61, 89–90, 93, 110, 132 + + Phouma, Prince Souvanna, 86, 88, 93 + + Phu Bai, 139 + + Phouc Thuan Province, 30 + + Phouc Thy Province, 136 + + Phouc Vin, 30 + + Plain of Jars, 86 + + Plain of Reeds, 70 + + Plateau Gi, 103 + + Pleiku, 9, 32, 46, 103, 129, 139, 152, 167 + + _Point Defiance_ (LSD-31), 90 + + Poland, 12, 93 + + Popular Forces, 129 + + Porter, Col Daniel B., Jr., 67, 73–74 + + _Princeton_ (CV-37) (LPH-5), 61–62, 162 + + Purple Heart Medal, 110 + + + Radar, counter-mortar, 164 + + Radios, 61, 68, 149 + + Rathbun, LtCol Robert L., 70–74, 84, 111, 113 + + Red River Delta, 3, 11, 16 + + Regional Forces, 129 + + Republic of Korea. _See_ South Korea + + Republic of Vietnam. _See_ South Vietnam + + Richardson, LtGen John L., 88, 90, 93–94 + + Roberts, MajGen Carson A., 57–58, 70 + + Robichaud, LtCol Clifford J., 35–36 + + Roe, 161 + + ROLLING THUNDER, 167 + + Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 23 + + Ross, LtCol Thomas J., 120, 144–146 + + Route 1, 9, 80, 141 + + Route 9, 9, 80, 139 + + Route 19, 9 + + Royal Marines, 48 + + Royal Thai Regiment, 88 + + Rung Sat, 18–19 + + Rung Sat Special Zone, 142 + + Rupp, LCpl Walter L., 148 + + + Saigon, 8–9, 15–16, 18–19, 28, 30–32, 34–36, 40, 45–48, 51, 53, 58, + 60, 62, 65, 80, 100–102, 105, 107, 121, 129, 131–133, 136, 138, + 141–153, 160, 166 + + Saigon Central Police Headquarters, 18 + + Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone, 45 + + Saigon River, 8 + + St. Clair, Col Howard B., 142 + + Saipan, 47 + + Secretary of Defense, 57, 128, 131 + + Self Defense Corps, 30, 45, 129 + + Seventh Fleet, 59–60, 88, 93–94, 141, 162 + + Schoech, VAdm William A., 59–61 + + Schrenkengost, PFC Fred T., 155–156 + + Shapley, LtGen Alan, 40, 57–58 + + Sheperd, Gen Lemuel C., 16 + + Sheridan, Capt John, 164 + + Shook, LtCol Frank A., 116, 119–120 + + Shoup, Gen David M., 51, 53, 58 + + SHUFLY, 59–62, 65, 69–71, 73–75, 83–86, 92, 111, 113–114, 117, 120, + 121, 139, 141, 142, 144, 146, 157–159, 165 + + Sides, Adm John H., 58–59 + + Silver Star Medal, 110, 138 + + Simpson, BGen Ormand B., 90, 92–95 + + Sinnott, Lt William T., 83 + + Slack, Cpl Richard D., Jr., 162 + + Smith, Capt Joseph N., 107, 109–110 + + Snell, Capt Bradley S., 49 + + SocTrang, 58, 60–63, 65, 67, 70–71, 73–76, 82, 86, 92, 111–113, 144 + + So Huynh Pho, 8 + + Son, MajGen Tran Van, 79 + + Song Cam Lo, 78 + + Song Cau Dai, 78 + + Song Cau Do, 78 + + Song Han, 78 + + Song Huong, 78 + + Song Thu Bonm, 78–79, 115, 162 + + Song Tra Bon, 159 + + Song Tra Bong, 78 + + Song Tra Khuc, 78 + + Song Ve, 78 + + Song Vu Gia, 78, 117 + + Souphanauvong, Prince, 86 + + South China Sea, 3, 6, 8, 78, 84, 141, 167 + + South Korea, 11–13, 15 + + South Vietnam, 3, 6, 8–9, 12, 14–16, 18–19, 22–23, 25, 27–30, 35, 40, + 42–45, 48, 51, 53, 57–58, 61, 65, 68, 70–71, 74, 78–79, 84, + 86, 88, 90, 93–94, 100, 109, 110–111, 119, 121–123, 127–129, + 138–139, 141–144, 152, 155–158, 166–167 + + South Vietnamese Armed Forces, 30, 32, 34, 36, 43, 45–46, 58, 129 + Units + Vietnamese Air Force, 27, 46, 48, 62, 67–69, 72, 80, 82, 105, + 115–120, 137, 144, 146–147, 149, 151–152, 154–156, 158, 162 + Vietnamese Army, 13–16, 18, 22–23, 26–27, 32, 49, 60–61, 63, 65, + 67, 72, 74, 80, 83–84, 103, 105, 110, 112, 116–121, 129, 139, + 141–142, 145, 147–149, 152–153, 155, 157–159, 161, 164–165 + 1st ARVN Division, 79, 111, 113, 115, 142 + 2d ARVN Division, 79, 82–83, 103, 105, 111, 113, 115, 117, 142, + 154, 159 + 5th ARVN Division, 62 + 7th ARVN Division, 62, 65 + 21st ARVN Division, 62, 65, 67, 79–80 + 25th ARVN Division, 79, 103, 111 + Airborne Brigade, 34, 129, 132 + 11th ARVN Regiment, 107 + 43d ARVN Regiment, 51 + Ranger Battalions, 79, 114, 136, 164–166 + Special Forces, 84 + Vietnamese Marine Corps, 16, 18–20, 22–24, 29–30, 32, 34–37, 40, + 47–49, 53, 58, 65, 84, 90, 100, 102–103, 105, 107, 109–110, + 116, 121, 129, 131–133, 136, 138, 142–143, 166 + Amphibious Support Battalion, 136 + 1st Battalion, 16, 18–20, 22–23, 31, 37, 49, 105, 107, 109 + 2d Battalion, 22–23, 31, 35, 49, 101–103, 107, 109–110 + 3d Battalion, 32, 36–37, 53, 105, 107, 109–110 + 4th Battalion, 36, 49, 51, 100–103, 105, 110, 136–138 + 5th Battalion, 133, 138 + Reconnaissance Company, 105 + Training Company, 136 + Artillery Batteries, 51, 100, 105 + Vietnamese Navy, 16, 36–37, 48, 101, 105, 142 + + South Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, 32 + + South Vietnamese Ministry of Interior, 27, 30 + + Southeast Asia, 3, 9, 11, 14, 29, 40–41, 94, 167 + + Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 14, 59, 61, 88, 90 + + Soviet Union, 12–13, 86, 93 + + Sparrow Hawk, _See_ Eagle Flight + + Special Landing Force, 59, 62, 88–89, 162 + + Special Operations Group, 141 + + Steele, Col Fred A., 89–90 + + Stilwell, MajGen Richard G., 131 + + Strategic Hamlet Program, 45–46, 51, 53, 80, 101, 121–122, 129 + + SURE WIND 202, 152, 154–156, 158 + + + Tactical Air Commander Airborne, 149 + + Tactical Air Navigation, 60 + + Tactical Air Support System, 62 + + Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, 60, 62, 69, 73, 75, 82, + 103, 114, 119, 148, 155 + + Takjli, 90 + + Tam Ky, 82–83, 103, 116, 149, 157, 159–161, 165 + + Taoism, 8 + + Tarawa, 51 + + Taylor, Gen Maxwell D., 42–43, 57, 127 + + Taylor, Capt Richard B., 101, 103, 110 + + Tay Ninh Province, 109, 133 + + Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, 26, 30 + + Texas A&M, 158 + + Thailand, 3, 14, 86, 88–90, 92–94, 113, 143 + + Thi, Col Nguyen Chanh, 29, 36 + + Thompson, SSgt John C., 155 + + Thompson, Sir Robert G. K., 45–46 + + Thoung Duc, 117, 119, 151 + + Throckmorton, LtGen John L., 131 + + Thua Thien Province, 76, 111, 115, 149, 157 + + Thu Duc, 36, 53, 100, 107, 136 + + Tien Phouc, 83, 160 + + Tiger Flight. _See_ Eagle Flight + + Tiger Force, 83, 162, 165 + + Tiger Tooth Mountain, (Dong Voi Mep), 139, 141, 155–156, 158 + + Timmes, MajGen Charles J., 47, 57 + + Tonkin, 3, 8–9, 11–12, 16 + + Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 128 + + Tourane, 71. + _See Also_ Da Nang + + Tracy, TSgt Jackson E., 19–20 + + Training Relations Instruction Mission, 16, 19, 22 + + Tra My, 103, 105, 116 + + Trong, Maj Le Quang, 16, 19 + + Tropic of Cancer, 6 + + Truman, President Harry S., 12, 15 + + TULUNGAN, 59–60 + + Tunny, Lt Michael J., 83 + + Turner, Capt James S. G., 37 + + Typhoon Kate, 162 + + Typhoon Tilda, 159–160 + + Typhoon Violet, 159 + + + Udorn, Thailand, 88–90, 92–93, 113, 158 + + U Minh Forest, 36, 40 + + United Front of National Forces, 18 + + United States, 13, 15, 19, 42, 71, 93, 99, 136, 166 + + U.S. Air Force. _See_ Air Force + + U.S. Army. _See_ Army + + U.S. Congress, 12 + + U.S. Embassy, Saigon, 32, 45, 138 + + U.S. Interagency Committee for Province Rehabilitation, 45 + + U.S. Marine Corps. _See_ Marine Corps + + U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, 15–16, 19, 22–24, 26, 29, + 31–32, 35–36, 42, 44, 46–48, 53, 57, 86, 131, 146 + + U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand, 88, 90 + + U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 46–48, 53, 57–63, 67, 73, + 76, 80, 88, 99–100, 117, 127, 131, 139, 141–144, 147, 154–155, + 158, 165, 167 + + U.S. Military Assistance Program, 16 + + U.S. Navy. _See_ Navy + + U.S. Operations Mission, 27 + + + Valentin, LCpl Miguel A., 83 + + _Valley Forge_ (LPH-8), 93, 156 + + Vichy Government, 9 + + Vientiane, Laos, 88, 93 + + Viet Cong, 19, 27–32, 34–37, 40, 43, 45–46, 49, 51, 53, 62–63, 65, + 67, 69–74, 80, 82–83, 99, 101–103, 105, 107, 109–111, 113–116, + 120–123, 127, 129, 136, 138, 141–144, 148–149, 151–153, 155, + 157–159, 161–162, 164–167 + Units + 9th Viet Cong Division, 138 + 4th Viet Cong Battalion, 80 + + Viet Minh, 8, 11–13, 16, 27, 32. + _See Also_ Viet Cong + + Village Self Defense Corps, 27–28 + + Vinh Binh Province, 31 + + Vinh Long, 9, 65 + + Vinson, Lt Richard P., 85 + + Vung Tau, 36, 40, 100, 136 + + + Walker, Maj John W., 142 + + Washington, D.C., 22, 29–30, 42, 46, 121, 128, 141, 143, 167 + + Watson, Cpl Billy S., 74 + + Weapons + Types + AR-15 automatic rifles, 65 + Browning automatic rifles, 22 + 81mm mortars, 32, 164 + 82mm mortars, 137 + 57mm recoilless rifles, 32, 109, 137 + .50 caliber machine guns, 107, 109, 137, 152–154 + 4.2-inch mortars, 22, 32, 60 + Hawk missiles, 167 + Light antiaircraft missiles, 167 + M-14 rifles, 65 + M-1 carbines, 22, 32 + M-1 rifles, 32 + M-16 rifles, 65 + M-60 machine guns, 73, 114–115, 147–149, 162 + M3A1 submachine guns, 65 + 105mm howitzers, 49, 118, 136 + 75mm pack howitzers, 36, 49, 136 + 60mm mortars, 32, 109 + .30 caliber machine guns, 107, 152 + TK-1, 162, 164 + 2.75-inch rockets, 115, 162 + + Webster, Capt David N., 114 + + Weede, MajGen Richard G., 47, 76, 131 + + Weller, MajGen Donald M., 40–41, 86, 90 + + Westmoreland, Gen William C., 127–128, 131, 155, 158, 166 + + Wilder, Capt Gary, 31 + + Wilkes, LtCol William N., Jr., 22–23, 31 + + Wilkinson, LtCol Frank R., Jr., 23, 31, 34–35 + + Williams, LtGen Samuel T., 26–27, 29, 32, 35 + + World War II, 9, 11, 13, 35–37, 40, 47, 51, 59, 62, 70, 75, 111–112, + 120, 131, 146, 156, 161 + + + Yen, Capt Nguyen Thanh, 107, 109 + + Youngdale, BGen Carl A., 131, 166 + + + Zimolzak, Capt Frank, 110 + + +U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977 O-211-623 + + + + +Transcriber’s Notes + + +Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a +predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they +were not changed. + +Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation +marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left +unbalanced. + +Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs and +outside quotations. + +The original book uses bottom-of-page footnotes and end-of-volume +endnotes. In this ebook, the footnotes have been moved directly +below the paragraphs that reference them, and their symbols have +been replaced by letters, so as to be unique within the eBook, while +retaining the original physical sequence. The endnotes remain in their +original positions, and their numbers have been modified to be unique +within the eBook. The modifications are intended to allow successful +hyper-linking in HTML and ereaders that support such links. + +The modified footnote numbering uses chapter numbers and sequences +within those chapters. The bottom-of-page sequences are alphabetic, +while the endnote sequences retain their original numeric values. + +In the original book, several footnotes were referenced multiple times. +In this eBook, those footnotes have been duplicated and assigned new, +unique letters, so that the references lead to separate footnotes. This +is intended to facilitate back-linking from the footnotes to their +references. + +The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page +references. + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75912 *** |