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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/77155-0.txt b/77155-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..28e9d7e --- /dev/null +++ b/77155-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,9293 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77155 *** + + SCEPTICISM AND ANIMAL FAITH + + + + + _BOOKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR._ + + + SOLILOQUIES IN ENGLAND AND LATER + SOLILOQUIES. + + CHARACTER AND OPINION IN THE + UNITED STATES. With Reminiscences + of William James and Josiah Royce and + Academic Life in America. + + LITTLE ESSAYS DRAWN FROM THE + WRITINGS OF GEORGE SANTAYANA. + Edited by LOGAN PEARSALL SMITH. + + INTERPRETATIONS OF POETRY AND + RELIGION. + + THE LIFE OF REASON. Five Volumes. + + THE SENSE OF BEAUTY. + + POEMS. + + + + + SCEPTICISM AND ANIMAL FAITH + + + INTRODUCTION TO A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY + + BY + + GEORGE SANTAYANA + + + NEW YORK + CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS + + + + +_First published 1923_ + +_Second Impression 1924_ + +_Third Impression 1929_ + +_Printed in Great Britain by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_. + + + + + PREFACE + + +Here is one more system of philosophy. If the reader is tempted to +smile, I can assure him that I smile with him, and that my system—to +which this volume is a critical introduction—differs widely in spirit +and pretensions from what usually goes by that name. In the first place, +_my system is not mine, nor new_. I am merely attempting to express for +the reader the principles to which he appeals when he smiles. There are +convictions in the depths of his soul, beneath all his overt parrot +beliefs, on which I would build our friendship. I have a great respect +for orthodoxy; not for those orthodoxies which prevail in particular +schools or nations, and which vary from age to age, but for a certain +shrewd orthodoxy which the sentiment and practice of laymen maintain +everywhere. I think that common sense, in a rough dogged way, is +technically sounder than the special schools of philosophy, each of +which squints and overlooks half the facts and half the difficulties in +its eagerness to find in some detail the key to the whole. I am animated +by distrust of all high guesses, and by sympathy with the old prejudices +and workaday opinions of mankind: they are ill expressed, but they are +well grounded. What novelty my version of things may possess is meant +simply to obviate occasions for sophistry by giving to everyday beliefs +a more accurate and circumspect form. I do not pretend to place myself +at the heart of the universe nor at its origin, nor to draw its +periphery. I would lay siege to the truth only as animal exploration and +fancy may do so, first from one quarter and then from another, expecting +the reality to be not simpler than my experience of it, but far more +extensive and complex. I stand in philosophy exactly where I stand in +daily life; I should not be honest otherwise. I accept the same +miscellaneous witnesses, bow to the same obvious facts, make conjectures +no less instinctively, and admit the same encircling ignorance. + +My system, accordingly, is _no system of the universe_. The Realms of +Being of which I speak are not parts of a cosmos, nor one great cosmos +together: they are only kinds or categories of things which I find +conspicuously different and worth distinguishing, at least in my own +thoughts. I do not know how many things in the universe at large may +fall under each of these classes, nor what other Realms of Being may not +exist, to which I have no approach or which I have not happened to +distinguish in my personal observation of the world. Logic, like +language, is partly a free construction and partly a means of +symbolising and harnessing in expression the existing diversities of +things; and whilst some languages, given a man’s constitution and +habits, may seem more beautiful and convenient to him than others, it is +a foolish heat in a patriot to insist that only his native language is +intelligible or right. No language or logic is right in the sense of +being identical with the facts it is used to express, but each may be +right by being faithful to these facts, as a translation may be +faithful. My endeavour is to think straight in such terms as are offered +to me, to clear my mind of cant and free it from the cramp of artificial +traditions; but I do not ask any one to think in my terms if he prefers +others. Let him clean better, if he can, the windows of his soul, that +the variety and beauty of the prospect may spread more brightly before +him. + +Moreover, my system, save in the mocking literary sense of the word, is +_not metaphysical_. It contains much criticism of metaphysics, and some +refinements in speculation, like the doctrine of essence, which are not +familiar to the public; and I do not disclaim being metaphysical because +I at all dislike dialectic or disdain immaterial things: indeed, it is +of immaterial things, essence, truth, and spirit that I speak chiefly. +But logic and mathematics and literary psychology (when frankly +literary) are not metaphysical, although their subject-matter is +immaterial, and their application to existing things is often +questionable. Metaphysics, in the proper sense of the word, is +dialectical physics, or an attempt to determine matters of fact by means +of logical or moral or rhetorical constructions. It arises by a +confusion of those Realms of Being which it is my special care to +distinguish. It is neither physical speculation nor pure logic nor +honest literature, but (as in the treatise of Aristotle first called by +that name) a hybrid of the three, materialising ideal entities, turning +harmonies into forces, and dissolving natural things into terms of +discourse. Speculations about the natural world, such as those of the +Ionian philosophers, are not metaphysics, but simply cosmology or +natural philosophy. Now in natural philosophy I am a decided +materialist—apparently the only one living; and I am well aware that +idealists are fond of calling materialism, too, metaphysics, in rather +an angry tone, so as to cast discredit upon it by assimilating it to +their own systems. But my materialism, for all that, is not +metaphysical. I do not profess to know what matter is in itself, and +feel no confidence in the divination of those _esprits forts_ who, +leading a life of vice, thought the universe must be composed of nothing +but dice and billiard-balls. I wait for the men of science to tell me +what matter is, in so far as they can discover it, and am not at all +surprised or troubled at the abstractness and vagueness of their +ultimate conceptions: how should our notions of things so remote from +the scale and scope of our senses be anything but schematic? But +whatever matter may be, I call it matter boldly, as I call my +acquaintances Smith and Jones without knowing their secrets: whatever it +may be, it must present the aspects and undergo the motions of the gross +objects that fill the world: and if belief in the existence of hidden +parts and movements in nature be metaphysics, then the kitchen-maid is a +metaphysician whenever she peels a potato. + +My system, finally, though, of course, formed under the fire of +contemporary discussions, is _no phase of any current movement_. I +cannot take at all seriously the present flutter of the image-lovers +against intelligence. I love images as much as they do, but images must +be discounted in our waking life, when we come to business. I also +appreciate the other reforms and rebellions that have made up the +history of philosophy. I prize their sharp criticism of one another and +their several discoveries; the trouble is that each in turn has denied +or forgotten a much more important truth than it has asserted. The first +philosophers, the original observers of life and nature, were the best; +and I think only the Indians and the Greek naturalists, together with +Spinoza, have been right on the chief issue, the relation of man and of +his spirit to the universe. It is not unwillingness to be a disciple +that prompts me to look beyond the modern scramble of philosophies: I +should gladly learn of them all, if they had learned more of one +another. Even as it is, I endeavour to retain the positive insight of +each, reducing it to the scale of nature and keeping it in its place; +thus I am a Platonist in logic and morals, and a transcendentalist in +romantic soliloquy, when I choose to indulge in it. Nor is it necessary, +in being teachable by any master, to become eclectic. All these vistas +give glimpses of the same wood, and a fair and true map of it must be +drawn to a single scale, by one method of projection, and in one style +of calligraphy. All known truth can be rendered in any language, +although the accent and poetry of each may be incommunicable; and as I +am content to write in English, although it was not my mother-tongue, +and although in speculative matters I have not much sympathy with the +English mind, so I am content to follow the European tradition in +philosophy, little as I respect its rhetorical metaphysics, its +humanism, and its worldliness. + +There is one point, indeed, in which I am truly sorry not to be able to +profit by the guidance of my contemporaries. There is now a great +ferment in natural and mathematical philosophy and the times seem ripe +for a new system of nature, at once ingenuous and comprehensive, such as +has not appeared since the earlier days of Greece. We may soon be all +believing in an honest cosmology, comparable with that of Heraclitus, +Pythagoras, or Democritus. I wish such scientific systems joy, and if I +were competent to follow or to forecast their procedure, I should gladly +avail myself of their results, which are bound to be no less picturesque +than instructive. But what exists to-day is so tentative, obscure, and +confused by bad philosophy, that there is no knowing what parts may be +sound and what parts merely personal and scatter-brained. If I were a +mathematician I should no doubt regale myself, if not the reader, with +an electric or logistic system of the universe expressed in algebraic +symbols. For good or ill, I am an ignorant man, almost a poet, and I can +only spread a feast of what everybody knows. Fortunately exact science +and the books of the learned are not necessary to establish my essential +doctrine, nor can any of them claim a higher warrant than it has in +itself: for it rests on public experience. It needs, to prove it, only +the stars, the seasons, the swarm of animals, the spectacle of birth and +death, of cities and wars. My philosophy is justified, and has been +justified in all ages and countries, by the facts before every man’s +eyes; and no great wit is requisite to discover it, only (what is rarer +than wit) candour and courage. Learning does not liberate men from +superstition when their souls are cowed or perplexed; and, without +learning, clear eyes and honest reflection can discern the hang of the +world, and distinguish the edge of truth from the might of imagination. +In the past or in the future, my language and my borrowed knowledge +would have been different, but under whatever sky I had been born, since +it is the same sky, I should have had the same philosophy. + + + + + CONTENTS + + +PREFACE ... v + +I. THERE IS NO FIRST PRINCIPLE OF CRITICISM ... 1 + +II. DOGMA AND DOUBT ... 6 + +III. WAYWARD SCEPTICISM ... 11 + +IV. DOUBTS ABOUT SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS ... 21 + +V. DOUBTS ABOUT CHANGE ... 27 + +VI. ULTIMATE SCEPTICISM ... 33 + +VII. NOTHING GIVEN EXISTS ... 42 + +VIII. SOME AUTHORITIES FOR THIS CONCLUSION ... 49 + +IX. THE DISCOVERY OF ESSENCE ... 67 + +X. SOME USES OF THIS DISCOVERY ... 77 + +XI. THE WATERSHED OF CRITICISM ... 99 + +XII. IDENTITY AND DURATION ATTRIBUTED TO ESSENCES ... 109 + +XIII. BELIEF IN DEMONSTRATION ... 116 + +XIV. ESSENCE AND INTUITION ... 125 + +XV. BELIEF IN EXPERIENCE ... 134 + +XVI. BELIEF IN THE SELF ... 145 + +XVII. THE COGNITIVE CLAIMS OF MEMORY ... 150 + +XVIII. KNOWLEDGE IS FAITH MEDIATED BY SYMBOLS ... 164 + +XIX. BELIEF IN SUBSTANCE ... 182 + +XX. ON SOME OBJECTIONS TO BELIEF IN SUBSTANCE ... 192 + +XXI. SUBLIMATIONS OF ANIMAL FAITH ... 214 + +XXII. BELIEF IN NATURE ... 233 + +XXIII. EVIDENCES OF ANIMATION IN NATURE ... 240 + +XXIV. LITERARY PSYCHOLOGY ... 252 + +XXV. THE IMPLIED BEING OF TRUTH ... 262 + +XXVI. DISCERNMENT OF SPIRIT ... 272 + +XXVII. COMPARISON WITH OTHER CRITICISMS OF KNOWLEDGE ... 289 + +INDEX + + + + + CHAPTER I + THERE IS NO FIRST PRINCIPLE OF CRITICISM + + +A philosopher is compelled to follow the maxim of epic poets and to +plunge _in medias res_. The origin of things, if things have an origin, +cannot be revealed to me, if revealed at all, until I have travelled +very far from it, and many revolutions of the sun must precede my first +dawn. The light as it appears hides the candle. Perhaps there is no +source of things at all, no simpler form from which they are evolved, +but only an endless succession of different complexities. In that case +nothing would be lost by joining the procession wherever one happens to +come upon it, and following it as long as one’s legs hold out. Every one +might still observe a typical bit of it; he would not have understood +anything better if he had seen more things; he would only have had more +to explain. The very notion of understanding or explaining anything +would then be absurd; yet this notion is drawn from a current +presumption or experience to the effect that in some directions at least +things do grow out of simpler things: bread can be baked, and dough and +fire and an oven are conjoined in baking it. Such an episode is enough +to establish the notion of origins and explanations, without at all +implying that the dough and the hot oven are themselves primary facts. A +philosopher may accordingly perfectly well undertake to find _episodes +of evolution_ in the world: parents with children, storms with +shipwrecks, passions with tragedies. If he begins in the middle he will +still begin at the beginning of something, and perhaps as much at the +beginning of things as he could possibly begin. + +On the other hand, this whole supposition may be wrong. Things may have +had some simpler origin, or may contain simpler elements. In that case +it will be incumbent on the philosopher to prove this fact; that is, to +find in the complex present objects evidence of their composition out of +simples. But in this proof also he would be beginning in the middle; and +he would reach origins or elements only at the end of his analysis. + +The case is similar with respect to first principles of discourse. They +can never be discovered, if discovered at all, until they have been long +taken for granted, and employed in the very investigation which reveals +them. The more cogent a logic is, the fewer and simpler its first +principles will turn out to have been; but in discovering them, and +deducing the rest from them, they must first be employed unawares, if +they are the principles lending cogency to actual discourse; so that the +mind must trust current presumptions no less in discovering that they +are logical—that is, justified by more general unquestioned +presumptions—than in discovering that they are arbitrary and merely +instinctive. + +It is true that, quite apart from living discourse, a set of axioms and +postulates, as simple as we like, may be posited in the air, and +deductions drawn from them _ad libitum_; but such pure logic is otiose, +unless we find or assume that discourse or nature actually follows it; +and it is not by deduction from first principles, arbitrarily chosen, +that human reasoning actually proceeds, but by loose habits of mental +evocation which such principles at best may exhibit afterwards in an +idealised form. Moreover, if we could strip our thought for the arena of +a perfect logic, we should be performing, perhaps, a remarkable +dialectical feat; but this feat would be a mere addition to the +complexities of nature, and no simplification. This motley world, +besides its other antics, would then contain logicians and their sports. +If by chance, on turning to the flowing facts, we found by analysis that +they obeyed that ideal logic, we should again be beginning with things +as we find them in the gross, and not with first principles. + +It may be observed in passing that no logic to which empire over nature +or over human discourse has ever been ascribed has been a cogent logic; +it has been, in proportion to its exemplification in existence, a mere +description, psychological or historical, of an actual procedure; +whereas pure logic, when at last quite recently, it was clearly +conceived, turned out instantly to have no necessary application to +anything, and to be merely a parabolic excursion into the realm of +essence. + +In the tangle of human beliefs, as conventionally expressed in talk and +in literature, it is easy to distinguish a compulsory factor called +facts or things from a more optional and argumentative factor called +suggestion or interpretation; not that what we call facts are at all +indubitable, or composed of immediate data, but that in the direction of +fact we come much sooner to a stand, and feel that we are safe from +criticism. To reduce conventional beliefs to the facts they rest +on—however questionable those facts themselves may be in other ways—is +to clear our intellectual conscience of voluntary or avoidable delusion. +If what we call a fact still deceives us, we feel we are not to blame; +we should not call it a fact, did we see any way of eluding the +recognition of it. To reduce conventional belief to the recognition of +matters of fact is empirical criticism of knowledge. + +The more drastic this criticism is, and the more revolutionary the view +to which it reduces me, the clearer will be the contrast between what I +find I know and what I thought I knew. But if these plain facts were all +I had to go on, how did I reach those strange conclusions? What +principles of interpretation, what tendencies to feign, what habits of +inference were at work in me? For if nothing in the facts justified my +beliefs, something in me must have suggested them. To disentangle and +formulate these subjective principles of interpretation is +transcendental criticism of knowledge. + +Transcendental criticism in the hands of Kant and his followers was a +sceptical instrument used by persons who were not sceptics. They +accordingly imported into their argument many uncritical assumptions, +such as that these tendencies to feign must be the same in everybody, +that the notions of nature, history, or mind which they led people to +adopt were the right or standard notions on these subjects, and that it +was glorious, rather than ignominious or sophistical, to build on these +principles an encyclopædia of false sciences and to call it knowledge. A +true sceptic will begin by throwing over all those academic conventions +as so much confessed fiction; and he will ask rather if, when all that +these arbitrary tendencies to feign import into experience has been +removed, any factual element remains at all. The only critical function +of transcendentalism is to drive empiricism home, and challenge it to +produce any knowledge of fact whatsoever. And empirical criticism will +not be able to do so. Just as inattention leads ordinary people to +assume as part of the given facts all that their unconscious +transcendental logic has added to them, so inattention, at a deeper +level, leads the empiricist to assume an existence in his radical facts +which does not belong to them. In standing helpless and resigned before +them he is, for all his assurance, obeying his illusion rather than +their evidence. Thus transcendental criticism, used by a thorough +sceptic, may compel empirical criticism to show its hand. It had +mistaken its cards, and was bluffing without knowing it. + + + + + CHAPTER II + DOGMA AND DOUBT + + +Custom does not breed understanding, but takes its place, teaching +people to make their way contentedly through the world without knowing +what the world is, nor what they think of it, nor what they are. When +their attention is attracted to some remarkable thing, say to the +rainbow, this thing is not analysed nor examined from various points of +view, but all the casual resources of the fancy are called forth in +conceiving it, and this total reaction of the mind precipitates a dogma; +the rainbow is taken for an omen of fair weather, or for a trace left in +the sky by the passage of some beautiful and elusive goddess. Such a +dogma, far from being an interpenetration or identification of thought +with the truth of the object, is a fresh and additional object in +itself. The original passive perception remains unchanged; the thing +remains unfathomed; and as its diffuse influence has by chance bred one +dogma to-day, it may breed a different dogma to-morrow. We have +therefore, as we progress in our acquaintance with the world, an always +greater confusion. Besides the original fantastic inadequacy of our +perceptions, we have now rival clarifications of them, and a new +uncertainty as to whether these dogmas are relevant to the original +object, or are themselves really clear, or if so, which of them is true. + +A prosperous dogmatism is indeed not impossible. We may have such +determinate minds that the suggestions of experience always issue there +in the same dogmas; and these orthodox dogmas, perpetually revived by +the stimulus of things, may become our dominant or even our sole +apprehension of them. We shall really have moved to another level of +mental discourse; we shall be living on ideas. In the gardens of Seville +I once heard, coming through the tangle of palms and orange trees, the +treble voice of a pupil in the theological seminary, crying to his +playmate: “You booby! of course angels have a more perfect nature than +men.” With his black and red cassock that child had put on dialectic; he +was playing the game of dogma and dreaming in words, and was insensible +to the scent of violets that filled the air. How long would that last? +Hardly, I suspect, until the next spring; and the troubled awakening +which puberty would presently bring to that little dogmatist, sooner or +later overtakes all elder dogmatists in the press of the world. The more +perfect the dogmatism, the more insecure. A great high topsail that can +never be reefed nor furled is the first carried away by the gale. + +To me the opinions of mankind, taken without any contrary prejudice +(since I have no rival opinions to propose) but simply contrasted with +the course of nature, seem surprising fictions; and the marvel is how +they can be maintained. What strange religions, what ferocious +moralities, what slavish fashions, what sham interests! I can explain it +all only by saying to myself that intelligence is naturally forthright; +it forges ahead; it piles fiction on fiction; and the fact that the +dogmatic structure, for the time being, stands and grows, passes for a +proof of its rightness. Right indeed it is in one sense, as vegetation +is right; it is vital; it has plasticity and warmth, and a certain +indirect correspondence with its soil and climate. Many obviously +fabulous dogmas, like those of religion, might for ever dominate the +most active minds, except for one circumstance. In the jungle one tree +strangles another, and luxuriance itself is murderous. So is luxuriance +in the human mind. What kills spontaneous fictions, what recalls the +impassioned fancy from its improvisation, is the angry voice of some +contrary fancy. Nature, silently making fools of us all our lives, never +would bring us to our senses; but the maddest assertions of the mind may +do so, when they challenge one another. Criticism arises out of the +conflict of dogmas. + +May I escape this predicament and criticise without a dogmatic +criterion? Hardly; for though the criticism may be expressed +hypothetically, as for instance in saying that if any child knew his own +father he would be a wise child, yet the point on which doubt is thrown +is a point of fact, and that there are fathers and children is assumed +dogmatically. If not, however obscure the essential relation between +fathers and children might be ideally, no one could be wise or foolish +in assigning it in any particular instance, since no such terms would +exist in nature at all. Scepticism is a suspicion of error about facts, +and to suspect error about facts is to share the enterprise of +knowledge, in which facts are presupposed and error is possible. The +sceptic thinks himself shrewd, and often is so; his intellect, like the +intellect he criticises, may have some inkling of the true hang and +connection of things; he may have pierced to a truth of nature behind +current illusions. Since his criticism may thus be true and his doubt +well grounded, they are certainly assertions; and if he is sincerely a +sceptic, they are assertions which he is ready to maintain stoutly. +Scepticism is accordingly a form of belief. Dogma cannot be abandoned; +it can only be revised in view of some more elementary dogma which it +has not yet occurred to the sceptic to doubt; and he may be right in +every point of his criticism, except in fancying that his criticism is +radical and that he is altogether a sceptic. + +This vital compulsion to posit and to believe something, even in the act +of doubting, would nevertheless be ignominious, if the beliefs which +life and intelligence forced upon me were always false. I should then be +obliged to honour the sceptic for his heroic though hopeless effort to +eschew belief, and I should despise the dogmatist for his willing +subservience to illusion. The sequel will show, I trust, that this is +not the case; that intelligence is by nature veridical, and that its +ambition to reach the truth is sane and capable of satisfaction, even if +each of its efforts actually fails. To convince me of this fact, +however, I must first justify my faith in many subsidiary beliefs +concerning animal economy and the human mind and the world they flourish +in. + +That scepticism should intervene in philosophy at all is an accident of +human history, due to much unhappy experience of perplexity and error. +If all had gone well, assertions would be made spontaneously in dogmatic +innocence, and the very notion of a _right_ to make them would seem as +gratuitous as in fact it is; because all the realms of being lie open to +a spirit plastic enough to conceive them, and those that have ears to +hear, may hear. Nevertheless, in the confused state of human speculation +this embarrassment obtrudes itself automatically, and a philosopher +to-day would be ridiculous and negligible who had not strained his +dogmas through the utmost rigours of scepticism, and who did not +approach every opinion, whatever his own ultimate faith, with the +courtesy and smile of the sceptic. + +The brute necessity of believing something so long as life lasts does +not justify any belief in particular; nor does it assure me that not to +live would not, for this very reason, be far safer and saner. To be dead +and have no opinions would certainly not be to discover the truth; but +if all opinions are necessarily false, it would at least be not to sin +against intellectual honour. Let me then push scepticism as far as I +logically can, and endeavour to clear my mind of illusion, even at the +price of intellectual suicide. + + + + + CHAPTER III + WAYWARD SCEPTICISM + + +Criticism surprises the soul in the arms of convention. Children +insensibly accept all the suggestions of sense and language, the only +initiative they show being a certain wilfulness in the extension of +these notions, a certain impulse towards private superstition. This is +soon corrected by education or broken off rudely, like the nails of a +tender hand, by hard contact with custom, fact, or derision. Belief then +settles down in sullenness and apathy to a narrow circle of vague +assumptions, to none of which the mind need have any deep affinity, none +of which it need really understand, but which nevertheless it clings to +for lack of other footing. The philosophy of the common man is an old +wife that gives him no pleasure, yet he cannot live without her, and +resents any aspersions that strangers may cast on her character. + +Of this homely philosophy the tender cuticle is religious belief; really +the least vital and most arbitrary part of human opinion, the outer +ring, as it were, of the fortifications of prejudice, but for that very +reason the most jealously defended; since it is on being attacked there, +at the least defensible point, that rage and alarm at being attacked at +all are first aroused in the citadel. People are not naturally sceptics, +wondering if a single one of their intellectual habits can be reasonably +preserved; they are dogmatists angrily confident of maintaining them +all. Integral minds, pupils of a single coherent tradition, regard their +religion, whatever it may be, as certain, as sublime, and as the only +rational basis of morality and policy. Yet in fact religious belief is +terribly precarious, partly because it is arbitrary, so that in the next +tribe or in the next century it will wear quite a different form; and +partly because, when genuine, it is spontaneous and continually +remodelled, like poetry, in the heart that gives it birth. A man of the +world soon learns to discredit established religions on account of their +variety and absurdity, although he may good-naturedly continue to +conform to his own; and a mystic before long begins fervently to condemn +current dogmas, on account of his own different inspiration. Without +philosophical criticism, therefore, mere experience and good sense +suggest that all positive religions are false, or at least (which is +enough for my present purpose) that they are all fantastic and insecure. + +Closely allied with religious beliefs there are usually legends and +histories, dramatic if not miraculous; and a man who knows anything of +literature and has observed how histories are written, even in the most +enlightened times, needs no satirist to remind him that all histories, +in so far as they contain a system, a drama, or a moral, are so much +literary fiction, and probably disingenuous. Common sense, however, will +still admit that there are recorded facts not to be doubted, as it will +admit that there are obvious physical facts; and it is here, when +popular philosophy has been reduced to a kind of positivism, that the +speculative critic may well step upon the scene. + +Criticism, I have said, has no first principle, and its desultory +character may be clearly exhibited at this point by asking whether the +evidence of science or that of history should be questioned first. I +might impugn the belief in physical facts reported by the senses and by +natural science, such as the existence of a ring of Saturn, reducing +them to appearances, which are facts reported by personal remembrance; +and this is actually the choice made by British and German critics of +knowledge, who, relying on memory and history, have denied the existence +of anything but experience. Yet the opposite procedure would seem more +judicious; knowledge of the facts reported by history is mediated by +documents which are physical facts; and these documents must first be +discovered and believed to have subsisted unknown and to have had a more +or less remote origin in time and place, before they can be taken as +evidence for any mental events; for if I did not believe that there had +been any men in Athens I should not imagine they had had any thoughts. +Even personal memory, when it professes to record any distant +experience, can recognise and place this experience only by first +reconstructing the material scene in which it occurred. Memory records +moral events in terms of their physical occasions; and if the latter are +merely imaginary, the former must be doubly so, like the thoughts of a +personage in a novel. My remembrance of the past is a novel I am +constantly recomposing; and it would not be a historical novel, but +sheer fiction, if the material events which mark and ballast my career +had not their public dates and characters scientifically discoverable. + +Romantic solipsism, in which the self making up the universe is a moral +person endowed with memory and vanity, is accordingly untenable. Not +that it is unthinkable or self-contradictory; because all the +complementary objects which might be requisite to give point and body to +the idea of oneself might be only ideas and not facts; and a solitary +deity imagining a world or remembering his own past constitutes a +perfectly conceivable universe. But this imagination would have no truth +and this remembrance no control; so that the fond belief of such a deity +that he knew his own past would be the most groundless of dogmas; and +while by chance the dogma might be true, that deity would have no reason +to think it so. At the first touch of criticism he would be obliged to +confess that his alleged past was merely a picture now before him, and +that he had no reason to suppose that this picture had had any constancy +in successive moments, or that he had lived through previous moments at +all; nor could any new experience ever lend any colour or corroboration +to such a pathological conviction. This is obvious; so that romantic +solipsism, although perhaps an interesting state of mind, is not a +position capable of defence; and any solipsism which is not a solipsism +of the present moment is logically contemptible. + +The postulates on which empirical knowledge and inductive science are +based—namely, that there has been a past, that it was such as it is now +thought to be, that there will be a future and that it must, for some +inconceivable reason, resemble the past and obey the same laws—these are +all gratuitous dogmas. The sceptic in his honest retreat knows nothing +of a future, and has no need of such an unwarrantable idea. He may +perhaps have images before him of scenes somehow not in the foreground, +with a sense of before and after running through the texture of them; +and he may call this background of his sentiency the past; but the +relative obscurity and evanescence of these phantoms will not prompt him +to suppose that they have retreated to obscurity from the light of day. +They will be to him simply what he experiences them as being, denizens +of the twilight. It would be a vain fancy to imagine that these ghosts +had once been men; they are simply nether gods, native to the Erebus +they inhabit. The world present to the sceptic may continue to fade into +these opposite abysses, the past and the future; but having renounced +all prejudice and checked all customary faith, he will regard both as +painted abysses only, like the opposite exits to the country and to the +city on the ancient stage. He will see the masked actors (and he will +invent a reason) rushing frantically out on one side and in at the +other; but he knows that the moment they are out of sight the play is +over for them; those outlying regions and those reported events which +the messengers narrate so impressively are pure fancy; and there is +nothing for him but to sit in his seat and lend his mind to the tragic +illusion. + +The solipsist thus becomes an incredulous spectator of his own romance, +thinks his own adventures fictions, and accepts a solipsism of the +present moment. This is an honest position, and certain attempts to +refute it as self-contradictory are based on a misunderstanding. For +example, it is irrelevant to urge that the present moment cannot +comprise the whole of existence because the phrase “a present moment” +implies a chain of moments; or that the mind that calls any moment the +present moment virtually transcends it and posits a past and a future +beyond it. These arguments confuse the convictions of the solipsist with +those of a spectator describing him from outside. The sceptic is not +committed to the implications of other men’s language; nor can he be +convicted out of his own mouth by the names he is obliged to bestow on +the details of his momentary vision. There may be long vistas in it; +there may be many figures of men and beasts, many legends and +apocalypses depicted on his canvas; there may even be a shadowy frame +about it, or the suggestion of a gigantic ghostly something on the +hither side of it which he may call himself. All this wealth of objects +is not inconsistent with solipsism, although the implication of the +conventional terms in which those objects are described may render it +difficult for the solipsist always to remember his solitude. Yet when he +reflects, he perceives it; and all his heroic efforts are concentrated +on _not_ asserting and _not_ implying anything, but simply noticing what +he finds. Scepticism is not concerned to abolish ideas; it can relish +the variety and order of a pictured world, or of any number of them in +succession, without any of the qualms and exclusions proper to +dogmatism. Its case is simply not to credit these ideas, not to posit +any of these fancied worlds, nor this ghostly mind imagined as viewing +them. The attitude of the sceptic is not inconsistent; it is merely +difficult, because it is hard for the greedy intellect to keep its cake +without eating it. Very voracious dogmatists like Spinoza even assert +that it is impossible, but the impossibility is only psychological, and +due to their voracity; they no doubt speak truly for themselves when +they say that the idea of a horse, if not contradicted by some other +idea, _is_ a belief that the horse exists; but this would not be the +case if they felt no impulse to ride that imagined horse, or to get out +of its way. Ideas become beliefs only when by precipitating tendencies +to action they persuade me that they are signs of things; and these +things are not those ideas simply hypostatised, but are believed to be +compacted of many parts, and full of ambushed powers, entirely absent +from the ideas. The belief is imposed on me surreptitiously by a latent +mechanical reaction of my body on the object producing the idea; it is +by no means implied in any qualities obvious in that idea. Such a latent +reaction, being mechanical, can hardly be avoided, but it may be +discounted in reflection, if a man has experience and the poise of a +philosopher; and scepticism is not the less honourable for being +difficult, when it is inspired by a firm determination to probe this +confused and terrible apparition of life to the bottom. + +So far is solipsism of the present moment from being self-contradictory +that it might, under other circumstances, be the normal and invincible +attitude of the spirit; and I suspect it may be that of many animals. +The difficulties I find in maintaining it consistently come from the +social and laborious character of human life. A creature whose whole +existence was passed under a hard shell, or was spent in a free flight, +might find nothing paradoxical or acrobatic in solipsism; nor would he +feel the anguish which men feel in doubt, because doubt leaves them +defenceless and undecided in the presence of oncoming events. A creature +whose actions were predetermined might have a clearer mind. He might +keenly enjoy the momentary scene, never conceiving himself as a separate +body or as anything but the unity of that scene, nor his enjoyment as +anything but its beauty: nor would he harbour the least suspicion that +it would change or perish, nor any objection to its doing so if it +chose. Solipsism would then be selflessness and scepticism simplicity. +They would not be open to disruption from within. The ephemeral insect +would accept the evidence of his ephemeral object, whatever quality this +might chance to have; he would not suppose, as Descartes did, that in +thinking anything his own existence was involved. Being new-born +himself, with only this one innate (and also experimental) idea, he +would bring to his single experience no extraneous habits of +interpretation or inference; and he would not be troubled by doubts, +because he would believe nothing. + +For men, however, who are long-lived and teachable animals, solipsism of +the present moment is a violent pose, permitted only to the young +philosopher, in his first intellectual despair; and even he often cheats +himself when he thinks he assumes it, and professing to stand on his +head really, like a clumsy acrobat, rests on his hands also. The very +terms “solipsism” and “present moment” betray this impurity. An actual +intuition, which by hypothesis is fresh, absolute, and not to be +repeated, is called and is perhaps conceived as an _ipse_, a self-same +man. But identity (as I shall have occasion to observe in discussing +identity in essences) implies two moments, two instances, or two +intuitions, between which it obtains. Similarly, a “present moment” +suggests other moments, and an adventitious limitation either in +duration or in scope; but the solipsist and his world (which are not +distinguishable) have by hypothesis no environment whatsoever, and +nothing limits them save the fact that there is nothing more. These +irrelevances and side glances are imported into the mind of the sceptic +because in fact he is retreating into solipsism from a far more +ambitious philosophy. A thought naturally momentary would be immune from +them. + +A perfect solipsist, therefore, hardly is found amongst men; but some +men are zealous in bringing their criticism down to solipsism of the +present moment just because this attitude enables them to cast away +everything that is not present in their prevalent mood, or in their +deepest thought, and to set up this chosen object as the absolute. Such +a compensatory dogma is itself not critical; but criticism may help to +raise it to a specious eminence by lopping off everything else. What +remains will be different in different persons: some say it is Brahma, +some that it is Pure Being, some that it is the Idea or Law of the moral +world. Each of these absolutes is the sacred residuum which the +temperament of different philosophers or of different nations clings to, +and will not criticise, and in each case it is contrasted with the world +in which the vulgar believe, as something deeper, simpler, and more +real. Perhaps when solipsism of the present moment is reached by a +philosopher trained in abstraction and inclined to ecstasy, his +experience, at this depth of concentration, will be that of an extreme +tension which is also liberty, an emptiness which is intensest light; +and his denial of all natural facts and events, which he will call +illusions, will culminate in the fervent assertion that all is One, and +that One is Brahma, or the breath of life. On the other hand, a +scientific observer and reasoner, who has pried into substance, and has +learned that all the aspects of nature are relative and variable, may +still not deny the existence of matter in every object; and this element +of mere intensity, drawn from the sense of mere actuality in himself, +may lead him to assert that pure Being is, and everything else is not. +Finally, a secondary mind fed on books may drop the natural emphasis +which objects of sense have for the living animal, and may retain, as +the sole filling of its present moment, nothing but the sciences. The +philosopher will then balance his denial of material facts by asserting +the absolute reality of his knowledge of them. This reality, however, +will extend no farther than his information, as some intensest moment of +recollection may gather it together; and his personal idea of the world, +so composed and so limited, will seem to him the sole existence. His +universe will be the after-image of his learning. + +We may notice that in these three instances scepticism has not suspended +affirmation but has rather intensified it, pouring it all on the devoted +head of one chosen object. There is a tireless and deafening vehemence +about these sceptical prophets; it betrays the poor old human Psyche +labouring desperately within them in the shipwreck of her native hopes, +and refusing to die. Her sacrifice, she believes, will be her salvation, +and she passionately identifies what remains to her with all she has +lost and by an audacious falsehood persuades herself she has lost +nothing. Thus the temper of these sceptics is not at all sceptical. They +take their revenge on the world, which eluded them when they tried to +prove its existence, by asserting the existence of the remnant which +they have still by them, insisting that this, and this only, is the true +and perfect world, and a much better one than that false world in which +the heathen trust. Such infatuation in the solipsist, however, is not +inevitable; no such exorbitant credit need be given to the object, +perhaps a miserable one, which still fills the sceptical mind, and a +more dispassionate scepticism, while contemplating that object, may +disallow it. + + + + + CHAPTER IV + DOUBTS ABOUT SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS + + +Do I know, can I know, anything? Would not knowledge be an impossible +inclusion of what lies outside? May I not rather renounce all beliefs? +If only I could, what peace would descend into my perturbed conscience! +The spectacle of other men’s folly continually reawakens in me the +suspicion that I too am surely fooled; and the character of the beliefs +which force themselves upon me—the fantasticality of space and time, the +grotesque medley of nature, the cruel mockery called religion, the sorry +history and absurd passions of mankind—all invite me to disown them and +to say to what I call the world, “Come now; how do you expect me to +believe in _you_?” At the same time this very incredulity and wonder in +me are baseless and without credentials. What right have I to any +presumptions as to what would be natural and proper? Is not the most +extravagant fact as plausible as any other? Is not the most obvious +axiom a wanton dogma? Yet turn whichever way I will, and refine as I +may, the pressure of existence, of tyrannical absolute present being, +seems to confront me. Something is evidently going on, at least in +myself. I feel an instant complex strain of existence, forcing me to say +that I think and that I am. Certainly the words I use in such reflection +bring many images with them which may possess no truth. Thus when I say +“I,” the term suggests a man, one of many living in a world contrasted +with his thinking, yet partly surveyed by it. These suggestions of the +word “I” might well be false. This thinking might not belong to a member +of the human family, and no such race as this mankind that I am thinking +of might ever have existed. The natural world in which I fancy that race +living, among other races of animals, might also be imaginary. Yet, in +that case, what is imagination? Banish myself and my world as much as I +will, the present act of banishing them subsists and is manifest; and it +was this act, now unrolling itself consciously through various phases, +not any particular person in any environment, that I meant when I said, +“I find that I think and am.” + +In like manner the terms thinking and finding, which I use for want of +anything better, imply contrasts and antecedents which I may disregard. +It is not a particular process called thinking, nor a particular +conjunction called finding, that I need assert to exist, but merely this +passing unrest, whatever you choose to call it: these pulsations and +phantoms which to deny is to produce and to strive to banish is to +redouble. + +It might seem for a moment as if this pressing actuality of experience +implied a relation between subject and object, so that an indescribable +being called the ego or self was given with and involved in any actual +fact. This analysis, however, is merely grammatical, and if pressed +issues in mythical notions. Analysis can never find in the object what, +by hypothesis, is not there; and the object, by definition, is all that +is found. But there is a biological truth, discovered much later, under +this alleged analytic necessity: the truth that animal experience is a +product of two factors, antecedent to the experience and not parts of +it, namely, organ and stimulus, body and environment, person and +situation. These two natural conditions must normally come together, +like flint and steel, before the spark of experience will fly. But +scepticism requires me to take the spark itself as my point of +departure, since it alone lives morally and lights up with its vital +flame the scene I seem to discover. This spark is single, though +changeful. Experience has no conditions for a critic of knowledge who +proceeds transcendentally, that is, from the vantage-ground of +experience itself. To urge, therefore, that a self or ego is presupposed +in experience, or even must have created experience by its absolute +fiat, is curiously to fail in critical thinking, and to renounce the +transcendental method. All transcendental system-makers are in fact +false to the very principle by which they criticise dogmatism; a +principle which admits of no system, tolerates no belief, but recalls +the universe at every moment into the absolute experience which posits +it here and now. + +This backsliding of transcendentalism, when it forgets itself so far as +to assign conditions to experience, might have no serious consequences, +if transcendentalism were clearly recognised to be simply a romantic +episode in reflection, a sort of poetic madness, and no necessary step +in the life of reason. That its professed scepticism should so soon turn +into mythology would then seem appropriate in such a disease of genius. +But the delusion becomes troublesome to the serious critic of knowledge +when it perhaps inclines him to imagine that, in asserting that +experience is a product, and has two terms, he is describing the inner +nature of experience, and not merely its external conditions, as natural +history reports them. He may then be tempted to assign a metaphysical +status and logical necessity to a merely material fact. Instead of the +body, which is the true “subject” in experience, he may think he finds +an absolute ego, and instead of the natural environment of the body, +which is the true “object,” he may think he finds an illimitable +reality; and, to make things simpler, he may proceed to declare that +these two are one; but all this is myth. + +The fact of experience, then, is single and, from its own point of view, +absolutely unconditioned and groundless, impossible to explain and +impossible to exorcise. Yet just as it comes unbidden, so it may fade +and lapse of its own accord. It constantly seems to do so; and my hold +on existence is not so firm that non-existence does not seem always at +hand and, as it were, always something deeper, vaster, and more natural +than existence. Yet this apprehension of an imminent non-existence—an +apprehension which is itself an existing fact—cannot be trusted to +penetrate to a real nothingness yawning about me unless I assert +something not at all involved in the present being, and something most +remarkable, namely, that I know and can survey the _movement_ of my +existence, and that it can actually have lapsed from one state into +another, as I conceive it to have lapsed. + +Thus the sense of a complex strain of existence, the conviction that I +am and that I am thinking, involve a sense of at least possible change. +I should not speak of complexity nor of strain, if various opposed +developments into the not-given were not, to my feeling, striving to +take place. Doors are about to open, cords to snap, blows to fall, +pulsations to repeat themselves. The flux and perspectives of being seem +to be open within me to my own intuition. + +Caution is requisite here. All this may be simply a present obsession, +destitute of all prophetic or retrospective truth, and carrying me no +further, if I wish to be honest, than a bare confession of how I feel. +Anything given in intuition is, by definition, an appearance and nothing +but an appearance. Of course, if I am a thorough sceptic, I may +discredit the existence of anything else, so that this appearance will +stand in my philosophy as the only reality. But, then, I must not +enlarge nor interpret nor hypostatise it: I must keep it as the mere +picture it is, and revert to solipsism of the present moment. One thing +is the _feeling_ that something is happening, an intuition which finds +what it finds and cannot be made to find anything else. Another thing is +the _belief_ that what is found is a report or description of events +that have happened already, in such a manner that the earlier phases of +the flux I am aware of existed first, before the later phases and +without them; whereas in my intuition now the earlier phases are merely +the first part of the given whole, exist only together with the later +phases, and are earlier only in a perspective, not in a flux of +successive events. If anything had an actual beginning, that first phase +must have occurred out of relation to the subsequent phases which had +not yet arisen, and only became manifest in the sequel: as the Old +Testament, if really earlier than the New Testament, must have existed +alone first, when it could not be called old. If it had existed only in +the Christian Bible, under that perspective which renders and calls it +old, it would be old only speciously and for Christian intuition, and +all revelation would have been really simultaneous. In a word, specious +change is not actual change. The unity of apperception which yields the +sense of change renders change specious, by relating the terms and +directions of change together in a single perspective, as respectively +receding, passing, or arriving. In so uniting and viewing these terms, +intuition of change excludes actual change in the given object. If +change has been actual, it must have been prior to, and independent of, +the intuition of that change. + +Doubtless, as a matter of fact, this intuition of change is itself +lapsing, and yielding its place in physical time to vacancy or to the +intuition of changelessness; and this lapse of the intuition in physical +time is an actual change. Evidently, however, it is not a given change, +since neither vacancy nor the intuition of changelessness can reveal it. +It is revealed, if revealed at all, by a further intuition of specious +change _taken as a report_. Actual change, if it is to be known at all, +must be known by belief and not by intuition. Doubt is accordingly +always possible regarding the existence of actual change. Having +renounced my faith in nature, I must not weakly retain faith in +experience. This intuition of change might be false; it might be the +only fact in the universe, and perfectly changeless. I should then be +that intuition, but it would not bring me any true knowledge of anything +actual. On the contrary, it would be an illusion, presenting a false +object, since it would present nothing but change, when the only actual +reality, namely its own, was unchanging. On the other hand, if this +intuition of change was no illusion, but a change was actually occurring +and the universe had passed into its present state out of a previous +state which was different (if, for instance, this very intuition of +change had grown more articulate or more complex), I should then be +right in hazarding a very bold assertion, namely, that it is known to me +that what now is was not always, that there are things not given, that +there is genesis in nature, and that time is real. + + + + + CHAPTER V + DOUBTS ABOUT CHANGE + + +As I watch a sensible object the evidence of variation is often +irresistible. This flag is flapping. This flame is dancing. How shall I +deny that almost everything, in nature and in fancy, like the Ghost in +_Hamlet_, is here, is there, is gone? Of course I witness these +appearances and disappearances. The intuition of change is more direct +and more imperious than any other. But _belief_ in change, as I found +just now, asserts that before this intuition of change arose the first +term of that change had occurred separately. This no intuition of change +can prove. The belief is irresistible in animal perception, for reasons +which biology can plausibly assign; and it cannot be long suspended in +actual thinking; but it may be suspended for a moment theoretically, in +the interests of a thorough criticism. The criticism too may prove +persuasive. Many solemn if not serious philosophers have actually +maintained that this irresistible assertion is false, and that all +diversity and change are illusion. In denying time, multiplicity, and +motion, their theory has harked back—and it is no mean feat of +concentration—almost to the infancy of thought, and reversed the whole +life of reason. This mystical retraction of all the beliefs necessary to +life, and suspension, almost, of life itself, have been sometimes +defended by dialectical arguments, to the effect that change is +impossible, because the idea of it is incoherent or self-contradictory. +Such arguments, however, are worthless for a critic of knowledge, +because they involve an assumption much grosser than that which they +discard. They assume that if a thing is dialectically unintelligible, as +change is, or inexpressible in terms other than its own, it cannot be +true; whereas, on the contrary, _only_ when dialectic passes its own +frontiers and, fortified by a passport countersigned by experience, +enters the realm of brute fact, has dialectic itself any claim to truth +or any relevance to the facts. Dialectical difficulties, therefore, are +irrelevant to valid knowledge, the terms of which are irrational, no +less than is their juxtaposition in existence. + +The denial of change may rest on more sceptical grounds, and may have a +deeper and more tragic character. It may come from insight into the +temerity of asserting change. Why, indeed, do men believe in it? Because +they see and feel it: but this fact is not denied. They may see and feel +all the changes they like: what reason is that for believing that over +and above this actual intuition, with the specious change it regards, +one state of the universe has given place to another, or different +intuitions have existed? You feel you have changed; you feel things +changing? Granted. Does this fact help you to feel an earlier state +which you do not feel, which is not an integral part of what is now +before you, but a state from which you are supposed to have passed into +the state in which you now are? If you feel that earlier state now, +there is no change involved. That datum, which you now designate as the +past, and which exists only in this perspective, is merely a term in +your present feeling. It was never anything else. It was never given +otherwise than as it is given now, when it is given as past. Therefore, +if things are such only as intuition makes them, every suggestion of a +past is false. For if the event now called past was ever actual and in +its day a present event, then it is not merely a term in the specious +change now given in intuition. Thus the feeling of movement, on which +you so trustfully rely, cannot vouch for the reality of movement, I +mean, for the existence of an actual past, once present, and not +identical with the specious past now falling within the compass of +intuition. By a curious fatality, the more you insist on the sense of +change the more you hedge yourself in in the changeless and the +immediate. There is no avenue to the past or future, there is no room or +breath for progressive life, except through faith in the intellect and +in the reality of things not seen. + +I think that if the sense of change, primordial and continual as it is, +were ever pure, this fact that in itself it is changeless would not seem +strange or confusing: for evidently the idea of _pure_ change would be +always the same, and changeless; it could change only by yielding to the +idea of rest or of identity. But in animals of a human complexity the +sense of change is never pure; larger terms are recognised and felt to +be permanent, and the change is seen to proceed within one of these or +the other, without being pervasive, or changing everything in the +picture. These are matters of animal sensibility, to be decided +empirically—that is, never to be decided at all. Every new animal is +free to feel in a new way. The gnat may begin with a sense of flux, like +Heraclitus, and only diffidently and sceptically ask himself _what_ it +is that is rushing by; and the barnacle may begin, like Parmenides, with +a sense of the unshakable foundations of being, and never quite +reconcile himself to the thought that reality could ever move from its +solid bottom, or exchange one adhesion for another. But, after all, the +mind of Heraclitus, seeing nothing but flux, would be as constant a mind +as that of Parmenides, seeing nothing but rest; and if the philosophy of +Heraclitus were the only one in the world, there would be no change in +the world of philosophy. + +Accordingly, when I have removed the instinctive belief in an +environment beyond the given scene, and in a past and future beyond the +specious present, the lapse in this specious present itself and the +sensible events within it lose all the urgency of actual motions. They +become pictures of motions and ideas of events: I no longer seem to live +in a changing world, but an illusion of change seems to play idly before +me, and to be contained in my changelessness. This pictured change is a +particular quality of being, as is pain or a sustained note, not a +passage from one quality of being to another, since the part called +earlier never disappears and the part called later is given from the +first. Events, and the reality of change they involve, may therefore be +always illusions. The sceptic can ultimately penetrate to the vision of +a reality from which they should be excluded. All he need do, in order +to attain to this immunity from illusion, is to extirpate from his own +nature every vestige of anxiety, not to regret nor to fear nor to +attempt anything. If he can accomplish this he has exorcised belief in +change. + +Moreover, the animal compulsion to believe in change may not only be +erroneous, but it may not operate at all times. I may remain alive, and +be actually changing, and yet this change in me, remaining unabated, may +be undiscerned. Very quick complete changes, cutting up existence into +discrete instants, the inner order of which would not be transmitted +from one to the other, would presumably exclude memory. There would be +no intuition of change, and therefore not even a possible belief in it. +A certain actual persistence is requisite to perceive a flux, and an +absolute flux, in which nothing was carried over from moment to moment, +would yield, in each of these moments, nothing but an intuition of +permanence. So far is the actual instability of things, even if I admit +it, from involving a sense of it, or excluding a sense of its opposite. +I may, therefore, occasionally deny it; and nothing can persuade me, +during those moments, that my insight then is not truer than at other +times, when I perceive and believe in change. The mystic must confess +that he spends most of his life in the teeming valleys of illusion: but +he may still maintain that truth and reality are disclosed to him only +on those almost inaccessible mountain tops, where only the One and +Changeless is visible. That the believer in nature perceives that this +mystical conviction is itself a natural event, and a very ticklish and +unstable illusion, does not alter that conviction while it lasts, nor +enter into its deliverance: so that under its sway the mystic may +disallow all change and multiplicity, either virtually by forgetting it, +or actually by demonstrating it to be false and impossible. Being +without irrational expectation (and all expectation is irrational) and +without belief in memory (which is a sort of expectation reversed), he +will lack altogether that sagacity which makes the animal believe in +latent events and latent substances, on which his eventual action might +operate; and his dialectic not being rebuked by any contrary buffets of +experience, he will prove to his heart’s content that change is +unthinkable. For if discrete altogether, without a continuous substance +or medium, events will not follow one another, but each will simply +exist absolutely; and if a substance or medium be posited, no relation +can be conceived to obtain between it and the events said to diversify +it: for in so far as the substance or medium permeates the events +nothing will happen or change; and in so far as the events really occur +and are not merely specious changes given in one intuition, they will be +discrete altogether, without foothold in that medium or substance +postulated in vain to sustain them. Thus the mystic, on the wings of a +free dialectic, will be wafted home to his ancient and comforting +assurance that all is One, that Being is, and that Non-Being is not. + + + + + CHAPTER VI + ULTIMATE SCEPTICISM + + +Why should the mystic, in proportion as he dismisses the miscellany of +experience as so much illusion, feel that he becomes one with reality +and attains to absolute existence? I think that the same survival of +vulgar presumptions which leads the romantic solipsist to retain his +belief in his personal history and destiny, leads the mystic to retain, +and fondly to embrace, the feeling of existence. His speculation is +indeed inspired by the love of security: his grand objection to the +natural world, and to mortal life, is that they are deceptive, that they +cheat the soul that loves them, and prove to be illusions: the +assumption apparently being that reality must be permanent, and that he +who has hold on reality is safe for ever. In this the mystic, who so +hates illusions, is the victim of an illusion himself: for the reality +he has hold of is but the burden of a single moment, which in its +solipsism thinks itself absolute. What is reality? As I should like to +use the term, reality is being of any sort. If it means character or +essence, illusions have it as much as substance, and more richly. If it +means substance, then sceptical concentration upon inner experience, or +ecstatic abstraction, seems to me the last place in which we should look +for it. The immediate and the visionary are at the opposite pole from +substance; they are on the surface or, if you like, at the top; whereas +substance if it is anywhere is at the bottom. The realm of immediate +illusion is as real as any other, and very attractive; many would wish +it to be the only reality, and hate substance; but if substance exists +(which I am not yet ready to assert) they have no reason to hate it, +since it is the basis of those immediate feelings which fill them with +satisfaction. Finally, if reality means existence, certainly the mystic +and his meditation may exist, but not more truly than any other natural +fact; and what would exist in them would be a pulse of animal being, +kindling that momentary ecstasy, as animal life at certain intensities +is wont to do. The theme of that meditation, its visionary object, need +not exist at all; it may be incapable of existing if it is essentially +timeless and dialectical. The animal mind treats its data as facts, or +as signs of facts, but the animal mind is full of the rashest +presumptions, positing time, change, a particular station in the midst +of events yielding a particular perspective of those events, and the +flux of all nature precipitating that experience at that place. None of +these posited objects is a datum in which a sceptic could rest. Indeed, +existence or fact, in the sense which I give to these words, cannot be a +datum at all, because existence involves external relations and actual +(not merely specious) flux: whereas, however complex a datum may be, +with no matter what perspectives opening within it, it must be embraced +in a single stroke of apperception, and nothing outside it can belong to +it at all. The datum is a pure image; it is essentially illusory and +unsubstantial, however thunderous its sound or keen its edge, or however +normal and significant its presence may be. When the mystic asserts +enthusiastically the existence of his immediate, ideal, unutterable +object, Absolute Being, he is peculiarly unfortunate in his faith: it +would be impossible to choose an image less relevant to the agencies +that actually bring that image before him. The burden and glow of +existence which he is conscious of come entirely from himself; his +object is eminently empty, impotent, non-existent; but the heat and +labour of his own soul suffuse that emptiness with light, and the very +hum of change within him, accelerated almost beyond endurance and quite +beyond discrimination, sounds that piercing note. + +The last step in scepticism is now before me. It will lead me to deny +existence to any datum, whatever it may be; and as the datum, by +hypothesis, is the whole of what solicits my attention at any moment, I +shall deny the existence of everything, and abolish that category of +thought altogether. If I could not do this, I should be a tyro in +scepticism. Belief in the existence of anything, including myself, is +something radically incapable of proof, and resting, like all belief, on +some irrational persuasion or prompting of life. Certainly, as a matter +of fact, when I deny existence I exist; but doubtless many of the other +facts I have been denying, because I found no evidence for them, were +true also. To bring me evidence of their existence is no duty imposed on +facts, nor a habit of theirs: I must employ private detectives. The +point is, in this task of criticism, to discard every belief that is a +belief merely; and the belief in existence, in the nature of the case, +can be a belief only. The datum is an idea, a description; I may +contemplate it without belief; but when I assert that such a thing +exists I am hypostatising this datum, placing it in presumptive +relations which are not internal to it, and worshipping it as an idol or +thing. Neither its existence nor mine nor that of my belief can be given +in any datum. These things are incidents involved in that order of +nature which I have thrown over; they are no part of what remains before +me. + +Assurance of existence expresses animal watchfulness: it posits, within +me and round me, hidden and imminent events. The sceptic can easily cast +a doubt on the remoter objects of this belief; and nothing but a certain +obduracy and want of agility prevents him from doubting present +existence itself. For what could present existence mean, if the imminent +events for which animal sense is watching failed altogether, failed at +the very roots, so to speak, of the tree of intuition, and left nothing +but its branches flowering _in vacuo_? Expectation is admittedly the +most hazardous of beliefs: yet what is watchfulness but expectation? +Memory is notoriously full of illusion; yet what would experience of the +present be if the veracity of primary memory were denied, and if I no +longer believed that anything had just happened, or that I had ever been +in the state from which I suppose myself to have passed into this my +present condition? + +It will not do for the sceptic to take refuge in the confused notion +that expectation _possesses_ the future, or memory the past. As a matter +of fact, expectation is like hunger; it opens its mouth, and something +probably drops into it, more or less, very often, the sort of thing it +expected; but sometimes a surprise comes, and sometimes nothing. Life +involves expectation, but does not prevent death: and expectation is +never so thoroughly stultified as when it is not undeceived, but +cancelled. The open mouth does not then so much as close upon nothing. +It is buried open. Nor is memory in a better case. As the whole world +might collapse and cease at any moment, nullifying all expectation, so +it might at any moment have sprung out of nothing: for it is thoroughly +contingent, and might have begun to-day, with this degree of complexity +and illusive memory, as well as long ago, with whatever energy or +momentum it was first endowed with. The backward perspective of time is +perhaps really an inverted expectation; but for the momentum of life +forward, we might not be able to space the elements active in the +present so as to assign to them a longer or a shorter history; for we +should not attempt to discriminate amongst these elements such as we +could still count on in the immediate future, and such as we might +safely ignore: so that our conception of the past implies, perhaps, a +distinction between the living and the dead. This distinction is itself +practical, and looks to the future. In the absolute present all is +specious; and to pure intuition the living are as ghostly as the dead, +and the dead as present as the living. + +In the sense of existence there is accordingly something more than the +obvious character of that which is alleged to exist. What is this +complement? It cannot be a feature in the datum, since the datum by +definition is the whole of what is found. Nor can it be, in my sense at +least of the word existence, the intrinsic constitution or specific +being of this object, since existence comports external relations, +variable, contingent, and not discoverable in a given being when taken +alone: for there is nothing that may not lose its existence, or the +existence of which might not be conceivably denied. The complement added +to the datum when it is alleged to exist seems, then, to be added by +_me_; it is the finding, the occurrence, the assault, the impact of that +being here and now; it is the experience of it. But what can experience +be, if I take away from it the whole of what is experienced? And what +meaning can I give to such words as impact, assault, occurrence, or +finding, when I have banished and denied my body, my past, my residual +present being, and everything except the datum which I find? The sense +of existence evidently belongs to the intoxication, to the _Rausch_, of +existence itself; it is the strain of life within me, prior to all +intuition, that in its precipitation and terror, passing as it +continually must from one untenable condition to another, stretches my +attention absurdly over what is not given, over the lost and the +unattained, the before and after which are wrapped in darkness, and +confuses my breathless apprehension of the clear presence of all I can +ever truly behold. + +Indeed, so much am I a creature of movement, and of the ceaseless +metabolism of matter, that I should never catch even these glimpses of +the light, if there were not rhythms, pauses, repetitions, and nodes in +my physical progress, to absorb and reflect it here and there: as the +traveller, hurried in a cloud of smoke and dust through tunnel after +tunnel in the Italian Riviera, catches and loses momentary visions of +blue sea and sky, which he would like to arrest, but cannot; yet if he +had not been rushed and whistled along these particular tunnels, even +those snatches, in the form in which they come to him, would have been +denied him. So it is the rush of life that, at its open moments, floods +me with intuitions, partial and confused, but still revelations; the +landscape is wrapped in the smoke of my little engine, and turned into a +tantalising incident of my hot journey. What appears (which is an ideal +object and not an event) is thus confused with the event of its +appearance; the picture is identified with the kindling or distraction +of my attention falling by chance upon it; and the strain of my material +existence, battling with material accidents, turns the ideal object too +into a temporal fact, and makes it seem substantial. But this fugitive +existence which I egotistically attach to it, as if its fate was that of +my glimpses of it, is no part of its true being, as even my intuition +discerns it; it is a practical dignity or potency attributed to it by +the irrelevant momentum of my animal life. Animals, being by nature +hounded and hungry creatures, spy out and take alarm at any datum of +sense or fancy, supposing that there is something substantial there, +something that will count and work in the world. The notion of a moving +world is brought implicitly with them; they fetch it out of the depths +of their vegetating psyche, which is a small dark cosmos, silently +revolving within. By being noticed, and treated as a signal for I know +not what material opportunity or danger, the given image is taken up +into the business world, and puts on the garment of existence. Remove +this frame, strip off all suggestion of a time when this image was not +yet present, or a time when it shall be past, and the very notion of +existence is removed. The datum ceases to be an appearance, in the +proper and pregnant sense of this word, since it ceases to imply any +substance that appears or any mind to which it appears. It is an +appearance only in the sense that its nature is wholly manifest, that it +is a specific being, which may be mentioned, thought of, seen, or +defined, if any one has the wit to do so. But its own nature says +nothing of any hidden circumstances that shall bring it to light, or any +adventitious mind that shall discover it. It lies simply in its own +category. If a colour, it is just this colour; if a pain, just this +pain. Its appearance is not an event: its presence is not an experience; +for there is no surrounding world in which it can arise, and no watchful +spirit to appropriate it. The sceptic has here withdrawn into the +intuition of a surface form, without roots, without origin or +environment, without a seat or a locus; a little universe, an immaterial +absolute theme, rejoicing merely in its own quality. This theme, being +out of all adventitious relations and not in the least threatened with +not being the theme it is, has not the contingency nor the fortunes +proper to an existence; it is simply that which it inherently, +logically, and unchangeably is. + +Existence, then, not being included in any immediate datum, is a fact +always open to doubt. I call it a fact notwithstanding, because in +talking about the sceptic I am positing his existence. If he has any +intuition, however little the theme of that intuition may have to do +with any actual world, certainly I who think of his intuition, or he +himself thinking of it afterwards, see that this intuition of his must +have been an event, and his existence at that time a fact; but like all +facts and events, this one can be known only by an affirmation which +posits it, which may be suspended or reversed, and which is subject to +error. Hence all this business of intuition may perfectly well be +doubted by the sceptic: the existence of his own doubt (however +confidently I may assert it for him) is not given to him then: all that +is given is some ambiguity or contradiction in images; and if afterwards +he is sure that he has doubted, the sole cogent evidence which that fact +can claim lies in the psychological impossibility that, so long as he +believes he has doubted, he should not believe it. But he may be wrong +in harbouring this belief, and he may rescind it. For all an ultimate +scepticism can see, therefore, there may be no facts at all, and perhaps +nothing has ever existed. + +Scepticism may thus be carried to the point of denying change and +memory, and the reality of all facts. Such a sceptical dogma would +certainly be false, because this dogma itself would have to be +entertained, and that event would be a fact and an existence: and the +sceptic in framing that dogma discourses, vacillates, and lives in the +act of contrasting one assertion with another—all of which is to exist +with a vengeance. Yet this false dogma that nothing exists is tenable +intuitively and, while it prevails, is irrefutable. There are certain +motives (to be discussed later) which render ultimate scepticism +precious to a spiritual mind, as a sanctuary from grosser illusions. For +the wayward sceptic, who regards it as no truer than any other view, it +also has some utility: it accustoms him to discard the dogma which an +introspective critic might be tempted to think self-evident, namely, +that he himself lives and thinks. That he does so is true; but to +establish that truth he must appeal to animal faith. If he is too proud +for that, and simply stares at the datum, the last thing he will see is +himself. + + + + + CHAPTER VII + NOTHING GIVEN EXISTS + + +Scepticism is not sleep, and in casting a doubt on any belief, or +proving the absurdity of any idea, the sceptic is by no means losing his +sense of what is proposed. He is merely doubting or denying the +_existence_ of any such object. In scepticism, therefore, everything +turns on the meaning of the word existence, and it will be worth while +to stop a moment here to consider it further. + +I have already indicated roughly how I am using the word existence, +namely, to designate such being as is in flux, determined by external +relations, and jostled by irrelevant events. Of course this is no +definition. The term existence is only a name. In using it I am merely +pointing out to the reader, as if by a gesture, what this word +designates in my habits of speech, as if in saying Cæsar I pointed to my +dog, lest some one should suppose I meant the Roman emperor. The Roman +emperor, the dog, and the sound Cæsar are all indefinable; but they +might be described more particularly, by using other indicative and +indefinable names, to mark their characteristics or the events in which +they figured. So the whole realm of being which I point to when I say +existence might be described more fully; the description of it would be +physics or perhaps psychology; but the exploration of that realm, which +is open only to animal faith, would not concern the sceptic. + +The sceptic turns from such indefinite confusing objects to the +immediate, to the datum; and perhaps for a moment he may fancy he has +found true existence there; but if he is a good sceptic he will soon be +undeceived. Certainly in the immediate he will find freedom from the +struggle of assertion and counter-assertion: no report there, no +hypothesis, no ghostly reduplication of the obvious, no ghostly +imminence of the not-given. Is not the obvious, he might ask, the truly +existent? Yet the obvious is only the apparent; and this in both senses +of this ambiguous word. The datum is apparent in the sense of being +self-evident and luminous; and it is apparent also in the sense of +merely appearing and being unsubstantial. In this latter sense, the +apparent threatens to become the non-existent. Does not the existent +profess to be more than apparent: to be not so much the self-evident as +that which I am seeking evidence for, in the sense of testimony? Is not +the existent, then (which from its own point of view, or physically, is +more than the apparent), cognitively and from my point of view less than +the apparent? Does it not need witnesses to bear testimony to its being? +And what can recommend those witnesses to me except their intrinsic +eloquence? I shall prove no sceptic if I do not immediately transfer all +my trust from the existence reported to the appearance reporting it, and +substitute the evidence of my senses for all lawyer’s evidence. I shall +forget the murders and embroglios talked about in the court, and gaze at +the judge in his scarlet and ermine, with the pale features of an old +fox under his grey wig; at the jury in their stolidity; at the witness +stammering; at the counsel, officially insolent, not thinking of what he +is saying mechanically, but whispering something that really interests +him in an aside, almost yawning, and looking at the clock to see if it +is time for luncheon; and at the flood of hazy light falling aslant on +the whole scene from the high windows. Is not the floating picture, in +my waking trance, the actual reality, and the whole world of existence +and business but a perpetual fable, which this trance sustains? + +The theory that the universe is nothing but a flux of appearances is +plausible to the sceptic; he thinks he is not believing much in +believing it. Yet the residuum of dogma is very remarkable in this view; +and the question at once will assail him how many appearances he shall +assert to exist, of what sort, and in what order, if in any, he shall +assert them to arise; and the various hypotheses that may be suggested +concerning the character and distribution of appearances will become +fresh data in his thought; and he will find it impossible to decide +whether any such appearances, beyond the one now passing before him, are +ever actual, or whether any of the suggested systems of appearances +actually exists. Thus existence will loom again before him, as something +problematical, at a distance from that immediacy into which he thought +he had fled. + +Existence thus seems to re-establish itself in the very world of +appearances, so soon as these are regarded as facts and events occurring +side by side or one after the other. In each datum taken separately +there would be no occasion to speak of existence. It would be an obvious +appearance; whatever appeared there would be simply and wholly apparent, +and the fact that it appeared (which would be the only fact involved) +would not appear in it at all. This fact, the existence of the +intuition, would not be asserted until the appearance ceased to be +actual, and was viewed from the outside, as something that presumably +had occurred, or would occur, or was occurring elsewhere. In such an +external view there might be truth or error; not so in each appearance +taken in itself, because in itself and as a whole each is a pure +appearance and bears witness to nothing further. Nevertheless, when some +term within this given appearance comes to be regarded as a sign of some +other appearance not now given, the question is pertinent whether that +other appearance exists or not. Thus existence and non-existence seem to +be relevant to appearances in so far as they are problematical and +posited from outside, not in so far as they are certain and given. + +Hence an important conclusion which at first seems paradoxical but which +reflection will support; namely, that the notion that the datum exists +is unmeaning, and if insisted upon is false. That which exists is the +fact that the datum is given at that particular moment and crisis in the +universe; the intuition, not the datum, is the fact which occurs; and +this fact, if known at all, must be asserted at some other moment by an +adventurous belief which may be true or false. That which is certain and +given, on the contrary, is something of which existence cannot be +predicated, and which, until it is used as a description of something +else, cannot be either false or true. + +I see here how halting is the scepticism of those modern philosophers +who have supposed that to exist is to be an idea in the mind, or an +object of consciousness, or a fact of experience, if by these phrases no +more is meant than to be a datum of intuition. If there is any existence +at all, presence to consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient to +render it an existence. Imagine a novelist whose entire life was spent +in conceiving a novel, or a deity whose only function was to think a +world. That world would not exist, any more than the novel would +comprise the feelings and actions of existing persons. If that novelist, +in the heat of invention, believed his personages real, he would be +deceived: and so would that deity if he supposed his world to exist +merely because he thought of it. Before the creation could be actual, or +the novel historical, it would have to be enacted elsewhere than in the +mind of its author. And if it was so enacted, it would evidently not be +requisite to its existence that any imaginative person, falsely +conceiving himself to be its author, should form an image of it in his +mind. If he did so, that remarkable clairvoyance would be a fact +requiring explanation; but it would be an added harmony in the world, +not the ground of its existence. + +If for the sake of argument I accept the notion that presence to +intuition is existence, I may easily disprove it by a _reductio ad +absurdum_. If nothing not given in intuition can exist, then all those +beliefs in existing facts beyond my intuition, by which thought is +diversified when it is intelligent, would be necessarily false, and all +intelligence would be illusion. This implication might be welcome to me, +if I wished not to entertain any opinions which might conceivably be +wrong. But the next implication is more disconcerting, namely, that the +intuitions in which such illusion appears can have no existence +themselves: for being instances of intuition they could not be data for +any intuition. At one moment I may _believe_ that there are or have been +or will be other moments; but evidently they would not be _other_ +moments, if they were data to me now, and nothing more. If presence to +intuition were necessary to existence, intuition itself would not exist; +that is, no other intuition would be right in positing it; and as this +absence of transcendence would be mutual, nothing would exist at all. +And yet, since presence to intuition would be sufficient for existence, +everything mentionable would exist without question, the non-existent +could never be thought of, to deny anything (if I knew what I was +denying) would be impossible, and there would be no such thing as fancy, +hallucination, illusion, or error. + +I think it is evidently necessary to revise a vocabulary which lends +itself to such equivocation, and if I keep the words existence and +intuition at all, to lend them meanings which can apply to something +possible and credible. I therefore propose to use the word existence (in +a way consonant, on the whole, with ordinary usage) to designate not +data of intuition but facts or events believed to occur in nature. These +facts or events will include, _first_, intuitions themselves, or +instances of consciousness, like pains and pleasures and all remembered +experiences and mental discourse; and _second_, physical things and +events, having a transcendent relation to the data of intuition which, +in belief, may be used as signs for them; the same transcendent relation +which objects of desire have to desire, or objects of pursuit to +pursuit; for example, such a relation as the fact of my birth (which I +cannot even remember) has to my present persuasion that I was once born, +or the event of my death (which I conceive only abstractly) to my +present expectation of some day dying. If an angel visits me, I may +intelligibly debate the question whether he exists or not. On the one +hand, I may affirm that he came in through the door, that is, that he +existed before I saw him; and I may continue in perception, memory, +theory, and expectation to assert that he was a fact of nature: in that +case I believe in his existence. On the other hand, I may suspect that +he was only an event in me, called a dream; an event not at all included +in the angel as I saw him, nor at all like an angel in the conditions of +its existence; and in this case I disbelieve in my vision: for visiting +angels cannot honestly be said to exist if I entertain them only in +idea. + +Existences, then, from the point of view of knowledge, are facts or +events affirmed, not images seen or topics merely entertained. Existence +is accordingly not only doubtful to the sceptic, but odious to the +logician. To him it seems a truly monstrous excrescence and superfluity +in being, since anything existent is more than the description of it, +having suffered an unintelligible emphasis or materialisation to fall +upon it, which is logically inane and morally comic. At the same time, +existence suffers from defect of being and obscuration; any ideal +nature, such as might be exhaustively given in intuition, when it is +materialised loses the intangibility and eternity proper to it in its +own sphere; so that existence doubly injures the forms of being it +embodies, by ravishing them first and betraying them afterwards. + +Such is existence as approached by belief and affirmed in animal +experience; but I shall find in the sequel that considered physically, +as it is unrolled amidst the other realms of being, existence is a +conjunction of natures in adventitious and variable relations. According +to this definition, it is evident that existence can never be given in +intuition; since no matter how complex a datum may be, and no matter how +many specious changes it may picture, its specious order and unity are +just what they are: they can neither suffer mutation nor acquire new +relations: which is another way of saying that they cannot exist. If +this whole evolving world were merely given in idea, and were not an +external object posited in belief and in action, it could not exist nor +evolve. In order to exist it must enact itself ignorantly and +successively, and carry down all ideas of it in its own current. + + + + + CHAPTER VIII + SOME AUTHORITIES FOR THIS CONCLUSION + + +The ultimate position of the sceptic, that nothing given exists, may be +fortified by the authority of many renowned philosophers who are +accounted orthodox; and it will be worth while to stop for a moment to +invoke their support, since the scepticism I am defending is not meant +to be merely provisional; its just conclusions will remain fixed, to +remind me perpetually that all alleged knowledge of matters of fact is +faith only, and that an existing world, whatever form it may choose to +wear, is intrinsically a questionable and arbitrary thing. It is true +that many who have defended this view, in the form that all appearance +is illusion, have done so in order to insist all the more stoutly on the +existence of something occult which they call reality; but as the +existence of this reality is far easier to doubt than the existence of +the obvious, I may here disregard that compensatory dogma. I shall soon +introduce compensatory dogmas of my own, more credible, I think, than +theirs; and I shall attribute existence to a flux of natural events +which can never be data of intuition, but only objects of a belief which +men and animals, caught in that flux themselves, hazard instinctively. +Although a sceptic may doubt all existence, none being involved in any +indubitable datum, yet I think good human reasons, apart from +irresistible impulse, can be found for positing existing intuitions to +which data appear, no less than other existing events and things, which +the intuited data report or describe. For the moment, however, I am +concerned to justify further the contention of the sceptic that, if we +refuse to bow to the yoke of animal faith, we can find in pure intuition +no evidence of any existence whatsoever. + +There is notably one tenet, namely, that all change is illusion, proper +to many deep-voiced philosophers, which of itself suffices to abolish +all existence, in the sense which I give to this word. Instead of change +they probably posit changeless substance or pure Being; but if substance +were not subject to change, at least in its distribution, it would not +be the substance of anything found in the world or happening in the +mind; it would, therefore, have no more lodgement in existence than has +pure Being, which is evidently only a logical term. Pure Being, as far +as it goes, is no doubt a true description of everything, whether +existent or non-existent; so that if anything exists, pure Being will +exist in it; but it will exist merely as pure colour does in all +colours, or pure space in all spaces, and not separately nor +exclusively. These philosophers, in denying change, accordingly deny all +existence. But though many of them have prized this doctrine, few have +lived up to it, or rather none have; so that I may pass over the fact +that in denying change they have inadvertently denied existence, even to +substance and pure Being, because they have inadvertently retained both +existence and change. The reality they attributed with so much unction +and conviction to the absolute was not that proper to this idea—one of +the least impressive which it is possible to contemplate—but was +obviously due to the strain of existence and movement within themselves, +and to the vast rumble, which hypnotised them, of universal mutation. + +It is the Indians who have insisted most sincerely and intrepidly on the +non-existence of everything given, even adjusting their moral regimen to +this insight. Life is a dream, they say: and all experienced events are +illusions. In dreaming of nature and of ourselves we are deceived, even +in imagining that we exist and are deceived and dreaming. Some aver, +indeed, that there is a universal dreamer, Brahma, slumbering and +breathing deeply in all of us, who is the reality of our dreams, and the +negation of them. But as Brahma is emphatically not qualified by any of +the forms of illusory existence, but annuls them all, there is no need, +for my purpose, of distinguishing him from the reported state of +redeemed souls (where many souls are admitted) nor from the Nirvana into +which lives flow when they happily cease, becoming at last aware, as it +were, that neither they nor anything else has ever existed. + +It would be rash, across the chasm of language and tradition that +separates me from the Indians, to accuse their formidable systems of +self-contradiction. Truth and reality are words which, in the mouths of +prophets, have often a eulogistic rather than a scientific force; and if +it is _better_ to elude the importunities of existence and to find a +sanctuary of intense safety and repose in the notion of pure Being, +there may be a dramatic propriety in saying that the view of the saved, +from which all memory of the path to salvation is excluded, is the true +view, and their condition the only reality; so that they are right in +thinking that they have never existed, and we wrong in thinking that we +now exist. + +Here is an egotism of the redeemed with which, as with other egotisms, I +confess I have little sympathy. The blessed, in giving out that I do not +exist in my sins, because they cannot distinguish me, appear to me to be +deceived. The intrinsic blessedness of their condition cannot turn into +a truth this small oversight on their part, however excusable. I +suspect, or I like to imagine, that what the Indians mean is rather that +the principle of my existence, and of my persuasion that I exist, is an +_evil_ principle. It is sin, guilt, passion, and mad will, the natural +and universal source of illusion—very much what I am here calling animal +faith; and since this assertiveness in me (according to the Indians) is +wrong morally, and since its influence alone leads me to posit existence +in myself or in anything else, if I were healed morally I should cease +to assert existence; and I should, in fact, have ceased to exist. + +Now in this doctrine, so stated, lies a great confirmation of my thesis +that nothing given exists; because it is only a dark principle, +transcendental in respect to the datum (that is, on the hither side of +the footlights) that calls up this datum at all, or leads me to posit +its existence. It is this sorry self of mine sitting here in the dark, +one in this serried pack of open-mouthed fools, hungry for illusion, +that is responsible for the spectacle; for if a foolish instinct had not +brought me to the playhouse, and if avid eyes and an idealising +understanding had not watched the performance, no part of it would have +abused me: and if no one came to the theatre, the actors would soon flit +away like ghosts, the poets would starve, the scenery would topple over +and become rubbish, and the very walls would disappear. Every part of +experience, as it comes, is illusion; and the source of this illusion is +my animal nature, blindly labouring in a blind world. + +Such is the ancient lesson of experience itself, when we reflect upon +experience and turn its illusions into instruction: a lesson which a +bird-witted empiricism can never learn, though it is daily repeated. But +the Indian with a rare sensitiveness joined a rare recollection. He +_lived_: a religious love, a childish absorption in appearances as they +come (which busy empiricists do not share), led him to remember them +truly, in all their beauty, and therefore to perceive that they were +illusions. The poet, the disinterested philosopher, the lover of things +distilled into purity, frees himself from belief. This infinite chaos of +cruel and lovely forms, he cries, is all deceptive, all unsubstantial, +substituted at will for nothing, and soon found to sink into nothing +again, and to be nothing in truth. + +I will disregard the vehemence with which these saintly scholastics +denounce the world and the sinful nature that attaches me to it. I like +the theatre, not because I cannot perceive that the play is a fiction, +but because I do perceive it; if I thought the thing a fact, I should +detest it: anxiety would rob me of all my imaginative pleasure. Even as +it is, I often wish the spectacle were less barbarous; but I am not +angry because each scene does not last for ever, and is likely to be +followed by a thousand others which I shall not witness. Such is the +nature of endless comedy, and of experience. But I wish to retain the +valuable testimony of the Indians to the non-existence of the obvious. +This testimony is the more valuable because the spectacle present to +their eyes was tropical; harder, therefore, to master and to smile at +than are the political and romantic medleys which fill the mind of +Europe. Yet amidst the serpents and hyænas, the monkeys and parrots of +their mental jungle, those sages could sit unmoved, too holily +incredulous for fear. How infinite, how helpless, how deserving of +forgiveness creative error becomes to the eye of understanding, that +loves only in pity, and has no concupiscence for what it loves! How like +unhappy animals western philosophers seem in comparison, with their +fact-worship, their thrift, their moral intolerance, their imaginative +poverty, their political zeal, and their subservience to intellectual +fashion! + +It makes no difference for my purposes if the cosmology of the Indians +was fanciful. It could hardly be more extraordinary than the +constitution of the material world is in fact, nor more decidedly out of +scale with human data; truth and fancy in this matter equally convict +the human senses of illusion. Nor am I out of sympathy with their hope +of escaping from the universal hurly-burly into some haven of peace. A +philosopher has a haven in himself, of which I suspect the fabled bliss +to follow in other lives, or after total emancipation from living, is +only a poetic symbol: he has pleasure in truth, and an equal readiness +to enjoy the scene or to quit it. Liberation is never complete while +life lasts, and is nothing afterwards; but it flows in a measure from +this very conviction that all experience is illusion, when this +conviction is morally effective, as it was with the Indians. Their +belief in transmigration or in Karma is superfluous in this regard, +since a later experience could only change the illusion without +perfecting the liberation. Yet the mention of some ulterior refuge or +substance is indispensable to the doctrine of illusion, and though it +may be expressed mythically must be taken to heart too. It points to +other realms of being—such as those which I call the realms of matter, +truth, and spirit—which by nature cannot be data of intuition but must +be posited (if recognised by man at all) by an instinctive faith +expressed in action. Whether these ulterior realms exist or not is their +own affair: existence may be proper to some, like matter or spirit, and +not to others, like truth. But as to the data of intuition, their +non-existent and illusory character is implied in the fact that they are +given. A datum is by definition a theme of attention, a term in passing +thought, a visioned universal. The realm in which it lies, and in which +flying intuition discloses it for a moment, is the very realm of +non-existence, of inert or ideal being. The Indians, in asserting the +non-existence of every term in possible experience, not only free the +spirit from idolatry, but free the realm of spirit (which is that of +intuition) from limitation; because if nothing that appears exists, +anything may appear without the labour and expense of existing; and +fancy is invited to range innocently—fancies not murdering other fancies +as an existence must murder other existences. While life lasts, the +field is thus cleared for innocent poetry and infinite hypothesis, +without suffering the judgement to be deceived nor the heart enslaved. + +European philosophers, even when called idealists, have seldom +reconciled themselves to regarding experience as a creature of fancy. +Instead of looking beneath illusion for some principle that might call +it forth or perhaps dispel it, as they would if endeavouring to +interpret a dream, they have treated it as dreams are treated by the +superstitious; that is, they have supposed that the images they saw were +themselves substances, or powers, or at least imperfect visions of +originals resembling them. In other words, they have been empiricists, +regarding appearances as constituents of substance. There have been +exceptions, but some of them only prove the rule. Parmenides and +Democritus certainly did not admit that the data of sense or imagination +existed otherwise than as illusions or conventional signs: but their +whole interest, for this reason, skipped over them, and settled heavily +on “Being,” or on the atoms and the void, which they severally supposed +underlay appearance. Appearance itself thereby acquired a certain +vicarious solidity, since it was thought to be the garment of substance; +somehow within the visionary datum, or beneath it, the most +unobjectionable substance was always to be found. Parmenides could not +have admitted, and Democritus had not discovered, that the sole basis of +appearances was some event in the brain, in no way resembling them; and +that the relation of data to the external events they indicated was that +of a spontaneous symbol, like an exclamatory word, and not that of a +copy or emanation. The simple ancients supposed (as some of my +contemporaries do also) that perception stripped material things of +their surface properties, or was actually these surface properties +peeled off and lodged in the observer’s head. Accordingly the denial of +existence to sensibles and to intelligibles was never hearty until +substance was denied also, and nothing existent was any longer supposed +to lurk within these appearances or behind them. + +All modern idealists have perceived that an actual appearance cannot be +a part of a substance that does not appear; the given image has only the +given relations; if I assign other relations to it (which I do if I +attribute existence to it) I substitute for the pure datum one of two +other things: either a substance possessing the same form as that datum, +but created and dissolved in its own medium, at its own periods, apart +from all observation; or else, a perception of my own, a moment in my +experience, carrying the vision of such an image. The former choice +simply puts me back at the beginning of physics, when a merely pictorial +knowledge of the material world existed, and nothing of its true +mechanism and history had been discovered. The latter choice posits +human discourse, or as these philosophers call it, experience: and it is +certain that the status of a datum in discourse or experience is that of +a mere appearance, fluctuating, intermittent, never twice the same, and +dependent for its specious actuality on the movement of attention and +the shuffling of confused images in the fancy. In other words, what +exists—that is, what is carried on through the flux and has changing and +external relations—is a _life_, discourse itself, the voluminous +adventures of the mind in its wholeness. This is also what novelists and +literary psychologists endeavour to record or to imagine; and the +particular data, hardly distinguishable by the aid of a word clapped on +to them, are only salient sparks or abstract points of reference for an +observer intent on ulterior events. It is ulterior events, the whole of +human experience and history as conventionally reported, that is the +object of belief in this school, and the true existence. + +Ostensibly empiricists seek to reduce this unmanageable object to +particular data, and to attribute existence to each scintilla taken +separately; but in reality all the relations of these intuitions (which +are not relations between the data), their temporal order, subordination +to habit and passion, associations, meaning, and embosoming +intelligence, are interpolated as if they were matters of course; and +indeed they are, because these are the tides of animal life on which the +datum sparkles for a moment. Empiricists are interested in practice, and +wish to work with as light an intellectual equipment as possible; they +therefore attribute existence to “ideas”—meaning intuitions but +professing to mean data. If they were interested in these data for their +own sake, they would perceive that they are only symbols, like words, +used to mark or express the crises in their practical career; and +becoming fervid materialists again in their beliefs, as they have always +been in their allegiances, they might soon go so far as to deny that +there is intuition of data at all: which is a radical way of denying +their existence. Discourse and experience would thus drop out of sight +altogether, and instead of data of intuition there would be only the +pictorial elements of physics—the other possible form in which anything +given may be asserted to exist. + +If anything, therefore, exists at all when an appearance arises, this +existence is not the unit that appears, but either a material fact +presenting such an appearance, though constituted by many other +relations, or else an actual intuition evoking, creating, or dreaming +that non-existent unit. Idealists, if they are thorough, will deny both; +for neither a material thing nor an actual intuition has its being in +being perceived: both, by definition, exist on their own account, by +virtue of their internal energy and natural relations. Therefore either +existence apart from givenness is admitted, inconsistently with +idealism, or existence is denied altogether. It is allowed, and in fact +urged, by all complete idealists that appearance, far from involving the +existence of what appears, positively excludes it. _Esse est percipi_ +was a maxim recalled by an intelligible literary impulse, as Faust said, +_Gefühl ist Alles!_ Yet that maxim was uttered without reflection, +because what those who uttered it really meant was the exact opposite, +namely, that only spirits, or perhaps one spirit, existed, which were +beings perfectly imperceptible. It was the beautiful and profound part +of such a sentiment that whatever is pictorial is nonexistent. Data +could be only forms assumed by animal sensibility, like the camel and +the weasel seen by Hamlet in a cloud; as these curious creatures could +have no zoological existence in that nebula, so the units of human +apperception have no existence anywhere. + +When idealists say, therefore, that ideas are the only objects of human +knowledge and that they exist only in the mind, their language is +incoherent, because knowledge of ideas is not knowledge, and presence to +intuition is not existence. But this incoherence enables two different +philosophies to use the same formula, to the extreme confusion both of +doctrine and feeling. One philosophy under the name idea conceives of a +fact or phenomenon, a phase in the flux of fortune or experience, +existing at a given moment, and known at other moments to have existed +there: in other words, its ideas are recollected events in nature, the +subject-matter of psychology and physics. This philosophy, when carried +out, becomes materialism; its psychology turns into a record of +behaviour and its phenomenalistic view of nature into a mathematical +calculus of invisible processes. The other philosophy (which alone +concerns me here) under the name idea understands the terms of sensation +and thought, and their pictorial or rhetorical synthesis. Since these +themes of intuition are called upon to absorb all reality, and no belief +is accepted as more than a fresh datum in thought, this philosophy +denies the transcendence of knowledge and the existence of anything. + +Although the temper of absolute idealists is often far from sceptical, +their method is scepticism itself: as appears not only in their +criticism of all dogma, but in the reasons they give for their own +views. What are these reasons? That the criticism of knowledge proves +that actual thinking is the only reality; that the objects of knowledge +can live, move, and have their being only within it; that existence is +something merely imputed; and that truth is coherence among views having +themselves no objects. A fact, these critics say, is a concept. This +statement might seem absurd, since a concept means at most the idea or +supposition of a fact; but if the statement is taken sympathetically, +for what the malicious criticism of knowledge means by it, it amounts to +this: that there are no facts, but that what we call facts, and believe +to be such, are really only conventional fictions, imaginations of what +facts would be if facts were possible at all. That facts are ideals, +impossible to realise, is clear on transcendental principles, since a +fact would be an event or existence which knowledge would have to +approach and lay siege to somehow from the outside, so that for +knowledge (the only reality on this system) they would always remain +phantoms, creatures of a superstitious instinct, terms for ever posited +but never possessed, and therefore perpetually unreal. If fact or truth +had any separate being it could not be an integral part of knowledge; +what modicum of reality facts or truths can possess they must borrow +from knowledge, in which they perforce remain ideals only; so that it is +only as unreal that they are real at all. Transcendentalists are sure +that knowledge is everything, not because they presume that everything +is known, but precisely because they see that there is nothing to know. +If anything existed actually, or if there was any independent truth, it +would be unknowable, as these voracious thinkers conceive knowledge. The +glorious thing about knowledge, in their eyes, is that, as there is +nothing to know, knowledge is a free and a sure creation, new and +self-grounded for ever. + +Transcendentalism, when it is thorough, accordingly agrees with the +Indian systems in maintaining that the illusion that given objects exist +has itself no existence. Any actual sensation, any instance of thinking, +would be a self-existing fact; but facts are only concepts, that is, +inert terms in absolute thought: if illusions occurred actually, they +would not be concepts but events, and though their visionary objects +might be non-existent, the vision of them would exist; and they would be +the sort of independent facts which transcendental logic excludes as +impossible. Acts of judging or positing or imagining cannot be admitted +on this system until they in their turn have been posited in another +judgement; that is, until they cease to hide their heads in the +obscurity of self-existence, and become purely ideal themes of actual +intuition. When they have thus become phenomenal, intent and judgement +may posit them and depute them to exist; but the belief that they exist +otherwise than as present postulates is always false. Imputed existence +is the only existence possible, but must always be imputed falsely. For +example, the much-talked-of opinions of ancient philosophers, if they +had existed at all, would have had to exist before they became objects +of intuition to the historian, or to the reader of history, who judges +them to have existed; but such self-existence is repugnant to +transcendental logic: it is a ghost cut off from knowledge and from the +breath of life in me here and now. Therefore the opinions of +philosophers exist only in history, history exists only in the +historian, and the historian only in the reader; and the reader himself +exists only for his self-consciousness, which is not really his own, but +absolute consciousness thinking about him or about all things from his +point of view. Thus everything exists only ideally, by being falsely +supposed to exist. The only knowable reality is unreal because specious, +and all other reality is unreal because unknowable. + +Transcendentalists are thus driven, like Parmenides and the Vedanta +philosophy, to withdraw into a dark interior yet omnipresent principle, +the unfathomable force that sets all this illusion going, and at the +same time rebukes and annuls the illusion. I am here concerned, let me +repeat, with scepticism, not with compensatory dogmas; but for the +transcendentalist, who fundamentally abhors substance, the compensatory +dogma itself is one more denial of existence. For what, in his system, +is this transcendental seat of all illusion, this agent in all +judgements and positings? Not an existing spirit, if such a phrase could +have a meaning. Absolute thought cannot exist first, before it imputes +existence to other things or to itself. If it needed to possess +existence before imputing it, as the inexpert in logic might suppose, +the whole principle of transcendental criticism would be abandoned and +disproved, and nothing would any longer prevent the existence of +intuitions or of material things before any one posited them. But if +non-existent, what can absolute spirit be? Just a principle, a logic to +be embodied, a self-creating programme or duty, asserting itself without +any previous instrument, ground, or occasion. Existence is something +utterly unworthy of such a transcendental spirit, and repugnant to it. +Spirit is here only a name for absolute law, for the fatality or chance +that one set of appearances instead of another insists upon arising. No +doubt this fatality is welcome to the enthusiast in whom this spirit is +awake, and its very groundlessness takes on the form of freedom and +creative power to his apprehension: but this sympathy with life, being +expressly without any natural basis, is itself a happy accident, and +precarious: and sometimes conscience may suddenly turn against it, and +call it vain, mad, and criminal. Fichte once said that he who truly +wills anything must will that very thing for ever; and this saying may +be interpreted consistently with transcendentalism, if it is understood +to mean that, since transcendental will is dateless and creates its own +universe wherever it exerts itself, the character of this will is +unalterable in that phase of it, producing just that vision and that +world, which being out of time cannot be devoured by time. But perhaps +even Fichte was not free from human weakness, and he may also have +meant, or half-meant, that a thorough education, such as Prussia was +called to create, could fix the will of mankind and turn it into an +unalterable habit; and that a philosopher could pledge the absolute +always to posit the same set of objects. So understood, the maxim would +be contrary to transcendentalism and to the fervent conviction of Fichte +himself, which demanded “new worlds for ever.” Even if he meant only +that the principle of perpetual novelty at least was safe and could +never be betrayed by the event, he would have contradicted the absolute +freedom of “Life” to be what it willed, and his own occasional fears +that, somewhere and some day, Life might grow weary, and might consent +to be hypnotised and enslaved by the vision of matter which it had +created. + +But the frailty even of the greatest idealists is nothing against +idealism, and the principle that existence is something always imputed, +and never found, is not less cogent if idealists, for the sake of +courtesy, sometimes say that when existence is imputed necessarily it is +imputed truly; and it makes no difference for my object whether they +call fiction truth because it is legal, or call legality illusion +because it is false. In any case, I can invoke the authority of this +whole school, in which consciousness has been studied and described with +admirable sincerity, for the thesis I have at heart. They deny with one +voice that anything given can exist on its own account, or can be +anything but a theme chosen by the spirit, a theme which no substantial +thing or event existing outside could ever force the spirit to conceive +or to copy. Nothing existent can appear, and nothing specious can exist. +An apparition is a thought, its whole life is but mine in thinking it; +and whatever monition or significance I may attribute to its presence, +it can never be anything but the specious thing it is. In the routine of +animal life, an appearance may be normal or abnormal, and animal faith +or practical intellect may interpret it in a way practically right or +wrong; but in itself every appearance, just because it is an appearance, +is an illusion. + +Confirmation of this thesis may also be found in an entirely different +quarter, in natural history. The sensibility of animals, as judged by +their motions and behaviour, is due to their own structure. The +surrounding facts and forces are like the sun shining and the rain +falling on the just and the unjust; they condition the existence of the +animal and reward any apt habits which he may acquire; but he survives +mainly by insensibility, and by a sort of pervasive immunity to most of +the vibrations that run through him. It is only in very special +directions, to very special occasional stimulations, that he develops +instinctive responses in special organs: and his intuitions, if he has +them, express these reactions. If the stimulus is cut off, the material +sources of it may continue to be what they were, but they will not be +perceived. If the stimulus, or anything equivalent to it, reaches the +brain from any source, as in dreams, the same intuition will appear, in +the absence of the material object. The feelings of animals express +their bodily habit; they do not express directly either the existence or +the character of any external thing. The intent to react on these +external things is independent of any presumptive data of intuition and +antecedent to their appearance: it is an animal endeavour in pursuit or +avoidance, or an animal expectation; but the signals by which intuition +may mark the crises of this animal watch or animal struggle are the same +signals as appear in a dream, when nothing is afoot. The immediate +visionary datum is never the intended object, but always a pathological +symptom, a term in discourse, a description proffered at that moment by +that feeling for that object, different for each channel of sense, +translating digestibility into taste, salubrity into freshness, distance +into size, refraction into colour, attitude into outline, distribution +into perspective, and immersing everything in a moral medium, where it +becomes a good or an evil, as it cannot be save to animal sympathy. + +All these transcripts, however original in character, remain symbols in +function, because they arise in the act of focussing animal sensibility +or animal endeavour upon some external influence. In a healthy life they +become the familiar and unmistakable masks of nature, lending to +everything in the environment its appropriate aspect in human discourse, +its nickname in the human family. For this reason, when imagination +works in a void (as it can do in dreams or under the influence of +violent passion) it becomes illusion in the bad sense of this word; that +is, it is still taken for a symbol, when it is the symbol of nothing. +All these data, if by a suspension of practical reference they came to +be regarded in themselves, would cease to be illusions cognitively, +since no existence would be suggested by any of them; but a practical +man might still call them illusions for that very reason, because +although free from error they would be devoid of truth. In order to +reach existences intent must transcend intuition, and take data for what +they mean, not for what they are; it must credit them, as understanding +credits words, accepting the passing vision as a warrant for something +that once was, or that will be, or that lies in an entirely different +medium, that of material being, or of discourse elsewhere. Intuition +cannot reveal or discriminate any fact; it is pure fancy; and the more I +sink into it, and the more absolute I make it, the more fanciful it +becomes. If ever it ceases to mean anything at all, it becomes pure +poetry if placid, and mere delirium if intense. So a pain, when it is +not sorrow at some event or the sign of some injury or crisis in bodily +life, becomes sheer horror, and a sort of wanton little hell, existing +absolutely; because the rending of the organism has raised intuition to +an extreme intensity without giving it direction upon anything to be +found or done in the world, or contemplated in the fancy; and pain, when +it reaches distraction, may be said to be that moral monster, intuition +devouring itself, or wasted in agony upon nothing. + +Thus scientific psychology confirms the criticism of knowledge and the +experience of life which proclaim that the immediate objects of +intuition are mere appearances and that nothing given exists as it is +given. + + + + + CHAPTER IX + THE DISCOVERY OF ESSENCE + + +The loss of faith, as I have already observed, has no tendency to banish +ideas; on the contrary, since doubt arises on reflection, it tends to +keep the imagination on the stretch, and lends to the whole spectacle of +things a certain immediacy, suavity, and humour. All that is sordid or +tragic falls away, and everything acquires a lyric purity, as if the die +had not yet been cast and the ominous choice of creation had not been +made. Often the richest philosophies are the most sceptical; the mind is +not then tethered in its home paddock, but ranges at will over the +wilderness of being. The Indians, who deny the existence of the world, +have a keen sense for its infinity and its variegated colours; they play +with the monstrous and miraculous in the grand manner, as in the +_Arabian Nights_. No critic has had a sharper eye for the outlines of +ideas than Hume, who found it impossible seriously to believe that they +revealed anything. In the critic, as in the painter, suspension of +belief and of practical understanding is favourable to vision; the +arrested eye renders every image limpid and unequivocal. And this is not +merely an effect of physiological compensation, in that perhaps the +nervous energy withdrawn from preparations for action is allowed to +intensify the process of mere sensation. There ensues a logical +clarification as well; because so long as belief, interpretation, and +significance entered in, the object in hand was ambiguous; in seeking +the fact the mind overlooked or confused the datum. Yet each element in +this eager investigation—including its very eagerness—is precisely what +it is; and if I renounce for the moment all transitive intelligence, and +give to each of these elements its due definition, I shall have a much +richer as well as clearer collection of terms and relations before me, +than when I was clumsily attempting to make up my mind. Living beings +dwell in their expectations rather than in their senses. If they are +ever to _see_ what they see, they must first in a manner stop living; +they must suspend the will, as Schopenhauer put it; they must photograph +the idea that is flying past, veiled in its very swiftness. This +swiftness is not its own fault, but that of my haste and inattention; my +hold is loose on it, as in a dream; or else perhaps those veils and that +swiftness are the truth of the picture; and it is they that the true +artist should be concerned to catch and to eternalise, restoring to all +that the practical intellect calls vague its own specious definition. +Nothing is vague in itself, or other than just what it is. Symbols are +vague only in respect to their signification, when this remains +ambiguous. + +It is accordingly an inapt criticism often passed upon Berkeley and Hume +that they overlooked vagueness in ideas, although almost every human +idea is scandalously vague. No, their intuition of ideas, at least +initially, was quite direct and honest. The ambiguity they overlooked +lay in the relation of ideas to physical things, which they wished to +reduce to groups or series of these pellucid ideas—a chimerical physics. +Had they abstained altogether from identifying ideas with objects of +natural knowledge (which are events and facts), and from trying to +construct material things out of optical and tactile images, they might +have much enriched the philosophy of specious reality, and discerned the +innocent realm of ideas as directly as Plato did, but more accurately. +In this they need not have confused or undermined faith in natural +things. Perception _is_ faith; more perception may extend this faith or +reform it, but can never recant it except by sophistry. These virgin +philosophers were like the cubists or futurists in the painting of +to-day. They might have brought to light curious and neglected forms of +direct intuition. They could not justly have been charged with absurdity +for seeing what they actually saw. But they lapse into absurdity, and +that irremediably, if they pretend to be the first and only masters of +anatomy and topography. + +Far from being vague or abstract the obvious ideas remaining to a +complete sceptic may prove too absorbing, too multitudinous, or too +sweet. A moral reprobation of them is no less intelligible than is the +scientific criticism which rejects them as illusions and as no +constituents of the existing world. Conscience no less than business may +blame the sceptic for a sort of luxurious idleness; he may call himself +a lotus-eater, may heave a sigh of fatigue at doing nothing, and may +even feel a touch of the vertigo and wish to close the eyes on all these +images that entertain him to no purpose. But scepticism is an exercise, +not a life; it is a discipline fit to purify the mind of prejudice and +render it all the more apt, when the time comes, to believe and to act +wisely; and meantime the pure sceptic need take no offence at the +multiplicity of images that crowd upon him, if he is scrupulous not to +trust them and to assert nothing at their prompting. Scepticism is the +chastity of the intellect, and it is shameful to surrender it too soon +or to the first comer: there is nobility in preserving it coolly and +proudly through a long youth, until at last, in the ripeness of instinct +and discretion, it can be safely exchanged for fidelity and happiness. +But the philosopher, when he is speculative only, is a sort of perpetual +celibate; he is bent on not being betrayed, rather than on being annexed +or inspired; and although if he is at all wise he must see that the true +marriage of the mind is with nature and science and the practical arts, +yet in his special theoretic vocation, it will be a boon to him to view +all experience simply, in the precision and distinctness which all its +parts acquire when not referred to any substance which they might +present confusedly, nor to any hypothesis or action which they might +suggest. + +The sceptic, then, as a consequence of carrying his scepticism to the +greatest lengths, finds himself in the presence of more luminous and +less equivocal objects than does the working and believing mind; only +these objects are without meaning, they are only what they are +obviously, all surface. They show him everything thinkable with the +greatest clearness and force; but he can no longer imagine that he sees +in these objects anything save their instant presence and their +face-value. Scepticism therefore suspends all knowledge worthy of the +name, all that transitive and presumptive knowledge of facts which is a +form of belief; and instead it bestows intuition of ideas, +contemplative, aesthetic, dialectical, arbitrary. But whereas transitive +knowledge, though important if true, may always be challenged, +intuition, on the contrary, which neither has nor professes to have any +ulterior object or truth, runs no risks of error, because it claims no +jurisdiction over anything alien or eventual. + +In this lucidity and calmness of intuition there is something +preternatural. Imagine a child accustomed to see clothes only on living +persons and hardly distinguishing them from the magical strong bodies +that agitate them, and suddenly carry this child into a costumer’s shop, +where he will see all sorts of garments hung in rows upon manikins, with +hollow breasts all of visible wire, and little wooden nobs instead of +heads: he might be seriously shocked or even frightened. How should it +be possible for clothes standing up like this not to be people? Such +abstractions, he might say to himself, are metaphysically impossible. +Either these figures must be secretly alive and ready, when he least +expects it, to begin to dance, or else they are not real at all, and he +can only fancy that he sees them. Just as the spectacle of all these +gaunt clothes without bodies might make the child cry, so later might +the whole spectacle of nature, if ever he became a sceptic. The little +word _is_ has its tragedies; it marries and identifies different things +with the greatest innocence; and yet no two are ever identical, and if +therein lies the charm of wedding them and calling them one, therein too +lies the danger. Whenever I use the word _is_, except in sheer +tautology, I deeply misuse it; and when I discover my error, the world +seems to fall asunder and the members of my family no longer know one +another. Existence is the strong body and familiar motion which the +young mind expects to find in every dummy. The oldest of us are +sometimes no less recalcitrant to the spectacle of the garments of +existence—which is all we ever saw of it—when the existence is taken +away. Yet it is to these actual and familiar, but now disembowelled +objects, that scepticism introduces us, as if to a strange world; a vast +costumer’s gallery of ideas where all sorts of patterns and models are +on exhibition, without bodies to wear them, and where no human habits of +motion distract the eye from the curious cut and precise embroideries of +every article. This display, so complete in its spectacular reality, not +a button nor a feather wanting or unobserved, is not the living crowd +that it ought to be, but a mockery of it, like the palace of the +Sleeping Beauty. To my conventional mind, clothes without bodies are no +less improper than bodies without clothes; yet the conjunction of these +things is but human. All nature runs about naked, and quite happy; and I +am not so remote from nature as not to revert on occasion to that +nakedness—which is unconsciousness—with profound relief. But ideas +without things and apparel without wearers seem to me a stranger +condition; I think the garments were made to fit the limbs, and should +collapse without them. Yet, like the fig leaves of Eden, they are not +garments essentially. They become such by accident, when one or another +of them is appropriated by the providential buyer—not necessarily +human—whose instinct may choose it; or else it is perfectly content to +miss its chance, and to lie stacked for ever among its motley neighbours +in this great store of neglected finery. + +It was the fear of illusion that originally disquieted the honest mind, +congenitally dogmatic, and drove it in the direction of scepticism; and +it may find three ways, not equally satisfying to its honesty, in which +that fear of illusion may be dispelled. One is death, in which illusion +vanishes and is forgotten; but although anxiety about error, and even +positive error, are thus destroyed, no solution is offered to the +previous doubt: no explanation of what could have called forth that +illusion or what could have dissipated it. Another way out is by +correcting the error, and substituting a new belief for it: but while in +animal life this is the satisfying solution, and the old habit of +dogmatism may be resumed in consequence without practical inconvenience, +speculatively the case is not at all advanced; because no criterion of +truth is afforded except custom, comfort, and the accidental absence of +doubt; and what is absent by chance may return at any time unbidden. The +third way, at which I have now arrived, is to entertain the illusion +without succumbing to it, accepting it openly as an illusion, and +forbidding it to claim any sort of being but that which it obviously +has; and then, whether it profits me or not, it will not deceive me. +What will remain of this non-deceptive illusion will then be a truth, +and a truth the being of which requires no explanation, since it is +utterly impossible that it should have been otherwise. Of course I may +still ask why the identity of this particular thing with itself should +have occurred to _me_; a question which could only be answered by +plunging into a realm of existence and natural history every part and +principle of which would be just as contingent, just as uncalled-for, +and just as inexplicable as this accident of my being; but that this +particular thing, or any other which might have occurred to me instead, +should be constituted as it is raises no problem; for how could _it_ +have been constituted otherwise? Nor is there any moral offence any +longer in the contingency of my view of it, since my view of it involves +no error. The error came from a wild belief about it; and the +possibility of error came from a wild propensity to belief. Relieve now +the pressure of that animal haste and that hungry presumption; the error +is washed out of the illusion; it is no illusion now, but an idea. Just +as food would cease to be food, and poison poison, if you removed the +stomach and the blood that they might nourish or infect; and just as +beautiful things would cease to be beautiful if you removed the wonder +and the welcome of living souls, so if you eliminate your anxiety, +deceit itself becomes entertainment, and every illusion but so much +added acquaintance with the realm of form. For the unintelligible +accident of existence will cease to appear to lurk in this manifest +being, weighting and crowding it, and threatening it with being +swallowed up by nondescript neighbours. It will appear dwelling in its +own world, and shining by its own light, however brief may be my glimpse +of it: for no date will be written on it, no frame of full or of empty +time will shut it in; nothing in it will be addressed to me, nor +suggestive of any spectator. It will seem an event in no world, an +incident in no experience. The quality of it will have ceased to exist: +it will be merely the quality which it inherently, logically, and +inalienably is. It will be an ESSENCE. + +Retrenchment has its rewards. When by a difficult suspension of +judgement I have deprived a given image of all adventitious +significance, when it is taken neither for the manifestation of a +substance nor for an idea in a mind nor for an event in a world, but +simply if a colour for that colour and if music for that music, and if a +face for that face, then an immense cognitive certitude comes to +compensate me for so much cognitive abstention. My scepticism at last +has touched bottom, and my doubt has found honourable rest in the +absolutely indubitable. Whatever essence I find and note, that essence +and no other is established before me. I cannot be mistaken about it, +since I now have no object of intent other than the object of intuition. +If for some private reason I am dissatisfied, and wish to change my +entertainment, nothing prevents; but the change leaves the thing I first +saw possessed of all its quality, for the sake of which I perhaps +disliked or disowned it. That, while one essence is before me, some one +else may be talking of another, which he calls by the same name, is +nothing to the purpose; and if I myself change and correct myself, +choosing a new essence in place of the old, my life indeed may have +shifted its visions and its interests, but the characters they had when +I harboured them are theirs without change. Indeed, only because each +essence is the essence defined by instant apprehension can I truly be +said to have changed my mind; for I can have discarded any one of them +only by substituting something different. This new essence could not be +different from the former one, if each was not unchangeably itself. + +There is, then, a sort of play with the non-existent, or game of +thought, which intervenes in all alleged knowledge of matters of fact, +and survives that knowledge, if this is ever questioned or disproved. To +this mirage of the non-existent, or intuition of essence, the pure +sceptic is confined; and confined is hardly the word; because though +without faith and risk he can never leave that thin and bodiless plane +of being, this plane in its tenuity is infinite; and there is nothing +possible elsewhere that, as a shadow and a pattern, is not prefigured +there. To consider an essence is, from a spiritual point of view, to +enlarge acquaintance with true being; but it is not even to broach +knowledge of fact; and the ideal object so defined may have no natural +significance, though it has æsthetic immediacy and logical definition. +The modest scope of this speculative acquaintance with essence renders +it infallible, whilst the logical and æsthetic ideality of its object +renders that object eternal. Thus the most radical sceptic may be +consoled, without being rebuked nor refuted; he may leap at one bound +over the whole human tangle of beliefs and dogmatic claims, elude human +incapacity and bias, and take hold of the quite sufficient assurance +that any essence or ideal quality of being which he may be intuiting has +just the characters he is finding in it, and has them eternally. + +This is no idle assurance. After all, the only thing that can ultimately +interest me in other men’s experience or, apart from animal egotism, in +my own, is just this character of the essences which at any time have +swum into our ken; not at all the length of time through which we may +have beheld them, nor the circumstances that produced that vision; +unless these circumstances in turn, when considered, place before the +mind the essences which it delights to entertain. Of course, the choice +and the interest of essences come entirely from the bent of the animal +that elicits the vision of them from his own soul and its adventures; +and nothing but affinity with my animal life lends the essences I am +able to discern their moral colour, so that to my mind they are +beautiful, horrible, trivial, or vulgar. The good essences are such as +accompany and express a good life. In them, whether good or bad, that +life has its eternity. Certainly when I cease to exist and to think, I +shall lose hold on this assurance; but the theme in which for a moment I +found the fulfilment of my expressive impulses will remain, as it always +was, a theme fit for consideration, even if no one else should consider +it, and I should never consider it again. + +Nor is this all. Not only is the character of each essence inalienable, +and, so long as it is open to intuition, indubitable, but the realm of +essences is infinite. Since any essence I happen to have hit upon is +independent of me and would possess its precise character if I had never +been born, or had never been led by the circumstances of my life and +temperament to apprehend that particular essence, evidently all other +essences, which I have not been led to think of, rejoice in the same +sort of impalpable being—impalpable, yet the only sort of being that the +most rugged experience can ever actually find. Thus a mind enlightened +by scepticism and cured of noisy dogma, a mind discounting all reports, +and free from all tormenting anxiety about its own fortunes or +existence, finds in the wilderness of essence a very sweet and +marvellous solitude. The ultimate reaches of doubt and renunciation open +out for it, by an easy transition, into fields of endless variety and +peace, as if through the gorges of death it had passed into a paradise +where all things are crystallised into the image of themselves, and have +lost their urgency and their venom. + + + + + CHAPTER X + SOME USES OF THIS DISCOVERY + + +There is some danger in pointing out the obvious. Quick wits, perceiving +at once how obvious the obvious is (though they may never have noticed +it before), will say it is futile and silly to dwell upon it. Pugnacious +people will assume that you mean more than you say, and are attempting +to smuggle in some objectionable dogma under your truisms. Finally, +docile minds, pleased to think you are delivering an oracle for their +edification, will bow before your plain words as before some sacred +mystery. The discernment of essence is subject, I know, to all these +misunderstandings, and before going further I will endeavour to remove +them. + +In the first place, a warning to tender idealists. This recognition that +the data of experience are essences is Platonic, but it is a corrective +to all that is sentimental in Platonism, curing it as it were +homœopathically. The realm of essence is not peopled by choice forms or +magic powers. It is simply the unwritten catalogue, prosaic and +infinite, of all the characters possessed by such things as happen to +exist, together with the characters which all different things would +possess if they existed. It is the sum of mentionable objects, of terms +about which, or in which, something might be said. Thus although +essences have the texture and ontological status of Platonic ideas, they +can lay claim to none of the cosmological, metaphysical, or moral +prerogatives attributed to those ideas. They are infinite in number and +neutral in value. Greek minds had rhetorical habits; what told in debate +seemed to them final; and Socrates thought it important to define in +disputation the common natures designated by various words. Plato, who +was initially a poet, had a warmer intuition of his ideas; but it was +still grammar and moral prejudice that led him to select and to deify +them. The quality or function that makes all shepherds shepherds or all +goods good is an essence; but so are all the remaining qualities which +make each shepherd and each good distinguishable from every other. Far +from gathering up the fluidity of existence into a few norms for human +language and thought to be focussed upon, the realm of essence +infinitely multiplies that multiplicity, and adds every undiscriminated +shade and mode of being to those which man has discriminated or which +nature contains. Essence is not something invented or instituted for a +purpose; it is something passive, anything that might be found, every +quality of being; it therefore has not the function of reducing +plurality to unity for the convenience of our poor wits or economy of +language. It is far more garrulous than nature, herself not laconic. + +Nor have essences a metaphysical status, so as to exercise a non-natural +control over nature. My doctrine lends no countenance to the human +presumption that whatsoever man notices or names or loves ought to be +more deeply seated in reality or more permanent than what he ignores or +despises. The good is a great magnet over discourse and imagination, and +therefore rightly rules the Platonic world, which is that of moral +philosophy only; but this good is itself defined and chosen by the +humble animal nature of man, demanding to eat and live and love. In the +realm of essence this human good has no pre-eminence, and being an +essence it has no power. The Platonic notion that ideas were models +which things imperfectly imitated expresses admirably the moral nature +of man attaining to self-knowledge and proclaiming clearly his +instinctive demands; or possibly (if the moralist is also a poet plastic +to the wider influences of nature) defining also the demands which +non-human creatures would make on themselves or on us if they had life +and thought. Platonic ideas, in their widest range, express sympathy +with universal life; they are anagrams of moral insight. Hence their +nobility, and constant appeal to minds struggling after perfection, +whether in art or in self-discipline. The spirit, by expressing itself +in them, is fortified, as the artist is by his work taking shape before +his eyes and revealing to him his own hidden intentions and judgements +never expressed. But the realm of essence is no more limited to these +few ideals chosen and projected heavenwards by the aspiration of living +creatures, than the celestial galaxy is limited to the north star. +Excellence is relative to the accidental life of nature which selects +now one essence and now another to be the goal of some thought or +endeavour. In the realm of essence no emphasis falls on these favourite +forms which does not fall equally on every other member of that infinite +continuum. Every bad thing—bad because false to the ideal which its own +nature may propose to it—illustrates an essence quite as accurately as +if it had been good. No essence, except temporarily and by accident, is +the goal of any natural process, much less its motive power. + +Thus the discernment of essence, while confirming Platonic logic in the +ideal status which it assigns to the terms of discourse (and discourse +includes all that is mental in sensation and perception), destroys the +illusions of Platonism, because it shows that essences, being +non-existent and omnimodal, can exercise no domination over matter, but +themselves come to light in nature or in thought only as material +exigencies may call them forth and select them. The realm of essence is +a perfect democracy, where everything that is or might be has a right of +citizenship; so that only some arbitrary existential principle—call it +the predispositions in matter or the blindness of absolute will—can be +rendered responsible, in a verbal metaphysics, for things being as they +are, causing them to fall now into this form and now into that, or to +choose one essence rather than another to be their type and ideal. These +chosen types are surrounded in the realm of essence by every monster, +every unexampled being, and every vice; no more vicious there, no more +anomalous or monstrous than any other nature. Seen against that infinite +background even the star-dust of modern astronomy, with its strange +rhythms and laws, and its strange fertility, seems the most curious of +accidents: what a choice for existence to make, when it might have been +anything else! And as to the snug universe which the ancients, and most +men in their daily thoughts, have imagined about them, presided over by +its Olympian deities, or its Jewish God, or its German Will, it is not +only the figment of the most laughable egotism, but even if by chance it +were the actual world, it would be utterly contingent and ephemeral. + +This is one hygienic effect of the discovery of essence: it is a +shower-bath for the dreamy moralist, and clears Platonism of +superstition. + +On the other hand, the discernment of essence reinstates the Socratic +analysis of knowledge, by showing that essences are indispensable terms +in the perception of matters of fact, and render transitive knowledge +possible. If there were no purely ideal characters present to intuition +yet not existentially a part either of the mind or of the environment, +nothing ulterior could ever be imagined, much less truly conceived. +Every supposed instance of knowledge would be either a bit of sentience +without an object, or an existing entity unrelated to any mind. But an +essence given in intuition, being non-existent in itself and by no means +the object at that moment intended by the animal in his alertness or +pursuit, may become a description of that object. If there is to be +intelligence at all, the immediate must be vehicular. It is so when +animal fancy is turned to the description of things; for then passive +sensibility supplies terms which are in themselves volatile and +homeless, and these terms may be dispersed as names, to christen the +things that receive them, carrying intelligence by its intent to its +objects (objects already selected by animal endeavour) and reporting the +objects to the animal mind by their appearance. What is given becomes in +this manner a sign for what is sought, and a conventional description of +it; and the object originally posited by faith and intent in the act of +living may be ultimately more and more accurately revealed to belief and +to thought. Essences are ideal terms at the command of fancy and of the +senses (whose data are fancies) as words are at the command of a ready +tongue. If thought arises at all, it must think something after some +fashion; and the essences it evokes in intuition enable it to imagine, +to assert, and perhaps truly to know something about what is not itself +nor its own condition: some existing thing or removed event which would +otherwise run on blindly in its own medium, at best overtaking the +animal unawares, or confronting him to no purpose. But when the animate +body responds to circumstances and is sensitive, in various +unprecedented ways, to their variations, it acquires a whole sensuous +vocabulary in which to describe them, colours, sounds, shapes, sizes, +excellences, and defects being the parts of speech in its grammar. It +feels hot or cold according to the season; so that cold and heat become +signs of the seasons for the spirit, the homely poetry in which the +senses render the large facts and the chief influences of nature. +Perhaps even the vegetative soul has her dreams, but in the animal these +floating visions are clarified by watchfulness and can be compared and +contrasted in their character as well as in their occasions; and they +lend intelligence terms in which to think and judge. The toys of sense +become the currency of commerce; ideas, which were only echoes of facts, +serve as symbols for them. Thus intuition of essences first enables the +mind to say something about anything, to think of what is not given, and +to be a mind at all. + +A great use of the discovery of essence, then, is to justify the notions +of intelligence and knowledge, otherwise self-contradictory, and to show +how such transcendence of the actual is possible for the animal mind. + +The notion of essence is also useful in dismissing and handing over to +physical science, where it belongs, the mooted question concerning the +primary and secondary qualities of matter. There is a profound but +genuine problem here which no logical discrimination and no +psychological analysis can affect, namely: What are the elements of +matter, and by what arrangement or motion of these elements do gross +bodies acquire their various properties? The physical philosophers must +tell us, if they can, how matter is composed: and as they are compelled, +like the rest of us, to begin by studying the aspects and behaviour of +obvious bodies, on the scale of human perception, it is but fair to give +them time, or even eternity, in which to come to a conclusion. But the +question of primary and secondary qualities, as mooted in modern +philosophy, is a false problem. It rests on the presumption that the +data of sense can be and should be constituents of the object in nature, +or at least exactly like its constituents. The object in nature is, for +example, bread I am eating: and the presumption of modern psychologists +is that this object is, or ought to be, composed of my sensations of +contact, colour, temperature, movement, and pleasure in eating it. The +pleasure and the colour, however, soon prove to be reversible according +to the accidents of appetite or jaundice in me, without any change in +the object itself. In the act of eating (overlooked by these +psychologists) I have my radical assurance of that object, know its +place, and continue to testify to its identity. The bread, for animal +faith, is this thing I am eating, and causing to disappear to my +substantial advantage; and although language is clumsy in expressing +this assurance, which runs much deeper than language, I may paraphrase +it by saying that bread is this substance I can eat and turn into my own +substance; in seizing and biting it I determine its identity and its +place in nature, and in transforming it I prove its existence. If the +psychological critics of experience overlooked this animal faith in fact +as they do in theory, their theory itself would have no point of +application, and they would not know what they were talking about, and +would not really be talking about anything. Their data would have no +places and no context. As it is, they continue illegitimately to posit +the bread, as an animal would, and then, in their human wisdom, proceed +to remove from the description of it the colour and the pleasure +concerned, as being mere effects on themselves, while they identify the +bread itself with the remainder of their description hypostatised: +shape, weight, and hardness. But how should some data, when posited, +produce others entirely different, but contemporary, or perhaps earlier? +Evidently these so-called primary qualities are simply those essences +which custom or science continues to use in its description of things: +but meantime the things have evaporated, and the description of them, in +no matter what terms, ought to be idle and useless. All knowledge of +nature and history has become a game of thought, a laborious dream in +which a dim superstition makes me believe that some trains of images are +more prosperous than others. + +It is because essences are not discerned that philosophers in so many +ways labour the hopeless notion that there is nothing in sense which is +not first in things. Either perception and knowledge (which are animal +faith) are deputed to be intuition, so that things have to be composed +pictorially, out of the elements of human discourse, as if their +substance consisted of images pressed together like a pack of cards; or +else ideas must be explained as imports from the outer world, prolonging +the qualities of things, as if the organs of sense were only holes in +the skin, through which emanations of things could pass ready-made into +the heart or head, and perhaps in those dark caverns could breed +unnaturally together, producing a monstrous brood of dreams and errors. +But, as a matter of fact, elaborate bodily mechanisms are just as +requisite for seeing as for thinking, and the landscape, as a man sees +it, is no less human than the universe as his philosophy constructs +it—and we know how human that is. Evidences soon accumulate to prove +that no quality in the object is like any datum of sense. Nothing given +exists. Consider, for instance, the water which seems cold to one hand +and warm to the other. Shall the water be called hot or cold? Both, +certainly, if a full description of it, in all its relations and +appearances, is what is sought. But if what is sought is the substance +of the water, properties shown to be relative to my organs of sense +cannot be “real” qualities of that substance. Their original (for they +were still expected to have originals) was accordingly placed elsewhere. +Perhaps the “real” cold might be in the warm hand, and the “real” warmth +in the cold one; or in cold and hot tracts of the brain respectively; or +else “in the mind”—a substance which might endure heat and cold +simultaneously in different parts of itself. Or perhaps the mind was +simply the heat and the cold existing successively, each a feeling +absolute in itself: but in this case a second mind would be required to +observe, remember, and appropriate those existing feelings, and how +should reflection reach those feelings or know at all what they were? If +they are past, how should intuition possess them now? And if they are +only the present data of intuition, need they ever have existed before, +or in any form but that in which I feel them now, when I feel them no +longer? + +The notion that knowledge is intuition, that it must either penetrate to +the inner quality of its object or else have no object but the overt +datum, has not been carried out with rigour: if it had, it might have +been sooner abandoned. Rudimentary vital feelings, such as pleasure or +hunger, are not supposed even by the most mythological philosophers to +be drawn from external sources of the same quality. Plato in one place +says of intelligence that there must surely be floods of it in the vast +heavens, as there are floods of light there, whence puny man may draw +his dribblet. He neglects, however, to extend this principle to pain, +pleasure, or hunger. He does not argue that my paltry pains and +pleasures can be but drops sucked in from some vast cosmic reservoir of +these feelings, nor that my momentary hunger could never have improvised +its own quality, but must be only a bit, transferred to my mortal +stomach, of a divine hunger eternally gnawing the whole sky. Yet this is +the principle on which many a candid idolater has supposed, and still +supposes, that light, space, music, and reason, as his intuition renders +them, must permeate the universe. + +The illusion is childish, and when we have once discerned essence, it +seems strangely idolatrous. The essences given in intuition are fetched +from no original. The reason, music, space, and light of my imagination +are essences existing nowhere: the intuition of them is quite as +spiritual and quite as personal as my pain, pleasure, or hunger, and +quite as little likely to be drawn from an imaginary store of similar +substances in the world at large. They are dream-lights kindled by my +fancy, like all the terms of discourse; they do not need to be +previously resident either in the object or in the organ of sense. Not +existing at all, they cannot be the causes of their own appearance; nor +would introducing an existing triangle under the skin, or making the +brain triangular, in the least help to display the triangle to +intuition. But if some material thing called a triangle is placed before +me at a suitable distance, my eyes and brain will do the rest, and the +essence dear to Euclid will arise in my mind’s eye. No essence would +ever appear simply because many hypostatic instances of it existed in +the world: a living body must create the intuition and blossom into it, +evoking some spontaneous image. Sense is a faculty of calling names +under provocation; all perception and thought are cries and comments +elicited from the heart of some living creature. They are original, +though not novel, like the feelings of lovers: normal phases of +animation in animals, whose life carries this inner flux of pictures and +currents in the fancy, mixed with little and great emotions and dull +bodily feelings: nothing in all this discourse being a passive copy of +existences elsewhere. + +On the other hand, if the so-called primary qualities, taken +pictorially, are just as symbolic as the secondary ones, the secondary, +taken indicatively, are just as true as the primary. They too report +some particularity in the object which, being relative to me, may be of +the highest importance, and being also relative to something in the +constitution of the object, may be a valuable indication of its nature, +like greenness in grapes. The qualities most obviously relative and +reversible, like pleasant and unpleasant, good and bad, are truly +qualities of things in some of their relations. They can all, by +judicious criticism and redistribution, become _true_ expressions of the +life of nature. They have their exits and their entrances at appointed +times, and they supply a perspective view, or caricature, of the world +no less interesting and pungent for being purely egotistical. Artists +have their place, and the animal mind is one of them. + +That like knows like is a proverb, and after the manner of proverbs it +is applicable on occasion, but its opposite is so too. Similar minds can +understand the same things, and in that sense can understand each other: +they can share and divine one another’s thoughts. This is because +similar organs under similar stimulation will yield similar intuitions, +revealing the same essence: like knows like by dramatic sympathy and +ideal unanimity. But in sensuous perception the unlike knows the unlike. +Here the organ is not adjusted to a similar organ, like instruments +tuned up to the same key: the adjustment is rather to heterogeneous +events in the environment or remote facts on quite a different scale; +and the images that mediate this knowledge are quite unlike the events +they signify. It would be grotesque to expect a flower to imitate or to +resemble the soil, climate, moisture, and light, or even the seed and +sap, that preside over its budding: but the flower presupposes all these +agencies and is an index to them; an index which may become a sign and a +vehicle of knowledge when it is used as an index by some discursive +observer. Any given essence is normally a true sign for the object or +event which occupies animal attention when that essence appears: as it +is true of arsenic that it is poisonous and of pepper that it is hot, +although the quality of being hot or poisonous cannot possibly be a +material constituent of those substances, nor a copy of such a +constituent. The environment determines the occasions on which +intuitions arise, the psyche—the inherited organisation of the +animal—determines their form, and ancient conditions of life on earth no +doubt determined which psyches should arise and prosper; and probably +many forms of intuition, unthinkable to man, express the facts and the +rhythms of nature to other animal minds. Yet all these various +symbolisms and sensuous dialects may be truly significant, composing +most relevant complications in nature, by which she comments on herself. +To suppose that some of these comments are poetical and others literal +is gratuitous. They are all presumably poetical in form (intuition being +poetry in act) and all expressive in function, and addressed to the +facts of nature in some human and moral perspective, as poetry is too. + +The absurdity of wishing to have _intuitions of things_ reaches its +climax when we ask whether things, if nobody looked at them, would still +look as they do. Of course they would still be what they are: but +whether their intrinsic essence, whether they are looked at or not, +_resembles_ such essences as eyes of one sort or another might gather by +looking at them, is an idle question. It is not resemblance but +relevance and closeness of adaptation that render a language expressive +or an expression true. We read nature as the English used to read Latin, +pronouncing it like English, but understanding it very well. If all +other traditions of Latin euphony had been lost, there would have been +no means of discovering in what respect the English pronunciation was a +distortion, although the judicious would have suspected that the Romans +could not have had an Oxonian accent. So each tribe of animals, each +sense, each stage of experience and science, reads the book of nature +according to a phonetic system of its own, with no possibility of +exchanging it for the native sounds: but this situation, though hopeless +in one sense, is not unsatisfactory practically, and is innocently +humorous. It adds to the variety, if not to the gaiety, of experience; +and perhaps a homely accent in knowledge, as in Latin, renders learning +more savoury and familiar, and makes us more willing to read. + +It is just because the images given in sense are so very original and +fantastic that understanding can enlarge knowledge by correcting, +combining, and discounting those appearances. Sensible qualities, like +pet names, do very well at home, when no consistent or exact description +of things is required, but only some familiar signal. When it comes to +public business, however, more serious and legal designations have to be +used, and these are what we call science. The description is not less +symbolic but more accurate and minute. It may also involve—as in optics +and psychology—a discovery of the images of sense as distinct from their +original uses as living visions of things; and we may then learn that +our immediate experience was but a diving-board, on which we hardly knew +we were standing in plunging into the world. It was indeed essentially a +theoretic eminence, a place of outlook, intended to fortify and prepare +us for the plunge. Accordingly the symbols of sense are most relevant to +their object at the remove and on the scale on which our daily action +encounters it. In science, analogies and hypotheses, if not microscopes +and telescopes, supply ideas of things more immediate or more remote. +Thus the warmth and the cold felt at once in the same water inform me +more directly about the water in relation to my two hands, than about my +temperature, my brain, or my intuitions; and yet these things too are +involved in that event and may be discovered in it by science. But +science and sense, though differing in their scope, are exactly alike in +their truth; and the views taken by science, though more penetrating and +extensive, are still views: ground plans, elevations, and geometric +projections taking the place of snapshots. All intuitions, whether in +sense or thought, are theoretic: all are appropriate renderings, on some +method and on some scale, of the circumstances in which they arise, and +may serve to describe those circumstances truly: but experience and tact +are requisite, as in the use of any language or technique of art, in +distributing our stock symbols, and fitting the image to the occasion +and the word to the fact. + +The notion of essence also relieves the weary philosopher of several +other problems, even more scholastic and artificial, concerning +sensations and ideas, particulars and universals, the abstract and the +concrete. There are no such differences in essences as they are given: +all are equally immediate and equally unsubstantial, equally ideal and +equally complete. Nothing could be more actual and specific than some +unpleasant inner feeling or sentiment, as it colours the passing moment; +yet nothing could be less descriptive of anything further, or vaguer in +its significance, or more ephemeral an index to processes and events +which it does not disclose but which are all its substance. And the +clearest idea—say a geometrical sphere—and the most remote from sense +(if we mean by sense the images actually supplied by the outer organs) +is just such a floating presence, caught and lost again, an essence that +in itself tells me nothing of its validity, nor of a world of fact to +which it might apply. All these current distinctions are extraneous to +essences, which are the only data of experience. The distinctions are +borrowed from various ulterior existential relations subsisting between +facts, some mental and some material, but none of them ever given in +intuition. The mental facts, namely the intuitions to which the essences +appear, may be confused by psychologists with those essences, as the +material things supposed to possess those essences as qualities may be +confused with them by the practical intellect, and both may be called by +the same names; a double equivocation which later enables the +metaphysician, by a double hypostasis of the datum, to say that the +material thing and the mental event are one and the same _given fact_. +We may innocently speak of given facts, meaning those posited in +previous perceptions or referred to in previous discourse: but no fact +can be a given fact in the sense of being a datum of intuition. And it +is entirely on relations between facts not given that those current +distinctions rest. They may often express truly the relative scope of +intuitions, or the manner in which they take place amongst the general +events in nature or arise in the animal body: but in respect to +essences, which are the only terms of actual thought, they are perfectly +unmeaning. + +Suppose, for instance, that I see yellow, that my eyes are open, and +that there is a buttercup before me; my intuition (not properly the +essence “yellow” which is the datum) is then called a sensation. If +again I see yellow with my eyes closed, the intuition is called an idea +or a dream—although often in what is called an idea no yellow appears, +but only words. If yet again I see yellow with my eyes open, but there +is no buttercup, the intuition is called a hallucination. These various +situations are curious, and worth distinguishing in optics and in +medical psychology, but for the sceptical scrutiny of experience they +make no difference. What can inform me, when I see yellow simply, +whether my eyes are open or shut, or whether I am awake or dreaming, or +what functions material buttercups may have in psycho-physical +correlation, or whether there is anything physical or anything psychical +in the world, or any world at all? These notions are merely +conventional, imported knowledge or imported delusion. Such extraneous +circumstances, whether true or false, cannot alter in the least the +essence which I have before me, nor its sort of reality, nor its status +in respect to my intuition of it. + +Suppose again that I am at sea and feel the ship rocking. This feeling +is called external perception; but if I feel nausea, my feeling is +called internal sensation, or emotion, or introspection; and there are +sad psychologists to conclude thence that while the ship rocking is +something physical, and a mere appearance, nausea is something +psychical, and an absolute reality. Why this partiality in distributing +metaphysical dignities amongst things equally obvious? Each essence that +appears appears just as it is, because its appearance defines it, and +determines the whole being that it is or has. Nothing given is either +physical or mental, in the sense of being intrinsically a thing or a +thought; it is just a quality of being. Essences (like “rocking”) which +serve eventually to describe material facts are given in intuitions +which are just as mental as those which supply psychological terms for +describing mental discourse. On the other hand, essences (like “nausea”) +used first perhaps for describing discourse, mark crises in the flux of +matter just as precisely as those which are used to describe material +facts directly; because discourse goes on in animals subject to material +influences. But in neither case can the intuitions—which constitute +discourse and the mental sphere—be ever given in intuition. They are +posited in memory, expectation, and dramatic psychology. The rocking I +feel is called physical, because the essence before me—say coloured +planes crossing—serves to report and designate very much more +complicated and prolonged movements in the ship and the waves; and the +nausea I also feel is called psychical, because it reports nothing +(unless my medical imagination intervenes) but is endured pathetically, +with a preponderating sense of time, change, and danger, as it largely +consists in feeling how long this lasts, how upset I am, and how sick I +am about to be. + +Again, if I see yellow once, my experience is called a particular +impression, and its object, yellow, is supposed to exist and to be a +particular too; but if I see yellow again, yellow has mysteriously +become a universal, a general idea, and an abstraction. Yet the datum +for intuition is throughout precisely the same. No essence is abstract, +yet none is a particular thing or event, none is an object of belief, +perception, or pursuit, having a particular position in the context of +nature. Even the intuition, though it is an event, cannot become an +object of pursuit or perception; and its conventional place in history, +when it has been posited and is believed to have occurred, is assigned +to it only by courtesy, at the place and time of its physical support, +as a wife in some countries takes her husband’s name. Not the data of +intuition, but the objects of animal faith, are the particulars +perceived: they alone are the existing things or events to which the +animal is reacting and to which he is attributing the essences which +arise, as he does so, before his fancy. These data of intuition are +universals; they form the elements of such a description of the object +as is at that time possible; they are never that object itself, nor any +part of it. Essences are not drawn out or abstracted from things; they +are given before the thing can be clearly perceived, since they are the +terms used in perception; but they are not given until attention is +stretched upon the thing, which is posited blindly in action; and they +come as revelations, or oracles, delivered by that thing to the mind, +and symbolising it there. In itself, as suspended understanding may +suffer us to recognise it in reflection, each essence is a positive and +complete theme: it is impossible that for experience anything should be +more concrete or individual than is this exact and total appearance +before me. Having never been parts of any perceived object, it is +impossible that given essences should be abstracted from it. Being +obvious and immediate data they cannot even have that congenital +imperfection, that limp, which we might feel in a broken arch, or in the +half of anything already familiar as a whole. But given essences are +indeed visionary, they are unsubstantial; and in that respect they seem +strange and unearthly to an animal expecting to work amongst things +without realising their appearance. Yet ghostly as his instinct may deem +them, they are perfect pictures, with nothing abstract or abstruse in +their specious nature. The abstract is a category posterior to +intuition, and applicable only to terms, such as numbers and other +symbols of mathematics, which have been intentionally substituted for +other essences given earlier, by which they were suggested; but even +these technical terms are abstract only by accident and in function; +they have a concrete essence of their own, and are constitutive elements +of perfectly definite structures in their own plane of being, forming +patterns and running into scales there, like so much music. + +Similarly, nothing given in sensation or thought is in the least vague +in itself. Vagueness is an adventitious quality, which a given +appearance may be said to possess in relation to an object presumed to +have other determinations: as the cloud in _Hamlet_ is but a vague camel +or a vague weasel, but for the landscape-painter a perfectly definite +cloud. The vague is merely the _too_ vague for some assumed purpose; and +philosophers with a mania for accuracy, who find all discourse vague +that is discourse about anything in the world of practice, are like +critics of painting who should find all colours and forms vague, when +they had been touched by aerial perspective, or made poetical by the +rich dyes of fancy and expression. That sort of vagueness is perfection +of artistic form, as the other sort of vagueness may be perfection of +judgement: for knowledge lies in thinking aptly about things, not in +becoming like them. If the standard of articulation in science were the +articulation of existence, science would be impossible for an animal +mind, and if it were possible would be useless: because nothing would be +gained for thought by reproducing a mechanism without any adaptation of +its scale and perspective to the nature of the thinker. + +If the instincts of man were well adapted to his conditions, his +thoughts, without being more accurate, would not seem confused. As it +is, intuition is most vivid in the act of hunting or taking alarm, just +when mistakes are probable: and any obvious essence is then precipitated +upon the object, and quarrelled with and dismissed if the object does +not sustain it. An essence, however evident, may even be declared absent +and inconceivable, if it cannot be attributed absolutely to the +substance of the object being chased or eaten. The hungry nominalist may +well say to himself: “If the hues of the pheasant are no part of the +bird, whence should he have fetched them? Am I not looking at the very +creature I am pursuing and hoping presently to devour? And as my teeth +and hands cannot possibly add anything to the substance they will seize +upon, how should my eyes do so now? If therefore any alleged image can +be proved to be no part of my object, I must be mistaken in supposing +that I see such an image at all.” This is also the argument of the +primitive painter, who knowing that men have two eyes and their hands +five fingers, will not admit that their image might be less complete. In +this way the wand of that Queen Mab, intuition, is assimilated by a too +materialistic philosophy to a tongue or an antenna, and required to +reach out to the object and stir it up, exploring its intrinsic quality +and structure. But it is a magic wand, and calls up only wild and +ignorant visions, mischievous and gaily invented; and if ever a +philosopher dreams he has fathomed the thing before him in action, that +wand is tickling his nose. Intuition cheats in enriching him, and nature +who whispers all these tales in his ear is laughing at him and fondling +him at the same time. It is a kindly fiction; because the dreams she +inspires are very much to his mind, and the lies she invents for his +benefit are her poetic masterpiece. Practical men despise the poetry of +poets, but they are well pleased with their own. They would be ashamed +of amusements which might defeat their purposes, or mislead them about +the issue of events; but they embrace heartily the ingenuous fictions of +the senses which they almost recognise to be fictions, and even the +early myths and religions of mankind. These they find true enough for +practical and moral purposes; their playfulness is a convenient +compendium for facts too hard to understand; they are the normal poetry +of observation and policy. Fancy disorganises conduct only when it +expresses vice; and then it is the vice that does the mischief, and not +the fancy. + +Even philosophers, when they wish to be very plain and economical, +sometimes fall to denying the immediate. Fact-worship, which is an +idolatry of prudence, prejudices them against their own senses, and +against the mind, which is what prudence serves, if it serves anything; +and perhaps they declare themselves incapable of framing images with +fewer determinations than they believe material things to possess. If a +material triangle must have a perfectly defined shape (although at close +quarters matter might elude such confines), or if a material house must +have a particular number of bricks and a particular shade of colour at +each point of its surface, a professed empiricist like Berkeley may be +tempted to deny that he can have an idea of a triangle, _et cetera_, +without such determinations; whereas, however clear his visual images +may have been, it is certain he never could have had, even in direct +perception, an image specifying all the bricks or all the tints of _any_ +house, nor the exact measure of _any_ angle. Berkeley himself, I +suspect, was secretly intent upon essence, which in every degree of +conventional determination is its own standard of completeness. But +given essences have any degree of vagueness in respect to the material +or mathematical objects which they may symbolise, and to which Berkeley +in his hasty nominalism wished to assimilate them. He almost turned +given essences into substances, to take the place of those material +things which he had denied. Each essence is certainly not two +contradictory essences at once; but the definitions which render each +precisely what it is lie in the realm of essence, an infinite continuum +of discrete forms, not in the realm of existence. Essences, in order to +appear, do not need to beg leave of what happens to exist, or to draw +its portrait; yet here the trooping essences are, in such gradations and +numbers as intuition may lend them. It is not by hypostatising them as +they come that their roots in matter or their scope in knowledge can be +discovered. + +Thus the discrimination of essence has a happy tendency to liberalise +philosophy, freeing it at once from literalness and from scepticism. If +all data are symbols and all experience comes in poetic terms, it +follows that the human mind, both in its existence and in its quality, +is a free development out of nature, a language or music the terms of +which are arbitrary, like the rules and counters of a game. It follows +also that the mind has no capacity and no obligation to copy the world +of matter nor to survey it impartially. At the same time, it follows +that the mind affords a true expression of the world, rendered in vital +perspectives and in human terms, since this mind arises and changes +symptomatically at certain foci of animal life; foci which are a part of +nature in dynamic correspondence with other parts, diffused widely about +them; so that, for instance, alternative systems of religion or science, +if not taken literally, may equally well express the actual operation of +things measured by different organs or from different centres. + + + + + CHAPTER XI + THE WATERSHED OF CRITICISM + + +I have now reached the culminating point of my survey of evidence, and +the entanglements I have left behind me and the habitable regions I am +looking for lie spread out before me like opposite valleys. On the one +hand I see now a sweeping reason for scepticism, over and above all +particular contradictions or fancifulness of dogma. Nothing is ever +present to me except some essence; so that nothing that I possess in +intuition, or actually see, is ever _there_; it can never exist bodily, +nor lie in that place or exert that power which belongs to the objects +encountered in action. Therefore, if I regard my intuitions as knowledge +of facts, all my experience is illusion, and life is a dream. At the +same time I am now able to give a clearer meaning to this old adage; for +life would not be a dream, and all experience would not be illusion, if +I abstained from believing in them. The evidence of data is only +obviousness; they give no evidence of anything else; they are not +witnesses. If I am content to recognise them for pure essences, they +cannot deceive me; they will be like works of literary fiction, more or +less coherent, but without any claim to exist on their own account. If I +hypostatise an essence into a fact, instinctively placing it in +relations which are not given within it, I am putting my trust in animal +faith, not in any evidence or implication of my actual experience. I +turn to an assumed world about me, because I have organs for turning, +just as I expect a future to reel itself out without interruption +because I am wound up to go on myself. To such ulterior things no +manifest essence can bear any testimony. They must justify themselves. +If the ulterior fact is some intuition elsewhere, its existence, if it +happens to exist, will justify that belief; but the fulfilment of my +prophecy, in taking my present dream for testimony to that ulterior +experience, will be found only in the realm of truth—a realm which is +itself an object of belief, never by any possibility of intuition, human +or divine. So too when the supposed fact is thought of as a substance, +its existence, if it is found in the realm of nature, will justify that +supposition; but the realm of nature is of course only another object of +belief, more remote if possible from intuition than even the realm of +truth. Intuition of essence, to which positive experience and certitude +are confined, is therefore always illusion, if we allow our +hypostatising impulse to take it for evidence of anything else. + +In adopting this conclusion of so many great philosophers, that all is +illusion, I do so, however, with two qualifications. One is emotional +and moral only, in that I do not mourn over this fatality, but on the +contrary rather prefer speculation in the realm of essence—if it can be +indulged without practical inconvenience—to alleged information about +hard facts. It does not seem to me ignominious to be a poet, if nature +has made one a poet unexpectedly. Unexpectedly nature lent us existence, +and if she has made it a condition that we should be poets, she has not +forbidden us to enjoy that art, or even to be proud of it. The other +qualification is more austere: it consists in not allowing exceptions. I +cannot admit that some particular essence—water, fire, being, atoms, or +Brahma—is the intrinsic essence of all things, so that if I narrow my +imagination to that one intuition I shall have intuited the heart and +the whole of existence. Of course I do not deny that there is water and +that there is being, the former in most things on earth, and the latter +in everything anywhere; but these images or words of mine are not the +things they designate, but only names for them. Desultory and partial +propriety these names may have, but no metaphysical privilege. No more +has the expedient of some modern critics who would take illusion as a +whole and call it the universe; for in the first place they are probably +reverting to belief in discourse, as conventionally conceived, so that +their scepticism is halting; and in the second place, even if human +experience could be admitted as known and vouched for, there would be an +incredible arrogance in positing it as the whole of being, or as itself +confined to the forms and limits which the critic assigns to it. The +life of reason as I conceive it is a mere romance, and the life of +nature a mere fable; such pictures have no metaphysical value, even if +as sympathetic fictions they had some psychological truth. + +The doctrine of essence thus renders my scepticism invincible and +complete, while reconciling me with it emotionally. + +If now I turn my face in the other direction and consider the prospect +open to animal faith, I see that all this insecurity and inadequacy of +alleged knowledge are almost irrelevant to the natural effort of the +mind to describe natural things. The discouragement we may feel in +science does not come from failure; it comes from a false conception of +what would be success. Our worst difficulties arise from the assumption +that knowledge of existences ought to be literal, whereas knowledge of +existences has no need, no propensity, and no fitness to be literal. It +is symbolic initially, when a sound, a smell, an indescribable feeling +are signals to the animal of his dangers or chances; and it fulfils its +function perfectly—I mean its moral function of enlightening us about +our natural good—if it remains symbolic to the end. Can anything be more +evident than that religion, language, patriotism, love, science itself +speak in symbols? Given essences unify for intuition, in entirely +adventitious human terms, the diffuse processes of nature; the aesthetic +image—the sound, the colour, the expanse of space, the scent, taste, and +sweet or cruel pressure of bodies—wears an aspect altogether unlike the +mechanisms it stands for. Sensation and thought (between which there is +no essential difference) work in a conventional medium, as do literature +and music. The experience of essence is direct; the expression of +natural facts through that medium is indirect. But this indirection is +no obstacle to expression, rather its condition; and this vehicular +manifestation of things may be knowledge of them, which intuition of +essence is not. The theatre, for all its artifices, depicts life in a +sense more truly than history, because the medium has a kindred movement +to that of real life, though an artificial setting and form; and much in +the same way the human medium of knowledge can perform its pertinent +synthesis and make its pertinent report all the better when it frankly +abandons the plane of its object and expresses in symbols what we need +to know of it. The arts of expression would be impossible if they were +not extensions of normal human perception. The Greeks recognised that +astronomy and history were presided over by Muses, sisters of those of +tragic and comic poetry; had they been as psychological as modern +reflection has become, they might have had Muses of sight, hearing, and +speech. I think they honoured, if they did not express, this +complementary fact also, that all the Muses, even the most playful, are +witnesses to the nature of things. The arts are evidences of wisdom, and +sources of it; they include science. No Muse would be a humane +influence, nor worthy of honour, if she did not studiously express the +truth of nature with the liberty and grace appropriate to her special +genius. + +Philosophers would not have overlooked the fact that knowledge is, and +ought to be, symbolical, if intuition did not exist also, giving them a +taste of something which perhaps they think higher and more satisfying. +Intuition, when it is placid and masterful enough to stand alone, free +from anxiety or delusion about matters of fact, is a delightful +exercise, like play; it employs our imaginative faculty without warping +it, and lets us live without responsibility. The playful and godlike +mind of philosophers has always been fascinated by intuition; +philosophers—I mean the great ones—are the infant prodigies of +reflection. They often take intuition of essence for their single ideal, +and wish to impose it on the workaday thoughts of men; they make a +play-world for themselves which it is glorious to dominate, much as +other men of genius, prolonging the masterfulness of childhood, continue +to play at this or at that in their politics and their religion. But +knowledge of existence has an entirely different method and an entirely +different ideal. It is playful too, because its terms are intuitive and +its grammar or logic often very subjective. Perception, theory, +hypothesis are rapid, pregnant, often humorous; they seize a fact by its +skirts from some unexpected quarter, and give it a nickname which it +might be surprised to hear, such as the rainbow or the Great Bear. Yet +in the investigation of facts all this play of mind is merely +instrumental and indicative: the intent is practical, the watchfulness +earnest, the spirit humble. The mind here knows that it is at school; +and even its fancies are docile. Its nicknames for things and for their +odd ways of behaving are like those which country people give to +flowers; they often pointedly describe how things look or what they do +to us. The ideas we have of things are not fair portraits; they are +political caricatures made in the human interest; but in their partial +way they may be masterpieces of characterisation and insight. Above all, +they are obtained by labour, by investigating what is not given, and by +correcting one impression by another, drawn from the same object—a thing +impossible in the intuition of essences. They therefore conduce to +wisdom, and in their perpetual tentativeness have a cumulative truth. + +Consider the reason why, instead of cultivating congenial intuitions, a +man may be drawn to the study of nature at all. It is because things, by +their impact, startle him into attention and a new thought. Such +external objects interest him for what they do, not for what they are; +and knowledge of them is significant, not for the essence it displays to +intuition (beautiful as this may be) but for the events it expresses or +foreshadows. It matters little therefore to the pertinent knowledge of +nature that the substance of things should remain recondite or +unintelligible, if their movement and operation can be rightly +determined on the plane of human perception. It matters little if their +very existence is vouched for only by animal faith and presumption, so +long as this faith posits existence where existence is, and this +presumption expresses a prophetic preadaptation of animal instincts to +the forces of the environment. The function of perception and natural +science is, not to flatter the sense of omniscience in an absolute mind, +but to dignify animal life by harmonising it, in action and in thought, +with its conditions. It matters little if the news these methods can +bring us of the world is fragmentary and is expressed rhetorically; what +matters is that science should be integrated with art, and that the arts +should substitute the dominion of man over circumstances, as far as this +is possible, for the dominion of chance. In this there is no sacrifice +of truth to utility; there is rather a wise direction of curiosity upon +things on the human scale, and within the range of art. Speculation +beyond those limits cannot be controlled, and is irresponsible; and the +symbolic terms in which it must be carried on, even at close quarters, +are the best possible indications for the facts in question. All these +inadequacies and imperfections are proper to perfect signs, which should +be brief and sharply distinguished. + +Complete scepticism is accordingly not inconsistent with animal faith; +the admission that nothing given exists is not incompatible with belief +in things not given. I may yield to the suasion of instinct, and +practise the arts with a humble confidence, without in the least +disavowing the most rigorous criticism of knowledge or hypostatising any +of the data of sense or fancy. And I need not do this with a bad +conscience, as Parmenides and Plato and the Indians seem to have done, +when they admitted illusion or opinion as an epilogue to their tight +metaphysics, on the ground that otherwise they would miss their way +home. It is precisely by _not_ yielding to opinion and illusion, and by +_not_ delegating any favourite essences to be the substance of things, +that I aspire to keep my cognitive conscience pure and my practical +judgement sane; because in order to find my way home I am by no means +compelled to yield ignominiously to any animal illusion; what guides me +there is not illusion but habit; and the intuitions which accompany +habit are normal signs for the circle of objects and forces by which +that habit is sustained. The images of sense and science will not delude +me if instead of hypostatising them, as those philosophers did the terms +of their dialectic, I regard them as graphic symbols for home and for +the way there. That such external things exist, that I exist myself, and +live more or less prosperously in the midst of them, is a faith not +founded on reason but precipitated in action, and in that intent, which +is virtual action, involved in perception. This faith, which it would be +dishonest not to confess that I share, does no violence to a sceptical +analysis of experience; on the contrary, it takes advantage of that +analysis to interpret this volatile experience as all animals do and +must, as a set of symbols for existences that cannot enter experience, +and which, since they are not elements in knowledge, no analysis of +knowledge can touch—they are in another realm of being. + +I propose now to consider what objects animal faith requires me to +posit, and in what order; without for a moment forgetting that my +assurance of their existence is only instinctive, and my description of +their nature only symbolic. I may know them by intent, based on bodily +reaction; I know them initially as whatever confronts me, whatever it +may turn out to be, just as I know the future initially as whatever is +coming, without knowing what will come. That something confronts me +here, now, and from a specific quarter, is in itself a momentous +discovery. The aspect this thing wears, as it first attracts my +attention, though it may deceive me in some particulars, can hardly fail +to be, in some respects, a telling indication of its nature in its +relation to me. Signs identify their objects for discourse, and show us +where to look for their undiscovered qualities. Further signs, catching +other aspects of the same object, may help me to lay siege to it from +all sides; but signs will never lead me into the citadel, and if its +inner chambers are ever opened to me, it must be through sympathetic +imagination. I might, by some happy unison between my imagination and +its generative principles, intuit the essence which is actually the +essence of that thing. In that case (which may often occur when the +object is a sympathetic mind) knowledge of existence, without ceasing to +be instinctive faith, will be as complete and adequate as knowledge can +possibly be. The given essence will be the essence of the object meant; +but knowledge will remain a claim, since the intuition is not satisfied +to observe the given essence passively as a disembodied essence, but +instinctively affirms it to be the essence of an existence confronting +me, and beyond the range of my possible apprehension. Therefore the most +perfect knowledge of fact is perfect only pictorially, not evidentially, +and remains subject to the end to the insecurity inseparable from animal +faith, and from life itself. + +Animal faith being a sort of expectation and open-mouthedness, is +earlier than intuition; intuitions come to help it out and lend it +something to posit. It is more than ready to swallow any suggestion of +sense or fancy; and perhaps primitive credulity, as in a dream, makes no +bones of any contradiction or incongruity in successive convictions, but +yields its whole soul to every image. Faith then hangs like a pendulum +at rest; but when perplexity has caused that pendulum to swing more and +more madly, it may for a moment stop quivering at a point of unstable +equilibrium at the top; and this vertical station may be likened to +universal scepticism. It is a more wonderful and a more promising +equilibrium than the other, because it cannot be maintained; but before +declining from the zenith and desisting from pointing vertically at +zero, the pendulum of faith may hesitate for an instant which way to +fall, if at that uncomfortable height it has really lost all animal +momentum and all ancient prejudice. Before giving my reasons—which are +but prejudices and human—for believing in events, in substances, and in +the variegated truths which they involve, it may be well to have halted +for breath at the apex of scepticism, and felt all the negative +privileges of that position. The mere possibility of it in its purity is +full of instruction; and although I have, for my own part, dwelt upon it +only ironically, by a scruple of method, and intending presently to +abandon it for common sense, many a greater philosopher has sought to +maintain himself acrobatically at that altitude. They have not +succeeded; but an impossible dwelling-place may afford, like a +mountain-top, a good point of view in clear weather from which to map +the land and choose a habitation. + + + + + CHAPTER XII + IDENTITY AND DURATION ATTRIBUTED TO ESSENCES + + +Human beliefs and ideas (which in modern philosophy are called human +knowledge) may be arranged systematically in various different series or +orders. One is the _order of genesis_. The origin of beliefs and ideas, +as of all events, is natural. All origins lie in the realm of matter, +even when the being that is so generated is immaterial, because this +creation or intrusion of the immaterial follows on material occasions +and at the promptings of circumstance. It is safe to say this, although +it may sound dogmatical, since an immaterial being not grafted in this +way upon material events would be undiscoverable; no place, time, or +other relations in nature could be assigned to it, and even if by chance +it existed it would have to exist only for its own benefit, unreported +to any one else. It is accordingly in the realm of matter, in the order +of events in animal life, that I must distribute human beliefs and ideas +if I wish to arrange them in the order of their genesis. + +Beliefs and ideas might also be surveyed in the _order of discovery_, as +within the field of human grammar and thought they come to be +discriminated. Such a survey would be a biography of reason, in which I +should neglect the external occasions on which ideas and beliefs arise +and study only the changing patterns which they form in the eye of +thought, as in a kaleidoscope. What would probably come first in the +order of discovery would be goods and evils; or a romantic metaphysician +might turn this experience into a fable, referring goods and evils to a +transcendental will which should pronounce them (for no reason) to be +such respectively. Will or moral bias is actually the background on +which images of objects are gradually deciphered by an awakening +intellect; they all appear initially loaded with moral values and +assigned to rival camps and quarters in the field of action. Discovery +is essentially romantic; there is less clearness in the objects that +appear than there is vehemence in the assertion and choice of them. The +life of reason is accordingly a subject to be treated imaginatively, and +interpreted afresh by every historian with legitimate variations; and if +no theme lies nearer to the heart of man, since it is the history of his +heart, none is more hopelessly the sport of apperception and of dramatic +bias in the telling. + +Finally, beliefs and ideas may be marshalled in the _order of evidence_; +and this is the only method that concerns me here. At any juncture in +the life of reason a man may ask himself, as I am doing in this book, +what he is most certain of, and what he believes only on hearsay or by +some sort of suggestion or impulse of his own, which might be suspended +or reversed. Alternative logics and creeds might thus suggest +themselves, raised in different styles of architecture upon the +bed-rock, if there is a bed-rock, of perfect certitude. I have already +discovered what this bed-rock of perfect certitude is; somewhat +disconcertingly, it turns out to be in the regions of the rarest ether. +I have absolute assurance of nothing save of the character of some given +essence; the rest is arbitrary belief or interpretation added by my +animal impulse. The obvious leaves me helpless; for among objects in the +realm of essence I can establish none of the distinctions which I am +most concerned to establish in daily life, such as that between true and +false, far or near, just now and long ago, once upon a time, and in five +minutes. All these terms of course are found there, else I could not +mention them, but they are found only as pictures; each is present only +in essence, without any reason for choosing, asserting, or making it +effective. The very opposite terms, if I am only willing to think of +them, lie sleeping side by side with these which I happen first to have +come upon. All essences and combinations of essences are brother-shapes +in an eternal landscape; and the more I range in that wilderness, the +less reason I find for stopping at anything, or for following any +particular path. Willingly or regretfully, if I wish to live, I must +rouse myself from this open-eyed trance into which utter scepticism has +thrown me. I must allow subterranean forces within me to burst forth and +to shatter that vision. I must consent to be an animal or a child, and +to chase the fragments as if they were things of moment. But which +fragment, and rolling in what direction? I am resigned to being a +dogmatist; but at what point shall my dogmatism begin, and by what first +solicitation of nature? + +Starting, as here I should, from absolute certitude—that is, from the +obvious character of some essence—the first object of belief suggested +by that assurance is the _identity_ of this essence in various instances +and in various contexts. This identity in divers cases is not +tautological, as identity would be if I spoke of the identity of any +essence with itself. Identity, to be significant, must be problematical. +I must pick up my pebble twice, so that a juggler might without my +knowledge have substituted another pebble for it in the interval; and +when I say confidently, _the same pebble_, I may always be deceived. My +own thought is not at all unlikely to play this trick on me; it is good +at legerdemain. In attending a second time to what I call the same +essence, I may really summon a different essence before me; my memory +need not retain the first intuition so precisely that its disparity from +the present one can be sensible to me now. Identity of essences given at +different times evidently presupposes time—an immense postulate; and +besides, it presupposes ability in thought to traverse time without +confusion, so that having lived through two intuitions I may correctly +distinguish them as events, whilst correctly identifying their common +object. These are ambitious and highly questionable dogmas. Yet there is +a circumstance in pure intuition of any essence which can insensibly +lead me to those elaborate conclusions, and can lead me at the same time +to posit the natural existence of myself, the possible dupe, having +those intuitions and surviving them, and even the existence of my +natural object, the persisting pebble, which those intuitions described +unanimously. + +This circumstance is closely connected with the property of essence +which is most ideal and remote from existence, namely, its eternity. +Eternity, taken intrinsically, has nothing to do with time, but is a +form of being which time cannot usher in nor destroy; it is always +equally real, silent, and indestructible, no matter what time may do, or +what time it may be. But intuition peruses eternal being in time; +consequently, so long as I am attending to an essence, this essence +seems to me _to endure_; and when, after an interval, I revert to it or +to any feature of it, this feature seems to me _to be identical_ with +what it was. This identity and this duration are not properly predicated +of essence in its own realm; they are superfluous epithets essentially, +and almost insults, because they substitute a questionable for an +unquestionable subsistence in the essence. Yet the epithets are well +meant, and indicate fairly enough the aspect which essences present to +moving thought when it plays upon them. Intuition finds essence by +watching, by exerting animal attention. Now when he watches, an animal +thinks that what he watches is watching him with the same intensity and +variability of attention which he is exerting; for attention is +fundamentally an animal uneasiness, fostered by the exigences of life +amid other material beings that can change and jump. Stillness or +constancy in any object accordingly does not seem to an animal eternity +in an essence; it seems rather a suspension of motion in a thing, a +pause for breath, an ominous and awful silence. He is superstitious +about the eternity of essences, as about all their other properties. +This breathless and ghostly duration which he attributes to essences, +treating them like living things, is his confused temporal translation +of their eternity, mixing it with existence, which is the negation of +eternity. Thus he assimilates it to the quasi-permanence in himself +which is transfused with change; for of course he is far from perceiving +that if essences were not natively eternal and nonexistent, it would be +impossible for crawling existence to change from one form to another. +This illusion is inevitable. The dubious and iterative duration proper +to animal life, when the lungs breathe and the mind is appetitive, seems +to this mind a pulsation in all being. + +Moreover, in watching any image, it is often possible to observe one +feature in it persisting while another disappears. The man not only says +to himself, “This, and still this,” but he ventures to say, “This, and +again this with a variation.” A variation in _this_? Here, from the +point of view of essence, is a sheer absurdity. _This_ cannot change its +nature, though what we have before us a moment later may be something +but slightly different from _this_; and of course the essence now +brought to view can be slightly different from the one formerly in +evidence only because each is eternally itself, so that the least +variant from it marks and constitutes a different essence. Material +categories such as existence, substance, and change, none of which are +applicable to pure data, are thus insinuated by the animal intellect +into contemplation. They transform intuition into belief; and this +belief, as if it would reinforce essences when they appear and annul +them when they disappear, ultimately posits an imaginary shuffling of +sensible existences—hypostatised essences—dancing about us as we watch +the scene. Even if this hypostasis is retracted afterwards by the +critic, the postulate remains that he is steadily perusing the _same +essence_, or returning to reconsider it. Without this postulate it would +be impossible to say or think anything on any subject. No essence could +be recognised, and therefore no change could be specified. Yet this +necessary belief is one impossible to prove or even to defend by +argument, since all argument presupposes it. It must be accepted as a +rule of the game, if you think the game worth playing. + +What shall I say of the probable truth of such fundamental assumptions? +Shall I think them false, because groundless, and shall I say that they +invalidate the whole edifice of natural faith which is raised upon them? +Or shall I say that the experienced security of this edifice justifies +them and implies their truth? Neither; because the happy results and +fertility of an assumption do not prove it true literally, but only +prove it to be suitable, to be worth cultivating as an art and repeating +as a good myth. The axioms of sanity and art must correspond _somehow_ +to truth, but the correspondence may be very loose and very partial. +Moreover, the circumstance that even this symbolic rightness is vouched +for only by an experience which would be false in all its records and +memories if this assumption were false, robs such experimental tests of +all logical force. Corroboration is no new argument; if I am deceived +once, I may all the more readily be deceived again. In the perspectives +of experience I cannot, except in these very perspectives, reach the +terms which they posit as self-existent, in order to see whether my +perspectives were rightly drawn. I am in the region of belief mediated +by symbols, in the region of animal faith. + + + + + CHAPTER XIII + BELIEF IN DEMONSTRATION + + +The essence which is the object of intuition is probably not simple. +Perhaps nothing that has a character recognisable in reflection can be +utterly simple. The datum may seem purely qualitative, like a smell or +like absolute Being, and yet some plurality may lurk in its very +diffuseness or continuity, giving a foothold for discrimination of +different moments or parts within it. Usually this inward complexity of +given essences is very marked, and a chief element in their nature; but +it is not at all incompatible with the æsthetic and logical +individuality which makes them terms for possible recognition and +discourse. Essences, like things, may be perfectly unambiguous objects +to name or to point to, and may be counted as units, without prejudice +to their internal complexity. My dog is one and the same dog +unmistakably, without prejudice to the possibly infinite complexity of +his organism or the interpenetration of his qualities. In the same way +Euclidean space is a single and definite essence; yet its character is +subject to analysis. I may say it has three dimensions, is necessarily +infinite, without scale, etc. These implications, which I may enumerate +successively, lie in the essence together, and lie there from the +beginning, even if my intuition is slow to disentangle them, or never +does so at all. The simplicity of the essence given at first was a +pregnant simplicity; it had enough character to be identified with the +total and unitary aspect of another essence—Euclidean space +analysed—which may appear later. + +Intuition therefore is a view of essence, attention fixed upon it, and +not that essence itself. When I say Euclidean space has three +dimensions, I am counting them; I am proceeding from one specious plane, +or felt direction of motion, to another, and perhaps back again, for the +sake of verification. If this operation is to be a valid survey of the +essence proposed, the plane or directions specified must, so to speak, +stay in their places. Each must remain itself, so that in passing from +it to another, as I do in counting, I may pass to something truly +different, and may be able to revert from this to the original element, +and find it still there, identical with its former self. But, as I have +already discovered, this self-identity of a term to which I revert +cannot be given either in the first intuition of it, nor in the second. +All that either intuition can yield while it endures is the nature of +the datum there, with the terms and relations which are displayed there +within it. Intuition can never yield the relation of its total datum to +anything not given. It cannot refer to the latent at all, since its +object, by definition, is just what is given immediately. To take the +leap from one intuition to another, and assert that they view the same +essence, or have the same intent, I must take my life in my hands and +trust to animal faith. Otherwise all dialectic would be arrested. + +Let me assume in the first place that I may steadily peruse the same +essence, and may revert to it on occasion. Let me assume further that in +so doing I may turn passive intuition into analysis, and analysis into +some fresh synthesis of the elements identified and distinguished in the +given essence. Intuition will thus pick up and group together, in +various ways, terms which by hypothesis are identical in these various +settings. It will scrutinise essences piecemeal and successively, +although in their own realm they compose a simultaneous and eternal +manifold. Suppose, for instance, I have reached the conclusion of a +calculation, and the final equation is before me: the inner relations +between its terms are parts of a given essence. Intuition, not +demonstration, synthesises this manifold. This synthetic essence is +therefore no conclusion; it is not an answer nor a deduction; it is not +true. It is simply the pattern of terms which it is; no one of these +terms, for aught I know, having ever figured in any other equation. Thus +any survey which is analytic, so that it gives foothold for +demonstration, or any definition following upon such analysis, +presupposes the repetition of the same essences in different contexts. +This presupposition cannot be justified by the intuition occupying the +mind at any one time. No more can the assurance that a term remains the +same in two successive instances and in two different contexts, nor that +what is asserted by a predicate is asserted of the very subject which +before had been intuited without that predicate. Explication is a +process, a deduction is an event; and although the force of logical +analysis or synthesis does not depend on assuming that fact, but rather +on ignoring it, this fact may be deduced from faith in the validity of +demonstration, which would lapse if this fact were denied. The validity +of demonstration is accordingly a matter of faith only, depending on the +assumption of matters of fact incapable of demonstration. I must believe +that I noted the terms of the argument separately and successively if I +am to assert anything in identifying them or pronouncing them +equivalent, or if the conclusion in which they appear now is to be +relevant in any way to the premises in which they appeared originally. + +The force of dialectic, then, lies in identifying terms in isolation +with the same terms in relation; so that even an analytic judgement is +synthetic. To say, for instance, that in “extended colour” “extension” +is involved is analysis; yet to identify the element of extension +abstracted from the first essence with the second essence as a whole, is +synthesis; and it is far from inconceivable that this synthesis should +be erroneous. In the identification of an essence given in one intuition +with something given in another intuition in a superadded context, there +is a postulate that in transcendent intent I am hitting a hidden target. +It is not two similar intuitions taken existentially that are +identified; they are not only admittedly distinct numerically and as +events in the world, but they have, by hypothesis, different total data +before them. It is mind, a spiritual counterpart of attitude and action, +that intends in both cases to consider the same essence. There is +repetition posited; and repetition, if actual, involves adventitious +differences accruing to a term that remains individually identical. +There is a difference in the setting of the same essence here and its +setting there. In judgement, accordingly, there is more than intuition; +there is assumed discourse, involving time, transcendent reference, and +various adventitious surveys of identical objects. Thus if I wish to +believe that any demonstration whatsoever is significant or correct, I +must assume (what I can never demonstrate) that there is an active +intelligence at work, capable of reverting to an old idea like the dog +returning to his vomit: an operation utterly extraneous to the timeless +identity of each element recovered. + +In other words, demonstration is an event, even when the thing +demonstrated is not an event. Without adventitious choice of some +starting-point, without selective and cumulative advance, and without +recapitulation, there would be no dialectic. Premises and conclusions +would all be static and separate terms; the dialectical nerve of their +relation would not be laid bare and brought to intuition. I should know +nothing about essence, in the sense of possessing such sciences of it as +mathematics or rhetoric, if the argument were not adventitious to the +subject-matter, casting the light of intuition now along this path and +now along that in a field posited as static, so as to enlarge and +confirm my apprehension of it; for if I lost at one end all that I +gained at the other, my progress would not enrich apprehension, nor ever +twice mean the same thing. Dialectic therefore is a two-edged sword: on +the one hand, if valid, it involves a realm of essence, independent of +it, over which it may range; and on the other hand it involves its own +temporal and progressive existence; since it is a name for the fact that +some part of that realm of essence has been chosen for perusal, +considered at leisure, folded upon itself, as it were, and recognised as +having this or that articulation. Even pure intuition shares (as I shall +try to show presently) this spiritual existence, distinct from the +logical or æsthetic being proper to the essences it apprehends; +intuition itself can hardly be prolonged without winking or re-survey. +But this coming and going of attention, in flashes and in varied +assaults, is even more conspicuous in dialectic; and the validity and +advance of insight in such cases depends on the essences in hand being +constant, in spite of the pulsations of attention upon them and the +variety of relations disclosed successively. + +Thus belief in the existence of mental discourse (which is a sort of +experience), whilst of course not demonstrable in itself, is involved in +the validity of any demonstration; and I come to the interesting insight +that dialectic would lose all its force if I renounced my instinctive +faith in my ability to pick up old meanings, to think consecutively, to +correct myself without changing my subject-matter, and in fine to +discourse and to live rationally. Challenge this faith, and +demonstration collapses into the illusion that a demonstration has been +made. If I confine myself to the given essence without admitting +discourse about it, I exclude all analysis of that essence, or even +examination of it. I must simply stare at it, in a blank and timeless +æsthetic trance. If this does not happen, the reason is not dialectical. +No logic could drive me from the obvious, unless I read omens in it +which are not there. The reason for my proclivity to play with ideas, to +lose them and catch them, and pride myself on my ability to keep them +circling without confusion in the air, is a vital reason. This logic is +a fly-wheel in my puffing engine; it is not logic at all. The animal +life which underlies discourse is concerned to discharge its +predetermined responses, which are but few, whenever an occasion +presents itself which will at all do; and all such occasions it calls +the same. It claps some recurrent name on different objects, which is +one source of error or of perpetual inaccuracy in its knowledge of +things; but even before that, in identifying the various instances of +that name, alleging the essence present now to be the same present +before, it runs a risk of error and may slip into self-contradiction. Is +the round square an essence? Certainly; but not in the geometry of +Euclid, because in his geometry the square is one essence and the circle +another, definitely and irreparably distinct from it. The round square +is an essence of comic discourse, actualised when, having confused +names, definitions and ideas, a fumbling or an impudent mind sets about +to identify two incompatibles; and this attempt is no more impossible to +a mind—which is subject to animal vapours—than it is impossible for such +a mind to look for a lost word. The psyche has the lost word in store, +as it has the intuitions of the circle and the square; but the loss of +memory or the confusion of ideas may arise notwithstanding, because the +movement in discourse which should culminate in those intuitions may be +intercepted mechanically, and arrested at a stage where the name is not +yet recovered, or where the words circle and square have fused their +associations and are striving to terminate in the intuition of both as +one. Such stammerings and contradictions make evident the physical basis +of thought and the remote level from which it turns to its ideal object, +like the moth to the star; but this physical basis is really just as +requisite for correcting a logical error as for falling into it. Thus +dialectic, which in intent and deliverance does not trespass beyond the +realm of essence, but only defines some fragment of the same, yet in +fact, if it is to be cogent, must presuppose time, change, and the +persistence of meanings in progressive discourse. + +Belief in demonstration, when it is admitted, has inversely some +steadying influence on belief in matters of fact. When poetic idealists +cry that life is a dream, they are indulging in a hyperbole, if they +still venture to compare one illusion with another in beauty or in +duration. Poetry, like demonstration, would not be possible if intuition +of essences could not be sustained and repeated in various contexts. The +poet could not otherwise express cumulative passions nor develop +particular themes. But life is no dream, if it justifies dialectic; +because dialectic explores various parts of the realm of essence—where +everything is steadfast, distinct, and imperishable—with a continuous +and coherent intent, and reaches valid insight into their structure; and +this amount of wakefulness and sanity the dialectical or poetic mind +would have in any case, even in the absence of a material world, of all +moral interests, and of any life except the life of discourse itself. + +Nevertheless, if discourse were always a pellucid apprehension of +essential relations, its existence would be little noted; only a very +scrupulous philosopher would insist on it, in view of the selective +order and direction of survey which discourse adds to its +subject-matter. There is, however, a much louder witness to the fact +that discourse exists and is no part of essence, but rather a function +of animal life; and this witness is error. Thought becomes obvious when +things betray it; as they cannot have been false, something else must +have been so, and this something else, which we call thought, must have +existed and must have had a different status from that of the thing it +falsified. Error thus awakens even the laziest philosophy from the dream +of supposing that its own meanderings are nothing but strands in the +texture of its object. + +I have now, by the mere consideration of the way in which essence +presents itself, managed to snatch from the jaws of scepticism one +belief familiar to me before I encountered that romantic dragon; namely, +belief in the existence of discourse, or of mind thinking. But be it +observed that I have so far seen reason for reinstating this belief only +in a very attenuated form. Thought here means nothing more than the fact +that some essence is contemplated, and discourse means only that this +essence is approached and surveyed repeatedly or piecemeal, with +partiality, succession, and possible confusion in describing it. Save +for this distinction of intuition from the essence intuited, I have as +yet no object before me that claims existence or solicits belief. The +whole datum is still simply an essence; but by the mere study of that +datum, when this study is reflected upon and admitted, I have +reintroduced a belief which relieves me of what was most obnoxious to +the flesh in my radical scepticism. I have found that even when no +change is perceived in the image before me, my discourse changes its +phases and makes progress in surveying it; so that in discourse I now +admit a sphere of events in which real variations are occurring. I may +now assert, when I perceive a motion, that this intuition of change is +_true_; that is, that it has actually followed upon the intuition of a +static first term, from which my attention has passed to this intuition +of change; and this I may now assert without confusing the essences +given successively, or trying, like animal perception, to knead one +concrete thing out of their incompatible natures. The existence of +changing things or events in nature I may still deny or doubt or ignore; +in the object I shall, with perfect clearness, see only an essence, and +if this happens to be the essence of change, and to present the image of +some motion, that theme will seem to me as determinate, as ideal and as +unchanging as any other, and as little prone to lapse into any different +theme. Any motion seen will be but a fixed image of motion. Actual flux +and actual existence will have their appropriate and sufficient seat in +my thought; I shall conceive and believe, when I reflect on my rapt +contemplations, that I have been ruminating, and passing from one to +another; but these objects will be only the several essences, the +several images or tunes or stories, each always itself, which my mind +picks up or invents or reconsiders. + + + + + CHAPTER XIV + ESSENCE AND INTUITION + + +To believe nothing and live immersed in intuition might be the privilege +of a disembodied spirit; and if a man could share it he would not only +be relieved from doubt but would, in one dimension, lose nothing in the +scope of his experience, since the realm of essence, which would still +be open to him, is absolutely infinite, and contains images of all the +events that any existing world could enact, or that all possible worlds +could enact together. Yet all this variety and richness would form a +mosaic, a marble effigy of life, or chronicle of ancient wars. The pangs +and horrors would be there, as well as the beauties, but each would burn +in its eternal place, balancing all the rest, and no anxious eye would +glance hurriedly from one to the other, wondering what the next might +be. The spirit that actually breathes in man is an animal spirit, +transitive like the material endeavours which it expresses; it has a +material station and accidental point of view, and a fevered preference +for one alternative issue over another. It thirsts for news; and this +curiosity, which it borrows of course from the insecurity and +instinctive anxiety of the animal whose spirit it is, is strangely +self-contradictory; because the further it ranges in the service of +animal will, the more the spectacle it discloses rebukes that animal +will and tends to neutralise it. It would indeed not be spirit at all if +it did not essentially tend to discount its accidental point of view, +and to exchange the material station to which it finds itself +unaccountably attached in its birth. In so far as it is spirit, and is +not called back by its animal allegiance to pleasures and ambitions +which pure spirit could not share (since they imply ignorance), it +accordingly tends to withdraw from preoccupation with animal life, from +the bias of time and place, and from all thought of existence. In so +doing, far from perishing, it seems to acquire a more intense, luminous, +and placid being. Since the roots of spirit, at least in man, are in +matter, this would seem to be an illusion; yet the experience is normal, +and no illusion need attach to it, if once the nature of intuition is +understood. + +At the vanishing-point of scepticism, which is also the acme of life, +intuition is absorbed in its object. For this reason, philosophers +capable of intense contemplation—Aristotle, for instance, at those +points where his thought becomes, as it were, internal to spirit—have +generally asserted that in the end essence and the contemplation of +essence are identical. Certainly the intuition of essence is oblivious +of itself, and cognisant of essence only, to which it adds nothing +whatever internally, either in character or in intensity; because the +intensity of a thunder-clap is the chief part of its essence, and so the +peculiar intolerableness of each sort of pain, or transitiveness of each +sort of pleasure. If in fact when any such essence is given there had +been nothing prior to this intuition, nothing beside it existentially, +and nothing to follow upon it, this obliviousness to the intuition +itself, as distinct from the given essence, would not be an oversight; +it would be rather an absence of illusion. For it would then have been +an illusion to suppose, as I should in calling the presence of that +essence an intuition of it, that a soul with a history and with other +adventitious qualities had come to contemplate that essence at one +moment in its career. There would really be the essence only, with no +relations other than those perfectly irreversible internal ones to other +essences which define it in its own realm. Those very high numbers, for +instance, which nobody has ever thought of specifically, have no other +relations than those which they have eternally in the series of whole +numbers; they have no place in any man’s life. So too those many forms +of torment for which nature does not provide the requisite instrument, +and which even hell has neglected to exemplify; they remain essences +only, of which fortunately there is no intuition. Evidently the being of +such numbers or such torments is constituted by their essence only, and +has not attained to existence. Yet it is this essential being alone +that, if there was intuition of those numbers or those torments, would +be revealed in intuition; for no external adventitious relations, such +as the intuition has in the life of some soul, would be presented within +it, if (as I assume) nothing but these essences was then given. + +It is therefore inevitable that minds singly absorbed in the +contemplation of any essence should attribute the presence and force of +that essence to its own nature, which alone is visible, and not to their +intuition, which is invisible. Thought as it sinks into its object rises +in its deliverance out of the sphere of contingency and change, and +loses itself in that object, sublimated into an essence. This +sublimation is no loss; it is merely absence of distraction. It is the +perfect fruition and fulfilment of that experience. In this manner I can +understand why Aristotle could call the realm of essence, or that part +of it which he had considered, a deity, and could declare sublimely that +its inalienable being was an eternal life. More strictly, it would have +been an eternal actualisation of cognitive life only; animal life would +have ceased, because animal life requires us to pick up and drop the +essences we consider, and to attribute temporal as well as eternal +relations to them; in other words, to regard them not as essences but as +things. But though cognitive life begins with this attention to +practical exigences and is kindled by them, yet its ideal is +sacrificial; it aspires to see each thing clearly and to see all things +together, that is to say, under the form of eternity, and as sheer +essences given in intuition. To cease to live temporally is +intellectually to be saved; it is ἀθανατίζειν, to fade or to brighten +into the truth, and to become eternal. It is the inmost aim and highest +achievement of cognition to cease to be knowledge for a self, to abolish +the bias and transcend the point of view by which knowledge establishes +its perspectives, so that all things may be present equally, and the +truth may be all in all. + +All this comes about, however, only subjectively, in that vital and +poetic effort of the mind to understand which begins with a candid +self-forgetfulness and ends in a passionate self-surrender. Seen from +outside, as it takes place psychologically, the matter wears an entirely +different aspect. In reality, essence and the intuition of essence can +never be identical. If all animal predicaments were resolved, there +would be no organ and no occasion for intuition; and intuition ceasing, +no essences would appear. Certainly they would not be abolished by that +accident in their own sphere, and each would be what it would have +seemed if intuition of it had arisen; but they would all be merely +logical or æsthetic themes unrehearsed, as remote as possible from life +or from the intense splendour of divinity. Essence without intuition +would be not merely non-existent (as it always is), but what is worse, +it would be the object of no contemplation, the goal of no effort, the +secret or implicit ideal of no life. It would be valueless. All that joy +and sense of liberation which pure objectivity brings to the mind would +be entirely absent; and essence would lose all its dignity if life lost +its precarious existence. + +I believe that Aristotle, and even more mystical spokesmen of the +spirit, would not have ignored this circumstance if they had not taken +so narrow a view of essence. They see it only through some peep-hole of +morals, grammar, or physics; the small part of that infinite realm which +thus becomes visible they take for the whole; or if they feel some +uneasiness at the obvious partiality of this survey, they rather blot +out and blur the part before them, lest it seem arbitrary, instead of +imagining it filled out with all the rest that, in the realm of essence, +cannot help surrounding it. Even Spinoza, who so clearly defines the +realm of essence as an infinite number of kinds of being, each having an +infinite number of variations, calls this infinity of being _substance_; +as if at once to weight it all with existence (a horrible possibility) +and to obliterate its internal distinctions; but distinction, infinitely +minute and indelible distinction of everything from everything else, is +what essence means. Yet people suppose that whatever is non-existent is +nothing—a stupid positivism, like that of saying that the past is +nothing, or the future nothing, or everything nothing of which I happen +to be ignorant. If people reflected that the non-existent, as Leibniz +says, is infinite, that it is everything, that it is the realm of +essence, they would be more cautious in regarding essence as something +selected, superior in itself, and worthy of eternal contemplation. They +would not conceive it as the power or worth in things actual, but rather +as the form of everything and anything. + +Value accrues to any part of the realm of essence by virtue of the +interest which somebody takes in it, as being the part relevant to his +own life. If the organ of this life comes to perfect operation, it will +reach intuition of that relevant part of essence. This intuition will be +vital in the highest degree. It will be absorbed in its object. It will +be unmindful of any possibility of lapse in that object, or defection on +its own part; it will not be aware of itself, of time, or of +circumstances. But this intuition will continue to exist, and to exist +in time, and the pulsations of its existence will hardly go on without +some oscillation, and probably a quick evanescence. So the intuition +will be an utterly different thing from the essence intuited: it will be +something existent and probably momentary; it will glow and fade; it +will be perhaps delightful; that is, no essences will appear to it which +are not suffused with a general tint of interest and beauty. The life of +the psyche, which rises to this intuition, determines all the characters +of the essence evoked, and among them its moral quality. But as pure +intuition is life at its best, when there is least rasping and thumping +in its music, a prejudice or presumption arises that _any_ essence is +beautiful and life-enhancing. This platonic adoration of essence is +undeserved. The realm of essence is dead, and the intuition of far the +greater part of it would be deadly to any living creature. + +The contemplation of so much of essence as is relevant to a particular +life is what Aristotle called the entelechy or perfect fruition of that +life. If the cosmos were a single animal, as the ancients supposed, and +had an aim and a life which, like human life, could be fulfilled in the +contemplation of certain essences, then a life like that of Aristotle’s +God would be involved in the perfection of nature, if this perfection +was ever attained. Or if, with Aristotle, we suppose that the cosmos has +always been in perfect equilibrium, then a happy intuition of all +relevant essence on the part of the cosmos would actually exist and +would be that sustained, ecstatic, divine life which Aristotle speaks +of. Yet even then the cosmic intuition of essence would not be the +essence it beheld. The intuition would be a natural fact, by accident +perpetual and necessarily selective; because the cosmos _might_ stop +turning at any moment, and certainly the music of those spheres, even +while they rolled well, would not be every sort and any sort of noise, +nor even of music. A different cosmos would have had, or might elsewhere +be having, a different happiness. Each, however, would be a divine life, +as the ancients conceived divinity. It would have such a natural basis +as any life must have, and the consequent warmth and moral colour; for +natural operations lend these values to the visions in which they rest. +The love of certain special essences which animates existence is an +expression of the direction which the movement of existence happens to +have. If the cosmos were a perfect animal—and in its unknown secular +pulsations it may possibly be one—the cosmic intellect in act would not +be the whole of the realm of essence, nor any part of it. It would be +the intuition of so much of essence as that cosmos had for its goal. + +The external and naturalistic point of view from which all this appears +is one I have not yet justified critically: I have anticipated it for +the sake of rendering the conception of essence perfectly unambiguous. +But if we start from the realm of essence, which demands no belief, we +may at once find conclusive reasons for believing that sundry intuitions +of parts of it exist in fact. One reason is the selectiveness of +discourse. All essences are always at hand, ready to be thought of, if +any one has the wit to do so. But my discourse takes something up first, +and then, even if it is purely dialectical, passes to some implication +or complement of that idea; and it never exhausts its themes. It +traverses the realm of essence as, in a mosque, some ray of light from +some high aperture might shoot across the sombre carpets: it is a brief, +narrow, shifting, oblique illumination of something vast and rich. The +fact that intuition has a direction is an added proof of its existential +character, and of its complete diversity in nature from the essences it +lights up. Life begins unaccountably and moves irreversably: when it is +prosperous and intelligent, it accumulates its experience of things in a +personal perspective, largely alien to the things themselves. When the +objects surveyed are essences, no one can be prior to any other in their +own sphere: they do not arise at all, and lie in no order of precedence. +When one essence includes another as number two includes number one, it +is as easy and as proper to reach one by dividing two as to reach two by +repeating one. In themselves essences have no genesis; and to repeat one +would be impossible if duality were not begged at the start, as well as +unity, to institute the possibility of repetition. In seizing upon any +particular essence first, discourse is guided by an irrational fatality. +Some chance bit is what first occurs to the mind: I run up against this +or that, for no logical reason. This arbitrary assault of intuition upon +essence is evidence that something not essence, which I call intuition, +has come into play. Thus all discourse, even if it traces ideal +implications, is itself contingent to them, and in its existence +irrational. Animal life is involved in the perusal of essence, just as +animal faith is involved in the trust I put in demonstration. If I +aspired to be a disembodied spirit, I ought to envisage all essences +equally and at once—a monstrous requirement. If I aspire instead to +dwell in the presence only of the pertinent, the beautiful, and the +good, I confess that I am but a natural creature, directed on a small +circle of interests and perfections; and that my intuition in particular +exercises an adventitious choice, and has a private method, in its +survey of essence. + +The first existence, then, of which a sceptic who finds himself in the +presence of random essences may gather reasonable proof, is the +existence of the intuition to which those essences are manifest. This is +of course not the object which the animal mind first posits and believes +in. The existence of things is assumed by animals in action and +expectation before intuition supplies any description of what the thing +is that confronts them in a certain quarter. But animals are not +sceptics, and a long experience must intervene before the problem arises +which I am here considering, namely, whether anything need be posited +and believed in at all. And I reply that it is not inevitable, if I am +willing and able to look passively on the essences that may happen to be +given: but that if I consider what they are, and how they appear, I see +that this appearance is an accident to them; that the principle of it is +a contribution from my side, which I call intuition. The difference +between essence and intuition, though men may have discovered it late, +then seems to me profound and certain. They belong to two different +realms of being. + + + + + CHAPTER XV + BELIEF IN EXPERIENCE + + +I have now agreed to believe that discourse is a contingent survey of +essence, partial, recurrent, and personal, with an arbitrary +starting-point and an arbitrary direction of progress. It picks up this +essence or that for no reason that it can assign. However dialectical +the structure of the theme considered may be, so that its various parts +seem to imply one another, the fact that this theme rather than any +other is being considered is a brute fact: and my discourse as a whole +is a sheer accident, initiated, if initiated at all, by some ambushed +power, not only in its existence, but in its duration, direction, and +scope. + +Nevertheless this fatality does not raise any problem in that discourse +itself, because it occasions no surprise. Problems are created after +discourse is in full swing, by contradictory presumptions or aching +voids arising within it. There are no problems in nature, and none in +the realm of essence. Existence—the most inexplicable of surds—is itself +no problem in its own eyes: it takes itself blandly for granted, so long +as it is prosperous. This is a healthy dulness on its part, because if +there is no reason why a particular fact should exist rather than any +other, or none at all, there is also no reason why it should not exist. +The philosopher who has learned to make nature the standard of +naturalness will not wonder at it. He will repeat on a large scale that +act of ready submission to fate which every new-born intuition performs +spontaneously. It does not protest against its sudden existence. It is +not surprised at the undeserved favour that has fallen to its share. It +modestly and wisely forgets itself and notes only the obvious, +profoundly self-justified essence which appears before it. That this +essence might just as well, or might far better, have been replaced by +some other is not a suggestion to be possibly gathered from that essence +itself. Nor is the psyche (the ambushed power from which the intuition +actually comes) less self-satisfied and at peace. The psyche, too, takes +her own idiosyncrasy for granted, singular and highly determinate as +this is, and extraordinarily censorious concerning all other things. Her +nature seems to her by right everlasting, and that to which it is the +obvious duty of all other things to adjust themselves. God, too, if we +refer these agreeable fatalities ultimately to his decrees, is conceived +in like manner never to wonder why he exists although evidently nothing +could have previously demanded his existence, or prepared the way for +it, or made it intelligible. Nevertheless the mortal psyche perhaps +thinks she sees the secret even of that, because it was necessary that +God should exist in order to make her own existence perfectly safe, +legitimate, and happy for ever. This assurance is needed, because there +are unfortunately some circumstances that might suggest the opposite. + +Before turning to these circumstances, it may be well to observe that +actual discourse, as distinguished from the internal dialectic of +essences, may have any degree of looseness; that is, the terms which it +takes up in succession may have nothing to do with one another +essentially. There is no added paradox in this: what is groundless and +irrational in its inception may well be groundless and irrational in its +procedure, and an appearance that has no reason for arising has no +reason for not yielding to any other appearance, or to vacancy. And yet +sometimes the course of appearances does produce wonder and discontent. +How can this be? If I am not surprised at beginning to exist, or at +finding something before me, since present being cannot contain any +presumption or contradiction against itself, so it would seem that I +should not be surprised at any changes in existence, however radical and +complete. Often, indeed, I am not surprised, but follow the development +of discourse, as in a dream, with perfect acquiescence, or even with a +distinct premonition of what is coming, and eagerness that it should +come. If I were a pure spirit, or even an open mind, this ought to be +always the case. However different essences may be, they cannot in their +own realm exclude or contradict one another; there, infinite diversity +provokes no conflict and imposes no alternatives, and the being of +anything, far from impeding that of other things, seems positively to +invite and to require it, somewhat as every part of Euclidean space, far +from denying the other parts, implies them. Irrelevance is, as it were, +mere distance; and there is nothing strange or evil in quickness of +thought, that should jump from one essence to another altogether +dissimilar to it, or even contrary. + +And yet I cannot prolong or intensify discourse without soon coming upon +what I call interruption, confusion, doubt, or contradiction. An impulse +to select, to pursue, and to reject specific essences insinuates itself +into discourse. Why this animosity or this impatience? I do not +disparage, nor subordinate, nor remove the circle from the realm of +essence, when I think of the square and say it is no circle. Why then +should I be angry if I find the one rather than the other? Evidently my +discourse here is not pure contemplation. Of course, no essence is any +other essence; but a clear spirit would not call any two essences +incompatible. Their diversity is part of their being; they _are_ +because, each being eternally itself, the two are eternally different. +If they are incompatible, I must ask: Incompatible for what purpose? +Even in calling them contradictory, I am surreptitiously speaking for +some hidden interest, which cannot put up with them both. There is an +inertia or prior direction somewhere, in the region of what I call +myself, that demands one of them, and rejects the other for the innocent +crime of not being that one. The incongruous essence appearing offends +me because I am wedded to an old one, and to its close relations. I will +tolerate nothing but what I meant should come, what fills my niche, and +falls in with my undertaking. + +Irrelevance, incongruity, and contradiction are accordingly possible in +discourse only because discourse is not a play of essences but a play of +attention upon them; which attention is no impartial exercise of spirit +but a manifestation of interest, intent, preference, and preoccupation. +A hidden life is at work. If I deny this, because my scepticism eschews +everything hidden, I must consistently abandon all dialectic and revert +to undirected dreaming, without comments on my dream intended to be +veridical: because if the least comment on my dreams were veridical I +must begin at once to reject, in my comments, all the essences +suggesting themselves which deviate from that particular dream I mean to +describe. Meaning, which is my guide in discriminating one suggestion +from another as being the right one, springs from beneath the surface; +it is a nether influence. It is a witness to my psychic life going on +beneath, which can be disturbed by the intrusion of one event, or +furthered by another; and this subterranean impulse breaks out into +judgements about the rightness and wrongness of essences—utterly absurd +and unmeaning judgements if the essences were considered simply in +themselves. If I feel that they clash, if I make a stumbling-block of +their irrelevance or diversity, I prove that I am discoursing about them +for an ulterior purpose, in the service of some alien interest. I am +stringing my pearls; therefore I require them to be of a particular +quality. I am a collector, not a poet; and what concerns me, even in the +purest dialectic or the most desultory dream, is not to explore essence, +but to gather _experience_. The psyche below is busy selecting her food, +fortifying her cave, and discriminating her friends from her enemies; +and in these meanderings of mine over the realm of essence, in spite of +myself, I am only her scout. + +By experience I understand a fund of wisdom gathered by living. I call +it a fund of wisdom, rather than merely memory or discursive ideation, +because experience accrues precisely when discrimination amongst given +essences is keenest, when only the relevant is retained or perhaps +noticed, and when the psyche sagaciously interprets data as omens +favourable or unfavourable to her interests, as perilous or inviting, +and, if she goes wrong, allows the event to correct her interpretation. +I think it mere mockery to use the word experience for what is not +learning or gathering knowledge of facts; if experience taught me +nothing it would not be experience, but reverie. Experience accordingly +presupposes intent and intelligence, and it also implies, as will appear +presently, a natural world in which it is possible to learn to live +better by practising the arts. + +Intuition is an event, although it reveals only an essence; and in like +manner discourse is an experience, even when its deliverance is mere +dialectic. It is an experience for two reasons: first, because it is +guided unawares by the efforts of the psyche to explore, not the realm +of essence, but the world that controls her fortunes; and secondly, +because the essences unrolled before it, apparently at random and for no +reason, really convey knowledge; in reality they are manifestations to +the psyche of that surrounding world which it concerns her to react upon +wisely. Discourse is hers; and it is full of the names—since images not +auditory may be names also—which she gives to her friends and enemies, +and of her ingenious imaginations concerning their ways. However +original the terms of discourse may be, under the control of the psyche +and her environment they fall into certain rhythms; they run into +familiar sequences; they become virtual and available knowledge of +things, persons, nature, and the gods. Imagination would be very +insecure and inconstant in these constructions, and they would not +become automatic habits in discourse, if instinct within and nature +without did not control the process of discourse, and dictate its +occasions. So controlled, discourse becomes experience. + +That discourse is secretly an experience, and may be turned into +knowledge, becomes particularly evident when it is interrupted by +_shocks_. Not only may an essence suddenly present itself which was not +the essence I expected or should have welcomed, but the whole placid +tenor of my thoughts may be arrested or overwhelmed. I may suffer a sort +of momentary and conscious death, in that I survive to feel the +extinction of all that made up my universe, and to face a blank, or a +precipice. When in my placid discourse one thing seemed to contradict +another, they were but rival images in the same field, and I had but to +choose between them, and proceed with the argument. Shock contradicts +nothing, but uproots the whole experience. The lights go out on the +stage, and discourse loses its momentum. + +In the sense of contradiction there is probably some element of shock. +The purest æsthetic or logical contemplation hardly goes on without a +throbbing accompaniment of interest, haste, reversals, and +satisfactions; but these dramatic notes are merged in the counterpoint +of the themes surveyed, and I think, prove, and enjoy without noticing +that I do so. But when a clap of thunder deafens me, or a flash of +lightning at once dazzles and blinds me, the fact that something has +_happened_ is far more obvious to me than just what it is that has +occurred; and there are perhaps shocks internal to the psyche in which +the tension of the event reaches a maximum, whilst the nature of it +remains so obscure that perhaps my only sense of it is a question, a +gasp, or a recoil. The feeling present in such a case is, with but +little further qualification, the sheer feeling of experience. + +Now experience of the most brutal and dumbest sort may be theoretically +described, and described exhaustively, in terms of the successive +intuition of essences; for loudness, dazzlingness, pain, or terror are +essences or elements of essences like any other data; and when such +essences are present, all is present that it is possible ever to feel in +that direction, and with any degree of intensity. Utter blankness, +intolerable strain, shrieking despair, are just the essences they are, +and they are unrolled and revealed to intuition like any other essences. +But such intuitions, being those proper to the most brutal and +rudimentary life, have a suasion in them out of all proportion to their +articulation, or rather, we might almost say, inversely proportional to +it; as if the more an experience meant the less it cried out, and the +more it cried out the less it meant. The purest discourse is (without +noticing it) an experience, and the blindest experience (also without +noticing it) is a discourse, since we should not call it experience if +it contained no sense of passage, no experiential perspective; but in +proportion as shock cancels discourse and obliterates its own +background, experience becomes mere experience, and inarticulate. + +In brute experience, or shock, I have not only a clear indication, for +my ulterior reflection, that I exist, but a most imperious summons at +that very moment to _believe_ in my existence. Discourse, as I first +disentangled the evidence for it from the pure intuition of essence, +seemed to be a progressive observation of the permanent—studious +attention perusing and registering the essential mutual relations of +given terms. But now, when shock interrupts me, discourse suffers +violence. The subject-matter itself takes up arms; one object leaves me +in the lurch, while another, quite irrelevantly, assaults me. And since +my discourse witnesses and records this revolution, I must now assert it +to be a permanent knowledge of the changing. + +Shocks _come_: if they did not _come_, if I had not pre-existed, if I +had never been anything more than the intuition of this shock, then this +shock would not be a shock in fact, but only the illusion of a shock, +only the essence of shock speciously persuading me that something had +happened, when in fact nothing had occurred. If the sense of shock does +not deceive me, I must have passed from a state in which the shock was +not yet, into the state in which the shock first startled me; and I must +since have passed from that startled state into another, in which my +intuition covers synthetically the coming, the nature, and the +subsidence of that shock; so that I am aware how startled I was, without +being startled afresh now. A wonderful and ambiguous presence of the +absent and persistence of the receding, which is called _memory_. My +objects have receded, yet I continue to consider them. They are no +longer essences, but facts, and my consideration is not intuition of +something given but faith in something absent, and a persistent +indication of it as still the same object, although my image of it is +constantly changing, is perhaps intermittent, and probably grows +fainter, vaguer, and more erroneous at every instant. + +Experience of shock, if not utterly delusive, accordingly establishes +the validity of memory and of transitive knowledge. It establishes +realism. If it be true that I have ever had any experience, I must not +only have existed unawares in order to gather it, but I am justified in +explicitly asserting a whole realm of existence, in which one event may +contain realistic knowledge of another. Experience, even conceived most +critically as a series of shocks overtaking one another and retained in +memory, involves a world of independent existences deployed in an +existing medium. Belief in experience is belief in nature, however +vaguely nature may as yet be conceived, and every empiricist is a +naturalist in principle, however hesitant his naturalism may be in +practice. + +Nevertheless shock, like any other datum, intrinsically presents an +essence only, and _might_ be nothing more; but in that case the dogmatic +suasion of it (which alone lends interest to so blank an experience) +would be an illusion. The intuition would be what it is, but it would be +nobody’s intuition, and it would mean nothing. For I should not be a +self, if that intuition made up my whole being, so that it involved no +change in my condition, but was perhaps itself the whole universe. Shock +will not suffer me, while it lasts, to entertain any such hypothesis. It +is itself the most positive, if the blindest, of beliefs; it loudly +proclaims an event; so that if by chance the change which I feel were +merely a feeling within the unity of apperception, shock would be an +illusion, in the only sense in which this can be said of any intuition: +it would incite me to a false belief that something like the given +essence existed. If the change has really occurred, and not merely been +imagined, shock is not only intuition of change, but trouble in a +process of change enveloping that intuition. I am right in positing a +desultory experience in which this intuition is an incident. I am not a +spectator watching this cataract, but a part of the water precipitated +over the edge. Thus if being shocked was, as perhaps it ought to be, the +first sensation in life, it proclaimed the existence of a previous state +without sensation. Unless it is an illusion, which I cannot admit while +I feel it, it implies variation in a voluminous vegetative life in which +the sense of surprise is a true indication of novelty. + +Before I had noticed shock, or consented to accept its witness, I had +already admitted, on dialectical grounds, that discourse was a process; +but now that I observe how shocks, more or less violent, interrupt +discourse at every moment, I can call discourse experience. For now I +see that in endeavouring to trace dialectical relations discourse is not +itself dialectical. Sheer chance decides whether it shall pursue +faithfully the theme it may have picked out, as sheer chance decided +that it should pick up that theme in particular. In my theoretical +bewilderment and helplessness before this absolute contingency of all +themes and all data, I am steadied only by animal presumptions, habits, +expectations, or omens, all of which my sceptical reflection must +condemn as utterly arbitrary. I can only say that I am the sport of an +unfathomable destiny; that in these shocks that fall upon me thick and +fast, and in the calmer stretches between them, miscellaneous essences +are revealed to me, most of them gratuitous and mutually irrelevant; and +that if the current of them did not carry me, somewhat congenially, into +a vortex of work and play, I should be condemned for ever to blank +watching and to sheer wonder. The very belief in experience is a +suggestion of instinct, not of experience itself. The steadfastness of +my nature, doggedly retaining its prejudices and assuming its power, +supplies and imposes a routine upon my experience which is far from +existing in my direct intuitions, very shifty in their quality (even +when signs of the same external object) and much mixed with dream. Even +the naturalist has to make up by analogy and presumption (which perhaps +he calls induction) the enormous spaces between and beyond his actual +observations. + +Belief in experience is the beginning of that bold instinctive art, more +plastic than the instinct of most animals, by which man has raised +himself to his earthly eminence: it opens the gates of nature to him, +both within him and without, and enables him to transmute his +apprehension, at first merely æsthetic, into mathematical science. This +is so great a step that most minds cannot take it. They stumble, and +remain entangled in poetry and in gnomic wisdom. Science and reasonable +virtue, which plunge their roots in the soil of nature, are to this day +only partially welcome or understood. Although they bring freedom in the +end, the approach to them seems sacrificial, and many prefer to live in +the glamour of intuition, not having the courage to believe in +experience. + + + + + CHAPTER XVI + BELIEF IN THE SELF + + +Experience, when the shocks that punctuate it are reacted upon +instinctively, imposes belief in something far more recondite than +mental discourse, namely, a person or self; and not merely such a +transcendental ego as is requisite intrinsically for any intuition, nor +such a flux of sentience as discourse itself constitutes, but a +substantial being preceding _all_ the vicissitudes of experience, and +serving as an instrument to produce them, or a soil out of which they +grow. + +Shock is the great argument of common sense for the existence of +material things, because common sense does not need to distinguish the +order of evidence from the order of genesis. If I know already that a +tile has fallen on my head, my sore head is a proof to me that the tile +was real; but if I start from the pain itself in all innocence, I cannot +draw any inference from it about tiles or the laws of gravity. By common +sense experience is conceived as the effect which the impact of external +things makes on a man when he is able to retain and remember it. As a +matter of fact, of course, shocks usually have an external origin, +although in dreams, madness, apparitions, and in disease generally, +their cause is sometimes internal. But all question concerning the +source of a shock is vain for the sceptic; he knows nothing of sources; +he is asking, not whence shocks come, but to what beliefs they should +lead. In the criticism of knowledge the _argumentum baculaneum_ is +accordingly ridiculous, and fit only for the backs of those who use it. +Why, if I am a spirit beholding essences, should I not feel shocks? Why +are not novelties and surprises as likely themes for my entertainment as +the analysis or synthesis of some theorem or of some picture? All +essences are grist for the mill of intuition, and any order or disorder, +any quality of noise or violence, is equally appropriate in an +experience which, for all I know or as yet believe, is absolute and +groundless. And I call it experience, not because it discloses anything +about the environment which produced it, but because it is composed of a +series of shocks, which I survey and remember. + +If, however, consenting to listen to the voice of nature, I ask myself +what a shock can signify, and of what it brings me most unequivocal +evidence, the least hazardous answer will be: evidence of prepossessions +on my part. What shock proves, if it proves anything, is that I have a +nature to which all events and all developments are not equally welcome. +How could any apparition surprise or alarm me, or how could interruption +of any sort overtake me, unless I was somehow running on in a certain +direction, with a specific rhythm? Had I not such a positive nature, the +existence of material things and their most violent impact upon one +another, shattering the world to atoms, would leave me a placid observer +of their movement; whereas a definite nature in me, even if disturbed +only by cross-currents or by absolute accidents within my own being, +would justify my sense of surprise and horror. A self, then, not a +material world, is the first object which I should posit if I wish the +experience of shock to enlarge my dogmas in the strict order of +evidence. + +But what sort of a self? In one sense, the existence of intuition is +tantamount to that of a self, though of a merely formal and transparent +one, pure spirit. A self somewhat more concrete is involved in +discourse, when intuition has been deployed into a successive survey of +constant ideal objects, since here the self not only sees, but adds an +adventitious order to the themes it rehearses; traversing them in +various directions, with varying completeness, and suspending or picking +up the consideration of them at will; so that the self involved in +discourse is a thinking mind. Now that I am consenting to build further +dogmas on the sentiment of shock, and to treat it, not as an essence +groundlessly revealed to me, but as signifying something pertinent to +the alarm or surprise with which it fills me, I must thicken and +substantialise the self I believe in, recognising in it a nature that +accepts or rejects events, a nature having a movement of its own, far +deeper, more continuous and more biassed than a discoursing mind: the +self posited by the sense of shock is a living psyche. + +This is a most obscure subterraneous object; I am venturing into the +nether world. It is alarming and yet salutary to notice how near to +radical scepticism are the gates of Hades. I shall have occasion later +to consider what the psyche is physically, when I have learned more +about the world in which she figures; she has some stake in it, since +she welcomes or strives against sundry events. So anxious a being must +have but precarious conditions of existence, and yet some native +adaptation to them, since she manages to exist at all. Here I need admit +only this: that the pure spirit involved in any intuition of essence is +in my case repeatedly and somewhat consecutively actualised in a running +mental discourse; that, further, it is employed in remembering, loving, +and hating, so that it almost seems to spring like a wild beast upon its +visions, as upon its prey, and to gnaw and digest them into its own +substance. Spirit, as I shall soon find, is no substance, and has no +interests; all this absurd animal violence may still be nothing but a +dream; and the fact, now agreed upon, that discourse is going on, may +suffice to dispose of these passionate movements. Music, which is +ethereal in its being and, in the objective direction, terminates in +pure essence, nevertheless in its play with pure essence is full of +trepidation, haste, terror, potentiality, and sweetness. If mere sound +can carry such a load, why should not discourse do likewise, in which +images of many other sorts come trooping across the field of intuition? +This is no idle doubt, since the whole Buddhist system is built on +accepting it as a dogma; and transcendentalism, though it talks much of +the self, denies, or ought to deny, its existence, and the existence of +anything; the transcendental self is pure spirit, incoherently +identified with the principle of change, preference, and destiny which +this philosophy calls Will, but which in truth, as I shall find, is +matter. The Buddhists too, in denying the self, are obliged to introduce +an ambiguous equivalent in the heritage of guilt, ignorance, and +illusion which they call Karma. These are ulterior mystifications, which +I mention here only lest I should proceed to posit the natural psyche +without a due sense of the risks I am taking. The natural psyche, being +a habit of matter, is to be described and investigated from without, +scientifically, by a behaviourist psychology; but the critical approach +to it from within, as a postulate of animal faith, is extremely +difficult and fraught with danger. Literary psychology, to which I am +here confined, is at home only in the sentiments and ideas of the adult +mind, as language has expressed them: the deeper it tries to go, the +vaguer its notions; and it soon loses itself in the dark altogether. I +cannot hope to discover, therefore, what precisely this psyche is, this +self of mine, the existence of which is so indubitable to my active and +passionate nature. The evidence for it in shock hardly goes beyond the +instinctive assertion that I existed before, that I am a principle of +steady life, welcoming or rejecting events, that I am a nucleus of +active interests and passions. It will be easy to graft upon these +passions and interests the mental discourse which I had previously +asserted to be going on, and which made up, in this critical +reconstruction of belief, my first notion of myself. And yet here is one +of the dangers of my investigation, because mental discourse is not, and +cannot be, a self nor a psyche. It is all surface; it neither precedes, +nor survives, nor guides, nor posits its data; it merely notes and +remembers them. Discourse is a most superficial function of the self; +and if by the self I was tempted to understand a series of ideas, I +should be merely reverting sceptically to that stage of philosophic +denudation in which I found myself, before I had consented to accept the +evidence of shock in favour of my own existence. I, if I exist, am not +an idea, nor am I the fact that several ideas may exist, one of which +remembers the other. If I exist, I am a living creature to whom ideas +are incidents, like aeroplanes in the sky; they pass over, more or less +followed by the eye, more or less listened to, recognised, or +remembered; but the self slumbers and breathes below, a mysterious +natural organism, full of dark yet definite potentialities; so that +different events will awake it to quite disproportionate activities. The +self is a fountain of joy, folly, and sorrow, a waxing and waning, +stupid and dreaming creature, in the midst of a vast natural world, of +which it catches but a few transient and odd perspectives. + + + + + CHAPTER XVII + THE COGNITIVE CLAIMS OF MEMORY + + +Belief in memory is implicit in the very rudiments of mind; mind and +memory are indeed names for almost the same thing, since memory +furnishes most of the resources of a mind at all developed, and nothing +is ever in the mind but may reappear in memory, if the psyche can fall +again for a moment into her old paces. Mind and memory alike imply +cognisance taken of outlying things, or knowledge. When the things known +are events within the past experience of the psyche, spontaneously +imagined, knowledge is called memory; it is called mind or intelligence +when they are past, present, or future events in the environment at +large, no matter by what means they are suggested or reported. Memory +itself must report facts or events in the natural world, if it is to be +knowledge and to deserve the name of memory. An intuition by chance +repeating an intuition that had occurred earlier would not be memory or +knowledge of that earlier event. There must be belief in its previous +occurrence, with some indication of its original locus. + +Intuition without memory must be assumed to have existed in the +beginning, but such intuition regards essence only. Not being directed +by memory upon the past, nor by animal faith upon the future or upon +external things, pure intuition exercises no sagacity, no transitive +intelligence, and does not think. It is merely the light of awareness +lending actuality to some essence. When identity and duration come to be +attributed to this essence, memory begins to make its claims felt, +although indirectly. When I call an essence identical I imply that I +have considered it twice, and that I possess a true memory of my past +intuition, since I know it presented this very essence. Similarly, when +I call an essence the same, but without distinguishing my two intuitions +of it, which may be continuous, I posit the truth of memory unawares; +for this sensation of living on, of having lived up to the present, is a +primary memory. It sets up a temporal perspective, believing firmly in +its recessional character; parts of the specious present are interpreted +as survivals of a receding present, a present that can never return, but +the vision of which I have not wholly lost. The perspective is not taken +to be specious only, but a true memorial of facts past and gone. + +Memory deploys all the items of its inventory at some distance, yet sees +them directly, by a present glance. It makes no difference to the +directness of this knowledge how great the distance of the object may be +in the direction of the past. So also in foresight: I foresee my death +as directly as I do my dinner, not necessarily more vaguely, and far +more certainly. Memory and prophecy do in time what perception does in +space; here too the given essence is projected upon an object remote +from the living psyche which is the organ of the intuition and of the +projection. The object is indeed not remote from the _mind_, if by mind +I understand the intellectual energy of memory, prophecy, or perception +reaching to that object, and positing it there in intent; but it is +remote from the psyche, from the material agent, from me here and now. A +little less or a little more interval of time or space—and there is +always an interval—does not render less ocular and immediate the +description of a removed event by the essences it brings before me. I +see a peewit in the sky as directly as I see the watch in my hand, and I +hear his note as easily as I do the ticking of the watch against my ear. +So I remember the Scotch kilt I wore when a child as directly as the +umbrella I carried this morning. The difficulty in extending the range +of knowledge is physical only; I may be near-sighted; and the mechanism +of memory may break down, or may be choked with parasitic fancies as it +grows old. + +In memory it is sometimes possible to reproduce almost exactly some +earlier scene or experience. If the psyche happens to run through the +same process twice—and being material she is compacted of habits—she +will twice have exactly the same intuition; but this precise repetition +of the past, far from constituting a perfect memory, excludes memory. +The sentiment of pastness, the receding perspective in which memory +places its data, will be wanting; and this perfect recovery of +experience will not be remembrance. Nor is any fulness or precision in +the image of the past necessary to the truth of memory. The nerve of +recollection lies elsewhere, in the projection of the given +essence—which may be vague or purely verbal—to a precise point or +nucleus of relations in the natural past. Memory is genuine if the +events it designates actually took place, and conformed to the +description, however brief and abstract, which I give of them. Pictorial +fulness and emotional reversion to the past are not important, and they +are found most often at unimportant points. Healthy memory excludes +them, and for two reasons. The bodily reaction to the old environment is +now hardly possible, and certainly not appropriate; and therefore, even +if the neurogram in the psyche could spring again into perfect life, it +would bring a dream into being, an interruption to life in the present, +rather than a sober memory filling the present appropriately with a long +perspective. The second reason is that the neurogram is likely to have +been modified by the accidents of nutrition and waste intervening, so +that the old movement cannot really be repeated, and the essence called +up will not really be the original one. That it may _seem_ to be the +original, in its very life, is nothing to the purpose. How, if vivid, +should it not seem so, when no other memory exists to control it? But if +I can control it by circumstantial evidence, I usually find that this +specious recovery of past experience is a cheap illusion. If the +reversion to the past seems complete, it is not because the facts are +remembered accurately, but because some subtle influence fills me with a +sentiment wholly foreign to my present circumstances, and redolent of a +remote past; and that dramatic shift seems to lift all the details of +the picture out of the perspective of memory into the foreground of the +present. It is the fancy that comes forward, producing a waking dream, +not the memory that sinks back into an old experience. The scent of a +cedar chest in which old finery is kept may carry me back vividly to my +earliest childhood; but the images that now seem to live again will be +creatures of my present sophisticated and literary fancy; I shall see +them romantically, not with the eyes of a child. I may truly recover +knowledge of long-forgotten facts, but I shall not re-enact a long-past +experience. And what need is there? A miraculous identity may be felt +emotionally even when the two descriptions of the identical thing differ +in _every_ sensible term, as happens in metaphors, in myths, in myself +as body and as mind, in idolatry, or in the doctrine—which expresses a +mystical experience—of transubstantiation. In such cases the vital +reaction, the deeper readjustment of the psyche, to the two appearances +is the same; therefore I feel that the thing appearing in the two ways +is identical, that the one is _really_ the other, however diverse the +two sets of symbols may be. + +I have already accepted the belief in memory; indeed, without accepting +it I could not have taken the first step forward from the most +speechless scepticism. But since such acceptance is an act of faith, and +asserts transitive or realistic knowledge, I will pause to consider +somewhat more explicitly what the cognitive claims of memory are, on +which all human beliefs are reared. + +The paradox of knowing the absent is posited in the past tenses of the +verb; it is the paradox of knowledge itself, since intuition of essence +is not properly called knowledge; it is imagination, since the only +object present is then non-existent and the description of it, being +creative, is infallible. The claim to knowledge everybody understands +perfectly when he makes it, which he does whenever he perceives, +remembers, or believes anything; but if we wish to paraphrase this claim +reflectively, we may perhaps say that in it attention professes to fall +on an object explicitly at a distance, being framed by other nearer +objects (though at some distance themselves) upon which attention falls +only virtually. If this foreground or frame were absent altogether, I +should live in the pictured past thinking it present; memory would +overleap its memorial office and become a dream. It would cease to be +liable to error, being no longer a report about anything else; but it +would become an idle entertainment, which a moralist might call an +illusion, on the ground that its images were irrelevant to the practice +of rational life, and its emotions wasted. But it would not misrepresent +anything, since in ceasing to be a memory it would have abandoned all +cognitive claims. + +A frame or foreground is accordingly indispensable to the projection +which renders a present image a vision of some past fact: I must stand +here to point there. Yet if my present station were explicitly +perceived, if the whole immediate datum were focussed equally in +thought, the picture would seem flat and the perspective merely painted +upon it, as upon a cheap drop-curtain in a theatre. It would destroy the +claim and, if you like, the illusion of memory to remember that I am +remembering; for then I should be considering myself only, and only the +present, whereas in living remembrance I am self-forgetful, and live in +the present thinking only of the past, and observe the past without +supposing that I am living in it. My recollections, my _souvenirs_, are +only essences which I read as I should the characters on this page, not +viewing them contemplatively in their own category as forms present in +their entirety, but accepting them readily (as in all knowledge) as +messengers, as signs for existences of which they furnish but an +imperfect description, for which I am perhaps hopeful of substituting a +better view. In lapsing into the past I seem to myself to be entering a +realm of shadows; and a chief part of my wakefulness, which prevents me +from actually dreaming that I am living in that other world, is +precisely this eagerness of mine to see better, to remember all, to +recover the past as it really was; and the elusive and treacherous +character of such images as come to me troubles me seriously, as a mist +distorting and shutting off the truth. My heart, as it were, is fixed on +that removed reality, and I know that my eyes see it but imperfectly. +Yet if my heart had intuition now of what that reality once was, +recollection would be superfluous, since I should possess all it could +bring me before it brought it; and on the other hand, if my heart did +not know the reality, how could I reject, criticise, or approve the +images that professed to restore its forgotten aspects? Obviously what I +am calling the heart, which is the psyche, is blind in herself: +imagination is her only light, her only language; but she is a prior +principle of choice and judgement and action in the dark; so that when +the light shines in that darkness, she comprehends it, and feels at once +whether the ray falls on the object towards which she was groping, or on +some irrelevant thing. The psyche, in the case of memory, contains all +the seeds, all the involutions and latent habits, which the past left +there in passing; any one of these may be released freely, or only +irritated and summoned to activity without being sufficiently fed, or +only to be at once thwarted and contradicted; and the _sentiment_ of +this prosperous or mutilated rendering of experience, when memory +proffers its images, enables the psyche to judge these images to be true +or false, adequate or inadequate, without possessing any other images +with which to compare them. + +This felt imperfection of memory is no obstacle to the directness of +such knowledge as it does afford. Memory, however vague, transports me +to the intended scene; I walk by its wavering light through those +ancient chambers; I see again (incorrectly, no doubt) what occurred +there. But if many a detail once obvious is thereby lost or misplaced, +memory may see the chief features of the past in a truer perspective +than that in which experience placed them originally. The ghostliness of +memory carries this compensation with it, comparable to the breadth of +sympathy that compensates old age for the loss of vivaciousness; memory +is a reconstruction, not a relapse. The view which the opened chest +creates in me now of my family history may be truer than any I had when +a child. My perceptions when a child were themselves descriptions, +naïve, disjointed, limited. In reproducing my past perceptions, my +dreaming memory does not regard those perceptions—perceptions being +spiritual facts, can become objects of intent only. Memory regards the +same objects (essences or things) which the past perceptions regarded. +But the soil in which these intuitions now grow has been tilled and +watered, and, even if a little exhausted, it may yield a fairer +description of those ancient incidents than existed before, more +voluminous, better knit, more knowing. Memory has fundamentally the same +function as history and science—to review things more intelligently than +they were ever viewed. Mind would never rise out of the most helpless +animal routine if it could not forget in remembering, and could not +substitute a moral perspective for the infinite flatness of physical +experience. That much drops out is a blessing; that something creeps in, +by way of idealisation, hyperbole, and legend, is not an unmixed evil. +In spite of this admixture of fiction, memory, legend, and science +achieve a true intellectual dominion over the flux of events; and they +add a poetic life and rhythm of their own, like the senses. + +This possibility of dominion proves that the images and the apperception +involved in remembering are fresh images and a fresh apperception. It +shows also that the later station in time of the act of remembering in +no way annuls the directness of the knowledge involved, nor cuts it off +from its object; on the contrary, the object being posited and chosen by +the psyche before any images or any apperception arise, these are free +to describe that object in any way they can, bringing all later +resources of the mind to illustrate it, and thereby perhaps describing +it far more truly than the senses revealed it when it was present. + +Here an important detail has come into view which at first sight might +seem paradoxical, but only because the paucity of language obliges us +often to use the same word for very different things. Thus it seems +natural to say that a man may remember his own experience, and can +remember nothing else; and yet it is not his _experience_ that he +commonly remembers at all, but the usual object of his memory is the +object of his former experience, the events or the situation in which +his earlier experience occurred. Experience is intuition, it is +discourse interspersed with shocks and recapitulated; but intuition, +actual experience, is not an object of any possible intuition or +experience, being, as I have said above, a spiritual fact. Its existence +can be discovered only by moral imagination, and posited dramatically, +as the experience proper to spirit under certain real or imaginary +circumstances. And this is true of my own past or future, no less than +of the experience of others. When I remember I do not _look at_ my past +experience, any more than when I think of a friend’s misfortunes I look +at his thoughts. I imagine them; or rather I imagine something of my own +manufacture, as if I were writing a novel, and I attribute this intuited +experience to myself in the past, or to the other person. Naturally, I +can impute only such feelings as my present psyche can evoke; and she, +although creative, creates automatically and in accordance with patterns +fixed by habit or instinct; so that it is true, in a loose way, that I +can remember or conceive only what I have experienced; but this is not +because my experience itself remains within me, and can be re-observed. +Such a notion needs but to be made clear to be made ridiculous. Living +intuition cannot be preserved; and even while it lives, it cannot be +found. It is spiritual. + +Recollection is accordingly incipient dreaming; it views the same +objects as the experience did which it rehearses, since the memory +arises by a renewal of the very process in the psyche by which that +experience was created originally. The psyche, in so far as she is +occupied with that dream, does not know that it is a memory, nor that +its objects are remote and perhaps no longer exist; she posits them with +all the confidence of action, as in any other dream. Yet in normal +memory the illusion is controlled and corrected, and the experience +actually given, with all its posited objects, is relegated to the past; +because this time it is framed in another experience, with more +obstinate objects and an environment to which the body is adjusted, +incompatible with the remembered environment. Hence the shadowy, +vaporous, unreal aspect of the remembered past: images chase one another +through it, as they chase one another sometimes in a cinema, or as in a +dream what was just now a white-capped wave may become a horse +galloping. Meantime reason rides the storm of seething incipient +fancies, anchored in the outer senses by the steady pull of the +instincts which bind it to the present world. + +Experience cannot be remembered, a perception cannot be perceived nor +re-perceived. This fact explains both the directness of memory (since it +regards the same objects, the same environment, as the old experience, +and repeats the same emotions), and also the ghostliness of memory and +of all imagination (since the beliefs and emotions evoked are irrelevant +to the present world, and inhibited by peremptory present reactions). + +There is a great difference conventionally between memory and fancy, +between history and fiction, and the two things diverge widely in their +physical significance, one regarding events in nature and the other +imaginary scenes; nevertheless psychologically they are clearly akin. It +is only by an ulterior control that we can distinguish which sort of +fancy is memory and which sort of fiction is historical. This control, +for the immediate past, is exercised by habit and sensation. The +immediate past is continuous with the present; I believe that I +remember, and do not merely imagine, the street in which I live, because +I am ready to walk out into it confidently, and by raising my eyes can +see it out of the window. It is an object continuous with the recurrent +objects of my present faith. When the past is more remote, this control, +while the same in principle, is less directly exercised; it is mainly +the _habit_ of memory that testifies to the truth of memory. I believe I +remember, and do not merely imagine, what I have always said I +remembered; just as we believe events to be historical and not invented, +when historians have always repeated them. It is consequently very easy +for a fiction, once incorporated in what, because of our practical +habits, we regard as real events, to pass for a fact for ever. +Autobiographies and religions (even when not systematically recast by +the fancy, as they usually are) contain many such involuntary +confusions. _Vice versa_, a lively fiction spontaneously takes the form +of a history or a memory. Although no junction with genuine memory or +history may be attempted in _Robinson Crusoe_ at the beginning or at the +end, many a real fact may be woven into the narrative, to add to its +verisimilitude, and absorb, as it were, the fancied details into the +romantic medley of things commonly believed. “Once upon a time,” says +the story-teller, in order vaguely to graft his imaginary events on to +the tree of memory; and in the _Thousand and One Nights_ we are +transported to one of the cities amongst cities, or to an island amongst +the isles of the sea; whereby the fiction grows more arresting, or the +real world more marvellous and large. + +Criticism of memory and history is a ticklish and often a comic matter, +because only fancy can be employed to do it; and we judge the authority +of records and the reports of our past experience by the criterion of +what, at the present moment, can exercise a decided suasion over our +belief, and create a living illusion. But the principle by which we +trust memory at all is always the same, and deeply paradoxical. How can +a flux be observed at all? If flux there be, the earlier part is gone +when the latter part appears: how then can the relation, the passage, be +observed? And where is the observation? If it occupies each instant in +turn, how can it bridge them? If it stands outside, how can it touch any +of them? In any case the observation would seem to be out of the flux +which it imagines, but does not undergo: for if its being is +instantaneous, there is no flux in it; and if it is comprehensive, and +contemporary with all the instants surveyed, again it endures no change. +Indeed, analytically, it is obvious that a sense of change, falling +necessarily under a unity of apperception, transcends _that_ change, +however changeful may be the conditions of its own genesis: mind, by its +very character as mind, is timeless. Is time, then, merely a picture of +time, and can it be nothing else? And is flux, which is an essential +quality of existence, only a mere appearance, and essentially incapable +of existing in fact? + +There is danger here of an enormous illusion, into which I think the +most redoubtable metaphysicians have fallen. We must admit that spirit +is not in time, that the perception of flux (or of anything else) is not +a flux, but a synthetic glance and a single intuition of relation, of +form, of quality. The seen is everywhere a universal, the seeing is +everywhere supernatural. But this admission is far from involving a +denial of flux—a denial, that is, of the deliverance of this very spirit +to which we are assigning such pompous prerogatives. The one prerogative +which we must assume spirit to possess—because we claim it in exercising +spirit at all—is that it _understands_, that it tells truly something +about something. Its own conditions of being, that it must be +immaterial, timeless, synthetic, intuitive, do not preclude it, if it is +truly intelligent, from revealing things differently constituted from +itself: much less can it prevent these non-spiritual things from +existing. What madness is this, because we may at last discern the +spirituality of spirit, to deny that there could ever have been anything +for spirit to discern? Why stultify the very faculty we are discovering +that we possess? Why tumble in this way head over heels from our little +eminence, and reduce ourselves to speechlessness in wonder at our +capacity to speak? This supernatural status and super-temporal scope of +spirit are not prerogatives; they are deprivations; they are sacrificial +conditions, from the point of view of natural existence, to which any +faculty must submit, if it is to understand. Of course understanding is +itself an achievement (though not all philosophers esteem it highly), +but it must be bought at a price: at the price of escaping into a fourth +dimension, of not being that which we understand. So when the flux, in +its rumble and perpetual superposition of movements, remembers that it +flows, it is not arrested materially; but the sense that what flows +through it at this instant has come from afar, that it has taken a fresh +shape, and is hurrying to new transformations, has itself eluded that +fate: for this sense, as distinguished from the psyche that exercises +it, is tangential to the flux it surveys, neither instantaneous nor +prolonged, but simply intelligent. How far into the past or future its +glance may reach, is a matter of accident, and of the range of +adjustments at that moment in the psyche. But spirit is virtually +omniscient: barriers of space and time do not shut it in; they are but +the boundary-stones of field and field in its landscape. It is ready to +survey all time and all existence if, by establishing some electric +connection with its seat, time and existence will consent to report +themselves to it. For spirit has no interests, no curiosity, no animal +impatience; and as it arises only when and where nature calls it forth, +so it surveys only what nature happens to spread before it. + + + + + CHAPTER XVIII + KNOWLEDGE IS FAITH MEDIATED BY SYMBOLS + + +In the claims of memory I have a typical instance of what is called +knowledge. In remembering I believe that I am taking cognisance not of a +given essence but of a remote existence, so that, being myself here and +now, I can consider and describe something going on at another place and +time. This leap, which renders knowledge essentially faith, may come to +seem paradoxical or impossible like the leap of physical being from +place to place or from form to form which is called motion or change, +and which some philosophers deny, as they deny knowledge. Is there such +a leap in knowing? Am I really here and now when I apprehend some remote +thing? Certainly, if by myself I understand the psyche within my body, +which directs my outer organs, reacts on external things, and shapes the +history and character of the individual animal that bears my name. In +this sense I am a physical being in the midst of nature, and my +knowledge is a name for the effects which surrounding things have upon +me, in so far as I am quickened by them, and readjusted to them. I am +certainly confined at each moment to a limited space and time, but may +be quickened by the influence of things at any distance, and may be +readjusting myself to them. For the naturalist there is accordingly no +paradox in the leap of knowledge other than the general marvel of +material interaction and animal life. + +If by myself, however, I meant pure spirit, or the light of attention by +which essences appear and intuitions are rendered actual, it would not +be true that I am confined or even situated in a particular place and +time, nor that in considering things remote from my body, my thoughts +are taking any unnatural leap. The marvel, from the point of view of +spirit, is rather that it should need to be planted at all in the +sensorium of some living animal, and that, being rooted there, it should +take that accidental station for its point of view in surveying all +nature, and should dignify one momentary phase of that animal life with +the titles of the Here and the Now. It is only spirit, be it observed, +that can do this. In themselves all the points of space-time are equally +central and palpitating, and every phase of every psyche is a focus for +actual readjustments to the whole universe. How then can the spirit, +which would seem to be the principle of universality and justice, take +up its station in each of these atoms and fight its battles for it, and +prostitute its own light in the service of that desperate blindness? Can +reason do nothing better than supply the eloquence of prejudice? Such +are the puzzles which spirit might find, I will not say in the leap of +knowledge, but in the fatality which links the spirit to a material +organ so that, in order to reach other things, it is obliged to leap; or +rather can never reach other things, because it is tethered to its +starting-point, except by its intent in leaping, and cannot even +discover the stepping-stone on which it stands because its whole life is +the act of leaping away from it. There is no reason, therefore, in so +far as knowledge is an apanage of spirit, why knowledge should not bathe +all time and all existence in an equal light, and see everything as it +is, with an equal sympathy and immediacy. The problem for the spirit is +how it could ever come to pick out one body or another for its cynosure +and for its instrument, as if it could not see save through such a +little eye-glass, and in such a violent perspective. This problem, I +think, has a ready answer, but it is not one that spirit could ever find +of itself, without a long and docile apprenticeship in the school of +animal faith. This answer is that spirit, with knowledge and all its +other prerogatives, is intrinsically and altogether a function of animal +life; so that if it were not lodged in some body and expressive of its +rhythms and relations, spirit would not exist at all. But this solution, +even when spirit is humble enough to accept it, always seems to it a +little disappointing and satirical. + +Spirit, therefore, has no need to leap in order to know, because in its +range as spirit it is omnipresent and omnimodal. Events which are past +or future in relation to the phase of the psyche which spirit expresses +in a particular instance, or events which are remote from that psyche in +space, are not for that reason remote from spirit, or out of its +cognitive range: they are merely hidden, or placed in a particular +perspective for the moment, like the features of a landscape by the +hedges and turns of a road. Just as all essences are equally near to +spirit, and equally fit and easy to contemplate, if only a psyche with +an affinity to those essences happens to arise; so all existing things, +past, future, or infinitely distant, are equally within the range of +knowledge, if only a psyche happens to be directed upon them, and to +choose terms, however poor or fantastic, in which to describe them. In +choosing these terms the psyche creates spirit, for they are essences +given in intuition; and in directing her action or endeavour, backward +or forward, upon those remote events, she creates intent in the spirit, +so that the given essences become descriptions of the things with which +the psyche is then busied. + +But how, I may ask, can intent distinguish its hidden object, so that an +image, distorted or faithful, may be truly or falsely projected _there_, +or used to describe _it_? How does the spirit divine that there is such +an object, or where it lies? And how can it appeal to a thing which is +hidden, the object of mere intent, as to a touchstone or standard for +its various descriptions of that object, and say to them, as they +suggest themselves in turn: You are too vague, You are absurd, You are +better, You are absolutely right? + +I answer that it does so by animal presumption, positing whatsoever +object instinct is materially predisposed to cope with, as in hunger, +love, fighting, or the expectation of a future. But before developing +this reply, let me make one observation. Since intuition of essence is +not knowledge, knowledge can never lie in an overt comparison of one +datum with another datum given at the same time; even in pure dialectic, +the comparison is with a datum _believed_ to have been given formerly. +If both terms were simply given they would compose a complex essence, +without the least signification. Only when one of the terms is indicated +by intent, without being given exhaustively, can the other term serve to +define the first more fully, or be linked with it in an assertion which +is not mere tautology. An object of faith—and knowledge is one species +of faith—can never, even in the most direct perception, come within the +circle of intuition. Intuition of things is a contradiction in terms. If +philosophers wish to abstain from faith, and reduce themselves to +intuition of the obvious, they are free to do so, but they will thereby +renounce all knowledge, and live on passive illusions. No fact, not even +the fact that these illusions exist, would ever be, or would ever have +been, anything but the false idea that they had existed. There would be +nothing but the realm of essence, without any intuition of any part of +it, nor of the whole: so that we should be driven back to a nihilism +which only silence and death could express consistently; since the least +actual assertion of it, by existing, would contradict it. + +Even such acquaintance with the realm of essence as constitutes some +science or recognisable art—like mathematics or music—lies in intending +and positing great stretches of essence not now given, so that the +essences now given acquire significance and become pregnant, to my vital +feeling, with a thousand things which they do not present actually, but +which I know where to look for eventually, and how to await. Suppose a +moment ago I heard a clap of thunder, loud and prolonged, but that the +physical shock has subsided and I am conscious of repose and silence. I +may find some difficulty, although the thing was so recent, in +_rehearsing_ even now the exact volume, tone, and rumblings of that +sound; yet I _know_ the theme perfectly, in the sense that when it +thunders again, I can say with assurance whether the second crash was +longer, louder, or differently modulated. In such a case I have no +longer an intuition of the first thunder-clap, but a memory of it which +is knowledge; and I can define on occasion, up to a certain point and +not without some error, the essence given in that particular past +intuition. Thus even pure essences can become objects of intent and of +tentative knowledge when they are not present in intuition but are +approached and posited indirectly, as the essences given on another +particular occasion or signified by some particular word. The word or +the occasion are natural facts, and my knowledge is focussed upon them +in the first instance by ordinary perception or conception of nature: +and the essence I hope to recover is elicited gradually, imaginatively, +perhaps incorrectly, at the suggestion of those assumed facts, according +to my quickness of wit, or my familiarity with the conventions of that +art or science. In this way it becomes possible and necessary to learn +about essences as if they were things, not initially by a spontaneous +and complete intuition, but by coaxing the mind until possibly, at the +end, it beholds them clearly. This is the sort of intuition which is +mediated by language and by works of fine art; also by logic and +mathematics, as they are learned from teachers and out of books. It is +not happy intuition of some casual datum: it is laborious recovery, up +to a certain point, of the _sort_ of essence somebody else may have +intuited. Whereas intuition, which reveals an essence directly, is not +knowledge, because it has no ulterior object, the designation of some +essence by some sign does convey knowledge, to an intelligent pupil, of +what that essence was. Obviously such divination of essences present +elsewhere, so that they become present here also, in so far as it is +knowledge, is trebly faith. Faith first in the document, as a genuine +natural fact and not a vapid fancy of my own; for instance, belief that +there is a book called the Bible, really handed down from the ancient +Jews and the early Christians, and that I have not merely dreamt of such +a book. Faith then in the significance of that document, that it means +some essence which it is not; in this instance, belief that the sacred +writers were not merely speaking with tongues but were signifying some +intelligible points in history and philosophy. Faith finally in my +success in interpreting that document correctly, so that the essences it +suggests to me now are the very essences it expressed originally: in +other words, the belief that when I read the Bible I understand it as it +was meant, and not fantastically. + +I revert now to the question how it is possible to posit an object which +is not a datum, and how without knowing positively what this object is I +can make it the criterion of truth in my ideas. How can I test the +accuracy of descriptions by referring them to a subject-matter which is +not only out of view now but which probably has never been more than an +object of intent, an event which even while it was occurring was +described by me only in terms native to my fancy? If I know a man only +by reputation, how should I judge if the reputation is deserved? If I +know things only by representations, are not the representations the +only things I know? + +This challenge is fundamental, and so long as the assumptions which it +makes are not challenged in turn, it drives critics of knowledge +inexorably to scepticism of a dogmatic sort, I mean to the assertion +that the very notion of knowledge is absurd. One assumption is that +knowledge should be intuition: but I have already come to the conclusion +that intuition is not knowledge. So long as a knowledge is demanded that +shall be intuition, the issue can only be laughter or despair; for if I +attain intuition, I have only a phantom object, and if I spurn that and +turn to the facts, I have renounced intuition. This assumption alone +suffices, therefore, to disprove the possibility of knowledge. But in +case the force of this disproof escaped us, another assumption is at +hand to despatch the business, namely, the assumption that in a true +description—if we grant knowledge by description—the terms should be +identical with the constituents of the object, so that the idea should +_look like_ the thing that it knows. This assumption is derived from the +other, or is a timid form of it: for it is supposed that I know by +intuiting my idea, and that unless that idea resembled the object I wish +to know, I could not even by courtesy be said to have discovered the +latter. But the intuition of an idea, let me repeat, is not knowledge; +and if a thing resembling that idea happened to exist, my intuition +would still not be knowledge of it, but contemplation of the idea only. + +Plato and many other philosophers, being in love with intuition (for +which alone they were perhaps designed by nature), have identified +science with certitude, and consequently entirely condemned what I call +knowledge (which is a form of animal faith) or relegated it to an +inferior position, as something merely necessary for life. I myself have +no passionate attachment to existence, and value this world for the +intuitions it can suggest, rather than for the wilderness of facts that +compose it. To turn away from it may be the deepest wisdom in the end. +What better than to blow out the candle, and to bed! But at noon this +pleasure is premature. I can always hold it in reserve, and perhaps +nihilism is a system—the simplest of all—on which we shall all agree in +the end. But I seem to see very clearly now that in doing so we should +all be missing the truth: not indeed by any false assertion, such as may +separate us from the truth now, but by dumb ignorance—a dumb ignorance +which, when proposed as a solution to actual doubts, is the most radical +of errors, since it ignores and virtually denies the pressure of those +doubts, and their living presence. Accordingly, so long as I remain +awake and the light burning, that total dogmatic scepticism is evidently +an impossible attitude. It requires me to deny what I assert, not to +mean what I mean, and (in the sense in which seeing is believing) not to +believe what I see. If I wish, therefore, to formulate in any way my +actual claim to knowledge—a claim which life, and in particular memory, +imposes upon me—I must revise the premisses of this nihilism. For I have +been led to it not by any accidental error, but by the logic of the +assumption that knowledge should be intuition of fact. It is this +presumption that must be revoked. + +Knowledge is no such thing. It is not intramental nor internal to +experience. Not only does it not require me to compare two given terms +and to find them similar or identical, but it positively excludes any +intuitive possession of its object. Intuition subsists beneath +knowledge, as vegetative life subsists beneath animal life, and within +it. Intuition may also supervene upon knowledge, when all I have learned +of the universe, and all my concern for it, turn to a playful or a +hypnotising phantom; and any poet or philosopher, like any flower, is +free to prefer intuition to knowledge. But in preferring intuition he +prefers ignorance. Knowledge is knowledge because it has compulsory +objects that pre-exist. It is incidental to the predicaments and labour +of life: also to its masterful explorations and satirical moods. It is +reflected from events as light is reflected from bodies. It expresses in +discourse the modified habits of an active being, plastic to experience, +and capable of readjusting its organic attitude to other things on the +same material plane of being with itself. The place and the pertinent +functions of these several things are indicated by the very attitude of +the animal who notices them; this attitude, physical and practical, +determines the object of intent, which discourse is about. + +When the proverbial child cries for the moon, is the object of his +desire doubtful? He points at it unmistakably; yet the psychologist (not +to speak of the child himself) would have some difficulty in recovering +exactly the sensations and images, the gathering demands and fumbling +efforts, that traverse the child’s mind while he points. Fortunately all +this fluid sentience, even if it could be described, is irrelevant to +the question; for the child’s sensuous experience is not his object. If +it were, he would have attained it. What his object is, his fixed gaze +and outstretched arm declare unequivocally. His elders may say that he +doesn’t know what he wants, which is probably true of them also: that +is, he has only a ridiculously false and inconstant idea of what the +moon may be in itself. But his attention is arrested in a particular +direction, his appetition flows the same way; and if he may be said to +know anything, he knows there is something there which he would like to +reach, which he would like to know better. He is a little philosopher; +and his knowledge, if less diversified and congealed, is exactly like +science. + +The attitude of his body in pointing to the moon, and his tears, fill +full his little mind, which not only reverberates to this physical +passion, but probably observes it: and this felt attitude _identifies +the object_ of his desire and knowledge _in the physical world_. It +determines what particular thing, in the same space and time with the +child’s body, was the object of that particular passion. If the object +which the body is after is identified, that which the soul is after is +identified too: no one, I suppose, would carry dualism so far as to +assert that when the mouth waters at the sight of one particular plum, +the soul may be yearning for quite another. + +The same bodily attitude of the child _identifies the object in the +discourse of an observer_. In perceiving what his senses are excited by, +and which way his endeavour is turned, I can see that the object of his +desire is the moon, which I too am looking at. That I am looking at the +same moon as he can be proved by a little triangulation: our glances +converge upon it. If the child has reached the inquisitive age and asks +“What is that?” I understand what he means by “that” and am able to +reply sapiently “That is the moon,” only because our respective bodies, +in one common space, are discoverably turned towards one material +object, which is stimulating them simultaneously. Knowledge of discourse +in other people, or of myself at other times, is what I call literary +psychology. It is, or may be, in its texture, the most literal and +adequate sort of knowledge of which a mind is capable. If I am a lover +of children, and a good psycho-analyst, I may feel for a moment exactly +as the child feels in looking at the moon: and I may know that I know +his feeling, and very likely he too will know that I know it, and we +shall become fast friends. But this rare adequacy of knowledge, attained +by dramatic sympathy, goes out to an object which in its existence is +known very indirectly: because poets and religious visionaries feel this +sort of sympathy with all sorts of imaginary persons, of whose existence +and thoughts they have only intuition, not knowledge. If I ask for +evidence that such an object exists, and is not an _alter ego_ of my +private invention, I must appeal to my faith in nature, and to my +conventional assumption that this child and I are animals of the same +species, in the same habitat, looking at the same moon, and likely to +have the same feelings: and finally the psychology of the tribe and the +crowd may enable me half to understand how we know that we have the same +feelings at once, when we actually share them. + +The attitude of the child’s body also _identifies the object for him, in +his own subsequent discourse_. He is not likely to forget a moon that he +cried for. When in stretching his hand towards it he found he could not +touch it, he learned that this bright good was not within his grasp, and +he made a beginning in the experience of life. He also made a beginning +in science, since he then added the absolutely true predicate “out of +reach” to the rather questionable predicates “bright” and “good” (and +perhaps “edible”) with which his first glimpse had supplied him. That +active and mysterious thing, co-ordinate with himself, since it lay in +the same world with his body, and affected it—the thing that attracted +his hand, was evidently the very thing that eluded it. His failure would +have had no meaning and would have taught him nothing—that is, would not +have corrected his instinctive reactions—if the object he saw and the +object he failed to reach had not been identical; and certainly that +object was not brightness nor goodness nor excitements in his brain or +psyche, for these are not things he could ever have attempted or +expected to touch. It is only things on the scale of the human senses +and in the field of those instinctive reactions which sensation calls +forth, that can be the primary objects of human knowledge: no other +things can be discriminated at first by an animal mind, or can interest +it, or can be meant and believed in by it. It is these instinctive +reactions that select the objects of attention, designate their locus, +and impose faith in their existence. But these reactions may be modified +by experience, and the description the mind gives of the objects reacted +upon can be revised, or the objects themselves discarded, and others +discerned instead. Thus the child’s instinct to touch the moon was as +spontaneous and as confident at first as his instinct to look at it; and +the object of both efforts was the same, because the same external +agency aroused them, and with them the very heterogeneous sensations of +light and of disappointment. These various terms of sense or of +discourse, by which the child described the object under whose +attractions and rebuffs he was living, were merely symbols to him, like +words. An animal naturally has as many signs for an object as he has +sensations or emotions in its presence. These signs are miscellaneous +essences—sights, sounds, smells, contacts, tears, provocations—and they +are alternative or supplementary to one another, like words in different +languages. The most diverse senses, such as smell and sight, if summoned +to the same point in the environment, and guiding a single action, will +report upon a single object. Even when one sense brings all the news I +have, its reports will change from moment to moment with the distance, +variation, or suspension of the connection between the object and my +body: and this without any relevant change in the object itself. Nay, +often the very transformation of the sensation bears witness that the +object is unchanged; as music and laughter, overheard as I pass a +tavern, are felt and known to continue unabated, and to be no merriment +of mine, just because they fade from my ears as I move away. + +The object of knowledge being that designated in this way by my bodily +attitude, the æsthetic qualities I attribute to it will depend on the +particular sense it happens to affect at the moment, or on the sweep and +nature of the reaction which it then calls forth on my part. This +diversity in signs and descriptions for a single thing is a normal +diversity. Diversity, when it is not contradiction, irritates only +unreasonably dogmatic people; they are offended with nature for having a +rich vocabulary, and sometimes speaking a language, or employing a +syntax, which they never heard at home. It is an innocent prejudice, and +it yields easily in a generous mind to pleasure at the wealth of +alternatives which animal life affords. Even such contradictions as may +arise in the description of things, and may truly demand a solution, +reside in the implication of the terms, not in their sensuous or +rhetorical diversity: they become contradictory only when they assign to +the object contrary movements or contrary effects, not when they merely +exhibit its various appearances. Looking at the moon, one man may call +it simply a light in the sky; another, prone to dreaming awake, may call +it a virgin goddess; a more observant person, remembering that this +luminary is given to waxing and waning, may call it the crescent; and a +fourth, a full-fledged astronomer, may say (taking the æsthetic essence +before him merely for a sign) that it is an extinct and opaque +spheroidal satellite of the earth, reflecting the light of the sun from +a part of its surface. All these descriptions envisage the same +object—otherwise no relevance, conflict, or progress could obtain among +them. What that object is in its complete constitution and history will +never be known by man; but that this object exists in a known space and +time and has traceable physical relations with all other physical +objects is a fact posited from the beginning; it was posited by the +child when he pointed, and by me when I saw him point. If it did not so +exist and (as sometimes happens) he and I were suffering from a +hallucination, in thinking we were pointing at the moon we should be +discoverably pointing at vacancy: exploration would eventually satisfy +us of that fact, and any bystander would vouch for it. But if in +pointing at it we were pointing to it, its identity would be fixed +without more ado; disputes and discoveries concerning it would be +pertinent and soluble, no matter what diversity there might be in the +ideal essences—light, crescent, goddess, or satellite—which we used as +rival descriptions of it while we pointed. + +I find that the discrimination of essence brings a wonderful clearness +into this subject. All data and descriptions—light, crescent, goddess, +or satellite—are equally essences, terms of human discourse, in-existent +in themselves. What exists in any instance, besides the moon and our +various reactions upon it, is some intuition, expressing those +reactions, evoking that essence, and lending it a specious actuality. +The terms of astronomy are essences no less human and visionary than +those of mythology; but they are the fruit of a better focussed, more +chastened, and more prolonged attention turned upon what actually +occurs; that is, they are kept closer to animal faith, and freer from +pictorial elements and the infusion of reverie. In myth, on the +contrary, intuition wanders idly and uncontrolled; it makes epicycles, +as it were, upon the reflex arc of perception; the moonbeams bewitch +some sleeping Endymion, and he dreams of a swift huntress in heaven. +Myth is nevertheless a relevant fancy, and genuinely expressive; only +instead of being guided by a perpetual fresh study of the object posited +by animal faith and encountered in action, it runs into marginal +comments, personal associations, and rhetorical asides; so that even if +based originally on perception, it is built upon principles internal to +human discourse, as are grammar, rhyme, music, and morals. It may be +admirable as an expression of these principles, and yet be egregiously +false if asserted of the object, without discounting the human medium in +which it has taken form. Diana is an exquisite symbol for the moon, and +for one sort of human loveliness; but she must not be credited with any +existence over and above that of the moon, and of sundry short-skirted +Dorian maidens. She is not other than they: she is an image of them, the +best part of their essence distilled in a poet’s mind. So with the +description of the moon given by astronomers, which is not less +fascinating; this, too, is no added object, but only a new image for the +moon known even to the child and me. The space, matter, gravitation, +time, and laws of motion conceived by astronomers are essences only, and +mere symbols for the use of animal faith, when very enlightened: I mean +in so far as they are alleged to constitute knowledge of a world which I +must bow to and encounter in action; for if astronomy is content to be a +mathematical exercise without any truth, an object of pure intuition, +its terms and its laws will, of course, be ultimate realities, apart +from what happens to exist: realities in the realm of essence. In the +description of the natural world, however, they are mere symbols, +mediating animal faith. Science at any moment may recast or correct its +conceptions (as it is doing now) giving them a different colour; and the +nerve of truth in them will be laid bare and made taut in proportion as +the sensuous and rhetorical vesture of these notions is stripped off, +and the dynamic relations of events, as found and posited by material +exploration, are nakedly recorded. + +Knowledge accordingly is belief: belief in a world of events, and +especially of those parts of it which are near the self, tempting or +threatening it. This belief is native to animals, and precedes all +deliberate use of intuitions as signs or descriptions of things; as I +turn my head to see who is there, before I see who it is. Furthermore, +knowledge is true belief. It is such an enlightening of the self by +intuitions arising there, that what the self imagines and asserts of the +collateral thing, with which it wrestles in action, is actually true of +that thing. Truth in such presumptions or conceptions does not imply +adequacy, nor a pictorial identity between the essence in intuition and +the constitution of the object. Discourse is a language, not a mirror. +The images in sense are parts of discourse, not parts of nature: they +are the babble of our innocent organs under the stimulus of things; but +these spontaneous images, like the sounds of the voice, may acquire the +function of names; they may become signs, if discourse is intelligent +and can recapitulate its phases, for the things sought or encountered in +the world. The truth which discourse can achieve is truth in its own +terms, appropriate description: it is no incorporation or reproduction +of the object in the mind. The mind notices and intends; it cannot +incorporate or reproduce anything not an intention or an intuition. Its +objects are no part of itself even when they are essences, much less +when they are things. It thinks the essences, with that sort of +immediate and self-forgetful attention which I have been calling +intuition; and if it is animated, as it usually is, by some ulterior +interest or pursuit, it takes the essences before it for messages, +signs, or emanations sent forth to it from those objects of animal +faith; and they become its evidences and its description for those +objects. Therefore any degree of inadequacy and originality is tolerable +in discourse, or even requisite, when the constitution of the objects +which the animal encounters is out of scale with his organs, or quite +heterogeneous from his possible images. A sensation or a theory, no +matter how arbitrary its terms (and all language is perfectly +arbitrary), will be true of the object, if it expresses some true +relation in which that object stands to the self, so that these terms +are not misleading as signs, however poetical they may be as sounds or +as pictures. + +Finally, knowledge is true belief grounded in experience, I mean, +controlled by outer facts. It is not true by accident; it is not shot +into the air on the chance that there may be something it may hit. It +arises by a movement of the self sympathetic or responsive to +surrounding beings, so that these beings become its intended objects, +and at the same time an appropriate correspondence tends to be +established between these objects and the beliefs generated under their +influence. + +In regard to the original articles of the animal creed—that there is a +world, that there is a future, that things sought can be found, and +things seen can be eaten—no guarantee can possibly be offered. I am sure +these dogmas are often false; and perhaps the event will some day +falsify them all, and they will lapse altogether. But while life lasts, +in one form or another this faith must endure. It is the initial +expression of animal vitality in the sphere of mind, the first +announcement that anything is going on. It is involved in any pang of +hunger, of fear, or of love. It launches the adventure of knowledge. The +object of this tentative knowledge is things in general, whatsoever may +be at work (as I am) to disturb me or awake my attention. The effort of +knowledge is to discover what sort of world this disturbing world +happens to be. Progress in knowledge lies open in various directions, +now in the scope of its survey, now in its accuracy, now in its depth of +local penetration. The ideal of knowledge is to become natural science: +if it trespasses beyond that, it relapses into intuition, and ceases to +be knowledge. + + + + + CHAPTER XIX + BELIEF IN SUBSTANCE + + +All knowledge, being faith in an object posited and partially described, +is belief in substance, in the etymological sense of this word; it is +belief in a thing or event subsisting in its own plane, and waiting for +the light of knowledge to explore it eventually, and perhaps name or +define it. In this way my whole past lies waiting for memory to review +it, if I have this faculty; and the whole future of the world in the +same manner is spread out for prophecy, scientific or visionary, to +predict falsely or truly. Yet the future and the past are not ordinarily +called substances; probably because the same material substance is +assumed to run through both. Nevertheless, from the point of view of +knowledge, every event, even if wholly psychological or phenomenal, is a +substance. It is a self-existing fact, open to description from the +point of view of other events, if in the bosom of these other events +there is such plasticity and intent as are requisite for perception, +prophecy, or memory. + +When modern philosophers deny material substance, they make substances +out of the sensations or ideas which they regard as ultimate facts. It +is impossible to eliminate belief in substance so long as belief in +existence is retained. A mistrust in existence, and therefore in +substance, is not unphilosophical; but modern philosophers have not +given full expression to this sceptical scruple. They have seldom been +disinterested critics, but often advocates of some metaphysic that +allured them, and whose rivals they wished to destroy. They deny +substance in favour of phenomena, which are hypostatised essences, +because phenomena are individually wholly open to intuition; but they +forget that no phenomenon can intuit another, and that if it contains +knowledge of that other, it must be animated by intent, and besides +existing itself substantially must recognise its object as another +substance, indifferent in its own being to the cognisance which other +substances may take of it. In other words, although each phenomenon in +passing is an object of intuition, all absent phenomena, and all their +relations, are objects of faith; and this faith must be mediated by some +feature in the present phenomenon which faith assumes to be a sign of +the existence of other phenomena elsewhere, and of their order. So that +in so far as the instinctive claims and transcendent scope of knowledge +are concerned, phenomenalism fully retains the belief in substance. In +order to get rid of this belief, which is certainly obnoxious to the +sceptic, a disinterested critic would need to discard all claims to +knowledge, and to deny his own existence, and that of all absent +phenomena. + +For my own part, having admitted discourse (which involves time and +existences deployed in time, but synthesised in retrospect), and having +admitted shocks that interrupt discourse and lead it to regard itself as +an experience, and having even admitted that such experience involves a +self beneath discourse, with an existence and movement of its own—I need +not be deterred by any _a priori_ objections from believing in substance +of any sort. For me it will be simply a question of good sense and +circumstantial evidence how many substances I admit, and of what sort. + +In the genesis of human knowledge (which I am not attempting to trace +here) the substance first posited is doubtless matter, some alluring or +threatening or tormenting thing. The ego, as Fichte tells us, unaware of +itself, posits a non-ego, and then by reflection posits itself as the +agent in that positing, or as the patient which the activity posited in +the non-ego posits in its turn. But all this positing would be mere +folly, unless it was an intelligent discovery of antecedent facts. Why +should a non-existent ego be troubled with the delirious duty of +positing anything at all? And, if nothing else exists, what difference +could it make what sort of a world the ego posited, or whether it +posited a thousand inconsequential worlds, at once or in succession? +Fichte, however, was far from sharing that absolute freedom in madness +which he attributes to the creative ego; he had a very tight tense mind, +and posited a very tense tight world. His myths about the birth of +knowledge (or rather of systematic imagination) out of unconscious egos, +acts, and positings concealed some modest truths about nature. The +actual datum has a background, and Fichte was too wise to ignore so +tremendous a fact. Romantic philosophy, like romantic poetry, has its +profound ways of recognising its own folly, and so turning it into +tragic wisdom. As a matter of fact, the active ego is an animal living +in a material world; both the ego and the non-ego exist substantially +before acquiring this relation of positing and being posited. The +instinct and ability to posit objects, and the occasion for doing so, +are incidents in the development of animal life. Positing is a symptom +of sensibility in an organism to the presence of other substances in its +environment. The sceptic, like the sick man, is intent on the symptom; +and positing is his name for felt plasticity in his animal responses. It +is not a bad name; because plasticity, though it may seem a passive +thing, is really a spontaneous quality. If the substance of the ego were +not alive, it would not leap to meet its opportunities, it would not +develop new organs to serve its old necessities, and it would not kindle +itself to intuition of essences, nor concern itself to regard those +essences as appearances of the substances with which it was wrestling. +The whole life of imagination and knowledge comes from within, from the +restlessness, eagerness, curiosity, and terror of the animal bent on +hunting, feeding, and breeding; and the throb of being which he +experiences at any moment is not proper to the datum in his mind’s eye—a +purely fantastic essence—but to himself. It is out of his organism or +its central part, the psyche, that this datum has been bred. The living +substance within him being bent, in the first instance, on pursuing or +avoiding some agency in its environment, it projects whatever (in +consequence of its reactions) reaches its consciousness into the locus +whence it feels the stimulus to come, and it thus frames its description +or knowledge of objects. In this way the ego really and sagaciously +posits the non-ego: not absolutely, as Fichte imagined, nor by a +gratuitous fiat, but on occasion and for the best of reasons, when the +non-ego in its might shakes the ego out of its primitive somnolence. + +Belief in substance is accordingly identical with the claim to +knowledge, and so fundamental that no evidence can be adduced for it +which does not presuppose it. In recognising any appearance as a witness +to substance and in admitting (or even in rejecting) the validity of +such testimony, I have already made a substance of the appearance; and +if I admit other phenomena as well, I have placed that substance in a +world of substances having a substantial unity. It is not to external +pressure, through evidence or argument, that faith in substance is due. +If the sceptic cannot find it in himself, he will never find it. I for +one will honour him in his sincerity and in his solitude. But I will not +honour him, nor think him a philosopher, if he is a sceptic only +histrionically, in the wretched controversies of the schools, and +believes in substance again when off the stage. I am not concerned about +make-believe philosophies, but about my actual beliefs. It is only out +of his own mouth, or rather out of his own heart, that I should care to +convince the sceptic. Scepticism, if it could be sincere, would be the +best of philosophies. But I suspect that other sceptics, as well as I, +always believe in substance, and that their denial of it is sheer +sophistry and the weaving of verbal arguments in which their most +familiar and massive convictions are ignored. + +It might seem ignominious to believe something on compulsion, because I +can’t help believing it; when reason awakes in a man it asks for reasons +for everything. Yet this demand is unreasonable: there cannot be a +reason for everything. It is mere automatic habit in the philosopher to +make this demand, as it is in the common man not to make it. When once I +have admitted the facts of nature, and taken for granted the character +of animal life, and the incarnation of spirit in this animal life, then +indeed many excellent reasons for the belief in substance will appear; +and not only reasons for using the category of substance, and positing +substance of some vague ambient sort, but reasons for believing in a +substance rather elaborately defined and scientifically describable in +many of its habits and properties. But I am not yet ready for that. Lest +that investigation, when undertaken, should ignore its foundations or be +impatient of its limits, I must insist here that trust in knowledge, and +belief in anything to know, are merely instinctive and, in a manner, +pathological. If philosophy were something prior to convention rather +than (as it is) only convention made consistent and deliberate, +philosophy ought to reject belief in substance and in knowledge, and to +entrench itself in the sheer confession and analysis of this belief, as +of all others, without assenting to any of them. But I have found that +criticism has no first principle, that analysis involves belief in +discourse, and that belief in discourse involves belief in substance; so +that any pretensions which criticism might set up to being more profound +than common sense would be false pretensions. Criticism is only an +exercise of reflective fancy, on the plane of literary psychology, an +after-image of that faith in nature which it denies; and in dwelling on +criticism as if it were more than a subjective perspective or play of +logical optics, I should be renouncing all serious philosophy. +Philosophy is nothing if not honest; and the critical attitude, when it +refuses to rest at some point upon vulgar faith, inhibits all belief, +denies all claims to knowledge, and becomes dishonest; because it itself +claims to know. + +Does the process of experience, now that I trust my memory to report it +truly, or does the existence of the self, now that I admit its +substantial, dynamic, and obscure life underlying discourse, require me +to posit any other substances? Certainly it does. Experience, for animal +faith, begins by reporting what is not experience; and the life of the +self, if I accept its endeavours as significant, implies an equally +substantial, dynamic, ill-reported world around it, in whose movements +it is implicated. In conveying this feeling, as in all else, experience +_might_ be pure illusion; but if I reject this initial and fundamental +suasion of my cognitive life, it will be hard to find anything better to +put in its place. I am unwilling to do myself so much useless violence +as to deny the validity of primary memory, and assert that I have never, +in fact, had any experience at all; and I should be doing myself even +greater violence if I denied the validity of perception, and asserted +that a thunder-clap, for instance, was only a musical chord, with no +formidable event of any sort going on behind the sound. To be startled +is to be aware that something sudden and mysterious has occurred not far +from me in space. The thunder-clap is felt to be an event in the self +and in the not-self, even before its nature as a sound—its æsthetic +quality for the self—is recognised at all; I first know I am shaken +horribly, and then note how loud and rumbling is the voice of the god +that shakes me. That first feeling of something violent and resistless +happening in the world at large, is accompanied by a hardly less +primitive sense of something gently seething within me, a smouldering +life which that alien energy blows upon and causes to start into flame. + +If this be not the inmost texture of experience, I do not know what +experience is. To me experience has not a string of sensations for its +objects; what it brings me is not at all a picture-gallery of clear +images, with nothing before, behind, or between them. What such a +ridiculous psychology (made apparently by studying the dictionary and +not by studying the mind) calls hypotheses, intellectual fictions, or +tendencies to feign, is the solid body of experience, on which what it +calls sensations or ideas hang like flimsy garments or trinkets, or play +like a shifting light and shade. Experience brings belief in substance +(as alertness) _before_ it brings intuition of essences; it is +appetition _before_ it is description. Of course sensation would precede +idea, if by sensation we understood contact with matter, and by idea +pure reverie about ideal things; but if idea means expectation, or +consciousness having intent, and if sensation means æsthetic +contemplation of data without belief, then idea precedes sensation: +because an animal is aware that something is happening long before he +can say to himself what that something is, or what it looks like. The +ultimate datum to which a sceptic may retreat, when he suspends all life +and opinion, some essence, pure and non-existent and out of all relation +to minds, bodies, or events—surely that is not the stuff out of which +experience is woven: it is but the pattern or picture, the æsthetic +image, which the tapestry may ultimately offer to the gazing eye, +incurious of origins, and contemptuous of substance. The radical stuff +of experience is much rather breathlessness, or pulsation, or as Locke +said (correcting himself) a certain uneasiness; a lingering thrill, the +resonance of that much-struck bell which I call my body, the continual +assault of some masked enemy, masked perhaps in beauty, or of some +strange sympathetic influence, like the cries and motions of other +creatures; and also the hastening and rising of some impulse in me in +response. Experience, at its very inception, is a revelation of +_things_; and these things, before they are otherwise distinguished, are +distinguishable into a here and a there, a now and a then, nature and +myself in the midst of nature. + +It is a mere prejudice of literary psychology, which uses the grammar of +adult discourse, like a mythology, in which to render primitive +experience—it is a mere prejudice to suppose that experience has only +such categories as colour, sound, touch, and smell. These essences are +distinguished eventually because the senses that present them can be +separated at will, the element each happens to furnish being thus +flashed on or cut off, like an electric light: but far more primitive in +animal experience are such dichotomies as good and bad, near and far, +coming and going, fast and slow, just now and very soon. The first thing +experience reports is the existence of something, merely as existence, +the weight, strain, danger, and lapse of being. If any one should tell +me that this is an abstraction, I should reply that it would seem an +abstraction to a parrot, who used human words without having human +experience, but it is no abstraction to a man, whose language utters +imperfectly, and by a superadded articulation, the life within him. +Aristotle, who so often seems merely grammatical, was not merely +grammatical when he chose substance to be the first of his categories. +He was far more profoundly psychological in this than the British and +German psychologists who discard the notion of substance because it is +not the datum of any separate sense. None of the separate data of sense, +which are only essences, would figure at all in an experience, or would +become terms in knowledge, if a prior interest and faith did not +apprehend them. Animal watchfulness, lying in wait for the signals of +the special senses, lends them their significance, sets them in their +places, and retains them, as descriptions of things, and as symbols in +its own ulterior discourse. + +This animal watchfulness carries the category of substance with it, +asserts existence most vehemently, and in apprehension seizes and throws +on the dark screen of substance every essence it may descry. To grope, +to blink, to dodge a blow, or to return it, is to have very radical and +specific experiences, but probably without one assignable image of the +outer senses. Yet a nameless essence, the sense of a moving existence, +is there most intensely present; and a man would be a shameless, because +an insincere, sceptic, who should maintain that this experience exists +_in vacuo_, and does not express, as it feels it does, the operation of +a missile flying, and the reaction of a body threatened or hit: motions +in substance anterior to the experience, and rich in properties and +powers which no experience will ever fathom. + +Belief in substance, taken transcendentally, as a critic of knowledge +must take it, is the most irrational, animal, and primitive of beliefs: +it is the voice of hunger. But when, as I must, I have yielded to this +presumption, and proceeded to explore the world, I shall find in its +constitution the most beautiful justification for my initial faith, and +the proof of its secret rationality. This corroboration will not have +any logical force, since it will be only pragmatic, based on begging the +question, and perhaps only a bribe offered by fortune to confirm my +illusions. The force of the corroboration will be merely moral, showing +me how appropriate and harmonious with the nature of things such a blind +belief was on my part. How else should the truth have been revealed to +me at all? Truth and blindness, in such a case, are correlatives, since +I am a sensitive creature surrounded by a universe utterly out of scale +with myself: I must, therefore, address it questioningly but trustfully, +and it must reply to me in my own terms, in symbols and parables, that +only gradually enlarge my childish perceptions. It is as if Substance +said to Knowledge: My child, there is a great world for thee to conquer, +but it is a vast, an ancient, and a recalcitrant world. It yields +wonderful treasures to courage, when courage is guided by art and +respects the limits set to it by nature. I should not have been so cruel +as to give thee birth, if there had been nothing for thee to master; but +having first prepared the field, I set in thy heart the love of +adventure. + + + + + CHAPTER XX + ON SOME OBJECTIONS TO BELIEF IN SUBSTANCE + + +According to those philosophers who look for the foundations of the +universe in their own minds, substance is but a dead and fantastic +thing—a ghost or abstracted shadow of many sensations, impossibly fused +and objectified. These philosophers, in their intense introspection, try +to catch thought alive, and the nearer they come to doing so, the more +unstable and unsubstantial they find it to be. It exists only in the act +of dominating or positing or meaning something; and before this +something can be specified exhaustively, something else has taken its +place, the limits of vision having expanded or its centre shifted. Such +self-observation may be profound, or at least sincere, although what is +true of life in one animal or at one moment might well be false of life +in another instance, and mere nonsense to a different mind. In myself, I +find experience so volatile that no insistence on its unsubstantial +flux, maniacally creative, seems to me exaggerated. But before such +observations of life in the quick can be turned into arguments against +the existence of substance, three assumptions must be made silently, all +three of which are false: first, that thought observes itself; secondly, +that if thought is itself in flux it can observe nothing permanent; and +lastly, that if direct observation offered no illustration of the +permanent, nothing permanent could exist in fact, or could be reasonably +believed to exist. + +In the first place, living thought is so far from observing itself, that +some philosophers deny its existence, and the others find the greatest +difficulty in distinguishing it from its various objects. The terms of +pure thought, in which observation is couched and in which it rests, I +have found to be not thoughts but essences; and the objects of thought, +when thought relapses into its animal form of belief, are again not +thoughts but things. If later I contrast the order, rate, and natural +locus of discourse with the movement of events in general which +discourse is considering, I may begin to understand what a curious thing +discourse is, and to have assurance of its existence. The introspection +into which I may ultimately plunge, when I seem to be creating the world +as I think it, is a violently artificial exercise, in which the wheels +of life are reversed; and the knowledge I thus gain of my imaginative +operations would itself be sheer raving, creating a dream about +dreaming, unless these operations were domiciled in a natural being, and +expressed his history and vulgar situation in the natural world; so that +my eventual description, or rather dramatic reconstruction, of my own +experience, is one of the latest forms of my knowledge, and its object +one of the most derivative and insecure. It is a theme for literary +psychology, of which transcendental self-consciousness, or +autobiography, is one variety. + +In the second place, permanence rather than change is native to the +prime objects of thought. The only data observable directly are essences +absolutely immutable in their nature, even if the one observed happens +to be the essence of change; since even this, so long as it is present +at all, presents change and nothing but change for ever. Attention of +course is continually drawn from one essence to another; but this +inconstancy in intuition could not be noticed, and could not actually +exist, if the essence which drops out of view and that which succeeds it +were not different, and each, therefore, always itself. Furthermore, +granting that an animal mind is probably always changing in some +respect, it by no means follows that no essence can be retained for more +than one instant under the light of attention. On the contrary, change +that was complete, and that substituted one totally new object for +another totally destroyed, would afford no inkling of its own existence: +only the permanent would ever appear to the mind. What happens is that +some detail changes in a field that does not change, and for that reason +the new element attracts attention, surprise, or joy. To hold something +fast, to watch, to stare, to wait and lie low in the presence of a felt +incubus, are primitive experiences; and the length of crawling time +through which a strain endures is a conspicuous feature in sensation, +especially in pain. This sense of duration doubtless involves the sense +of something changing at the same time—of something coming or continuing +to come as it threatened or as it was demanded—of some pulse of feeling +recurring and mounting towards increased potency or increased fatigue. +Yet in all this setting of cumulative change (which is but a perspective +in the fancy) there often shines a fixed focus of interest; and the +sense of something which lasts, and which remains itself whether I +approach or elude it, is one of the first and loudest notes of +awareness. Perhaps, when my mood is clear and musical, there is some +permanent essence clearly revealed that arouses my curiosity and wonder; +or when the stream runs thick and turbid, the obscure life of the psyche +itself rises to the surface, and yields the primary criterion of +happiness and naturalness in events. In either case in mastering, +recognising, and positing what I find or what I want, I know the +beginnings of speculative joy and of participation in eternity. The flux +touches the eternal at the top of every wave. Whatever thwarts this +achievement, or disturbs the deep rhythms of the life slumbering +beneath, seems illegitimate; and until acquisitive or sexual impulses +are aroused, the dozing animal counts on a perpetual well-being, and any +change seems to it as hateful as it is incredible. + +In this way change itself, when it is rhythmic and regular, wears to +intuition the form of sustained being. The life of the body, by its +latent operation, sets a measure and scale for the duration of any +passing vision. There is an ever-present background felt as permanent, +myself always myself; and there is a large identity in the universe +also, familiar and limited in spite of its agitation, like a cage full +of birds. Everything seems to be more or less prolonged; comfort, +digestive warmth, the past still simmering, the brooding potentiality of +things to come, shaping themselves in fancy before they have occurred. +Both sleep and watchfulness are long drawn out, so is the very sense of +movement. Though change be everywhere, it remains everywhere strange and +radically unwelcome: for even when, as in destructive passion or +impatience, it is imperatively sought, it is sought as an escape from an +uncomfortable posture, in the hope of restoring a steady life, and +resting in safety. + +Thus the notion of permanence behind change—which is a chief element in +the notion of substance—is trebly rooted in experience; because every +essence that appears is eternally what it is; because many congenial +images and feelings appear lastingly; and because whatever interrupts +the even flow and luxurious monotony of organic life is odious to the +primeval animal. + +In the third place, even if direct experience did not illustrate the +permanent, the order of events when reflected on would suggest and +impose a belief in it. I reserve for another occasion all discussion of +the laws of nature or of the constant quantities of matter or energy: +the most ordinary recognition of things being as they were, and +remaining always at hand, posits their substantial nature. Suppose all +intuition was instantaneous; and in one sense it may be said always to +be so, because specious durations have no common scale, and the most +prolonged may be treated as a single moment, as the dome of St. Peter’s +may be seen through a keyhole. Instantaneous intuition, when suspended, +may be suspended only for a moment, and instantly recovered, as when I +blink. Such brief interruptions to perception are bridged over in +primary memory, and do not break the specious identity and continuity of +the object. It does not follow, however, that the interruption is not +felt. On the contrary, it is felt and resented just because beneath it +the object is sensibly continuous. There is a stock optical experiment +in which a pencil is made to cross the field of vision between the eye +and a book, without ever hiding any part of the page. What binocular +vision does in that instance, the persistence of impressions does in the +case of an intermittent stimulus. The interruption is startling and +obvious, but the continuity of the object is obvious too. This +experience may be repeated on a larger scale. The psyche, being +surrounded by substances, is adapted to them, and does not suspend her +adjustments or her beliefs whenever her sensations are interrupted. +Children recognise and identify things and persons more readily than +they distinguish them. As intuition is addressed to terms in discourse +which are eternal in their nature, though the intuition of them is +desultory, so faith and art are addressed to _habits_ in substance, +which without arresting the perpetual and pervasive flux of experience +(nor perhaps that of substance itself) manifest its dynamic permanence; +and, of course, it is on its dynamic side, not pictorially or +intuitively, that substance is conceived, posited, measured, and +trusted. + +Hence the discovery, big with scientific consequences, that an existing +thing may endure unchanged, although my experience of it be +intermittent. The object of these recurrent observations is not +conceived, as a sophistical psychology would have it, by feigning that +the _observations_ are not discrete. Every one knows, when he shuts and +opens his eyes, that his vision has been interrupted; the interruption +is the point of the game. The notion that the thing persists was there +from the beginning; until I blinked, I had found it persisting, and I +find it persisting still after I open my eyes again. In considering the +fortunes of the object posited, I simply discard the interruption, as +voluntary and due to a change in myself which I can repeat at will. In +spontaneous thought I never confuse the changes which the thing may +undergo in its own being with the variations in my attention nor (when I +have a little experience) with shifts in my perspectives. I therefore +recognise it to be permanent in relation to my intermittent glimpses of +it; and this without in the least confusing or fusing my different +views, or supposing them to be other than discrete and perhaps +instantaneous. + +On the same principle, as education advances, a thing which stimulates +different senses at once or successively is easily recognised to be the +same object; and this, again, is done without in the least fusing or +confusing colour with hardness or sound with shape. And with the growth +of the arts and of experience of the world, the persisting and +continuous engine of nature is clearly conceived as the common object +which all my senses and all my theories describe in their special +languages at their several awakenings. That the syllables are broken +does not make their messages conflicting; on the contrary, they +supplement one another’s blindness, and correct one another’s +exuberance. Substance was their common object from the beginning, faith +in substance not being a consequence of reasoning about appearances, but +an implication of action, and a conviction native to hunger, fear, +feeding, and fighting; as an aid and guide to which the organs of the +outer senses are developed, and rapidly paint their various symbols in +the mind. The euphony and syntax of sense, far from disproving the +existence of substance, arise and change in the act of expressing its +movement, and especially the responsive organisation of that part of it +which is myself. + +So much for the objections to the belief in substance which may be +raised from the point of view of self-consciousness, when this is +regarded as the principle of knowledge or even of universal existence, +neither of which it is. + +Objections to the belief in substance may also come from a different +quarter (or one ostensibly different), in the name of critical sense and +economy in the interpretation of appearances. Suppose, the empiricist +may say, that your substance exists: how does it help you to explain +anything? You never have seen, and you never will see, anything but +appearances. If you trust your memory (as it is reasonable to do, since +you must, if you are to play the game of discourse at all) you may +assume that appearances have come in a certain order; and if you trust +expectation (for the same bad reason) you may assume that they will come +in somewhat the same order in future. These assumptions are not founded +on any proof or on any real probability, but it is intelligible that you +should make them, because the mind can hardly be asked to discredit its +vistas, when it has nothing else by which to criticise them. But why +should you interpolate amongst appearances, or posit behind them, +something that you can never find? That seems a gratuitous fiction, and +at best a hypostasis of grammar and names. You want a substance because +you use substantives, or because your verbal logic talks in subjects and +predicates. + +But let us grant, the empiricist will go on, that your substance is +possible, since everything is possible where ignorance is complete. In +what terms can you conceive it, save in terms of appearance? Or if you +say it exists unconceived, or is inconceivable, it will simply encumber +your philosophy with a metaphysical world, in addition to the given one, +and with the hopeless problem of relating the two. + +These empirical objections to the belief in substance might in +strictness be ruled out, since (in so far as they deny substance) they +rest on the same romantic view of self-consciousness as the source of +knowledge and being as do the transcendental objections just considered. +Empiricism, however, has the advantage of being less resolute in folly. +Such terms as appearance, phenomenon, given fact (meaning given essence +_plus_ thing posited), and perception (meaning intuition _plus_ belief) +are all used sophistically to cover the muddles of introspection. They +are not analysed critically, but are allowed to retain in solution many +of the assumptions of common sense. The essence given is confused with +the intuition of it which is not given, but which common sense knows is +implicated. This intuition is then confused with the belief, prompted by +animal impulse and, for analysis, utterly gratuitous, that a thing or +event exists definable by the essence given. This belief finally is +confused with the existence of its object, which it merely posits and +cannot witness. This object, in psychological idealism, is some ulterior +intuition or (as it is called by common sense, which assumes a material +object producing it) some ulterior perception. But it is utterly +impossible that one perception should perceive another, and it is +improper to call an intuition a perception when it has no existing +object. + +In consequence of this halting criticism of immediate experience, +empiricism admits the existence of many feelings or ideas deployed in +time and referred to in memory and in social intercourse; and in +admitting this (let me repeat) it admits substance in principle. Such a +flux of feelings or ideas is a permanent hidden substance for purposes +of knowledge, even if each of them, being a momentary life, might not be +called by that name. Each feeling or idea is substantial, however, in +respect to any memory or theory, contained in some other moment, which +may refer to it; and this memory or theory is an appearance of that +substantial but remote fact. + +Let us suppose that David Hume, in spite of his corpulence, was nothing +but a train of ideas. Some of these composed his philosophy, and I, when +I endeavour to learn what it was, create in my own mind a fresh train of +ideas which refer to those in the mind of Hume: and for me his opinions +are a substance of which my apprehension is an appearance. My +apprehension, in this case, is conceived to be an apprehension of a +matter of fact, namely, the substance of Hume at some date; and in +studying his philosophy I am learning nothing but history. This is an +implication of empiricism, but is not true to the facts. For when I try +to conceive the philosophy of Hume I am not considering any particular +ideas which may have constituted Hume at one moment of his career; I am +considering an _essence_, his total system, as it would appear when the +_essences_ present in his various reflective moments are collated; and, +therefore, I am really studying and learning a system of philosophy, not +the presumable condition of a dead man’s mind at various historical +moments. + +If empiricists were a little more sceptical, they would perceive that in +admitting knowledge of historical facts they have admitted the principle +that the beliefs they call ideas may report the existence of natural +substances. If the substance of this world is a flux, and even a flux of +feelings, it is none the less substantial, like the fire of Heraclitus, +and the existing object of such ideas as may describe it. But this +reasonable faith is obscured by the confusions I mentioned above. The +empiricist forgets that he is asserting the existence of outlying facts, +because he half identifies them with the living fact of his present +belief in them: and, further, because he identifies this living fact, +his belief now, with the essence which it is attributing to those remote +existences. He thinks he believes only what he sees, but he is much +better at believing than at seeing. + +Apart from this unconscious admission of the existence of substances, +the empirical objections to substance in the singular express a distrust +of metaphysics with which I sympathise, and they show a love of home +truths which deserves to be satisfied. + +In the first place, the substance in which I am proposing to believe is +not metaphysical but physical substance. It is the varied stuff of the +world which I meet in action—the wood of this tree I am felling, the +wind that is stirring its branches, the flesh and bones of the man who +is jumping out of the way. Belief in substance is not imported into +animal perception by language or by philosophy, but is the soul of +animal perception from the beginning, and the perpetual deliverance of +animal experience. Later, as animal attention is clarified, and animal +experience progresses, the description of these obvious substances may +be refined: the tree, the wind, and the man may reveal their elements +and genesis to more patient observation, and the first aspect they wore +may be found to be a fused and composite appearance of many elaborate +processes within them. But the more diffused substances in operation +which I shall then come upon will be simply the constituents of the +tree, the wind, and the man; they will be just as truly (though more +calculably) the realities I confront and may use in action. They will be +just as open to perception, although instruments or hypotheses may be +required to extend the accidental range of my senses in observing them; +and they will be just as much substances and not essences, that is, +objects of belief posited in action, not images given in intuition. My +notions of substance will therefore be subject to error, and capable of +reform: I may arrive at the belief that earth, air, water, and fire are +the substances in all things; later I may discover that fire is not a +substance, but a form of motion; for earth, air, and water I may come to +substitute the four or five score elements of chemistry, or more or +less; and I may remain in doubt whether light and space and ether are +substances or not. But all these opinions would be equally fantastic, +and equally devoid of truth or falsehood, if there were no substance +before me in the first instance which I was attempting to describe. + +By a substance I understand what modern philosophers often call an +“independent object”—a most unfortunate phrase, because precisely at the +moment when a substance or an essence becomes my object, by becoming the +theme of my discourse, it ceases to be independent of me in that +capacity: and when this happens, before the cognitive relation between +me and my object is established, a dynamic relation has probably arisen +between the substance of that object and the substance of myself, +causing me to make that intrusive substance the object of my attention. +When a thing becomes my object it becomes dependent on me ideally, for +being known, and I am probably, directly or indirectly, dependent on it +materially, for having been led to know it. What is independent of +knowledge is substance, in that it has a place, movement, origin, and +destiny of its own, no matter what I may think or fail to think about +it. This self-existence is what the name object jeopardises, and what +the name substance indicates and asserts. + +If abuses of language were not inevitable, I should be tempted to urge +philosophers to revert to the etymological and scholastic sense of the +words object and objective, making them refer to whatever is placed +before the mind, as a target to be aimed at by attention. Objective +would then mean present to imagination; and things would become objects +of thought in the same incidental way in which they become objects of +desire. But I will content myself with returning in my own person to the +correct use of the word substance for whatever is self-existent, and +with bestowing the term object on occasion upon any substance, essence, +event, or truth, when it becomes incidentally the theme of discourse. + +Substances are called things when found cut up into fragments which move +together and are recognisable individually; and things are called +substances when their diffuse and qualitative existence is thought of +rather than their spatial limits. Flour is a substance and a loaf of +bread is a thing; but there is nothing metaphysical about flour, nor is +there any difference of physical status between a thing and the +substance of it. + +But is not the _materia prima_ of Aristotle metaphysical? Is not the +substance of Spinoza metaphysical? Are not souls and Platonic Ideas, +which are also reputed to be substances, perfectly metaphysical? + +Of course: and I shall have occasion, when surveying the realm of +matter, to show that these and other metaphysical entities are only +nominal essences, and cannot be the substance of anything. + +I think these explanations will suggest to the reader a sufficient +answer to the other points raised by the empiricists against belief in +substance. Substance does not reduplicate natural objects, but is +identical with them. What it might be said to reduplicate (or rather to +back up and to render significant) would be given essences. Certainly +known substances, and other known objects, require to be posited by +animal faith on occasion of intuitions, as that which these intuitions +report. But there is hardly any reduplication here. Such representation +as there is, is probably quite heterogeneous in aspect from its +original, and even when—as in memory or a historical romance—some +specious similarity is presumed, it is a highly selective and idealised +reproduction, in a wholly different medium from the represented facts, +and possessing utterly different functions and conditions of being. +Nature in being discovered is not reproduced, but acquires a new +dimension, and is extraordinarily enriched. Matters are ludicrously +reversed if it is imagined that a pure spirit contemplating essences +could _invent_ a body and a world of matter surrounding it; the body +exists first, and in reacting on its environment kindles intuitions +expressive of its vicissitudes; and the commentary is like that which +any language or chronicle or graphic art creates by existing. Substance +is the speaker and substance is the theme; intuition is only the act of +speaking or hearing, and the given essence is the audible word. +Substance is on the same plane of being as trees and houses, but, like +trees and houses, it is on an entirely different plane of being from the +immediate terms of experience (which are essences) and from experience +itself (which is spirit thinking). + +As to the reproach that substance, because it is not an appearance +presented exhaustively, must remain unconceived and inconceivable, it +rests on a false ideal of human knowledge. Intuition of essence is not +knowledge, but fancy and mental sport: and if logic and mathematics are +called sciences, they are such only as expansions of given hypotheses +according to given rules may be sciences, as there is a science of +chess. They are not _true_ nor human, except in the special form in +which actual discourse and actual bodies happen to illustrate them. A +preference for dialectic over knowledge of fact (which is knowledge of +substance) may manifest a poetical and superior spirit, as might a +preference for music over conversation; but it would be vain and +suicidal for human knowledge to transfer that ideal to the general +interpretation of experience. Substance being the object set before me +in action, pursuit, and investigation cannot be antecedently in my +possession, either materially or intellectually; it confronts me as +something challenging respect and demanding study; and its intrinsic +essence must remain always problematical, since I approach it only from +the outside and experimentally. The essences by which it is revealed to +me, and the hypotheses I frame about its nature, are so many +provocations for me to manipulate and examine it, and to call it by +various humorous names, expressive to me of its strange habits. My +natural curiosity, if I am a healthy young animal, will prompt me to do +this eagerly, and to turn my first luminous impressions into triumphant +dogmas; but to pure spirit, when that awakes, all this faith and +knowingness will seem childish. + +To pure spirit substance and all its ways must remain always dark, +alien, and impertinent. From the transcendental point of view, which is +that of spirit, substance is an unattainable goal, or object-as-such, +being posited, not possessed. Only essences please this jealous lover of +light, and seem to it sufficient; it hates faith, existence, doubt, +anything ulterior. Substance and truth offend it by their unnecessary +claims; it would gladly brush them aside as superstitious obsessions. +What ghostly thing, it says to itself, is this Speaker behind the voice, +this Meaning behind the vision, this dark Substance behind the fair +appearance? Substance interrupts and besets the spirit in its innocence, +and in its mad play; one substance, which it calls the flesh, torments +it from below, and a kindred substance, which it calls matter, prods, +crushes, and threatens it from without. God also, another substance, +looms before it, commanding and forbidding; and he is terrible in his +wrath and obscurity, until it learns his ways. Yet, as religion shows, +it is possible for the spirit to be tamed and chastened. The fear of +substance may be the beginning of wisdom; and accustomed to the steady +dispensations of that power, the spirit may grow pious and modest, and +happy to be incarnate. God will then become in its eyes a source of +protection and comfort and daily bread, as all substance is to those who +learn how to live with it. When the lessons of experience are thus +accepted, and spirit is domesticated in the world, the belief in +substance explains everything; because _if_ substance exists, a +perpetual dependence in point of destiny, and a perpetual inadequacy in +knowledge are clearly inevitable, and soon come to seem proper and even +fortunate. + +As knowledge advances, my conception of substance becomes a map in which +my body is one of the islets charted: the relations of myself to +everything else may be expressed there in their true proportions, and I +shall cease to be an egotist. In the symbolic terms which my map +affords, I can then plan and test my actions (which otherwise I should +perform without knowing it) and trace the course of other events; but I +am myself a substance, moving in the plane of universal substance, not +on the plane of my map; for neither I nor the rest of substance belong +to the realm of pictures, nor exist on that scale and in that flat +dimension. How we exist and what we are substantially must accordingly +remain a problem to the end; even if by chance I should ever hit upon +the essence of substance, nothing could test or maintain that miraculous +moment of clairvoyance. The only sphere in which clairvoyance is normal +is the sphere of mental discourse, one part of which may survey another +in the very terms in which the other unrolled itself in act; as I may +faithfully rehearse my own past or future thinkings, or those of men of +my own mind. The probability of such clairvoyance diminishes as the +similarity of structure and substance between me and the other creature +diminishes; and it vanishes altogether where life dies down; so that in +respect to inorganic substance I am indeed reduced to arbitrary symbols, +at which that substance, if it could know them, would laugh. Yet for my +purposes in studying inorganic substance (which is not interesting to me +in itself) these symbols do very well: they arise on occasion of +substantial events, and therefore appear in the same historical +sequence; so that in surveying the order of my symbols I learn the order +of real events, though my pictures certainly are not portraits of their +substance. Yet even the pictorial quality of these symbols expresses +true variations and variety in the substance of myself: it falls and +rises with my life. For this reason the map I draw of the universe in my +fancy, when I grow studious, becomes a truer and truer map, rendering +the movement of substance within and without me with increasing +precision, though always in an original notation, native to my senses +and intellect. + +False ideals of knowledge are also involved in the contention that the +hypothesis of substance does not help to explain appearances, and even +renders appearances inexplicable. What is explanation? In dialectic it +is the utterance, in further words or images, of relations and terms +implied in a given essence: it is the explication of meanings. But facts +have no meaning in that sense. Essences implied ideally in their +essences need never become facts too: otherwise the whole realm of +essence would have to exist in act, and it would be impossible so much +as to begin the survey of that horrible infinitude, for lack of any +principle of emphasis to give me a starting-point, and create a +particular perspective. No: facts are surds, they exemplify fragments of +the realm of essence chosen for no reason: for if a will or reason +choosing anything (say the good) were admitted, that will or reason +would itself be a groundless fact, and an absolute accident. Existence +(as the least insight into essence shows) is necessarily irrational and +inexplicable. It cannot, therefore, contain any principle of explanation +_a priori_; and substance, as I understand the term, being what exists +in itself, it must be also (to borrow the rest of Spinoza’s definition +of it) what is understood through itself, that is, by taking its own +accidental nature as the standard for all explanations. If substance +were some metaphysical principle, some dialectical or moral force, it +might be expected to “explain” existence as a whole; but it ought not +then to be called a substance; at best it would be a harmony or music +which things somehow made. Such a harmony would not exist in things +bodily and individually, rendering their essences existential, but would +supervene upon them and float through them, like those principles which +certain moody metaphysicians have dreamt of, as solving the riddle of +the universe, and have called Sin, Will, Duty, the Good, or the Idea. +Substance, as I understand the word, is nothing of that sort. It is not +metaphysical, but simply whatever the physical substance may be which is +found in things or between them. It therefore cannot “explain” these +things, since they are its parts or instances, and it is simply their +substance. They have one, since they may be cut up, ground into powder, +dissolved into gases, or caused to condense again before our eyes; and +if they are living things, we may observe them devouring and generating +one another, the flux of substance evidently running through them, and +taking on recurrent forms. When these habits of nature are taken (as +they should be taken) as the true principle of explanation, the belief +in substance does become a great means of understanding events. It helps +me to explain their place, date, quality, and quantity, so that I am +able to expect or even to produce them, when the right substances are at +hand. If they were detached facts, not forms regularly taken on by +enduring and pervasive substances, there would be no knowing when, +where, of what sort, or in what numbers they would not assault me; and +my life would not seem life in a tractable world, but an inexplicable +nightmare. + +I shall be thought a silly philosopher to mention this, as if it were +not obvious; but why do so many wise philosophers ignore it, and defend +systems which contradict it? + +Finally, even if, in a moment of candour, the friend of phenomena was +inclined to allow that substance, so understood, was neither +metaphysical nor undiscoverable nor useless for explaining events, he +might still urge that the belief in substance creates an insoluble +difficulty, because opposite to substance appearance rises at once like +a ghost; and how shall this ghost be laid or what room shall be found +for it in the world of substance which we have posited? In other words, +substance, by hypothesis, is the source of appearances: but how, +remaining substance, can it ever produce them? + +Here again the objection arises out of false demands. As at first +substance was condemned on the ground that knowledge should possess its +object as intuition does its data (a demand which would rob knowledge of +all transitive force), so now substance is condemned on the ground that +causation should be dialectical and that reality should be uniform, so +that if substance exists nothing should exist except substance. Whence +these absurd postulates? In the first place, reality (since it includes +the realm of essence) is infinitely omnimodal; and even when reduced to +existence it may certainly take on as many dimensions and as many +varieties as it likes. Substance is not more real than appearance, nor +appearance more real than essence, but only differently real. When the +word reality is used invidiously or eulogistically, it is merely in view +of the special sort of reality which the speaker expects or desires to +find in a particular instance. So when the starving gymnosophist takes a +rope for a serpent, he misses the reality of that, which is lifeless +matter; when the tourist gazing at an Arabic scroll calls it a frieze, +he misses the reality of that, which is a pious sentiment; and when the +millionaire buys a picture for its antiquity and its reputation, he +misses the reality of that, which is a composition. When substance is +asserted, appearance is not denied; its actuality is not diminished, but +a significance is added to it which, as a bare datum, it could not have. + +In the second place, in so far as causation is not sheer magic imputed +by laying a superstitious emphasis on those phases which interest me +most in the flux of things, causation is the order of generation in +nature: whatsoever grows out of a certain conjunction in things, and +only out of that conjunction, may be said to be caused by it. Nothing +that happens is groundless, since whatever antecedents it actually has +are adequate to produce it. Yet all that happens is marvellous, because +like existence itself it is unfathomable, and, if we abstract from our +familiarity with it, almost incredible. But the antecedents, the +consequents, and the connection between them are equally remarkable in +this respect, and equally perspicuous. The schoolboy will be delighted +to learn how the refraction of the sun’s rays paints the rainbow on a +shower, or on the spray of the waves; the farmer will perfectly +understand that chickens are hatched from eggs; and I for one (though +other philosophers are less fortunate) can perceive clearly that when +animals react upon things in certain ways these things appear to them in +certain forms; and the fact that they appear does not seem to me (so +simple am I) to militate against their substantial existence. + +Certainly neither the awakening of intuition, nor the character of the +essences that appear, can be deduced dialectically from the state of the +substance which produces them; but dialectic traces the implication of +one essence in another and can never issue from the eternal world. It is +perfectly impotent to express, much less to explain, any change or any +existence. If dialectic ruled the world, all implications would always +have been realised, no movement would have been possible, and the very +discourse that pursues dialectic would have been congealed and +identified from the beginning with the essence which it describes. +Existence, change, life, appearance, must be understood to be +unintelligible: on any other assumption the philosopher might as well +tear his hair and go mad at once. But when that assumption has been duly +made, and dialectic has been relegated to an innocuous dignity, the +blossoming of substance into appearance becomes the most amiable of +mysteries. If instead of admitting this evident and familiar kindling of +mind in nature, which makes the charm of childhood, of morning, and of +spring, I supposed that mind could animate no material body, and that +the flame of spirit could rise from no natural hearth, I should not have +a more intelligible world on my hands, but only a very miserable and +ghostly one. I should be foolishly shutting myself up in myopic +ignorance of that great world which is not mine nor like me, although I +belong to it and feed on it unawares. Why should I think it +philosophical to be so unintelligent, or to assert that appearances are +the only possible realities, when these appearances themselves do their +very best to inform me of the opposite? For though the poor things can’t +be actually more than they are, they arrange themselves and troop +together in such a manner that, if I make the least beginning in +understanding them, I gather that they are voices of self-evolving +things, on the same plane of reality as myself. Indeed, without such a +background to lend them a subterranean influence over my own being, they +would be unmeaning creations, and every transition from one to another +of them would be arbitrary. If I am told that appearances are but +loosely and unintelligibly bound to substance, I may reply that without +substance appearances would be far more loosely and unintelligibly bound +to one another. Appearances are at least conventional transcripts of +facts; they are expressions of substance which may serve as signs of its +movements; but what relation, moral or habitual, would each appearance, +if taken absolutely and not as significant of things, retain to the +other appearances that in dreaming or waking might follow upon it? None +whatever: it is only in its organs and its objects that experience +touches anything continuous or measurable and possesses a background on +which to piece together the broken segments of its own orbit. That +substance should be capable of attaining to expression in appearance is +a proof that substance is fertile, not that it is superfluous. On the +contrary, it is certain that if I knew the essence of substance, and if +I made nature the standard of natural necessity, the emergence of +appearance in the form and on the occasions in which it emerges would +seem to me necessary and inevitable. + + + + + CHAPTER XXI + SUBLIMATIONS OF ANIMAL FAITH + + +Animal faith, being an expression of hunger, pursuit, shock, or fear, is +directed upon _things_; that is, it assumes the existence of alien +self-developing beings, independent of knowledge, but capable of being +affected by action. While things are running on in the dark, they may be +suddenly seized, appropriated, or destroyed. In other words, animal +faith posits substances, and indicates their locus in the field of +action of which the animal occupies the centre. Being faith in action +and inspired by action, it logically presupposes that the agent is a +substance himself, that can act on other things and be affected by them; +although temporally the substantial existence of the self may not be +posited until later, as one of the things in the world of things. +Meantime in this animal faith, and even in the choice of one essence +rather than another to be presented to intuition, spirit suffers +violence, since spirit is inherently addressed to everything impartially +and is always, in its own principle, ready to be omniscient and just. +For by spirit I understand simply the pure light or actuality of +thought, common to all intuitions, in which essences are bathed if they +are given. At first, as we see in children, spirit is carried away by +the joy of doing or seeing anything; it adopts any passion +unquestioningly, not being a respecter of persons nor at all squeamish; +it is innocently happy in accepting any task and watching any world, if +the body welcomes it. Ultimately, however, the spirit may come to wonder +why it regards all things from the point of view of one body in +particular, which seems to have no prerogative over the others in their +common realm. Justice and charity will then seem to lie in rescinding +this illegitimate pre-eminence of one’s own body: and it may come to be +an ideal of the spirit, not only to extend its view over all time and +all existence, but to exchange its accidental point of view for every +other, and adopt every insight and every interest: an effort which, by a +curious irony, might end in abolishing all interests and all views. + +Such moral enlightenment is dangerous to animal life, and incidentally +to the animal faith on which the recognition of existing things hangs in +the first place. If the qualms and ambitions of spirit prevailed in +anybody altogether, as they tend to do in the saint and even in the +philosopher, he would not be able to halt at the just sympathy by which, +preserving animal faith, he would admit and respect the natural +interests of others as he does his own. He would be hurried on to rebel +against these natural interests in himself, would call them vain or +sinful, since the spirit of itself could never justify them, and would +initiate some discipline, mortifying the body and transfiguring the +passions, so as to free himself from that ignominy and bondage. He would +not succeed: but for speculative purposes I will suppose for a moment +that he succeeded. What would occur? He would be happier fasting than +eating, freezing than loving. Not sharing the impulses of his body, he +would regard it as a ridiculous mechanism; and the bodies of others +would be ridiculous mechanisms too, with which he could feel no +sympathy. His sympathy, if it survived at all, would be sublimated into +pity for the spirits chained to those bodies by their sin and ignorance, +and perhaps not even struggling to be free, but suffering in those +prisons perpetual pain and dishonour. He might aspire to save the spirit +in others as in himself; but hardened to his own animal vicissitudes he +would be steeled to theirs (a result even easier to accomplish), and +would be all scorn and lamentations for the life of the world. + +I suspend all consideration of this moral issue, and revert to the +variations which animal faith may undergo during this long and always +imperfect transformation. + +Things when they are posited are known to be substances. It would be +impossible for a child to be frightened without implicitly believing in +a substance at hand; and it would be impossible for him to attempt to +frighten other people (as children like to do in play) without +implicitly assuming that he is a substance himself. But though his +assurance of substance, in both cases, is complete, his knowledge of it +is superficial. In conceiving his own nature especially, he begins +building at the wrong end, from the weathercock down, not from the +foundations up. Although in action he identifies himself with his body, +as also in vanity and all the passions, yet when he asks himself +deliberately _what_ he is, he may be tempted to say that he is his +thoughts. Or, less analytically, he may feel that he is a soul, a living +spiritual power, a deep will at work in his body and in the world; and +though what he posits in other things is primarily their physical +presence, he will conceive this substance of theirs, particularly when +they are animals, in the same moral terms in which he conceives himself. +He will imagine them to be souls, passionate powers, wills guiding +events. He will not think people spirits to the exclusion of their +bodies, but will conceive their persons confusedly, as souls inhabiting +and using bodies, or as bodies breaking out into some thought or passion +which, once existing, agitates and governs the body that bred it. + +Such a thought or passion, while evidently animating the body and +expressing its situation, does not exactly lie within the body; to +localise it there with any literalness or precision is absurd; and a man +feels in his own case that his thoughts and passions _come_ into his +heart, that they are influences visiting him, perhaps demons or +obsessions. He thinks they may pass from one man to another, or perhaps +exist suspended and ambient, in the form of gods or mighty laws. Hence +the notion of spiritual substances; a self-contradictory notion at +bottom, because substance is a material and spirit is an entelechy, or +perfection of function realised; so that (if I may parody Aristotle), if +a candle were a living being, wax would be its substance and light its +spirit. Nevertheless, in the history of philosophy, and even in current +discourse, the notion of spiritual substance was unavoidable. In the +haste of practical life, I count the lights without counting the +candles. Feelings and thoughts pass for the principles of action; I +inevitably stop there, and conceive my enemy as an evil purpose, and my +contradictor as a false thought. And it is in these imagined thoughts +and purposes that I lodge the power which, in action, I am contending +with: although I should be truly contending with ghosts, and trying to +drive essences out of the realm of essence (where each is immovable) if +I did not oppose that power or defeat that purpose in the precise places +and bodies in which it operates. The spirit can be confused with +substance only when it is spirit incarnate. Animal faith could hardly +light on such metaphysical objects unless it was called forth by a +material influence, to which animal faith is the natural response; but +the mind has but vague notions of what a material influence can be, and +therefore attributes the substantiality of which it is intimately aware +to hybrid essences floating before it: hence superstition, myth, +metaphysics, and the materialisation of words. + +It is a task for natural philosophy to remove these ghosts, by +discovering the true movement of that living substance on which animal +faith _means_ to be directed, the substance on which the animal depends +and on which he can act. But the human mind naturally breathes its own +atmosphere of myth and dialectic, and evidence of fact pierces this +atmosphere with difficulty, only after much experience of error. +Gradually the wiser heads see that all substances fall together into one +system called nature; and then various metaphysical substances, which at +first seem to inhabit or compose nature, are discovered to be modes of +the single familiar substance called matter. The second Book of _Realms +of Being_ will be devoted to this subject; meantime, I will here draw up +a list of the chief false substances which human faith may rest on when +the characteristic human veil of words and pictures hides the modes of +matter which actually confront the human race in action, and which +therefore, throughout, are the _intended_ object of its faith. + +1. _Souls._—These are essentially moral forces, that is, passions or +interests not necessarily self-conscious, conceived as magically ruling +animal bodies and dictating their acts. + +This notion fuses three different things, belonging to three distinct +realms of being. The first is a mode of matter, the inherited mechanism +and life of the body, which I am calling the psyche. This is a true +dynamic unit, forming and using the outer organs of the body, a system +of habits relatively complete and self-centred; but it is only the fine +quick organisation within the material animal, and not a different +thing. This is the original soul which savages conceive as leaving the +body in sleep or death, itself a tenuous body of similar aspect and +powers; because they feel that bodily life and action have a principle +which is not visible on the surface, and yet they have no means of +conceiving this principle except as an image or ghost of that very body +which it is needed to control. Were wandering souls and ghosts more +often met with and studied, the question of the true souls of these +creatures would present itself anew: for nothing would be found on the +surface of a ghost to explain its words or its motions, and it would +soon be observed to give up the ghost in its turn. Even in spirit-land +the judicious would have recourse in the end to a behaviourist +psychology. For at the other extreme of human philosophising, the +material psyche reappears. Observation can trace back motions only to +other motions, and outward actions to activities hidden within, but +essentially no less observable; so that the mechanism of the body and +its habits are really the only conceivable mainspring of its behaviour. +The soul again becomes a subtler body within the body: only that instead +of a shadow of the whole man, even as in life he stood, it is a +prodigious network of nerves and tissues, growing in each generation out +of a seed. + +Habit, though it is a mode of matter, has a unity or rhythm which +reappears in many different instances: it is a form not of matter but of +behaviour. Matter makes a vortex which reproduces itself, and plays as a +unit amongst the other vortices near it; and the eye can follow the +pleasing figures of the dance, without discerning the atoms or the laws +that compose it. Now the habits of animals exercise a strong influence, +sympathetic or antipathetic, over the kindred observer. He feels what +those habits seek; he reads them as purposes, as tendencies, as efforts +hostile or friendly to the free play of his own habits. The soul +agitating those bodies is therefore in his eyes more than another +ghostly body, which might quit them; it is a passion or a will which is +expressed there. And this unit of discourse, which if actual belongs to +the realm of truth, he regards superstitiously as a substance and a +power. He fancies that he himself is a will and a power reacting upon +other wills and powers: as if these habits or relations could be prior +to the terms that compose them, or could create those terms. It is this +element in the notion of souls that becomes predominant in the belief in +gods and in devils. Something subjective and moral, the dramatic value +which habits in nature have for the observer, is projected by him, and +conceived as a metaphysical power creating those habits. Passions, in +men, are often arrested on words. They are often arrested, as in poetic +love, upon images. And yet the magic of images and words is vicarious: +they would be empty, did not subtle material influences flow through +them, and hide behind them, rendering them exciting to the material soul +of the observer, who in his poetic ecstasy may think he is living in a +pure world of discourse. + +Finally, in the notion of souls there is a projection of mental +discourse: this, when it really exists in animals, is a mode of spirit. +Animal life sometimes reaches its entelechy in a stream of intuitions, +expressive of its modifications by the presence of other bodies, or by +the ferments of its own blood. These modes of spirit are in themselves +intangible, unobservable, volatile, and fugitive; and if anything +actual, about which truth and error may arise, may be called +unsubstantial, they are as unsubstantial as possible. But as they arise +in the operations of substance, and are read into these operations when +a sympathetic being observes them, they seem to be a part of what is +observed. But they are in quite another dimension of being, in the realm +of spirit; and spirit, or the intuitions in which it exists, is not a +part of the substance on which animal faith is directed, nor a mode of +it, nor a natural substance at all. It cannot by any possibility be met +with in action, perceived, fought with, nor (if we consider it from +within, in its own being) can it be lodged anywhere in space nor even in +time. It belongs to nature only by its individual outlook and moral +relevance: and we may say of it only by courtesy that it lodges in the +place and time which its organ occupies and in the world which, by +affecting that organ, enters into its specious perspectives. When a man +believes in another man’s thoughts and feelings, his faith is moral, not +animal. Such a spiritual dimension in the substances on which he is +reacting can be revealed to him only by dramatic imagination; only his +instant sympathy can shape, or can correct, his notion of them. In +origin, these tertiary qualities of bodies, imputed to them by literary +psychology (which is an exercise of dramatic insight) are as +superstitious and mythical as the purposes and powers of magical +metaphysics; but the intuitions assigned to other people are _possible_ +existences, as those metaphysical chimeras are not; and when the +creature that imputes the intuitions and the one that has them are the +same, or closely akin and close together, he may be absolutely +clairvoyant in imputing them. The mind as conceived by literary +psychology, or as represented by dramatic historians, is hypothetical +discourse, composed of what this psychology calls sensations, ideas, and +emotions. It _may_ exist, or may have existed, very much as conceived; +it would be a substance if idealism were true; but in fact it is a +translation into moral terms, rapid, summary, and prophetic, of an +animal life going on very laboriously and persistently in the dark; and +this animal life is itself no special substance, but a special mode or +vortex in the general substance of nature. + +2. _Master-types, or Platonic Ideas._—This is an assimilation of +substances to their names. Words and grammar are professedly notes +indicating the identities and relations of things; but in practice +everything, in being expressed, is conventionalised. The terms of +discourse mark only the forms which things wear on the average, or at +their best, or approximately; and in discourse these conventional terms +soon acquire their own identity and relations, and form a pattern quite +different from that of their objects. Philosophers, who necessarily +employ language, are like naturalists who should study zoology only in a +farmyard: the jungle would disconcert them. An argumentative and +dialectical mind trusts its verbal logic: but a logic, however cogent in +itself, is always of problematical application to facts, since it +describes only one possible world out of an infinite number, and (unless +it is secretly founded on observation) is not likely to describe the +actual one. The logicians themselves, when men of open mind, notice this +fact and lament it; and they bear the actual world a great grudge for +showing so little fidelity to their principles. It is false, they are +convinced, to its true nature, to the ideal it ought to realise, to the +function which you see at every turn that it is endeavouring to fulfil. +So that the dialectician can easily become an idealist of the Platonic +type, by conceiving that the substance of things is not the moving +matter that to-day is one thing and to-morrow another, and that never is +anything perfectly, but that this matter is only what the voice is to a +song, or a book to its message or spirit—a treacherous and subordinate +vehicle of expression; whereas the true object to look for, the source +of the applicability of words to facts at all, is the eternal nature +which an actual thing may illustrate: so that the form of things and not +their matter is their true substance or οὐσία. + +This substantiation of ideals, besides leaning on language, leans on a +sort of pragmatism or utilitarianism. Things are called beds if people +may sleep well upon them, and bridles if they serve to rein in a horse: +this function is their essence, in so far as they are beds or bridles at +all, and they are excellent in proportion to the perfection with which +they fulfil this function. And here an ascetic and supernaturalistic +motive begins to play a part in Platonism. For since the substance and +excellence of things lie _merely_ in their moral essence, or in the +fulfilment of the function designated by their names, all superfluous +ornaments, all variations, all hybrid combinations are monstrous. Things +should have only the barely necessary matter in them, and that wholly +obedient to the mastering form. What am I saying? Need things have any +matter in them at all? What could be more ideal than the idea itself, or +more perfect than the function exercised by magic, and without an +instrument? Away, then, with all material embodiments of ideas, even if +these embodiments seem perfect for a moment. Being material, they will +be treacherous and unstable: there will be some alloy of imperfection in +them, some unreality. Fly, then, to the heaven of ideas, absolute and +eternal, as the realm of essence contains them. There at last you will +find the substance which in this world of phenomena you sought in vain. +Things are only appearances; in minding and loving them, and thinking +they can wound us, we are befooled; for the only bread that can feed the +soul is celestial, and the only death that can overtake her is moral +disintegration and the darkness of merely existing without loyalty to +what she ought to be. + +This is good ethics: not because our ideal is our substance nor because +our soul in heaven is our true self, but because life is a harmony in +material motions, reproducing themselves, and happiness is a +consciousness of this harmony; so that substance would have no value and +its formations no name but for the choice they make of some eternal +essence to embody, and the purity with which they manifest it. But the +flux of substance is by no means limited to producing but one type of +perfection, or one circle of types. The infinite is open to all +variations; and any particular idea is so far from being the substance +of things, that it acquires its ideal prerogative, as a goal of +aspiration, only when substance has blindly chosen it as a practicable +harmony tending to establish itself and to recur in the local motions of +that substance; and nowhere else, and not for a moment longer, does any +eternal essence possess any authority, express any aspiration, or even +seem to exercise any power. + +3. _Phenomena._—When master-types were regarded as the true objects of +knowledge, the instances of these types found in the natural world were +called their appearances or phenomena; but they were not conceived to be +unsubstantial images, thrown off by the celestial type impartially into +all parts of space, like rays from a luminary. Phenomena were understood +to be existences, confined to particular places and times; indeed, in +contrast to the superior sort of being possessed by the types in heaven, +these phenomena were existences _par excellence_: and it was to them +that the philosophy of Heraclitus, that admirable description of +existence, continued to apply. That phenomena appeared was therefore not +the doing of the types alone: these, from their eternal seats, rained +down influence and, as it were, a perpetual invitation to things to +imitate and to mirror them; but before this invitation could be +accepted, or this influence gathered and obeyed, matter must exist +variously distributed and predisposed; so that of all the Ideas, equally +radiating virtue, here one and there another might find expression, and +that imperfectly and for a time only. + +Phenomena, then, for Platonism, are simply things: and they are called +appearances not because they are supposed not to exist except in the +mind, but because they are believed to be copies of an original in +heaven far more ideal and akin to the mind than themselves: and also +perhaps because they are so unstable and indefinable, that they elude +our exact knowledge and betray our affections. + +Phenomena, however, were supposed to be revealed to us by sense, whereas +thought revealed their types: and this way of putting things has led to +a shift in the meaning of the word phenomenon, so that in modern times +it has been confused with what is called an idea in the mind. Sense +would not reveal phenomena in nature (where Plato supposed them to +arise) if sense meant passive intuition. It would then reveal essences +only: that is, just what Plato found thought to reveal: only that being +merely æsthetic intuition, and not thought about nature and politics and +moral life, the essences revealed would not be Platonic Ideas; for these +were only such essences as expressed the categories of Greek speech, the +perfections of animals, or the other forms of the good. But sense, as +opposed to dialectic, meant for the ancients animal perception and +faith: it included understanding, sagacity, and a belief in matter: +indeed, common speech identified immersion in sense with materialism. +Modern philosophers have conceived sense passively, as mere sensation or +feeling or vision of inert ideas: and the word phenomenon has sometimes +been attracted into the same subjective vortex, and has come to mean a +datum of intuition. So that phenomenalism suggests less a belief in the +phenomena of nature than a disbelief in them, and a reduction of all +natural events to images in particular minds. + +The other, and proper, meaning of phenomenon seems to be retained by the +positivists, who deprecate metaphysics, and even literary psychology, +and wish to be satisfied with the data of science. But why use the word +phenomenon for an event or an existence that is substantial, and +manifests nothing deeper? Is it because another substance, not internal +to those events and existences, is supposed to exist somewhere and to be +unknowable? Or is it because the laws of nature, raised to a magical +authority, are made manifest or phenomenal in the facts? Or is it +because the positivists are at heart rather afraid of the psychological +critics of knowledge, and by calling things and events phenomena think +that they may pass for critics themselves, no less prudent and +scientific than if they talked of immediate experience or of ideas in +the mind? If so, it is a sorry expedient and a poor defence. If +phenomena are essences given in intuition they are not the objects nor +the themes of science, nor the facts or events in nature: and essences, +such as the absolutely unprejudiced and unpractical mind may behold +them, are the last things on which a positivist should pin his faith. As +to immediate experience, conceived as an existing process or life, and +as to ideas in the mind, they are names for discourse—the theme of just +that literary psychology which the positivist disdains. And if phenomena +are simply things, as they were to Plato, the positivist (who does not +regard things as weak efforts of nature to realise divine Ideas) should +not call them phenomena, but substances; unless indeed he is a +metaphysician without knowing it, and believes in some unknowable +substance which is not in things. + +4. _Truth._—Memory presents many a scene which is not substantial, as is +the world before me now: yet this _now_ is fleeting, and the +unsubstantiality which vitiates the past is in the act of invading the +present. Is not the pre-eminence of the present, then, an illusion, and +is not the reality that panorama which all those presents would present +when equalised and seen under the form of eternity? Is not the invidious +actuality of any part of things a mere appearance, and is not the +substance of them all merely their truth? + +This suggestion of memory is reinforced by the suggestions of doubt, of +disputation, and of information by hearsay. In our perplexities we seem +always to be appealing to a metaphysical plenum or standard, which we +call the truth: there all facts are not only evident, but judicial: they +settle our quarrels: they correct our ignorance: they vindicate our +faith. To the discoursing mind, therefore, present things and material +forces may come to seem of little consequence, negligible and +unsubstantial in comparison with the truth which remains immovable, +while things pass before it like clouds across the constellations. + +This is legitimate tragedy: the truth is the realm of being to which the +earnest intellect is addressed. The senses and passions may feed on +matter, and fancy may sport in the wilderness of essence: to the earnest +intellect the one exercise seems instrumental and the other wasteful: +what concerns it is the truth. But why is mere experience though it may +fall short of truth, relevant to truth, and helpful in discovering it? +And why is play of fancy, or definition of mere essences, not an avenue +to truth? Because the truth, if not a substance, is a luminous shadow or +penumbra which substance, by its existence and movements, casts on the +field of essence: so that unless a substance existed which was more +physical than truth, truth itself would have no nucleus, and would fade +into identity with the infinite essence of the non-existent. The truth, +however nobly it may loom before the scientific intellect, is +ontologically something secondary. Its eternity is but the wake of the +ship of time, a furrow which matter must plough upon the face of +essence. Truth must have a subject-matter, it must be the truth about +something: and it is the character of this moving object, lending truth +and definition to the truth itself, that is substantial and fundamental +in the universe. A sign that truth is simply fact, though described +under the form of eternity, is the heat and haste of men in asserting +what they think true. It is an object of animal faith, not of pure +contemplation. + +5. _Fact._—Those who appeal to fact with unction are philosophers justly +dissatisfied with theory and discourse: they are looking in the +direction of substance. Yet in the conception of fact there is an +element of an opposite kind, for fact is supposed to be obvious as well +as fundamental. Not substance, says the empirical philosopher, which +indeed would be the fact if it existed, but immediate fact, however +unsubstantial, if I can only be sure of it. Unfortunately, the immediate +datum is not a fact at all, but an essence: and even the intuition of +that essence, which he may say is the fact he means, is only a bit of +discourse or theory: the very thing of which he was so distrustful, and +from which his common sense was appealing to the facts. The love of fact +indeed has its revenges, and the word comes sometimes to be used for +inarticulate feeling or intuition of the unutterable—a perfectly +possible and rather common intuition. But at this point a triple +confusion perhaps arises between the given essence of the unutterable, +the incidental intuition of that essence, and the substance of the +natural world which the philosopher is trying to discover. The +unutterableness of the given essence is absurdly transferred to this +substance, which would need to be no less articulate than appearance, if +appearance was to arise from it or express it at all. Such a formless +substance is as far as possible from being the object of animal faith +posited in action and described in perception spontaneously and more +deliberately in theory and discourse. It is as far as possible from +being a fact. And the intuition (which _is_ a fact) will yield cold +comfort to the philosopher who wanted “facts” rather than intuitions. +The facts he wanted were things, and he has been looking for them in the +wrong direction. + +More often, however, fact is a name for any pronounced and conspicuous +feature of the natural world, or event assumed to occur in that physical +medium; so that such a fact may well be a mode of substance. It +obviously could neither arise nor be discovered except in a context no +less substantial than itself; for if each fact was a detached existence +it would form a universe by itself, and the eulogistic title of fact +could not belong to it with any better right than to any intuition. +Intuitions, discourse, theories too, taken bodily, are facts; but if +they had no locus in nature, they could convey no knowledge of fact, +being insignificant sensations or isolated worlds, occurring at no +assignable time. + +Fact, therefore, when honestly pointed to without metaphysical +interpretation, means a thing or an event against which the speaker has +indubitably run up: as it is a fact that the Atlantic Ocean separates +Europe from America, or that men die. If understood not to mean such +natural facts, but rather the impressions or notions of the mind that +notes them, facts become an impossible sublimation of things: either +actual intuitions, revealing not facts but essences: or alleged +intuitions postulated by literary psychology (which assumes the natural +world, without confessing it, as the field in which these intuitions are +deployed); or finally an undiscoverable atom of sentience cut off from +all relations in a metaphysical void. Such an atom, although it would be +a substance in an absolute sense, if it existed, yet could neither act +nor be acted upon, and therefore would not be the sort of substance that +a practical mind, in love with facts, would be tempted to believe in. + +6. _Events._—Although things rather than events are the object of animal +faith, ordinarily it is some event that calls attention to a thing: and +it is intelligible that philosophers, reverting to the study of nature +after their long quarantine in psychological scepticism, should dare to +speak of events as constituting the woof of nature, before they dare to +speak of them as things in flux or as modes of substance. Yet events can +be nothing less. Events are changes, and change implies continuity and +derivation of event from event: otherwise there might be variety in +existence, but there could be no variation, since the phases of the +alleged changes would not follow one another. This continuity and +derivation essential to events suffice to render them events in +substance, or changes in things. Both the medium of events (requisite to +render any two events successive or contiguous) and the quantitative +heritage of each (which it derives from the quantity of its antecedents) +are substantial. Not so any event taken separately, and conceived merely +as a passage of attention from one essence to another: for though the +intuition spanning this transition would be a fact, neither it nor the +terms it played with would be events. I can imagine an exception to this +principle, if a total event exists including the whole process of +creation. Such a total event (also any minute irreducible event if such +existed) would be actually identical with a changing thing or a +substance in flux. But every intermediate event would have arbitrary +limits, being composed of minor events and embedded in greater ones. +Perhaps there is no total and no rudimentary event: the men of science +must decide that point if they can, although I am not confident, that +after they had decided it on the best of evidence, their decision would +prevent the flux of nature from stopping, if they said it must go on, or +from going on, if they said it must stop. However, the mere possibility +that there should be no comprehensive and no least event shows on what +slippery ground we stand if we attempt to make events the ultimate +objects of belief. They are really only half of what changing existence +implies: the other half is substance. + +In the effort to halt at events without positing things there is some +vestige of the psychological confusion which identifies intuition with +the essences present to it. An intuition may present a specious event: +it does not follow that it is an event itself, or occurs in time. +Intuitions would indeed not be events if they had no locus in physical +time, and were not members of a series of events occurring in quite +another realm of being from the visionary events which those intuitions +might picture. In order to be events in physical time (even so to speak +by marriage) intuitions must have organs which are parts of the moving +substance of nature. Otherwise they would be pure spirits, out of time, +and out of relation to one another. They are events only because a +natural event, not an intuition, envelops them and lends them a natural +status. Were they only specious events present to another intuition they +would not be events at all, but eternal essences contemplated by an +eternal mind. + +Nevertheless, the notion of events comes very near to that of things, as +posited and required in action, and as analysed in physics. The +substance of these things is, by definition, the ground of changing +appearance and the agent in perpetual action: it is therefore +essentially in flux. I cannot say whether this flux is pervasive, so +that nothing whatever in substance remains for any time unchanged, the +constant element in it being only a constant form or quantity of change: +but on the level and scale of human experience, substance is everywhere +the substance of events, not of things immutable. If Heraclitus and +modern physics are right in telling us that the most stable of the +Pyramids is but a mass of events, this truth about substance does not +dissolve substance into events that happen nowhere and to nothing: that +supposition, on the contrary, would paralyse the events. If an event is +to have individual identity and a place amongst other events, it must be +a change which substance undergoes in one of its parts. Otherwise, like +facts and truths taken hypostatically, events would be metaphysical +abstractions, utterly incompatible with that natural status which must +belong to the things posited by animal faith in the heat of action—the +only things in which there is any reason for believing. + + + + + CHAPTER XXII + BELIEF IN NATURE + + +Belief in substance, I have seen, is inevitable. The hungry dog _must_ +believe that the bone before him is a substance, not an essence; and +when he is snapping at it or gnawing it, that belief rises into +conviction, and he would be a very dishonest dog if, at that moment, he +denied it. For me, too, while I am alive, it would be dishonest to deny +the belief in substance; and not merely dishonest, but foolish: because +if I am observant, observation will bring me strong corroborative +evidence for that belief. Observation itself, of course, assumes a +belief in discourse and in experience; it assumes that I can recognise +essences, remembering their former apparitions and contexts and +comparing the earlier with the present instance of them, or with the +different essences which now appear instead. When I survey my experience +in this way, the order of appearances, as memory or presumption sets it +before me, will confirm the suasion which these appearances exercised +singly, and will show me how very well grounded was the instinct which +told me, when I saw some casual essence, that it was a sign of something +happening in an independent, persisting, self-evolving, indefinitely +vast world. If experience, undergone, imposes belief in substance, +experience studied imposes belief in nature. + +The word nature is sometimes written with a capital, as if nature were +some sort of deity or person: and in ancient philosophy and common +speech, powers and habits are attributed to nature which imply a certain +moral idiosyncrasy in that personage. Poets also praise nature, and +theologians rehearse her marvellous ways, in order to show that she +could not have fallen into them of her own accord. All this mythology +about nature is natural, and perhaps shows a better total appreciation +of what nature is than would a precise physics. The precision of physics +is mathematical; it defines an essence; and the attribution of this +mathematical essence to nature, however legitimate, is sure to overlook +many properties which belong to her just as truly, and appear in the +realms of truth or of spirit. One such property, at least, is +fundamental, and is better expressed by personifying nature than by +describing her movements mathematically, I mean, her constancy, the +assumption that we may trust her to be true to herself. In science, some +observed or some hypothetical process is studied and the method or law +of it is ascertained: but there is nothing particularly scientific in +the presumption that this process is all that is going on in the given +case, or that it will recur in other cases. What is called the +uniformity of nature is an assumption made, in respect to the future, +without any evidence, and with proportionately scanty evidence about the +past: where experience confirms it in some particular, the confirmation +itself is good for those instances, up to that time: it tells me nothing +of anything beyond, or of the future. The source of my confidence is +animal faith, the same that inspires confidence in a child towards his +parents, or towards pet animals; and the whole monstrous growth of human +religion is an extension of this sense that nature is a person, or a set +of persons, with constant but malleable characters. As experience +remodels my impulses, I assume that the world will remain amenable to my +new ways; the convert feels he is saved; the philosopher thinks he has +found the key to happiness; the astronomer tells you he has measured the +infinite, and perhaps rolled it up upon itself, and put it in his +pocket. They all express the infantile conviction that nature cannot be +false to what they have already learned or instinctively affirmed of it: +making nature a single and quasi-personal entity, bound tragically to +its past, and pledged more or less wilfully to a particular future. It +is this sense that the world, like a person, has a certain vital unity, +and remains constant or at least consequential in its moral aspects, +that is expressed by calling it nature. Like a being born of a seed, it +has a determinate form, and a normal career, a _nature_, which it cannot +change. + +What evidence is there for the existence of nature, in this sense of the +word? If I speak of the universe at large, there can be no evidence. Of +course the universe must be what it is, it must have a character, it +must exemplify an essence; but taken as a whole, it may be a chaos, in +which nothing is predeterminate, nor progressive, nor persistent, and in +which the parts are self-centred and the events spontaneous. A +philosopher who took his own life as a model for conceiving all other +things, ought perhaps to incline to this view; because he is himself, +transcendentally speaking, an absolute centre, and being ignorant of the +sources of his thoughts and actions, may presume that they have no +sources. If under these circumstances he still has the weakness (for it +would be a weakness) to believe in anything else, say in other monads, +he would doubtless allow them an equal liberty; so that in his universe +of monads there would be no common space, no common time, no common type +of character or development, no mutual influence or kindred destiny. I +think the inner life of animals, if we treated each as a moral romance, +apart from its physical setting and influence, would actually present +such a chaos: especially if we imagine what may be the lives of +creatures in other parts of the stellar universe, or out of any relation +with ourselves at all. Such a loose universe could not properly be +called nature. It would not have given us birth, it would not have +nurtured us, it would not surround us with any constant influences or +familiar aspects, it would not bring any seeds to maturity for our +encouragement or warning. + +Evidences for the existence of nature must be sought elsewhere, in a +region which a monadologist would regard as internal to each monad, in +that the substances posited by me in obedience to my vital instincts +seem to me to behave as if they were parts of nature. Nature is the +great counterpart of art. What I tuck under my pillow at night, I find +there in the morning. Economy increases my possessions. People all grow +old. Accidents have discoverable causes. There is a possible distinction +between wisdom and folly. But how should all this be, and how could +experience, or the shocks that punctuate it, teach me anything to the +purpose, or lend me any assurance in life not merely a reinforced +blindness and madness on my part, unless substances standing and moving +in ordered ways surrounded me, and I was living in the midst of nature? +Certainly a partial sceptic like Berkeley, closing one eye in the +interests of a sentimental religion, may conceive that nature is not a +system of evolving substances round him affecting his own growth, but a +perpetual illusion, like a dream: a story told him in the dark, a +consecutive miracle of grace or of punishment by which a divine spirit +dazzles and conducts his spirit, without any medium or any occasion. But +if this fairy-tale is to hold good, and to justify the arts of life and +maintain the distinction between vice and virtue, I must be able to +discern the ways of Providence in their routine; everything will happen +exactly as if nature existed, and unrolled itself in a mechanical, +inexorable, and often shocking way; my idealism will merely allow me to +admit miracles, and to hope that to-morrow everything will be well. If I +regard the world of appearance as a mask which the deity wears +inevitably, the very essence of the creator being to create such a +world, the difference between belief in God and belief in nature will be +merely verbal, and I may say with Spinoza, _Deus sive natura_. If on the +contrary God is approachable in himself and would prove a better +companion than nature and sweeter to commune with, why should he terrify +me or delude me with this unworthy disguise? Why should he have +preferred to manifest himself by creating appearances rather than by +creating substances? What secret necessity could have compelled him to +create anything at all, or whispered in his ear these irresponsible +designs? If nature behaves as nature would, is it not simply nature? If +God were there instead would he not behave like God? Or if I say that I +have no right to presume how God should behave, but that wisdom counsels +me to learn his ways by experience, what difference remains between God +and nature, and are they more than two names for the same thing? + +If by calling nature God or the work of God, or the language in which +God speaks to us, nothing is meant except that nature is wonderful, +unfathomed, alive, the source of our being, the sanction of morality, +and the dispenser of happiness and misery, there can be no objection to +such alternative terms in the mouth of poets; but I think a philosopher +should avoid the ambiguities which a too poetical term often comports. +The word nature is poetical enough: it suggests sufficiently the +generative and controlling function, the endless vitality and changeful +order of the world in which I live. + +Faith in nature restores in a comprehensive way that sense of the +permanent which is dear to animal life. The world then becomes a home, +and I can be a philosopher in it. Perhaps nature is not really constant, +nor single; unless indeed I so stretch and eviscerate the notions of +unity and constancy as to apply them to the total aspect of nature, +under the form of eternity, however incoherent and loose the structure +of that totality may be. But in this æon, in this portion or special +plane of space, a sufficient constancy is discoverable: far greater than +my scope can cover, or my interest require. It is inattention and +prejudice in men, not inconstancy in nature, that keeps them so +ignorant, and the art of government so chaotic. Whenever a little +persistent study of nature is made (as recently in the interest of +mechanical inventions) rapid progress at once follows in the arts: and +art is the true discoverer, the unimpeachable witness to the reality of +nature. The master of any art sees nature from the inside, and works +with her, or she in him. Certainly he does not know _how_ he operates, +nor, at bottom, _why_ he should: but no more does she. His mastery is a +part of her innocence. It happens so, and within limits it prospers. To +that extent he has assurance of power and of support. It is a faith +congruous with his experience that if he could bend his faculties more +accurately to their task, nature would prove indefinitely tractable: and +if a given animal with special organs and a special form of imagination +can progressively master the world, the fact proves that the world is +con-natural with him. I do not mean that it favours his endeavours, much +less that it is composed as his fancy pictures it; I mean only that his +endeavours express one of the formations which nature has fallen into, +for the time in equilibrium with the surrounding formations; and that +his ideas too are in correspondence with the sphere of his motions, and +express his real relations. The possibility of such correspondence and +such equilibrium proves that nature exists, and that the creature that +sustains them is a part of nature. + + + + + CHAPTER XXIII + EVIDENCES OF ANIMATION IN NATURE + + +The sense that nature is animate, and in particular that men and brutes +have feelings and thoughts, stands in greater need of criticism than of +defence. I assume it before my notions of substance or of nature are +clearly formed, and before I can distinguish animate from inanimate +being. I assume it, not because it is at all evident or probable in +itself, but because I fetch the materials for all my inchoate +conceptions from my own sensibility: and in discourse (which I am busy +with from the beginning) I unwittingly interweave the notion of +animation in gathering my experience of essences and of things. I +attribute an existence to these essences which is proper only to the +light of intuition travelling over them: and I attribute to these +substances moral attributes and sensuous perspectives also borrowed from +my running discourse. This subjective matrix and envelope of all my +knowledge, though I may overlook it, underlies knowledge to the end; so +that I shall never cease to conceive nature as animate and brutes and +men as walking thoughts and passions until I have advanced very far in +scepticism. Even then, except in deliberate theory, my apprehension of +nature will be fabulous and dramatic; so that now that I have officially +reinstated my faith in nature, faith in the animation of nature will +tend to slip in unannounced; somewhat as when an exile is amnestied or a +foreigner naturalised, his parasites (if any) are silently admitted too. +Yet this is not, or need not be, the law; and as it is legality in +opinion that here occupies me, I will inquire whether evidence of +animation (even supposing that nature is animate in fact) could by any +possibility be found at all; and having cleared up that point, I will +inquire further under what control, and with what chances of truth, I +may imaginatively attribute animation to nature in the absence of all +evidence. + +Why do I attribute animation to myself, that is, to my body? That my +spirit discovers a world with my body in it, is not the question; the +why of that would be a metaphysical enigma obviously insoluble, arising +out of a trick of thought and inapt application of categories. The point +is why, when I feel a pain, I suppose that it is my back or my stomach +that aches, and not simply my spirit. I think we may distinguish two +reasons. One is that the pain is an element in the perception of my back +or stomach; it is instinct with the loudest and most urgent animal +faith; and it imperatively summons my attention to those obscure +regions, and makes me wonder what is happening there. The other reason +is that the pain may be associated with another observed event in which +my body appears as an integral element, as when my back aches because I +am being thrashed. My nobler thoughts are also known to animate my body +for this external reason. It is my tongue or gesture that announces +them, even to myself. Bad observers, who suppose themselves to see or to +discourse without intervention of their eyes or larynx, imagine that +they are essentially disembodied spirits, to whom all things are +directly perspicuous, and that only a hateful invention of philosophers, +called introjection or bifurcation, has put their minds inside their +bodies. Whether incarnation is or is not a hateful fatality to spirit, I +will not discuss here; but that spirit is incarnate, that it lodges in +the body and looks forth from it on the world, is a fact easily +ascertained by closing the eyes, taking a glass of wine, or blushing at +having made a fool of oneself. + +Faith in memory (which is involved in dialectic and in perception) also +reveals to me what animation means, and obliges me to assert its +existence. In dialectic and in perception I assume that recurrent views +are being taken by me of an object identical with itself if an essence, +or continuous with itself if a substance. Such recurrent intuitions or +mentions of the terms of discourse are posited in primary memory, as +well as in reversion to the past after an interval of forgetfulness. +This remembrance is remembrance of animation. It posits thought, +cognitive, synthetic, immaterial; but it posits it as having occurred in +particular conjunctions at particular times, in the vicissitudes of a +particular body, my own, in a material world. These alleged past +intuitions could not be kept apart in memory, nor assumed to have been +spaced at longer or shorter intervals of time, nor to have been enacted +in a particular order, unless they were attributed to the past career of +myself, an animal in the natural world, and grafted upon recognisable +material situations and actions to which those intuitions were relevant. +Nature is the canvas on which, in memory, I paint the perspective of my +personal experience. Even a fictitious memory, or a false experience +like that of a dream, is recognisable as having had a natural occasion +and date, and as painting a particular incredible perspective of the +same world. Otherwise, I should not think I was remembering my past +thoughts, but I should be merely contemplating certain fresh essences. + +By animation, then, I understand material life quickened into +intuitions, such as, if rehearsed and developed pertinently, make up a +private experience. The question whether nature is animate does not +regard its substance, but its moral individuation. In how many places is +experience being gathered? What evidence have I that nature thinks and +feels, or that the men and animals think and feel who people nature? + +I must discard at once, as incompatible with the least criticism, the +notion that nature or certain parts of nature are known to be animate +because they _behave_ in certain ways. The only behaviour that can give +proof of thinking is thinking itself. If I have ever conceived intuition +or discourse at all, and obtained assurance of its existence, it has +been in my own person, by knowing what I mean and am meaning, what I +feel and have felt; and this posited discourse of mine has assumed, in +my estimation, the character of animation of my body, by virtue of two +additional dogmas which I have accepted: first, the dogma that I am a +substantial being far deeper than my discourse, a psyche or self; and +second, the dogma that this substantial being is in dynamic interplay +with a whole environing system of substances on the same plane with +itself. In this way I have come by my initial instance of animation in +nature, on the model of which I am able to conceive animation in its +other parts. + +Now it is obvious that in many parts of nature, and especially in the +language and gestures of men of my own race, I find a setting for mental +discourse exactly similar to the setting into which I have put my own +intuitive experience; so that their words and actions vividly suggest to +me my own thoughts. Just as formerly I incorporated or introjected my +thoughts into my own body, so now I incorporate or introject them into +the bodies moving before me. Imitation contributes to this dramatic +understanding, because I am not confined, when I watch other people, to +remembering what I may have felt when I was in some such situation, or +spoke some such words. Their attitude and language may be novel to me, +and, as we say, a revelation: that is, they may by contagion arouse +unprecedented intuitions in me now, which I unhesitatingly attribute to +them, perhaps with indignation, swearing that such thoughts never could +enter my head, and that I am utterly incapable of such feelings. Yet +this is psychologically false; because if I understand a thought, I have +it; though it may be present as an essence only, without carrying +assent. The irony of the case is that very likely I alone have it, and +not at all the man to whom I attribute it. Even the closest similarity +in language or action is a very abstract similarity, and the concrete +and full current of our two lives, on which the quality of intuitions +depends, may be quite different. All dramatic understanding of which I +am capable is, by hypothesis, _my_ discourse. The most contagious +feelings, the clearest thoughts, of others are clear or contagious only +because I can readily make them my own. I cannot conceive deeper +thoughts than my lead can plumb, nor feelings for which I lack the +organ. + +Of course by an abuse of language the word animation might be used to +designate certain kinds of behaviour; as the ancients said the world was +rational because orderly, or the stars intelligent because they kept +going round in circles. So men or women might be said to think because +they speak or because they write books; but it does not follow. The +inner patter of words which I sometimes hear in myself, and which +mystics have called inspiration or (when explosive) speaking with +tongues, is not thinking; it is an object of perception that may suggest +to me a subsequent thought, although often I see, when I try to frame +this thought, that those words make nonsense. It is very true, as I +shall find later, that the fountain of my thoughts, that is, the self +who thinks them, is my psyche, and that movements there guide my +thoughts and render them, as the case may be, intelligent, confused, +rapid, or halting; also supply my language, dictate my feelings, and +determine when my thinking shall begin and where it shall end. But the +light of thought is wanting there, which is the very thinking; and no +fine inspection of behaviour nor interweaving of objects will ever +transmute behaviour into intuition nor objects into the attention which, +falling upon them, turns them from substances or essences into objects +of actual thought. By animation I understand the incarnation in nature, +when it behaves in these ways, of a pure and absolute spirit, an +imperceptible cognitive energy, whose essence is intuition. + +Animation being essentially imperceptible and not identical with any +habit or act observable in nature, I see the justification of those +philosophers who say that animals, in so far as science can study them, +are machines; the discoverable part of them is material only, just as is +the rest of nature. But this conclusion being implied only in my +transcendental approach to nature and my knowledge of her, can in no way +prejudge her real constitution, which may be as rich and superabundant +as it likes, without asking my leave or reporting to me her domestic +budget; nor is anything thereby prejudged in respect to the nature or +laws of matter, or the simplicity of its mechanism. Nature seems, at +first blush, to have many levels of habit, irreducible to one another. +As it was only the other day that a hint reached us that gravity and the +first law of motion might be forms of a single principle, so it may be +long before we hear from the biologists that chemical reaction and +animal instinct are forms of the same habit in matter. Even if they are +irreducible to a common principle, they will be two habits of matter, +and nothing more. There is a sense in which every different +manifestation of a principle makes a different principle of it, as the +language of the United States might be said not to be English; but the +alienation of form from form is not a departure from the habit of flux, +complication, dissolution, and temporary arrest which runs through all +language. So nature might be said to have as many irreducible habits as +she has forms; but she has an underlying ground of transformation as +well, on which, I suspect, all those forms are grafted, no more wilfully +diverse nor artificially identical than leaves upon a tree; and when +wiseacres, every day of every year, bring their ponderous proofs that +life is not mechanical, that the human will, by exception, is free, and +that a single disembodied purpose, by magic, makes all things dance +contrarily to their own nature, nature and I wink at each other. + +The circumstance that animation, by its very essence, must be +imperceptible, and not a link in any traceable process, renders disproof +of animation anywhere as impossible as proof of it. Those +sentimentalists are short-sighted who in their desire to show that mind +is everywhere, introduce mental forces or interpolate mental links into +their account of physical economy. If thought was discoverable only in +the gaps between motions, no thoughts would be discoverable in nature at +all. I do not presume to say that nature can make no leaps; I leave her +to her own paces; but I do not conceive that, if she shows gaps (and +what is a gap but a transition?) I must hasten to fill them up for her +with alleged intuitions. She may be made up of gaps; they may be her +steps; and if her limbs have strength in them for leaping, let her leap. +Her strides are their own measure; it is only my ignorance or egotism +that can regard any of her ways as abnormal. Thought in myself has not +appeared when my system has broken down, but rather when it has +established quick connections with things about it. Thought is not a +substitute for physical force or physical life, but an expression of +them when they are working at their best. If I may read animation into +nature at all, it must be where her mechanisms are sustained, not where +they are suspended. + +There are two stages in the criticism of myth, or dramatic fancy, or the +sort of idealism that sees purposes and intentions and providential +meanings in everything. The first stage treats them angrily as +superstitions; the second treats them smilingly as poetry. I think that +most of the specific thoughts which men attribute to one another are +proper only to the man who attributes them; and the fabulous psychology +of poets and theologians is easy to deride; it has no specific +justification, and the moral truth of it can be felt only by a poetic +mind. Nevertheless, when I consider the inevitable egotism that presides +over the understanding of mind in others, I fear that I am no less +likely to sin through insensibility to the actual life of nature, +because my tight little organs cannot vibrate to alien harmonies, than I +am to sin through a childish anthropomorphism which makes not only the +beasts but even the clouds and the gods discourse like myself. After +all, in attributing human thoughts (with a difference) to non-human +beings, I recognise their parity with myself; my instinct is courteous +or even humble; and my incapacity to speak any moral language but my own +is not only inevitable but healthy and manly. Sages and poets who have +known no language but their own have a richer savour and a deeper wisdom +than witlings full of miscellaneous accomplishments; and when once I +have renounced the pedantic demand that poetry should be prose, I can +allow that myth may do the life of nature less injustice than would the +only alternative open to me, which is silence. + +This may be said also about myth regarding myself, I mean the attempts +of memory, self-justifying eloquence, or psycho-analysis to unfold the +riches of my own mind. How much do I know about my own animation? How +much is too fluid to be caught in the sieve of memory, and to be +officially assimilated in verbal soliloquy? When any one asks me what I +think of the weather or of the Prime Minister, does my answer report +anything that I have previously thought? Probably not; my past +impressions are lost, or obliterated by the very question put to me; and +I make bold to invent, on the spur of the moment, a myth about my +sentiments on the subject. The present play of language and fancy may +fairly bring to a head old impressions or ruling impulses; or I may have +occasion to amend my first expression, and obeying a fresh suggestion of +my fancy I may say: No, no; I meant rather this. Whereupon I may proceed +laboriously to create and modulate my opinion, groping perhaps to a +final epigram, which I say expresses just what I think, although I never +thought it before. Such is my discourse when I am really thinking; at +other times it is but the echo of language which I remember to have +formerly used, and therefore call my ideas. It is clear therefore that +even in expressing my own mind when I conceive what I have felt, I have +never really felt just that before. My report is an honest myth. + +The case is even worse as regards the emotions. What do I mean when I +talk of my desires, my intentions, or the motives of others? Unless +these things have been actually expressed in words which I can recover, +neither I nor my neighbours have ever had in mind anything like what I +now impute. My desire, in fact, was only a certain alacrity in doing +things which afterwards I see leading to a certain issue; my intention +(if actual at all) was a certain foresight of what the issue might be; +and the motives I assigned to others were but ulterior events imagined +by me which, if they had actually occurred, I suppose would have pleased +those people. The sensations or ideas which may really have accompanied +their actions, or the words they may really have pronounced mentally, +are not within my view; if they were they would probably go a very +little way towards preparing or covering the actions in question. These +actions would turn out to have had subjectively a totally different +complexion from that which I assign to them on seeing them performed. +The very abundance and incessant dream-like prolixity of mental +discourse render it elusive; and the discourse I officially impute to +myself or to others is a subsequent literary fiction, apt if it suggests +the events which the discourse concerned, or excites the emotions which +those events if witnessed would have produced on an observer of my +disposition, but by no means a fiction patterned on any actual former +experience in anybody. My sense of animation in nature, and all my +notions of human experience, are dramatic poetry, and nothing else. + +There is therefore no direct evidence of animation in nature anywhere, +but only a strong propensity in me to imagine nature discoursing as I +discourse, because my apprehension of nature is embedded in my +miscellaneous, serried, and private thoughts, and I can hardly clear it +of the mental elements—emotional, pictorial, or dramatic—which encrust +it there. On reflection, however, and by an indirect approach, I can see +good reason for believing that some sort of animation (not at all such +animation as my fancy attributes to it at first) pervades the organic +world; because my psyche is animate; she is the source and seat, as I +have learned to believe, of all my discourse; yet she is not different, +in any observable respect, from the psyches of other animals, nor is she +composed of a different sort of substance from the common earth, light, +and air out of which she has arisen, and by which she is fed; she is but +one in the countless generations of living creatures. Accordingly the +analogy of nature would suggest that the other living creatures in the +world are animate too, and discourse privately no less assiduously and +absurdly than I do. It would even suggest that all the substance of +nature is ready to think, if circumstances allow by presenting something +to think about, and creating the appropriate organ. + +The character of this universal animation, or readiness to think, is +inconceivable by me, in so far as its organs or objects differ from my +own. The forms of it are doubtless as various as the forms of material +being; a stone will think like me, in so far as it lives like me. There +are actually some men, a few, who do live like me; these also think like +me; and we can truly understand one another and impute to one another +the very thoughts we severally have. In such rare cases, human discourse +in one man may bring perfect knowledge (though no evidence) of human +discourse in another. In doing the same things and uttering the same +words we have instant assurance of unanimity, in this case not +deceptive; especially when it is not the outer stimulus that is common +to us, but the spontaneous reaction. For this reason gesture or poetry +is a better index to feeling than are events or information coming to +men from outside. What happens to people will never tell you how they +feel; the alien observer misunderstands everything; only he understands +a mind who can share its free and comic expression. For this reason too +psychology is not a science unless it becomes the science of behaviour, +when it ceases to be an account of mental discourse and traces only the +material life of the psyche. In order to communicate thought it is +necessary to impose it. + +Moral communication becomes surer in proportion as the discourse to be +reproduced involves more articulation, more distinct turns by which +fidelity in the rendering may be controlled. The form of thought is more +easily transferable than its sensuous elements. Under the same sky, with +the same animal instincts, with the same experience of love, labour, and +war, one race or one age may be totally cut off from another in spirit. +The same language, on the contrary, the same myths, legends, or +histories, may be carried almost unchanged across seas and ages, and may +unite the happier moments of distant peoples. The range of such moral +unity is also easy to discover; I may learn how far languages or +religions are diffused; they create recognisable moral communities. +Indeed, they tyrannise over society, so social are they; and they often +render people who share the same spirit cruel to heretics of their own +flesh and blood. The humanities may prove inhuman; and the less +articulate, more robust instincts of mankind may take their revenge by +stamping the humanities out. Yet the barbarians, who are not divided by +rival traditions, fight all the more incessantly for food and space. +Peoples cannot love one another unless they love the same ideas. + + + + + CHAPTER XXIV + LITERARY PSYCHOLOGY + + +Scientific psychology is a part of physics, or the study of nature; it +is the record of how animals act. Literary psychology is the art of +imagining how they feel and think. Yet this art and that science are +practised together, because one characteristic habit of man, namely +speech, yields the chief terms in which he can express his thoughts and +feelings. Still it is not the words, any more than the action and +attitude which accompany them, that are his _understanding_ of the +words, or his sense of his attitude and action. These can evidently be +apprehended only dramatically, by imitative sympathy; so that literary +psychology, however far scientific psychology may push it back, always +remains in possession of the moral field. + +When nature was still regarded as a single animal, this confusion +extended to science as a whole, and tinctured the observation of nature +with some suggestion of how a being that so acts must be minded, and +what thoughts and sentiments must animate it. Such myths cannot be true; +not because nature or its parts may not be animate in fact, but because +there is no vital analogy between the cosmos and the human organism; so +that if nature is animate as a whole, or in her minute or gigantic +cycles, animation there is sure not to resemble human discourse, which +is all we can attribute to her. Myth and natural theology are +accordingly fabulous essentially and irremediably. If literary +psychology is to interpret the universe at large, it can be only very +cautiously, after I have explored nature scientifically as far as I can, +and am able to specify the degree of analogy and the process of +concretion that connect my particular life with the universal flux. + +Myth is now extinct (which is a pity) and theology discredited; but the +same confusion subsists in the quarters where it is not fashionable to +doubt. History, for instance, is partly a science, since it contains +archæological and antiquarian lore and a study of documents; but it is +also, in most historians, an essay in dramatic art, since it pretends to +rehearse the ideas and feelings of dead men. These would not be +recoverable even if the historian limited himself to quoting their +recorded words, as he would if he was conscientious; because even these +words are hard to interpret afterwards, so as to recover the living +sentiment they expressed. At least authentic phrases, like authentic +relics, have an odour of antiquity about them which helps us to feel +transported out of ourselves, even if we are transported in fact only +into a more romantic and visionary stratum of our own being. Classic +historians, however, are not content with quoting recorded words: they +compose speeches for their characters, under the avowed inspiration of +Clio; or less honestly, in modern times, they explain how their heroes +felt, or what influences were at work in the spirit of the age, or what +dialectic drove public opinion from one sentiment to another. All this +is shameless fiction; and the value of it, when it has a value, lies +exclusively in the eloquence, wisdom, or incidental information found in +the historian. Such history can with advantage be written in verse, or +put upon the stage; its virtue is not at all to be true, but to be well +invented. + +Philosophy fell into the same snare when in modern times it ceased to be +the art of thinking and tried to become that impossible thing, the +science of thought. Thought can be found only by being enacted. I may +therefore guide my thoughts according to some prudent rule, and appeal +as often as I like to experience for a new starting-point or a +controlling perception in my thinking; but I cannot by any possibility +make experience or mental discourse at large the object of +investigation: it is invisible, it is past, it is nowhere. I can only +surmise what it might have been, and rehearse it imaginatively in my own +fancy. It is an object of literary psychology. The whole of British and +German philosophy is only literature. In its deepest reaches it simply +appeals to what a man says to himself when he surveys his adventures, +re-pictures his perspectives, analyses his curious ideas, guesses at +their origin, and imagines the varied experience which he would like to +possess, cumulative and dramatically unified. The universe is a novel of +which the ego is the hero; and the sweep of the fiction (when the ego is +learned and omnivorous) does not contradict its poetic essence. The +composition is perhaps pedantic, or jejune, or overloaded; but on the +other hand it is sometimes most honest and appealing, like the +autobiography of a saint; and taken as the confessions of a romantic +scepticism trying to shake itself loose from the harness of convention +and of words, it may have a great dramatic interest and profundity. But +not one term, not one conclusion in it has the least scientific value, +and it is only when this philosophy is good literature that it is good +for anything. + +The literary character of such accounts of experience would perhaps have +been more frankly avowed if the interest guiding them had been truly +psychological, like that of pure dramatic poetry or fiction. What kept +philosophers at this task—often quite unsuited to their powers—was +anxiety about the validity of knowledge in physics or in theology. They +thought that by imagining how their ideas might have grown up they could +confirm themselves in their faith or in their scepticism. Practising +literary psychology with this motive, they did not practise it freely or +sympathetically; they missed, in particular, the decided dominance of +the passions over the fancy, and the nebulous and volatile nature of +fancy itself. For this reason the poets and novelists are often better +psychologists than the philosophers. But the most pertinent effect of +this appeal of science to a romantic psychology was the _hypostasis of +an imagined experience_, as if experience could go on in a void without +any material organs or occasions, and as if its entire course could be +known by miracle, as the experiences of the characters in a novel are +known to the author. + +Criticism of knowledge is thus based on the amazing assumption that a +man can have an experience which is past, or which was never his own. +Although criticism can have no first principle, I have endeavoured in +this book to show how, if genuinely and impartially sceptical, it may +retreat to the actual datum and find there some obvious essence, +necessarily without any given place, date, or inherence in any mind. But +from such a datum it would not be easy to pass to belief in anything; +and if the leap was finally taken, it would be confessedly at the +instance of animal faith, and in the direction of vulgar and +materialistic convictions. Modern critics of knowledge have had more +romantic prepossessions. Often they were not really critics, saying _It +seems_, but rebels saying _I find_, _I know_, or empiricists saying +_Everybody finds_, _Everybody knows_. Their alleged criticism of science +is pure literary psychology, gossip, and story-telling. They are +miraculously informed that there are many minds, and that these all have +a conventional experience. What this experience contains, they think is +easily stated. You have but to ask a friend, or make an experiment, or +imagine how you would feel in another man’s place. So confident is this +social convention, that the natural world in which these experiences are +reported to occur, and the assumed existence of which renders them +imaginable, may be theoretically resolved into a picture contained in +them. Thus the ground is removed which sustained all this literary +psychology and suggested the existence of minds and their known +experience at all; yet the groundless belief in these minds, and in +copious knowledge of their fortunes, is retained as obvious; and this +novelesque universe is called the region of facts, or of immediate +experience, or of radical empiricism. Literary psychology thus becomes a +metaphysics for novelists. It supplies one of the many thinkable systems +of the universe, though a fantastic one; and I shall return to it, under +the name of psychologism, when considering the realm of matter. Here I +am concerned only with the evidence that such masses of experience exist +or are open to my inspection. + +No inspection is competent to discover anything but an essence; what +social intuition touches is therefore always a dramatic illusion of life +in others or in myself, never the actual experience that may have +unfolded itself elsewhere as a matter of fact. Yet this dramatic +illusion, like any given essence, may be a true symbol for the material +events upon which the psyche is then directed; in this case, the life of +other people, or my own past life, as scientific psychology might +describe it. A good literary psychologist, who can read people’s minds +intuitively, is likely to anticipate their conduct correctly. His +psychological imagination is not a link in this practical sagacity but a +symptom of it, a poetic by-product of fineness in instinct and in +perception. Slight indications in the attitude or temper of the persons +observed, much more than their words, will suggest to the sympathetic +instinct of the observer what those persons are in the habit of doing, +or are inclined to do; and the stock idea assigned to them, or the stock +passion attributed to them, will be but a sign in the observer’s +discourse for that true observation. I watch a pair of lovers; and it +requires no preternatural insight for me to see whether the love is +genuine, whether it is mutual, whether it is waxing or waning, irritable +or confident, sensual or friendly. I may make it the nucleus of a little +novel in my own mind; and it will be a question of my private fancy and +literary gift whether I can evolve language and turns of sentiment +capable of expressing all the latent dispositions which the behaviour of +those lovers, unconscious of my observation, suggested to me. Have I +read their minds? Have I divined their fate? It is not probable; and yet +it is infinitely probable that minds and fates were really evolving +there, not generically far removed from those which I have imagined. + +The only facts observable by the psychologist are physical facts, and +the only events that can test the accuracy of his theories are material +events; he is therefore in those respects simply a scientific +psychologist, even if his studies are casual and desultory. Whence, +then, his literary atmosphere? For there is not only the medium of words +which intervenes in any science, but the ulterior sympathetic echo of +feelings truly felt and thoughts truly rehearsed and intended. I reply +that whereas scientific psychology is addressed to the bodies and the +material events composing the animate world, literary psychology +restores the essences intervening in the perception of those material +events, and re-echoes the intuitions aroused in those bodies. This +visionary stratum is the true immediate as well as the imagined +ultimate. Even in the simplest perceptions on which scientific +psychology, or any natural science, can be based, there is an essence +present which only poetry can describe or sympathy conceive. Schoolroom +experiments in optics, for instance, are initially a play of intuitions, +and exciting in that capacity; I see, and am confident and pleased that +others see with me, this colour of an after-image, this straight stick +bent at the surface of the water, the spokes of this wheel vanishing as +it turns. For science, these given essences are only stepping-stones to +the conditions under which they arise, and their proper æsthetic nature, +which is trivial in itself, is forgotten in the curious knowledge I may +acquire concerning light and perspective and refraction and the +structure of the eye. Yet in that vast, vibrating, merciless realm of +matter I am, as it were, a stranger on his travels. The adventure is +exhilarating, and may be profitable, but it is endless and, in a sense, +disappointing; it takes me far from home. I may seem to myself to have +gained the whole world and lost my own soul. Of course I am still at +liberty to revert in a lyrical moment to the immediate, to the +intuitions of my childish senses; yet for an intelligent being such a +reversion is a sort of _gran rifiuto_ in the life of mind, a collapse +into lotus-eating and dreaming. It is here that the Muses come to the +rescue, with their dramatic and epic poetry, their constructive music, +and their literary psychology. Knowledge of nature and experience of +life are presupposed; but as at first, in the beginnings of science, +intuition was but a sign for material facts to be discovered, so now all +material facts are but a pedestal for images of other intuitions. The +poet feels the rush of emotion on the other side of the deployed events; +he wraps them in an atmosphere of immediacy, luminous or thunderous; and +his spirit, that piped so thin a treble in its solitude, begins to sing +in chorus. Literary psychology pierces to the light, to the shimmer of +passion and fancy, behind the body of nature, like Dante issuing from +the bowels of the earth at the antipodes, and again seeing the stars. + +Such a poetic interpretation of natural things has a double dignity not +found in sensuous intuitions antecedent to any knowledge of the world. +It has the dignity of virtual truth, because there are really intuitions +in men and animals, varying with their fortunes, often much grander and +sweeter than any that could come to me. The literary psychologist is +like some antiquary rummaging in an old curiosity shop, who should find +the score of some ancient composition, in its rude notation, and should +sit down at a wheezy clavichord and spell out the melody, wondering at +the depth of soul in that archaic art, so long buried, and now so feebly +revealed. This curious music, he will say to himself, was mighty and +glorious in its day; this moonlight was once noon. There is no illusion +in this belief in life long past or far distant; on the contrary, the +sentimentalist errs by defect of imagination, not by excess of it, and +his pale watercolours do no justice to the rugged facts. The other merit +that dignifies intuitions mediated by knowledge of things, is that they +release capabilities in one’s own soul which one’s personal fortunes may +have left undeveloped. This makes the mainspring of fiction, and its +popular charm. The illusion of projecting one’s own thoughts into remote +or imaginary characters is only half an illusion: these thoughts were +never there, but they were always here, or knocking at the gate; and +there is an indirect victory in reaching and positing elsewhere, in an +explicit form, the life which accident denied me, and thereby enjoying +it _sub rosa_ in spite of fate. And there are many experiences which are +only tolerable in this dream-like form, when their consequences are +negligible and their vehemence is relieved by the distance at which they +appear, and by the show they make. Thus both the truth and the illusion +of literary psychology are blessings: the truth by revealing the minds +of others, and the illusion by expanding one’s own mind. + +These imaginative blessings, however, are sometimes despised, and +philosophers, when they suspect that they have no evidence for their +psychological facts, or become aware of their literary flavour, +sometimes turn away from this conventional miscellany of experience, and +ask what is the substantial texture of experience beneath. Suppose I +strain my introspection in the hope of discovering it; the picture (for +such a method can never yield anything but pictures) may be transformed +in two ways, to which two schools of recent literary psychology are +respectively wedded. One transformation turns experience, intensely +gaped at, into a mere strain, a mere sense of duration or tension; the +other transformation unravels experience into an endless labyrinth of +dreams. In the one case, experience loses its articulation to the extent +of becoming a dumb feeling; and it is hard to see how, if one dumb +undifferentiated feeling is the only reality, the illusion of many +events and the intuition of many pictures could be grafted upon it. In +the other case experience increases its articulation to the extent of +becoming a chaos; and the sensitive psychology that dips into these +subterranean dreams needs, and easily invents, guiding principles by +which to classify them. Especially it reverts to sexual and other animal +instincts, thus grafting literary psychology (which in this field is +called psycho-analysis) again on natural substance and the life of +animals, as scientific psychology may report it. + +This natural setting restores literary psychology to its normal status; +it is no longer a chimerical metaphysics, but an imaginative version, +like a historical novel, of the animation that nature, in some +particular regions, may actually have possessed. The fineness and +complexity of mental discourse within us may well be greater than we can +easily remember or describe; and there is piety as well as ingenuity in +rescuing some part of it from oblivion. But here, as elsewhere, myth is +at work. We make a romance of our incoherence, and compose new unities +in the effort to disentangle those we are accustomed to, and find their +elements. Discourse is not a chemical compound; its past formations are +not embedded in its present one. It is a life with much iteration in it, +much recapitulation, as well as much hopeless loss and forgetfulness. As +the loom shifts, or gets out of order, the woof is recomposed or +destroyed. It is a living, a perpetual creation; and the very fatality +that forces me, in conceiving my own past or future, or the animation of +nature at large, to imagine that object afresh, with my present vital +resources and on the scale and in the style of my present discourse—this +very fatality, I say, reveals to me the nature of discourse everywhere, +that it is poetry. But it is poetry about facts, or means to be; and I +need not fear to be too eloquent in expressing my forgotten sentiments, +or the unknown sentiments of others. Very likely those sentiments, when +living, were more eloquent than I am now. + + + + + CHAPTER XXV + THE IMPLIED BEING OF TRUTH + + +From the beginning of discourse there is a subtle reality posited which +is not a thing: I mean the truth. If intuition of essence exists +anywhere without discourse, the being of truth need not be posited +there, because intuition of itself is intransitive, and having no object +other than the datum, can be neither true nor false. Every essence +picked up by intuition is equally real in its own sphere; and every +degree of articulation reached in intuition defines one of a series of +essences, each contained in or containing its neighbour, and each +equally central in that infinite progression. The central one, for +apprehension, is the one that happens to appear at that moment. +Therefore in pure intuition there is no fear of picking up the wrong +thing, as if the object were a designated existence in the natural +world; and therefore the being of truth is not broached in pure +intuition. + +Truth is not broached even in pure dialectic, which is only the +apprehension of a system of essences so complex and finely articulated, +perhaps, as to tax human attention, or outrun it if unaided by some +artifice of notation, but essentially only an essence like any other. +Truth, therefore, is as irrelevant to dialectic as to merely æsthetic +intuition. Logic and mathematics are not true inherently, however cogent +or extensive. They are ideal constructions based on ideal axioms; and +the question of truth or falsity does not arise in respect to them +unless the dialectic is asserted to apply to the natural world, or +perhaps when a dispute comes up as to the precise essence signified by +some word, such as, for instance, infinity. + +When men first invented language and other symbols, or fixed in +reflection the master-images of their dreams and thoughts, it seemed to +them that they were discovering parts of nature, and that even in those +developments they must be either right or wrong. There was a _true_ name +for every object, a part of its nature. There was a _true_ logic, and a +_true_ ethics, and a _true_ religion. Certainly in so far as these mixed +disciplines were assertions about alleged facts, they were either right +or wrong; but in so far as they were systems of essences, woven together +in fancy to express the instincts of the mind, they were only more or +less expressive and fortunate and harmonious, but not at all true or +false. Dialectic, though so fine-spun and sustained, is really a more +primitive, a more dream-like, exercise of intuition than are animal +faith and natural science. It is more spontaneous and less responsible, +less controlled by secondary considerations, as poetry is in contrast +with prose. If only the animals had a language, or some other fixed +symbols to develop in thought, I should be inclined to believe them the +greatest of dialecticians and the greatest of poets. But as they seem +not to speak, and there is no ground for supposing that they rehearse +their feelings reflectively in discourse, I will suppose them to be very +empty-headed when they are not very busy; but I may be doing them an +injustice. In any case their dreams would not suggest to them the being +of truth; and even their external experience may hardly do so. + +It might seem, perhaps, that truth must be envisaged even by the animals +in action, when things are posited; especially as uncertainty and change +of tactics and purpose are often visible in their attitudes. Certainly +truth is there, if the thing pursued is such as the animal presumes it +to be; and in searching for it in the right quarter and finding it, he +enacts a true belief and a true perception, even if he does not realise +them spiritually. What he realises spiritually, I suppose, is the +pressure of the situation in which he finds himself, and the changes in +his object; but that his belief from moment to moment was right or wrong +he probably never notices. Truth would then not come within his purview, +nor be distinguished amongst his interests. He would want to be +successful, not to be right. + +So in a man, intent experience, when not reflective, need not disclose +the being of truth. Sometimes, in a vivid dream, objects suffer a +transformation to which I eagerly adapt myself, changing my feelings and +actions with complete confidence in the new facts; and I never ask +myself which view was true, and which action appropriate. I live on in +perfect faith, never questioning the present circumstances as they +appear, nor do I follow my present policy with less assurance than I did +the opposite policy a moment before. This happens to me in dreams; but +politicians do the same thing in real life, when the lives of nations +are at stake. In general I think that the impulse of action is +translated into a belief in changed things long before it reproaches +itself with having made any error about them. The recognition of a truth +to be discerned may thus be avoided; because although a belief in things +must actually be either true or false, it is directed upon the present +existence and character of these things, not upon its own truth. The +active object posited alone interests the man of action; if he were +interested in the rightness of the action, he would not be a man of +action but a philosopher. So long as things continue to be perceived in +one form or another, and can be posited accordingly, the active impulse +is released, and the machine runs on prosperously until some hitch +comes, or some catastrophe. It is then always the things that are +supposed to have changed, not the forms of folly. Even the most pungent +disappointment, as when a man loses a bet, is not regarded otherwise +than as a misfortune. It is all the fault of the dice; they might and +ought to have turned up differently. This, I say to myself, is an +empirical world; all is novelty in it, and it is luck and free will that +are to blame. My bet was really right when I made it; there was no error +about the future then, for I acted according to the future my fancy +painted, which was the only future there was. My act was a creative act +of vitality and courage; but afterwards things accountably went wrong, +and betrayed their own promise. + +I am confirmed in this surmise about the psychology of action by the +reasoning of empirical and romantic philosophers, who cling to this +instinctive attitude and deny the being of truth. No substance exists, +according to their view, but only things as they seem from moment to +moment; so that it is idle to contrast opinion with truth, seeing that +there is nothing, not even things, except in opinion. They can easily +extend this view to the future of opinion or of experience, and maintain +that the future does not exist except in expectation; and at a pinch, +although the flesh may rebel against such heroic subjectivism, they may +say that the past, too, exists only in memory, and that no other past +can be thought of or talked about; so that there is no truth, other than +current opinion, even about the past. If an opinion about the past, they +say, seems problematical when it stands alone, we need but corroborate +it by another opinion about the past in order to make it true. In other +words, though the word truth is familiar to these philosophers, the idea +of it is unintelligible to them, and absent altogether from their +apprehension of the world. + +The experience which perhaps makes even the empiricist awake to the +being of truth, and brings it home to any energetic man, is the +experience of other people lying. When I am falsely accused, or when I +am represented as thinking what I do not think, I rebel against that +contradiction to my evident self-knowledge; and as the other man asserts +that the liar is myself, and a third person might very well entertain +that hypothesis and decide against me, I learn that a report may fly in +the face of the facts. There is, I then see clearly, a comprehensive +standard description for every fact, which those who report it as it +happened repeat in part, whereas on the contrary liars contradict it in +some particular. And a little further reflection may convince me that +even the liar must recognise the fact to some extent, else it would not +be _that_ fact that he was misrepresenting; and also that honest memory +and belief, even when most unimpeachable, are not exhaustive and not +themselves the standard for belief or for memory, since they are now +clearer and now vaguer, and subject to error and correction. That +standard comprehensive description of any fact which neither I nor any +man can ever wholly repeat, is the truth about it. + +The being of truth thus seems to be first clearly posited in +disputation; and a consequence of this accident (for it is an accident +from the point of view of the truth itself under what circumstances men +most easily acknowledge its authority)—a consequence is that truth is +often felt to be somehow inseparable from rival opinions; so that people +say that if there was no mind and consequently no error there could be +no truth. They mean, I suppose, that nothing can be correct or incorrect +except some proposition or judgement regarding some specific fact; and +that the same constitution of the fact which renders one description +correct, renders any contradictory description erroneous. “Truth” is +often used in this abstract sense for correctness, or the quality which +all correct judgements have in common; and another word, perhaps “fact” +or “reality,” would then have to be used for that standard comprehensive +description of the object to which correct judgements conform. But a +fact is not a description of itself; and as to the word “reality,” if it +is understood to mean existence, it too cannot designate a description, +which is an essence only. Facts are transitory, and any part of +existence to which a definite judgement is addressed is transitory too; +and when they have lapsed, it is only their essence that subsists and +that, being partially recovered and assigned to them in a retrospective +judgement, can render this judgement true. Opinions are true or false by +repeating or contradicting some part of the truth about the facts which +they envisage; and this truth about the facts is the standard +comprehensive description of them—something in the realm of essence, but +more than the essence of any fact present within the limits of time and +space which that fact occupies; for a comprehensive description includes +also all the radiations of that fact—I mean, all that perspective of the +world of facts and of the realm of essence which is obtained by taking +this fact as a centre and viewing everything else only in relation with +it. The truth about any fact is therefore infinitely extended, although +it grows thinner, so to speak, as you travel from it to further and +further facts, or to less and less relevant ideas. It is the splash any +fact makes, or the penumbra it spreads, by dropping through the realm of +essence. Evidently no opinion can embrace it all, or identify itself +with it; nor can it be identified with the facts to which it relates, +since they are in flux, and it is eternal. + +The word truth ought, I think, to be reserved for what everybody +spontaneously means by it: the standard comprehensive description of any +fact in all its relations. Truth is not an opinion, even an ideally true +one; because besides the limitation in scope which human opinions, at +least, can never escape, even the most complete and accurate opinion +would give precedence to some terms, and have a direction of survey; and +this direction might be changed or reversed without lapsing into error; +so that the truth is the field which various true opinions traverse in +various directions, and no opinion itself. An even more impressive +difference between truth and any true discourse is that discourse is an +event; it has a date not that of its subject-matter, even if the +subject-matter be existential and roughly contemporary; and in human +beings it is conversant almost entirely with the past only, whereas +truth is dateless and absolutely identical whether the opinions which +seek to reproduce it arise before or after the event which the truth +describes. + +The eternity of truth is inherent in it: all truths—not a few grand +ones—are equally eternal. I am sorry that the word eternal should +necessarily have an unction which prejudices dry minds against it, and +leads fools to use it without understanding. This unction is not +rhetorical, because the nature of truth is really sublime, and its name +ought to mark its sublimity. Truth is one of the realities covered in +the eclectic religion of our fathers by the idea of God. Awe very +properly hangs about it, since it is the immovable standard and silent +witness of all our memories and assertions; and the past and the future, +which in our anxious life are so differently interesting and so +differently dark, are one seamless garment for the truth, shining like +the sun. It is not necessary to offer any evidence for this eternity of +truth, because truth is not an existence that asks to be believed in, +and that may be denied. It is an essence involved in positing any fact, +in remembering, expecting, or asserting anything; and while no truth +need be acknowledged if no existence is believed in, and none would +obtain if there was no existence in fact, yet on the hypothesis that +anything exists, truth has appeared, since this existence must have one +character rather than another, so that only one description of it in +terms of essence will be complete; and this complete description, +covering all its relations, will be the truth about it. No one who +understands what is meant by this eternal being of truth can possibly +deny it; so that no argument is required to support it, but only enough +intensity of attention to express what we already believe. + +Inspired people, who are too hot to think, often identify the truth with +their own tenets, to signify by a bold hyperbole how certain they feel +in their faith; but the effect is rather that they lead foolish people, +who may see that this faith may be false, to suppose that therefore the +truth may be false also. Eternal truths, in the mouth of both parties, +are then tenets which the remotest ancestors of man are reputed to have +held, and which his remotest descendants are forbidden to abandon. Of +course there are no eternal tenets: neither the opinions of men, nor +mankind, nor anything existent can be eternal; eternity is a property of +essences only. Even if all the spirits in heaven and earth had been so +far unanimous on any point of doctrine, there is no reason, except the +monotony and inertia of nature, why their logic or religion or morals +should not change to-morrow from top to bottom, if they all suddenly +grew wiser or differently foolish. + +At the risk of being scholastic I will suggest the uses to which the +word eternal and the terms akin to it might be confined if they were +made exact. + +A thing that occupied but one point of physical time would be +_instantaneous_. No essence is instantaneous, because none occupies any +part of physical time or space; and I doubt whether any existence is +instantaneous either; for if the mathematicians decide that the +continuous or extended must be composed of an infinite number of +inextended and non-contiguous units, in bowing to their authority I +should retain a suspicion that nothing actual is confined to any of +these units, but that the smallest event has duration and contains an +infinite number of such units; so that one event (though not one +instant) can be contiguous to another. + +A given essence containing no specious temporal progression or +perspective between its parts would be _timeless_. Colour, for instance, +or number, is timeless. The timeless often requires to be abstracted +from the total datum, because round any essence as actually given there +is an atmosphere of duration and persistence, suggesting the existential +flux of nature behind the essence. Colour seems to shine, that is, to +vibrate. Number seems to mount, and to be built up. The timeless is +therefore better illustrated in objects like laws or equations or +definitions, which though intent on things in time, select relations +amongst them which are not temporal. + +A being that should have no external temporal relations and no locus in +physical time would be _dateless_. Thus every given essence and every +specious present is dateless, internally considered, and taken +transcendentally, that is, as a station for viewing other things or a +unit framing them in. Though dateless, the specious present is not +timeless, and an instant, though timeless, is not dateless. + +Whatsoever, having once arisen, never perishes, would be _immortal_. I +believe there is nothing immortal. + +Whatsoever exists through a time infinite in both directions is +_everlasting_. Matter, time, the life of God, souls as Plato conceived +them, and the laws of nature are commonly believed to be everlasting. In +the nature of the case this can be only a presumption. + +That which without existing is contemporary with all times is _eternal_. +Truth is dateless and eternal, but not timeless, because, being +descriptive of existence, it is a picture of change. It is frozen +history. As Plato said that time was a moving image of eternity, we +might say that eternity was a synthetic image of time. But it is much +more than that, because, besides the description of all temporal things +in their temporal relations, it contains everything that is not temporal +at all; in other words, the whole realm of essence, as well as the whole +realm of truth. + + + + + CHAPTER XXVI + DISCERNMENT OF SPIRIT + + +Is the existence of spirit evident to spirit, and involved in the +presence of anything? Is its nature simple and obvious? I think there is +something of which this may be said, but not of spirit; for by spirit I +understand not only the passive intuition implied in any essences being +given, but also the understanding and belief that may greet their +presence. Even passive intuition is no datum; there is nothing evident +except the given essence itself. Yet, as I have seen above, the mere +prolongation of this presence, the recognition of this essence as +identical with itself, and the survey of its elements in various orders, +very soon impose upon me a distinction between this essence and my +intuition of it. This intuition is a fact and an event, as the essence +cannot be; so that even if spirit meant nothing but pure consciousness +or the activity of a transcendental ego, it would need to be posited, in +view of the felt continuity of discourse, and could not be an element in +the given essences. If spirit were defined as the common quality of all +appearances, distinguishing them from the rest of the realm of essence +which does not appear, spirit would be reduced to an appearance itself. +It would be like light, something seen, a luminousness in all objects, +not what I understand by it, which is the seeing; not the coloured +lights I may observe, but the exercise of sight as distinguished from +blindness. + +The common quality of all appearances is not spirit but mere Being; that +simple and always obvious element to which I referred just now as given +in all essences without distinction, and which some philosophers and +saints have found so unutterably precious. This is all that is common to +all possible appearances, considered in themselves; but animal tension +is not altogether absent even in this abstruse contemplation, and the +sense that appearances are assaulting _me_ thickens my intuition of +their essence into an apprehension of existence, which existence, having +no idea of myself, I of course attribute to them, or to the abstract +common element in their essences, pure Being, which thus becomes in my +eyes absolute existence. + +The present stimulus that awakens me out of my material lethargy and +keeps my attention more or less taut is not spirit, although, of course, +the birth of spirit is involved in my awakening. That stimulus is the +strain and rumble of the universal flux, audible in my little sea-shell. +It preserves the same ground-tone (that of a disturbance or a strain) no +matter what image it may bring forth, or even if it brings forth no +images but only a pervasive sense of swimming in safety and bliss. This +budding sentiment of existence is a recognition not of spirit but of +substance, of fact, of force, of an unfathomable mystery. + +By spirit I understand the light of discrimination that marks in that +pure Being differences of essence, of time, of place, of value; a living +light ready to fall upon things, as they are spread out in their weight +and motion and variety, ready to be lighted up. Spirit is a fountain of +clearness, decidedly wind-blown and spasmodic, and possessing at each +moment the natural and historical actuality of an event, not the imputed +or specious actuality of a datum. Spirit, in a word, is no phenomenon, +not sharing the æsthetic sort of reality proper to essences when given, +nor that other sort proper to dynamic and material things; its peculiar +sort of reality is to be intelligence in act. Spirit, or the intuitions +in which it is realised, accordingly forms a new realm of being, +silently implicated in the apparition of essences and in the felt +pressure of nature, but requiring the existence of nature to create it, +and to call up those essences before it. By spirit essences are +transposed into appearances and things into objects of belief; and (as +if to compensate them for that derogation from their native status) they +are raised to a strange actuality in thought—a moral actuality which in +their logical being or their material flux they had never aspired to +have: like those rustics and servants at an inn whom a travelling poet +may take note of and afterwards, to their astonishment, may put upon the +stage with applause. + +It is implied in these words, when taken as they are meant, that spirit +is not a reality that can be observed; it does not figure among the +_dramatis personæ_ of the play it witnesses. As the author, nature, and +the actors, things, do not emerge from the prompter’s box, or remove +their make-up so as to exhibit themselves to me in their unvarnished +persons, but are satisfied that I should know them only as artists (and +I for my part am perfectly willing to stop there in my acquaintance with +them); so the spirit in me which their art serves is content not to be +put on the stage; that would be far from being a greater honour, or +expressing a truer reality, than that which belongs to it as spectator, +virtually addressed and consulted and required in everything that the +theatre contrives. Spirit can never be observed as an essence is +observed, nor encountered as a thing is encountered. It must be enacted; +and the essence of it (for of course it has an essence) can be described +only circumstantially, and suggested pregnantly. It is actualised in +actualising something else, an image or a feeling or an intent or a +belief; and it can be discovered only by implication in all discourse, +when discourse itself has been posited. The witnesses to the existence +of spirit are therefore the same as those to the existence of discourse; +but when once discourse is admitted, the existence of spirit in it +becomes self-evident; because discourse is a perusal of essence, or its +recurring presence to spirit. + +Now in discourse there is more than passive intuition; there is intent. +This element also implies spirit, and in spirit as man possesses it +intent or intelligence is almost always the dominant element. For this +reason I shall find it impossible, when I come to consider the realm of +spirit, to identify spirit with simple awareness, or with consciousness +in the abstract sense of this abused word. Pure awareness or +consciousness suffices to exemplify spirit; and there may be cold +spirits somewhere that have merely that function; but it is not the only +function that only spirits could perform; and the human spirit, having +intent, expectation, belief, and eagerness, runs much thicker than that. +Spirit is a category, not an individual being: and just as the realm of +essence contains an infinite number of essences, each different from the +rest, and each nothing but an essence, so the realm of spirit may +contain any number of forms of spirit, each nothing but a spiritual +fact. Spirit is a fruition, and there are naturally as many qualities of +fruition as there are fruits to ripen. Spirit is accordingly qualified +by the types of life it actualises, and is individuated by the occasions +on which it actualises them. Each occasion generates an intuition +numerically distinct, and brings to light an essence qualitatively +different. + +Let me suppose, by way of illustration, that there was a disembodied +spirit addressed to the realm of truth in general, and seeing all things +under the form of eternity. This would be a very special kind of spirit, +and many an essence would be excluded from its intuition; for instance, +the essence of surprise. No doubt it would congratulate itself on this +incapacity, and say with Aristotle that there are things it is better +not to know than to know, at least by experience. The essence of +surprise involves ignorance of the future, and it could never be +realised, or known by intuition, in a spirit to whom the future had +always been known: and to know surprise by experience is the only way of +knowing its essence. It might indeed be known by description, and +defined as a feeling which animals have when they expect one thing and +find another. Such a description may suggest the essence of surprise to +me, who know by intuition what it is to expect and to find; but it would +never suggest that essence to a spirit that had only descriptions to go +by, and who could reach a conception of “expecting” and of “finding” +only in symbols that translated their transitive natures into synthetic +pictures. Thus the essence of surprise would remain for ever excluded +from intuition in a spirit that saw all things under the form of +eternity. + +The occasions on which spirit arises in man are the vicissitudes of his +animal life: that is why spirit in him runs so thick. In intent, in +belief, in emotion a given essence takes on a value which to pure spirit +it could not have. The essence then symbolises an object to which the +animal is tentatively addressed, or an event through which he has just +laboured, or which he is preparing to meet. This attitude of the animal +may be confined to inner readjustments in the psyche, not open to gross +external observation; yet it may all the more directly be raised to +consciousness in the form of attention, expectation, deliberation, +memory, or desire. These sentiments form a moving but habitual +background for any particular essence considered; they frame it in, not +only pictorially in a sensuous perspective, but morally, by its ulterior +suggestions, and by the way in which, in surveying the whole field of +intuition, that particular feature in it is approached or attacked or +rejected. In such settings given essences acquire their felt meanings; +and if they should be uprooted from that soil and exhibited in +isolation, they would no longer mean the same thing to the spirit. Like +a note in a melody, or a word in a sentence, they appeared in a field of +essence greater than they; they were never more than a term or a feature +within it. For this reason I imagine that I see things and not essences; +the essences I see incidentally are embedded in the voluminous +ever-present essences of the past, the world, myself, the future; +master-presences which express attitudes of mine appropriate not to an +essence—which is given—but to a thing—which though not given enlists all +my conviction and concern. + +Thus intelligence in man, being the spiritual transcript of an animal +life, is transitional and impassioned. It approaches its objects by a +massive attack, groping for them and tentatively spying them before it +discovers them unmistakably. It is energetic and creative, in the sense +of slowly focussing its object within the field of intuition in the +midst of felt currents with a felt direction, themselves the running +expression of animal endeavours. All this intuition of turbulence and +vitality, which a cold immortal spirit could never know, fills the +spirit of man, and renders any contemplation of essences in their own +realm only an interlude for him or a sublimation or an incapacity. It +also renders him more conscious than a purer spirit would be of his own +spirit. For just as I was able to find evidence of intuition in +discourse, which in the motionless vision of essence would have eluded +me, so in intent, expectation, belief, and emotion, the being of my +thoughts rises up and almost hides the vision of my object. Although I +myself am a substance in flux, on the same level as the material thing +that confronts me, the essences that reveal my own being are dramatic +and moral, whereas those that express the thing are sensuous; and these +dramatic and moral essences, although their presence involves spirit +exactly in the same way, and no more deeply, than the presence of the +sensuous essences does, yet seem to suggest its presence more directly +and more voluminously. + +Hence the popular identification of spirit with the heart, the breath, +the blood, or the brain; and the notion that my substantial self and the +spirit within me are identical. In fact, they are the opposite poles of +my being, and I am neither the one nor the other exclusively. If I am +spiritually proud and choose to identify myself with the spirit, I shall +be compelled to regard my earthly person and my human thoughts as the +most alien and the sorriest of accidents; and my surprise and +mortification will never cease at the way in which my body and its world +monopolise my attention. If on the contrary I modestly plead guilty to +being the biped that I seem, I shall be obliged to take the spirit +within me for a divine stranger, in whose heaven it is not given me to +live, but who miraculously walks in my garden in the cool of the +evening. Yet in reality, incarnation is no anomaly, and the spirit is no +intruder. It is as much at home in any animal as in any heaven. In me, +it takes my point of view; it is the voice of my humanity; and what +other mansions it may have need not trouble me. Each will provide a +suitable shrine for its resident deity and its native oracle. It is a +prejudice to suppose that spirit is contaminated by the flesh; it is +generated there; and the more varied its instruments and sources are, +the more copiously it will be manifested, and the more unmistakably. + +Spiritual minds are the first to recognise the empire of the flesh over +the spirit in the senses, the passions, and even in a too vivid +imagination; and they call these influences the snares of the adversary. +I think they are right in condemning as vain or carnal any impulses +which would disrupt the health of the soul, either directly in the +individual body, or indirectly by loosening such bonds with society as +are requisite for human happiness. I also think, however, that moralists +of this type overlook two considerations of the greatest moment, by +which all the metaphysical background of their maxims is removed, and +what is reasonable in them is put on a naturalistic basis. One +consideration is that, on a small scale and in its own key, every +impulse in man or beast bears its little flame of spirit. How much +longing, how much laughter, how much perception, how much policy and art +in those vices and crimes which the moralist thinks fatal to spirit! +They may render a finer thing impossible (which the moralist should +bethink himself to depict more attractively), but in themselves they are +full of life and light. For this reason crimes and vices, together with +horrible adventures and the pomps and vanities of this wicked world, are +the chosen theme of novelists and playwrights; and the poor public, +having hardly any other intellectual pleasure, gloats on these fictions, +as an imaginative escape from the moral penury not only of their work, +but of their religion. The poets are far more genuine lovers of spirit +in this than their mentors, whose official morality is probably quite +worldly, and insensible to any actually spiritual achievement, because +such achievements are necessarily fugitive, invisible, and +un-productive. The devil was an angel essentially; it was only in the +complicated politics of this world that he missed his way, and became an +enemy of the highest good. + +The other consideration that is overlooked is that the spirit which may +discern this highest good is itself a natural passion, and not less an +expression of the flesh—though more justly and broadly—than the random +impulses it condemns. Consider, for instance, the earnestness with which +evil is condemned. If this evil is pain, the objection to it could not +be more instinctive. Why should pure spirit detest pain? A material +accident in the body here absorbs my attention, and strangely persuades +me to be utterly rebellious and impatient at being so absorbed. The +psyche, or the principle of bodily life, is somehow striving against the +event or stimulus which produced the pain (a perfectly harmless essence +to contemplate in itself), because the psyche is congenitally a system +or cycle of habits which that obnoxious event interrupts. It is this +material pressure and effort not to be stifled or rent in any of her +operations that the psyche imposes on the spirit, commanding it to +pronounce it a terrible evil that she should be rent or stifled. These +strange and irrational pronouncements of spirit, calling events good or +evil, are accordingly grounded on nothing but on a creeping or shrinking +of the flesh. If the evil is moral—the eventual defeat of some ideal I +cherish for myself, my children, or my country—what has fixed this +ideal, or declared it to be a good? Suppose this ideal is a life +glorious and unending; is it not obvious that nothing but the momentum +of life, already accidentally working in myself, my children, or my +country, could possibly demand life or determine what forms of life +would be glorious for us? I will not pursue this topic: if the reader +does not understand, he probably never will. + +Let me turn to the most intellectual powers of spirit—attention, +synthesis, perception. These too are voices loudly issuing from the +heart of material existence, and proclaiming their origin there not only +by their occasions and external connections, but by their inmost moral +nature. Why does the spirit stop to collect or to recollect anything? +Why not range undisturbed and untrammelled over image after image, +without referring one to another or attempting (always in vain) to +preserve the design of vanished images, or the order of their +appearance, even through the lapse of the sensible elements that filled +them in? Because the animal is forming habits. The psyche is plastic; no +impression can endure unchanged, as if it had been a substantial little +thing in itself, and not a mode, a ripple, in an inherited, +transmissible, ever rejuvenated substance. Scarcely is the impression +received, but it merges in the general sensitiveness or responsiveness +of the organ affected, modifying its previous way of reacting on some +natural object, an object reported not by that impression alone, but by +many others: so that the synthetic unity of apperception (that most +radical of transcendental principles) obeys a compulsion peculiar to +animal economy, which no pure spirit would need to share, the compulsion +to use things as materials, to drop them and forge ahead, or to eat and +to digest them: for the drinking in of light through the eyes, or of +currents from other organs, thereby rearranging the habits of the +nervous system, is very like the consumption of food, restoring the +vegetative functions. Synthesis in thought, correlation, scope, or (as +the phrase is) taking things in, is laborious piety on the spirit’s part +in subservience to the flesh. It is the mental fruit of training, of +care: an inner possession rewarding an outer fidelity. + +Pure spirit would never need to _apperceive_ at all; this is an animal +exigency that distracts it from intuition. There is unity in intuition +too, of a nebulous sort, as there must be unity in the universe, since +it is all there is, however loose its structure or unmarked its limits. +Yet in intuition, as in cloud-land, the field is in the act of changing +pervasively; every part shifts more or less. Any feature you may +distinguish fades and refashions itself irresponsibly; and pure spirit +would be perfectly content that it should do so. Perhaps, if it was a +young spirit, it would positively whip up the hoop, or blow and distend +the bubble, for the fun of seeing it run or burst more gloriously; and +it would be happy to think there was no harm done, and nothing left +over. The scene would then be cleared for something utterly fresh. The +synthetic unity of apperception is something imposed by things on +animals, when these things exercise a seductive charm or threaten +mischief. Attention cries halt, it reconnoitres, it takes note, it +throws a lassoo over the horses of Poseidon, lord of the flux. And why? +Because the organs of spirit are structures; they are mechanisms +instituted in nature to keep doing certain things, roughly appropriate +to the environment, itself roughly constant. It is to this approximate +fixity of function and habit that spirit owes its distinct ideas, the +names it gives to things, and its faith in things, which is a true +revelation of their existence—knowledge of them stored for use. + +Perception, too, would be a miracle and an impossibility to a spirit +conceived as alien to matter. Perception is a stretching forth of intent +beyond intuition; it is an exercise of intelligence. Intelligence, the +most ideal function of spirit, is precisely its point of closest +intimacy with matter, of most evident subservience to material modes of +being. The life of matter (at least on the human scale, if not at every +depth) is a flux, a passage from this to that, almost forbidding +anything to be simply itself, by immediately turning it, in some +respect, into something different. If the psyche were a closed round of +motions, the spirit it generated (if it generated spirit at all) would +certainly not be perceptive or cognitive, but in some way emotional or +musical—the music of those spheres. But the round of motions which the +psyche is actually wound up to make must be executed in a changeful and +precarious environment, not to speak of changes in her own substance. +She must hunt, fight, find a mate, protect the offspring, defend the den +and the treasure. Perception, intelligence, knowledge accurately +transcribe this mode of being, profoundly alien to repose in intuition +or to drifting reverie. Perception points to what it does not, save by +pointing, know to exist; knowledge is only of the past or the future, +both of which are absent; and intelligence talks and talks to an +interlocutor—the mind of another man or god or an eventual self of one’s +own—whom it can never see and whose replies, conveyed (if at all) +through material channels, it is never sure exist morally, or could be +understood if they did exist. There is no dilemma in the choice between +animal faith and reason, because reason is only a form of animal faith, +and utterly unintelligible dialectically, although full of a pleasant +alacrity and confidence, like the chirping of birds. The suasion of +sanity is physical: if you cut your animal traces, you run mad. + +It is impossible to say everything at once, and I have been contrasting +intelligence with intuition, as if intuition were less subject than +intelligence to physical inspiration, or had an independent source. This +is not the case; intuition is itself pathetically animal. Why should I +have awaked at all? Can anything, inwardly considered, be more +gratuitous than consciousness? I am afraid I must be constituted +differently from other people, at least in the reflective faculty, +because it astonishes me to hear so many philosophers talking of spirit +as if its existence explained itself, and denying the possibility of +matter; whereas to me it seems credible, though certainly unnecessary _a +priori_, that matter should exist without being consulted, for it cannot +help itself, suffers nothing, and has no reason to protest; and its +existence is antecedently just as plausible as its non-existence. But +the existence of spirit really demands an explanation; it is a +tremendous paradox to itself, not to say a crying scandal—I mean from a +scientific or logical point of view, because treated as a family secret +the scandal is often delicious, and privately it is in this festive and +poetic medium that I love to dwell. Spirit, since it _can_ ask how it +came to exist, has a right to put the question and to look for an +answer. And it may perhaps find an answer of a sort, although not one +which spirit, in all its moods, will think satisfactory. + +Fact can never be explained, since only another fact could explain it: +therefore the existence of a universe rather than no universe, or of one +sort of universe rather than another, must be accepted without demur. In +this very irrationality or contingency of existence, which is inevitable +in any case, I find a clue to the strange presence of spirit in this +world. Spirit, the wakefulness of attention, could not have arisen of +its own accord; it contains no bias, no principle of choice, but is an +impartial readiness to know. It never could have preferred one thing to +another, nor preferred existence for itself to nonexistence, nor _vice +versa_. Attention is not a principle that can select the themes that +shall attract attention: to select them it must already have thought of +them. As far as its own nature is concerned, attention is equally ready +to fall on the just and on the unjust; spirit is equally ready to speak +any language, to quicken any body, and to adopt any interest. An +instance of spirit cannot be determined by spirit itself either in its +occasion, its intensity, or the æsthetic character of the essence +presented to it. Chance, matter, fate—some non-spiritual principle or +other—must have determined what the spirit in me shall behold, and what +it shall endure. Some internal fatality, their own brute existence and +wilfulness, must be responsible for the fact that things are as they +are, and not otherwise. If any instance of spirit was to arise anywhere, +the ground of it (if I speak of grounds at all) must have been +irrational. Spirit has the innocence of a child; it pleads not guilty; +at most it has become, without knowing how, an accomplice after the +fact. It is astonished at everything. It is essentially, wherever it may +be found, unsubstantial and expressive; it is essentially secondary. +Even if in fact some instance of spirit, some isolated intuition, sprang +miraculously into being in an absolute void, and nothing else had ever +existed or would exist, yet logically and in its own eyes that intuition +would be secondary, since no principle internal to spirit, but only +brute chance, would be expressed in the existence of that intuition, and +in the arbitrary choice of the essence that happened to appear there. +Spirit is therefore of its very nature and by its own confession the +voice of something else: it speaks not of itself, but of the Father that +sent it. I am accordingly prepared to find some arbitrary world or other +in existence; and since this arbitrary world obviously has spirit in it, +my problem is reduced to inquiring what features, in this arbitrary +existing world, can have called spirit forth, and made it their living +witness. + +I postpone the detail of this inquiry, but I have already indicated how +the life of nature is expressed in the chief phases of spirit. +Wakefulness, common to all these phases, is itself a witness to animal +unrest, appetition, alarm, concern, preparation. It would be inane, as +well as impossible, for me to open my eyes, if in looking I did not +identify my spirit with my material person in its material predicaments, +raising to an actual hypostasis in consciousness its material +sensitiveness to outlying things. Electric influences issuing from these +allow my organs to adjust themselves before grosser contact occurs; and +then intuition is a premonition of material fusion. Organic systems +about to collide send forth this conscious cry or salutation. The +current established may prevent a ruder shock, or may precipitate it, +according to the prepared instinct of the receivers. The intuition +expresses the initial fusion involved in the distant response, as if a +ghostly messenger of oncoming things had rushed like a forerunner into +the audience chamber, announcing their arrival. It is only messengers +that reach the spirit, even in the thick of the fray; but by lending +credence to their hot reports, it can live through the battle, lost in +its mists and passions, and thinking itself to give and to receive the +blows. + +For a man, and especially for a philosopher, to suggest that spirit does +not exist may accordingly pass for a delicious absurdity, and the best +of unconscious comedy. If it had been some angel that denied it, because +in his serenity and selflessness he could not discover that he was +alive, we might regard the denial of spirit as the highest proof of +spirituality: but in a material creature struggling to see and to think, +and tossed from one illusion and passion to another, such a denial seems +not only stupid, but ungracious; for a man ought to be very proud of +this dubious spark in his embers, and nurse it more tenderly than the +life of a frail child. Nevertheless I think that those who deny the +existence of spirit, although their language is rash and barbarous, are +honestly facing the facts, and are on the trail of a truth. Spirit is +too near them for them to stop at it in their eagerness to count their +visible possessions; and when they hear the word used, it irritates +them, because they suppose it means some sort of magical power or +metaphysical caloric, alleged to keep bodies alive, and to impose +purposes on nature; purposes which such a prior spirit, being +supernatural and immortal, could have had no reason for choosing. Such a +dynamic spirit would indeed be nothing but an immaterial matter, a +second physical substance distinguished from its grosser partner only in +that we know nothing of it, but assign to its operation all those +results which seem to us inexplicable. Belief in such a spirit is simply +belief in magic; innocent enough at first when it is merely verbal and +childish, but becoming perverse when defended after it has ceased to be +spontaneous. I am not concerned with spirit of that sort, nor with any +kind of nether influences. The investigation of substance and of the +laws of events is the province of physics, and I call everything that +science may discover in that direction physical and not spiritual. Even +if the substance of things should be sentiency, or a bevy of souls, or a +single intense Absolute, it would be nothing but matter to what I call +spirit. It would exercise only material functions in kindling the flame +of actual intuition, and bearing my light thoughts like bubbles upon its +infinite flood. I do not know what matter is in itself: but what +metaphysical idealists call spirit, if it is understood to be +responsible for what goes on in the world and in myself, and to be the +“reality” of these appearances, is, in respect to my spiritual +existence, precisely what I call matter; and I find the description of +this matter which the natural sciences supply much more interesting than +that given by the idealists, much more beautiful, and much more likely +to be true. That there is no spirit in the interstices of matter, where +the magicians look for it, nor at the heart of matter, where many +metaphysicians would place it, needs no proof to one who understands +what spirit is; because spirit is in another realm of being altogether, +and needs the being and movement of matter, by its large sweeping +harmonies, to generate it, and give it wings. It would be a pity to +abandon this consecrated word to those who are grubbing for the atoms of +substance, or speculating about a logic in history, or tabulating the +capers of ghosts; especially as there is the light of intuition, the +principle of actuality in vision and feeling, to call by that name. The +popular uses of the word spiritual support this definition of it; +because intuition, when it thoroughly dominates animal experience, +transmutes it into pure flame, and renders it religious or poetical, +which is what is commonly meant by spiritual. + + + + + CHAPTER XXVII + COMPARISON WITH OTHER CRITICISMS OF KNOWLEDGE + + +Descartes was the first to begin a system of philosophy with universal +doubt, intended to be only provisional and methodical; but his mind was +not plastic nor mystical enough to be profoundly sceptical, even +histrionically. He could doubt any particular fact easily, with the +shrewdness of a man of science who was also a man of the world; but this +doubt was only a more penetrating use of intelligence, a sense that the +alleged fact might be explained away. Descartes could not lend himself +to the disintegration of reason, and never doubted his principles of +explanation. For instance, in order to raise a doubt about the +applicability of mathematics to existence (for their place in the realm +of essence would remain the same in any case) he suggested that a malign +demon might have been the adequate cause of our inability to doubt that +science. He thus assumed the principle of sufficient reason, a principle +for which there is no reason at all. If any idea or axiom were really _a +priori_ or spontaneous in the human mind, it would be infinitely +improbable that it should apply to the facts of nature. Every genius, in +this respect, is his own malign demon. Nor was this the worst; for +Descartes was not content to assume that reason governs the world—a +notion scandalously contrary to fact, and at bottom contrary to reason +itself, which is but the grammar of human discourse and aspiration +linking mere essences. He set accidental limits to his scepticism even +about facts. “I think, therefore I am,” if taken as an inference is +sound because analytical, only repeating in the conclusion, for the sake +of emphasis, something assumed in the premise. If taken as an +attestation of fact, as I suppose it was meant, it is honest and richly +indicative, all its terms being heavy with empirical connotations. What +is “thinking,” what is “I,” what is “therefore,” and what is +“existence”? If there were no existence there would certainly be no +persons and no thinking, and it may be doubted (as I have indicated +above) that anything exists at all. That any being exists that may be +called “I,” so that I am not a mere essence, is a thousand times more +doubtful, and is often denied by the keenest wits. The persuasion that +in saying “I am” I have reached an indubitable fact, can only excite a +smile in the genuine sceptic. No _fact_ is self-evident; and what sort +of fact is this “I,” and in what sense do I “exist”? Existence does not +belong to a mere datum, nor am I a datum to myself; I am a somewhat +remote and extremely obscure object of belief. Doubtless what I _mean_ +by myself is an existence and even a substance; but the rudimentary +phantoms that suggest that object, or that suggest the existence of +anything, need to be trusted and followed out by a laborious empirical +exploration, before I can make out at all what they signify. Variation +alleged, strain endured, persistence assumed—notions which when taken on +faith lead to the assertion of existence and of substance, if they +remained merely notions would prove nothing, disclose nothing, and +assert nothing. Yet such, I suppose, are the notions actually before me +when I say “I am.” As to myself, when I proceed to distinguish that +object in the midst of the moving world, I am roughly my body, or more +accurately, its living centre, master of its organs and seat of its +passions; and this inner life of the body, I suspect, was the rock of +vulgar belief which Descartes found at hand, easy to mount on, after his +not very serious shipwreck. And the rock was well chosen; not because +the existence of my inner man is a simpler or a surer fact than any +other; to a true sceptic this alleged being so busily thinking and +willing and fuming within my body is but a strange feature in the +fantastic world that appears for the moment. Yet the choice of the inner +man as the one certain existence was a happy one, because this sense of +life within me is more constant than other perceptions, and not wholly +to be shaken off except in profound contemplation or in some strange +forms of madness. It was a suitable first postulate for the romantic +psychologist. On this stepping-stone to idealism the father of modern +philosophy, like another Columbus, set his foot with elegance. His new +world, however, would be but an unexplored islet in the world of the +ancients if all he discovered was himself thinking. + +Thinking is another name for discourse; and perhaps Descartes, in noting +his own existence, was really less interested in the substance of +himself, or in the fact that he was alive, than in the play of terms in +discourse, which seemed to him obvious. Discourse truly involves spirit, +with its intuition and intent, surveying those terms. And the definition +of the soul, that its essence is to think, being a definition of spirit +and not of a man’s self, supports this interpretation. But discourse, no +less than the existence of a self, needs to be posited, and the +readiness with which a philosopher may do so yields only a candid +confession of personal credulity, not the proof of anything. The +assumption that spirit discoursing exists, and is more evident than any +other existence, leads by a slightly different path to the same +conclusion as the assumption of the self as the fundamental fact. In the +one case discourse will soon swallow up all existence, and in the other +this chosen existence, myself, will evaporate into discourse: but it +will remain an insoluble problem whether I am a transcendental spirit, +not a substance, holding the whole imaginary universe in the frame of my +thought, or whether I am an instance of thinking, a phase of that flux +of sentience which will then be the substance of the world. It is only +if we interpret and develop the Cartesian axiom in the former +transcendental sense that it supplies an instrument for criticism. +Understood in an empirical way, as the confident indication of a +particular fact, it is merely a chance dogma, betraying the +psychological bias of reflection in modern man, and suggesting a +fantastic theory of the universe, conveniently called psychologism; a +theory which fuses the two disparate substances posited by Descartes, +and maintains that while the inner essence of substance everywhere is to +think, or at least to feel, its distribution, movement, and aspect, seen +from without, are those of matter. + +In adopting the method of Descartes, I have sought to carry it further, +suspending all conventional categories as well as all conventional +beliefs; so that not only the material world but all facts and all +existences have lost their status, and become simply the themes or +topics which intrinsically they are. Neither myself nor pure spirit is +at all more real in that realm of essence than any other mentionable +thing. When it comes to assertion (which is belief) I follow Descartes +in choosing discourse and (as an implication of discourse) my +substantial existence as the objects of faith least open to reasonable +doubt; not because they are the first objects asserted, nor because +intrinsically they lend themselves to existence better than anything +else, but simply because in taking note of anything whatever I find that +I am assuming the validity of primary memory; in other words, that the +method and the fact of observation are adventitious to the theme. But +the fact that observation is involved in observing anything does not +imply that observation is the only observed fact: yet in this gross +sophism and insincerity the rest of psychologism is entangled. + +Hume and Kant seemed sceptics in their day and were certainly great +enemies of common sense, not through any perversity of temper (for both +were men of wise judgement) but through sophistical scruples and +criticism halting at unfortunate places. They disintegrated belief on +particular points of scholastic philosophy, which was but common sense +applied to revelation; and they made no attempt to build on the +foundations so laid bare, but rather to comfort themselves with the +assurance that what survived was practically sufficient, and far +simpler, sounder, and purer than what they had demolished. After the +manner of the eighteenth century, they felt that convention was a burden +and an imposture, not because here and there it misinterpreted nature, +but because it interpreted or defined nature at all; and in their +criticism they ran for a fall. They had nothing to offer in the place of +what they criticised, except the same cheque dishonoured. All their +philosophy, where it was not simply a collapse into living without +philosophy, was retrenchment; and they retrenched in that hand-to-mouth +fashion which Protestantism had introduced and which liberalism was to +follow. They never touched bottom, and nothing could be more gratuitous +or more helpless than their residual dogmas. These consisted in making +metaphysics out of literary psychology; not seeing that the discourse or +experience to which they appealed was a social convention, roughly +dramatising those very facts of the material world, and of animal life +in it, which their criticism had denied. + +Hume seems to have assumed that every perception perceived itself. He +assumed further that these perceptions lay in time and formed certain +sequences. Why a given perception belonged to one sequence rather than +to another, and why all simultaneous perceptions were not in the same +mind, he never considered; the questions were unanswerable, so long as +he ignored or denied the existence of bodies. He asserted also that +these perceptions were repeated, and that the repetitions were always +fainter than the originals—two groundless assertions, unless the +transitive force of memory is admitted, and impressions are +distinguished from ideas externally, by calling an intuition an +impression when caused by a present object, visible to a third person, +and calling it an idea when not so caused. Furthermore, he invoked an +alleged habit of perceptions always to follow one another in the same +order—something flatly contrary to fact; but the notion was made +plausible by confusion with the habits of the physical world, where +similar events recur when the conditions are similar. Intuitions no +doubt follow the same routine; but the conditions for an intuition are +not the previous intuitions, but the whole present state of the psyche +and of the environment, something of which the previous intuitions were +at best prophetic symptoms, symptoms often falsified by the event. + +All these haltings and incoherences arose in the attempt to conceive +experience divorced from its physical ground and from its natural +objects, as a dream going on _in vacuo_. So artificial an abstraction, +however, is hard to maintain consistently, and Hume, by a happy exercise +of worldly wit, often described the workings of the mind as our social +imagination leads us all vaguely to conceive them. In these inspired +moments he made those acute analyses of our notions of material things, +of the soul, and of cause, which have given him his name as a sceptic. +These analyses are bits of plausible literary psychology, essays on the +origin of common sense. They are not accounts of what the notions +analysed mean, much less scientific judgements of their truth. They are +supposed, however, by Hume and by the whole modern school of idealists, +to destroy both the meaning of these notions and the existence of their +intended objects. Having explained how, perhaps, early man, or a +hypothetical infant, might have reached his first glimmerings of +knowledge that material things exist, or souls, or causes, we are +supposed to have proved that no causes, no souls, and no material things +can exist at all. We are not allowed to ask how, in that case, we have +any evidence for the existence of early man, or of the hypothetical +infant, or of any general characteristics of the human mind, and its +tendencies to feign. The world of literature is sacred to these bookish +minds; only the world of nature and science arouses their suspicion and +their dislike. They think that “experience,” with the habits of thought +and language prevalent in all nations, from Adam down, needs only to be +imagined in order to be known truly. All but this imagined experience +seems to them the work of imagination. While their method of criticism +ought evidently to establish not merely solipsism, but a sort of +solipsism of the present datum, yet they never stop to doubt the whole +comedy of human intercourse, just as the most uncritical instinct and +the most fanciful history represent it to be. How can such a mass of +ill-attested and boldly dogmatic assumptions fail to make the critics of +science uncomfortable in their own house? Is it because the criticism of +dogma in physics, without this dogma in psychology, could never so much +as begin? Is not their criticism at bottom a work of edification or of +malice, not of philosophic sincerity, so that they reject the claim to +knowledge only in respect to certain physical, metaphysical, or +religious objects which the modern mind has become suspicious of, and +hopes to feel freer without? Meantime, they keep their conventional +social assumptions without a qualm, because they need them to justify +their moral precepts and to lend a false air of adequacy to their view +of the world. Thus we are invited to believe that our notions of +material things do not mean what they assert, but being illusions in +their deliverance, really signify only the series of perceptions that +have preceded them, or that, for some unfathomable reason, may be +expected to ensue. + +All this is sheer sophistry, and limping scepticism. Certainly the +vulgar notions of nature, and even the scientific ones, are most +questionable; and they may have grown up in the way these critics +suggest; in any case they have grown up humanly. But they are not mere +images; they are beliefs; and the truth of beliefs hangs on what they +assert, not on their origin. The question is whether such an object as +they describe lies in fact in the quarter where they assert it to lie; +the genealogy of these assertions in the mind of the believer, though +interesting, is irrelevant. _It is for science and further investigation +of the object to pronounce on the truth of any belief._ It will remain a +mere belief to the end, no matter how much corroborated and corrected; +but the fact that it is a belief, far from proving that it must be +false, renders it possibly true, as it could not be if it asserted +nothing and had no object beyond itself which it pointed to and +professed to describe. This whole school criticises knowledge, not by +extending knowledge and testing it further, but by reviewing it +maliciously, on the tacit assumption that knowledge is impossible. But +in that case this review of knowledge and all this shrewd psychology are +themselves worthless; and we are reduced, as Hume was in his deeper +moments of insight, to a speechless wonder. So that whilst all the +animals trust their senses and live, philosophy would persuade man alone +not to trust them and, if he was consistent, to stop living. + +This tragic conclusion might not have daunted a true philosopher, if +like the Indians he had reached it by a massive moral experience rather +than by incidental sophistries with no hold on the spirit. In that case +the impossibility of knowledge would have seemed but one illustration of +the vanity of life in general. That all is vanity was a theme sometimes +developed by Christian preachers, and even in some late books of the +Bible, with special reservations; but it is an insight contrary to +Hebraic religion, which invokes supernatural or moral agencies only in +the hope of securing earthly life and prosperity for ever. The wisdom +demanded could, therefore, not be negative or merely liberating; and +scepticism in Christian climes has always seemed demoralising. When it +forced itself on the reluctant mind, people either dismissed it as a +game not worth playing and sank back, like Hume, into common sense, +though now with a bad conscience; or else they sought some subterfuge or +equivocation by which knowledge, acknowledged to be worthless, was +nevertheless officially countersigned and passed as legal tender, so +that the earnest practice of orthodoxy, religious or worldly, or both at +once, might go on without a qualm. Evidently, to secure this result, it +was necessary to set up some oracle, independent of natural knowledge, +that should represent some deeper reality than natural knowledge could +profess to reach; and it was necessary that this oracle itself, by a +pious or a wilful oversight, should escape criticism; for otherwise all +was lost. It escaped criticism by virtue of the dramatic illusion which +always fills the sails of argument, and renders the passing conviction +the indignant voice of omniscience and justice. The principle invoked in +criticism, whatever it might be, could not be criticised. It did not +need to be defended: its credentials were the havoc it wrought among +more explicit conventions. And yet, by a mocking fatality, those +discredited conventions had to be maintained in practice, since they are +inevitable for mankind, and the basis, even by their weaknesses, of the +appeal to that higher principle which, in theory, was to revise and +reject them. This higher principle was no alternative view of the world, +no revelation of further facts or destinies; it was the thinking or +dreaming spirit that posited those necessary conventions, and would +itself die if it ceased to posit them. In discrediting the fictions of +spirit we must, therefore, beware of suspending them. We are not asked +to abolish our conception of the natural world, nor even, in our daily +life, to cease to believe in it; we are to be idealists only +north-north-west, or transcendentally; when the wind is southerly, we +are to remain realists. The pronouncements of animal faith have no doubt +been reversed in a higher court, but with this singular proviso, that +the police and the executioner, while reverently acknowledging the +authority of the higher tribunal, must unflinchingly carry out the +original sentence passed by the lower. This escape from scepticism by +ambiguity, and by introducing only cancelled dogmas, was chosen by +German philosophy at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and by +modernism and pragmatism at the end of it. + +Kant was thought a sceptic in his day, and called his philosophy +criticism; but his scepticism was very impure and his criticism, though +laborious, was very uncritical. That he was regarded as a great +philosopher in the nineteenth century is due to the same causes that +made Locke seem a great philosopher in the eighteenth, not to any +intrinsic greatness. He announced some revolutionary principles, which +alarmed and excited the public, but he did not carry them out, so that +the public was reassured. In his criticism of knowledge he assumed +without question the Humian sequences of perceptions, although contrary +to his doctrine of time; and, more wisely than Hume, he never abandoned +the general sense that these perceptions had organs and objects beneath +and beyond them; but having cut off, by his malicious criticism of +knowledge, the organs and objects which perceptions notoriously have, he +was forced to forge others, artificial and metaphysical. Instead of the +body, he posited a transcendental ego, the categories of thought, and a +disembodied law of duty; instead of natural substances he posited the +unknowable. I shall revert to these subjects in discussing the realm of +matter, which is where they belong. Here I am concerned only with the +analysis of knowledge, which in Kant was most conscientious, and +valuable in spite of its rationalistic bias and its mythical solutions. + +Any intelligent mind comes upon data and takes them for signs of things. +Empirical criticism consists in reverting from these objects of intent, +the things of common sense and science, to the immediate data by which +they are revealed. But since data are not vacantly stared at by an +intelligent being, but are interpreted and combined, there is evidently +a subtler element in knowledge of things than the data which empirical +criticism reverts to: namely, the principles of interpretation, since +the data are read and taken to be significant of existing objects, far +richer and more persistent and more powerful than themselves. These +principles I have summarily called animal faith, not being concerned to +propose any analysis of them that should apply to all minds or to all +objects; for I conceive, for instance, that the future, in other +animals, may be a more frequent and vivid object of animal faith than +the past or the material environment posited by human beings. But Kant, +assuming that mind everywhere must have a single grammar, investigated +very ingeniously what he conceived to be its recondite categories, and +schemata, and forms of intuition: all pompous titles for what Hume had +satirically called tendencies to feign. But Kant, in dishonouring the +intellect, at least studied it devotedly, like an alienist discovering +the logic of madness; and he gave it so elaborate an articulation, and +imposed it so rigorously on all men for ever, that people supposed he +was establishing the sciences on a solid foundation rather than +prescribing for all men a gratuitous uniformity in error. Yet this was +his true meaning: and in spite of its psychological prefaces and +metaphysical epilogues, and in spite of this pedantry about the +necessary forms of all the sciences, the heart of the Kantian system was +the most terrible negation. Among transcendental principles he placed +space, time, and causality; so that, if he had been consistent, he would +have had to regard all multiple and successive existence as imagined +only. Everything conceivable would have collapsed into the act of +conceiving it, and this act itself would have lost its terms and its +purpose, and evaporated into nothing. But not at all; as if aware that +all his conclusions were but curiosities in speculation and academic +humours, he continued to think of experience as progressing in time, +trifled most earnestly with astronomy and geography, and even comforted +the pious with a postulate of immortality, as if time existed otherwise +than in imagination. In fact, these backslidings were his amiable side: +he always retained a certain humanity and wisdom, being much more +thoroughly saturated with his conventional presuppositions than with his +extravagant conclusions. + +A philosopher, however, must be taken at his best, or at his worst; in +any case, his pure doctrine must be freed as far as possible from its +personal alloy: and the pure doctrine of Kant was that knowledge is +impossible. Anything I could perceive or think was _ipso facto_ a +creature of my sense or thought. Nature, history, God and the other +world, even a man’s outspread experience, could be things imagined only. +Thought—for it was still assumed that there was thought—was a bubble, +self-inflated at every moment, in an infinite void. All else was +imaginary; no world could be anything but the iridescence of that empty +sphere. And this transcendental thought, so rich in false perspectives, +could it be said to exist anywhere, or at any time, or for any reason? + +Here we touch one of those ambiguities and mystifications in which +German philosophy takes refuge when pressed; strong in the attack, it +dissolves if driven to the defensive. Transcendentalism, in so far as it +is critical, is a method only; the principles by which data are +interpreted come into play whenever intelligence is at work. The +occasions for this exercise, as a matter of fact, are found in animal +life; and while every mind, at every moment, is the seat and measure of +its own understanding, and creates its own knowledge (though, of course, +not the objects on which animal life is directed and which it professes +to know) yet the quality and degree of this intelligence may vary +indefinitely from age to age and from animal to animal. Transcendental +principles are accordingly only principles of local perspective, the +grammar of fancy in this or that natural being quickened to imagination, +and striving to understand what it endures and to utter what it deeply +wills. The study of transcendental logic ought, therefore, to be one of +the most humane, tender, tentative of studies: nothing but sympathetic +poetry and insight into the hang and rhythm of various thoughts. It +should be the finer part of literary psychology. But such is not the +transcendentalism of the absolute transcendentalists. For them the +grammar of thought is single and compulsory. It is the method of the +creative fiat by which not this or that idea of the universe, but the +universe itself, comes into being. The universe has only a specious +existence; and the method by which specious existence is evoked in +thought is divine and identical in all thinking. + +But why divine, and why always identical? And why any thinking at all, +or any process or variation in discourse, other than the given +perspectives of the present vision? At this point vertigo seizes the +transcendentalist, and he no longer knows what he means. On the one +hand, phenomena cannot be produced by an agency prior to them, for his +first principle is that all existence is phenomenal and exists only in +being posited or discovered. Will, Life, Duty, or whatever he calls this +transcendental agency, by which the illusions of nature and history are +summoned from the vasty deep, cannot be a fact, since all facts are +created by its incantations. On the other hand phenomena cannot be +substantial on their own account, for then they would not be phenomena +but things, and no transcendental magician, himself non-existent and +non-phenomenal, would be needed to produce them. + +Absolute transcendentalism—the only radical form of a psychological +criticism of knowledge—is accordingly not a thinkable nor a stable +doctrine. It is merely a habit of speaking ambiguously, with a just +sense for the living movement of thought and a romantic contempt for its +deliverance. Self-consciousness cannot be, as this school strove to make +it, a first principle of criticism: it is far too complex and derivative +for that. But transcendentalism is a legitimate attitude for a poet in +his dramatic reflections and romantic soliloquies; it is the principle +of perspective in thought, the scenic art of the mental theatre. The +fully awakened soul, looking about it in this strange world, may well +believe that it is dreaming. It may review its shifting memories, with a +doubt whether they were ever anything in themselves. It may marshal all +things in ideal perspectives about the present moment, and esteem them +important and even real only in so far as they diversify the mental +landscape. And to compensate it for the visionary character which the +world takes on, it may cultivate the sense (by no means illusory) of +some deep fountain of feeling and fancy within the self. Such wistful +transcendentalism is akin to principles which in India long ago inspired +very deep judgements upon life. It may be practised at will by any +reflective person who is minded to treat the universe, for the time +being, as so much furniture for his dreams. + +Yet this attitude, seeing that man is not a solitary god but an animal +in a material and social world, must be continually abandoned. It must +be abandoned precisely when a man does or thinks anything important. Its +own profundity is dreamful, and, so to speak, digestive: action, virtue, +and wisdom sound another note. It is therefore no worthy philosophy; and +in fact the Germans, whose philosophy it is, while so dutiful in their +external discipline, are sentimental and immoral in their spiritual +economy. If a learned and placid professor tells me he is creating the +universe by positing it in his own mind according to eternal principles +of logic and duty, I may smile and admire such an inimitable mixture of +enthusiasm and pedantry, profundity and innocence. Yet there is +something sinister in this transcendentalism, apparently so pure and +blameless; it really expresses and sanctions the absoluteness of a +barbarous soul, stubborn in its illusions, vulgar in its passions, and +cruel in its zeal—cruel especially to itself, as barbarism always is, +because it feeds and dilates its will as if its will were an absolute +power, whereas it is nothing but a mass of foolish impulses and boasts +ending in ignominy. Moreover, transcendentalism cannot even supply a +thorough criticism of knowledge, which would demand that the ideas of +self, of activity, and of consciousness should be disintegrated and +reduced to the immediate. In the immediate, however, there is no +transcendental force nor transcendental machinery, not even a set of +perceptions nor an experience, but only some random essence, staring and +groundless. + +I hope I have taken to heart what the schools of Hume and Kant have to +offer by way of disintegrating criticism of knowledge, and that in +positing afresh the notions of substance, soul, nature, and discourse, I +have done so with my eyes open. These notions are all subject to doubt; +but so, also, are the notions proposed instead by psychological +philosophers. None of these have reached the limit of possible doubt; +yet the dogmas they have retained, being romantic prejudices, are +incoherent and incapable of serving as the basis for any reasonable +system: and in a moral sense they are the very opposite of philosophy. +When pressed, their negations end in solipsism and their affirmations in +rhapsody. Far from purging the mind and strengthening it, that it might +gain a clearer and more stable vision of the world, these critics have +bewildered it with a multitude of methods and vistas, the expression of +the confusion reigning in their day between natural science and +religious faith, and between psychology and scepticism. + +My endeavour has been to restore these things to their natural places, +without forgetting the assumptions on which they rest. But the chief +difference between my criticism of knowledge and theirs lies in the +conception of knowledge itself. The Germans call knowledge +_Wissenschaft_, as if it were something to be found in books, a +catalogue of information, and an encyclopædia of the sciences. But the +question is whether all this _Wissenschaft_ is knowledge or only +learning. My criticism is criticism of myself: I am talking of what I +believe in my active moments, as a living animal, when I am really +believing something: for when I am reading books belief in me is at its +lowest ebb; and I lend myself to the suasion of eloquence with the same +pleasure (when the book is well written) whether it be the _Arabian +Nights_ or the latest philosophy. My criticism is not essentially a +learned pursuit, though habit may sometimes make my language scholastic; +it is not a choice between artificial theories; it is the discipline of +my daily thoughts and the account I actually give to myself from moment +to moment of my own being and of the world around me. I should be +ashamed to countenance opinions which, when not arguing, I did not +believe. It would seem to me dishonest and cowardly to militate under +other colours than those under which I live. Merely learned views are +not philosophy; and therefore no modern writer is altogether a +philosopher in my eyes, except Spinoza; and the critics of knowledge in +particular seem to me as feeble morally as they are technically. + +I should like, therefore, to turn to the ancients and breathe again a +clear atmosphere of frankness and honour; but in the present business +they are not very helpful. The Indians were poets and mystics; and while +they could easily throw off the conventions of vulgar reason, it was +often only to surrender themselves to other conventions, far more +misleading to a free spirit, such as the doctrine of transmigration of +souls; and when, as in Buddhism, they almost vanquished that illusion, +together with every other, their emasculated intellect had nothing to +put in its place. The Greeks on the contrary were rhetoricians; they +seldom or never reverted to the immediate for a foothold in thought, +because the immediate lies below the level of language and of political +convention. But they were disputatious, and in that sense no opinion +escaped their criticism. In this criticism they simply pitted one +plausible opinion against another, supporting each in turn by all +conceivable arguments, based on no matter what prejudices or +presumptions. The result of this forensic method was naturally a +suspense of rational judgement, favourable now to frivolity and now to +superstition. The frivolity appeared in the Sophists who, seeing that +nothing was certain, impudently assumed as true whatever it was socially +convenient to advocate. Protagoras seems to have reduced this bad habit +to an honest system, when he taught that each occasion is, for itself, +the ultimate judge of truth. This, taken psychologically, is evidently +the case: a mind cannot judge on other subjects nor on other evidences +than are open to it when judging. But the judging moment need not judge +truly; and to maintain (as Protagoras does in Plato’s _Dialogue_ and as +some pragmatists have done in our day) that all momentary opinions are +equal in truth, though not equal in value, is to fail in radical +scepticism: for it is to assume many moments, and knowledge (utterly +inexplicable on these principles) of their several sequences and import; +and to assume something even more wanton, a single standard of value by +which to judge them all. Such incoherence is not surprising in sophists +whose avowed purpose in philosophising is to survive and succeed in this +world, or perhaps in the next. Worldly people will readily admit that +some ideas are better than others, even if both sets are equally false. +The interest in truth for its own sake is not a worldly interest, but +the human soul is capable of it; and there might be spirits directed on +the knowledge of truth as upon their only ultimate good, as there might +be spirits addressed exclusively to music. Which arts and sciences are +worth pursuing, and how far, is a question for the moralist, to be +answered in each case in view of the faculties and genius of the persons +concerned, and their opportunities. Socrates may humorously eschew all +science that is useless to cobblers; he thereby expresses his plebeian +hard sense, and his Hellenic joy in discourse and in moral apologues; +but if he allows this pleasant prejudice to blind him to the possibility +of physical discoveries, or of cogent mathematics, he becomes a simple +sophist. The moralist needs true knowledge of nature—even a little +astronomy—in order to practise the art of life in a becoming spirit; and +an agnosticism which was not merely personal, provisional, and humble +would be the worst of dogmas. + +A sinking society, with its chaos of miscellaneous opinions, touches the +bottom of scepticism in this sense, that it leaves no opinion +unchallenged. But as a complete suspense of judgement is physically +impossible in a living animal, every sceptic of the decadence has to +accept some opinion or other. Which opinions he accepts, will depend on +his personal character or his casual associations. His philosophy +therefore deserts him at the threshold of life, just when it might cease +to be a verbal accomplishment; in other words, he is at intervals a +sophist, but at no time a philosopher. Nevertheless, among the Greek +sceptics there were noble minds. They turned their scepticism into an +expression of personal dignity and an argument for detachment. In such +scepticism every one who practises philosophy must imitate them; for why +should I pledge myself absolutely to what in fact is not certain? +Physics and theology, to which most philosophies are confined, are +dubious in their first principles: which is not to say that nothing in +them is credible. If we assert that one thing is more probable than +another, as did the sceptics of the Academy, we have adopted a definite +belief, we profess to have some hold on the nature of things at large, a +law seems to us to rule events, and the lust of scepticism in us is +chastened. This belief in nature, with a little experience and good +sense to fill in the picture, is almost enough by way of belief. Nor can +a man honestly believe less. An active mind never really loses the +conviction that it is scenting the way of the world. + +Living when human faith is again in a state of dissolution, I have +imitated the Greek sceptics in calling doubtful everything that, in +spite of common sense, any one can possibly doubt. But since life and +even discussion forces me to break away from a complete scepticism, I +have determined not to do so surreptitiously nor at random, +ignominiously taking cover now behind one prejudice and now behind +another. Instead, I have frankly taken nature by the hand, accepting as +a rule in my farthest speculations the animal faith I live by from day +to day. There are many opinions which, though questionable, are +inevitable to a thought attentive to appearance, and honestly expressive +of action. These natural opinions are not miscellaneous, such as those +which the Sophists embraced in disputation. They are superposed in a +biological order, the stratification of the life of reason. In rising +out of passive intuition, I pass, by a vital constitutional necessity, +to belief in discourse, in experience, in substance, in truth, and in +spirit. All these objects may conceivably be illusory. Belief in them, +however, is not grounded on a prior probability, but all judgements of +probability are grounded on them. They express a rational instinct or +instinctive reason, the waxing faith of an animal living in a world +which he can observe and sometimes remodel. + +This natural faith opens to me various Realms of Being, having very +different kinds of reality in themselves and a different status in +respect to my knowledge of them. I hope soon to invite the friendly +reader to accompany me in a further excursion through those tempting +fields. + + + + + INDEX + + + Analysis and synthesis, 117-119 + + Animation, not behaviour, 244-246; + an expression of mechanism, not a substitute, 246, 247; + conceived dramatically, 248, 249 + + Anthropomorphism excusable, 147, 148 + + Appearance, two senses of the word, 39, 43 + + Apperception, timeless, 24, 25, 28-30; + its physical ground, 282 + + _Arabian Nights_, 67, 160, 305 + + Aristotle, his metaphysics, vii; + identifies essence with intuition, 126-129; + on God, 130, 131; + on substance, 190; + on entelechies, 217 + + Arts, creative like the senses, 87, 102 + + Astronomy, good for moralists, 307 + + + Behaviour, theme of scientific psychology, 243-246 + + Belief, not implied in intuition, 16; + enacted before it is asserted, 264 + + Berkeley, alluded to, 58; + his direct intuition, 68; + his nominalism, 97 + + Brahma, 18, 19, 51 + + British and German philosophy criticises perception, not memory, 13; + only literature, 254 + + Buddhism, 306 + + + Causation, 210 + + Change, feeling of it not a change, 25; + known by faith only, 26; + may be illusion, 30; + fallacious disproofs of it, 31, 32 + + Common sense, roughly sound, v + + Contingency of all existence, 134, 135 + + Contradiction an essence of discourse, 121, 137 + + Criticism, empirical and transcendental, 3, 4; + arises by conflict of dogmas, 8; + depends on literary psychology, 187; + should appeal to living beliefs, 305 + + + Data, non-existentials, 45; + universals, 54; + their basis cerebral, 56 + + Dateless, defined, 270 + + Democritus, ix, 55 + + Demonstration, assumes discourse, 115-119 + + Descartes, 17; + doubts facts only, 289; + _cogito ergo sum_, 290-293 + + Dialectic, not true unless descriptive, 28; + involves belief in memory, 119, 120 + + Discourse, an event, 119; + involved in positing anything, 124; + distinguished late, 193 + + Dogma, how precipitated, 6 + + + Empiricism admits substance, 199-201 + + Entelechy, 130, 217 + + Error distinguishes discourse from its objects, 123 + + _Esse est percipi_, 58 + + Essences adumbrated, 35, 38, 39, 48; + simile of the costumer’s shop, 70-72; + introduced, 73, 74; + defined further, 75-78; + necessary terms in knowledge, 80-82; + of any complexity, 116, 262; + infinitely comminuted, 129; + without inherent values, 130; + not limited to Platonic ideas, 225 + + Eternal, defined, 271 + + Eternity, 112 + + Euclid, 86, 121; + his space, 116, 117 + + Events involve substance, 230-232 + + Everlasting, defined, 271 + + Evidence, two meanings, 43, 44, 99 + + Existence, the sense of it, 24, 25, 187, 188; + not a datum, 34-38; + presence to intuition neither sufficient for it nor necessary, 45-47; + its physical definition, 48; + odious to logic, 48, 206; + name for an object of faith, 42; + felt as pure Being posited, 273 + + Expectation, irrational as hunger, 36 + + Experience, use of the word, 138; + naturally conditioned, transcendentally primary, 23, 24; + conceived as a life, 57; + is discourse interrupted by shocks, 143; + belief in it imposed by instinct, not by experience itself, 144; + its primitive texture, 188, 189; + imagined experience hypostatised, 255, 256; + reduced to blank feeling or extended to dreams, 260 + + Explanation, 208 + + + Fact, 228, 229; + never a datum, 91; + denied if regarded as a concept, 60 + + Faith prior to intuition, 107 + + Fichte, 62, 63, 184, 185 + + Future, an assumption, 36; + rash notion of it, 235 + + + God assimilated to nature, 237; + to truth, 268; + to the spirit of a cosmos, 130, 131 + + + Hamlet, 27, 58, 95 + + Heraclitus, ix, 29 + + History, dependent for its validity on physics, 13; + interfused with fiction, 160; + partly literary psychology, 253 + + Hume, his sharp intuition, 67, 68; + criticism by retrenchment, 293; + residual assumptions, 294; + analysis of conventions, 295; + sophistical result, 296, 297 + + + Ideas not beliefs unless action is suggested, 16; + Platonic ideas, 222-224 + + Identification an act of faith, 117, 119 + + Identity felt under diverse appearances, 153 + + Illusion, three ways out of it, 72 + + Immortal, defined, 271 + + Indian philosophy, viii, 51-55, 67, 305, 306 + + Instantaneous, defined, 270 + + Intelligence expresses animal adjustments, 281 + + Intent, 100, 137, 166, 167 + + Interpretation obscures the datum, 67, 68 + + Introjection, 241 + + Intuition yields only appearance, 24; + denied by sceptics, 58; + an expression of animal wakefulness, 133; + does not think, 150; + may exist behind observable facts, 258; + divined by sympathy, 221, 250; + most communicable when most articulate, 251 + + Ionian physics, vii, viii + + + Kant, 4, 97; + his incoherence, 298; + his analysis of knowledge, 299, 300; + destructive results, 301 + + Karma, 54 + + Knowledge, impossible with nothing to know, 60; + is symbolical, 95, 96, 98, 101; + has a removed object, 154; + bridges the flux, 161; + its animal basis, 164, 172; + may recover essences given elsewhere, 168, 169; + not intuition, 170, 171; + the object identified by bodily attitude (illustration of the moon), + 172-177; + though symbolical progressive, 177-179; + may be adequate to discourse elsewhere, 207; + when pictorially adequate it is still faith, 107 + + + Life of reason, 109, 110 + + Literary psychology, 174; + possibly true, 259; + turned into metaphysics, 293, 294 + + Logic, partly creative, partly descriptive, vi; + not coercive over fact, _ibid._, 2, 3; + studies essence, not truth, 262 + + + Memory, presence of the absent, 141; + is direct, 151; + posits animation, 242; + in a natural setting, 150, 158; + pictorial exactitude possible but worthless, 152, 153; + stationed in the present, which frames the past, 154, 155; + may be truer than experience, 156; + should be selective, 157; + criticised only by fancy, 160 + + Metaphysics confuses different realms of being, vii, 203, 208, 209, 218 + + + Natural philosophy, vii; + present ferment in it, ix; + progresses in knowledge, 218; + has a poetic side, 234 + + Nature, the total object of perception, 197, 198; + connotations of the word, 234; + uniformity of nature an assumption, _ibid._; + tested and embodied in art, 236, 239 + + Nirvana, 51 + + + Object, use and misuse of the word, 202, 203 + + Order of genesis, of discovery, 109; + of evidence, 110 + + + Pain, 65, 66, 280 + + Parmenides, 29, 55, 61 + + Past, an object of faith, 29; + may be illusory, 36, 37 + + Perception, not intuition but faith expressing a bodily response, 282, + 283 + + Permanence given in experience, 193, 195 + + Phenomena, in Platonism, 224; + in modern philosophy, 225, 226 + + Plato, 69, 78, 85, 225, 226, 306 + + Platonic ideas, selected essences, 77; + hypostatised, 222-224 + + Positing, propriety of the term, 184 + + Primary and secondary qualities, 82-90 + + Protagoras, 306 + + Psyche, 19, 147, 156. Cf. _Self_ + + Psychologism, 256, 292 + + Psychology, scientific and literary, 252; + supports the non-existence of data, 63-66 + + Pythagoras, ix + + + Reality, meaning of the term, 33, 34; + eulogistic use of it, 51, 210 + + Reason, not a force, 186; + principle of sufficient reason, 289 + + Religious dogmas easily doubted, 11, 12 + + + Scepticism, a conflict of dogmas, 8; + an accident in philosophy, 9; + rich in ideas, 67; + a trance state, 69; + would be the best philosophy if tenable, 100, 186; + deprecated in Christian times, 297 + + Sceptics in Greece, some sophists, 307; + some true philosophers, 308 + + Schopenhauer, 68 + + + Self, evidence for its existence, 146; + may be denied, 148, 290; + is obscure, 149; + an almost perpetual object, 291 + + Sensations and ideas, ambiguous uses of the terms, 86-90, 188, 225 + + Shock, distinguishes experience from pure discourse, 139, 141; + prompts to belief in the self and in the object, 142 + + Socrates, his favourite essences, 78; + his utilitarianism in science, 307 + + Solipsism, untenable if personal, 13; + tenable if of the present moment, 15, 16 + + Sophists, 306 + + Soul, genesis of the notion, 216; + analysis of it, 218-221 + + Spinoza, right on chief issue, viii; + thinks ideas beliefs, 16; + defines the realm of essence, 129; + a philosopher in the better sense, 305 + + Spirit, non-existential for transcendentalists, 62; + at home in intuition, 125, 126; + implied in it, 147; + ready to be omniscient, 116; + timeless and supernatural in status, 161, 162; + distrusts substance but lives by it, 147; + is no datum, 272; + often more than intuition, 273, 274; + expresses animal life, 276-280; + is not a substance, 286-288 + + Spiritual substance, a contradiction, 217; + how suggested, _ibid._ + + Substance, posited by intent expressing animal reaction, 106; + belief in it primordial, 185, 187; + prior to intuition, 188; + revealed on its dynamic side, not pictorially, 197; + not metaphysical, 201, 202; + the material in things, 203; + not duplicated by them, 204; + explains their genesis and distribution, 209; + connects appearances, 212 + + Surprise, not occasioned by contingency, 136; + incompatible with omniscience, 276 + + + Timeless, defined, 270 + + Transcendentalism, properly a method only, 25; + its subject and object false, _ibid._; + denies all existences, 59-63; + its ambiguity, 297, 298; + a part of literary psychology, 301; + its metaphysical form, 302; + must be abandoned in practice, 303; + its latent barbarism, 304 + + Truth, may be conveyed through symbols, 179-181; + mistaken for substance, 226-228; + possible in literary psychology, 259; + not proper to names or values, 263; + ignored by supposing things to change with the views of them, + 264-266; + not an existence, not an opinion, not certitude, but the ultimate + description of things in all their relations, 267, 268; + the subjective seat of opinions does not jeopardise it, 306; + may be loved for its own sake, 307 + + + Unity of apperception, 25 + + Universals, data of intuition, 91, 93 + + Universe, not known as a whole, vi; + may be a chaos, 235, 237 + + + Vagueness, relative, 94, 95 + + Variation involves eternal essences, 113, 114 + + Vedanta, 61 + + +THE END + + + + + ● Transcriber’s Notes: + ○ Text that was in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_). + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77155 *** diff --git a/77155-h/77155-h.htm b/77155-h/77155-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b182e65 --- /dev/null +++ b/77155-h/77155-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,11863 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html lang="en"> + <head> + <meta charset="UTF-8"> + <title>Scepticism and animal faith | Project Gutenberg</title> + <link rel="icon" href="images/cover.jpg" type="image/x-cover"> + <style> + body { margin-left: 8%; margin-right: 10%; } + h1 { text-align: center; font-weight: normal; font-size: 1.4em; } + h2 { text-align: center; font-weight: normal; font-size: 1.2em; } + .pageno { right: 1%; font-size: x-small; background-color: inherit; color: silver; + text-indent: 0em; text-align: right; position: absolute; + border: thin solid silver; 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width:80%; } + .ig001 { width:100%; } + .nf-center { text-align: center; } + .nf-center-c1 { text-align: left; margin: 1em 0; } + .c000 { margin-top: 1em; } + .c001 { page-break-before: always; margin-top: 1em; } + .c002 { margin-top: 4em; } + .c003 { margin-top: 2em; } + .c004 { margin-top: 4em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; } + .c005 { margin-top: 0.5em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; } + .c006 { page-break-before:auto; margin-top: 4em; } + .c007 { margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; } + .c008 { margin-top: .5em; } + div.tnotes { padding-left:1em;padding-right:1em;background-color:#E3E4FA; + border:1px solid silver;margin:1em 5% 0 5%;text-align:justify; } + abbr {border:none; text-decoration:none; font-variant:normal; } + </style> + </head> + <body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77155 ***</div> + +<div class='figcenter id001'> +<span class='pageno' id='Page_on'>on</span> +<img src='images/cover.jpg' alt='' class='ig001'> +</div> +<div class='pbb'> + <hr class='pb c000'> +</div> +<div> + <h1 class='c001'>SCEPTICISM AND ANIMAL FAITH</h1> +</div> + +<div class='nf-center-c1'> +<div class='nf-center c002'> + <div><span class='pageno' id='Page_ii'>ii</span><i>BOOKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR.</i></div> + <div class='c003'>SOLILOQUIES IN ENGLAND AND LATER</div> + <div>SOLILOQUIES.</div> + <div class='c000'>CHARACTER AND OPINION IN THE</div> + <div>UNITED STATES. With Reminiscences</div> + <div>of William James and Josiah Royce and</div> + <div>Academic Life in America.</div> + <div class='c000'>LITTLE ESSAYS DRAWN FROM THE</div> + <div>WRITINGS OF GEORGE SANTAYANA.</div> + <div>Edited by <span class='sc'>Logan Pearsall Smith</span>.</div> + <div class='c000'>INTERPRETATIONS OF POETRY AND</div> + <div>RELIGION.</div> + <div class='c000'>THE LIFE OF REASON. Five Volumes.</div> + <div class='c000'>THE SENSE OF BEAUTY.</div> + <div class='c000'>POEMS.</div> + </div> +</div> + +<div class='nf-center-c1'> +<div class='nf-center c002'> + <div><span class='pageno' id='Page_iii'>iii</span><span class='xxlarge'><b>SCEPTICISM AND ANIMAL FAITH</b></span></div> + <div class='c003'><span class='xlarge'><b>INTRODUCTION TO A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY</b></span></div> + <div class='c000'><span class='large'><b>BY</b></span></div> + <div class='c000'><span class='xxlarge'><b>GEORGE SANTAYANA</b></span></div> + <div class='c003'>NEW YORK</div> + <div>CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS</div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c004'><span class='pageno' id='Page_iv'>iv</span><i>First published 1923</i></p> + +<p class='c005'><i>Second Impression 1924</i></p> + +<p class='c005'><i>Third Impression 1929</i></p> + +<p class='c005'><i>Printed in Great Britain by</i> <span class='sc'>R. & R. Clark, Limited</span>, <i>Edinburgh</i>.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_v'>v</span> + <h2 id='preface' class='c006'>PREFACE</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Here is one more system of philosophy. If the reader +is tempted to smile, I can assure him that I smile with +him, and that my system—to which this volume is +a critical introduction—differs widely in spirit and +pretensions from what usually goes by that name. +In the first place, <i>my system is not mine, nor new</i>. I +am merely attempting to express for the reader the +principles to which he appeals when he smiles. There +are convictions in the depths of his soul, beneath all +his overt parrot beliefs, on which I would build our +friendship. I have a great respect for orthodoxy; +not for those orthodoxies which prevail in particular +schools or nations, and which vary from age to age, +but for a certain shrewd orthodoxy which the sentiment +and practice of laymen maintain everywhere. I +think that common sense, in a rough dogged way, is +technically sounder than the special schools of philosophy, +each of which squints and overlooks half the +facts and half the difficulties in its eagerness to find +in some detail the key to the whole. I am animated +by distrust of all high guesses, and by sympathy with +the old prejudices and workaday opinions of mankind: +they are ill expressed, but they are well grounded. +What novelty my version of things may possess is +meant simply to obviate occasions for sophistry by +giving to everyday beliefs a more accurate and circumspect +form. I do not pretend to place myself at the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_vi'>vi</span>heart of the universe nor at its origin, nor to draw its +periphery. I would lay siege to the truth only as +animal exploration and fancy may do so, first from +one quarter and then from another, expecting the +reality to be not simpler than my experience of it, +but far more extensive and complex. I stand in +philosophy exactly where I stand in daily life; I +should not be honest otherwise. I accept the same +miscellaneous witnesses, bow to the same obvious +facts, make conjectures no less instinctively, and admit +the same encircling ignorance.</p> + +<p class='c005'>My system, accordingly, is <i>no system of the universe</i>. +The Realms of Being of which I speak are not parts +of a cosmos, nor one great cosmos together: they are +only kinds or categories of things which I find conspicuously +different and worth distinguishing, at least +in my own thoughts. I do not know how many +things in the universe at large may fall under each of +these classes, nor what other Realms of Being may +not exist, to which I have no approach or which I +have not happened to distinguish in my personal +observation of the world. Logic, like language, is +partly a free construction and partly a means of +symbolising and harnessing in expression the existing +diversities of things; and whilst some languages, +given a man’s constitution and habits, may seem more +beautiful and convenient to him than others, it is a +foolish heat in a patriot to insist that only his native +language is intelligible or right. No language or logic +is right in the sense of being identical with the facts +it is used to express, but each may be right by being +faithful to these facts, as a translation may be faithful. +My endeavour is to think straight in such terms as +are offered to me, to clear my mind of cant and free +it from the cramp of artificial traditions; but I do +not ask any one to think in my terms if he prefers +others. Let him clean better, if he can, the windows +<span class='pageno' id='Page_vii'>vii</span>of his soul, that the variety and beauty of the prospect +may spread more brightly before him.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Moreover, my system, save in the mocking literary +sense of the word, is <i>not metaphysical</i>. It contains +much criticism of metaphysics, and some refinements +in speculation, like the doctrine of essence, which are +not familiar to the public; and I do not disclaim +being metaphysical because I at all dislike dialectic +or disdain immaterial things: indeed, it is of immaterial +things, essence, truth, and spirit that I speak +chiefly. But logic and mathematics and literary +psychology (when frankly literary) are not metaphysical, +although their subject-matter is immaterial, +and their application to existing things is often +questionable. Metaphysics, in the proper sense of +the word, is dialectical physics, or an attempt to +determine matters of fact by means of logical or moral +or rhetorical constructions. It arises by a confusion +of those Realms of Being which it is my special care +to distinguish. It is neither physical speculation nor +pure logic nor honest literature, but (as in the treatise +of Aristotle first called by that name) a hybrid of the +three, materialising ideal entities, turning harmonies +into forces, and dissolving natural things into terms +of discourse. Speculations about the natural world, +such as those of the Ionian philosophers, are not +metaphysics, but simply cosmology or natural philosophy. +Now in natural philosophy I am a decided +materialist—apparently the only one living; and I am +well aware that idealists are fond of calling materialism, +too, metaphysics, in rather an angry tone, so as to +cast discredit upon it by assimilating it to their own +systems. But my materialism, for all that, is not +metaphysical. I do not profess to know what matter +is in itself, and feel no confidence in the divination of +those <span lang="fr"><i>esprits forts</i></span> who, leading a life of vice, thought +the universe must be composed of nothing but dice +<span class='pageno' id='Page_viii'>viii</span>and billiard-balls. I wait for the men of science to +tell me what matter is, in so far as they can discover +it, and am not at all surprised or troubled at the +abstractness and vagueness of their ultimate conceptions: +how should our notions of things so remote +from the scale and scope of our senses be anything +but schematic? But whatever matter may be, I call +it matter boldly, as I call my acquaintances Smith +and Jones without knowing their secrets: whatever it +may be, it must present the aspects and undergo the +motions of the gross objects that fill the world: and +if belief in the existence of hidden parts and movements +in nature be metaphysics, then the kitchen-maid is a +metaphysician whenever she peels a potato.</p> + +<p class='c005'>My system, finally, though, of course, formed under +the fire of contemporary discussions, is <i>no phase of +any current movement</i>. I cannot take at all seriously +the present flutter of the image-lovers against intelligence. +I love images as much as they do, but +images must be discounted in our waking life, when +we come to business. I also appreciate the other +reforms and rebellions that have made up the history +of philosophy. I prize their sharp criticism of one +another and their several discoveries; the trouble is +that each in turn has denied or forgotten a much +more important truth than it has asserted. The first +philosophers, the original observers of life and nature, +were the best; and I think only the Indians and the +Greek naturalists, together with Spinoza, have been +right on the chief issue, the relation of man and of his +spirit to the universe. It is not unwillingness to be +a disciple that prompts me to look beyond the modern +scramble of philosophies: I should gladly learn of +them all, if they had learned more of one another. +Even as it is, I endeavour to retain the positive insight +of each, reducing it to the scale of nature and keeping +it in its place; thus I am a Platonist in logic and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_ix'>ix</span>morals, and a transcendentalist in romantic soliloquy, +when I choose to indulge in it. Nor is it necessary, +in being teachable by any master, to become eclectic. +All these vistas give glimpses of the same wood, and +a fair and true map of it must be drawn to a single +scale, by one method of projection, and in one style +of calligraphy. All known truth can be rendered in +any language, although the accent and poetry of +each may be incommunicable; and as I am content +to write in English, although it was not my mother-tongue, +and although in speculative matters I have +not much sympathy with the English mind, so I am +content to follow the European tradition in philosophy, +little as I respect its rhetorical metaphysics, its humanism, +and its worldliness.</p> + +<p class='c005'>There is one point, indeed, in which I am truly +sorry not to be able to profit by the guidance of my +contemporaries. There is now a great ferment in +natural and mathematical philosophy and the times +seem ripe for a new system of nature, at once ingenuous +and comprehensive, such as has not appeared since +the earlier days of Greece. We may soon be all +believing in an honest cosmology, comparable with +that of Heraclitus, Pythagoras, or Democritus. I +wish such scientific systems joy, and if I were competent +to follow or to forecast their procedure, I +should gladly avail myself of their results, which are +bound to be no less picturesque than instructive. +But what exists to-day is so tentative, obscure, and +confused by bad philosophy, that there is no knowing +what parts may be sound and what parts merely +personal and scatter-brained. If I were a mathematician +I should no doubt regale myself, if not the +reader, with an electric or logistic system of the +universe expressed in algebraic symbols. For good +or ill, I am an ignorant man, almost a poet, and +I can only spread a feast of what everybody knows. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_x'>x</span>Fortunately exact science and the books of the learned +are not necessary to establish my essential doctrine, +nor can any of them claim a higher warrant than it +has in itself: for it rests on public experience. It +needs, to prove it, only the stars, the seasons, the +swarm of animals, the spectacle of birth and death, +of cities and wars. My philosophy is justified, and +has been justified in all ages and countries, by the +facts before every man’s eyes; and no great wit is +requisite to discover it, only (what is rarer than wit) +candour and courage. Learning does not liberate +men from superstition when their souls are cowed or +perplexed; and, without learning, clear eyes and +honest reflection can discern the hang of the world, +and distinguish the edge of truth from the might of +imagination. In the past or in the future, my language +and my borrowed knowledge would have been different, +but under whatever sky I had been born, since it is +the same sky, I should have had the same philosophy.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_xi'>xi</span> + <h2 class='c006'>CONTENTS</h2> +</div> + +<p class='c007'><a href='#preface'><span class='sc'>Preface</span></a> ... v</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap01'><abbr title='one'>I.</abbr> <span class='sc'>There is no First Principle of Criticism</span></a> ... 1</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap02'><abbr title='two'>II.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Dogma and Doubt</span></a> ... 6</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap03'><abbr title='three'>III.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Wayward Scepticism</span></a> ... 11</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap04'><abbr title='four'>IV.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Doubts about Self-Consciousness</span></a> ... 21</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap05'><abbr title='five'>V.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Doubts about Change</span></a> ... 27</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap06'><abbr title='six'>VI.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Ultimate Scepticism</span></a> ... 33</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap07'><abbr title='seven'>VII.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Nothing Given Exists</span></a> ... 42</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap08'><abbr title='eight'>VIII.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Some Authorities for this Conclusion</span></a> ... 49</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap09'><abbr title='nine'>IX.</abbr> <span class='sc'>The Discovery of Essence</span></a> ... 67</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap10'><abbr title='ten'>X.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Some Uses of this Discovery</span></a> ... 77</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap11'><abbr title='eleven'>XI.</abbr> <span class='sc'>The Watershed of Criticism</span></a> ... 99</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap12'><abbr title='twelve'>XII.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Identity and Duration attributed to Essences</span></a> ... 109</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap13'><abbr title='thirteen'>XIII.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Belief in Demonstration</span></a> ... 116</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap14'><abbr title='fourteen'>XIV.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Essence and Intuition</span></a> ... 125</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap15'><abbr title='fifteen'>XV.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Belief in Experience</span></a> ... 134</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap16'><abbr title='sixteen'>XVI.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Belief in the Self</span></a> ... 145</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap17'><abbr title='seventeen'>XVII.</abbr> <span class='sc'>The Cognitive Claims of Memory</span></a> ... 150</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap18'><abbr title='eighteen'>XVIII.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Knowledge is Faith mediated by Symbols</span></a> ... 164</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap19'><abbr title='nineteen'>XIX.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Belief in Substance</span></a> ... 182</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap20'><abbr title='twenty'>XX.</abbr> <span class='sc'>On some Objections to Belief in Substance</span></a> ... 192</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_xii'>xii</span><a href='#chap21'><abbr title='twenty-one'>XXI.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Sublimations of Animal Faith</span></a> ... 214</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap22'><abbr title='twenty-two'>XXII.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Belief in Nature</span></a> ... 233</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap23'><abbr title='twenty-three'>XXIII.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Evidences of Animation in Nature</span></a> ... 240</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap24'><abbr title='twenty-four'>XXIV.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Literary Psychology</span></a> ... 252</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap25'><abbr title='twenty-five'>XXV.</abbr> <span class='sc'>The Implied Being of Truth</span></a> ... 262</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap26'><abbr title='twenty-six'>XXVI.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Discernment of Spirit</span></a> ... 272</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap27'><abbr title='twenty-seven'>XXVII.</abbr> <span class='sc'>Comparison with other Criticisms of Knowledge</span></a> ... 289</p> + +<p class='c005'><a href='#index'><span class='sc'>Index</span></a></p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_1'>1</span> + <h2 id='chap01' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='one'>I</abbr> <br> THERE IS NO FIRST PRINCIPLE OF CRITICISM</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>A philosopher is compelled to follow the maxim of +epic poets and to plunge <span lang="la"><i>in medias res</i></span>. The origin +of things, if things have an origin, cannot be revealed +to me, if revealed at all, until I have travelled very +far from it, and many revolutions of the sun must +precede my first dawn. The light as it appears hides +the candle. Perhaps there is no source of things at +all, no simpler form from which they are evolved, but +only an endless succession of different complexities. +In that case nothing would be lost by joining the +procession wherever one happens to come upon it, +and following it as long as one’s legs hold out. Every +one might still observe a typical bit of it; he would +not have understood anything better if he had seen +more things; he would only have had more to explain. +The very notion of understanding or explaining anything +would then be absurd; yet this notion is drawn +from a current presumption or experience to the effect +that in some directions at least things do grow out of +simpler things: bread can be baked, and dough and +fire and an oven are conjoined in baking it. Such an +episode is enough to establish the notion of origins and +explanations, without at all implying that the dough +and the hot oven are themselves primary facts. A +philosopher may accordingly perfectly well undertake +to find <i>episodes of evolution</i> in the world: parents +<span class='pageno' id='Page_2'>2</span>with children, storms with shipwrecks, passions with +tragedies. If he begins in the middle he will still begin +at the beginning of something, and perhaps as much +at the beginning of things as he could possibly begin.</p> + +<p class='c005'>On the other hand, this whole supposition may be +wrong. Things may have had some simpler origin, +or may contain simpler elements. In that case it will +be incumbent on the philosopher to prove this fact; +that is, to find in the complex present objects +evidence of their composition out of simples. But +in this proof also he would be beginning in the middle; +and he would reach origins or elements only at the +end of his analysis.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The case is similar with respect to first principles +of discourse. They can never be discovered, if +discovered at all, until they have been long taken for +granted, and employed in the very investigation which +reveals them. The more cogent a logic is, the fewer +and simpler its first principles will turn out to have +been; but in discovering them, and deducing the rest +from them, they must first be employed unawares, if +they are the principles lending cogency to actual discourse; +so that the mind must trust current presumptions +no less in discovering that they are logical—that +is, justified by more general unquestioned presumptions—than +in discovering that they are arbitrary +and merely instinctive.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It is true that, quite apart from living discourse, a +set of axioms and postulates, as simple as we like, may +be posited in the air, and deductions drawn from them +<span lang="la"><i>ad libitum</i></span>; but such pure logic is otiose, unless we +find or assume that discourse or nature actually follows +it; and it is not by deduction from first principles, +arbitrarily chosen, that human reasoning actually +proceeds, but by loose habits of mental evocation +which such principles at best may exhibit afterwards +in an idealised form. Moreover, if we could strip our +<span class='pageno' id='Page_3'>3</span>thought for the arena of a perfect logic, we should +be performing, perhaps, a remarkable dialectical feat; +but this feat would be a mere addition to the complexities +of nature, and no simplification. This motley +world, besides its other antics, would then contain +logicians and their sports. If by chance, on turning +to the flowing facts, we found by analysis that they +obeyed that ideal logic, we should again be beginning +with things as we find them in the gross, and not with +first principles.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It may be observed in passing that no logic to +which empire over nature or over human discourse +has ever been ascribed has been a cogent logic; it has +been, in proportion to its exemplification in existence, +a mere description, psychological or historical, of an +actual procedure; whereas pure logic, when at last +quite recently, it was clearly conceived, turned out +instantly to have no necessary application to anything, +and to be merely a parabolic excursion into the realm +of essence.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In the tangle of human beliefs, as conventionally +expressed in talk and in literature, it is easy to distinguish +a compulsory factor called facts or things +from a more optional and argumentative factor called +suggestion or interpretation; not that what we call +facts are at all indubitable, or composed of immediate +data, but that in the direction of fact we come much +sooner to a stand, and feel that we are safe from +criticism. To reduce conventional beliefs to the facts +they rest on—however questionable those facts +themselves may be in other ways—is to clear our intellectual +conscience of voluntary or avoidable delusion. +If what we call a fact still deceives us, we feel we are +not to blame; we should not call it a fact, did we see +any way of eluding the recognition of it. To reduce +conventional belief to the recognition of matters of +fact is empirical criticism of knowledge.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_4'>4</span>The more drastic this criticism is, and the more +revolutionary the view to which it reduces me, the +clearer will be the contrast between what I find I +know and what I thought I knew. But if these plain +facts were all I had to go on, how did I reach those +strange conclusions? What principles of interpretation, +what tendencies to feign, what habits of inference +were at work in me? For if nothing in the facts +justified my beliefs, something in me must have +suggested them. To disentangle and formulate these +subjective principles of interpretation is transcendental +criticism of knowledge.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Transcendental criticism in the hands of Kant +and his followers was a sceptical instrument used +by persons who were not sceptics. They accordingly +imported into their argument many uncritical assumptions, +such as that these tendencies to feign must be +the same in everybody, that the notions of nature, +history, or mind which they led people to adopt were +the right or standard notions on these subjects, and +that it was glorious, rather than ignominious or +sophistical, to build on these principles an encyclopædia +of false sciences and to call it knowledge. A +true sceptic will begin by throwing over all those +academic conventions as so much confessed fiction; +and he will ask rather if, when all that these arbitrary +tendencies to feign import into experience has been +removed, any factual element remains at all. The +only critical function of transcendentalism is to drive +empiricism home, and challenge it to produce any +knowledge of fact whatsoever. And empirical criticism +will not be able to do so. Just as inattention +leads ordinary people to assume as part of the given +facts all that their unconscious transcendental logic +has added to them, so inattention, at a deeper level, +leads the empiricist to assume an existence in his +radical facts which does not belong to them. In +<span class='pageno' id='Page_5'>5</span>standing helpless and resigned before them he is, for +all his assurance, obeying his illusion rather than their +evidence. Thus transcendental criticism, used by a +thorough sceptic, may compel empirical criticism to +show its hand. It had mistaken its cards, and was +bluffing without knowing it.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_6'>6</span> + <h2 id='chap02' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='two'>II</abbr> <br> DOGMA AND DOUBT</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Custom does not breed understanding, but takes its +place, teaching people to make their way contentedly +through the world without knowing what the world is, +nor what they think of it, nor what they are. When +their attention is attracted to some remarkable thing, +say to the rainbow, this thing is not analysed nor +examined from various points of view, but all the +casual resources of the fancy are called forth in conceiving +it, and this total reaction of the mind precipitates +a dogma; the rainbow is taken for an omen +of fair weather, or for a trace left in the sky by the +passage of some beautiful and elusive goddess. Such +a dogma, far from being an interpenetration or +identification of thought with the truth of the object, +is a fresh and additional object in itself. The original +passive perception remains unchanged; the thing +remains unfathomed; and as its diffuse influence has +by chance bred one dogma to-day, it may breed a +different dogma to-morrow. We have therefore, as +we progress in our acquaintance with the world, an +always greater confusion. Besides the original fantastic +inadequacy of our perceptions, we have now rival +clarifications of them, and a new uncertainty as to +whether these dogmas are relevant to the original +object, or are themselves really clear, or if so, which +of them is true.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_7'>7</span>A prosperous dogmatism is indeed not impossible. +We may have such determinate minds that the +suggestions of experience always issue there in the +same dogmas; and these orthodox dogmas, perpetually +revived by the stimulus of things, may become our +dominant or even our sole apprehension of them. +We shall really have moved to another level of mental +discourse; we shall be living on ideas. In the +gardens of Seville I once heard, coming through the +tangle of palms and orange trees, the treble voice +of a pupil in the theological seminary, crying to his +playmate: “You booby! of course angels have a +more perfect nature than men.” With his black and +red cassock that child had put on dialectic; he was +playing the game of dogma and dreaming in words, +and was insensible to the scent of violets that filled +the air. How long would that last? Hardly, I +suspect, until the next spring; and the troubled +awakening which puberty would presently bring to +that little dogmatist, sooner or later overtakes all +elder dogmatists in the press of the world. The +more perfect the dogmatism, the more insecure. A +great high topsail that can never be reefed nor furled +is the first carried away by the gale.</p> + +<p class='c005'>To me the opinions of mankind, taken without any +contrary prejudice (since I have no rival opinions to +propose) but simply contrasted with the course of +nature, seem surprising fictions; and the marvel is +how they can be maintained. What strange religions, +what ferocious moralities, what slavish fashions, what +sham interests! I can explain it all only by saying +to myself that intelligence is naturally forthright; it +forges ahead; it piles fiction on fiction; and the fact +that the dogmatic structure, for the time being, stands +and grows, passes for a proof of its rightness. Right +indeed it is in one sense, as vegetation is right; it is +vital; it has plasticity and warmth, and a certain +<span class='pageno' id='Page_8'>8</span>indirect correspondence with its soil and climate. +Many obviously fabulous dogmas, like those of religion, +might for ever dominate the most active minds, except +for one circumstance. In the jungle one tree strangles +another, and luxuriance itself is murderous. So is +luxuriance in the human mind. What kills spontaneous +fictions, what recalls the impassioned fancy +from its improvisation, is the angry voice of some +contrary fancy. Nature, silently making fools of us +all our lives, never would bring us to our senses; but +the maddest assertions of the mind may do so, when +they challenge one another. Criticism arises out of +the conflict of dogmas.</p> + +<p class='c005'>May I escape this predicament and criticise without +a dogmatic criterion? Hardly; for though the criticism +may be expressed hypothetically, as for instance +in saying that if any child knew his own father he +would be a wise child, yet the point on which doubt +is thrown is a point of fact, and that there are fathers +and children is assumed dogmatically. If not, however +obscure the essential relation between fathers +and children might be ideally, no one could be wise +or foolish in assigning it in any particular instance, +since no such terms would exist in nature at all. +Scepticism is a suspicion of error about facts, and to +suspect error about facts is to share the enterprise +of knowledge, in which facts are presupposed and +error is possible. The sceptic thinks himself shrewd, +and often is so; his intellect, like the intellect he +criticises, may have some inkling of the true hang +and connection of things; he may have pierced to a +truth of nature behind current illusions. Since his +criticism may thus be true and his doubt well grounded, +they are certainly assertions; and if he is sincerely +a sceptic, they are assertions which he is ready to +maintain stoutly. Scepticism is accordingly a form +of belief. Dogma cannot be abandoned; it can only +<span class='pageno' id='Page_9'>9</span>be revised in view of some more elementary dogma +which it has not yet occurred to the sceptic to doubt; +and he may be right in every point of his criticism, +except in fancying that his criticism is radical and +that he is altogether a sceptic.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This vital compulsion to posit and to believe +something, even in the act of doubting, would nevertheless +be ignominious, if the beliefs which life and +intelligence forced upon me were always false. I +should then be obliged to honour the sceptic for his +heroic though hopeless effort to eschew belief, and I +should despise the dogmatist for his willing subservience +to illusion. The sequel will show, I trust, that +this is not the case; that intelligence is by nature +veridical, and that its ambition to reach the truth is +sane and capable of satisfaction, even if each of its +efforts actually fails. To convince me of this fact, +however, I must first justify my faith in many subsidiary +beliefs concerning animal economy and the +human mind and the world they flourish in.</p> + +<p class='c005'>That scepticism should intervene in philosophy at +all is an accident of human history, due to much +unhappy experience of perplexity and error. If all +had gone well, assertions would be made spontaneously +in dogmatic innocence, and the very notion of a <i>right</i> +to make them would seem as gratuitous as in fact it +is; because all the realms of being lie open to a spirit +plastic enough to conceive them, and those that have +ears to hear, may hear. Nevertheless, in the confused +state of human speculation this embarrassment +obtrudes itself automatically, and a philosopher to-day +would be ridiculous and negligible who had not +strained his dogmas through the utmost rigours of +scepticism, and who did not approach every opinion, +whatever his own ultimate faith, with the courtesy +and smile of the sceptic.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The brute necessity of believing something so long +<span class='pageno' id='Page_10'>10</span>as life lasts does not justify any belief in particular; +nor does it assure me that not to live would not, for +this very reason, be far safer and saner. To be dead +and have no opinions would certainly not be to discover +the truth; but if all opinions are necessarily false, it +would at least be not to sin against intellectual honour. +Let me then push scepticism as far as I logically can, +and endeavour to clear my mind of illusion, even at +the price of intellectual suicide.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_11'>11</span> + <h2 id='chap03' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='three'>III</abbr> <br> WAYWARD SCEPTICISM</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Criticism surprises the soul in the arms of convention. +Children insensibly accept all the suggestions of sense +and language, the only initiative they show being a +certain wilfulness in the extension of these notions, +a certain impulse towards private superstition. This +is soon corrected by education or broken off rudely, +like the nails of a tender hand, by hard contact with +custom, fact, or derision. Belief then settles down in +sullenness and apathy to a narrow circle of vague +assumptions, to none of which the mind need have +any deep affinity, none of which it need really +understand, but which nevertheless it clings to for +lack of other footing. The philosophy of the common +man is an old wife that gives him no pleasure, yet he +cannot live without her, and resents any aspersions +that strangers may cast on her character.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Of this homely philosophy the tender cuticle is +religious belief; really the least vital and most +arbitrary part of human opinion, the outer ring, as +it were, of the fortifications of prejudice, but for that +very reason the most jealously defended; since it is +on being attacked there, at the least defensible point, +that rage and alarm at being attacked at all are first +aroused in the citadel. People are not naturally +sceptics, wondering if a single one of their intellectual +habits can be reasonably preserved; they are +<span class='pageno' id='Page_12'>12</span>dogmatists angrily confident of maintaining them all. +Integral minds, pupils of a single coherent tradition, +regard their religion, whatever it may be, as certain, +as sublime, and as the only rational basis of morality +and policy. Yet in fact religious belief is terribly +precarious, partly because it is arbitrary, so that in +the next tribe or in the next century it will wear quite +a different form; and partly because, when genuine, +it is spontaneous and continually remodelled, like +poetry, in the heart that gives it birth. A man of +the world soon learns to discredit established religions +on account of their variety and absurdity, although +he may good-naturedly continue to conform to his +own; and a mystic before long begins fervently to +condemn current dogmas, on account of his own +different inspiration. Without philosophical criticism, +therefore, mere experience and good sense suggest +that all positive religions are false, or at least (which +is enough for my present purpose) that they are all +fantastic and insecure.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Closely allied with religious beliefs there are usually +legends and histories, dramatic if not miraculous; +and a man who knows anything of literature and has +observed how histories are written, even in the most +enlightened times, needs no satirist to remind him +that all histories, in so far as they contain a system, +a drama, or a moral, are so much literary fiction, +and probably disingenuous. Common sense, however, +will still admit that there are recorded facts not to be +doubted, as it will admit that there are obvious physical +facts; and it is here, when popular philosophy has +been reduced to a kind of positivism, that the speculative +critic may well step upon the scene.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Criticism, I have said, has no first principle, and +its desultory character may be clearly exhibited at +this point by asking whether the evidence of science +or that of history should be questioned first. I might +<span class='pageno' id='Page_13'>13</span>impugn the belief in physical facts reported by the +senses and by natural science, such as the existence +of a ring of Saturn, reducing them to appearances, +which are facts reported by personal remembrance; +and this is actually the choice made by British and +German critics of knowledge, who, relying on memory +and history, have denied the existence of anything +but experience. Yet the opposite procedure would +seem more judicious; knowledge of the facts reported +by history is mediated by documents which are +physical facts; and these documents must first be +discovered and believed to have subsisted unknown +and to have had a more or less remote origin in time +and place, before they can be taken as evidence for +any mental events; for if I did not believe that there +had been any men in Athens I should not imagine +they had had any thoughts. Even personal memory, +when it professes to record any distant experience, can +recognise and place this experience only by first +reconstructing the material scene in which it occurred. +Memory records moral events in terms of their physical +occasions; and if the latter are merely imaginary, the +former must be doubly so, like the thoughts of a personage +in a novel. My remembrance of the past is a +novel I am constantly recomposing; and it would not +be a historical novel, but sheer fiction, if the material +events which mark and ballast my career had not their +public dates and characters scientifically discoverable.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Romantic solipsism, in which the self making up +the universe is a moral person endowed with memory +and vanity, is accordingly untenable. Not that it is +unthinkable or self-contradictory; because all the +complementary objects which might be requisite to +give point and body to the idea of oneself might be +only ideas and not facts; and a solitary deity imagining +a world or remembering his own past constitutes +a perfectly conceivable universe. But this imagination +<span class='pageno' id='Page_14'>14</span>would have no truth and this remembrance no control; +so that the fond belief of such a deity that he knew +his own past would be the most groundless of dogmas; +and while by chance the dogma might be true, that +deity would have no reason to think it so. At the +first touch of criticism he would be obliged to confess +that his alleged past was merely a picture now before +him, and that he had no reason to suppose that this +picture had had any constancy in successive moments, +or that he had lived through previous moments at all; +nor could any new experience ever lend any colour or +corroboration to such a pathological conviction. This is +obvious; so that romantic solipsism, although perhaps +an interesting state of mind, is not a position capable of +defence; and any solipsism which is not a solipsism +of the present moment is logically contemptible.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The postulates on which empirical knowledge and +inductive science are based—namely, that there has +been a past, that it was such as it is now thought +to be, that there will be a future and that it must, +for some inconceivable reason, resemble the past and +obey the same laws—these are all gratuitous dogmas. +The sceptic in his honest retreat knows nothing of +a future, and has no need of such an unwarrantable +idea. He may perhaps have images before him of +scenes somehow not in the foreground, with a sense +of before and after running through the texture of +them; and he may call this background of his sentiency +the past; but the relative obscurity and evanescence +of these phantoms will not prompt him to suppose +that they have retreated to obscurity from the light +of day. They will be to him simply what he experiences +them as being, denizens of the twilight. It +would be a vain fancy to imagine that these ghosts +had once been men; they are simply nether gods, +native to the Erebus they inhabit. The world present +to the sceptic may continue to fade into these opposite +<span class='pageno' id='Page_15'>15</span>abysses, the past and the future; but having renounced +all prejudice and checked all customary faith, he will +regard both as painted abysses only, like the opposite +exits to the country and to the city on the ancient +stage. He will see the masked actors (and he will +invent a reason) rushing frantically out on one side +and in at the other; but he knows that the moment +they are out of sight the play is over for them; those +outlying regions and those reported events which the +messengers narrate so impressively are pure fancy; +and there is nothing for him but to sit in his seat and +lend his mind to the tragic illusion.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The solipsist thus becomes an incredulous spectator +of his own romance, thinks his own adventures fictions, +and accepts a solipsism of the present moment. This +is an honest position, and certain attempts to refute it +as self-contradictory are based on a misunderstanding. +For example, it is irrelevant to urge that the present +moment cannot comprise the whole of existence +because the phrase “a present moment” implies a +chain of moments; or that the mind that calls any +moment the present moment virtually transcends it +and posits a past and a future beyond it. These +arguments confuse the convictions of the solipsist +with those of a spectator describing him from outside. +The sceptic is not committed to the implications of +other men’s language; nor can he be convicted out +of his own mouth by the names he is obliged to bestow +on the details of his momentary vision. There may +be long vistas in it; there may be many figures of +men and beasts, many legends and apocalypses depicted +on his canvas; there may even be a shadowy frame +about it, or the suggestion of a gigantic ghostly something +on the hither side of it which he may call himself. +All this wealth of objects is not inconsistent with +solipsism, although the implication of the conventional +terms in which those objects are described may render +<span class='pageno' id='Page_16'>16</span>it difficult for the solipsist always to remember his +solitude. Yet when he reflects, he perceives it; and +all his heroic efforts are concentrated on <i>not</i> asserting +and <i>not</i> implying anything, but simply noticing what +he finds. Scepticism is not concerned to abolish +ideas; it can relish the variety and order of a pictured +world, or of any number of them in succession, +without any of the qualms and exclusions proper to +dogmatism. Its case is simply not to credit these +ideas, not to posit any of these fancied worlds, nor +this ghostly mind imagined as viewing them. The +attitude of the sceptic is not inconsistent; it is merely +difficult, because it is hard for the greedy intellect +to keep its cake without eating it. Very voracious +dogmatists like Spinoza even assert that it is impossible, +but the impossibility is only psychological, and due to +their voracity; they no doubt speak truly for themselves +when they say that the idea of a horse, if not +contradicted by some other idea, <i>is</i> a belief that the +horse exists; but this would not be the case if they +felt no impulse to ride that imagined horse, or to get +out of its way. Ideas become beliefs only when by +precipitating tendencies to action they persuade me +that they are signs of things; and these things are +not those ideas simply hypostatised, but are believed +to be compacted of many parts, and full of ambushed +powers, entirely absent from the ideas. The belief +is imposed on me surreptitiously by a latent mechanical +reaction of my body on the object producing the idea; +it is by no means implied in any qualities obvious in +that idea. Such a latent reaction, being mechanical, +can hardly be avoided, but it may be discounted in +reflection, if a man has experience and the poise of a +philosopher; and scepticism is not the less honourable +for being difficult, when it is inspired by a firm +determination to probe this confused and terrible +apparition of life to the bottom.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_17'>17</span>So far is solipsism of the present moment from +being self-contradictory that it might, under other +circumstances, be the normal and invincible attitude +of the spirit; and I suspect it may be that of many +animals. The difficulties I find in maintaining it +consistently come from the social and laborious +character of human life. A creature whose whole +existence was passed under a hard shell, or was spent +in a free flight, might find nothing paradoxical or +acrobatic in solipsism; nor would he feel the anguish +which men feel in doubt, because doubt leaves them +defenceless and undecided in the presence of oncoming +events. A creature whose actions were predetermined +might have a clearer mind. He might +keenly enjoy the momentary scene, never conceiving +himself as a separate body or as anything but the +unity of that scene, nor his enjoyment as anything but +its beauty: nor would he harbour the least suspicion +that it would change or perish, nor any objection to +its doing so if it chose. Solipsism would then be +selflessness and scepticism simplicity. They would +not be open to disruption from within. The ephemeral +insect would accept the evidence of his ephemeral +object, whatever quality this might chance to have; +he would not suppose, as Descartes did, that in thinking +anything his own existence was involved. Being +new-born himself, with only this one innate (and also +experimental) idea, he would bring to his single +experience no extraneous habits of interpretation or +inference; and he would not be troubled by doubts, +because he would believe nothing.</p> + +<p class='c005'>For men, however, who are long-lived and teachable +animals, solipsism of the present moment is a violent +pose, permitted only to the young philosopher, in his +first intellectual despair; and even he often cheats +himself when he thinks he assumes it, and professing +to stand on his head really, like a clumsy acrobat, rests +<span class='pageno' id='Page_18'>18</span>on his hands also. The very terms “solipsism” and +“present moment” betray this impurity. An actual +intuition, which by hypothesis is fresh, absolute, and +not to be repeated, is called and is perhaps conceived +as an <span lang="la"><i>ipse</i></span>, a self-same man. But identity (as I shall +have occasion to observe in discussing identity in +essences) implies two moments, two instances, or two +intuitions, between which it obtains. Similarly, a +“present moment” suggests other moments, and an +adventitious limitation either in duration or in scope; +but the solipsist and his world (which are not distinguishable) +have by hypothesis no environment +whatsoever, and nothing limits them save the fact +that there is nothing more. These irrelevances and +side glances are imported into the mind of the sceptic +because in fact he is retreating into solipsism from a +far more ambitious philosophy. A thought naturally +momentary would be immune from them.</p> + +<p class='c005'>A perfect solipsist, therefore, hardly is found +amongst men; but some men are zealous in bringing +their criticism down to solipsism of the present moment +just because this attitude enables them to cast away +everything that is not present in their prevalent mood, +or in their deepest thought, and to set up this chosen +object as the absolute. Such a compensatory dogma +is itself not critical; but criticism may help to raise +it to a specious eminence by lopping off everything +else. What remains will be different in different +persons: some say it is Brahma, some that it is Pure +Being, some that it is the Idea or Law of the moral +world. Each of these absolutes is the sacred residuum +which the temperament of different philosophers or +of different nations clings to, and will not criticise, +and in each case it is contrasted with the world in +which the vulgar believe, as something deeper, simpler, +and more real. Perhaps when solipsism of the present +moment is reached by a philosopher trained in abstraction +<span class='pageno' id='Page_19'>19</span>and inclined to ecstasy, his experience, at this +depth of concentration, will be that of an extreme +tension which is also liberty, an emptiness which is +intensest light; and his denial of all natural facts and +events, which he will call illusions, will culminate in +the fervent assertion that all is One, and that One is +Brahma, or the breath of life. On the other hand, a +scientific observer and reasoner, who has pried into +substance, and has learned that all the aspects of +nature are relative and variable, may still not deny the +existence of matter in every object; and this element +of mere intensity, drawn from the sense of mere +actuality in himself, may lead him to assert that pure +Being is, and everything else is not. Finally, a secondary +mind fed on books may drop the natural emphasis +which objects of sense have for the living animal, and +may retain, as the sole filling of its present moment, +nothing but the sciences. The philosopher will then +balance his denial of material facts by asserting the +absolute reality of his knowledge of them. This +reality, however, will extend no farther than his +information, as some intensest moment of recollection +may gather it together; and his personal idea of the +world, so composed and so limited, will seem to him +the sole existence. His universe will be the after-image +of his learning.</p> + +<p class='c005'>We may notice that in these three instances scepticism +has not suspended affirmation but has rather +intensified it, pouring it all on the devoted head of +one chosen object. There is a tireless and deafening +vehemence about these sceptical prophets; it betrays +the poor old human Psyche labouring desperately +within them in the shipwreck of her native hopes, and +refusing to die. Her sacrifice, she believes, will be +her salvation, and she passionately identifies what +remains to her with all she has lost and by an audacious +falsehood persuades herself she has lost nothing. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_20'>20</span>Thus the temper of these sceptics is not at all sceptical. +They take their revenge on the world, which eluded +them when they tried to prove its existence, by asserting +the existence of the remnant which they have still +by them, insisting that this, and this only, is the true +and perfect world, and a much better one than that +false world in which the heathen trust. Such infatuation +in the solipsist, however, is not inevitable; +no such exorbitant credit need be given to the object, +perhaps a miserable one, which still fills the sceptical +mind, and a more dispassionate scepticism, while +contemplating that object, may disallow it.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_21'>21</span> + <h2 id='chap04' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='four'>IV</abbr> <br> DOUBTS ABOUT SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Do I know, can I know, anything? Would not +knowledge be an impossible inclusion of what lies +outside? May I not rather renounce all beliefs? If +only I could, what peace would descend into my +perturbed conscience! The spectacle of other men’s +folly continually reawakens in me the suspicion that +I too am surely fooled; and the character of the +beliefs which force themselves upon me—the fantasticality +of space and time, the grotesque medley of +nature, the cruel mockery called religion, the sorry +history and absurd passions of mankind—all invite me +to disown them and to say to what I call the world, +“Come now; how do you expect me to believe in +<i>you</i>?” At the same time this very incredulity and +wonder in me are baseless and without credentials. +What right have I to any presumptions as to what +would be natural and proper? Is not the most +extravagant fact as plausible as any other? Is not the +most obvious axiom a wanton dogma? Yet turn +whichever way I will, and refine as I may, the pressure +of existence, of tyrannical absolute present being, +seems to confront me. Something is evidently going +on, at least in myself. I feel an instant complex strain +of existence, forcing me to say that I think and that I +am. Certainly the words I use in such reflection bring +many images with them which may possess no truth. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_22'>22</span>Thus when I say “I,” the term suggests a man, one +of many living in a world contrasted with his thinking, +yet partly surveyed by it. These suggestions of the +word “I” might well be false. This thinking might +not belong to a member of the human family, and no +such race as this mankind that I am thinking of might +ever have existed. The natural world in which I +fancy that race living, among other races of animals, +might also be imaginary. Yet, in that case, what is +imagination? Banish myself and my world as much +as I will, the present act of banishing them subsists +and is manifest; and it was this act, now unrolling +itself consciously through various phases, not any +particular person in any environment, that I meant +when I said, “I find that I think and am.”</p> + +<p class='c005'>In like manner the terms thinking and finding, +which I use for want of anything better, imply contrasts +and antecedents which I may disregard. It is +not a particular process called thinking, nor a particular +conjunction called finding, that I need assert +to exist, but merely this passing unrest, whatever you +choose to call it: these pulsations and phantoms which +to deny is to produce and to strive to banish is to +redouble.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It might seem for a moment as if this pressing +actuality of experience implied a relation between +subject and object, so that an indescribable being +called the ego or self was given with and involved in +any actual fact. This analysis, however, is merely +grammatical, and if pressed issues in mythical notions. +Analysis can never find in the object what, by hypothesis, +is not there; and the object, by definition, is +all that is found. But there is a biological truth, +discovered much later, under this alleged analytic +necessity: the truth that animal experience is a +product of two factors, antecedent to the experience +and not parts of it, namely, organ and stimulus, body +<span class='pageno' id='Page_23'>23</span>and environment, person and situation. These two +natural conditions must normally come together, like +flint and steel, before the spark of experience will fly. +But scepticism requires me to take the spark itself as +my point of departure, since it alone lives morally and +lights up with its vital flame the scene I seem to +discover. This spark is single, though changeful. +Experience has no conditions for a critic of knowledge +who proceeds transcendentally, that is, from the +vantage-ground of experience itself. To urge, therefore, +that a self or ego is presupposed in experience, +or even must have created experience by its absolute +fiat, is curiously to fail in critical thinking, and to +renounce the transcendental method. All transcendental +system-makers are in fact false to the very +principle by which they criticise dogmatism; a +principle which admits of no system, tolerates no +belief, but recalls the universe at every moment into +the absolute experience which posits it here and now.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This backsliding of transcendentalism, when it +forgets itself so far as to assign conditions to experience, +might have no serious consequences, if transcendentalism +were clearly recognised to be simply a +romantic episode in reflection, a sort of poetic madness, +and no necessary step in the life of reason. That its +professed scepticism should so soon turn into mythology +would then seem appropriate in such a disease of genius. +But the delusion becomes troublesome to the serious +critic of knowledge when it perhaps inclines him to +imagine that, in asserting that experience is a product, +and has two terms, he is describing the inner nature +of experience, and not merely its external conditions, +as natural history reports them. He may then be +tempted to assign a metaphysical status and logical +necessity to a merely material fact. Instead of the +body, which is the true “subject” in experience, he +may think he finds an absolute ego, and instead of the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_24'>24</span>natural environment of the body, which is the true +“object,” he may think he finds an illimitable reality; +and, to make things simpler, he may proceed to declare +that these two are one; but all this is myth.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The fact of experience, then, is single and, from +its own point of view, absolutely unconditioned and +groundless, impossible to explain and impossible to +exorcise. Yet just as it comes unbidden, so it may +fade and lapse of its own accord. It constantly seems +to do so; and my hold on existence is not so firm +that non-existence does not seem always at hand and, +as it were, always something deeper, vaster, and more +natural than existence. Yet this apprehension of an +imminent non-existence—an apprehension which is +itself an existing fact—cannot be trusted to penetrate +to a real nothingness yawning about me unless I assert +something not at all involved in the present being, +and something most remarkable, namely, that I know +and can survey the <i>movement</i> of my existence, and +that it can actually have lapsed from one state into +another, as I conceive it to have lapsed.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Thus the sense of a complex strain of existence, +the conviction that I am and that I am thinking, +involve a sense of at least possible change. I should +not speak of complexity nor of strain, if various opposed +developments into the not-given were not, to my +feeling, striving to take place. Doors are about to +open, cords to snap, blows to fall, pulsations to repeat +themselves. The flux and perspectives of being seem +to be open within me to my own intuition.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Caution is requisite here. All this may be simply +a present obsession, destitute of all prophetic or +retrospective truth, and carrying me no further, if I +wish to be honest, than a bare confession of how I +feel. Anything given in intuition is, by definition, an +appearance and nothing but an appearance. Of course, +if I am a thorough sceptic, I may discredit the existence +<span class='pageno' id='Page_25'>25</span>of anything else, so that this appearance will stand in +my philosophy as the only reality. But, then, I must +not enlarge nor interpret nor hypostatise it: I must +keep it as the mere picture it is, and revert to solipsism +of the present moment. One thing is the <i>feeling</i> that +something is happening, an intuition which finds +what it finds and cannot be made to find anything else. +Another thing is the <i>belief</i> that what is found is a +report or description of events that have happened +already, in such a manner that the earlier phases of +the flux I am aware of existed first, before the later +phases and without them; whereas in my intuition +now the earlier phases are merely the first part of the +given whole, exist only together with the later phases, +and are earlier only in a perspective, not in a flux of +successive events. If anything had an actual beginning, +that first phase must have occurred out of relation +to the subsequent phases which had not yet arisen, +and only became manifest in the sequel: as the Old +Testament, if really earlier than the New Testament, +must have existed alone first, when it could not be +called old. If it had existed only in the Christian +Bible, under that perspective which renders and calls +it old, it would be old only speciously and for Christian +intuition, and all revelation would have been really +simultaneous. In a word, specious change is not +actual change. The unity of apperception which +yields the sense of change renders change specious, by +relating the terms and directions of change together in +a single perspective, as respectively receding, passing, +or arriving. In so uniting and viewing these terms, +intuition of change excludes actual change in the given +object. If change has been actual, it must have been +prior to, and independent of, the intuition of that +change.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Doubtless, as a matter of fact, this intuition of +change is itself lapsing, and yielding its place in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_26'>26</span>physical time to vacancy or to the intuition of changelessness; +and this lapse of the intuition in physical +time is an actual change. Evidently, however, it is +not a given change, since neither vacancy nor the +intuition of changelessness can reveal it. It is revealed, +if revealed at all, by a further intuition of specious +change <i>taken as a report</i>. Actual change, if it is to +be known at all, must be known by belief and not +by intuition. Doubt is accordingly always possible +regarding the existence of actual change. Having +renounced my faith in nature, I must not weakly +retain faith in experience. This intuition of change +might be false; it might be the only fact in the universe, +and perfectly changeless. I should then be that +intuition, but it would not bring me any true knowledge +of anything actual. On the contrary, it would be an +illusion, presenting a false object, since it would +present nothing but change, when the only actual +reality, namely its own, was unchanging. On the +other hand, if this intuition of change was no illusion, +but a change was actually occurring and the universe +had passed into its present state out of a previous +state which was different (if, for instance, this very +intuition of change had grown more articulate or more +complex), I should then be right in hazarding a very +bold assertion, namely, that it is known to me that +what now is was not always, that there are things not +given, that there is genesis in nature, and that time +is real.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_27'>27</span> + <h2 id='chap05' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='five'>V</abbr><br> DOUBTS ABOUT CHANGE</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>As I watch a sensible object the evidence of variation +is often irresistible. This flag is flapping. This +flame is dancing. How shall I deny that almost everything, +in nature and in fancy, like the Ghost in <i>Hamlet</i>, +is here, is there, is gone? Of course I witness these +appearances and disappearances. The intuition of +change is more direct and more imperious than any +other. But <i>belief</i> in change, as I found just now, +asserts that before this intuition of change arose the +first term of that change had occurred separately. +This no intuition of change can prove. The belief is +irresistible in animal perception, for reasons which +biology can plausibly assign; and it cannot be long +suspended in actual thinking; but it may be suspended +for a moment theoretically, in the interests of a thorough +criticism. The criticism too may prove persuasive. +Many solemn if not serious philosophers have actually +maintained that this irresistible assertion is false, and +that all diversity and change are illusion. In denying +time, multiplicity, and motion, their theory has harked +back—and it is no mean feat of concentration—almost +to the infancy of thought, and reversed the whole life +of reason. This mystical retraction of all the beliefs +necessary to life, and suspension, almost, of life itself, +have been sometimes defended by dialectical arguments, +to the effect that change is impossible, because the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_28'>28</span>idea of it is incoherent or self-contradictory. Such +arguments, however, are worthless for a critic of +knowledge, because they involve an assumption much +grosser than that which they discard. They assume +that if a thing is dialectically unintelligible, as change +is, or inexpressible in terms other than its own, it +cannot be true; whereas, on the contrary, <i>only</i> when +dialectic passes its own frontiers and, fortified by a +passport countersigned by experience, enters the realm +of brute fact, has dialectic itself any claim to truth +or any relevance to the facts. Dialectical difficulties, +therefore, are irrelevant to valid knowledge, the terms +of which are irrational, no less than is their juxtaposition +in existence.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The denial of change may rest on more sceptical +grounds, and may have a deeper and more tragic +character. It may come from insight into the temerity +of asserting change. Why, indeed, do men believe in +it? Because they see and feel it: but this fact is +not denied. They may see and feel all the changes +they like: what reason is that for believing that over +and above this actual intuition, with the specious +change it regards, one state of the universe has given +place to another, or different intuitions have existed? +You feel you have changed; you feel things changing? +Granted. Does this fact help you to feel an earlier +state which you do not feel, which is not an integral +part of what is now before you, but a state from which +you are supposed to have passed into the state in +which you now are? If you feel that earlier state +now, there is no change involved. That datum, +which you now designate as the past, and which exists +only in this perspective, is merely a term in your +present feeling. It was never anything else. It was +never given otherwise than as it is given now, when it +is given as past. Therefore, if things are such only +as intuition makes them, every suggestion of a past +<span class='pageno' id='Page_29'>29</span>is false. For if the event now called past was ever +actual and in its day a present event, then it is not +merely a term in the specious change now given in +intuition. Thus the feeling of movement, on which +you so trustfully rely, cannot vouch for the reality of +movement, I mean, for the existence of an actual +past, once present, and not identical with the specious +past now falling within the compass of intuition. By +a curious fatality, the more you insist on the sense of +change the more you hedge yourself in in the changeless +and the immediate. There is no avenue to the +past or future, there is no room or breath for progressive +life, except through faith in the intellect and +in the reality of things not seen.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I think that if the sense of change, primordial and +continual as it is, were ever pure, this fact that in +itself it is changeless would not seem strange or +confusing: for evidently the idea of <i>pure</i> change +would be always the same, and changeless; it could +change only by yielding to the idea of rest or of +identity. But in animals of a human complexity the +sense of change is never pure; larger terms are +recognised and felt to be permanent, and the change +is seen to proceed within one of these or the other, +without being pervasive, or changing everything in +the picture. These are matters of animal sensibility, +to be decided empirically—that is, never to be decided +at all. Every new animal is free to feel in a new way. +The gnat may begin with a sense of flux, like Heraclitus, +and only diffidently and sceptically ask himself <i>what</i> +it is that is rushing by; and the barnacle may begin, +like Parmenides, with a sense of the unshakable +foundations of being, and never quite reconcile himself +to the thought that reality could ever move from +its solid bottom, or exchange one adhesion for another. +But, after all, the mind of Heraclitus, seeing nothing +but flux, would be as constant a mind as that of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_30'>30</span>Parmenides, seeing nothing but rest; and if the +philosophy of Heraclitus were the only one in the +world, there would be no change in the world of +philosophy.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Accordingly, when I have removed the instinctive +belief in an environment beyond the given scene, and +in a past and future beyond the specious present, the +lapse in this specious present itself and the sensible +events within it lose all the urgency of actual motions. +They become pictures of motions and ideas of events: +I no longer seem to live in a changing world, but an +illusion of change seems to play idly before me, and +to be contained in my changelessness. This pictured +change is a particular quality of being, as is pain or +a sustained note, not a passage from one quality of +being to another, since the part called earlier never +disappears and the part called later is given from the +first. Events, and the reality of change they involve, +may therefore be always illusions. The sceptic can +ultimately penetrate to the vision of a reality from +which they should be excluded. All he need do, in +order to attain to this immunity from illusion, is to +extirpate from his own nature every vestige of anxiety, +not to regret nor to fear nor to attempt anything. If +he can accomplish this he has exorcised belief in +change.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Moreover, the animal compulsion to believe in +change may not only be erroneous, but it may not +operate at all times. I may remain alive, and be +actually changing, and yet this change in me, remaining +unabated, may be undiscerned. Very quick +complete changes, cutting up existence into discrete +instants, the inner order of which would not be transmitted +from one to the other, would presumably +exclude memory. There would be no intuition of +change, and therefore not even a possible belief in it. +A certain actual persistence is requisite to perceive +<span class='pageno' id='Page_31'>31</span>a flux, and an absolute flux, in which nothing was +carried over from moment to moment, would yield, +in each of these moments, nothing but an intuition +of permanence. So far is the actual instability of +things, even if I admit it, from involving a sense of +it, or excluding a sense of its opposite. I may, therefore, +occasionally deny it; and nothing can persuade +me, during those moments, that my insight then is +not truer than at other times, when I perceive and +believe in change. The mystic must confess that he +spends most of his life in the teeming valleys of +illusion: but he may still maintain that truth and reality +are disclosed to him only on those almost inaccessible +mountain tops, where only the One and Changeless +is visible. That the believer in nature perceives +that this mystical conviction is itself a natural event, +and a very ticklish and unstable illusion, does not +alter that conviction while it lasts, nor enter into +its deliverance: so that under its sway the mystic +may disallow all change and multiplicity, either +virtually by forgetting it, or actually by demonstrating +it to be false and impossible. Being without irrational +expectation (and all expectation is irrational) and +without belief in memory (which is a sort of expectation +reversed), he will lack altogether that sagacity which +makes the animal believe in latent events and latent +substances, on which his eventual action might operate; +and his dialectic not being rebuked by any contrary +buffets of experience, he will prove to his heart’s +content that change is unthinkable. For if discrete +altogether, without a continuous substance or medium, +events will not follow one another, but each will +simply exist absolutely; and if a substance or medium +be posited, no relation can be conceived to obtain +between it and the events said to diversify it: for in +so far as the substance or medium permeates the +events nothing will happen or change; and in so far +<span class='pageno' id='Page_32'>32</span>as the events really occur and are not merely specious +changes given in one intuition, they will be discrete +altogether, without foothold in that medium or substance +postulated in vain to sustain them. Thus the +mystic, on the wings of a free dialectic, will be wafted +home to his ancient and comforting assurance that all +is One, that Being is, and that Non-Being is not.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_33'>33</span> + <h2 id='chap06' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='six'>VI</abbr> <br> ULTIMATE SCEPTICISM</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Why should the mystic, in proportion as he dismisses +the miscellany of experience as so much illusion, feel +that he becomes one with reality and attains to absolute +existence? I think that the same survival of vulgar +presumptions which leads the romantic solipsist to +retain his belief in his personal history and destiny, +leads the mystic to retain, and fondly to embrace, the +feeling of existence. His speculation is indeed inspired +by the love of security: his grand objection to the +natural world, and to mortal life, is that they are +deceptive, that they cheat the soul that loves them, +and prove to be illusions: the assumption apparently +being that reality must be permanent, and that he +who has hold on reality is safe for ever. In this the +mystic, who so hates illusions, is the victim of an +illusion himself: for the reality he has hold of is but +the burden of a single moment, which in its solipsism +thinks itself absolute. What is reality? As I should +like to use the term, reality is being of any sort. If it +means character or essence, illusions have it as much +as substance, and more richly. If it means substance, +then sceptical concentration upon inner experience, +or ecstatic abstraction, seems to me the last place in +which we should look for it. The immediate and the +visionary are at the opposite pole from substance; +they are on the surface or, if you like, at the top; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_34'>34</span>whereas substance if it is anywhere is at the bottom. +The realm of immediate illusion is as real as any other, +and very attractive; many would wish it to be the +only reality, and hate substance; but if substance +exists (which I am not yet ready to assert) they have +no reason to hate it, since it is the basis of those +immediate feelings which fill them with satisfaction. +Finally, if reality means existence, certainly the mystic +and his meditation may exist, but not more truly +than any other natural fact; and what would exist +in them would be a pulse of animal being, kindling +that momentary ecstasy, as animal life at certain +intensities is wont to do. The theme of that meditation, +its visionary object, need not exist at all; it may be +incapable of existing if it is essentially timeless and +dialectical. The animal mind treats its data as facts, +or as signs of facts, but the animal mind is full of the +rashest presumptions, positing time, change, a particular +station in the midst of events yielding a particular +perspective of those events, and the flux of all nature +precipitating that experience at that place. None of +these posited objects is a datum in which a sceptic +could rest. Indeed, existence or fact, in the sense +which I give to these words, cannot be a datum at all, +because existence involves external relations and actual +(not merely specious) flux: whereas, however complex +a datum may be, with no matter what perspectives +opening within it, it must be embraced in a single +stroke of apperception, and nothing outside it can +belong to it at all. The datum is a pure image; it is +essentially illusory and unsubstantial, however thunderous +its sound or keen its edge, or however normal +and significant its presence may be. When the +mystic asserts enthusiastically the existence of his +immediate, ideal, unutterable object, Absolute Being, +he is peculiarly unfortunate in his faith: it would be +impossible to choose an image less relevant to the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_35'>35</span>agencies that actually bring that image before him. +The burden and glow of existence which he is conscious +of come entirely from himself; his object is eminently +empty, impotent, non-existent; but the heat and +labour of his own soul suffuse that emptiness with +light, and the very hum of change within him, accelerated +almost beyond endurance and quite beyond +discrimination, sounds that piercing note.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The last step in scepticism is now before me. It +will lead me to deny existence to any datum, whatever +it may be; and as the datum, by hypothesis, is the +whole of what solicits my attention at any moment, I +shall deny the existence of everything, and abolish +that category of thought altogether. If I could not +do this, I should be a tyro in scepticism. Belief in +the existence of anything, including myself, is something +radically incapable of proof, and resting, like +all belief, on some irrational persuasion or prompting +of life. Certainly, as a matter of fact, when I deny +existence I exist; but doubtless many of the other +facts I have been denying, because I found no evidence +for them, were true also. To bring me evidence of +their existence is no duty imposed on facts, nor a +habit of theirs: I must employ private detectives. +The point is, in this task of criticism, to discard every +belief that is a belief merely; and the belief in existence, +in the nature of the case, can be a belief only. The +datum is an idea, a description; I may contemplate +it without belief; but when I assert that such a thing +exists I am hypostatising this datum, placing it in +presumptive relations which are not internal to it, +and worshipping it as an idol or thing. Neither its +existence nor mine nor that of my belief can be given +in any datum. These things are incidents involved +in that order of nature which I have thrown over; +they are no part of what remains before me.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Assurance of existence expresses animal watchfulness: +<span class='pageno' id='Page_36'>36</span>it posits, within me and round me, hidden and +imminent events. The sceptic can easily cast a doubt +on the remoter objects of this belief; and nothing but +a certain obduracy and want of agility prevents him +from doubting present existence itself. For what could +present existence mean, if the imminent events for +which animal sense is watching failed altogether, +failed at the very roots, so to speak, of the tree of +intuition, and left nothing but its branches flowering +<span lang="la"><i>in vacuo</i></span>? Expectation is admittedly the most hazardous +of beliefs: yet what is watchfulness but expectation? +Memory is notoriously full of illusion; yet +what would experience of the present be if the veracity +of primary memory were denied, and if I no longer +believed that anything had just happened, or that I +had ever been in the state from which I suppose +myself to have passed into this my present condition?</p> + +<p class='c005'>It will not do for the sceptic to take refuge in the +confused notion that expectation <i>possesses</i> the future, +or memory the past. As a matter of fact, expectation +is like hunger; it opens its mouth, and something +probably drops into it, more or less, very often, the +sort of thing it expected; but sometimes a surprise +comes, and sometimes nothing. Life involves expectation, +but does not prevent death: and expectation +is never so thoroughly stultified as when it is not +undeceived, but cancelled. The open mouth does +not then so much as close upon nothing. It is buried +open. Nor is memory in a better case. As the +whole world might collapse and cease at any moment, +nullifying all expectation, so it might at any moment +have sprung out of nothing: for it is thoroughly +contingent, and might have begun to-day, with this +degree of complexity and illusive memory, as well as +long ago, with whatever energy or momentum it was +first endowed with. The backward perspective of +time is perhaps really an inverted expectation; but +<span class='pageno' id='Page_37'>37</span>for the momentum of life forward, we might not be +able to space the elements active in the present so as +to assign to them a longer or a shorter history; for +we should not attempt to discriminate amongst these +elements such as we could still count on in the immediate +future, and such as we might safely ignore: +so that our conception of the past implies, perhaps, a +distinction between the living and the dead. This +distinction is itself practical, and looks to the future. +In the absolute present all is specious; and to pure +intuition the living are as ghostly as the dead, and the +dead as present as the living.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In the sense of existence there is accordingly +something more than the obvious character of that +which is alleged to exist. What is this complement? +It cannot be a feature in the datum, since the datum +by definition is the whole of what is found. Nor can +it be, in my sense at least of the word existence, the +intrinsic constitution or specific being of this object, +since existence comports external relations, variable, +contingent, and not discoverable in a given being +when taken alone: for there is nothing that may not +lose its existence, or the existence of which might not +be conceivably denied. The complement added to +the datum when it is alleged to exist seems, then, to +be added by <i>me</i>; it is the finding, the occurrence, the +assault, the impact of that being here and now; it is +the experience of it. But what can experience be, +if I take away from it the whole of what is experienced? +And what meaning can I give to such words as impact, +assault, occurrence, or finding, when I have banished +and denied my body, my past, my residual present +being, and everything except the datum which I find? +The sense of existence evidently belongs to the +intoxication, to the <i>Rausch</i>, of existence itself; it is +the strain of life within me, prior to all intuition, that +in its precipitation and terror, passing as it continually +<span class='pageno' id='Page_38'>38</span>must from one untenable condition to another, stretches +my attention absurdly over what is not given, over +the lost and the unattained, the before and after +which are wrapped in darkness, and confuses my +breathless apprehension of the clear presence of all I +can ever truly behold.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Indeed, so much am I a creature of movement, +and of the ceaseless metabolism of matter, that I +should never catch even these glimpses of the light, +if there were not rhythms, pauses, repetitions, and +nodes in my physical progress, to absorb and reflect +it here and there: as the traveller, hurried in a cloud +of smoke and dust through tunnel after tunnel in the +Italian Riviera, catches and loses momentary visions +of blue sea and sky, which he would like to arrest, +but cannot; yet if he had not been rushed and whistled +along these particular tunnels, even those snatches, in +the form in which they come to him, would have been +denied him. So it is the rush of life that, at its open +moments, floods me with intuitions, partial and +confused, but still revelations; the landscape is +wrapped in the smoke of my little engine, and turned +into a tantalising incident of my hot journey. What +appears (which is an ideal object and not an event) +is thus confused with the event of its appearance; +the picture is identified with the kindling or distraction +of my attention falling by chance upon it; and the +strain of my material existence, battling with material +accidents, turns the ideal object too into a temporal +fact, and makes it seem substantial. But this fugitive +existence which I egotistically attach to it, as if its +fate was that of my glimpses of it, is no part of its +true being, as even my intuition discerns it; it is a +practical dignity or potency attributed to it by the +irrelevant momentum of my animal life. Animals, +being by nature hounded and hungry creatures, spy +out and take alarm at any datum of sense or fancy, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_39'>39</span>supposing that there is something substantial there, +something that will count and work in the world. +The notion of a moving world is brought implicitly +with them; they fetch it out of the depths of their +vegetating psyche, which is a small dark cosmos, +silently revolving within. By being noticed, and +treated as a signal for I know not what material opportunity +or danger, the given image is taken up into +the business world, and puts on the garment of +existence. Remove this frame, strip off all suggestion +of a time when this image was not yet present, or a +time when it shall be past, and the very notion of +existence is removed. The datum ceases to be an +appearance, in the proper and pregnant sense of this +word, since it ceases to imply any substance that +appears or any mind to which it appears. It is an +appearance only in the sense that its nature is wholly +manifest, that it is a specific being, which may be +mentioned, thought of, seen, or defined, if any one +has the wit to do so. But its own nature says nothing +of any hidden circumstances that shall bring it to +light, or any adventitious mind that shall discover it. +It lies simply in its own category. If a colour, it is +just this colour; if a pain, just this pain. Its appearance +is not an event: its presence is not an experience; +for there is no surrounding world in which it can +arise, and no watchful spirit to appropriate it. The +sceptic has here withdrawn into the intuition of a +surface form, without roots, without origin or environment, +without a seat or a locus; a little universe, an +immaterial absolute theme, rejoicing merely in its own +quality. This theme, being out of all adventitious +relations and not in the least threatened with not +being the theme it is, has not the contingency nor the +fortunes proper to an existence; it is simply that +which it inherently, logically, and unchangeably is.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Existence, then, not being included in any +<span class='pageno' id='Page_40'>40</span>immediate datum, is a fact always open to doubt. I +call it a fact notwithstanding, because in talking about +the sceptic I am positing his existence. If he has any +intuition, however little the theme of that intuition +may have to do with any actual world, certainly I who +think of his intuition, or he himself thinking of it +afterwards, see that this intuition of his must have +been an event, and his existence at that time a fact; +but like all facts and events, this one can be known +only by an affirmation which posits it, which may be +suspended or reversed, and which is subject to error. +Hence all this business of intuition may perfectly well +be doubted by the sceptic: the existence of his own +doubt (however confidently I may assert it for him) +is not given to him then: all that is given is some +ambiguity or contradiction in images; and if afterwards +he is sure that he has doubted, the sole cogent +evidence which that fact can claim lies in the psychological +impossibility that, so long as he believes he has +doubted, he should not believe it. But he may be +wrong in harbouring this belief, and he may rescind +it. For all an ultimate scepticism can see, therefore, +there may be no facts at all, and perhaps nothing has +ever existed.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Scepticism may thus be carried to the point of +denying change and memory, and the reality of all +facts. Such a sceptical dogma would certainly be +false, because this dogma itself would have to be +entertained, and that event would be a fact and an +existence: and the sceptic in framing that dogma +discourses, vacillates, and lives in the act of contrasting +one assertion with another—all of which is to exist +with a vengeance. Yet this false dogma that nothing +exists is tenable intuitively and, while it prevails, is +irrefutable. There are certain motives (to be discussed +later) which render ultimate scepticism precious +to a spiritual mind, as a sanctuary from grosser illusions. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_41'>41</span>For the wayward sceptic, who regards it as no truer +than any other view, it also has some utility: it +accustoms him to discard the dogma which an introspective +critic might be tempted to think self-evident, +namely, that he himself lives and thinks. That he +does so is true; but to establish that truth he must +appeal to animal faith. If he is too proud for that, +and simply stares at the datum, the last thing he will +see is himself.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_42'>42</span> + <h2 id='chap07' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='seven'>VII</abbr> <br> NOTHING GIVEN EXISTS</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Scepticism is not sleep, and in casting a doubt on +any belief, or proving the absurdity of any idea, the +sceptic is by no means losing his sense of what is +proposed. He is merely doubting or denying the +<i>existence</i> of any such object. In scepticism, therefore, +everything turns on the meaning of the word existence, +and it will be worth while to stop a moment here to +consider it further.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I have already indicated roughly how I am using +the word existence, namely, to designate such being +as is in flux, determined by external relations, and +jostled by irrelevant events. Of course this is no +definition. The term existence is only a name. In +using it I am merely pointing out to the reader, as if +by a gesture, what this word designates in my habits +of speech, as if in saying Cæsar I pointed to my dog, +lest some one should suppose I meant the Roman +emperor. The Roman emperor, the dog, and the +sound Cæsar are all indefinable; but they might be +described more particularly, by using other indicative +and indefinable names, to mark their characteristics +or the events in which they figured. So the whole +realm of being which I point to when I say existence +might be described more fully; the description of it +would be physics or perhaps psychology; but the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_43'>43</span>exploration of that realm, which is open only to +animal faith, would not concern the sceptic.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The sceptic turns from such indefinite confusing +objects to the immediate, to the datum; and perhaps +for a moment he may fancy he has found true existence +there; but if he is a good sceptic he will soon be +undeceived. Certainly in the immediate he will find +freedom from the struggle of assertion and counter-assertion: +no report there, no hypothesis, no ghostly +reduplication of the obvious, no ghostly imminence +of the not-given. Is not the obvious, he might ask, +the truly existent? Yet the obvious is only the +apparent; and this in both senses of this ambiguous +word. The datum is apparent in the sense of being +self-evident and luminous; and it is apparent also in +the sense of merely appearing and being unsubstantial. +In this latter sense, the apparent threatens to become +the non-existent. Does not the existent profess to +be more than apparent: to be not so much the self-evident +as that which I am seeking evidence for, in +the sense of testimony? Is not the existent, then +(which from its own point of view, or physically, is +more than the apparent), cognitively and from my +point of view less than the apparent? Does it not +need witnesses to bear testimony to its being? And +what can recommend those witnesses to me except +their intrinsic eloquence? I shall prove no sceptic +if I do not immediately transfer all my trust from the +existence reported to the appearance reporting it, and +substitute the evidence of my senses for all lawyer’s +evidence. I shall forget the murders and embroglios +talked about in the court, and gaze at the judge in his +scarlet and ermine, with the pale features of an old +fox under his grey wig; at the jury in their stolidity; +at the witness stammering; at the counsel, officially +insolent, not thinking of what he is saying mechanically, +but whispering something that really interests +<span class='pageno' id='Page_44'>44</span>him in an aside, almost yawning, and looking at the +clock to see if it is time for luncheon; and at the flood +of hazy light falling aslant on the whole scene from the +high windows. Is not the floating picture, in my +waking trance, the actual reality, and the whole world +of existence and business but a perpetual fable, which +this trance sustains?</p> + +<p class='c005'>The theory that the universe is nothing but a flux +of appearances is plausible to the sceptic; he thinks +he is not believing much in believing it. Yet the +residuum of dogma is very remarkable in this view; +and the question at once will assail him how many +appearances he shall assert to exist, of what sort, and +in what order, if in any, he shall assert them to arise; +and the various hypotheses that may be suggested +concerning the character and distribution of appearances +will become fresh data in his thought; and he +will find it impossible to decide whether any such +appearances, beyond the one now passing before him, +are ever actual, or whether any of the suggested +systems of appearances actually exists. Thus existence +will loom again before him, as something problematical, +at a distance from that immediacy into which he +thought he had fled.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Existence thus seems to re-establish itself in the +very world of appearances, so soon as these are regarded +as facts and events occurring side by side or one after +the other. In each datum taken separately there would +be no occasion to speak of existence. It would be +an obvious appearance; whatever appeared there +would be simply and wholly apparent, and the fact +that it appeared (which would be the only fact involved) +would not appear in it at all. This fact, the +existence of the intuition, would not be asserted until +the appearance ceased to be actual, and was viewed +from the outside, as something that presumably had +occurred, or would occur, or was occurring elsewhere. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_45'>45</span>In such an external view there might be truth or error; +not so in each appearance taken in itself, because in +itself and as a whole each is a pure appearance and +bears witness to nothing further. Nevertheless, when +some term within this given appearance comes to be +regarded as a sign of some other appearance not now +given, the question is pertinent whether that other +appearance exists or not. Thus existence and non-existence +seem to be relevant to appearances in so far +as they are problematical and posited from outside, +not in so far as they are certain and given.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Hence an important conclusion which at first +seems paradoxical but which reflection will support; +namely, that the notion that the datum exists is unmeaning, +and if insisted upon is false. That which +exists is the fact that the datum is given at that particular +moment and crisis in the universe; the intuition, +not the datum, is the fact which occurs; and this fact, +if known at all, must be asserted at some other moment +by an adventurous belief which may be true or false. +That which is certain and given, on the contrary, is +something of which existence cannot be predicated, +and which, until it is used as a description of something +else, cannot be either false or true.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I see here how halting is the scepticism of those +modern philosophers who have supposed that to +exist is to be an idea in the mind, or an object of +consciousness, or a fact of experience, if by these +phrases no more is meant than to be a datum of +intuition. If there is any existence at all, presence to +consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient to +render it an existence. Imagine a novelist whose +entire life was spent in conceiving a novel, or a deity +whose only function was to think a world. That +world would not exist, any more than the novel +would comprise the feelings and actions of existing +persons. If that novelist, in the heat of invention, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_46'>46</span>believed his personages real, he would be deceived: +and so would that deity if he supposed his world to +exist merely because he thought of it. Before the +creation could be actual, or the novel historical, it +would have to be enacted elsewhere than in the mind +of its author. And if it was so enacted, it would +evidently not be requisite to its existence that any +imaginative person, falsely conceiving himself to be +its author, should form an image of it in his mind. If +he did so, that remarkable clairvoyance would be a +fact requiring explanation; but it would be an added +harmony in the world, not the ground of its existence.</p> + +<p class='c005'>If for the sake of argument I accept the notion +that presence to intuition is existence, I may easily +disprove it by a <span lang="la"><i>reductio ad absurdum</i></span>. If nothing not +given in intuition can exist, then all those beliefs in +existing facts beyond my intuition, by which thought +is diversified when it is intelligent, would be necessarily +false, and all intelligence would be illusion. This +implication might be welcome to me, if I wished not +to entertain any opinions which might conceivably be +wrong. But the next implication is more disconcerting, +namely, that the intuitions in which such illusion +appears can have no existence themselves: for being +instances of intuition they could not be data for any +intuition. At one moment I may <i>believe</i> that there +are or have been or will be other moments; but +evidently they would not be <i>other</i> moments, if they +were data to me now, and nothing more. If presence +to intuition were necessary to existence, intuition itself +would not exist; that is, no other intuition would be +right in positing it; and as this absence of transcendence +would be mutual, nothing would exist at +all. And yet, since presence to intuition would be +sufficient for existence, everything mentionable would +exist without question, the non-existent could never +be thought of, to deny anything (if I knew what I was +<span class='pageno' id='Page_47'>47</span>denying) would be impossible, and there would be +no such thing as fancy, hallucination, illusion, or +error.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I think it is evidently necessary to revise a vocabulary +which lends itself to such equivocation, and if I keep +the words existence and intuition at all, to lend them +meanings which can apply to something possible and +credible. I therefore propose to use the word existence +(in a way consonant, on the whole, with ordinary +usage) to designate not data of intuition but facts or +events believed to occur in nature. These facts or +events will include, <i>first</i>, intuitions themselves, or +instances of consciousness, like pains and pleasures +and all remembered experiences and mental discourse; +and <i>second</i>, physical things and events, having a +transcendent relation to the data of intuition which, in +belief, may be used as signs for them; the same +transcendent relation which objects of desire have to +desire, or objects of pursuit to pursuit; for example, +such a relation as the fact of my birth (which I cannot +even remember) has to my present persuasion that I +was once born, or the event of my death (which I +conceive only abstractly) to my present expectation of +some day dying. If an angel visits me, I may intelligibly +debate the question whether he exists or not. +On the one hand, I may affirm that he came in through +the door, that is, that he existed before I saw him; +and I may continue in perception, memory, theory, +and expectation to assert that he was a fact of nature: +in that case I believe in his existence. On the other +hand, I may suspect that he was only an event in me, +called a dream; an event not at all included in the +angel as I saw him, nor at all like an angel in the +conditions of its existence; and in this case I disbelieve +in my vision: for visiting angels cannot honestly be +said to exist if I entertain them only in idea.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Existences, then, from the point of view of knowledge, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_48'>48</span>are facts or events affirmed, not images seen or +topics merely entertained. Existence is accordingly +not only doubtful to the sceptic, but odious to the +logician. To him it seems a truly monstrous +excrescence and superfluity in being, since anything +existent is more than the description of it, having +suffered an unintelligible emphasis or materialisation +to fall upon it, which is logically inane and morally +comic. At the same time, existence suffers from +defect of being and obscuration; any ideal nature, +such as might be exhaustively given in intuition, when +it is materialised loses the intangibility and eternity +proper to it in its own sphere; so that existence +doubly injures the forms of being it embodies, by +ravishing them first and betraying them afterwards.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Such is existence as approached by belief and +affirmed in animal experience; but I shall find in the +sequel that considered physically, as it is unrolled +amidst the other realms of being, existence is a conjunction +of natures in adventitious and variable +relations. According to this definition, it is evident +that existence can never be given in intuition; since +no matter how complex a datum may be, and no +matter how many specious changes it may picture, its +specious order and unity are just what they are: +they can neither suffer mutation nor acquire new +relations: which is another way of saying that they +cannot exist. If this whole evolving world were +merely given in idea, and were not an external object +posited in belief and in action, it could not exist nor +evolve. In order to exist it must enact itself ignorantly +and successively, and carry down all ideas of it in its +own current.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_49'>49</span> + <h2 id='chap08' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='eight'>VIII</abbr> <br> SOME AUTHORITIES FOR THIS CONCLUSION</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>The ultimate position of the sceptic, that nothing +given exists, may be fortified by the authority of many +renowned philosophers who are accounted orthodox; +and it will be worth while to stop for a moment to +invoke their support, since the scepticism I am defending +is not meant to be merely provisional; its just +conclusions will remain fixed, to remind me perpetually +that all alleged knowledge of matters of fact is faith +only, and that an existing world, whatever form it may +choose to wear, is intrinsically a questionable and +arbitrary thing. It is true that many who have +defended this view, in the form that all appearance is +illusion, have done so in order to insist all the more +stoutly on the existence of something occult which +they call reality; but as the existence of this reality is +far easier to doubt than the existence of the obvious, +I may here disregard that compensatory dogma. I +shall soon introduce compensatory dogmas of my own, +more credible, I think, than theirs; and I shall +attribute existence to a flux of natural events which +can never be data of intuition, but only objects of a +belief which men and animals, caught in that flux +themselves, hazard instinctively. Although a sceptic +may doubt all existence, none being involved in any +indubitable datum, yet I think good human reasons, +apart from irresistible impulse, can be found for +<span class='pageno' id='Page_50'>50</span>positing existing intuitions to which data appear, no +less than other existing events and things, which the +intuited data report or describe. For the moment, +however, I am concerned to justify further the contention +of the sceptic that, if we refuse to bow to the +yoke of animal faith, we can find in pure intuition no +evidence of any existence whatsoever.</p> + +<p class='c005'>There is notably one tenet, namely, that all change +is illusion, proper to many deep-voiced philosophers, +which of itself suffices to abolish all existence, in the +sense which I give to this word. Instead of change +they probably posit changeless substance or pure +Being; but if substance were not subject to change, +at least in its distribution, it would not be the substance +of anything found in the world or happening in the +mind; it would, therefore, have no more lodgement +in existence than has pure Being, which is evidently +only a logical term. Pure Being, as far as it goes, is +no doubt a true description of everything, whether +existent or non-existent; so that if anything exists, +pure Being will exist in it; but it will exist merely as +pure colour does in all colours, or pure space in all +spaces, and not separately nor exclusively. These +philosophers, in denying change, accordingly deny all +existence. But though many of them have prized +this doctrine, few have lived up to it, or rather none +have; so that I may pass over the fact that in denying +change they have inadvertently denied existence, even +to substance and pure Being, because they have +inadvertently retained both existence and change. +The reality they attributed with so much unction and +conviction to the absolute was not that proper to this +idea—one of the least impressive which it is possible +to contemplate—but was obviously due to the strain +of existence and movement within themselves, and to +the vast rumble, which hypnotised them, of universal +mutation.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_51'>51</span>It is the Indians who have insisted most sincerely +and intrepidly on the non-existence of everything +given, even adjusting their moral regimen to this +insight. Life is a dream, they say: and all experienced +events are illusions. In dreaming of nature and of +ourselves we are deceived, even in imagining that we +exist and are deceived and dreaming. Some aver, +indeed, that there is a universal dreamer, Brahma, +slumbering and breathing deeply in all of us, who is +the reality of our dreams, and the negation of them. +But as Brahma is emphatically not qualified by any +of the forms of illusory existence, but annuls them all, +there is no need, for my purpose, of distinguishing +him from the reported state of redeemed souls (where +many souls are admitted) nor from the Nirvana into +which lives flow when they happily cease, becoming +at last aware, as it were, that neither they nor anything +else has ever existed.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It would be rash, across the chasm of language +and tradition that separates me from the Indians, to +accuse their formidable systems of self-contradiction. +Truth and reality are words which, in the mouths of +prophets, have often a eulogistic rather than a scientific +force; and if it is <i>better</i> to elude the importunities of +existence and to find a sanctuary of intense safety and +repose in the notion of pure Being, there may be a +dramatic propriety in saying that the view of the +saved, from which all memory of the path to salvation +is excluded, is the true view, and their condition the +only reality; so that they are right in thinking that +they have never existed, and we wrong in thinking +that we now exist.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Here is an egotism of the redeemed with which, +as with other egotisms, I confess I have little sympathy. +The blessed, in giving out that I do not exist in my +sins, because they cannot distinguish me, appear to +me to be deceived. The intrinsic blessedness of their +<span class='pageno' id='Page_52'>52</span>condition cannot turn into a truth this small oversight +on their part, however excusable. I suspect, or I like +to imagine, that what the Indians mean is rather that +the principle of my existence, and of my persuasion +that I exist, is an <i>evil</i> principle. It is sin, guilt, +passion, and mad will, the natural and universal source +of illusion—very much what I am here calling animal +faith; and since this assertiveness in me (according +to the Indians) is wrong morally, and since its influence +alone leads me to posit existence in myself or in +anything else, if I were healed morally I should cease +to assert existence; and I should, in fact, have ceased +to exist.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Now in this doctrine, so stated, lies a great confirmation +of my thesis that nothing given exists; +because it is only a dark principle, transcendental in +respect to the datum (that is, on the hither side of the +footlights) that calls up this datum at all, or leads me +to posit its existence. It is this sorry self of mine +sitting here in the dark, one in this serried pack of +open-mouthed fools, hungry for illusion, that is +responsible for the spectacle; for if a foolish instinct +had not brought me to the playhouse, and if avid eyes +and an idealising understanding had not watched the +performance, no part of it would have abused me: +and if no one came to the theatre, the actors would +soon flit away like ghosts, the poets would starve, the +scenery would topple over and become rubbish, and +the very walls would disappear. Every part of experience, +as it comes, is illusion; and the source of +this illusion is my animal nature, blindly labouring in +a blind world.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Such is the ancient lesson of experience itself, +when we reflect upon experience and turn its illusions +into instruction: a lesson which a bird-witted empiricism +can never learn, though it is daily repeated. But +the Indian with a rare sensitiveness joined a rare +<span class='pageno' id='Page_53'>53</span>recollection. He <i>lived</i>: a religious love, a childish +absorption in appearances as they come (which busy +empiricists do not share), led him to remember them +truly, in all their beauty, and therefore to perceive +that they were illusions. The poet, the disinterested +philosopher, the lover of things distilled into purity, +frees himself from belief. This infinite chaos of cruel +and lovely forms, he cries, is all deceptive, all unsubstantial, +substituted at will for nothing, and soon +found to sink into nothing again, and to be nothing +in truth.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I will disregard the vehemence with which these +saintly scholastics denounce the world and the sinful +nature that attaches me to it. I like the theatre, not +because I cannot perceive that the play is a fiction, +but because I do perceive it; if I thought the thing a +fact, I should detest it: anxiety would rob me of all +my imaginative pleasure. Even as it is, I often wish +the spectacle were less barbarous; but I am not +angry because each scene does not last for ever, and +is likely to be followed by a thousand others which +I shall not witness. Such is the nature of endless +comedy, and of experience. But I wish to retain the +valuable testimony of the Indians to the non-existence +of the obvious. This testimony is the more valuable +because the spectacle present to their eyes was tropical; +harder, therefore, to master and to smile at than are +the political and romantic medleys which fill the mind +of Europe. Yet amidst the serpents and hyænas, the +monkeys and parrots of their mental jungle, those +sages could sit unmoved, too holily incredulous for +fear. How infinite, how helpless, how deserving of +forgiveness creative error becomes to the eye of understanding, +that loves only in pity, and has no concupiscence +for what it loves! How like unhappy +animals western philosophers seem in comparison, +with their fact-worship, their thrift, their moral +<span class='pageno' id='Page_54'>54</span>intolerance, their imaginative poverty, their political +zeal, and their subservience to intellectual fashion!</p> + +<p class='c005'>It makes no difference for my purposes if the +cosmology of the Indians was fanciful. It could +hardly be more extraordinary than the constitution +of the material world is in fact, nor more decidedly +out of scale with human data; truth and fancy in this +matter equally convict the human senses of illusion. +Nor am I out of sympathy with their hope of escaping +from the universal hurly-burly into some haven of +peace. A philosopher has a haven in himself, of +which I suspect the fabled bliss to follow in other +lives, or after total emancipation from living, is only +a poetic symbol: he has pleasure in truth, and an +equal readiness to enjoy the scene or to quit it. Liberation +is never complete while life lasts, and is nothing +afterwards; but it flows in a measure from this very +conviction that all experience is illusion, when this +conviction is morally effective, as it was with the +Indians. Their belief in transmigration or in Karma +is superfluous in this regard, since a later experience +could only change the illusion without perfecting the +liberation. Yet the mention of some ulterior refuge +or substance is indispensable to the doctrine of illusion, +and though it may be expressed mythically must be +taken to heart too. It points to other realms of being—such +as those which I call the realms of matter, +truth, and spirit—which by nature cannot be data of +intuition but must be posited (if recognised by man +at all) by an instinctive faith expressed in action. +Whether these ulterior realms exist or not is their +own affair: existence may be proper to some, like +matter or spirit, and not to others, like truth. But as +to the data of intuition, their non-existent and illusory +character is implied in the fact that they are given. +A datum is by definition a theme of attention, a term +in passing thought, a visioned universal. The realm +<span class='pageno' id='Page_55'>55</span>in which it lies, and in which flying intuition discloses +it for a moment, is the very realm of non-existence, +of inert or ideal being. The Indians, in asserting the +non-existence of every term in possible experience, +not only free the spirit from idolatry, but free the realm +of spirit (which is that of intuition) from limitation; +because if nothing that appears exists, anything may +appear without the labour and expense of existing; +and fancy is invited to range innocently—fancies not +murdering other fancies as an existence must murder +other existences. While life lasts, the field is thus +cleared for innocent poetry and infinite hypothesis, +without suffering the judgement to be deceived nor +the heart enslaved.</p> + +<p class='c005'>European philosophers, even when called idealists, +have seldom reconciled themselves to regarding experience +as a creature of fancy. Instead of looking +beneath illusion for some principle that might call it +forth or perhaps dispel it, as they would if endeavouring +to interpret a dream, they have treated it as dreams +are treated by the superstitious; that is, they have +supposed that the images they saw were themselves +substances, or powers, or at least imperfect visions of +originals resembling them. In other words, they have +been empiricists, regarding appearances as constituents +of substance. There have been exceptions, but some +of them only prove the rule. Parmenides and Democritus +certainly did not admit that the data of sense or +imagination existed otherwise than as illusions or +conventional signs: but their whole interest, for this +reason, skipped over them, and settled heavily on +“Being,” or on the atoms and the void, which they +severally supposed underlay appearance. Appearance +itself thereby acquired a certain vicarious solidity, +since it was thought to be the garment of substance; +somehow within the visionary datum, or beneath it, +the most unobjectionable substance was always to be +<span class='pageno' id='Page_56'>56</span>found. Parmenides could not have admitted, and +Democritus had not discovered, that the sole basis of +appearances was some event in the brain, in no way +resembling them; and that the relation of data to +the external events they indicated was that of a +spontaneous symbol, like an exclamatory word, and +not that of a copy or emanation. The simple ancients +supposed (as some of my contemporaries do also) that +perception stripped material things of their surface +properties, or was actually these surface properties +peeled off and lodged in the observer’s head. Accordingly +the denial of existence to sensibles and to intelligibles +was never hearty until substance was denied +also, and nothing existent was any longer supposed +to lurk within these appearances or behind them.</p> + +<p class='c005'>All modern idealists have perceived that an actual +appearance cannot be a part of a substance that does +not appear; the given image has only the given +relations; if I assign other relations to it (which I do +if I attribute existence to it) I substitute for the pure +datum one of two other things: either a substance +possessing the same form as that datum, but created +and dissolved in its own medium, at its own periods, +apart from all observation; or else, a perception of +my own, a moment in my experience, carrying the +vision of such an image. The former choice simply +puts me back at the beginning of physics, when a +merely pictorial knowledge of the material world +existed, and nothing of its true mechanism and history +had been discovered. The latter choice posits human +discourse, or as these philosophers call it, experience: +and it is certain that the status of a datum in discourse +or experience is that of a mere appearance, fluctuating, +intermittent, never twice the same, and dependent for +its specious actuality on the movement of attention +and the shuffling of confused images in the fancy. +In other words, what exists—that is, what is carried +<span class='pageno' id='Page_57'>57</span>on through the flux and has changing and external +relations—is a <i>life</i>, discourse itself, the voluminous +adventures of the mind in its wholeness. This is also +what novelists and literary psychologists endeavour +to record or to imagine; and the particular data, +hardly distinguishable by the aid of a word clapped on +to them, are only salient sparks or abstract points of +reference for an observer intent on ulterior events. +It is ulterior events, the whole of human experience +and history as conventionally reported, that is the +object of belief in this school, and the true existence.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Ostensibly empiricists seek to reduce this unmanageable +object to particular data, and to attribute +existence to each scintilla taken separately; but in +reality all the relations of these intuitions (which are +not relations between the data), their temporal order, +subordination to habit and passion, associations, meaning, +and embosoming intelligence, are interpolated as +if they were matters of course; and indeed they are, +because these are the tides of animal life on which +the datum sparkles for a moment. Empiricists are +interested in practice, and wish to work with as light +an intellectual equipment as possible; they therefore +attribute existence to “ideas”—meaning intuitions +but professing to mean data. If they were interested +in these data for their own sake, they would perceive +that they are only symbols, like words, used to mark +or express the crises in their practical career; and +becoming fervid materialists again in their beliefs, as +they have always been in their allegiances, they might +soon go so far as to deny that there is intuition of data +at all: which is a radical way of denying their existence. +Discourse and experience would thus drop out of sight +altogether, and instead of data of intuition there would +be only the pictorial elements of physics—the other +possible form in which anything given may be asserted +to exist.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_58'>58</span>If anything, therefore, exists at all when an appearance +arises, this existence is not the unit that appears, +but either a material fact presenting such an appearance, +though constituted by many other relations, or +else an actual intuition evoking, creating, or dreaming +that non-existent unit. Idealists, if they are thorough, +will deny both; for neither a material thing nor an +actual intuition has its being in being perceived: both, +by definition, exist on their own account, by virtue of +their internal energy and natural relations. Therefore +either existence apart from givenness is admitted, +inconsistently with idealism, or existence is denied +altogether. It is allowed, and in fact urged, by all +complete idealists that appearance, far from involving +the existence of what appears, positively excludes it. +<span lang="la"><i>Esse est percipi</i></span> was a maxim recalled by an intelligible +literary impulse, as Faust said, <span lang="de"><i>Gefühl ist Alles!</i></span> Yet +that maxim was uttered without reflection, because +what those who uttered it really meant was the exact +opposite, namely, that only spirits, or perhaps one +spirit, existed, which were beings perfectly imperceptible. +It was the beautiful and profound part of +such a sentiment that whatever is pictorial is nonexistent. +Data could be only forms assumed by +animal sensibility, like the camel and the weasel seen +by Hamlet in a cloud; as these curious creatures +could have no zoological existence in that nebula, so +the units of human apperception have no existence +anywhere.</p> + +<p class='c005'>When idealists say, therefore, that ideas are the +only objects of human knowledge and that they exist +only in the mind, their language is incoherent, because +knowledge of ideas is not knowledge, and presence +to intuition is not existence. But this incoherence +enables two different philosophies to use the same +formula, to the extreme confusion both of doctrine +and feeling. One philosophy under the name idea +<span class='pageno' id='Page_59'>59</span>conceives of a fact or phenomenon, a phase in the +flux of fortune or experience, existing at a given +moment, and known at other moments to have existed +there: in other words, its ideas are recollected events +in nature, the subject-matter of psychology and +physics. This philosophy, when carried out, becomes +materialism; its psychology turns into a record of +behaviour and its phenomenalistic view of nature into +a mathematical calculus of invisible processes. The +other philosophy (which alone concerns me here) +under the name idea understands the terms of sensation +and thought, and their pictorial or rhetorical +synthesis. Since these themes of intuition are called +upon to absorb all reality, and no belief is accepted +as more than a fresh datum in thought, this philosophy +denies the transcendence of knowledge and the +existence of anything.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Although the temper of absolute idealists is often +far from sceptical, their method is scepticism itself: +as appears not only in their criticism of all dogma, but +in the reasons they give for their own views. What +are these reasons? That the criticism of knowledge +proves that actual thinking is the only reality; that +the objects of knowledge can live, move, and have +their being only within it; that existence is something +merely imputed; and that truth is coherence among +views having themselves no objects. A fact, these +critics say, is a concept. This statement might seem +absurd, since a concept means at most the idea or +supposition of a fact; but if the statement is taken +sympathetically, for what the malicious criticism of +knowledge means by it, it amounts to this: that there +are no facts, but that what we call facts, and believe +to be such, are really only conventional fictions, imaginations +of what facts would be if facts were possible at +all. That facts are ideals, impossible to realise, is +clear on transcendental principles, since a fact would +<span class='pageno' id='Page_60'>60</span>be an event or existence which knowledge would have +to approach and lay siege to somehow from the outside, +so that for knowledge (the only reality on this +system) they would always remain phantoms, creatures +of a superstitious instinct, terms for ever posited but +never possessed, and therefore perpetually unreal. If +fact or truth had any separate being it could not be +an integral part of knowledge; what modicum of +reality facts or truths can possess they must borrow +from knowledge, in which they perforce remain ideals +only; so that it is only as unreal that they are real at +all. Transcendentalists are sure that knowledge is +everything, not because they presume that everything +is known, but precisely because they see that there is +nothing to know. If anything existed actually, or if +there was any independent truth, it would be unknowable, +as these voracious thinkers conceive knowledge. +The glorious thing about knowledge, in their +eyes, is that, as there is nothing to know, knowledge +is a free and a sure creation, new and self-grounded +for ever.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Transcendentalism, when it is thorough, accordingly +agrees with the Indian systems in maintaining that +the illusion that given objects exist has itself no +existence. Any actual sensation, any instance of +thinking, would be a self-existing fact; but facts are +only concepts, that is, inert terms in absolute thought: +if illusions occurred actually, they would not be concepts +but events, and though their visionary objects +might be non-existent, the vision of them would exist; +and they would be the sort of independent facts which +transcendental logic excludes as impossible. Acts of +judging or positing or imagining cannot be admitted +on this system until they in their turn have been +posited in another judgement; that is, until they +cease to hide their heads in the obscurity of self-existence, +and become purely ideal themes of actual +<span class='pageno' id='Page_61'>61</span>intuition. When they have thus become phenomenal, +intent and judgement may posit them and +depute them to exist; but the belief that they exist +otherwise than as present postulates is always false. +Imputed existence is the only existence possible, but +must always be imputed falsely. For example, the +much-talked-of opinions of ancient philosophers, if +they had existed at all, would have had to exist before +they became objects of intuition to the historian, or +to the reader of history, who judges them to have +existed; but such self-existence is repugnant to transcendental +logic: it is a ghost cut off from knowledge +and from the breath of life in me here and now. +Therefore the opinions of philosophers exist only in +history, history exists only in the historian, and the +historian only in the reader; and the reader himself +exists only for his self-consciousness, which is not +really his own, but absolute consciousness thinking +about him or about all things from his point of view. +Thus everything exists only ideally, by being falsely +supposed to exist. The only knowable reality is +unreal because specious, and all other reality is unreal +because unknowable.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Transcendentalists are thus driven, like Parmenides +and the Vedanta philosophy, to withdraw into a dark +interior yet omnipresent principle, the unfathomable +force that sets all this illusion going, and at the same +time rebukes and annuls the illusion. I am here +concerned, let me repeat, with scepticism, not with +compensatory dogmas; but for the transcendentalist, +who fundamentally abhors substance, the compensatory +dogma itself is one more denial of existence. +For what, in his system, is this transcendental seat of +all illusion, this agent in all judgements and positings? +Not an existing spirit, if such a phrase could have a +meaning. Absolute thought cannot exist first, before +it imputes existence to other things or to itself. If it +<span class='pageno' id='Page_62'>62</span>needed to possess existence before imputing it, as the +inexpert in logic might suppose, the whole principle +of transcendental criticism would be abandoned and +disproved, and nothing would any longer prevent the +existence of intuitions or of material things before +any one posited them. But if non-existent, what can +absolute spirit be? Just a principle, a logic to be +embodied, a self-creating programme or duty, asserting +itself without any previous instrument, ground, or +occasion. Existence is something utterly unworthy +of such a transcendental spirit, and repugnant to it. +Spirit is here only a name for absolute law, for the +fatality or chance that one set of appearances instead +of another insists upon arising. No doubt this +fatality is welcome to the enthusiast in whom this +spirit is awake, and its very groundlessness takes on +the form of freedom and creative power to his apprehension: +but this sympathy with life, being expressly +without any natural basis, is itself a happy accident, +and precarious: and sometimes conscience may +suddenly turn against it, and call it vain, mad, and +criminal. Fichte once said that he who truly wills +anything must will that very thing for ever; and +this saying may be interpreted consistently with transcendentalism, +if it is understood to mean that, since +transcendental will is dateless and creates its own +universe wherever it exerts itself, the character of this +will is unalterable in that phase of it, producing just +that vision and that world, which being out of time +cannot be devoured by time. But perhaps even +Fichte was not free from human weakness, and he +may also have meant, or half-meant, that a thorough +education, such as Prussia was called to create, could +fix the will of mankind and turn it into an unalterable +habit; and that a philosopher could pledge the absolute +always to posit the same set of objects. So understood, +the maxim would be contrary to transcendentalism +<span class='pageno' id='Page_63'>63</span>and to the fervent conviction of Fichte himself, which +demanded “new worlds for ever.” Even if he meant +only that the principle of perpetual novelty at least +was safe and could never be betrayed by the event, +he would have contradicted the absolute freedom of +“Life” to be what it willed, and his own occasional +fears that, somewhere and some day, Life might grow +weary, and might consent to be hypnotised and enslaved +by the vision of matter which it had created.</p> + +<p class='c005'>But the frailty even of the greatest idealists is +nothing against idealism, and the principle that +existence is something always imputed, and never +found, is not less cogent if idealists, for the sake of +courtesy, sometimes say that when existence is imputed +necessarily it is imputed truly; and it makes +no difference for my object whether they call fiction +truth because it is legal, or call legality illusion because +it is false. In any case, I can invoke the authority of +this whole school, in which consciousness has been +studied and described with admirable sincerity, for +the thesis I have at heart. They deny with one voice +that anything given can exist on its own account, or +can be anything but a theme chosen by the spirit, a +theme which no substantial thing or event existing +outside could ever force the spirit to conceive or to +copy. Nothing existent can appear, and nothing +specious can exist. An apparition is a thought, its +whole life is but mine in thinking it; and whatever +monition or significance I may attribute to its presence, +it can never be anything but the specious thing it is. +In the routine of animal life, an appearance may be +normal or abnormal, and animal faith or practical +intellect may interpret it in a way practically right or +wrong; but in itself every appearance, just because +it is an appearance, is an illusion.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Confirmation of this thesis may also be found in +an entirely different quarter, in natural history. The +<span class='pageno' id='Page_64'>64</span>sensibility of animals, as judged by their motions and +behaviour, is due to their own structure. The surrounding +facts and forces are like the sun shining and +the rain falling on the just and the unjust; they condition +the existence of the animal and reward any apt +habits which he may acquire; but he survives mainly +by insensibility, and by a sort of pervasive immunity +to most of the vibrations that run through him. It is +only in very special directions, to very special occasional +stimulations, that he develops instinctive responses in +special organs: and his intuitions, if he has them, +express these reactions. If the stimulus is cut off, +the material sources of it may continue to be what +they were, but they will not be perceived. If the +stimulus, or anything equivalent to it, reaches the +brain from any source, as in dreams, the same intuition +will appear, in the absence of the material object. +The feelings of animals express their bodily habit; +they do not express directly either the existence or +the character of any external thing. The intent to +react on these external things is independent of any +presumptive data of intuition and antecedent to their +appearance: it is an animal endeavour in pursuit or +avoidance, or an animal expectation; but the signals +by which intuition may mark the crises of this animal +watch or animal struggle are the same signals as +appear in a dream, when nothing is afoot. The +immediate visionary datum is never the intended +object, but always a pathological symptom, a term in +discourse, a description proffered at that moment by +that feeling for that object, different for each channel +of sense, translating digestibility into taste, salubrity +into freshness, distance into size, refraction into colour, +attitude into outline, distribution into perspective, and +immersing everything in a moral medium, where it +becomes a good or an evil, as it cannot be save to +animal sympathy.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_65'>65</span>All these transcripts, however original in character, +remain symbols in function, because they arise in the +act of focussing animal sensibility or animal endeavour +upon some external influence. In a healthy life they +become the familiar and unmistakable masks of +nature, lending to everything in the environment its +appropriate aspect in human discourse, its nickname +in the human family. For this reason, when +imagination works in a void (as it can do in dreams or +under the influence of violent passion) it becomes +illusion in the bad sense of this word; that is, it is +still taken for a symbol, when it is the symbol of +nothing. All these data, if by a suspension of practical +reference they came to be regarded in themselves, +would cease to be illusions cognitively, since no +existence would be suggested by any of them; but +a practical man might still call them illusions for that +very reason, because although free from error they +would be devoid of truth. In order to reach existences +intent must transcend intuition, and take data for +what they mean, not for what they are; it must credit +them, as understanding credits words, accepting the +passing vision as a warrant for something that once +was, or that will be, or that lies in an entirely different +medium, that of material being, or of discourse elsewhere. +Intuition cannot reveal or discriminate any +fact; it is pure fancy; and the more I sink into it, +and the more absolute I make it, the more fanciful it +becomes. If ever it ceases to mean anything at all, it +becomes pure poetry if placid, and mere delirium if +intense. So a pain, when it is not sorrow at some +event or the sign of some injury or crisis in bodily +life, becomes sheer horror, and a sort of wanton little +hell, existing absolutely; because the rending of the +organism has raised intuition to an extreme intensity +without giving it direction upon anything to be found +or done in the world, or contemplated in the fancy; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_66'>66</span>and pain, when it reaches distraction, may be said to +be that moral monster, intuition devouring itself, or +wasted in agony upon nothing.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Thus scientific psychology confirms the criticism +of knowledge and the experience of life which proclaim +that the immediate objects of intuition are mere +appearances and that nothing given exists as it is +given.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_67'>67</span> + <h2 id='chap09' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='nine'>IX</abbr> <br> THE DISCOVERY OF ESSENCE</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>The loss of faith, as I have already observed, has no +tendency to banish ideas; on the contrary, since +doubt arises on reflection, it tends to keep the imagination +on the stretch, and lends to the whole spectacle +of things a certain immediacy, suavity, and humour. +All that is sordid or tragic falls away, and everything +acquires a lyric purity, as if the die had not yet been +cast and the ominous choice of creation had not been +made. Often the richest philosophies are the most +sceptical; the mind is not then tethered in its home +paddock, but ranges at will over the wilderness of +being. The Indians, who deny the existence of the +world, have a keen sense for its infinity and its variegated +colours; they play with the monstrous and +miraculous in the grand manner, as in the <i>Arabian +Nights</i>. No critic has had a sharper eye for the outlines +of ideas than Hume, who found it impossible +seriously to believe that they revealed anything. In +the critic, as in the painter, suspension of belief and +of practical understanding is favourable to vision; +the arrested eye renders every image limpid and unequivocal. +And this is not merely an effect of physiological +compensation, in that perhaps the nervous +energy withdrawn from preparations for action is +allowed to intensify the process of mere sensation. +There ensues a logical clarification as well; because +<span class='pageno' id='Page_68'>68</span>so long as belief, interpretation, and significance +entered in, the object in hand was ambiguous; in +seeking the fact the mind overlooked or confused the +datum. Yet each element in this eager investigation—including +its very eagerness—is precisely what it is; +and if I renounce for the moment all transitive intelligence, +and give to each of these elements its due +definition, I shall have a much richer as well as clearer +collection of terms and relations before me, than when +I was clumsily attempting to make up my mind. +Living beings dwell in their expectations rather than +in their senses. If they are ever to <i>see</i> what they see, +they must first in a manner stop living; they must +suspend the will, as Schopenhauer put it; they must +photograph the idea that is flying past, veiled in its +very swiftness. This swiftness is not its own fault, +but that of my haste and inattention; my hold is +loose on it, as in a dream; or else perhaps those veils +and that swiftness are the truth of the picture; and +it is they that the true artist should be concerned to +catch and to eternalise, restoring to all that the practical +intellect calls vague its own specious definition. +Nothing is vague in itself, or other than just what it +is. Symbols are vague only in respect to their signification, +when this remains ambiguous.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It is accordingly an inapt criticism often passed +upon Berkeley and Hume that they overlooked vagueness +in ideas, although almost every human idea is +scandalously vague. No, their intuition of ideas, at +least initially, was quite direct and honest. The +ambiguity they overlooked lay in the relation of ideas +to physical things, which they wished to reduce to +groups or series of these pellucid ideas—a chimerical +physics. Had they abstained altogether from identifying +ideas with objects of natural knowledge (which are +events and facts), and from trying to construct material +things out of optical and tactile images, they might +<span class='pageno' id='Page_69'>69</span>have much enriched the philosophy of specious reality, +and discerned the innocent realm of ideas as directly +as Plato did, but more accurately. In this they need +not have confused or undermined faith in natural +things. Perception <i>is</i> faith; more perception may +extend this faith or reform it, but can never recant it +except by sophistry. These virgin philosophers were +like the cubists or futurists in the painting of to-day. +They might have brought to light curious and neglected +forms of direct intuition. They could not justly have +been charged with absurdity for seeing what they +actually saw. But they lapse into absurdity, and that +irremediably, if they pretend to be the first and only +masters of anatomy and topography.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Far from being vague or abstract the obvious ideas +remaining to a complete sceptic may prove too absorbing, +too multitudinous, or too sweet. A moral reprobation +of them is no less intelligible than is the scientific +criticism which rejects them as illusions and as no +constituents of the existing world. Conscience no +less than business may blame the sceptic for a sort +of luxurious idleness; he may call himself a lotus-eater, +may heave a sigh of fatigue at doing nothing, +and may even feel a touch of the vertigo and wish to +close the eyes on all these images that entertain him +to no purpose. But scepticism is an exercise, not a +life; it is a discipline fit to purify the mind of prejudice +and render it all the more apt, when the time comes, +to believe and to act wisely; and meantime the pure +sceptic need take no offence at the multiplicity of +images that crowd upon him, if he is scrupulous not +to trust them and to assert nothing at their prompting. +Scepticism is the chastity of the intellect, and it is +shameful to surrender it too soon or to the first comer: +there is nobility in preserving it coolly and proudly +through a long youth, until at last, in the ripeness of +instinct and discretion, it can be safely exchanged for +<span class='pageno' id='Page_70'>70</span>fidelity and happiness. But the philosopher, when he +is speculative only, is a sort of perpetual celibate; he +is bent on not being betrayed, rather than on being +annexed or inspired; and although if he is at all wise +he must see that the true marriage of the mind is with +nature and science and the practical arts, yet in his +special theoretic vocation, it will be a boon to him to +view all experience simply, in the precision and distinctness +which all its parts acquire when not referred to any +substance which they might present confusedly, nor to +any hypothesis or action which they might suggest.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The sceptic, then, as a consequence of carrying his +scepticism to the greatest lengths, finds himself in the +presence of more luminous and less equivocal objects +than does the working and believing mind; only these +objects are without meaning, they are only what they +are obviously, all surface. They show him everything +thinkable with the greatest clearness and force; +but he can no longer imagine that he sees in these +objects anything save their instant presence and their +face-value. Scepticism therefore suspends all knowledge +worthy of the name, all that transitive and presumptive +knowledge of facts which is a form of belief; +and instead it bestows intuition of ideas, contemplative, +aesthetic, dialectical, arbitrary. But whereas transitive +knowledge, though important if true, may always be +challenged, intuition, on the contrary, which neither +has nor professes to have any ulterior object or truth, +runs no risks of error, because it claims no jurisdiction +over anything alien or eventual.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In this lucidity and calmness of intuition there is +something preternatural. Imagine a child accustomed +to see clothes only on living persons and hardly distinguishing +them from the magical strong bodies that +agitate them, and suddenly carry this child into a +costumer’s shop, where he will see all sorts of garments +hung in rows upon manikins, with hollow breasts all +<span class='pageno' id='Page_71'>71</span>of visible wire, and little wooden nobs instead of heads: +he might be seriously shocked or even frightened. +How should it be possible for clothes standing up like +this not to be people? Such abstractions, he might +say to himself, are metaphysically impossible. Either +these figures must be secretly alive and ready, when he +least expects it, to begin to dance, or else they are not +real at all, and he can only fancy that he sees them. +Just as the spectacle of all these gaunt clothes without +bodies might make the child cry, so later might the +whole spectacle of nature, if ever he became a sceptic. +The little word <i>is</i> has its tragedies; it marries and +identifies different things with the greatest innocence; +and yet no two are ever identical, and if therein lies the +charm of wedding them and calling them one, therein +too lies the danger. Whenever I use the word <i>is</i>, +except in sheer tautology, I deeply misuse it; and +when I discover my error, the world seems to fall +asunder and the members of my family no longer +know one another. Existence is the strong body and +familiar motion which the young mind expects to find +in every dummy. The oldest of us are sometimes no +less recalcitrant to the spectacle of the garments of +existence—which is all we ever saw of it—when the +existence is taken away. Yet it is to these actual and +familiar, but now disembowelled objects, that scepticism +introduces us, as if to a strange world; a vast +costumer’s gallery of ideas where all sorts of patterns +and models are on exhibition, without bodies to wear +them, and where no human habits of motion distract +the eye from the curious cut and precise embroideries of +every article. This display, so complete in its spectacular +reality, not a button nor a feather wanting or +unobserved, is not the living crowd that it ought to +be, but a mockery of it, like the palace of the Sleeping +Beauty. To my conventional mind, clothes without +bodies are no less improper than bodies without +<span class='pageno' id='Page_72'>72</span>clothes; yet the conjunction of these things is but +human. All nature runs about naked, and quite +happy; and I am not so remote from nature as not to +revert on occasion to that nakedness—which is unconsciousness—with +profound relief. But ideas without +things and apparel without wearers seem to me a +stranger condition; I think the garments were made +to fit the limbs, and should collapse without them. +Yet, like the fig leaves of Eden, they are not garments +essentially. They become such by accident, when one +or another of them is appropriated by the providential +buyer—not necessarily human—whose instinct may +choose it; or else it is perfectly content to miss its +chance, and to lie stacked for ever among its motley +neighbours in this great store of neglected finery.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It was the fear of illusion that originally disquieted +the honest mind, congenitally dogmatic, and drove it +in the direction of scepticism; and it may find three +ways, not equally satisfying to its honesty, in which +that fear of illusion may be dispelled. One is death, +in which illusion vanishes and is forgotten; but +although anxiety about error, and even positive error, +are thus destroyed, no solution is offered to the previous +doubt: no explanation of what could have called forth +that illusion or what could have dissipated it. Another +way out is by correcting the error, and substituting a +new belief for it: but while in animal life this is the +satisfying solution, and the old habit of dogmatism +may be resumed in consequence without practical +inconvenience, speculatively the case is not at all +advanced; because no criterion of truth is afforded +except custom, comfort, and the accidental absence of +doubt; and what is absent by chance may return at +any time unbidden. The third way, at which I have +now arrived, is to entertain the illusion without succumbing +to it, accepting it openly as an illusion, and +forbidding it to claim any sort of being but that which +<span class='pageno' id='Page_73'>73</span>it obviously has; and then, whether it profits me or +not, it will not deceive me. What will remain of this +non-deceptive illusion will then be a truth, and a +truth the being of which requires no explanation, since +it is utterly impossible that it should have been otherwise. +Of course I may still ask why the identity of +this particular thing with itself should have occurred +to <i>me</i>; a question which could only be answered by +plunging into a realm of existence and natural history +every part and principle of which would be just as +contingent, just as uncalled-for, and just as inexplicable +as this accident of my being; but that this +particular thing, or any other which might have +occurred to me instead, should be constituted as it is +raises no problem; for how could <i>it</i> have been constituted +otherwise? Nor is there any moral offence +any longer in the contingency of my view of it, since +my view of it involves no error. The error came +from a wild belief about it; and the possibility of +error came from a wild propensity to belief. Relieve +now the pressure of that animal haste and that hungry +presumption; the error is washed out of the illusion; +it is no illusion now, but an idea. Just as food would +cease to be food, and poison poison, if you removed +the stomach and the blood that they might nourish +or infect; and just as beautiful things would cease to +be beautiful if you removed the wonder and the +welcome of living souls, so if you eliminate your +anxiety, deceit itself becomes entertainment, and +every illusion but so much added acquaintance with +the realm of form. For the unintelligible accident of +existence will cease to appear to lurk in this manifest +being, weighting and crowding it, and threatening it +with being swallowed up by nondescript neighbours. +It will appear dwelling in its own world, and shining +by its own light, however brief may be my glimpse of +it: for no date will be written on it, no frame of full +<span class='pageno' id='Page_74'>74</span>or of empty time will shut it in; nothing in it will +be addressed to me, nor suggestive of any spectator. +It will seem an event in no world, an incident in no +experience. The quality of it will have ceased to +exist: it will be merely the quality which it inherently, +logically, and inalienably is. It will be an <span class='sc'>Essence</span>.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Retrenchment has its rewards. When by a difficult +suspension of judgement I have deprived a given image +of all adventitious significance, when it is taken neither +for the manifestation of a substance nor for an idea in +a mind nor for an event in a world, but simply if a +colour for that colour and if music for that music, and +if a face for that face, then an immense cognitive +certitude comes to compensate me for so much cognitive +abstention. My scepticism at last has touched bottom, +and my doubt has found honourable rest in the +absolutely indubitable. Whatever essence I find and +note, that essence and no other is established before +me. I cannot be mistaken about it, since I now have +no object of intent other than the object of intuition. +If for some private reason I am dissatisfied, and wish +to change my entertainment, nothing prevents; but +the change leaves the thing I first saw possessed of all +its quality, for the sake of which I perhaps disliked or +disowned it. That, while one essence is before me, +some one else may be talking of another, which he calls +by the same name, is nothing to the purpose; and if +I myself change and correct myself, choosing a new +essence in place of the old, my life indeed may have +shifted its visions and its interests, but the characters +they had when I harboured them are theirs without +change. Indeed, only because each essence is the essence +defined by instant apprehension can I truly be said to +have changed my mind; for I can have discarded any +one of them only by substituting something different. +This new essence could not be different from the +former one, if each was not unchangeably itself.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_75'>75</span>There is, then, a sort of play with the non-existent, +or game of thought, which intervenes in all alleged +knowledge of matters of fact, and survives that knowledge, +if this is ever questioned or disproved. To this +mirage of the non-existent, or intuition of essence, the +pure sceptic is confined; and confined is hardly the +word; because though without faith and risk he can +never leave that thin and bodiless plane of being, this +plane in its tenuity is infinite; and there is nothing +possible elsewhere that, as a shadow and a pattern, is +not prefigured there. To consider an essence is, from +a spiritual point of view, to enlarge acquaintance with +true being; but it is not even to broach knowledge of +fact; and the ideal object so defined may have no +natural significance, though it has æsthetic immediacy +and logical definition. The modest scope of this +speculative acquaintance with essence renders it infallible, +whilst the logical and æsthetic ideality of its +object renders that object eternal. Thus the most +radical sceptic may be consoled, without being rebuked +nor refuted; he may leap at one bound over the whole +human tangle of beliefs and dogmatic claims, elude +human incapacity and bias, and take hold of the quite +sufficient assurance that any essence or ideal quality +of being which he may be intuiting has just the characters +he is finding in it, and has them eternally.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This is no idle assurance. After all, the only thing +that can ultimately interest me in other men’s experience +or, apart from animal egotism, in my own, is just +this character of the essences which at any time have +swum into our ken; not at all the length of time +through which we may have beheld them, nor the +circumstances that produced that vision; unless these +circumstances in turn, when considered, place before +the mind the essences which it delights to entertain. +Of course, the choice and the interest of essences come +entirely from the bent of the animal that elicits the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_76'>76</span>vision of them from his own soul and its adventures; +and nothing but affinity with my animal life lends the +essences I am able to discern their moral colour, so +that to my mind they are beautiful, horrible, trivial, or +vulgar. The good essences are such as accompany +and express a good life. In them, whether good or +bad, that life has its eternity. Certainly when I cease +to exist and to think, I shall lose hold on this assurance; +but the theme in which for a moment I found the +fulfilment of my expressive impulses will remain, as +it always was, a theme fit for consideration, even if no +one else should consider it, and I should never consider +it again.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Nor is this all. Not only is the character of each +essence inalienable, and, so long as it is open to +intuition, indubitable, but the realm of essences is +infinite. Since any essence I happen to have hit +upon is independent of me and would possess its +precise character if I had never been born, or had +never been led by the circumstances of my life and +temperament to apprehend that particular essence, +evidently all other essences, which I have not been +led to think of, rejoice in the same sort of impalpable +being—impalpable, yet the only sort of being that the +most rugged experience can ever actually find. Thus +a mind enlightened by scepticism and cured of noisy +dogma, a mind discounting all reports, and free from +all tormenting anxiety about its own fortunes or +existence, finds in the wilderness of essence a very +sweet and marvellous solitude. The ultimate reaches +of doubt and renunciation open out for it, by an easy +transition, into fields of endless variety and peace, as +if through the gorges of death it had passed into a +paradise where all things are crystallised into the +image of themselves, and have lost their urgency and +their venom.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_77'>77</span> + <h2 id='chap10' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='ten'>X</abbr> <br> SOME USES OF THIS DISCOVERY</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>There is some danger in pointing out the obvious. +Quick wits, perceiving at once how obvious the obvious +is (though they may never have noticed it before), will +say it is futile and silly to dwell upon it. Pugnacious +people will assume that you mean more than you say, +and are attempting to smuggle in some objectionable +dogma under your truisms. Finally, docile minds, +pleased to think you are delivering an oracle for their +edification, will bow before your plain words as before +some sacred mystery. The discernment of essence is +subject, I know, to all these misunderstandings, and +before going further I will endeavour to remove them.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In the first place, a warning to tender idealists. +This recognition that the data of experience are +essences is Platonic, but it is a corrective to all that is +sentimental in Platonism, curing it as it were homœopathically. +The realm of essence is not peopled +by choice forms or magic powers. It is simply the +unwritten catalogue, prosaic and infinite, of all the +characters possessed by such things as happen to exist, +together with the characters which all different things +would possess if they existed. It is the sum of mentionable +objects, of terms about which, or in which, something +might be said. Thus although essences have +the texture and ontological status of Platonic ideas, +they can lay claim to none of the cosmological, metaphysical, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_78'>78</span>or moral prerogatives attributed to those +ideas. They are infinite in number and neutral in +value. Greek minds had rhetorical habits; what told +in debate seemed to them final; and Socrates thought +it important to define in disputation the common +natures designated by various words. Plato, who was +initially a poet, had a warmer intuition of his ideas; +but it was still grammar and moral prejudice that led +him to select and to deify them. The quality or +function that makes all shepherds shepherds or all +goods good is an essence; but so are all the remaining +qualities which make each shepherd and each good +distinguishable from every other. Far from gathering +up the fluidity of existence into a few norms for +human language and thought to be focussed upon, +the realm of essence infinitely multiplies that multiplicity, +and adds every undiscriminated shade and +mode of being to those which man has discriminated +or which nature contains. Essence is not something +invented or instituted for a purpose; it is something +passive, anything that might be found, every quality +of being; it therefore has not the function of reducing +plurality to unity for the convenience of our poor +wits or economy of language. It is far more garrulous +than nature, herself not laconic.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Nor have essences a metaphysical status, so as to +exercise a non-natural control over nature. My +doctrine lends no countenance to the human presumption +that whatsoever man notices or names or +loves ought to be more deeply seated in reality or more +permanent than what he ignores or despises. The +good is a great magnet over discourse and imagination, +and therefore rightly rules the Platonic world, which +is that of moral philosophy only; but this good is +itself defined and chosen by the humble animal nature +of man, demanding to eat and live and love. In the +realm of essence this human good has no pre-eminence, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_79'>79</span>and being an essence it has no power. The Platonic +notion that ideas were models which things imperfectly +imitated expresses admirably the moral nature +of man attaining to self-knowledge and proclaiming +clearly his instinctive demands; or possibly (if the +moralist is also a poet plastic to the wider influences +of nature) defining also the demands which non-human +creatures would make on themselves or on us +if they had life and thought. Platonic ideas, in their +widest range, express sympathy with universal life; +they are anagrams of moral insight. Hence their +nobility, and constant appeal to minds struggling after +perfection, whether in art or in self-discipline. The +spirit, by expressing itself in them, is fortified, as the +artist is by his work taking shape before his eyes and +revealing to him his own hidden intentions and judgements +never expressed. But the realm of essence is +no more limited to these few ideals chosen and projected +heavenwards by the aspiration of living creatures, +than the celestial galaxy is limited to the north star. +Excellence is relative to the accidental life of nature +which selects now one essence and now another to be +the goal of some thought or endeavour. In the realm +of essence no emphasis falls on these favourite forms +which does not fall equally on every other member +of that infinite continuum. Every bad thing—bad +because false to the ideal which its own nature may +propose to it—illustrates an essence quite as accurately +as if it had been good. No essence, except temporarily +and by accident, is the goal of any natural process, +much less its motive power.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Thus the discernment of essence, while confirming +Platonic logic in the ideal status which it assigns to +the terms of discourse (and discourse includes all that +is mental in sensation and perception), destroys the +illusions of Platonism, because it shows that essences, +being non-existent and omnimodal, can exercise no +<span class='pageno' id='Page_80'>80</span>domination over matter, but themselves come to light +in nature or in thought only as material exigencies may +call them forth and select them. The realm of essence +is a perfect democracy, where everything that is or +might be has a right of citizenship; so that only some +arbitrary existential principle—call it the predispositions +in matter or the blindness of absolute will—can +be rendered responsible, in a verbal metaphysics, +for things being as they are, causing them to fall now +into this form and now into that, or to choose one +essence rather than another to be their type and ideal. +These chosen types are surrounded in the realm of +essence by every monster, every unexampled being, +and every vice; no more vicious there, no more +anomalous or monstrous than any other nature. Seen +against that infinite background even the star-dust +of modern astronomy, with its strange rhythms and +laws, and its strange fertility, seems the most curious +of accidents: what a choice for existence to make, +when it might have been anything else! And as to +the snug universe which the ancients, and most men +in their daily thoughts, have imagined about them, +presided over by its Olympian deities, or its Jewish +God, or its German Will, it is not only the figment of +the most laughable egotism, but even if by chance it +were the actual world, it would be utterly contingent +and ephemeral.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This is one hygienic effect of the discovery of +essence: it is a shower-bath for the dreamy moralist, +and clears Platonism of superstition.</p> + +<p class='c005'>On the other hand, the discernment of essence +reinstates the Socratic analysis of knowledge, by +showing that essences are indispensable terms in the +perception of matters of fact, and render transitive +knowledge possible. If there were no purely ideal +characters present to intuition yet not existentially a +part either of the mind or of the environment, nothing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_81'>81</span>ulterior could ever be imagined, much less truly +conceived. Every supposed instance of knowledge +would be either a bit of sentience without an object, +or an existing entity unrelated to any mind. But an +essence given in intuition, being non-existent in itself +and by no means the object at that moment intended by +the animal in his alertness or pursuit, may become a +description of that object. If there is to be intelligence +at all, the immediate must be vehicular. It is so +when animal fancy is turned to the description of +things; for then passive sensibility supplies terms +which are in themselves volatile and homeless, and +these terms may be dispersed as names, to christen +the things that receive them, carrying intelligence by +its intent to its objects (objects already selected by +animal endeavour) and reporting the objects to the +animal mind by their appearance. What is given +becomes in this manner a sign for what is sought, +and a conventional description of it; and the object +originally posited by faith and intent in the act of +living may be ultimately more and more accurately +revealed to belief and to thought. Essences are ideal +terms at the command of fancy and of the senses +(whose data are fancies) as words are at the command +of a ready tongue. If thought arises at all, it must +think something after some fashion; and the essences +it evokes in intuition enable it to imagine, to assert, +and perhaps truly to know something about what is +not itself nor its own condition: some existing thing +or removed event which would otherwise run on +blindly in its own medium, at best overtaking the +animal unawares, or confronting him to no purpose. +But when the animate body responds to circumstances +and is sensitive, in various unprecedented ways, to +their variations, it acquires a whole sensuous vocabulary +in which to describe them, colours, sounds, shapes, +sizes, excellences, and defects being the parts of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_82'>82</span>speech in its grammar. It feels hot or cold according +to the season; so that cold and heat become signs of +the seasons for the spirit, the homely poetry in which +the senses render the large facts and the chief influences +of nature. Perhaps even the vegetative soul has her +dreams, but in the animal these floating visions are +clarified by watchfulness and can be compared and +contrasted in their character as well as in their occasions; +and they lend intelligence terms in which to think and +judge. The toys of sense become the currency of commerce; +ideas, which were only echoes of facts, serve +as symbols for them. Thus intuition of essences first +enables the mind to say something about anything, +to think of what is not given, and to be a mind at all.</p> + +<p class='c005'>A great use of the discovery of essence, then, is to +justify the notions of intelligence and knowledge, otherwise +self-contradictory, and to show how such transcendence +of the actual is possible for the animal mind.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The notion of essence is also useful in dismissing +and handing over to physical science, where it belongs, +the mooted question concerning the primary and +secondary qualities of matter. There is a profound +but genuine problem here which no logical discrimination +and no psychological analysis can affect, namely: +What are the elements of matter, and by what arrangement +or motion of these elements do gross bodies +acquire their various properties? The physical philosophers +must tell us, if they can, how matter is composed: +and as they are compelled, like the rest of us, +to begin by studying the aspects and behaviour of +obvious bodies, on the scale of human perception, it +is but fair to give them time, or even eternity, in +which to come to a conclusion. But the question of +primary and secondary qualities, as mooted in modern +philosophy, is a false problem. It rests on the presumption +that the data of sense can be and should +be constituents of the object in nature, or at least +<span class='pageno' id='Page_83'>83</span>exactly like its constituents. The object in nature is, +for example, bread I am eating: and the presumption +of modern psychologists is that this object is, or +ought to be, composed of my sensations of contact, +colour, temperature, movement, and pleasure in eating +it. The pleasure and the colour, however, soon prove +to be reversible according to the accidents of appetite +or jaundice in me, without any change in the object +itself. In the act of eating (overlooked by these +psychologists) I have my radical assurance of that +object, know its place, and continue to testify to its +identity. The bread, for animal faith, is this thing +I am eating, and causing to disappear to my substantial +advantage; and although language is clumsy in +expressing this assurance, which runs much deeper +than language, I may paraphrase it by saying that +bread is this substance I can eat and turn into my +own substance; in seizing and biting it I determine +its identity and its place in nature, and in transforming +it I prove its existence. If the psychological critics +of experience overlooked this animal faith in fact as +they do in theory, their theory itself would have no +point of application, and they would not know what +they were talking about, and would not really be +talking about anything. Their data would have no +places and no context. As it is, they continue +illegitimately to posit the bread, as an animal would, +and then, in their human wisdom, proceed to remove +from the description of it the colour and the pleasure +concerned, as being mere effects on themselves, while +they identify the bread itself with the remainder of +their description hypostatised: shape, weight, and +hardness. But how should some data, when posited, +produce others entirely different, but contemporary, +or perhaps earlier? Evidently these so-called primary +qualities are simply those essences which custom or +science continues to use in its description of things: +<span class='pageno' id='Page_84'>84</span>but meantime the things have evaporated, and the +description of them, in no matter what terms, ought +to be idle and useless. All knowledge of nature and +history has become a game of thought, a laborious +dream in which a dim superstition makes me believe +that some trains of images are more prosperous than +others.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It is because essences are not discerned that philosophers +in so many ways labour the hopeless notion +that there is nothing in sense which is not first in +things. Either perception and knowledge (which are +animal faith) are deputed to be intuition, so that +things have to be composed pictorially, out of the +elements of human discourse, as if their substance +consisted of images pressed together like a pack of +cards; or else ideas must be explained as imports +from the outer world, prolonging the qualities of +things, as if the organs of sense were only holes in +the skin, through which emanations of things could +pass ready-made into the heart or head, and perhaps +in those dark caverns could breed unnaturally together, +producing a monstrous brood of dreams and errors. +But, as a matter of fact, elaborate bodily mechanisms +are just as requisite for seeing as for thinking, and +the landscape, as a man sees it, is no less human than +the universe as his philosophy constructs it—and we +know how human that is. Evidences soon accumulate +to prove that no quality in the object is like any datum +of sense. Nothing given exists. Consider, for instance, +the water which seems cold to one hand and +warm to the other. Shall the water be called hot or +cold? Both, certainly, if a full description of it, in +all its relations and appearances, is what is sought. +But if what is sought is the substance of the water, +properties shown to be relative to my organs of sense +cannot be “real” qualities of that substance. Their +original (for they were still expected to have originals) +<span class='pageno' id='Page_85'>85</span>was accordingly placed elsewhere. Perhaps the “real” +cold might be in the warm hand, and the “real” +warmth in the cold one; or in cold and hot tracts of +the brain respectively; or else “in the mind”—a +substance which might endure heat and cold simultaneously +in different parts of itself. Or perhaps the mind +was simply the heat and the cold existing successively, +each a feeling absolute in itself: but in this case a +second mind would be required to observe, remember, +and appropriate those existing feelings, and how +should reflection reach those feelings or know at all +what they were? If they are past, how should +intuition possess them now? And if they are only +the present data of intuition, need they ever have +existed before, or in any form but that in which I +feel them now, when I feel them no longer?</p> + +<p class='c005'>The notion that knowledge is intuition, that it +must either penetrate to the inner quality of its object +or else have no object but the overt datum, has not +been carried out with rigour: if it had, it might have +been sooner abandoned. Rudimentary vital feelings, +such as pleasure or hunger, are not supposed even by +the most mythological philosophers to be drawn from +external sources of the same quality. Plato in one +place says of intelligence that there must surely be +floods of it in the vast heavens, as there are floods +of light there, whence puny man may draw his +dribblet. He neglects, however, to extend this principle +to pain, pleasure, or hunger. He does not argue +that my paltry pains and pleasures can be but drops +sucked in from some vast cosmic reservoir of these +feelings, nor that my momentary hunger could never +have improvised its own quality, but must be only a +bit, transferred to my mortal stomach, of a divine +hunger eternally gnawing the whole sky. Yet this +is the principle on which many a candid idolater has +supposed, and still supposes, that light, space, music, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_86'>86</span>and reason, as his intuition renders them, must +permeate the universe.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The illusion is childish, and when we have once +discerned essence, it seems strangely idolatrous. The +essences given in intuition are fetched from no original. +The reason, music, space, and light of my imagination +are essences existing nowhere: the intuition of them +is quite as spiritual and quite as personal as my pain, +pleasure, or hunger, and quite as little likely to be +drawn from an imaginary store of similar substances +in the world at large. They are dream-lights kindled +by my fancy, like all the terms of discourse; they do +not need to be previously resident either in the object +or in the organ of sense. Not existing at all, they +cannot be the causes of their own appearance; nor +would introducing an existing triangle under the skin, +or making the brain triangular, in the least help to +display the triangle to intuition. But if some material +thing called a triangle is placed before me at a suitable +distance, my eyes and brain will do the rest, and the +essence dear to Euclid will arise in my mind’s eye. +No essence would ever appear simply because many +hypostatic instances of it existed in the world: a +living body must create the intuition and blossom into +it, evoking some spontaneous image. Sense is a +faculty of calling names under provocation; all +perception and thought are cries and comments +elicited from the heart of some living creature. They +are original, though not novel, like the feelings of +lovers: normal phases of animation in animals, whose +life carries this inner flux of pictures and currents in +the fancy, mixed with little and great emotions and +dull bodily feelings: nothing in all this discourse +being a passive copy of existences elsewhere.</p> + +<p class='c005'>On the other hand, if the so-called primary qualities, +taken pictorially, are just as symbolic as the secondary +ones, the secondary, taken indicatively, are just as true +<span class='pageno' id='Page_87'>87</span>as the primary. They too report some particularity +in the object which, being relative to me, may be of +the highest importance, and being also relative to +something in the constitution of the object, may be a +valuable indication of its nature, like greenness in +grapes. The qualities most obviously relative and +reversible, like pleasant and unpleasant, good and bad, +are truly qualities of things in some of their relations. +They can all, by judicious criticism and redistribution, +become <i>true</i> expressions of the life of nature. They +have their exits and their entrances at appointed +times, and they supply a perspective view, or caricature, +of the world no less interesting and pungent for being +purely egotistical. Artists have their place, and the +animal mind is one of them.</p> + +<p class='c005'>That like knows like is a proverb, and after the +manner of proverbs it is applicable on occasion, but +its opposite is so too. Similar minds can understand +the same things, and in that sense can understand +each other: they can share and divine one another’s +thoughts. This is because similar organs under +similar stimulation will yield similar intuitions, revealing +the same essence: like knows like by dramatic +sympathy and ideal unanimity. But in sensuous +perception the unlike knows the unlike. Here the +organ is not adjusted to a similar organ, like instruments +tuned up to the same key: the adjustment is +rather to heterogeneous events in the environment or +remote facts on quite a different scale; and the images +that mediate this knowledge are quite unlike the events +they signify. It would be grotesque to expect a +flower to imitate or to resemble the soil, climate, +moisture, and light, or even the seed and sap, that +preside over its budding: but the flower presupposes +all these agencies and is an index to them; an index +which may become a sign and a vehicle of knowledge +when it is used as an index by some discursive observer. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_88'>88</span>Any given essence is normally a true sign for the +object or event which occupies animal attention when +that essence appears: as it is true of arsenic that it is +poisonous and of pepper that it is hot, although the +quality of being hot or poisonous cannot possibly be +a material constituent of those substances, nor a copy +of such a constituent. The environment determines +the occasions on which intuitions arise, the psyche—the +inherited organisation of the animal—determines +their form, and ancient conditions of life on earth no +doubt determined which psyches should arise and +prosper; and probably many forms of intuition, +unthinkable to man, express the facts and the rhythms +of nature to other animal minds. Yet all these various +symbolisms and sensuous dialects may be truly +significant, composing most relevant complications in +nature, by which she comments on herself. To +suppose that some of these comments are poetical +and others literal is gratuitous. They are all presumably +poetical in form (intuition being poetry in act) +and all expressive in function, and addressed to the +facts of nature in some human and moral perspective, +as poetry is too.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The absurdity of wishing to have <i>intuitions of +things</i> reaches its climax when we ask whether things, +if nobody looked at them, would still look as they do. +Of course they would still be what they are: but +whether their intrinsic essence, whether they are +looked at or not, <i>resembles</i> such essences as eyes of one +sort or another might gather by looking at them, is an +idle question. It is not resemblance but relevance +and closeness of adaptation that render a language +expressive or an expression true. We read nature as +the English used to read Latin, pronouncing it like +English, but understanding it very well. If all other +traditions of Latin euphony had been lost, there would +have been no means of discovering in what respect +<span class='pageno' id='Page_89'>89</span>the English pronunciation was a distortion, although +the judicious would have suspected that the Romans +could not have had an Oxonian accent. So each +tribe of animals, each sense, each stage of experience +and science, reads the book of nature according to a +phonetic system of its own, with no possibility of +exchanging it for the native sounds: but this situation, +though hopeless in one sense, is not unsatisfactory +practically, and is innocently humorous. It adds to +the variety, if not to the gaiety, of experience; and +perhaps a homely accent in knowledge, as in Latin, +renders learning more savoury and familiar, and makes +us more willing to read.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It is just because the images given in sense are so +very original and fantastic that understanding can +enlarge knowledge by correcting, combining, and +discounting those appearances. Sensible qualities, +like pet names, do very well at home, when no consistent +or exact description of things is required, but +only some familiar signal. When it comes to public +business, however, more serious and legal designations +have to be used, and these are what we call science. +The description is not less symbolic but more accurate +and minute. It may also involve—as in optics and +psychology—a discovery of the images of sense as +distinct from their original uses as living visions of +things; and we may then learn that our immediate +experience was but a diving-board, on which we +hardly knew we were standing in plunging into the +world. It was indeed essentially a theoretic eminence, +a place of outlook, intended to fortify and prepare us +for the plunge. Accordingly the symbols of sense are +most relevant to their object at the remove and on the +scale on which our daily action encounters it. In +science, analogies and hypotheses, if not microscopes +and telescopes, supply ideas of things more immediate +or more remote. Thus the warmth and the cold felt +<span class='pageno' id='Page_90'>90</span>at once in the same water inform me more directly +about the water in relation to my two hands, than +about my temperature, my brain, or my intuitions; +and yet these things too are involved in that event +and may be discovered in it by science. But science +and sense, though differing in their scope, are exactly +alike in their truth; and the views taken by science, +though more penetrating and extensive, are still views: +ground plans, elevations, and geometric projections +taking the place of snapshots. All intuitions, whether +in sense or thought, are theoretic: all are appropriate +renderings, on some method and on some scale, of +the circumstances in which they arise, and may serve +to describe those circumstances truly: but experience +and tact are requisite, as in the use of any language +or technique of art, in distributing our stock symbols, +and fitting the image to the occasion and the word to +the fact.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The notion of essence also relieves the weary +philosopher of several other problems, even more +scholastic and artificial, concerning sensations and +ideas, particulars and universals, the abstract and the +concrete. There are no such differences in essences +as they are given: all are equally immediate and +equally unsubstantial, equally ideal and equally complete. +Nothing could be more actual and specific +than some unpleasant inner feeling or sentiment, as +it colours the passing moment; yet nothing could be +less descriptive of anything further, or vaguer in its +significance, or more ephemeral an index to processes +and events which it does not disclose but which are +all its substance. And the clearest idea—say a geometrical +sphere—and the most remote from sense +(if we mean by sense the images actually supplied +by the outer organs) is just such a floating presence, +caught and lost again, an essence that in itself tells +me nothing of its validity, nor of a world of fact to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_91'>91</span>which it might apply. All these current distinctions +are extraneous to essences, which are the only data +of experience. The distinctions are borrowed from +various ulterior existential relations subsisting between +facts, some mental and some material, but none of +them ever given in intuition. The mental facts, +namely the intuitions to which the essences appear, +may be confused by psychologists with those essences, +as the material things supposed to possess those +essences as qualities may be confused with them by +the practical intellect, and both may be called by the +same names; a double equivocation which later +enables the metaphysician, by a double hypostasis of +the datum, to say that the material thing and the +mental event are one and the same <i>given fact</i>. We +may innocently speak of given facts, meaning those +posited in previous perceptions or referred to in +previous discourse: but no fact can be a given fact +in the sense of being a datum of intuition. And it is +entirely on relations between facts not given that +those current distinctions rest. They may often +express truly the relative scope of intuitions, or the +manner in which they take place amongst the general +events in nature or arise in the animal body: but in +respect to essences, which are the only terms of actual +thought, they are perfectly unmeaning.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Suppose, for instance, that I see yellow, that my +eyes are open, and that there is a buttercup before +me; my intuition (not properly the essence “yellow” +which is the datum) is then called a sensation. If +again I see yellow with my eyes closed, the intuition +is called an idea or a dream—although often in what +is called an idea no yellow appears, but only words. +If yet again I see yellow with my eyes open, but there +is no buttercup, the intuition is called a hallucination. +These various situations are curious, and worth distinguishing +in optics and in medical psychology, but +<span class='pageno' id='Page_92'>92</span>for the sceptical scrutiny of experience they make no +difference. What can inform me, when I see yellow +simply, whether my eyes are open or shut, or whether +I am awake or dreaming, or what functions material +buttercups may have in psycho-physical correlation, +or whether there is anything physical or anything +psychical in the world, or any world at all? These +notions are merely conventional, imported knowledge +or imported delusion. Such extraneous circumstances, +whether true or false, cannot alter in the least the +essence which I have before me, nor its sort of reality, +nor its status in respect to my intuition of it.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Suppose again that I am at sea and feel the ship +rocking. This feeling is called external perception; +but if I feel nausea, my feeling is called internal +sensation, or emotion, or introspection; and there +are sad psychologists to conclude thence that while +the ship rocking is something physical, and a mere +appearance, nausea is something psychical, and an +absolute reality. Why this partiality in distributing +metaphysical dignities amongst things equally obvious? +Each essence that appears appears just as it is, because +its appearance defines it, and determines the whole +being that it is or has. Nothing given is either +physical or mental, in the sense of being intrinsically +a thing or a thought; it is just a quality of being. +Essences (like “rocking”) which serve eventually to +describe material facts are given in intuitions which +are just as mental as those which supply psychological +terms for describing mental discourse. On the other +hand, essences (like “nausea”) used first perhaps for +describing discourse, mark crises in the flux of matter +just as precisely as those which are used to describe +material facts directly; because discourse goes on in +animals subject to material influences. But in neither +case can the intuitions—which constitute discourse +and the mental sphere—be ever given in intuition. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_93'>93</span>They are posited in memory, expectation, and dramatic +psychology. The rocking I feel is called physical, +because the essence before me—say coloured planes +crossing—serves to report and designate very much +more complicated and prolonged movements in the +ship and the waves; and the nausea I also feel is +called psychical, because it reports nothing (unless +my medical imagination intervenes) but is endured +pathetically, with a preponderating sense of time, +change, and danger, as it largely consists in feeling +how long this lasts, how upset I am, and how sick I +am about to be.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Again, if I see yellow once, my experience is called +a particular impression, and its object, yellow, is +supposed to exist and to be a particular too; but if +I see yellow again, yellow has mysteriously become a +universal, a general idea, and an abstraction. Yet the +datum for intuition is throughout precisely the same. +No essence is abstract, yet none is a particular thing +or event, none is an object of belief, perception, or +pursuit, having a particular position in the context of +nature. Even the intuition, though it is an event, +cannot become an object of pursuit or perception; +and its conventional place in history, when it has been +posited and is believed to have occurred, is assigned +to it only by courtesy, at the place and time of its +physical support, as a wife in some countries takes +her husband’s name. Not the data of intuition, but +the objects of animal faith, are the particulars perceived: +they alone are the existing things or events to which +the animal is reacting and to which he is attributing +the essences which arise, as he does so, before his +fancy. These data of intuition are universals; they +form the elements of such a description of the object +as is at that time possible; they are never that object +itself, nor any part of it. Essences are not drawn out +or abstracted from things; they are given before the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_94'>94</span>thing can be clearly perceived, since they are the +terms used in perception; but they are not given +until attention is stretched upon the thing, which is +posited blindly in action; and they come as revelations, +or oracles, delivered by that thing to the mind, and +symbolising it there. In itself, as suspended understanding +may suffer us to recognise it in reflection, +each essence is a positive and complete theme: it is +impossible that for experience anything should be more +concrete or individual than is this exact and total +appearance before me. Having never been parts of +any perceived object, it is impossible that given +essences should be abstracted from it. Being obvious +and immediate data they cannot even have that +congenital imperfection, that limp, which we might +feel in a broken arch, or in the half of anything already +familiar as a whole. But given essences are indeed +visionary, they are unsubstantial; and in that respect +they seem strange and unearthly to an animal expecting +to work amongst things without realising their appearance. +Yet ghostly as his instinct may deem them, +they are perfect pictures, with nothing abstract or +abstruse in their specious nature. The abstract is a +category posterior to intuition, and applicable only to +terms, such as numbers and other symbols of mathematics, +which have been intentionally substituted for +other essences given earlier, by which they were +suggested; but even these technical terms are abstract +only by accident and in function; they have a concrete +essence of their own, and are constitutive elements of +perfectly definite structures in their own plane of +being, forming patterns and running into scales there, +like so much music.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Similarly, nothing given in sensation or thought is +in the least vague in itself. Vagueness is an adventitious +quality, which a given appearance may be said +to possess in relation to an object presumed to have +<span class='pageno' id='Page_95'>95</span>other determinations: as the cloud in <i>Hamlet</i> is but +a vague camel or a vague weasel, but for the landscape-painter +a perfectly definite cloud. The vague is +merely the <i>too</i> vague for some assumed purpose; and +philosophers with a mania for accuracy, who find all +discourse vague that is discourse about anything in +the world of practice, are like critics of painting who +should find all colours and forms vague, when they +had been touched by aerial perspective, or made +poetical by the rich dyes of fancy and expression. +That sort of vagueness is perfection of artistic form, +as the other sort of vagueness may be perfection of +judgement: for knowledge lies in thinking aptly about +things, not in becoming like them. If the standard +of articulation in science were the articulation of +existence, science would be impossible for an animal +mind, and if it were possible would be useless: +because nothing would be gained for thought by +reproducing a mechanism without any adaptation of +its scale and perspective to the nature of the thinker.</p> + +<p class='c005'>If the instincts of man were well adapted to his +conditions, his thoughts, without being more accurate, +would not seem confused. As it is, intuition is most +vivid in the act of hunting or taking alarm, just when +mistakes are probable: and any obvious essence is +then precipitated upon the object, and quarrelled with +and dismissed if the object does not sustain it. An +essence, however evident, may even be declared +absent and inconceivable, if it cannot be attributed +absolutely to the substance of the object being chased +or eaten. The hungry nominalist may well say to +himself: “If the hues of the pheasant are no part of +the bird, whence should he have fetched them? Am +I not looking at the very creature I am pursuing and +hoping presently to devour? And as my teeth and +hands cannot possibly add anything to the substance +they will seize upon, how should my eyes do so now? +<span class='pageno' id='Page_96'>96</span>If therefore any alleged image can be proved to be +no part of my object, I must be mistaken in supposing +that I see such an image at all.” This is also the +argument of the primitive painter, who knowing that +men have two eyes and their hands five fingers, will +not admit that their image might be less complete. +In this way the wand of that Queen Mab, intuition, +is assimilated by a too materialistic philosophy to a +tongue or an antenna, and required to reach out to the +object and stir it up, exploring its intrinsic quality and +structure. But it is a magic wand, and calls up only +wild and ignorant visions, mischievous and gaily +invented; and if ever a philosopher dreams he has +fathomed the thing before him in action, that wand is +tickling his nose. Intuition cheats in enriching him, +and nature who whispers all these tales in his ear is +laughing at him and fondling him at the same time. +It is a kindly fiction; because the dreams she inspires +are very much to his mind, and the lies she invents +for his benefit are her poetic masterpiece. Practical +men despise the poetry of poets, but they are well +pleased with their own. They would be ashamed of +amusements which might defeat their purposes, or +mislead them about the issue of events; but they +embrace heartily the ingenuous fictions of the senses +which they almost recognise to be fictions, and even +the early myths and religions of mankind. These +they find true enough for practical and moral purposes; +their playfulness is a convenient compendium for facts +too hard to understand; they are the normal poetry +of observation and policy. Fancy disorganises conduct +only when it expresses vice; and then it is the vice +that does the mischief, and not the fancy.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Even philosophers, when they wish to be very +plain and economical, sometimes fall to denying the +immediate. Fact-worship, which is an idolatry of +prudence, prejudices them against their own senses, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_97'>97</span>and against the mind, which is what prudence serves, +if it serves anything; and perhaps they declare themselves +incapable of framing images with fewer determinations +than they believe material things to possess. +If a material triangle must have a perfectly defined +shape (although at close quarters matter might elude +such confines), or if a material house must have a +particular number of bricks and a particular shade of +colour at each point of its surface, a professed empiricist +like Berkeley may be tempted to deny that he +can have an idea of a triangle, <i>et cetera</i>, without such +determinations; whereas, however clear his visual +images may have been, it is certain he never could +have had, even in direct perception, an image specifying +all the bricks or all the tints of <i>any</i> house, nor +the exact measure of <i>any</i> angle. Berkeley himself, +I suspect, was secretly intent upon essence, which in +every degree of conventional determination is its own +standard of completeness. But given essences have +any degree of vagueness in respect to the material or +mathematical objects which they may symbolise, and +to which Berkeley in his hasty nominalism wished to +assimilate them. He almost turned given essences +into substances, to take the place of those material +things which he had denied. Each essence is certainly +not two contradictory essences at once; but the +definitions which render each precisely what it is lie +in the realm of essence, an infinite continuum of +discrete forms, not in the realm of existence. Essences, +in order to appear, do not need to beg leave of what +happens to exist, or to draw its portrait; yet here the +trooping essences are, in such gradations and numbers +as intuition may lend them. It is not by hypostatising +them as they come that their roots in matter or their +scope in knowledge can be discovered.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Thus the discrimination of essence has a happy +tendency to liberalise philosophy, freeing it at once +<span class='pageno' id='Page_98'>98</span>from literalness and from scepticism. If all data are +symbols and all experience comes in poetic terms, it +follows that the human mind, both in its existence and +in its quality, is a free development out of nature, a +language or music the terms of which are arbitrary, +like the rules and counters of a game. It follows also +that the mind has no capacity and no obligation to +copy the world of matter nor to survey it impartially. +At the same time, it follows that the mind affords a +true expression of the world, rendered in vital perspectives +and in human terms, since this mind arises +and changes symptomatically at certain foci of animal +life; foci which are a part of nature in dynamic correspondence +with other parts, diffused widely about +them; so that, for instance, alternative systems of +religion or science, if not taken literally, may equally +well express the actual operation of things measured +by different organs or from different centres.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_99'>99</span> + <h2 id='chap11' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='eleven'>XI</abbr> <br> THE WATERSHED OF CRITICISM</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>I have now reached the culminating point of my +survey of evidence, and the entanglements I have left +behind me and the habitable regions I am looking for +lie spread out before me like opposite valleys. On the +one hand I see now a sweeping reason for scepticism, +over and above all particular contradictions or fancifulness +of dogma. Nothing is ever present to me except +some essence; so that nothing that I possess in +intuition, or actually see, is ever <i>there</i>; it can never +exist bodily, nor lie in that place or exert that power +which belongs to the objects encountered in action. +Therefore, if I regard my intuitions as knowledge of +facts, all my experience is illusion, and life is a dream. +At the same time I am now able to give a clearer +meaning to this old adage; for life would not be a +dream, and all experience would not be illusion, if +I abstained from believing in them. The evidence +of data is only obviousness; they give no evidence of +anything else; they are not witnesses. If I am content +to recognise them for pure essences, they cannot +deceive me; they will be like works of literary fiction, +more or less coherent, but without any claim to exist +on their own account. If I hypostatise an essence +into a fact, instinctively placing it in relations which +are not given within it, I am putting my trust in +animal faith, not in any evidence or implication of my +<span class='pageno' id='Page_100'>100</span>actual experience. I turn to an assumed world about +me, because I have organs for turning, just as I expect +a future to reel itself out without interruption because +I am wound up to go on myself. To such ulterior +things no manifest essence can bear any testimony. +They must justify themselves. If the ulterior fact is +some intuition elsewhere, its existence, if it happens to +exist, will justify that belief; but the fulfilment of my +prophecy, in taking my present dream for testimony +to that ulterior experience, will be found only in the +realm of truth—a realm which is itself an object of +belief, never by any possibility of intuition, human or +divine. So too when the supposed fact is thought +of as a substance, its existence, if it is found in the +realm of nature, will justify that supposition; but the +realm of nature is of course only another object of +belief, more remote if possible from intuition than +even the realm of truth. Intuition of essence, to which +positive experience and certitude are confined, is therefore +always illusion, if we allow our hypostatising +impulse to take it for evidence of anything else.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In adopting this conclusion of so many great +philosophers, that all is illusion, I do so, however, with +two qualifications. One is emotional and moral only, +in that I do not mourn over this fatality, but on the +contrary rather prefer speculation in the realm of +essence—if it can be indulged without practical inconvenience—to +alleged information about hard facts. +It does not seem to me ignominious to be a poet, if +nature has made one a poet unexpectedly. Unexpectedly +nature lent us existence, and if she has +made it a condition that we should be poets, she has +not forbidden us to enjoy that art, or even to be proud +of it. The other qualification is more austere: it +consists in not allowing exceptions. I cannot admit +that some particular essence—water, fire, being, atoms, +or Brahma—is the intrinsic essence of all things, so +<span class='pageno' id='Page_101'>101</span>that if I narrow my imagination to that one intuition +I shall have intuited the heart and the whole of +existence. Of course I do not deny that there is +water and that there is being, the former in most +things on earth, and the latter in everything anywhere; +but these images or words of mine are not the things +they designate, but only names for them. Desultory +and partial propriety these names may have, but no +metaphysical privilege. No more has the expedient +of some modern critics who would take illusion as a +whole and call it the universe; for in the first place +they are probably reverting to belief in discourse, as +conventionally conceived, so that their scepticism is +halting; and in the second place, even if human +experience could be admitted as known and vouched +for, there would be an incredible arrogance in positing +it as the whole of being, or as itself confined to the +forms and limits which the critic assigns to it. The +life of reason as I conceive it is a mere romance, and +the life of nature a mere fable; such pictures have +no metaphysical value, even if as sympathetic fictions +they had some psychological truth.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The doctrine of essence thus renders my scepticism +invincible and complete, while reconciling me with +it emotionally.</p> + +<p class='c005'>If now I turn my face in the other direction and +consider the prospect open to animal faith, I see that +all this insecurity and inadequacy of alleged knowledge +are almost irrelevant to the natural effort of the mind +to describe natural things. The discouragement we may +feel in science does not come from failure; it comes +from a false conception of what would be success. +Our worst difficulties arise from the assumption that +knowledge of existences ought to be literal, whereas +knowledge of existences has no need, no propensity, +and no fitness to be literal. It is symbolic initially, +when a sound, a smell, an indescribable feeling are +<span class='pageno' id='Page_102'>102</span>signals to the animal of his dangers or chances; and +it fulfils its function perfectly—I mean its moral +function of enlightening us about our natural good—if +it remains symbolic to the end. Can anything be +more evident than that religion, language, patriotism, +love, science itself speak in symbols? Given essences +unify for intuition, in entirely adventitious human +terms, the diffuse processes of nature; the aesthetic +image—the sound, the colour, the expanse of space, +the scent, taste, and sweet or cruel pressure of bodies—wears +an aspect altogether unlike the mechanisms +it stands for. Sensation and thought (between which +there is no essential difference) work in a conventional +medium, as do literature and music. The experience +of essence is direct; the expression of natural facts +through that medium is indirect. But this indirection +is no obstacle to expression, rather its condition; and +this vehicular manifestation of things may be knowledge +of them, which intuition of essence is not. The +theatre, for all its artifices, depicts life in a sense more +truly than history, because the medium has a kindred +movement to that of real life, though an artificial +setting and form; and much in the same way the +human medium of knowledge can perform its pertinent +synthesis and make its pertinent report all the better +when it frankly abandons the plane of its object and +expresses in symbols what we need to know of it. +The arts of expression would be impossible if they +were not extensions of normal human perception. +The Greeks recognised that astronomy and history +were presided over by Muses, sisters of those of tragic +and comic poetry; had they been as psychological +as modern reflection has become, they might have had +Muses of sight, hearing, and speech. I think they +honoured, if they did not express, this complementary +fact also, that all the Muses, even the most playful, +are witnesses to the nature of things. The arts are +<span class='pageno' id='Page_103'>103</span>evidences of wisdom, and sources of it; they include +science. No Muse would be a humane influence, +nor worthy of honour, if she did not studiously express +the truth of nature with the liberty and grace appropriate +to her special genius.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Philosophers would not have overlooked the fact +that knowledge is, and ought to be, symbolical, if +intuition did not exist also, giving them a taste of +something which perhaps they think higher and more +satisfying. Intuition, when it is placid and masterful +enough to stand alone, free from anxiety or delusion +about matters of fact, is a delightful exercise, like +play; it employs our imaginative faculty without +warping it, and lets us live without responsibility. +The playful and godlike mind of philosophers has +always been fascinated by intuition; philosophers—I +mean the great ones—are the infant prodigies of +reflection. They often take intuition of essence for +their single ideal, and wish to impose it on the workaday +thoughts of men; they make a play-world for +themselves which it is glorious to dominate, much as +other men of genius, prolonging the masterfulness of +childhood, continue to play at this or at that in their +politics and their religion. But knowledge of existence +has an entirely different method and an entirely +different ideal. It is playful too, because its terms +are intuitive and its grammar or logic often very +subjective. Perception, theory, hypothesis are rapid, +pregnant, often humorous; they seize a fact by its +skirts from some unexpected quarter, and give it a +nickname which it might be surprised to hear, such +as the rainbow or the Great Bear. Yet in the investigation +of facts all this play of mind is merely instrumental +and indicative: the intent is practical, the +watchfulness earnest, the spirit humble. The mind +here knows that it is at school; and even its fancies are +docile. Its nicknames for things and for their odd +<span class='pageno' id='Page_104'>104</span>ways of behaving are like those which country people +give to flowers; they often pointedly describe how +things look or what they do to us. The ideas we have +of things are not fair portraits; they are political +caricatures made in the human interest; but in their +partial way they may be masterpieces of characterisation +and insight. Above all, they are obtained by +labour, by investigating what is not given, and by +correcting one impression by another, drawn from the +same object—a thing impossible in the intuition of +essences. They therefore conduce to wisdom, and +in their perpetual tentativeness have a cumulative +truth.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Consider the reason why, instead of cultivating +congenial intuitions, a man may be drawn to the study +of nature at all. It is because things, by their impact, +startle him into attention and a new thought. Such +external objects interest him for what they do, not for +what they are; and knowledge of them is significant, +not for the essence it displays to intuition (beautiful +as this may be) but for the events it expresses or +foreshadows. It matters little therefore to the pertinent +knowledge of nature that the substance of +things should remain recondite or unintelligible, if +their movement and operation can be rightly determined +on the plane of human perception. It matters +little if their very existence is vouched for only by +animal faith and presumption, so long as this faith +posits existence where existence is, and this presumption +expresses a prophetic preadaptation of animal +instincts to the forces of the environment. The +function of perception and natural science is, not to +flatter the sense of omniscience in an absolute mind, +but to dignify animal life by harmonising it, in action +and in thought, with its conditions. It matters little +if the news these methods can bring us of the world +is fragmentary and is expressed rhetorically; what +<span class='pageno' id='Page_105'>105</span>matters is that science should be integrated with art, +and that the arts should substitute the dominion of +man over circumstances, as far as this is possible, for +the dominion of chance. In this there is no sacrifice +of truth to utility; there is rather a wise direction of +curiosity upon things on the human scale, and within +the range of art. Speculation beyond those limits +cannot be controlled, and is irresponsible; and the +symbolic terms in which it must be carried on, even +at close quarters, are the best possible indications for +the facts in question. All these inadequacies and +imperfections are proper to perfect signs, which should +be brief and sharply distinguished.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Complete scepticism is accordingly not inconsistent +with animal faith; the admission that nothing given +exists is not incompatible with belief in things not +given. I may yield to the suasion of instinct, and +practise the arts with a humble confidence, without +in the least disavowing the most rigorous criticism of +knowledge or hypostatising any of the data of sense +or fancy. And I need not do this with a bad conscience, +as Parmenides and Plato and the Indians seem to have +done, when they admitted illusion or opinion as an +epilogue to their tight metaphysics, on the ground +that otherwise they would miss their way home. It +is precisely by <i>not</i> yielding to opinion and illusion, +and by <i>not</i> delegating any favourite essences to be the +substance of things, that I aspire to keep my cognitive +conscience pure and my practical judgement sane; +because in order to find my way home I am by no +means compelled to yield ignominiously to any animal +illusion; what guides me there is not illusion but +habit; and the intuitions which accompany habit are +normal signs for the circle of objects and forces by +which that habit is sustained. The images of sense +and science will not delude me if instead of hypostatising +them, as those philosophers did the terms of their +<span class='pageno' id='Page_106'>106</span>dialectic, I regard them as graphic symbols for home +and for the way there. That such external things +exist, that I exist myself, and live more or less prosperously +in the midst of them, is a faith not founded +on reason but precipitated in action, and in that intent, +which is virtual action, involved in perception. This +faith, which it would be dishonest not to confess that +I share, does no violence to a sceptical analysis of +experience; on the contrary, it takes advantage of +that analysis to interpret this volatile experience as all +animals do and must, as a set of symbols for existences +that cannot enter experience, and which, since they +are not elements in knowledge, no analysis of knowledge +can touch—they are in another realm of being.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I propose now to consider what objects animal +faith requires me to posit, and in what order; without +for a moment forgetting that my assurance of their +existence is only instinctive, and my description of +their nature only symbolic. I may know them by +intent, based on bodily reaction; I know them initially +as whatever confronts me, whatever it may turn out +to be, just as I know the future initially as whatever +is coming, without knowing what will come. That +something confronts me here, now, and from a specific +quarter, is in itself a momentous discovery. The +aspect this thing wears, as it first attracts my attention, +though it may deceive me in some particulars, can +hardly fail to be, in some respects, a telling indication +of its nature in its relation to me. Signs identify +their objects for discourse, and show us where to look +for their undiscovered qualities. Further signs, catching +other aspects of the same object, may help me to +lay siege to it from all sides; but signs will never lead +me into the citadel, and if its inner chambers are ever +opened to me, it must be through sympathetic imagination. +I might, by some happy unison between my +imagination and its generative principles, intuit the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_107'>107</span>essence which is actually the essence of that thing. +In that case (which may often occur when the object +is a sympathetic mind) knowledge of existence, without +ceasing to be instinctive faith, will be as complete and +adequate as knowledge can possibly be. The given +essence will be the essence of the object meant; but +knowledge will remain a claim, since the intuition is +not satisfied to observe the given essence passively +as a disembodied essence, but instinctively affirms it +to be the essence of an existence confronting me, +and beyond the range of my possible apprehension. +Therefore the most perfect knowledge of fact is perfect +only pictorially, not evidentially, and remains subject +to the end to the insecurity inseparable from animal +faith, and from life itself.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Animal faith being a sort of expectation and open-mouthedness, +is earlier than intuition; intuitions +come to help it out and lend it something to posit. +It is more than ready to swallow any suggestion of +sense or fancy; and perhaps primitive credulity, as +in a dream, makes no bones of any contradiction or +incongruity in successive convictions, but yields its +whole soul to every image. Faith then hangs like a +pendulum at rest; but when perplexity has caused +that pendulum to swing more and more madly, it +may for a moment stop quivering at a point of unstable +equilibrium at the top; and this vertical station may +be likened to universal scepticism. It is a more +wonderful and a more promising equilibrium than +the other, because it cannot be maintained; but +before declining from the zenith and desisting from +pointing vertically at zero, the pendulum of faith may +hesitate for an instant which way to fall, if at that +uncomfortable height it has really lost all animal +momentum and all ancient prejudice. Before giving +my reasons—which are but prejudices and human—for +believing in events, in substances, and in the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_108'>108</span>variegated truths which they involve, it may be well +to have halted for breath at the apex of scepticism, +and felt all the negative privileges of that position. +The mere possibility of it in its purity is full of instruction; +and although I have, for my own part, dwelt +upon it only ironically, by a scruple of method, and +intending presently to abandon it for common sense, +many a greater philosopher has sought to maintain +himself acrobatically at that altitude. They have not +succeeded; but an impossible dwelling-place may +afford, like a mountain-top, a good point of view in +clear weather from which to map the land and choose +a habitation.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_109'>109</span> + <h2 id='chap12' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='twelve'>XII</abbr> <br> IDENTITY AND DURATION ATTRIBUTED TO ESSENCES</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Human beliefs and ideas (which in modern philosophy +are called human knowledge) may be arranged systematically +in various different series or orders. One is +the <i>order of genesis</i>. The origin of beliefs and ideas, +as of all events, is natural. All origins lie in the realm +of matter, even when the being that is so generated is +immaterial, because this creation or intrusion of the +immaterial follows on material occasions and at the +promptings of circumstance. It is safe to say this, +although it may sound dogmatical, since an immaterial +being not grafted in this way upon material events +would be undiscoverable; no place, time, or other +relations in nature could be assigned to it, and even if +by chance it existed it would have to exist only for its +own benefit, unreported to any one else. It is accordingly +in the realm of matter, in the order of events in +animal life, that I must distribute human beliefs and +ideas if I wish to arrange them in the order of their +genesis.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Beliefs and ideas might also be surveyed in the +<i>order of discovery</i>, as within the field of human grammar +and thought they come to be discriminated. Such a +survey would be a biography of reason, in which I +should neglect the external occasions on which ideas +and beliefs arise and study only the changing patterns +which they form in the eye of thought, as in a kaleidoscope. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_110'>110</span>What would probably come first in the order +of discovery would be goods and evils; or a romantic +metaphysician might turn this experience into a fable, +referring goods and evils to a transcendental will +which should pronounce them (for no reason) to be +such respectively. Will or moral bias is actually the +background on which images of objects are gradually +deciphered by an awakening intellect; they all appear +initially loaded with moral values and assigned to rival +camps and quarters in the field of action. Discovery +is essentially romantic; there is less clearness in the +objects that appear than there is vehemence in the +assertion and choice of them. The life of reason is +accordingly a subject to be treated imaginatively, and +interpreted afresh by every historian with legitimate +variations; and if no theme lies nearer to the heart +of man, since it is the history of his heart, none is +more hopelessly the sport of apperception and of +dramatic bias in the telling.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Finally, beliefs and ideas may be marshalled in the +<i>order of evidence</i>; and this is the only method that +concerns me here. At any juncture in the life of +reason a man may ask himself, as I am doing in this +book, what he is most certain of, and what he believes +only on hearsay or by some sort of suggestion or +impulse of his own, which might be suspended or +reversed. Alternative logics and creeds might thus +suggest themselves, raised in different styles of architecture +upon the bed-rock, if there is a bed-rock, of +perfect certitude. I have already discovered what +this bed-rock of perfect certitude is; somewhat disconcertingly, +it turns out to be in the regions of the +rarest ether. I have absolute assurance of nothing +save of the character of some given essence; the rest +is arbitrary belief or interpretation added by my +animal impulse. The obvious leaves me helpless; for +among objects in the realm of essence I can establish +<span class='pageno' id='Page_111'>111</span>none of the distinctions which I am most concerned +to establish in daily life, such as that between true and +false, far or near, just now and long ago, once upon a +time, and in five minutes. All these terms of course +are found there, else I could not mention them, but +they are found only as pictures; each is present only +in essence, without any reason for choosing, asserting, +or making it effective. The very opposite terms, if +I am only willing to think of them, lie sleeping side +by side with these which I happen first to have +come upon. All essences and combinations of essences +are brother-shapes in an eternal landscape; and the +more I range in that wilderness, the less reason I find +for stopping at anything, or for following any particular +path. Willingly or regretfully, if I wish to live, +I must rouse myself from this open-eyed trance into +which utter scepticism has thrown me. I must allow +subterranean forces within me to burst forth and to +shatter that vision. I must consent to be an animal +or a child, and to chase the fragments as if they were +things of moment. But which fragment, and rolling +in what direction? I am resigned to being a dogmatist; +but at what point shall my dogmatism begin, +and by what first solicitation of nature?</p> + +<p class='c005'>Starting, as here I should, from absolute certitude—that +is, from the obvious character of some essence—the +first object of belief suggested by that assurance +is the <i>identity</i> of this essence in various instances and +in various contexts. This identity in divers cases is +not tautological, as identity would be if I spoke of +the identity of any essence with itself. Identity, to be +significant, must be problematical. I must pick up +my pebble twice, so that a juggler might without my +knowledge have substituted another pebble for it in +the interval; and when I say confidently, <i>the same +pebble</i>, I may always be deceived. My own thought +is not at all unlikely to play this trick on me; it is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_112'>112</span>good at legerdemain. In attending a second time to +what I call the same essence, I may really summon a +different essence before me; my memory need not +retain the first intuition so precisely that its disparity +from the present one can be sensible to me now. +Identity of essences given at different times evidently +presupposes time—an immense postulate; and besides, +it presupposes ability in thought to traverse time +without confusion, so that having lived through two +intuitions I may correctly distinguish them as events, +whilst correctly identifying their common object. +These are ambitious and highly questionable dogmas. +Yet there is a circumstance in pure intuition of any +essence which can insensibly lead me to those elaborate +conclusions, and can lead me at the same time to posit +the natural existence of myself, the possible dupe, +having those intuitions and surviving them, and even +the existence of my natural object, the persisting +pebble, which those intuitions described unanimously.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This circumstance is closely connected with the +property of essence which is most ideal and remote +from existence, namely, its eternity. Eternity, taken +intrinsically, has nothing to do with time, but is a +form of being which time cannot usher in nor destroy; +it is always equally real, silent, and indestructible, no +matter what time may do, or what time it may be. +But intuition peruses eternal being in time; consequently, +so long as I am attending to an essence, +this essence seems to me <i>to endure</i>; and when, after +an interval, I revert to it or to any feature of it, this +feature seems to me <i>to be identical</i> with what it was. +This identity and this duration are not properly predicated +of essence in its own realm; they are superfluous +epithets essentially, and almost insults, because +they substitute a questionable for an unquestionable +subsistence in the essence. Yet the epithets are well +meant, and indicate fairly enough the aspect which +<span class='pageno' id='Page_113'>113</span>essences present to moving thought when it plays upon +them. Intuition finds essence by watching, by exerting +animal attention. Now when he watches, an +animal thinks that what he watches is watching him +with the same intensity and variability of attention +which he is exerting; for attention is fundamentally +an animal uneasiness, fostered by the exigences of +life amid other material beings that can change and +jump. Stillness or constancy in any object accordingly +does not seem to an animal eternity in an essence; it +seems rather a suspension of motion in a thing, a +pause for breath, an ominous and awful silence. He +is superstitious about the eternity of essences, as about +all their other properties. This breathless and ghostly +duration which he attributes to essences, treating them +like living things, is his confused temporal translation +of their eternity, mixing it with existence, which is +the negation of eternity. Thus he assimilates it to +the quasi-permanence in himself which is transfused +with change; for of course he is far from perceiving +that if essences were not natively eternal and nonexistent, +it would be impossible for crawling existence +to change from one form to another. This illusion is +inevitable. The dubious and iterative duration proper +to animal life, when the lungs breathe and the mind is +appetitive, seems to this mind a pulsation in all being.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Moreover, in watching any image, it is often +possible to observe one feature in it persisting while +another disappears. The man not only says to himself, +“This, and still this,” but he ventures to say, +“This, and again this with a variation.” A variation +in <i>this</i>? Here, from the point of view of essence, is +a sheer absurdity. <i>This</i> cannot change its nature, +though what we have before us a moment later may be +something but slightly different from <i>this</i>; and of +course the essence now brought to view can be slightly +different from the one formerly in evidence only +<span class='pageno' id='Page_114'>114</span>because each is eternally itself, so that the least variant +from it marks and constitutes a different essence. +Material categories such as existence, substance, and +change, none of which are applicable to pure data, are +thus insinuated by the animal intellect into contemplation. +They transform intuition into belief; and this +belief, as if it would reinforce essences when they +appear and annul them when they disappear, ultimately +posits an imaginary shuffling of sensible existences—hypostatised +essences—dancing about us as we watch +the scene. Even if this hypostasis is retracted afterwards +by the critic, the postulate remains that he is +steadily perusing the <i>same essence</i>, or returning to +reconsider it. Without this postulate it would be +impossible to say or think anything on any subject. +No essence could be recognised, and therefore no +change could be specified. Yet this necessary belief +is one impossible to prove or even to defend by +argument, since all argument presupposes it. It must +be accepted as a rule of the game, if you think the +game worth playing.</p> + +<p class='c005'>What shall I say of the probable truth of such +fundamental assumptions? Shall I think them false, +because groundless, and shall I say that they invalidate +the whole edifice of natural faith which is raised upon +them? Or shall I say that the experienced security +of this edifice justifies them and implies their truth? +Neither; because the happy results and fertility of +an assumption do not prove it true literally, but only +prove it to be suitable, to be worth cultivating as an +art and repeating as a good myth. The axioms of +sanity and art must correspond <i>somehow</i> to truth, but +the correspondence may be very loose and very partial. +Moreover, the circumstance that even this symbolic +rightness is vouched for only by an experience which +would be false in all its records and memories if this +assumption were false, robs such experimental tests of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_115'>115</span>all logical force. Corroboration is no new argument; +if I am deceived once, I may all the more readily be +deceived again. In the perspectives of experience I +cannot, except in these very perspectives, reach the +terms which they posit as self-existent, in order to see +whether my perspectives were rightly drawn. I am +in the region of belief mediated by symbols, in the +region of animal faith.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_116'>116</span> + <h2 id='chap13' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='thirteen'>XIII</abbr> <br> BELIEF IN DEMONSTRATION</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>The essence which is the object of intuition is probably +not simple. Perhaps nothing that has a character +recognisable in reflection can be utterly simple. The +datum may seem purely qualitative, like a smell or +like absolute Being, and yet some plurality may lurk +in its very diffuseness or continuity, giving a foothold +for discrimination of different moments or parts +within it. Usually this inward complexity of given +essences is very marked, and a chief element in their +nature; but it is not at all incompatible with the +æsthetic and logical individuality which makes them +terms for possible recognition and discourse. Essences, +like things, may be perfectly unambiguous objects to +name or to point to, and may be counted as units, +without prejudice to their internal complexity. My +dog is one and the same dog unmistakably, without +prejudice to the possibly infinite complexity of his +organism or the interpenetration of his qualities. In +the same way Euclidean space is a single and definite +essence; yet its character is subject to analysis. I +may say it has three dimensions, is necessarily infinite, +without scale, etc. These implications, which I may +enumerate successively, lie in the essence together, +and lie there from the beginning, even if my intuition is +slow to disentangle them, or never does so at all. The +simplicity of the essence given at first was a pregnant +<span class='pageno' id='Page_117'>117</span>simplicity; it had enough character to be identified +with the total and unitary aspect of another essence—Euclidean +space analysed—which may appear later.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Intuition therefore is a view of essence, attention +fixed upon it, and not that essence itself. When I +say Euclidean space has three dimensions, I am +counting them; I am proceeding from one specious +plane, or felt direction of motion, to another, and +perhaps back again, for the sake of verification. If +this operation is to be a valid survey of the essence +proposed, the plane or directions specified must, so +to speak, stay in their places. Each must remain +itself, so that in passing from it to another, as I do in +counting, I may pass to something truly different, and +may be able to revert from this to the original element, +and find it still there, identical with its former self. +But, as I have already discovered, this self-identity +of a term to which I revert cannot be given either in +the first intuition of it, nor in the second. All that +either intuition can yield while it endures is the +nature of the datum there, with the terms and relations +which are displayed there within it. Intuition can +never yield the relation of its total datum to anything +not given. It cannot refer to the latent at all, since +its object, by definition, is just what is given immediately. +To take the leap from one intuition to +another, and assert that they view the same essence, +or have the same intent, I must take my life in my +hands and trust to animal faith. Otherwise all dialectic +would be arrested.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Let me assume in the first place that I may steadily +peruse the same essence, and may revert to it on +occasion. Let me assume further that in so doing I +may turn passive intuition into analysis, and analysis +into some fresh synthesis of the elements identified +and distinguished in the given essence. Intuition +will thus pick up and group together, in various ways, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_118'>118</span>terms which by hypothesis are identical in these +various settings. It will scrutinise essences piecemeal +and successively, although in their own realm +they compose a simultaneous and eternal manifold. +Suppose, for instance, I have reached the conclusion +of a calculation, and the final equation is before me: +the inner relations between its terms are parts of a +given essence. Intuition, not demonstration, synthesises +this manifold. This synthetic essence is +therefore no conclusion; it is not an answer nor a +deduction; it is not true. It is simply the pattern +of terms which it is; no one of these terms, for aught +I know, having ever figured in any other equation. +Thus any survey which is analytic, so that it gives +foothold for demonstration, or any definition following +upon such analysis, presupposes the repetition of +the same essences in different contexts. This presupposition +cannot be justified by the intuition occupying +the mind at any one time. No more can the +assurance that a term remains the same in two successive +instances and in two different contexts, nor that what +is asserted by a predicate is asserted of the very subject +which before had been intuited without that predicate. +Explication is a process, a deduction is an event; and +although the force of logical analysis or synthesis does +not depend on assuming that fact, but rather on +ignoring it, this fact may be deduced from faith in +the validity of demonstration, which would lapse if this +fact were denied. The validity of demonstration is +accordingly a matter of faith only, depending on the +assumption of matters of fact incapable of demonstration. +I must believe that I noted the terms of the +argument separately and successively if I am to assert +anything in identifying them or pronouncing them +equivalent, or if the conclusion in which they appear +now is to be relevant in any way to the premises in +which they appeared originally.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_119'>119</span>The force of dialectic, then, lies in identifying +terms in isolation with the same terms in relation; so +that even an analytic judgement is synthetic. To say, +for instance, that in “extended colour” “extension” +is involved is analysis; yet to identify the element of +extension abstracted from the first essence with the +second essence as a whole, is synthesis; and it is far +from inconceivable that this synthesis should be +erroneous. In the identification of an essence given +in one intuition with something given in another +intuition in a superadded context, there is a postulate +that in transcendent intent I am hitting a hidden +target. It is not two similar intuitions taken existentially +that are identified; they are not only admittedly +distinct numerically and as events in the world, but +they have, by hypothesis, different total data before +them. It is mind, a spiritual counterpart of attitude +and action, that intends in both cases to consider the +same essence. There is repetition posited; and +repetition, if actual, involves adventitious differences +accruing to a term that remains individually identical. +There is a difference in the setting of the same essence +here and its setting there. In judgement, accordingly, +there is more than intuition; there is assumed discourse, +involving time, transcendent reference, and +various adventitious surveys of identical objects. +Thus if I wish to believe that any demonstration +whatsoever is significant or correct, I must assume +(what I can never demonstrate) that there is an active +intelligence at work, capable of reverting to an old +idea like the dog returning to his vomit: an operation +utterly extraneous to the timeless identity of each +element recovered.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In other words, demonstration is an event, even +when the thing demonstrated is not an event. Without +adventitious choice of some starting-point, without +selective and cumulative advance, and without recapitulation, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_120'>120</span>there would be no dialectic. Premises +and conclusions would all be static and separate +terms; the dialectical nerve of their relation would +not be laid bare and brought to intuition. I should +know nothing about essence, in the sense of possessing +such sciences of it as mathematics or rhetoric, if the +argument were not adventitious to the subject-matter, +casting the light of intuition now along this path and +now along that in a field posited as static, so as to +enlarge and confirm my apprehension of it; for if I +lost at one end all that I gained at the other, my +progress would not enrich apprehension, nor ever +twice mean the same thing. Dialectic therefore is a +two-edged sword: on the one hand, if valid, it involves +a realm of essence, independent of it, over which it +may range; and on the other hand it involves its own +temporal and progressive existence; since it is a +name for the fact that some part of that realm of +essence has been chosen for perusal, considered at +leisure, folded upon itself, as it were, and recognised +as having this or that articulation. Even pure intuition +shares (as I shall try to show presently) this +spiritual existence, distinct from the logical or æsthetic +being proper to the essences it apprehends; intuition +itself can hardly be prolonged without winking or +re-survey. But this coming and going of attention, in +flashes and in varied assaults, is even more conspicuous +in dialectic; and the validity and advance of insight +in such cases depends on the essences in hand being +constant, in spite of the pulsations of attention upon +them and the variety of relations disclosed successively.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Thus belief in the existence of mental discourse +(which is a sort of experience), whilst of course not +demonstrable in itself, is involved in the validity of +any demonstration; and I come to the interesting +insight that dialectic would lose all its force if I +renounced my instinctive faith in my ability to pick +<span class='pageno' id='Page_121'>121</span>up old meanings, to think consecutively, to correct +myself without changing my subject-matter, and in +fine to discourse and to live rationally. Challenge +this faith, and demonstration collapses into the illusion +that a demonstration has been made. If I confine +myself to the given essence without admitting discourse +about it, I exclude all analysis of that essence, or even +examination of it. I must simply stare at it, in a +blank and timeless æsthetic trance. If this does not +happen, the reason is not dialectical. No logic could +drive me from the obvious, unless I read omens in +it which are not there. The reason for my proclivity +to play with ideas, to lose them and catch them, and +pride myself on my ability to keep them circling +without confusion in the air, is a vital reason. This +logic is a fly-wheel in my puffing engine; it is not +logic at all. The animal life which underlies discourse +is concerned to discharge its predetermined responses, +which are but few, whenever an occasion presents +itself which will at all do; and all such occasions it +calls the same. It claps some recurrent name on +different objects, which is one source of error or of +perpetual inaccuracy in its knowledge of things; but +even before that, in identifying the various instances +of that name, alleging the essence present now to be +the same present before, it runs a risk of error and +may slip into self-contradiction. Is the round square +an essence? Certainly; but not in the geometry +of Euclid, because in his geometry the square is +one essence and the circle another, definitely and +irreparably distinct from it. The round square is an +essence of comic discourse, actualised when, having +confused names, definitions and ideas, a fumbling or +an impudent mind sets about to identify two incompatibles; +and this attempt is no more impossible to +a mind—which is subject to animal vapours—than +it is impossible for such a mind to look for a lost +<span class='pageno' id='Page_122'>122</span>word. The psyche has the lost word in store, as it +has the intuitions of the circle and the square; but +the loss of memory or the confusion of ideas may arise +notwithstanding, because the movement in discourse +which should culminate in those intuitions may be +intercepted mechanically, and arrested at a stage +where the name is not yet recovered, or where the +words circle and square have fused their associations +and are striving to terminate in the intuition of both +as one. Such stammerings and contradictions make +evident the physical basis of thought and the remote +level from which it turns to its ideal object, like the +moth to the star; but this physical basis is really just +as requisite for correcting a logical error as for falling +into it. Thus dialectic, which in intent and deliverance +does not trespass beyond the realm of essence, but +only defines some fragment of the same, yet in fact, +if it is to be cogent, must presuppose time, change, +and the persistence of meanings in progressive discourse.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Belief in demonstration, when it is admitted, has +inversely some steadying influence on belief in matters +of fact. When poetic idealists cry that life is a dream, +they are indulging in a hyperbole, if they still venture +to compare one illusion with another in beauty or in +duration. Poetry, like demonstration, would not be +possible if intuition of essences could not be sustained +and repeated in various contexts. The poet could +not otherwise express cumulative passions nor develop +particular themes. But life is no dream, if it justifies +dialectic; because dialectic explores various parts of +the realm of essence—where everything is steadfast, +distinct, and imperishable—with a continuous and +coherent intent, and reaches valid insight into their +structure; and this amount of wakefulness and sanity +the dialectical or poetic mind would have in any case, +even in the absence of a material world, of all moral +<span class='pageno' id='Page_123'>123</span>interests, and of any life except the life of discourse +itself.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Nevertheless, if discourse were always a pellucid +apprehension of essential relations, its existence would +be little noted; only a very scrupulous philosopher +would insist on it, in view of the selective order and +direction of survey which discourse adds to its subject-matter. +There is, however, a much louder witness to +the fact that discourse exists and is no part of essence, +but rather a function of animal life; and this witness +is error. Thought becomes obvious when things +betray it; as they cannot have been false, something +else must have been so, and this something else, +which we call thought, must have existed and must +have had a different status from that of the thing it +falsified. Error thus awakens even the laziest philosophy +from the dream of supposing that its own +meanderings are nothing but strands in the texture of +its object.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I have now, by the mere consideration of the way +in which essence presents itself, managed to snatch +from the jaws of scepticism one belief familiar to me +before I encountered that romantic dragon; namely, +belief in the existence of discourse, or of mind thinking. +But be it observed that I have so far seen reason +for reinstating this belief only in a very attenuated +form. Thought here means nothing more than the +fact that some essence is contemplated, and discourse +means only that this essence is approached and surveyed +repeatedly or piecemeal, with partiality, succession, +and possible confusion in describing it. Save for +this distinction of intuition from the essence intuited, +I have as yet no object before me that claims existence +or solicits belief. The whole datum is still simply +an essence; but by the mere study of that datum, +when this study is reflected upon and admitted, I +have reintroduced a belief which relieves me of what +<span class='pageno' id='Page_124'>124</span>was most obnoxious to the flesh in my radical scepticism. +I have found that even when no change is +perceived in the image before me, my discourse changes +its phases and makes progress in surveying it; so +that in discourse I now admit a sphere of events in +which real variations are occurring. I may now assert, +when I perceive a motion, that this intuition of change +is <i>true</i>; that is, that it has actually followed upon the +intuition of a static first term, from which my attention +has passed to this intuition of change; and this I +may now assert without confusing the essences given +successively, or trying, like animal perception, to +knead one concrete thing out of their incompatible +natures. The existence of changing things or events +in nature I may still deny or doubt or ignore; in the +object I shall, with perfect clearness, see only an +essence, and if this happens to be the essence of +change, and to present the image of some motion, +that theme will seem to me as determinate, as ideal +and as unchanging as any other, and as little prone +to lapse into any different theme. Any motion seen +will be but a fixed image of motion. Actual flux +and actual existence will have their appropriate and +sufficient seat in my thought; I shall conceive and +believe, when I reflect on my rapt contemplations, +that I have been ruminating, and passing from one to +another; but these objects will be only the several +essences, the several images or tunes or stories, each +always itself, which my mind picks up or invents or +reconsiders.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_125'>125</span> + <h2 id='chap14' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='fourteen'>XIV</abbr> <br> ESSENCE AND INTUITION</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>To believe nothing and live immersed in intuition +might be the privilege of a disembodied spirit; and +if a man could share it he would not only be relieved +from doubt but would, in one dimension, lose nothing +in the scope of his experience, since the realm of +essence, which would still be open to him, is absolutely +infinite, and contains images of all the events that any +existing world could enact, or that all possible worlds +could enact together. Yet all this variety and richness +would form a mosaic, a marble effigy of life, or chronicle +of ancient wars. The pangs and horrors would be +there, as well as the beauties, but each would burn in +its eternal place, balancing all the rest, and no anxious +eye would glance hurriedly from one to the other, +wondering what the next might be. The spirit that +actually breathes in man is an animal spirit, transitive +like the material endeavours which it expresses; it +has a material station and accidental point of view, +and a fevered preference for one alternative issue over +another. It thirsts for news; and this curiosity, +which it borrows of course from the insecurity and +instinctive anxiety of the animal whose spirit it is, +is strangely self-contradictory; because the further it +ranges in the service of animal will, the more the +spectacle it discloses rebukes that animal will and +tends to neutralise it. It would indeed not be spirit +<span class='pageno' id='Page_126'>126</span>at all if it did not essentially tend to discount its +accidental point of view, and to exchange the material +station to which it finds itself unaccountably attached +in its birth. In so far as it is spirit, and is not called +back by its animal allegiance to pleasures and ambitions +which pure spirit could not share (since they imply +ignorance), it accordingly tends to withdraw from +preoccupation with animal life, from the bias of time +and place, and from all thought of existence. In so +doing, far from perishing, it seems to acquire a more +intense, luminous, and placid being. Since the roots +of spirit, at least in man, are in matter, this would +seem to be an illusion; yet the experience is normal, +and no illusion need attach to it, if once the nature +of intuition is understood.</p> + +<p class='c005'>At the vanishing-point of scepticism, which is also +the acme of life, intuition is absorbed in its object. +For this reason, philosophers capable of intense contemplation—Aristotle, +for instance, at those points +where his thought becomes, as it were, internal to +spirit—have generally asserted that in the end essence +and the contemplation of essence are identical. Certainly +the intuition of essence is oblivious of itself, +and cognisant of essence only, to which it adds nothing +whatever internally, either in character or in intensity; +because the intensity of a thunder-clap is the chief +part of its essence, and so the peculiar intolerableness +of each sort of pain, or transitiveness of each sort of +pleasure. If in fact when any such essence is given +there had been nothing prior to this intuition, nothing +beside it existentially, and nothing to follow upon it, +this obliviousness to the intuition itself, as distinct +from the given essence, would not be an oversight; +it would be rather an absence of illusion. For it +would then have been an illusion to suppose, as I +should in calling the presence of that essence an +intuition of it, that a soul with a history and with +<span class='pageno' id='Page_127'>127</span>other adventitious qualities had come to contemplate +that essence at one moment in its career. There +would really be the essence only, with no relations +other than those perfectly irreversible internal ones +to other essences which define it in its own realm. +Those very high numbers, for instance, which nobody +has ever thought of specifically, have no other relations +than those which they have eternally in the series of +whole numbers; they have no place in any man’s life. +So too those many forms of torment for which nature +does not provide the requisite instrument, and which +even hell has neglected to exemplify; they remain +essences only, of which fortunately there is no intuition. +Evidently the being of such numbers or such torments +is constituted by their essence only, and has not +attained to existence. Yet it is this essential being +alone that, if there was intuition of those numbers or +those torments, would be revealed in intuition; for +no external adventitious relations, such as the intuition +has in the life of some soul, would be presented +within it, if (as I assume) nothing but these essences +was then given.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It is therefore inevitable that minds singly absorbed +in the contemplation of any essence should attribute +the presence and force of that essence to its own +nature, which alone is visible, and not to their intuition, +which is invisible. Thought as it sinks into its object +rises in its deliverance out of the sphere of contingency +and change, and loses itself in that object, sublimated +into an essence. This sublimation is no loss; it is +merely absence of distraction. It is the perfect +fruition and fulfilment of that experience. In this +manner I can understand why Aristotle could call the +realm of essence, or that part of it which he had +considered, a deity, and could declare sublimely that +its inalienable being was an eternal life. More strictly, +it would have been an eternal actualisation of cognitive +<span class='pageno' id='Page_128'>128</span>life only; animal life would have ceased, because +animal life requires us to pick up and drop the essences +we consider, and to attribute temporal as well as +eternal relations to them; in other words, to regard +them not as essences but as things. But though +cognitive life begins with this attention to practical +exigences and is kindled by them, yet its ideal is +sacrificial; it aspires to see each thing clearly and to +see all things together, that is to say, under the form +of eternity, and as sheer essences given in intuition. +To cease to live temporally is intellectually to be +saved; it is ἀθανατίζειν, to fade or to brighten into +the truth, and to become eternal. It is the inmost +aim and highest achievement of cognition to cease +to be knowledge for a self, to abolish the bias and +transcend the point of view by which knowledge +establishes its perspectives, so that all things may be +present equally, and the truth may be all in all.</p> + +<p class='c005'>All this comes about, however, only subjectively, +in that vital and poetic effort of the mind to understand +which begins with a candid self-forgetfulness +and ends in a passionate self-surrender. Seen from +outside, as it takes place psychologically, the matter +wears an entirely different aspect. In reality, essence +and the intuition of essence can never be identical. +If all animal predicaments were resolved, there would +be no organ and no occasion for intuition; and +intuition ceasing, no essences would appear. Certainly +they would not be abolished by that accident in their +own sphere, and each would be what it would have +seemed if intuition of it had arisen; but they would +all be merely logical or æsthetic themes unrehearsed, +as remote as possible from life or from the intense +splendour of divinity. Essence without intuition +would be not merely non-existent (as it always is), but +what is worse, it would be the object of no contemplation, +the goal of no effort, the secret or implicit ideal +<span class='pageno' id='Page_129'>129</span>of no life. It would be valueless. All that joy and +sense of liberation which pure objectivity brings to +the mind would be entirely absent; and essence +would lose all its dignity if life lost its precarious +existence.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I believe that Aristotle, and even more mystical +spokesmen of the spirit, would not have ignored this +circumstance if they had not taken so narrow a view +of essence. They see it only through some peep-hole +of morals, grammar, or physics; the small part of +that infinite realm which thus becomes visible they +take for the whole; or if they feel some uneasiness at +the obvious partiality of this survey, they rather blot +out and blur the part before them, lest it seem arbitrary, +instead of imagining it filled out with all the rest that, +in the realm of essence, cannot help surrounding it. +Even Spinoza, who so clearly defines the realm of +essence as an infinite number of kinds of being, each +having an infinite number of variations, calls this +infinity of being <i>substance</i>; as if at once to weight +it all with existence (a horrible possibility) and to +obliterate its internal distinctions; but distinction, +infinitely minute and indelible distinction of everything +from everything else, is what essence means. +Yet people suppose that whatever is non-existent is +nothing—a stupid positivism, like that of saying that +the past is nothing, or the future nothing, or everything +nothing of which I happen to be ignorant. If +people reflected that the non-existent, as Leibniz says, +is infinite, that it is everything, that it is the realm of +essence, they would be more cautious in regarding +essence as something selected, superior in itself, and +worthy of eternal contemplation. They would not +conceive it as the power or worth in things actual, but +rather as the form of everything and anything.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Value accrues to any part of the realm of essence +by virtue of the interest which somebody takes in it, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_130'>130</span>as being the part relevant to his own life. If the +organ of this life comes to perfect operation, it will +reach intuition of that relevant part of essence. This +intuition will be vital in the highest degree. It will +be absorbed in its object. It will be unmindful of any +possibility of lapse in that object, or defection on its +own part; it will not be aware of itself, of time, or +of circumstances. But this intuition will continue to +exist, and to exist in time, and the pulsations of its +existence will hardly go on without some oscillation, +and probably a quick evanescence. So the intuition +will be an utterly different thing from the essence +intuited: it will be something existent and probably +momentary; it will glow and fade; it will be perhaps +delightful; that is, no essences will appear to it which +are not suffused with a general tint of interest and +beauty. The life of the psyche, which rises to this +intuition, determines all the characters of the essence +evoked, and among them its moral quality. But as +pure intuition is life at its best, when there is least +rasping and thumping in its music, a prejudice or +presumption arises that <i>any</i> essence is beautiful and +life-enhancing. This platonic adoration of essence is +undeserved. The realm of essence is dead, and the +intuition of far the greater part of it would be deadly +to any living creature.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The contemplation of so much of essence as is +relevant to a particular life is what Aristotle called +the entelechy or perfect fruition of that life. If the +cosmos were a single animal, as the ancients supposed, +and had an aim and a life which, like human life, +could be fulfilled in the contemplation of certain +essences, then a life like that of Aristotle’s God would +be involved in the perfection of nature, if this perfection +was ever attained. Or if, with Aristotle, we +suppose that the cosmos has always been in perfect +equilibrium, then a happy intuition of all relevant +<span class='pageno' id='Page_131'>131</span>essence on the part of the cosmos would actually exist +and would be that sustained, ecstatic, divine life which +Aristotle speaks of. Yet even then the cosmic intuition +of essence would not be the essence it beheld. The +intuition would be a natural fact, by accident perpetual +and necessarily selective; because the cosmos +<i>might</i> stop turning at any moment, and certainly the +music of those spheres, even while they rolled well, +would not be every sort and any sort of noise, nor +even of music. A different cosmos would have had, +or might elsewhere be having, a different happiness. +Each, however, would be a divine life, as the ancients +conceived divinity. It would have such a natural +basis as any life must have, and the consequent warmth +and moral colour; for natural operations lend these +values to the visions in which they rest. The love of +certain special essences which animates existence is +an expression of the direction which the movement +of existence happens to have. If the cosmos were a +perfect animal—and in its unknown secular pulsations +it may possibly be one—the cosmic intellect in act +would not be the whole of the realm of essence, nor +any part of it. It would be the intuition of so much +of essence as that cosmos had for its goal.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The external and naturalistic point of view from +which all this appears is one I have not yet justified +critically: I have anticipated it for the sake of rendering +the conception of essence perfectly unambiguous. +But if we start from the realm of essence, which +demands no belief, we may at once find conclusive +reasons for believing that sundry intuitions of parts +of it exist in fact. One reason is the selectiveness of +discourse. All essences are always at hand, ready to +be thought of, if any one has the wit to do so. But my +discourse takes something up first, and then, even if +it is purely dialectical, passes to some implication or +complement of that idea; and it never exhausts its +<span class='pageno' id='Page_132'>132</span>themes. It traverses the realm of essence as, in a +mosque, some ray of light from some high aperture +might shoot across the sombre carpets: it is a brief, +narrow, shifting, oblique illumination of something +vast and rich. The fact that intuition has a direction +is an added proof of its existential character, and of +its complete diversity in nature from the essences it +lights up. Life begins unaccountably and moves +irreversably: when it is prosperous and intelligent, +it accumulates its experience of things in a personal +perspective, largely alien to the things themselves. +When the objects surveyed are essences, no one can +be prior to any other in their own sphere: they do +not arise at all, and lie in no order of precedence. +When one essence includes another as number two +includes number one, it is as easy and as proper to +reach one by dividing two as to reach two by repeating +one. In themselves essences have no genesis; and +to repeat one would be impossible if duality were not +begged at the start, as well as unity, to institute the +possibility of repetition. In seizing upon any particular +essence first, discourse is guided by an irrational +fatality. Some chance bit is what first occurs to the +mind: I run up against this or that, for no logical +reason. This arbitrary assault of intuition upon +essence is evidence that something not essence, which +I call intuition, has come into play. Thus all discourse, +even if it traces ideal implications, is itself +contingent to them, and in its existence irrational. +Animal life is involved in the perusal of essence, just +as animal faith is involved in the trust I put in demonstration. +If I aspired to be a disembodied spirit, I +ought to envisage all essences equally and at once—a +monstrous requirement. If I aspire instead to dwell +in the presence only of the pertinent, the beautiful, +and the good, I confess that I am but a natural creature, +directed on a small circle of interests and perfections; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_133'>133</span>and that my intuition in particular exercises an adventitious +choice, and has a private method, in its survey +of essence.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The first existence, then, of which a sceptic who +finds himself in the presence of random essences may +gather reasonable proof, is the existence of the intuition +to which those essences are manifest. This is of +course not the object which the animal mind first +posits and believes in. The existence of things is +assumed by animals in action and expectation before +intuition supplies any description of what the thing +is that confronts them in a certain quarter. But +animals are not sceptics, and a long experience must +intervene before the problem arises which I am here +considering, namely, whether anything need be posited +and believed in at all. And I reply that it is not +inevitable, if I am willing and able to look passively +on the essences that may happen to be given: but +that if I consider what they are, and how they appear, +I see that this appearance is an accident to them; +that the principle of it is a contribution from my +side, which I call intuition. The difference between +essence and intuition, though men may have discovered +it late, then seems to me profound and certain. They +belong to two different realms of being.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_134'>134</span> + <h2 id='chap15' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='fifteen'>XV</abbr> <br> BELIEF IN EXPERIENCE</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>I have now agreed to believe that discourse is a contingent +survey of essence, partial, recurrent, and +personal, with an arbitrary starting-point and an +arbitrary direction of progress. It picks up this +essence or that for no reason that it can assign. However +dialectical the structure of the theme considered +may be, so that its various parts seem to imply one +another, the fact that this theme rather than any +other is being considered is a brute fact: and my +discourse as a whole is a sheer accident, initiated, if +initiated at all, by some ambushed power, not only +in its existence, but in its duration, direction, and +scope.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Nevertheless this fatality does not raise any problem +in that discourse itself, because it occasions no surprise. +Problems are created after discourse is in full swing, +by contradictory presumptions or aching voids arising +within it. There are no problems in nature, and +none in the realm of essence. Existence—the most +inexplicable of surds—is itself no problem in its own +eyes: it takes itself blandly for granted, so long as it +is prosperous. This is a healthy dulness on its part, +because if there is no reason why a particular fact +should exist rather than any other, or none at all, there +is also no reason why it should not exist. The philosopher +who has learned to make nature the standard +<span class='pageno' id='Page_135'>135</span>of naturalness will not wonder at it. He will repeat +on a large scale that act of ready submission to fate +which every new-born intuition performs spontaneously. +It does not protest against its sudden +existence. It is not surprised at the undeserved +favour that has fallen to its share. It modestly and +wisely forgets itself and notes only the obvious, +profoundly self-justified essence which appears before +it. That this essence might just as well, or might +far better, have been replaced by some other is not +a suggestion to be possibly gathered from that essence +itself. Nor is the psyche (the ambushed power from +which the intuition actually comes) less self-satisfied +and at peace. The psyche, too, takes her own idiosyncrasy +for granted, singular and highly determinate +as this is, and extraordinarily censorious concerning +all other things. Her nature seems to her by right +everlasting, and that to which it is the obvious duty +of all other things to adjust themselves. God, too, +if we refer these agreeable fatalities ultimately to his +decrees, is conceived in like manner never to wonder +why he exists although evidently nothing could have +previously demanded his existence, or prepared the +way for it, or made it intelligible. Nevertheless the +mortal psyche perhaps thinks she sees the secret even +of that, because it was necessary that God should +exist in order to make her own existence perfectly +safe, legitimate, and happy for ever. This assurance +is needed, because there are unfortunately some circumstances +that might suggest the opposite.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Before turning to these circumstances, it may be +well to observe that actual discourse, as distinguished +from the internal dialectic of essences, may have any +degree of looseness; that is, the terms which it takes +up in succession may have nothing to do with one +another essentially. There is no added paradox in +this: what is groundless and irrational in its inception +<span class='pageno' id='Page_136'>136</span>may well be groundless and irrational in its procedure, +and an appearance that has no reason for +arising has no reason for not yielding to any other +appearance, or to vacancy. And yet sometimes the +course of appearances does produce wonder and +discontent. How can this be? If I am not surprised +at beginning to exist, or at finding something +before me, since present being cannot contain any +presumption or contradiction against itself, so it would +seem that I should not be surprised at any changes +in existence, however radical and complete. Often, +indeed, I am not surprised, but follow the development +of discourse, as in a dream, with perfect acquiescence, +or even with a distinct premonition of what is coming, +and eagerness that it should come. If I were a pure +spirit, or even an open mind, this ought to be always +the case. However different essences may be, they +cannot in their own realm exclude or contradict one +another; there, infinite diversity provokes no conflict +and imposes no alternatives, and the being of anything, +far from impeding that of other things, seems positively +to invite and to require it, somewhat as every part of +Euclidean space, far from denying the other parts, +implies them. Irrelevance is, as it were, mere distance; +and there is nothing strange or evil in quickness of +thought, that should jump from one essence to another +altogether dissimilar to it, or even contrary.</p> + +<p class='c005'>And yet I cannot prolong or intensify discourse +without soon coming upon what I call interruption, +confusion, doubt, or contradiction. An impulse to +select, to pursue, and to reject specific essences insinuates +itself into discourse. Why this animosity or +this impatience? I do not disparage, nor subordinate, +nor remove the circle from the realm of essence, when +I think of the square and say it is no circle. Why +then should I be angry if I find the one rather than +the other? Evidently my discourse here is not pure +<span class='pageno' id='Page_137'>137</span>contemplation. Of course, no essence is any other +essence; but a clear spirit would not call any two +essences incompatible. Their diversity is part of their +being; they <i>are</i> because, each being eternally itself, +the two are eternally different. If they are incompatible, +I must ask: Incompatible for what +purpose? Even in calling them contradictory, I am +surreptitiously speaking for some hidden interest, +which cannot put up with them both. There is an +inertia or prior direction somewhere, in the region of +what I call myself, that demands one of them, and +rejects the other for the innocent crime of not being +that one. The incongruous essence appearing offends +me because I am wedded to an old one, and to its +close relations. I will tolerate nothing but what I +meant should come, what fills my niche, and falls in +with my undertaking.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Irrelevance, incongruity, and contradiction are accordingly +possible in discourse only because discourse +is not a play of essences but a play of attention upon +them; which attention is no impartial exercise of +spirit but a manifestation of interest, intent, preference, +and preoccupation. A hidden life is at work. If I +deny this, because my scepticism eschews everything +hidden, I must consistently abandon all dialectic and +revert to undirected dreaming, without comments on +my dream intended to be veridical: because if the +least comment on my dreams were veridical I must +begin at once to reject, in my comments, all the +essences suggesting themselves which deviate from +that particular dream I mean to describe. Meaning, +which is my guide in discriminating one suggestion +from another as being the right one, springs from +beneath the surface; it is a nether influence. It is a +witness to my psychic life going on beneath, which +can be disturbed by the intrusion of one event, or +furthered by another; and this subterranean impulse +<span class='pageno' id='Page_138'>138</span>breaks out into judgements about the rightness and +wrongness of essences—utterly absurd and unmeaning +judgements if the essences were considered simply in +themselves. If I feel that they clash, if I make a +stumbling-block of their irrelevance or diversity, I +prove that I am discoursing about them for an ulterior +purpose, in the service of some alien interest. I am +stringing my pearls; therefore I require them to be +of a particular quality. I am a collector, not a poet; +and what concerns me, even in the purest dialectic +or the most desultory dream, is not to explore essence, +but to gather <i>experience</i>. The psyche below is busy +selecting her food, fortifying her cave, and discriminating +her friends from her enemies; and in these +meanderings of mine over the realm of essence, in +spite of myself, I am only her scout.</p> + +<p class='c005'>By experience I understand a fund of wisdom +gathered by living. I call it a fund of wisdom, rather +than merely memory or discursive ideation, because +experience accrues precisely when discrimination +amongst given essences is keenest, when only the +relevant is retained or perhaps noticed, and when the +psyche sagaciously interprets data as omens favourable +or unfavourable to her interests, as perilous or inviting, +and, if she goes wrong, allows the event to correct +her interpretation. I think it mere mockery to use +the word experience for what is not learning or gathering +knowledge of facts; if experience taught me +nothing it would not be experience, but reverie. +Experience accordingly presupposes intent and intelligence, +and it also implies, as will appear presently, +a natural world in which it is possible to learn to live +better by practising the arts.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Intuition is an event, although it reveals only an +essence; and in like manner discourse is an experience, +even when its deliverance is mere dialectic. It is an +experience for two reasons: first, because it is guided +<span class='pageno' id='Page_139'>139</span>unawares by the efforts of the psyche to explore, not +the realm of essence, but the world that controls her +fortunes; and secondly, because the essences unrolled +before it, apparently at random and for no reason, +really convey knowledge; in reality they are manifestations +to the psyche of that surrounding world +which it concerns her to react upon wisely. Discourse +is hers; and it is full of the names—since images not +auditory may be names also—which she gives to her +friends and enemies, and of her ingenious imaginations +concerning their ways. However original the +terms of discourse may be, under the control of the +psyche and her environment they fall into certain +rhythms; they run into familiar sequences; they +become virtual and available knowledge of things, +persons, nature, and the gods. Imagination would be +very insecure and inconstant in these constructions, and +they would not become automatic habits in discourse, +if instinct within and nature without did not control +the process of discourse, and dictate its occasions. So +controlled, discourse becomes experience.</p> + +<p class='c005'>That discourse is secretly an experience, and may +be turned into knowledge, becomes particularly evident +when it is interrupted by <i>shocks</i>. Not only may an +essence suddenly present itself which was not the +essence I expected or should have welcomed, but the +whole placid tenor of my thoughts may be arrested +or overwhelmed. I may suffer a sort of momentary +and conscious death, in that I survive to feel the +extinction of all that made up my universe, and to +face a blank, or a precipice. When in my placid +discourse one thing seemed to contradict another, +they were but rival images in the same field, and I +had but to choose between them, and proceed with +the argument. Shock contradicts nothing, but uproots +the whole experience. The lights go out on +the stage, and discourse loses its momentum.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_140'>140</span>In the sense of contradiction there is probably +some element of shock. The purest æsthetic or +logical contemplation hardly goes on without a throbbing +accompaniment of interest, haste, reversals, +and satisfactions; but these dramatic notes are merged +in the counterpoint of the themes surveyed, and I +think, prove, and enjoy without noticing that I do so. +But when a clap of thunder deafens me, or a flash of +lightning at once dazzles and blinds me, the fact that +something has <i>happened</i> is far more obvious to me +than just what it is that has occurred; and there are +perhaps shocks internal to the psyche in which the +tension of the event reaches a maximum, whilst the +nature of it remains so obscure that perhaps my only +sense of it is a question, a gasp, or a recoil. The +feeling present in such a case is, with but little further +qualification, the sheer feeling of experience.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Now experience of the most brutal and dumbest +sort may be theoretically described, and described +exhaustively, in terms of the successive intuition of +essences; for loudness, dazzlingness, pain, or terror +are essences or elements of essences like any other +data; and when such essences are present, all is +present that it is possible ever to feel in that direction, +and with any degree of intensity. Utter blankness, +intolerable strain, shrieking despair, are just the +essences they are, and they are unrolled and revealed +to intuition like any other essences. But such intuitions, +being those proper to the most brutal and +rudimentary life, have a suasion in them out of all +proportion to their articulation, or rather, we might +almost say, inversely proportional to it; as if the more +an experience meant the less it cried out, and the more +it cried out the less it meant. The purest discourse +is (without noticing it) an experience, and the blindest +experience (also without noticing it) is a discourse, +since we should not call it experience if it contained +<span class='pageno' id='Page_141'>141</span>no sense of passage, no experiential perspective; but +in proportion as shock cancels discourse and obliterates +its own background, experience becomes mere +experience, and inarticulate.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In brute experience, or shock, I have not only a +clear indication, for my ulterior reflection, that I +exist, but a most imperious summons at that very +moment to <i>believe</i> in my existence. Discourse, as I +first disentangled the evidence for it from the pure +intuition of essence, seemed to be a progressive +observation of the permanent—studious attention +perusing and registering the essential mutual relations +of given terms. But now, when shock interrupts me, +discourse suffers violence. The subject-matter itself +takes up arms; one object leaves me in the lurch, +while another, quite irrelevantly, assaults me. And +since my discourse witnesses and records this revolution, +I must now assert it to be a permanent knowledge +of the changing.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Shocks <i>come</i>: if they did not <i>come</i>, if I had not +pre-existed, if I had never been anything more than +the intuition of this shock, then this shock would not +be a shock in fact, but only the illusion of a shock, +only the essence of shock speciously persuading me +that something had happened, when in fact nothing +had occurred. If the sense of shock does not deceive +me, I must have passed from a state in which the +shock was not yet, into the state in which the shock +first startled me; and I must since have passed from +that startled state into another, in which my intuition +covers synthetically the coming, the nature, and the +subsidence of that shock; so that I am aware how +startled I was, without being startled afresh now. A +wonderful and ambiguous presence of the absent and +persistence of the receding, which is called <i>memory</i>. +My objects have receded, yet I continue to consider +them. They are no longer essences, but facts, and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_142'>142</span>my consideration is not intuition of something given +but faith in something absent, and a persistent indication +of it as still the same object, although my image +of it is constantly changing, is perhaps intermittent, +and probably grows fainter, vaguer, and more erroneous +at every instant.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Experience of shock, if not utterly delusive, accordingly +establishes the validity of memory and of +transitive knowledge. It establishes realism. If it be +true that I have ever had any experience, I must not +only have existed unawares in order to gather it, but +I am justified in explicitly asserting a whole realm of +existence, in which one event may contain realistic +knowledge of another. Experience, even conceived +most critically as a series of shocks overtaking one +another and retained in memory, involves a world of +independent existences deployed in an existing medium. +Belief in experience is belief in nature, however +vaguely nature may as yet be conceived, and every +empiricist is a naturalist in principle, however hesitant +his naturalism may be in practice.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Nevertheless shock, like any other datum, intrinsically +presents an essence only, and <i>might</i> be +nothing more; but in that case the dogmatic suasion +of it (which alone lends interest to so blank an experience) +would be an illusion. The intuition would +be what it is, but it would be nobody’s intuition, and +it would mean nothing. For I should not be a self, +if that intuition made up my whole being, so that it +involved no change in my condition, but was perhaps +itself the whole universe. Shock will not suffer me, +while it lasts, to entertain any such hypothesis. It is +itself the most positive, if the blindest, of beliefs; it +loudly proclaims an event; so that if by chance the +change which I feel were merely a feeling within the +unity of apperception, shock would be an illusion, in +the only sense in which this can be said of any intuition: +<span class='pageno' id='Page_143'>143</span>it would incite me to a false belief that something +like the given essence existed. If the change has really +occurred, and not merely been imagined, shock is not +only intuition of change, but trouble in a process of +change enveloping that intuition. I am right in +positing a desultory experience in which this intuition +is an incident. I am not a spectator watching this +cataract, but a part of the water precipitated over the +edge. Thus if being shocked was, as perhaps it +ought to be, the first sensation in life, it proclaimed +the existence of a previous state without sensation. +Unless it is an illusion, which I cannot admit while I +feel it, it implies variation in a voluminous vegetative +life in which the sense of surprise is a true indication +of novelty.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Before I had noticed shock, or consented to accept +its witness, I had already admitted, on dialectical +grounds, that discourse was a process; but now that +I observe how shocks, more or less violent, interrupt +discourse at every moment, I can call discourse experience. +For now I see that in endeavouring to +trace dialectical relations discourse is not itself dialectical. +Sheer chance decides whether it shall pursue +faithfully the theme it may have picked out, as sheer +chance decided that it should pick up that theme in +particular. In my theoretical bewilderment and helplessness +before this absolute contingency of all themes +and all data, I am steadied only by animal presumptions, +habits, expectations, or omens, all of which +my sceptical reflection must condemn as utterly +arbitrary. I can only say that I am the sport of an +unfathomable destiny; that in these shocks that fall +upon me thick and fast, and in the calmer stretches +between them, miscellaneous essences are revealed to +me, most of them gratuitous and mutually irrelevant; +and that if the current of them did not carry me, +somewhat congenially, into a vortex of work and play, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_144'>144</span>I should be condemned for ever to blank watching +and to sheer wonder. The very belief in experience +is a suggestion of instinct, not of experience itself. +The steadfastness of my nature, doggedly retaining +its prejudices and assuming its power, supplies and +imposes a routine upon my experience which is far +from existing in my direct intuitions, very shifty in +their quality (even when signs of the same external +object) and much mixed with dream. Even the +naturalist has to make up by analogy and presumption +(which perhaps he calls induction) the enormous +spaces between and beyond his actual observations.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Belief in experience is the beginning of that bold +instinctive art, more plastic than the instinct of most +animals, by which man has raised himself to his +earthly eminence: it opens the gates of nature to him, +both within him and without, and enables him to +transmute his apprehension, at first merely æsthetic, +into mathematical science. This is so great a step +that most minds cannot take it. They stumble, and +remain entangled in poetry and in gnomic wisdom. +Science and reasonable virtue, which plunge their +roots in the soil of nature, are to this day only partially +welcome or understood. Although they bring freedom +in the end, the approach to them seems sacrificial, +and many prefer to live in the glamour of intuition, +not having the courage to believe in experience.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_145'>145</span> + <h2 id='chap16' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='sixteen'>XVI</abbr> <br> BELIEF IN THE SELF</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Experience, when the shocks that punctuate it are +reacted upon instinctively, imposes belief in something +far more recondite than mental discourse, namely, +a person or self; and not merely such a transcendental +ego as is requisite intrinsically for any +intuition, nor such a flux of sentience as discourse itself +constitutes, but a substantial being preceding <i>all</i> the +vicissitudes of experience, and serving as an instrument +to produce them, or a soil out of which they +grow.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Shock is the great argument of common sense for +the existence of material things, because common +sense does not need to distinguish the order of evidence +from the order of genesis. If I know already that a +tile has fallen on my head, my sore head is a proof +to me that the tile was real; but if I start from the +pain itself in all innocence, I cannot draw any inference +from it about tiles or the laws of gravity. By common +sense experience is conceived as the effect which the +impact of external things makes on a man when he +is able to retain and remember it. As a matter of +fact, of course, shocks usually have an external origin, +although in dreams, madness, apparitions, and in +disease generally, their cause is sometimes internal. +But all question concerning the source of a shock is +vain for the sceptic; he knows nothing of sources; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_146'>146</span>he is asking, not whence shocks come, but to what +beliefs they should lead. In the criticism of knowledge +the <span lang="la"><i>argumentum baculaneum</i></span> is accordingly ridiculous, +and fit only for the backs of those who use it. +Why, if I am a spirit beholding essences, should +I not feel shocks? Why are not novelties and +surprises as likely themes for my entertainment as the +analysis or synthesis of some theorem or of some +picture? All essences are grist for the mill of intuition, +and any order or disorder, any quality of noise or +violence, is equally appropriate in an experience which, +for all I know or as yet believe, is absolute and groundless. +And I call it experience, not because it discloses +anything about the environment which produced it, +but because it is composed of a series of shocks, which +I survey and remember.</p> + +<p class='c005'>If, however, consenting to listen to the voice of +nature, I ask myself what a shock can signify, and of +what it brings me most unequivocal evidence, the least +hazardous answer will be: evidence of prepossessions +on my part. What shock proves, if it proves +anything, is that I have a nature to which all events +and all developments are not equally welcome. How +could any apparition surprise or alarm me, or how +could interruption of any sort overtake me, unless I +was somehow running on in a certain direction, with +a specific rhythm? Had I not such a positive nature, +the existence of material things and their most violent +impact upon one another, shattering the world to +atoms, would leave me a placid observer of their +movement; whereas a definite nature in me, even +if disturbed only by cross-currents or by absolute +accidents within my own being, would justify my +sense of surprise and horror. A self, then, not a +material world, is the first object which I should posit +if I wish the experience of shock to enlarge my dogmas +in the strict order of evidence.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_147'>147</span>But what sort of a self? In one sense, the existence +of intuition is tantamount to that of a self, though of +a merely formal and transparent one, pure spirit. A +self somewhat more concrete is involved in discourse, +when intuition has been deployed into a successive +survey of constant ideal objects, since here the self +not only sees, but adds an adventitious order to the +themes it rehearses; traversing them in various +directions, with varying completeness, and suspending +or picking up the consideration of them at will; so +that the self involved in discourse is a thinking mind. +Now that I am consenting to build further dogmas on +the sentiment of shock, and to treat it, not as an essence +groundlessly revealed to me, but as signifying something +pertinent to the alarm or surprise with which it +fills me, I must thicken and substantialise the self I +believe in, recognising in it a nature that accepts or +rejects events, a nature having a movement of its own, +far deeper, more continuous and more biassed than +a discoursing mind: the self posited by the sense of +shock is a living psyche.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This is a most obscure subterraneous object; I am +venturing into the nether world. It is alarming and +yet salutary to notice how near to radical scepticism +are the gates of Hades. I shall have occasion later to +consider what the psyche is physically, when I have +learned more about the world in which she figures; +she has some stake in it, since she welcomes or strives +against sundry events. So anxious a being must have +but precarious conditions of existence, and yet some +native adaptation to them, since she manages to exist +at all. Here I need admit only this: that the pure +spirit involved in any intuition of essence is in my +case repeatedly and somewhat consecutively actualised +in a running mental discourse; that, further, it is +employed in remembering, loving, and hating, so that +it almost seems to spring like a wild beast upon its +<span class='pageno' id='Page_148'>148</span>visions, as upon its prey, and to gnaw and digest them +into its own substance. Spirit, as I shall soon find, is +no substance, and has no interests; all this absurd +animal violence may still be nothing but a dream; +and the fact, now agreed upon, that discourse is going +on, may suffice to dispose of these passionate movements. +Music, which is ethereal in its being and, in +the objective direction, terminates in pure essence, +nevertheless in its play with pure essence is full of +trepidation, haste, terror, potentiality, and sweetness. +If mere sound can carry such a load, why should not +discourse do likewise, in which images of many other +sorts come trooping across the field of intuition? +This is no idle doubt, since the whole Buddhist system +is built on accepting it as a dogma; and transcendentalism, +though it talks much of the self, denies, or ought +to deny, its existence, and the existence of anything; +the transcendental self is pure spirit, incoherently +identified with the principle of change, preference, and +destiny which this philosophy calls Will, but which +in truth, as I shall find, is matter. The Buddhists +too, in denying the self, are obliged to introduce an +ambiguous equivalent in the heritage of guilt, ignorance, +and illusion which they call Karma. These are +ulterior mystifications, which I mention here only lest +I should proceed to posit the natural psyche without +a due sense of the risks I am taking. The natural +psyche, being a habit of matter, is to be described +and investigated from without, scientifically, by a behaviourist +psychology; but the critical approach to it +from within, as a postulate of animal faith, is extremely +difficult and fraught with danger. Literary psychology, +to which I am here confined, is at home only in the +sentiments and ideas of the adult mind, as language +has expressed them: the deeper it tries to go, the +vaguer its notions; and it soon loses itself in the dark +altogether. I cannot hope to discover, therefore, what +<span class='pageno' id='Page_149'>149</span>precisely this psyche is, this self of mine, the existence +of which is so indubitable to my active and passionate +nature. The evidence for it in shock hardly goes +beyond the instinctive assertion that I existed before, +that I am a principle of steady life, welcoming or +rejecting events, that I am a nucleus of active interests +and passions. It will be easy to graft upon these +passions and interests the mental discourse which I +had previously asserted to be going on, and which +made up, in this critical reconstruction of belief, my +first notion of myself. And yet here is one of the +dangers of my investigation, because mental discourse +is not, and cannot be, a self nor a psyche. It is all +surface; it neither precedes, nor survives, nor guides, +nor posits its data; it merely notes and remembers +them. Discourse is a most superficial function of +the self; and if by the self I was tempted to understand +a series of ideas, I should be merely reverting +sceptically to that stage of philosophic denudation in +which I found myself, before I had consented to accept +the evidence of shock in favour of my own existence. +I, if I exist, am not an idea, nor am I the fact that +several ideas may exist, one of which remembers the +other. If I exist, I am a living creature to whom +ideas are incidents, like aeroplanes in the sky; they +pass over, more or less followed by the eye, more or +less listened to, recognised, or remembered; but the +self slumbers and breathes below, a mysterious natural +organism, full of dark yet definite potentialities; so +that different events will awake it to quite disproportionate +activities. The self is a fountain of joy, folly, +and sorrow, a waxing and waning, stupid and dreaming +creature, in the midst of a vast natural world, +of which it catches but a few transient and odd +perspectives.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_150'>150</span> + <h2 id='chap17' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='seventeen'>XVII</abbr> <br> THE COGNITIVE CLAIMS OF MEMORY</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Belief in memory is implicit in the very rudiments of +mind; mind and memory are indeed names for almost +the same thing, since memory furnishes most of the +resources of a mind at all developed, and nothing is +ever in the mind but may reappear in memory, if the +psyche can fall again for a moment into her old paces. +Mind and memory alike imply cognisance taken of +outlying things, or knowledge. When the things +known are events within the past experience of the +psyche, spontaneously imagined, knowledge is called +memory; it is called mind or intelligence when they +are past, present, or future events in the environment +at large, no matter by what means they are suggested +or reported. Memory itself must report facts or +events in the natural world, if it is to be knowledge +and to deserve the name of memory. An intuition by +chance repeating an intuition that had occurred earlier +would not be memory or knowledge of that earlier +event. There must be belief in its previous occurrence, +with some indication of its original locus.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Intuition without memory must be assumed to +have existed in the beginning, but such intuition +regards essence only. Not being directed by memory +upon the past, nor by animal faith upon the future +or upon external things, pure intuition exercises no +sagacity, no transitive intelligence, and does not think. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_151'>151</span>It is merely the light of awareness lending actuality +to some essence. When identity and duration come +to be attributed to this essence, memory begins to +make its claims felt, although indirectly. When I call +an essence identical I imply that I have considered it +twice, and that I possess a true memory of my past +intuition, since I know it presented this very essence. +Similarly, when I call an essence the same, but without +distinguishing my two intuitions of it, which may be +continuous, I posit the truth of memory unawares; +for this sensation of living on, of having lived up to +the present, is a primary memory. It sets up a +temporal perspective, believing firmly in its recessional +character; parts of the specious present are interpreted +as survivals of a receding present, a present +that can never return, but the vision of which I have +not wholly lost. The perspective is not taken to +be specious only, but a true memorial of facts past +and gone.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Memory deploys all the items of its inventory at +some distance, yet sees them directly, by a present +glance. It makes no difference to the directness of +this knowledge how great the distance of the object +may be in the direction of the past. So also in foresight: +I foresee my death as directly as I do my dinner, +not necessarily more vaguely, and far more certainly. +Memory and prophecy do in time what perception +does in space; here too the given essence is projected +upon an object remote from the living psyche which +is the organ of the intuition and of the projection. +The object is indeed not remote from the <i>mind</i>, if by +mind I understand the intellectual energy of memory, +prophecy, or perception reaching to that object, and +positing it there in intent; but it is remote from the +psyche, from the material agent, from me here and +now. A little less or a little more interval of time +or space—and there is always an interval—does not +<span class='pageno' id='Page_152'>152</span>render less ocular and immediate the description of +a removed event by the essences it brings before me. +I see a peewit in the sky as directly as I see the watch +in my hand, and I hear his note as easily as I do the +ticking of the watch against my ear. So I remember +the Scotch kilt I wore when a child as directly as the +umbrella I carried this morning. The difficulty in +extending the range of knowledge is physical only; +I may be near-sighted; and the mechanism of memory +may break down, or may be choked with parasitic +fancies as it grows old.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In memory it is sometimes possible to reproduce +almost exactly some earlier scene or experience. If +the psyche happens to run through the same process +twice—and being material she is compacted of habits—she +will twice have exactly the same intuition; but +this precise repetition of the past, far from constituting +a perfect memory, excludes memory. The sentiment +of pastness, the receding perspective in which memory +places its data, will be wanting; and this perfect +recovery of experience will not be remembrance. Nor +is any fulness or precision in the image of the past +necessary to the truth of memory. The nerve of +recollection lies elsewhere, in the projection of the +given essence—which may be vague or purely verbal—to +a precise point or nucleus of relations in the natural +past. Memory is genuine if the events it designates +actually took place, and conformed to the description, +however brief and abstract, which I give of them. +Pictorial fulness and emotional reversion to the past +are not important, and they are found most often at +unimportant points. Healthy memory excludes them, +and for two reasons. The bodily reaction to the old +environment is now hardly possible, and certainly +not appropriate; and therefore, even if the neurogram +in the psyche could spring again into perfect life, it +would bring a dream into being, an interruption to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_153'>153</span>life in the present, rather than a sober memory filling +the present appropriately with a long perspective. +The second reason is that the neurogram is likely to +have been modified by the accidents of nutrition and +waste intervening, so that the old movement cannot +really be repeated, and the essence called up will not +really be the original one. That it may <i>seem</i> to be +the original, in its very life, is nothing to the purpose. +How, if vivid, should it not seem so, when no other +memory exists to control it? But if I can control it +by circumstantial evidence, I usually find that this +specious recovery of past experience is a cheap illusion. +If the reversion to the past seems complete, it is not +because the facts are remembered accurately, but +because some subtle influence fills me with a sentiment +wholly foreign to my present circumstances, and +redolent of a remote past; and that dramatic shift +seems to lift all the details of the picture out of the +perspective of memory into the foreground of the +present. It is the fancy that comes forward, producing +a waking dream, not the memory that sinks back into +an old experience. The scent of a cedar chest in +which old finery is kept may carry me back vividly +to my earliest childhood; but the images that now +seem to live again will be creatures of my present +sophisticated and literary fancy; I shall see them +romantically, not with the eyes of a child. I may +truly recover knowledge of long-forgotten facts, but +I shall not re-enact a long-past experience. And +what need is there? A miraculous identity may be +felt emotionally even when the two descriptions of the +identical thing differ in <i>every</i> sensible term, as happens +in metaphors, in myths, in myself as body and as +mind, in idolatry, or in the doctrine—which expresses +a mystical experience—of transubstantiation. In such +cases the vital reaction, the deeper readjustment of +the psyche, to the two appearances is the same; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_154'>154</span>therefore I feel that the thing appearing in the two +ways is identical, that the one is <i>really</i> the other, +however diverse the two sets of symbols may be.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I have already accepted the belief in memory; +indeed, without accepting it I could not have taken the +first step forward from the most speechless scepticism. +But since such acceptance is an act of faith, and +asserts transitive or realistic knowledge, I will pause +to consider somewhat more explicitly what the cognitive +claims of memory are, on which all human beliefs +are reared.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The paradox of knowing the absent is posited in +the past tenses of the verb; it is the paradox of +knowledge itself, since intuition of essence is not +properly called knowledge; it is imagination, since +the only object present is then non-existent and the +description of it, being creative, is infallible. The +claim to knowledge everybody understands perfectly +when he makes it, which he does whenever he perceives, +remembers, or believes anything; but if we wish to +paraphrase this claim reflectively, we may perhaps +say that in it attention professes to fall on an object +explicitly at a distance, being framed by other nearer +objects (though at some distance themselves) upon +which attention falls only virtually. If this foreground +or frame were absent altogether, I should live in the +pictured past thinking it present; memory would +overleap its memorial office and become a dream. It +would cease to be liable to error, being no longer a +report about anything else; but it would become an +idle entertainment, which a moralist might call an +illusion, on the ground that its images were irrelevant +to the practice of rational life, and its emotions wasted. +But it would not misrepresent anything, since in +ceasing to be a memory it would have abandoned all +cognitive claims.</p> + +<p class='c005'>A frame or foreground is accordingly indispensable +<span class='pageno' id='Page_155'>155</span>to the projection which renders a present image a +vision of some past fact: I must stand here to point +there. Yet if my present station were explicitly +perceived, if the whole immediate datum were focussed +equally in thought, the picture would seem flat and +the perspective merely painted upon it, as upon a +cheap drop-curtain in a theatre. It would destroy +the claim and, if you like, the illusion of memory to +remember that I am remembering; for then I should +be considering myself only, and only the present, +whereas in living remembrance I am self-forgetful, +and live in the present thinking only of the past, and +observe the past without supposing that I am living +in it. My recollections, my <i>souvenirs</i>, are only essences +which I read as I should the characters on this page, +not viewing them contemplatively in their own category +as forms present in their entirety, but accepting them +readily (as in all knowledge) as messengers, as signs +for existences of which they furnish but an imperfect +description, for which I am perhaps hopeful of substituting +a better view. In lapsing into the past I +seem to myself to be entering a realm of shadows; +and a chief part of my wakefulness, which prevents me +from actually dreaming that I am living in that other +world, is precisely this eagerness of mine to see better, +to remember all, to recover the past as it really was; +and the elusive and treacherous character of such +images as come to me troubles me seriously, as a +mist distorting and shutting off the truth. My heart, +as it were, is fixed on that removed reality, and I know +that my eyes see it but imperfectly. Yet if my heart +had intuition now of what that reality once was, +recollection would be superfluous, since I should +possess all it could bring me before it brought it; +and on the other hand, if my heart did not know the +reality, how could I reject, criticise, or approve the +images that professed to restore its forgotten aspects? +<span class='pageno' id='Page_156'>156</span>Obviously what I am calling the heart, which is the +psyche, is blind in herself: imagination is her only +light, her only language; but she is a prior principle +of choice and judgement and action in the dark; so +that when the light shines in that darkness, she +comprehends it, and feels at once whether the ray +falls on the object towards which she was groping, or +on some irrelevant thing. The psyche, in the case +of memory, contains all the seeds, all the involutions +and latent habits, which the past left there in passing; +any one of these may be released freely, or only +irritated and summoned to activity without being +sufficiently fed, or only to be at once thwarted and +contradicted; and the <i>sentiment</i> of this prosperous or +mutilated rendering of experience, when memory +proffers its images, enables the psyche to judge these +images to be true or false, adequate or inadequate, +without possessing any other images with which to +compare them.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This felt imperfection of memory is no obstacle to +the directness of such knowledge as it does afford. +Memory, however vague, transports me to the intended +scene; I walk by its wavering light through those +ancient chambers; I see again (incorrectly, no doubt) +what occurred there. But if many a detail once +obvious is thereby lost or misplaced, memory may see +the chief features of the past in a truer perspective +than that in which experience placed them originally. +The ghostliness of memory carries this compensation +with it, comparable to the breadth of sympathy that +compensates old age for the loss of vivaciousness; +memory is a reconstruction, not a relapse. The view +which the opened chest creates in me now of my +family history may be truer than any I had when a +child. My perceptions when a child were themselves +descriptions, naïve, disjointed, limited. In reproducing +my past perceptions, my dreaming memory does +<span class='pageno' id='Page_157'>157</span>not regard those perceptions—perceptions being +spiritual facts, can become objects of intent only. +Memory regards the same objects (essences or things) +which the past perceptions regarded. But the soil +in which these intuitions now grow has been tilled +and watered, and, even if a little exhausted, it may +yield a fairer description of those ancient incidents +than existed before, more voluminous, better knit, +more knowing. Memory has fundamentally the same +function as history and science—to review things +more intelligently than they were ever viewed. Mind +would never rise out of the most helpless animal +routine if it could not forget in remembering, and +could not substitute a moral perspective for the +infinite flatness of physical experience. That much +drops out is a blessing; that something creeps in, by +way of idealisation, hyperbole, and legend, is not an +unmixed evil. In spite of this admixture of fiction, +memory, legend, and science achieve a true intellectual +dominion over the flux of events; and they add a +poetic life and rhythm of their own, like the senses.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This possibility of dominion proves that the images +and the apperception involved in remembering are +fresh images and a fresh apperception. It shows also +that the later station in time of the act of remembering +in no way annuls the directness of the knowledge +involved, nor cuts it off from its object; on the +contrary, the object being posited and chosen by the +psyche before any images or any apperception arise, +these are free to describe that object in any way +they can, bringing all later resources of the mind to +illustrate it, and thereby perhaps describing it far +more truly than the senses revealed it when it was +present.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Here an important detail has come into view which +at first sight might seem paradoxical, but only because +the paucity of language obliges us often to use the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_158'>158</span>same word for very different things. Thus it seems +natural to say that a man may remember his own +experience, and can remember nothing else; and yet +it is not his <i>experience</i> that he commonly remembers +at all, but the usual object of his memory is the object +of his former experience, the events or the situation +in which his earlier experience occurred. Experience +is intuition, it is discourse interspersed with shocks +and recapitulated; but intuition, actual experience, +is not an object of any possible intuition or experience, +being, as I have said above, a spiritual fact. Its +existence can be discovered only by moral imagination, +and posited dramatically, as the experience proper to +spirit under certain real or imaginary circumstances. +And this is true of my own past or future, no less than +of the experience of others. When I remember I do +not <i>look at</i> my past experience, any more than when +I think of a friend’s misfortunes I look at his thoughts. +I imagine them; or rather I imagine something of my +own manufacture, as if I were writing a novel, and I +attribute this intuited experience to myself in the past, +or to the other person. Naturally, I can impute only +such feelings as my present psyche can evoke; and +she, although creative, creates automatically and in +accordance with patterns fixed by habit or instinct; +so that it is true, in a loose way, that I can remember +or conceive only what I have experienced; but this +is not because my experience itself remains within me, +and can be re-observed. Such a notion needs but to +be made clear to be made ridiculous. Living intuition +cannot be preserved; and even while it lives, it cannot +be found. It is spiritual.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Recollection is accordingly incipient dreaming; it +views the same objects as the experience did which +it rehearses, since the memory arises by a renewal of +the very process in the psyche by which that experience +was created originally. The psyche, in so far as she +<span class='pageno' id='Page_159'>159</span>is occupied with that dream, does not know that it is +a memory, nor that its objects are remote and perhaps +no longer exist; she posits them with all the confidence +of action, as in any other dream. Yet in +normal memory the illusion is controlled and corrected, +and the experience actually given, with all its posited +objects, is relegated to the past; because this time it +is framed in another experience, with more obstinate +objects and an environment to which the body is +adjusted, incompatible with the remembered environment. +Hence the shadowy, vaporous, unreal aspect +of the remembered past: images chase one another +through it, as they chase one another sometimes in a +cinema, or as in a dream what was just now a white-capped +wave may become a horse galloping. Meantime +reason rides the storm of seething incipient +fancies, anchored in the outer senses by the steady +pull of the instincts which bind it to the present +world.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Experience cannot be remembered, a perception +cannot be perceived nor re-perceived. This fact +explains both the directness of memory (since it +regards the same objects, the same environment, as +the old experience, and repeats the same emotions), +and also the ghostliness of memory and of all imagination +(since the beliefs and emotions evoked are +irrelevant to the present world, and inhibited by +peremptory present reactions).</p> + +<p class='c005'>There is a great difference conventionally between +memory and fancy, between history and fiction, and +the two things diverge widely in their physical significance, +one regarding events in nature and the other +imaginary scenes; nevertheless psychologically they +are clearly akin. It is only by an ulterior control that +we can distinguish which sort of fancy is memory and +which sort of fiction is historical. This control, for +the immediate past, is exercised by habit and sensation. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_160'>160</span>The immediate past is continuous with the present; +I believe that I remember, and do not merely imagine, +the street in which I live, because I am ready to walk +out into it confidently, and by raising my eyes can see +it out of the window. It is an object continuous with +the recurrent objects of my present faith. When the +past is more remote, this control, while the same in +principle, is less directly exercised; it is mainly the +<i>habit</i> of memory that testifies to the truth of memory. +I believe I remember, and do not merely imagine, +what I have always said I remembered; just as we +believe events to be historical and not invented, when +historians have always repeated them. It is consequently +very easy for a fiction, once incorporated in +what, because of our practical habits, we regard as +real events, to pass for a fact for ever. Autobiographies +and religions (even when not systematically recast by +the fancy, as they usually are) contain many such +involuntary confusions. <i>Vice versa</i>, a lively fiction +spontaneously takes the form of a history or a memory. +Although no junction with genuine memory or history +may be attempted in <i>Robinson Crusoe</i> at the beginning +or at the end, many a real fact may be woven into the +narrative, to add to its verisimilitude, and absorb, as +it were, the fancied details into the romantic medley +of things commonly believed. “Once upon a time,” +says the story-teller, in order vaguely to graft his +imaginary events on to the tree of memory; and in +the <i>Thousand and One Nights</i> we are transported to +one of the cities amongst cities, or to an island amongst +the isles of the sea; whereby the fiction grows more +arresting, or the real world more marvellous and +large.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Criticism of memory and history is a ticklish and +often a comic matter, because only fancy can be +employed to do it; and we judge the authority of +records and the reports of our past experience by the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_161'>161</span>criterion of what, at the present moment, can exercise +a decided suasion over our belief, and create a living +illusion. But the principle by which we trust memory +at all is always the same, and deeply paradoxical. +How can a flux be observed at all? If flux there be, +the earlier part is gone when the latter part appears: +how then can the relation, the passage, be observed? +And where is the observation? If it occupies each +instant in turn, how can it bridge them? If it stands +outside, how can it touch any of them? In any case +the observation would seem to be out of the flux +which it imagines, but does not undergo: for if its +being is instantaneous, there is no flux in it; and if +it is comprehensive, and contemporary with all the +instants surveyed, again it endures no change. Indeed, +analytically, it is obvious that a sense of change, falling +necessarily under a unity of apperception, transcends +<i>that</i> change, however changeful may be the conditions +of its own genesis: mind, by its very character as +mind, is timeless. Is time, then, merely a picture +of time, and can it be nothing else? And is flux, +which is an essential quality of existence, only a mere +appearance, and essentially incapable of existing in +fact?</p> + +<p class='c005'>There is danger here of an enormous illusion, into +which I think the most redoubtable metaphysicians +have fallen. We must admit that spirit is not in time, +that the perception of flux (or of anything else) is not +a flux, but a synthetic glance and a single intuition of +relation, of form, of quality. The seen is everywhere +a universal, the seeing is everywhere supernatural. +But this admission is far from involving a denial of +flux—a denial, that is, of the deliverance of this very +spirit to which we are assigning such pompous prerogatives. +The one prerogative which we must assume +spirit to possess—because we claim it in exercising +spirit at all—is that it <i>understands</i>, that it tells truly +<span class='pageno' id='Page_162'>162</span>something about something. Its own conditions of +being, that it must be immaterial, timeless, synthetic, +intuitive, do not preclude it, if it is truly intelligent, +from revealing things differently constituted from +itself: much less can it prevent these non-spiritual +things from existing. What madness is this, because +we may at last discern the spirituality of spirit, to deny +that there could ever have been anything for spirit to +discern? Why stultify the very faculty we are discovering +that we possess? Why tumble in this way +head over heels from our little eminence, and reduce +ourselves to speechlessness in wonder at our capacity +to speak? This supernatural status and super-temporal +scope of spirit are not prerogatives; they +are deprivations; they are sacrificial conditions, from +the point of view of natural existence, to which any +faculty must submit, if it is to understand. Of course +understanding is itself an achievement (though not all +philosophers esteem it highly), but it must be bought +at a price: at the price of escaping into a fourth +dimension, of not being that which we understand. +So when the flux, in its rumble and perpetual superposition +of movements, remembers that it flows, it is +not arrested materially; but the sense that what flows +through it at this instant has come from afar, that it +has taken a fresh shape, and is hurrying to new transformations, +has itself eluded that fate: for this sense, +as distinguished from the psyche that exercises it, is +tangential to the flux it surveys, neither instantaneous +nor prolonged, but simply intelligent. How far into +the past or future its glance may reach, is a matter of +accident, and of the range of adjustments at that +moment in the psyche. But spirit is virtually +omniscient: barriers of space and time do not shut +it in; they are but the boundary-stones of field and +field in its landscape. It is ready to survey all time +and all existence if, by establishing some electric +<span class='pageno' id='Page_163'>163</span>connection with its seat, time and existence will +consent to report themselves to it. For spirit has +no interests, no curiosity, no animal impatience; and +as it arises only when and where nature calls it forth, +so it surveys only what nature happens to spread +before it.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_164'>164</span> + <h2 id='chap18' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='eighteen'>XVIII</abbr> <br> KNOWLEDGE IS FAITH MEDIATED BY SYMBOLS</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>In the claims of memory I have a typical instance of +what is called knowledge. In remembering I believe +that I am taking cognisance not of a given essence but +of a remote existence, so that, being myself here and +now, I can consider and describe something going +on at another place and time. This leap, which +renders knowledge essentially faith, may come to +seem paradoxical or impossible like the leap of physical +being from place to place or from form to form which +is called motion or change, and which some philosophers +deny, as they deny knowledge. Is there such a leap +in knowing? Am I really here and now when I +apprehend some remote thing? Certainly, if by +myself I understand the psyche within my body, +which directs my outer organs, reacts on external +things, and shapes the history and character of the +individual animal that bears my name. In this sense +I am a physical being in the midst of nature, and my +knowledge is a name for the effects which surrounding +things have upon me, in so far as I am quickened by +them, and readjusted to them. I am certainly confined +at each moment to a limited space and time, but may +be quickened by the influence of things at any distance, +and may be readjusting myself to them. For the +naturalist there is accordingly no paradox in the leap +<span class='pageno' id='Page_165'>165</span>of knowledge other than the general marvel of material +interaction and animal life.</p> + +<p class='c005'>If by myself, however, I meant pure spirit, or +the light of attention by which essences appear and +intuitions are rendered actual, it would not be true +that I am confined or even situated in a particular +place and time, nor that in considering things remote +from my body, my thoughts are taking any unnatural +leap. The marvel, from the point of view of spirit, is +rather that it should need to be planted at all in the +sensorium of some living animal, and that, being +rooted there, it should take that accidental station for +its point of view in surveying all nature, and should +dignify one momentary phase of that animal life with +the titles of the Here and the Now. It is only spirit, +be it observed, that can do this. In themselves all +the points of space-time are equally central and +palpitating, and every phase of every psyche is a focus +for actual readjustments to the whole universe. How +then can the spirit, which would seem to be the +principle of universality and justice, take up its station +in each of these atoms and fight its battles for it, and +prostitute its own light in the service of that desperate +blindness? Can reason do nothing better than supply +the eloquence of prejudice? Such are the puzzles +which spirit might find, I will not say in the leap of +knowledge, but in the fatality which links the spirit +to a material organ so that, in order to reach other +things, it is obliged to leap; or rather can never reach +other things, because it is tethered to its starting-point, +except by its intent in leaping, and cannot even +discover the stepping-stone on which it stands because +its whole life is the act of leaping away from it. There +is no reason, therefore, in so far as knowledge is an +apanage of spirit, why knowledge should not bathe all +time and all existence in an equal light, and see everything +as it is, with an equal sympathy and immediacy. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_166'>166</span>The problem for the spirit is how it could ever come +to pick out one body or another for its cynosure and +for its instrument, as if it could not see save through +such a little eye-glass, and in such a violent perspective. +This problem, I think, has a ready answer, but it is +not one that spirit could ever find of itself, without a +long and docile apprenticeship in the school of animal +faith. This answer is that spirit, with knowledge and +all its other prerogatives, is intrinsically and altogether +a function of animal life; so that if it were not lodged +in some body and expressive of its rhythms and +relations, spirit would not exist at all. But this +solution, even when spirit is humble enough to accept +it, always seems to it a little disappointing and satirical.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Spirit, therefore, has no need to leap in order to +know, because in its range as spirit it is omnipresent +and omnimodal. Events which are past or future in +relation to the phase of the psyche which spirit expresses +in a particular instance, or events which are remote +from that psyche in space, are not for that reason +remote from spirit, or out of its cognitive range: they +are merely hidden, or placed in a particular perspective +for the moment, like the features of a landscape by +the hedges and turns of a road. Just as all essences +are equally near to spirit, and equally fit and easy +to contemplate, if only a psyche with an affinity to +those essences happens to arise; so all existing things, +past, future, or infinitely distant, are equally within +the range of knowledge, if only a psyche happens to +be directed upon them, and to choose terms, however +poor or fantastic, in which to describe them. In +choosing these terms the psyche creates spirit, for +they are essences given in intuition; and in directing +her action or endeavour, backward or forward, upon +those remote events, she creates intent in the spirit, +so that the given essences become descriptions of the +things with which the psyche is then busied.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_167'>167</span>But how, I may ask, can intent distinguish its +hidden object, so that an image, distorted or faithful, +may be truly or falsely projected <i>there</i>, or used to +describe <i>it</i>? How does the spirit divine that there is +such an object, or where it lies? And how can it +appeal to a thing which is hidden, the object of mere +intent, as to a touchstone or standard for its various +descriptions of that object, and say to them, as they +suggest themselves in turn: You are too vague, +You are absurd, You are better, You are absolutely +right?</p> + +<p class='c005'>I answer that it does so by animal presumption, +positing whatsoever object instinct is materially predisposed +to cope with, as in hunger, love, fighting, or +the expectation of a future. But before developing +this reply, let me make one observation. Since intuition +of essence is not knowledge, knowledge can +never lie in an overt comparison of one datum with +another datum given at the same time; even in pure +dialectic, the comparison is with a datum <i>believed</i> to +have been given formerly. If both terms were simply +given they would compose a complex essence, without +the least signification. Only when one of the terms +is indicated by intent, without being given exhaustively, +can the other term serve to define the first +more fully, or be linked with it in an assertion which +is not mere tautology. An object of faith—and knowledge +is one species of faith—can never, even in the +most direct perception, come within the circle of +intuition. Intuition of things is a contradiction in +terms. If philosophers wish to abstain from faith, +and reduce themselves to intuition of the obvious, +they are free to do so, but they will thereby renounce +all knowledge, and live on passive illusions. No fact, +not even the fact that these illusions exist, would ever +be, or would ever have been, anything but the false +idea that they had existed. There would be nothing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_168'>168</span>but the realm of essence, without any intuition of any +part of it, nor of the whole: so that we should be +driven back to a nihilism which only silence and death +could express consistently; since the least actual +assertion of it, by existing, would contradict it.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Even such acquaintance with the realm of essence +as constitutes some science or recognisable art—like +mathematics or music—lies in intending and positing +great stretches of essence not now given, so that the +essences now given acquire significance and become +pregnant, to my vital feeling, with a thousand things +which they do not present actually, but which I know +where to look for eventually, and how to await. +Suppose a moment ago I heard a clap of thunder, loud +and prolonged, but that the physical shock has subsided +and I am conscious of repose and silence. I +may find some difficulty, although the thing was so +recent, in <i>rehearsing</i> even now the exact volume, tone, +and rumblings of that sound; yet I <i>know</i> the theme +perfectly, in the sense that when it thunders again, I +can say with assurance whether the second crash was +longer, louder, or differently modulated. In such a +case I have no longer an intuition of the first thunder-clap, +but a memory of it which is knowledge; and I +can define on occasion, up to a certain point and not +without some error, the essence given in that particular +past intuition. Thus even pure essences can become +objects of intent and of tentative knowledge when +they are not present in intuition but are approached +and posited indirectly, as the essences given on another +particular occasion or signified by some particular word. +The word or the occasion are natural facts, and my +knowledge is focussed upon them in the first instance +by ordinary perception or conception of nature: and +the essence I hope to recover is elicited gradually, +imaginatively, perhaps incorrectly, at the suggestion +of those assumed facts, according to my quickness of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_169'>169</span>wit, or my familiarity with the conventions of that +art or science. In this way it becomes possible and +necessary to learn about essences as if they were +things, not initially by a spontaneous and complete +intuition, but by coaxing the mind until possibly, at +the end, it beholds them clearly. This is the sort +of intuition which is mediated by language and by +works of fine art; also by logic and mathematics, as +they are learned from teachers and out of books. It +is not happy intuition of some casual datum: it is +laborious recovery, up to a certain point, of the <i>sort</i> +of essence somebody else may have intuited. Whereas +intuition, which reveals an essence directly, is not +knowledge, because it has no ulterior object, the +designation of some essence by some sign does convey +knowledge, to an intelligent pupil, of what that essence +was. Obviously such divination of essences present +elsewhere, so that they become present here also, in +so far as it is knowledge, is trebly faith. Faith first +in the document, as a genuine natural fact and not a +vapid fancy of my own; for instance, belief that +there is a book called the Bible, really handed down +from the ancient Jews and the early Christians, and +that I have not merely dreamt of such a book. Faith +then in the significance of that document, that it +means some essence which it is not; in this instance, +belief that the sacred writers were not merely speaking +with tongues but were signifying some intelligible +points in history and philosophy. Faith finally in my +success in interpreting that document correctly, so +that the essences it suggests to me now are the very +essences it expressed originally: in other words, the +belief that when I read the Bible I understand it as +it was meant, and not fantastically.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I revert now to the question how it is possible to +posit an object which is not a datum, and how without +knowing positively what this object is I can make it +<span class='pageno' id='Page_170'>170</span>the criterion of truth in my ideas. How can I test +the accuracy of descriptions by referring them to a +subject-matter which is not only out of view now but +which probably has never been more than an object +of intent, an event which even while it was occurring +was described by me only in terms native to my fancy? +If I know a man only by reputation, how should I +judge if the reputation is deserved? If I know things +only by representations, are not the representations +the only things I know?</p> + +<p class='c005'>This challenge is fundamental, and so long as the +assumptions which it makes are not challenged in +turn, it drives critics of knowledge inexorably to +scepticism of a dogmatic sort, I mean to the assertion +that the very notion of knowledge is absurd. One +assumption is that knowledge should be intuition: +but I have already come to the conclusion that intuition +is not knowledge. So long as a knowledge is +demanded that shall be intuition, the issue can only +be laughter or despair; for if I attain intuition, I +have only a phantom object, and if I spurn that and +turn to the facts, I have renounced intuition. This +assumption alone suffices, therefore, to disprove the +possibility of knowledge. But in case the force of +this disproof escaped us, another assumption is at +hand to despatch the business, namely, the assumption +that in a true description—if we grant knowledge by +description—the terms should be identical with the +constituents of the object, so that the idea should +<i>look like</i> the thing that it knows. This assumption +is derived from the other, or is a timid form of it: for +it is supposed that I know by intuiting my idea, and +that unless that idea resembled the object I wish to +know, I could not even by courtesy be said to have +discovered the latter. But the intuition of an idea, +let me repeat, is not knowledge; and if a thing resembling +that idea happened to exist, my intuition +<span class='pageno' id='Page_171'>171</span>would still not be knowledge of it, but contemplation +of the idea only.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Plato and many other philosophers, being in love +with intuition (for which alone they were perhaps +designed by nature), have identified science with +certitude, and consequently entirely condemned what +I call knowledge (which is a form of animal faith) or +relegated it to an inferior position, as something merely +necessary for life. I myself have no passionate attachment +to existence, and value this world for the intuitions +it can suggest, rather than for the wilderness +of facts that compose it. To turn away from it may +be the deepest wisdom in the end. What better than +to blow out the candle, and to bed! But at noon this +pleasure is premature. I can always hold it in reserve, +and perhaps nihilism is a system—the simplest of all—on +which we shall all agree in the end. But I seem +to see very clearly now that in doing so we should all +be missing the truth: not indeed by any false assertion, +such as may separate us from the truth now, but by +dumb ignorance—a dumb ignorance which, when +proposed as a solution to actual doubts, is the most +radical of errors, since it ignores and virtually denies +the pressure of those doubts, and their living presence. +Accordingly, so long as I remain awake and the light +burning, that total dogmatic scepticism is evidently an +impossible attitude. It requires me to deny what I +assert, not to mean what I mean, and (in the sense in +which seeing is believing) not to believe what I see. +If I wish, therefore, to formulate in any way my +actual claim to knowledge—a claim which life, and in +particular memory, imposes upon me—I must revise +the premisses of this nihilism. For I have been led +to it not by any accidental error, but by the logic of +the assumption that knowledge should be intuition of +fact. It is this presumption that must be revoked.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Knowledge is no such thing. It is not intramental +<span class='pageno' id='Page_172'>172</span>nor internal to experience. Not only does it not +require me to compare two given terms and to find +them similar or identical, but it positively excludes +any intuitive possession of its object. Intuition subsists +beneath knowledge, as vegetative life subsists +beneath animal life, and within it. Intuition may also +supervene upon knowledge, when all I have learned of +the universe, and all my concern for it, turn to a +playful or a hypnotising phantom; and any poet or +philosopher, like any flower, is free to prefer intuition +to knowledge. But in preferring intuition he prefers +ignorance. Knowledge is knowledge because it has +compulsory objects that pre-exist. It is incidental to +the predicaments and labour of life: also to its +masterful explorations and satirical moods. It is +reflected from events as light is reflected from bodies. +It expresses in discourse the modified habits of an +active being, plastic to experience, and capable of +readjusting its organic attitude to other things on the +same material plane of being with itself. The place +and the pertinent functions of these several things +are indicated by the very attitude of the animal who +notices them; this attitude, physical and practical, +determines the object of intent, which discourse is +about.</p> + +<p class='c005'>When the proverbial child cries for the moon, is +the object of his desire doubtful? He points at it +unmistakably; yet the psychologist (not to speak of +the child himself) would have some difficulty in recovering +exactly the sensations and images, the gathering +demands and fumbling efforts, that traverse the +child’s mind while he points. Fortunately all this +fluid sentience, even if it could be described, is irrelevant +to the question; for the child’s sensuous +experience is not his object. If it were, he would +have attained it. What his object is, his fixed gaze +and outstretched arm declare unequivocally. His +<span class='pageno' id='Page_173'>173</span>elders may say that he doesn’t know what he wants, +which is probably true of them also: that is, he has +only a ridiculously false and inconstant idea of what +the moon may be in itself. But his attention is +arrested in a particular direction, his appetition flows +the same way; and if he may be said to know anything, +he knows there is something there which he +would like to reach, which he would like to know +better. He is a little philosopher; and his knowledge, +if less diversified and congealed, is exactly like science.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The attitude of his body in pointing to the moon, +and his tears, fill full his little mind, which not only +reverberates to this physical passion, but probably +observes it: and this felt attitude <i>identifies the object</i> +of his desire and knowledge <i>in the physical world</i>. It +determines what particular thing, in the same space +and time with the child’s body, was the object of that +particular passion. If the object which the body is +after is identified, that which the soul is after is +identified too: no one, I suppose, would carry dualism +so far as to assert that when the mouth waters at the +sight of one particular plum, the soul may be yearning +for quite another.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The same bodily attitude of the child <i>identifies the +object in the discourse of an observer</i>. In perceiving +what his senses are excited by, and which way his +endeavour is turned, I can see that the object of +his desire is the moon, which I too am looking at. +That I am looking at the same moon as he can be +proved by a little triangulation: our glances converge +upon it. If the child has reached the inquisitive age +and asks “What is that?” I understand what he +means by “that” and am able to reply sapiently +“That is the moon,” only because our respective +bodies, in one common space, are discoverably turned +towards one material object, which is stimulating +them simultaneously. Knowledge of discourse in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_174'>174</span>other people, or of myself at other times, is what I +call literary psychology. It is, or may be, in its +texture, the most literal and adequate sort of knowledge +of which a mind is capable. If I am a lover of children, +and a good psycho-analyst, I may feel for a moment +exactly as the child feels in looking at the moon: and +I may know that I know his feeling, and very likely +he too will know that I know it, and we shall become +fast friends. But this rare adequacy of knowledge, +attained by dramatic sympathy, goes out to an object +which in its existence is known very indirectly: +because poets and religious visionaries feel this sort +of sympathy with all sorts of imaginary persons, of +whose existence and thoughts they have only intuition, +not knowledge. If I ask for evidence that such an +object exists, and is not an <i>alter ego</i> of my private +invention, I must appeal to my faith in nature, and +to my conventional assumption that this child and I +are animals of the same species, in the same habitat, +looking at the same moon, and likely to have the same +feelings: and finally the psychology of the tribe and +the crowd may enable me half to understand how we +know that we have the same feelings at once, when we +actually share them.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The attitude of the child’s body also <i>identifies the +object for him, in his own subsequent discourse</i>. He is +not likely to forget a moon that he cried for. When in +stretching his hand towards it he found he could not +touch it, he learned that this bright good was not +within his grasp, and he made a beginning in the +experience of life. He also made a beginning in +science, since he then added the absolutely true +predicate “out of reach” to the rather questionable +predicates “bright” and “good” (and perhaps +“edible”) with which his first glimpse had supplied +him. That active and mysterious thing, co-ordinate +with himself, since it lay in the same world with his +<span class='pageno' id='Page_175'>175</span>body, and affected it—the thing that attracted his +hand, was evidently the very thing that eluded it. +His failure would have had no meaning and would +have taught him nothing—that is, would not have +corrected his instinctive reactions—if the object he +saw and the object he failed to reach had not been +identical; and certainly that object was not brightness +nor goodness nor excitements in his brain or psyche, +for these are not things he could ever have attempted +or expected to touch. It is only things on the scale +of the human senses and in the field of those instinctive +reactions which sensation calls forth, that can be the +primary objects of human knowledge: no other +things can be discriminated at first by an animal +mind, or can interest it, or can be meant and believed +in by it. It is these instinctive reactions that select +the objects of attention, designate their locus, and +impose faith in their existence. But these reactions +may be modified by experience, and the description +the mind gives of the objects reacted upon can be +revised, or the objects themselves discarded, and +others discerned instead. Thus the child’s instinct +to touch the moon was as spontaneous and as confident +at first as his instinct to look at it; and the object of +both efforts was the same, because the same external +agency aroused them, and with them the very heterogeneous +sensations of light and of disappointment. +These various terms of sense or of discourse, by which +the child described the object under whose attractions +and rebuffs he was living, were merely symbols to him, +like words. An animal naturally has as many signs +for an object as he has sensations or emotions in its +presence. These signs are miscellaneous essences—sights, +sounds, smells, contacts, tears, provocations—and +they are alternative or supplementary to one +another, like words in different languages. The most +diverse senses, such as smell and sight, if summoned +<span class='pageno' id='Page_176'>176</span>to the same point in the environment, and guiding +a single action, will report upon a single object. Even +when one sense brings all the news I have, its reports +will change from moment to moment with the distance, +variation, or suspension of the connection between the +object and my body: and this without any relevant +change in the object itself. Nay, often the very +transformation of the sensation bears witness that the +object is unchanged; as music and laughter, overheard +as I pass a tavern, are felt and known to continue +unabated, and to be no merriment of mine, just +because they fade from my ears as I move away.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The object of knowledge being that designated in +this way by my bodily attitude, the æsthetic qualities +I attribute to it will depend on the particular sense +it happens to affect at the moment, or on the sweep +and nature of the reaction which it then calls forth +on my part. This diversity in signs and descriptions +for a single thing is a normal diversity. Diversity, +when it is not contradiction, irritates only unreasonably +dogmatic people; they are offended with nature for +having a rich vocabulary, and sometimes speaking a +language, or employing a syntax, which they never +heard at home. It is an innocent prejudice, and it +yields easily in a generous mind to pleasure at the +wealth of alternatives which animal life affords. Even +such contradictions as may arise in the description of +things, and may truly demand a solution, reside in the +implication of the terms, not in their sensuous or +rhetorical diversity: they become contradictory only +when they assign to the object contrary movements +or contrary effects, not when they merely exhibit its +various appearances. Looking at the moon, one man +may call it simply a light in the sky; another, prone +to dreaming awake, may call it a virgin goddess; a +more observant person, remembering that this luminary +is given to waxing and waning, may call it the crescent; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_177'>177</span>and a fourth, a full-fledged astronomer, may say +(taking the æsthetic essence before him merely for a +sign) that it is an extinct and opaque spheroidal +satellite of the earth, reflecting the light of the sun +from a part of its surface. All these descriptions +envisage the same object—otherwise no relevance, +conflict, or progress could obtain among them. What +that object is in its complete constitution and history +will never be known by man; but that this object +exists in a known space and time and has traceable +physical relations with all other physical objects is a +fact posited from the beginning; it was posited by +the child when he pointed, and by me when I saw +him point. If it did not so exist and (as sometimes +happens) he and I were suffering from a hallucination, +in thinking we were pointing at the moon we should +be discoverably pointing at vacancy: exploration +would eventually satisfy us of that fact, and any bystander +would vouch for it. But if in pointing at it +we were pointing to it, its identity would be fixed +without more ado; disputes and discoveries concerning +it would be pertinent and soluble, no matter what +diversity there might be in the ideal essences—light, +crescent, goddess, or satellite—which we used as +rival descriptions of it while we pointed.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I find that the discrimination of essence brings a +wonderful clearness into this subject. All data and +descriptions—light, crescent, goddess, or satellite—are +equally essences, terms of human discourse, in-existent +in themselves. What exists in any instance, +besides the moon and our various reactions upon it, +is some intuition, expressing those reactions, evoking +that essence, and lending it a specious actuality. The +terms of astronomy are essences no less human and +visionary than those of mythology; but they are the +fruit of a better focussed, more chastened, and more +prolonged attention turned upon what actually occurs; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_178'>178</span>that is, they are kept closer to animal faith, and freer +from pictorial elements and the infusion of reverie. +In myth, on the contrary, intuition wanders idly and +uncontrolled; it makes epicycles, as it were, upon the +reflex arc of perception; the moonbeams bewitch +some sleeping Endymion, and he dreams of a swift +huntress in heaven. Myth is nevertheless a relevant +fancy, and genuinely expressive; only instead of being +guided by a perpetual fresh study of the object posited +by animal faith and encountered in action, it runs into +marginal comments, personal associations, and rhetorical +asides; so that even if based originally on perception, +it is built upon principles internal to human +discourse, as are grammar, rhyme, music, and morals. +It may be admirable as an expression of these principles, +and yet be egregiously false if asserted of the object, +without discounting the human medium in which it +has taken form. Diana is an exquisite symbol for the +moon, and for one sort of human loveliness; but she +must not be credited with any existence over and above +that of the moon, and of sundry short-skirted Dorian +maidens. She is not other than they: she is an +image of them, the best part of their essence distilled +in a poet’s mind. So with the description of the +moon given by astronomers, which is not less fascinating; +this, too, is no added object, but only a new +image for the moon known even to the child and me. +The space, matter, gravitation, time, and laws of +motion conceived by astronomers are essences only, +and mere symbols for the use of animal faith, when +very enlightened: I mean in so far as they are alleged +to constitute knowledge of a world which I must bow +to and encounter in action; for if astronomy is content +to be a mathematical exercise without any truth, an +object of pure intuition, its terms and its laws will, of +course, be ultimate realities, apart from what happens +to exist: realities in the realm of essence. In the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_179'>179</span>description of the natural world, however, they are +mere symbols, mediating animal faith. Science at +any moment may recast or correct its conceptions (as +it is doing now) giving them a different colour; and +the nerve of truth in them will be laid bare and made +taut in proportion as the sensuous and rhetorical +vesture of these notions is stripped off, and the dynamic +relations of events, as found and posited by material +exploration, are nakedly recorded.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Knowledge accordingly is belief: belief in a world +of events, and especially of those parts of it which are +near the self, tempting or threatening it. This belief +is native to animals, and precedes all deliberate use of +intuitions as signs or descriptions of things; as I turn +my head to see who is there, before I see who it is. +Furthermore, knowledge is true belief. It is such an +enlightening of the self by intuitions arising there, +that what the self imagines and asserts of the collateral +thing, with which it wrestles in action, is actually +true of that thing. Truth in such presumptions or +conceptions does not imply adequacy, nor a pictorial +identity between the essence in intuition and the +constitution of the object. Discourse is a language, +not a mirror. The images in sense are parts of discourse, +not parts of nature: they are the babble of +our innocent organs under the stimulus of things; +but these spontaneous images, like the sounds of the +voice, may acquire the function of names; they may +become signs, if discourse is intelligent and can recapitulate +its phases, for the things sought or encountered +in the world. The truth which discourse +can achieve is truth in its own terms, appropriate +description: it is no incorporation or reproduction +of the object in the mind. The mind notices and +intends; it cannot incorporate or reproduce anything +not an intention or an intuition. Its objects are no +part of itself even when they are essences, much less +<span class='pageno' id='Page_180'>180</span>when they are things. It thinks the essences, with +that sort of immediate and self-forgetful attention +which I have been calling intuition; and if it is +animated, as it usually is, by some ulterior interest or +pursuit, it takes the essences before it for messages, +signs, or emanations sent forth to it from those objects +of animal faith; and they become its evidences and +its description for those objects. Therefore any degree +of inadequacy and originality is tolerable in discourse, +or even requisite, when the constitution of the objects +which the animal encounters is out of scale with his +organs, or quite heterogeneous from his possible +images. A sensation or a theory, no matter how +arbitrary its terms (and all language is perfectly +arbitrary), will be true of the object, if it expresses +some true relation in which that object stands to the +self, so that these terms are not misleading as signs, +however poetical they may be as sounds or as pictures.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Finally, knowledge is true belief grounded in +experience, I mean, controlled by outer facts. It is +not true by accident; it is not shot into the air on the +chance that there may be something it may hit. It +arises by a movement of the self sympathetic or +responsive to surrounding beings, so that these beings +become its intended objects, and at the same time an +appropriate correspondence tends to be established +between these objects and the beliefs generated under +their influence.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In regard to the original articles of the animal +creed—that there is a world, that there is a future, +that things sought can be found, and things seen can +be eaten—no guarantee can possibly be offered. I +am sure these dogmas are often false; and perhaps +the event will some day falsify them all, and they will +lapse altogether. But while life lasts, in one form or +another this faith must endure. It is the initial +expression of animal vitality in the sphere of mind, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_181'>181</span>the first announcement that anything is going on. +It is involved in any pang of hunger, of fear, or of love. +It launches the adventure of knowledge. The object +of this tentative knowledge is things in general, whatsoever +may be at work (as I am) to disturb me or +awake my attention. The effort of knowledge is to +discover what sort of world this disturbing world +happens to be. Progress in knowledge lies open in +various directions, now in the scope of its survey, now +in its accuracy, now in its depth of local penetration. +The ideal of knowledge is to become natural science: +if it trespasses beyond that, it relapses into intuition, +and ceases to be knowledge.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_182'>182</span> + <h2 id='chap19' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='nineteen'>XIX</abbr> <br> BELIEF IN SUBSTANCE</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>All knowledge, being faith in an object posited and +partially described, is belief in substance, in the +etymological sense of this word; it is belief in a thing +or event subsisting in its own plane, and waiting for +the light of knowledge to explore it eventually, and +perhaps name or define it. In this way my whole +past lies waiting for memory to review it, if I have +this faculty; and the whole future of the world in +the same manner is spread out for prophecy, scientific +or visionary, to predict falsely or truly. Yet the +future and the past are not ordinarily called substances; +probably because the same material substance +is assumed to run through both. Nevertheless, from +the point of view of knowledge, every event, even if +wholly psychological or phenomenal, is a substance. +It is a self-existing fact, open to description from the +point of view of other events, if in the bosom of these +other events there is such plasticity and intent as are +requisite for perception, prophecy, or memory.</p> + +<p class='c005'>When modern philosophers deny material substance, +they make substances out of the sensations or +ideas which they regard as ultimate facts. It is +impossible to eliminate belief in substance so long as +belief in existence is retained. A mistrust in existence, +and therefore in substance, is not unphilosophical; +but modern philosophers have not given full expression +<span class='pageno' id='Page_183'>183</span>to this sceptical scruple. They have seldom been +disinterested critics, but often advocates of some +metaphysic that allured them, and whose rivals they +wished to destroy. They deny substance in favour +of phenomena, which are hypostatised essences, because +phenomena are individually wholly open to intuition; +but they forget that no phenomenon can intuit another, +and that if it contains knowledge of that other, it +must be animated by intent, and besides existing itself +substantially must recognise its object as another +substance, indifferent in its own being to the cognisance +which other substances may take of it. In other words, +although each phenomenon in passing is an object of +intuition, all absent phenomena, and all their relations, +are objects of faith; and this faith must be mediated +by some feature in the present phenomenon which +faith assumes to be a sign of the existence of other +phenomena elsewhere, and of their order. So that +in so far as the instinctive claims and transcendent +scope of knowledge are concerned, phenomenalism fully +retains the belief in substance. In order to get rid +of this belief, which is certainly obnoxious to the +sceptic, a disinterested critic would need to discard +all claims to knowledge, and to deny his own existence, +and that of all absent phenomena.</p> + +<p class='c005'>For my own part, having admitted discourse +(which involves time and existences deployed in time, +but synthesised in retrospect), and having admitted +shocks that interrupt discourse and lead it to regard +itself as an experience, and having even admitted that +such experience involves a self beneath discourse, with +an existence and movement of its own—I need not +be deterred by any <span lang="la"><i>a priori</i></span> objections from believing +in substance of any sort. For me it will be simply +a question of good sense and circumstantial evidence +how many substances I admit, and of what sort.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In the genesis of human knowledge (which I am +<span class='pageno' id='Page_184'>184</span>not attempting to trace here) the substance first posited +is doubtless matter, some alluring or threatening or +tormenting thing. The ego, as Fichte tells us, unaware +of itself, posits a non-ego, and then by reflection +posits itself as the agent in that positing, or as the +patient which the activity posited in the non-ego posits +in its turn. But all this positing would be mere folly, +unless it was an intelligent discovery of antecedent +facts. Why should a non-existent ego be troubled +with the delirious duty of positing anything at all? +And, if nothing else exists, what difference could it +make what sort of a world the ego posited, or whether +it posited a thousand inconsequential worlds, at once +or in succession? Fichte, however, was far from +sharing that absolute freedom in madness which he +attributes to the creative ego; he had a very tight +tense mind, and posited a very tense tight world. +His myths about the birth of knowledge (or rather of +systematic imagination) out of unconscious egos, acts, +and positings concealed some modest truths about +nature. The actual datum has a background, and +Fichte was too wise to ignore so tremendous a fact. +Romantic philosophy, like romantic poetry, has its +profound ways of recognising its own folly, and so +turning it into tragic wisdom. As a matter of fact, +the active ego is an animal living in a material world; +both the ego and the non-ego exist substantially before +acquiring this relation of positing and being posited. +The instinct and ability to posit objects, and the +occasion for doing so, are incidents in the development +of animal life. Positing is a symptom of sensibility +in an organism to the presence of other substances +in its environment. The sceptic, like the sick +man, is intent on the symptom; and positing is his +name for felt plasticity in his animal responses. It is +not a bad name; because plasticity, though it may +seem a passive thing, is really a spontaneous quality. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_185'>185</span>If the substance of the ego were not alive, it would not +leap to meet its opportunities, it would not develop +new organs to serve its old necessities, and it would +not kindle itself to intuition of essences, nor concern +itself to regard those essences as appearances of the +substances with which it was wrestling. The whole +life of imagination and knowledge comes from within, +from the restlessness, eagerness, curiosity, and terror +of the animal bent on hunting, feeding, and breeding; +and the throb of being which he experiences at any +moment is not proper to the datum in his mind’s eye—a +purely fantastic essence—but to himself. It is +out of his organism or its central part, the psyche, +that this datum has been bred. The living substance +within him being bent, in the first instance, on pursuing +or avoiding some agency in its environment, it +projects whatever (in consequence of its reactions) +reaches its consciousness into the locus whence it feels +the stimulus to come, and it thus frames its description +or knowledge of objects. In this way the ego really +and sagaciously posits the non-ego: not absolutely, +as Fichte imagined, nor by a gratuitous fiat, but on +occasion and for the best of reasons, when the non-ego +in its might shakes the ego out of its primitive +somnolence.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Belief in substance is accordingly identical with +the claim to knowledge, and so fundamental that no +evidence can be adduced for it which does not presuppose +it. In recognising any appearance as a witness +to substance and in admitting (or even in rejecting) +the validity of such testimony, I have already made a +substance of the appearance; and if I admit other +phenomena as well, I have placed that substance in +a world of substances having a substantial unity. It +is not to external pressure, through evidence or +argument, that faith in substance is due. If the +sceptic cannot find it in himself, he will never find it. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_186'>186</span>I for one will honour him in his sincerity and in his +solitude. But I will not honour him, nor think him +a philosopher, if he is a sceptic only histrionically, in +the wretched controversies of the schools, and believes +in substance again when off the stage. I am not +concerned about make-believe philosophies, but about +my actual beliefs. It is only out of his own mouth, +or rather out of his own heart, that I should care to +convince the sceptic. Scepticism, if it could be +sincere, would be the best of philosophies. But I +suspect that other sceptics, as well as I, always believe +in substance, and that their denial of it is sheer sophistry +and the weaving of verbal arguments in which their +most familiar and massive convictions are ignored.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It might seem ignominious to believe something on +compulsion, because I can’t help believing it; when +reason awakes in a man it asks for reasons for everything. +Yet this demand is unreasonable: there +cannot be a reason for everything. It is mere automatic +habit in the philosopher to make this demand, +as it is in the common man not to make it. When +once I have admitted the facts of nature, and taken +for granted the character of animal life, and the incarnation +of spirit in this animal life, then indeed +many excellent reasons for the belief in substance will +appear; and not only reasons for using the category +of substance, and positing substance of some vague +ambient sort, but reasons for believing in a substance +rather elaborately defined and scientifically describable +in many of its habits and properties. But I am not +yet ready for that. Lest that investigation, when +undertaken, should ignore its foundations or be +impatient of its limits, I must insist here that trust in +knowledge, and belief in anything to know, are merely +instinctive and, in a manner, pathological. If philosophy +were something prior to convention rather +than (as it is) only convention made consistent and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_187'>187</span>deliberate, philosophy ought to reject belief in substance +and in knowledge, and to entrench itself in the +sheer confession and analysis of this belief, as of all +others, without assenting to any of them. But I have +found that criticism has no first principle, that analysis +involves belief in discourse, and that belief in discourse +involves belief in substance; so that any pretensions +which criticism might set up to being more +profound than common sense would be false pretensions. +Criticism is only an exercise of reflective +fancy, on the plane of literary psychology, an after-image +of that faith in nature which it denies; and in +dwelling on criticism as if it were more than a subjective +perspective or play of logical optics, I should +be renouncing all serious philosophy. Philosophy is +nothing if not honest; and the critical attitude, when +it refuses to rest at some point upon vulgar faith, +inhibits all belief, denies all claims to knowledge, and +becomes dishonest; because it itself claims to know.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Does the process of experience, now that I trust +my memory to report it truly, or does the existence of +the self, now that I admit its substantial, dynamic, and +obscure life underlying discourse, require me to posit +any other substances? Certainly it does. Experience, +for animal faith, begins by reporting what is not +experience; and the life of the self, if I accept its +endeavours as significant, implies an equally substantial, +dynamic, ill-reported world around it, in +whose movements it is implicated. In conveying this +feeling, as in all else, experience <i>might</i> be pure illusion; +but if I reject this initial and fundamental suasion of +my cognitive life, it will be hard to find anything +better to put in its place. I am unwilling to do myself +so much useless violence as to deny the validity of +primary memory, and assert that I have never, in +fact, had any experience at all; and I should be doing +myself even greater violence if I denied the validity +<span class='pageno' id='Page_188'>188</span>of perception, and asserted that a thunder-clap, for +instance, was only a musical chord, with no formidable +event of any sort going on behind the sound. To be +startled is to be aware that something sudden and +mysterious has occurred not far from me in space. +The thunder-clap is felt to be an event in the self and +in the not-self, even before its nature as a sound—its +æsthetic quality for the self—is recognised at all; I +first know I am shaken horribly, and then note how +loud and rumbling is the voice of the god that shakes +me. That first feeling of something violent and resistless +happening in the world at large, is accompanied +by a hardly less primitive sense of something gently +seething within me, a smouldering life which that +alien energy blows upon and causes to start into +flame.</p> + +<p class='c005'>If this be not the inmost texture of experience, I +do not know what experience is. To me experience +has not a string of sensations for its objects; what it +brings me is not at all a picture-gallery of clear images, +with nothing before, behind, or between them. What +such a ridiculous psychology (made apparently by +studying the dictionary and not by studying the mind) +calls hypotheses, intellectual fictions, or tendencies +to feign, is the solid body of experience, on which +what it calls sensations or ideas hang like flimsy +garments or trinkets, or play like a shifting light +and shade. Experience brings belief in substance +(as alertness) <i>before</i> it brings intuition of essences; it +is appetition <i>before</i> it is description. Of course +sensation would precede idea, if by sensation we +understood contact with matter, and by idea pure +reverie about ideal things; but if idea means expectation, +or consciousness having intent, and if sensation +means æsthetic contemplation of data without belief, +then idea precedes sensation: because an animal is +aware that something is happening long before he +<span class='pageno' id='Page_189'>189</span>can say to himself what that something is, or what it +looks like. The ultimate datum to which a sceptic +may retreat, when he suspends all life and opinion, +some essence, pure and non-existent and out of all +relation to minds, bodies, or events—surely that is +not the stuff out of which experience is woven: it is +but the pattern or picture, the æsthetic image, which +the tapestry may ultimately offer to the gazing eye, +incurious of origins, and contemptuous of substance. +The radical stuff of experience is much rather breathlessness, +or pulsation, or as Locke said (correcting +himself) a certain uneasiness; a lingering thrill, the +resonance of that much-struck bell which I call my +body, the continual assault of some masked enemy, +masked perhaps in beauty, or of some strange sympathetic +influence, like the cries and motions of other +creatures; and also the hastening and rising of some +impulse in me in response. Experience, at its very +inception, is a revelation of <i>things</i>; and these things, +before they are otherwise distinguished, are distinguishable +into a here and a there, a now and a then, +nature and myself in the midst of nature.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It is a mere prejudice of literary psychology, which +uses the grammar of adult discourse, like a mythology, +in which to render primitive experience—it is a mere +prejudice to suppose that experience has only such +categories as colour, sound, touch, and smell. These +essences are distinguished eventually because the +senses that present them can be separated at will, the +element each happens to furnish being thus flashed +on or cut off, like an electric light: but far more +primitive in animal experience are such dichotomies +as good and bad, near and far, coming and going, fast +and slow, just now and very soon. The first thing +experience reports is the existence of something, +merely as existence, the weight, strain, danger, and +lapse of being. If any one should tell me that this +<span class='pageno' id='Page_190'>190</span>is an abstraction, I should reply that it would seem +an abstraction to a parrot, who used human words +without having human experience, but it is no abstraction +to a man, whose language utters imperfectly, +and by a superadded articulation, the life within him. +Aristotle, who so often seems merely grammatical, +was not merely grammatical when he chose substance +to be the first of his categories. He was far more +profoundly psychological in this than the British and +German psychologists who discard the notion of +substance because it is not the datum of any separate +sense. None of the separate data of sense, which are +only essences, would figure at all in an experience, or +would become terms in knowledge, if a prior interest +and faith did not apprehend them. Animal watchfulness, +lying in wait for the signals of the special senses, +lends them their significance, sets them in their places, +and retains them, as descriptions of things, and as +symbols in its own ulterior discourse.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This animal watchfulness carries the category of +substance with it, asserts existence most vehemently, +and in apprehension seizes and throws on the dark +screen of substance every essence it may descry. To +grope, to blink, to dodge a blow, or to return it, is to +have very radical and specific experiences, but probably +without one assignable image of the outer senses. +Yet a nameless essence, the sense of a moving existence, +is there most intensely present; and a man would be +a shameless, because an insincere, sceptic, who should +maintain that this experience exists <span lang="la"><i>in vacuo</i></span>, and does +not express, as it feels it does, the operation of a +missile flying, and the reaction of a body threatened +or hit: motions in substance anterior to the experience, +and rich in properties and powers which no experience +will ever fathom.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Belief in substance, taken transcendentally, as a +critic of knowledge must take it, is the most irrational, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_191'>191</span>animal, and primitive of beliefs: it is the voice of +hunger. But when, as I must, I have yielded to this +presumption, and proceeded to explore the world, I +shall find in its constitution the most beautiful justification +for my initial faith, and the proof of its secret +rationality. This corroboration will not have any +logical force, since it will be only pragmatic, based on +begging the question, and perhaps only a bribe offered +by fortune to confirm my illusions. The force of the +corroboration will be merely moral, showing me how +appropriate and harmonious with the nature of things +such a blind belief was on my part. How else should +the truth have been revealed to me at all? Truth +and blindness, in such a case, are correlatives, since +I am a sensitive creature surrounded by a universe +utterly out of scale with myself: I must, therefore, +address it questioningly but trustfully, and it must +reply to me in my own terms, in symbols and parables, +that only gradually enlarge my childish perceptions. +It is as if Substance said to Knowledge: My child, +there is a great world for thee to conquer, but it is a +vast, an ancient, and a recalcitrant world. It yields +wonderful treasures to courage, when courage is +guided by art and respects the limits set to it by +nature. I should not have been so cruel as to give +thee birth, if there had been nothing for thee to +master; but having first prepared the field, I set in +thy heart the love of adventure.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_192'>192</span> + <h2 id='chap20' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='twenty'>XX</abbr> <br> ON SOME OBJECTIONS TO BELIEF IN SUBSTANCE</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>According to those philosophers who look for the +foundations of the universe in their own minds, +substance is but a dead and fantastic thing—a ghost +or abstracted shadow of many sensations, impossibly +fused and objectified. These philosophers, in their +intense introspection, try to catch thought alive, and +the nearer they come to doing so, the more unstable +and unsubstantial they find it to be. It exists only +in the act of dominating or positing or meaning something; +and before this something can be specified +exhaustively, something else has taken its place, the +limits of vision having expanded or its centre shifted. +Such self-observation may be profound, or at least +sincere, although what is true of life in one animal or +at one moment might well be false of life in another +instance, and mere nonsense to a different mind. In +myself, I find experience so volatile that no insistence +on its unsubstantial flux, maniacally creative, seems to +me exaggerated. But before such observations of life +in the quick can be turned into arguments against the +existence of substance, three assumptions must be +made silently, all three of which are false: first, that +thought observes itself; secondly, that if thought is +itself in flux it can observe nothing permanent; and +lastly, that if direct observation offered no illustration +<span class='pageno' id='Page_193'>193</span>of the permanent, nothing permanent could exist in +fact, or could be reasonably believed to exist.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In the first place, living thought is so far from +observing itself, that some philosophers deny its +existence, and the others find the greatest difficulty in +distinguishing it from its various objects. The terms +of pure thought, in which observation is couched and +in which it rests, I have found to be not thoughts but +essences; and the objects of thought, when thought +relapses into its animal form of belief, are again not +thoughts but things. If later I contrast the order, +rate, and natural locus of discourse with the movement +of events in general which discourse is considering, +I may begin to understand what a curious thing +discourse is, and to have assurance of its existence. +The introspection into which I may ultimately plunge, +when I seem to be creating the world as I think it, is a +violently artificial exercise, in which the wheels of life +are reversed; and the knowledge I thus gain of my +imaginative operations would itself be sheer raving, +creating a dream about dreaming, unless these operations +were domiciled in a natural being, and expressed +his history and vulgar situation in the natural world; +so that my eventual description, or rather dramatic +reconstruction, of my own experience, is one of the +latest forms of my knowledge, and its object one +of the most derivative and insecure. It is a theme +for literary psychology, of which transcendental self-consciousness, +or autobiography, is one variety.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In the second place, permanence rather than change +is native to the prime objects of thought. The only +data observable directly are essences absolutely immutable +in their nature, even if the one observed +happens to be the essence of change; since even this, +so long as it is present at all, presents change and +nothing but change for ever. Attention of course is +continually drawn from one essence to another; but +<span class='pageno' id='Page_194'>194</span>this inconstancy in intuition could not be noticed, +and could not actually exist, if the essence which drops +out of view and that which succeeds it were not +different, and each, therefore, always itself. Furthermore, +granting that an animal mind is probably +always changing in some respect, it by no means +follows that no essence can be retained for more than +one instant under the light of attention. On the +contrary, change that was complete, and that substituted +one totally new object for another totally +destroyed, would afford no inkling of its own existence: +only the permanent would ever appear to the mind. +What happens is that some detail changes in a field +that does not change, and for that reason the new +element attracts attention, surprise, or joy. To hold +something fast, to watch, to stare, to wait and lie low +in the presence of a felt incubus, are primitive experiences; +and the length of crawling time through +which a strain endures is a conspicuous feature in +sensation, especially in pain. This sense of duration +doubtless involves the sense of something changing at +the same time—of something coming or continuing +to come as it threatened or as it was demanded—of +some pulse of feeling recurring and mounting towards +increased potency or increased fatigue. Yet in all this +setting of cumulative change (which is but a perspective +in the fancy) there often shines a fixed focus +of interest; and the sense of something which lasts, +and which remains itself whether I approach or elude +it, is one of the first and loudest notes of awareness. +Perhaps, when my mood is clear and musical, there is +some permanent essence clearly revealed that arouses +my curiosity and wonder; or when the stream runs +thick and turbid, the obscure life of the psyche itself +rises to the surface, and yields the primary criterion +of happiness and naturalness in events. In either case +in mastering, recognising, and positing what I find +<span class='pageno' id='Page_195'>195</span>or what I want, I know the beginnings of speculative +joy and of participation in eternity. The flux touches +the eternal at the top of every wave. Whatever +thwarts this achievement, or disturbs the deep rhythms +of the life slumbering beneath, seems illegitimate; and +until acquisitive or sexual impulses are aroused, the +dozing animal counts on a perpetual well-being, and +any change seems to it as hateful as it is incredible.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In this way change itself, when it is rhythmic and +regular, wears to intuition the form of sustained being. +The life of the body, by its latent operation, sets a +measure and scale for the duration of any passing +vision. There is an ever-present background felt as +permanent, myself always myself; and there is a +large identity in the universe also, familiar and limited +in spite of its agitation, like a cage full of birds. Everything +seems to be more or less prolonged; comfort, +digestive warmth, the past still simmering, the brooding +potentiality of things to come, shaping themselves +in fancy before they have occurred. Both sleep and +watchfulness are long drawn out, so is the very sense +of movement. Though change be everywhere, it +remains everywhere strange and radically unwelcome: +for even when, as in destructive passion or impatience, +it is imperatively sought, it is sought as an escape +from an uncomfortable posture, in the hope of restoring +a steady life, and resting in safety.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Thus the notion of permanence behind change—which +is a chief element in the notion of substance—is +trebly rooted in experience; because every essence +that appears is eternally what it is; because many +congenial images and feelings appear lastingly; and +because whatever interrupts the even flow and luxurious +monotony of organic life is odious to the primeval +animal.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In the third place, even if direct experience did +not illustrate the permanent, the order of events when +<span class='pageno' id='Page_196'>196</span>reflected on would suggest and impose a belief in it. +I reserve for another occasion all discussion of the +laws of nature or of the constant quantities of matter +or energy: the most ordinary recognition of things +being as they were, and remaining always at hand, +posits their substantial nature. Suppose all intuition +was instantaneous; and in one sense it may be said +always to be so, because specious durations have no +common scale, and the most prolonged may be treated +as a single moment, as the dome of St. Peter’s may +be seen through a keyhole. Instantaneous intuition, +when suspended, may be suspended only for a moment, +and instantly recovered, as when I blink. Such brief +interruptions to perception are bridged over in primary +memory, and do not break the specious identity and +continuity of the object. It does not follow, however, +that the interruption is not felt. On the contrary, it +is felt and resented just because beneath it the object +is sensibly continuous. There is a stock optical +experiment in which a pencil is made to cross the field +of vision between the eye and a book, without ever +hiding any part of the page. What binocular vision +does in that instance, the persistence of impressions +does in the case of an intermittent stimulus. The +interruption is startling and obvious, but the continuity +of the object is obvious too. This experience +may be repeated on a larger scale. The psyche, being +surrounded by substances, is adapted to them, and +does not suspend her adjustments or her beliefs whenever +her sensations are interrupted. Children recognise +and identify things and persons more readily than +they distinguish them. As intuition is addressed to +terms in discourse which are eternal in their nature, +though the intuition of them is desultory, so faith +and art are addressed to <i>habits</i> in substance, which +without arresting the perpetual and pervasive flux +of experience (nor perhaps that of substance itself) +<span class='pageno' id='Page_197'>197</span>manifest its dynamic permanence; and, of course, it +is on its dynamic side, not pictorially or intuitively, +that substance is conceived, posited, measured, and +trusted.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Hence the discovery, big with scientific consequences, +that an existing thing may endure unchanged, +although my experience of it be intermittent. +The object of these recurrent observations is not +conceived, as a sophistical psychology would have it, +by feigning that the <i>observations</i> are not discrete. +Every one knows, when he shuts and opens his eyes, +that his vision has been interrupted; the interruption +is the point of the game. The notion that the thing +persists was there from the beginning; until I blinked, +I had found it persisting, and I find it persisting still +after I open my eyes again. In considering the +fortunes of the object posited, I simply discard the +interruption, as voluntary and due to a change in +myself which I can repeat at will. In spontaneous +thought I never confuse the changes which the thing +may undergo in its own being with the variations in +my attention nor (when I have a little experience) with +shifts in my perspectives. I therefore recognise it to +be permanent in relation to my intermittent glimpses +of it; and this without in the least confusing or fusing +my different views, or supposing them to be other +than discrete and perhaps instantaneous.</p> + +<p class='c005'>On the same principle, as education advances, a +thing which stimulates different senses at once or +successively is easily recognised to be the same object; +and this, again, is done without in the least fusing or +confusing colour with hardness or sound with shape. +And with the growth of the arts and of experience of +the world, the persisting and continuous engine of +nature is clearly conceived as the common object +which all my senses and all my theories describe in +their special languages at their several awakenings. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_198'>198</span>That the syllables are broken does not make their +messages conflicting; on the contrary, they supplement +one another’s blindness, and correct one another’s +exuberance. Substance was their common object +from the beginning, faith in substance not being a +consequence of reasoning about appearances, but an +implication of action, and a conviction native to +hunger, fear, feeding, and fighting; as an aid and +guide to which the organs of the outer senses are +developed, and rapidly paint their various symbols in +the mind. The euphony and syntax of sense, far from +disproving the existence of substance, arise and change +in the act of expressing its movement, and especially +the responsive organisation of that part of it which is +myself.</p> + +<p class='c005'>So much for the objections to the belief in substance +which may be raised from the point of view of self-consciousness, +when this is regarded as the principle +of knowledge or even of universal existence, neither +of which it is.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Objections to the belief in substance may also come +from a different quarter (or one ostensibly different), +in the name of critical sense and economy in the interpretation +of appearances. Suppose, the empiricist +may say, that your substance exists: how does it help +you to explain anything? You never have seen, and +you never will see, anything but appearances. If you +trust your memory (as it is reasonable to do, since you +must, if you are to play the game of discourse at all) +you may assume that appearances have come in a +certain order; and if you trust expectation (for the +same bad reason) you may assume that they will come +in somewhat the same order in future. These assumptions +are not founded on any proof or on any real +probability, but it is intelligible that you should make +them, because the mind can hardly be asked to discredit +its vistas, when it has nothing else by which +<span class='pageno' id='Page_199'>199</span>to criticise them. But why should you interpolate +amongst appearances, or posit behind them, something +that you can never find? That seems a gratuitous +fiction, and at best a hypostasis of grammar and names. +You want a substance because you use substantives, +or because your verbal logic talks in subjects and +predicates.</p> + +<p class='c005'>But let us grant, the empiricist will go on, that +your substance is possible, since everything is possible +where ignorance is complete. In what terms can you +conceive it, save in terms of appearance? Or if you +say it exists unconceived, or is inconceivable, it will +simply encumber your philosophy with a metaphysical +world, in addition to the given one, and with the +hopeless problem of relating the two.</p> + +<p class='c005'>These empirical objections to the belief in substance +might in strictness be ruled out, since (in so far as +they deny substance) they rest on the same romantic +view of self-consciousness as the source of knowledge +and being as do the transcendental objections just +considered. Empiricism, however, has the advantage +of being less resolute in folly. Such terms as appearance, +phenomenon, given fact (meaning given essence +<i>plus</i> thing posited), and perception (meaning intuition +<i>plus</i> belief) are all used sophistically to cover the +muddles of introspection. They are not analysed +critically, but are allowed to retain in solution many +of the assumptions of common sense. The essence +given is confused with the intuition of it which is +not given, but which common sense knows is implicated. +This intuition is then confused with the +belief, prompted by animal impulse and, for analysis, +utterly gratuitous, that a thing or event exists definable +by the essence given. This belief finally is confused +with the existence of its object, which it merely posits +and cannot witness. This object, in psychological +idealism, is some ulterior intuition or (as it is called +<span class='pageno' id='Page_200'>200</span>by common sense, which assumes a material object +producing it) some ulterior perception. But it is +utterly impossible that one perception should perceive +another, and it is improper to call an intuition a perception +when it has no existing object.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In consequence of this halting criticism of immediate +experience, empiricism admits the existence +of many feelings or ideas deployed in time and referred +to in memory and in social intercourse; and in +admitting this (let me repeat) it admits substance in +principle. Such a flux of feelings or ideas is a permanent +hidden substance for purposes of knowledge, +even if each of them, being a momentary life, might +not be called by that name. Each feeling or idea is +substantial, however, in respect to any memory or +theory, contained in some other moment, which may +refer to it; and this memory or theory is an appearance +of that substantial but remote fact.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Let us suppose that David Hume, in spite of his +corpulence, was nothing but a train of ideas. Some +of these composed his philosophy, and I, when I +endeavour to learn what it was, create in my own mind +a fresh train of ideas which refer to those in the mind +of Hume: and for me his opinions are a substance +of which my apprehension is an appearance. My +apprehension, in this case, is conceived to be an +apprehension of a matter of fact, namely, the substance +of Hume at some date; and in studying his philosophy +I am learning nothing but history. This is an implication +of empiricism, but is not true to the facts. +For when I try to conceive the philosophy of Hume I +am not considering any particular ideas which may +have constituted Hume at one moment of his career; +I am considering an <i>essence</i>, his total system, as it +would appear when the <i>essences</i> present in his various +reflective moments are collated; and, therefore, I am +really studying and learning a system of philosophy, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_201'>201</span>not the presumable condition of a dead man’s mind +at various historical moments.</p> + +<p class='c005'>If empiricists were a little more sceptical, they +would perceive that in admitting knowledge of historical +facts they have admitted the principle that the beliefs +they call ideas may report the existence of natural +substances. If the substance of this world is a flux, +and even a flux of feelings, it is none the less substantial, +like the fire of Heraclitus, and the existing +object of such ideas as may describe it. But this +reasonable faith is obscured by the confusions I +mentioned above. The empiricist forgets that he is +asserting the existence of outlying facts, because he +half identifies them with the living fact of his present +belief in them: and, further, because he identifies +this living fact, his belief now, with the essence which +it is attributing to those remote existences. He thinks +he believes only what he sees, but he is much better +at believing than at seeing.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Apart from this unconscious admission of the +existence of substances, the empirical objections to +substance in the singular express a distrust of metaphysics +with which I sympathise, and they show a +love of home truths which deserves to be satisfied.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In the first place, the substance in which I am +proposing to believe is not metaphysical but physical +substance. It is the varied stuff of the world which +I meet in action—the wood of this tree I am felling, +the wind that is stirring its branches, the flesh and +bones of the man who is jumping out of the way. +Belief in substance is not imported into animal perception +by language or by philosophy, but is the soul +of animal perception from the beginning, and the +perpetual deliverance of animal experience. Later, as +animal attention is clarified, and animal experience +progresses, the description of these obvious substances +may be refined: the tree, the wind, and the man may +<span class='pageno' id='Page_202'>202</span>reveal their elements and genesis to more patient +observation, and the first aspect they wore may be +found to be a fused and composite appearance of +many elaborate processes within them. But the more +diffused substances in operation which I shall then +come upon will be simply the constituents of the tree, +the wind, and the man; they will be just as truly +(though more calculably) the realities I confront and +may use in action. They will be just as open to +perception, although instruments or hypotheses may +be required to extend the accidental range of my +senses in observing them; and they will be just as +much substances and not essences, that is, objects of +belief posited in action, not images given in intuition. +My notions of substance will therefore be subject to +error, and capable of reform: I may arrive at the +belief that earth, air, water, and fire are the substances +in all things; later I may discover that fire is not a +substance, but a form of motion; for earth, air, and +water I may come to substitute the four or five score +elements of chemistry, or more or less; and I may +remain in doubt whether light and space and ether +are substances or not. But all these opinions would +be equally fantastic, and equally devoid of truth or +falsehood, if there were no substance before me in +the first instance which I was attempting to describe.</p> + +<p class='c005'>By a substance I understand what modern philosophers +often call an “independent object”—a most +unfortunate phrase, because precisely at the moment +when a substance or an essence becomes my object, +by becoming the theme of my discourse, it ceases to +be independent of me in that capacity: and when this +happens, before the cognitive relation between me +and my object is established, a dynamic relation has +probably arisen between the substance of that object +and the substance of myself, causing me to make that +intrusive substance the object of my attention. When +<span class='pageno' id='Page_203'>203</span>a thing becomes my object it becomes dependent on +me ideally, for being known, and I am probably, +directly or indirectly, dependent on it materially, for +having been led to know it. What is independent of +knowledge is substance, in that it has a place, movement, +origin, and destiny of its own, no matter what +I may think or fail to think about it. This self-existence +is what the name object jeopardises, and +what the name substance indicates and asserts.</p> + +<p class='c005'>If abuses of language were not inevitable, I should +be tempted to urge philosophers to revert to the +etymological and scholastic sense of the words object +and objective, making them refer to whatever is placed +before the mind, as a target to be aimed at by attention. +Objective would then mean present to imagination; +and things would become objects of thought in the +same incidental way in which they become objects of +desire. But I will content myself with returning in +my own person to the correct use of the word substance +for whatever is self-existent, and with bestowing the +term object on occasion upon any substance, essence, +event, or truth, when it becomes incidentally the theme +of discourse.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Substances are called things when found cut up +into fragments which move together and are recognisable +individually; and things are called substances +when their diffuse and qualitative existence +is thought of rather than their spatial limits. Flour +is a substance and a loaf of bread is a thing; but there +is nothing metaphysical about flour, nor is there any +difference of physical status between a thing and the +substance of it.</p> + +<p class='c005'>But is not the <span lang="la"><i>materia prima</i></span> of Aristotle metaphysical? +Is not the substance of Spinoza metaphysical? +Are not souls and Platonic Ideas, which are also +reputed to be substances, perfectly metaphysical?</p> + +<p class='c005'>Of course: and I shall have occasion, when +<span class='pageno' id='Page_204'>204</span>surveying the realm of matter, to show that these and +other metaphysical entities are only nominal essences, +and cannot be the substance of anything.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I think these explanations will suggest to the reader +a sufficient answer to the other points raised by the +empiricists against belief in substance. Substance +does not reduplicate natural objects, but is identical +with them. What it might be said to reduplicate (or +rather to back up and to render significant) would +be given essences. Certainly known substances, and +other known objects, require to be posited by animal +faith on occasion of intuitions, as that which these +intuitions report. But there is hardly any reduplication +here. Such representation as there is, is probably +quite heterogeneous in aspect from its original, and +even when—as in memory or a historical romance—some +specious similarity is presumed, it is a highly +selective and idealised reproduction, in a wholly +different medium from the represented facts, and +possessing utterly different functions and conditions +of being. Nature in being discovered is not reproduced, +but acquires a new dimension, and is extraordinarily +enriched. Matters are ludicrously reversed +if it is imagined that a pure spirit contemplating +essences could <i>invent</i> a body and a world of matter +surrounding it; the body exists first, and in reacting +on its environment kindles intuitions expressive of its +vicissitudes; and the commentary is like that which +any language or chronicle or graphic art creates by +existing. Substance is the speaker and substance is +the theme; intuition is only the act of speaking or +hearing, and the given essence is the audible word. +Substance is on the same plane of being as trees and +houses, but, like trees and houses, it is on an entirely +different plane of being from the immediate terms of +experience (which are essences) and from experience +itself (which is spirit thinking).</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_205'>205</span>As to the reproach that substance, because it is +not an appearance presented exhaustively, must remain +unconceived and inconceivable, it rests on a false +ideal of human knowledge. Intuition of essence is +not knowledge, but fancy and mental sport: and if +logic and mathematics are called sciences, they are +such only as expansions of given hypotheses according +to given rules may be sciences, as there is a science +of chess. They are not <i>true</i> nor human, except in +the special form in which actual discourse and actual +bodies happen to illustrate them. A preference for +dialectic over knowledge of fact (which is knowledge +of substance) may manifest a poetical and superior +spirit, as might a preference for music over conversation; +but it would be vain and suicidal for human +knowledge to transfer that ideal to the general interpretation +of experience. Substance being the object +set before me in action, pursuit, and investigation +cannot be antecedently in my possession, either +materially or intellectually; it confronts me as something +challenging respect and demanding study; and +its intrinsic essence must remain always problematical, +since I approach it only from the outside and experimentally. +The essences by which it is revealed +to me, and the hypotheses I frame about its nature, +are so many provocations for me to manipulate and +examine it, and to call it by various humorous names, +expressive to me of its strange habits. My natural +curiosity, if I am a healthy young animal, will prompt +me to do this eagerly, and to turn my first luminous +impressions into triumphant dogmas; but to pure +spirit, when that awakes, all this faith and knowingness +will seem childish.</p> + +<p class='c005'>To pure spirit substance and all its ways must +remain always dark, alien, and impertinent. From +the transcendental point of view, which is that of +spirit, substance is an unattainable goal, or object-as-such, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_206'>206</span>being posited, not possessed. Only essences +please this jealous lover of light, and seem to it sufficient; +it hates faith, existence, doubt, anything ulterior. +Substance and truth offend it by their unnecessary +claims; it would gladly brush them aside as superstitious +obsessions. What ghostly thing, it says to +itself, is this Speaker behind the voice, this Meaning +behind the vision, this dark Substance behind the fair +appearance? Substance interrupts and besets the +spirit in its innocence, and in its mad play; one +substance, which it calls the flesh, torments it from +below, and a kindred substance, which it calls matter, +prods, crushes, and threatens it from without. God +also, another substance, looms before it, commanding +and forbidding; and he is terrible in his wrath and +obscurity, until it learns his ways. Yet, as religion +shows, it is possible for the spirit to be tamed and +chastened. The fear of substance may be the beginning +of wisdom; and accustomed to the steady +dispensations of that power, the spirit may grow pious +and modest, and happy to be incarnate. God will +then become in its eyes a source of protection and +comfort and daily bread, as all substance is to those +who learn how to live with it. When the lessons of +experience are thus accepted, and spirit is domesticated +in the world, the belief in substance explains everything; +because <i>if</i> substance exists, a perpetual dependence +in point of destiny, and a perpetual inadequacy +in knowledge are clearly inevitable, and soon +come to seem proper and even fortunate.</p> + +<p class='c005'>As knowledge advances, my conception of substance +becomes a map in which my body is one of the islets +charted: the relations of myself to everything else +may be expressed there in their true proportions, and +I shall cease to be an egotist. In the symbolic terms +which my map affords, I can then plan and test my +actions (which otherwise I should perform without +<span class='pageno' id='Page_207'>207</span>knowing it) and trace the course of other events; but +I am myself a substance, moving in the plane of +universal substance, not on the plane of my map; +for neither I nor the rest of substance belong to the +realm of pictures, nor exist on that scale and in that +flat dimension. How we exist and what we are +substantially must accordingly remain a problem to +the end; even if by chance I should ever hit upon the +essence of substance, nothing could test or maintain +that miraculous moment of clairvoyance. The only +sphere in which clairvoyance is normal is the sphere +of mental discourse, one part of which may survey +another in the very terms in which the other unrolled +itself in act; as I may faithfully rehearse my own +past or future thinkings, or those of men of my own +mind. The probability of such clairvoyance diminishes +as the similarity of structure and substance between +me and the other creature diminishes; and it vanishes +altogether where life dies down; so that in respect +to inorganic substance I am indeed reduced to arbitrary +symbols, at which that substance, if it could know +them, would laugh. Yet for my purposes in studying +inorganic substance (which is not interesting to me +in itself) these symbols do very well: they arise on +occasion of substantial events, and therefore appear +in the same historical sequence; so that in surveying +the order of my symbols I learn the order of real +events, though my pictures certainly are not portraits +of their substance. Yet even the pictorial quality of +these symbols expresses true variations and variety +in the substance of myself: it falls and rises with +my life. For this reason the map I draw of the +universe in my fancy, when I grow studious, becomes +a truer and truer map, rendering the movement of +substance within and without me with increasing +precision, though always in an original notation, +native to my senses and intellect.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_208'>208</span>False ideals of knowledge are also involved in the +contention that the hypothesis of substance does not +help to explain appearances, and even renders appearances +inexplicable. What is explanation? In dialectic +it is the utterance, in further words or images, +of relations and terms implied in a given essence: it +is the explication of meanings. But facts have no +meaning in that sense. Essences implied ideally in +their essences need never become facts too: otherwise +the whole realm of essence would have to exist in act, +and it would be impossible so much as to begin the +survey of that horrible infinitude, for lack of any +principle of emphasis to give me a starting-point, and +create a particular perspective. No: facts are surds, +they exemplify fragments of the realm of essence +chosen for no reason: for if a will or reason choosing +anything (say the good) were admitted, that will or +reason would itself be a groundless fact, and an absolute +accident. Existence (as the least insight into essence +shows) is necessarily irrational and inexplicable. It +cannot, therefore, contain any principle of explanation +<span lang="la"><i>a priori</i></span>; and substance, as I understand the term, +being what exists in itself, it must be also (to borrow +the rest of Spinoza’s definition of it) what is understood +through itself, that is, by taking its own accidental +nature as the standard for all explanations. If +substance were some metaphysical principle, some +dialectical or moral force, it might be expected to +“explain” existence as a whole; but it ought not +then to be called a substance; at best it would be +a harmony or music which things somehow made. +Such a harmony would not exist in things bodily and +individually, rendering their essences existential, but +would supervene upon them and float through them, +like those principles which certain moody metaphysicians +have dreamt of, as solving the riddle of the +universe, and have called Sin, Will, Duty, the Good, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_209'>209</span>or the Idea. Substance, as I understand the word, is +nothing of that sort. It is not metaphysical, but +simply whatever the physical substance may be which +is found in things or between them. It therefore +cannot “explain” these things, since they are its parts +or instances, and it is simply their substance. They +have one, since they may be cut up, ground into +powder, dissolved into gases, or caused to condense +again before our eyes; and if they are living things, +we may observe them devouring and generating one +another, the flux of substance evidently running +through them, and taking on recurrent forms. When +these habits of nature are taken (as they should be +taken) as the true principle of explanation, the belief +in substance does become a great means of understanding +events. It helps me to explain their place, +date, quality, and quantity, so that I am able to expect +or even to produce them, when the right substances +are at hand. If they were detached facts, not forms +regularly taken on by enduring and pervasive substances, +there would be no knowing when, where, of +what sort, or in what numbers they would not assault +me; and my life would not seem life in a tractable +world, but an inexplicable nightmare.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I shall be thought a silly philosopher to mention +this, as if it were not obvious; but why do so many +wise philosophers ignore it, and defend systems which +contradict it?</p> + +<p class='c005'>Finally, even if, in a moment of candour, the friend +of phenomena was inclined to allow that substance, +so understood, was neither metaphysical nor undiscoverable +nor useless for explaining events, he +might still urge that the belief in substance creates +an insoluble difficulty, because opposite to substance +appearance rises at once like a ghost; and how shall +this ghost be laid or what room shall be found for it +in the world of substance which we have posited? +<span class='pageno' id='Page_210'>210</span>In other words, substance, by hypothesis, is the source +of appearances: but how, remaining substance, can +it ever produce them?</p> + +<p class='c005'>Here again the objection arises out of false demands. +As at first substance was condemned on the ground +that knowledge should possess its object as intuition +does its data (a demand which would rob knowledge +of all transitive force), so now substance is condemned +on the ground that causation should be dialectical and +that reality should be uniform, so that if substance +exists nothing should exist except substance. Whence +these absurd postulates? In the first place, reality +(since it includes the realm of essence) is infinitely +omnimodal; and even when reduced to existence it +may certainly take on as many dimensions and as +many varieties as it likes. Substance is not more real +than appearance, nor appearance more real than +essence, but only differently real. When the word +reality is used invidiously or eulogistically, it is merely +in view of the special sort of reality which the speaker +expects or desires to find in a particular instance. So +when the starving gymnosophist takes a rope for a +serpent, he misses the reality of that, which is lifeless +matter; when the tourist gazing at an Arabic scroll +calls it a frieze, he misses the reality of that, which is +a pious sentiment; and when the millionaire buys a +picture for its antiquity and its reputation, he misses +the reality of that, which is a composition. When +substance is asserted, appearance is not denied; its +actuality is not diminished, but a significance is added +to it which, as a bare datum, it could not have.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In the second place, in so far as causation is not +sheer magic imputed by laying a superstitious emphasis +on those phases which interest me most in the flux of +things, causation is the order of generation in nature: +whatsoever grows out of a certain conjunction in things, +and only out of that conjunction, may be said to be +<span class='pageno' id='Page_211'>211</span>caused by it. Nothing that happens is groundless, +since whatever antecedents it actually has are adequate +to produce it. Yet all that happens is marvellous, +because like existence itself it is unfathomable, and, if +we abstract from our familiarity with it, almost incredible. +But the antecedents, the consequents, and +the connection between them are equally remarkable +in this respect, and equally perspicuous. The schoolboy +will be delighted to learn how the refraction of +the sun’s rays paints the rainbow on a shower, or on +the spray of the waves; the farmer will perfectly +understand that chickens are hatched from eggs; and +I for one (though other philosophers are less fortunate) +can perceive clearly that when animals react upon +things in certain ways these things appear to them in +certain forms; and the fact that they appear does not +seem to me (so simple am I) to militate against their +substantial existence.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Certainly neither the awakening of intuition, nor +the character of the essences that appear, can be +deduced dialectically from the state of the substance +which produces them; but dialectic traces the implication +of one essence in another and can never issue +from the eternal world. It is perfectly impotent to +express, much less to explain, any change or any +existence. If dialectic ruled the world, all implications +would always have been realised, no movement +would have been possible, and the very discourse that +pursues dialectic would have been congealed and +identified from the beginning with the essence which +it describes. Existence, change, life, appearance, +must be understood to be unintelligible: on any other +assumption the philosopher might as well tear his hair +and go mad at once. But when that assumption has +been duly made, and dialectic has been relegated to +an innocuous dignity, the blossoming of substance +into appearance becomes the most amiable of mysteries. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_212'>212</span>If instead of admitting this evident and familiar +kindling of mind in nature, which makes the charm +of childhood, of morning, and of spring, I supposed +that mind could animate no material body, and that +the flame of spirit could rise from no natural hearth, +I should not have a more intelligible world on my +hands, but only a very miserable and ghostly one. I +should be foolishly shutting myself up in myopic +ignorance of that great world which is not mine nor +like me, although I belong to it and feed on it unawares. +Why should I think it philosophical to be +so unintelligent, or to assert that appearances are the +only possible realities, when these appearances themselves +do their very best to inform me of the opposite? +For though the poor things can’t be actually more than +they are, they arrange themselves and troop together +in such a manner that, if I make the least beginning +in understanding them, I gather that they are voices +of self-evolving things, on the same plane of reality +as myself. Indeed, without such a background to +lend them a subterranean influence over my own being, +they would be unmeaning creations, and every transition +from one to another of them would be arbitrary. +If I am told that appearances are but loosely and unintelligibly +bound to substance, I may reply that +without substance appearances would be far more +loosely and unintelligibly bound to one another. +Appearances are at least conventional transcripts of +facts; they are expressions of substance which may +serve as signs of its movements; but what relation, +moral or habitual, would each appearance, if taken +absolutely and not as significant of things, retain to +the other appearances that in dreaming or waking +might follow upon it? None whatever: it is only +in its organs and its objects that experience touches +anything continuous or measurable and possesses a +background on which to piece together the broken +<span class='pageno' id='Page_213'>213</span>segments of its own orbit. That substance should be +capable of attaining to expression in appearance is a +proof that substance is fertile, not that it is superfluous. +On the contrary, it is certain that if I knew the essence +of substance, and if I made nature the standard of +natural necessity, the emergence of appearance in the +form and on the occasions in which it emerges would +seem to me necessary and inevitable.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_214'>214</span> + <h2 id='chap21' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='twenty-one'>XXI</abbr> <br> SUBLIMATIONS OF ANIMAL FAITH</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Animal faith, being an expression of hunger, pursuit, +shock, or fear, is directed upon <i>things</i>; that is, it +assumes the existence of alien self-developing beings, +independent of knowledge, but capable of being +affected by action. While things are running on in +the dark, they may be suddenly seized, appropriated, +or destroyed. In other words, animal faith posits +substances, and indicates their locus in the field of +action of which the animal occupies the centre. Being +faith in action and inspired by action, it logically presupposes +that the agent is a substance himself, that +can act on other things and be affected by them; +although temporally the substantial existence of the +self may not be posited until later, as one of the things +in the world of things. Meantime in this animal +faith, and even in the choice of one essence rather +than another to be presented to intuition, spirit suffers +violence, since spirit is inherently addressed to everything +impartially and is always, in its own principle, +ready to be omniscient and just. For by spirit I +understand simply the pure light or actuality of +thought, common to all intuitions, in which essences +are bathed if they are given. At first, as we see in +children, spirit is carried away by the joy of doing or +seeing anything; it adopts any passion unquestioningly, +not being a respecter of persons nor at all +<span class='pageno' id='Page_215'>215</span>squeamish; it is innocently happy in accepting any +task and watching any world, if the body welcomes it. +Ultimately, however, the spirit may come to wonder +why it regards all things from the point of view of one +body in particular, which seems to have no prerogative +over the others in their common realm. +Justice and charity will then seem to lie in rescinding +this illegitimate pre-eminence of one’s own body: and +it may come to be an ideal of the spirit, not only to +extend its view over all time and all existence, but to +exchange its accidental point of view for every other, +and adopt every insight and every interest: an effort +which, by a curious irony, might end in abolishing +all interests and all views.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Such moral enlightenment is dangerous to animal +life, and incidentally to the animal faith on which the +recognition of existing things hangs in the first place. +If the qualms and ambitions of spirit prevailed in anybody +altogether, as they tend to do in the saint and +even in the philosopher, he would not be able to halt +at the just sympathy by which, preserving animal +faith, he would admit and respect the natural interests +of others as he does his own. He would be hurried +on to rebel against these natural interests in himself, +would call them vain or sinful, since the spirit of itself +could never justify them, and would initiate some +discipline, mortifying the body and transfiguring the +passions, so as to free himself from that ignominy and +bondage. He would not succeed: but for speculative +purposes I will suppose for a moment that he succeeded. +What would occur? He would be happier fasting +than eating, freezing than loving. Not sharing the +impulses of his body, he would regard it as a ridiculous +mechanism; and the bodies of others would be +ridiculous mechanisms too, with which he could feel +no sympathy. His sympathy, if it survived at all, +would be sublimated into pity for the spirits chained +<span class='pageno' id='Page_216'>216</span>to those bodies by their sin and ignorance, and perhaps +not even struggling to be free, but suffering in those +prisons perpetual pain and dishonour. He might +aspire to save the spirit in others as in himself; but +hardened to his own animal vicissitudes he would be +steeled to theirs (a result even easier to accomplish), +and would be all scorn and lamentations for the life +of the world.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I suspend all consideration of this moral issue, and +revert to the variations which animal faith may undergo +during this long and always imperfect transformation.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Things when they are posited are known to be +substances. It would be impossible for a child to be +frightened without implicitly believing in a substance +at hand; and it would be impossible for him to +attempt to frighten other people (as children like to +do in play) without implicitly assuming that he is a +substance himself. But though his assurance of substance, +in both cases, is complete, his knowledge of it +is superficial. In conceiving his own nature especially, +he begins building at the wrong end, from the weathercock +down, not from the foundations up. Although +in action he identifies himself with his body, as also +in vanity and all the passions, yet when he asks himself +deliberately <i>what</i> he is, he may be tempted to say +that he is his thoughts. Or, less analytically, he may +feel that he is a soul, a living spiritual power, a deep +will at work in his body and in the world; and though +what he posits in other things is primarily their physical +presence, he will conceive this substance of theirs, +particularly when they are animals, in the same moral +terms in which he conceives himself. He will imagine +them to be souls, passionate powers, wills guiding +events. He will not think people spirits to the exclusion +of their bodies, but will conceive their persons +confusedly, as souls inhabiting and using bodies, or +as bodies breaking out into some thought or passion +<span class='pageno' id='Page_217'>217</span>which, once existing, agitates and governs the body +that bred it.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Such a thought or passion, while evidently animating +the body and expressing its situation, does not +exactly lie within the body; to localise it there with +any literalness or precision is absurd; and a man feels +in his own case that his thoughts and passions <i>come</i> +into his heart, that they are influences visiting him, +perhaps demons or obsessions. He thinks they may +pass from one man to another, or perhaps exist suspended +and ambient, in the form of gods or mighty +laws. Hence the notion of spiritual substances; a +self-contradictory notion at bottom, because substance +is a material and spirit is an entelechy, or perfection +of function realised; so that (if I may parody Aristotle), +if a candle were a living being, wax would be its substance +and light its spirit. Nevertheless, in the history +of philosophy, and even in current discourse, the +notion of spiritual substance was unavoidable. In the +haste of practical life, I count the lights without +counting the candles. Feelings and thoughts pass for +the principles of action; I inevitably stop there, and +conceive my enemy as an evil purpose, and my contradictor +as a false thought. And it is in these imagined +thoughts and purposes that I lodge the power which, +in action, I am contending with: although I should +be truly contending with ghosts, and trying to drive +essences out of the realm of essence (where each is +immovable) if I did not oppose that power or defeat +that purpose in the precise places and bodies in which +it operates. The spirit can be confused with substance +only when it is spirit incarnate. Animal faith could +hardly light on such metaphysical objects unless it +was called forth by a material influence, to which +animal faith is the natural response; but the mind has +but vague notions of what a material influence can be, +and therefore attributes the substantiality of which it +<span class='pageno' id='Page_218'>218</span>is intimately aware to hybrid essences floating before +it: hence superstition, myth, metaphysics, and the +materialisation of words.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It is a task for natural philosophy to remove these +ghosts, by discovering the true movement of that +living substance on which animal faith <i>means</i> to be +directed, the substance on which the animal depends +and on which he can act. But the human mind +naturally breathes its own atmosphere of myth and +dialectic, and evidence of fact pierces this atmosphere +with difficulty, only after much experience of error. +Gradually the wiser heads see that all substances fall +together into one system called nature; and then +various metaphysical substances, which at first seem +to inhabit or compose nature, are discovered to be +modes of the single familiar substance called matter. +The second Book of <i>Realms of Being</i> will be devoted +to this subject; meantime, I will here draw up a list +of the chief false substances which human faith may +rest on when the characteristic human veil of words +and pictures hides the modes of matter which actually +confront the human race in action, and which therefore, +throughout, are the <i>intended</i> object of its faith.</p> + +<p class='c005'>1. <i>Souls.</i>—These are essentially moral forces, that +is, passions or interests not necessarily self-conscious, +conceived as magically ruling animal bodies and +dictating their acts.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This notion fuses three different things, belonging +to three distinct realms of being. The first is a mode +of matter, the inherited mechanism and life of the +body, which I am calling the psyche. This is a true +dynamic unit, forming and using the outer organs of +the body, a system of habits relatively complete and +self-centred; but it is only the fine quick organisation +within the material animal, and not a different thing. +This is the original soul which savages conceive as +leaving the body in sleep or death, itself a tenuous +<span class='pageno' id='Page_219'>219</span>body of similar aspect and powers; because they feel +that bodily life and action have a principle which is +not visible on the surface, and yet they have no means +of conceiving this principle except as an image or +ghost of that very body which it is needed to control. +Were wandering souls and ghosts more often met with +and studied, the question of the true souls of these +creatures would present itself anew: for nothing +would be found on the surface of a ghost to explain its +words or its motions, and it would soon be observed +to give up the ghost in its turn. Even in spirit-land +the judicious would have recourse in the end to a +behaviourist psychology. For at the other extreme +of human philosophising, the material psyche reappears. +Observation can trace back motions only +to other motions, and outward actions to activities +hidden within, but essentially no less observable; so +that the mechanism of the body and its habits are +really the only conceivable mainspring of its behaviour. +The soul again becomes a subtler body within the +body: only that instead of a shadow of the whole +man, even as in life he stood, it is a prodigious network +of nerves and tissues, growing in each generation +out of a seed.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Habit, though it is a mode of matter, has a unity +or rhythm which reappears in many different instances: +it is a form not of matter but of behaviour. +Matter makes a vortex which reproduces itself, and +plays as a unit amongst the other vortices near it; +and the eye can follow the pleasing figures of the +dance, without discerning the atoms or the laws +that compose it. Now the habits of animals exercise +a strong influence, sympathetic or antipathetic, over +the kindred observer. He feels what those habits +seek; he reads them as purposes, as tendencies, as +efforts hostile or friendly to the free play of his own +habits. The soul agitating those bodies is therefore +<span class='pageno' id='Page_220'>220</span>in his eyes more than another ghostly body, which +might quit them; it is a passion or a will which is +expressed there. And this unit of discourse, which +if actual belongs to the realm of truth, he regards +superstitiously as a substance and a power. He +fancies that he himself is a will and a power reacting +upon other wills and powers: as if these habits or +relations could be prior to the terms that compose +them, or could create those terms. It is this element +in the notion of souls that becomes predominant in the +belief in gods and in devils. Something subjective +and moral, the dramatic value which habits in nature +have for the observer, is projected by him, and conceived +as a metaphysical power creating those habits. +Passions, in men, are often arrested on words. They +are often arrested, as in poetic love, upon images. +And yet the magic of images and words is vicarious: +they would be empty, did not subtle material influences +flow through them, and hide behind them, rendering +them exciting to the material soul of the observer, +who in his poetic ecstasy may think he is living in a +pure world of discourse.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Finally, in the notion of souls there is a projection +of mental discourse: this, when it really exists in +animals, is a mode of spirit. Animal life sometimes +reaches its entelechy in a stream of intuitions, expressive +of its modifications by the presence of other +bodies, or by the ferments of its own blood. These +modes of spirit are in themselves intangible, unobservable, +volatile, and fugitive; and if anything +actual, about which truth and error may arise, may +be called unsubstantial, they are as unsubstantial as +possible. But as they arise in the operations of +substance, and are read into these operations when a +sympathetic being observes them, they seem to be a +part of what is observed. But they are in quite +another dimension of being, in the realm of spirit; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_221'>221</span>and spirit, or the intuitions in which it exists, is not +a part of the substance on which animal faith is +directed, nor a mode of it, nor a natural substance at +all. It cannot by any possibility be met with in +action, perceived, fought with, nor (if we consider it +from within, in its own being) can it be lodged anywhere +in space nor even in time. It belongs to nature +only by its individual outlook and moral relevance: +and we may say of it only by courtesy that it lodges +in the place and time which its organ occupies and in +the world which, by affecting that organ, enters into +its specious perspectives. When a man believes in +another man’s thoughts and feelings, his faith is +moral, not animal. Such a spiritual dimension in the +substances on which he is reacting can be revealed +to him only by dramatic imagination; only his instant +sympathy can shape, or can correct, his notion of +them. In origin, these tertiary qualities of bodies, +imputed to them by literary psychology (which is an +exercise of dramatic insight) are as superstitious and +mythical as the purposes and powers of magical +metaphysics; but the intuitions assigned to other +people are <i>possible</i> existences, as those metaphysical +chimeras are not; and when the creature that imputes +the intuitions and the one that has them are the same, +or closely akin and close together, he may be absolutely +clairvoyant in imputing them. The mind as conceived +by literary psychology, or as represented by dramatic +historians, is hypothetical discourse, composed of what +this psychology calls sensations, ideas, and emotions. +It <i>may</i> exist, or may have existed, very much as +conceived; it would be a substance if idealism were +true; but in fact it is a translation into moral terms, +rapid, summary, and prophetic, of an animal life going +on very laboriously and persistently in the dark; and this +animal life is itself no special substance, but a special +mode or vortex in the general substance of nature.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_222'>222</span>2. <i>Master-types, or Platonic Ideas.</i>—This is an +assimilation of substances to their names. Words +and grammar are professedly notes indicating the +identities and relations of things; but in practice +everything, in being expressed, is conventionalised. +The terms of discourse mark only the forms which +things wear on the average, or at their best, or approximately; +and in discourse these conventional +terms soon acquire their own identity and relations, +and form a pattern quite different from that of their +objects. Philosophers, who necessarily employ language, +are like naturalists who should study zoology +only in a farmyard: the jungle would disconcert +them. An argumentative and dialectical mind trusts +its verbal logic: but a logic, however cogent in itself, +is always of problematical application to facts, since +it describes only one possible world out of an infinite +number, and (unless it is secretly founded on observation) +is not likely to describe the actual one. The +logicians themselves, when men of open mind, notice +this fact and lament it; and they bear the actual world +a great grudge for showing so little fidelity to their +principles. It is false, they are convinced, to its true +nature, to the ideal it ought to realise, to the function +which you see at every turn that it is endeavouring +to fulfil. So that the dialectician can easily become +an idealist of the Platonic type, by conceiving that the +substance of things is not the moving matter that +to-day is one thing and to-morrow another, and that +never is anything perfectly, but that this matter is +only what the voice is to a song, or a book to its +message or spirit—a treacherous and subordinate +vehicle of expression; whereas the true object to look +for, the source of the applicability of words to facts +at all, is the eternal nature which an actual thing may +illustrate: so that the form of things and not their +matter is their true substance or οὐσία.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_223'>223</span>This substantiation of ideals, besides leaning on +language, leans on a sort of pragmatism or utilitarianism. +Things are called beds if people may sleep +well upon them, and bridles if they serve to rein in +a horse: this function is their essence, in so far as +they are beds or bridles at all, and they are excellent +in proportion to the perfection with which they fulfil +this function. And here an ascetic and supernaturalistic +motive begins to play a part in Platonism. For +since the substance and excellence of things lie +<i>merely</i> in their moral essence, or in the fulfilment of +the function designated by their names, all superfluous +ornaments, all variations, all hybrid combinations are +monstrous. Things should have only the barely +necessary matter in them, and that wholly obedient +to the mastering form. What am I saying? Need +things have any matter in them at all? What could +be more ideal than the idea itself, or more perfect than +the function exercised by magic, and without an +instrument? Away, then, with all material embodiments +of ideas, even if these embodiments seem perfect +for a moment. Being material, they will be treacherous +and unstable: there will be some alloy of imperfection +in them, some unreality. Fly, then, to the heaven of +ideas, absolute and eternal, as the realm of essence +contains them. There at last you will find the substance +which in this world of phenomena you sought +in vain. Things are only appearances; in minding +and loving them, and thinking they can wound us, we +are befooled; for the only bread that can feed the +soul is celestial, and the only death that can overtake +her is moral disintegration and the darkness of merely +existing without loyalty to what she ought to be.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This is good ethics: not because our ideal is our +substance nor because our soul in heaven is our true +self, but because life is a harmony in material motions, +reproducing themselves, and happiness is a consciousness +<span class='pageno' id='Page_224'>224</span>of this harmony; so that substance would have +no value and its formations no name but for the choice +they make of some eternal essence to embody, and +the purity with which they manifest it. But the +flux of substance is by no means limited to producing +but one type of perfection, or one circle of types. +The infinite is open to all variations; and any particular +idea is so far from being the substance of things, that +it acquires its ideal prerogative, as a goal of aspiration, +only when substance has blindly chosen it as a practicable +harmony tending to establish itself and to recur +in the local motions of that substance; and nowhere +else, and not for a moment longer, does any eternal +essence possess any authority, express any aspiration, +or even seem to exercise any power.</p> + +<p class='c005'>3. <i>Phenomena.</i>—When master-types were regarded +as the true objects of knowledge, the instances of these +types found in the natural world were called their +appearances or phenomena; but they were not conceived +to be unsubstantial images, thrown off by the +celestial type impartially into all parts of space, like +rays from a luminary. Phenomena were understood +to be existences, confined to particular places and +times; indeed, in contrast to the superior sort of +being possessed by the types in heaven, these phenomena +were existences <i>par excellence</i>: and it was to +them that the philosophy of Heraclitus, that admirable +description of existence, continued to apply. That +phenomena appeared was therefore not the doing of +the types alone: these, from their eternal seats, rained +down influence and, as it were, a perpetual invitation +to things to imitate and to mirror them; but before +this invitation could be accepted, or this influence +gathered and obeyed, matter must exist variously distributed +and predisposed; so that of all the Ideas, equally +radiating virtue, here one and there another might find +expression, and that imperfectly and for a time only.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_225'>225</span>Phenomena, then, for Platonism, are simply things: +and they are called appearances not because they are +supposed not to exist except in the mind, but because +they are believed to be copies of an original in heaven +far more ideal and akin to the mind than themselves: +and also perhaps because they are so unstable and +indefinable, that they elude our exact knowledge and +betray our affections.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Phenomena, however, were supposed to be revealed +to us by sense, whereas thought revealed their types: +and this way of putting things has led to a shift in +the meaning of the word phenomenon, so that in +modern times it has been confused with what is called +an idea in the mind. Sense would not reveal phenomena +in nature (where Plato supposed them to arise) +if sense meant passive intuition. It would then reveal +essences only: that is, just what Plato found thought +to reveal: only that being merely æsthetic intuition, +and not thought about nature and politics and moral +life, the essences revealed would not be Platonic +Ideas; for these were only such essences as expressed +the categories of Greek speech, the perfections of +animals, or the other forms of the good. But sense, +as opposed to dialectic, meant for the ancients animal +perception and faith: it included understanding, +sagacity, and a belief in matter: indeed, common +speech identified immersion in sense with materialism. +Modern philosophers have conceived sense passively, +as mere sensation or feeling or vision of inert ideas: +and the word phenomenon has sometimes been +attracted into the same subjective vortex, and has +come to mean a datum of intuition. So that phenomenalism +suggests less a belief in the phenomena of +nature than a disbelief in them, and a reduction of all +natural events to images in particular minds.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The other, and proper, meaning of phenomenon +seems to be retained by the positivists, who deprecate +<span class='pageno' id='Page_226'>226</span>metaphysics, and even literary psychology, and wish +to be satisfied with the data of science. But why use +the word phenomenon for an event or an existence +that is substantial, and manifests nothing deeper? Is +it because another substance, not internal to those +events and existences, is supposed to exist somewhere +and to be unknowable? Or is it because the laws +of nature, raised to a magical authority, are made +manifest or phenomenal in the facts? Or is it because +the positivists are at heart rather afraid of the psychological +critics of knowledge, and by calling things and +events phenomena think that they may pass for critics +themselves, no less prudent and scientific than if they +talked of immediate experience or of ideas in the +mind? If so, it is a sorry expedient and a poor +defence. If phenomena are essences given in intuition +they are not the objects nor the themes of science, +nor the facts or events in nature: and essences, such +as the absolutely unprejudiced and unpractical mind +may behold them, are the last things on which a +positivist should pin his faith. As to immediate +experience, conceived as an existing process or life, +and as to ideas in the mind, they are names for discourse—the +theme of just that literary psychology +which the positivist disdains. And if phenomena +are simply things, as they were to Plato, the positivist +(who does not regard things as weak efforts of nature +to realise divine Ideas) should not call them phenomena, +but substances; unless indeed he is a metaphysician +without knowing it, and believes in some +unknowable substance which is not in things.</p> + +<p class='c005'>4. <i>Truth.</i>—Memory presents many a scene which +is not substantial, as is the world before me now: +yet this <i>now</i> is fleeting, and the unsubstantiality which +vitiates the past is in the act of invading the present. +Is not the pre-eminence of the present, then, an +illusion, and is not the reality that panorama which +<span class='pageno' id='Page_227'>227</span>all those presents would present when equalised and +seen under the form of eternity? Is not the invidious +actuality of any part of things a mere appearance, and +is not the substance of them all merely their truth?</p> + +<p class='c005'>This suggestion of memory is reinforced by the +suggestions of doubt, of disputation, and of information +by hearsay. In our perplexities we seem always to +be appealing to a metaphysical plenum or standard, +which we call the truth: there all facts are not only +evident, but judicial: they settle our quarrels: they +correct our ignorance: they vindicate our faith. To +the discoursing mind, therefore, present things and +material forces may come to seem of little consequence, +negligible and unsubstantial in comparison with the +truth which remains immovable, while things pass +before it like clouds across the constellations.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This is legitimate tragedy: the truth is the realm +of being to which the earnest intellect is addressed. +The senses and passions may feed on matter, and +fancy may sport in the wilderness of essence: to the +earnest intellect the one exercise seems instrumental +and the other wasteful: what concerns it is the truth. +But why is mere experience though it may fall short +of truth, relevant to truth, and helpful in discovering +it? And why is play of fancy, or definition of mere +essences, not an avenue to truth? Because the truth, +if not a substance, is a luminous shadow or penumbra +which substance, by its existence and movements, +casts on the field of essence: so that unless a substance +existed which was more physical than truth, truth +itself would have no nucleus, and would fade into +identity with the infinite essence of the non-existent. +The truth, however nobly it may loom before the +scientific intellect, is ontologically something secondary. +Its eternity is but the wake of the ship of time, a furrow +which matter must plough upon the face of essence. +Truth must have a subject-matter, it must be the truth +<span class='pageno' id='Page_228'>228</span>about something: and it is the character of this +moving object, lending truth and definition to the +truth itself, that is substantial and fundamental in +the universe. A sign that truth is simply fact, though +described under the form of eternity, is the heat +and haste of men in asserting what they think true. +It is an object of animal faith, not of pure contemplation.</p> + +<p class='c005'>5. <i>Fact.</i>—Those who appeal to fact with unction +are philosophers justly dissatisfied with theory and +discourse: they are looking in the direction of +substance. Yet in the conception of fact there is an +element of an opposite kind, for fact is supposed to be +obvious as well as fundamental. Not substance, says +the empirical philosopher, which indeed would be +the fact if it existed, but immediate fact, however +unsubstantial, if I can only be sure of it. Unfortunately, +the immediate datum is not a fact at all, +but an essence: and even the intuition of that essence, +which he may say is the fact he means, is only a bit +of discourse or theory: the very thing of which he +was so distrustful, and from which his common sense +was appealing to the facts. The love of fact indeed +has its revenges, and the word comes sometimes to +be used for inarticulate feeling or intuition of the +unutterable—a perfectly possible and rather common +intuition. But at this point a triple confusion perhaps +arises between the given essence of the unutterable, +the incidental intuition of that essence, and the +substance of the natural world which the philosopher +is trying to discover. The unutterableness of the +given essence is absurdly transferred to this substance, +which would need to be no less articulate than appearance, +if appearance was to arise from it or express it +at all. Such a formless substance is as far as possible +from being the object of animal faith posited in action +and described in perception spontaneously and more +<span class='pageno' id='Page_229'>229</span>deliberately in theory and discourse. It is as far as +possible from being a fact. And the intuition (which +<i>is</i> a fact) will yield cold comfort to the philosopher +who wanted “facts” rather than intuitions. The +facts he wanted were things, and he has been looking +for them in the wrong direction.</p> + +<p class='c005'>More often, however, fact is a name for any +pronounced and conspicuous feature of the natural +world, or event assumed to occur in that physical +medium; so that such a fact may well be a mode of +substance. It obviously could neither arise nor be +discovered except in a context no less substantial than +itself; for if each fact was a detached existence it +would form a universe by itself, and the eulogistic +title of fact could not belong to it with any better +right than to any intuition. Intuitions, discourse, +theories too, taken bodily, are facts; but if they had +no locus in nature, they could convey no knowledge +of fact, being insignificant sensations or isolated +worlds, occurring at no assignable time.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Fact, therefore, when honestly pointed to without +metaphysical interpretation, means a thing or an +event against which the speaker has indubitably run +up: as it is a fact that the Atlantic Ocean separates +Europe from America, or that men die. If understood +not to mean such natural facts, but rather the +impressions or notions of the mind that notes them, +facts become an impossible sublimation of things: +either actual intuitions, revealing not facts but essences: +or alleged intuitions postulated by literary psychology +(which assumes the natural world, without confessing +it, as the field in which these intuitions are deployed); +or finally an undiscoverable atom of sentience cut off +from all relations in a metaphysical void. Such an +atom, although it would be a substance in an absolute +sense, if it existed, yet could neither act nor be acted +upon, and therefore would not be the sort of substance +<span class='pageno' id='Page_230'>230</span>that a practical mind, in love with facts, would be +tempted to believe in.</p> + +<p class='c005'>6. <i>Events.</i>—Although things rather than events are +the object of animal faith, ordinarily it is some event +that calls attention to a thing: and it is intelligible +that philosophers, reverting to the study of nature +after their long quarantine in psychological scepticism, +should dare to speak of events as constituting the woof +of nature, before they dare to speak of them as things +in flux or as modes of substance. Yet events can be +nothing less. Events are changes, and change implies +continuity and derivation of event from event: otherwise +there might be variety in existence, but there +could be no variation, since the phases of the alleged +changes would not follow one another. This continuity +and derivation essential to events suffice to +render them events in substance, or changes in things. +Both the medium of events (requisite to render any +two events successive or contiguous) and the quantitative +heritage of each (which it derives from the quantity +of its antecedents) are substantial. Not so any event +taken separately, and conceived merely as a passage +of attention from one essence to another: for though +the intuition spanning this transition would be a +fact, neither it nor the terms it played with would be +events. I can imagine an exception to this principle, +if a total event exists including the whole process of +creation. Such a total event (also any minute +irreducible event if such existed) would be actually +identical with a changing thing or a substance in flux. +But every intermediate event would have arbitrary +limits, being composed of minor events and embedded +in greater ones. Perhaps there is no total and no +rudimentary event: the men of science must decide +that point if they can, although I am not confident, +that after they had decided it on the best of evidence, +their decision would prevent the flux of nature from +<span class='pageno' id='Page_231'>231</span>stopping, if they said it must go on, or from going on, +if they said it must stop. However, the mere possibility +that there should be no comprehensive and no +least event shows on what slippery ground we stand +if we attempt to make events the ultimate objects of +belief. They are really only half of what changing +existence implies: the other half is substance.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In the effort to halt at events without positing +things there is some vestige of the psychological +confusion which identifies intuition with the essences +present to it. An intuition may present a specious +event: it does not follow that it is an event itself, or +occurs in time. Intuitions would indeed not be +events if they had no locus in physical time, and were +not members of a series of events occurring in quite +another realm of being from the visionary events +which those intuitions might picture. In order to be +events in physical time (even so to speak by marriage) +intuitions must have organs which are parts of the +moving substance of nature. Otherwise they would +be pure spirits, out of time, and out of relation to one +another. They are events only because a natural +event, not an intuition, envelops them and lends them +a natural status. Were they only specious events +present to another intuition they would not be events +at all, but eternal essences contemplated by an eternal +mind.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Nevertheless, the notion of events comes very near +to that of things, as posited and required in action, +and as analysed in physics. The substance of these +things is, by definition, the ground of changing +appearance and the agent in perpetual action: it is +therefore essentially in flux. I cannot say whether +this flux is pervasive, so that nothing whatever in +substance remains for any time unchanged, the constant +element in it being only a constant form or quantity +of change: but on the level and scale of human +<span class='pageno' id='Page_232'>232</span>experience, substance is everywhere the substance of +events, not of things immutable. If Heraclitus and +modern physics are right in telling us that the most +stable of the Pyramids is but a mass of events, this +truth about substance does not dissolve substance into +events that happen nowhere and to nothing: that +supposition, on the contrary, would paralyse the +events. If an event is to have individual identity +and a place amongst other events, it must be a change +which substance undergoes in one of its parts. Otherwise, +like facts and truths taken hypostatically, events +would be metaphysical abstractions, utterly incompatible +with that natural status which must belong to +the things posited by animal faith in the heat of action—the +only things in which there is any reason for +believing.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_233'>233</span> + <h2 id='chap22' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='twenty-two'>XXII</abbr> <br> BELIEF IN NATURE</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Belief in substance, I have seen, is inevitable. The +hungry dog <i>must</i> believe that the bone before him is a +substance, not an essence; and when he is snapping +at it or gnawing it, that belief rises into conviction, +and he would be a very dishonest dog if, at that +moment, he denied it. For me, too, while I am alive, +it would be dishonest to deny the belief in substance; +and not merely dishonest, but foolish: because if I +am observant, observation will bring me strong corroborative +evidence for that belief. Observation itself, +of course, assumes a belief in discourse and in experience; +it assumes that I can recognise essences, +remembering their former apparitions and contexts +and comparing the earlier with the present instance +of them, or with the different essences which now +appear instead. When I survey my experience in +this way, the order of appearances, as memory or +presumption sets it before me, will confirm the suasion +which these appearances exercised singly, and will +show me how very well grounded was the instinct +which told me, when I saw some casual essence, that +it was a sign of something happening in an independent, +persisting, self-evolving, indefinitely vast world. If +experience, undergone, imposes belief in substance, +experience studied imposes belief in nature.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The word nature is sometimes written with a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_234'>234</span>capital, as if nature were some sort of deity or person: +and in ancient philosophy and common speech, powers +and habits are attributed to nature which imply a +certain moral idiosyncrasy in that personage. Poets +also praise nature, and theologians rehearse her +marvellous ways, in order to show that she could not +have fallen into them of her own accord. All this +mythology about nature is natural, and perhaps shows +a better total appreciation of what nature is than +would a precise physics. The precision of physics is +mathematical; it defines an essence; and the attribution +of this mathematical essence to nature, however +legitimate, is sure to overlook many properties which +belong to her just as truly, and appear in the realms +of truth or of spirit. One such property, at least, is +fundamental, and is better expressed by personifying +nature than by describing her movements mathematically, +I mean, her constancy, the assumption that +we may trust her to be true to herself. In science, +some observed or some hypothetical process is studied +and the method or law of it is ascertained: but there +is nothing particularly scientific in the presumption +that this process is all that is going on in the given +case, or that it will recur in other cases. What is +called the uniformity of nature is an assumption made, +in respect to the future, without any evidence, and +with proportionately scanty evidence about the past: +where experience confirms it in some particular, the +confirmation itself is good for those instances, up to +that time: it tells me nothing of anything beyond, +or of the future. The source of my confidence is +animal faith, the same that inspires confidence in a +child towards his parents, or towards pet animals; and +the whole monstrous growth of human religion is an +extension of this sense that nature is a person, or a +set of persons, with constant but malleable characters. +As experience remodels my impulses, I assume that +<span class='pageno' id='Page_235'>235</span>the world will remain amenable to my new ways; +the convert feels he is saved; the philosopher thinks +he has found the key to happiness; the astronomer +tells you he has measured the infinite, and perhaps +rolled it up upon itself, and put it in his pocket. +They all express the infantile conviction that nature +cannot be false to what they have already learned or +instinctively affirmed of it: making nature a single +and quasi-personal entity, bound tragically to its +past, and pledged more or less wilfully to a particular +future. It is this sense that the world, like a person, +has a certain vital unity, and remains constant or at +least consequential in its moral aspects, that is expressed +by calling it nature. Like a being born of a +seed, it has a determinate form, and a normal career, +a <i>nature</i>, which it cannot change.</p> + +<p class='c005'>What evidence is there for the existence of nature, +in this sense of the word? If I speak of the universe +at large, there can be no evidence. Of course the +universe must be what it is, it must have a character, +it must exemplify an essence; but taken as a whole, it +may be a chaos, in which nothing is predeterminate, +nor progressive, nor persistent, and in which the +parts are self-centred and the events spontaneous. +A philosopher who took his own life as a model for +conceiving all other things, ought perhaps to incline +to this view; because he is himself, transcendentally +speaking, an absolute centre, and being ignorant of +the sources of his thoughts and actions, may presume +that they have no sources. If under these circumstances +he still has the weakness (for it would be a +weakness) to believe in anything else, say in other +monads, he would doubtless allow them an equal +liberty; so that in his universe of monads there would +be no common space, no common time, no common +type of character or development, no mutual influence +or kindred destiny. I think the inner life of animals, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_236'>236</span>if we treated each as a moral romance, apart from its +physical setting and influence, would actually present +such a chaos: especially if we imagine what may be +the lives of creatures in other parts of the stellar +universe, or out of any relation with ourselves at all. +Such a loose universe could not properly be called +nature. It would not have given us birth, it would +not have nurtured us, it would not surround us with +any constant influences or familiar aspects, it would +not bring any seeds to maturity for our encouragement +or warning.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Evidences for the existence of nature must be +sought elsewhere, in a region which a monadologist +would regard as internal to each monad, in that the +substances posited by me in obedience to my vital +instincts seem to me to behave as if they were parts +of nature. Nature is the great counterpart of art. +What I tuck under my pillow at night, I find there in +the morning. Economy increases my possessions. +People all grow old. Accidents have discoverable +causes. There is a possible distinction between +wisdom and folly. But how should all this be, and +how could experience, or the shocks that punctuate +it, teach me anything to the purpose, or lend me any +assurance in life not merely a reinforced blindness +and madness on my part, unless substances standing +and moving in ordered ways surrounded me, and I +was living in the midst of nature? Certainly a +partial sceptic like Berkeley, closing one eye in the +interests of a sentimental religion, may conceive that +nature is not a system of evolving substances round +him affecting his own growth, but a perpetual illusion, +like a dream: a story told him in the dark, a consecutive +miracle of grace or of punishment by which a +divine spirit dazzles and conducts his spirit, without +any medium or any occasion. But if this fairy-tale +is to hold good, and to justify the arts of life and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_237'>237</span>maintain the distinction between vice and virtue, I +must be able to discern the ways of Providence in +their routine; everything will happen exactly as if +nature existed, and unrolled itself in a mechanical, +inexorable, and often shocking way; my idealism will +merely allow me to admit miracles, and to hope that +to-morrow everything will be well. If I regard the +world of appearance as a mask which the deity wears +inevitably, the very essence of the creator being to +create such a world, the difference between belief in +God and belief in nature will be merely verbal, and I +may say with Spinoza, <span lang="la"><i>Deus sive natura</i></span>. If on the contrary +God is approachable in himself and would prove a +better companion than nature and sweeter to commune +with, why should he terrify me or delude me with +this unworthy disguise? Why should he have preferred +to manifest himself by creating appearances +rather than by creating substances? What secret +necessity could have compelled him to create anything +at all, or whispered in his ear these irresponsible +designs? If nature behaves as nature would, is it +not simply nature? If God were there instead would +he not behave like God? Or if I say that I have no +right to presume how God should behave, but that +wisdom counsels me to learn his ways by experience, +what difference remains between God and nature, +and are they more than two names for the same thing?</p> + +<p class='c005'>If by calling nature God or the work of God, or +the language in which God speaks to us, nothing is +meant except that nature is wonderful, unfathomed, +alive, the source of our being, the sanction of morality, +and the dispenser of happiness and misery, there can +be no objection to such alternative terms in the mouth +of poets; but I think a philosopher should avoid the +ambiguities which a too poetical term often comports. +The word nature is poetical enough: it suggests +sufficiently the generative and controlling function, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_238'>238</span>the endless vitality and changeful order of the world +in which I live.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Faith in nature restores in a comprehensive way +that sense of the permanent which is dear to animal +life. The world then becomes a home, and I can +be a philosopher in it. Perhaps nature is not really +constant, nor single; unless indeed I so stretch and +eviscerate the notions of unity and constancy as to +apply them to the total aspect of nature, under the +form of eternity, however incoherent and loose the +structure of that totality may be. But in this æon, +in this portion or special plane of space, a sufficient +constancy is discoverable: far greater than my scope +can cover, or my interest require. It is inattention +and prejudice in men, not inconstancy in nature, +that keeps them so ignorant, and the art of government +so chaotic. Whenever a little persistent study of +nature is made (as recently in the interest of mechanical +inventions) rapid progress at once follows in the arts: +and art is the true discoverer, the unimpeachable +witness to the reality of nature. The master of any +art sees nature from the inside, and works with her, +or she in him. Certainly he does not know <i>how</i> he +operates, nor, at bottom, <i>why</i> he should: but no more +does she. His mastery is a part of her innocence. +It happens so, and within limits it prospers. To that +extent he has assurance of power and of support. +It is a faith congruous with his experience that if he +could bend his faculties more accurately to their task, +nature would prove indefinitely tractable: and if a +given animal with special organs and a special form +of imagination can progressively master the world, +the fact proves that the world is con-natural with him. +I do not mean that it favours his endeavours, much +less that it is composed as his fancy pictures it; I +mean only that his endeavours express one of the formations +which nature has fallen into, for the time in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_239'>239</span>equilibrium with the surrounding formations; and +that his ideas too are in correspondence with the sphere +of his motions, and express his real relations. The +possibility of such correspondence and such equilibrium +proves that nature exists, and that the creature +that sustains them is a part of nature.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_240'>240</span> + <h2 id='chap23' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='twenty-three'>XXIII</abbr> <br> EVIDENCES OF ANIMATION IN NATURE</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>The sense that nature is animate, and in particular +that men and brutes have feelings and thoughts, +stands in greater need of criticism than of defence. I +assume it before my notions of substance or of nature +are clearly formed, and before I can distinguish +animate from inanimate being. I assume it, not +because it is at all evident or probable in itself, but +because I fetch the materials for all my inchoate +conceptions from my own sensibility: and in discourse +(which I am busy with from the beginning) I unwittingly +interweave the notion of animation in gathering +my experience of essences and of things. I +attribute an existence to these essences which is +proper only to the light of intuition travelling over +them: and I attribute to these substances moral +attributes and sensuous perspectives also borrowed +from my running discourse. This subjective matrix +and envelope of all my knowledge, though I may +overlook it, underlies knowledge to the end; so that +I shall never cease to conceive nature as animate and +brutes and men as walking thoughts and passions +until I have advanced very far in scepticism. Even +then, except in deliberate theory, my apprehension +of nature will be fabulous and dramatic; so that now +that I have officially reinstated my faith in nature, +faith in the animation of nature will tend to slip in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_241'>241</span>unannounced; somewhat as when an exile is amnestied +or a foreigner naturalised, his parasites (if any) are +silently admitted too. Yet this is not, or need not +be, the law; and as it is legality in opinion that here +occupies me, I will inquire whether evidence of animation +(even supposing that nature is animate in fact) +could by any possibility be found at all; and having +cleared up that point, I will inquire further under +what control, and with what chances of truth, I may +imaginatively attribute animation to nature in the +absence of all evidence.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Why do I attribute animation to myself, that is, +to my body? That my spirit discovers a world with +my body in it, is not the question; the why of that +would be a metaphysical enigma obviously insoluble, +arising out of a trick of thought and inapt application +of categories. The point is why, when I feel a pain, +I suppose that it is my back or my stomach that +aches, and not simply my spirit. I think we may +distinguish two reasons. One is that the pain is an +element in the perception of my back or stomach; it +is instinct with the loudest and most urgent animal +faith; and it imperatively summons my attention to +those obscure regions, and makes me wonder what is +happening there. The other reason is that the pain +may be associated with another observed event in +which my body appears as an integral element, as +when my back aches because I am being thrashed. +My nobler thoughts are also known to animate my +body for this external reason. It is my tongue or +gesture that announces them, even to myself. Bad +observers, who suppose themselves to see or to discourse +without intervention of their eyes or larynx, imagine +that they are essentially disembodied spirits, to whom +all things are directly perspicuous, and that only a +hateful invention of philosophers, called introjection +or bifurcation, has put their minds inside their bodies. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_242'>242</span>Whether incarnation is or is not a hateful fatality to +spirit, I will not discuss here; but that spirit is +incarnate, that it lodges in the body and looks forth +from it on the world, is a fact easily ascertained by +closing the eyes, taking a glass of wine, or blushing +at having made a fool of oneself.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Faith in memory (which is involved in dialectic +and in perception) also reveals to me what animation +means, and obliges me to assert its existence. In +dialectic and in perception I assume that recurrent +views are being taken by me of an object identical +with itself if an essence, or continuous with itself if +a substance. Such recurrent intuitions or mentions +of the terms of discourse are posited in primary +memory, as well as in reversion to the past after an +interval of forgetfulness. This remembrance is remembrance +of animation. It posits thought, cognitive, +synthetic, immaterial; but it posits it as having +occurred in particular conjunctions at particular times, +in the vicissitudes of a particular body, my own, in a +material world. These alleged past intuitions could +not be kept apart in memory, nor assumed to have +been spaced at longer or shorter intervals of time, +nor to have been enacted in a particular order, unless +they were attributed to the past career of myself, +an animal in the natural world, and grafted upon +recognisable material situations and actions to which +those intuitions were relevant. Nature is the canvas +on which, in memory, I paint the perspective of my +personal experience. Even a fictitious memory, or a +false experience like that of a dream, is recognisable +as having had a natural occasion and date, and as +painting a particular incredible perspective of the +same world. Otherwise, I should not think I was +remembering my past thoughts, but I should be +merely contemplating certain fresh essences.</p> + +<p class='c005'>By animation, then, I understand material life +<span class='pageno' id='Page_243'>243</span>quickened into intuitions, such as, if rehearsed and +developed pertinently, make up a private experience. +The question whether nature is animate does not +regard its substance, but its moral individuation. In +how many places is experience being gathered? What +evidence have I that nature thinks and feels, or that +the men and animals think and feel who people +nature?</p> + +<p class='c005'>I must discard at once, as incompatible with the +least criticism, the notion that nature or certain parts +of nature are known to be animate because they +<i>behave</i> in certain ways. The only behaviour that can +give proof of thinking is thinking itself. If I have ever +conceived intuition or discourse at all, and obtained +assurance of its existence, it has been in my own +person, by knowing what I mean and am meaning, +what I feel and have felt; and this posited discourse +of mine has assumed, in my estimation, the character +of animation of my body, by virtue of two additional +dogmas which I have accepted: first, the dogma that +I am a substantial being far deeper than my discourse, +a psyche or self; and second, the dogma that this +substantial being is in dynamic interplay with a whole +environing system of substances on the same plane +with itself. In this way I have come by my initial +instance of animation in nature, on the model of +which I am able to conceive animation in its other +parts.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Now it is obvious that in many parts of nature, +and especially in the language and gestures of men of +my own race, I find a setting for mental discourse +exactly similar to the setting into which I have put +my own intuitive experience; so that their words and +actions vividly suggest to me my own thoughts. Just +as formerly I incorporated or introjected my thoughts +into my own body, so now I incorporate or introject +them into the bodies moving before me. Imitation +<span class='pageno' id='Page_244'>244</span>contributes to this dramatic understanding, because +I am not confined, when I watch other people, to +remembering what I may have felt when I was in +some such situation, or spoke some such words. +Their attitude and language may be novel to me, and, +as we say, a revelation: that is, they may by contagion +arouse unprecedented intuitions in me now, which I +unhesitatingly attribute to them, perhaps with indignation, +swearing that such thoughts never could enter +my head, and that I am utterly incapable of such +feelings. Yet this is psychologically false; because +if I understand a thought, I have it; though it may +be present as an essence only, without carrying assent. +The irony of the case is that very likely I alone have +it, and not at all the man to whom I attribute it. Even +the closest similarity in language or action is a very +abstract similarity, and the concrete and full current +of our two lives, on which the quality of intuitions +depends, may be quite different. All dramatic understanding +of which I am capable is, by hypothesis, <i>my</i> +discourse. The most contagious feelings, the clearest +thoughts, of others are clear or contagious only because +I can readily make them my own. I cannot conceive +deeper thoughts than my lead can plumb, nor feelings +for which I lack the organ.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Of course by an abuse of language the word +animation might be used to designate certain kinds of +behaviour; as the ancients said the world was rational +because orderly, or the stars intelligent because they +kept going round in circles. So men or women +might be said to think because they speak or because +they write books; but it does not follow. The inner +patter of words which I sometimes hear in myself, +and which mystics have called inspiration or (when +explosive) speaking with tongues, is not thinking; +it is an object of perception that may suggest to me +a subsequent thought, although often I see, when I +<span class='pageno' id='Page_245'>245</span>try to frame this thought, that those words make +nonsense. It is very true, as I shall find later, that +the fountain of my thoughts, that is, the self who +thinks them, is my psyche, and that movements +there guide my thoughts and render them, as the +case may be, intelligent, confused, rapid, or halting; +also supply my language, dictate my feelings, and +determine when my thinking shall begin and where +it shall end. But the light of thought is wanting +there, which is the very thinking; and no fine inspection +of behaviour nor interweaving of objects will +ever transmute behaviour into intuition nor objects +into the attention which, falling upon them, turns +them from substances or essences into objects of +actual thought. By animation I understand the incarnation +in nature, when it behaves in these ways, +of a pure and absolute spirit, an imperceptible cognitive +energy, whose essence is intuition.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Animation being essentially imperceptible and not +identical with any habit or act observable in nature, +I see the justification of those philosophers who say +that animals, in so far as science can study them, are +machines; the discoverable part of them is material +only, just as is the rest of nature. But this conclusion +being implied only in my transcendental approach +to nature and my knowledge of her, can in no way +prejudge her real constitution, which may be as rich +and superabundant as it likes, without asking my +leave or reporting to me her domestic budget; nor +is anything thereby prejudged in respect to the nature +or laws of matter, or the simplicity of its mechanism. +Nature seems, at first blush, to have many levels of +habit, irreducible to one another. As it was only the +other day that a hint reached us that gravity and the +first law of motion might be forms of a single principle, +so it may be long before we hear from the biologists +that chemical reaction and animal instinct are forms +<span class='pageno' id='Page_246'>246</span>of the same habit in matter. Even if they are irreducible +to a common principle, they will be two +habits of matter, and nothing more. There is a +sense in which every different manifestation of a +principle makes a different principle of it, as the +language of the United States might be said not to +be English; but the alienation of form from form is +not a departure from the habit of flux, complication, +dissolution, and temporary arrest which runs through +all language. So nature might be said to have as +many irreducible habits as she has forms; but she +has an underlying ground of transformation as well, +on which, I suspect, all those forms are grafted, no +more wilfully diverse nor artificially identical than +leaves upon a tree; and when wiseacres, every day +of every year, bring their ponderous proofs that life +is not mechanical, that the human will, by exception, +is free, and that a single disembodied purpose, by +magic, makes all things dance contrarily to their own +nature, nature and I wink at each other.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The circumstance that animation, by its very +essence, must be imperceptible, and not a link in +any traceable process, renders disproof of animation +anywhere as impossible as proof of it. Those sentimentalists +are short-sighted who in their desire to +show that mind is everywhere, introduce mental +forces or interpolate mental links into their account +of physical economy. If thought was discoverable +only in the gaps between motions, no thoughts would +be discoverable in nature at all. I do not presume to +say that nature can make no leaps; I leave her to her +own paces; but I do not conceive that, if she shows +gaps (and what is a gap but a transition?) I must +hasten to fill them up for her with alleged intuitions. +She may be made up of gaps; they may be her steps; +and if her limbs have strength in them for leaping, let +her leap. Her strides are their own measure; it is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_247'>247</span>only my ignorance or egotism that can regard any of +her ways as abnormal. Thought in myself has not +appeared when my system has broken down, but +rather when it has established quick connections with +things about it. Thought is not a substitute for +physical force or physical life, but an expression of +them when they are working at their best. If I may +read animation into nature at all, it must be where +her mechanisms are sustained, not where they are +suspended.</p> + +<p class='c005'>There are two stages in the criticism of myth, +or dramatic fancy, or the sort of idealism that sees +purposes and intentions and providential meanings +in everything. The first stage treats them angrily +as superstitions; the second treats them smilingly as +poetry. I think that most of the specific thoughts +which men attribute to one another are proper only +to the man who attributes them; and the fabulous +psychology of poets and theologians is easy to deride; +it has no specific justification, and the moral truth of +it can be felt only by a poetic mind. Nevertheless, +when I consider the inevitable egotism that presides +over the understanding of mind in others, I fear that +I am no less likely to sin through insensibility to the +actual life of nature, because my tight little organs +cannot vibrate to alien harmonies, than I am to sin +through a childish anthropomorphism which makes +not only the beasts but even the clouds and the gods +discourse like myself. After all, in attributing human +thoughts (with a difference) to non-human beings, I +recognise their parity with myself; my instinct is +courteous or even humble; and my incapacity to +speak any moral language but my own is not only +inevitable but healthy and manly. Sages and poets +who have known no language but their own have a +richer savour and a deeper wisdom than witlings full +of miscellaneous accomplishments; and when once +<span class='pageno' id='Page_248'>248</span>I have renounced the pedantic demand that poetry +should be prose, I can allow that myth may do the +life of nature less injustice than would the only alternative +open to me, which is silence.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This may be said also about myth regarding myself, +I mean the attempts of memory, self-justifying eloquence, +or psycho-analysis to unfold the riches of my +own mind. How much do I know about my own +animation? How much is too fluid to be caught in +the sieve of memory, and to be officially assimilated +in verbal soliloquy? When any one asks me what I +think of the weather or of the Prime Minister, does +my answer report anything that I have previously +thought? Probably not; my past impressions are +lost, or obliterated by the very question put to me; +and I make bold to invent, on the spur of the moment, +a myth about my sentiments on the subject. The +present play of language and fancy may fairly bring to +a head old impressions or ruling impulses; or I may +have occasion to amend my first expression, and +obeying a fresh suggestion of my fancy I may say: +No, no; I meant rather this. Whereupon I may +proceed laboriously to create and modulate my opinion, +groping perhaps to a final epigram, which I say +expresses just what I think, although I never thought +it before. Such is my discourse when I am really +thinking; at other times it is but the echo of language +which I remember to have formerly used, and therefore +call my ideas. It is clear therefore that even +in expressing my own mind when I conceive what +I have felt, I have never really felt just that before. +My report is an honest myth.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The case is even worse as regards the emotions. +What do I mean when I talk of my desires, my +intentions, or the motives of others? Unless these +things have been actually expressed in words which +I can recover, neither I nor my neighbours have ever +<span class='pageno' id='Page_249'>249</span>had in mind anything like what I now impute. My +desire, in fact, was only a certain alacrity in doing +things which afterwards I see leading to a certain +issue; my intention (if actual at all) was a certain +foresight of what the issue might be; and the motives +I assigned to others were but ulterior events imagined +by me which, if they had actually occurred, I suppose +would have pleased those people. The sensations +or ideas which may really have accompanied their +actions, or the words they may really have pronounced +mentally, are not within my view; if they were they +would probably go a very little way towards preparing +or covering the actions in question. These actions +would turn out to have had subjectively a totally +different complexion from that which I assign to +them on seeing them performed. The very abundance +and incessant dream-like prolixity of mental discourse +render it elusive; and the discourse I officially impute +to myself or to others is a subsequent literary fiction, +apt if it suggests the events which the discourse +concerned, or excites the emotions which those events +if witnessed would have produced on an observer of +my disposition, but by no means a fiction patterned +on any actual former experience in anybody. My +sense of animation in nature, and all my notions of +human experience, are dramatic poetry, and nothing +else.</p> + +<p class='c005'>There is therefore no direct evidence of animation +in nature anywhere, but only a strong propensity in +me to imagine nature discoursing as I discourse, +because my apprehension of nature is embedded in +my miscellaneous, serried, and private thoughts, and I +can hardly clear it of the mental elements—emotional, +pictorial, or dramatic—which encrust it there. On +reflection, however, and by an indirect approach, I +can see good reason for believing that some sort of +animation (not at all such animation as my fancy +<span class='pageno' id='Page_250'>250</span>attributes to it at first) pervades the organic world; +because my psyche is animate; she is the source +and seat, as I have learned to believe, of all my discourse; +yet she is not different, in any observable +respect, from the psyches of other animals, nor is +she composed of a different sort of substance from +the common earth, light, and air out of which she +has arisen, and by which she is fed; she is but +one in the countless generations of living creatures. +Accordingly the analogy of nature would suggest that +the other living creatures in the world are animate +too, and discourse privately no less assiduously and +absurdly than I do. It would even suggest that all +the substance of nature is ready to think, if circumstances +allow by presenting something to think about, +and creating the appropriate organ.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The character of this universal animation, or +readiness to think, is inconceivable by me, in so far +as its organs or objects differ from my own. The +forms of it are doubtless as various as the forms of +material being; a stone will think like me, in so far +as it lives like me. There are actually some men, a +few, who do live like me; these also think like me; +and we can truly understand one another and impute +to one another the very thoughts we severally have. +In such rare cases, human discourse in one man +may bring perfect knowledge (though no evidence) +of human discourse in another. In doing the same +things and uttering the same words we have instant +assurance of unanimity, in this case not deceptive; +especially when it is not the outer stimulus that is +common to us, but the spontaneous reaction. For +this reason gesture or poetry is a better index to +feeling than are events or information coming to men +from outside. What happens to people will never +tell you how they feel; the alien observer misunderstands +everything; only he understands a mind who +<span class='pageno' id='Page_251'>251</span>can share its free and comic expression. For this +reason too psychology is not a science unless it +becomes the science of behaviour, when it ceases to +be an account of mental discourse and traces only +the material life of the psyche. In order to communicate +thought it is necessary to impose it.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Moral communication becomes surer in proportion +as the discourse to be reproduced involves more +articulation, more distinct turns by which fidelity in +the rendering may be controlled. The form of +thought is more easily transferable than its sensuous +elements. Under the same sky, with the same animal +instincts, with the same experience of love, labour, +and war, one race or one age may be totally cut off +from another in spirit. The same language, on the +contrary, the same myths, legends, or histories, may +be carried almost unchanged across seas and ages, +and may unite the happier moments of distant peoples. +The range of such moral unity is also easy to discover; +I may learn how far languages or religions are diffused; +they create recognisable moral communities. Indeed, +they tyrannise over society, so social are they; and +they often render people who share the same spirit +cruel to heretics of their own flesh and blood. The +humanities may prove inhuman; and the less articulate, +more robust instincts of mankind may take their +revenge by stamping the humanities out. Yet the +barbarians, who are not divided by rival traditions, +fight all the more incessantly for food and space. +Peoples cannot love one another unless they love the +same ideas.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_252'>252</span> + <h2 id='chap24' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='twenty-four'>XXIV</abbr> <br> LITERARY PSYCHOLOGY</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Scientific psychology is a part of physics, or the +study of nature; it is the record of how animals act. +Literary psychology is the art of imagining how they +feel and think. Yet this art and that science are +practised together, because one characteristic habit of +man, namely speech, yields the chief terms in which +he can express his thoughts and feelings. Still it is +not the words, any more than the action and attitude +which accompany them, that are his <i>understanding</i> of +the words, or his sense of his attitude and action. +These can evidently be apprehended only dramatically, +by imitative sympathy; so that literary psychology, +however far scientific psychology may push it back, +always remains in possession of the moral field.</p> + +<p class='c005'>When nature was still regarded as a single animal, +this confusion extended to science as a whole, and +tinctured the observation of nature with some suggestion +of how a being that so acts must be minded, and +what thoughts and sentiments must animate it. Such +myths cannot be true; not because nature or its parts +may not be animate in fact, but because there is no +vital analogy between the cosmos and the human +organism; so that if nature is animate as a whole, or +in her minute or gigantic cycles, animation there is +sure not to resemble human discourse, which is all +we can attribute to her. Myth and natural theology +<span class='pageno' id='Page_253'>253</span>are accordingly fabulous essentially and irremediably. +If literary psychology is to interpret the universe at +large, it can be only very cautiously, after I have +explored nature scientifically as far as I can, and am +able to specify the degree of analogy and the process +of concretion that connect my particular life with +the universal flux.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Myth is now extinct (which is a pity) and theology +discredited; but the same confusion subsists in the +quarters where it is not fashionable to doubt. History, +for instance, is partly a science, since it contains +archæological and antiquarian lore and a study of +documents; but it is also, in most historians, an +essay in dramatic art, since it pretends to rehearse the +ideas and feelings of dead men. These would not be +recoverable even if the historian limited himself to +quoting their recorded words, as he would if he was +conscientious; because even these words are hard to +interpret afterwards, so as to recover the living sentiment +they expressed. At least authentic phrases, like +authentic relics, have an odour of antiquity about +them which helps us to feel transported out of ourselves, +even if we are transported in fact only into a +more romantic and visionary stratum of our own being. +Classic historians, however, are not content with +quoting recorded words: they compose speeches for +their characters, under the avowed inspiration of Clio; +or less honestly, in modern times, they explain how +their heroes felt, or what influences were at work in +the spirit of the age, or what dialectic drove public +opinion from one sentiment to another. All this is +shameless fiction; and the value of it, when it has a +value, lies exclusively in the eloquence, wisdom, or +incidental information found in the historian. Such +history can with advantage be written in verse, or put +upon the stage; its virtue is not at all to be true, but +to be well invented.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_254'>254</span>Philosophy fell into the same snare when in +modern times it ceased to be the art of thinking and +tried to become that impossible thing, the science of +thought. Thought can be found only by being enacted. +I may therefore guide my thoughts according to some +prudent rule, and appeal as often as I like to experience +for a new starting-point or a controlling perception +in my thinking; but I cannot by any possibility make +experience or mental discourse at large the object of +investigation: it is invisible, it is past, it is nowhere. +I can only surmise what it might have been, and +rehearse it imaginatively in my own fancy. It is an +object of literary psychology. The whole of British +and German philosophy is only literature. In its +deepest reaches it simply appeals to what a man says +to himself when he surveys his adventures, re-pictures +his perspectives, analyses his curious ideas, guesses at +their origin, and imagines the varied experience which +he would like to possess, cumulative and dramatically +unified. The universe is a novel of which the ego +is the hero; and the sweep of the fiction (when +the ego is learned and omnivorous) does not contradict +its poetic essence. The composition is perhaps +pedantic, or jejune, or overloaded; but on the other +hand it is sometimes most honest and appealing, +like the autobiography of a saint; and taken as the +confessions of a romantic scepticism trying to shake +itself loose from the harness of convention and of +words, it may have a great dramatic interest and +profundity. But not one term, not one conclusion in +it has the least scientific value, and it is only when +this philosophy is good literature that it is good for +anything.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The literary character of such accounts of experience +would perhaps have been more frankly avowed +if the interest guiding them had been truly psychological, +like that of pure dramatic poetry or fiction. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_255'>255</span>What kept philosophers at this task—often quite +unsuited to their powers—was anxiety about the +validity of knowledge in physics or in theology. They +thought that by imagining how their ideas might have +grown up they could confirm themselves in their faith +or in their scepticism. Practising literary psychology +with this motive, they did not practise it freely or +sympathetically; they missed, in particular, the decided +dominance of the passions over the fancy, and the +nebulous and volatile nature of fancy itself. For this +reason the poets and novelists are often better psychologists +than the philosophers. But the most pertinent +effect of this appeal of science to a romantic psychology +was the <i>hypostasis of an imagined experience</i>, as if +experience could go on in a void without any material +organs or occasions, and as if its entire course could +be known by miracle, as the experiences of the characters +in a novel are known to the author.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Criticism of knowledge is thus based on the amazing +assumption that a man can have an experience which +is past, or which was never his own. Although criticism +can have no first principle, I have endeavoured in +this book to show how, if genuinely and impartially +sceptical, it may retreat to the actual datum and find +there some obvious essence, necessarily without any +given place, date, or inherence in any mind. But +from such a datum it would not be easy to pass to +belief in anything; and if the leap was finally taken, +it would be confessedly at the instance of animal +faith, and in the direction of vulgar and materialistic +convictions. Modern critics of knowledge have had +more romantic prepossessions. Often they were not +really critics, saying <i>It seems</i>, but rebels saying <i>I +find</i>, <i>I know</i>, or empiricists saying <i>Everybody finds</i>, +<i>Everybody knows</i>. Their alleged criticism of science +is pure literary psychology, gossip, and story-telling. +They are miraculously informed that there are many +<span class='pageno' id='Page_256'>256</span>minds, and that these all have a conventional experience. +What this experience contains, they think is +easily stated. You have but to ask a friend, or make +an experiment, or imagine how you would feel in +another man’s place. So confident is this social +convention, that the natural world in which these +experiences are reported to occur, and the assumed +existence of which renders them imaginable, may be +theoretically resolved into a picture contained in them. +Thus the ground is removed which sustained all this +literary psychology and suggested the existence of +minds and their known experience at all; yet the +groundless belief in these minds, and in copious +knowledge of their fortunes, is retained as obvious; +and this novelesque universe is called the region +of facts, or of immediate experience, or of radical +empiricism. Literary psychology thus becomes a +metaphysics for novelists. It supplies one of the many +thinkable systems of the universe, though a fantastic +one; and I shall return to it, under the name of +psychologism, when considering the realm of matter. +Here I am concerned only with the evidence that such +masses of experience exist or are open to my inspection.</p> + +<p class='c005'>No inspection is competent to discover anything +but an essence; what social intuition touches is +therefore always a dramatic illusion of life in others +or in myself, never the actual experience that may have +unfolded itself elsewhere as a matter of fact. Yet this +dramatic illusion, like any given essence, may be a true +symbol for the material events upon which the psyche +is then directed; in this case, the life of other people, +or my own past life, as scientific psychology might +describe it. A good literary psychologist, who can +read people’s minds intuitively, is likely to anticipate +their conduct correctly. His psychological imagination +is not a link in this practical sagacity but a symptom +of it, a poetic by-product of fineness in instinct and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_257'>257</span>in perception. Slight indications in the attitude or +temper of the persons observed, much more than their +words, will suggest to the sympathetic instinct of the +observer what those persons are in the habit of doing, +or are inclined to do; and the stock idea assigned to +them, or the stock passion attributed to them, will be +but a sign in the observer’s discourse for that true +observation. I watch a pair of lovers; and it requires +no preternatural insight for me to see whether the +love is genuine, whether it is mutual, whether it is +waxing or waning, irritable or confident, sensual or +friendly. I may make it the nucleus of a little novel +in my own mind; and it will be a question of my +private fancy and literary gift whether I can evolve +language and turns of sentiment capable of expressing +all the latent dispositions which the behaviour of +those lovers, unconscious of my observation, suggested +to me. Have I read their minds? Have I divined +their fate? It is not probable; and yet it is infinitely +probable that minds and fates were really evolving +there, not generically far removed from those which +I have imagined.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The only facts observable by the psychologist are +physical facts, and the only events that can test the +accuracy of his theories are material events; he is +therefore in those respects simply a scientific psychologist, +even if his studies are casual and desultory. +Whence, then, his literary atmosphere? For there is +not only the medium of words which intervenes in +any science, but the ulterior sympathetic echo of +feelings truly felt and thoughts truly rehearsed and +intended. I reply that whereas scientific psychology +is addressed to the bodies and the material events +composing the animate world, literary psychology +restores the essences intervening in the perception +of those material events, and re-echoes the intuitions +aroused in those bodies. This visionary stratum is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_258'>258</span>the true immediate as well as the imagined ultimate. +Even in the simplest perceptions on which scientific +psychology, or any natural science, can be based, +there is an essence present which only poetry can +describe or sympathy conceive. Schoolroom experiments +in optics, for instance, are initially a play of +intuitions, and exciting in that capacity; I see, and +am confident and pleased that others see with me, +this colour of an after-image, this straight stick bent +at the surface of the water, the spokes of this wheel +vanishing as it turns. For science, these given essences +are only stepping-stones to the conditions under +which they arise, and their proper æsthetic nature, +which is trivial in itself, is forgotten in the curious +knowledge I may acquire concerning light and perspective +and refraction and the structure of the eye. +Yet in that vast, vibrating, merciless realm of matter +I am, as it were, a stranger on his travels. The +adventure is exhilarating, and may be profitable, but +it is endless and, in a sense, disappointing; it takes +me far from home. I may seem to myself to have +gained the whole world and lost my own soul. Of +course I am still at liberty to revert in a lyrical moment +to the immediate, to the intuitions of my childish +senses; yet for an intelligent being such a reversion +is a sort of <i>gran rifiuto</i> in the life of mind, a collapse +into lotus-eating and dreaming. It is here that the +Muses come to the rescue, with their dramatic and +epic poetry, their constructive music, and their literary +psychology. Knowledge of nature and experience of +life are presupposed; but as at first, in the beginnings +of science, intuition was but a sign for material facts +to be discovered, so now all material facts are but a +pedestal for images of other intuitions. The poet +feels the rush of emotion on the other side of the +deployed events; he wraps them in an atmosphere of +immediacy, luminous or thunderous; and his spirit, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_259'>259</span>that piped so thin a treble in its solitude, begins to +sing in chorus. Literary psychology pierces to the +light, to the shimmer of passion and fancy, behind the +body of nature, like Dante issuing from the bowels of +the earth at the antipodes, and again seeing the stars.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Such a poetic interpretation of natural things has +a double dignity not found in sensuous intuitions +antecedent to any knowledge of the world. It has +the dignity of virtual truth, because there are really +intuitions in men and animals, varying with their +fortunes, often much grander and sweeter than any +that could come to me. The literary psychologist is +like some antiquary rummaging in an old curiosity +shop, who should find the score of some ancient +composition, in its rude notation, and should sit down +at a wheezy clavichord and spell out the melody, +wondering at the depth of soul in that archaic art, so +long buried, and now so feebly revealed. This curious +music, he will say to himself, was mighty and glorious +in its day; this moonlight was once noon. There is +no illusion in this belief in life long past or far distant; +on the contrary, the sentimentalist errs by defect of +imagination, not by excess of it, and his pale watercolours +do no justice to the rugged facts. The other +merit that dignifies intuitions mediated by knowledge +of things, is that they release capabilities in one’s own +soul which one’s personal fortunes may have left +undeveloped. This makes the mainspring of fiction, +and its popular charm. The illusion of projecting +one’s own thoughts into remote or imaginary characters +is only half an illusion: these thoughts were never +there, but they were always here, or knocking at the +gate; and there is an indirect victory in reaching +and positing elsewhere, in an explicit form, the life +which accident denied me, and thereby enjoying it +<i>sub rosa</i> in spite of fate. And there are many experiences +which are only tolerable in this dream-like +<span class='pageno' id='Page_260'>260</span>form, when their consequences are negligible and +their vehemence is relieved by the distance at which +they appear, and by the show they make. Thus both +the truth and the illusion of literary psychology are +blessings: the truth by revealing the minds of others, +and the illusion by expanding one’s own mind.</p> + +<p class='c005'>These imaginative blessings, however, are sometimes +despised, and philosophers, when they suspect +that they have no evidence for their psychological facts, +or become aware of their literary flavour, sometimes +turn away from this conventional miscellany of experience, +and ask what is the substantial texture of experience +beneath. Suppose I strain my introspection +in the hope of discovering it; the picture (for such +a method can never yield anything but pictures) may +be transformed in two ways, to which two schools of +recent literary psychology are respectively wedded. +One transformation turns experience, intensely gaped +at, into a mere strain, a mere sense of duration or +tension; the other transformation unravels experience +into an endless labyrinth of dreams. In the one case, +experience loses its articulation to the extent of becoming +a dumb feeling; and it is hard to see how, if one +dumb undifferentiated feeling is the only reality, the +illusion of many events and the intuition of many +pictures could be grafted upon it. In the other +case experience increases its articulation to the extent +of becoming a chaos; and the sensitive psychology +that dips into these subterranean dreams needs, and +easily invents, guiding principles by which to classify +them. Especially it reverts to sexual and other animal +instincts, thus grafting literary psychology (which in +this field is called psycho-analysis) again on natural +substance and the life of animals, as scientific psychology +may report it.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This natural setting restores literary psychology +to its normal status; it is no longer a chimerical +<span class='pageno' id='Page_261'>261</span>metaphysics, but an imaginative version, like a historical +novel, of the animation that nature, in some particular +regions, may actually have possessed. The fineness +and complexity of mental discourse within us may +well be greater than we can easily remember or describe; +and there is piety as well as ingenuity in rescuing +some part of it from oblivion. But here, as elsewhere, +myth is at work. We make a romance of our incoherence, +and compose new unities in the effort to +disentangle those we are accustomed to, and find their +elements. Discourse is not a chemical compound; +its past formations are not embedded in its present +one. It is a life with much iteration in it, much +recapitulation, as well as much hopeless loss and +forgetfulness. As the loom shifts, or gets out of +order, the woof is recomposed or destroyed. It is a +living, a perpetual creation; and the very fatality +that forces me, in conceiving my own past or future, +or the animation of nature at large, to imagine that +object afresh, with my present vital resources and on +the scale and in the style of my present discourse—this +very fatality, I say, reveals to me the nature of +discourse everywhere, that it is poetry. But it is +poetry about facts, or means to be; and I need not +fear to be too eloquent in expressing my forgotten +sentiments, or the unknown sentiments of others. +Very likely those sentiments, when living, were more +eloquent than I am now.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_262'>262</span> + <h2 id='chap25' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='twenty-five'>XXV</abbr> <br> THE IMPLIED BEING OF TRUTH</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>From the beginning of discourse there is a subtle +reality posited which is not a thing: I mean the truth. +If intuition of essence exists anywhere without discourse, +the being of truth need not be posited there, +because intuition of itself is intransitive, and having +no object other than the datum, can be neither true +nor false. Every essence picked up by intuition is +equally real in its own sphere; and every degree of +articulation reached in intuition defines one of a +series of essences, each contained in or containing its +neighbour, and each equally central in that infinite +progression. The central one, for apprehension, is +the one that happens to appear at that moment. +Therefore in pure intuition there is no fear of picking +up the wrong thing, as if the object were a designated +existence in the natural world; and therefore the +being of truth is not broached in pure intuition.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Truth is not broached even in pure dialectic, +which is only the apprehension of a system of essences +so complex and finely articulated, perhaps, as to tax +human attention, or outrun it if unaided by some +artifice of notation, but essentially only an essence +like any other. Truth, therefore, is as irrelevant to +dialectic as to merely æsthetic intuition. Logic and +mathematics are not true inherently, however cogent +or extensive. They are ideal constructions based on +<span class='pageno' id='Page_263'>263</span>ideal axioms; and the question of truth or falsity +does not arise in respect to them unless the dialectic +is asserted to apply to the natural world, or perhaps +when a dispute comes up as to the precise essence +signified by some word, such as, for instance, infinity.</p> + +<p class='c005'>When men first invented language and other +symbols, or fixed in reflection the master-images of +their dreams and thoughts, it seemed to them that +they were discovering parts of nature, and that even +in those developments they must be either right or +wrong. There was a <i>true</i> name for every object, a +part of its nature. There was a <i>true</i> logic, and a <i>true</i> +ethics, and a <i>true</i> religion. Certainly in so far as +these mixed disciplines were assertions about alleged +facts, they were either right or wrong; but in so far +as they were systems of essences, woven together in +fancy to express the instincts of the mind, they were +only more or less expressive and fortunate and harmonious, +but not at all true or false. Dialectic, though +so fine-spun and sustained, is really a more primitive, +a more dream-like, exercise of intuition than are +animal faith and natural science. It is more spontaneous +and less responsible, less controlled by +secondary considerations, as poetry is in contrast with +prose. If only the animals had a language, or some +other fixed symbols to develop in thought, I should +be inclined to believe them the greatest of dialecticians +and the greatest of poets. But as they seem not to +speak, and there is no ground for supposing that they +rehearse their feelings reflectively in discourse, I will +suppose them to be very empty-headed when they +are not very busy; but I may be doing them an +injustice. In any case their dreams would not +suggest to them the being of truth; and even their +external experience may hardly do so.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It might seem, perhaps, that truth must be envisaged +even by the animals in action, when things +<span class='pageno' id='Page_264'>264</span>are posited; especially as uncertainty and change of +tactics and purpose are often visible in their attitudes. +Certainly truth is there, if the thing pursued is such +as the animal presumes it to be; and in searching +for it in the right quarter and finding it, he enacts a +true belief and a true perception, even if he does not +realise them spiritually. What he realises spiritually, +I suppose, is the pressure of the situation in which +he finds himself, and the changes in his object; but +that his belief from moment to moment was right or +wrong he probably never notices. Truth would then +not come within his purview, nor be distinguished +amongst his interests. He would want to be successful, +not to be right.</p> + +<p class='c005'>So in a man, intent experience, when not reflective, +need not disclose the being of truth. Sometimes, in +a vivid dream, objects suffer a transformation to +which I eagerly adapt myself, changing my feelings +and actions with complete confidence in the new +facts; and I never ask myself which view was true, +and which action appropriate. I live on in perfect +faith, never questioning the present circumstances as +they appear, nor do I follow my present policy with +less assurance than I did the opposite policy a moment +before. This happens to me in dreams; but politicians +do the same thing in real life, when the lives of nations +are at stake. In general I think that the impulse of +action is translated into a belief in changed things +long before it reproaches itself with having made any +error about them. The recognition of a truth to be +discerned may thus be avoided; because although a +belief in things must actually be either true or false, +it is directed upon the present existence and character +of these things, not upon its own truth. The active +object posited alone interests the man of action; if +he were interested in the rightness of the action, he +would not be a man of action but a philosopher. So +<span class='pageno' id='Page_265'>265</span>long as things continue to be perceived in one form +or another, and can be posited accordingly, the active +impulse is released, and the machine runs on prosperously +until some hitch comes, or some catastrophe. +It is then always the things that are supposed to have +changed, not the forms of folly. Even the most +pungent disappointment, as when a man loses a bet, +is not regarded otherwise than as a misfortune. It +is all the fault of the dice; they might and ought to +have turned up differently. This, I say to myself, is +an empirical world; all is novelty in it, and it is luck +and free will that are to blame. My bet was really +right when I made it; there was no error about the +future then, for I acted according to the future my +fancy painted, which was the only future there was. +My act was a creative act of vitality and courage; +but afterwards things accountably went wrong, and +betrayed their own promise.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I am confirmed in this surmise about the psychology +of action by the reasoning of empirical and romantic +philosophers, who cling to this instinctive attitude +and deny the being of truth. No substance exists, +according to their view, but only things as they seem +from moment to moment; so that it is idle to contrast +opinion with truth, seeing that there is nothing, not +even things, except in opinion. They can easily +extend this view to the future of opinion or of experience, +and maintain that the future does not exist +except in expectation; and at a pinch, although the +flesh may rebel against such heroic subjectivism, they +may say that the past, too, exists only in memory, +and that no other past can be thought of or talked +about; so that there is no truth, other than current +opinion, even about the past. If an opinion about +the past, they say, seems problematical when it stands +alone, we need but corroborate it by another opinion +about the past in order to make it true. In other +<span class='pageno' id='Page_266'>266</span>words, though the word truth is familiar to these +philosophers, the idea of it is unintelligible to them, +and absent altogether from their apprehension of the +world.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The experience which perhaps makes even the +empiricist awake to the being of truth, and brings it +home to any energetic man, is the experience of other +people lying. When I am falsely accused, or when +I am represented as thinking what I do not think, I +rebel against that contradiction to my evident self-knowledge; +and as the other man asserts that the +liar is myself, and a third person might very well +entertain that hypothesis and decide against me, I +learn that a report may fly in the face of the facts. +There is, I then see clearly, a comprehensive standard +description for every fact, which those who report it +as it happened repeat in part, whereas on the contrary +liars contradict it in some particular. And a little +further reflection may convince me that even the liar +must recognise the fact to some extent, else it would +not be <i>that</i> fact that he was misrepresenting; and also +that honest memory and belief, even when most unimpeachable, +are not exhaustive and not themselves +the standard for belief or for memory, since they are +now clearer and now vaguer, and subject to error and +correction. That standard comprehensive description +of any fact which neither I nor any man can ever +wholly repeat, is the truth about it.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The being of truth thus seems to be first clearly +posited in disputation; and a consequence of this +accident (for it is an accident from the point of view +of the truth itself under what circumstances men +most easily acknowledge its authority)—a consequence +is that truth is often felt to be somehow inseparable +from rival opinions; so that people say that if there +was no mind and consequently no error there could +be no truth. They mean, I suppose, that nothing +<span class='pageno' id='Page_267'>267</span>can be correct or incorrect except some proposition +or judgement regarding some specific fact; and that +the same constitution of the fact which renders one +description correct, renders any contradictory description +erroneous. “Truth” is often used in this +abstract sense for correctness, or the quality which +all correct judgements have in common; and another +word, perhaps “fact” or “reality,” would then have +to be used for that standard comprehensive description +of the object to which correct judgements conform. +But a fact is not a description of itself; and as to the +word “reality,” if it is understood to mean existence, +it too cannot designate a description, which is an +essence only. Facts are transitory, and any part of +existence to which a definite judgement is addressed +is transitory too; and when they have lapsed, it is +only their essence that subsists and that, being partially +recovered and assigned to them in a retrospective +judgement, can render this judgement true. Opinions +are true or false by repeating or contradicting some +part of the truth about the facts which they envisage; +and this truth about the facts is the standard comprehensive +description of them—something in the +realm of essence, but more than the essence of any +fact present within the limits of time and space which +that fact occupies; for a comprehensive description +includes also all the radiations of that fact—I mean, +all that perspective of the world of facts and of the +realm of essence which is obtained by taking this +fact as a centre and viewing everything else only in +relation with it. The truth about any fact is therefore +infinitely extended, although it grows thinner, so to +speak, as you travel from it to further and further +facts, or to less and less relevant ideas. It is the +splash any fact makes, or the penumbra it spreads, +by dropping through the realm of essence. Evidently +no opinion can embrace it all, or identify itself with it; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_268'>268</span>nor can it be identified with the facts to which it +relates, since they are in flux, and it is eternal.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The word truth ought, I think, to be reserved +for what everybody spontaneously means by it: the +standard comprehensive description of any fact in all +its relations. Truth is not an opinion, even an ideally +true one; because besides the limitation in scope +which human opinions, at least, can never escape, +even the most complete and accurate opinion would +give precedence to some terms, and have a direction +of survey; and this direction might be changed or +reversed without lapsing into error; so that the truth +is the field which various true opinions traverse in +various directions, and no opinion itself. An even +more impressive difference between truth and any +true discourse is that discourse is an event; it has a +date not that of its subject-matter, even if the subject-matter +be existential and roughly contemporary; and +in human beings it is conversant almost entirely with +the past only, whereas truth is dateless and absolutely +identical whether the opinions which seek to reproduce +it arise before or after the event which the truth +describes.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The eternity of truth is inherent in it: all truths—not +a few grand ones—are equally eternal. I am +sorry that the word eternal should necessarily have +an unction which prejudices dry minds against it, +and leads fools to use it without understanding. This +unction is not rhetorical, because the nature of truth +is really sublime, and its name ought to mark its +sublimity. Truth is one of the realities covered in +the eclectic religion of our fathers by the idea of God. +Awe very properly hangs about it, since it is the immovable +standard and silent witness of all our memories +and assertions; and the past and the future, which +in our anxious life are so differently interesting and +so differently dark, are one seamless garment for the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_269'>269</span>truth, shining like the sun. It is not necessary to +offer any evidence for this eternity of truth, because +truth is not an existence that asks to be believed in, +and that may be denied. It is an essence involved +in positing any fact, in remembering, expecting, or +asserting anything; and while no truth need be +acknowledged if no existence is believed in, and none +would obtain if there was no existence in fact, yet on +the hypothesis that anything exists, truth has appeared, +since this existence must have one character rather +than another, so that only one description of it in +terms of essence will be complete; and this complete +description, covering all its relations, will be the truth +about it. No one who understands what is meant by +this eternal being of truth can possibly deny it; so +that no argument is required to support it, but only +enough intensity of attention to express what we +already believe.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Inspired people, who are too hot to think, often +identify the truth with their own tenets, to signify by +a bold hyperbole how certain they feel in their faith; +but the effect is rather that they lead foolish people, +who may see that this faith may be false, to suppose +that therefore the truth may be false also. Eternal +truths, in the mouth of both parties, are then tenets +which the remotest ancestors of man are reputed to +have held, and which his remotest descendants are +forbidden to abandon. Of course there are no eternal +tenets: neither the opinions of men, nor mankind, +nor anything existent can be eternal; eternity is a +property of essences only. Even if all the spirits in +heaven and earth had been so far unanimous on any +point of doctrine, there is no reason, except the +monotony and inertia of nature, why their logic or +religion or morals should not change to-morrow from +top to bottom, if they all suddenly grew wiser or +differently foolish.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_270'>270</span>At the risk of being scholastic I will suggest the +uses to which the word eternal and the terms akin +to it might be confined if they were made exact.</p> + +<p class='c005'>A thing that occupied but one point of physical time +would be <i>instantaneous</i>. No essence is instantaneous, +because none occupies any part of physical time or +space; and I doubt whether any existence is instantaneous +either; for if the mathematicians decide that the +continuous or extended must be composed of an +infinite number of inextended and non-contiguous +units, in bowing to their authority I should retain a +suspicion that nothing actual is confined to any of +these units, but that the smallest event has duration +and contains an infinite number of such units; so +that one event (though not one instant) can be contiguous +to another.</p> + +<p class='c005'>A given essence containing no specious temporal +progression or perspective between its parts would be +<i>timeless</i>. Colour, for instance, or number, is timeless. +The timeless often requires to be abstracted from the +total datum, because round any essence as actually +given there is an atmosphere of duration and persistence, +suggesting the existential flux of nature behind the +essence. Colour seems to shine, that is, to vibrate. +Number seems to mount, and to be built up. The +timeless is therefore better illustrated in objects like +laws or equations or definitions, which though intent +on things in time, select relations amongst them +which are not temporal.</p> + +<p class='c005'>A being that should have no external temporal +relations and no locus in physical time would be +<i>dateless</i>. Thus every given essence and every specious +present is dateless, internally considered, and taken +transcendentally, that is, as a station for viewing other +things or a unit framing them in. Though dateless, +the specious present is not timeless, and an instant, +though timeless, is not dateless.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_271'>271</span>Whatsoever, having once arisen, never perishes, +would be <i>immortal</i>. I believe there is nothing immortal.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Whatsoever exists through a time infinite in both +directions is <i>everlasting</i>. Matter, time, the life of God, +souls as Plato conceived them, and the laws of nature +are commonly believed to be everlasting. In the +nature of the case this can be only a presumption.</p> + +<p class='c005'>That which without existing is contemporary with +all times is <i>eternal</i>. Truth is dateless and eternal, +but not timeless, because, being descriptive of existence, +it is a picture of change. It is frozen history. As +Plato said that time was a moving image of eternity, +we might say that eternity was a synthetic image of +time. But it is much more than that, because, besides +the description of all temporal things in their temporal +relations, it contains everything that is not temporal +at all; in other words, the whole realm of essence, +as well as the whole realm of truth.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_272'>272</span> + <h2 id='chap26' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='twenty-six'>XXVI</abbr> <br> DISCERNMENT OF SPIRIT</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Is the existence of spirit evident to spirit, and involved +in the presence of anything? Is its nature simple and +obvious? I think there is something of which this +may be said, but not of spirit; for by spirit I understand +not only the passive intuition implied in any +essences being given, but also the understanding and +belief that may greet their presence. Even passive +intuition is no datum; there is nothing evident except +the given essence itself. Yet, as I have seen above, +the mere prolongation of this presence, the recognition +of this essence as identical with itself, and the survey +of its elements in various orders, very soon impose +upon me a distinction between this essence and my +intuition of it. This intuition is a fact and an event, +as the essence cannot be; so that even if spirit meant +nothing but pure consciousness or the activity of a +transcendental ego, it would need to be posited, in +view of the felt continuity of discourse, and could +not be an element in the given essences. If spirit +were defined as the common quality of all appearances, +distinguishing them from the rest of the realm of +essence which does not appear, spirit would be reduced +to an appearance itself. It would be like light, something +seen, a luminousness in all objects, not what I +understand by it, which is the seeing; not the coloured +<span class='pageno' id='Page_273'>273</span>lights I may observe, but the exercise of sight as +distinguished from blindness.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The common quality of all appearances is not +spirit but mere Being; that simple and always obvious +element to which I referred just now as given in all +essences without distinction, and which some philosophers +and saints have found so unutterably precious. +This is all that is common to all possible appearances, +considered in themselves; but animal tension is not +altogether absent even in this abstruse contemplation, +and the sense that appearances are assaulting <i>me</i> thickens +my intuition of their essence into an apprehension of +existence, which existence, having no idea of myself, +I of course attribute to them, or to the abstract common +element in their essences, pure Being, which thus +becomes in my eyes absolute existence.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The present stimulus that awakens me out of my +material lethargy and keeps my attention more or less +taut is not spirit, although, of course, the birth of spirit +is involved in my awakening. That stimulus is the +strain and rumble of the universal flux, audible in my +little sea-shell. It preserves the same ground-tone +(that of a disturbance or a strain) no matter what +image it may bring forth, or even if it brings forth no +images but only a pervasive sense of swimming in +safety and bliss. This budding sentiment of existence +is a recognition not of spirit but of substance, of fact, +of force, of an unfathomable mystery.</p> + +<p class='c005'>By spirit I understand the light of discrimination +that marks in that pure Being differences of essence, +of time, of place, of value; a living light ready to fall +upon things, as they are spread out in their weight +and motion and variety, ready to be lighted up. +Spirit is a fountain of clearness, decidedly wind-blown +and spasmodic, and possessing at each moment +the natural and historical actuality of an event, not +the imputed or specious actuality of a datum. Spirit, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_274'>274</span>in a word, is no phenomenon, not sharing the æsthetic +sort of reality proper to essences when given, nor +that other sort proper to dynamic and material things; +its peculiar sort of reality is to be intelligence in act. +Spirit, or the intuitions in which it is realised, accordingly +forms a new realm of being, silently implicated +in the apparition of essences and in the felt +pressure of nature, but requiring the existence of +nature to create it, and to call up those essences before +it. By spirit essences are transposed into appearances +and things into objects of belief; and (as if to compensate +them for that derogation from their native +status) they are raised to a strange actuality in thought—a +moral actuality which in their logical being or +their material flux they had never aspired to have: +like those rustics and servants at an inn whom a +travelling poet may take note of and afterwards, to +their astonishment, may put upon the stage with +applause.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It is implied in these words, when taken as they +are meant, that spirit is not a reality that can be +observed; it does not figure among the <span lang="la"><i>dramatis +personæ</i></span> of the play it witnesses. As the author, +nature, and the actors, things, do not emerge from +the prompter’s box, or remove their make-up so as +to exhibit themselves to me in their unvarnished +persons, but are satisfied that I should know them only +as artists (and I for my part am perfectly willing to +stop there in my acquaintance with them); so the +spirit in me which their art serves is content not to +be put on the stage; that would be far from being a +greater honour, or expressing a truer reality, than that +which belongs to it as spectator, virtually addressed +and consulted and required in everything that the +theatre contrives. Spirit can never be observed as an +essence is observed, nor encountered as a thing is +encountered. It must be enacted; and the essence +<span class='pageno' id='Page_275'>275</span>of it (for of course it has an essence) can be described +only circumstantially, and suggested pregnantly. It +is actualised in actualising something else, an image +or a feeling or an intent or a belief; and it can be +discovered only by implication in all discourse, when +discourse itself has been posited. The witnesses to +the existence of spirit are therefore the same as those +to the existence of discourse; but when once discourse +is admitted, the existence of spirit in it becomes +self-evident; because discourse is a perusal of essence, +or its recurring presence to spirit.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Now in discourse there is more than passive intuition; +there is intent. This element also implies +spirit, and in spirit as man possesses it intent or intelligence +is almost always the dominant element. +For this reason I shall find it impossible, when I come +to consider the realm of spirit, to identify spirit with +simple awareness, or with consciousness in the abstract +sense of this abused word. Pure awareness or consciousness +suffices to exemplify spirit; and there may +be cold spirits somewhere that have merely that +function; but it is not the only function that only +spirits could perform; and the human spirit, having +intent, expectation, belief, and eagerness, runs much +thicker than that. Spirit is a category, not an individual +being: and just as the realm of essence +contains an infinite number of essences, each different +from the rest, and each nothing but an essence, so +the realm of spirit may contain any number of forms +of spirit, each nothing but a spiritual fact. Spirit is +a fruition, and there are naturally as many qualities +of fruition as there are fruits to ripen. Spirit is +accordingly qualified by the types of life it actualises, +and is individuated by the occasions on which it +actualises them. Each occasion generates an intuition +numerically distinct, and brings to light an essence +qualitatively different.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_276'>276</span>Let me suppose, by way of illustration, that there +was a disembodied spirit addressed to the realm of +truth in general, and seeing all things under the form +of eternity. This would be a very special kind of +spirit, and many an essence would be excluded from +its intuition; for instance, the essence of surprise. +No doubt it would congratulate itself on this incapacity, +and say with Aristotle that there are things it is better +not to know than to know, at least by experience. +The essence of surprise involves ignorance of the +future, and it could never be realised, or known by +intuition, in a spirit to whom the future had always +been known: and to know surprise by experience is +the only way of knowing its essence. It might indeed +be known by description, and defined as a feeling which +animals have when they expect one thing and find +another. Such a description may suggest the essence +of surprise to me, who know by intuition what it is to +expect and to find; but it would never suggest that +essence to a spirit that had only descriptions to go by, +and who could reach a conception of “expecting” +and of “finding” only in symbols that translated their +transitive natures into synthetic pictures. Thus the +essence of surprise would remain for ever excluded +from intuition in a spirit that saw all things under the +form of eternity.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The occasions on which spirit arises in man are +the vicissitudes of his animal life: that is why spirit +in him runs so thick. In intent, in belief, in emotion +a given essence takes on a value which to pure spirit +it could not have. The essence then symbolises an +object to which the animal is tentatively addressed, or +an event through which he has just laboured, or which +he is preparing to meet. This attitude of the animal +may be confined to inner readjustments in the psyche, +not open to gross external observation; yet it may +all the more directly be raised to consciousness in the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_277'>277</span>form of attention, expectation, deliberation, memory, +or desire. These sentiments form a moving but +habitual background for any particular essence considered; +they frame it in, not only pictorially in a +sensuous perspective, but morally, by its ulterior +suggestions, and by the way in which, in surveying +the whole field of intuition, that particular feature in +it is approached or attacked or rejected. In such +settings given essences acquire their felt meanings; +and if they should be uprooted from that soil and +exhibited in isolation, they would no longer mean +the same thing to the spirit. Like a note in a melody, +or a word in a sentence, they appeared in a field of +essence greater than they; they were never more +than a term or a feature within it. For this reason +I imagine that I see things and not essences; the +essences I see incidentally are embedded in the +voluminous ever-present essences of the past, the +world, myself, the future; master-presences which +express attitudes of mine appropriate not to an essence—which +is given—but to a thing—which though not +given enlists all my conviction and concern.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Thus intelligence in man, being the spiritual +transcript of an animal life, is transitional and impassioned. +It approaches its objects by a massive +attack, groping for them and tentatively spying them +before it discovers them unmistakably. It is energetic +and creative, in the sense of slowly focussing its +object within the field of intuition in the midst of felt +currents with a felt direction, themselves the running +expression of animal endeavours. All this intuition +of turbulence and vitality, which a cold immortal +spirit could never know, fills the spirit of man, and +renders any contemplation of essences in their own +realm only an interlude for him or a sublimation or +an incapacity. It also renders him more conscious +than a purer spirit would be of his own spirit. For +<span class='pageno' id='Page_278'>278</span>just as I was able to find evidence of intuition in +discourse, which in the motionless vision of essence +would have eluded me, so in intent, expectation, belief, +and emotion, the being of my thoughts rises up and +almost hides the vision of my object. Although I +myself am a substance in flux, on the same level as +the material thing that confronts me, the essences +that reveal my own being are dramatic and moral, +whereas those that express the thing are sensuous; and +these dramatic and moral essences, although their +presence involves spirit exactly in the same way, and +no more deeply, than the presence of the sensuous +essences does, yet seem to suggest its presence more +directly and more voluminously.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Hence the popular identification of spirit with the +heart, the breath, the blood, or the brain; and the +notion that my substantial self and the spirit within +me are identical. In fact, they are the opposite poles +of my being, and I am neither the one nor the other +exclusively. If I am spiritually proud and choose to +identify myself with the spirit, I shall be compelled +to regard my earthly person and my human thoughts +as the most alien and the sorriest of accidents; and +my surprise and mortification will never cease at the +way in which my body and its world monopolise my +attention. If on the contrary I modestly plead guilty +to being the biped that I seem, I shall be obliged to +take the spirit within me for a divine stranger, in +whose heaven it is not given me to live, but who +miraculously walks in my garden in the cool of the +evening. Yet in reality, incarnation is no anomaly, +and the spirit is no intruder. It is as much at home +in any animal as in any heaven. In me, it takes my +point of view; it is the voice of my humanity; and +what other mansions it may have need not trouble me. +Each will provide a suitable shrine for its resident +deity and its native oracle. It is a prejudice to suppose +<span class='pageno' id='Page_279'>279</span>that spirit is contaminated by the flesh; it is generated +there; and the more varied its instruments and +sources are, the more copiously it will be manifested, +and the more unmistakably.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Spiritual minds are the first to recognise the +empire of the flesh over the spirit in the senses, the +passions, and even in a too vivid imagination; and +they call these influences the snares of the adversary. +I think they are right in condemning as vain or carnal +any impulses which would disrupt the health of the +soul, either directly in the individual body, or indirectly +by loosening such bonds with society as are +requisite for human happiness. I also think, however, +that moralists of this type overlook two considerations +of the greatest moment, by which all the metaphysical +background of their maxims is removed, and what is +reasonable in them is put on a naturalistic basis. +One consideration is that, on a small scale and in its +own key, every impulse in man or beast bears its +little flame of spirit. How much longing, how much +laughter, how much perception, how much policy and +art in those vices and crimes which the moralist +thinks fatal to spirit! They may render a finer thing +impossible (which the moralist should bethink himself +to depict more attractively), but in themselves they are +full of life and light. For this reason crimes and +vices, together with horrible adventures and the pomps +and vanities of this wicked world, are the chosen +theme of novelists and playwrights; and the poor +public, having hardly any other intellectual pleasure, +gloats on these fictions, as an imaginative escape from +the moral penury not only of their work, but of their +religion. The poets are far more genuine lovers of +spirit in this than their mentors, whose official morality +is probably quite worldly, and insensible to any +actually spiritual achievement, because such achievements +are necessarily fugitive, invisible, and un-productive. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_280'>280</span>The devil was an angel essentially; it +was only in the complicated politics of this world +that he missed his way, and became an enemy of the +highest good.</p> + +<p class='c005'>The other consideration that is overlooked is that +the spirit which may discern this highest good is +itself a natural passion, and not less an expression of +the flesh—though more justly and broadly—than the +random impulses it condemns. Consider, for instance, +the earnestness with which evil is condemned. If +this evil is pain, the objection to it could not be more +instinctive. Why should pure spirit detest pain? A +material accident in the body here absorbs my attention, +and strangely persuades me to be utterly rebellious +and impatient at being so absorbed. The psyche, or +the principle of bodily life, is somehow striving against +the event or stimulus which produced the pain (a +perfectly harmless essence to contemplate in itself), +because the psyche is congenitally a system or cycle +of habits which that obnoxious event interrupts. It +is this material pressure and effort not to be stifled +or rent in any of her operations that the psyche imposes +on the spirit, commanding it to pronounce it a terrible +evil that she should be rent or stifled. These strange +and irrational pronouncements of spirit, calling events +good or evil, are accordingly grounded on nothing +but on a creeping or shrinking of the flesh. If the +evil is moral—the eventual defeat of some ideal I +cherish for myself, my children, or my country—what +has fixed this ideal, or declared it to be a good? +Suppose this ideal is a life glorious and unending; is +it not obvious that nothing but the momentum of +life, already accidentally working in myself, my +children, or my country, could possibly demand life +or determine what forms of life would be glorious +for us? I will not pursue this topic: if the reader +does not understand, he probably never will.</p> + +<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_281'>281</span>Let me turn to the most intellectual powers of +spirit—attention, synthesis, perception. These too +are voices loudly issuing from the heart of material +existence, and proclaiming their origin there not only +by their occasions and external connections, but by +their inmost moral nature. Why does the spirit stop +to collect or to recollect anything? Why not range +undisturbed and untrammelled over image after image, +without referring one to another or attempting (always +in vain) to preserve the design of vanished images, or +the order of their appearance, even through the lapse +of the sensible elements that filled them in? Because +the animal is forming habits. The psyche is plastic; +no impression can endure unchanged, as if it had been +a substantial little thing in itself, and not a mode, a +ripple, in an inherited, transmissible, ever rejuvenated +substance. Scarcely is the impression received, but +it merges in the general sensitiveness or responsiveness +of the organ affected, modifying its previous way of +reacting on some natural object, an object reported +not by that impression alone, but by many others: +so that the synthetic unity of apperception (that most +radical of transcendental principles) obeys a compulsion +peculiar to animal economy, which no pure spirit +would need to share, the compulsion to use things as +materials, to drop them and forge ahead, or to eat +and to digest them: for the drinking in of light +through the eyes, or of currents from other organs, +thereby rearranging the habits of the nervous system, +is very like the consumption of food, restoring the +vegetative functions. Synthesis in thought, correlation, +scope, or (as the phrase is) taking things in, is laborious +piety on the spirit’s part in subservience to the flesh. +It is the mental fruit of training, of care: an inner +possession rewarding an outer fidelity.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Pure spirit would never need to <i>apperceive</i> at all; +this is an animal exigency that distracts it from +<span class='pageno' id='Page_282'>282</span>intuition. There is unity in intuition too, of a nebulous +sort, as there must be unity in the universe, since it is +all there is, however loose its structure or unmarked +its limits. Yet in intuition, as in cloud-land, the field +is in the act of changing pervasively; every part +shifts more or less. Any feature you may distinguish +fades and refashions itself irresponsibly; and pure +spirit would be perfectly content that it should do so. +Perhaps, if it was a young spirit, it would positively +whip up the hoop, or blow and distend the bubble, +for the fun of seeing it run or burst more gloriously; +and it would be happy to think there was no harm +done, and nothing left over. The scene would then +be cleared for something utterly fresh. The synthetic +unity of apperception is something imposed by things +on animals, when these things exercise a seductive +charm or threaten mischief. Attention cries halt, it +reconnoitres, it takes note, it throws a lassoo over +the horses of Poseidon, lord of the flux. And why? +Because the organs of spirit are structures; they are +mechanisms instituted in nature to keep doing certain +things, roughly appropriate to the environment, itself +roughly constant. It is to this approximate fixity of +function and habit that spirit owes its distinct ideas, +the names it gives to things, and its faith in things, +which is a true revelation of their existence—knowledge +of them stored for use.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Perception, too, would be a miracle and an impossibility +to a spirit conceived as alien to matter. +Perception is a stretching forth of intent beyond +intuition; it is an exercise of intelligence. Intelligence, +the most ideal function of spirit, is precisely its point +of closest intimacy with matter, of most evident subservience +to material modes of being. The life of +matter (at least on the human scale, if not at every +depth) is a flux, a passage from this to that, almost +forbidding anything to be simply itself, by immediately +<span class='pageno' id='Page_283'>283</span>turning it, in some respect, into something different. +If the psyche were a closed round of motions, the +spirit it generated (if it generated spirit at all) would +certainly not be perceptive or cognitive, but in some +way emotional or musical—the music of those spheres. +But the round of motions which the psyche is actually +wound up to make must be executed in a changeful +and precarious environment, not to speak of changes +in her own substance. She must hunt, fight, find a +mate, protect the offspring, defend the den and +the treasure. Perception, intelligence, knowledge +accurately transcribe this mode of being, profoundly +alien to repose in intuition or to drifting reverie. +Perception points to what it does not, save by pointing, +know to exist; knowledge is only of the past or the +future, both of which are absent; and intelligence +talks and talks to an interlocutor—the mind of another +man or god or an eventual self of one’s own—whom +it can never see and whose replies, conveyed (if at all) +through material channels, it is never sure exist +morally, or could be understood if they did exist. +There is no dilemma in the choice between animal +faith and reason, because reason is only a form of +animal faith, and utterly unintelligible dialectically, +although full of a pleasant alacrity and confidence, +like the chirping of birds. The suasion of sanity is +physical: if you cut your animal traces, you run mad.</p> + +<p class='c005'>It is impossible to say everything at once, and I +have been contrasting intelligence with intuition, as if +intuition were less subject than intelligence to physical +inspiration, or had an independent source. This is +not the case; intuition is itself pathetically animal. +Why should I have awaked at all? Can anything, +inwardly considered, be more gratuitous than consciousness? +I am afraid I must be constituted +differently from other people, at least in the reflective +faculty, because it astonishes me to hear so many +<span class='pageno' id='Page_284'>284</span>philosophers talking of spirit as if its existence explained +itself, and denying the possibility of matter; +whereas to me it seems credible, though certainly +unnecessary <span lang="la"><i>a priori</i></span>, that matter should exist without +being consulted, for it cannot help itself, suffers +nothing, and has no reason to protest; and its existence +is antecedently just as plausible as its non-existence. +But the existence of spirit really demands an explanation; +it is a tremendous paradox to itself, not to say +a crying scandal—I mean from a scientific or logical +point of view, because treated as a family secret the +scandal is often delicious, and privately it is in this +festive and poetic medium that I love to dwell. Spirit, +since it <i>can</i> ask how it came to exist, has a right to +put the question and to look for an answer. And it +may perhaps find an answer of a sort, although not +one which spirit, in all its moods, will think satisfactory.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Fact can never be explained, since only another +fact could explain it: therefore the existence of a +universe rather than no universe, or of one sort of +universe rather than another, must be accepted without +demur. In this very irrationality or contingency of +existence, which is inevitable in any case, I find a +clue to the strange presence of spirit in this world. +Spirit, the wakefulness of attention, could not have +arisen of its own accord; it contains no bias, no +principle of choice, but is an impartial readiness to +know. It never could have preferred one thing to +another, nor preferred existence for itself to nonexistence, +nor <i>vice versa</i>. Attention is not a principle +that can select the themes that shall attract attention: +to select them it must already have thought of them. +As far as its own nature is concerned, attention is +equally ready to fall on the just and on the unjust; +spirit is equally ready to speak any language, to quicken +any body, and to adopt any interest. An instance of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_285'>285</span>spirit cannot be determined by spirit itself either in +its occasion, its intensity, or the æsthetic character +of the essence presented to it. Chance, matter, fate—some +non-spiritual principle or other—must have +determined what the spirit in me shall behold, and +what it shall endure. Some internal fatality, their +own brute existence and wilfulness, must be responsible +for the fact that things are as they are, and not otherwise. +If any instance of spirit was to arise anywhere, +the ground of it (if I speak of grounds at all) must +have been irrational. Spirit has the innocence of a +child; it pleads not guilty; at most it has become, +without knowing how, an accomplice after the fact. +It is astonished at everything. It is essentially, +wherever it may be found, unsubstantial and expressive; +it is essentially secondary. Even if in fact +some instance of spirit, some isolated intuition, sprang +miraculously into being in an absolute void, and +nothing else had ever existed or would exist, yet +logically and in its own eyes that intuition would be +secondary, since no principle internal to spirit, but +only brute chance, would be expressed in the existence +of that intuition, and in the arbitrary choice of the +essence that happened to appear there. Spirit is +therefore of its very nature and by its own confession +the voice of something else: it speaks not of itself, +but of the Father that sent it. I am accordingly +prepared to find some arbitrary world or other in +existence; and since this arbitrary world obviously +has spirit in it, my problem is reduced to inquiring +what features, in this arbitrary existing world, can +have called spirit forth, and made it their living witness.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I postpone the detail of this inquiry, but I have +already indicated how the life of nature is expressed +in the chief phases of spirit. Wakefulness, common +to all these phases, is itself a witness to animal unrest, +appetition, alarm, concern, preparation. It would be +<span class='pageno' id='Page_286'>286</span>inane, as well as impossible, for me to open my eyes, +if in looking I did not identify my spirit with my +material person in its material predicaments, raising +to an actual hypostasis in consciousness its material +sensitiveness to outlying things. Electric influences +issuing from these allow my organs to adjust themselves +before grosser contact occurs; and then intuition is a +premonition of material fusion. Organic systems +about to collide send forth this conscious cry or +salutation. The current established may prevent a +ruder shock, or may precipitate it, according to the +prepared instinct of the receivers. The intuition +expresses the initial fusion involved in the distant +response, as if a ghostly messenger of oncoming +things had rushed like a forerunner into the audience +chamber, announcing their arrival. It is only messengers +that reach the spirit, even in the thick of the +fray; but by lending credence to their hot reports, it +can live through the battle, lost in its mists and passions, +and thinking itself to give and to receive the blows.</p> + +<p class='c005'>For a man, and especially for a philosopher, to +suggest that spirit does not exist may accordingly pass +for a delicious absurdity, and the best of unconscious +comedy. If it had been some angel that denied it, +because in his serenity and selflessness he could not +discover that he was alive, we might regard the denial +of spirit as the highest proof of spirituality: but in a +material creature struggling to see and to think, and +tossed from one illusion and passion to another, such +a denial seems not only stupid, but ungracious; for +a man ought to be very proud of this dubious spark +in his embers, and nurse it more tenderly than the +life of a frail child. Nevertheless I think that those +who deny the existence of spirit, although their +language is rash and barbarous, are honestly facing +the facts, and are on the trail of a truth. Spirit is +too near them for them to stop at it in their eagerness +<span class='pageno' id='Page_287'>287</span>to count their visible possessions; and when they +hear the word used, it irritates them, because they +suppose it means some sort of magical power or +metaphysical caloric, alleged to keep bodies alive, +and to impose purposes on nature; purposes which +such a prior spirit, being supernatural and immortal, +could have had no reason for choosing. Such a +dynamic spirit would indeed be nothing but an immaterial +matter, a second physical substance distinguished +from its grosser partner only in that we +know nothing of it, but assign to its operation all +those results which seem to us inexplicable. Belief +in such a spirit is simply belief in magic; innocent +enough at first when it is merely verbal and childish, +but becoming perverse when defended after it has +ceased to be spontaneous. I am not concerned with +spirit of that sort, nor with any kind of nether influences. +The investigation of substance and of the +laws of events is the province of physics, and I call +everything that science may discover in that direction +physical and not spiritual. Even if the substance of +things should be sentiency, or a bevy of souls, or a +single intense Absolute, it would be nothing but +matter to what I call spirit. It would exercise only +material functions in kindling the flame of actual +intuition, and bearing my light thoughts like bubbles +upon its infinite flood. I do not know what matter +is in itself: but what metaphysical idealists call spirit, +if it is understood to be responsible for what goes on +in the world and in myself, and to be the “reality” +of these appearances, is, in respect to my spiritual +existence, precisely what I call matter; and I find +the description of this matter which the natural +sciences supply much more interesting than that given +by the idealists, much more beautiful, and much more +likely to be true. That there is no spirit in the +interstices of matter, where the magicians look for it, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_288'>288</span>nor at the heart of matter, where many metaphysicians +would place it, needs no proof to one who understands +what spirit is; because spirit is in another realm of +being altogether, and needs the being and movement +of matter, by its large sweeping harmonies, to generate +it, and give it wings. It would be a pity to abandon +this consecrated word to those who are grubbing for +the atoms of substance, or speculating about a logic +in history, or tabulating the capers of ghosts; especially +as there is the light of intuition, the principle of +actuality in vision and feeling, to call by that name. +The popular uses of the word spiritual support this +definition of it; because intuition, when it thoroughly +dominates animal experience, transmutes it into pure +flame, and renders it religious or poetical, which is +what is commonly meant by spiritual.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_289'>289</span> + <h2 id='chap27' class='c006'>CHAPTER <abbr title='twenty-seven'>XXVII</abbr> <br> COMPARISON WITH OTHER CRITICISMS OF KNOWLEDGE</h2> +</div> +<p class='c007'>Descartes was the first to begin a system of philosophy +with universal doubt, intended to be only provisional +and methodical; but his mind was not plastic nor +mystical enough to be profoundly sceptical, even +histrionically. He could doubt any particular fact +easily, with the shrewdness of a man of science who +was also a man of the world; but this doubt was only +a more penetrating use of intelligence, a sense that +the alleged fact might be explained away. Descartes +could not lend himself to the disintegration of reason, +and never doubted his principles of explanation. For +instance, in order to raise a doubt about the applicability +of mathematics to existence (for their place in +the realm of essence would remain the same in any +case) he suggested that a malign demon might have +been the adequate cause of our inability to doubt that +science. He thus assumed the principle of sufficient +reason, a principle for which there is no reason at all. +If any idea or axiom were really <span lang="la"><i>a priori</i></span> or spontaneous +in the human mind, it would be infinitely improbable +that it should apply to the facts of nature. Every +genius, in this respect, is his own malign demon. +Nor was this the worst; for Descartes was not content +to assume that reason governs the world—a notion +scandalously contrary to fact, and at bottom contrary +to reason itself, which is but the grammar of human +<span class='pageno' id='Page_290'>290</span>discourse and aspiration linking mere essences. He +set accidental limits to his scepticism even about +facts. “I think, therefore I am,” if taken as an +inference is sound because analytical, only repeating +in the conclusion, for the sake of emphasis, something +assumed in the premise. If taken as an attestation +of fact, as I suppose it was meant, it is honest and +richly indicative, all its terms being heavy with empirical +connotations. What is “thinking,” what is “I,” +what is “therefore,” and what is “existence”? If +there were no existence there would certainly be no +persons and no thinking, and it may be doubted (as +I have indicated above) that anything exists at all. +That any being exists that may be called “I,” so +that I am not a mere essence, is a thousand times +more doubtful, and is often denied by the keenest +wits. The persuasion that in saying “I am” I have +reached an indubitable fact, can only excite a smile +in the genuine sceptic. No <i>fact</i> is self-evident; and +what sort of fact is this “I,” and in what sense do I +“exist”? Existence does not belong to a mere +datum, nor am I a datum to myself; I am a somewhat +remote and extremely obscure object of belief. Doubtless +what I <i>mean</i> by myself is an existence and even +a substance; but the rudimentary phantoms that +suggest that object, or that suggest the existence of +anything, need to be trusted and followed out by a +laborious empirical exploration, before I can make +out at all what they signify. Variation alleged, strain +endured, persistence assumed—notions which when +taken on faith lead to the assertion of existence and of +substance, if they remained merely notions would +prove nothing, disclose nothing, and assert nothing. +Yet such, I suppose, are the notions actually before +me when I say “I am.” As to myself, when I proceed +to distinguish that object in the midst of the moving +world, I am roughly my body, or more accurately, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_291'>291</span>its living centre, master of its organs and seat of its +passions; and this inner life of the body, I suspect, +was the rock of vulgar belief which Descartes found +at hand, easy to mount on, after his not very serious +shipwreck. And the rock was well chosen; not +because the existence of my inner man is a simpler or +a surer fact than any other; to a true sceptic this +alleged being so busily thinking and willing and +fuming within my body is but a strange feature in +the fantastic world that appears for the moment. Yet +the choice of the inner man as the one certain existence +was a happy one, because this sense of life within me +is more constant than other perceptions, and not +wholly to be shaken off except in profound contemplation +or in some strange forms of madness. It was a +suitable first postulate for the romantic psychologist. +On this stepping-stone to idealism the father of +modern philosophy, like another Columbus, set his +foot with elegance. His new world, however, would +be but an unexplored islet in the world of the ancients +if all he discovered was himself thinking.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Thinking is another name for discourse; and +perhaps Descartes, in noting his own existence, was +really less interested in the substance of himself, or +in the fact that he was alive, than in the play of terms +in discourse, which seemed to him obvious. Discourse +truly involves spirit, with its intuition and +intent, surveying those terms. And the definition of +the soul, that its essence is to think, being a definition +of spirit and not of a man’s self, supports this interpretation. +But discourse, no less than the existence +of a self, needs to be posited, and the readiness with +which a philosopher may do so yields only a candid +confession of personal credulity, not the proof of +anything. The assumption that spirit discoursing +exists, and is more evident than any other existence, +leads by a slightly different path to the same conclusion +<span class='pageno' id='Page_292'>292</span>as the assumption of the self as the fundamental fact. +In the one case discourse will soon swallow up all +existence, and in the other this chosen existence, +myself, will evaporate into discourse: but it will +remain an insoluble problem whether I am a transcendental +spirit, not a substance, holding the whole +imaginary universe in the frame of my thought, or +whether I am an instance of thinking, a phase of that +flux of sentience which will then be the substance of +the world. It is only if we interpret and develop +the Cartesian axiom in the former transcendental +sense that it supplies an instrument for criticism. +Understood in an empirical way, as the confident +indication of a particular fact, it is merely a chance +dogma, betraying the psychological bias of reflection +in modern man, and suggesting a fantastic theory of +the universe, conveniently called psychologism; a +theory which fuses the two disparate substances +posited by Descartes, and maintains that while the +inner essence of substance everywhere is to think, or +at least to feel, its distribution, movement, and aspect, +seen from without, are those of matter.</p> + +<p class='c005'>In adopting the method of Descartes, I have sought +to carry it further, suspending all conventional categories +as well as all conventional beliefs; so that not +only the material world but all facts and all existences +have lost their status, and become simply the themes +or topics which intrinsically they are. Neither myself +nor pure spirit is at all more real in that realm of +essence than any other mentionable thing. When it +comes to assertion (which is belief) I follow Descartes +in choosing discourse and (as an implication of discourse) +my substantial existence as the objects of +faith least open to reasonable doubt; not because +they are the first objects asserted, nor because intrinsically +they lend themselves to existence better than +anything else, but simply because in taking note of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_293'>293</span>anything whatever I find that I am assuming the +validity of primary memory; in other words, that +the method and the fact of observation are adventitious +to the theme. But the fact that observation is +involved in observing anything does not imply that +observation is the only observed fact: yet in this gross +sophism and insincerity the rest of psychologism is +entangled.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Hume and Kant seemed sceptics in their day and +were certainly great enemies of common sense, not +through any perversity of temper (for both were men +of wise judgement) but through sophistical scruples +and criticism halting at unfortunate places. They +disintegrated belief on particular points of scholastic +philosophy, which was but common sense applied to +revelation; and they made no attempt to build on +the foundations so laid bare, but rather to comfort +themselves with the assurance that what survived was +practically sufficient, and far simpler, sounder, and +purer than what they had demolished. After the +manner of the eighteenth century, they felt that +convention was a burden and an imposture, not +because here and there it misinterpreted nature, but +because it interpreted or defined nature at all; and +in their criticism they ran for a fall. They had +nothing to offer in the place of what they criticised, +except the same cheque dishonoured. All their philosophy, +where it was not simply a collapse into living +without philosophy, was retrenchment; and they +retrenched in that hand-to-mouth fashion which +Protestantism had introduced and which liberalism +was to follow. They never touched bottom, and +nothing could be more gratuitous or more helpless +than their residual dogmas. These consisted in making +metaphysics out of literary psychology; not seeing +that the discourse or experience to which they appealed +was a social convention, roughly dramatising those +<span class='pageno' id='Page_294'>294</span>very facts of the material world, and of animal life +in it, which their criticism had denied.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Hume seems to have assumed that every perception +perceived itself. He assumed further that these perceptions +lay in time and formed certain sequences. +Why a given perception belonged to one sequence +rather than to another, and why all simultaneous +perceptions were not in the same mind, he never +considered; the questions were unanswerable, so long +as he ignored or denied the existence of bodies. He +asserted also that these perceptions were repeated, +and that the repetitions were always fainter than the +originals—two groundless assertions, unless the transitive +force of memory is admitted, and impressions +are distinguished from ideas externally, by calling an +intuition an impression when caused by a present +object, visible to a third person, and calling it an idea +when not so caused. Furthermore, he invoked an +alleged habit of perceptions always to follow one +another in the same order—something flatly contrary +to fact; but the notion was made plausible by confusion +with the habits of the physical world, where similar +events recur when the conditions are similar. Intuitions +no doubt follow the same routine; but the +conditions for an intuition are not the previous +intuitions, but the whole present state of the psyche +and of the environment, something of which the +previous intuitions were at best prophetic symptoms, +symptoms often falsified by the event.</p> + +<p class='c005'>All these haltings and incoherences arose in the +attempt to conceive experience divorced from its +physical ground and from its natural objects, as a +dream going on <span lang="la"><i>in vacuo</i></span>. So artificial an abstraction, +however, is hard to maintain consistently, and Hume, +by a happy exercise of worldly wit, often described +the workings of the mind as our social imagination +leads us all vaguely to conceive them. In these +<span class='pageno' id='Page_295'>295</span>inspired moments he made those acute analyses of +our notions of material things, of the soul, and of cause, +which have given him his name as a sceptic. These +analyses are bits of plausible literary psychology, +essays on the origin of common sense. They are +not accounts of what the notions analysed mean, much +less scientific judgements of their truth. They are +supposed, however, by Hume and by the whole +modern school of idealists, to destroy both the meaning +of these notions and the existence of their intended +objects. Having explained how, perhaps, early man, +or a hypothetical infant, might have reached his first +glimmerings of knowledge that material things exist, +or souls, or causes, we are supposed to have proved +that no causes, no souls, and no material things can +exist at all. We are not allowed to ask how, in that +case, we have any evidence for the existence of early +man, or of the hypothetical infant, or of any general +characteristics of the human mind, and its tendencies +to feign. The world of literature is sacred to these +bookish minds; only the world of nature and science +arouses their suspicion and their dislike. They think +that “experience,” with the habits of thought and +language prevalent in all nations, from Adam down, +needs only to be imagined in order to be known truly. +All but this imagined experience seems to them the +work of imagination. While their method of criticism +ought evidently to establish not merely solipsism, but +a sort of solipsism of the present datum, yet they +never stop to doubt the whole comedy of human +intercourse, just as the most uncritical instinct and +the most fanciful history represent it to be. How can +such a mass of ill-attested and boldly dogmatic assumptions +fail to make the critics of science uncomfortable +in their own house? Is it because the criticism of +dogma in physics, without this dogma in psychology, +could never so much as begin? Is not their criticism +<span class='pageno' id='Page_296'>296</span>at bottom a work of edification or of malice, not of +philosophic sincerity, so that they reject the claim to +knowledge only in respect to certain physical, metaphysical, +or religious objects which the modern mind +has become suspicious of, and hopes to feel freer +without? Meantime, they keep their conventional +social assumptions without a qualm, because they +need them to justify their moral precepts and to lend +a false air of adequacy to their view of the world. +Thus we are invited to believe that our notions of +material things do not mean what they assert, but +being illusions in their deliverance, really signify only +the series of perceptions that have preceded them, or +that, for some unfathomable reason, may be expected +to ensue.</p> + +<p class='c005'>All this is sheer sophistry, and limping scepticism. +Certainly the vulgar notions of nature, and even the +scientific ones, are most questionable; and they may +have grown up in the way these critics suggest; in +any case they have grown up humanly. But they +are not mere images; they are beliefs; and the truth +of beliefs hangs on what they assert, not on their +origin. The question is whether such an object as +they describe lies in fact in the quarter where they +assert it to lie; the genealogy of these assertions in +the mind of the believer, though interesting, is irrelevant. +<i>It is for science and further investigation of +the object to pronounce on the truth of any belief.</i> It +will remain a mere belief to the end, no matter how +much corroborated and corrected; but the fact that +it is a belief, far from proving that it must be false, +renders it possibly true, as it could not be if it asserted +nothing and had no object beyond itself which it +pointed to and professed to describe. This whole +school criticises knowledge, not by extending knowledge +and testing it further, but by reviewing it maliciously, +on the tacit assumption that knowledge is impossible. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_297'>297</span>But in that case this review of knowledge and all this +shrewd psychology are themselves worthless; and we +are reduced, as Hume was in his deeper moments of +insight, to a speechless wonder. So that whilst all +the animals trust their senses and live, philosophy +would persuade man alone not to trust them and, if +he was consistent, to stop living.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This tragic conclusion might not have daunted a +true philosopher, if like the Indians he had reached +it by a massive moral experience rather than by +incidental sophistries with no hold on the spirit. In +that case the impossibility of knowledge would have +seemed but one illustration of the vanity of life in +general. That all is vanity was a theme sometimes +developed by Christian preachers, and even in some +late books of the Bible, with special reservations; but +it is an insight contrary to Hebraic religion, which +invokes supernatural or moral agencies only in the +hope of securing earthly life and prosperity for ever. +The wisdom demanded could, therefore, not be negative +or merely liberating; and scepticism in Christian +climes has always seemed demoralising. When it +forced itself on the reluctant mind, people either +dismissed it as a game not worth playing and sank +back, like Hume, into common sense, though now +with a bad conscience; or else they sought some +subterfuge or equivocation by which knowledge, acknowledged +to be worthless, was nevertheless officially +countersigned and passed as legal tender, so that the +earnest practice of orthodoxy, religious or worldly, +or both at once, might go on without a qualm. Evidently, +to secure this result, it was necessary to set up +some oracle, independent of natural knowledge, that +should represent some deeper reality than natural +knowledge could profess to reach; and it was necessary +that this oracle itself, by a pious or a wilful oversight, +should escape criticism; for otherwise all was lost. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_298'>298</span>It escaped criticism by virtue of the dramatic illusion +which always fills the sails of argument, and renders +the passing conviction the indignant voice of omniscience +and justice. The principle invoked in criticism, +whatever it might be, could not be criticised. +It did not need to be defended: its credentials were +the havoc it wrought among more explicit conventions. +And yet, by a mocking fatality, those discredited +conventions had to be maintained in practice, since +they are inevitable for mankind, and the basis, even +by their weaknesses, of the appeal to that higher +principle which, in theory, was to revise and reject +them. This higher principle was no alternative view +of the world, no revelation of further facts or destinies; +it was the thinking or dreaming spirit that posited +those necessary conventions, and would itself die if +it ceased to posit them. In discrediting the fictions +of spirit we must, therefore, beware of suspending +them. We are not asked to abolish our conception +of the natural world, nor even, in our daily life, to +cease to believe in it; we are to be idealists only +north-north-west, or transcendentally; when the wind +is southerly, we are to remain realists. The pronouncements +of animal faith have no doubt been reversed +in a higher court, but with this singular proviso, that +the police and the executioner, while reverently acknowledging +the authority of the higher tribunal, must +unflinchingly carry out the original sentence passed +by the lower. This escape from scepticism by +ambiguity, and by introducing only cancelled dogmas, +was chosen by German philosophy at the beginning +of the nineteenth century, and by modernism and +pragmatism at the end of it.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Kant was thought a sceptic in his day, and called +his philosophy criticism; but his scepticism was very +impure and his criticism, though laborious, was very +uncritical. That he was regarded as a great philosopher +<span class='pageno' id='Page_299'>299</span>in the nineteenth century is due to the same causes that +made Locke seem a great philosopher in the eighteenth, +not to any intrinsic greatness. He announced some +revolutionary principles, which alarmed and excited +the public, but he did not carry them out, so that the +public was reassured. In his criticism of knowledge +he assumed without question the Humian sequences +of perceptions, although contrary to his doctrine of +time; and, more wisely than Hume, he never abandoned +the general sense that these perceptions had organs +and objects beneath and beyond them; but having +cut off, by his malicious criticism of knowledge, the +organs and objects which perceptions notoriously have, +he was forced to forge others, artificial and metaphysical. +Instead of the body, he posited a transcendental +ego, the categories of thought, and a +disembodied law of duty; instead of natural substances +he posited the unknowable. I shall revert to these +subjects in discussing the realm of matter, which is +where they belong. Here I am concerned only with +the analysis of knowledge, which in Kant was most +conscientious, and valuable in spite of its rationalistic +bias and its mythical solutions.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Any intelligent mind comes upon data and takes +them for signs of things. Empirical criticism consists +in reverting from these objects of intent, the things of +common sense and science, to the immediate data by +which they are revealed. But since data are not +vacantly stared at by an intelligent being, but are +interpreted and combined, there is evidently a subtler +element in knowledge of things than the data which +empirical criticism reverts to: namely, the principles +of interpretation, since the data are read and taken to +be significant of existing objects, far richer and more +persistent and more powerful than themselves. These +principles I have summarily called animal faith, not +being concerned to propose any analysis of them +<span class='pageno' id='Page_300'>300</span>that should apply to all minds or to all objects; for +I conceive, for instance, that the future, in other +animals, may be a more frequent and vivid object of +animal faith than the past or the material environment +posited by human beings. But Kant, assuming that +mind everywhere must have a single grammar, investigated +very ingeniously what he conceived to be +its recondite categories, and schemata, and forms of +intuition: all pompous titles for what Hume had +satirically called tendencies to feign. But Kant, in +dishonouring the intellect, at least studied it devotedly, +like an alienist discovering the logic of madness; and +he gave it so elaborate an articulation, and imposed it +so rigorously on all men for ever, that people supposed +he was establishing the sciences on a solid foundation +rather than prescribing for all men a gratuitous uniformity +in error. Yet this was his true meaning: +and in spite of its psychological prefaces and metaphysical +epilogues, and in spite of this pedantry about +the necessary forms of all the sciences, the heart of +the Kantian system was the most terrible negation. +Among transcendental principles he placed space, +time, and causality; so that, if he had been consistent, +he would have had to regard all multiple and successive +existence as imagined only. Everything conceivable +would have collapsed into the act of conceiving it, +and this act itself would have lost its terms and its +purpose, and evaporated into nothing. But not at +all; as if aware that all his conclusions were but +curiosities in speculation and academic humours, he +continued to think of experience as progressing in +time, trifled most earnestly with astronomy and +geography, and even comforted the pious with a +postulate of immortality, as if time existed otherwise +than in imagination. In fact, these backslidings were +his amiable side: he always retained a certain humanity +and wisdom, being much more thoroughly saturated +<span class='pageno' id='Page_301'>301</span>with his conventional presuppositions than with his +extravagant conclusions.</p> + +<p class='c005'>A philosopher, however, must be taken at his best, +or at his worst; in any case, his pure doctrine must +be freed as far as possible from its personal alloy: +and the pure doctrine of Kant was that knowledge is +impossible. Anything I could perceive or think was +<span lang="la"><i>ipso facto</i></span> a creature of my sense or thought. Nature, +history, God and the other world, even a man’s +outspread experience, could be things imagined only. +Thought—for it was still assumed that there was +thought—was a bubble, self-inflated at every moment, +in an infinite void. All else was imaginary; no world +could be anything but the iridescence of that empty +sphere. And this transcendental thought, so rich in +false perspectives, could it be said to exist anywhere, +or at any time, or for any reason?</p> + +<p class='c005'>Here we touch one of those ambiguities and +mystifications in which German philosophy takes +refuge when pressed; strong in the attack, it dissolves +if driven to the defensive. Transcendentalism, in so +far as it is critical, is a method only; the principles by +which data are interpreted come into play whenever +intelligence is at work. The occasions for this exercise, +as a matter of fact, are found in animal life; and while +every mind, at every moment, is the seat and measure +of its own understanding, and creates its own knowledge +(though, of course, not the objects on which +animal life is directed and which it professes to know) +yet the quality and degree of this intelligence may vary +indefinitely from age to age and from animal to animal. +Transcendental principles are accordingly only principles +of local perspective, the grammar of fancy in +this or that natural being quickened to imagination, +and striving to understand what it endures and to +utter what it deeply wills. The study of transcendental +logic ought, therefore, to be one of the most humane, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_302'>302</span>tender, tentative of studies: nothing but sympathetic +poetry and insight into the hang and rhythm of various +thoughts. It should be the finer part of literary +psychology. But such is not the transcendentalism +of the absolute transcendentalists. For them the +grammar of thought is single and compulsory. It is +the method of the creative fiat by which not this or +that idea of the universe, but the universe itself, +comes into being. The universe has only a specious +existence; and the method by which specious existence +is evoked in thought is divine and identical in all +thinking.</p> + +<p class='c005'>But why divine, and why always identical? And +why any thinking at all, or any process or variation +in discourse, other than the given perspectives of the +present vision? At this point vertigo seizes the +transcendentalist, and he no longer knows what he +means. On the one hand, phenomena cannot be +produced by an agency prior to them, for his first +principle is that all existence is phenomenal and exists +only in being posited or discovered. Will, Life, Duty, +or whatever he calls this transcendental agency, by +which the illusions of nature and history are summoned +from the vasty deep, cannot be a fact, since all facts +are created by its incantations. On the other hand +phenomena cannot be substantial on their own account, +for then they would not be phenomena but things, +and no transcendental magician, himself non-existent +and non-phenomenal, would be needed to produce +them.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Absolute transcendentalism—the only radical form +of a psychological criticism of knowledge—is accordingly +not a thinkable nor a stable doctrine. It is +merely a habit of speaking ambiguously, with a just +sense for the living movement of thought and a +romantic contempt for its deliverance. Self-consciousness +cannot be, as this school strove to make it, a first +<span class='pageno' id='Page_303'>303</span>principle of criticism: it is far too complex and +derivative for that. But transcendentalism is a +legitimate attitude for a poet in his dramatic reflections +and romantic soliloquies; it is the principle of perspective +in thought, the scenic art of the mental theatre. +The fully awakened soul, looking about it in this +strange world, may well believe that it is dreaming. +It may review its shifting memories, with a doubt +whether they were ever anything in themselves. It +may marshal all things in ideal perspectives about the +present moment, and esteem them important and +even real only in so far as they diversify the mental +landscape. And to compensate it for the visionary +character which the world takes on, it may cultivate +the sense (by no means illusory) of some deep fountain +of feeling and fancy within the self. Such wistful +transcendentalism is akin to principles which in India +long ago inspired very deep judgements upon life. +It may be practised at will by any reflective person +who is minded to treat the universe, for the time +being, as so much furniture for his dreams.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Yet this attitude, seeing that man is not a solitary +god but an animal in a material and social world, +must be continually abandoned. It must be abandoned +precisely when a man does or thinks anything important. +Its own profundity is dreamful, and, so to +speak, digestive: action, virtue, and wisdom sound +another note. It is therefore no worthy philosophy; +and in fact the Germans, whose philosophy it is, +while so dutiful in their external discipline, are sentimental +and immoral in their spiritual economy. If a +learned and placid professor tells me he is creating +the universe by positing it in his own mind according +to eternal principles of logic and duty, I may smile +and admire such an inimitable mixture of enthusiasm +and pedantry, profundity and innocence. Yet there +is something sinister in this transcendentalism, apparently +<span class='pageno' id='Page_304'>304</span>so pure and blameless; it really expresses +and sanctions the absoluteness of a barbarous soul, +stubborn in its illusions, vulgar in its passions, and +cruel in its zeal—cruel especially to itself, as barbarism +always is, because it feeds and dilates its will as if its +will were an absolute power, whereas it is nothing +but a mass of foolish impulses and boasts ending in +ignominy. Moreover, transcendentalism cannot even +supply a thorough criticism of knowledge, which +would demand that the ideas of self, of activity, and +of consciousness should be disintegrated and reduced +to the immediate. In the immediate, however, there +is no transcendental force nor transcendental machinery, +not even a set of perceptions nor an experience, but +only some random essence, staring and groundless.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I hope I have taken to heart what the schools of +Hume and Kant have to offer by way of disintegrating +criticism of knowledge, and that in positing afresh the +notions of substance, soul, nature, and discourse, I +have done so with my eyes open. These notions are +all subject to doubt; but so, also, are the notions +proposed instead by psychological philosophers. None +of these have reached the limit of possible doubt; +yet the dogmas they have retained, being romantic +prejudices, are incoherent and incapable of serving +as the basis for any reasonable system: and in a +moral sense they are the very opposite of philosophy. +When pressed, their negations end in solipsism and +their affirmations in rhapsody. Far from purging the +mind and strengthening it, that it might gain a clearer +and more stable vision of the world, these critics have +bewildered it with a multitude of methods and vistas, +the expression of the confusion reigning in their day +between natural science and religious faith, and +between psychology and scepticism.</p> + +<p class='c005'>My endeavour has been to restore these things to +their natural places, without forgetting the assumptions +<span class='pageno' id='Page_305'>305</span>on which they rest. But the chief difference +between my criticism of knowledge and theirs lies in +the conception of knowledge itself. The Germans +call knowledge <span lang="de"><i>Wissenschaft</i></span>, as if it were something +to be found in books, a catalogue of information, and +an encyclopædia of the sciences. But the question is +whether all this <span lang="de"><i>Wissenschaft</i></span> is knowledge or only +learning. My criticism is criticism of myself: I am +talking of what I believe in my active moments, as a +living animal, when I am really believing something: +for when I am reading books belief in me is at its +lowest ebb; and I lend myself to the suasion of +eloquence with the same pleasure (when the book is +well written) whether it be the <i>Arabian Nights</i> or the +latest philosophy. My criticism is not essentially a +learned pursuit, though habit may sometimes make my +language scholastic; it is not a choice between artificial +theories; it is the discipline of my daily thoughts +and the account I actually give to myself from moment +to moment of my own being and of the world around +me. I should be ashamed to countenance opinions +which, when not arguing, I did not believe. It would +seem to me dishonest and cowardly to militate under +other colours than those under which I live. Merely +learned views are not philosophy; and therefore no +modern writer is altogether a philosopher in my eyes, +except Spinoza; and the critics of knowledge in +particular seem to me as feeble morally as they are +technically.</p> + +<p class='c005'>I should like, therefore, to turn to the ancients +and breathe again a clear atmosphere of frankness and +honour; but in the present business they are not +very helpful. The Indians were poets and mystics; +and while they could easily throw off the conventions +of vulgar reason, it was often only to surrender themselves +to other conventions, far more misleading to a +free spirit, such as the doctrine of transmigration of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_306'>306</span>souls; and when, as in Buddhism, they almost +vanquished that illusion, together with every other, +their emasculated intellect had nothing to put in its +place. The Greeks on the contrary were rhetoricians; +they seldom or never reverted to the immediate for +a foothold in thought, because the immediate lies +below the level of language and of political convention. +But they were disputatious, and in that sense no +opinion escaped their criticism. In this criticism they +simply pitted one plausible opinion against another, +supporting each in turn by all conceivable arguments, +based on no matter what prejudices or presumptions. +The result of this forensic method was naturally a +suspense of rational judgement, favourable now to +frivolity and now to superstition. The frivolity appeared +in the Sophists who, seeing that nothing was +certain, impudently assumed as true whatever it was +socially convenient to advocate. Protagoras seems to +have reduced this bad habit to an honest system, when +he taught that each occasion is, for itself, the ultimate +judge of truth. This, taken psychologically, is evidently +the case: a mind cannot judge on other +subjects nor on other evidences than are open to it +when judging. But the judging moment need not +judge truly; and to maintain (as Protagoras does in +Plato’s <i>Dialogue</i> and as some pragmatists have done +in our day) that all momentary opinions are equal in +truth, though not equal in value, is to fail in radical +scepticism: for it is to assume many moments, and +knowledge (utterly inexplicable on these principles) +of their several sequences and import; and to assume +something even more wanton, a single standard of +value by which to judge them all. Such incoherence +is not surprising in sophists whose avowed purpose +in philosophising is to survive and succeed in this +world, or perhaps in the next. Worldly people will +readily admit that some ideas are better than others, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_307'>307</span>even if both sets are equally false. The interest in +truth for its own sake is not a worldly interest, but +the human soul is capable of it; and there might be +spirits directed on the knowledge of truth as upon +their only ultimate good, as there might be spirits +addressed exclusively to music. Which arts and +sciences are worth pursuing, and how far, is a question +for the moralist, to be answered in each case in view +of the faculties and genius of the persons concerned, +and their opportunities. Socrates may humorously +eschew all science that is useless to cobblers; he +thereby expresses his plebeian hard sense, and his +Hellenic joy in discourse and in moral apologues; +but if he allows this pleasant prejudice to blind him +to the possibility of physical discoveries, or of cogent +mathematics, he becomes a simple sophist. The +moralist needs true knowledge of nature—even a little +astronomy—in order to practise the art of life in a +becoming spirit; and an agnosticism which was not +merely personal, provisional, and humble would be +the worst of dogmas.</p> + +<p class='c005'>A sinking society, with its chaos of miscellaneous +opinions, touches the bottom of scepticism in this +sense, that it leaves no opinion unchallenged. But as +a complete suspense of judgement is physically impossible +in a living animal, every sceptic of the decadence +has to accept some opinion or other. Which +opinions he accepts, will depend on his personal +character or his casual associations. His philosophy +therefore deserts him at the threshold of life, just +when it might cease to be a verbal accomplishment; +in other words, he is at intervals a sophist, but at no +time a philosopher. Nevertheless, among the Greek +sceptics there were noble minds. They turned their +scepticism into an expression of personal dignity and +an argument for detachment. In such scepticism +every one who practises philosophy must imitate +<span class='pageno' id='Page_308'>308</span>them; for why should I pledge myself absolutely to +what in fact is not certain? Physics and theology, to +which most philosophies are confined, are dubious in +their first principles: which is not to say that nothing +in them is credible. If we assert that one thing is +more probable than another, as did the sceptics of the +Academy, we have adopted a definite belief, we profess +to have some hold on the nature of things at large, a +law seems to us to rule events, and the lust of scepticism +in us is chastened. This belief in nature, with a little +experience and good sense to fill in the picture, is +almost enough by way of belief. Nor can a man +honestly believe less. An active mind never really +loses the conviction that it is scenting the way of the +world.</p> + +<p class='c005'>Living when human faith is again in a state of +dissolution, I have imitated the Greek sceptics in +calling doubtful everything that, in spite of common +sense, any one can possibly doubt. But since life +and even discussion forces me to break away from a +complete scepticism, I have determined not to do so +surreptitiously nor at random, ignominiously taking +cover now behind one prejudice and now behind +another. Instead, I have frankly taken nature by the +hand, accepting as a rule in my farthest speculations +the animal faith I live by from day to day. There +are many opinions which, though questionable, are +inevitable to a thought attentive to appearance, and +honestly expressive of action. These natural opinions +are not miscellaneous, such as those which the Sophists +embraced in disputation. They are superposed in a +biological order, the stratification of the life of reason. +In rising out of passive intuition, I pass, by a vital +constitutional necessity, to belief in discourse, in +experience, in substance, in truth, and in spirit. All +these objects may conceivably be illusory. Belief in +them, however, is not grounded on a prior probability, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_309'>309</span>but all judgements of probability are grounded on +them. They express a rational instinct or instinctive +reason, the waxing faith of an animal living in a world +which he can observe and sometimes remodel.</p> + +<p class='c005'>This natural faith opens to me various Realms of +Being, having very different kinds of reality in themselves +and a different status in respect to my knowledge +of them. I hope soon to invite the friendly reader +to accompany me in a further excursion through those +tempting fields.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <h2 id='index' class='c006'>INDEX</h2> +</div> +<ul class='index c003'> + <li class='c008'>Analysis and synthesis, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a>-119</li> + <li class='c008'>Animation, not behaviour, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>-246; + <ul> + <li>an expression of mechanism, not a substitute, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>;</li> + <li>conceived dramatically, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Anthropomorphism excusable, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Appearance, two senses of the word, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Apperception, timeless, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>-30; + <ul> + <li>its physical ground, <a href='#Page_282'>282</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'><i>Arabian Nights</i>, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Aristotle, his metaphysics, vii; + <ul> + <li>identifies essence with intuition, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>-129;</li> + <li>on God, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>;</li> + <li>on substance, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>;</li> + <li>on entelechies, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Arts, creative like the senses, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Astronomy, good for moralists, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a></li> + <li class='c003'>Behaviour, theme of scientific psychology, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>-246</li> + <li class='c008'>Belief, not implied in intuition, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>; + <ul> + <li>enacted before it is asserted, <a href='#Page_264'>264</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Berkeley, alluded to, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>; + <ul> + <li>his direct intuition, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>;</li> + <li>his nominalism, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Brahma, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a></li> + <li class='c008'>British and German philosophy criticises perception, not memory, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>; + <ul> + <li>only literature, <a href='#Page_254'>254</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Buddhism, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a></li> + <li class='c003'>Causation, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Change, feeling of it not a change, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>; + <ul> + <li>known by faith only, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>;</li> + <li>may be illusion, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>;</li> + <li>fallacious disproofs of it, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Common sense, roughly sound, v</li> + <li class='c008'>Contingency of all existence, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Contradiction an essence of discourse, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Criticism, empirical and transcendental, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>, <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>; + <ul> + <li>arises by conflict of dogmas, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>;</li> + <li>depends on literary psychology, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>;</li> + <li>should appeal to living beliefs, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c003'>Data, non-existentials, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>; + <ul> + <li>universals, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>;</li> + <li>their basis cerebral, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Dateless, defined, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Democritus, ix, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Demonstration, assumes discourse, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>-119</li> + <li class='c008'>Descartes, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>; + <ul> + <li>doubts facts only, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>;</li> + <li><span lang="la"><i>cogito ergo sum</i></span>, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>-293</li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Dialectic, not true unless descriptive, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>; + <ul> + <li>involves belief in memory, <a href='#Page_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Discourse, an event, <a href='#Page_119'>119</a>; + <ul> + <li>involved in positing anything, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>;</li> + <li>distinguished late, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Dogma, how precipitated, <a href='#Page_6'>6</a></li> + <li class='c003'>Empiricism admits substance, <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>-201</li> + <li class='c008'>Entelechy, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Error distinguishes discourse from its objects, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a></li> + <li class='c008'><span lang="la"><i>Esse est percipi</i></span>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Essences adumbrated, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a>, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>; + <ul> + <li>simile of the costumer’s shop, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>-72;</li> + <li>introduced, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>;</li> + <li>defined further, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>-78;</li> + <li>necessary terms in knowledge, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>-82;</li> + <li>of any complexity, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>;</li> + <li>infinitely comminuted, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>;</li> + <li>without inherent values, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>;</li> + <li>not limited to Platonic ideas, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Eternal, defined, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Eternity, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Euclid, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>; + <ul> + <li>his space, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Events involve substance, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>-232</li> + <li class='c008'>Everlasting, defined, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Evidence, two meanings, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Existence, the sense of it, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>; + <ul> + <li>not a datum, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>-38;</li> + <li>presence to intuition neither sufficient for it nor necessary, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>-47;</li> + <li>its physical definition, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>;</li> + <li>odious to logic, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>;</li> + <li>name for an object of faith, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>;</li> + <li>felt as pure Being posited, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Expectation, irrational as hunger, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Experience, use of the word, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>; + <ul> + <li>naturally conditioned, transcendentally primary, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>;</li> + <li>conceived as a life, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>;</li> + <li>is discourse interrupted by shocks, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>;</li> + <li>belief in it imposed by instinct, not by experience itself, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>;</li> + <li>its primitive texture, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>;</li> + <li>imagined experience hypostatised, <a href='#Page_255'>255</a>, <a href='#Page_256'>256</a>;</li> + <li>reduced to blank feeling or extended to dreams, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Explanation, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a></li> + <li class='c003'>Fact, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>; + <ul> + <li>never a datum, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>;</li> + <li>denied if regarded as a concept, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Faith prior to intuition, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Fichte, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Future, an assumption, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>; + <ul> + <li>rash notion of it, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c003'>God assimilated to nature, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>; + <ul> + <li>to truth, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>;</li> + <li>to the spirit of a cosmos, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c003'>Hamlet, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Heraclitus, ix, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></li> + <li class='c008'>History, dependent for its validity on physics, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>; + <ul> + <li>interfused with fiction, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>;</li> + <li>partly literary psychology, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Hume, his sharp intuition, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>; + <ul> + <li>criticism by retrenchment, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>;</li> + <li>residual assumptions, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>;</li> + <li>analysis of conventions, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>;</li> + <li>sophistical result, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c003'>Ideas not beliefs unless action is suggested, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>; + <ul> + <li>Platonic ideas, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>-224</li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Identification an act of faith, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a>, <a href='#Page_119'>119</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Identity felt under diverse appearances, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Illusion, three ways out of it, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Immortal, defined, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Indian philosophy, viii, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>-55, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Instantaneous, defined, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Intelligence expresses animal adjustments, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Intent, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Interpretation obscures the datum, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Introjection, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Intuition yields only appearance, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>; + <ul> + <li>denied by sceptics, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>;</li> + <li>an expression of animal wakefulness, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>;</li> + <li>does not think, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>;</li> + <li>may exist behind observable facts, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a>;</li> + <li>divined by sympathy, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>;</li> + <li>most communicable when most articulate, <a href='#Page_251'>251</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Ionian physics, vii, viii</li> + <li class='c003'>Kant, <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>; + <ul> + <li>his incoherence, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>;</li> + <li>his analysis of knowledge, <a href='#Page_299'>299</a>, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>;</li> + <li>destructive results, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Karma, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Knowledge, impossible with nothing to know, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>; + <ul> + <li>is symbolical, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>;</li> + <li>has a removed object, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>;</li> + <li>bridges the flux, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>;</li> + <li>its animal basis, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>;</li> + <li>may recover essences given elsewhere, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>;</li> + <li>not intuition, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>;</li> + <li>the object identified by bodily attitude (illustration of the moon), <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>-177;</li> + <li>though symbolical progressive, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>-179;</li> + <li>may be adequate to discourse elsewhere, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a>;</li> + <li>when pictorially adequate it is still faith, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c003'>Life of reason, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Literary psychology, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>; + <ul> + <li>possibly true, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>;</li> + <li>turned into metaphysics, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Logic, partly creative, partly descriptive, vi; + <ul> + <li>not coercive over fact, <i>ibid.</i>, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a>, <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>;</li> + <li>studies essence, not truth, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c003'>Memory, presence of the absent, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>; + <ul> + <li>is direct, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a>;</li> + <li>posits animation, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>;</li> + <li>in a natural setting, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>;</li> + <li>pictorial exactitude possible but worthless, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>;</li> + <li>stationed in the present, which frames the past, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>;</li> + <li>may be truer than experience, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>;</li> + <li>should be selective, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>;</li> + <li>criticised only by fancy, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Metaphysics confuses different realms of being, vii, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a>, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a></li> + <li class='c003'>Natural philosophy, vii; + <ul> + <li>present ferment in it, ix;</li> + <li>progresses in knowledge, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a>;</li> + <li>has a poetic side, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Nature, the total object of perception, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>; + <ul> + <li>connotations of the word, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>;</li> + <li>uniformity of nature an assumption, <i>ibid.</i>;</li> + <li>tested and embodied in art, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Nirvana, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a></li> + <li class='c003'>Object, use and misuse of the word, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Order of genesis, of discovery, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>; + <ul> + <li>of evidence, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c003'>Pain, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Parmenides, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Past, an object of faith, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>; + <ul> + <li>may be illusory, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Perception, not intuition but faith expressing a bodily response, <a href='#Page_282'>282</a>, <a href='#Page_283'>283</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Permanence given in experience, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Phenomena, in Platonism, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>; + <ul> + <li>in modern philosophy, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Plato, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Platonic ideas, selected essences, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>; + <ul> + <li>hypostatised, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>-224</li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Positing, propriety of the term, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Primary and secondary qualities, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>-90</li> + <li class='c008'>Protagoras, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Psyche, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>. <abbr class='spell'>Cf.</abbr> <a href='#index-self'><i>Self</i></a></li> + <li class='c008'>Psychologism, <a href='#Page_256'>256</a>, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Psychology, scientific and literary, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a>; + <ul> + <li>supports the non-existence of data, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>-66</li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Pythagoras, ix</li> + <li class='c003'>Reality, meaning of the term, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>; + <ul> + <li>eulogistic use of it, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Reason, not a force, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>; + <ul> + <li>principle of sufficient reason, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Religious dogmas easily doubted, <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a></li> + <li class='c003'>Scepticism, a conflict of dogmas, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>; + <ul> + <li>an accident in philosophy, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>;</li> + <li>rich in ideas, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>;</li> + <li>a trance state, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>;</li> + <li>would be the best philosophy if tenable, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>;</li> + <li>deprecated in Christian times, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Sceptics in Greece, some sophists, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>; + <ul> + <li>some true philosophers, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Schopenhauer, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a></li> + <li class='c008'><a id='index-self'></a></li> + <li class='c008'>Self, evidence for its existence, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>; + <ul> + <li>may be denied, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>;</li> + <li>is obscure, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>;</li> + <li>an almost perpetual object, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Sensations and ideas, ambiguous uses of the terms, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>-90, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Shock, distinguishes experience from pure discourse, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>; + <ul> + <li>prompts to belief in the self and in the object, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Socrates, his favourite essences, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>; + <ul> + <li>his utilitarianism in science, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Solipsism, untenable if personal, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>; + <ul> + <li>tenable if of the present moment, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Sophists, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Soul, genesis of the notion, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>; + <ul> + <li>analysis of it, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a>-221</li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Spinoza, right on chief issue, viii; + <ul> + <li>thinks ideas beliefs, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>;</li> + <li>defines the realm of essence, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>;</li> + <li>a philosopher in the better sense, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Spirit, non-existential for transcendentalists, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>; + <ul> + <li>at home in intuition, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>;</li> + <li>implied in it, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>;</li> + <li>ready to be omniscient, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>;</li> + <li>timeless and supernatural in status, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>;</li> + <li>distrusts substance but lives by it, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>;</li> + <li>is no datum, <a href='#Page_272'>272</a>;</li> + <li>often more than intuition, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>;</li> + <li>expresses animal life, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a>-280;</li> + <li>is not a substance, <a href='#Page_286'>286</a>-288</li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Spiritual substance, a contradiction, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a>; + <ul> + <li>how suggested, <i>ibid.</i></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Substance, posited by intent expressing animal reaction, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>; + <ul> + <li>belief in it primordial, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>;</li> + <li>prior to intuition, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>;</li> + <li>revealed on its dynamic side, not pictorially, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>;</li> + <li>not metaphysical, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a>, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>;</li> + <li>the material in things, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>;</li> + <li>not duplicated by them, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>;</li> + <li>explains their genesis and distribution, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>;</li> + <li>connects appearances, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Surprise, not occasioned by contingency, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>; + <ul> + <li>incompatible with omniscience, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c003'>Timeless, defined, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Transcendentalism, properly a method only, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>; + <ul> + <li>its subject and object false, <i>ibid.</i>;</li> + <li>denies all existences, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>-63;</li> + <li>its ambiguity, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>;</li> + <li>a part of literary psychology, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>;</li> + <li>its metaphysical form, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a>;</li> + <li>must be abandoned in practice, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>;</li> + <li>its latent barbarism, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c008'>Truth, may be conveyed through symbols, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>-181; + <ul> + <li>mistaken for substance, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>-228;</li> + <li>possible in literary psychology, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>;</li> + <li>not proper to names or values, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>;</li> + <li>ignored by supposing things to change with the views of them, <a href='#Page_264'>264</a>-266;</li> + <li>not an existence, not an opinion, not certitude, but the ultimate description of things in all their relations, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>;</li> + <li>the subjective seat of opinions does not jeopardise it, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>;</li> + <li>may be loved for its own sake, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c003'>Unity of apperception, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Universals, data of intuition, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Universe, not known as a whole, vi; + <ul> + <li>may be a chaos, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a></li> + </ul> + </li> + <li class='c003'>Vagueness, relative, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Variation involves eternal essences, <a href='#Page_113'>113</a>, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a></li> + <li class='c008'>Vedanta, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a></li> +</ul> + +<p class='c007'>THE END</p> + +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77155 ***</div> + </body> + <!-- created with ppgen.py 3.57e on 2025-10-30 15:38:45 GMT --> +</html> diff --git a/77155-h/images/cover.jpg b/77155-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..d19845d --- /dev/null +++ b/77155-h/images/cover.jpg diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c72794 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This book, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. 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