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The +number is the Chapter number; the letter is the sequence within the +chapter.</p> + +<p>References to <a href="#Notes">endnotes</a> (near the end of the book) are numeric, <span class="italic">e.g.</span>, [1-1]. +The first number is the Chapter number; the second number is the sequence +within the chapter.</p> + +<p><a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Additional notes</a> will be found near the end of this ebook.</p> +<div> </div> +</div> + +<div class="section"> +<figure id="coversmall" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 25em;"> + <img src="images/coversmall.jpg" width="1200" height="1651" alt=""> +</figure><div> </div> +</div> + +<div class="section center wspace"> +<h1>U.S. MARINES IN VIETNAM<br> +<span class="xxsmall">THE ADVISORY & COMBAT ASSISTANCE ERA</span><br> +1954–1964</h1> + +<p class="p2 vspace"><i>by</i><br> +Captain Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR</p> + +<figure id="i_1" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 15em;"> + <img src="images/i_001.png" width="641" height="631" style="width: 67%;" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption">DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY<br> + UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p class="p4 vspace small">HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION<br> +HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS<br> +WASHINGTON, D.C.<br> +<span class="larger">1977</span> +</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +</div> + +<div class="section p4"> +<p class="center"> +Library of Congress Card No. 76-600051 +</p> + +<p class="p2 in0">PCN 190 003064 00</p> + +<p class="center small bt"> +For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office<br> +Washington, D.C. 20402 (Buckram)<br> +<br> +Stock Number 008-055-00094-7 +</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div> </div> +</div> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">iii</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Foreword"><span id="toclink_iii"></span>Foreword</h2> +</div> + +<p>This is the first of a series of nine chronological histories being prepared by the +Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps +involvement in the Vietnam conflict. This particular volume covers a relatively +obscure chapter in U.S. Marine Corps history—the activities of Marines in Vietnam +between 1954 and 1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities from +a one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina War in +1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some 700 Marines at the end +of 1964. As the introductory volume for the series this account has an important +secondary objective: to establish a geographical, political, and military foundation +upon which the subsequent histories can be developed.</p> + +<p>The author is a Marine Reservist who was a member of the History and Museums +Division from September 1972 until August 1974. Promoted to major soon after his +return to inactive duty, he is now working for the Kentucky State Government. A +native of Kentucky, he holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Morehead State College +(1965) and a Master of Arts degree in American History from the University of Kentucky +(1972). Commissioned in 1965, Major Whitlow served as an infantry platoon +commander with the 6th Marines, an aerial observer with the 1st Marine Division in +Vietnam, and later as a platoon commander at Officer Candidate School, Quantico. +For services in the Republic of Vietnam during 1967 and 1968 he was awarded the Distinguished +Flying Cross and 26 awards of the Air Medal.</p> + +<figure id="i_2" class="figright l2" style="max-width: 15em;"> + <img src="images/i_002.png" width="748" height="231" alt="(Signature of) <i>E. H. Simmons</i>"> +</figure> + +<p class="right clear"> +<span style="margin-right: 6em;">E. H. SIMMONS</span><br> +<span style="margin-right: 0.5em;">Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)</span><br> +Director of Marine Corps History and Museums +</p> + +<p class="in0"> +Reviewed and Approved:<br> +15 September 1976 +</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">v</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Preface"><span id="toclink_v"></span>Preface</h2> +</div> + +<p><i>U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954–1964</i> is a narrative account of the initial decade of +Marine Corps operations in South Vietnam. The monograph had two immediate +forerunners, both classified studies prepared in the middle 1960s by the former Historical +Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Authored by Major +James M. Yingling, Captain Harvey D. Bradshaw, and Mr. Benis M. Frank, the +first of these was entitled “United States Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1963.” +The second, entitled “United States Marine Corps Operations in the Republic +of Vietnam, 1964,” was authored by Major Harvey D. Bradshaw. Although unpublished, +these studies served as important sources for the material contained in this +text. Otherwise, this history has been derived from official Marine Corps records, the +Oral History Collection of the History and Museums Division, the comment files of +the division, and appropriate historical works. Of particular value in its compilation +have been the command diaries of the various Marine organizations involved.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately, few official documents relative to either the early Marine advisory +program or to the early operations of the Vietnamese Marine Corps still exist. Therefore, +that portion of the text which deals with those areas has been reconstructed +from interviews with various former Marine advisors. Even their generous assistance, +however, has not completely overcome the dearth of documentary sources. +Any reader possessing a knowledge of this period and subject is invited to submit +pertinent comments to the History and Museums Division.</p> + +<p>This monograph has not been the product of a single individual’s labor. A comment +draft of the manuscript was reviewed by over 40 persons, most of whom were +directly associated with the described events. (A list of these contributors appears as +Appendix E.) Their remarks have been of immense value in reconstructing with +accuracy the origin, nature, and scope of the various Marine operations. The manuscript +was prepared under the editorial direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Chief +Historian of the History and Museums Division. Final editing and the preparation +of the index was done by Mr. Charles R. Smith of the Historical Branch. Miss Kay P. +Sue, editorial clerk and manuscript typist for the division, performed valuable services +in typing and proof reading both the comment and final drafts. Staff Sergeant Paul A. +Lloyd and Sergeant Eric A. Clark, also members of the History and Museums +Division, were responsible for preparing all maps and charts. Unless otherwise +credited, photographs are from official Marine Corps files.</p> + +<figure id="i_3" class="figright l2" style="max-width: 14em;"> + <img src="images/i_003.png" width="648" height="181" alt="(Signature of) <i>Robert Whitlow</i>"> +</figure> + +<p class="right clear"> +<span style="margin-right: 2em;">ROBERT H. WHITLOW</span><br> +Captain, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve +</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">vii</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Table_of_Contents"><span id="toclink_vii"></span>Table of Contents</h2> +</div> + +<table id="toc"> +<tr> + <td></td> + <td class="tdr"><i>Page</i></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Foreword</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_iii">iii</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Preface</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_v">v</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Table of Contents</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_vii">vii</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="part"> + <td class="tdl">PART I THE WATERSHED</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_1">1</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Chapter 1 Background to Military Assistance</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_3">3</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The Geographic Setting</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_3a">3</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The People</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_6">6</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Vietnam’s Recent History</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_9">9</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Post-Geneva South Vietnam</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_12">12</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The American Response</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_14">14</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Chapter 2 The Formative Years</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_15">15</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_15a">15</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_16">16</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Political Stabilization and Its Effects</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_18">18</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Reorganization and Progress</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_20">20</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Summing Up Developments</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_25">25</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Chapter 3 Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_26">26</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_26a">26</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_31">31</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_39">39</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">American Decisions at the Close of 1961</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_42">42</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Chapter 4 An Expanding War, 1962</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_44">44</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The War’s New Context</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_44a">44</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_46">46</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_49">49</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Some Conclusions</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_53">53</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="part"> + <td class="tdl">PART II MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_55">55</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Chapter 5 SHUFLY at Soc Trang</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_57">57</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The Decision</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_57a">57</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Deployment to Soc Trang</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_59">59</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_65">65</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Preparations and Redeployment</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_73">73</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Accomplishments</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_74">74</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Chapter 6 SHUFLY Moves North</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_75">75</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Arrival at Da Nang</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_75a">75</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">I Corps Tactical Zone</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_76">76</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Military Situation, September 1962</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_79">79</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Initial Helicopter Operations</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_80">80</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Marine People-to-People Program</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_85">85</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">SHUFLY Operations in I Corps</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_85a">85</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">viii</span></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Chapter 7 The Laotian Crisis, 1962</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_86">86</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Genesis of the Problem</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_86a">86</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The American Response</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_88">88</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The Marine Corps Role</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_88a">88</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Marine Participation: A Summary</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_94">94</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="part"> + <td class="tdl">PART III THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_97">97</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Chapter 8 The Marine Advisory Effort</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_99">99</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The Political Climate</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_99a">99</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_100">100</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Accomplishments</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_110">110</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Chapter 9 SHUFLY Operations</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_111">111</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Development of the Compound Continues</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_111a">111</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Combat Support Operations</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_113">113</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The Situation in Vietnam</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_121">121</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="part"> + <td class="tdl">PART IV AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_125">125</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Chapter 10 Marines Meet the Challenge</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_127">127</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">New American Decisions</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_127a">127</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">A Restructured Military Assistance Command</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_130">130</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Changes in Marine Leadership</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_130a">130</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Redesignation and Reorganization</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_131">131</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The Vietnamese Marine Brigade</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_132">132</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Additional Marine Activities</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_138">138</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Chapter 11 Spring and Summer Fighting</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_144">144</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The Monsoons</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_144a">144</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">The Weather Breaks</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_148">148</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Sure Wind 202</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_152">152</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Operations Elsewhere in I Corps</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_154">154</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Changing the Watch</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_156">156</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Chapter 12 Fall and Winter Operations</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_157">157</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Dry Weather Fighting</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_157a">157</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_159">159</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Changes and Improvements</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_162">162</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Action as the Year Ends</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_164">164</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="chap"> + <td class="tdl">Chapter 13 Prelude to Escalation</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_166">166</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="part"> + <td class="tdl">NOTES</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_169">169</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="part"> + <td class="tdl">APPENDICES</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_175">175</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">A. USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954–1964</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_175a">175</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">B. Awards and Decorations, RVN, Through 1964</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_176">176</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">C. Glossary of Acronyms</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_178">178</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">D. Chronology</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_179">179</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">E. List of Reviewers</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_182">182</a></td> +</tr> +<tr class="part"> + <td class="tdl">INDEX</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#toclink_184">184</a></td> +</tr> +</table> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="main"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">1</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak part" id="PART_I"><span id="toclink_1">PART I</span><br> + +<span class="subhead">THE WATERSHED</span></h2> +<div> </div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">3</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_1"><span id="toclink_3"></span>CHAPTER 1<br> +<span class="subhead large">Background to Military Assistance</span><br> +<span class="subhead notbold"><i>The Geographic Setting—The People—Vietnam’s Recent History—Post-Geneva +South Vietnam—The American Response</i></span></h2> +</div> + +<h3 id="toclink_3a"><i>The Geographic Setting</i></h3> + +<p>Hanging like a bulbous pendant from China’s +southern border, the Southeast Asian land mass +projects itself southward to within 100 miles of the +equator. Often referred to as the Indochinese +Peninsula, this land mass is contained by the +Andaman Sea on the west, the Gulf of Siam on the +south, and the South China Sea and the Tonkin +Gulf on the east. Along with the extensive Indonesian +island chain which lies to the immediate +south, mainland Southeast Asia dominates the key +water routes between the Pacific and the Indian +Oceans. So positioned, the Indochinese Peninsula +and the offshore islands resemble the Middle East +in that they traditionally have been recognized as a +“crossroads of commerce and history.”<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[1-1]</a></p> + +<p>Seven sovereign states currently make up the +Indochinese Peninsula. Burma and Thailand occupy +what is roughly the western two-thirds of the entire +peninsula. To the south, the Moslem state of +Malaysia occupies the southern third of the rugged, +southward-reaching Malaysian Peninsula. East of +Thailand lies Cambodia, which possesses a relatively +abbreviated coastline on the Gulf of Siam, +and Laos, a landlocked country. The Democratic +Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), which +borders to the north on China, and the Republic of +Vietnam (South Vietnam) form the eastern rim of +the Indochinese Peninsula.</p> + +<p>Vietnamese have often described the area currently +administered by the two separate Vietnamese +states as resembling “two rice baskets at the +ends of their carrying poles.”<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[1-2]</a> This description +is derived from the position of extensive rice producing +river deltas at the northern and southern +extremities of the long, narrow expanse of coastline +and adjacent mountains. Vietnamese civilization +originated in the northernmost of these so-called +“rice baskets,” the Red River Delta, centuries +before the birth of Christ. Pressured at +various stages in their history by the vastly more +powerful Chinese and by increasingly crowded +conditions in the Red River Delta, the Vietnamese +gradually pushed southward down the narrow +coastal plain in search of new rice lands. Eventually +their migration displaced several rival cultures +and carried them into every arable corner of the +Mekong Delta, the more extensive river delta +located at the southern end of the proverbial +“carrying pole.” Although unified since the +eighteenth century under the Vietnamese, the area +between the Chinese border and the Gulf of Siam +came to be divided into three more or less different +regions: Tonkin, centered on the Red River Delta; +Cochinchina, centered on the Mekong Delta; and +Annam, the intervening coastal region.</p> + +<figure id="ip_3" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 28em;"> + <img src="images/i_004.jpg" width="1763" height="2549" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +MAINLAND<br> +SOUTHEAST ASIA<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure id="ip_3b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;"> + <img src="images/i_005.jpg" width="1797" height="2588" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +FRENCH<br> +INDOCHINA<br> +1954<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Since mid-1954 the area known collectively as +Vietnam has been divided into northern and +southern states. South Vietnam (known after 1956 +as the Republic of Vietnam), where the earliest +U.S. military activities were focused, came to +include all of former Cochinchina and the southern +half of Annam. The geography of this small state, +described in general terms, is rugged and difficult. +The lengthy country shares often ill-defined jungle +boundaries with Laos and Cambodia in the west +and with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam +(DRV) to the north. Its land borders total almost +1,000 miles—600 with Cambodia, 300 with Laos, +and roughly 40 with North Vietnam. Approximately<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">6</span><span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">5</span> +1,500 miles of irregular coastline on the +Tonkin Gulf and the South China Sea complete +the enclosure of its 66,000-square mile area.</p> + +<p>South Vietnam is divided into four relatively +distinct physiographic regions—the Mekong Delta, +the coastal plain, the Annamite Mountains, and the +forested plain. The Mekong Delta, an extensive and +fertile lowland centered on the Mekong River, +covers roughly the southern quarter of the country. +This region is essentially a marshy flat land well +suited for rice growing and is recognized as one of +Asia’s richest agricultural areas. South Vietnam’s +second physiographic region, the coastal plain, is +similar to the Mekong Delta in that it is predominantly +flat and generally well suited for rice +growing. Properly known as the coastal lowland, +this region extends from the country’s northern +border to the Mekong Delta. Its width is never +constant, being defined on the west by the rugged +Annamite Mountains—the region which dominates +the northern two thirds of South Vietnam. The +jungle-covered mountains, whose highest elevations +measure over 8,000 feet, stand in sharp contrast +to the low and flat coastal plain. The eastern +slopes of the mountains normally rise from the +lowlands at a distance of five or 10 miles from the +sea. At several points along the coast, however, +the emerald mountains crowd to the water’s edge, +dividing the coastal plain into compartments and +creating a seascape breathtaking in its beauty. +At other locations the mountain chain recedes +from the coast, allowing the lowlands to extend +inland as far as 40 miles. An extensive upland +plateau sprawls over the central portion of South +Vietnam’s mountain region.</p> + +<p>This important subregion, known as the Central +Highlands, possesses relatively fertile soil and has +great potential for agricultural development. The +highest elevations in the Annamite chain are recorded +south of the Central Highlands. From +heights of 6,000 to 7,000 feet, the mountains dissolve +southward into the forested plain, a hilly +transition zone which forms a strip between the +Mekong lowlands and the southernmost mountains.</p> + +<p>South Vietnam lies entirely below the Tropic of +Cancer. Its climate is best described as hot and +humid. Because the country is situated within +Southeast Asia’s twin tropical monsoon belt, it +experiences two distinct rainy seasons. The southwest +(or summer) monsoon settles over the Mekong +Delta and the southern part of the country in mid-May +and lasts until early October. In the northern +reaches, the northeast (or winter) monsoon season +begins in November and continues through most +of March. Unlike the rainy season in the south, +fog, wind, and noticeably lower temperatures +characterize the wet season in the north. While the +reversed monsoon seasons provide an abundance of +water for rice growing throughout the Mekong +Delta and most of the long coastal plain, rainfall +is not distributed uniformly. Parts of the central +coast record only about 28 inches of annual precipitation. +In contrast, other areas along the +northern coast receive as much as 126 inches of +rain during the course of a year. Even worse, a +percentage of this rainfall can be expected to occur +as a result of typhoons. The tropical storms +usually lash the Annamese coast between July and +November. Almost always they cause extensive +flooding along normally sluggish rivers which +dissect the coastal plain.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_6"><i>The People</i></h3> + +<p>Slightly over 16 million people currently inhabit +South Vietnam. Of these, over 13 million are +ethnic Vietnamese. Primarily rice farmers and +fishermen, the Vietnamese have tended to compress +themselves into the country’s most productive +agricultural areas—the Mekong Delta and the +coastal plain. Chinese, numbering around one +million, form South Vietnam’s largest ethnic +minority. Concentrated for the most part in the +major cities, the Chinese traditionally have played +a leading role in Vietnam’s commerce. About +700,000 Montagnard tribesmen, scattered across +the upland plateau and the rugged northern mountains, +constitute South Vietnam’s second largest +minority. Some 400,000 Khmers, closely akin to +the dominant population of Cambodia, inhabit the +lowlands along the Cambodian border. Roughly +35,000 Chams, remnants of a once powerful kingdom +that blocked the southern migration of the +Vietnamese until the late 1400s, form the country’s +smallest and least influential ethnic minority. The +Chams, whose ancestors once controlled most of +the central and southern Annamese coast, are confined +to a few small villages on the central coast +near Phan Rang.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">7</span></p> + +<figure id="ip_7" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;"> + <img src="images/i_007.jpg" width="1823" height="2571" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +TERRAIN FEATURES<br> +SOUTH VIETNAM<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">8</span></p> + +<p>South Vietnamese adhere to a broad range of +religions. Between 70 and 80 percent of the country’s +16 million people are classified as Buddhist. +It is estimated, however, that a much smaller +percentage are actually practitioners. Roman Catholics +comprise roughly 10 percent of the total +population. Usually found in and around the country’s +urban centers, the Catholics are products of +Vietnam’s contacts with Europeans. Two so-called +politico-religious sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa +Hao, have attracted large segments of the rural +population, particularly in the Mekong Delta.<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1-A]</a> For +the most part, the scattered Montagnard tribes +worship animal forms and have no organized +religion, although many have been converted to +Christianity.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1-A]</a> Founded just after World War I, the Cao Dai claims more +than one and a half million faithful in South Vietnam. The +religion incorporates elements of Taoism, Buddhism, Christianity, +Confucianism, and large doses of spiritualism. Its +clergy, headed by a “pope,” is organized in a hierarchy modelled +on that of the Roman Catholic Church. The extent of its borrowing +is suggested by the fact that adherents count the French +author Victor Hugo as one of their saints. Politically, the Cao +Dai moved sharply in the direction of nationalism during the +1940s, organized its own army, and fought sporadic actions +against the French and the subsequent French-controlled government +of Emperor Bao Dai until suppressed by the Diem government +in 1954.</p> + +<p>Like the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao is peculiarly Vietnamese. In +the late 1930s, a Buddhist monk named Huynh Pho So began a +“protestant” movement within the worldly, easy-going Buddhist +faith then prevalent. His followers, whose ranks grew rapidly, +called themselves Hoa Hao after the village where Phu So began +his crusade. Like the Cao Dai faithful and Catholics, they +tended to live apart in their own villages and hamlets concentrated +in the very south and west of Vietnam, primarily along the +Cambodian border. Intensely nationalistic and xenophobic, +they were under constant attack from the French, Japanese, and +Viet Minh, and by the late 1940s had recruited a large militia +which was subsequently disbanded. Today their overall membership +stands at about one million.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Fundamentally, South Vietnamese society is +rural and agrarian. Over the centuries the Vietnamese +have tended to cluster in tiny hamlets +strewn down the coastal plain and across the Mekong +Delta. Usually composed of a handful of +closely knit families whose ancestors settled the +surrounding land generations earlier, the hamlet is +South Vietnam’s basic community unit. Next +larger is the village which resembles the American +township in function in that it encompasses a +number of adjacent hamlets. The Vietnamese +people have naturally developed strong emotional +ties with their native villages. “To the Vietnamese,” +it has been said without exaggeration, +“the village is his land’s heart, mind, and soul.”<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[1-3]</a> +Given the rural nature of the country it is understandable +that the inhabitants of the villages +and hamlets have retained a large degree of self-government. +“The laws of the emperor,” states an +ancient Vietnamese proverb, “are less than the +customs of the village.”<a id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[1-4]</a></p> + +<p>Overlaying this rural mosaic are two intermediate +governmental echelons—the districts and +the provinces, The district, the smaller of these +political and geographic subdivisions, first appeared +in Vietnamese history following the earliest +annexation of Tonkin by the Chinese in 111 B.C. It +remained in use and was extended down the Annamese +coast and into Cochinchina by the successive +Vietnamese dynasties which came to power in the +ensuing centuries. Provinces, larger geographic +subdivisions, eventually were superimposed over +groups of contiguous districts, thus adding another +echelon between the reigning central government +and the villages. This structure remained in existence +under the French after they took control of all +Vietnam in the late 19th century. In order to make +their administration more efficient French colonial +authorities modernized the cumbersome administrative +machinery and adjusted provincial boundaries. +It is essentially this French-influenced structure +that exists in South Vietnam today. Still, +after years of use and modification, the system +seems somewhat superficial as traditional self-rule +of the villages tends to nullify the efforts of +provinces and districts to govern rural areas. Often +the central government’s influence is unable to +seep lower than the district headquarters, particularly +in more remote areas.</p> + +<p>While South Vietnam is predominantly rural, it +does possess several important urban centers. As +might be expected, these are found primarily in the +densely populated Mekong Delta and along the +coastal lowland. Saigon, the nation’s capital and +largest city, presently has a population estimated +at 3.5 million. Located slightly north of the Mekong +River complex and inland from the coast, the +city dominates the country in both an economic +and political sense. Saigon has excellent port facilities +for ocean-going ships, although such traffic +must first negotiate the tangled Saigon River which +leads inland from the South China Sea. Da Nang, +located on the Annamese coast 84 miles below the +northern border, is the country’s second largest<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">9</span> +city. With a population of roughly 500,000 and a +protected harbor, Da Nang constitutes the principal +economic center in northern South Vietnam. +The old imperial capital of Hue (population of +roughly 200,000), situated about 50 miles north of +Da Nang, historically has exerted a strong cultural +influence over the Annamese coast.<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[1-B]</a> Scores of +large towns, such as Quang Tri, Hoi An, Quang +Ngai, Can Tho, and Vinh Long, extend down the +coast and across the Mekong Delta. Often these +serve as provincial capitals. A few lesser population +centers, notably Pleiku, Kontum, and Ban Me +Thuot, are situated in the Central Highlands.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[1-B]</a> The population of most of South Vietnam’s cities and towns +has been swollen by the influx of refugees which occurred as the +Vietnam War intensified in the middle 1960s. In 1965, for example, +refugee population estimates for the three major cities +were as follows: Saigon—1.5 million; Da Nang—144,000; Hue—105,000.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Most of South Vietnam’s major towns and +cities are connected by one highway—Route 1. +Constructed by the French during the early 20th +century, Route 1 originally extended from Hanoi, +the principal city of Tonkin in northern Vietnam, +down the coast and inland to Saigon. While Route +1 and a French-built railroad which parallels it +helped unify South Vietnam’s most densely populated +areas, the country’s road network is otherwise +underdeveloped. A few tortuous roads do +twist westward from Route 1 into the mountains +to reach the remote towns there. Of these the most +noteworthy are Route 19, built to serve Pleiku in +the Central Highlands, and Route 9, which extends +westward into Laos from Dong Ha, South +Vietnam’s northernmost town. A number of roads +radiate outward from Saigon to the population +centers of the Mekong Delta. For the most part, +however, the Vietnamese people traditionally have +depended on trail networks, inland waterways, +and the sea to satisfy their transportation needs. +The location of the bulk of the population in the +watery Mekong Delta and along the seacoast has +encouraged their reliance on waterborne +transportation.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_9"><i>Vietnam’s Recent History</i></h3> + +<p>Prior to July 1954 the expanse of mainland Southeast +Asia now occupied by South Vietnam, North +Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia belonged to France. +Together these possessions constituted French-Indochina +over which the French had exercised +political control in one form or another, with one +exception, since the last quarter of the 19th century. +The only interruption occurred following the +capitulation of France in June 1940. Exploiting +the disrupted power balance in Europe, and attracted +by the natural resources and strategic +value of the area, Japan moved into northern +French-Indochina less than four months after +France had fallen. In 1941 the Vichy French government +agreed to Japanese occupation of southern +French-Indochina. Soon Japanese forces controlled +every airfield and major port in Indochina. Under +this arrangement the Japanese permitted French +colonial authorities to maintain their administrative +responsibilities. But as the tide of war began +to turn against the Japanese, the French became +increasingly defiant. The Japanese terminated this +relationship on 9 March 1945 when, without +warning, they arrested colonial officials throughout +Indochina and brutally seized control of all +governmental functions.</p> + +<p>Six months after the dissolution of the French +colonial apparatus in Indochina, World War II +ended. The grip which Japan had held on most of +Southeast Asia for nearly half a decade was broken +on 2 September 1945 when her foreign minister +signed the instrument of unconditional surrender +on board the battleship USS <i>Missouri</i>. Shortly thereafter, +in accordance with a previously reached +Allied agreement, Chinese Nationalist forces moved +into Tonkin and northern Annam to accept the +surrender of Japanese forces. South of the 16th +parallel, British units arrived from India to disarm +the defeated Japanese. A detachment of 150 men +from a small French Expeditionary Corps arrived +by air in Saigon on the 12th to assist the British, +who had included them only as a courtesy since +France was not among the powers slated to receive +the surrender of the Japanese in Indochina.</p> + +<p>But the end of World War II and the arrival of +Allied forces did not end the struggle for control of +French-Indochina. Instead, it signalled the beginning +of a new conflict in which the contestants +were, in many respects, more formidable. One of +these, the French, moved quickly to restore their +former presence in Cochinchina and Annam. Reinforced +with additional units, they occupied most +major towns between the Mekong Delta and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">11</span> +16th parallel by the end of 1945. Two months later +French negotiators secured an agreement with the +Chinese Nationalists whereby French units would +replace the Chinese occupation forces north of the +16th parallel.</p> + +<figure id="ip_11" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;"> + <img src="images/i_010.jpg" width="1825" height="2580" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +MAJOR CITIES OF<br> +SOUTH VIETNAM<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Wartime developments in French-Indochina, +however, had brought about profound political +changes which eventually would doom the French +effort to re-establish political and economic influence +in the region. During World War II, Ho Chi +Minh, an avowed Communist, had transformed a +relatively feeble political party into a sizable +guerrilla organization. Known as the Viet Minh, +the Communist guerrillas had been organized, +trained, and led by Vo Nguyen Giap, a former history +teacher from Annam. During the latter stages +of the war, the United States had supplied the Viet +Minh with limited quantities of military supplies. +In return, Ho’s guerrillas had assisted downed +American pilots and occasionally had clashed with +small Japanese units. But the Viet Minh had +wasted few men on costly major actions against +the Japanese. Conserving their forces, Ho and Giap +had concentrated on organization and had managed +to extend their strength into the densely +populated Red River Delta and along the Annamese +coast. In Cochinchina, where their numbers +were considerably smaller, the Communists had +limited their activities almost entirely to organization +and recruitment. Thus, by the end of the war +Ho’s organization was able to emerge as a definite +military-political force in northern French-Indochina.</p> + +<p>Following the Japanese surrender and before the +arrival of the Chinese Nationalist occupation forces, +the Viet Minh seized control of Hanoi, the capital +of Tonkin, and proclaimed the Democratic Republic +of Vietnam. At Ho’s direction the Viet +Minh promptly shifted from their anti-Japanese +posture and prepared to contest the French return.</p> + +<p>Confronted with this situation in northern +Indochina, the French were forced to bargain with +the Communists. A preliminary agreement was +reached on 6 March 1946 whereby the French +agreed to recognize the newly founded but relatively +weak Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a +“free state within the French Union.” In return, +Ho’s government declared itself “ready to welcome +in friendly fashion the French Army, when in +conformance with international agreement, it +would relieve the Chinese forces” which had accepted +the Japanese surrender in Tonkin.<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[1-5]</a> Shortly +after the conclusion of this agreement, French +forces began reoccupying Tonkin and northern +Annam. Within six months they controlled every +major strategic position from the Chinese border +to the Ca Mau Peninsula, Cochinchina’s southern +tip.</p> + +<p>The uneasy peace was broken in December 1946 +after Viet Minh and French negotiators failed to +reach a final agreement on actual political control +of Tonkin and Annam. When open warfare erupted, +Ho withdrew the bulk of his military forces into +mountainous sanctuaries along the Chinese border, +but left small groups of guerrillas scattered +throughout the heavily populated Red River Delta. +Reinforced with contingents from Europe and +Africa, the French Expeditionary Corps initially +managed to hold its own and, in some cases, even +extend its control. But, drawing strength from its +natural appeal to Vietnamese nationalism, the +Communist movement began gaining momentum +in the late 1940s. Gradually the war intensified +and spread into central Annam and Cochinchina.</p> + +<p>In January 1950, the French moved to undercut +the Viet Minh’s appeal to non-Communist nationalists +by granting nominal independence to its +Indochina possessions. Under the terms of a formal +treaty, all of Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina) +was brought together under a Saigon-based +government headed by Emperor Bao Dai. +Laos and Cambodia likewise formed their own +governments, whereupon all three countries became +known as the Associated States of Indochina.</p> + +<p>This new arrangement, however, had little +effect on the ongoing war with the Viet Minh. In +accordance with the treaties, the Associated States +became members of the French Union and agreed +to prosecute the war under French direction. +Moreover, French political dominance in the region +continued, virtually undiluted by the existence of +the Associated States.</p> + +<p>In related developments, Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese +Communist armies seized control of mainland +China in 1949 and Communist North Korean +forces invaded the pro-Western Republic of Korea +in 1950. These events added new meaning to the +French struggle in Indochina as American policy +makers came to view the war on the Southeast +Asian mainland within the context of a larger<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">12</span> +design to bring Asia entirely under Communist +domination. Following the invasion of South +Korea, President Truman immediately announced +his intention to step up U.S. military aid to the +French in Indochina. Congress responded quickly +by adding four billion dollars to existing military +assistance funds. Of this, $303 million was earmarked +for Korea, the Philippines, and “the general +area of China.”<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[1-6]</a><a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[1-C]</a> Thus, the Truman Administration, +now confronted by the possibility +that Communism might engulf all of mainland +Asia, extended its containment policy to Indochina.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">[1-C]</a> The following year would see a half billion U.S. dollars +allocated to support French operations in Indochina. By 1954 +that figure would climb to an even one billion dollars.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Even with rapidly increasing amounts of U.S. +material assistance, the French proved unable to +wrest the initiative from Giap’s growing armies. +Although national armies drawn from Cambodia, +Laos, and Vietnam were now fighting alongside +the French, the Expeditionary Corps was over-extended. +Moreover, the French cause was extremely +vulnerable to Communist propaganda. On +the home front, public support for the so-called +<i lang="fr">sale guerre</i> (dirty war) eroded steadily during the +early 1950s as the Expeditionary Corps’ failures and +casualties mounted. Finally, on 7 May 1954, the +besieged 13,000-man French garrison at Dien Bien +Phu surrendered to the Viet Minh, thus shattering +what remained of French determination to prosecute +the war in Indochina. In Geneva, where Communist +and Free World diplomats had gathered to +consider a formal peace in Korea along with the +Indochina problem, French and Viet Minh representatives +signed a cease-fire agreement on 20 July +which ended the eight-year conflict.</p> + +<p>The bilateral cease-fire agreement substantially +altered the map of the Indochinese Peninsula. +France agreed to relinquish political control +throughout the area. Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam +all gained full independence. The most controversial +provision of the 20 July agreement divided +Vietnam at the Ben Hai River and superimposed a +demilitarized zone over the partition line. This +division, intended to facilitate the disengagement +of the opposing forces, was to be temporary pending +a reunification election scheduled for mid-1956. +In accordance with the agreement, France immediately +turned over political control of the +northern zone (Tonkin and the northern half of +Annam) to the Communist Viet Minh. Ho +promptly re-established the Democratic Republic +of Vietnam (DRV) with its capital in Hanoi.</p> + +<p>Other provisions of the Geneva Agreement +called for the opposing armies to regroup in their +respective zones within 300 days. Following their +regroupment, the French military forces were to be +completely withdrawn from the North within +300 days and from the South by mid-1956. Civilians +living both north and south of the partition line +were to be allowed to emigrate to the opposite +zone in accordance with their political convictions. +It was anticipated that thousands of Catholics +living in Tonkin would seek refuge in the non-Communist +South. Other articles of the agreement +dealt with the creation and responsibilities of an +International Control Commission (ICC) to +supervise the cease-fire. Canadian, Indian, and Polish +delegations were to comprise this commission.</p> + +<p>On 21 July, the day following the bilateral agreement, +Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the Peoples +Republic of China, Cambodia, and Laos joined +France and the Viet Minh in endorsing a “Final +Declaration” which sanctioned the previously +reached cease-fire agreement. The United States +refused to endorse this declaration, but issued a +statement to the effect that it would not use force to +disturb the cease-fire.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_12"><i>Post-Geneva South Vietnam</i></h3> + +<p>The execution of the Geneva Agreement thrust +that area of Vietnam south of the partition line +into a period of profound confusion and instability. +Even worse, the colonial period had done +little to prepare the Cochinchinese and Annamese +for the tremendous problems at hand. No real apparatus +for central government existed. Likewise, +the long colonial period left the area with few +experienced political leaders capable of establishing +and managing the required governmental +machinery. Political control passed nominally to +the French-sponsored emperor, Bao Dai, who was +living in France at the time. For all practical purposes, +leadership in the South devolved upon Bao +Dai’s recently appointed pro-Western premier, +Ngo Dinh Diem. The product of a prosperous and +well-educated Catholic family from Hue, Diem +had served the French briefly as a province chief<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">13</span> +prior to World War II. Always a strong nationalist +but staunchly anti-Communist, he had been unable +to reconcile his anti-French attitudes with the +Viet Minh movement during the Indochina War. +As a result Diem had left his homeland in the +early 1950s to live at a Catholic seminary in the +United States. There he remained until his appointment +as premier in mid-June of 1954.</p> + +<p>The months immediately following the Geneva +agreement found Ngo Dinh Diem struggling to +create the necessary governmental machinery in +Saigon, the capital of the southern zone. At best, +however, his hold on the feeble institutions was +tenuous. A serious confrontation was developing +between the premier and the absent Bao Dai, still +residing in France. Further complicating the +political scene was the presence of Hoa Hao and +Cao Dai armies in the provinces surrounding the +capital, and the existence in Saigon of an underworld +organization named the Binh Xuyen.<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[1-D]</a> As +1955 opened the leaders of these three politically +oriented factions were pressing demands for concessions +from the new central government. Among +these were permission to maintain their private +armies, and the authority to exercise political +control over large, heavily populated areas.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">[1-D]</a> The Binh Xuyen originally operated from the swamps south +of the Chinese-dominated Cholon district of Saigon. Controlling +the vice and crime of the city, by 1954 they had gained control +of the police under circumstances that reeked of bribery. A year +later the organization was brutally crushed by Ngo Dinh Diem.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The outcome of the embryonic power struggle +in Saigon hinged largely on control of the Vietnamese +National Army (VNA). Although not +considered an efficient military organization by +even the most liberal estimates, the 210,000-man +National Army was the principal source of organized +power available to the quarreling leaders of +southern Vietnam. Originally created by the French +in 1950 to supplement their Expeditionary Corps, +the VNA had since suffered from structural deficiencies. +It actually had no organizational echelon +between the French-controlled General Staff and +the 160 separate battalions. Tied to no regiments +or divisions, the Vietnamese battalions naturally +were dependent on the French Expeditionary Corps +for operational instructions and logistical support.<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[1-E]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">[1-E]</a> Selected VNA battalions were sometimes task organized into +<i lang="fr">groupes mobiles</i> (mobile groups) by the French for specific offensive +operations. But these groups, which were roughly equivalent to a +regimental combat team, were never composed entirely of VNA +battalions under a Vietnamese command group.</p> + +</div> +A dearth of qualified Vietnamese officers and a +degree of inattention on the part of the French +compounded the problems which stemmed from +the army’s structural flaw. Partially as a result of +these shortcomings the morale of the VNA had deteriorated +sharply in the waning stages of the +French-Indochina War. At the time of the cease-fire +agreement, high desertion rates were reported +in almost every Vietnamese battalion. Still, it was +evident that he who controlled the National Army +would most likely control the government in the +area south of the partition line. + +<p>The danger that the pro-Western zone might become +the victim of a sudden Communist attack +from the north, as had been the case on the Korean +Peninsula, injected another element of uncertainty +into the overall situation in southern Vietnam. +The conditions which settled over the area in the +immediate aftermath of the Geneva settlement suggested +this possibility since they were alarmingly +similar to the conditions which had prevailed in +Korea prior to the North Korean invasion of 1950. +Like Korea, Vietnam was divided both geographically +and ideologically: the North clearly within +the orbit of the Soviet Union and Communist +China, and the South under the influence of the +Western powers. As in Korea in 1950, there also +existed a very real armed threat to the weaker pro-Western +southern state. Immediately after the +Geneva cease-fire, the Viet Minh army regrouped +north of the 17th parallel and was redesignated the +People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). American +intelligence reported that the PAVN, which numbered +roughly 240,000 disciplined veterans, was +being reorganized and re-equipped with Soviet and +Chinese weapons in violation of the Geneva Agreement. +At the same time Western intelligence +sources estimated that the Viet Minh had intentionally +left between 5,000 and 10,000 men south +of the partition line following their withdrawal. +Also done in violation of the cease-fire agreement, +this meant that Communist guerrillas could be +expected to surface throughout the South in the +event of an outright invasion.</p> + +<p>A related condition heightened fears that a +Korea-type invasion might occur in Vietnam. In +South Korea a military vacuum had been allowed +to form in 1949 when American units withdrew +from the area. Apparently that vacuum, coupled +with a statement by the American Secretary of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">14</span> +State to the effect that the U.S. defensive perimeter +in the Pacific did not include South Korea, had +encouraged Communist aggression. Now, with the +scheduled evacuation of French armies from Indochina +by mid-1956, there emerged the distinct +possibility that such a military vacuum would +recur, this time in southern Vietnam. “Vietnam,” +warned one American scholar familiar with the +region, “may very soon become either a dam +against aggression from the north or a bridge serving +the communist block to transform the countries +of the Indochinese peninsula into satellites of +China.”<a id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[1-7]</a></p> + +<h3 id="toclink_14"><i>The American Response</i></h3> + +<p>It was in the face of this uncertain situation on +the Southeast Asian mainland that the Eisenhower +administration moved to discourage renewed Communist +military activity. First, the United States +sought to create a regional international organization +to promote collective military action under +the threat of aggression. This was obtained on +8 September 1954 when eight nations—the United +States, Great Britain, France, New Zealand, Australia, +the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand—signed +the Manila Pact. The treaty area encompassed +by the pact included Southeast Asia, the +Southwest Pacific below 21°31′ north latitude, and +Pakistan. Two weeks later the pact was transformed +into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization +(SEATO). In a separate protocol, the member +nations agreed that Cambodia, Laos, and the +“Free Territory under the jurisdiction of the State +of Vietnam” all resided within their defense +sphere.<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[1-8]</a></p> + +<p>Next, after several months of hesitation, the +United States settled on a policy of comprehensive +assistance to South Vietnam, as the area south +of the 1954 partition line was already being called. +As conceived, the immediate objective of the new +American policy was to bring political stability +to South Vietnam. The longer range goal was +the creation of a bulwark to discourage renewed +Communist expansion down the Indochinese Peninsula. +In this scheme, military assistance was to +play a key role. “One of the most efficient means +of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become +strong,” explained Eisenhower’s Secretary of +State, John Foster Dulles, “is to assist it in reorganizing +the National Army and in training +that Army.”<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[1-9]</a> In short, the State Department’s +position was that a stronger, more responsive +Vietnamese National Army would help Premier +Diem consolidate his political power. Later that +same force would serve as a shield behind which +South Vietnam would attempt to recover from the +ravages of the French-Indochina War and the +after effects of the Geneva Agreement.</p> + +<p>So by early 1955 a combination of circumstances—South +Vietnam’s position adjacent to a +Communist state, the unsavory memories of the +Korean invasion, and the impending withdrawal +of the French Expeditionary Corps—had influenced +the United States to adopt a policy of military +support for Premier Diem’s struggling government.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">15</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_2"><span id="toclink_15"></span>CHAPTER 2<br> +<span class="subhead large">The Formative Years</span><br> +<span class="subhead notbold"><i>Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam—Origins of U.S. Marine +Assistance—Political Stabilization and Its Effects—Reorganization and +Progress—Summing Up Developments</i></span></h2> +</div> + +<h3 id="toclink_15a"><i>Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam</i></h3> + +<p>When the Geneva cease-fire went into effect in +the late summer of 1954, the machinery for implementing +the military phase of the American assistance +program for South Vietnam already existed. +President Truman had ordered the establishment +of a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group +(USMAAG or MAAG) in French Indochina in +mid-1950 as one of several reactions to the North +Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea. Established +to provide materiel support to the French +Expeditionary Corps, the MAAG constituted little +more than a logistical funnel through which U.S. +military aid had been poured.</p> + +<p>Lieutenant General John M. (“Iron Mike”) +O’Daniel, U.S. Army, had been assigned to command +the MAAG in the spring of 1954. O’Daniel’s +selection for the Saigon post anticipated a more +active U.S. role in training of the Vietnamese +National Army. He had been chosen for the assignment +largely on the basis of his successful role +in creating and supervising the training programs +which had transformed the South Korean Army +into an effective fighting force during the Korean +War. Now, in the aftermath of the Geneva settlement, +he and his 342-man group began preparing +for the immense task of rebuilding South Vietnam’s +armed forces.</p> + +<p>The entire American project to assist the South +Vietnamese in the construction of a viable state +was delayed during the fall of 1954 while the necessary +diplomatic agreements were negotiated among +American, French, and South Vietnamese officials. +President Eisenhower dispatched General J. Lawton +Collins, U.S. Army (Retired), to Saigon in +November to complete the details of the triangular +arrangements. Collins carried with him the broad +powers which would be required to expedite the +negotiations.</p> + +<p>By mid-January 1955, the president’s special envoy +had paved the way for the transfer of responsibility +for training, equipping, and advising the +Vietnamese National Army from the French to the +USMAAG. He and General Paul Ely, the officer +appointed by the Paris government to oversee the +French withdrawal from Indochina, had initialed +a “Minute of Understanding.” In accordance with +this document, the United States agreed to provide +financial assistance to the French military in Vietnam +in exchange for two important concessions. +First, the French pledged to conduct a gradual +military withdrawal from South Vietnam in order +to prevent the development of a military vacuum +which might precipitate a North Vietnamese +invasion. Secondly, they accepted an American +plan to assist in a transition stage during which the +responsibility for rebuilding the Vietnamese military +could be transferred to the MAAG in an orderly +fashion. General Collins, in addition to engineering +the understanding with General Ely, +had advised Premier Diem to reduce his 210,000-man +military and naval forces to a level of 100,000, +a figure which the U.S. State Department felt the +United States could realistically support and +train.</p> + +<p>The American plan to begin assisting South +Vietnam encountered further delay even after the +Ely-Collins understanding had been reached. Ely’s +government, arguing that the United States had +agreed to provide only one-third of the amount +France had requested to finance its Indochina forces, +refused to ratify the agreement. The deadlock was +finally resolved on 11 February 1955 when French<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">16</span> +officials accepted the terms of the Ely-Collins arrangement +in a revised form.</p> + +<p>A combined Franco-American training command, +designated the Training Relations Instruction Mission +(TRIM), became operational in Saigon the +day following the French ratification of the Ely-Collins +understanding.<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[2-A]</a> Headed by Lieutenant +General O’Daniel but under the “overall authority” +of General Ely, TRIM was structured to prevent +domination by either French or Americans. +The training mission was composed of four divisions, +Army, Navy, Air Force, and National +Security, each of which was headed alternately by +either an American or a French officer. The chief of +each division had as his deputy an officer of the +opposite nationality. U.S. officers, however, headed +the divisions considered by MAAG officials as the +most important—Army and National Security. +Operating through TRIM and assisted by the +French military, the USMAAG was tasked with +implementing the U.S. Military Assistance Program +in a manner that would help shape the +Vietnamese national forces into a cohesive defense +establishment prior to the withdrawal of French +forces.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">[2-A]</a> The combined training mission originally was designated the +Allied Training Operations Mission. This designation was +changed prior to the time the mission became operational.</p> + +</div> + +<h3 id="toclink_16"><i>Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance</i></h3> + +<p>Only one U.S. Marine was serving with the +USMAAG in Saigon when TRIM became operational—Lieutenant +Colonel Victor J. Croizat.<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[2-B]</a> +Croizat’s assignment to the U.S. advisory group +had resulted when General Lemuel C. Shepherd, +Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, nominated +him to fill a newly created billet as liaison officer +between the MAAG and the French High Command +during the latter stages of the Indochina +War. Largely because of his French language +fluency and his former association with many +French officers while attending their war college +in 1949, Croizat was chosen for the assignment.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">[2-B]</a> Other Marines, however, were present in Saigon at the time. +They were those assigned to the American Embassy. One officer +was serving as Assistant Naval Attache/Assistant Naval Attache +for Air, and 12 other Marines were serving as security guards.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Lieutenant Colonel Croizat, however, did not +arrive in Vietnam until 2 August 1954. By then +the cease-fire agreement had been signed at Geneva +and the need for a liaison officer with the French +High Command no longer existed. General +O’Daniel, therefore, assigned the newly arrived +Marine officer to serve on the General Commission +for Refugees which had been created by the South +Vietnamese Government immediately after the +cease-fire. In this capacity Croizat became directly +involved in the construction of refugee reception +centers and the selection and development of +resettlement areas in the South. When U.S. naval +forces began assisting in the evacuation of North +Vietnam, Lieutenant Colonel Croizat was sent +to Haiphong, the principal seaport of Tonkin. +There he headed the MAAG detachment and was +responsible for coordinating U.S. operations in the +area with those of the French and Vietnamese. +When the so-called “Passage to Freedom” concluded +in May 1955, 807,000 people, 469,000 tons +of equipment and supplies, and 23,000 vehicles +had been evacuated from Communist North +Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[2-C]</a> It was not until February 1955 that the +Marine returned to Saigon.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">[2-C]</a> The French moved 497,000 people, 400,000 tons of equipment +and supplies, and 15,000 vehicles. The U.S. Navy moved the +balance.</p> + +</div> + +<p>During Lieutenant Colonel Croizat’s absence, +Premier Diem had acted on a long-standing proposal +to create a small Vietnamese Marine Corps. The +issue of a separate Marine force composed of +Vietnamese national troops had surfaced frequently +since the birth of the Vietnamese Navy in the +early 1950s. Although the proposal had been +heartily endorsed by a number of senior French +Navy officers, the downward spiral of the French +war effort had intervened to prevent the subject +from being advanced beyond a conceptual stage. +Largely as a result of earlier discussions with +Croizat, Premier Diem acted on the matter on +13 October when he signed a decree which included +the following articles:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p class="hang">ARTICLE 1. Effective 1 October 1954 there is created +within the Naval Establishment a corps of infantry +specializing in the surveillance of waterways and amphibious +operations on the coast and rivers, to be designated +as:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">17</span></p> + +<p class="center"> +‘THE MARINE CORPS’ +</p> + +<div class="tb">* * * * *</div> + +<p class="hang">ARTICLE 3. The Marine Corps shall consist of various +type units suited to their functions and either already +existing in the Army or Naval forces or to be created in +accordance with the development plan for the armed +forces.<a id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[2-1]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>In accordance with this decree a miscellaneous +collection of commando-type units was transferred +from the Vietnamese National Army and +Navy to the Marine Corps. Except for a naval +commando unit, which had conducted amphibious +raids along the coastal plains, these forces had +operated in the Red River Delta with the French +and Vietnamese Navy <i lang="fr">dinassauts</i> (river assault +divisions). First employed in 1946, the <i lang="fr">dinassauts</i> +had evolved into relatively effective naval commands +capable of landing light infantry +companies along Indochina’s tangled riverbanks. +Normally the <i lang="fr">dinassaut</i> was composed of about a +dozen armored and armed landing craft, patrol +boats, and command vessels. An Army commando +unit, consisting of approximately 100 men, would +be attached to such naval commands for specific +operations. Thus organized, the <i lang="fr">dinassauts</i> could +transport light infantry units into otherwise inaccessible +areas and support landings with heavy +caliber automatic weapons and mortar fire. Such +operations had been particularly successful in the +sprawling Red River Delta of Tonkin where +navigable estuaries and Viet Minh abounded.<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[2-D]</a> +Later in the war, as the concept was refined, the +French created a number of Vietnamese National +Army commando units for specific service with the +<i lang="fr">dinassauts</i>. Still attached to the Navy commands +these units were sometimes responsible for security +around the <i lang="fr">dinassaut</i> bases when not involved in +preplanned operations. A number of these rather +elite Vietnamese units, variously designated light +support companies, river boat companies, and commandos, +were now transferred to the newly decreed +Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC).</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">[2-D]</a> Of the <i lang="fr">dinassaut</i> Bernard Fall wrote: “[It] may well have +been one of the few worthwhile contributions of the Indochina +war to military knowledge.” (Fall, <cite>Street Without Joy</cite>, p. 39) +A more thorough analysis of <i lang="fr">dinassaut</i> operations is included +in Croizat, <cite>A Translation From The French Lessons of the War</cite>, pp. +348–351.</p> + +</div> + +<p>By the time Lieutenant Colonel Croizat returned +to Saigon in early 1955 these units, which totalled +approximately 2,400 officers and men, had been +evacuated from North Vietnam. Several of the +commandos had been assembled at Nha Trang on +South Vietnam’s central coast where the French +still maintained an extensive naval training facility. +There, under the supervision of a junior +French commando officer, several former commandos +had been organized into the 1st Marine +Landing Battalion (or 1st Landing Battalion). +The balance of the newly designated Marine units, +however, were scattered in small, widely separated +garrisons from Hue to the Mekong Delta. +These units included six river boat companies, five +combat support light companies, and a small training +flotilla. Diem had appointed a former Vietnamese +National Army officer, Major Le Quang +Trong, as Senior Marine Officer. But because no +formal headquarters had been created and because +no real command structure existed, Major Trong +remained relatively isolated from his far-flung Marine +infantry units.</p> + +<p>Upon returning to Saigon, Croizat was assigned +to the MAAG’s Naval Section and subsequently to +TRIM’S Naval Division as the senior U.S. advisor +to the newly created Vietnamese Marine Corps. +In this capacity the Marine officer quickly determined +that the small Vietnamese amphibious force +was faced with several serious problems. First, +and perhaps its most critical, was that despite +Premier Diem’s decree, the Marine Corps continued +to exist essentially on an informal basis. “The +Marine Corps itself had no real identity,” its U.S. +advisor later explained. “It was a scattering of dissimilar +units extending from Hue to the Mekong +Delta area.”<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[2-2]</a> The fact that its widespread units +were still dependent on the French Expeditionary +Corps for logistical support underscored the weakness +inherent in the VNMC’s initial status.</p> + +<p>Other problems arose from the continuation of +French officers in command billets throughout the +Vietnamese naval forces. Under the Franco-American +agreement which had created TRIM, a +French Navy captain doubled as chief of the combined +training missions’ Naval Division and as +commanding officer of the Vietnamese naval +forces. This placed the French in a position to +review any proposals advanced by the U.S. Marine +advisor. Complicating the situation even further, a +French Army captain, Jean Louis Delayen, actually<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">18</span> +commanded the 1st Landing Battalion at Nha +Trang.<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[2-E]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="label">[2-E]</a> Delayen, described by Croizat as “an exceptionally qualified +French Commando officer,” later attended the U.S. Marine +Corps Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico. (Croizat, +“Notes on The Organization,” p. 3.)</p> + +</div> + +<p>Demobilization presented another potential difficulty +for the Vietnamese Marine Corps in early +1955. Under the U.S.-Vietnamese force level +agreements, the Vietnamese naval forces were +limited to 3,000 men. The Marine Corps, which +alone totalled a disproportionate 2,400 men, had +been instructed to reduce its strength to 1,137 +men and officers. With no effective centralized +command structure and so many widely separated +units, even the relatively simple task of mustering +out troops assumed the dimensions of a complex +administrative undertaking.</p> + +<p>In short, the very existence of the Vietnamese +Marine Corps was threatened in a number of inter-related +situations. The continuation of a separate +and distinct Marine Corps hinged ultimately, of +course, on the overall reorganization of the Vietnamese +armed forces and their support structure. +Essentially it would be necessary to establish a +requirement for such an organization within South +Vietnam’s future military-naval structure. Croizat +personally sensed that this would be the pivotal +issue in determining the VNMC’s future. “There +were numerous representatives of the three military +services from each of the three countries concerned +with the fate of the Vietnamese Army, Navy, and +Air Force,” he pointed out. “But, there was no +champion from within the Vietnamese Marine +Corps since no Corps existed except on paper.”<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[2-3]</a> +Thus, it was left initially to a French captain, a +Vietnamese major, and a U.S. Marine lieutenant +colonel to keep alive the idea that South Vietnam’s +defense establishment needed a separate Marine +Corps.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_18"><i>Political Stabilization and Its Effects</i></h3> + +<p>During early 1955 the entire South Vietnamese +government was engulfed by a crisis which threatened +to disrupt the American plans to help build +a viable anti-Communist country. The crisis +occurred not in the form of an overt North Vietnamese +attack but rather as a result of the South’s +political instability. In February the leaders of the +Hoa Hao, the Cao Dai, and the Binh Xuyen, +dissatisfied with Premier Diem’s refusal to accede +to their various demands, formed the United Front +of National Forces.</p> + +<p>By mid-March the disaffected leaders of these +organizations felt strong enough to test the premier’s +strength. Trouble began late that month +when the Hoa Hao began undertaking guerrilla-type +activities against Diem’s National Army +units in the sect’s stronghold southwest of Saigon. +On 28 March Diem ordered a company of paratroops +to seize the Saigon Central Police Headquarters +which the French had allowed the Binh +Xuyen to control. Fighting erupted throughout +the capital the next day as Binh Xuyen units +clashed with loyal government forces. A truce was +arranged finally in the city on 31 March after three +days of intermittent but fierce fighting. That +same day the Cao Dai broke with the United +Front and accepted a government offer to integrate +some of its troops into the National Army.</p> + +<p>An uneasy peace prevailed over South Vietnam +until 28 April when new fighting broke out. By the +middle of May, government forces had driven the +Binh Xuyen forces from Saigon, fracturing their +organization. Remnants of the bandit group, +however, escaped into the extensive Rung Sat +swamps south of the capital where they continued +fighting individually and in small groups. In the +countryside south of Saigon, 30 of Diem’s battalions, +including the 1st Landing Battalion, took +the offensive against the Hoa Hao regular and +guerrilla forces.</p> + +<p>The national crisis, for all practical purposes, +ended in the last week of June when a Hoa Hao +leader surrendered 8,000 regulars and ordered his +followers to cease all anti-government activities. +Sporadic fighting continued, however, as Diem’s +forces sought to mop-up Hoa Hao splinter groups +fighting in the western Mekong Delta and Binh +Xuyen elements still resisting in the rugged mangrove +swamps south of the capital. In August the +Marine Landing Battalion fought a decisive action +against the remaining Hoa Hao in Kien Giang +Province about 120 miles southwest of Saigon, +destroying the rebel headquarters. Later in the +year the 1st Landing Battalion, joined by several +river boat companies, reduced one of the last<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">19</span> +pockets of Binh Xuyen resistance in the Rung Sat. +As a result of these and similar actions being +fought simultaneously by loyal Army units, organized +resistance to Premier Diem gradually +collapsed.<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[2-F]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="label">[2-F]</a> Some sources contend that remnants of the Hoa Hao and +Cao Dai armies survived to operate alongside the Viet Cong +guerrillas who began threatening the Diem government in the +late 1950s. (Kahin and Lewis, <cite>The U.S. in Vietnam</cite>, p. 111.)</p> + +</div> + +<p>The sect crisis of 1955 proved to be the turning +point in Diem’s political fortunes. At the height +of the crisis, Emperor Bao Dai attempted to remove +Diem as premier by ordering him to France for +“consultations.” Electing to remain in Saigon and +direct his government efforts to quell the rebellion, +the premier declined Bao Dai’s summons. The +Vietnamese military forces proved loyal to the +premier, having faithfully executed Diem’s commands +throughout the emergency. Having successfully +met the armed challenge of the sects and +the Binh Xuyen and having openly repudiated +Bao Dai’s authority, Premier Diem had imposed at +least a measure of political stability on South +Vietnam.</p> + +<p>An epilogue to the sect crisis was written on +23 October when a nationwide referendum was +held in South Vietnam to settle the issue of national +leadership. In the balloting, since criticized as +having been rigged, Premier Diem received 98.2 +percent of the total vote against Bao Dai. Three +days later, on 26 October, South Vietnam’s new +president proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam +(RVN).</p> + +<p>The Vietnamese Marine Corps benefited greatly +from Premier Diem’s successful confrontation with +his political rivals. On 1 May, in preparation for +the 1st Landing Battalion’s deployment to combat, +Major Trong had established a small Marine Corps +headquarters in Saigon. Shortly thereafter, Diem +had appointed a Vietnamese officer, Captain Bui +Pho Chi, to replace Captain Delayen as commander +of the landing battalion. The French commando +officer, who was a member of TRIM, remained +at Nha Trang as an advisor to the VNMC. Then, +on the last day of June, Diem removed the remaining +French officers from command positions +throughout South Vietnam’s naval forces. The +combined effect of these actions was to reduce +French influence throughout the nation’s naval +establishment while making the Vietnamese Marine +Corps more responsive to the central government.</p> + +<p>The burdens of demobilization also were lightened +somewhat as a result of the sect crisis when a +new force level was approved by the United States +in mid-summer of 1955. The new agreement, +dictated in part by the requirement to integrate +portions of the sects’ armies into the national +forces, raised the force level to 150,000 men and +placed the personnel ceiling of the Vietnamese +naval forces at 4,000 men. This revision enhanced +the prospects for a corresponding increase in the +authorized strength of the VNMC.</p> + +<p>The 1st Landing Battalion’s performance against +the sect forces in the Mekong Delta and the Rung +Sat, moreover, tempered much of the previous +opposition to a separate VNMC. Heretofore, U.S. +and Vietnamese Army officers had opposed the +existence of a Vietnamese amphibious force apart +from the National Army. Until the sect uprising, +Lieutenant Colonel Croizat had used the influence +afforded by his position as naval advisor to the +general staff to advocate the continuation of the +VNMC. But during the sect battles the Vietnamese +Marines had firmly established their value to the +new government. By displaying loyalty, discipline, +and efficiency in combat, they had spoken out in +their own behalf at a critical juncture in their +corp’s existence.</p> + +<p>Shortly before the 1st Landing Battalion deployed +to fight the rebellious sect forces, two additional +U.S. Marine advisors—an officer and a noncommissioned +officer—arrived in South Vietnam +for duty with the MAAG. Both Marines were +assigned to TRIM. Croizat dispatched the officer, +Captain James T. Breckinridge, to Nha Trang +where he soon replaced Captain Delayen as advisor +to the 1st Landing Battalion. As State Department +policy prohibited U.S. military personnel +from participating in combat activities with indigenous +forces, Breckinridge was forced to await +the battalion’s return from the field. During its +absence he divided his time between Nha Trang +and Saigon where he assisted Colonel Croizat with +planning and logistics matters. The noncommissioned +officer, Technical Sergeant Jackson E. +Tracy, initially remained in Saigon but later +moved to Nha Trang. There, serving principally +as a small unit tactics instructor to the Vietnamese +Marines, Tracy impressed Breckinridge as a “first-rate<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">20</span> +Marine ‘NCO’—one who could carry out the +most complex assignment with little or no supervision.”<a id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[2-4]</a></p> + +<figure id="ip_20" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_020.jpg" width="1888" height="1284" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat, first U.S. Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, translates during +discussions between Lieutenant General John “Iron Mike” O’Daniel, USA, Chief, USMAAG, Vietnam, and Premier +Ngo Dinh Diem. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Colonel Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.)</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Soon after 1956 opened, President Diem appointed +a new officer to head the Vietnamese Marine Corps. +On 18 January Major Phan Van Lieu assumed command +of the VNMC, and thereby became the second +Senior Marine Officer.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_20"><i>Reorganization and Progress</i></h3> + +<p>The 1st Landing Battalion remained in action +against the Binh Xuyen remnants until February +1956. During this period Lieutenant Colonel Croizat +reviewed the entire organizational structure +of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. By now the size +of the service had been reduced to roughly 1,800 +officers and men although it retained its original +organization of six river boat companies, five +light support companies, a landing battalion, a +training flotilla, and a small headquarters.</p> + +<p>This organization, with so many dissimilar units +existing on one echelon, influenced Croizat to +suggest that Major Lieu restructure the service. +Assisted by Croizat, Captain Breckinridge, and +Technical Sergeant Tracy, Lieu and his small staff +spent several months developing and refining plans +for the comprehensive reorganization of the Marine +Corps. Lieu submitted this package to the +Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) on 21 December +1955. The salient feature of the plan was to +create an additional landing battalion without +increasing the 1,837-man ceiling which then governed +the size of the VNMC. Significantly, the +plan contained a clause proposing that the Vietnamese +Marine Corps be expanded to regimental +size in the future.<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[2-5]</a></p> + +<figure id="ip_20b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 42em;"> + <img src="images/i_021.png" width="2679" height="934" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><p>VNMC TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 18 FEBRUARY 1956</p> + +<p>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH, 1,837</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure id="ip_20c" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 42em;"> + <img src="images/i_021b.png" width="2667" height="945" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><p>LANDING BATTALION TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 18 FEBRUARY 1956</p> + +<p>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 728</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The Vietnamese Joint General Staff approved +the new structure, and reorganization of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">22</span> +VNMC was begun when the 1st Landing Battalion +finally returned to Nha Trang in February. The +old river boat and light support companies were +disbanded and three new units—a 4.2-inch mortar +company, a headquarters and service company, +and a new landing battalion—were formed. Designated +the 2d Landing Battalion, this new unit +formed about 25 miles south of Nha Trang at +Cam Ranh Bay where the French had trained +amphibious forces during the latter stages of the +Indochina War.</p> + +<p>As a result of the 1956 reorganization effort, the +tables of organization and tables of equipment for +the Vietnamese Marine battalions were completely +revised. Three infantry companies, a heavy +weapons company, and a headquarters and service +company now comprised a landing battalion.<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[2-G]</a> +Each infantry company was organized into three +rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. In turn, +the rifle platoons each consisted of three 10-man +squads (three 3-man fire teams and a squad +leader). The individual Vietnamese Marine rifleman +was armed with the .30 caliber M-1 carbine, +a weapon formerly carried by many French and +Vietnamese commandos. It had been retained for +use within the VNMC because it was substantially +shorter and lighter than the standard U.S. infantry +weapon, the M-1 rifle, and was therefore better +suited to the small Vietnamese fighting man. The +automatic rifleman in each Vietnamese Marine +fire team carried the Browning automatic rifle +(BAR), a heavier .30 caliber automatic weapon. +The weapons platoon of the rifle company was +built around six .30 caliber light machine guns. +Within the heavy weapons company of the landing +battalions was a mortar platoon, equipped with +four 81mm mortars, and a recoilless rifle platoon.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="label">[2-G]</a> Whereas U.S. Marine infantry companies were designated by +letters (A, B, C, D, etc.), the Vietnamese Marine infantry companies +were given number designations.</p> + +</div> + +<p>While this reorganization was underway, Lieutenant +Colonel Croizat initiated a search for +acceptable means of expanding the Vietnamese +Marine Corps to regimental size. A staff study +produced by the Senior Marine Advisor a month +before the first phase of the reorganization effort +had begun included several important recommendations. +Croizat proposed to General O’Daniel +that authorization be granted to raise the ceiling +on the VNMC from 1,837 to 2,435 officers and +men. This, the Marine advisor pointed out, could +be accomplished without affecting the overall +ceiling on all South Vietnamese military and +naval forces. By reassigning to the Vietnamese +Marine Corps an amphibious battalion still +organized within the National Army, the 150,000-man +force level would not be altered. This would +transform the Vietnamese Marine Corps into a +three battalion regiment and would unify all South +Vietnamese amphibious forces under a single +command. Croizat’s study further recommended +that the Vietnamese Marine Corps be designated +part of the general reserve of the nation’s armed +forces and that it be controlled directly by the +Vietnamese Joint General Staff. Although no +immediate action was taken on these recommendations, +they were to serve as a blueprint for the +future expansion of the VNMC. Equally important, +they bore the seed that would eventually +make the Vietnamese Marine Corps a fully integrated +component of South Vietnam’s defense +establishment.</p> + +<p>During the ensuing three years, several apparently +unrelated occurrences impacted either directly or +indirectly on the U.S. Marine advisory effort in +South Vietnam. The French completed their military +withdrawal from South Vietnam and dissolved +their High Command in April 1956, slightly +ahead of schedule.<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[2-H]</a> In conjunction with this final +phase of the French withdrawal, the Training +Relations Instructions Mission was abolished. +Thus, it was no longer necessary for the MAAG +programs to be executed through the combined +training mission.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="label">[2-H]</a> A few French naval officers and noncommissioned officers +remained at Nha Trang as instructors until late May 1957.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Shortly after the departure of the last French +troops, Lieutenant Colonel Croizat ended his assignment +as Senior Marine Advisor. He was replaced +by Lieutenant Colonel William N. Wilkes, +Jr., in June 1956. A veteran of the Guadalcanal +campaign, Wilkes came to Vietnam from Washington, +D.C. where he had recently completed a +French language course. Like his predecessor, the +new Senior Marine Advisor was scheduled to serve +in Vietnam for two years.</p> + +<p>In August, less than two months after Lieutenant +Colonel Wilkes’ arrival, President Diem appointed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">23</span> +a new officer to head his Marine Corps. This time +Bui Pho Chi, the captain who had commanded +the 1st Landing Battalion during the sect uprising, +was selected for the assignment. Chi’s appointment +was only temporary, however, for in October Diem +ordered Major Le Nhu Hung to assume command +of the Marine Corps. Major Hung, who became the +VNMC’s fourth Senior Officer, was to hold the +position for four years.</p> + +<p>An attempt to abolish the Vietnamese Marine +Corps coincided with the series of changes in its +leadership and the departure of Lieutenant Colonel +Croizat. During the summer months, the Vietnamese +Minister of Defense proposed that the +VNMC be made a branch of South Vietnam’s +Army. Fortunately, the recent combat record of +the 1st Landing Battalion outweighed the minister’s +influence and the effort to disestablish the +Vietnamese Marine Corps was thwarted.</p> + +<p>Another noteworthy incident in the record of +the early relations between the U.S. and Vietnamese +Marines occurred when the Marine noncommissioned +officer billet within the MAAG +was upgraded to an officer position. This adjustment, +which anticipated the creation of the 2d +Landing Battalion, had the effect of making a +U.S. Marine officer available to advise individual +VNMC battalions on a permanent basis. Thus +originated a plan whereby a U.S. Marine officer +would advise each Vietnamese Marine battalion—a +concept abandoned only temporarily between +1959 and 1962.</p> + +<p>The Vietnamese Marine Corps continued as a +two-battalion regiment under the command of +Major Le Nhu Hung from mid-1956 through +1959. During this period Lieutenant Colonel +Wilkes and his successor, Lieutenant Colonel +Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., a Marine who had +served as an aide to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, +instituted a variety of programs intended to +provide the Vietnamese Marines with a common +base of experience and training.<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[2-I]</a> Perhaps the +most important of these was one implemented in +1958 whereby Vietnamese Marine officers began +attending basic and intermediate level schools +at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico. Other formal +schools for noncommissioned officers were +established by the Vietnamese Marine Corps in +South Vietnam. In an effort to build <i lang="fr">esprit de +corps</i> among the lower ranking Vietnamese Marines, +the U.S. advisors encouraged voluntary enlistments. +They also persuaded their Vietnamese +counterparts to adopt a corps-wide marksmanship +training program similar to the one then in use +by the U.S. Marine Corps.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="label">[2-I]</a> See <a href="#Appendix_A">Appendix A</a> for complete listings of VNMC Commandants +and Senior Marine Advisors to the VNMC during +the 1954–1964 period.</p> + +</div> + +<p>In conjunction with the reorganization of the +VNMC and the stress being placed upon small +unit and individual training, much of the U.S. +advisory effort during this period was devoted +to logistics. The Marine advisors soon discovered +that the Vietnamese officers, who had not been +directly concerned with supply matters under the +French, tended to ignore this important area. +“The real problem,” explained Captain Breckinridge, +“was the newness of it all. The Vietnamese +officers simply possessed no base of experience or +training in logistic matters.”<a id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[2-6]</a> This shortcoming +dictated that the American advisors not only +design a workable logistics system but closely +supervise its operation as well. Wilkes and Wilkinson +instituted intensive schooling of supply and +maintenance personnel and emphasized the value +of command supervision to the Vietnamese leaders. +The Marine advisors, for example, taught their +counterparts that equipment shortages could often +be prevented if command attention were given to +requisitions. Still, even with constant supervision +and formal schooling, the Vietnamese Marine +Corps continued to experience problems in this +area throughout the 1950s and well into the +next decade. Breckinridge, who returned to serve +with the Vietnamese Marines again as a lieutenant +colonel in the late 1960s, recalled shortages of +such vital and common items as small arms ammunition +even then.</p> + +<p>The years between 1955 and 1959 also saw the +Marine advisors working to overcome a potentially +more serious problem, one that also +dated from the French-Indochina War. From the +outset of their experience with the Vietnamese +Marine Corps, the Marine advisors perceived that +a strong defensive orientation seemed to pervade +every echelon of the small service. Most Americans, +including U.S. Army advisors who were encountering +similar difficulties with the Vietnamese Army, +agreed that this “defensive psychology” was a +by-product of the long subordination of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">24</span> +Vietnamese National forces to the French High +Command. Indeed, a criticism frequently voiced +by USMAAG officials during the Indochina War +had been that the French tended to frustrate the +development of the Vietnamese military forces +by assigning them static security tasks rather +than offensive missions. Even though the forerunners +of the Vietnamese Marine battalions had +operated as commando units, they too had seen +extensive duty protecting <i lang="fr">dinassaut</i> bases and +other French installations. Now this defensive +thinking was affecting the attitude of the Vietnamese +Marine toward training. Moreover, it +was threatening the American effort to transform +the service into an aggressive amphibious strike +force.</p> + +<figure id="ip_24" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 35em;"> + <img src="images/i_024.jpg" width="1901" height="1169" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>First group of Vietnamese Marine officers to attend U.S. Marine Officers Basic School, Quantico, Virginia, pose with +Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (second from right), and Captain Michael Gott (extreme right). At the +extreme left is Captain Le Nguyen Khang, a future Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. To his immediate +left is Major Le Nhu Hung, a senior officer of the VNMC. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael Gott, USMC</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>By nature this particular problem defied quick, +simple solutions. The Marine advisors, therefore, +undertook to adjust the orientation of the entire +Vietnamese Marine Corps over a prolonged period +through continuous emphasis on offensive training. +The advisors consistently encouraged their Vietnamese +counterparts to develop training schedules +which stressed patrolling, ambushing, fire and +maneuver, and night movement. In this same +connection the Marine advisors translated U.S. +Marine small unit tactics manuals into French, +whereupon the same manuals were further translated +by Vietnamese Marines into Vietnamese. +This process assured that adequate training literature +was made available to the individual Marine +and his small unit leaders. The offensively oriented +training programs and the translation project +complemented one another, and combined with +continuous supervision by the U.S. advisors and +the return of young Vietnamese officers from +Quantico, gradually helped impart a more aggressive<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">25</span> +offensive spirit to the entire Marine +Corps.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_25"><i>Summing Up Developments</i></h3> + +<p>The years between 1955 and 1959 constitute perhaps +the most critical and challenging span in the +chronicle of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. Born +out of the confusion which dominated South Vietnam +in the aftermath of the Geneva Agreement, +the embryonic Marine Corps had survived against +heavy odds. Even before its scattered components +could be drawn together under a centralized command, +the Corps had been hurled into combat +against the rebellious sects. Over the course of +their commitment the Vietnamese Marines had +strengthened their own cause through demonstrations +of their fighting capability and loyalty. +In terms of the VNMC’s continued existence, +equally critical battles were being waged in Saigon +where the Senior U.S. Marine Advisor and the +Vietnamese Senior Marine Officer struggled to gain +support for the infant service. It was there, ironically, +that the destiny of the Vietnamese Marine +Corps ultimately had been decided.</p> + +<p>On balance, the interval between 1955 and 1959 +was characterized by uncertainty, transition, and +problem solving. Never sure of the Marine Corps’ +future, the Senior Vietnamese Marine Officer and a +handful of U.S. Marine advisors had carried forward +their efforts to transform scattered French-inspired +river commando units into a coherent and +responsive American-style amphibious force. While +this transformation was only partially realized, +definite progress was apparent. Vietnamese officers +had replaced French commanders, and with American +guidance, had given their service a strong interim +structure. Many of the more serious problems +which had plagued the struggling organization +since its inception had been identified. With +American assistance, solutions to those problems +were being developed and tested. So, despite a +stormy beginning and a threatened early childhood, +the Vietnamese Marine Corps lived.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">26</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_3"><span id="toclink_26"></span>CHAPTER 3<br> +<span class="subhead large">Vietnamese Marines +and the Communist Insurgency</span><br> +<span class="subhead notbold"><i>Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency—Insurgency and the Vietnamese +Marine Corps—Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands—American +Decisions at the Close of 1961</i></span></h2> +</div> + +<h3 id="toclink_26a"><i>Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency</i></h3> + +<p>South Vietnam gave every outward indication +that it had achieved a measure of overall stability +in the two-year period following President Diem’s +election in the fall of 1955. In early 1956 Diem +felt strong enough politically to announce his +government’s refusal to participate in the reunification +elections scheduled for midyear. He +based this position upon the argument that free +elections were impossible in Communist North +Vietnam. The proposed July election deadline +passed without a serious reaction by North Vietnam. +Equally encouraging was the fact that there +had been no noticeable resurgence in the armed +power of either the politico-religious sects or the +Binh Xuyen. At the same time the American-backed +South Vietnamese economy appeared to +be gaining considerable strength.</p> + +<figure id="ip_26" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;"> + <img src="images/i_026.jpg" width="922" height="1128" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, USA, Commander, +Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. +(<cite>USA Photo SC494954</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The threat of invasion from the North had also +been tempered somewhat by 1958. The MAAG, +now headed by Lieutenant General Samuel T. +Williams, U.S. Army, a commander respected as +a tough disciplinarian, was beginning to reshape +the former Vietnamese national forces.<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[3-A]</a> Renamed +the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), +the army now consisted of four field divisions +(8,500 men each), six light divisions (5,000 men +each), 13 territorial regiments (whose strength +varied), and a parachute regiment. Although +General Williams viewed this as merely an interim +organization, it had provided the South Vietnamese +army with a unified command structure +based on sound organizational principles. The +arrival of a 350-man U.S. Temporary Equipment +Recovery Mission (TERM) in 1956, moreover, +had freed U.S. Army advisors for assignment to +each ARVN regiment. American officers were +likewise reorganizing and helping train the small<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">27</span> +Vietnamese Navy (2,160 officers and men) and +Air Force (4,000 officers and men). The Vietnamese +Marine Corps continued to exist as a two-battalion +amphibious force within the nation’s naval +establishment. General Williams felt confident +that by 1958 South Vietnam’s regular military +establishment had been strengthened enough to +discourage North Vietnamese leaders from seriously +considering an outright invasion.<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[3-1]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="label">[3-A]</a> General Williams would head the MAAG until his retirement +in 1960.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Backing these developing regular forces, at +least on paper, were two generally feeble paramilitary +organizations—the Civil Guard (CG) +and the Village Self Defense Corps (SDC). The +larger of these, the Civil Guard, existed within the +Ministry of Interior and was funded and advised +by the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM). Its +48,000 men, therefore, were not charged against +the 150,000-man force level ceiling that regulated +the size of Diem’s regular forces. Nor were the +47,000 members of the Self Defense Corps, even +though this organization received limited amounts +of U.S. military assistance funds for payroll purposes. +In any case, serious shortcomings were +evident in both the CG and the SDC. Organized +into provincial companies directly responsible to +the various province chiefs, the Civil Guard was +entirely separate from the ARVN chain of command. +Furthermore, American civilians under +government contract had armed and trained the +CG for police-type as opposed to military missions. +The SDC, essentially a scattering of local militia +units, was even weaker, having been organized +at the village level into squads and an occasional +platoon. Although the SDC units were subordinate +to the respective village chief, the ARVN bore +the responsibility for providing them with arms +and training. More often than not the Vietnamese +Army units gave their obsolete weapons to the +SDC and showed little genuine interest in training +the small units.<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[3-2]</a></p> + +<p>Although a measure of stability was obviously +returning to South Vietnam by 1958, one of the +country’s more serious problems remained unsolved—the +threat of subversion by Communist +Viet Minh agents who had remained south of the +17th parallel following the Geneva cease-fire. +Following the resolution of the sect crisis in 1955, +Diem turned to neutralize this potential threat. +Initially his army experienced some success with +pacification operations conducted in former Viet +Minh strongholds. While they did help extend +government control into the rural areas of several +provinces, such operations were discontinued in +1956.</p> + +<p>Another policy initiated that same year seems to +have nullified the moderate gains produced by the +pacification campaigns. Acting both to eliminate +Viet Minh sympathizers from positions of leadership +at the local level and to extend his own grip +downward to the rural population, Diem replaced +elected village officials with appointed chiefs. The +new policy, which threatened the traditional +autonomy of the individual Vietnamese village, +was immediately unpopular.</p> + +<p>So was another government program which +Diem implemented to undercut Communist strength +throughout the country—the Anti-Communist +Denunciation Campaign. Initiated in mid-1955 to +discredit former Viet Minh, the denunciation +campaign evolved into something of a witch hunt. +By the late 1950s large numbers of Vietnamese with +only minimal Communist connections were allegedly +being confined in political re-education +camps. Like the appointment of village leaders, +the denunciation campaign served to alienate +Vietnamese who might otherwise have supported +the central government in its struggle for control of +the rural regions.</p> + +<p>Forced underground by the Anti-Communist +Denunciation Campaign, Viet Minh agents concentrated +on strengthening their political posture +for the proposed general election in the period +immediately following the Geneva Agreement. +When the hope of reunification by plebiscite passed +in mid-1956, the so-called “stay behinds” began +rebuilding clandestine political cells in their +former strongholds. Having retained their aptitude +for the adroit manipulation of local grievances, the +Communists gradually won support from rural +Vietnamese who saw themselves threatened by the +new government policies. In mid-1957, the Communists, +who were now being labelled “Viet +Cong” by the Diem government (a derogatory but +accurate term which, literally translated, meant +“Vietnamese Communist”) began assassinating +government officials in several of the country’s +rural provinces. Aimed at unpopular village chiefs, +rural police, district officials, and school teachers, +the Viet Cong’s assassination campaign was undertaken +to erode the government’s contacts with the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">28</span> +local populace and thereby enhance their own +organizational efforts.</p> + +<p>Still faced with the possibility of a conventional +attack across the demilitarized zone, President +Diem was reluctant to commit his regular military +units to a problem which seemed to demand police-type +operations. Seeing no clear-cut threat, he +relied on the Village Self Defense Corps and the +Civil Guard to maintain order in the provinces. +Poorly led and equipped, and trained primarily in +urban police methods, the paramilitary forces +proved unable to prevent the diffuse terrorist +attacks. In the 12-month period between July 1957 +and July 1958, for example, some 700 more South +Vietnamese officials reportedly died at the hands of +Communist terrorists.<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[3-3]</a></p> + +<p>The Viet Cong terror-propaganda campaigns +continued apace throughout 1958. The occurrence +of the first attacks on U.S. facilities in Saigon and +the initiation of an anti-American propaganda +campaign near the end of that year, moreover, +indicated that the Communists were broadening the +scope of their activities. By this time, the internal +disturbances were beginning to assume the dimensions +of a concerted guerrilla movement in several +of the country’s more heavily populated regions, +including parts of the important Mekong Delta. +Near the close of 1958 President Diem finally began +ordering regular military units into the provinces +with instructions to eliminate the Viet Cong and +restore government control.</p> + +<p>The very nature of the enemy, however, tended +to render such government operations ineffective. +Essentially, the Viet Cong derived their strength +from the clandestine political structure which +agents had established in portions of the countryside. +Interwoven into the social fabric of the hamlets +and villages, this political infrastructure, as it +later came to be called, served a dual purpose. It +was both the machinery by which the Communists +exercised control over the population and a vital +base of support for the growing guerrilla forces, +providing the Viet Cong with men, food, intelligence +information, and refuge.</p> + +<p>As the Viet Cong guerrillas were recruited from +and lived among the local populace, outsiders +found it virtually impossible to identify them. +Their familiarity with the local terrain, their +methods of operating in small groups, and massing +for attacks mostly at night made locating them +equally difficult. Even their patience seemed to +enhance their ability to survive. Unwilling to +engage a stronger military force and realizing that +a specific government operation could not continue +indefinitely, the Viet Cong normally would melt +into their environment with the arrival of regular +units. When the operation terminated and the +regular government forces withdrew, the Communists +would re-emerge, often stronger than before. +In many cases the guerrillas could give real meaning +to their anti-government propaganda once the local +population had felt the weight of military operations +in their particular community. Operating in +this manner, the Viet Cong were able to husband +their strength while simultaneously expanding +their influence.</p> + +<p>There was ample indication that the Communist +movement was not wholly indigenous to South +Vietnam. Indeed, evidence of increasing North +Vietnamese support for the Viet Cong was becoming +apparent near the end of the decade. In May +1959, the Central Committee of the North Vietnamese +Communist Party publicly announced its +intention “to smash” the government of Ngo Dinh +Diem.<a id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[3-4]</a> By the summer of that year the Viet Cong +were being reinforced with men and limited quantities +of equipment infiltrated from North Vietnam. +Many of the Communist infiltrators, who at this +early stage were entering Diem’s country across the +DMZ and by sea, were southerners who had gone +North with the Viet Minh in late 1954. Trained in +political and military operations, these returnees +added substantially to the Viet Cong’s discipline +and technical capabilities.<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[3-B]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="label">[3-B]</a> A State Department publication released in 1965 placed the +number of confirmed North Vietnamese infiltrators for the years +1959 and 1960 at 1,800. It also noted that an additional 2,700 +North Vietnamese were estimated to have been infiltrated during +this two-year period. The vast majority of these were thought +to have been former residents of southern Vietnam. (Department +of State, <cite>Aggression from the North</cite>, p. 33.)</p> + +</div> + +<p>So strengthened, the Communist guerrillas +reportedly were operating in battalion strength +(300– to 400-man battalions) in some areas by mid-1959. +Throughout the country they had expanded +their activities to include hit-and-run attacks on +paramilitary posts, district headquarters, hospitals, +schools, and agricultural stations. Like the assassination +campaign which was underway concurrently +in areas still controlled by the GVN, these attacks<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">29</span> +were conceived with political considerations in +mind. By successfully raiding remote, poorly defended +facilities, the Viet Cong was able to embarrass +the central government while demonstrating +their own strength to the local population. The +raids, furthermore, produced weapons which +enabled the guerrillas to operate without total +dependence on the North.</p> + +<p>By mid-1959 the security situation in the Republic +of Vietnam had deteriorated to the point +that much of the optimism formerly voiced by +American and South Vietnamese officials had begun +to disappear. The National Intelligence Estimate +released in Washington during August accurately +described the conditions which were settling over +South Vietnam. This paper disclosed that the +nation’s economy was beginning to falter noticeably +and that President Diem’s government was growing +increasingly unpopular. Furthermore, the estimate +warned that harassment by the Viet Cong could be +expected to intensify.<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[3-5]</a></p> + +<p>As predicted, security conditions in South +Vietnam did grow worse in the period following +the August intelligence estimate. In the last four +months of 1959 almost 200 assassinations were +reported. In January 1960 another 96 civilians were +killed by the Communists and in the following +month the total reached 122. By the fall of 1960 +the Viet Cong were strong enough to begin ambushing +regular ARVN units in several provinces. +Like their raids on fixed installations, their ambush +tactics were resulting in frequent and demoralizing +defeats for the government. Like the raids, they +were also providing weapons and ammunition for +the growing guerrilla forces.</p> + +<p>By 1960 the government’s inability to contain +the disturbing malaise was beginning to produce +political tensions in Saigon. On 26 April a group +of 18 distinguished Vietnamese political figures, +including a number of former cabinet members, +issued a public demand for President Diem’s +resignation. Diem refused, eventually ordering the +arrest of all who signed the manifesto.</p> + +<p>A more serious effort to bring down the central +government occurred in November when a group of +military officers led by Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi, +the commander of a newly formed (1959) ARVN +airborne brigade, staged an abortive coup d’etat +in Saigon. Two companies of Vietnamese Marines +joined Thi’s rebellious paratroops.<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[3-C]</a> But the power +struggle, which began in the early morning hours +of 11 November, ended when units loyal to President +Diem converged on the capital. Realizing +that the balance had been tipped against them, the +coup leaders fled the country and the incident was +closed. While it had failed to bring down the Diem +government, Thi’s attempted coup had revived +the possibility of efforts by military leaders to +seize control of the government and had injected +a new element of uncertainty into South Vietnam’s +already unstable internal situation.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="label">[3-C]</a> Vietnamese Marine participation in the abortive coup of +10 November 1960 is covered in greater detail elsewhere in this +chapter.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Two other danger signals flashed across Southeast +Asia shortly after the abortive coup. In +January 1961, Communist leaders in Hanoi announced +that the National Liberation Front (NLF) +had been founded in the South on 20 December 1960 +with the stated purpose of closely uniting the +“various classes of the South Vietnamese patriotic +population in the struggle against the Americans +and Diem....”<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[3-6]</a> In truth, the NLF emerged as +a fully developed Communist political organization +imported from North Vietnam for the purpose of +controlling, directing, and coordinating the insurgency +south of the 17th parallel. For American +officials, the announced establishment of the NLF +signified that Ho Chi Minh’s government had opted +for the forceful reunification of North and South.</p> + +<p>Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, another event led +to further speculation that the war in Vietnam was +about to enter a new phase. Backed by the North +Vietnamese Army, Communist Pathet Lao forces +seized control of the southeastern portion of the +Laotian panhandle. Thus, the North Vietnamese +obtained a protected corridor along South Vietnam’s +northwestern border through which men and +materiel could be infiltrated to the South.</p> + +<p>The establishment of the NLF and the Communist +takeover in southern Laos coincided roughly +with approval in Washington of a comprehensive +plan designed to help President Diem restore +internal order. Designated the Counter-Insurgency +Plan (CIP), this study had been ordered by President +Eisenhower in early 1960. Developed by +Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr, U.S. Army, +the officer who had relieved General Williams as +MAAG Chief, the completed CIP reached the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">30</span> +White House shortly after President John F. +Kennedy’s inauguration in January 1961. Significantly, +its arrival came at a time when the Soviet +Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, was publicly pledging +his country’s support for “wars of national +liberation.”</p> + +<p>The plan presented for the new president’s consideration +drew clear connections between the +military and political aspects of the war in Vietnam. +It included a conditional offer of U.S. support +for a 20,000-man increase in the regular South +Vietnamese military forces and a 32,000-man increase +in the size of the Civil Guard. These military +and paramilitary increases were to be dependent +upon President Diem’s agreement to effect major +reforms in his military and political apparatus—measures +which American officials in Saigon considered +necessary for the success of any counterinsurgency +effort.</p> + +<p>President Kennedy approved the main provisions +of the Counter-Insurgency Plan on 28 January 1961 +and negotiations on the package opened with Diem +two weeks later. But the talks soon deadlocked on +the issue of political and military reforms. Meanwhile, +with the discussions in Saigon dragging on +inconclusively, the situation in the provinces +continued to worsen. A National Intelligence +Estimate released in March estimated that Viet +Cong military strength had reached 10,000 men. +Furthermore, the number of violent incidents +reported in the country had risen to 650 per month. +Even worse, it was estimated that 58 percent of +South Vietnam was under some degree of Communist +control.<a id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[3-7]</a></p> + +<p>Convinced that the situation was becoming +critical and fearing that it might soon become +hopeless, President Kennedy approved a new program +of military assistance to the Diem government +on 29 April. Inspired in part by Kennedy’s desire +to increase Diem’s confidence in the new U.S. +administration, the 29 April program did not +require concrete pledges of reform from the South +Vietnamese. In its specifics, however, the new +package was similar to the CIP. It contained provisions +for supporting a 20,000 man increase in the +Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)—a +move which would raise the ceiling on the South +Vietnamese regular forces from 150,000 to 170,000. +Another provision approved the use of Military +Assistance Program appropriations for the Civil +Guard and Self Defense Corps and expanded the +MAAG’s responsibility to include training and +equipping these forces. Under the 29 April plan, +the paramilitary forces were to be transferred from +Diem’s Ministry of the Interior to his Ministry of +Defense. In order to meet its increased advisory +responsibilities, authorization was given to increase +the size of the MAAG by 100 men to a strength of +785. This provision allowed the first enlargement +of the group since the introduction of the Temporary +Equipment Recovery Mission in 1956.<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[3-D]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="label">[3-D]</a> With the dissolution of TERM in the late 1950s, the International +Control Commission had granted permission for the +MAAG to maintain a strength of 685 men. When the logistics +personnel departed Vietnam, new advisor billets were created +within the MAAG’s table of organization.</p> + +</div> + +<p>General McGarr’s advisory group began implementing +President Kennedy’s 29 April program +during the summer of 1961. But the increases in the +government’s regular and paramilitary establishments +and in the size of the MAAG failed to arrest +the trend of warfare on South Vietnam’s battlefields. +The remainder of 1961 was characterized by +increasingly aggressive guerrilla operations and the +steady growth of Viet Cong military forces. In +August, for example, the ARVN reported 41 major +armed attacks on its units. The following month +brought 450 Viet Cong-initiated incidents, including +several involving multi-battalion forces of over +1,000 guerrillas. In mid-September, for example, an +estimated 1,500 Viet Cong overran Phuoc Vin, the +capital of Phuoc Thuan Province, and held the +town for an entire day before escaping unmolested +into the countryside.<a id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[3-8]</a></p> + +<p>Equally alarming was the rapid rise in the +Viet Cong’s overall strength. Increasing numbers +of Communist troops were now being infiltrated +over recently opened trails through Laos. Curving +southwestward out of the North Vietnamese +panhandle, these infiltration routes enabled the +Communists to bypass the demilitarized zone +which separated the two Vietnamese states and +continue their southward movement down the +length of Laos and into Cambodia. From sanctuaries +within these countries the North Vietnamese +could easily infiltrate into South Vietnam by using +trails through the rugged mountains. Relying +primarily on these routes, over 3,750 North Vietnamese +infiltrators reportedly entered South Vietnam +during 1961. Successful recruiting in the +South served as another source of manpower for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">31</span> +the Viet Cong. Well propagandized, the steady +cadence of victories greatly enhanced the Viet +Cong’s prestige and thereby made recruitment less +difficult. By the end of 1961 infiltration from the +North and recruitment in the South had swollen +the Viet Cong regular military forces to an estimated +25,000 men.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_31"><i>Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps</i></h3> + +<p>At the end of 1958, when President Diem began +ordering his regular military forces into action +against the Viet Cong, the Vietnamese Marine +Corps was a two-battalion infantry force organized +within South Vietnam’s naval establishment. The +1,837-man corps was still commanded by Major +Le Nhu Hung. Hung maintained his headquarters +at the Cuu Long Navy Yard, an installation +situated on an estuary near the Saigon-Gia Dinh +boundary. Although they continued to maintain +barracks at Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay respectively, +the 1st and 2d Landing Battalions were now +being rotated to crude little camps near Bien Hoa, +a town located about 20 miles northeast of the +capital. Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, who had +replaced Lieutenant Colonel Wilkes as Senior +Marine Advisor in mid-1958, operated out of the +MAAG headquarters in Saigon but maintained an +office in the VNMC headquarters at Cuu Long. +Wilkinson’s two assistants, Captains Gary Wilder +and Dale N. Davis, lived with their battalions.</p> + +<p>Elements of Hung’s Marine Corps were among +the first regular government units committed to the +counterguerrilla effort. The 1st Landing Battalion +was ordered into action by the Joint General Staff +in the closing weeks of 1958. After deploying from +Bien Hoa, the battalion spent nearly two months +searching for Viet Cong in a mosquito-infested +region of An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s southernmost +province. Primarily, the Vietnamese Marines +conducted company and platoon-sized patrols +through rugged mangrove swamps in search of +guerrillas. When the operation ended in late +January 1959, the Vietnamese commanders reported +that their units had killed and captured several +Communist guerrillas and political leaders. Their +troops had also reported finding a suspected +guerrilla training camp which contained small +quantities of food and some weapons. The Vietnamese +Marines suffered no casualties during their +deployment. Adhering to prevailing USMAAG +policy, the U.S. Marine advisors did not accompany +the unit into combat. Unable to observe the operation, +the American advisors could not accurately +assess the battalion’s tactical proficiency.</p> + +<figure id="ip_31" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;"> + <img src="images/i_031.jpg" width="865" height="1084" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., USMC, +Senior Marine Advisor. (<cite>USMC Photo A229373</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>A few months after this initial operation, both +VNMC battalions were deployed against the Viet +Cong—the 1st again to An Xuyen Province and the +2d to Vinh Binh Province south of Saigon on the +seacoast. So deployed, both units came under the +operational control of the respective province +chiefs. In widely-scattered actions fought during +May, the 1st Battalion and a Civil Guard unit +claimed to have inflicted over 200 casualties on the +Viet Cong. In Vinh Binh Province, one company of +the 2d Landing Battalion reported killing 18 +guerrillas and capturing over 100 more. Again, U.S. +Marine advisors were not present and therefore +could not assess the accuracy of these reports. In +any case, these were the final combat operations for +the Vietnamese Marine Corps as a two-battalion +force.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">32</span></p> + +<p>Obviously, U.S. and Vietnamese authorities in +Saigon were giving increased attention to the +growing internal threat. Still, they had yet to +initiate any sweeping changes in the orientation of +the RVNAF. Indeed, in early 1959, the entire +ARVN was in the final phase of a reorganization +program which would culminate by midyear in +the formation of seven divisions of uniform size +(10,500 men each), five territorial regiments, and +an airborne brigade (formed from the old Army +parachute regiment). Under the new organization +the seven standard divisions were to be deployed +in or near population centers throughout the +country and were to be organized under two corps +headquarters, one (I Corps) located at Da Nang, and +the other (II Corps) located at Pleiku in the Central +Highlands. A third provisional corps headquarters +had also been formed in Saigon for activation in the +event of a national emergency.<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[3-E]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="label">[3-E]</a> By 1961 the third corps headquarters would be activated and +geographic boundaries of all three corps would be delineated to +facilitate the coordination of the government’s military efforts +against the Viet Cong. These military-geographic subdivisions +were termed corps tactical zones (CTZ).</p> + +</div> + +<p>One of the MAAG’s reactions to the emerging +guerrilla threat was to urge that President Diem +transfer the Civil Guard to his Ministry of Defense. +This adjustment, General Williams pointed out, +would permit the MAAG to train and equip +the CG for a mobile counterguerrilla mission. +But it also entailed raising the 150,000-man force +level ceiling. When both the Diem government and +the U.S. Embassy objected to the proposed transfer, +the MAAG turned to another alternative: the +strengthening and use of the regular units whose +assignment to counterguerrilla operations would +not seriously disturb the country’s counterinvasion +potential. The Vietnamese Marine Corps, whose +infantry battalions had already participated in +several operations against the Viet Cong, fell into +this category of units to be bolstered for the +counterguerrilla role.</p> + +<p>It was against this background that the VNMC +was enlarged again in mid-1959. This latest expansion +was generally accomplished in accordance +with the staff study prepared by Lieutenant Colonel +Croizat some three years earlier. On 1 June, after +both Marine battalions had returned from their +combat assignments in the Mekong Delta, a 3d +Landing Battalion was formed at a camp just +outside the Cuu Long Navy Yard. This new unit, +manned primarily by troops transferred from +amphibious elements then being phased out of the +reorganized ARVN, was built around a small +nucleus of seasoned Marine officers and noncommissioned +officers. Transferred from the 1st and 2d +Battalions, most of these Marines had seen combat +against the Viet Minh, the sects, and the Viet +Cong.</p> + +<p>Another development saw a fourth rifle company +added to each Marine infantry battalion. In turn, +the old heavy weapons companies were abolished. +The 81mm mortars and 57mm recoilless rifles were +reorganized into platoons within the battalions’ +headquarters and service companies. New weapons, +two 60mm mortars, and personnel to man them +were added to each Marine rifle company. These +adjustments raised the strength of the infantry +battalions to around 900 officers and men and +provided the Vietnamese Marine Corps with a +basic organizational structure which its infantry +battalions would retain throughout the coming +decade.<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[3-F]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="label">[3-F]</a> A side-effect of this reorganization was the modification of +the VNMC’s table of equipment. The most important change +saw the Vietnamese Marine riflemen exchange their M-1 carbines +for the heavier M-1 rifle, the weapon with which the ARVN +infantry forces were equipped.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Concurrent with the formation of the 3d Battalion +and the modification of the organizational +tables, the VNMC was formally designated the +“Marine Corps Group.” Now numbering 2,276 +officers and men, the Vietnamese Marines were +formed into a group headquarters, a group headquarters +and service company, a 4.2-inch mortar +battery, and the three infantry battalions.<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[3-G]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="label">[3-G]</a> The Vietnamese Marine Group continued to be known as +the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) in spite of its formal +redesignation.</p> + +</div> + +<p>As important as the VNMC’s expansion, reorganization, +and redesignation was the dramatic +change in its role within the Vietnamese armed +forces. On 1 June the Joint General Staff directed +the Vietnamese Marine Corps and the newly formed +ARVN airborne brigade to assume the mission of +the general reserve force for the entire RVNAF. So +assigned, the Vietnamese Marine Corps became a +“force in readiness”—a service directly responsible +to the Joint General Staff for any assigned ground +warfare mission.<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[3-9]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">33</span></p> + +<figure id="ip_33" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 41em;"> + <img src="images/i_033.png" width="2566" height="1765" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><p>VNMC (MARINE GROUP) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JUNE 1959</p> + +<p>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 2,276</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">34</span></p> + +<p>The Vietnamese Marine battalions and elements +of the ARVN airborne brigade (also garrisoned +near Saigon) were ordered into action against the +Viet Cong with increasing frequency after being +designated the RVNAF general reserve. Usually, +the Marine battalions, like their airborne counterparts, +were assigned to operate in a particular +province for a specified time period. In such assignments +the battalion commander was directly +responsible to the province chief who, in most +cases, was a military officer. The province chiefs +sometimes utilized the Marines in conjunction with +their Civil Guard units. It was not uncommon for +the Vietnamese Marines to find themselves conducting +operations in the most rugged and inaccessible +regions of the province to which they were +assigned. In such deployments the Marine battalions +often bore the brunt of hostile action or +suffered the physical hardships associated with +living and fighting in the most adverse swamps +and jungles.</p> + +<figure id="ip_34" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_034.jpg" width="1905" height="1409" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Vietnamese Marine riflemen traverse mosquito-infested swamps of the Ca Mau Peninsula on August 1961 operation. +(<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC.</cite>)</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>In connection with their continuing campaign +to transform the Vietnamese Marine Corps into a +truly elite fighting organization, the U.S. Marine +Advisors encouraged the Vietnamese Leathernecks +to take pride in the difficult and dangerous missions +now being assigned. In a related effort intended to +generate <i lang="fr">esprit de corps</i> throughout the service, +Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson proposed that the +Marine Corps adopt an official emblem and a +distinctive uniform. These suggestions produced +results when a board of Vietnamese officers selected +an emblem design similar to that of the U.S. +Marines. Shortly thereafter the VNMC adopted a +light weight, black and green “tiger stripe” +camouflaged utility uniform similar to that formerly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">35</span> +worn in Indochina by French commando +units. Although designed and procured primarily +for use in steamy tropical jungles, the colorful +uniform came to be worn in garrison with a dark +green beret. Along with the newly adopted emblem, +which was worn as a patch over the left breast +pocket, this uniform became the distinguishing +mark of the Vietnamese Marine and his U.S. +Marine advisor. Together, the uniform and emblem +did much to set the VNMC apart from the other +South Vietnamese armed services.<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[3-10]</a></p> + +<p>Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson instigated another +change during this same period which did much to +improve the effectiveness of the Marine advisory +program. Since the sect rebellion of 1955 American +policy had prohibited all U.S. military personnel +from participating in combat with South Vietnamese +forces. Because the prevailing restrictions prevented +his assistants from accurately assessing the +combat capabilities of the Vietnamese Marine +battalions, Wilkinson requested that they be +allowed to accompany their units into action. After +some study, General Williams, still the MAAG +Chief, approved this request with the stipulation +that the U.S. Marines were to act strictly as non-participating +observers.<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[3-11]</a> This privilege was not +extended to other MAAG personnel. Wilkinson +and his assistants, therefore, became the first +American servicemen to witness actual combat +operations against the Viet Cong. So through an +informal and relatively unknown arrangement, a +handful of Marine advisors were able to insure +that principles being stressed in training were +being applied in combat. Now operating alongside +the Vietnamese Marines in action, the advisors +were also able to obtain a better appreciation of the +terrain and enemy and a more thorough understanding +of the frustrating problems being encountered +by the VNMC units.</p> + +<p>The first half of 1960 brought changes in both +the leadership of the Vietnamese Marine Corps and +the U.S. Marine advisory program. In May President +Diem relieved Major Hung as Senior Marine +Officer. His replacement was Major Le Nguyen +Khang, an officer who spoke fluent English and +who had been the first Vietnamese Marine graduated +from the U.S. Marine Amphibious Warfare +School at Quantico. A capable and inspiring officer +who had formerly commanded a landing battalion +in combat against the Viet Cong, Khang was to +head the VNMC for over three years. The following +month Lieutenant Colonel Clifford J. Robichaud +relieved Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson as Senior +Marine Advisor. Like Khang, Robichaud had seen +combat previously. A former master sergeant, he +had been commissioned during World War II and +had fought as an infantry unit leader on Guadalcanal +and later in Korea. Like all U.S. Marines +assigned as advisors to the VNMC after 1960, +Robichaud was scheduled to serve only a one year +tour in South Vietnam.</p> + +<figure id="ip_35" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 14em;"> + <img src="images/i_035.png" width="861" height="1144" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Vietnamese Marine Corps Emblem.</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Combat assignments against the Viet Cong +continued to dominate the VNMC’s activities +during the remainder of 1960. With Communist +forces now capable of battalion-sized operations in +some areas, the Joint General Staff began deploying +government forces to the provinces in multi-battalion +strength. By late 1960 the Vietnamese +Marines were conducting two-battalion operations +controlled by a task force headquarters. Khang, +now a lieutenant colonel, normally commanded +these Marine task forces.</p> + +<figure id="ip_35b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;"> + <img src="images/i_036.jpg" width="927" height="1107" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Colonel Clifford J. Robichaud, USMC, Senior Marine +Advisor. (<cite>USMC Photo A25342</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>It was during one such operation, in which the +1st and 2d VNMC Battalions were operating +together in the provinces south of Saigon, that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">36</span> +elements of the 3d Battalion became involved in +the abortive coup of November 1960. The power +struggle began in the early morning hours of the +11th while the U.S. Marine advisors were attending +an informal celebration of the Marine Corps +birthday at Lieutenant Colonel Robichaud’s quarters +in Saigon. At the appointed hour Colonel Thi’s +rebellious paratroops, accompanied by the 3d +VNMC battalion commander and two Marine +companies from Cuu Long, moved into the capital +on trucks and seized the Joint General Staff Headquarters. +The remainder of the 3d battalion, led by +the battalion executive officer, who was unaware +of his superior’s intentions, moved to the presidential +palace and established protection for Diem. +Word of the coup, meanwhile, had reached Khang +at his field headquarters in the Mekong Delta. Led +by the Senior Marine Officer, the 1st and 2d +Battalions returned to Saigon by truck convoy and +immediately joined the two Marine companies +already around the palace. For several hours the +possibility existed that Khang’s Marines might +clash with Thi’s paratroops or even with the two +rebellious Marine companies of the 3d Battalion. +But pro-Diem units soon began converging on +Saigon in such numbers that the coup collapsed. +Thi and his associates fled the country, whereupon +Diem appointed new officers to command the +insubordinate units. With loyalists in charge +throughout South Vietnam’s military and naval +services, the incident was closed. Both the airborne +brigade and the VNMC resumed their functions +as the RVNAF general reserve.<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[3-12]</a></p> + +<p>By the summer of 1961 the USMAAG, now +headed by General McGarr, was ready to implement +the 20,000-man expansion of the RVNAF as +authorized in the package approved by President +Kennedy the previous spring. Included in this U.S. +program were plans to increase the size of the +Vietnamese Marine Corps by over 1,000 men. This +expansion got underway in July when the initial +steps were taken to form a fourth infantry battalion +and a 75mm pack-howitzer battery—additions +which were to raise the authorized strength of the +VNMC to 3,321 officers and men. The transfer of +ARVN artillerymen provided the personnel necessary +to man the pack-howitzer unit, which formed +near Thu Duc, a small town about 13 miles north +of the capital. Officers and noncommissioned +officers were drawn from the three existing VNMC +battalions to form a nucleus for the new infantry +battalion while its ranks were filled gradually by +recruitment. This 4th Battalion was organized at +Vung Tau, a coastal resort town situated on Cape +St. Jacques about 40 miles southeast of Saigon. +Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Brown, a World +War II veteran who replaced Robichaud as Senior +Marine Advisor in August, was on hand to assist +with this latest reorganization of the VNMC.</p> + +<p>While the new Marine units were forming the +JGS ordered the Vietnamese Navy and Marine +Corps to conduct an amphibious assault against a +suspected Communist stronghold near South Vietnam’s +southern tip. The objective area was a +portion of the U Minh Forest, an extensive inundated +region located along the western coast of +the Ca Mau Peninsula. Because it was inaccessible +by land, the forest had served as Communist base +area since the French Indochina War. The concept +of operation called for the Marines to land at +daybreak, move inland through the mangrove +swamps, and hopefully push Viet Cong elements +into ARVN units which would have established a +blocking force inland from the beach. Captains<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">37</span> +Michael J. Gott and James S. G. Turner, two U.S. +Marine advisors, embarked on board two World +War II vintage Vietnamese Navy LCIs (landing +craft, infantry) at Saigon with the 1st and 3d +Battalions respectively.</p> + +<figure id="ip_37" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 35em;"> + <img src="images/i_037.jpg" width="1885" height="1083" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Captain Michael J. Gott, infantry advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, discusses tactical plans with Vietnamese +officers. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>A series of problems arose on the morning of +the operation to delay the landing for several +hours. When the Marines finally came ashore late +in the morning they failed to locate any enemy +forces. Captain Gott, who accompanied the 1st +Battalion for the duration of the operations ashore, +later recounted the difficulties. He noted, for +instance, that no U.S. Navy advisors were embarked +on board the Vietnamese ships. As a result, the +relatively inexperienced Vietnamese sailors encountered +technical difficulties with their navigational +aids, and the ships arrived at the objective +area late. Inexperience on the part of the Vietnamese +Marines and sailors in debarkation techniques +compounded the delay. Once ashore, outdated +French maps and dense mangrove jungle combined +to retard the Marines’ progress inland, thus allowing +the Viet Cong ample time to melt away. Gott +concluded that some of the difficulties encountered +after the landing phase of the operation might +have been offset by the presence of observation +aircraft. As it was, the Marines’ visibility was +restricted throughout the operation by thick +mangrove vegetation. Thus a combination of +unforeseen factors had rendered this particular +operation ineffective.<a id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[3-13]</a></p> + +<figure id="ip_37b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 41em;"> + <img src="images/i_038.png" width="2607" height="1800" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><p>VNMC (MARINE GROUP) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 AUGUST 1961</p> + +<p>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 3,321</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>A similar landing was repeated in the same area +the following month. Again the participating +Marine units failed to engage Viet Cong forces. +Vietnamese Navy and Marine officers complained +that there were no enemy troops in the area and +that the government’s intelligence was inaccurate. +Whatever the reason, the results of these two +unsuccessful offensives typified the problems which +plagued most South Vietnamese ground forces +throughout the country during the 1960–1961 +period. The Communist guerrillas, aided by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">39</span> +difficult terrain, a well-developed intelligence +network, and sometimes by the local population, +could usually evade government units whenever +escape was desirable. Because the Marines normally +operated in unfamiliar areas where the Viet Cong +political apparatus was strong, their units were +particularly frustrated. In regions such as the +U Minh Forest intelligence information simply +did not flow upward from the people. Instead, in +such Communist-controlled environments, the local +Vietnamese served the Viet Cong, warning them +of strengths, locations, and movements of Marine +units.</p> + +<p>While combat deployments such as the Ca Mau +landings highlighted the remainder of 1961, the +Marine battalions nevertheless spent the majority +of their time in non-combat assignments. During +such periods the battalions occupied their respective +base camps around Saigon and Vung Tau, awaiting +orders from the Joint General Staff. Even though +held in reserve, they frequently were called upon +to provide security detachments for vital points +such as bridges, naval facilities, and communications +installations. Most U.S. Marine advisors +tended to oppose such assignments, contending +that they detracted from the overall readiness +of the battalions and disrupted much needed +training. The utilization of the VNMC units in +static security roles also conflicted with the advisor’s +continuing efforts to convince the Vietnamese +Marine that he belonged to an elite, offensively +oriented strike force. Still, despite the protestations +of the American advisors, the JGS persisted in +dispersing VNMC detachments in and around the +capital.</p> + +<p>Although its battalions were sometimes being +frustrated, both in their attempts to accomplish +unit training and in their attempts to fix Communist +troop formations, the VNMC’s involvement in the +war effort was forcing improvement of the service +in other areas. Frequent inspections by U.S. +advisors revealed that the Vietnamese were placing +more emphasis on the care of individual equipment +and weapons. Replacement items were being +requisitioned with more promptness and unit commanders +were beginning to show increasing concern +about the slow receipt of requested supply +items. The replacement of worn-out World War II +trucks with new vehicles removed a long-standing +source of trouble in that it greatly reduced the +time consumed in performing major mechanical +repairs on the older vehicles. Even the frequent +deployments of the VNMC battalions were helping +to improve the overall combat readiness of the +service by preparing a solid core of small unit +leaders and troops for operations against the Viet +Cong.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_39"><i>Ancillary Effects of Marine Pacific Commands</i></h3> + +<p>At the same time the intensified conflict in South +Vietnam was forcing improvement on the VNMC, +it was having a similar but less direct effect on +U.S. Marine commands in the Pacific. In early 1961 +Lieutenant General Alan Shapley, the Commanding +General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), +approved a plan to assign individual Marines from +his scattered commands to temporary duty in +Vietnam. The purpose of this program, which +became known as On-The-Job Training (OJT), was +to allow Marine officers and noncommissioned +officers to obtain first-hand knowledge of the complex +nature of the conflict being waged in South +Vietnam. Beginning in May 1961 small groups of +officers and noncommissioned officers from various +FMFPac commands were sent each month to +observe the counterguerrilla techniques being +developed and employed in Vietnam. Although the +OJTs were normally “in country” for only a two-week +period, the program was gradually producing +a pool of small unit leaders somewhat acquainted +with the situation in the Republic of Vietnam by +the end of 1961.<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[3-H]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="label">[3-H]</a> The OJT program would be suspended briefly near the end +of 1962 but would be reinstituted in the first months of 1963.</p> + +</div> + +<figure id="ip_39" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;"> + <img src="images/i_040.jpg" width="1796" height="2166" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Vietnamese Marines wade ashore from a Vietnamese Navy Landing Ship, initiating a search for Viet Cong on the Ca +Mau Peninsula. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The major Marine command to feel the impact +of the war in Southeast Asia during the early +1960s was the 3d Marine Division, a 20,000-man +combat-ready force headquartered on Okinawa. In +addition to its participation in the OJT program, +the 3d Marine Division began altering its conventional +amphibious orientation. Major General +Donald M. Weller, the division commander, provided +the initial impetus for this shift away from +a purely conventional posture. Weller, who in early +1961 had commanded a task force headquarters +formed in response to the deteriorating military +situation in Laos, anticipated that his command<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">41</span> +might be committed to combat somewhere on the +Southeast Asian mainland. He therefore instructed +his staff to begin studying possible counterinsurgency +training programs which would help “turn +the entire orientation of the division toward the +type of intervention [which] we would be faced +with in Southeast Asia.”<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[3-14]</a></p> + +<figure id="ip_41" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 31em;"> + <img src="images/i_041.jpg" width="1924" height="1468" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Vietnamese Marines advance from concealment during search operations on the Ca Mau Peninsula. (<cite>Photo courtesy of +Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, USMC</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Major General Robert E. Cushman, holder of a +Navy Cross and a future Commandant of the +Marine Corps, assumed command of the 3d Marine +Division in September 1961 before General Weller’s +objectives could be fully realized. The new commanding +general immediately convened a Counterguerrilla +Warfare Study Group to consider the +problem. This study group framed a set of recommendations +for Cushman in late 1961. His approval +of their proposals led to the creation of an Infantry +Unit Training Course and a Command and Staff +Training Course early the next year.</p> + +<p>Conducted in Okinawa’s rugged Northern Training +Area, the infantry course prepared rifle companies +from the various infantry battalions for +participation in counterguerrilla warfare. The +instructors, graduates of either the Jungle Warfare +School in Johore, Malaya, or the new Army +Special Warfare School at Ft. Bragg, North +Carolina, placed much emphasis on the origins +and nature of guerrilla movements, small units +tactics, and night operations. The training syllabus +for this course included several live firing exercises +designed for individual Marines and fire teams. +Some of these exercises required the Marines to +negotiate “jungle lanes” equipped with pop-up +targets. The week-long infantry course culminated<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">42</span> +with a two and one-half day field operation for +the individual infantry platoons.</p> + +<p>The Command and Staff Training course was +somewhat less rigorous, being designed primarily +to prepare battalion staffs to support their companies +in a counterinsurgency environment. Less +than 10 hours in length, this course was based +primarily on lectures and map exercises.</p> + +<p>At General Cushman’s direction, the division +G-3 (Operations Section) began stressing the +significance of counterinsurgency training at all +echelons of the division. Unconventional warfare +training soon became an integral part of the training +schedules at every echelon. Under this program +the various infantry battalions were required to +conduct an extended battalion-sized counterguerrilla +operation, and to report to the G-3 on the +progress of their efforts.<a id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[3-15]</a></p> + +<p>The FMFPac On-The-Job Training program and +the 3d Marine Division’s new approach to training +complemented each other in several ways. Whereas +the OJT program helped create an awareness of +counterguerrilla operations among individual Marine +officers and noncommissioned officers, the +division’s training programs achieved the same +results at the staff and battalion level. At points +the two programs overlapped to the further +benefit of the 3d Marine Division. Attuned to the +nature of guerrilla warfare and the problems involved +in countering the guerrilla, the officers and +noncommissioned officers who returned from OJT +assignments in Vietnam provided assistance in +planning and supervising the division’s counterinsurgency +training programs. Short of actual +commitment to combat in a guerrilla-type environment, +it is doubtful that any other combination +of training could have better prepared the 3d +Marine Division for a future assignment in Vietnam.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_42"><i>American Decisions at the Close of 1961</i></h3> + +<p>The progressive erosion of the government’s +strength and the steady growth of the Viet Cong +during 1961 prompted President Kennedy to dispatch +his special military advisor, General Maxwell +D. Taylor, to Vietnam in mid-October. Taylor, +who had retired in the late 1950s after having +served as Chief of Staff of the Army, carried the +following instructions from the president:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>I should like you to proceed to Saigon for the purpose of +appraising the situation in South Vietnam, particularly as +it concerns the threat to the internal security and defense +of that country and adjacent areas. After you have conferred +with the appropriate United States and South Vietnamese +authorities, including the Commander in Chief, Pacific, +I would like your views on the courses of action which our +Government might take at this juncture to avoid a further +deterioration in the situation in South Vietnam; and +eventually to contain and eliminate the threat to its +independence.<a id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[3-16]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Like other American officials who had visited +Diem’s republic during the course of the year, +General Taylor returned to Washington convinced +that South Vietnam was in grave danger. In a +report delivered to President Kennedy in November, +the general outlined his formula for salvaging +the situation. This included the broad recommendation +that the United States abandon its existing +policy of strict military advice and begin cooperating +with the Vietnamese in a form of “limited +partnership.” The American role in such a partnership, +Taylor explained, would be to provide +“working” advisors and “working” military units +to aid South Vietnam’s military forces.</p> + +<p>General Taylor’s report offered several specific +proposals for implementing such a program. +Among these were recommendations that three +U.S. Army helicopter companies and approximately +6,000–8,000 American ground troops be +deployed quickly to the Republic of Vietnam. The +helicopter units would support the government’s +ground operations but the American ground forces +were to be used only in a defensive posture. Taylor +believed that their presence would underscore the +United States’ determination to stand by South +Vietnam. A side-effect of this display of determination +would be to stimulate the morale of the republic’s +armed forces. He added that in order to +support such a build-up, it would be necessary to +restructure and increase the size of the USMAAG.</p> + +<p>President Kennedy’s consideration of Taylor’s +proposals resulted in a compromise decision which +cleared the way for more intense American involvement +in the Vietnam conflict. After securing Diem’s +approval in early December, Kennedy authorized +the Department of Defense to expand its advisory +and assistance programs. To enhance the effectiveness +of the advisory program, he removed some of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">43</span> +the official restrictions under which most U.S. +military advisors had operated since 1955. One +important change would allow all advisors to +accompany their Vietnamese units into combat. At +the same time President Kennedy decided against +ordering U.S. ground forces into the war zone; +however, he instructed the Secretary of Defense, +Robert S. McNamara, to prepare plans for such a +contingency. He also approved General Taylor’s +recommendation that American helicopter units +be sent to support the RVNAF. The arrival of the +first of these reinforcements just before 1961 ended, +signalled the beginning of a new and more dynamic +phase of American military participation in the +struggle to preserve the independence of South +Vietnam.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">44</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_4"><span id="toclink_44"></span>CHAPTER 4<br> +<span class="subhead large">An Expanding War, 1962</span><br> +<span class="subhead notbold"><i>The War’s New Context—Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory +Division—The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962—Some Conclusions</i></span></h2> +</div> + +<h3 id="toclink_44a"><i>The War’s New Context</i></h3> + +<p>More than any previous year, 1962 was to be a +period of deepened commitment for all participants +in the continuing struggle for control of South +Vietnam. On the American side plans already set +in motion by President Kennedy’s recent decisions +promised to loosen the flow of dollars, equipment, +advisors, and combat support personnel to South +Vietnam. Administration officials envisioned that +this sharp influx of assistance would stimulate a +redoubled war effort on the part of the Diem +government.</p> + +<p>Viet Cong strength and operational capabilities +likewise were on the upswing as 1962 opened. +U.S. and South Vietnamese sources were placing +total Viet Cong military strength at roughly +25,000 men. Backing these military forces was a +far greater number of sympathizers. American +agencies tended to divide the Communist military +forces into three rough categories according to +function and composition—main forces, local forces, +and village activists. Thought to total around +9,000 men at the beginning of the year, the main +forces constituted the pillar of Communist military +strength in the South. They were organized into +approximately 20 small (200– to 400-man) and +highly mobile battalions and a number of independent +companies. Main force units as a rule +were cadred by North Vietnamese (or returnees +trained in the North) and were capable of conducting +operations on an interprovincial scale. +(They often were referred to as interprovincial +battalions and companies. Later in the war Americans +came to call the main forces “hard core” +units.) Next in terms of operational capabilities +were the Viet Cong local forces whose aggregate +strength stood at around 8,000 part-time but well-trained +soldiers. The local forces were organized +into platoons and companies which operated +independently within their respective districts. +Finally, there were some 8,000 village activists. +Part-time guerrillas in the truest sense of the +term, the activists commonly worked in the +paddies by day and engaged in military pursuits at +night. For the most part their ranks were filled +with men considered either too young or too old +for service with organized Viet Cong military +units. Nevertheless, they played an important +role in the struggle for South Vietnam’s rural areas +by providing various forms of support for larger +Viet Cong formations. Living and working within +the rural hamlets and villages as they did, the +activists were a ready source of intelligence +information for the Viet Cong. Often they served +as porters and guides for main force units which +had been assigned to operate within their locale. +Otherwise, the activists were responsible for defending +their particular villages against the government’s +military and police forces—a defense which +normally took the form of harassment with mines +and sniper fire.<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[4-A]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="label">[4-A]</a> The three-way division was the most commonly used method +of categorizing the Communist forces. (See U.S. Army, <cite>The +Viet Cong</cite>, p. I:52.) A USMAAG document published during +this period, however, divided the Viet Cong into two somewhat +broader categories—main forces and guerrillas. Both local force +units and village activists were classified as guerrillas under this +system. (USMAAG, Vietnam, <cite>Tactics and Techniques of Counterinsurgent +Operations</cite>, p. II-5.) Other sources tended to make more +elaborate divisions. (See Pike, <cite>Viet Cong</cite>.)</p> + +</div> + +<p>After early 1962 the activities of these Viet Cong +military and paramilitary forces were carefully +coordinated with Communist political activities +on the national level by a Central Office for South +Vietnam (COSVN).<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[4-B]</a> From its headquarters,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">45</span> +believed to have been located northeast of Saigon in +Binh Duong Province, COSVN exercised direct +control over six military regions (MRs). Designated +MR-5 through MR-9 (arranged in a north +to south pattern) with an additional Saigon-Gia +Dinh Special Zone, the Communist military regions +served essentially the same purpose as the government’s +corps tactical zones. Within these six regions +COSVN utilized a province and district structure +only slightly different from that of the Diem +government to exercise administrative and military +control. At each level within this organization a +small, disciplined Communist political committee +orchestrated the activities of its subordinate +military units with the actions of its political +apparatus.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="label">[4-B]</a> COSVN apparently was established in March. Prior to this +the NLF had functioned through two separate geographic headquarters—Interzone +V, responsible for roughly the northern +three-quarters of South Vietnam, and the NAMBO Interzone, +responsible for the area roughly described by the forested hills +and Mekong Delta physiographic regions.</p> + +</div> + +<p>To counter the strengthened NLF organization +and to satisfy American demands that he adopt +some form of national strategy, President Diem +launched one of the most controversial large-scale +undertakings of the war—the Strategic Hamlet +Program. Instituted on an informal basis in the +closing stages of 1961, the program became fully +operative in mid-1962. Although heralded as a new +concept, the campaign actually grew out of an +existing program whose broad objective had been +to bring improved economic and social conditions +to South Vietnam’s rural areas. Named the Agroville +Program, this effort had been in effect since +late 1959 under the direction of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the +president’s brother and principal advisor. Since its +institution, however, the program had achieved +little aside from the resettlement of many rural +families into government constructed communities. +Few meaningful reforms, either social or economic, +had been realized. During the early 1960s, moreover, +many of the Agrovilles had been victimized +by the Viet Cong, who saw the developments as +symbols of the government’s presence in contested +areas. By mid-1961, in an effort to protect the more +remote Agrovilles, authorities in several provinces +had begun fortifying the otherwise helpless population +centers.</p> + +<p>Concurrent with this evolution of the Agrovilles +into fortified communities, Sir Robert G. K. +Thompson, the head of a newly formed British +Advisory Mission in Saigon, suggested that +President Diem consider adopting a similar scheme +with broader strategic objectives. Thompson, +who had helped implement such an effort in +Malaya in the 1950s during the struggle there +against Communist insurgents, specifically proposed +that the South Vietnamese integrate various +economic and social programs into an effective +campaign to reestablish its influence in the heavily +populated Mekong Delta. This campaign, Thompson +advised, “should lead by stages to a reorganization +of the government machinery for directing +and coordinating all action against the communists +and the production of an overall strategic operational +plan for the country as a whole....”<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[4-1]</a></p> + +<p>Under pressure from the U.S. Embassy to develop +some sort of national strategy for countering the +insurgency, President Diem accepted the concept +of Thompson’s proposal. Shortly thereafter, Diem +named Ngo Dinh Nhu to head a campaign formally +designated the Strategic Hamlet Program. Nhu +was instructed to plan the program and to create a +combined agency that would insure its coordination +within the various government ministries. These +instructions resulted in the creation (in February) +of the Interministerial Committee for Strategic +Hamlets. A counterpart American organization, +the U.S. Interagency Committee for Province +Rehabilitation, was formed in April to provide +assistance to Nhu’s agency.</p> + +<p>With advice from Thompson and the U.S. Embassy, +the Vietnamese formulated a program which +in theory was to evolve in several rather distinct +phases. First it would be necessary to select specific +geographic areas wherein the Strategic Hamlet +Program would be implemented. Once specific +objective areas had been established, regular military +units would initiate operations to clear those +areas of Viet Cong formations. Following the +completion of these operations RVNAF units +would resettle the inhabitants of the area in fortified +hamlets. Initially these hamlets were to be +defended by Civil Guard units while regular forces +continued screening operations in the surrounding +countryside. In the final phase, Self Defense Corps +units would assume responsibility for local security +while regular units continued to screen Viet Cong +forces from the developments. During this phase +district civil authorities would initiate economic +and social programs within the newly formed +communities in an effort to recapture the allegiance +of the local populace. Thus, in this final phase, it +was expected that the Communist political infrastructure +would be broken.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">46</span></p> + +<p>Following the pacification of a few contiguous +hamlets, the same process was to be repeated over +and over, in an expanding pattern. In this manner +Diem hoped to expand the GVN’s control progressively +outward from the initial secure hamlets +over large areas of the countryside. Ultimately the +GVN intended to construct nearly 11,000 such protected +communities in several of the country’s +most critical rural areas.</p> + +<p>A principal shortcoming of this method of +pacification was that the success of the entire program +within a specific area depended on the successful +completion of virtually every developmental +phase in every strategic hamlet. Should the Communist +infrastructure remain intact in even one +hamlet, that hamlet could precipitate the collapse +of the entire campaign by contaminating +the surrounding communities in a geometric +progression.</p> + +<p>Given this critical requirement that all phases be +accomplished in a deliberate and orderly manner, it +was unfortunate that Nhu initiated the program +in an uncoordinated fashion. By the first of the +year, months before the appropriate American and +South Vietnamese agencies had been formed to +guide the program, the construction of hamlets had +begun on a scale which already suggested a nationwide +campaign. Furthermore, the government +failed to test the plan in a pilot project such as +Thompson (as well as U.S. advisors) had recommended. +Instead, it launched rather extensive +campaigns simultaneously in several traditional +Communist strongholds during the spring of 1962.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, once formally initiated, the Strategic +Hamlet Program constituted the government’s +first real effort to implement a concerted counterinsurgency +strategy on a national scale. Regardless +of its weaknesses and its somewhat abortive start, +the program would serve as the context within +which the Diem government would wage its battle +with the Viet Cong during 1962 and most of 1963. +From this military standpoint, moreover, Diem’s +adoption of the Strategic Hamlet Program marked +somewhat of a watershed in the evolution of ground +strategy in the Vietnam war. Inherent in its +selection was the decision to opt for a “clear-and-hold” +as opposed to a “search-and-destroy” +strategy. In accordance with the dictates of the +pacification campaign, RVNAF ground forces would +focus primarily during the next two years on +operations to clear Communist military formations +from the more densely populated rural areas.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_46"><i>The Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division</i></h3> + +<p>The American military build-up called for by +the Washington decisions of December 1961 was +well underway as the new year opened. Several +U.S. units introduced in the closing weeks of 1961 +had already begun operations by January. These +included two U.S. Army transport helicopter +companies and a composite U.S. Air Force detachment. +Designated FARM GATE and composed +initially of 151 officers and men, the Air Force +detachment had a dual mission of training VNAF +elements and conducting attack sorties in support +of President Diem’s forces. The arrival of another +U.S. Air Force unit, a C-123 transport squadron, +another Army helicopter company, and an Army +communications organization, the 3d Radio Research +Unit, just after the first of the year raised +the number of American military personnel serving +on permanent assignment in Vietnam to over 3,000. +Assigned to the Army’s radio unit, which immediately +began operations from Pleiku in II Corps +Tactical Zone, were 42 Marines from the 1st +Radio Company, FMF. Designated Detachment A, +1st Radio Company, these were the first U.S. +Marines to participate in the ongoing build-up.</p> + +<p>Thus far, however, the U.S. troops arriving in +Vietnam were for combat support rather than +advisory type duty. At a meeting held in Honolulu +in mid-January, Secretary of Defense McNamara +ordered the ranking American military officials +concerned with Vietnam to make substantial +increases in the number of advisors serving with +the Vietnamese armed forces.</p> + +<p>Less than a month after the Honolulu conference, +a new U.S. command was created in Saigon to +manage the expected influx of advisors and the +intensified military assistance effort more efficiently. +On 8 February, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, +Vietnam (USMACV or MACV) supplanted +the MAAG as the senior American command in +the Republic of Vietnam. Its commander, Army +General Paul D. Harkins (ComUSMACV), assumed +direct responsibility for all U.S. military policy, +operations, and assistance to President Diem’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">47</span> +government. Harkins was directly subordinate to +the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry +D. Felt, whose headquarters was in Hawaii.</p> + +<p>The number of U.S. Marines assigned to MACV’s +staff indicated that they would play an important +role in its operations. In all, 21 staff billets in the +new command were allocated to the Marine Corps. +The most important of these was the chief of staff +billet. This assignment went to Major General +Richard G. Weede, a veteran who had commanded +an artillery battalion during the campaigns for +Saipan and Okinawa during World War II. Later, +in Korea, he had distinguished himself as the +commander of the 5th Marines. Weede arrived in +Saigon from Hawaii where he had commanded the +1st Marine Brigade since 1959. Other Marines +joined General Harkins’ command as Deputy Chief +of Staff, J-2 and as branch chiefs for the J-3 through +J-6 divisions. Two other positions assigned to +Marine officers were the project officer for a Joint +Operations Evaluation Group and a research and +development project officer for a Department of +Defense agency. Both of these were operationally +controlled by the newly organized Military +Assistance Command.</p> + +<figure id="ip_47" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;"> + <img src="images/i_047.jpg" width="934" height="1074" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Major General Richard G. Weede, USMC, Chief of +Staff, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. +(<cite>USMC Photo A150562</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Under the new U.S. command arrangement, the +old Military Assistance Advisory Group became +subordinate to General Harkins’ command. Headed +by Major General Charles J. Timmes, U.S. Army, +the MAAG was now responsible primarily for the +advisory aspect of the assistance program. To +accommodate the impending increases in the number +of advisors, the MAAG’s staff was restructured. +Under its new table of organization, Marine +officers were to serve as deputy chief of staff and +head of the plans branch of the J-3 division. Later, +in 1963, the MAAG’s table of distribution would +be modified with the effect that the chief of staff +billet would be held by a Marine colonel. The first +Marine to serve as General Timmes’ chief of staff +would be Colonel Earl E. Anderson, a much-decorated +aviator who eventually would become +the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.</p> + +<p>The reorganization of the MAAG brought about +a dramatic change in the size and scope of the U.S. +Marine advisory effort. The new table of organization +included a provision for an 18-man Marine +Advisory Division within the MAAG’s Naval +Section. The organizational charts for this division +included advisor billets for a lieutenant colonel, a +major, six captains, a gunnery sergeant, and four +staff sergeants. Administrative positions were to +make up the balance of the new organization.</p> + +<p>As had been the case previous to this expansion, +the lieutenant colonel was to serve as the Senior +Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. +The inclusion of the major’s billet was expected to +enhance the overall effectiveness of the advisory +division as he was to double as Assistant Senior +Advisor and as senior artillery advisor. The gunnery +sergeant was to assist in the artillery advisory +duties. Of the six captains, four were to be assigned +as advisors to VNMC infantry battalions while the +two others were slated to advise on engineer and +supply matters. The four logistics-trained staff +sergeants were to be assigned as assistant infantry +battalion advisors and were expected to free the +officer advisors from direct involvement in time-consuming +supply matters.</p> + +<p>Marines required to man this enlarged advisory +unit began arriving in Vietnam as early as February. +All of the new officer advisors were graduates +of either Junior School at Marine Corps Schools, +Quantico or the U.S. Army Special Warfare +School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Following<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">48</span> +their assignments, but before departing for Vietnam, +many advisors received schooling in military +assistance operations. This normally included a +five-month course of instruction in the French +language, a requirement which more and more +Marine advisors were beginning to question as a +result of the Vietnamese desire to converse in +their own language rather than French. Upon +arrival in Saigon, the Marines were given two days +of orientation briefings at MACV headquarters +before assuming their jobs in the Marine Advisory +Division.</p> + +<p>Lieutenant Colonel Brown continued to serve as +the Senior Marine Advisor and headed the new +advisory division throughout the summer of 1962. +In October he was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel +Clarence G. Moody, Jr., a veteran who held the +Navy Cross for heroism as a company commander +during the Korean War. Having served with the +British Royal Marines following Korea, Moody +was somewhat familiar with the problems involved +in dealing with foreign military services.</p> + +<figure id="ip_48" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;"> + <img src="images/i_048.jpg" width="923" height="1086" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody, Jr., USMC, +Senior Marine Advisor. (<cite>USMC Photo A412981</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Encouraged by both Brown and Moody, the U.S. +Marine advisors participated in every combat +operation undertaken by the VNMC during 1962. +Prior to planned operations they helped their +Vietnamese counterparts coordinate the more +sophisticated means of support which became +available as the American military build-up took +hold. During planning phases, for example, they +assisted with the development of detailed orders +and helped plan for employing artillery fire and air +support. If the impending operation was to be +amphibious in nature, the Marine officers coordinated +with the U.S. Navy advisors assigned to the +supporting Vietnamese Navy units, thereby insuring +that planning for embarkation had been +accomplished. On occasion the advisors were +required to coordinate helicopter support for the +VNMC units—a task sometimes complicated by +the Vietnamese Marines’ lack of experience in +heliborne operations. Unfortunately, the almost +constant combat assignments being drawn by the +handful of U.S. and VNAF helicopter units available +in Vietnam made training in such operations +impossible.</p> + +<p>Even more difficult were the advisor’s responsibilities +after their units deployed to combat. The +U.S. Marines were experiencing the often frustrating +task of actually searching out the elusive +Viet Cong on a continuing daily basis. Additionally, +the Americans found themselves faced with +the unenviable task of advising Vietnamese officers, +who, in some cases, had been fighting Communist +guerrillas since the French-Indochina War. These +circumstances presented a unique set of challenges +for the advisors. For American officers with +relatively little actual experience in this brand of +warfare to offer tactical advice in a form acceptable +to their Vietnamese counterparts demanded a +combination of tact, patience, and subtle persuasive +powers.</p> + +<p>The U.S. Marine advisors quickly learned that +success in this peculiar assignment depended +largely on the degree of respect they commanded +among the Vietnamese Marines. To help build this +intangible yet vital foundation of mutual understanding +and confidence, the Marine advisors +stayed with their units in combat, sharing with the +Vietnamese Marine the same foods, the same +dangers, the same discomforts, and the same +routines. The Marine advisors lived in U.S. +bachelor quarters in Saigon when their respective +battalions were in garrison. Nevertheless, they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">49</span> +spent much of this time at the Marine base camps, +inspecting troops and equipment and making +preparations for the battalion’s next combat +assignment. Among others, Lieutenant Colonels +Brown and Moody viewed this continuous association +with the Vietnamese Marines as the single +most essential ingredient to a successful advisory +program.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_49"><i>The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962</i></h3> + +<p>For the Vietnamese Marine Corps 1962 was +characterized by expansion, redesignation, and +continued combat operations against the Viet +Cong. On 1 January the former Vietnamese Marine +Group was redesignated the Vietnamese Marine +Brigade and was enlarged to 5,483 officers and men. +Under its new table of organization, the number of +infantry battalions remained at four but two new +battalions were added. One battery of eight 105mm +howitzers, two batteries of eight 75mm pack +howitzers, and a headquarters and service battery +comprised an artillery battalion which was created +to provide artillery fire support to the infantry +units. An amphibious support battalion of 1,038 +officers and men was also formed. This unit contained +the personnel necessary to provide the entire +Marine brigade with reconnaissance, communications, +motor transport, medical, engineer, and +training support. Lieutenant Colonel Khang continued +in his position as Commandant of the +expanded and restructured Vietnamese Marine +Corps.</p> + +<p>The infantry battalions of the Vietnamese +Marine Brigade performed a variety of combat +missions ranging from security duty around key +government installations to helicopter landings in +suspected Viet Cong redoubts during 1962. The +four infantry battalions (the 4th Battalion became +available for combat assignment at midyear) participated +in 23 combat operations which involved +404 days in the field. These operations included +12 amphibious landings and eight heliborne +assaults. With the exception of two howitzer +batteries which saw some combat, the artillery +battalion devoted the year to training. Supervised +by Major Alfred J. Croft and Gunnery Sergeant +William A. Loyko, their new Marine advisors, the +Vietnamese artillerymen learned their skills in a +number of field firing exercises conducted on ARVN +artillery ranges.</p> + +<p>In terms of casualties the VNMC battalions +fought no major engagements with the Communists +during the year. A typical operation was +one conducted in An Xuyen, South Vietnam’s +southernmost province, early in the year. The 2d +Battalion, which was assigned to the An Xuyen +province chief for the period between 18 February +and 26 April, conducted one helicopter landing, +provided troop escorts for numerous truck convoys, +and fought several minor engagements with the +Viet Cong. Although the Vietnamese commander +reported 112 enemy killed and another 40 wounded +during the two-month assignment, the figures +contradicted those of Captain Evan L. Parker, the +Marine advisor, which placed the Viet Cong +casualties at about 40 dead and 20 wounded. This +difference, which was not uncommon, stemmed +largely from the fact that the Marine advisors +limited their reports to enemy dead and wounded +actually sighted. Still, the conflicting reports sometimes +led to tensions between the Vietnamese +commander and the Marine advisor.</p> + +<p>In other instances the Vietnamese Marine +battalions were ordered to serve as the reserve force +for one of the three corps tactical zones. The 1st +Battalion, for example, accompanied by Captain +Bradley S. Snell, assumed the mission as II Corps +reserve on 16 May and remained in that role until +mid-September. Based at Ban Me Thuot deep in the +Central Highlands, the battalion provided security +for government installations while remaining ready +to react to enemy threats. As the corps reserve it +conducted one heliborne operation and several +search-type missions. In one of these searches the +Vietnamese Marines uncovered and destroyed a +Viet Cong small arms factory. During its assignment +in II Corps, the 1st Battalion accounted for +only four Viet Cong dead and one wounded while +suffering 16 dead and 28 wounded. These statistics +attested both to the grim effectiveness of +enemy sniper fire and mines and to the enemy’s +elusiveness.</p> + +<figure id="ip_49" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 42em;"> + <img src="images/i_050.png" width="2649" height="1821" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><p>VNMC (MARINE BRIGADE) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JANUARY 1962</p> + +<p>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 5,483</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The newly activated 4th Battalion, advised by +Captain Don R. Christensen, entered combat for the +first time during an operation in Binh Thuan<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">51</span> +Province in the first week in August. Supported +by Battery A (a 75mm howitzer unit) of the +artillery battalion, it joined the 43d ARVN +Infantry Regiment in an attempt to locate and +destroy Viet Cong forces operating around Phan +Thiet, the provincial capital, located on the coast +95 miles east of Saigon. Following the conclusion +of this operation on 22 August, the Marine units +reverted to the control of the Binh Thuan province +chief. In this capacity they assisted in clearing and +resettlement operations being conducted in conjunction +with the Strategic Hamlet Program. +Between 4 August and 15 October, when its assignment +in the province ended, the 4th Battalion +reported 12 Viet Cong killed and seven captured. +Vietnamese Marine casualties were one killed and +five wounded. During the assignment the Marines +resettled some 600 civilians in fortified hamlets.<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[4-2]</a><a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[4-C]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="label">[4-C]</a> Major Croft, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor during +this period, later recalled that province chiefs tended to misuse +the Marine units by assigning them unproductive missions such +as static security. (Col Alfred J. Croft, Comments on 2d Draft +MS, Whitlow, “Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964,” +hereafter <cite>Croft Comments</cite>.)</p> + +</div> + +<figure id="ip_51" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_051.jpg" width="1883" height="1414" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Vietnamese Marines search dense jungle for Viet Cong base areas. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Gott, +USMC</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>In the last week of September General David M. +Shoup, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, +arrived in Saigon to begin a four-day tour of South +Vietnam. Shoup, who held the Medal of Honor for +his actions as a regimental commander on Tarawa +in World War II, was recognized as one of President +Kennedy’s most trusted military advisors. Acting +in his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, +the Commandant was scheduled to visit a number +of U.S. and South Vietnamese installations, including +several strategic hamlets.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">52</span></p> + +<figure id="ip_52" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;"> + <img src="images/i_052.jpg" width="1822" height="2574" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +CORPS TACTICAL ZONES<br> +1962<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">53</span></p> + +<p>After a series of briefings at MACV and MAAG +headquarters in Saigon, the Commandant and his +party journeyed by automobile to the base camp of +the 3d Vietnamese Marine Battalion at Thu Duc +on the outskirts of the capital. There, accompanied +by Lieutenant Colonels Brown and Khang, Shoup +reviewed a Vietnamese Marine honor guard and +inspected the 3d Battalion. Impressed with the +units he had seen, General Shoup commended +President Diem on the status of his Marine Brigade. +“From my observation,” he wrote from Washington, +“the Vietnamese Marine Corps is in an excellent +state of readiness from the standpoint of +equipment as well as the degree of training of its +members.” “Indeed,” he added, “your Corps of +Marines seemed to be a splendid and competent +fighting organization.”<a id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[4-3]</a></p> + +<p>The Commandant was less complimentary of the +Strategic Hamlet Program. After visiting several +of the developments, he concluded that the government’s +effort to concentrate the Vietnamese civilians +into defended communities was counter-productive +to the program’s stated objective of +winning the allegiance of the rural population. As +Shoup reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon his +return to Washington, the forced resettlement of +the peasants from their native hamlets and villages +into what amounted to fortified camps seemed to +be generating antagonism rather than good will.<a id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[4-4]</a></p> + +<p>At the close of 1962 Vietnamese Marine commanders +reported a total of 192 Viet Cong killed, +77 wounded, and another 158 taken prisoner. U.S. +Marine advisors felt that even these moderate +figures were inflated. They estimated that only +about 98 enemy soldiers had been killed, 27 wounded, +and roughly half as many actual Viet Cong +captured as had been reported by their Vietnamese +Marine counterparts. The Vietnamese Marines also +had failed to inflict any serious damage on the +enemy’s logistic system, capturing only 16,000 +rounds of small arms ammunition, 45 grenades, +31 mines, and 50 individual weapons, a printing +press, two typewriters, several motors, and an +assortment of medical supplies.<a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[4-5]</a></p> + +<h3 id="toclink_53"><i>Some Conclusions</i></h3> + +<p>In retrospect, 1962 bears assessment as an important +watershed in the chronicle of U.S. Marine +activities in Vietnam. As the year began only +three Marine advisors and a handful of embassy +guards were serving in the Republic. The initial +months, however, brought a dramatic expansion +of that role, both in terms of numbers and responsibilities. +By March Marines were functioning on +MAAG and MACV staffs in Saigon, in U.S. Army +communications facilities in the Central Highlands, +and throughout the provinces where Vietnamese +Marine units operated. Their contributions to the +war effort, therefore, were broad and varied, ranging +from high level planning to infantry advisory +duties. The Marine role had expanded in rough +proportion to the broad-based expansion of the +overall U.S. military assistance program. In this +connection, Marine contributions tended to be +concealed within the context of the American +assistance effort. Still, by mid-1962 it could be +said that the Marines in Vietnam were leaving +the impact of their service on virtually every stage +of the ground war.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">55</span></p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak part" id="PART_II"><span id="toclink_55">PART II</span><br> + +<span class="subhead">MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR</span></h2> +<div> </div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">57</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_5"><span id="toclink_57"></span>CHAPTER 5<br> +<span class="subhead large">SHUFLY at Soc Trang</span><br> +<span class="subhead notbold"><i>The Decision—Deployment to Soc Trang—Mekong Delta Combat Support +Operations—Preparations and Redeployment—Accomplishments</i></span></h2> +</div> + +<p>One of the most important developments in the +chronicle of U.S. Marine activities in South +Vietnam during the early 1960s occurred shortly +after the creation of MACV. In mid-April 1962, a +Marine medium helicopter squadron was deployed +to the Mekong Delta to provide support for the +Government of Vietnam forces in their battle with +the Communist guerrillas. The significance of the +squadron’s arrival went beyond the added mobility +that it afforded those Vietnamese units attempting +to hold the rice producing delta region. Coinciding +as it did with the increases in the number of Marines +serving on the MACV staff and under the MAAG, +its arrival indicated that the Marine role would +expand in direct proportion to the widening U.S. +effort to defend the Republic of Vietnam.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_57a"><i>The Decision</i></h3> + +<p>The decision to deploy the Marine aviation unit +to the combat zone originated in the immediate +aftermath of General Taylor’s report to President +Kennedy. On 17 January 1962, the Joint Chiefs of +Staff directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific +(CinCPac), Admiral Harry D. Felt, to prepare for +increased operations in South Vietnam. This order +implied that the Pacific command should stand +ready to deploy additional helicopter units to +Diem’s republic in the event that it became necessary +to augment the Army companies already operating +there. (By now the number of Army helicopter +companies in South Vietnam stood at three.) +CinCPac was also instructed to explore South +Vietnam’s requirements for additional helicopter +units beyond the Army companies already present.<a id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[5-1]</a></p> + +<p>Shortly afterward, Admiral Felt advised the +Joint Chiefs of Staff that a valid requirement for +additional helicopter support did exist in the +Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. He +recommended that a fourth U.S. Army light helicopter +company be deployed to the area. Included +in the admiral’s recommendation was a proposal +to support the aviation unit with a composite +maintenance, avionics, and medical group.<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[5-2]</a></p> + +<p>Admiral Felt’s recommendations were approved +by the Secretary of Defense on 6 March. The Joint +Chiefs immediately assigned the responsibility for +providing the support package and helicopter unit +to the Army. In turn, Army authorities alerted +the 33d Transportation Light Helicopter Company +at Fort Ord, California for the move. Its departure +date was set for 18 April.<a id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[5-3]</a></p> + +<p>Unknown to the officers and men of the alerted +unit, the plans for its deployment to combat +were being reconsidered at the time the orders +were received. Two days before Admiral Felt’s +recommendation reached the joint Chiefs, a proposal +to augment Army helicopter units with Marine +pilots had been advanced by General Timmes, the +MAAG chief. This proposal triggered a brief but +eventful debate within U.S. military circles. With +General Harkins’ concurrence, Timmes recommended +that nine Marine helicopter pilots be +assigned to the Army aviation units in Vietnam +for periods of 60 to 90 days. This arrangement, he +pointed out, would enable the Marine pilots to +become familiar with the nature of the combat +support operations in South Vietnam and would +provide them with transitional training in the +Army’s Piasecki-built tandem-rotored H-21 helicopter +(nicknamed the “Flying Banana”).<a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[5-4]</a></p> + +<p>Admiral Felt turned to the Commanding General, +Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), Lieutenant +General Alan Shapley, for his comments on the +MAAG chief’s plan. Shapley in turn instructed +Major General Carson A. Roberts, the Commanding +General, Aircraft, FMFPac to study the proposal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">58</span> +and to frame a set of recommendations. Roberts, +who had been selected for promotion to lieutenant +general and was scheduled to relieve Shapley as +Commanding General, FMFPac, found the prospect +of Marine aviators participating in combat support +operations in Vietnam appealing but felt that the +proposal under review had some definite disadvantages. +He pointed out that under Timmes’ plan +the Marine pilots would be flying a type of helicopter +unfamiliar to them instead of the ones they +would operate if the Marine squadrons were later +deployed to Vietnam. Furthermore, General Roberts +warned that the piecemeal assignment of his +pilots would reduce the combat readiness of the +unit from which they would be drawn.<a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[5-5]</a></p> + +<p>At Roberts’ suggestion, General Shapley offered +CinCPac a counterproposal which he believed +would benefit both the South Vietnamese government +and the Marine Corps. He suggested that a +complete Marine medium helicopter squadron from +Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16), 1st Marine +Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) and supporting elements +be moved from Okinawa to the war zone. The +Marine squadron, operating 24 HUS-1s (a single-rotor, +Sikorsky-built transport helicopter later +known as the UH-34D) would replace the Army +helicopter company at Da Nang in the northernmost +corps tactical zone, I Corps. The Army unit +would then be freed for redeployment southward +into either II or III Corps Tactical Zones.</p> + +<p>General Shapley emphasized several advantages +which he saw in this plan. First, it would provide +additional helicopter support for the Republic of +Vietnam Armed Forces while concurrently providing +an entire Marine helicopter squadron with +an opportunity to gain first-hand experience in a +counterguerrilla environment. It would also provide +Marine Corps units with operational experience +in I Corps, the area to which they would be +committed if standing contingency plans were later +executed. Finally, Shapley explained that his +proposal offered an almost entirely self-sufficient +aviation unit which could be supported administratively +and logistically by the 1st Marine +Aircraft Wing. The unit would require only +minimal support from the Military Assistance +Command, Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">[5-6]</a></p> + +<p>On the same day that he had heard the Marine +commander’s proposal, Admiral Felt received a +message from Admiral John H. Sides, Commander +in Chief, Pacific Fleet, which strongly advised +that Roberts’ plan be implemented.<a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[5-7]</a> Admiral Felt +then solicited General Harkins’ opinion on the +matter. He reminded the MACV commander that +the proposed deployment would provide the +Marines with operational experience in an area +where they might some day be committed. The +admiral further pointed out that the location of a +Marine helicopter unit at Da Nang would enable +the Army aviation companies to move south into +one of the other corps tactical zones—a move that +would facilitate the logistical support of those +units by shortening their supply lines.<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[5-8]</a></p> + +<p>Harkins generally concurred with Admiral Felt’s +viewpoint. He noted that the more powerful +Marine HUS helicopter (Sea Horse) could be +expected to out perform the Army’s H-21 in the +higher elevations around Da Nang. He also felt +that the Marines, with their seaborne supply +network, were better equipped to cope with the +logistics problems in the more isolated northern +reaches of South Vietnam. But he objected to the +deployment of the Marine unit to Da Nang on the +basis that the relocation of the Army’s 93d Helicopter +Company from I Corps in the immediate +future would disrupt a series of operations which +were already underway in I Corps. As an alternative, +General Harkins proposed that the Marine +helicopters be located initially at Soc Trang in the +Mekong Delta. Later, when the tempo of operations +in the northern corps tactical zone permitted, it +could exchange places with the Army unit at +Da Nang.<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[5-9]</a></p> + +<p>One Army general raised a specific objection to +the proposal that the Marine squadron be deployed +from Okinawa. General James F. Collins, the +Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific (CinCUSArPac) +argued that the presence of the Marine +helicopters at Soc Trang would introduce yet +“another supply and maintenance feature into the +III Corps area.”<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[5-10]</a> This argument was followed by +the recommendation that the Army’s 81st Light +Helicopter Company, then based in Hawaii, be +ordered to the Mekong Delta. The 81st, General +Collins contended, was already trained in troop +transportation operations in jungle terrain.</p> + +<p>General David M. Shoup, the Marine Corps +Commandant, who approved the FMFPac plan in +concept, harbored one reservation regarding +General Roberts’ proposals. His concern stemmed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">59</span> +from the possibility that the Marine Corps might +be required to replace the squadron from Okinawa +with another in order to maintain the level of +operational forces available to CinCPac—an eventuality +which would upset long-range Marine +Corps deployment schedules. General Shoup indicated +that he, too, would oppose the deployment +of a Marine helicopter squadron to South Vietnam +if this proved to be the case.<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[5-11]</a></p> + +<p>At this juncture in the debate, Admiral Felt +journeyed to Saigon to discuss the matter more +thoroughly with General Harkins. Following +consultations, the two commanders jointly communicated +their recommendations to the Joint +Chiefs of Staff on 14 March. They advised that +it would be more desirable to deploy one of the +Marine helicopter squadrons from Okinawa than +either the Army unit already on alert in California +or the one in Hawaii. This decision, Felt and +Harkins informed the Joint Chiefs, was influenced +heavily by the readiness posture of the various +units under consideration. A Marine squadron, +they pointed out, could be on station and ready +for combat operations by 15 April—three days +before the company already alerted by the Army +could depart California.<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[5-12]</a></p> + +<p>Admiral Felt and General Harkins then dealt with +the CinCUSARPac contention that additional +supply problems would be created by the deployment +of a Marine unit to the Mekong Delta. The +Pacific commanders advised that, in their opinion, +the logistical support “can be handled relatively +easily by [the] Marines.”<a id="FNanchor_111" href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[5-13]</a> They added that should +requirements for a fifth helicopter unit arise in +South Vietnam, the Army’s 81st Helicopter Company +would be selected for the assignment. It +would be replaced in Hawaii by the 33d Transportation +Light Helicopter Company from Fort +Ord. Finally, Admiral Felt and General Harkins +recommended that the Marine squadron be deployed +initially to the Mekong Delta area of III +Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). Later, when +operational conditions in I Corps were more +favorable, the Marines could replace the Army +helicopter unit there.</p> + +<p>After meeting to discuss the matter, the Joint +Chiefs of Staff approved the entire package of +recommendations on 16 March. Admiral Felt +immediately ordered the Pacific Fleet to deploy +a Marine helicopter squadron to South Vietnam +and authorized direct liaison between the 1st +Marine Aircraft Wing and ComUSMACV. In turn, +Admiral Sides, the Commander of the Pacific +Fleet, notified the Commander, Seventh Fleet, +Vice Admiral William A. Schoech, of the decision +and directed him to take appropriate action.<a id="FNanchor_112" href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[5-14]</a></p> + +<h3 id="toclink_59"><i>Deployment to Soc Trang</i></h3> + +<p>The Commanding General of the 1st Marine +Aircraft Wing, Major General John P. Condon, a +Michigan native who had earned a Distinguished +Flying Cross and three Legions of Merit for service +during World War II and Korea, was informed of +the impending deployment on 22 March. At the +time, Condon, his staff, and elements of his command +were participating in SEATO exercise +TULUNGAN in the Philippines. The arrival of the +orders proved timely for most of the affected units +were in close proximity to the wing commander. +As the Marine helicopter squadron and its supporting +elements were scheduled to arrive in Vietnam +just two weeks after the SEATO exercise ended, +preparations for the move were begun immediately. +General Condon quickly dispatched several officers +to Saigon to establish liaison with USMACV.</p> + +<p>The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing fortunately +possessed a background which facilitated the rapid +preparations for the movement. Since August of the +previous year General Condon’s command regularly +had deployed a medium helicopter squadron +(HMM) and its supporting elements with the +Special Landing Force (SLF), a Marine air-ground +team embarked on board the Seventh Fleet’s +Amphibious Ready Group. Since 1961 this naval +task force had cruised Southeast Asian waters ready +to implement U.S. contingency plans. These +deployments had given the Marines of the wing a +reservoir of experience which enabled them to make +maximum use of the short period of time available +for planning.</p> + +<p>By 30 March, the wing’s planning had progressed +to the stage that General Condon could +provide the Commander of the Seventh Fleet with +specific recommendations for the entire operation. +The general concept of the plan was that Task Unit +79.3.5, under the command of a Marine colonel, +was to be built around a Marine medium helicopter +squadron which was participating in Operation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">60</span> +TULUNGAN. This task unit, code named SHUFLY, +was to occupy an old Japanese-built landing +strip near Soc Trang, a small town located about +85 miles southwest of Saigon in Ba Xuyen Province. +Situated only 20 miles from the coast, Soc Trang +possessed one of the few hard surfaced runways in +the area. Condon informed the Seventh Fleet +commander of the arrangements which his liaison +officers had made during their trip to Saigon. An +ARVN infantry battalion and two 4.2-inch mortar +companies were to assume the defense of the air +strip at Soc Trang the same day that the Marines +began landing.</p> + +<figure id="ip_60" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;"> + <img src="images/i_060.jpg" width="919" height="1111" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Major General John P. Condon, USMC, Commanding +General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. (<cite>USMC Photo +A420792</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The Marine general then proceeded to outline the +chain of command and method of support which he +considered best for the Marine task unit. SHUFLY, +he suggested, should be under the operational +control of ComUSMACV but should remain under +the administrative control of the 1st Marine Aircraft +Wing. Most of its logistic support, the wing +commander thought, could come through normal +Marine and Navy channels with fuels, lubricant +oils, rations, and ammunition, being the exceptions. +Rations and ammunition were to be provided +by MACV, while fuels would be supplied by +private Vietnamese distributers operating under +contracts with the U.S. government.</p> + +<p>Next, General Condon explained to Admiral +Schoech his desires for the organization of the task +unit. He felt that SHUFLY would function best if +organized into three distinct task elements. First, +he proposed that a headquarters be formed under +the command of Colonel John F. Carey, a veteran +Marine aviator who had been awarded the Navy +Cross for heroism during the battle for Midway. +Carey was currently serving as Chief of Staff of the +1st Marine Aircraft Wing. This headquarters, +General Condon advised, should consist of eight +officers and six enlisted men. The second element of +the task unit, the wing commander continued, +would be Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 +(HMM-362), reinforced, under the command of +Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp. The squadron, +whose normal complement was 63 officers and 196 +enlisted Marines, was to be augmented by 50 +additional maintenance personnel. Its equipment +would include 24 HUS helicopters (which under +normal operating conditions could lift eight to 12 +combat-loaded Vietnamese troops), three Cessna +single-engine OE-1 observation aircraft, one R4D +transport aircraft, and supplemental maintenance +equipment. Prior to its deployment, HMM-362 +would exchange its helicopters for recently overhauled +aircraft in order to reduce maintenance +problems once operations in Vietnam began. +SHUFLY’s third element would be a sub unit of +Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS-16). Designated +Task Element 79.3.5.2, it would be commanded +by Lieutenant Colonel William W. Eldridge. +Navy medical, dental, and chaplain personnel +would be included in the sub unit’s 193 +enlisted men and 18 officers.</p> + +<p>The wing commander intended to provide the +MABS-16 sub unit with a Tactical Airfield Fuel +Dispensing System (TAFDS) and a Marine Airfield +Traffic Control Unit (MATCU). The traffic control +unit would be equipped with Tactical Air +Navigation (TACAN) and Ground Control Approach +(GCA) systems which would enable the +helicopter squadron to conduct landings during +periods of reduced visibility.<a id="FNanchor_113" href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[5-15]</a></p> + +<p>Colonel Carey, the task unit commander, was +to be assigned responsibility for liaison with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">61</span> +MACV and military authorities in III Corps, the +tactical zone which encompassed the entire Mekong +Delta and the transition zone between the delta +and the highlands. All operational planning, +security, external communications, and administrative +matters also were to fall under his cognizance. +This arrangement would allow Lieutenant Colonel +Clapp and his squadron to concentrate on daily +flight operations and aircraft maintenance. Lieutenant +Colonel Eldridge’s MABS-16 sub unit would +be responsible for all normal base support and +airfield operations.<a id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[5-16]</a></p> + +<p>General Condon’s report to Admiral Schoech +concluded with a rough outline of the schedule for +the task unit’s deployment. On 9 April—only eight +days after the termination of the SEATO exercise +in the Philippines—Marine transport aircraft from +the 1st MAW, augmented by three transports from +the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW), would +begin airlifting the task unit headquarters and the +MABS-16 detachment from Okinawa. The Marine +general anticipated that all “housekeeping” facilities +would be in position at Soc Trang within five +days. Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s HMM-362 would +fly into Soc Trang from the amphibious assault +ship (helicopter carrier) USS <i>Princeton</i> (LPH-5) on +the morning of 15 April. The proposal that the +helicopters be flown ashore satisfied a Department +of Defense requirement that conspicuous unloading +activities were to be avoided in the Saigon area.</p> + +<p>Admiral Schoech approved the 1st MAW’s proposed +plan on 3 April and ordered Task Unit 79.3.5 +to be transferred to General Harkins’ command +on 15 April. He then instructed the Commander, +Task Group 76.5 (the Amphibious Ready Group) +to provide SHUFLY with whatever supply and +administrative support it might require for the +movement. At the same time the fleet commander +ordered appropriate subordinate commanders to +provide an escort of destroyers for the USS <i>Princeton</i> +and an inconspicuous air cover when the LPH +arrived and began unloading HMM-362. Accordingly, +the covering aircraft were instructed not to +approach within 20 miles of South Vietnam unless +the situation around Soc Trang endangered the +Marine helicopters.<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[5-17]</a></p> + +<p>The day following Schoech’s approval of the +Marine plan, the carrier task unit was formed to +transport HMM-362 to South Vietnam. SHUFLY +was activated simultaneously and given orders +which reflected General Condon’s planning. Colonel +Carey was instructed to establish his headquarters +at the Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan, +in order to prepare for the deployment. The task +unit commander was advised that he would receive +more detailed instructions relative to administration +and logistics at a later date.</p> + +<p>Colonel Carey’s task group headquarters in Japan +had only one week in which to complete preparations +for the move to the Republic of Vietnam. His +staff’s responsibility for coordinating between units +located at Atsugi, Japan, and Futema, Okinawa, +made this task even more difficult. Carey’s officers +worked out the details of the airlift with the staff +of Marine Aerial Refueler-Transport Squadron 152 +(VMGR-152), the GV-1<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[5-A]</a> unit assigned to carry +the MABS-16 sub unit and the task unit headquarters +to Soc Trang.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="label">[5-A]</a> The GV-1 (later KC-130), a four-engine, turbo-prop +refueler-transport built by Lockheed, is the Marine refueling +version of the Air Force C-130.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The airlift portion of the movement began as +scheduled on 9 April with the MABS-16 detachment +being transported from Futema directly to +Soc Trang. At 0800 Colonel Carey and part of his +staff landed at Soc Trang in a twin-engine Douglas +R4D Skytrain. As planned, the 400-man ARVN +battalion had already established a perimeter +around the airfield. Using the R4D’s radio, the +crew provided landing instructions for the GV-1s +of VMGR-152 and VMGR-352 which began landing +and unloading their cargoes at half hour +intervals. Several key American and Vietnamese +military officers were on hand to watch the lead +elements of SHUFLY arrive. Major General +Condon, the 1st MAW commander, flew the first +GV-1 into Soc Trang but departed after the aircraft +had been unloaded. General Harkins and Brigadier +General Le Van Nghiem, the Vietnamese commander +of III Corps, also made appearances at the +airstrip to welcome Colonel Carey and his Marines.</p> + +<p>Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge’s MABS-16 detachment +began readying the airfield for HMM-362’s +arrival shortly after the first transport aircraft had +unloaded. To serve as living spaces the Marines +raised 75 strongback tents, all with plywood decks. +They set up a water purification system and began +trucking water from the town of Soc Trang, about +two and a half miles away. Within two days, 9,000 +gallons of water had been purified. Other conveniences<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">62</span> +improved the camp’s living conditions. +A field laundry and a mess hall were set up and by +12 April, hot meals were being served to the +Marines. A post office began operations and telephones +were installed to connect living and +working areas.</p> + +<p>By 14 April, the day before HMM-362 was +scheduled to arrive at Soc Trang, most of the +airfield facilities were ready to support flight +operations. An old hangar, which had been +constructed by the Japanese during their World +War II occupation of Indochina, had been repaired +to house some of the squadron’s aircraft and equipment. +The MABS-16 communications section was +operational and had established radio and teletype +links with MACV in Saigon and MAG-16 on +Okinawa. The TAFDS had been assembled and +filled with aviation fuel and MATCU-68, the air +traffic control unit assigned to SHUFLY, was +prepared to control flight operations.</p> + +<p>The Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5) +steamed from Okinawa on 10 April with HMM-362, +its reinforcements, and HMM-261 embarked on the +USS <i>Princeton</i>. The task group arrived off the coast +of South Vietnam in the early morning hours of 15 +April. At dawn Lieutenant Colonel Clapp, who had +seen action as a fighter pilot during the Iwo Jima +and Okinawa campaigns in World War II, led the +first flight of helicopters from the deck of the +<i>Princeton</i>. The operation proceeded smoothly with +aircraft from both squadrons ferrying HMM-362’s +equipment inland to the Soc Trang airstrip. Far +out at sea, jets of the Seventh Fleet orbited, ready +to provide protection to the Marine helicopters. +They were not needed, however, as the Viet Cong +made no effort to oppose the movement. By mid-afternoon +the airlift of HMM-362’s personnel and +equipment to the Soc Trang airfield had been +completed. HMM-261 returned to the <i>Princeton</i> +where it continued to function as the helicopter +element of the Special Landing Force.</p> + +<p>The day after arriving at Soc Trang, Lieutenant +Colonel Clapp’s squadron, nicknamed “Archie’s +Angels,” was prepared to support the ARVN. +Since the squadron’s combat support was not required +immediately, the pilots and crews began +flying missions to familiarize themselves with their +new surroundings. They learned that their operations +were to be conducted over the vast expanse +of South Vietnam which stretched from just north +and east of Saigon to the nation’s southernmost tip, +the Ca Mau Peninsula, and from the South China +Sea westward to the Cambodian border. Their +initial flights over the Mekong Delta revealed a +predominantly flat and monotonous landscape. +Parched by the long dry season, the dusty brown +rice paddies stood in sharp contrast with the verdant +mangrove swamps which abounded near major +streams and along the coast. Numerous hamlets, +most enclosed by dense hedgerows and treelines, +were scattered across the countryside. Thousands +of canals and trails and a few crude roads completed +the rural landscape in which the Viet Cong +guerrilla thrived. Larger towns, such as Soc Trang, +Can Tho (located about 80 miles southwest of +Saigon), and My Tho (located about half way +between the capital and Can Tho) were under the +control of the Government of Vietnam.</p> + +<p>While the pilots and crews of HMM-362 were +acquainting themselves with the geography of the +Mekong Delta, Colonel Carey and his staff met in +Saigon with U.S. and Vietnamese officers from the +MACV and III Corps headquarters. There, they +established liaison with the three ARVN divisions +subordinate to General Nhgiem’s III Corps—the +21st, the 7th, and the 5th—and discussed operational +matters. After several conferences, the final +details of the command arrangements were completed. +It was agreed that all Marine missions +would require the approval of MACV, III Corps, +and the task unit commander. This arrangement +would enable General Harkins’ command to retain +actual operational control of the Marine helicopters +even though they would be supporting III Corps +exclusively. Final approval of all mission requests +for Marine support would rest with the Joint +Operations Center (JOC) at JGS headquarters in +Saigon. Manned by U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, +ARVN, and VNAF officers, this agency was part of +a recently instituted Tactical Air Support System, +the purpose of which was to provide positive control +over all military aircraft in South Vietnam. +To insure maximum coordination at lower echelons, +Marine liaison officers were assigned to the corps +headquarters and to the 21st ARVN Division. It +was anticipated that this division, headquartered +at Can Tho, only 35 miles northwest of Soc Trang, +would require more Marine helicopter support than<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">63</span> +the other divisions that were operating within the +corps tactical zone.<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[5-B]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="label">[5-B]</a> I and II Corps had their own agencies within the corps headquarters +for control of air assets whereas III CTZ relied directly +on the JOC. Under this arrangement, I Corps and II Corps were +required to pass mission requests for air support on to the JOC.</p> + +</div> + +<figure id="ip_63" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_063.jpg" width="1915" height="1426" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Lieutenant Colonel Archie Clapp (second from left), HMM-362 squadron commander, Major General John Condon +(fourth from left), Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Colonel John Carey (extreme right), task +unit commander, confer briefly after arriving at Soc Trang. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kizer, USMC</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>While operational planning was underway, the +MABS-16 Marines set about to improve the newly +occupied compound. Two diesel-powered generators +were put into operation and began furnishing +electrical power for the camp. The utilities section, +which maintained the generators, then began installing +electrical wiring throughout the compound. +Toilet and shower facilities were constructed +to accommodate the Marines.</p> + +<p>Measures were also taken during this interlude +to strengthen the airfield’s defenses. Expecting that +the Viet Cong might attempt to infiltrate the +Marine position, Colonel Carey created a 40-man +security unit to protect the inner camp and flight +lines. This unit, composed of men from MABS-16 +and HMM-362 and responsible to a permanent +sergeant-of-the-guard, maintained roving patrols +and security posts during hours of darkness. A +network of concertina wire, trip flares, and machine +gun emplacements provided additional protection +around the helicopters and living area. Attack +alerts were conducted periodically to coordinate +the ARVN’s outer defenses and the Marine guard +within the perimeter.</p> + +<figure id="ip_63b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 28em;"> + <img src="images/i_064.jpg" width="1761" height="2575" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE<br> +1962<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Within less than two weeks after the first +Marines had arrived at Soc Trang, the camp had +been adequately prepared to support sustained +combat helicopter operations. In addition, defenses +had been established and the lines of logistical +support from MACV had been opened. Food and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">65</span> +water were readily available. All necessary liaison +with the Vietnamese units to be supported had +been accomplished. Pilots and crews had gained a +rudimentary knowledge of the area in which they +would fly and SHUFLY’s entire command structure +had undergone a one week “shake down” in which +it had proven sound.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_65"><i>Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations</i></h3> + +<p>Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s squadron began combat +operations on Easter Sunday, 22 April, exactly +one week after arriving in the Republic of Vietnam. +The unit’s first combat assignment was to assist +the Army’s Saigon-based 57th Helicopter Company +in an operation code named LOCKJAW. The +American helicopters were to support the ARVN +7th Division which was headquartered at My Tho, +53 miles northeast of Soc Trang. The Marine helicopters, +which departed Soc Trang at 0900, flew 29 +sorties and lifted 400 Vietnamese soldiers without +incident during the course of their first operation.</p> + +<p>Unlike the U.S. Army helicopters already operating +in other parts of South Vietnam, the Marine +HUS-1s were not armed with machine guns during +their initial operations from Soc Trang. Prior to +their deployment, the Marine commanders had +reasoned that weapons mounted in the cargo hatch +would hinder loading and unloading during +critical periods while the helicopters were in +landing zones. Additionally, armed aircraft would +tend to present a more hostile appearance to +Vietnamese civilians, thereby providing the Viet +Cong ready-made material for their anti-American +propaganda themes. The only weapons on board the +helicopters, therefore, were the individual side +arms and two M3A1 .45 caliber submachine guns +carried by the crew members. The automatic +weapons enabled Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s men +to return fire at short ranges and would also enhance +their survival capabilities in the event an +aircraft was forced down in unsecure territory.<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[5-C]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="label">[5-C]</a> By the summer the new light weight AR-15, the forerunner +of the M-16, would replace the M3A1 “greaseguns.” +Near the end of the year, however, the Leatherneck crews +were carrying M-14 rifles, the standard U.S. 7.62mm infantry +weapon of this period.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Once HMM-362 began combat flight operations +the tempo of activities at Soc Trang quickened. +The same day that SHUFLY helicopters participated +in the coordinated helilift from My Tho, an +HUS was called upon to evacuate an American +advisor from Vinh Long, 46 miles north of Soc +Trang. The following day the first combined operation +involving Vietnamese Marine ground forces +and U.S. Marine helicopters was conducted. A +company of Vietnamese Marines was helilifted into +a threatened government outpost south of the +town of Ca Mau, located near the southern tip of +South Vietnam, to provide security while HMM-362’s +helicopters evacuated the 57-man garrison.</p> + +<p>On 24 April, 16 Marine helicopters supported the +21st ARVN Division in Operation NIGHTINGALE +conducted near Can Tho. In this operation 591 +ARVN troops were lifted into eight landing zones +along two canals where a large group of Viet +Cong had been reported. Shortly after the first +wave of the assault force landed, a vicious small +arms fight erupted. HMM-362 suffered its first +combat damage when a helicopter was forced +down after its oil line was punctured by enemy fire. +An accompanying HUS quickly landed and retrieved +the crew. Four other helicopters proceeded +to the forward loading site, picked up a Marine +repair team and enough ARVN troops to protect +the team while it worked, and returned to the +downed aircraft. The mechanics completed their +repairs in two hours after which the crew returned +the helicopter to Soc Trang. The security force +was then lifted out of the area.</p> + +<p>Despite the damage suffered by the Marine +aircraft, the Can Tho operation apparently achieved +some success. The Viet Cong reportedly suffered +70 dead and lost three prisoners to the South +Vietnamese while the ARVN units lost only three +killed and six wounded. The Marines of HMM-362, +moreover, had responded to a new challenge by +demonstrating that they could recover helicopters +which had been forced to land in insecure territory. +Although the principle of providing security while +accomplishing field repairs had been employed +previously by the Army helicopter companies, the +Can Tho operation of 24 April marked the first +time the Marines had been required to use the +technique.</p> + +<figure id="ip_65" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_066.jpg" width="1896" height="2431" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Aerial view of Soc Trang airstrip. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kizer, USMC</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>HMM-362 again joined the Army’s 57th Helicopter +Company for a coordinated troop lift on +25 April. This time the objective was the small +town of Chau Doc on the Bassac River near the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">67</span> +Cambodian border which had been raided and +burned by a force whose identity was undetermined. +Fourteen Marine helicopters transported 168 troops +from the 21st ARVN Division to the scene of the +incident while two other squadron aircraft lifted +the Deputy Commander of III Corps, the 21st +Division Commander, and the Senior U.S. Advisor +in III Corps, Colonel Daniel B. Potter, Jr., U.S. +Army, to the village. The landing was uncontested +as the marauding band had fled across the international +border into Cambodia.</p> + +<p>The conditions which confronted HMM-362 in +the Mekong Delta during its first weeks of combat +operations encouraged the squadron’s pilots to +experiment with new tactics. One such instance +occurred in the first week of May in Ba Xuyen +Province when the province chief requested that +the Marine helicopters support his Civil Guard +company in a raid on a fortified Viet Cong village +about 12 miles southwest of Soc Trang. Because the +objective was located so near the Soc Trang airfield, +Lieutenant Colonel Clapp ordered an unusual +technique used for approaching the landing zone. +The flight would rendezvous over Soc Trang at +tree-top level and proceed to the objective with the +flight leader slightly to the rear and above the +formation. From this vantage point the flight +leader could keep the other aircraft in sight and +exercise better control over each element of the +flight. The success of the new procedure led +Lieutenant Colonel Clapp to remark later that the +technique was similar to “calling the plays from +the grandstand.”<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[5-18]</a> It became another tactic available +for the squadron’s future use.</p> + +<p>In terms of lessons learned, HMM-362’s most +significant operation during its initial month of +combat support came on 9 May. Twenty-three +helicopters and two OE-1 observation aircraft +launched from Ca Mau at 1100 for an assault on +Cai Ngai, a Viet Cong-controlled village 21 miles +to the south. At 1200 the helicopters began landing +the ARVN troops in six landing zones which had +been attacked only five minutes earlier by Vietnamese +Air Force fighter bombers. Firing broke out +even before the Vietnamese troops could jump +from the helicopters. During this clash eight of +the Marine aircraft were hit by small arms fire +and two Vietnamese troops were wounded while +still on board. One HUS, struck in the oil return +line, was forced to land a few miles from the +objective. Troops were flown in quickly to establish +a perimeter around the downed aircraft while +repairs were made. After the temporary repairs +had been completed, its crew flew the helicopter +to Ca Mau, where it remained until more extensive +work could be accomplished. The other aircraft, +including an OE-1, suffered only superficial damage +and continued to support the ARVN operation.</p> + +<p>From this encounter with the Viet Cong, the +Marine pilots learned that air strikes conducted +just prior to a helicopter landing in the heavily +populated delta country tended to disclose the +location of the landing zone to the enemy. In this +instance the Communists had been able to reach the +landing zone in the few minutes which elapsed +between the last air strike and the arrival of the +Marine helicopters. Following this experience, +the Marines would no longer allow VNAF air +strikes on landing zones prior to operations in the +flat delta region.<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[5-D]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="label">[5-D]</a> The development of helicopter tactics and techniques in +Vietnam will be covered in detail in a separate monograph being +prepared for publication by the History and Museums Division, +Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The Americans and Vietnamese, however, soon +learned to use fixed-wing aircraft to support +helicopter operations in another manner. By mid-June, +FARM GATE T-28 Trojans (a single-engine +two-seat trainer built by North American) modified +to carry bombs, rockets, and machine guns were +flying escort missions for the Marine helicopter +squadron. This particular aircraft could fly slowly +enough to cruise with the HUS yet fast enough to +deliver an air strike en route to the objective and +then catch up with the helicopter formation. Normally +an element of two T-28s accompanied the +helicopters and were used primarily to attack +targets near the landing zone after the ARVN +troops were on the ground. The placement of an +American pilot-instructor and a Vietnamese student +in the T-28, a requirement imposed by MACV, +helped avert language problems which invariably +developed when coordinating ARVN ground operations +and U.S. air operations. The effectiveness of +the escort tactic increased as the Marine and Air +Force pilots became accustomed to planning, coordinating, +and executing the missions.</p> + +<p>The Marines quickly learned the value of utilizing +the OE-1 in conjunction with their helicopter +operations. Three single-engine, two-man aircraft,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">68</span> +a detachment from Marine Observation Squadron +2 (VMO-2), proved remarkably versatile in day-to-day +operations over the delta. Primarily, they +were used in daylight visual reconnaissance, usually +to study objective areas and the approach routes +which the helicopters would later use. Sometimes +their crews were called upon to photograph proposed +landing zones for briefing purposes. Often +the aircraft’s radios were used to relay messages +between various ARVN ground units which were +operating beyond the range of their radios. +Equipped with two frequency-modulated (FM) +radios for work with ground stations and one +ultra high-frequency (UHF) radio for communicating +with other aircraft, the OE-1 was perfectly +suited for controlling helicopter landings. The +Marine aviators also found that, unlike their +helicopters, the observation aircraft did not arouse +suspicion in the area over which it flew. This +advantage was due probably to several factors. +First, the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) routinely +operated similar aircraft over the entire region; +secondly, the enemy could not readily determine +whether the OE-1 was on a reconnaissance mission +or merely flying from one point to another; and +finally, the small aircraft made little noise. Given +these characteristics it was no accident that the +helicopter squadron relied on the observation aircraft +more and more as the pattern of operations +unfolded.</p> + +<figure id="ip_68" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 31em;"> + <img src="images/i_068.jpg" width="1928" height="1386" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Vietnamese infantrymen disembark from HMM-362 helicopters and move toward treeline in one of the first helicopter +assault operations attempted by a Marine unit in the Mekong Delta. (<cite>Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel James P. +Kizer, USMC</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Shortly after their arrival in Vietnam, the +Marines of HMM-362 began experimenting with +one of the more imaginative techniques developed +in the early stages of the intensified U.S.-GVN +counterinsurgency effort. Marine air crews had +noticed that the enemy often managed to elude the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">69</span> +larger ARVN units by fleeing the operations area +in small groups. Even the smallest breach between +ARVN units seemed to allow large numbers of +guerrillas to escape into covered or heavily populated +areas where they became impossible to find. +Colonel Carey and Lieutenant Colonel Clapp +devised a plan to prevent escapes of this nature. +Their idea was to have a flight of four Marine +helicopters loaded with about 50 ARVN soldiers +circle above the contested area. This so-called +“Eagle Flight” would be on the alert for any +Viet Cong attempting to evade the ground forces. +Once the enemy was located, often by the OE-1 +observation aircraft, the helicopters would land +the Vietnamese soldiers at a position where they +could block his escape. The Marine commanders +felt that the adoption of such a tactic would +increase the effectiveness of the ARVN’s helicopter +assault operations.</p> + +<p>After several weeks of planning by HMM-362 +and the affected III Corps commands, the concept +was put into practice. The Eagle Flight was first +tested in a large operation on 18 June when +HMM-362 helilifted ARVN troops into 16 different +landing zones. Heavy monsoon rains made the +enemy particularly difficult to pin down, but the +Marine pilots managed to sight 10 Viet Cong near +the main landing zone. After landing near the +enemy, the ARVN troops captured 10 Communist +soldiers and wounded one other. Shortly after this +incident another Eagle Flight made two eventful +contacts with the enemy. The Marine helicopters +landed their small force and the ARVN promptly +killed four Viet Cong and captured another. +Twenty minutes later, after reboarding the helicopters, +the South Vietnamese swept down upon a +new prey, this time capturing four prisoners.</p> + +<p>The novel concept was employed successfully +again on 10 July. While HMM-362 aircraft lifted +968 ARVN troops into the Ca Mau area, an Eagle +Flight spotted a sampan moving northward from +the operations area. The flight leader landed the +troops nearby and the ARVN intercepted the craft. +Later that day the Marines and ARVN of the Eagle +Flight clashed twice with an estimated platoon of +Viet Cong. In the first encounter seven enemy were +killed and several weapons were captured. In the +second skirmish, the enemy suffered six dead and +lost more weapons. All four Marine helicopters, +however, were hit by small arms fire during the +two brief fights.</p> + +<p>By the middle of July, the Eagle Flight had +become a proven combat tactic. By reducing the +enemy’s opportunity to escape when the government +forces possessed the advantage on the battlefield, +it had favorably influenced the tactical situation +when used in the Mekong Delta. Equally +important, SHUFLY’s commanders had demonstrated +their ability to adapt their technological +resources to the Viet Cong’s methods of operations. +Variants of the Eagle Flight tactic, under different +names such as Tiger Flight, Sparrow Hawk, +Pacifier, and Quick Reaction Force, would be used +by the Marines throughout the Vietnam war.</p> + +<p>The Marines were quick to apply their technological +knowhow to other problems which were +to confront them during their early operations in +the III Corps Tactical Zone. One example was their +adaptation of the TAFDS to the problem which +arose when the helicopters were called upon to +operate far beyond their normal fuel range. HMM-362 +helicopters would airlift a TAFDS unit, +complete with a 10,000 gallon fuel bladder, pumps, +and MABS-16 personnel, to the site where the +ARVN troops were to be loaded. The fuel bladders +were filled by gasoline trucks which travelled from +the nearest source of fuel. The Marine helicopters +could then use the TAFDS as a temporary base of +operations, refueling between troop pick-ups when +necessary. Thus employed, the TAFDS allowed the +operating radius of the helicopters to be extended +to support even the most distant South Vietnamese +operation.</p> + +<p>While the Marines were learning to adapt +their technology to the guerrilla war environment, +the enemy was applying his ingenuity in attempts +to frustrate the American and South Vietnamese +helicopter operations. The Viet Cong quickly +learned to capitalize on the presence of large +crowds of civilians who sometimes gathered near +helicopter landing zones to watch the strange +aircraft. One such incident occurred in June when +Communist soldiers mingled with a crowd and +delivered fire on helicopters which were lifting +elements of the 21st ARVN Division. Two aircraft +were hit by enemy fire although the damage was +not extensive enough to force them to land. The +Marines, who refused to return fire with their +individual weapons unless the Viet Cong could be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">70</span> +separated from the civilian populace, found no +effective method of countering this tactic. Later in +June, the Marines of HMM-362 encountered +another tactic when they found that hundreds of +upright bamboo stakes had been prepositioned in +the intended landing zone. The perpendicular +spikes, each four or five feet high, not only prevented +the helicopters from landing but also made +it impossible to disembark the ARVN troops while +hovering. Fortunately, the abundance of landing +zones in the delta region tended to make this +particular tactic ineffective.<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[5-E]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="label">[5-E]</a> The German army had used a similar technique (upright +poles) to obstruct landing zones against U.S. paratroops at +Normandy during World War II. (Taylor, <cite>Swords and Plowshares</cite>, +p. 80.)</p> + +</div> + +<p>On 20 July, HMM-362 added a new dimension +to the counterguerrilla capabilities of the South +Vietnamese forces when it executed the first night +helicopter assault of the war. The mission, which +began at 0415 at Soc Trang, involved lifting three +waves of ARVN troops into an objective on the +Plain of Reeds, about 40 miles southwest of Ben +Tre. The ARVN force intended to encircle a suspected +Viet Cong village before dawn and then +attack it at daybreak. The Marine portion of the +airlift was completed 10 minutes before daylight +after which the Army’s 57th Helicopter Company +joined the operation. Although the night troop +lift was executed without incident, Lieutenant +Colonel Clapp attributed its success at least partially +to the near perfect conditions. The moonlight, +reflected from the flat, flooded rice paddies, +had aided the Marine pilots in the tricky +operation.<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[5-19]</a></p> + +<p>Prior to SHUFLY’s deployment to Soc Trang, +General Roberts’ staff at FMFPac had developed a +policy for the periodic rotation of the task unit’s +Marines for which the Commandant’s approval +had been gained. The helicopter squadron would be +replaced by a similar unit after approximately +four months of operations in the combat zone. +But rather than being drawn from the 1st MAW +on Okinawa, the replacement squadron was to be +provided by the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in +California. Officers and men serving with the +supporting headquarters and MABS-16 elements, +however, were to be replaced by Marines from +MAG-16 at approximately four-month intervals. +So as not to disrupt the operational efficiency of +the task unit, individual replacements would be +made in increments.</p> + +<p>In accordance with this rotation policy, HMM-163, +the HUS unit scheduled to relieve HMM-362, +began arriving at Soc Trang on 23 July. Commanded +by Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Rathbun, a +veteran fighter pilot of World War II and Korea, +the squadron continued to arrive during the last +week of July. Airlifted by GV-1s from the Marine +Corps Air Facility, Santa Ana, California, the +new squadron brought neither helicopters nor +maintenance equipment. The squadron commander +had orders to continue operations with HMM-362’s +aircraft and equipment.</p> + +<p>Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s squadron maintained +a steady operational pace even after the new unit’s +appearance. On 27 July, 18 of HMM-362’s helicopters +participated in an operation about 30 +miles northeast of Soc Trang. The next day the +task unit commander committed 21 helicopters and +OE-1s to a 21st ARVN Division operation near +Ca Mau. The Eagle Flight was committed on four +different occasions during this operation.</p> + +<p>Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s “Ridge Runners” +officially relieved “Archie’s Angels” on 1 August +after a week of orientation flying with HMM-362’s +crews. The men of the departing squadron could +reflect on their tour in South Vietnam with a +sense of satisfaction and accomplishment. Since +their arrival in mid-April, they had executed 50 +combat helicopter assaults, had flown 4,439 sorties, +and had amassed 5,262 hours of combat flight time, +all in unarmed aircraft. During the course of these +missions they had made approximately 130 different +landings against Viet Cong opposition. Seventeen +of their 24 helicopters and two of the three OE-1 +aircraft had received battle damage. To the credit +of the squadron’s maintenance personnel and aircrews, +HMM-362 had not lost a single aircraft +during its operations in the Republic of Vietnam. +Miraculously the squadron had suffered no casualties +while testing the Marine Corps’ vertical envelopment +concept in the guerrilla war situation.<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">[5-20]</a></p> + +<p>During their three and a half months at Soc +Trang, Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s men had contributed +significantly to another facet of the war +effort—one usually considered unrelated to normal +combat operations. Sensing the unique links between +the political and military aspects of the +struggle in South Vietnam, Colonel Carey had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">71</span> +initiated a “People-to-People-Program,” the objective +of which was to assist the Government of +Vietnam in winning the allegiance of the Vietnamese +people. Within a few days after occupying +the Soc Trang airfield, Colonel Carey had ordered +the task unit’s medical facilities made available to +Vietnamese civilians requiring emergency medical +treatment. U.S. Navy doctors and corpsmen began +visiting nearby villages to hold “sick call” for the +local inhabitants. On an average visit these medical +teams would examine around 60 Vietnamese of all +ages. They would then dispense soap, vitamins, and +aspirin—commodities which some rural Vietnamese +had never seen. Gradually, the medical teams +expanded their operations until by mid-June they +were being flown by helicopter as far away as +Ca Mau.</p> + +<p>HMM-362’s departure from Vietnam coincided +roughly with the departure of most of the Marine +task unit’s senior officers—the men who had +directed the efforts to win the “other war” for the +allegiance of the Vietnamese people. On 30 July, +Colonel Julius W. Ireland, another Marine aviator +who had seen combat in two previous wars, +relieved Colonel Carey as the task unit commander. +The new commander was one of few Marines who +had been in Vietnam previously. In April 1954 he +had landed at Da Nang (then known by its French +name, Tourane) as squadron commander of Marine +Attack Squadron 324 (VMA-324) and delivered 25 +F4U/FG Corsair fighter bombers to the French who +were in desperate need of attack aircraft to support +Dien Bien Phu. Five days after Ireland assumed +command of Task Unit 79.3.5, Lieutenant Colonel +Ralph R. Davis replaced Lieutenant Colonel +Eldridge as commanding officer of the MABS-16 +sub unit. On 13 August another change occurred +when the executive officer of the Marine task unit, +Lieutenant Colonel Harry C. Dees, was relieved by +Lieutenant Colonel Alton W. McCully. Except +that it left few original members of the task unit, +the departure of these Marines for new duty +stations in Okinawa, Japan, and the United States +did not affect the operations at Soc Trang. Thoroughly +briefed on their responsibilities, the new +officers would continue to direct Marine support of +the Vietnamese government on both the battlefield +and the psychological front.</p> + +<p>HMM-163 participated in its first combat +mission as a squadron on 1 August when it joined +the Army’s 57th Helicopter Company in a coordinated +troop lift. Like their predecessors, +“Rathbun’s Ridge Runners” maintained a brisk +pace of operations during the weeks following +their initial assignment. Shortly after its first troop +lift, the squadron participated in a 2,000-man +South Vietnamese spoiling operation in An Xuyen, +South Vietnam’s southernmost province. Anticipating +a major Viet Cong offensive in the four +southern provinces, III Corps authorities moved +their headquarters to Soc Trang and established a +forward command post at Ca Mau. The Vietnamese +Air Force then positioned a composite detachment +of four AD-6 Skyraiders (single-engine, propeller-driven +attack bombers built by Douglas), two +T-28s, and a number of H-34 helicopters (the U.S. +Army, Air Force, and VNAF version of the HUS) +at Soc Trang to support the operation. Joined by +the VNAF H-34s, the Marine squadron conducted +numerous troop lifts during the week-long operation. +At the end of the action the ARVN reported +84 Viet Cong killed, another 30 captured, and the +confiscation of nearly 15,000 pounds of arms, +ammunition, and explosives. The first Marine helicopter +loss in Vietnam occurred during the operation +when a VNAF fighter careened off the runway +and damaged a parked HUS to the extent that it +could not be repaired. Marine mechanics stripped +undamaged parts from the helicopter for use as +replacements.<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[5-F]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="label">[5-F]</a> Marine helicopters lost in Vietnam during the 1962–1964 +period were replaced by new ones airlifted from Okinawa by +U.S. Air Force C-124 Globemaster transports. By replacing +aircraft losses on a one-to-one basis the task unit was able to +maintain a level of 24 helicopters except for brief periods.</p> + +</div> + +<p>HMM-163 suffered its first aircraft damage as a +result of combat a few day’s later on 18 August during +a mission led by Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun. +Fourteen HUSs arrived at a prearranged pickup +point to rendezvous with an ARVN infantry force +but the Marine pilots discovered that the unit had +not appeared. One crewman then reported having +seen some ARVN troops about a half mile away +from the landing zone. At this juncture, a white +smoke signal appeared at approximately the same +location that the Marine had observed the South +Vietnamese troops. Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun +and his wingmate, assuming that the smoke +marked the actual pickup point, took off to investigate +the area. While making a low pass over<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">72</span> +the smoke signal, the squadron commander’s +helicopter was hit several times by small arms fire +which severed the rudder control cable and punctured +the main rotor transmission. The loss of oil +required Rathbun to make a forced landing on a +nearby road. After mechanics had been flown in and +repairs had been accomplished, the helicopter was +flown to a secure area.</p> + +<figure id="ip_72" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 35em;"> + <img src="images/i_072.jpg" width="1923" height="1222" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Marine officers visit Father Phuoc’s village. Left to right: Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp; Colonel John F. Carey; +Father Phuoc; Colonel Julius W. Ireland; Colonel Gordon Gale; Major General Richard G. Weede; French Interpreter +Gilles H. Rocheleau; and three unidentified Marine officers. (<cite>USMC Photo A420824</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>An investigation of the incident later revealed +that the confusion had begun when the ARVN +unit scheduled to be helilifted became involved +in a skirmish with guerrillas less than a mile from +the pick up point. A VNAF Forward Air Controller +(FAC) in an observation aircraft had then marked +the Viet Cong position for an air strike with a +white smoke grenade rather than red smoke, as +was normally used. This was the smoke which +Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun had attempted to +identify when his aircraft was hit.</p> + +<p>From this incident the pilots of HMM-163 +learned several valuable lessons about helicopter +support in conjunction with ARVN ground +operations. First, helilifts of government forces +from the field at prearranged times required +thorough last minute coordination. Secondly, +helicopters could not be used safely on low-level +reconnaissance or identification passes. Finally, +prearranged colored smoke signals were easily +confused and when used routinely were subject to +enemy attempts at deception. Such signalling +methods were most effective when used in conjunction +with radio communications between air and +ground units.</p> + +<p>A somewhat humorous sequel to this incident<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">73</span> +took place later in the day when Rathbun learned +that he had been selected for promotion to colonel. +The timing of the notification prompted one +squadron wit to quip: “Lost a bird, gained a +bird.”<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[5-21]</a></p> + +<p>“Rathbun’s Ridge Runners” continued intensive +support operations in III Corps Tactical Zone +throughout the month of August. Their daily +missions normally included both scheduled troop +lifts and unscheduled medical evacuations. During +the week of 19–25 August HMM-163 helicopters +logged slightly over 800 combat flying hours. A +squadron record for a single day was established on +24 August when 197.6 helicopter hours were flown. +Flight time for the helicopters during the entire +month totalled 2,543 hours—a new Marine Corps +record for an HUS squadron. The OE-1 aircraft +added 63 missions and 212 hours to this total. +Another statistic revealed that 21 of the squadron’s +pilots logged over 100 hours of combat flying time +during August.<a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[5-22]</a> This record was even more +impressive considering that flight operations were +hampered by the monsoon season which reached +its peak during August in the Mekong Delta.</p> + +<p>In August Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s men +made a significant modification to their helicopters +when they began mounting M-60 machine guns +inside the cargo hatch. So as not to obstruct the +hatch during loading and unloading phases, the +squadron’s metalsmiths designed a flexible mount +which allowed the crew chiefs to swing the belt-fed, +7.62mm automatic weapon back into the +cabin when necessary. The addition of the machine +gun enabled the crew chief to protect the otherwise +defenseless helicopter during critical landing and +take off phases. Still, the Marine gunners were +restricted in their action by MACV’s “rules of +engagement” which at this time stipulated that +American servicemen could fire only after being +fired upon and then only at clearly identified +enemy. Intended to prevent offensive combat +action by U.S. military personnel operating in +Vietnam, these regulations prevented Americans +from returning fire except when the enemy was +clearly identified.<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[5-G]</a> Primarily because of these +restrictions the Marines seldom employed their +M-60s in the heavily populated Mekong Delta.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="label">[5-G]</a> The rules of engagement applied to U.S. advisors as well as +aviation crews. Although they underwent several modifications +during the course of the war, the above definition was virtually +unaltered during the period between 1962 and 1964.</p> + +</div> + +<h3 id="toclink_73"><i>Preparations and Redeployment</i></h3> + +<p>In early September General Harkins directed +that Colonel Ireland begin planning for the redeployment +of his helicopter task unit northward to +Da Nang. The shift to I Corps, which had been +the subject of much debate prior to SHUFLY’s +assignment at Soc Trang, came as no surprise. +Shortly after the task unit’s arrival in the Mekong +Delta, Colonel Carey accompanied General Condon +on a visit to the Army’s 93d Helicopter Company +at Da Nang. There they discussed details of the +relocation with Army officers. In early July +General Harkins set 1 August as the date on which +the Marine task unit and the 93d Helicopter Company +would switch locations. But personal appeals +by General Nghiem, the III Corps commander and +his senior U.S. advisor, Colonel Porter, that the +Marine helicopters be retained at Soc Trang caused +Harkins to postpone the date for the exchange +until 15 September.</p> + +<p>In that the airlift was executed in phases, the +Marines’ movement to Da Nang was accomplished +in much the same manner as had been the task +unit’s initial move into Soc Trang. On 4 September +Colonel Ireland dispatched the task unit’s assistant +communications officer and an advance party to +Da Nang to assess the communications requirements +there and to prepare for the arrival of the +remainder of the Marines and their equipment. +Four days later Marine wiremen, message center +personnel, and radio operators began preparing a +communications center at their new home. The +next day the advance party established radio +contact with SHUFLY headquarters in order to +help coordinate the move. By 9 September MABS-16 +technicians had assembled a TAFDS at the Da +Nang airfield. This facility would enable the GV-1 +transports participating in the airlift to refuel for +the 460-mile return flight to Soc Trang after +unloading their cargoes at Da Nang.</p> + +<p>While the advance party readied the facilities at +Da Nang for its unit’s arrival, combat support +operations and preparations for the move northward +continued simultaneously at Soc Trang. +During an operation on 5 September, three of +HMM-163’s helicopters were hit by several rounds +of enemy small arms fire. Although all three aircraft +returned safely to base, the Marines suffered +their first casualty to Viet Cong fire when Corporal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">74</span> +Billy S. Watson, a crew chief, was slightly +wounded. Troop lifts from Soc Trang continued +until 1740 on 13 September when helicopter support +operations were ended and the final preparations +for the move to Da Nang began.</p> + +<p>On the evening of 14 September, the first of the +Marine GV-1s slated to transport the task unit +arrived at Soc Trang from Okinawa. At dawn the +next morning, the refueler-transports began shuttling +Marines and their equipment to Da Nang and +the Army’s 93d Helicopter Company to Soc Trang. +By the end of the day much of the airlift had been +completed. The crews and helicopters of Lieutenant +Colonel Rathbun’s squadron, however, did not +begin displacing northward until the 16th when +12 HUSs made the seven-hour flight to Da Nang +with three en route refueling stops. The 12 remaining +helicopters arrived at SHUFLY’s new base of +operations the next day. The move was completed +on 20 September when the last cargo carrying GV-1 +landed at Da Nang.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_74"><i>Accomplishments</i></h3> + +<p>As SHUFLY’s Marines began preparing for their +impending operations in the northern provinces +they could look with pride on their accomplishments +at Soc Trang. Since their arrival in the +Mekong Delta in April the Leathernecks had +clearly demonstrated their ability to conduct sustained +and effective helicopter operations in support +of non-English-speaking ground forces. While it +could not be said that their presence had completely +transformed the complexion of the GVN’s +struggle to control the critical Mekong Delta +region, the Marine helicopters had provided the +ARVN units operating there with a degree of +mobility they had not previously possessed. This +new-found mobility in turn had helped generate a +new offensive spirit within government units +assigned to southern III Corps. In his letter to +ComUSMACV requesting the retention of the task +unit at Soc Trang, Colonel Porter, the Senior U.S. +Advisor to the corps tactical zone, reported: “Now +they [ARVN forces] have a taste of victory and +for the first time are beginning to believe there is a +possibility of defeating the Viet Cong.”<a id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[5-23]</a></p> + +<p>During the course of their operations throughout +South Vietnam’s southern provinces, the SHUFLY +Marines displayed an instinct for recognizing +and coping with the challenges of unconventional +warfare. Confronted by a war without front +lines in which an elusive, highly mobile enemy +blended readily with the local populace, the +task unit’s leaders devised new and successful +helicopter tactics. Likewise, SHUFLY’s Marine +and Navy personnel moved to prevent a possible +conflict of cultures and to discredit Communist +propaganda through the initiation of the People-to-People +Program. Although only an informal +beginning, this program would serve as a foundation +upon which the U.S. Marine Corps would +later build a doctrine defining the relationship +between Marines on duty in Vietnam and the +Vietnamese people.</p> + +<p>Beyond the innovative thinking of its leaders, +much of SHUFLY’s success in III Corps was +produced by hard work on a sustained basis. For +this the individual Marines, particularly the +maintenance crews which often worked around the +clock in primitive surroundings to keep the +helicopters airworthy, deserved heavy credit. +Although unglamorous, their daily contributions +underwrote the success of the combat support +operations. So, functioning as a team, the task +unit’s members blended innovation, hard work, and +technical expertise with perseverance and courage +to carve out a reputation for themselves in the faraway +rice lands of the Mekong Delta.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">75</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_6"><span id="toclink_75"></span>CHAPTER 6<br> +<span class="subhead large">SHUFLY Moves North</span><br> +<span class="subhead notbold"><i>Arrival at Da Nang—I Corps Tactical Zone—Military Situation, +September 1962—Initial Helicopter Operations—Marine People-to-People +Program—SHUFLY Operations in I Corps</i></span></h2> +</div> + +<h3 id="toclink_75a"><i>Arrival at Da Nang</i></h3> + +<p>Da Nang retained many characteristics of an old +French colonial port city when the Marines arrived +there in mid-September 1962. With its thriving +market place, its throngs of bicycles, and a noticeable +dearth of automobile traffic, the city was +certainly more Asian than European in appearance. +Still, the former French presence was evident in +the architecture of public buildings, electric and +telephone lines, paved streets, built-up waterfront, +and an airfield. Although the French influence +seemed not to have disturbed the traditional +Vietnamese culture, it had imparted a picturesque +charm to South Vietnam’s second largest city.</p> + +<p>Virtually surrounded by the city itself, Da +Nang’s airfield was to serve as SHUFLY’s new base +of operations. Having been rebuilt as a military +base by the French following World War II, the +Da Nang facility was relatively modern. Understandably, +it differed in many ways from the crude +little airfield the Marines had left behind in the +steamy Mekong Delta. The runway, for example, +was considerably longer, having 8,000 feet of paved +surface. The Da Nang base was also busier, having +already been occupied by Vietnamese and U.S. Air +Force units. Furthermore, it served the city as a +commercial airport.</p> + +<p>Scattered around the long north-south runway +were numerous clusters of French-built masonry +structures. A group of 50 of these yellow-walled +buildings, located about one half mile west of the +runway, had been designated as living quarters for +the newly arrived Marines. Although the actual +living spaces were somewhat crowded and in need +of much repair, the indoor toilets, showers, ceiling +fans, and fluorescent lights (none of which functioned +properly) were welcomed by the men who +had experienced the discomforts of life in Soc +Trang’s “tent city.” Once the Marines had moved +in, their compound would include a chapel, +medical and dental facilities, service clubs, a movie, +a barber shop, a laundry, and a mess hall.</p> + +<p>While many of the problems encountered +initially by the Marines at Da Nang were similar +to those that had greeted their predecessors at Soc +Trang, there were also some new ones to be +resolved. The two most imposing of these stemmed +from the distance between the living compound and +working areas. Located along the southeast side of +the airstrip, the flight line and hangar were nearly +three miles from the Marine quarters by road. +Located still farther away, about a quarter mile +south of the hangar, were the motor pool and +communications facility. In addition to creating a +new requirement for transportation, the distances +between the various areas necessitated adjustments +in the security arrangements which had been used +at Soc Trang.</p> + +<p>Fortunately SHUFLY’s first commander, Colonel +Carey, had foreseen the requirement for transportation +between the living area and the flight line +during his visit to the Da Nang installation in +April. The problem was solved by the purchase of +three used American school buses which were already +on hand when the Marines arrived from Soc +Trang. The security situation proved somewhat +more perplexing. Initially Colonel Ireland handled +the problem in much the same manner as it had +been at Soc Trang. A permanent sergeant-of-the-guard +was detailed to supervise a security force +composed of men from the MABS-16 sub unit and +HMM-163. Guard posts were established around +the helicopter flight line, the hangar, the TAFDS, +the motor pool-communications area, and the +billeting compound. But this arrangement, while<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">76</span> +serving the intended purpose, was not ideal. +Frequently the Marines who served on security +watch at night were called upon to perform long +hours of work the following day. This prompted +Colonel Ireland to request that a permanent security +force be assigned to his command in order that the +overworked mechanics, cooks, carpenters, electricians, +and communicators could concentrate on +their particular jobs. The request was placed under +consideration by ComUSMACV and FMFPac +authorities but was not approved immediately.<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[6-A]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="label">[6-A]</a> General Weede explained that, because such increases could +not be made without the approval of the Department of Defense, +such requests were forwarded first to MACV Headquarters for +approval. (<cite>Weede Interview.</cite>)</p> + +</div> + +<figure id="ip_76" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_076.jpg" width="1917" height="1405" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>A portion of the Marine Compound at Da Nang. (<cite>Official USMC Photo</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>At Da Nang Colonel Ireland’s task unit was not +responsible for every facet of airfield operations as +had been the case previously at Soc Trang. The +U.S. Air Force provided radar, ground control +approach, tactical air navigation, and meteorological +services at the new installation while the Vietnamese +operated the control tower. These conveniences +allowed Ireland to make a small reduction +in the overall size of the Marine task unit. Those +MABS-16 specialists who had operated these +systems at Soc Trang were returned to their parent +organizations on Okinawa.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_76"><i>I Corps Tactical Zone</i></h3> + +<p>At the time the Marine task unit arrived in Da +Nang, I Corps Tactical Zone encompassed South +Vietnam’s five northern provinces. Quang Tri +Province, located immediately south of the demilitarized +zone (DMZ) topped this tier of political +subdivisions. Below Quang Tri Province lay +Thua Thien, followed by Quang Nam, Quang Tin<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">78</span> +(recently created), and Quang Ngai Provinces. All +are coastal provinces and, with the exception of +Quang Ngai, extend inland from the seacoast to +the Laotian border, a distance which varies between +30 and 70 miles. Together, they occupy the +central portion of the region formerly known as +Annam and extend 225 miles to the south of the +DMZ.</p> + +<figure id="ip_78" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_077.jpg" width="1871" height="2603" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +I CORPS 1962<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The climatic pattern in the northern provinces +is the exact reverse of that which affects the southern +portion of the nation. In I Corps the dry season +occurs in the summer months while the monsoons, +which blow from the northeast, dominate the +winter. Heavy monsoon rains accompanied by wind +and fog normally begin in October. After reaching +their peak usually in November, the monsoon rains +tend to diminish gradually until their disappearance +around mid-March.</p> + +<p>The differences between the physical structure +of the northern provinces and the Mekong Delta +is even more striking than their reversed climatic +patterns. White beaches stretch almost unbroken +along the entire length of I Corps. Just inland and +roughly parallel to the coast south of Da Nang +lies a lightly populated strip of sand dunes and +generally unproductive soil. This strip varies in +width from one half to two miles. In the west it +dissolves into the flat, densely populated coastal +plain. Any similarity between the Mekong Delta +and the northern provinces is found in this expanse +of fertile rice-producing land where tiny rural +hamlets and slightly larger villages, each enclosed +by thick hedgerows and treelines, abound. North +of Da Nang the semi-barren coastal sands tend to +extend farther inland, and thereby reduce the +productive portion of the coastal plains.</p> + +<p>The most distinct geographic feature of I Corps, +and one easily visible to the Marines at Da Nang, +is the chain of towering mountains which protrude +from the flat coastal plain several miles west of +the city. There is a conspicuous absence of foothills +leading to the mountains which seem to surround +Da Nang on the north and west. North of the Hai +Van Peninsula, a rugged promonotory which juts +into the South China Sea about 10 miles north of +the Marines’ new home, a zone of foothills eases +the transition from the wide coastal plain to the +rugged jungle-covered mountains.</p> + +<p>The coastal plains of the five northern provinces +are broken by several significant streams along +which most of the region’s principal population +centers are located. Roughly 10 miles south of the +1954 partition line the Cua Viet empties into the +southern portion of the Tonkin Gulf. Both Quang +Tri City, the capital of Quang Tri Province, and +Dong Ha, South Vietnam’s northernmost population +center of any significance, are situated on the +Cua Viet and its major tributary, the Song Cam Lo. +The Song Huong (often referred to as the Perfume +River), which flows past the old imperial capital +of Hue, enters the sea at a point approximately half +way between Da Nang and the nation’s northern +boundary.<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[6-B]</a> At Da Nang the Song Han (also called +the Da Nang River) flows into Da Nang Harbor +after its main tributary, the Song Cau Do, curves +through the coastal plains immediately south and +west of the city. Eighteen miles south of the +Marines’ new base of operations, the Song Cau Dai +empties into the South China Sea near Hoi An, the +capital of Quang Nam Province. The Song Cau Dai +originates about 18 miles inland at the confluence +of the Song Thu Bon and the Song Vu Gia which +twist seaward from the south and west respectively. +Together these three estuaries constitute the +most important geographic feature of the sprawling +coastal plain south of Da Nang. Another major +stream, the Song Tra Bong, flows on an eastward +course about 32 miles south of the Song Cau Dai. +Still further south is the Song Tra Khuc, a river +which dominates the wide coastal plain of Quang +Ngai Province in much the same fashion as does +the Song Cau Dai and its tributaries in the area +south of Da Nang. The provincial capital, Quang +Ngai, once a major railroad center for South +Vietnam, is situated several miles inland on the +south bank of the Song Tra Khuc. The southernmost +stream of any significance in I Corps is the +Song Ve, which angles northeastward through +central Quang Ngai Province. While none of these +waterways is navigable far beyond its mouth by +ocean-going vessels, each serves the local population +as convenient local routes of communication +as well as vital sources of irrigation water +during the long dry seasons.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="label">[6-B]</a> In the Vietnamese language the word “song” means stream +and normally precedes the name of rivers.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The two and a half million people who inhabited +I Corps in 1962 had developed along social and +economic lines dictated largely by the geography +and climate of their region. Rice growing, centered<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">79</span> +on the coastal plains, dominated the economic +activities of the area. Combined, the provinces of +I Corps produced nearly half a million tons of +rice annually. Fishing, concentrated along the +coast and the major rivers, ranked as the second +most important economic pursuit. Unlike most of +South Vietnam, I Corps did possess some potential +for industrial development. A small but productive +surface coal mine was located about 25 miles +southwest of Da Nang at Nong Son along the +western bank of the Song Thu Bon. Although the +mine was operating in 1962, it had made little +discernable impact on the overall economic picture +of the region.</p> + +<figure id="ip_79" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_079.jpg" width="1914" height="1412" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Aerial view of Marine helicopter flight line at Da Nang shortly after SHUFLY’s relocation to I Corps in September +1962. (<cite>Official USMC Photo</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<h3 id="toclink_79"><i>Military Situation, September 1962</i></h3> + +<p>From its new base at Da Nang, Colonel Ireland’s +task unit was responsible for directly supporting +the forces under Major General Tran Van Don’s +I Corps headquarters. The 1st and 2d ARVN +Divisions, headquartered respectively at Hue and +Da Nang, were the major tactical units at General +Don’s disposal. Occasionally elements of the 25th +ARVN Division, headquartered at Kontum in +northwestern II Corps, joined I Corps forces for +offensive operations along the southern fringe of +Quang Ngai Province. Several ARVN Ranger +battalions served as mobile reaction forces for the +corps tactical zone.<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[6-C]</a> Also scattered over the northern +corps tactical zone were numerous paramilitary +units of assorted sizes. These, too, were garrisoned +primarily along the heavily populated coastal +plain.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="label">[6-C]</a> The ranger battalions had been organized in late 1960 from +existing ARVN forces. They were conceived as highly mobile +infantry units and were under the direct control of the CTZ +commander.</p> + +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">80</span></p> + +<p>Opposing these government forces in the early +fall of 1962 were Viet Cong forces of formidable +strength. Four interprovincial battalions (main +force), four interprovincial companies, five provincial +companies, 18 district companies, and three +district platoons were known to be operating within +the boundaries of I Corps. Together, these units +totalled an estimated 4,750 men.<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">[6-1]</a> Added to the +presence of these known Viet Cong units was the +threat posed to I Corps by its proximity to North +Vietnam and to the so-called “Ho Chi Minh +Trails” located across the Laotian border. The +relative position of the northern provinces naturally +invited Communist infiltration. In June, for +example, the <i>4th Viet Cong Battalion</i>, a main force +unit, was infiltrated into Quang Nam Province +from sanctuaries in Laos. By September MACV +intelligence estimates reported one North Vietnamese +(PAVN) infantry division, two independent +PAVN infantry regiments, and an artillery regiment +poised in areas of Laos adjacent to the I Corps +border. “These units,” the U.S. report warned, +“... could be committed anywhere in I Corps or +[the] northern part of II Corps 20 days after +starting movement.”<a id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">[6-2]</a></p> + +<p>While the government’s nationwide strategy +focused on clearing and holding the populated +areas, the physiographic configuration of I Corps +(as well as II Corps to the south) demanded that +offensive operations be conducted in the mountains +adjacent to the coastal plains against Viet Cong +base areas. Since the arrival of the U.S. Army +helicopter company at Da Nang early in the year, +General Don had shown an increasing tendency to +mount battalion and regimental heliborne assaults +deep into the western mountains. Capitalizing on +the mobility which the American helicopters +afforded, the ARVN command had hoped to +disrupt remote Communist base areas inside the +international border. Still, heliborne offensives +into western I Corps were often hampered by bad +weather, particularly during the monsoon season.</p> + +<p>Another facet of the government effort to deny +the enemy unrestricted access to the mountains was +a system characterized by a network of small, +relatively isolated outposts. In late 1961, at the +urging of U.S. officials in Saigon, the Diem government +had launched a program whose ultimate +objective was similar to that of the Strategic +Hamlet Program. First, U.S. Army Special Forces +teams entered remote Montagnard villages located +in the Annamite Chain and built small fortified +camps. This accomplished, the Americans initiated +pacification activities with the hope of securing the +allegiance of the traditionally independent Montagnard +tribesmen.</p> + +<p>By mid-1962 the Special Forces effort appeared +on its way to success. Already Montagnard tribesmen +had been organized into a number of Civilian +Irregular Defense Groups (CIDGs) throughout the +mountains of I and II Corps. Advised by Special +Forces teams, the CIDG units were monitoring infiltration +routes and harassing the Communists as +they attempted to move through the mountains. +By the summer of 1962 the distinctive little barbed +wire enclosed camps were scattered over the length +of western I Corps.</p> + +<p>Although it played an important role in the +government’s strategy for controlling the insurgency +in the northern provinces, the outpost system +had obvious shortcomings. Roads between the +distant camps and the towns along the coastal +plain were almost nonexistent. Those that did +exist, such as Route 9, the road which extended +from Route 1 westward across Quang Tri Province +and into Laos, were vulnerable to ambush or +interdiction by guerrilla forces. Truck convoys, +furthermore, consumed time and required protection +by security forces. As a result of their relative +isolation, the CIDG camps had come to depend +heavily on aircraft as a means of resupply. While +crude runways had been constructed at many of +the outposts, they were often better suited for +helicopter operations than for fixed-wing transport +landings. The newly arrived Marine commanders +anticipated that their squadron, like the Army +helicopter company it had replaced, would be required +to devote a sizable percentage of sorties to +resupplying the far-flung outposts.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_80"><i>Initial Helicopter Operations</i></h3> + +<p>The system of helicopter coordination in I +Corps promised to be somewhat different from +that which had governed Marine operations in +the Mekong Delta. At Da Nang, an Air Support +Operations Center (ASOC) was organized within +the corps headquarters to process all requests for +aviation support. Manned by ARVN, VNAF, U.S.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">82</span> +Air Force, and U.S. Marine officers, the ASOC +processed mission requests from the various field +commands, passing them on to the Joint Operations +Center at JGS headquarters for final approval. +Once approved, the ASOC assigned specific missions +to the American and Vietnamese units which +supported I CTZ. This arrangement enabled the +corps headquarters to plan and coordinate all +combat support missions flown within the five +northern provinces.</p> + +<figure id="ip_82" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_081.jpg" width="1867" height="2603" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +MAJOR OUTPOSTS I CORPS 1962<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The Vietnamese commanders in I Corps, who +had learned to value helicopter support as a result +of the Army aviation company’s eight-month +presence at Da Nang, lost no time in employing the +newly arrived Marine squadron. HMM-163 flew its +first combat operation from Da Nang on 18 September, +the day after the last flight of helicopters +arrived from Soc Trang. Fourteen HUSs lifted +troops of the 2d ARVN Division into two landing +zones in the rugged hills about 35 miles south of +Da Nang and 25 miles inland from the coast. The +scarcity of suitable landing zones in the steep hill +country and the fact that the enemy could deliver +fire on those that did exist from nearby high ground +and the surrounding jungle prompted the Marine +pilots to adjust their tactics in preparation for this +mission. After VNAF fighters bombed and strafed +the objective area, the helicopters made an unopposed +landing.</p> + +<p>The tactic of preparing helicopter landing zones +with air strikes was continued and refined in the +ensuing weeks. The Marines began using artillery +fire in conjunction with air strikes to neutralize +enemy troops in the vicinity of the objective. The +OE-1 was well suited for assisting in the employment +of the artillery fire support. Having familiarized +themselves with the landing site during a +prior reconnaissance mission, the pilot and observer +of the OE-1 would arrive over the designated area +prior to the operation and adjust artillery fire until +the helicopters appeared. During the landing the +crew of the observation aircraft often coordinated +between the helicopters and the escorting aircraft +and were available to assist the ground units with +artillery fire missions.</p> + +<p>The task unit’s staff borrowed another idea from +their experience in the Mekong Delta which +allowed HMM-163 to provide more efficient helicopter +support in the northern provinces. In this +case the concept of temporarily positioning the +TAFDS to support specific operations was refined +somewhat by placing the portable refueling bladders +at secure, permanent locations throughout I Corps. +Several days after arriving in I Corps, the Marines +emplaced a 10,000-gallon section of the TAFDS at +Quang Ngai, about 65 miles south of Da Nang, to +serve as a permanent refueling point for aircraft +operating in southern I Corps. Within the month, +another fuel bladder was positioned at Hue and a +third was emplaced at Tam Ky, the capital of +Quang Tin Province, which was situated on Route +1 about half way between Da Nang and Quang +Ngai. These well-chosen refueling points greatly +enhanced the squadron’s operational potential. +Used to support daily operations, they enabled the +helicopters to operate deep into the adjacent +mountain areas on resupply and medical evacuation +missions.</p> + +<p>On 19 September, the day after their initial +combat support assignment in I Corps, the Marine +helicopter crews were called upon to conduct an +operation which they would repeat often in the +coming months. They were ordered to evacuate a +threatened government outpost from the mountains +18 miles west of Da Nang. That day the HMM-163 +pilots lifted an odd cargo of troops, dependents, +personal belongings and an assortment of pigs, +cows, chickens, and ducks to a secure area on the +coastal plain.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately, helicopter evacuations of encircled +or endangered South Vietnamese outposts +would become almost routine for Marine helicopter +squadrons assigned to Vietnam during the period +between 1962 and 1965. As the North Vietnamese +stepped up their support for the Viet Cong, the +isolated government outposts along the infiltration +routes became particularly vulnerable. The increased +number of helicopter evacuation missions +during the next three years would be grim testimony +of the trend of warfare which was unfolding +in the South. Reinforced with more and more North +Vietnamese and growing amounts of Communist +bloc and captured U.S. equipment, the Viet Cong +would press the initiative even in South Vietnam’s +most isolated areas.</p> + +<p>The Communists operating in I Corps lost little +time in challenging the newly arrived Marine unit. +HMM-163 suffered its first battle damage while +lifting elements of the 2d ARVN Division into a +landing zone southwest of Tam Ky on 26 September.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">83</span> +One of 22 helicopters involved in the mission was +struck in the fuselage by small arms fire despite the +use of preparatory air and artillery strikes on the +landing zone. The day after this incident another +of the squadron’s helicopters was hit by enemy fire +while attempting to evacuate wounded ARVN +soldiers from the battlefield. On the 29th two more +aircraft were damaged by ground fire while participating +in another troop lift. One round passed +through the windshield and exited at the rear of the +cockpit, missing the copilot’s head by inches. +During the first week of October another HUS was +struck while landing at Tien Phuoc, a government +outpost about 15 miles southwest of Tam Ky. In +this incident two ARVN troops were killed and +the Marine crew chief, Lance Corporal James I. +Mansfield, was wounded before the pilot could fly +the aircraft out of the danger area. In each of the +instances the helicopters were able to return to Da +Nang where necessary repairs were made.</p> + +<p>The most serious incident recorded during the +early operations in I Corps ironically resulted from +mechanical failure rather than Viet Cong fire. It +occurred on 6 October when a search and rescue +helicopter crashed and burned on a hillside 15 miles +southeast of Tam Ky while covering a 20-plane +helilift of 2d ARVN Division elements.<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[6-D]</a> Unable to +land near the downed aircraft because of the thick +jungle, other helicopters landed troops at the base +of the hill with instructions to proceed to the crash +site on foot. When the Vietnamese soldiers reached +the downed aircraft after cutting their way through +dense vegetation, they found the copilot, crew +chief, and five other members of the task unit dead. +The pilot, First Lieutenant William T. Sinnott, +who was injured seriously, was hoisted through +the trees and evacuated by an HUS which came to +the rescue. The five Marines killed in the crash were +First Lieutenant Michael J. Tunney, Sergeant +Richard E. Hamilton, Sergeant Jerald W. Pendell, +Corporal Thomas E. Anderson, and Lance Corporal +Miguel A. Valentin. Two Navy personnel, Lieutenant +Gerald Griffin, a doctor, and Hospitalman +G. O. Norton were also dead. These were the first +deaths suffered by Marine Task Unit 79.5 since +deploying to Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[6-3]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="label">[6-D]</a> For larger operations the task unit commander usually +designated one HUS as a search and rescue aircraft. This helicopter +normally carried several mechanics and Navy medical +personnel and was equipped with a hoist.</p> + +</div> + +<p>An administrative measure which eventually +resulted in the extension of the length of tours for +the Marine helicopter squadron as well as all other +personnel assigned to SHUFLY was initiated in the +first week of October. Colonel Ireland dispatched +a recommendation to the Commanding General, +1st Marine Aircraft Wing proposing that the +tours for both the squadron and the individual +Marines serving with the sub unit and the task +unit headquarters be set at six months. Pointing +out that the U.S. Army helicopter company which +had occupied Da Nang previously had operated +from January to September without rotating +personnel, the task unit commander outlined the +positive features of such an adjustment. It would, +he contended, provide more continuity for administration +and operations, thereby resulting in a +more effective utilization of manpower. To underscore +his argument, Ireland emphasized the number +of man hours involved in the rotation of a helicopter +squadron. Adding his opinion that the two-month +extension of all tours would not measurably +affect the morale of the Marines at Da Nang, he +recommended that the next rotation of helicopter +squadrons be postponed until January. After being +forwarded to FMFPac for consideration, Colonel +Ireland’s proposals were approved later in the fall +and instructions were passed to all involved +commands to implement the new policy.<a id="FNanchor_125" href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[6-4]</a></p> + +<p>Another adjustment—this one in the area of +tactics—had been made during the task unit’s +first two months at Da Nang. By November the +Eagle Flight concept had been tailored to complement +reaction force plans which already existed +in I Corps at the time of SHUFLY’s relocation. +ARVN authorities in the northern corps tactical +zone had developed a system whereby their various +infantry units were placed on alert for use as +heliborne reaction forces. Designated the Tiger +Force, the alert unit was staged at its base, ready +to react to any tactical emergency.</p> + +<p>HMM-163 Marines executed one of their earliest +Tiger Flights on 7 November in response to a train +ambush sprung by the Viet Cong several miles +northwest of the Hai Van Peninsula. Four Marine +helicopters launched from Da Nang, made an +airborne rendezvous with two other HUSs, and +proceeded to Hoa My, four miles away, to pick up +a 52-man ARVN Tiger Force. The Marines then +helilifted the South Vietnamese into a suitable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">84</span> +landing zone near the ambush site. The relatively +short amount of time consumed in the reaction did +not prevent the Communist attackers from vanishing +into the surrounding jungle. Generally, however, +the tactic was more successful, particularly +when the reaction force was used to reinforce a +threatened static position or to establish hasty +blocking positions in support of ground offensive +operations that were already underway.</p> + +<p>While the task unit encountered few major +problems during the early operations from Da +Nang, minor difficulties were commonplace. Most +often these developed during the execution phase +of combat support missions. One that particularly +concerned the Marine commanders was the tendency +of South Vietnamese units not to prepare +properly for scheduled helilifts. To the dismay of +the Leatherneck helicopter crews, ARVN activities +at the pickup points were usually characterized by +confusion. More often than not the Vietnamese unit +scheduled to be helilifted had not been organized +into heliteams prior to the arrival of the transport +aircraft. Given the fact that heliborne operations +were still somewhat of a novelty to most ARVN +small unit leaders (and to many U.S. advisors) at +this stage of the war, these circumstances were +perhaps understandable. Nevertheless, lack of prior +preparation at pickup points on the part of the +ground units often threatened to disrupt the timing +of preplanned operations.</p> + +<p>To help remedy this situation and to insure that +their helicopters were not overloaded, the U.S. +Marines began designating one of the squadron’s +noncommissioned officers as “loadmaster.” +Equipped with a radio, the loadmaster would +arrive at the assembly area on board the first helicopter, +whereupon he would disembark and supervise +the entire loading process. This technique was +particularly valuable during operations in which +ARVN units were being helilifted from the field. +In such cases the loadmaster performed the same +function as did those who supervised the loading +process at secure assembly areas. This, of course, +required that the Leatherneck remain in the landing +zone until the last Vietnamese troops had boarded +the final helicopter. Although dangerous, this +technique enabled the Marines to eliminate many +problems which might otherwise have occurred.</p> + +<p>By early November the monsoon season had +begun to settle over the northern portions of South +Vietnam. Unlike the summer rains in the Mekong +Delta in which Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s +crews had managed to set new helicopter flight +records, the winter monsoons that struck the +northern provinces seriously restricted flight operations. +Heavy fog and low clouds frequently made +it impossible to conduct air operations in the mountainous +areas; therefore, the squadron was forced +to concentrate most of its operations in the coastal +plains. In an effort to maintain his support at a +maximum level, Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun began +dispatching an OE-1 to the objective area prior +to scheduled missions in order to obtain a current +report on the local weather conditions. Despite +these efforts, the monsoon rains, which often +moved in quickly from the South China Sea, still +disrupted flight operations. A typical weather-related +incident occurred on 13 November when a +scheduled troop lift was cancelled because of heavy +fog after 200 Vietnamese Special Forces troops had +loaded onto 20 Marine helicopters for an early +morning operation.</p> + +<p>Several unrelated changes in official designations +occurred at approximately the same time that the +monsoons began affecting operations in the northern +provinces. In November all Marine aircraft +were redesignated in accordance with a Department +of Defense order which standardized aircraft designations +throughout the U.S. armed services. +Thereafter, SHUFLY’s HUS helicopters would be +known as UH-34Ds, its OE-1s as O-1Bs, and its +R4D as a C-117. In another adjustment, the Joint +General Staff in Saigon ordered the realignment of +South Vietnam’s tactical zones. A fourth corps +tactical zone (IV CTZ), which encompassed the +entire Mekong Delta, and a Capital Military +District, which included Saigon and its environs, +were created. The composition of I Corps was +affected by the adjustments as the new alignment +shifted Quang Ngai Province into II Corps. The +Marines, however, continued to provide helicopter +support to the province, which was relatively +isolated from the remainder of II Corps.</p> + +<p>More important than either the new aircraft +designations or the realignment of the tactical +zones were several internal changes within the +Marine task unit. On 6 November the task unit +was redesignated Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6. +That same day Lieutenant Colonel Alton W. +McCully, who had been functioning as Colonel<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">85</span> +Ireland’s executive officer, assumed command of +the task element. Ireland returned to Okinawa +where he took command of Marine Aircraft +Group 16, which, under the new arrangement, +became responsible for both the administrative +and logistical support of SHUFLY.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_85"><i>Marine People-to-People Program</i></h3> + +<p>The concept of the People-to-People Program, +which had been initiated with a degree of success +in the Mekong Delta, was brought to Da Nang by +Colonel Ireland and his Marines. During the fall +and early winter of 1962, as weather caused flight +operations to subside, the Marines were able to +increase the tempo of the program. SHUFLY’s +men actively supported an orphanage in Da Nang +which was maintained by an American missionary +family. On Christmas day the Marines participated +in a “Father-For-A-Day” program which +had been arranged by the task element chaplain, +Lieutenant Richard P. Vinson, U.S. Navy. Each +orphan spent the day with a Marine who had +volunteered to serve as his “father.” The Vietnamese +children were treated to dinner in the mess +hall, presented with Christmas gifts, and then +joined in singing carols with the Marines. At the +conclusion of the festivities, Chaplain Vinson +presented the director of the orphanage with a gift +in Vietnamese currency equivalent to over 800 +dollars—money which the men of the task element +had donated.</p> + +<p>In addition to their activities associated with the +orphanage, the Marine officers taught English to +a number of Vietnamese civilians. Held three +nights weekly, the classes were received enthusiastically. +Beyond the foundations of good will +which it helped shape, the People-to-People Program +enabled the Marines to acquire a better +understanding of the Vietnamese people, their +culture, and their problems.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_85a"><i>SHUFLY Operations in I Corps</i></h3> + +<p>SHUFLY’s initial helicopter support operations +in I Corps represented the beginnings of what +would become a long association of U.S. Marines +with South Vietnam’s rugged northern provinces. +Essentially these early operations were characterized +by continuity and adjustment. Since their +arrival at Da Nang in September the Marines had +extended the standard of consistent and effective +combat support operations set earlier in the flat +Mekong Delta. Necessarily, SHUFLY’s commanders +had modified the previously developed tactics +and techniques to fit the mountainous terrain and +the nature of warfare being waged in I Corps. For +the most part these adjustments had proven successful +by allowing the Marines to continue the pace of +helicopter support with a reduction of the risks +involved. That SHUFLY had suffered its first +fatalities during these initial months in I Corps +dampened but did not detract from its overall +achievements. As 1962 closed, the Marines had +begun establishing a reputation in the northern +provinces as courageous, professional fighting +men and generous allies. It was this reputation +upon which a generation of Marines would build +in the ensuing decade.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">86</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_7"><span id="toclink_86"></span>CHAPTER 7<br> +<span class="subhead large">The Laotian Crisis, 1962</span><br> +<span class="subhead notbold"><i>Genesis of the Problem—The American Response—The Marine Corps +Role—Marine Participation: A Summary</i></span></h2> +</div> + +<h3 id="toclink_86a"><i>Genesis of the Problem</i></h3> + +<p>Almost simultaneous with SHUFLY’s deployment +to Soc Trang in April 1962, U.S. Marine combat +forces were ordered to Thailand in response to +the growing crisis in Laos. Inhabited for the most +part by peaceful hill tribes, the small, landlocked +Kingdom of Laos seemed an unlikely setting for +any significant military confrontation. Even more +improbable was the possibility that a serious +international crisis could stem from what had +begun as a political rivalry among relatively +obscure princes.</p> + +<p>To be certain, the context of what should have +been a rather meaningless political feud had been +altered substantively by North Vietnam’s drive to +extend its control over the Republic of Vietnam. +Recognizing Laos as a strategic stepping stone for +their southward thrust, the North Vietnamese, +joined by the Soviet Union, had begun providing +military aid to the Pathet Lao army of the leftist +prince, Souphanauvong, in the late 1950s. To +counter these Communist activities, the United +States had extended military assistance to the anti-Communist +government of Prince Boun Oum. In +the resultant struggle, Prince Souvanna Phouma, +who previously had proclaimed neutrality, sided +with the Pathet Lao. With the lines drawn and +the contenders now reinforced by powerful allies, +the conflict naturally escalated. Laos, like South +Vietnam, had become a pawn in the Cold War.</p> + +<p>Administered through a small USMAAG, the +American military assistance to Boun Oum, however, +did little to slow the advances of the Pathet +Lao. Early in 1960, they had joined forces with +North Vietnamese units to seize control of the +eastern portion of the country’s long, southward +extending panhandle. In early 1961, again backed +by North Vietnamese forces, the Pathet Lao had +opened an offensive on the Plain of Jars in central +Laos. Boun Oum’s units, commanded by General +Phoumi Nosavan, proved unable to contain this +push into central Laos.</p> + +<p>By March 1961 the situation had become critical +enough for President Kennedy to direct that +CinCPac alert U.S. military units for possible deployment. +In response, Admiral Felt activated a +task force headquarters and assigned Major General +Donald M. Weller, who was then serving as +Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, as its +commander. Designated Joint Task Force 116 in +accordance with existing CinCPac contingency +plans, Weller’s command was to consist predominantly +of Marine air and ground forces with Army +and Air Force units making up the balance. +Simultaneous with the activation of Weller’s +headquarters on Okinawa, CinCPac alerted the +scattered forces earmarked for assignment to the +joint task force.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration managed +to defuse the situation somewhat by securing +Soviet assistance in arranging a cease-fire in Laos. +The crisis cooled further when 14 governments, +including the Soviet Union, Communist China, +and North Vietnam, agreed to reconvene the +Geneva Conference to consider neutralization of the +Kingdom of Laos. This conference convened on +16 May 1961, and together with the shaky cease-fire, +brought a modicum of stability to Laos. With +international tensions eased, the alert of U.S. +forces in the Pacific ended. Subsequently, General +Weller’s JTF 116 headquarters was deactivated.</p> + +<figure id="ip_86" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 28em;"> + <img src="images/i_087.jpg" width="1772" height="2558" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +MAINLAND<br> +SOUTHEAST ASIA<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The negotiations in Geneva proved to be long +and tedious. In Laos, frequent fighting, usually of +a localized nature, punctuated the cease-fire almost +from the day it was effected. Finally, in the first<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">88</span> +weeks of 1962 heavy fighting broke out anew, this +time on a general scale, and precipitated a new and +more intense crisis. For U.S. observers the situation +seemed to reach its critical point in early May when +Pathet Lao forces, backed by North Vietnamese +formations, routed a major element of Phouma’s +army from Nam Tha, a town located east of the +Mekong River in extreme northwestern Laos. +Following this action, Phoumi’s forces retreated +southwestward across the Mekong into northern +Thailand. Now in full control of the east bank of +the Mekong, the Communists appeared poised for +a drive into Thailand, a full-fledged member of +SEATO. The collapse of Phoumi’s military forces, +moreover, seriously threatened the U.S. bargaining +position at the ongoing Geneva talks.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_88"><i>The American Response</i></h3> + +<p>In the face of the situation along the Laotian-Thai +border, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed +CinCPac to upgrade the readiness of Joint Task +Force 116 for possible deployment. Accordingly, on +10 May Admiral Felt directed Major General John +Condon, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft +Wing, to activate the joint task force headquarters, +assemble its staff, and refine its deployment +plans. The Amphibious Ready Group of the Seventh +Fleet, carrying the Special Landing Force, promptly +sailed into the Gulf of Siam.</p> + +<p>Both to reassure Thailand of the U.S. commitment +to its defense and to discourage further Communist +advances on the Southeast Asian Peninsula, President +Kennedy ordered U.S. forces deployed to Thailand +on 15 May. Admiral Felt moved immediately +to execute this decision. In simultaneous actions +CinCPac designated Army Lieutenant General +John L. Richardson, then serving as Deputy Commander +in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, to replace +Major General Condon as Commander, JTF 116 and +instructed Richardson to execute CinCPac Operations +Plan 32-59, Phase II (Laos). Felt’s instructions +to the new Commander, JTF 116 were +explicit. General Richardson’s command was to +act in such a way that would leave no doubt as to +American intentions to defend Thailand. Through +these same actions JTF 116 was to exert a “precautionary +impact” on the situation in Laos. +Furthermore, the Commander, JTF 116 was directed +to position his forces in a manner so that +they could respond to any armed Communist threat +to Thailand.<a id="FNanchor_126" href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[7-1]</a></p> + +<p>Concurrently with the order to deploy JTF 116, +CinCPac instructed the Commander, U.S. Military +Assistance Command, Vietnam, General Harkins, +to establish and assume command of a U.S. Military +Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACThai). +Thus Harkins, in a dual role as ComUSMACV +and ComUSMACThai, was to be responsible to +CinCPac for all U.S. military activities and operations +in both Thailand and South Vietnam. Once +it became operational in Thailand, JTF 116 plus +the already existing Joint U.S. Military Advisory +Assistance Group, Thailand (JUSMAAG), were to +come under Harkins’ purview. Until USMACThai +and the JTF staffs could become operational, however, +the various task force components were to +report to the Chief JUSMAAG, Thailand, Major +General J. F. Conway, U.S. Army.</p> + +<p>One element of the joint task force was already +in Thailand when President Kennedy issued the +order to commit U.S. forces—the Army’s 1st +Brigade, 27th Infantry. At the time this infantry +brigade was participating in a SEATO exercise +near Korat, a town located about 130 miles northeast +of Bangkok in the central portion of the country. +In response to CinCPac orders it promptly +moved into bivouac at a position 40 miles west of +Korat.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_88a"><i>The Marine Corps Role</i></h3> + +<p>Operations Plan 32-59, Phase II (Laos), called +for a U.S. Marine expeditionary brigade composed +of a regimental landing team (three reinforced +infantry battalions), a jet attack squadron, a +helicopter transport squadron, and supporting +units, to operate from Udorn, a provincial capital +located nearly 350 miles northeast of Bangkok. +Strategically situated only 35 miles south of +Vientiane, the political capital of Laos, Udorn +was the site of a 7,000-foot concrete runway. A +300-man Marine aviation support unit, Marine +Air Base Squadron 16, had actually been positioned +at this airstrip for over six months during 1961. +While at Udorn the MABS-16 Marines had provided +maintenance support for helicopters which +were assisting General Phoumi’s forces in Laos. A +Royal Thai regiment had provided security for the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">89</span> +base during this unit’s deployment and was still +in the area in 1962 when the decision was made to +commit JTF 116 to Thailand.</p> + +<figure id="ip_89" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_089.jpg" width="1906" height="1396" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Aerial view of Udorn airstrip. (<cite>USMC Photo A182977</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Lieutenant Colonel Harvey M. Patton’s VMA-332, +an A-4C (Skyhawk) jet attack squadron, +claimed the distinction of being the first Marine +unit to arrive in Thailand in response to the 1962 +Laotian crisis. The 20 single-placed Skyhawks +departed the Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the +Philippines on the morning of 18 May, were +refueled in flight by aircraft from VMA-211, another +Marine A-4 squadron, and landed at Udorn +around noon. The bulk of the Marine units began +arriving in Thailand the following day. At Bangkok +the Special Landing Force, composed of +Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Adams’ 1,500-man +Battalion Landing Team 3/9 and Lieutenant +Colonel Fred A. Steele’s HMM-261, an HUS-1 +helicopter squadron, disembarked from the ships +of the Amphibious Ready Group.<a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[7-A]</a> That same day +Marine GV-1 refueler-transports began airlifting +additional aviation support detachments from +Okinawa to Udorn. These included detachments +of Marine Air Control Squadrons 2 and 4 (MACS-2 +and -4), Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12), +and a Provisional Marine Aircraft Group (ProvMAG) +headquarters. Upon landing Colonel Ross +S. Mickey, the commander of the ProvMAG, +established his headquarters at the airfield and +assumed operational control of all USMC aviation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">90</span> +elements at Udorn. On the 18th, HMM-261’s +helicopters began arriving at the now busy airfield, +having flown from the Amphibious Ready Group +with a refueling stop at Korat. Lieutenant Colonel +Steele reported to the newly activated ProvMAG.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="label">[7-A]</a> A Marine battalion landing team derives its designation +from the infantry battalion around which it is built, in this +case the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. In 1962, the BLT included +a howitzer battery, a tank platoon, an amphibious tractor +platoon, a pioneer platoon, a motor transport platoon, an anti-tank +platoon, and air and naval gunfire liaison teams.</p> + +<p>Following the commitment of the SLF on 19 May, another +BLT and helicopter squadron from Okinawa reconstituted the +Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force.</p> + +</div> + +<p>On 19 May Brigadier General Ormand B. Simpson +arrived at Udorn with the staff and communications +personnel of the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade +(3d MEB) headquarters. Simpson, a Texan who +had been serving as Assistant Division Commander, +3d Marine Division, had assembled and activated +this headquarters on Okinawa shortly after +CinCPac’s activation of JTF 116. As Commanding +General, 3d MEB, Simpson was to assume command +of all Marine elements, air and ground, +deployed to Udorn. In addition to being the CG +3d MEB, General Simpson carried the designation, +Naval Component Commander, a title which +gave him responsibility for all Navy as well as +Marine forces operating at Udorn under JTF 116.</p> + +<p>Concurrent with General Simpson’s arrival, U.S. +Air Force C-130 and C-123 transports were ferrying +Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ Battalion Landing +Team from Bangkok to Udorn. The BLT had placed +its supplies and trucks, along with HMM-261’s +heavier equipment, on rail cars for transport to +Udorn. Because the Thai flat cars were too small to +accommodate such massive vehicles, Adams ordered +his tank and amphibious tractor platoons to re-embark +on board the USS <i>Point Defiance</i> (LSD-31). +Once on the ground at Udorn the battalion and its +remaining reinforcements assembled alongside the +airstrip. From there the Leathernecks were transported +by Thai Army trucks some eight miles +south to Nong Ta Kai, a small town situated astride +the main service road. Adams’ battalion established +a temporary camp on some high ground just beyond +the town. With the BLT’s arrival, the initial +Marine combat forces assigned to JTF 116 were in +position. The next day, 20 May, General Simpson +assumed command of all U.S. Marine and Navy +units at Udorn and the 3d MEB, a complete air-ground +team, was in being.</p> + +<p>Elsewhere in Thailand the U.S. military build-up +was continuing apace. A squadron of 20 U.S. Air +Force F-100 Super Sabre tactical fighter bombers +and a detachment of three refueler aircraft had +deployed to Takhli airfield from Clark Air Force +Base in the Philippines. Two USAF transport +squadrons had also begun operations from this +base. At Korat, the 1st Brigade, 27th Infantry was +being reinforced with Army units from Hawaii. +Another Army unit, a logistics support command, +was being activated near Bangkok.</p> + +<p>To command this growing assortment of military +units, General Richardson established the +JTF 116 headquarters at Korat. Major General +Donald M. Weller, who had been serving as Deputy +Commanding General, FMFPac, since leaving the +3d Marine Division in 1961, joined Richardson’s +headquarters as chief of staff. General Weller’s +offices were located at Korat initially. Later he +relocated at Bangkok where he headed a rear +echelon responsible for coordination with the +JUSMAAG, ComUSMACThai, and the American +representatives to SEATO. While in the capital +Weller was also responsible for implementing a +logistic plan, the objective of which was to upgrade +lines of communication being used by JTF-116 +elements.</p> + +<p>It is of interest to note that Colonel Croizat, who +had been the first U.S. Marine advisor to the Vietnamese +Marine Corps, was serving at this time as +the senior U.S. military representative on the +SEATO planning staff in Bangkok. Both Weller, +who had commanded JTF 116 for a period during +early 1961, and Croizat who had served as its +chief of staff during that interval, were intimately +familiar with the JTF’s structure, capabilities, and +functions. In fact, the operations plan being executed +had been developed in large part under their +guidance.<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[7-2]</a></p> + +<figure id="ip_90" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_091.jpg" width="1917" height="2510" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Marines disembark from attack transports at Bangkok, Thailand. (<cite>USMC Photo A182785</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Another facet of this particular situation was +that portions of Operations Plan 32-59 Phase II, +(Laos) were to exert a profound influence on later +U.S. Marine operations in the Republic of Vietnam. +A key provision of this particular document outlined +the command relationships which would +govern Marine and Air Force tactical air support in +the event JTF 116 actually became involved in +combat. This provision designated the Commander +JTF 116 as the “coordinating authority” responsible +for synchronizing all JTF tactical air support. +But at the same time it assigned the CG, 3d MEB, +operational control of all Marine tactical aircraft, +thereby insuring that the Marine air-ground team +would not be fractured. Later, in the mid-1960s +when American tactical jet squadrons would be +called upon to support U.S. and RVNAF ground +forces in South Vietnam, the CinCPac staff would<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">92</span> +borrow heavily from this arrangement to define +the relationships of Marine and Air Force tactical +aviation assets.</p> + +<figure id="ip_92" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;"> + <img src="images/i_092.jpg" width="933" height="1110" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Major General Donald M. Weller, Chief of Staff, +Joint Task Force-116. (<cite>USMC Photo A407463</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Training began almost immediately after the +Marine units were in position at Udorn and Nong +Ta Kai. Generally the MEB adhered to a training +program designed to help fulfill three requirements: +to make its presence known and thereby enhance +its credibility as a “show of force”; to acclimatize +the individual Marines to the hot, humid, tropical +climate; and finally, to familiarize the operational +elements and their commanders with the surrounding +terrain. The primary objective of this program, +of course, was to prepare the brigade for combat +should that contingency arise out of the troubled +situation in Laos. Coordinated air-ground exercises +conducted around Udorn enabled General Simpson’s +command to publicize its presence in the area while +concurrently refining its heliborne and close air +support capabilities.<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[7-B]</a> In addition to air-ground +exercises, Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ infantry companies +sharpened their skills in patrolling of all +types and made frequent use of nearby Thai Army +firing ranges to maintain their weapons proficiency. +All field training was conducted in an unpopulated +area defined by the Thai government and every +precaution was taken so as not to disturb the local +population. The Marine units utilized blank ammunition +exclusively in training except for the closely +supervised live fire exercises.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="label">[7-B]</a> The MEB’s after action report pointed out one flaw in the +composition of the Provisional MAG. There had been no provision +made to include light observation aircraft in its organization. +As a result, aerial reconnaissance had to be accomplished +from either A-4Cs or HUS-1s, neither of which was configured +for such a mission. The A-4C, which could carry only the pilot, +and the HUS-1 proved equally unsuited for reconnaissance missions. +The 3d MEB report specifically recommended that future +composite aviation packages of this nature should include a +detachment of OEs with pilots and trained aerial observers.</p> + +</div> + +<figure id="ip_92b" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;"> + <img src="images/i_092b.jpg" width="926" height="1083" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Brigadier General Ormond R. Simpson and Brigadier +General John F. Dobbin confer at Udorn, Thailand. +(<cite>USMC Photo A182779</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Realizing that the ultimate success or failure of +the American commitment in Thailand might hinge +on the relationships U.S. military men established +with the Thai populace, General Simpson ordered +his command to initiate a civic action program. +The day after his arrival at Udorn, Simpson met +with local civilian officials and established the +basis for a people-to-people program similar to the +one instituted by SHUFLY Marines at Soc Trang. +Thereafter, the MEB’s goal in this area was to +foster among the Thai a favorable impression of +the individual Marine, his commanders, and his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">93</span> +unit. The people-to-people program which followed +was, in all respects, a concerted and integrated +effort. Officers taught conversational English +classes to interested civilians both at Udorn and at +Nong Ta Kai, while Leatherneck engineers and +Navy Seabees (who arrived near the end of May) +helped repair public buildings. Navy medical and +dental personnel attached to Colonel Mickey’s +ProvMAG and Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT +joined the effort by administering almost daily to +the physical ailments of the local populace and +occasionally visiting the more remote villages by +helicopter. In an action intended to help prevent +friction between Marines and Thai townspeople, +General Simpson directed that MEB units disembark +from trucks as they approached towns, march +through the population centers at sling arms, and +re-embark aboard their trucks at the opposite end +of the town. Relying on this broad array of simple +but effective programs, the 3d MEB was able to +impress upon the civilian population that its mission +was one of assistance and good will rather +than occupation.</p> + +<p>This crisis in Laos eased somewhat after the +U.S. joint task force established its presence in +northeastern Thailand, and Communist forces +halted their advance short of the international +border. With these two developments there was +no requirement for additional Marine infantry +battalions. Accordingly, General Simpson redesignated +his force the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit +(3d MEU), even though other reinforcements +continued to arrive at Udorn throughout May and +most of June. Near the end of May, a 70-man +Seabee detachment from Navy Mobile Construction +Battalion 10 was airlifted to the position. +This detachment, the initial increment of a larger +Logistics Support Group (LSG), moved to Nong +Ta Kai where it helped the BLT’s pioneer platoon +complete a more permanent camp designed to +withstand the approaching monsoon season. In +mid-June, with no end to the MEU’s assignment +in sight, the remainder of the 500-man LSG +deployed from Okinawa to Udorn. Commanded +by Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Hudson, this +group included a motor transport detachment, +a medical detachment, a supply unit, and an +engineer detachment.<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[7-C]</a> These reinforcements +brought the number of Marines, Seabees, and Navy +medical and dental personnel under General +Simpson’s command to its highest level—3,426 +officers and men. A final change in the composition +of the 3d MEU occurred in the final week of +June when HMM-162, an HUS-1 squadron commanded +by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu, +replaced HMM-261 as the helicopter element.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="label">[7-C]</a> Lieutenant Colonel Hudson was relieved by Lieutenant +Colonel Angus J. Cronin on 22 July.</p> + +</div> + +<p>While General Simpson’s MEU was strengthening +its posture in northeastern Thailand, U.S. +officials were reporting definite progress in the +negotiations being held in Geneva and Vientiane. +Encouraged by these signs and hoping to influence +the Geneva talks even further, President Kennedy +ordered major elements of the U.S. combat forces +withdrawn from Thailand on 29 June, just four +days after HMM-162’s arrival at Udorn. In +response General Richardson directed General +Simpson to prepare for the immediate withdrawal +of the ProvMAG and one infantry company. +Two days later, on the morning of 1 July, VMA-332’s +Skyhawks launched for Cubi Point in the +Philippines. Subsequently, HMM-162’s helicopters +departed for Bangkok where they re-embarked +on board the USS <i>Valley Forge</i>. Okinawa-based +GV-1s airlifted one of BLT 3/9’s companies to +the Philippines while elements of the Marine air +control squadrons traveled by rail to Bangkok +for embarkation on board ships of the Seventh +Fleet. By 6 July General Simpson’s 3d MEU had +been reduced by just over 1,000 men.</p> + +<p>At Geneva, the first weeks of July were marked +by steady progress toward a diplomatic solution +to the long-standing Laotian problem. By the 20th +it was evident that a formal agreement would soon +be forthcoming. With these encouraging developments, +General Richardson was directed to prepare +for the withdrawal of the remainder of his forces +from Thailand. In Laos, the quarreling political +factions had already agreed to participate in a +coalition government headed by Prince Souvanna +Phouma which would serve as the basis for a +neutral state. At Geneva on the 23d, the United +States, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, South +Vietnam, Burma, Great Britain, France, Canada, +India, Communist China, Thailand, Poland, the +Kingdom of Laos, and Cambodia finally signed the +Declaration of Neutrality of Laos and an attached +protocol. In so doing the 14 signatories agreed to +recognize and respect the sovereignty, independence,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">94</span> +and neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos. +Under the terms of this agreement, foreign troops +were prohibited from entering or operating within +the borders of Laos. Had it been adhered to, this +provision would have denied North Vietnam the +use of the corridor down the length of eastern +Laos, altering the scope and nature of the conflict +in the Republic of Vietnam.</p> + +<figure id="ip_94" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_094.jpg" width="1905" height="1386" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Marines of BLT 3/9 assemble before being airlifted to the Philippines. (<cite>USMC Photo A182883</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Following the signing of this declaration in +Geneva, CinCPac directed General Richardson to +effect the withdrawal of the remainder of his +joint task force. General Simpson’s 3d MEU began +executing these instructions on the 28th when +Marine GV-1s and Air Force C-130s began airlifting +Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT 3/9 to +Okinawa. By the 31st no Marine combat units +were left at Udorn. General Simpson and his staff +departed the airfield a few days later, and shortly +thereafter the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit was +deactivated.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_94"><i>Marine Participation: A Summary</i></h3> + +<p>The deactivation of the 3d MEU marked the end +of the first deployment of a Marine air-ground combat +team to mainland Southeast Asia. Since the +decision to commit American forces to Thailand +in mid-May, the Marine units assigned to General +Simpson had demonstrated anew the value of their +service as a force capable of supporting U.S. foreign +policy on short notice. Within the period of a few +days, the various FMFPac commands had assembled +a complete air-ground-support team, and, assisted +by the Seventh Fleet, had deployed the affected +units to a position over 1,800 miles from the nearest +major Marine base. Located far inland from the +seacoast, a Marine unit’s normal habitat, the 3d +MEU had been sustained solely by air while maintaining +its combat readiness in a difficult tropical +environment.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">95</span></p> + +<p>In so doing the Marines had shown that a substantial +American combat force could be brought +to bear quickly in the remote areas chosen by the +Communists as targets for their so-called “wars +of national liberation.” Furthermore, the MEU +by relying on a vigorous civic action program, had +established that a sizable Marine command could +maintain its combat readiness almost indefinitely +without eroding the respect of the indigenous +population. Thus, General Simpson’s Marines had +created a solid foundation of mutual respect and +confidence with the Thai people. This accomplishment +alone would prove valuable when +American military forces would be required to +return to northern Thailand later in the decade. +Against the backdrop of these accomplishments, +the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit’s operations in +Thailand could be assessed as having extended the +tradition of the U.S. Marine Corps as an effective +instrument of American diplomacy.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">97</span></p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak part" id="PART_III"><span id="toclink_97">PART III</span><br> + +<span class="subhead">THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963</span></h2> +<div> </div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">99</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_8"><span id="toclink_99"></span>CHAPTER 8<br> +<span class="subhead large">The Marine Advisory Effort</span><br> +<span class="subhead notbold"><i>The Political Climate—The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations—Accomplishments</i></span></h2> +</div> + +<h3 id="toclink_99a"><i>The Political Climate</i></h3> + +<p>A sudden rupture occurred in South Vietnam’s +internal political situation during 1963 which +largely determined the course of the war as well +as the nation’s future. Following the sect uprising +of 1955–1956, the Diem government had experienced +a three-year period of relative political +tranquility. Beginning in 1959, however, political +dissent had begun to re-emerge from several influential +segments of South Vietnamese society. The +results of the August 1959 national elections, in +which pro-Diem candidates captured every seat in +the National Assembly, served to stimulate political +opposition which had lain dormant for nearly +four years. Opposition to the government mounted +steadily in the months following the elections +within military as well as political circles as some +South Vietnamese officers began privately expressing +disenchantment with Diem’s management of +the war. Then came the abortive coup in November +1960. The regime’s popularity diminished in the +wake of this crisis as Diem tightened his control +on the war-torn nation.</p> + +<p>Another problem—religious unrest—which was +to play a key role in determining South Vietnam’s +political direction as the decade unfolded, also +emerged during this period. Buddhist leaders +throughout South Vietnam began protesting +against various policies enacted by the Catholic-controlled +government. The tensions gradually +mounted, and by early 1963 the protests were +highlighted by spectacular and highly publicized +self-immolations by Buddhist monks. Finally, in +May, the religious problem erupted into violence +when the Vietnamese police and military forces +killed 12 Buddhist demonstrators while suppressing +a religious demonstration at Hue. This action +triggered a protracted crisis of public confidence +in the Diem government which deepened as the +summer wore on. Then, on 21 August, Ngo Dinh +Nhu, the president’s closest political advisor, +ordered the national police to raid key Buddhist +pagodas throughout the nation. Following the +raids, which uncovered some weapons, Nhu +attempted to blame the attacks on several key +South Vietnamese generals. His effort to shift the +responsibility for the police raids served only to +alienate some of the nation’s most powerful military +leaders.</p> + +<p>On 1 November, a junta of South Vietnamese +generals led by Major General Duong Van Minh +reacted to the deepening political crisis by deposing +President Diem and seizing control of the Government +of Vietnam. Both the president and his +brother were murdered by an ARVN officer the +following day. The U.S. government, which had +advance knowledge of the coup and was in contact +with the plotting generals, publically declared its +intention to remain neutral. General Harkins ordered +USMACV to cease all activities and to withdraw +its advisors from South Vietnamese units +pending the outcome of the power struggle.</p> + +<p>The overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem stirred fresh +hope among many Americans and South Vietnamese +that the new government could attract the +solid public support of the Vietnamese people, and +thereby wage a more effective war against the +Communists. South Vietnam’s new leaders immediately +focused their attention upon healing the +nation’s deep political divisions and securing continued +U.S. assistance for the war effort. They +pledged to respect religious freedom, to return the +government to civilian control, and to continue +the struggle against the Viet Cong. Appreciating +the interrelationship of these assurances, the +United States officially recognized the new government<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">100</span> +on 7 November, whereupon ComUSMACV +lifted the temporary ban on military assistance.</p> + +<p>The American hopes that the new political +climate in the Republic of Vietnam would stimulate +a more effective military effort, however, +proved to be shortlived. Confusion reminiscent of +the sect uprising in 1955 spread throughout the +government following Diem’s death. The dismissal +of more than 30 high-ranking military officers for +actively supporting the former president during the +coup typified the new regime’s campaign to realign +top personnel in all governmental agencies. Far +from enhancing the efficiency of the Vietnamese +military, the power struggle and the chaos which +prevailed in its wake dragged the war effort to its +most ineffective level since before the U.S. stepped-up +its military assistance program in early 1962. It +was on this unfortunate note that the year 1963 +ended.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_100"><i>The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations</i></h3> + +<p>At the beginning of 1963, the Marine Advisory +Division, still headed by Lieutenant Colonel +Moody, consisted of eight Marine officers and 10 +noncommissioned officers. In April, however, the +table of organization was adjusted slightly when +the first sergeant and four assistant infantry advisor +(noncommissioned officers) billets were eliminated. +Another small unit training advisor was added to +the organization, changing the strength of Lieutenant +Colonel Moody’s command to eight +officers and six noncommissioned officers. Men from +the 3d Marine Division continued to augment the +advisory effort and gain combat experience while +serving in Vietnam on temporary assignments.</p> + +<p>Like the U.S. organization which advised and +assisted it, the Vietnamese Marine Corps began the +new year at the same strength that it had achieved +when it had been expanded to brigade size in early +1962. Still commanded by Lieutenant Colonel +Le Nguyen Khang, the Vietnamese Marine Brigade +continued to operate as part of the nation’s +general reserve under the direct control of the Vietnamese +Joint General Staff.</p> + +<p>As the year opened three of the four VNMC infantry +battalions were garrisoned separately in +small, crude, self-sustaining camps around Thu +Duc on the northern outskirts of Saigon. The 4th +Battalion maintained its camp at Vung Tau on the +coast. The newly formed artillery battalion, which +became fully operational in mid-January when B +and C Batteries passed their final gunnery examinations, +was garrisoned near Thu Duc. While the +Marine units spent little time in their base camps, +being deployed almost continuously in combat, +the Joint General Staff normally kept one battalion +at Thu Duc to enable it to respond to any +emergency which might develop.</p> + +<p>For the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1963 was to +be highlighted by innovations in the important +areas of training and operations. Prior to Lieutenant +Colonel Moody’s arrival in Vietnam, all +Vietnamese Marine recruits had received basic +training at ARVN installations, an arrangement +tolerated but never appreciated by the U.S. Marine +advisors. Before his departure in the fall of 1963, +Moody was able to convince Khang that he should +push for the authority to establish a separate +Marine training center. In late 1963 the JGS +approved this proposal, whereupon the Vietnamese +Marine engineers, advised by Captain Robert C. +Jones, began building a small training facility at +Thu Duc. In a related action Moody set in motion +plans to have a small number of specially selected +Vietnamese Marine noncommissioned officers sent +to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at San Diego +for training as drill instructors. Although these +plans would not come to fruition during Moody’s +assignment, the concept of a separate recruit +training center promised to permit the Vietnamese +Marine Corps to establish and maintain its own +standards for basic training.</p> + +<p>Another change to occur in 1963, this one in +the area of tactical operations, was the reinstitution +of multi-battalion combat operations under +the control of provisional Marine Brigade headquarters.<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[8-A]</a> +Although the VNMC had performed +such operations in 1960, they had been abandoned +in the ensuing years in favor of battalion-sized +deployments to the various provinces and corps +tactical zones. Moody, however, prevailed upon +Khang to alter this pattern by seeking assignments<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">101</span> +that would enable the brigade headquarters to +exercise tactical control of its battalions.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="label">[8-A]</a> Such task-organized Marine forces were usually called either +provisional brigades or provisional regiments but on at least one +occasion the organization was designated a Marine Task Force. +In each case the composition was similar—two or three infantry +battalions, an artillery unit, an engineer or reconnaissance +company, and a command element.</p> + +</div> + +<figure id="ip_101" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_101.jpg" width="1896" height="1422" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Lieutenant General Carson A. Roberts, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (right center), inspects an +honor guard of Vietnamese Marines in Saigon. With him, from left, are Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang, Commandant +of the Vietnamese Marine Corps; Major General Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff, Military Assistance +Command, Vietnam; and Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody, Jr., Senior USMC Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine +Corps. (<cite>Official USA Photo</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The first such operation was launched in the first +week of the new year. On 1 January a provisional +brigade headquarters, commanded by Khang and +advised by Moody, embarked on board a Vietnamese +Navy LST (landing ship, tank) at Saigon +along with the 2d VNMC battalion. The 4th +VNMC Battalion, advised by Captain Don R. +Christensen, embarked on board two Vietnamese +LSMs (landing ship, medium) at the same time. +The mission of the provisional brigade was to +conduct an amphibious landing near the tip of the +Ca Mau Peninsula and clear Viet Cong units from +a series of villages in conjunction with the Strategic +Hamlet Program. Subsequent to the clearing +operations, VNMC engineers were to construct +a fortified hamlet. The entire operation was to +extend until mid-April.</p> + +<p>Elaborate precautions were taken not to disclose +the location of the objective area. The small +flotilla sailed beyond sight of land and remained +afloat for two days before moving into position +off Ca Mau. On 3 January the two LSMs proceeded +to the coast, moved up a river lined with thick +mangrove vegetation, and landed the 4th Battalion. +The 2d Battalion, accompanied by Captain Richard +B. Taylor, came ashore from the LST in Dong Nai +boats, small styrofoam craft specifically designed +for use in swampy terrain. The provisional brigade +headquarters remained on board the LST as the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">102</span> +designated operations area did not extend far +inland.</p> + +<figure id="ip_102" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_102.jpg" width="1893" height="1389" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>U.S. Marine-trained drill instructor with Vietnamese recruits. (<cite>USMC Photo A183561</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>To their surprise the VNMC assault elements +found the first objective, a large village, completely +deserted. As Lieutenant Colonel Moody +later recalled, “They had removed everything, +even the cattle and other livestock.”<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">[8-1]</a> At the +second objective, a nearby village, the Marines +found definite evidence of recent Viet Cong activity +but no enemy troops. There they captured a handful +of rifles, carbines, and light mortars along with +a printed document that contained detailed excerpts +of the Marine operations plan. Quite +obviously the operation had been compromised +in Saigon during the planning stages. In any case, +this discovery explained the evacuation of the +initial objective as well as the relative dearth of +action during the remainder of the operation.</p> + +<p>The provisional headquarters and the 4th Battalion +returned to Saigon after the initial phases of +the operation had been executed, leaving the 2d +Battalion and an engineer platoon to continue +security operations in the area and build the strategic +hamlet.<a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[8-B]</a> When the operation finally ended +on 11 April, the Vietnamese Marines had lost a +total of five men killed and 14 wounded. Mines +and snipers had produced most of these casualties. +The Marines accounted for 11 Viet Cong killed +and 14 wounded.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="label">[8-B]</a> Lieutenant Colonel Moody noted that the Vietnamese +Marines seldom were involved in the actual construction of +strategic hamlets. This task was normally left to the civil +authorities in the area who more often than not used the local +population as a labor force. (<cite>Moody Comments.</cite>)</p> + +</div> + +<p>In the closing days of April, the JGS ordered +Lieutenant Colonel Khang to form two infantry +battalions and an artillery element into a provisional +brigade for immediate assignment to II +Corps. There the Vietnamese Marines were to join<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">103</span> +elements of the 2d and 25th ARVN Divisions for a +multi-regiment thrust into the rugged mountains +just south of the I Corps-II Corps border. Code +named BACH PHOUNG XI, this offensive was to +penetrate the Do Xa, a Viet Cong base area never +before entered by government forces. Centered in +that portion of the Annamite Mountains where +the borders of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and Kontum +Provinces converged, the Do Xa had been +under Communist control since the early stages of +the French-Indochina War. In this remote, inaccessible +mountainous zone the Viet Cong reportedly +had built-up extensive staging areas and training +camps. Prisoner interrogations obtained throughout +the early 1960s revealed that many North +Vietnamese soldiers entering the South’s northern +provinces had infiltrated the Do Xa before moving +into the densely populated coastal lowlands of +Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. Additionally, +the area was thought to contain the Communist +military headquarters for Military Region +5 (MR-5).</p> + +<p>After alerting his 2d and 4th Battalions, a pack +howitzer battery, a reconnaissance platoon, and a +headquarters element, Khang flew with Lieutenant +Colonel Moody to Pleiku for planning conferences +with Major General Nguyen Khanh and his II +Corps staff. The concept of BACH PHOUNG XI, +Khang and Moody learned, called for U.S. Marine +and Army helicopters to lift ARVN infantry and +artillery elements into positions which would form +a loose ring around the suspected center of the +Do Xa base area. The ARVN units would then +begin contracting this ring in stages, whereupon +the provisional Marine brigade would be helilifted +into its center, the heart of the Do Xa, to search for +Communist camps. To control the entire operation +General Khanh would establish a corps headquarters +forward at Plateau Gi, a Montagnard village +located on the southern edge of the operations +area, about 25 miles northeast of Kontum.</p> + +<p>On 1 May, U.S. Air Force C-123 transports +airlifted Khang and the 2,000-man provisional +Marine brigade from the capital to Quang Ngai. +Both Lieutenant Colonel Moody and Major Croft, +the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor and artillery +advisor, accompanied the Marine force. The next +day an ARVN truck convoy transported the +Marines from Quang Ngai some 40 miles north to +Tam Ky, the roadside town which served as the +capital of Quang Tin Province. The 2d Battalion, +advised by Captain Taylor, dismounted from the +trucks and assembled at Tam Ky air strip while the +remainder of the convoy turned west onto a narrow +dirt road which curved through the foothills +and deep into the jungle-covered Annamite Chain. +Meanwhile, Army H-21s from Pleiku landed at +Tam Ky, loaded assault elements of the 2d Battalion, +and began helilifting them into a stream-side +landing zone some 30 miles southwest of the +provincial capital. The convoy carrying the balance +of the Marine force continued its southwest motor +march until it reached the small ARVN-held town +of Tra My. There, some 24 miles southwest of Tam +Ky, Khang established his command post in a +school house adjacent to a crude little dirt airstrip. +The 75mm pack howitzer battery, advised +by Major Croft, set up its weapons nearby while the +reconnaissance platoon and elements of the 4th +Battalion, advised by Captain Christensen, established +security. When these units were in place +U.S. Marine UH-34Ds from Da Nang lifted a +TAFDS fuel bladder and pump to the airfield. +Once the helilift of the 2d Battalion was completed, +the Army H-21s, refueling from the TAFDS +bladder, began lifting the 4th Battalion into the +2d Battalion’s landing zone, which was located +several miles south of Tra My.</p> + +<p>With the initial movement into the operations +area accomplished and the brigade command post +functioning, the two infantry battalions began +combing a deep valley and the adjacent mountains +for Communist base camps. After several days +Khang’s Marines located one rather complete camp +but encountered no resistance upon entering the +position. Once again the occupants, probably forewarned +by the initial movement of the ARVN +units into the area, had withdrawn ahead of the +Marines. The only people found in the camp were +a North Vietnamese doctor and nurse. A subsequent +search of the bamboo huts and the underlying +tunnel complex did produce a supply cache. +The Vietnamese Marines discovered several rifles, +six typewriters, three sewing machines, a radio, +44 maps, a French artillery computing board, and +scores of flashlight batteries.</p> + +<figure id="ip_103" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_104.jpg" width="1883" height="2586" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +LOCATION OF DO XA<br> +BASE AREA<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>ARVN and Marine operations in the area during +the next two weeks failed to locate any large Viet +Cong elements. For the most part the Marines +busied themselves by destroying a few abandoned<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">105</span> +camps and some cultivated crops. ARVN units +operating around the Marines reported scattered +action as they engaged small groups of Viet Cong +attempting to escape from the center of the Do Xa. +BACH PHOUNG XI concluded in mid-May when +U.S. Marine UH-34Ds lifted the VNMC battalions +back to Tra My. From there the Marines returned +by convoy to Quang Ngai where they staged for +the airlift back to Saigon. The statistics for the +Marine portion of the operation revealed that only +two Viet Cong soldiers had been killed. Khang’s +force suffered 36 wounded, most as a result of +encounters with booby traps constructed from +sharpened bamboo spikes. ARVN forces fared only +slightly better, having killed barely a score of +Communists. Except for the fact that they had +demonstrated their ability to penetrate the most +difficult Viet Cong sanctuary, the two week offensive +into the Do Xa base area had little impact on +the war effort. From the standpoint of training +and experience, however, the operation was +beneficial. The Vietnamese Marines and their +advisors learned a great deal about construction of +landing zones and about directing helicopters, +fields in which they had received little previous +training.<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[8-C]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="label">[8-C]</a> An interesting sidelight to this operation was that it stimulated +somewhat of a fad in the offices at MACV and the JGS. +Military officials from Saigon who visited the brigade command +post, including General Weede, took back large water-smoothed +rocks as souvenirs of their trip to the infamous Viet Cong +stronghold. Printed on the side of these ornate stones were the +words “Do Xa, May 1963.” (<cite>Moody Comments.</cite>)</p> + +</div> + +<p>In early September Lieutenant Colonel Wesley C. +Noren, recently transferred from the 2d Marine +Division where he had served as Assistant G-3, +arrived in Saigon to replace Lieutenant Colonel +Moody as the Senior Marine Advisor to the +Vietnamese Marine Corps. Already selected for +promotion to colonel, Noren would become the +seventh Senior Marine Advisor when Moody +left Vietnam in October.</p> + +<p>In mid-October the Vietnamese Marine commanders +formed a provisional regiment for Operation +PHI-HOA 5, which was to be conducted +in III Corps Tactical Zone.<a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[8-D]</a> The 1st, 3d, and +4th Battalions, supported by a composite artillery +battery and the reconnaissance company, joined +ARVN, VNAF, and Vietnamese Navy units in +a major search and clear campaign in the northwest +corner of Gia Dinh Province, only about 20 miles +southeast of Saigon. Like many other large government +military operations undertaken in 1963, +this one failed to uncover any major enemy forces. +The Communist soldiers again managed to elude +government forces. An extensive tunnel and cave +network, which the Marines systematically destroyed +with demolitions, was discovered under +the entire area. Still, the Marines managed to +kill only six Viet Cong and capture 10. Two +Vietnamese Marines were killed and 36 others +wounded before the operation terminated on 1 +November.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="label">[8-D]</a> After the realignment of the CTZs the previous December, +III Corps included a 200-mile-long section of Vietnam which +encompassed the southern one third of the Central Highlands +and the area south to the boundary of the Capital Military +District near Saigon.</p> + +</div> + +<figure id="ip_105" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_105.jpg" width="914" height="679" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the +Marine Corps, and Lieutenant Colonel Wesley G. Noren, +Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, +confer with Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant +of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (<cite>USMC +Photo A420917</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The coup d’etat which toppled President Diem +from power began the same day that Operation +PHI-HOA 5 concluded. Instead of returning to +their base camps, the 1st and 4th Vietnamese +Marine Battalions, accompanied by the composite +battery, moved into the capital to participate in +the power struggle. These units actually launched +the coup by seizing key installations in the heart +of the city while the 2d VNMC Battalion blocked +the highway to Bien Hoa, thus preventing loyalist +intervention. Sporadic fighting against troops loyal +to Diem continued until the early morning of +2 November when the 4th Battalion finally stormed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">107</span> +and captured the presidental palace. Four Vietnamese +Marines were killed and 12 wounded during +the battles in Saigon. No U.S. Marines were involved +in the fighting as Lieutenant Colonel Noren +directed his subordinate advisors to remain in their +quarters. When the situation stabilized, the advisors +rejoined their units and resumed their normal +duties.</p> + +<figure id="ip_107" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;"> + <img src="images/i_106.jpg" width="1834" height="2580" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +CORPS TACTICAL ZONES<br> +1963–1964<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Combat operations against the Communist guerrillas +resumed for the Vietnamese Marine Brigade +in the second week of November. Accompanied by +its U.S. Marine advisor, Captain James P. McWilliams, +the 3d Battalion initiated a search and clear +operation in III Corps in conjunction with the 11th +ARVN Regiment on 10 November. The next day +the Vietnamese Marines clashed sharply with a +substantial Viet Cong force west of My Tho and +suffered six killed and 21 wounded. Nineteen enemy +bodies were found on the battlefield along with +four weapons, several grenades, and some documents. +McWilliams, respected by his fellow advisors +for his candid and forthright assessments, +later recalled that such encounters were the exception +rather than the rule. “While the Vietnamese +Marines were individually good fighters and +showed tenacity in most cases against forces that +would stand and fight, this was not the nature of +the conflict,” he lamented. More often than not, +McWilliams went on to explain, the highly mobile +Viet Cong could elude the larger, more cumbersome +government units.<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">[8-2]</a></p> + +<p>On 14 November, the same day that the combined +Marine-ARVN operation in III Corps terminated, +the Vietnamese Marine command formed a provisional +regiment to control operations DAI-PHONG +28 and 29, which were to be conducted +concurrently in the same general area. Composed +of the 1st and 3d Battalions, and a 75mm pack +howitzer platoon, the Marine force searched until +21 November for Viet Cong units thought to be in +Binh Duong Province but with discouraging results. +Only one enemy was killed, two prisoners +taken, and three weapons captured at the expense +of five dead and 13 wounded Marines.</p> + +<p>A week later the 2d Battalion, now advised +by Captain Joseph N. Smith, fought a more typical +action while participating in Operation DAI-PHONG +30. The battalion commander, Captain +Nguyen Thanh Yen, received orders for the operation +during the early morning hours of 25 November. +Shortly after daybreak nearly 550 Vietnamese +Marines boarded trucks at their camp near Thu +Duc for the trip to Bien Hoa airfield. Upon arrival, +officers from III Corps headquarters informed +Captain Yen that his battalion was to conduct a +heliborne assault against Hoi Dong Sam, a Viet +Cong-held village in western Hau Nghia Province +just west of Saigon. The purpose of the operation +was to intercept a guerrilla force which had overrun +the nearby Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp the +previous day and had taken several American +prisoners. The enemy unit was believed to be using +Hoi Dong Sam as a way station while attempting +to escape across the Cambodian border.<a id="FNanchor_130" href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[8-3]</a></p> + +<p>The operation began at about 0800 when eight +U.S. Army H-21 “Flying Bananas” from the +145th Aviation Battalion helilifted Captain Smith, +a Vietnamese company commander, and his +90-man assault force from Bien Hoa. Eight Army +UH-1B gunships and a U.S. Air Force O-1B +Bird Dog observation aircraft escorted the transport +helicopters on the 20-minute flight to the +objective area. The gunships were put to use almost +immediately when Communist .50 caliber machine +gun fire erupted from a treeline at the eastern edge +of the village. Under the suppressive fire of the +UH-1Bs, the first wave of H-21s landed the assault +force in some partially flooded rice paddies about +700 meters east of the Viet Cong positions. The +Marine assault force quickly deployed into a +treeline on the western edge of the landing zone. +From this position the company began returning +fire with rifles and .30 caliber machine guns. +The Air Force forward air controller (FAC) +overhead in the O-1B and the Army gunships +prevented the enemy from withdrawing across +the open rice paddies which surrounded the +objective on the north, south, and west.</p> + +<p>The distance between the assembly area at Bien +Hoa and the landing zone combined with the +scarcity of transport helicopters to slow the +progress of the helilift. The landings continued at +40-minute intervals while the UH-1B gunships +teamed with the Vietnamese Marine assault force +to suppress the enemy’s fire. The last elements +of the battalion were finally landed about two hours +after the initial assault. Largely because of the +effective suppressive fires from the air and ground, +no aircraft were hit during the helilift.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">108</span></p> + +<figure id="ip_108" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;"> + <img src="images/i_108.jpg" width="1847" height="2604" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +2d VNMC BATTALION ATTACK ON<br> +HOI DONG SAM 25 NOV 1963<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">109</span></p> + +<p>Once the entire battalion was on the ground, the +assault company, augmented by a pair of 60mm +mortars and two 57mm recoilless rifles, provided +a base of fire to protect the movement of its sister +companies. Captain Yen maneuvered his three +remaining rifle companies and a battalion command +group north to a position from which they could +launch an envelopment on the fortified village. +Using a treeline which bordered an irrigation +canal as cover, the force hooked westward until +it was directly north of the Viet Cong position. +Meanwhile, a FARM GATE twin-engine B-26 +relieved the UH-1B gunships on station. At this +point in the action the Air Force FAC observed a +group of 30–40 enemy attempting to flee from the +northwest corner of Hoi Dong Sam. After clearing +the target with the Marine battalion, he directed +the B-26 to attack the target with its 250-pound +bombs. The aircraft made several bombing passes +and dispersed the Viet Cong. When the air strike +ended the enveloping force began its assault against +the northern edge of the village with two companies +abreast and one following in reserve several +hundred meters to the rear. Once the assault force +was in motion the base of fire displaced forward, +firing as they moved, to a small canal about 120 +meters in front of the .50 caliber positions in the +treeline. The two assault companies, followed +closely by Yen, Smith, and the battalion command +group, penetrated the northern end of the village +and swept through to its southern periphery. The +commander of the company on the east (or left) +flank, deployed elements into the treeline where +the Viet Cong automatic weapons had been active. +Following a sharp but brief exchange of gunfire, +the Marines cleared the position. They found eight +enemy dead and three .50 caliber machine guns.</p> + +<p>By noon the 2d Battalion had secured the entire +village. Captain Yen ordered his assault companies +to establish a perimeter defense and the reserve +company to begin a systematic search of the position. +His Marines uncovered a number of well-camouflaged +bunkers and fighting positions. In +a small canal just east of the village the Marines +found the mount for another heavy caliber automatic +weapon. They also discovered eight Viet +Cong suspects and detained them for questioning. +One rifle company moved to investigate the area +where the B-26 had attacked the fleeing enemy +earlier in the morning but found no evidence of +additional casualties. Following the capture of +Hoi Dong Sam, Yen’s battalion conducted patrols +for several days in search of the Viet Cong force +that had attacked the Hiep Hoa Special Forces +camp on the 25th. The enemy force, however, +eluded the Marines by gaining refuge in Cambodia. +The battalion returned to garrison at Thu Duc on +28 November.</p> + +<p>In many ways the results of DAI-PHONG 30 +pointed up the problems which frequently frustrated +GVN military forces and their American +advisors. The 2d Battalion had seized its objective +and in so doing had killed a handful of Viet Cong +and detained a number of suspects. The Marines +had captured three heavy caliber automatic weapons +and an assortment of small arms—all without +suffering a single casualty of their own. Still, it +was difficult to translate the action into victory. +The Marines, along with the other government +forces involved in the operation, had failed to +intercept the Viet Cong raiding force in its flight +toward the international boundary. Moreover, +most of the occupants of Hoi Dong Sam had made +good their escape despite the presence of observation +and attack aircraft. Like many other government +military operations undertaken during the +1961–1964 period, DAI-PHONG 30 was successful +from a statistical standpoint but did little to wrest +the tactical initiative from the guerrillas.</p> + +<p>In the first week of December, the Vietnamese +Joint General Staff ordered VNMC units to conduct +an extended search in the jungles of western Tay +Ninh Province in III Corps. A special Marine Task +Force composed of the 1st and 3d Battalions was +helilifted into the area on 3 December to begin +Operation DAI-PHONG 31. This operation was +punctuated by two major engagements and frequent +enemy harassment. In one particularly vicious +clash, the Vietnamese Marines incurred heavy +casualties while attempting to fight out of a skillfully +executed Viet Cong ambush. When the operation +concluded on 9 December, the Vietnamese +Marines had suffered 11 men killed, 58 wounded, +and 1 captured. Nine Viet Cong bodies were +found and another Communist soldier was captured. +The enemy left four individual weapons on +the battlefield.</p> + +<p>In mid-December, South Vietnam’s new leaders +removed Lieutenant Colonel Khang from his position +as Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">110</span> +Corps. Although he had not participated in the +November coup, Khang had been a political appointee +of President Diem and as such was viewed +as a potential threat to the new regime. After being +promoted to colonel, he was assigned to the Philippines +as the Republic of Vietnam’s Armed Forces +Attache. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, who +had been serving as Assistant Commandant and +Chief of Staff of the VNMC, was appointed as +Khang’s successor. He assumed command of the +Vietnamese Marine Corps on 16 December.</p> + +<p>Vietnamese Marine Brigade units continued +operations against the Viet Cong following +Khang’s relief but fought no major engagements. +Near the end of December, with the nation drifting +into political uncertainty and its own top +leadership changed, the morale of the Vietnamese +Marine Corps plummeted. Lieutenant Colonel +Noren saw this unfortunate trend as a by-product +of the general political instability which was +beginning to grip the country rather than a reflection +of Lien’s leadership. Indeed, Noren thought +the new VNMC commandant to be an extraordinarily +capable officer.<a id="FNanchor_131" href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[8-4]</a> In any case, as 1963 ended +the U.S. Marine advisors were reporting climbing +desertion rates in almost every battalion.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_110"><i>Accomplishments</i></h3> + +<p>Even though 1963 closed upon a discouraging +note, the Marine Advisory Division could report +positively on its own activities. At the urging of +the Senior Marine Advisor, the Vietnamese Marine +Corps had reinstituted multi-battalion combat +operations. Steps had also been taken to cut the +VNMC’s last formal ties to the ARVN by creating +a separate Marine Corps recruit training facility. +When activated this training center was expected +to provide VNMC battalions with a stream of enlisted +men who would possess a background of +higher quality basic training.</p> + +<p>As for personal achievements, the U.S. Marine +advisors had accompanied their units in every combat +operation during 1963 except the November +coup. No advisors had been killed in the 12-month +period and only four (two of whom were on temporary +assignment from the 3d Marine Division) +had been wounded. The first combat decorations +other than Purple Heart Medals for wounds were +also approved and awarded to the advisors during +the year. On 13 December, Captains Don Christensen +and Frank Zimolzak, former advisors to +the 4th and 3d Battalions respectively, were +awarded the Bronze Star Medals with the Combat +“V” for meritorious service. Captain Richard +Taylor, an advisor with the 2d Battalion, earned +the first Silver Star Medal during the same period +for “conspicuous gallantry” between November +1962 and October 1963. Captain Joseph N. Smith, +advisor to the 2d and 4th VNMC Battalions, earned +the second Silver Star for gallantry displayed +between October 1963 and April 1964.<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[8-E]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="label">[8-E]</a> Both Silver Star Medals were awarded during 1964.</p> + +</div> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">111</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_9"><span id="toclink_111"></span>CHAPTER 9<br> +<span class="subhead large">SHUFLY Operations</span><br> +<span class="subhead notbold"><i>Development of the Compound Continues—Combat Support Operations—The +Situation in Vietnam</i></span></h2> +</div> + +<p>SHUFLY, the only U.S. Marine tactical command +assigned to South Vietnam, continued its +combat support operations in the semi-isolated +northern provinces throughout 1963. Although +the size of I Corps had been reduced in late 1962 +when the Vietnamese Joint General Staff shifted +Quang Ngai Province to II CTZ, the mission of +the Marine task element remained essentially +unchanged. As the new year opened Lieutenant +Colonel McCully’s command was still responsible +for providing direct helicopter support to the +forces of the five northern provinces. Likewise, +the government’s order of battle in the northern +provinces had not changed to any great degree. +The 1st ARVN Division still occupied the coastal +plains south of the DMZ in Quang Tri and Thua +Thien Provinces. Headquartered at Da Nang, the +2d ARVN Division continued to carry the main +burden of operations against the Viet Cong in +Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. Operating +in Quang Ngai Province to the south of the new +I Corps-II Corps border were elements of the 25th +ARVN Division. Interspersed along the coastal +lowlands among the various regular battalions +of these three divisions were small paramilitary +garrisons. In the mountains to the west, the +scattered Special Forces outposts with their Montagnard +defenders continued their struggle for +survival while monitoring Communist infiltration.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_111a"><i>Development of the Compound Continues</i></h3> + +<p>The first month of 1963 saw three important +changes in the composition and leadership of +Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6. On 11 January, +HMM-162, a UH-34D squadron commanded by +Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu, replaced Lieutenant +Colonel Rathbun’s HMM-163 as the task +element’s helicopter unit. Five days later, on the +16th, Lieutenant Colonel George H. Linnemeier, +winner of four Distinguished Flying Crosses during +World War II and Korea, relieved Lieutenant +Colonel Davis as the MABS-16 sub unit commander. +In the last week of January Lieutenant +Colonel Harold F. Brown, a veteran aviator who +had piloted scout-dive bombers during the Second +World War, arrived at Da Nang and assumed +command of the task element from Lieutenant +Colonel McCully.</p> + +<p>During McCully’s tour as the Commander, +Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6, the Marine compound +at Da Nang had begun to assume a quality +of permanency which had never been evident at +Soc Trang. The utilities section of the MABS-16 +detachment was responsible for many of the more +noticeable improvements. By the first of the +new year they had constructed several shelters +on the west side of the runway to cover the motor +transport section’s working area. They also had +replaced the electrical system and repaired some of +the damaged plumbing in the living areas. The +task element’s special services section had begun +to provide the Da Nang Marines with entertainment +by showing nightly movies, arranging +fishing trips into Da Nang harbor, and issuing +athletic equipment.</p> + +<p>The monsoon season, which was characterized +by cold rains, high winds, and deep mud, proved +to be a source of much irritation to the Marines +during the winter of 1962–1963. In addition to +slowing flight operations and creating almost +constant discomfort, the weather caused some +unforeseen complications. In October 1962, heavy +rainfall had combined with constant vehicle usage +to turn the road between the living area and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">112</span> +flight line into a quagmire that was virtually +impassable. At the time, Colonel Ireland, then +the task unit commander, had responded by +requesting equipment from Okinawa to improve +the Marines’ only road link with their aircraft. +Wing authorities promptly complied and a road +grader was flown in by KC-130 (the new designation +for the GV-1 Hercules). Within days a 700-foot +section of the road was opened and a drainage +ditch dug along its entire length.</p> + +<p>This measure proved to be only temporary, +however, for in January the mud again threatened +to cut the Marine vehicles off from the east side +of the airfield. Lieutenant Colonel McCully +obtained a bulldozer from Okinawa to make more +permanent repairs. With the help of this piece +of equipment, the Marines constructed a new 400-foot +section of road on an eight-inch rock base. +These repairs proved to be satisfactory and the +road caused no further problem during the remainder +of the monsoon season.</p> + +<p>Improvements in the compound continued to be +made under the task element’s new commander, +Lieutenant Colonel Brown. In April action was +taken on an earlier request for the assignment of a +security detachment to guard the Marine area. A +reconnaissance platoon of 47 Marines from the 3d +Marine Division joined the task element, thus +freeing the men of the helicopter squadron and the +MABS-16 sub unit of the important secondary +responsibility they had held since the task unit’s +deployment to Soc Trang. The assignment of the +ground Marines was timely in that it corresponded +with a reduction by the ARVN of its forces guarding +the perimeter of the Da Nang airbase. One +Marine general later observed that with the arrival +of the infantry unit, “the air-ground team was in +being in Vietnam.”<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">[9-1]</a></p> + +<p>Other less obvious changes that contributed to +the overall efficiency of the Marine task element +also occurred during the early spring. In April, the +task element commander was able to assign a better +facility to medical and dental services. They had +been crowded into one of the small structures along +with other offices since the displacement from Soc +Trang, but now were moved into a separate building +in the living compound.</p> + +<p>Another problem that plagued the Marines +during their entire first year at Da Nang—inadequate +water supply—was finally solved in late +1963. Originally the task unit had depended on a +shallow well from which water was pumped and +purified. The Marines nearly exhausted this source +shortly after their arrival at Da Nang late in the +dry season and their commanders were forced to +impose strict water discipline. The monsoon rains +eased the water crisis but by January production +again dropped, this time as a result of the accumulation +of heavy silt in the pumps. A Vietnamese +contractor was engaged to clean and repair the +pumping system but the problem soon recurred. +In the early spring two new shallow wells were +dug, one in the motor transport working area and +the other in the living compound. With the onset +of the dry season, however, the Marines again +were forced to conserve water. This time the shortage +became so acute that tank trucks were required +to haul some 16,000 gallons of water a day from a +nearby Air Force installation. Finally, in November, +a detachment from a Navy construction battalion +completed a well 450 feet deep and capped +it with a high pressure pump. This proved to be +the permanent solution to the long-standing water +shortage.</p> + +<p>Over the course of the year the Marines received +several new vehicles which helped relieve the burden +on the rebuilt buses which were beginning to +falter under heavy use. Four 10-passenger, four-wheel-drive +trucks and two M-442 “Mighty +Mite” jeeps were flown in by KC-130s from Okinawa +and assigned to the task element’s motor +transport section. By summer, two of the old buses +were replaced with tactical passenger vehicles +which were better suited for transporting personnel +between the barracks and work areas. The addition +of the new vehicles also allowed the mess hall to +begin transporting hot noon meals to the men +working on the east side of the airstrip. A mess +line set up in the hangar area fed those Marines +who previously had lost time by travelling to the +living compound for noon meals.</p> + +<p>Two changes were made in the task element’s +command structure in midyear. On 5 July Lieutenant +Colonel Earl W. Cassidy, a veteran aviator +with 20 years service, relieved Lieutenant Colonel +Linnemeier as commanding officer of the MABS-16 +sub unit. Two weeks later, on the 18th, Colonel +Andre D. Gomez, a Marine who had distinguished +himself as an artillery officer during World War II<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">113</span> +before becoming a pilot, assumed command of +Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6.</p> + +<p>In summary, the improvements made in the +task element’s compound during the course of +1963 helped insure the successful support of sustained +combat helicopter operations. Although +overshadowed by the publicity which the actual +flight operations attracted, the continued improvement +of the Da Nang base was vital to the overall +effectiveness of the Marine combat support effort.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_113"><i>Combat Support Operations</i></h3> + +<p>Marine helicopter support for government forces +in I Corps encountered a brief interruption shortly +after the new year began when HMM-163 was +replaced by a fresh UH-34D squadron. Marine +KC-130s shuttled between Okinawa and Da Nang +for several days during the second week of January +bringing the officers and men of HMM-162 to +Vietnam and returning with members of HMM-163. +The change-over of units was completed on +11 January when Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun +officially transferred his squadron’s aircraft and +maintenance equipment to the newly-arrived unit.</p> + +<p>In the five months and ten days since they initiated +operations at Soc Trang, “Rathbun’s Ridge +Runners” had amassed an enviable combat record. +The squadron’s crews had flown a total of 10,869 +hours, 15,200 sorties, and had lifted over 25,216 +combat assault troops and 59,024 other passengers. +In one month alone (August) they had established +a Marine Corps record for medium helicopter +squadrons by flying 2,543 helicopter hours. These +records had not been set without risks, however. +During the course of their operations in the Mekong +Delta and in I Corps, helicopters operated +by HMM-163’s crews had been hit on 32 occasions +by Communist small arms fire.<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">[9-2]</a> Moreover, the +squadron had become the first Marine unit to suffer +combat casualties in the Vietnam conflict.</p> + +<p>HMM-162, led by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt +Leu, the veteran Marine aviator who had +commanded the squadron during the recent deployment +to Thailand as part of the 3d MEU, began +full-fledged combat support operations the same +day that the last of Rathbun’s squadron departed +Da Nang. HMM-162’s crews, many of whom had +participated in similar operations around Udorn +the previous summer, limited their early flights +to routine resupply missions and a few medical +evacuations. Such missions enabled the squadron’s +personnel to become better acquainted with the +terrain over which they would operate during the +next six months.</p> + +<p>The new squadron participated in its first major +combat troop lift on January 19, when a break in +the monsoon allowed the 2d ARVN Division to +execute a heliborne operation into the mountains +about 15 miles west of Da Nang. Eighteen Marine +UH-34Ds lifted 300 ARVN troops into three +separate landing zones near a suspected Communist +base area. The squadron’s pilots and crews +encountered their first Viet Cong opposition during +this troop lift. Upright bamboo stakes obstructed +one of the landing zones while at another the enemy +fired at the Marine aircraft with small arms. +Although two UH-34Ds were hit, none were +shot down and the mission was completed successfully.</p> + +<p>A month later, on 18 February, the Marine pilots +experienced another of the hazards associated with +flight operations in Vietnam while attempting to +land troops from the 1st ARVN Division in a +clearing about 18 miles southwest of Hue. Five +helicopters sustained punctures in the bottoms +of their fuselages when they accidentally landed on +tree stumps concealed by high grass in the landing +zone. One stump caused extensive damage to an +aircraft when it ripped into its forward fuel cell. +The crew was forced to leave the UH-34D in +the field under ARVN protection overnight. The +next morning Marine mechanics were flown in +from Da Nang to repair the helicopter.</p> + +<p>Despite several troop lifts involving a dozen +or more aircraft, heliborne assault missions did +not dominate HMM-162’s operations during the +unit’s first three months in South Vietnam. Poor +weather conditions over the northern provinces +continued to restrict flight operations generally +to resupply and medical evacuation missions. +Statistics for the first quarter of 1963, for example, +indicated that Marine helicopters conducted 6,537 +logistics sorties as opposed to 1,181 tactical support +sorties.</p> + +<p>The single most significant incident during +HMM-162’s initial three months in Vietnam took +place in the second week of March when the +squadron suffered its first aircraft losses and casualties.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">114</span> +These were incurred during a salvage-rescue +attempt in the mountains of northern II Corps. +The incident began on 10 March as two Marine +UH-34Ds attempted to insert a four-man American-Vietnamese +ground rescue team into the jungle +about 30 miles southwest of Quang Ngai. The +team’s assignment was to locate a U.S. Army OV-1 +Mohawk (a twin-engine, turboprop, electronic reconnaissance +aircraft manufactured by Grumman) +which had crashed, and its pilot, who had parachuted +into the jungle. The exact site of the +accident had not been located but the general area +was known to be a steep jungle-covered mountain, +the elevation of which approached 5,000 feet. +While attempting to lower search personnel into +the jungle by means of a hoist, one of the helicopters +lost power and crashed. The ARVN ranger +who was on the hoist when the accident occurred +was killed but the helicopter’s crew managed to +climb from the wreckage shortly before it erupted +in flames. The copilot, Captain David N. Webster, +was severely burned in the explosion.</p> + +<p>Other Marine UH-34Ds from Da Nang joined in +the rescue operation, refueling from the TAFDS at +Quang Ngai for the flight into the mountains. The +situation was complicated further when a second +Marine helicopter experienced a power loss and +crashed near the burned-out UH-34D hulk while +attempting to land a rescue team composed of +MABS-16 Marines. Fortunately, the aircraft did +not burn and the only injury incurred in the crash +was a sprained ankle, but the extremely steep and +densely jungled terrain kept the Marines from +reaching the site of the other downed helicopter. +Bad weather and darkness prevented further efforts +to extricate the various American and South Vietnamese +personnel from the jungle that day. During +the night Captain Webster died of injuries.</p> + +<p>The next day, the Marines stripped a UH-34D of +some 700 pounds of equipment so as to enable it to +operate more efficiently at the extreme elevations +in the vicinity of the crash sites. After carefully +maneuvering the helicopter into a hovering position, +the pilot was able to extract the survivors +and the dead copilot from the site where the first +UH-34D had crashed and burned. The survivors +were flown to Quang Ngai. There the wounded +were treated and later evacuated by U.S. Air Force +transport to an American hospital at Nha Trang.</p> + +<p>While these events were taking place, the Marines +from the second downed helicopter, guided by +search aircraft operating over the area, located and +recovered the injured Army Mohawk pilot. This +accomplished, the Marines hacked out a small +clearing from which they were evacuated by +another Marine helicopter.</p> + +<p>The episode was not yet over, however, as the +crashed OV-1 and its payload of advanced electronics +equipment still had not been secured. +Finally, an ARVN ranger company, which had +joined the search, reached the remnants of the +Mohawk and established security around the site +while U.S. Army technicians were helilifted in to +examine the debris. The Marine UH-34D, which +had crashed nearby without burning and was +damaged beyond repair, was cannibalized for usable +parts and then destroyed.</p> + +<p>On 13 March, with the search and rescue tasks +completed, Marine helicopters began shuttling +South Vietnamese rangers to Mang Buc, a nearby +government outpost. During this phase of the +mission the helicopters received fire from Viet +Cong who had moved into positions near the rangers’ +perimeter. Three UH-34Ds delivered suppressive +fire on the enemy with their door-mounted +M-60 machine guns while the remaining helicopters +picked up the troops in the landing zone. This +was the first recorded instance of a Marine helicopter +providing close air support in actual combat.</p> + +<p>Other developments occurred in the early months +of 1963 which either directly or indirectly affected +the conduct of Marine helicopter operations. One +was the improved coordination of intelligence +gathering and usage among all South Vietnamese +and American agencies within I Corps. This effort, +which was essentially a concerted drive to streamline +the collection and flow of intelligence information, +was stimulated by a series of corps-wide +intelligence seminars, the first of which was held +in early February. Of special interest to the Marine +aviators was the establishment of closer liaison +between the Marine task element, U.S. Army +Special Forces, and South Vietnamese units in the +northern corps tactical zone.</p> + +<p>Closely related to the improvement of the overall +intelligence situation was the acquisition of +some new equipment by the SHUFLY Marines. +In March the task element received two new +model hand-held aerial cameras for use by the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">115</span> +crews of the O-1B observation aircraft. Later in +the month a photo lab was completed to facilitate +the rapid processing of the photographs. By the +end of the month the Marines were also being +provided with high altitude photographic coverage +of some objective areas taken by U.S. Air +Force reconnaissance jets.</p> + +<p>The tempo of Marine helicopter operations began +to quicken in early April with the advent of sustained +periods of clear weather. On 13 April, +HMM-162 participated in a major heliborne +assault in which 435 2d ARVN Division troops +were lifted into a suspected Communist stronghold +in the mountains along the Song Thu Bon, about 30 +miles south of Da Nang. As in most troop lift missions, +the Marine O-1Bs provided reconnaissance +and radio relay support. For the first time in the +war Marine transport helicopters were escorted +by helicopter gunships, the UH-1B Iroquois (a +single-engine, turbine-powered utility helicopter +built by the Bell Helicopter Company). Five +UH-1Bs from a detachment of the Army’s Da +Nang-based 68th Aviation Company, armed with +M-60 machine gun clusters and 2.75-inch rockets, +joined the VNAF fighter bombers to conduct preparatory +airstrikes on the landing zones.</p> + +<p>The initial landing met no enemy resistance but +later in the day action in the operational area +intensified. A Marine UH-34D was hit by eight +rounds of enemy small arms fire while attempting +to evacuate wounded South Vietnamese soldiers +and U.S. Army advisors from a landing zone near +the point where the ARVN forces had been landed +that morning. With the copilot, First Lieutenant +John D. Olmen, wounded, the badly damaged +aircraft force landed in the Vietnamese position.</p> + +<p>Two other Marine helicopters were dispatched +to the scene to pick up the Marine crew and complete +the evacuation. They managed to evacuate +Lieutenant Olmen, a wounded American advisor, +and one dead and four wounded ARVN soldiers +without incident. On a return trip to pick up more +wounded, however, one of the two UH-34Ds suffered +heavy damage from Viet Cong fire. In this +incident the crew chief, Corporal Charley M. +Campbell, was wounded in the thigh, chest, and +back by small arms fire, and the aircraft was forced +to land near the first downed helicopter. The accompanying +UH-34D landed, picked up Campbell, +and returned him to Da Nang for emergency treatment. +Repair teams were helilifted to the position +on the afternoon of the 13th, and began repairing +both helicopters. One was able to return to Da Nang +later that day but the other required extensive +repairs and could not be flown to safety until the +15th.</p> + +<p>While HMM-162 repair crews were working +feverishly to extricate their aircraft from the +predicament along the banks of the Song Thu Bon, +another of their helicopters was shot down nearby +while supporting the same operation. This aircraft +was hit four times while approaching an +ARVN landing zone located in a small valley about +three miles south of the action in which the two +helicopters had been lost earlier. After temporary +repairs were made, its crew flew the damaged UH-34D +to Da Nang where more detailed repair work +was accomplished.</p> + +<p>The number of combat support sorties flown +into the mountains by HMM-162’s crews rose +steadily as the weather improved. Near the end +of April, the Marines helilifted three battalions +of the 1st ARVN Division into the mountains of +Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces near the +Laotian border. These units were to participate +in an extended multi-regiment drive against suspected +Communist infiltration routes there. This +operation, for which Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s +squadron provided daily support after the initial +landing, taxed the durability of both the Marine +crews and their aircraft. For 90 days task element +helicopters flew into and out of hazardous landing +zones located at elevations as high as 4,500 feet. +The majority of these sorties were resupply and +medical evacuation missions with the occasional +exception being the heliborne displacement of +infantry and artillery units when distance or +terrain prohibited overland movement. Despite the +dangers inherent in helicopter operations conducted +over mountainous terrain, the squadron +incurred no aircraft or personnel losses while +supporting the offensive in western Quang Tri and +Thua Thien Provinces.</p> + +<p>While his squadron’s support of the 1st ARVN +Division’s ongoing drive near the Laotian border +continued, Lieutenant Colonel Leu committed +21 UH-34Ds to support the offensive against the +Do Xa base area along the southern edge of I +Corps. On 27 April, Marine crews helilifted over +567 troops of the 2d ARVN Division into the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">116</span> +mountainous area roughly 22 miles southwest +of Tam Ky to begin Operation BACH PHUONG +XI. The squadron was less fortunate during this +operation than it was during the lengthy Quang +Tri effort. One helicopter was shot down by Viet +Cong fire which wounded the pilot, Captain +Virgil R. Hughes, in the leg. The crew and the +embarked ARVN soldiers escaped further injury +when the aircraft made a crash landing in which +it suffered extensive damage. After the crew was +rescued, a salvage team from Da Nang stripped +the helicopter of all usable parts and burned the +hulk so the Viet Cong could not make use of it. +This was the first Marine helicopter loss definitely +attributed to direct enemy action.<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">[9-3]</a></p> + +<p>Following the initial heliborne assaults into the +Do Xa area, two UH-34Ds were rotated to Tra My +from Da Nang on a daily basis. Refueling from the +TAFDS bladder, these standby aircraft were used +primarily to perform medical evacuation missions +for VNMC and ARVN units involved in BACH +PHOUNG XI. Before the operation ended in mid-May, +HMM-162’s crews had evacuated nearly 100 +Marine and ARVN casualties from hazardous landing +zones scattered along the border of I and II +Corps. The task element’s O-1Bs also provided +aerial reconnaissance support for all phases of the +operation. On 19 May, the day before BACH +PHOUNG XI terminated, 12 Marine UH-34Ds +lifted the two Vietnamese Marine battalions to +the provisional brigade command post at Tra My. +This particular phase of the operation evoked favorable +comment from an anonymous U.S. Marine +pilot who noted on an unsigned debriefing form +that the heliborne withdrawal had gone smoothly +and that the Vietnamese Marines appeared “well +organized in the landing zones and at Tra My.”<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" class="fnanchor">[9-4]</a> +BACH PHOUNG XI ended unceremoniously the +following day when HMM-162 helilifted the +ARVN battalions from the Do Xa base area.</p> + +<p>One trend which became increasingly apparent +as the spring of 1963 unfolded was the growing +utilization of the Army UH-1B helicopter gunships +as escorts to and from landing zones. The gunships +accompanied all Marine assault helilifts and medical +evacuations, and when available, also escorted +resupply flights in order to provide suppressive fire +around government positions while landings were +in progress. Although well suited for the escort +missions, the lightly armed UH-1Bs did not replace +the Vietnamese Air Force attack aircraft as +the principal source of preparatory air strikes +around landing zones being used for assault helilifts. +The Marines continued to rely on the more +heavily armed VNAF T-28s and A-1Hs to conduct +the so-called “prep strikes.”<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[9-A]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="label">[9-A]</a> As a result of the joint helicopter operations in I Corps, a +vigorous debate developed within the Marine Corps concerning +the value of armed helicopters. This debate and the subsequent +development, procurement, and operations of Marine helicopter +gunships will be covered in a separate historical monograph +being prepared by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, +U.S. Marine Corps.</p> + +</div> + +<p>May was the last full month of combat support +operations for Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s squadron. +In the first week of June, transports from VMGR-152 +began landing at Da Nang with the Marines +of a new UH-34D squadron. Since assuming +responsibility for helicopter support in I Corps +in mid-January, HMM-162 had compiled a solid +combat record. While under the squadron’s operations, +the UH-34D helicopters had flown 17,670 +sorties for a total of 8,579 flight hours. The O-1Bs +added approximately 400 sorties and another 1,000 +hours to these figures. In the month of May alone +HMM-162’s helicopters flew over 2,000 flight +hours—a number which approached the record +set by HMM-163 during the previous summer in +the Mekong Delta. Other statistics reflected the +growing intensity of the Vietnam war. Since its +deployment to Da Nang, Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s +unit had lost three helicopters—two as a result of +operations at extreme elevations and one to enemy +fire. One member of the unit had been killed and +three others wounded since the squadron entered +the combat zone.<a id="FNanchor_136" href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[9-5]</a></p> + +<p>After a brief change-over period, the outgoing +squadron commander officially turned over his +unit’s aircraft and maintenance equipment on 8 +June to Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Shook, the +commanding officer of HMM-261. Shook, who had +flown Marine helicopters in combat during the +Korean War, committed his crews to their first +actual combat missions that same day.</p> + +<p>A significant change took place in the coordinating +arrangements that governed U.S. helicopter +units supporting I Corps at approximately the same +time that HMM-261 initiated combat support +operations. Since its relocation at Da Nang, the +Marine task element, along with all other aviation +units in I CTZ, had received its missions from the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">117</span> +Air Support Operations Center located within the +corps headquarters. As the number of U.S. and +VNAF aviation organizations assigned to I Corps +grew and the total number of missions multiplied, +it became necessary to modify the system +of coordination and control. In accordance with a +ComUSMACV directive, I Corps headquarters +created an Aviation Headquarters Operations +Center (AHOC) to oversee the employment of +Marine and Army aircraft in the CTZ. The AHOC, +which was composed of a senior Army representative, +a senior Marine representative, and an +operations section, was to be directed by the +Commander, Task Element 79.3.3.6. Formally +stated, its primary mission was to “plan, direct, +and control the employment of all Army and +Marine Corps Aviation Units and aircraft operations +in direct support of I Corps.” The newly +organized AHOC was also ordered to “participate +in, and provide assistance to operational planning +and the coordination of employment of USA/USMC +Aviation with VNAF/USAF tactical air.”<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" class="fnanchor">[9-6]</a> The +AHOC, therefore, was formed to supplement rather +than replace the older Air Support Operations +Center, which continued to direct and control +all U.S. Air Force and VNAF operations over the +northern provinces. It was under this arrangement +that U.S. Marine and Army aviation units operated +after mid-1963.</p> + +<p>HMM-261’s Marines began encountering systematic +Viet Cong resistance to their operations +shortly after their first combat missions in early +June. A 21-aircraft assault mission into the mountains +west of Da Nang was aborted on 6 July +when the Marine pilots discovered that the Viet +Cong had obstructed the two available landing +zones with upright stakes. While inspecting one of +the landing zones on a low pass, a helicopter was +hit in the forward fuel cell by Communist small +arms fire. The damage to the aircraft was not +serious enough to force a landing, but the pilot +of an escorting U.S. Army UH-1B was mortally +wounded while attempting to suppress the ground +fire.</p> + +<p>Ten days after the enemy forced the cancellation +of the assault mission west of Da Nang, HMM-261 +suffered its first aircraft loss in Vietnam. The crash, +which was later attributed to mechanical failure, +occurred about 37 miles southwest of Da Nang +while one of the squadron’s helicopters was on a +routine logistics mission. Six passengers, two +American advisors and four ARVN soldiers, were +injured in the accident. The squadron commander +dispatched two other UH-34Ds to the scene of the +crash to evacuate the wounded and insert a salvage +team. The badly damaged aircraft was assessed +as beyond repair and was destroyed.</p> + +<p>In the second week of August, officers from +HMM-261 and the task element’s staff (under the +command of Colonel Gomez) met with American +and Vietnamese officers at I Corps headquarters to +plan a large-scale heliborne retrograde movement. +The planned helilift was to mark the culmination +of Operation LAM SON XII, a three-week long +offensive by several battalions of the 2d ARVN +Division against Communist infiltration routes in +Quang Nam Province along the Laotian border. +Although not encircled, the ARVN battalions had +encountered increasing Viet Cong pressure since +early August. I Corps authorities feared that unless +their units were withdrawn promptly they might +be cut off from the few landing zones that existed +in the rugged operations area.</p> + +<p>As planned, the retrograde operation involved +helilifting some 1,300 troops with their artillery +and equipment to Thuong Duc, a government-held +town situated 30 miles southwest of Da Nang along +the Song Vu Gia. The operation plan called for +the commitment of 20 Marine helicopters, 18 of +which would participate in the actual troop lifts. +The two extra UH-34Ds would be used in the event +it became necessary either to replace helicopters +assigned to the troop lift or to conduct search and +rescue operations for downed aircraft. Three VNAF +UH-34s and two U.S. Army unarmed UH-1Bs +were designated by the I Corps headquarters to +assist HMM-261 with the helilift.</p> + +<p>The Da Nang Air Support Operations Center +assigned a variety of other aircraft to support the +operation. These included two VNAF T-28s, +one FARM GATE B-26, and two U.S. Army +UH-1B gunships. These aircraft would share the +task of providing close air support for the troop +lift. A Marine O-1B was scheduled to perform +weather reconnaissance missions.</p> + +<p>The entire air operation was to be coordinated +from two aircraft. An American forward air controller +in a VNAF observation plane was to direct +all air strikes while overall control for the multiservice, +bilingual effort was to come from a U.S.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">118</span> +Air Force U-10 Super Courier. This six-man, single +engine aircraft, which possessed an eight hour +fuel capacity and carried three radios, would serve +as an airborne air support operations center (Airborne +ASOC). It would be flown by an Air Force +pilot and would carry a Marine officer from the +task element along with U.S. and Vietnamese +representatives from the Da Nang ASOC. These +officers would be in continuous radio contact with +all aircraft in the operations area, and also with +the U.S. Air Force liaison officer to I Corps who +would be positioned with the ground troops.</p> + +<p>The concept of the operation called for the +ARVN units to be lifted from two hazardous landing +zones over a three-day period. According to the +plan 500 ARVN soldiers were to be removed from +Landing Zone HOTEL on Thursday, 15 August. +Landing Zone HOTEL, a small clearing which +could accommodate only three UH-34Ds, was +situated along a river and was crowded between +two 1,000-foot-high ridgelines only five miles +from the Laotian border. The steep, jungle-covered +ridges generally paralleled each other less than 400 +meters apart on either side of the landing zone. +Slightly west of the small clearing the ridges +joined to form a box canyon. The physical structure +of the location dictated that the transport +helicopters use the same approach and retirement +routes.</p> + +<p>Due largely to the proximity of the high terrain +which surrounded Landing Zone HOTEL, the +ARVN adopted a Marine proposal to leave a 125-man +security force on the two ridges. This force +would provide cover for the helicopters conducting +the final troop lift during this first phase of the +retrograde movement. The 125 South Vietnamese +soldiers would move cross-country to another +landing zone to be picked up by helicopters following +the completion of the helilift from Landing +Zone HOTEL.</p> + +<p>The second landing zone, codename ZULU, was +nearly as treacherous as the first. ZULU was completely +encircled by a rim of hills some 500 feet +higher than the floor of the landing site. In addition +to the 125-man security force from HOTEL, +the Marine, Army, and VNAF helicopters were +scheduled to lift 200 ARVN troops and two 105mm +howitzers from this landing zone on 16 and 17 August +(the second and third days of the operation).</p> + +<p>An unexpected complication developed the +morning the operation began when the Air Force +grounded its B-26s after one of the attack bombers +crashed elsewhere in the northern portion of Vietnam +as a result of undetermined causes. Shortly +after this crash, HMM-261 was called upon to +divert a flight of helicopters to assist in search +and rescue operations for the downed B-26, thus +reducing even further the assets available to support +the heliborne retrograde.</p> + +<p>Despite the loss of some of the air power assigned +to the operation, I Corps authorities elected to +proceed with the helilift from Landing Zone +HOTEL as planned. After the crew of a Marine +O-1B confirmed that good weather prevailed over +the operations area, the first helicopters departed +Da Nang on schedule. Less than half an hour after +take off the Marine and Vietnamese pilots began +maneuvering their aircraft between the two ridges +which dominated Landing Zone HOTEL. Twice +during the pickup the armed UH-1B escorts drew +fire from the thick jungle on one side of the approach +lanes being used by the transports. Both +times they returned fire in the direction of the +unseen enemy and forced him to silence his weapons. +The first phase of the operation was completed +without serious incident four hours after it +had begun.</p> + +<p>The second phase of the helilift began the next +morning with the two unarmed U.S. Army UH-1Bs +making several trips to Landing Zone ZULU to +lift out the disassembled ARVN 105mm howitzers. +The Marine and VNAF transport helicopters followed +and continued to shuttle troops out of the +landing zone for three hours without encountering +enemy opposition. Then a departing flight of +UH-34Ds drew fire from a nearby ridgeline. One +of the escorting UH-1Bs immediately marked the +suspected target for the VNAF T-28s and the +attack aircraft bombed and strafed the position. +The Communist activity ceased.</p> + +<p>After an overnight march, the covering force +from Landing Zone HOTEL arrived at Landing +Zone ZULU. Although they were not scheduled +to be removed from the field until the next day, +the schedule was adjusted and the 125 weary +ARVN soldiers were flown to the secure assembly +area on the afternoon of their arrival. This modification +reduced the amount of work which would +be required of the helicopters on the final day of +the operation.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">119</span></p> + +<p>The next phase of the helilift from ZULU on +17 August was characterized by increasing concern +for security around the landing site. The general +scheme for protecting the helicopters during this +critical stage of the exercise was to establish two +perimeters, one around the rim of high ground +which surrounded the zone and another around +the immediate landing site. The outer perimeter +would be withdrawn first, leaving the inside ring +of troops to deny the enemy direct access to the +landing zone while the force from the outer perimeter +boarded the helicopters. Once the Vietnamese +soldiers were withdrawn from the rim of hills, +the area within 300 meters of the close-in defenses +would be automatically cleared for air strikes. +Even with these precautions the helicopters +would be extremely vulnerable to any enemy +force that might rapidly occupy the high ground +above Landing Zone ZULU following the withdrawal +of the outer perimeter. Accordingly, once +the troops from the outer defenses were staged for +the helilift, the transport helicopters would be +directed by the airborne ASOC to tighten the landing +interval between aircraft from the usual five +minutes to as short a time span as possible. By +landing in such rapid succession, the dangerous +final stage of the operation could be accomplished +more quickly.</p> + +<p>Two hours after the helilift began on Saturday +morning, the air liaison officer at ZULU reported +that the outer perimeter had been withdrawn and +that all remaining Vietnamese troops were in +positions around the landing zone. At this point +the operation, now in its most critical phase, +began to experience agonizing delays. First, a +loaded helicopter arrived at the assembly area +with a rough running engine. Fearing that the +fuel in the TAFDS had somehow become contaminated, +Lieutenant Colonel Shook instructed all +HMM-261 pilots to check their aircraft’s fuel +strainers while their passengers disembarked at +the assembly point. No evidence was found to +indicate that the fuel contained contaminants, but +the operation was slowed at the exact point where +the intensified helilift was to have begun. Another +minor delay occurred after a helicopter flying near +the landing zone reported having drawn enemy +ground fire. The approach and departure routes +were adjusted slightly so that the transport helicopters +would not fly over the area and VNAF +T-28s were directed to attack the suspected enemy +position. Shortly after the air strike ended the air +liaison officer at the landing zone reported more +enemy activity only 500 meters from his position. +This momentary crisis was resolved when the +American air liaison officer personally directed +armed UH-1Bs to neutralize the target area.</p> + +<p>Finally, the airborne ASOC passed instructions +to proceed with the operation, whereupon HMM-261 +and VNAF helicopters began spiraling down +into the landing zone. The escorting UH-1B +gunships provided continuous protection for the +transport helicopters by flying concentric but +opposite patterns around them. One after another +the transports landed, took on troops, climbed +out of the landing zone, and turned toward Thuong +Duc. Less than five minutes after the stepped-up +helilift began, the last troops were airborne. The +crew chief of the helicopter which embarked the +final ARVN heliteam then dropped a purple smoke +grenade into the empty landing zone to signal +all other aircraft that the lift was complete.</p> + +<p>The three-day heliborne retrograde from the +Laotian border proved to be one of the most +efficient helicopter operations conducted by the +Marines in the Republic of Vietnam during the +early 1960s. Its success was due largely to detailed +planning, particularly the South Vietnamese plans +for the ground defense of both landing zones. These +plans and their subsequent execution led a grateful +Colonel Gomez, the task element commander, to +declare: “This was the first time in our experience +that a helicopter-borne withdrawal had been +treated as a retrograde operation rather than an +administrative lift. Without a sound retrograde +plan the operation might well have failed.”<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">[9-7]</a></p> + +<p>Although this observation was correct, it should +be added that the close coordination between the +airborne ASOC, the operational aircraft, and the +air liaison officer on the ground had contributed to +the successful execution of the plans. These agencies +were instrumental in coordinating the bilingual, +multiservice effort, particularly when it was beset +with difficulties in its critical final stage.</p> + +<p>HMM-261’s combat support missions continued +at a normal rate following the completion of the +mid-August retrograde helilift. A month later, on +16 September, Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s squadron +lost its second UH-34D in a crash 25 miles west-southwest +of Hue. The helicopter, which had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">120</span> +developed mechanical problems while carrying +troops of a South Vietnamese assault force, was +damaged beyond repair. Its crew members and passengers +fortunately escaped injury. The aircraft +was stripped of usable parts by a salvage team from +Da Nang and burned.</p> + +<p>Shortly after this incident, the first elements of a +new squadron began arriving at Da Nang and +HMM-261 turned to preparations for its departure. +Since early June, when it had become the fourth +Marine helicopter squadron assigned to SHUFLY, +Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s unit had accumulated +5,288 combat flying hours and 11,406 sorties in +the UH-34Ds alone. The squadron’s crews had +helilifted over 6,000 troops, nearly 1,900,000 +pounds of cargo, and had accomplished over 600 +medical evacuation missions.<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">[9-8]</a></p> + +<p>The new squadron, HMM-361, assumed responsibility +for helicopter support in I Corps on 2 October +after a short period of orientation flying with +the crews of the departing unit. HMM-361’s commanding +officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. +Ross, was well qualified to direct a tactical aviation +unit in a combat situation. Decorated with +five Distinguished Flying Crosses during World +War II and Korea, he was a recent graduate of the +Air Force Command and Staff College.</p> + +<p>Barely a week after Ross’ squadron initiated +combat support operations at Da Nang, it suffered +its first aircraft and personnel losses. The incident +occurred on 8 October when two UH-34Ds crashed +almost simultaneously while on a search and rescue +mission 38 miles southwest of Da Nang. Both helicopters +burned, killing 10 men; the pilots, copilots, +the squadron’s flight surgeon, and five crewmen. A +search of the area was initiated immediately for +the downed aircraft, but darkness prevented their +discovery until the next morning. By then the Viet +Cong had surrounded both crash sites and were +waiting to ambush the search and rescue helicopters +which they knew would arrive. When the +rescue aircraft attempted to land, they met determined +enemy opposition. Colonel Gomez requested +ARVN assistance and 254 South Vietnamese troops +were lifted into nearby clearings with instructions +to dislodge the enemy force from the area around +the downed aircraft. While executing the landing, +HMM-361 helicopters were hit nine times by small +arms fire, but suffered only superficial damage. One +ARVN soldier was killed.</p> + +<p>The following day, as the South Vietnamese +forces moved toward the downed UH-34Ds, three +Marine helicopters escorted by three armed UH-1Bs +and two VNAF T-28s lifted an inspection +team into the crash site to recover the bodies and +investigate the wreckage. Enemy automatic weapons +fire broke out while the UH-34Ds waited in +the landing zone and forced the pilots to take off +while the inspection team found cover on the +ground. After the Communist fire had been suppressed, +the helicopters returned for the stranded +Marines. Their investigation of the aircraft hulks +had been fruitful: the evidence of enemy small +arms fire in the wreckage and the relative positions +of the two helicopters led Lieutenant Colonel +Ross to conclude that the aircraft had been shot +down by the Viet Cong.<a id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[9-9]</a> But this was not a conclusive +finding. There was room for speculation +that the two helicopters had actually collided in +midair while attempting to evade ground fire.</p> + +<p>Ground action in the hills around the crash +sites continued. On 11 October, another Marine +helicopter was hit by Viet Cong fire while resupplying +ARVN units in the area. In this incident the +UH-34D was struck twice in the engine and once +in the wheel strut while in a landing zone about +two miles from the point where the crashes had +occurred. After assessing the damage, a maintenance +team from Da Nang determined that the +helicopter would require a new engine. Marines +from the security platoon were utilized to provide +security until 13 October when an additional +120 ARVN troops were helilifted into the area +and established a perimeter around the aircraft. +Other helicopters then delivered the new engine +and a maintenance crew to the landing zone. After +the engines were exchanged, a crew returned the +UH-34D to Da Nang.</p> + +<p>By the time HMM-361 had removed the last +ARVN troops from the hills around the scene +of the tragic accidents, monsoon weather had +begun to restrict flight operations. The remaining +two weeks of October were characterized by a +reduced number of missions, most of which were +either resupply or medical evacuations. By the +end of October, despite numerous flight cancellations, +Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ crews had gained +the unenviable distinction of having attracted +more enemy fire during a one month period than +any previous squadron to serve with SHUFLY.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">121</span> +Their helicopters had been shot at on 46 different +occasions and had been hit 18 times.<a id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[9-10]</a></p> + +<p>SHUFLY’s combat support operations came to a +halt in the first days of November as the reverberations +from Diem’s overthrow spread to South +Vietnam’s northern provinces. American officials +in Washington and Saigon, aware of the pitfalls +that might accompany open support of either side +in the power struggle, ordered all U.S. military +forces to cease advisory and combat support activities. +As a result of the sensitive political situation, +no U.S. aircraft left the ground on 2 November. +Two days after the new regime seized power in +Saigon, the U.S. Marine helicopters were permitted +to perform emergency medical evacuation and +emergency resupply missions. Even these flights +were to be approved beforehand by ARVN military +officers in Saigon. Four days after Diem’s +overthrow, the new leaders in Saigon eased the +political restrictions and SHUFLY’s operations +returned to near normal. One remaining limitation +stipulated that U.S. helicopters could not transport +ARVN units into population centers even though +troops could be helilifted from the cities into rural +areas.</p> + +<p>Due to torrential monsoon rains which began +striking the Da Nang area in mid-November, +HMM-361’s combat support operations continued +at a relatively low level throughout the remainder +of the year. This trend was confirmed by the flight +totals compiled for the final two months of 1963. +In November, the squadron’s UH-34Ds flew only +145 sorties for 233 flight hours. December’s statistics, +230 helicopter sorties for 338 flight hours, +indicated a slight upswing but fell far short of the +monthly figures achieved earlier in the year. With +rain and fog frequently rendering the mountains +inaccessible by air, the preponderance of the squadron’s +missions were conducted along the coastal +plains. As 1963 ended SHUFLY’s combat support +operations were continuing at a greatly reduced +rate.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_121"><i>The Situation in Vietnam</i></h3> + +<p>Although not yet desperate, the overall situation +in South Vietnam at the end of 1963 was far from +favorable. Mismanaged and poorly coordinated +from the outset, the Strategic Hamlet Program had +failed to fulfill even the most moderate of American +and South Vietnamese expectations. Little discernable +headway had been made toward restoring +any large segment of the populated rural areas to +government control. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese +had disregarded the Geneva Agreement of +1962 and had continued to infiltrate troops and +material down the Laotian corridor into the South. +Although the 1963 figure of 4,200 confirmed infiltrators +was roughly 1,000 men lower than the +figure for the previous year, it was substantial +enough to force the government to deviate more and +more from its avowed strategy of clearing Viet +Cong formations from the vital populated areas. +To help meet this continuing influx of Communist +regulars, the government had committed its ground +force to operations against base areas located in the +remote hinterlands with increasing frequency. +More often than not these multi-battalion offensives, +such as the VNMC-ARVN drive into the Do +Xa base area in May, proved futile, usually resulting +in scattered and inconsequential clashes with +small groups of Viet Cong. The continuation of +such actions, of course, worked to the advantage +of the Communists as the government forces expended +time, energy, and lives without exacting +a commensurate price from the enemy.</p> + +<p>Other disturbing trends had emerged on the +South’s battlefields during the course of the year. +Following an action fought in the Mekong Delta +during early January in which the Viet Cong +soundly defeated a multi-battalion ARVN heliborne +force, enemy main force units continued to +maintain their integrity and fought back when +confronted with helicopter assaults. This trend +was evident even in the northern provinces where +each successive assault by Marine helicopters appeared +to meet more determined resistance. Aside +from the Viet Cong’s new-found confidence in +countering heliborne offensives, another source of +concern to U.S. and Vietnamese officials was the +appearance in the South of several Viet Cong regimental +headquarters during the year. The activation +of these headquarters, which assumed control +of already operational main force battalions, +seemed to presage another phase of Communist +military escalation.</p> + +<p>The situation throughout South Vietnam worsened +in the aftermath of the Diem coup. Subsequent +to the widespread command changes ordered by +the new government, the morale, and in turn the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">122</span> +effectiveness, of the Vietnamese armed forces declined +sharply. The Viet Cong moved quickly to +exploit the prevailing state of confusion by staging +a rash of attacks in the weeks after Diem’s overthrow—attacks +which worked a profound influence +on the already faltering Strategic Hamlet Program. +“The fall of the Ngo regime,” wrote one American +scholar, “was accompanied by the complete collapse +of the pacification efforts in many areas, and +vast regions that had been under government control +quickly came under the influence of the Viet +Cong.”<a id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142" class="fnanchor">[9-11]</a> The nation’s new leaders therefore formally +terminated the badly damaged Strategic +Hamlet Program. Although it was soon to be +replaced with similar pacification campaigns, most +Vietnamese and American officials conceded that +much time and energy would be required to restore +momentum to the government’s efforts at securing +the allegiance of the rural population. So, by the +end of 1963 both the tempo and effectiveness of +South Vietnam’s overall war effort was at its lowest +ebb since the intensification of the U.S. military +assistance program in early 1962.</p> + +<figure id="ip_122" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_122.jpg" width="1908" height="1392" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>ARVN troops fan out from an HMM-361 helicopter during an assault into the mountains of I Corps. (<cite>USMC Photo +A420866</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>This threatening situation was hardly consistent +with American military plans which were being +implemented at year’s end. Drawn up at Secretary +of Defense McNamara’s direction and approved +by him in the late summer of 1963, these plans +called for a phased withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. +servicemen from Vietnam by January 1964. The +phased withdrawal plan, whose ultimate objective +was to end direct American participation in the +war, envisioned a gradual scaling down of U.S. +involvement while simultaneously turning over +more military responsibility to the South Vietnamese. +Included in the initial 1,000-man reduction<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">123</span> +was the 47-man security platoon which had guarded +the U.S. Marine task element’s compound at Da +Nang since April. For the Marines serving with the +task element, 1963 thus ended on an incongruous +note. While the Viet Cong threat appeared on the +rise, their own defenses were being reduced. +Clearly, events in Vietnam had overtaken long-range +plans already in motion.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">125</span></p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<h2 class="nobreak part" id="PART_IV"><span id="toclink_125">PART IV</span><br> + +<span class="subhead">AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964</span></h2> +<div> </div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">127</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_10"><span id="toclink_127"></span>CHAPTER 10<br> +<span class="subhead large">Marines Meet the Challenge</span><br> +<span class="subhead notbold"><i>New American Decisions—A Restructured Military Assistance Command—Changes +in Marine Leadership—Redesignation and Reorganization—The +Vietnamese Marine Brigade—Additional Marine Activities</i></span></h2> +</div> + +<h3 id="toclink_127a"><i>New American Decisions</i></h3> + +<p>Less than three weeks after the overthrow of +Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. Presidency changed hands. +On 22 November President Kennedy was assassinated +in Dallas and Vice President Lyndon B. +Johnson took the reigns of the American government. +By late November, when the new president +assumed office, the process of political and military +disintegration which had begun in South Vietnam +following the Diem coup was already well underway. +This process continued into the early weeks +of 1964 when, in late January, General Nguyen +Khanh, the newly appointed commander of I +Corps, seized power in a bloodless coup. This +second turnover in the government of South Vietnam +in less than three months had its most serious +impact on the nation’s armed forces. A new series +of command changes ensued and again the government’s +operations against the Communists suffered. +As had been the case in the closing months of 1963, +the Viet Cong continued to capitalize on the government’s +disarray by expanding its control into +previously secure areas.</p> + +<p>By March the rapidly declining effectiveness of +the South Vietnamese military forces led the +Johnson Administration to review the earlier +decisions to withdraw American servicemen and +to cut back the military assistance program. In a +16 March memorandum to President Johnson, +Secretary of Defense McNamara warned that “the +[military] situation had unquestionably been +growing worse” in South Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_143" href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">[10-1]</a> To counteract +this threatening trend, McNamara offered a +broad set of recommendations which included a +proposal to support a 50,000-man increase in the +size of the Vietnamese military and paramilitary +forces. The memorandum did not address the question +of additional American advisors who might +be needed to supervise the proposed expansion. +In any case, President Johnson approved McNamara’s +plan the following day, thus setting the +stage for increases in U.S. military assistance to +South Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_144" href="#Footnote_144" class="fnanchor">[10-2]</a></p> + +<p>Shortly after his most recent decision on Vietnam, +President Johnson ordered changes in his +top civilian and military representatives in Saigon. +On 22 June, General William C. Westmoreland, +U.S. Army, who had been serving since January +as Deputy Commander, USMACV, succeeded +General Harkins as ComUSMACV. One day later, +on the 23d, President Johnson announced that +General Maxwell D. Taylor would replace Henry +Cabot Lodge as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic +of Vietnam. Taylor, who had been serving since +1962 as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, +had been closely associated with the Vietnam +problem since his 1961 fact-finding mission. Both +he and Westmoreland were thoroughly familiar +with U.S. programs and objectives in Vietnam.</p> + +<p>Soon after assuming his new responsibilities, +General Westmoreland requested that the Joint +Chiefs of Staff augment his command with 5,100 +additional military personnel. In his opinion, +these men were needed to support and supervise +the expansion of the Vietnamese military and +paramilitary forces. Secretary McNamara met with +the Joint Chiefs on 20 July to discuss this request +for 900 more advisors and 4,200 additional support +personnel. All agreed that the deteriorating situation +in Vietnam demanded the measure and recommended +its approval. The proposal was forwarded +to President Johnson who approved it in +early August. Emphasizing the urgency of the +military situation, McNamara then ordered the +Joint Chiefs to complete the entire build-up<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">128</span> +before 30 September. At this juncture, however, +General Westmoreland pointed out that such a +rapid influx of personnel would “overload existing +facilities [in South Vietnam]” and stated his +desire to see the build-up accomplished in a more +orderly progression over a period of several months. +After considering the general’s latest request, +the Secretary of Defense withdrew his earlier +demand for an accelerated deployment.<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">[10-3]</a></p> + +<figure id="ip_128" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 31em;"> + <img src="images/i_128.jpg" width="1921" height="1424" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>The MACV staff, spring 1964. Seated at head of table are General Paul D. Harkins, USA, Commander, U.S. Military +Assistance Command, Vietnam, and his relief General William C. Westmoreland, USA. Major General Richard G. +Weede, USMC, MACV Chief of Staff, is seated to General Westmoreland’s immediate left, and Brigadier General Carl +A. Youngdale, USMC, Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, is seated two positions to General Weede’s left. (<cite>Photo courtesy +of Major General Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.)</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>While the details of the expanded U S. advisory +program were being hammered out in Washington, +the focus of the administration’s concern swung +abruptly from the battlefields of South Vietnam to +the Tonkin Gulf off the coast of North Vietnam. +In two separate incidents during the first week of +August, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked +U.S. Navy ships operating in international waters.<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[10-A]</a> +An international crisis ensued when the United +States retaliated with limited air strikes against +North Vietnamese naval facilities. On 6 August, +the U.S. Congress unanimously passed a joint resolution +authorizing the President “to use all measures, +including the commitment of armed forces to +assist [South Vietnam] in the defense of its independence +and territorial integrity....”<a id="FNanchor_146" href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">[10-4]</a> President +Johnson signed the so-called Tonkin Gulf +Resolution five days after it was passed, and in so<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">129</span> +doing, reaffirmed his pledge of full support for the +Government of Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[10-B]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="label">[10-A]</a> A vigorous debate has since developed concerning the actual +origins of the Tonkin Gulf incidents. It has been claimed that +the Americans precipitated the attacks by supporting aggressive +South Vietnamese naval patrols off the North Vietnamese coast.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="label">[10-B]</a> U.S. Marines figured prominently in the crisis which followed +the North Vietnamese attacks. A Marine expeditionary +brigade, the 9th MEB, was activated from elements of the 3d +Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and deployed on +board amphibious shipping to a position off Da Nang where it +was available to support U.S. contingency plans. Its commander, +Brigadier General Raymond G. Davis, and his staff attended +planning conferences in Da Nang and reconnoitered possible +landing sites near the city, but the MEB was not committed. +Instead, the organization remained in existence throughout the +remainder of 1964 and into early 1965 when, in March, two of +its battalions were landed at Da Nang. The formation and +subsequent commitment of the 9th MEB in the Republic of +Vietnam are covered in detail in the 1965 history of U.S. Marine +operations in the Republic of Vietnam.</p> + +</div> +</div> + +<p>While the tensions generated by the Tonkin Gulf +incidents never really subsided, the immediate +crisis soon passed. Thereafter the American attentions +focused once again on South Vietnam where +the political and military situation began to deteriorate +at an unprecedented rate after midyear. Ironically, +this process of accelerated decay coincided +with the initiation of a new South Vietnamese +pacification strategy designed to prevent just such +an occurrence. One aspect of the strategy was the +Chien Tang (“Struggle for Victory”) Plan. Announced +by General Khanh shortly after his rise to +power, this campaign was similar in method and +objective to the defunct Strategic Hamlet Program. +Like the earlier program, the Chien Tang Plan +envisioned the restoration of government influence +in selected rural areas through the coordination of +military and paramilitary operations with social +and economic development programs.<a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[10-C]</a> While the +Chien Tang campaign was better planned and far +less ambitious than the Strategic Hamlet Program, +there were definite similarities between the two. +The instrument for the social, economic, and political +developmental phase of the new effort, for +example, was the New Life Hamlet—a variation of +the planned government community. Begun in some +areas around midyear, the New Life Hamlets were +to become the symbol of the new pacification effort +in much the same manner that the fortified hamlets +had symbolized the earlier Strategic Hamlet +Program.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="label">[10-C]</a> Motivated at least partially by the requirement to provide +better support for the pacification strategy, the Vietnamese +government restructured its paramilitary forces in the spring +of 1964. The old Self Defense Corps was expanded dramatically +and renamed the Popular Force (PF). The Civil Guard was +reorganized and designated the Regional Force (RF). More +importantly, the RVNAF extended its control over both paramilitary +organizations for the first time since their creation.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Coincident with the Chien Tang campaign, a +similar but locally concentrated pacification effort +was instituted in the rural areas around Saigon. +Designated the Hop Tac Program, this campaign +was conceived in order to link the seven provinces +around the capital into a zone of intensive pacification +in which closely coordinated military, paramilitary, +police, and civil activities would systematically +reduce Viet Cong strength. Because of +their proximity to the area and their availability, +the Vietnamese Marine Brigade and the ARVN +Airborne Brigade were assigned primary responsibility +for military operations in support of the +Hop Tac campaign. By midyear, the Chien Tang +and Hop Tac plans emerged as the backbone of +General Khanh’s strategy to stave off further +Communist advances in critical areas of the +country.</p> + +<p>The development of the government’s newest +pacification strategy, however, was based on the +assumption that the Viet Cong would pursue a +campaign to strengthen their control in South Vietnam’s +populated rural areas. Such was not the case. +Instead, at midyear the Communists began waging +a brand of warfare characterized by large-scale +mobile operations against government military +forces. Obviously the enemy had shifted to the +“general counter-offensive”—that phase of guerrilla +warfare designed to bring on the complete +political and military collapse of the opposition.</p> + +<p>The new Viet Cong strategy revealed itself in +two general geographic areas during the fall +months. In Binh Dinh Province on the coast of +northern II Corps, two Viet Cong main force +regiments staged a series of particularly swift and +successful attacks which virtually eliminated the +government’s presence except in the province +capital, Qui Nhon, and a few district towns. In +a coordinated offensive the Communists increased +pressure throughout that portion of the Central +Highlands west of Binh Dinh Province, thereby +threatening to sever South Vietnam along an +axis that extended roughly between Qui Nhon +on the coast and Pleiku in the highlands. Meanwhile, +another phase of the new initiative unfolded +in III Corps where the government’s Hop +Tac campaign was just getting underway. There +the Communist offensive threatened to neutralize<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">130</span> +the government’s concentrated pacification +campaign.</p> + +<p>Eroded by the political side-effects of the battlefield +developments, South Vietnam’s fragile power +structure became increasingly unstable. The last +five months of 1964 brought frequent changes +in the Saigon government although General +Khanh was able to maintain a semblance of control +until December. The turmoil then climaxed +when Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, the +commander of the Vietnamese Air Force, engineered +a bloodless coup that forced Khanh from the +Saigon political scene.</p> + +<p>The frequent changes of government coupled +with the stepped-up Viet Cong military pressure +throughout Vietnam produced a downward spiral +in the effectiveness of the republic’s armed forces. +By the end of the year it was becoming increasingly +doubtful that the government could stave off +total collapse even with the increased volume of +military assistance it was already receiving from +the United States. Against this backdrop of +Communist military activities, unprecedented political +instability on the part of the South Vietnamese, +and mounting combat losses, American +military involvement in Vietnam deepened.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_130"><i>A Restructured Military Assistance Command</i></h3> + +<p>In many respects 1964 was a year of transition for +the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. +Not only did the command experience a change in +leadership when General Westmoreland replaced +General Harkins as ComUSMACV, but it was +thoroughly reorganized in preparation for the +more vigorous U.S. advisory program which was +expected to begin about midyear.</p> + +<p>The major organizational change within MACV +took place on 15 May when the MAAG was +abolished and its staff integrated into that of the +senior command. In June MACV itself was restructured +under a new table of distribution. These +changes reflected the anticipated influx of advisors +and support personnel, and therefore concerned +the Army more than the other U.S. armed services.</p> + +<p>Initially, the number of Marine billets on the +restructured Military Assistance Command staff +did not change substantially. Twenty-four Marines +(15 officers and nine enlisted) were included in the +new table of distribution. This represented a net +increase of only one over the number previously +assigned to the MAAG and MACV staffs. By the +end of September, however, Marines temporarily +assigned to the MACV staff from FMFPac commands +brought the on-board strength to 37. +Another increase occurred in the early fall when +eight more permanent Marine billets (three officers +and five enlisted) were approved.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_130a"><i>Changes in Marine Leadership</i></h3> + +<p>Two key links in the Marine command chain +that joined government policy decisions in Washington +to Marine Corps operations in Vietnam +changed hands during the first 60 days of 1964. +On 1 January, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., +replaced General Shoup as Commandant of the +Marine Corps. Greene, known in American military +circles as a brilliant staff officer, had been +serving since 1960 as Chief of Staff of the Marine +Corps. By 1964 he had become an outspoken supporter +of South Vietnam’s struggle for independence. +As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and +as a Chief of Service, his presence in administration +policies would be felt until his tour as commandant +ended on 31 January 1967.</p> + +<p>An equally important change occurred in early +March when General Greene named Lieutenant +General Victor H. Krulak to replace General +Roberts as Commanding General, FMFPac. A 1934 +graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Krulak had +won the Navy Cross during ground action in World +War II. He arrived in the Pacific from Washington +where he had served both Presidents Kennedy and +Johnson as special assistant for counterinsurgency +matters. Having made numerous fact-finding trips +to Vietnam in this capacity, he was intimately +familiar with the unique political-military struggle +being waged there. He also had a reputation of +being one of Washington’s most vocal advocates +of resisting Communist aggression in Southeast +Asia. A dynamic leader and a man of strong convictions, +Krulak was to exert a pervasive influence +over all Marine operations in the Pacific for nearly +half a decade.</p> + +<p>Less obvious but of immense importance to both +the Marine Corps and to the future of U.S. military<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">131</span> +operations in Vietnam was a change instituted +within MACV by General Westmoreland during +the early part of the year. The command’s modified +table of organization called for the establishment +of a Deputy ComUSMACV billet to be filled by an +Army general officer. The joint table of distribution +for the reorganized command specified that an +Army general would also fill the chief of staff +billet—a position which had been held by General +Weede since MACV’s creation in early 1962. +Thus, when Weede’s assignment ended in May, +Major General Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army, +became Westmoreland’s chief of staff while Lieutenant +General John L. Throckmorton, U.S. Army, +became Deputy ComUSMACV.<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[10-D]</a> The Marine Corps, +however, did not lose its entire senior presence +on the MACV staff. Brigadier General Carl A. +Youngdale, an officer whose 30-year career included +distinguished combat tours in both World +War II and Korea, arrived 15 January for assignment +as Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2 (Intelligence). +His presence on the MACV staff would insure a +Marine voice in U.S. military planning at the +Saigon level. Still, many Marines saw their relative +strength on Westmoreland’s staff seriously reduced—a +change which seemed to mark somewhat +of a turning point in the overall management of +the military assistance effort.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="label">[10-D]</a> For his service as MACV chief of staff, General Weede was +awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.</p> + +</div> + +<h3 id="toclink_131"><i>Redesignation and Reorganization</i></h3> + +<p>The reorganization of the U.S. Military Assistance +Command, Vietnam, had little initial effect +on the Marine advisory program. With the dissolution +of the MAAG, the old Naval Section, under +which the Marine advisors had operated since 1955, +was redesignated the Naval Advisory Group, +MACV. Lieutenant Colonel Noren’s Marine Advisory +Division, whose authorized strength remained +at 11 officers and nine enlisted men through +the first half of the year, was also renamed in mid-May. +Known thereafter as the Marine Advisory +Unit, Vietnam, the organization continued to +function in much the same manner as it had under +the previous arrangements.</p> + +<p>The last five months of the year, however, saw +some substantial changes in the composition of the +Marine Advisory Unit as the advisor build-up +recently approved by the Secretary of Defense +began. Colonel William P. Nesbit, a recent graduate +of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode +Island, relieved Colonel Noren (promoted from +lieutenant colonel on 1 July) as the Senior Marine +Advisor on 4 September. Colonel Nesbit arrived in +time to supervise the implementation of a new +table of organization which added eight first lieutenants +and a captain to the advisory unit in +November.<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[10-E]</a> The captain and one of the lieutenants +were assigned as advisor and assistant advisor +respectively to a new Vietnamese Marine infantry +battalion which was in the process of being formed. +Four other first lieutenants joined Colonel Nesbit’s +command as assistant advisors to existing infantry +battalions and one became the assistant artillery +advisor. The two remaining lieutenants were assigned +as advisors to the brigade’s motor transport +and communications companies, replacing noncommissioned +advisors. Two billets were downgraded +in rank: the engineer advisor from captain +to first lieutenant, and the artillery advisor from +major to captain.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="label">[10-E]</a> A number of the Marines scheduled to fill the newly created +billets did not arrive until early 1965.</p> + +</div> + +<p>In addition to phasing out three enlisted advisor +billets, these changes relieved the Assistant +Senior Marine Advisor of his artillery responsibilities. +Colonel Earl E. Anderson, who had been +serving since mid-1963 as the MAAG Chief of +Staff, was instrumental in bringing about this +particular modification. Under the old arrangement, +the Senior Marine Advisor’s presence frequently +had been required at the MAAG headquarters +in Saigon while the Vietnamese Marine +Brigade headquarters was deployed to combat. +As the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor was +likewise torn between two jobs, Anderson had +directed that he be relieved of artillery advisory +duties. Thus, Major Raymond C. Damm, an +officer who had served as Assistant Naval Attache +in Saigon between 1959 and 1961, became the +first full-time Assistant Senior Marine Advisor +after he joined Colonel Nesbit’s command in May. +When the changes were finally completed, the +restructured and redesignated Marine Advisory<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">132</span> +Unit included permanent billets for 24 officers +and men (18 officers and six enlisted men).</p> + +<p>Another important aspect of the overall Marine +advisory program was altered in the closing +months of 1964. Since Lieutenant Colonel Croizat’s +tour with the Vietnamese Marines in the immediate +post-Geneva period, most Marine advisors +had attended French language courses prior to +departing for service in Vietnam. As French +influence in Vietnam faded during the late 1950s, +however, the requirement for the language had +gradually diminished, particularly as French maps +were replaced by American ones. By the early +1960s this situation had prompted several Marine +advisors to recommend that instruction in French +be replaced by Vietnamese language training. +Primarily through the persistence of Colonels +Moody and Noren, the policy was revised in +1964. The arrival of the new advisors in the fall +marked the first time that Marine officers had +received formal Vietnamese language training +before beginning their tours. Colonel Nesbit, who +had the advantage of commanding advisors +trained in both languages, saw the change as +“a marked step forward,” in improving the +advisory effort.<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147" class="fnanchor">[10-5]</a></p> + +<h3 id="toclink_132"><i>The Vietnamese Marine Brigade</i></h3> + +<p>At the beginning of 1964, the 6,109-man Vietnamese +Marine Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant +Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, experienced a crisis +of morale. The recent command changes that had +occurred at almost every echelon and a soaring +desertion rate combined to undermine the brigade’s +combat readiness. In February the Khanh government +recalled Colonel Le Nguyen Khang from the +Philippines, promoted him to brigadier general, +and reinstated him as commandant in an attempt +to restore the unit’s spirit. A veteran Marine who +had been instrumental in the development of the +VNMC since its inception, Khang commanded +confidence throughout the corps. Following his +return, increased attention was given to the welfare +of the individual Marine and his dependents in +order to reduce the climbing desertion rate. Under +the close supervision of the senior Vietnamese +officers and their American advisors, the morale +problem was gradually overcome.</p> + +<p>Throughout the year the Vietnamese Marine +Brigade continued to share the role of South +Vietnam’s general reserve force with an ARVN +airborne brigade. Normally at least one Marine +battalion was held in the vicinity of Saigon, ready +to respond to tactical emergencies while others +operated nearby in support of the Hop Tac campaign. +Still, the brigade’s infantry battalions +managed to see action in every corps tactical zone +except I Corps, which was the farthest removed +from the capital.<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[10-F]</a> Although sometimes combined +into regimental-sized task forces for specific operations, +the individual Marine battalions normally +were attached to either a corps, a province, or an +ARVN division for combat operations. When so +attached, the Vietnamese Marines often were +assigned to clear particularly hazardous or difficult +terrain. At times they served as a reserve force, +responding to crucial situations to either recoup +or exploit actions initiated by other government +units.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="label">[10-F]</a> South Vietnam’s corps boundaries were adjusted again in +late 1964. The southern boundary of I Corps was moved south +to include Quang Ngai Province. The southern border of II +Corps was also moved southward to include eight provinces +formerly encompassed by III Corps. Under the new arrangement, +III CTZ formed a narrow strip across the nation which centered +roughly on Saigon. The Capital Military District, the boundaries +of which coincided with those of Gia Dinh Province, +formed an enclave within III Corps. The southernmost tactical +zone, IV Corps, encompassed the entire Mekong Delta.</p> + +</div> + +<p>In early January, the Vietnamese Joint General +Staff assigned a Marine task force to a pacification +mission in Go Cong and Long An Provinces, located +just southeast of Saigon. Two VNMC battalions, +controlled by a task force headquarters, moved into +the operations area later in the month and remained +until mid-September when the operation was terminated. +The object of the Marine unit’s presence +was to reestablish government control over the +region through systematic small unit operations +designed to deny the enemy his usual freedom of +movement.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">133</span></p> +<figure id="ip_133" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 29em;"> + <img src="images/i_133.jpg" width="1843" height="2575" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +CORPS TACTICAL ZONES<br> +AT THE END OF 1964<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Despite the length of this particular deployment, +the Vietnamese Marines fought no major engagements. +Furthermore, they had not translated their +improved morale into an effective pacification operation. +While desertions and unauthorized absences +remained low considering the duration of this +particular assignment, Colonel Noren later recalled +several flaws in the campaign. These operations, he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">134</span> +remarked “were characterized by inadequate coordination +of military operations and intelligence +reporting ... too little operational activity ... +and a seeming lack of appreciation of the objectives +of pacification.”<a id="FNanchor_148" href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">[10-6]</a> Colonel Nesbit, who became the +Senior Marine Advisor as the operation entered its +final stages, tended to confirm this assessment. +“The capacity of the task force headquarters in +staff functioning,” he reported, “was marginal.”<a id="FNanchor_149" href="#Footnote_149" class="fnanchor">[10-7]</a></p> + +<figure id="ip_134" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_134.jpg" width="1899" height="1399" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, inspects an honor guard of Vietnamese Marines. +With him are Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, and Major General +Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. (<cite>Official USMC Photo</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>While the drive to pacify the Go Cong-Long An +areas was in progress, other Vietnamese Marine +task forces were organized to undertake different +combat assignments elsewhere in the southern portion +of Vietnam. One, composed of two battalions, +an artillery detachment, and a headquarters element, +launched a brief clearing operation northwest +of Saigon in heavily populated Tay Ninh Province +in January. A similar operation involving another +task force was conducted the next month in the +difficult mangrove swamps of An Xuyen Province +at the southern tip of the nation. In both cases the +government offensives enjoyed local success, but +failed to reduce significantly the enemy’s capabilities +and influence in the area.</p> + +<p>Midyear 1964 found the Vietnamese Marine +commanders and their American advisors engaged +in renewed efforts to restructure and expand the +Vietnamese Marine Brigade. Accomplished for the +most part in July, the salient feature of this latest +reorganization was the creation of a new infantry +battalion. With its nucleus garrisoned at a small +base about 12 miles northwest of Saigon, the newly +organized 5th Battalion devoted the remainder of +the year and the first six months of 1965 to forming +and training its companies. It finally became combat +ready in June 1965.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">135</span></p> + +<figure id="ip_135" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 41em;"> + <img src="images/i_135.png" width="2619" height="1887" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><p>VNMC (MARINE BRIGADE) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JULY 1964</p> + +<p>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 6,555</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">136</span></p> + +<p>Aside from the addition of the new infantry +battalion, the mid-1964 reorganization produced +other noteworthy changes in the structure of the +Vietnamese Marine Corps. In the artillery battalion, +the two 75mm pack howitzer batteries +were combined into one battery of eight weapons, +while the one 105mm howitzer battery was divided +to form two new batteries of six howitzers +each. The tables of equipment were revised to +reflect these adjustments. Another significant +change occurred in the area of training. The +Training Company was deleted from the Amphibious +Support Battalion and a separate recruit +training center was created at Thu Duc near +Saigon. Tactical planning and control was also +improved when the Brigade Headquarters was +reduced in size and two smaller Task Force Headquarters +(Task Force A and Task Force B) were +formed.</p> + +<p>Following the mid-1964 reorganization, the +Vietnamese Marines performed combat missions +not unlike those they had been assigned prior +to July. One exception was that the brigade no +longer found itself tasked with actual pacification +phases of operations. Instead, the Marine battalions +concentrated on clearing operations around +Saigon in conjunction with the Hop Tac campaign. +Additionally, the various battalions were called +upon occasionally during this period to provide +security for key government installations located +in Saigon and Vung Tau—assignments which +gave the infantry units much needed respites +from field duty.</p> + +<p>By the end of the year the Vietnamese Marine +Corps had been improved in several areas. In the +motor transport field two new pieces of equipment +were put into full-time operation—a high pressure +steam cleaner and an M-108 wrecker. Progress +also was made in upgrading the entire communications +capability of the brigade when the table +of equipment was revised in accordance with the +modified table of organization. The new tables +provided for modern test and repair equipment +and eliminated obsolete and impractical items. +Other unrealized improvements were still in their +formative stages as the year closed. In the field +of supply, for example, the brigade supply officer, +with assistance from his American advisor, was +drawing up plans which would give the Vietnamese +Marines a more responsive and more manageable +system.</p> + +<p>While the technically oriented programs were +being developed and implemented, intensified +training programs were preparing more and better +trained Vietnamese Marines for their responsibilities. +Established in July, the Marine Training +Center at Thu Duc had graduated 1,464 recruits +before the end of the year. These recruits, moreover, +were trained by Vietnamese noncommissioned +officers who had recently completed the drill +instructor course at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, +San Diego. For the first time since its inception, +the VNMC was benefiting from a flow of recruits +trained by Vietnamese Marines at a separate +Marine training facility.</p> + +<p>Other programs likewise were helping prepare +Vietnamese officers and noncommissioned officers +to command and manage their growing service. +A total of 718 officers and noncommissioned +officers attended various training courses in South +Vietnam during the year while 42 more officers +attended formal schools in the United States during +the same period. Another 52 small unit leaders +participated in on-the-job training programs with +U.S. Marine units on Okinawa between January +and December.<a id="FNanchor_150" href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">[10-8]</a></p> + +<p>Unfortunately, these developments were overshadowed +by a military disaster which befell the +4th VNMC Battalion on the last day of the year. +The Marine unit had been serving since early +December as the reserve force for III Corps Tactical +Zone. On the 27th an estimated Viet Cong battalion +overran the small pro-government town of Binh +Gia located in Phuoc Thy Province roughly 35 +miles east of Saigon. III Corps officials reacted +by dispatching the 4th Battalion and an ARVN +Ranger battalion to the area. The 4th Battalion, +accompanied by two U.S. Marine advisors and +three OJT observers from the 3d Marine Division, +was ordered to recapture the town. It proceeded +to do so on the 30th, encountering no enemy +opposition. Later in the day, while the Marines +were developing defensive positions around the +town, a spotter aircraft sighted a large Viet Cong +force approximately two miles to the west and +called for air strikes. A U.S. Army helicopter +gunship was shot down and its crew killed while +attacking the target.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">137</span></p> + +<p>Against the advice of his senior U.S. Marine +Advisor, Captain Franklin P. Eller, the 4th Battalion +commander ordered one of his companies to +secure the crash site and recover the bodies of the +dead crewmen. Accompanied by Eller, First Lieutenant +James P. Kelliher, and Staff Sergeant Clifford +J. Beaver, two of the 3d Division OJTs, the +company moved west from Binh Gia on the +morning of the 31st to carry out the mission. After +reaching the crash site, the Marine unit was ambushed +by a large Viet Cong force using 82mm +mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, and .50 caliber +machine guns. Unable to maneuver because of the +intense fire, the company radioed for assistance and +began withdrawing from the ambush site in small +groups.</p> + +<figure id="ip_137" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_137.jpg" width="1916" height="1230" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Marine Captain Franklin P. Eller, advisor to the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion, coordinates with other American-advised +units operating nearby. (<cite>USMC Photo A183570</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The battalion commander, accompanied by the +assistant Marine advisor, First Lieutenant Philip +O. Brady and the other OJTs, responded to the +call for assistance by leading the remaining three +companies from their positions at Binh Gia. Just +outside the town they met Captain Eller, who had +been wounded in the face, along with Lieutenant +Kelliher and the remnants of the hard-hit company. +Eller and the survivors of the morning ambush +returned to Binh Gia while the remainder of the +battalion pushed westward in an attempt to locate +the enemy force. Later in the morning, the Marine +column was surprised while moving through an +abandoned rubber plantation by a Communist +force of between 1,200 and 1,800 men.</p> + +<p>No artillery was available to support the beleaguered +battalion. Vietnamese Air Force A-1 +Skyraiders, however, were able to deliver close +air strikes for about 45 minutes. U.S. Army helicopter +gunships replaced the Skyraiders on station, +but their rocket and machine gun fire proved too +light to dislodge the enemy from his positions +under the dense vegetation. By late afternoon, +29 of the 4th Battalion’s 35 officers, including the +battalion commander, were dead. In desperation, +the Americans organized the surviving Vietnamese<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">138</span> +Marines into small groups some of which +managed to slip past the Viet Cong and find their +way back to Binh Gia.</p> + +<p>The Vietnamese Marines had suffered their most +decisive defeat of the war. Their losses were extremely +high: 112 killed, 71 wounded, and 13 +missing out of a 326-man battalion. Equipment +losses included 142 weapons and over a dozen +radios. Additionally, all four of the U.S. Marines +who had participated in the disastrous action had +been wounded. Both Captain Eller and Lieutenant +Brady were later awarded the Silver Star Medal +for their roles in the battle.<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[10-G]</a> Captain Donald G. +Cook, one of the OJT observers from the 3d Marine +Division, was missing in action at the close of +the battle.<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[10-H]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="label">[10-G]</a> Personal decorations for heroism were awarded more frequently +to Marine advisors through 1964. Earlier in the year +(16 February), a Marine captain, Donald E. Koelper, an advisor +to the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion earned a Navy Cross, +the nation’s second highest award for heroism. Koelper was +decorated for warning the occupants of a crowded American +theater in Saigon to take cover just prior to the detonation of a +Viet Cong terrorist bomb. The Marine was killed by a Viet +Cong satchel charge. But his sacrifice limited the number of +casualties to three killed and 51 wounded.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="label">[10-H]</a> It was later learned that Captain Cook had been wounded +and captured by the Viet Cong. Cook reportedly died in captivity +in 1967.</p> + +</div> +</div> + +<p>The ranger battalion operating nearby suffered a +similar fate, incurring nearly 400 casualties in another +violent ambush. Thus, within a 24-hour +period two elite government battalions had been +shattered. Only later was it learned that the Marines +and rangers had clashed with two main force regiments +of the <i>9th Viet Cong Division</i>—the first +Communist division to become operational in +South Vietnam.</p> + +<p>As a result of the disastrous engagement at +Binh Gia, the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion +was rendered ineffective as a fighting force for a +period of three months. This loss created two +immediate problems for General Khang and his +American advisors. It reduced the brigade’s available +infantry strength by approximately 25 percent +and placed an added burden on the recruit training +center which was already laboring to provide +enough new troops to fill the 5th Battalion. For +the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1964 ended on a +discouraging note.</p> + +<figure id="ip_138" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 18em;"> + <img src="images/i_138.jpg" width="907" height="1113" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Marine Captain Donald E. Koelper, advisor to the 4th +Vietnamese Marine Battalion, was posthumously +awarded the first Navy Cross for action in Vietnam. +(<cite>USMC Photo A411741</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<h3 id="toclink_138"><i>Additional Marine Activities</i></h3> + +<p>U.S. Marine participation in the Vietnam War +during 1964 was not limited to the activities of +the advisory division and the helicopter task +element. Various other Marine units and detachments +made significant, although less publicized, +contributions to the war effort throughout the +year. One of these was the Marine security detachment +which continued to protect the U.S. Embassy +in Saigon. Twice during the year the growing +political unrest and the increasing threat of +Communist terrorist attacks prompted the expansion +of the security detachment, first in April and +again in October. By the end of the year the +detachment’s strength stood at 30 Marines—a +figure which made it the second largest such unit +in the world. Only the Marine detachment in +Paris, with 37 officers and men, was larger. And +nowhere was an embassy guard assignment more +dangerous than in Vietnam where terrorist attacks +were apt to occur at anytime.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">139</span></p> + +<p>Other groups of Marines performed an assortment +of missions in support of the Government +of Vietnam during the course of the year. The +Detachment, 1st Composite Radio Company, for +example, continued its duties at the U.S. Army +Communications installation in Pleiku. A handful +of these Marines also served at a newly opened +U.S. Army communications station at Phu Bai +some eight miles southeast of Hue. The strength +of the Detachment, 1st Composite Radio Company, +however, was reduced from 42 officers and men to +only 16 by the end of December.</p> + +<p>The spring of 1964 saw a new, substantially +larger Marine communications detachment introduced +into the northern provinces of South +Vietnam. Unlike its predecessors at Pleiku and +Phu Bai, this unit was composed exclusively of +Marines and included an infantry element for +security purposes. Designated the Signal Engineering +Survey Unit, the radio detachment consisted +of three officers and 27 enlisted men drawn from +the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac, and from +Headquarters Marine Corps. This element, commanded +by Major Alfred M. Gray, Jr. arrived at +Da Nang on 20 May along with a 76-man infantry +detachment from Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d +Marines. The infantry element, reinforced with an +81mm mortar section (two mortars), was commanded +by First Lieutenant Raymond J. Otlowski. +Major Gray assumed overall command of the +composite force which was designated Marine +Detachment, Advisory Team One. Advisory Team +One became the first actual Marine ground unit +to conduct independent operations in the Republic +of Vietnam.</p> + +<p>U.S. Air Force C-123 transports airlifted the +bulk of the newly formed unit to the Civilian +Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp at Khe +Sanh in northwestern Quang Tri Province in the +closing days of May. Two officers and five enlisted +communicators remained behind at Da Nang and +a four-man team positioned itself in the U.S. Army +compound at Phu Bai to provide radio support for +the main body. At Khe Sanh, Advisory Team One +initially concentrated on building a solid supply +base prior to undertaking actual communications +operations. ARVN truck convoys brought the +preponderance of its supplies from Quang Tri over +Route 9, the old colonial road that snaked through +the Annamite Mountains into Laos. While Major +Gray and his men proceeded with this task, +Marine UH-34Ds from Da Nang helilifted an +ARVN infantry company onto Tiger Tooth +Mountain (Dong Voi Mep), a jungle-covered +mountain located eight miles north of the CIDG +Camp. With an elevation of 5,500 feet, Tiger Tooth +Mountain is the highest terrain feature in northern +I Corps. On 13 June U.S. Army UH-1B helicopters +lifted Major Gray, nine enlisted men, and several +thousand pounds of equipment into a tiny landing +zone which the South Vietnamese troops had +hacked out near the top of the rugged mountain. +The ARVN soldiers, who had established a rough +perimeter around a peak slightly below the mountain’s +highest point, were on hand to greet the +small group of Americans. After the initial helilift, +however, bad weather in the form of dense clouds +intervened to delay the remainder of the movement +for an entire week. SHUFLY helicopters finally +completed the mission on 21 June. When the +helilift concluded 73 Marines and roughly 100 +Vietnamese troops were strung around and across +a 5,000-foot peak just south of Tiger Tooth’s +highest elevation. Another 81 Leathernecks remained +at Khe Sanh to provide a pool from which +fresh security forces and radiomen could be drawn +when needed.</p> + +<p>MACV orders explicitly prohibited the Marines +on Tiger Tooth Mountain from patrolling or +engaging in any other activity which could have +been construed as offensive in nature. As a result +of this restriction, Major Gray’s men were confined +to defensive positions around the crude little +landing zone and the tents which housed the +radio equipment. Even so, life on the mountain +was extremely rigorous. The clouds which frequently +enshrouded the mountain top left the +Marines, their clothing, weapons, and equipment +constantly damp. High winds heightened +their discomfort. The local weather conditions +also made food and water deliveries to the position +hazardous and irregular. Marine UH-34Ds prepositioned +at Khe Sanh brought C rations and +water cans whenever the clouds revealed Tiger +Tooth’s higher elevations. Often, however, the +weather did not break for days. Normally the +men were limited to two canteens of water daily—a +restriction which made bathing and shaving impossible. +Because of the harsh living conditions +on the mountain, fresh security forces and radio<span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">141</span> +men were rotated from Khe Sanh at two week intervals, +weather permitting.</p> + +<figure id="ip_141" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 41em;"> + <img src="images/i_140.jpg" width="2576" height="1682" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +MARINE DETACHMENT<br> +ADVISORY TEAM ONE<br> +OPERATIONS IN I CTZ<br> + +MAY-AUGUST 1964<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Advisory Team One operated in the extreme +northwestern corner of the republic without +incident until the second week of July. Then +a severe storm struck its mountaintop base, +blowing away tents and antennae, collapsing +fighting positions, and generally disrupting operations. +Several nights later, on the 17th, a Viet +Cong force of undetermined size probed the Marine +sector of the perimeter. An intense exchange of +small arms and automatic weapons fire ensued for +nearly two hours. Although the Marines suffered +no casualties and could find no dead or wounded +Viet Cong the next day, it was apparent that their +location had been compromised.</p> + +<p>Amid reports of increasing Communist activity +throughout the area, MACV authorities in Saigon +promptly ordered Major Gray to withdraw his +force from Tiger Tooth Mountain. Fortunately +good weather permitted Marine helicopters from +Da Nang to helilift the men and their equipment +from the mountain to Khe Sanh the day after the +firefight. On the 22d, Air Force C-123 transports +airlifted the entire Marine detachment to Da +Nang. There Gray and his Marines crowded into +the old French compound occupied by the helicopter +task element. Although cramped, the +SHUFLY facilities provided welcome relief for +the men who had endured the rigors of Tiger +Tooth Mountain and Khe Sanh for nearly two +months.</p> + +<p>While at Da Nang, Major Gray detached a small +group of radiomen to Monkey Mountain, a rocky, +jungle-covered peninsula that jutted into the +South China Sea just northeast of the city. There +in relative comfort and safety, the technicians +conducted equipment tests for two weeks. Several +changes in the leadership and composition of the +advisory team took place during this interval. +Captain Raymond A. Becker, a communications +officer from the 1st Radio Company, FMFPac, +relieved Major Gray as the commander of the unit +on 13 August. Soon thereafter a reinforced infantry +company, Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, +commanded by Captain William R. Irwin, replaced +Lieutenant Otlowski and the Company G Marines +as the advisory team’s security element.</p> + +<p>Under Captain Becker’s command, Advisory +Team One redeployed, this time to Dong Bach Ma, +a 3,500-foot mountain located roughly 25 miles +west-northwest of Da Nang. An abandoned +French resort, still untouched by the war, sprawled +across the higher elevations of Bach Ma and a +hard surface road curved up its steep northern face +from Route 1. Using this road ARVN trucks +moved Captain Irwin and the infantry element to +the newly selected site in advance of the radio +personnel. Once atop the mountain, Irwin had his +men establish a perimeter around an abandoned +monastery. This accomplished, Marines cleared a +small helicopter landing zone near the old but well-preserved +religious building which was to serve +as their base of operations. On 19 August Marine +helicopters lifted Captain Becker, his communicators, +and some 4,000 pounds of equipment to +the site from Da Nang.</p> + +<p>Advisory Team One, relying heavily on Marine +helicopters for logistical support, operated without +incident from the quaint old monastery until the +second week of September. The composite unit +completed its operations at Bach Ma on the 10th +whereupon it returned to Da Nang. Within days +the detachment was disbanded without fanfare. +The radio experts returned to their parent commands +in Hawaii and Washington while Company +K was airlifted to Okinawa where it rejoined the +3d Battalion, 3d Marines. The quiet dissolution +of the Marine Detachment, Advisory Team One, +ended the first brief and little publicized chapter +of Marine ground unit operations in the Republic +of Vietnam.</p> + +<p>In October an element of the 3d Reconnaissance +Battalion, 3d Marine Division, operating from +ships of the Seventh Fleet, conducted an extensive +survey of Cam Ranh Bay in southern II Corps. +The purpose of its survey was to determine the +feasibility of establishing a naval facility. Marine +counterintelligence teams from FMFPac also were +temporarily assigned to MACV for 30-day periods +throughout the year. These officers and noncommissioned +officers normally augmented the U.S. +Army 704th Counterintelligence Unit during their +stay in Vietnam. Another group of Marines to +employ their skills in the counterinsurgency +environment was a small Special Operations Group +of six officers and 21 enlisted men. These Marines +conducted operations under the auspices of MACV.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">142</span></p> + +<p>A more permanent influx of Marines into the +war-torn republic occurred in the last quarter +of the year. In response to the intensified advisory +effort ordered by Secretary McNamara in July, +General Greene, the new Marine Commandant, +assured the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff +that the Marines could be expected to carry their +share of the increased burden. Shortly thereafter, +the Marine Corps was directed to provide 60 +officers and noncommissioned officers to serve as +advisors with ARVN units in I Corps Tactical +Zone. These orders, later described by Major +Damm, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor to +the VNMC as “very short fused ones,” were +executed without delay.<a id="FNanchor_151" href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">[10-9]</a> The 3d Marine Division +was given short notice to select suitable personnel +and to transfer them immediately to ComUSMACV. +In response to these instructions, the Okinawa-based +command quickly formed four advisory +teams, each composed of four men—a captain, +a first lieutenant, a gunnery sergeant, and a corporal +(who was to serve as the team’s radio operator). +Accompanied by Major John W. Walker, the +first increment of Marine advisors was airlifted to +Da Nang by KC-130 in mid-September.</p> + +<p>Upon reporting to the I Corps Senior U.S. +Advisor, Colonel Howard B. St. Clair, U.S. +Army, the four teams were broken up, the Marines +being assigned individually to battalions of the +1st and 2d ARVN Divisions. Major Walker +joined the I Corps advisory staff in Da Nang as +assistant operations officer. The balance of the 60 +new Marine advisors were formed into teams on +Okinawa and airlifted to Da Nang in the ensuing +weeks. By December the advisors, who had +initially been drawn from the 3d Marine Division, +were being replaced gradually by officers and +noncommissioned officers just beginning their +normal 12-month overseas tours.</p> + +<p>Two additional permanent Marine advisor +billets were also approved in the closing weeks of +1964. These were created within the Naval Advisory +Group to assist the Vietnamese Navy in +controlling one of South Vietnam’s most troublesome +areas—the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ). +Located southeast of Saigon on both sides of the +Long Tao River, the main ship channel to the +capital, the Rung Sat was a vast, difficult-to-penetrate, +mangrove swamp. Due largely to its +relative inaccessibility, the area had been developed +by the Viet Cong into a key base for +supporting their operations in the surrounding +provinces. More significantly, by early 1964 the +Communist-held Rung Sat posed a serious threat +to commercial ships bound for Saigon. For this +reason the responsibility for pacifying the area was +turned over to the Vietnamese Navy in April.</p> + +<p>Initially one Marine major, Edward J. Bronars, +was assigned to assist and advise the Vietnamese +Navy in its attempts to secure the Rung Sat. In +November, however, the RSSZ advisory staff was +reorganized to include one Marine captain and one +sergeant. Although they did not arrive for duty +until early the following year, the newly approved +billets created the third distinct group of +Marine ground advisors assigned to the Republic +of Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_152" href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">[10-10]</a></p> + +<p>The OJT program continued in effect for junior +Marine officers and staff noncommissioned officers +throughout 1964. Near the end of the year the +program was broadened somewhat to include +members of Hawaii-based Marine commands. Each +month 10 Leathernecks arrived at Da Nang to +begin their 30-day assignments. At SHUFLY headquarters +the visitors were briefed as a group before +being attached individually to specific South Vietnamese +units for the duration of their stay in +Vietnam. Normally, the officers and staff noncommissioned +officers joined a unit already being advised +by a U.S. Marine. When possible, the OJT +was assigned to a unit which could benefit from +his particular military and technical skills. Still, +the on-the-job-trainee was not always considered +an asset. “In honesty,” one permanent advisor to +the Vietnamese Marine Corps conceded, “OJTs +were a mixed blessing—they provided some help +but they also were an added responsibility for the +VNMC commander who was charged with their +safety.” “Some OJTs,” he added, “received misperceptions +of the capability of the Viet Cong +since their knowledge/experience was limited to +the events occurring during their brief 30-day +tour.”<a id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">[10-11]</a> Nevertheless, a significant number of +Marine small unit leaders were able to gain some +degree of first-hand experience in counter guerrilla<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">143</span> +warfare under the provisions on the OJT +program.<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[10-I]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="label">[10-I]</a> The 3d Marine Division’s OJT program did not end until +after elements of the division landed at Da Nang in March 1965. +The Marine Advisory Unit experimented successfully with +another form of augmentation in the first days of 1965. When +the Vietnamese Marines deployed to the Binh Gia area with a +provisional brigade in early January, Colonel Nesbit, who was +still serving as Senior Marine Advisor, requested additional +personnel to assist and advise at the staff level. FMFPac responded +by temporarily detaching eight officers and 11 enlisted men to +the advisory division. MACV provided two more Marine officers +and seven additional enlisted men, all of whom remained attached +to the Marine Advisory Unit for the duration of the operation. +The temporarily assigned Marines returned to their parent +organizations when the operation terminated. This is covered +in more detail in the 1965 account of U.S. Marine activities in +Vietnam.</p> + +</div> + +<p>A similar but shorter term program for field +grade officers and colonels, the Job Related Orientation +(JRO) Program, also took hold during the +early months of 1964. Instituted in the last half +of the previous year, the JRO program provided for +a small number of staff officers from the various +FMFPac commands to visit U.S. Headquarters +in Vietnam and Thailand for an eight-day period. +Small groups of these officers arrived at Da Nang +from Okinawa and, like the OJTs, were briefed by +the helicopter task element commander and his +staff. Later they were afforded an orientation flight +over the northern provinces. Next, the visiting +officers were flown to Saigon where they received +more briefings at MACV headquarters. In the +capital, where they were hosted by the Senior +Marine Advisor, they visited Vietnamese Marine +units and discussed tactics and problem areas with +the advisors. After four days in the Republic of +Vietnam the Marines travelled on to Bangkok +where they spent the balance of their visit. Upon +the conclusion of these JRO trips, each officer was +required to submit a detailed written report to the +Commanding General, FMFPac. In turn, extracts +of these reports were forwarded to the Commandant +of the Marine Corps in Washington.</p> + +<p>Generally these reports addressed tactical, operational, +logistics, and intelligence matters. But a +number of the Marine officers used the reporting +system to articulate their opinions relative to the +overall direction of the war. Colonel Warren P. +Baker, a member of the 3d Marine Division staff +who visited Vietnam in March, pointed out that +field advisors and MACV staff members differed +sharply in their personal assessments of progress +being made. The field advisors, Baker observed, +demonstrated far less optimism than did the staff +members. Furthermore, he reported that unless the +people of South Vietnam could be won over to the +government, the Viet Cong’s success could be +expected to continue.<a id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154" class="fnanchor">[10-12]</a> Another officer, Lieutenant +Colonel Harry E. Dickinson, summarized his +conclusions with an even more emphatic warning:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>The commitment of sizeable U.S. combat units should +not be effected except to protect the seat of government. +While local success might be achieved in certain areas, it +is extremely doubtful whether any lasting degree of success +would entail in the northern and western sections. As combat +units were increased, the forces of Vietnam would do less +and less with the inevitable conflict of overall command. The +end result would be the ringing of the country with combat +units but no solution for the internal conflict. I strongly +disagree that any two or three divisions could achieve real +victory as has been stated in the press.<a id="FNanchor_155" href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[10-13]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="in0">Through candid reporting of this nature, Marine +commanders from Okinawa to Washington were +kept abreast of the complex and difficult problems +being generated by the war in Southeast Asia.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">144</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_11"><span id="toclink_144"></span>CHAPTER 11<br> +<span class="subhead large">Spring and Summer Fighting</span><br> +<span class="subhead notbold"><i>The Monsoons—The Weather Breaks—Sure Wind 202—Operations +Elsewhere in I Corps—Changing the Watch</i></span></h2> +</div> + +<p>Commanded by Colonel Andre D. Gomez, the +strength of the Marine task element at Da Nang +stood at 450 officers and men as 1964 opened. +Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ HMM-361 continued +its assignment as the task element’s helicopter +squadron while Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy’s +204-man MABS-16 sub unit retained responsibility +for maintaining and operating the support facilities.</p> + +<p>Shortly after New Year’s Day, ComUSMACV +advised Colonel Gomez that the entire Marine +task element would be withdrawn from the +Republic of Vietnam during the first half of 1964. +This decision was one of CinCPac’s continuing +responses to the Defense Department plans for +reducing the level of direct American military +involvement in Vietnam. Additionally, Gomez +was informed that the task element would be +called upon to initiate a training program designed +to prepare Vietnamese Air Force pilots and mechanics +to operate and maintain the UH-34Ds. +This program was scheduled to culminate with the +takeover of the 24 Marine helicopters by a new +VNAF squadron on 30 June, and the subsequent +departure of the entire task element for Okinawa +where it would rejoin MAG-16, its parent +organization.<a id="FNanchor_156" href="#Footnote_156" class="fnanchor">[11-1]</a></p> + +<h3 id="toclink_144a"><i>The Monsoons</i></h3> + +<p>The new year broke with Marine flight operations +at Da Nang still proceeding at a reduced +rate due to the heavy monsoon weather. As had +been the case at the close of 1963, medical evacuation +and resupply missions continued to constitute +the major source of work for HMM-361’s crews. +The first Marine helicopter loss during 1964 occurred +during one such mission on 3 January when +an aircraft was shot down while attempting to +perform a medical evacuation about 30 miles due +west of Da Nang. Hit at least six times on its +descent toward the landing zone, the UH-34D +crashed into the jungle. Its crew miraculously +escaped injury and was rescued by another Marine +helicopter. The aircraft, damaged beyond repair, +was intentionally destroyed by U.S. Special +Forces personnel. This was only the second Marine +helicopter loss definitely attributed to Communist +fire since SHUFLY’s arrival at Soc Trang +nearly two years earlier.</p> + +<p>In the second week of January the weather over +the mountains west to Da Nang broke long enough +for Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ squadron to accomplish +a critical trooplift. On short notice the +Marines were ordered to remove a 200-man CIDG +force from the hills about 30 miles west-southwest +of Da Nang. Accompanied by a U.S. Army advisor, +the South Vietnamese unit had been conducting +a reconnaissance in force about eight miles west +of its camp at An Diem.<a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[11-A]</a> Under cover of the +monsoon clouds, which limited effective U.S. or +VNAF air support, Viet Cong elements of undetermined +strength had closed in on the government +force, threatening to isolate and destroy it before +the weather lifted.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="label">[11-A]</a> See <a href="#ip_82">map of outposts</a> in I CTZ, page 81.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The immediate nature of this particular mission +left little time for detailed planning and briefing. +I Corps headquarters could only advise the Marines +of such vital information as the unit’s radio call +sign, radio frequency, size, and location. To +familiarize himself with the terrain in the vicinity +of the pickup site, Lieutenant Colonel Ross first +made a reconnaissance flight to the area in an +O-1B. His reconnaissance revealed the landing +zone to be “a precarious hill top knob exposed to +a 360° field of fire,” Ross later recalled.<a id="FNanchor_157" href="#Footnote_157" class="fnanchor">[11-2]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">145</span></p> + +<p>The reconnaissance accomplished, the squadron +commander returned to Da Nang, exchanged the +O-1B for a UH-34D, and led a flight of 14 helicopters +to the pickup point. In accordance with the +squadron’s standing operating procedure, Ross, +the flight leader, was to land first, drop off a loadmaster, +and lift out the first Vietnamese heliteam. +Upon approaching the hilltop, however, the lead +helicopter was forced away by heavy small arms +fire which punctured the aft section of the aircraft’s +fuselage, wounding the loadmaster.</p> + +<p>The second aircraft, following at close interval, +was also hit. Lieutenant Colonel Ross then ordered +the entire formation into a holding pattern out of +small arms range while he attempted to persuade +the American advisor to move the Vietnamese +unit overland a short distance to a less exposed +landing zone beside a stream. This the U.S. advisor +was reluctant to do. “I was convinced,” +Ross concluded, “that his real concern was the +shattered morale of his ARVN troops and doubts +about being able to get them moving to the alternate +site.”<a id="FNanchor_158" href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[11-3]</a> After some delay the Vietnamese unit +finally moved to the new landing zone, whereupon +the Marines completed the troop lift. Still, the +helicopters were exposed to unnecessary risks.</p> + +<p>Understandably concerned with problems of +this nature which tended to plague all but the +larger preplanned operations, Lieutenant Colonel +Ross questioned the “ability of the advisors to +make operational decisions based upon considerations +beyond their own tactical problems.”<a id="FNanchor_159" href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">[11-4]</a> +In this particular case the selection of the exposed +hilltop landing zone tended to substantiate the +Marine commander’s complaints.</p> + +<figure id="ip_145" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_145.jpg" width="1914" height="1429" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Loadmaster directs a helicopter into a recently cleared landing zone. (<cite>USMC Photo A329576</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>During the second week of January, General +Greene, the newly appointed Commandant of the +Marine Corps, visited the Marine installation at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">146</span> +Da Nang. The Commandant conducted an inspection +of the compound and was briefed on operations +by Colonel Gomez and his staff. After presenting +combat decorations to several members of the task +element, Greene departed for Hawaii where he was +to visit the FMFPac headquarters.</p> + +<p>The Commandant summed up his impressions of +the Marine helicopter task element in testimony +before the House Committee on Armed Services +several weeks after his return to Washington. “I +was assured by General Harkins and his officers—and +by the officers of the supported Vietnamese +units—that this squadron has performed its supporting +mission in an outstanding manner,” related +Greene. “Everything that I observed,” he added, +“certainly attested to the high morale and effectiveness +of this unit.”<a id="FNanchor_160" href="#Footnote_160" class="fnanchor">[11-5]</a><a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">[11-A]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="label">[11-A]</a> A more frequent visitor to the Marine helicopter task element +was Colonel Anderson, the MAAG Chief of Staff. An experienced +aviator, Colonel Anderson had commanded a Marine bomber +squadron (VMB-443) in the latter stages of World War II. While +serving as the MAAG Chief of Staff during 1963 and 1964, +Anderson participated in a number of combat missions as a pilot +with the various squadrons assigned to SHUFLY.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Late January and early February saw the normal +rotation of several of the task element’s key +personnel as well as its helicopter squadron. On 14 +January, Colonel Robert A. Merchant, an officer +with a diverse military background, assumed +command of SHUFLY. Merchant had commanded +an artillery battalion on Okinawa in World War +II, a Marine attack squadron in Korea, and had +served on the joint staff of the Specified Commander +for the Middle East in Beirut during the 1958 +Lebanon Operation. More recently he had graduated +from the Industrial College of the Armed +Forces. Having flown with the task element’s +squadron while on temporary duty in Vietnam the +previous October and since his arrival in early +January, Merchant was thoroughly familiar with +SHUFLY’s operations.</p> + +<p>Command of the MABS-16 sub unit changed +hands two weeks later when Lieutenant Colonel +Samuel G. Beal relieved Lieutenant Colonel +Cassidy. Beal, also a veteran of World War II and +Korea, came from the 4th Marines in Hawaii where +he had served as that unit’s air liaison officer.</p> + +<p>Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ HMM-361 ended its +tour at Da Nang on 1 February. The squadron’s +arrival in I Corps unfortunately had coincided with +the arrival of the early monsoon rains. The unit’s +flight statistics had suffered also from the interruption +caused by the political infighting which had +deposed President Diem. As a result, its operations +never reached the sustained tempo which had +characterized the records of the Marine helicopter +squadrons previously assigned to SHUFLY. Lieutenant +Colonel Ross’ UH-34Ds totalled 4,236 +combat flight hours and just under 7,000 combat +sorties—figures which, considering the conditions +surrounding their accumulation, compared favorably +with the number of combat flight hours +(7,249) and sorties (11,900) averaged by the four +previous UH-34D squadrons to serve in Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_161" href="#Footnote_161" class="fnanchor">[11-6]</a></p> + +<p>HMM-364, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel +John H. La Voy, a pilot who had flown his first +combat helicopter missions during the Korean +War, initiated support operations from Da Nang +on 1 February. Under the existing plans to deactivate +the Marine task element, La Voy’s +squadron was scheduled to be the last Marine +helicopter unit to operate in South Vietnam. +As such, HMM-364’s pilots and maintenance +crews were to launch the training program that +would prepare the Vietnamese Air Force personnel +to take over the Marine helicopters upon the task +element’s departure from Da Nang.</p> + +<p>On 4 February the first class of eight Vietnamese +pilots began a 50-hour package of flight instruction +under the supervision of Lieutenant Colonel La +Voy’s pilots. Included in the course of instruction +were operational missions, night and instrument +flying, formation work, and landing practice. Each +student was already a qualified copilot with at +least 25 flight hours in VNAF UH-34s—a factor +which allowed the training to be conducted concurrently +with normal operations. This was accomplished +by having the Vietnamese trainees +fly as copilots with a Marine pilot on operational +flights. In addition to being an effective training +method this system had two other advantages. +First, it enabled the Vietnamese students to acquire +a first-hand knowledge of the helicopter tactics +most commonly used in the northern provinces. +Secondly, it allowed Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s +squadron to concentrate on its primary mission of +providing combat support for the ground forces +in I Corps.</p> + +<p>Another vital aspect of the training program +involved preparing Vietnamese ground personnel +to keep the squadron operational. This demanded<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">147</span> +extensive training of mechanics, crew chiefs, +engineering, supply, operations, and ordnance +personnel. “This additional duty,” Lieutenant +Colonel La Voy explained, “was a tremendous +burden on all departments of my squadron, whose +primary job was to keep aircraft in commission +and to conduct combat operations.” The language +barrier understandably threatened the success of +the overall training effort. In La Voy’s opinion, +however, “the eagerness of the students to learn +and the wealth of practical experience and varied +demonstrations” combined to help reduce problems +imposed by the language difference.<a id="FNanchor_162" href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[11-7]</a></p> + +<p>The progress of the program proved the concepts +sound. The first small group of student pilots was +graduated on 9 March despite numerous flight +cancellations due to bad weather during the +training period. Subsequent classes of VNAF +pilots continued to train with the Marine helicopter +task element throughout 1964. Eventually, a more +advanced training program would have the +Vietnamese pilots flying sections of two and four +helicopters as integral elements of larger Marine +helicopter operations.</p> + +<p>Although heavy monsoon clouds lingered over +I Corps throughout most of the month of March, +brief periods of good weather sometimes allowed +heliborne incursions into the mountainous areas. +One such period began on the 5th and lasted long +enough for Marine, Army, and VNAF helicopters +to lift a 54-man ARVN patrol from An Diem to a +landing zone near the Laotian border. During the +operation one escorting U.S. Army UH-1B gunship +accidentally struck a tree and was forced to land +in a nearby jungle clearing. Two Marine helicopters +quickly rescued the crew and weapons of the +downed UH-1B, but drew automatic weapons fire +in the process. That afternoon 15 Marine helicopters +and two armed UH-1Bs returned to the +crash site with 64 ARVN troops who established +a perimeter around the damaged helicopter after +being landed. A maintenance team then landed and +repaired the aircraft which subsequently was flown +back to Da Nang.</p> + +<p>Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s crews undertook +to correct several problems which they identified +during these initial combat operations. One was +the need for machine gun fire to protect the port +(left) side of the transport helicopters as they +approached contested landing zones. To fill this +requirement the squadron’s metalsmiths designed +and fabricated a flexible mount for an additional +M-60 machine gun. This new mount was designed +to allow the machine gun to be swung out a portside +window from the cabin. Placed on each of +HMM-364’s 24 helicopters, this modification +ultimately added a gunner to each crew and enabled +the Marines to deliver fire to either or both +sides of the aircraft during the critical landing +phase of helilifts.<a id="FNanchor_163" href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">[11-8]</a></p> + +<p>La Voy personally instituted another change +which made the coordination of trooplifts more +effective. Prior to HMM-364’s arrival in Vietnam, +different Marines had served as loadmasters for +each heliborne operation. While this system of +rotating the loadmaster assignment had stood the +test of numerous operations since its inception in +late 1962, La Voy believed that it could be improved. +Accordingly, he assigned one pilot and +two crew chiefs permanent additional responsibilities +as loadmasters. Thereafter, this three-man +team was responsible for coordinating loading and +unloading activities at pickup points and landing +zones for all troop lifts. Thus, through a relatively +minor adjustment, the Marines helped insure the +closer coordination of their helicopter operations +with ARVN ground forces.<a id="FNanchor_164" href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">[11-9]</a></p> + +<p>In early March hostile incidents around the Da +Nang air base increased dramatically. The incidents +usually took the form of sniper fire from the village +situated just across the perimeter fence from the +living compound. The primary target of the enemy +snipers seemed to be the task element’s electrical +generators whose high noise level prevented +sentries from determining the firing position. +Tensions heightened on the night of the 15th when +a terrorist hurled a gasoline-filled bottle into the +doorway of the staff noncommissioned officers +quarters. The crude bomb fortunately failed to +ignite. Several days later, however, a Marine in +the compound was wounded by sniper fire from +beyond the perimeter wire.</p> + +<p>These latest incidents led Colonel Merchant to +request that the security platoon from the 3d +Marine Division be redeployed to help protect the +base camp and flight line. This request was approved +by ComUSMACV and CGFMFPac without +delay. On 24 March a 53-man platoon from the +1st Battalion, 9th Marines arrived at Da Nang on a +Marine KC-130 and assumed responsibility for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">148</span> +security around the Marine compound and flight +line. Attached to the MABS-16 sub unit, the +infantry platoon freed Colonel Merchant’s aviation +personnel to devote full time to their primary +mission—providing helicopter support to I Corps. +Like its predecessor which had been withdrawn +only three months earlier, the new infantry unit +would assist with rescue operations in insecure +areas and on occasion would be called upon to +provide security around TAFDS bladders during +helicopter operations in more remote areas.</p> + +<figure id="ip_148" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 31em;"> + <img src="images/i_148.jpg" width="1921" height="1432" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>South Vietnamese troops unload ammunition from a UH-34D while a Marine loadmaster, braced against wheel and +wheel strut, exchanges information with the Leatherneck pilot. (<cite>USMC Photo A329570</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The same day that the platoon from the 3d +Marine Division arrived at Da Nang, a task element +Marine was involved in an act of heroism which +later earned him the Bronze Star Medal. While +escorting Marine helicopters on a resupply mission +about five miles west-northwest of Tam Ky, a +U.S. Army UH-1B gunship from Da Nang was +hit by Viet Cong fire and crashed in flames. Marine +Lance Corporal Walter L. Rupp, a volunteer +machine gunner on board the Army gunship, +acted rapidly to help secure the area despite +having suffered injuries in the crash. Manning +an M-60 machine gun, Rupp delivered fire on the +approaching enemy while the pilot, copilot, and +three other passengers were pulled from the +wreckage. All six American personnel, including +the injured Marine, were evacuated safely to Da +Nang, and then flown to the U.S. Army Field +Hospital at Nha Trang for more extensive medical +attention.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_148"><i>The Weather Breaks</i></h3> + +<p>Much of I Corps began experiencing improved +weather conditions during the first days of April. +Relying on helicopter support, the ARVN resumed +its offensives into the rugged mountainous regions.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">149</span> +On the 6th a combined Allied helicopter flight +lifted 42 ARVN soldiers from Tam Ky to a landing +zone about 18 miles directly west of Quang Ngai. +An Army UH-1B was shot down by Communist +fire during the operation. Shortly after the crash, +one of HMM-364’s helicopters landed to rescue +the crew and strip the weapons from the downed +aircraft. Marine mechanics then helped Army +aviation technicians disassemble the UH-1B whereupon +it was suspended beneath an Army UH-37 +(a twin-engine, piston-powered, heavy helicopter +manufactured by Sikorsky) in a specially designed +sling and helilifted back to Da Nang for repairs.</p> + +<p>Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s squadron suffered +its first combat aircraft loss on 14 April. The +incident occurred after one of HMM-364’s helicopters +was hit in the engine by Viet Cong fire +while attempting to evacuate wounded Vietnamese +infantrymen from a hillside landing zone +about 40 miles west of Da Nang near the Laotian +border. Struck while taking off, the UH-34D +plunged 150 feet down the steep hillside and +crashed through the jungle into a stream bed. +One Marine manning an M-60 machine gun suffered +a broken leg in the crash. The other crew members +and passengers, however, were able to carry him +up the hill to the ARVN landing zone. Heavy +thunder showers prevented rescue for two hours, +but the weather finally broke and the men were +helilifted to Da Nang. The aircraft was destroyed +the next day.</p> + +<p>Four days after this incident, HMM-364 committed +all available aircraft to a battalion-size +heliborne assault into rugged northwestern Thua +Thien Province. The ARVN’s objective was a +mountainous area on the northern rim of the +A Shau Valley, a 30-mile-long, two-mile-wide +trough whose location adjacent to the Laotian +border invited Communist infiltration. Although +enemy activity would eventually force the government +to abandon its string of outposts in the valley, +the issue of control of the area was still unresolved +in early 1964.</p> + +<p>Colonel Merchant, as commander of the Aviation +Headquarters Operations Center for I Corps, +assigned 20 Marine UH-34Ds, four VNAF UH-34s, +five U.S. Army UH-1B gunships, and three Marine +O-1Bs to the operation which the ARVN code +named LAM SON 115. Additionally, 14 VNAF +T-28s, four A-1H Skyraiders, and two observation +aircraft were assigned by the Joint General Staff to +provide support for the helicopter assault. The +operation was to be controlled by Colonel Merchant +as the Tactical Air Commander Airborne (TACA) +from a U.S. Air Force U-10, whose radios would +permit the commander and his staff to communicate +with every aircraft participating in the effort. (The +Marine helicopters had UHF and VHF communications, +while the Marine observation aircraft used +UHF and FM. The Army UH-1Bs had UHF; the +VNAF transport helicopters also relied upon UHF +radios.)</p> + +<p>In addition to Merchant, the airborne control +staff from the ASOC included Lieutenant Colonel +William Montgomery, USAF, and a Vietnamese +officer. The Vietnamese representative was to +assist in clearing close air strikes with ARVN +ground forces and also was to help resolve any +language problems which developed.</p> + +<p>The one-day operation began early on 18 April +with Marine and VNAF transport helicopters +lifting 200 South Vietnamese soldiers from an +outpost in the northwestern portion of the A Shau +Valley into a rugged landing zone approximately +six miles further north. Later the same morning +300 more Vietnamese troops were helilifted from a +government outpost in the central portion of the +valley to a second landing zone situated six miles +north of the 200-man unit which had been flown +in earlier. HMM-364’s helicopters averaged almost +8 hours per aircraft while flying 160 total hours +in support of LAM SON 115. Only one Marine +UH-34D and one VNAF helicopter were hit by +enemy fire during the execution of the well-planned +and efficiently coordinated operation. No aircraft +were lost.</p> + +<p>Often the daily support flights proved more +hazardous then the large assault operations whose +details were planned in advance. An incident +that occurred on 21 April while a UH-34D was +evacuating a wounded South Vietnamese soldier +from the mountains 15 miles west of Tam Ky +confirmed the dangers inherent in such daily +operations. In an effort to lure the evacuation +helicopter within range of their weapons, the +Communists ignited a yellow smoke grenade in +a clearing close by the actual landing zone. The +pilot alertly identified the correct landing zone, +thereby foiling the enemy ruse.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">150</span></p> + +<figure id="ip_150" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_150.jpg" width="1867" height="2599" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +MAJOR MARINE HELICOPTER<br> +OPERATIONS FIRST HALF 1964<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">151</span></p> + +<figure id="ip_151" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_151.jpg" width="1904" height="1370" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>HMM-364 loadmaster directs loaded UH-34D into a hilltop landing zone during operations in I Corps. (<cite>USMC Photo +A329571</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Several days later, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s +Marines encountered an equally clever Viet Cong +tactic while performing another evacuation mission, +this time in support of a U.S. Special Forces +patrol 20 miles west of Thuong Duc. Army UH-1B +gunships made several low-level reconnaissance +passes over the pickup site while the UH-34D +pilot prepared to hoist the casualties through the +dense jungle. When the gunship crews reported +no enemy activity, the Marine pilot maneuvered +his aircraft into a hovering position above the +invisible patrol. At this juncture, well-concealed +Viet Cong began firing automatic weapons at the +hovering helicopter and forced it to seek safety +away from the pickup area. The escorting gunships +then wheeled in from above, returning the Viet +Cong’s fire with rockets and machine guns. The +enemy promptly ceased firing, whereupon the +Marine helicopter again maneuvered into position +above the patrol. Again the enemy challenged +the aircraft with fire, this time striking it in the +rear portion of the fuselage. Although no serious +damage was done, the evacuation helicopter was +again forced away from the patrol’s position.</p> + +<p>The UH-1Bs once more placed suppressive fire +on the enemy position, finally allowing a second +Marine helicopter to hoist the wounded man +through the trees. A new burst of enemy fire, +however, interrupted a subsequent effort to retrieve +the body of a dead patrol member. An +HMM-364 helicopter returned to the area the +following day and completed the evacuation.</p> + +<p>Although neither resulted in U.S. or VNAF +aircraft losses, the incidents of 21 and 24 April +confirmed that the Viet Cong was devising new +methods with which to counter the Allies’ helicopters. +His use of false smoke signals and his +persistent refusal to compromise his position by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">152</span> +firing on the faster, more heavily armed U.S. +gunships represented crude but effective additions +to his expanding repertoire of counter-helicopter +tactics. Although unappreciated by the Leatherneck +crews, the enemy’s most recent flurry of +actions had no lasting effect on the overall pattern +of helicopter operations.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_152"><i>Sure Wind 202</i></h3> + +<p>In late April Colonel Merchant’s Marines joined +with VNAF and U.S. Army elements to launch +what would be the costliest and most viciously +opposed heliborne assault attempted in South +Vietnam during the 1962–1965 period. On the 26th, +Merchant, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy, and +Lieutenant Colonel George Brigham, the task +element operations officer, flew to Quang Ngai and +Pleiku to participate in the final stages of planning +for a multi-battalion heliborne offensive into the +Do Xa area, the mountainous Viet Cong stronghold +located along the northern border of II +Corps. At Quang Ngai officials from the II +Corps headquarters had already completed the +general plans for Operation SURE WIND 202 +(Vietnamese code name: QUYET THANG 202), +the size of which demanded the use of all transport +helicopters available in both I and II Corps. The +Marine representatives learned that HMM-364’s +role in the upcoming operation would be to helilift +a 420-man South Vietnamese battalion from the +Quang Ngai airfield to Landing Zone BRAVO, +an objective located about 30 miles due west of the +pickup point. Simultaneous with this assault, a +U.S. Army helicopter company based at Pleiku +was scheduled to transport two ARVN battalions +(960 troops) from Gi Lang, an outpost located 24 +miles west-southwest of Quang Ngai, to a second +landing zone about eight miles west-southwest +of Landing Zone BRAVO. The operation was to +begin on the morning of 27 April, with the first +assault waves scheduled to land at 0930.</p> + +<p>Due to the distance between the mountainous +landing zones and because two different helicopter +units would be conducting the respective trooplifts, +the operation plan treated the two assaults +as separate operations. A U.S. Air Force U-10 aircraft +had been assigned to carry Colonel Merchant, +the TACA, and other ASOC representatives who +would coordinate the helilift into Landing Zone +BRAVO. Twenty Vietnamese A-1H Skyraiders +had been assigned to provide tactical air support +for the Marine portion of the operation. Twelve +of these attack aircraft were scheduled to conduct +preparatory strikes on and around the landing +zones, four were to orbit above the area after the +helicopter landing began, and the remaining four +were to be positioned on airstrip alert at Da Nang. +Five Army UH-1B gunships were assigned to +escort the Marine UH-34Ds to and from the landing +zone.</p> + +<p>The preparatory air strikes around Landing Zone +BRAVO began as the first ARVN heliteams boarded +the 19 Marine and two VNAF helicopters at +Quang Ngai. Following the VNAF’s air strikes, +the escorting Army gunships swept in for a prelanding +reconnaissance of the zone. They were +met by fire from Viet Cong .50 and .30 caliber +machine guns. The gunships countered with repeated +rocket and machine gun attacks on those +enemy positions that could be located but were +unable to silence the Communist weapons. Meanwhile, +the loaded Marine and VNAF helicopters +cleared Quang Ngai and were closing on the +objective. After the UH-1Bs expended their +entire ordnance load and most of their fuel in +attempts to neutralize enemy fire, Colonel Merchant +ordered all helicopters, transports and gunships +alike, back to Quang Ngai to rearm and refuel.</p> + +<p>With the transports and gunships enroute to +Quang Ngai, the ASOC summoned the on-call +VNAF A-1Hs to attack the Viet Cong positions. +During ensuing strikes one Skyraider was +damaged severely by .50 caliber machine gun fire. +The Vietnamese pilot turned his smoking aircraft +eastward in an unsuccessful effort to nurse it to +the Quang Ngai airstrip. The attack bomber +crashed less than one mile from the west end of +the small airstrip.</p> + +<p>The A-1H air strikes on and around Landing +Zone BRAVO continued until 1225. Shortly after +the strikes ceased Colonel Merchant ordered the +first wave of transport helicopters to land the +ARVN assault force. Escorting UH-1Bs were still +drawing fire as the first flight of three UH-34Ds +approached the contested landing zone. This time, +however, the Marine and VNAF pilots were not +deterred. The first UH-34Ds touched down at 1230 +with their machine gunners pouring streams of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">153</span> +orange tracers into the surrounding jungle. Despite +the high volume of suppressive fire, several helicopters +in the first wave sustained hits from Viet +Cong automatic weapons. One, damaged critically, +crashed in the landing zone. Its crew members, all +of whom escaped injury, were picked up by another +Marine helicopter, piloted by Major John R. +Braddon, which had been designated as the search +and rescue aircraft for the operation. Another +UH-34D with battle damage proceeded to the +outpost from which the Army helicopter missions +were originating and made an emergency landing.</p> + +<figure id="ip_153" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_153.jpg" width="1908" height="1430" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>A formation of Marine UH-34Ds lift South Vietnamese troops into mountains southwest of Da Nang. (<cite>USMC Photo +A329574</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The second assault wave was delayed while +VNAF Skyraiders renewed their efforts to dislodge +the enemy from his positions around the embattled +landing zone. The helilift resumed at 1355 in the +face of reduced but stubborn Communist resistance. +During this phase of the troop lift, one VNAF and +several Marine helicopters were hit by enemy .50 +caliber fire. The Vietnamese aircraft, which lost +its tail rotor controls, spun sharply while trying +to take off and crashed near the center of the zone. +Its crew members escaped injury and were picked +up by Major Braddon’s rescue helicopter.<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[11-B]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="label">[11-B]</a> For his role in the two successful rescue attempts, Braddon +was awarded the Silver Star Medal.</p> + +</div> + +<p>After this incident, as the South Vietnamese +soldiers began fanning out from the landing zone +and forcing the Communist gunners to withdraw +deeper into the jungle, the landing proceeded +somewhat faster. The fourth and final assault lift +of the day was executed at 1730, after which 357 +of the 420 ARVN troops had been transported into +Landing Zone BRAVO. During the first day of the +operation, 15 of the 19 participating Marine +UH-34Ds were hit. Only 11 Marine and VNAF<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">154</span> +helicopters originally assigned to support the +operation remained airworthy.</p> + +<figure id="ip_154" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 20em;"> + <img src="images/i_154.jpg" width="944" height="1026" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>At the loadmaster’s direction, a Marine UH-34D waits +in a crude landing zone as an unidentified U.S. advisor +and two Vietnamese soldiers unload supplies. Other +ARVN troops provide security. (<cite>USMC Photo A329572</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The heliborne assault portion of SURE WIND +202 was completed the next morning. Fourteen +UH-34Ds from HMM-364, several of which had +been repaired during the night, and four Army +UH-1Bs lifted the remainder of the South Vietnamese +battalion into the landing zone. By then +the intensity of the enemy action in the surrounding +hills had diminished greatly. Only one Marine +helicopter was hit and it suffered only minor +damage. Upon finishing their tasks, HMM-364’s +aircraft proceeded to Gi Lang, the outpost from +which the Army helicopter company was operating, +to help it complete its portion of the assault +lift.</p> + +<p>Aircraft losses for the operation continued to +accumulate on the second day when a Marine +UH-34D was caught in the rotor wash of other +landing helicopters and crashed while approaching +the runway at Quang Ngai. The aircraft plummeted +into an irrigation canal adjacent to the airstrip, +rolled over onto its side, and completely submerged. +The crewmen managed to climb to safety +but the helicopter was a total loss.</p> + +<p>On 29 April, three UH-34Ds flew a maintenance-inspection +team and a Marine security squad +from Da Nang into Landing Zone BRAVO to +assess the damage suffered by the two helicopters +which had been shot down on the first day of SURE +WIND 202. The inspection team found that four +bullets had struck the Marine aircraft. The VNAF +aircraft, on the other hand, was riddled by nearly +30 bullets, including a .50 caliber round that had +severed the tail rotor control cable. The inspection +team concluded that both helicopters were damaged +beyond repair and proceeded to destroy them +where they had fallen.</p> + +<p>Originally, MACV and II Corps planners had +anticipated that the Marine helicopters would +not be required to support SURE WIND 202 +beyond the initial assault. It soon became apparent, +however, that the daily helicopter requirements +for the operation would exceed the +aviation assets available in II Corps. The American +command in Saigon, therefore, directed Colonel +Merchant’s task element to continue providing +support for the duration of the offensive. Accordingly, +the task element commander assigned a +liaison officer to the 2d ARVN Division headquarters. +This officer was tasked with coordinating +daily aircraft requirements. When SURE +WIND 202 finally ended on 25 May, HMM-364’s +crews had contributed 983 sorties and 800 flight +hours to the South Vietnamese effort in northwestern +II Corps.<a id="FNanchor_165" href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">[11-10]</a></p> + +<h3 id="toclink_154"><i>Operations Elsewhere in I Corps</i></h3> + +<p>While some of HMM-364’s crews continued +flying support missions from Quang Ngai, others +conducted a critical operation in western I Corps. +The mission, which already had been delayed five +days because of the Marines’ extensive commitment +during the early stages of SURE WIND 202, was +executed on 30 April. It involved 17 Marine +UH-34Ds, four Army UH-1Bs (two transports +and two gunships), two Marine O-1Bs, two VNAF +Skyraiders, and one South Vietnamese observation +aircraft. Their assignment was to evacuate a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">155</span> +78-man ARVN patrol which had been under +frequent enemy fire for six days in the rugged +jungle about 42 miles west of Da Nang. The +transport helicopters encountered almost continuous +small arms fire during the landing and +subsequent evacuation. One Marine helicopter +carrying a crew of four Marines and five ARVN +passengers was shot down while climbing away +from the contested landing zone. The pilot made +a forced landing in a nearby clearing and the nine +men were evacuated under fire by other UH-34Ds. +Despite the hazardous nature of the mission, the +entire South Vietnamese patrol was removed to +the safety of Nam Dong, a well-defended Special +Forces camp located in a valley 34 miles west of +Da Nang.</p> + +<p>Acts of heroism were commonplace during the +30 April evacuation. One Marine copilot assumed +control of his severely damaged helicopter and +flew it to Nam Dong after the pilot and crew chief +had been wounded. Staff Sergeant John C. Thompson, +who served as one of the loadmasters for the +operation, was later awarded the Navy Cross for +his role in the action. Having arrived in the landing +zone aboard the first transport helicopter, the +Marine noncommissioned officer exposed himself +to Viet Cong fire almost continuously while +supervising the loading of each aircraft. After the +last five South Vietnamese troops had boarded the +final helicopter, Thompson shouted to its pilot +that he would remain on the ground to provide +covering fire while the aircraft took off. But the +pilot ordered Staff Sergeant Thompson on board and +then succeeded in maneuvering the heavily loaded +UH-34D out of the empty landing zone.</p> + +<p>By late May it had become apparent to U.S. +military authorities in South Vietnam that the +demand for American transport helicopters in I +Corps would continue beyond the 30 June date +which had been set earlier for SHUFLY’s departure. +General Westmoreland, therefore, proposed to the +Commander in Chief, Pacific, that the Marine unit +be retained at Da Nang indefinitely. He further +recommended that HMM-364 turn over its helicopters +and maintenance equipment to the Vietnamese +Air Force on 30 June as scheduled, and +that the unit be replaced by another Marine +UH-34D squadron. These recommendations were +forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who approved +them on 10 June. In response, the Marine +Corps began immediate preparations to deploy a +new, fully equipped, medium helicopter squadron +to Da Nang.</p> + +<p>HMM-364 began its final month in Vietnam by +supporting another heliborne assault into II Corps. +This time the Marines teamed with the U.S. +Army’s 52d Aviation Battalion to lift an ARVN +battalion from Dak To, a town situated in western +Kontum Province, to an objective in the Do Xa base +area. To support the operation, which was code +named SURE WIND 303, Lieutenant Colonel La +Voy’s crews positioned a TAFDS fuel bladder at the +Dak To airstrip on 1 June. Two days later, 15 Marine +UH-34Ds contributed 180 sorties to the assault +phase of the new government operation. No battle +damage was recorded by Marine aircraft during +this latest incursion into northern II Corps.</p> + +<p>The Marine task element’s responsibilities were +expanded slightly in the first week of June when +MACV directed Colonel Merchant to provide +search and rescue (SAR) support for U.S. aerial +reconnaissance operations which had begun over +Laos and North Vietnam. After 7 June at least two +UH-34Ds (one section) were positioned together +either at Quang Tri or at Khe Sanh, ready to +conduct SAR missions for downed American and +VNAF pilots. While based at Khe Sanh the helicopters +were also used to support Advisory Team +One on Tiger Tooth Mountain. At Quang Tri the +SAR helicopters operated from a clearing adjacent +to a local soccer field. Years later, Marine pilots +who had stood the SAR duty there would recall +the incongruous sight of small Vietnamese boys +playfully pursuing their soccer games alongside +parked combat aircraft and a TAFDS bladder.</p> + +<p>In addition to normal support operations, +HMM-364’s pilots devoted much of the second +week of June to a search for Privates First Class +Fred T. Schrenkengost and Robert L. Greer, two +MABS-16 Marines who had disappeared from the +Da Nang compound on 7 June. Intelligence reports +indicated that both men had been captured by +Communist guerrillas about five miles south of the +airfield while sight-seeing on rented motor bikes. +The aerial search produced no signs of the missing +enlisted men but reliable Vietnamese sources +reported that the Viet Cong had displayed them +in several villages. The task element commander +finally called off the fruitless search on 15 June, a +full week after it had begun. Ground efforts by the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">156</span> +South Vietnamese to locate the men continued but +were also futile. The two Marines were never +found.<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[11-C]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="label">[11-C]</a> The status of PFC Fred T. Schrenkengost was changed from +missing in action to killed in action, body not recovered, on +23 July 1974. The status of PFC Robert L. Greer was likewise +changed on 14 November 1975.</p> + +</div> + +<p>While the aerial search south of Da Nang was +in its final stages, HMM-364 suffered its last +aircraft loss in Vietnam when a helicopter crashed +while carrying supplies from Khe Sanh to Major +Gray’s Advisory Team One on Tiger Tooth Mountain. +The accident occurred on 13 June when a +UH-34D was caught in severe down drafts while +attempting to land in the small landing zone near +the top of the jagged 5,000-foot-high peak. The +crew and passengers luckily escaped injury and +were rescued but the aircraft was damaged too +extensively to be repaired. Marines stripped the +UH-34D of radios and machine guns and then +burned the hulk.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_156"><i>Changing the Watch</i></h3> + +<p>On 16 June, three days after the crash on Tiger +Tooth Mountain, Lieutenant Colonel La Voy’s +unit ceased its operations and began preparations +for turning over its helicopters and equipment to +the Vietnamese Air Force. The Marines spent +three days removing the automatic stabilization +equipment (the helicopter’s equivalent of an +automatic pilot) and the USMC identification +from the 24 UH-34Ds. While HMM-364’s men +accomplished the necessary last-minute preparations, +pilots from a new Marine medium helicopter +squadron, HMM-162, began flying their +UH-34Ds ashore from the LPH-8, USS <i>Valley +Forge</i>. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver +W. Curtis, an Oklahoman who held four Distinguished +Flying Crosses for air actions fought +during World War II and Korea, HMM-162 was +the first Marine squadron since Lieutenant Colonel +Clapp’s to deploy to Vietnam with its complement +of aircraft and maintenance equipment. With +HMM-162’s arrival, elements of Lieutenant +Colonel La Voy’s unit began departing for Okinawa +on board refueler-transport aircraft from VMGR-152. +Also on board one of the KC-130s bound for +Okinawa was Lieutenant Colonel Beal, who +relinquished command of the MABS-16 sub unit to +Major Marion R. Green on the last day of June.</p> + +<p>The newly commissioned VNAF 217th Squadron +informally accepted the aircraft from HMM-364 +on 19 June. Formal acceptance occurred 10 days +later with Major General Paul J. Fontana, the +commanding general of the 1st Marine Aircraft +Wing, attending a ceremony presided over by the +I Corps commanding general. Following the +exchange of equipment, the Vietnamese officials +presented various orders of the Cross of Valor, +their nation’s second highest decoration, to Marine +pilots who had distinguished themselves during +Operation SURE WIND 202. Vice Air Marshal +Nguyen Cao Ky, commanding general of the Vietnamese +Air Force, then presented Vietnamese +pilot wings to Colonel Merchant, Lieutenant +Colonel La Voy, and to each Marine instructor-pilot +who had participated in the helicopter pilot +training program. HMM-364’s tour in South +Vietnam ended officially on 30 June when the last +of its members boarded KC-130’s bound for +Okinawa. Since initiating combat flight operations +in February, the squadron’s helicopters had logged +2,665 combat sorties and 2,365 combat hours. +Another statistic underscored the intensity of the +actions in which the unit had participated. Well +over half of the squadron’s 24 helicopters had been +damaged by enemy fire during its five-month +deployment in Vietnam.<a id="FNanchor_166" href="#Footnote_166" class="fnanchor">[11-11]</a></p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">157</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_12"><span id="toclink_157"></span>CHAPTER 12<br> +<span class="subhead large">Fall and Winter Operations</span><br> +<span class="subhead notbold"><i>Dry Weather Fighting—Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations—Changes +and Improvements—Action as the Year Ends</i></span></h2> +</div> + +<h3 id="toclink_157a"><i>Dry Weather Fighting</i></h3> + +<p>The military situation in I Corps remained +essentially unchanged as HMM-162 began its +assignment with SHUFLY. Hot, dry weather, +with its promise of near perfect flying conditions +and spirited fighting, continued over the mountainous +northern provinces.</p> + +<p>After a series of orientation briefings and familiarization +flights, Lieutenant Colonel Curtis’ squadron +initiated support operations in the closing +days of June. HMM-162’s first real taste of action +came on the last day of the month when six UH-34Ds, +escorted by two armed U.S. Army UH-1Bs, +attempted to resupply ARVN troops operating in +the hills nine miles west of Tam Ky. While trying +to locate a Communist position which was firing +on the resupply aircraft, one of the gunships was +hit and crashed in flames. Two transport helicopters +landed immediately to rescue the crew. +The Marines pulled three of the four injured men +from the wreckage before being driven away from +the scene by approaching guerrillas. During takeoff, +one UH-34D was struck by ground fire but was +able to continue its flight to Da Nang. The wounded +copilot of the downed Army aircraft died while enroute +to the dispensary, but the injured pilot +survived and later was evacuated to the Nha +Trang Field Hospital. The heat from the still-smoldering +aircraft hulk prevented a second attempt +to extricate the body of the fourth soldier +later in the day. It was finally recovered on 1 July.</p> + +<p>The squadron’s first critical troop lift came +within days of its initial action when the task +element was called upon to helilift urgently needed +reinforcements to the Nam Dong CIDG camp +which had come under heavy Communist attack. +Situated in south central Thua Thien Province +at a point where two prominent mountain valleys +converge, Nam Dong held special strategic appeal +to both sides engaged in the struggle for South +Vietnam. It sat astride natural infiltration routes +from Laos into the lowlands around Da Nang and +Phu Bai and also protected some 5,000 Montagnard +tribesmen who occupied a string of villages along +the valley floor. The camp and the villages were +defended by only a handful of U.S. Special Forces +personnel and three CIDG companies, none of +which could muster more than 90 men. Its status +as a thorn in the enemy’s side, its relative isolation, +and its proximity to Communist base areas along +the Laotian border, combined to make the outpost +a particularly lucrative target for the Viet Cong.</p> + +<p>Nam Dong’s hour of crisis came shortly after +midnight on 7 July when the Communists launched +a large-scale ground assault against the barbed +wire-enclosed main camp. Shortly after 0400, with +his position holding out against heavy mortar and +machine gun fire, Captain Roger H. Donlon, the +Special Forces officer in charge, radioed for assistance. +Two hours later, six Marine helicopters, +loaded with U.S. Special Forces and South Vietnamese +personnel, launched from Da Nang for the +beleaguered little fortress. Colonel Merchant, flying +an O-1B, led the transport helicopters to the +objective area while two U.S. Army UH-1B gunships +provided escort. Meanwhile, two other +HMM-162 helicopters launched for An Diem carrying +U.S. Special Forces officers with instructions to +assemble a company-sized reaction force for commitment +to Nam Dong.</p> + +<p>Intense enemy mortar and ground fire at Nam +Dong initially prevented the six UH-34Ds from +landing the reinforcements, whereupon Colonel +Merchant and the flight returned to Da Nang +for fuel. At the airfield the task element commander<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">158</span> +briefed VNAF A-1H Skyraider pilots and +the crew of a Marine O-1B on the battlefield +situation. He took off again at 0910, this time to +act as TACA in an Air Force U-10. Meanwhile, a +U.S. Army CV-2 Caribou (a twin-engine, fixed-wing +light transport) had managed to airdrop +small arms ammunition to Donlon and the embattled +defenders. Following this emergency resupply, +air strikes were conducted on the hills to +the south and west of the outpost, causing enemy +ground fire to diminish somewhat. At 0945, a +flight of 18 Marine helicopters, led by Lieutenant +Colonel Curtis and escorted by four UH-1B gunships +and two VNAF Skyraiders, began landing +a 93-man relief force which had been collected +earlier from Da Nang and An Diem. Evacuation +of the dead and wounded began immediately. +At 1545, a flight of 10 UH-34Ds lifted 9,500 +pounds of ammunition, medical supplies, radios, +and miscellaneous equipment to Nam Dong. Six +passengers, five wounded Vietnamese, and eight +more bodies were evacuated to Da Nang on the +return trip. By then, the battle was finished. Two +Americans, one Australian advisor, and 55 South +Vietnamese had been killed. Captain Donlon, who +earned the first Medal of Honor awarded for action +in Vietnam, and 64 other defenders had been +wounded. The Viet Cong, who had failed to +eliminate the Nam Dong outpost, left 62 bodies on +the battlefield.<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[12-A]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="label">[12-A]</a> For a more detailed account of the battle for Nam Dong, +see Donlon, <cite>Outpost of Freedom</cite>.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Four days after the battle for Nam Dong, Colonel +Merchant’s tour in Vietnam ended. He returned to +Okinawa to assume command of Marine Aircraft +Group 16 whereupon Colonel Hardy (“Tex”) Hay, +a 1940 graduate of Texas A&M, assumed command +of Task Element 79.3.3.6.<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[12-B]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="label">[12-B]</a> For his role as Task Element Commander, ARVN I Corps +Aviation Headquarters Commander, and Senior U.S. Aviation +Advisor to I Corps, Colonel Merchant was later awarded the +Legion of Merit with Combat “V.” He was also decorated with +two Vietnamese Crosses of Valor—one for SURE WIND 202 +and the other for the relief of Nam Dong.</p> + +</div> + +<p>Normal flight operations continued during the +remainder of July with no major heliborne assaults +conducted and no Marine aircraft lost. These +operations, however, did not lack excitement. +Supporting the Marine and ARVN forces on Tiger +Tooth Mountain proved extremely hazardous as +the HMM-162 crews soon came to realize. On +11 July, for example, the mountain nearly claimed +one of their helicopters when a UH-34D lost +power as a result of the extreme altitude while +delivering supplies to Advisory Team One. As the +aircraft plummeted into the hillside landing zone, +its tail pylon struck the vegetation around the +edge of the tiny clearing causing some structural +damage. Fortunately, the damage was such that the +crewmen were able to make emergency repairs +while Major Gray’s men provided security around +the aircraft. This accomplished, the crew returned +their damaged helicopter to Khe Sanh without +further incident.</p> + +<p>Daily operations continued to produce action +for the newly arrived squadron as July wore on. +On the 15th a UH-34D was hit by Viet Cong fire +while performing a routine resupply mission south +of Da Nang. Again, damage was only minor and the +aircraft continued its mission. Support for Tiger +Tooth Mountain dominated SHUFLY’s operations +on the 18th after MACV officials ordered Major +Gray’s Advisory Team One withdrawn to safety. +Colonel Hay directed HMM-162 to commit all +available aircraft in order to complete the withdrawal +as rapidly as possible. Good weather and +flying expertise helped the helicopter crews transport +the entire Marine force (92 men) and over +21,000 pounds of equipment to Khe Sanh before +nightfall on the 19th.</p> + +<p>In a simultaneous but unrelated development, +HMM-162 was called upon to detach four helicopters +to Udorn, Thailand, for temporary duty. +These aircraft and crews were assigned to assist +with search and rescue operations in support of +ongoing U.S. aerial reconnaissance efforts in that +area.</p> + +<p>In early August, the heightened international +tensions which accompanied the Gulf of Tonkin +crisis prompted General Westmoreland to order all +American military installations throughout South +Vietnam to brace for possible enemy attacks. +Colonel Hay responded to ComUSMACV’s instructions +by placing his Marines on high alert +status for several weeks. The precautions were +relaxed gradually as the crisis eased and the +likelihood of a sudden Communist attack +diminished.</p> + +<p>The pattern of helicopter operations in the +northern provinces throughout the remainder of +the summer differed little from that which had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">159</span> +emerged earlier in the dry season. Medical evacuation +and resupply sorties continued to constitute +the majority of the task element’s support missions. +Generally, medical evacuation missions, many of +which were executed while Viet Cong and South +Vietnamese forces were engaged in combat, provided +the major source of action for Lieutenant +Colonel Curtis’ squadron during this period. On +6 August, for example, a UH-34D was hit by enemy +fire while its crew was evacuating ARVN casualties +from a landing zone along the Song Tra Bon. +Two days later, a second Marine helicopter was hit +during an attempt to evacuate dead and wounded +from the mountains about eight miles west of +Tam Ky. The following day, on 9 August, another +HMM-162 UH-34D drew fire while evacuating a +wounded U.S. advisor from a village on the coastal +plain 12 miles southeast of Tam Ky. In all three +incidents the aircraft received only minor damage +and were able to return safely to Da Nang.</p> + +<p>Although the medical evacuation missions +generally attracted more Viet Cong attention, +many resupply flights also proved hazardous. +Small landing zones, high elevations, and bad +weather often made even the most routine missions +difficult. HMM-162 lost a helicopter as a result +of a combination of two of these adverse conditions—extreme +elevation and a small landing zone—on +30 August. While resupplying a mountain-top +outpost five miles southwest of Nam Dong, the +UH-34D struck a tree at the edge of a tiny clearing +and crashed. The crew members were uninjured, +but the extent of the aircraft’s damage was too +great to permit repair. It was stripped of radios, +machine guns, machine gun mounts, and other +usable parts before being destroyed.</p> + +<p>In mid-August the Marines also lost their first +observation aircraft since deploying to Vietnam +in 1962 when an O-1B crashed after experiencing +mechanical failure. The incident occurred on the +15th while the pilot and observer were conducting +a reconnaissance of the northwestern corner of +Quang Ngai Province. Bad weather delayed rescue +attempts for over an hour, but the two injured +crewmen were finally recovered by helicopter and +flown to the Da Nang dispensary for treatment. +The pilot’s injuries were severe enough that he +was evacuated to the U.S. field hospital at Nha +Trang.</p> + +<p>The last major heliborne assault conducted in +extreme western I Corps during 1964 was initiated +in the first week of September. Eighteen Marine +UH-34Ds, four Army UH-1Bs, six VNAF Skyraiders, +two Marine O-1Bs, and two U.S. Air Force +liaison aircraft were assigned to support a 2d +ARVN Division heliborne offensive against Communist +infiltration routes in remote southwestern +Quang Nam Province. The operation, code named +CHINH BIEN, began on the morning of 4 September +when 15 HMM-162 helicopters (the other +three UH-34Ds participating in the operation were +serving as search and rescue aircraft) lifted the +first wave of South Vietnamese soldiers from Kham +Duc, a government-controlled town located 12 +miles from the Laotian border in northwestern +Quang Tin Province. Their objective was a landing +zone situated 24 miles northwest of the assembly +area in Quang Nam Province and only three miles +from the Laotian border. No enemy resistance was +encountered and the initial assault helilifts were +completed shortly after noon. Support for CHINH +BIEN continued the next morning. When the +helilifts were finally completed shortly before +1000, Marine UH-34Ds had flown 265 sorties for +180.2 flight hours in another effort to place ARVN +ground forces in remote areas of I Corps.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_159"><i>Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations</i></h3> + +<p>Adverse weather began influencing SHUFLY’s +operations a few days after CHINH BIEN ended. +On 14 September all flights were cancelled by rain +and high winds from Typhoon Violet, a severe +tropical storm. All aircraft remained grounded +until late afternoon of the next day when HMM-162 +helicopters conducted an emergency evacuation +of storm victims from Tam Ky which had been +hard hit by Violet. The typhoon caused some +minor damage to SHUFLY’s facilities when +electrical power was lost for a few hours. By the +morning of the 16th, power was restored and all +Marine operations returned to normal.</p> + +<p>Within a week, however, a more severe weather +disturbance—Typhoon Tilda—struck the coast +near Da Nang. On the morning of 21 September, in +the face of the approaching storm, Colonel Hay +ordered Lieutenant Colonel Curtis to displace his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">160</span> +squadron to Nha Trang in central II Corps. +Later in the day, the unit’s entire complement of +aircraft departed Da Nang on the 325-mile flight +to safety. The task element’s C-117D found refuge +at Saigon. HMM-162 remained at Nha Trang +until the 23d when it returned to I Corps.</p> + +<figure id="ip_160" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_160.jpg" width="1906" height="1248" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"><i>Marine helicopters enroute to an objective overfly the coastal plain south of Da Nang. (<cite>Official USMC Photo</cite>).</i> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Typhoon Tilda caused considerably more damage +to the Marine base of operations than had her +immediate forerunner. Most of the permanent +structures in the compound showed signs of water +damage and the electrical power was lost for an +entire week, except at the waterpoint and the mess +hall where a concerted repair effort restored power +promptly. Teletype communications circuits were +closed for a full week as a result of damage, and the +radio link with the 1st MAW was broken for +nearly two hours.</p> + +<p>While the Marines of the MABS-16 sub unit +concerned themselves with cleaning up the debris +and repairing their damaged facilities, HMM-162’s +crews resumed combat support operations. +On the afternoon of their return from Nha Trang, +a flight of UH-34Ds delivered 19 passengers and +4,000 pounds of cargo to Tien Phuoc, a government-controlled +town located seven miles west of Tam +Ky. The next day Major General Paul J. Fontana, +who as commanding general of the 1st Marine +Aircraft Wing was responsible for the administrative +and logistical support of the task element, +arrived at Da Nang for a one day visit to assess +the damage and to confer with Colonel Hay. +Flood relief missions and clean up activities +combined with normal flight operations to consume +the remainder of September.</p> + +<p>Two changes were made in the composition of +the Marine task element in late September and +early October. On 29 September, the security force +from the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines rotated back<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">161</span> +to its parent unit on Okinawa. It was replaced by +a 78-man element from Company E, 2d Battalion, +9th Marines the same day. Led by Second Lieutenant +Anthony A. Monroe, the newly arrived +Marines would provide protection for the aviation +unit until late November.</p> + +<p>The second alteration occurred about a week +later when HMM-162 was relieved on-station by +the officers and men of a fresh squadron. The +rotation of helicopter units was completed on +8 October when Lieutenant Colonel Curtis officially +signed over the aircraft and maintenance equipment +to the new squadron’s commanding officer. In a +three month deployment to the war zone HMM-162’s +helicopters had conducted approximately +6,600 sorties for a total of slightly over 4,400 +flight hours. Many of these sorties had been +missions of mercy flown in the wake of the typhoons +which had ravaged Vietnam’s northern +provinces. During three months of sustained +combat support activities, the squadron had lost +two UH-34Ds and one O-1B in operational +accidents.<a id="FNanchor_167" href="#Footnote_167" class="fnanchor">[12-1]</a></p> + +<p>The newly arrived squadron, HMM-365, was +commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Koler, +Jr., an experienced Marine officer who had begun +his career shortly after World War II as an infantry +platoon leader with the 1st Marine Division in +China. Under his leadership the squadron began +performing resupply missions the same day that +the last of HMM-162’s personnel departed Da +Nang. On their first day of operations, Koler’s +crews airlifted over 25,000 pounds of cargo to +various outposts around Da Nang. The following +day a flight of 12 HMM-365 helicopters provided +transportation for ARVN troops who were being +rotated between Kham Duc and A Roe, an isolated +outpost in southwestern Quang Nam Province +less than seven miles from the Laotian border. +On 11 October the newly arrived Marine pilots +and crews tasted their first actual combat when +eight UH-34Ds drew Viet Cong fire while landing +a 112-man Vietnamese unit in the hills 10 miles +west-southwest of Tam Ky.</p> + +<p>The day after its crews had witnessed their +first ground fire, Koler’s squadron lost its first +aircraft in Vietnam. The incident occurred in +western Quang Nam Province while a UH-34D +was attempting to take off from a South Vietnamese +landing zone located high in the mountains. +The crash, in which the pilot was slightly injured, +resulted from a loss of power due to the high +altitude. After the crew was evacuated, a maintenance +team salvaged the usable parts and destroyed +the aircraft.</p> + +<p>In mid-October Colonel Hay summarized the +situation in I Corps for his superiors at the 1st +Marine Aircraft Wing. The task element commander +was particularly concerned about a new +phase of Viet Cong activity which he saw developing +in the coastal lowlands of the northern +provinces. Although there were few visible signs +of either combat or enemy movement to confirm +the trend, intelligence sources indicated that Viet +Cong main force battalions in I Corps had increased +in number from nine to 11 in the past several +months. During this same period, the number of +local force Viet Cong companies in the area had +jumped by 50 percent to a total of 17. These growth +patterns, Colonel Hay noted, enabled the Communists +to tighten their grip on the civilian populace. +Likewise, they were responsible for increased +enemy harassment of lines of communications in +I Corps and posed a particular threat to Da Nang.<a id="FNanchor_168" href="#Footnote_168" class="fnanchor">[12-2]</a></p> + +<p>Colonel Hay’s tour as task element commander +ended on 17 October. After a brief change of +command ceremony during which he expressed +his appreciation to his subordinates for their +assistance, Hay departed for Okinawa to assume +command of MAG-16. His replacement at Da +Nang, Colonel John H. King, Jr., an officer who +had seen his first action as a fighter pilot during +World War II, was well prepared to direct the task +element’s operations. A recent graduate of the +National War College, King had commanded the +first operational Marine transport helicopter unit, +Marine Helicopter Squadron 161, during the +Korean War.</p> + +<p>HMM-365’s operations continued throughout +the remainder of October with only a few significant +actions reported. One of these was an abortive +medical evacuation mission attempted on 26 +October during which the squadron suffered its +first combat casualties. The incident, in which +both the copilot and crew chief were wounded by +Viet Cong small arms fire, occurred while the +helicopter was approaching a poorly protected +landing zone 10 miles southwest of Tam Ky. The +pilot managed to return the damaged helicopter +to Tam Ky and land safely, whereupon the seriously<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">162</span> +wounded copilot was evacuated to Nha +Trang and the crew chief was administered first +aid.</p> + +<p>In early November, at the height of the monsoon +season, Typhoon Iris struck the Annamese coast. +The tropical storm, whose full force was felt on +4 November, was followed by nearly a week of +continuous rain, wind, and fog. The conditions +caused flight operations to be suspended except +for emergency medical evacuations. When the +operations resumed on the 10th, the Marine Corps +birthday, the Leatherneck crews concentrated +on rescuing Vietnamese civilians from the inundated +coastal plains. Between 1700 and 1900 on +their first day of the flood relief operation, Lieutenant +Colonel Koler’s Marines rescued 144 flood +victims. These rescues, many of which were +accomplished by hoisting the Vietnamese from +precarious positions in trees or on roof tops were +complicated by sporadic Viet Cong harassing +fire. Many of the stranded civilians were evacuated +to the Da Nang airfield. Following emergency +medical treatment administered by Navy doctors +and hospitalmen, the civilians were given shelter +in the task unit hangar. Lieutenant Robert P. +Heim, the Navy chaplain assigned to SHUFLY +at the time, later praised the Marines who shared +their birthday cake with the homeless Vietnamese +that night.<a id="FNanchor_169" href="#Footnote_169" class="fnanchor">[12-3]</a> The next day, although poor visibility +continued to hamper flights, the Marines helilifted +1,136 more flood victims to safety. Again the +guerrillas harassed the rescue attempts with small +arms fire, this time hitting three of the participating +aircraft.</p> + +<p>The humanitarian operation continued until +16 November, when another typhoon—Kate—threatened +to make matters even worse. The +weather on the storm’s periphery forced the cancellation +of many Marine flights but the center of +the disturbance passed about 200 miles south of +Da Nang. The flooding which resulted from the +two back-to-back storms, however, demanded a +rescue effort beyond the capabilities of the Marine +and VNAF helicopter units located in I Corps. +Accordingly, the Special Landing Force (SLF) of +the U.S. Seventh Fleet joined the operations on 17 +November. Lieutenant Colonel Curtis’ HMM-162, +the helicopter element of the SLF, returned to its +former operations area and spent six days rescuing +flood victims. The Marines evacuated the most +seriously injured to the USS <i>Princeton</i> where they +received emergency treatment before being returned +to civilian hospitals. When the SLF departed +Vietnamese waters on 23 November, HMM-162’s +helicopters had flown over 600 hours and completed +1,020 sorties in support of the disaster +relief operations. Unfortunately, one UH-34D +was lost at sea in an operational accident on 21 +November while participating in these operations. +Two crewmen, Corporal Richard D. Slack, Jr. +and Lance Corporal David Nipper, died in the +crash.<a id="FNanchor_170" href="#Footnote_170" class="fnanchor">[12-4]</a></p> + +<p>With the SLF’s departure, the Marine task element +and the VNAF 217th Squadron reassumed +the full burden of rescue operations until they +were finally terminated on 10 December. During +this period HMM-365 was forced to divide its +flights judiciously between combat support and +missions of mercy.<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[12-C]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="label">[12-C]</a> The magnitude of the damage inflicted upon the inhabitants +of Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin Provinces by the +November storms is borne out by the following statistics. In +these three provinces over 50,600 houses were destroyed while +4,870 civilians were reported either dead or missing. Another +12,240 Vietnamese were forced to seek refuge at government +centers in the wake of the flood. (CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 17Oct64–14Jan65.)</p> + +</div> + +<h3 id="toclink_162"><i>Changes and Improvements</i></h3> + +<p>While some of Lieutenant Colonel Koler’s men +were employed in evacuating the flood-stricken +Vietnamese, others were modifying three of the +squadron’s helicopters to carry a new weapons +system which had been developed specifically for +use on the UH-34D. The TK-1, an externally +mounted combination of M-60 machine guns and +2.75-inch rocket launchers, was first used on 19 +November in support of a Tiger Flight mission +conducted just south of the Song Thu Bon about +17 miles from Da Nang. Two armed UH-34Ds +expended 90 rockets and 500 rounds of 7.62mm +ammunition on enemy positions during prelanding +strikes. The effectiveness of the new system could +not be determined after this particular strike, but +an estimated 10–15 Viet Cong were killed in a +similar action by the armed UH-34Ds the next +day. The transport aircraft armed with the TK-1 +would continue to escort troop carrying helicopters +regularly throughout the remainder of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">164</span> +year. At best, however, the TK-1 was of only +marginal value. The inherent limitations of the +UH-34D, which possessed neither the maneuverability +nor the speed to conduct truly effective +attacks, reduced the overall value of the system. +Because of these limitations the Marines seldom +relied solely on the UH-34D for fire suppression +during assault missions. The system would eventually +be phased out in 1965 with the arrival of +Marine jet attack squadrons in Vietnam.</p> + +<figure id="ip_164" class="figcenter" style="max-width: 30em;"> + <img src="images/i_163.jpg" width="1870" height="2593" alt=""> + <figcaption class="caption"> + +<p> +MAJOR MARINE HELICOPTER<br> +OPERATIONS SECOND HALF 1964<br> +</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Two improvements, one in the physical facilities +available to the task element and the other in the +size and composition of its security detachment, +were made shortly after the Marines began using +the UH-34Ds in the gunship role. On 25 November, +HMM-365 moved its aircraft and maintenance +equipment across the airfield into a newly constructed +hangar just west of the strip. The second +change took place the next day when the security +force from the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was +replaced by Company L, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, +reinforced with engineers, 81mm mortar teams, +and counter-mortar radar personnel. This adjustment +came in response to the reports of the growing +Viet Cong threat to Da Nang. Designated the +Security Detachment, Marine Unit Vietnam, the +255-man organization was under the command of +Major William F. Alsop, the battalion’s executive +officer. Captain John Sheridan, the company +commander, retained tactical control of the +infantry unit.</p> + +<p>Although responsibility for the overall defense +of the Da Nang airstrip still resided with the +ARVN, the enlarged security detachment greatly +strengthened the Marine defenses within the +installation. Major Alsop divided his reinforced +rifle company into two groups—one to protect +the living compound and the other to defend the +flight line and the new hangar. Around the living +compound the engineers constructed a complex of +machine gun positions, mortar pits, and ammunition +bunkers. A barricade was also erected at a +gate near the Marine compound which previously +had been open and manned only by Vietnamese +sentries. Strong defensive positions were also constructed +around the task element’s new hangar +and flight line. This network included fox holes, +barbed wire, and cleared fields of fire. As an added +precaution, Company L maintained a reaction force +at the living compound. This force was prepared +to board trucks and rush to reinforce the critical +defenses around the aircraft and maintenance +facilities in the event of an enemy ground attack.<a id="FNanchor_171" href="#Footnote_171" class="fnanchor">[12-5]</a></p> + +<p>Despite the stronger defenses and the presence +of the larger Marine infantry force, several security-related +problems were still unsolved. One which +remained outside of Colonel King’s influence was +the laxity of the ARVN sentries around the outer +perimeter who sometimes allowed Vietnamese +civilians to wander into the installation. Another +was that a small village close to the Marine +compound, but outside the perimeter fence, still +harbored an occasional sniper. The task element +commander had lodged repeated complaints about +both situations with the appropriate South +Vietnamese authorities but no action had been +taken to eliminate them. In spite of these minor +sources of irritation, the recent changes in its +defenses greatly enhanced the task element’s +ability to protect itself against Communist ground +attacks.</p> + +<h3 id="toclink_164"><i>Action as the Year Ends</i></h3> + +<p>While Company L was developing defensive +positions at the airbase, HMM-365’s crews continued +to provide support for both flood relief +and military operations throughout I Corps. On +7 December, 17 Marine helicopters and eight +Army UH-1B transports were called upon to help +trap a Viet Cong force known to be hiding in a +village less than five miles west of Da Nang. Code +named DA NANG SIX, the operation began at +daybreak when the American helicopters lifted +240 men of the 11th ARVN Ranger Battalion into +the objective area. Two UH-1B gunships teamed +with two armed UH-34Ds to suppress ground fire +that erupted as the first wave of transport aircraft +began their approach to the landing zone. One +Army gunship sustained minor damage when hit +three times during the exchange of fire. After the +enemy had been silenced, the landing proceeded +without incident and the Vietnamese rangers +quickly secured their objective. In the process, +nine Viet Cong were killed and four others captured +along with nine rifles and one automatic +weapon. Successful though it was, the action on +the outskirts of Da Nang confirmed previous reports +that the Communists were tightening their +grip on Quang Nam Province.<a id="FNanchor_172" href="#Footnote_172" class="fnanchor">[12-6]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">165</span></p> + +<p>Another indication of the enemy’s growing +strength in I Corps came only two days later when +a large Viet Cong force overran an ARVN outpost +four and a half miles southwest of Tam Ky. I +Corps Headquarters quickly drew up plans for a +multi-company search of the area even though the +Communists had withdrawn from the badly +damaged government position shortly after their +final assault. At 0845, 18 Marine UH-34Ds (three +armed) and four Army UH-1Bs (two armed) +helilifted a 208-man Tiger Force from Da Nang to +Tam Ky where it had orders to stage with other +units for the operation. While the U.S. helicopters +were in the process of transporting the Vietnamese +troops to Tam Ky, an aerial observer sighted a +large formation of Viet Cong moving southwest +from the scene of the previous night’s battle. The +observer immediately brought air strikes and artillery +fire to bear on the enemy, blocking his escape.</p> + +<p>Firepower contained the enemy throughout the +morning while the infantry units at Tam Ky +prepared to exploit the situation with a heliborne +assault. The helilift was launched at 1345. Enroute +to a landing zone, located six miles southwest +of Tam Ky, the helicopter formation passed over the +smoldering ruins of the ARVN outpost where +ammunition stockpiles were still exploding. Once +at the objective, the armed helicopters began delivering +suppressive fire into the surrounding hedge +rows and treelines as the troop carrying aircraft +approached the landing zone. Still, after nearly +six hours of air and artillery strikes, the Communist +force was able to oppose the landing with +intense small arms fire. No helicopters were hit +during the landing, however, and the assault force +managed to secure the landing zone. This accomplished, +two companies from the 11th ARVN +Ranger Battalion were helilifted into the position +without incident. After the final troop lifts, the +Marine transport helicopters began evacuating +casualties from the outpost where eight Vietnamese +soldiers and one American advisor had +died and 20 ARVN and an Australian advisor had +been wounded. The government’s response to the +enemy-initiated action, including air and artillery +strikes, accounted for 70 Viet Cong killed and 39 +weapons captured. While reflecting a moderate +success, these statistics were little compensation +for the knowledge that the Communists could +destroy a well-fortified position within five miles +of a provincial capital.<a id="FNanchor_173" href="#Footnote_173" class="fnanchor">[12-7]</a></p> + +<p>Weather caused many Marine flights to be +delayed and some to be cancelled during the closing +month of 1964. But the interruptions were not +frequent enough to prevent the task element +from fulfilling its support commitments. The +only type of support operation actually curtailed +due to the monsoons was the preplanned heliborne +assault into the mountains. Brief periods of favorable +weather usually enabled the Marine crews to +accomplish resupply and medical evacuation missions +even into the most remote areas of I Corps, although +delays of such flights were not uncommon.</p> + +<p>Lieutenant Colonel Koler’s HMM-365 was past +the midpoint of its assignment in Vietnam as 1964 +drew to a close. Through 31 December the unit’s +helicopters had already flown over 6,700 sorties +for a total of nearly 4,700 hours of flight time. +Since its arrival in early October, Koler’s squadron +had distinguished itself not only by providing +support to military units throughout I Corps but +by its extensive participation in the flood relief +operations of November and December. During +the 30-day period after 10 November, HMM-365 +had contributed a substantial percentage of its +flights to the prolonged effort to rescue and evacuate +Vietnamese civilians from flooded areas.<a id="FNanchor_174" href="#Footnote_174" class="fnanchor">[12-8]</a></p> + +<p>FMFPac changed the designation of the task +element on the final day of 1964. From that date +until mid-March of the following year the Marine +helicopter squadron and its supporting elements +in Vietnam would be known officially as Task +Unit 79.3.5, Marine Unit Vietnam. This change, +however, did not alter the existing command relationships. +ComUSMACV continued to exercise +operational control over the Marine task unit +while the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft +Wing retained responsibility for its administrative +and logistic support.</p> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">166</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak smaller" id="CHAPTER_13"><span id="toclink_166"></span>CHAPTER 13<br> +<span class="subhead large">Prelude to Escalation</span></h2> +</div> + +<p>The close of 1964 marked the end of a full decade +of American political, economic, and military +advice and assistance to South Vietnam. That +10-year period saw a fragile state born and begin +its struggle for survival only to have its existence +threatened by a new brand of Communist aggression—the +“war of national liberation.” It +also saw the U.S. commitment to Vietnam’s +defense deepen in almost direct proportion to the +increasing threat. Despite growing amounts of +American aid and advice, there was little doubt +that South Vietnam stood near the brink of destruction +at the hands of the Viet Cong and their +North Vietnamese allies as 1964 ended.</p> + +<p>In many respects, the disaster which befell the +Vietnamese Marines and ARVN Rangers at Binh +Gia on the final day of 1964 marked a critical +turning point in the war being waged in South +Vietnam. General Westmoreland feared that the +battle heralded “the beginning of the classic and +final ‘mobile’ phase of the war.” “To the South +Vietnamese government,” he reported, “it meant +the beginning of an intensive military challenge +which the Vietnamese government could not +meet within its own resources.”<a id="FNanchor_175" href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">[13-1]</a> Brigadier +General Carl Youngdale, Westmoreland’s assistant +chief of staff for intelligence and the ranking +Marine assigned to Vietnam, assessed the meaning +of the battle in equally distressing terms. “Binh +Gia,” he explained, “was just part of the whole +thing. All the reserve—the strategic reserve—was +fixed: the airborne and the four Marine battalions +had all been committed. There was absolutely +no strategic reserve left.”<a id="FNanchor_176" href="#Footnote_176" class="fnanchor">[13-2]</a> So, as 1964 ended, hope +was fading rapidly among American military +officials in Saigon that the ground war for South +Vietnam could continue for long without more +vigorous participation of the United States.</p> + +<p>Pressures other than those produced by military +events in the South were also working to move the +United States toward direct military intervention +against the Communists in Indochina. Although +sustained open warfare had not occurred as a +result of the Tonkin Gulf crisis of early August, +tensions continued to mount between North +Vietnam and the United States throughout the +autumn. On 1 November, just after the cessation +of the U.S. air strikes which followed the Tonkin +Gulf incidents, Viet Cong mortar squads attacked +American facilities at the Bien Hoa airbase near +Saigon. Four American servicemen were killed, +five B-57 medium bombers destroyed, and eight +others heavily damaged in the raid.</p> + +<p>President Johnson’s reaction to the Bien Hoa +attack was to initiate a month-long review of +U.S. policy regarding North Vietnam. In early +December that review culminated in the adoption +of a two-phased plan to discourage further North +Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong by expanding +the air war. Phase I, approved for implementation +in December, called for stepped-up air operations +against the vital Communist infiltration routes in +Laos, and for the intensification of covert operations +against North Vietnam. Approved “in principle,” +Phase II involved “a continuous program +of progressively more serious air strikes” against +North Vietnam. The implementation of Phase II, +it was agreed, would depend on future enemy +actions.<a id="FNanchor_177" href="#Footnote_177" class="fnanchor">[13-3]</a> As if to indicate that Communist policy +makers had settled on a parallel course of escalation, +Viet Cong terrorists bombed a U.S. officers’ +quarters in Saigon on Christmas Eve, killing two +Americans and wounding over 50 others.<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[13-A]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="label">[13-A]</a> Among the wounded was Major Damm, the Assistant +Senior Marine Advisor.</p> + +</div> + +<p>The new year, 1965, would open against this +portentous combination of intensified U.S. air +activities over Laos, a worsening military situation +on South Vietnam’s battlefields, and the existence +of the Phase II contingency plans. It was this +situation which would spawn a new series of +events as the first months of 1965 unfolded—events +which would determine the direction of American<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">167</span> +and North Vietnamese military involvement in +the war for South Vietnam. In January, MACV +intelligence would learn that two new North +Vietnamese Army regiments, the <em>32d</em> and the <em>101st</em>, +had infiltrated the South and had initiated combat +operations. Intelligence sources would also report +the existence of another NVA regiment in the +first stages of formation in Quang Tri Province. +When added to a unit of similar size which had +appeared in Kontum Province (II Corps Tactical +Zone) in the final weeks of 1964, the new arrivals +would raise to four the number of North Vietnamese +regiments known to be operating on +South Vietnamese soil.<a id="FNanchor_178" href="#Footnote_178" class="fnanchor">[13-4]</a></p> + +<p>The pace of escalation would quicken in early +February. The Viet Cong would attack a U.S. +installation at Pleiku in the Central Highlands on +the 7th. Eight Americans would die in this incident, +over 100 would be wounded, and a score of +aircraft would be either destroyed or damaged. +President Johnson would react quickly to the +Pleiku attack by ordering a series of reprisal air +strikes under the code name FLAMING DART. +Recognizing the possibility of surprise North +Vietnamese air strikes against U.S. installations +in Vietnam, Johnson would also order a Marine +light antiaircraft missile (LAAM) battalion to +Da Nang, the American base located closest to +Communist airfields. Armed with Hawk missiles, +the Marines would protect the growing Da Nang +airbase from which many of the FLAMING +DART raids were to originate.</p> + +<p>American reaction to the Communists’ escalation +would not be limited to the bombing of North +Vietnam. Washington also would authorize the +use of U.S. jet attack aircraft to engage targets in +the south. On 19 February, U.S. Air Force B-57s +would conduct the first jet strikes flown by Americans +in support of Government of Vietnam ground +units. Less than one week later, on the 24th, Air +Force jets would strike again, this time to break +up a Communist ambush in the Central Highlands +with a massive series of tactical air sorties.<a id="FNanchor_179" href="#Footnote_179" class="fnanchor">[13-5]</a></p> + +<p>While the events of February would serve to +focus world opinion more sharply on the intensifying +conflict already raging over Southeast +Asia, March would prove the decisive month in +terms of the commitment of American combat +power to the war in Vietnam. On 2 March, the +President would order the FLAMING DART +raids replaced by Operation ROLLING THUNDER—a +sustained air campaign against the +Democratic Republic of Vietnam designed to +escalate gradually in response to continued Communist +military activities in South Vietnam. +ROLLING THUNDER would constitute a transition +from the earlier reprisal type raids to a continuing +air campaign based upon strategic +considerations.</p> + +<p>Within a week after the first ROLLING THUNDER +strikes over the North, the ground war in +South Vietnam would also shift toward deeper +and more active American involvement. On 7 +March, the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade—the +force which had been poised in the South +China Sea since the Tonkin Gulf crisis of the +previous August—would finally land at Da Nang +to provide protection for the air base. Although +the Pentagon would announce their mission as +purely defensive, the Marines would become the +first actual American ground combat battalions +on hand for use in Vietnam. With that commitment, +the stage would be set for a new and more +dramatic phase of what was already becoming +known as the “Second Indochina War.”</p> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">169</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Notes"><span id="toclink_169"></span>Notes</h2> +</div> + +<div class="endnotes"> + +<h3>PART I<br> +<span class="subhead">THE WATERSHED</span></h3> + +<h4>Chapter 1<br> +<span class="subhead">Background to Military Assistance</span></h4> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived +from: Department of Defense, <cite>United States-Vietnam Relations, +1945–1947</cite>, 12 books (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter <cite>Pentagon +Papers</cite>; The Senator Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers: The Defense +Department History of Decision Making On Vietnam</cite>, 4 vols. (Boston: +Beacon press, n.d.), hereafter Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>; +Foreign Area Studies Division, American University, <cite>Area Handbook +for South Vietnam</cite> (Washington: GPO, 1967), hereafter +American University, <cite>Area Handbook</cite>; Chester L. Cooper, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, +<cite>The American Experience With Pacification in Vietnam</cite>, 3 vols. +(Washington, D.C.: Institute For Defense Analysis, 1972), +hereafter Cooper, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, <cite>The American Experience With Pacification</cite>; +Joseph Buttinger, <cite>The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam</cite> +(New York: Praeger, 1958), hereafter Buttinger, <cite>The Smaller +Dragon</cite>; Bernard Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military +Analysis</cite> (New York: Praeger, 1967, 2d rev. ed.), hereafter Fall, +<cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>; D. G. E. Hall, <cite>A History of South-East Asia</cite> (New +York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966), hereafter Hall, <cite>A History of South-East +Asia</cite>; Frances FitzGerald, <cite>Fire In The Lake: The Vietnamese and +the Americans In Vietnam</cite> (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, +1972), hereafter FitzGerald, <cite>Fire In The Lake</cite>; Ellen J. Hammer, +<cite>The Struggle for Indochina</cite> (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University +Press, 1954), hereafter Hammer, <cite>The Struggle for Indochina</cite>; Douglas +Pike, <cite>Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of The National +Liberation Front</cite> (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), hereafter +Pike, <cite>Viet Cong</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="label">[1-1]</a> Hanson W. Baldwin, <cite>Strategy for Tomorrow</cite> (New York: +Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 261.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="label">[1-2]</a> Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>, p. 3.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="label">[1-3]</a> Pike, <cite>Viet Cong</cite>, p. 81.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="label">[1-4]</a> FitzGerald, <cite>Fire In The Lake</cite>, p. 42.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="label">[1-5]</a> Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), <cite>A Translation From +The French Lessons of The War In Indochina</cite>, v. II (Santa Monica, +Cal.: Rand Corporation, 1967), p. 12, hereafter Croizat, <cite>A +Translation From the French Lessons</cite>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="label">[1-6]</a> Dean Acheson, <cite>Present At The Creation: My Years in The State +Department</cite> (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), +p. 673.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="label">[1-7]</a> Buttinger, <cite>The Smaller Dragon</cite>, p. 46.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="label">[1-8]</a> B. S. N. Murti, <cite>Vietnam Divided</cite> (New York, 1954), p. 49.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="label">[1-9]</a> Letter, SecState to SecDef, 18Aug54 as quoted in “U.S. +Training of the Vietnamese National Army 1954–1959,” <cite>Pentagon +Papers</cite>, bk. 2, sec. IV.A.4, p. 3.</p> + +</div> + +<h4>Chapter 2<br> +<span class="subhead">The Formative Years</span></h4> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived +from: MajGen Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (Ret.), <cite>In the Midst +of Wars: An American’s Mission To Southeast Asia</cite> (New York: +Harper & Row, 1972), hereafter Lansdale, <cite>In the Midst of Wars</cite>; +George McTurnam Kahin and John W. Lewis, <cite>The United States +in Vietnam</cite> (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), hereafter +Kahin and Lewis, <cite>The U.S. In Vietnam</cite>; Joseph Buttinger, +<cite>Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled</cite>, 2 vols (New York: Praeger, 1967), +Vol. II, <cite>Vietnam at War</cite>, hereafter Buttinger, <cite>Vietnam: A Dragon +Embattled</cite>, v. II; Robert Scigliano, <cite>South Vietnam: Nation Under +Stress</cite> (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), hereafter Scigliano, +<cite>South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress</cite>; Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>; Pike, +<cite>Viet Cong</cite>; Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, vs. I & II; Vietnam +Histories Comment File, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, hereafter Vietnam +Comment File; U.S. Marine Activities in RVN, 1954–1964 +Project Interview Folder Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, hereafter +1954–1964 Project Interview Folder.</p> + +<h5><i>Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: Bernard B. Fall, <cite>Street Without Joy: Indochina At War, +1946–1954</cite>, (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1961), +hereafter Fall, <cite>Street Without Joy</cite>; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC +(Ret.), “Vietnamese Naval Forces: Origin of the Species,” +<cite>USNI Proceedings</cite>, v. 99, no. 2 (Feb73), pp. 48–58, hereafter +Croizat, “Vietnamese Naval Forces”; Col Victor J. Croizat, +USMC (Ret.), intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 10–11 +Feb70 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter <cite>Croizat +Interview</cite>; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), Comments and supporting +materials on Draft MS, Jack Shulimson, “U.S. Marines in +Vietnam,” pt. 1 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Croizat +Comments and Supporting Materials</cite>; Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC +(Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. +Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment +File), hereafter <cite>Croizat Comments On Whitlow MS</cite>; Col James T. +Breckinridge, USMC, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert +Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Breckinridge Comments</cite>; +MajGen William B. Fulton, USA (Ret.), <cite>Riverine Operations</cite> +(Washington, D.C.: Department of The Army, 1973), hereafter +Fulton, <cite>Riverine Operations</cite>; Croizat, <cite>A Translation From The +French Lessons</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="label">[2-1]</a> Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.), “Notes on The Organization +of the Vietnamese Marine Corps,” p. 3 (<cite>Croizat Comments +and Materials</cite>), hereafter Croizat, “Notes on The Organization.”</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="label">[2-2]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite>, p. 5.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="label">[2-3]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite>, p. 6.</p> + +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">170</span></p> + +<h5><i>Political Stabilization and its Effects</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: Buttinger, <cite>Vietnam; A Dragon Embattled</cite>, v. II; Gravel +Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. I; Fall, <cite>Two Viet-nams</cite>; Robert Shaplen, +<cite>The Lost Revolution</cite> (New York: Harper, 1965); Kahin and Lewis, +<cite>The U.S. In Vietnam</cite>; Lansdale, <cite>In The Midst of Wars</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="label">[2-4]</a> Col John T. Breckinridge, telephone conversation with +Capt Robert Whitlow, dtd 21 Feb 74, subj: Early Experiences +with the VN Marine Corps (Addenda to <cite>Breckinridge Comments</cite>, +Vietnam Comments File), hereafter <cite>Breckinridge Conversation</cite>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_76" href="#FNanchor_76" class="label">[2-5]</a> Croizat, “Notes on The Organization,” p. 5.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_77" href="#FNanchor_77" class="label">[2-6]</a> <cite>Breckinridge Conversation.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<h4>Chapter 3<br> +<span class="subhead">Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency</span></h4> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived +from: Department of State, <cite>Aggression From The North; The +Record of North Viet-Nam’s Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam</cite> +(Washington: GPO, 1965), hereafter Department of State, +<cite>Aggression From The North</cite>; Buttinger, <cite>Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled</cite>, +v. II; Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>; FitzGerald, <cite>Fire In The Lake</cite>; +Kahin and Lewis, <cite>The U.S. In Vietnam</cite>; Pike, <cite>Viet Cong</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_78" href="#FNanchor_78" class="label">[3-1]</a> <cite>U.S. News & World Report</cite>, 9Nov64, p. 63.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_79" href="#FNanchor_79" class="label">[3-2]</a> Scigliano, <cite>South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress</cite>, p. 164.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_80" href="#FNanchor_80" class="label">[3-3]</a> Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>, p. 360.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_81" href="#FNanchor_81" class="label">[3-4]</a> Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. II, p. 35.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_82" href="#FNanchor_82" class="label">[3-5]</a> “Evolution of The War,” <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, bk. 2, sec. IV.B.1, +p. 1.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_83" href="#FNanchor_83" class="label">[3-6]</a> Pike, <cite>Viet Cong</cite>, p. 81.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_84" href="#FNanchor_84" class="label">[3-7]</a> Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. II, p. 36.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_85" href="#FNanchor_85" class="label">[3-8]</a> HistBr, G-3, HQMC, “General Chronology of Events in +Vietnam, 1945–1964,” p. 41.</p> + +</div> + +<h5><i>Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived +from: SMA to CMC, ltr dtd 22 March 1973, Subj: Vietnamese +Marine Corps/Marine Advisory Unit Historical Summary, +1954–1973, hereafter VNMC/MAU HistSum, 22Mar73; Maj +James Yingling, Capt Harvey D. Bradshaw, and Mr. Benis M. +Frank, “United States Marine Corps Activities in Vietnam +1954–1963,” MS (HistDiv, HQMC, 1963), hereafter Yingling, +<abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, “USMC Activities 1954–1963”; Col Frank R. Wilkinson, +USMC (Ret.), intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 14Jul74 +(Oral HistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter <cite>Wilkinson +Interview</cite>; LtCol Robert E. Brown, Comments on Draft MS, Capt +Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter, <cite>R. E. Brown Comments</cite>; +Col Raymond C. Damm, Comments on Draft MS, Capt +Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” +(Vietnam Comment File) hereafter <cite>Damm Comments</cite>; LtCol +Michael J. Gott, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, +“U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment +File) hereafter <cite>Gott Comments</cite>; Col Gary L. Wilder, Comments +on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “Marine Activities in +Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter +<cite>Wilder Comments</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_86" href="#FNanchor_86" class="label">[3-9]</a> VNMC/MAU HistSumm, 22Mar73.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_87" href="#FNanchor_87" class="label">[3-10]</a> <cite>Wilkinson Interview.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_88" href="#FNanchor_88" class="label">[3-11]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_89" href="#FNanchor_89" class="label">[3-12]</a> <cite>Damm Comments.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_90" href="#FNanchor_90" class="label">[3-13]</a> <cite>Gott Comments.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<h5><i>Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: Maj T. C. Edwards, “3d MarDiv Counterguerrilla Training: +A Readiness Report,” <cite>Marine Corps Gazette</cite>, v. 47, no. 5 +(May 1963), pp. 45–48, hereafter Edwards, “Counterguerrilla +Training”; MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.), Comments +on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities +in Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter +<cite>Weller Comments</cite>; MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.), +intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, +HQMC), hereafter <cite>Weller Interview</cite>; MajGen Donald M. +Weller, USMC (Ret.), Intvw with Captain Robert Whitlow, dtd +26Sep73, Subj: 3d MarDiv Training Program (1954–1964 Project +Interview Folder), hereafter <cite>Weller Interview on Training Programs</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_91" href="#FNanchor_91" class="label">[3-14]</a> <cite>Weller Interview on Training Programs.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_92" href="#FNanchor_92" class="label">[3-15]</a> Edwards, “Counterguerrilla Training,” p. 46.</p> + +</div> + +<h5><i>American Decisions at the Close of 1961</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. II; “The Fall Decisions,” +<cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, bk. 2, sec. IV.B, ch. V and VI; Arthur +M. Schlesinger, Jr., <cite>A Thousand Days</cite> (Boston: Houghton +Mifflin Company, 1965), hereafter Schlesinger, <cite>A Thousand +Days</cite>; Maxwell D. Taylor, <cite>Swords and Plowshares</cite> (New York: +W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972), hereafter Taylor, <cite>Swords +and Plowshares</cite>; Chester L. Cooper, <cite>The Lost Crusade: America In +Vietnam</cite> (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1970), hereafter +Cooper, <cite>The Lost Crusade</cite>; Gen. William C. Westmoreland and +Adm U. S. G. Sharp, <cite>Report On The War In Vietnam</cite> (Washington: +GPO 1969), hereafter Westmoreland and Sharp, <cite>Report On The +War</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_93" href="#FNanchor_93" class="label">[3-16]</a> Taylor, <cite>Swords and Plowshares</cite>, p. 225.</p> + +</div> + +<h4>Chapter 4<br> +<span class="subhead">An Expanding War, 1962</span></h4> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived +from: William A. Nighswonger, <cite>Rural Pacification in Vietnam +1962–1965</cite> (Washington: Advanced Research Projects Agency, +1966), hereafter Nighswonger, <cite>Rural Pacification, 1962–65</cite>; +USMAAG, Vietnam, “Tactics and Techniques of Counterinsurgent +Operations” (Saigon, RVN: USMAAG, 1961), hereafter, +USMAAG Vietnam, “Tactics and Techniques of Counterinsurgent +Opns”; Hdqts, U.S. Army, <cite>The Viet Cong</cite> (Ft. Bragg, +N.C.: 1965) hereafter, U.S. Army, <cite>Viet Cong</cite>; Cooper, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, <cite>The +American Experience With Pacification</cite>; Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon +Papers</cite>, v. II; “The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961–63,” <cite>Pentagon +Papers</cite>, bk. 3, sec. IV.B.2; Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_94" href="#FNanchor_94" class="label">[4-1]</a> As quoted in the Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. II, +p. 140.</p> + +</div> + +<h5><i>Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: Senior Marine Advisor letter to CMC, dtd 24Jan64, hereafter +<cite>SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64</cite>; CinCPac Command History, +1962; MACV Command History, 1962; Marine Corps Command +Center, Items of Significant Interest, Jan-Feb62, hereafter <cite>MCC +Items</cite>; LtGen Richard G. Weede, Intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC +dtd 23Jul73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter +<cite>Weede Interview</cite>.</p> + +<h5><i>The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: <cite>SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64</cite>; Capt Don R. Christensen, “A +Special Gazette Report: Dateline ... Vietnam,” <cite>Marine Corps +Gazette</cite>, v. 47, no. 9 (Sep63), p. 5, hereafter Christensen, “Dateline”;<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">171</span> +Gen David M. Shoup, SE Asia Trip Folder, Sep62, hereafter +<cite>Shoup SEA Trip Folder</cite>; LtCol Harold F. Brown, Comments +on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in +Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter +<cite>H. F. Brown Comments</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_95" href="#FNanchor_95" class="label">[4-2]</a> <cite>SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_96" href="#FNanchor_96" class="label">[4-3]</a> Gen David M. Shoup, ltr to President Ngo Dinh Diem, dtd +Oct62 (<cite>Shoup SEA Trip Folder</cite>).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_97" href="#FNanchor_97" class="label">[4-4]</a> Gen David M. Shoup conversation with BGen Edwin H. +Simmons, dtd Feb74 (1954–64 Project Interview Folder).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_98" href="#FNanchor_98" class="label">[4-5]</a> <cite>SMA ltr to CMC, 24Jan64.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<h3>PART II<br> +<span class="subhead">MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR</span></h3> + +<h4>Chapter 5<br> +<span class="subhead">SHUFLY at Soc Trang</span></h4> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived +from: HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File <cite>MCC Items</cite>; +CinCPac Command History, 1962; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, +“Marine Aviation In Vietnam, 1962–1970,” <cite>Naval Review</cite>, v. 10 +(1971), hereafter McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation.”</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_99" href="#FNanchor_99" class="label">[5-1]</a> JCS to CinCPac, 17Jan62, 1212Z (HQMC Msg File).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_100" href="#FNanchor_100" class="label">[5-2]</a> CinCPac to JCS, 28Feb62, 0217Z (HQMC Msg File).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_101" href="#FNanchor_101" class="label">[5-3]</a> JCS to CinCPac, 6Mar62, 1838Z (HQMC Msg File). DA to +CinCPac and CinCUSARPac, 2Mar63 (HQMC Msg File).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_102" href="#FNanchor_102" class="label">[5-4]</a> ChMAAG, VN to CinCPac, 26Feb62, 0945Z (HQMC Msg +File).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_103" href="#FNanchor_103" class="label">[5-5]</a> CGFMPac to CinCPac, 28Feb62, 0113Z (HQMC Msg File).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_104" href="#FNanchor_104" class="label">[5-6]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_105" href="#FNanchor_105" class="label">[5-7]</a> CinCPacFlt to CinCPac, 28Feb62, 2044Z (HQMC Msg +File).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_106" href="#FNanchor_106" class="label">[5-8]</a> CinCPac (Bangkok Th) to ComUSMACV, 5Mar62, 0340Z +(HQMC Msg File).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_107" href="#FNanchor_107" class="label">[5-9]</a> ComUSMACV to CinCPac, 8Mar62, 0941Z (HQMC Msg File).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_108" href="#FNanchor_108" class="label">[5-10]</a> CinCUSARPac to CinCPac, 9Mar62, 2100Z (HQMC Msg File).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_109" href="#FNanchor_109" class="label">[5-11]</a> Dir, DivAv, HQMC, Briefing Item, dtd 14Mar62, for CMC +Weekly Conf., Subj: Assignment of Marine Helicopter Squadron +to ChMAAG, Vietnam.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_110" href="#FNanchor_110" class="label">[5-12]</a> CinCPac to JCS, 14Mar62, 0712Z (HQMC Msg File).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_111" href="#FNanchor_111" class="label">[5-13]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_112" href="#FNanchor_112" class="label">[5-14]</a> CinCPac to CinCPacFlt and ComUSMACV, 21Mar62, +0412Z (HQMC Msg File); CinCPacFlt to ComSeventhFlt, +21Mar62, 2048Z (HQMC Msg File).</p> + +</div> + +<h5><i>Deployment to Soc Trang</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: Commander Task Unit 79.3.5 ComdDiary, 31Jul–5Nov62, +hereafter <cite>CTU 79.3.5 CmdD, 31Jul-Nov62</cite>; CG 1st MAW, +SHUFLY, OpSums, Apr-Sep62; CG, 1st MAW, Ltr of Instruction, +SHUFLY, dtd 12Nov62, hereafter <cite>CG, 1st MAW LOI</cite>; +LtCol Archie J. Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary,” <cite>USNI Proceedings</cite>, v. +89, no. 10 (Oct63), hereafter Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary”; Cdr +Withers M. Moore, Chaplain Corps, USN, <cite>Navy Chaplains in +Vietnam, 1954–1964</cite> (Washington: Department of Navy, 1968), +hereafter Moore, <cite>Navy Chaplains</cite>; Capt Robert B. Asprey, “Saga +At Soc Trang: Marines In Viet-Nam,” <cite>Marine Corps Gazette</cite>, v. +46, no. 12 (Dec62), pp. 2–3, hereafter Asprey, “Saga At Soc +Trang”; VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret.), Intvw by Capt +Robert Whitlow, dtd 15Apr74 (1954–64 Project Interview +Folder), hereafter <cite>Hooper Interview</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_113" href="#FNanchor_113" class="label">[5-15]</a> CG, 1st MAW to ComSeventhFlt, 30Mar62, 0700Z, (HQMC +Msg File).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_114" href="#FNanchor_114" class="label">[5-16]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_115" href="#FNanchor_115" class="label">[5-17]</a> ComSeventhFlt to CTF 76 and CTG 79.3, 3Apr62 (HQMC +Msg File).</p> + +</div> + +<h5><i>Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: Marine Corps Operational Analysis Group, Study No. 1, +dtd 12Mar63, “Characteristics of U.S. Marine Helicopter Operations +in the Mekong Delta,” hereafter <cite>MCOAG Study No. 1</cite>; +LtCol Robert L. Rathbun, Comments on Yingling, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, “USMC +Activities 1954–1963,” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter +<cite>Rathbun Comments on Yingling MS</cite>; Richard Tregaskis, <cite>Vietnam +Diary</cite> (New York: Popular Library, 1963), hereafter Tregaskis, +<cite>Vietnam Diary</cite>; Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary”; CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, +31Jul–5Nov62; CG, 1stMAW SHUFLY OpSums, Apr-Sep62.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_116" href="#FNanchor_116" class="label">[5-18]</a> Clapp, “SHU-FLY Diary,” p. 46.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_117" href="#FNanchor_117" class="label">[5-19]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite>, p. 51.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_118" href="#FNanchor_118" class="label">[5-20]</a> CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul–5Nov62.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_119" href="#FNanchor_119" class="label">[5-21]</a> Yingling, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, “USMC Activities 1954–1963,” p. 118.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_120" href="#FNanchor_120" class="label">[5-22]</a> CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul-Nov62.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_121" href="#FNanchor_121" class="label">[5-23]</a> C of S memo 007A20763, as quoted in Yingling, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, +“USMC Activities, 1954–1963,” p. 153.</p> + +</div> + +<h4>Chapter 6<br> +<span class="subhead">SHUFLY Moves North</span></h4> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived +from: Col Julius W. Ireland, Comments on Draft MS, Capt +Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Ireland Comments</cite>; +McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; <cite>Weede Interview</cite>; <cite>Rathbun +Comments on Yingling MS</cite>.</p> + +<h5><i>I Corps Tactical Zone</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: BGen Edwin H. Simmons, “Marine Corps Operations in +Vietnam, 1965–1966,” <cite>Naval Review</cite>, 1968, hereafter Simmons, +“Marine Corps Operations in RVN, 65–66”; McCutcheon, +“Marine Aviation”; Fall, <cite>Street Without Joy</cite>; Nighswonger, +<cite>Rural Pacification, 1962–65</cite>.</p> + +<h5><i>Military Situation, September 1962</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: Col Francis J. Kelly, USA, <cite>U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971</cite> +(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), hereafter +Kelly, <cite>U.S. Army Special Forces</cite>; MACV J-2 ltr to CTU +79.3.5, dtd 11Oct62, Subj: Intelligence Estimate, Period Oct62–Feb63 +(Encl D-17 to CTU 79.3.5 ComdD), hereafter <cite>MACV +Intell Est, 11Oct62</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_122" href="#FNanchor_122" class="label">[6-1]</a> <cite>MACV Intel Est, 11Oct62.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_123" href="#FNanchor_123" class="label">[6-2]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<h5><i>Initial Helicopter Operations</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: <cite>CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 31Jul–5Nov62</cite>; CG 1st MAW, SHUFLY, +OpSums, Sep-Dec62; McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation”; <cite>Ireland +Comments</cite>; <cite>Rathbun Comments on Yingling MS</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_124" href="#FNanchor_124" class="label">[6-3]</a> <cite>MCC Items</cite>, 7Oct62.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_125" href="#FNanchor_125" class="label">[6-4]</a> CTU 79.3.5 ltr to CG 1st MAW, dtd 4Oct62, Subj: Rotation +of Task Unit Personnel to South Vietnam (encl D-15, <cite>CTU +79.3.5 ComdD, 6Apr–5Nov62</cite>).</p> + +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">172</span></p> + +<h4>Chapter 7<br> +<span class="subhead">The Laotian Crisis, 1962</span></h4> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived +from: 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Report, 16May–7Aug +1962, hereafter <cite>3d MEU Special Report</cite>; CinCPac Operations +Plan 32-59 Phase II (Laos), hereafter <cite>OpPlan 32-59</cite>; <cite>Weller +Interview</cite>; <cite>Croizat Interview</cite>; <cite>MCC Items</cite>, May, Jun, Jul62; +Schlesinger, <cite>A Thousand Days</cite>; Cooper, <cite>The Lost Crusade</cite>; Paul F. +Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, <cite>North Vietnam and The Pathet Lao: +Partners in The Struggle For Laos</cite> (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard +University Press, 1970), hereafter Langer and Zasloff, <cite>North +Vietnam and The Pathet Lao</cite>; LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC +(Ret.) Comments on 2d Draft MS, Whitlow, “U.S. Marine +Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1963,” (Vietnam Comment File), +hereafter <cite>Simpson Comments</cite>; Foster Rhea Dulles, <cite>American Policy +Toward Communist China: The Historical Record</cite> (New York: +Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972), hereafter Dulles, <cite>American +Policy Toward Communist China</cite>; Taylor, <cite>Swords and Plowshares</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_126" href="#FNanchor_126" class="label">[7-1]</a> <cite>MCC Items</cite>: 16 May 62.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_127" href="#FNanchor_127" class="label">[7-2]</a> <cite>Croizat Interview</cite>; <cite>Weller Interview</cite>.</p> + +</div> + +<h3>PART III<br> +<span class="subhead">THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963</span></h3> + +<h4>Chapter 8<br> +<span class="subhead">The Marine Advisory Effort</span></h4> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived +from: FitzGerald, <cite>Fire In The Lake</cite>; “The Overthrow of Ngo +Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963,” <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, bk. 3, +sec. IV.B.5; Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. III; Shaplen, +<cite>The Lost Revolution</cite>; Kahin and Lewis, <cite>The U.S. In Vietnam</cite>.</p> + +<h5><i>The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived +from: Senior Marine Advisor, MACV, Monthly Historical +Summaries, 1963–1965, hereafter <cite>SMA, MACV HistSums</cite>; Col +Wesley C. Noren, Comments on Draft MS, Maj Harvey +Bradshaw, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations in RVN, 1964” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Noren Comments on Bradshaw +MS</cite>; Col Wesley C. Noren, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert +Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–1964”. +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Noren Comments on Whitlow +MS</cite>; Col Clarence G. Moody, Comments on Draft MS, Capt +Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Moody Comments</cite>; +LtCol James P. McWilliams, Comments on Draft MS, Capt +Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>McWilliams Comments</cite>; +LtCol Joseph N. Smith, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert +Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Smith Comments</cite>; LtCol +Joseph N. Smith intvw by Capt Robert Whitlow (1954–1964 +Project Interview Folder), hereafter <cite>Smith Interview</cite>; Col Edwin +F. Black, USA, and Lt R. P. W. Murphy, USNR, “The South +Vietnamese Navy,” <cite>USNI Proceedings</cite>, v. 90, no. 1 (Jan64) +pp. 52–62, hereafter, Black and Murphy, “The South Vietnamese +Navy”; Maj Alfred J. Croft, “A Special Gazette Report: +Dateline, Vietnam,” <cite>Marine Corps Gazette</cite> v. 47, n. 10 (Oct63), +p. 18, hereafter Croft, “Dateline, Vietnam”; Christenson, +“Dateline”; Capt. James P. McWilliams, “Pacify and Hold,” +<cite>Marine Corps Gazette</cite>, v. 49, no. 2 (Feb65), p. 56, hereafter +McWilliams, <cite>Pacify and Hold</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_128" href="#FNanchor_128" class="label">[8-1]</a> <cite>Moody Comments</cite>; <cite>Weede Interview</cite>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_129" href="#FNanchor_129" class="label">[8-2]</a> <cite>McWilliams Comments.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_130" href="#FNanchor_130" class="label">[8-3]</a> <cite>Smith Interview.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_131" href="#FNanchor_131" class="label">[8-4]</a> <cite>Noren Comments on Whitlow MS.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<h4>Chapter 9<br> +<span class="subhead">SHUFLY Operations</span></h4> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived +from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov62–31Oct63; CTE 79.3.3.6 +ComdD, 31Oct63–14Jan64; Col Thomas J. Ross, Comments on +Draft MS, Bradshaw, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations in RVN, +1964,” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Ross Comments on +Bradshaw MS</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_132" href="#FNanchor_132" class="label">[9-1]</a> McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation.”</p> + +</div> + +<h5><i>Combat Support Operations</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov62–31Oct63; CTE 79.3.3.6 +ComdD, 31Oct63–14Jan64; CTE 79.3.3.6 After Action Reports, +26Apr–20May63, hereafter <cite>CTE 79.3.3.6 AAR</cite>; McCutcheon, +“Marine Aviation”; MajGen Paul J. Fontana, Comments on +Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In +Vietnam, 1954–1964,” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter +<cite>Fontana Comments</cite>; Col Thomas J. Ross, Comments on Draft MS, +Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, +1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Ross Comments +On Whitlow MS</cite>; <cite>Ross Comments On Bradshaw MS</cite>; <cite>H. F. Brown +Comments</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_133" href="#FNanchor_133" class="label">[9-2]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov–31Oct63.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_134" href="#FNanchor_134" class="label">[9-3]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_135" href="#FNanchor_135" class="label">[9-4]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 AAR, 19May63.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_136" href="#FNanchor_136" class="label">[9-5]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov–31Oct63.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_137" href="#FNanchor_137" class="label">[9-6]</a> Aviation Headquarters Operations Center SOP, p. 1 (encl +5, CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 18Jul–31Oct63).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_138" href="#FNanchor_138" class="label">[9-7]</a> Col A. D. Gomez ltr to Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing +Force Development Center, dated 23Oct63 (encl 1, CTE 79.3.3.6 +ComdD, 18Jul–31Oct63).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_139" href="#FNanchor_139" class="label">[9-8]</a> 1st MAW OpSums, 8Jun–20Oct63.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_140" href="#FNanchor_140" class="label">[9-9]</a> <cite>Ross Comments on Bradshaw MS.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_141" href="#FNanchor_141" class="label">[9-10]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 6Nov63–14Jan64.</p> + +</div> + +<h5><i>The Situation in Vietnam</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived +from: Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. II; Nighswonger, +<cite>Rural Pacification, 1962–65</cite>; Fall, <cite>Two Viet-Nams</cite>; Cooper, <cite>The +Lost Crusade</cite>; Department of State, <cite>Aggression from the North</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_142" href="#FNanchor_142" class="label">[9-11]</a> Nighswonger, <cite>Rural Pacification, 1962–65</cite>.</p> + +</div> + +<h3>PART IV<br> +<span class="subhead">AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964</span></h3> + +<h4>Chapter 10<br> +<span class="subhead">Marines Meet the Challenge</span></h4> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived +from: MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.) intvw by Hist&MusDiv, +HQMC, dtd 24Jul73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, +HQMC), hereafter <cite>Youngdale Interview</cite>; MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, +USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow +“U.S. Marine Activities in Vietnam, 1954–64” (Vietnam +Comment File), hereafter, <cite>Youngdale Comments</cite>; Westmoreland and +Sharp, <cite>Report On The War</cite>; Cooper, <abbr lang="la">et al.</abbr>, <cite>The American Experience +With Pacification, 1962–65</cite>; “Military Pressures Against North +Vietnam, July-Oct 1964,” <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, bk. 4, sec. IV.C.2; +Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. III; CinCPac Command +History, 1964, hereafter <cite>CinCPac ComdHist, 64</cite>; U.S. Military +Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History, 1964, hereafter +MACV ComdHist, 64; Nighswonger, <cite>Rural Pacification, +1962–65</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_143" href="#FNanchor_143" class="label">[10-1]</a> Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. III, p. 501.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_144" href="#FNanchor_144" class="label">[10-2]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_145" href="#FNanchor_145" class="label">[10-3]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite>, v. II, p. 471.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_146" href="#FNanchor_146" class="label">[10-4]</a> “Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, Jul-Oct 1964,” +<cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, bk. 4, sec. IV.C.2(b), p. 42.</p> + +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">173</span></p> + +<h5><i>Redesignation and Reorganization</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: Senior Marine Advisor, MACV, After Action Reports, +1964–65, hereafter <cite>SMA, MACV, AARs 64-65</cite>; Col William P. +Nesbit, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert +Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Nesbit Comments On Whitlow +MS</cite>; Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft +MS, Maj Harvey Bradshaw, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations In +RVN, 1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Nesbit Comments +on Bradshaw MS</cite>; <cite>Noren Comments on Whitlow MS</cite>; <cite>Noren +Comments on Bradshaw MS</cite>; James C. Pickerell, “Marine Advisor: +Vietnam,” <cite>Marine Corps Gazette</cite>, v. 48, n. 4 (Apr64), hereafter +Pickerall, “Marine Advisor”; <cite>Damm Comments</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_147" href="#FNanchor_147" class="label">[10-5]</a> <cite>Nesbit Comments on Bradshaw MS.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<h5><i>The Vietnamese Marine Brigade</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: <cite>SMA, MACV, AARs, 64-65</cite>; CG FMFPac On-The-Job-Training, +RVN, Monthly Reports, Jan-Dec, 1964, hereafter +<cite>OJT Monthly Repts, 64</cite>; Capt Philip O. Brady, intvw by HistBr, +G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Jan66 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, +HQMC), hereafter <cite>Brady Interview</cite>; Westmoreland and Sharp, +<cite>Report On The War</cite>; Pickerell, “Marine Advisor”; Naval Advisory +Group, MACV, Historical Review, 1964–65, hereafter NAVGP, +MACV, HistRevw, 64-65.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_148" href="#FNanchor_148" class="label">[10-6]</a> <cite>Noren Comments on Whitlow MS.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_149" href="#FNanchor_149" class="label">[10-7]</a> <cite>Nesbit Comments on Whitlow MS.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_150" href="#FNanchor_150" class="label">[10-8]</a> NAVGP, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65, p. 21.</p> + +</div> + +<h5><i>Additional Marine Activities</i></h5> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived +from: LtCol Raymond Becker, intvw with Capt Robert Whitlow, +dtd 25Jan74 (1954–64 Project Interview Folder), hereafter +<cite>Becker Interview</cite>; Capt Charles H. Gallina, Intvw with Capt +Robert Whitlow, dtd 29Jan74 (1954–64 Project Interview +Folder), hereafter <cite>Gallina Interview</cite>; Director of Intelligence, +HQMC, to Director, History and Museums Division, dtd +31Jan74, Subj: Summary of U.S. Marine Corps Operations at +Tiger Tooth Mountain and Dong Bach Ma in 1964, hereafter +“Summary of USMC Opns at Tiger Tooth Mountain”; Col +Raymond C. Damm intvw with Captain Robert H. Whitlow, +dtd 19Jul73 (1954–64 Project Interview Folder), hereafter <cite>Damm +Interview</cite>; NAVG, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65; CTE 79.3.3.6 +ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_151" href="#FNanchor_151" class="label">[10-9]</a> <cite>Damm Interview.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_152" href="#FNanchor_152" class="label">[10-10]</a> NAVG, MACV, HistRevw, 64-65, p. 14.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_153" href="#FNanchor_153" class="label">[10-11]</a> <cite>Smith Comments.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_154" href="#FNanchor_154" class="label">[10-12]</a> Col Warren P. Baker, ltr to CG, 3dMarDiv, dtd 3Apr64, +Subj: Job Related Orientation Report.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_155" href="#FNanchor_155" class="label">[10-13]</a> CG, FMFPac ltr to CMC 18Mar64, Subj: SVN Observations.</p> + +</div> + +<h4>Chapter 11<br> +<span class="subhead">Spring and Summer Fighting</span></h4> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived +from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; Col Andre +Gomez, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. +Marine Activities in Vietnam 1954–64” (Vietnam Comment +File), hereafter <cite>Gomez Comments</cite>; Col Robert A. Merchant, +Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine +Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), +hereafter <cite>Merchant Comments</cite>; Col John H. La Voy, Comments +on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities +In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter +<cite>La Voy Comments</cite>; <cite>Ross Comments on Whitlow MS</cite>; LtGen Herman +Nickerson, USMC (Ret.), Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert +Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” +(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Nickerson Comments</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_156" href="#FNanchor_156" class="label">[11-1]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_157" href="#FNanchor_157" class="label">[11-2]</a> <cite>Ross Comments on Whitlow MS.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_158" href="#FNanchor_158" class="label">[11-3]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_159" href="#FNanchor_159" class="label">[11-4]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_160" href="#FNanchor_160" class="label">[11-5]</a> Statement of General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., CMC, before +the House Committee On Armed Services, dtd March 1964 +(Greene Papers Collection).</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_161" href="#FNanchor_161" class="label">[11-6]</a> CTE ComdD 79.3.3.6, 1Nov63–16Oct64.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_162" href="#FNanchor_162" class="label">[11-7]</a> <cite>La Voy Comments.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_163" href="#FNanchor_163" class="label">[11-8]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_164" href="#FNanchor_164" class="label">[11-9]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_165" href="#FNanchor_165" class="label">[11-10]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; <cite>Merchant Comments</cite>; +<cite>La Voy Comments</cite>.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_166" href="#FNanchor_166" class="label">[11-11]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.</p> + +</div> + +<h4>Chapter 12<br> +<span class="subhead">Fall and Winter Operations</span></h4> + +<p>Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived +from: CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; CTU 79.3.5 +ComdD, 17Oct64–14Jan65; 1st MAW OpSums, 9Jul64–7Oct64; +CinCPac CmdHist 64; <cite>Fontana Comments</cite>; BGen Joseph Koler, +USMC, Comments on Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. +Marine Activities In Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment +File), hereafter <cite>Koler Comments</cite>; Col Hardy Hay, Comments on +Draft MS, Capt Robert Whitlow, “U.S. Marine Activities In +Vietnam, 1954–1964” (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter <cite>Hay +Comments</cite>; <cite>Becker Comments</cite>; <cite>Merchant Comments</cite>; <cite>Nickerson Comments</cite>; +Capt Roger H. Donlon, USA, <cite>Outpost of Freedom</cite> (New +York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), hereafter Donlon, <cite>Outpost of Freedom</cite>; +Moore, <cite>Navy Chaplains</cite>.</p> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_167" href="#FNanchor_167" class="label">[12-1]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64; CG 1st MAW +OpSums, 9Jul–7Oct64.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_168" href="#FNanchor_168" class="label">[12-2]</a> CTE 79.3.3.6 ComdD, 1Nov63–16Oct64.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_169" href="#FNanchor_169" class="label">[12-3]</a> Moore, <cite>Navy Chaplains</cite>, p. 92.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_170" href="#FNanchor_170" class="label">[12-4]</a> <cite>MCC Items</cite>, 23Nov64.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_171" href="#FNanchor_171" class="label">[12-5]</a> CTU 79.3.5 ComdD, 17Oct64–14Jan65.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_172" href="#FNanchor_172" class="label">[12-6]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_173" href="#FNanchor_173" class="label">[12-7]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_174" href="#FNanchor_174" class="label">[12-8]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<h4>Chapter 13<br> +<span class="subhead">Prelude to Escalation</span></h4> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_175" href="#FNanchor_175" class="label">[13-1]</a> Westmoreland and Sharp, <cite>Report On The War</cite>, p. 95.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_176" href="#FNanchor_176" class="label">[13-2]</a> <cite>Youngdale Interview.</cite></p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_177" href="#FNanchor_177" class="label">[13-3]</a> Gravel Edition, <cite>Pentagon Papers</cite>, v. III, p. 289.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_178" href="#FNanchor_178" class="label">[13-4]</a> Westmoreland and Sharp, <cite>Report On The War</cite>, pp. 95, 97.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_179" href="#FNanchor_179" class="label">[13-5]</a> <cite>Ibid.</cite>, p. 98.</p> + +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">175</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_A"><span id="toclink_175"></span>Appendix A<br> +<span class="subhead">USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954–1964</span></h2> +</div> + +<table id="officers"> +<tr> + <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="3"><span id="toclink_175a"></span>USMC SENIOR MARINE ADVISORS</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Victor J. Croizat</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">Aug 1954–Jun 1956</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol William N. Wilkes, Jr</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">Jun 1956–Jun 1958</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">Jun 1958–Jun 1960</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">Jun 1960–Aug 1961</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Robert E. Brown</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">Aug 1961–Oct 1962</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Clarence G. Moody, Jr</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">Oct 1962–Oct 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Wesley C. Noren</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">Oct 1963–Sep 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col William P. Nesbit</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr l3">Sep 1964–</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="3">VNMC SENIOR OFFICERS AND COMMANDANTS</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Maj Le Quang Trong</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">1 Oct 1954–17 Jun 1956</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Maj Phan Van Lieu</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">18 Jan 1956–22 Aug 1956</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Bui Pho Chi</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">23 Aug 1956– 1 Oct 1956</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Maj Le Nhu Hung</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">2 Oct 1956–23 May 1960</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Le Nguyen Khang</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">24 May 1960–15 Dec 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Nguyen Ba Lien</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">16 Dec 1963– Feb 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">BGen Le Nguyen Khang</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr l3">Feb 1964– </td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="3">SHUFLY, SQUADRON, AND SUB UNIT COMMANDERS<a id="FNanchor_180" href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[14-A]</a></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><i>SHUFLY Commanders</i></td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdc"><i>Dates</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col John F. Carey</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col Julius W. Ireland</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">1 Aug 1962– 5 Nov 1962</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Alton W. McCully</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">6 Nov 1962–28 Jan 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Harold F. Brown</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">29 Jan 1963–17 Jul 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col Andre D. Gomez</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">18 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col Robert A. Merchant</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">16 Jan 1964– 9 Jul 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col Hardy Hay</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">10 Jul 1964–16 Oct 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col John H. King, Jr</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr l3">17 Oct 1964– </td> +</tr> +<tr class="subhead"> + <td class="tdl"><i>Squadron Commanders</i></td> + <td class="tdc"><i>Squadron</i></td> + <td class="tdc"><i>Dates</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Archie J. Clapp</td> + <td class="tdc">HMM-362</td> + <td class="tdr">15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Robert L. Rathbun</td> + <td class="tdc">HMM-163</td> + <td class="tdr">1 Aug 1962–11 Jan 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Reinhardt Leu</td> + <td class="tdc">HMM-162</td> + <td class="tdr">12 Jan 1963– 7 Jun 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Frank A. Shook</td> + <td class="tdc">HMM-261</td> + <td class="tdr">8 Jun 1963– 1 Oct 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Thomas J. Ross</td> + <td class="tdc">HMM-361</td> + <td class="tdr">2 Oct 1963–31 Jan 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol John H. La Voy</td> + <td class="tdc">HMM-364</td> + <td class="tdr">1 Feb 1964–21 Jun 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Oliver W. Curtis</td> + <td class="tdc">HMM-162</td> + <td class="tdr">17 Jun 1964– 7 Oct 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr</td> + <td class="tdc">HMM-365</td> + <td class="tdr l3">8 Oct 1964– </td> +</tr> +<tr class="subhead"> + <td class="tdl"><i>Sub Unit Commanders</i></td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdc"><i>Dates</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol William W. Eldridge, Jr</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">15 Apr 1962– 3 Aug 1962</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Ralph R. Davis</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">4 Aug 1962–15 Jan 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol George H. Linnemeier</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">16 Jan 1963– 4 Jul 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Earl W. Cassidy</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">5 Jul 1963– 6 Feb 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Samuel G. Beal</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">7 Feb 1964–26 Jun 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Maj Marion R. Green</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr">27 Jun 1964–14 Dec 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Thomas E. Vernon</td> + <td class="tdc"> </td> + <td class="tdr l3">15 Dec 1964– </td> +</tr> +</table> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_180" href="#FNanchor_180" class="label">[14-A]</a> SHUFLY was designated Task Unit 79.3.5 from 15 April 1962 until 6 November 1962; Task Element 79.3.3.6 from 6 November +1962 through 31 December 1964.</p> + +</div> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">176</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_B"><span id="toclink_176"></span>Appendix B<br> +<span class="subhead">Awards and Decorations, Vietnam, +through 1964<a id="FNanchor_181" href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">[14-B]</a></span></h2> +</div> + +<table id="awards"> +<tr> + <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2"><i>Navy Cross</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Maj Donald E. Koelper<a id="FNanchor_182" href="#Footnote_182" class="fnanchor">[14-C]</a></td> + <td class="tdr">16 Feb 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">SSgt John C. Thompson</td> + <td class="tdr">30 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2"><i>Navy Distinguished Service Medal</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">MajGen Richard G. Weede<a id="FNanchor_183" href="#Footnote_183" class="fnanchor">[14-D]</a></td> + <td class="tdr">Feb 1962–May 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">MajGen Carl A. Youngdale</td> + <td class="tdr">25 Jan 1964–20 Jul 1965</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2"><i>Silver Star Medal</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Maj John R. Braddon</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">1stLt Phillip O. Brady</td> + <td class="tdr">31 Dec 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Franklin P. Eller, Jr</td> + <td class="tdr">31 Dec 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Joseph N. Smith</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Oct 1963–25 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Richard B. Taylor<a id="FNanchor_184" href="#Footnote_184" class="fnanchor">[14-E]</a></td> + <td class="tdr">25 Nov 1962–31 Oct 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2"><i>Legion of Merit</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col Earl E. Anderson</td> + <td class="tdr">8 Jul 1963–15 May 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Earl W. Cassidy</td> + <td class="tdr">2 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col John F. Carey<a id="FNanchor_185" href="#Footnote_185" class="fnanchor">[14-F]</a></td> + <td class="tdr">9 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Archie J. Clapp<a id="FNanchor_186" href="#Footnote_186" class="fnanchor">[14-G]</a></td> + <td class="tdr">15 Apr 1962–31 Jul 1962</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col Andre D. Gomez</td> + <td class="tdr">19 Jul 1963–14 Jan 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col John H. King, Jr</td> + <td class="tdr">16 Oct 1964–15 May 1965</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr</td> + <td class="tdr">7 Oct 1964–18 Feb 1965</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol John H. La Voy</td> + <td class="tdr">1 Feb 1964–22 Jun 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col Robert A. Merchant</td> + <td class="tdr">2 Jan 1964–10 Jul 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Clarence C. Moody, Jr</td> + <td class="tdr">18 Jan 1962–24 Oct 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col Wesley C. Noren</td> + <td class="tdr">13 Oct 1963–13 Sep 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Thomas J. Ross</td> + <td class="tdr">1 Oct 1963–31 Jan 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col Roy H. Thompson</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Feb 1962–16 Jun 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col Charles E. Warren</td> + <td class="tdr">8 Feb 1962– 9 Jul 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Col Edwin B. Wheeler</td> + <td class="tdr">1 Aug 1964–23 Aug 1965</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2"><i>Distinguished Flying Cross</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Maj Albert N. Allen</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt William J. Burrows</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Charles E. Cannon</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt William Cunningham</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">1stLt Ronald V. Debrincat</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt George H. Dunn II</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt George H. Dunn II</td> + <td class="tdr">30 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Robert K. Ervi</td> + <td class="tdr">31 Dec 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">1stLt Melvin T. Graves</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Theodore A. Heister</td> + <td class="tdr">1 Aug 1963<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">177</span></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">1stLt Donald A. Hodgen<a id="FNanchor_187" href="#Footnote_187" class="fnanchor">[14-H]</a></td> + <td class="tdr">10 Mar 1963–11 Mar 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol John H. La Voy</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Peter A. Love</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">WO Dennis T. McKee</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">1stLt Edward P. Moore</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">CWO Robert F. Patton</td> + <td class="tdr">5 Jun 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">1stLt Thomas H. Peters<a id="FNanchor_188" href="#Footnote_188" class="fnanchor">[14-I]</a></td> + <td class="tdr">9 Mar 1963–10 Mar 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Eugene W. Rawlins</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Howard G. Taylor</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">1stLt Charles R. Upshaw</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt William W. Wamel, Jr.</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt William W. Wamel, Jr.</td> + <td class="tdr">30 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Maj Goodell P. Warren</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">1stLt Charles C. Wood, Jr.</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Grant T. Yule</td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdc subhead" colspan="2"><i>Bronze Star Medal</i></td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">SSgt John Baran</td> + <td class="tdr">12 Dec 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Samuel G. Beal</td> + <td class="tdr">3 Feb 1964– 1 Jul 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">SSgt Clifford J. Beaver</td> + <td class="tdr">30 Dec 1964–31 Dec 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol George A. Brigham</td> + <td class="tdr">3 Apr 1964– 3 Jul 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">SSgt Marvin I. Bryant</td> + <td class="tdr">12 Oct 1964– 8 Mar 1965</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Cpl Clarence L. Chester</td> + <td class="tdr">30 Jun 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Don R. Christensen<a id="FNanchor_189" href="#Footnote_189" class="fnanchor">[14-J]</a></td> + <td class="tdr">28 Sep 1962–31 Jul 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">2dLt Francis R. Ciccone</td> + <td class="tdr">16 Oct 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">SSgt James A. Coryer</td> + <td class="tdr">30 Jun 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Maj Alfred J. Croft</td> + <td class="tdr">1 Feb 1962– 7 Feb 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Oliver W. Curtis</td> + <td class="tdr">17 Jun 1964–23 Nov 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LtCol Raymond C. Damm</td> + <td class="tdr">10 May 1964– 1 Dec 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Maj Alfred M. Gray, Jr.</td> + <td class="tdr">11 Apr 1964–15 Aug 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt James J. Harp</td> + <td class="tdr">10 Mar 1963–11 Mar 1963</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Cpl Cary F. Janulewicz</td> + <td class="tdr">9 Dec 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">1stLt Weston L. Johnson</td> + <td class="tdr">10 Nov 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">2dLt James P. Kelliher</td> + <td class="tdr">31 Dec 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">1stLt Donald H. Larson</td> + <td class="tdr">4 Apr 1964– 1 Feb 1965</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">GySgt Richard L. Latimer</td> + <td class="tdr">9 Dec 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt John P. Monahan</td> + <td class="tdr">21 Mar 1964–28 Feb 1965</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt James P. McWilliams</td> + <td class="tdr">2 May 1963– 9 Jun 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">GySgt Charles D. Peck</td> + <td class="tdr">14 Apr 1963–22 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LCpl James N. Phinney</td> + <td class="tdr">10 Apr 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LCpl Walter L. Rupp</td> + <td class="tdr">24 Mar 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">GySgt Edmund R. Sewell</td> + <td class="tdr">20 Sep 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">SSgt Cecil C. Stibbens</td> + <td class="tdr">Dec 1962– Dec 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Edward H. Walsh</td> + <td class="tdr">28 Sep 1964– 1 May 1964</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Maj Charles K. Whitfield</td> + <td class="tdr">31 Jan 1964–20 Jan 1965</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Capt Frank Zimolzak<a id="FNanchor_190" href="#Footnote_190" class="fnanchor">[14-K]</a></td> + <td class="tdr">27 Apr 1962–25 May 1963</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<div class="footnotes"> +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_181" href="#FNanchor_181" class="label">[14-B]</a> Other awards, such as Navy Commendation Medals, Air Medals, and Purple Hearts are not included in this list.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_182" href="#FNanchor_182" class="label">[14-C]</a> First Navy Cross approved for Vietnam.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_183" href="#FNanchor_183" class="label">[14-D]</a> First Navy Distinguished Service Medal awarded for Vietnam.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_184" href="#FNanchor_184" class="label">[14-E]</a> First Silver Star Medal awarded to a Marine for Vietnam.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_185" href="#FNanchor_185" class="label">[14-F]</a> First Legions of Merit awarded to USMC personnel for Vietnam.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_186" href="#FNanchor_186" class="label">[14-G]</a> First Legions of Merit awarded to USMC personnel for Vietnam.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_187" href="#FNanchor_187" class="label">[14-H]</a> First Distinguished Flying Crosses approved for USMC personnel in Vietnam.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_188" href="#FNanchor_188" class="label">[14-I]</a> First Distinguished Flying Crosses approved for USMC personnel in Vietnam.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_189" href="#FNanchor_189" class="label">[14-J]</a> One of the first two Bronze Star Medals (approved the same date) for USMC personnel in Vietnam.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_190" href="#FNanchor_190" class="label">[14-K]</a> One of the first two Bronze Star Medals (approved the same date) for USMC personnel in Vietnam.</p> + +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">178</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_C"><span id="toclink_178"></span>Appendix C<br> +<span class="subhead">Glossary of Acronyms</span></h2> +</div> + +<table id="acronyms"> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">AHOC</td> + <td class="tdl">Aviation Headquarters Operations Center</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">ARVN</td> + <td class="tdl">Army of The Republic of Vietnam</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">ASOC</td> + <td class="tdl">Air Support Operation Center</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">BLT</td> + <td class="tdl">Battalion Landing Team</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">CG</td> + <td class="tdl">Civil Guard</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">ChMAAG</td> + <td class="tdl">Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">CIDG</td> + <td class="tdl">Civil Irregular Defense Group</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">CinCPac</td> + <td class="tdl">Commander in Chief, Pacific</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">CIP</td> + <td class="tdl">Counter Insurgency Plan</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">ComUSMACV</td> + <td class="tdl">Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">COSVN</td> + <td class="tdl">Central Office for South Vietnam</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">CTZ</td> + <td class="tdl">Corps Tactical Zone</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">DMZ</td> + <td class="tdl">Demilitarized Zone</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">DRV</td> + <td class="tdl">Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">FAC</td> + <td class="tdl">Forward Air Controller</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">FEC</td> + <td class="tdl">French Expeditionary Corps</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">FMFPac</td> + <td class="tdl">Fleet Marine Force, Pacific</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">GCA</td> + <td class="tdl">Ground Controlled Approach (system)</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">GVN</td> + <td class="tdl">Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam)</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">HMM</td> + <td class="tdl">Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">ICC</td> + <td class="tdl">International Control Commission</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">JCS</td> + <td class="tdl">Joint Chiefs of Staff</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">JGS</td> + <td class="tdl">Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">JRO</td> + <td class="tdl">Job Related Orientation (Program)</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">JTF</td> + <td class="tdl">Joint Task Force</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">LSG</td> + <td class="tdl">Logistics Support Group</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">MABS</td> + <td class="tdl">Marine Air Base Squadron</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">MAG</td> + <td class="tdl">Marine Aircraft Group</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">MATCU</td> + <td class="tdl">Marine Airfield Traffic Control Unit</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">MAW</td> + <td class="tdl">Marine Aircraft Wing</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">MEB</td> + <td class="tdl">Marine Expeditionary Brigade</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">MEU</td> + <td class="tdl">Marine Expeditionary Unit</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">MR</td> + <td class="tdl">Military Region</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">NLF</td> + <td class="tdl">National Liberation Front</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">OJT</td> + <td class="tdl">On-The-Job Training (Program)</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">PAVN</td> + <td class="tdl">Peoples Army of Vietnam</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">PF</td> + <td class="tdl">Popular Forces</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">RF</td> + <td class="tdl">Regional Forces</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">RLT</td> + <td class="tdl">Regimental Landing Team</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">RSSZ</td> + <td class="tdl">Rung Sat Special Zone</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">RVN</td> + <td class="tdl">Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">RVNAF</td> + <td class="tdl">Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">SAR</td> + <td class="tdl">Search and Rescue</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">SDC</td> + <td class="tdl">Self Defense Corps</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">SEATO</td> + <td class="tdl">Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">SLF</td> + <td class="tdl">Special Landing Force</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">TACAN</td> + <td class="tdl">Tactical Air Navigation (system)</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">TAFDS</td> + <td class="tdl">Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">TERM</td> + <td class="tdl">Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">TRIM</td> + <td class="tdl">Training Relations Instruction Mission</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">USMAAG (MAAG)</td> + <td class="tdl">U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">USMACThai</td> + <td class="tdl">U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">USOM</td> + <td class="tdl">U.S. Operations Mission</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">VC</td> + <td class="tdl">Viet Cong</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">VMGR</td> + <td class="tdl">Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">VNA</td> + <td class="tdl">Vietnamese National Army</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">VNAF</td> + <td class="tdl">Vietnamese Air Force</td> +</tr> +<tr> + <td class="tdl">VNMC</td> + <td class="tdl">Vietnamese Marine Corps</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">179</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_D"><span id="toclink_179"></span>Appendix D<br> +<span class="subhead">Chronology</span></h2> +</div> + +<p class="chronyear">1954</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang"> + +<p>7 May—French garrison at Dien Bien Phu surrenders to Viet +Minh.</p> + +<p>16 Jun—Ngo Dinh Diem named premier of Vietnam by French-sponsored +emperor, Bao Dai.</p> + +<p>20 Jul—French and Viet Minh representatives sign Geneva +cease-fire. Vietnam is divided into northern and southern +zones pending reunification elections to be held in 1956.</p> + +<p>2 Aug—LtCol Victor J. Croizat, USMC, arrives in South Vietnam +for duty with USMAAG.</p> + +<p>8 Sep—Manila Pact signed by U.S. and seven other nations. +Within weeks (Sep 1954) the Manila Pact is transformed +into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).</p> + +<p>13 Oct—Premier Diem decrees the establishment of a 1,137-man +Marine Corps (VNMC).</p> +</div> + +<p class="chronyear">1955</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang"> + +<p>Feb—LtCol Croizat becomes first advisor to VNMC.</p> + +<p>Apr—Sect rebellion threatens to topple the Diem government. +Marine Landing Battalion deploys to the Mekong Delta.</p> + +<p>31 May—Diem names Major Le Quang Trong as Senior Marine +Officer of VNMC.</p> + +<p>Sep—Two USMC advisors, a captain and a technical sergeant, +are assigned to the USMAAG, Vietnam, for duty with the +VNMC.</p> + +<p>23 Oct—Premier Diem receives 98 percent of South Vietnamese +vote during a national referendum in which he was opposed +by Bao Dai.</p> + +<p>26 Oct—Ngo Dinh Diem proclaims the Republic of Vietnam +and becomes the republic’s first president.</p> +</div> + +<p class="chronyear">1956</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang"> + +<p>18 Jan—Diem appoints Major Phan Van Lieu as Senior Officer of +VNMC.</p> + +<p>Feb—Marine Landing Battalion returns to garrison at Nha +Trang. VNMC reorganized into two landing battalions, a +4.2-inch mortar company, and a small headquarters.</p> + +<p>Jun—LtCol William N. Wilkes, Jr., replaces LtCol Croizat as +Senior Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p> + +<p>Jul—Election deadline for reunification of northern and southern +zones passes without serious incident.</p> + +<p>Aug—Diem appoints Captain Bui Pho Chi as Senior Officer of +VNMC.</p> + +<p>Oct—Diem appoints Major Le Nhu Hung as Senior Officer of +VNMC.</p> + +<p>Nov—LtGen Samuel T. Williams, USA, relieves LtGen John +O’Daniel as Chief USMAAG, Vietnam.</p> +</div> + +<p class="chronyear">1958</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang"> + +<p>Jun—LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., relieves LtCol Wilkes as +Senior Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p> +</div> + +<p class="chronyear">1959</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang"> + +<p>May—1st VNMC Landing Battalion conducts operations against +Viet Cong in An Xuyen Province while 2d Landing Battalion +conducts similar operation against Communist guerrillas +in Vinh Binh Province.</p> + +<p>1 Jun—The VNMC is expanded to a Marine Corps Group of +2,276 officers and men. A 3d Landing Battalion is formed +and the battalions are reorganized into four infantry companies.</p> +</div> + +<p class="chronyear">1960</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang"> + +<p>Jun—LtCol Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr., relieves LtCol Wilkinson +as Senior Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p> + +<p>Sep—LtGen Lionel C. McGarr, USA, relieves LtGen Williams +as Chief USMAAG, Vietnam.</p> + +<p>11 Nov—An abortive attempt by ARVN paratroops and two +Marine companies to overthrow the Diem Government.</p> + +<p>20 Dec—The Communist “National Front for Liberation of +South Vietnam” was formed.</p> +</div> + +<p class="chronyear">1961</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang"> + +<p>May—On The Job Training (OJT) program for USMC junior +officers and staff noncommissioned officers is initiated. +Thereafter, 20 Marines per month enter Vietnam to observe +operations.</p> + +<p>16 May—A 14 nation conference on the deteriorating Laotian +situation convenes at Geneva.</p> + +<p>Jul—VNMC again reorganized and expanded. The addition of a +fourth infantry battalion and a 75mm pack howitzer battery +raises the strength of the VNMC to 3,321.</p> + +<p>Aug—LtCol Robert E. Brown relieves LtCol Robichaud as +Senior Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p> + +<p>Aug—VNMC battalion conducts operations in the inundated +U Minh Forest region of the Ca Mau Peninsula.</p> + +<p>Nov—General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (ret.), President +Kennedy’s special military advisor, visits South Vietnam on +fact-finding mission.</p> + +<p>11 Dec—The first direct support contingent of U.S. military +forces arrives in Vietnam—400 Army Troops and two +helicopter companies.</p> + +<p>Dec—USMAAG approves plan for new 18-man Marine Advisory +Division.</p> +</div> + +<p class="chronyear">1962</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang"> + +<p>1 Jan—VNMC expanded to 6,109 officers and men, and redesignated +the Vietnamese Marine Brigade. A new amphibious +support battalion is formed.</p> + +<p>3 Jan—First element of USAF transport aircraft arrive in South +Vietnam to support government forces.</p> + +<p>Jan—Detachment A, 1st Radio Company, FMF arrives in +Vietnam for duty with Army communications unit.</p> + +<p>20 Jan—CinCPac authorizes all MAAG advisors to accompany +their Vietnamese units into combat.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">180</span></p> + +<p>3 Feb—President Diem issues decree formalizing initiation of +the Strategic Hamlet Program.</p> + +<p>8 Feb—U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV) +activated in Saigon with General Paul D. Harkins as commander. +MajGen Richard G. Weede, USMC, becomes +MACV’s first chief of staff.</p> + +<p>7 Feb—Vietnamese Air Force fighters bomb and strafe the +Presidential Palace in Saigon but fail to injure President +Diem.</p> + +<p>9 Apr—The leading elements of Marine Task Unit 79.3.5 +(SHUFLY), commanded by Col John F. Carey, arrive at +Soc Trang, Republic of Vietnam.</p> + +<p>15 Apr—HMM-362 (Reinforced), a Marine medium transport +helicopter squadron, arrives at Soc Trang to begin operations +in support of government forces.</p> + +<p>22 Apr—HMM-362 helicopters fly their first combat support +missions in Vietnam.</p> + +<p>9 May—Eight Marine helicopters hit by small arms fire during +landing on Ca Mau Peninsula.</p> + +<p>18 May—The 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit (3d MEU) began +moving into position at Udorn, Thailand, in response to +the deteriorating situation in Laos. The 3d MEU was part +of Joint Task Force 116, organized for use in the mounting +crisis.</p> + +<p>20 May—BGen Ormond R. Simpson assumes command of 3d +MEU.</p> + +<p>18 Jun—Eagle Flight first employed in combat by Marine +helicopters operating from Soc Trang.</p> + +<p>25 Jun—HMM-162 replaces HMM-261 at Udorn as 3d MEW +(MEB) helicopter element.</p> + +<p>1 Jul—First Marine Combat units withdraw from Udorn, +Thailand, as a display of good faith.</p> + +<p>23 Jul—An agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of Laos is +signed by the U.S., the Soviet Union, Communist China, +North Vietnam, and 10 other nations at Geneva.</p> + +<p>30 Jul—Col Julius W. Ireland relieves Col Carey as SHUFLY +commander.</p> + +<p>31 Jul—Last Marine combat units withdrawn from Udorn, +Thailand.</p> + +<p>1 Aug—HMM-163 replaces HMM-362 as operational squadron +assigned to SHUFLY.</p> + +<p>Aug—First machine guns mounted on Marine helicopters +operating in Vietnam.</p> + +<p>4 Sep—Initial SHUFLY elements begin displacing to Da Nang +in I Corps Tactical Zone.</p> + +<p>18 Sep—HMM-163 conducts first combat operations in I Corps.</p> + +<p>20 Sep—All SHUFLY elements are in place at Da Nang.</p> + +<p>Oct—LtCol Clarence G. Moody relieves LtCol Brown as Senior +Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p> + +<p>6 Oct—Five Marines and two U.S. Navy personnel killed in +HUS crash near Tam Ky.</p> + +<p>7 Nov—HMM-163 executes first tiger flight reaction force +mission in I Corps.</p> + +<p>Nov—All Marine Corps aircraft redesignated.</p> + +<p>6 Nov—Marine Task Unit (SHUFLY) redesignated Task Element +79.3.3.6.</p> + +<p>6 Nov—LtCol Alton W. McCully assumes command of SHUFLY.</p> + +<p>Dec—Vietnamese Joint General Staff realigns South Vietnam’s +Corps Tactical Zones, creating a fourth CTZ and a Capital +Military District.</p> +</div> + +<p class="chronyear">1963</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang"> + +<p>11 Jan—HMM-162 replaces HMM-163 as SHUFLY’s operational +squadron.</p> + +<p>19 Jan—HMM-162 conducts its first combat troop lift in Vietnam.</p> + +<p>10–13 Mar—HMM-162 helicopters participate in search and +rescue attempts for U.S. Army OV-1 Mohawk and crew. +Two Marine helicopters crash in high mountains of northern +II Corps.</p> + +<p>13 Apr—Marine transport helicopters conduct first operation +with U.S. Army UH-1B armed helicopters.</p> + +<p>Apr—Organization of Marine Advisory Division modified +slightly.</p> + +<p>1 May—Provisional Marine Brigade joins ARVN forces for +operation in Do Xa base area.</p> + +<p>8 Jun—HMM-261 replaces HMM-162 as SHUFLY’s operational +squadron.</p> + +<p>15–16 Aug—HMM-261 helilifts 2d ARVN Division units from +field to culminate operation LAM SON XII.</p> + +<p>21 Aug—Vietnamese National Police raid Buddhist pagodas +throughout South Vietnam.</p> + +<p>Sep—LtCol Wesley C. Noren relieves LtCol Moody as Senior +Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p> + +<p>2 Oct—HMM-361 replaces HMM-261 as SHUFLY’s operational +squadron.</p> + +<p>Oct—Provisional Marine Regiment conducts operation PHI-HOA +5 in Gia Dinh Province.</p> + +<p>1 Nov—Diem government overthrown by coup of military +leaders. Diem and brother Ngo Dinh Nhu assassinated.</p> + +<p>14 Nov—Provisional Marine Regiment launches Operation +DAI-PHONG 28 and 29 in III Corps Tactical Zone.</p> + +<p>25 Nov—2d VNMC Battalion participates in Operation DAI-PHONG +30.</p> + +<p>16 Dec—LtCol Khang relieved as Commandant of Vietnamese +Marine Corps. Replaced by LtCol Nguyen Ba Lien.</p> +</div> + +<p class="chronyear">1964</p> + +<div class="blockquot hang"> + +<p>1 Jan—General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., relieves General David +Shoup as Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps.</p> + +<p>Jan—General Greene visits Vietnam.</p> + +<p>15 Jan—BGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC, becomes MACV +Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (J-2).</p> + +<p>1 Feb—HMM-364 replaces HMM-361 as SHUFLY’s operational +squadron.</p> + +<p>Feb—Col Khang recalled from Philippines and relieves LtCol +Lien as Commandant of VNMC.</p> + +<p>Mar—LtGen Victor H. Krulak relieves LtGen Carson A. Roberts +as Commanding General, FMFPac.</p> + +<p>27 Apr—HMM-364 participates in Operation SURE WIND 202 +in northern II Corps.</p> + +<p>May—MajGen Weede, USMC, relieved as MACV Chief of Staff.</p> + +<p>15 May—USMAAG abolished. Marine Advisory Division renamed +Marine Advisory Unit and placed under Naval +Advisory Group, MACV.</p> + +<p>20 May—Marine Advisory Team One arrives at Da Nang.</p> + +<p>7 Jun—Two Marines from SHUFLY compound reported missing +south of Da Nang.</p> + +<p>13 Jun—Advisory Team One moves to Tiger Tooth Mountain +in northwestern I Corps.</p> + +<p>19 Jun—HMM-364 turn over helicopters and maintenance +equipment to VNAF 217th Squadron.</p> + +<p>21 Jun—HMM-162 replaces HMM-364 as SHUFLY’s operational +squadron.</p> + +<p>Jul—Vietnamese Marine Recruit Training Center opens at Thu +Due. VNMC expanded with the creation of a fifth infantry +battalion.</p> + +<p>7 Jul—HMM-162 participates in relief of Nam Dong Special +Forces Camp.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">181</span></p> + +<p>2–5 Aug—North Vietnamese patrol boats and U.S. ships clash +in Tonkin Gulf.</p> + +<p>6 Aug—U.S. Congress passes Tonkin Gulf resolution.</p> + +<p>11 Aug—President Johnson signs the so-called Tonkin Gulf +Resolution.</p> + +<p>19 Aug—Advisory Team One moves to Bach Ma and continues +operations.</p> + +<p>4 Sep—Col William P. Nesbit replaces Col Noren as Senior +Marine Advisor to VNMC.</p> + +<p>13 Sep—Advisory Team One dissolved, departs Vietnam.</p> + +<p>14 Sep—SHUFLY aircraft flown to safety in face of severe +tropical storm.</p> + +<p>Sep—Marine Advisory Unit reorganized and expanded.</p> + +<p>8 Oct HMM-365 replaces HMM-364 as SHUFLY’s operational +squadron.</p> + +<p>Oct—Marine reconnaissance element conducts survey of Cam +Ranh Bay in southern II Corps.</p> + +<p>31 Dec—Viet Cong terrorist bomb American BOQ in Saigon.</p> + +<p>31 Dec—4th VNMC Battalion defeated at Binh Gia in III Corps.</p> +</div> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">183</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Appendix_E"><span id="toclink_182"></span>Appendix E<br> +<span class="subhead">List of Reviewers</span></h2> +</div> + +<div class="officers"> +<ul> +<li class="p1"> +<i>General Officers</i></li> +<li>Gen Earl E. Anderson, USMC</li> +<li>Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Gen David M. Shoup, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>LtGen Carson A. Roberts, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>LtGen Ormond R. Simpson, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>LtGen Richard G. Weede, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>MajGen Norman Anderson, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>MajGen Paul J. Fontana, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>MajGen Charles J. Timmes, U.S. Army (Ret.)</li> +<li>MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>MajGen Carl A. Youngdale, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>BGen Joseph Koler, Jr., USMC</li> + +<li class="p1"><i>Colonels</i></li> +<li>Col Frederick S. Aldridge, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Samual Beal, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col John T. Breckinridge, USMC</li> +<li>Col Harold F. Brown, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col John F. Carey, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Archie J. Clapp, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Alfred J. Croft, USMC</li> +<li>Col Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Oliver W. Curtis, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Raymond C. Damm, USMC</li> +<li>Col Andre Gomez, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Hardy Hay, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Julius W. Ireland, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col John H. La Voy, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Reinhardt Leu, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Robert A. Merchant, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Ross S. Mickey, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Clarence G. Moody, Jr., USMC</li> +<li>Col William P. Nesbit, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Wesley C. Noren, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Robert L. Rathbum, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Thomas J. Ross, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr., USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>Col Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., USMC (Ret.)</li> + +<li class="p1"><i>Lieutenant Colonels</i></li> +<li>LtCol Robert E. Brown, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>LtCol Earl W. Cassidy, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>LtCol Michael J. Gott, USMC</li> +<li>LtCol George H. Linnemeier, USMC (Ret.)</li> +<li>LtCol James P. McWilliams, USMC</li> +<li>LtCol Joseph N. Smith, USMC</li> + +<li class="p1"><i>CMC Advisory Committee on Marine Corps History</i></li> +<li>Col Frederick S. Aldridge, USMC (Ret.)<a id="FNanchor_191" href="#Footnote_191" class="fnanchor">[14-L]</a></li> +<li>MajGen Norman Anderson, USMC (Ret.)<a id="FNanchor_192" href="#Footnote_192" class="fnanchor">[14-M]</a></li> +<li>Dr. Gordon A. Craig</li> +<li>Dr. Philip K. Lundeberg</li> +<li>Mr. Robert L. Sherrod</li> +<li>MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret.)<a id="FNanchor_193" href="#Footnote_193" class="fnanchor">[14-N]</a></li> + +<li class="p1"><i>Others</i></li> +<li>Center of Military History, Department of the Army</li> +<li>Dr. Philip A. Crowl</li> +<li>Capt Joseph Drachnik, U.S. Navy (Ret.)</li> +<li>Naval Historical Division, Department of the Navy</li> +<li>Office of Air Force History, Department of the Air Force</li> +</ul> +</div> + +<div class="footnotes"> +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_191" href="#FNanchor_191" class="label">[14-L]</a> Cited previously.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_192" href="#FNanchor_192" class="label">[14-M]</a> Cited previously.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_193" href="#FNanchor_193" class="label">[14-N]</a> Cited previously.</p> + +</div> +</div> +</div> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">185</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Index"><span id="toclink_184"></span>Index</h2> + +<div class="index"> +<ul class="index"> +<li class="ifrst">Adams, LtCol Harold W., <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–94</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Africa, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Agroville Program, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Aircraft</li> +<li class="isub1">Types</li> +<li class="isub2">AD-6, <i>See</i> <a href="#A1-H">A1-H</a></li> +<li class="isub2"><a id="A1-H"></a>A1-H (Skyraider), <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152–154</a>, + <a href="#Page_158">158–159</a></li> +<li class="isub2">A-4C, (Skyhawk), <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> +<li class="isub2">B-26, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117–118</a></li> +<li class="isub2">B-57, <a href="#Page_166">166–167</a></li> +<li class="isub2">F4U (Corsair), <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> +<li class="isub2">F-100 (Super Sabre), <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> +<li class="isub2"><a id="C-117"></a>C-117 (Skytrain), <a href="#Page_60">60–61</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> +<li class="isub2">C-124 (Globemaster), <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> +<li class="isub2">C-123 (Provider), <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> +<li class="isub2"><a id="CH-21"></a>CH-21 (Shawnee), <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> +<li class="isub2">CV-2 (Caribou), <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> +<li class="isub2">GV-1. <i>See</i> <a href="#KC-130">KC-130</a></li> +<li class="isub2">H-21. <i>See</i> <a href="#CH-21">CH-21</a></li> +<li class="isub2">HUS-1. <i>See</i> <a href="#UH-34D">UH-34D</a></li> +<li class="isub2"><a id="KC-130"></a>KC-130 (Hercules), <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a>, + <a href="#Page_112">112–114</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> +<li class="isub2"><a id="O-1B"></a>O-1B (Bird Dog), <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67–69</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, + <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–118</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144–145</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–159</a>, + <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> +<li class="isub2">OE-1. <i>See</i> <a href="#O-1B">O-1B</a></li> +<li class="isub2">OV-1 (Mohawk), <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> +<li class="isub2">R4D. <i>See</i> <a href="#C-117">C-117</a></li> +<li class="isub2">T-28 (Trojans), <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116–118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, + <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> +<li class="isub2">U-10 (Super Courier), <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> +<li class="isub2">UH-1B (Iroquois), <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–120</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147–149</a>, + <a href="#Page_151">151–152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–159</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–165</a></li> +<li class="isub2"><a id="UH-34D"></a>UH-34D, <a href="#Page_57">57–58</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–93</a>, + <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113–121</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144–146</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, + <a href="#Page_151">151–161</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–165</a></li> +<li class="isub2">UH-37 (Mojave), <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Air_Force"></a>Air Force, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, + <a href="#Page_114">114–115</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158–159</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Air Force Command and Staff College, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Air Support Operations Center, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117–119</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Allied Training Operations Mission, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Alsop, Maj William F., <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Amphibious Ready Group, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88–90</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Amphibious Ready Group (TG 76.5), <a href="#Page_61">61–62</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Andaman Sea, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Anderson, Col Earl E., <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Anderson, Cpl Thomas E., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li class="indx">An Diem, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Annam, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Annamese Coast, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Annamite Mountains, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li> + +<li class="indx">An Xuyen Province, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Armed Services Committee, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Army"></a>Army, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, + <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–158</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Units</li> +<li class="isub2">27th Infantry Brigade, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> +<li class="isub2">52d Aviation Battalion, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> +<li class="isub2">145th Aviation Battalion, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> +<li class="isub2">33d Helicopter Company, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li> +<li class="isub2">57th Helicopter Company, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70–71</a></li> +<li class="isub2">68th Aviation Company, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li> +<li class="isub2">81st Helicopter Company, <a href="#Page_58">58–59</a></li> +<li class="isub2">93d Helicopter Company, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–74</a></li> +<li class="isub2">704th Counterintelligence Unit, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> +<li class="isub2">3d Radio Research Unit, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Paratroopers, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Special Forces, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, + <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Army Communications Station, Phu Bai, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Army Communications Station, Pleiku, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Army Field Hospital, Nha Trang, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, NC, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> + +<li class="indx">A Shau Valley, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Asia, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Associated States of Indochina, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Atsugi, Japan, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Australia, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Aviation Headquarters Operations Center, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Bach Phoung XI, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Baker, Col Warren P., <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bangkok, Thailand, <a href="#Page_88">88–89</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ban Me Thuot, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bassac River, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ba Xuyen Province, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Beal, LtCol Samuel G., <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Beaver, SSgt Clifford J., <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Becker, Raymond A., <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Beirut, Lebanon, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bell Helicopter Company, <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ben Hai River, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ben Tre, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bien Hoa, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Binh Dinh Province, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Binh Duong Province, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Binh Gia, <a href="#Page_136">136–138</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Binh Thuan Province, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Binh Xuyen, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–20</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Braddon, Maj John R., <a href="#Page_153">153</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Brady, Lt Philip O., <a href="#Page_137">137–138</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Breckinridge, Capt James T., <a href="#Page_19">19–20</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Brigham, LtCol George, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> + +<li class="indx">British Advisory Mission, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bronars, Maj Edward J., <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Bronze Star, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Brown, LtCol Harold F., <a href="#Page_111">111–112</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Brown, LtCol Robert E., <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48–49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Buddhist, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">186</span>Burma, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Cai Ngai, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> + +<li class="indx">California, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ca Mau, <a href="#Page_37">40</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69–71</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ca Mau Peninsula, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cambodia, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8–9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, + <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cambodian Border, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Campbell, Cpl Charley M., <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cam Ranh Bay, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Canada"></a>Canada, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Can Tho, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cao Dai, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cape St. Jacques, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Capital Military District, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Carey, Col John F., <a href="#Page_60">60–61</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69–71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cassidy, LtCol Earl W., <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Catholicism, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12–13</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Central Highlands, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, + <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Central Office for South Vietnam, <a href="#Page_44">44–45</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Chai Doc, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Chams, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Chien Tang (“Struggle for Victory”) Plan, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Chi, Capt Bui Pho, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="China"></a>China, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–13</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">96</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Chinese, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Chinese Nationalist Forces, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx">CHINH BIEN, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cholon District, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Christanity, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Christensen, Capt Don R., <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Civil Guard, <a href="#Page_27">27–28</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30–32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, + <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Civilian Irregular Defense Group, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Clapp, LtCol Archie J., <a href="#Page_60">60–62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69–70</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Clark Air Force Base, Philippines, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cochinchina, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cold War, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Collins, Gen James F., CinCUSARPac, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Collins, Gen J. Lawton, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Command and Staff Training Course, <a href="#Page_41">41–42</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Condon, MajGen John P., <a href="#Page_59">59–61</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Confucianism, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Conway, MajGen J. F., <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cook, Capt Donald G., <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Corps Tactical Zones</li> +<li class="isub1">I Corps, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78–80</a>, + <a href="#Page_82">82–85</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113–114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116–118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, + <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, + <a href="#Page_148">148–149</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–162</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–165</a></li> +<li class="isub1">II Corps, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79–80</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, + <a href="#Page_102">102–103</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, + <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–155</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> +<li class="isub1">III Corps, <a href="#Page_58">58–59</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61–63</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–74</a>, + <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> +<li class="isub1">IV Corps, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Counter-Insurgency Plan, <a href="#Page_29">29–30</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Counterguerrilla Warfare Study Group, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Croft, Maj Alfred J., <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Croizat, LtCol Victor J., <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, + <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cronin, LtCol Angus J., <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cross of Valor, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cua Viet, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Philippines, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Curtis, LtCol Oliver W., <a href="#Page_156">156–159</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161–162</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cushman, MajGen Robert E., <a href="#Page_41">41–42</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cuu Long, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Cuu Long Navy Yard, <a href="#Page_31">31–32</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Dai, Emperor Bao, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–13</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li> + +<li class="indx">DAI-PHONG 28, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> + +<li class="indx">DAI-PHONG 29, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> + +<li class="indx">DAI-PHONG 30, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> + +<li class="indx">DAI-PHONG 31, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dak To, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Damm, Maj Raymond C., <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Da_Nang"></a>Da Nang, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–76</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78–80</a>, + <a href="#Page_83">83–85</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111–118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120–121</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–149</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–162</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–165</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Da Nang Harbor, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Da Nang River, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">DA NANG SIX, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Davis, Capt Dale N., <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Davis, LtCol Ralph R., <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Davis, BGen Raymond G., <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Declaration of Neutrality of Laos, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dees, LtCol Harry C., <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Delayen, Capt Jean Louis, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Demilitarized Zone, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27–29</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Democratic Republic of Vietnam. <i>See</i> <a href="#North_Vietnam">North Vietnam</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Department of Defense, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, + <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Department of State, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dickinson, LtCol Harry E., <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Diem, President Ngo Dinh, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12–16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26–32</a>, + <a href="#Page_35">35–36</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99–100</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, + <a href="#Page_121">121–122</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dien Bien Phu, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Distinguished Flying Cross, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Distinguished Service Medal, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Don, MajGen Tran Van, <a href="#Page_79">79–80</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dong Bach Ma, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dong Ha, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dong Nai boats, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Donlon, Capt Roger H. C., <a href="#Page_157">157–158</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Do Xa Base Area, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–116</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, + <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Dulles, Secretary of State John Foster, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst"><a id="Eagle_Flight"></a>Eagle Flight, <a href="#Page_69">69–70</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Eisenhower, President Dwight D., <a href="#Page_14">14–15</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Eldridge, LtCol William W., <a href="#Page_60">60–61</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Eller, Capt Franklin P., <a href="#Page_137">137–138</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ely, Gen Paul, <a href="#Page_15">15–16</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Europe, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Father-For-A-Day Program, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Felt, Adm Harry D., <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57–58</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + +<li class="indx">FLAMING DART, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, <a href="#Page_37">40</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, + <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, + <a href="#Page_165">165</a>.</li> +<li class="isub1"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#Marine_Corps">Marine Corps</a>, <a href="#FMF_Air_Units">FMF Unit</a>s</li> + +<li class="indx">Fontana, MajGen Paul J., <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Fort Ord, California, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Forward Air Controller, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> + +<li class="indx">France, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–14</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">French Expeditionary Corps, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–16</a></li> + +<li class="indx">French High Command, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> + +<li class="indx">French-Indochina, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> + +<li class="indx">French-Indochina War, <a href="#Page_13">13–14</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–24</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, + <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> + +<li class="indx">French Navy, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> + +<li class="indx">French Union, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Futema, Okinawa, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">General Commission for Refugees, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Geneva Conference, <a href="#Page_12">12–16</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a>, + <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx">German Army, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gia Dinh Province, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Giap, Gen Vo Nyguyen, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gi Lang, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">187</span>Go Cong, <a href="#Page_132">132–133</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gomez, Col Andre D., <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119–120</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gott, Capt Michael J., <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gray, Maj Alfred M., <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Great Britain, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Green, Maj Marion R., <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Greene, Gen Wallace M., Jr., <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145–146</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Greer, PFC Robert L., <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Griffin, Lt Gerald, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ground Control Approach, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Guadalcanal, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gulf of Siam, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Gulf of Tonkin, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128–129</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166–167</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Haiphong, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hai Van Peninsula, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hamilton, Sgt Richard E., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hanoi, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Harkins, Gen Paul D., <a href="#Page_46">46–47</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57–59</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61–62</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, + <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hau Nghia Province, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hawaii, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–142</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hay, Col Hardy, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160–161</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Heim, Lt Robert P., <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hiep Hoa Special Forces Camp, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hoa Hao, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hoa My, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ho Chi Minh. <i>See</i> <a href="#Minh_Ho_Chi">Minh, Ho Chi</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ho Chi Minh Trail, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hoi An, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hoi Dong Sam, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Honolulu Conference, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Hop_Tac_Program"></a>Hop Tac Program, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hudson, LtCol Robert S., <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hue, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78–79</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, + <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hughes, Capt Virgil R., <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hugo, Victor, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Hung, Maj Le Nhu, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst"><a id="India"></a>India, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Indian Ocean, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Indochina, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Industrial College of the Armed Forces, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Infantry Unit Training Course, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>.</li> +<li class="isub1"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#Strategic_Hamlet_Program">Strategic Hamlet Program</a></li> + +<li class="indx">International Control Commission, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.</li> +<li class="isub1"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#Canada">Canada</a>, <a href="#India">India</a>, and <a href="#Poland">Poland</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Interzone V, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ireland, Col Julius W., <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75–76</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, + <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Irwin, Capt William R., <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Iwo Jima, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Japan, <a href="#Page_8">8–9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Jeep, M-442 “Mighty Mite,” <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Job Related Orientation Program, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Johnson, President Lyndon B., <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166–167</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Johore, Malaya, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Joint Chiefs of Staff, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, + <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Joint General Staff, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31–32</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35–36</a>, <a href="#Page_37">40</a>, + <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, + <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Joint Operations Center, <a href="#Page_62">62–63</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Joint Operations Evaluation Group, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Joint Task Force 116, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88–90</a>.</li> +<li class="isub1"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#Marine_Corps">Marine Corps</a>, <a href="#FMF_Air_Units">FMF Units</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Joint U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group, Thailand, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Jones, Capt Robert C., <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Jungle Warfare School, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Kelliher, Lt James P., <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kennedy, President John F., <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42–44</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, + <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kham Duc, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Khang, BGen Le Nguyen, <a href="#Page_35">35–36</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100–103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, + <a href="#Page_109">109–110</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Khanh, MajGen Nguyen, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ke Sanh, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Khmers, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Khrushchev, Premier Nikita, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kien Giang Province, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li> + +<li class="indx">King, Col John H., Jr., <a href="#Page_161">161–164</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Koler, LtCol Joseph, Jr., <a href="#Page_161">161–162</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kontum, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Kontum Province, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Korat, Thailand, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Korean War, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47–48</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, + <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ky, Vice Air Marshal Nguyen Cao, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">LAM SON XII, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> + +<li class="indx">LAM SON, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Laos, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29–30</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, + <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–94</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Laotian Border, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117–119</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, + <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> + +<li class="indx">La Voy, LtCol John H., <a href="#Page_146">146–147</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151–152</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Legion of Merit, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Leu, LtCol Reinhardt, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–116</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lien, Lt Col Nguyen Ba, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lieu, Maj Pham Van, <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Linnemeier, LtCol George H., <a href="#Page_111">111–112</a></li> + +<li class="indx">LOCKJAW, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Logistics Support Group, Thailand, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Long An, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Long An Province, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Long Tao River, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Loyko, GSgt William A., <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Malaya, <i>See</i> <a href="#Malaysia">Malaysia</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Malaysia"></a>Malaysia, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mang Buc, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Manila Pact, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mansfield, LCpl James I., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mao Tse-tung, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Marine_Corps"></a>Marine Corps, <a href="#Page_22">22–25</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34–35</a>, <a href="#Page_37">40–41</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46–48</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, + <a href="#Page_57">57–58</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–74</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, + <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110–111</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116–117</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, + <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136–139</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> +<li class="isub1"><a id="FMF_Air_Units"></a>FMF Air Units:</li> +<li class="isub2">1st Marine Aircraft Wing, <a href="#Page_59">59–61</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, + <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160–161</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> +<li class="isub2">3d Marine Aircraft Wing, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Task Unit 79.3.5. <i>See</i> <a href="#SHUFLY">SHUFLY</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Task Element 79.3.3.6. <i>See</i> <a href="#SHUFLY">SHUFLY</a></li> +<li class="isub2">MAG-16, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> +<li class="isub2">ProvMAG, <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></li> +<li class="isub2">MACS-2, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> +<li class="isub2">MABS-12, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> +<li class="isub2"><a id="MABS-16"></a>MABS-16, <a href="#Page_60">60–63</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69–71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75–76</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111–114</a>, + <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> +<li class="isub2">VMA-211, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> +<li class="isub2">VMA-324, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> +<li class="isub2">VMA-332, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> +<li class="isub2">VMB-443, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>n</li> +<li class="isub2">VMGR-152, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> +<li class="isub2">VMGR-352, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li> +<li class="isub2">VMO-2, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li> +<li class="isub2">HMM-161, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> +<li class="isub2">HMM-162, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–116</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156–162</a></li> +<li class="isub2"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">188</span>HMM-163, <a href="#Page_70">70–73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, + <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li> +<li class="isub2">HMM-261, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117–120</a></li> +<li class="isub2">HMM-361, <a href="#Page_120">120–121</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> +<li class="isub2">HMM-362, <a href="#Page_60">60–63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67–71</a></li> +<li class="isub2">HMM-364, <a href="#Page_146">146–147</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151–152</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a></li> +<li class="isub2">HMM-365, <a href="#Page_161">161–162</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–165</a></li> +<li class="isub2">MATCU-68, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Task Element 79.3.5.2, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.</li> +<li class="isub3"><i>See also</i> <a href="#MABS-16">MABS-16</a></li> +<li class="isub1">FMF Ground Units</li> +<li class="isub2">1st Marine Division, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> +<li class="isub2">3d Marine Division, <a href="#Page_41">40–41</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, + <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136–138</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147–158</a></li> +<li class="isub2">4th Marine Division, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> +<li class="isub2">3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–93</a></li> +<li class="isub2">9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> +<li class="isub2">5th Marines, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> +<li class="isub2">3d Marine Expeditionary Unit, <a href="#Page_93">93–95</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Marine Advisory Unit, Vietnam, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Infantry Battalions</li> +<li class="isub2">1/9, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> +<li class="isub2">2/9, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> +<li class="isub2">3/9, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Infantry Companies</li> +<li class="isub2">G/2/3, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> +<li class="isub2">K/3/3, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> +<li class="isub2">E/2/9, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> +<li class="isub2">L/3/9, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Advisory Team One, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> +<li class="isub2"><a id="1st_Radio_Company"></a>1st Radio Company, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Signal Engineering Survey Unit, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.</li> +<li class="isub3"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#1st_Radio_Company">1st Radio Company</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Security Detachment, Marine Unit Vietnam, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Marine Corps Air Facility, Santa Ana, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, + <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Marine Corps Junior School, Quantico, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li class="indx">McCully, LtCol Alton W., <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111–112</a></li> + +<li class="indx">McGarr, LtGen Lionel C, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> + +<li class="indx">McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert S., <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, + <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + +<li class="indx">McWilliams, Capt James P., <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Medal of Honor, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mekong Delta, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8–9</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, + <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44–45</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57–59</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61–62</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, + <a href="#Page_73">73–75</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84–85</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, + <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mekong River, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Merchant, Col Robert A., <a href="#Page_146">146–149</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–158</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Mickey, Col Ross S., <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Middle East, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Midway, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Military Assistance Program, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Military Region 5, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Military Region 9, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Minh, MajGen Duong Van, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Minh_Ho_Chi"></a>Minh, Ho Chi, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> + +<li class="indx">“Minute of Understanding,” <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Missouri</i> (BB-63), <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx">M-108 Wrecker, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Monkey Mountain, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Monroe, Lt Anthony A., <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Montagnards, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Montgomery, LtCol William, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Moody, LtCol Clarence G., <a href="#Page_48">48–49</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100–103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx">My Tho, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">NAMBO Interzone, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nam Dong, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–159</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nam Tha, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> + +<li class="indx">National Intelligence Estimate, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> + +<li class="indx">National Liberation Front, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> + +<li class="indx">National War College, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Navy"></a>Navy, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Navy Cross, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Navy Mobile Construction Battalion, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> + +<li class="indx">New Life Hamlets. <i>See</i> <a href="#Hop_Tac_Program">Hop Tac Program</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Newport, Rhode Island, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> + +<li class="indx">New Zealand, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nesbit, Col William P., <a href="#Page_131">131–133</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nghiem, BGen LeVan, <a href="#Page_61">61–62</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nha Trang, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, + <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nhu, Ngo Dinh, <a href="#Page_45">45–46</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li> + +<li class="indx">NIGHTINGALE, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nipper, LCpl David, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nong Son, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nong Ta Kai, Thailand, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Noren, LtCol Wesley C., <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Normandy, France, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Northern Training Area, Okinawa, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> + +<li class="indx">North Korea, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="North_Vietnam"></a>North Vietnam, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28–29</a>, + <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, + <a href="#Page_166">166–167</a></li> + +<li class="indx">North Vietnamese, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, + <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li class="indx">North Vietnamese Army</li> +<li class="isub1">Units</li> +<li class="isub2">32d Regiment, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> +<li class="isub2">101st Regiment, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Norton, H. G. O., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Nosavan, Gen Phoumi, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">O’Daniel, LtGen John M., <a href="#Page_15">15–16</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Olmen, Lt John D., <a href="#Page_115">115</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Okinawa, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61–62</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70–71</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, + <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85–86</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112–113</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, + <a href="#Page_141">141–144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> + +<li class="indx">On-The-Job Training Program, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136–137</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142–143</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Otlowski, Lt Raymond J., <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Oum, Prince Boun, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Pacific Ocean, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Pacifier, <i>See</i> <a href="#Eagle_Flight">Eagle Flight</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Pakistan, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Paris, France, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Parker, Capt Evan L., <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> + +<li class="indx">“Passage to Freedom,” <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Pathet Lao, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Patton, LtCol Harvey M., <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Pendell, Sgt Jerald W., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li class="indx">People-to-People Program, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">People’s Army of Vietnam, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> + +<li class="indx">People’s Republic of China. <i>See</i> <a href="#China">China</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Perfume River, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Phan Rang, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Phan Thiet, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li> + +<li class="indx">PHI-HOA 5, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Philippines, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, + <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Phouma, Prince Souvanna, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Phu Bai, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Phouc Thuan Province, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Phouc Thy Province, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Phouc Vin, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Plain of Jars, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Plain of Reeds, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Plateau Gi, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">189</span>Pleiku, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, + <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Point Defiance</i> (LSD-31), <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Poland"></a>Poland, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Popular Forces, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Porter, Col Daniel B., Jr., <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–74</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Princeton</i> (CV-37) (LPH-5), <a href="#Page_61">61–62</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Purple Heart Medal, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Radar, counter-mortar, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Radios, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Rathbun, LtCol Robert L., <a href="#Page_70">70–74</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Red River Delta, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Regional Forces, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Republic of Korea. <i>See</i> <a href="#South_Korea">South Korea</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Republic of Vietnam. <i>See</i> <a href="#South_Vietnam">South Vietnam</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Richardson, LtGen John L., <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Roberts, MajGen Carson A., <a href="#Page_57">57–58</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Robichaud, LtCol Clifford J., <a href="#Page_35">35–36</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Roe, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> + +<li class="indx">ROLLING THUNDER, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Roosevelt, President Franklin D., <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Ross, LtCol Thomas J., <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144–146</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Route 1, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Route 9, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Route 19, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Royal Marines, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Royal Thai Regiment, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Rung Sat, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Rung Sat Special Zone, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Rupp, LCpl Walter L., <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Saigon, <a href="#Page_8">8–9</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15–16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30–32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34–36</a>, + <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45–48</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, + <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100–102</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, + <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131–133</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–153</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, + <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Saigon Central Police Headquarters, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Saigon River, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li class="indx">St. Clair, Col Howard B., <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Saipan, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Secretary of Defense, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Self Defense Corps, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Seventh Fleet, <a href="#Page_59">59–60</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Schoech, VAdm William A., <a href="#Page_59">59–61</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Schrenkengost, PFC Fred T., <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Shapley, LtGen Alan, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57–58</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sheperd, Gen Lemuel C., <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sheridan, Capt John, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Shook, LtCol Frank A., <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119–120</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Shoup, Gen David M., <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="SHUFLY"></a>SHUFLY, <a href="#Page_59">59–62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69–71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–75</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83–86</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, + <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113–114</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–159</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sides, Adm John H., <a href="#Page_58">58–59</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Silver Star Medal, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Simpson, BGen Ormand B., <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–95</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sinnott, Lt William T., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Slack, Cpl Richard D., Jr., <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Smith, Capt Joseph N., <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109–110</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Snell, Capt Bradley S., <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li> + +<li class="indx">SocTrang, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60–63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70–71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73–76</a>, + <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111–113</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> + +<li class="indx">So Huynh Pho, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Son, MajGen Tran Van, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Song Cam Lo, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Song Cau Dai, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Song Cau Do, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Song Han, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Song Huong, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Song Thu Bonm, <a href="#Page_78">78–79</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Song Tra Bon, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Song Tra Bong, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Song Tra Khuc, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Song Ve, <a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Song Vu Gia, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Souphanauvong, Prince, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li> + +<li class="indx">South China Sea, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, + <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="South_Korea"></a>South Korea, <a href="#Page_11">11–13</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="South_Vietnam"></a>South Vietnam, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8–9</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14–16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–19</a>, + <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27–30</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42–45</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, + <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57–58</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70–71</a>, + <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78–79</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a>, + <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110–111</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121–123</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127–129</a>, + <a href="#Page_138">138–139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–144</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–158</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166–167</a></li> + +<li class="indx">South Vietnamese Armed Forces, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, + <a href="#Page_45">45–46</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Units</li> +<li class="isub2">Vietnamese Air Force, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67–69</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, + <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–120</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, + <a href="#Page_146">146–147</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151–152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Vietnamese Army, <a href="#Page_13">13–16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26–27</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, + <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60–61</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, + <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83–84</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, + <a href="#Page_116">116–121</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–142</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147–149</a>, + <a href="#Page_152">152–153</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–159</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–165</a></li> +<li class="isub2">1st ARVN Division, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> +<li class="isub2">2d ARVN Division, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82–83</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, + <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> +<li class="isub2">5th ARVN Division, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li> +<li class="isub2">7th ARVN Division, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> +<li class="isub2">21st ARVN Division, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79–80</a></li> +<li class="isub2">25th ARVN Division, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Airborne Brigade, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> +<li class="isub2">11th ARVN Regiment, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> +<li class="isub2">43d ARVN Regiment, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Ranger Battalions, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–166</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Special Forces, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Vietnamese Marine Corps, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–24</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29–30</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, + <a href="#Page_34">34–37</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47–49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, + <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102–103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109–110</a>, + <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131–133</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, + <a href="#Page_142">142–143</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Amphibious Support Battalion, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> +<li class="isub2">1st Battalion, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18–20</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, + <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> +<li class="isub2">2d Battalion, <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101–103</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, + <a href="#Page_109">109–110</a></li> +<li class="isub2">3d Battalion, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36–37</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, + <a href="#Page_109">109–110</a></li> +<li class="isub2">4th Battalion, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100–103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, + <a href="#Page_136">136–138</a></li> +<li class="isub2">5th Battalion, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Reconnaissance Company, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Training Company, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Artillery Batteries, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Vietnamese Navy, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36–37</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, + <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + +<li class="indx">South Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> + +<li class="indx">South Vietnamese Ministry of Interior, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Southeast Asia, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40–41</a>, + <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Soviet Union, <a href="#Page_12">12–13</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Sparrow Hawk, <i>See</i> <a href="#Eagle_Flight">Eagle Flight</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Special Landing Force, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88–89</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Special Operations Group, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Steele, Col Fred A., <a href="#Page_89">89–90</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Stilwell, MajGen Richard G., <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Strategic_Hamlet_Program"></a>Strategic Hamlet Program, <a href="#Page_45">45–46</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, + <a href="#Page_121">121–122</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li class="indx">SURE WIND 202, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Tactical Air Commander Airborne, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tactical Air Navigation, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tactical Air Support System, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, + <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Takjli, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tam Ky, <a href="#Page_82">82–83</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159–161</a>, + <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Taoism, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tarawa, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">190</span>Taylor, Gen Maxwell D., <a href="#Page_42">42–43</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Taylor, Capt Richard B., <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tay Ninh Province, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Texas A&M, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Thailand, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88–90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–94</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, + <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Thi, Col Nguyen Chanh, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Thompson, SSgt John C., <a href="#Page_155">155</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Thompson, Sir Robert G. K., <a href="#Page_45">45–46</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Thoung Duc, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Throckmorton, LtGen John L., <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Thua Thien Province, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Thu Duc, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tien Phouc, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tiger Flight. <i>See</i> <a href="#Eagle_Flight">Eagle Flight</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tiger Force, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tiger Tooth Mountain, (Dong Voi Mep), <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155–156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Timmes, MajGen Charles J., <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tonkin, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8–9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–12</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tonkin Gulf Resolution, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tourane, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>.</li> +<li class="isub1"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#Da_Nang">Da Nang</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tracy, TSgt Jackson E., <a href="#Page_19">19–20</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Training Relations Instruction Mission, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tra My, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Trong, Maj Le Quang, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tropic of Cancer, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Truman, President Harry S., <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li> + +<li class="indx">TULUNGAN, <a href="#Page_59">59–60</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Tunny, Lt Michael J., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Turner, Capt James S. G., <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Typhoon Kate, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Typhoon Tilda, <a href="#Page_159">159–160</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Typhoon Violet, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Udorn, Thailand, <a href="#Page_88">88–90</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92–93</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></li> + +<li class="indx">U Minh Forest, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40</a></li> + +<li class="indx">United Front of National Forces, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li> + +<li class="indx">United States, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, + <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li class="indx">U.S. Air Force. <i>See</i> <a href="#Air_Force">Air Force</a></li> + +<li class="indx">U.S. Army. <i>See</i> <a href="#Army">Army</a></li> + +<li class="indx">U.S. Congress, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li> + +<li class="indx">U.S. Embassy, Saigon, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> + +<li class="indx">U.S. Interagency Committee for Province Rehabilitation, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> + +<li class="indx">U.S. Marine Corps. <i>See</i> <a href="#Marine_Corps">Marine Corps</a></li> + +<li class="indx">U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, <a href="#Page_15">15–16</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–24</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, + <a href="#Page_31">31–32</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35–36</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46–48</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, + <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li> + +<li class="indx">U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + +<li class="indx">U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, <a href="#Page_46">46–48</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57–63</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, + <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99–100</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–144</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154–155</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, + <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li class="indx">U.S. Military Assistance Program, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> + +<li class="indx">U.S. Navy. <i>See</i> <a href="#Navy">Navy</a></li> + +<li class="indx">U.S. Operations Mission, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Valentin, LCpl Miguel A., <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><i>Valley Forge</i> (LPH-8), <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Vichy Government, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Vientiane, Laos, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Viet_Cong"></a>Viet Cong, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27–32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34–37</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45–46</a>, + <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62–63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69–74</a>, + <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82–83</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101–103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, + <a href="#Page_109">109–111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113–116</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120–123</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, + <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141–144</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148–149</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151–153</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157–159</a>, + <a href="#Page_161">161–162</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164–167</a></li> +<li class="isub1">Units</li> +<li class="isub2">9th Viet Cong Division, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> +<li class="isub2">4th Viet Cong Battalion, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Viet Minh, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11–13</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li> +<li class="isub1"><i>See Also</i> <a href="#Viet_Cong">Viet Cong</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Village Self Defense Corps, <a href="#Page_27">27–28</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Vinh Binh Province, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Vinh Long, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Vinson, Lt Richard P., <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Vung Tau, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Walker, Maj John W., <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Washington, D.C., <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29–30</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, + <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Watson, Cpl Billy S., <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Weapons</li> +<li class="isub1">Types</li> +<li class="isub2">AR-15 automatic rifles, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Browning automatic rifles, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> +<li class="isub2">81mm mortars, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> +<li class="isub2">82mm mortars, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> +<li class="isub2">57mm recoilless rifles, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li> +<li class="isub2">.50 caliber machine guns, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152–154</a></li> +<li class="isub2">4.2-inch mortars, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Hawk missiles, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> +<li class="isub2">Light antiaircraft missiles, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> +<li class="isub2">M-14 rifles, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> +<li class="isub2">M-1 carbines, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> +<li class="isub2">M-1 rifles, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li> +<li class="isub2">M-16 rifles, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> +<li class="isub2">M-60 machine guns, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114–115</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147–149</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> +<li class="isub2">M3A1 submachine guns, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> +<li class="isub2">105mm howitzers, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> +<li class="isub2">75mm pack howitzers, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> +<li class="isub2">60mm mortars, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> +<li class="isub2">.30 caliber machine guns, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a></li> +<li class="isub2">TK-1, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> +<li class="isub2">2.75-inch rockets, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Webster, Capt David N., <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Weede, MajGen Richard G., <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Weller, MajGen Donald M., <a href="#Page_41">40–41</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Westmoreland, Gen William C., <a href="#Page_127">127–128</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Wilder, Capt Gary, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Wilkes, LtCol William N., Jr., <a href="#Page_22">22–23</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Wilkinson, LtCol Frank R., Jr., <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34–35</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Williams, LtGen Samuel T., <a href="#Page_26">26–27</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> + +<li class="indx">World War II, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35–37</a>, <a href="#Page_41">40</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, + <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111–112</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, + <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Yen, Capt Nguyen Thanh, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li> + +<li class="indx">Youngdale, BGen Carl A., <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Zimolzak, Capt Frank, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> +</ul> +</div></div> + +<p class="p2 right"><span class="small">U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977 O-211-623</span></p> + +<div class="chapter transnote"> +<h2 class="nobreak" id="Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</h2> + +<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made +consistent when a predominant preference was found +in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.</p> + +<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced +quotation marks were remedied when the change was +obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.</p> + +<p>Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned +between paragraphs and outside quotations.</p> + +<p>The original book uses bottom-of-page footnotes and +end-of-volume endnotes. In this ebook, the footnotes +have been moved directly below the paragraphs that +reference them, and their symbols have been replaced +by letters, so as to be unique within the eBook, +while retaining the original physical sequence. +The endnotes remain in their original positions, +and their numbers have been modified to be unique +within the eBook. The modifications are intended to allow +successful hyper-linking in HTML and ereaders that +support such links.</p> + +<p>The modified footnote numbering uses chapter +numbers and sequences within those chapters. The +bottom-of-page sequences are alphabetic, while +the endnote sequences retain their original +numeric values.</p> + +<p>In the original book, several footnotes were +referenced multiple times. In this eBook, those +footnotes have been duplicated and assigned new, +unique letters, so that the references lead to +separate footnotes. This is intended to facilitate +back-linking from the footnotes to their +references.</p> + +<p>The index was not checked for proper alphabetization +or correct page references. +</p> +</div> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 75912 ***</div> +</body> +</html> + diff --git a/75912-h/images/cover.jpg b/75912-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..d72b84e --- /dev/null +++ b/75912-h/images/cover.jpg diff --git a/75912-h/images/coversmall.jpg b/75912-h/images/coversmall.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2d4e8b --- /dev/null +++ b/75912-h/images/coversmall.jpg diff --git a/75912-h/images/i_001.png b/75912-h/images/i_001.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..22fa59e --- /dev/null +++ b/75912-h/images/i_001.png diff --git a/75912-h/images/i_002.png b/75912-h/images/i_002.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..a0f1149 --- /dev/null +++ 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